

WORLD COUNCIL OF PEACE

**DOCUMENTS
AND PAPERS
ON DISARMAMENT**

1945-1955

**OFFICIAL STATEMENTS PERTAINING
TO DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS
BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS**

VIENNA, 1956

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At Geneva the four Heads of State recognised that international differences could be solved by negotiation. They recognised the need to end the threat and use of force. Their agreement was a result of the will and action of the people, who created the spirit of Geneva.

The problems submitted to the Foreign Ministers' Conference could have been solved in the same spirit. By its failure to implement the directive of the Heads of State, the Foreign Ministers' Conference disappointed the hopes of the peoples.

The arms race, continuing in spite of the relaxation of international tension, is the principal obstacle to the success of negotiations between the four Great Powers.

However, a first agreement on disarmament was and is still possible. This has been shown by the work of the United Nations Organisation. Such an agreement could deal with a limitation of armaments, a pledge not to use nuclear weapons, the banning of test explosions of nuclear weapons and an effective control of these measures. Different schemes have been proposed for the control of armaments; they could now be applied to the first measures of disarmament. The possibility of disarmament remains a firm hope in the hearts of men. They know that they can live in peace and that scientific discoveries can end the fear of poverty and hunger, ensuring them of continuously increasing welfare.

The Bureau of the World Council of Peace calls for action in all countries in all the different ways possible to stop the arms race and bring about first agreements on the reduction of armaments and the abolition of atomic weapons.

To allow a discussion on all points of view and to help the full development of all efforts, the Bureau has decided to call, on the 5th-9th April, 1956, an Extraordinary Session of the World Council of Peace devoted to disarmament and the abolition of nuclear weapons.

The Bureau invites all those who are alarmed by the arms race and wish to end it to take part in this session and bring their views and suggestions: national and international organisations and movements, scientists who have a special contribution to make towards solving these problems, working people who suffer so much from the burden of armaments, all those who condemn war on religious or moral grounds.

Each step taken towards the reduction of armaments will allow new measures of disarmament to be worked out and accomplished. Each step taken in this direction will help re-establish confidence and assist in the settlement of questions in dispute. Each step taken in this direction will bring nearer the time when distrust and fear will give place to peaceful cooperation between all countries and friendship between all peoples.

THE BUREAU OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF PEACE

Helsinki, 13 December 1955

FOREWORD

The problems of disarmament have been the subject of almost continuous international discussion in the ten years since the end of the Second World War. Despite fundamental differences of opinion, the Governments concerned have put much work into the attempt to limit conventional armaments and secure the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.

Certainly, this effort has not yet achieved success; for the level of armaments has actually increased and the extent of the danger from nuclear weapons has multiplied a thousandfold since the development of the hydrogen bomb. Nevertheless the effort to secure disarmament has not been wasted. In spite of critical situations in many parts of the world no general war has broken out and serious local wars have been brought to an end through negotiation. Nor has the pursuit of disarmament slackened. As can be seen from the documents presented here, difficulties which have held up progress for months have ultimately been surmounted and the differences between contending views have been narrowed step by step: the remaining gap seems now so small that it seems that political rather than technical difficulties still keep it open.

All through this period it has been evident that the peoples' desire for peace has been the most important factor in urging statesmen to seek agreed means for disarmament. This has been expressed in many ways, not least by activities of organisations for peace, both national and international, among which the World Council of Peace and movements associated with it have played their part. It is world public opinion which will have to overcome the last obstacles and find a way to agreed disarmament and the removal of the fear of atomic destruction.

To be effective popular opinion must be informed.

The great debate on disarmament that has gone on in the United Nations and at other international conferences has been prolonged and complex. The very abundance of reports and articles on it makes it difficult, almost impossible, for the ordinary man or woman to follow. For this reason the Bureau of the World Council of Peace, on the suggestion of its President, decided to compile this selection of official documents to illustrate the main stages in the pursuit of disarmament during the last ten years and some of the arguments that have been used in supporting the different proposals that have been put forward. It is in no sense a history of disarmament; it is an effort to give the essentials of the voluminous official reports, while presenting the most important documents in detail.

In the interests of impartiality no attempt has been made to comment on the documents. The remainder of this introduction forms a general guide designed to put the them in their historical setting and to indicate how they form a coherent story.

The selection falls into four major parts, corresponding to the four major phases of the disarmament discussion. In the first phase, 1945-50, the reduction of conventional armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons were separated and no agreement was reached on either. The outbreak of the Korean war and the rapid rearmament that accompanied it made disarmament negotiations both more difficult and more necessary than ever. The second phase began in 1951 when the Atomic Energy Commission and the Conventional Armaments Commission were dissolved and the Disarmament Commission was set up to deal with both conventional and atomic weapons. Some progress was made on detailed points; but fundamental differences remained. The third phase, covering the year 1954, marks the beginning of agreement, which coincided with the relaxation of tension due to the settlement of the wars in Korea

and in Indo-China. Compromise solutions began to appear and to become the bases of discussion. The fourth phase, comprising a further advance towards agreement, began with the meeting of the Disarmament Sub-Committee in February 1955. It coincided with the great relaxation of tension which led to the meeting of the Heads of Government which took place in Geneva in that year. At that time it seemed that the principles of disarmament were acceptable to all the States involved. In spite of this, however, in the later part of the year, differences began to appear in the method of application of the principles; up to the present these differences have prevented the preparation of an agreed disarmament convention.

Phase I

- April 1945 The collection begins with the relevant Statutes of the United Nations (p. 9) agreed at San Francisco in June 1945, placing on the Assembly the responsibility of deciding the general principles of disarmament and on the Security Council the task of their realisation in practice. The explosion of the first atomic bomb at Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 introduced a new element of danger to peace
- August 1945
- December 1945 but already in December 1945 the U.S.S.R. associated itself with the earlier declaration of the U.S.A., Britain and Canada calling for the elimination of the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes and calling on the United Nations to set up an Atomic Energy Commission.
- January 1946 That Commission was duly established early in 1946 (p. 9). Immediately it set to work it was apparent that two radically different

June 1946

solutions were proposed. One, generally known as the Baruch plan (p. 9), was put forward by the United States and won the support of Britain, France and other associated States. Its essential feature was the proposed setting up of an Atomic Development Authority which should own and control all fissile material. When this Authority had been established the production of bombs would stop and existing stocks would be disposed of. The Authority would further have the power for action, without veto, on any infringement of violations of the agreement. The major provisions of the Baruch plan were objected to by the Soviet Union: the ownership clause because it interfered with national sovereignty and independence, the procedure by stages because it would leave the prohibition of the bomb till last, and the power of sanctions without veto because it would place virtual control of national existence in the hands of the Power holding the majority of the United Nations. The Soviet Union put forward alternative proposals of its own (pp. 11 and 16) proposing a convention prohibiting the production and use of atomic weapons, and calling for the destruction of stocks to be verified by a control commission. The United States and other Governments objected to this essentially on the grounds that the convention would not be respected by a prospective aggressor and that the abolition of atomic weapons by itself would give the advantage to any Power possessing preponderance of

- conventional arms. It became apparent that the question of atomic weapon control could not be achieved unless corresponding progress was made in the limitation of armaments, In this spirit the General Assembly in December
- December 1946 1946 unanimously passed a resolution on the principles of disarmament (p. 14) which in regard to atomic weapons embodied certain concessions from both sides with regard to the veto and inspection but left the questions of stages and ownership unresolved. The Atomic Energy Commission continued its work, considering the problems of atomic control in detail, and arrived at a report in which in regard to technical questions (p. 15) there was substantial agreement that control was possible. In other respects the majority of the Commission supported a slightly amended Baruch plan. This was submitted to the Security Council which failed to agree on it. It was resubmitted to the Atomic Energy Commission and after much discussion, without any progress, the General Assembly
- November 1948 accepted the Commission's third report on 4 November 1948. This majority report was frequently subsequently referred to as the 'United Nations Plan.'
- February 1947 Meanwhile, in February 1947, a committee had been set up on Conventional Arms (p. 16). Some positive progress was made, particularly in a definition of weapons of mass destruction (p. 18) and in principles of regulation and
- August 1948 reduction of armaments (p. 18). Here there was another divergence of opinion, running

along similar lines. The majority proposals demanded first the disclosure of conventional weapons but not atomic weapons and the agreement about their reduction. This was opposed by a Soviet plan calling for substantial reductions first followed by the setting up of a control body to verify them. The U.S.S.R. further demanded that atomic arms should be disclosed along with conventional arms.

At this point it seemed that deadlock was reached. Progress was all the more difficult because of the international tension which accompanied the beginning of the cold war. Increasing tension in 1948 and 1949, and the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 made disarmament appear remote in the face of the massive rearmament that was being undertaken. However, there were other factors which seemed to change the balance of forces, such as the creation of the People's Republic of China and the manufacture of atomic bombs in the Soviet Union. Further, popular alarm about the dangers of atomic warfare was growing and found expression in the signatures gained by the Stockholm Appeal against atomic weapons in 1950. Renewed efforts were made to restart negotiations on disarmament and the prohibition of atomic weapons. It became clear that it would be impossible to get on as long as these two problems were separated and accordingly the United Nations Assembly set up in January 1952 a Disarmament Commission (p. 20).

June 1950

March 1950

January 1952

Phase II

March 1952

The work of the Disarmament Commission was difficult but the problems were treated more realistically than in the first phase. Initial proposals made by the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and France brought different approaches to disarmament and its relation to the abolition of atomic weapons. In the Soviet plan (p. 21) the first place is given to the proportional reduction by a third to a half of all armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons to be verified by a control commission. This proposal included two important concessions: that prohibition and control should be put into effect simultaneously and that the operation of the control commission should be continuous. In the United States proposals (p. 22) the main emphasis is placed on a graduated disclosure of armed forces leaving atomic armaments to the last to be followed by a limitation of forces. New and fruitful suggestions put forward by the French for absolute limitation of all forces at a low level and the setting up of a time table of stages by which it could be secured were further elaborated in a joint proposal of France, the United Kingdom and the United States (p. 25). This was objected to by the U.S.S.R. on the grounds that it still separated the questions of armed forces and atomic weapons and that it made no provision for the abolition of bases on foreign territory. The Disarmament Commission continued its

May 1952

discussions until August but without making any specific recommendations.

July 1953

No further advance to agreement on disarmament was made until late in 1953; so the second phase was to end as inconclusively as the first. Meanwhile, however, events had occurred which made a fresh start possible. On the one hand the signature of the Korean armistice reduced war tensions and pointed the way to the settlement of localised war by negotiation. On the other hand the announcement of the explosion of hydrogen bombs both by the United States and the Soviet Union made the pursuit of some form of disarmament and the prohibition of such weapons even more necessary. The third

August 1953

report of the Disarmament Commission (p. 26) expressed the hope that recent international events would create a more propitious atmosphere.

Phase III

November 1953

The third phase begins with the eighth meeting of the General Assembly in November 1953. The Assembly adopted an unopposed resolution (p. 26) that urged the continuation of the search for a means of disarmament and proposed that the Disarmament Commission set up a Sub-Committee containing the main interested Powers to seek in private an acceptable solution.

The meeting of the Foreign Ministers

- February 1954 of the four Great Powers in Berlin in February 1954 issued a Communique in which they agreed to hold an exchange of views to promote a successful solution of the disarmament problem. The alarm caused universally by the consequences of the hydrogen bomb test explosion on 1 March 1954 found expression in a communication to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Prime Minister of India (p. 28) urging the prohibition of these weapons and at least a standstill agreement on experimental explosions.
- May 1954 The Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission was set up (p. 29) and sat from 13 May to 22 June 1954. This time considerable progress was made. The United States put forward a working paper on disarmament (p. 30) largely concerned with the machinery of disclosure and verification of atomic and other armaments. The Authority it proposed would not exercise rights of ownership and thus one major contentious point of the original Baruch proposals was waived. The Soviet Union subsequently presented proposals (p. 31) for prohibition of atomic weapons, reduction of armed forces and control of both operations III which there is an explicit provision for continuous control, thus eliminating another contentious point. The British and French delegations the presented a
- June 1954

compromise resolution (p. 32) proposing a disarmament treat open to United Nations members and non-members and including features of the American, Soviet and previous French proposals. These proposals were forwarded to the Disarmament Commission and formed the basis of its fourth report.

Meanwhile, following President Eisenhower's proposals of 12 December 1953 to set up an International Atomic Energy Agency, which would provide a pool of fissile material for peaceful purposes, discussions had taken place between the United States and Soviet Governments. These discussions led to no agreement. The Soviet view was that such an agency could only be useful if it was part of a general disarmament agreement, but that by itself it could only serve to create an atmosphere of false confidence (p. 33). In its answer the United States Government set out certain conditions (p. 34) for any effective plan of disarmament and claimed that the Soviet proposals did not satisfy them. In a further reply (p. 34) the Soviet Government disputed this viewpoint and reasserted the value of declarations made by States. Though no agreement was reached the correspondence was valuable in bringing out the major concern of the United States Government with enforcement and control and of the Soviet Government with an

international undertaking not to employ weapons of mass destruction.

September 1954 The Soviet proposals were presented to the Ninth General Assembly in 1954 (p. 35) and discussed there together with the Report of the Disarmament Commission. The Assembly discussion was more explanatory and less contentious than earlier ones and was further helped by an Indian resolution (p. 37) proposing an armaments truce pending agreement on a disarmament convention which was referred to the Disarmament Commission for consideration. Finally a unanimously agreed resolution (p. 37) urged the continuation of the work of the Disarmament Commission and referred to it the Soviet proposals.

November 1954

This first unanimous agreement marked a definite improvement of the prospects of disarmament and may appropriately be taken as ending the third phase of the discussions.

Phase IV

The first part of the year 1955 was most favourable to negotiations on disarmament. The negotiations to end the Indo-Chinese war set in motion a general relaxation of tension which was further improved in May 1955 by the signature of a treaty on Austria. At the same time the

conference of Asian and African Powers in Bandung and the general interest in the Nehru-Chou En-lai Five Principles of Coexistence indicated world-wide concern with the firm establishment of peace.

The Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission met on 25 February 1955 and, in the first few months, it made important steps towards agreement. The first proposal to be discussed was a four-power draft resolution (p. 38) setting out a treaty of disarmament by stages, largely based on the three power plan of May 1952 (p. 25) but incorporating some concessions to Soviet views. After a preliminary declaration and the setting up of a control organ, actual disarmament should begin. The first stage would limit armaments at existing levels; the second would reduce them half-way to their final levels and stop the production of atomic weapons, and the third would complete the disarmament process and secure the elimination of atomic weapons. These proposals were further discussed and clarified. The Soviet Union, while not accepting the scheme in its entirety, put forward on 18 March 1955 a somewhat similar scheme, also based on stages, in the same terms as its proposal in the General Assembly in September (p. 39). Later the four Powers clarified their views on the methods of achieving nuclear disarmament and on its

coordination with the limitation of conventional arms (p.40). Finally, they further clarified their views on the principles of control (p. 41).

May 1955

All these points were taken into account in a draft prepared by the Soviet Union and presented on 10 May 1955 (p.41). This follows essentially the same pattern as the four-power draft (p. 38) with a three-phase disarmament programme. Both sides agreed the figures for limitation of armed forces and both agreed to a half cut in the second stage. The differences between the two were reduced to relatively minor points. The most important of these was the proposal in the Soviet draft for the dismantling of military bases in territories of other countries. Study of the Soviet proposals was begun, but before any conclusions could be arrived at there supervened the meeting at Geneva of the Heads of the four Governments—France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Here disarmament figured as one

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of the major topics discussed and extracts from the speeches referring to it are given (pp. 45-47). It will be seen that in this emphasis was changed from the elimination of atomic weapons, or even from the prohibition of their use, to the even more urgent problem of preventing the outbreak of an atomic war. It was for this purpose that President Eisenhower's scheme of aerial surveys, Premier

Bulganin's proposals of inspection teams at aerodromes and ports and Prime Minister Eden's neutral zone, were all proposed and ultimately referred to the Disarmament Sub-Committee. Another consequence of the meeting was the linking of the question of disarmament to that of security and, hence, to the difficult problem of German unity.

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Although the major outcome of the meeting lay undoubtedly in the creation of the Geneva atmosphere of international goodwill it did not prove possible in the ensuing months to overcome the last obstacles to a disarmament agreement. The autumn 1955 meetings of the Disarmament Sub-Committee (pp. 48-60) helped to clarify a number of points but when this series of meetings ended at the beginning of October agreement was still to seek.

The situation was not improved at the conference of the four Foreign Ministers at Geneva, as extracts from their speeches show (pp. 63-72). It even appeared as if the United States Government then was no longer supporting the four-power scheme of disarmament by stages. The central core of difference, between a demand for completely effective control on the one hand and on rapid disarmament on the other, remained. It was made even more difficult by the technical developments of increased stockpiling of fissile material

and by the impossibility of detecting the components of hydrogen bombs. It seemed, indeed, as if these would be used to make all control seem impossible and thus prevent any agreement whatever on disarmament. Despite these tendencies, world opinion, deeply concerned with the desperate fate of humanity in a war in which nuclear weapons were used, is pressing more than ever for the achievement of disarmament.

December 1955 This is reflected in the unanimous resolution of the Tenth Assembly of the United Nations (p. 75) and in the Bulganin-Eisenhower correspondence. (pp. 61-63).

SECTION I

FIRST ATTEMPTS: 1945-1948

1. Introduction

Among the first acts of the United Nations Organisation was the setting up of an Atomic Energy Commission in 1946 and of a Commission on Conventional Armaments in 1947. These two bodies worked through the years 1947, 1948 and 1949 but did not succeed in finding a basis for agreement on disarmament measures. Many proposals and counter-proposals were made during these discussions but their essentials remained the same.

In this section are given the foundation of the two commissions and the two main plans, with certain clarifications. The various modifications put forward during the discussions of subsequent years which ended in deadlock are not included.

2. Charter of the United Nations

Article II

1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the

Members or to the Security Council or to both...

Article 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

3. Atomic Energy Commission Established

On 24 January 1946, the General Assembly adopted the following resolution (1 (I)), establishing the Atomic Energy Commission.

Resolved by the General Assembly of the United Nations to establish a Commission, with the composition and competence set out hereunder, to deal with problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters:

1. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION

A Commission is hereby established by the General Assembly with the terms of reference set out under section 5 below ...

3. COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION

The Commission shall be composed of one representative

from each of those States represented on the Security Council, and Canada, when that State is not a member of the Security Council...

5. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE COMMISSION

The Commission shall proceed with the utmost despatch and enquire into all phases of the problem, and make such recommendations from time to time with respect to them as it finds possible. In particular, the Commission shall make specific proposals.

(a) for extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;

(b) for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes;

(c) for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;

(d) for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States' against the hazards of violations and evasions.

The work of the Commission should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken ...

4. Creation of an International Atomic Development Authority proposed by U.S.A.

THE 'BARUCH PLAN'

On 14 June 1946 Mr. Bernard Baruch outlined the United

States' proposals on atomic energy which subsequently became known as the Baruch plan. The essential points are given in the following extracts from Mr. Baruch's speech.

The United States proposes the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material and including:

(1) Managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security.

(2) Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities.

(3) The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.

(4) Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative character intended to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge and thus enable it to comprehend and therefore to detect misuse of atomic energy. To be effective, the Authority must itself be the world's leader in the field of atomic knowledge and development and thus supplement its legal authority with the great power inherent in possession of leadership in knowledge ...

When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon; has been agreed upon and put into effective operation and condign punishments set up for the violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatised as international crimes, we propose that:

- (1) manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop;
- (2) existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty;
- (3) the Authority shall be in possession of full information as to the know-how for the production of atomic energy.

Let me repeat, so as to avoid misunderstanding: my

country is ready to make its full contribution toward the end we seek, subject, of course, to our constitutional processes, and to an adequate system of control becoming effective as we finally work it out.

Now as to violations: in the agreement, penalties of as serious a nature as the nations may wish and as immediate and certain in their execution as possible, should be fixed for:

- (1) illegal possession or use of an atomic bomb;
- (2) illegal possession, or separation, of atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb;
- (3) seizure of any plan or other property belonging to or licensed by the Authority;
- (4) wilful interference with the activities of the Authority;
- (5) creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to, or in the absence of, a license granted by the international control body.

It would be a deception, to which I am unwilling to lend myself, were I not to say to you and to our peoples, that, the matter of punishment lies at the very heart of our present security system. It might as well be admitted, here and now, that the subject goes straight to the veto power contained in the Charter Of the United Nations so far as it relates to the field of atomic energy. The Charter permits penalisation only by concurrence of each of the five Great Powers: the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, China, France and the United States.

I want to make very plain that I am concerned here with the veto power only as it affects this particular problem. There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes ...

I now submit the following measures as representing the fundamental features of a plan which would give effect to certain of the conclusions which I have epitomised .

(1) General

The Authority should set up a thorough plan for control of the field of atomic energy, through various forms of ownership, dominion, licenses, operation, inspection, research and management by competent personnel. After this is provided for, there should be as little interference as may be with the economic plans and the present private, corporate and State relationships in the several countries involved.

(2) Raw materials

The Authority should have as one of its earliest purposes to obtain and maintain complete and accurate information on world supplies of uranium and thorium and to bring them under its dominion. The precise pattern of control for various types of deposits of such material will have to depend upon the geological, mining, refining, and economic facts involved in different situations.

The Authority should conduct continuous surveys so that it will have the most complete knowledge of the world geology of uranium and thorium. Only after all current information on world sources of uranium and thorium is known to us all can equitable plans be made for their production, refilling and distribution.

(3) Primary production plants

The Authority should exercise complete managerial control of the production of fissionable materials, This means that it should control and operate all plants producing fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and must own and control the product of these plants.

(4) Atomic explosives

The Authority should be given sole and exclusive right to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives. Research activities in the field of atomic explosives are essential in order that the Authority may keep in the forefront of knowledge in the field of atomic energy, and fulfil the objective of preventing illicit manufacture of bombs. Only by maintaining its position as the best informed agency will the Authority be able to determine the line between intrinsically dangerous and non-dangerous activities.

(5) Strategic distribution of activities and materials

The activities entrusted exclusively to the Authority because they are intrinsically dangerous to security should be distributed throughout the world. Similarly, stockpiles of raw materials and fissionable material should not be centralised.

(6) Non -dangerous activities

A function of the Authority should be promotion of the peacetime benefits of atomic energy.

Atomic research (except in explosives), the use of research reactors, the production of radioactive tracers by means of non-dangerous reactors, the use of such tracers, and to some extent the production of power should be open to nations and their citizens under reasonable licensing arrangements from the Authority. Denatured materials, whose use we know always also requires suitable safeguards, should be furnished for such purposes by the Authority under lease or other arrangement. Denaturing seems to have been overestimated by the public as a safety measure.

(7) Definition of dangerous and non-dangerous activities

Although a reasonable dividing line can be drawn between dangerous and non-dangerous activities, it is not hard and fast. Provision should, therefore, be made to assure constant re-examination of the questions, and to permit revision of the dividing line as changing conditions and new discoveries may require.

(8) Operation of dangerous activities

Any plant dealing with uranium or thorium after it once reaches the potential of dangerous use must not only be subject to the most vigorous and competent inspection by the Authority, but its actual operation shall be under the management, supervision and control of the Authority.

(9) Inspection

By assigning intrinsically dangerous activities exclusively to the Authority, the difficulties of inspection are reduced. If the Authority is the only agency which may lawfully conduct dangerous activities, then visible operation by others than the Authority will constitute an ambiguous danger signal. Inspection will also occur in connexion with the licensing functions of the Authority.

(10) Freedom of access

Adequate ingress and egress for all qualified representatives of the Authority must be assured. Many of the inspection activities of the Authority should grow out of, and be incidental to, its other functions. Important measures of inspection will be associated with the tight control of raw

materials, for this is a keystone of the plan. The continuing activities of prospecting, survey and research in relation to raw materials will be designed not only to serve the affirmative development functions of the Authority, but also to assure that no surreptitious operations are conducted in the raw materials field by nations or their citizens.

(11) Personnel

The personnel of the Authority should be recruited on a basis of proven competence, but also so far as possible on an international basis.

(2) Progress by stages

A primary step in the creation of the system of control is the setting forth, in comprehensive terms, of the functions, responsibilities, powers and limitations of the Authority. Once a charter for the Authority has been adopted, the Authority and the system of control for which it will be responsible will require time to become fully organised and effective. The plan of control will, therefore; have to come into effect in successive stages. These should be specifically fixed in the charter or means should be otherwise set forth in the charter for transitions from one stage to another, as contemplated in the resolution of the United Nations Assembly which created this Commission.

(13) Disclosures

In the deliberations of the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy, the United States is prepared to make available the information essential to a reasonable understanding of the proposals which it advocates. Further disclosures must be

dependent, in the interests of all, upon the effective ratification of the treaty. When the Authority is actually created, the United States will join the other nations in making available the further information essential to that organisation for the performance of its functions. As the successive stages of international control are reached, the United States will be prepared to yield, to the extent required by each stage, national control of activities in this field to the Authority.

(14) International control

There will be questions about the extent of control to be allowed to national bodies, when the Authority is established. Purely national authorities for control and development of atomic energy should, to the extent necessary for the effective operation of the Authority, be subordinate to it. This is neither an endorsement nor a disapproval of the creation of national authorities. The Commission should evolve a clear demarcation of the scope of duties and responsibilities of such national authorities.

5. Convention Prohibiting Production and Use of Atomic Weapons proposed by the U.S.S.R.

On 19 June 1946 Mr. Andrei Gromyko presented the U.S.S.R. proposals on prohibiting the use and production of atomic weapons. The main points of this speech are here given.

There can be no active and effective system of peace if the discovery of the means of using atomic energy is not placed in the service of humanity and is not applied to peaceful purposes only. The use of this discovery only for the purpose of promoting the welfare of the peoples and widening their scientific and cultural horizons will help to strengthen

confidence between countries and friendly relations between them.

On the other hand, to continue the use of this discovery for the production of weapons of mass destruction is likely to intensify mistrust between States and to keep the peoples of the world in continual anxiety and uncertainty. Such a position is contrary to the aspirations of the peace-loving peoples, who long for the establishment of enduring peace and are making every effort in order that these aspirations may be transformed into reality.

As one of the primary measures for the fulfilment of the resolution of the General Assembly of 24 January 1946, the Soviet delegation proposes that consideration be given to the question of concluding an international convention prohibiting the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy for that purpose of mass destruction. The object of such a convention should be the prohibition of the production and employment of atomic weapons, the destruction of existing stocks of atomic weapons and the condemnation of all activities undertaken in violation of this convention.

The elaboration and conclusion of a convention of this kind would be, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, only one of the primary measures to be taken to prevent the use of atomic energy to the detriment of mankind. This act should be followed by other measures aiming at the establishment of methods to ensure the strict observance of the terms and obligations contained in the above-mentioned convention, the establishment of a system of control over the observance of the convention and the taking of decisions regarding the sanctions to be applied against the unlawful use of atomic energy. The public opinion of the whole civilised world has already rightly condemned the use in warfare of asphyxiating, poisonous and other similar gases, as well as all similar liquids and substances, and likewise bacteriological means, by concluding

corresponding agreements for the prohibition of their use ...

The situation existing at the present time, which has been, brought about by the discovery of the means of applying atomic energy and using them for the production of atomic weapons, precludes the possibility of normal scientific cooperation between the States of the world. At the very basis of the present situation, which is characterised by the absence of any limitation in regard to the production and employment of atomic weapons, there are reasons which can only increase the suspicion of some countries in regard to others and give rise to political instability. It is clear that the continuation of such a situation is likely to bring only negative results in regard to peace.

Moreover, the continuation of the present situation means that the latest scientific attainments in this field will not be a basis for joint scientific efforts among the countries for the object of discovering ways of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Hence there follows only one correct conclusion, namely the necessity of an exchange of scientific information between countries and the necessity of joint scientific efforts directed toward a broadening of the possibilities of the use of atomic energy only in the interests of promoting the material welfare of the peoples and developing science and culture. The success of the work of the Commission will be determined in a large measure by the extent to which it succeeds in solving this important task ...

I have stated the general considerations regarding the tasks and the character of the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission. In order to develop these general statements, on the instructions of my Government, I will place before the Commission for consideration two concrete proposals which, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, may constitute a basis for the adoption by the Commission of recommendations to the Security Council and play an important role in the

strengthening of peace. These proposals are as follows:

(1) concerning the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy for the purpose of mass destruction.

(2) concerning the organisation of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission.

I will read the text of the first proposal.

**DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION TO PROHIBIT
THE PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS
BASED ON THE USE OF ATOMIC ENERGY FOR THE
PURPOSE OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

(Here follows a list of signatory States)

Being profoundly aware of the vast significance of the great scientific discoveries connected with the splitting of the atom and the obtaining and use of atomic energy for the purpose of promoting the welfare and raising the standard of living of the peoples of the world, as well as for the development of culture and science for the benefit of mankind;

animated by the desire to promote in every way the fullest possible utilisation by all peoples of scientific discoveries in the sphere of atomic energy for the purpose of improving the conditions of life of the peoples of the world and promoting their welfare and the further progress of human culture;

fully realising that the great scientific discoveries in the sphere of atomic energy carry with them a great danger, above all, for peaceful towns and the civilian population in the event of these discoveries being used in the form of atomic weapons for the purpose of mass destruction;

recognising the great significance of the fact that international agreements have already prohibited the use in warfare of asphyxiating, poisonous and other similar gases, as well as all similar liquids, substances and processes, and likewise bacteriological means, rightly condemned by the public opinion of the civilised world, and considering that the international prohibition of the use of atomic weapons for the mass destruction of human beings corresponds in still greater measure to the aspirations and the conscience of the peoples of the whole world;

being firmly resolved to avert the danger of these scientific discoveries being used to the detriment and against the interests of mankind;

resolved to conclude a convention to prohibit the production and the employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy, and for this purpose appointed as their plenipotentiaries... (here follows the list of plenipotentiaries), who, after presenting their credentials found to be in good and due form, agreed as follows:

Article 1. The high contracting parties solemnly declare that they are unanimously resolved to prohibit the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy, and for this purpose assume the following obligations:

(a) not to use atomic weapons in any circumstances whatsoever;

(b) to prohibit the production and storing of weapons based on the use of atomic energy;

(c) to destroy, within a period of three months from the day of the entry into force of the *present convention*, all stocks of atomic energy weapons whether in a finished or unfinished condition.

Article 2. The high contracting parties declare that any violation of Article 1 of the present convention is a most serious international crime against humanity.

Article 3. The high contracting parties shall, within a period of six months from the day of the entry into force of the present convention, pass legislation providing severe penalties for violators of the statutes of the present convention.

Article 4. The present convention shall be of indefinite duration.

Article 5. The present convention shall be open for the adhesion of any State whether a Member or non-member of the United Nations.

Article 6. The present convention shall come into force after its approval by the Security Council and after the ratification and delivery of ratification documents to the Secretary-General for safekeeping by one half of the signatory States, including all the Member States of the United Nations named in Article 23 of the Charter of the Organisation.

Article 7. After the entry into force of the present convention it shall be binding on all States whether Members or non-members of the United Nations.

Article 8. The present convention, of which the Russian, Chinese, French, English and Spanish texts shall be authentic, is drawn up in one copy and shall be kept in the archives of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall communicate certified copies to all the parties to the convention.

I will read the text of the second proposal.

CONCERNING THE ORGANISATION OF THE WORK OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

In accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly of 24 January 1946 regarding the establishment of a commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters, and in particular

with Article 5 of the said resolution relating to the terms of reference of the Commission, the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to propose the following plan of organisation of the work of the Commission for the initial stage of its activity.

I. Establishment of Committees of the Commission

In pursuance of the aim indicated in the resolution of the General Assembly to proceed with the utmost despatch and inquire into all phases of the problems, it appears to be necessary to set up two committees which as auxiliary organs of the Commission would ensure a thorough examination of the problem of atomic energy and the elaboration of recommendations, which the Commission must make in fulfilment of the resolution of the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations.

It is proposed that the following committees should be set up:

Committee for the Exchange of Scientific Information

This committee shall be set up for the purpose of carrying out the aims indicated in point (a) of item 5 of the resolution of the General Assembly of 24 January 1946.

The tasks of the committee shall include the elaboration of recommendations concerning practical measures for organising the exchange of information:

- (1) concerning the contents of scientific discoveries connected with the splitting of the atomic nucleus and other discoveries connected with obtaining and using atomic energy;
- (2) concerning the technology and the organisation of technological processes for obtaining and using atomic energy;
- (3) concerning the organisation and methods of industrial production of atomic energy and the use of this energy;

(4) concerning the forms, sources and locations of the raw materials necessary for obtaining atomic energy.

Committee for the Prevention of the Use of Atomic Energy to the Detriment of Mankind

This committee shall be set up to carry out the aims set forth in points (b), (c) and (d) of item 5 of the resolution of the General Assembly.

The task of the committee shall be to elaborate recommendations:

(1) concerning the drafting of an international convention for outlawing weapons based on the use of atomic energy and prohibiting the production and use of such weapons and all other similar kinds of weapons capable of being used for mass destruction;

(2) concerning the quest for and establishment of measures to prohibit the production of weapons based on the use of atomic energy and to prevent the use of atomic-weapons and all other main kinds of weapons capable of being used for mass destruction;

(3) concerning the measures, systems and organisation of control over the use of atomic energy and over the observance of the terms of the above-mentioned international convention for the outlawing of atomic weapons;

(4) concerning the elaboration of a system of sanctions to be applied against the unlawful use of atomic energy.

II. Composition of the Committees

Each committee shall be composed of one representative of each State represented in the Commission. Each representative may have assistants.

III. Rules of Procedure of the Committees

The rules of procedure of the committees shall be drawn up by the Commission.

The proposal for the conclusion of a convention and the proposal for the organisation of the work of the Commission are both capable of being put into practice at the present time.

The convention would be a definite and important step towards the creation of an effective system of control over atomic energy. This measure would have an immense moral and political significance and would contribute to the strengthening of political stability in the world and of friendly relations between the peoples.

The activity of the Atomic Energy Commission can bring about the desired results only when it is in full conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations which are laid down as the basis of the activity of the Security Council, because the Commission is an organ of this Organisation, working under the instructions of the Security Council and responsible to the same.

Attempts to undermine the principles, as established by the Charter, of the activity of the Security Council, including unanimity of the members of the Security Council in deciding questions of substance, are incompatible with the interests of the United Nations, who created the international organisation for the preservation of peace and security. Such attempts must be rejected.

I deemed it necessary to make this statement in order that from the very beginning of the work of our Commission, I might make clear the position of the Soviet Government regarding the question of the character and basis of the work of the Commission, regarding the question of the recommendations to be prepared by it, and regarding the

measures of control over atomic energy to be submitted to the Security Council.

6. Principles of Regulation and Reduction of Armaments

On 14 December 1946 the General Assembly unanimously adopted the following resolution: (41 (I)), called 'Principles Governing the Regulation and Reduction of Armaments.'

1. In pursuance of Article 11 of the Charter and with a view to strengthening international peace and security in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

The General Assembly

Recognises the necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

2. Accordingly,

The General Assembly

Recommends that the Security Council give prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential to provide for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and to assure that such regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces will be generally observed by all participants and not unilaterally by only some. of the participants. The plans formulated by the Security Council shall be submitted by the Secretary-General to the Members of the United Nations for consideration at a special session of the General. Assembly. The treaties or conventions approved by the General Assembly shall be submitted to the signatory States for ratification in accordance with Article 26 of the Charter.

3. As an essential step towards the urgent objective of

prohibiting and eliminating from national armaments atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction, and the early establishment of international control of atomic energy and other modern scientific discoveries and technical developments to ensure their use only for peaceful purposes,

The General Assembly

Urges the expeditious fulfilment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its terms of reference as set forth in section 5 of the General Assembly resolution of 24 January 1946,

4. In order to ensure that the general prohibition, regulation and reduction of armaments are directed towards the major weapons of modern warfare and not merely towards the minor weapons,

The General Assembly

Recommends that the Security Council expedite consideration of the reports which the Atomic Energy Commission will make to the Security Council and that it facilitate the work of that Commission, and also that the Security Council expedite consideration of a draft convention or conventions for the creation of an international system of control and inspection, these conventions to include the prohibition of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction and the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes.

5. The General Assembly

Further recognises that essential to the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces is the provision practical and effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

Accordingly,

The General Assembly

Recommends to the Security Council that it give prompt consideration to the working out of proposals to provide such practical and effective safeguards in connexion with the control of atomic energy and the general regulation and reduction of armaments.

6. To ensure the adoption of measures for the early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, for the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes and the elimination from national armaments of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now or in the future to mass destruction and for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes,

There shall be established, within the framework of the Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, an international system, as mentioned in Paragraph 4, operating through special organs, which organs shall derive their powers and status from the convention or conventions under which they are established.

7. The General Assembly,

Regarding the problem of security as closely connected with that of disarmament,

Recommends the Security Council to accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter;

Recommends the Members to undertake the progressive and balanced withdrawal, taking into account the needs of occupation, of their armed forces stationed in ex-enemy territories and the withdrawal without delay of their armed forces stationed in the territories of Members without their consent freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not' contradicting international agreements;

Further recommends a corresponding reduction of national armed forces and a general progressive and balanced reduction of national armed forces.

8. Nothing herein contained shall alter or limit the resolution of the General Assembly passed on 24 January 1946, creating the Atomic Energy Commission.

9. The General Assembly

Calls upon all Members of the United Nations to render every possible assistance to the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and collective security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.

7. Scientific and Technical Aspects of Control

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION'S GENERAL FINDINGS

On 30 December the Atomic Energy Commission presented to the Security Council its first report (AEC/10/ Rev. 1) in which. it dealt in considerable detail with 'scientific and technical aspects of the problem of control' and of 'safeguards required to ensure the use of atomic energy only for peaceful purposes.' At the conclusion of this report, which the Security Council adopted by nine votes to nil, Poland and the U.S.S.R. abstaining, the Commission gave the following 'General Findings':

1. That scientifically, technologically, and practically, it is feasible:

(a) To extend among 'all nations the exchange of basic scientific information' on atomic energy 'for peaceful ends';

(b) To control ‘atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes’;

(c) To accomplish ‘the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons,’ and

(d) To provide ‘effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.’

2. That effective control of atomic energy depends upon effective control of the production and use of uranium, thorium, and their fissionable derivatives. Appropriate mechanisms of control to prevent their unauthorised diversion or clandestine production and use and to reduce the dangers of seizure — including one or more of the following types of safeguard: accounting, inspection, supervision, management, and licensing — must be applied through the various stages of the processes from the time the uranium and thorium ores are severed from the ground to the time they become nuclear fuel and are used. Ownership by the international control agency of mines and of ores still in the ground is not to be regarded as mandatory.

3. That whether the ultimate nuclear fuel be destined for peaceful or destructive uses, the productive processes are identical and inseparable up to a very advanced state of manufacture. Thus, the control of atomic energy to ensure its use for peaceful purposes, the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments, and the provision of effective safeguards to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions must be accomplished, through a single unified international system of control and inspection designed to carry out all of these related purposes.

4. That the development and use of atomic energy are not essentially matters of domestic concern of the individual nations, but rather have predominantly international implications and repercussions.

5. That an effective system for the control of atomic energy must be international, and must be established by an enforceable multilateral treaty or convention which in turn must be administered and operated by an international organ or agency within the United Nations, possessing adequate powers and properly organised, staffed, and equipped for the purpose.

Only by such an international system of control and inspection can the development and use of atomic energy be freed from nationalistic rivalries with consequent risks to the safety of all peoples. Only by such a system can the benefits of widespread exchange of scientific knowledge and of the peaceful uses of atomic energy be assured. Only such a system of control and inspection would merit and enjoy the confidence of the people of all nations.

6. That international agreement to outlaw the national production, possession, and use of atomic weapons is an essential part of any such international system of control and inspection. An international treaty or convention to this effect, if standing alone, would fail: (a) 'to ensure' the use of atomic energy 'only for peaceful purposes,' and (b) to provide 'for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions,' and thus would fail to meet the requirements of the terms of reference of the Commission. To be effective, such agreement must be embodied in a treaty or convention providing for a comprehensive international system of control and inspection and including guarantees and safeguards adequate to ensure the carrying out of the terms of the treaty or convention and 'to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.'

8. Commission for Conventional Armaments Set Up

RESOLUTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL OF 13 FEBRUARY 1947 (S/268/Rev. 1)

The Security Council,

Having accepted the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 December 1946 and recognising that the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces constitute a most important measure for strengthening international peace and security, and that the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly on this subject is one of the most urgent and important tasks before the Security Council,

Resolves:

1. To work out the practical measures for giving effect to the resolutions of the General Assembly on 14 December 1946 concerning, on the one hand, the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and the establishment of international control to bring about the reduction of armaments and armed forces and, on the other hand, information concerning the armed forces of the United Nations;

2. To consider as soon as possible the report submitted by the Atomic Energy Commission and to take suitable decisions in order to facilitate its work;

3. To set up a Commission consisting of representatives of the members of the Security Council with instructions to prepare and to submit to the Security Council within the space of not more than three months, the proposals: (a) for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces; (b) for practical and effective safeguards in connexion with the general regulation and reduction of armaments; which

the commission play be in a position to formulate in order to ensure the implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly of 14 December 1946, in so far as these resolutions relate to armaments within the new Commission's jurisdiction;

The Commission shall submit a plan of work to the Council for approval;

Those matters which fall within the competence of the Atomic Energy Commission as determined by the General Assembly resolutions of 24 January 1946 and 14 December 1946 shall be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Commission hereby established;

The title of the Commission shall be the Commission for Conventional Armaments;

The Commission shall make such proposals as it may deem advisable concerning the studies which the Military Staff Committee and possibly other organs of the United Nations might be asked to undertake;

4. To request the Military Staff Committee to submit to it, as soon as possible, and as a matter of urgency, the recommendations for which it has been asked by the Security Council on 16 February 1946 in pursuance of Article 43 of the Charter, and as a first step, to submit to the Security Council not later than 30 April 1947, its recommendations with regard to the basic principles which should govern the organisation of the United Nations armed force.

9. U.S.S.R.: Basic Provisions of an International Agreement

**PRESENTED TO THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 11
JUNE 1947**

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in addition to, and in development of, its proposal concerning the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of atomic and other major weapons of mass destruction, a proposal which was submitted for the consideration of the Atomic Energy Commission on 19 June 1946, presents for the consideration of the above-mentioned Commission the following basic provisions on which an international agreement or convention on atomic energy control should be based:

1. To ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only, in accordance with the international convention on the prohibition of atomic and other major weapons of mass destruction, and also with the purpose of preventing violations of the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons and for the protection of complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions, strict international control shall be established simultaneously over all facilities engaged in the mining of atomic raw materials and in the production of atomic materials and atomic energy.

2. To carry out measures of control of atomic energy facilities, there shall be established within the framework of the Security Council an international commission for atomic energy control, to be called the International Control Commission.

3. The International Control Commission shall have its own machinery for inspection.

4. The terms and organisational principles of the

international control of atomic energy, and also the composition, rights and obligations of the International Control Commission, as well as provisions on the basis of which it shall carry out its activities, shall be determined by a special international convention on atomic energy control, which is to be concluded in accordance with the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons.

5. In order to ensure the effectiveness of international control of atomic energy, the convention on the control of atomic energy shall be based on the following fundamental provisions:

(a) The International Control Commission shall be composed of the representatives of States members of the Atomic Energy Commission established by the General Assembly decision of 24 January 1946, and may create such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the fulfilment of its functions;

(b) The International Control Commission shall establish its own rules of procedure;

(c) The personnel of the International Control Commission shall be selected on an international basis;

(d) The International Control Commission shall periodically carry out inspection of facilities for the mining of atomic raw materials, and for the production of atomic materials and atomic energy.

6. In carrying out the inspection of atomic energy facilities, the International Control Commission shall undertake the following measures:

(a) Investigate the activities of facilities for mining atomic raw materials, for the production of atomic materials and atomic energy, and check their accounts;

(b) Check existing stocks of atomic raw materials, atomic materials and unfinished products;

(c) Study production operations to the extent necessary for

the control of the use of atomic materials and atomic energy;

(d) Observe the fulfilment of the rules of technical exploitation of the facilities prescribed by the convention on control; and work out and prescribe the rules of technological control of such facilities;

(e) Collect and analyse data on the mining of atomic raw materials and on the production of atomic materials and atomic energy;

(f) Carry out special investigations in cases where suspicion of violations of the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons arises;

(g) Make recommendations to Governments on questions relating to the production, stockpiling and use of atomic materials and atomic energy;

(h) Make recommendations to the Security Council on measures for prevention and suppression with regard to violators of the conventions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and on the control of atomic energy.

7. For the fulfilment of the tasks of control and inspection entrusted to the International Control Commission the latter shall have the right of:

(a) Access to any facilities for mining, production and stockpiling of atomic raw materials and atomic materials, as well as to the facilities for the exploitation of atomic energy;

(b) Acquaintance with the production operations of the atomic energy facilities, to the extent necessary for the control of the use of atomic materials and atomic energy;

(c) Carrying out weighing, measurements and various analyses of atomic raw materials, atomic materials and unfinished products;

(d) Requesting from the Government of any nation, and checking, various data and reports on the activities of atomic energy facilities;

(e) Requesting various explanations on the questions

relating to the activities of atomic energy facilities;

(f) Making recommendation and presenting suggestions to Governments on matters concerning the production and use of atomic energy;

(g) Submitting recommendations for the consideration of the Security Council on measures in regard to violators of the conventions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and on the control of atomic energy.

8. In accordance with the tasks of international control of atomic energy scientific research activities in the field of atomic energy shall be based on the following provisions:

(a) Scientific research activities in the field of atomic energy must comply with the necessity of carrying out the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons and with the necessity of preventing its use for military purposes;

(b) Signatory States to the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons must have the right to carry on unrestricted scientific research activities, in the field of atomic energy, directed toward discovery of methods of its use for peaceful purposes;

(c) In the interests of an effective fulfilment of its control and inspectorial functions, the International Control Commission must have the possibility of carrying out scientific research activities in the field of the discovery of methods for the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The carrying out of such activities will enable the Commission to keep itself informed on the latest achievements in this field and to have its own skilled international personnel, which is required by the Commission for the practical execution of the measures of control and inspection;

(d) In conducting scientific research in the field of atomic energy, one of the most important tasks of the International Control Commission should be to ensure a wide exchange of information among nations in this field and to render necessary

assistance, through advice, to the countries parties to the convention which may request such assistance;

(e) The International Control Commission must have at its disposal material facilities including research laboratories and experimental installations necessary for the proper organisation of the research activities to be conducted by it.

10. Definition of Weapons of Mass Destruction

RESOLUTION OF COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

On 12 August 1948 the Commission for Conventional Armaments adopted a resolution (S/C, 3/27) in which it considered that:

... All armaments and armed forces except atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction fall within its jurisdiction and that weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive-material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above...

11. Principles of Regulation and Reduction of Armaments

RESOLUTION OF COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

On 12 August 1948 the Commission for Conventional

Armaments adopted a resolution setting out the following general principles which should govern the regulation and reduction. of armaments and armed forces.

(1) A system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces should embrace all States, though it may be initiated with the adherence of all States having substantial military resources;

(2) To put such a system into effect there must be international confidence and security, but the regulation and reduction of armaments and the existence of confidence are reciprocal;

(3) The conditions essential to international confidence and security include an adequate system of agreements under Article 43 of the Charter, an effective control of atomic energy and the conclusion of peace settlements with Germany and Japan;

(4) To conform with Article 26 of the Charter, armaments and armed forces under such a system must be limited to those consistent with and indispensable to the maintenance of international peace and security and must not exceed those necessary for the implementation of Members' obligations and the protection of their rights under the Charter;

(5) To ensure observance, such a system must include adequate safeguards, including an agreed system of international supervision;

(6) Provision must be made for effective enforcement in the event of violation.

SECTION II

A NEW START: 1951-1953

12. Introduction

At the end of 1951 discussions took place between the representatives of France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. which led to unanimous agreement between the four Powers on a new effort to negotiate disarmament: the General Assembly was to be asked to set up a single Disarmament Commission to examine both nuclear and conventional armaments. This Commission was set up by the General Assembly in January 1952, though it did not prove possible to reach unanimity on its terms of reference.

In the six months following the setting up of the new Commission a number of plans of work, working papers and proposals on the principles of disarmament were submitted by the different Powers. No agreement on these proposals was reached; but a number of points of principle put forward at this time formed the basis on which the points of view of the Powers later moved towards agreement. The extracts given in this section give the essential points of the main proposals made.

13. Sub-Committee of Four Powers

On 30 November 1951 the Political Committee (First Committee) of the General Assembly set up a Sub-Committee

consisting of the President of the General Assembly, as chairman, and the representatives of France, the U.K., the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. The work of this sub-committee is summarised as follows by U.N. Background Paper No. 75/Rev. I of 15 March 1955.

The report of the Sub-Committee (A/C. 1/677) stated that there was agreement among the four Powers on the establishment of a single commission whose terms of reference would include all armed forces and all armaments, including atomic. There was agreement also that there should be full disclosure of information on all armaments and armed forces. While there were some differences regarding the publication of the information disclosed, these were not irreconcilable.

The U.S.S.R. objected to inspection on a continuing basis as proposed by the three Powers, on the ground that it would hinder efficiency and would be incompatible with national sovereignty. The U.S.S.R. held that effective international inspections' could be carried out intermittently in accordance with the decisions of the control organ.

All four Powers appeared to agree that the control organ should decide the times and places of inspection and that a majority decision in that regard should be binding on all with no right of veto.

All Powers were agreed on the necessity of safeguards. The U.S.S.R. considered that the control organ should have the right to carry out special investigations when suspicions of a breach of the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons, arose. The three Powers on the other hand, maintained that special investigations alone would be inadequate.

There was agreement also, as to the convening of a world conference of all States.

There were serious and fundamental differences in the Sub-Committee on the specific means of attaining the general objectives of the two proposals and the principles to be

established for the guidance of the commission. The U.S.S.R., for example, was opposed to the three-power formulation of balanced reduction to levels adequate for defence but not for aggression, on the ground that the levels envisaged might mean an increase of armaments rather than a reduction, and that that was not a concrete proposal for the reduction of armaments.

The three-power proposal to achieve international control to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons was opposed by the U.S.S.R. on the ground that it did not provide for immediate and unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, and that unless there was prior prohibition there would be nothing to control.

Other U.S.S.R. objections concerned: the proposal to use the United Nations plan as a basis for the international control of atomic energy; the system of stages of disclosure proposed by the three Powers; and the directives to be given to the commission.

The three Powers could not accept the U.S.S.R. proposals regarding the prohibition of atomic weapons and the one-third reduction of armed forces and armaments. They held that, until a system of control was in operation, the prohibition would be unenforceable and, as regards the one-third reduction of armaments and armed forces, they stated that reduction by a fraction arbitrarily fixed would preserve or possibly even intensify the existing imbalance between them and the U.S.S.R.

The report concluded by stating that, despite the disagreements which existed on a number of matters of major importance in the two proposals, it seemed clear that there was some agreement on a number of aspects. The discussions in the Sub-Committee, it was stated, appeared to have helped to widen the areas of agreement on some points.

14. Disarmament Commission Established

On 11 January 1952 the General Assembly adopted by 42 votes' to 5 with 7 abstentions a resolution (502/VI) on regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and international control of atomic energy. The main paragraphs of this resolution are given below:

The General Assembly,

Moved by anxiety at the general lack of confidence plaguing the world and leading to the burden of increasing armaments and the fear of war,

Desiring to lift from the peoples of the world this burden and this fear, and thus to liberate new energies and resources for positive programmes of reconstruction and development,

Reaffirming its desire that the United Nations develop an effective collective security system to maintain the peace and that the armed forces and armaments of the world be progressively reduced in, accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter,

Believing that a necessary means to this end is the development by the United Nations of comprehensive and coordinated plans, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,

Recognising that a genuine system for disarmament must include all kinds of armed forces and armaments, must be accepted by all nations whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system, and must include safeguards that will ensure the compliance of all such nations,

Noting the recommendation of the Committee of Twelve established by resolution 496 (V) that the General Assembly should establish a new commission to carry forward the tasks originally assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments,

1. Establishes under the Security Council a Disarmament Commission, This Commission shall have the same membership as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and shall function under the rules of procedure of the Atomic Energy Commission with such modifications as the Commission shall deem necessary;

2. Dissolves the Atomic Energy Commission and recommends to the Security Council that it dissolve the Commission for Conventional Armaments;

3. Directs the Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty (or treaties) for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. The Commission shall be guided by the following principles: —

(a) In a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces including paramilitary, security and police forces—and all armaments including atomic:

(b) Such verification must be based on effective international inspection to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information disclosed; this inspection to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the international control organ (or organs) to be established;

(c) The Commission shall be ready to consider any

proposals or plans for control that may be put forward involving either conventional armaments or atomic energy. Unless a better or no less effective system is devised, the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition, of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for the international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only;

(d) There must be an adequate system of safeguards to ensure observance of the disarmament programme, so as to provide for the prompt detection of violations while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country;

(e) The treaty (or treaties) shall specifically be open to all States for signature and ratification of adherence, The treaty (or treaties) shall provide what States must become parties thereto before the treaty (or treaties) shall enter into force;

4. Directs the Commission, when preparing the proposals referred to in the preceding paragraph, to formulate plans for the, establishment, within the framework of the Security Council, of an international control organ (or organs) to ensure the implementation of the treaty (or treaties). The functions and powers of the control organ (or organs) shall be defined in the treaty which establishes it;

5. Directs the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred to in paragraph 3 above, to consider from the outset plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the implementation of which is recognised as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the present resolution;

6. Directs the Commission, in working out plans for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments:

(a) To determine how overall limits and restrictions on all

armed forces, and all armaments can be calculated and fixed;

(b) To consider methods according to which States can agree by negotiation among themselves, under the auspices of the Commission, concerning the determination of the overall limits and restrictions referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above and the allocation within their respective national military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments;

7. Directs the Commission to commence its work not later than thirty days from the adoption of the present resolution and to report periodically, for information, to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, or to the Members of the United Nations when the General Assembly is not in session. The Commission shall submit its first report not later than 1 June 1952;

8. Declares that a conference of all States should be, convened to consider the proposals for a draft treaty (or treaties) prepared by the Commission as soon as the work of the Commission shall have progressed to a point where in the judgment of the Commission any part of its programme is ready for submission to Governments...

15. U.S.S.R. Proposals Referred by General Assembly to Disarmament Commission

On 19 January 1952 the General Assembly adopted a resolution referring to the Disarmament Commission for consideration paragraphs 3 to 7 of the proposals (A/C. 1/698) put before the Assembly by the U.S.S.R. The paragraphs omitted referred to the Atlantic Pact, the war in Korea, and the conclusion of a pact between the live Great Powers. Paragraphs 3 to 7 are given here.

The General Assembly, considering the use of atomic weapons, as weapons of aggression and of the mass destruction of people, to be at variance with the conscience and honour of peoples and incompatible with membership of the United Nations, proclaims the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition, it being understood that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of international control shall be put into effect simultaneously.

The General Assembly instructs the Disarmament Commission to prepare and submit to the Security Council, not later than 1 June 1952, for its consideration, a draft convention providing measures to ensure the implementation of the General Assembly decision on the prohibition of atomic weapons, the cessation of their production, the use of already manufactured atomic bombs exclusively for civilian purposes, and the establishment of strict international control over the observance of the above-mentioned convention.

The General Assembly recommends the permanent members of the Security Council—the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—to reduce the armaments and armed forces in their possession at the time of the adoption of this recommendation by one-third during a period of one year from the date of its adoption.

The General Assembly recommends that forthwith, and in any case not later than one month after the adoption by the General Assembly of the decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the five Powers, all States should submit complete official data on the situation of their armaments and armed forces, including data on atomic weapons and military bases in foreign territories. These data shall be submitted with reference to the situation obtaining at the time when the above-

mentioned decisions are adopted by the General Assembly.

The General Assembly recommends the establishment within the framework of the Security Council of an international control organ, the functions of which shall be to supervise the implementation of the decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces, and to verify the data submitted by States regarding the situation of their armaments and armed forces.

With a view to the establishment of an appropriate system of guarantees for the observance of the General Assembly's decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments the international control organ shall have the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis, but it shall not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of States.

The General Assembly calls upon the Governments of all States, both Members of the United Nations and those not at present in the Organisation, to consider at a world conference the question of the substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments and also the question of practical measures for prohibiting the atomic weapon and establishing international control over the observance of such prohibition.

The General Assembly recommends that the abovementioned world conference should be convened at the earliest possible date and, in any case, not later than 15 July 1952.

16. Plans of Work for the Disarmament Commission

In the opening stages of the work of the Commission the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and France each submitted a 'Plan of Work.' After considerable debate the French plan was adopted

by 15 votes to 1. The three plans are given below.

(a) U.S.A. PLAN (DC/3)

A.—Disclosure and verification:

(a) plans for the progressive and continuing disclosures of all armed forces, including paramilitary, security and police forces, and all armaments including atomic,

(b) methods of verification, in particular through international inspection, to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information thus disclosed.

B.—Methods of calculating and fixing overall limits and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments, including:

(a) effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,

(b) elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

C.—The development of agreed national programmes, by negotiation among States under the auspices of the Commission, and the allocation within the respective military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments.

D.—Methods of implementing and enforcing the disarmament programme, including:

(a) the establishment of an international control organ or organs with appropriate rights, powers and functions,

(b) the elaboration of effective safeguards.

E.—Procedure and time-table for giving effect to the disarmament programme.

(b) U.S.S.R. PLAN (DC/4)

I.—Prohibition of atomic weapons, reduction of armaments, and provision of information on armaments.

1. Adoption of a resolution on the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and all other kinds of weapons of mass destruction and on the establishment of strict international control over the observance of such prohibition, it being understood that prohibition of atomic weapons and international control shall be put into effect simultaneously.

2. The adoption of a decision on the reduction of armaments and armed forces:

(a) preparation of agreed recommendations on the reduction by the five Powers—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom and France—of the armaments and armed forces in their possession by one-third within a year;

(b) the adoption of a decision for the convening of a world conference to consider the question of the substantial reduction of armaments and armed forces, and the question of practical measures for prohibiting atomic weapons and establishing international control over the observance of such prohibition.

3. The adoption of a decision on the compulsory provision by all States of full official information on the state of their armaments and armed forces, including information on atomic weapons and military bases in foreign territories, immediately after the adoption of a decision on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments.

II.—Consideration of the question of violation of the prohibition of bacteriological warfare, the banning of the use of bacteriological weapons and the calling to account of those who violate the ban on bacteriological warfare.

III.—Preparation of a draft convention, for presentation to the Security Council, providing for measures to ensure:

(a) the prohibition of atomic weapons and the cessation of their production;

(b) the use of already-manufactured atomic bombs exclusively for civilian purposes;

(c) the establishment of strict international control over the observance of the convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons.

IV.—The preparation of provisions for the establishment within the framework of the Security Council of an international control organ, with the following functions:

1. supervision of the implementation of the decision on the prohibition of atomic weapons;

2. supervision of the implementation of the decision on the reduction of armaments and armed forces;

3. verification of the data submitted by States regarding the state of their armaments and armed forces.

V. The right of the international control organ, with a view to the establishment of an appropriate system of guarantees for the observance of decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments, to carry out inspection on a continuing basis, without the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of States.

(c) FRENCH PLAN (D0/5)

A.—Disclosure and verification of all armaments, including atomic armaments, and of all armed forces.

B.—Regulation of all armaments and armed forces, including:—

1. Elimination of atomic weapons and control of atomic energy, with a view to ensuring their elimination;

2. Elimination of weapons of mass destruction and control with a view to ensuring their elimination; .

3. Limitation and balanced reduction of all other armaments and of all armed forces and control of this limitation and reduction.

C.—Procedure and time-table for giving effect to the disarmament programme.

Points A and B to be studied concurrently in the first stage of the Commission's work.

17. U.S.A. Proposals on Disclosure and Verification

On 5 April 1952 the U.S.A. representative submitted to the Disarmament Commission a working paper on progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments. This long document dealt in detail with the extent of disclosure and verification, the stages of disclosure and verification, and inspection. Below are given the annexes to the working paper (DC/C.2/1) setting out its detailed proposals.

ANNEX I

PROPOSED STAGES OF DISCLOSURE AND VERIFICATION ARMED FORCES AND NON-ATOMIC ARMAMENTS

Stage I

Disclose—

(a) Overall manpower strength of regular and reserve military forces and paramilitary organisations, including training establishments and security and police forces, broken down into each category.

(b) Location of all operational military installations.

Verify—

(a) By examination and cross checks of central records to include personnel, disbursement, medical and procurement supplemented by access to and spot checks of records at selected installations.

(b) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and physical dimensions of installations.

(a) and (b)—Inspectors will have access to entire national territory to extent necessary to determine that all facilities and installations have been declared. Aerial surveys will be permitted for same purpose and to same extent.

Stage II

Disclose—

(a) Organisation, composition and disposition of units making up overall strengths disclosed in Stage I.

(b) Overall annual capacity of heavy industry relating to armaments to include coal, steel, aluminium and electricity.

Verify—

(a) By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to personnel, movement of units and administrative support supplemented by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.

(b) By cross checks of pertinent statistics and employment records, access to plants, and analysis of operation with respect to materials used.

(a) and (b).—By aerial survey as stated in Stage I.

Stage III

Disclose—

(a) Equipment (including reserve equipment of units making up overall strengths disclosed in Stages I and II except

units equipped with novel weapons).

(b) Production facilities for manufacture of weapons and heavy equipment for units making up overall strengths disclosed in Stages I and II (excluding novel weapons), giving location, type and capacity.

Verify—

(a) By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to table of organisation and equipment, and repair and overhaul of equipment supplemented by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.

(b) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and examination of records pertaining to consumption of power and raw materials, available labour force, and finances, and by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.

(a) and (b).—By aerial survey as stated in Stage I.

Stage IV

Disclose—

(a) Information as to equipment of units equipped with novel weapons to include biological warfare, chemical warfare, radiological warfare and atomic weapons.

(b) Installations and facilities devoted to manufacture of novel weapons.

Verify—

(a) By crosschecks with Stages I and II and quantitative inspection of units disclosed.

(b) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and examination of records pertaining to consumption of power and raw materials, available labour force, and finances, and by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.

(a) and (b).—By aerial survey as set forth in Stage I.

Stage V

Disclose—

- (a) Quantities of novel weapons on hand by types.

Verify—

- (a) By physical count of stockpiles of finished novel weapons, cross checked with information disclosed in Stages I, II, III and IV.

ANNEX II

PROPOSED STAGES OF DISCLOSURES AND VERIFICATION ATOMIC ARMAMENTS

Stage I

Disclose—

- (a) Location of all installations directly concerned with production of atomic energy, or the product of which is primarily useful in the production of atomic energy. Also manpower employed, physical dimensions, and power input of each installation. (Excluding weapon storage sites.)

- (b) Uses or functions of these installations. This should be confined to a statement giving the input material, the produce material and the process used in each instance.

Verify—

- (a) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and physical dimensions of installations. (Inspectors will have access to entire national territory to the extent necessary to determine through such means as aerial survey, inspection of water and railways and power lines, that all atomic energy installations been declared.)

- (b) Uses and functions in so far as revealed by external

examination of all structures and unhoused equipment. Detailed interior inspection shall take place in subsequent stages, the particular stage in which it will take place depending upon the function of the plant. (Verification of (a) above will be of value as partial verification of plant use or function.)

(a) and (b).—By aerial survey in all stages for same purposes and to same extent as permitted with armed forces and non-automatic armaments. (See Annex I.)

Stage II

Disclose—

(a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output, of all those installations or parts of installations concerned with preparation of atomic energy raw or feed materials (and such auxiliary materials as graphite, heavy water and beryllium), from mines up to but not including reactors, isotope separation plants, and similar nuclear conversion devices used to produce fissionable or fusionable material.

Verify—

(a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stage I.

Stage III

Disclose—

(a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output of all those atomic energy installations, or parts of installations, concerned with the conversion of feed materials to fissionable or fusionable materials or with the preparation of radioactive materials in large quantities.

(b) Amounts and types of fissionable or fusionable material

on hand or in process; amounts and types of radio-isotopes on hand or in process.

(c) General design and operational characteristics of research laboratories involving reactors operating at a power level of 1 MW. or more, including amounts of radioactive, or fissionable or fusionable materials produced.

Verify—

(a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stages I and II.

(b) By direct and detailed inspection of fissionable or fusionable material, or radioactive materials, installations for production thereof, and appropriate records.

(c) By survey of facilities associated with reported reactors, by detailed inspection of reactors themselves.

Stage IV

Disclose—

(a) Details of design and operation, including past and present output of all those atomic energy establishments and installations concerned with the fabrication of atomic or radioactive weapons from fissionable or other materials.

Verify—

(a) By direct and detailed inspection of installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stages I, II and III.

Stage V

Disclose- I

(a) Location, numbers and types of atomic and radioactive weapons on hand. Weapon storage sites.

Verify—

(a) By direct inspection. Cross checks with Stages I, II and In and (a) above.

18. U.S.S.R. Statement on International Control

On 22 May 1952 Mr. Malik made the following statement on the rights of a control agency.

The second important new Soviet Union proposal is the proposal to create the necessary system of guarantees for the implementation of decisions to prohibit atomic weapons and to reduce armaments. Under this proposal the international control agency would be given the right to carry out continuing inspection, for the purpose of establishing the necessary system of guarantees of the implementation of decisions to prohibit atomic weapons and reduce armaments, but without the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of States. The system of international control proposed by the Soviet Union envisages extensive measures to ensure strict international control, namely: inspection of the operations of undertakings concerned with mining atomic raw materials and producing atomic energy, and checking of their accounts; verification of existing stocks of atomic raw materials, materials and semi-manufactured products; a study of production processes to the extent required for the control of the use of atomic materials and atomic energy; supervision of compliance with the rules laid down for technological control.

The system of control proposed by the Soviet Union thus provides not only for general control but also for technological control; it provides not only for supervision of implementation but also gives the international control agency the right to evolve and prescribe rules of technological control for undertakings processing atomic raw materials and any other undertakings concerned with atomic materials. Thus, under our proposals, the control agency may prescribe whatever technological rules it may deem necessary for any undertaking concerned with atomic raw materials.

The control agency will be entitled to collect and analyse data on the mining of atomic raw materials. It will also be entitled to collect data on the production of atomic materials and atomic energy. It will have the right of continuing inspection. It will also be entitled to undertake special inspections in the event of suspected violations of the convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons, etc.

19. Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces

On 28 May 1952 France, the U.K. and the U.S.A. put forward a working paper (DC/10) with proposals for fixing numerical limitations of all armed forces. The extracts below give the essential points of these proposals.

3. The present working paper presents a plan for the determination of overall numerical limitations on the size of the armed forces of States. Obviously some overall limitations on the size of the armed forces of States are an essential part of any comprehensive plan for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments. The working paper is not intended to exclude, but to facilitate the development of other essential components which must be included in what the preamble of the General Assembly resolution refers to as comprehensive and coordinated plans, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes' including 'safeguards that will ensure the compliance of all ... nations (whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system).'

B.—Standards for determining numerical limitations of all armed forces

4. In fixing numerical limitations on the armed forces of States a number of factors, demographic, geographic, political and economic, have to be considered. The Charter responsibilities of States and the need of balanced power-relationships among States must also be taken into account. There is no one automatic formula which can inflexibly be applied in all cases. The objective must be to reduce the possibility and the fear of successful aggression and to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security.

5. The following working formula is suggested as a basis of discussion:—

(a) There should be fixed numerical ceilings for China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America which should be worked out with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security among themselves or with other States and thus reducing the danger of war. It is tentatively suggested that the maximum ceilings for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and China should be the same and fixed at, say, between 1 million and 1.5 million, and the maximum ceilings for the United Kingdom and France should be the same and fixed at, say, between 700,000 and 800,000.

(b) For all other States having substantial armed forces there should be agreed maximum ceilings agreed upon for the five Powers. Such ceilings should be fixed with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security in any area of the world and thus reducing the danger of war. The ceilings would normally be less than 1 per cent of the population. Moreover, they should be less than

current levels except in very special circumstances.

C.—Significance of overall numerical limitations

6. While a nation's armed forces are not the only measure of its armed strength, and other elements of armed strength will have to be considered in any comprehensive programme for the balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, nevertheless a numerical limitation on armed forces is a major element in any such programme for the following reasons: —

(a) All armaments programmes depend upon manpower and therefore must to a greater or less degree be affected by limitations on permitted armed forces.

(b) A substantial reduction of armed forces as here suggested in itself would tend to reduce the likelihood of successful aggression.

(c) Agreement on a substantial and balanced reduction of armed forces, minimising the likelihood and fear of successful aggression should greatly facilitate agreement reducing and restricting the armaments supporting these armed forces.

D.—Implementation of proposals for numerical limitations of all armed forces

7. In determining the numbers in the armed forces, all kinds of armed forces, including paramilitary and security forces, must be included.

8. Adequate provision must be made to ensure that the maximum limitation on armed forces is not circumvented through building up large forces of trained reserves or militarily trained police.

9. This system must be accepted by all States, whether or not Members of the United Nations, whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system.

10. There should be adequate safeguards throughout the process of reduction to ensure that limitations are put into effect and observed as agreed and that violations can be promptly detected.

11. The implementation of the reductions should be closely related to progress in connexion with other phases of the programme for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, such as the control of atomic energy and the system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification.

12. The reduction should be carried through in a manner and in accordance with a time schedule prescribed by the international control organ and should be completed within the shortest feasible time after its commencement ...

20. Third Report of the Disarmament Commission (DC/32) 30 August 1953

1. By General Assembly resolution 704 (VII), the Disarmament Commission was requested to report to the General Assembly and Security Council not later than 1 September 1953.

2. The Disarmament Commission has held no meetings since the adoption of the General Assembly resolution mentioned in the preceding paragraph, except for a meeting on 20 August 1953.

3. It is hoped that recent international events will create a more propitious atmosphere for the reconsideration of the disarmament question, whose capital importance in conjunction with other questions affecting the maintenance of peace is recognised by all. The Disarmament Commission therefore expects to continue its work and suggests that it present a report to the ninth session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council.

SECTION III

THE SEARCH FOR AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION: 1954

21. Introduction

At the end of 1953 the General Assembly of U.N.O. decided to suggest to the Disarmament Commission the setting up of a sub-committee consisting of the representatives of the Powers principally concerned 'which should seek in private an acceptable solution.' Subsequently the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., at their meeting in Berlin in February 1954, supported this proposal.

The Sub-Committee was established on 19 April, 1954. It held twenty meetings between 23 April and 22 June. During May and June the different proposals put forward by the Powers showed that differences on certain important questions were growing less; at the General Assembly in November 1954 it was possible to reach unanimous agreement on, a resolution calling on the Disarmament Commission to resume its work.

The extracts given in this section have been chosen to give the essentials of all the more important principles and practical proposals put forward and the effort has been made to show both the points on which agreement has been near and those on which divergences remain.

22. General Assembly Recommends Setting up Disarmament Sub-Committee

On 28 November 1953 the General Assembly adopted by 54 votes with 5 abstentions a resolution (715 (VIII)) on the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, which took note of the third report of the Disarmament Commission and recommended the setting up of a sub-committee of the Powers most concerned.

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations for considering the problem of disarmament and affirming the need of providing for:

(a) The regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments,

(b) The elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction,

(c) The effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,

the whole programme to be carried out under effective international control and in such a way that no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered,

Believing that the continued development of weapons of mass destruction such as atomic and hydrogen bombs has given additional urgency to efforts to bring about effectively controlled disarmament throughout the world, as the existence of civilisation itself may be at stake,

Mindful that progress in the settlement of existing international disputes and the resulting reestablishment of confidence are vital to the attainment of peace and disarmament and that efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive and coordinated disarmament programme with

adequate safeguards should be made concurrently with progress in the settlement of international disputes,

Believing that progress in either field would contribute to progress in the other,

Realising that competition in the development of armaments and armed forces beyond what is necessary for the individual or collective security of Member States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations is not only economically unsound but is in itself a grave danger to peace,

Conscious of the continuing desire of all nations, by lightening the burden of armaments, to release more of the world's human and economic resources for peace,

Having received the third report of the Disarmament Commission of 20 August 1953, submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 704 (VII) of 8 April 1953,

Endorsing the Commission's hope that recent international events will create a more propitious atmosphere for reconsideration of the disarmament question, the capital importance of which, in conjunction with other questions affecting the maintenance of peace, is recognised by all,

1. Recognises, the general wish and affirms its earnest desire to reach agreement as early as possible on a comprehensive and coordinated plan, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydro, gen, bacterial, chemical and all such other weapons of war and mass destruction, and for the attainment of these ends through effective measures;

2. Recognises that, whatever the weapons used, aggression is contrary to the conscience and honour of the peoples and incompatible with membership in the United Nations and is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world;

3. Takes note of the third report of the Disarmament

Commission;

4. Requests the Commission to continue its efforts to reach, agreement on the problems with which it is concerned, taking into consideration proposals made at the eighth session of the General Assembly, and to report again to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than 1 September 1954;

5. Calls on all Member States, and particularly the major Powers, to intensify their efforts to assist the Disarmament Commission in its tasks and to submit to the Commission any proposals which they have to make in the field of disarmament;

6. Suggests that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of representatives of Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution and report to the Disarmament Commission as soon as possible, in order that the Commission may study and report on such a solution to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than 1 September 1954;

7. Further suggests to the Disarmament Commission, in order to facilitate the progress of its work, to arrange for the sub-committee, when established, to hold its private meetings as appropriate in the different countries most concerned with the problem.

23. U.S.S.R. Proposal on 'Measures to Avert the Threat of a New World War'

On 30 November 1953 the General Assembly considered a resolution (A/L. 168) proposed by the U.S.S.R. on measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations. This resolution, which was defeated, is quoted below.

The General Assembly...

With the object of reducing the threat of a new world war and strengthening the peace and security of nations,

1. Declares atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction to be unconditionally prohibited, and instructs the Security Council to take immediate steps to prepare and implement an international agreement which will ensure the establishment of strict international control over the observance of this prohibition;

2. Recommends to the five permanent members of the Security Council, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, France and China, which bear the chief responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, that they reduce their armed forces by one-third within one year; and with a view to the alleviation of the burden of military expenditure recommends to the Security Council that it call as soon as possible an international conference for the carrying out by all States of the reduction of armaments;

3. Recognises that the establishment of military, air and naval bases in the territories of other States increases the threat of a new world war and operates to undermine the national sovereignty and independence of States;

The General Assembly recommends to the Security Council that it take steps to ensure the elimination of military bases in the territories of other States, considering this a matter of vital importance for the establishment of a stable peace and of international security;

4. Condemns the propaganda which is being conducted in a number of countries with the aim of inciting enmity and hatred among nations and preparing a new world war, and calls upon all States to take measures to put a stop to such propaganda, which is incompatible with the fundamental purposes and

principles of the United Nations.

24. Berlin Conference of Four Foreign Ministers: Communique

On 18 February 1954 the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. issued a communique from which the following is an extract.

(b) The Governments of France, of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of the United Kingdom and of the United States of America,

convinced that the solution of international controversies, necessary for the establishment of a lasting peace, would be considerably aided by an agreement on disarmament, or at least on a substantial reduction of armaments,

will subsequently hold an exchange of views to promote a successful solution of this problem as provided for in paragraph 6 of the United Nations resolution of 28 November 1953.

25. Indian Proposal to the Disarmament Commission

On 8 April 1954 the Indian representative asked the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission and its special Sub-Committee the views of the Indian Government on the hydrogen bomb, contained in a statement in Parliament on 2 April 1954 by Prime Minister Nehru (DC/44). The main parts of this statement are given below.

4. The people and Government of India are disturbed and moved by the after-effects of the hydrogen bomb explosions on the people of Japan which, they submit, deserve special consideration of the Commission. Japan is not represented at the United Nations and it is not one of the parties principally concerned in this problem.

5. The Government of India also consider that informed world opinion as to the known and unknown but probable effects and implications of the explosions of these weapons of mass destruction are an important and perhaps a decisive factor in the solution of the problems to which the Commission is addressing itself.

6. The Government of India make these proposals and request their immediate consideration by the Disarmament Commission in the sincere belief and the earnest hope that they will make a useful beginning in the fulfilment of the earnest desire which the General Assembly affirmed last year in its resolution No. 751 (VIII), paragraph 1.

**EXTRACTS FROM THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE
PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA IN THE HOUSE OF THE
PEOPLE, ON 2 APRIL 1954, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE
HYDROGEN BOMB**

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, we are told, possess this weapon and each of these countries has during the last two-years effected test explosions, unleashing impacts which in every respect were far beyond those of any weapons of destruction known to man.

‘A further and more powerful explosion than the one of 1 March has been effected by the United States and more are reported to have been scheduled to take place.

‘We know little more about the hydrogen bomb and its

disastrous and horrible consequences than have appeared in the press or are otherwise matters of general knowledge or speculation. But even what we do know, and the very fact that the full facts of the effects of these explosions do not appear to be known or are not ascertainable with any certainty even by scientists, points to certain conclusions. A new weapon of unprecedented power, both in volume and intensity, with unascertained and probably unascertainable range of destructive potential in respect to time and space, that is, both as regards the duration and extent of the consequences, is being tested, unleashing its massive power for use as a weapon of war. We know that its use threatens the existence of man and civilisation as we know it. We are told there is no effective protection against the hydrogen bomb and that millions of people may be exterminated by a single explosion and many more injured and perhaps still many more condemned to slow death or to live under the shadow of the fear of disease and death.

‘These are horrible prospects and affect us nations and peoples everywhere, whether we are involved in wars or power blocs or not, From diverse sides and parts of the world have come pronouncements which point to the dread features and ominous prospects of the hydrogen bomb era...

‘Mankind has to awaken itself to reality and face the situation with determination and assert itself to avert calamity.

‘The general position of this country in this matter has been repeatedly stated and placed beyond all doubt. It is up to us to pursue as best as we can the, objective we seek.

‘We have maintained that nuclear (including thermonuclear), chemical and biological (bacterial) knowledge and power should not be used to forge these weapons of mass destruction. We have advocated the prohibition of such weapons by common consent and immediately by agreement amongst those concerned, which latter is at present the only

effective way to bring about their abandonment...

‘I have stated publicly as our view that these experiments, which may have served their one and only useful purpose, namely to expose the nature of the horror and the tragedy, even though only partly, should cease. I repeat that to be our considered position and it is our hope this view, and the great concern it reflects and which is world-wide, will evoke adequate and timely responses.

‘Pending progress towards some solution, full or partial, in respect of prohibition and elimination of these weapons of mass destruction, which the General Assembly has affirmed as its earnest desire, the Government would consider among the steps to be taken, now and forthwith, the following:

‘1. Some sort of what may be called “standstill agreement” in respect, at least, of these actual explosions, even if arrangements about the discontinuance of production and stockpiling must await more substantial agreements among those principally concerned.

‘2. Full publicity by those principally concerned in the production of these weapons and by the United Nations of the extent of destructive power and known effects of these weapons, and also adequate indication of the extent of unknown but probable effects. Informed world public opinion is in our view a most effective factor in bringing about the results we desire.

‘3. Immediate (and continuing) private meetings of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission to consider the “standstill” proposal which I have just mentioned, pending decisions on prohibitions and controls, etc., to which the Disarmament Commission is asked by the General Assembly to address itself.

‘4. Active steps by the States and peoples of the world, who, though not directly concerned with the production of these weapons, are very much concerned with the possible use

of them, and at present by these experiments and their effects. They would, I venture to hope, express their concern and add their voices and influence in as effective a manner as possible to arrest the progress of this destructive potential which menaces all alike.

‘The Government of India will use its best efforts in pursuit of these objectives...’

26. Disarmament Sub-committee Set Up

RESOLUTION OF DISARMAMENT COMMISSION OF 19 APRIL 1954 (DC/49)

The Disarmament Commission,

Noting General Assembly resolution 715 (VIII) and the resolution on disarmament agreed by the four Foreign Ministers at Berlin on 18 February 1954,

1. Decides, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 715 (VIII), to establish a Sub-Committee consisting of representatives of Canada, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America;

2. Recommends that the Sub-Committee should hold its first meeting on 23 April, and should arrange its own meetings and method of work;

3. Recommends that the Sub-Committee should present a report on the results of its work to the Disarmament Commission not later than 15 July.

27. Weapons and Armed Forces to be Covered by a Disarmament Convention

PROPOSAL SUBMITTED TO THE DISARMAMENT SUB- COMMITTEE BY THE UNITED KINGDOM ON 21 MAY 1954 (DC/SC. 1/4)

The United Kingdom Delegation propose that the Disarmament Sub-Committee should consider what weapons and armed forces and other matters should be covered by a disarmament convention. It would be useful if the Sub-Committee could consider whether there is general agreement—

1. (i) that the disarmament convention should cover all types of weapons, all types of armed forces and military facilities of all kinds;

(ii) that the weapons which should be covered should be divided into two groups—

(a) the weapons to be prohibited, and

(b) the weapons to be limited and reduced;

(iii) that the weapons to be prohibited should include nuclear (i.e., atomic and hydrogen),

(iv) that as regards weapons to be limited, the disarmament convention should provide for the substantial reduction of all arms, ammunition and implements especially designed or adapted for use in war; these should include items such as those in the following list:

all aircraft designed or adapted for aerial combat as well as equipment especially designed for and used solely by airborne troops;

warships of all kinds, landing craft and submersible or semi-submersible ships; craft, weapons or devices of any kind;

assault bridging, assault boats and storm boats and personal war equipment of a specialised nature;
 armoured fighting vehicles, armoured trains; guns, howitzers, mortars, aircraft cannon, breechless or recoilless guns and flamethrowers;
 rocket projectors, launching and control mechanisms for self-propelling and guided missiles, all self-propelling and guided missiles; projectiles, rockets, &c.;
 grenades, bombs, torpedoes, mines, depth charges and other military explosives; mechanical and self-propelled carriages for any of the weapons already mentioned, aiming and computing devices including predictors and plotting apparatus for fire control;
 machine-guns, military automatic or auto-loading rifles and machine -pistols;
 all military rifles, carbines, revolvers and pistols;
 (v) that the disarmament convention should also cover:

- (a) the entire armed forces of at least all those Powers possessing substantial armaments;
- (b) not only armies, navies and air forces of the Powers concerned but all paramilitary and security forces, and
- (c) all persons who receive military training, military air training, or naval training, each of which should be defined in the convention.

2. The Disarmament Sub-Committee should also consider whether the disarmament convention might usefully contain provisions condemning all propaganda against peace and recommending the free exchange of information and ideas as one of the foundations of good neighbourly relations between peoples...

3. The Disarmament Sub-Committee should also consider whether the disarmament convention should limit in any way the expenditure of the participating Powers on military

purposes...

28. Methods of Implementing and Enforcing Disarmament Programmes

U.S.A. WORKING PAPER OF 25 MAY 1954 (DC/SC. 1/5)

Below are given the essential passages of the U.S.A. Working Paper of 25 May 1954 in which the rights, powers and functions of a proposed U.N. Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority are described.

3. The United States suggests the establishment of a United Nations Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority (hereafter referred to as the Authority).

4. Under the Authority there would be a Disarmament Division to carry out the responsibilities of the Authority with respect to the safeguards to ensure enforcement of the programme and the reduction and limitation of all armed forces and non-atomic armaments.

5. Also under the Authority there would be an Atomic Development Division to carry out the responsibilities of the Authority with respect to the international development and control of atomic energy...

II.—RIGHTS, POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE AUTHORITY

30. The Authority would derive its rights and powers from the disarmament programme treaty. The General Assembly would take appropriate action, in anticipation of the signing of this treaty, to ensure the establishment and activation of the

Authority immediately upon the coming into effect of the treaty and the progressive assumption of its functions as required.

31. The Authority would be empowered to supervise and control progressive and continuous disclosure and verification of all armed forces—including paramilitary, security and police forces—and all armaments including atomic.

32. Within the limits of the programmes and phasing as laid down in the disarmament treaty, the Authority would be empowered to determine the details of the time and the manner of the reduction of armed forces and armaments to supervise such reduction insofar as such details are not fixed by the treaty. The disposition of existing stocks of nuclear fuel would be made by the Authority in accordance with the treaty on international control.

33. The Authority would be empowered to function in accordance with whatever plan may be agreed upon for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure effective prohibition of nuclear weapons and use of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes only...

37. The Authority would carry out an agreed programme of safeguards to ensure the observance of the agreements for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments. This programme of safeguards would include provision for whatever programme of effective disclosure and verification of all armed forces and 'all armaments may be agreed upon. This function would include, among others, the following tasks:

(a) Provide guidance and instructions, within the framework of the treaty, for the disclosure programme:

(b) Control the receipt of and process the information from each State, and, within the framework of the disarmament programme treaty, prescribe the particulars of the information

desired from the States;

(c) Organise and conduct field inspections and aerial surveys to verify information on reported installations and to determine whether all installations and facilities have been disclosed;

(d) Station personnel permanently in countries adhering to the programme for the purpose of ensuring continuous verification;

(e) Prepare reports of disclosure and verification for the United Nations and for the signatory States;

(f) In the event of a finding by the Authority of violations, obstructions, discrepancies, or pertinent omissions by a State, call upon such State to remedy forthwith the violation or other infraction; in the event of failure within a reasonable time of the offending State to comply fully, report the violation' or other infraction to the Security Council, to the General Assembly, and to all States in order to permit appropriate action by the United Nations or by individual States in accordance with the treaty establishing the control organ;

(g) Submit such special reports to the Security Council as may be requested by any seven members thereof;

(h) Submit such special reports to the General Assembly as may be requested by that body;

(i) Determine when each provision of the treaty relating to the timing of disclosure and verification and of reductions of armed forces and non-atomic armaments has been completed.

38. The powers of the Authority relating to disclosure and verification; of course, would not be limited to the initial disclosure and verification but would continue as permanent powers of the Authority.

(a) The Authority would carry out the agreed programme for safeguards other than disclosure and verification;

(b) The Authority should have positive research and developmental responsibilities in order to remain in the

forefront of atomic knowledge so as to render the Authority more effective in promoting the beneficial uses of atomic energy and in eliminating its destructive ones.

39. Authorised personnel of the Secretariat of the Disarmament Division would have the right, in accordance with the terms of the disarmament treaty, to conduct on-the-spot inspections preparatory to and in aid of inspections by formal inspection teams...

IV.—RELATIONSHIP TO INDIVIDUAL STATES

52. The question of the relationship of the Authority to the participating States will require careful treaty definition particularly regarding the extent to which the privileges and immunities accorded to the Authority will exempt it and its personnel from the operation of national laws and the means by which individual rights and liberties of citizens of each State will be protected against possible infringement stemming from inspections. The grant of privileges and immunities to the Authority should be based on the principle of minimum interferences with the national laws of a State consistent with adequate and expeditious carrying out of the Authority's responsibilities and activities...

55. Provision must be made in a treaty to permit individual States to take necessary steps to protect themselves in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter in the event of serious violations determined, by, the Authority and not remedied within a reasonable time. Such provision would include the right of any State under such circumstances to terminate its obligations under the treaty, to take steps for individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter, and to take such other action as might be decided or recommended by the United Nations Security Council or by the United Nations General Assembly...

29. U.S.A. View on Rights and Powers of Control Machinery

EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY MR. PATTERSON 20 JULY 1954

The working paper proposes the establishment of a United Nations disarmament and atomic energy development authority composed of the members of the Security Council, plus Canada. The objectives in establishing this authority are: (a) to provide international control of atomic energy so as to enforce compliance with the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and ensure that nuclear materials are used for peaceful purposes; (b) to supervise programmes for limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, and prohibition and elimination of major mass destruction weapons; (c) to supervise the various safeguards necessary to enforce a disarmament programme, including disclosure and verification; and (d) to assure each participant that other States are observing the various agreements.

The control machinery would derive its rights and powers from the disarmament treaty after ratification by the various States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. Among these rights and powers would be the right to function by majority rule; to determine the details of the time and the manner of 'enforcing the agreed reductions, limitations and prohibitions within the limits of the disarmament treaty; to organise and conduct field inspections and aerial surveys, as well as prescribe and control required information within the framework of the treaty; and to station personnel permanently in the countries adhering to the

agreement in order to ensure continuous verification. If a violation should occur, the authority could, among other actions, call upon the violator to remedy the situation, report the violation to the Security Council, to the General Assembly, and to all States in order to permit appropriate action; suspend the supply of nuclear materials to the offending State; and close plants utilising nuclear materials in the offending State. Among the privileges and immunities accorded the authority would be the right of its representatives to go into, within and from the territory of participating States; the right to use communication facilities necessary to the discharge of its responsibilities; and inviolability of premises, property and archives. Each participating State would designate and maintain a national agency to supervise the execution of its obligations and assist the authority in its work.

30. 'Basic Principles of a Draft International Convention'

PROPOSAL PUT TO THE DISARMAMENT SUB-COMMITTEE BY THE U.S.S.R. ON 11 JUNE 1954 (DC/SC. 1/9)

I.—The Government of the Soviet Union submits for consideration by the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission the 'Basic provisions of a draft international convention for the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, for a substantial reduction, in armaments and armed forces, and for the establishment of international control over the observance of the convention.'

In so doing the Government of the Soviet Union presumes

that, as a first important step towards 'the complete elimination from the armaments of States of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction, together with the simultaneous establishment of strict international control to secure the observance of the agreement to prohibit the use of atomic energy for military purposes, the States concerned will assume a solemn and unconditional obligation not to use atomic, hydrogen or other weapons of mass destruction, as is contemplated in the proposal submitted to the Sub-Committee by the Soviet Union representative on June I.

II.—An international convention for the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, for effecting a substantial reduction in armaments and armed forces, and for the simultaneous establishment of international control over the observance of the convention should contain the following basic provisions:—

1. Unconditional prohibition of the use, production and conservation of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

2. Reduction by each State party to the convention and primarily by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, of all armaments and all land, naval and air forces by one-third, to be effected during the year following the entry into force of the convention.

Obligation of States parties to the convention to reduce their military expenditure within one year by not less than one-third of the 1953-1954 level of expenditure.

Obligation of States parties to the convention not to maintain military, air or naval bases on the territories of other States and to liquidate any such existing bases within one year.

3. Establishment of effective international control over observance by all States of the provisions of the convention prohibiting weapons of mass destruction and requiring

reduction of armaments and armed forces.

International control shall be established as follows:—

(a) International control shall be established over all undertakings engaged in extraction of atomic raw materials and production of atomic materials and atomic energy, and over conventional armaments.

(b) An international control organ shall be set up under the Security Council to carry out measures of control over atomic undertakings and over conventional armaments.

The staff of the organ shall be selected on an international basis.

(c) The international control organ shall also inspect undertakings extracting atomic crudes and producing atomic materials and atomic energy; it shall carry out such inspection on a continuing basis without the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of States. It shall supervise the observance by all States of their obligation to reduce conventional armaments and armed forces.

(d) The international control organ, in the performance of its functions, shall supervise the work of undertakings extracting; processing and utilising atomic materials and atomic energy; it shall collect and compile data on the extraction, production, and utilisation of atomic materials and atomic energy; it shall call for, and shall verify when submitted by States, information on armaments and armed forces; it shall make recommendations to Governments and to the Security Council on matters relating to the production, conservation and utilisation of atomic materials and atomic energy, and to the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of States.

4. All States parties to the convention shall undertake to prohibit propaganda designed to inflame enmity and hatred among nations or to prepare for a new world war,

5. The Convention shall enter into force on its ratification by the five Permanent Members of the Security Council of the

United Nations.

31. 'A Possible Basis for Compromise'

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY FRANCE AND THE U.K. ON 11 JUNE 1954 (DC/SC. 1/10)

The French and United Kingdom Delegations submit the following proposals as a possible basis for compromise:

1. The States members of the Sub-Committee regard themselves as prohibited in accordance with the terms of the Charter of the United Nations from the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression. They recommend that the Disarmament Treaty should include an immediate and explicit acceptance of this prohibition by all signatory States, pending the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons as proposed in the subsequent paragraphs of this memorandum. They further recommend that the obligations assumed by the Members of the United Nations to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial or political independence of any States should be accepted by all signatory States not members of the United Nations.

2. The draft Disarmament Treaty prepared by the Disarmament Commission and submitted by it to the Security Council, to the General Assembly and to the World Disarmament Conference should include provisions covering the following:—

(a) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes.

(b) Major reductions in all armed forces and conventional

armaments.

(c) The establishment of a control organ with rights and powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed prohibitions and reductions.

3. After the approval of the draft treaty by the World Disarmament Conference this instrument would be open to signature and adherence by all States. The treaty would enter into force immediately it had been ratified by those of the signatories who would be specified in the treaty.

4. The treaty should provide that the disarmament programme should be carried out as described below.

5. After the constitution and positioning of the Control Organ, which shall be carried out within a specified time, and as soon as the Control Organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect:—

(a) Overall military manpower shall be limited to 31 December 1953 levels.

(b) Overall military expenditure, both atomic and non-atomic, shall be limited to amounts spent in the year ending 31 December 1953.

6. As soon as the Control Organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect:—

(a) One-half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces shall take effect.

(b) On completion of (a) the manufacture of all kinds of nuclear weapons and all other prohibited weapons shall cease.

7. As soon as the Control Organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect:—

(a) The second half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces shall take effect;

(b) On completion of (a):—

(i) The total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes shall be carried out;

(ii) The total prohibition and elimination of all other prohibited weapons shall be carried out.

8. It is to be hoped that when all the measures enumerated above have been carried out the armaments and armed forces of the Powers will be further reduced to the levels strictly necessary for the maintenance of internal security and the fulfilment of the obligations of signatory States under the terms of the United Nations Charter.

9. The Control Organ shall remain in being to ensure that the reductions, prohibitions and eliminations are faithfully and permanently observed.

32. U.S.A.- U.S.S.R. Discussion on Atomic Questions

During 1954 conversations and an extensive exchange of private notes took place between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. arising out of President Eisenhower's proposal for a pool of fissile materials. Extracts from these exchanges are given below.

A. AIDE-MEMOIRE: MR. MOLOTOV to MR. DULLES 27 APRIL 1954

... The present level of science and technology makes it possible to utilise the very application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to increase the production of atomic weapons.

It is known that the practical possibility exists for

organising, on an industrial scale, such a process of generating atomic electric power for peaceful uses that will not reduce, but on the contrary increase, the amount of fissionable atomic material employed in the process. Moreover, non-dangerous atomic materials are in this process transformed into explosive fissionable materials that are basic to the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons. In other words, it has been practically and irrefutably demonstrated that peaceful application of atomic energy is associated with the possibility of producing simultaneously atomic materials used in the manufacture of atomic weapons. That situation, far from reducing the stockpiles of atomic materials used in the manufacture of atomic weapons, would actually lead to an unrestricted increase of such stockpiles, resulting from expanded output of atomic materials both by individual countries and the International Agency.

Consequently, the United States proposal that some part of atomic materials be allocated for peaceful uses, far from halting the atomic armaments race, would actually lead to its further intensification...

The fact that it has been impossible so far to reach agreement on unconditional prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, far from detracting from the importance of efforts in this direction, makes such efforts even more necessary in view of the mounting danger to the nations presented by the continuing atomic and hydrogen armaments race. This applies in particular to countries which are in command of the necessary resources of atomic materials and which produce atomic and hydrogen weapons.

An international agreement that reduces the whole matter, to the assignment of some small part of atomic materials for peaceful purpose, and imposes no restraint on the continued production of atomic weapons, would in effect give impermissible sanction for the manufacture of atomic weapons,

which would only play into the hands of the aggressive forces. And far from facilitating agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons, this international sanction would, on the contrary, represent a new obstacle to the achievement of such agreement.

Not some part, but the entire mass of atomic materials must be applied exclusively to peaceful purposes in order that scientific achievements in this sphere be made to serve not the purposes of war and mass annihilation of human life but economic and cultural development, which would open up unparalleled opportunities for advancing industry, agriculture and transport, for applying atomic materials in medicine, for perfecting technology, and for promoting progress in science.

Prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and utilisation of all atomic materials for peaceful purposes with adequate assistance to economically backward areas, would at the same time make it easier to reach agreement on a decisive reduction of conventional armaments. This would make possible an immense easement of the tax burden imposed on the peoples by the existence in many countries of inflated armies, the result of the continuing arms drive.

The Soviet Government, anxious to facilitate agreement on unconditional and complete prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of adequate international control, expressed its readiness to take part in negotiations regarding the United States Government's proposal, and submitted the following proposal for consideration:

The countries party to the Agreement, guided by a desire to lessen international tension, shall give a solemn and unconditional undertaking not to employ atomic, hydrogen or any other weapon of mass destruction...

**B. AIDE-MEMOIRE: MR. MERCHANT TO MR. ZARUBIN 9
JULY 1954**

10. In the opinion of the United States, any effective plan for disarmament must provide satisfactory answers to two fundamental questions:

A. First, will the plan result in an actual reduction or elimination of national armaments in a manner consistent with the security of each nation? A paper promise not to use weapons will not enable the nations safely to reduce their armaments. The very existence of any weapon poses the possibility of its use, despite promises not to do so, which can be broken without notice.

B. Second, will the plan materially reduce or eliminate the danger of aggression and warfare? If any plan would, in fact, tend to increase the danger of resort to war by a potential aggressor, it would not accomplish the basic purpose of disarmament.

11. The Soviet Union's proposal of 30 January fails to meet either of these basic tests, or to offer any hope for beneficial results in the disarmament field:

A. It would leave unimpaired existing armaments and continued armament production. This is clear from the terms of the Soviet proposal itself. There would be only an exchange of promises not to make use of weapons which are still retained. There could be no certainty that these assurances would be observed. The maintenance of stocks of weapons and the continued manufacture of weapons would bear ominous witness to the danger that the assurances might be disregarded.

B. The danger of aggression and war would not be lessened if the Soviet proposal were put in effect. Indeed, it could be increased, since the deterrent effect upon a potential aggressor of the existence of nuclear weapons would doubtless be lessened if his possible victims had undertaken an obligation

not to use them. Such an aggressor might be tempted to initiate an attack in the hope that the ban would prevent or delay the use of such weapons in the defence of his victims. Yet, the aggressor with nuclear weapons would be in a position to repudiate his past assurances and employ nuclear weapons whenever it suited his interests. Thus, such a plan might merely serve to induce aggression and weaken its victims.

12. Not only does the Soviet proposal fail to meet the necessary tests of any effective plan to prevent atomic warfare, but it would in fact harm the chances of adoption of any such effective plan. For surely the Soviet proposal, if it were accepted would tend to create the deceptive impression that the danger of atomic warfare had somehow been limited. and weaken the vigilance of the people regarding a threat which had, if anything, increased. This false sense of security could discourage further efforts to achieve genuine disarmament under effective safeguards, which would actually enhance the security of all, reduce the danger of war, and lighten the heavy burden of armaments...

**C. AIDE-MEMOIRE: MR. GROMYKO TO MR. CHARLES E.
BOHLEN 22 SEPTEMBER 1954**

... It is evident from the U.S. Government's memorandum of 9 July that its attitude towards the aforementioned proposal of the Soviet Union is a negative one. The United States Government, in objecting to the Soviet proposal, alleges that it cannot be certain that the agreement on unconditional renouncement of the employment of atomic and hydrogen weapons will be observed. But to adopt that standpoint, is to believe that practically every international treaty and agreement ever concluded, and the obligations following therefrom, must be held in doubt. That view, of course, cannot be accepted, for

it runs counter to the established principles and standards of international relations.

Actually, the international obligations assumed by the States in virtue of the declaration renouncing the employment of weapons of mass destruction would have not less, but much more significance than certain major international agreements concluded in the past, whose positive value is generally recognised. During the first world war, as is known, when there were no international agreements on the subject, such weapons of mass destruction, as asphyxiating and poison gases and other chemical weapons, were widely used, and this was resolutely condemned by the nations. It was precisely in this connexion that it was found necessary to conclude an international agreement prohibiting employment of these weapons of mass annihilation. In the end, a Protocol was signed in Geneva in 1925 banning chemical and bacteriological weapons. It is generally known that the Protocol played an important part in preventing the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in the second world war, with the result that the peoples were spared the terrible consequences that would have followed from resort to this weapon by the belligerents.

That fact makes it clear that international agreements committing the nations not to employ specified weapons are not only possible, but necessary, and represent an important instrument for the promotion of peace. This should apply all the more to an agreement dealing with atomic and hydrogen weapons, the most destructive weapons known to man...

33. 'Basle Provisions of an International Convention': U.S.S.R. Proposal

On 30 September 1954 the U.S.S.R. presented to the General Assembly a resolution (A/C. 1/750/Rev. 1) on the

'conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons,' taking as a basis the French and British proposals of 11 June 1954.

1. The General Assembly instructs the U.N. Disarmament Commission to draw up and submit for the approval of the Security Council the draft of an international convention (treaty) designed to promote international peace and security and providing for the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction and their elimination from national armaments, for a substantial reduction of armaments, and for the institution of international control to ensure the observance of these decisions, taking as a basis the French and British proposals of 11 June 1954.

The convention (treaty) shall accordingly contain the following basic provisions:

1) Simultaneous implementation of the following measures:

a) Reduction by the States within six months (or one year) of their armaments, armed forces and budget allocations for military purposes to the extent of 50 per cent of agreed standards of reduction. The reduction of armaments and armed forces shall be from the level of armaments and armed forces existing as of 31 December 1953, and the reduction of allocations shall be from the level of military expenditure in the year ending 31 December 1953;

b) For the purpose of supervising the carrying out by the States of their obligation to reduce their armaments and armed forces in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a), there shall be set up under the Security Council a temporary international control commission which shall have the right to demand from the States all information necessary for verifying the measures taken in respect to reduction of their armaments

and armed forces. The commission shall adopt the necessary measures for supervising the carrying out by the States of their obligations with regard to reduction of their armaments and armed forces and of their allocations for military purposes. The States shall periodically, at intervals to be fixed, submit to the commission information concerning the carrying out of the measures envisaged in this convention.

2) Upon the completion of the measures specified in clause 1, the simultaneous carrying out of the following measures shall be envisaged:

a) Reduction by the States within six months (or one year) of their armaments, armed forces and budget allocations for military purposes to the extent of the remaining 50 per cent of the agreed standards of reduction from the level of the armaments and armed forces existing as of 31 December 1953, and of allocations from the level of military expenditure in the year ending 31 December 1953;

(b) Atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction shall be absolutely prohibited, their production shall be discontinued, and they shall be completely eliminated from national armaments; all available atomic materials shall be utilised solely for peaceful purposes.

The implementation of these measures shall be completed not later than the implementation of the measures regarding reduction of armaments and armed forces envisaged in clause 2 (a), but production of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall be discontinued immediately upon the beginning of the reduction of the remaining 50 per cent of the agreed standards of reduction of armaments, armed forces and allocations for military purposes.

c) The States shall institute a permanent international agency for supervising the observance of the convention (treaty) on prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, discontinuance of production of such

weapons and their elimination from national armaments, and reduction of armaments, armed forces and allocations for military purposes. This international agency shall be empowered to exercise control, including inspection on a permanent basis, to the extent required to ensure the observance of this convention by all the States.

II. In connexion with the proposal contained in the Anglo-French memorandum of 11 June 1954, concerning prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression, the General Assembly instructs the U.N. Disarmament Commission to examine and elucidate this question and submit its recommendations.

34. U.S.S.R. View on Prohibition of Atomic Weapons and Control

On 11 October 1954 Mr. Vyshinsky spoke in the U.N. Political Committee to clarify the U.S.S.R. position on prohibition of atomic weapons and control.

As regards the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, I should like to clarify the position between us,]low that the USSR has accepted your proposals as a basis. Under the USSR proposals a complete prohibition of such weapons would be put into effect; the production of such weapons would be discontinued, they would be entirely eliminated from the armaments of States, and all existing atomic materials would be used only for peaceful purposes. It is proposed that the carrying out of these measures must be completed not later than the carrying out of the measures. taken for the reduction of armaments and armed forces referred to in paragraph 2 (a) of the Soviet draft resolution.

It is also laid down that the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall cease immediately, as soon as a start is made with the reduction of armaments, armed forces and appropriations for military requirements in respect of the remaining 50 per cent... Suppose we take 1 July of the given year. Six months would bring us to 31 December of the same year: Within one year all the measures specified in paragraph 2 of our draft resolution would have to be carried out. What does this mean? It means that as soon as the second stage has commenced — that is, on completion of the first stage, the measures specified in paragraph 1 — we should have to proceed to the reduction of armaments, armed forces and military appropriations by the remaining 50 per cent. Such a reduction could not, of course, be carried out very rapidly; obviously it would take some time, but the space of time we have suggested is long enough — six months. And the period mentioned by Mr. Moch was 1 July to 31 December.

Simultaneously, that is, within the same period of six months, the complete prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction would be declared. It is laid down that the carrying out of these measures must be completed not later than the carrying out of the measures taken for the reduction of armaments and armed forces; so that the point that the prohibition of atomic weapons is to take place at the same time as the reduction of armaments is stressed once again. Of course, we do not know exactly how much time that will take; it is one thing to declare a prohibition, and another to put into effect a whole system of measures; nevertheless, all these measures have to be completed during this same period.

Finally, sub-paragraph 2 (c) goes on to propose the institution of a standing international organ for the supervision... etc. When would that organ be instituted? Simultaneously with the prohibition of atomic weapons. There was a time, you will remember, when it was maintained on one

side that the prohibition of atomic weapons must come first and the setting up of the control organ second, and on the other that the setting up of the control organ must come first and the prohibition second. Ultimately the possibility arose of advancing a new formula capable of reconciling these two different points of view: prohibition of atomic weapons and the setting up of the control organ should take place simultaneously. Of course the question of timing then arises, because we cannot set up a control organ in the five minutes it would take us to sign an order prohibiting atomic weapons. There must in any event be some difference in scheduling, because the two operations differ in scope and in regard to the conditions under which they will be effected; what is important is that the same final date should be set for both.

It seems to me therefore that there is room for more specific proposals on this point; perhaps some of my colleagues have some suggestions to make. They should be studied carefully, if there is a genuine wish to reach agreement. But it seems to us that there is no incompatibility, no unbridgeable difference or contradiction, between the two sets of proposals. At least I see no such contradiction ...

That resolution provides for the complete prohibition of atomic weapons and their elimination from armaments, to be carried into effect simultaneously with the reduction of conventional armaments by the remaining 50 per cent of the agreed levels; that is laid down in paragraph 2 of the draft resolution from which I have already quoted. I would reiterate that the Soviet Union draft resolution provides for these measures to be carried out simultaneously, that is, within a strictly limited period of time. The term simultaneously does not mean that both measures should be carried out — say, the moment the clock strikes seven, which would obviously be impossible. A meeting may rise at exactly 7 p.m., but it is not possible for all of us to leave the room at exactly 7 p.m. Some

of us are bound to leave at five minutes past seven and others at ten minutes past. The facts impose a certain degree of relativity in this respect....

The French and United Kingdom proposals of 11 June also contained an important provision to the effect that the States concerned should regard themselves as prohibited from the use of nuclear weapons, and should recommend the inclusion in the disarmament treaty of an immediate acceptance of this prohibition by all signatory States, pending the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. As I have said, this provision is important. The Soviet Union draft resolution proposes that the Disarmament Commission should be instructed to study and clarify this question and submit its recommendations. What is the reason for this proposal in the Soviet draft resolution? Why is clarification necessary, clarification of the formula used in the French and United Kingdom proposals, namely, 'in defence against aggression'? It is necessary, we believe, because such a formula could itself offer a basis for sanctioning the use of atomic weapons on the pretext of defence against aggression where there was no such defence in reality; and that might actually occur if this formula is not sufficiently clarified and defined. Therefore, we feel that this matter has to be clarified in order that we may be perfectly clear whom and what we are discussing. There is no such clarity here. I think that this will be one of our next tasks.

35. Enforcement by Majority Vote

STATEMENT BY MR. SELWYN LLOYD, IN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 20 OCTOBER 1954

... In our view, the proposals which we put forward would have to be within the terms of the Charter. On the question of

the veto and the position of the Charter in relation to the veto, we would say, I think, that it would be quite wrong for a treaty between States to provide that the veto should not operate in the Security Council on this or that matter; that it would be contrary to the Charter to insert such a provision in a multilateral treaty; but that it would be perfectly consistent with the Charter to say that certain enforcement measures should be decided upon in the control organisation by majority vote.

36. Conclusion of an International Convention (Treaty)

UNANIMOUS RESOLUTION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY

On 4 November 1954 the General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution (808 (IX)) proposed by Canada, the U.K., the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. as follows.

The General Assembly

Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations for seeking a solution of the disarmament problem,

Conscious that the continuing development of armaments increases the urgency of the need for such a solution,

Having considered the fourth report of the Disarmament Commission of 29 July 1954 and the documents annexed thereto, and the draft resolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction,

1. Concludes that a further effort should be made to reach agreement on comprehensive and coordinated proposals to be

embodied in a draft international disarmament convention providing for;

- (a) The regulation, limitation and major reduction of all armed forces and all conventional armaments;
- (b) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes;
- (c) The establishment of effective international control, through a control organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed reductions of all armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of nuclear weapons of mass destruction, and to ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only; the whole programme to be such that no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered.

2. Requests the Disarmament Commission to seek an acceptable solution of the disarmament problem, taking into account the various proposals referred to in the preamble of the present resolution and any other proposals within the Commission's terms of reference;

3. Suggests that the Disarmament Commission reconvene the Sub-Committee established in accordance with paragraph 6 and 7 of General Assembly Resolution 715 (VIII) of 28 November 1953;

4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to report to the Security Council and to the General Assembly as soon as sufficient progress is made.

37. Indian Proposal for an 'Armament Truce'

On 4 November 1954 the General Assembly adopted a

resolution by 57 votes to 1, referring to the Disarmament Commission for appropriate consideration' a draft resolution presented by India which contained the following proposals.

The General Assembly ...

Recommends to the Disarmament Commission that it take into consideration as part of the 'other proposals' provided for in resolution A/CI/752/Rev. 2

- (a) the study of ways and means of establishing 'an armament truce' pending agreement on a Disarmament Convention;
- (b) Procedures for effective cooperation with the ascertainment of the views of States not members of the Disarmament Commission;
- (c) The discussions and suggestions on disarmament in the General Assembly;
- (d) The determination of the factors which should govern the equitable, reduction and levels of armed forces and conventional armaments in respect of their quantum and character.

SECTION IV

STEPS TOWARDS AGREEMENT: 1955

38. Disarmament Sub-Committee Resumes

On 25 February 1955, in accordance with the General Assembly resolution of 4 November 1954, the Disarmament Sub-Committee started to meet again. The five documents given below contain the most important proposals put to the Sub-Committee during the months February to May. On 18 May 1955 the Sub-Committee suspended its meetings to give the governments time to study the resolution presented by the U.S.S.R. on 10 May, incorporating main principles from the Western proposals.

39. Basis for a Draft International Treaty

PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY CANADA, FRANCE, THE U.K. AND THE U.S.A. ON 8 MARCH 1955 (DC/SC. 1/15/REV.

1)

The General Assembly (The Security Council)...

1. Considers that all States possessing nuclear weapons should regard themselves as prohibited in accordance with the terms of the Charter of the United Nations from the use of such weapons except in defence against aggression;

2. Recommends that such a disarmament treaty should include an immediate and explicit acceptance of this

prohibition by all signatory States, pending the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons as proposed in the subsequent paragraphs of this resolution;

3. Further recommends that the obligations assumed by the Members of the United Nations to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State should be accepted by all signatory States not Members of the United Nations;

4. Considers that such a disarmament treaty prepared by the Disarmament Commission and submitted by it to the Security Council to the General Assembly and to a World Disarmament Conference should include provisions covering the following:

(a) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes;

(b) Major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments;

(c) The establishment of a control organ with rights and powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed prohibitions and reductions;

5. Further considers that after the approval of the draft treaty by the World Disarmament Conference this instrument would be open to signature and adherence by all States. The treaty would enter into force immediately it had been ratified by those of the signatories who would be specified in the treaty;

6. Decides that the treaty should provide that the disarmament programme should be carried out as described below:—

I. After the constitution and positioning of the control

organ, which shall be carried out within a specified time, and as soon as the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect:

(a) Overall military manpower shall be limited to levels existing on 31 December 1954, or such other date as may be agreed at the World Disarmament Conference.

(b) Overall military expenditure, both atomic and non-atomic, shall be limited to amounts spent in the year ending 31 December 1954, or such other date as may be agreed at the World Disarmament Conference.

II. As soon as the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect:

(a) One-half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces shall take effect;

(b) On completion of (a) the manufacture of all kinds of nuclear weapons and all other prohibited weapons shall cease.

III. As soon as the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect:

(a) The second half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces shall take effect:

(b) On completion of (a):

(i) The total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes shall be carried out;

(ii) The total prohibition and elimination of all other prohibited weapons shall be carried out.

7. Expressed the hope that when all the measures enumerated above have been carried out the armaments and

armed forces of the Powers will be further reduced to the levels strictly necessary for the maintenance of internal security and the fulfilment of the obligations of signatory States under the terms of the United Nations Charter;

8. Decides that the control organ shall remain in being to ensure that the reductions, Prohibitions and eliminations are faithfully and permanently observed;

9. Requests the Commission to inform the General Assembly as soon as the preparation of the draft treaty has progressed to a point where, in the judgment of the Commission, its programme is ready for submission to the World Disarmament Conference.

40. Conclusion of an International Convention (Treaty): U.S.S.R. Proposal

On 18 March 1955 the U.S.S.R. presented a proposal (DC/SC. 1/19/Rev. 1) on the conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. The first paragraph was identical with that of the U.S.S.R. draft of 30 September 1954 (p. 35).

... Accordingly, the convention (treaty) should contain the following basic provisions:

- (1) The following measures shall be taken simultaneously:
 - (a) In the course of six months (or one year), States shall reduce their armaments, armed forces and budgetary appropriations for military requirements to the extent of 50 per cent of the agreed norms. Armaments and armed forces shall be reduced from the strength of armaments and armed forces existing on 1 January 1955, and appropriations shall be reduced

from the amount of appropriations for military requirements during 1955.

States parties to the convention (treaty) shall pledge themselves, as a first step towards the reduction of armaments and armed forces, not to increase their armaments and armed forces above the level of 1 January 1955, and not to increase their appropriations for military requirements above the level of the appropriations for these purposes in 1955.

In the case of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France, China and the United Kingdom, a major reduction of armaments and armed forces is considered to be necessary; and with a view to the execution of further measures relating to general disarmament, it is also considered necessary to convene in 1955 a world conference on the general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, to be attended by States both Members and non-members of the United Nations.

In establishing the norms for the reduction of armaments of States, simple agreed criteria, including demographic, geographic, economic and political factors shall be taken into account, with a view to the strengthening of world peace and international security and the diminution of the threat of aggression.

(b) For the purpose of supervising the fulfilment by States of the obligations in connexion with the reduction of armaments and armed forces provided for in sub-paragraph (a), a temporary international control commission shall be established under the Security Council with the right to require States to provide the necessary information on the measures taken by them to reduce armaments and armed forces. The commission shall take the necessary steps to supervise the fulfilment by States of the obligations assumed by them in connexion with the reduction of armaments,

armed forces and appropriations for military requirements. States shall periodically supply the commission at established intervals with information concerning the implementation of the measures provided for in the convention (treaty).

(2) On completion of the measures referred to in paragraph (1), the following measures shall be, taken simultaneously:

(a) In the course of six months (or one year); States shall reduce their armaments, armed forces and budgetary appropriations for military requirements by the remaining 50 per cent of the agreed norms from the strength of armaments and armed forces existing on 1 January 1955, and shall reduce their appropriations from the amount of appropriations for military requirements during 1955;

(b) A complete prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction shall be carried into effect, the production of such weapons shall be discontinued and they shall be entirely eliminated from the armaments of States; all existing atomic materials shall be used for peaceful purposes.

The carrying out of these measures must be completed not later than the carrying out of the measures taken for the reduction of armaments and armed forces referred to in paragraph (2) (a), and the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall cease immediately, as soon as a start is made with the reduction of armaments, armed forces and appropriations for military requirements in respect of the remaining 50 per cent of the agreed norms. States shall institute a standing international organ for the supervision of the implementation of the convention (treaty) on the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, the discontinuance of the production of these weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States and the reduction of

armaments, armed forces and appropriations for military requirements. This international organ shall have powers to exercise supervision, including inspection on a continuing basis, to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention by all States.

In all States signatories to the convention, the international control organ shall have its own permanent staff of inspectors, having unrestricted access, within the limits of the supervisory functions they exercise, to all establishments subject to control.

Staff recruited to carry out the work of inspection shall be selected on an international basis.

(3) It is to be hoped that when all the measures enumerated above have been carried out, the armaments and armed forces of the Powers will be further reduced to the levels strictly necessary for the maintenance of internal security and the fulfilment of the obligations of signatory States under the terms of the United Nations Charter.

41. Nuclear Disarmament

PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY CANADA, FRANCE, THE U.K. AND THE U.S.A. ON 18 APRIL 1955 (DC/SC. 1/23)

The delegations of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America make the following proposal in relation to the destruction and prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and the conversion for peaceful purpose of all stocks of fissile material in the possession of any State.

(1) A disarmament treaty shall include provision for the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of

nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and for the elimination of existing stocks; these measures shall be fitted in with reductions in armed forces and arms in such a way that no country's security will be endangered in the process;

(2) the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction must be supervised by an effective system of international control;

(3). when all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction have been eliminated and all stocks of .such weapons destroyed, all States signatory to the disarmament treaty shall convert and devote their supplies of fissile material to peaceful purposes only.

42. Stage at which Nuclear Weapons Should be Prohibited

PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY FRANCE AND THE U. K. ON 19 APRIL 1955 (DC/SC. I/24)

The Soviet representative has claimed that the disarmament programme put forward by the Western Powers in their draft resolution of 8 March is uncoordinated and that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the conversion of stocks of such weapons to peaceful purposes should be carried out simultaneously with the second half of the agreed reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments.

The delegations of France and the United Kingdom agree that it is desirable that the reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments should be better coordinated with the abolition of nuclear weapons. In order to reach agreement on

this point they suggest that the Soviet delegation should agree that the production of nuclear weapons should cease at the earlier stage proposed in paragraph 6 II of the Western Powers' draft resolution of 8 March, instead of at the later stage suggested in the Soviet draft resolution of 19 March. For their part they would be prepared to agree that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the process of eliminating all nuclear stocks should be carried out at the same time as the final quarter of the agreed reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments begins, i.e., when 75 per cent of those reductions have been completed.

This proposal would entail amending the Western draft resolution of 8 March in the following respects (new words in italics):

Paragraph 6 II to read:

As soon as the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect:

- (a) One-half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces shall take effect;
- (b) On completion of (a), the manufacture *atomic, hydrogen and all other weapons mass destruction shall cease.*

Paragraph 6 III to read:

As soon as the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect:

- (a) *the third quarter* of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces shall take effect;

(b) on completion of (a), a complete prohibition on the use of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction shall come into force. Simultaneously, the elimination of these weapons and the final quarter of the agreed reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments shall begin; and both processes shall be completed within the time limit laid down in the Disarmament Treaty. All atomic materials shall then be used only for peaceful purposes.

Paragraph 6 III (b) (ii) to be deleted.

The delegations of France and the United Kingdom wish to make it clear that this proposal is dependent on agreement being reached on two essential elements in the disarmament programme, namely, (a) drastic reductions in the armed forces and conventional armaments of the Great Powers so that an equilibrium is attained as suggested in the Anglo-French memorandum of 29 March 1955, and (b) the institution of an effective system of control which would operate throughout the whole disarmament programme.

43. Principles of Control

DRAFT PROPOSED BY CANADA, FRANCE, THE U.K. AND THE U.S.A. ON 21 APRIL 1945 (DC/SC. 1/25)

The General Assembly (Security Council)...

Recommends that the provisions of the draft disarmament treaty relating to the responsibilities, functions, powers and rights of the control organ should be based on the following principles;

A. The control organ shall have, to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the treaty by all nations, full responsibility for supervising and guaranteeing effective observance of all the provisions of the disarmament treaty including:

(1) The limitations on levels of conventional armaments and overall military manpower, and on overall military expenditures including both atomic and non-atomic (paragraphs 6 I (a) and (b) of the four-power draft resolution of 8 March 1955);

(2) The major reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments (paragraphs 6 II (a) and 6 III (a) of the four-power draft resolution of 8 March 1955);

(3) The total prohibition of manufacture and use, and the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, as well as conversion of existing stocks of nuclear materials to peaceful uses (paragraphs 6 II (b), 6 III (b) of the four-power draft resolution of 8 March 1955);

(4) The continued supervision of permitted atomic energy installations and facilities.

B. In order to enable it to carry out these responsibilities and functions, the control organ shall be accorded powers to be exercised in accordance with the terms of the disarmament treaty and which shall include the following;

(1) To determine, within the limits established by the disarmament treaty, the details of the methods and processes of supervising and guaranteeing the effective observance of the various phases of agreed limitations, reductions, and prohibitions, in order to ensure that the disarmament programme is carried out as rapidly

as possible and with safety and equity for all;

(2) To supervise and verify the disclosures of information required at each stage of the disarmament programme laid down in the four-power draft resolution of 8 March 1955, with respect to all armaments and armed forces and related installations and facilities;

(3) To ensure that installations, facilities, equipment, and materials, including stocks of nuclear materials, are disposed of or utilised in accordance with the terms of the disarmament treaty;

(4) To organise and conduct field and aerial surveys in connexion with the above functions and for the purpose of determining whether all installations and facilities have been disclosed;

(5) To conduct such research as is necessary to keep itself in the forefront of nuclear knowledge and to enable it to be fully effective in eliminating the destructive uses of nuclear energy, so that such energy shall be used only for peaceful purposes;

(6) To report and provide information to the Security Council, the General Assembly and the signatory States and to make recommendations concerning appropriate action by them in the event of violation of the disarmament treaty;

(7) To take such measures provided for in the treaty as may be necessary to deal with violations of the disarmament treaty pending action by the Security Council, the General Assembly or the signatory States, and to call upon the party concerned and its agents to comply with such measures, without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the party concerned.

C. In order to ensure that the international officials of the control organ are continuously in a position to fulfil their responsibilities; they will be granted the right:

(1) to be stationed permanently in the countries adhering to the disarmament agreement;

(2) of unrestricted access to, egress from and travel within the territory of participating States, and unrestricted access to all installations and facilities as required by them for the effective performance of their responsibilities and functions;

(3) of unrestricted use of communication facilities necessary for the discharge of their responsibilities;

(4) of inviolability of person, premises, property and archives.

D. The control organ shall remain in being to ensure that the reductions, prohibitions and eliminations are faithfully and permanently observed.

44. Reduction of Armaments and Prohibition of Atomic Weapons: U.S.S.R. Proposal

On 10 May 1955 the U.S.S.R. presented a proposal (DC/SC. 1/26/Rev. 2) on the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the elimination of the threat of a new war. The first part of this proposal was a comprehensive declaration on the relaxation of international tension and measures which could contribute to it. The second part consisted of proposals on a convention of the reduction of armaments and on international control over arms reduction and the prohibition of atomic weapons. This second part is given below.

**CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF AN
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE REDUCTION OF
ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC
WEAPONS**

The General Assembly (Security Council),

Seeking to save mankind from a new and destructive war, to reduce the tension in relations between States, and to relieve the peoples of the heavy burden of taxation they bear as a result of the continuing armaments race,

Desirous of ensuring the possibility of resources thus released being used to improve the well-being of the peoples and to afford extensive assistance to the economically underdeveloped countries,

Instructs the United Nations Disarmament Commission to draw up and submit for the approval of the Security Council a draft 'international convention (treaty) on the question of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.'

Such a convention, having as its purpose the strengthening of peace and international security, shall provide for:

- (a) the complete prohibition of the use and production both of nuclear and of all other weapons of mass destruction, and the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes;
- (b) a major reduction in all armed forces and all conventional armaments;
- (c) the establishment of a control organ with rights and powers and functions adequate to guarantee in the case of all States alike the effective observance of the agreed prohibitions and reductions.

Accordingly, the convention (treaty) shall contain the basic provisions set forth hereunder relating to the execution of measures for the reduction of the conventional armaments of

States, the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen. and other weapons of mass destruction and the procedure for the carrying out of these measures in two stages:

First Stage-Measures to be carried out in 1956

The following measures shall be carried out in 1956:

1. The States parties to the convention (treaty) shall undertake, as a first step towards the reduction of armaments and armed forces, not to increase their armed forces and conventional armaments above the level obtaining on 31 December 1954. They shall also undertake not to increase their appropriations for armed forces and armaments, including atomic weapons, above the level of the expenditures effected for those purposes during the year ended 31 December 1954.

The above-mentioned measures shall be carried out within two months of the entry into force of the corresponding agreement.

The United States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom and France shall furnish the Disarmament Commission, within one month after the entry into force of the convention (treaty), with full official figures of their armed forces, conventional armaments and expenditures for military requirements.

2. An agreed level shall be established to which armed forces of all States in excess of that level shall be reduced, in order that no State may possess armed forces capable of constituting a serious threat to international peace. A substantial reduction of armed forces shall be effected by the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom and France. To these ends the above-mentioned five Powers shall undertake to reduce the strength of their armed forces so that they do not exceed the following figures:

United States 1,000,000 to 1,500,000

Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics . 1,000,000 to 1,500,000

China 1,000,000 to 1,500,000

United Kingdom.... ... 650,000

France 650,000

The five Powers shall undertake also to reduce their conventional armaments correspondingly.

The above-mentioned five Powers shall in the course of one year effect a reduction in their armed forces and armaments by 50 per cent of the difference between the level of their armed forces and armaments obtaining on 31 December 1954, and the reduced level of the armed forces and armaments of each of these States established in accordance with the obligations assumed by them as set forth hereinabove.

Appropriations by States for armed forces and conventional armaments shall be reduced correspondingly.

3. There shall be convened, not later than during the first half of 1956, a World Conference on the general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, with the participation of States both Members and non-members of the United Nations, with a view to determining the size of the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the other States and to prohibiting atomic weapons.

The strength of the armed forces which other States shall be authorised to retain, shall in all cases be considerably lower than the levels established for the five permanent members of the Security Council.

In establishing the size of the reduction in the armaments of States, including those of the permanent members of the Security Council, simple agreed criteria including demographic, geographic, economic and political factors shall be taken into account, with a view to the strengthening of world peace and international security and the diminution of the threat of aggression.

4. As one of the first measures for the execution of the programme for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, States possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons shall undertake to discontinue tests of these weapons.

With a view to supervision of the fulfilment by States of the aforementioned obligation, an International Commission shall be set up which shall submit reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

5. Simultaneously with the initiation of measures for the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the five Powers by the first 50 per cent of the agreed reduction to the prescribed levels and before the entry into force of the agreement on the complete prohibition of atomic weapons, States shall assume a solemn obligation not to use nuclear weapons, which they shall regard as prohibited to them. Exceptions to this rule may be permitted for purposes of defence against aggression, when a decision to that effect is taken by the Security Council.

6. States possessing military, naval and air bases in the territories of other States shall undertake to liquidate such bases.

The question of the bases to be liquidated during the first stage shall be additionally agreed upon.

The carrying out of these measures must promote the strengthening of the necessary trust between States and facilitate the execution of the measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons envisaged for the second stage.

Second Stage—Measures to be carried out in 1957

The following measures shall be carried out in 1957:

1. The production of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall be discontinued immediately, and budgetary appropriations of

States for military requirements shall be reduced correspondingly,

2. The United States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom and France shall, in the course of one year, reduce their armed forces and armaments by the remaining 50 per cent of the difference between the level of the armed forces and armaments of each of these five States obtaining on 31 December 1954, and the reduced level of the armed forces and armaments of each of these States established in accordance with the obligations assumed by them under the convention. These States shall correspondingly reduce their appropriations for armed forces and conventional armaments.

During this stage, measures with a view to the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of other States to the extent established for them at the World Conference shall also be completed.

3. After the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments has been carried out to the extent of 75 per cent of the total reduction laid down in the convention, a complete prohibition on the use of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction shall enter into force. The elimination of these weapons from the armaments of States and their destruction, and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments by the final 25 per cent of the agreed reductions shall begin simultaneously; and both these processes shall be compelled within the time limits in 1957. All atomic materials shall thereafter be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

State shall undertake to promote extensive international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. This cooperation shall include the free exchange of information concerning the use of atomic energy in industry, agriculture and medicine and in other fields of economics and science. In this connexion, special attention shall be given to assistance to

economically underdeveloped countries. Such assistance shall not be made conditional upon any demands of a political or military nature.

States shall endeavour to devote a part of the savings resulting from world-wide disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons to the extensive use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

4. Measures for the liquidation of all foreign, military, naval and air bases on the territories of other States shall be completed.

On the completion of all the measures enumerated above, it would be desirable that the Powers should further reduce their armaments and armed forces to the levels strictly necessary for the maintenance of internal security and the fulfilment of the obligations of signatory States under the terms of the United Nations Charter.

The question of the obligations of China, as one of the permanent members of the Security Council, under the convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, and other weapons of mass destruction shall be examined with the participation of the People's Republic of China.

CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OVER THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

The General Assembly,

Recognising the great importance and the necessity of instituting effective international control over the fulfilment by States of their obligations under the, convention on the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons,

Notes that the necessary conditions for the institution of a control system which would enjoy the trust of all States and would fully meet the requirements of international security do not at present exist.

It is impossible to disregard the fact that there exists at present considerable international tension and mistrust in relations between States. It is this that accounts for the fact that, in the conditions of mistrust among States which have come into being, barriers of every sort are being erected even in regard to the interchange of industrial, agricultural, scientific, cultural and other delegations. Such a situation makes difficult the attainment of agreement regarding the admission by States to their enterprises, particularly those engaged in military production, of foreign control officials who might carry out the inspection of such enterprises.

In the existing situation, when many States are displaying legitimate anxiety for their security, it is difficult to expect that these States would trustingly provide other States with facilities for access to industrial and other resources of theirs which are vital to their security.

Insofar as the necessary trust does not at the present time exist between States, a situation may arise in which the adoption of decisions on international control will in reality be reduced to a mere formality which does not achieve the objective. This is all the more inadmissible because, in present conditions, the greatest apprehensions exist among peace-loving peoples in connexion with the existence of atomic and hydrogen weapons, in regard to which the institution of international control is particularly difficult.

This danger is inherent in the very nature of atomic production. It is well known that the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes can be used for the accumulation of stocks of explosive atomic materials, and moreover, in ever greater quantities. This means that States having establishments

for the production of atomic energy can accumulate, in violation of the relevant agreements, large quantities of explosive materials for the production of atomic weapons. The danger of this state of affairs becomes still more understandable if account is taken of the fact that where the corresponding quantities of explosive atomic materials exist production of actual atomic and hydrogen bombs is technically fully feasible and can be effected on a large scale.

Thus, there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organising the clandestine manufacture of atomic, and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control. In such a situation, the security of the States signatories to the international convention cannot be guaranteed, since the possibility would be open to a potential aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise atomic attack on peace-loving States.

Until an atmosphere of trust has been created in relations between States, any agreement on the institution of international control can only serve to lull the vigilance of the peoples. It will create a false sense of security, while in reality there will be a danger of the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons and hence the threat of surprise attack and the unleashing of an atomic war with all its appalling consequences for the peoples.

It must also be borne in mind that preparations for a new war, the danger of which has been greatly increased, by the development of atomic and hydrogen weapons, inevitably necessitate the concentration of large military formations at certain points together with large quantities of conventional armaments—aircraft, artillery, tanks, warships and so forth. Such concentration and the movement of large formations of land, sea and air forces cannot be effected except through important communication centres, ports and airfields. Under

conditions of modern military technique, the importance of such points in the preparation of an aggressive war has not diminished, but is on the contrary increasing.

In addition to atomic and hydrogen weapons, for all their destructive capacity, armies of many millions and vast quantities of conventional armaments, which are of decisive importance to the outcome of any major war, would inevitably be involved in military operations in the event of the outbreak of war.

All this must be taken into account in resolving the problem of instituting international control over the fulfilment by States of their obligations under the convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

The problem of instituting International Control and of the rights and powers of the international control organ must therefore be considered in close connexion with the execution of the above-mentioned measures for the lessening of international tension, . the strengthening of trust between States and the carrying out of other measures relating to the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

In view of the foregoing,

the General Assembly institutes an International Control Organ having the following rights and powers:

1. DURING THE FIRST STAGE of execution of the measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons:

(a) In order to prevent a surprise attack by one State upon another, the International Control Organ shall establish on the territory of all the States concerned, on a basis of reciprocity, control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and in aerodromes. The task of these posts shall be to see to it that there is no dangerous concentration of military land forces or of air or naval forces.

(b) The International Control Organ shall have the right to require from States any necessary information on the execution of measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

(c) The Control Organ shall have unimpeded access to records relating to the budgetary appropriations of States for military needs, including all decisions of their legislative and executive organs on the subject. States shall periodically, within specified time limits, furnish the control organ with information on the execution of the measures provided for in the convention (treaty).

2. DURING THE SECOND STAGE of execution of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons:

The carrying out of the measures provided for in the Declaration set forth above and of the measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons envisaged for the first stage will create the necessary atmosphere of trust between States, thereby ensuring the appropriate conditions for the extension of the functions of the International Control Organ.

In these conditions, the International Control Organ shall have the following rights and powers:

(a) To exercise control, including inspection on a continuing basis, to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the abovementioned convention by all States. The international control organ shall exercise these functions, while also enjoying the right to require from States the necessary information on the execution of measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

Staff recruited to carry out the work of inspection shall be selected on an international basis.

(b) To have permanently in all States signatories to the

convention its own staff of inspectors having, within the bounds of the control functions they exercise, unimpeded access at all times to all objects of control.

In order to prevent a surprise attack by one State upon another, the International Control Organ shall in particular have on the territory of all the States concerned, on a basis of reciprocity, control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and in aerodromes.

(c) The Control Organ shall have unimpeded access to records relating to the budgetary appropriations of States for military needs, including all decisions of their legislative and executive organs on the subject. States shall periodically, within specified time limits, furnish the control organ with information on the execution of the measures provided for in the convention (treaty).

3. The Control Organ shall make recommendations to the Security Council on measures of prevention and suppression with regard to violators of the convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

4. The functions and powers of the permanent international control organ shall be defined on the basis of the foregoing principles, and appropriate instructions shall be prepared for this purpose.

45. Geneva Heads of Government Conference, July 1955

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

... Finally, there is the overriding problem of armament. This is at once a result and a cause of existing tension and distrust. Contrary to a basic purpose of the United Nations

Charter armaments now divert much of men's effort from creative to non-productive uses. We would all like to end that. But apparently none dares to do so because of fear of attack. Surprise attack has a capacity for destruction far beyond anything which man has yet known. So each of us deems it vital that there should be means to deter such attack. Perhaps, therefore, we should consider whether the problem of limitation of armament may not best be approached by seeking—as a first stop—dependable ways to supervise and inspect military establishments, so that there can be no frightful surprises, whether by sudden attack. or by secret violation of agreed restrictions. In this field nothing is more important than that we explore together the challenging and central problem of effective mutual inspection. Such a system is the foundation for real disarmament.

As we think of this problem of armament, we need to remember that the present burden of costly armaments not only deprives our own people of higher living standards, but it also denies the peoples of under-developed areas of resources which would improve their lot. These areas contain much of the world's population and many nations now emerging for the first time into political independence. They are grappling with the urgent problem of economic growth. Normally they would receive assistance particularly for capital development from the more developed nations of the world. However, that normal process is gravely retarded by the fact that the more developed industrial countries are dedicating so much of their productive effort to armament. Armament reduction would and should insure that part of the savings would flow into the less developed areas of the world to assist their economic development.

In addition, we must press forward in developing the use of atomic energy for constructive purposes. We regret that the Soviet Union has never accepted our proposal of December

1953 that nations possessing stockpiles of fissionable material should join to contribute to a 'world bank' so as, in steadily increasing measure, to substitute cooperation in human welfare for competition in means of human destruction. We still believe that if the Soviet Union would according to its ability contribute, to this great project, that act would improve the international climate...

STATEMENT BY MR. EDGAR FAURE

Disarmament is the core of any general organisation for peace. For a long time disarmament has been thought of as a Utopia. Today, the doubts of statesmen and the fears of the public faced with new forms of destruction are putting an end to scepticism.

The studies undertaken by the U.N. Sub-Committee have made considerable progress, and it seems that agreement will soon be reached on the turning of limited figures for manpower. But it is still not clear how the two main obstacles are to be surmounted; that is to say, control and sanctions.

It would not, at the present time, appear to be possible to unite the four Powers we represent in one organisation endowed with common strategic machinery. But, on the other hand, I believe it would be possible to agree upon economic and social cooperation.

How could an economic organisation ensure military disarmament? To answer that question it is necessary only to give to the problem of disarmament its full significance—not to look merely at its traditional and negative aspect, but also at the positive aspect which is its essential complement.

The problem of disarmament must be linked with that of transferring the productive capacity which would then become available. A changeover from unproductive expenditure to

productive expenditure is difficult within the framework of any one State, since security calculations do not depend upon that State alone. But it would become possible within a system of collective security, since that would cut down the cost of security.

Any reduction of arms potential makes certain budgetary credits and means of production available, which may, according to circumstances, take the form of working hours, power, or material assets.

Every State knows that if it reduces its expenditure on security it increase its means of production and its welfare. But no State dare take the risk, alone, of cutting down its expenditure on security. The problem of security is an international problem. Thus we must at the same time internationalise the reduction of expenditure on security and the disposal of the resources thus liberated, which would otherwise remain unused.

An international organisation would benefit from all the money and materials made available by an agreement to limit armaments for stock. These assets would be administered by a special, common organisation. My suggestion is that they be applied to the tasks of aiding and equipping under-developed territories and under-privileged peoples.

Such a system would solve the problem of control and sanctions. (The-only problem which would not be changed by this solution would be that of fixing percentages but we have seen that this is the only one of the three which can be solved in present conditions.)

Control would become world control of a financial and budgetary nature. This is much easier than physical control, for the budget is a definite document. And, even if such control is not perfect, sanctions are automatically ensured and that is the essential point.

The common fund will consist of assets deriving from the

application of the agreed percentage. If, therefore, one of the participants maintains his arms potential at a higher level, he will be penalised to the exact extent of the concealment and the infringement of rules of which he is guilty. The sanction is certain. If at the beginning it is not very considerable, the yearly increase which is part and parcel of the system will soon make it very formidable indeed.

This new machinery must not put a stop to the investigations which are now being made, particularly by U.N.O., into the technique of control. There is no need for this work to be interrupted, since it is quite compatible with the new formula we are proposing.

The machinery of international transfer also provides a guarantee against a fear of economic recession which often accompanies a policy of reducing armaments, seeing that the contribution of each participant to the common fund could be furnished by its own national production...

Some States will be disappointed that the charges levied upon them will be used for the benefit of people of other lands and of countries far away, instead of for their own national development or for the reduction of their taxes. There are two replies to that:—

(i) There is nothing to prevent any State reducing its military expenditure as much as it likes and using this transfer of resources as it wishes. The only point with which we are concerned here is that of agreed and simultaneous reductions which would not have taken place otherwise — a special sort of saving. National production will continue as before, but part of it will be devoted to charitable aims instead of being put to unproductive use.

(ii) There is also nothing to prevent the fund being used to assist some of the participants, either because they themselves have charge of under-developed

peoples, or for other reasons which may be laid down. These States, which will become applicants for aid after paying their dues will therefore have to accept all the agreed' controls both in regard to reducing armaments and in the use of the funds.

If these general ideas are commonly accepted, I suggest that our Conference should decide to adopt them and thus to promote a new doctrine with regard to disarmament. We could either, under our common U.N.O. guarantee, put this forward to the Powers whose military potential may have to be reduced under agreement, or—and this seems to me preferable—we might ourselves decide in principle to set up a common organisation, with administrative organs.

It is said that our Conference is a first chance. It might be a first step.

In the course of our reflexions on the question of disarmament, we cannot forget that it is almost exactly ten years to the day since the first atomic bomb was dropped. This terrible but brilliant invention may perhaps have hastened the end of the war but it must on no account be allowed to threaten peace. France does not possess the atomic bomb, but my Government has decided, to direct its nuclear researches towards the peaceful uses of atomic energy. We are in all the better position, therefore, for most solemnly demanding that we should seek together the means of controlling atomic armaments. In my view, we have no right to ignore the anxieties of a world whose fate has become one and indivisible.

The inventive genius which has conceived these incredible methods of destruction can also find the means of preventing their consequences and of using them for the common good...

STATEMENT BY SIR ANTHONY EDEN

... There was a time when the aggressor in war might hope to win an advantage and to realise political gain for his country by military action. The more overwhelming the military power the more tempting was the prize and the less might the aggressor expect to have to pay. We can each one of us think of examples of this in history. Nothing of the kind is possible now. No war can bring the victor spoils; it can only bring him and his victim utter annihilation. Neutral would suffer equally with the combatants.

Those are stern facts out of which we can perhaps win enduring peace at last. The deterrent against warlike action holds up a warning hand. But the deterrent cannot of itself solve international problems or remove the differences that exist between us. It is in an attempt to make progress with these problems and differences that we are met here today...

In these last ten years there have been plenty of occasions for suspicions and alarms. These have found expression in heavy armament programmes. To try to deal with these issues in their wider aspect we have all agreed to work through the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations. We welcome the substantial progress which has recently been made there and the important measure of common thinking which has now emerged between the various proposals of the Western Powers and those recently set before us by the Soviet Government. All these discussions will go on, but, as we know, the immediate need is to make a practical start.

The urgent problem is how to begin the process of reducing tensions and removing suspicion and fear. There is also the practical question of how we can devise and operate together an effective control of armaments and of armed forces...

I wish therefore now to suggest that we should consider a

number of inter-related proposals which are intended to do two things. First, they are calculated to meet the apprehension of increased danger which some at Berlin felt might follow the acceptance of our plan. Secondly, they are intended to make a practical experiment in the operative control of armaments...

Secondly, we would be ready to discuss and try to reach agreement, as to the total of forces and armaments on each side in Germany and the countries neighbouring Germany. To do this it would be necessary to join in a system of reciprocal control to supervise the arrangement effectively. All those represented here would we hope be partners in this, together with a united Germany. It would be understood that any proposals in this field would not exclude, or delay, the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, to which we all attach great importance...

STATEMENT BY MR. N. A. BULGANIN

... Whoever is genuinely concerned over the present state of affairs, characterised as it is by the armaments race, the appearance of ever more dangerous and powerful weapons of mass destruction which greatly increases the menace of another war with all the incalculable sacrifices it would entail for the peoples — cannot but associate himself with the demand that an end be put to the arms race, atomic weapons banned, and atomic energy utilised exclusively for peaceful purposes, for promoting the welfare of humanity, the progress of civilisation.

As regards the Soviet Union, it has always advocated broad international cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy, the importance of which was emphasised by President Eisenhower in his well-known statement. The Soviet Government has repeatedly made this clear both in the United Nations and in the course of the Soviet-American negotiations on atomic

energy.

The Soviet Government has decided to contribute an appropriate amount of fissionable materials to the world pool of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as soon as agreement on its establishment is reached.

In this connexion, it should be pointed out that the Soviet Union considers it right to establish the levels suggested by the United States, Britain, France and Canada for the armed forces of the five Powers. It would be very valuable if this Conference were to pronounce in favour of an international agreement setting forth our joint consent to fix the level of the armed forces of the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and China at 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 men each, at 650,000 for Britain and France, and not more than 150,000-200,000 each for all the other countries.

I wish to emphasise once more that the Soviet Government has accepted the three-power proposal on conventional armaments. We are now entitled to expect that the three Powers will take a step which would ensure agreement on prohibition of atomic weapons. This would place the whole question of disarmament. on a realistic basis.

Mr. Faure, the French Prime Minister, suggested in his statement that budget allocations for military purposes should be reduced, and advanced arguments in substantiation. We believe that they are of interest and merit careful study.

Furthermore, the Soviet Government believes that the four Powers would be making a good beginning if, already now, they were to agree to demobilise the military contingents withdrawn from Austria in accordance with the State Treaty, and reduce their armed forces correspondingly. The Soviet Government has decided to take that course and invites the Governments of the U.S.A., France and Britain to do likewise...

It could also be agreed that, pending an agreement on armaments reduction and prohibition of atomic weapons and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of European

countries, the parties to the treaty would pledge to refrain from any further steps to increase their armed forces stationed in other European countries under previous treaties and arrangements...

The value of this step becomes even more evident when examined in relation to armaments reduction and prohibition of atomic weapons. The withdrawal of foreign troops from European countries would in many ways contribute to agreement both on reduction of the conventional armaments of the European—and not only European—nations, and on prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons...

DIRECTIVE TO FOREIGN MINISTERS, 23 JULY

The Heads of Government of France, the United -Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., guided by the desire to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and to the consolidation of confidence between States, instruct their Foreign Ministers to continue the consideration of the following questions with regard to which an exchange of views has taken place at the Geneva Conference, and to propose effective means for their solution, taking account of the close link between the reunification of Germany and the problems of European security, and the fact that the successful settlement of each of these problems would serve the interests of consolidating peace...

2. Disarmament

The Four Heads of Government,

Desirous of removing the threat of war and lessening the burden of armaments,

Convinced of the necessity, for secure peace and for the welfare of mankind, of achieving a system for the control and

reduction of all armaments and armed forces under effective safeguards,

Recognising that achievements in this field would release vast material resources to be devoted to the peaceful economic development of nations, for raising their well-being, as well as for assistance to under-developed countries,

Agree:

(1) for these purposes to work together to develop an acceptable system for disarmament through the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission;

(2) to instruct their representatives in the Sub-Committee in the discharge of their mandate from the United Nations to take account in their work of the views and proposals advanced by the Heads of Government at this Conference;

(3) to propose that the next meeting of the Sub-Committee be held on 29 August 1955 at New York;

(4) to instruct the Foreign Ministers to take note of the proceedings in the Disarmament Commission, to take account of the views and proposals advanced by the Heads of Government at this Conference and to consider whether the four Governments can take any further useful initiative in the field of disarmament...

46. Disarmament Sub-Committee Discussions 29 August-7 October 1955

A. INTRODUCTORY SPEECHES 29 AUGUST MR. JULES MOCH (FRANCE)

We are met again here after a three months interruption in our work; but happily we are able to say that this interruption has not arrested the advance towards peace...

I take the liberty of recalling that for nearly four years,

alone and often without support, I have been defending the thesis that the longer we delay the entry into force of the control organ, the less effective it will be...

The Soviet Note of 10 May is particularly clear on that point. It speaks of the difficulty of establishing international control of the nuclear field, not only because of lack of the necessary trust in the relations among States, but also because of the very nature of atomic production, which makes it possible to build up reserves of fissionable material from power reactors. It states: 'Thus, there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organising the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control.'

This is the point which the French delegation has consistently urged since the establishment of the present Disarmament Commission, but which in past years it has been alone in urging. Its point of view is now generally recognised, and in this matter the United States is at one with the Soviet Union...

Thus on one matter there is a new point of agreement between us, but one which unfortunately reduces the value of the partial agreements reached in 1954 and 1955: we all realise the added technical difficulties involved in the supervision of mounting nuclear production.

Must we drop the idea of any system of verification, and consequently of any elimination of weapons of mass destruction? We strongly oppose any such inference. We must continue study of the powers of the control organ, and at the same time call, upon scientists to discover new methods of detection. This is an old idea which is still pertinent. The Danish scientist Niels Bohr, a Nobel Prize-winner and patriot who escaped from Copenhagen, emphasised in two memoranda which he sent early in 1944 and on 24 March 1945, to

President Roosevelt—hence long before the first atomic explosion—that a close inter-connexion existed between the peaceful development and the military application of nuclear science. He regarded international cooperation between scientists with a view to laying the foundations for the genuine technical supervision of all atomic industries, supplemented by the full exchange of scientific information and the adoption of the necessary political measures to restore trust among States, as essential even at that early date.

Such technical research is today more necessary than ever before. It may take a fairly long time. Without waiting for the results of this work, we must both perfect our ideas of control and eliminate the causes of international mistrust—in the absence of which, I might add, the relative ineffectiveness of control would seem less to be feared. On the first point, the improvement of methods, the French delegation will present a number of proposals, modest ones it is true, during this session. That is all I have to say, and I wish to conclude on a note of encouragement. While the difficulties have increased as we have come to closer grips with the problem, some favourable factors have on the other hand emerged; and those factors will help us to achieve further progress. The advances already preconceived ideas and concepts which were yesterday considered to be sacrosanct by one side or the other, but which have not withstood the test of events. Let us therefore try, in a new spirit, to come to grips with reality, animated only by the ardent desire to overcome or circumvent obstacles in the interests of peace with disarmament. The French delegation stands ready to make this effort; however long it may take. It has no doubt that this is also the aim of the other four delegations.

MR. CABOT LODGE (U.S.A.)

... We believe accordingly that the heart of the disarmament problem is inspection, that no nation—not the United States, not the Soviet Union, nor any other nation—can afford to cut, its strength under an international agreement unless and until an inspection system is created which will support every portion of such an agreement and upon which humanity can rely...

The Heads of Government at Geneva instructed their representatives in this Sub-Committee to consider the proposals made at Geneva by each of them. I do, therefore, here and now present President Eisenhower's plan to this body with the complete text of the words spoken by him on 21 July. This text is being distributed by the Secretariat.

The word 'blueprint' in the President's plan includes, first, the identification, strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, including organised, reserve and paramilitary; second, a complete list of military plants, facilities and installations with their locations.

No nation, of course, could furnish such information without assurances of complete reciprocity and of simultaneous delivery of similar types of information. There must be effective means for verifying the reports of the participating States by air, ground and sea observation.

In implementation of the aerial photography in the President's plan, each country shall permit unrestricted but monitored aerial reconnaissance by the other country.

In order to provide fully against major surprise assault, the United States believes that the plan should provide particularly for safeguards against attack by long-range striking forces of both countries through observation and inspection of these forces and their support, and through measures to detect

preparation for such an attack. The United States believes further that the exchange of information under the President's plan should proceed in progressive stages from the least sensitive aspects to the more sensitive, covering those items most likely to provide against the possibility of surprise.

Further details will be supplied to you concerning the methods by which mutual aerial reconnaissance would be conducted. Among other things, each inspecting country would utilise its own aircraft and related equipment, including visual, photographic and electronic means of observation. Personnel of the country being inspected would be aboard each reconnaissance aircraft during all over-flights.

The United States contemplates that the lists of military installations which are exchanged would include the designation of one or more airfields or bases which would be made available for the support of reconnaissance aircraft and crews.

There would be provision for adequate communication facilities, as required for rapid and direct reports by observers to their home governments.

Each government would arrange to designate ports of entry and egress for observers and aircraft; to clear observers, aircraft and crews to and from home territory, and to check and identify personnel and, equipment engaged in these operations.

Each country being inspected would be responsible for air traffic control of inspecting aircraft...

The world anticipates that before this body adjourns it will make an early beginning on this important plan and that all of us here will show our intention to contribute to its execution and extension of it to our own establishments and territories on a reciprocal and appropriate basis. We in the United States are prepared to put the plan immediately into effect between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

We shall propose that the Disarmament Commission and

the General Assembly record their support of this plan in simple unmistakable language, and that the report which the Commission makes shall be equally clear to the peoples of the world who have a great stake in the vital issues of peace and war...

MR. ANTHONY NUTTING (U.K.)

... We hope that the Geneva meeting has done something to reduce the suspicion and, distrust which have so poisoned and perplexed the world in recent years. We hope it has helped to make a start with the long process of replacing disunity with cooperation and fear with confidence. We are therefore meeting today, I feel, in a different atmosphere, an atmosphere more propitious, more hopeful, than seemed possible only a few months ago, The Geneva meeting has given or should have given a new impetus to our talks...

Our present meetings follow upon three months of intensive discussions by the Sub-Committee in London earlier this year. I think that all my colleagues will agree that the position in which we stand, today—the position in which we stood when, we adjourned last May—is in remarkable and encouraging contrast with the situation at the opening of the Sub-Committee last February. When the Sub-Committee opened last February I think that then it was no exaggeration to say that we were poles apart...

I hope that all of us will have something constructive to offer. I myself am open to suggestions from any quarter. At Geneva several suggestions were made which we should study carefully. We are all grateful, I am sure, to Mr. Moch and to Mr. Lodge for the expositions which they have given in greater detail of the proposals brought forth at Geneva by the Prime Minister of France and the President of the United States. In

addition to these . proposals, there was my Prime Minister's proposal for a system of joint inspection of the forces which now confront each other in Europe...

May I say, therefore, that in our view the control organ must have the right of full information and inspection of the following 'objects of control,' if I may use the Soviet phrase:

- (1) numbers of armed forces and their equipment;
- (2) conventional land, sea and' air armaments, including certain categories of civilian aircraft and shipping;
- (3) military installations, including barracks, ordnance depots, dockyards and airfields;
- (4) factories capable of making armaments (including aircraft), explosives and propellants;
- (5) nuclear installations and reactors;
- (6) plants capable of making chemical and bio, logical weapons.

The control organ should be able to make use of the following methods of inspection and supervision:

- (1) aerial reconnaissance;
- (2) inspection on the ground;
- (3) budgetary controls;
- (4) observation at strategic points.

The control organ should also have the following rights:

- (1) unrestricted rights of freedom of movement to, from and within all States party to the treaty;
- (2) the right to make full use of the communication systems of the State which it is inspecting and to possess suitable transport and communications of its own;
- (3) the right of access to all the objects which I have just mentioned; advance notice would be given of routine visits, but the right of inspection without warning would also be essential;
- (4) the right to investigate alleged or suspected breaches of the treaty in any establishment or installation in the

territory of any State party to the treaty; and, perhaps, in some respects, the most important of all;
(5) the right to use all necessary technical devices which may assist supervision and detection..

I do not pretend for one moment that, even if granted all these facilities, rights and powers, any international machinery that we might devise would be completely watertight and effective, both as regards conventional and nuclear armaments. I do not suggest that this list of rights and powers is final or fully comprehensive. I do suggest that anything less than this would be inadequate. But given all these things—and I hope that we in this Sub-Committee can agree to give all these things—there are still two essential elements lacking. One is experience and the other is confidence.

We in this Sub-Committee are perhaps limited in what we can devise in the way of international agreements to build up confidence. So much must inevitably depend upon what our Governments can do to find solutions of other outstanding political issues. Surely however we can at least give a lead towards building up experience. At Geneva Sir Anthony Eden launched his proposal for joint inspection of the armed forces on both sides of the present dividing line in Europe...

What we do have in mind in this proposal is for a practice in international inspection or, if you like, a pilot or pioneering scheme designed to educate ourselves in the practical and physical problems involved in the inspection of armed forces and equipment. I am tabling the initial exposition of this plan made by Sir Anthony Eden at Geneva together with the text of the proposal itself. I shall have more to say about it at a later stage, and in particular more about the details of such a scheme. But let me say for the moment that its purpose is to give the West and the Soviet Union a chance to see how teams of inspectors from both sides can work together. The

experience gained in seeing just what can be learned from inspecting a military unit or installation, and the actual working of a central control organ with roving teams would all be valuable knowledge when the time comes to set up an international control system on a broad basis to supervise and control world disarmament. It will give us an opportunity to practise on a small scale the complicated technical business of inspecting and reporting what is going on in an area of Europe to be defined by mutual agreement. It would also, I think, play some part, perhaps a modest part, but some part none the less, in building up confidence through the mere experience of people working together people working together who, alas, for too long have worked apart...

MR. A. A. SOBOLEV (U.S.S.R.)

... In the opinion of the Soviet Government, the main task in dealing with the problem of disarmament at the present time is to find a way of bringing the position of the Powers on this issue closer together and of reaching the necessary agreement both on the question of the reduction of conventional armaments and on that of the prohibition of atomic weapons. The Soviet Government's well-known-proposals of 10 May on the general reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the removal of the threat of a new war are directed towards this goal. The main feature of these proposals is that they represent a concentration of proposals on all questions relating directly to the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of trust among States. This determines their positive character and their tremendous importance.

It can hardly be denied that at present the lack of necessary trust in the relations among States constitutes the main obstacle

in the way of the implementation of a comprehensive disarmament programme coupled with the establishment of effective international control.

The proposals set forth in the form of a draft declaration of the United Nations General Assembly and submitted by the Soviet Government to the Sub-Committee on 10 May are a contribution towards establishing such trust. In our opinion, the application of the measures proposed in the declaration will help to bring to an end the 'cold war' and create that atmosphere of trust among States which is the chief prerequisite for a real, practical solution of the disarmament problem.

The Soviet proposals of 10 May concerning the conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons are based on proposals acceptable both to the Soviet Union and to the Western countries. At the same time, they embody a definite programme of action for carrying out these proposals within specified time-limits...

The Soviet Government considers that the question of the establishment of international control and of the powers and functions of the control organ must be examined in close connexion with the implementation of measures to reduce international tension and to strengthen trust among States and that of other measures relating to the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

The Soviet Government's proposals of 10 May make it possible, even during the first stage of the implementation of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, to endow the international control organ with broad rights and powers. These proposals provide for a radical method of control. They provide that the international control organ should immediately establish control posts on the territory of all States concerned on a basis of reciprocity in

order to prevent a sudden attack by one State against another. These posts are to be established in large ports, at railway junctions, main highways and airfields. Their task would be to ensure that no dangerous concentration of armed forces of any type took place.

In the second period it is planned to extend the functions and powers of the international control organ. The necessary prerequisite for this, an atmosphere of trust among States, will have been brought about by the implementation of measures of reducing armaments in the first period, and also by the implementation of measures provided for in the above-mentioned declaration. Under these conditions the international control organ will be empowered and will be able successfully to carry out its task of control, including complete inspection on a permanent basis which is necessary to ensure that all States observe the disarmament convention. The control organ will have a staff of inspectors, recruited on an international basis, who will at all times have free access to all facilities being controlled.

It is quite clear that the Soviet Government's proposals of 10 May relating to the question of control are very realistic and practical...

For its part the Soviet Government has already begun to take practical measures for the reduction of armed forces. At the four-power conference at Geneva the Soviet Union delegation expressed the wish that the reduction of armed forces and armaments should begin without further delay. The Soviet Union delegation proposed that the four Powers should set an example in that respect by reducing their armed forces by the number of troops to be withdrawn from the territory of Austria. Accordingly, the Soviet Government decided to withdraw all its troops stationed in Austria to Soviet territory by 1 October and to reduce the total number of its armed forces by the number of troops withdrawn from Austria.

The successful completion of the four-power conference at Geneva, which convincingly showed that negotiation is the only possible method of settling outstanding international issues has resulted in a certain lessening of tension in international relations.

With a view to further easing international tension and establishing trust among the States, the Soviet Government adopted on 13 August a decision to reduce the strength of the armed forces of the Soviet Union by 640,000 men by 15 December 1955. Thus, in its endeavour to promote a further strengthening of trust among States, the Soviet Government, for the second time in the space of one month, adopted a decision to reduce the armed forces of the Soviet Union...

The Soviet Union expects that States with a large number of men under arms will in turn promptly take corresponding steps to reduce their armed forces. Such action would undoubtedly promote the further strengthening of international trust and would provide a real basis for a settlement of the question of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons...

B. MAIN PROPOSALS SUBMITTED

FRANCE: FINANCIAL SUPERVISION OF DISARMAMENT—DRAFT AGREEMENT (DC/SC. 1/27)

The purpose of the present agreement is to institute a financial supervision of military expenditure, together with a system of penalties, for the purpose of encouraging disarmament. It provides for the allocation of the resulting funds for the improvement of levels of living and the development of underdeveloped areas.

This financial supervision has an economic purpose. By ensuring the automatic transfer of part of the savings effected on military expenditure to orders for goods for peaceful purpose, the agreement averts the threat of an economic crisis which might be brought about by mass disarmament within a short period of time.

The agreement provides certain advantages for States which, in a manner recognised as accurate and complete by the financial body, submit evidence of the budgetary reductions which they have agreed to make. States will agree to reduce their total military expenditure by a percentage that will increase from year to year, the increase in the percentage from one year to the following year being based on the amount of the original defence budget. However, when the reductions are recognised as accurate and complete, this percentage will for the current budgetary year refer only to the actual amount of expenditure, that is to say, to a lower sum.

The sums thus released will be transferred to an international fund which will ensure that they are used in accordance with the criteria laid down by the agreement.

The computation, administration and distribution of these resources will be assured by an International Fund for Development and Mutual Assistance, hereinafter called the 'Fund.'

Upon the entry into force of the Convention for the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, the abolition of weapons of mass destruction and the setting up of a control, the percentage reductions in military expenditure envisaged in the agreement will be calculated in such a way as to correspond to the reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces and the abolition of weapons of mass destruction as provided for in each stage of the Disarmament Convention.

ARTICLE I

Powers of the Fund

The Fund shall collect the resources released by each signatory State in conformity with the provisions of the Agreement or the Disarmament Convention. It shall verify their allocation or proceed to allocate them in accordance with the principles set forth below.

The Fund shall comprise the following organs:

- (a) an Executive Board, appointed by the States parties to the Convention, on which the contributing and the recipient countries shall be assured of balanced representation;
- (b) a Standing Executive Committee;
- (c) an international Secretariat under the supervision of a Director.

The Board shall receive and approve the reports of the Executive Committee and of the Director. It shall, on the advice of the Standing Executive Committee, decide upon the disposition of the resources placed at the disposal of the Fund. It shall deal with statutory and general administrative questions.

ARTICLE II

Collection of Resources

The Standing Executive Committee shall be notified of the programme for the reduction of military expenditure agreed upon jointly by Governments. The programme shall determine the scale of the rates applied to the initial volume of military expenditure on the basis of which the annual amount of the contribution payable by the States shall be determined. This

amount shall be assessed each year against the initial military appropriation of each State.

Nevertheless, if the information supplied by the States is recognised as accurate and complete by the Standing Executive Committee, the percentage shall be applied to the actual amount of military expenditure for the relevant financial year and not to the initial appropriation.

The Standing Executive Committee shall, in accordance with these principles, compute the sums to be allocated to the Fund. For this purpose, all documents relating to military expenditure shall be communicated to the Committee.

In particular, it shall ensure that the common definition of military expenditure is interpreted by all States in the same spirit, and to this end it shall request the civil and military budgets that are submitted to the institutions which, under the constitutional procedures of each State, are responsible for voting upon or approving the budget.

It shall lay down criteria and make all practical arrangements for rendering the defence expenditures of the signatory States comparable either among themselves or in relation to the total expenditure of each State. For this purpose, it shall establish a common nomenclature including a list of categories of expenditure of a military nature. It shall then make a comparative study of the documents submitted to it by the signatory States and shall submit a detailed report to the signatory States and, upon the conclusion of a Disarmament Convention, to the Standing Committee provided for therein.

ARTICLE III

Allocation of Resources

The Standing Executive Committee shall issue general

instructions to the Director. It shall supervise the administration and distribution of the resources of the Fund.

The resources shall be allocated in accordance with the following criteria:

- (a) one part of the resources made available shall be left at the disposal of each Government, which will thus be able to make such internal transfers as it considers appropriate;
- (b) one part of the resources shall also be retained by each State for the economic and financial development of the States or territories which are constitutionally linked to it, the amount being in proportion to the size of the population of such States or territories;
- (c) the remaining sums shall be made available to the Fund to be allocated for the development of under-developed areas, and shall be used in a proportion of 75 per cent for orders given to the countries which provide the funds.

In preparing the Statutes of the Fund, the Executive Board of the Fund shall define the relations of the Fund with the United Nations, in particular the Technical Assistance Administration and with the specialised agencies, such as the International Bank.

U.S.A.: A SYSTEM OF INSPECTION AND REPORTING

On 29 August Mr. Cabot Lodge deposited a memorandum (DC(SC. 1/28) containing the statement made by President Eisenhower at Geneva on 21 July 1956.

Disarmament is one of the most important subjects on our agenda. It is also extremely difficult. In recent years the scientists have discovered methods of making weapons many, many times more destructive of opposing armed forces—but also of homes, and industries and lives—than ever known or

even imagined before. These same scientific discoveries have made much more complex the problems of limitation and control and reduction of armament...

We know that a mutually dependable system for less armament on the part of all nations would be a better way to safeguard peace and to maintain our security...

Therefore, the United States Government is prepared to enter into a sound and reliable agreement making possible the reduction of armament. I have directed that an intensive and thorough study of this subject be made within our own Government. From these studies, which are continuing, a very important principle is emerging to which I referred in my opening statement on Monday.

No sound and reliable agreement can be made unless it is completely covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to support every portion of the agreement. The lessons of history teach us that disarmament agreements without adequate reciprocal inspection increase the dangers of war and do not brighten the prospects of peace. Thus it is my view that the priority attention of our combined study of disarmament should be upon the subject of inspection and reporting...

We have not as yet been able to discover any scientific or other inspection method which would make certain of the elimination of nuclear weapons. So far as we are aware no other nation has made such a discovery. Our study of this problem is continuing. We have not as yet been able to discover any accounting or other inspection method of being certain of the true budgetary facts of total expenditures for armament. Our study of this problem is continuing. We by no means exclude the possibility of finding useful checks in these fields.

As you Can see from these statements, it is our impression that many past proposals of disarmament are more sweeping

than can be insured by effective inspection.

Gentlemen, since I have been working on this memorandum to present to this conference, I have been searching my heart and mind for something that I could say here that could convince everyone of the great sincerity of the United States in approaching this problem of disarmament.

I should address myself for a moment principally to the delegates from the Soviet Union, because our two great countries admittedly possess new and terrible weapons in quantities which do give rise in other parts of the world, or reciprocally, to the fears and dangers of surprise attack.

I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement very quickly as between ourselves—immediately. These steps would include:

To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other, layout the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.

Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country—we to provide you—the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations, and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension.

Likewise we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning.

Now from my statements I believe you will anticipate my suggestion. It is that we instruct our representatives in the Sub-

Committee on Disarmament in the discharge of their mandate from the United Nations to give priority effort to the study of inspection and reporting. Such a study could well include a step-by-step testing of inspection and reporting methods.

The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspections and reporting, and when that system is proved, then to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results...

U.S.S.R.: REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

DRAFT DECISION PROPOSED TO THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS BY MR. BULGANIN (DC/SC.1/29/Rev.I)

I.

With a view to the reduction of tension in the relations between States, the strengthening of mutual confidence among them and the removal of the threat of a new war, the Heads of Government of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France consider it necessary to endeavour to secure as soon as possible the conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

Following an exchange of views on the question of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, they have agreed on the following:

1. The levels of the armed forces of the United States of America, the Soviet Union and China shall be fixed at 1 to 1.5 million men for each of these Powers; the levels for the United

Kingdom and France shall be 650 thousand men each, and the question of the level to be fixed for China, with other related questions concerning the armed forces of China, shall be examined with the participation of the Government of the People's Republic of China.

The levels of armed forces for all other States shall not exceed 150-200 thousand men, and shall be subject to agreement at the appropriate international conference.

2. The complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall enter into force when conventional armaments and armed forces have been reduced to the extent of 75 per cent of the agreed reductions. The elimination of these weapons from the armaments of States and their destruction shall be completed during the process of the reduction of armaments by the final 25 per cent of the agreed reductions. All atomic materials shall thereafter be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

3. Simultaneously with the initiation of measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the four Powers, before the entry into force of the agreement on the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, shall assume a solemn obligation not to use nuclear weapons, which they shall regard as prohibited to them. Exceptions to this rule may be permitted for purposes of defence against aggression, when a decision to that effect is taken by the Security Council.

4. As one of the first measures for the execution of the programme for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, States possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons shall undertake to discontinue tests of these weapons.

5. Effective international control shall be instituted over the execution of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

6. The Heads of Government of the four Powers have instructed their Ministers of Foreign Affairs to make every

effort to achieve the necessary agreement on any yet unsettled points of the convention referred to above, which shall be subject to examination in the United Nations.

II.

At the same time, the Heads of Government of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, determined to prevent the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons, which are weapons of mass destruction of human beings, and to liberate the peoples from the threat of devastating atomic war, solemnly declare:

Pending the conclusion of the international convention for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France assume the obligation not to be the first to use atomic or hydrogen weapons against any country, and call on all other States to associate themselves with this declaration.

UNITED KINGDOM: SYSTEM OF JOINT INSPECTION IN EUROPE

I

PROPOSAL BY THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION AT GENEVA

The United Kingdom delegation proposes that, as a means of increasing mutual confidence in Europe, consideration should be given to the establishment of a system of joint inspection of the forces now confronting each other in Europe. In specified areas of agreed extent on either side of the line

dividing Eastern and Western Europe joint inspecting teams would operate by mutual consent.

This project would provide opportunity for the practical test on a limited scale of international inspection of forces in being and would provide valuable experience and lessons for use over a wider field in the future.

The willingness of the four Governments to accept such inspection would moreover demonstrate their determination to reduce international tension in Europe.

The system of inspection here proposed is without prejudice to the work of the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee. It is also distinct from the proposals put forward by the United Kingdom delegation for the limitation, control and inspection of forces and armaments in connexion with European security.

II

SPEECH BY SIR ANTHONY EDEN, GENEVA, 21 JULY 1955

... Marshal Bulganin asked our view on the Soviet proposals of 10 May which were submitted to the Disarmament Sub-Committee. As I think we have already said, we welcome those proposals. They include of course a number of points which we and our French allies—the author is here at the table—had put forward some little time before, and as a result of these Soviet proposals of 10 May we are, certainly much closer together. We wish to pursue these proposals and others in the Disarmament Sub-Committee of the United Nations at an early date. We consider that that Committee has worked hard and well.

One point is, however, crucial, and it is recognised in paragraph 5 of the paper which the Soviet Government has just

submitted to us—the necessity of establishing an effective international control. On that point I fully support the principle enunciated by President Eisenhower this afternoon, that no disarmament plan can be acceptable which does not contain a system of inspection and reporting which is adequate to support every phase of the plan. I think we are all agreed about that.

As has been well said this afternoon, disarmament is perhaps the most complicated of all international problems, principally I think for two reasons: because on the technical side it is infinitely complex, and because it is bound up with international confidence. No country feels that it can go far with disarmament unless it has confidence in the intentions of its neighbours. That is why international discussions on disarmament are apt to get caught in a vicious circle.

I therefore think the Soviet Government was right, if I may say so, in its proposals of 10 May, to link disarmament with a reduction of international tension. The two are closely connected. If we are to make any practical progress towards disarmament, we have got to find some way of breaking out of this vicious circle. We cannot wait until confidence between the nations is so strong that a plan of general disarmament can be adopted and brought into operation all in one move. This is essentially one of the international objectives which must be approached by stages, and we must make a start upon them now...

For myself, while endorsing what M. Faure has said about the publicity methods of control, I would only like to offer a much more modest suggestion. It has only the advantage that, like the President's much bolder and more imaginative suggestion, it could be put into operation at once. I suggest that we should consider whether we cannot set up a simple, joint inspection of the forces now confronting one another in Europe. It should not be impossible to decide that over a

specified area to be agreed between us, extending perhaps for a fixed depth on either side of the line which now divides East and West Europe, there should be supervision by inspecting teams appointed by the military commands on both sides. This suggestion is not of course connected, with the wider proposal for a possible limitation of forces which was connected with our discussions for the unity of Germany. This suggestion could however be a practical experiment in the operative inspection of armaments, an experiment which if it were locally successful might extend outwards from the centre to the periphery. In this way we might hope to establish a sense of security in Europe and begin the process of reducing tensions here...

NOTE. On 30 August 1955 Mr. Cabot Lodge presented an outline plan for the implementation of President Eisenhower's proposal of 21 July. The main points of this outline were given by Mr. Lodge in his speech of 29 August quoted above.

AERIAL INSPECTION: U.S.A. SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM

On 7 October 1955 Mr. Stassen submitted a supplementary memorandum (DC/SC. 1/36) which contained the following amplification of the outline plan explained by Mr. Cabot Lodge on 29 August.

... In introducing this 30 August Outline Plan, the United States also recognised that the danger of great surprise attack is a matter of concern to each of the Governments represented in the Sub-Committee and to all nations of the world. It is further realised. that the carrying out of the President's proposal will involve the cooperation of each of the Governments

represented in the Disarmament Sub-Committee, and the question arises whether this exchange of military blueprints and aerial reconnaissance should be confined to the territorial limits of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is the belief of the United States that it is most essential that a beginning should be made on the President's proposal by agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, but that this agreement between these two countries putting the President's plan into effect without delay might also provide for the adherence and participation, as agreed, of designated countries on an equitable basis, once the plan is in operation between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Furthermore, it should be clear that the President's proposal is directed toward providing against the possibility of a great surprise attack of any kind with any weapon. So far as the information to be exchanged is concerned, it will consist of the identification, strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, including organised reserves and paramilitary; and a complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations with their locations. It is not contemplated that the blueprints of military establishments would include every specific detail. Similar information would be simultaneously exchanged by each Government, as mutually agreed upon by the two Governments, within the framework of the United Nations. This exchange of information would be directed toward safeguarding the possibility of a great surprise attack, and the details of information to be exchanged are subject to negotiation.

So far as aerial reconnaissance is concerned, however, the United States would not consider that there are prohibited areas. In the words of President Eisenhower, the United States 'would allow these planes, properly inspected, peaceful planes, to fly over any particular area of the country that they wanted

to, because in this—only in this—way could you convince them there wasn't something over there that maybe was by surprise ready to attack them.'

Reduction of the burden of armaments.

The United States believes that the taking of this practical step to provide against the possibility of surprise attack, as suggested in the President's proposals, will lessen danger and relax international tensions.

By this very fact, a system guarding against surprise attack as proposed by the United States should make more easily attainable a broader disarmament agreement. The lessons learned through the mutual exchange of military blueprints and through reciprocal aerial reconnaissance will help measurably in the joint efforts of the Disarmament Sub-Committee to find an effective inspection and control system which will fully support agreements to reduce, limit and regulate armaments and armed forces ...

C. SPEECHES MADE AT THE END OF THE AUTUMN SERIES OF MEETINGS 7 OCTOBER 1955

MR. ANTHONY NUTTING (U.K.)

... While it would hardly be true to say that we had made very much progress in the last five weeks, none the less I think we have all been glad to find that our discussions here in New York have maintained one significant advance on our previous discussions on disarmament in the United Nations.

In spite of the constant attentions of our friends of the press who stand with expectant faces, and who have stood for five weeks with expectant faces, outside our Conference Room and

ply us with searching questions every time we emerge at the end of a meeting, in spite of all this and the inevitable temptations to which it exposes delegations there has been about our talks in the last few weeks a noticeable and encouraging absence of propaganda.

We should not ignore this important point, this important fact...

Ten years ago there was virtually no problem of nuclear stockpiles.

Today we are told by Governments and scientific authorities the world over that such is the accumulation of these terrible weapons that science is incapable as at present of devising any system which would be adequate to detect any number of them which might be secretly hidden away.

Are we then to spend another ten years arguing and allowing the problems to compound themselves upon a scale perhaps vaster still' than that which we have Witnessed since the end of the last world war?

It was with these thoughts in mind that at Geneva last July my Prime Minister launched his proposal for a pilot scheme of inspection of the forces confronting one another in Europe today.

It was to try, to quote what I think is your own phrase, Mr. Chairman, to begin the beginning of disarmament that this plan was put forward...

I have given unequivocal answers to all Mr. Sobolev's questions about the position of the United Kingdom in relation to the Anglo-French plan of 1954, the Angle-French amendments of 1955, and the Soviet plan of 10 May 1955.

I maintain the view and attitude of Her Majesty's Government in the Disarmament Sub-Committee earlier this year in respect of our former proposals for levels of forces and the timing of nuclear disarmament, provided—and this is the crux of the matter—there can be agreement upon a completely

effective and watertight system of international control. It is not I, therefore, who am isolating one element of disarmament from another...

As I have said before in this Sub-Committee, observers sitting in railway stations, airport terminals or seaports will be quite incapable of guaranteeing that the proposed measures of disarmament are being carried out. Also, these control posts will be quite inadequate to warn against the danger of sudden and devastating nuclear attack launched from the air.

The Soviet proposal does provide that the control organ should receive information and documents relating to the disarmament measures in each stage. But, despite all my enquiries, I am still in the dark as to whether inspectors will be allowed to check this information at first hand from the start of the disarmament programme, from the freeze right through to the final stage.

I am equally in the dark about the exact meaning of the cryptic and enigmatic phrase 'objects of control' to which the Soviet proposal says the control organ should have access in the second stage of a disarmament programme. Mr Sobolev has said that the form of the control organ in this second stage will have to be laid down in a special directive which is to be worked out after agreement has been reached in principle. But how can agreement be reached, in principle, if the Soviet Government still refuses to answer the questions which I have put to it, as it has done consistently throughout this series of our discussions?...

We join with our partners in the Disarmament Sub-Committee in hoping that we may shortly be able to resume our labours for agreement. Meanwhile, we have clearly reached a point where a little time for reflexion is necessary prior to the discussions on this and other topics at Geneva between the Foreign Ministers of the four Great Powers. We, too, have reached a stage where our parent body, the Disarmament

Commission, and, the other forty-eight members of the United Nations General Assembly will want to have the opportunity to assess our work so as to be able to make their own contributions and suggestions in the important debate which will take place on disarmament later in this General Assembly session...

MR. A. A. SOBOLEV (U.S.S.R.)

... In view of the fact that our positions were brought closer together by the Soviet Government's submission of the proposals of 10 May, it would be reasonable and logical to begin here in the Sub-Committee by achieving agreement on the most important aspects of the disarmament problem. This is particularly true because, as has been pointed out, the positions of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada have been brought so close together on a number of points of substance of this problem that it was possible to record a definite measure of agreement between them. In this way a firm foundation would be laid for the future work of the Sub-Committee, when we could finally decide on all aspects of the necessary agreement to work out an acceptable system of disarmament.

The Soviet delegation feels that this approach would be the best way to accomplish the tasks before the Sub-Committee because the implementation of all measures relating to the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons is inconceivable in the absence of a system of real and effective control. For this reason the Soviet Union considers that the question of control is the most important aspect of the convention. It is precisely in this way that the question is approached in the Soviet Government's proposals of 10 May.

The Soviet Government is fully convinced that effective

control of disarmament is possible. This control can be established only on the basis of a sober appraisal of the present international situation and the measures to be carried out in order to attain an international disarmament convention. For these reasons, the Soviet Union links the establishment of an international system of control with the implementation of a number of measures designed to relax international tension, strengthen confidence between States and other measures relating to the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

The Soviet Government proposed the establishment of a form of control making it possible to detect in time and to frustrate the aggressive intentions of any State. Beyond any doubt, modern war requires the use of millions of soldiers and an enormous quantity of military equipment. Consequently, certain points where large military formations, armed with all this military equipment, may be concentrated become of crucial importance. The system of control proposed by the Soviet Union, providing as it does for the establishment of control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and in aerodromes, is designed to prevent a dangerous concentration of armed forces and large quantities of military equipment and thus to avert the possibility of a surprise attack by one country upon another. The advantage of the Soviet proposal regarding the control posts is that it safeguards States from surprise attacks by other States. It can be put into practice in the present international situation...

The Soviet Government's proposal provides for a gradual extension of the functions and powers of the control organ as the disarmament programme is put into effect, and for a transition to further and more complex measures as the confidence among States increases. During the first stage of the disarmament programme, when measures for the reduction of conventional armaments are to be carried out—the armaments

being reduced by the first 50 per cent of the agreed reduction, a measure not applying to atomic weapons—the Soviet Union's proposals ensure that the control organ will be able to carry out its appointed tasks. In addition to maintaining the control posts, which are to prevent surprise attack, the control organ at this stage will have the right to require from States any necessary information on the execution of measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and shall also have unimpeded access to records relating to the budgetary appropriations of States for military needs, including all decisions of their legislative and executive organs on the subject.

During the second stage, as the measures for disarmament are extended—at this stage they include the reduction of conventional armaments by the remaining 50 per cent of the agreed reduction and also the prohibition of atomic weapons—the functions and powers of the control organ are also considerably extended. This extension of the control organ's powers will become a practical possibility because the successful completion of the first stage will have strengthened confidence among States. In addition to the powers conferred on the control organ at the first stage, it will have the right to exercise control, including inspection on a continuing basis, to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention by all States. The control organ will have in all States signatories to the convention its own staff of inspectors, selected on an international basis and having, within the bounds of the control functions they exercise, unimpeded access at all times to all objects of control...

The representatives of the United Kingdom, France and Canada have explained their positions and, as we see it, have expressed agreement in principle with such all-important ideas as the establishment of levels of armed forces, time limits for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the need to establish effective international control over the execution of

disarmament measures. The Sub-Committee is therefore informed of the position taken by these States on the programme for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. The position of only one delegation remains unclear—the delegation of the United States, which has said that it reserves all its earlier positions on the disarmament question. The United States still has not stated its attitude towards the Soviet Government's proposal of 10 May. This cannot but hinder the successful completion by the Sub-Committee of the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly—to prepare basic proposals to be embodied in an international disarmament convention providing for the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of effective control.

I should like to mention that the Soviet delegation approaches in a constructive spirit the proposals submitted to the Sub-Committee by other members. We examine with great attention both such proposals and the explanations furnished by the delegations concerned. The Soviet Government is giving serious consideration to the proposals made by Mr. Faure, the Prime Minister of France, on the reduction of military budgets and the establishment of a special fund to assist economically under-developed countries. We consider that savings resulting from reductions in military expenditure could be used both to reduce the tax burden on the peoples of the States concerned and to assist economically under-developed countries. The Soviet Union is giving equally careful consideration to the proposals made by Mr. Eden, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, on the establishment of an experimental system of inspection in one part of Europe.

The Soviet Union recognises the importance of President Eisenhower's proposals on the exchange of military information and aerial photo-reconnaissance. As we have already stated at the Sub-Committee's meetings) the Soviet

delegation regards these proposals as indicative of a sincere desire to advance the solution of the important problem of international control. We are studying President Eisenhower's proposal and its various aspects in this spirit...

The Soviet delegation's position on the exchange of military information is that at a specific stage in the disarmament programme States must exchange information on armed forces and armaments. As we have already pointed out, the Soviet proposals of 10 May make a suitable provision in that respect. The Soviet Union also considers that such information should be submitted by all States, and not only by the United States and the Soviet Union, to the international control organ on the establishment of which we have to agree. This information should, in our opinion, cover all types of armaments, both conventional and nuclear. In a letter to President Eisenhower, Mr. Bulganin, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, said that, if these assumptions are correct, a detailed examination will have to be undertaken to determine when this complete information on the armaments of States, and particularly the armaments of the Great Powers, should be submitted.

There can be no doubt that the submission of this information to the international control organ would serve its full purpose only if agreement is reached, on the reduction of armaments and the execution of measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons. Nor should we overlook the fact that the prospects for a really complete exchange of military information would improve as mutual confidence among States is strengthened...

Despite the General Assembly resolution of 4 November 1954, directing the Sub-Committee to work out basic proposals on the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of

effective international control, the proposal was made in the Sub-Committee that all our attention should be concentrated instead on the problems of control, inspection and reporting. It was asserted that the solution of these problems and the implementation of such solutions, without any agreement on a programme, of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, would somehow open the way to disarmament or even lead to an agreed reduction of armaments. But what guarantee is there that the inspection and reporting of armed forces will be followed by any real reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons? Where can such a method lead us, if it is not known precisely what measures will be taken for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons and when they will be taken?...

There can be no doubt that inspection and reporting measures alone, without agreement on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, would do nothing to end the armaments race and consequently would not remove the threat of another war or ease the burden which the nations are bearing in consequence. It is self-evident that the problem of disarmament cannot be reduced to inspection and reporting, important as these two points are.

In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, agreement on important aspects of the disarmament problem is possible. On some vital facets of this problem the positions of the members of the Sub-Committee have been brought so close together that it is now possible to record agreement on certain points and to adopt a corresponding resolution. A joint resolution of the Sub-Committee, recording general agreement on such important questions as the establishment of levels for the armed forces of the Great Powers time limits for the date at which prohibition of the use of atomic weapons is to take effect, the setting up of control posts at strategic points and pledges by Governments,

prior to the conclusion of an international convention for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, not to be the first to use atomic or hydrogen weapons against any country, would be of enormous importance, because it would implant in the hearts of millions of people the confidence that disarmament is fully possible, and that the Powers represented in the Sub-Committee are taking practical steps in this direction. Moreover, agreement on these questions would open the way for a settlement of other questions concerning the disarmament problem and thus automatically create favourable conditions for the implementation of a broader programme of disarmament and control of disarmament...

MR. JULES MOCH (FRANCE)

...But in this second part of our present session, we have made practically no progress, as Mr. Martin and Mr. Sobolev have just pointed out. We must study the causes of this relative stagnation which, after the raising of our hopes at Geneva, is likely to perturb other delegations and public opinion in various countries.

I see four reasons for it, which I would like to state frankly.

The first is the difficulty which we find in establishing a full satisfactory control system even in fields where it is technically possible. Mr. Sobolev will permit me to say to him—and I am certainly not saying this in a spirit of controversy—that although we have endeavoured first of all to analyse the Soviet note of 10 May and to push this study as far as possible, we have come up against an impenetrable barrier as soon as we have tried to define the powers and functions of the control body...

The second barrier to our progress is also connected with

this matter of control. But here, the delay is quite unconnected with anything we have done; it is the result of the irregular pace of scientific progress. The duel between artillery and armour, the conventional duel, will never be settled whilst improvements in attack and protection keep pace with one another. Similarly, control will begin to be effective once improvements in the apparatus to be supervised and in the means of detection keep abreast of each other. Today we are in a position where artillery has shattered armour, where, whatever may be said to the contrary, there is no effective protection against modern nuclear weapons, and the universal fear engendered by this fact should help to promote peace...

The third reason for our slow progress is the multiplicity of plans before us. Geneva has trebled them, since each of the Heads of Government stated a plan of his own. Profusion in this matter is not always a desirable thing, particularly when—as is to some extent the case—each author thinks that his contribution is more precious than all the others. I shall refer later to the remedy which I can see for our present abundance of ideas.

The fourth stumbling block is that some of our colleagues are still not clear regarding President Eisenhower's plan. Mr. Sobolev just made an unequivocal allusion to this. Precisely because Mr. Stassen has tried not to present this plan in an immutable form, to be accepted or rejected in its entirety, some members of the Sub-Committee do not have a clear idea of its geographical scope and its evolution in time and have not understood whether it was—and, in particular, in what way it might eventually become—a prelude to effective disarmament measures.

I state this objectively, since we have a duty to be absolutely frank with one another...

What common view of the future do we hold? I should like

to repeat here, this evening, with all firmness, what I have been repeating during this session. None of our Governments can reasonably expect to see its own concepts adopted to the exclusion of all others. This, for me, is essential: there will be no universal current of opinion in favour of measures advocated by only one of these Governments and, even if such a current were to emerge; it could not compel certain Governments to renounce all their concepts and to adopt in their entirety concepts originating elsewhere and differing from their own. To speculate on such a hypothesis, to hope for such a unilateral victory is to journey in a land of fancy or to take flight, at this early stage, on one of the future satellites of our planet.

I therefore fervently hope that the first lesson we shall learn from our debates will once again be the need for synthesis, for a new effort at mutual comprehension and hence at conciliation.

I have, as you all know, given much thought to such a merger and I have frequently referred to it since the beginning of this session. I should like to make a confession. Such a merger appeared indispensable to me from the very evening of the day when the four Heads of Government had each explained and submitted their plans at Geneva. I immediately sought ways of making the plans fully compatible. Although I have sketched out preliminary drafts for this purpose, I have not yet submitted any of them, because I believe that compromise must come when the time is ripe; prematurely adopted, it is almost as ineffective as it would be if it were deferred until after the breakdown of negotiations.

But although the moment is not yet propitious—and I deeply deplore it—for the examination of such a document with a reasonable prospect of general acceptance, I feel impelled at the end of this session to formulate certain principles which, as I understand it, should govern its

elaboration and which have guided me in my studies.

Some of the plans submitted to us are general, others specialised in character.

Among the former, some concern the totality of measures in their manifold aspects: military, technical, scientific and financial—that is true of the Franco-British proposals and of the Soviet note of 10 May—while the Faure plan attempts to solve the general problem by the particular method of financial control of budgets and transfers, reinforced by a system of rewards and penalties.

One of the specialised proposals, the Eisenhower plan, deals only with control, which is regarded as a means for restoring international confidence and paving the way to future progress, while the other, the Eden plan, pursues the same object by the creation of ‘a small-scale model’ comprising a pilot project of inspection in a trial zone, and, possibly, by a limitation of armaments.

That being so, I think that we must recognise objectively:

- (1) that no control plan without a simultaneously established and signed disarmament plan has any chance of being accepted at present by the five Governments represented here;
- (2) that, conversely, no plan which is absolutely general, providing from the outset for all the necessary operations and fixing for them a rigid time table, will be unanimously approved by these Governments, owing mainly to the fact that, in some respects, atomic control is technically impossible;
- (3) that we must nevertheless arrive at a unanimous agreement, because the greatest danger would be to keep postponing a decision, allowing the accumulation of stocks of nuclear materials which could destroy our entire civilisation, undermining the spirit of Geneva and resuming the cold war with its threats of conflict.

I have been completely frank in stating these three principles because their validity is particularly clear to me. Perhaps in so doing I have' offended the susceptibilities of some among you. If that is the case I apologise, but I felt that it was my duty to express my thoughts fully...

What I want to emphasise today is the absolute necessity, if we are to agree on the substance of the question, of agreeing on these principles which can be summarised in the following few words:

Neither control without disarmament,
Nor disarmament "without control,
But agreement on disarmament which can really be controlled.

Once these measures have been accepted and carried out, the international situation will be improved to such an extent by partial disarmament, the restoration of confidence and the resumption of normal relations, that the other decisions which some of us cannot bring ourselves to take at the present time—will have to be accepted by all, almost without further discussion. Once we have taken the first steps towards a partially disarmed peace, nothing will hamper our progress which will of itself gather momentum towards disarmed peace...

MR. HAROLD STASSEN (U.S.A.)

... As you are all aware, President Eisenhower on 21 July presented a new and historic American proposal. That proposal called for the exchange of blueprints of military information between the United States and the Soviet Union, to be verified by mutual aerial reconnaissance...

In the past several weeks I hope I have given you some idea of the estimates which lie behind this plan. For the final

record let me sum them up as succinctly as I can. And then I shall explain for the first time in these meetings something more that we are doing.

First, we begin with the postulate of peace—just and durable peace. This is the great imperative of the thermonuclear age. On 19 October 1954, President Eisenhower declared that ‘there is just no real alternative to peace.’ And every day that passes makes it appear more clearly that this was the principal conclusion of Geneva. The Eisenhower plan will impose burdens of far-reaching character upon all who participate in it. But if these undertakings will advance the cause of peace, they will be gladly accepted by the American people.

Second, our studies convince us that in the past, perhaps more than others two courses have often led to war: one is irresponsible and self-indulgent unilateral disarmament; another is the classic arms race which feeds and is fed upon international fear and distrust. United States policy is not based on either course.

Third, and of vital importance for our studies, we have recognised that we are no longer the absolute masters of the most powerful tool of war. It is not possible by any presently known scientific means to detect nuclear weapons grade material once it has been placed in casings and hidden away. Such hidden stocks from past and current production could be fabricated into weapons and used in devastating surprise attack. All of us here, and all of our Governments, now recognise this fact.

Fourth, in this situation and unless the world’s scientists are able to achieve a breakthrough, making it possible to account in full for nuclear weapons material, we believe the best course is to find a way to eliminate large-scale surprise attack. We believe that one kind of surprise attack and the only kind which right now threatens vast destruction and which

holds the world in fear is surprise attack involving the Soviet Union and the United States.

Fifth, we believe that on the day these two Powers decide to open up to each other and to lay bare their military potential, the security of the whole world will be increased. A climate of greater confidence will surely prevail. And in that climate, the world will build the kind of disarmament and inspection system in which all nations can put their trust—a system in which all can reduce and limit and regulate armaments and armed forces...

The United States believes that inspection is the key to arms limitation. No nation—not the United States, not the Soviet Union, nor any other nation—can safely reduce its armed strength unless there is international agreement which will enable all nations to know that these commitments are being honoured in fact...

My Government believes that the Soviet Union proposals of 10 May for stationing ground observers at certain key points would have merit if these inspectors had adequate powers and immunities. We do not believe, however, that in the absence of aerial inspection, this system would provide adequate security against surprise attack. Nor do we believe it would be sufficient to support a comprehensive programme of arms limitation and reduction. We note the absence of provisions in the 10 May proposals for inspection of atomic facilities and the industrial facilities which back up an arms programme...

As you know, in mid-March President Eisenhower directed that an intensive study of United States policy on the question of disarmament should be made. On the basis of our preliminary inquiries it soon became apparent to the President and the Government of the United States that the situation required a new, fundamental and extensive expert study, by the most competent authorities in American life, of the methods of international inspection and control. Accordingly, we selected

outstanding men to head up task forces in the appropriate fields of inquiry, and they, in turn, assembled outstanding men to be associated with them...

Pending progress on the problem of inspection, we have thought that candour required us to place a reservation for the time being upon our past positions.

We certainly do not reject or disavow our past suggestions—nor do we believe that it would be realistic or logical to re-affirm them in blanket fashion, confronted as we are by new difficulties for inspection, by new proposals made at Geneva and by an evolving international political situation...

47. Bulganin-Eisenhower Correspondence September-October 1955

MR. BULGANIN TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

Dear Mr. President,

I feel I must sincerely and frankly exchange opinions ‘with you on a subject which at the present time has acquired particular importance. I have in mind the question which is being discussed now by our representatives in the Sub-Committee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

In the course of our memorable meetings in Geneva we agreed to work jointly for elaboration of . an acceptable system of disarmament. When we approved directives to our Ministers of Foreign Affairs on this score, I thought a great deal had been accomplished. Now the representatives of our countries, guided by these directives and taking into account in their work the opinions and proposals put forth by the Heads of the four Governments in Geneva, can and must achieve definite progress.

I and my colleagues thought that even at the very beginning of their work our representatives would be able to reach general agreement on those basic questions on which our viewpoints either coincided or had already appreciably approached each other. I have in mind first of all the question of the levels of armed forces of the five Great Powers, the question of dates for introducing into force the prohibition of atomic weapons, and the question of international control. In this manner there would be created a solid foundation for further work during which it would be possible to make more precise all the details of the necessary agreement concerning the working out of an acceptable system of disarmament.

However, the first weeks of the work of the Sub-Committee so far have not yet produced those results for which you and I were fully entitled to hope, and I must frankly say that the delay is occasioned to a considerable degree by the fact that the members of the Sub-Committee so far do not know the position of the representative of the United States with regard to those provisions which we had all the grounds to consider as agreed. As is known, the representative of the United States completely put aside the questions of reduction of the armed forces, of armaments, and prohibition of atomic weapons, having expressed the desire to discuss first of all and mainly your proposal concerning the exchange of military information between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. as well as of the mutual exchange of aerial photography of the territories of both countries. In this manner the impression is left that the entire problem of disarmament is being confined by him to these proposals.

I think to put the question in this manner would not satisfy the aspiration of peoples, even though I fully recognise the importance of the proposals introduced by you in Geneva.

However, since I and my colleagues have received the above-mentioned impression, I consider it my duty once more

to share with you, esteemed Mr. President, certain primary considerations.

We feel that the main problem for us is to use further efforts to look for ways which would permit us to move the problem of disarmament away from dead centre, which problem has vital importance for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. as well as peoples of the entire world.

In connexion with this allow me to touch upon the proposals put forward by you at Geneva. We regard these proposals as testimony of your sincere desire to find a way to settle the important problem of international control and inspection and to contribute personally to general efforts for the normalisation of international relations.

Upon our return from Geneva we with all carefulness have studied your proposal of 21 July, which was introduced on 30 August by Mr. Stassen into the Disarmament Sub-Committee. In the course of this study several questions have arisen about which I would like to express to you my thoughts.

First of all, about the mutual exchange by the United States of America and the Soviet Union of information concerning their armed forces and armaments.

In principle, we have no objections to this proposal. I think that at a definite stage the exchange of such information between States is necessary. It would be better, however, if such information concerning armaments were submitted by all States, and not only by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., to the international organ of control and inspection, concerning the creation of which we should reach an agreement. It is self-evident that information on all kinds of armaments, conventional as well as nuclear, must be submitted in order to avoid misunderstanding. If these considerations are valid, we should carefully discuss exactly when this full information on armaments of states should be presented and first of all information concerning the armaments of Great Powers.

It is self-evident that the submission of the above-mentioned information to an international control organ would become significant only if agreement is achieved on the reduction of armaments and on taking measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons.

It seems to me that the problem of the creation of an international control organ which would satisfy the requirements of the problems of disarmament should be considered in indissoluble unity with decisions for putting into effect a plan for gradual disarmament. At the same time it is necessary to keep sight of the fact that achievement of a really valuable exchange of military information will become really effective to the degree that mutual trust among States is strengthened.

Now I would also like to express my opinion about the problem of aerial photography.

I do not doubt that when you introduced your proposal for photographing from the air the territories of our two countries, you were guided by a legitimate desire to create confidence that neither of our two countries would be subjected to attack by the other.

However, let us be frank to the end. Under present international conditions both our countries are not acting singly. The United States of America, as is known, heads all military groupings which exist in the West and in the East, and what is more their armed forces are stationed not only on American territory; they are also stationed in England, West Germany, Italy, France, Spain, North Africa, Greece, Turkey, in several countries of the Near and Middle East, in Japan, on Taiwan, in the Philippines, etc.

To this should be added the fact that the armed forces of several States are organically connected with the military forces of the United States through inclusion under a single command.

Under these conditions, the Soviet Union on its side has united militarily with several allied States.

It is impossible not to see that the proposal introduced by you completely omits from consideration armed forces and military installations which are outside the area of the United States and the Soviet Union.

And yet it is perfectly self-evident that aerial photographing should also be extended to all armed forces and military installations located on the territories of those other States.

This presents an entirely new problem: Would the governments of such States permit their sovereign territory to be photographed from the air by foreign aircraft?

All this shows that the problem of aerial photography is not a question which, under present conditions, would lead to effective progress toward insuring security of States and successful accomplishment of disarmament.

This conclusion is suggested by the fact that your proposal, unfortunately, does not mention the necessity for reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons.

It is therefore natural that people should ask more and more often what the proposal for aerial photography and the collecting of such information would really do to end the arms race. If such a proposal does not promote the ending of the arms race, then it means that it does not remove the threat of a new war. It does not lighten the burden which the peoples are bearing in connexion with this arms race. Would such a proposal satisfy the expectations of the people of our States and those of all countries?

Finally, it is impossible not to stop and think about what would happen if we occupy ourselves with the questions of aerial photography and the exchange of military information without taking effective measures for reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons.

I have apprehensions which I cannot help but share with you: Would not such a situation lead to the weakening of vigilance toward the still existing threat of violation of the peace generated by the arms race?

My remarks do not at all mean that we cannot achieve an agreement on important aspects of the disarmament problem. I would like to call your attention to the fact that on very substantial aspects of this problem our positions have become so close that we would be able to reach a definite agreement.

Let us take such a question as the establishment of levels of armed forces for the Great Powers.

It is generally recognised that this is a question of great importance. Originally, the idea of establishing levels to which armed forces of the Big Five should be reduced, as is known, was put forth by your Government together with the Governments of Great Britain and France in 1952. In the interest of achieving general agreement on this matter, which is so important for the problem of disarmament, we decided to adopt this joint proposal of the U.S., England, and France as a basis for discussion. Consequently we have a common point of view on this question. It is very important for us to arrive at agreement on this point.

On the question of atomic weapons, we must remember that at the present, when the greatest armies of the world have at their disposal such means of mass destruction as atomic and hydrogen weapons, it is impossible, of course, to talk about disarmament without touching on this important subject. Therefore, we have always attached paramount importance to the problem of prohibition of atomic weapons. In the discussion of this problem, one of the substantial subjects of disagreement was the question of dates when the prohibition against the use of atomic weapons would go into force. In our desire to bring the opposition positions closer and to thereby facilitate and expedite the achievement of agreement on this

subject, we agreed to accept the dates for putting into force the prohibition on the use of atomic weapons which were proposed by the representatives of England and France in the Sub-Committee of the U.N. Commission on Disarmament in London in April 1955.

I think you will agree that the proposal concerning the stage at which prohibition against the use of atomic weapons would come into force, as proposed by England and France, and accepted by the Soviet Union, satisfies our common interests.

It would be desirable—and I think completely feasible—to reach an agreement also on this question.

It also seems expedient for us to reach agreement at this time on putting into effect several measures designed to prevent sudden attack by one State or another. We feel that this measure would be in accord with the interests of maintaining peace and security of nations and in this respect it would be possible to reach agreement 1 also concerning the form of control suitable to the above-mentioned problem.

You, Mr. President, as a military man, know from your own experience that modern war requires drawing into military action armies of many millions and an enormous quantity of technical combat equipment. In this connexion great importance has now been acquired by the definite locations where concentrations of large military groups can take place and whose armaments would include all this technical combat equipment. The system of control proposed by us, namely the creation of control posts in large ports, at railroad junctions, on automobile highways, and at airfields, is designed to prevent dangerous concentrations of troops and combat equipment on large scale and thereby remove the possibility of sudden attack by one country against another. Establishment of such posts would be an important step toward relaxation of international tension and the establishment of trust among States.

In my opinion our proposal concerning control posts has the advantage that it provides a definite guarantee against a sudden attack by one State against another.

I think you will agree that the proposals introduced by us concerning levels of armed forces, the dates for coming into effect of the prohibition of nuclear weapons and for the establishment of control posts can promote the reduction of tension in international relations and strengthening of peace. I do not see, therefore, any reasons why we could not arrange to reach agreement on these questions. Such joint decisions of the four Powers would have tremendous importance because they would put into the hearts of millions of people the assurance that disarmament is fully realisable and that real steps are being taken in this direction. An agreement on these questions would open the way toward solution of other questions which concern the problem of disarmament. It would encourage the strengthening of that atmosphere of cooperation and mutual understanding which we initiated at Geneva, and it would create favorable conditions to put into practice a broader programme of disarmament and control over this disarmament.

In presenting ideas to you, Mr. President, I am inspired by the sincere desire to achieve through a frank exchange of opinions on the problem of disarmament better mutual understanding which may facilitate reaching agreed decisions on this most important problem.

Inasmuch as the solution of these questions depends mainly on the four Great Powers who participated in the Geneva Conference, I have taken the liberty of sending copies of this letter to Mr. Eden and Mr. Faure and hope that you will not misunderstand this action.

I hope soon to receive your ideas on the questions touched upon in this letter.

With sincere respect,

N. BULGANIN

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO MR. BULGANIN

Denver, Colorado, 11 October 1955

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I wish to thank you for your letter of 19 September 1955 about my Geneva proposal of 21 July that we exchange information about military establishments and permit reciprocal aerial inspection over our two countries.

You raise a good many questions, and I shall not be able to reply to them until the doctors let me do more than at present. In any event, a full reply calls for preliminary work by my advisers and this is actively under way.

Let me now say, however, that I am encouraged that you are giving such full consideration to my Geneva proposal. I hope that we can agree on it, not as a cure-all, but, as I said at Geneva, to show a spirit of non-aggressiveness on both sides; and so to create a fresh atmosphere which would dispel much of the present fear and suspicion. This, of itself, would be worthwhile. It would, I believe, make it more possible to make progress in terms of comprehensive plans for inspection, controls and reductions of armament, which will satisfy the high hopes of our peoples, and indeed of all the world.

I have not forgotten your proposal having to do with stationing inspection teams at key points in our countries, and if you feel this would help to create the better spirit I refer to, we could accept that too.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

48. Conference of Four Foreign Ministers 27 October-16 November 1955

A. EXTRACTS FROM MAIN SPEECHES ON DISARMAMENT

MR. V. M. MOLOTOV 10 NOVEMBER

According to the directives we have received, we are 'to consider whether the four Governments can take any further useful initiative in the field of disarmament'...

The Soviet Union's attitude to the question of disarmament is well known. What determines it is not some transitory, speculative consideration, but a consistent and principled struggle for peace and the security of the peoples. This attitude was outlined in great detail in the Soviet Government's proposal of 10 May, this year...

The proposal also contains the basic principles of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, with the establishment of appropriate effective international control. So far as this part of the proposal is concerned, it was prepared with due regard to the fact that on some, important issues the differences between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the Western Powers, on the other, had in effect been resolved. There are two such issues:

Firstly, the Soviet Union accepted the proposal of the Western countries concerning the levels to which the armed forces of the five Great Powers—the U.S.S.R., the United States, China, Britain and France—should be limited.

Secondly, we agreed that the final prohibition of atomic weapons and their withdrawal from national armaments should

be put into effect after conventional armaments had been reduced by 75 per cent of the agreed reduction...

The proposal of the U.S.S.R. envisages that, already during the first period, when atomic weapons have not yet been prohibited and their manufacture has not yet been stopped, control measures should be carried out to provide a sure guarantee against a surprise attack by one nation on another.

No one is likely to dispute the fact that, should a war break out in our time, armies many millions strong and a tremendous quantity of the conventional armaments that are of decisive importance to the outcome of any major war would be involved in the military operations, together with atomic and hydrogen weapons of overwhelming destructive power. This means that war preparations are inevitably connected with the need for the concentration in certain areas of large military units with great quantities of ordinary arms: aircraft, artillery, tanks, warships, etc. The only way this can be achieved is by transporting troops through big junctions, ports and aerodromes, the importance of which, far from diminishing, is steadily increasing.

All this makes it possible to draw the following important conclusion: No nation can carry out a surprise attack on another nation—not, at all events, with the use of more or less substantial forces—once international control posts have been set up at important points on its territory. Such posts would make it possible to give timely warning of a dangerous concentration of troops and war material on the territory of this or that State.

It is worth mentioning that no convincing arguments have been put forward against our proposals for organising these control posts as an effective means of applying disarmament control.

The proposals the Soviet Government put forward on 10 May would seem to have provided a workable basis for achieving agreement between us, since, as I have pointed out,

we have in fact already agreed on a number of important questions. Nevertheless, as the proceedings of the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee in New York have made clear, no further progress has been made. Moreover, judging by the pronouncements of the United States representative in this Sub-Committee and also by the statements of other members of the Sub-Committee, there has even been a certain backsliding. At the same time it is a matter of record that no one has rejected the U.S.S.R. proposal of 10 May. Six months have already passed since it was made, but we are still where we were.

It seemed possible to record unequivocally the agreement reached on the levels of armed forces and on the order in which measures for outlawing atomic weapons should be carried out. That would have made the further consideration of the disarmament problem easier. Yet the agreement achieved on these questions has, for some reason or other, been called in question. As for the United States representative, he has cast doubt even on the possibility of achieving positive results on the question of reducing armaments and prohibiting atomic weapons at the present time.

Technical difficulties are now being referred to which are alleged to hinder effective control over the carrying out by the nations of their commitments with regard to the prohibition of atomic weapons...

We cannot deny that there are technical difficulties involved in establishing control over the observance by the nations of their commitments with regard to the prohibition of atomic weapons, nor that the study and exploration of the appropriate technical means would take time. But it is precisely for this reason that a moral and political condemnation of the use of atomic weapons would be of tremendous significance in the present circumstances. It would be impossible to ignore such a condemnation of atomic weapons. It would be an

important step towards the complete prohibition of atomic weapons and towards the conclusion of an appropriate international convention. One should not underrate the importance of such an act promoting confidence among nations, for relieving the people's fear of an atomic attack.

It would be appropriate to recall here the fact that no nation dared to violate, at the time of the Second World War, a similar international convention, achieved in 1925, outlawing biological and chemical weapons. This fact alone says a great deal. It is a good rejoinder to those pessimists who are trying to deny the importance of a moral and political condemnation of atomic weapons.

The Soviet Government, striving for agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons and thus for the solution of the disarmament problem as a whole, introduced their new proposal at the conference of the Heads of Government. They proposed that the four Powers should undertake not to be the first to use atomic and hydrogen weapons against any country and should call upon all other nations to accede to an appropriate declaration.

Should we agree on this question at the present conference, the conference would, for this reason alone, go down in history as an important landmark in the people's struggle for peace and genuine security.

It is sometimes said that the first step towards solving the disarmament problem should be to settle the question of establishing control. The essence of this proposal is, in point of fact, that we should plunge into endless debate on the details of control, while the arms drive would be continued and even stepped up and the danger of atomic war would still be looming over the peoples...

President Eisenhower put forward at the 'summit' conference his proposal for aerial photography and the exchange of military blueprints.

We do not doubt that, in introducing his proposal, President Eisenhower was guided by the best intentions. This is clear from the statements made at the Geneva Conference. This is exactly the way the proposal was appraised in the letter of N. A. Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers. of the U.S.S.R.

Our attitude to this proposal depends on the extent to which it meets the need to end the arms drive and on whether the adoption of this proposal would facilitate a reduction of armaments and a lessening of the danger of atomic war. If we face the truth, we must admit that it does not, unfortunately, meet these objectives.

The proposal for aerial photography and the exchange of military blueprints is divorced from the question of ending the arms drive and has in fact nothing in common with this task. Thus it would not decrease the danger of another war, nor would it relieve the peoples of the heavy burden of taxation they are shouldering because of the arms drive. Since it applies only to the Soviet Union and the United States and to the territory of these two States, It does not meet the purpose of preventing an attack by one country on another, which is proved by the mere fact that Britain, France, Western Germany, Italy, Turkey and a whole number of other countries are partners of the United States in military groupings, to say nothing of the fact that there are numerous American bases on foreign territory. It does not provide at all for aerial survey and exchange of military blueprints in those countries where American military bases have been established, and which are bound to the United States by military commitments under well-known treaties and agreements whose purposes are equally well known. One has to reckon with the fact that the very existence of these bases undermines security, if we are speaking of real security and not of declaratory pronouncements.

Suppose we agreed to the enormous material expenditure that would be required for aerial photography. And it is indeed clear to everyone that aerial photography of all these territories would call for a tremendous amount of technical resources—aircraft, fuel, etc. Furthermore, aerial photography would have to be carried out over and over again, since the situation in individual countries would not remain unchanged as time went on.

Because this American proposal is divorced from the task of stopping the arms drive, all this would be done while armaments were being built up and atomic weapons stockpiled without any respite, while military groupings remained and were even being expanded and there were still a large number of military bases on foreign territory directed against the Soviet Union, and not only against the Soviet Union.

Is it not clear that under these conditions the implementation of the proposal for aerial photography and exchange of military blueprints would not only fail to promote confidence among nations but would, on the contrary, intensify mutual distrust? Instead of a decrease in world tension, we should be faced with an increase in international tension.

This proposal of the United States would not ensure the nations against surprise attack because it does not provide, as the U.S.S.R. proposal does, for setting up control posts (at ports, railway junctions and aerodromes), which, being part and parcel of the overall disarmament scheme, would provide a certain guarantee against surprise attack...

Does this mean that our attitude to President Eisenhower's proposal would be unfavourable under all conditions? No, it does not. We could approach it differently if the measures it envisaged were to be taken in close relation to the task of reducing armaments and prohibiting atomic weapons. Under such conditions, the Soviet Union would be willing to give favourable consideration to this proposal, bearing in mind that

the question of aerial photography, as one of the forms of control, would be examined in combination with the establishment of control over the implementation of an appropriate international convention at the final stage in implementing the measures for reducing armaments and prohibiting atomic weapons.

The Soviet Government has already had occasion to state its views on the proposal for limiting national military budgets made by Mr Faure, Prime Minister of France, at the conference of the Heads of Government. This proposal, if considered in relation to the task of ending the arms drive, should be regarded favourably.

In our opinion, careful consideration should also be given to the remarks made by Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister of Britain, at the 'summit' conference. Sir Anthony is known to have suggested at that time that certain measures should be carried out in a certain area of Europe as part of the solution of the disarmament problem...

MR. FOSTER DULLES 10 NOVEMBER

... Let us then, in the first instance, look briefly at the work of the Sub-Committee of the United Nations. Disarmament Commission during the meetings it held in New York from 29 August until its recess on. 7 October 1955.

It is clear that these sessions, which were conducted in a cooperative spirit, have been useful. It is also evident that they must be viewed as preparatory and analytical, They have not yet produced concrete results.

All of our Governments seem to be restudying the implications of the accelerated development of nuclear science in its peaceful and its military aspects in order to take account both of new constructive opportunities and heightened dangers.

Once the reviews are completed, it is reasonable to hope for more rapid progress in the work of the United Nations Sub-Committee.

During its recent sessions, the Sub-Committee examined at some length the proposals of the four Heads of Government. The Soviet Union stated that it is continuing to study President Eisenhower's Geneva proposal for aerial reconnaissance and the exchange of military blueprints. The United States expressed its willingness to accept, in conjunction with the President's plan, ground inspectors as proposed by Chairman Bulganin.

I turn now to some discussion of the initiative of President Eisenhower. That is appropriate as part of our second task under the Directive.

When the President made his proposal here on 21 July his purpose was simple and clear. It was to help in creating conditions which would enable real progress toward disarmament to be made...

The proposal for exchange of blueprints and aerial reconnaissance was designed to attack this problem and lay a sound basis for inspection and control and reducing armaments. Major aggression is unlikely unless the aggressor has the advantage of surprise and can hope to strike a blow that will be devastating because it is unexpected.

But the preparation of an attack of such magnitude could hardly be concealed from aerial inspection. This is not to say that inspection by air would detect everything or that inspection by air is a perfect instrument of inspection.

Aerial inspection would, however, provide a warning against a great surprise attack. Moreover, the addition of ground observation posts, as suggested by the Soviet Union, to which President Eisenhower's letter of 11 October agreed, would supplement and reinforce this protection.

This combined system would constitute a decisive initial

step in providing against the possibility of a great surprise attack. The opportunity to know the status and location and extent of each other's forces and armaments would provide convincing evidence that, our expressed peaceful intentions are true. This would at once make the atmosphere more favourable for armaments reductions...

I have listened with interest to the observations on this point which have just been made by the head of the Soviet delegation. Obviously, these require closer study than is possible for me to have given them at this point. It is, however, my initial impression that the Soviet Union does not accept the suggestion of President Eisenhower as an initial step but it does accept President Eisenhower's concept of aerial inspection as a possible subsequent step.

It is suggested that, although, President Eisenhower's intentions are good, he has misjudged the value of his proposal as an initial step. It remains, however, the opinion of the United States that the proposal that President Eisenhower has made would, in fact, help to create the atmosphere of greater confidence which is an essential prelude to a practical system for the control and reduction of armaments which all desire...

Our Government continues to seek as a major objective a comprehensive system for the reduction of armaments under effective inspection and control. Under such conditions we will join in measures for prompt mutual reductions in the burden of arms, military expenditures, and the size of armed forces, and we shall devote more resources to the well-being of people.

Our third task under this item of our agenda is to consider whether our Governments can take any further useful initiatives in this field. In our opinion negotiations and detailed work on disarmament should continue to be carried on in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations, although obviously at a later stage, the time will come when other nations should be associated with this task.

We, the Foreign Ministers here, can best contribute, I believe, to the success of these negotiations by improving the atmosphere in which they are conducted...

All members of the Disarmament Commission Sub-Committee agree that there is no presently-known inspection control system which can guarantee that nuclear weapons can be eliminated. Obviously, a sound disarmament programme must take realistic account of the existing situation. The United States is continuing intensive search for methods which might make possible a thoroughly effective inspection and control system for nuclear weapons material as part of a general disarmament programme. We believe that each State shall carry forward similar scientific research with appropriate consultation between governments.

We may well find effective means to control future output of nuclear weapons-grade material, including the by-products of nuclear power reactors, despite the special problems of accounting fully for past production. This would have extreme significance. The aim of all of us should be to develop the maximum feasible control which would be effective and certain. The spreading of nuclear weapons, without control, or adequate responsibility, could greatly increase the danger of a nuclear war. It may be that the new International Atomic Energy Agency, soon to be established pursuant to action of the United Nations General Assembly, can contribute to control in this field. It is an urgent necessity.

If this could be done, it would jointly serve the best interests of each of our States, and the other States in the world. We could advance toward the goal of a just and durable peace. Given the proper spirit, there is reason to hope for a sound agreement for open knowledge of armaments, a reduction in limitation, the expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the promotion of the well-being of the people.

Such hope can be justified, however, only if we accept the

fundamental scientific and military facts, if we refrain from attempts at propaganda, and manifest genuinely peaceful purposes, and if we join in a sincere endeavour to develop reliable means of inspection and control.

MR. ANTOINE PINAY 10 NOVEMBER

We cannot but pay tribute to the work accomplished and the studies undertaken by the Disarmament Sub-Committee at its last meeting in New York from 29 August to 7 October, and to the spirit of understanding and cooperation in which it worked...

The Sub-Committee's report, and the exchanges of views which have taken place elsewhere, have strengthened my conviction that if we are to make any progress in this work, which is bound to be long and difficult—but of which France, as I need hardly remind you, has always had and still has, the greatest hopes—we must be realistic.

In this connexion, there are certain facts which we must take into account and which I do not think any of us hem denies:

(1) There can be no disarmament without an effective control which will guarantee to each that the measures agreed upon will be effectively applied by all and that the security of each and every people will be really ensured by disarmament. Control is not an end in itself, but it is the corner stone of any disarmament programme.

(2) Detailed proposals concerning this important question of control, to which, I would remind you, France has made a most active contribution, were put before the Disarmament Sub-Committee by Canada, the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Those proposals have so far produced no reaction in the Soviet Union; nor,

when those countries endeavoured to give a clear definition of the powers and functions of that control, did they receive any reply from the Soviet Union, even with regard to those fields in which it might be technically possible.

(3) To perfect an international system of control, fully covering all the requirements of security, is an extremely difficult and complex matter from the technical point of view. Many people are doubtful as to the effectiveness of any such control. Some believe that effectiveness could be obtained only at the cost of enormous forces. Others think that even were it backed by tremendous resources, the system of control would still have serious deficiencies because the technical means of inspection are inadequate. In any case, there is one point which both the Soviet Union and the Western Powers have emphasised, and that is that, at the present stage of scientific knowledge, there are no means of detection capable of guaranteeing the efficiency of any international control of atomic or hydrogen weapons.

(4) Any programme of disarmament presupposes the elimination of mistrust from international relations...

In these circumstances, I think the most fruitful method, and also the most honest towards the peoples we represent, would be, as I suggested in my speech of 29 September and, more briefly, here on 27 October, to seek agreement on certain *preliminary* measures which could be combined to form an initial plan and put into force quickly without undue difficulty.

These preliminary measures, though intended only as the prelude to others, would not be negligible in themselves. On the contrary, those that I have in mind would be of capital importance in present world conditions. Their application would be a powerful contribution to international security, and a decisive step forward on the road to peace, creating vast possibilities for the future. It would also evoke a great response

in men's minds throughout the world.

I am thinking in particular of the proposal for the exchange of military information and for aerial inspection put forward by President Eisenhower and the proposal for setting up control posts at key points drawn up by Marshal Bulganin...

I also have in mind the proposals submitted by Mr. Edgar Faure, on 22 July, to the Conference of Heads of Governments. Some of them could very easily be integrated into this set of preliminary measures whose adoption and application, as I have said, seem possible in the near future. It would be chiefly a matter of ensuring wide publicity for military expenditure and budgets, of analysing, interpreting and comparing, according to a uniform plan, the budgets and accounts supplied, and, finally, of arranging for them to be audited by teams of financial inspectors.

I think it might be useful at this preliminary stage to undertake practical experiments on problems of inspection and control, as was suggested by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in the proposal he put forward on 21 July at the Conference of Heads of Government.

I am convinced that a realistic plan for a preliminary set of concrete measures can be evolved from the various proposals I have just enumerated. Such an agreed plan, I repeat, would of itself, and more especially, by reason of its implementation, be a very considerable contribution to improving the international atmosphere and decreasing mistrust.

During this preliminary stage our Governments should, in the United Nations Sub-Committee continue to study the technical conditions and methods required for a general disarmament plan acceptable to all, and should consider ways and means of making it possible to guarantee effective control of disarmament in all fields.

MR. HAROLD MACMILLAN 10 NOVEMBER

The discussions in the Sub-Committee were encouraging from one point of view and discouraging from another. There was a welcome absence of the propagandist proposals which, have too often characterised discussions on disarmament in recent years. On the other hand, the Sub-Committee made absolutely no headway in resolving the problems of control, which are the main obstacle to progress on this subject. It is true that since the Soviet Government put forward their proposals of 10 May we have come much closer together on the broad features of a disarmament plan, and especially on the ultimate objectives and the timing of the different elements of the plan. But all our Western proposals for disarmament, both in the conventional field and in the nuclear field, have been put forward on the understanding that agreement would be reached on a system of international inspection and control ' which would provide a guarantee that all the measures were being faithfully carried out. This is where the discussions have stuck. They have stuck firstly because the Soviet suggestions for a control system are, in our eyes, quite inadequate, while the Soviet representative has been unable to comment on the proposals for a control system which we have put forward. Secondly, they have stuck because of the difficulties which have arisen in connexion with the control of nuclear weapons and the materials of which they are made...

Now I suggest that if we are in earnest about disarmament, we cannot go on admitting on the one hand that there are possibilities of evasion beyond international control, and proposing on the other hand the total abolition of all nuclear weapons. We can retain the total abolition of nuclear weapons as our ultimate goal, but it would be misleading to pretend that it is a realisable goal in our present state of scientific knowledge.

President Eisenhower clarified the basic point when he said at the Summit Conference in July: 'No sound and reliable agreement can be made unless it is completely covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to support every portion of the agreement.' And Sir Anthony Eden repeated this same thought: 'No disarmament plan can be acceptable which does not contain a system of inspection and reporting which is adequate to support every phase of the plan.'

I cannot agree on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, and I would not expect other Governments to agree, to abolish all our nuclear weapons as long as there is no assurance that every other State is doing the same. In the case of conventional weapons, one could reconcile oneself to a certain margin of error or deception in any control system. This would not be disastrous. But these thermonuclear weapons are now so deadly that the slightest margin of error, or deception could be decisive for the fate of nations. The risks involved are quite unacceptable in present conditions...

If we are to make progress in this complicated subject. I feel we must face these facts honestly and let a new breath of realism blow through our discussions. I do not mean by this that I despair of mitigating the menace of these weapons. The dangers involved are so unfathomable that we should be failing in our duty if we did not explore every possibility. A substantial degree of control over future production of nuclear material is, in principle, attainable. And even if complete control over the materials themselves cannot be guaranteed, there may be other possibilities of controlling the means of delivery of these weapons that ought to be investigated fully. With all that I agree wholeheartedly. All I am suggesting now is that some of the concepts of total nuclear disarmament which we have been using are quite out-of-date in the world as it is today and that we only mislead people by clinging to them.

We have up till now sought in the United Nations a

comprehensive disarmament agreement. By this has been meant an agreement, covering all weapons and all countries, which—once it had been signed and ratified—would lead us by a series of clearly defined steps to a world where nuclear weapons no longer existed and where conventional armaments and armed forces would be reduced to levels which permitted their use only for police purposes. Such a comprehensive agreement can still be our goal, but it is becoming increasingly clear that the conclusion of such an all-embracing convention is bound to be a protracted affair. It must await a vast increase in international trust and confidence and it must await signal developments in scientific detection and control. I therefore find myself asking whether it might not be advisable to turn our attention, in the first instance, to some more limited, preliminary agreement that would enable disarmament to get under way. I have no intention of suggesting that even a modest agreement of this kind will be easy to complete. But I believe that even the most modest agreement would be an historic step forward and would help to create the necessary confidence for bolder advances to follow. By this means we might achieve a balance of forces at reduced levels which would help to lower international tension and slow down the arms race. It would not endanger the security of either side and yet it would permit substantial savings to be transferred to more constructive purposes. This is not the time to go into detail on such a conception of partial disarmament, but I should be glad to know whether such a practical, if limited, approach, commends itself to my colleagues...

These two suggestions—concentration on an agreement for a first instalment of disarmament, and the carrying out of confidence-building, pilot schemes for disarmament—seem to me the most promising line for us to pursue and for our representatives to pursue at the forthcoming discussions in the United Nations. They are not alternatives. They are

complementary suggestions. Further they are not exclusive suggestions. While they were being worked out, we could still, with the aid of our scientists, continue to investigate all the possibilities of effective control in the nuclear field. By the time these preliminary agreements had been carried out, we might hope that the prospects for a more far-reaching disarmament agreement would be brighter. But the first step if I may quote Marshal Bulganin's letter to President Eisenhower, must be to get the disarmament discussions 'away from dead centre,' and it is to this end that I have suggested concentrating on these two approaches to the problem. Mr. Molotov will not, I am sure, expect me to comment today on the proposal he has just put forward. I will only say that I will, of course, study it with care, and I am sure that my colleagues, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Pinay, will do the same.

Finally, I would like to put forward a draft four-power declaration on disarmament. This declaration, if adopted, would make our discussion of this item of the agenda more fruitful.

I put forward this declaration—this draft—on behalf of Mr. Dulles and Mr. Pinay, as well as on my own account.

MR. FOSTER DULLES 11 NOVEMBER

... When President Eisenhower made his proposal to Chairman Bulganin it was greeted with a wave of acclaim throughout the whole world. The people everywhere felt instinctively that his proposal, if accepted, would, for all practical purposes, mean an ending of the danger of war between our two countries.

I believe that the instinct of the people of the world was right. I do not think that they will be convinced to the contrary by the arguments which Mr. Molotov yesterday put forward. I

shall take up these arguments one by one and comment on them.

1. It is said that the link between the Eisenhower proposal and disarmament is not clear. But, in fact, the proposal was made as a prelude to a programme for a mutually dependable system for less armament.

2. The Soviet delegation points out that the Eisenhower proposal refers solely to the territory of the Soviet Union and of the United States, and would not cover the forces of these two countries elsewhere, or the forces of our allies.

It is quite true that both the Soviet Union and the United States have substantial military forces beyond their sovereign border. Certainly, the Government of the Soviet Union will not deny that it maintains substantial forces in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Roumania, and other places and locations. However, the most important forces of both the Soviet Union and the United States are located within their sovereign borders. The overwhelming portion of the forces that would be inevitably involved in an attack are located in both instances within the sovereign borders. This, then, is the place to begin. It is the place where a beginning can be made promptly because it would not require the sovereign decision of many nations, or raise the problems involved in negotiating agreements with some forty to fifty other countries...

3. In the third place, objection is made to what is called 'enormous expenditures' which would be required to carry out aerial photography.

It is quite true that there would be considerable expense and that planes and technical facilities might have to be diverted from purposes of war to purposes of peace. The United States, I may say, is prepared to do that. I cannot believe that any country would really refuse to embark on a great project for peace because it required a diversion of resources from war.

4. It is further argued that President Eisenhower's proposal does not provide for 'the setting up of control posts at ports, railway junctions,' and so forth. I am surprised to hear this argument made after Chairman Bulganin has received President Eisenhower's letter of 11 October in which President Eisenhower said, and I quote, 'I have not forgotten your proposal having to do with stationing inspection teams at key points in our countries, and if you feel this would help to create the better spirit I refer to, we could accept that, too.'

5. Finally, it is argued that the Eisenhower plan would increase the risk of war because it would give countries information about the military installations of each other and thus enable an aggressor to make a more effective surprise attack.

I know that the Soviet Union has ample information about the United States and about our military and industrial dispositions. And the United States is not totally ignorant of the Soviet Union. Both of us, I surmise, know enough to attack. What is lacking is the deterrent to attack which would come if preparations for attack can be detected so that the aggressor does not have the benefit of surprise.

That is the way in which the Eisenhower proposal would work powerfully for peace.

We do not ignore the fact that the Soviet Union, although rejecting President Eisenhower's proposal, as he made it, indicates that it would accept a concept of aerial photography as one of the forms of control to be considered, as the Soviet Union puts it, 'at the concluding stage of the implementation of measures to reduce armaments and prohibit atomic weapons.' We accept this statement of the Soviet Union as a welcome advance over prior Soviet positions. We are, nevertheless, grievously disappointed that the Soviet Union now rejects President Eisenhower's proposal as a beginning step to lessen tension between our countries and open the path to further

steps for inspection and control, and reduction of armament based thereon...

I turn now to the proposal introduced yesterday by the Soviet delegation on this topic of disarmament, a proposal which in the main is a duplication of prior proposals made on various occasions. I deal with this proposal myself only in so far as it deals with atomic matters. There are four items with reference to atomic matters.

One is that 'As one of the first measures for the execution of the programme for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, States possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons pledge themselves to discontinue tests of these weapons.'

Let me say that if agreement can be reached to eliminate or limit nuclear weapons under proper safeguards, the United States would be prepared to agree to corresponding restrictions on the testing of such weapons.

Then there are two rather similar items, one of which suggests that the four Powers would pledge themselves, 'not to be the first to use atomic and hydrogen weapons,' and the other of which suggests that they should 'pledge themselves not to use nuclear weapons.'

These suggestions are subject to the grave defect that they contemplate only promises.

It is basic in the United States policy not to allow its security to be dependent upon promises and agreements which may prove illusory...

We further point out that if a war begins it will be because some nation has violated the solemn pledge contained in the Charter of the United Nations, and found in many other international agreements, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Charter. If a nation breaks that pledge, how can we assume that it will live up to its pledge not to use

atomic weapons, or not to be the first to use them? The United States has agreed not to use force against the Soviet Union in violation of the Charter of the United Nations. But if the Soviet Union does not believe that we shall live by that pledge, why does it want more pledges? And vice versa?

With respect to the proposal that all atomic weapons shall be eliminated, I call attention to the powerful statement made by the Soviet Union in its 10 May proposals, to the effect that there can be no assurance of the elimination of atomic weapons.

It will be recalled that in the proposal which the three Western Powers submitted yesterday, we called for continued scientific search by each State, with appropriate consultation between governments, for methods which might be derived from evolving scientific knowledge that would make possible a thoroughly effective inspection and control system of nuclear weapons material as part of a disarmament programme covering all kinds of armaments.'

It cannot reasonably be expected that we here shall agree to an elimination of nuclear weapons in the face of the difficulties and dangers to which the Soviet Union has itself directed our attention and which create a situation such that—in the words of the Soviet Union—we cannot be assured 'until an atmosphere of trust has been created in relations between States.' We can only regret that at this conference the position of the Soviet Union has brought no progress, but retrogression, as regards 'an atmosphere of trust.' It is more than ever inevitable that the United States should adhere closely to the position which President Eisenhower set forth in his address of 25 July 1955:—

'In the matter of disarmament, the American Government believes that an effective disarmament system can be reached only if at its base there is an effective reciprocal inspection and overall supervision system, one

in which we can have confidence and each side can know that the other side is carrying out its commitments.’...

MR. HAROLD MACMILLAN 11 NOVEMBER

... I would now like to refer to Mr. Molotov’s proposals regarding the level of armed forces. The figures for the levels of forces of the five Great Powers, which were contained in the Soviet plan of 10 May, were taken from Western proposals first tabled in 1952. They were then put forward—in 1952—on the explicit understanding that it would be practicable to conclude a comprehensive disarmament agreement, including—and this is the vital point—the abolition of all nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, since, these proposals were made the situation has changed both technically and politically. The Soviet Government itself, on 10 May, stated in categorical terms that it was scientifically impossible, at the present time, to guarantee effective control over nuclear weapons. In addition, the conditions for creating confidence, which were mentioned by the Soviet Government, are still far from having been fulfilled. We have only to recall our failure, so far, to agree on the German problem.

We have therefore been compelled to see in what way a practical start can be made on disarmament in the new situation/ These studies are not yet complete, but they will be ready for discussion at the next session of the Disarmament Sub-Committee...

I notice also that the Soviet proposals for recording agreement on the levels of armed forces make no mention of armament, reductions to correspond to these forces.

As I said yesterday, my Government is genuinely concerned that we should start, as soon as possible, some

measure of conventional disarmament. But I must ask Mr. Molotov what will be the value of an agreement on reducing levels of armed forces in terms of men without providing for corresponding reductions in their armaments? Would this not simply 'weaken the vigilance' of the peoples of the world, to use words in Marshal Bulganin's letter of 19 September to President Eisenhower, instead of giving them the substance of security? Without such an agreement about reducing armaments, the threat would be ever present that some State would build up vast supplies of weapons of all kinds, clandestinely as well as overtly, and would then threaten to use them in a surprise attack on its neighbours. Moreover, the possibilities of mobilising reserves to make use of such inflated supplies of equipment would be easier for some States than others. It would obviously be much easier for authoritarian regimes than for democratic regimes. Real security for all, therefore, implies that we should agree simultaneously on the scaling down of the mass armies and of the armaments which they use, I have dealt with the question of the level of forces and the question of the level of armaments. Now there is just one other aspect in paragraph 5 of Mr. Molotov's proposals which I should like to deal with. In this paragraph it is said that 'effective international control shall be established.' This, however, is a very general statement. In fact, we are being asked to accept very precise levels—actually fixed numbers—to which armed forces should be reduced in return for only a very vague assurance that effective international control shall be established.

But when will this international control be established? And what exactly will this control consist of? These are questions on which we have been trying to get the Soviet Union to clarify its position for years.

No agreement on disarmament can be of any value unless it contains clear and adequate proposals for supervising and

controlling the disarmament in question.

It would help us to make progress in the matter if the Soviet delegation found themselves able to answer these three questions. I ask them in the sincere desire to make progress.

First, does the Soviet Government agree that international inspectors should be established in the territory of all States which are parties to the proposed disarmament agreement, and that "these inspectors should be ready to work before disarmament actually begins? That is the first question.

Second, what rights of access and what rights of communication would the Soviet Government allow to the staff of the international control organ?

Third, what does the Soviet Government mean by the somewhat obscure phrase 'objects of control,' to which it is said that the international inspectors would have access when nuclear disarmament is being carried out?

I think if we could get a little further on these three points we should have made some real progress.

MR. V. M. MOLOTOV 11 NOVEMBER

Gentlemen, we have now all stated the views of our Governments on the question of disarmament. There were, in addition, two proposals introduced yesterday: the proposal of the Soviet delegation as a draft decision of the conference, and the three-power proposal, as a draft declaration, introduced by Mr. Macmillan.

The Soviet delegation have had the opportunity to study this draft of the three Powers, and have listened attentively to what has been said in its defence today. They would now like to present their views on the matter.

The first question to be put is: does the three-power proposal meet the demand for the arms drive and,

consequently, the demand for ending the arms drive and, consequently, the demand for ending the arms drive and, consequently, the demand for outlawing atomic weapons? A study of this proposal shows that it does not meet that demand. It contains no provision and envisages no practical step which would lead to a reduction of national armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons...

It should be stated bluntly that, judging by the proposal tabled yesterday, the Governments of the United States, France and Britain have given up their own proposals for disarmament which they put forward in the United Nations last year. We all remember the proposals of Britain and France of 11 June last year, which have been supported by the United States, as well as subsequent proposals of the same kind. These proposals have been useful in bringing much closer the positions of the Soviet Union and the three Western Powers on disarmament. This rapprochement of positions has found expression in the Soviet Government's proposal of 10 May 'On the Reduction of Armaments, the Prohibition of Atomic Weapons and the Elimination of the Threat of a New War.'

We all remember the result of this rapprochement between the U.S.S.R. on the one hand and the three Powers on the other. The Soviet Union has agreed to the proposal of France, Britain and the United States for the limitation of the levels of the armed forces of the five Great Powers: the U.S.S.R., the United States, China, Britain and France. At the same time, the Soviet Union has accepted the three-power proposal that disarmament measures—including those for banning atomic weapons—should be carried out by stages, which also used to be a matter of disagreement. And now we are asked to forget all about it.

The draft submitted by the three Ministers is in fact a milk-and-water declaration on the need to continue consideration of the questions of disarmament. At the same time Mr. Pinay declared: 'If we were to consider objectively and loyally the

fact I have just mentioned, if we were to cast aside all kinds of demagogic and propaganda considerations that would be unacceptable in discussing so serious a question, we would, have to recognise that we are not in a position at the present moment to carry into effect an overall disarmament scheme.'

The meaning of this statement is quite clear. It means giving up disarmament, Mr. Macmillan, and Mr. Dulles have spoken to the same effect.

It emerges that as soon as opportunities for four-power agreement on a number of basic disarmament questions appeared—particularly in view of the proposal introduced by the Soviet Government on 10 May—the three Powers began retreating and whittling down the achievements obtained in working for agreement.

But we may be told that the draft declaration which has been proposed speaks of the renunciation of the use of atomic weapons. But what sort of 'renunciation' is it? The three-power draft recommends that all parties should express their agreement on the renunciation 'of the use of nuclear weapons and all other weapons in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.' What strikes one first of all is that the nuclear weapons—that is to say, atomic and hydrogen weapons—are backdated with the other types of weapons. This means dismissing the problem of nuclear weapons as weapons of mass destruction constituting a particular threat to the peoples. What this draft actually wants us to do is to agree to the use of nuclear weapons while attempting to make the use of these weapons consistent with the 'United Nations Charter—which it is clearly impossible to do. This attempt cannot be construed as anything but a desire to keep a free hand for the possible use of atomic weapons...

Another circumstance that demands attention is this: in March and April of this year, when the Disarmament Sub-Committee was sitting in London, the delegations of France,

Britain and the United States appealed to the Soviet Union to accept their proposal for the limitation of the levels of the armed forces of the five Great Powers and also for carrying out disarmament, including the ban on atomic weapons, by stages.

Certain unexpected developments have since taken place.

When the Disarmament Sub-Committee met in New York this autumn Mr. Stassen declared, on 6 September, that the United States was making a reservation concerning all the positions it had in fact taken up in the Sub-Committee before the Geneva Conference. He declared there and then that the United States was not giving up its positions and at the same time said that it was not supporting them. By this Mr. Stassen indicated that the United States had retreated from the positions it held in the spring.

But even at that time, Mr. Nutting, representing Britain, when replying to a question by the Soviet representative, A. A. Sobolev, had said that Britain maintained the positions she had held during the Sub-Committee's session in London last spring.

It is necessary to mention also that the representative of France, Mr. Moch, also reaffirmed that France adhered to the positions she had held during the Disarmament Sub-Committee's spring session in London.

What has happened, then, since that time? Are we to understand that now it is not only the United States that does not want to reaffirm the position it held last spring?

What is the matter with France's position? Mr. Pinay's statement which we heard yesterday was at variance with the statement Mr. Moch made in New York on 6 September.

What has happened to Britain's position during this short period of time? The conclusion which can be drawn from Mr. Macmillan's statement of yesterday is that Britain's position is now at variance, with Mr. Nutting's statement of 6 September.

We expect these questions to be clarified...

First, control.

We do not need to be persuaded of the necessity for international control over the decisions to be taken for reducing armaments and outlawing atomic weapons. The Soviet Union has stood, and continues to stand, for such strict international control. It is not difficult to reply to the three questions Mr. Macmillan has raised here today. We had hoped that, once the questions were given detailed consideration in the Disarmament Commission, he would have received replies that would have satisfied him. But we should not forget that the first thing for us to do is to achieve agreement on the need to end the arms drive, and this is what Mr. Macmillan has still said nothing about. However, if we are to abandon the question of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, what then will be the purpose of control and inspection? It is one thing to reach agreement on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons and to establish proper international control and inspection over the implementation of these decisions. This will make necessary all the measures required to establish effective control and inspection corresponding to the demands of all peace-loving peoples. But what would control be like if we were to abandon the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons? If we were to get down to discussing the details of control and inspection while the arms drive continued, would this mean anything except lulling the vigilance of the peoples and contributing to the further unrestrained build-up of armaments and the stockpiling of atomic and hydrogen weapons? Would not the talk about control be deceiving the public in that case? Would we not discredit in that way both international control and our disarmament discussions?...

Mr. Dulles quoted today the passage from the U.S.S.R. proposal of 10 May which points out that with the present development of science, control in itself will not ensure the

exclusively peaceful use of atomic energy and that the possibility for the clandestine manufacture of atomic weapons will still remain. Thus, control and a corresponding formal agreement on it do not preclude the danger of a sudden atomic attack.

This argument is beyond dispute. But it has led to different conclusions.

The Soviet Government proceeds from the possibility of making progress in the matter of disarmament, including the removal of the danger of atomic attack, in the present circumstances. This can be achieved, first of all, by means of a moral and political condemnation of atomic weapons and by taking practical steps towards their complete prohibition. It is this purpose that underlies our proposal for refusing to be the first to use atomic weapons, Secondly, we propose the establishment of control posts, the importance of which I also mentioned in my statement of yesterday. Naturally, we are acting on the assumption that the establishment of such posts should not be considered as an end in itself but as one of the measures provided for by an overall disarmament scheme, and this is what Mr. Dulles failed to mention in his statement today.

The representatives of the United States, France and Britain are forming another conclusion, attempting to prove that it is completely impossible under the present conditions to carry out measures for reducing armaments and prohibiting atomic weapons. This conclusion is quite clearly unconvincing.

It remains for me to comment on the question of confidence, to which Mr. Macmillan, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Pinay referred.

We do not think it would be of any use to rebuke each other in this connexion. In any case we have something to say on this score with regard to the policies of the United States, France and Britain. Would it not be better, however, to take another course and try to take practical steps towards

promoting the confidence between States, and above all between the Great Powers without which the disarmament problem cannot be solved? It is this purpose that the Soviet Government strives to achieve when, in introducing its proposals for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, it suggests that agreements be reached on urgent steps to promote confidence between States. This is the meaning of the declaration which forms the first section of the U.S.S.R. proposal 10 May.

We have heard it remarked here that the U.S.S.R. proposal was not to the liking of everyone. But is it not possible to give more concrete consideration to the measures envisaged in the Soviet draft declaration and to try to agree, if not on all the measures recommended, then at least on some of them? Above all, it would be necessary to agree on such questions as ending the 'cold war' and also the cessation of war propaganda, which is known to have been denounced by the United Nations.

It would not be out of place to mention here the recent statement of Air Marshal Sir Basil Embry, Commander-in-Chief, N.A.T.O. Air Forces Central Europe. This statement was made in Fontainebleau on 26 October, only a fortnight ago. Air Marshal Embry, having emphasised the increasing importance of air reconnaissance, stressed that atomic war called for accurate and up-to-date intelligence data on what was to be the objective of this overwhelmingly powerful weapon in order to inflict the greatest possible damage. Judge for yourselves how can one consider at this time a plan for exchanging military information and aerial photography in the light of such statements by leading generals of N.A.T.O.! The Soviet delegation considers that we could agree on certain questions at this conference, and first and foremost on those on which we reached agreement not so long ago. As to the questions on which we have not yet been able to agree, we could adopt agreed recommendations for their further consideration in the

appropriate agencies of the United Nations.

B. DRAFTS SUBMITTED ON DISARMAMENT

PROPOSAL BY THE U.S.S.R. 10 NOVEMBER

1

To reduce tension in the relations between States to strengthen mutual confidence between them and to remove the threat of a new war, the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France recognise the need to strive to achieve the earliest possible conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

As a result of the exchange of views on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, they have agreed on the following:

1. The level of the armed forces of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China shall be established at from 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 men each; that of the United Kingdom and France, at 650,000 men each; while the level provided for China as well as other questions bearing on the armed forces of China shall be the subject of consideration, in which the Government of the People's Republic of China is to take part.

The levels of the armed forces of all other States shall not exceed 150,000 to 200,000 men and shall be agreed upon at an appropriate international conference.

2. After the armed forces and conventional armaments have been reduced to the extent of 75 per cent of the agreed reduction, a complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall come into effect. The elimination of such weapons from the armaments of states and their destruction shall be completed in the course of the reduction of armaments

covering the remaining 25 per cent of the agreed reductions. All atomic materials shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

3. Simultaneously with the initiation of measures to effect the reduction of armaments and armed forces, and before the entry into force of the agreement on the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the four Power's shall solemnly pledge themselves not to use nuclear weapons, which they shall regard as prohibited to them. Exceptions to this rule may be permitted for purposes of defence against aggression, when a decision to that effect is taken by the Security Council.

4. As one of the first measures for the implementation of the programme for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, States possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons pledge themselves to discontinue tests of these weapons.

5. Effective international control shall be established over the implementation of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

2

The Foreign Ministers of the four Powers have recognised the need to strive to achieve the necessary agreement on the outstanding questions of the abovementioned convention, subject to consideration by the United Nations. Guided by the desire to reduce international tension, to strengthen confidence among states and put an end to the arms drive, the Foreign Ministers have agreed that it is necessary in this connexion to consider first of all the provisions contained in:

(a) The proposal of the U.S.S.R. of 10 May, this year, on the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the elimination of the threat of a new war;

(b) The proposal by the President of the United States of 21

July on aerial photography and exchange of military information;

(c) The proposals by the Government of the United Kingdom on disarmament submitted on 21 July and 29 August; and

(d) The proposal by the Government of France on the financial control over disarmament and on the allocation of the released resources for peaceful purposes.

3

Simultaneously, the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, determined not to allow the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons, which are weapons for the mass extermination of people, and to relieve the nations from the threat of a devastating atomic war, solemnly declare:

Pending the conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France assume the obligation not to be the first to use atomic or hydrogen weapons against any country, and call upon other States to adhere to this declaration.

PROPOSAL BY FRANCE, THE U.K. AND THE U.S.A. 10 NOVEMBER

The four Ministers of Foreign Affairs

1. Note that their representatives on the Sub-Committee of the United-Nations Disarmament Commission, in the pursuit of their efforts to establish a satisfactory system of disarmament, have followed the directive given by the four Heads of Government at Geneva on 27 July 1955;

2. Take note of the work the Sub-Committee has accomplished in the spirit of the conference of the Heads of Government during its meetings in New York from 29 August to 7 October 1955, and express their appreciation to the Sub-Committee for its efforts;

3. Express their agreement on the following:

(a) the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons and all other weapons in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) the need to arrive at limitations and reductions of armaments and of armed forces;

(c) the need to devote to the peaceful economic development of nations, for raising their wellbeing, as well as for assistance to less developed countries, the material resources that would be released by agreements in the disarmament field;

(d) the fact that an effective system of inspection and control is the keystone of any disarmament programme, and, consequently, the need to establish an organ responsible for the inspection and control of agreed measures of disarmament under effective safeguards;

(e) the fact that there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organising the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons even if there is a formal agreement on international control;

(f) the need for continued scientific search by each State, with appropriate consultation between Governments, for methods which might be derived from evolving scientific knowledge that would make possible a thoroughly effective inspection and control system of nuclear weapons material as part of a disarmament programme covering all kinds of armaments;

4. Declare their intent to continue to seek agreements on a

comprehensive programme for disarmament which will promote international peace and security with the least diversion for armament of the world's human and economic resources;

5. Recognise that inspection, control, limitation and reduction of armaments can best be achieved in an atmosphere which is free of fear and suspicion;

6. Propose accordingly that, as a contribution to such an atmosphere and as a prelude to a general disarmament programme, the States concerned:—

(a) should agree promptly to put into early operation, in order to help prevent a surprise attack;

(i) a plan for exchange of military blueprints and aerial inspection on the basis of the proposal of the President of the United States of 21 July 1955; and

(ii) a plan for establishing control posts at key points, as suggested in the proposals of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union of 21 July 1955;

(b) should also agree:

(i) to arrange for the exchange and publication of information regarding military expenditures and budgets, as suggested in the proposals made by the Prime Minister of France on 22 July 1955; and

(ii) to study how best to gain practical experience regarding the problems of inspection and control, as suggested by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on 21 July 1955.

7. Direct their representatives on the United Nations Disarmament Commission to request that its Sub-Committee be reconvened at an early date and continue to seek an acceptable solution to the problem of disarmament.

DRAFT STATEMENT OF THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS ON THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEM

PROPOSED BY THE U.S.S.R. 15 NOVEMBER

Guided by the desire to promote a relaxation of international tension, the strengthening of confidence between States, the removal of the threat of war and the easing of the burden of armaments,

The Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the French Republic are convinced as hitherto of the need to continue to strive for agreement on a comprehensive disarmament programme which would promote world peace and security while diverting the minimum of manpower and of the world's economic resources for armaments:

Their discussions have shown that there is agreement on this aim and that the views of the four Powers have come closer together on some important questions concerning the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, including the need to establish effective control. As for the questions on which agreement has not yet been reached, the Ministers have agreed that the four Powers, jointly with other interested States, shall endeavour to eliminate the existing divergences and thus work out an acceptable system of disarmament, including the reduction of all armaments and armed forces with effective guarantees.

At the same time, the Ministers have agreed that the study of the methods of control over the fulfilment by the States of the obligations to disarm, which is now in progress in various countries, must aim at facilitating a settlement of the disarmament problem.

The Ministers have agreed that, in conformity with the directives of the Heads of Government, it is therefore necessary

to continue the examination, in the first place, of those provisions which are contained in;

(a) The U.S.S.R. proposals of 10 May and 21 July of this year on the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons and elimination of the threat of a new war,

(b) the proposal of the United States President on 21 July for reciprocal aerial inspection and exchange of military blueprints,

(c) the proposals of the United Kingdom Government on the question of disarmament, submitted on 21 July and 29 August, and

(d) the proposal of the French Government on financial control over disarmament and the conversion to peaceful purposes of the resources that would be released.

The Ministers also note that there has been revealed unanimous agreement that the four Powers, in conformity with the pronouncements made by the Heads of their Governments, will refrain from the use of armed force in their relations with each other and will strive for a peaceful solution of the differences which exist or which might arise between them.

DRAFT STATEMENT OF THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS ON DISARMAMENT PROPOSED BY FRANCE, UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES, 16 NOVEMBER

Guided by the desire to contribute to lessening international tension, strengthening confidence between States and reducing the burden of armaments,

The Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and the French Republic remain convinced of the need to continue to seek agreement on a

comprehensive programme for disarmament which will promote international peace and security with the least diversion for armament of the world's human and economic resources.

Their discussions showed that, while there was agreement on this objective, it was not yet possible to reach agreement on effective methods and safeguards for achieving it.

The Ministers will transmit the record of these discussions to their representatives on the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee. They believe that their exchange of views has been useful in clarifying their respective positions and should assist the Sub-Committee in its efforts to reach agreement, as their representatives continue to carry out the directive of the Heads of Government, taking into account the proposals made at the July conference.

In the meantime the Ministers agree that the studies of methods of control which are now proceeding in different countries should be designed to facilitate a settlement of the disarmament problem.

The Ministers further reaffirmed the obligation of their Governments to refrain from the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

49. Effects of Atomic Radiation

On 3 December 1955 the General Assembly unanimously adopted the following resolution. (A/Res/335) on the effects of atomic radiation.

The General Assembly,

Recognising the importance of and the widespread attention being given to problems relating to the effects of ionising radiation upon man and his environment,

Believing that the widest distribution should be given to all available scientific data on the short-term and long-term effects upon man and his environment of ionising radiation, including radiation levels and radioactive ‘fallout,’

Noting that studies of this problem are being conducted in various countries,

Believing that the peoples of the world should be more fully informed on this subject,

1. Establishes a Scientific Committee consisting of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and requests the Governments of these countries each to designate one scientist, with alternate and consultants as appropriate, to be its representative on this Committee;

2. Requests this Committee:

(a) To receive and assemble in an appropriate and useful form the following radiological information furnished by States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialised agencies: (1) reports on observed levels of ionising radiation and radioactivity in the environment; and (2) reports on scientific observations and experiments relevant to the effects of ionising radiation upon man and his environment already under way or later undertaken by national scientific bodies or by authorities of national Governments;

(b) To recommend uniform standards with respect to procedures for sample collection and instrumentation, and radiation counting procedures to be used in analyses of samples;

(c) To compile and assemble in an integrated manner the various reports referred to in (a) (1), on observed radiological levels;

(d) To review and collate national reports, referred to in (a)

(2), evaluating each report to determine its usefulness for the purposes of the Committee;

(e) To make yearly progress reports and to develop by 1 July 1958, or earlier, if the assembled facts warrant, a summary of the reports received on radiation levels and radiation effects on man and his environment together with the evaluations provided for in sub-paragraph (d) above and indications of research projects which might require further study;

(f) To transmit from time to time as it deems appropriate the documents and evaluations referred to above to the Secretary-General for publication and dissemination to States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialised agencies...

4. Calls upon all concerned to cooperate in making available reports and studies relating to the short-term and long-term effects of ionising radiation upon man and his environment and radiological data collected by them;

5. Requests the specialised agencies to concert with the Committee concerning any work they may be doing or contemplating within the sphere of the Committee's terms of reference to assure proper coordination;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to invite the Government of Japan to nominate a scientist, with alternate and consultants as appropriate, to be its representative on the Committee...

50. Disarmament Sub- Committee Asked to Reconvene

On 16 December 1955 the General Assembly by 56 votes to 7 adopted the following resolution.

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 808 (IX) of 4 November 1954, which established the conclusion that a further effort should be made to reach agreement on comprehensive and coordinated proposals to be embodied in a draft international disarmament convention providing for:

‘(a) The regulation, limitation and major reduction of all armed forces and all conventional armaments;

‘(b) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes;

‘(c) The establishment of effective international control, through a control organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed reductions of all armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and to ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only’;

and further

‘The whole programme to be such that no State would have cause to fear its security was endangered.’

Expressing the hope that efforts to relax international tensions, to promote mutual confidence, and to develop cooperation among States, such as the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Governments, the Bandung Conference and the ‘Tenth Anniversary Commemorative meeting of the United Nations at San Francisco will prove effective in promoting world peace,

Desirous of contributing to the lowering of international tensions, the strengthening of confidence between States, the removal of the threat of war, and the reduction of the burden of armaments,

Convinced therefore of the need to continue to seek agreement on a comprehensive programme for disarmament

which will promote international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Welcoming the progress which has been made towards agreement on objectives during the meetings in 1955 of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission,

Noting that agreement has not yet been reached on the rights, powers and functions of a control system, which is the keystone of any disarmament agreement, nor on other essential matters set out in resolution 808 (IX),

Noting also that special technical difficulties have arisen in regard to the detection and control of nuclear weapons material,

Recognising further that inspection and control of disarmament can best be achieved in an atmosphere which is free of fear and suspicion,

1. Urges that the States concerned and particularly those on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission:

(a) Should continue their endeavours to reach agreement on a comprehensive disarmament plan in accordance with the goals set out in General Assembly resolution 808 (IX) of 4 November 1955;

(b) Should, as initial steps, give priority to early agreement on and implementation of:

(i) Such confidence-building measures as President Eisenhower's plan for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection, and Marshal Bulganin's plan for establishing control posts at strategic centres;

(ii) All such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible;

2. Suggests that account should also be taken of the proposals of the Prime Minister of France for exchanging and publishing information regarding military expenditures and budgets, of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland for seeking practical experience in the problems of inspection and control, and of the Government of India regarding the suspension of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons and an 'armaments truce';

3. Calls upon the States concerned, and especially those on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, to study the proposal of the Prime Minister of France for the allocation of funds resulting from disarmament for improving the standards of living throughout the world and, in particular, in the less developed countries;

4. Recommends further that scientific search should be continued by each State, with appropriate consultation between Governments, for methods that would make possible thoroughly effective inspection and control of nuclear weapons material, having as its aim to facilitate the solution of the problems of comprehensive disarmament;

5. Suggests that the Disarmament Commission reconvene its Sub-Committee and that they should both pursue their efforts to attain the above objectives;

6. Decides to transmit to the Disarmament Commission, for its information, the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which the disarmament problem was discussed, and requests the Disarmament Commission and the Sub-Committee to give careful and early consideration to the views expressed in those documents.

ANNEX I

- A. Extract from communique of Asian-African Conference, Bandung, 24 April 1955
- B. Extract from joint statement by Premier Bulganin, Mr. Khrushchov and Prime Minister Nehru, 13 December 1955
- C. Extract from message of Pope Pius XII, 24 December 1955

A. COMMUNIQUE OF THE ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE AT BANDUNG

The representatives of the Governments of twenty-nine countries of Asia and Africa, meeting in Bandung 18- 24 April 1955, adopted a communique which included a section on 'Promotion. of World Peace and Cooperation,' of which the following is an extract:

... The Asian-Africa Conference, having considered the dangerous situation of international tension existing and the risks confronting the whole human race from the outbreak of global war in which the destructive power of all types of armaments, including nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, would be employed, invited the attention of all nations to the terrible consequences that would follow if such a war were to break out.

The Conference considered that disarmament and the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons of war are imperative to save mankind and civilisation from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction.

It considered that the nations of Asia and Africa assembled here have a duty towards humanity and civilisation to proclaim

their support for disarmament and for prohibition of these weapons, and to appeal to nations principally concerned and to world opinion to bring about such disarmament and prohibition.

The Conference considered that effective international control should be established and maintained to implement such disarmament and prohibition, and that speedy and determined efforts should be made to this end.

Pending the total prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, this Conference appealed to all the Powers concerned to reach agreement to suspend experiments with such weapons.

B. EXTRACT FROM JOINT STATEMENT BY PREMIER BULGANIN, MR. KHRUSHCHOV AND PRIME MINISTER NEHRU, NEW DELHI, 13 DECEMBER 1955

... The only way to establish peace throughout the world and abolish the conditions leading to a devastating and ruinous world war is by disarmament. Increasing or even maintaining the existing level of armaments is a constant threat of war, a source of fear and the reason for a drive for new types of weapons of mass destruction. The insistent need for disarmament grows in direct proportion to the invention and accumulation of weapons of ever-increasing destructive potential. The widespread desire to see war eliminated altogether demands positive, constructive and rapid steps towards disarmament. A large measure of agreement has already been reached on this question and, clearly, there are no reasons why the remaining obstacles should not be quickly overcome, provided the aim is to establish lasting peace, In

particular the statesmen of the two countries wish to express once more the firm conviction that the manufacture, use and testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons must be unconditionally prohibited. Simultaneously a considerable reduction of conventional armaments must be carried out with effective international control to ensure strict observance of this prohibition and disarmament. So long as this is not done the world will remain depressed and burdened with the fear of war and the peoples will doubt the sincerity of the desire for peace...

C. APPEAL OF POPE PIUS XII EXTRACT FROM MESSAGE OF 24 DECEMBER 1955

... We propose to direct our attention to a recent proposal which aims at putting a check on experiments in nuclear weapons by means of an international agreement. There has been talk also of taking further steps towards conventions, through which the use of those weapons would be renounced, and all States subjected to an effective arms control. Thus, there would be a question of three steps: renunciation of experimentation with atomic weapons, renunciation of the use of such, and general control of armaments.

The supreme importance of these proposals is tragically illustrated, if one stops to consider what science thinks it can predict about such actions, and which we think it useful to sum up briefly here.

As for the experiments of atomic explosions, the opinion of those who fear the effects produced if they are multiplied, would seem to be finding greater acceptance. Too many such explosions would in time cause increased density of radioactive products in the atmosphere, whose diffusion depends on elements not under man's control; thus would be generated

conditions very dangerous for many living beings.

Concerning the use: in a nuclear explosion an enormous amount of energy, equivalent to several thousand million kilowatts, is developed in an exceedingly short time; this energy is composed of electromagnetic radiations of very great intensity, distributed within a vast gamut of wave lengths, even to the most penetrating, and of tiny bodies, produced by nuclear disintegration, which are hurled at nearly the speed of light. This energy is transferred to the atmosphere, and within thousandths of a second increases the temperature of the surrounding air masses by hundreds of degrees; their displacement is violent, propagated at the speed of sound. On the earth's surface, in an area of many square kilometres, reactions of unimaginable violence take place, material volatilised and utterly destroyed by direct radiation, by heat, by mechanical action, while an enormous amount of radioactive materials of varying life-span, complete and continue the destruction through their activity.

This is the spectacle offered to the terrified gaze as a result of such use: entire cities, even the largest and the richest in art and history, wiped out; a pall of death over the pulverised ruins, covering countless victims with limbs burned, twisted and scattered, while others groan in their death agony. Meanwhile, the spectre of the radioactive cloud hinders the survivors from giving any help, and inexorably advances to snuff out any remaining life. There will be no song of victory, only the inconsolable weeping of humanity, which in desolation will gaze upon the catastrophe brought on by its own folly.

Concerning the control: inspection by properly equipped planes has been suggested, in view of watching over any atomic activities in broad territories. Others might, perhaps, think of the possibility of a world-wide network of observation posts, each one staffed by experts of different countries, and

protected by solemn international pacts. Such centres would have to be equipped with delicate and precise meteorological and seismic instruments, with equipment for chemical analysis, with vast spectrographs and such like; they would render possible the real control of many, unfortunately not of all, the activities which antecedently would be outlawed in the field of atomic experimentation.

We do not hesitate to declare, as we have in previous allocutions, that the sum total of those three precautions as an object of international agreement, is an obligation in conscience of nations and of their leaders.

We said the sum of those precautions, because the reason they are morally binding is also that equal security be established for all. If, however, only the first point, concerning experimentation, be put into effect, the result would be that that condition would not be verified, the more so that there would be given sufficient reason to doubt a sincere desire to put into effect the other two conventions. We speak so frankly because the danger of insufficient proposals concerning peace depends in large part on the mutual suspicions that often trouble the dealings of the Powers concerned, each accusing the other in varying degrees of mere tactics, even of a lack of sincerity in a matter basic to the fate of the whole human race.

For the rest, efforts toward peace must consist not only in measures aimed at restricting the possibility of waging war, but even more in preventing, or eliminating, or lessening with time the quarrels between nations which might lead to war.

ANNEX II

This annex reproduces a number of resolutions and statements of international organisations, movements and groups. The list does not pretend to be complete. It is a choice made to illustrate the wide concern felt on the question of disarmament among all sections of world opinion.

- a. Conference of Mayors of 37 Capitals
- b. International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
- c. International Cooperative Alliance
- d. International Federation of Resistance Fighters
- e. Inter-parliamentary Union
- f. League of Red Cross Societies
- g. Proposal for a World Conference of^o Scientists
(Einstein-Russell)
- h. Statement of Eighteen Nobel Prize-winners
- j. Society of Friends (Quakers)
- k. Women's International League
- l. World Association of Parliamentarians for World
Government (Scientific Conference)
- m. World Council of Churches
- n. World Federation of Scientific Workers
- o. World Federation of Trade Unions
- p. World Federation of United Nations Associations
- q. World Veterans' Association
- r. Young Women's Christian Association

a. Florence Meeting of Representatives of World's Capitals

From 2-5 October 1955 mayors and other representatives

of the capitals of thirty-seven countries met together at the invitation of the Mayor of Florence. They sent the following letter to the United Nations:

We mayors of thirty-seven capitals and other great cities of Europe, Asia and Africa, meeting in Florence from 2-6 October 1955, warmly greet the delegates to the Tenth General Assembly of the United Nations and ask them to accept our most sincere good wishes for the success of the Assembly's work.

We are certain that we express the desire and the will of the millions of inhabitants of our cities in stating that they want to live on good terms with each other and do their utmost to increase mutual knowledge and understanding, in order to strengthen collaboration and friendship with all the cities and peoples of the world.

It is a matter of the greatest importance for us mayors that atomic energy, all modern technical discoveries and all the financial resources of our countries should be used, not to wipe out our cities but to develop them and to construct new houses, schools, hospitals, gardens and monuments.

With a strong desire to see a secure and lasting peace established in the world, we ask the General Assembly of the United Nations, on behalf of the millions of citizens of our capitals, to redouble its efforts to reach as soon as possible agreements on the banning of atomic weapons, effective disarmament, and the establishment of a system of collective security for all the countries of Europe and the world on the basis of respect for the national independence and sovereignty of all peoples.

b. International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

EXTRACT FROM STATEMENT TO THE GOVERNMENTAL DELEGATIONS ATTENDING THE TENTH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

... The workers have at all times fervently desired a just and lasting peace and the replacement of the arms race by a race for social progress.

The free trade union movement has always been in favour of an international agreement on a programme of effectively controlled universal disarmament. With the ever-growing destructive power of atomic weapons, the need has become more burning than ever for an agreed international disarmament programme. Such a programme, in order to be realistic and effective, would have to include the reduction by appropriate stages or the prohibition not only of certain types of armaments in which some States might have superiority over others, but of all nuclear, hydrogen, bacteriological and conventional weapons. In the framework of such a programme 'experiments with nuclear and hydrogen weapons, their production and their use in warfare would be brought to an end. It has become perfectly clear that the great goal of genuine disarmament cannot be achieved without the establishment of a system of effective international inspection and control, especially of all atomic resources and projects, and provisions for adequate world sanctions, not subject to veto, against any violators...

c. International Cooperative Alliance

For its 60th anniversary in August 1955, the International Cooperative Alliance issued a statement which said in part:

The International Cooperative Alliance calls on its affiliated organisations to ask their Governments once again:

—to renew their efforts, through the United Nations, to achieve an agreement on the limitation of armaments of all types as a first step to total disarmament;

—to set up an impartial and effective organ for the supervision and control of armaments and the production thereof in all nations.

d. International Federation of resistance Fighters

ADDRESS TO THE U.N. DISARMAMENT SUB-COMMITTEE ADOPTED BY THE BUREAU OF THE FEDERATION, 27 SEPTEMBER 1955

The Bureau of the International Federation of Resistance Fighters, representing twenty-seven associations of former resistance fighters, deportees and victims of nazism from twenty European nations, is happy to note that, thanks to the similarity of the various proposals glade, the work of the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee foreshadows the solution of problems vital to the existence and future of every nation.

Speaking in the name of resistance fighters and victims of nazism who are concerned for the interests of their various countries, the Bureau of the International Federation of Resistance Fighters asks the members of the Sub-Committee to take all steps to stop the arms race, reduce armed forces and armaments, ban the use of nuclear weapons and lay down effective methods of control over the implementation of these measures.

Such decisions, which would lighten the burden of military expenditure and raise the peoples' living standards, should be taken in the shortest possible time.

The Bureau of the International Federation of Resistance Fighters' draws the attention of the members of the Sub-Committee to the serious consequences of failure in negotiations which have raised well-founded hopes throughout the world.

e. Inter-parliamentary Union

(i) RESOLUTION ON THE PROBLEM OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND OF SECURITY ADOPTED BY THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE, 1954

The XLIIIrd Interparliamentary Conference,

Recalling the work for peace continually pursued by the Interparliamentary Union and its previous discussions relating to general, progressive, simultaneous and controlled disarmament,

Recognising that the increased development of weapons of indiscriminate mass destruction, particularly of atomic

weapons, constitutes a threat to the very survival of civilisation,

Deeply conscious that the peoples of the world are filled with a desire for peace and security in a harmonious family of nations,

Welcoming the fact that the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations has resumed its efforts,

Is convinced that the problem of disarmament can only be solved within the United Nations Organisation, in connexion with a system of collective security;

Calls upon the Parliaments of the world to press for all Governments, and especially those of the countries primarily concerned, to meet together for the purpose of agreeing, as part of a programme of all round reduction of armaments, to subject all atomic weapons and everything that belongs to the field of nuclear energy to effective supervision and control by the United Nations and to consider the methods and means of banning the use of atomic weapons and their manufacture;

Further, expresses the hope that current negotiations will lead to the setting up of an international body for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

(ii) RESOLUTION ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT ADOPTED BY THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE, 1955

The XLIVth Interparliamentary Conference,

Considering that atomic and thermonuclear weapons involve for the whole human race the risk of the destruction of civilisation and perhaps of life itself, and that this menace is at the present time spreading anxiety throughout the world,

Noting that the burden of armaments gravely prejudices necessary efforts for; international solidarity, particularly with

respect to assistance to the under-developed countries,

Believing, however, that progress on the road to disarmament cannot be separated from the achievement of security for all nations,

Appeals to the Parliaments of the whole world to urge their Governments:

(1) to enter into negotiations with a view to the peaceful solution of all contentious questions,

(2) to put into effect the principles of the United Nations Charter by endeavouring to create a system of collective security open to all countries;

Takes satisfaction in the fact that the Franco-British proposal of June 1954 on disarmament has been unanimously accepted as a working basis by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which have also reached agreement on the necessity of promoting international collaboration for the peaceful use of atomic energy;

Emphasises the necessity of establishing an international control over atomic, thermonuclear and conventional armaments, and draws attention to the interdependence between the establishment of this control and the necessary prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and a balanced reduction of conventional armaments;

Emphasises also the feeling of security which would immediately result for all from the mere functioning of such a control;

Urges that all required steps be taken to arrive at the conclusion of a disarmament agreement, which appears possible on this basis;

And recommends to the various Parliaments to follow by appropriate means the problems and progress of the disarmament negotiations and to keep public opinion in their countries informed thereof.

f. League of Red Cross Societies

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE LEAGUE OF RED CROSS SOCIETIES AT ITS 23RD SESSION, OSLO, 24-29 May 1954

Nuclear, Gas and Bacteriological Warfare

The Board of Governors, considering that,

Whereas the Red Cross is a purely humanitarian organisation; striving at all times to relieve human suffering and thereby working for peace and

Whereas it has during previous International Red Cross Conferences adopted similar resolutions which are hereby reaffirmed and

Whereas recent experiments have conclusively proved the great danger to which mankind is exposed by the use of nuclear weapons of war,

The Board of Governors of the League of Red Cross Societies,

Recognising that the most practical contribution which the Red Cross can make towards ensuring a lasting peace is to fulfil its fundamental purpose the relief and prevention of human suffering irrespective of class, creed, nationality or race—,

Pledges anew all its member National Societies to work unceasingly to achieve this end thus helping to bring about a better understanding between the peoples of the world,

Pleas with all the Powers

a) to intensify their efforts for a peaceful settlement of conflicts,

- b) to continue to work unceasingly for general disarmament,
- c) to agree to prohibit absolutely and effectively the use of all nuclear weapons of war as well as the use of asphyxiating and poison gases and bacteriological warfare,
- d) to establish effective international control of atomic energy which will ensure that this is used solely for peaceful purposes and
- e) to take prompt and effective measures to protect all peoples from harm and damage resulting from test of atomic energy.

g. Proposal for a World Conference of Scientists

THE EINSTEIN-RUSSELL STATEMENT OF 9 JULY 1955

In the tragic situation which confronts humanity, we feel that scientists should assemble in conference to appraise the perils that have arisen as a result of the development of weapons of mass destruction, and to discuss a resolution in the spirit of the appended draft.

We are speaking on this occasion, not as members of this or that nation, continent or creed, but as human beings, members of the species man, whose continued existence is in doubt.

The world is full of conflicts; and overshadowing all minor conflicts, the titanic struggle between Communism and anti-Communism.

Almost everybody who is politically conscious has strong

feelings about one or more of these issues. But we want you, if you can, to set aside such feelings and consider yourself only as members of a biological species which has had a remarkable history, and whose disappearance none of us can desire.

We shall try to say no single word which should appeal to one group rather than to another. All, equally, are in peril, and, if the peril is understood, there is hope that they may collectively avert it.

We have to learn to think in a new way. We have to learn to ask ourselves, not what steps can be taken to give military victory to whatever military group we prefer, for there no longer are such steps; the question we have to ask ourselves is: What steps can be taken to prevent a military contest of which the issue must be disastrous to all parties?

The general public, and even many men in positions of authority, have not realised what would be involved in a war with nuclear bombs. The general public still thinks in terms of the obliteration of cities. It is understood that the new bombs are more powerful than the old and that, while one A-bomb could obliterate Hiroshima, one H-bomb could obliterate the largest cities such as London, New York and Moscow.

No doubt, in an H-bomb war, great cities would be obliterated. But this is one of the minor disasters which would have to be faced. If everybody in London, New York, and Moscow were exterminated, the world might, in a few centuries, recover from the blow. But we now know, especially since the Bikini test, that nuclear bombs can gradually spread destruction over a very much wider area than had been supposed.

It is stated on very good authority that a bomb can now be manufactured which will be 2,500 times as powerful as that which destroyed Hiroshima.

Such a bomb, if exploded near the ground or under water, sends radioactive particles into the upper air. They sink

gradually and reach the surface of the earth in the form of a deadly dust or rain. It was this dust which infected the Japanese fishermen and their catch of fish.

No one knows how widely such lethal radioactive particles might be diffused, but the best authorities are unanimous in saying that a war with H-bombs might possibly put an end to the human race.

It is feared that if many H-bombs are used there would be universal death—suddenly only for a minority, but for the majority a slow torture of disease and disintegration.

Many warnings have been uttered by eminent men of science and by authorities in military strategy. None of them will say the worst results are certain. What they do say, is that these results are possible, and no one can be sure that they will not be realised.

We have not yet found that the views of experts on this question depend in any degree on their politics or prejudices. They depend only, so far as our researches have revealed, upon the extent of the particular expert's knowledge. We have found that the men who know most are most gloomy.

Here, then, is the problem which we present to you, stark and dreadful, and inescapable:

Shall we put an end to the human race:
or shall mankind renounce war?

People will not face this alternative because it is so difficult to abolish war. The abolition of war will demand distasteful limitations of national sovereignty. But what perhaps impedes understanding of the situation more than anything else is that the term 'mankind' feels vague and abstract. People scarcely realise in imagination that the danger is to themselves and their children and their grandchildren, and not only to a dimly apprehended humanity.

They can scarcely bring themselves to grasp that they, individually, and those whom they love, are in imminent

danger of perishing agonisingly. And so they hope that perhaps war may be allowed to continue, provided modern weapons are prohibited.

This hope is illusory. Whatever agreements not to use H-bombs had been reached in time of peace, they would no longer be considered binding in time of war. Both sides would set to work to manufacture H-bombs as soon as war broke out, for, if one side manufactured the bombs and the other did not, the side that manufactured them would inevitably be victorious.

Although an agreement to renounce nuclear weapons as part of a general reduction of armaments would not afford an ultimate solution, it would serve certain important purposes.

1.— Any-agreement between East and West is to the good insofar as it tends to diminish tension.

2.— The abolition of thermonuclear weapons, if each side believed that the other had carried it out sincerely, would lessen the fear of a sudden attack which at present keeps both sides in a state of nervous apprehension. We should, therefore, welcome such an agreement, though only as a first step.

Most of us are not neutral in feeling, but, as human beings, we have to remember that, if the issues between East and West are to be decided in any manner that can give any possible satisfaction to anybody, whether Communist or anti-Communist, whether Asian or European or American, whether white or black, then these issues must not be decided by war.

We should wish this to be understood, both in the East and in the West.

There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels?

We appeal, as human beings, to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way

lies open to a new paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.

RESOLUTION

We invite this Congress, and through it the scientists of the world and the general public, to subscribe to the following resolution:

In view of the fact that in any future world war, nuclear weapons will certainly be employed, and that such weapons threaten the continued existence of mankind, we urge the Governments of the world to realise, and to acknowledge, publicly, that their purposes cannot be furthered by a world war, and we urge them, consequently, to find peaceful means for the settlement of all matters of dispute between them.

The above statement was issued by Bertrand Russell at a press conference in London on 9 July 1955. It was signed by

Professor P. W. Bridgeman (Harvard University)

Professor Albert Einstein*

Professor Leopold Infeld (Warsaw University)

Professor Frederick Joliot-Curie (Paris University)

Professor H. J. Muller (University of Indiana)

Professor C. F. Powell (Bristol University)

Professor J. Rotblat (London University)

Bertrand Russell

Professor Hideki Yukawa (Tokio University)

* Professor Einstein signed a week before his death.

h. Statement Issued by Eighteen Nobel Prize Winners, 15 July 1955

We, the undersigned, are scientists of different countries, different creeds, different political persuasions. Outwardly we are bound together only by the Nobel Prize, which we have been favoured to receive. With pleasure we have devoted our lives to the service of science. It is, we believe, a path to a happier life for people. We see with horror that this very science is giving mankind the means to destroy itself. By total military use of weapons feasible today, the earth can be contaminated with radioactivity to such an extent that whole peoples can be annihilated. Neutrals may die thus as well as belligerents.

If war broke out among the Great Powers, who could guarantee that it would not develop into a deadly conflict? A nation that engages in a total war thus signals its own destruction and imperils the whole world. We do not deny that perhaps today peace is being preserved precisely by the fear of these weapons.

Nevertheless, we think it is a delusion if Governments believe they can avoid war for a long time through the fear of these weapons. Fear and tension have often engendered wars. Similarly it seems to us a delusion to believe that small conflicts could in the future always be decided by traditional weapons. In extreme danger no nation will deny itself the use of any weapon that scientific technology can produce. All nations must come to the decision to renounce force as a final resort of policy. If they are not prepared to do this they will cease to exist.

Kurt Adler, Germany
H. J. Muller, U.S.A.

Max Born, Great Britain
 Richard Kuhn, Germany
 Adolf Butenandt, Germany
 Fritz Lipman, U.S.A.
 Arthur Compton, U.S.A.
 Paul Mueller, Switzerland
 Gerhard Domagk, Germany
 L. Ruzicka, Switzerland
 Hans von Euler, Sweden
 Frederick Soddy, Great Britain
 Otto Hahn, Germany
 Werner Heisenberg, Germany
 Wendell M. Staney, U.S.A.
 Hermann Staudinger, Germany
 George de Hevesy, Sweden
 Hideki Yukawa, Japan

j. Society of Friends (Quakers)

Below are extracts from. Toward Security Through Disarmament, a report prepared for the American Friends Service Committee in 1952.

... We believe the following principles and assumptions provide a basis for discussing detailed plans.

1. Armaments are both a symptom and a contributing cause of international tensions. Their very existence is evidence of distrust and suspicion and a cause of additional anxiety. The great expansion of a suspicion breeding secrecy of both sides of the Iron Curtain during and since World War II has created additional uncertainty and insecurity, In a dilemma where suspicion breeds armaments and armaments augment suspicion, successful negotiation at any point may help break

the vicious circle...

2. *Mutual concessions are required for any acceptable and workable plan for drastic arms reduction.* Any such plan must begin with a recognition of the rights, interests and prevailing attitudes of all parties. Agreement cannot be expected on terms that require substantially greater concessions from one Power bloc than from another. Agreement will also require willingness to change from positions heretofore taken. In the present context this means reciprocal concessions by proponents of both the United States and the Soviet Union proposals.

3. *Further expansion of arms production should cease.* This step, important at all levels of the arms reduction program, is the basic preliminary for a drastic reduction of armaments and a mutual expression of good faith.

4. *Weapons of mass destruction should be banned.* If world-wide fear and insecurity are to be overcome, stockpiles of the basic ingredients of such weapons (atomic, bacteriological, and other types) should be limited, under strict and effective international control, to peaceful purposes only...

5. *Conventional arms should be reduced drastically.* The more drastic the cutback of arms and armed forces, the less difficult will it be to establish equivalents among the Powers by which a balance can be maintained at all times. Mere 'progressive limitation and gradual reduction' of arms will invite delaying and stalling tactics by Governments and affected interest groups. But a general agreement to reduce the levels of armament drastically and as soon as equivalents can be established would make such delaying tactics considerably less likely. By 'drastic' we mean the reduction of arms and armed forces to levels required for domestic police purposes.

6. *All types of weapons, arms installations and armed forces should be subject to a single inclusive system of international inspection and control...*

7. *Adequate safeguards against either evasions or open violations must be provided by the control plan.* This does not mean that the plan must necessarily be ‘foolproof’ in the absolute meaning of that term. Some risks must undoubtedly be accepted, but under an adequate plan these would be minimal compared to present risks in the absence of any controls .

8. *All nations with substantial military potential should participate in the planning and establishment of an international arms reduction programme.* Application of this principle will require some arrangement whereby Germany, Japan, Italy, the Chinese people’s Republic and other nations—not now members of the United Nations—can be brought into the discussions and agreements.

9. *Disarmament agreements should be negotiated within the framework of the United Nations, and the necessary control organ should operate within the same framework...*

10. *Disarmament can begin at once.* Drastic reduction and permanent international control of national arsenals will, we believe, make the world both safer and less tense than at present. It is unnecessary, therefore, to await implementation of the collective measures provisions of the United Nations Charter, as some have suggested, before starting to disarm. Nor is it necessary to construct a world super-government with a monopoly of force, as others suggest, before beginning drastic reduction of armaments. With mass death-dealing weapons banned, with other weapons drastically reduced, and with a world-wide control organ in successful operation, the confidence generated and experience gained should contribute greatly toward the peaceful evolution of a stronger world government.

k. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

EXTRACT FROM STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE MEETING AT MAGLEAS FOLK HIGH SCHOOL, DENMARK, 16- 21 AUGUST, 1954

Modern scientific warfare has made it obvious that the concepts and doctrines of security hitherto existing have become obsolete and that new measures are urgently required. While the old system was based on military collective security, at the present time true collective security rests on the peaceful coexistence and cooperation of the peoples of the world. As immediate practical steps towards this end the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) recommends:

(5) In view of the possible apocalyptic effects which the latest nuclear arms experiments forecast, the WILPF believes that the United Nations should take steps immediately to outlaw the use and further development of fission and fusion bombs and other weapons of mass destruction.

(6) The WILPF takes the position that nations should at once initiate a plan, for; total world disarmament which would necessitate the following steps:

a) An immediate standstill in the production of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction as well as of all other arms;

b) utilisation of material and human resources thus released for a large-scale effort on constructive projects to meet humanity's needs.

**EXTRACT FROM MESSAGE FROM WOMEN TO
THE WORLD ADOPTED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
MEETING AT HAMBURG 25-31 JULY 1955**

1. Disarmament

We believe that nations must not attempt to maintain peace by the formation of military alliances, establishment of overseas bases, stockpiling of suicidal armaments, extension of military conscription and performance of provocative military exercises simultaneously with their efforts to agree on disarmament and to extend social and economic justice to the technically under-developed peoples. These aims are mutually incompatible because they involve opposing interests.

True peace is impossible while the major part of every nation's expenditure of money, intelligence and effort is geared to war preparations...

**I. World Association of Parliamentarians
for World Government**

SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

From 3 to 5 August 1955 a scientific conference convened by the World Association of Parliamentarians for World Government met in London. It was attended by scientists from Australia, the United Kingdom, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and other countries, including Lord Boyd-Orr (U.K.), Professor J. Bronowski (U.K.), Professor S.A. Galunsky (U.S.S.R.), Sir Alexander Haddow (U.K.), Professor Eugene Rabinowitch

(U.S.A.), *Bertrand Russell* (U.K.), *Professor M.L. Oliphant* (Australia).

The conference adopted the following resolution proposed jointly by Bertrand Russell and Professor Galunsky:

Since in any future war nuclear weapons will probably be employed and since such weapons threaten to bring immeasurable suffering for humanity and material destruction and possibly even the end of mankind, we urge, therefore, the Governments of the world to realise and to acknowledge publicly that their purposes cannot be furthered by world war; consequently we urge the full and open examination of the implications of recent scientific developments for humanity as a whole and the promotion of peaceful means for the settlement of all matters of international dispute.

m. World Council of Churches

(i) EXTRACT FROM APPEAL OF THE WORLD ASSEMBLY OF CHURCHES: EVANSTON AUGUST 1954

... We believe there are two conditions of crucial importance which must be met, if catastrophe is to be avoided:

- (i) The prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction, including atomic and hydrogen bombs, with provision for international inspection and control such as would safeguard the security of all nations, together with the drastic reduction of all other armaments.
- (ii) The certain assurance that no country will engage in or support aggressive or subversive acts in other

countries.

3. We believe that a sound international order is possible only to the extent that peace, justice, freedom and truth are assured. We are convinced that peace will be gravely endangered so long as the armaments race continues, and so long as any nation seeks to extend its power by the threat or use of military force...

**(ii) DOCUMENT PREPARED BY THE
COMMISSION OF THE CHURCHES ON
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND ADOPTED BY
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE WORLD
COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, AUGUST 1955**

Disarmament and Peaceful Change

The C.C.I.A. has consistently advanced the thesis that both moral and political factors must be taken into consideration as well as the mathematical and mechanical approach to the reduction of armaments. These factors apply to two indispensable and complementary processes:

- a) the process whereby all armaments will be progressively reduced under adequate international inspection and control; and
- b) the process of developing and securing international acceptance of methods for peaceful settlements and change to rectify existing injustices, particularly in situations where military conflict has arisen.

Progress in these complementary approaches is dependent upon the extent to which mutual confidence has been attained. Every genuine agreement strengthens confidence and provides the basis for more significant agreements. Therefore, we are

encouraged by the willingness of representatives of Governments to talk together, and we urge that such exchanges be continued in order that mutual trust may be further developed and the area of agreement progressively expanded.

Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy

The prospect of the benefits which can come to mankind from the discovery of atomic energy is dimmed by the fear that its military use may lead to catastrophic destruction. We Christians consider it the responsibility of all men to see to it that this power is used solely for positive and constructive purposes.

We, therefore, welcome the expressed desire of the U.N. General Assembly 'to promote energetically the use of atomic energy to the end that it will serve only the peaceful pursuits of mankind..' We support the proposal to establish an International Atomic Energy Agency, and believe that it should be constituted within the framework of the United Nations. We commend the decision to convene the International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy to study 'the development of atomic power and... consider other technical areas—such as biology, medicine, radiation, protection and fundamental science—in which international cooperation might most effectively be accomplished.' We are encouraged by the manifest concern and diligent participation of highly competent scientists from many nations.

The present effort to place the benefits of atomic energy at the service of mankind is little hampered by the necessity of controversial provisions for inspection and control. There is thus offered an opportunity for nations to work together constructively and to remove some of the suspicions which have hitherto divided them.

Reduction of Armaments

In face of difficulties that may at times seem insuperable, we urge unwavering effort to devise and put into effect a system for the elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and all other weapons of mass destruction, as well as the reduction of all armaments to a minimum, under adequate international inspection and control. At the same time we caution against over-simplified formulas which are pressed merely to secure propaganda advantage or superficial agreements.

Two tasks appear especially urgent:

- i) to devise a system of inspection and control;
- ii) to find a starting-point for the reduction of armaments.

Any system of inspection and control must be technically adequate and politically workable so as to provide warning for other nations if any nation violates its treaty commitment. Since there is so much uncertainty as to what is scientifically necessary for reliable inspection and control, we suggest that the United Nations establish an international commission of scientists and technicians to identify the essential scientific requirements for an adequate system. Members of the Commission should be selected from a panel named by Governments, but should serve in their individual capacity. Their findings would be indispensable to trustworthy and politically acceptable arrangements. They would also provide a basis for testing the readiness of Governments to cooperate in the elimination and prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction under trustworthy international control, and in the reduction of all other armaments to a minimum.

The starting-point for reduction of armaments must be both fair and mutually acceptable.

The prospect of finding such a starting-point for successive

stages is becoming progressively brighter. At various times since the Disarmament Commission was established in 1951, we have called attention to the fact that Member Governments of the U.N. have committed themselves in the Charter to abstain from the threat or use of force for aggressive ends. The implicit commitment not to use atomic or hydrogen or any other weapons for aggressive purpose should be made explicit as a possible first step toward a trustworthy system to control all weapons of mass destruction.

As the nations proceed to devise an adequate system, they should meanwhile seek ways whereby they can cooperate voluntarily and whereby compliance of all parties can be tested by day-to-day performances. These could include exchange of military information and certain types of inspection. Tensions could thus be further relaxed, the threat of military action eased, and the way paved for the kind of inspection and control which will ultimately offer the greatest security to all peoples...

n. World Federation of Scientific Workers

Resolutions adopted at Fourth General Assembly 23-25 September 1955 on the need for an international conference on the dangers of nuclear weapons.

The use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons in war would produce a disaster beyond any in human history. The full extent of the death and suffering it would cause cannot yet be gauged. Many of its consequences are indeed at present unpredictable. From facts already available, however, we know that it could produce hundreds of millions of victims and serious genetic and other long term effects. Even the experimental explosions of nuclear weapons have caused death

and disease. These horrors have been made possible as a consequence of scientific discoveries and it is the first duty of scientists to do all in their power to prevent their occurrence.

The Assembly accordingly welcomes the initiatives already taken by numerous scientific organisations and individuals in protesting against atomic war. We join them in urging on all Governments the conclusion of negotiations which would make it impossible.

The effectiveness of the action of scientists greatly depends on the achievement of cooperation between them. Here the success of the Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy has already shown what can be done. However, from the very fact that the dangers of the military uses of atomic energy could not be discussed there it is evident that, for the purpose of preventing atomic war, Geneva is not enough.

A further conference of comparable importance and authority is still urgently needed. It should examine, in the light of indisputable facts, the nature of atomic warfare and the ways of averting it. It would consider the scientific aspects of the problem of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the possibilities of ensuring their adequate control. The conference, apart from its scientific contribution, would serve the indispensable purpose of providing the public with reliable information of vital importance to them.

Such a conference to be effective must be of the widest character embracing scientists in all principal countries and of different opinions.

The Federation declares its willingness to give its fullest support to any sufficiently qualified and representative conference. Such a conference was called for in the letter signed by Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein, Frederick Joliot-Curie and other world-famous scientists. It should give effective expression to the moral responsibilities of scientists.

The Federation will cooperate in this with other organisations of scientists to ensure that a conference is held as soon as it is technically possible. It is in this way, we are convinced, that scientists can best contribute to preventing atomic warfare and securing a permanent peace.

o. World Federation of Trade Unions

EXTRACT FROM RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT 20th SESSION OF EXECUTIVE BUREAU 12 OCTOBER 1955

... The Executive Bureau is of the opinion that an international agreement for substantial, simultaneous and controlled disarmament would lead to a further lessening of tension and would create conditions conducive to the improvement of the standard of living of the workers in peace and security. The Executive Bureau decides to emphasise to the General Assembly of the United Nations that it is necessary and possible at the present moment for the Great Powers to reach an agreement on the principles and methods for reducing armaments. The W.F.T.U. will further ask the General Assembly to adopt the conclusions of the Bandung Conference on national independence of the oppressed peoples.

The Executive Bureau believes that it is the duty of the W.F.T.U. and all trade union organisations, without exception, to increase their activity to bring about disarmament and a relaxation of tension. It calls on the workers of all opinions and affiliations to support these activities, from wherever they may come, by muted, broad and resolute actions...

p. World Federation of United Nations Associations

(i) RESOLUTION ON DISARMAMENT ADOPTED BY SEVENTH PLENARY ASSEMBLY, 1952

The Seventh Plenary Assembly of W.F.U.N.A.,

Deeply concerned to lift from all peoples their fear of a Third World War,

Recalling that at its Second and Third Plenary Session the Federation asked for the prohibition and suppression of atomic and bacteriological arms and of similar means of mass destruction, and at its Fifth Plenary Session for a system of inspection and control of atomic energy to ensure that it should be used for peaceful purposes only,

Repeats its request to all Governments to reach a general agreement to prohibit the use of atomic, bacteriological and all other arms of mass destruction, and at the same time to accept an effective system of control and inspection, by which this prohibition can be assured,

Welcomes the concessions made by the Great Powers which have now led to further negotiations in a new Disarmament Commission, and

Expresses the deepest wishes of countless people in urging that these negotiations must be continued until success is achieved.

The Federation believes that the Disarmament Commission should also make proposals which will ensure the limitation of all national armed forces and armaments to the minimum size necessary for the defence of the common peace, taking into account all relevant factors and at the same time an effective system, within the scope of the Security Council, of

international inspection and control of all armed forces and armaments, and

Hopes that the five Great Powers will be the first to accept these proposals in order to show their will to peace and to restore the confidence of all the world.

**(ii) EXTRACT FROM RESOLUTION ON
DISARMAMENT AND THE PROHIBITION OF
ATOMIC AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
ADOPTED BY THE NINTH PLENARY ASSEMBLY,
1954**

... The Ninth Plenary Assembly of W.F.U.N.A. urges

(1) that both the use and manufacture of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited by a Convention which would not be considered as binding upon the signatories until an organ of control had been established and had declared itself in a position to fulfil its task,

(2) that under the same conditions all armaments and armed forces should be reduced to levels necessary for the maintenance of internal security and the fulfilment of the obligations of signatory States under the terms of the United Nations Charter,

(3) that pending these developments and to create an appropriate atmosphere, explosions of nuclear weapons likely seriously to endanger life and property should cease, and the appropriate precautions be taken in this respect, and, further, that a declaration in this sense be made by the nations concerned.

q. World Veterans' Federation

EXTRACT FROM RESOLUTION ON PEACE AND DISARMAMENT ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1954.

The Fifth General Assembly,

... Appeals again to the Governments of all world Powers calling upon them to bend all their efforts to the rapid conclusion of a sincere agreement concerning:

(1) permanent and effective control of all armaments and, in particular, international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic arms and all weapons of mass destruction;

(2) the simultaneous and progressive reduction of armaments and armed forces;

(3) the coordinated use of atomic energy resources for the improvement of the standard of living of peoples everywhere and, in particular, of under-privileged nations.

r. Young Women's Christian Association

The following is an extract from a peace policy adopted by the World Y.W.C.A. Council, 15 September 1955.

... There can be no peace in the world unless the nations are willing to respect basic principles of international law. As long as they fail to accept a common foundation of moral values for international conduct as superseding the will of individual nations, there will be no basis for universal security.

We support all international efforts to settle disputes by

peaceful means and to put into effect progressive disarmament, including the establishment of reliable measures for the elimination and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction under adequate inspection and control.

Because the discovery of the use of atomic energy has brought to the world both fear and hope, and because its development can bring incalculable destruction and benefits, it demands serious study.

We consider that the pooling of all resources in atomic energy is a condition essential for the benefit of all and that it is a measure which will contribute to the development of a partner-relationship between the nations of the world. We have welcomed the first Conference on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy and we support all efforts of the United Nations 'to promote energetically the use of atomic energy to the end that it will serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind' ...

ANNEX III

From the beginning disarmament has been a fundamental concern of the World Peace Movement. At various international meetings, congresses, conferences, sessions of the World Council of Peace, efforts have been made to work out proposals which could help to form the basis of a compromise between the Powers. These proposals are represented below by an extract from the appeal of the first World Peace Congress, 1949, the appeal to U.N.O. adopted by the Second World Congress, 1950, an extract from the report of the commission on the relaxation of tension at the Congress of Peoples, 1952, and the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission of the World Peace Assembly, 1955. These documents represent a developing policy which has increasingly been the result of consultations between the World Peace Movement and others who work for peace.

a. First World Peace Congress, Paris- Prague 20-25 April 1949

EXTRACT FROM MANIFESTO

We stand for the banning of atomic weapons and other methods of mass extermination of human beings; we demand the limitation of the armed forces of the Great Powers and the establishment of effective international control over the use of atomic energy for exclusively peaceful ends and for the good of humanity.

b. Second World Peace Congress, Warsaw 16-22 November 1950

RESOLUTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND ON GENERAL DISARMAMENT

The Second World Peace Congress, noting with deep satisfaction that more than 500 million men and women throughout the world have already expressed their desire for peace by signing the Stockholm Appeal for the banning of atomic weapons;

Voicing this urgent demand of all peoples; Voicing the mounting anxiety of the peoples threatened by war, and crushed by ever-increasing military expenditure;

Desiring to contribute to the establishment of a stable and enduring peace;

Solemnly appeals to the United Nations, to the Parliaments and to all peoples, and submits to them the following proposals:

Unconditional prohibition of all types of atomic, bacteriological, chemical, poisonous and radioactive devices and all other means of mass destruction;

Denunciation as a war criminal of the first Government to use these weapons.

The Second World Peace Congress, mindful of its responsibilities to the people, makes the same earnest appeal to the Great Powers and calls upon them to begin, during the years 1951 and 1952, a progressive, simultaneous and proportionate reduction of all their land, sea and air forces by a third to a half of their present size. Such a step, by putting a definite end to the arms race, will diminish the risks of aggression. It will lighten the costs which burden State budgets

and weigh heavily on all sections of the people. It will permit the restoration of international confidence and the necessary cooperation among all nations, irrespective of their social systems.

The Congress declares that the controls for prohibiting atomic weapons and all weapons of mass destruction, as well as all conventional arms, are technically possible.

The Congress proposes that an international body, staffed by qualified inspectors, should be set up within the framework of the Security Council, and should be made responsible for controlling the reduction of conventional arms as well as the prohibition of atomic, bacteriological, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction.

These controls, to be effective, must apply not only to military forces, existing arms and arms' production as declared by each nation, but also, on the demand of the international control commission, must be extended to include the inspection of military forces, arms and arms' production which are suspected to exist beyond what has been declared. These proposals for the reduction of armed forces constitute a first step on the road to general and complete disarmament, the final goal of all defenders of peace.

The Second World Congress, convinced that peace cannot be secured by seeking a balance of forces involving an arms race, holds that these proposals give no military advantage to any country, but that they would certainly result in halting the drive to war and in advancing the well-being and security of all the peoples of the world.

c. Congress of the Peoples for Peace, Vienna 12-19 December 1952

EXTRACT FROM RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON LESSENING INTERNATIONAL TENSION

. . . The peoples view with the deepest anxiety the present arms race which is imposing an unbearable burden on the various national economies, demanding increasing sacrifices from millions of people in all countries and involving an extension of the period of military service in many States.

The arms race, a consequence of international tension, is not only failing to reduce the tension, but itself becoming the cause of new fears and mistrust and creating new dangers of war.

The delegates of the peoples of the whole world who are meeting in Vienna believe that, in such a situation, action for disarmament assumes decisive importance for the preservation of peace. This action, supported by all those who see the abyss to which the people are being dragged by unbridled rearmament, can lead the Governments of the five Great Powers in the first place, and subsequently those of other countries, to conclude a series of agreements, aiming at:

(a) An immediate and substantial reduction in armaments of all kinds; this reduction to be proportionate and simultaneous. If carried out as from now in as broad a measure as possible, safeguarding the genuine needs of national security' it would permit the reduction of military service and open real prospects for future total disarmament.

(b) Unconditional banning of weapons of mass destruction, and primarily of atomic, chemical and bacteriological weapons.

The application of these measures shall be subject to strict international control...

d. World Assembly for Peace, Helsinki 22-29 June 1955

STATEMENT OF THE COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT AND ATOMIC WEAPONS

The existence of weapons of destruction of unprecedented and almost unimaginable power makes disarmament, including their complete abolition, together with a new growth of trust and cooperation among the nations, an immediate necessity for mankind.

Atomic warfare is not only capable of inflicting untold destruction and suffering upon the living, it may be a source of genetic damage to the life and health of generations yet unborn. Even test explosions have done harm, to an extent not fully known, but which is certainly not confined to one area or country.

The danger is made more acute by the growing tendency to take atomic war for granted and to make practical preparations for conducting it.

Steps in this direction already include:

- the treatment in military plans of nuclear weapons as ‘conventional weapons’;

- the pretence that they can be ‘tactical’;

- the pretence that civil defence can give adequate protection;

- the representation that prohibition and control of nuclear weapons are impossible;

- the justification of nuclear weapons by fostering the idea that in future any war must inevitably be an atomic war;

- the defence of nuclear weapons as ‘deterrents.’

Far from being 'deterrent,' the existence of stocks of atomic and nuclear weapons, and the preparations for atomic war, are themselves a cause of fear and mistrust. They serve to increase mutual hostility and so increase the risk of war.

The destruction of all stocks of nuclear weapons, the ending of the threat of atomic war, is therefore a necessary step toward ridding mankind of war and the burden of armaments.

All wars bring misery and suffering but the use of methods of indiscriminate and mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, is utterly inhuman and carries such risks for all that their use should not be tolerated under any circumstances. It is now clear, however, that the effective abolition of nuclear weapons cannot be obtained as an isolated act. It must take place within the framework of a general scheme of disarmament.

A substantial measure of general disarmament is necessary not only for its own sake, but also to reduce the present state of tension in the world, and enable the growth of the necessary trust for fruitful cooperation. That general disarmament is fully possible is shown by the wide progress already made toward agreement.

A fair scheme must include practical measures in relation to all types of weapons, equally affecting those supposed to favour the military interests of anyone group of countries or another.

Such a scheme must include:

- the stopping of test explosions of nuclear weapons;
- a solemn agreement not to use nuclear weapons; the abolition of nuclear weapons and substantial and progressive disarmament by agreed stages, both under strict control;
- a fair control system, one that makes impossible evasion by any country, and which includes observers stationed at ports, military establishments, arms

factories, sources of atomic raw material production, atomic installations, etc.

All this has in principle been agreed in the Anglo-French and Soviet plans now before the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations. To embrace in these measures all countries, a conference must be held including all Governments, both those inside and those outside the United Nations. Agreement is urgent, and implementation must be as swift as practicable.

To make disarmament fully effective, the whole range of these measures must be carried out, but any and every agreed step in these directions is good, because each agreement made and carried out will increase confidence to go further.

The Governments must agree and act—to this they are bidden alike by their responsibility for the safety of their own countries and by their duty towards mankind.

Effective disarmament and the removal of the atomic threat will open immense possibilities for the benefit of mankind. Labour and material resources, no longer diverted to destructive ends, will become available for production and so immeasurably increase the welfare of all peoples. Only along this path can the benefits envisaged in the proposals for peaceful use of atomic energy, made by President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin respectively, be fully realised. Along this path atomic energy can make real a golden age.

It is in the hands of the peoples to prevent the madness of atomic war which would cause irreparable harm to all the peoples of the world without exception. It is in their hands to ensure that agreements shall be made and that they shall be kept. Vigilance must never be relaxed.

The mighty movement of public opinion all over the world, the growing number of declarations by Parliaments, statesmen and organisations that it inspires—outstandingly the decision on nuclear weapons of the Asian-African Conference at

Bandung—represent but a beginning.

The coming meeting of the Heads of State of the four Great Powers at Geneva affords a new great opportunity. The peoples of the world demand and will ensure that it be carried forward to success.

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