SOME OF STALIN’S WORKS
From February 9, 1946 to October 14, 1952
CONTENT
Speech at an Election Meeting
Stalin Election District, Moscow
February 9, 1946
Answer to a Letter of 30 January, from Col.-Professor Rasin
On Clausewitz and the questions of war and the art of war
February 23, 1946
Interview with the Correspondent of Associated Press, Gilmore
March 22nd, 1946
Answers to the Questions of the Moscow Correspondent of the “Sunday Times”, Mr. Alexander Werth, in a Letter of September 17, 1946
September 24, 1946
Replies to Questions put by Mr. Hugh Baillie, President of the U. P. of America
October 28, 1946
Replies to Questions put by Mr. Elliot Roosevelt, in an Interview
December 21, 1946
Exchange of Messages Between Mr. E. Bevin and J. V. Stalin, Concerning the Anglo-Soviet Treaty
January 19 and January 22, 1947
Interview with the American Republican Presidential Candidate, Harold Stassen
Protocol of the Interview
April 9, 1947
Answer to the Open Letter of Henry Wallace
May 17, 1948
Berlin Crisis, the U.N. and Anglo-American Agressive Policies, Churchill *
October 28, 1948
CONTENT
-I-
DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION BY THE USSR IN THE UN: 1950-1952
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft resolution on the definition of
aggression
4 November 1950:
-II-
NOT BEING ABLE TO PASS THE RESOLUTION ON AGGRESSION, UN TAKES THE FOLLOWING DECISION IS ON:
20 DECEMBER 1952.
-III-
NOTE BY THE USSR DELEGATION AFTER THE UN’S DECISION OF 20 DECEMBER 1952
-IV-
FROM A STUDY (BY “LAW TEACHER”): THE HISTORY OF THE WORK ON THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION AFTER SECOND WORLD WAR IN THE UN AND THE STUDY OF THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION AGREED BY THE UN ON 1974
-IV-1. A Short History of the Discussions on Definition of Aggression in United Nations
-IV-2.AGREED DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY- RESOLUTION 3314 (XXIX).
14 DECEMBER 1974
-I-
DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION BY THE USSR IN THE UN: 1950-1952
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft resolution on the definition of
aggression
4 November 1950:
The same definition was presented on:
4 November 1950: fifth session
5 January 1952: sixth session
14 November 1952: seventh session
The General Assembly,
Considering it necessary, in the interests of general security and to facilitate
agreement on the maximum reductions of armaments, to define the concept of
aggression as accurately as possible, so as to forestall any pretext which might be
used to justify it,
Recognizing that all States have equal rights to independence, security and the
defence of their territory,
Inspired by the desire, in the interests of general peace, to guarantee all nations the
right freely to develop by such means as are appropriate to them and at the rate
which they consider to be necessary, and for that purpose to provide the fullest
possible protection for their security, their independence and the integrity of their
territory, and also for their right to defend themselves against aggression or invasion
from without, but only within the limits of their own countries, and
Considering it necessary to formulate essential directives for such international
organs as may be called upon to determine which party is guilty of attack,
Declares:
That in an international conflict that State shall be declared the attacker which first
commits one of the following acts:
(a) Declaration of war against another State;
(b) Invasion by its armed forces, even without a declaration of war, of the territory of
another State;
(c) Bombardment by its land, sea or air forces of the territory of another State or the
carrying out of a deliberate attack on the ships or aircraft of the latter;
(d) The landing or leading of its land, sea or air forces inside the boundaries of
another State without the permission of the government of the latter, or the violation
of the conditions of such permission, particularly as regards the length of their stay or
the extent of the area in which they may stay;
(e) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;
Attacks such as those referred to in paragraph 1 may not be justified by any
arguments of a political, strategic or economic nature, or by the desire to exploit
natural riches in the territory of the State attacked or to derive any other kind of
advantages or privileges, or by reference to the amount of capital invested in the
State attacked or to any other particular interests in its territory, or by the affirmation
that the State attacked lacks the distinguishing marks of statehood;
In particular, the following may not be used as justifications for attack:
A. The internal position of any State, as, for example:
(a) The backwardness of any nation politically, economically or culturally;
(b) Alleged shortcomings of its administration;
(c) Any danger which may threaten the life or property of aliens;
(d) Any revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movement, civil war, disorders or
strikes;
(e) The establishment or maintenance in any State of any political, economic or
social system;
B. Any acts, legislation or orders of any State, as for example:
(a) The violation of international treaties;
(b) The violation of rights and interests in the sphere of trade, concessions or any
other kind of economic activity acquired by another State or its citizens;
(c) The rupture of diplomatic or economic relations;
(d) Measures in connexion with an economic or financial boycott;
(e) Repudiation of debts;
(f) Prohibition or restriction of immigration or modification of the status of foreigners;
(g) The violation of privileges granted to the official representatives of another State;
(h) Refusal to allow the passage of armed forces proceeding to the territory of a third
State;
(i) Measures of a religious or anti-religious nature;
(j) Frontier incidents.
In the event of the mobilization or concentration by another State of considerable
armed forces near its frontier, the State which is threatened by such action shall
have the right of recourse to diplomatic or other means of securing a peaceful
settlement of international disputes. It may also in the meantime adopt requisite
measures of a military nature similar to those described above, without, however,
crossing the frontier.
-II-
NOT BEING ABLE TO PASS THE RESOLUTION ON AGGRESSION, UN TAKES THE FOLLOWING DECISION IS ON:
20 DECEMBER 1952.
Resolution on Aggression UN 1952
688 (VII). Question of defining aggression
The General Assembly,
Having regard to its resolution 599 (VI) of 31 January 1952,
Considering that the discussion of the question of defining aggression at the sixth and seventh sessions of the General Assembly and in the International Law Commission (7) has revealed the complexity of this question and the need for a detailed study of:
(a) The various forms of aggression,
(b) The connexion between a definition of aggression and the maintenance of international peace and security,
(c) The problems raised by the inclusion of a definition of aggression in the Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind and by its application within the framework of international criminal jurisdiction,
(d) The effect of a definition of aggression on the exercise of the jurisdiction of the various organs of the United Nations,
(e) Any other problem which might be raised by a definition of aggression,
Considering that continued and joint efforts shall be made to formulate a generally acceptable definition of aggression, with a view to promoting international peace and security and to developing international law,
Decides to establish a Special Committee of fifteen members, each representing one of the following Member States: Bolivia, Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, France, Iran, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Re publics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and North ern Ireland, United States of America, to meet at the Headquarters of the United Nations in 1953; Requests the said Special Committee
(a) To submit to the General Assembly at its ninth session draft definitions of aggression or draft statements of the notion of aggression;
(b) To study all the problems referred to above on the assumption of a definition being adopted by a resolution of the General Assembly;
Requests the Secretary-General to communicate the Special Committee's report to Member States for their comments and to place the question on the provisional agenda of the ninth session of the General Assembly.
408th plenary meeting,
20 December 1952.
7 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Ses sion, Supplenient No. 9, para. 35 et seq.
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/7/ares7.htm
(resolution 688 (VII) of 20 December 1952)
-III-
NOTE BY THE USSR DELEGATION AFTER THE UN’S DECISION OF 20 DECEMBER 1952
A sidelight on the Atlantic war camp’s definition of ‘aggression’ was revealed by the burmese Government when it raised in vain before the United Nations the invasion of Burma by the American-armed and equipped Kuomingtang forces under General Li. With barbed irony the Burmese delegate pleated:
I am heartened by the statements of the representatives of the United states, the United Kingdom and France that Communist aggression in South East Asia will not be tolerated. But I hope that their assurance is not only in respect of Communist aggression and that it would cover any aggression from whatever source it should come.
At the moment we are facing a Koumingtang aggression in the Eastern portion of Burma. Can Burma count on the support of these three countries and on the countries of my fellow delegates? Let it not be said that collective action of the Unites Nations is to meet Communist aggression alone.
The Burmese delegate was given his answer. In face of the admitted fact that thousands of Kuomintang, i.e. of American satellite armed forces, had invaded Burma (‘one of Chiang Kai-shek’s best battalions from Formosa has recently reinforced Kuomintang General Li Mi’s 93rd Division in Burma… there is indisputable evidence that Americans are helping the 93rd Division’. Observer, January 20, 1952), and were further, according to the Burmese delegate, ‘killing our men, taking our food, and raping our women’, the United States, British and French Government’s issued a solemn warning that if a single Chinese soldier, engaged in resisting the Kuomintang raids on Yunnan from their base in Burma, should be found anywhere to have crossed the Yunnan-Burmese frontier, this would be immediately regarded as an act of ‘aggression’ by China on Burma, and the western Powers would immediately act as in Kores. No wonder the same Western Powers of the Atlantic War Bloc strenuously resisted the wish of the majority of the United Nations Assembly for a definition of aggression to be adopted (the resolution in favour of such a definition was carried against them by 28 votes to 12). the burglar deplores the attempt to define theft.
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/7/ares7.htm
(resolution 688 (VII) of 20 December 1952)
-IV-
FROM A STUDY (BY “LAW TEACHER”): THE HISTORY OF THE WORK ON THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION AFTER SECOND WORLD WAR IN THE UN AND THE STUDY OF THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION AGREED BY THE UN ON 1974
-IV-1. A Short History of the Discussions on Definition of Aggression in United Nations
The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 was the a great step on the road to reject war in international relations. That was clear in the charter of the United Nations where it states in Article 2, paragraph 4 that:All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. ([3])
This frank commitment by U.N members introduced an absolute and unconditional prohibition both to the use and the threat to use force in international disputes. Although the Charter of the United Nations does not clarify in detail the notion of aggression, this matter was unclear as a threat to peace and a breach of the peace ([4]).
According to the U.N Charter too, the Security Council –one of the main body of United Nations- has responsibility to deal with aggression as indicated by Article 39 of the Charter which read that: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security".([5])
Article 39 of the Charter left "aggression" undefined, and put on the same level threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression'([6]). It does not give a definition for threat to peace either.
During the discussion concerning the draft of the U.N Charter in San Francisco Conference, some countries proposed to include definitions of aggression. There was a Bolivian proposal to define aggression similar to the Soviet proposal submitted to the Disarmament Conference in 1933([7]). However, the specialized committee in San Francisco rejected any idea to define aggression arguing that it would not be able to envisage or encompass developments in warfare, besides which it might lead to the 'premature application of enforcement measures' through 'automatic Council action'. ([8])
In its first committee on November 6, 1950, the Soviet Union revived, under the item 'Duties of States in the Event of the Outbreak of Hostilities', the substance of its draft definition of 1933. This, with related matters, was submitted in due course to the International Law Commission for its views.([9])
On November 17, 1950, in its resolution 378/B (V), the General Assembly condemned the intervention of a state in the internal affairs of another state for the purpose of changing its legally established government by the threat or use of force', and declared that 'any aggression, whether committed openly, or by fermenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign power, or otherwise, is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world…'.([10]).
In the same resolution (378), the General Assembly ordered the International Law Commission to present some solutions to the problem of the definition of aggression. The Commission reached the conclusion that 'a juridical definition of aggression would be an artificial device, which could never be adequate enough to include all possible cases of aggression, especially since aggression methods are constantly developing'. ([11])
As a result, the Commission decided to introduce among the crimes defined in the draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind –which was under preparation by the Commission- all acts and threats of aggression, without defining what aggression is. ([12])
On November 13, 1951, the General Assembly, having placed the Report of the International Law Commission's Third Session on its agenda, referred to its Sixth Committee the question of defining aggression. ([13])
The Committee examined the issue of defining aggression at its 278th to 295th meetings held from 5 January to 22 January 1952. ([14]) At the end of these meetings, the Committee took a position opposed on the whole to that of International Law Commission, based on the view that it would be advantageous to provide "directive" for international bodies which "may be called on to determine the aggressor"([15]).
General Assembly resolution 599 (VI) of 31 January 1952 (Question of defining aggression) Report of the Secretary-General on the question of defining aggression. Resolution said that it was:
'possible and desirable, with a view to ensuing international peace and security and for the development of international criminal law, to define aggression by reference to the elements which constitute it'. ([16])
As resolution 599 emphasized the desirability of a definition, the resolution also ordered to establish a series of Special Committees to work on the definition of aggression. After seven sessions, the fourth Special Committee of the General Assembly submitted a Report of a proposed definition of aggression to the General Assembly. According to this Report, the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly found that the proposed resolution is acceptable and commended the General Assembly to adopt it. But, the United States of America and many other states saw that the definition was inappropriate because it gave the Security Council the plenipotentiary to determine whether aggression has taken place ([17]).
On December 20, 1952, General Assembly –according to its resolution 688 (VII)- established a special Committee composed of fifteen members, to work on the subject of the definition of aggression. After a great deal of work, the Committee came to the conclusion that it will not submit the draft of the proposed definition to a vote procedure. Instead, it will demonstrate the proposals to the members of United Nations.([18])
In December 4, 1954, the General Assembly, in its resolution 895 (IX), decided to establish a Special Committee composed of nineteen members, charged with studying the definition of aggression and requested the Committee 'to submit to the General Assembly at its eleventh session a detailed report followed by a draft definition of aggression'. ([19]) Another time, the Committee admitted that there were considerable difference of opinion and therefore could only refer the question to the General Assembly XI Session. ([20])
At the same session, the International Law Commission adopted the revised draft Code of Offences against Peace and Security of Mankind, with Commentaries. (21])
In relation to aggression, the Code stated that([22]):
"The following acts are offences against peace and security of mankind:
(1) Any act of aggression, including the employment by the authorities of a state armed force against another State, for any purpose other than national or collective self-defence or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation of a competent organ of the United Nations.
(2) Any threat by the authorities of a state to resort to an act of aggression against another State".
During the works of United Nations eleventh session, the Special Committee held a meeting from 8 October to 9 November 1956. The Committee did not adopt a definition but decided to transmit its report to the General Assembly, summarizing the views expressed on the various aspects of the matter, together with draft definitions previously submitted to it. ([23])
On 29 November 1957, the General Assembly, at its twelfth session, discussed the Special Committee's report which was concluded in its resolution 1181 (XII) deciding to invite the views of 22 states admitted to United Nations since 14 December 1955, and again comments from other Member States of United Nations. It also decided to establish a new Committee, after seeking the opinion of governments about it. The committee was composed of the Member States which had served on the General Committee of the Assembly at its most recent regular session. The main remit of the New Committee was to study the replies 'for the purpose of determining when its shall be appropriate for the General Assembly to consider again the question of defining aggression'([24]).
In the light of this position of the United Nations, and the consideration that the draft Code submitted by the Special Committee still raised problems relating to the question of defining aggression. The General Assembly in its resolution 1186 (XII) of 11 December 1957, postponed consideration of the draft Code, and decided to rediscuss the question of defining aggression ([25]).
The General Assembly also decided to forward the draft Code to the member governments in the United Nations to give their comments and to deliver their replies to the General Assembly. Since then, the draft Code did not appear on the General Assembly Agenda ([26]).
The Special Committee of the General Assembly which held its meetings from 14 to 24 April 1959, decided that the governments replies relating to the draft code didn’t comprise any change of attitude and agreed to defer any discussion related to the question of defining aggression until 1962. The Special Committee held meetings in 1962, 1965, and 1967, but was unable to determine any specific time suitable for the General Assembly to resume its discussion about the question of defining aggression ([27]).
In 1967, the Special Committee works came to an end when General Assembly decided to rediscuss the question of aggression . ([28])
In December 18, 1967, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2330 (XXII), in which it decided to establish a new Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression.([29]) The Committee included thirty-five Member States, "to consider all aspects of the question so that an adequate definition of aggression may be prepared".([30])
After Seven sessions held between 1968- 1974, the Special Committee adopted a draft definition of aggression and recommended it to the General Assembly to adopt it. ([31])
-IV-2.AGREED DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY- RESOLUTION 3314 (XXIX).
14 DECEMBER 1974
Committee: 6
Vote: Adopted without a vote
Ref: 3105(XXVIII), 2967(XXVII), 2781(XXVII), 2644(XXV), 2549(XXIV), 2420(XXIII), 2330(XXII), 1181(XII), 895(IX), 688(VII), 599(VI)
The General Assembly,
Having considered the report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, established pursuant to its resolution 2330(XXII) of 18 December 1967, covering the work of its seventh session held from 11 March to 12 April 1974, including the draft Definition of Aggression adopted by the Special Committee by consensus and recommended for adoption by the General Assembly,[FN1]
Deeply, convinced that the adoption of the Definition of Aggression would contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security,
2319th plenary meeting
14 December 1974
Annex:
Definition of Aggression
The General Assembly,
Basing itself on the fact that one of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security and to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,
Recalling that the Security Council, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations, shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security,
Recalling also the duty of States under the Charter to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in order not to endanger international peace, security and justice,
Bearing in mind that nothing in this Definition shall be interpreted as in any way affecting the scope of the provisions of the Charter with respect to the functions and powers of the organs of the United Nations,
Considering also that, since aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force, being fraught, in the conditions created by the existence of all types of weapons of mass destruction, with the possible threat of a world conflict and all its catastrophic consequences, aggression should be defined at the present stage,
Reaffirming the duty of States not to use armed force to deprive peoples of their right to self-determination, freedom and independencUNITED NATIONS ON AGGRESSION - 1950-1974e, or to disrupt territorial Integrity,
Reaffirming also that the territory of a State shall not be violated by being the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State in contravention of the Charter, and that it shall not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from such measures or the threat thereof,
Reaffirming also the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
Convinced that the adoption of a definition of aggression ought to have the effect of deterring a potential aggressor, would simplify the determination of acts of aggression and the implementation of measures to suppress them and would also facilitate the protection of the rights and lawful interests of, and the rendering of assistance to, the victim,
Believing that, although the question whether an act of aggression has been committed must be considered in the light of all the circumstances of each particular case, it is nevertheless desirable to formulate basic principles as guidance for such determination,
Adopts the following Definition of Agression:[FN3]
Article I
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.
Explanatory note: In this Definition the term "State":
(a) Is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is a member of the United Nations;
(b) Includes the concept of a "group of States" where appropriate.
Article 2
The First use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.
Article 3
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof,
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its temtory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.
Article 4
The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter.
Article 5
Article 6
Nothing in this Definition shall be construed as in any way enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.
Article 7
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination: nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration.
Article 8
In their interpretation and application the above provisions are interrelated and each provision should be construed in the context of the other provisions.
FOOTNOTES
Berlin, Disarmament, Stalin-Truman Meeting *
January 27, 1949
Answer to Kingsbury Smith
On the question of a meeting with Truman
February 2, 1949
Peace in Europe *
October 13, 1949
Peace in Korea *
July 15, 1950
Interview with a "Pravda" Correspondent
February 17, 1951
Answering Telegram to the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic Mao Tse Tung
On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of victory oven. the Japanese imperialists
September 2, 1951
Prohibition of Atomic Weapons *
October 6, 1951
New Year Message to the Japanese People
December 31, 1951
Answers to Four Questions from a Group of Editors of American Newspapers
March 31, 1952
Telegram to the Minister President of the Gerrman Democratic Republic, Otto Grotewohl
On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of the German people from the fascist tyranny
May 8, 1952
Speech of the 19th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
October 14, 1952
Comrades!
Eight years have passed since the last elections to the Supreme Soviet. This has been a period replete with events of a decisive nature. The first four years were years of intense labour on the part of Soviet people in carrying out the Third Five Year Plan. The second four years covered the events of the war against the German and Japanese aggressors – the events of the Second World War. Undoubtedly, the war was the major event during the past period.
It would be wrong to think that the Second World War broke out accidentally, or as a result of blunders committed by certain statesmen, although blunders were certainly committed. As a matter of fact, the war broke out as the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of present day monopolistic capitalism. Marxists have more than once stated that the capitalist system of world economy contains the elements of universal crises and military conflicts, that, in view of this, the development of world capitalism in our times does not proceed smoothly and evenly, but through crises and war catastrophes. The point is that the uneven development of capitalist countries usually leads, in the course of time, to a sharp disturbance of the equilibrium within the world system of capitalism, and that group of capitalist countries which regards itself as being less securely provided with raw materials and markets usually attempts to change the situation and to redistribute "spheres of influence" in its own favour – by employing armed force. As a result of this, the capitalist world is split into two hostile camps, and war breaks out between them.
Perhaps war catastrophes could be avoided if it were possible periodically to redistribute raw materials and markets among the respective countries in conformity with their economic weight – by means of concerted and peaceful decisions. But this is impossible under the present capitalist conditions of world economic development.
Thus, as a result of the first crisis of the capitalist system of world economy, the First World War broke out; and as a result of the second crisis, the Second World War broke out.
This does not mean, of course, that the Second World War was a copy of the first. On the contrary, the Second World War differed substantially in character from the first. It must be borne in mind that before attacking the Allied countries the major fascist states – Germany, Japan and Italy – destroyed the last vestiges of bourgeois-democratic liberties at home and established there a cruel, terroristic regime, trampled upon the principle of sovereignty and free development of small countries, proclaimed as their own the policy of seizing foreign territory and publicly stated that they were aiming at world domination and the spreading of the fascist regime all over the world; and by seizing Czechoslovakia and the central regions of China, the Axis Powers showed that they were ready to carry out their threat to enslave all the peace-loving peoples. In view of this, the Second World War against the Axis Powers, unlike the First World War, assumed from the very outset the character of an anti-fascist war, a war of liberation, one of the tasks of which was to restore democratic liberties. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against the Axis Powers could only augment – and really did augment – the anti-fascist and liberating character of the Second World War.
It was on this basis that the anti-fascist coalition of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain and other freedom-loving countries came into being and later played the decisive role in defeating the armed forces of the Axis Powers.
That is how it stands with the question of the origin and character of the Second World War.
Everybody, probably, now admits that the war was not nor could have been an accident in the lives of the peoples, that it actually became a war of the peoples for their existence, and that for that very reason could not have been a swift or lightning war.
As far as our country is concerned, for her this war was the fiercest and most arduous war in the history of our Motherland.
But the war was not only a curse. It was also a great school in which all the forces of the people were examined and tested. The war laid bare all facts and events in the rear and at the front, it ruthlessly tore down all the veils and coverings that concealed the actual features of states, governments and parties, and brought them onto the stage without masks and without make-up, with all their defects and merits. The war was something in the nature of an examination of our Soviet system, of our State, of our Government and of our Communist Party; and it summed up their work and said, as it were: Here they are, your people and organizations, their life and work – scrutinize them carefully and treat them according to their deserts.
This is one of the positive sides of the war.
For us, for the voters, this is of immense importance, for it helps us quickly and impartially to appraise the activities of the Party and its men, and to draw correct conclusions. At another time we would have had to study the speeches and reports of the representatives of the Party, analyze them, compare their words with their deeds, sum up the results, and so forth. This is a complicated and laborious job, and there is no guarantee against mistakes. It is different now, when the war is over, when the war itself has verified the work of our organizations and leaders and has summed it up. It is now much easier to analyze matters, and arrive at correct conclusions.
And so, what are the results of the war?
There is one principal result, upon which all the others rest. This is, that at the end of the war the enemies sustained defeat and we and our Allies proved to be the victors. We terminated the war with complete victory over our enemies – this is the principal result of the war. But this is too general, and we cannot put a full stop here. Of course, to defeat the enemies in a war such as the Second World War, the like of which has never been witnessed in the history of mankind before, means achieving a victory of world historical importance. All this is true. But still, it is a general result, and we cannot rest content with it. To appreciate the great historical importance of our victory we must analyze the matter more concretely.
And so, how should our victory over the enemies be interpreted? What can this victory signify from the point of view of the state and the development of the internal forces of our country?
Our victory signifies, first of all, that our Soviet social system was victorious, that the Soviet social system successfully passed the test of fire in the war and proved that it is fully viable.
As we know, the foreign press on more than one occasion asserted that the Soviet social system was a "risky experiment" that was doomed to failure, that the Soviet system was a "house of cards" having no foundations in life and imposed upon the people by the Cheka, and that a slight shock from without was sufficient to cause this "house of cards" to collapse.
Now we can say that the war has refuted all these assertions of the foreign press and has proved them to have been groundless. The war proved that the Soviet social system is a genuinely people's system, which grew up from the ranks of the people and enjoys their powerful support; that the Soviet social system is a fully viable and stable form of organization of society.
More than that. The issue now is not whether the Soviet social system is viable or not, because after the object lessons of the war, no sceptic now dares to express doubt concerning the viability of the Soviet social system. Now the issue is that the Soviet social system has proved to be more viable and stable than the non-Soviet social system, that the Soviet social system is a better form of organization of society than any non-Soviet social system.
Secondly, our victory signifies that our Soviet state system was victorious, that our multi-national Soviet state passed all the tests of the war and proved its viability.
As we know, prominent foreign journalists have more than once expressed themselves to the effect that the Soviet multi-national state is an "artificial and short-lived structure," that in the event of any complications arising, the collapse of the Soviet Union would be inevitable, that the Soviet Union would share the fate of Austria-Hungary.
Now we can say that the war refuted these statements of the foreign press and proved them to have been devoid of all foundation. The war proved that the Soviet multinational state system suceessfully passed the test, grew stronger than ever during the war, and turned out to be quite a viable state system. These gentlemen failed to realise that the analogy of Austria-Hungary was unsound, because our multi-national state grew up not on the bourgeois basis, which stimulates sentiments of national distrust and national enmity, but on the Soviet basis, which, on the contrary, cultivates sentiments of friendship and fraternal cooperation among the peoples of our state.
Incidentally, after the lessons of the war, these gentlemen no longer dare to come out and deny the viability of the Soviet state system. The issue now is no longer the viability of the Soviet state system, because there can be no doubt about its viability. Now the issue is that the Soviet state system has proved to be a model multi-national state, that the Soviet state system is such a system of state organization in which the national problem and the problem of the cooperation of nations have found a better solution than in any other multi-national state.
Thirdly, our victory signifies that the Soviet Armed Forces were victorious, that our Red Army was victorious, that the Red Army heroically withstood all the hardships of the war, utterly routed the armies of our enemies, and emerged from the war the victor. (A voice: "Under Comrade Stalin's leadership!" All rise. Loud and prolonged applause, rising to an ovation.)
Now, everybody, friends and enemies alike, admit that the Red Army proved equal to its tremendous task. But this was not the case six years ago, in the period before the war. As we know, prominent foreign journalists, and many recognized authorities on military affairs abroad, repeatedly stated that the condition of the Red Army raised grave doubts, that the Red Army was poorly armed and lacked a proper commanding staff, that its morale was beneath criticism, that while it might be fit for defence, it was unfit for attack, and that, if struck by the German troops, the Red Army would collapse like "a colossus with feet of clay." Such statements were made not only in Germany, but also in France, Great Britain and America.
Now we can say that the war refuted all these statements and proved them to have been groundless and ridiculous. The war proved that the Red Army is not "a colossus with feet of clay," but a first-class modern army, equipped with the most up-to-date armaments, led by most experienced commanders and possessed of high morale and fighting qualities. It must not be forgotten that the Red Army is the army which utterly routed the German army, the army which only yesterday struck terror in the hearts of the armies of the European states.
It must be noted that the "critics" of the Red Army are becoming fewer and fewer. More than that. Comments are more and more frequently appearing in the foreign press noting the high qualities of the Red Army, the skill of its men and commanders, and the flawlessness of its strategy and tactics. This is understandable. After the brilliant victories the Red Army achieved at Moscow and Stalingrad, at Kursk and Belgorod, at Kiev and Kirovograd, at Minsk and Bobruisk, at Leningrad and Tallinn, at Jassy and Lvov, on the Vistula and the Niemen, on the Danube and the Oder and at Vienna and Berlin – after all this, it is impossible not to admit that the Red Army is a first-class army, from which much can be learned. (Loud applause.)
This is how we concretely understand the victory our country achieved over her enemies.
Such, in the main, are the results of the war.
It would be wrong to think that such a historical victory could have been achieved without preliminary preparation of the whole country for active defence. It would be no less wrong to assume that such preparation could have been made in a short space of time, in a matter of three or four years. It would be still more wrong to assert that our victory was entirely due to the bravery of our troops. Without bravery it is, of course, impossible to achieve victory. But bravery alone is not enough to overpower an enemy who possesses a vast army, first-class armaments, well-trained officers and fairly well-organized supplies. To withstand the blow of such an enemy, to resist him and then to inflict utter defeat upon him it was necessary to have, in addition to the unexampled bravery of our troops, fully up-to-date armaments, and in sufficient quantities, and well-organized supplies, also in sufficient quantities. But for this it was necessary to have, and in sufficient quantities, elementary things such as: metals – for the production of armaments, equipment and industrial machinery; fuel – to ensure the operation of industry and transport; cotton – to manufacture army clothing; grain – to supply the army with food.
Can it be maintained that before entering the Second World War our country already possessed the necessary minimum of the material potentialities needed to satisfy these main requirements? I think it can. To prepare for this immense task we had to carry out three Five Year Plans of national economic development. It was precisely these three Five Year Plans that enabled us to create these material potentialities. At all events, the situation in our country in this respect was ever so much better before the Second World War, in 1940, than it was before the First World War, in 1913.
What were the material potentialities at our country's disposal before the Second World War?
To help you to understand this I shall have to make you a brief report on the activities of the Communist Party in the matter of preparing our country for active defence.
If we take the data for 1940 – the eve of the Second World War – and compare it with the data for 1913 – the eve of the First World War – we shall get the following picture.
In 1913 there was produced in our country 4,220,000 tons of pig iron, 4,230,000 tons of steel, 29,000,000 tons of coal, 9,000,000 tons of oil, 21,600,000 tons of marketable grain and 740,000 tons of raw cotton.
Such were the material potentialities of our country when she entered the First World War.
This was the economic basis old Russia could utilize for the purpose of prosecuting the war.
As regards 1940, in that year the following was produced in our country: 15,000,000 tons of pig iron, i.e., nearly four times as much as in 1913; 18,300,000 tons of steel, i.e., four and a half times as much as in 1913; 166,000,000 tons of coal, i.e., five and a half times as much as in 1913; 31,000,000 tons of oil, i.e., three and a half times as much as in 1913; 38,300,000 tons of marketable grain, i.e., 17,000,000 tons more than in 1913; 2,700,000 tons of raw cotton, i.e., three and a half times as much as in 1913.
Such were the material potentialities of our country when she entered the Second World War.
This was the economic basis the Soviet Union could utilize for the purpose of prosecuting the war.
The difference, as you see, is colossal.
This unprecedented growth of production cannot be regarded as the simple and ordinary development of a country from backwardness to progress. It was a leap by which our Motherland became transformed from a backward country into an advanced country, from an agrarian into an industrial country.
This historic transformation was brought about in the course of three Five Year Plans, beginning with 1928 – with the first year of the first Five Year Plan period. Up to that time we had to restore our ruined industries and heal the wounds inflicted upon us by the First World War and the Civil War. If we take into consideration the fact that the first Five Year Plan was carried out in four years, and that the execution of the third Five Year Plan was interrupted by the war in the fourth year, it works out that the transformation of our country from an agrarian into an industrial country took only about thirteen years.
It cannot but be admitted that thirteen years is an incredibly short period for the execution of such a gigantic task.
It is this that explains the storm of controversy that broke out in the foreign press at the time these figures were published. Our friends decided that a "miracle" had happened; those who were ill-disposed towards us proclaimed that the Five Year Plans were "Bolshevik propaganda" and "tricks of the Cheka." But as miracles do not happen and the Cheka is not so powerful as to be able to annul the laws of social development, "public opinion" abroad was obliged to resign itself to the facts.
By what policy was the Communist Party able to create these material potentialities in so short a time?
First of all by the Soviet policy of industrializing the country.
The Soviet method of industrializing the country differs radically from the capitalist method of industrialization. In capitalist countries, industrialization usually starts with light industry. In view of the fact that light industry requires less investments, that capital turnover is faster, and profits are made more easily than in heavy industry, light industry becomes the first object of industrialization in those countries. Only after the passage of a long period of time, during which light industry accumulates profits and concentrates them in banks, only after this does the turn of heavy industry come and accumulation begin gradually to be transferred to heavy industry for the purpose of creating conditions for its development. But this is a long process, which takes a long time, running into several decades, during which you have to wait while the light industry develops and do without heavy industry. Naturally, the Communist Party could not take this path. The Party knew that war was approaching, that it would be impossible to defend our country without heavy industry, that it was necessary to set to work to develop heavy industry as quickly as possible, and that to be belated in this matter meant courting defeat. The Party remembered what Lenin said about it being impossible to protect the independence of our country without heavy industry, and about the likelihood of the Soviet system perishing without heavy industry. The Communist Party of our country therefore rejected the "ordinary" path of industrialization and commenced the industrialization of the country by developing heavy industry. This was a very difficult task, but one that could be accomplished. It was greatly facilitated by the nationalization of industry and the banks, which made it possible quickly to collect funds and transfer them to heavy industry.
There can be no doubt that without this it would have been impossible to transform our country into an industrial country in so short a time.
Secondly, by the policy of collectivizing agriculture.
To put an end to our backwardness in agriculture and to provide the country with the largest possible amount of marketable grain, cotton, and so forth, it was necessary to pass from small peasant farming to large-scale farming, for only large-scale farming can employ modern machinery, utilize all the achievements of agricultural science and provide the largest possible quantity of marketable produce. But there are two kinds of large-scale farming – capitalist and collective. The Communist Party could not take the capitalist path of developing agriculture not only on grounds of principle, but also because that path presupposes an exceedingly long process of development and calls for the ruination of the peasants and their transformation into agricultural labourers. The Communist Party therefore took the path of collectivizing agriculture, the path of organizing large farms by uniting the peasant farms into collective farms. The collective method proved to be an exceedingly progressive method not only because it did not call for the ruination of the peasants, but also, and particularly, because it enabled us in the course of several years to cover the entire country with large collective farms capable of employing modern machinery, of utilizing all the achievements of agricultural science and of providing the country with the largest possible quantity of marketable produce.
There is no doubt that without the policy of collectivization we would not have been able to put an end to the age-long backwardness of our agriculture in so short a time.
It cannot be said that the Party's policy met with no resistance. Not only backward people, who always refuse to listen to anything that is new, but even many prominent members of our Party persistently tried to pull our Party back, and by every possible means tried to drag it onto the "ordinary" capitalist path of development. All the anti-Party machinations of the Trotskyites and of the Rights, all their "activities" in sabotaging the measures of our Government, pursued the one object of frustrating the Party's policy and of hindering industrialization and collectivization. But the Party yielded neither to the threats of some nor to the howling of others and confidently marched forward in spite of everything. It is to the Party's credit that it did not adjust itself to the backward, that it was not afraid to swim against the current, and that all the time it held onto its position of the leading force. There can be no doubt that if the Communist Party had not displayed this staunchness and perseverance it would have been unable to uphold the policy of industrializing the country and of collectivizing agriculture.
Was the Communist Party able to make proper use of the material potentialities created in this way for the purpose of developing war production and of supplying the Red Army with the armaments it needed?
I think it was, and that it did so with the utmost success.
Leaving out of account the first year of the war, when the evacuation of industry to the East hindered the work of developing war production, we can say that during the three succeeding years of the war the Party achieved such successes as enabled it not only to supply the front with sufficient quantities of artillery, machine-guns, rifles, aeroplanes, tanks and ammunition, but also to accumulate reserves. Moreover, as is well known, the quality of our armaments was not only not inferior but, in general, even superior to the German.
It is well known that during the last three years of the war our tank industry produced annually an average of over 30,000 tanks, self-propelled guns and armoured cars. (Loud applause.)
It is well known, further, that in the same period our aircraft industry produced annually up to 40,000 aeroplanes. (Loud applause.)
It is also well known that our artillery industry in the same period produced annually up to 120,000 guns of all calibres (loud applause), up to 450,000 light and heavy machine-guns (loud applause), over 3,000,000 rifles (applause) and about 2,000,000 automatic rifles. (Applause.)
Lastly, it is well known that our mortar industry in the period of 1942-44 produced annually an average of up to 100,000 mortars. (Loud applause.)
It goes without saying that simultaneously we produced corresponding quantities of artillery shells, mines of various kinds, air bombs, and rifle and machine-gun cartridges.
It is well known, for example, that in 1944 alone we produced over 240,000,000 shells, bombs and mines (applause) and 7,400,000,000 cartridges. (Loud applause.)
Such is the general picture of the way the Red Army was supplied with arms and ammunition.
As you see, it does not resemble the picture of the way our army was supplied during the First World War, when the front suffered a chronic shortage of artillery and shells, when the army fought without tanks and aircraft, and when one rifle was issued for every three men.
As regards supplying the Red Army with food and clothing, it is common knowledge that the front not only felt no shortage whatever in this respect, but even, had the necessary reserves.
This is how the matter stands as regards the activities of the Communist Party of our country in the period up to the beginning of the war and during the war.
Now a few words about the Communist Party's plans of work for the immediate future. As you know, these plans are formulated in the new Five Year Plan, which is to be adopted in the very near future. The main tasks of the new Five Year Plan are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of our country, to restore industry and agriculture to the pre-war level, and then to exceed that level to a more or less considerable extent. Apart from the fact that the rationing system is to be abolished in the very near future (loud and prolonged applause), special attention will be devoted to the expansion of the production of consumer goods, to raising the standard of living of the working people by steadily reducing the prices of all commodities (loud and prolonged applause), and to the extensive organization of scientific research institutes of every kind (applause) capable of giving the fullest scope to our scientific forces. (Loud applause.)
I have no doubt that if we give our scientists proper assistance they will be able in the very near future not only to overtake but even outstrip the achievements of science beyond the borders of our country. (Prolonged applause.)
As regards long-term plans, our Party intends to organize another powerful uplift of our national economy that will enable us to raise our industry to a level, say, three times as high as that of pre-war industry. We must see to it that our industry shall be able to produce annually up to 50,000,000 tons of pig iron (prolonged applause), up to 60,000,000 tons of steel (prolonged applause), up to 500,000,000 tons of coal (prolonged applause) and up to 60,000,000 tons of oil (prolonged applause). Only when we succeed in doing that can we be sure that our Motherland will be insured against all contingencies. (Loud applause.) This will need, perhaps, another three Five Year Plans, if, not more. But it can be done, and we must do it.
This, then, is my brief report on the activities of the Communist Party during the recent past and on its plans of work for the future. (Loud and prolonged applause.)
It is for you to judge to what extent the Party has been and is working on the proper lines (applause), and whether it could not have worked better. (Laughter and applause.)
It is said that victors are not judged (laughter and applause), that they must not be criticized, that they must not be inquired into. This is not true. Victors may and should be judged (laughter and applause), they may and should be criticized and inquired into. This is beneficial not only for the cause, but also for the victors (laughter and applause); there will be less swelled-headedness, and there will be more modesty. (Laughter and applause.) I regard the election campaign as a court of the voters sitting in judgement over the Communist Party as the ruling party. The result of the election will be the voters' verdict. (Laughter and applause.) The Communist Party of our country would not be worth much if it feared criticism and investigation. The Communist Party is ready to receive the verdict of the voters. (Loud applause.)
In this election contest the Communist Party does not stand alone. It is going to the polls in a bloc with the non-Party people. In the past Communists were somewhat distrustful of non-Party people and of non-Party-ism. This was due to the fact that various bourgeois groups, who thought it was not to their advantage to come before the voters without a mask, not infrequently used the non-Party flag as a screen. This was the case in the past. Times are different now. Non-Party people are now separated from the bourgeoisie by a barrier called the Soviet social system. And on this side of the barrier the non-Party people are united with the Communists in one, common, collective body of Soviet people. Within this collective body they fought side by side to consolidate the might of our country, they fought side by side and shed their blood on the various fronts for the sake of freedom and greatness of our Motherland, and side by side they hammered out and forged our country's victory over her enemies. The only difference between them is that some belong to the Party and some don't. But this difference is only a formal one. The important thing is that all are engaged in one common cause. That is why the Communist and non-Party bloc is a natural and vital thing. (Loud and prolonged applause.)
In conclusion, permit me to express my thanks for the confidence which you have shown me (loud and prolonged applause. A voice: "Cheers for the great leader of all our victories, Comrade Stalin!") by nominating me as a candidate for the Supreme Soviet. You need have no doubt that I will do my best to justify your confidence. (All rise. Loud and prolonged applause rising to an ovation. Voices in different parts of the hall: "Long live great Stalin, Hurrah!" "Cheers for the great leader of the peoples!" "Glory to great Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin, the candidate of the entire people!" "Glory to the creator of all our victories, Comrade Stalin!")
("Soviet Calendar 1917 - 1947")
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Dear Comrade Rasin,
I have received your letter of 30 January on Clausewitz and your short thesis on war and the art of war.
By putting the question in such a way one could believe that Lenin had analyzed the science of war and the works of Clausewitz, judged them from a military viewpoint, and had left us a number of guidelines on military questions. Putting the question in such a way is wrong because there are no such "Theses" of Lenin on Clausewitz's teachings on the art of war.
Unlike Engels, Lenin did not believe himself to be an expert on military matters, - neither before the October Revolution, nor in the period up to the end of the Civil War.
During the Civil War, Lenin abjured us young comrades on the Central Committee to study the art of war thoroughly. He unhesitatingly declared that it was too late for him to become a military expert. This explains why Lenin, in his judgement on Clausewitz and his remarks on Clausewitz's works, does not touch upon solely military aspects such as questions of military strategy and tactics and their relation to each other, the relation between attack and retreat, defence and counter-offensive and so on.
What was Lenin's interest in Clausewitz and why did he acknowledge him?
Lenin acknowledged Clausewitz who was not a Marxist, and who was recognized as an authority in the field of military theory because in his works he confirmed the known Marxist theory that there is a direct relation between war and politics, that politics can engender war and that war is the continuation of politics by force. Here, Lenin needed Clausewitz to prove that Plekhanov, Kautsky and others had fallen once more into social chauvinism and social imperialism. He further acknowledged Clausewitz in that he confirmed the Marxist viewpoint in his works that under certain unfavourable conditions, - retreat is as justifiable a military action as is attack. Lenin needed Clausewitz to disprove the theory of the "left" Communists who denied that retreat could be a justifiable military action.
In this way, not as a military expert, but as a politician, Lenin used the works of Clausewitz, and was mainly interested in those questions in the works of Clausewitz which showed the relation between war and politics.
Thus, as successors of Lenin, there are no restrictions on us in the criticism of the Military doctrine of Clausewitz, as there are no remarks of Lenin that could hinder us in our free criticism.
Thus, your judgement, on the article of Comrade Meshtsherjakov (in "Wojennaja Mysl," No. 6/7, 1945), which criticises the military doctrine of Clausewitz, regarding it as a "Revision" of Lenin's judgement is completely unjustified.
Concerning Clausewitz, as an authority in the field of military authority, he is of course out of date. On the whole, Clausewitz was a representative of the time of manufacture in war, but now we are in the machine age of war. Undoubtedly the machine age of war requires new military ideologies. Thus, it would be ridiculous to follow the teachings of Clausewitz today. One cannot make progress and further science without a critical analysis of the antiquated theories of well known authorities. This applies not only to the authorities in war theory but also to the Marxist classics. Engels once said of the Russian Commanders of 1812, that Gen. Barclay de Tolley was the only one of any relevance. Engels was of course wrong, as Kut-usov was of greater importance by far. Nevertheless there are people in our time who did not hesitate to defend this wrong judgement of Engels.
In our criticism we must not be guided by single remarks and judgements from the classics, but must be guided by Lenin's well known guideline :
"We do not regard the theory of Marx as something final and untouchable; on the contrary, we are convinced that it has laid the foundations of that science that the Socialists must develop in every direction if they do not want to fall bad behind the times. We are of the opinion that the Russian Socialists must find their own interpretation of Marxism, as this theory gives only general guidelines, the application of which in detail is different in England than in France; in France, different than in Germany; in Germany, different than in Russia." (Lenin Works, Vol. 4. Moscow 1946. Pp 191-192. Russian Ed.)
Such an attitude is for us even more necessary concerning the authorities of war theory.
J. Stalin
("New World," No. 7, April 1947, pp. 23 - 25)
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March 22nd, 1946
Question: What significance do you believe the United Nations Organization has as a means of maintaining international peace?
Answer: I think the United Nations Organization is of great importance because it is an important instrument for the maintaining of peace and international security. The strength of this international Organization lies in the principle of the equality of states and not on the domination of some over the rest. If the United Nations Organization manages to maintain the principle of equality it will definitely play a great and positive role in ensuring general peace and security.
Question: In your opinion, what is causing the present general fear of war in many people and countries?
Answer: I am convinced that neither nations nor their armies want a new war, – they want peace and are trying to maintain it. Thus, "the present fear of war" is not caused from this side. I am of the opinion that "the present fear of war" is caused by the actions of some political groups that engage in propaganda for a new war and in this way sow the seeds of distrust and insecurity.
Question: What must the governments of the freedom-loving countries do to secure peace and calm in the whole world?
Answer: It is necessary for the public and the government circles of the states to organize counter-propaganda on a broad basis against the propagandists of a new war, for the securing of peace; so that the campaign of the propagandists of a new war meets adequate resistance from the public and the press, – so that the arsonists of war are unmasked in time and denied the possibility of using freedom of speech against the interests of peace.
("Daily Review," No. 70, 24 March, 1946)
Question: Do you think there is a real danger of a “new war,” which is being so irresponsibly talked about in the whole world at the moment? What steps should be taken to prevent this war, if such a danger exists?
Answer: I do not believe in the actual danger of a new war. The clamour about a new war now comes mainly from military-political secret agents and the people behind them in the administration. They need this alarm, if only for the purpose of spreading it in the areas of their opposition.
(a) Certain naive politicians try to get as many concessions as possible out of the opposition and help their own governments by frightening people with the spectre of war;
(b) to hinder the reduction of military budgets in their own countries for a certain time;
(c) to block the demobilization of their troops and thereby guard against a swift rise in unemployment numbers in their countries.
One must differentiate between the present clamour and outcry about a “new war,” and the real danger of a “new war,” which does not exist at the present time.
Question: Do you think that Great Britain and the United States of America are deliberately carrying out a “capitalist encirclement” of the Soviet Union?
Answer: I am not of the opinion that Great Britain and the United States of America could carry out a “capitalist encirclement” of the Soviet Union even if they wanted to, which, in any case, I do not maintain.
Question: To quote Mr. Wallace in his last speech, can England, Western Europe and the United States be sure that Soviet politics in Germany will not be turned into a Russian instrument against Western Europe?
Answer: I believe that the possibility of Germany making profitable moves through the Soviet Union, against Western Europe and the United States can be excluded. I think that it can be excluded also, not only because the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France are bound by their joint and mutual support against German aggression and through the decisions of the Potsdam Conference which bind these three powers to the United States of America, but also because Germany's political exploitation against Western Europe and the United States of America would mean a deviation on the part of the Soviet Union from its fundamental national interests. To put it in a nutshell, the politics of the Soviet Union in relation to the German problem is restricted by itself to the demilitarization and democratization of Germany. I believe that the demilitarization and democratization of Germany to be the most meaningful guarantee for the building of a stable and lasting peace.
Question: What is your opinion about the accusation that the politics of the Communist parties of Western Europe are “directed by Moscow”?
Answer: I regard this accusation as an absurdity that people have borrowed from the bankrupt arsenal of Hitler and Goebbels.
Question: Do you believe in the possibility of a friendly and lasting cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, despite the existing ideological differences, and in “friendly competition” between the two systems, as Wallace mentioned in his speech?
Answer: I firmly believe in that.
Question: During the stay of the deputation from the Labour Party in the Soviet Union, you have, as I have been informed, expressed certainty regarding the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. What would help to establish these relations which the majority of the English people obviously desire?
Answer: I am really certain of the possibility of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The strengthening of the political, economic and cultural ties between these countries would contribute enormously to the construction of such relations.
Question: Do you believe the earliest possible withdrawal of all American troops from China would be of the greatest significance for future peace?
Answer: Yes, I believe so.
Question: Do you believe that actual monopoly of the United States on the atom bomb to be one of the greatest threats to peace?
Answer: I do not think that the atom bomb is such a power as certain politicians are disposed to state. The atom bomb is intended to frighten people with weak nerves, but it cannot decide the fate of war, and would under no circumstance suffice for this purpose. Certainly, the monopoly on the secrets of the atom bomb poses a threat, but against that there are at least two things:
(a) The monopoly on the possession of the atom bomb cannot last long;
(b) the use of the atom bomb will be forbidden.
Question: Do you believe that with the further progress of Communism in the Soviet Union, the possibilities of friendly cooperation with the outside world as far as the Soviet Union is concerned will not be reduced? Is “Communism in one country” possible?
Answer: I do not doubt that the possibility of peaceful cooperation will not be reduced, far from it, but could even be stronger. “Communism in one country” is absolutely possible, especially in a country like the Soviet Union.
("Pravda," 25 September, 1946)
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The following answers were given by J. V. Stalin to questions put to him on October 23, 1946, by Mr. Hugh Baillie, President of the United Press of America:
1.Question:Do you agree with Secretary Byrnes’ feeling, as expressed in his radio speech last Friday (October 18th), that there is growing tension between the U.S.S.R. and the United States?
Answer: No.
2.Question: If such an increasing tension exists, could you indicate the reason, or reasons for it, and what are the most essential bases for eliminating it?
Answer: The question does not arise in view of my answer to the preceding question.
3.Question:Do you foresee that the present negotiations will result in peace treaties which will establish amicable relations among the nations which were allies in the war against Fascism, and remove the danger of war on the part of former Fascist sources?
Answer: I hope so.
4.Question: If not, what are the principal obstacles to the establishment of such amicable relations among the nations which were allies in the Great War?
Answer: The question does not arise in view of the answer to the preceding question.
5.Question: What is Russia’s attitude with regard to Yugoslavia’s decision not to sign the Peace Treaty with Italy
Answer: Yugoslavia has grounds to be dissatisfied.
6.Question: What, in your opinion, is to-day the worst threat to world peace?
Answer: The instigators of a new war, in the first place Churchill and people of like mind in Britain and the U.S.A.
7.Question: If such a threat should arise, what steps should be taken by the nations of the world to avoid a new war?
Answer: The instigators of a new war should be exposed and curbed.
8.Question: Is the United Nations Organisation a guarantee of the integrity of the small nations?
Answer: It is hard to say so far.
9.Question: Do you think that the four zones of occupation in Germany should in the near future be thrown together, so far as economic administration is concerned, with a view to restoring Germany as a peaceful economic unit and thus lessening the burden of occupation to the four powers?
Answer: Not only the economic but also the political unity of Germany should be restored.
10.Question: Do you feel that it is feasible at this time to create some sort of central administration to be placed in the hands of the Germans themselves, but under Allied control, which will make it possible for the Council of Foreign Ministers to draft a peace treaty for Germany?
Answer: Yes, I do.
Answer: So far I am not certain of it.
12.Question: Do you feel that, as has been suggested in some quarters, the level of permitted industry should be increased above the agreed level, to permit Germany to pay her own way more fully?
Answer: Yes, I do.
13. Question: What should be done beyond the present four-Power programme to prevent Germany from again becoming a world military menace?
Answer: The remnants of Fascism in Germany should be extirpated in fact and she should be democratised to the end.
14. Question: Should the German people be allowed to reconstruct their industry and trade and become self-supporting?
Answer: Yes, they should.
15. Question: Have the provisions of Potsdam, in your opinion, been adhered to? If not, what is needed to make the Potsdam Declaration an effective instrument?
Answer: They are not always adhered to, especially in the sphere of the democratisation of Germany.
16. Question: Do you feel the veto power has been used to excess during the discussions among the four Foreign Ministers and in meetings of the United Nations Council?
Answer: No, I do not.
17. Question: How far does the Kremlin feel the Allied Powers should go hunting down and trying minor war criminals in Germany? Does it feel that the Nuremberg decisions created a sufficiently strong basis for such action?
Answer: The farther they go the better.
18. Question:Does Russia consider the Western frontiers of Poland permanent?
Answer: Yes, she does.
19. Question: How does the U.S.S.R. regard the presence of British troops in Greece? Does it feel that Britain should supply more arms to the present Greek Government?
Answer: As unnecessary.
20. Question: What is the extent of Russian military contingents in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Austria, and how long do you feel that, in the interests of securing peace, these contingents must be maintained?
Answer: In the West, that is in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Poland, the Soviet Union has at present in all 60 divisions (infantry and armour together). Most of them are below full complement. There are no Soviet troops in Yugoslavia. In two months, when the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of October 22 of this year on the last stage of demobilisation is put into effect, 40 Soviet divisions will remain in the above-mentioned countries.
21. Question: What is the attitude of the Government of the U.S.S.R. towards the presence of American warships in the Mediterranean?
Answer: Indifferent.
22. Question: What is the present outlook for a commercial agreement between Russia and Norway?
Answer: It is hard to tell, so far.
23. Question: Is it possible for Finland again to become a self-sufficient nation after reparations have been paid, and is there any idea in contemplation of revising the reparations programme so far as to expedite Finland’s recovery?
Answer: The question has been put in the wrong way. Finland has been and remains an entirely self-sufficient nation.
24. Question: What will trade agreements with Sweden and other countries mean with regard to reconstruction in the U.S.S.R.? What outside aid do you consider desirable in accomplishing this great task?
Answer: The agreement with Sweden constitutes a contribution to the cause of economic co-operation among the nations.
25. Question: Is Russia still interested in obtaining a loan from the United States?
Answer: She is interested.
26. Question:Has Russia developed its own atom bomb or any similar weapon.
Answer: No.
27. Question: What is your opinion of the atom bomb or similar weapon as an instrument of warfare?
Answer: I have already given my appraisal of the atom bomb in the well-known answer to Mr. Worth.
28. Question: How, in your opinion, can atomic power best be controlled? Should this control be created on an international basis, and to what extent should the powers sacrifice their sovereignty in the interest of making the control effective?
Answer: Strict international control is necessary.
29. Question: How long will it require to rebuild the devastated areas of Western Russia?
Answer: Six to seven years, if not more.
30. Question:Will Russia permit commercial airlines to operate across the Soviet Union? Does Russia intend to extend her own airlines to other continents on a reciprocal basis?
Answer: Under certain conditions this is not excluded.
31. Question: How does your Government view the occupation of Japan? Do you feel it has been a success on the present basis?
Answer: There are some successes, but better successes could have been obtained.
(Soviet News, 1947)
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At an interview with J. V. Stalin in the Kremlin on December 21, 1946 Mr. Elliott Roosevelt put 12 questions. These, together with Stalin’s answers, were published in the American Magazine “Look” and then broadcast by Moscow Radio.
1. Question:Do you believe it is possible for a democracy such as the United States to live peaceably side by side in this world with a communistic form of government like the Soviet Union's and with no attempt on the part of either to interfere with the internal political affairs of the other?
Answer: Yes, of course. This is not only possible. It is wise and entirely within the bounds of realisation. In the most strenuous times during the war the differences in government did not prevent our two nations from joining together and vanquishing our foes. Even more so is it possible to continue this relationship in time of peace.
2. Question: Do you believe that the success of the United Nations depends upon agreement as to fundamental policies and aims between the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States?
Answer: Yes, I think so. In many respects the fate of the United Nations as an organisation depends upon a state of harmony being reached by those three powers.
3. Question: Do you believe, Generalissimo Stalin, that an important step toward world peace would be the attainment of economic agreement of broader scope for the interchange of manufactured and raw materials between our two countries?
Answer: Yes, I believe that it would be an important step for the establishment of world peace. Of course, I agree. The expansion of world trade would benefit in many respects the development of good relations between our two countries.
4. Question: Is the Soviet Union in favour of the immediate creation by the United Nations Security Council of an international police force composed of all the United Nations, which would step in immediately wherever armed warfare threatens peace?
Answer: Of course.
5. Question: If you believe that the atomic bomb should be controlled by the United Nations, should not they, through inspection, control all research and manufacturing facilities for armaments of any nature and the peace-time use and development of atomic energy?
(At this point Mr. Elliott Roosevelt parenthetically says: “Stalin shot back at me a quick question: ‘In general?’ I said, ‘Yes, but, especially as to agreement an principle by Russia to such a plan.’”)
Answer: Of course. To the principle of equality no exception should be made in the case of Russia. Russia should be subject to the same rules of inspection and control as any other nation must.
(At this point Mr. Elliott Roosevelt parenthetically says: “There was no hesitancy in his answer. And no question of reserving the right of veto was even mentioned.”)
6. Question: Do you think it would serve a useful purpose if another Big Three meeting was held for discussion of all international problems at present threatening peace in the world?
Answer: I think there should not be one meeting, but several; they would serve a useful purpose.
(Here Mr. Elliott Roosevelt parenthetically says: “At this point my wife asked whether he thought that such meetings would help towards achieving closer relations at lower levels among officials of the respective Governments. She also asked whether such a result was achieved by the wartime conferences. His answer came with a smile in her direction: ‘There is no doubt of that the wartime meetings and the results achieved greatly helped co-operation at lower levels.’”)
7. Question: Sir, I know you are a student of many other political and social problems existing in other countries. And so I should like to ask whether you feel that the elections in the United States last November indicate a swing away, on the part of the people, from belief in the policies of Roosevelt and towards the isolationist policies of his political adversaries?
Answer: I am not so well acquainted with the internal life of the people of the United States, but I would think the election indicated that the present Government was wasting the moral and political capital created by the late President, and thus it facilitated the victory of the Republicans.
(At this point Mr. Elliott Roosevelt parenthetically says: “In answering my next question Generalissimo Stalin became very emphatic.”)
8. Question: To what do you ascribe the lessening of friendly relations and understanding between our two countries since the death of Roosevelt?
Answer: I feel that if this question relates to the relations and understanding between the American and Russian peoples, no deterioration has taken place, but on the contrary relations have improved. As to the relations between the two Governments, there have been misunderstandings. A certain deterioration has taken place, and then great noise has been raised that their relations would even deteriorate still further. But I see nothing frightful about this in the sense of violation of peace or military conflict.
Not a single Great Power, even if its Government is anxious to do so, could at present raise a large army to fight another Allied Power, another Great Power, because at present one cannot possibly fight without one’s people – and the people are unwilling to fight. They are tired of war.
Moreover, there are no understandable objectives to justify a new war. One would not know for what he had to fight, and therefore I see nothing frightful in the fact that some representatives of the United States Government are talking about deterioration of relations between us.
In view of all these considerations I think the danger of a new war is unreal.
9. Question: Do you favour a broad exchange of cultural and scientific information between our two nations? Also, do you favour exchange of students, artists, scientists and professors?
Answer: of course.
10. Question: Should the United States and the Soviet Union form a common long-term policy of aid to the peoples of the Far East?
Answer: I feel it will be useful if it is possible. In any case our Government is ready to pursue a common policy with the United States in Far Eastern questions.
11. Question: If a systcm of loans or credits is arranged between the United States and the Soviet Union, would such agreements have lasting benefit to the United States economy?
Answer: A system of such credits is of course mutually advantageous both to the United States and to the Soviet Union
(Here Mr. Elliott Roosevelt parenthetically says: “I then asked the question that is creating obvious concern in many countries of Europe.”)
12. Question: Does the failure in the American and British zones of occupied Germany to carry out denazification give serious cause for alarm to the Soviet Government?
Answer: No, it has not been a cause for serious alarm, but of course it is unpleasant for the Soviet Union that part of our common programme is not being put into effect.
(Soviet News, 1947)
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On January 18, 1947, Mr. Bevin, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, through the medium of the British Ambassador in the U.S.S.R., Sir M. Peterson, conveyed the following message to J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.:
I am gratified at the friendly reception which was given to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in Moscow and am studying with interest the account which he has given me of his conversations with you.
We are however disturbed at the suggestion which you made to him that the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Post-War Collaboration might be regarded in London as “suspended in the air” since it might be regarded as superseded by the United Nations Organisation. This view has been attributed to me personally in the most misleading manner by Pravda in an article of January 15, which takes out of its context and misinterprets one sentence in my broadcast of December 22. In fact, I said what all the other major Allies have said, namely, that they based their policy on the United Nations Organisation.
I cannot understand what is behind this line of reasoning, and I am more amazed at the Pravda article since I understand from Field-Marshal Montgomery that you said this was not your own view regarding the Treaty. It is certainly not my view either.
Since Pravda has published this misleading article, I have no alternative but to issue a statement which I should like you to see in advance, making the views of His Majesty’s Government clear once again on this subject. I propose to publish it on the morning of January 20.
On January 23, 1947, J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., sent to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain the following message in reply, which was handed to Mr. Bevin by the Soviet Ambassador in London, G. N. Zarubin, on January 23:
I have received your message of January 18. I must admit that your statement that Great Britain is not tied to anybody except in regard to her obligations arising from the Charter caused me some perplexity.
It seems to me that such a statement without a corresponding explanation can be used by the enemies of Anglo-Soviet friendship. For one it is clear that no matter what reservations there are in the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, and no matter how these reservations weaken the significance of the Treaty in the post-war period, the existence of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty imposes obligations on our countries.
It was just these circumstances that I had in mind when I stated on September 17, 1946, in my interview with Mr. Alexander Werth, that “the Soviet Union is bound with Great Britain by the Treaty of Mutual Assistance against German aggression” and, that means, has obligations with regard to Great Britain, not counting the obligations arising from the Charter.
However, your message and the statement of the British Government completely explain the affair and do not leave any room for misunderstandings. It is now clear that you and I share the same view-point with regard to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty.
As regards the extension of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, to which special reference is made in the British Government’s statement, I must say that if one is to speak seriously of such an extension, then, before extending this Treaty, it is necessary to change it, freeing it from the reservations which weaken this Treaty. Only after such a procedure would it be possible to talk seriously of an extension of the Treaty.
(Soviet News, 1947)
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Stassen declared that he was grateful to Stalin for receiving him. He, Stassen, had wanted an interview with Stalin as the State leader, to show his respect. He, Stassen, had undergone an interesting journey through the European countries, and during this journey was particularly interested in the economic situation of different countries after the war. It was his opinion that the living standards of the people was of great significance for their prosperity. The relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were of great significance during the war and would also be of further great significance. He was aware that that the economic systems of the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America were different. The economy of the U.S.S.R. was on the principle of planning, was built on Socialist principles and its development led by the Communist Party. In the United States there was a free economy with private capital. It would interest him to know if Stalin was of the opinion that these two economic systems could live side by side in one and the same world, and if they could cooperate together after the war.
Stalin answered that of course the two systems could cooperate together. The difference between them was of no great essential significance as far as their cooperation was concerned. The economic systems in Germany and the United States of America were the same, nevertheless it had come to war between them. The economic systems of the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. were different, but it had not led them to war with one another, but rather led them to cooperate during the war. If two different systems could cooperate during the war, why should they not be able to cooperate in peace time? Of course, he meant by that, that cooperation between two different economic systems was possible if the wish to cooperate existed. But if the wish to cooperate did not exist, then the states and people even of similar economic systems could come into conflict.
Stassen declared that the wish to cooperate was, of course, of great importance. However, earlier, before the war, in both countries, different declarations of the impossibility of cooperation had been made. Before the war, Stalin too, had himself declared this. He, Stassen, would like to know whether Stalin was of the opinion that the events of the war, the defeat of the fascist Axis of Germany and Japan, had changed the situation, and one could now, if the wish existed, hope for cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America.
Stalin answered that he could in no case have said that the two different systems could not cooperate. Lenin was the first to express the idea on the cooperation of two systems. "Lenin is our teacher," said Stalin, "and we Soviet people are Lenin's pupils. We have never deviated from Lenin's directives and we never will deviate." It was possible that he, Stalin, had said that a system, for example the capitalist system, was not willing to cooperate, but this remark concerned the wish to cooperate, but not the possibility of cooperation. But where the possibility of cooperation was concerned, he, Stalin, stood on Lenin's standpoint that cooperation between two economic systems was possible and desirable. It was also the wish of the people and the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. concerning cooperation; they had this wish. Such a cooperation could only be useful for both countries.
Stassen answered that that was clear. It reminded him of the explanation Stalin had given to the 18th Party Congress and the Plenary Session in 1937. In this declaration he had spoken of "the capitalist environment," and of "monopoly and imperialist development." from the explanation that Stalin had made today, he, Stassen, had inferred that now, after the defeat of Japan and Germany, the situation had changed.
Stalin declared that at no Party Congress and at no Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party had he spoken, nor could he have, of the impossibility of the cooperation of two systems. He, Stalin, had said that in a capitalist environment there existed the danger of an attack on the U.S.S.R. If one of the parts did not want to cooperate, that signified that the danger of an attack existed. And, in fact, Germany did not want to cooperate with the U.S.S.R., and had attacked the U.S.S.R. Had the U.S.S.R. been able to cooperate with Germany? Yes, – the U.S.S.R. had been able to cooperate with Germany, but the Germans had not wanted this. Otherwise the U.S.S.R. would have cooperated with Germany as they had with other countries. "As you see, the wish for cooperation existed, but not the possibility.
One must distinguish between the possibility of cooperation and the wish to cooperate. The possibility of cooperation is always there, but the wish to cooperate is not always there. If one part does not want to cooperate, it results in conflict, in war."
Stassen declared that the wish must be present on both sides. Stalin replied that he wanted to attest to the fact that Russia had the wish to cooperate.
Stassen said that he was pleased to hear that, and that he would like to go into Stalin's declaration about the similarity of the economic systems of the United States of America and Germany. He must say that the economic systems of the United States of America and Germany had been different from one another when it was Germany that began the war.
Stalin was not in agreement with that and explained that there was a difference between the regimes of the United States of America and Germany, but no difference between the economic systems. The regime is transient, a political factor.
Stassen said that many articles had been written saying that the capitalist system had produced the menace of monopolies, imperialism and the oppression of the workers. In his, Stassen's, opinion, the United States of America had succeeded in preventing the development of the monopolist and imperialist tendencies of capitalism, had led to prosperity and through this the workers in the United States of America had a larger say in many matters than Marx and Engels had thought possible. Therein lay the difference between the economic system of the United States of America and the economic system that existed in Hitler's Germany.
Stalin said that one must not allow oneself to be carried away by the criticism of the system of the other. Every people holds firmly to the system that it wants. History will show which system is better. One must respect the system that the people choose and approve. Whether the system in the United States of America is bad or good is a matter for the American people. For cooperation, it is not necessary for the peoples to have the same system. One must respect the system approved by the people. Only on these terms is cooperation possible.
Concerning Marx and Engels, they of course, could not predict what would happen forty years after their deaths.
The Soviet system was called a totalitarian or a dictatorship system, but the Soviet people call the American system monopoly capitalism. If the two sides begin to insult each other as monopolist or totalitarian they would not come to cooperation. One must take note of the historical fact that there exist two systems which have been approved by the people. Only on this basis is cooperation possible.
Where the passion for the criticism of monopolism and totalitarianism was concerned, it was propaganda, –, but he, Stalin, was not a propagandist, – rather a man of deeds. We may not be sectarian, Stalin said. If the people wish to change a system, they will do so. As he, Stalin, had met Roosevelt and discussed military questions, he and Roosevelt had not insulted each other as monopolists and totalitarianists. They had considered it more essential that he and Roosevelt had established cooperation with one another and had achieved victory over the enemy.
Stassen said that this manner of criticism of both sides had been one of the causes of the misunderstandings that had arisen since the end of the war. He, Stassen, wished to know whether Stalin hoped in the future to raise to a higher degree the exchange of ideas, students, teachers, actors and tourists, if cooperation was established between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America.
Stalin answered that it was inevitable, if cooperation was established. The exchange of goods led to the exchange of people.
Stassen said that in the past there had been misunderstandings between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America, that the Soviet side did not wish to exchange ideas, as was seen in the introduction of censorship of reports sent out by foreign reporters from Moscow. So that in the circumstances, that the newspaper "New York Herald Tribune" was refused permission to have a reporter of their own in Moscow, that this mistake was one of the causes of the mutual misunderstandings between the peoples of the U.S.S.R and the United States of America.
Stalin answered that the case of the refusal of a visa for a correspondent of the "New York Herald Tribune" had, as a matter of fact, happened. That this misunderstanding, however, was an accidental phenomenon and had no relation to the politics of the Soviet government. He, Stalin, knew that the "New York Herald Tribune" was a respectable newspaper. In this respect, it was of great significance that some American correspondents were unfavourably disposed towards the U.S.S.R.
Stassen answered that it was a fact that there were such reporters. The reporter of the "New York Herald Tribune" was given permission to stay in Moscow, however, only for the duration of the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Now this newspaper posed the question of sending a permanent reporter to Moscow. The "New York Herald Tribune" was a leading organ of the Republicans, that was gaining more importance now that the Republicans had gained a majority in Congress.
Stalin answered: "That is of no importance to us, we see no great difference between the Republicans and the Democrats.” Concerning the question of the reporters, he, Stalin, remembered an incident. In Tehran, the three great powers held a conference in which they worked efficiently and in a friendly atmosphere. An American reporter whose name he could not remember at the moment, had sent a report that Marshal Timoshenko was present at the Tehran Conference, although in reality he was not there, and that he, Stalin, had violently attacked Timoshenko during the dinner. But that was a big and slanderous lie. And now? Should one praise such a reporter? At that dinner, where the participants celebrated Churchill's sixty-ninth birthday, he Churchill, Brook, Leahy and others were present, in total about thirty people could attest that no such thing had taken place. Nevertheless this reporter had sent his false report to the newspaper, and it was published in the press of the United States of America. "Can one trust such a reporter? We," said Stalin, "are not of the opinion that the United States of America or its politicians are to blame for this. Such incidents do happen. That caused bad feelings among the Soviet people."
hoped, – would come to terms. In his, Stalin's, view there would need to be international control and inspection and this would be of great importance. The application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes would cause a great revolution in production procedure. Where the application of atomic energy for military purposes was concerned, it possibly would be forbidden. The desires and the conscience of the peoples demanded so.
Stassen answered that it was one of the most important problems. If it was solved, atomic energy could be a great blessing for the peoples of all the world, but if not, then a great curse.
Stalin said that he believed it would be possible to establish international control and inspection. The development moved towards that. Stassen thanked Stalin for the interview. Stalin answered that he was at Stassen's disposal and that the Russians respected their guests.
Stassen said that during the San Francisco Conference he had had an unofficial talk with Molotov. In the course of this conversation he had been invited to visit Russia.
Stalin said that he believed the situation in Europe was very bad now. What did Mr. Stassen think about it?
Stassen answered that this was right in general, – that some countries had not suffered so much from the war and were not in such a difficult position, for example Czechoslovakia and Switzerland.
Stalin said that Switzerland and Czechoslovakia were small countries.
Stassen answered that the large countries found themselves in a very difficult situation. The problems they were facing were of a financial, raw materials and nutritional nature.
Stalin explained that Europe was a part of the world in which there were many factories and works, but where there was a perceptible lack of raw materials and food. That was tragic.
Stassen thought that the poor level of the output of the coal production in the Ruhr area had led to a coal shortage in Europe.
Stalin said that a coal shortage had also been felt in England and that this was most strange.
Stassen explained that the coal production in the United States of America fortunately stood at a high level. In the United States of America, two million tons of bituminate coal was mined daily. Consequently, .the United States of America was in the position of being able to supply Europe with large amounts of coal.
Stalin declared that the situation was not so bad in the United States of America. America was protected by two oceans. On the northern border of the United States of America was the weak country of Canada, and in the south the weak country of Mexico. The United States of America did not need to be afraid of them. After the War of Independence the people had not been involved in war for sixty years and had enjoyed peace. All that had contributed to the swift development of the United States of America. In addition, the population of the United States of America consisted of people that had liberated themselves long ago from the yoke of kings and land aristocracy. All these circumstances had also favoured the rapid development of the United States of America.
Stassen declared that his great-grandfather had fled from Czechoslovakia because of imperialism. Of course, the geographical situation of the United States of America was a great help. "We are lucky," said Stassen, "that the enemy was defeated far away from our coasts. The United States of America was in the position to adapt itself completely, and after the war to resurrect production in great volume. Now the task is to avoid a depression and economic crisis."
Stalin asked if an economic crisis was expected in the United States of America.
Stassen answered that no economic crisis was expected. He believed that it was possible to regulate capitalism in the United States of America, to raise the level of employment to a high standard and to avoid any serious crisis. The main task lay, however, in avoiding a crisis in the economic system of the United States of America. But if the government followed a wise policy and if one took account of the lessons of the years 1929-30, there would be established regulated capitalism and not monopoly capitalism in the United States of America, which would help to avoid a crisis.
Stalin said that to achieve this a very strong government would be needed, which was also inspired by great determination.
Stassen said that he was right, besides which the people must understand the measures, that the stabilizing and preservation of the economic system is aimed at. That is a new task for which there is no parallel in any economic system of the world.
Stalin declared that there were favourable circumstances for the United States of America, that the two rivals of the United States of America in the world market – Japan and Germany, had been removed. Consequently, the demand for American goods had increased and that had created favourable conditions for the development of the United States of America. The markets of China and Japan were open to the United States of America, like Europe. This would help the United States of America. Such favourable conditions had never before existed.
Stassen said that on the other hand no means of payment existed in these markets, so that it would be a burden and not a profitable business for the United States of America. But of course the removal of Germany and Japan, two carriers of the imperialist danger, was a great blessing for the United States of America and for the other countries from the point of view of peace. Earlier, world trade had, of course, not been a factor of great importance for the United States of America. Their market had been confined to the area of the United States of America or the western hemisphere.
Stalin said that before the war about 10% of American produce was exported to other countries. As far as purchasing power was concerned, he, Stalin, believed the merchants would find a means of payment, so as to buy American goods and sell them to the peasants of these countries. The merchants in China, Japan, Europe and South America had saved money. Now the United States of America will probably raise its exports to 20%. Was that correct?
Stassen said that he did not believe so.
Stalin asked: "Seriously?"
Stassen answered in the affirmative and said that if the United States of America's exports increased to 15% they would be lucky, in his opinion. Most of the merchants had saved money in their country's currency, which was all tied up and not suitable for transfer. Thus, in Stassen's opinion, the exports of the United States of America would not exceed 15%.
Stalin thought that if one considered the level of production in the United States of America, then 15% was no small figure.
Stassen agreed with that.
Stalin declared that American industry, it was said, had many orders. Was that correct? It was said that the works of the United States of America were not in the position of being able to fulfil all these orders, and that all works were functioning at 100%. Was that correct?
Stassen answered that that was correct, but that they handled the inland orders.
Stalin remarked that that was very important.
Stassen said that they succeeded in meeting the demand for food, women's clothing and shoes; the production of machinery, motor vehicles and locomotives was still lagging behind.
Stalin said that reports had appeared in the American press that an economic crisis would soon occur.
Stassen said that the press had reported that the unemployment figure in the United States of America would rise to eight million in November of last year. This report, however, had been false. The task therein was to raise production to a high level and to increase stabilization, and so avoid an economic crisis.
Stalin remarked that Stassen obviously had the regulation of production in mind.
Stassen answered that that was right and explained that there were people in America who asserted that there would be a depression. But he, Stassen, was optimistic and believed and maintained that the Americans could avoid a depression; he, Stassen, knew that the people had a deeper understanding of stronger regulation than earlier.
Stalin asked: "And the business people? Would they understand, allow such regulation and submit to restrictions?"
Stassen said that the business people would oppose such a rule.
Stalin remarked that of course they would oppose it.
Stassen thought that they had, however, understood that the depression of 1929 must not repeat itself, and they could now see better the necessity of regulation. Of course, to be a far-reaching regulation, the government would need to make many decisions and to proceed sensibly.
Stalin remarked that he was right.
Stassen declared that it was necessary for all systems and forms of government.
Under any form of government it was bad for the people if they made mistakes.
Stalin agreed to that.
Stassen said that Japan and Germany had proved this to be correct.
Stalin said that in these countries the economy had been under the control of the military, which did not understand economy. So, in Japan, for example, the economy was led by Toto, who only knew how to conduct war.
Stassen said that that was right. He thanked Stalin for giving him the possibility of speaking to him and for the time Stalin had spared him.
Stalin asked how long Stassen meant to stay in the U.S.S.R.
Stassen answered that he would be going to Kiev the next day. Upon that he wanted to express his admiration for the heroic defenders of Stalingrad and he thought after that, to leave the U.S.S.R. by way of Leningrad. During the defence of Stalingrad he had been with the American fleet in the Pacific, where he had followed the Epopee of Stalingrad with anxious attention.
Stalin said that Admiral Niemitz was clearly a very important marine commander.
Stalin asked whether Stassen had been to Leningrad yet.
Stassen said that he .had not yet been to Leningrad and had the intention of leaving the U.S.S.R. by way of Leningrad.
Stalin said that the talk with Stassen had given him much.
Stassen said that the talk with Stalin had also been very useful .to him for his work in the study of economic problems.
Stalin said that he had also been occupied very much with economic problems before the war and only through the compulsion of necessity was he a military specialist.
Stassen asked whether he could get and keep the protocol of the interview from Pavlov and whether he had permission to speak to reporters about the interview if he came together with one.
Stalin said that of course Stassen could keep the protocol and talk to reporters about it, – there was nothing secret about it.
("Pravda," 8 May, 1947)
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May 17, 1948
I believe that among the political documents of recent times, that have the strengthening of peace, the furthering of international cooperation and the securing of democracy as their aims, the open letter of Henry Wallace, the presidential candidate of the Third Party in the U.S.A., is the most important.
The open letter of Wallace cannot be regarded as a mere exposition of the wish to improve the international situation, as an exposition of the wish for a peaceful settlement of the differences of opinion between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A., and the wish to find a way towards such a settlement. The declaration of the government of the U.S.A. of 4 May, and the answer of the Soviet government of 9 May are, therefore, insufficient, because they do not go so far as to declare that the settlement of the Soviet-American differences of opinion is desirable.
The great importance of the open letter lies in the fact that it is not limited just to that, to giving a declaration, but rather exceeds that, - a more important step, an advance, -and proposes a concrete programme for the peaceful settlement of the differences of opinion between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A.
One cannot say that the open letter of Wallace invariably deals with all the differences. One also cannot say that none of the formulas and opinions in the open letter need to be improved. But that is not the important thing at the moment. The important thing is that Wallace, in his letter, makes an open and honest attempt to work out a peaceful programme for a peaceful settlement and gives concrete proposals on all the points of difference between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A.
These proposals are generally known:
General limitation of armaments and the forbidding of atomic weapons. Conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and Japan and the withdrawal of the troops from these countries.
Withdrawal of the troops from China and Korea.
Consideration for the right of nations to self-determination and non-interference in their internal affairs.
Forbidding the building of military bases in the countries that belong to the United Nations.
Development of international trade in every area, with the elimination of all discrimination.
Help and rebuilding within the framework of the United Nations for countries that suffered from the war.
Defence of democracy and the securing of civil rights in all countries, etc.
One can be for or against these proposals; but no statesman that has anything to do with the matter of peace and cooperation of nations can ignore this programme, which reflects the hopes and longing of the peoples for the strengthening of peace, and which, without doubt, will find the support of millions of the common people.
I do not know whether the government of the U.S.A. acknowledges the programme of Wallace as a basis for understanding between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. As far as the government of the U.S.S.R. is concerned, we believe that the programme of Wallace could be a good and fruitful foundation for such understanding and for the development of international cooperation, because the government of the U.S.S.R. is of the opinion that despite the differences in their economic systems and ideologies, these systems can live side by side and that peaceful settlement of the differences between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. is not only possible, but also absolutely necessary in the interests of general peace.
("Pravda," 18 May, 1948)
[Interview with correspondent of Pravda, October 28, 1948]
Question: How do you regard the results of the discussions in the Security Council on the question of the situation in Berlin and the conduct of the Anglo-American and French representatives in this matter?
Answer: I regard them as a display of the aggressiveness of the policy of Anglo-American and French ruling circles.
Question: Is it true that in August of this year agreement had already been reached among the four powers on the question of Berlin?
Answer: Yes, that is true. Agreement is known to have been reached in Moscow on August 30 last, among the representatives of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Great Britain, and France regarding the simultaneous implementation of measures for the lifting of transport restrictions, on the one hand, and for the introduction of the German mark of the Soviet zone in Berlin as the sole currency, on the other hand. That agreement does not hurt anyone’s prestige. It takes into account the interests of the parties concerned and insures the possibility of further co-operation. But the governments of the U.S.A. and Great Britain disavowed then representatives in Moscow and declared the agreement to be null and void, that is, they violated the agreement, having decided to refer the question to the Security Council where the Anglo-Americans have a guaranteed majority.
Question: Is it true that, in Paris during the recent discussions on the question in the Security Council, an agreement on the situation in Berlin had again been reached in unofficial talks even before the question was voted upon in the Security Council?
Answer: Yes. That is true. Dr. Bramuglia, the representative of the Argentine and president of the Security Council, who conducted unofficial talks with Comrade Vishinsky on behalf of the other powers concerned, did have in his hands an agreed-upon draft decision on the question of the situation in Berlin. But the representatives of the U.S.A. and Great Britain once again declared that agreement to be null and void.
Question: What is the matter then? Would you explain?
Answer: The thing is that those in the United States and Great Britain who inspire an aggressive policy do not consider themselves interested in an agreement and in co-operation with the U.S.S.R. What they want is not agreement and co-operation, but talk about agreement and co-operation, so as to put the blame on the U.S.S.R. by preventing agreement and thus to “prove” that co-operation with the U.S.S.R. is impossible. What the war instigators who are striving to unleash a new war fear most of all is the reaching of agreements and co-operation with the U.S.S.R. because a policy of concord with the U.S.S.R. undermines the position of the instigators of war and deprives the aggressive policy of these gentlemen of any purpose.
It is for this reason that they disrupt agreements that have already been reached, that they disavow their representatives who have drawn up such agreements together with the U.S.S.R., and in violation of the United Nations Charter refer the question to the Security Council, where they have a guaranteed majority and where they can “prove” whatever they like. All this is done to “show” that co-operation with the U.S.S.R. is impossible and to “show” the necessity for a new war, and thus to prepare the ground for the unleashing of war. The policy of the present leaders of the U.S.A. and Great Britain is a policy of aggression, a policy of unleashing a new war.
Question: How should one regard the conduct of the representatives of the six states, members of the Security Council: of China, Canada, Belgium, Argentina, Colombia, and Syria?
Answer: Those gentlemen are obviously lending their support to the policy of aggression, to the policy of unleashing a new war.
Question: What can all this end in?
Answer: It can only end in ignominious failure on the part of the instigators of a new war. Churchill, the main instigator of a new sear, has already managed to deprive himself of the trust of his own nation and of democratic forces throughout the world. The same fate lies in store for all other instigators of war. The horrors of the recent war are still too fresh in the memory of the peoples; and public forces favoring peace are too strong for Churchill’s pupils in aggression to overpower them and to turn them toward a new war.
(For Peaceful Coexistence: Post War Interviews, International Publishers, New York, 1951)
January 27, 1949
[Interview with Kingsbury Smith, representative of International News Service, January 27, 1949]
Question: Would the government of the U.S.S.R. be prepared to consider the issuance of a joint declaration with the government of the United States of America, asserting that the respective governments have no intention of resorting to war against one another?
Answer: The Soviet government would be prepared to consider the issuance of such a declaration.
Question: Would the government of the U.S.S.R, be prepared to join with the government of the United States of America in measures designed to implement this pact of peace, such as gradual disarmament?
Answer:Naturally, the government of the U.S.S.R. could cooperate with the government of the United States of America in taking measures designed to implement this pact of peace and leading to gradual disarmament.
Question: If the governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and France agreed to postpone the establishment of a separate Western German state, pending a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider the German problem as a whole, would the Government of the U.S.S.R. be prepared to remove the restrictions which the Soviet authorities have imposed on communications between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany?
Answer: Provided the United States of America, Great Britain, and France observe the conditions set forth in the third question, the Soviet government sees no obstacles to lifting transport restrictions, on the understanding, however, that transport and trade restrictions introduced by the three Powers should be lifted simultaneously.
Question: Would Your Excellency be prepared to confer with President Truman at a mutually suitable place to discuss the possibility of concluding such a pact of peace?
Answer: I have already stated before that there is no objection to a meeting.
(For Peaceful Coexistence: Post War Interviews, International Publishers, New York, 1951)
On the question of a meeting with Truman
February 2, 1949
To Mr. Kingsbury Smith, European General Director of the "International News Service" Agency.
I have received your telegram of 1 February.
I thank President Truman for the invitation to Washington. It i has long been my wish to travel to Washington, as I formerly said to President Roosevelt in Yalta and to President Truman in Potsdam. Sadly, I do not have the possibility of realizing my wish at present, as the doctor has decided against my making a long journey, especially by sea or air.
The government of the Soviet Union would greet a visit from the President to the U.S.S.R. One could hold a conference in Moscow, Leningrad or in Kaliningrad, Odessa or Yalta, whichever the President chooses, - of course, in so far as it presents no inconvenience.
However, if this proposal meets with objections, one could hold a meeting in Poland or in Czechoslovakia, at the President’s convenience.
Respectfully,
J. Stalin
("New World," February 1949, p. 4)
[Greetings to the President and Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic, October 13, 1949]
Allow me to congratulate you and, in your persons, the German people, on the creation of the German Democratic Republic and the election of the former to the presidency and the latter as Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic.
The formation of the peace-loving German Democratic Republic is a turning point in the history of Europe. There can be no doubt that the existence of a peace-loving democratic Germany side by side with the existence of the peace-loving Soviet Union excludes the possibility of new wars in Europe, puts an end to bloodshed in Europe, and makes impossible the enslaving of European countries by the world imperialists.
The experience of the recent war showed that the biggest sacrifices in this war were borne by the German and Soviet peoples, and that these two peoples possess the greatest potentialities in Europe for accomplishing great actions of world importance. If these two peoples display determination to fight for peace, straining their energies to the same extent as they did to wage war, peace in Europe may then be considered as secured.
Thus laying the foundation for a unified, democratic, and peace-loving Germany, you simultaneously perform a great deed for all of Europe, guaranteeing her lasting peace.
You need not doubt that in advancing along this road and promoting the cause of peace you will find great sympathy and active support among all the peoples of the world, including the American, British, French, Polish, Czechoslovak, and Italian peoples, let alone the peace-loving Soviet people. I wish you success on this new and glorious road. May unified, independent, democratic, peace-loving Germany live and prosper!
(For Peaceful Coexistence: Post War Interviews, International Publishers, New York, 1951)
July 15, 1950
[Reply to Prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, in connection with his proposals for seating the representatives of the People’s Government of China on the Security Council of the U.N. and the “cessation of the conflict” in Korea, July 15, 1950]
I welcome your peaceable initiative. I fully share your point of view as regards the expediency of peaceful regulation of the Korean question through the Security Council with the obligatory participation of representatives of the five great Powers, including the People’s Government of China. I believe that for speedy settlement of the Korean question it would be expedient to hear in the Security Council representatives of the Korean people.
(For Peaceful Coexistence: Post War Interviews, International Publishers, New York, 1951)
Q. How do you, evaluate the last declaration of the British Prime Minister Attlee, in the House of Commons, that since the end of the war, the Soviet Union has not disarmed; that is, they have not demobilized their troops; that the Soviet Union has since then even further increased their forces?
A. I evaluate this declaration of Prime Minister Attlee as a slander on the Soviet Union.
The whole world knows that the Soviet Union has demobilized its troops after the war. As it is known, the demobilization was carried out in three phases: the first and second phases in the year 1945, and the third phase from May to September, 1946. In addition, in the years 1946 and 1947, the demobilization of older age groups of the Soviet army was carried through and, starting in 1948, the rest of the older age groups were demobilized.
That is a generally known fact.
If Prime Minister Attlee was conversant with finance and economy he would be able to understand, without difficulty, that no one state, also not the Soviet Union, is in the position to completely develop the volume of their peace industry, - even more, - dozens of billions of the state expenditure is required for the purpose of building, such as the hydro-power works on the Volga, Dnieper and Amu-Darya; to introduce the policy of a systematic reduction in the price of consumer goods. Likewise, dozens of billions of the state expenditure is needed to immediately add to the hundreds of billions for the reconstruction of the economy demolished by the German occupation, to expand the people's economy and at the same time to increase their military forces and develop their war industry. It is not difficult to understand that such a foolish policy would lead to state bankruptcy. Prime Minister Attlee must, from his own experience as well as, from the experience of the U.S.A., know that the increasing of the military forces of countries and the development of the arms race would lead to a limitation of the peace industry, to a close-down of great civic building, to a raising of tax and to a raising of the price of consumer goods. It is understandable that, if the Soviet Union does not limit the peace industry but, on the contrary, furthers it, then new building, greater hydro-power works and water systems will not be suspended but, on the contrary, developed, the policy of reducing prices will not be suspended but, on the contrary, continued, they could not at the same time develop their war industry and increase their military strength without thereby taking the risk of bankruptcy.
And if Prime Minister Attlee, despite all these facts and economic considerations, nevertheless holds it possible to openly insult the Soviet Union and its peaceful politics, one can only declare that, by slandering the Soviet Union, the present Labour government in England wants to justify carrying on their own arms race.
Prime Minister Attlee needs to lie about the Soviet Union; he must represent the peaceful politics of the Soviet Union as aggressive, and the aggressive politics of the English government as peaceful politics to mislead the English people, to blindfold them with this lie about the Soviet Union, and in this way drag them towards a new world war that would be organized by the warmongering circles in the United States of America.
Prime Minister Attlee pretends to be a follower of peace. But if he really is for peace, why was he against the proposal of the Soviet Union in the United Nations Organization on the conclusion of a peace pact between the Soviet Union, England, the United States of America, China and France?
If he really is for peace, why is he against the proposals of the Soviet Union to immediately begin to limk armaments and to immediately forbid atomic weapons?
If he really is for peace, why does he persecute those that intercede for the defence of peace; why has he forbidden the peace congress in England? Could the campaign for the defence of peace possibly threaten the security of England?
It is clear that Prime Minister Attlee is not for the keeping of peace, but rather for the unleashing of a new world-encompassing war of aggression.
Q. What do you think about the intervention in Korea? How can that end?
A. If England and the United States of America finally decline the proposals of the People's Government of China for peace, then the war in Korea can only end in defeat of the interventionists.
Q. Why? Are then, the American and English generals and officers worse than the Chinese and Korean?
A. No, not worse. The American and English generals and officers are not worse than the generals and officers of any other country you like to name. Where the soldiers of the U.S.A. and England are concerned, in the war against Hitler-Germany and militaristic Japan, they proved to be the best side, as is known. Where, then, lies the difference? In that the soldiers in the war against Korea and China do not consider it as just, whereas in the war against Hitler-Germany and militaristic Japan, they considered it absolutely just. It also lies in that this war is extremely unpopular among the American and English soldiers.
In this case it is difficult to convince the soldiers that China, who threatened neither England nor America, from whom the Americans stole the island of Taiwan, are aggressors, and that the U.S.A., having stolen the island of Taiwan and led their troops straight to the borders of China, is the defending side. It is therefore difficult to convince the troops that the U.S.A. is right to defend its security on Korean territory and on the borders of China, and that China and Korea are not right to defend their security on their own territory or on the borders of their states. That is why the war is unpopular among the American and English soldiers.
It is understandable that experienced generals and officers will suffer a defeat if their soldiers are forced into a war which they consider totally unjust, and if they believe their duties at the front to be formal, without believing in the justice of their mission, without feeling enthusiasm.
Q. How do you evaluate the decision of the United Nations Organization to declare the Chinese People's Republic as the aggressors?
A. 1 regard it as a scandalous decision.
Really, one must have lost what was left of conscience to maintain that the United States of America, which has stolen Chinese territory, the island of Taiwan, and fallen upon China's borders in Korea, is the defensive side; and on the other hand, to declare that the Chinese People's “Republic which has defended its borders and striven to take back the island of Taiwan, stolen by the Americans, is the aggressor.
The United Nations Organization, which was created as a bulwark for keeping peace, has been transformed into an instrument of war, a means to unleash a new world war. The aggressive core of the United Nations Organization have formed the aggressive North Atlantic pact from ten member states (the U.S.A., England, France, Belgium, Canada, Holland, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland) and twenty Latin-American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Equador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruquay, Venezuela.) And the representatives of these countries now make the decisions in the United Nations Organization about war and peace. It was these that have, in the United Nations Organizations, carried through the scandalous decision about the aggression of the Chinese People's Republic.
It is typical of the present situation in the United Nations Organization, that, for example, the little Dominican Republic in America that has a population figure of scarcely two million, has today the same weight in the United Nations Organization as India has, and a much greater weight than the Chinese People's Republic, which has been robbed of a voice in the United Nations Organization.
Thus, the United Nations Organization, from being a world organization of nations with equal rights, has changed into an instrument of a war of aggression. In reality, the United Nations Organization is now not so much a world organization as an organization for the Americans and treats American aggression as acceptable. Not only the United States of America and Canada are striving to unleash a new war, but on this path you also find the twenty Latin-American countries; their landowners and merch.ants long for a new war somewhere in Europe or Asia, to sell their goods to the countries at inflated prices, and to make millions out of this bloody business. The fact is not a secret -to anybody that the representatives of the twenty Laiin-American countries represent the strongest supporters and the willing army of the United Stales of America in the United Nations Organization.
The United Nations Organization treads, in this maniier, the inglorious path of the League of Nations. Thereby they bury their moral authority unci fall into decay.
Q. Do you hold a new world war to be unavoidable?
A. No. At least, one can, at present, hold it to be not unavoidable.
Of course, in the United States of America, in England and also in France, there are aggressive powers that long for a new war. .They need war to achieve super-profits and to plunder other countries. These are the billionaires and millionaires that regard war as a fountain of revenue, that brings colossal profits.
They, the aggressive powers, hold the reactionary governments in their hands and guide them. But at the same time they are afraid of their people who do not want a new war and are for the keeping of peace. Therefore they take the trouble of using the reactionary governments to ensnare their people with lies, to deceive them, to represent a new war as a war of defence, and the peaceful politics of peace-loving countries as aggressive. They take the trouble to deceive the people, to force them and draw them into a new war with their aggressive plans.
They therefore even fear the campaign for the defence of peace, they fear that this campaign would expose the aggressive intentions of the reactionary governments.
They therefore even oppose the proposals of the Soviet Union on the conclusion of a peace treaty, on the limitation of armaments and on the forbidding of atomic weapons; they fear that the acceptance of these proposals would frustrate the aggressive measures of the reactionary governments and render the arms race unnecessary.
Where will all this struggle between the aggressive and the peace-loving powers end?
Peace will be kept and strengthened if the people take the holding of peace into their own hands and defend it to the utmost. War could be unavoidable if the arsonists of war succeed in trapping the masses with their lies, in deceiving them and in drawing them into a new war.
Now, therefore, a broad campaign for the holding of peace, as a way of exposing the criminal machinations of the arsonists of war, is of prime importance.
As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it will continue to carry through the politics of preventing war and keeping peace.
J. Stalin
("For lasting Peace, for People's Democracy!" No. 8, 23 February - 1 March, 1951)
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On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of victory oven. the Japanese imperialists
September 2, 1951
To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic, Comrade Mao Tse Tung.
I thank you, Comrade Chairman, for the high estimation of the role which the Soviet Union and its fighting power played in the smashing of Japanese aggression.
The Chinese people, and their liberation army have played a great role, despite the machinations of the Kuomintang, in the liquidation of Japanese imperialism. The struggle of the Chinese people and their liberation army has helped the smashing of the Japanese aggression profoundly.
It cannot be doubted that the unbreakable friendship of the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic serves and will serve to guarantee peace in the far East against all and every aggressor and arsonist of war.
Please accept, Comrade Chairman, the good wishes of the Soviet Union and its fighting forces on the sixth anniversary of the liberation of East Asia from the yoke of Japanese imperialism.
Long live the great friendship of the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union!
Long live the Chinese People's Liberation Army!
J. Stalin
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R,
("New Times," No. 36, 5 September, 1951, p. 1)
October 6, 1951
[Interview with correspondent of Pravda, October 6, 1951]
Question: What is your opinion of the hubbub raised recently in the foreign press in connection with the test of an atom bomb in the Soviet Union?
Answer: Indeed, one of the types of atom bombs was recently tested in our country. Tests of atom bombs of different calibers will be conducted in the future as well, in accordance with the plan for the defence of our country from attack by the Anglo-American aggressive bloc.
Question: In connection with the test of the atom bomb, various personages in the United States are raising alarm and shouting about the threat to the security of the United States. Are there any grounds for such alarm?
Answer: There are no grounds whatever for such alarm. Personages in the United States cannot but know that the Soviet Union is not only opposed to the employment of the atomic weapon, but that it also stands for its prohibition and for the termination of its production. It is known that the Soviet Union has several times demanded the prohibition of the atomic weapon, but each time this has been refused by the Atlantic bloc powers. This means that, in the event of an attack by the United States on our country, the ruling circles of the United States will use the atom bomb. It is this circumstance that has compelled the Soviet Union to have the atomic weapon in order to meet the aggressors fully prepared. Of course the aggressors want the Soviet Union to be unarmed in the event of their attack upon it. The Soviet Union, however, does not agree to this, and it thinks that it should be fully prepared to meet the aggressor. Consequently, if the United States has no intention of attacking the Soviet Union, the alarm of the personages in the United States should be considered as pointless and false, because the Soviet Union does not contemplate ever attacking the United States or any other country.
Personages in the United States are vexed because the secret of the atom bomb is possessed not only by the United States but also by other countries, the Soviet Union primarily. They would like the United States to be the monopolist of the production of the atom bomb. They would like the United States to have unlimited power to intimidate and blackmail other countries. But on what grounds do they think so? By what right do the interests of preserving peace require such monopoly? Would it not be more correct to say that matters are directly the opposite, that it is the interests of preserving peace that require first of all the liquidation of such a monopoly and then the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon too? I think that the proponents of the atom bomb may agree to the prohibition of the atomic weapon only if they see that they are no longer monopolists.
Question: What is your opinion regarding international control of the atomic weapon?
Answer: The Soviet Union stands for prohibiting the atomic weapon and terminating the production of the atomic weapon. The Soviet Union stands for the establishment of international control over the fully exact and conscientious implementation of the decision to prohibit the atomic weapon, to terminate the production of the atomic weapon and utilize the already produced atom bombs solely for civilian purposes. The Soviet Union stands for precisely this kind of international control. American personages also speak of control, but their control presupposes not the termination of the production of the atomic weapon, but the continuation of such production in quantities conforming to the amounts of raw material at the disposal of different countries. Consequently, the American control presupposes not prohibiting the atomic weapon, but making it legal and lawful. Thereby the right of the warmongers to annihilate tens and hundreds of thousands of peaceful inhabitants with the help of the atomic weapon is made lawful. It is not difficult to understand that this is not control but a mockery of control and a deception of the peaceful aspirations of the peoples. It is clear that such control cannot satisfy the peace-loving peoples who demand the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the termination of its production.
(For Peaceful Coexistence: Post War Interviews, International Publishers, New York, 1951)
December 31, 1951
To the Chief Editor of the Kyodo Agency, Mr. Kiishi Iwamoto
Dear Mr. Iwamoto! I have received your request to send the Japanese people a message for New Year.
It is not a tradition of Soviet statesmen to send greetings to the people of another state. But the great sympathy that the people of the Soviet Union have for the Japanese people, who have suffered misery through foreign occupation, leads me to make an exception to the rule and to accede to your request.
I ask you to convey to the Japanese people my wishes for their freedom and happiness, as well as success in their courageous struggle for the independence of their homeland.
The people of the Soviet Union have in the past, learnt to know themselves, the terror of foreign occupation, in which the Japanese imperialists took part. Therefore, they fully understand the sorrow of the Japanese people, have great sympathy for them and believe that the rebirth and independence of their homeland will be achieved, even as it was by the people of the Soviet Union.
I wish the Japanese workers liberation from unemployment, from poor wages, the abolition of high prices for consumer goods and success in the struggle for keeping peace.
I wish the Japanese peasants liberation from landlessness and poverty, the abolition of high taxes and success in the struggle for keeping peace.
I wish the entire Japanese people and their intelligentsia, complete victory of the democratic forces of Japan, the revival and prosperity of the economic life of the country, a blossoming of national culture, knowledge and art as well as success in the struggle for keeping peace.
J. Stalin
("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 2, 3 January, 1952)
March 31, 1952
Q. Is a third world war presently as near as two or three years away?
A. No, it is not.
Q. Would a meeting of heads of state of the great powers be useful?
A. Possibly, it would be useful.
Q. Are you of the opinion that the present times are appropriate for Germany’s unification?
A. Yes, I am of that opinion.
Q. On what basis is it possible for capitalism and communism to live side by side?
A. It is possible for capitalism and communism to live side by side if both sides wish to cooperate and the readiness to do so exists, to fulfil the duties they have taken on themselves, if its basis is complete equality and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states.
J. Stalin
("Unity," 5 May, 1952, P. 417)
May 8, 1952
To the Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Otto Grotewohl.
I ask the government of the German Demo-ocratic Republic and you personally, Comrade Minister President, to accept my thanks for your friendly greetings on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of the German people from the fascist tyranny.
I wish the German people and the government of the German Democratic Republic, success in the struggle for an united, independent, democratic and peace-loving Germany, for the immediate conclusion of a peace treaty and the departure of the occupying forces from Germany in the interests of Germany and of world peace.
J. Stalin
("New Germany," Berlin Ed., No. 109, May, 1952)
Comrades!
Permit me, in the name of our Party Congress, to express our thanks to all fraternal parties and organizations whose representatives have honoured our Party Congress by their presence, or who have sent our Party Congress greetings of friendship, for their wishes for our further success and for their confidence. (Stormy, prolonged applause that became an ovation.)
For us, this trust is especially valuable as it signifies their readiness to support our Party in its struggle for a better future for the people, in its struggle against war, in its struggle to keep peace. (Stormy, prolonged applause.)
It would be a mistake to believe that our Party, which has become a mighty power, does not need more support. That would be wrong. Our Party and our country need the continuous trust, sympathy and support of fraternal peoples outside our borders, and will always need it.
The special quality of this support lies in that every support of the peace endeavours of our Party by each fraternal party, simultaneously signifies the support of their own people in their struggle to keep peace. As the English workers in the years 1918-1919, during the armed attack of the English bourgeoisie on the Soviet Union, organized their struggle against the war under the slogan "Hands off Russia!", was a support, it was above all a support of the struggle of their own people for peace, and then, also, a support of the Soviet Union. If Comrade Thorez or Comrade Togliatti declare that their people do not want to be led into a war against the people of the Soviet Union (stormy applause), – then that is a support, above all a support for the French and Italian workers and peasants who struggle for peace, and then, also, a support of the peace endeavours of the Soviet Union. The special quality of the present support is thus explained, that the interests of our Party are not only not against the interests of the peace-loving people, but on the contrary, blend with them. (Stormy applause.) Where the Soviet Union is concerned, its interest in the matter of world peace cannot be separated from the cause of peace in the whole world.
It is understood that our Party must do its duty by its fraternal parties and support them and their peoples in the struggle for liberation and in their struggle for keeping peace. This is what the Party does. (Stormy applause.) After the seizure of power by our Party in 1917, and after our Party took real measures to eliminate the yoke of capitalists and landlords, the representatives of the' fraternal parties, inspired by our daring and the success of our Party, gave it the name "Shock Brigade" of the revolutionary movement and the workers' movement of the world. Thereby they expressed the hope that the success of the "Shock Brigade" would alleviate the sufferings of the people in the situation of being under the capitalist yoke. I think that our Party has fulfilled these hopes, especially in the time of the second world war, as the Soviet Union smashed the German and Japanese fascist tyranny and liberated the European and Asian peoples from the danger of fascist slavery. (Stormy applause.)
Of course it was very difficult to fulfil this honourable task as long as there was only one "Shock Brigade," as long as it stood alone, the avant-garde in the fulfillment of this task. But that is in the past. Now it is completely different. Now, from China and Korea to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, new "Shock Brigades" have appeared on the map, in the form of people's democracies; now the struggle has been eased for our Party and also the work proceeds better. (Stormy, prolonged applause.)
Special attention must be paid to the communist, democratic or worker and peasant parties that are not yet in power and which must carry out their work under the yoke of strict, bourgeois rule. Of course their work is more difficult. But their work is not so difficult as it was for us Russian Communists in the time of the Tsar, as the smallest step forward was declared a serious crime. The Russian Communists nevertheless held firm, did not retreat from difficulties and came to victory. The same will be the case with these parties.
Why is it that these parties do not have such difficult work as the Russian Communists had in the times of Tsarism?
Because, first of all, they have the example of the struggle and success, as in the Soviet Union and in the people's democratic countries, before them. Consequently, they can learn from the mistakes and successes of these countries and thus ease their work.
Because, secondly, the bourgeoisie itself, the arch-enemy of the freedom movement, has become different, has essentially changed, has become more reactionary, has lost the cooperation of the people and thus has been weakened. It is understood that these circumstances must likewise ease the work of the revolutionary and democratic parties. (Stormy applause.)
Earlier, the bourgeoisie presented themselves as liberal, they were for bourgeois democratic freedom and in that way gained popularity with the people. Now there is not one remaining trace of liberalism. There is no such thing as "freedom of personality" any more, -personal rights are now only acknowledged by them, the owners of capital, – all the other citizens are regarded as raw materials, that are only for exploitation. The principle of equal rights for people and nations is trodden in the dust and it is replaced by the principle of Full rights for the exploiting minority and the lack of rights of the exploited majority of the citizens. The banner of bourgeois democratic free clom has boon flung overboard. I think thai you, the representatives of communist and democratic parties must pick up this banner and carry it forward if you want to gain the majority of the people. There is nobody else to raise it. (Stormy applause.)
Earlier, the bourgeoisie, as the heads of nations, were for the rights and independence of nations and put that "above all." Now there is no trace left of this "national principle." Now the bourgeoisie sell the rights and independence of their nations for dollars. The banner of national independence and national sovereignty has been thrown overboard. Without doubt, you, the representatives of the communist and democratic parties must raise this banner and carry it forward if you want to be patriots of your countries, if you want to be the leading powers of the nations. There is nobody else to raise it. (Stormy applause.)
That is how matters stand at present.
It is understood that all these circumstances must ease the work of the communist and democratic parties that are not yet in power.
Consequently, there is every ground for the success and victory of the fraternal parties in the lands of capitalist rule. (Stormy applause.)
Long live our fraternal parties! (Prolonged applause.)
Long life and health to the leaders of the fraternal parties! (Prolonged applause.)
Long live the peace between the peoples! (Prolonged applause.)
Down with the arsonists of war! (Everyone stood up. Stormy, prolonged applause that became an ovation. There were shouts of "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Long live the great leader of the working people of the world, Comrade Stalin!" "The, great Stalin!" "Long live peace between the peoples!")
(Speech at the 19th Party Congress of the C.P.S.U., Dietz Press, Berlin 1952, pp. 5 - 15)
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