

**REF: 1**

**THE PARTY'S TASKS (Report Delivered at an Enlarged Meeting of the Krasnaya Presnya District Committee of the R.C.P. (B) With Group Organisers, Members of the debating Society and of the Bureau of the Party Units, December 2, 1923, Pravda, December 6, 1923, J.V. Stalin, Works, 1921-1923, V.5, p.368-369, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1953, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd.**

**THE CAUSES OF THE DEFECTS**

The first cause is that our Party organisations have not yet rid themselves, or have still not altogether rid themselves, of certain survivals of the war period, a period that has passed, but has left in the minds of our responsible workers vestiges of the military regime in the Party. I think that these survivals find expression in the view that our Party is not an independently acting organism, not an independently acting, militant organisation of the proletariat, but something in the nature of a system of institutions, something in the nature of a complex of institutions in which there are officials of lower rank and officials of higher rank. That, comrades, is a profoundly mistaken view that has nothing in common with Marxism; that view is a survival that we have inherited from the war period, when we militarised the Party, when the question of the independent activity of the mass of the Party membership had necessarily to be shifted into the background and military orders were of decisive importance. I do not remember that this view was ever definitely expressed; nevertheless, it, or elements of it, still influences our work. Comrades, we must combat such views with all our might, for they are a very real danger and create favourable conditions for the distortion in practice of the essentially correct line of our Party.

The second cause is that our state apparatus, which is bureaucratic to a considerable degree, exerts a certain amount of pressure on the Party and the Party workers. In 1917, when we were forging ahead, towards October, we imagined that we would have a Commune, a free association of working people, that we would put an end to bureaucracy in government institutions, and that it would be possible, if not in the immediate period, then within two or three short periods, to transform the state into a free association of working people. Practice has shown, however, that this is still an ideal which is a long way off, that to rid the state of the elements of bureaucracy, to transform Soviet society into a free association of working people, the people must have a high level of culture, peace conditions must be fully guaranteed all around us so as to remove the necessity of maintaining a large standing army, which entails heavy expenditure and cumbersome administrative departments, the very existence of which leaves its impress upon all the other state institutions. Our state apparatus is bureaucratic to a considerable degree, and it will remain so for a long time to come. Our Party comrades work in this apparatus, and the situation—I might say the atmosphere—in this bureaucratic apparatus is such that it helps to bureaucratise our Party workers and our Party organisations.

**REF: 2**

**THE DISCUSSION, RAFAIL, THE ARTICLES BY PREOBRAZHESKY AND SAPRONOV, AND TROTSKY'S LETTER,** Pravda, December 15, 1923, J.V. Stalin, Works, 1921-1923, V.5, p.393-397, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1953, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd.

...

**TROTSKY'S LETTER**

...

After referring to bureaucracy in the Party apparatus and the danger of degeneration of the old guard, i.e., the Leninists, the main core of our Party, Trotsky writes:

"The degeneration of the 'old guard' has been observed in history more than once. Let us take the latest and most glaring historical example: the leaders and the parties of the Second International. We know that Wilhelm Liebknecht, Bebel, Singer, Victor Adler, Kautsky, Bernstein, Lafargue, Guesde, and others, were the immediate and direct pupils of Marx and Engels. We know, however, that all those leaders—some partly, and others wholly—degenerated into opportunism."... "We, that is, we 'old ones,' must say that our generation, which naturally plays a leading role in the Party, has no self-sufficient guarantee against the gradual and imperceptible weakening of the proletarian and revolutionary spirit, assuming that the Party tolerates a further growth and consolidation of this bureaucratic-apparatus methods of policy which are transforming the younger generation into passive educational material and are inevitably creating estrangement between the apparatus and the membership, between the old and the young."... "The youth—the Party's truest barometer—react most sharply of all against Party bureaucracy."... "The youth must capture the revolutionary formulas by storm...."

First, I must dispel a possible misunderstanding. As is evident from his letter, Trotsky includes himself among the Bolshevik old guard, thereby showing readiness to take upon himself the charges that may be hurled at the old guard if it does indeed take the path of degeneration. It must be admitted that this readiness for self-sacrifice is undoubtedly a noble trait. But I must protect Trotsky from Trotsky, because, for obvious reasons, he cannot, and should not, bear responsibility for the possible degeneration of the principal cadres of the Bolshevik old guard. Sacrifice is a good thing, of course, but do the old Bolsheviks need it? I think that they do not.

Secondly, it is impossible to understand how opportunists and Mensheviks like Bernstein, Adler, Kautsky, Guesde, and the others, can be put on a par with the Bolshevik old guard, which has always fought, and I hope will continue to fight with honour, against opportunism, the Mensheviks and the Second International. What is the cause of this muddle and confusion? Who needs it bearing in mind the interests of the Party and not ulterior motives that by no means aim at defence of the old guard? How is one to interpret these insinuations about opportunism in relation to the old Bolsheviks, who matured in the struggle against opportunism?

Thirdly, I do not by any means think that the old Bolsheviks are absolutely guaranteed against the danger of degeneration any more than I have grounds for asserting that we are absolutely guaranteed against, say, an earthquake. As a possibility, such a danger can and should be assumed. But does this mean that such a danger is real, that it exists? I think that it does not. Trotsky himself has adduced no evidence to show that the danger of degeneration is a real danger. Nevertheless, there are a number of elements within our Party who are capable of giving rise to a real danger of degeneration of certain ranks of our Party. I have in mind that section of the Mensheviks who joined our Party unwillingly, and who have not yet got rid of their old opportunist habits. The following is what Comrade Lenin wrote about these Mensheviks, and about this danger, at the time of the Party purge:

"Every opportunist is distinguished for his adaptability, and the Mensheviks, as opportunists, adapt themselves 'on principle' so to speak, to the prevailing trend among the workers and assume a protective colouring, just as a hare's coat turns white in the winter. It is necessary to know this specific feature of the Mensheviks and take it into account. And taking it into account means purging the Party of approximately ninety-nine out of every hundred of the Mensheviks who joined the Russian Communist Party after 1918, i.e., when the victory of Bolsheviks first became probable and then certain (See Vol. XXVII, p. 13.)

How could it happen that Trotsky, who lost sight of this and similar, really existing dangers, pushed into the foreground a possible danger, the danger of the degeneration of the Bolshevik old guard? How can one shut one's eyes to a real danger and push into the foreground an unreal, possible danger, if one has the interest of the Party in view and not the object of undermining the prestige of the majority in the Central Committee, the leading core of the Bolshevik old guard? Is it not obvious that "approaches" of this kind can only bring grist to the mill of the opposition?

Fourthly, what reason did Trotsky have for contrasting the "old ones," who may degenerate, to the "youth," the Party's "truest barometer"; for contrasting the "old guard," who may become bureaucratic, to the "young guard," which must "capture the revolutionary formulas by storm"? What grounds had he for drawing this contrast, and what did he need it for? Have not the youth and the old guard always marched in a united front against internal and external enemies? Is not the unity between the "old ones" and the "young ones" the basic strength of our revolution? What was the object of this attempt to discredit the old guard and demagogically to flatter the youth if not to cause and widen a fissure between these principal detachments of our Party? Who needs all this, if one has the interests of the Party in view, its unity and solidarity, and not an attempt to shake this unity for the benefit of the opposition?

### REF: 3

**THIRTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P. (B.),** January 16-18, 1924, J.V. Stalin, Works, 1924, V.6, p.15-23, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1953, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd.

...  
Trotsky's third error is that in his pronouncements he puts the Party apparatus in opposition to the Party and advances the slogan of combating the "apparatus men." Bolshevism cannot accept such contrasting of the Party to the Party apparatus. What, actually, does our Party apparatus consist of? It consists of the Central Committee, the Regional Committees, the Gubernia Committees, the Uyezd Committees. Are these subordinated to the Party? Of course they are, for to the extent of 90 per cent they are elected by the Party. Those who say that Gubernia Committees have been appointed are wrong. They are wrong, because, as you know, comrades, our Gubernia Committees are elected, just as the Uyezd Committees and the C.C. are. They are subordinated to the Party. But once elected, they must direct the work, that is the point. Is Party work conceivable without direction from the Central Committee, after its election by the congress, and from the Gubernia Committee, after its election by the Gubernia conference? Surely, Party work is inconceivable without this. Surely, this is an irresponsible anarcho-Menshevik view which renounces the very principle of direction of Party activities. I am afraid that by contrasting the Party apparatus to the Party, Trotsky, whom, of course, I have no intention of putting on a par with the Mensheviks, impels some of the inexperienced elements in our Party towards the standpoint of anarcho-Menshevik indiscipline and organisational laxity. I am afraid that this error of Trotsky's may expose our entire Party apparatus—the apparatus without which the Party is inconceivable—to attack by the inexperienced members of the Party.

Trotsky's fourth error consists in the fact that he has put the young members of the Party in opposition to its cadres, that he has unwarrantedly accused our cadres of degeneration. Trotsky put our Party on a par with the Social-Democratic Party in Germany. He referred to examples how certain disciples of Marx, veteran Social-Democrats, had degenerated, and from this he concluded that the same danger of degeneration faces our Party cadres. Properly speaking, one might well laugh at the sight of a C.C. member who only yesterday fought Bolshevism hand in hand with the opportunists and Mensheviks, attempting now, in this seventh year of Soviet power, to assert, even if only as an assumption, that our Party cadres, born, trained and steeled in the struggle against Menshevism and opportunism—that these cadres are faced with the prospect of degeneration. I repeat, one might well laugh at this attempt. Since, however, this assertion was made at no ordinary time but during a discussion, and since we are confronted here with a certain contrasting of the Party cadres, who are alleged to be susceptible to degeneration, to the young Party members, who are alleged to be free, or almost free, of such a danger, this assumption, though essentially ridiculous and frivolous, may acquire, and already has acquired, a definite practical significance. That is why I think we must stop to look into it.

...  
Trotsky affirms that groups arise because of the bureaucratic regime instituted by the Central Committee and that if there were no bureaucratic regime, there would be no groups either. This is an un-Marxist approach, comrades. Groups arise, and will continue to arise, because we have in our country the most diverse forms of economy—from embryonic forms of socialism down to medievalism. That in the first place. Then we have the NEP, that is, we have allowed capitalism, the revival of private capital and the revival of the ideas that go with it, and these ideas are penetrating into the Party. That in the second place. And, in the third place, our Party is made up of three component parts: there are workers, peasants and intellectuals in its ranks. These then, if we approach the question in a

Marxist way, are the causes why certain elements are drawn from the Party for the formation of groups, which in some cases we must remove by surgical action, and in others dissolve by ideological means, through discussion.

It is not a question of regime here. There would be many more groups under a regime of maximum freedom. So it is not the regime that is to blame, but the conditions in which we live, the conditions that exist in our country, the conditions governing the development of the Party itself.

#### **REF: 4**

**THIRTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P. (B.),** May 23-31, 1924, J.V. Stalin, Works, 1924, V.6, p.233-238, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1953, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd.

#### **REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION, May 27**

....  
The point is that there is a vast difference between the discussion in the second period and that in the first, where the discussion found its reflection in the December 5 resolution- That resolution did not raise the question of a degeneration of the cadres. Trotsky, with whom we jointly framed that resolution, did not so much as hint at a degeneration of the cadres. Evidently, he was saving this additional issue for his later pronouncements.

Further, the December 5 resolution does not raise the question of the student youth being the truest barometer. This question, too, Trotsky was apparently keeping in reserve for fresh discussion pronouncements. In the December 5 resolution there is nothing of the tendency to attack the apparatus, nor of the demands for punitive measures against the Party apparatus, about which Trotsky spoke at such length in his subsequent letters. Lastly, in the December 5 resolution there is not even a hint about groups being necessary, although this question, the question of groups, is one on which Trotsky spoke at great length in his subsequent letters.

There you have the immense difference between the stand taken by the opposition prior to December 5 and the stand its leaders took after December 5.

....  
Let us examine who has proved right on the issues raised in the opposition platform after December 5. Who has proved right on the four new issues brought up in Trotsky's letters?

First issue: degeneration of the cadres. We have all demanded and continue to demand that facts be adduced to prove that the cadres are degenerating. But no facts have been produced, nor could they be, because no such facts exist. And when we looked into the matter properly we all found that there was no degeneration, but that there was undoubtedly a deviation towards petty-bourgeois policy on the part of certain opposition leaders. Who, then, has proved to be right? Not the opposition, it would seem.

...  
The second question: The greatest danger, Trotsky says, is bureaucratisation of the Party apparatus. This too is wrong. The danger resides not in this, but in the possibility of the Party's actual isolation from the non-Party masses. You can have a party with a democratically constructed apparatus, but if the Party is not linked with the working class this democracy will be worthless, it won't be worth a brass farthing. The Party exists for the class. So long as it is linked with the class, maintains contact with it, enjoys prestige and respect among the non-Party masses, it can exist and develop even if it has bureaucratic shortcomings. But in the absence of all this the Party is doomed, no matter what kind of Party organisation you build—bureaucratic or democratic. The Party is part of the class; it exists for the class, not for itself.

#### **REF: 5**

**THE RESULTS OF THE THIRTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P. (B), Report Delivered at the C.C., R.C.P. (B) Courses for Secretaries of Uyezd party Committees, June 17, 1924,** J.V. Stalin, Works, 1924, V.6, p.260-271, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1953, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd.

#### **QUESTIONS OF THE EDUCATION AND RE-EDUCATION OF THE WORKING MASSES**

One of the essential tasks confronting the Party in the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat is to re-educate the older generations and educate the new generations in the spirit of the proletarian dictatorship and socialism. The old habits and customs, traditions and prejudices inherited from the old society are most dangerous enemies of socialism. They—these traditions and habits—have a firm grip over millions of working people; at times they engulf whole strata of the proletariat; at times they present a great danger to the very existence of the proletarian dictatorship. That is why the struggle against these traditions and habits, their absolute eradication in all spheres of our activity, and, lastly, the education of the younger generations in the spirit of proletarian socialism, represent immediate tasks for our Party without the accomplishment of which socialism cannot triumph. Work to improve the state apparatus, work in the countryside, work among women toilers and among the youth—these are the principal spheres of the Party activity in the fulfilment of these tasks.

a) *The struggle to improve the state apparatus.* The congress devoted little time to the question of the state apparatus. The report of the Central Control Commission on the fight against defects in the state apparatus was endorsed without debate. The resolution on "The work of the Control Commissions" was likewise adopted without debate. This, I believe, was due to lack of time and to the great number of questions which the congress was called upon to consider. But it would be absolutely wrong to infer from this that the Party does not regard the question of the state apparatus as one of key importance. On the contrary, it is a vital issue in all our constructive

work. Does the state apparatus function honestly, or does it indulge in graft; does it exercise economy in expenditure, or does it squander the national wealth; is it guilty of duplicity, or does it serve the state loyally and faithfully; is it a burden on the working people, or an organisation that helps them; does it inculcate respect for proletarian law, or does it corrupt the people's minds by disparaging proletarian law; is it progressing towards transition to a communist society in which there will be no state, or is it retrogressing towards the stagnant bureaucracy of the ordinary bourgeois state—these are all questions the correct solution of which cannot but be a matter of decisive importance for the Party and for socialism. That our state apparatus is full of defects, that it is cumbersome and expensive and nine-tenths bureaucratic, that its bureaucracy weighs heavily on the Party and its organisations, hampering their efforts to improve the state apparatus—these are things which hardly anyone will doubt. Yet it should be perfectly clear that, if our state apparatus were to rid itself of at least some of its basic faults, it could, in the hands of the proletariat, serve as a most valuable instrument for the education and re-education of broad sections of the population in the spirit of the proletarian dictatorship and socialism.

....

## THE PARTY

Another example. People often say that we have a "dictatorship of the Party." Someone will say: I am for the dictatorship of the Party. I recall that the expression figured in one of our congress resolutions, in fact, I believe, in a resolution of the Twelfth Congress. This of course, was an oversight. Apparently, some comrades think that ours is a dictatorship of the Party, not of the working class. But that is sheer nonsense, comrades. If that contention were right, then Lenin was wrong, for he taught us that the Soviets *implement* the dictatorship, while the Party *guides* the Soviets. Then Lenin was wrong, for he spoke of the dictatorship of the proletariat, not of the dictatorship of the Party. If the contention about "dictatorship of the Party" were correct, there would be no need for the Soviets, there would have been no point in Lenin, at the Eleventh Congress, speaking of the necessity to draw a "*distinction* between Party and Soviet organs."...

REF: 6

**THE RESULTS OF THE WORK OF THE FOURTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P. (B.), Report Delivered at a Meeting of the Active of the Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P. (B), May 9, 1925, J.V. Stalin, Works, 1925, V.7, p.114-120, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd.**

## IV. THE FATE OF SOCIALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

"Without direct state support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power and to transform its temporary rule into a lasting socialist dictatorship. This we cannot doubt for an instant" (see Trotsky's *Our Revolution*, p. 278).

In other words, we cannot even dream of maintaining power for any length of time unless the Western proletariat takes power and renders us state support.

Further:

"It would be hopeless to think... that, for example, a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe" (see Trotsky's Works, Vol. III, Part I, p. 90).

In other words, it appears that not only are we unable to build socialism, but we cannot even hold out albeit for a brief period "in the face of a conservative Europe," although the whole world knows that we have not only held out, but have repulsed a number of furious attacks upon our country by a conservative Europe.

And lastly:

"Real progress of a socialist economy in Russia," says Trotsky, "will become possible *only after the victory*\* of the proletariat in the major European countries" (ibid., p. 93). \* My italics.-J. St.

Clear, one would think.

I have quoted these passages, comrades, in order to contrast them with passages from the works of Lenin, and thus to enable you to grasp the quintessence of the question of the possibility of building a complete socialist society in the land of the proletarian dictatorship, which is surrounded by capitalist states.

....

The final victory of socialism is the full guarantee against attempts at intervention, and hence against restoration, for any serious attempt at restoration can take place only with serious support from outside, only with the support of international capital. Therefore, the support of our revolution by the workers of all countries, and still more the victory of the workers in at least several countries, is a necessary condition for fully guaranteeing the first victorious country against attempts at intervention and restoration, a necessary condition for the final victory of socialism.

"As long as our Soviet Republic," says Lenin, "remains an isolated borderland of the entire capitalist world, just so long will it be quite ludicrously fantastic and utopian to hope for the disappearance of all danger. Of course, as long as such fundamental opposites remain, dangers will remain too, and we cannot escape them" (sec Vol. XXVI, p. 29).

And further:

"We are living not merely in a state, but *in a system of states*, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 122).

That is why Lenin says that:

"Final victory can be achieved only on a world scale, and only by the joint efforts of the workers of all countries"(see Vol. XXIII, p. 9).

That is how the matter stands with the contradictions of the second order.

**REF: 7**

**THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U. (B.), December 18-31, 1925**, J.V. Stalin, Works, 1925, V.7, p.352, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd.

### **III. THE PARTY**

... But these successes would not have been possible had our Party not been equal to its tasks, had it not grown and gained strength. The Party's importance in this respect, as the guiding force, is immeasurable. The dictatorship of the proletariat is not exercised automatically; it is exercised primarily by the Party's forces, under its leadership. Without the Party's leadership, in the present conditions of capitalist encirclement, the dictatorship of the proletariat would be impossible. It would be enough to shake the Party, to weaken it, for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be shaken and weakened in an instant. It is precisely for this reason that all the bourgeois in all countries talk with such fury about our Party.

By that I do not at all mean to say that our Party is identical with the state. Not in the least. The Party is the guiding force in our state. It would be foolish to say on these grounds, as some comrades do, that the Political Bureau is the supreme organ in the state. That is not true. It is a confusion that brings grist to the mill of our enemies. The Political Bureau is the supreme organ not of the state, but of the Party, while the Party is the supreme guiding force in the state. The Central Committee and the Political Bureau are organs of the Party. I do not want to identify the state institutions with the Party. All I want to say is that in all the fundamental questions of our internal and foreign policy, the Party has played the leading role. And it was solely due to this that we achieved successes in our internal and foreign policy...

**REF: 8**

**CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF LENINISM, January 25, 1926**, J.V. Stalin, Works, V.8, 1926, January-November, p.49-90, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd.

### **V. THE PARTY AND THE WORKING CLASS IN THE SYSTEM OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT**

From these quotations it follows that:

- 1) The prestige of the Party and the iron discipline within the working class that are necessary for the dictatorship of the proletariat are built up not on fear or on "unrestricted" rights of the Party, but on the confidence of the working class in the Party, on the support which the Party receives from the working class.
- 2) The confidence of the working class in the Party is not acquired at one stroke, and not by means of force against the working class, but by the Party's prolonged work among the masses, by the correct policy of the Party, by the ability of the Party to convince the masses through their own experience of the correctness of its policy, by the ability of the Party to secure the support of the working class and to take the lead of the masses of the working class.
- 3) Without a correct Party policy, reinforced by the experience of the struggle of the masses, and without the confidence of the working class, there is not and cannot be real leadership by the Party.
- 4) The Party and its leadership, if the Party enjoys the confidence of the class, and if this leadership is real leadership, cannot be counterpoised to the dictatorship of the proletariat, because without the leadership of the Party (the "dictatorship" of the Party), enjoying the confidence of the working class, it is impossible for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be at all firm.

Without these conditions, the prestige of the Party and iron discipline within the working class are either empty phrases or boastfulness and adventurism.

...

What if the Party itself begins, in some way or other, to counterpose itself to the class, thus upsetting the foundations of its correct mutual relations with the class, thus upsetting the foundations of "mutual confidence"?

Are such cases at all possible?

Yes, they are.

They are possible:

- 1) *if* the Party begins to build its prestige among the masses, not on its work and on the confidence of the masses, but on its "unrestricted " rights;
- 2) *if* the Party's policy is obviously wrong and the Party is unwilling to reconsider and rectify its mistake;
- 3) *if* the Party's policy is correct on the whole but the masses are not yet ready to make it their own, and the Party is either unwilling or unable to bide its time so as to give the masses an opportunity to become convinced through their own experience that the Party's policy is correct, and seeks to impose it on the masses.

The history of our Party provides a number of such cases. Various groups and factions in our Party have come to grief and disappeared because they violated one of these three conditions, and sometimes all these conditions taken together.

....

## VI. THE QUESTION OF THE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY

....

What is meant by the *possibility* of the victory of socialism in one country?

It means the possibility of solving the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry by means of the internal forces of our country, the possibility of the proletariat seizing power and using that power to build a complete socialist society in our country, with the sympathy and the support of the proletarians of the other countries, but without the preliminary victory of the proletarian revolution in other countries.

Without such a possibility, building socialism is building without prospects, building without being sure that socialism will be completely built. It is no use engaging in building socialism without being sure that we can build it completely, without being sure that that technical backwardness of our country is not an insuperable obstacle to the building of a complete socialist society. To deny such a possibility means disbelief in the cause of building socialism, departure from Leninism.

What is meant by the *impossibility* of the complete, final victory of socialism in one country without the victory of the revolution in other countries?

It means the impossibility of having a full guarantee against intervention, and consequently against the restoration of the bourgeois order, without the victory of the revolution in at least a number of countries. To deny this indisputable thesis means departure from internationalism, departure from Leninism.

"We are living, " says Lenin, "not merely in a state, but *in a system of states*, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end comes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable. That means that if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to, and will hold sway, it must prove this by its military organisation also" (see Vol. XXIV, P. 122).

"We have before us, " says Lenin in another passage, "a certain equilibrium, which is in the highest degree unstable, but an unquestionable, an indisputable equilibrium nevertheless. Will it last long? I do not know and, I think, it is impossible to know. And therefore we must exercise very great caution. And the first precept of our policy, the first lesson to be learned from our governmental activities during the past year, the lesson which all workers and peasants must learn, is that we must be on the alert, we must remember that we are surrounded by people, classes and governments who openly express their intense hatred for us. We must remember that we are at all times but a hair's breadth from every manner of invasion" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 117).

....

## VII. THE FIGHT FOR THE VICTORY OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

....

But what is the meaning of the thesis that NEP is capitalism, that NEP is mainly a retreat? What does this thesis proceed from?

It proceeds from the wrong assumption that what is now taking place in our country is simply the restoration of capitalism, simply a "return" to capitalism. This assumption alone can explain the doubts of the opposition regarding the socialist nature of our industry. This assumption alone can explain the panic of the opposition in face of the kulak. This assumption alone can explain the haste with which the opposition seized upon the inaccurate statistics on differentiation in the peasantry. This assumption alone can explain the opposition's special forgetfulness of the fact that the middle peasant is the central figure in our agriculture. This assumption alone can explain the under-estimation of the importance of the middle peasant and the doubts concerning Lenin's co-operative plan. This assumption alone can serve to "substantiate" the "New Opposition's" disbelief in the new path of development of the countryside, the path of drawing it into the work of socialist construction.

As a matter of fact, what is taking place in our country now is not a one-sided process of restoration of capitalism, but a double process of development of capitalism and development of socialism—a contradictory process of struggle between the socialist and

the capitalist elements, a process in which the socialist elements are overcoming the capitalist elements. This is equally incontestable as regards the towns, where state industry is the basis of socialism, and as regards the countryside, where the main foothold for socialist development is mass co-operation linked up with socialist industry.

The simple restoration of capitalism is impossible, if only for the reason that the proletariat is in power, that large-scale industry is in the hands of the proletariat, and that transport and credit are in the possession of the proletarian state.

#### **REF: 9**

**THE POSSIBILITY OF BUILDING SOCIALISM IN OUR COUNTRY, Reply to Comrade Pokoyev, February 10, 1926, J.V. Stalin, Works, V.8, January-November 1926, p.103, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954, Reprinted by Red Star Ltd.**

....  
There was also talk at the congress of the final victory of socialism. What does that mean? It means a full guarantee against the intervention of foreign capitalists and the restoration of the old order in our country as the result of an armed struggle by those capitalists against our country. Can we, by our own efforts, ensure this guarantee, that is, render armed intervention on the part of international capital impossible? No, we cannot. That is something to be done jointly by our-selves and the proletarians of the entire West. International capital can be finally curbed only by the efforts of the working class of all countries, or at least of the major European countries. For that the victory of the revolution in several European countries is indispensable—without it the final victory of socialism is impossible.

What follows then in conclusion?

It follows that we are capable of completely building a socialist society by our own efforts and without the victory of the revolution in the West, but that, by itself alone, our country cannot guarantee itself against encroachments by international capital—for that the victory of the revolution in several Western countries is needed. The possibility of completely building socialism in our country is one thing, the possibility of guaranteeing our country against encroachments by international capital is another.

#### **REF: 10**

**THE OPPOSITION BLOC IN THE C.P.S.U. (B.), Theses for the Fifteenth All-Union Conference of the C.P.S.U. (B), Adopted by the Conference and Endorsed by the C.C. C.P.S.U. (B), October 26, 1926, J.V. Stalin, Works, V.8, January-November 1926, p.235-241, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954, Reprinted by Red Star Ltd.**

### **II. THE PRACTICAL PLATFORM OF THE OPPOSITION BLOC**

....  
c) *A fight against the Party apparatus under the guise of fighting bureaucracy in the Party.* The Party takes as its starting point that the Party apparatus and the mass of the Party members constitute an integral whole, that the Party apparatus (Central Committee, Central Control Commission, oblast Party Committees, gubernia committees, okrug committees, uyezd committees, bureaus of Party units, etc.) embodies the leading element of the Party as a whole, that the Party apparatus comprises the finest members of the proletariat, who may be and should be criticised for errors, who may be and should be "freshened up," but who cannot be vilified without the risk of disrupting the Party and leaving it defenceless

The opposition bloc, on the other hand, starts out by counterposing the mass of the Party members to the Party apparatus, tries to minimise the leading role of the Party apparatus, reducing its functions to registration and propaganda, incites the mass of the Party members against the Party apparatus, and thus discredits the latter, weakening its position in regard to leading the state.

The conference considers that this policy of the opposition bloc, a policy which has nothing in common with Leninism, can only result in the Party being disarmed in its fight against bureaucracy in the state apparatus, for a real transformation of this apparatus, and hence for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat.

d) *A fight against the "regime" in the Party under the guise of fighting for inner-Party democracy.* The Party takes as its starting point that "whoever weakens in the least the iron discipline of the Party of the proletariat (especially during the time of its dictatorship), actually aids the bourgeoisie against the proletariat" (Lenin, Vol. XXV, p. 190); that inner-Party democracy is necessary not in order to weaken and shatter proletarian discipline in the Party, but in order to strengthen and consolidate it, and that without iron discipline in the Party, without a firm regime in the Party, backed by the sympathy and support of the vast masses of the proletariat, the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible.

### **III. THE "REVOLUTIONARY" WORDS AND OPPORTUNIST DEEDS OF THE OPPOSITION BLOC**

....  
The opposition accuses the Party of being unwilling to fight against bureaucracy in the state apparatus, and at the same time it proposes that wholesale prices should be raised, evidently thinking that raising wholesale prices has no bearing on the question of bureaucracy in the state apparatus, whereas in fact it turns out that the result must be completely to bureaucratise the state economic apparatus, since high wholesale prices are the surest means for causing industry to wilt, for converting it into a hothouse plant and for bureaucratising the economic apparatus. In words—opponents of bureaucracy, but in deeds—advocates and promoters of bureaucratising the state apparatus.

....

The opposition raises a cry about degeneration of the party apparatus, but in fact it turns out that when the Central Committee raises the question of the expulsion of one of the Communists who have really degenerated Mr. Ossovsky, the opposition displays maximum loyalty to this gentleman and votes against his expulsion. In words—opponents of degeneration, but in deeds—abettors and defenders of degeneration.

**REF: 11**

**THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DEVIATION IN OUR PARTY, Report Delivered at the Fifteenth All-Union Conference of the C.P.S.U. (B), November 1, 1926**, J.V. Stalin, Works, V.8, January-November 1926, p.271-272, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954, Reprinted by Red Star Ltd.

## **2. LENINISM OR TROTSKYISM**

...

"... As long as the bourgeoisie remains in power in the other European countries we shall be compelled, in our struggle against economic isolation, to strive for agreement with the capitalist world; at the same time it may be said with certainty that these agreements may at best help us to mitigate some of our economic ills, to take one or another step forward, but real progress of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the major European countries" (see Trotsky's Works, Vol. 111, pp. 92-93).

**REF: 12**

**THE PROSPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION IN CHINA, Speech Delivered in the Chinese Commission of the E.C.C.I., November 30, 1926**, J.V. Stalin, Works, V.8, January-November 1926, p.376, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954, Reprinted by Red Star Ltd.

## **II. IMPERIALISM AND IMPERIALIST INTERVENTION IN CHINA**

That is a profound mistake, comrades. Intervention is by no means confined to the incursion of troops, and the incursion of troops by no means constitutes the principal feature of intervention. In the present-day conditions of the revolutionary movement in the capitalist countries, when the direct incursion of foreign troops may give rise to protests and conflicts, intervention assumes more flexible and more camouflaged forms. In the conditions prevailing today, imperialism prefers to intervene in a dependent country by organising civil war there, by financing counter-revolutionary forces against the revolution, by giving moral and financial support to its Chinese agents against the revolution. The imperialists were inclined to depict the struggle of Denikin and Kolchak, Yudenich and Wrangel against the revolution in Russia as an exclusively internal struggle. But we all knew—and not only we, but the whole world—that behind these counter-revolutionary Russian generals stood the imperialists of Britain and America, France and Japan, without whose support a serious civil war in Russia would have been quite impossible. The same must be said of China.

**REF: 13**

**THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U. (B)-December 2-19, 1927**, J.V. Stalin, Works, V.10, August-December 1927, p.327-331, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954, Reprinted by Red Star Ltd.

## **II. The Successes of Socialist Construction and the Internal Situation in the U.S.S.R.**

### **4. Classes, the State Apparatus and the Country's Cultural Development**

....

d) *The state apparatus and the struggle against bureaucracy.* So much is being said about bureaucracy that there is no need to dilate on it. That elements of bureaucracy exist in our state, co-operative and Party apparatus, there can be no doubt. That it is necessary to combat the elements of bureaucracy, and that this task will confront us all the time, as long as we have state power, as long as the state exists, is also a fact.

But one must know how far one can go. To carry the struggle against bureaucracy in the state apparatus to the point of destroying the state apparatus, of discrediting the state apparatus, of attempts to break it up—that means going against Leninism, means forgetting that our apparatus is a Soviet apparatus, which is a state apparatus of a higher type than any other state apparatus in the world.

Wherein lies the strength of our state apparatus? In that it links the state power with the millions of workers and peasants through the Soviets. In that the Soviets are schools of administration for tens and hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants. In that the state apparatus does not fence itself off from the masses of the people, but merges with them through an incalculable number of mass organisations, all sorts of commissions, committees, conferences, delegate meetings, etc., which encompass the Soviets and in this way buttress the organs of government.

Wherein lies the weakness of our state apparatus? In the existence within it of elements of bureaucracy, which spoil and distort its work. In order to eliminate bureaucracy from it—and this cannot be done in one or two years—we must systematically improve the state apparatus, bring it closer to the masses, reinvigorate it by bringing in new people loyal to the cause of the working class, remodel it in the spirit of communism, but not break it up or discredit it. Lenin was a thousand times right when he said: "*Without an 'apparatus'*

*we would have perished long ago. If we do not wage a systematic and stubborn struggle to improve the apparatus we shall perish before we have created the base for socialism."*

I shall not dilate on those defects in our state apparatus that are glaring enough as it is. I have in mind, primarily, "Mother Red Tape." I have at hand a heap of materials on the matter of red tape, exposing the criminal negligence of a number of judicial, administrative, insurance, co-operative and other organisations.

....

*The Party's task is, in fighting against bureaucracy and for the improvement of the state apparatus, to extirpate with a red-hot iron such outrageous things in our practical work as those I have just spoken about.*

e) *Concerning Lenin's slogan about the cultural revolution.* The surest remedy for bureaucracy is raising the cultural level of the workers and peasants. One can curse and denounce bureaucracy in the state apparatus, one can stigmatise and pillory bureaucracy in our practical work, but unless the masses of the workers reach a certain level of culture, which create the possibility, the desire, the ability to control the state apparatus from below, by the masses of the workers themselves, bureaucracy will continue to exist in spite of everything. Therefore, the cultural development of the working class and of the masses of the working peasantry, not only the development of literacy, although literacy is the basis of all culture, but primarily the cultivation of the ability to take part in the administration of the country, is the chief lever for improving the state and every other apparatus. This is the sense and significance of Lenin's slogan about the cultural revolution.

Here is what Lenin said about this in March 1922, before the opening of the Eleventh Congress of our Party, in his letter to the Central Committee addressed to Comrade Molotov:

*"The chief thing we lack is culture, ability to administer.... Economically and politically NEP fully ensures us the possibility of laying the foundation of socialist economy. It is 'only' a matter of the cultural forces of the proletariat and of its vanguard."*

These words of Lenin's must not be forgotten, comrades (Voices "Quite right!")

Hence the Party's task: to exert greater efforts to raise the cultural level of the working class and of the working strata of the peasantry.

**REF: 14**

**THE WORK OF THE APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION, Report Delivered at a Meeting of the Active of the Moscow Organisation of the C.P.S.U. (B), April 13, 1928,** J.V. Stalin, Works, V.11, 1928-March 1929, p.34-42, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954, Reprinted by Red Star Ltd.

## **I. SELF-CRITICISM**

....

Lastly, there is yet another circumstance that impels us to self-criticism I am referring to the question of the masses and the leaders. A peculiar sort of relation has lately begun to arise between the leaders and the masses. On the one hand there was formed, there came into being historically, a group of leaders among us whose prestige is rising and rising, and who are becoming almost unapproachable for the masses. On the other hand the working-class masses in the first place, and the masses of the working people in general are rising extremely slowly, are beginning to look up at the leaders from below with blinking eyes, and not infrequently are afraid to criticise them.

Of course, the fact that we have a group of leaders who have risen excessively high and enjoy great prestige is in itself a great achievement for our Party. Obviously, the direction of a big country would be unthinkable without such an authoritative group of leaders. But the fact that as these leaders rise they get further away from the masses, and the masses begin to look up at them from below and do not venture to criticise them, cannot but give rise to a certain danger of the leaders losing contact with the masses and the masses getting out of touch with the leaders.

This danger may result in the leaders becoming conceited and regarding themselves as infallible. And what good can be expected when the top leaders become self-conceited and begin to look down on the masses? Clearly, nothing can come of this but the ruin of the Party. But what we want is not to ruin the Party, but to move forward and improve our work. And precisely in order that we may move forward and improve the relations between the masses and the leaders, we must keep the valve of self-criticism open all the time, we must make it possible for Soviet people to "go for" their leaders, criticise their mistakes, so that the leaders may not grow conceited, and the masses may not get out of touch with the leaders.

The question of the masses and the leaders is sometimes identified with the question of promotion. That is wrong, comrades. It is not a question of bringing new leaders to the fore, although this deserves the most serious attention. It is a question of preserving the leaders who have already come to the fore and possess the greatest prestige by organising permanent and indissoluble contact between them and the masses. It is a question of organising, along the lines of self-criticism and criticism of our shortcomings, the broad public opinion of the Party, the broad public opinion of the working class, as an instrument of keen and vigilant moral control, to which the most authoritative leaders must lend an attentive ear if they want to retain the confidence of the Party and the confidence of the working class.

...

What does this mean? It means that one of the main tasks of our constructive work is to develop in the working class the faculty and ability to administer the country, to administer economy, to administer industry.

Can we develop this faculty and ability in the working class without giving full play to the powers and capacities of the workers, the powers and capacities of the finest elements of the working class, for criticising our errors, for detecting our shortcomings and for advancing our work? Obviously, we cannot

And what is required in order to give full play to the powers and capacities of the working class and the working people generally, and to enable them to acquire the faculty of administering the country? It requires, above all, honest and Bolshevik observance of the slogan of self-criticism, honest and Bolshevik observance of the slogan of criticism from below of shortcomings and errors in our work. If the workers take advantage of the opportunity to criticise shortcomings in our work frankly and bluntly, to improve and advance our work, what does that mean? It means that the workers are becoming active participants in the work of directing the country, economy, industry. And this cannot but enhance in the workers the feeling that they are the masters of the country, cannot but enhance their activity, their vigilance, their culture.

This question of the cultural powers of the working class is a decisive one. Why? Because, of all the ruling classes that have hitherto existed, the working class, as a ruling class, occupies a somewhat special and not altogether favourable position in history. All ruling classes until now—the slave-owners, the landlords, the capitalists—were also wealthy classes. They were in a position to train in their sons the knowledge and faculty needed for government. The working class differs from them, among other things, in that it is not a wealthy class, that it was not able formerly to train in its sons the knowledge and faculty of government, and has become able to do so only now, after coming to power.

That, incidentally, is the reason why the question of a cultural revolution is so acute with us. True, in the ten years of its rule the working class of the U.S.S.R. has accomplished far more in this respect than the landlords and capitalists did in hundreds of years. But the international and internal situation is such that the results achieved are far from sufficient. Therefore, every means capable of promoting the development of the cultural powers of the working class, every means capable of facilitating the development in the working class of the faculty and ability to administer the country and industry—every such means must be utilised by us to the full.

But it follows from what has been said that the slogan of self-criticism is one of the most important means of developing the cultural powers of the proletariat, of developing the faculty of government in the working class. From this follows yet another reason why the carrying out of the slogan of self-criticism is a vital task for us.

**REF: 15**

**THE WORK OF THE APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION, Report Delivered at a Meeting of the Active of the Moscow Organisation of the CPSU (B), April 13, 1928, J. V. Stalin, Works, Volume 11, p.57-64, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954**

### **III. THE SHAKHTY AFFAIR**

What do the facts, the documents in the Shakhty case, show?

The facts show that the Shakhty affair was an economic counter-revolution, plotted by a section of the bourgeois experts, former coal-owners.

The facts show, further, that these experts were banded together in a secret group and were receiving money for sabotage purposes from former owners now living abroad and from counter-revolutionary anti-Soviet capitalist organisations in the West.

The facts show, lastly, that this group of bourgeois experts operated and wrought destruction to our industry on orders from capitalist organisations in the West.

And what does all this indicate?

It indicates that it is a matter here of economic intervention in our industrial affairs by West-European anti-Soviet capitalist organisations. At one time there was military and political intervention, which we succeeded in liquidating by means of a victorious civil war. Now we have an attempt at economic intervention, for the liquidation of which we do not need a civil war, but which we must liquidate all the same, and shall liquidate with all the means at our disposal.

It would be foolish to believe that international capital will leave us in peace. No, comrades, that is not true. Classes exist, international capital exists, and it cannot look on calmly at the development of the country that is building socialism. Formerly, international capital thought it could overthrow the Soviet regime by means of outright armed intervention. The attempt failed. Now it is trying, and will go on trying, to undermine our economic strength by means of inconspicuous, not always noticeable but quite considerable, economic intervention, organising sabotage, engineering all sorts of "crises" in this or that branch of industry, and thereby facilitating the possibility of armed intervention in the future. All this is woven into the web of the class struggle of international capital against the Soviet regime, and there can be no question of anything accidental here.

One thing or the other:

*either*, we continue to pursue a revolutionary policy, rallying the proletarians and the oppressed of all countries around the working class of the U.S.S.R.—in which case international capital will do everything it can to hinder our advance;

*or*, we renounce our revolutionary policy and agree to make a number of fundamental concessions to international capital—in which case international capital, no doubt, will not be averse to "assisting" us in converting our socialist country into a "good" bourgeois republic.

There are people who think that we can conduct an emancipatory foreign policy and at the same time have the European and American capitalists praising us for doing so. I shall not stop to show that such naive people do not and cannot have anything in common with our Party.

...

*Stalin*: But precisely because we cannot agree to these or similar concessions without being false to ourselves —precisely because of this we must take it for granted that international capital will go on playing us every sort of scurvy trick, whether it be a Shakhty affair or something else of a similar nature.

There you have the class roots of the Shakhty affair.

Why was armed intervention by international capital possible in our country? Because there were in our country whole groups of military experts, generals and officers, scions of the bourgeoisie and the landlords who were always ready to undermine the foundations of the Soviet regime. Could these officers and generals have organised a serious war against the Soviet regime if they had not received financial, military and every other kind of assistance from international capital? Of course not. Could international capital have organised serious intervention without the assistance of this group of whiteguard officers and generals? I do not think so.

There were comrades among us at that time who thought that the armed intervention was something accidental, that if we had not released Krasnov, Mamontov and the rest from prison, there would have been no intervention. That, of course, is untrue. That the release of Mamontov, Krasnov and the other whiteguard generals did play a part in the development of civil war is beyond doubt. But that the roots of the armed intervention lay not in this, but in the class contradictions between the Soviet regime on the one hand, and international capital and its lackey generals in Russia on the other, is also beyond doubt.

Could certain bourgeois experts, former mine owners, have organised the Shakhty affair here without the financial and moral support of international capital, without the prospect of international capital helping them to overthrow the Soviet regime? Of course not. Could international capital have organised in our country economic intervention, such as the Shakhty affair, if there had not been in our country a bourgeoisie, including a certain group of bourgeois experts who were ready to go to all lengths to destroy the Soviet regime? Obviously not. Do there exist at all such groups of bourgeois experts in our country as are ready to go to the length of economic intervention, of undermining the Soviet regime? I think there do. I do not think that there can be many of them. But that there do exist in our country certain insignificant groups of counter-revolutionary bourgeois experts—far fewer than at the time of the armed intervention—is beyond doubt.

It is the combination of these two forces that creates the soil for economic intervention in the U.S.S.R.

And it is precisely this that constitutes the class background of the Shakhty affair.

Now about the practical conclusions to be drawn from the Shakhty affair.

...

Were some of our business executives who have now deteriorated worse than any of us? Why is it that they, and other comrades like them, began to deteriorate and degenerate and come to identify themselves in their way of living with the bourgeois experts? It is due to our wrong way of doing things in the business field; it is due to our business executives being selected and having to work in conditions which hinder their development, which convert them into appendages of the bourgeois experts. This way of doing things must be discarded, comrades.

.....

The third conclusion concerns the question of enlisting the broad mass of the workers in the management of industry. What is the position in this respect, as revealed by the Shakhty evidence? Very bad. Shockingly bad, comrades. It has been revealed that the labour laws are violated, that the six-hour working day in under ground work is not always observed, that safety regulations are ignored. Yet the workers tolerate it. And the trade unions say nothing. And the Party organisations take no steps to put a stop to this scandal.

**REF: 16**

**SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF THE ALL-UNION LENINIST YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE, May 16, 1928**, J.V. Stalin, Works, 1928-March 1929, V.11, p.74-82, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954, Reprinted by Red Star Ltd.

## I. STRENGTHEN THE READINESS FOR ACTION OF THE WORKING CLASS

....

The procurement crisis and the Shakhty affair were of tremendous educational value, because they shook up all our organisations, discredited the theory of things going "of their own accord," and once more stressed the existence of class enemies, showing that they are alive, are not dozing, and that in order to combat them we must enhance the strength of the working class, its vigilance, its revolutionary spirit, its readiness for action.

From this follows the immediate task of the Party, the political line of its day-to-day work: *to enhance the readiness of the working class for action against its class enemies.*

....

## II. ORGANISE MASS CRITICISM FROM BELOW

The second question concerns the task of combating bureaucracy, of organising mass criticism of our shortcomings, of organising mass control from below.

Bureaucracy is one of the worst enemies of our progress. It exists in all our organisations—Party, Y.C.L. trade-union and economic. When people talk of bureaucrats, they usually point to the old non-Party officials, who as a rule are depicted in our cartoons as men wearing spectacles. (Laughter.) That is not quite true, comrades. If it were only a question of the old bureaucrats, the fight against bureaucracy would be very easy. The trouble is that it is not a matter of the old bureaucrats. It is a matter of the new bureaucrats, bureaucrats who sympathise with the Soviet Government, and finally, communist bureaucrats. The communist bureaucrat is the most dangerous type of bureaucrat. Why? Because he masks his bureaucracy with the title of Party member. And, unfortunately, we have quite a number of such communist bureaucrats.

Take our Party organisations. You have no doubt read about the Smolensk affair, the Artyomovsk affair and so on. What do you think, were they matters of chance? What is the explanation of these shameful instances of corruption and moral deterioration in certain of our Party organisations? The fact that Party monopoly was carried to absurd lengths, that the voice of the rank and file was stifled, that inner-Party democracy was abolished and bureaucracy became rife. How is this evil to be combated? I think that there is not and cannot be any other way of combating this evil than by organising control from below by the Party masses, by implanting inner-Party democracy. What objection can there be to rousing the fury of the mass of the Party membership against these corrupt elements and giving it the opportunity to send such elements packing? There can hardly be any objection to that.

Or take the Young Communist League, for instance. You will not deny, of course, that here and there in the Young Communist League there are utterly corrupt elements against whom it is absolutely essential to wage a ruthless struggle. But let us leave aside the corrupt elements. Let us take the latest fact of an unprincipled struggle waged by groups within the Young Communist League around personalities, a struggle which is poisoning the atmosphere in the Young Communist League. Why is it that you can find as many "Kosarevites" and "Sobolevites" as you like in the Young Communist League, while Marxists have to be looked for with a candle? (Applause.) What does this indicate, if not that a process of bureaucratic petrification is taking place in certain sections of the Y.C.L. top leadership?

And the trade unions? Who will deny that in the trade unions there is bureaucracy in plenty? We have production conferences in the factories. We have temporary control commissions in the trade unions. It is the task of these organisations to rouse the masses, to bring our shortcomings to light and to indicate ways and means of improving our constructive work. Why are these organisations not developing? Why are they not seething with activity? Is it not obvious that it is bureaucracy in the trade unions, coupled with bureaucracy in the Party organisations, that is preventing these highly important organisations of the working class from developing?

Lastly, our economic organisations. Who will deny that our economic bodies suffer from bureaucracy? Take the Shakhty affair as an illustration. Does not the Shakhty affair indicate that our economic bodies are not speeding ahead, but crawling, dragging their feet?

How are we to put an end to bureaucracy in all these organisations?

There is only one sole way of doing this, and that is to organise control from below, to organise criticism of the bureaucracy in our institutions, of their shortcomings and their mistakes, by the vast masses of the working class.

I know that by rousing the fury of the masses of the working people against the bureaucratic distortions in our organisations, we sometimes have to tread on the toes of some of our comrades who have past services to their credit, but who are now suffering from the disease of bureaucracy. But ought this to stop our work of organising control from below? I think that it ought not and must not. For their past services we should take off our hats to them, but for their present blunders and bureaucracy it would be quite in order to give them a good drubbing. (Laughter and applause.) How else? Why not do this if the interests of the work demand it?

There is talk of criticism from above, criticism by the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, by the Central Committee of our Party and so on. That, of course, is all very good. But it is still far from enough. More, it is by no means the chief thing now. The chief thing now is to start a broad tide of criticism from below against bureaucracy in general, against shortcomings in our work in particular. Only by organising twofold pressure—from above and from below—and only by shifting the principal stress to criticism from below, can we count on waging a successful struggle against bureaucracy and on rooting it out.

It would be a mistake to think that only the leaders possess experience in constructive work. That is not true, comrades. The vast masses of the workers who are engaged in building our industry are day by day accumulating vast experience in construction, experience which is not a whit less valuable to us than the experience of the leaders. Mass criticism from below, control from below, is needed by us in order that, among other things, this experience of the vast masses should not be wasted, but be reckoned with and translated into practice.

From this follows the immediate task of the Party: *to wage a ruthless struggle against bureaucracy, to organise mass criticism from below, and to take this criticism into account when adopting practical decisions for eliminating our shortcomings.*

...

### III. THE YOUTH MUST MASTER SCIENCE

We have plenty of people who are willing to build and to direct the work of construction both in agriculture and in industry. But we have scandalously few people who know how to build and direct. On the contrary, our ignorance in this sphere is abysmal. More, there are people among us who are prepared to extol our lack of knowledge. If you are illiterate or cannot write grammatically and are proud of your backwardness—You are a worker "at the bench, " you deserve honour and respect. But if you have climbed out of your ignorance, have learned to read and write and have mastered science—you are an alien element who has "broken away" from the masses, you have ceased to be a worker.

I consider that we shall not advance a single step until we root out this barbarism and boorishness, this barbaric attitude towards science and men of culture. The working class cannot become the real master of the country if it does not succeed in overcoming its lack of culture, if it does not succeed in creating its own intelligentsia, if it does not master science and learn to administer economy on scientific lines.

It must be realised, comrades, that the conditions of the struggle today are not what they were at the time of the civil war. At the time of the civil war it was possible to capture enemy positions by dash, courage, daring, by cavalry assaults. Today, in the conditions of peaceful economic construction, cavalry assaults can only do harm. Courage and daring are needed now as much as before. But courage and daring alone will not carry us very far. In order to beat the enemy now, we must know how to build industry, agriculture, transport, trade; we must abandon the haughty and supercilious attitude towards trade.

In order to build, we must have knowledge, mastery of science. And knowledge entails study. We must study perseveringly and patiently. We must learn from everyone, both from our enemies and from our friends, especially from our enemies. We must clench our teeth and study, not fearing that our enemies may laugh at us, at our ignorance, at our backwardness.

Before us stands a fortress. That fortress is called science, with its numerous branches of knowledge. We must capture that fortress at all costs. It is our youth who must capture that fortress, if they want to be builders of the new life, if they want to be real successors of the old guard

We cannot now confine ourselves to training communist cadres in general, people who are able to prattle a little about everything. Dilettantism and the know-all attitude are now shackles on our feet. We now need Bolshevik experts in metallurgy, textiles, fuel, chemistry, agriculture, transport, trade, accountancy, and so on and so forth. We now need whole groups, hundreds and thousands of new Bolshevik cadres capable of becoming masters of their subject in the most diverse branches of knowledge. Failing this, it is useless to think of any swift rate of socialist construction in our country. Failing this, it is useless to think that we can overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries.

*We must master science, we must train new cadres of Bolshevik experts in all branches of knowledge, we must study, study and study most perseveringly.* That is the task now.

*A mass campaign of the revolutionary youth for science—that is what we need now comrades...*

**REF: 17**

**TO THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, REPLY TO FRUMKIN (with Reference to Frumkin's Letter of June 15, 1928), June 20, 1928,** J.V. Stalin, Works, 1928-march 1929 V.11, p.121-122, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954, Reprinted by Red Star Ltd.

Frumkin's Letter of June 15, 1928, deserves attentive consideration.

Let us examine it point by point.

1. Incorrect, in the first place, is Frumkin's appraisal of the international position of the U.S.S.R. It is the generally accepted opinion in the Party that the reason for the growth of the contradictions between U.S.S.R. and its capitalist encirclement, the reason for the offensive of the capitalist states against the U.S.S.R., is the growth of the socialist elements in the U.S.S.R., the growth of the U.S.S.R.'s influence on the working class in all countries and, hence, the danger which the developing U.S.S.R. represents for capitalism. That is precisely the way the Fifteenth Congress of our Party understood it, in saying in its resolution on the report of the Central Committee: "The contradictions between the countries of the bourgeois encirclement and the U.S.S.R., whose victorious development is undermining the foundations of world capitalism, have grown more acute. The chief factors contributing to this increasing acuteness

are the growth of the socialist elements in the U.S.S.R., the collapse of the hopes of the bourgeoisie that the proletarian dictatorship would degenerate, coupled with the increasing international and revolutionary influence of the U.S.S.R.”

We know that the Party elaborated this standpoint not casually and incidentally, but in the course of a desperate struggle against the opposition, who openly asserted that the reason for the offensive of imperialism against the U.S.S.R. was the weakening of the U.S.S.R. owing to its being in process of degeneration.

Frumkin, however, fundamentally disagrees with the standpoint of the Party. He asserts that, on the contrary, "the basic and decisive factor determining the offensive of the capitalist world against the U.S.S.R. is that we are growing weaker, politically and economically "

What can there be in common between these two opposite estimates, one of which emanates from Frumkin and the other from the Fifteenth Congress of our Party.

2. Even more incorrect is Frumkin's estimate of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. Reading Frumkin's letter, one might think that the Soviet regime is on its last legs, that the country is on the verge of the abyss and that the downfall of the U.S.S.R. is a matter of only a few months, if not of a few days. The only thing he omitted to say is that we have "sung our swan song. "

We are accustomed to hearing the wailing of intellectuals about the "doom" of the U.S.S.R. coming from the lips of the oppositionists. But is it seemly for Frumkin to follow the example of the opposition?

### REF: 18

**AGAINST VULGARISING THE SLOGAN OF SELF-CRITICISM**, J. V. Stalin, Works, 1928-March 1929, Volume 11, p.133-140, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954, June 26, 1928, Pravda. No 146

“But in order to develop self-criticism, we must first overcome a number of obstacles standing in the way of the Party. These include the cultural backwardness of the masses, the inadequate cultural forces of the proletarian vanguard, our conservatism, our "communist vainglory," and so on. But one of the most serious obstacles, if not the most serious of all, is the *bureaucracy* of our apparatus. I am referring to the bureaucratic elements to be found in our Party, government, trade-union, co-operative and all other organisations. I am referring to the bureaucratic elements who batten on our weaknesses and errors, who fear like the plague all criticism by the masses, all control by the masses, and who hinder us in developing self-criticism and ridding ourselves of our weaknesses and errors. Bureaucracy in our organisations must not be regarded merely as routine and red-tape. Bureaucracy is a manifestation of bourgeois influence on our organisations. Lenin was right when he said:

"... We must realise that the fight against bureaucracy is an *absolutely essential one*, and that it is just as complicated as the fight against the petty-bourgeois elemental forces. Bureaucracy in our state system has become a malady of such gravity that it is spoken of in our Party programme, and that is because *it is connected with these petty-bourgeois elemental forces and their wide dispersion*"[\*] My italics.- J. St., (Vol. XXVI, p. 220).

With all the more persistence, therefore, must the struggle against bureaucracy in our organisations be waged, if we really want to develop self-criticism and rid ourselves of the maladies in our constructive work.

With all the more persistence must we rouse the vast masses of the workers and peasants to the task of criticism *from below*, of control *from below*, as the principal antidote to bureaucracy.

Lenin was right when he said:

"If we want to combat bureaucracy, we must *enlist the co-operation of the rank and file* "... for "what other way is there of putting an end to bureaucracy than by *enlisting the co-operation of the workers and peasants?*" \* My italics.- J. St., (Vol. XXV, pp. 496 and 495.)

But in order to "enlist the co-operation" of the vast masses, we must develop proletarian democracy in all the mass organisations of the working class, and primarily within the Party itself. Failing this, self-criticism will be nothing, an empty thing, a mere word.

It is not just *any kind* of self-criticism that we need. We need such self-criticism as will raise the cultural level of the working class, enhance its fighting spirit, fortify its faith in victory, augment its strength and help it to become the real master of the country.

Some say that, once there is self-criticism, we do not need *labour discipline*, we can stop working and give ourselves over to prattling a little about everything. That would be not self-criticism but an insult to the working class. Self-criticism is needed not in order to shatter labour discipline, but to *strengthen* it, in order that labour discipline may become *conscious* discipline, capable of withstanding petty-bourgeois slackness.

Others say that, once there is self-criticism, we no longer need *leadership*, we can abandon the helm and let things "take their natural course." That would be not self-criticism but a disgrace. Self-criticism is needed not in order to relax leadership, but to *strengthen* it, in order to convert it from leadership on paper and of little authority into *vigorous* and really *authoritative* leadership.

But there is another kind of "self-criticism," one that tends to *destroy* the Party spirit, to *discredit* the Soviet regime, to *weaken* our work of construction, to *corrupt* our economic cadres, to *disarm* the working class, and to foster talk of *degeneration*. It was just this kind of "self-criticism" that the Trotsky opposition was urging upon us only recently. It goes without saying that the Party has nothing in common with such "self-criticism." It goes without saying that the Party will combat such "self-criticism" with might and main.

A strict distinction must be drawn between this "self-criticism," which is *alien* to us, destructive and anti-Bolshevik, and our, Bolshevik self-criticism, the object of which is to *promote* the Party spirit, to *consolidate* the Soviet regime, to *improve* our constructive work, to *strengthen* our economic cadres, to arm the working class."

## REF: 19

**THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U. (B), Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Moscow Committee and Moscow Control Commission of the C.P.S.U. (B), October 19, 1928, J.V. Stalin, Works, V.11, 1928-March 1929, p.234-244, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954, Reprinted by Red Star Ltd.**

....  
*Under the conditions of Soviet development*, when capitalism has already been overthrown, but its roots have not yet been torn out, the Right deviation in communism signifies a tendency, an inclination that has not yet taken shape, it is true, and is perhaps not yet consciously realised, but nevertheless a tendency of a section of the Communists to depart from the general line of our Party in the direction of bourgeois ideology. When certain circles of our Communist strive to drag the Party back from the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress, by denying the need for an offensive against the capitalist elements in the countryside; or demand a contraction of our industry, in the belief that its present rapid rate of development is fatal for the country; or deny the expediency of subsidies to the collective farms and state farms, in the belief that such subsidies are money thrown to the winds- or deny the expediency of fighting against bureaucracy by methods of self-criticism, in the belief that self-criticism undermines our apparatus; or demand that the monopoly of foreign trade be relaxed, etc., etc., it means that there are people in the ranks of our Party who are striving, perhaps without themselves realising it, to adapt our socialist construction to the tastes and requirements of the "Soviet" bourgeoisie.

A victory of the Right deviation in our Party would mean an enormous strengthening of the capitalist elements in our country. And what does the strengthening of capitalist elements in our country mean? It means weakening the proletarian dictatorship and increasing the chances of the restoration of capitalism.

Consequently, a victory of the Right deviation in our Party would mean a development of the conditions necessary *for the restoration* of capitalism in our country.

Have we in our Soviet country any of the conditions that would make the restoration of capitalism *possible*? Yes, we have. That, comrades, may appear strange, but it is a fact. We have overthrown capitalism, we have established the dictatorship of the Proletariat, we are developing our socialist industry at a rapid pace and are linking peasant economy with it. But we have not yet torn out the roots of capitalism. Where are these roots imbedded? They are imbedded in commodity production, in small production in the towns and, especially, the countryside.

As Lenin says, the strength of capitalism lies "in the strength of *small production*. For, unfortunately, small production is still very, very widespread in the world, and small production *engenders* capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale" (see Vol. XXV, p. 173).

It is clear that, since small production bears a mass, and even a predominant character in our country, and since it *engenders* capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously and on a mass scale, particularly under the conditions of NEP, we have in our country conditions which make the restoration of capitalism *possible*.

Have we in our Soviet country the necessary means and forces to abolish, to eliminate the *possibility* of the restoration of capitalism? Yes, we have. And it is this fact that proves the correctness of Lenin's thesis on the *possibility* of building a complete socialist society in the U.S.S.R. For this purpose it is necessary to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, strengthen the alliance between the working class and peasantry, develop our key positions from the standpoint of industrialising the country, develop industry at a rapid rate, electrify the country, place the whole of our national economy on a new technical basis, organise the peasantry into co-operatives on a mass scale and increase the yield of its farms, gradually unite the individual peasant farms into socially-conducted, collective farms, develop state farms, restrict and overcome the capitalist elements in town and country, etc., etc.

Here is what Lenin says on this subject:

"As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the towns, knows that we have

not torn out the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the internal enemy. The latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one way of undermining it, namely, to place the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production. And it is only electricity that is such a basis. Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country. Otherwise, the country will remain a small-peasant country, and we have got to understand that clearly. We are weaker than capitalism, not only on a world scale, but also within the country. Everybody knows this. We are conscious of it, and we shall see to it that our economic base is transformed from a small-peasant base into a large-scale industrial base. Only when the country has been electrified, only when our industry, our agriculture, our transport system have been placed upon the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, shall we achieve final victory" (Vol. XXVI, pp. 46-47).

It follows, firstly, that as long as we live in a small-peasant country, as long as we have not torn out the roots of capitalism, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism than for communism. It may happen that you cut down a tree but fail to tear out the roots; your strength does not suffice for this. Hence the *possibility* of the restoration of capitalism in our country.

Secondly, it follows that besides the possibility of the restoration of capitalism there is also the *possibility of the victory of socialism* in our country, because we can destroy the *possibility* of the restoration of capitalism, we can tear out the roots of capitalism and achieve final victory over capitalism in our country if we intensify the work of electrifying the country, if we place our industry, agriculture and transport on the technical basis of modern, large-scale industry. Hence the *possibility* of the victory of socialism in our country.

Lastly, it follows that we cannot build socialism in industry alone and leave agriculture to the mercy of spontaneous development on the assumption that that the countryside will automatically follow the lead of the towns. The existence of socialist industry in the towns is the principal factor in the socialist transformation of the countryside. But it does not mean that that factor is quite sufficient. If the socialist towns are to take the lead of the peasant countryside all the way, it is essential, as Lenin says, "to place the economy of the country, *including agriculture\**, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production. "

Does this quotation from Lenin contradict another of his statements, to the effect that "NEP fully ensures us the *possibility\** of laying the foundation of a socialist economy"? No, it does not. On the contrary, the two statements fully coincide. Lenin by no means says that NEP gives us socialism ready-made. Lenin merely says that NEP ensures us the *possibility* of laying the foundation of a socialist economy. There is a great difference between the *possibility* of building socialism and the *actual building of socialism*. Possibility and actuality must not be confused. It is precisely for the purpose of transforming possibility into actuality that Lenin proposes the electrification of the country and the placing of industry, agriculture and transport on the technical basis of modern large-scale production as a condition for the final victory of socialism in our country.

But this condition for the building of socialism cannot be fulfilled in one or two years. It is impossible in one or two years to industrialise the country, build up a powerful industry, organise the vast masses of the peasantry into co-operatives, place agriculture on a new technical basis, unite the individual peasant farms into large collective farms, develop state farms, and restrict and overcome the capitalist elements in town and country. Years and years of intense constructive work by the proletarian dictatorship will be needed for this. And until that is accomplished—and it cannot be accomplished all at once—we shall remain a small-peasant country, where small production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously and on a mass scale, and where the danger of the restoration of capitalism remains.

And since our proletariat does not live in a vacuum, but in the midst of the most actual and real life with all its variety of forms, the bourgeois elements arising on the basis of small production "encircle the proletariat on every side with petty-bourgeois elemental forces, by means of which they permeate and corrupt the proletariat and continually cause relapses among the proletariat into petty-bourgeois spinelessness, disunity, individualism, and alternate moods of exaltation and dejection" (Lenin, Vol. XXV, p. 189), thereby introducing into the ranks of the proletariat and of its Party a certain amount of vacillation, a certain amount of wavering.

There you have the root and the basis of all sorts of vacillations and deviations from the Leninist line in the ranks of our Party.

That is why the Right and "Left" deviations in our Party cannot be regarded as a trifling matter.

Where does the danger of the Right, frankly opportunist, deviation in our Party lie? In the fact it underestimates the strength of our enemies, the strength of capitalism; it does not see the danger of the restoration of capitalism; it does not understand the mechanism of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat and therefore so readily agrees to make concessions to capitalism, demanding a slowing down of the rate of development of our industry, demanding concessions for the capitalist elements in town and country, demanding that the question of collective farm and state farms be relegated to the background, demanding that the monopoly of foreign trade be relaxed, etc., etc.

There is no doubt that the triumph of the Right deviation in our Party would unleash the forces of capitalism, undermine the revolutionary positions of the proletariat and increase the chances of the restoration of capitalism in our country.

Where does the danger of the "*Left*" (Trotskyist) deviation in our Party lie? In the fact that it *overestimates* the strength of our enemies, the strength of capitalism; it sees only the possibility of the restoration of capitalism, but cannot see the possibility of building socialism by the efforts of our country; it gives way to despair and is obliged to console itself with chatter about Thermidor tendencies in our Party.

From the words of Lenin that "as long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism," the "Left" deviation draws the false conclusion that it is impossible to build socialism in the U.S.S.R at all; that we cannot get anywhere with the peasantry; that the idea of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry is an obsolete idea; that unless a victorious revolution in the West comes to our aid the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. must fall or degenerate; that unless we adopt the fantastic plan of super-industrialisation, even at the cost of a split with the peasantry, the cause of socialism in the U.S.S.R. must be regarded as doomed.

Hence the adventurism in the policy of the "Left" deviation. Hence its "superhuman" leaps in the sphere of policy.

There is no doubt that the triumph of the "Left" deviation in our Party would lead to the working class being separated from its peasant base, to the vanguard of the working class being separated from the rest of the working-class masses, and, consequently, to the defeat of the proletariat and to facilitating conditions for the restoration of capitalism.

You see, therefore, that both these dangers, the "Left" and the Right, both these deviations from the Leninist line, the Right and the "Left," lead to the same result, although from different directions.

Which of these dangers is worse? In my opinion one is as bad as the other.

The difference between these deviations from the point of view of successfully combating them consist in the fact that the danger of the "Left" deviation is at the present moment more obvious to the Party than the danger of the Right deviation. The fact that an intense struggle has been waged against the "Left" deviation for several years now has, of course, not been without its value for the Party. It is clear that the Party has learned a great deal in the years of the fight against the "Left," Trotskyist deviation and cannot now be easily deceived by "Left" phrases.

As for the Right danger, which existed before, but which has now become more prominent because of the growth of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces resulting from last year's grain procurement crisis, I think it is not quite so obvious to certain sections of our Party. That is why our task must be—while not in the least relaxing the fight against the "Left," Trotskyist danger—to lay the emphasis on the fight against the Right deviation and to take all measures to make the danger of this deviation as obvious to the Party as the Trotskyist danger.

The question of the Right deviation would not, perhaps, be as acute as it is now, were it not for the fact that it is connected *with the difficulties* accompanying our development. But the whole point is that the existence of the Right deviation complicates the difficulties accompanying our development and hinders our efforts to overcome these difficulties. And for the very reason that the Right danger hinders the efforts to overcome the difficulties, the question of overcoming the Right danger has assumed particularly great importance for us.

A few words about the nature of our difficulties. It should be borne in mind that our difficulties should by no means be regarded as difficulties of stagnation or decline. There are difficulties that arise at a time of economic decline or stagnation, and in such cases efforts are made to render the stagnation less painful, or the decline less profound. Our difficulties have nothing in common with difficulties of that kind. The characteristic feature of our difficulties is that they are difficulties of *expansion*, difficulties of growth. When we speak about difficulties we usually mean by what percentage industry ought to be *expanded*, by what percentage the crop area ought to be *enlarged*, by how many poods the crop yield ought to be *increased*, etc., etc. And because our difficulties are those of expansion, and not of decline or stagnation, they should not be anything particularly dangerous for the Party.

But difficulties are difficulties, nevertheless. And since in order to overcome difficulties it is necessary to exert all efforts, to display firmness and endurance, and since not everybody possesses sufficient firmness and endurance—perhaps as a result of fatigue and overstrain, or because of a preference for a quiet life, free from struggle and commotion—it is just here that vacillations and waverings begin to take place, tendencies to adopt the line of least resistance, talk about slowing down the rate of industrial development, about making concessions to the capitalist elements, about rejecting collective farms and state farms and, in general, everything that goes beyond the calm and familiar conditions of the daily routine.

But unless we overcome the difficulties in our path we shall make no progress. And in order to overcome the difficulties we must first defeat the Right danger, we must first overcome the Right deviation, which is hindering the fight against the difficulties and is trying to undermine our Party's will to fight and overcome the difficulties.

I am speaking, of course, of a real fight against the Right deviation, not a verbal, paper fight. There are people in our Party who, to soothe their conscience, are quite willing to proclaim a fight against the Right danger in the same way as priests sometimes cry, "Hallelujah! Hallelujah! " But they will not undertake any practical measures at all to organise the fight against the Right deviation on a firm basis, and to overcome this deviation in actual fact. We call this tendency a conciliatory tendency towards the Right, frankly opportunist, deviation. It is not difficult to understand that the fight against this conciliatory tendency is an integral part of the general fight against the Right deviation, against the Right danger. For it is impossible to overcome the Right, opportunist deviation without waging a systematic fight against the conciliatory tendency, which takes the opportunists under its wing. [\*My italics.-J. St.]

**REF: 20**

**REPLY TO COMRADE SH., October 27, 1928**, J.V. Stalin, Works, 1928-March 1929, V.11, p.249, Foreign languages publishing House, Moscow 1954, reprinted by Red Star Press ltd.

I have received your letter and must say that I cannot possibly agree with you.

1) It is clear from the quotation from Lenin that so long as we remain a small-peasant country the danger of the restoration of capitalism will exist. You say that this opinion of Lenin's "cannot be applied to the present period in the U.S.S.R. " Why, one asks? Are we not still a small-peasant country?

*Of course, inasmuch as our socialist industry is developing and collective forms of economy are beginning to take root in the countryside, the chances of the restoration of capitalism are diminishing. That is a fact.* But does that mean that we have already ceased to be a small-peasant country? Does it mean that the socialist forms have developed to such an extent that the U.S.S.R. can no longer be considered a small-peasant country? It obviously does not.

But what follows from this? Only one thing, namely, the danger of the restoration of capitalism in our country does exist. How can one contest such an obvious fact?

**REF: 21**

**THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE CPSU (B), Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU (B) in April 1929 (Verbatim report),** J.V. Stalin, Works, April 1929-June 1930, V.12, p.9, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.

### **I. ONE LINE OR TWO LINES?**

In his speech, Rykov did not tell the truth when he declared that we have only one general line. He sought thereby to disguise his own line, which differs from the Party line, for the purpose of stealthily undermining the Party line. The policy of opportunism consists precisely in attempting to slur over disagreements, to gloss over the actual situation within the Party, to disguise one's own position and to make it impossible for the party to attain complete clarity.

Why does opportunism need such a policy? Because it enables opportunists to carry out in effect their own line, which differs from the Party line, behind a smoke screen of talk about the unity of the line. In his speech at the present plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission Rykov adopted this opportunist standpoint.

**REF: 22**

**THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE CPSU (B), Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU (B) in April 1929 (Verbatim Report),** J.V. Stalin, Works, April 1929-June 1930, V.12, p.11, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.

### **II. CLASS CHANGES AND OUR DISAGREEMENTS**

What are our disagreements? What are they connected with?

They are connected, first of all, with the class changes that have been taking place recently in our country and in capitalist countries. Some comrades think that the disagreements in our Party are of an accidental nature. That is wrong, comrades. That is quite wrong. The disagreements in our Party have their roots in the class changes, in the intensification of the class struggle which has been taking place lately and which marks a turning point in development.

The chief mistake of Bukharin's group is that it fails to see these changes and this turning point; it does not see them, and does not want to notice them. That in fact, explains the failure to understand the new tasks of the Party and of the Comintern which is the characteristic feature of the Bukharin opposition.

**REF 23:**

**THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE CPSU (B), Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU (B) in April 1929 (Verbatim Report),** J.V. Stalin, Works, April 1929-June 1930, V.12, p.14-16, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.

### **II. CLASS CHANGES AND OUR DISAGREEMENTS**

Finally, the slogan of purging the Party.- It would be ridiculous to think that it is possible to strengthen our Soviet-economic, trade-union and co-operative organisations, that it is possible to purge them of the dross of bureaucracy, without giving a sharp edge to the Party itself. There can be no doubt that bureaucratic elements exist not only in the economic and co-operative, trade-union and Soviet organisations, but in the organisations of the Party itself. Since the Party is the guiding force of all these organisations, it is obvious that purging the Party is the essential condition for thoroughly revitalising and improving all the other organisations of the working class. Hence the slogan of purging the Party.

Are these slogans a matter of accident? No, they are not. You see yourselves that they are not accidental. They are necessary links in the single continuous chain which is called the offensive of socialism against the elements of capitalism.

....

.... The so-called Shakhty affair cannot be regarded as something accidental. "Shakhtyists" are at present entrenched in every branch of our industry. Many of them have been caught, but by no means all of them. The wrecking activities of the bourgeois intelligentsia are one of the most dangerous forms of resistance to developing socialism. The wrecking activities are all the more dangerous because they are connected with international capital. Bourgeois wrecking is undoubtedly an indication of the fact that the capitalist elements have by no means laid down their arms, that they are gathering strength for fresh attacks on the Soviet regime.

**REF 24:**

**THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE CPSU (B), Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU (B) in April 1929 (Verbatim Report), J.V. Stalin, Works, April 1929-June 1930, V.12, p.38-40, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.**

#### **IV. DISAGREEMENTS IN REGARD TO INTERNAL POLICY**

##### **b) THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE**

"The mistake of Bukharin and his friends lies in failing to understand this simple and obvious truth. Their mistake lies in approaching the matter not in a Marxist, but in a philistine way, and trying to explain the intensification of the class struggle by all kinds of accidental causes: the "incompetence" of the Soviet apparatus, the "imprudent" policy of local comrades, the "absence" of flexibility, "excesses," etc., etc.

....

It follows, therefore, that the intensification of the class struggle is to be explained by causes connected with the character of the apparatus, the competence or incompetence, the strength or weakness of our lower organizations.

It follows, for instance, that the wrecking activities of the bourgeois intellectuals in Shakhty, which are a form of resistance of the bourgeois elements to the Soviet government and a form of intensification of the class struggle, are to be explained, not by the relation of class forces, not by the growth of socialism, but by the incompetence of our apparatus.

It follows that before the wholesale wrecking occurred in the Shakhty area, our apparatus was a good one, but that later, the moment wholesale wrecking occurred, the apparatus, for some unspecified reason, suddenly became utterly incompetent.

It follows that until last year, when grain procurements proceeded automatically and there was no particular intensification of the class struggle, our local organizations were good, even ideal; but that from last year, when the resistance of the kulaks assumed particularly acute forms, our organizations have suddenly become bad and utterly incompetent.

That is not an explanation, but a mockery of an explanation. That is not science, but quackery.

What then is the actual reason for this intensification of the class struggle?

There are two reasons.

Firstly, our advance, our offensive, the growth of socialist forms of economy both in industry and in agriculture, a growth which is accompanied by a corresponding ousting of certain sections of capitalists in town and country. The fact is that we are living according to Lenin's formula: "Who will beat whom?" Will we overpower them, the capitalists -- engage them, as Lenin put it, in the last and decisive fight -- or will they overpower us?

Secondly, the fact that the capitalist elements have no desire to depart from the scene voluntarily; they are resisting, and will continue to resist socialism, for they realize that their last days are approaching. And they are still able to resist because, in spite of the decline of their relative importance, they are nevertheless growing in absolute numbers; the petty bourgeoisie in town and country, as Lenin said, daily and hourly produces from its midst capitalists, big and small, and these capitalist elements go to all lengths to preserve their existence.

There have been no cases in history where dying classes have voluntarily departed from the scene. There have been no cases in history where the dying bourgeoisie has not exerted all its remaining strength to preserve its existence. Whether our lower Soviet apparatus is good or bad, our advance, our offensive will diminish the capitalist elements and oust them, and they, the dying classes, will carry on their resistance at all costs.

That is the basis for the intensification of the class struggle in our country."

**REF: 25**

**A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE, On the Occasion of the Twelfth Anniversary of the October Revolution**, November 7, 1929, J.V. Stalin, Works, April 1929-June 1930, V.12, p.139, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.

### III. IN THE SPHERE OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

...

The last hope of the capitalists of all countries, who are dreaming of restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R.—"the sacred principle of private property"—is collapsing and crumbling to dust. The peasants, whom they regarded as material that fertilises the soil for capitalism, are abandoning en masse the lauded banner of "private property" and are going over to the lines of collectivism, of socialism. The last hope for the restoration of capitalism is collapsing.

This, by the way, explains the desperate efforts of the capitalist elements in our country to rouse all the forces of the old world against advancing socialism—efforts which are leading to an intensification of the class struggle. Capital does not want "to grow into" socialism.

This also explains the furious howl against Bolshevism which has been raised recently by the watchdogs of capital, by the Struves and Hessens, the Milyukovs and Kerenskys, the Dans and Abramoviches and their like. The last hope for the restoration of capitalism is disappearing—that is no joke for them.

**REF: 26**

**CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE USSR, Speech Delivered at a Conference of Marxist Students of Agrarian Questions, December 27, 1929**, J.V. Stalin, Works, April 1929-June 1930, V.12, p.167-171, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.

### V. THE NATURE OF COLLECTIVE FARMS

The collective farm, as a type of economy, is one of the forms of socialist economy. There can be no doubt whatever about that.

One of the speakers here tried to discredit the collective farms. He asserted that the collective farms, as economic organisations, have nothing in common with the socialist form of economy. I must say, comrades, that such a characterisation of the collective farms is absolutely wrong. There can be no doubt that it has nothing in common with the true state of affairs.

What determines the type of an economy? Obviously, the relations between people in the process of production. How else can the type of an economy be determined? But is there in the collective farms a class of people who own the means of production and a class of people who are deprived of these means of production? Is there an exploiting class and an exploited class in the collective farms? Does not the collective farm represent the socialisation of the principal instruments of production on land belonging to the state? What grounds are there for asserting that the collective farms, as a type of economy, do not represent one of the forms of socialist economy?

Of course, there are contradictions in the collective farms. Of course, there are individualistic and even kulak survivals in the collective farms, which have not yet disappeared, but which are bound to disappear in the course of time as the collective farms become stronger, as they are provided with more machines. But can it be denied that the collective farms as a whole, with all their contradictions and shortcomings, the collective farms as an economic fact, represent, in the main, a new path of development of the countryside, the path of socialist development of the countryside in contradistinction to the kulak, capitalist path of development? Can it be denied that the collective farms (I am speaking of real, not sham collective farms) represent, under our conditions, a base and centre of socialist construction in the countryside—a base and centre which have grown up in desperate clashes with the capitalist elements?

Is it not clear that the attempts of some comrades to discredit the collective farms and declare them a bourgeois form of economy are devoid of all foundation?

...

Are there elements of the class struggle in the collective farms? Yes, there are. There are bound to be elements of the class struggle in the collective farms as long as there still remain survivals of individualistic, or even kulak, mentality, as long as there still exists a certain degree of material inequality. Can it be said that the class struggle in the collective farms is equivalent to the class struggle in the absence of collective farms? No, it cannot. The mistake our "Left" phrasemongers make lies precisely in not seeing the difference.

What does the class struggle imply in the absence of collective farms, prior to the establishment of collective farms? It implies a fight against the kulak who owns the instruments and means of production and who keeps the poor peasants in bondage with the aid of those instruments and means of production. It is a life-and death struggle.

But what does the class struggle imply with the collective farms in existence? It implies, firstly, that the kulak has been defeated and deprived of the instruments and means of production. It implies, secondly, that the poor and middle peasants are united in collective farms on the basis of the socialisation of the principle instruments and means of production. It implies, finally, that it is a struggle between members of collective farms, some of whom have not yet rid themselves of individualistic and kulak survivals and are striving to turn the inequality that exists to some extent in the collective farms to their own advantage, while the others want to

eliminate these survivals and this inequality. Is it not clear that only the blind can fail to see the difference between the class struggle with the collective farms in existence and the class struggle in the absence of collective farms?

**REF: 27**

**REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES**, Pravda, April 3, 1930, J.V. Stalin, Works, April 1929-June 1930, V.12, p.217, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.

*Third question.* How could these errors have arisen, and how must the Party correct them?

*Reply.* They arose because of our rapid successes in the collective-farm movement. Success sometimes turns people's heads. It not infrequently gives rise to extreme vanity and conceit. That may very easily happen to representatives of a party which is in power, especially in the case of a party like ours, whose strength and prestige are almost immeasurable. Here, instances of communist vainglory, which Lenin combated so vehemently, are quite possible. Here, belief in the omnipotence of decrees, resolutions and orders is quite possible. Here, there is a real danger of the Party's revolutionary measures being converted into empty bureaucratic decreeing by individual representatives of the Party in one corner or another of our boundless country. I have in mind not only local officials, but also individual regional officials, and even individual members of the Central Committee.

"Communist vainglory," says Lenin, "means that a man, who is a member of the Communist Party, and has not yet been purged from it, imagines that he can solve all his problems by issuing communist decrees" (Vol. XXVII, pp. 50-51).

**REF: 28**

**REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES**, Pravda, April 3, 1930, J.V. Stalin, Works, April 1929-June 1930, V.12, p.222-223, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.

*Fifth question.* Which is our chief danger, the Right or the "Left"?

*Reply.* Our chief danger at the present time is the Right danger. The Right danger has been, and still is, the chief danger.

Does not this thesis contradict that in the Central Committee's decision of March 15, 1930, to the effect that the errors and distortions of the "Left" distorters are now the chief hindrance to the collective-farm movement? No, it does not. The fact of the matter is that the errors of the "Left" distorters in regard to the collective-farm movement are such as create a favourable situation for the strengthening and consolidation of the Right deviation in the Party. Why? Because these errors present the Party's line in a false light—consequently, they make it easier to discredit the Party, and therefore they facilitate the struggle of the Right elements against the Party's leadership. Discrediting the Party leadership is just that elementary ground on which alone the struggle of the Right deviators against the Party can be waged. This ground is provided for the Right deviators by the "Left" distorters, by their errors and distortions. Therefore, if we are to fight successfully against Right opportunism, we must overcome the errors of the "Left" opportunists. Objectively, the "Left" distorters are allies of the Right deviators.

Such is the peculiar connection between "Left" opportunism and Right deviationism.

**REF: 29**

**REPLY TO COMRADE M. RAFAIL (Regional Trade-Union Council, Leningrad) Copy to Comrade Kirov, Secretary, Regional Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B), May 31, 1930**, J.V. Stalin, Works, April 1929-June 1930, V.12, p.222-223, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.

"3) Is it possible for a ruling party instantaneously to grasp the coming into being of new processes, and also instantaneously to reflect them in its practical policy? I think it is not possible. It is not possible, because the facts occur first of all, then their reflection in the consciousness of the most advanced elements of the Party, and only after that does the moment come when the new processes are perceived by the minds of the mass of Party members. Do you remember what Hegel said: "The owl of Minerva makes its flight only at night"? In other words, consciousness lags somewhat behind the facts."

**REF: 30**

**POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U. (B), June 27, 1930**, J.V. Stalin, Works, April 1929-June 1930, V.12, p.282, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.

### **3. The Key Position of Socialist Industry and Its Rate of Growth**

"4) People who talk about the necessity of reducing the rate of development of our industry are enemies of socialism, agents of our class enemies. (Applause.)"

**REF: 31**

**POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U. (B), June 27, 1930**, J.V. Stalin, Works, April 1929-June 1930, V.12, p.305-306, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.

#### **6.The Improvement in the Material and Cultural Conditions of the Workers and Peasants**

This does not mean, of course, that everything necessary for an important increase in real wages has already been done, that real wages could not have been raised to a higher level. If this has not been done, it is because of the bureaucracy in our supply organisations in general, and primarily and particularly because of the bureaucracy in the consumers' co-operatives. According to the data of the State Planning Commission, in 1929-30 the socialised sector of internal trade embraced over 99 per cent of wholesale trade and over 89 per cent of retail trade. This means that the co-operatives are systematically ousting the private sector and are becoming the monopolists in the sphere of trade. That, of course, is good. What is bad, however, is that in a number of cases this monopoly operates to the detriment of the consumers. It appears, that in spite of the almost monopolist position they occupy in trade, the co-operatives prefer to supply the workers with more "paying" goods, which yield bigger profits (haberdashery, etc.), and avoid supplying them with less "paying," although more essential, goods for the workers (agricultural produce). As a result, the workers are obliged to satisfy about 25 per cent of their requirements for agricultural produce in the private market, paying higher prices. That is apart from the fact that the co-operative apparatus is concerned most of all with its balance and is therefore reluctant to reduce retail prices in spite of the categorical instructions of the leading centres. It follows, therefore, that in this case the co-operatives function not as a Socialist sector, but as a peculiar sector that is infected with a sort of Nepman spirit. The question is, does anyone need co-operatives of this sort, and what benefit do the workers derive from their monopoly if they do not carry out the function of seriously raising the workers' real wages?

If, in spite of this, real wages in our country are steadily rising from year to year, it means that our social system, our system of distribution of the national income, and our entire wages policy, are such that they are able to neutralise and make up for all defects arising from the co-operatives.

**REF: 32**

**POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U. (B), June 27, 1930**, J.V. Stalin, Works, April 1929-June 1930, V.12, p.308, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.

#### **6.The Improvement in the Material and Cultural Conditions of the Workers and Peasants**

The chief thing now is to pass to universal, compulsory elementary education. I say the "chief" thing, because this would be a decisive step in the cultural revolution. And it is high time we took this step, for we now possess all that is needed to organise compulsory, universal elementary education in all areas of the U.S.S.R.

Until now we have been obliged to "exercise economy in all things, even in schools" in order to "save, to restore heavy industry" (Lenin). During the recent period, however, we have already restored heavy industry and are developing it further. Hence, the time has arrived when we must set about fully achieving universal, compulsory elementary education.

**REF: 33**

**POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U. (B), June 27, 1930**, J.V. Stalin, Works, April 1929-June 1930, V.12, p.311-314, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.

#### **7. Difficulties of Growth, The Class Struggle and the Offensive of Socialism Along the Whole Front**

Thirdly, we must bear in mind the circumstance that our work for the socialist reconstruction of the national economy, since it breaks up the economic connections of capitalism and turns all the forces of the old world upside down, cannot but rouse the desperate resistance of these forces. Such is the case, as you know. The malicious wrecking activities of the top stratum of the bourgeois intelligentsia in all branches of our industry, the brutal struggle of the kulaks against collective forms of farming in the countryside, the sabotage of the Soviet government's measures by bureaucratic elements in the state apparatus, who are agents of our class enemy—such, so far, are the chief forms of the resistance of the moribund classes in our country. Obviously, these circumstances cannot facilitate our work of reconstructing the national economy.

Fourthly, we must bear in mind the circumstance that the resistance of the moribund classes in our country is not taking place in isolation from the outside world, but is receiving the support of the capitalist encirclement. Capitalist encirclement must not be regarded simply as a geographical concept. Capitalist encirclement means that the U.S.S.R. is surrounded by hostile class forces, which are ready to support our class enemies within the U.S.S.R. morally, materially, by means of a financial blockade and, if the opportunity offers, by military intervention. It has been proved that the wrecking activities of our specialists, the anti-Soviet activities at our factories and installations are subsidised and inspired from abroad. The imperialist world is not interested in the U.S.S.R. standing up firmly and becoming able to overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries. Hence, the assistance it renders the forces of the old world in the U.S.S.R. Naturally, this circumstance, too, cannot serve to facilitate our work of reconstruction.

The characterisation of our difficulties will not be complete, however, if we fail to bear in mind one other circumstance. I am referring to the special character of our difficulties. I am referring to the fact that our difficulties are not difficulties of decline, or of stagnation, but difficulties of growth, difficulties of ascent, difficulties of progress. This means that our difficulties differ fundamentally from those encountered by the capitalist countries. When people in the United States talk about difficulties they have in mind difficulties due to decline for America is now going through a crisis, i.e., economic decline. When people in Britain talk about difficulties they have in mind difficulties due to stagnation, for Britain, for a number of years already, has been experiencing stagnation, i.e., cessation of progress. When we speak about our difficulties, however, we have in mind not decline and not stagnation in development, but the growth of our forces, the upswing of our forces, the progress of our economy. How many points shall we move further forward by a given date? What per cent more goods shall we produce? How many million more hectares shall we sow? How many months earlier shall we erect a factory, a mill, a railway?—such are the questions that we have in mind when we speak of difficulties. Consequently, our difficulties, unlike those encountered by, say, America or Britain, are difficulties of growth, difficulties of progress.

What does this signify? It signifies that our difficulties are such as contain within themselves the possibility of surmounting them. It signifies that the distinguishing feature of our difficulties is that they themselves give us the basis for surmounting them.

What follows from all this?

It follows from this, first of all, that our difficulties are not difficulties due to minor and accidental "derangements," but difficulties arising from the class struggle.

It follows from this, secondly, that behind our difficulties are hidden our class enemies, that these difficulties are complicated by the desperate resistance of the moribund classes in our country, by the support that these classes receive from abroad, by the existence of bureaucratic elements in our own institutions, by the existence of unsureness and conservatism among certain sections of our Party.

It follows from this, thirdly, that to surmount the difficulties it is necessary, first of all, to repulse the attacks of the capitalist elements, to crush their resistance and thereby clear the way for rapid progress.

It follows from this, lastly, that the very character of our difficulties, being difficulties of growth, creates the possibilities that we need for crushing our class enemies.

There is only one means, however, of taking advantage of these possibilities and of converting them into reality, of crushing the resistance of our class enemies and surmounting the difficulties, and that is to organise an offensive against the capitalist elements, along the whole front and to isolate the opportunist elements in our own ranks, who are hindering the offensive, who are rushing in panic from one side to another and sowing doubt in the Party about the possibility of victory.  
(Applause.)

There are no other means.

**REF: 34**

**POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U. (B), June 27, 1930**, J.V. Stalin, Works, V.12, April 1929-June 1930, p.320-324, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.

## **7. Difficulties of Growth, The Class Struggle and the Offensive of Socialism Along the Whole Front**

....

c) What is the essence of the Bolshevik offensive under our present conditions?

The essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies, first and foremost, in mobilising the class vigilance and revolutionary activity of the masses against the capitalist elements in our country; in mobilising the creative initiative and independent activity of the masses against bureaucracy in our institutions and organisations, which keeps concealed the colossal reserves latent in the depths of our system and prevents them from being used; in organising emulation and labour enthusiasm among the masses for raising the productivity of labour, for developing socialist construction.

The essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies, secondly, in organising the reconstruction of the entire practical work of the trade-union, co-operative, Soviet and all other mass organisations to fit the requirements of the reconstruction period; in creating in them a core of the most active and revolutionary functionaries, pushing aside and isolating the opportunist, trade-unionist, bureaucratic elements; in expelling from them the alien and degenerate elements and promoting new cadres from the rank and file.

The essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies, further, in mobilising the maximum funds for financing our industry, for financing our state farms and collective farms, in appointing the best people in our Party for developing all this work.

The essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies, lastly, in mobilising the Party itself for organising the whole offensive; in strengthening and giving a sharp edge to the Party organisations, expelling elements of bureaucracy and degeneration from them; in isolating and thrusting aside those that express Right or "Left" deviations from the Leninist line and bringing to the fore genuine, staunch Leninists.

Such are the principles of the Bolshevik offensive at the present time.

....

Further, the Party organised a wide campaign for the struggle against bureaucracy and issued the slogan of purging the Party, trade-union, co-operative and Soviet organisations of alien and bureaucratised elements. A sequel to this campaign was the well-known decision of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of March 16, 1930, concerning the promotion of workers to posts in the state apparatus and the organisation of mass workers' control of the Soviet apparatus (Patronage by factories). As is known, this campaign evoked tremendous enthusiasm and activity among the masses of the workers. The result of this campaign has been an immense increase in the Party's prestige among the masses of the working people, an increase in the confidence of the working class in the Party, the influx into the Party of further hundreds of thousands of workers, and the resolutions passed by workers expressing the desire to join the Party in whole shops and factories. Lastly, a result of this campaign has been that our organisations have got rid of a number of conservative and bureaucratic elements, and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions has got rid of the old, opportunist leadership.

....

The most remarkable feature of emulation is the radical revolution it brings about in people's views of labour, for it transforms labour from a degrading and heavy burden, as it was considered before, into a matter of honour, a matter of glory, a matter of valour and heroism. There is not, nor can there be, anything of the sort in capitalist countries. There, among the capitalists, the most desirable thing, deserving of public approval, is to be a bondholder, to live on interest, not to have to work, which is regarded as a contemptible occupation. Here, in the U.S.S.R., on the contrary, what is becoming the most desirable thing, deserving of public approval, is the possibility of being a hero of labour, the possibility of being a hero in shock-brigade work, surrounded with an aureole of esteem among millions of working people.

A no less remarkable feature of emulation is the fact that it is beginning to spread also in the countryside, having already spread to our state farms and collective farms. Everybody is aware of the numerous cases of genuine labour enthusiasm being displayed by the vast masses of state-farm workers and collective farmers.

Who could have dreamed of such successes in emulation and shock-brigade work a couple of years ago?"

**REF: 35**

**POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U. (B), June 27, 1930**, J.V. Stalin, Works, April 1929-June 1930, V.12, p.337-338, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.

## **9. The Next Tasks**

### **a) General**

4) The problem of combating bureaucracy. The danger of bureaucracy lies, first of all, in that it keeps concealed the colossal reserves latent in the depths of our system and prevents them from being utilised, in that it strives to nullify the creative initiative of the masses, ties it hand and foot with red tape and reduces every new undertaking by the Party to petty and useless trivialities. The danger of bureaucracy lies, secondly, in that it does not tolerate the checking of fulfilment and strives to convert the basic directives of the leading organisations into mere sheets of paper divorced from life. It is not only, and not so much, the old bureaucrats stranded in our institutions who constitute this danger; it is also, and particularly, the new bureaucrats, the Soviet bureaucrats; and the "Communist" bureaucrats are by no means the least among them. I have in mind, those "Communists" who try to substitute bureaucratic orders and "decrees", in the potency of which they believe as in a fetish, for the creative initiative and independent activity of the vast masses of the working class and peasantry.

The task is to smash bureaucracy in our institutions and organisations, to get rid of bureaucratic "habits" and "customs" and to clear the way for utilising the reserves of our social system, for developing the creative initiative and independent activity of the masses.

That is not an easy task. It cannot be carried out "in a trice." But it must be carried out at all costs if we really want to transform our country on the basis of socialism.

In the struggle against bureaucracy, the Party is working along four lines: that of developing self-criticism, that of organising the checking of fulfilment, that of purging the apparatus and, lastly, that of promoting from below to posts in the apparatus devoted workers from those of working-class origin.

The task is to exert every effort to carry out all these measures.

**REF: 36**

**POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U. (B), June 27, 1930**, J.V. Stalin, Works, April 1929-June 1930, V.12, p.353, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.

## **III. The Party**

## 1. Questions of the Guidance of Socialist Construction

It is proved by the fate of Trotskyism, with which everybody is now familiar. The gentlemen in the Trotsky camp chattered about the "degeneration" of the Soviet regime, about "Thermidor," about the "inevitable victory" of Trotskyism, and so forth. But, actually, what happened? What happened was the collapse, the end of Trotskyism. One section of the Trotskyists, as is known, broke away from Trotskyism and in numerous declarations of its representatives admitted that the Party was right, and acknowledged the counter-revolutionary character of Trotskyism. Another section of the Trotskyists really degenerated into typical petty-bourgeois counter-revolutionaries, and actually became an information bureau of the capitalist press on matters concerning the C.P.S.U. (B.). But the Soviet regime, which was to have "degenerated" (or "had already degenerated"), continues to thrive and to build socialism, successfully breaking the backbone of the capitalist elements in our country and their petty-bourgeois yes-men.

REF: 37 - 1

**JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C., C.P.S.U. (B), January 7-12, 1933, Pravda, Nos. 10 and 17, January 10 and 17, 1933, J.V. Stalin, Works, July 1930-January 1934, V.13, p. 211-216, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1955, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd.**

## VII. THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS IN THE SPHERE OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE REMNANTS OF THE HOSTILE CLASSES

As a result of the fulfilment of the five-year plan in regard to industry, agriculture and trade, we have established the principle of socialism in all spheres of the national economy and have expelled the capitalist elements from them.

What should this have led to in relation to the capitalist elements; and what has it actually led to?

It has led to this: the last remnants of the moribund classes—the private manufacturers and their servitors, the private traders and their henchmen, the former nobles and priests, the kulaks and kulak agents, the former whiteguard officers and police officials, policemen and gendarmes, all sorts of bourgeois intellectuals of a chauvinist type, and all other anti-Soviet elements—have been thrown out of their groove.

Thrown out of their groove, and scattered over the whole face of the U.S.S.R., these "have-beens" have wormed their way into our plants and factories, into our government offices and trading organisations, into our railway and water transport enterprises, and, principally, into the collective farms and state farms. They have crept into these places and taken cover there, donning the mask of "workers" and "peasants," and some of them have even managed to worm their way into the Party.

What did they carry with them into these places? Of course, they carried with them a feeling of hatred towards the Soviet regime, a feeling of burning enmity towards the new forms of economy, life and culture.

These gentlemen are no longer able to launch a frontal attack against the Soviet regime. They and their classes made such attacks several times, but they were routed and dispersed. Hence, the only thing left them is to do mischief and harm to the workers, to the collective farmers, to the Soviet regime and to the Party. And they are doing as much mischief as they can, acting on the sly. They set fire to warehouses and wreck machinery. They organise sabotage. They organise wrecking activities in the collective farms and state farms, and some of them, including certain professors, go to such lengths in their passion for wrecking as to inject plague and anthrax germs into the cattle on the collective farms and state farms, help to spread meningitis among horses, etc.

But that is not the main thing. The main thing in the "work" of these "have-beens" is that they organise mass theft and plundering of state property, co-operative property and collective-farm property. Theft and plundering in the factories and plants, theft and plundering of railway freight, theft and plundering in warehouses and trading enterprises—particularly theft and plundering in the state farms and collective farms—such is the main form of the "work" of these "have-beens." Their class instinct, as it were, tells them that the basis of Soviet economy is public property, and that it is precisely this basis that must be shaken in order to injure the Soviet regime—and they try indeed to shake the foundations of public ownership, by organising mass theft and plundering.

In order to organise plundering they play on the private-property habits and survivals among the collective farmers, the individual farmers of yesterday who are now members of collective farms. You, as Marxists, should know that in its development man's consciousness lags behind his actual position. The position of the members of collective farms is that they are no longer individual farmers, but collectivists; but their consciousness is as yet still the old one—that of private property owners. And so, the "have-beens" from the ranks of the exploiting classes play on the private-property habits of the collective farmers in order to organise the plundering of public wealth and thus shake the foundation of the Soviet system, viz., public property.

Many of our comrades look complacently upon such phenomena and fail to understand the meaning and significance of this mass theft and plundering. They remain blind to these facts and take the view that "there is nothing particular in it." But these comrades are profoundly mistaken. The basis of our system is public property, just as private property is the basis of capitalism. If the capitalists proclaimed private property sacred and inviolable when they were consolidating the capitalist system, all the more reason why we Communists should proclaim public property sacred and inviolable in order to consolidate the new socialist forms of economy in all spheres of production and trade. To permit theft and plundering of public property—no matter whether it is state property or co-operative or collective-farm property—and to ignore such counter-revolutionary outrages means to aid and abet the undermining of

the Soviet system, which rests on public property as its basis. It was on these grounds that our Soviet Government passed the recent law for the protection of public property. This enactment is the basis of revolutionary law at the present time. And it is the prime duty of every Communist, of every worker, and of every collective farmer strictly to carry out this law.

It is said that revolutionary law at the present time does not differ in any way from revolutionary law in the first period of NEP, that revolutionary law at the present time is a reversion to revolutionary law of the first period of NEP. That is absolutely wrong. The sharp edge of revolutionary law in the first period of NEP was directed mainly against the excesses of war communism, against "illegal" confiscation and imposts. It guaranteed the security of the property of private owner, of the individual peasant and of the capitalist, provided they strictly observed the Soviet laws. The position in regard to revolutionary law at the present time is entirely different. The sharp edge of revolutionary law at the present time is directed, not against the excesses of war communism, which have ceased to exist, but against thieves and wreckers in public economy, against rowdies and pilferers of public property. The main concern of revolutionary law at the present time is, consequently, the protection of public property, and not something else.

That is why it is one of the fundamental tasks of the Party to fight to protect public property, to fight with all measures and all the means placed at our command by our Soviet laws.

A strong and powerful dictatorship of the proletariat—that is what we need now in order to scatter to the winds the last remnants of the dying classes and to frustrate their thieving designs.

Some comrades have interpreted the thesis about the abolition of classes, the creation of a classless society, and the withering away of the state as a justification of laziness and complacency, a justification of the counter-revolutionary theory of the extinction of the class struggle and the weakening of the state power. Needless to say, such people cannot have anything in common with our Party. They are either degenerates or double-dealers, and must be driven out of the Party. The abolition of classes is not achieved by the extinction of the class struggle, but by its intensification. The state will wither away, not as a result of weakening the state power, but as a result of strengthening it to the utmost, which is necessary for finally crushing the remnants of the dying classes and for organising defence against the capitalist encirclement, which is far from having been done away with as yet, and will not soon be done away with.

As a result of fulfilling the five-year plan we have succeeded in finally ejecting the last remnants of the hostile classes from their positions in production; we have routed the kulaks and have prepared the ground for their elimination. Such are the results of the five-year plan in the sphere of the struggle against the last detachments of the bourgeoisie. But that is not enough. The task is to eject these "have-beens" from our own enterprises and institutions and make them harmless for good and all.

It cannot be said that these "have-beens" can alter anything in the present position of the U. S.S.R. by their wrecking and thieving machinations. They are too weak and impotent to withstand the measures adopted by the Soviet Government. But if our comrades do not arm themselves with revolutionary vigilance and do not actually put an end to the smug, philistine attitude towards cases of theft and plundering of public property, these "have-beens" may do considerable mischief.

We must bear in mind that the growth of the power of the Soviet state will intensify the resistance of the last remnants of the dying classes. It is precisely because they are dying and their days are numbered that they will go on from one form of attack to another, sharper form, appealing to the backward sections of the population and mobilising them against the Soviet regime. There is no mischief and slander these "have-beens" will not resort to against the Soviet regime and around which they will not try to rally the backward elements. This may provide the soil for a revival of the activities of the defeated group of the old counter-revolutionary parties: the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks, and the bourgeois nationalists of the central and border regions, it may also provide the soil for a revival of the activities of the fragments of counter-revolutionary elements among the Trotskyists and Right deviators. Of course, there is nothing terrible in this. But we must bear all this in mind if we want to have done with these elements quickly and without particular sacrifice.

That is why revolutionary vigilance is the quality that Bolsheviks especially need at the present time.

**REF: 38 - 2**

**WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, Speech Delivered on January 11, 1933, J.V. Stalin, Works, July 1930-January 1934, V.13, p. 231-239, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1955, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd.**

The collective farm is a socialist form of economic organisation, just as the Soviets are a socialist form of *political* organisation. Both collective farms and Soviets are a tremendous achievement of our revolution, a tremendous achievement of the working class. But collective farms and Soviets are only a *form* of organisation—a socialist form, it is true, but only a *form* of organisation for all that. Everything depends upon the *content* that is put into this form.

We know of cases when Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies for a certain time supported the counter-revolution against the revolution. That was the case in our country, in the U.S.S.R., in July 1917, for example, when the Soviets were led by the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and when the Soviets shielded the counter-revolution against the revolution. That was the case in Germany at the end of 1918, when Soviets were led by the Social-Democrats, and when they shielded the counter-revolution against the revolution. Hence, it is not only a matter of Soviets as a form of organisation, even though that form is a great revolutionary achievement in itself. It is primarily a matter of the content of the work of the Soviets; it is a matter of the character of the work of the Soviets; it is a matter of *who* leads the Soviets—revolutionaries or counter-revolutionaries. That, indeed, explains the fact that

counter-revolutionaries are not always opposed to Soviets. It is well known, for example, that during the Kronstadt mutiny Milyukov, the leader of the Russian counter-revolution, came out in favour of Soviets, but without Communists. "Soviets without Communists"—that was the slogan Milyukov, the leader of the Russian counter-revolution, advanced at that time. The counter-revolutionaries understood that it is not merely a matter of the Soviets as such, but, primarily, a matter of who is to lead them.

The same must be said of the collective farms. Collective farms, as a socialist form of economic organisation, may perform miracles of economic construction if they are headed by real revolutionaries, Bolsheviks, Communists. On the other hand, collective farms may for a certain period become a shield for all sorts of counter-revolutionary acts if these collective farms are run by Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, Petlyura officers and other whiteguards, former Denikinists and Kolchakites. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the collective farms, as a form of organisation, are not only not guaranteed against the penetration of anti-Soviet elements, but, at first, even provide certain facilities which enable counter-revolutionaries to take advantage of them temporarily. As long as the peasants were engaged in individual farming they were scattered and separated from one another, and therefore the counter-revolutionary tendencies of anti-Soviet elements among the peasantry could not be very effective. The situation is altogether different once the peasants have adopted collective farming....

...

From the point of view of Leninism, collective farms, like the Soviets, taken as a form of organisation, are a weapon, and only a weapon. Under certain conditions this weapon may be turned against the revolution. It can be turned against counter-revolution. It can serve the working class and peasantry. Under certain conditions it can serve the enemies of the working class and peasantry. It all depends upon who wields this weapon and against whom it is directed.

The enemies of the workers and peasants, guided by their class instinct, are beginning to understand this.

Unfortunately, some of our Communists still fail to understand it.

And it is precisely because some of our Communists have not understood this simple thing that we now have a situation where a number of collective farms are managed by well-camouflaged anti-soviet elements, who organise wrecking and sabotage in them.

4) The fourth reason for the defects in our work in the countryside is the inability of a number of our comrades in the localities to reorganise the front of the struggle against the kulaks; their failure to understand that the face of the class enemy has changed of late, that the tactics of the class enemy in the countryside have changed, and that we must change our tactics accordingly if we are to achieve success. The enemy understands the changed situation, understands the strength and the might of the new system in the countryside; and because he understands this, he has reorganised his ranks, has changed his tactics—has passed from frontal attacks against the collective farms to activities conducted on the sly. But we have failed to understand this; we have overlooked the new situation and continue to seek the class enemy where he is no longer to be found— we continue to apply the old tactics of a simplified struggle against the kulaks at a time when these tactics have long since become obsolete.

...

5) Finally, there is one other reason for the defects in our work in the countryside. This consists in underestimating the role and responsibility of Communists in the work of collective-farm development, in underestimating the role and responsibility of Communists in the matter of grain procurements. In speaking of the difficulties of grain procurement, Communists usually throw the responsibility upon the peasants, claiming that the peasants are to blame for everything. But that is absolutely untrue, and certainly unjust. The peasants are not to blame at all. If we are to speak of responsibility and blame, then the responsibility falls wholly upon the Communists, and we Communists alone are to blame for all this.

There is not, nor has there ever been, in the world such a powerful and authoritative government as our Soviet Government. There is not, nor has there ever been, in the world such a powerful and authoritative Party as our Communist Party. No one prevents us, nor can anyone prevent us, from managing the affairs of the collective farms in the way that is required by the interests of the collective farms, the interests of the state. And if we do not always succeed in managing the affairs of the collective farms in the way that Leninism requires; if, not infrequently, we commit gross, unpardonable mistakes with regard to grain procurements, say—then we, and we alone, are to blame.

We are to blame for not having perceived the negative aspects of collective-farm trade in grain, and for having committed a number of gross mistakes.

We are to blame for the fact that a number of our Party organisations have become divorced from the collective farms, have been resting on their laurels and allowing things to take their own course.

We are to blame for the fact that a number of our comrades still overestimate the collective farms as a form of mass organisation, and fail to understand that it is not so much a matter of the form as of taking the leadership of the collective farms into our own hands and expelling the anti-Soviet elements from the leadership of the collective farms.

We are to blame for not having perceived the new situation and for not having appreciated the new tactics of the class enemy, who is carrying on his activities on the sly.

One may ask: what have the peasants to do with it?

I know of whole groups of collective farms which are developing and flourishing, which punctually carry out the assignments of the state and are becoming economically stronger day by day. On the other hand, I know also of collective farms, situated in the

neighbourhood of the first-mentioned, which, in spite of having the same harvest yields and objective conditions as these, are nevertheless wilting and in a state of decay. What is the reason for this? The reason is that the first group of collective farms are led by real Communists, while the second group are led by drifters—with Party membership cards in their pockets, it is true, but drifters all the same.

One may ask: what have the peasants to do with it?

The result of underestimating the role and responsibility of Communists is that, not infrequently, the reason for the defects in our work in the countryside is not sought where it should be sought, and because of this the defects remain unremoved.

The reason for the difficulties of grain procurement must be sought not among the peasants, but among ourselves, in our own ranks. For we are at the helm; we have the resources of the state at our disposal; it is our mission to lead the collective farms; and we must bear the whole responsibility for the work in the countryside.

These are the main reasons for the defects of our work in the countryside.

**REF: 39 - 3**

**REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U. (B), January 26, 1934, J.V. Stalin, Works, July 1930-January 1934, V.13, p. 355-357, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1955, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd.**

### **III. THE PARTY**

#### **1. QUESTIONS OF IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP**

Does this mean, however, that the fight is ended, and that the offensive of socialism is to be discontinued as superfluous?

No, it does not.

Does it mean that all is well in our Party; that there will be no more deviations in the Party, and that, therefore, we may now rest on our laurels?

No, it does not.

We have smashed the enemies of the Party, the opportunists of all shades, the nationalist deviators of all kinds. But remnants of their ideology still live in the minds of individual members of the Party, and not infrequently they find expression. The Party must not be regarded as something isolated from the people who surround it. It lives and works in its environment. It is not surprising that at times unhealthy moods penetrate into the Party from outside. And the ground for such moods undoubtedly exists in our country, if only for the reason that there still exist in town and country certain intermediary strata of the population who constitute a medium which breeds such moods.

The Seventeenth Conference of our Party declared that one of the fundamental political tasks in fulfilling the Second Five-Year Plan is "to overcome the survivals of capitalism in economic life and in the minds of people." That is an absolutely correct idea. But can we say that we have already overcome all the survivals of capitalism in economic life? No, we cannot say that. Still less can we say that we have overcome the survivals of capitalism in the minds of people. We can not say that, not only because in development the minds of people lag behind their economic position, because the capitalist encirclement still exists, which endeavours to revive and sustain the survivals of capitalism in the economic life and in the minds of the people of the U.S.S.R., and against which we Bolsheviks must always keep our powder dry.

Naturally, these survivals cannot but be a favourable ground for a revival of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups in the minds of individual members of our Party. Add to this the not very high theoretical level of the majority of our Party members, the inadequate ideological work of the Party bodies, and the fact that our Party functionaries are overburdened with purely practical work, which deprives them of the opportunity of augmenting their theoretical knowledge, and you will understand the origin of the confusion on a number of questions of Leninism that exists in the minds of individual Party members, a confusion which not infrequently penetrates into our press and helps to revive the survivals of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups.

That is why we cannot say that the fight is ended and that there is no longer any need for the policy of the socialist offensive.

It would be possible to take a number of questions of Leninism and to demonstrate by means of them how tenaciously the survivals of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups continue to exist in the minds of certain Party members.

**REF: 40 - 4**

**REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U. (B), January 26, 1934, J.V. Stalin, Works, July 1930-January 1934, V.13, p. 370, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1955, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd.**

### III. THE PARTY

#### 1. QUESTIONS OF IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

We have always said that the "Lefts" are in fact Rights who mask their Rightness by Left phrases. Now, the "Lefts" themselves confirm the correctness of our statement. Take last year 's issues of the Trotskyist *Bulletin*. What do Messieurs the Trotskyists demand, what do they write about, in what does their "Left" programme find expression? They demand: *the dissolution of the state farms*, on the grounds that they do not Pay; *the dissolution of the majority of the collective farms*, on the grounds that they are fictitious; *the abandonment of the policy of eliminating the kulaks*; *reversion to the policy of concessions*, and *the leasing to concessionaires of a number of our industrial enterprises*, on the ground that they do not pay.

There you have the programme of these contemptible cowards and capitulators-their counter-revolutionary programme of restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R.!

REF: 41 - 5

**REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U. (B), January 26, 1934, J.V. Stalin, Works, July 1930-January 1934, V.13, p. 374, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1955, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd.**

### III. THE PARTY

#### 2. QUESTIONS OF ORGANISATIONAL LEADERSHIP

We must realise that the strength and prestige of our Party and Soviet, economic and all other organisations, and of their leaders, have grown to an unprecedented degree. And precisely because their strength and prestige have grown to an unprecedented degree, it is their work that now determines everything, or nearly everything. There can be no justification for reference to so-called objective conditions. Now that the correctness of the Party's political line has been confirmed by the experience of a number of years, and that there is no longer any doubt as to the readiness of the workers and peasants to support this line, the part played by so-called objective conditions has been reduced to minimum; whereas the part played by our organisations and their leaders has become decisive, exceptional. What does this mean? It means that from now on nine-tenths of the responsibility for the failures and defects in our work rest, not on "objective" conditions, but on ourselves, and on ourselves alone.

REF: 42 - 6

**ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.S.R., J.V. Stalin, Works, 1934-1940, V.14, p. 157-161, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1955, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd.**

### II. CHANGES IN THE LIFE OF THE U.S.S.R. IN THE PERIOD FROM 1924 TO 1936

In conformity with these changes in the economic life of the U.S.S.R., the class structure of our society has also changed.

The landlord class, as you know, had already been eliminated as a result of the victorious conclusion of the civil war. As for the other exploiting classes, they have shared the fate of the landlord class. The capitalist class in the sphere of industry has ceased to exist. The kulak class in the sphere of agriculture has ceased to exist. And the merchants and profiteers in the sphere of trade have ceased to exist. Thus all the exploiting classes have been eliminated.

There remains the working class.

There remains the peasant class.

There remains the intelligentsia.

But it would be a mistake to think that these social groups have undergone no change during this period, that they have remained the same as they were, say, in the period of capitalism.

Take, for example, the working class of the U.S.S.R. By force of habit, it is often called the proletariat. But what is the proletariat? The proletariat is a class bereft of the instruments and means of production, under an economic system in which the means and instruments of production belong to the capitalists and in which the capitalist class exploits the proletariat. The proletariat is a class exploited by the capitalists. But in our country, as you know, the capitalist class has already been eliminated, and the instruments and means of production have been taken from the capitalists and transferred to the state, of which the leading force is the working class. Consequently, our working class, far from being bereft of the instruments and means of production, on the contrary, possess them jointly with the whole people. And since it possesses them and the capitalist class has been eliminated, all possibility of the working class being exploited is precluded. This being the case, can our working class be called the proletariat? Clearly, it cannot. Marx said that if the proletariat is to emancipate itself, it must crush the capitalist class, take the instruments and means of production from the capitalists, and abolish those conditions of production which give rise to the proletariat. Can it be said that the working class of the U.S.S.R. has already brought about these conditions for its emancipation? Unquestionably, this can and must be said. And what does this mean? This means that the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. has been transformed into an entirely new class, into the working class of

the U.S.S.R., which has abolished the capitalist economic system, which has established the Socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production and is directing Soviet society along the road to Communism.

As you see, the working class of the U.S.S.R. is an entirely new working class, a working class emancipated from exploitation, the like of which history of mankind has never known before.

Let us pass on to the question of the peasantry. It is customary to say that the peasantry is a class of small producers, with its members atomised, scattered over the face of the land, delving away in isolation on their small farms with their backward technical equipment; that they are slaves to private property and are exploited with impunity by landlords, kulaks, merchants, profiteers, usurers, and the like. And, indeed, in capitalist countries the peasantry, if we take it in the mass, is precisely such a class. Can it be said that our present day peasantry, the Soviet peasantry, taken in the mass, resembles that kind of peasantry? No, that cannot be said. There is no longer such a peasantry in our country. Our Soviet peasantry is an entirely new peasantry. In our country there are no longer any landlords and kulaks, merchants and usurers who could exploit the peasants. Consequently, our peasantry is a peasantry emancipated from exploitation. Further. Our Soviet peasantry, its overwhelming majority, is a collective farm peasantry, i.e., it bases its work and wealth not on individual labour and on backward technical equipment, but on collective labour and up-to-date technical equipment. Finally, the economy of our peasants is based, not on private property, but on collective property, which has grown up on the basis of collective labour.

As you see, the Soviet peasantry is an entirely new peasantry, the like of which the history of mankind has never known before.

Lastly, let us pass on to the question of the intelligentsia, to the question of engineers and technicians, of workers on the cultural front, of employees in general, and so on. The intelligentsia too, has undergone great changes during this period. It is no longer the old hidebound intelligentsia which tried to place itself above classes, but which actually, for the most part, served the landlords and the capitalists. Our Soviet intelligentsia is an entirely new intelligentsia, bound up by its very roots with the working class and the peasantry. In the first place, the composition of the intelligentsia has changed. People who come from the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie constitute but a small percentage of our Soviet intelligentsia; 80 to 90 per cent of the Soviet intelligentsia are people who have come from the working class, from the peasantry, or from some other strata of the working population. Finally, the very nature of the activities of the intelligentsia has changed. Formerly it had to serve the wealthy classes, for it had no alternative, Today it must serve the people, for there are no longer any exploiting classes. And that is precisely why it is now an equal member of Soviet society, in which, side by side with the workers and peasants, pulling together with them, it is engaged in building the new, classless, Socialist society.

As you see, this is an entirely new, working intelligentsia, the like of which you will not find in any other country on earth.

Such are the changes which have taken place during this period as regards the class structure of Soviet society.

What do these changes signify?

Firstly, they signify that the dividing lines between the working class and the peasantry, and between these classes and the intelligentsia, are being obliterated, and that the old class exclusiveness is disappearing. This means that the distance between these social groups is steadily diminishing.

Secondly, they signify that the economic contradictions between these social groups are declining, are becoming obliterated.

And lastly, they signify that the political contradictions between them are also declining and becoming obliterated.

Such is the position in regard to the changes in the class structure of the U.S.S.R.

**REF: 43 - 7**

**REPORT AND SPEECH IN REPLY TO DEBATE AT THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U. (B) March 3-5, 1937**, J.V. Stalin, Works, 1934-1940, V.14, p.241-249, Pravda, 29 March 1937, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.

#### **DEFECTS IN PARTY WORK AND MEASURES FOR LIQUIDATING TROTSKYITE AND OTHER DOUBLE-DEALERS**

“Comrades, from the reports and the debates on these reports heard at this Plenum it is evident that we are dealing with the following three main facts.

First, the wrecking, diversionist and espionage work of the agents of foreign countries, among whom a rather active role was played by the Trotskyites, affected more or less all, or nearly all, our organisations- economic, administrative and Party.

Second, the agents of foreign countries, among them the Trotskyites, not only penetrated into our lower organisations, but also into a number of responsible positions.

Third, some of our leading comrades, at the centre and in the districts, not only failed to discern the real face of these wreckers, diversionists, spies and assassins, but proved to be so careless, complacent and naive that not infrequently they themselves helped to promote agents of foreign powers to responsible positions.

Such are the three incontrovertible facts which naturally emerge from the reports and the debates on these reports.

## **I. POLITICAL CARELESSNESS**

How are we to explain the fact that our leading comrades, who have rich experience in the fight against all sorts of anti-Party and anti-Soviet trends, proved in this case to be so naive and blind that they were unable to see the real face of the enemies of the people, were unable to discern the wolves in sheep's clothing, unable to tear off their masks?

Can it be said that the wrecking, diversionist and espionage work of the agents of foreign powers operating in the territory of the U.S.S.R. can be anything unexpected and unprecedented for us? No, that cannot be said. This is shown by the wrecking activities in various branches of national economy during the past ten years, beginning with the Shakhty period, activities which, are registered in official documents.

Can it be said that in this past period there were no warning signals and warning signs about the wrecking espionage or terrorist activities of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite agents of fascism? No, that cannot be, said. We had such signals, and Bolsheviks have no right to forget, about them.

The foul murder of Comrade Kirov was the first, serious warning which showed that the enemies of the people would resort to duplicity, and resorting to duplicity would disguise themselves as Bolsheviks, as Party members, in order to worm their way into our confidence and gain access to our organizations. The trial of the "Leningrad Centre" as well as the "Zinoviev-Kamenev" trial gave fresh grounds for the lessons which followed from the foul murder of Comrade Kirov.

The trial of the "Zinovievite-Trotskyite bloc" broadened the lessons of the preceding trials and strikingly demonstrated that the Zinovievites and Trotskyites had united around themselves all the hostile bourgeois elements, that they had become transformed into an espionage, diversionist and terrorist agency of the German secret police, that duplicity and camouflage are the only means by which the Zinovievites and Trotskyites can penetrate into our organizations, that vigilance and political insight are the surest means of preventing such penetration, of liquidating the Zinovievite-Trotskyite gang.

The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. in its confidential letter of January 18, 1935, on the foul murder of Comrade Kirov emphatically warned the Party organizations against political complacency and philistine heedlessness. In the confidential letter it was stated:

"We must put a stop to opportunist complacency which comes from the mistaken assumption that as we grow in strength our enemies become tamer and more innocuous. Such an assumption is radically wrong. It is an echo of the Right deviation which assured all and sundry that the enemy would quietly creep into socialism, that in the end they would become real socialists. Bolsheviks cannot rest on their laurels and become heedless. We do not want complacency, but vigilance, real Bolshevik, revolutionary vigilance. We must remember that the more hopeless the position of the enemies becomes the more eagerly will they clutch at extreme methods as the only methods of the doomed in their struggle against the Soviet power. We must remember this and be vigilant"

In its confidential letter of July 29, 1936, on the espionage-terrorist activities of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. once again called upon the Party organizations to display the utmost vigilance, to acquire the ability to discern the enemies of the people no matter how well disguised they may be. In that confidential letter it was stated:

"Now that it has been proved that the Trotskyite-Zinovievite monsters are uniting in their struggle against the Soviet power all the most enraged and sworn enemies of the toilers of our country -spies, provocateurs, diversionists, whiteguards, kulaks, etc.- when between these elements and the Trotskyites and Zinovievites all lines of demarcation have been obliterated, all our Party organisations, all members of the Party, must understand that the vigilance of Communists is needed on every sector and under all circumstances. An inalienable quality of every Bolshevik under present conditions must be the ability to discern the enemy of the Party no matter how well he may disguise himself."

And so there were signals and warnings.

What did these signals and warnings call for?

They called for the elimination of the weakness of Party organizational work and for the transformation of the Party into an impregnable fortress into which not a single double-dealer could penetrate. They called upon us to put a stop to the underestimation of Party political work and to make an emphatic turn in the direction of intensifying this work to the utmost, of intensifying political vigilance.

But what happened? The facts show that our comrades reacted to these signals and warnings very slowly.

This is eloquently shown by all the known facts that have emerged from the campaign of verifying and exchanging Party documents.

How are we to explain the fact that these warnings and signals did not have the required effect?

How are we to explain the fact that our Party comrades, notwithstanding their experience in the struggle against anti-Soviet elements, notwithstanding the numerous warning signals and warning signs, proved to be politically short-sighted in face of the wrecking, espionage and diversionist work of the enemies of the people?

Perhaps our Party comrades have deteriorated, have become less class-conscious and less disciplined? No, of course not!

Perhaps they have begun to degenerate? Again, of course not! There are no grounds whatever for such an assumption.

What is the matter then? Whence this heedlessness, carelessness, complacency, blindness?

The matter is that our comrades, carried away by economic campaigns and by colossal successes on the front of economic construction, simply forgot about certain very important facts which Bolsheviks have no right to forget. They forgot about the main fact in the international position of the U.S.S.R. and failed to notice two very important facts which have direct relation to the present-day wreckers, spies, diversionists and assassins who are concealing themselves behind Party membership cards and disguising themselves as Bolsheviks.

## **II. THE CAPITALIST ENCIRCLEMENT**

What are the facts which our Party comrades forgot about, or simply failed to notice?

They forgot that the Soviet power is victorious only on one-sixth of the globe, that five-sixths of the globe are in the possession of capitalist states. They forgot that the Soviet Union is encircled by capitalist states. It is an accepted thing among us to chatter about capitalist encirclement, but people refuse to ponder over what sort of thing this capitalist encirclement is. Capitalist encirclement is not an empty phrase, it is a very real and unpleasant thing. Capitalist encirclement means that there is a country, the Soviet Union, which has established the socialist system, and that there are, besides, many other countries, bourgeois countries, which continue to lead the capitalist mode of life and which surround the Soviet Union, waiting for an opportunity to attack her, to crush her, or, at all events, to undermine her might and weaken her.

It is this main fact that our comrades forgot. But it is precisely this fact that determines the basis of the relations between the capitalist encirclement and the Soviet Union.

Take the bourgeois states, for example. Naive people might think that exceptionally good relations exist between them, as between states of the same type. But only naive people can think like that. As a matter of fact relations far from neighbourly exist between them. It has been proved as definitely as twice two are four that the bourgeois states send to each other spies, wreckers, diversionists, and sometimes also assassins, instruct them to penetrate into the institutions and enterprises of these states, set up their agencies and "in case of necessity" disrupt their rear, in order to weaken them and to undermine their strength. Such is the case at the present time. Such, also, was the case in the past. For example, take the states in Europe at the time of Napoleon the First. At that time France was swarming with spies and diversionists from the side of the Russians, Germans, Austrians and English. On the other hand, England, the German states, Austria and Russia, had in their rear a no smaller number of spies and diversionists from the French side. English agents twice made an attempt on the life of Napoleon, and several times they roused the peasants of the Vendee in France against the Napoleon government. And what was this Napoleon government? A bourgeois government, which strangled the French Revolution and preserved only those results of the revolution which were of advantage to the big bourgeoisie. Needless to say the Napoleon government did not remain in debt to its neighbours and also undertook diversionist measures. Such was the case in the past, 130 years ago. That is the case now, 130 years after Napoleon the First. Today France and England are swarming with German spies and diversionists, and, on the other hand, Anglo-French spies and diversionists are busy in Germany; America is swarming with Japanese spies and diversionists, and Japan is swarming with American spies and diversionists.

Such is the law of the relations between bourgeois states.

The question arises, why should the bourgeois states treat the Soviet socialist state more gently and in a more neighbourly manner than they treat bourgeois states of their own type? Why should they send to the Soviet Union fewer spies, wreckers, diversionists and assassins than they send to their kindred bourgeois states? Why should you think so? Would it not be more correct from the point of view of Marxism to assume that the bourgeois states would send twice and three times as many wreckers, spies, diversionists and assassins to the Soviet Union as they send to any bourgeois state?

Is it not clear that as long as capitalist encirclement exists we shall have wreckers, spies, diversionists and assassins sent to us by agents of foreign states?

Our Party comrades forgot about all this, and having forgotten about it, they were caught unawares. That is why the espionage and diversionist work of the Trotskyite agents of the Japano-German secret police proved to be quite unexpected for some of our comrades.”

**REF: 44 - 8**

**REPORT AND SPEECH IN REPLY TO DEBATE AT THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U. (B) March 3-5, 1937, DEFECTS IN PARTY WORK AND MEASURES FOR LIQUIDATING TROTSKYITE AND OTHER DOUBLE-DEALERS, J.V. Stalin, Works, 1934-1940, V.14, p.249-253, Pravda, 29 March 1937, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, 1978, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.**

### **III. PRESENT DAY TROTSKYISM**

Further, while fighting the Trotskyite agents, our Party comrades failed to notice, overlooked the fact that present-day Trotskyism is not what it was, say, seven or eight years ago, that during this period Trotskyism and the Trotskyites had undergone an important evolution which radically changed the face of Trotskyism, that in view of this, the struggle against Trotskyism, the methods of fighting it, have to be radically changed. Our Party comrades failed to notice that Trotskyism had ceased to be a political trend in the working class, that from the political trend in the working class that it was seven or eight years ago Trotskyism had become transformed into a wild and unprincipled gang of wreckers, diversionists, spies and assassins acting on the instructions of the intelligence services of foreign states.

What is a political trend in the working class? A political trend in the working class is a group, or party, which has a definite political face, a platform, a program, which does not and cannot hide its views from the working class, but on the contrary, advocates its views openly and honestly before the working class, which is not afraid of showing its political face to the working class, which is not afraid of demonstrating its real aims and objects to the working class, but on the contrary, goes to the working class with open visor in order to convince it of the correctness of its views. In the past, seven or eight years ago, Trotskyism was such a political trend in the working class, an anti-Leninist and, therefore, a profoundly mistaken trend, it is true, but a political trend, nevertheless.

Can it be said that present-day Trotskyism, Trotskyism, say, of 1936, is a political trend in the working class? No, this cannot be said. Why? Because the present day Trotskyites are afraid to show their real face to the working class, are afraid to reveal to it their real aims and objects, carefully hide their political face from the working class, fearing that if the working class learns about their real intentions it will curse them as people alien to it and drive them away. This, in fact, explains why the principal methods of Trotskyite work are now not the open and honest advocacy of its views in the working class, but the disguising of its views, the obsequious, fawning eulogy of the views of its opponents, the pharisaical and hypocritical trampling of its own views in the mud.

At the trial in 1936, if you remember, Kamenev and Zinoviev emphatically denied that they had any political platform. They had every opportunity of unfolding their political platform at the trial. But they did not do this, declaring that they had no political platform. There can be no doubt that both of them were lying when they denied that they had a political platform. Now even the blind can see that they had a political platform. But why did they deny that they had a political platform? Because they were afraid to reveal their real political face, they were afraid to demonstrate their real platform of restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R., they were afraid because such a platform would cause revulsion in the ranks of the working class.

At the trial in 1937, Pyatakov, Radek and Sokolnikov took a different line. They did not deny that the Trotskyites and Zinovievites had a political platform. They admitted that they had a definite political platform, admitted it and unfolded it in their evidence. But they unfolded it not in order to call upon the working class, to call upon the people, to support the Trotskyite platform, but in order to curse and brand it as an anti-people and anti-proletarian platform. The restoration of capitalism, the liquidation of the collective farms and state farms, the restoration of the system of exploitation, alliance with the fascist forces of Germany and Japan to bring nearer the war against the Soviet Union, the fight for war and against the policy of peace, the territorial dismemberment of the Soviet Union in which the Ukraine was to be surrendered to the Germans and the Maritime Region to the Japanese, preparation for the military defeat of the Soviet Union in the event of an attack on her by hostile states and, as a means of achieving these aims, wrecking, diversion, individual acts of terrorism against the leaders of the Soviet government, espionage on behalf of the Japano-German fascist forces—such was the political platform of present-day Trotskyism unfolded by Pyatakov, Radek and Sokolnikov. Naturally the Trotskyites could not but hide such a platform from the people, from the working class. And they hid it not only from the working class, but also from the rank-and-file Trotskyites, and not only from the rank-and-file Trotskyites, but even from the leading Trotskyite group consisting of a small clique of thirty or forty people. When Radek and Pyatakov demanded from Trotsky permission to convene a small conference of thirty or forty Trotskyites for the purpose of informing them about the character of this platform, Trotsky forbade them on the ground that it was inexpedient to tell even a small clique of Trotskyites about the real character of this platform, for such an "operation" might cause a split.

"Political figures," hiding their views and their platform not only from the working class, but also from the Trotskyite rank-and-file, and not only from the Trotskyite rank-and-file, but from the leading group of the Trotskyites—such is the face of present-day Trotskyism.

But it follows from this that present-day Trotskyism can no longer be called a political trend in the working class.

Present-day Trotskyism is not a political trend in the working class, but a gang without principles and without ideals, a gang of wreckers, diversionists, intelligence service agents, spies, assassins, a gang of sworn enemies of the working class, working in the pay of the intelligence services of foreign states.

Such is the incontrovertible result of the evolution of Trotskyism in the last seven or eight years.

Such is the difference between Trotskyism in the past and Trotskyism at the present time.

The mistake our Party comrades made is that they failed to notice this profound difference between Trotskyism in the past and Trotskyism at the present time. They failed to notice that the Trotskyites have long ceased to be people devoted to an ideal, that the Trotskyites long ago became highway robbers, capable of any foulness, capable of all that is disgusting, to the point of espionage and the downright betrayal of their country, if only they can harm the Soviet government and Soviet power. They failed to notice this and therefore were unable to adapt themselves in time to fight the Trotskyites in a new way, more determinedly.

**REF: 45 - 9**

**REPORT AND SPEECH IN REPLY TO DEBATE AT THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U. (B) March 3-5, 1937, DEFECTS IN PARTY WORK AND MEASURES FOR LIQUIDATING TROTSKYITE AND OTHER DOUBLE-DEALERS, J.V. Stalin, Works, 1934-1940, V.14, p.260-269, Pravda, 29 March 1937, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, 1978, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.**

## **V. OUR TASKS**

....

It must be explained that economic successes, their stability and duration wholly and entirely depend on the successes of Party organisational and Party political work, that without this, economic successes may prove to have been built on sand.

4) We must remember and never forget that the capitalist encirclement is the main fact which determines the international position of the Soviet Union.

We must remember and never forget that as long as the capitalist encirclement exists there will be wreckers, diversionists, spies, terrorists, sent to the Soviet Union by the intelligence services of foreign states; this must be borne in mind and a struggle must be waged against those comrades who underestimate the significance of the capitalist encirclement, who underestimate the strength and significance of wrecking.

It must be explained to our Party comrades that no economic successes, no matter how great, can annul the capitalist encirclement and the consequences arising from it.

The necessary measures must be taken to enable our comrades, both Party and non-Party Bolsheviks, to become familiar with the aims and objects, with the practice and technique of the wrecking, diversionist and espionage work of the foreign intelligence services.

5) It must be explained to our Party comrades that the Trotskyites, who are the active elements in the diversionist, wrecking and espionage work of the foreign intelligence services, have long ceased to be a political trend in the working class, that they have long ceased to serve any ideal compatible with the interests of the working class, that they have become a gang of wreckers, diversionists, spies, assassins, without principles and ideals, working in the pay of foreign intelligence services.

It must be explained that in the struggle against present-day Trotskyism, not the old methods, the methods of discussion must be used, but new methods, uprooting and smashing methods.

6) We must explain to our Party comrades the difference between the present-day wreckers and the wreckers of the Shakhty period; we must explain that whereas the wreckers of the Shakhty period deceived our people in the sphere of technique, taking advantage of their technical backwardness, the present-day wreckers, with Party cards in their possession, deceive our people by taking advantage of the political confidence shown towards them as Party members, by taking advantage of the political carelessness of our people.

.....

That is why the old slogan on the mastery of technique must now be supplemented by the new slogan on the mastery of Bolshevism, the political training of cadres and the abandonment of our political carelessness.

7) We must smash and cast aside the rotten theory that with every advance we make the class struggle here must subside, the more successes we achieve the tamer will the class enemy become.

This is not only a rotten theory but a dangerous one, for it lulls our people, leads them into a trap, and enables the class enemy to recuperate for the struggle against the Soviet government.

On the contrary, the further forward we advance the greater the successes we achieve, the greater will be the fury of the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes, the more ready will they be to resort to sharper forms of struggle, the more will they seek to harm the Soviet state, and the more will they clutch at the most desperate means of struggle as the last resort of the doomed.

It must be borne in mind that the remnants of the defeated classes in the U.S.S.R. do not stand alone. They have the direct support of our enemies beyond the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. It would be a mistake to think that the sphere of the class struggle is limited to the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. One end of the class struggle operates within the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. but its other end stretches across the frontiers of the bourgeois states surrounding us. The remnants of the defeated classes cannot but be aware of this. And precisely because they are aware of it, they will continue their desperate sorties.

This is what history teaches us. This is what Leninism teaches us.

We must remember all this and be on the alert.

8) We must smash and cast aside another rotten theory to the effect that a person who is not always engaged in wrecking and who even occasionally shows successes in his work cannot be a wrecker.

This strange theory exposes the naiveté of its authors. No wrecker will engage in wrecking all the time if he wants to avoid being exposed in the shortest possible time. On the contrary, the real wrecker must from time to time show successes in his work, for this is his only means of preservation as a wrecker, of winning the confidence of people and of continuing his wrecking work.

I think that this question is clear and requires no further explanation.

9) We must smash and cast aside the third rotten theory to the effect that the systematic fulfilment of the economic plans nullifies wrecking and its consequences.

Such a theory can only have one purpose, namely to tickle the self-esteem of our department officials, to lull them and to weaken their struggle against wrecking.

...

Fourthly, the wreckers usually time the main part of their wrecking work not for peace time, but for the eve of war, or for war itself. Suppose we lulled ourselves with this rotten "systematic fulfilment of economic plans" theory and did not touch wreckers. Do the authors of this rotten theory appreciate what an enormous amount of harm the wreckers would do to our country in case of war if we allowed them to remain within the body of our national economy, sheltered by the rotten "systematic fulfilment of economic plans" theory?

Is it not clear that this "systematic fulfilment of economic plans" theory is a theory which is advantageous to the wreckers?

10) We must smash and cast aside the fifth rotten theory to the effect that the Stakhanov movement is the principal means for the liquidation of wrecking.

This theory has been invented in order, amidst the noisy chatter about the Stakhanovites and Stakhanov movement, to parry the blow against wreckers.

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11) We must smash and cast aside the fifth rotten theory to the effect that the Trotskyite wreckers have no more reserves, that they are mustering their last cadres.

This is not true, comrades. Only naive people could invent such a theory. The Trotskyite wreckers have their reserves. These consist first of all of the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes in the U.S.S.R. They consist of a whole number of groups and organisations beyond the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. which are hostile to the Soviet Union.

Take, for example, the Trotskyite counter-revolutionary forth International, two-thirds of which is made up of spies and diversionist agents. Is not this a reserve? Is it not clear that this international of spies will provide forces for the spying and wrecking work of the Trotskyites?

Or take, for example, the group of that rascal, Scheflo, in Norway who provided a haven for the arch-spy Trotsky and helped him to harm the Soviet Union. Is not this group a reserve? Who can deny that this counter-revolutionary group will continue to render services to the Trotskyite spies and wreckers?

Or take, for example, the group of another rascal like Scheflo, the Souvarine group in France. Is not this a reserve? Can it be denied that this group of rascals will also help the Trotskyites in their espionage and wrecking work against the Soviet Union?

Those ladies and gentlemen from Germany, the Ruth Fischers, Maslovs, and Urbahns who have sold themselves body and soul to the fascists - are they not reserves for the espionage and wrecking work of the Trotskyites?

Or take, for example, the well-known gang of writers in America headed by the well-known crook Eastman, all these pen pirates who live by slandering the working class of the Soviet Union - are they not reserves for Trotskyism?

No, the rotten theory that the Trotskyite are mustering their last forces must be cast aside.

12) Finally we must smash and cast aside another rotten theory to the effect that since we Bolsheviks are many, while the wreckers are few, since we Bolsheviks have the support of tens of millions of people, while the Trotskyite wreckers can be numbered in tens and units, then we Bolsheviks can afford to ignore this handful of wreckers.

This is wrong, comrades. This more than strange theory has been invented for the consolation of certain of our leading comrades who have failed in their work because of their inability to combat wrecking. It has been invented to lull their vigilance, to enable them to sleep peacefully.

Of course it is true that the Trotskyite wreckers have the support of individuals, while the Bolsheviks have the support of tens of millions of people. But it by no means follows from this that the wreckers are not able to inflict very serious damage on us. It does not need a large number of people to do harm and to cause damage. To build a Dnieper Dam tens of thousands of workers have to be set to work. But to blow it up, only a score or so would be required. To win a battle in a war several Red Army corps may be required. But to nullify this gain at the front only a few spies are needed at Army Headquarters, or even at Divisional Headquarters, to steal the plan of operations and pass it on to the enemy. To build a big railway bridge thousands of people are required. But to blow it up a few are sufficient. Scores and hundreds of similar examples could be quoted.

Consequently, we must not comfort ourselves with the fact that we are many, while they, the Trotskyite wreckers, are few.

We must see to it that not a single Trotskyite wrecker is left in our ranks."

**REF: 46 - 10**

**ON THE FINAL VICTORY OF SOCIALISM IN THE U.S.S.R., 18 January 1938-12 February 1938, STALIN TO IVANOV, J.V.** Stalin, Works, 1934-1940, V.14, p.317-325, Pravda, 14 February 1938, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, 1978, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.

Of course you are right, Comrade Ivanov, and your ideological opponents i.e., Comrades Urozhenko and Kazelkov, are wrong. And for the following reasons:

Undoubtedly the question of the victory of Socialism in one country, in this case our country, has two different sides.

The first side of the question of the victory of socialism in our country embraces the problem of the mutual relations between classes in our country. This concerns the sphere of internal relations.

Can the working class of our country overcome the contradictions with our peasantry and establish an alliance, collaboration with them?

Can the working class of our country, in alliance with our peasantry smash the bourgeoisie of our country, deprive it of the land, factories, mines, etc., and by its own efforts build a new, classless society, complete Socialist society?

Such are the problems that are connected with the first side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country.

Leninism answers these problems in the affirmative. Lenin teaches us that "we have all that is necessary for the building of a complete Socialist society."

Hence we can and must, by our own efforts, overcome our bourgeoisie and build Socialist society.

Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and those other gentlemen who later became spies and agents of fascism, denied that it was possible to build Socialism in our country unless the victory of the Socialist revolution was first achieved in other countries, in capitalist countries. As a matter of fact, these gentlemen wanted to turn our country back to the path of bourgeois development and they concealed their apostasy by hypocritically talking about the "victory of the revolution" in other countries.

This was precisely the point of controversy between our Party and these gentlemen.

Our country's subsequent course of development proved that the Party was right and that Trotsky and company were wrong.

For, during this period, we succeeded in liquidating our bourgeoisie, in establishing fraternal collaboration with our peasantry and in building, in the main, Socialist society, notwithstanding the fact that the Socialist revolution has not yet been victorious in other countries.

This is the position in regards to the first side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country.

I think, Comrade Ivanov, that this is not the side of the question that is the point of controversy between you and Comrades Urozhenko and Kazelkov.

The second side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country embraces the problem of the mutual relations between our country and other countries, capitalist countries; the problem of the mutual relations between the working class of our country and the

bourgeoisie of other countries. This concerns the sphere of external, international relations. Can the victorious Socialism of one country, which is encircled by many strong capitalist countries, regard itself as being fully guaranteed against the danger of military invasion, and hence, against attempts to restore capitalism in our country?

Can our working class and our peasantry, by their own efforts, without the serious assistance of the working class in capitalist countries, overcome the bourgeoisie of other countries in the same way as we overcame our own bourgeoisie? In other words: Can we regard the victory of Socialism in our country as final, i.e., as being free from the dangers of military attack and of attempts to restore capitalism, assuming that Socialism is victorious only in one country and that the capitalist encirclement continues to exist?

Such are the problems that are connected with the second side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country.

Leninism answers these problems in the negative. Leninism teaches that "the final victory of Socialism, in the sense of full guarantee against the restoration of bourgeois relations, is possible only on an international scale" (c.f. resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union).

This means that the serious assistance of the international proletariat is a force without which the problem of the final victory of Socialism in one country cannot be solved.

This, of course, does not mean that we must sit with folded arms and wait for assistance from outside. On the contrary, this assistance of the international proletariat must be combined with our work to strengthen the defence of our country, to strengthen the Red Army and the Red Navy, to mobilise the whole country for the purpose of resisting military attack and attempts to restore bourgeois relations.

This is what Lenin says on this score: "We are living not merely in a State but in a system of States, and it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to co-exist for a long period side by side with imperialist States. Ultimately one or other must conquer. Meanwhile, a number of terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois States is inevitable. This means that if the proletariat, as the ruling class, wants to and will rule, it must prove this also by military organisation." (Collected Works, Vol. 24. P.122.)

And further:

"We are surrounded by people, classes and governments which openly express their hatred for us. We must remember that we are at all times but a hair's breadth from invasion." (Collected Works, Vol. 27. P.117.)

This is said sharply and strongly but honestly and truthfully without embellishment as Lenin was able to speak.

On the basis of these premises Stalin stated in "Problems of Leninism" that: "The final victory of Socialism is the full guarantee against attempts at intervention, and that means against restoration, for any serious attempt at restoration can take place only with serious support from outside, only with the support of international capital."

Hence the support of our revolution by the workers of all countries, and still more, the victory of the workers in at least several countries, is a necessary condition for fully guaranteeing the first victorious country against attempts at intervention and restoration, a necessary condition for the final victory of Socialism." (Problems of Leninism, 1937, P.134.)

Indeed, it would be ridiculous and stupid to close our eyes to the capitalist encirclement and to think that our external enemies, the fascists, for example, will not, if the opportunity arises, make an attempt at a military attack upon the U.S.S.R. Only blind braggarts or masked enemies who desire to lull the vigilance of our people can think like that.

No less ridiculous would it be to deny that in the event of the slightest success of military intervention, the interventionists would try to destroy the Soviet system in the districts they occupied and restore the bourgeois system.

Did not Denikin and Kolchak restore the bourgeois system in the districts they occupied? Are the fascists any better than Denikin or Kolchak?

Only blockheads or masked enemies who with their boastfulness want to conceal their hostility and are striving to demobilise the people, can deny the danger of military intervention and attempts at restoration as long as the capitalist encirclement exists.

Can the victory of Socialism in one country be regarded as final if this country is encircled by capitalism, and if it is not fully guaranteed against the danger of intervention and restoration?

Clearly, it cannot.

This is the position in regard to the question of the victory of Socialism in one country.

It follows that this question contains two different problems:

1. The problem of the internal relations in our country, i.e., the problem of overcoming our own bourgeoisie and building complete Socialism; and

2. The problem of the external relations of our country, i.e., the problem of completely ensuring our country against the dangers of military intervention and restoration.

We have already solved the first problem, for our bourgeoisie has already been liquidated and Socialism has already been built in the main. This is what we call the victory of Socialism, or, to be more exact, the victory of Socialist Construction in one country.

We could say that this victory is final if our country were situated on an island and if it were not surrounded by numerous capitalist countries.

But as we are not living on an island but "in a system of States," a considerable number of which are hostile to the land of Socialism and create the danger of intervention and restoration, we say openly and honestly that the victory of Socialism in our country is not yet final.

But from this it follows that the second problem is not yet solved and that it has yet to be solved. More than that: the second problem cannot be solved in the way that we solved the first problem, i.e., solely by the efforts of our country.

The second problem can be solved only by combining the serious efforts of the international proletariat with the still more serious efforts of the whole of our Soviet people.

The international proletarian ties between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the working class in bourgeois countries must be increased and strengthened; the political assistance of the working class in the bourgeois countries for the working class of our country must be organised in the event of a military attack on our country; and also every assistance of the working class of our country for the working class in bourgeois countries must be organised; our Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air Fleet, and the Chemical and Air Defence Society must be increased and strengthened to the utmost.

The whole of our people must be kept in a state of mobilisation and preparedness in the face of the danger of a military attack, so that no "accident" and no tricks on the part of our external enemies may take us by surprise.

From your letter it is evident that Comrade Urozhenko adheres to different and not quite Leninist opinions. He, it appears, asserts that "we now have the final victory of Socialism and full guarantee against intervention and the restoration of capitalism."

There cannot be the slightest doubt that Comrade Urozhenko is fundamentally wrong.

Comrade Urozhenko's assertion can be explained only by his failure to understand the surrounding reality and his ignorance of the elementary propositions of Leninism, or by empty boastfulness of a conceited young bureaucrat.

If it is true that "we have full guarantee against intervention and restoration of capitalism," then why do we need a strong Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air Fleet, a strong Chemical and Air Defence Society, more and stronger ties with the international proletariat?

Would it not be better to spend the milliards that now go for the purpose of strengthening the Red Army on other needs and to reduce the Red Army to the utmost, or even to dissolve it altogether?

People like Comrade Urozhenko, even if subjectively they are loyal to our cause, are objectively dangerous to it because by their boastfulness they- willingly or unwillingly (it makes no difference!)- lull the vigilance of our people, demobilise the workers and peasants and help the enemies to take us by surprise in the event of international complications.

As for the fact that, as it appears, you, Comrade Ivanov, have been "removed from propaganda work and the question has been raised of your fitness to remain in the Y.C.L.," you have nothing to fear.

If the people in the Regional Committee of the Y.C.L. really want to imitate Chekov's Sergeant Prishibeyev, you can be quite sure that they will lose on this game.

Prishibeyevs are not liked in our country.

Now you can judge whether the passage from the book "Problems of Leninism" on the victory of Socialism in one country is out of date or not.

I myself would very much like it to be out of date, I would like unpleasant things like capitalist encirclement, the danger of military attack, the danger of the restoration of capitalism, etc., to be things of the past. Unfortunately, however, these unpleasant things exist.

**REF: 47 - 11**

**REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U. (B) (Delivered March 10, 1939), J.V. Stalin, Works, 1934-1940, V.14, p.395-422, Reprinted by Red Star Press Ltd, 1978, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1954.**

## II. Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union

Certain foreign pressmen have been talking drivel to the effect that the purging of Soviet organisations of spies, assassins and wreckers like Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Yakir, Tukhachevsky, Rosengoltz, Bukharin and other fiends has "shaken" the Soviet system and caused its "demoralisation." One can only laugh at such cheap drivel. How can the purging of Soviet organisations of noxious and hostile elements shake and demoralise the Soviet system? This Trotsky-Bukharin bunch of spies, assassins and wreckers, who kow-towed to the foreign world, who were possessed by a slavish instinct to grovel before every foreign bigwig, and, who were ready to enter his employ as a spy - this handful of people who did not understand that the humblest Soviet citizen, being free from the fetters of capital, stands head and shoulders above any high-placed foreign bigwig whose neck wears the yoke of capitalist slavery - who needs this miserable band of venal slaves, of what value can they be to the people, and whom can they "demoralise"? In 1937 Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich and other fiends were sentenced to be shot. After that, the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. were held. In these elections, 98.6 per cent of the total vote was cast for the Soviet power. At the beginning of 1938 Rosengoltz, Rykov, Bukharin and other fiends were sentenced to be shot. After that, the elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics were held. In these elections 99.4 per cent of the total vote was cast for the Soviet power. Where are the symptoms of "demoralisation," we would like to know, and why was this "demoralisation" not reflected in the results of the elections?

To listen to these foreign drivellers, one would think that if the spies, assassins and wreckers has been left at liberty to wreck, murder and spy without let or hindrance, the Soviet organisations would have been far sounder and stronger. (Laughter.) Are not these gentlemen giving themselves away too soon by so insolently defending the cause of spies, assassins and wreckers?

Would it not be truer to say that the weeding out of spies, assassins and wreckers from our Soviet organisations was bound to lead, and did lead, to the further strengthening of these organisations?

What, for instance, do the events at Lake Hassan show, if not that the weeding out of spies and wrecker is the surest means of strengthening our Soviet organisations.

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The tasks of the Party in the sphere of industrial policy are:

...

5. Never to forget that we are surrounded by a capitalist world; to remember that the foreign espionage services will smuggle spies, assassins and wreckers into our country; and, remembering this, to strengthen our Socialist intelligence service and systematically help it to defeat and eradicate the enemies of the people.

...

## III. Further Strengthening of the C.P.S.U. (B)

...

In the face of these imposing achievements, the opponents of the general line of our Party, all the various "Left" and "Right" trends, all the Trotsky-Pyatakov and Bukharin-Rykov degenerates were forced to creep into their shells, to tuck away their hackneyed "platforms," and to go into hiding. Lacking the manhood to submit to the will of the people, they preferred to merge with the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and fascists, to become the tools of foreign espionage services, to hire themselves out as spies, and to obligate themselves to help the enemies of the Soviet Union to dismember our country and to restore capitalist slavery in it.

...

... The Party could not but feel that in the conditions prevailing in 1930-33 such a mass influx into its ranks was an unhealthy and undesirable expansion of its membership. The Party knew that its ranks were being joined not only by honest and loyal people, but also by chance elements and careerists, who were seeking to utilise the badge of the Party for their own personal ends. The Party could not but know that its strength lay not only in the size of its membership, but, and above all, in the quality of its members. This raised the question of regulating the composition of the Party. It was decided to continue the purge of Party members and candidate members begun in 1933; and the purge actually was continued until May 1935. It was further decided to suspend the admission of new members into the Party; and the admission of new members actually was suspended until September 1936, the admission of new members being resumed only on November 1, 1936. Further, in connection with the dastardly murder of Comrade Kirov, which showed that there were quite a number of suspicious elements in the Party, it was decided to undertake a verification of the records of Party members and an exchange of old Party cards for new ones, both these measures being completed only in September 1936. Only after this was the admission of new members and candidate members into the Party resumed. As a result of all these measures, the Party succeeded in weeding out chance, passive, careerist and directly hostile elements, and in selecting the most staunch and loyal people. It cannot be said that the purge was not accompanied by grave mistakes. There were unfortunately more mistakes than might have been expected. Undoubtedly, we shall have no further need of resorting to the method of mass purges. Nevertheless, the purge of 1933-36 was unavoidable and its results, on the whole, were beneficial. The number of Party members represented at this, the Eighteenth Congress is about 1,600,000, which is 270,000 less than were represented at the Seventeenth Congress. But there is nothing bad in that. On the contrary, it is all to the good, for the Party strengthens itself by clearing its ranks of dross. Our Party is now somewhat smaller in membership, but on the other hand it is better in quality.

That is a big achievement.

## 3. Selection, Promotion and Allocation of Cadres

...

The party cadres constitute the commanding staff of the Party; and since our Party is in power, they also constitute the commanding staff of the leading organs of state. After a correct political line has been worked out and tested in practice, the Party cadres become the decisive force in the work of guiding the Party and the state. A correct political line is, of course, the primary and most important thing. But that in itself is not enough. A correct political line is not needed as a declaration, but as something to be carried into effect. But in order to carry a correct political line into effect, we must have cadres, people who understand the political line of the Party, who accept it as their own line, who are prepared to carry it into effect, who are able to put it into practice and are capable of answering for it, defending it and fighting for it. Failing this, a correct political line runs the risk of being purely nominal.

And here arises the question of the correct selection of cadres, the training of cadres, the promotion of new people, the correct allocation of cadres, and the testing of cadres by work accomplished.

### **3. Party Propaganda, Marxist-Leninist Training of Party Members and Party Cadres**

....

...The work of regulating the composition of the Party and of bringing the leading bodies closer to the activities of the lower bodies may be organised satisfactorily; the work of promoting, selecting and allocating cadres may be organised satisfactorily; but, with all this, if our Party propaganda for some reason or other goes lame, if the Marxist-Leninist training of our cadres begins to languish, if our work of raising the political and theoretical level of these cadres flags, and the cadres themselves cease on account of this to show interest in the prospect of our further progress, cease to understand the truth of our cause and are transformed into narrow plodders with no outlook, blindly and mechanically carrying out instructions from above -then our entire state and Party work must inevitably languish. It must be accepted as an axiom that the higher the political level and the Marxist-Leninist knowledge of the workers in any branch of state or Party work the better and more fruitful will be the work itself, and the more effective the results of the work; and, vice versa, the lower the political level of the workers, and the less they are imbued with the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, the greater will be the likelihood of disruption and failure in the work, of the workers themselves becoming shallow and deteriorating into paltry plodders, of their degenerating altogether. It may be confidently stated that if we succeeded in training the cadres in all branches of our work ideologically, and in schooling them politically, to such an extent as to enable them easily to orientate themselves in the internal and international situation; if we succeeded in making them quite mature Marxist-Leninists capable of solving the problems involved in the guidance of the country without serious error, we would have every reason to consider nine-tenths of our problems already settled. And we certainly can accomplish this, for we have all the means and opportunities for doing so.

The training and moulding of our young cadres usually proceeds in some particular branch of science or technology, along the line of specialisation. This is necessary and desirable. There is no reason why a man who specialises in medicine should at the same time specialise in physics or botany, or vice versa. But there is one branch of science which Bolsheviks in all branches of science are in duty bound to know, and that is the Marxist-Leninist science of society, of the laws of social development, of the laws of development of the proletarian revolution, of the laws of development of Socialist construction, and of the victory of Communism...

### **4. Some Questions of Theory**

...

These questions show that those who ask them have conscientiously memorised certain propositions contained in the doctrine of Marx and Engels about the state. But they also show that these comrades have failed to understand the essential meaning of this doctrine; that they have failed to realise in what historical conditions the various propositions of this doctrine were elaborated; and, what is more, that they do not understand present-day international conditions, have overlooked the capitalist encirclement and the dangers it entails for the Socialist country. These questions not only betray an underestimation of the capitalist encirclement, but also an underestimation of the role and significance of the bourgeois states and their organs, which send spies, assassins and wreckers into our country and are waiting for a favourable opportunity to attack it by armed force. They likewise betray an underestimation of the role and significance of our Socialist state and of its military, punitive and intelligence organs, which are essential for the defence of the Socialist land from foreign attack. It must be confessed that the comrades mentioned are not the only ones to sin in this underestimation. All the Bolsheviks, all of us without exception, sin to a certain extent in this respect. Is it not surprising that we learned about the espionage and conspiratorial activities of the Trotskyite and Bukharinite leaders only quite recently, in 1937 and 1938, although, as the evidence shows, these gentry were in the service of foreign espionage organisations and carried on conspiratorial activities from the very first days of the October Revolution? How could we have failed to notice so grave a matter? How are we to explain this blunder? The usual answer to this question is that we could not possibly have assumed that these people could have fallen so low. But that is no explanation, still less is it a justification: for the blunder was a blunder. How is this blunder to be explained? It is to be explained by an underestimation of the strength and consequence of the mechanism of the bourgeois states surrounding us and of their espionage organs, which endeavour to take advantage of people's weaknesses, their vanity, their slackness of will, to enmesh them in their espionage nets and use them to surround the organs of the Soviet state. It is to be explained by an underestimation of the role and significance of the mechanism of our Socialist state and of its intelligence service, by an underestimation of this intelligence service, by the twaddle that an intelligence service in a Soviet state is an unimportant trifle, and that the Soviet intelligence service and the Soviet state itself will soon have to be relegated to the museum of antiquities.

...

Since the October Revolution, our Socialist state has passed through two main phases in its development.

The first phase was the period from the October revolution to the elimination of the exploiting classes. The principal task in that period was to suppress the resistance of the overthrown classes, to organise the defence of the country against the attacks of the interventionists, to restore industry and agriculture, and to prepare the conditions for the elimination of the capitalist elements. Accordingly, in this period our state performed two main functions. The first function was to suppress the overthrown classes inside the country. In this respect our state bore a superficial resemblance to previous states whose functions had also been to suppress

recalcitrants, with the fundamental difference, however, that our state suppressed the exploiting minority in the interests of the labouring majority, while previous states had suppressed the exploited majority in the interests of the exploiting minority. The second function was to defend the country from foreign attack. In this respect it likewise bore a superficial resemblance to previous states, which also undertook the armed defence of their countries, with the fundamental difference, however, that our state defend from foreign attack the gains of the labouring majority, while previous states in such cases defended the wealth and privileges of the exploiting minority. Our state had yet a third function: this was the work of economic organisation and cultural education performed by our state bodies with the purpose of developing the infant shoots of the new, Socialist economic system and re-educating the people in the spirit of Socialism. But this new function did not attain to any considerable development in that period.

The second phase was the period from the elimination of the capitalist elements in town and country to the complete victory of the Socialist economic system and the adoption of the new Constitution. The principal task in this period was to establish the Socialist economic system all over the country and to eliminate the last remnants of the capitalist elements, to bring about a cultural revolution, and to form a thoroughly modern army for the defence of the country. And the functions of our Socialist state changed accordingly. The function of military suppression inside the country ceased, died away; for exploitation had been abolished, there were no more exploiters left, and so there was no one to suppress. In place of this function of suppression the state acquired the function of protecting Socialist property from thieves and pilferers of the people's property. The function of defending the country from foreign attack fully remained; consequently, the Red Army and the Navy also fully remained, as did the punitive organs and the intelligence service, which are indispensable for the detection and punishment of the spies, assassins and wreckers sent into our country by foreign espionage services. The function of economic organisation and cultural education by the state organs also remained, and was developed to the full. Now the main task of our state inside the country is the work of peaceful economic organisation and cultural education. As for our army, punitive organs, and intelligence service, their edge is no longer turned to the inside of the country, but to the outside, against external enemies.

As you see, we now have an entirely new, Socialist state, without precedent in history and differing considerably in form and functions from the Socialist state of the first phase.

But development cannot stop there. We are going ahead, towards Communism. Will our state remain in the period of Communism also?

Yes, it will, unless the capitalist encirclement is liquidated, and unless the danger of foreign military attack has disappeared. Naturally, of course, the forms of our state will again change in conformity with the change in the situation at home and abroad.

No, it will not remain and will atrophy if the capitalist encirclement is liquidated and a Socialist encirclement takes its place.

That is how the question stands with regard to the Socialist state.

**REF: 48 - 12**

**HISTORY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS)-SHORT COURSE, Edited by A Commission of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. (B), Authorised by the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. (B), 1938, p. 328-331, First Published in Russian in the U.S.S.R. in 1938, Authorised English translation published in the U.S.S.R. in 1939, Reprinted in Britain 1943, Cobbett Publishing Co. Ltd., London**

**CHAPTER TWELVE, THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY IN THE STRUGGLE TO COMPLETE THE BUILDING OF THE SOCIALIST SOCIETY, INTRODUCTION OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION (1935-1937)**

**CONCLUSION**

...

3) The history of the Party further teaches us that unless the petty-bourgeois parties which are active within the ranks of the working class and which push the backward sections of the working class into the arms of the bourgeoisie, thus splitting the unity of the working class, are smashed, the victory of the proletarian revolution is impossible.

The history of our Party is the history of the struggle against the petty-bourgeois parties—the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, Anarchists and nationalists—and of the utter defeat of these parties. If these parties had not been vanquished and driven out of the ranks of the working class, the unity of the working class could not have been achieved; and if the working class had not been united, it would have been impossible to achieve the victory of the proletarian revolution.

If these parties, which at first stood for the preservation of capitalism, and later, after the October Revolution, for the restoration of capitalism, had not been utterly defeated, it would have been impossible to preserve the dictatorship of the proletariat, to defeat the foreign armed intervention, and to build up Socialism.

It cannot be regarded as an accident that all the petty-bourgeois parties, which styled themselves "revolutionary" and "Socialist" parties in order to deceive the people—the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, Anarchists and nationalists—became counter-revolutionary parties even before the October Socialist Revolution, and later turned into agents of foreign bourgeois espionage services, into a gang of spies, wreckers, diversionists, assassins and traitors to the country.

"The unity of the proletariat in the epoch of social revolution," Lenin says, "can be achieved only by the extreme revolutionary party of Marxism, and only by a relentless struggle against all other parties." (Lenin, Collected Works, Russian. ed., Vol. XXVI, p. 50.)

4) The history of the Party further teaches us that unless the Party of the working class wages an uncompromising struggle against the opportunists within its own ranks, unless it smashes the capitulators in its own midst, it cannot preserve unity and discipline within its ranks, it cannot perform its role of organiser and leader of the proletarian revolution, nor its role as the builder of the new, Socialist society.

The history of the development of the internal life of our Party is the history of the struggle against the opportunist groups within the Party—the "Economists," Mensheviks, Trotskyites, Bukharinites and nationalist deviators—and of the utter defeat of these groups.

The history of our Party teaches us that all these groups of capitulators were in point of fact agents of Menshevism within our Party, the lees and dregs of Menshevism, the continuers of Menshevism. Like the Mensheviks, they acted as vehicles of bourgeois influence among the working class and in the Party. The struggle for the liquidation of these groups within the Party was therefore a continuation of the struggle for the liquidation of Menshevism.

If we had not defeated the "Economists" and the Mensheviks, we could not have built the Party and led the working class to the proletarian revolution.

If we had not defeated the Trotskyites and Bukharinites, we could not have brought about the conditions that are essential for the building of Socialism.

If we had not defeated the nationalist deviators of all shades and colours, we could not have educated the people in the spirit of internationalism, we could not have safeguarded the banner of the great amity of the nations of the U.S.S.R., and we could not have built up the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

It may seem to some that the Bolsheviks devoted far too much time to this struggle against the opportunist elements within the Party, that they overrated their importance. But that is altogether wrong. Opportunism in our midst is like an ulcer in a healthy organism, and must not be tolerated. The Party is the leading detachment of the working class, its advanced fortress, its general staff. Sceptics, opportunists, capitulators and traitors cannot be tolerated on the directing staff of the working class. If, while it is carrying on a life and death fight against the bourgeoisie, there are capitulators and traitors on its own staff, within its own fortress, the working class will be caught between two fires, from the front and the rear. Clearly, such a struggle can only end in defeat. The easiest way to capture a fortress is from within. To attain victory, the Party of the working class, its directing staff, its advanced fortress, must first be purged of capitulators, deserters, scabs and traitors.

It cannot be regarded as an accident that the Trotskyites, Bukharinites and nationalist deviators who fought Lenin and the Party ended just as the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties did, namely, becoming agents of fascist espionage services, by turning spies, wreckers, assassins, diversionists and traitors to the country.

"With reformists, Mensheviks, in our ranks," Lenin said, "it is *impossible* to achieve victory in the proletarian revolution, it is *impossible* to retain it. That is obvious in principle, and it has been strikingly confirmed by the experience both of Russia and Hungary. In Russia, difficult situations have arisen *many times*, when the Soviet regime would *most certainly* have been overthrown had Mensheviks, reformists and petty-bourgeois democrats remained in our Party...." (Lenin, Collected Works, Russ. ed., Vol. XXV, pp. 462-63.)

"Our Party," Comrade Stalin says, "succeeded in creating internal unity and unexampled cohesion of its ranks primarily because it was able in good time to purge itself of the opportunist pollution, because it was able to rid its ranks of the Liquidators, the Mensheviks. Proletarian parties develop and become strong by purging themselves of opportunists and reformists, social-imperialists and social-chauvinists, social-patriots and social-pacifists. The Party becomes strong by purging itself of opportunist elements." (Stalin, *Leninism*, Eng. ed., p.83)

5) The history of the Party further teaches us that a party cannot perform its role as leader of the working class if, carried away by success, it begins to grow conceited, ceases to observe the defects in its work, and fears to acknowledge its mistakes and frankly and honestly to correct them in good time.

A party is invincible if it does not fear criticism and self-criticism, if it does not gloss over the mistakes and defects in its work, if it teaches and educates its cadres by drawing the lessons from the mistakes in Party work, and if it knows how to correct its mistakes in time.

A party perishes if it conceals its mistakes, if it glosses over sore problems, if it covers up its shortcomings by pretending that all is well, if it is intolerant of criticism and self-criticism, if it gives way to self-complacency and vainglory and if it rests on its laurels.

"The attitude of a political party towards its own mistakes," Lenin says, "is one of the most important and surest ways of judging how earnest the party is and how it *in practice* fulfils its obligations towards its class and the toiling masses. Frankly admitting a mistake, ascertaining the reasons for it, analysing the conditions which led to it, and thoroughly discussing the means of correcting it—that is the earmark of a serious party; that is the way it should perform its duties, that is the way it should educate and train the class, and then the masses." (Lenin, Selected Works, Eng. ed., Vol. X, p. 98.)

**ECONOMONIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM IN THE U.S.S.R., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1952, P 73-78**

Comrade Yaroshenko thinks that we have only to ensure a rational organisation of the productive forces, and we shall be able to obtain an abundance of products and to pass to communism, to pass from the formula, "to each according to his work," to the formula, "to each according to his needs." That is a profound error, and reveals a complete lack of understanding of the laws of economic development of socialism. Comrade Yaroshenko's conception of the conditions for the transition from socialism to communism is far too rudimentary and puerile. He does not understand that neither an abundance of products, capable of covering all the requirements of society, nor the transition to the formula, "to each according to his needs," can be brought about if such economic factors as collective-farm, group, property, commodity circulation, etc., remain in force. Comrade Yaroshenko does not understand that before we can pass to the formula, "to each according to his needs," we shall have to pass through a number of stages of economic and cultural re-education of society, in the course of which work will be transformed in the eyes of society from only a means of supporting life into life's prime want, and social property into the sacred and inviolable basis of the existence of society.

In order to pave the way for a real, and not declaratory transition to communism, at least three main preliminary conditions have to be satisfied.

1. It is necessary, in the first place, to ensure, not a mythical "rational organisation" of the productive forces, but a continuous expansion of all social production, with a relatively higher rate of expansion of the production of means of production. The relatively higher rate of expansion of production of means of production is necessary not only because it has to provide the equipment both for its own plants and for all the other branches of the national economy, but also because reproduction on an extended scale becomes altogether impossible without it.
2. It is necessary, in the second place, by means of gradual transitions carried out to the advantage of the collective farms, and, hence, of all society, to raise collective-farm property to the level of public property, and, also by means of gradual transitions, to replace commodity circulation by a system of products-exchange, under which the central government, or some other social-economic centre, might control the whole product of social production in the interests of society.

Comrade Yaroshenko is mistaken when he asserts that there is no contradiction between the relations of production and the productive forces of society under socialism. Of course, our present relations of production are in a period when they fully conform to the growth of the productive forces and help to advance them at seven-league strides. But it would be wrong to rest easy at that and to think that there are no contradictions between our productive forces and the relations of production. There certainly are, and will be, contradictions, seeing that the development of the relations of production lags, and will lag, behind the development of the productive forces. Given a correct policy on the part of the directing bodies, these contradictions cannot grow into antagonisms, and there is no chance of matters coming to a conflict between the relations of production and the productive forces of society. It would be a different matter if we were to conduct a wrong policy, such as that which Comrade Yaroshenko recommends. In that case conflict would be inevitable, and our relations of production might become a serious brake on the further development of the productive forces.

The task of the directing bodies is therefore promptly to discern incipient contradictions, and to take timely measures to resolve them by adapting the relations of production to the growth of the productive forces. This, above all, concerns such economic factors as group, or collective-farm, property and commodity circulation. At present, of course, these factors are being successfully utilised by us for the promotion of the socialist economy, and they are of undeniable benefit to our society. It is undeniable, too, that they will be of benefit also in the near future. But it would be unpardonable blindness not to see at the same time that these factors are already beginning to hamper the powerful development of our productive forces, since they create obstacles to the full extension of government planning to the whole of the national economy, especially agriculture. There is no doubt that these factors will hamper the continued growth of the productive forces of our country more and more as time goes on. The task therefore is to eliminate these contradictions by gradually converting collective-farm property into public property, and by introducing also gradually—products-exchange in place of commodity circulation.

3. It is necessary, in the third place, to ensure such a cultural advancement of society as will secure for all members of society the all-round development of their physical and mental abilities, so that the members of society may be in a position to receive an education sufficient to enable them to be active agents of social development, and in a position freely to choose their occupations and not be tied all their lives, owing to the existing division of labour, to some one occupation.

What is required for this?

It would be wrong to think that such a substantial advance in the cultural standard of the members of society can be brought about without substantial changes in the present status of labour. For this, it is necessary first of all, to shorten the working day at least to six and subsequently to five hours. This is needed in order that the members of society might have the necessary free time to receive an all round education. It is necessary further, to introduce universal compulsory polytechnic education, which is required in order that the members of society might be able freely to choose their

occupation and not be tied to some one occupation all their life. It is likewise necessary that housing conditions should be radically improved, and that real wages of workers and employees should be at least doubled, if not more, both by means of direct increases of wages and salaries, and, more especially, by further systematic reductions of prices of consumer goods.

These are the basic conditions required to pave the way for the transition to communism. Only after all these preliminary conditions are satisfied in their entirety may it be hoped that work will be converted in the eyes of the members of society from nuisance into "life's prime want" (Marx), that "labour will become a pleasure instead of a burden" (Engels), and that social property will be regarded by all members of society as the sacred and inviolable basis of the existence of society.

Only after all these preliminary conditions have been satisfied in their entirety will it be possible to pass from the socialist formula, "from each according to his ability to each according to his work," to the communist formula "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."

This will be a radical transition from one form of economy, the economy of socialism, to another, higher form of economy, the economy of communism.

As we see, the transition from socialism to communism is not such a simple matter as Comrade Yaroshenko imagines.

To attempt to reduce this complex and multiform process, which demands deep-going economic changes, to the "rational organisation of the productive forces," as Comrade Yaroshenko does, is to substitute Bogdanovism for Marxism.

**REF: 50 - 14**

**REPORT TO THE NINETEENTH PARTY CONGRESS ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U. (B.), G. M. MALENKOV, p. 100-130, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1952**

The enemies and vulgarisers of Marxism preach the theory, most harmful to our cause, that the Soviet state will wither and die away even though the capitalist encirclement continues. The Party shattered this putrid theory and cast it aside. It advanced and substantiated the proposition that while the socialist revolution has triumphed in one country and capitalism still rules in the majority of countries, the land of the victorious revolution must not weaken, but strengthen the state to the utmost, that the state will remain even under communism, if the capitalist encirclement remains. We would not have achieved the successes in peaceful construction that we are so proud of now had we permitted the weakening of our state. Had we not strengthened our state, our army, our penal and security agencies, we would have found ourselves unarmed in the face of our enemies and confronted with the danger of military defeat. Our Party was able to transform the Land of Soviets into an impregnable fortress of socialism because it strengthened the socialist state to the utmost, and it is continuing to strengthen it.

....

In the post-war period, the chief function of our state—economic organisation and cultural-educational activity—received further development and became more prominent, The great expansion of socialist construction and the task of bringing Party and Soviet leadership still closer to the districts, towns and villages, necessitated a number of changes in administrative and territorial divisions, and new Regions, Areas and Districts were formed.

...

It has become a matter of particular importance in this post-war period to strengthen the Party directing bodies and to improve their work and the work of the Party organisations.

The new tasks that faced the country with the end of the war and the reversion to peaceful construction demanded a substantial improvement of inner-Party work and of the leadership of government and economic activity by the Party organisations. The fact was that wartime conditions had demanded certain modifications in methods of Party leadership, and had also given rise to grave shortcomings in the work of the Party directing bodies and Party organisations. This was reflected first of all in the fact that the Party bodies had been giving less attention to organisation and ideological work within the Party, with the result that in many of the party organisations these activities were neglected. There was a certain danger of the Party bodies becoming severed from the masses and being transformed from organs of political leadership, from militant and self-acting organisations, into something in the nature of managing institutions, incapable of counteracting parochial, narrow-departmental and other anti-state tendencies, or of perceiving outright distortions of the Party's policy in the economic field and violations of the interests of the state.

In order to eliminate this danger and successfully to cope with the task of strengthening the local Party directing bodies and stimulating the activities of the Party organisations, it was necessary to stop the neglect of organisation and ideological work within the Party, and to put an end to such tendencies as the adoption by Party organisations of administrative methods of leadership, the effect of which was to lend a bureaucratic character to Party work and to dampen the activity and initiative of the Party masses.

The Central Committee focused the attention of the Party organisations on the duty of consistently practising inner-Party democracy and developing criticism and self-criticism, and in this way strengthening control by the Party masses over the activities of the Party directing bodies, which is the key to the improvement of all Party work and to the enhancement of the activity and initiative of Party organisations and Party members.

...

...We still meet with responsible workers who never tire of professing their fidelity to the Party, but who actually cannot tolerate criticism from below, stifle it, and revenge themselves on those who criticise them. We know of plenty of cases when a bureaucratic

attitude towards criticism and self-criticism has done serious damage to the Party, killed the initiative of a Party organisation, undermined the prestige of the leadership among the Party masses, and infected some of the organisations with the anti-Party habits of bureaucrats, sworn enemies of the Party.

The Party cannot close its eyes to the fact that wherever criticism and self-criticism are suppressed and control by the masses over the activities of organisations and institutions is weakened, there such ugly features as bureaucracy and degeneration, and even the corruption of individual sections of the Party apparatus, invariably appear. Of course, such cases are not very prevalent. Our Party is stronger and sounder than it ever was. But it must be realised that these dangerous maladies have not become very wide-spread only because the Party has been prompt, using the weapon of criticism and self-criticism in openly and boldly denouncing them and striking vigorous blows at concrete manifestations of vainglory, bureaucracy and degeneration. Wise leadership consist, in fact, in the ability to perceive a danger in its incipiency, and not to allow it to grow to the dimensions of a direct menace.

...

It is particularly important at the present time to stimulate self-criticism and criticism from below, and ruthlessly to combat, as malignant enemies of the Party, all who hamper the development of criticism of our shortcomings, who stifle criticism, and answer it with persecution and victimisation. The fact is that with the victorious conclusion of the war and our big achievements in the economic field since the war, an uncritical attitude has developed in the ranks of the Party towards defects and errors in the work of Party, economic and other organisations. There are facts that show that achievement has bred in the ranks of the Party a tendency to self-satisfaction, to make a pretence of all being well, a spirit of smug complacency, a desire on the part of people to rest on their laurels and to live on the capital of their past services. There are quite a number of responsible workers who are inclined to think, "we can do everything," "nothing's beyond us," that "all's going well," and so there is no need for them to worry themselves with such a disagreeable occupation as disclosing defects and errors in work, or combating undesirable and unhealthy tendencies in our organisations. This attitude of mind, which has such pernicious consequences, has infected a section of our cadres who are poorly trained and unstable from the Party point of view. Leaders of Party, Soviet and economic organisations not infrequently turn meetings, gatherings of active members, plenary meetings and conferences into vainglorious displays, into occasions of self-laudation, with the result that errors and shortcomings in work, maladies and weaknesses are not brought to light and subjected to criticism; and the effect of this is to encourage the attitude of self-satisfaction and smug complacency. A spirit of negligence has penetrated our Party organisations. There are cases of Party, economic, Soviet and other executives relaxing their vigilance and failing to see what is going on around them; there are cases of divulgence of Party and state secrets. Some responsible workers get absorbed in economic affairs; they allow their heads to be turned by successes, and begin to forget that we are still in a capitalist encirclement, that the enemies of the Soviet state are working persistently to smuggle their agents into our country and to utilise unstable elements in Soviet society for their own malignant ends.

If our work is to be successfully advanced, undesirable tendencies must be vigorously combated, the attention of the Party and of all Soviet citizens must be focused on the elimination of shortcomings; and this requires the broad development of self-criticism, and especially of criticism from below.

The active participation of the broad mass of workers in eliminating shortcomings in work and undesirable features in the life of our society is a graphic demonstration of the genuinely democratic character of the Soviet system and of the high political intelligence of our Soviet citizens. Criticism from below reflects the creative initiative and enterprise of our working millions, their concern to strengthen the Soviet state. The more widespread self-criticism and criticism from below become, the more fully will the creative powers and energies of our people manifest themselves, and the stronger will grow the consciousness among the masses that they are the masters of the country.

It would be a mistake to think that criticism from below can develop of itself, spontaneously. Criticism from below can grow and spread only if every person who come forward with sound criticism feels sure that he will have the support of our organisations and that the defects he points to will really be removed. Our Party organisations and Party workers, indeed all our leading personnel, must take a lead in this and set an example in showing a sincere and conscientious attitude towards criticism. It is the duty of all our leading personnel, and especially of our Party workers, to create the conditions in which all honest Soviet citizens may come forward boldly and fearlessly and criticise defects in the work of organisations and institutions. In all organisations, general meetings, meetings of active workers, plenary meetings and conferences must really become broad forums for bold and trenchant criticism of shortcomings.

The persistent effort to eliminate defects and unhealthy tendencies in the work of Party, Soviet, economic and other organisations must be the daily concern of the whole Party. A Communist has no right to remain indifferent to unhealthy features and shortcomings in work, still less to conceal them from the Party...

...

One of the most dangerous and vicious violations of Party and state discipline is the concealment by some leading workers of the true state of affairs in the plants or institutions in their charge, and the depicting of the results of their work in too rosy a light. The Central Committee and the government have disclosed cases when leading workers place their narrow departmental and local interests higher than the general interests of the state, and, under the guise of concern for the welfare of the enterprises under their charge, conceal from the government material resources at their disposal, which is a violation of the laws of Party and government. We also know of business executives who, with the connivance of the Party organisations, put in exaggerated applications for raw materials and prefabricates, or who, when they are not fulfilling their production plans, overstate actual output in their reports. There are quite a number of executives who forget that the enterprises entrusted to their charge are state enterprises, and try to turn them into their own private domain where these apologies for leaders think they are the cock of the walk and can do anything they fancy. (Laughter.) Another grave evil is that there are quite a number of executives who believe that Party decisions and Soviet laws are not written for them, and imagine that we have two disciplines: one for the rank and file, and the other for leaders. Such "leaders" think

that everything is allowed them, that they need not pay heed to state and Party rules, that they may break Soviet laws, and take any arbitrary action they please.

The Party demands truthfulness and honesty, unswerving observance of duty to Party and state of all its members, and especially of those in leading positions. It cannot trust people who go against the interests of the state, who play false with the government and try to deceive Party and state. Deceiving the Party or state in any form whatsoever, any attempt at deceit, whether by concealing or by distorting the truth, cannot be regarded otherwise than as a severe offence against the Party. It is time it were understood that there is only one discipline in our Party, for rank and file and for leaders alike, and that Soviet laws are equally binding on all Soviet citizens, high and low. Leaders who do not carry out decisions of Party and government conscientiously, who act lawlessly and arbitrarily, cannot expect to have any allowances made for them on account of their position.

....

The chief shortcoming is that some of our executives do not base their selection of personnel on political and business qualifications, but on considerations of kinship, friendship and hometown ties. Not infrequently, people who are honest and competent, but peremptory in their intolerance of shortcomings, and therefore a cause of annoyance to executives, are shouldered out on various pretexts and replaced by people of dubious value, or even entirely unfit for their jobs, but are compliant and subservient enough to suit the tastes of certain executives. Owing to such distortions of the Party line in the matter of selection and promotion of personnel, we get in some organisations close coteries who constitute themselves into a sort of mutual insurance society and set their group interests higher than the interests of Party and state. It is not surprising that such a state of affairs usually results in degeneration and corruption. This was the case, for instance, with the Ulyanovsk Party organisation, where a section of the economic, Soviet and Party workers in the top leadership of the regional organisation became morally corrupt and began to engage in speculation, in squandering and pilfering state property.

...

#### **4) Many Party organisations underrate the importance of ideological work, with the result that it falls short of the Party's requirements, and in many organisations is in a state of neglect.**

Ideological work is a prime duty of the Party, and underestimation of its importance may do irreparable damage to the interests of Party and state. We must always remember that if the influence of socialist ideology is weakened the effect is to strengthen the influence of the bourgeois ideology.

There is no class basis, there can be no class basis, for the domination of the bourgeois ideology in our Soviet society. It is the socialist ideology that dominates in our country, and Marxism-Leninism constitutes its indestructible foundation. But we still have vestiges of the bourgeois ideology, relics of the private-property mentality and morality. These relics do not die away of themselves; they are very tenacious and may strengthen their hold, and a determined struggle must be waged against them. Nor are we guaranteed against the infiltration of alien views, ideas and sentiments from outside, from the capitalist countries, or from inside, from the relics of groups hostile to the Soviet state which have not been completely demolished by the Party. It should not be forgotten that the enemies of the Soviet Union are working to inculcate, foment and foster unhealthy sentiments, ideologically to corrupt the unstable elements in our society.

Some of our Party organisations tend to devote all their attention to economic affairs and to forget ideological matters, to relegate them to the background. Ideological work does not receive sufficient attention even in so front-rank a Party organisation as the Moscow organisation. And that cannot be done with impunity. Whenever attention to ideological questions is relaxed, a favourable soil is created for the revival of views and ideas hostile to us. If there are sectors of ideological work which for any reason fall out of the purview of Party organisations, if there are sectors in which Party leadership and influence have slackened, alien elements, the remnants of anti-Leninist groups smashed by the Party, will try to get hold of these sectors and utilise them for the promotion of their own line, for the revival and spread of all sorts of un-Marxist "opinions" and "conceptions."

...

The ideological work of the Party must play an important part in purging the minds of people of survivals of the capitalist mentality, of prejudices and pernicious traditions inherited from the old society. We must continue to foster in the masses a lofty sense of social duty, we must educate the workers in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, friendship among nations, and concern for the interests of the state, and perfect those sterling qualities of our Soviet people—confidence in the victory of our cause and readiness and ability to overcome all difficulties.