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CONTENTS

OPENING REMARKS BY RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER I.S. IVANOV.....	28
OPENING REMARKS BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL D. LEVY.....	30
FOREWORD BY THE RUSSIAN-ISRAELI EDITORIAL BOARD...	32
FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE RUSSIAN EDITION....	33
FROM THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE LONDON OFFICE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE January 30, 1941.....	36
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE GENERAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR IN THE UK I.M.MAYSKY WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION H. WEITZMAN February 3, 1941.....	39
RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN E. NEUMANN, A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, AND THE HEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT OF THE WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS, M. PERL-TSWEIG, WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, K.A. UMANSKY July 17, 1941.....	42
TELEGRAM OF J.I., A STAFF MEMBER OF THE LONDON OFFICE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE. LINTON DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE BOARD	

OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE M. SHERTOKU August 2, 1941.....	45
TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN I.M.MAYSKY IN NKID USSR September 2, 1941.....	46
LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION H. WEIZMANN TO THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN THE UK I.M.MAY September 8, 1941.....	48
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE D.BEN- GURION WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN GREAT BRITAIN I.M. MAY October 9, 1941.....	50
NOTE OF S.I.KAVTARADZE, HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID OF THE USSR, TO THE FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY December 31, 1941.....	54
NOTE OF F.T. GUSEV, HEAD OF THE SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID OF THE USSR, TO THE FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY January 20, 1942.....	56
E. EPSTEIN, AN EMPLOYEE OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, REPORTS ON CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY, S.A. VINOGRADOV January 25, 1942.....	58
LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION H. WEIZMANN TO THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN THE UK I.M.MAY March 2, 1942.....	71
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, M.M. LITVINOV, WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION H. WEITZMAN AND THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON, N. GOLDMAN May 6, 1942.....	77
A LETTER FROM MAGEN TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, M. SHERTOKU June 18, 1942.....	78

LETTER FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE USSR IN TURKEY, M.A. KOSTYLEV, TO THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID USSR S.I.KAVTARADZE June 22, 1942.....	80
NOTE OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PRESS AND INFORMATION OF THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE I. KLINOV TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE AGENCY'S BOARD M. SHERTOKU August 30, 1942.....	82
RECORDING OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF PALESTINE I.BEN-TSVI WITH THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN TURKEY S.S.MIKHAILOV AND THE PRESS ATTACHE OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN TURKEY, N.A. PETRENKO August 31, 1942.....	86
LETTER OF THE ACTING HEAD OF THE EASTERN DEPARTMENT OF VOCS ALEVINSON TO THE LEAGUE "FOR SOVIET RUSSIA" October 26, 1942.....	97
FROM THE RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY WITH THE POLISH AMBASSADOR TO THE USSR T. ROMER December 23, 1942	98
LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, M. SHERTOK, TO THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN THE UK, I.M. MAYSKY January 19, 1943.....	100
NOTE OF DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR S.ALOZOVSKY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V.M.MOLOTOV AND SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (B) A.S. SCHERBAKOV March 10, 1943	103
REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION OF E. KAPLAN, A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, AND AN EMPLOYEE OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE AGENCY E. EPSTEIN WITH THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE	

SOVIET EMBASSY IN TURKEY, S.S. MIKHAILOV March 16, 1943.....	104
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN M. SHERTOK, DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON, N.G. GOLKDMAN, WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, M.M. LITVINOV March 24, 1943.....	106
THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE M. SHERTOK ABOUT THE CONVERSATION WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN GREAT BRITAIN I.M. MAY AT THE MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE HISTADRUT April 29, 1943.....	108
NOTE OF THE CONSULAR DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID USSR TO THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.G. DEKANOZOV May 15, 1943...	110
NOTE OF DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR S.ALOZOVSKY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V.M. MOLOTOV May 22, 1943.....	112
LETTER FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON, N. GOLDMAN TO THE PRESIDENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA E. BENESH May 27, 1943.....	115
SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION H. WEIZMANN AT A DINNER IN HONOR OF THE DELEGATION OF THE JEWISH ANTI-FASCIST COMMITTEE IN THE USSR June 25, 1943.....	123
FROM THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE LONDON OFFICE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE September 14, 1943.....	125
RECORDING OF A.A. GROMYKO, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON, D.A. September 23, 1943.....	127
FROM THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE October 4, 1943.....	129

FROM THE RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SECOND SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN EGYPT, A.F. SULTANOV WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE M. SHERTOK December 21, 1943.....	132
LETTER FROM THE SOVIET ENVOY TO EGYPT, N.V. NOVIKOV, TO THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR S.I.KAVTARADZE April 15, 1944....	133
LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID USSR I.V. SAMYLOVSKY TO THE HEAD OF THE GENERAL CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT OF THE NKVT USSR KUZNETSOV July 22, 1944 Secret.....	135
LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE D.BEN-GURION TO THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR I.M.MAY August 8, 1944.....	137
FROM THE LETTER OF THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN TURKEY S.S. MIKHAILOV TO THE BOARD MEMBER OF THE VOCS L.D. KISLOVA AND THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID USSR I.V.SAMILOVSKY August 9, 1944.....	140
RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON, GOLDMAN, WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO, K.A. UMANSKY August 15, 1944.....	143
REPORTING BY E. EPSTEIN, A MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, ABOUT CONVERSATIONS WITH D.S. SOLOD, AN ADVISER TO THE SOVIET MISSION IN EGYPT. September 3, 1944.....	147
NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID OF THE USSR I.V. SAMYLOVSKY DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.G. DEKANOZOV September 18, 1944.....	151
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SECOND SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN EGYPT, A.F. SULTANOV, WITH A DELEGATE FROM PALESTINIAN ARABS	

AT THE CONFERENCE ON THE CONVENING OF THE PAN-ARAB CONGRESS BY MUSA AL-ALAMY October 11, 1944..	152
LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE JEWISH RESCUE DEPARTMENT OF THE WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS L. KUBOWITZKY TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE RESCUE COMMITTEE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE I.GRUN-BAUM October 15, 1944.....	156
TELEGRAM OF THE DIRECTORS OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION OF THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE M. SHERTOK AND E. DOBKIN TO THE CHARGE D.IN THE SOVIET UNION IN THE UK K.M. KUKIN November 20, 1944.....	158
NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID OF THE USSR I.V.SAMYLOVSKIY AND THE SOVIET UNION'S ENVOY TO EGYPT A.D. YSBORIN TO THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.G. DEKANOZOV November 25, 1944.....	159
REPORT ON THE MEETING OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HISTADRUT WITH THE SOVIET TRADE UNION DELEGATION AT THE FOUNDING CONFERENCE OF THE WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS IN LONDON February 25, 1945.....	161
FROM THE RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE ASSISTANT HEAD OF THE FOURTH EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID OF THE USSR N.F.PAISOV WITH THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF YUGOSLAVIA IN THE USSR R.NIKOLAEVICH March 22, 1945.....	162
NOTE OF THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR S.I.KAVTARADZE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M.MOLOTOV March 31, 1945.....	164
TELEGRAM OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE NEW ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA M. MENDELSSOHN TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR J.V.STALIN April 8, 1945.....	166
LETTER FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON, N. GOLDMAN TO	

THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO THE UNITED STATES A.A.GROMYKO April 13, 1945.....	167
LETTER FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON, N. GOLDMAN TO THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO THE UNITED STATES A.A.GROMYKO May 30, 1945.....	169
LETTER FROM K.M. KUKIN, A POLITICAL ADVISER TO THE LONDON OFFICE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY OF PALESTINE DAY, TO K.M. KUKIN, THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE USSR IN THE UK. June 10, 1945.....	170
FROM THE MEMO OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE PREPARATION OF PEACE TREATIES AND THE POST- WAR DEVICE OF M.MLITVINOV "PALESTINIAN QUESTION" July 27, 1945.....	172
FROM THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE USSR September 26, 1945.....	179
HELP OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF NKID USSR October 20, 1945.....	189
FROM THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE PREPARATION OF PEACE TREATIES AND THE POST- WAR SYSTEM November 15, 1945.....	192
REPORTING BY EISENSTADT, A POLITICAL OFFICER OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH TASS CORRESPONDENT IN CAIRO JANCHENKO January 1, 1946.....	193
LETTER FROM THE SOVIET ENVOY IN LEBANON D.S. MALT TO THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID USSR I.V. SAMILOVSKY January 3, 1946.....	197
REPORTING BY EISENSTADT, A STAFF MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH TASS CORRESPONDENT IN CAIRO, M. KOROSTOVTSEV February 1, 1946.....	201
LETTER FROM MAJ. GEN. BASILOV, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF THE SOVIET UNION'S COUNCIL OF	

MINISTERS FOR REPATRIATION, TO THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DIVISION OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY, I.V. SAMILOVSKY April 27, 1946.....	203
CONSIDERATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST DIVISION OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE May 15, 1946.....	204
LETTER FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON, N. GOLDMAN TO THE PUBLIC FIGURE OF MEXICO L. TOLEDANO May 21, 1946	208
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE USSR L. TARNOPOLER WITH THE HEAD OF THE CONSULAR DEPARTMENT OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN LEBANON R. AGARONOV Jerusalem, May 22, 1946.....	211
RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN A MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, EISENSTADT, WITH A.A. SHVEDOV, THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN EGYPT. June 12, 1946.....	213
LETTER FROM E. SASSON, HEAD OF THE ARAB SECTION OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, TO E. EPSTEIN, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON. Jerusalem, June 28, 1946.....	217
LETTER FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO POLAND, V.S. LEBEDEV TO THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY July 12, 1946.....	221
LETTER FROM THE SOVIET ENVOY IN LEBANON D.S. MALT TO THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DIVISION OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY I.V.SAMILOVSKY August 13, 1946.....	223
NOTE OF DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF THE SOVIET COUNCIL OF MINISTERS FOR REPATRIATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL GOLUBEV TO THE HEAD OF THE THIRD EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY A.A.SMIRNOV September 4, 1946.....	228

NOTE OF DEPUTY HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DIVISION OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY M.A.MAKSIMOV TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR V.G.DEKANOZOV September 6, 1946.....	230
NOTE OF THE THIRD EUROPEAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN DEPARTMENTS OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR V. KUYNANOZOV September 17, 1946.....	233
NOTE FROM L. GEPBER, A POLITICAL ADVISER TO THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN NEW YORK. November 15, 1946.....	234
FROM A TRANSCRIPT OF A SPEECH BY J. ROBINSON, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF JEWISH STUDIES AT THE WORLD AND AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESSES, AT A MEETING OF THE AMERICAN EMERGENCY ZIONIST COUNCIL November 19, 1946.....	237
LETTER FROM THE SOVIET ENVOY IN LEBANON D.S. MALT TO THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DIVISION OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY I.V.SAMILOVSKY February 19, 1947...	247
NOTE OF A MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE TO THE UN U.EITAN February 25, 1947.....	256
REFERENCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY "PALESTINIAN PROBLEM" March 5, 1947.....	258
NOTE OF THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY ADVISER B.E. STEIN TO THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY March 6, 1947.....	263
NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DIVISION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR I.V.SAMYLOVSKIY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR J.A. MALIK March 14, 1947	268
LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DIVISION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR I.V.SAMYLOVSKIY TO THE ENVOY OF THE USSR IN LEBANON D.S. SOLOD March 26, 1947.....	269

CONSIDERATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST DIVISION OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY ON THE POSITION OF THE USSR ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE April 12, 1947.....	271
REFERENCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE April 15, 1947.....	274
MEMORANDUM OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE "POINT OF VIEW OF THE JEWISH DELEGATION ON AGENDA" OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPECIAL SESSION New York, April 28, 1947.....	281
MEMORANDUM OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE New York, April 28, 1947.....	283
LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE D. WAL TO THE BOARD MEMBER OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE M. GROSSMAN April 29, 1947.....	292
LETTER FROM THE PRESS ATTACHE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON, I. HAMLIN TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN NEW YORK, AURI April 29, 1947.....	294
A.A. GROMYKO, THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR TO THE UN, AT THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE May 14, 1947.....	295
LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE D. WAL TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE AMERICAN SECTION OF THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE A. SILVER May 15, 1947.....	305
TELEGRAM OF A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE H. GREENBERG TO A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE BLOCKER, IN LONDON May 20, 1947.....	308
FROM THE CIRCULAR LETTER OF THE DIASPORA AND HALUZ CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE MAPAI PARTY Tel Aviv, May 29, 1947.....	309

RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN E. EPSTEIN AND THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF YUGOSLAVIA, V. VELEBIT, IN WASHINGTON. June 25, 1947.....	315
NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR I.N.BAKULIN TO THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY July 30, 1947.....	318
REFERENCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY "ON THE UN SPECIAL COMMISSION ON PALESTINE" July 31, 1947.....	327
RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN E. EPSTEIN, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON, AND M.S. VAVILOV, THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN THE UNITED STATES. July 31, 1947.....	334
RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN E. EPSTEIN, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON, AND M.S. VAVILOV, THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN THE UNITED STATES. September 11, 1947.....	337
FROM THE RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON, E. EPSTEIN, WITH S.K. TSARAPKIN, THE CHARGE D.C. CHARGE D.C., AND M.S.VAVILOV, THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN THE UNITED STATES. Jerusalem, September 23, 1947.....	341
TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY, TO NEW YORK. September 30, 1947.	347
TELEGRAM OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M.MOLOTOV, FROM NEW YORK. October 15, 1947	348
TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY, TO NEW YORK. October 16, 1947.	349

RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE M. SHERTOK WITH THE CHARGE D.S. CHARGE D.S. S.K.TSARAPKIN. New York, October 26, 1947.....	350
REFERENCE OF THE UN DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY "TO THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE" October 23, 1947.....	355
NOTE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR B.M.MO TOTUBA TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (B), CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR J.V. STALIN. October 26, 1947.....	360
REPORTING BY L. GELBER, A POLITICAL ADVISER TO THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN NEW YORK, ON A CONVERSATION WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS DIVISION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, D. RASK. November 5, 1947.....	362
SUMMARY OF THE LETTER OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE USSR IN IRAQ A.F. SULTANOV TO THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR. November 5, 1947.....	365
TELEGRAM OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M.MOLOTOV, FROM NEW YORK. November 18, 1947	368
TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY, TO NEW YORK. September 30, 1947	371
Soe.secret.....	371
TELEGRAM OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M.MOLOTOV, FROM NEW YORK. October 15, 1947	372

TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY, TO NEW YORK. October 16, 1947.	373
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE M. SHERTOK WITH THE CHARGE D.S. CHARGE D.S. S.K.TSARAPKIN. New York, October 26, 1947.....	374
REFERENCE OF THE UN DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY "TO THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE". October 23, 1947.....	379
NOTE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR B.M.MO TOTUBA TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (B), CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR J.V.STALIN. October 26, 1947.....	384
REPORTING BY L. GELBER, A POLITICAL ADVISER TO THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN NEW YORK, ON A CONVERSATION WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS DIVISION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, D. RASK. November 5, 1947.....	386
D'AFFAIRES OF THE USSR IN IRAQ A.F. SULTANOV TO THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR. November 5, 1947.....	389
Secret.....	389
TELEGRAM OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M.MOLOTOV, FROM NEW YORK. November 18, 1947	392
A.A. GROMYKO, THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR TO THE UN, AT THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. November 26, 1947.....	395
LETTER FROM A. SILVER, CHAIRMAN OF THE AMERICAN SECTION OF THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, TO A.A. GROMYKO, THE PERMANENT	

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR TO THE UNITED NATIONS. New York, December 4, 1947.....	407
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF S.K. TSARAPKIN, THE CHARGE D.C. CHARGE D.C. IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY OF PALESTINE, M. SCHERTOK, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON, E. EPSTEIN. December 8, 1947.....	408
RECORDING OF S.K. TSARAPKIN, THE CHARGE D.C. CHARGE D.C. IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH E. EPSTEIN, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON. December 18, 1947.....	411
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN M. SHERTOK, DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, WITH UN UNDER-SECRETARY- GENERAL A.A. SOBOLEV. December 26, 1947.....	414
NOTE OF THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR V.A.SORIN TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV. January 22, 1948.....	418
RECORDING OF S.K. TSARAPKIN, THE CHARGE D.C. CHARGE D.C. IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH E. EPSTEIN, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON. January 26, 1948.....	420
Secret.....	420
RECORDING OF S.K. TSARAPKIN, THE CHARGE D.C. CHARGE D.C. IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH E. EPSTEIN, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON. February 9, 1948.....	425
TELEGRAM OF M. SHERTOKU, DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, A MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE TO THE UN. February 12, 1948.....	427
TELEGRAM TO D. BEN-GURION, DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, FROM NEW YORK. February 13, 1948.....	428

LETTER FROM THE MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS OF THE USSR K. SERGEYCHUK TO THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY, DEPUTY FINANCE MINISTER OF THE USSR A.A. POPONOV, DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE OF THE USSR A.D. KRUTIKOV. March 6, 1948.....	429
MEMORANDUM BY W.EITAN, ALEVAVI, H.HERZOG, H.BERMAN AND E.SASSON March 26, 1948.....	430
NOTE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (B), THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR J.V. STALIN. April 9, 1948.....	433
REFERENCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY "THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE AFTER THE UN DECISION ON THE PARTITION OF THE COUNTRY". April 13, 1948.....	436
PROTOCOL RECORDING OF THE SPEECH OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR TO THE UN A.A.GROMYKO AT THE MEETING OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. April 20, 1948.....	445
NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR I.N.BAKULIN TO THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR V.A.SORIN. May 15, 1948.....	450
TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV. May 15, 1948.....	451
TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SCHERTOK. May 18, 1948.....	453
NOTE OF THE DEPUTY RESPONSIBLE SECRETARY OF THE JEWISH ANTI-FASCIST COMMITTEE IN THE USSR G.M. HEIFETZ TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (B). May 18, 1948.....	454

TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED STATES E. ESHPAIN. May 22, 1948.....	456
EXCHANGE OF TELEGRAMS BETWEEN ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHERTOK AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER V.M. MOLOTOV. May 24, 1948, May 25, 1948.....	457
NOTE OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE JEWISH ANTI-FASCIST COMMITTEE IN THE USSR IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (B). May 31, 1948.....	459
NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR I.N.BAKULIN TO THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR V.A.SORIN. June 5, 1948.....	466
FROM THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE JEWISH ANTI-FASCIST COMMITTEE IN THE USSR. June 7, 1948.....	467
TELEGRAM TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED STATES E. EPSTEIN. June 9, 1948.....	480
MEMORANDUM BY A. LEVAVI, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY. June 13, 1948.....	481
NOTE OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND TREATY-LEGAL DEPARTMENTS OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY TO THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY. June 16, 1948.....	485
TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED STATES E. ESIETAIN. June 16, 1948.....	486
TELEGRAM OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED STATES E. EPSTEIN TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK. June 18, 1948	487
TELEGRAM TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED STATES E. EPSTEIN. June 20, 1948.....	488

MEMORANDUM BY A. LEVAVI, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY. June 13, 1948.....	489
NOTE OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND TREATY-LEGAL DEPARTMENTS OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY TO THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY. June 16, 1948.....	493
TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED STATES E. ESIETAIN. June 16, 1948.....	494
TELEGRAM OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED STATES E. EPSTEIN TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK. June 18, 1948.....	495
TELEGRAM TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED STATES E. EPSTEIN. June 20, 1948.....	496
LETTER FROM THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY TO THE MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS OF THE USSR N.D.PSURTSEV. June 23, 1948.....	497
TELEGRAM TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED STATES E. EPSTEIN. June 23, 1948.....	498
LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL FOR RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY AT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR, MR. KARPOV, TO THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR, A.Y.VYSHINSKY. June 24, 1948...	499
P.I. ERSHOV, THE RIGHT ENVOY OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL. June 30, 1948.....	501
TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UN A. EAN. July 7, 1948.....	502
TELEGRAM TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED STATES E. EPSTEIN. July 22, 1948.....	503

TELEGRAM OF ISRAEL'S REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN A. EBAN TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SCHERTOK. July 23, 1948.....	504
LETTER FROM THE BOARD TO P.I.ERSHOV TO THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL. July 26, 1948.....	505
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA M.A. SILIN WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA E. UBERAL. August 9, 1948.....	507
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SCHERTOK. August 11, 1948.....	509
LETTER FROM ISRAEL'S REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN, A. EBAN TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SCHERTOK. August 12, 1948.....	512
LETTER FROM THE SPORTS ASSOCIATION "GAPOEL" TO THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. August 12, 1948.....	514
RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SOVIET MISSION ADVISER IN ISRAEL, M. MUKHIN, WITH ISRAELI CITIZEN S.V. TSIRULNIKOV. August 13, 1948.....	516
INFORMATION OF THE SECOND SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE VOCS IN ISRAEL M.P. FEDORIN ABOUT THE MEETING OF THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS OF THE USSR. August 14, 1948	520
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. August 14, 1948.....	522
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL D.BEN-GURION. August 17, 1948.....	524
NEW VERSION OF PARAGRAPH 18 (AND) OF THE DRAFT DIRECTIVES OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE. August 26, 1948.....	526

THE CREDENTIALS OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. August 26, 1948.....	527
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SECOND SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE VOCS IN ISRAEL M.P. FEDORIN WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS OF THE USSR L. TARNOPOLER. August 31, 1948	528
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SCHERTOK. September 2, 1948.....	532
TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK. September 6, 1948.....	535
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. September 7, 1948.....	536
TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SCHERTOK. September 7, 1948.....	541
LETTER FROM THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR, V.A.SORIN, TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL FOR RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY AFFAIRS AT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR, G.G. KARPOV. September 10, 1948	542
TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SCHERTOK. September 11, 1948.....	545
TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SCHERTOK. September 12, 1948.....	546
LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN TO THE ENVOY OF ISRAEL TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. September 12, 1948.....	547

RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY ATTACHE OF THE ISRAELI MISSION IN THE USSR, COLONEL I. RATNER, WITH MAJOR GENERAL I.M. SARAEV. September 13, 1948.....	551
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV WITH THE COMMISSIONER FOR RUSSIAN PROPERTY IN ISRAEL I. RABINOVICH. September 13, 1948.....	554
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY I.N.BAKULIN WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. September 15, 1948.....	556
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SCHERTOK. September 16, 1948.....	558
EXTRACT FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE (B) "ON THE DIRECTIVES OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE 3RD SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY". September 17, 1948.....	563
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR, F.T. GUSEV, WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. September 17, 1948.....	564
NOTE OF THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR G.M. MALENKOV TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (B), CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR J.V. STALIN. September 18, 1948.....	566
RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE ADVISER OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL, M. MUKHINA, WITH THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY, W. EITAN. September 20, 1948.....	577
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE DEPUTY HEAD OF THE CONSULAR DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY I.B. KONJUKOV WITH THE ADVISER OF	

THE ISRAELI MISSION IN THE USSR M.NAMIR. September 21, 1948.....	580
NOTE OF THE DEPUTY HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR A.D.S. ZYBORIN TO THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR V.A.SORIN. September 22, 1948.....	581
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV WITH THE SECRETARIES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED WORKERS' PARTY OF ISRAEL (MAPAM) J. RIFTIN AND L. LEVIT. September 23, 1948	582
TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK. September 24, 1948.....	585
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SCHERTOK. September 27, 1948.....	587
LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI INTERIOR MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN TO THE ENVOY OF ISRAEL TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. September 28, 1948.....	592
LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SCHERTOK, IN PARIS. September 30, 1948.....	596
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL P.I. ERSHOV WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE PROVISIONAL STATE COUNCIL OF ISRAEL H. WEIZMAN. October 5, 1948.....	598
TELEGRAM OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE TO THE ISRAELI MISSION TO THE USSR, COLONEL I. RATNER TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF ISRAEL D.BEN-GURION. October 6, 1948.....	599
LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL FOR RELIGIOUS WORSHIP AT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR D.D. POLYANSKY TO THE FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR,	

TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV. October 6, 1948.....	600
TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY W. EITAN. October 6. 1948.....	603
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV WITH THE ISRAELI POLITICIAN M.SNE. October 9, 1948.....	604
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE HEAD OF THE PRESS DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY V.S.VASILENKO WITH THE FIRST SECRETARY, PRESS ATTACHE OF THE ISRAELI MISSION IN THE USSR A. LEVAVI. October 14, 1948.....	609
ORDER OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR TO GO TO ISRAEL RUSSIAN SPIRITUAL MISSION. October 14, 1948	610
TELEPHONEOGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (B), THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR J.V. STALIN. October 19, 1948.....	611
NOTE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (B), THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR J.V. STALIN. October 20, 1948.....	612
LETTER FROM THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL, P.I.ERSHOV, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR V.A.SORIN. October 20, 1948.....	616
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE HEAD OF THE CONSULAR DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY A.P. VLASOV WITH THE ADVISER OF THE ISRAELI MISSION IN THE USSR M.NAMIR. October 21, 1948.....	618
FROM THE REPORT OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHERTOK AT THE MEETING OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. October 26, 1948.....	620

RECORDING OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECOND SECRETARY OF THE MIDDLE AND MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY E.M. PODVIGINA WITH THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE ISRAELI MISSION IN THE USSR A. LEVAVI. October 27, 1948.....	625
LETTER FROM DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE OF THE USSR M.A. MENSHIKOV TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M.MOLOTOV. October 30, 1948. 626	626
LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR I.N.BAKULIN TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD IN/ ABOUT THE "INTERNATIONAL BOOK" YU.M. KAGANOVICH. November 4, 1948.....	627
TELEGRAM OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL D.BEN- GURION TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR J.V.STALIN. November 5, 1948.....	628
TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR G. MEYERSON November 5, 1948.....	629
TELEGRAM OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF ISRAEL D.BEN-GURION TO THE MILITARY ATTACHE TO THE ISRAELI MISSION TO THE USSR COLONEL I. RATNER. November 8, 1948.....	636
TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY W. EITAN. November 9, 1948.....	638
LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY I.N.BAKULIN TO THE RESPONSIBLE HEAD OF TASS N.G. PALGUNOV. November 12, 1948.....	639
LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR I.N.BAKULIN TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF VOCS A.I.DENISOV. November 12, 1948.....	640
LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE EASTERN DEPARTMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION, I.SLADKOVSKY TO THE HEAD OF THE	

DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY I.N.BAKULIN. November 72, 1948.....	641
LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN TO THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON, AND TO THE MISSION ADVISER M.NAMIR. November 17, 1948.....	643
TELEGRAM OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET COUNCIL OF MINISTERS I.V.STALIN TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL D.BEN-GURION. November 18, 1948.....	645
LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK AND THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON, IN PARIS. November 21, 1948.....	646
NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR I.N.BAKULIN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR V.A.SORIN. November 24, 1948.....	650
LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL FOR RELIGIOUS WORSHIP AT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR D.D. POLYANSKY TO THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR V.A.SORIN November 30, 1948...	652
TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M.NAMIR TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY, U. EITAN. December 2, 1948.....	654
TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M. NAMIR TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN. December 10, 1948.....	655
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHERTOK AND THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY.....	655
TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M. NAMIR TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN. December 16, 1948.....	665

LETTER FROM THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR, V.A.SORIN, TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL FOR RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY AFFAIRS AT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR, G.G. KARPOV. December 22, 1948	667
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL D.BEN-GURION WITH THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV. December 27, 1948.....	669
LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN TO THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR, M.NAMIR. December 31, 1948.....	672
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN WITH THE ADVISER OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL M.I. MUHIN. January 11, 1949.....	675
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY I.N.BAKULIN WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. January 19, 1949.....	677
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY AND THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. January 20, 1949.....	679
LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MIDDLE EAST FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR I.N.BAKULIN TO THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV. January 21, 1949.	680
TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SCHERTOK. January 22, 1949.....	681
LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN TO THE ENVOY OF ISRAEL TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. January 26, 1949.....	682
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF	

THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN WITH THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV. February 1, 1949.	684
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN WITH THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV. February 3, 1949.	688
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR V.A.SORIN WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. February 7, 1949.....	690
ORAL STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF the USSR. February 7, 1949.....	692
TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SCHERTOK. February 9, 1949.....	693
LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN OF THE ISRAELI MISSION TO THE USSR. February 9, 1949.....	695
LETTER FROM THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL, P.I.ERSHOV, HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY, I.N.BAKULIN. February 10, 1949	698
LETTER FROM THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR V.A.SORIN TO THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF SOVIET PROPERTY ABROAD AT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR V.A.SERGEYEV. February 10, 1949.....	699
LETTER FROM THE SECOND SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE VOCS IN ISRAEL, M.P.FEDORIN I.O. HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF VOKS YU.I.KOSYAKINA. February 10, 1949	700
TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR G. MEYERSON. February 13, 1949.....	701

TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M.NAMIR TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SCHERTOK. February 17, 1949.....	702
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE AND MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY I.N.BAKULIN WITH THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M.NAMIR. February 28, 1949.....	703
LETTER FROM THE SECOND SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE VOCS IN ISRAEL, M.P.FEDORIN I.O. HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF VOKS YU.I.KOSYAKINA. March 2, 1949. .	704
TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M. NAMIR TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN. March 10, 1949.....	705
TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SCHARETTE TO THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M.NAMIR. March 14, 1949.....	706
RECORDING OF A.Y.VYSHINSKY' FOREIGN MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M.NAMIR. March 14, 1949.....	708
REFERENCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY "THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL". March 15, 1949.....	709
TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M. NAMIR TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN. March 18, 1949.....	713
TELEGRAM OF THE CHIEF OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE IDF OF THE ISRAEL DEFENSE, LIEUTENANT COLONEL H. DUKE, TO THE MILITARY ATTACHE OF THE ISRAELI MISSION TO THE USSR, COLONEL I. RATNER. March 24, 1949.....	716
TELEGRAM OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S.	

FRIEDMAN OF THE ISRAELI MISSION TO THE USSR. April 1, 1949.....	717
TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY W. EITAN. April 8, 1949.....	718
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY AND THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. April 14, 1949.....	719
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON, WITH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY. April 14, 1949.....	722
STATEMENT BY THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. April 18, 1949.....	729
TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M.NAMIR TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHARETT. April 23, 1949.....	731
RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE AND MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY I.N.BAKULIN WITH THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M.NAMIR. May 13, 1949	732

OPENING REMARKS BY RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER I.S. IVANOV

Dear readers,

It is known that the future cannot be built without knowing the past. In this sense, the publication of the Russian-Israeli documentary collection is of great importance. In fact, it is a unique attempt to look together at the history of Russian-Israeli relations, which have come a long way, having experienced all the consequences of sharp turns in the development of the international and regional situation of the second half of the twentieth century. For almost a quarter of a century, Russia and Israel have been deprived of normal interstate and human communication. This situation was the result of the cold war, when public interests were often replaced by ideological stamps, and the uncompromising logic of global confrontation overshadowed a promising vision of things and even common sense.

Fortunately, these times have fallen into oblivion. The full Russian-Israeli relations restored in 1991 are gaining momentum. Thanks to the much increased degree of openness and freedom of contacts, we have been able to get to know each other better in a short period of time, to become on the path to overcoming the layers of the past. Not the least role here is played by the fact that in the last ten years in Israel settled hundreds of thousands of people, for whom the native language is Russian. They have in many ways become the link between our countries, the living bridge that leads to confidence-building and constructive cooperation. The pages of this edition reflect the

different views of Russian and Israeli figures and diplomats. This is natural, because Russia and Israel are states with their own views and traditions. Their juxtaposition allows us to re-reflect on the lessons of the past in order to move forward and develop mutually beneficial cooperation in the future.

I am convinced that the publication of the collection will be a notable step in the progressive development of the renewed relations between the two countries, and the materials extracted from the archives will be useful not only for Middle Eastern professionals, but also for all those who are interested in the modern history of the Middle East.

I.S. Ivanov Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

OPENING REMARKS BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL D. LEVY

The official publication of documents on Soviet-Israeli relations is an exceptional development. Governments do not often carry out joint official publications and generally prefer to present their own position by publishing collections separately. The decision to prepare a joint collection, taken by our Governments immediately after the restoration of relations in 1991, was an important step in building confidence and overcoming the consequences of the nearly quarter-end period of mutual suspicion and antagonism. This edition is the first part of the project. It allows you to see from within Soviet-Israeli relations during their formation. It largely removes the veil of mystery around the Soviet Union's firm support for the creation of the State of Israel in 1947-1948, as well as the subsequent departure of the Soviet Union from this position.

Documents, in addition to being interesting to read, give a clear historical lesson for the future. For almost the entire period under review, our countries confronted each other, which was hardly in the true interests of Israel and the Soviet Union. Conflicts were often caused by the Cold War, in which the Middle East became a battleground between the major powers.

Thus, from the outset, Israel could only have a very limited impact on its relations with the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union's interest in Israel and Arab countries was merely a reflection of its relations with the United States.

With the end of the cold war, obstacles that hindered the development of relations and fuelled hostility were removed. The restoration of relations coincided with the progress of the peace process, in which Russia, as a co-sponsor along with the United States, now plays an important positive role. The Russian Government can use its traditionally strong position in our Arab neighbours to achieve reconciliation. Russian Jews are no longer an apple of contention between our countries. Moreover, about a million new immigrants from Russia serve as a bridge to strengthen Russian-Israeli economic, scientific and cultural ties.

As it is clear from the published documents, the main themes of the Soviet-Israeli dialogue have not lost their relevance for us. The experience of the history of bilateral relations increasingly leads Russia to the realization that Israel is a strong, technologically advanced and economically developed country in the Middle East, which has the right to a safe and peaceful existence. Israel, for its part, has come to understand that Russia, as a great power located on the European and Asian continents, has direct interests in our region. We are convinced that these interests can be aimed at ensuring the stability, security and prosperity of the Middle East.

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Israel

FOREWORD BY THE RUSSIAN-ISRAELI EDITORIAL BOARD

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Israel, on the basis of the relevant protocol concluded between them on 27 April 1993, are publishing a joint Russian-Israeli documentary book. The first volume of the collection consists of two books covering the period 1941-May 1949 and May 1949-1953.

The collection includes a variety of documents and materials that reveal the formation and development of relations between our countries in various fields. Its training is provided by the Russian-Israeli editorial board and working groups of the parties.

The book was published in Russian language in Moscow and in English in Jerusalem. Both editions are identical in composition of documents, which are arranged in chronological order.

FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE RUSSIAN EDITION

The joint Russian-Israeli collection of documents reflecting the formation and development of relations between the Soviet Union and Israel between 1941 and 1953 included Russian and Israeli documents, most of which are published for the first time. The material selection was carried out on the basis of parity and was aimed at objective and reliable disclosure of the topic. Both editions, both in Russian and in English, are identical in documentary composition. The reference apparatus and comments were compiled by the parties in accordance with national standards for the production of documentary publications.

Accordingly, the Russian editorial board was guided by the rules that have been established and tested in the Russian diplomatic service for many years of publishing activity. The only element that the editor

introduces to the publication is the title given to each document. It identifies first of all the nature of the document (diplomatic note, letter, internal service note, telegram, recording of the conversation, etc.), as well as the name, initials and position of the person on whose behalf the document is sent to whom it is addressed.

The names of the documents of the Russian side reflect the practice traditionally adopted in the Russian Foreign Ministry (recording of the conversation, letter, note, reference, etc.). In the headlines given to the documents of the Israeli side, because of their often significant differences in form from Russian documents, descriptive (e.g., a report on the conversation) or author's names (memorandum, analytical note) were used.

Documents' own titles are stored as subtitles highlighted in the font, are listed in the footnotes, or are included as a composite, quoted element in the editorial title.

In some cases, when this was dictated by the obvious need for clarification, the location of the event or the place of the document was drawn up, respectively, either on one line with the date of the document or at the end of the title, through a comma (depending on the type of document).

The date of the document is listed under the headline, right. For documents on meetings, negotiations, meetings, speeches, it is usually the date of the event; for the rest - the date of compilation (signing), sometimes clerical registration. The difficult cases encountered in dating are stipulated in footnotes.

The official litters on the documents, if they are substantial rather than formal, are reproduced after the text of the document and italics.

The signature of the document is considered as its component and is published in accordance with the original. A fairly large number of documents provided by the Israeli side is unsigned, although their authorship is unquestionable and is therefore reflected in the headline; no further explanation is made in these cases.

The editorial board strictly followed the principle of non-intrusion in the text of the published documents. If, however, by mutual consent, the editorial boards have decided to publish only part of the document or make amendments in it, in the appropriate places there is a sharpening in brackets and a brief explanation is given. Where, in order to better understand the content, one or more words would be required, in the opinion of the editorial board, or to make up for a pass that was clearly mistaken in the compilation, the appropriate clarification was introduced in brackets. Correction of obvious errors of the text (typos, violation of agreement, etc.) is not specified.

The requirements of modern spelling and punctuation are observed. The names of well-known foreign figures are printed in the transcription adopted in the scientific literature, the spelling of geographical names, press bodies, companies, institutions, etc. is as specified as possible. In all cases, the text is followed by archival ciphers or data about the first publication. The editorial board considers, however, to apologise in advance if inaccuracies are found anywhere, especially in Hebrew names.

The Editors found it useful to provide the publication with explanations - references to other documents and brief clarifications in the form of footnotes and more detailed notes, which are marked in the text with numbers in ascending order and printed in one block at the end of each book. The publication is also equipped with a name pointer, brief

biographical information about the most frequently mentioned persons and a list of abbreviations.

In the work to identify and select documents staff of the Historical and Documentary Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Barsukov S.A., Treasurers V.G., Melnikov O.V., Nesterenko E.V., Pedan-Volbenko E.V., Tarasov G.F., Tolkova T.V., diplomatic consultant Experts of the State Archives of the Russian Federation and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences gave an expert assessment of the composition of the documents of the collection.

**FROM THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF
THE LONDON OFFICE OF THE JEWISH
AGENCY FOR PALESTINE January 30, 1941**

Secretly

Attended: Dr. Weitzman, Ms Dugdale, Prof. Namir, Mr. Lockyer, Mr. Linton.

Speaking out: Dr Weitzman said he had had a very unfortunate conversation with Mr Duff-Cooper, who was not willing to meet at all.

He had a very interesting conversation with Mr. May, the Russian ambassador. The purpose of his visit was to discuss a proposal that the Russian government buy oranges in Palestine by paying for them with furs in New York. M. Maysky said that he is not a businessman, but the proposal seems reasonable to him, and he will report it to his government, expressing his support for this idea. Dr. Weitzman noted that such a barter agreement would be mutually beneficial for both parties. Oranges from Palestine should have found their customers in Russia long ago, and such trade contacts in the future would be very valuable. Then M. Maisky asked how the war affects Palestine, Dr. Weitzman outlined the economic situation.

Then the conversation turned to political issues. Dr. Weizmann told M. Maysky that the Arab-Israeli issue has been frozen for the time being. There is now some semblance of cooperation between the two peoples, but of course there may be a new sharp escalation. Then they discussed possible solutions to this problem after the war (it is interesting to note that M. May indirectly allowed for Britain the possibility of victory in the war). M. Maisky said that after the war there would be a big problem related to the Jews, to which Mr. Weitzman replied that, with the exception of Palestine, the British Empire, America and to some extent (and in some sense) Russia, Jewry was destroyed. M. Maisky asked: in Dr. Weizmann's opinion, the only solution to the Jewish question is possible only in Palestine? To his affirmative answer M. Maisky said that there will be an

exchange of population. Dr. Weitzman said that if half a million Arabs could be resettled, two million Jews could take their place. This, of course, would be the first wave of resettlement that could happen later - it is a matter for history. M.Maisky noted that Russia also had to deal with the exchange of the population. Dr. Weitzman stated that the distances to be dealt with in Palestine would be much shorter: they would resettle Arabs only in Iraq or Transjordan. M. Maysky asked whether there could be some difficulties in resettling the population from hilly areas to plains; Dr. Weitzman replied that the Arab population living in the Jordan Valley could have started, but in any case the conditions in Transjordan were not very different from those in mountainous Palestine.

He then told M.Maisky about efforts to establish cooperative settlements. Maysky said that Jews in Russia have shown themselves to be very good farmers. He asked how community settlements were developing and asked what progress had been made in their robust rooting. Dr. Weitzman replied that such settlements were developing well if they were not too numerous, with the maximum number of settlers likely to be between 800 and 1,000. M. Maisky said that their experience in Russia in many ways turned out to be the same. Large groups disintegrated, so the community of about 800 people was the most optimal. Dr. Weitzman went on to explain to M. Maysky that the land designated for settlements had been "nationalized" and that the settlers had been paying their obligations for three years. The Palestinian Authority called them "communists" because of the collective settlements, and the Russian government considered them "counter-revolutionaries", but in fact they were just Zionists. M.Maisky, in kind of, mom, liked this explanation. He then returned to the question of the Arabs, and Dr. Weitzman explained

that they could not treat them in a way that, for example, the Russian authorities would treat backward segments of the population in the USSR. They wouldn't want to do that. When M. Maisky called the Arabs "sons of the desert," Dr. Weitzman told him that Major Jarvis, who had extensive experience with them in Sinai, called them "the fathers of the desert" in his book. M. Maysky liked this statement. At the end of the conversation, M. Maisky said that he had learned a lot about Palestine and the Jewish problem. He would telegraph to his government about the orange proposal and would inform Dr. Weitzman as soon as he received a reply. Mr. Maysky then mentioned the problem of yeshiva students in Vilna. He stated that the Russian government was ready to grant them permission to leave for Palestine. Dr. Weitzman said that they would be happy to see them, but that there were difficulties in obtaining certificates for them to enter Palestine.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE GENERAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
USSR IN THE UK I.M.MAYSKY WITH THE
PRESIDENT OF THE WORLD ZIONIST
ORGANIZATION H. WEITZMAN February 3,
1941**

The other day I had an unexpected guest: the famous leader of zionism Dr. Weitzman. Tall, elderly, elegantly dressed gentleman with pale yellow skin and a large bald head. There are a lot of wrinkles and some dark spots on the face. Nose with a hump, beard wedge, calm slow speech. He speaks Russian very well, although he left Russia 45 years ago.

Weizmann came to this case: Palestine now has nowhere to export its oranges, will the USSR not take them in exchange for furs? The fur could be well marketed through Jewish firms in America.

I told Weitzman that the offhand could not say anything definite, but promised to make inquiries. In a preliminary order, however, I noted that Palestinian Jews should not be seduced by special hopes: we do not usually import fruit from abroad. And so it turned out. Moscow reacted negatively to Weizmann's proposal, which I notified him with a letter today.

However, in connection with the conversation about oranges, Weitzman touched on Palestinian affairs in general. Moreover, he was talking about the state and prospects of world Jewry. Weizmann is extremely pessimistic.

In total, according to his calculations, there are now about 17 million Jews in the world. These are Jews living in the United States, the British Empire and the USSR. In particular, weitzman says about Soviet Jews:

I'm not worried about them. Nothing threatens them. It will be 20 to 30 years , and if the current regime continues in your country, they will assimilate.

How are they assimilated? Don't you know that Jews in the USSR enjoy all the rights of the national minority along with Armenians, Georgians, Ukrainians, etc.?

"No, I know that very well," Weitzman said, "but when I say "assimilate," I just mean that Soviet Jews will gradually become an integral part of the mainstream of Russian life. I may not like it, but I am ready to put up with it: at least, Soviet Jews are on the road, and their fate does not make me shudder. What I cannot think of without horror is the fate of the 6-7 million Jews who live in Central and South-Eastern Europe: Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Balkans and especially Poland. What's going to happen to them? Where will they go?

Weitzman took a deep breath and added:

"If Germany wins the war, they will all die. However, I do not believe in the victory of Germany. But if England wins the war, what then?

And then Weitzman began to express his fears. The British do not like Jews, especially they do not like the English colonial administrators. This is particularly evident in Palestine, where both Jews and Arabs live. Here, British "high commissioners" certainly prefer Arabs to Jews. why? It's very simple why.

The English colonial administrator usually goes to school in such British possessions as Nigeria, Sudan, Rhodesia, etc. It's simple, easy, it's calm. No major problems and no claims from the managed. The English receptionist likes it and he gets used to it. And in Palestine? Here, Weizmann continued, "you can't go far on such a program. There are big and complex problems here. True, Palestinian Arabs are familiar to the administrator guinea pigs, but the Jews lead him to

despair. They are dissatisfied with everything, they put questions, they demand answers, sometimes difficult answers. The receptionist starts to get angry. Begins to look at the Jews as a nuisance. And most importantly, the administrator always feels that the Jew looks at him and thinks to himself: "You're smart?.. And I'm maybe twice as smart as you."

This finally sets the administrator against the Jews, and he begins to praise the Arabs. Whether it's with them! They don't want anything and don't bother you.

And so, given all these circumstances, Weitzman wonders with dismay: what can a British victory promise to a Jew? He wonders and comes to disappointing conclusions. For the only "plan" that Weitzman can come up with to save Central European Jewry (primarily Polish Jewry) is this: to resettle from Palestine to Iraq a million Arabs living now in Palestine, and on the land occupied by them to settle 4-5 million Jews from Poland and other countries. But it is unlikely that the British will go for it, if they do not go, what will happen next?

I expressed surprise, how is it to the territory occupied by a million Arabs, Weitzman is going to bring 5 million Jews?

"Oh, don't worry," Weitzman laughed. "Arab is often called the "son of the desert." It would be more correct to call him "the father of the desert." By its laziness and primitiveness, it turns the flowering garden into a desert. Give me land occupied by a million Arabs, and I will perfectly arrange it for five times the number of Jews.

Weitzman sadly shook his head and finished, "That's just how to get this land?..."

**RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION
BETWEEN E. NEUMANN, A MEMBER OF
THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR
PALESTINE, AND THE HEAD OF THE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
OF THE WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS, M.
PERL-TSWEIG, WITH THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES,
K.A. UMANSKY July 17, 1941**

Rabbi Perlzweig, representing the American Jewish Congress⁶, and I, representing the Emergency Committee on Zionist Affairs, were received by the Ambassador in a friendly and even cordial setting.

At first, we suggested that the recent events that had brought Soviet Russia to the side of democracy had opened the possibility of establishing working relations between representatives of Jewish organizations and the Soviet government.

Mr. Umansky agreed. He took the opportunity to state that Jewish groups and organizations, especially the Jewish press in the United States, had in the past strenuously attacked the Soviet government. There is a very voluminous dossier on this issue. However, he believes that the only way to continue our relationship is to draw a line under the past and think about the future. If we continue to debate the past, we will come to nothing.

Then we moved on to discussing two specific issues. The first was the question of allowing some Jews to leave Russia for Palestine or other countries. Mr. Umansky claimed that The Jews, who had been living in the territories that had retreated to Russia after the outbreak of the war, had become citizens of the Soviet state and that the vast majority (95%) had been killed. satisfied with their new position. Therefore, there is no point in trying to resolve issues on their behalf. We offered to start by discussing the possibilities of departure for those Jews who came to Russia from places west of the border, which Mr. Umansky called the "Curzon Line". As an example, we cited several names, including Rabbi Shore of Warsaw, Dr. Sommernggein of Lemberg, and Ms. Tartakover. Mr. Umansky noted that he believed that Rabbi Shore had been in Moscow and had been at large for the past four or five months. He does not know whether there are many who would like to leave Russia or go elsewhere, but suggests that we first submit a list of names that he would be happy to hand over to his government. We agreed to do so.

The second theme we raised was the conditions for providing assistance to those Jews who probably needed it because they had not been able to adapt to social and economic conditions. Mr. Umansky did not deny that such cases exist, but asked that we put forward our ideas and proposals.

During the conversation, the Ambassador took the opportunity to point out the satisfactory conditions in which Jews exist in Russia are satisfactory. He recalled the signs in the streets in Yiddish, the synagogues, the Jewish republic in Birobidzhan, etc. It seemed that these figures included non-Jews, but we did not ask questions on this subject.

We exchanged comments about the Zionists, Mr. Umansky argued that it would be better not to engage

in a discussion on the subject. He claimed that the Government did not arrest Jews for being Zionists. Everyone can be a Zionist and believe in zionism without being persecuted for it. He stated that the Soviet Government only took action against those people (whether they were Jews or non-Jews) whose actions were hostile. Since we had previously agreed not to raise the issue of the Soviet position on zionism and Zionists, we agreed not to continue discussing this topic.

At the end of the conversation, which lasted almost an hour, Mr. Umansky asked several questions not directly related to the situation in Palestine. He then noted that the future of Palestine would of course be determined at the forthcoming peace conference, at which Soviet Russia would be present and have a say. To this I replied that, of course, we would be happy to have as many friends as possible at the peace conference.

We left, having agreed that we will provide the requested materials on time and will continue the contacts started.

Throughout the conversation, the ambassador maintained a friendly tone and attentive attitude.

Emmanuel Neumann

**TELEGRAM OF J.I., A STAFF MEMBER OF
THE LONDON OFFICE OF THE JEWISH
AGENCY FOR PALESTINE. LINTON
DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE BOARD OF THE
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE M.
SHERTOKU August 2, 1941**

Last week, Brodecki and Lockyer met with the first secretary of the Russian embassy, Novikov. Novikov was sympathetic to the request for the release of the Polish Zionists, which was prepared for sending to Moscow, but pointed out that the issue may have already been settled in the agreement between Russia and Poland⁸. As for the legalization of zionism, Novikov replied that the Soviet Union could not allow any political movements to exist on its territory. With regard to the Russian Zionists, he pointed out that, in the preliminary plan, there was some prospect of obtaining a release permit if emigration was then secured. In general, it is likely that it will be possible to

obtain permission to leave Russia for Jews wishing to emigrate to Palestine, but this should not be accompanied by any propaganda. According to Novikov, there is no prohibition on individual Hebrew study, but in his opinion it is unlikely that the Soviet authorities would agree to include Hebrew in the official curriculum; there is also a general ban on private teaching. We propose to submit a memorandum to May on the following issues: first, the release of arrested or exiled Russian Zionists. Secondly, a general permit to emigrate to Palestine. Third, the establishment of a Jewish Agency for Palestine. Fourthly, the permission to hold cultural events. Fifth, permission to study and teach Hebrew. Tell the Telegraph your point of view with the number of Exiled Russian Zionists, their names and places of detention.

Linton

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR
TO GREAT BRITAIN I.M.MAYSKY IN NKID
USSR September 2, 1941**

Top Secret Immediately

I had a well-known leader of the Zionism Weizmann today. I came to ask for advice. The conversion of the Jews of the USSR found a great response among the Jews of England and America. Weizmann, on behalf of the Zionist movement, would like to send a telegram of sympathy and greetings in response to this appeal. Should he do it? In view of the negative attitude of the Soviet government towards Zionism, will its telegram cause any completely undesirable reaction? I replied

that I saw no reason why Weitzman could not send his telegram, but advised him to help ensure that the responses to the appeal were not only from the Zionists, but also from other Jewish organizations. Weitzman was quite satisfied and told that among other Jewish organizations in England (in particular, the Council of Deputies of Jewish Communities, which, however, has nothing to do with the Soviet authorities) is already moving to send a response to Soviet Jews. Weizmann had doubts only about sending a telegram for his own signature. Meanwhile, he considers it especially important to respond to the Soviet appeal. In England now Jews are not allowed to reveal their attitude to the war in any way, in Palestine the British are hindering the creation of Jewish troops (there is only one Jewish division¹⁰). With such great satisfaction he notes that the voice of the Jews in this war first came out of the USSR. Weitzman has just returned from the United States, where he spent 4 months. According to his impressions, over the last 6-7 weeks the public interest in war among Americans has fallen significantly, because the average American thinks something like this: the Russians fight well, together with the British they somehow will wipe out Hitler, and we, the Americans, do not make sense to get too deep into these affairs. Weitzman considers such sentiments criminally frivolous and thinks that American Jewry, if properly stimulated, will be able to strongly counteract them. That is why he wholeheartedly welcomes the initiative of Soviet Jews.

May

**LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION H.
WEIZMANN TO THE AMBASSADOR OF THE
USSR IN THE UK I.M.MAY September 8,
1941**

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

On behalf of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, I attach to this letter our response to the call made during the recent general meeting in Moscow would be grateful if you could arrange for its transfer.

Yours sincerely,

H. Weitzman
President

APPATU To the Moscow Anti-Fascist Committee

We have received your call to all the Jews of the world to unite in the fight against Hitler and all that he stands for, and fully agree with this call. From the very beginning, Hitler chose the Jews as his victims. In those countries that were enslaved one by one, he pursued his brutal policies even more actively each time than before. His example was followed by fascists all over the world. Now he came to the land of the Soviet Union. It is with deep sadness that we hear of your suffering, but we are proud of your struggle in the Soviet Army, whose actions have earned universal admiration and increased confidence in victory. This faith has never been and will never be lost, even in the darkest hours. Where Jews have been enslaved, they bear the hardships of their destiny with dignity. Where they are free, they fight. In Palestine, the Jewish community, now half a million people, is contributing to this struggle. Ten thousand Jews have enlisted in the Jewish military or served in the Royal Navy and Air Force. They fought valiantly in Libya, Abyssinia, Greece, Crete and Syria. Many more thousands are eager to enlist in the military, and if the enemy ever comes to Palestine, the men and women of our people, like you, will all fight it. Tens of thousands of people in other countries are asking for the opportunity to serve in the Jewish army so that we, as a people, can take our place in the struggle for common cause.

Helmet you brotherly hello. You can assure all your fellow citizens that Jews all over the world will not give a common cause.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF THE
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE D.BEN-
GURION WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF THE
USSR IN GREAT BRITAIN I.M. MAY October
9, 1941**

Secretly

Having said that I am very grateful for his courtesy to take me in these difficult days, immediately moved on to the purpose of my visit.

He said he had recently come from Palestine and would soon be in the United States. He mentioned that for the last eight years he was the leader of the Jewish people and trade union movement all over the world, and therefore in the USSR, a movement that includes the USSR. We really wanted to help and do everything we could to do it. We know, of course, the scope of the struggle and the enormous power of the forces involved. We understand that Jews are just a small people and Jewish trade unions are only part of this people, so of course we can't do much. But there's something we can do. So I wanted him to know what Jewish trade unions are in Palestine, what they are fighting for. In Palestine, the Jewish community was small, about half a million of the population of one and a half million. Of this half a million, about 125,000 were members of the trade union federation. Trade unions are the leading force of the Jewish community in Palestine. The chairman of the Jewish community was a trade unionist. Trade unions are the main factor in the colonization of Palestine. Almost all the settlements founded by the Zionist organization were trade union, based on the principles of communal (I want to point out to avoid a mistake that I did not say communist) life. Although from an economic point of view, they were communist settlements, our movement was not communist. About 80 LLC workers in Palestine lived in such settlements. In America, most organized Jewish trade unions supported us. In all countries, hundreds of thousands of young men and women were our supporters. On some issues, we disagreed not only with the Communists in Russia, but also with the leaders of the labour movements in Britain and on the European continent. We were also

at odds with other Jewish Zionists, and in this case the main reason was that we took our goals very seriously: for us, zionism is a matter of life or death, and we want to solve the problems at all costs. We take our socialist ideas very seriously and strive to achieve our goal. Indeed, we have already created elements of the socialist commonwealth in Palestine. This was done only on a voluntary basis, as we did not have state power. However, we believe that people can do great things of their own free will if they really want to.

At present, we are extremely interested in two things about Russia: first, we really want to do everything in our power to help achieve our common victory; Secondly, we would like to dispel the misunderstanding that has arisen in connection with Palestine. During the unrest there before the war, we were attacked by Arab terrorists. They were not led by the working Arab movement or other progressive elements of the Arab people, but they enjoyed the moral support of the Communist Party. I do not criticize the past, but we are concerned about Russia's attitude towards Palestine in the future. At the end of the war, Russia will be at least one of the three leading powers determining the fate of the new world. We represent the growing community of Palestine. I came to Moscow eighteen years ago on behalf of the Trade Union Federation of Palestine. At that time we represented a very small group—the entire Palestinian Jewish community numbered only about 100 LLC, and the trade union group about 8000. Over the past 10 years, we have transported more than 300,000 people, and once the war is over, no matter what British politics is in Palestine, our community will grow. This is vital for all of our people and I believe it is important for the international trade union movement, because we are the only organized trade union movement throughout the Middle East.

We understand that now the main concern for Moscow is the war, at the same time we know that the USSR thinks not only about its own destiny. We would therefore like to send a two or three-person delegation to Moscow with a dual purpose: 1) to clarify how we can assist the USSR. In Palestine itself, 10,000 people have joined the British army and another 40,000 want to fight. But we believe that we are able to do something outside of Palestine; 2) Make sure that Moscow clearly understands the role and importance of the trade union movement in Palestine for the Jewish people and the trade union movement as a whole.

He said, "You're going to America. You will do us a great service if you bring to the consciousness of Americans the problem of urgency to help us, we need tanks, guns, planes - as much as possible, and, most importantly, as soon as possible."

I said I would definitely do what I could. I'm aware that it may be a little, but I have friends in the trade union movement in the U.S., both Jewish and non-Jews, and we know a number of people close to the administration.

He then said of the delegation to Moscow: "I would suggest that you send me a written memorandum outlining what you have just said about the position of the trade union movement in Palestine and especially about your community. I will immediately send him to Moscow with my recommendations. You understand that these days Moscow is mostly engaged in war." He then asked how long I was going to be in England and I replied that maybe three or four weeks. He said that in this case he could get a response from Moscow before I left.

Before I left, I asked him about Umansky if he had already returned to Washington. He replied that Umansky was still in Moscow and that he did not know

when he would return. He knows that our people have been in contact with him about the prisoners of the Zionists, and that our representation here is also dealing with this issue. Since I visited him on histadrut's orders, I did not go into this matter.

D. Ben-Gurion

**NOTE OF S.I.KAVTARADZE, HEAD OF THE
MIDDLE EASTERN DEPARTMENT OF THE
NKID OF THE USSR, TO THE FIRST DEPUTY
PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY
December 31, 1941**

Secretly

On December 8, on the personal recommendation of the British Ambassador to Ankara, Hugossen, ambassador of the USSR T. Vinogradov received a representative of the Jewish Palestinian Agency for Emigration and Colonization, Epstein Elias Menachem.

According to the latter, the organization is officially recognized by the League of Nations and still has offices in Geneva, London, Washington and Istanbul.

Epstein Elias Menachem made the following suggestions to T. Vinogradov:

1. Palestine would like to establish trade ties with the USSR by supplying medicines to the Union. In the event of a positive attitude of the Soviet government to this, Epstein would like to go to the USSR with a specialist in the production of chemist Dobki Ilya to conduct negotiations. Epstein pointed out that the organization he represented could send a team of doctors to the USSR with visiting hospitals.

2. If Epstein was allowed to enter the USSR, he would like to ask the Soviet Government to allow elderly relatives of Palestinian Jews in the USSR to leave for Palestine. The British government allegedly gives a hundred permits to enter Palestine elderly Jews from the USSR.

3. Epstein expressed a desire to get movies for Palestine with combat episodes to demonstrate them at a meeting of the Jewish Labour Party.

4. Epstein handed to Vinogradov a resolution of the 45th session of the General Federation of the Jewish Labour Party of October 20, 1941 (attached to the report note).

The Middle East department offers:

1. To seek the opinion of Narkomvneshtorg on the issue of trade with Palestine medicines and on the question of the feasibility of Epstein's entry of Elias Menachem, accompanied by Ilya Dobkin to the USSR for negotiations.

2. To consider unacceptable Epstein's proposal to send to the USSR a team of doctors from Palestine with camping hospitals. ^

3. It is impractical to leave elderly Jews from the USSR to visit their relatives in Palestine.

4. Do not object to the sale of combat films to Epstein in Turkey by the Soviet Union for screening in Palestine.

5. Ask the NKVD if it has any information about Epstein Elias Menachem and the society he represents.

I ask for your instructions.

Head of the Middle East Department

S.Kavtaradze

On the document of the litter: "Tov. Gusev. What's your opinion? In particular, about 100 permissions we had conversations with Cripps. How did they end up? A. Vyshinsky."

**NOTE OF F.T. GUSEV, HEAD OF THE
SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE
NKID OF THE USSR, TO THE FIRST DEPUTY
PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY**

January 20, 1942

Secretly

On the proposals of the representative of the Jewish Palestinian Agency for Emigration and Colonization

The proposals of the Jewish Agency for Emigration and Colonization, made by the representative of the agency in Ankara Epstein T. Vinogradov, have the same purpose, as the London representative of the agency spoke to our embassy in London, and then the British Embassy addressed to the NKID in Kuibyshev.

Palestinian Jews in every way to seek entry into the USSR, if not a permanent agent, then an interim commissioner for the immigration of Jews from the USSR to Palestine. The first appeal of the agency was made in London by T. Maysky, but the latter offered to address the Soviet government through the British Embassy in the USSR.

On November 6, 1941, the secretary of the Berry Embassy addressed me, and on November 18, Cripps asked you to facilitate entry to Kuibyshev for Jews wishing to obtain entry visas to Palestine. Cripps

pointed out that the Palestinian Government had set a quota of 125 people for entry into Palestine in the fourth quarter of 1941 and wanted to organize the sending of Jews wishing to travel to Palestine.

On 27 November 1941, I was given Berry's response to his and Cripps's submissions on the matter. We found it impractical to visit a permanent or temporary representative of the agency in the USSR for Jewish immigration.

As for the departure of Jews from the USSR to Palestine, the general procedure for obtaining permission to leave the USSR after filing a corresponding application to the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR remains. With regard to the entry into Kuibyshev of those who wish to obtain English entry visas, we promised to consider the embassy's wish on a case-by-case basis and grant the necessary permission.

Since 27 November to the present, there have been no requests from the embassy for permission to enter Kuibyshev.

1. I think the proposals are correct.

2. Resolution of the General Federation of the Jewish Labour Party, handed to Epstein by T. Vinogradov, to hand over to the Chairman of the Red Cross T. Kolesnikov with a proposal to accept the promised medical care in the form of medicines, medical equipment and monetary contributions. From the offer to send to us camping hospitals to refrain.

Gusev

On the document of the litter: "Tov. Kavtaradze, Gusevu. Prepare a certificate and suggestions in the name of Molotov. A.Y. Vyshinsky."

**E. EPSTEIN, AN EMPLOYEE OF THE
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH
AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, REPORTS ON
CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY, S.A.
VINOGRADOV January 25, 1942**

Secretly

Report on talks with the Soviet ambassador in
Ankara

Upon my arrival in Ankara in mid-November 1941, I asked the British Embassy to advise the Soviet Ambassador to accept me for a conversation on the negotiations that the Jewish Agency had previously conducted with May in London and Umansky in Washington. I explained to the employees of the British Embassy the questions I intended to raise in a conversation with the Soviet representative. I stressed that at the moment we are primarily interested in

finding out the possibility of sending a representative of the Jewish Agency to the USSR in order to practically solve a set of problems related to repatriation within the existing quotas of refugees from Poland, who are currently in Russia. The British envoy, G. Morgan, whom I was able to speak with, explained to me that since I was not asking for a private recommendation to the Soviet Ambassador, but was going to discuss with him matters outside the purview of the British Embassy in Ankara, he would have to contact the Office in London in advance and ask for instructions. The correspondence with London took more than two weeks, only in early December received a final response from the Foreign Office. I would like to note that the positive solution to the problem took place after our office in London, acting on the basis of the information and instructions received from me, began to deal with it.

After receiving a reply from London, the British Embassy sent an official letter to the Soviet ambassador, signed personally by the ambassador. In this letter, I was presented as the authoritative representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, who has the right to negotiate the repatriation of Jews from the USSR and on other issues. The letter also contained a brief reference to the structure and activities of the Jewish Agency, which stated in particular that the Jewish Agency had been formally recognized by His Majesty's Government as an advisory body on all issues related to the establishment of a Jewish national hearth in Palestine, and was engaged in repatriation, colonization, etc.

A few days later I received an invitation from the Soviet ambassador. The meeting was scheduled for January 6 this year.

Before going to talk to the Soviet ambassador in Ankara Vinogradov, I tried to collect material about

him and his advisers. I learned that prior to his appointment to the diplomatic post, he was a professor of history at Moscow University and had only a short time in the foreign affairs commission. Ankara is his first job outside the Soviet Union. Vinogradov is Russian by nationality, coming from a working family near Moscow. He is about 40 years old, joined the Communist Party at a very young age, directly from the Komsomol. I was told that he does not speak foreign languages - only in Ankara he began to learn French, but still cannot speak it. Conversations with foreigners are conducted only through an interpreter. The translator at the after is T. Shchegalova, combining this function with the work of the head of the secretariat of the embassy. I was introduced to her as a woman with a wide education, fluent in French, English and German. She received her education before the revolution, in Russia and abroad. She has already reached old age, is a veteran of the Communist Party and, as I have heard, enjoys the absolute trust of Moscow. In addition, G. Kuznetsov, the ambassador's personal secretary, plays an important role in the embassy. Officially, it also performs consular functions, and informally seems to work for the GPU. It has a duty to monitor the movements of all embassy workers, including the ambassador himself. Until last year, these functions were performed in the embassy by a Jew named Kogan, but then he was transferred somewhere else. I was told about Kuznetsov that he is a very limited and introverted person. He does not speak French enough, only to maintain basic communication with the personal secretaries of the other ambassadors in Ankara and with representatives of the Turkish authorities.

As a result, I was able to get only a little information about the Soviet post-mission staff. The

fact that they live in complete isolation, on the territory of the embassy - there they work, eat there, there and sleep, going out into the city only in exceptional cases. They are strictly forbidden to accept invitations from local residents and foreigners - an exception is made only for representatives of the Turkish authorities and for members of the diplomatic corps, but in this case only official ceremonies and receptions held in embassies or in the homes of Turkish statesmen are allowed to attend. Freedom of movement is used only by TASS correspondents, who, because of their functions, can travel wherever they want and meet whomever they want. Since Soviet Russia became an ally of Great Britain and other democratic countries, friendly ties between the Soviet embassy and embassies of the coalition countries have begun. However, even now these links are mostly official, as, in addition to differences in education and diplomatic traditions, there is also a language barrier. When I asked what the scope of the Soviet ambassador's powers in Ankara was, a credible source told me that although Vinogradov was officially authorized to act only in Turkey, in fact he and his colleague, the ambassador to Tehran, were dealing with the whole range of Middle East issues. There is no doubt that the problems of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine are informally in the sphere of Vinogradov's interests and are being monitored by him.

When I arrived at the Soviet embassy at the appointed hour for a meeting with Vinogradov, I was first introduced to his secretary Kuznetsov. We talked to him for about half an hour, he asked all sorts of questions about the Jewish Agency, its official status, activities, etc., and the issues that I intend to discuss with the ambassador. Although the conversation took place in Russian, Kuznetsov was neither directly nor in a hint of how I knew the language and whether I had

ties to Russia. The conversation from beginning to end was very polite, Kuznetsov formulated his questions succinctly and very carefully. Then he took me to the ambassador's office and introduced me to him. Vinogradov received me in his office - a huge and luxurious room, completely out of line neither with the modest appearance of the ambassador, nor portraits on the wall (in the center of a large portrait of Stalin in his traditional simple kitel, on the right and left - portraits of Molotov and Kalinin). The ambassador immediately got down to business and politely asked me to explain the purpose of the visit. First I gave him a greeting from the Jewish Agency and explained what the body I represent was doing. When it came to the composition of the agency, the ambassador asked which public and political organizations support it and which are against it. Then I moved on to the very subject of my mission. I informed that we had already addressed his colleagues in London and Washington, May and Umansky, and asked them to convey our wishes and requests to Moscow. But since there has been no progress on the issues yet, we have found it desirable to address the ambassador to Turkey. In our view, explaining the substance of the issue and our tasks to the Soviet diplomatic representative in Ankara is particularly important because it relates to Middle East issues more closely than other diplomatic representatives of the USSR, although Palestine is not part of its official activities. At that moment Vinogradov interrupted me and said that this is the case - although he is the ambassador only in Turkey, he is entrusted with a number of regional problems, such as working with Soviet citizens in Palestine. I then briefed him on the contents of conversations between Prof. Weiz-Mana, Ben-Gurion and Prof. Brodetsky with May in London and conversations between Dr. Goldman and Rabbi S. Wise with Umansky in

Washington. When I came to the question of the release of the Zionists imprisoned in Soviet prisons, the Ambassador interrupted me again, stating that the Soviet Union had never arrested the Zionists for their national beliefs and the desire to repatriate to Palestine: only those who were in connection with foreign political organizations were arrested, thus violating Soviet law prohibiting the establishment of such links without the knowledge and authorization of the official authorities.

At the center of the conversation with the ambassador, I made the issue of the repatriation of Jewish refugees for whom we had obtained visas to enter Palestine. I emphasized that all problems related to the repatriation of refugees, relatives and other groups of Jews will be solved strictly on the basis of Soviet law and in accordance with the conditions of the state of emergency. For the organization and implementation of this task, it would be important for the USSR to have one or two authorized representatives of the Jewish Agency, who with the help of the Soviet authorities would solve problems on the ground. I explained the urgency of the situation and the urgent need to resolve the problems as soon as possible, emphasizing our interest in the influx of new returnees to Palestine to improve the effectiveness of our military efforts, the mobilization of recruits, the growth of industrial and agricultural production, etc. I was extremely astonished and offended when Vinogradov asked with naively and surprised intonation: "What, Jews in Palestine really work?"

Talking about the social structure of the Jewish population of Palestine, I highlighted the place and the role of the labor movement, its achievements in various fields. It immediately became clear that the Ambassador was virtually uninformed here, and he

asked, for example, whether workers in Palestine had the right to strike. This turn of the conversation allowed me to report on the decision of the Council of Histadrut to hold actions of solidarity and support for Soviet Russia (just this text was with me) and about the appeal of the executive committee of Histadrut to the Central Committee of Soviet trade unions about sending medical aid for the Red Army. At the same time, I noted that so far no response has been received to this proposal. I also spoke about the Jerusalem radio broadcasts for Soviet Jews and the feelings of brotherhood and sympathy with which the Jewish population of Palestine follows the heroic military efforts of the peoples of the USSR and the Red Army in the fight against fascism and Nazism. The Ambassador asked me to convey a friendly greeting on behalf of the Soviet government to the Executive Committee of Histadrut, adding that it should not be attempted to interpret the silence of the Soviet authorities as a sign of disinterest. The situation in Moscow and Kuibyshev is such that everyone is occupied solely with the situation on the fronts and on many issues, including very important ones, there is simply no time left. This, he said, can also be explained by the fact that we have not yet received a response from Kuibyshev to our appeals to the Soviet ambassadors in London and Washington.

When I spoke to the Ambassador about our military efforts in Palestine, in particular the results of the mobilization (mentioning the results of the Arab conscription), the accelerated growth of industrial production, etc., I emphasized that the entire Jewish population of Palestine was firmly committed to the fight to destroy Hitlerism and was ready to make any sacrifices on the altar of victory. This war, I said, has convincingly proved who is interested in the victory of democracy and progressive humanity, and who wants

the reign of fascism and Nazism, including in the East. I then regretted that throughout the past, Russia had been misunderstood in Palestine and elsewhere in the region, supporting forces that, in the midst of war, had quickly demonstrated their true identity as agents and henchmen of Nazism. I drew the ambassador's attention to the reactionary-clerical beliefs of the Mufti and his assistants, stressed the anti-democratic nature of the various units of the Arab national movement in Palestine and beyond. The Ambassador listened to me with great attention and only after I finished, made such a remark: "Don't you understand what you called now the Soviet orientation, was in fact Trotskyist criminals?" where and how Hitler's ridge will be broken - on the banks of the Volga river or in Libya. The main thing is to destroy the Nazi contagion and mobilize all the forces of progressive humanity to achieve this goal."

I then drew the attention of the Soviet ambassador to the economic potential of Palestine, which is still not fully utilized and which under certain circumstances could benefit Soviet Russia. I informed him that in a number of areas of industry, science and production organization we have the highest skills. In particular, I pointed out that our citrus stocks could, if properly used, be useful to the Red Army (concentrated vitamins, etc.). Here the Ambassador showed great interest and said that although in the current situation in the field of transport ties between Russia and the Middle East it is difficult to assume the possibility of giving our economic ties any regular character, we should still look for and find opportunities for mutual contacts in order to fully realize at least the minimum that can be realized in the current conditions. He had decided to send his staff member to Palestine in the near future to study some issues, in particular economic cooperation. According to him, up to 800

Soviet citizens live in Palestine, most of them are in Tel Aviv. The Embassy was in contact with them, but he would like to send a representative to establish direct contacts. The Ambassador recommended that I meet with Mr. Potapov, a Soviet trade representative, in Istanbul: I could learn more details about the economic functions that would be entrusted to the representative of the Embassy sent to Palestine. At the same time, he promised to contact Potapov personally and warn about my visit in advance.

At the end of the conversation, I asked the ambassador to pass on our request to the Soviet government, accompanying it with his own recommendations. The Ambassador promised to do so and let us know as soon as we received the response. But he immediately said that it was not to be hoped that the answer would follow immediately, for the reasons mentioned above, i.e., because martial law did not allow many issues to be dealt with with appropriate speed. The ambassador stressed that he would convey not only our specific wishes to The Drug Lord, but also all other issues that were raised in the conversation. By the way, throughout the conversation the ambassador carefully wrote down for me, and in the end, to my great surprise, began to read out his notes to me, asking to correct, if that is not the case. In fact, it was just for the benefit, because here I was able to supplement something, and what was not properly understood, to explain again. In total, the conversation with the Ambassador lasted approximately an hour and a half.

When I left the ambassador's office, I met with Kuznetsov again. He asked me how the conversation had gone and whether I was satisfied with the results. I took the opportunity to announce that I am a candidate for the mission of the Jewish Agency in Moscow, together with I. Dobkin.

The general impression of a conversation with the ambassador and the secretary can be summed up by one phrase: complete lack of information and a great desire to know. Uninformedness is a consequence of communist propaganda, complete prejudice and initial hostility to everything that does not carry the seal of official communist doctrine. At the same time, the Russians are showing great interest in everything new - this is the result of the upheavals of the last years of the war, the reassessment of values in the Soviet foreign policy. Throughout the conversation, I had the feeling that even if the meeting did not lead to a final solution to the issues discussed, it was still very useful, if only because there was direct contact with a Soviet diplomat dealing with The Palestinian issues in one way or another. The explanations I have given him are of independent value and may still play a role in the future.

Second visit to the ambassador

Four days after the first meeting with Vinogradov, I received an invitation to dine with him and attend a screening of a military film in one of the halls of the Soviet Embassy (after the Turkish government banned the display in cinemas of any films about the war - English, German, Russian, etc., embassies began to organize the screening of such films on their territory and invite representatives of other diplomatic missions, representatives of the local administration, etc.). At the dinner, the Soviet ambassador was attended by about sixty people, including the ambassadors of Great Britain, Yugoslavia, Greece, responsible officials of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, journalists, etc. After dinner we were all invited to the viewing room, where for two hours we showed a military chronicle. It was a rich factual material about the fighting on land and in the air, about the life of the civilian population, which all, as one, stood up for the

homeland. Today, the line between the front and the rear is almost erased - the same self-sacrifice, the same dedication and discipline. Many of the footage was filmed by life-threatening cameramen. The films themselves leave the impression of great art and at the same time subtle propaganda psychology.

That night I had a little conversation with the ambassador. He said from the outset that he had not yet received any response from Kuibyshev, but "everything that had to be done has already been done". The Ambassador then introduced me to Ms. Shchegalova, with whom she had a brief conversation about the problems of Palestine. It has become clear to me from her remarks that she knows much more about our country and the Middle East as a whole than the Ambassador and his secretary. In the reception environment, it was difficult to have a conversation for any long time, and it is a pity, because I had heard a lot of good things about Shchegalova and knew that she enjoyed great authority in the embassy. The Ambassador also introduced me to Mr. Jarov, the head of the TASS office in Ankara. At the same time, he noticed that he could hear from me "a lot of interesting things." We agreed to meet with Sharov the next day, and I briefly retold to him what I had said to the ambassador before- about our military efforts, about the growth and achievements of the Jewish population of Palestine in recent years, about the mobilization of volunteers, about the decision of the Histadrut Council to hold a solidarity and assistance rally for Soviet Russia, about radio broadcasts for Soviet Jews from Jerusalem and about the feelings of brotherly solidarity experienced by the Jews of Palestine against the Jews of Palestine. Jarov recorded all this, and then said that he would send a telegram to Kuibyshev tonight. Whether his report was

published, and if so, in what form - it is unknown to me.

At the reception I also met Kuznetsov, who said that the statement of our conversation had already been sent to Kuibyshev. But he also warned me not to count on a quick response. Kuznetsov said that if the answer comes before I leave Turkey, it will be handed over to me personally. If he comes later, the embassy will send him to the leadership of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem.

Visit to the Soviet trade representative Potapov

In accordance with Vinogradov's recommendation, during my stay in Istanbul, I met with the Soviet trade representative A. Potapov. He already knew about me and made a warm welcome. Potapov is a Kalmyk by origin, speaks Russian until now with an accent. At the same time, he is more talkative than all the other Soviet representatives I have met. In general, it makes a pleasant impression. Prior to his appointment to the post, Potapov served for two years as a deputy trade representative in Italy, where he learned Italian.

First of all, Potapov repeated to me what I had already heard from the Ambassador: they were going to send a representative to Palestine, who would deal primarily with economic issues. Potapov was very interested in Palestine, he said, he read a lot about the tremendous economic progress we have made in recent years. Although the maritime transport arteries between the USSR and Palestine are now virtually blocked, there are several bypass routes, especially land, through Iraq and Iran. The diplomat, who will be sent to Palestine, will first have to find out the possibility of providing cargo flows for trade with the USSR. According to Potapov, the medical, chemical and pharmaceutical industries of Palestine are of particular interest to the Russians. In addition, this diplomat will have to check on the spot the possibility

of implementing the proposal of a certain Ruhimovich - a resident of Palestine, who took the initiative to organize the delivery to the USSR of food and clothing for refugees. The Soviet government has already agreed to this, but the attitude of the mandated administration of Palestine itself must be determined. Finally, the issue of opening a Sovkino office in Palestine for the sale of Soviet films will have to be resolved, as Potapov said more and more orders are coming from cinema owners, especially in Tel Aviv. When I asked when the diplomat would come to Palestine and what his name was, Potapov replied that the visit was scheduled for January, the candidate had not yet been finalized, but in all likelihood it would be one of the representatives of the Intourist.

I told Potapov some of what I had told the ambassador before, but I emphasized economic issues. Potapov listened very carefully and thanked him when I offered to give him more information about our economy and its industries in writing. To do this, I used several issues of "Palestein and Middle East" that happened to be at my fingertips, but since the embassy did not have a single person who knew English, I had to translate the relevant articles into Russian. By the way, I have not been able to get an answer to the question of what happened to the economic memorandum, which we passed to the Soviet Embassy in Istanbul last year. Potapov said he had never seen him and promised to find out.

At the end of the conversation, I suggested to Potapov that he send his representative when he goes to Palestine, directly to the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, where he will receive any necessary assistance. It would be good to notify us in advance of the date of arrival. Potapov thanked and said that he knew that Jews were the most important element of Palestinian economic life, and at the embassy in

Ankara he was told that I represented the most important and official Jewish organization in Palestine. Of course, when the Soviet representative goes to Jerusalem, he will gladly use our help and recommendations, but above all he will have to appear before the British authorities to avoid undesirable incidents. In this regard, Potapov hinted that he did not want the Soviet representative to face difficulties in Palestine because of the "exaggerated suspicion" that in the past had been shown abroad to guests from the USSR.

The trade representative asked the Jewish Agency to send him economic materials from time to time: this, he said, would benefit both sides, even if it was not possible to start developing contacts immediately under the current circumstances. I promised that we would send him all the interesting economic literature that we publish, and if he had any questions, let him write to us, we would be happy to give the most detailed answer.

Returning from Istanbul to Palestine, I stayed in Ankara for one day (December 26) and contacted Kuznetsov by phone to find out if they had come from Kuibyshev. Kuznetsov replied that there was no answer yet, but as soon as he received something, he would immediately inform me of Jerusalem.

In conclusion, I doubt very much that we will receive a positive response from the Soviet authorities to the request for the release of the arrested and exiled Zionists and to the proposal to send representatives of the Jewish Agency to the USSR for the practical implementation of the repatriation of refugees and relatives. During my conversation with Vinogradov, I realized how little the Soviet ambassador's ability to influence the issues, whether large or small, was. Only a direct appeal to the Soviet authorities would perhaps help to move our problems

from a dead point. At the same time, all the information I receive from knowledgeable sources shows that, despite the new foreign policy approaches of the Soviet government, there have been no changes in the internal policy of the USSR. While military and political cooperation with democratic states is expanding, Stalin is tightening his grip on the mindset within the USSR to avoid deviations from the general line and “misunderstanding” of the true meaning of this cooperation with regimes that remain in the eyes of the Communists as “unacceptable” as they were before the German attack on Russia. When planning certain operations in relation to Soviet Russia, we should not entertain ourselves with illusions. It seems to me erroneous that the situation has changed and we have some new opportunities in terms of resolving the Zionist activities in the USSR. I am convinced that a sober and practical view of this problem is important not only in assessing our chances in the negotiations that we have conducted so far with Soviet officials abroad, but also in terms of the overall assessment of the Russian factor in this war and after its end.

E. Epstein

**LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION H.
WEIZMANN TO THE AMBASSADOR OF THE
USSR IN THE UK I.M.MAY March 2, 1942**

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

I owe you an apology for the delay in handing over the memorandum we talked about the last time I had the pleasure of seeing you. Unfortunately, lately I can not work hard and I had to postpone its compilation. For the same reason, my departure to America was postponed, but now we expect to leave very soon.

To the contents of the memorandum I want to add a few comments.

The three fundamental aspects of Soviet social philosophy are embodied in the state structure that it creates in

Palestine is a Zionist movement: collective property (not the self-interest of a private citizen) is the leading principle and purpose of the economic system; society grants equal rights to workers of mental and physical labour and therefore provides the widest opportunities for the development of intellectual life and work. For mutual understanding there are no insurmountable psychological barriers, the Zionist movement has never experienced antagonism to Soviet social psychology. The Zionists, like the USSR, develop a planned economy, because both have to build a modern, developed society in economically underdeveloped countries, and they must modify the human material used in the work. They operate on a small scale, but their experience allows them to assess the activities of the USSR, which are carried out on an immeasurably larger scale. The vast majority of the supporters of zionism have close

personal and family ties with the USSR and have a special interest and sympathy for the Soviet people. The heroism with which the Soviet people reflect the onslaught of the Nazis and defends universal values, the Zionists met with delight and understanding.

In conclusion, I would like to express my firm belief that the Soviet troops, who have already achieved great victories, will free their land from the invaders and thus destroy the dark veil that now extends over the distraught world, and that all progressive and free forces will unite to restore all that has been destroyed. I have no doubt that the Soviet government and people will show sympathy and understanding in the tangled Jewish problem that has dominated us and Europe for so many decades.

I would like to personally thank you for accepting me and listening to my opinion.

Yours sincerely

H. Weitzman

Appendix MEMORANDUM on the USSR and the goals of the Zionists

The Jewish question was brought to the fore by Hitler and used as the main tool for consolidating the fascist movement around the world. It would not have been so successful if there had not been a Jewish problem that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had not been able to solve.

Number and resettlement of Jews

1) In September 1939 (approximately):

USSR - 3 LLC, USA - almost 5 LLC UK - 750 LLC
Palestine - 500 LLC Poland - 3 LLC Baltic Country - 250 Ltd.

Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Great Germany - 1,500,000
Czech Protectorate - 450,000
Western Europe - 500,000
North Africa - 500,000

Middle East (without Palestine) - 500,000
South America - nearly 500,000

Within the borders reached by June 1941, the Jewish population increased to almost 5,000,000.

The situation of Jews in Eastern Europe and the need to emigrate

2) It is impossible to predict how the Jewish population will decline because of the killings and suffering caused by fascism. It is also impossible to prejudge future international borders, but it seems that some 3,500,000 or more Jews who will be concentrated in Central and Eastern Europe, i.e. Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Austria and Germany, will represent the most complex components of the Jewish problem after the war.

3) The excess of the rural population in these countries forces unnecessary people to go to cities that are not ready to accept them. As a result, the sharp rivalry between Jews and non-Jews in the past few decades has led to a sharp rise in anti-Semitism brought under the influence of Nazism to boiling point. Jews were constantly pushed out of the economic life of countries, partly by direct anti-Jewish legislation, partly specifically directed by economic and financial policies, as well as by administrative measures designed to weaken the economic position of the Jews.

4) The Germans began the mass extermination of the Jews, their expulsion from their places of residence, imprisonment in concentration camps, complete economic ruin. It is absolutely impossible to restore what it was before the war, and while some of the Jewish population may go back, there is no doubt that the need for emigration will increase dramatically.

Jewish wanderings and Jewish national idea

5) Jewish wanderings from country to country and from continent to continent is an ancient phenomenon, but never solved the Jewish question. From 1881 until the First World War about 3 LLC Of Jews emigrated from Eastern Europe to the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere and to the British Empire. Emigration from Eastern and Central Europe would increase if the countries to which they sought, especially the United States, did not enact harsh laws that restricted the entry of immigrants. Despite this, hundreds of thousands still emigrated. This resettlement process has created the basis for a Jewish national hearth in Palestine.

6) One of the few constructive outcomes of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles was the international recognition of the Zionist desire to restore the Jewish nation in ancient territory. After 30 years of preparatory work, the Balfour¹¹ declaration and mandate paved the way for the realization of this age-old dream. The historical ties of the Jewish people with Palestine had gained international recognition, and Jewish resettlement to that country had been proclaimed by right, not grace. Palestine became the country where most Jewish immigrants sought, the only country where Jewish immigration was planned and organized. Between 1918 and 1941, the Jewish population in Palestine increased from 60 LLCs to more than 500 LLCs and from 10% to almost one third of the total population, the largest percentage of the Jewish population compared to any other country in the world.

7) Among the countries to which Jews move, only Palestine does not have a well-developed economy to which they need to adapt. There they build their own economic life. The aim of the Jewish masses to be re-educated in Palestine is to re-educate them into ordinary people, free from any anomalies of Jewish

economic life in the diaspora, so that they are actively involved in all sectors of production: agriculture, industry, transport, etc.

8) This is the purpose of the return to the land, which allowed many thousands of young Jews to overcome the centuries-old habit of urban life, made it possible to get used to life in a country that is so different from the countries where they were born, to lay the foundations of the Jewish economy based on agriculture and industry. They have already organized agricultural settlements on a cooperative and voluntary basis; thousands of people began to earn money in private Jewish agricultural colonies owned by Jews. They build roads and bridges, work as stonemasons, plant forests in hills, drain swamps, run cars and buses, make machines, work in power plants and mine potash in the Dead Sea area, work on railways and ports. The Jewish worker found solid ground under his feet in all areas of work.

9) The policy of agricultural colonization of the Jewish Agency is mainly in the organization of labour settlements. Of the 150 hectares of land owned by the Jewish community, about 60 ARE are owned by the Jewish National Trust and are intrinsic property of the Jewish people. Of the 72 LTDs engaged in agriculture in 1940, about 40 LLCs lived in settlements of workers, which are created on the principle of personal labor and cooperation, more than half of this number live in public settlements, where all means of production and results of labor belong to a commune whose members work on the abilities and use the products of general labor by needs. These thriving settlements are living proof of the possibility of a society based on the principle of solidarity rather than profit.

10) The following figures from the statistics department of the Jewish Agency for 1940 provide an insight into the successes achieved. Of the 500,000

Jews who lived in Palestine at the time, 200,000 were economically active. Of these, 37,000 worked in agriculture, 36,000 in industry, 9,000 in transport, 14,000 in construction, 19,000 in clerical work and public service, 23,000 in trade, 20,000 in all sorts of jobs, 14,000 in services, 10,000 in finance, and 10,000 in finance.

Prospects for Palestine

11) So far, Jews have received only about 150,000 (out of 2,600,000) hectares of land in Palestine, where more than 500,000 Jews have been resettled. The Arab population, as any objective observer agrees, has benefited greatly from these turbulent economic transformations. Its number has doubled in the last 20 years. There are significant opportunities for agricultural development, and under favourable political conditions, 2 or 3 million Jews could settle there in the next 15-20 years.

Palestine has no alternative

12) There is no country on the globe with vast territories that would be willing to accept 2 to 3 million Jews, to organize their compact settlements within its borders- neither the United States nor any British dominion, nor any of the South American republics, nor, as we understand, the USSR. There are a number of projects related to the organization of settlements in tropical or Arctic areas, probably there could be displaced, but the problem will not be solved.

The USSR and the Jewish problem

Past misunderstandings cannot be allowed to become an obstacle to the development of new relations between the USSR and zionism. It was only natural for the Zionist congresses to protest against

the prohibition of their movement, the Jewish language in the USSR, against the treatment of the Zionists as counter-revolutionaries. But they have never been hostile to the Soviet government, to the USSR, home to nearly 73 world Jews and closest to the countries where the problem is most acute, one of the great powers responsible for a peaceful settlement.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO
THE UNITED STATES, M.M. LITVINOV,
WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE WORLD
ZIONIST ORGANIZATION H. WEITZMAN
AND THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN
WASHINGTON, N. GOLDMAN May 6, 1942**

I was visited by Dr. Weitzman, the head of the Zionists who had come from England, with the local Zionist representative Goldman.

Weitzman said he came to pay his respects because he always maintains a good relationship with Maisky. Along the way, he, of course, told me about the Zionist affairs and offered to receive the relevant

Zionist literature in order to be aware of the matter by the time of the peace conference, at which the Jewish question must be finally resolved.

Litvinov

**A LETTER FROM MAGEN TO THE
DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE BOARD OF THE
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, M.
SHERTOKU June 18, 1942**

Dear Sir,

No doubt, you know that we received a letter from the American Jewish Congress informing us that Mr. Litvinov, the Ambassador of the USSR, during a conversation with the Zionist delegation that raised the issue of arrested Zionists in Russia, offered to

submit a list of prisoners and exiles for transfer to the Russian government.

Because of the critical importance of this issue, we decided to discuss it at the executive committee session, which decided by a majority vote not to present any list of prisoners and exiles to Mr. Litvinov in America.

Reasons: (a) We do not have detailed lists of prisoners and exiles, and a list that contains hundreds of names of people whose ties with us have weakened over the past 3-5 years can lead to adverse consequences;

b) If the list of Russian GPU is handed over under the pretext of circumstances and conditions of wartime, it will declare that the search for hundreds of people in the USSR will take a very long time; In addition, as we can imagine, based on past experience, no answer will follow;

c) This list, if seen as the result of pressure from abroad, may be harmful to our comrades. Some of them might have been "released" from prison and theoretically found themselves "free". It should also be taken into account that other Zionists were arrested last year;

(d) Litvinov's proposal is purely diplomatic, which does not oblige him or the Soviet government to do anything;

(d) At present, we must insist on the release of all Zionist prisoners and exiles and for permission for all those wishing to imigra in Palestine. By presenting a list of Zionists, we can weaken this requirement.

A minority put forward the following reasons in favor of submitting this list to Litvinov:

(a) It is possible that the Zionists will be released on an exceptional basis;

b) It is hoped that dozens of our comrades will be able to escape imprisonment;

(c) The list in any case will not hurt those who are in prison on charges of zionism;

d) There is no point in waiting for the Soviet Government to change its course with regard to zionism, but it is to be hoped that the Zionists will be released on a case-by-case basis.

While attaching great importance to this issue, we have decided to send you a resolution of the executive committee together with the justifications for and against and ask you to inform your opinion as soon as possible. If you think that an additional meeting is needed on this important issue, please let you know what the meeting will be. In any case, we expect your speedy response.

Sincerely yours, "Magen" is a society to help those who fight for zionism, Judaism and Jewish national values in Soviet Russia.

Executive Committee

Aharonov B. West

**LETTER FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
OF THE USSR IN TURKEY, M.A. KOSTYLEV,
TO THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN
DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID USSR
S.I.KAVTARADZE June 22, 1942**

Secretly

Epstein has spoken to the Ambassador of the USSR only once, and the contents of this conversation are stated in the letter of 8.XII.41 mentioned by you. In mid-December, Epstein visited the Soviet trade representative Potapov in Istanbul, in a conversation with whom he did not essentially raise the issue of establishing trade ties between Palestine and the Soviet Union, but only found out the possibility of assisting the Red Army by sending parcels with medicines, etc.

As for his proposal to establish trade links with Palestine, the situation today is as follows. To the trade-presidency of the USSR in Turkey have received repeatedly similar proposals from Palestine. In particular, he was approached in January 1942 by representatives of several Palestinian trading firms with a request to supply them with cotton, flaxseed, hemp and beet seeds, a thousand beech or oak barrels, fertilizers and a thousand tons of iron in exchange for medicines and chemical pharmaceuticals; The trade office reported the proposal to Narcomvneshtorg and received a reply that, owing to the inability to satisfy the request of Palestinian firms at present, such transactions should be abandoned. Then, taking into account the great interest shown in Palestine in Soviet films, and the importance for our country of moving them there, the trade office concluded a contract with the Palestinian firm "Shenfeld" to sell it 20 long films and 8 short films and 100 film magazines - a total of about 24 thousand am. Dollars. However, due to some new orders concerning the departure of Jews from Palestine, Shenfeld was unable to travel to Istanbul for the final settlement of the treaty and the latter was terminated by the trade office. The trade office is now once again

negotiating with a Palestinian firm on behalf of Sovintorgkino regarding the sale of the same batch of Soviet films. The trade-pment was intended to purchase in Palestine almost the entire amount to be received from the said transaction, medicines, chemical and pharmaceutical products and medical appliances.

The above evidence shows that Palestinian trading firms and merchants have a strong desire to establish trade links with the Soviet Union. I believe that this fact would have not so much trade as political significance for us, but practical implementation of this is possible only if we have a Soviet man in Palestine, at least under the guise of a permanent representative of any trade organization of the USSR. It seems to me that it would be appropriate to put this issue before the leadership of the NKID.

M. Kostylev, Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Turkey

**NOTE OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF PRESS AND
INFORMATION OF THE BOARD OF THE
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE I. KLINOV
TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE AGENCY'S BOARD M.
SHERTOKU August 30, 1942**

After the end of the visit to Palestine of the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Ankara, whom I met and spoke to several times - at the Jerusalem Workers' Council, at the Lith13 congress, and at the press conference we held for them - I would like to present to you some of my impressions and conclusions regarding this visit:

Members of the delegation. Mikhailov and Petrenko, of course, give the impression of educated, politically prepared people. The first secretary of the Embassy Mikhailov by education linguist, well-owned, can remain calm in difficult situations. The second member of the delegation, Petrenko, a press attache of the embassy in Ankara, a Ukrainian, was born in Odessa, well versed in the "Jewish issue." There is no doubt that our achievements in Palestine have made a strong impression on them. They have learned a lot here, made records, and it is safe to assume that they will present their reports to the Soviet ambassador in Ankara and even higher and include many of what we have told them. In essence, this is the significance of their visit. If we wanted Moscow to know more about our plans, situation and opportunities here in Palestine, we now have an extraordinary opportunity to do so. And this is very important, regardless of the end result. As far as I am concerned, I believe that in the future we should make every effort to strengthen these ties.

Attitudes to zionism. Despite all the admiration for our achievements, they have consistently refrained

from any positive assessments of zionism. And although in most cases they carefully avoided talking about this topic, sometimes the truth came out. Thus, Rubashov mentioned that Mikhailov told him: "The achievements are huge, but zionism, the Zionist movement..." And you know, of course, that First Secretary Mikhailov deliberately evaded visiting the Jewish Agency. Petrenko came alone and was received by Grunbaum, Joseph and Dobkin. The pretext was that Mikhailov went to Tel Aviv. But half an hour later he came to a press conference in Jerusalem, and I met him there. The delegation visited Leumi¹⁴ twice. Here they learned to distinguish between representatives of Ishuva¹⁵ and the Zionist movement. But even so, they sometimes showed naivety. For example, at a press conference during the discussion on the exchange of information between Russia and Palestine, Petrenko said that many years ago they had the idea to offer broadcasting to Palestine in Hebrew from Baku or Tiflis. At the same conference, I asked several questions on behalf of journalists about the development of information sharing. I have also asked the members of the delegation to help the Palestinian press establish the exact number of Zionist prisoners in the USSR and what their fate is, especially after Russia joined the Allied States in the fight against Hitler. They were not confused and said they would consider the request.

Attitude to the Communists. I do not know whether the members of the delegation met or received information from the Communists anywhere. We had the impression that they carefully tried to avoid meeting them. The Communists were not visible at the League's meetings, and none of them spoke. Mr. El-Roy, the son of Haya Lichtenstein and weizmann's nephew, once rose to the podium and announced that he would speak on behalf of the Palestinian

Communist Party. A storm of indignation erupted, shouting: "Get out, the mufti's supporter will not perform here!" The members of the delegation sitting on the podium did not intervene in the incident. Of course, they were informed of what the Palestinian communists were, what their role was in the events, and their links to the Mufti and Italian agents. For their part, the Communists also wanted to express their views. But they didn't do much. The following incident occurred: Light spoke with Petrenko about the press conference. The same El-Roy, hearing this, went up to Petrenko and said: "The Central Committee of the Communist Party against this meeting." Petrenko looked at him, did not answer, and turned to the Light, said in the presence of El-Roy, "So we will meet with the Jewish press tomorrow." It is also true that shouts were heard from the audience against El-Roy: "Down with trotskyist!"

The second meeting of the League Congress was essentially Zionist. We informed the members of the delegation about our goals, our attitude to fascism, the significance of our achievements, discrimination against Hebrew and zionism in Russia, our hopes for better relations, mass immigration from Russia to Palestine, etc.

Attitude to arabs. As far as I know, the members of the delegation met with the Arabs only in Jerusalem (on a farm in Talpiyot) and in Bethlehem at the house of Bandak (a man close to the League for Rapprochement¹⁶). Levite from Ein Harod, who attended the meeting in Bethlehem, told me that Mikhailov had behaved perfectly. About 30 Arabs, including students and intellectuals, participated in the meeting. It is possible that among them also were communists. One Arab spoke of 25 years of Soviet rule, noting, among other things, that although "during the war we concluded a truce with the imperialists and

Zionists, we hope that after the war we will continue our traditional struggle.” However, Mikhailov showed no desire to continue the conversation in the same spirit. On the contrary, he said that this beautiful land is for two peoples. He saw the great achievements of Ishuv. He noted that both Jews and Arabs are historically connected with this land, there is enough space for both peoples. He categorically opposed incitement and provocation, stressing that the new world order would be based on the Atlantic Charter.¹⁷ In the end, he thanked those gathered in Arabic and Hebrew (“Toda Rabah!”). In Bethlehem, his speech made a strong impression.

Future contacts. During my discussions with members of the delegation, I discussed the possibility of them receiving information from Palestine. It became clear from the conversation that they did not have a person in Ankara who could translate the Jewish press. “Palestine Post” is not now coming to Turkey, so we agreed that in the future they will receive a daily copy of the newspaper in a sealed envelope. They will ensure that the envelope is handed to them personally. In addition, I spoke to them about the bulletin in Russian language on the events taking place here, which will send them from here. Most likely, they will not be able to keep their word, as well as to pass at least some of our information to The Soviet newspapers. But even if this information reaches only their ears and even if only a few Soviet leaders in Kuibyshev or Moscow read the bulletin, it will be valuable for us. And I would suggest that we start issuing such a newsletter in Russian language. This project may require additional costs, but I think that such a political action should be carried out. And of course, the bulletin will not prevent us from sending various materials to the Soviet Embassy in Ankara.

I. Klinov

**RECORDING OF CONVERSATIONS
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE JEWISH
COMMUNITY OF PALESTINE I.BEN-TSVI
WITH THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE
SOVIET EMBASSY IN TURKEY
S.S.MIKHAILOV AND THE PRESS ATTACHE
OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN TURKEY, N.A.
PETRENKO August 31, 1942**

The first visit is on Wednesday, 26.08, at 8.30 am, before walking through the Old Town. I gave them a general idea of the functions of the National Committee and the structure of the Knesset Israel, and also talked about the education system, health care and social assistance.

The second time we visited Mikhailov and Petrenko on Thursday morning, 27.08. Petrenko went from here to the Jewish Agency, and Mikhailov said that he should go to Tel Aviv - before a visit to the head of the

British administration. I recommended him cancel the trip, so as not to be late for the appointment, he did not agree and left, but when we were already sitting at Grunbaum, he called Petrenko and said that he still refused to travel, fearing that he would be late.

The third time they both came to me for a private conversation on Friday.

Mikhailov and Petrenko's comrades came at 11.30 with one attendant. In the meantime, I arranged for the office to have one to be able to talk without interference. Obviously, not only I was interested in this meeting, but they were looking for such an opportunity: later they made it clear to Rachel Ben-Tsvi and other comrades how important this conversation meant to them. They showed up almost without delay, and we sat in the office for about two hours. Only then did I invite the rest of the leadership who were in the building at the time - The Berlin, Dr. A. Katz-Nelson, Mr. Elmaleh and Mr. Shragai.

I said I wanted to discuss two or three questions with them in private. Mikhailov replied that that's why they came. He, for his part, is going to talk about the meeting with the Governor-General.

As I noted in the previous recording, on Thursday, August 27, Mikhailov and Petrenko were invited to breakfast with the Governor-General. They then stayed for a private conversation that lasted almost an hour and a half. Mikhailov is relatively fluent in English, and Petrenko speaks French. In any case, they did not need the services of an interpreter during the meeting with the Governor-General. Mikhailov noted that the Governor-General had made an impressive impression on him: although you Jews do not see him as a friend, he said, he still has good intentions, i.e. he is acting to you (Jews) for the benefit and is interested in improving the relationship between Jews and Arabs.

I did not want to argue with the Russians on this subject, nor to talk about the personality of the Governor-General, and I limited myself to the brief observation that he is guided by a certain plan, fixed in the White Paper¹⁸, and fully implements the installation of this political line. In this regard, I briefly told them what the principles of the White Paper are, why it contains such far-reaching promises to the Arabs and what concrete results this policy brings: Jews are forbidden to acquire land, at the same time limited to a minimum (if not at all prohibited) emigration, in the near future the Arabs are promised the transfer of political power. I added that we all favour mutual understanding with the Arabs, but in the situation in which the White Paper put us, there is not the slightest chance of any understanding with them, since the White Paper puts us in the hands of the Arab majority in Palestine.

At the beginning of the meeting, I noticed that our conversation was confidential. That. Mikhailov agreed, but asked for permission to take notes during the conversation. I agreed to this, saying that it is good if this information reaches the Soviet government. Petrenko immediately took a pencil and paper and began to write down in detail.

I started with the provisions set out in the telegram to the Chairman of the Soviet Republic Kalinin, a copy of which I gave them during the first visit. I repeated our arguments and insisted on the release of the "prisoners of Zion" whose all the fault was in supporting zionism and wanting to go to Palestine. In this regard, I complained to the guests that so far we have not received not only consent, but even confirmation of receipt of the telegram.

Then I moved on to the main issue - the situation of Jewish refugees from the occupied countries, especially Polish refugees, which, according to some

reports, numbered to 400,000 people. But there are too few of us. So far, we have been able to allocate 26,000 people, of which 17,000 to the front, 7 to the armed police under the control of the army, and another 2,000 to the Allied army. We know what more needs to be given. But we have another front - now the difficult days have come, we are constantly attacked by Arabs, instigated by fascist propaganda of the mufti. We have to be on guard all the time. Besides, we can't completely bleed industry and agriculture. Our human potential is too small, it is almost used, we just need additional human resources. The potential of hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees and displaced persons cannot be tolerated when we need them. All you need is your permission to allow these people to repatriate to us. In our country, they will immediately stand up to the machine and go into the field - and this will free up significant forces for the front.

Mikhailov asked if I also meant Russian citizens, I replied that it was only about refugees from Poland and other countries occupied by the Nazis. These people have never been Russian citizens. As for the problems related to the repatriation of Russian citizens, we will have time to discuss this issue after the war. Then he asked, why am I so sure that these refugees really want to go to Palestine? Or maybe they are just trying to stay in the USSR? I objected to this that no one was going to repatriate against their will, but I am truly convinced that the vast majority of these people, if not all of them, will want to repatriate to Palestine. He then asked if we wanted to repatriate all or only those who were able to work. I replied: from a selfish point of view, we are certainly more interested in certain age groups, but it would be completely unacceptable to repatriate only those men and women who are able to work, and the elderly and children to

leave. We must accept all those who work and those whom they "contain. Mikhailov also asked whether we are going to conduct some kind of selection, depending on political views. To this I said that not the views of returnees are of interest to us, but their ability to live and work here. We demand discipline and loyalty to one idea: the creation of the state of Israel as a homeland for Jews. And the views and beliefs of returnees are their own business.

I then raised the issue of our cultural activities. Even during our last meeting I told the guests what the Hebrew language means to us. This time I presented them with a brief overview of our system of education and education in Hebrew, our press, the activities of the Language Committee, etc. When they were at my house, it was also about the revival of Hebrew. By the way, the name Ben-Yihudy is familiar to them. I showed them 11 volumes of his dictionary and explained its value. It should be noted that Mikhailov himself is a philologist by training, and the dictionary made a great impression on him and his companion. It seems to me that the revival of Hebrew, as they have seen in the huge repository of the National Library, in the press, at numerous rallies in the city and in the countryside, will be the main impression that they will take away from the country.

When it came to Hebrew, the question arose, how to call it in Russian. Until now, it was called "The Hebrew language." But they felt that this name is unpleasant to us, and does not correspond to the real state of affairs, and therefore with a laugh offered to call Hebrew from now on "your new language."

Then I asked them, is it true that there is discrimination against Hebrew and its study in the USSR? And if Hebrew can be freely studied, why are no dictionaries published, why are there no Hebrew textbooks published in Soviet Russia, and only old

books remain? And can we hope that the situation will begin to change for the better now that the need for it is, when joint efforts to strengthen ties between the country of the Soviets and our country are on the agenda? And also - will it be allowed to import books and newspapers in Hebrew into the USSR?

The guests then moved on to a third question that was of particular interest to them: the Arab problem. Mikhailov began first: "Why don't you follow the path of compromise to solve this problem?" Here he recalled the statements of the Governor-General, who, according to him, showed interest in strengthening Jewish-Arab ties. I have clarified our position on this issue. Yes, I said, we are ready to make great sacrifices in order to reach agreement with the Arabs. The main problem for us as a people is the problem of repatriation. The White Paper would like to make repatriation dependent on the consent of the Arabs. We will never agree to this, repatriation in economic terms does not depend on the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, it depends only on the strength of the Jewish people. To receive and absorb returnees, we use the special material means we receive from the Jewish people, not from the Arab people of that country. Then I explained what Keren Kaemet is, the Jewish National Fund, what Keren ha-yesod¹⁹ is (I don't think they knew anything about it before). Therefore, I added, Jewish repatriation cannot depend on Arabs and politically.

I added that we do not want to seize power over the Arabs, but we will not agree to take over us. There are half a million of us, about a million Arabs. In this situation, we are already strong enough to prevent the Arabs from dominating us.

We are looking for a way to compromise so that instead of a national conflict there will be inter-ethnic cooperation similar to the one in Great Syria between

Christian Lebanese and Muslim Syrians. I went on to explain to the guests the role of small peoples in the Middle East region: Transjordan, whose population is smaller than the number of Jews in only the three major cities of Palestine (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa), the Republic of Lebanon with a population only slightly larger than the number of Jews in Palestine, even though the ruling Christian community is smaller than the number of Palestinian Jews; I also mentioned the Druze and their aspirations, the Alawites and the Mutavalli sect. After all, I said that the future in the East can only be based on peace among small peoples. On the recognition of the independence of each of them. The future of Palestine, in my view, should be based on the acceptance of the fact that the Jewish people have an advantage here in matters of Jewish repatriation and settlement. Maybe as a result we will have one state consisting of two autonomous "cantons" or "states."

Then we moved on to the question of the Arab labour force. Here I felt not only the influence of the previous meeting with the Governor-General, but also the obvious consequences of their conversations with the Arabs (yesterday and this morning). Mikhailov said: Arabs complain that you do not give them work. They have seasons in agriculture when there is simply no work, at this time they need to work in Jewish farms. At the same time, you need your own working hands. Why don't you give them a job for three months a year? It seems to me that in this way you would be able to win their sympathy and create the basis for a lasting unification of interests. Of course, I understand that there is a contradiction with the principles of your collective farms (here he used the Russian word "kolkhoz"). But first, it is only a matter of temporary work, and secondly, the lofty goal of peace between the two peoples is meant. Shouldn't we give up on

principles for such a purpose? To this I replied that for us this is a key issue, especially for the working class, here one-sided approach is unacceptable. It is not only about principles, but also about practice.

To understand our principled approach, I said, you'll have to dive into history for a while. You have been an agricultural nation for generations, and we came to work on earth in this country only two generations ago. That's why we're facing a lot of danger here that you're not exposed to.

Here I explained what our villages looked like 40 years ago, at the beginning of labour repatriation. Then there was the threat that Jewish agriculture would become a sector of the capitalist economy: Jewish landowners would remain in charge, and all types of work would be carried out by non-Jews. Then we had to start fighting against this dangerous trend in our capitalist farms. The struggle was hard, its successes were insignificant - and then the idea of independent economy of workers, cooperative and collective was born. This is the national source of our idea, which we have come to from class positions. And now our economy is based on the principle of self-organized work, and we can never bring into it elements of class exploitation, even for three months a year.

At the same time, there is a practical aspect of the problem of the absorption of new returnees. There are up to a thousand Arab villages with 700,000 inhabitants in the country, and another 300,000 live in cities. Of course, there is no place for Jews in Arab villages now, and it would be all the more naive to think that there would be some place for new arrivals. Similarly, it is impossible to find a place for Jews in Arab cities. In other words, the Arab sector, which comprises two thirds of the population and 90 per cent of the land, cannot in any way be used for returnees.

The only sector for the absorption of returnees is Jewish, in the city and in the village. It is therefore clear that if we increase the influx of Arab labour and reduce the number of Jewish workers in the Jewish sector, we will not even dream of accepting additional Jewish returnees.

Here I drew the attention of the guests to the situation of the Jews in those countries that had undergone the German invasion to prove to them that we were facing the serious problem of Jewish emigration from Europe that would arise immediately after the war. America, England and the rest of the democratic countries are closed to Jewish immigrants from Europe, I stressed, and it is not to be hoped that this situation will change after the war.

Mikhailov tried to revisit his assertions that economic and economic cooperation with Arab workers was first and foremost necessary, and that the best way to do so was to give Arabs work in Jewish farms: in his view, collectivist principles could be sacrificed to some extent to achieve that goal. Then I saw that Petrenko's opinion on this issue does not coincide with Mikhailov's approach, because Petrenko clearly doubted at that moment. Then I added: we Jews have purely psychological grounds to resist the proposals to give access to the Arabs in our kibbutz. You Russians have been peasants for centuries, and we have become them only now. We are fighting against the diaspora's concept that a Jew always governs and a non-Jew works for him. We decided to do all the work with our own hands. If we allow Arab labour in the collective sector, how can we oppose it in private farms? After all, we will cut the on which we sit with our own hands!

I don't know if I managed to convince them. I explained that there was actually a possibility of joint labor, for example, on the railway or in the municipal

economy. I told them something from my own experience in this area and added that in the private sector of agriculture in practice many people still hire Arabs - but in Arab estates and farms a Jew will never be hired.

Further, during the conversation, Mikhailov repeatedly expressed admiration for the successes made by Jews in Palestine. According to him, "it was hard to even dream about it." Until now, they have received only sketchy information about the activities of Jews in Palestine, about progress in agriculture and technology, but now they see that the reality far exceeded the most rosy forecasts. He told about a friend of his, named Yugoslavov, who two years ago visited Palestine and then talked about the achievements of the Jews. At that time Mikhailov did not attach much importance to his words, but now, having visited the kibbutz Afikim, he accidentally heard about the visit of this Yugoslavov and immediately remembered that he was talking about Jewish agriculture. Mikhailov said that on their return to the Soviet Union, they would tell people everything they saw here.

Due to lack of time, the conversation, in fact, remained unfinished. Towards its conclusion, four other members of the leadership (Berlin, Katznelson, Elmaleh and Shra-gai) entered the room, and the conversation became common. At the same time the phone rang all the time, and we were in a hurry, and they were in a hurry that it was already time to have lunch, and about two hours they left.

In my opinion, the conversation turned out to be sincere and open. They were amazed at what they saw here. Apparently, they did not really have any idea of our activities in Palestine (the story of Yugoslavism is a good example). Either they did not pay enough attention to the information support, or , and more

likely - their informants simply led them by the nose, and they themselves showed no interest in the topic.

The Russians held on as diplomats and avoided unnecessary words. Therefore, out of caution, the first secretary of the embassy refrained from visiting the Jewish Agency, and only Petrenko, whose rank is not so high and not so responsible, paid a brief visit to the agency. Mikhailov limited himself to handing over a business card

Grunbaum. They were not afraid to visit the National Committee, as they saw it as a purely local Jewish institution, whose visit could not be construed as "recognition of zionism".

This visit should be seen as the beginning of a new stage of relations with Soviet Russia. For the first time in modern history, representatives of Russia saw tens of thousands of Jews in labor and struggle: they were amazed by what they saw, because it turned out to be so similar to what was happening to them, only without a whip, without state coercion.

For the first time they saw the power of the awakening Hebrew language - nothing like they had ever seen in Russian Jews. They were surprised by the explanations of the work of our schools and the development of the education system; they were struck by the fact that all the money Jews give on a voluntary basis, without any influence of government structures. They were impressed by our university, Hadassah Hospital, and active health activities. More than once during private conversations they expressed the opinion: "Here the Jews laid the foundation for the Jewish state." Hence the high appreciation of our activities, hence respect for us. Obviously, this assessment and this respect they will pass on to those who sent them. One can only hope that they will pass on our demands for the repatriation of refugees from Poland and other countries, in relation to the language,

and perhaps even to facilitate the fate of the "prisoners of Sion". And not only that: for the first time, representatives of the USSR stood by the rendition of the hymn "Ha-Tikva" and the raising of the Jewish flag decorated with the Star of David.

But the other side of this visit should not be ignored: it can be assumed that their trip is only the first step, the first link; that upon their return to Russia, they will hand over to their leadership not only what we asked for and what they promised us, but also what we did not ask for. For example, they will surely report that in addition to Hebrew, the Russian language is common here, that during the speeches at rallies they were applauded by so many people that there is no doubt that tens of thousands here know Russian, therefore, it would only be useful to start building up the activities of the USSR in Palestine in favor of their country and regime. Surely they will try to open a Russian consulate here, and there is a danger that in this case there will be difficulties, because "the sons of Korea are not dead" and the Palestinian Communist Party is still alive (as we saw during this visit), and we have yet to face its proceedings, its betrayal, its denunciation - and perhaps on an even larger scale than ever before.

You should be prepared for all this, too.

**LETTER OF THE ACTING HEAD OF THE
EASTERN DEPARTMENT OF VOCS
ALEVINSON TO THE LEAGUE "FOR SOVIET
RUSSIA" October 26, 1942**

Dear gentlemen!

The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee informed us about the creation and activities of your respected League, as well as that you are interested in materials about the life and struggle of the Soviet people.

As the All-Union Society of Cultural Communication with Abroad, we are very happy to assist you in every way possible and to provide you with all the materials you are interested in.

In a separate package, we send you two photo albums, one photo newspaper, as well as a number of

brochures in the Jewish language. We believe that this material will be of interest to you.

Please confirm receipt of these materials and give us your opinion about them.

For our part, we will be very grateful for the information provided about the activities of your League and the cultural life of Palestine.

Waiting for your kind letters.

With respect

Levinson East division of VOX.

**FROM THE RECORDING OF THE
CONVERSATION OF THE FIRST DEPUTY
PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY
WITH THE POLISH AMBASSADOR TO THE
USSR T. ROMER December 23, 1942**

He then stated that he wanted to find out privately the issue of persons with controversial, as he said, citizenship. The fact is that these persons (he specifically refers to Jews) have great difficulties because the question of their nationality is supposedly unclear. In Romer's view, it would be necessary, without touching the fundamental side of the issue, to find any practical solution, for example by allowing

some Jews with family abroad (e.g. in the United States) to go there. He has information that our ambassadors in America and in England - Litvinov and Maysky - gave supposedly some Jewish organizations assurances about the possibility of a group of rabbis abroad. Romer wonders how correct this message is. He believes that now that all the Allied Governments have joined the protest condemning the German atrocities against the Jewish population, it would be very useful to highlight the huge difference in attitudes towards Jews in Germany and in the allied states.

I said that since the Ambassador was asking me this question informally, I could also answer it informally as well. As the ambassador knows, all Soviet citizens wishing to go abroad should apply to the OVIR, which, based on the existing laws, decides their departure. Of course, there can be no exceptions for rabbis who are Soviet citizens. As for the promises made by May and Litvinov about the departure of a group of rabbis from the USSR, I doubt that they will make such promises. Moreover, I am sure they did not make such promises.

I took Romer's remark about the ambiguities allegedly in the issue of the nationality of non-Polish people. I stated that this question is absolutely clear. It was decided by the decree of the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR of 29.XI.39, which the embassy knows from our note of December 1, 1941. I replied by stating that we were addressing the issue of nationality on the basis of our laws and that, in terms of our laws raised by Romero, albeit privately, the question was indisputable.

I further noted that I see no link between Romer's statement that a favourable decision on the departure of the rabbis would underline the special situation of Jews in freedom-loving countries. I do not understand

why the Ambassador puts these two questions in touch.

Responding to me, Romer said that, speaking of favorable experiences abroad, he meant only the possibility of connecting rabbis with families and the possibility of working them in "normal conditions", i.e. as rabbis. Romer mentioned, among other things, that the Soviet authorities, not counting supposedly Jews for Polish citizens, at the same time do not consider them as Soviet citizens.

I disputed Romer's remark, stating that there was nothing known about cases in which the Soviet authorities were allegedly hesitant about determining the nationality of a person or when they did not recognize the persons as Soviet citizens.

Romer reiterated that he had raised his question privately. Now he sees that the information he received regarding the assurances of Maysky and Litvinov is not accurate.

In conclusion, Romer said that at the time of his departure, the Charge d'Affaires would remain in office, to whom he asked for the necessary assistance in carrying out his duties, which I had promised.

The conversation lasted 2 hours.

T. Novikov was present at the reception.

A. Vyshinsky

**LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH
AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, M. SHERTOK, TO
THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN THE
UK, I.M. MAYSKY January 19, 1943**

Your Excellency,

As a follow-up to our conversation of 13 January, I would like to present in writing the comments I have made.

The Palestinian Jewish community is fully engaged in efforts to ensure victory in the war. Of the total of 500 Llc jews now living in Palestine, 30 HAVE voluntarily joined the armed forces; some 20,000 are employed as civilians in the army and another 20,000 work under army contracts in factories and factories (in addition to about the same number of workers hired to meet the needs of the civilian population). Many thousands of people who work on the land are engaged in the production of food for the army. There is a great demand for Jewish workers and artisans to carry out urgent, war-related work in neighbouring territories, many hundreds of Jews work in refineries in Abadan in southern Persia, military construction in Iraq, bridges and highways in Syria, aircraft workshops in Eritrea, etc.

The shortage of labour to meet direct military needs has been increasing for many months, and the Palestinian Administration is now prepared to accept a significant number of immigrants if it can find the right people and ensure their passage to Palestine.

It is believed that among the many Jewish refugees from Poland currently in the USSR, many are not involved or fully involved in the Soviet Union's efforts to achieve victory in the war, owing to the natural difficulties associated with integrating new people into the economic life of a country living under martial law. It is assumed that many of these people could be directly involved in the common effort to ensure victory in the war if they moved to Palestine. This applies not only to skilled workers but also to those without qualifications: the latter could well work in

agriculture, where labour shortages are currently leading to excessive working hours and production cuts, as well as in various military jobs; they could also be useful as conscripts for the Jewish units of the British Army. The Jewish Agency for Palestine considers that if the Soviet government had given in principle consent to the departure of a certain number of Polish Jews (e.g. 3,000 to 5,000, both men and women), the agency would submit the list through the British Embassy in Moscow for consideration and approval by the Soviet authorities.

The Jews of Palestine have a fervent sympathy for the Soviet Union and a universal sense of admiration for its heroic struggle. The Jews of Palestine are well aware that they are making their modest contribution to the common effort to secure victory in the war, an effort in which the Soviet Union plays such an important role. With this in mind, the Jews of Palestine would warmly welcome, as a gesture of goodwill and a sign of support, the Soviet Government's agreement to allow a limited number of Polish Jews currently in the USSR to support the efforts of Palestinian Jews to secure victory in the war.

In addition to adult refugees, Palestinian Jews would be happy to accept refugee children, many of whom must have lost their parents during their travels. Their upbringing and education undoubtedly pose particular problems. In this regard, our proposal is for the Soviet Government to authorize the departure of a certain number of Polish Jewish children, especially orphans, and to inform the British Embassy in Moscow and to us so that the necessary measures can be taken to arrange their relocation.

I would like to make it clear that I am putting forward these proposals on behalf of the board of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, headquartered in Jerusalem and with a permanent office in London. I am

the official representative of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, my main task during this period was to coordinate the efforts of the Jews of Palestine to ensure victory in the war. As you are no doubt aware, the Jewish Agency is a body established under article 4 of the mandate for Palestine to consult with the Palestinian Administration and cooperate with it on matters affecting the interests of Jews in that country.

I remain a humble servant of Your Excellency

M.Schertok

**NOTE OF DEPUTY PEOPLE'S
COMMISSIONER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR S.ALOZOVSKY PEOPLE'S
COMMISSIONER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
V.M.MOLOTOV AND SECRETARY OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY (B) A.S. SCHERBAKOV
March 10, 1943**

Secretly

We received the following telegram from New York in Kuibyshev:

"Kuibyshev, Sovinformburo, Mihoels, Feferu.

We strongly insist on your arrival in the U.S. and touring the country. The Russian Defense Fund in the war could raise huge sums, help to achieve the unity of the Jewish people. The Jewish Council of the Russian Foundation for The Assistance to War."

This telegram is obviously the result of the message that Litvinov made to this Jewish Council according to directives from Moscow. It would be very bad if after all these conversations and telegrams the question was delayed or the trip would be postponed. It is clear from the telegram that Jewish organizations want to do something. The trip of Mihoels and Fefer can bring a certain benefit.

In this regard, I propose to send T. Mihoels and Fefer for 3-4 months in the United States, laying on T.S. Scherbakov and on me to develop an instruction for this delegation of the Anti-Fascist Jewish Committee.

Deputy People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs
S. Lozovsky

On the document of the litter: "t. Scherbakov. I agree (with the spr.) for 2-3 months. V. Molotov."

**REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION OF E.
KAPLAN, A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF
THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, AND
AN EMPLOYEE OF THE POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE AGENCY E. EPSTEIN
WITH THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE
SOVIET EMBASSY IN TURKEY, S.S.
MIKHAILOV March 16, 1943**

I accompanied E. Kaplan to a meeting with Mikhailov. Kaplan raised the issue of Jewish refugees from Poland who are in the USSR and stressed our desire to repatriate those who are not involved in the military efforts of the Soviet government. First of all, we are interested in the repatriation of children: there is no benefit from them to Russia and by taking them to Palestine, we are only making it easier for the Soviet government to care for the food of refugees. If the removal of refugees from the USSR is not possible - neither children nor adults - we would ask for permission to send one or two people to Russia to find out the amount of assistance that we could provide them from our country.

Then E. Kaplan proposed to create a company that would develop trade relations between Palestine and the Soviet Union. Such a company would have good prospects in the post-war period.

Kaplan then introduced the plan to transport returnees from the Balkans by sea and asked to what

extent we could be sure that the ships carrying the refugees would not be attacked by Russian submarines.

Mikhailov accepted us very politely, listened carefully to everything that Kaplan had told him, but, as is usual with the Soviet representatives, answered briefly and made only a few general comments to Kaplan's words: "It's interesting," "It's very important," "I'll tell you who should" etc.

Kaplan handed him a memorandum about the issues raised during the conversation, and Mikhailov promised to hand it over to his government.

At the end of the meeting, Mikhailov asked to say hello to all his friends in Palestine and members of the "V League". On our return to the hotel, each of us received a gift from Mikhailov - a book published in the USSR.

Wednesday, March 17

At the hotel I met with TASS correspondent Valuysky, who introduced me to A. Kulazhenkov, the new first secretary of the Soviet Embassy, responsible for relations with the press. He knew about our meeting with Mikhailov and showed interest in the development of cultural ties between Palestine and the Soviet Union. He promised to send to us some literary materials received from Russia.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN M. SHERTOK, DIRECTOR OF THE
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH
AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, AND THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON, N.G.
GOLKDMAN, WITH THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES,
M.M. LITVINOV March 24, 1943**

I had previously requested a meeting for myself and Mr. Shertok, but through the Secretary of the Ambassador I was informed that he was very busy and that let Mr. Schertok write down what he wanted to say. After that I applied in writing and I was scheduled to meet.

Mr. Schertok could not keep up with the beginning of the meeting and arrived later. I asked Mr. Litvinov why it was so difficult for the first time in many years of our acquaintance to get an audience, and asked directly whether he thought that we had anything to do with the protests over the shooting of Alter and Ehrlich²². I assured him in a joking tone that it would be an insulting assessment of my intellect to believe

that he might believe that I was involved in such anti-Soviet propaganda. Then Mr. Litvinov laughed, rose and bowed, saying that in our future relationship he would never again commit the sin of underestimating my intellect.

After that, our conversation was conducted in a serious tone. I informed him that I and most of my friends regretted the shooting of Alter and Ehrlich, but did not make any judgments about the proceedings, said that we are, in principle, against the shootings, but we do not consider this case as a Jewish problem. We view Bund's statement that "the Jewish people will never forget this" as a misconception. This is, in any case, a problem between socialists and communists or Poles and Russians, but it has nothing to do with the Jewish people, because whatever the reasons for their execution, it certainly did not happen because they are Jews. Neither the Zionist organization nor the World Jewish Congress participated in any demonstration, although they were pressured. I told Mr. Litvinov that the Bund was as sharply anti-Sionist as anti-communist.

Mr. Litvinov took it with satisfaction, and his attitude, cold and hard, completely changed, he began to hold on more friendly than ever before.

Mr. Schertok arrived. He told Litvinov about Palestine in the war, about Ishuv's contribution to the military efforts and his special contribution to Russia's assistance. Mr. Litvinov listened very carefully and asked what the Arabs had done compared to the Jews. After Mr. Schertok provided him with facts and figures, he said, "You need to do everything you can to get America's attention to this."

He asked if we had reached an agreement with Britain and the State Department on post-war plans for Palestine and whether the British were still sheltering Arabs.

We told him about our negotiations with the State Department and informed him that the British were not yet ready to discuss our problems with us.

**THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE BOARD OF THE
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE M.
SHERTOK ABOUT THE CONVERSATION
WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN
GREAT BRITAIN I.M. MAY AT THE MEETING
OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
HISTADRUT April 29, 1943**

During my conversation with May, I emphasized two things:

A. We are convinced that so many Jewish refugees who may be involved in military efforts are not properly used in the Soviet Union simply because they are refugees not involved in the activities of the Soviet

economic structures. As a result, these people wander around the cities without a purpose, while we have experience of absorbing such Jews, in our country they will be able to work in agriculture, industrial enterprises, enlist in the army and actively participate in the war.

At the same time, I stressed another problem of relationships. So far, there has been no relationship between us and Soviet Russia, and it is not our fault. In our country, the Struggle of the Soviet Union and the resilience of all sectors of Soviet society are watched with great enthusiasm and sympathy. We have a large and strong proletariat, it is the cornerstone on which the Jewish community stands. Not in all political and social issues our working class is in the same position as you: it is independent, it has its own positions, its own policy, it determines its way according to its needs and understanding. But he has great respect for the way you build your society, your state. For all the differences, he thinks he belongs to the same camp with you. And moving from the private to the common, our country is small, there are not many of us in it, but we (not just Palestine) are the future of this country. In fact, we do not share much, it is quite possible that in the future there will be connections between us, there will be a common interest. We think you can afford a gesture of goodwill towards the Jewish population of Palestine. The Jews of Palestine are now fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with you, we are your allies. (Here I told him briefly about the volunteer appeal and our military efforts in general. When I say "gesture of goodwill," I mean not words and declarations, but practical steps, such as the liberation of at least three thousand Jews, two thousand, even one thousand to move to Palestine. He showed a known interest in my words and asked how to select people. I thought, "God willing, we can get to solve these issues!" and

immediately offered to send an expert who would help in this Soviet side.

Maysky did not react to this, only asked to give him a memorandum and promised to hand it over to his government. He said, "You can't ask me for an immediate response." To which I said I was ready to prepare a note for him.

Towards the end of the conversation, the ice began to melt a little. Maysky walked me to the door and suddenly asked me in front of the door, "How are you doing?" I don't think I'm. expressed his intention to engage in propaganda. Then he asked, "Do you have an army?" He asked why. I said, "Because of previous political processes," and I looked at him so that he could understand the hint that it wasn't just the British who had "previous political processes." I then explained to him that there were Jewish units in the British Army and what "Jewish units" were, what was the internal sense of Jewry, etc. We're just fighting for it. He asked what we wanted. I replied that we demand at least the merger of these units into a large Jewish military unit. I said I had met with the British Minister of War on this issue. He asked, "How successful?"

**NOTE OF THE CONSULAR DEPARTMENT OF
THE NKID USSR TO THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S
COMMISSIONER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR V.G. DEKANOZOV May 15, 1943**

In connection with Ivanov's request on the issue of registration of Soviet citizens in Palestine, we consider it necessary to note the following:

In October 1941, the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey, T. Vinogradov, put forward a proposal to open our consulate in Palestine. In a telegram dated 14.10.41 you told him that setting this question on our initiative is not beneficial to us, as the British can ask for permission to open a consulate in Baku or Vladivostok; in the same telegram, Vinogradov was instructed to ask the British Ambassador Hugh Gessen for permission to travel to Palestine by a consular officer of the Embassy. In December 1941, Hugessen gave a positive response to this appeal, but on the additional instruction of the NKID the trip to Palestine was postponed and has not taken place to date (not counting the trip of T. Mikhailov and Petrenko in August 1942 at the invitation of the Jewish League "Vi").

We believe that the Consular Division of nkid should put this issue before the British Embassy. When talking to the British, it is possible, along with the presentation of a commemorative note, to recall our previous appeal, indicating that the permission granted at that time could not be used for technical reasons.

A draft commemorative note is attached.

Atroshchenko

Shchegalova

application

Commemorative note

The People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs has the honour of addressing the British Embassy with the following case.

According to the data available to the People's Commission, there are currently some 400 Soviet citizens living in Palestine. The absence of a Soviet consulate in the country and the inability to maintain personal contact with the nearest consular institution of the USSR (the Soviet Consulate General in Istanbul)

created a situation in which the majority of Soviet citizens in Palestine do not have properly framed documents on co-citizenship.

In order to streamline the case, as well as to accurately record all Soviet citizens, the People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs intends to send a team of consular officers to Palestine and asks the British Embassy to assist in obtaining the necessary permits.

Kuibyshev ... May 1943

**NOTE OF DEPUTY PEOPLE'S
COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR S.ALOZOVSKY PEOPLE'S**

**COMMISSIONER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V.M.
MOLOTOV May 22, 1943**

Secret

I hereby send you a draft directive to the delegates of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee Mihoels and Fefer. This draft directive is a response to a request by our Consul General in New York, T. Kiselyov, on how delegates should behave towards the Zionists.

Since Mihoels and Fefer will have to face different organizations and groups, including anti-Soviet groups, I thought that they should give directives on this issue as well.

Deputy People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs S. Lozovsky

On the document the litters: "Tov. Dekanozov V.G. Please inform V. Vyshinsky 26.V."

"In general, Lozovsky should have been instructed by Mihoels and Fefer before entering, as all these issues and many others could have been foreseen in the United States. I'm coming back with my amendments.

V.Dekanozov 26. V.»

"It's business. Correct in accordance with the comments of T. Dekanozov. A. Vyshinsky 27.V."

Draft directive to delegates of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee Tt. Michoels and Fefer

I hereby send you a directive on the line of conduct of Mihoels and Fefer during my stay in the United States.

Michoels and Fefer were sent by the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee to the United States at the invitation of the Jewish Foundation for The Assistance of Russia in War and are guests of this organization. They are representatives of the EAC, not the Soviet

government. The main purpose of the EAC delegation is to establish cooperation between Soviet Jews and The Jews of the United States (with the exception of anti-Soviet groups) through the joint struggle against Hitler's Germany and its vassals and the deployment of a Red Army aid campaign in the United States. Delegates have no other powers or assignments. This determines their behavior and attitude towards different, struggling Jewish organizations. The question of whether Zionist organizations should participate in a broad committee and all rallies in the country and under what conditions is a matter for American Jewish organizations.

As representatives of Soviet Jews who came to visit American Jews, they should make sure that Soviet and American flags were hung at rallies. The question of the flag and anthem of the Zionists, as well as whether or not to mention the "Jewish state of a free Palestine" in the resolution, should be decided by an American Jewish organization, at the invitation of which Mihoels and Fefer travel to the United States.

The EAC delegates should never interfere in the internal life of the United States, in the struggle of Jewish organizations among themselves and should not speak on the issue of international policy, what is the issue of the Jewish state of free Palestine, because Palestine is known to be the mandated territory of Great Britain.

In relation to such Jewish groups that oppose the USSR, Mihoels and Fefer should refuse any communication and discussion with them and not take any part in their rallies, demonstrations, etc.

During interviews with representatives of organizations (Jint, Ambijan, Jewish Aid Fund, etc.) they should not make any commitments without first requesting nkid through the embassy, telling the initiators of the proposals that they would submit their

projects and proposals to the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee.

In the event of an attempt by the Polish and Jewish enemies of the Soviet Union to raise the case of Alter and Ehrlich Mihoels and Fefer at any meeting, they should firmly defend the policy of the Soviet Union, stating that the destruction of the 5th Column, regardless of the nationality of its participants, is a preliminary and necessary condition for the defeat of Hitler's Germany.

In their speeches Mihoels and Fefer should not be limited only to the Jewish theme, but should talk about the friendship of peoples in the Soviet Union, about the competition of all the peoples of the Soviet Union in the fight against Hitler, about the heroism of the Red Army, etc.

The Embassy and Consulate should provide all political assistance to EAC delegates during their stay in the United States to submit their requests and proposals to the NKID.

Check out the contents of this telegram by Mihoels and Fefer.

On the margins of the document at the third paragraph of the letter V.G. Dekanozov: "In my opinion, this whole section needs to be remade in the sense that our delegates should not interfere in the question of what flags to display at rallies and what anthems should be performed."

**LETTER FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN
WASHINGTON, N. GOLDMAN TO THE
PRESIDENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA E.
BENESH May 27, 1943**

Dear Mr. Benesh,

I enclose a commemorative note on the theme "Soviet Russia and zionism" which you asked me to prepare for you. I have tried to set out the main reasons for the difficulties that existed between us and the Russian Government up to this time and the grounds for the current new and positive relations. I also briefly reflected some of the specific issues that we and the representatives of that Government have discussed over the past two years.

Further, in the hope that you will find this useful, I enclose a pamphlet by Mr. David Ben-Gurion, Chairman of the Board of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, on the current objectives of the Zionist movement, as well as a copy of a commemorative note we submitted to the State Department a few months ago containing our political demands.

Needless to say, how inspiring your sympathy has affected us and how grateful we are to you for being willing to discuss our problems with the authorities of

Soviet Russia. If anyone can make a difference in an issue that concerns our relationship with them and has such great potential significance for the future of the Zionist movement, it is you.

Needless to say, we are ready to provide any additional material you need.

I have enjoyed meeting with you, and on behalf of Dr. Weizmann and myself, I wish you all the best in your important mission to Moscow. Let me ask you to inform through our friends in London of the results of the mission to the extent that our affairs are concerned. By the time you get back, Dr. Weitzman will be in London, and I'm sure you'll get in touch with him. I hope to meet you again in London in the autumn.

With sincere respect

Naum Goldman

Application

A memo on the relationship between the Zionist movement and Soviet Russia

I. Reasons for Russia's hostility to zionism in the past

The antagonism that the USSR has shown against zionism over the past two decades, and which was expressed in the arrest of many Zionists in Russia, in the prohibition of Hebrew literature there and the anti-Zionist position of communist organizations around the world, stemmed from the following two main reasons:

(a) This was partly an echo of the internal ideological struggle for the dominant influence on the lives of Jews in Tsarist Russia between the Zionists, who saw the final solution to the Jewish problem in the creation of Jewish Palestine, and the Jewish

communists, who claimed that the only solution was the world revolution.

(b) This was partly a reflection of the strained relations that have been developing over the years between the UK and Russia due to Britain's armed intervention in the revolutionary struggle in Russia. Soviet Russia considered zionism to be a conduit for British interests in the Middle East and, in the language of the Communists, a representative of British imperialism in the region. The highest manifestation of this antagonism was the position of the Communists in Palestine, both Jews and non-Jews, who during the 1936-1938 unrest openly supported Arab terrorists acting against the Jewish population.

Now both of these causes have lost their significance. Today, when the Soviet regime has existed for more than 20 years, the internal struggle between Russian Zionists and Russian communes-Tami-Jews has no significance. The new generation of Jews in Russia does not remember it. In any case, the non-Jewish communists were not affected by this, a fact that should be taken into account when explaining why in the past, when talking to diplomats from Soviet Russia, we often found more sympathy and understanding of the program of the Zionist movement among the communes of non-Jews than among the communists of Jewish origin.

As for the second reason for this antagonism, now that Soviet Russia and Great Britain are no longer enemies, but allies both during the war and in the subsequent period, the situation has changed radically.

We would like to state with determination that with the elimination of these two main causes of historical antagonism, it is time to rethink the approach of Soviet Russia to zionism and establish relations of understanding.

II. Arguments in favor of establishing a relationship of understanding and friendship between the Zionist movement and Soviet Russia

There is nothing in the communist idea or in the soviet policies that would make it impossible to show sympathy on the part of Soviet Russia, its support for the jewish demands on Palestine. Ideologically, Soviet Russia has always defended the right of all peoples to their national existence. Indeed, the struggle for the liberation of oppressed peoples is one of the most important ideological principles of Soviet Russia. The tests that Jews living in Europe outside Soviet Russia have gone through over the past decade have proved that it is impossible to truly solve the Jewish problem by simply guaranteeing equality of rights or the so-called rights of minorities. On the other hand, the Jewish people suffered relatively more in these ten years than any other. In tomorrow's world, it is necessary not only to compensate it, but also to prevent the possibility of a repeat of a catastrophe such as the ten years of Hitler's regime, so that Jews can build the life of their nation as a people equal among other peoples. Let's note that with regard to Russian Jews the question of emigration does not arise yet, there is nevertheless a far-reaching problem of emigration for those homeless and disadvantaged Jews of Europe living outside Soviet Russia, who must be resettled at the end of the war. Russia, as one of the world's leading powers, has renounced the isolationism of the past, and cannot but be interested or indifferent to the problem of Jews in Europe. And if the vast majority of these Jews, after the trials of the last decade, seek the right to their own independent and natural national life in Palestine, that right should be granted to them.

Politically, Soviet Russia, which has natural interests in the Middle East, hardly has a reason to

object to the emergence of a Jewish community in Palestine. Russian diplomats have repeatedly pointed out to us that Russia is not particularly concerned about the demands made by the Arabs, nor does it attach much importance to them. If we take the current war, the leaders of the Arab states openly or secretly occupy pro-Nazi or pro-fascist positions. For example, the former Mufti of Jerusalem and former Prime Minister of Iraq, Rashid al-Ghailani, defected to the Nazis and today, as a fugitive, they are carrying out a furious propaganda of Nazism. However, even those Arab leaders who have taken a more circumspect stance have never effectively supported the United Nations in the war against the Axis. Egypt, bound by a treaty with England under which it was to declare war on Italy and Germany in the event of their invasion, remained neutral even as Nazi troops approached Alexandria. Iraq, also bound by commitments to declare war on the Axis countries in the event of hostilities, initially launched a failed coup attempt against the British and, finally, three years later, declared war on the Axis countries only after its participation had no significance and the United Nations victory was effectively secured. Today, Ibn Saud is still neutral.

On the other hand, of all the peoples living in the Middle East, only Palestinian Jews have faithfully and passionately done and continue to do their utmost in the name of a common struggle against the axis countries, despite all the difficulties created by the short-sighted colonial administration with regard to the full mobilization of human and other resources. In terms of maintaining the position of allies in the Middle East and strengthening progressive elements there, the development of a strong Jewish Palestine is extremely important.

Moreover, what Jews are trying to create in Palestine today is not only a new national life for themselves, but also important new social forms. Palestinian Jews were overwhelmingly non-communists, but they were deeply concerned with the social organization and the desire to create a new society based on the principles of justice and equality, which was already reflected in the lives of Palestinian Jews. Community settlements and other forms of agricultural and industrial labour organization in Palestine, based on the principles of cooperation and national land ownership and, in most cases, for means of production, are the main trends that should cause natural sympathy in the Soviet Union.

It may also be added that a large, if not the largest, part of the first settlers and creators of modern Palestine were Russian Jews with natural sympathy for Russia, "which, unlike Tsarist Russia, no longer exists anti-Semitic sentiments. Thus, it is only natural that the Jewish community in Palestine should enthusiastically support the heroic struggle of Soviet Russia against Nazism. This fact was recently confirmed in an article published in the Pravda newspaper and transmitted in an ETA report from Moscow on 17 May, which stated that Palestinian Jews had donated several first aid vehicles and a mobile hospital to the Red Army. ETA reports: "Today in the Moscow press expressed gratitude to the Palestinian Jews, who were the first of all Jews of democratic countries to respond to the call to help the Russian army." "Cars," Pravda writes, "have traveled 2,000 km through the desert and mountainous areas of Arabia and Iran... Workers, farmers and intellectuals in Palestine enthusiastically participate in the collection of funds for medical care of the Red Army... and asked to convey a warm greeting to the Red Army as a fighter for civilization."

resume. Here's a quick summary:

(a) In reality, there are no internal contradictions, both theoretical and factual, between the interests of the Soviet State and the creation of Jewish Palestine. On the contrary, in many ways there is a genuine commonality of sympathy and interests;

b) The establishment of Jewish education in Palestine would be the only real solution to the problem of Jewish migration that might arise after the end of the war;

(c) The rebirth of the Jewish nation would mean a great act of justice and reparation of all that Jews had lost during centuries of injustice.

Specific problems

In addition to addressing the common problem of the change in The Attitude of Soviet Russia to zionism, there are also two specific issues that have been discussed between the Zionist leaders and representatives of the Russian government. These issues need to be addressed not only on their own, but also because their solution may open the way to improving relations between the Zionists and Russia.

1. Permission to leave for Polish Jews. We do not intend to take sides in the disagreement between Soviet Russia and Poland on the issue of the citizenship of those Poles (both Jews and Christians) who came to Russia during the war. But even acknowledging the correctness of the Soviet government's position on which all these refugees are now Russian citizens, there are good reasons to satisfy our request, passed repeatedly through the ambassadors of Soviet Russia in London and Washington, to grant a number of Polish Jews exit visas for immigration to Palestine. Many of them have not been able to adapt to the Russian wartime economy and represent a real burden for Russia. Thousands have died without enduring the inevitable

harsh living conditions caused by their sudden arrival as refugees in a country living under the laws of war; many of these refugees, such as rabbis, yeshiva students, and fanatical young Zionists, whose only passion and ideal is to devote their lives to the creation of a Jewish state, spiritually and ideologically alien to the principles of today's Russia. On the other hand, Palestinian Jews are severely short of labour for industry and agriculture. 30 Young Men's and Women's Ltd., many from rural areas, are currently serving in the army; 10 LLCs are engaged in the protection of residential areas and industry. If Palestine had a large workforce, it could increase its material contribution to the fight against Nazism, and since The Nazi-occupied Europe is tightly closed to immigration, the main source of additional labour for Palestine are Polish Jews from Soviet Russia, especially the part that is concentrated in areas close to Iran (Tashkent, Samarkand, etc.) from where they could easily get to Iran and Palestine. There is a precedent for such emigration: when Soviet Russia occupied Lithuania at the beginning of the war and incorporated it into the Soviet Union, the Soviet authorities allowed 5,000 Lithuanian Jews to leave for Turkey and Palestine, despite the fact that they had legally become Russian citizens. Such permission could be given today without any damage to the position of the Soviet government, which considers them Russian citizens. For Palestine, this would be extremely important from an economic point of view and would also be welcomed by Jews around the world as a gesture of friendliness and goodwill.

2. Contacts with The Jews of Russia. As a result of the isolationist policy pursued earlier by Soviet Russia, the Jews of Russia have so far been unable to contact the rest of the Jewish people. This policy changed after Russia entered the war. The Jewish Anti-Fascist

Committee in Kuibyshev has made considerable efforts to ensure mutual understanding and cooperation among Jews around the world, and, as mentioned above, its activities have found the most sincere response among the Jews of Palestine. It is extremely important, both in terms of rapprochement between Soviet Russia and other democratic states, and from the point of view of Jews, to strengthen contacts between the large Russian Jewish community and other Jewish communities. The best way to achieve this would be for the Soviet authorities to authorize representatives of the global Jewish community and the Zionist movement to establish contacts with the Jews of Russia. A visit by such a delegation to Russia could be useful in terms of improving understanding between the Jewish people, including the Zionists on the one hand, and the Russian Jewish community and Soviet Russia on the other.

IV. In conclusion, I would like to add that there is nothing more misguided than the view expressed by some soviet leaders that the Zionist movement is antagonistic to Soviet Russia. Neither the Zionist ideology nor the Zionist policy give any basis for such antagonism. It has always been on the side of progressive movements. Naturally, he considered the Axis countries his mortal enemy and welcomed and supported all the forces that rose to fight the Nazis. In addition, the Jews of Palestine, motivated by such a strong desire to create a better social order, have always shown a deep and close interest in large-scale experiments conducted in Russia, although they did not fully agree with all aspects of these experiments. The Zionist movement has always sincerely regretted that, due to circumstances, it was forced to take a conflicting position towards Soviet Russia. With Russia's entry into the war, there was hope that the Russian government's attitude towards zionism may

now change. The entire Zionist movement would be very pleased with this change of attitude, as well as by the Soviet Russia's awareness that it has no good reason to fight zionism, and that, on the contrary, Soviet Russia has every reason to support the Zionist demands for a final and just solution to the Jewish problem.

**SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION H.
WEIZMANN AT A DINNER IN HONOR OF
THE DELEGATION OF THE JEWISH ANTI-
FASCIST COMMITTEE IN THE USSR June
25, 1943**

I am honoured to welcome the distinguished members of the delegation sent by the Soviet Union to America as ambassadors of Russian culture.

There are several fundamental principles in our relations with Russia that we must take into account. What is the basis of our friendship as Americans and as Jews with its people? Is it the only reason that they and we have one common enemy- Germany? Or that in the face of the Soviet Union we have a strong ally who stopped the advance of the so-called invincible army, shackled its forces on the Eastern Front and made in fear of waiting for the inevitable offensive, which will surely be held anywhere in its rear? Or that in the face of the Soviet Union we have a country that voluntarily gave the lives of 5 million of its sons, whose valiant struggle cost the enemy almost twice as many losses?

Dear friends, although these facts are admired by Russia, our friendship towards its people is motivated by something much deeper. We are deeply moved by the growing awareness of the fact that it is waging a popular war, its army is popular, its defenders are men, women and children. She, like us, is waging a war for the people, as Vice President Wallace said, for the common man of tomorrow.

Our friendship is based on the fact that we Jews understand what suffering is. The Russians, like us, know that the Nazis are not soldiers fighting for their country, but vandals, cruel sadists, murderers of the innocent. They brought severe suffering to the Russians. Our Jewish brothers living overseas were subjected to torment and suffering, and suffered greatly. Both we and they sympathize with the suffering of the civilian population, who, in violation of international laws of war, are the articles of any moral code caused by the ruthless cruelty from which Genghis Khan himself would be ashamed. Our sons, like the Russians who came out on the battlefield, know that they are fighting against physical enslavement and moral destruction.

We should take the example of the Russians in terms of their standards of equality of race and peoples, as reflected in Stalin's historic message on the 24th anniversary of the Red Army:

"The Red Army is free from the sense of racial hatred. She is free from this humiliating feeling because she was brought up in a spirit of racial equality and respect for the rights of other peoples. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that in our country the manifestation of racial hatred is punishable by law."

Yes, and we are grateful to this army, which shared its provisions with refugees, both Jewish and other

nationalities, who met on its way. These are the very bonds that bind us, despite all the differences.

We strive to respond with goodness. We have helped and will continue to assist the Soviet Union financially through the supply of medicines, clothing, food and other basic necessities. I am proud that 600 LTD Jews serve in the Soviet army and countless others in the guerrilla groups bravely fight the Germans in the rear. Many noted the selfless heroism of Jewish men and women shown in combat and labour.

We swear by their blood, that we will continue this popular war, and that, in turn, we will spare our lives, wealth, talent and work so that nowhere else in the world will no one in the world ever be a pariah or exile and that everyone can live in a safe and free world.

**FROM THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF
THE LONDON OFFICE OF THE JEWISH
AGENCY FOR PALESTINE September 14,
1943**

Secretly

Present: Dr. Weitzman, Prof. Brodetsky, Prof. Namir, Mr. Linton.

Conversation with Mr. May:

Dr Weitzman said he had had a lengthy conversation with Mr May before leaving England. He gave Mr. May a report on the agency's situation and his conversation with President Roosevelt. He told Mr.

Maysky that the British would not act alone, that they needed moral support from America and Russia. It was at this point that he told him about the president and added that they did not know Russia's position. They are friendly to Russia and hope that the Soviet government will understand their goals.

Mr. Maysky replied that he could not make a commitment to his government, but he believed that the Russians would support them. There is one thing that bothers him: the small size of Palestine. He made every effort to allay Mr. Maysky's fears in that regard, and presented him with a number of arguments that, by the most modest estimates, they could move some 2 million more Jews there. He stressed that when Lord Samuel had recently returned from Palestine, he had spoken of 3 million, while Dr. Lauder milk had mentioned the figure of 4 million. Mr. Maisky said that he was very happy to hear that and would take note of the matter when he returned to Russia. He believes that Russia will certainly support them. Mr. Maysky said that what the Germans had done to the Jews was appalling. When they soviet troops entered the liberated city, they found nothing but corpses and graves.

Dr. Weitzman then raised the issue of the Zionists in detention and the permits for Polish Jews to leave in Russia.

Mr. Maisky stated that it was not in his competence and invited Dr. Weitzman to discuss the issues with Michoels and Fefer.

**RECORDING OF A.A. GROMYKO, A
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON, D.A.
September 23, 1943**

I told the Ambassador that the purpose of my visit was not to discuss specific issues, but to establish contact. He had several conversations with his predecessor, Mr. Litvinov, who had also met with Dr. Weitzman, Mr. Ben-Gurion and Mr. Sher-electro.

I told the Ambassador that we all believe that Soviet Russia cannot remain indifferent to the problem of Palestine and the problem of Jews in Europe. Soviet Russia, as one of the great powers, will have to take a position on the solution of the Jewish problem and the Palestinian question.

I said: we understand that the Soviet government will not finally form its attitude to these issues during the war, but we believe that it should be informed by us about the developments in order to have it in mind our point of view when the time comes to define the political line. For this reason, I have kept Mr. Litvinov informed of the situation in Palestine, and I would like to be able to do the same with regard to Mr. Gromyko.

He replied that he agreed with me that the Soviet government would be interested in these issues and that he would be very happy to see me at any time when I had information in order to pass on to him. He also said that he would be happy to receive any handwritten or printed materials that I would consider necessary to present to him, and that he would make sure that the Soviet Government received the materials. (I sent him the text of my speech at the American Jewish Conference and the conference resolution.)

He then discussed with me the visit of Prof. Michoels and Lt. Col. Fefer here in the United States and asked about the State Department's attitude to the Palestinian problem.

The new ambassador is a young, calm man, very cautious, but cute.

Naum Goldman

**FROM THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF
THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE
October 4, 1943**

Ben-Gurion: First of all, I don't think it's going to be in the papers until Sunday, and I hope the journalists won't hear from you.

On Saturday evening, Dr. Joseph received a call from the main secretariat informing him that Maysky was here and wanted to visit Jewish settlements. We were asked to prepare a program for the trip for the day, for half a day and for one evening. In the end we were informed that we decided to stop at the evening trip program, i.e. for the afternoon, from 3.30. The programme included only two settlements near Jerusalem, Kiryat Anawim and Maale Hahamish.

Shertok wasn't here, so I took Kaplan as an economist with me. When we entered the Governor-General's house, the secretary said he was asking for two books - the Royal Commission report and the Woodhead report. That is, it was clear that there was a conversation with Maisky and now they want to give him the relevant literature. They couldn't forbid him to meet with us directly, but they made sure that he had free time for the Jews. In the morning he was given a tour of the Old City, taken until noon, he was completely exhausted and only at 4 o'clock in the afternoon got out to us - and we were told that we should return before sunset.

We went to Kiryat Anavim. This trip had social significance, he kept asking questions about collective farms. Back in London, it seemed to me that he suspected us of fiction, because we did here what they do not dare to do in Russia. When we went there, he was just amazed - surprised by the forests we planted, fruit trees and everything else. There's really a very revealing route, you can compare what was before and what is now. The young guys told everything, showed the farm, explained how the work and daily routine is organized. In Ma'ale Hahamish, he saw an earlier stage of the establishment of the farm, and it made a

huge impression on him. Maysky was with his wife, she is a very energetic woman, always asking how this or that is called in Hebrew. The only thing that made it a little uncomfortable was because of the huge retinue of the military and the secret police.

On the way back, we set out to talk to him about things about zionism, for example, because he asked questions about it himself. He asked what our plans for the post-war period were, if there were prospects for further settlement, and here I would like to ask that all this be included in the protocol. "After the war," Maysky said, "the Jewish problem will be very difficult, we will have to solve it, we have to develop approaches, we must know everything. We are told that there is no space here in Palestine, we want to know if this is true, we want to get an idea of the possibilities of this country."

We talked a little bit about our plans - now and those that are intended for the future. We talked about general ideas, settlement, irrigation, our major projects. I told him that there are opportunities for the resettlement of two million Jews, but I can't say for sure how long it will take. He requested our programs and actual materials. I explained to him why they always say that there are few places, I have given two types of arguments: some of them come from disbelief, as they are accustomed to completely different and much larger territories; others know what the reality is, but they don't want to admit it. He also asked for photos, albums with views of Palestine and Jerusalem, wants to send pictures to friends. We handed him all the literature we had, including two books by Dr. Ruppin. He asked for statistics that would prove the country's ability to receive returnees. I said we'd love to send it. He asked to send everything to Moscow, but I objected that it is impossible by mail

now, then he said that soon there will be such an opportunity.

I think he's really interested. He told us that they needed to come up with an opinion, saying as if the government wanted to express that opinion. Now he is the third most important person in foreign policy immediately after Stalin and Molotov. And since he is a specialist in European affairs, he and deal with these issues.

His wife was impressed by the trip, it just struck me. In London, he made himself an opinion, and this visit is organized on his initiative.

When we returned, it was getting dark, but he asked to be taken through the Jewish neighborhoods of Jerusalem. Either he really wanted to see the Jewish sector of the city, or he just wanted to continue talking to us. We were very happy and immediately determined the route. When we entered the city and turned in the direction they wanted to go, the whole armada that was following us was in a panic - but we immediately explained that it was the guest's wish, and they had to put up with it. We drove through Sikhron Moshe, Mea Shearim, on Neviim Street, and took him home through Rehavia.

He said he was leaving the next day to get there. As the path was through the Israel Valley, we recommended him make a small detour and stop in our villages. But he said he had already been warned that the road was life-threatening.

In general, we showed him both aspects - both socialist and Zionist. But first of all, it is obvious that he has taken very serious political attention to the question of whether our country can solve the Jewish problem after the war or not. We can say that what he saw was a discovery for him. I didn't even count on that. Now we have to work with maximum efficiency,

because there is another state that has shown interest in this issue.

**FROM THE RECORDING OF THE
CONVERSATION OF THE SECOND
SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN
EGYPT, A.F. SULTANOV WITH THE
DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE BOARD OF THE
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE M.
SHERTOK December 21, 1943**

Secretly

Referring to the agency's plans in Palestine, Mr. Schertok said: "We are seeking "stabilization" in Palestine. We're there.

must be strengthened by all means. Now there are half a million of us Jews. Arabs - 1 million. We hope to increase Jewish immigration to Palestine after the war and make the ratio of 2.5 million Jews per 1 million Arabs and stabilize at this level. We are building industry and transport. Economic positions are in our hands. We will achieve political domination in Palestine when we have a majority.

To my question, "How do the Arabs look at your plans and what are your relations with the Arabs?" After all, there were only 100,000 of us, and now 500,000. They have to respect our opinion. Tens of thousands of absolutely devastated Jews will remain in Europe after the war, and we will resettle them in

Palestine. We must only get the consent of the great powers to do so. During the war, we injected 45,000 Jews into Palestine. And after the war, things will go faster. We have very well organized workers. Not bad and peasant colonies in agriculture. In the Allied (English) army we have about 23,000 volunteers, of which more than a thousand only sailors. If we had our own government, we would be able to build a decent army."

Second Secretary of the Soviet Mission in Egypt
Sultans

**LETTER FROM THE SOVIET ENVOY TO
EGYPT, N.V. NOVIKOV, TO THE DEPUTY
PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR S.I.KAVTARADZE
April 15, 1944**

Secretly

Over the past few days, more than 230 letters of protest against attempts to turn Palestine into a "Jewish state" and as many letters of protest against Algeria's transformation into a French province by granting French citizenship to Algerians have been sent to the mission from all over Egypt.

The specifics of the letters on Palestine are as follows:

1. Palestine is an Arab Muslim country and is a right-of-conquest right for the Arabs.
2. Jews have neither the historical nor the moral right to claim Palestine.

3. The establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, in this centre of Arab countries, is aimed at diluting all-Arab unity.

4. The Allied promotion of a Jewish state in Palestine runs counter to the Atlantic Charter, putting an end to Arab hope and trust in the promises of the Allies.

5. Any speeches and manoeuvres aimed at resolving the Palestinian problem at the expense of the Arabs were doomed to failure, for the Arabs were prepared to stand as one to defend their ancestral rights to Palestine.

6. The Muslim Brotherhood Society fully joins the Egyptian Government's protest and appreciates the firm position of all Arab countries on the Palestinian issue.

This is the content of these letters. As you can see, such letters have been sent to all foreign missions and embassies.

The letters of protest against Jewish immigration to Palestine are a reaction to speeches in the American Senate and the press in favor of the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. They are a response to the Zionist campaign to mobilize the opposition's public opinion for the abolition of the White Paper and for unrestricted immigration to Palestine and, finally, to the recent interventions of Zionist extremists in Palestine.

Envoy

N. Novikov

**LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE
EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID USSR I.V.
SAMYLOVSKY TO THE HEAD OF THE
GENERAL CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT OF THE
NKVT USSR KUZNETSOV July 22, 1944
Secret**

Through our mission in Cairo, we received letters from various Jewish organizations in Palestine who sent parcels to the USSR to their relatives. In these letters they report:

1. For 8 years in Tel Aviv (Palestine) there is an office for sending parcels to the USSR. Before the war, it paid a fee to Soviet consuls in the Baltic states. Recently, parcels were sent through South Africa, where the Soviet consul received a fee for parcels. Currently, the office had to stop sending parcels in this way for reasons:

(a) South Africa does not have a postal convention with the USSR and therefore parcels were sent from Pretoria to London and from there to the USSR;

b) South Africa has temporarily stopped sending parcels due to the lack of free steamships.

Recently, parcels have been transited through Tehran and the fee has been paid there, but the Palestinian government is obstructing the export of parcels to Tehran, as it is related to the transfer of money to Tehran to pay the fee. Therefore, parcels are sent to the USSR with the payment of duties on the ground in the USSR. The letters further say that there are many people in Palestine who want to help their relatives in the USSR, but the senders of these parcels, in order not to burden the recipients with the need to pay the fee, offer:

(a) To pay the fee of our mission in Egypt with Palestinian pounds, according to the established tariff;

b) The fee for parcels containing second-hand items, which do not have accounts of their value, to set by their weight.

2. Due to the fact that the fee exceeds by 100-120% the cost of the parcels themselves, they apply for the removal of protective duties and other overlays from all parcels of a non-commercial nature sent to the USSR. If, for various reasons, it is not possible to exempt all parcels from duty, they insist on exemption from duties and other overlays of free parcels sent by the countrymen and various charitable institutions. If this proposal proves unacceptable, they ask for a

general reduction of the fee by at least 50-60%. Moreover, the entire Jewish mission for Palestine should be given the right to certify the nature of the parcels sent, i.e. whether they are paid or charitable.

The Middle East Division asks for your opinion on the merits of the proposals put forward.

Head of the Middle East Division

I. Samylovsky

**LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR
PALESTINE D.BEN-GURION TO THE
DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR I.M.MAY
August 8, 1944**

Dear Mr. Maisky,

When I had the pleasure of showing you Jewish collective settlements near Jerusalem a few months ago, you asked me to give an authoritative opinion on the possibilities of hosting new Jewish settlers in Palestine. I am sending you an enclosed memorandum on this issue prepared by David Horowitz, an employee of the economic research bureau of the Jewish Agency.

The memorandum has a dual purpose. The first part (p. 1-23) of the document describes the efforts of the Jews to rebuild the country, while the conclusions are drawn from the practical experience of this work. You will see that the economic development of Palestine in the period between the wars was in the main characteristics at the same time as the increase of its population, both naturally and through immigration. Growth in production and consumption, as well as the inflow of capital per capita, have significantly outpaced population growth. In general, development has benefited indigenous people greatly, reflected in improved living standards, lower infant mortality, etc.

The second part of the memorandum attempts to assess the country's potential to receive new immigrants. As you will notice, based on very careful calculations in agriculture, industrial production, as well as the development of trade and communications, it is concluded that about 2,500 NEW settlers could be accommodated in Palestine. This is not an excessive assumption, as can be seen from comparing population density in other countries with similar sizes to those described in the respective sections of the memorandum.

The first part analyses the methods of agricultural and industrial development used in the past. In the second part, methods that have proven in practice

that they are feasible and effective are projected for the future. Most likely, these methods will continue to develop and improve over time and the accumulation of experience. The main factors that have been effective in the past and are likely to be relevant in the future are:

(a) The evolution of the economy of intensive development and population growth as a result of persistent large-scale immigration, as well as capital imports.

b) Projecting the structure and level of economic development achieved in the new territories development sector to the whole country.

(c) The transformation of uncultivated land into cultivated and cultivated by irrigation and reclamation.

d) Industrialization of the country.

(d) Moving to modern methods of economics.

(e) Applying a system of optimal territorial capital allocation and skills to improve population density and living standards.

Over the past twenty years, numerous assessments of the country's capacity to receive settlers have been carried out by competent, authoritative representatives (Jews and non-Jews), including government representatives. They have consistently lagged behind the actual development of the country, which, as has already been emphasized, continues under the pressure of acute economic necessity.

You will also notice that the assessments implied that the indigenous Arab population would remain in the country and benefit from overall development. We believe that there is unusable but suitable for processing land in Palestine that can be used in agriculture and which could provide everything necessary for the population already living there and for the new Jewish settlers. The experience of recent

years has shown that Palestine, with regard to the immigration of Jewish technicians and other professionals, can become a major industrial centre, which is likely to benefit the entire Middle East in the post-war period.

**FROM THE LETTER OF THE FIRST
SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN
TURKEY S.S. MIKHAILOV TO THE BOARD
MEMBER OF THE VOCS L.D. KISLOVA AND
THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST
DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID USSR
I.V.SAMILOVSKY August 9, 1944**

Secretly

I think it is necessary to give you some information about the activities of organizations in Palestine and Lebanon that aim to communicate with the USSR as a result of my visit to these countries this spring.

In Palestine

1. The Palestinian society "League "V" for Soviet Russia has become even more explicitly Zionist in the last year and a half. It can be called a society for the promotion of zionism, and not a society for cultural communication with the USSR and assistance to the red army soldiers. Not only does it not do any work to popularize the USSR and strengthen ties with it, but it even uses the funds it collects to help the Red Army to publish various publications in Russian language through the Jewish Agency for the Propaganda of zionism (I attach a sample to this letter). In this respect, the League's financial report for the period 01.11.1942 - 01.10.1943 (in Hebrew) and a brief account of its activities (in English) are very characteristic of this letter. The latter is composed by those members of the League who oppose the transformation of the League into an organization for the promotion of zionism. It shows quite objectively the anti-Soviet essence of the work of this organization, but it must be said that because of its

brevity it does not give yet the full picture of it. I draw your attention, in addition to him, to the fact that the League has completely ceased to use the materials sent to it by you and the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, and therefore, in my opinion, it is necessary not to send her any more material. I can cite in the form of an example the fact that albums, exhibitions, posters, books and other materials sent by you to the League in recent times, not only have not become public, but the anti-Soviet Zionist leadership of the League even refuses to show them to ordinary activists who are really interested in the life and struggle of the USSR. The gramophone records sent by you to the League were not only not used, but intentionally negligent and barbaric storage (lying on the floor in the Secretariat of the League in paper envelopes) were rendered in complete disrepair.

The true activists of the League, who cherished the idea and clustered around the Levant publishing house, questioned me whether they should leave the League and organize a real society of friends of the Soviet Union in Palestine, in which the Zionist spirit would be banished. I have refused to give them any advice in this regard, bearing in mind the need to pre-arrange this matter with you. I will ask you to write to me what your opinion is about this.

2. The Levant, which I mentioned above, deserves, in my view, support, because, firstly, it does not have Zionist elements, and secondly, it does a useful job of publishing and distributing our literature in Hebrew and Arabic. In particular, it successfully reprints the magazine "War and the working class" in Hebrew. However, this "publishing house", if it can be called, organized by amateurs and without money ("basic and working capital" of its only about 50 pounds), can not, of course, conduct any broad publishing activity, especially since the attitude to it of the Jewish

authorities, who advocate for zionism, is a very big obstacle to this, because in their hands is the distribution of paper.

3. In one of your letters, you asked what constituted the Palestinian Committee for Cultural Relations with the USSR. This, in fact, anti-Soviet organization, which is run by the Jewish Agency, is the worst kind of Zionist propaganda about the Soviet Union, does not deserve, of course, any attention on our part, but only taking appropriate measures against its activities.

4. The Arab Anti-Fascist League in Palestine had almost completely ceased its work due to lack of funds.

5. To this letter I attach a pamphlet by Veritas Militans, "Jews and the question of anti-Semitism", as well as a letter from a certain Margulis, apparently the author of the pamphlet, who asks for a review of the work. The brochure is of a known interest. She was mailed to the embassy.

6. I direct to your discretion, perhaps, to transfer to any literary museum, a letter by Romain Rolland about anti-Semitism and its attitude towards Jews in the USSR, received by me in Palestine. This letter has not been published anywhere else.

Mikhailov

**RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN
WASHINGTON, GOLDMAN, WITH THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO, K.A.
UMANSKY August 15, 1944**

Mr. Umansky stated that he wanted to discuss various issues with Dr. Goldman not as an ambassador, but as a person interested in certain issues both as a Russian and as a Jew. First, he asked Dr. Goldman if he could inform him of President Benesh's meetings with Stalin and other Soviet leaders. He knows about the conversations, but would like to hear the details.

Dr. Goldman described the nature of the negotiations as Mr. Benesh had informed him.

Mr. Umansky believes that this communication reveals Russia's position on the Palestinian issue. He did not know whether they were ready for the Government to take an official position now, but he believed that opinion was in favour of the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. He asked whether Dr. Goldman knew whether the British had discussed the issue with the Russians.

Dr. Goldman replied that he did not know, but if they did, they would probably not inform him.

Mr. Umansky said that they were likely to do what they normally do - first agreeing with the Americans and then with the Russians once an agreement has been reached. But he said that "it doesn't matter - we can oppose both."

He asked Dr. Goldman where he believed Jews would be resettled to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. Is the Jewish public not aware of what happened to Jews in Europe?

Dr. Goldman said that Jews were aware of this and that the problem was very serious. However, he estimates that there are still about 2.5 million Jews left in Europe, of whom about a million will go to Palestine.

Mr. Umansky said, "Let's not talk in general, let's take a consistent look at each country, and you'll show me where you hope to find so many people."

Dr. Goldman said that if the status quo continued, about 800,000 people were in the Balkans, including Hungary, about half of whom were ready to go to Palestine. About 300-400,000 people are in Poland, to which another 200,000 Polish Jews from Russia can be added, to whom Russia will allow to return to Poland or go to another country. Of these two groups, about 250,000 will go to Palestine. In Central and Western Europe, we hope, there are still 200,000 people left, some of whom will want to go to Palestine. Then there are other places of residence of the Jewish population - in North Africa, where the living conditions of Jews are not very good, in Iraq and Yemen. Thus, the figure of 1 million can become real. The latter may not be immediately available, but later Jews from the Western Hemisphere may move to Palestine. Mr. Umansky said that he was pleased to hear that Dr. Goldman had mentioned it. It seems to him that Jews in the New World are deceiving themselves about the stability of

their position. He is referring not to the United States, but to Latin American countries, where the situation is critical and could change for the worse from day to day.

Mr. Umansky then raised the issue of The Borders of Palestine.

Dr Goldman said there was a risk of the country being dismembered: he had been asked for details. He stated that the Zionists rejected the partition.

Mr. Umansky said that he certainly understands this, "but" ...

Dr Goldman said that if something like the Peel project or any other project that would miss Galileo, Emek and Haifa were proposed, it could not even be considered. However, if some concession to the Arabs is required and a small part of the Nablus area is linked to Transjordan, this might be acceptable. Dr. Goldman demonstrated all this on the map, and the Ambassador took notes.

Mr. Umansky then said that he wanted to discuss the issue of security: who would protect the Jewish state and what its program was in that regard.

Dr. Goldman said that there was no programme yet, as the situation was not clear enough to enable the Zionists to formulate a programme, as it was not yet clear whether the current Middle East should be seen as a sphere of British influence, whether the future Middle East should be seen as a sphere of British influence, whether the Middle East federation would be established. Therefore, he can only express his personal opinion. The more guarantors there are, the better. It would be better for the three powers to guarantee the security of the Jewish state than only one Britain, although we would not mind if the great powers want the Jewish state to transfer military affairs in Palestine to the British. The main objective is to try to get the maximum international support. Jews

are a nation that lives all over the world, and they must make every effort not to be drawn into any blocs in the future. All they need are international guarantees, which in practice means that the three great Powers must agree.

Mr. Umansky believes that this is a great position not to target Jews to any one camp alone. If Russia agrees to the creation of the state, it may wish to become a guarantor of its security together with the United States and Great Britain.

Mr. Umansky raised the issue of the Russian Jewish delegation, which is scheduled to attend the World Jewish Congress conference in November³².

Dr. Goldman said that the answer had not yet been received, but that Congress would be happy if such a delegation arrived, which should include not only delegates from the Anti-Fascist League, but also representatives of the orthodox group, whose arrival would make a great impression on public opinion.

He agreed that combining Michoels and the bearded orthodoxy was a great idea, and he was prepared to recommend allowing such a delegation to arrive. He recommended contacting Michoel Som, who was in favour of sending such a delegation and enjoyed great authority in government circles. He then discussed the possibility of Dr. Goldman's visit and any Jewish delegation to Russia. Personally, he is in favor, but as an ambassador he will not be able to do much on this issue. We also need to make contact with Michoels on this issue. He knows from him (saw him in Mexico City) that he wants to help and arrange for Dr. Goldman and maybe someone else to travel to Russia.

Dr. Goldman said he would like to make contact with Sommerstein, a new member of the Polish Freedom Committee. On this occasion, Mr. Umansky also said that it was necessary to contact Mihoels, as he would, of course, pass the message.

Mr. Umansky asked for best wishes to Bew from Dr. Vaize and invited Dr. Goldman to visit him again.

The meeting lasted 1.5 hours and was very cordial.

N. Goldman

**REPORTING BY E. EPSTEIN, A MEMBER OF
THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, ABOUT
CONVERSATIONS WITH D.S. SOLOD, AN
ADVISER TO THE SOVIET MISSION IN
EGYPT. September 3, 1944**

Arriving in mid-July in Cairo, I visited the Soviet Mission to send a commemorative note to Ivan Maisky about the potential for admission to Palestine (Maisky was interested in this issue during last year's trip there). I was received by the adviser of the Malt Mission, who at that time was acting head of the

mission of Novikov, who was visiting Syria and Lebanon.

In my conversation with Mr. Mald, I referred to the question of the direction of the Soviet mission to Palestine and asked whether such a task was practically necessary, once the question of the mission in Syria and Lebanon had been resolved, was whether the Soviet Government was going to open a permanent mission in our country as well. Malt's answer is that the opening of the Consulate General in Palestine will be discussed in the near future, but it is not yet clear whether it will operate under the auspices of the mission in Egypt or the mission in Syria or Lebanon.

I went on to say that, since the situation in Palestine was different from that in neighbouring countries because of the establishment of a national hotbed of the Jewish people there, it would be useful for the nearest territorially Soviet Mission to receive the necessary clarifications on the situation in the country and its problems from the authoritative body representing the Jewish people in matters relating to Palestine, and that would be desirable even before the final decision on the direction of permanent Soviet representation to the country. Malt replied that this proposal seemed reasonable to him, but they could not offer to hold a meeting themselves, the initiative should come from us. I then asked him to consider my words as a request for a meeting on the matter. Malt said he could only give an answer after Novikov's return. Then he asked who would represent the Jewish' agency at this meeting. I replied that it would depend on who would accept our representative from the Soviet side. When he said that it would certainly be Novikov himself, I expressed the opinion that in this case the chairman of the board of the agency D.Ben-Gurion could come to a meeting with him. I asked him

if he knew the name Ben-Gurion. Malt replied that he had heard the name and knew who it was.

He went on to say that we should not think that Moscow does not know about us or are not interested in us. Most recently, the mission in Cairo was instructed to pick up and send to the Foreign Ministry materials about us (they sent everything that was on hand, Malt complained that they had little, and thanked for the materials that received from us). According to him, our problems are dealt with by Maysky, and indirectly, maybe, Litvinov, responsible for the plans of the post-war international order.

Then he started asking me questions about the situation in the country: social life, the economy, the culture of the Jewish and Arab population. It was evident that he remembered well everything I had told him during previous trips to Cairo. In particular, he said (as if by chance) that the Sultans had not taken advantage of the opportunities given to him to get to know Palestine in depth, and that the rest of his colleagues now had to fill in the information gaps.

As for helping Jewish refugees in Russia and finding relatives, Malt showed extreme restraint, to say the least, saying that it was beyond his competence. To Grunbaum's proposal to bomb Jewish extermination centers in Poland, he replied that the diplomatic mission in Cairo was not entitled to give strategic advice to the military command in Moscow. Moreover, such proposals are politically inappropriate, as the Soviet Government does not take any steps that are nationally colored. According to Malt, the Soviet leadership rejected several requests in this regard, which had subtext about the need to provide Slavic mutual assistance.

A few days passed, Novikov still did not return. Then I visited Malt again to clarify the situation. Malt said that since Novikov's return was delayed for 7-10

days, he decided to send a telegram to Moscow with a request for instructions on my offer.

I've been waiting nine days for an answer. On August 15, Malt invited me to the office and informed me of the following:

"I received a reply from Moscow: it was decided to postpone consideration of your proposal for a month or two. The reason is purely technical, in the coming weeks Novikov will have to deal with some very urgent matters outside Egypt, so that he will not be able to find time to talk to you, especially since he himself should prepare for this conversation properly."

Я тут же спросил, идет ли речь о временной отсрочке или наше предложение отвергнуто — т.е. как мне объяснить это нашему руководству? Он сказал, что, если бы речь шла о негативном ответе, советская сторона так и сказала бы. Нам следует связаться с советским представительством через месяц-другой, если вопрос все еще будет представляться нам актуальным.

During this meeting, Malod introduced me to Dr. Mikhail Korostovtsev, TASS correspondent in Egypt and representative of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the Middle East. Later I met with him twice, once he invited me to dinner and during the conversation expressed a desire to develop comprehensive ties with our structures in Palestine to get to know our lives and problems. Korostovtsev said that he became interested in our problems while still in Russia, when he read in the foreign press about zionism and our achievements. Korostovtsev is good at English and French, and now he teaches Arabic. He is an Egyptologist by profession. He said that the lawyer at Baylis's trial was his uncle and that they always had sympathy for Jews in their home. Soon he was going to visit Palestine to learn about the situation in the country and to establish contacts with scientific

organizations. At the end of the trip he will write a report to Moscow to highlight the issues on which there is no clear picture yet and to refute some of the prejudices that exist about us. He really treats us with sympathy and is ready to help improve mutual understanding between us and Soviet Russia.

The malt was also excellently polite during all the meetings we had during my stay in Cairo. Although he did not go beyond the traditional caution of Soviet officials, his behaviour reinforced the impression of what he had told me during one of my previous visits to Egypt: they really wanted to get to know and understand us better; they had never had a negative attitude towards zionism, and they persecuted the Zionists for political activities prohibited in the USSR; the Soviet Government pursued a realistic policy, and its attitude to religion could serve as an example of how the authorities treated factors that had previously been ignored.

Whatever the final results of our relations with the Russians, which we have been systematically developing since the spring of this year through the channels of their mission in Cairo, in any case, in my view, they should be made permanent, although so far real progress is extremely slow.

E. Epstein

**NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST
DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID OF THE USSR
I.V. SAMYLOVSKY DEPUTY PEOPLE'S
COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR V.G. DEKANOZOV September 18,
1944**

secretly

Please read the accompanying letter from the Chairman of the Palestinian "Central Union of Jewish Emigrants from Warsaw" received by our mission in Cairo.

The proposal of the Union of Emigrants to organize the sending to the USSR of individual charitable parcels of Jewish refugees from Warsaw with payment of a fee for them in Palestine is unacceptable, as it contradicts the rules of the existing customs code, under Article 154 of which the passage of charitable parcels is allowed only with the mandatory transfer of them for distribution to a special commission under the NCVT USSR.

The proposal to send a special delegate to Warsaw through the SOVIET Union, to register German atrocities against the Jews of Warsaw and to deal with all issues relating to the Jews of Warsaw and the surrounding area is a repetition of the repeated attempts of the Palestinian Zionist circles to establish ties with the USSR and, on the basis of these ties, to intensify the struggle against the Arabs for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

By virtue of the foregoing, I believe that the letter of the expat union can be left unanswered, as our mission in Cairo is informed of, while at the same time suggesting that missions send a detailed description of the union in question.

Appendix: letter from the chairman of the Central Union of Emigrants from Warsaw.

Head of the Middle East Division

I. Samylovsky

On the document of the litter: "I agree. Decanos."

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE SECOND SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET
MISSION IN EGYPT, A.F. SULTANOV, WITH A
DELEGATE FROM PALESTINIAN ARABS AT
THE CONFERENCE ON THE CONVENING OF
THE PAN-ARAB CONGRESS BY MUSA AL-
ALAMY October 11, 1944**

Musa al-Alamy is very pleased with the results of the conference. He believes that the conference laid the foundation for Arab unity. The Conference considered the arab League to be the most appropriate form for Arab unity, which was more in line with the level of economic and political development of those countries. At present, it would be difficult to talk about the Arab Union in terms of State unity among Arab countries. But what we have achieved fully lives up to the expectations that all Arab countries had for this conference. It laid the foundation for the future of all-Arab unity.

The British at one time, through the mouth of Foreign Minister Eden, announced that they are ready to support the idea of Arab unity. However, when the British made this statement, as far as al-Alamy was aware, they did not expect that the Arab countries would achieve the unity expressed in the conference minutes. So far, the British have not yet revealed their attitude to the decisions of the conference. They may still say something vague, but the British could not have imagined that such an agreement would be

reached politically, economically and culturally between representatives of various Arab countries.

One of the main issues at the conference was the question of Palestine, the Palestinian issue was of interest to all Arab countries, and it was natural that the issue had been fully discussed. They concluded that the Palestinian problem was an all-Arab problem and that all Arab States were prepared to support the Palestinian Arabs in their natural demands.

To my observation that the decisions of the conference on the Palestinian issue are based on the English White Paper, Al-Alamy said this: many people think so, but this is wrong, because, in addition to the White Paper, there is still one document that has not yet been known to the world, namely the agreement between the Arabs of Palestine and the British in Baghdad in 1940.³⁵ When the situation of the British was tight, they made concessions and agreed to the demand of the Arabs to immediately establish a local government in Palestine under the leadership of the High Commissioner. war and on the condition that, six months after the end of the war, the Palestinian Legislative Council would elect the head of government that Jewish immigration would be stopped and Palestine would become self-governing.

However, the British did not fulfill their promise this time.

The decisions of the conference thus proceed not only from the necessity of the British compliance with the terms of the White Paper, but also from the need to implement the Baghdad Agreement of 1940, which they are well aware of but keep silent about.

When asked how he assesses the forces of the Zionists in Palestine, Al-Alamy said the following: generally speaking, the White Paper had long since been violated by the British and Jews, according to the White Paper, Palestine had to accept another 75,000

Jews within 5 years, and thus in 1944 there would have been 475,000 Jews in Palestine, since in 1939 there were 400,000 Jews. , and, according to The Arab data, 750,000 and, according to the reduced Jewish data, 650,000: therefore, the terms of the White Paper in relation to Jewish emigration are not only fulfilled, but also exceeded, and furtively emigrated to Palestine more than was stipulated by the agreement. The British pretend not to notice it, although they are certainly well aware of it. In addition, the British themselves had originally trained Jews to possess the weapons allegedly needed to protect the Jewish colony from the Arabs; according to the data available to al-Alah, Jews now have at least 100,000 trained reserves. They get weapons mainly through the British. The British claim that they do not release weapons to Jews, but they condone the Zionists who take out weapons illegally in the British commandants in the Middle East.

The actions of individual Zionist extremists against certain representatives of the British authorities in Palestine are meant to show the Arab world and the British that Jews are strong and that they should be reckoned with. The British could have suppressed them long ago, but they did not do so on purpose to show the Arabs the power of Jewish organizations and to make us more compliant in the demands of the British or, rather, to intimidate the Zionist danger so that the Palestinian Arabs asked the British to remain in Palestine forever.

However, Jews are not afraid of Zionist organizations and demand self-government and the withdrawal of the British from Palestine. The Arabs are confident that they will cope with the Zionists, no matter how armed they are, and also believe in the possibility of a peace agreement with the Jews if the British leave Palestine.

Al-Alamy says that the Arabs have high hopes for both individual Arab states and the Allied Peace Conference, and especially the Soviet Union. They are well aware that the Soviet Union is not an interested party in this matter, has no imperialist goals in the Arab countries and has a negative attitude towards the Zionist movement. Palestinian Arabs therefore have high hopes for the Soviet Union's position on the Palestinian issue at the peace conference. They had the intention of sending a delegation to the Soviet Union of 2-3 people on this issue, but they were not allowed.

Alamy believes that stabilization in the Arab East is impossible without resolving the Palestinian problem in favor of the Arabs, and they believe that the interests of the Soviet Union also require the support of the just demands of the Arabs at the peace conference.

I asked al-Alamy if the change of cabinet in Egypt would affect the conference's decision. He replied in the negative, noting that they had already had a number of meetings with members of the new Cabinet, including Prime Minister Ahmed Maher Pasha, as well as with King Farook, who had pledged full support for the issue, in particular, various commissions on economic, cultural and political issues were already being drawn up, in which members of the new Cabinet promised full support.

"Of course," he said, "there may be various obstacles to the practical implementation of the conference's decisions in the future, but whatever obstacles stand in the way of the unity of the Arab countries and cooperation between them, my colleagues and I have expressed our full conviction from the conference of the real possibility of cooperation between the Arab countries." Although the representatives of Saudi Arabia and Yemen did not sign the conference protocol, they participated in the

entire conference, and they are confident that the protocol will be approved by Yemen and Saudi Arabia in the future.

Referring to the details of Arab cooperation on economic issues, al-Alamy said that customs duties on local goods between Arab countries were to be lifted, as well as the fixation of a single customs rate for foreign-born goods imported into Arab countries in order to stop the smuggling of foreign goods from some Arab countries to others, which would severely disrupt the economies of those countries.

Second Secretary of the Sultans mission

**LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE JEWISH
RESCUE DEPARTMENT OF THE WORLD
JEWISH CONGRESS L. KUBOWITZKY TO
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE RESCUE
COMMITTEE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR
PALESTINE I.GRUN-BAUM October 15, 1944**

Dear Yitzhak Grunbaum,

Your telegram concerning Auschwitz came to me with considerable delay. I think you've already received the message I sent you through the military refugee organization.

I have repeatedly, verbally and in writing, discussed the camp case with Mr. John J. McCloy,

Deputy Secretary of Defense. On 28 September, he assured me that the head of the Allied Mediterranean Command had been fully informed of the situation in the death camps and promised that the Ministry of Defence would once again draw his attention to the gravity of recent events. He nevertheless advised me to contact our friends in London to lobby the Case in the British Military Office, which would be more helpful in advising General Sir Sir Henry Maitland Wilson on the measures that could be taken. I have accordingly informed our London friends, I think that they raised this issue in the British Ministry of War.

I also discussed with Mr. Alexander Kapustin, an adviser to the Soviet Embassy, our proposal to use the Soviet paratroopers to destroy these structures. Mr. Kapustin informed me that the Ambassador had already telegraphed to Moscow on this issue after a conversation he had with Dr. Goldman, and promised to bring our latest information and our request to Moscow once again.

A few days ago, I was informed by Mr. Jan Masaryk that he had raised the issue with several Allied Governments and had faced considerable difficulties.

A new warning, especially regarding the known plans to destroy the camps and their inhabitants, which was recently issued by our State Department, appeared in the press. I understand that this was done at the request of the Polish government.

Dr. Schwarzbart informed me on 9 September that the Polish Council of Ministers had decided on 25 August to ask the "commander of the internal forces to consider the possibility of destroying concentration camps and releasing political prisoners before they were destroyed and deported" and that "appropriate orders be given to the commander-in-chief". However, it seems that the Polish internal troops are not able to carry out the orders that were given to them.

Yours sincerely

Leon Kubovitsky

**TELEGRAM OF THE DIRECTORS OF THE
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION OF THE
BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR
PALESTINE M. SHERTOK AND E. DOBKIN
TO THE CHARGE D.IN THE SOVIET UNION
IN THE UK K.M. KUKIN November 20, 1944**

Continuing the theme, In September, I am pleased to report that the first batch of charity parcels consisting of 2,507 pairs of shoes, 1,172 poolers, 1,600 pairs of stockings, 1,388 sets of laundry, 8,000 pajamas sent by the Palestinian Committee to help Jews, delivered to the Palestinian Committee for the Assistance of Jews, delivered to the Soviet representative in Tehran, who promised to immediately arrange for dr. Sommer to be sent to Ljubljana.

I take this opportunity to thank you for your sympathy.

Dobkin Schertok

**NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST
DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID OF THE USSR
I.V.SAMYLOVSKIY AND THE SOVIET
UNION'S ENVOY TO EGYPT A.D. YSBORIN
TO THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER**

**FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.G.
DEKANOZOV November 25, 1944**

On our attitude towards the pan-Arab federation and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine

1. The Arab desire for unification and the creation of a unified pan-Arab federation is fuelled and supported by the British to the extent that they are in line with their plans to strengthen their influence in the Middle East and to create a barrier against the possible infiltration of soviet Union influence there. Among the Arabs themselves, this movement encompasses only the circles of the ruling elite and intellectuals, and the leaders of the movement are undoubtedly pro-English people.

Since virtually all Arab countries are not independent States, all kinds of connectivity is only possible under the auspices of the dominant Power, i.e. England at present.

Judging by a number of facts, the attitude of Americans to this kind of association is negative. This is evidenced by Roosevelt's statement on the possibility of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine, made at the time of the strengthening of pan-Arab activities in the Middle East, as well as the fact that the conference in Alexandria delegates from Saudi Arabia and Yemen (where the American influence is now more affected) arrived only after a special invitation sent from all other delegates already gathered, and yet they did not sign the conference.

With all this in mind, we believe that our position on the issue of the pan-Arab federation should now be as follows:

We cannot support these aspirations, but at the same time we should not associate ourselves with any direct statements about our negative attitude towards

them, so as not to provoke a hostile reaction from the ruling circles of the Arab countries, the Arab press and the British. On this basis, in conversations in Cairo, it should not be driven to address these issues on its own, but rather to avoid discussion when directed by the interlocutor.

2. The Zionist organizations in Palestine are now working hard to establish links with our missions in the Middle East in the hope of enlisting the soviet Union's support for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

However, such support will undoubtedly provoke an unfavourable reaction from the Arab population, not only in Palestine, but also in all other Arab countries. Moreover, in view of the recent assassination of Lord Moeen in Cairo, the British do not seem inclined to make any promises now to change the existing mandate regime in Palestine.

In Palestine, we have great property interests in the form of the property of the former Russian government, the Spiritual Mission and Palestinian society, which must be returned to the Soviet state. A successful solution to this issue can only be achieved with the favourable attitude of the British, who now dispose of the property. Given this point, it is also unprofitable for us to make any promises of support for the Jews, which would be perceived by the British as a step against them.

On this basis, we believe that the ties of our missions with various Jewish organizations and individual public figures should be limited to cultural ties with the HOKS, no statements about our support for the idea of a Jewish state should be made.

Our main focus in Palestine should be on the issue of returning all Russian property to us.

Head of the Middle East Division

I. Samylovskiy Ambassador of the USSR in Egypt A. Yiborin

**REPORT ON THE MEETING OF THE
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HISTADRUT
WITH THE SOVIET TRADE UNION
DELEGATION AT THE FOUNDING
CONFERENCE OF THE WORLD
FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS IN
LONDON February 25, 1945**

That. On behalf of the Palestinian delegation, Lockyer, Oren and Idelson had an official meeting with T. Tarasov, Komas and Kuznetsov, representing the Soviet delegation, on behalf of the Palestinian delegation.

Lockyer thanked the Soviet delegation for their support of our demands for Palestine and expressed hope that the position of the Soviet representatives at the conference would have an impact on their country's policy on this issue. Lockyer also spoke of the great respect of the Jewish workers of Palestine to the USSR and recalled the help they sent to Tehran for the Red Army. On behalf of the Executive Committee of Histadrut, he invited a Soviet delegation to visit Palestine.

In response, Tarasov said that the Soviet delegation at the conference represents the interests not only of the workers of the USSR, but also of the working class of other countries. He stressed the need to exchange information and contacts between the trade unions of the USSR and Palestine. That. Tarasov expressed his gratitude for the assistance provided to the Red Army and for the invitation to pay a visit to Palestine, which, unfortunately, for technical reasons

cannot be organized at present. "If Histadrut sends an official invitation to the trade unions of the USSR," he continued, "their executive committees will certainly gladly accept such an invitation."

Tarasov asked Palestinian delegates to convey their best wishes from the Soviet delegation to Histadrut.

**FROM THE RECORDING OF THE
CONVERSATION OF THE ASSISTANT HEAD
OF THE FOURTH EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT
OF THE NKID OF THE USSR N.F.PAISOV
WITH THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF
YUGOSLAVIA IN THE USSR R.NIKOLAEVICH
March 22, 1945**

In conclusion, Nikolaevich told me some of his Palestinian observations. He was appointed to Moscow about 2 months ago, and until that time he was consul in Jerusalem. The popularity of the USSR in Palestine, he said, is growing every day, and I wonder why there is still no Soviet representation there. There are many Jews from Russia living in Palestine, and there are many Russian monasteries run by the Russian spiritual mission. While many monks and nuns are quite loyal to the USSR, this mission is led by a man who is strongly hostile to the USSR, namely Archimandrite Antony. Antony is a Russian immigrant who graduated from the theological faculty in Belgrade and then arrived in Jerusalem. When Belgrade was liberated, Nikolaevich asked him to serve a solemn service in the Orthodox Church in Jerusalem, but he refused, saying that Belgrade had liberated the godless Red Army and therefore he would not serve. Nikolaevich once heard

how Antony remembered in the church “killed by the Bolsheviks” Tsar Nicholas. This “living anachronism,” Nikolaevich said, has no place in Jerusalem. I agreed with him.

Nikolaevich said that in Jerusalem he headed the Slavic Committee, the vice-chairman of which was Grigory Kurilas, a former Orthodox priest from Lviv. During the evacuation of the Soviet Army Anders Kurilas was taken to Iraq, but later he was considered “suspicious” there and arrested, and then sent to Jerusalem, where he was appointed a priest in one of the parishes. When Antony found out that he worked for the Slavic Committee, he told him to get out of the apartment he had received from the Orthodox community and threatened to fire him. Kurilas is in a desperate situation now and would love to return to the Lions, but he does not know what needs to be done.

I told Nikolaevich that I would report the facts to my management. The conversation lasted about an hour.

Assistant Head of the IV European Division

N.Paisov

**NOTE OF THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S
COMMISSIONER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR S.I.KAVTARADZE TO THE
PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M.MOLOTOV
March 31, 1945**

On the need to open a Soviet consulate in Palestine
According to 1944 data, Palestine has the Consulates General of the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and consulates of Bolivia, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, Spain, Honduras, Iraq, Iran, Mexico, Switzerland, Paraguay's interests in Palestine representing the Consulate General in Beirut and Sweden - consulate general in Cairo.

Russia also had three consulates in Palestine before the revolution:

1. In Jerusalem, the consulate was opened in 1858, converted to the Consulate General in 1893.

2. In Haifa - consulate (there is no exact opening date).

3. Jaffa has been a vice-consulate since 1882, converted to a consulate in 1893.

In November 1914, due to the severance of diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey, all Russian consulates in the Middle East were closed and since then there have been no official Russian representatives in Palestine.

We currently have very little information about Palestine, although every day it is increasingly needed. The so-called Palestinian problem is now closely intertwined with all the major post-war problems in the Middle East, according to our missions in Egypt and Syria.

Palestine is located on the line of important world communications. It is expected that new powerful oil pipelines will pass through the territory of Palestine, and the English and American capitals are showing increased interest in Palestine.

The presence of our representative in Jerusalem or another Palestinian destination is dictated by:

1) the need to monitor the policy of England and the United States in the area;

2) our direct property interests, which amount to up to 1 million British pounds;

3) Living there more than two hundred Soviet citizens and several thousand immigrants from the Baltic republics, Bessarabia and Western Ukraine, who are entitled to Soviet citizenship.

The attitude of the Palestinian population - Arabs and Jews to the USSR - is friendly. Even anti-Soviet Zionist circles, taking into account the general situation, are now trying to establish official ties with the USSR.

In 1944, a bureau was set up in Palestine to establish trade and economic relations with England,

America and the USSR. In Tel Aviv and other Palestinian cities, newspapers and magazines in Russian language are published, the VOKS exhibitions are periodically organized, the All-Slavic Committee has been established, etc.

On the basis of all of the above, I believe that the Soviet consulate should be opened in Palestine and negotiations with the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be entrusted to our ambassador in London, T. Gusev.

I ask for your instructions.

S. Kavtaradze

**TELEGRAM OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
NEW ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA
M. MENDELSSOHN TO THE CHAIRMAN OF
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR
J.V.STALIN April 8, 1945**

Your Excellency, we ask you to instruct your delegation to the San Francisco conference to demand that the international promise made to the Jewish people that Palestine be re-established within the historical borders as a Jewish national homeland is

immediately fulfilled and that the country's mandated status be replaced by the status of a Jewish State. The Jewish people are fully prepared to take control of Palestine under temporary international control if necessary.

We also ask that you insist that Jewish representatives be invited to San Francisco on an equal footing with other large and small peoples whose concerns must be addressed with their direct and active participation. We ask you to do so in the name of fairness and good faith in order to eliminate once and for all from the international arena the Jewish problem and the constant threat that it poses to public tranquillity and to universal peace. Informed American and world public opinion fully endorses this position.

I would appreciate your response.

Colonel Morris J Mendelson President of the New
Zionist organization of America

55 West Street, New York City

**LETTER FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN
WASHINGTON, N. GOLDMAN TO THE
AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO THE
UNITED STATES A.A.GROMYKO April 13,
1945**

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

I would very much like to meet and discuss with you issues related to San Francisco, but I understand that this is not possible due to your overloaded calendar. Perhaps I will be in San Francisco in early May and hope to meet in you.

I want to draw your attention to the plight of Jewish immigrants in Palestine who have documents from the Palestinian Authority from Romania and Bulgaria. You remember that when I made a request about the attitude of the Russian authorities to allow these Jews to leave, you informed me that if they were Romanian or Bulgarian citizens, there would be no objection to their departure. We were grateful for the position taken by your government, but the situation does not seem to have changed. Such immigrants have their own documents, they are issued transit visas, but they cannot obtain exit visas.

We have been informed by the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem that it is necessary for the exit permit to be issued on behalf of the Federal Military Control Commission and, mainly, on behalf of your authorities, otherwise exit visas cannot be obtained. There is no need to tell you how important it is to obtain them for those who have been granted permission to enter Palestine, which means for those who cannot secure their existence in Romania and who only hope to start a new life in Palestine.

Let me add that this situation prevails in Hungary and the same exit permit is required for Hungarian Jews who have documents to enter Palestine.

I ask you to contact your government and pass on our request for permission by your authorities in Romania and Bulgaria for Jews with documents to enter Palestine. Hungary is also concerned. I would be

very grateful if this message was telegraphed and you could inform us of the contents of the response as soon as you receive it.

Yours sincerely

Naum Goldman

**LETTER FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN**

**WASHINGTON, N. GOLDMAN TO THE
AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO THE
UNITED STATES A.A.GROMYKO May 30,
1945**

A message in today's New York Time indicates that the Soviet delegation intends to propose the deletion of the fifth paragraph from the guardianship plan. This paragraph, until further action is taken, guarantees the rights of all, including the rights of the Jewish people under the existing mandate. The first part of paragraph 5 leaves room for further decisions on the arrangement and location of these territories and provides the necessary flexibility in this regard. The essence of the paragraph as a whole is that, without freezing the status of these territories, existing rights are protected. The Jewish people in all countries were very grateful for the support of the proposal, which the Soviet representatives had always provided before. Abandoning it now would be detrimental to our rights and could be misunderstood and misinterpreted. I am sure that the Soviet Government has no such intention, and for this reason we call for abstaining from any action aimed at eliminating this right-to-do clause.

Best wishes

Naum Goldman

**LETTER FROM K.M. KUKIN, A POLITICAL
ADVISER TO THE LONDON OFFICE OF THE
JEWISH AGENCY OF PALESTINE DAY, TO
K.M. KUKIN, THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF
THE USSR IN THE UK. June 10, 1945**

Dear Mr. Kukin,

Allow me to offer in writing the issue I discussed with you last Friday.

There are thousands of Jews in Romania and Bulgaria who are eager to be able to emigrate to Palestine. Their situation in these countries still seems very difficult, although discriminatory laws have of course been repealed. After all that they have been through under the old regimes, especially after Romania and Bulgaria joined the Axis powers, it is very difficult for them to adapt to life in these countries again. Their economic situation had been destroyed and their families, especially in Romania, had disintegrated. On the other hand, many of them have relatives in Palestine who would be happy and willing to help them achieve economic independence again there. Some of the young people received preliminary training to work in agriculture and industry in Palestine.

As you remember, several hundred of these people were allowed to leave Romania via Bulgaria a few months ago, and you yourself were so kind that you made inquiries about some of the difficulties (later eliminated) that arose in connection with their crossing of the Bulgarian-Turkish border. However, now, for several months now, it has become impossible to

leave Romania or Bulgaria for Palestine. The Jewish Agency has allocated about 1,200 certificates for the two countries, but they cannot be used because of these difficulties.

It is difficult for us to understand why such difficulties have arisen, and we believe that if your Government or its representative in the Federal Control Commission puts the matter before the relevant authorities, the obstacles could be removed. Can I ask you, for purely humane reasons, to convey this request to your Government? Since this problem has been around for many months, further delay can only cause further suffering, and we would be so extremely grateful if immediate action were taken.

Yours sincerely

B. Lockyer

**FROM THE MEMO OF THE CHAIRMAN OF
THE COMMISSION FOR THE PREPARATION
OF PEACE TREATIES AND THE POST-WAR
DEVICE OF M.MLITVINOV "PALESTINIAN
QUESTION" July 27, 1945**

The Palestinian question

Statistical and geographical data

Palestine is located on the southeastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. It borders Syria to the north and northeast, Transjordan to the east and Egypt to the southwest. Its area is 26,158 sq km. The population (according to the data of 1937) was 1,383,000 people, of which Arabs - 61%, Jews - 29% and other nationalities - 10%. According to the data of 1936, the import to Palestine was calculated in the amount of 13,900 LLC, and export from Palestine - in 3,625 LLC art. About 80% of all export (in value) accounted for the share of citrus fruits. The rest is potash, soap, knitwear, olive oil, wine. Food products, forest materials, mineral fuels, cotton, metals, products from them, electrical supplies, machinery and other industrial equipment are imported. In imports in the first place until 1937 was Great Britain, and in

1937 the first place was taken by Germany. Exports were mainly to the UK.

Sixty-seven per cent of the Palestinian population is engaged in agriculture (agriculture and pastoralism). The area suitable for culture is defined in about 1 million hectares.

In November 1944, four Arab organizations (the Arab Federation, the Arab Union, the Muslim Youth Society and the Muslim Brotherhood Association) sent a special address to President Roosevelt stating:

“No country has experienced such injustice as Palestine. Palestine is an Arab country and by the will of God and the population will remain so forever. 70 million Arabs and 300 million Muslims support Palestinian Arabs and are determined to shed blood and sacrifice their lives to protect Arabs. Neither the Balfour Declaration nor the statements of other Jewish-influenced politicians will ever change historical factors or force Arabs and Muslims to change their position or renounce the protection of Palestine so that it remains an Arab country for Arabs.”

The Essence of Jewish-Arab-English Differences

The attraction of Jews to Palestine, to the “country of ancestors,” existed for a long time. The arrival of the Messiah expected by the Jews was always in contact with their vision of their return to Palestine. But this Palestinian movement was at one time religious and mystical. Many Orthodox Jews dreamed of moving to Palestine in their old age to die there, believing that it would have a beneficial effect on their afterlife, and this dream was realized. More enlightened nationalist Jews sought to establish a spiritual center for Jewry in Palestine. The development of anti-Semitism in the late 19th century in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Romania, and the

Jewish pogroms in southern Russia made the Palestinian movement more prosaic. Jewish artisans and other petty bourgeois elements sought refuge in Palestine from persecution at home, using the charity of richer Jews.

The political overtones of Palestinianism, or as it came to be called, zionism, received after the appearance of Dr. Herzl's pamphlet "The Jewish State." Herzl argued that as long as Jews did not have their own territory and remained citizens without a fatherland and an alien element in all countries, anti-Semitism would not stop. It is necessary to create a Jewish "law-enforcement" state, where a significant part of it could be resettled, if not all Jews. In this case, Jews who remained in other countries but became citizens of their own Jewish state would enjoy the diplomatic patronage of the latter and the same situation as other foreigners in different states. Thanks to Herzl's extraordinary energy and the numerous adherents he has acquired in all over the world (Max Nordau in France, member of the Supreme Court of Brandeis in the United States, Professor Mandelstam, Usyshkin, Kogan-Bernstein and others in Russia), the Zionist movement immediately gained a very wide scope. Herzl beat the thresholds of Turkish and other governments of different countries, unsuccessfully seeking international recognition of the autonomous Jewish state under the sovereignty of the sultan. The British government was the first to meet the Zionist movement by making the aforementioned Balfour Declaration in favour of the establishment of a "Jewish national hearth" in Palestine.

There is every reason to believe that Balfour, in his declaration, was referring to the real realization of the ideal of zionism, i.e. the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. However, later, faced with The Arab resistance, British politicians began to "explain" the

Balfour Declaration in the sense that it was not a question of creating a Jewish state, but only about the establishment of a Jewish national hearth in a Palestinian state. For example, around 1920, Winston Churchill, then minister of the colonies, issued a memorandum stating that "the nationality that all Palestinian citizens, both Jews and non-Jews, will acquire will be Palestinian and no other, but ... the Jewish community will know that it is in Palestine by right, not through tolerance."

Jews, of course, do not agree with this interpretation, insisting that the British government promised them a Jewish state in which they would be full masters. They state that it is not for Jews to seek to enter Palestine to find themselves once again a minority among the people of another, but to become a majority, they demand unrestricted Jewish immigration to Palestine. According to the statement of the British Minister of Colonies Macdonald permanent mandate commission of the League of Nations, in 1919 there were about 635 Arab LLC and 58 LLC of Jews, and a total of 693 LLC people, while at the end of March 1939 there were already 1,535 LLCs of the population, of which 1,113 Were 113 Arabs AND 422 OO.

As we have seen above, the British government intends to restrict the further immigration of Jews to 75,000. This would mean stabilizing the Jewish population as a minority, under which circumstances there can be, of course, no question of establishing a Jewish state. A Palestinian state would mean an Arab state.

The significant achievements of Jewish colonization in Palestine are not denied by anyone. Thanks to the capitals imported by Jews (mostly philanthropic), a large part of the unprocessed land has been turned into fertile land, swamps have been drained, malaria

breeding grounds have been destroyed, health care has been improved, and some industry has been developed, such as diamond processing, extraction and processing of chemical deposits from the Dead Sea, and electrification has been introduced. In 1942, the cost of industrial products was 3 million f. In addition to military supplies, the Jewish industry in Palestine produces steel and iron products, textiles, leather goods, food products, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, drainage pipes, glass, essential oils and trucks. The increase in wages and living standards attracted up to 500,000 Arabs from nearby Arab countries to Palestine.

The British government justifies the restriction of immigration, by the way, and the insufficient economic capacity of the country. Jews objected to this, pointing out that, even without the eviction of the local population, agriculture in the plains and hilly areas of Palestine could absorb up to three-quarters of a million colonists, and that the development of agriculture would have the effect of further development of an industry that could absorb another three million inhabitants. Of course, if such opportunities are available, they will require significant capital. It should be noted, however, that Jewish colonization is still a philanthropic enterprise and can provide for itself, according to English data, by 40% and, even according to Jewish, only 60%. The United States alone sends \$5.5 million to Palestine each year.

The continued immigration of Jews will no doubt be resisted by all means by the Arab population of Palestine, supported by all other Arab States and the newly created Arab League. It is quite clear from the above that the differences between Jews, Arabs and the British are now being raised in the question of allowing Jews to continue to be immigrating to Palestine and acquiring land.

There is a project to create a Great Syria within Syria, Iraq, Transjordan and Arab areas of Palestine with the provision of the remaining areas under the Jewish state. There is, however, no reason to believe that the plan will be met sympathetically by independent Arab States and Palestinian Arabs. Labour's Lord Strabolge once said that including Palestine in the British Empire as a dominion would be the best solution. It is possible that Jews would prefer British domination to the Arab, but the Dominion implies self-government, and with the Arab majority of the population, legislative and other state institutions must inevitably end up in the hands of the Arabs. There are no other plans or projects to resolve the complex Palestinian problem.

Findings

1. No matter how much the British try to justify the compatibility of their current policy in Palestine with the Balfour Declaration, there is no doubt that they have not fulfilled the terms of the mandate assigned to them, as is recognized as the above-mentioned statements of responsible statesmen of England itself. This gives every right to remove the mandate for Palestine from the British hands.

2. The Palestinian question could not be satisfactorily resolved without infringing on the rights and desires of either Jews or Arabs, and perhaps both. The British government is simultaneously influenced by both Arab states and world Jewry. Hence its difficulty in finding the right way to resolve the Palestinian problem.

3. The U.S. government is subject to the same influence. If the Palestinian policy of England should be strongly affected mainly by attention to the interests of the Arabs, the American government is more

influenced by the powerful American Jew. It should be recalled that in the last presidential elections both parties, Democratic and Republican, felt compelled to publish declarations of attitude towards Palestine, in which they demanded unrestricted immigration of Jews and the right of unrestricted ownership of land. At the same time, the U.S. government is unlikely to want to quarrel with the Arabs, when the American-interested oil pipeline from Saudi Arabia must pass through hundreds of kilometers of Arab territory. Thus, the American government would be in relation to Palestine almost as difficult as the British one.

4. The Soviet Union, free of both Arab and Jewish influence, could most likely have taken up the solution of the Palestinian problem. This entitles him to at least apply for temporary custody of Palestine until the problem is resolved more radically.

5. Palestine, which guards the approaches to the Suez Canal and has An Iraqi oil output on its territory, is too valuable for England to be able to count on its consent at least for the temporary transition of Palestine into the hands of another state, much less the USSR.

6. If the Soviet application is rejected, the question of the transfer of Palestine to the collective guardianship of three states - the USSR, the United States and England - arises. Collectively, these three Powers will be able to make the necessary decisions without giving that tribute to the arab or Jewish populations that the British or American Government would consider to be obligatory.

7. Conditions of collective custody should not be bounded by the Balfour Declaration or any other promises made by Britain as a mandate so that the collective new administration can tackle the Palestinian problem fairly and in accordance with the

interests of the entire population and with new demands for political life and universal security.

Chairman of the commission M. Litvinov

**FROM THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF
THE SECRETARIAT OF THE LEAGUE OF**

FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE USSR

September 26, 1945

Attendance: Kaplinsky, Pratkin, Tarnopler, Greenblatt, Manja Shohat, Tsvi Nadav, Cirulnikov, Dr. Crook, Nehorai, Kramer, Erem.

agenda:

1. Information by S. Kapeczynski;
2. National Congress;
3. Project laying the Forest in honor of the Red Army.

Chairman T. 3. Pratkin welcomes S. Kapeshtinsky in connection with his return from London.

S. Kaplinsky: I apologize in advance if my report on the meeting in the Soviet mission in London will be deprived of freshness: the fact that I have repeated it several times - in England, and here.

Remez came to London in front of us and waited for us. Immediately upon arrival, Cizling and I asked the Soviet Embassy to receive us at the official level. A positive response was received immediately, the meeting is scheduled for 9.08. In connection with the absence of Ambassador Gusev, who participated in the meeting at the summit in Potsdam, we were received by the chargeur K. Kukin. From reliable sources, we learned that in fact Kukin is a major figure in the embassy, he has been working here for 12 years. Accordingly, talking to him is like talking to an ambassador. Moreover, Kukin is better informed than the ambassador. During the conversation, the high assessment given to Kukin by our informants was fully confirmed, he is a very intelligent, intelligent and educated person. During the conversation it became clear that he was well versed in our affairs and interested in the events in Palestine.

I opened the official part of the meeting with a brief message about the League's activities in Palestine, our

assistance to the Soviet Union, and our ties to various Soviet organizations. I told that after the end of the war we decided to hold a wide discussion of plans for the future, this discussion will be devoted to our nearest national conference, to which we invited authorized representatives of the government of the USSR and the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. So far, we have not received a response to the invitation. We had a well-founded fear that our invitations did not reach the address, so we decided to hand them over directly to the Soviet representatives in Cairo and Beirut. In connection with our stay in London, we expressed our desire to discuss our working program with a representative of the Soviet Embassy.

D. Remez took the floor after me, he gave additional details about the negotiations that were held recently in Tehran by members of our delegation with the representative of the Soviet Red Cross Dr. Baryan. Remez recalled Baryan's specific proposal to our League to organize assistance to the Jewish orphanage in Minsk and outlined the program of the bureau's activities on scientific and medical relations, which we intend to create in the country. In the end, he stressed that we attach great importance to the visit of the representatives of the USSR to Palestine, not only to participate in our forum, but also to familiarize ourselves with our activities in the country. Remez expressed his wish that we should be given the opportunity to visit the USSR and make contact with Soviet Jews.

Kukin gave a detailed answer to our questions and wishes. First, he noted that such conversations could be given a purely formal diplomatic character, but could be made friendly and, if possible, frank. He prefers the second path, i.e. to speak as straight as possible.

Asked whether it makes sense to continue the activities of the League, he said that, of course, the work should continue, adding that it would be a big mistake on our part to dissolve the League due to the end of the war. Although the war is over, fascism has not yet been wiped out. It spread to all countries that were occupied by the Nazis, infiltrated many nooks and crannies. In Europe, there are still many fascist groups and cells operating quite openly, their influence has reached even America, where fascism has also captured quite significant positions. And fascism in its crude form carries unbridled zoological anti-Semitism.

The fight against fascism remains our most important common task, Kukin stressed, and then noted with surprising sincerity that he had to admit that even in some parts of the USSR, which had long been under Nazi occupation, the contagion of fascism and anti-Semitism, which is reflected in negative social phenomena, has penetrated. In these words Kukin could be heard confirmation that everything he said before was completely sincere.

Kukin further stressed that the USSR as a state is quite capable of curbing and uprooting any manifestations of fascism and anti-Semitism. That is why Moscow attaches such great importance to the continuation of the fight against fascism and anti-Semitism, conducted by public organizations.

Kukin reiterated that in this regard, the continuation of the League's activities in Palestine is not only desirable, but also necessary. As for the program of our work, he appreciates the efforts to develop cultural ties with the USSR, dissemination of comprehensive information about Soviet culture, art, music and science, and, of course, the mutual exchange of information about life in the USSR and Palestine. In this area, he seemed to think, the League's activities should be concentrated.

As for the ties between us, Kukin recognized the difficulties in this area. He stressed, however, that similar complaints were being received from other countries regarding the irregular nature of contacts with relevant organizations and institutions in the USSR. In his view, we should keep in touch with VOCS and with the EAC in Moscow directly, without the mediation of embassies in Cairo, Ankara or Beirut.

In conclusion, Kukin noted that let's hope that the relations between us, which were still sporadic, will improve and become regular.

From the discussion of the problems of the League Kukin turned the conversation to general political problems, and it was felt that he speaks sincerely. "There have been difficulties in the past. Perhaps there will be many of them in the future. The USSR is in a very delicate position. Yes, the USSR has not yet spoken definitively on the issue of Palestine, as this area is in the sphere of influence of Great Britain. Not for every economic shift the USSR can express a clear and unambiguous position, do not be surprised by it, do not demand from the USSR now specific obligations or clear political declarations."

In response to Kukin's words, I said, in particular: "We as emissaries of the V League do not demand political declarations, as it is not our business." There are official Jewish institutions in Palestine for negotiations with the USSR. The time will come and these ties will no doubt be established. As for Kukin's proposal that the League focus on creating cultural ties with the USSR, there is a serious contradiction between this proposal and Dr. Baryan's proposal. He told our delegation that it is desirable to focus the League's activities on specific constructive projects, and especially warned against the intention to turn it into an organization for cultural relations with the USSR. In this case, Dr. Baryan believes, we will be able

to fix all sorts of obstacles in relations with the Soviet authorities, because we will be seen as a kind of Soviet, agents.

Here Kukin interrupted me and said that such a view seems to him completely in keeping with the current political moment or the special conditions of our country. For my part, I noted that we are not afraid of the label of Soviet agents and are ready to develop friendly relations with the USSR in any areas. At the same time, I stressed that there is a great deal of sympathy among the Jews of Palestine for the Soviet Union. Among us, many of them are from Russia, these people are brought up in Russian culture and it is not surprising that our activity can arouse the sympathy of the general public.

Now as for our relationship with the UK. We are grateful to her for all the good that has been done for us. We recognize that without the British mandate, we would not have been able to achieve such results in Palestine. But Palestine is not an English colony or a "historical fiefdom", it is an international territory for which the mandated authorities are responsible to the international community.

Here Kukin interrupted me again and translated the conversation into the current situation in Palestine. He asked what issues the World Zionist conference was discussing and asked whether the Labour government had made the final decision on British politics in Palestine. I replied that the Jewish Agency had not yet made contact with the new cabinet (in those days the Labour government had not yet been formed). As for the Zionist forum, I said that it had not yet ended and no decisions had yet been taken. But the report on which decisions will be made has already been submitted. It is therefore clear that the Zionist Congress will require the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

Kukin asked what to do with the Arabs. In response, Cizling cited the second half of the Resolutions of the Assembly of Representatives on political, economic and cultural equality with the Arab population.

I informed about the development of the situation in the Arab community in connection with Jewish repatriation and stressed that there was no reason to fear a change in the situation for the worse when a Jewish state was established.

Kukin replied that, in his view, the Arabs would not be satisfied with such a situation and asked whether alternative solutions had been considered, such as the variant of a binational state on the Czechoslovakian model. I replied that such a view existed in the WSO and above all in the Jewish labour movement, but this is the opinion of a minority.

Kukin said that he had recently spoken to a high-ranking British official, a specialist in the Middle East and Palestine. He admitted that at one time he advocated the option of a binational state, but recently became disillusioned with it.

To this I replied that we have long known this argument of the British colonial administration. It opposes Zionist activities, so it claims that there is a danger of pogroms and Arab uprisings to intimidate us and the government in London. I can only repeat what Kukin said to the members of the Labour Party after the 1929 riots: we Russian Jews know very well what pogroms are and how they are provoked by the authorities. The pogroms took place where and when the government planned them. The Arabs decided to act only because they knew in advance that there were people in the British administration who were interested in the riots. Now the Arab population has received too much as a result of Jewish repatriation, I

do not think it will be so easy to encourage it to pogroms, as it was in 1929.

Cizling then added to my words, stressing that he too was highly doubtful that the Arabs could be so easily provoked into anti-Jewish riots. Jews are now an organized force that can defend itself.

To this Kukin remarked: "It's good that you are confident in your abilities, but it would be better you do not have to use this force." Then I said, "We know very well that the success of our activities in Palestine depends on the state of peace. Of course, if our problems can be resolved by understanding and agreeing with the Arab population, we will welcome that. Whatever the position of the majority in the Zionist leadership, let me express my conviction that it would be willing to pay a high price for peace with the Arab population. But peace cannot and must not come at the expense of limiting our repatriation to Palestine."

David Remez tried to return the conversation to its starting point and get a clearer answer from Kukin about the possibility of sending a delegation to the USSR. Remez stressed that we highly appreciate contacts with Soviet Jewry. For many years, the Jewish population and Zionist activities in Palestine have been subjected to insinuations and attacks. Communists in Palestine acted hand in hand with the fascists and spread malicious fabrications about our work in the country. "I suspect," Remez said, "that these inventions have reached Moscow. That is why it is so important that we are given the opportunity to communicate directly with the USSR and Soviet Jews."

Kukin replied that he understood our desire to conduct propaganda work among Soviet Jews, but is convinced that the time to talk about the direction of the delegation to the USSR has not come yet.

I felt that something in Remez's words offended Kukin, and it was reflected in the wording of his answer. Therefore, I felt it necessary to give a somewhat more detailed explanation of my colleague's words.

In 1936, I said, bloody events began in Palestine. At the head of the gangs of mobsters were Haj Amin al-Husseini and his party. Even then we knew and warned that this movement has ties with Berlin and Rome. And the Jewish communists thought otherwise, they claimed that the bloodshed was an Arab national uprising in Palestine, and therefore treated the mob with sympathy. The bloodshed on the Jewish side killed up to 500 people and brought the Arab casualties closer to 1,000. This example alone is enough for you to understand how deep the gap is between us and the Jewish communists. Haj Amin al-Husseini fled to Iraq, then he was implicated in the fascist rebellion of Rashid Ali. After the suppression of the rebellion, Haj Amin fled to Berlin and began to serve Hitlerism. All this proves the rightness of our point of view on the causes and drivers of the pogroms of 1929 and 1936. As far as I know, the Communists in Palestine have already abandoned their previous views. As a result, they returned to the ranks of the Federation of Trade Unions. Because of this, it seems that there was a split in the communist movement in the country.

When I finished explaining the situation, Kukin remarked, "How many times have I had to listen to explanations about what is happening to you, but from all heard I was not able to make a complete picture. I must admit that I was able to hear a purely business message for the first time from Mr. Kapalnsky's mouth."

The conversation lasted about 2.5 hours. In conclusion, Kukin reiterated that in Soviet circles they do not doubt the progressive nature of the Jewish

movement in Palestine. We have expressed to him the wish that he should visit Palestine. Kukin replied that he had friends in the country and hoped that he would be able to come.

findings

Now let me draw conclusions. Although I passed the report to both London and several members of the secretariat on the ground when they came to Haifa, it is possible that I missed some of the details. Or maybe my memory let me down and some details were forgotten. In any case, my comments are recorded, and when Cizling and Remez return, they will read the text and be able to supplement and correct it if necessary.

The conversation with Kukin was very friendly. The very fact that at a time of political tension, the highest official in the Soviet embassy found it possible to devote 2.5 hours to talking to us, suggests that the Soviet Union takes the League seriously and attaches importance to relations with us.

Now as for the specific issues that we have raised in the conversation. I have the impression that the USSR has so far exercised the utmost caution in everything that concerns the development of the political situation in the Middle East in general and in Palestine in particular. At the same time, there is a reluctance to somehow connect embassies and missions in the region to direct contacts with the League. It seems that all contacts with foreign organizations they would like to establish exclusively on VOCS. Differences of opinion between Kukin and Baryan are obviously explained by the difference in the time of the meetings. Not that he rejected Baryan's proposals, but rather he supplemented them. The mention of VOCS indicates that they prefer to contact us through non-governmental organizations. From the conversation it became clear to me why

there is no answer to the invitations of Soviet representatives to our national congress - the Soviet authorities to which we applied did not want to answer with a refusal, and they can not give a positive answer. In any case, we should not expect that the official Soviet representatives will arrive at our congress. Maybe representatives of VOCS will come.

Remez considers the outcome of the conversation in a pessimistic light, from his point of view, Kukin's words that the USSR has not yet expressed its opinion towards our country and will say its word only "at the right moment", mean a departure from the position of the Soviet delegation at the London conference. However, later I heard from Cizling that Remez revised this assessment and now considers the atmosphere of sincerity that prevailed during the meeting especially important.

It seemed to me that Kukin's allusion to a conversation with a high-ranking British official - whether it was true that such a conversation actually took place or whether he had simply used the "British official" as an excuse to touch on the topic - rather suggests that information is being exchanged between the USSR and Great Britain than that the British in every conversation repeat threats about the impending Jewish pogroms in Palestine. It seems that Kukin was interested in our opinion on this matter.

In conclusion, let me reiterate that I may have missed something or forgotten something. For example, I asked why it is so difficult to get an answer from Moscow. When I reported that the EAC had not responded to our invitation, I suggested that shahno Epstein's death might have caused some interference in the committee's work. To this Kukin replied that he knew nothing about Epstein's death (Shahno Epstein died in mid-July, and our conversation took place in early August).

Kukin asked about our party affiliation. I have the impression that he knows a lot about us and our social situation. Later, we learned that he, accompanied by BLockker, had visited an agricultural farm where repatriation candidates were trained professionally and received first-hand information about the situation in Palestine.

I.Kruk, on behalf of all those present, thanked Kapochkin-sky for the report and noted that of all the delegations representing the League, the latter worked best.

HELP OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF NKID USSR October 20, 1945

Secretly

Reference about our property in Palestine

(In addition to a reference on the same subject from 11.H.45.)

Our property in Palestine consists of 35 plots of land (see annex) with a total area of up to 2 sq km with a built-on

buildings (backyards, hotels, hospitals, churches, etc.). According to the materials available in the NKID of the USSR, the value of these plots of land with buildings erected on them is estimated at one million pounds. Legally, all this property can be reduced to 4 groups:

1. Property owned by the Russian government.
2. Property belonging to the former Spiritual Mission.
3. Property belonging to the former Russian Orthodox Palestinian society.
4. Property issued fictitiously in the name of individuals but acquired by the Spiritual Mission or the Palestinian Society. At that time, under Turkish law, foreign societies, companies and individuals could not own real estate. Only Turkish nationals used the right to own real estate, the exception was allowed for members of the Russian reigning house. This explains the fact that the merchants for many land and other property in Palestine were issued to the chairman of

the Palestinian Society of Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich.

This property must be legally recognized as the property of the Soviet state by virtue of the decree on the nationalization of the property of members of the former imperial family. In the conduct of the case, we can refer to the decision of the Lebanese court as a precedent and to the subsequent decree of the President of the Lebanese Republic on the transfer to us of the property of the Palestinian Society in the ashrafie (Beirut) district, written in the name of former Prince Sergei Aleksandrovich.

In 1914, after the beginning of the war between Turkey and Russia, the Turks occupied the backyards of the Palestinian society, hospitals and the buildings of the Russian spiritual mission. In 1917, with the occupation of Palestine by British troops, all these important buildings were occupied by parts of British troops. On July 24, 1922, Britain received a mandate for Palestine. Under Article 13 of this mandate, England is responsible for all "holy" places and religious buildings in Palestine. All the property of the former Russian spiritual mission, as well as the former Palestinian society falls under the heading of "religious places", because according to Article 1 of the statute of the Russian Orthodox Palestinian Society, the tasks of society were to assist Orthodox pilgrims on pilgrimages to "holy" places and gathering scientific information about the "holy" places of the East. Consequently, the British Government is responsible for the state of our property in Palestine.

In accordance with the mandate, the British High Commissioner in Palestine issued a number of executive orders on the management of the property of the Russian Spiritual Mission and Palestinian Society. These orders were appointed by special administrators with very extensive powers and with

the right to spend income derived from our assets. It should be noted, however, that the orders of the High Commissioner do not say anything about property belonging to the former Russian government (e.g. the home of the Russian Consulate General in Jerusalem). It is not known what position this property is in.

According to the information in the case, the British dispose of our property as their property. Most housing-fit buildings are occupied by either English institutions or English troops, or rented out. At the same time, Russian white emigrant organizations use our property. For example, the considerable property of the former Russian spiritual mission by the British was transferred to a white emigrant "spiritual mission" led by Archimandrite Antony Senkevich, who is the content of the British. There is also the head of the self-styled Russian Palestinian society Antipov, a former Russian consul in Persia. He is currently an English official.

Appendix: a list of Russian property in Palestine on 3 sheets.

Head of the Middle East Division of the NKID of the USSR

I. Samilovsky Otv. BVI referee V. Malarov

**FROM THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF
THE COMMISSION FOR THE PREPARATION
OF PEACE TREATIES AND THE POST-WAR
SYSTEM November 15, 1945**

Top secret Ex. Unity.

There are: members of the commission T. Litvinov, Lozovsky, Suritz, Stein, the secretary of the commission T. Yudin.

agenda:

Chairman's report on the commission's activities. That. Litvinov makes the following report:

The Jewish question. The note was ordered to the late Epstein, who sadly passed away without completing the order. The question, however, is not yet internationally worth it, except for the problem of Palestine, about which the note was sent. At the conclusion of his report, the Chairman of the Litvinov M.M. Commission concludes that "the Commission has nothing more to do and it seems timely to ask the

Government to liquidate the Commission as it has fulfilled its objectives within its limits”.

Note: the protocol was sent to V.M. Molotov.

**REPORTING BY EISENSTADT, A POLITICAL
OFFICER OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR
PALESTINE, ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH
TASS CORRESPONDENT IN CAIRO
JANCHENKO January 1, 1946**

Confidentially

Yesterday I had a long conversation with TASS correspondent Janchenko. In short, his position can be outlined as follows:

“I see that your people continue to rebel. I don’t think that tactic will pay off. It gives the British an excuse and an opportunity to stay in the area, and instead of getting rid of them, you will help them become stronger. I understand that these are extremes.

The explosion of state institutions as a demonstrative step is a rather primitive way of fighting. The railway case was much more thoughtful,

as there was a specific purpose in this case and it was demonstrated that obstacles could be created during future hostilities.

During the last Moscow conference, the negotiations on Iran ended in failure, as Molotov told Bevin that Russia is ready to leave Iran if Britain leaves Egypt and Palestine. We have much more rights to Iran than England have for Egypt and Palestine. In any case, Tehran is much closer to our borders than Cairo and Jerusalem to London. The day is near when Russia will have its say on the Middle East issue, so we need to be aware of everything that is happening in the region.

My colleague Korostovtsev has just returned from Palestine. He did not meet with either Arab or your officials, he tried to form his opinion on Palestine. He's been to your colonies and settlements incognito. Everything he saw made a great impression on him, especially collective settlements.

We understand very well that Arab feudalism does not want to adopt such a way of life and that the British are fighting it, in order to

to prevent the spread of social reform in the Middle East, where feudalism is their mainstay and only hope. The more Soviet Russia would have to be interested in Jewish Palestine. And Moscow is really interested. Our envoy to Cairo has been in Moscow for a month, and I am sure that these issues are being discussed there. He specifically visited Palestine before traveling to Moscow to see everything in person.

Therefore, we ask you to give us a complete picture of the social life of the Arabs, to tell about the parties, newspapers and the history of the ruling families, emphasizing the primitiveness of this form of life, the predominance of power of several families, feudal relations in the village, their internal struggle, etc.

We are well aware that Jewish immigration has made the standard of living of Arabs in Palestine higher than anywhere else in the Middle East, and at the same time relations with Jews are better than in other countries.

Hatred of Jews in the East is part of a feudal policy supported by the United Kingdom to divert the attention of the population from more important issues. The events of November 2 were a typical example of such a policy and strongly resembled similar actions in Tsarist Russia.

We therefore ask that we be provided with all the necessary materials to make the facts compelling and the overall picture more complete.

You asked me how Soviet Russia could help Jewish Palestine. You also stressed that while you acknowledge that we are currently opposed to the Arab League, you cannot imagine that Russia will not try to win the hearts of the Arab population in its foreign policy. In this regard, you asked: what will happen to the Jews then? You also told me that Palestine is far from Russia's borders and that there is a danger that, seeking rapprochement with you today, Russia will abandon you tomorrow, given the ever-changing political environment and the practice of making lucrative political deals.

I understand your thoughts and feelings. I honestly have to admit that I don't have the answer to all these questions. And I would like to discuss all these problems with Yiborin after his return from Moscow. In all likelihood, he will know a more definite opinion of Moscow.

Personally, I also believe that Russia should come to an understanding with the Arabs, but given their backwardness and your progressiveness, all our sympathies will remain on the side of your experiment,

and I believe that we are well prepared to find a solution to the Arab-Jewish question.

As for the boycott. According to our information, the British are undoubtedly against the boycott. It was a big surprise for them, and they negotiated the ouster of Azzam. The reason for their negative attitude is probably that they fear that the idea of a boycott is dangerous and could also be used tomorrow against British goods.

Personally, I think it's impossible to put this into practice.

You probably know that a few days ago Muslim pilgrims from the USSR visited Cairo on their way from Mecca. They informed me that King Ibn Saud had made a lengthy speech to pilgrims in which he called on them to boycott the Jews in the countries where they lived. Our pilgrims were received by Ibn Saud, and he asked them about life in Russia.

I arranged a meeting with an American journalist and the leader of the pilgrims told him the whole story, adding that the call for Muslims from the USSR to fight Jews looks ridiculous and that what they saw convinced them that Muslims in the USSR had overtaken the Arab population of the Middle East for four centuries and that life in Central Asia is incomparable to that of Arabs. The sheikh only asked the journalist not to emphasize it too much, so as not to spoil the relations between Muslims from the USSR and Arab countries. One of the pilgrims was a professor of Kazan University, a doctor (Tatar), who was to monitor the health of pilgrims. But when it became known that a Soviet doctor had arrived, thousands of Arabs in Arabia came to him for medical help.

In all likelihood, the number of our pilgrims in 1946 will increase. Thousands of pilgrims will go to Palestine for Easter. The Soviet government has already applied

for visas for them. You're saying people will think it's the vanguard of the Red Army. Indeed, on any occasion, suspicion falls on us.

In any case, I think we should do everything to help you, and when you create a Jewish state, don't forget that I deserve a medal for helping to create this state."

Eisenstadt

**LETTER FROM THE SOVIET ENVOY IN
LEBANON D.S. MALT TO THE HEAD OF THE**

MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID
USSR I.V. SAMILOVSKY January 3, 1946

In doing so, I am sending you some translations of some, in my opinion, material of interest to the department on the Palestinian issue.

As is well known, the current Palestinian situation with regard to Jewish immigration was defined by the British White Paper in 1939, according to which by 1944 175 JEWISH immigrants were admitted to Palestine and this was to end the creation of a Jewish national hearth in Palestine, cursed in the famous Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917.

Since then, especially in the wake of the Second World War, the question of Palestine does not seem to have become topical or particularly acute.

The beginning of the current period of aggravation should be attributed to the statements of the American Republican and then democratic parties in the presidential campaign in 1944.

The statements of the American parties have caused considerable concern in the Arab countries, which explains the sending to President Roosevelt the accompanying March letters of King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia and President of the Syrian Republic Shukri al-Kuatli, after their conversation with Roosevelt in Cairo during his return from the Yalta Conference.

The second period of the debate about Palestine arose as a result of President Truman's statement that the Palestinian issue was discussed between the Americans and the British at the Potsdam Conference in August 1945.

A new wave of activity on the Palestinian issue, which continues to this day, erupted in mid-September when it became known about Truman's proposal to

allow 100 Western European Jews to immigrate to Palestine.

All the activity of this period, accompanied by unrest and provocations in Palestine, led to a well-known statement on 13 November by the British Foreign Minister Bevin in the House of Commons, the establishment of the Anglo-American Survey Commission, the formation of the Supreme Arab Palestinian Council, which unites all the major Arab parties of Palestine, that is, something resembling the Pil Commission in 1937 and the then Supreme Arab Committee, which decided to declare a boycott of the Arab League.

All of these materials deserve detailed analysis, but I think you already have a similar development, so I will limit myself to the shortest of the following:

1. The urgency and severity of the Palestinian question has arisen and exists because, in many preconditions, Palestine is a hub of Anglo-American contradictions on the eastern Mediterranean coast.

The fact is that in connection with the alleged oil development in Saudi Arabia, it is extremely important for the Americans to gain a foothold on the south-eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea and to bring to this place an Arab oil pipeline, the final point of which would not be in The English-controlled territory.

The most convenient place for this is the Egyptian or Palestinian coast, as the closest to both Saudi Arabia and the common world highway of the Mediterranean Sea. But Egypt is bound by the treaty with Great Britain and very jealously it is protected, so direct or even indirect penetration of the United States into Egypt cannot be carried out without serious objections and even clashes with England.

The more vulnerable place of Great Britain in this area is Palestine. Although it is a mandated English territory, the unresolved issue of the creation of a

Jewish hearth may allow Americans to find a solution that would not seem a direct violation of British privileges in Palestine, and at the same time through the Jewish "hearth" or "state" would present to Americans the possibility of economic and political ousting of the British.

These provisions, which are not yet clearly bulging on either side, practically turn Palestine into a knot of Anglo-American contradictions in the Middle East.

Of course, the Americans can conduct an oil pipeline to Lebanon and they have already secured such an opportunity to conclude an agreement for the construction of oil refineries, but it lengthens the pipeline and distances itself from the main Mediterranean highway.

2. The formation of an Anglo-American survey commission may mean that Americans are seeking to achieve a solution to the autonomous or self-assigned Jewish part of Palestine for the above purposes. On the part of the British, such an intention of the Americans can hardly meet special resistance. However, at the end of the application there is a statement in the House of Lords of the former First British High Commissioner in Palestine, Lord Samuel, in which he does not approve of the partition of Palestine. However, in their desire to strengthen Iraq and create a counterweight for Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the British can make Palestine so that, at the expense of parts of Palestine and Transjordan, it can strengthen its position in the Middle East.

3. The Arab League Council's announcement of a boycott of the Zionist industry and its slavish response to Bevin's statement is a good manoeuvre by the British, which easily leads to the partition of Palestine, for this fascist method of inciting racial strife diverts the attention of Arabs from the true causes that prevent the Palestinian question from being resolved

and provides favourable justifications for the need to protect the existence of the Jewish hotbed against the obvious threat of the surrounding Arab countries.

In addition, the boycott of the Zionist industry, which in the current conditions in Palestine cannot be separated from the Jewish industry, creates favourable conditions for the British to receive a large number of orders from Arab countries for their goods, which will restore their economic position in these countries, as due to the war the Palestinian consumer goods industry has developed so strongly that it has begun to represent serious competition for British industry. However, the announcement of a boycott here is of little importance, as already now Arab merchants are stockpiling a large number of Palestinian goods, so that when the council's decision to boycott the issue of Palestinian goods for leftovers in warehouses comes into force, and it is good to earn good money. However, a boycott should inevitably boost orders for British and American firms.

4. Whatever the solution to the Palestinian question, whether the Americans will be able to oust the British here or not, it seems to me that in both cases its solution without our participation is unprofitable for us. Therefore, in a timely and reasonable manner we can and should demand our participation in the resolution of this issue, as Jews in Europe are not only in the Anglo-American occupation zone, but also in the Soviet. And besides, Palestine itself is not only on British imperial communications, but also on Soviet lines of maritime communication with various ports of our own country.

Appendix: by text on 54 sheets.

Envoy

Malt

On the document of the litter: "Maximov. We should pay attention to 4 letters. Include in the dossier on Palestine, which should be updated. That. Maximov to perform. Samilovsky. 24.1.46.».

**REPORTING BY EISENSTADT, A STAFF
MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE,
ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH TASS
CORRESPONDENT IN CAIRO, M.
KOROSTOVTSEV February 1, 1946**

Conversation with M.Korostovtsev, TASS
correspondent

I recently visited Palestine and visited several collective settlements. I spent some time in Givat Brenner. What struck me most about the kibbutz was the lack of personal economic interest. This means that there is no private property, no salary that settlement members can spend as they want, and there is no distinction between people of different professions. I see it as a willingness to sacrifice for all time. Of course, a person sometimes has to join the army and sacrifice a few years of his life for the sake of the country, but this is a temporary measure. However, this economy is based on constant self-sacrifice. I have to admit, I don't believe in this type of economy. This may last 10-15 years, perhaps within a

generation, but the economy cannot be built on pure idealism. Let's compare a kibbutz with a collective farm. The collective farmer has his own house, a garden, a domestic bird. Collaboration in the field is paid, with this money he can have as he wishes. The state farm is where the employee receives a salary, which he can save, put aside for the period when he leaves the state farm. Of course, the work of an engineer in the enterprise is paid much higher than the person who digs potatoes. This is the main incentive to gain knowledge and skills. What incentive will a student have to study at university if, ultimately, he will receive the same as an unskilled worker. Of course, I know that people in the kibbutz do not in any way consider their work to be self-sacrifice, their work is paid for by food, clothing, housing and education for their children. I also know that members of the kibbutz are less prone to crises or unemployment, and that this movement is the product of new spiritual ideals among Jews and a new understanding of the basics of public life. I know all this, and yet I cannot consider this experiment any other way as idealistic, which will end with the cessation of population growth or with the increase in the number of farmers.

However, there is no doubt that this is an extremely progressive socialist experiment; neither the English nor the Arab League can accept it. All of England's relations with the East are built on the support of large landowners, and the Arab League is a tool of this system of relations. Anti-Semitism is in many ways the result of fear of a new system of economics and social life.

Eisenstadt

**LETTER FROM MAJ. GEN. BASILOV,
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF THE
SOVIET UNION'S COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
FOR REPATRIATION, TO THE HEAD OF THE
MIDDLE EAST DIVISION OF THE USSR
FOREIGN MINISTRY, I.V. SAMILOVSKY April
27, 1946**

Secretly

During 1945, our representative in Egypt, Major Semin, took into account 206 Soviet citizens in Palestine who were to be repatriated to the USSR, but the issue of their repatriation took a protracted nature, requiring diplomatic resolution.

These Soviet citizens, who had expressed a desire to go home, were reportedly subjected to all kinds of

bullying and persecution by Palestinian reactionary organizations.

Please inform to what extent this issue is resolved, as our representative from Egypt in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in January 1946 we have withdrawn, and further work on the identification and repatriation of Soviet citizens by the decision of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR is entrusted to the envoy to Egypt, T. Yiborin.

Appendix: a list of Soviet citizens registered in Palestine on 7 sheets, only to the recipient.

Assistant Commissioner of the Council of Ministers of the Union of the USSR for repatriation, Major General

Basilov

On the document of the litter: "Maximov and Malarov. This case was led at one time by T. Ivanov. Please find out the state of the case and answer to Taesilov. Samylovsky 29/IV."

**CONSIDERATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST
DIVISION OF THE USSR FOREIGN
MINISTRY ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE
May 15, 1946**

Secretly

On April 30, 1946, the Anglo-American Commission set up by Britain and the United States to review the issue of Palestine and make recommendations to both

governments, finished its work and published its report.

The Commission recommended to the governments of England and the United States:

1. To resettle 100,000 Jews in Palestine, if possible, in 1946. Immigration must be carried out as quickly as circumstances allow.

2. Do not establish a Jewish or Arab state in Palestine, as this would lead to civil war. Palestine must eventually become a State that must guarantee equal rights to Christians, Jews and Arabs.

3. Continue to govern Palestine on the basis of the existing English mandate until the United Nations implements the guardianship agreements through the United Nations.

4. Existing rules for the lease and sale of land in Palestine should be replaced by others based on the policy of free sale and leasing of land to all persons, regardless of race or religion.

5. To proclaim in Palestine the principle that the economic, cultural and political development of Arabs in Palestine would be as important as the development of Jews.

These are the main points of the recommendations developed by the commission and submitted for approval by the governments of the United States and England.

The commission's published report sparked a storm of protests in Arab countries: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Muslim part of India. Strikes, rallies and speeches against the report of the commission, considered by the Arabs as an attempt by the Arabs in the commonwealth and under the cover of the United States to organize a new military, economic and political foothold in Palestine, the second "independent

Trans-International” in the Middle East, were held in the Arab East.

Britain’s position on the Palestinian issue is clear: along with Transjordan, the British government is trying to create in Palestine, providing The output of British oil to the Mediterranean Sea, a new foothold in the Middle East and to close Palestine created a chain of British-controlled states.

The United States has engaged the British to resolve the Palestinian problem in order to divert from Britain the attacks of Arab countries on the policy of the development of Palestine and in order to push the United States with Arab public opinion, thereby weakening the position of Americans in the Arab East, in particular in Saudi Arabia.

However, the U.S. itself got involved in the Palestinian “proud knot” not only at the invitation of the British, but also with the intention to settle, in addition to Saudi Arabia, and on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, close to the oil fields of Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. The U.S. is also interested in The Ports of Palestine for exporting its Arabian oil. Finally, the U.S. government is under intense pressure from large American Zionist capitalists, who have invested significant capital in Palestine and continue to export new capital there (currently foreign capital in Palestine has reached the sum of 500 LLC dollars, the American Zionist capital is developing a plan for the irrigation and electrification of Palestine, which will require new investments of 43,700 LTDs; only during the war, the Zionist capital of Palestine has created a plan for the irrigation and electrification of Palestine, which will require new investments of 43,700 LTDs; only during the war, the Zionist capital of Palestine has created 432 new industrial enterprises).

The attempt by Britain and the United States, together but outside the United Nations, to continue

the British mandate to Palestine on the pretext that any fundamental resolution of the Palestinian issue would now cause a civil war in Palestine, as well as a reference to the fact that, before the end of the unrest in Palestine, it must be under British mandate and military occupation, clearly demonstrates the desire of Britain and the United States to prevent the intervention of other countries in resolving the Palestinian issue before the full development of the United States and England.

Our silence on the Palestinian issue could be interpreted by the United States, Britain, Arabs and Jews as some kind of agreement of the Soviet Union with the proposals put forward by the commission. With this in mind, and given that in order to resolve the Palestinian question, official and unofficial representatives of Arab countries and Jewish organizations are approached by the Soviet Government, we believe that it is appropriate, by publishing two or three articles in our press, to state the Soviet side's views on the Palestinian issue. These articles may then, in private conversations, be referred to by our diplomatic representatives in the event of an appeal to them, in connection with the Palestinian question, representatives of Arabs or Jews.

Our position on the Palestinian issue should probably be boiled down to the following:

1. The Anglo-American Commission for the Study of the Palestinian Question, established without the participation of the United Nations, was not in power to discuss the issue and to resolve the Palestinian problem without the participation of directly interested parties.

2. The Jewish question in Europe cannot be resolved by the immigration of Jews to Palestine, since only the complete destruction of all the roots of

fascism and the democratization of European countries can give the Jewish masses normal living conditions.

3. The British mandate for Palestine should be abolished as making it difficult to resolve the Palestinian question in a fundamental way and now posing a threat to security in the Middle East. Foreign troops should be withdrawn from Palestine.

4. Palestine should be placed in the custody of the United Nations, which would prepare the conditions for an independent and democratic Palestine for a period of time.

We must not put the Palestinian issue to the United Nations for ourselves. It must be put by the Arabs themselves, by the members of the United Nations, and we must only express our point of view and protect it.

The publication of articles on the Palestinian issue should be postponed until after the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

M.Maximov

On the document the litters: "T. Molotov. For my part, I believe that these proposals are generally acceptable. I ask for your instructions. V. Dekanozov"; "T. Vyshinsky, Lozovsky, Dekanozov. We need to talk about it. V. Molotov."

**LETTER FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN
WASHINGTON, N. GOLDMAN TO THE
PUBLIC FIGURE OF MEXICO L. TOLEDANO**

May 21, 1946

Dear Mr. Toledano,

I am sending you a memorandum on the issue that we have discussed.

I am really grateful to you for your willingness to discuss this issue with the Soviet government and I hope that your mission will be successful.

Please be kind enough to inform me of your return from Moscow to New York so that I can see you again and learn the results of your negotiations.

Once again thank you, my best wishes to you and Toledano, I wish you a pleasant trip.

Yours sincerely

Naum Goldman APPERATE

Memorandum

Secretly

May 21, 1946

For many years, the Jewish Agency for Palestine has tried to start negotiations with the Soviet government on the Jewish and Palestinian issue.

Representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, myself included, had many conversations with Soviet ambassadors and representatives in Washington, Mexico City, Paris, London and others.

We have repeatedly suggested that the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine should be given the opportunity to come to Moscow to talk to the leaders of the Soviet government, but no response was received from Moscow on this issue. As a result, all negotiations on the Palestinian issue are being conducted with the British and American Governments, and this gives the impression that we, for our part, wish to discuss this issue only with these two Governments and wish to exclude Soviet Russia from the negotiations, while the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Zionist movement have in fact always viewed zionism as an international problem and sought the support of all peoples and Governments.

There is another consideration to consider. Five Arab states are recognized by Soviet Russia and represented by their ambassadors and envoys in Moscow, and the Soviet government has ambassadors and envoys in Arab capitals. Thus, Arab states have access to the Soviet government and can always discuss their problems and make suggestions.

Without a government and a normal representation in Moscow, we are deprived of this opportunity, so the Soviet Government knows only the Arab point of view and is not familiar with the Jewish position on the Palestinian issue.

It is very likely that the Palestinian issue will be discussed at the UN in the near future. The Arab States are hinting that the report of the Anglo-American

Commission for the Study of the Situation in Palestine may be presented at a Security Council meeting. The Palestinian problem as a whole should be addressed at the UN in the near future. Therefore, it is in the interest of the Soviet government to obtain all the factual material on the issue and to get acquainted with the demands and proposals of the Jews to resolve the issue.

Arab propaganda is constantly trying to give the impression that the Soviet government will support the Arab side. I do not believe that this is the case, but the fact that the representatives of the Zionist movement cannot discuss their problems with the Soviet Government, while the Arabs have such an opportunity, has created in broad Jewish circles the impression that the Soviet Government has committed itself to supporting the position of the Arabs.

For all these reasons, we believe that the time has come to allow the representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to discuss the Palestinian issue with representatives of the Soviet Government, either in Moscow or with Mr. Molotov anywhere else of his choice. Before the Soviet Government takes a position on the Palestinian issue, the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Jewish people, of course, have the right to ask to be heard and given the opportunity to present their views and arguments to the Soviet Government.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE
OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE USSR
L. TARNOPOLER WITH THE HEAD OF THE
CONSULAR DEPARTMENT OF THE SOVIET
MISSION IN LEBANON R. AGARONOV
Jerusalem, May 22, 1946**

I think it is necessary to present to you a brief content of my conversation with the Soviet Vice-Consul, Mr. Aharonov.

The question is: What is the USSR's position on the Palestinian issue? A: At the moment, he cannot give a specific answer. However, it is obvious to him that sooner or later the Palestinian issue will be considered at the UN General Assembly and, of course, representatives of his government will then lay out the position of the USSR on this issue.

V.: Would it be right to assume, on the basis of K. Serezhin's article in the New Time, that the Soviet

government had moved away from the position taken by the delegation of Soviet trade unions at the international conference in London?

A: He does not believe that the Soviet delegation's support for the resolution is only a minor episode. What was published in the Soviet press does not support the assumption that the Soviet government has moved away from the line set out in the London resolution. He did not know of any reasons for the withdrawal of the Soviet government from the position taken by the delegation in London. This should not be understood in the way that the Soviet government, by supporting the London resolution, took a pro-Zionist position. We need to make sure that the Zionist movement as a movement for the national liberation of the Jewish people is independent and autonomous, as the real liberation movement should be. Although we know that there are strong and influential progressive elements in the Zionist movement, the movement as a whole is not independent, in other words, it cannot determine its own policies.

V.: Our press reported that Lozovsky is studying the Jewish problem and that the results of his research will serve as material for the Soviet government in determining its attitude to the demands of the Zionists and the Jewish people. What is true in this message?

A: He doesn't know anything about it. Maybe it is. I have already said that soon the government of the USSR will formulate its position on this issue. The Soviet Government would like to know what the Jewish side's proposals were to break the political impasse in this situation. The material I have gathered on this issue is not credible. The situation is that information obtained from a reliable source, for example, in February, includes facts and assumptions that are completely contrary to the information received in April.

V.: Can I find out what will be done about the huge amount of material - the testimony given to the commission for the study of the situation in Palestine, which I gave you?

A: All this material will be immediately translated into Russian and handed over to the Government of the USSR. At the same time, he added, his Government would like to receive basic, objective materials on the political situation in Palestine, as well as on the various proposals of the Jewish side, which it has made or will make to resolve the whole set of political problems.

V.: Do you agree if I arrange for you to meet with the leadership of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR?

A: After I have spoken to the ambassador, I will be happy to meet with the league leaders in early June.

**RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION
BETWEEN A MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE, EISENSTADT, WITH A.A.
SHVEDOV, THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE
SOVIET MISSION IN EGYPT. June 12, 1946**

I had a lengthy conversation with Mr. A. Shvedov, the first secretary of the Soviet mission. The meeting took place in the mission room, attended by Mr. Kakhanov, from the Zionist federation, and Mr. Gnedikh, a mission officer.

I told Mr. Shvedov about the various political and cultural relations that bind Jewish Palestine to Soviet Russia, and about the great interest of Jews in everything related to the development of Russia and its position in the international arena. I reminded him of the various efforts we have made over the past 5 years to establish cultural and trade relations through personal contacts, memorandums and publications. I told him that, despite all this, we had not been able to establish the kind of relationship we wanted to have, and we felt that our struggle was not clear enough. I stressed that many of the articles appearing in the Soviet press are far from benevolent. That, judging by The Viewpoint attributed to Mr. Malt, the Soviet envoy to Lebanon is hostile to us and that during the last month Moscow radio has reported only on the reaction of the Arabs to the Anglo-American report, without mentioning the Jewish point of view at all. I added that we deeply regretted this and that the purpose of my visit was to discuss the issue and to try again to establish normal relations in various fields.

Mr. Shvedov. The lack of coverage of the Jewish position in the Soviet press is probably due to the fact that we do not have a TASS correspondent in Palestine. As you know, the British government did not allow us to send it. However, the Palestinian question was of interest to the Soviet Government, and the fact that the three Deputy Foreign Ministers were Jewish ensured that the issue was given due attention. The view, attributed to Malt by the Lebanese press, was later refuted. The fact that his name always appears in connection with such information is due to the fact that Palestine is in his control, not in ours.

But I'll say more. The Soviet Government did take a position on the Palestinian issue, and it had expressed it several times. Our position was based on the principle that Britain should leave Palestine and allow

Jews and Arabs to decide their own destiny. You know well that our policy has always been that the people of each country must decide their own destiny.

Swedes. However, going back to the relations between Palestine and Soviet Russia and your efforts to strengthen and develop these relations, here I would like to say something as the first secretary of the mission and before that as a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Let's start with the ambulances you sent as a gift to Tehran. We were very happy to receive them, we met your delegates perfectly, we staged a demonstration of cars, etc. There, in Tehran, they appear at various meetings, even in Iranian factories, telling the dirtiest stories about Soviet Russia.

Now let's turn to your leaders. I regret to say that Mr. Ben-Gurion's speeches are little different from fascist. About six months ago I was in Turkey. Turkish newspapers published his speech in which he stated that Hitler's system and methods were the best and that Palestinian youth should be brought up in the same spirit. Of course, I sent all these papers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and they made an impression there. But Ben-Gurion isn't the only one. Mr. Schertok's speeches are actually not much better. Of course, both of them do not need my approval, but I think it is necessary to mention it.

I also think your press is grossly unfair. My friend Mr. Gnedykh was in Palestine, and, having been presented to several newspapermen, he asked them, "How are you. These journalists immediately published an interview with Gnedykh, which he never gave, attributing to him things he never said, and because of their fault we conducted a long and unpleasant correspondence with Moscow.

You're talking about cultural connections. But you should know that all the materials that we send to the

V League never reach the population. Books and brochures are burned and records are broken. We receive hundreds of letters from friends from Palestine explaining to us that the V League is in the hands of people who want to prevent any ties with Soviet Russia.

When your orchestra was in Cairo, I invited them to arrange a slavic music concert. The orchestra manager asked for 5,000 pounds for this. Of course, if people want to profit from our friendship, it will not lead to anything good. Two days later, the same manager asked me to arrange an orchestra trip to Russia, stating that they were friends of Soviet Russia. I told him we didn't need those friends.

You mentioned the printed material you send to Russia. I looked at it when I was working at the Foreign Office. In fact, he remained in my department without movement. All this material was pure propaganda and gave no idea of Palestine or understanding its problems. These materials were extremely one-sided. After reading them, you would think that Arabs do not exist in Palestine at all. And you know what we believe: every nation has the right to a place under the sun, especially when that people live on their land.

I am not an expert in trade affairs, and we do not make deals with Palestinian business representatives, as these matters are in the hands of our mission in Lebanon, where Mr. Dnipro is dealing with them. But I can say that we are not too interested in trade with Palestine at the moment. However, it is not easy to trade even in a small amount, as your commercial principles are not always clear, and Soviet Russia is used to making fair and clean deals. When Dnipro arrived in Palestine, one of the major Jewish firms immediately contacted him and warned that it was impossible to trade with the Arabs, as they were all

thieves. Dnipro, of course, replied that his first visit would be to the Arabs.

In Moscow, we usually received dozens of commercial offers from the Middle East. Those that were obtained from Palestine were always put aside to be read last but as the least reliable. They had the least important proposals. Copies of these letters were usually sent simultaneously to Stalin and Molotov. Many correspondents advised not to make deals with competitors, as they are dishonest.

However, people who have tried to trade have a deplorable experience. For example, the Yugoslavs advised us to be careful about trade with Palestine. A Palestinian firm ordered cement in Yugoslavia, and when the cargo arrived by sea, they refused to accept it, as during that time the firm had received a better offer from someone else.

However, trade relations are not my area. As for cultural ties, write us a letter with specific proposals on the areas you have outlined to me, and we will discuss them again. I am ready to start our cooperation in the field of culture with an exhibition of Russian sculpture, if you do not organize it on a commercial basis. Of course, it would be good if such an exhibition was organized by a mixed Arab-Jewish organization. In general, I think it would be desirable to create a new group of real friends of Soviet Russia from young and energetic people instead of The V League, and we could provide real help to such a group. And as you know, we have enough opportunities to help if we want to.

My impression of the conversation is the following. We were made to understand that:

1) In today's crisis, the world is divided into two camps, and each state and people must give a clear answer, with whom they are;

2) Peace is on the eve of major events, and negotiations on culture and trade are not relevant to establishing normal relations;

3) There are forces among the Zionists who understand the situation and go much further in their proposals.

Eisenstadt

**LETTER FROM E. SASSON, HEAD OF THE
ARAB SECTION OF THE POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE, TO E. EPSTEIN, A
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON.
Jerusalem, June 28, 1946**

Dear Elahou!

In today's letter, I would like to try to explain to you Russia's attitude towards the problem of Palestine and to the problems of the Arab East, as I see it as a result of reading the press and as a result of personal conversations.

Although Russia's attitude towards the Palestinian issue is still not clear enough, it gradually seems that the Soviets tend to attach international significance to the problem no less than other Middle Eastern issues where. there are differences between Russia and England (problems of Libya, Italy, Greece, Turkey, etc.). Councils cannot accept the fact that the UK is trying to solve the problems of the region on its own, based solely on its own interests, without connecting Russia at least to the extent that it connects the United States. The Irritation of the Russians on this issue was particularly evident at the time of the announcement of the abolition of the mandate for

Trans-Jordan, the proclamation of its independent state and the signing of a military treaty between Transjordan and England, allowing the latter to keep military units on trans-Jordanian territory and its borders in any number. This agreement makes Transjordan into an English military base that controls the entire Arab region and can, under certain circumstances, serve as a springboard for The UK to reach Russia's borders. But without the ability to prevent the conclusion of this treaty, Russia is now trying to derail it by indirect interference in the solution of the Palestinian problem. The Russians believe that if the problem remains in limbo and the Arab-Jewish conflict continues to escalate, and the British will find themselves in a situation where they cannot meet either Jewish or Arab demands, in the end, the problem will, of course, be brought before some international forum with Russia. Then the Russians will have official authority to intervene in the Palestinian problem, and through this - and other problems of the Arab East. Hence the negative position of the Russians towards the Anglo-American commission to study the situation in Palestine. Hence their instructions to all their agents - communes and flocks, all diplomatic representatives and all the Communist Parties in the Arab world, to put pressure on Arab politicians, demanding to bring the Palestinian and all other regional problems to the consideration of the Security Council or the UN General Assembly.

What are the conclusions from this assessment? First of all, it should be noted that this corresponds to the foreign policy line of the USSR: not to allow Great Britain to be the only Western power defining the situation in the Middle East. Secondly, encourage any resistance to the British political line in the Middle East, including the Jewish and Arab resistance to this line in Palestine, the actions of Kurds, Shiites in Iraq,

the Waffles or the government in Egypt, extremist or moderate forces in Lebanon and Syria. From the Soviet point of view, any means going in this direction are good, even if at times it seems that they contradict each other and only confuse public opinion. It is on these grounds that the Russians are so closely monitoring the development of Anglo-Egyptian relations, and the Soviet press is closely monitoring any anti-British speeches, actions or demonstrations, whether behind them, Wafd, Misr al-Fatat or Muslim Brotherhood or the Egyptian authorities and other moderate organizations. For example, the trial of the murderers of Amin Osman Pasha in Egypt was widely covered in the Soviet press, with an emphasis on the anti-British aspect, on the desire to get the British out of the Nile Valley.

At the same time, the Soviets resort to the exact opposite political trick: they hush up any statements of radical Arab leaders in favour of seeking help from the USSR. Nor do they encourage those Arabs who demand the sending of Arab delegations to Russia. The reason is simple: first, they do not want to define their place in the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine (neither on the side of the Jews nor on the side of the Arabs); they do not want to be defined in the Arab-Kurdish conflict in Iraq (again on either side). Secondly, they want to be an influential factor in the Arab East, to interfere in the problems of the region and to participate in the definition of solutions without paying anyone for it. They want to interfere in Eastern affairs legally, through international organizations, and not through Arab or other forces in the region. They believe that the British's peace policy is not successful. This rate forces England to pay nine per cent to get ten. For example, in order to maintain control over communications in India, over its share of Middle Eastern oil, over military bases in the region, the

British are now forced to pay a high price to the Arabs: the withdrawal of troops from Syria and Lebanon, the withdrawal from Egypt, then the granting of independence to Transjordan, the change in the terms of the treaty with Iraq, the conflict with the Jewish people, the admission of Americans to the economy of the Arab countries, the conflict with France and, above all, the creation of the Arab League. Russia is not ready to pay such a price, it only wants to take, not give. Russia seeks to direct the development of events in such a way that no one else can influence it.

This is how I see the situation from here, and it seems to me that this picture is very close to the truth. If so, we should not be afraid of bringing the Palestinian issue to the Security Council or to the UN General Assembly. Not only should we not fear that the Russians will take a hostile position, but on the contrary, there are serious reasons to believe that the position of the USSR will be friendly. Not because they sympathize with us or hate the Arabs, but because of the need to settle political scores with the British. If anyone loses, it will be, first of all, Arabs and Great Britain. The first will be forced to come to terms with Soviet control over their actions, the second - with Soviet participation in all Eastern affairs. And both control and participation will be perfectly legal. Soviet control will be able to undermine all the political and social structures of the Arab world, and Soviet participation in the affairs of the region - further limit the development of self-government in the Arab East. It is possible that what happened in Iran will happen throughout the region, and as a result there will again be many small Arab and non-Arab States that will undermine the very foundations of the Arab League and exclude the establishment of any new Arab union.

Yours sincerely

E. Sasson

**LETTER FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR
TO POLAND, V.S. LEBEDEV TO THE FIRST
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR
A.Y.VYSHINSKY July 12, 1946**

Secretly

In May this year, a group of leaders of Jewish democratic parties arrived in Poland from Palestine to familiarize themselves with the situation of Jews in Europe, to organize assistance for them and to resettle some Jews in Palestine.

The delegation was led by members of the Central Committee of the Palestinian League of Friendship with the USSR Elevit, M. Erem (left Poalei Tsion)⁵² and

Barzilai (the workers' party Ha-shomer ha-tsair), who through Berman and other democratic figures of Poland strenuously sought to visit me. On my behalf, these people were accepted by Councillor Yakovlev.

In the conversation it turned out that the Palestinian delegation came to Poland with the hope to use the stay here, through the Soviet embassy to arrange a trip to the USSR in order to inform the Soviet leaders about the situation in Palestine and to get the support of the Soviet government in the organization of independent life and statehood of the Jewish population in Palestine.

Delegates presented to Yakovlev their views on the problems of Palestine. Their views are outlined in special notes, which they passed to Yakovlev. I'm forwarding these notes.

From the conversation Yakovlev found that both a group of representatives of the leftist Poalei Tsion (Levite, Erem) and Ha-shomer ha-tsair (Barzilai) are fighting to preserve the remnants of the Jewish population in Europe and send Jews to Palestine. The difference in views between the leftist Poalay tsion and Ha-shomer ha-tsair on the state structure of Palestine is that the Group of Poalei Tsion stands on the point of view of the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine, while Ha-Shomer ha-tsair, considering that half of the population of Palestine are Arabs, is fighting for the creation of a federal Arab-Jewish state in Palestine.

Delegates of both directions are parties, standing on the basis of strong friendship with the USSR. Levite and Barzilai told Yakovlev that they were extremely concerned about England's desire to turn Palestine into an armed base of English imperialism on the

Middle East and the involvement of the ruling elite of Arab countries in their adventurous policy.

Yakovlev to the request of delegates to visit the Soviet Union was restrained and offered to issue relevant applications for visas (Barzilai filed such an application before the conversation with Yakovlev and was denied entry from the Ussr Foreign Ministry).

At present, Levite, who leaves the impression of the most solid person of the entire delegation, has left for Paris, and Erem and Barzilai are still in Poland. Levit and Erem gave their desire to visit the USSR to Adviser Yakovlev only verbally.

Soviet Ambassador to Poland V. Lebedev

**LETTER FROM THE SOVIET ENVOY IN
LEBANON D.S. MALT TO THE HEAD OF THE
MIDDLE EAST DIVISION OF THE USSR
FOREIGN MINISTRY I.V.SAMILOVSKY
August 13, 1946**

Secretly

In doing so, I send you some material from the local press on the Palestinian issue, in particular

statements on the Plan of the Federal System of Palestine proposed by the British Government.

It is clear from the attached materials that on July 10 this year the English newspaper "The Times" reported that there was an opinion in Anglo-American circles on the need for the partition of Palestine. Twenty days later, on 31 July, Deputy British Prime Minister Herbert Morrison presented in the House of Commons an English plan to divide Palestine into four zones: the Arab, Jewish, the "holy places" and the Negev desert.

In this regard, the most important and important point to be paid attention to is the allocation to the independent zone of the desert area of southern Palestine Negev, which, according to the English plan, is transferred to the full administration of the British administration, since neither the local administration nor the "government" nor the "parliament" in the area can be formed, as is planned in other areas, because there is no population in the Negev area.

According to many data, the British single out the Negev area in an independent zone for the following two reasons:

1. Forming a Palestinian federal "state", the British will have to cover it with a fig leaf of "guardianship" or "independence", which under some conditions may make it difficult for them to stay in Palestine, and this in turn cannot but hinder the communication of British troops in Transjordan with the ports of the eastern mediterranean coast. Although no one is still saying what exactly the territory is meant by the Negev area and which cities or settlements of southern Palestine will join it, but by all indications it is safe to say that the British will choose the port of Gaza as the center of the Negev district.

In short, the British allocation of the Negev area into an independent zone is primarily due to military-

strategic considerations for the creation of a common military foothold of Transjordan with southern Palestine in case, for some reason, the British have to withdraw their troops from the Arab and Jewish parts of Palestine.

To this it should be added that the creation of such a military-strategic foothold in the Negev area of Egypt is completely separated by the British military belt from Syria, Lebanon and northern Palestine.

2. In addition to the military-strategic goals pursued by the British in the Negev area, they still want to deceive the Americans.

In my letter for No. 05/C of 3 January this year, I have already noted that the Clash of Anglo-American Contradictions is noticeable in the Palestinian question. That the Americans are looking for a solution to the Palestinian question that would allow them to bring the Arabian oil pipeline to the east coast of the Mediterranean Sea outside territories under English influence or outside English possessions. On the eastern coast of the Mediterranean, one of the most suitable ports for Americans is the Palestinian port of Gaza, of course, if it had moved to the Jewish zone, or the Jewish province, as it is called in the English plan for the partition of Palestine.

But, singling out the area of the Negev under English rule, the British quite openly prepared these unspoken, but clearly expressed American intentions and thus, in fact, deprived the Americans of the main element that could justify their consent to the partition of Palestine.

In connection with this trick of the British, as you would expect, the U.S. President Truman refused to approve the English plan for the partition of Palestine, which, in turn, greatly upset the British plans in general.

It seems to me that it was the Negev district that was the main reason for Truman's rejection of the English plan, which can be confirmed at least by the fact that in principle the Americans do not reject the idea of partition of Palestine, but reject only the English plan.

For example, today in local newspapers there were reports that the Americans are proposing their plan for the partition of Palestine, not in four parts, as suggested by the British, but only for two. It seemed to be a three-part question, since there was no reason for the Americans to object to the allocation of "holy sites" to a separate area, i.e. the cities of Jerusalem and Bethlehem.

Here's what the newspapers report about the American plan:

The New York Times reports on four points of the plan developed by American experts for the partition of Palestine:

1. The division of Palestine into two zones, Arab and Jewish, would be much wider than the British plan, 4,900 sq km instead of 2,900.

2. Broad autonomy for Jews in their zone and restriction of the power of the British High Commissioner.

3. Jews themselves determine the upper limit of immigration.

4. The United States stands ready to finance operations within the agreed deadline."

Thus, by this plan for the partition of Palestine, the Americans openly demonstrate the fact that there are Anglo-American contradictions in the Palestinian question, and it is the contradictions related to the desire of both sides to gain a foothold in the southern Palestinian Mediterranean coast. True, it is not yet possible to believe that these contradictions can lead

to aggravation of Anglo-American relations, but it is already a clear, so to speak, living spring swallow.

Other comments included a statement by former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in the House of Commons that if the Arabs resisted British intentions on the Palestinian issue, it should be stated that British troops would remain in Egypt. Of course, there is no reason to believe that British troops will indeed leave Egypt if the Arabs accept The British activities on Palestine, yet Churchill's political blackmail facilitates the local English henchmen colluding with the British, as it more clearly justifies their actions, exposing them as accepted in case of hopelessness.

Another critical aspect of the Palestinian question is the response of the head of the Arab Bureau, Ahmed al-Shukeiri, to a question about the attitude of Arabs towards Russian interference in Palestinian affairs. "I personally believe," Shukeiri said, "that Russia has every reason to intervene. It is this state that has been freed in the happiest way from racial and religious differences."

This statement provoked a lightning-painful response from London, where the first duty noted that Shukeiri's statement was his personal opinion and did not reflect the views of the Arab Bureau. At the same time, the most effective means were put into action, i.e. the communist parties of Palestine and Lebanon were immediately attached to it, as the accusation of involvement in the Communist Party here has now become unsafe.

In total, the emergence of such an unceremonious and brazen English plan for the partition of Palestine and the open takeover of its southern part by the surrender to the British, which was accepted by the heads of the Arab States at the meeting in Inshas on 28-29 May, and Arab politicians at an extraordinary

session of the Arab League Council in Bluedan on 8-12 June this year.

It is still difficult to say how the Palestinian question will end, as the final word for the exit from the current arab situation belongs to the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Arab Arab League countries, which opened yesterday in Alexandria. However, based on all the materials put together, there is every reason to assume that the current Arab leaders will yield again, because, first, among them there is no one who dares to raise his voice against the British, which would cause the need to rely on the broad Arab masses, and secondly, they are all afraid of the broad movements of the masses, which are overwhelmingly opposed to the British and by joining the movement, current political "actors" of Arab countries may overwhelm.

Appendix: by text, on 40 sheets.

Envoy

Malt

On the document of the litter: "Tov. Malarov. Malt materials should be attached to the certificate of Palestine. Maybe make a smaller reference, only the proposals of the commission of experts. Yiborin 29/8/46."

**NOTE OF DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF THE
SOVIET COUNCIL OF MINISTERS FOR
REPATRIATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL
GOLUBEV TO THE HEAD OF THE THIRD
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR
FOREIGN MINISTRY A.A.SMIRNOV
September 4, 1946**

Secretly

1. I inform you that, according to Colonel Starov, the repatriation representative in Austria, the transit of Jews bound for Palestine has begun from Poland through Czechoslovakia and the Soviet zone of Austria. A total of 200,000 Jews are expected to go to Palestine.

To our request, Colonel Konev, a representative for repatriation in Poland, said:

A number of sources confirm the figure of 150-180 thousand Jews who pass not only through Czechoslovak territory, but also the ports of Poland.

The transports are reportedly being sent to the United American zone of occupation in Munich, where a prefabricated post is allegedly set up to send them to Palestine. Transports from Poland are sent indefinitely through Graz, Czechoslovakia.

The main contingent of the Jews sent consists of members of the parties of the Zionists, Ha-shomer ha-tsair and other small parties.

Warsaw has a central Jewish committee, which houses a representative of the American government, and there are Jewish committees in the provinces and towns that provide free travel and food to Jews traveling to Palestine.

Between 15 and 25.07.46, the British intervened to send Jews, resulting in the return of several steamships to the ports of departure.

2. In August, up to 800 Jewish people gathered near the Brook camp in Austria because of "alleged harassment by Poles".

The above Jews appeal to our officers working on the repatriation of Soviet citizens with questions and requests to return to the Soviet Union, explaining their request that some of them were handed over to Poland in 1940 under an agreement of the governments in exchange.⁵⁷

As this issue is not within the purview of our office, I ask you to let you know which organization is dealing with this issue and what to respond to our representatives' requests from the applicants.

Deputy Commissioner of the Council of Ministers of the Union of the USSR for repatriation of lieutenant-general

Golubev

**NOTE OF DEPUTY HEAD OF THE MIDDLE
EAST DIVISION OF THE USSR FOREIGN
MINISTRY M.A.MAKSIMOV TO DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR
V.G.DEKANOZOV September 6, 1946**

Secretly

The report and proposals of the Anglo-American Commission, which studied the Palestinian question, published on 30 April 1946, caused such strong objections from the Arab countries that the Governments of England and the United States did not dare to implement the commission's recommendations.

A so-called commission of experts has been set up by the Governments of the United States and England to prepare a new solution to the Palestinian issue. On 27 July this year, the Commission submitted proposals to both Governments that were clearly contrary to the report of the previous Anglo-American commission.

The Commission of Experts recommended the United States and England:

1. Divide Palestine into four areas, of which one area should become Jewish, one is Arab and two areas should be directly managed by England.

2. To market these areas to one Palestinian state, which should be led by a "central" government under the leadership of the British High Commissioner.

3. To put Britain in control of the defence and foreign policy of all Palestine, the police, communications, transport, the ports of Haifa and Jaffa.

4. The Councils of Ministers of the "autonomous" Arab and Jewish regions should be appointed by the British High Commissioner.

Subject to the adoption of such a plan for the Palestinian system, the experts recommended the immediate admission of 100 Jewish immigrants to Palestine.

The new plan for the resolution of the Palestinian problem fully enshrines Palestine behind England, replacing the mandate form with a special federal arrangement of the country, in which, along with Arabs and Jews, England becomes a permanent member of the federation.

The British Government accepted the experts' proposals as a basis for resolving the Palestinian issue, but the United States has not yet expressed its views on the experts' proposals, although the American press indicated that the British proposed partition of Palestine cemented Britain's position in Palestine and provided less benefits to the United States.

The proposal of the commission of experts was opposed by the public of Arab countries. The Supreme Arab Committee in Palestine stated on 31 July that the Arabs would not accept the partition of Palestine because it meant the loss of Palestine to the Arabs.

On 6 August, the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency opposed the partition of Palestine, since such a partition did not give independence to Palestinian Jews, and the proposed plan for self-rule by the autonomous regions was illusory. However, the Zionists do not strongly oppose the experts' proposals, as, excluding the immediate transformation of Palestine into a Jewish state, the experts' proposals still increase the influx of Jewish immigrants to Palestine.

In order to exclude the United States, which is now the country that is now deciding the fate of Palestine, the Egyptian Government on 20 June this year invited The United States to begin direct negotiations with Syria, Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Yemen on a Palestinian agreement designed to "end the current situation and create a new regime based on the conditions and objectives expressed by the United Nations". The Government of Iraq has made a similar proposal to England.

The British Government accepted the proposals and invited representatives of Arab countries to discuss the Palestinian issue at a conference in London on 9 September this year.

The adoption at the conference of the proposed plan for the partition of Palestine, or the British collusion with the Arabs and Jews on a different basis close to the plan for the partition of Palestine, would mean that All Palestine would be further enshrined indefinitely for Britain.

It is necessary to respond to the plans for the dismemberment of Palestine before the conference in London is completed. As a result, it seems appropriate to speak again in our press (1-2 articles) to explain the nature of the British plan for the partition of Palestine.

The following basic provisions should be taken into account when asking the question in the press:

1. The military regime established by the British forces in Palestine and the presence of British troops in Palestine increase the security threat in the Middle East; the withdrawal of British troops from Palestine is necessary.

2. Attempts to achieve a fundamental solution to the Palestinian question on the basis of the existing mandate are doomed to failure because of the depravity of the very foundation. The mandate must be abolished.

3. A fundamental solution to the Palestinian question and the establishment of an independent Palestine on a democratic basis must be achieved through the custody of Palestine established by the United Nations.

I ask for your instructions.

M.Maximov

**NOTE OF THE THIRD EUROPEAN AND
MIDDLE EASTERN DEPARTMENTS OF THE
USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY TO DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR V.
KUYNANOZOV September 17, 1946**

Secretly

Lieutenant-General Golubev, Deputy Commissioner of the Council of Ministers of the Union of the USSR for Repatriation, reported that there was a mass exodus of Jews from Poland through Czechoslovakia, the Soviet zone of Austria and through Polish ports. The number

of Jews seeking to leave reaches 150-180 thousand people. Transport with Jews is sent to the American zone of occupation, to Munich, where a prefabricated station is supposedly organized to send them to Palestine. That. Osokin, referring to his conversation with the head of the Zionist organization in Hungary, on September 10, this year informed from Budapest about the intention of the Jews-Zionists of Hungary also to go to Palestine. Sending Jews from these countries to Palestine is organized by Zionist organizations. For this purpose, a central Jewish committee has been set up in Warsaw, where a representative of the U.S. government is based.

We consider it appropriate to request from our ambassadors in Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and envoys in Bulgaria and Hungary more information about the activities of Zionist organizations in these countries in connection with the ongoing activities to organize the mass departure of Jews to Palestine.

When attaching a draft message to our offices in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, we ask for your instructions.

A.Smirnov M.Maximov

**NOTE FROM L. GEPBER, A POLITICAL
ADVISER TO THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR
PALESTINE IN NEW YORK. November 15,
1946**

Repeated comments on the Palestinian issue and the United Nations

The comments of Mr. N.V. Novikov⁵⁹, the representative of the USSR in the Fourth Committee of

the UN General Assembly, at the committee meeting on November 11 are a general statement and do not oblige anyone to take concrete steps. After reviewing his comments, as well as the comments made by the Ukrainian and Belarusian delegates at the end of the week, it is clear that their premise is that mandate-holders have a duty to report what they are going to do under their mandates; with regard to Palestine, he believed that it was necessary to know at least some of the British intentions. Of course, based on the UN Charter and the Assembly resolution of 9 February 1946, it seems difficult to count, from a legal point of view, on their commitment to truly turn the mandate into guardianship. The moral side of the issue seems clear. It may be added that Mr. Bevin did not commit his Majesty's Government to ever define the provision of the Palestinian mandate, although he proposed a guardianship agreement for other territories, such as Cameroon, Togo and Tanganyika.

In view of the ambiguity of the Charter and the non-binding nature of the Assembly resolution of 9 February 1946, it can be assumed that in London and Washington, Mr. Novikov's assertion that "the British Government's attempts to resolve the question of Palestine through negotiations with the United States Government and representatives of Arabs and Jews other than the United Nations are not in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which establishes a system of custody of the non-self-administered including the former mandated territories."

However, another excerpt from his speech on the Palestinian issue may make a deeper impression: "The fate of this, as well as other former mandated territories, after the liquidation of the League of Nations cannot remain in the air. There are only two possible legitimate ways of determining their fate:

either by granting independence to a given territory or by establishing custody. There is no third way, in terms of the principles of the Charter.”

If We consider Mr. Novikov’s statement to be a protest against the senseless postponement, it is in line with the Assembly resolution of 9 February 1946, and in this context it may work for the Zionists. However, perhaps Mr. Novikov sought to point out that the USSR would pretend to be agreed not only with proposals for possible custody of Palestine, but also to consult in determining the “real independence” that would satisfy his government.

The expression “real independence” with the word “real” should be considered in the context of the application of Jewish Palestine for admission to the UN. It contains a strategic aspect of the problem. On 14 November, Egyptian Prime Minister Sidki Pasha, shortly after the Anglo-Egyptian talks, stated that, while the focus of British interests in the Middle East was shifting from the Mediterranean to East Africa, the construction of new barracks on the border with Egypt showed that Britain still intended to view Palestine as part of its global strategic system. As this will be linked to the UN, the new Jewish Palestine may still be in the “same boat” with Transjordan. Had Transjordan not been in military dependence on Britain, Russia’s inviolable tone towards it, echoed in Mr. Novikov’s speech, might not have arisen. Therefore, in the case of the partition of Palestine, Moscow would show little enthusiasm if the dominant British influence continued where, under other circumstances, an international Jerusalem zone could be established. Moreover, they will be even less pleased with the Anglo-Jewish agreement on British naval bases, airfields and military cooperation on land: it is assumed that the era of secret treaties has passed. However, understanding the future possibilities, more than the harsh and harsh

conditions signed, sealed and published, may therefore be necessary at the initial stage of the existence of an independent Jewish state, if the Russian "stumbling block" is to be removed.

It should be remembered, however, that Transjordan, while remaining part of the mandated territory, has achieved what at least looks outwardly like sovereignty and no international obstacles stand in its way. But the refusal to accept it to the UN or the fact that it is not recognized by a power like Russia puts Transjordan in an unprecedented position. Other states were withdrawn from the League of Nations, as well as from the United Nations, or remained unrecognized for a long time by major powers. Therefore, the example of Transjordan provides a good opportunity to get a practical answer to the question of the political independence of Jews, even taking into account that this issue is rather outside the competence of the UN. In any case, active disapproval on the part of Russia and even direct intervention of the Arab bloc in the voting procedure can be circumvented in this way. It is also true that it will be very difficult to achieve the reception of the future Jewish state at the UN. If the Russians remain adamant, this could be postponed indefinitely. Although it will be very unfortunate, but not fatal. The primary should be the first.

Lionel Gelber

FROM A TRANSCRIPT OF A SPEECH BY J. ROBINSON, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF JEWISH STUDIES AT THE WORLD AND AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESSES, AT A MEETING OF THE AMERICAN EMERGENCY ZIONIST COUNCIL November 19, 1946

Dr. Robinson: In the last few weeks, there have been three important circumstances that are re-illuminating the Soviet

Position. First of all, it is a well-known political statement of the Communist Party of the United States about the work of the party among the Jewish masses. The 10-15 thousand-word statement defines the Communist Party's new political line on the Jewish issue, and in particular the Palestinian problem. The statement openly acknowledges that, from now on, the policy should be focused, first, on establishing mutual understanding between Jews and Arabs, and then, if they reach an agreement on immigration, immigration can be initiated. There is certainly inconsistency in the presentation of the problem: on the one hand, it is an independent Palestine and, on the other hand, the guardianship of the troika over Palestine, and it is very difficult to understand what the final conclusion is, since both statements can be found in the same paragraph. The so-called slogan of the Jewish national hearth is harshly criticized. The idea of a "world Jewish nation" is ridiculed. "Jews in Palestine have no cultural interests in the future." The statement can be found to include references to the so-called Zionist democrats, probably implied by the Communists. The leadership of the American Zionist organization is under harsh attack.

Also a very important new development is the attitude of Jewish writers and artists in the USSR to Jewish problems. It is well known that in early September a large-scale campaign against Jewish literature and theatre began. It is rather curious that the well-known report on bias among Soviet writers does not mention Jewish writers. Only the representatives of this current are mentioned among the representatives of this current. This is despite the fact that the next day in Moscow Jewish writers held a meeting in support. There were a number of speeches. One of the writers said: "... too much attention is paid to the Jewish tragedy and there is not enough space placed on the heroism of the Jews and, most importantly, international, reactionary Jewry is not exposed, the author neglects the problems of the new Soviet five-year plan." Under the same pretexts, a campaign against all Jewish theatres that now exist in Russia is organized. "They idealize the past, they become centres of obscurantism, in the future Jewish theatre should fit seamlessly into the atmosphere of a five-year plan." One of the most offensive traits is the unexpected love of Ukrainians and Belarusians for the Jewish people during the Nazi occupation, meanwhile their moods over the past four years have been portrayed by the Soviet press as anti-Jewish. Ukrainians were actual allies of the Germans in the fight against the Jews. This was regarded as a counter-revolution, but the author of the article David Bergelson unexpectedly stated that he was unfair to the Ukrainians, and, of course, in the next issue (-) there was a short note about the virtues of the Ukrainian people. The division of Soviet Jews and Jews around the world was finally fixed. Jews living outside the USSR were finally identified as reactionaries.

And the last important factor is the USSR's position in the UN, especially now, after the statement made

last week by Novikov, which leaves no doubt about what policy the USSR will follow at the UN. I am sorry that Jewish journalists are not sufficiently informed that he is legally right, since under the Charter the legal approach gives only two decisions on the mandate: either guardianship or real independence - it means not fictitious independence, as the independence of Transjordan. The UN Charter does not establish a common continuity from the League of Nations to the UN, nor does it enshrine these two decisions, giving the mandate-state the greatest power, as it may not agree to the establishment of guardianship, but certainly recognizes the enormous role and authority of the mandate-holder state in deciding on the future of the mandated territory. Yiddish newspapers wrote in this regard: "This is true, but Palestine must become, so to speak, a democratic Jewish state."

In any case, here we go back to our old problems when we see that all three elements are intertwined. On the one hand, Russia, on the other hand - the remnants of Judaism and the USSR and communist parties all over the world. Of course, there are slight deviations, mainly due to the ignorance of this article in "Politician Scam." It's not worth highlighting all the mistakes, but I'd like to say something about it.

Mr. Lurie: Do you think these are unintentional errors or intentional?

Dr. Robinson: No, they are admitted by sheer ignorance. If we now return to our core problem, the problem of what needs to happen, I certainly am not going to pretend to know how to fight the Councils to defeat them. Neither Byrnes nor Bevin have such installations. No one has such installations, because it is very difficult. However, I believe that if the Jews still have some political flair, then one should ask themselves a question. Since 1941, if not earlier, a

new period has begun in our relations with the USSR. We began to appease them occasionally, to praise them, despite what we knew well; silently passing by the most terrible things that happened even during the war, and, if I can say so, there were grounds for that while the war continued. The victory over Nazi Germany was more important than any circumstances, and I believe that Jews acted wisely when they refrained from making statements or from any truthful information about what was happening in the USSR to both Soviet Jews and, in particular, the so-called "refugees". But now it's been 18 months. Therefore, there was a question that became the most important, and this is the change. Now we are beginning to discuss changes in our policy. I believe that this should become obvious to ourselves, the reason for this will be three prerequisites. The first premise is that Jews are still a political force in the world, especially in the United States. We have made Lord Inverchepel's life here very difficult, and he understands that if the Jews were sympathetic to England, it would be a great success for him. So, first, we must understand that we are a force, whatever it may be. We must understand that America now has enormous power. It is a democratic country where international policy is carried out through democratic institutions, so it should be interested in 5 million 200,000 Jews. Now, if we agree with this, the next step will be a real understanding of the USSR that the Jews are not in their pockets. They think that's the case, but I don't really understand how attentive people in this country read newspapers. An article about Churchill pickets could be read in the Herald Tribune on March 23, 1946. Not a single non-Jewish name among all these boys and girls. The second example is from a well-known report of the royal commission, where the commission considers it necessary to discuss why

there is such a disproportionate number of Jews among these people. They argue that one of the factors that played a major role in attracting one Canadian is that he could struggle with social issues, and then he cites Gerson's questions and answers. I've made calculations of the ratio of the number of Jews to non-Jews, and the conclusion is terrible. To begin with, he was the organizer of the Communist Party. He disappeared, then there was Fred Rose, or Rosenberg, the son of a Polish Jew, himself an immigrant, he was an organizer of the Communist Party and, worst of all, being elected by Jewish voters, now in prison. Now the facilitator (-) of the organization that led the spy network, unfortunately, is an old friend of mine, from one of the best Jewish families. Having such documents in his hands, I believe that Mr. N will be satisfied. He knows that Jews help him both in Canada and here.

Now I turn to the third premise. If we still represent force, if we need to fight someone, what are the methods? It seems to me that the first method, designed for the long term, is to destroy the confidence of the local Soviet embassy and the centre as a whole in the devotion of Jews to the Soviet Union. I believe that this document will be reacted to. I believe that the American Jewish Congress is in such a state that they will also make a statement next Friday, and I believe that this will be followed by a very friendly reaction from Jewish organizations. Churchill's expression "Iron Curtain" takes on a literal meaning. The most educated Jews in the United States have no idea what is going on in the USSR. Everyone prefers to forget about the existence of the problem. I believe that one of the tasks of each Jewish publication is to give information in each issue about what is happening in the USSR: we must start the process of consistently informing people. It is necessary to talk about what is

happening in an impartial, distancing manner, and I hope that in six months after weekly, two weeks or monthly messages American Jews will start to think differently about the USSR. However, information alone is not enough. I believe it's time to start destroying legends. Why did American Jews turn their heads so well? Why do most Jews think that the Soviet Union has solved the Jewish question? Because they believe five legends. Legend number one is that anti-Semitism is outlawed in the USSR. It's a lie. Anti-Semitism has never been banned by law in the USSR. In the USSR, there is a general provision on incitement, in fact in the form in which Lech-*Man* formulated it in 1920, I believe that it should be (-) coercion and conviction. Indeed, in 1928 there was a broad campaign against anti-Semitism in the literature, but none of the American Jews wants to know that since 1928 not a single pamphlet has been printed, and at the beginning of the five-year period there was a widespread surge of anti-Semitism. At the moment, the majority of Russians have been living under the Nazi regime for many years, completely poisoned by it. Now the situation is such that there is no article against anti-Semitism. Is anything being done? No problem. There are no courts. In 1928 it was possible to read about the courts. However, since 1928, no court has been held, even now, after the war; it should become known. We cannot continue to say everywhere that anti-Semitism is outlawed in the USSR. In fact, anti-Semitism today is in great fashion. Since 1926.

Moscow carried out such purges of Jews, which never existed in American history. But, of course, no one knows about it. No one wants to know. This is the first myth.

The second myth is that culture flourishes in the USSR. After 29 years, there is probably not a single

Jewish, Jews do not want to have a school where Yiddish is taught. Conscious Jews avoid such schools. They prefer Russian and Ukrainian schools. After 29 years of prosperity culture, all you have today is this newspaper. The Jewish population of 2 million people does not have a daily newspaper. The output of books related to Jewish problems hardly exceeds 20 titles, while the rest is related to translations of Communist Party materials that have nothing to do with Jews and Judaism.

There is a third myth, the myth of Birobidzhan, which is nothing more than an outpost of strategic importance in the struggle for the Far East. In fact, this drastically reduces the number of The Jewish population. They're looking for people, they're offering to come, and people don't want to go. This is again inflating the problem among the anti-Zionist population.

Another myth is that the USSR saved 5 million Jews. In fact, none. The truth is that of the 2 million Jews who lived in Ukraine and Belarus, only 200-300,000 people were rescued and the rest were exterminated by the Nazis. Only 400,000 people were evacuated, and 1 million 600,000 people remained and were destroyed. Now we are told: they saved a lot of Jews, evacuees: tearing them from Poland. That's only partly true. This is probably the only case in the recent history of Jews when a country that seeks to appear so friendly to Jews is the most dangerous. If, as we are told, is a paradise for Jews, then why are they leaving?

There is also a fourth myth that they have done something for world Jewry. In fact, when the refugee problem arose, we went on a special mission to try to get help from them. The only country that refused to accept refugees after 1923 was the Soviet Union. They took in several communists. I am not going to go on,

but I want to say that we believe in the USSR here under the influence of several myths and no one has dared to reveal the truth and say that all this is a lie. I believe that we should launch a broad campaign to highlight the truth. We need to know what's going on in the USSR. The man quite competent in this matter Will Grant, he asked me what I think about this. I told him he was a great humanist. In one generation, you lose 3 million people from Jewry. This policy aims to separate Jews from the people of the rest of the world, to create a new Jewish nation that began in 1917.

Ms. Poole: Do you consider this category the activities of the Jewish Council to assist Russia in the war.

Dr. Robinson: Of course I do. This is completely unjustified. In times of war, it's beautiful. We had a common enemy. The pervasive penetration of the communists is something else. We cannot continue to do so. Soon the world will realize that we know what is happening, that even Jewish public opinion does not support this activity, will come to the conclusion that American Jews should be brought to their side, and will think differently than today. In this regard, I would like to put forward an idea. In a year's time we will be celebrating the 30th anniversary, it is a good opportunity to determine what we need to do, what we want and what we have lost in these 30 years - not only in the USSR, but all over the world. As for me, I am satisfied with the results. However, it is important that over time every intelligent and educated Jew has on his desk books about what happened during these 30 years.

Now I turn to a few specific questions. Who should do this work? I don't think it would be wise to entrust this only to Zionist groups. It affects all American Jews, there will be a real split of opinions and preferences. We will see who is more loyal to Moscow and who is

more loyal to New York and Jerusalem. We need to focus on all Jewish organizations to start working on this project, and I think that's important. You cannot fail to be surprised by the complete lack of political literacy when you are holding a Jewish newspaper. Poland, where about 800,000 Jews remain, is treated with great attention, and the USSR, where 2 million Jews live, is ignored. Poland, which plays no role in the Palestinian issue, and the USSR, which is taboo, has not a word about it. Of course, all Jewish organizations and, of course, all Jewish communities in America should start doing something about it. I think we should start with a few research projects. It's easy for me to talk about them in general terms. Indeed, this may be the greatest moment in Jewish history. It cannot be compared with the Alexandrian period and even with the period of liberation in Western Europe. If we compare with these two examples of the realization of the Jewish nation, this stage stands out by the number of people involved. Those who believe that Judaism must survive must decide what we should do about such an experiment, whether to repeat it. This will continue to be done in Yugoslavia. 400,000 Jews live in Romania, 650,000 behind the Iron Curtain. Today, when we are so poor, active Judaists 9 million people. Now I can assume that some people will object to us that we cannot declare war on the USSR, we cannot create a new enemy. We don't create it, it already exists, we just have to understand it. We are not going to declare war, we are not going to use any sensational methods either. Our main task is to disseminate the information known to us by methods of gradual, systematic, impartial, calm and truthful information of the population. And of course, I can't believe that the USSR will remain indifferent to public opinion. Of course, we cannot declare war on them, as we did with England. In England, you can always find

Crosman, who will speak in Parliament and say a few words in your defence. In the USSR you will not see anything like this, just behind the scenes. If people have nothing to do with Jews, they will do nothing for them.

I strongly doubt that neutrality is possible in the circumstances of what they are today. We tried to do it in practice and failed. In fact, we went to Paris to take a neutral position.⁶⁰ It didn't help. There were representatives of all countries, and everyone tried to get something. One of our principles was neutrality and the non-acceptance of a draw between East and West, but on all the proposals made on the Jewish issue by England and America, sixteen against six voted.

The Soviet bloc voted against everything that had to do with the Jewish problem. We tried to be neutral here at the UN. It didn't help us. We can't be neutral. The world is divided. Excluding Yugoslavia, which introduced a specific resolution, and the Poles who made reservations, the USSR and all of them are definitely in the same camp with all Arab states. They do not realize that they are fighting not only against their enemies, but also against any possibility of solving the Jewish problem.

Knowing this, they are not stupid enough not to realize that all these circumstances are not in favour of the Jews, but they believe that the Jews are their friends. In fact, that's all I wanted to say here today. However, I believe that this will be sufficient for a basic document aimed at resuming consideration of an issue whose practical solution will not be possible within 5 to 10 years.

Mr. Gelber: A few small comments I have made about refugees coming from Russia at the moment. I learned from interviews with British diplomats at the UN and in Washington that, since the summer, they

have taken the view that this immigration was deliberately activated by the Russians in order to embarrass the UK. They easily crossed the Russian zone and were delivered to their destination. That would be one of the arguments against immigration. I naturally objected that people didn't flee through the half-continent until something forced them to do so. I mean crossing the Mediterranean.

Dr. Robinson: People are at a loss. They ask why the Russians raised the Iron Curtain and released 150,000 Jews. There is an explanation, a convincing explanation. These 150,000 Jews represented the problem in the USSR. Either they leave them and will have an enemy, which will be a source of problems for them, or they will release them and get 150,000 people who will lead propaganda against the USSR, and they had to choose from two evils.

Mr. Gelber: I think I can describe their reaction to you. I also told them that the Russians are probably releasing them to confuse us, but the fact remains that there is a huge need. I expected you to explain this aspect rather than the reasons why you were engaged in identifying pro-Russian sentiments among the Zionists. The realization that Jews oppose Britain seems to be pushing them into a Russian camp. I found it at Ruth Gruber's party. If you criticize Russia, you support the UK. They don't understand that you can't depend on both sides. In that sense, you always take sides. I think this is a very important factor for the bulk of American Jews who are full of goodwill. Their natural reaction: Britain is our enemy, and you have to take that into account when shaping policy.

**LETTER FROM THE SOVIET ENVOY IN
LEBANON D.S. MALT TO THE HEAD OF THE
MIDDLE EAST DIVISION OF THE USSR
FOREIGN MINISTRY I.V.SAMILOVSKY
February 19, 1947**

Secretly

On the situation in the solution of the Palestinian problem

In doing so, I am sending you a number of materials on changes in the "search" for a solution to the Palestinian problem over the past two months.

Since the end of the London Roundtable Conference on Palestine on 2 October this year, the main highlights are:

1. A letter from President Truman of the United States⁶¹ dated 4 October to British Prime Minister Attlee on the desirable direction in dealing with the Palestinian problem and the reaction caused by that letter.

2. Defining their views by Zionist organizations as to the direction of resolving the Palestinian problem.

3. President Truman's reply of 30 October this year to a letter from King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia.

4. Statement by the Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini of Jerusalem on his position towards The United Kingdom on the Palestinian issue.

5. Speech of the Soviet delegate T. Novikov in the Committee No. 4 on guardianship of the UN General Assembly.

All these changes taking place in the Palestinian question deserve our most serious attention, because they show the nature of the intentions to resolve not only the Palestinian question itself, but also the solutions to the entire Middle East problem. Moreover, there are already signs that the Middle East is entering a crucial phase and that the British have once again begun to make extraordinary efforts to improve their position and, if possible, to stabilize the situation.

U.S. policy on middle East issues can be defined as follows:

(a) Do not prevent the British from doing their own thing;

b) In parallel with the actions of the British, if possible, to take over all the leading economic positions in the Arab countries;

c) provide regular and well-equipped airfields and landing sites with air communications based on the so-called "fifth freedom of air" and

d) To ensure the withdrawal of the Arabian oil pipeline to the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea in a place that would be economically cheap for construction and operation, strategically most convenient in terms of steamship delivery and, finally, free from direct English influence.

President Truman seems to reflect the views of those American circles that, to this day, believe that of all the Middle Eastern countries, the most satisfying of the above conditions is Palestine, because, among other things, it is easiest to settle in it without producing formal legal violations of issues of independence and sovereignty, since it is under the British mandate and therefore under the guise of transferring it under the custody of the ONU it is most

convenient to seize it in its own hands. especially by supporting expanded Jewish immigration.

In dealing with these issues in a manner, it should be noted that:

1. Truman's letter of 4 October clearly reflects these American intentions. In the letter, for example, he said bluntly that "I cannot think that the differences of the many proposals submitted are so great that they cannot be reconciled with goodwill. Our government can support this decision."

In urging the immediate "substantial immigration" of Jews to Palestine, the President expressed his readiness to provide economic assistance to the development of Palestine.

It is quite natural that the British met in bayonets these intentions of the American imperialists, who under a very plausible pretext, as they say, in broad daylight decided to snatch from their hands such an important piece as Palestine. By inviting Americans to participate in the resolution of the Palestinian question, the British meant only American support for their actions, not satisfaction with American claims. The English daily Daily Mail, commenting on Truman's statement, made clear the nature and direction of the expected American support, namely, that "President Truman offers immediate assistance if significant immigration of Jews to Palestine is allowed. If two American divisions are expected to be sent to Palestine because of this assistance, then its intervention is the most justified." The newspaper adds with apparent annoyance that "unfortunately, in our opinion, this is not what he wanted to say." The newspaper therefore calls Truman's statement strange, which "may have very sad results" as Jewish terrorists may regard it as a "direct encouragement to intensify their terrorist actions."

In the Arab world, Truman's statement drew sharp criticism and calls not only for declarative protests, but also for the application of a boycott of American goods, to the severance of economic and cultural relations with the United States. It should also be noted that these so "brave" and violent protests were carried out with the explicit encouragement of the British, who, among other things, intended to cause a conflict between Arabs and Americans in order to force the Americans to abandon their intentions to pursue independent policies in the Arab countries and, above all, to force them to provide British military assistance. But, according to all the data, the British miscalculated, and Truman decided to act independently in Palestinian affairs. The French newspaper *Le Monde* wrote that "the United States will henceforth pursue its own policy in the eastern Mediterranean, and they refuse to further align their positions with the position of the office foreman, with which until now it has held common views on the problems of the Middle East."

However, Truman's attempt was very timid, untimely and unsuccessful. Truman is not distinguished by the foresight or scope of the statesman. His actions most likely reflect the habits of a petty official, who used in the morning to count the remnants of the surrender for fear that he was not counted by a cook, and accidentally got to a high place, completely preserving his habits.

In the Palestinian question, Truman in August 1945 put forward the idea of resettling 100,000 Jews displaced in Europe. Although this figure does not correspond to the actual number of Jews displaced in Europe who are homeless or to the number of immigrants, and in general, although it does not express anything strongly, as it will not give Jews a majority of the population in Palestine, nevertheless,

until the elections to the American Congress and representatives in November 1946, Truman kept clinging to that figure.

The British immediately determined the insolvency of Truman's letter and, relying on very sharp criticism of the Arab public and the press, behaved not quite politely with the President of the United States

States of America, refusing to even publish Truman's further remarks on the subject.

Truman's swan song in the Palestinian question, apparently, can be considered his letter to King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, in which he continues to insist on the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine and "cannot understand why Your Majesty seems to feel that this statement is contrary to previous promises or statements made by the Government". And Truman "does not understand" this at a time when President Roosevelt wrote in a letter dated April 5, 1945, to Ibn Saud that he "clarified our desire that no decision be taken as to what would concern the basic situation in this country without exhaustive consultation with both Jews and Arabs."

In view of the Arab outcry against President Truman's interference in Palestinian affairs, Truman's failure to act in front of the British, and apparently because Jewish voting in the United States did not save Truman from defeat in the last election, he decided to step away from direct leadership of Palestinian affairs and handed them over to the State Secretariat.

2. Encouraged by Truman's support, the Zionists decided that the time had come to finalize their positions on the Palestinian issue and, according to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, had handed over to the British and American Governments their plan to resolve the Palestinian issue.

The main elements of this plan were the allocation of the Jewish part in Palestine under the project of the British royal commission of 1937 and the formation of a Jewish state in it, the admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants under the protection of the U.S. army and navy and the transformation of the Jewish Agency into the government of this Jewish state.

The Palestinian council, in its decision on 29 October, supported the plan in effect and had begun its practical implementation even before, launching a sudden organization of 12 kibbutzim (something like cooperative farms) in the southern Palestinian desert.

The Swiss-convened Zionist Congress is likely to outline further harassment in Palestine and align its actions with the policies of the British Labour government.

3. It is only natural that the actions of the Americans, the actions of the Zionists, the constant incitement of the British and their continuous play-out of the comedy against Jewish terrorists in Palestine have caused a growing discontent in the Arab countries, which even began to escalate into clashes between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. However, more sober elements, both from the Arab and Jewish sides, were able to quickly eliminate these provocations.

By the way, the British were so carried away with the game of fighting Jewish terrorists that, in addition to the continuous round-ups carried out by the British army in Tel Aviv, and partial raids in all the cities of Palestine, they fenced off in Jerusalem, Haifa whole quarters of barbed wire. It all looks so funny that the Palestinians jokingly call these fenced-off neighbourhoods "Bevin towns."

All these provisions have necessitated a clearer definition and Arab position on the Palestinian issue. In addition to those daily statements and calls for protests by certain Arab groups and newspapers, the

speech of the Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini of Jerusalem, who told the American correspondent that he has no animosity towards Great Britain and wants to see Palestine living in friendship with all countries, including Great Britain, is very characteristic, that the declaration of Balfour Britain has made an aggressive act against Palestine. therefore, the Arabs had to defend themselves that during the Second World War he fled to Germany because he could not find refuge in any Arab or Muslim country, and finally that his attitude towards Britain would depend on its policy towards Palestine.

Referring to the British plan for the partition of Palestine, the Mufti stated that he was against any partition of Palestine that involved the establishment of a Jewish State.

Although the Mufti's statement was made in a very conciliatory manner, it shows the well-known determination of Palestinian Arabs not to make concessions to the British in the Palestinian question beyond those made in the Plan presented by the Arabs at the London Conference.

4. For their part, the British also did not remain indifferent to the Palestinian issue after the interruption of the London Conference. British politicians and newspapers began to make their views and proposals.

In all these speeches of the British there is nothing clear or definite, except for one thing - the desire to remain and for a further time full masters of Palestine. Criticising the Labour government, in a speech at the Conservative party congress, Churchill openly stated that "due to Labour's mistakes, the British nation is deprived of the fruits of the struggle and its efforts."

However, in order not to stir up public opinion of Arab countries and Palestinian Arabs, the British began to spread all sorts of calming and encouraging rumors,

even to the point that, as the American correspondent Roberts reported, "there is an increasingly noticeable trend among the British Cabinet in favour of the transfer of the British mandate to Palestine to the United Nations". There is hardly any need to say that the British Government has no such voluntary intention, and all this was done only to cover up the started bargaining on Palestine between Bevi-Y and Byrnes, who used the convening of the GENERAL Assembly of ONY in New York.

The most clear evidence of this is the reaction of the English press, which was met with the speech of the Soviet delegate T. Novikov in the committee No. 4 on guardianship at the General Assembly of ONY.

5. The statement by the Soviet delegate on the need to grant independence to Palestine or to transfer it to the custody of the United Nations seems to complete this preparatory period and opens a new phase in the search for a real solution to the Palestinian question.

From the materials attached to the reaction caused by this statement by T. Novikov, it is clear that the Arab public opinion was very approving of him, and the British made every effort to, first of all, by any means and means to denigrate the statement of the Soviet delegate, such as the statement of Jamal al-Husseini, that " instead of domination of one country, we will be subordinate to 50 capitals, in which certainly have more influence than the Arabs"; secondly, to intimidate the Arabs with anti-Soviet fabrications such as the one that, according to the Soviet opinion, "the development of Jewish capitalism would ensure the fall of the current feudal system and the transition to a bourgeois society, which would then prepare the way to the communist regime", and, thirdly, to quickly hush up the question and stop talking about the Soviet proposal.

However, progressive Arab circles have understood correctly the meaning of this statement. For example, the newspaper Oryan wrote on 13 November that the Soviet delegate "expressed on this occasion an opinion that is the opinion of all independent patriots of Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Jerusalem and Cairo. He said what we have been saying for months, namely that the UK's attempt to resolve the Palestinian problem through direct negotiations with the United States and representatives of Arabs and Jews is contrary to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

The interest, attention and approval of the Arab public by the Soviet delegate's speech were so great that even a fascist newspaper such as Beirut's Al-Hayat had to write: "We take note of this Russian position without going into the motives that prompted it."

Analysing the situation in Palestine, the Jaffa newspaper Al-Itti-Hadh wrote that "by demanding the independence of Palestine and the formation of a democratic government in it, the Soviet Union did not pursue any selfish purpose, for it requires it for all colonies and this is the purpose of its struggle". The newspaper adds that "the position of the Soviet Union encourages Arab countries to change their attitude towards the United Nations and the Soviet Union, which is one of its main nerves. Perhaps this will encourage them to change their position towards negotiations as well..."

This may be the end of a period in the course of the Palestinian question.

This period shows that the British, after the break of the London Round Table Conference on Palestine, tried to negotiate with the Americans on such a solution to the Palestinian question, which would allow them to remain on the modified terms in the form of

Palestine, and the other part to provide to the Americans.

In support of the Americans and in fact the British, but without a final agreement, were Jewish Zionists, who formulated their demands and plan for the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine. However, in view of the lack of unity of views among the various movements among the Jewish Zionists themselves, the final determination of their positions was postponed until the convening of the next world Zionist congress in Switzerland. Congress has now opened and perhaps a common solution is to be expected.

During this time, the Arabs remained in support of the plan proposed at the London Conference to gradually grant Independence to Palestine. Although the Arab plan did not preclude the abandonment of British troops and actual English domination in Palestine, it did create some legal uncertainty for the British of their stay in Palestine, which they could not allow under the current circumstances.

A new discussion of Arab positions on the Palestinian issue is currently under way at the Arab League Council meetings in Cairo, but so far there is no indication of the direction of their positions. From many supporting indications, there are indications that the leaders of the Arab countries that dominate the League are inclined to make further concessions because of Egypt's plight in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations.

Appendix: by text, on 75 sheets.

Envoy

malt

**NOTE OF A MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION
OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE
TO THE UN U.EITAN February 25, 1947**

1. I enclose an analysis of the positions of UN member states, made in the light of our political campaign.

USSR, Belarus, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia

I do not take into account the first three countries and, of course, I do not think that their opposition is perhaps more profitable than their support. The last three usually vote with the USSR, but on the Palestinian issue there may be a chance to win their support.

(a) I do not believe that Czechoslovakia, led by Masaryk and Benesh, will vote against the Zionists. But I propose that special efforts be made in Prague not to prevent the anti-Zionist vote under pressure from the USSR, but to convince the Czech government to provide us with the support of the Slavs in the voting. This is the task of the special mission - under no circumstances can it be entrusted to the local Zionists.

b) The Special Representative, if he has a high enough rank (board member), may well continue his mission in Warsaw, especially after the Polish Consul General in Palestine has repeatedly raised the issue. I can hardly believe that the votes of the Polish government could be influenced by the statements of one of our emissaries, but there is a possibility that Poland will not vote against us in any case. If they abstain from voting, then at least they can do so intelligently.

(c) The Government of Yugoslavia, rather than the other two States, will blindly follow the SOVIET line, and I believe that we should not make much effort on our part. However, their consul in Jerusalem is very busy collecting materials, and I think we should do everything here in Washington and London with regard to the Yugoslav representatives to see if their Government has all the actual material that we could provide them with.

W.Eitan

**REFERENCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST
DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN
MINISTRY "PALESTINIAN PROBLEM"
March 5, 1947**

Secretly

The London Conference on Palestine, which opened on September 10, 1946, ended in failure.

The British government, under the pretext of the need to study the Arab plan of the state of Palestine, postponed the conference first until December 16, 1946, and then until January 27, 1947.

Jews who did not attend the London Conference rejected both English and Arab proposals. They demanded the free immigration of Jews to Palestine, the transfer of control over immigration into the hands of the Jewish Agency and the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine.

On December 9, 1946, the 27th World Zionist Congress opened in Basel, adopting a resolution expressing outrage that the British government was continuing to pursue the policy outlined in the 1939 White Paper.

The resolution stated:

1. Palestine should become a Jewish state.
2. It should be open to Jewish immigration.
3. The Jewish agency should be given control over immigration.

4. The Jewish agency must be endowed with the necessary authority to establish a Jewish state in Palestine.

Congress passed a decision requiring Jews not to participate in the new London Conference on the Palestinian issue.

Arab representatives and Palestinian Arabs, although they had agreed to participate in the new London Conference, had reaffirmed their determination to defend the establishment of an independent Arab State in Palestine and to reject any plan to partition the country. U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes announced on December 6, 1946, that the United States would accept An invitation for England to send an observer to an upcoming conference in London if Jewish leaders took part in its work.

Such was the setting for the new London Conference, which opened on 27 January 1947.

Delegations from the following Arab states were present: Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, as well as Palestinian Arab delegates. The British delegation was led by Foreign Minister Bevin and Minister of Colonies Arthur Creech Jones.

Jewish representatives did not participate in the conference, but they were in London and held separate talks with Bevin and Krich.

At the beginning of the conference, the head of the Syrian delegation, Faris al-Khoury, stated that the Plan of the State of Palestine proposed by the Arabs was the most just one guaranteeing civil and political rights for all Palestinian citizens. "That is why the Arabs cannot," Khoury continued, "to participate in the discussion of the plan for the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state." Palestinian Arab leader Jamal al-Husseini also spoke in the same vein.

The British Government presented a new plan for the State of Palestine to Syrian delegates and the

Jewish Agency. It envisaged the creation of two autonomous cantons in Palestine: Jewish and Arab, which should be subordinate to the central trinity government (Arab-Jewish-en-Glyian) established in Jerusalem. Jerusalem will be divided into three districts: Jewish, Christian and Muslim.

Arabs in their canton must guarantee the rights of the Jewish minority living on their territory. The Jewish canton should make the same commitment to the Arab minority. New 100,000 Jewish immigrants must be admitted to the Jewish canton.

The Triple-A Government would be only temporary and would exist for four years, after which a bi-national constituent assembly would be established in Palestine to draft the constitution of a Palestinian State. Further relations between the UK and the Palestinian state will be governed by a treaty. The future Palestinian State will be placed in custody for a five-year term.

This project was rejected by both Arabs and Jews. However, the latter stated that they were ready to discuss with the British government any "compromise proposal for the establishment of a viable Jewish state in the area of Palestine".

According to Bevin (speech in the House of Commons on 19 February 1947), the Jewish Agency at the beginning of the conference proposed that the British Government continue to implement the administration in accordance with a mandate on a basis that would enable Jews to continue expanding the Jewish national hearth until they acquired a numerical majority in Palestine as a result of immigration and could demand the establishment of an independent Jewish state throughout the country.

On 14 February 1947, Bevin announced to Arab delegates at the London Conference and representatives of the Jewish Agency that the British Government had agreed to refer the question of

Palestine to the United Nations because the British proposals had been rejected by the Arabs.

Jewish leaders categorically objected to the transfer of the Palestinian issue to the Guardian Committee, but suggested that the United Nations should provide a detailed account of the progress of events in Palestine, establish a special commission to study the Palestinian problem, and then refer the commission's findings to the United Nations.

Arab leaders believe that a credible international organization can find the right and just solution to the Palestinian problem and meet the age-old aspirations of Palestinian Arabs.

On 25 February 1947, Bevin, speaking in the House of Commons on the Palestinian issue, stated that "there is still an opportunity to resolve this issue without addressing the United Nations if the parties (i.e. Arabs and Jews) give up their irreconcilable positions".

In conclusion, Bevin's attitude, on the one hand, and Creech's attitude to the issue of the mandate on the other, should be noted. Bevin, whose speech was largely demagogic and was designed mainly to reassure Arabs, stressed that the mandate had outlived itself and was "actually unfeasible," while The Minister of The Colonies, Creech, stated bluntly: "We are not going to the United Nations to relinquish the mandate. We are going to the United Nations to pose a problem and ask for advice on how to implement the mandate if it can be implemented in its current form."

Based on the above frank statement by the British Minister of the Colonies, it can be concluded that Britain is not going to let Palestine out of its hands, but is merely looking for new ways to continue to govern Palestine with the approval of the United Nations.

Our position on the Palestinian issue should probably be based, if The issue is referred by Britain to the United Nations, on the following grounds:

1. The British mandate for Palestine must be abolished because it makes it impossible to resolve the Palestinian question in a fundamental way and constantly poses a threat to security in the Middle East.

2. British troops should be withdrawn from Palestine in order to create a normal situation there.

3. The United Nations must prepare the conditions for a united, independent and democratic Palestine that ensures equal national and democratic rights for the peoples who inhabit it.

4. The Jewish question in Western Europe could not be resolved through immigration to Palestine, since only the complete destruction of all the roots of fascism and the democratization of Western Europe could give the Jewish masses normal living conditions.

Deputy Head of the Middle East Division

M.Maximov Attache of the Middle East Department
of S.Nemchinov

**NOTE OF THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY
ADVISER B.E. STEIN TO THE FIRST DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR
A.Y.VYSHINSKY March 6, 1947**

Secretly

UK position.

For Britain, Palestine has always played the role of a strategic cover for the Suez Canal, which, like Egypt, provides freedom of communication to India. The clearer the need for Britain to leave Egypt, the more important the position was made by Palestine.

During the First World War, Britain decided to rely on Jews in Palestine. The expression of this decision was the declaration of Balfour on November 2, 1917,

which promised the creation of a “national Jewish hearth” in Palestine. This declaration was included in the mandate received by Great Britain from the League of Nations in 1920, and the High Commissioner of Palestine was appointed a Jew Herbert Samuel. During the first period of the administration of Palestine, the British relied mainly on the Zionists and patronized Jewish immigration to Palestine and the raising of capital of large Jewish financiers for the development of the country’s national economy.

In 1925, this policy changed dramatically. Influenced by the growing Arab national movement in a number of countries in the Middle East, Great Britain decided in Palestine to bet not on Jews, but on the Arabs. Herbert Samuel was recalled and replaced by Field Marshal Lord Plumer, who relied in his policies on the support of Arab sheikhs. Jewish immigration to Palestine has been severely reduced.

However, this change of political line in Palestine did not bring the UK the expected results. The Arabs were not going to help the British in the creation of a British colony from Palestine and continued the struggle for independence. During the entire period of mandated administration of Palestine, neither the Arab struggle for independence nor the struggle of Arabs and Jews between each other continued there. Whatever plans to resolve the question of Palestine, since 1937 all these plans have been based on the preservation of British power in Palestine. Britain has tried and is trying to maintain the role of arbiter between two groups fighting in Palestine (Jews and Arabs).

The British Government’s decision to refer the question of Palestine to the United Nations was the result of the following reasons:

1. The impasse in which the British Government negotiated with both Arabs and Jews and the inability

to propose a plan that would be accepted by both sides.

2. Understanding that forcibly maintaining the status quo in Palestine would require the sending of a large number of armed forces and the cost of large material resources, which in the current extremely tense financial situation of the United Kingdom becomes particularly difficult.

3. Opportunities to move the UK's main strategic base in the Middle East from Palestine to Transjordan, the treaty with which, concluded in April 1946, provides this operation.

4. Increasing pressure from the United States (about below).

The transfer of the question of Palestine to the United Nations by no means

does not mean, of course, that the UK completely and definitively abandons Palestine and is ready to immediately evacuate its troops from there. The decision to refer the matter to UNO is a very clever diplomatic manoeuvre under the present circumstances. Bevin is well aware that a concrete solution to the question of Palestine by the United Nations is by no means a simple and quick achievable thing. On the other hand, the United Kingdom continues to consider itself a mandate-taker, and therefore no solution to the question of Palestine without its consent is possible. Colonies Minister Creech Jones has made it clear that the UK has no intention of relinquishing the mandate. Thus, by shifting responsibility on the question of Palestine to the United Nations, the United Kingdom simultaneously retains its position in Palestine and its troops. She wins time and reserves her positions.

3. U.S. position.

The U.S. interest in Palestine dates back to the period before the First World War. In 1919, President

Wilson proposed the idea of giving the United States a mandate for Palestine. In 1922, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution stating that “the United States is conducive to establishing a national hotbed for the Jewish people in Palestine.” This U.S. interest in Palestine was dictated mainly by two circumstances: the presence of oil on the one hand, and the role played by Jews in the United States on the other.

U.S. interest in Palestine was particularly heightened during World War II by American concessions for the development of Saudi Arabia’s richest oil fields and a plan to build an American oil pipeline from Arabia to the Mediterranean Sea and build oil refineries in Palestine.

Even under Roosevelt, the United States expressed its disapproval of the 1939 English White Paper and advocated the expansion of Jewish immigration. During the Second World War, however, Roosevelt took a very cautious line on the question of Palestine, not wanting to alienate the Arab states.

Under Truman, the United States strongly supported Jewish demands for Palestine. In August 1945, Truman required 100 Jews from England to enter Palestine. The U.S. position in the mixed Anglo-American commission was outlined above. When the London Conference on Palestine was postponed on 2 October 1946, Truman addressed Prime Minister Attlee the next day with a message saying that the United States would not support the plan for the partition of Palestine proposed by the British, as the plan met opposition from the main U.S. political parties.

U.S. support for Jews on the question of Palestine has led to a sharp debate between the UK and the Us. During a debate in the House of Commons on February 25, Bevin, speaking about the position of the United States, stressed that the UK is a mandate country and is responsible for Palestine. Bevin further stated that

the publication of Truman's statement on the admission of 100 JEWS to Palestine was the reason for the failure of the negotiations. Bevin added: "I can't resolve issues that are the subject of the election campaign."

In fact, Bevin was right, of course, because the U.S. position on Palestine, as we pointed out above, depends to a large extent on the presence of two million Jewish voters, whose votes are being hunted by both the Democratic and Republican parties.

Bevin's speech provoked a sharp reaction in the United States. The White House released a statement refuting the view that "American interest in Palestine is due to party politics."

For the United States, Palestine, of course, is an extremely important point, both strategically and economically. Leaving the UK in Palestine would mean for the US English control over the export of oil from Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the possession of Palestine (in one form or another) for the United States means a serious stronghold in the Mediterranean. The U.S. is known to have no other such bases on this sea.

Possible position of the USSR.

To date, the USSR has not formulated its position on the question of Palestine. In connection with the forthcoming discussion of the Palestinian problem by the United Nations, this formulation of the USSR's point of view is necessary.

The USSR must first strongly express its support for the abolition of The British Mandate for Palestine. As a mandate-holder, Britain has failed in its task. Throughout the mandate period, i.e. for more than a quarter of a century, Britain has failed to establish order in the country and prevent almost continuous bloodshed. Nor can there be a question of replacing the mandate with British custody of Palestine. Replacing the name won't change anything. There

could be more collective custody of Palestine, either the United Nations as an organization or a few Powers (the eventual permanent members of the Security Council). However, the possibility of establishing custody of Palestine is met with the fact that the people of that country (both Jews and Arabs) are mature enough for full independence. Neither the Arabs nor the Jews agree to any guardianship and demand full independence.

The Soviet Union cannot but support the demands for full independence of Palestine as a state. The first and obligatory condition of this independence should be the withdrawal of British troops from the country.

The granting of independence to Palestine does not, however, resolve the Jewish-Arab contradictions in that country. The USSR cannot see any other method of resolving these contradictions than the democratic method. This means that, together with independence, Palestine must obtain a democratic statute that ensures full and genuine equality (both civil, political and national) for the entire Palestinian population. The statute should be drafted by the United Nations, which would then guarantee the implementation of the statute.

The UK's transfer of the question of Palestine to the United Nations presents for the first time an opportunity for the USSR not only to express its views on the question of Palestine, but also to participate effectively in the fate of Palestine.

Matte

**NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST
DIVISION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF**

**THE USSR I.V.SAMYLOVSKIY DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR J.A.
MALIK March 14, 1947**

Soy.

At the same time, I submit a reference on the Palestinian issue.

In connection with The Appeal of Trygve Lee to T. Gromyko regarding the opinion of the Soviet government on the creation of a special United Nations committee to discuss the Palestinian problem, on March 6, 2017, Gromyko was sent under the signature of T.M.Molotov telegram instructing to give consent to Trygve Lee on the creation of the committee mentioned.

Our position on the Palestinian issue in the report note addressed to T. Vyshinsky A.Y. was as follows:

1. The British mandate for Palestine should be abolished because it was an obstacle to resolving the question of Palestine.

2. British troops should be withdrawn from Palestine in order to create a normal situation there.

3. The United Nations must draft a statute of a single independent democratic Palestine, with equal national and democratic rights for the peoples who inhabit it.

I. Samylovsky

**LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE
EAST DIVISION OF THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY OF THE USSR I.V.SAMYLOVSKIY
TO THE ENVOY OF THE USSR IN LEBANON
D.S. SOLOD March 26, 1947**

Soy.

The information letter 77/s sent by you on 19 February this year on the question of the "Palestinian problem" although based on the data of the last quarter of last year is nevertheless of interest to the department. In particular, it is interesting to translate some of the documents attached to the letter, which have not been in the department's files to date.

Your definition of the essence of U.S. policy towards Palestine and your assessment of Britain's position not intended to let Palestine out of its hands, but only seeking a solution to the Palestinian question that would allow it to maintain its dominance over Palestine for a longer period of time, are largely in line with the material we have on the Palestinian question.

We do, however, have the following observations on some of the provisions you have made in this letter.

The conclusion you have concluded that Truman's attempt to "conduct his own policies in the eastern Mediterranean has proved to be very timid, untimely and unsuccessful..." (p. 5), clearly does not reflect reality. The U.S. has in fact intervened and continues to interfere actively and frankly in almost all affairs of the Middle East (seizure of oil resources, construction of airlines, supplying Middle Eastern countries with military materials, sending advisers, providing loans, etc.).

It cannot be accepted that Truman has already departed from direct management of Palestinian affairs and that his letter to Ibn Saud may seem to be the last act of his intervention in Palestinian affairs (p. 6).

We do not yet have any evidence to support this conclusion.

It is also difficult to accept the conclusion that Palestine is unable to "accommodate a certain number of immigrants".

Despite the above observations, the letter, provided with well-chosen translations from the local press, will serve as material for further development by the "Palestinian problem" department.

Head of the Middle East Division of the USSR
Foreign Ministry

J. Samylovsky

**CONSIDERATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST
DIVISION OF THE USSR FOREIGN
MINISTRY ON THE POSITION OF THE USSR
ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE April 12, 1947**

Secretly

Possible position of the USSR when discussing the Palestinian issue at the United Nations

The USSR's position on the question of Palestine can be summarized in the form of the following provisions:

1. The British mandate for Palestine must be abolished.

2. British troops must be withdrawn from Palestine.

3. The United Nations must draft a statute of a single independent democratic Palestine, with equal national and democratic rights for the peoples who inhabit it.

4. The Jewish question in Western Europe could not be resolved by immigration only to Palestine, since only the complete destruction of all the roots of fascism and the democratization of Western Europe could give the Jewish masses normal living conditions.

- I.

The British mandate for Palestine must be abolished because it is an insurmountable and fundamental obstacle to the fundamental resolution of the Palestinian question.

The British Government, having adopted a mandate for Palestine in 1922, committed itself to promoting the development of that state towards local government and local autonomy. By virtue of the mandate, the United Kingdom has obtained all rights under the law and governance of Palestine, including control over external relations and the judicial system. The mandate enshrined for England the right to keep its troops in Palestine. The unfettered ruler of the country is the English High Commissioner, who owns the fullness of the legislative and executive power.

And yet, Britain, which has ruled Palestine for almost a quarter of a century, with all the broad powers, the vast state and military apparatus as a mandate-holder has failed in its task and has failed to establish order in the country, to prevent almost continuous bloodshed posing a threat to security in the Middle East.

II.

British troops should be withdrawn from Palestine in order to create a normal situation there. The urgent withdrawal of British troops from Palestine must be carried out in order to create a provision there that would prepare the conditions for the organization of Palestinian self-rule, since the presence of British troops in Palestine creates anxiety and disarray not only in Palestine itself, but also in neighbouring countries. Palestine, which is one of the main bases of British troops at the Near East, is included by Britain as part of the overall plan of British military activities in this part of the world, aimed at creating a military-strategic foothold, which is not only not a necessity at present, but also threatens complications for the countries of the Middle East.

III.

The demands of the progressive social circles of Palestine for a united independent and democratic

Palestine that ensures equal national and democratic rights for all the peoples inhabiting it must be supported.

The United Nations must prepare the conditions for the establishment of an independent democratic Palestinian State within a certain period of time and work with the people of Palestine on the statute of that State. At the same time, the United Nations must be the guarantor of the conditions it has developed to establish an independent and democratic Palestinian State.

The independent and democratic State of Palestine is included in the United Nations. Attempts to resolve the Jewish issue in the states of Western Europe only at the expense of Jewish immigration to Palestine are doomed to failure, as only the complete destruction of all the roots of fascism and the complete democratization of the countries of Western Europe will be able to give the Jewish masses normal living conditions in any country.

V.

Any attempt to obtain individual custody of Palestine from the United Nations cannot be accepted. There is no doubt that Britain, which claims to retain its mandate for Palestine or for guardianship, will pursue the same policy in Palestine as it did during the mandate period.

It is more appropriate to discuss the establishment of collective custody of the United Nations over Palestine, although it should be taken into account that the population of that country (both Arabs and Jews) is mature enough to gain full independence and that both Arabs and Jews are in principle negative for guardianship, demanding full independence and the establishment of a Jewish (Jewish demand) or An Arab (Arab) State.

M.Maximov

**REFERENCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST
DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN
MINISTRY ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE
April 15, 1947**

Secretly

(To the forthcoming discussion of the Palestinian issue at the United Nations)

Position of the United States

The last official U.S. position was formulated in Truman's statement of October 3, 1946, Truman stated that U.S. public opinion would support the proposal for a viable Jewish state that controls its own

immigration and economic policies in the relevant area of Palestine, not the whole of Palestine, and the immediate entry into Palestine of 100,000 Jewish immigrants, as proposed by the Jewish Agency. The U.S. government could support such a decision.

The U.S. interest in Palestine is mainly due to the following circumstances:

1. The seizure by the United States trusts of the richest oil resources of the Middle East and the desire of the United States to establish the hegemony of American capital in the Middle East markets. An American oil pipeline will pass through Palestine and American oil refineries will be built here.

2. The U.S. desire to establish its air and sea bases in the Middle East and, in particular, Palestine in order to establish American world domination.

Under Truman, the United States strongly supported the Zionists and, seeking to establish its economic and military domination over the countries of the Middle East, focused on the establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine. Influential circles of American Zionists support this policy Truman. Part of the U.S. position depends on the presence of 2 million Jewish voters in the United States and American Zionist capitalists.

The United States considers that Palestine is for them an extremely important strategic and economic springboard on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Hence the exceptionally strong support of the Zionists in their quest to establish a Zionist state in Palestine, even to the detriment of the U.S. relationship with the Arab countries.

ENGLAND'S POSITION

Britain's last position on the Palestinian issue was reflected at the London Conference in January 1947.

The British Government has proposed to Arab delegates and the Jewish Agency a plan to establish two autonomous cantons in Palestine: Jewish and Arab, which must submit to the central triple-A government (Arab-Jewish-English).

Arabs must guarantee the rights of the Jewish minority living on their territory in their canton. The Jewish canton should make the same commitment to the Arab minority. New 100,000 Jewish immigrants must be admitted to the Jewish canton.

The Triple Government would exist in Palestine for four years, after which a bi-national constituent assembly would be established in Palestine, which would develop the constitution of a Palestinian state. The Palestinian State will be placed in custody for a five-year term. Relations between the UK and the Palestinian state will be governed by a treaty.

This position was rejected by both Jews and Arabs. Britain referred the matter to the United Nations, believing that Britain itself, as a mandate-holder, could not solve the problem of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine (as the Zionists and the United States insist) or the Arab state (as the Arabs insist).

Bevin's statement of 25 February 1947 on this issue states that the British government "as a mandate-holder is not authorized to make such a decision."

For England, Palestine acts as a strategic springboard to ensure the freedom of maritime and air communications to India. In Palestine, the English oil pipeline that supplies Iraqi oil is coming to an end.

If in the first period of the administration of Palestine the British relied mainly on the Zionists, patronizing Jewish immigration and attracting Jewish capital to Palestine, in 1925 England decided to bet on the Arabs. At the same time, England tried to play the

role of arbiter between the two struggling parties in Palestine.

Britain's decision to refer the question of Palestine to the United Nations appears to have been the result of the following reasons:

1. It is inability for England to propose a plan that has been adopted by the Arab and Jewish parties while at the same time retaining All England's position in Palestine.

2. It is impossible for Britain to bear the heavy financial burden in Palestine of maintaining a significant armed force and state apparatus there.

3. Increasing pressure from the United States and the planned unified Anglo-Saxon plan to capture the resources of the Middle East (oil, airbases, military supply and training of local armies, etc.).

By transferring the question of Palestine to the United Nations, Britain continues to consider itself a mandate-taker Power and, therefore, no radical solution to the question of Palestine without its consent is not yet possible. By shifting responsibility on the question of Palestine to the United Nations, Britain is trying to buy time and is reserving its position on the peoples of Palestine.

POSITION OF THE ARAB STATES

The proposals of the Arab delegations on the Palestinian issue were outlined in a memorandum handed down on 21 November 1946 by the head of the Syrian delegation to the members of the United Nations. The proposals consisted of a number of items, the main ones of which were:

1. The appointment of the Palestinian High Commissioner as an interim Government of Palestine, with the transfer of the entire executive and legislative

power to it, but with the preservation of the High Commissioner's veto over the transitional period.

2. Elections of the Palestinian Constituent Assembly.

3. The adoption of a democratic Palestinian constitution, which could not be vetoed by the High Commissioner and which provided for the election of a legislative body.

4. Ending Jewish immigration.

5. The termination of the mandate after the appointment of the head of the Palestinian state, but no later than December 31, 1948.

6. Conclusion of an alliance agreement with England.

Arab progressive organizations, such as the Arab League for National Liberation, are fighting for the independence of Palestine and the abolition of the mandate, for the withdrawal of British troops from the country, for the democratization of the country. The League stands for Arab-Jewish unity in the struggle against imperialism and Zionism.

IV. POSITION of the Zionists

In a resolution adopted in December 1946, the Basel Congress of Zionists demanded:

(a) The transformation of Palestine into a Jewish "community of nations" into a Jewish hotbed;

b) the transfer of control over all Jewish immigration to Palestine to the Jewish Agency.

Congress rejected the plan to divide Palestine into Arab, Jewish and English zones.

The Zionist organizations in Palestine are unapologetic about the Arabs. Only two organizations, the League of Arab-Jewish Cooperation and Rapprochement and the Palestinian Communist Party, are advocating the establishment of a binational

Jewish-Arab State in Palestine on the basis of full equality of Jews and Arabs, for the full independence of Palestine and for the establishment of a truly democratic Palestinian constitution.

V. POSSIBLE POSITION OF THE USSR WHEN DISCUSSING THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The USSR's position on the question of Palestine can be summarized in the form of the following provisions:

1. The British mandate for Palestine must be abolished.

The British mandate for Palestine must be abolished because it is an insurmountable and fundamental obstacle to the fundamental resolution of the Palestinian question.

The British Government, having adopted a mandate for Palestine in 1922, committed itself to promoting the development of that state towards local government and local autonomy. By virtue of the mandate, the United Kingdom has obtained all rights under the law and governance of Palestine, including control over external relations and the judicial system. The mandate enshrined for England the right to keep its troops in Palestine. The unfettered ruler of the country is the English High Commissioner, who owns the fullness of the legislative and executive power.

And yet Britain, which has ruled Palestine for almost a quarter of a century, with all the broad powers, the vast state and military apparatus as a mandate-holder state has failed in its task and has failed to establish order in the country, to prevent almost continuous bloodshed posing a threat to security in the Middle East.

2. British troops must be withdrawn from Palestine.

British troops should be withdrawn from Palestine in order to create a normal situation there. The urgent withdrawal of British troops from Palestine must be carried out in order to create a provision there that would prepare the conditions for the organization of Palestinian self-rule, since the presence of British troops in Palestine creates anxiety and disarray not only in Palestine itself, but also in neighbouring countries. Palestine, one of the main bases of British troops in the Middle East, is included by Britain as part of the overall plan of British military activities in this part of the world aimed at establishing a military-strategic foothold, which is not only not a necessity at present, but also threatens complications for the countries of the Middle East.

3. The United Nations must draft a statute of a single independent democratic Palestine, with equal national and democratic rights for the peoples who inhabit it.

The demands of the progressive social circles of Palestine for a united independent and democratic Palestine that ensures equal national and democratic rights for all the peoples inhabiting it must be supported.

The United Nations must prepare the conditions for the establishment of an independent democratic Palestinian State within a certain period of time and work with the people of Palestine on the statute of that State. At the same time, the United Nations must be the guarantor of the conditions it has developed to establish an independent and democratic Palestinian State.

The independent and democratic State of Palestine is included in the United Nations.

4. The Jewish question in Western Europe could not be resolved by immigration only to Palestine, since only the complete destruction of all the roots of

fascism and the democratization of Western Europe could give the Jewish masses normal living conditions.

Attempts to resolve the Jewish issue in the states of Western Europe only at the expense of Jewish immigration to Palestine are doomed to failure, as only the complete destruction of all the roots of fascism and the complete democratization of the countries of Western Europe will be able to give the Jewish masses normal living conditions in any country.

Any attempt to obtain individual custody of Palestine from the United Nations cannot be accepted. There is no doubt that Britain, which claims to retain its mandate for Palestine or for guardianship, will pursue the same policy in Palestine as it did during the mandate period.

It is more appropriate to discuss the establishment of the United Nations over Palestine, although in this case it should be taken into account that the population of that country (both Arabs and Jews) is mature enough to gain full independence and establish a Jewish (Jewish demand) or an Arab (Arab demand) State.

M.Maximov

**MEMORANDUM OF THE JEWISH AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE "POINT OF VIEW OF THE
JEWISH DELEGATION ON AGENDA" OF THE
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPECIAL SESSION
New York, April 28, 1947**

Confidential

1. The special session of the General Assembly, which opens on 28 April this year, is convened at the initiative of the United Kingdom and with the consent of the majority of the members of the United Nations, including the permanent members of the Security Council. There is currently only one item on the agenda: the formation of a Special Commission to prepare for the consideration of the Palestinian issue at the next regular session of the General Assembly and the determination of the objectives of the commission.

The Jewish delegation did not object to that item.

2. Arab States are reportedly proposing to include another item on the agenda: the end of the British mandate and the formation of an independent Palestinian State.

The Jewish delegation did not consider it appropriate to consider the Arab proposal at that session and therefore objected to such an expansion of the agenda. This is just one way to resolve the Palestinian problem. The United Nations will be able to

make its recommendations only after a comprehensive study of the problem in all its aspects, which takes time. In the period between the special and the next sessions, the Special Commission will be able to prepare carefully thought-out proposals, which cannot be done at this session.

3. There were three parties directly interested in the Palestinian question: Jews, Arabs and the United Kingdom. The latter participates in the General Assembly. The interests of Palestinian Arabs are represented by five Arab States. There are no Jews. It is difficult to imagine that a United Nations acting in accordance with the principles of justice and international law could, in such an important matter for the Jewish people, disregard these principles. With regard to their aspirations for Palestine, the Jewish people are represented by a Jewish delegation, which is also the authorized representative of the Jewish population of Palestine (Article 4 of the Mandate of the League of Nations, which is tested by Article 80 of the Charter of the United Nations).

The Jewish delegation would require permission to participate in the Assembly (without the right to vote) and looked forward to strong support from other delegations in that regard.

4. With regard to the composition of the Special Commission, the Jewish delegation considered the participation of the Arab States unacceptable. On the other hand, both the Jewish people and the Arab people of Palestine should be given the widest possible opportunity to be listened to by the members of the commission, as well as to present, in writing and orally, their thoughts and wishes.

5. The Commission should be instructed: 1) to make clear what the purpose of the mandate for Palestine was; 2) to state the extent to which the administration and the mandate-holder have fulfilled

their international obligations; 3) recommend solutions in accordance with the spirit and letter of the mandate, Article 80 of the United Nations Charter, the Balfour Declaration and the principles of international law (including the theory of “legally acquired rights”).

The Commission should be instructed to travel to Palestine without delay to study the issue on the ground.

MEMORANDUM OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE New York, April 28, 1947

The background of the Palestinian problem

promise. During the First World War, the Allied Powers recognized the claims of the Zionists in determining the future of the vast territories of the Ottoman Empire and agreed to return Palestine to the Jewish people.

On November 2, 1917, the British government declared the Balfour Declaration, pledging to “make every effort to facilitate the restoration of a national hotbed for the Jewish people in Palestine.” France and Italy joined the declaration as early as 1918, and on March 3, 1919, President Wilson, who had previously endorsed it, declared: “Union nations, in complete coincidence with the views of our Government and people, agreed that the foundations of the Jewish commonwealth would be laid in Palestine.”

Mandate. On 25 April 1920, in San Remo, the Supreme Union Council granted Britain a mandate for Palestine to implement the Balfour Declaration in the first place. On July 2, 1922, 51 member states of the League of Nations ratified this mandate through the League Council.

The mandate recognized the “historic connection between the Jewish people and Palestine” as one of the reasons for the restoration of its national hearth here. The mandate obliged the UK to put Palestine “in the kind of political, administrative and economic conditions that will ensure the creation of a Jewish national hearth” and “facilitate Jewish immigration”, “will encourage ... “Guaranteeing the civil and religious rights of all Palestinian residents, regardless of race or religion.”

This promise was made not only to Jews living in Palestine, but, as Winston Churchill stated in the House of Commons in 1939, also applied to “Jews outside Palestine, to that large mass of unhappy, scattered, persecuted, unrepentant Jews, whose unchanging, invincible aspiration is the structure of the national hearth.”

Accordingly, in order to create a tool by which the Jewish people could exercise their rights in Palestine, the mandate provided that the Jewish Agency would be recognized as giving advice and cooperation with the Palestinian Authority in order to “promote and participate in the development of the country”.

The United States was not a member of the League of Nations, but on July 30, 1922, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution endorsing this undertaking. Subsequently, the mandate was included in the text of the Anglo-American Agreement of December 3, 1924.

Statesmen around the world allowed the possibility of the restoration of the Jewish state or commonwealth. This clearly stems from statements by

the then Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, President Wilson, Field Marshal J. Smets, Lord Robert Cecil, Sir Herbert Samuel and Mr. Churchill.

Promises to the Arabs. During the war, the Arabs were given commitments to promote their independence in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. There was no conflict between the promises made to both Jews and Arabs.

Sir Henry McMahon, who negotiated with the Arabs, wrote: "I feel it is my duty to declare, and I state this definitely and underline, that, in making a commitment to King Hussein, I had no intention of including Palestine in the region where the Arabs were promised independence. I also had every reason to think at the time that the fact that Palestine was not included in my commitment was clearly understood by King Hussein."

Tlaurens, who took part in the negotiations with the Arabs, sympathized with the Zionist colonization of Palestine and predicted that "the consequences may be of the greatest importance to the future of the Arab world". At the Paris Conference, Lawrence facilitated rapprochement between Jews and Arabs, and Emir Faisal, the leading representative of the Arabs, later king of Iraq, signed a treaty with Dr. Haim Weizmann to implement the Balfour Declaration. "We will heartily tell Jews to "welcome home,"" he wrote.

As a condition, Faisal insisted on self-government in neighbouring Arab countries. This condition has now been met, albeit belatedly. There are now seven Arab States, of which 5 are members of the United Nations. They occupy a space of 1,650 sq miles - 160 times the size of the area occupied by Palestine.

However, the promises to the Jews were not fulfilled. Palestine is now a police State. The development of the Jewish national hearth has been suspended by the mandate-long State, although its

sole right to remain in Palestine stems from the responsibility it, as a mandated guardian, to help the Jewish people rebuild their historic homeland.

The development of Palestine. Over the past 25 years, Jewish colonization has turned the barren and abandoned country into one of the main self-sufficient economic centres of the Middle East. The population of Palestine has increased from 675 LLCs in 1920 to more than 1,300 LLC today. The Jewish population has increased from 67 LLCs to 600,000. In 1914 there were 43 Jewish settlements. There are currently 320. The industry grew rapidly in terms of volume and product diversity. The Jordan River was used to generate electrical energy; The Dead Sea supplies valuable potash and bromine, marshes are drained, terraces on hills are restored, trees are planted, desert lands are reclaimed. Schools, scientific institutes and hospitals have been opened. And urban Jews, detached from trade and free professions, began to work physically on farms and industrial enterprises, integrating into ordinary life.

Arabs are thriving. The colonization of the Zionist population has raised the standard of living of the entire population. The Arabs did not move. On the contrary, while the Arab population of Transjordan has stopped growing at a dead point, The Arab population of Palestine increased from 515,000 in 1919 to 1,064,000 in 1944, partly due to immigration, but mainly, as Minister for Colonies Malcolm MacDonald stated in Parliament on November 24, 1938, "due to the fact that the Jewish people bring with them a modern health system and other benefits to Palestine. „Arab men and women who would have died under different conditions are alive today, and their children, who would never breathe the air, were born and raised healthy."

The natural population growth in Palestine is higher than in any other country.

Obstacles. The dynamic development of Palestine was hampered by unsympathetic administrators who, accustomed to dealing with subdued peoples and being interested in maintaining the status quo, did little to contribute to the undertaking. On the contrary, they showed great sympathy to our opponents.

As early as 1920, anti-Semitic riots were organized in Jerusalem. Haj Amin al-Husseini, who was convicted of involvement in the killings, has never served his sentence. He was amnestied and appointed by the British administration to the influential position of grand mufti of Jerusalem. In 1929 and 1936, he, endowed with the immunity of his position, had organized new anti-Jewish riots. (He was later one of the organizers of the pro-Nazi putsch in Iraq, then fled to Berlin, where he began to cooperate with Hitler.) Again and again, the hesitant colonial authorities have shown an inability to act decisively in a policy clearly defined and endorsed by the international community. The reward for the unrest was the suspension of immigration, and Palestinian Arabs were given to believe that the violent opposition to the Zionist programme would be appreciated. A major British step towards appeasement was the partition of Palestine in 1921, with its 37,400 sq km area cut off, leaving only 10,400 sq miles west of Jordan.

Retreat. The separation of Transjordan from Palestine was the first violation of Balfour's promise, which was understood to have covered all of historic Palestine. This was the beginning of a series of retreats that encouraged new Arab aggression and finally resulted in the current illegal policy.

The mandate obliged the UK to contribute to the construction of the Jewish national hearth. In the 1922 White Paper, the Government advocated only allowing

the country to begin its initial development if the Jews provided funds not only for their own needs, but also for the advancement of the Arabs. The White Paper of 1930 (Pasfield) attempted to make Jewish economic development dependent on the Arab, but it was recalled by Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald in 1931. The Government accepted the proposal in principle, but subsequently backed down again, and the Woodhead Commission, which worked on the details of the project in 1938, reduced it to absurdity.

Meanwhile, Mussolini and Hitler's propaganda was in lush colour in the Middle East. Arab leaders became agitators of the Axis countries. Competing with Germany and Italy for the favour of the Arabs, the British yielded to Arab terror and, going back on the discredited path of Munich appeasement, published in 1939 the White Book of MacDonald.

Breaking the promise. The new policy, in apparent violation of the mandate, limited for five years Jewish immigration to 75,000, further immigration made dependent on the consent of the Arabs. Acquisition of land by Jews was severely limited. (Under the rules then established in 1940, Jews were effectively deprived of the right to acquire land within 95% of all of Palestine.) Jews had to shrink to a minority, like the Gepo, in a country that became an Arab state ten years later.

The 1939 White Paper was harshly condemned by the House of Representatives as "breaking the promise and reneging on The Promises of Britain" given by Mr Churchill, Leopold Emery, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Mr. Herbert Morrison and many others.

The Permanent Mandate Commission of the League of Nations recognized that the White Paper was inconsistent with the UK's mandate obligations, but the League had not taken any action. With the outbreak of war, it ceased to function.

Years of war. The White Paper came into force, but failed to achieve the goal of gaining Arab support. Until the Allied victory became unquestionable, the Arabs remained open on the axis side. Egypt, which had been infested, and Saudi Arabia remained neutral. Syria and Lebanon were hotbeds of intrigue of the Axis countries. In Iraq, Prime Minister Rashid Ali al-Ghailani led a failed uprising inspired by the Axis countries. Only in February 1945, when the hostilities were almost over, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon dutifully declared war on Germany in order to secure the right to a seat in the United Nations until March 1.

On the contrary, Jewish Palestine fought against the axis throughout the war. With the outbreak of war, 136,200 Jewish men and women declared their readiness to serve in the military. Nearly 26 LLCs were enlisted in the army and more than 7,000 were enlisted in local self-defence units. Palestine has become an important base of operations and supplies for the Allied powers.

At the same time, in the case of Europe, the White Paper was the death sentence for tens of thousands of Jews who, having been deprived of asylum in Palestine, were among the dead in the gas chambers of 6 million people. We will never know how many of them would have escaped death if Palestine had been open to them.

The end of illusions. Throughout the war, Jews in vain cried out about the softening of the Policy of the White Paper. With the end of the war, there was hope that help would quickly come to those homeless who survived in Hitler's concentration camps. The British Labour Party in December 1944 and in April 1945 was a sharp critic of the White Paper. Now she has come to power. But the days were followed by weeks, weeks - months. In August 1945, following the publication of Earl J. Harrison's report on appalling conditions in

camps for displaced persons, President Truman called on the British government to allow 100 Jews into Palestine. The United Kingdom responded by proposing to form an Anglo-American commission to investigate. The United States has agreed to this. The Commission began hearings in 1946. In May 1946, it submitted its unanimous recommendations. The Commission considered it necessary to immediately allow 100 JEWS to enter Palestine and recommended the lifting of the restrictions imposed by the White Paper. But the commission did not give constructive proposals for a long-term political settlement.

Tightening tactics. President Truman sought immediate real action from the British Government and offered United States cooperation. Prime Minister Attlee raised new objections. He argued that an additional contingent of troops would have to be sent to Palestine if more Jews were allowed in. Paradoxically, he sought to disarm the Jewish self-defence units as a precondition for further Jewish immigration. The members of the commission, recalling the promise of Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin to implement the recommendations of the commission, if they are unanimous, accused him of a new violation of the promise.

Negotiations dragged on. The British came up with a new plan (Morrison-Grady). As a price for allowing 100,000 Jews into Palestine, Jews were asked to renounce their rights under the mandate. Palestine was to be divided into Jewish and Arab provinces under strict centralized Control of Great Britain. Immigration belonged to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. It was an old federalization plan in a new robe. It has proved totally unacceptable to all parties.

Victims of delaying tactics. Meanwhile, the plight of the surviving Jews in Europe became critical. It has become clear that hundreds of thousands of them will

not be able to regain their former position and restore property on land poisoned by Hitler's anti-Semitism. The number of displaced Jews has now risen to 250,000 from 70,000 in 1945. Thousands went to Palestine, trying to get there as soon as they could. Repeating the most tragic episodes of the war, they were launched on frail and unsuitable for sea voyage ships across the Mediterranean Sea. During the war, the Jews sought to escape from the Nazis, and now they were tearing out of the blockade of their "liberators." They rejected the infamous label of "illegal immigrant," insisting that

The white paper separating them from their homeland is illegal in itself.

Forgetting the misfortunes of the Jews, the British mechanically limited their immigration to 1,500 per month. Their warships caught refugees who interned first in camps in Palestine and then deported to the island of Cyprus.

Britain's lawless policies have had inevitable consequences. Sporadic violence erupted in Palestine. The vast majority of Jews regretted these acts, but they were unable to suspend them when the British imposed a hundred thousand troops into Palestine and for provocative purposes imposed the harshest restrictions on personal freedom, abolishing basic civil rights, tearing economic life and turning Palestine into a police state. The situation has steadily deteriorated.

On July 4, 1946, President Truman tried to offer a way out of the impasse. He repeated his arguments for allowing 100,000 Jews into Palestine and presented to the UK a plan to divide Palestine into two sovereign states. The Jewish Agency for Palestine was prepared to discuss the plan with the British Government. But the British rejected President Truman's advice. On January 27, 1947, Great Britain and the Arab states held a new conference in London. Mr. Bevin gave the

Arabs new concessions. He proposed five years of custody of Palestine. His new plan meant neither federalization nor partition. Instead, it provided for the fragmentation of the country into local Jewish or Arab administrative units. The plan limited Jewish immigration to 4,000 visas per month for the first two years, and the issue of further immigration was passed on to the High Commissioner. Discriminatory anti-European land regulation remained in force. Jews had to remain a permanent minority, the establishment of an Arab state was allowed to be established. The Arab States, which demanded an immediate end to Jewish immigration, rejected Bevin's new plan; The Jewish Agency notified Mr. Bevin that his plan was incompatible with the main objectives of the mandate.

Once again defeated, Mr. Bevin announced on 14 February 1947 that he would refer the problem to the United Nations.

The question is put before the United Nations two years after the defeat of Hitler. Jews, the first victims of Hitlerism, enter the third year of langory expectations. Most of the 1.5 million European Jews decided to leave the continent, which for them is a little better than the cemetery of six million dead. They are determined to start a new life in their own country, where they will never be victims of intolerance and bigotry and where, as free people, they will have a voice in determining their future.

And Palestinian Jews, who believe in the ideals for which the United Nations fought, are waiting for the day when the Four Freedoms will pay their debt to the Ten Commandments.

**LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE
WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE AMERICAN
JEWISH CONFERENCE D. WAL TO THE
BOARD MEMBER OF THE JEWISH AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE M. GROSSMAN April 29,
1947**

Yesterday and today I sent to the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy materials handed over by the American Emergency Zionist Council and the Jewish Agency for the Soviet delegation to the Un. Today, the Soviet Embassy informed me that they had sent Mr. Gromyko a telegram asking him to accept me as a representative of American Jewish organizations and the Jewish Agency for Palestine. I have to call Mr. Gromyko on Friday morning, and if he fails to accept me, I will probably meet with Mr. Tsarapkin, who is his deputy in the delegation. The people from the Jewish Agency here are not quite prepared about what should be discussed with the Russians on behalf of the agency. It was suggested that Arthur Lurie speak to me before I agree on this meeting, and some of the material would be provided by the Ha-Shomer ha-tsair party. In any case, I think you should talk to Arthur

Lurie, Shea Kene-no and all those who should be involved in my conversation with Gromyko. Since the Jewish Agency informed me that they had not been able to contact the Russians, this possibility is probably the only one available to inform them of our opinion. Of course, the people at the agency may not want me to discuss these issues with the Russians; in this case, it is necessary to decide whether I should meet with Gromyko at all or whether I should meet with him on behalf of The Congress representing American Jewish organizations, and should not negotiate on behalf of the agency. In any case, this issue should be considered in New York before I call Gromyko's office on Friday. If Gromyko's representatives try to contact me through the conference office to agree on the time of the meeting, ask them to wait until I call myself on Friday morning.

We agreed to get copies of Rabbi Bernstein's press release dated April 24, send them to my office in New York. They should be there tomorrow.

**LETTER FROM THE PRESS ATTACHE OF
THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN
WASHINGTON, I. HAMLIN TO THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE IN NEW YORK, AURI April
29, 1947**

I spoke today with David Wal, who informed me that the first secretary of the Russian Embassy, Vavilov, had requested materials from him in order to pass them on to members of the Russian delegation. Yesterday we prepared a selection of materials from the available here and sent it to the Russian Embassy.

I spoke with Wal today and suggested that he contact you immediately on the matter upon his arrival in New York on Thursday. He told me that while the Russian delegation was shying away from meetings on the Palestinian issue with unofficial representatives, he, Wal, had access to Tsarapkin. I don't know what is being done about the Russians in New York, but I

suggest that Wale discuss this matter with you if this additional visit is necessary.

There are additional problems with finding a decent printed material for the Russian delegation. Of the standard materials that we have in the office, very little is suitable for them. So I invited Wale to talk to you about the possibility of contacting Ha-Shomer ha-Tsair and the left-leaning Poales of Tsion in New York, who may have the right printed material, especially on social and economic issues in Palestine and the Middle East.

**A.A. GROMYKO, THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR TO THE
UN, AT THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UN
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE QUESTION
OF PALESTINE May 14, 1947**

The debate, both in the plenary sessions of the General Assembly and in the Political Committee, showed that the question of Palestine had become a pressing political issue. This view seems to be shared by all the delegations that participated in the discussion. This view is already confirmed by the fact that this issue is the subject of discussion at the United Nations.

The fact that the question of Palestine has been the subject of debate in the General Assembly not only

shows, however, its poignancy, but also imposes on the United Nations responsibility for its decision. This obliges us to study it carefully and comprehensively, and we must be guided by the principles and objectives of our Organization and the interests of maintaining peace and international security.

The discussion also showed that it seemed difficult to make any definite, much less definitive, substantive solution at this special session of the Assembly. The discussion at this session, therefore, can only be considered the first stage of the consideration of the question of Palestine. In the general view of delegations, the General Assembly will have to decide on the substance of the issue at the regular regular session at the end of 1947.

Nevertheless, the discussion showed that delegations from a number of countries found it useful to exchange views on some important aspects of the question of Palestine already at this session. Discussion, albeit incomplete, of some important aspects of the issue is useful. First, it allows delegations to become more familiar with the facts relating to the question of Palestine, and especially the situation in that country at present, and secondly, such a discussion, which is even preliminary, makes it easier for us to determine the functions and direction of the commission's work, which we are going to set up to prepare substantive proposals for the next session of the General Assembly.

In discussing the question of Palestine, at least tentatively, and in discussing the tasks and functions of the commission mentioned above, it is impossible not to note, first of all, the important fact that the mandated system of governance of Palestine established in 1922 has not paid off. She couldn't pass the exam. The correctness of such a conclusion can hardly be disputed by anyone. There is no doubt that

the objectives set in the mandate have not been achieved. The solemn declarations that accompanied the establishment of a mandated system of governance for Palestine remained declarations that had not been implemented.

The conclusion that the mandated system of governance of Palestine has not paid off is borne out by the whole history of the governance of Palestine on the basis of this system, not to mention that it is confirmed by the current situation in that country. In this regard, it is useful to recall that as far back as 1937, Lord Peel's English commission, after examining the situation in Palestine, declared that "the exercise of the mandate is not possible". This conclusion was reached at the time by the Permanent Mandate Commission of the League of Nations, which also pointed out the "impossibility" of the implementation of the Palestinian mandate. The commission we are about to establish should be familiar with the historical facts pertaining to this issue.

There are many other facts pertaining to the history of mandated governance of Palestine, which confirm the bankruptcy of this system of governance. However, there is hardly any need to elaborate on these facts. Suffice it to point to, for example, the Arab uprising that erupted in 1936 and lasted virtually several years. There is also ample evidence of the situation in Palestine and the conclusion reached above. Everyone knows the bloody events that took place in Palestine. Such events are becoming more frequent. They are therefore increasingly attracting the attention of the peoples of the world, and above all the United Nations. It was as a result of the bankruptcy of the mandated system of governance of Palestine, which had led to the extreme deterioration of the situation and to the bloody events in Palestine that the matter had come to the consideration of the General

Assembly. The fact that the British Government itself has referred the matter to the General Assembly is very revealing. This cannot be seen as a recognition of the impossibility of continuing the situation in Palestine. The Commission should also take a close look at the current situation in Palestine.

It is known that the British Government has repeatedly pointed out at various times, even before the issue was referred to the General Assembly, that the mandated system of governance of Palestine had failed and that a solution to the question of how to deal with Palestine should be found by the United Nations. For example, Mr. Bevin stated in the House of Commons on 18 February 1947 the following:

"We intend to present to the United Nations a historical report on how the British Government has exercised its custody of Palestine for twenty-five years. We will explain that the mandate has not been implemented in practice and that the commitments made to the two communities in Palestine have proved irreconcilable."

This statement by the British Foreign Secretary expressly and openly states the reality of the mandated administration of Palestine. It is a recognition that the Administration has failed to address the issue of the relationship between Arabs and Jews, a major and sensitive issue, and has failed to achieve the objectives of the mandate.

The existing form of government, as Mr. Bevin had confirmed, had proved unacceptable to the Arab or Jewish population of Palestine. Both Arabs and Jews are protesting against it. It has not enjoyed or enjoyed the support of the peoples of Palestine, and without such support it can only lead to further difficulties and complications.

Referring to the attitude of the Arab and Jewish population towards the mandated system of

governance of Palestine, the British Foreign Secretary stated in his address to the House of Commons on 26 February 1917:

"The administration in Palestine faced the most difficult task. It did not enjoy the support of the people, it was criticized on both sides."

The Commission we are about to establish cannot but take into account the conclusions drawn by the British Government itself regarding the results of the mandated governance of Palestine.

It is not only the British Government that has come to this conclusion. In fact, the so-called Anglo-American Committee for the Inquiry on Palestine, which studied the issue in 1946, came to the same conclusion.

"Palestine is an armed camp. We found signs of this immediately after we crossed the border. Every day more and more the presence of a tense atmosphere was found here. Many buildings are surrounded by barbed wire hedges and other defensive fortifications. We ourselves were heavily guarded by armed police; often we were accompanied by armoured vehicles... There are well-built police barracks all over the country."

This is how the Anglo-American committee describes the situation in Palestine. His characterization of the situation was further evidence of what the mandated administration of Palestine had led to. The transformation of Palestine into an "armed camp," as the committee notes, is a fact that speaks for itself. In such circumstances, it is impossible to speak seriously about the protection of the interests of the Palestinian population, the improvement of the material conditions of its existence, the rise of its cultural level.

The same committee points to the following very interesting facts: the total number of full-time

employees in the police and prison administration in 1945 reached 15,000. This figure is very revealing. She explains to us where the considerable resources that weigh on the population go. Under other circumstances, these funds could be used for the economic and cultural development of the country, for the benefit of its peoples.

Here's another fact. In 1944/45, \$18 million,400,000 was spent on maintaining "order and law." During the same fiscal year, only \$2 million was spent on health care and \$2 million in 800,000 dollars on education.

In citing these figures, the committee comes to the following noteworthy conclusion:

"So, even from a budgetary point of view, Palestine has become a kind of paramilitary and police state."

The committee's report above is of considerable interest in terms of the characterization of the situation in Palestine and raises serious questions about how to rectify the situation and find a solution to the question of Palestine that is in the interests of its peoples as well as the common interests of the United Nations. The commission's task should be to help the United Nations achieve this solution by examining the actual situation on the ground in Palestine.

Should it be surprising that, given the situation in Palestine, both Jews and Arabs are demanding the elimination of the mandate? That's where they're all about. There is no disagreement between them on this issue. And with this the United Nations cannot but be reckoned with when considering the future of Palestine.

When discussing the task of the commission on the preparation of proposals for Palestine, our attention cannot but be focused on another important aspect of this issue. As is well known, the aspirations of a large part of the Jewish people are connected with the

question of Palestine and its future state structure. This provision hardly needs proof. It is not surprising, therefore, that this aspect is given much attention to this aspect in both the General Assembly and the Political Committee meeting. Interest in it is understandable and quite justified.

The Jewish people suffered exceptional calamities and suffering in the last war. These calamities and sufferings, without exaggeration, are indescribable. They are difficult to express in a series of dry figures about the sacrifices made by the Jewish people from the fascist occupiers. In the territories where the Nazis dominated, the Jews were subjected to almost complete physical extermination. The total number of Jewish people killed by fascist executioners is approximately 6 million. Only about one and a half million Jews in Western Europe survived the war.

But these figures, giving an idea of the sacrifices suffered by the Jewish people from the fascist aggressors, do not give an idea of the plight of large masses of the Jewish population after the war.

A huge number of surviving Jewish population of Europe was deprived of homeland, shelter and means of subsistence. Hundreds of thousands of Jews roam different countries of Europe in search of livelihoods, in search of refuge. Most of them are in camps for displaced persons and all continue to suffer great hardship. These deprivations are highlighted, in particular, by a representative of a Jewish organization, whom we heard in the Political Committee.

It is permissible to ask: can the United Nations, given such a plight of hundreds of thousands of surviving Jewish populations, not show interest in the situation of these people, separated from their homeland and their hearths? The United Nations cannot and should not be indifferent to this situation,

for it would be incompatible with the high principles enshrined in its Charter, the principles of human rights, regardless of race, religious beliefs and gender. It's time not in words, but in practice to help these people. The urgent needs of the people who had suffered greatly as a result of the war waged by Hitler's Germany must be taken care of. This is the duty of the United Nations.

Drawing attention to the need to take care of the needs of the Jewish population, who had been homeless and without their livelihoods, the Soviet delegation considered it necessary to draw the general Assembly's attention to the following important circumstances. The experience of the past, especially during the Second World War, showed that no state in Western Europe was able to provide adequate assistance to the Jewish people in protecting their rights and their very existence from the abuses of the Nazis and their allies. It's a hard fact. But, unfortunately, like all facts, it must be recognized.

The fact that no Western European state was able to protect the basic rights of the Jewish people and protect them from the attacks of fascist executioners explains the desire of the Jews to create their own state. It would be unfair not to ignore this and deny the right of the Jewish people to pursue such an aspiration. The denial of this right for the Jewish people cannot be justified, especially given all that they experienced during the Second World War. Therefore, studying this aspect of the issue and preparing relevant proposals should be an important task for the commission.

I am now approaching the issue that is central to the discussion of the objectives and powers of the commission that we intend to establish: the future of Palestine. It is known that there are many different kinds of projects regarding the future of the Palestinian

order and the solution of the Jewish people in connection with the problem of Palestine. In particular, some proposals have been prepared on this issue by the Anglo-American committee I have mentioned. Among the best-known projects on the future of The Palestinian order, the following are:

1. The formation of a single Arab-Jewish state with equal rights for Arabs and Jews.

2. The division of Palestine into two separate states, Arab and Jewish.

3. The establishment of an Arab state from Palestine without due regard for the rights of the Jewish population.

4. The establishment of a Jewish State from Palestine without due regard for the rights of the Arab population.

Each of these four main plans, in turn, has different options for settling relations between Arabs and Jews and addressing some other issues. I'm not going to analyse all these projects in detail right now. The Soviet Union will set out in more detail its position on different plans when concrete proposals are prepared and considered, and especially when decisions on the future of Palestine are taken. At this time, I will limit myself to some observations on the merits of the proposed drafts in terms of defining the commission's objectives in this area as well.

In analysing different kinds of projects on the future of Palestine, it is necessary, first of all, to take into account the specifics of this issue. It must be taken into account the indisputable fact that the Palestinian population consists of two peoples, Arabs and Jews. Each of them has historical roots in Palestine. Palestine has become the birthplace of both of these peoples, each of which has a prominent place in the economy and cultural life of the country.

The historical past, as well as the current conditions in Palestine, cannot justify any unilateral resolution of the Palestinian question, both in favour of the establishment of an independent Arab State, without regard to the legitimate rights of the Jewish people, and in favour of the establishment of an independent Jewish State, while ignoring the legitimate rights of the Arab population. Both such extreme solutions would not have brought a just solution to this complex issue, since, above all, they would not have ensured the settlement of relations between Arabs and Jews, which is the most important task.

It can only be found to have a just solution if the legitimate interests of both peoples are sufficiently taken into account. All this gives the Soviet delegation reason to conclude that the legitimate interests of the Jewish, as well as the Arab, peoples of Palestine can be protected properly only by the establishment of an independent two-pronged democratic Arab-Jewish state. Such a State should be based on equal rights for the Jewish and Arab populations, which could lay the groundwork for cooperation between the two peoples in their common interest and for the benefit of both of them. It is known that such a plan to decide the future of Palestine has a course in Palestine itself.

Modern history knows not only racial and religious discrimination, which, unfortunately, still takes place in some countries. It also gives us examples of peaceful cooperation between different nationalities within a single State, a collaboration in which each nationality has unlimited opportunities to invest their work and show talent within a single State and in the common interest of the entire nation. Is it not clear that it is useful to take into account the experience of such friendly coexistence and the fraternal community of different nationalities within a single State in dealing with the question of Palestine?

The solution of the question of Palestine by establishing a single Arab-Jewish State with equal rights for Jews and Arabs can thus be seen as one of the possible and most noteworthy ways of dealing with this complex problem. Such a solution to the future of Palestine could provide a healthy basis for the peaceful existence and cooperation of the Arab and Jewish people of Palestine for the benefit of both these peoples and for the benefit of the entire Palestinian population, for peace and security in the Middle East.

If this option were not feasible because of the broken relations between Jews and Arabs - and the commission's opinion on this issue would be very important to know - then the second option, as well as the first one, was to be divided into two independent States, Jewish and Arab. I repeat, such a solution to the question of Palestine would be justified only if it turned out that the relations between the Jewish population and the Arab population of Palestine were indeed so bad that they could not be established that it was impossible to ensure the peaceful coexistence of Arabs and Jews.

Both of these possible options for resolving the future of Palestine, of course, should be explored by the commission. Its task should be to have a comprehensive and thorough discussion of the drafts on the structure of Palestine in order to present at the next regular session of the General Assembly thoughtful and motivated proposals that would help the United Nations to find a just solution to this issue, in the interests of the peoples of Palestine, the interests of the United Nations and our common interests in promoting peace and international security.

These are the considerations that the Soviet delegation felt was necessary to express at this early stage of the consideration of the question of Palestine.

United Nations. Official report of the First Special Session of the General Assembly, Volume 1. Plenary sessions of the General Assembly. Transcript for April 28-May 15, 1947. New York, 1947. S. 83-87.

**LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE
WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE AMERICAN
JEWISH CONFERENCE D. WAL TO THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE AMERICAN SECTION
OF THE BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE A. SILVER May 15, 1947**

Dear Dr. Silver,

As you may already know, I have done a great deal of work with both the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet delegation in New York. I must inform you that the Embassy in Washington has expressed extreme interest in receiving any possible assistance and proposals for its delegation to the United Nations. They sent a special diplomatic post to their delegation all the materials I had received from the Office of the Emergency Zionist Council and the Jewish Agency's office in Washington. In addition to what I had said in my personal conversations with Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Tsarapkin in New York, the Soviet Embassy in Washington sent them a special analytical note prepared by me in which I outlined the wishes of the agency and the American Jewish community on the situation in Palestine.

I must inform you that during all my conversations in the embassy and with the Soviet delegation, I did not feel a rejection of the aspirations of the Jewish people stated in the official political line of the agency. To my and I hope to your great satisfaction, the Soviet delegation supported us beyond any expectations in comparison with what we are used to counting on from any great power. I would like to state categorically that it would be a sad mistake to consider the actions of the Soviet delegation as the result of excessive efforts on my part or by some other special lobbyist to persuade them to take such a position. In my opinion, it is realistic to assume that this was also possible by a convergence of interests and approaches.

It was only in one case that I discovered the desire of the Soviet delegation to amend the position it intended to take. This is due to the position on the composition of the Special Commission for the Study of the Palestinian question. Mr. Gromyko was extremely surprised when he learned that the agency preferred to include the UNITED Kingdom, Arab and neutral

countries, as well as the agency itself, among the non-voting parties. Initially, they intended to take a position that would exclude the accession of the British, Arab and great powers to the commission, which would be more beneficial for the Jewish community of Palestine. After I briefed them on the instructions of the agency's board, they expressed their willingness to change their position and to support the inclusion of the G5, as well as the agency to the commission, despite the fact that this also means the inclusion of Arab countries. Based on personal conversations, I can inform you that, contrary to press reports, there were serious contradictions between the Arab and Soviet delegations. In fact, much more overlap is present in the position of the Soviet delegation and the aspirations of the agency.

I report this in more detail, as I had for the first time a specific conversation with the Soviet representatives on the Palestinian issue, which revealed that their favourable treatment of Jewish displaced persons was in stark contrast to the position of non-Jewish displaced persons.

If I had to assess the experience I had gained over a year and a half on the issue of displaced persons, I would have to say honestly that it was through cooperation with the Soviet Government in the repatriation of many thousands of Polish Jews that we were able to increase the number of Jewish displaced persons currently in Germany from 70,000 at the end of the war to almost a quarter of a million today; and, of course, no one would deny that the pressure exerted by such a large mass of Jewish displaced persons was invaluable to the cause of Zionism, referring to the increase in immigration to Palestine and the formation of a Jewish majority there.

I am informing you of this in the hope that both the agency and the Organization of America will formally

express their gratitude to both the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet delegation for the Soviet Union's contribution to progress within the UN, particularly in terms of clarifying all these issues. I would also like to stress that at this time, in the new environment, the agency must do everything possible to consolidate the understanding reached to continue cooperation with the Soviet side as a counterweight to the anti-Jewish position taken by both the United Kingdom and the United States, as revealed in the UN debate.

With sincere respect

David R. Wahl, Secretary of State for Washington

**TELEGRAM OF A MEMBER OF THE BOARD
OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE
H. GREENBERG TO A MEMBER OF THE
BOARD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR
PALESTINE BLOCKER, IN LONDON May
20, 1947**

Benarzi, in conversation with David Ben-Gurion and Naum Goldman, only asked about some aspects of "haluka". He didn't add anything important to the content of his speech. When we asked if we could turn to his management, he replied that it was not necessary because he was here, but he promised to report back.

With respect

Greenberg

**FROM THE CIRCULAR LETTER OF THE
DIASPORA AND HALUZ CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE MAPAI PARTY Tel Aviv,
May 29, 1947**

Dear comrades!

In the previous letter, we analysed Gromyko's speech to the UN, which was the most important event. Two weeks have passed since then, and it should be noted that this speech is still in the spotlight. . However, Gromyko's speech is still the main topic of discussion, discussion and evaluation. For all, both Jews and non-Jews, see it as evidence of the turn of Soviet politics towards Zionism.

Ben-Gurion on Gromyko's speech: Tov. Ben-Gurion, who arrived from the United States on the opening day of the Assembly of Deputies and gave a presentation on the UN special session, said of Gromyko's speech: "For a long time we have not heard from the mouth of a representative of a great power (except President Truman) such stunning and faithful words about the suffering of the Jewish people, his terrible losses in the years of the last world war, about the torment and the state of hundreds of European Jews. seeking refuge in vain after the disaster, the words that Gromyko said on behalf of the USSR. However, the importance and surprise of Gromyko's speech is not in the description of the catastrophe of the Jewish people, but in the political conclusion that he made from the analysis of the situation in which the Jews found themselves. Of course, the Zionist movement came to this conclusion

decades ago, but for the first time the world heard confirmation from the representative of the Soviet Union: the Jewish people are determined to create their own state.

Here is an excerpt from Gromyko's speech: "It would be unfair not to reckon with this and deny the right of the Jewish people to create their own state, to deny the Jewish people the right to carry out such an aspiration. The denial of this right for the Jewish people cannot be justified, especially given all that they experienced during the Second World War. Therefore, the study of this aspect of the issue and the preparation of relevant proposals should be an important task for the commission."

Ben-Gurion cautioned against exaggerating the importance of the friendly statements made by international leaders. At the same time, he stressed that it was very gratifying to note the moral and political significance of Gromyko's Soviet approach to the dual problem of the Jewish people and Palestine.

Ben-Gurion added: "I had a lengthy conversation with Gromyko, in which he gave further explanations of the official speech he gave at the UN session. I also explained to him the talking points of my statement to the Political Committee. I don't think there is any need to quote my words, and I don't have the opportunity to quote Gromyko's words. But I must say, most of his explanations were positive—in any case, they did not detract from the impressions of his official public appearance at the UN."

The reaction of the British to Gromyko's speech: the responses coming to us through the British press, allow us to conclude that for London this speech was largely a surprise, and a surprise unpleasant. The British press continues to comment on Gromyko's speech to this day. On the one hand, she argues that we are exaggerating its importance for Zionism, on the

other hand, distorting our words in order to deprive us of the friendly relations of Russia. In particular, the Times resorted to falsifying Ben-Gurion's words at the session of the Assembly of Deputies, adding to them: "Russia has broken its promises in the past." Bevin's statement in the House of Commons that Britain is determined to remain in the Middle East is seen by the press as a response to Gromyko's "Zionist" speech at the UN. Opposition opinion in Histadrot: Our previous letter quoted the first responses to Gromyko's speech to Mishmar and Kol Ghaam. It is worth noting that "Mishmar" enters into an indirect controversy with Gromyko and with his proposed alternative to the creation of a Jewish state by dividing the country. In other words, "Mishmar" is not satisfied with the very tendency to create a Jewish state, but the newspaper does not dare to declare it openly. Critical arrows are addressed as if not to Gromyko, but to the leadership of the Jewish Agency, which is leading the case to the creation of a Jewish state.

Interestingly, this time the PKP followed Mishmar. Here is an excerpt from the publication in "Kol Ghaam" on this issue: "Everyone who knows the position of the USSR on the problem of our country, without great difficulty will understand that the Soviet public sees only one basis for a just solution to the national problem in our country - the elimination of British imperialist domination. There are many ways to live in a friendly partnership, in peace and friendship between peoples. The USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia are instructive examples of a just solution of national problems for the benefit of the interests of large and small nations. The national issue has found its solution here not on the basis of division, but on the basis of unity. On the same basis, a solution to our country's problem is possible. The war for partition waged by Ben-Gurion and others is in line

with Bevin's policy of strengthening and consolidating imperialist domination in the Middle East and our country. A solution to the problem is possible only through the establishment of an independent democratic Jewish-Arab State, for only a programme of state and independent living for Jews and Arabs will lead to the maximum mobilization of anti-imperialist forces. The program of "division" will only lead to an increase in disagreements between Jews and Arabs, for the benefit of exclusively imperialism."

It should be noted that Gromyko's speech gave rise to ideological problems for Ahdut ha-avod - Poalei Tzion-left⁶⁵. Of course, this party also sent a welcome telegram to Moscow after Gromyko's speech. However, the text of the telegram contains, among other things, a demand for the establishment of a Jewish state, and the editorial published by the weekly movement, despite the vagueness of the wording, shows the rejection of the alternative proposed by Gromyko. Here is a characteristic quote: "Gromyko's statement is intended to designate and make public in advance (until the commission's work is completed) not the form of solving the problem, but its content. It is the content side that is openly discussed at the beginning of the speech: the two pillars are Jewish political independence and mass Jewish repatriation. These two pillars initially add a note of doubt to the balanced text of the statement the feasibility of the division of power by establishing a bi-national State, to the extent that it could freeze the existing balance of national power in Palestine. The same two elements also bring a share of doubt to the feasibility of partition of territory, since there can be no question of genuine independence in the area of Western influence or of the territorial opportunity to accept a wave of mass repatriation.

The main content and significance of Gromyko's speech is in the elimination of the regime that uses the

international mandate to create a "semi-semi-police state", in the rapid progress of the project of the Zionists, including the immediate repatriation of those "numerous Jews of Europe who have been deprived of their homeland, shelter and means of subsistence" to form the political independence of the Jews as a factor of peace and progress in the heart of the strife-ridden Middle East.

Here is the true content of Gromyko's statement. As for the political form for this transitional period, it can only be one - international control, in which the USSR will be an equal and full participant in the decision of the fate of our country."

Since the opposition in Histadrot is both an opposition to Gromyko and an opposition to our political leadership, the PKK calls on opposition parties to "unity in the name of a democratic agenda." Kol Ghaam states in particular: "Today Ben-Gurion and Rabbi Silver are symbols of a policy that has caused a catastrophe on the Jewish population and at the same time proved to be unpromising. This is a policy of hopelessness and capitulation. Opposition forces in Histadrut include the Communist Party, Ha-shomer ha-tsair, and part of Ahdut Haavo-yes, which opposes the Biltmore plan. These forces are responsible for the future of the Jewish population, for the future of friendly ties with the country of socialism."

Arabs after Gromyko's speech: It should be noted that the element of great satisfaction and optimism that emerged after the conciliatory invitation to the representative of the Supreme Arab Committee to speak at the meeting of the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly gave way to growing frustration and despondency. This was after it became clear that the powers of the commission of inquiry did not take into account Arab requirements and that it did not include a single authorized representative from Arab

countries. Gromyko's unexpected statement only increased the confusion and anger of the Arabs.

Today it is obvious that this statement was a complete surprise to the Arabs - after the USSR strongly supported their demand to discuss the possibility of immediate independence at the UNGA session and then in the commission. The Arabs hoped to make the most of Russia by making it a kind of scarecrow for the British. At the same time, they were not going to pay the Russians at all. After Gromyko's speech, the Arabs tried to hide their amazement by downplaying the soviet minister's words by hushing them up and distorting their meaning. Emphasizing the attacks on the British and the mandated regime, The Arabs tried to interpret the demand for a bi-national state as support for their own demand for the establishment of a "democratic Palestinian state" with a Jewish minority deprived of the right to receive immigrants, deprived of collective state rights and, it is not even known whether they have personal political rights (Jamal Husseini speaks of citizenship for Jews who arrived in the country before 1920, Faris al-Huri - about the citizenship of "Jews who demonstrated allegiance" to the Jews. , the Arab Left - about citizenship for those Jews who are already in the country). At the same time, they completely ignored Gromyko's words about the recognition of the Jewish national hearth, the right of Jews to the state, the connection between the problem of displaced persons and the Palestinian problem, the division as a possible alternative to a bi-national state. Even the Arab left, finding itself in a very delicate position, tried to obscure and distort the meaning of Gromyko's speech by stating that in fact Russia supports the idea of creating a democratic Palestinian state with full equality for all Jews currently in the country (rather than a bi-national state), but Gromyko cautions the

Arabs that their uncompromising position can lead to a highly undesirable solution- to the partition of the country. Arab communists opposed to partition no less strongly than the Mufti turn their anger to the extremism and fanaticism of the official Palestinian leadership, whose racist hatred of Jews and the refusal to recognize the Jewish community in the country in fact lead to division.

In any case, Gromyko's speech did not lead to open attacks by Arabs on the USSR. As a rule, the Arabs are limited to the confused statements that the Russians were no better than the imperialist powers - that is, Great Britain and the United States. However, serious Arab circles concluded from Gromyko's speech that they should be reckoned with the USSR more, abandoning the exclusive orientation of the British. These circles believe that the Arabs should pay the Russians a higher price to win their support. Another consequence of Gromyko's speech was the growing desire of the Arabs to strengthen ties with Asian states, such as Turkey, India, Iran, with the aim of creating a pan-Asian bloc against the great powers.

**RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION
BETWEEN E. EPSTEIN AND THE DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER OF YUGOSLAVIA, V.
VELEBIT, IN WASHINGTON. June 25, 1947**

Confidentially

The first time I met Dr. Velebit was in Cairo during the war, when he was a general in Tito's army. It was he who led the guerrilla delegation in London in

negotiations with Churchill on military and political issues. He came to the United States to attend a special U.N. session on the Palestinian issue and then stayed there to negotiate with the U.S. government on repatriation.

I met him several times during the session, and from the very beginning he tried to convince me of the friendly intentions of his Government, as well as the governments of the Slavic bloc. After Gromyko's statement, Velebit told me that he knew it was expected, but could not warn me in advance because he promised to keep the secret. Dr. Velebit was at our house for lunch, where we had the opportunity to talk without interruption for several hours. I realized that he was well informed about the situation of Jews in Europe. He described very vividly and vividly their current suffering, as well as the social and economic insecurity of the deported Jews, whose number is much larger than officially recognized. In his opinion, only a small proportion of Jews in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria will be able to adapt to the changing socio-economic conditions in these countries. So far, very few Jews have shown a desire to integrate into the new socio-economic models of society emerging in the aforementioned countries. Governments, if they wish to avoid any coercion against these Jews, will experience great relief, especially in Romania and Hungary, if a significant proportion of them emigrate anywhere. It will also solve the problem of anti-Semitism, which can facilitate and expand the scope for conspiracies against new regimes by reactionary and counter-revolutionary elements. According to Dr. Velebit, at least 1-1.5 million Jews in such circumstances will be forced to leave Central Europe, a unique historic opportunity for the Zionist movement to achieve its goals on an unprecedented scale, as he noted.

The Soviet approach to the problem as a whole was defined by realistic but distant- considerations. The Russians and their allies have come to the conclusion that only in Palestine can Jews from Central Europe be easily accommodated, especially given the fact that no country in the world is willing to accept large numbers of Jews. The governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, which knew more about Zionism and the successes of Jewish colonization in Palestine than the Russians before and during the special session, had the right data on the subject.

In response to my question as to the extent to which Gromyko's statement reflects the Soviet Government's firm, consistent policy on the Palestinian issue, Dr. Velebit stressed that the statement was the result of a very thorough and careful analysis of the problem. He also stated that we would be victims of a cynical and distorted interpretation if we perceived it simply as a temporary manoeuvring by the Soviet government. The Soviet government would not risk getting involved in a conflict with the Arabs for temporary gain. However, we should not look for in the statement what was not and did not imply in order to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings with the Soviet Government in the future.

When I asked him to clarify this point, he said that we should take Gromyko's statement as it is, without overemphasis to what we consider to be the best solution. No doubt, the interlocutor meant that we should not give in to dreams, highlighting the division of territory more vividly than references to the creation of a bi-national State, but should consider the Soviet position on the basis of the precise meaning of the statement.

He went on to say that if a Jewish state were to be established in Palestine, the Slavic bloc would see it as a factor of peace in the Middle East and not as a

centre of international intrigue. In the event of a new war, Dr. Velebit stressed, the Jews who were saved from total annihilation in the previous war would once again be the first to suffer. Palestinian Jews, sandwiched between Russia and Western powers, can easily be crushed, as can the remnants of Jews in Europe living in countries where reactionary elements are just waiting for the opportunity to take revenge and restore old regimes. American Jews will experience the strongest rolled-up of anti-Semitism. Therefore, it is vital for Jews, more than any other people in the world, to do everything in their power in the struggle to preserve peace.

Dr. Velebit expressed the hope that, if a Jewish State was established in Palestine, it would seize every opportunity to develop favourable trade relations with Yugoslavia, given that our economies complemented each other. He was pleased with the results achieved in that area by the Yugoslav trade delegation, which had recently visited Palestine.

He also expressed hope that the representative of Yugoslavia in the UN special commission of inquiry will be useful to us. The Yugoslav Government will study and evaluate the report after receiving a report from its representative to the commission, but we can be sure that the overall policy in Palestinian affairs, as already stated by the Slavic bloc, will essentially remain the same as it was at the time of the conclusion of the special session of the UN General Assembly.

Dr. Velebit went on to say that he would be very happy to assist us in any way possible if our delegate or delegates visited Belgrade before the September session. He assured me that his assistance would not be limited to formalities, but that he was ready to really help us wherever he could. He returns to his country around next week.

**NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST
DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
OF THE USSR I.N.BAKULIN TO THE FIRST
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR
A.Y.VYSHINSKY July 30, 1947**

Secretly

1. Background

Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire before the First World War.

In 1915, the British government, in order to encourage the Arabs to oppose Turkey, promised in secret negotiations with the sheriff of Mecca Hussein to form after the end of the war an independent Arab state, which was to enter and Palestine.

In May 1916, a treaty was concluded between England and France (Sykes-Picot), under which Palestine at the end of the war was transferred to international administration, the definition of forms of which was in the joint competence of Russia, England and France, and the Palestinian ports of Haifa and Acre were granted to England.

On November 2, 1917, the British government, wanting to secure the support of the influential Jewish bourgeoisie of Europe and the United States in the consolidation of Palestine occupied by English forces for England at that time, published a declaration by Lord Balfour, in which England was obliged to "treat favourably to the establishment in Palestine of a national hotbed for the Jewish people."

In 1920, England achieved the transfer of Palestine under the English mandate, approved by the League of Nations on June 24, 1922.

By virtue of the mandate, England received “all rights under the law and governance” of Palestine, including control over external relations, the judicial system and the “holy places”. The mandate gave England the right to keep its troops in Palestine.

All legislative and executive power in the country was concentrated in the hands of the British High Commissioner, which operates the so-called “Palestinian government” made up of British officials.

The “constitution” of 1922 was supposed to create a “legislative council” in Palestine, but due to the boycott of Arab elections, this event was never held by the British.

The main pillar of British colonial rule in Palestine were the Zionists. On the basis of the mandate, the Jewish Agency was established, a body to assist the Palestinian Government in matters related to the organization of the Jewish National Hearth, in which the Zionists played a major role.

Thus was created on the initiative of the British Jewish National Council (Waad Leumi), officially recognized as a self-government body, whose competence was to collect taxes among Jews for the maintenance of schools and community needs. A Assembly of Deputies was also established. The illegal Jewish army of Haganah (Defence) was created under the Zionist organization, numbering up to 80,000 people, which was used by the British to suppress the Arab national movement. Montgomery’s instruction (published in Palestine and Middle East 8.IX.46) in connection with the preparation of British troops for action against Arab rebels in 1938 explicitly referred to the creation of mixed groups of soldiers and “proven locals” in Palestine. As “verified locals” the instruction recommended the Jews-Zionists.

The economic infiltration of the Zionist capital undermined the foundations of the Arabs of Palestine,

and the political privileges granted to the Zionists were detrimental to their national rights and aspirations.

The seizure of Arab lands by the Zionists provoked strong protests from the Arabs.

The struggle between Arabs and Jews in Palestine was used by the British. Thus, in particular, with the help of the Jews were suppressed strong anti-English speeches of the Arabs in 1929, 1936, 1939.

The Arab uprising in Palestine, raised in 1935, forced England to negotiate with the Arabs on constitutional reforms in Palestine. However, the British intention to introduce a constitution for the people of Palestine was not approved by the Zionists. In April 1936, a new Arab uprising broke out, far surpassing all previous anti-English protests of the Arabs. It was supported by Arabs of other countries and Muslims of India.

The unrest lasted 3 years. With the outbreak of the Second World War, the Arab unrest in Palestine would have been an extremely dangerous threat to English domination, forcing the British to reconsider their policy towards the Arabs of Palestine.

As early as 1937, the English royal commission of Lord Peel, which examined the situation in Palestine, came to the conclusion that the mandate “survived” and could not provide England with lasting power over Palestine. The commission’s proposed plan to divide Palestine into three parts- English, Jewish and Arabic—was rejected by the Arabs. Under the pressure of the continuing anti-English Arab movement, the British were forced to work out a new course, formulated in the White Paper of 1939.

With the White Paper, England refused the exclusive support of the Zionists and tried to cooperate with the top of the Arab national movement, promising to stop Jewish immigration to Palestine by

1944 and to begin negotiations on the independence of Palestine in 1949.

The White Paper of 1939 stirred up strong discontent among the Zionists, which, starting in the spring of 1944, took the form of open armed acts against the British.

This struggle took a particularly active form after the end of the Second World War, when the United States provided significant support to the Zionists in the fight against the British.

In August 1945, Truman demanded the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews from Europe to Palestine. The British refused to meet this demand. In this regard, in November 1945, a mixed Anglo-American commission was formed, tasked with examining both the Palestinian and Jewish question in Europe and making proposals to the governments of the United States and England.

On April 30, 1946, the commission published its report.

The Commission recommended allowing 100,000 Jews to enter Palestine. Referring to the situation in Palestine, the Commission recognized that the country "represented an armed camp" and that unrest continued in Palestine, despite the siege and the presence of a huge British army. The report highlighted the irreconcilable animosity between Arabs and Jews living in Palestine.

The Commission recommended that the English mandate for Palestine be retained until custody was established under the United Nations agreement.

The recommendations of the Anglo-American commission caused discontent with both the Zionists and the Arabs.

On July 8, 1946, negotiations between experts from the British and U.S. governments began in London to develop a concrete plan to solve the Palestinian

problem based on a report by the Anglo-American Commission. The experts, citing animosity between Jews and Arabs, recommended the formation of a federation in Palestine of four regions, of which two would be governed by the central government (English) and two would constitute "autonomous" provinces: Arab and Jewish. All major government functions would remain with the central government.

The federation's plan was in the best interests of England, but could not satisfy the Americans, and Truman, under the pretext of having to "revise the whole issue anew", recalled American experts from London.

During this period, the activities of Jewish terrorist organizations increased markedly. British authorities in Palestine responded with mass repression against Jews.

Following the failure of the Anglo-American experts' meeting, the Arab countries, according to the decision of the Arab League session in Bludan, invited England to start negotiations on a solution to the Palestinian problem. The British accepted the Arab proposal, and on September 10, 1946, a special conference on Palestine was convened in London with the participation of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan and Saudi Arabia.

Jews and Palestinian Arabs refused to participate in the conference.

The Arabs, rejecting the English plan of the federation, put forward their plan, the essence of which boils down to the following.

At the end of 1948, it was envisaged to establish a single independent Palestinian state with a predominantly Arab population, where the rest of the nationalities, including Jews, would be given full rights. Under the plan, an interim Palestinian government consisting of seven Arab and three Jewish ministers

should be established immediately. The Provisional Government would prepare elections for the Constituent Assembly. Once a democratic constitution had been adopted by the Constituent Assembly, elections to the Legislature would have been held. Based on the Jewish population in Palestine, Jews would be allocated approximately a third of the seats in the Palestinian Parliament.

After the appointment of the first head of state, the English mandate would cease.

The Jews rejected both the English federal plan and the Arab proposals to establish an Arab independent state in Palestine and demanded the free immigration of Jews to Palestine, the transfer of control over immigration into the hands of the Jewish Agency and the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine.

The United States, judging by Truman Attlee's telegram on the termination of the conference, supported the Jewish Agency's proposal and suggested that Britain allow 100,000 Jews to enter Palestine.

The British government, under the pretext of the need to study the Arab plan of the state of Palestine, postponed the conference first until December 16, 1946, and then until January 27, 1947.

On the eve of the resumption of the London Conference on the Palestinian Issue in Basel, the 27th World Jewish Congress was held, which supported the demands of Jews for free immigration and the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine.

The London Conference, which resumed on 27 January 1947, was attended by representatives of Palestinian Arabs, in addition to Arab representatives.

During the course of the conference, the British, having met resistance from Arab delegates to the federal plan they had put forward, proposed the

creation of two autonomous cantons in Palestine: Jewish and Arab, which should be subordinated to the triple government (Arab-Jewish-English) with a place in Jerusalem.

The Arabs also rejected this offer of the British.

On 14 February 1947, Bevin stated that the British Government had decided to refer the question of Palestine to the United Nations after an agreement had not been reached.

2. Un Commission Review of the Issue

On 28 April this year, at the suggestion of the British Government, a special session of the UN General Assembly was convened, with the task of establishing and instructing a special commission to prepare for consideration at the next regular session of the Assembly of the report on Palestine.

From the procedural debate, it can be concluded that the United States and Britain have decided to join forces and prevent detailed discussion of the Palestinian issue on the merits, presumably in the expectation that during the work of the UN commission in Palestine they will be able to amicably agree among themselves on the future of Palestine and will try to reconcile their original positions on which they stood before the consideration of the Palestinian issue at the United Nations.

Both the representative of England and the U.S. representative at the General Assembly did not express new views of their Governments. The positions of England and the United States thus remained as they were before the Assembly (see reference 337-BV of 15.4.47 on the positions of the United States, England, Arabs and Zionists in the Palestinian issue).

Only indirectly, Marshall's letter, published in the American press on 6 May this year, in response to a

question about whether the United States intended to take a stand on the issue of custody of Palestine, indicated that the issue would not arise until any steps were taken to include Palestine in the UN guardianship system. At the same time, Marshall stressed that under Article 77 of the UN Charter, the transfer of territories under the mandate of the League of Nations to the UN is a voluntary, not automatic, action.

According to the resolution adopted by the session, representatives of 11 states were appointed to the commission to draft a report on Palestine at the upcoming session of the UN General Assembly: Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Holland, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.

The dedicated commission, after reviewing the Palestinian problem, arrived in Palestine on 15 June to study the situation on the ground.

A) The position of the Arabs. The Arab Executive Committee in Palestine decided to boycott the UN commission and urged all Arabs not to give any testimony to the members of the commission.

Thus, the UN commission has the opportunity to read only the testimony of the Jewish part of the Palestinian population.

The attitude of Palestinian Arabs towards the UN Commission can only be judged by the statements in the Arab press by the leaders of Palestinian Arabs and Arabs of other countries, which are reduced to the demand to end the British mandate for Palestine, grant it independence and suspend Jewish immigration.

The representatives of the Arab countries, according to the statement of the Syrian President Shukri al-Kuati, published in the newspaper "Oryan" on 21 July this year, fully share the opinion of Palestinian Arabs and will oppose the division of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

The only correct solution to the Palestinian issue, according to representatives of the Arab countries, outlined in the memorandum submitted on behalf of the Arab countries to the UN commission in Beirut on July 22 this year, is the formation of a free government in Palestine on the basis of proportional representation.

B) The position of the Jews. The Jewish Agency in its statements to the UN commission requires the organization in Palestine of a Jewish state with the right of unlimited admission to Palestine of Jews-immigrants from other countries.

Ben-Gurion, chairman of the executive committee of the Jewish Agency, proposed a plan to the UN Commission to establish a Jewish state for all of Palestine, to repeal the 1939 English White Paper and to promote the Jewish-Arab Alliance. Ben-Gurion stated that the Jewish Agency would be unapologetically applicable to any rulings concerning the formation of a bi-national state and the imposition of a mandate of England or the United Nations over Palestine.

3. Our positions

The attitude of the Soviet Union to the Palestinian question was outlined in the speech of T. Gromyko at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly on 14 May 1947.

On this basis, when discussing the Palestinian issue at the forthcoming Assembly, we must:

1. To seek the abolition of the mandated system of governance of Palestine as having failed to justify itself.

2. To seek the withdrawal of British troops from Palestine, since without this condition it is impossible to create an independent state in Palestine.

3. Support the idea of an independent, two-pronged, democratic Arab-Jewish state based on equal rights for the Jewish and Arab populations.

4. If it turns out in the discussion of the Palestinian question that relations between Arabs and Jews have deteriorated so much that their peaceful existence in a two-pronged democratic State cannot be supported, then support the creation of two independent States, Arab and Jewish.

5. If a proposal to resettle 100,000 Jews in Palestine is put to the Assembly for discussion, we should support this proposal.

The above proposals, which define our attitude to the Palestinian question, have been communicated by Gromyko.

The need for additional proposals and guidance may arise after a report has been submitted by the UN committee investigating the situation in Palestine.

Head of the Middle East Division

I.Bakulin

**REFERENCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST
DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN
MINISTRY "ON THE UN SPECIAL
COMMISSION ON PALESTINE" July 31, 1947**

Secretly

The Special Commission on Palestine, established under a UN General Assembly resolution of 15 May 1947, comprises representatives of 11 countries: Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia (the commission's chairman is representative of Sweden Sand-strom).

The Commission's task was, as indicated in the resolution, to prepare for the next session of the Assembly of the report on Palestine, which included specific proposals by the commission on how to resolve the Palestinian problem.

The United Nations Palestinian Commission, with the broadest powers to state and record facts and investigate all issues related to the Palestinian problem, authorized to hear statements (written or oral) of representatives from the mandate-holder country, representatives from the Palestinian population and other Governments, drawing maximum attention to the religious interests of Islam, Judaism and Christianity.

The dedicated commission, after resolving procedural issues and reviewing the materials on Palestine, arrived in Palestine on 15 June this year to carry out its tasks by directly examining the situation on the ground through contact with local residents, Arabs and Jews.

Even during the Session of the Assembly, where the Palestinian issue was discussed, Arab delegates demanded that issues on the agenda of the session to terminate the mandate and grant independence to Palestine as an Arab State were included; later, when the objectives of the Commission on Palestine were discussed, the Arabs insisted on the need to include in

its responsibility the investigation in Palestine to terminate the mandate and grant it full independence, considering separately the issue of Jewish refugees from the Palestinian problem. Such conditions had not been accepted by the Assembly, and the Arabs had expressed their negative attitude towards the Palestinian Commission.

According to the decision of the Supreme Arab Executive Committee, referred to the United Nations on 14 June this year, the Arab part of the Palestinian population was prohibited under threat of treason charges of having any contact with the members of the commission in order to provide information about the Arabs of Palestine. The boycott, according to Jamal al-Husseini, vice-chairman of the Arab Executive Committee, even extended to events held in honour of the commission. According to press reports, the boycott was very effective and, as the delegate of Yugoslavia to the UN commission on Palestine Simic points out in a telegram to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, was arranged on the orders of the British with the intention of obstructing the work of the commission and diminishing its credibility. The British desire to prevent the commission from doing so is also evidenced by the fact that the British authorities in Palestine, despite the Assembly's resolution to abstain from any acts that might interfere with the work of the commission on Palestine, timed the execution of three Jews accused of anti-English sabotage to the day of its work in Palestine. The resulting wave of resentment of the Palestinian Jewish population made it much more difficult to establish contact not only with the Arabs because of their boycott, but also with the Jews. The members of the commission, with the exception of the Yugoslavs and a few others, according to reports from the Secretary of the Yugoslav Delegation to the Palestinian Commission of Churchia, were extremely

indifferent to the work of the commission and were treated by the British, who, through various combinations and frauds, sent the commission members to well-prepared points and prevented the free visit to Arab settlements. The commission's staff were largely singled out from among the British, who, at their discretion, for the purpose of "safety", sorted the persons admitted to the commission, which also had a significant impact on the objectivity of the survey. During the Palestinian commission's work, Palestinian Jews continued to be terrorised against the British, and the commission was forced to call on clandestine Jewish terrorist organizations to respect the international organization and its commission. After that, the anti-English speeches of Jewish terrorists ceased, but the British upheld the provisions restricting the activities of the commission. The Press reported cases in which the British, under the pretext of security, arrested Jews who, at their discretion, could pass anti-English information to the commission. The commission's meetings were largely closed and little material was published about its work, which also prevented the involvement of the Palestinian population in order to obtain the necessary information.

After a visit to Palestine and a study of the British administration's report on the work done by the British, the commission heard from the Jewish Agency and visited Beirut and Amman between 20 and 24 July, where they heard testimony from Arab representatives.

The departure of the commission from Palestine was a signal for the beginning of new anti-English protests by the Jews. As a result of the ensuing wave of terror, 73 British soldiers were killed and wounded between 18 and 25 July this year alone. Palestinian Arabs, concerned about the increased Jewish activity,

are increasingly expressing outrage and demanding stronger action against Jewish terrorists.

Statements of representatives of Jews of the UN Commission on Palestine

The Jewish Agency, according to the statement of the Chairman of the Executive Committee Ben-Gurion of June 4 this year, demands the creation of a Jewish state for the whole of Palestine, the abolition of the English White Paper of 1939, which restricts Jewish immigration to Palestine, and the promotion of the Arab-Jewish alliance. This plan is characterized by Ben-Gurion as the basis for the restoration of freedom in Palestine, justice for the Jewish people and stability, progress and prosperity of the Middle East. In another statement, Ben-Gurion pointed out that the Jewish Agency would be unapologetically responsible for all activities relating to the formation of a bi-national state and the imposition of a mandate over Palestine by Britain or the United Nations.

The World Jewish Congress supported the Jewish agency's demands (a letter from the Chairman of the Congress of Weiz to the secretariat of the UN Commission on Palestine).

The Jewish terrorist organization Irgun declared its rejection of the solution to the Palestinian question through the partition of Palestine and made demands:

1. England must evacuate its troops from Palestine and renounce the indirect control of Transjordan.

2. Immediately form a provisional Jewish government.

3. The Government should organize the repatriation of Jews.

4. To hold general elections in Palestine.

5. To issue an international loan to raise the standard of living of the Palestinian population.

The Anglo-Jewish Association, in a memorandum submitted to the UN commission, stated that it did not

see a favourable alternative to the partition of Palestine and stated that the section "should be in a form that does not necessarily mean severing all ties between different regions".

Samuel Mikunis, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Palestine, said in a statement to the commission on June 13, describing British rule in Palestine as a "bloody colonial regime", demanded the immediate evacuation of British troops from Palestine and the creation of a "free independent democratic state of Palestine".

Another member of the Palestinian Communist Party, who addressed the commission, stated that "Palestine should no longer serve as a military camp for the imperialist army".

Stern's Jewish underground organization said that if the United Nations decided to establish an independent Jewish state in Palestine, the underground organization would provide them with armed assistance.

Hagan's underground Palestinian army has stated that it is strong enough to challenge any anti-Zionist policy in Palestine. "If necessary," her memorandum says, "we will use force."

The Chairman of the Palestinian organization Ishuv (Union), Dr. Leon Magnes, asked the commission to allow the immediate admission to Palestine of 100 OA Jews currently in camps for displaced persons in Europe, and spoke out against the partition of Palestine, describing the plan for the partition of Palestine as a great misfortune for Arabs and Jews.

The Revisionist Party demanded the establishment of a Jewish independent state and the restoration of the historic borders of Palestine between the Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Desert, including Transjordan, the annulment of the English mandate for

Palestine and the evacuation of British troops and the British administration from the country.

Representatives of the League of Arab-Jewish Rapprochement stated that the Palestinian problem could only be resolved by taking into account the common political objectives of both Arabs and Jews, and they would be satisfied if a single bi-national State was established in Palestine.

The World Peace League, in its memorandum to the UN Commission, calls for the establishment of a Jewish independent state in what is now a Jewish stronghold in Jerusalem. "The rest," the memorandum states, "should remain for five years under the UN mandate with the permission of Jewish colonization... so that, at the end of this period, this part of Palestine will be annexed to the Jewish State."

Arab statements

The Arab Executive Committee, as mentioned above, decided to boycott the UN commission and called on all Arabs not to give any testimony to the members of the commission. The attitude of Palestinian Arabs towards the activities of the UN Palestinian Commission can only be judged by the statements reported in the Arab press by the leaders of Palestinian Arabs and Arabs of other countries, which are reduced to the demand to end the British mandate on Palestine, grant it independence and suspend Jewish immigration to Palestine. The representatives of the Arab countries, according to the statement of the Syrian President Shukri al-Kuati, published in the newspaper "Oryan" on 21 July this year, fully share the opinion of Palestinian Arabs and will oppose the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state on its territory.

The only correct solution to the Palestinian question, according to Arab representatives, outlined in the memorandum submitted on behalf of Arab countries to the UN commission in Beirut on 22 July this year, is the formation of a free government in Palestine on the basis of proportional representation.

Jamal al-Husseini, vice-chairman of the Arab Executive Committee in Palestine, told BRC correspondent Nixon expressed dissatisfaction with the British's connivance towards Jewish terrorists and said that if the UN decision was unfavourable to the Arabs, they would oppose the decision by all means they have.

Jamal al-Husseini, in a speech at an Arab rally in Haifa on July 6 this year, called on the Arabs to revolt "if Britain and the United Nations do not grant the Arabs their legal rights."

Emil Touma, a spokesman for the Palestine National Liberation League, said at a press conference on July 5 this year that his group rejected the proposal for the partition of Palestine and supported the Arab boycott of the UN commission on Palestine.

Touma spoke out against the Zionists and pointed out that the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine would be used as a base for Anglo-American imperialism, "which intends to crush the Arab countries and impose on them reactionary plans, such as the project of Great Syria and the Eastern Bloc, and to cause a war against the countries of the new democracy and the Soviet Union."

Findings

Summing up the statements of the Jewish people on the question of Palestine, it can be concluded that they demand the organization in Palestine of a Jewish state with the right of unrestricted admission to

Palestine of Jewish immigrants from other countries. Only a certain part of the Jewish population doubts the possibility of resolving the Palestinian problem by establishing a unified Arab-Jewish State there on the basis of full mutual respect and cooperation.

As far as the Arabs were concerned, they did not accept the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine and demanded the formation of a free government in Palestine on the basis of proportional representation of all Palestinian nationalities and religious groups.

Head of the Middle East Division

I. Bakulin

**RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION
BETWEEN E. EPSTEIN, THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON,
WASHINGTON, AND M.S. VAVILOV, THE
FIRST SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET
EMBASSY IN THE UNITED STATES. July 31,
1947**

Confidential

Mr. and Mrs. Vavilov were invited the day before for lunch at our home, which gave me the opportunity to discuss the situation in Palestine in more detail than was possible earlier in more formal meetings. Mr. Vavilov has been working at the Soviet Embassy in

Washington for many years and has been involved in press and public relations.

His responsibilities include informing Moscow, along with other questions, about events in Jewish circles in the United States. He has extensive ties to Jews in New York and a large amount of general information about American Jewry.

Much of the conversation during and after lunch concerned life in Palestine in the social, economic and cultural fields; both Vavilov and his wife showed great interest in the conversation and asked many questions.

Mr. Vavilov pointed out that the conditions in Palestine were well known in Moscow and only after a thorough exhaustive analysis of the situation in Palestine was Gromyko authorized to make a statement at the special session of the UN General Assembly. The Soviet government understands the desire of the Jews, as well as the need for statehood, and our work in Palestine has convinced the Soviet government that we can achieve this. The Soviet Government does not pursue any self-interest in Palestine and in supporting the Jewish question. The Soviet Government is well aware that the social and economic structure of Thelshuw is capitalist and that our experience in building collective farms has nothing to do with the Marxist interpretation of the principles of collectivism. However, it believes that we are building a peace-loving, democratic and progressive society in Palestine that can prevent the spread of anti-Soviet sentiments that so easily emerge in reactionary ruling circles in Arab countries today.

It is also clear that Palestine is the only solution to the problem of homeless Jewish displaced persons in Europe. Mr. Vavilov illustrated the inability to find a home for displaced persons outside Palestine, citing

Straton's bill, which was frozen by Congress, probably for a long time.

He continued, saying that the Soviet government was satisfied with the reaction of Jewish public opinion in the United States, Palestine and around the world to Gromyko's statement. He sent a large number of clippings from Jewish newspapers to Moscow in the United States, which approved the position of the Soviet government and Mr. Gromyko on the Palestinian issue. He wrote a number of inquiries on the subject based on conversations he had with many Jewish leaders in the United States. He concluded that the vast majority of Jews in America were either Zionists or sympathizers of Zionism, and that support for the struggle of The Jews in Palestine was not limited to any particular group, organization or party among Jews in America. He ridiculed the "harmful propaganda" of some anti-Soviet circles in the United States, including the Jewish ones, that Gromyko's statement was not intended to help the Jews, but was a springboard to attack the British, that it was more intended to cause further trouble for the British and American governments in relations with the Arabs than to help the Jews. If that were the case, Gromyko would not advocate the creation of Jewish statehood and would not commit the Soviet government to some policy in this regard. Moreover, the British have enough problems in the Middle East and elsewhere, so it hardly seems necessary for the Soviet Union to make efforts to speak on this issue.

Although Mr. Vavilov listened intently when I made the case against a bi-national State in Palestine, he was reluctant to speak out in favour of partition, the second alternative mentioned in Gromyko's statement. However, he noted that the issue of the partition of Palestine would be thoroughly studied, as would the problem of a bi-national State. Priority will be given to

a solution that will be the most realistic and constructive. Mr. Vavilov suggested that we provide them with all the materials we published in the United States, which would be sent to Moscow.

**RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION
BETWEEN E. EPSTEIN, THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON,
WASHINGTON, AND M.S. VAVILOV, THE**

**FIRST SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET
EMBASSY IN THE UNITED STATES.**

September 11, 1947

Confidentially

On September 2, Mr. Vavilov invited me to the Soviet Embassy for breakfast. When I arrived, he introduced me to Mr. Yuri M. Bruslov, the second secretary of the embassy, who then joined us.

Mr. Vavilov, whom I had met earlier, informed me that he had been appointed a member of the Soviet delegation to the UN General Assembly and had been instructed to collect all possible information on Palestine. Although he believed that his Government in Moscow had all the material we had submitted to UNSCOP, he would like to have another compilation of them in Lake Success as reference material. I promised to give him a copy of all the memorabilia and statements submitted to UNSCOP by the agency, although we ourselves, unfortunately, lacked such materials.

Mr. Vavilov then moved on to the UNSCOP reports on Palestine and asked our opinion on the recommendations of the majority and minority. I explained our approach to the two UNSCOP reports and added that we regretted learning that the representative of Yugoslavia had signed the minority report, as it meant the complete surrender of Jewish rights to the Arab majority in the proposed federal State, although there was an obvious attempt to mask that fact through distracting terminology, such as the use of the phrase "Jewish State". I went on to say that, as we understand, Mr. Gromyko's statement on a bi-national State provides for full equality for the Jewish

and Arab peoples in Palestine and that, if the minority option is adopted, such equality is jeopardized.

Mr. Vavilov interrupted me at this place to say that although the Yugoslav delegate had voted for the minority report, the representative of Czechoslovakia had joined the majority, a testament to the free decision by the two Governments on the Palestinian issue. He made it clear that the position of the Soviet Government expressed by Mr. Gromyko remained the same, without any change, and that the Soviet delegation would act in accordance with the principles set out by Mr. Gromyko. Nevertheless, there are many practical aspects of the Palestinian settlement that are of great interest to the Soviet Government, and he would very much like to know how we regard these issues. The USSR, for example, would like to know about the attitude of Jews living in America to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. In response, I described how Palestinian affairs are perceived in the Jewish community of America, recalled the history of the Balfour Declaration and the role of American Jewry in its publication. Then he mentioned the organization of the Jewish Agent- a movement in 1929 with the active participation of Jewish non-Zionist leaders of the United States, the Biltmore program, endorsed by the vast majority of Jewish organizations in America, the American Jewish Workers' Council, which works with 150 working organizations to assist the Zionist cause, and finally, the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry, which also pushed the American Jewish Committee to support the majority of the Zionist demands in Palestine. I then mentioned the role of the Yiddish press and concluded by saying that, apart from a small group led by Lessing Rosenwald and several members of the Polish Bund who had taken refuge in America, there was virtually no organized opposition to Zionism or the

establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine among the five million American Jews.

Mr. Vavilov then asked about the attitude of the non-Jewish American public towards Zionism and the Jewish state in Palestine. I again had to make a history in history, from President Wilson to President Truman's statement on October 4, 1946, and I referred to joint resolutions of the United States Congress of 1922 and 1945 in support of the Jewish National Hearth in Palestine, as well as the very recent resolutions on Palestine adopted by the Democratic and Republican parties at their national conventions in 1944.

I have paid particular attention to the support that Zionism has found in the working movement in this country and the assistance we have received in many aspects from the executive bodies of the PPT and the ATF and their sister organizations. In conclusion, I mentioned the support that the Zionist cause received from the American press and radio in general, with relatively few exceptions, and particularly emphasized the value of that support during the special session of the UN General Assembly on Palestine.

Mr. Vavilov and Mr. Bruslov interrupted me several times to ask which of the reports is more friendly to us, the more support we have from the PPC or from the ATF, which of the leaders is particularly located to us, the common background of American support for the Zionist cause is stronger in the East or the West of the country, etc.

When Mr. Vavilov asked me about the reaction of the American press to the UNSCOP recommendations, I drew his attention to the editorials of leading newspapers in New York and Washington, which generally supported the majority report and called for greater American participation in the implementation of its recommendations. I quoted an article published that day by Mr. Arthur Croc as a significant example of

a fairly new approach adopted by a newspaper that for several years had either avoided discussions on Palestine or had written about Palestine in the spirit of sharp opposition to the Zionist elements and the Jewish national hearth.

In conclusion, Mr. Vavilov asked me what I saw as the relationship between the Jewish state in Palestine and the USSR. In my reply, I mentioned that the main interests of the Jewish state must necessarily include social and economic development and the preservation of peace. For geographical, economic and political reasons, establishing satisfactory relations with the USSR should obviously be a matter of primary concern for the Jewish state. The relative proximity of the USSR to Palestine, the possibility of mutually beneficial economic exchange should inevitably lead the Jewish state to the desire to establish a relationship of friendship and understanding with the Soviet Union. I mentioned the spirit of friendship towards the Russian people, which was expressed in the activities of the V League, as well as in the satisfaction with which the Jewish public and the press in Palestine accepted Gromyko's statement at the special session of the UN General Assembly.

In conclusion, I mentioned that the structure of the Jewish community was consistent with the model of Western democracy and would probably remain so. At the same time, its essence will be progressive, and its purpose is creation and development. Perpetuating poverty, disease and backwardness in the Middle East is not in the interests of Jews or Russians. By helping to revive the region in which they are forced to live, the Jews of Palestine would contribute to the well-being of all. The view of the Middle East is based on three concepts: equality in independence, social reform and international cooperation. These ideas, we

believe, will be fully in line with the interests of the Soviet Union and its wishes and hopes for the region.

At the end of the breakfast, Mr. Vavilov asked me if I could present a short note that would contain the main points of our discussion, in particular the analysis of the reports of the majority and minority, the reaction of the Jews to the report, the general American reaction, what the relationship of the Jewish state with the USSR would be. This note was later prepared by Arthur Lurie and handed over to Mr. Vavilov along with other UNSCOP materials.

**FROM THE RECORDING OF A
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON, E.
EPSTEIN, WITH S.K. TSARAPKIN, THE
CHARGE D.C. CHARGE D.C., AND
M.S.VAVILOV, THE FIRST SECRETARY OF
THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN THE UNITED
STATES. Jerusalem, September 23, 1947**

After consulting with Mr. Berman on Monday, 22 September, I met with Mr. Viktor Hangulov of the Soviet Mission in Beirut. I first met Mr. Hangulov a few months ago, during his previous visit to Palestine.

At the beginning of our conversation, Hangulov thanked me for the book I sent him at his request (a collection of articles on Great Syria published by the Trans-Jordan government). I noted that since our last conversation there have been important political developments related to Palestine, and in particular the expression of the essence of Soviet policy in Gromyko's speech. He confirmed this and immediately

went on the counterattack, saying that he would like to hear the assessment of Rabbi Silver's statement that the Soviet Union's support was disastrous for the cause of the Jews. I replied that, to my knowledge, it was a distortion of what Rabbi Silver had said. In any case, such comments should be taken as nothing more than a personal statement. American Zionism reflects the mindset of various segments of Jewish society here, even the Jewish communists in America take a much more positive stance against the Zionist idea than the Palestinian Communist Party. It is clear that such statements do not reflect the position of world Zionism, even less the position of Ishuwa in Palestine. Here we briefly discussed the positions of the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States and agreed that after Roosevelt's death, they were difficult to distinguish from each other.

I informed Mr. Hangulov that one of the evening newspapers described him as an "emissary of Armenian Zionism". He laughed and asked if this was a stunt by Mr. B. Sveta, who had visited him the day before. I explained to him that Mr. Light was a serious journalist who did not need sensational headlines and was not cooperating with the evening newspaper. Mr. Hangulov then explained that his connection to the Armenian issue was a coincidence and that he was a diplomatic representative of the USSR with no special ties to the Armenian community. Returning to the main subject of our conversation, I said that I have questions for him. After Gromyko's speech, we are increasingly convinced that the USSR does not ignore the rights of Jews and seeks a just solution for both peoples. In various conversations that have taken place recently in the United States and elsewhere, we have received confirmation that the line outlined in Gromyko's speech is a constant political attitude on the Palestinian issue. Hangulov, who nodded his head,

agreeing with my remarks, stopped me to ask whether the meetings had actually taken place in the United States. I confirmed this and said that among the questions our representatives were: why do we prefer the UN commission's majority plan to the minority plan? What is the position of Jewish and public opinion in the United States on Zionism? And how do we see the relationship between the USSR and the Jewish state when they are established?

I went on to say that while a favourable exchange of views like this is happening everywhere, in the Middle East we cannot achieve normal links, which creates a lack of understanding and insecurity among people. There is no Soviet representation in Palestine, and it is difficult for us to reach Lebanon. The mission in Egypt operates under surveillance and espionage (Hangulov comments: "Very true"). Indeed, Soviet representatives visit Palestine, but we learn about it only by chance from the press, and sometimes do not know about it. I gave him an example of an undesirable development: a few weeks ago, Hussein's newspaper Al-Wah Hell published a report on a statement made by the director of the information office of the Soviet Embassy in Beirut that the Soviet bloc, together with Muslim countries, number 15 or more, would oppose the UN decision proposed by a special commission. We assumed that this was nothing more than a provocation, but there was no one to ask, and the ordinary reader could only be surprised: on the one hand, Gromyko's statement, and on the other hand, an attack of this kind.

Hangulov began to talk about the nature of Russian diplomacy for quite a long time. He stressed that this was direct diplomacy and that I should understand the principle that diplomats would not fit into schemes or commit actions that did not fully correspond to the most official public statements under any

circumstances. "Even the Americans say that it is enough to read "Izvestia" or "Truth" to find out what Gromyko's position on the issue will be. It may not always be a successful tactic, but it is our way, and we will follow it anyway." As for the statement above, I was right to assume that it was merely a fruitless provocation. There are only two Soviet representatives in Beirut with the right to make such statements. This is Mr. Solod, a Soviet envoy and himself, Hangulov. In addition, there is also Mr. Podvigni in Beirut, but he is the consul and his task is only to deal with such matters as passports, citizenship and the like, as well as to maintain links with VOCS (delivery of literature and press). The USSR has a temporary charge in Damascus, he is subordinate to the mission in Beirut, which is currently responsible for both countries (during this detailed description Hangulov does not define his position or role and only repeats several times that he is a diplomatic, not consular representative and that the local press all the time incorrectly indicates his position). Naturally, none of those he mentioned made a statement published in Al-Wahada. Hangulov then said that, frankly, the reason he refrained from meeting with Ishuwa officials was because he had bitter experience. He had such negotiations, but they were given a completely distorted and mocking tone publication. I did not want to ask him directly what negotiations he meant, but I noticed that, to my knowledge, he had not met with the officials of the Jewish Agency and that the conversation with Ms. G. Meyerson, which we had agreed to at the last meeting, had not yet taken place. He then asked me how I imagined the meetings I had proposed. He was prepared to conduct them on the understanding that information about them should not be made public and that their character should be absolutely "personal and friendly". I agreed to his

terms and mentioned several topics: the issue of Great Syria, which is of interest to both of us (this topic did not seem to like him), the possible outcome of the discussions at the UN General Assembly (obviously, it is necessary to be careful, the British will try to complicate the situation in order to preserve the status quo, but do not think that it will remain indefinitely; he agreed with my assumption), the topic of cultural and economic relations), the topic of cultural and economic relations). that the V League is unable to develop to a large extent, despite its good intentions, etc.

Here we exchanged short remarks about the V League. He stated that the League saw its task accomplished in connection with the end of the war. I tried to protect the League. We returned to the topic of our conversation: he promised to inform me about every future visit. He would like to meet With Ms. G. Meyerson on his next visit. He had heard that she was about to resign and that she had had lengthy conversations with the High Commissioner. I replied that these things were in no way related and that the reports of her resignation were unfounded. I spoke briefly to him about terrorism (our opposition to terrorism, on the one hand, our refusal to "cooperate" with the authorities on the other), repatriation, Exodus,⁶⁷ immigration of children.⁶⁸ I noted that the Government of Palestine is not authorized to negotiate on major political issues. He said he read about "Exodus" and the immigration of children on our ballot. I asked him about the ballot, and he replied that he particularly liked ballot number 13, which did not contain anything superfluous and provided a fair amount of informative material, in particular a selection of decisions of the UN commission. We agreed that we cannot expect to receive the reports of the Commission on Palestine every two weeks in order to put their contents on the ballot paper. He wanted to

know if Ms. Meyerson spoke Russian: his English was very poor. I said I would be present during the conversation, so the language barrier would be overcome.

We talked a little bit about the Russian ships "Russia" and "Victory." ("Victory" will transport the Armenians when they can leave.

After a few comments about Soviet literature, etc., he asked me what my situation was at the Jewish Agency. I told him I was working for the Political Department, which handles foreign affairs. I am the deputy director of the school of our "diplomats" and specialize in Soviet affairs: I issue a newsletter, read the Soviet press and literature and try (so far with little success) to maintain normal relations with Soviet representatives in this part of the world. He showed interest in the school and then noticed that the desired relationship would undoubtedly be established in due course. At the end of the conversation, when I was about to leave, he asked if I could give him a note about political parties in Ishuva and illegal organizations (as an example of illegal organizations he mentioned Lehi). He doesn't ask me to give away secrets (here we smiled at each other like two burglars), but they lack concentrated objective information. He would like to have materials in Russian language. I expressed my willingness to send the materials and asked how to deliver them. After some hesitation, he asked if we could send a note in a sealed envelope in his name to the Yugoslav Consulate in Jerusalem. When I left, Manja Shohat (probably from The V League) came in. She did not consult with us in advance when to come in, and we are not aware of the subject of the conversation between them.

I am preparing a commemorative note in accordance with Hangulov's request.

**TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO**

**DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR
A.Y. VYSHINSKY, TO NEW YORK. September
30, 1947.**

The majority's opinion on the partition of Palestine should not be objected to. The rest agree with your suggestions.

Get confirmed.

Hammers

**TELEGRAM OF DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY
TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV, FROM NEW
YORK. October 15, 1947**

Soy.

Our statement on Palestine was met with very approving approval by the Jews. The Arabs were disappointed, although they had very little hope of changing our position after Gromyko's emergency session. The Syrian had told him before Tsa-Rapkin's speech that if the Assembly decided to base the Special Committee's report, they would then be inclined to focus on the minority plan, as far as the majority plan was concerned, it was totally unacceptable to the Arabs.

Arabs, although dissatisfied with our position, but the main fire of their criticism at the committee meeting directed against the Americans. They were particularly angry with the American proposal to establish police units of volunteers to maintain order in Palestine during the transitional period. Johnson expressed satisfaction that the Soviet position on the question of Palestine is very similar to that of the Americans. The press also notes this and favourably comments on our statement.

On 14 October, the Yugoslav representative defended the minority report, of which he is one of the authors.

Vyshinsky

**TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR
A.Y. VYSHINSKY, TO NEW YORK. October 16,
1947**

Secret.

First. Your proposals on paragraphs 2, 3 and 469 agree.

Second. We see no grounds for objection to the Colombian proposal. From a political point of view, it would seem appropriate to support this proposal, as it provides, along with the issue of immigration to Palestine of 150,000 Jews, a solution to the common problem of impoverished European Jews. It is necessary, however, to find out the opinion of the Jews themselves. If the Colombian proposal suits them, you should not object to this proposal.

Be informed of the following.

Hammers

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE BOARD OF THE
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE M.
SHERTOK WITH THE CHARGE D.S. CHARGE
D.S. S.K.TSARAPKIN. New York, October 26,
1947**

Present: Mr. S.Tsarapkin, Prof. Stein, Mr. M. Schertok, Mr. E. Epstein, Mr. D. Horowitz.

The meeting took place at the suggestion of Mr. Tsarapkin, although for some reason the Russian representatives felt it necessary to pretend that we had asked for a meeting. We weren't interested in arguing about it. At the beginning of the interview, Mr. Tsarapkin said that since the Special Committee on the Palestinian issue would soon begin a detailed analysis of the situation, they would like to examine the issues on the agenda, and he personally asked for our position to be presented. During the conversation, the Russian side did not express readiness or, moreover, promise to accept our point of view, but at the same time it was demonstrated a desire to familiarize ourselves with our position and understand it. The conversation was like they wanted to get something like a briefing from us. We have decided on some issues to present possible alternatives, stressing that we have not yet taken a final decision on these

alternatives. Over the past three weeks, we have received several reports that their position towards us has turned for the worse and they intend to withdraw their support for the majority recommendation in the UN committee on Palestine. In response, we were informed that at a meeting of representatives of the Slavic bloc when discussing the Palestinian problem, a high-ranking Russian representative criticized the representative of Yugoslavia for joining the recommendations of the minority in the Special Commission, and said, "You ignore the tragedy that the Jews suffered in this war and forget that we have a duty to them."

The following questions were raised during the conversation:

1. Our interlocutors recalled that the committee should decide on 17 proposals and asked what our opinion was. After explaining the details, M. Shertok summed up: although there may be disagreements on a particular issue, we are interested in making decisions on two proposals:

- (a) The adoption of the majority report and the formation of a subcommittee to implement it;

- b) immediate repatriation (Simic's proposal along with Fabregat's proposal plus immigrants from the Exodus ship).

Judging by The Reaction of Tsarapkin, we have the impression that our position is acceptable for them.

2. On the composition of the subcommittee. Mr. Schertok outlined the information we received about the composition of the subcommittee (representatives of the five great powers, Belgium, Czech Republic, Brazil, Mexico, Australia, Iceland and Iraq, and if Iraq refuses, Pakistan or Iran will be replaced). Schertok said that a subcommittee of this composition would clearly lean towards the Arab position, and suggested that only representatives of countries that supported

the recommendations of the majority should participate in such structures. Our interlocutors agreed that the Arabs should not be disturbed, but did not accept our position on participation in the subcommittee only by supporters of the proposals of the majority and "uninterested" countries.

The question of boundaries. We explained that those who advocate the reduction of the territory recommended by the majority plan are trying to argue that it is necessary to reduce the Arab minority in the Jewish state, but at the same time they are going to take away from us the Negev and other territories where there is no population at all or it is extremely small. We also explained the importance to us of Galilee, but did not hide that under known conditions we can ask for the inclusion in the territory of the Jewish state only those 370,000 dunums, which are referred to in the "Lifshitz plan". We stressed that the advantage of this plan is that we get 250,000 dunums of desert in the Negev and do not claim Toku. As for Jaffa, we made it clear that we would not suggest that this city be taken away from us, but if there was pressure in that direction, we would not resist. On the issue of Haifa, we explained that this is an example of a Jewish-majority territory where problems are solved in cooperation with the Arab minority. On the question of Jerusalem, after explaining the structure of the city and the possibilities of its partition geographically and demographically, two possibilities were mentioned, in addition to the existing one at that hour: the partition of the city into three parts, so that the Jewish part would be subject to the laws of the Jewish State, or the expansion of the international regime to the west and south (so that the territory included 9 Jewish settlements) and to the east (including the Potash and Kibbutz Khaarawa factories). We also noted that the same regime could be introduced in Jerusalem as in

Jaffa, referring to free passage from one area to another.

4. We explained that we would demand the full participation of our representatives in the subcommittee, i.e., so that we could participate in the discussion not only when we were invited, but each time we deem it necessary. This demand was met with full understanding by the interlocutors.

The problem of implementation. After talking about the actions of the British in terms of withdrawal and cooperation in the transfer of administrative affairs (it is not clear how they are going to do it), we said that we are not going to force them out by force of weapons, but in any case we will not try to detain them. We believe that it is necessary to be prepared for the immediate taking of power in Jewish areas, but this requires certain power structures appointed by the UN to monitor the transfer of power and for all parties to respect the decisions of the world community. Power should be transferred to the Jews at once, but if the British agree to cooperate, we do not mind: then it is possible that the power will be transferred in stages, albeit in a short time. As for the security forces, it makes sense to discuss two possibilities: either Jewish militias are being established that will receive weapons from abroad, or it will be a UN force operating with the assistance of Jews. If the first proposal is accepted, a small symbolic international brigade will be needed. Then the question arises from which countries to recruit soldiers and officers. Our interlocutors have raised the question of who should appoint a monitoring body and which commission or other UN body should be responsible for it. We explained that, in our view, it is desirable to carry out these appointments in the same way as the issues related to Palestine have so far been resolved, i.e. by establishing bodies or commissions only for that particular purpose. We do

not want control to be in the hands of the Guardian Council, whose composition and bodies do not correspond to the specifics of our problems. The Russians who did not participate in the Council generally agreed with this position, and Stein explained that our problems would not be solved in the same way that Samoa's Aboriginal problems were being addressed. At the same time, the Russians did not agree with our proposal for a special mechanism and tried to find out the possible advantages of transferring the relevant powers to the Security Council. They reiterated this position when discussing military issues, stating that there was an entrenched practice of transferring all military problems to the competence of the Security Council. Mr. Schertok said that we do not think that the practice of connecting the Security Council is in any way contrary to or hinders the implementation of the solution of the Palestinian question. It was obvious to us that the Russians would like to refer this issue to the Security Council.

Economic cooperation. After discussing the details of the recommendation on economic cooperation, we explained that we were not encouraged by the recommendation, but we were prepared to accept it.

At the end of the conversation, we exchanged general words. M. Shertok thanked for the consent to the meeting, and Tsarapkin said that he hopes that this was only the first detailed discussion and in the near future this practice will continue.

**REFERENCE OF THE UN DEPARTMENT OF
THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY "TO THE
PALESTINIAN ISSUE" October 23, 1947**

Secretly

On 2 April 1947, the British Government asked the UN Secretary-General to put the question of Palestine on the agenda of the regular session of the General Assembly and, in addition, to convene a special session to establish a commission on the Palestinian issue.

The governments of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia have asked the Secretary-General to include the issue of ending Britain's mandate over Palestine and declaring its independence on the agenda of the special session.

On April 28, 1947, Mr. Gromyko was sent talking points for his address to the Assembly. The main thing in the talking points:

1. The mandate system of governance of Palestine established in 1922 failed the exam. According to the British Government itself, the mandate for Palestine has proved unfeasible in practice.

2. If the debate in the Assembly was essentially discussed on the abolition of the British mandate for Palestine, it would be in principle to support the abolition of that mandate.

3. Note that in the last war the Jewish people suffered exceptional calamities and suffering. The needs of a people who have suffered such suffering must be taken care of.

4. Consider the existence of different projects about the arrangement of Jews, with two possible options:

The first option is the formation of a two-pronged Arab-Jewish state with equal rights for Jews and Arabs.

If, however, this option may seem unfeasible, given the spoiled relations between Jews and Arabs, then the second option must be put forward: the division of Palestine into two separate States: Jewish and Arab.

If the question of resettlement of 100,000 Jews to Palestine were put forward in the discussion, the proposal would be supported.

On 28 April 1947, a special session of the General Assembly on the Palestinian issue opened in New York. Aranja (Brazil) was elected president of the session.

The General Assembly rejected the Arab proposal to end the mandate and grant independence to Palestine.

On 15 May, the General Assembly approved the composition, function and authority of the commission to study the Palestinian question.

During the General Assembly debate, only the SOVIET delegate made a political statement on the substance of the Palestinian question.

Representatives of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia were elected to the Special Commission.

On September 1, 1947, the Special Commission submitted its report to the UN.

The report contains a number of recommendations adopted unanimously by the Special Commission. Among them: the abolition of the mandate for Palestine, the granting of independence to Palestine as soon as possible, the establishment of a transitional period, the provision of three religions and "holy places" etc.

The majority of the commission concluded that Palestine should be divided into two states. The main recommendation of the majority in general coincides with our second option - the division of Palestine into two separate states.

The Commission has submitted two plans for the future of the Palestinian system:

1. The Majority Plan (endorsed by representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay) provides for the division of Palestine into two independent States, the Arab and the Jewish, united by an economic union. Jerusalem is transferred to the UN. The independence of both countries will be proclaimed after the end of the transitional period of two years. The transition is

managed by the United Kingdom under the supervision of the United Nations. During the transition period, 150,000 Jews are allowed to enter the Jewish state. Territorially, the Jewish state should include the Eastern Galilee, the Israel Level, the most of the coastal plain and the entire Area of Beersheba, including the Negev region. The Arab state should include Western Galilee, the Samaria and Judea regions, as well as the coastal plain from Aschdod to the Egyptian border.

2. The Minority Plan (endorsed by Yugoslavia, India and Iran) envisages the creation of a single independent federal state of Palestine, consisting of Arab and Jewish states with the capital Jerusalem. Responsibility for the administration of Palestine during a transitional period that should last up to three years rests with a special body appointed by the General Assembly. The issue of Jewish immigration during the transition period is referred to the UN Special Commission, which must include three representatives from Arabs and Jews.

On 23 September 1947, the second session of the General Assembly included the Palestinian issue on its agenda and was referred to the General Assembly's Special Committee on Palestine.

The USSR's position on the question of Palestine

On September 30, Vyshinsky was instructed by T. Molotov not to object to the opinion of the majority of the commission on the issue of the partition of Palestine. That. Molotov also agreed not to object to the panel's unanimous recommendations on the mandate, granting independence to Palestine, etc.

On the same day, Molotov sent additional instructions to our delegation on the Palestinian issue. The essence of these indications is that since, after the survey, the majority of the UN commission supported the creation of a separate Jewish state, our delegation

should support the majority opinion that is consistent with our basic attitude on this issue.

In connection with the discussion of the Palestinian issue in the Special Committee, Mr. Vyshinsky sought our opinion on the duration of the transition period, Jewish immigration to Palestine during the transition period, the number of Arabs in the Jewish state and the statute of Jerusalem.

Our position on these issues is expressed in the relevant statement sent by T. Vyshinsky on October 15. The guidelines are:

1. On all important Palestinian issues, the views of Jews should be sought. In particular, that should be done on the question of Jerusalem, for which a special statute would have to be established to ensure the interests of the three religions.

2. One should not fear the large minority of Arabs in the Jewish state, only to have less than 50% of Arabs. This situation cannot threaten the existence of an independent Jewish state, because inevitably the Jewish part in this state will grow.

The transition period should be shortened. It is impossible to leave England for this period. It is better to take the path of handing over control of Palestine to the Security Council.

Another important point in the USSR's position on the question of Palestine is the attitude towards Jewish immigration to Palestine.

In discussing the issue at the Special Committee, the Uruguayan delegation proposed that 30,000 Jewish children now in camps for displaced persons be allowed into Palestine immediately and to establish a quota for the immigration of the parents of those children to Palestine. We have indicated to our delegation that we do not object to this proposal.

Equally, we were positive about the proposal of the Colombian delegation to appeal on behalf of the

General Assembly to the people of Palestine to put an end to acts of violence, as well as to assist the United Nations in resolving the question of Palestine.

At this time, the general debate on the Palestinian issue has ended and the Special Committee is beginning to discuss draft resolutions introduced by various delegations.

My delegation will vote in favour of a Swedish-American resolution that proposes to adopt as a basis the basic principles outlined in the unanimously adopted recommendations of the commission on Palestine, as well as the plan of the majority of that commission. My delegation will also support the resolution of Yugoslavia to immediately allow all Jewish refugees currently living in camps on the island of Cyprus to enter Palestine without any quotas.

A. Timofeev

**NOTE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR B.M.MO TOTUBA TO
THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY (B), CHAIRMAN OF
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR
J.V. STALIN. October 26, 1947**

Secretly

In a telegram dated 27 October, Vyshinsky reports that the first subcommittee of the Palestinian Committee has begun to develop a plan for a transitional Palestinian arrangement based on the unanimous recommendations and report of the majority of the Special Committee.

Vyshinsky makes the following suggestions:

1. Repeal of the mandate from January 1, 1948
2. Withdrawal of British troops no later than 3-4 months after the abolition of the mandate.
3. Establishing a transition period of no more than one year from the abolition of the mandate.
4. The administration of Palestine during the transitional period is entrusted to the UN by the Security Council, through a special commission made up of representatives of the Member States of the Security Council. The commission's location is Palestine.
5. The Special Commission is working to establish the boundaries of the Jewish and Arab States in accordance with the General Assembly's decision to partition Palestine.

6. The Special Commission, after consultation with democratic parties and public organizations of the Jewish and Arab States, elects in each state a provisional government council, which is under the general direction of a special commission.

7. The Provisional Government Council of each State holds democratic elections within six months of its formation. Election provisions are drafted by government councils and approved by a special commission of the Security Council.

8. The Constituent Assembly of each State drafts a democratic constitution and elects a government.

9. Provisional Government Councils, after their formation, begin, under the supervision of a special commission, to establish central and local administrations.

10. These government councils should form an armed militia of their own citizens in the shortest possible time to maintain internal order and prevent border clashes. This armed militia will be operationally under the command of its national command, but the general military and political control over its activities will be carried out by a special commission.

Vyshinsky points out that the above provisions mostly coincide with the opinion of representatives of the Jewish Agency.

I propose to agree with Vyshinsky's proposals.

V. Molotov

On the document of the litter: "Tov. Poskrebyshv told the HF that Stalin agrees. 28.H. Podcerob."

**REPORTING BY L. GELBER, A POLITICAL
ADVISER TO THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR
PALESTINE IN NEW YORK, ON A
CONVERSATION WITH THE DIRECTOR OF
THE UNITED NATIONS DIVISION OF THE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, D. RASK.
November 5, 1947**

Strictly confidential

United States policy

On Sunday evening, November 2, 1947, as commissioned by the Jewish Agency board, I met again with Mr. Dean Rusk, Director of the United Nations Department of State Department (as he soon became known), to discuss an issue he raised in a conversation with me last Friday. He seemed satisfied with the content of the message I had been instructed to convey. With regard to unauthorized immigration to Palestine, he noted that it was as important for our relationship with the United States Government as it was for their relations with the British, so that we would "moderate our efforts somewhat". Once the monthly immigration figures, which were once again

proposed by Mr. Hershel Johnson, become part of the current plan, the problem, he said, will be solved by itself.

Mr. Rusk took me to Mr. Marshall's own hotel room. During the war, he was a colonel in the General Staff, until March 1947 he worked on the civilian line as a political assistant to the Minister of Defence and was presumably one of the new figures transferred to the State Department by the Secretary of State from among former colleagues in the army. It would be logical to assume that Mr. Rusk is not an ordinary head of the department, he is someone who enjoys the trust and speaks on behalf of General Marshall himself. If that is the case, some of Mr. Rusk's following statements should have been given the greatest importance.

1) For our own benefit, in his opinion, we should avoid any manifestation of attachment to Russia. Russia's speech in favour of partitioning its novelty in the seemingly partitionist policy is surprising. Now behind the scenes there is talk that Jewish displaced persons gather in Constanta on the Black Sea and sail to Palestine from the Russian zone. We can understand this fact ourselves as an expression of humane treatment on the part of the USSR, but others may interpret it as a manoeuvre of a great power in which displaced persons play the role of pawns and whose purpose is to cause concern to the Anglo-American group. Mr. Rusk advised us to take a closer look at the effect that any special connection that would be seen between the Zionists and the Soviet Union would have on the United States and the Western world.

2) As I asked, Mr. Rusk himself explains Russia's more sympathetic position to Jewish Palestine. He said he could not offer an official point of view, but could repeat what one observer had given him. There is an understanding in American circles that the main tool of

American policy against Russia today is the Marshall Plan. Equally, there is agreement that Russia's main goal towards the United States is to undermine the Marshall Plan and prevent its successful implementation. If, in order to achieve this goal, the Russians could attract the Jews of Europe (perhaps also America) to their side, they would enlist the support of a powerful influential force.

My answer to this reasoning was, of course, obvious. As Russians and Americans move in parallel with Palestine, there is no reason why the Jews of Europe should be more grateful to Russia than to the Americans. Moreover, if the Marshall Plan were to succeed in restoring some prosperity to Europe, Europe's surviving Jews would have an additional reason to thank the United States. The Americans would help them financially in their current situation, and they would do much to help them and their brothers, as positive policies on the Palestinian issue could help Palestinian and European Jewry equally. Having considered other possibilities, he did not rule out that the Russian policy in the Zionist issue may be a lack of interest, as he sees it from the point of view of the United States.

**SUMMARY OF THE LETTER OF THE
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE USSR IN IRAQ
A.F. SULTANOV TO THE MIDDLE EAST
DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
OF THE USSR. November 5, 1947**

Secret

Arab position

The Palestinian problem is now a major issue in the political life of Arab countries. Arab circles consider English imperialism to be a weaker enemy than Zionism, as the latter will realize the economic penetration of the Jewish capital and the Anglo-

American capital behind it into the Arab markets of neighbouring countries and the seizure of Transjordan and then Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. Moreover, there is no national threat to the Anglicization of Palestine, and the domination of British imperialism in the East will sooner or later cease. The Jews managed to create entire cities and large settlements in Palestine, settling indigenous people from parts of Palestine. "The establishment of a Jewish state at the heart of the Arab countries would threaten the realization of the Arab's historic dreams of restoring the economic and cultural unity of the Arab countries, as they would have to transit through a hostile Jewish Palestine." The Arabs do not object to guarantee equal democratic rights to the Jewish people of Palestine, subject to the eventual cessation of immigration and the claim to establish a separate Jewish State. The Arabs believe that if they do not prevent the creation of a Jewish state now, then it will be too late.

Local reaction to the position of the Soviet delegation to the UN on the Palestinian issue

Arab circles were confident that the Soviet Union would not agree to the project of creating a Zionist state for the following reasons:

1. The Soviet Union had always followed the principle of self-determination and assistance to the oppressed peoples of the East in their struggle for independence, and the Balfour Declaration was the result of the British desire to have a Zionist reserve in the event of a violent Arab desire for independence.

2. The Soviet Union supported the Indonesian Republic in the UN and Egypt's demands to evacuate British troops and cancel an unequal treaty with England.

3. Arab governments believed that the USSR “will always vote against Anglo-Americans on any issue.”

The reactionary press concluded from the speech of The Soviet Delegates to the UN that the Soviet Union “comes only from its own political interests” in resolving peaceful issues, and not on the principle of justice.

The Democratic and Communist Parties have always stood on the platform of not recognizing Balfour’s declaration as an imperialist venture and fighting zionism - the agents of British and American imperialism - and explained that the Soviet Union would support the Arabs. Therefore, the friends are somewhat confused and expect a rampage of internal reaction, encouraged by the Anglo-Saxons.

Disagreements between the Hashemites (Iraq and Transjordan), who want to annex the whole of Palestine or part of it to Transjordan as a first step towards the implementation of the Great Syria project, and other Arab countries on the future of Palestine weaken the position of the Arabs and facilitate the creation of conditions for the arab League’s agreement and to little acceptable to Arab nationalists decisions on the Palestinian issue or delay of a decision for a number of years.

T. Sultanov’s opinion on the creation of a Jewish state

Positive side: our position has aroused sympathy for the USSR Of Jewry all over the world, and in particular in America. If the Jewish state moves away from Anglo-American banks and dollar diplomacy, it could be a factor revolutionizing the Arab East.

Negatives:

1. Support for Jews can alienate the Arab world as a whole.

2. It will help the Anglo-Saxons to collude with the reactionary top of the Arab League at the expense of the people-democratic interests of the Arab countries and at the expense of the foreign policy interests of the USSR.

3. It will help to build an anti-Soviet Muslim bloc from the Arab League countries, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

4. It will facilitate imperialism by suppressing the democratic and revolutionary movement.

5. In addition, the Zionist state can become the base of Americans for expansion into the countries of the East.

6. "Arab governments, "confident" in supporting the Soviet Union and encouraged by the Anglo-Saxons, are using this circumstance to directly enter with the latter into a clearly anti-Soviet agreement on the further open representation of bases and strategic resources in the event of war against us."

"The well-known Arab tolerance and tolerance towards other nations is unlikely to take place in the Zionist national chauvinist state, especially if it is led by the current leadership of the Jewish Agency." (According to the UN plan, 500,000 Jews and 400,000 Arabs will live in the Jewish state, A.S.)

Compiled by BVI attache A.Semioshkin

**TELEGRAM OF DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY
TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

OF THE USSR V.M.MOLOTOV, FROM NEW YORK. November 18, 1947

Owls. Secretly

On the question of the Jerusalem regime, the rapporteur introduced a plan based on the report of the majority of the Palestinian Committee (pages 166-169 and 193-195). The text was sent by the clerk.

The following changes have been made to this plan compared to the majority plan.

First. Paragraph 1 is replaced by the text: "The city of Jerusalem will be formed as a separate corps with a special international regime and will be managed by the UN through:

- (a) The Guardianship Council, or
- (B) The Security Council, or
- (c) A special commission elected each year by the next General Assembly and made up of representatives of UN members who will be held accountable for governance on behalf of the UN."

Second. The size of the Jerusalem area remained unchanged from the description in paragraph 2 of the report of the majority of the Palestinian Committee.

Third. The following points of the majority report are: on page 166 paragraphs 1, 2, 3, page 167 paragraphs 4, 5, page 168 paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, page 193 paragraph 3 (1 and 2), page 194 paragraph 3 (3, 4, 5, 6), page 195 paragraph 3 (7, 8, 9, 10) included in this draft without a change, except for minor amendments to the editorial.

Fourth. The following additions have been made:

- 1) The body that will govern Jerusalem on behalf of the United Nations will draft and approve a detailed statute of the City of Jerusalem, which will include the main provisions set out in the plan under discussion.

2) The Governor will be appointed as the body that governs Jerusalem on behalf of the UN and will be responsible to him.

3) The Governor will submit for approval the body governing Jerusalem on behalf of the Un, a project providing for the allocation of Jewish suburbs of Jerusalem and the formation of a special urban unit (Jewish proposal).

4) A legislative council will be convened, elected by the adult population of the city without distinction of nationality and on the basis of universal, secret and proportional voting.

5) Representatives of the Arab and Jewish states will be appointed at the same time as the governor. Their responsibilities will be to protect the interests of their States and citizens.

6) Arabic, English and Hebrew are the official languages of the city.

7) The Statute of Jerusalem will remain in force for 10 years, after which there will be a popular vote and if two thirds of the votes are in favour of a revision, it will be revised.

In discussing the plan, we reserved our position as a whole, noting that the Security Council and the Guardian Council could be suitable for the administration of Jerusalem.

I believe that the General Assembly commission is not appropriate. The U.S. representative spoke in favor of the Guardianship Board. We believe that the Security Council as the governing body of Jerusalem is more appropriate, but this proposal has no chance. We consider it appropriate to speak in favour of the Guardian Council in this case. The Jews agree with this, fearing that otherwise the case will fail at all.

The above additions to the plan of the majority of the Palestinian Committee are not objectionable, but

we consider it appropriate to exclude English from official languages.

I ask for instructions, if possible, by the morning of November 19, when the next meeting will take place.

Vyshinsky

**TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR
A.Y. VYSHINSKY, TO NEW YORK. September
30, 1947**

Soe.secret

In addition to our No 106.

You must bear in mind that when the directive for Gromyko known to you as the first option to resolve the Palestinian question was proposed for the establishment of a two-state, we did so for tactical reasons. We cannot take the lead in the establishment of a Jewish state, but our position is better expressed by the second version of our directive on an independent Jewish state. Since, after the survey, the majority of the commission was in favour of the creation of a separate Jewish state, you should support the opinion of this majority, which corresponds to our basic set-up on this issue.

Get confirmed.

Hammers

**TELEGRAM OF DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY
TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE USSR V.M.MOLOTOV, FROM NEW
YORK. October 15, 1947**

Soy.

Our statement on Palestine was met with very approving approval by the Jews. The Arabs were disappointed, although they had very little hope of changing our position after Gromyko's emergency session. The Syrian had told him before Tsa-Rapkin's speech that if the Assembly decided to base the Special Committee's report, they would then be inclined to focus on the minority plan, as far as the majority plan was concerned, it was totally unacceptable to the Arabs.

Arabs, although dissatisfied with our position, but the main fire of their criticism at the committee meeting directed against the Americans. They were particularly angry with the American proposal to establish police units of volunteers to maintain order in Palestine during the transitional period. Johnson expressed satisfaction that the Soviet position on the question of Palestine is very similar to that of the Americans. The press also notes this and favourably comments on our statement.

On 14 October, the Yugoslav representative defended the minority report, of which he is one of the authors.

Vyshinsky

**TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR
A.Y. VYSHINSKY, TO NEW YORK. October 16,
1947**

Secret

First. Your proposals on paragraphs 2, 3 and 469 agree.

Second. We see no grounds for objection to the Colombian proposal. From a political point of view, it would seem appropriate to support this proposal, as it provides, along with the issue of immigration to Palestine of 150,000 Jews, a solution to the common problem of impoverished European Jews. It is necessary, however, to find out the opinion of the Jews themselves. If the Colombian proposal suits them, you should not object to this proposal.

Be informed of the following.

Hammers

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE BOARD OF THE
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE M.
SHERTOK WITH THE CHARGE D.S. CHARGE
D.S. S.K.TSARAPKIN. New York, October 26,
1947**

Present: Mr. S.Tsarapkin, Prof. Stein, Mr. M. Schertok, Mr. E. Epstein, Mr. D. Horowitz.

The meeting took place at the suggestion of Mr. Tsarapkin, although for some reason the Russian representatives felt it necessary to pretend that we had asked for a meeting. We weren't interested in arguing about it. At the beginning of the interview, Mr. Tsarapkin said that since the Special Committee on the Palestinian issue would soon begin a detailed analysis of the situation, they would like to examine the issues on the agenda, and he personally asked for our position to be presented. During the conversation, the Russian side did not express readiness or, moreover, promise to accept our point of view, but at the same time it was demonstrated a desire to familiarize ourselves with our position and understand it. The

conversation was like they wanted to get something like a briefing from us. We have decided on some issues to present possible alternatives, stressing that we have not yet taken a final decision on these alternatives. Over the past three weeks, we have received several reports that their position towards us has turned for the worse and they intend to withdraw their support for the majority recommendation in the UN committee on Palestine. In response, we were informed that at a meeting of representatives of the Slavic bloc when discussing the Palestinian problem, a high-ranking Russian representative criticized the representative of Yugoslavia for joining the recommendations of the minority in the Special Commission, and said, "You ignore the tragedy that the Jews suffered in this war and forget that we have a duty to them."

The following questions were raised during the conversation:

1. Our interlocutors recalled that the committee should decide on 17 proposals and asked what our opinion was. After explaining the details, M. Shertok summed up: although there may be disagreements on a particular issue, we are interested in making decisions on two proposals:

- (a) The adoption of the majority report and the formation of a subcommittee to implement it;

- b) immediate repatriation (Simic's proposal along with Fabregat's proposal plus immigrants from the Exodus ship).

Judging by The Reaction of Tsarapkin, we have the impression that our position is acceptable for them.

2. On the composition of the subcommittee. Mr. Schertok outlined the information we received about the composition of the subcommittee (representatives of the five great powers, Belgium, Czech Republic, Brazil, Mexico, Australia, Iceland and Iraq, and if Iraq

refuses, Pakistan or Iran will be replaced). Schertok said that a subcommittee of this composition would clearly lean towards the Arab position, and suggested that only representatives of countries that supported the recommendations of the majority should participate in such structures. Our interlocutors agreed that the Arabs should not be disturbed, but did not accept our position on participation in the subcommittee only by supporters of the proposals of the majority and "uninterested" countries.

The question of boundaries. We explained that those who advocate the reduction of the territory recommended by the majority plan are trying to argue that it is necessary to reduce the Arab minority in the Jewish state, but at the same time they are going to take away from us the Negev and other territories where there is no population at all or it is extremely small. We also explained the importance to us of Galilee, but did not hide that under known conditions we can ask for the inclusion in the territory of the Jewish state only those 370,000 dunums, which are referred to in the "Lifshitz plan". We stressed that the advantage of this plan is that we get 250,000 dunums of desert in the Negev and do not claim Toku. As for Jaffa, we made it clear that we would not suggest that this city be taken away from us, but if there was pressure in that direction, we would not resist. On the issue of Haifa, we explained that this is an example of a Jewish-majority territory where problems are solved in cooperation with the Arab minority. On the question of Jerusalem, after explaining the structure of the city and the possibilities of its partition geographically and demographically, two possibilities were mentioned, in addition to the existing one at that hour: the partition of the city into three parts, so that the Jewish part would be subject to the laws of the Jewish State, or the expansion of the international regime to the west and

south (so that the territory included 9 Jewish settlements) and to the east (including the Potash and Kibbutz Khaarawa factories). We also noted that the same regime could be introduced in Jerusalem as in Jaffa, referring to free passage from one area to another.

4. We explained that we would demand the full participation of our representatives in the subcommittee, i.e., so that we could participate in the discussion not only when we were invited, but each time we deem it necessary. This demand was met with full understanding by the interlocutors.

The problem of implementation. After talking about the actions of the British in terms of withdrawal and cooperation in the transfer of administrative affairs (it is not clear how they are going to do it), we said that we are not going to force them out by force of weapons, but in any case we will not try to detain them. We believe that it is necessary to be prepared for the immediate taking of power in Jewish areas, but this requires certain power structures appointed by the UN to monitor the transfer of power and for all parties to respect the decisions of the world community. Power should be transferred to the Jews at once, but if the British agree to cooperate, we do not mind: then it is possible that the power will be transferred in stages, albeit in a short time. As for the security forces, it makes sense to discuss two possibilities: either Jewish militias are being established that will receive weapons from abroad, or it will be a UN force operating with the assistance of Jews. If the first proposal is accepted, a small symbolic international brigade will be needed. Then the question arises from which countries to recruit soldiers and officers. Our interlocutors have raised the question of who should appoint a monitoring body and which commission or other UN body should be responsible for it. We explained that, in our view, it

is desirable to carry out these appointments in the same way as the issues related to Palestine have so far been resolved, i.e. by establishing bodies or commissions only for that particular purpose. We do not want control to be in the hands of the Guardian Council, whose composition and bodies do not correspond to the specifics of our problems. The Russians who did not participate in the Council generally agreed with this position, and Stein explained that our problems would not be solved in the same way that Samoa's Aboriginal problems were being addressed. At the same time, the Russians did not agree with our proposal for a special mechanism and tried to find out the possible advantages of transferring the relevant powers to the Security Council. They reiterated this position when discussing military issues, stating that there was an entrenched practice of transferring all military problems to the competence of the Security Council. Mr. Schertok said that we do not think that the practice of connecting the Security Council is in any way contrary to or hinders the implementation of the solution of the Palestinian question. It was obvious to us that the Russians would like to refer this issue to the Security Council.

Economic cooperation. After discussing the details of the recommendation on economic cooperation, we explained that we were not encouraged by the recommendation, but we were prepared to accept it.

At the end of the conversation, we exchanged general words. M. Shertok thanked for the consent to the meeting, and Tsarapkin said that he hopes that this was only the first detailed discussion and in the near future this practice will continue.

**REFERENCE OF THE UN DEPARTMENT OF
THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY "TO THE
PALESTINIAN ISSUE". October 23, 1947**

Secret

On 2 April 1947, the British Government asked the UN Secretary-General to put the question of Palestine

on the agenda of the regular session of the General Assembly and, in addition, to convene a special session to establish a commission on the Palestinian issue.

The governments of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia have asked the Secretary-General to include the issue of ending Britain's mandate over Palestine and declaring its independence on the agenda of the special session.

On April 28, 1947, Mr. Gromyko was sent talking points for his address to the Assembly. The main thing in the talking points:

1. The mandate system of governance of Palestine established in 1922 failed the exam. According to the British Government itself, the mandate for Palestine has proved unfeasible in practice.

2. If the debate in the Assembly was essentially discussed on the abolition of the British mandate for Palestine, it would be in principle to support the abolition of that mandate.

3. Note that in the last war the Jewish people suffered exceptional calamities and suffering. The needs of a people who have suffered such suffering must be taken care of.

4. Consider the existence of different projects about the arrangement of Jews, with two possible options:

The first option is the formation of a two-pronged Arab-Jewish state with equal rights for Jews and Arabs.

If, however, this option may seem unfeasible, given the spoiled relations between Jews and Arabs, then the second option must be put forward: the division of Palestine into two separate States: Jewish and Arab.

If the question of resettlement of 100,000 Jews to Palestine were put forward in the discussion, the proposal would be supported.

On 28 April 1947, a special session of the General Assembly on the Palestinian issue opened in New York. Aranja (Brazil) was elected president of the session.

The General Assembly rejected the Arab proposal to end the mandate and grant independence to Palestine.

On 15 May, the General Assembly approved the composition, function and authority of the commission to study the Palestinian question.

During the General Assembly debate, only the SOVIET delegate made a political statement on the substance of the Palestinian question.

Representatives of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia were elected to the Special Commission.

On September 1, 1947, the Special Commission submitted its report to the UN.

The report contains a number of recommendations adopted unanimously by the Special Commission. Among them: the abolition of the mandate for Palestine, the granting of independence to Palestine as soon as possible, the establishment of a transitional period, the provision of three religions and "holy places" etc.

The majority of the commission concluded that Palestine should be divided into two states. The main recommendation of the majority in general coincides with our second option - the division of Palestine into two separate states.

The Commission has submitted two plans for the future of the Palestinian system:

1. The Majority Plan (endorsed by representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay) provides for the division of Palestine into two independent States, the Arab and the Jewish, united by an economic union.

Jerusalem is transferred to the UN. The independence of both countries will be proclaimed after the end of the transitional period of two years. The transition is managed by the United Kingdom under the supervision of the United Nations. During the transition period, 150,000 Jews are allowed to enter the Jewish state. Territorially, the Jewish state should include the Eastern Galilee, the Israel Level, the most of the coastal plain and the entire Area of Beersheba, including the Negev region. The Arab state should include Western Galilee, the Samaria and Judea regions, as well as the coastal plain from Aschdod to the Egyptian border.

2. The Minority Plan (endorsed by Yugoslavia, India and Iran) envisages the creation of a single independent federal state of Palestine, consisting of Arab and Jewish states with the capital Jerusalem. Responsibility for the administration of Palestine during a transitional period that should last up to three years rests with a special body appointed by the General Assembly. The issue of Jewish immigration during the transition period is referred to the UN Special Commission, which must include three representatives from Arabs and Jews.

On 23 September 1947, the second session of the General Assembly included the Palestinian issue on its agenda and was referred to the General Assembly's Special Committee on Palestine.

The USSR's position on the question of Palestine

On September 30, Vyshinsky was instructed by T. Molotov not to object to the opinion of the majority of the commission on the issue of the partition of Palestine. That. Molotov also agreed not to object to the panel's unanimous recommendations on the mandate, granting independence to Palestine, etc.

On the same day, Molotov sent additional instructions to our delegation on the Palestinian issue. The essence of these indications is that since, after the survey, the majority of the UN commission supported the creation of a separate Jewish state, our delegation should support the majority opinion that is consistent with our basic attitude on this issue.

In connection with the discussion of the Palestinian issue in the Special Committee, Mr. Vyshinsky sought our opinion on the duration of the transition period, Jewish immigration to Palestine during the transition period, the number of Arabs in the Jewish state and the statute of Jerusalem.

Our position on these issues is expressed in the relevant statement sent by T. Vyshinsky on October 15. The guidelines are:

1. On all important Palestinian issues, the views of Jews should be sought. In particular, that should be done on the question of Jerusalem, for which a special statute would have to be established to ensure the interests of the three religions.

2. One should not fear the large minority of Arabs in the Jewish state, only to have less than 50% of Arabs. This situation cannot threaten the existence of an independent Jewish state, because inevitably the Jewish part in this state will grow.

The transition period should be shortened. It is impossible to leave England for this period. It is better to take the path of handing over control of Palestine to the Security Council.

Another important point in the USSR's position on the question of Palestine is the attitude towards Jewish immigration to Palestine.

In discussing the issue at the Special Committee, the Uruguayan delegation proposed that 30,000 Jewish children now in camps for displaced persons be allowed into Palestine immediately and to establish a

quota for the immigration of the parents of those children to Palestine. We have indicated to our delegation that we do not object to this proposal.

Equally, we were positive about the proposal of the Colombian delegation to appeal on behalf of the General Assembly to the people of Palestine to put an end to acts of violence, as well as to assist the United Nations in resolving the question of Palestine.

At this time, the general debate on the Palestinian issue has ended and the Special Committee is beginning to discuss draft resolutions introduced by various delegations.

My delegation will vote in favour of a Swedish-American resolution that proposes to adopt as a basis the basic principles outlined in the unanimously adopted recommendations of the commission on Palestine, as well as the plan of the majority of that commission. My delegation will also support the resolution of Yugoslavia to immediately allow all Jewish refugees currently living in camps on the island of Cyprus to enter Palestine without any quotas.

A. Timofeev

**NOTE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR B.M.MO TOTUBA TO
THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY (B), CHAIRMAN OF
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR
J.V.STALIN. October 26, 1947**

Secret

In a telegram dated 27 October, Vyshinsky reports that the first subcommittee of the Palestinian Committee has begun to develop a plan for a transitional Palestinian arrangement based on the unanimous recommendations and report of the majority of the Special Committee.

Vyshinsky makes the following suggestions:

1. Repeal of the mandate from January 1, 1948
2. Withdrawal of British troops no later than 3-4 months after the abolition of the mandate.
3. Establishing a transition period of no more than one year from the abolition of the mandate.
4. The administration of Palestine during the transitional period is entrusted to the UN by the Security Council, through a special commission made up of representatives of the Member States of the Security Council. The commission's location is Palestine.
5. The Special Commission is working to establish the boundaries of the Jewish and Arab States in

accordance with the General Assembly's decision to partition Palestine.

6. The Special Commission, after consultation with democratic parties and public organizations of the Jewish and Arab States, elects in each state a provisional government council, which is under the general direction of a special commission.

7. The Provisional Government Council of each State holds democratic elections within six months of its formation. Election provisions are drafted by government councils and approved by a special commission of the Security Council.

8. The Constituent Assembly of each State drafts a democratic constitution and elects a government.

9. Provisional Government Councils, after their formation, begin, under the supervision of a special commission, to establish central and local administrations.

10. These government councils should form an armed militia of their own citizens in the shortest possible time to maintain internal order and prevent border clashes. This armed militia will be operationally under the command of its national command, but the general military and political control over its activities will be carried out by a special commission.

Vyshinsky points out that the above provisions mostly coincide with the opinion of representatives of the Jewish Agency.

I propose to agree with Vyshinsky's proposals.

V. Molotov

On the document of the litter: "Tov. Poskrebyshv told the HF that Stalin agrees. 28.H. Podcerob."

**REPORTING BY L. GELBER, A POLITICAL
ADVISER TO THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR
PALESTINE IN NEW YORK, ON A
CONVERSATION WITH THE DIRECTOR OF
THE UNITED NATIONS DIVISION OF THE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, D. RASK.
November 5, 1947**

Strictly confidential

United States policy

On Sunday evening, November 2, 1947, as commissioned by the Jewish Agency board, I met again with Mr. Dean Rusk, Director of the United Nations Department of State Department (as he soon became known), to discuss an issue he raised in a conversation with me last Friday. He seemed satisfied with the content of the message I had been instructed to convey. With regard to unauthorized immigration to Palestine, he noted that it was as important for our relationship with the United States Government as it was for their relations with the British, so that we would "moderate our efforts somewhat". Once the

monthly immigration figures, which were once again proposed by Mr. Hershel Johnson, become part of the current plan, the problem, he said, will be solved by itself.

Mr. Rusk took me to Mr. Marshall's own hotel room. During the war, he was a colonel in the General Staff, until March 1947 he worked on the civilian line as a political assistant to the Minister of Defense and was presumably one of the new figures transferred to the State Department by the Secretary of State from among former colleagues in the army. It would be logical to assume that Mr. Rusk is not an ordinary head of the department, he is someone who enjoys the trust and speaks on behalf of General Marshall himself. If that is the case, some of Mr. Rusk's following statements should have been given the greatest importance.

1) For our own benefit, in his opinion, we should avoid any manifestation of attachment to Russia. Russia's speech in favour of partitioning its novelty in the seemingly partitionist policy is surprising. Now behind the scenes there is talk that Jewish displaced persons gather in Constanta on the Black Sea and sail to Palestine from the Russian zone. We can understand this fact ourselves as an expression of humane treatment on the part of the USSR, but others may interpret it as a manoeuvre of a great power in which displaced persons play the role of pawns and whose purpose is to cause concern to the Anglo-American group. Mr. Rusk advised us to take a closer look at the effect that any special connection that would be seen between the Zionists and the Soviet Union would have on the United States and the Western world.

2) As I asked, Mr. Rusk himself explains Russia's more sympathetic position to Jewish Palestine. He said he could not offer an official point of view, but could repeat what one observer had given him. There is an

understanding in American circles that the main tool of American policy against Russia today is the Marshall Plan. Equally, there is agreement that Russia's main goal towards the United States is to undermine the Marshall Plan and prevent its successful implementation. If, in order to achieve this goal, the Russians could attract the Jews of Europe (perhaps also America) to their side, they would enlist the support of a powerful influential force.

My answer to this reasoning was, of course, obvious. As Russians and Americans move in parallel with Palestine, there is no reason why the Jews of Europe should be more grateful to Russia than to the Americans. Moreover, if the Marshall Plan were to succeed in restoring some prosperity to Europe, Europe's surviving Jews would have an additional reason to thank the United States. The Americans would help them financially in their current situation, and they would do much to help them and their brothers, as positive policies on the Palestinian issue could help Palestinian and European Jewry equally. Having considered other possibilities, he did not rule out that the Russian policy in the Zionist issue may be a lack of interest, as he sees it from the point of view of the United States.

**D'AFFAIRES OF THE USSR IN IRAQ A.F.
SULTANOV TO THE MIDDLE EAST
DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
OF THE USSR. November 5, 1947**

Secret

Arab position

The Palestinian problem is now a major issue in the political life of Arab countries. Arab circles consider English imperialism to be a weaker enemy than Zionism, as the latter will realize the economic

penetration of the Jewish capital and the Anglo-American capital behind it into the Arab markets of neighbouring countries and the seizure of Transjordan and then Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. Moreover, there is no national threat to the Anglicization of Palestine, and the domination of British imperialism in the East will sooner or later cease. The Jews managed to create entire cities and large settlements in Palestine, settling indigenous people from parts of Palestine. "The establishment of a Jewish state at the heart of the Arab countries would threaten the realization of the Arab's historic dreams of restoring the economic and cultural unity of the Arab countries, as they would have to transit through a hostile Jewish Palestine." The Arabs do not object to guarantee equal democratic rights to the Jewish people of Palestine, subject to the eventual cessation of immigration and the claim to establish a separate Jewish State. The Arabs believe that if they do not prevent the creation of a Jewish state now, then it will be too late.

Local reaction to the position of the Soviet delegation to the UN on the Palestinian issue

Arab circles were confident that the Soviet Union would not agree to the project of creating a Zionist state for the following reasons:

1. The Soviet Union had always followed the principle of self-determination and assistance to the oppressed peoples of the East in their struggle for independence, and the Balfour Declaration was the result of the British desire to have a Zionist reserve in the event of a violent Arab desire for independence.

2. The Soviet Union supported the Indonesian Republic in the UN and Egypt's demands to evacuate British troops and cancel an unequal treaty with England.

3. Arab governments believed that the USSR "will always vote against Anglo-Americans on any issue."

The reactionary press concluded from the speech of The Soviet Delegates to the UN that the Soviet Union “comes only from its own political interests” in resolving peaceful issues, and not on the principle of justice.

The Democratic and Communist Parties have always stood on the platform of not recognizing Balfour’s declaration as an imperialist venture and fighting Zionism— the agents of British and American imperialism—and explained that the Soviet Union would support the Arabs. Therefore, the friends are somewhat confused and expect a rampage of internal reaction, encouraged by the Anglo-Saxons.

Disagreements between the Hashemites (Iraq and Transjordan), who want to annex the whole of Palestine or part of it to Transjordan as a first step towards the implementation of the Great Syria project, and other Arab countries on the future of Palestine weaken the position of the Arabs and facilitate the creation of conditions for the Arab League’s agreement and to little acceptable to Arab nationalists decisions on the Palestinian issue or delay of a decision for a number of years.

T. Sultanov’s opinion on the creation of a Jewish state

Positive side: our position has aroused sympathy for the USSR Of Jewry all over the world, and in particular in America. If the Jewish state moves away from Anglo-American banks and dollar diplomacy, it could be a factor revolutionizing the Arab East.

Negatives:

1. Support for Jews can alienate the Arab world as a whole.

2. It will help the Anglo-Saxons to collude with the reactionary top of the Arab League at the expense of

the people-democratic interests of the Arab countries and at the expense of the foreign policy interests of the USSR.

3. It will help to build an anti-Soviet Muslim bloc from the Arab League countries, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

4. It will facilitate imperialism by suppressing the democratic and revolutionary movement.

5. In addition, the Zionist state can become the base of Americans for expansion into the countries of the East.

6. "Arab governments, "confident" in supporting the Soviet Union and encouraged by the Anglo-Saxons, are using this circumstance to directly enter with the latter into a clearly anti-Soviet agreement on the further open representation of bases and strategic resources in the event of war against us."

"The well-known Arab tolerance and tolerance towards other nations is unlikely to take place in the Zionist national chauvinist state, especially if it is led by the current leadership of the Jewish Agency." (According to the UN plan, 500,000 Jews and 400,000 Arabs will live in the Jewish state, A.S.)

Compiled by BVI attaché A. Semioshkin

**TELEGRAM OF DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY
TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV, FROM NEW
YORK. November 18, 1947**

Owls. Secret

On the question of the Jerusalem regime, the rapporteur introduced a plan based on the report of the majority of the Palestinian Committee (pages 166-169 and 193-195). The text was sent by the clerk.

The following changes have been made to this plan compared to the majority plan.

First. Paragraph 1 is replaced by the text: "The city of Jerusalem will be formed as a separate corps with a special international regime and will be managed by the UN through:

(a) The Guardianship Council, or

(B) The Security Council, or

(c) A special commission elected each year by the next General Assembly and made up of representatives of UN members who will be held accountable for governance on behalf of the UN."

Second. The size of the Jerusalem area remained unchanged from the description in paragraph 2 of the report of the majority of the Palestinian Committee.

Third. The following points of the majority report are: on page 166 paragraphs 1, 2, 3, page 167 paragraphs 4, 5, page 168 paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, page 193 paragraph 3 (1 and 2), page 194 paragraph 3 (3, 4, 5, 6), page 195 paragraph 3 (7, 8, 9, 10) included in this draft without a change, except for minor amendments to the editorial.

Fourth. The following additions have been made:

1) The body that will govern Jerusalem on behalf of the United Nations will draft and approve a detailed statute of the City of Jerusalem, which will include the main provisions set out in the plan under discussion.

2) The Governor will be appointed as the body that governs Jerusalem on behalf of the UN and will be responsible to him.

3) The Governor will submit for approval the body governing Jerusalem on behalf of the Un, a project providing for the allocation of Jewish suburbs of Jerusalem and the formation of a special urban unit (Jewish proposal).

4) A legislative council will be convened, elected by the adult population of the city without distinction of nationality and on the basis of universal, secret and proportional voting.

5) Representatives of the Arab and Jewish states will be appointed at the same time as the governor. Their responsibilities will be to protect the interests of their States and citizens.

6) Arabic, English and Hebrew are the official languages of the city.

7) The Statute of Jerusalem will remain in force for 10 years, after which there will be a popular vote and if two thirds of the votes are in favour of a revision, it will be revised.

In discussing the plan, we reserved our position as a whole, noting that the Security Council and the Guardian Council could be suitable for the administration of Jerusalem.

I believe that the General Assembly commission is not appropriate. The U.S. representative spoke in favor of the Guardianship Board. We believe that the Security Council as the governing body of Jerusalem is more appropriate, but this proposal has no chance. We consider it appropriate to speak in favour of the Guardian Council in this case. The Jews agree with this, fearing that otherwise the case will fail at all.

The above additions to the plan of the majority of the Palestinian Committee are not objectionable, but we consider it appropriate to exclude English from official languages.

I ask for instructions, if possible, by the morning of November 19, when the next meeting will take place.

Vyshinsky

**A.A. GROMYKO, THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR TO THE
UN, AT THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE**

SECOND SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. November 26, 1947

The Soviet Union, as it is known, has no direct material or other interests in Palestine. He is interested in the question of Palestine as a member of the United Nations and as a great Power, which, along with other great Powers, has a special responsibility to maintain international peace. This determines the position taken by the Government of the Soviet Union on the question of Palestine. The position of the Soviet Union has already been expressed quite fully at the special session of the General Assembly in early 1947, as well as during the debate at this session of the Assembly. Therefore, I will not repeat what was previously said by the representatives of the USSR during the discussion on the future of Palestine. It was therefore only natural that each delegation felt obliged not only to take a stand by voting in favour of a proposal, but also to set out the motives behind it.

The Soviet Government, when discussing the future of Palestine at the special session of the General Assembly, pointed out the two most appropriate options for dealing with the issue. The first option is the creation of a single democratic Arab-Jewish state with equal rights for Arabs and Jews. If this option proves unrealistic if Arabs and Jews claim that they will not be able to live together because of the spoiled relations between them, the Soviet Government, through its delegation to the Assembly, has pointed to the second option: the division of Palestine into two independent democracies, the Arab and the Jewish ones.

The Special Session of the Assembly, as you know, has established a Special Commission that has carefully examined the question of Palestine in terms

of finding the most acceptable solution to this issue. After the end of the commission's work, we were pleased to note that the proposal of this commission, or rather the majority of it, coincides with one of the two options named by the Soviet Union delegation at the special session. I am referring to the option of dividing Palestine into two separate democratic states, the Arab and the Jewish.

The delegation of the Soviet Union, therefore, could not but support this option, recommended by the Special Commission. It is now known that not only did the Special Commission considering the future of Palestine accept the option of partition, but that the overwhelming majority of other delegations represented in the General Assembly agreed to the proposal. The vast majority of The United Nations member countries have reached the same conclusion that the Soviet Government has reached as a result of a comprehensive examination of how the future of Palestine should be resolved.

The question arises as to why the vast majority of delegations represented in the General Assembly have settled on this option rather than on any other option. This can only be explained by the fact that all other options for resolving the question of Palestine have proved to be unrealistic and impractical. I also refer to the option of establishing an independent, unified Arab-Jewish state with equal rights for Arabs and Jews. Experience with the question of Palestine, including the experience of the Special Commission, had shown that Jews and Arabs in Palestine did not want or could not live together. This was followed by a logical conclusion: if these two peoples inhabiting Palestine, both of whom have deep historical roots in that country, cannot live together within a single State, there is no choice but to form instead of one two

States, Arab and Jewish. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, no other feasible option could be invented.

Opponents of the partition of Palestine into two independent democracies usually point out that this decision is aimed at Arabs, against the Arab population of Palestine and against the Arab States in general. This is particularly pointed out by Arab delegations for understandable reasons. The Soviet delegation could not share that view. The proposal to divide Palestine into two independent States, as well as the decision of the Ad Nos Commission established at this session, which endorsed the proposal, which is the subject of our discussion, is not directed against the Arabs. This decision is not directed against any of the two main peoples inhabiting Palestine.

On the contrary, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, this decision is in the fundamental national interests of both peoples, the interests of both the Jewish and Arab people.

Arab representatives point out that the partition of Palestine is a historical injustice. But this view cannot be accepted, if only because the Jewish people have been associated with Palestine for a long historical period of time. Moreover, we cannot lose sight of this, and the Soviet delegation has already pointed out this at the special session of the General Assembly, we cannot lose sight of the situation in which the Jewish people found themselves as a result of the last world war. I will not repeat what the Soviet delegation said in this regard at the special session of the Assembly. However, it is worth recalling now that as a result of the war imposed by Hitler's Germany, Jews as a people suffered more than any other people. You know that there is not a single state in Western Europe that could properly protect the interests of the Jewish people from the arbitrariness and violence of the Nazis.

Referring to the proposal for the partition of Palestine, representatives of some countries mentioned the Soviet Union and tried to cast a shadow over the foreign policy of the Soviet government. In particular, the representative of Lebanon has twice exercised in this regard. I have already pointed out that the proposal to divide Palestine into two independent States and the position taken by the Soviet Union in this matter are not directed against the Arabs, which we strongly believe that this solution is in the fundamental national interest not only of Jews but also of Arabs.

The peoples of the Soviet Union were sympathetic and sympathetic to the national aspirations of the peoples of the Arab East. The Soviet Union is sympathetic and sympathetic to the attempts of these peoples to free themselves from the last shackles of colonial dependence. Therefore, we do not equate the clumsy statements of some representatives of the Arab states about the foreign policy of the USSR in relation to the question of the future of Palestine with the vital national interests of the Arabs. We distinguish between these kinds of statements, apparently under the impression of minute-long sentiments, and the fundamental interests of the Arab people. The Soviet delegation is confident that the Arabs and Arab countries will look towards Moscow more than once, waiting for the Soviet Union to help fight for its legitimate interests, trying to free themselves from the remnants of foreign dependence.

The Soviet delegation believes that the decision to partition Palestine is in full compliance with the high principles and objectives of the United Nations as well. It is in line with the principle of national self-determination of peoples. The policy of the USSR in the field of national question, pursued since the creation of the Soviet state, is the policy of the commonwealth

and self-determination of peoples. All the peoples of the Soviet Union are a united and united family that has endured the ordeal of the war against the strongest and most dangerous enemy that peace-loving peoples have ever faced.

The solution of the question of Palestine by dividing it into two independent States would be of great historical importance, as such a decision would meet the legitimate demands of the Jewish people, whose hundreds of thousands of representatives, as you know, are still homeless, without their own pockets, who have found only temporary shelter in special camps in the territories of some Western European States. I'm not going to talk about the conditions these people live in. These conditions are quite well known. They were said enough by delegates who share the view of the USSR delegation on this issue and support the plan of partition of Palestine into two states.

The Assembly is working hard to find the most just and feasible and at the same time the most radical solution to the question of the future of Palestine. It is based on some indisputable facts that have raised the question of Palestine in the United Nations. What are these facts? Fact one: the mandate system has not paid off. I will say more: the mandate system has gone bankrupt. We have also heard statements from the British representatives that the mandate system of governance of Palestine has not paid off. Such statements were made at the special session as well as at this session of the Assembly. It was because the mandate system went bankrupt that the British Government turned to the United Nations for help. It asked the Assembly to take a decision and thereby take control of the question of the future of Palestine.

The second fact. The British Government, in contacting the United Nations, stated that it could not take responsibility for all the actions that would have

to be taken in Palestine in response to a possible General Assembly decision. In doing so, the British Government has recognized that the General Assembly can, by virtue of its rights and powers, under the Charter, take responsibility for resolving the question of the future of Palestine.

The Soviet delegation, however, considers it useful to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that the British Assembly still does not feel the support we would be entitled to expect. On the one hand, the British Government has asked the Assembly for assistance in deciding the future of Palestine. On the other hand, the British Government has made so many reservations during the discussion of this issue at the special session, as well as at this session of the Assembly, that it begs the question whether the United Kingdom really wants the question of Palestine to be resolved through the United Nations.

At the special session of the Assembly, the Representative of the United Kingdom, on the one hand, stated that the United Kingdom was prepared to implement United Nations decisions, provided that it was not only the United Kingdom that was responsible for the events to be held.

In making such a statement, the British delegation made it clear to other States that it was prepared to work with the United Nations on the issue.

On the other hand, at the same special session, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that his Government was prepared to implement the relevant decisions of the General Assembly only if Arabs and Jews agreed to a solution. It is clear to everyone that the first and second statements contradict one another. While the first statement indicates the UK's willingness to cooperate with the United Nations on this issue, the second statement shows that the British Government may not be in the Assembly's decision.

Such reservations were made by the representative of the United Kingdom at this session as well. We heard today's statement from Mr. Cadogan on this matter. In a somewhat modified form, he repeated the idea that the United Kingdom would agree to implement the Assembly's decision, provided that Jews and Arabs were in agreement. But we all know that the Arabs and Jews did not agree among themselves. The discussion of this issue at this session shows that they cannot agree. Prospects for a possible agreement between Arabs and Jews are not visible.

This is the view of not only the Soviet delegation, but also all delegations that have come to the conclusion that a decision on this issue is necessary at this session of the Assembly.

All of these reservations by the British delegation indicate that the British government has no real desire to cooperate fully with the United Nations on this issue to this day. At a time when the vast majority of delegations represented in the General Assembly were in favour of a solution now to the question of the future of Palestine, which is for a two-State division, the British Government states that it will only be considered when the Assembly decides when Jews and Arabs agree on each other. I repeat, to put forward such a condition is almost tantamount to a decision to bury the Assembly even before the Assembly decides to bury it. Is this the way the UK should act on this issue, especially now that after a long discussion it has become clear to all, including the UK, that the vast majority of states are behind the partition of Palestine?

If, at the first session, when the question of a possible solution to the future of Palestine first arose, it was at least possible to understand the reservations emanating from the British delegation, now that the overwhelming majority of the membership of the United Nations knew to make such reservations, it was

to declare in advance that the United Kingdom did not consider itself bound by a possible general assembly decision.

The USSR delegation cannot share this view. We have the right to expect UK's cooperation in this matter. We are entitled to expect that, if the Assembly adopts the relevant recommendation, the United Kingdom will take up this recommendation, especially since the current order in Palestine is hated by both Jews and Arabs. You all know what the attitude of Jews to these orders expresses, in particular.



Выступление представителя ВОКК С. С. Михайлова на первом съезде Лиги «V», 25 августа 1942 г. (*The Institute for Labour Research in Memory of Pinchas Lavon, Tel Aviv.*)



Машины для оказания первой помощи, переданные Лигой «Во» в дар Красной армии. Иерусалим, 1943 г. (*The Institute for Labour Research in Memory of Pinchas Lavon, Tel Aviv.*)



Сотрудники миссии Израиля в СССР. Крайний слева — М. Намир, пятый слева — А. Левани, в центре — М. Шерток и справа от него — Г. Мейерсон. Тель-Авив, август 1948 г. (*Из личного архива А. Левани.*)



Перед вручением верительных грамот. Посланник СССР в Израиле П. И. Ершов (справа) и шеф протокола МИД Израиля М. Симон. 17 августа 1948 г. (АВП РФ, ф. 779, д. 3064.)



После вручения верительных грамот. П. И. Ершов и М. Симон. 17 августа 1948 г. (АВП РФ, ф. 779, д. 3065.)



Дипломатические сотрудники миссии СССР в Израиле. Сидят (слева направо): В. И. Рожков, П. И. Ершов, М. Л. Мушин. Стоят (слева направо): А. С. Семюшкин, М. П. Попов, М. П. Федорин, сотрудник миссии (фамилию установить не удалось). 17 августа 1948 г. (АВП РФ, ф. 779, д. 3570.)



Здание миссии СССР в Тель-Авиве. 1948 г. (АВП РФ, ф. 779, д. 3068.)



Беседа после вручения верительных грамот. Слева направо: Г. Мейерсон, В. А. Зорин, И. А. Власов. 10 сентября 1948 г. (*The Golda Meir Memorial Association, Tel Aviv.*)



Делегация Израиля на третьей сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН в Париже. Сидят: М. Шерток (слева) и А. Эбан. Октябрь 1948 г. (*The Abba Eban Centre for Israeli Diplomacy, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.*)



Посещение сотрудниками миссии СССР в Израиле Горненского монастыря. 15 февраля 1949 г. (*АВП РФ, ф. 779, д. 3077/1.*)



Посланник и сотрудники миссии СССР в Израиле в Троицком соборе. Иерусалим, 15 февраля 1949 г. (АВП РФ, ф. 779, д. 3076/1.)



Троицкий собор в Иерусалиме. (АВП РФ, ф. 779, д. 3075/1.)

I also think it is necessary to note another fact.

From the outset of the discussion of this issue, a number of delegations, mainly Arab delegations, have tried to convince us that this issue is not within the purview of the United Nations. And, as might be expected, they could not provide any convincing arguments, except for general and unmotivated statements and declarations.

The General Assembly, as in the United Nations as a whole, not only has the right to consider this issue, but in the current situation in Palestine it must take action. In the view of the Soviet delegation, the Ad Nos Commission's plan to resolve the question of Palestine, which should be the practical implementation of its implementation activities, should be in full compliance with the Security Council, is fully in the interest of maintaining and strengthening international peace and in the interests of strengthening cooperation among States. That is why the Soviet delegation supports the recommendation to partition Palestine.

The Soviet delegation, unlike some other delegations, had taken a clear and clear line on the issue from the outset. She consistently draws that line. It is not going to manoeuvre or manipulate the voices, which, unfortunately, is taking place in the Assembly and in the debate on the Palestinian question.

The United Nations. Plenary sessions of the General Assembly. Stenographic Records September 16-November 24, 1947- Volume II. 351-352.

**LETTER FROM A. SILVER, CHAIRMAN OF
THE AMERICAN SECTION OF THE BOARD
OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE,
TO A.A. GROMYKO, THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR TO THE
UNITED NATIONS. New York, December 4,
1947**

Your Excellency,

The Jewish Agency for Palestine wishes to express its deep gratitude to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for supporting the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in support of the establishment of the Jewish State.

The adoption of this recommendation marked a turning point in the history of the Jewish people. After two millennia of absence from the national hearth, Jews are now given the opportunity to join the family of nations and make a notable contribution to international life. In authorising to this great cause, the General Assembly also offers the prospect of rehabilitation to the hundreds of thousands of our people who have been victims of Nazi oppression, who have survived, and those who, for their own reasons, are in need of a national hearth.

The Jewish state will strive to conform to the best examples of democracy, good neighbourliness and international cooperation. The Jewish people will always be grateful to your Government, which at this session of the General Assembly helped them achieve national liberation.

It would be very grateful if you would pass on the contents of this letter to your Government.

I am honoured, sir, to be sincerely your Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman of the American Section of the Jewish Agency for Palestine

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
S.K. TSARAPKIN, THE CHARGE D.C.
CHARGE D.C. IN THE UNITED STATES,
WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE BOARD OF THE
JEWISH AGENCY OF PALESTINE, M.
SCHERTOK, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE IN
WASHINGTON, E. EPSTEIN. December 8,
1947**

Secret

Today he received representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine Schertok and Epstein at their request. Schertok announced that he was going to go to Jerusalem to familiarize himself with the situation on the ground and would return to New York by 1 January, from where he and the United Nations Palestinian Commission would travel to London.

Schertok said that the UN commission has not yet been appointed (meaning the personal composition of the commission), and suggested that it would be good if the commission went to Palestine as soon as possible, because the commission's arrival in place at the moment would have great moral and political significance for the whole case. According to the information available to Schertok, the commission, as

soon as it is staffed, will immediately travel to London for talks with the British government.

Schertok further said that he had received a telegram from Ben-Gurion from Jerusalem stating that the head of the British authorities in Palestine, in response to Ben-Gurion's demands to provide the Jewish organizations with self-defence weapons, had replied that the British Government had decided to transfer to the Jewish administration an area that included the city and port of Tel Aviv and a portion of the territory 8 kilometres north of the city, including the town of Petah Tikva, from December. Schertok and Epstein said they still have to verify this message and details and accurate details on this matter will inform me further. The main thing that interests them is whether control over the port of Tel Aviv will be transferred to the Jews or whether it will remain in the hands of the British. At first glance, Schertok said, it can be concluded from Ben-Gurion's telegram that the British will hand over control of the port of Tel Aviv to the Jews, in which case the Jews will be able to organize the importation of necessary weapons under their responsibility through this port. Schertok said that according to the information they received, the British would carry out the evacuation of their troops from Palestine in the northern part of the country through the port of Haifa, and in the south - through Gaza.

Speaking about the location of the future capital of the Jewish state, Schertok said that this issue has not yet been resolved. There are supporters that the capital was the city of Tel Aviv, while others prefer that Haifa be the capital.

Schertok said that during his trip to Palestine, he was thinking of visiting Cairo, or maybe Beirut, and asked if he would be able to make contact with our representatives there.

I replied to Schertok that it was his own business if he, for example, wanted to visit a member of our mission in Cairo or Beirut, but added that he should bear in mind the tense situation currently in place in Cairo and Beirut.

Leaving, Epstein said that he remained in Washington and a day or two thought to come to me with confidential telegrams, mi, received by him from Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, which cover the situation in Palestine. Referring to the situation in Palestine, Schertok noted that Arab attacks on Jews were limited to only two points, Jerusalem and Jaffa, as far as the village was concerned, it was calm and there were no attacks by Arabs on Jews.

At the end of the conversation, Schertok hinted that it would be a good idea if the Security Council, whose meetings begin tomorrow, 9 December, made a firm statement in response to the statement of the Arab representatives that they would not obey the General Assembly's decision on the partition of Palestine. Schertok believes that a statement in the Security Council that they would take action in the event of unrest in Palestine could significantly sober up the ripping Arab leaders and force the Mufti to abandon the inflating of the anti-Jewish movement in Palestine and other Arab countries. In response to this remark, Schertok said that the General Assembly resolution has a special indication of this, not to mention that the Security Council, within the powers granted to it by the Charter, can take action on any situation that threatens peace and security.

S.K.Tsarapkin

**RECORDING OF S.K. TSARAPKIN, THE
CHARGE D.C. CHARGE D.C. IN THE UNITED
STATES, WITH E. EPSTEIN, A
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON.
December 18, 1947**

Secret

Epstein came to inform me of the situation in Palestine. Passing to me a confidential summary of the situation in Palestine obtained from Jerusalem (attached), Epstein said that now there is no doubt that the British have a firm intention to fail the UN decision on Palestine. The British by all means support and instigate the riots and protests of Arabs against

Jews not only in Palestine, but throughout the Middle East. Epstein said that the question of the situation in Palestine was now before the Security Council.

Epstein said they're concerned about getting a gun right now. True, they have their factories in Palestine, which can make grenades and mortars, but all this is done so far only artisanal way and now they illegally export weapons to Palestine mainly from the United States, as well as from some European countries and from a Latin American country.

Speaking of the British, Epstein noted that he did not know whether they were operating in Palestine and the Middle East on instructions

London, but there is ample evidence that British representatives on the ground are actively disruptive. There are many British agents throughout the Middle East who have been working there for many years, they are very familiar with the situation in the Middle East. These agents have their own views on Palestine and can operate there on the ground even against the general line of the British Government, although Epstein believes that there is no certainty that what is being done now in Palestine and the Middle East is not a consequence of the directives obtained from London. Epstein said that under the current situation it would be highly desirable for a UN commission to leave as soon as possible for Palestine. This would have a great political and moral impact on the further course of events in Palestine.

Epstein said they now have a large team of specialists who are drafting the constitution of the Jewish state of Judea. The main principle that will form the basis of the constitution is the neutrality of the Jewish state, following the example of Switzerland. The principle of neutrality has many supporters among Jewish figures, although there are opponents of it. In the current complex international environment,

Epstein said, they see no better course than to adhere to strict neutrality. The Jewish state has become the actual as a result of the position mainly of the U.S. and the USSR and is the brainchild of the UN. There are about 5 million Jews in the United States and 3 million Jews in the USSR. The new Jewish state does not want to keep its orientation towards any particular country, so the most correct foreign policy for the new Jewish state would be neutrality and orientation to the UN. Epstein noted that, of course, the Jewish state would be heavily economically dependent on the United States, because at present they would only be able to purchase weapons, equipment and other supplies for themselves. At the same time, Epstein noted that the SOVIET Union with a request to supply them with weapons and equipment, they now do not think not to give a reason for insinuations, as Jews are already accused of allegedly entering into some secret agreements with the Soviet government. Epstein went on to say that the recently concluded conference of American Jews in Atlantic City had decided to raise \$250 million for Palestine. This is a very large sum, and it will have a serious impact on the economy of the Jewish state.

Before leaving, Epstein said that when they formed an interim government, he would send a delegation to the USSR to discuss the establishment of close economic and cultural ties between the USSR and Judea. The basis of the future economy of the Jewish state, Epstein said, will be mainly an accurate manufacturing industry requiring a highly skilled workforce, similar to Switzerland. For example, they are already manufacturing precision devices, microscopes, industrial diamonds and other such industries.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN M. SHERTOK, DIRECTOR OF THE
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH
AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, WITH UN
UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL A.A.
SOBOLEV. December 26, 1947**

Mr. Schertok began the conversation by asking whether there was any truth in press reports that the United Nations was preparing for the formation of an international force for Palestine, or whether there were any plans for such projects.

Mr. Sobolev confided in the allegations, saying that Mr. Lee had asked the permanent representatives of the G5 whether they agreed to form such an international force. The question had been asked during a number of discussions, and Mr. Lee had taken the opportunity to raise the Palestinian issue. They have not been able to give an answer, and Mr. Lee is still waiting for it. Mr. Sobolev made it clear that they were being asked not only to agree to the establishment of such a force, but also to indicate the possibility of participating in such a force, although Mr. Li stated that other States could also be invited to participate.

Mr. Schertok asked whether it was possible to form such a force from a legal point of view, as well as in the practical and political aspects.

Mr. Sobolev believes that, from a legal point of view, the UN definitely has the right to form such forces. As far as the political complications associated with the formation of such forces can be judged, the key position is taken by the United States, since the United Kingdom in any case will have to leave some forces in Palestine, France will be ready to participate, the Russians are ready to participate now, and China's position is not an important and decisive factor. He asked Mr. Schertok if he thought there was any chance that the United States would participate.

Mr. Schertok replied that it was well known that the Americans were against sending their troops to Palestine, as well as sending troops from the Soviet Union.

Asked by Mr. Schertok about the possibility of Security Council intervention, Mr. Sobolev replied that this was definitely possible if a majority of its seven members were voted for in accordance with the Security Council's regulations.

When Mr. Schertok pointed out that it was necessary to distinguish between the actions of the Security Council while the British were still in Palestine and its actions after the evacuation, Mr. Sobolev stated that the truth was that the consent of the British would be required, and in any case their opposition meant a veto, but it was practically possible to start sending troops to Palestine, even when the British were still there. He believes that if we are only committed to a show of strength and determination of the UN, it can be organized in a couple of days, because the U.S. has naval units and aircraft in the Mediterranean, the Russians can send two squadrons of bombers in a short time. However, if the intention is to send forces capable of conducting military operations, then infantry is needed and it will take at least a month to relocate them from their current locations.

Mr. Schertok asked what action could be taken against states that violated the UN decision by providing military assistance to Palestinian Arabs. Mr. Sobolev replied: "We will take diplomatic steps; then, the Security Council may follow the action of the Security Council to prevent the States involved; The Security Council may call on them to cease their actions and to threaten action against them. A decision on the practical forms of such steps can be taken only after the scale of their actions becomes known." The difference between aggression and indirect assistance also depends on the scope of their actions. It is possible that if the Arab Governments are very active in supporting Palestinian Arabs without

sending their troops to Palestine, there will be a basis for the Security Council to take action against them. It must be understood that this is a slow process.

Mr. Shertok mentioned the explanation That Loy Genderson gave him regarding the embargo and noted that Loy Genderson also asked about our needs. Mr. Sobolev agreed that mr. Genderson's response was not positive, but it could not be regarded as completely negative. Mr. Schertok conveyed to Mr. Sobolev the information we had that Czechoslovakia was selling arms to Arab governments.

Mr. Schertok explained that our requests for arms shipments would be based on the principle that those who commit themselves to the UN decision and assist in its implementation can rightfully receive military and other assistance.

Mr. Sobolev agreed and said that it would be the right thing to do through the Commission on Palestine and the Security Council.

Mr. Schertok also explained the difficulties we face because of the urgent need for armaments on the one hand and our determination to do business properly with all members of the United Nations.

Responding to a question from Mr. Schertok, Mr. Sobolev expressed his opinion that when the arms issue was resolved, it would be sent to the Jewish State or the Jewish Agency, not the commission. The Commission does not have the financial means for this purpose, it is only a guide and supervisory body, and one of its responsibilities could be to ensure that we obtain weapons. The Commission will recommend how many weapons are needed, how to obtain them and how to distribute them between governments, the Jewish Agency or Arabs.

Mr. Schertok informed Mr. Sobolev during a conversation about the Intentions of the British to negotiate with the Commission in New York and their

view that the commission should remain in New York for some time.

Mr. Sobolev asked how the Provisional Government Council would be formed. The first meeting of the commission was scheduled for January 9, and Mr. Sobolev thinks that we should be ready to make our recommendations on the composition of the Provisional Government Council at the first meeting.

**NOTE OF THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
OF THE USSR V.A.SORIN TO THE MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M.
MOLOTOV. January 22, 1948**

Secret

According to T. Bodrov, the Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak government sold weapons (mortars, mines, ammunition) to the Syrian government. At the same time, the Czechs refused to sell arms to the Jewish Agency in Palestine, which made the request in November 1947.

On this issue, Agence France-Presse reported from Cairo on 13 December that the British were seeking to disrupt the supply of Czechoslovakian weapons to Arab countries and that the British government had allegedly delayed the transfer, which the Syrian government had made through London to pay for weapons purchased from Czechoslovakia. This report is confirmed by the appeal to the State Insurance Company slavia, which has a contractual relationship with the State Insurance Company, for assistance in connection with the fact that the British are preventing the insurance of the cargo of weapons sent from Czechoslovakia to Beirut for Arabs.

Taking into account the position we have taken on the Palestinian issue, I would consider it possible to entrust Todrova, if gottwald's attention, that the sale of weapons by the CzechOslovak Government to the Arabs in the current climate, when the situation in Palestine is worsening every day, can be used by the

Anglo-Americans against the Soviet Union and the countries of the new democracy.

A draft telegram to Prague is attached.

I ask for your instructions.

V. Sorin

On the document of the litter: "Abstain. V.Molotov. 27.1"; "Bakulin, Alexandrova. To the leadership. V.Sorin. 27.1."

**RECORDING OF S.K. TSARAPKIN, THE
CHARGE D.C. CHARGE D.C. IN THE UNITED
STATES, WITH E. EPSTEIN, A
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON. January
26, 1948**

Secret

Epstein said that now there is absolutely indisputable data confirming the double play of the British in the question of Palestine. The British do not want to leave and are now taking all measures to create a situation in Palestine and throughout the Middle East that would lead to the failure of the UN decision. The main role in this regard in the Middle East is now played by three British - Brigadier Clayton, diplomat Sir Walter Smart and General Glabb. Brigadier Clayton is the main person in this three. During the First World War he was the chief assistant to the well-known agent Intel-Lygens Lawrence service. In fact, Clayton is the creator of the Arab League, a tool of British politics throughout the Middle East. Clayton is currently liaising with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London and the Arab League. Sir Walter Smart has been in Cairo for many years as an oriental officer. He is a major expert in Arab affairs.

Finally, the third person is General Glabb (Glubb). Officially, he is in the service of King Abdullah of Transjordan. Glabb is fluent in Arabic and knows many

dialects of the language. He is an expert on the Bedouin issue and has written a number of books on the subject. Now he is actually coordinating from the point of view of the military and political activities of the countries belonging to the Arab League.

To thwart the General Assembly's decisions on the partition of Palestine, the British use three kinds of armed groups in Palestine itself:

1) Mufti detachments, which are led by someone Hasan Selami. It is known that during the last war, when the Mufti himself was sitting at Hitler's in Germany, Hassan Selami was taken by the Germans to Palestine by plane and was parachuted near Jericho. During the landing he broke his leg, was captured by the British, but then was released and now enters Palestine, being one of the mufti's closest assistants. He leads armed groups of Palestinian Arabs; 2) armed groups of Muslims, numbering up to 5,000. 3) Anders.

The aforementioned three Britons - Clayton, Smart and Glabb—are inspired by the provocative actions of the Arab states, organizing attacks on Palestine from the outside, and, relying on the three groups listed, is carrying out subversive work against the UN decision inside Palestine.

In order to deflect any accusations and to preserve its alibi, the British Government occasionally sends diplomatic representations to the Arab capitals. For example, the British recently addressed the Syrian government, as well as the government of their puppet Abdallah, King of Transjordan, in connection with the invasion of Palestine by their troops. Epstein told me that last Wednesday, January 21, Schertok and he visited the State Department twice and had conversations with Handerson and Lovett. They asked the State Department the following three questions:

1. The lifting of the embargo on the export of military materials from the United States to Palestine.

The State Department did not give a definite answer to this question, saying that the United States wanted to treat both sides equally in this matter and that the ban on arms transfers to Palestine applies equally to Jews and Arabs. Schertok and Epstein responded that the imposition of an embargo on the export of military materials to Palestine by the American government had placed Jews in a very difficult and unequal position. While Palestinian Arabs, especially after the British treaties with Iraq and Transjordan, have full freedom to acquire the weapons they need from the British through the said and other Arab countries, Jews are effectively deprived of such an opportunity, because the only place where they could acquire arms, the United States, becomes inaccessible to them because of the imposition of the embargo. Under such circumstances, the arms embargo on Palestine, if not in form, is essentially a discriminatory exercise by the United States Government, which is actually aimed only at Jews. Epstein stressed that this position of the State Department is undoubtedly strongly influenced by the current strategic, political and economic considerations of the United States, reflected in the Marshall Plan and in the ongoing congressional debate.

It should be taken into account that the State Department generally strong pro-Arab and anti-Jewish sentiments. In addition, the State Department is under intense pressure from U.S. oil monopolies with concessions and other interests in Arab countries.

2. The second question the Jews posed to the State Department was the sending of troops of the great powers of the great Powers, the permanent members of the Security Council, to Palestine by the Security Council. The proposal was motivated by the fact that the current situation in Palestine required the presence of such troops there in order to ensure that the General Assembly's decision on the partition of

Palestine was implemented. It was said that Arab countries were allowed to take a defiant and openly belligerent position, thanks to the connivance or even outright incitement on the part of England. The fact that The Arab countries are effectively ignoring the UN's decisions on the partition of Palestine and threatening Palestine with an armed takeover requires the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, to take the necessary urgent measures to ensure that the General Assembly's decision is implemented. One such measure should first be for the Security Council to send special troops to Palestine.

In response, the State Department pointed out that the question of Palestine was now a matter for the United Nations as a whole and, noting the complexity of the question, had evaded a certain answer. However, Shertok and Epstein pressed the State Department, saying that the question of Palestine now stands in the Security Council, so it is impossible to talk about this case in such an abstract form that the issue of Palestine is handled by the United Nations. The Security Council is occupied by representatives of certain Powers, including the representative of the United States, and therefore the United States cannot shirk its share of responsibility in the Security Council when the Council considers the situation in Palestine and the issue of sending foreign troops to Palestine.

Epstein told me that, as he learned from reliable sources, the U.S. Military Department is now considering sending foreign troops to Palestine. At this stage of the study of this issue, there are following points of view in the Military Department. First, we should consider whether foreign troops should be sent there, if any, which powers should be sent there. The question of whether Soviet Union troops should be allowed to take part in this case should also be resolved. Secondly, if the participation of the Soviet

Union troops is allowed, then on what conditions. The military department is ostensibly inclined that the United States could accept that Soviet troops should also be sent to Palestine, but on condition that they were sent there by sea. If The Soviet troops were to be sent there by land, for example through Iran or Turkey and further through Iraq and Syria to Palestine, and if the USSR required the right to supply its troops through those countries, the United States would never agree, even if it threatened to completely fail the implementation of the General Assembly's decision on Palestine. So far, this is only an inconclusive opinion of the military department, and the State Department will consider the matter in a day or two. During the conversation, Epstein made such a remark that they, the Jews, were interested in having foreign troops of such powers as the United States and the USSR in Palestine, and that they had no doubt that the Soviet Union would certainly not refuse to send its troops there. In this regard, they, the Jews, would like the Soviet Union to show the same spirit of compromise and agreement in this regard, given the foregoing of the Americans, which was shown in the last General Assembly, which then allowed the Assembly to decide on the partition of Palestine. Epstein could be understood to have the Jewish wish that the Soviet government agree to send its troops to Palestine by sea and agree on the matter with the United States when it was discussed.

3. The third question that Jews had raised before the State Department was that the United States should take steps in the Security Council to ensure that a United Nations commission could travel to Palestine and begin its work there. At the same time, Epstein expressed hope that the Soviet government would also take a position on this issue, which would ensure the commission's early departure to Palestine.

During the conversation, Epstein repeatedly spoke kindly about the performance of T. Gromyko at the dinner of Jewish writers in New York. He was also very pleased to note the fact that the Malt was presented to the Syrian government in Damascus.

S.Tsarapkin

**RECORDING OF S.K. TSARAPKIN, THE
CHARGE D.C. CHARGE D.C. IN THE UNITED
STATES, WITH E. EPSTEIN, A
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE IN WASHINGTON. February
9, 1948**

Secret

Referring to Palestinian affairs, Epstein said that it was now abundantly clear to them that if the solution to the Palestinian question with regard to United States policy was in the hands of Forrestal and Lovett, it could be said in advance that the United States would adopt a Arab-friendly position in the Security

Council. Now Palestine is the focus of all Middle Eastern and Middle Eastern policy of the British and Americans. The Americans and the British are all focused on consolidating politically and strategically the entire Middle East with its rich oil resources and military-strategic importance. Recently, a representative of the Arab-American oil company, Duce, travelled to the Arab States in the Middle East, who, claiming to have no official mission and expressing his personal opinion, told Arab leaders to be calm that, in his view, United States policy on the Palestinian issue was not yet final, that it was possible to reconsider the position taken by the United States in dealing with the question of Palestine in the last United Nations.

As a result of his trip to the Arab countries, Deuce has compiled a detailed report that is likely to be considered in the U.S. government spheres. The report proposes that the United States revise its policy on the Palestinian issue and thereby strengthen the position of the United States and American oil companies in Arab countries. The same report allegedly asserted that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine was the work of the Soviet Union, that the Jewish state in Palestine would be a Trojan horse in the hands of the Communists, that there was a secret agreement between the Jews and the Soviet Union.

**TELEGRAM OF M. SHERTOKU, DIRECTOR
OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, A
MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION OF THE
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE TO THE
UN. February 12, 1948**

From various conversations I have come to understand that the following two things excite the

minds of leading military figures and people from the State Department regarding the general and Middle East policy of the United States - both of which are related to the USSR.

1) With regard to the threat from Arab states to American interests (especially oil) in the Middle East, the United States is unable to draw a line to defend its threatened interests by sending American troops to the Middle East. This would immediately allow the Russians to invade Northern Iran under the pretext of protecting their interests there (an unratified agreement between the USSR and Iran on oil).

2) The U.S. military and state officials oppose the Soviet Union's participation in international forces not because they fear that the Russians may not leave the country, but because, the Americans argue, that wherever Russian troops are stationed, the Russians plant their agents, organize a subversive network, begin to conduct propaganda among the population, thus counting on the preparation of the ground for a revolutionary coup, which can happen much later, after the withdrawal of Russian troops.

**TELEGRAM TO D. BEN-GURION, DIRECTOR
OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, FROM
NEW YORK. February 13, 1948**

Met with Gromyko on February 5, outlined the essence of The Lifshitz Report. He asked to intervene

in the situation with the sale of arms to the Arabs by Czechoslovakia and the refusal of Yugoslavia. He didn't answer, but apparently he took note. Today, Ehud Avriel said by telephone that the cargo intended for the Arabs had been returned to Prague, but Yugoslavia steadfastly refused to give permission. He asked me to continue his support. I doubt whether there is a reason for this and whether there will be an effect, although Ehud believes that everything depends on instructions from Moscow. During the conversation, Gromyko asked if we had the opportunity to provide unloading. For his part, he replied that we had such opportunities. Before I meet him again, let me know whether I should give firm assurances on this matter, otherwise his willingness to intervene is highly questionable, if at all possible.

Schertok

**LETTER FROM THE MINISTER OF
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE USSR K.
SERGEYCHUK TO THE FIRST DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR**

**A.Y.VYSHINSKY, DEPUTY FINANCE
MINISTER OF THE USSR A.A. POPONOV,
DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE OF
THE USSR A.D. KRUTIKOV. March 6, 1948**

Secret

The General Directorate of PostMen of Palestine appealed to the Ministry of Communications with a proposal to establish an exchange of parcels between the USSR and Palestine.

The exchange of parcels between different States is based on an international postal parcel exchange agreement, which is being developed and accepted at postal congresses.

The USSR did not join this agreement and exchanges parcels with non-state on the basis of bilateral agreements.

The conclusion of the parcel-sharing agreement with Palestine is complicated by the fact that the exchange of parcels will depend on the Turkish postal office, through which parcels must be sent.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Ministry of Communications considers it necessary to temporarily refrain from concluding an agreement on the exchange of parcels with Palestine⁷⁸.

Please give your opinion on this matter.

Appendix: translation of a letter from Palestine.

K. Sergeyuk

**MEMORANDUM BY W.EITAN, ALEVAVI,
H.HERZOG, H.BERMAN AND E.SASSON**
March 26, 1948

Memorandum on political issues

The undersigned considered it their professional duty, as responsible employees of the Political Department, to discuss the current political situation together. To this end, on 24 and 25 March 1948 we held a meeting, the results of which we, by mutual consent, decided to present in writing.

1. The main question under discussion is whether to build hopes for the realization of our objectives solely on the possibility of a military victory over the Arabs. In our view, the chances of such a victory appear to be weak, as we do not receive assistance from any of the great Powers that currently dominate the region. Given the position of unfriendly neutrality that the Powers take towards us, we should bear in mind that it will be very difficult for us to ensure the supply of arms, the replenishment of the army, the flow of money, food, etc. Such conditions may arise if the British leave most of the country, the discussion of our problem in the Security Council in the meantime will become permanently confused, and our relations with the United States will cool down almost to the same extent as our relations with the United Kingdom. In this situation, there is a great danger of physical annihilation of a large part of the Jewish population, and we do not see an opportunity to win even after a long struggle. Therefore, political ways should be found to avoid exacerbating the situation described.

2. Political activity aimed at achieving the goals outlined in the previous paragraph should be directed,

on the one hand, at Western Powers and, on the other, at Arab countries. The possibility of independent intervention of the Slavic bloc in the events in our region seems at the moment extremely limited. If we can enlist the help of this bloc, the result will be a final transition of the United States to the side of our enemies and giving them even more assistance. However, the attempts of the opposition forces in the Jewish population of the country to establish contacts with the countries of the Soviet bloc should not be completely negative. If a world war breaks out in the near future, the Middle East could be occupied by the Soviet army in the early stages of such a war.

3. The political agenda and organizational aspects of our actions against Arab countries were summarized in a memorandum submitted by the department before American policy changed. However, the urgency of the proposals contained in that note has only grown today. Every effort must be made to establish political contacts with Arab countries, even as the fighting in Palestine continues and is intensifying. We cannot forget for a moment that we can walk out of the conflict with dignity and for the Arabs, to find a solution that can lead to peace.

4. With regard to our political line towards Western powers, in particular the United States, after a sharp turn in the Power's policy on the Palestinian issue, bridges should never be burned. Of course, we must insist with certainty on our right to an independent Jewish state and on the urgency of such a solution. At the same time, we should not take a position close to physical resistance in any attempt to delay the public recognition of a sovereign Jewish state. At the same time, efforts must continue to establish an interim regime that will continuously strengthen the real foundations of our State sovereignty in the areas of repatriation, defence, governance and economics. This

is an issue for a political campaign, and should not go here by maintaining complete political isolation.

In conclusion, we would like to emphasize that time is not waiting and that it is totally unjustified to postpone decisions and actions "until everything is cleared up". The process of clarification of the situation is absolutely independent of us, and we can "stop on the train" and miss opportunities that will no longer be presented. We must decide to act without certainty, so as not to be forced to change the direction of our actions in the near future. It is unforgivable to do nothing in such circumstances.

W.Eitan, A.Jleaeu, X.Herzog, X.Berman, E.Sasson

**NOTE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO
THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY (B), THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE
USSR J.V. STALIN. April 9, 1948**

Secret

I am submitting a draft directive to the General Assembly.

V.Molotov Draft directives of the USSR delegation at the second special session of the UN General Assembly on the question of Palestine

The Soviet delegation should be guided by the following in its work at the special session of the General Assembly:

1. To seek election to the Committee for the Verification of the Powers of One Representative from the Soviet delegations or from Poland or Czechoslovakia.

2. Nominations for the presidency of the Assembly are not nominated. The issue of supporting the nominee was decided by delegations on the ground depending on the situation.

3. To seek the election to the General Committee, in addition to the USSR, two more representatives

from Eastern European countries, depending on the situation: two vice-presidents of the Assembly and one chairman of the committee or two committee chairmen and one vice-president of the Assembly.

4. Defend the General Assembly resolution of 29.11.1947 on the partition of Palestine, guided by the directives given to Soviet delegations at the special and second sessions of the General Assembly.

Point out that during the period since the adoption of the resolution, the United Kingdom has obstructed its implementation in every way and, in particular, opposed the arrival in Palestine of the Palestinian Commission, which has therefore been unable to begin on-the-spot preparatory work on the partition.

It should also be pointed out that the Security Council, for its part, has not exhausted the means at its disposal to implement the resolution.

5. Criticize the American proposal for guardianship of Palestine, noting the following:

(a) The new United States proposal on The Palestinian question, aimed at overturning the General Assembly's decision by a majority of two thirds of the vote, not only fails to bring peace to Palestine, but is exacerbating the struggle between Jews and Arabs, while at the same time threatening peace and anxiety in the Middle East. At the same time, the General Assembly, which has taken its decision with the active participation of the United States after a detailed discussion of the question of Palestine, is being put in a false position as the object of political manoeuvres by the ruling circles of the United States, trying to impose a new solution to the question of Palestine to the General Assembly, regardless of the legitimate national interests of the peoples of Palestine.

b) The U.S. proposal to establish custody of Palestine does not correspond to the current cultural and political level of development of the Jewish and

Arab population, which is why it is negative and opposed by both Jews and Arabs. The establishment of guardianship of Palestine was not a step forward from the mandated system to the national self-determination of the peoples of Palestine, but left Palestine in a semi-colony position.

(c) With regard to the part of the American proposals that refer to the foundations of the organization of power in Palestine, it is contrary to the principle of self-government and is imbued with distrust of the ability of the local population to govern on their own on a democratic basis.

6. To state that, for these reasons, The Soviet delegations will vote against the American proposal.

7. Insist on the confirmation of the resolution on 29 November and on the adoption by UN members of effective measures to implement it.

**REFERENCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST
DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN
MINISTRY "THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE
AFTER THE UN DECISION ON THE
PARTITION OF THE COUNTRY". April 13,
1948**

The United Nations General Assembly, after more than six months of research into the Palestinian problem, adopted a democratic decision on 29 November 1947 to establish two independent States in Palestine, Arab and Jewish. This decision, reflecting the desire of the Jewish and Arab peoples to build their lives within the framework of nation-states, has been praised in democratic circles around the world.

Jewry

The news of the establishment of a Jewish state caused the jubilation of Jews throughout Palestine on 30 November, with demonstrators thanking the United

Nations, the Soviet Union and other countries that supported the partition of Palestine. Arab resistance to the UN decision and widespread clashes between Arabs and Jews made it necessary to prepare Jews to protect the future of the Jewish state. The Jewish Agency and

The Jewish National Council announced on 9 December the mobilization of the first conscription group (17-25 years) for security service and use in the Jewish semi-legal military organization Haganah. Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency, stated on January 1, 1948, that the Jews "have stood up for not only themselves and not only the UN, but also the borders of the Jewish state. We have the right to demand that the UN provide us with moral and material support... These are the ancestral torments of the Jewish state, and we will accept them with faith and selfless devotion."

The growing resistance of the Arabs to the partition was dictated by the urgency of the creation of the Jewish militia. Schertok, the head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, insisted at a press conference in New York on January 12, 1948, that "the Jews of Palestine need a well-armed and motorized militia of 15-20,000 people." The events that followed forced the Jewish Agency to demand the creation of a militia of 30-35 thousand people, including aviation units. This militia was to be established on the base of Hagana, which already has some weapons and most of the soldiers of which received military training in the British army during the Second World War. Jewish organizations launched a worldwide campaign to raise funds for Palestine and purchase weapons, but these efforts were met with a ban on the export of military materials from the United States (confiscation of large quantities of explosives in New York) and a thorough blockade of Palestinian shores by the British navy.

Jews, fearing the possibility of a failure of the UN decision on Palestine because of the resistance of the Arabs, agreed and demanded the sending of the UN armed forces to carry out the partition of the country.

Beginning in January 1948, Jews began to establish an interim government of the Jewish state. The U.S. refusal to support the General Assembly's decision led to the Jewish Agency and the National Council's decision at a joint meeting on March 23 in Tel Aviv to declare the Jewish state on May 16 (the day after the end of the English mandate for Palestine). At the end of March, a Jewish military office was formed in Tel Aviv, which included Ben-Gurion. Most of the seats in the projected government are given to the Mapai Labour Party and the right-wing bourgeois parties, which are closely linked to reactionary circles in the United States.

The Jewish Agency rejects the U.S. offer of guardianship even for a short period of time, as "guardianship would inevitably bring with it the deprivation of Jews' right to national independence. This would give Palestine the power of a foreign military regime." Meyerson, head of the Political Division of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, said that "we will never accept any other solution than the establishment of a Jewish state." Jewish terrorist organizations strongly opposed the "treason of the United States to the cause of the Jews." "If U.S. troops are sent to Palestine to carry out guardianship, we will join them in a fierce struggle and treat the Americans as they treated the British invaders" (Irgun Tswai Lami, March 24). "American imperialism is no different from British. We will continue to fight for the Jewish state and against all imperialist claims even if we are forced to fight alone. But if we look closely at the current situation, we are almost certain that we will not be left alone in our struggle" (Stern Group, March 22).

Although the Jewish Agency continues to insist in its official statements on the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, there are indications that some Jewish groups are concerned and are making attempts to leave Palestine, so that the Jewish Agency has been forced to prevent Jews from leaving the country. The rector of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and influential politician Dr. Magnes in late March 1948 called on Jews to accept the guardianship of the UN and the creation of a bi-national state.

Immigration

Despite the mandate-holder's refusal to provide, according to the UN decision, a port for Jewish immigration by 1 February, several steamships managed to land illegal immigrants on the Palestinian shore. On the night of December 4, 1947, a ship carrying 182 immigrants broke the blockade and disembarked its passengers near Tel Aviv, and the UN ship landed 700 people north of Haifa on 1 January 1. The British Government issues 1,500 permits a month to Jewish immigrants held on the island of Cyprus, where all Palestinian-eligible vessels with immigrants are sent, in particular, at the end of 1947 two steamers were sent there, carrying 15,000 Jews from the Black Sea ports.

The British, having imposed a blockade on Palestinian shores, deprived the Jews of the opportunity to receive more or less significant amounts of aid from abroad. Britain and the United States fear an influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe.

Arabs

The main Arab feudal-bourgeois organizations, the Supreme Arab Committee and the Arab Bureau, inspired by the British, opposed the establishment of a Jewish state and the partition of Palestine. The United Nations decision on the Palestinian issue provoked strong reactions in Arab circles and was marked by a three-day protest strike led by the Supreme Arab Committee.

Armed protests against Jews took place with renewed vigour in December 1947 and continue to this day. Traitors and quislings from all over the world began to flock to Palestine and took part in the struggle on the side of the Arabs, among them Anders Scum, Bosnian Muslims from the camps of displaced persons in Germany, German prisoners of war who had fled the camps in Egypt, "volunteers" from Francoist Spain.

The Arab League countries, following the decisions of the League Council, send armed groups of Arabs to Palestine. The first unit entered Palestine from Syria on January 9, 1948. It consisted of Syrian, Iraqi and Lebanese volunteers who, having attacked two Jewish settlements, were forced to retreat back to Syria. This speech was timed to coincide with the start of the work of the UN Palestinian Commission.

From January to March 1948, numerous Arab groups crossed the Palestinian border, travelling in vehicles and armed with mortars and automatic rifles. For example, on 30 January, 800 heavily armed Arabs in 50 trucks crossed the Palestinian-Transjordan border. The Arab armed forces are located mainly in the mountains of Samaria with headquarters in the city of Nablus, where the commander of the Arab Volunteer Army, Fawzi Kauk-chi, is currently stationed. The number of Arab troops was estimated at the beginning of March at 6,000 people, and according to Arab sources - almost 15,000 people. (According to the

Jewish Agency, there are 2,500 Syrians, 2,500 Iraqis and several hundred Egyptians and Lebanese in Palestine.) Arab police officers, along with weapons, leave their posts and join the Arab militias.

The Arabs receive weapons from the Arab countries supplied by England. In March 1948, a mission of the Palestinian Supreme Arab Committee arrived in London to purchase weapons worth 500,000 pounds, and it is expected to receive 10,000 machine guns, etc., which will be sent to Palestine through neighbouring Arab countries. In France, guns and tanks are purchased and will be handed over to Palestinian Arabs through the Levant.

The Trans-Jordanian Arab Legion, which is held and under the command of the British, takes part in the battles against the Jews. Legion soldiers guarded one of the bridges across the Jordan River and unhindered allowed a 700-Arab unit into Palestine. The Arab Legion is the force within Palestine through which Abdallah intends to take over the country after the end of the British mandate on 15 May.

The head of the Supreme Arab Committee is a former Mufti of Palestine, who moved to Damascus in March to make direct contact with Arab groups in Palestine. Although the Arabs see the change in the U.S. position on the Palestinian issue as their "moral victory", the Mufti opposed the guardianship of Palestine and reiterated the Arab resolve to fight to the end. A March 26 report by the Arab Information Bureau stated that "Arabs will only agree to establish guardianship after the plan for the partition of Palestine is finally rejected."

Only the left-wing National Liberation League opposes the bloody clashes between Arabs and Jews in Palestine.

Armed struggle between Jews and Arabs erupted throughout Palestine. During the first 15 days of December 1947, each side had 100 killed and several hundred wounded. On the border of the Arab city of Jaffa and the Jewish - Tel Aviv for four months there are continuous street battles, sniper gunfights and mutual raids. Traffic on the roads can take place only if there is strong armed protection. Jewish convoys of vehicles between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are under attack and looting. The Arabs are carrying out a systematic offensive against Jewish settlements scattered in the southern Negev desert, destroying irrigation pipes without which it is impossible to exist in this waterless area.

The scale and brutality of the bloody struggles is growing from day to day. Jewish terrorists committed an irresponsible act on 30 December 1947 by throwing a bomb at a crowd of Arabs standing at the entrance to the Anglo-Iraqi oil refinery in Haifa. Six Arabs were killed and 40 wounded. Further carnage by the Arabs, during which 41 Jews were killed, took place in front of the guards of the factory run by the Arab Legion and British officers.

In Jerusalem, where the population is mixed, Arab-Jewish clashes have reached extreme tensions. The Hebrew University, Hadassah Hospital, the editorial office of the Jewish newspaper Palestine Post, the home of the former Mufti of Palestine, which he handed over to Arab organisations, the Semiramis Hotel (the meeting place of the Najada military organization) and a number of other buildings were blown up. For several months they have been under siege of 1,800 Jews in the old city of Jerusalem. This quarter, where Jewish "holy places" are concentrated, is surrounded by Arabs and food deliveries to the besieged can only be made on British armoured vehicles. The unrest in Palestine led to the

development of banditry and looting, and attacks on banks and railways increased.

The U.S. peacekeeping statement had the opposite effect: the fighting was all flaring up, Arabs were using guns and machine guns, and during the clash in late March, the Jewish armed forces even had several planes.

According to official data of the British administration, in Palestine in the four months to April 1, 1948 killed almost 2,000 people, including 800 Jews.

The Arabs have recently moved to systematic and systematic operations against Jewish colonies scattered throughout the country. The colonies in the south of the country, in the Negev, and in the north, in the Galilee, are cut off from the main Jewish population of the coastal strip, and the defense of them, and even more so, the implementation of communication between them is almost impossible task for the semi-legal Jewish militia. In addition, Jews are deprived of assistance from outside, bear great losses killed and wounded, which will adversely affect the resistance of this small (only 640,000 people) community.

English

The “neutral” position of the British in the Palestinian question cannot hide their aspirations, provoking internecine struggle of Jews and Arabs, to disrupt the UN decisions on the partition of Palestine and to remain in Palestine in the form of a third force, one or together with the United States, or to hand over to Palestine to the transiordian king, who will preserve it for Great Britain. Therefore, the British police and army are either inactive or secretly assisting the Arabs in their fight against the Jews. The Jewish newspaper Dawar wrote in January 1948 that “the British want to organize chaos of this kind, so that by May 15 the

country will be concentrated large Arab gangs, that at its borders everything was ready for an open invasion and that those who defend the UN decision were deprived of weapons and the ability to defend themselves."

The National Liberation League newspaper Al-Ittihad reported cases in which the British sought to set Arabs against Jews; this message the British administration banned reprinting, and the newspaper was closed on January 19.

British soldiers sell weapons and ammunition to Arab units, cases of "missing" armoured vehicles have increased - all this is done against the background of soothing statements of the British administration about the desire to preserve peace and order in the country. In fact, opening the borders of Palestine with neighbouring Arab countries (since the protection of several bridges in Jordan, through which the Arabs move in trucks, would not be an impossible task for the hundred thousand British army), England strictly protects the sea coast, preventing Jews from getting help.

The evacuation of British troops from Palestine has hardly yet begun, although it has already been 4 months after the UN decision on the gradual withdrawal of the mandate-holder powers. It was not until 7 March that the first batch of 2,000 soldiers was sent.

The British, who hold all the values of the Palestinian people, demand \$74 million from Palestinian funds to pay pensions to British officials and take the gold reserves of Palestine to London. In November 1947, the British administration opened bidding for state lands in Haifa.

The U.S. refusal to support the UN decision made the British speeches more frank. For example, officials of the British administration in Palestine proposed to

the British Ministry of Colonies to divide Jerusalem on a religious basis and to put the head of the city of the English governor, and the security police officers to recruit from the British police.

Economic life in Palestine

Armed clashes have paralyzed many aspects of economic life in Palestine. Railroads and road transport are disorganized and transportation costs have increased significantly. There has been a significant increase in the prices of food and livestock feed, partly because of delivery difficulties. Palestine, unless vigorous action is taken, will come to a stand in a few months in the face of impending famine. Already, the Jews of Jerusalem receive 200 grams. bread a day. The industry has suffered to a much lesser extent.

findings

1. The situation of Jews in Palestine is deteriorating day by day because of the inability to receive human assistance and weapons and the heavy losses that cannot be compensated because of the small Jewish population in Palestine.

2. Arabs are encouraged by the help of Arab countries and England and the U.S. retreat from support for the UN decision. They have launched a systematic offensive against Jewish settlements, attempting to expand their areas of domination and capturing the city of Jerusalem.

3. The British administration assists the Arabs and prevents the organization of the defence of the Jews.

BVO attache

A.Semioshkin

**PROTOCOL RECORDING OF THE SPEECH
OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE USSR TO THE UN A.A.GROMYKO AT
THE MEETING OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE
OF THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. April 20, 1948**

A.A. Gromyko (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) shares the fears of a number of delegations that the partition plan has not been implemented, that the Palestinian issue is being discussed for the third time by the General Assembly, and that one Of the States is putting forward a proposal that nullifies the general Assembly's decision, is not in the interests of the Palestinian people and is not conducive to the maintenance of international peace. According to the General Assembly's partition plan, the Palestinian Commission had to take some measures to establish a Jewish and Arab State in Palestine. The commission was to receive instructions and assistance from the Security Council. The Security Council, however, has

not only failed to take the necessary steps to implement this decision of the General Assembly, but, on the contrary, has made the implementation of the plan more difficult.

Mr. Gromyko attributed the inaction of the Security Council mainly to the position taken by the United States, which was trying to change the General Assembly's decision. While the United States initially used all its influence to adopt a partition plan, it suddenly changed its line on the issue. This change of position was clear as early as 9 December 1947 at the first meeting at which the Security Council was to discuss measures to implement the General Assembly's decision. Beginning on 29 November 1947, when the partition plan was adopted, the United States prepared its own plan, which was formally presented to the Security Council on 19 March 1948 and which provided for the establishment of United Nations custody over Palestine.

At the end of the last session of the Assembly, public opinion, even in the United States, found that the latter's position on the Palestinian issue was in fact aimed at derailing the General Assembly resolution. No one believed in the official rebuttal of the United States. Everyone understood that the United States was preparing a deadly blow to the decision to divide and was hatching some new plans for Palestine. We are being persuaded that the new plan is better than the old one, although in reality the opposite is true. It is argued that the partition plan cannot be implemented peacefully. This argument would be worthy of attention only if the Security Council had taken any practical steps to carry out this decision, but it has not been done.

The inaction of the Security Council in recent months has been the result of a position taken by the United States, the United Kingdom and some other

States. The Security Council has been trampled on the ground without achieving any useful results. The decision he made on 5 March 1948 (document S/691) was merely a simple appeal to the permanent members of the Security Council to make their recommendations to the Palestinian Commission. The resolution also called on all Governments and peoples to do everything possible to put an end to the unrest in Palestine. The decision, however, did not help the Palestinian Commission, and it did not have the necessary instructions for the implementation of the partition plan. The appeal to Governments and peoples to end the unrest in Palestine was without consequences, as those to whom it had been addressed knew that they could expect total impunity in their actions.

The meetings of the permanent members of the Security Council have revealed that not only does the United States be unwilling to discuss how the General Assembly's decision could be implemented, but it wants that decision to be reconsidered. From the outset, the representative of the United States had offered to consult with Jews and Arabs as if there was no solution to Palestine, after which he tried to prove that the decision was supposedly impossible to implement peacefully. He did not, however, mention that

The Security Council has not exhausted the capacity at its disposal to hold a general Assembly decision.

The last resolution adopted by the Armistice Council (document S/723) is not being implemented by those who, from the outset, have decided to fight against the General Assembly's decision of 29 November 1947.

The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recalls that, after a comprehensive study of

the issue and after discussing all the other proposed solutions, the United Nations has concluded that the two-State partition of Palestine represents the most just solution. It is most just because it is in the national interest of both peoples of Palestine, it will resolve relations between these peoples once and for all and that will ensure the maintenance of peace in the Middle East.

Mr. Gromyko pointed out that the struggle between the two peoples had intensified during the mandate of the United Kingdom. A partition plan involving close economic cooperation between the two States could put an end to that struggle. The partition would mean the end of the semi-colonial order in Palestine and the recognition that the Jewish and Arab populations, in their political, economic and cultural development, had reached a level that allowed each of them to establish their own independent State. The section would also satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Jewish people, who suffered so much during the existence of Hitler's regime.

When discussing the Palestinian question, everyone should be mindful of all these benefits of partition. It seems, however, that some States are not governed by the needs of Palestine, not by the common interests of the United Nations, but by the political, economic, military and military-strategic interests of one or two Powers. Those States are prepared to sacrifice the aspirations of the peoples of Palestine if it is not in the interests of the United States leadership. The change in the United States position on the Palestinian issue is dictated by its oil and military interests. Prominent influential circles, reflecting these interests, are trying to turn Palestine into its strategic and military base, and economically into the American semi-colony.

The guardianship plan proposed by the United States is likely to exacerbate the struggle in Palestine, threaten peace and heighten anxiety in the Middle East. Moreover, the establishment of guardianship over Palestine does not correspond to the current cultural and political level of development of the Jewish and Arab population. This plan was incompatible with the right to self-determination of the peoples of Palestine, and it would effectively put that country in the position of colonial slavery, with all the deplorable consequences that ensued.

Finally, the United States plan puts the General Assembly in a false position: the Assembly, after a long study of the issue, adopted a partition plan with the active participation of the United States, and now the same plan is the subject of political machinations by America's ruling circles.

The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics further accuses the Mandate Power of using all means available to it to prevent the General Assembly resolution from being implemented. The United Kingdom opposed the Palestinian Commission's arrival in Palestine, leaving the latter unable to begin the preparatory work required to implement the partition decision. The Commission was not allowed to come to Palestine until 1 May, in other words, two weeks before the end of the mandate, and the United Kingdom refused to even guarantee the commission the safety of its stay during those two weeks. The Government of the United Kingdom has thus tried to make the Palestinian Commission a body that could discuss the issue but not take any practical measures to implement the General Assembly's decision. In doing so, the United Kingdom has jeopardized the entire plan of partition. It also ignored the part of the General Assembly resolution that said that a port for Jewish immigration had been opened in Palestine since

1 February 1948. All these facts, together with the report of the Palestinian Commission, prove that the United Kingdom is largely responsible for all the complications that have arisen over the question of the future of Palestine. Despite the best efforts of the United Kingdom to justify its actions in Palestine, it is clear that its purpose is to nullify the decision on partition and thus to condone those elements in the Middle East that wish to derail the plan of partition. The mandate-holder Power has not only failed to ensure basic order in Palestine, but has even opened the borders of that State to the armed gangs that have infiltrated Palestine in order to fight there against the Assembly's decision.

The policies of the United Kingdom and the United States clearly have much in common. The behaviour of these two States on the Palestinian issue has dealt a serious blow to the credibility of the United Nations, which in fact has long been overlooked by the ruling circles of the United States. It is also clear that those States that have set out to derail the partition plan and impose on the United Nations a solution dictated by the selfish interests of the ruling circles of the United States are responsible.

The Soviet delegation would therefore vote against the United States proposal to establish a guardianship regime in Palestine.

The USSR delegation believed that the decision to partition Palestine was the right decision and that the United Nations should take effective measures to implement it.

United Nations. Official reports from the Second Special Session of the General Assembly. Volume 11. The main committees. Summary of meetings from April 16 to May 14, 1948. New York, 1948.

**NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST
DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
OF THE USSR I.N.BAKULIN TO THE DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR
V.A.SORIN. May 15, 1948**

Secret

Until 1914, the Russian government had one consulate of general in Jerusalem (opened in 1858) and two consulates in Haifa (opened in 1842) and Jaffa (opened in 1820).

In 1914, in connection with the First World War, all three consulates were closed and the buildings were seized by the Turks.

In 1922, having received a mandate for Palestine, England seized the building of the Consulate General in Jerusalem (only one of this building is the property of the USSR) and used it at its discretion.

On February 19, 1947, In one of his letters, Malod asked about the expediency of opening our consulate in Jerusalem, but due to the Palestinian problem, this issue was not further developed, especially since the permission to open this consulate had to be asked by the mandate-holder.

At present, following the abolition of the Palestinian mandate, it is appropriate to send one of our mission in Lebanon to Jerusalem as a representative of the Mission to Protect Soviet Property in Jerusalem until relations with Palestine are established.

I. Bakulin

**TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M.
MOLOTOV. May 15, 1948**

I am honoured to inform you and ask you to inform your Government that the National Council of the Jewish State, made up of members of selected representatives of Palestinian Jewish organizations, met yesterday, 14 May, after the end of the British Mandate, and on the basis of a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of 29 November 1947, proclaimed the formation of an independent Jewish State in Palestine to be called the State of Israel. The Council stated that the State of Israel would be open to the immigration of Jews from all the countries in which they were scattered; will contribute to the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; will be based on the principles of freedom, justice and peace; will uphold the full social and political equality of all citizens, regardless of race, creed or gender; will guarantee full freedom of conscience, religion, education, culture and language; will protect the sanctity and integrity of temples and holy sites of all religions and will devote himself to upholding the principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations. The Council also stated that the State of Israel would be ready to cooperate with the organs and representatives of the United Nations in implementing the Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947 and would take steps to ensure the formation of

an economic union for the whole of Palestine. The Council called on the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to return to the path of peace and to play their part in its development through full and equal citizenship and due representation in its administration, temporary and permanent. The Council also offered peace to all neighbouring States and their peoples and invited them to cooperate with the State of Israel for the common good for all. On behalf of the Provisional Government of Israel, I hereby ask for the official recognition of the State of Israel and its Provisional Government by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I express the hope that such recognition will soon follow, and I am sure that it will strengthen the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and its peoples, on the one hand, and the State of Israel and the Jewish people of Palestine, on the other hand, as well as serve the cause of peace and justice in international relations in general. I take this opportunity to express the deep gratitude and understanding of the Jewish people of Palestine, which are shared by Jews around the world, for the firm position taken by the SOVIET delegation to the United Nations in support of the establishment of an independent sovereign Jewish state in Palestine; for her consistent promotion of this idea, despite all the difficulties; for expressing her genuine sympathy for the suffering of the Jewish people in Europe at the hands of Nazi tormentors and for supporting the principle that the Jews of Palestine are a nation deserving of sovereignty and independence.

On behalf of the Provisional Government of Israel

Mote Schertok, Minister of Foreign Affairs

**TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO
THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
ISRAEL M. SCHERTOK. May 18, 1948**

I confirm receipt of your telegram dated May 16, in which you inform the Government of the USSR about the proclamation on the basis of the UN General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947 the establishment of an independent State of Israel in Palestine and request the recognition of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the State of Israel and its Provisional Government.

I hereby inform that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has decided to formally recognize the State of Israel and its Provisional Government.

The Soviet Government hopes that the establishment by the Jewish people of their sovereign State will serve to promote peace and security in Palestine and the Middle East and expresses confidence in the successful development of friendly relations between the USSR and the State of Israel.

Foreign Minister of the USSR

V. Molotov

**NOTE OF THE DEPUTY RESPONSIBLE
SECRETARY OF THE JEWISH ANTI-FASCIST
COMMITTEE IN THE USSR G.M. HEIFETZ
TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY (B). May 18, 1948**

B. Urgently Secret

In connection with the events in Palestine, the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee is contacted by telephone and in person, and there are applications to be sent to Palestine as volunteers "to participate in the fight against the aggressor and fascists".

The applicants, in the majority, speak not only on their own behalf, but also from their work or academic comrades.

Most applications were received from students of Moscow higher education institutions: law institute, chemical institute, technical school of foreign languages, institute of chemical engineering and others.

There are statements from Soviet employees - engineers of the Steel Project and the Ministry of Arms and from officers of the Soviet army. The applicants explain their requests by wanting to help the Jewish people in the fight against the English aggressor in the creation of a Jewish state.

The EAC has also received applications for fundraising for the purchase of weapons.

More than 20 people personally contacted the committee on May 17 and 18.

Steel engineer Urman S.I., 52, and his two sons (all participants of the Patriotic War) want to "fight against the aggressor." Student Anatole Dong, according to him, organized a significant group of students of Moscow higher education institutions, who are ready to immediately go to Palestine "to fight the Arabs."

Engineer tank builder (did not name himself), a participant of the Civil and Patriotic Wars, is also ready to leave immediately at the first request. He asks "urgently, before it's too late, to organize a Jewish brigade."

Student Levin P.A. said that 80 students of the Moscow Law Institute are ready for immediate departure to Palestine.

Student Leizernok M.N. said that he and 20 people, students of the Moscow Foreign College, are ready to go to Palestine to "participate in the fight against the fascists."

We enclose a copy of the letter received by mail on May 18, 48.

EAC Deputy Responsible Secretary

G. Heifetz

**TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE
UNITED STATES E. ESHPAIN. May 22, 1948**

Please request an immediate response from the State Department regarding the dispatch of fighter-bombing aircraft, anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery, yes or no. Also, contact the Soviet embassy immediately with a request to urgently contact Moscow on the issue of the same assistance⁸⁰. For your information, air raids on Tel Aviv are increasing, becoming more intense and destructive, causing serious disruption in the work of industry, trade, institutions, schools. The morale is now excellent, but there are fears of serious deterioration if the city

remains virtually defenceless. Don't beg the State Department-just ask, but emphasize that we are determined to buy weapons, as it is a matter of life or death. The case is extremely urgent. Inform Weizmann.

Schertok

**EXCHANGE OF TELEGRAMS BETWEEN
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHERTOK
AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER V.M.
MOLOTOV. May 24, 1948, May 25, 1948**

I. Telegram of Israeli Foreign Minister M. Shertok

May 24, 1948

I am honoured to express to you the deepest satisfaction with which my Government has taken note of the announcement of the official recognition of the State of Israel by the Government of the USSR,

courtesy of your telegram of 18 May this year, the Government of the State of Israel fully shares the wishes so generously expressed by you, and once again reaffirms its firm hope, based on the events that led to the establishment of our Government, for that reason. that Moir's most friendly relations be established between the State of Israel and the Soviet Union. To that end, we ask you to inform us whether you agree to the State of Israel immediately establishing its mission in Moscow as an envoy or charge d'affaires and consul-general, and for a Soviet mission of the same rank to be established simultaneously in Tel Aviv.

On behalf of the Provisional State Council of Israel

Mote Schertok, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Telegram of soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov

May 25, 1948

I confirm receipt of your telegram dated May 24, 1948, in which you ask the consent of the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the State of Israel immediately establish its mission in Moscow and that at the same time the Soviet mission be established in Tel Aviv.

I am truly honoured to announce that the Soviet Government agrees to the establishment of a mission of the State of Israel in Moscow, headed by an envoy or charge d'affaires, including the performance of consular functions, and, in turn, is ready to establish a Soviet mission in Tel Aviv.

V. Molotov Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

**NOTE OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE
JEWISH ANTI-FASCIST COMMITTEE IN THE
USSR IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY (B). May 31, 1948**

Secret

That. Baranov L.S.

We send you copies of statements and letters received by the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in connection with the events in Palestine.

EAC Deputy Responsible Secretary
G. Heifetz Stavropol, May 23, 2048
To the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee
I. Feferu

Dear comrades!

I appeal to you with confidence that I express the opinion of millions of Jews - Soviet citizens.

At the moment there has been an unprecedented change in our lives: our name- a Jew - has risen to such a level that we have become an equal people. At the moment, a small handful of Jews of the State of Israel is engaged in a tense struggle against the Arab attack. It is also a struggle against the English Empire. This is a struggle not only for the independent State of Israel, but also for our future, for democracy and justice.

The question arises: why do we stand aside and do not take part in the just struggle of our brothers, heroically fighting against a large enemy!

I appeal to you, representatives of Soviet Jews. Take all measures to create a volunteer legion of Jewish-Soviet citizens under the slogan: for a democratic state in the Jewish country of Israel.

I am sure that this call will unite many thousands of Jews, former soldiers of the Soviet army. I also believe that our Soviet government, the protector of all oppressed peoples, will be positive about our opinion.

Don't think you're dealing with a Zionist. I am not a Zionist, but a former member of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine and a political detainee of the former Poland.

I hope my letter doesn't be solitary.

Our call is to save before it's too late. I'm asking for an answer.

Hello Aron Perlmuther.

My address:

Stavropol n/Caucasus, Comintern Street, 4, sq. 44.

Dear t. Fefer!

In the heart of The Great Stalin and his friend Vyacheslav Molotov found a place to care for our dispossessed people. I cannot express in words the deepest gratitude to the genius of mankind, the native, dear Joseph Stalin, for the support given to him by the newly organized State of Israel.

Pride for my homeland - the USSR and the Communist Party, of which I am a member, filled everything. The Soviet Union has once again proved to the world that it is the most consistent defender of all the oppressed. And I believe that for centuries the persecuted, destroyed, scattered around the world Jewish people will become as free and happy as all the peoples of the USSR. I believe that the Jewish state of Israel will not perish, but will stand in the fight against the British imperialists and their mercenaries. I want to help the Jews fighting the interventionists, and I ask you to let me know if volunteers are allowed to join the Jewish army. If the issue had not yet been resolved, the Government should be asked to allow the organization of a Jewish volunteer corps. We cannot sit idly by when our blood brothers die in unequal combat.

My address:

Kiev, Prozorovskaya Street, No. 33, sq.71.

Captain of the reserve of the Soviet Army, Serper Abram Mihajlovic.

To the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee

Orenburg I.G.

We, a group of Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality, address you as one of the leaders of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, a body representing the Jewish

public in the Soviet Union, with the following statement:

As Jews and as citizens of the Soviet Union, we cannot remain indifferent to the events in Palestine. This is not only due to understandable and legitimate sympathies for our one-blooded brothers in Palestine fighting for their right to national existence. This is also due to our feelings of the Soviet people, feelings of sympathy towards the liberation struggle of the oppressed people against imperialism. The struggle of the Jewish people in Palestine as a whole is such a struggle, despite the differences between the class and ideological groups involved in this struggle. This struggle is also an integral part of the struggle for democracy and peace waged by democratic forces around the world.

The Jewish state in Palestine, recently proclaimed and recognized by the Soviet Union and the United States, is subject to aggression by Arab countries in an agreement with the British government. This aggression is an illegal interference in the internal affairs of Palestine and at the same time a blatant disregard for the decision to partition Palestine taken by the UN Security Council, and these actions are committed by countries that are members of the United Nations.

In this regard, we ask the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee on behalf of the entire Soviet Jewish community to raise its voice in defence of the legitimate rights of the Jewish people, against violation of international obligations, against aggression and intervention.

It is already clear that the further advance of the Arab troops is accompanied and will be accompanied by acts of violence and terror, mass killings of civilians. Reports of the bombing of Tel Aviv and the extermination by the Arabs of the entire population of

the Jewish village they captured are the first information that will certainly not be the last. Mass terror, the extermination of civilians, the murder of old people, women and children - these actions have always been the weapon of reactionary forces in the fight against democratic and national liberation movements, weapons of imperialism. It is also known that the Arab armed forces are involved in hired units made up of SS executioners.

We cannot accept that in Palestine, at least on a smaller scale, the tragedy of the Jewish people in the past war will be repeated. We ask the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee to raise the voice of protest against the new mass extermination of our half-brothers.

The letter was signed by 16 people.

Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the USSR

Dear comrades!

In Palestine, the Arabs attacked innocent Jews and innocent blood was pouring. This is the work of the fascists of England and other capitalist countries, looking for a way to power and continuing Hitler's policy of extermination of our people.

We Jews, citizens of the Soviet Union, cannot remain indifferent to these events.

Moral support alone is not enough. We need to organize a broad campaign to provide material assistance to our struggling brothers. It is necessary to obtain the government's permission so that Jews who wish to help our brothers with weapons in their hands can do so.

Here's what I'm saying:

1. For the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee to ask the Government on behalf of Jewish Soviet citizens to allow it to collect money and other material values for the warring Jews of Palestine;

2. Allow those who wish to help our struggling brothers to go to Palestine to join the army;

3. Allow the purchase and delivery of weapons and other military supplies to the Jewish Government;

4. In all cities and districts of the Soviet Union, offices of the anti-fascist committee were set up to implement the proposal.

Unfortunately, I am a disabled man of the world war and my state of health does not allow me to participate in the struggle. However, I am ready to do everything in my power. I give my monthly salary of 700 rubles and call on all Jews of the Soviet Union to follow suit and help the struggling Jews as much as possible.

Hurry, comrades, with help so it won't be too late. Do not let the fire ignite - you need to put out from the first minute.

Do not allow fascism to find an opportunity to grow - you need to immediately cross the road to it.

For the freedom of all nations!

Death of the Black Reaction!

Selman Toiwicz

Sverdlovsk, Pushkinskaya Street, 2, sq. 2.

To the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee
treatment

The treacherous policy of English imperialism, the policy of inciting discord between peoples led to a new massacre in the Middle East. The Jewish people, who made enormous sacrifices in the Second World War, earned the right to have their own sovereign state. Despite this, a bloc of Arab states, instigated, led and supported by England, attacked the newly created Jewish state, serving only as a tool of England's imperialist policy in the Middle East. True to its principles of protecting the rights of small nations to self-determination, the Soviet Union has taken a firm stand in support of the legitimate rights of the Jewish people from the outset and officially recognized the

State of Israel. Arab gangs do not stop before the mass murder of civilians, bomb peaceful colonies, exterminate the population in the captured territory, as it was in the colony of Dangur.

In writing to the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, we express our deep indignation and indignation at the brazen act of aggression of the imperialist bloc against the State, which offered peaceful cooperation to all Arab countries. We think that we express the opinion not only of the signatories of this letter, but also of all Jews of both Leningrad and the entire Soviet Union.

We ask the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee to immediately launch an active campaign to help the Jewish state.

We propose to start raising funds to help the Jewish people of Palestine fighting aggression.

The letter was signed by 21 people.

Due to the lack of time, not everyone who wants to sign here signed. There are a lot of people who want to. Please respond via Eynikite.

May 19, 2015

Leningrad.

Presidency of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee
in the Soviet Union

Recent events in Palestine have stirred public opinion around the world. Progressive humanity is watching the struggle of the young state with great attention.

The State of Israel was created by the Jews of Palestine on the basis of the decision of the UN General Assembly of November 29, 1947.

On the day of the declaration of independence, the army of six countries, armed with American and American money with American weapons, invaded Israel in defiance of the decision of the UN General Assembly. In the ranks of the Arab armies are German

fascists, Polish reactionaries from Anders army, Spanish Phalanxists.

The Jewish people experienced during the war all the horrors of Nazi atrocities. About six million Jews died in concentration camps, camps and ghettos.

All progressive humanity believes that after all the hardships and misfortunes, Jews have the right to establish a national independent state. This opinion was expressed by the representative of the USSR to the UN, T. Gromyko, as well as a number of progressive figures of other countries.

However, this proposal does not find support from the governments of England and the United States. Although the United States has recognized the new state of Israel, it and Britain have not ceased their dark behind-the-scenes machinations in Arab countries, inciting national discord between Jews and Arabs. The bloody events in Israel, as well as the shootings of resistance fighters in Greece and the persecution of democratic organizations in South Korea and West Germany, are part of the reactionary policy of the Anglo-American imperialists.

Soviet Jews are watching with great attention the events taking place in Israel.

We are interested in the position of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee regarding the events in Israel. We are interested in what concrete measures the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee intends to take to assist Israel in its fight against the henchmen of Anglo-American imperialism. We ask the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee to speak in the central press to protest against the invasion of the armies of the Arab States by Israel.

Students of Leningrad universities

May 17, 1948 Leningrad

Signature

(36 people signed this statement)

**NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST
DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
OF THE USSR I.N.BAKULIN TO THE DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR
V.A.SORIN. June 5, 1948**

Secret

In connection with The Report by T. Gromyko, the request of representatives of the State of Israel, Elias and Hacogen, would consider it possible to assist the Government of Israel:

1. Make it clear to the Czechs and the Yugoslavs, in confidence through our ambassadors in Prague and Belgrade, that it is desirable to assist the representatives of the State of Israel in purchasing the latter and sending artillery and aircraft to Palestine, given that, despite the Security Council's decision to ban the import of weapons into Arab countries, the latter have full opportunity to obtain the necessary weapons from the Necessary Quantities from British warehouses and bases in Transjordan Iraq and Egypt.

2. Refrain from issuing permits to travel to the USSR to representatives of the Government of Israel from Czechoslovakia in order to negotiate the purchase of aircraft in the USSR, as such negotiations could be conducted by an Israeli mission to which the Soviet Government agreed.

I. Bakulin

On the document the litter: "Bakulin. We can't act so carelessly. After all, we voted for a ceasefire in Palestine. We should refrain from steps that can be used against us. V. Sorin. 6/V1."

**FROM THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF
THE PRESIDUM OF THE JEWISH ANTI-
FASCIST COMMITTEE IN THE USSR. June 7,
1948**

Present: T. Fefer, Haikin, Rabinovich, Shimeliovich, Sheinin, Kvitko, Slepak, Novik.

That. Fefer.

We are meeting today to consult on the EAC's statement on the events in Palestine. It is clear that we do not accidentally carry this name. We are a Jewish committee that represents the Jewish Soviet community. We can't get past what's going on there. It is clear to us that british officers and Nazis are involved in the mass of Arab armies. Therefore, as a Jewish committee, as an anti-fascist committee, we cannot respect neutrality in these matters. This would be harmful from various points of view and in terms of our participation in political life and assistance to democratic organizations. It is clear that today we cannot yet determine our attitude towards the State of Israel. Some members of the government do not inspire us. We must today determine our attitude towards the act of aggression that is taking place in Palestine. Seven Arab States - Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Transjordan and Saudi Arabia - have

attacked the young state, and after the great losses suffered by the Jewish people during the war, the black case is now continuing. In connection with the events in Palestine, we receive many letters. We should not be splashed in the tail of these moods, but should be aware of the mood. Allow us to read some of the letters we have received from different groups. There are letters from students, military doctors, etc. Some just ask the question: comrades, what are you waiting for?..

Various proposals have been received to our committee. I'm not talking about them to vote for these letters, some of them are very awkward, but we need to be aware of these sentiments.

Some of the letters raise the issue of raising funds to help the fighters of the State of Israel. A large group of letters raises the issue of armed assistance.

The authors of the letters do not understand one thing that when Gromyko speaks in the Security Council, he speaks not on his own behalf, but on behalf of the people. As for armed assistance, there is also an impressive proposal, such as "on behalf of the participants of the civil and Patriotic Wars ..."

Some letters indicate that, along with a just anger at aggression, there are letters written in the spirit of bourgeois nationalism.

We only mentioned a small part of the emails here. What do these letters show? They show that the authors of the letters are not aware of the situation, the situation or the objectives of our organization. They do not realize what the Soviet man is and what is the role of the Soviet man, what is Soviet patriotism at all stages and under all conditions. People who do not understand the situation can talk about sending volunteers to Palestine today. Sending people and troops cannot go without government approval, it will lead to the outbreak of war in the Middle East. There

are closer neighbours from the countries of the new democracy. Now the Zionism, which was under the spud, is coming out. You can see it from the letters. People believe that now there is a legalization of the Zionism that was condemned by us. I believe that our newspaper "Enikite" should play a well-known role. It should publish a number of articles, nurturing patriotism, to fight back against the harmful moods of the residents of the city of Yumerinka⁸¹ and similar.

As for the position of the EAC, we cannot weave in the tail, but we cannot remain neutral. The new Jewish state was attacked by the British imperialists. We think we have to raise our voices. We think it would be very appropriate to call a radio match. The main task of this radibmiting would be to expose the Anglo-American imperialists. The second challenge is to encourage progressive organizations around the world to act more actively and to fight resolutely against the Governments of England and America that are actually pandering to the bloody deeds that are going on in Palestine. On the other hand, it is necessary to clarify the misunderstanding that exists among some segments of the Jewish population in the country. It seems to me that if we had been able to conduct such radio-meeting in Russian language, we would have achieved a lot. Then such a radio-televisioning would be a moral support for the Jewish army in Palestine and would greatly help our influence on the layers in Palestine that we need to influence, and our silence can be very costly for us. It seems to me that from all points of view, from the point of view of moral support for the Jewish population of Palestine, which is fighting against aggression, both in terms of the fight against reaction, and in terms of explaining to some of our backward segments, from all points of view, it seems to us that such radio-meting could play a big role. We need to make an appeal to fight more decisively

against the remnants of fascism, because the war in Palestine is a new challenge to the response. We are meeting to consult on these issues and to take a decision on this matter.

That. Shimeliovich.

What we have done during this period is very small. We had a statement about the events in Greece, printed in Pravda, and after that there was a good appeal to the President of the State of Israel Weizman and on this, in fact, we stopped. It seems to me that the members of the Presidency, if they are not extras, feel that they have to do something. I was on the committee and had a conversation with a former military intelligence officer who came to the EAC to offer his services to Palestine. I had to intervene in this conversation. This man had a very vague idea of what could be done and what could not be done. But it is quite clear that all those letters that come to the EAC and will be received cannot receive any written response from us and all the proposals that are being made are totally unacceptable because people have no idea that the parcel of military personnel, volunteers, etc. cannot be produced only by our State, which will lead to a new war. It is also clear that the committee cannot currently open a fundraising campaign for the State of Israel. But it is clear that it would be totally inexcusable from all points of view, if we do not mobilize public opinion and the entire Jewish progressive community outside our country around this, it would be totally inexcusable. Every day that goes away is damage to our entire case, to our committee as a public organization. That's why I also have thoughts about conversion. And I think about two appeals—one appeal to all Jewish progressive organizations, it will be possible to send such an appeal to mobilize The Jewry, so that this appeal will result in certain forms, in forms of protest against the

policies of the governments of England and America. I also had the idea of addressing the progressive Jews of America and England. It is also impossible to ignore the fact that Hitlers, Anders, etc. are involved in this aggression. In America we have a number of progressive organizations, I have not heard their voices. Maybe we should send a few calls. I'm in favour of radiosong. In one of the letters received by the committee, the author proposes the creation of a Jewish committee to assist the fighters of Israel. I don't mind such a campaign in America to help Israel's fighters.

So I had the idea that we should organize a meeting with those progressives who are closer to us. Maybe we should meet Goldberg here, maybe we should go to the countries of the new democracy, but something needs to be done.

Here are my suggestions: radio-mitting, one or two appeals. I don't know about Weizmann's treatment, whether it's printed or not.

That. Fefer.

There are already early responses to this appeal. But it should be done literally now, because every day that goes is a great damage to the cause.

That. Sheinin.

We've heard a lot of letters coming to the committee. A letter was also read out from the citizens of the mountains. The women. On it, on the sentiments expressed in this letter, it is necessary to seriously stop. These are harmful moods that discredit us, not only the Bolsheviks, but also Soviet citizens. Jews here have found their homeland, only in the Soviet Union they feel like equal citizens. And suddenly there is a letter from Yumerinka from a group of Jews that they ask permission to go to their homeland, Palestine. After all, it is an unheard of, outrageous thing. We have to deal with that sentiment. We have to hit them

hard. We need a number of good strong articles about Soviet patriotism in the newspaper "Hey-nikit" and a number of brochures on this issue. Radiomining is also very appropriate in this regard to rebuff such sentiments. I think that at the same time we need to educate about this letter, because people do not understand. In this direction it is necessary to make clarifications: it is impossible to speak in full voice, but between the lines it is necessary to be able to say so that it was clear. It was right to talk about appealing to democratic organizations, about appealing to the countries of the new democracy. This will help us, our common cause. This is a very delicate and delicate thing. We need our friends to hear our voice. On the other hand, we must show all those who want to drag us into the swamp that we will not follow them.

That. Rabinowitz.

In connection with the Palestinian events, the question of how to print more often about what is being done in Palestine and around Palestine has become a question of publishing more often about what is being done in Palestine and around Palestine. During this time we have given a number of articles: the article by T. Goldberg about Palestine, now after the proclamation of the Jewish state was placed an article by T. Fefer, gave an overview of the military actions of Colonel Fadeev, according to the reviews of our readers, a good review. This review examines in detail the balance of power, what material capabilities the Jewish army and the Arab armies have. Articles that give a clear picture of what constitutes the theater of war in Palestine. On Saturday we printed an article by Maeva—a very good article. It's called "After the Security Council Resolution." There's a very well-assembled of all the facts lately, and the dots are put above the "and." Here the fire against American policy is directed, it is emphasized that American politics is

no different from British politics. We have agreed with a number of qualified sponsors from the General Staff and other reputable institutions, with comrades who deal with Middle East issues. They will provide systematic reviews of military action and events. On this side we have more or less safely. We are now concerned about how to deal with the numerous letters that also come to the editorial office. We've received a lot of letters. Just like letters to the committee, letters to us mostly correctly raise the question. The position of the Soviet government is properly assessed. The letters raise the question of the need to help with money. For example, the author of one letter offers to arrange a subscription to the loan. He read in the newspaper that there was a subscription to a loan in Palestine. Many offer their savings to buy clothes. Some questioned the government's request to provide assistance to the State of Israel. At the same time, there are letters of anti-patriotic, purely nationalistic nature. I don't want to repeat myself, here Isaac Fefer read out one letter. I want to quote one letter: "We, the Jews of the USSR, cannot and should not be in the role of outside observers of what is happening and should immediately provide possible assistance by people and means (as Minin and Pozharsky did), because I do not imagine any other attitude towards the Jews of Palestine, although we are citizens of the USSR, but it is clear to everyone that we look at this as a temporary phenomenon (although it has been going on for many centuries). The grind. Shertok emphasized this in his note in the name of Molotov, thanks to the USSR on behalf of Jews all over the world. He is right in both..."

The question before us is what to do with this letter. We have a law—we have to answer every letter to the author. The authors suggest printing their

letters. We can't print them, but we have to answer to the authors. What events are we holding in the editorial office to give a proper political rebuff to these sentiments? We've mapped out a thematic plan. Tomorrow we have a big front-page article, Our Socialist Homeland. This article speaks generally about the homeland and 70-80 percent say that the homeland gave to the Jews. It is written about our mighty socialist homeland. It is the motherland for all the peoples of the Soviet Union and is the pride of the Soviet people. There is also an article, which the author should supplement, "National Pride of the Soviet People," then the article "The Moral Appearance of the Soviet Man", "The Great Power of Soviet Patriotism." This all goes along the lines of propaganda, on the line of other materials we discussed on the next fly and decided that it is necessary in all materials to strengthen the patriotic spirit.

That. Sheinin.

Maybe we should release not only in Hebrew, but also in Russian language?

That. Rabinowitz.

The newspaper is published only in Hebrew. In connection with the events in Palestine, our newspaper is read by people who do not speak the Jewish language, of course, with the help of their comrades. We often get calls asking why we can't get Einicite at the kiosks. There was a suggestion by Kvitko to print burning, fiery poems. We got a poem from Pinczewski from Chernovits. He read it at the town meeting in Chernovitz. He was told that the poem would not be printed, and he sent it to us in the hope that it would be printed. The poem is dedicated to Palestine and in some lines is unworthy of the Soviet writer-patriot. He imagines the State of Israel as his homeland. It is clear that the newspaper should strengthen the patriotic

spirit, raise the role of the homeland in the eyes of our readers who do not understand it. The letter I'm talking about came from Pravda, telling koi that Oyo was going to the Newspaper Eniklight.

I think that the events of the Presidency, especially with regard to radioming, are very important.

Delegations of people who know that I work in the editorial office of the newspaper "Enikite" come to me on a day off. They think I'm hearing Voice of Israel radio. We need to step up our advocacy efforts.

That. Haikin.

I would like to highlight our advocacy in connection with recent events. We don't have a complete picture of events, but from the data that comes, it is clear the following. After the proclamation of the state there was a large protest campaign against the policy of the imperialists in Palestine. After the negotiations that Weitzman led with Truman, the decline of this protest movement was noticeable. A strong protest movement began on June 1. What is the weakness of the first and second wave of protest? The weakness is that the main fire was directed against England, and in America itself nothing is said about the actions of the American imperialists. The role that American circles play in Palestine is not affected. There were a number of protests in American cities. But American reactionary circles are responsible for the events taking place in Palestine. In the U.S. held a large rally, from the guests was Taft - the "best friend" of the Jewish people, a new contender for the presidency in the upcoming elections.

All the advocacy that the committee has been doing over the past two months in relation to Palestinian events has been to highlight the policies, roles and actions of the American ruling circles and England. In the past two weeks, we have sent about 4 articles from the Soviet press on the military action in

Palestine; in order to inform and target the public in Palestine itself, we have practiced the premise of the telegraph.

We are now taking a number of measures to strengthen coverage of the life of the peoples of the Soviet Union, the Leninist-Stalinist policy of friendship of peoples and the situation in the Jewish Autonomous Region, so that the situation of Soviet Jews is not kept silent and that it does not disappear from the pages of progressive foreign Jewish newspapers, especially since there is such a danger.

Now a few words about the newspaper Enickiit. Rabinovich's proposals are correct. But it seems to me that although the articles should be kept in an educational spirit, it should not give the impression that the newspaper should fight within the Soviet Union. The educational focus of these articles is very important. A number of articles should be given to clarify that the issue is not about immigration; it is necessary to show for which segments of the Jewish population Palestine is needed - for a number of stateless displaced persons, for those Jews who are in the camps of the British and American zones of occupation. This refers to the victims of fascism who are still in the camps.

That. Kvitko.

Of course, I believe that our leaders have so wonderfully and well exposed British and American diplomats that we cannot compete with them. We managed to break them so much that we would not come up with better. This is the best answer and the best exposure of warmongers, our diplomats say well enough. But I attach a lot of importance to the rally, I see no other form of speech, except a rally. We can't shut up those who don't understand what's going on around them. It's real hysteria. Those elements that have lurked to this day, think that now it is possible to

legalize, to act legally. Our fire must be directed against them. We are compromising the fact that we have been silent so far. But now the most important task of our propaganda is to appeal to our population. A lot of blood was shed by the Soviet people to defend their beautiful homeland. We have a wonderful Soviet homeland.

That. Shimeliovich.

What are the American authorities and the Yumerinsky City Council doing?

That. Kvitko.

The most important task of our meeting are the two addresses where we will direct our fire and the power of our word- is the Jewish population. We have to explain all our tasks well. The second address to send our fire is to Palestinian Jewish people who should know our opinion, the opinion of the public of the Soviet Union about these events. These are the two addresses. At the same time, we must remember our American organizations that know our point of view. Our American friends know full well that the Jewish people of Europe and America would not be in this mood if it were not for the Soviet Union. I believe that it is necessary to say to all the Jews of the Soviet Union the words of our attitude to all these events, it is necessary to properly interpret these events. We need to direct all this fire at American and English imperialism. I think our wonderful representatives at the UN do it perfectly. And the most important thing is to make it clear to some of our citizens to Jews that our homeland is here in the Soviet Union.

That. Fefer.

Allow the discussion to be discussed and a rough draft of the solution. I don't see any disagreement about these issues. Whether we have differences within the Presidency in terms of assessing the situation in Palestine, there is no such disagreement.

Do we have differences in the sense of assessing Anglo-American imperialism in Palestine? There are no such discrepancies. Do we have differences in the sense of assessing the morale of the State of Israel? There are no such discrepancies. Are there discrepancies in terms of further position? There are no such discrepancies. Everyone believes that the committee should come forward and have its say on the Palestinian events. Is there any disagreement about the organization of the rally? There are no such discrepancies. Everyone agrees that such a radio meeting should be carried out. Are there discrepancies in the sense of treatment? There are no fundamental differences, there are some nuances. Of course, we will consult on this, without advice we do nothing. Do we have discrepancies in the political attitudes of our radio-simulating? Everyone agrees that radio mitting should be a serious blow to the warmongers. What is happening in Palestine is what happens at the request of Anglo-American imperialism.

farther. We all believe that our radio-meeting should encourage all progressives around the world to speak more vigorously against what the governments of England and America are doing. This rally is of exceptional importance in terms of our foreign policy. The future will show what position that Government will take in international politics, whether it will embark on the path of the countries of the new democracy or take a different path. As for our relationship with the Jewish people of Palestine, it is clear to us that radio-sitting will strengthen their sympathy for the Soviet Union and strengthen our influence on the masses.

On the radio-sitting it is necessary to speak about the role of the Soviet country in the salvation of the Jewish people, about the role of Stalin's friendship of peoples, about the connection with the great Russian

people. In short, this whole Palestinian set of issues is quite clear, we have no disagreement.

What I'm suggesting now is this:

1. To put a question before the court about the convening of radio-simulating in Moscow.

2. It is appropriate to make an appeal to Jewish progressive public organizations.

3. To instruct the newspaper Einkit to systematically cover the role of the great Soviet socialist homeland in the struggle for peace and security, in the salvation of the Jewish people and in helping the democratic peoples of the world in their struggle for peace and independence.

4. It is considered appropriate to intensify the struggle at Eniklight with nationalist sentiments and distortions in understanding the important UN decision.

We have to do this work politically subtly, the way we have been taught to do so. Then we have to ask the Writers' Bureau about sending a team of writers to Yumerinka for a series of literary evenings and we should agree with the Union of Soviet Writers to hold a number of literary evenings and send writers to Odessa, Jitomir, Yumerinka, etc.

Allow me, I will read you a letter to the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (b) T. Suslov about the convening of radio-simulating (i.e. Fefer reads out the letter).

What are the comments on the composition of the speakers and on substance?

That. Shimeliovich.

We need to shorten the text. I would not write to Suslov that the rally should help overcome the wrong mood among the Jewish population, I would have let it down altogether.

That. Fefer.

It's embarrassing to walk past it, it's just unseemly. It is known that such sentiments exist.

That. Shimeliovich.

It is necessary to write that it is necessary to overcome misconceptions about sending volunteers and sending weapons.

That. Fefer.

We're not going to talk to Yumerinka. It will be necessary to write that radio-meting should dispel misconceptions among certain elements of the Jewish population, it is necessary to raise the question of our speech and appeal to foreign progressive organizations in connection with Palestinian events. We would consider it appropriate to devote radio-fitting in Moscow to these events.

That. Kvitko.

I don't like the phrase regarding the new wave of sympathies for the USSR.

That. Fefer.

Let's put that phrase down.

That. Shimeliovich.

I would not write that radio-mitting will contribute to the promotion of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

That. Fefer.

Let's talk about the composition of the speakers. He remains. Instead of Leonov, we should put Simonov. It sounds stronger. Academician Volgin wrote very popularly against anti-Semitism. Writer Bergelson is due to speak. Then Pauline Gelman - a woman and Hero of the Soviet Union. We intentionally did not put neither J. Kreiser nor D.Dragunsky on the list. I.Erenburg should speak, he is very popular, Dr. Shimeliovich, then the Stakhanovets of Metrostroy Benjamin Katamanin, the writer Kvitko and the academic Tarle instead of Frumkin. Academician Tarle is very popular.

That. Rabinowitz.

I have add-ons. A committee is represented here, and the newspaper is the body of the committee. Wouldn't it be appropriate to include a newspaper editor?

That. Fefer.

I don't think that's a part of it. What will be the opinion on the inclusion of Rabbi Schlifer?

That. Haikin.

He could have played a big role, his speech would have been important because of some of the sentiments. He is both the chief rabbi and the representative of the Moscow community. The rally is supposed to last two hours, isn't it too long?

TELEGRAM TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED STATES E. EPSTEIN. June 9, 1948

Please contact the Representatives of the USSR at your discretion in New York or Washington with a request for the possibility of a special mission visit to Moscow to discuss the purchase of arms and food. Its preliminary line-up: Namir, Ben-Aaron, Perlson. This special mission is awaiting a decision on departure. If they agree, the above-mentioned persons will apply for visas upon arrival in Prague or Warsaw. The case is extremely urgent. Telegraph the performance, inform Golda Meyerson⁸².

Schertok

**MEMORANDUM BY A. LEVAVI, ACTING
DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN
DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY. June 13, 1948**

The urgent tasks of the Eastern European Department

A. The urgent tasks of the Eastern Europe department stem from the following facts:

1. The USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary recognized the State of Israel de jure and expressed their readiness to maintain full-scale diplomatic relations with us.

2. Other countries of the Eastern European bloc (Bulgaria, Romania, Finland) are ready to follow the above states.

3. The Eastern European bloc is one of the main power centres in the world.

4. Under certain conditions, we may need the direct and full support of the Eastern European bloc in all areas of political and public life, economy, defence, etc. or partially in some areas. There are signs that such assistance may be provided to us under certain conditions and in certain sizes.

5. The countries of the Eastern European bloc are of great economic importance to the State of Israel. The conditions of navigation between Israel and the countries of Eastern Europe can be easily improved.

6. In a number of Eastern European countries, there are still large Jewish communities, partly a source of repatriation.

7. In some countries of the Eastern European bloc, Jews hold important government posts, some of whom tend to assist the State of Israel.

8. A very large proportion of Israel's Jewish population has been repatriated from Eastern Europe. As a result, there is a certain socio-cultural affinity. In many cases, family ties between Israeli citizens and their relatives living in Eastern European countries are still maintained.

9. The Middle East region is outside the sphere of influence of the USSR.

10. The USSR cannot accept that it is excluded from policy-making in a region virtually bordering on its political zone of influence and oil-rich, a strategic commodity that the USSR needs, perhaps, more than any other commodity. Hence the Russian-American and Russian-British confrontation on Middle East issues. Russia is now pursuing a cautious policy in the

Middle East, but it is not a policy of concessions and final humility with existing realities.

11. In most countries in the Middle East, there are communist groups and organizations. They were brutally persecuted by Arab regimes, but socio-political realities contributed to their development, and the possibility that they might gain significant influence under certain circumstances should not be ignored.

12. Recently, Soviet Middle Eastern policy has been characterized by the support of ethnic minorities, especially Armenians and Kurds, and to some extent Lebanese.

13. In Israel, the communists' positions are weak. They are not persecuted, not outlawed, but the general social ground does not contribute to their strengthening. A significant factor in the life of the country communists can become only under extraordinary military and political circumstances.

14. The Government of Israel was generally focused on maintaining friendship with the United States, but at the same time efforts were being made not to conflict with the interests of the Eastern European bloc. At this stage, the danger to the State of Israel comes from a third force among the great powers, Britain. Therefore, we aim to help ease the tensions that exist (including on the problems of our country) between the United States and the USSR.

B.1. The main task of the Eastern European Department is to assist in the organization of diplomatic missions of the State of Israel in all the countries of the Eastern European bloc, which have recognized us. Administrative problems should be addressed in particular. This includes the identification of the communication system, the constant monitoring of the flow of letters and visitors, the collection of information sent to and from missions and, where possible, advice on the letters sent to the missions.

The Department should assist in working with representatives of Eastern European countries who would be arriving in the capital of the State of Israel. Since these States have not recognized Transjordan, it is possible that their representatives will move from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv in the near future. The Department will communicate with these missions on a day-to-day basis, provide them with the necessary facilities, provide information, assist with consular issues, communicate with various ministries and government agencies, prepare meetings between the heads of missions and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, etc.

3. The Department will assist in sending informal representatives to countries that have not yet recognized the State of Israel in order to negotiate to prepare for the establishment of normal diplomatic relations.

The Department will publish print publications in the languages of the Eastern European bloc, with the following objectives in mind:

(a) An expression of friendly attitude towards the peoples of Eastern Europe;

(b) Preparing the ground for economic and cultural ties;

(c) Dissemination of information about the State of Israel;

(d) Strengthening in an indirect way of communication with the Jewish communities of these countries.

The Department will collect and organize current information on Eastern European countries and lead basic research on these countries by the Foreign Ministry's research department.

The Department will liaise with other Foreign Ministry services on issues related to the Eastern European bloc.

7. The Department will collect and process current information on the issues of our political and general relations with the eastern European bloc and will submit proposals on these issues from time to time.

B. Organizational core:

In the first stage, the department needs three responsible employees (the head of the department and two of his assistants), as well as a secretary and typist. In general, it is desirable that the head of the department and at least one of his assistants have roots in Slavic culture, and the second assistant would be a specialist in Romania and Hungary (including language proficiency). Knowledge of French is desirable for all employees of the department. Three typewriters with fonts in Hebrew, Russian and Latin are required. Freelance staff will be available for publication of print and newsletters. The department needs two rooms and two phones. It is advisable to staff and resolve other organizational issues within a month of the creation of the department.

A.Levavi

**NOTE OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND TREATY-
LEGAL DEPARTMENTS OF THE USSR
FOREIGN MINISTRY TO THE FIRST DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR
A.Y.VYSHINSKY. June 16, 1948**

Secret

In addition to our report dated March 17 this year, we report:

As can be seen from the letter of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR T. Borisov dated April 24, this year, the income of the USSR from parcels sent from Palestine in 1947 amounted to a total of 1,056 thousand foreign currency rubles, when 15,845 parcels were received during the same period. If an agreement with Palestine on parcels is concluded, the number of receipts, as reported by telephone by the head of the international department of the Ministry of Communications T. Erygin, will increase to 20 LLCs per year, which will increase the income of the USSR in foreign currency. At the same time, there will be no expenses on our part.

Bearing in mind that the Turkish Postal Service has given its consent for the transit of parcels through Turkey (see letter of the Palestinian Postal Authority) and that for the transit of parcels from Palestine we will also not bear any costs, it would be economically advantageous for the USSR to conclude such an agreement.

However, given that the British mandate for Palestine ended on 15.V. 1948 and Palestine is divided into two separate states, it is not currently possible to resolve the issue of a parcel agreement, as it is not known which of the two states in the territory of Palestine would wish to establish a parcel exchange.

A draft response to Psurtsev N.D. is attached.
Please ask for your consent.
I. Bakulin M. Buev

**TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE
UNITED STATES E. ESIETAIN. June 16, 1948**

In view of the critical situation with fuel, we send a special emissary to Romania for negotiations on the purchase of gasoline. The tanker is due to arrive during the truce. In this regard, ask for Soviet support for our appeal to the Romanian government. The representative's name will be reported separately.

Schertok

**TELEGRAM OF THE SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE
UNITED STATES E. EPSTEIN TO THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
ISRAEL M. SHERTOK. June 18, 1948**

Today informed the Soviet Embassy about the contents of your telegrams for numbers 11/37 and 12/87 for transfer to Moscow. The Embassy asked to convey the following message from Molotov: the Russian government intends to appoint Pavel Ershov as head of their mission as "ambassador" of Russia to Israel. Ershov was born in 1914 and received a humanitarian education. In 1941 - 1944 he held responsible positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1944 - 1946 he was an adviser to the Soviet Embassy in Turkey, in the last two years he was the Interim Charge d'Affaires in Turkey. I suggest that you answer Molotov through the embassy here. Please let me know if you have informed Moscow and have received a response prior to the public announcement of Meyerson's appointment.

Epstein

**TELEGRAM TO ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE
UNITED STATES E. EPSTEIN. June 20, 1948**

Please agree with their candidacy. We haven't made a public announcement about our appointment yet, but the press has spread rumours. Please report officially for transfer to Moscow: age-50 years, arrived in Palestine in 1921 from the United States, participated in the development of land, then was elected a member of the executive committee of the General Federation of Jewish Trade Unions, on behalf of which made numerous trips abroad. In 1946, she was elected as a member of the board of the Jewish Agency for Palestine by the World Zionist Congress and became head of its Political Department in Jerusalem. Now on a special mission in the United States. Check with her for the above facts. I send a telegram directly to her.

Schertok

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3. The Eastern European bloc is one of the main power centres in the world.

4. Under certain conditions, we may need the direct and full support of the Eastern European bloc in all areas of political and public life, economy, defence, etc. or partially in some areas. There are signs that such assistance may be provided to us under certain conditions and in certain sizes.

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The conditions of navigation between Israel and the countries of Eastern Europe can be easily improved.

6. In a number of Eastern European countries, there are still large Jewish communities, partly a source of repatriation.

7. In some countries of the Eastern European bloc, Jews hold important government posts, some of whom tend to assist the State of Israel.

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desirable for all employees of the department. Three typewriters with fonts in Hebrew, Russian and Latin are required. Freelance staff will be available for publication of print and newsletters. The department needs two rooms and two phones. It is advisable to staff and resolve other organizational issues within a month of the creation of the department.

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FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR
A.Y.VYSHINSKY. June 16, 1948**

Secret

In addition to our report dated March 17 this year, we report:

As can be seen from the letter of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR T. Borisov dated April 24, this year, the income of the USSR from

parcels sent from Palestine in 1947 amounted to a total of 1,056 thousand foreign currency rubles, when 15,845 parcels were received during the same period. If an agreement with Palestine on parcels is concluded, the number of receipts, as reported by telephone by the head of the international department of the Ministry of Communications T. Erygin, will increase to 20 LLCs per year, which will increase the income of the USSR in foreign currency. At the same time, there will be no expenses on our part.

Bearing in mind that the Turkish Postal Service has given its consent for the transit of parcels through Turkey (see letter of the Palestinian Postal Authority) and that for the transit of parcels from Palestine we will also not bear any costs, it would be economically advantageous for the USSR to conclude such an agreement.

However, given that the British mandate for Palestine ended on 15.V. 1948 and Palestine is divided into two separate states, it is not currently possible to resolve the issue of a parcel agreement, as it is not known which of the two states in the territory of Palestine would wish to establish a parcel exchange.

A draft response to Psurtsev N.D. is attached.

Please ask for your consent.

I. Bakulin M. Buev

**TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE
UNITED STATES E. ESIETAIN. June 16, 1948**

In view of the critical situation with fuel, we send a special emissary to Romania for negotiations on the purchase of gasoline. The tanker is due to arrive

during the truce. In this regard, ask for Soviet support for our appeal to the Romanian government. The representative's name will be reported separately.

Schertok

**TELEGRAM OF THE SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE
UNITED STATES E. EPSTEIN TO THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
ISRAEL M. SHERTOK. June 18, 1948**

Today informed the Soviet Embassy about the contents of your telegrams for numbers 11/37 and

12/87 for transfer to Moscow. The Embassy asked to convey the following message from Molotov: the Russian government intends to appoint Pavel Ershov as head of their mission as "ambassador" of Russia to Israel. Ershov was born in 1914 and received a humanitarian education. In 1941 - 1944 he held responsible positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1944 - 1946 he was an adviser to the Soviet Embassy in Turkey, in the last two years he was the Interim Charge d'Affaires in Turkey. I suggest that you answer Molotov through the embassy here. Please let me know if you have informed Moscow and have received a response prior to the public announcement of Meyerson's appointment.

Epstein

**TELEGRAM TO ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE
UNITED STATES E. EPSTEIN. June 20, 1948**

Please agree with their candidacy. We haven't made a public announcement about our appointment yet, but the press has spread rumours. Please report officially for transfer to Moscow: age-50 years, arrived in Palestine in 1921 from the United States, participated in the development of land, then was elected a member of the executive committee of the General Federation of Jewish Trade Unions, on behalf of which made numerous trips abroad. In 1946, she was elected as a member of the board of the Jewish Agency for Palestine by the World Zionist Congress and became head of its Political Department in Jerusalem. Now on a special mission in the United States. Check with her for the above facts. I send a telegram directly to her.

Schertok

**LETTER FROM THE FIRST DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y.
VYSHINSKY TO THE MINISTER OF**

COMMUNICATIONS OF THE USSR
N.D.PSURTSEV. June 23, 1948

Secret

In order to respond to your letter regarding the agreement with Palestine on the exchange of parcels, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR asks the Ministry of Communications to inform with which part of Palestine (Jewish or Arab) the Soviet Union was predominantly exchanged parcels in 1947.

Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

A. Vyshinsky

**TELEGRAM TO ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE SPECIAL**

**REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE
UNITED STATES E. EPSTEIN. June 23, 1948**

I was not informed in time about Hacogen's conversation with Gromyko and the negative response on the issue of the truce. Please meet them again, you or Eban, offering to discuss with us how to sell the planes, other heavy weapons and then deliver it after the end of the truce (if it happens). Please state that the terms of the truce do not prohibit the purchase of weapons abroad.

Schertok

**LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
COUNCIL FOR RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY AT
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE
USSR, MR. KARPOV, TO THE FIRST DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR,
A.Y.VYSHINSKY. June 24, 1948**

Secret

The Council sends you for information a copy of the telegram of Patriarch Timothy of Jerusalem to the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alexiy, against whom Patriarch Alexis decided not to take any action.

Appendix: by text.

Chairman of the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs

At the Soviet Union's Council of Ministers, Karpov application

Telegram of Patriarch Timothy of Jerusalem to Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alexey I

Moscow

We have received information from the correct sources that the Rome Mission for the Protection of Holy Places requested that the United Nations appoint, above the mentioned guard, the Administrator of the Free City of Jerusalem and that a volunteer security police corps be formed to guard the Holy Places.

The Greek Orthodox patriarch is protesting against the aforementioned petition and against similar activities of Franciscan guards. Although he did not wish to interfere in any way in the administrative affairs of the authorities of the Holy City of Jerusalem, he recalled that the rights of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate as a guardian of the Holy Places had existed since their founding, for four centuries, and

that, therefore, he alone had the right to protect the Holy Places in the future, as had been the case in the past, should the need arise.

Timoteos, Patriarch of Jerusalem

**P.I. ERSHOV, THE RIGHT ENVOY OF THE
SOVIET UNION IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL.
June 30, 1948**

Presidency of the Supreme Council of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics

President of the Provisional Council of the
Government of Israel, Dr. Haima Weizmann

Mr. President,

Wanting to ensure the maintenance and
development of the friendship between the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and the State of Israel, the
Presidency of the Supreme Council of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics decided to appoint a citizen
Pavel Ershov as its Extraordinary and Comprehensive
Envoy.

The President's Accreditation of citizen Pavel
Ershov with this letter, the Presidency of the Supreme
Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics asks
you, Mr. President, to accept it with favor and to
believe that he will have the honor to present to you
on behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.

N. Schwernik

**TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UN A.
EAN. July 7, 1948**

Explain to the Soviet delegation that we are interested in extending the truce to strengthen the state and strengthen the army, so we hope that they will not oppose the Security Council's decision if the Arab League refuses to implement it.

Schertok

**TELEGRAM TO ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE
UNITED STATES E. EPSTEIN. July 22, 1948**

In view of the impending arrival of the U.S. representative to Tel Aviv, please convey to the Soviet mission that the early arrival of their envoy is highly desirable.⁸⁴ Take the opportunity to clarify that we deeply regret the delay in the establishment of the Israeli mission in Moscow in the wake of the Golda incident. We are waiting for her next week, we hope that she will be able to go to Moscow after a brief stay here.

Schertok

**TELEGRAM OF ISRAEL'S REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE UN A. EBAN TO ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTER M. SCHERTOK. July 23, 1948**

Today was the first long, very cordial, conversation with Malik. He appreciated our military successes, talked about the impact of failures on the Arab regimes. Approved our application to become a member of the UN, but advises to prepare carefully, believes that it all depends on the degree of American support. Hopes for the soon-to-be-established mission of Golda Meyerson.

Eban

**LETTER FROM THE BOARD TO P.I.ERSHOV
TO THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL. July 26,
1948**

In accordance with the agreement with you, we forward to you one copy of the following films:

1. "Russian question."
2. "Mikluho-McClay."
3. "Third Strike."
4. "Day of the victorious country,"
5. "Alexander Matrosov."
6. "Life in the citadel."
7. "Concert of Young Pioneers."
8. "Physical Parade 1947," one part 1.

All of these films are to be handed over to Yair-Philms owner Ishar Yair, who lives in Tel Aviv, Rothschild Boulevard, 8, on the following terms:

1. The film "Fizcultparad" (1st part) to give him for free, because for it he has already paid through the Anglo-Palestinian bank. The other five parts of this film are at the firm "Yairfilms."

2. Copies of all other films should be given to him only against the presentation of the Certificate of The Anglo-Palestinian Bank to us about the payment to us "Yairfilms" the cost of the relevant film on our accounts, cashed through UINO State Bank from Moscow.

3. If Yairphilms refuses to buy any of these films, we may sell such a film to any other company you consider to be more suitable for commercial relations with Sovexportfilm.

4. Given the special importance of expanding the screening of Soviet films in Israel, we ask you to allocate up to the organization there of the trade mission of the USSR one employee from the apparatus of the mission of the USSR in Israel to work with movies, to which we could address our requests in the future.

5. At the same time we send you a copy of the contract with Yairphilms to supply it with up to 20 films annually.

Under this agreement, the firm is granted the right to rent only the films it has selected, as far as films that it refuses—Sovexportfilm has the right to sell them in this country to another firm.

In addition, we send for your information a list of all films sold by us in Palestine before 1945.

However, none of these films has been returned to us and we have not received an additional license. In cases where on the screens of Israel there will be a film, the terms of the license of which have already expired, we are asked to inform about this fact - to recover from the firm the cost of the license.

In the previous order, we sent only such films to Israel, which the company accepted from us, i.e. only commercial ones. But now we can send to the Soviet mission any film allowed for export, which you can show the Soviet colony and then offer or transfer to the company for commercial screening.

Please do not refuse the courtesy to give the appropriate instruction on the sending to us information related to the screening of Soviet films in Israel.

We inform for information that in Tel Aviv in the Anglo-Palestinian Bank there are copies of films: "The Court of The Peoples" (Nuremberg Process) and "Alisher Navoi", from which "Yairphilms" refuses, explaining that the former is forbidden by censorship, and the second is not suitable for the audience.

We give you a telegraph order to give you these films.

Please ask for your instructions to use them after you have been viewed for sale on commercial screens.

Vrio Managing In/Sovexportfilm

Head of the Eastern Division of Avetisov

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA M.A. SILIN WITH THE
ISRAELI ENVOY TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA E.
UBERAL. August 9, 1948**

Secret

On August 9 this year, I was paid a protocol visit by the envoy of the State of Israel to Czechoslovakia, Uberal, who recently presented credentials to President Gottwald.

During the conversation, talking about the situation in the country, Uberal said that the military situation on the fronts is favourable to Israel and that the mood of the population is very good. He noted that the population did not hope for the success of the negotiations and was preparing for fighting in order to bring the war to an end.

Uberal stated that the representative of the United Nations, Count Bernadotte, was in fact the messenger

of the Americans and the British and was acting to the detriment of Israel. The Government of Israel is trying to reach a direct agreement with the Arabs.

In this respect, there is now some hope, as there are differences between Egypt and the British. Moreover, there is a strong desire among the Arab population and some Arab States for peace with Israel.

Speaking about the difficulties that are taking place in Israel, Uberal said that first of all they lack heavy weapons - heavy artillery and tanks. However, it is hoped that some of these weapons will be produced this month.

Israel's food situation is good and has been provided with food for several months.

Israel is constantly receiving financial assistance from American Jews. Recently, however, the United States Government has begun to discourage this assistance. The American government itself does not provide assistance to Israel.

Uberal went on to say that about 10 immigrants of military age arrive in Palestine every month. It is now planned that up to 20 IMMIGRANTS, including their families, will arrive in Israel every month. In particular, an agreement was concluded with Romania that up to 5,000 Jews would travel to Israel every month.

Uberal noted that after the Soviet Union, the countries of popular democracy provide the greatest assistance to Israel.

Uberal said that in two weeks, Israel's envoy to Moscow would travel to the Soviet Union via Czechoslovakia. Uberal wondered whether he should bring with him all the necessary equipment for the office space, or all this can be purchased on the spot.

In addition, Uberal asked if he could, since Israel's envoy to Moscow had not yet arrived, address the Soviet Union through me on issues of significant importance to Israel.

I replied that if he had the authority of his government, he could send documents or notes to the Soviet government that he would like to send.

On the issue of the equipment for the Israeli mission in Moscow, I replied that the equipment could be brought with the permission of the Soviet Union, but that if they wished and had the means, everything they needed would be available on the spot.

At the end of the conversation, Ueberal asked to convey to the Soviet government from the Government of Israel and the people of Israel gratitude for the Soviet Union's support to the State of Israel.

The conversation lasted 50 minutes.

Ambassador of the USSR to Czechoslovakia M. Silin

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV
WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
SCHERTOK. August 11, 1948**

He visited Schertok on his first visit. He congratulated on his arrival, asked about the route and stated that the decision of the Soviet Union on the question of the partition of Palestine, and then the recognition of Israel as a sovereign State, was a historic decision of great importance for both the Jewish people of Palestine and the Jews of other countries. Palestine is home to quite a large number of Jews from Russia who studied in Russian schools and were brought up in Russian literature, and despite the persecution and pogroms to which they were subjected by the tsarist authorities, they largely

retained their sympathies for the Russian people. After the October Revolution, they (i.e. the Jews of Palestine) expected that their attitudes would change radically, but there were no official documents on it, and some statements of the press and the position of individual Communist parties on this issue indicated that there had been no significant change. This fact has upset Jews for many years, but they hoped that sooner or later the attitude would become friendly. Unlike the war of 1914-1918, when the Jews supported the governments of their host countries, were divided into two warring camps and therefore fought each other, the last world war brought all Jews of all countries together in one camp and led to a change in the attitude of many countries, including the Soviet Union, to the Jews. The Jews' sympathies for the USSR intensified, and they realized that in their aspirations for the creation of a nation state, they will not be left without the support of the Soviet Union. The latter's recognition of Israel lived up to that hope and was hailed with great joy and encouragement as a fact of great historical significance.

After this comment, Schertok, I gave him a copy of the credentials. He said that it was a great honour for him to be the first in Israel to adopt such an important document, carefully and perhaps twice after reading a copy, asked who Schwernik was, and after my clarification again asked who Kalinin was. I responded with an express of my extreme surprise at his ignorance that Kalinin, as we know, died two years ago. Schertok was confused, though he tried to hide it, and as if in retaliation he noticed that he should pay attention to the inaccuracy of the address of credentials, because they should be addressed not to Weizmann, but to Ben-Gurion, who before the election of the president combines the post of head of government and state, while Weizmann is the

chairman (president) of the Council of State, a body of legislative and control, like the parliament. There is no doubt that Weizmann will be elected President after the constitution is approved in October unless he resigns for health reasons, which cannot be considered satisfactory, but he is now only the President of Parliament. Schertok added that the inaccuracy of the address is not significant and he will agree with Ben-Gurion on the delivery of these certificates without replacing them.

Schertok went on to say that the arrival of the Soviet mission in Tel Aviv would allow for direct links between the USSR and Israel. You have to understand, he continued, that Israel is a young, just beginning to build a state and in need of a lot of economic help from the outside. Immigration will continue with the expectation that in the next few years the population of Israel will reach 2-3 million people. To accommodate and accommodate such a mass of people will require huge funds that will come from Jewish communities in the United States, Canada, South Africa and England. The Government of Israel will have to reckon with the fact that the members of these communities are citizens of foreign countries, but since all these states are members of the UN, Israel will focus on the UN.

In response to Schertok's question about how we settled down, I told him bluntly that I had settled badly and asked for a building that corresponded to its prestige. Schertok promised to help, but did nothing concrete.

At the end of the conversation, which lasted 35 minutes, Schertok invited me into the garden and expressed a desire to take a picture with him. Then Schertok took me to the office of Foreign Minister Eitan and introduced me to him. The conversation with Eitan lasted 7-8 minutes and was of a protocol nature.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**LETTER FROM ISRAEL'S REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE UN, A. EBAN TO ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTER M. SCHERTOK. August 12, 1948**

Remarks in connection with a conversation with Mr.
Jacob Malik

On 5 August, after protocol questions, Mr. Malik moved on to a general discussion of the situation in the Middle East.

He expressed his deep admiration for Israel's military efforts. Given the social underdevelopment of most countries in the Middle East, serious differences among the members of the Arab League, it was possible to conclude the appropriate level of training of the army units - such was the Soviet point of view. Nevertheless, no one expected such a defeat.

Mr. Malik told me that there is now a common view among all delegations that the establishment of the State of Israel is an irreversible fact. I asked him if that even applied to those who behaved as if the State of Israel did not exist. He reiterated that all members of the Security Council, and he believed that even the Arab representative at heart now held the view that the State of Israel had already been established and would exist.

In the ensuing discussion of the nature of Arab society and culture, it became clear to me that the Soviet side believed that it had made the right analysis and had made the right decision, after which it hoped to receive dividends. He suggested that we would assess the fact of receiving assistance from Eastern European and Balkan countries as a result of Russia's benevolent position.

His Government believed that such a dramatic event as the loss of the war in Palestine had profound consequences for the Arab world. Apparently, there will be doubts about the popularity of some regimes, so we can expect a period of increasing instability. I analysed the defects of the Arab social structure by detailing Egyptian society with relevant statistics. This seems to be of deep interest to him, and he has asked for the materials we have available on these issues. He has repeatedly expressed the view that the military

adventures of the Arab League were in no way in the interests of the Arabs. He also hinted that Britain's position had been undermined not only in Palestine but also in the Middle East, and that this was a success for Soviet policy towards Palestine.

We discussed Israel's social, economic and cultural future. He sought to learn the details of industrial projects and expressed his view on the profound impact of Israel's economic and social development on the entire Middle East. He agreed with me that it was these perspectives that explained why there was such opposition to Israel's economic development. He made it clear that he would like more information about our industrial and social programme for the next few years.

Conclusions: It is clear that while the USSR has a great subjective sympathy for our course, its position rests on an even more stable foundation of its own interests. The Soviet side views its decision to support the Jewish State as triumphant in the context of the goals it sets for itself in the Middle East. These goals do not imply any hope that Israel will become the satellite of the Eastern Bloc. There is never any dissatisfaction with our apparent interest in improving ties with Western powers. The Soviet side, however, is aware that their position deserves and perhaps provides sympathy in Israel, as well as in certain circles of American society. It also strengthens its moral position in the United Nations. The advantages acquired by the USSR are fully compatible with our independence. It is the very fact of Jewish statehood, rather than the political course of the state, that coincides with its current objectives.

**LETTER FROM THE SPORTS ASSOCIATION
"GAPOEL" TO THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE
USSR, MR. MEYERSON. August 12, 1948**

We congratulate you on your appointment to an important and responsible post of representative of our country in the Soviet Union. We would also like to draw your attention to the various issues that will be discussed in this letter.

Physical education in the Soviet Union is a phenomenon we want to learn about.

From a country that has not paid much attention to physical training, the Soviet Union has, according to the reports at our disposal, an impressive force for several short years.

Physical education there has become an extremely useful element of strengthening the labour and defence capabilities of the masses.

Simultaneously with mass physical training, competitive sports there have reached a very high level, and Soviet athletes can easily compete with athletes of any country in most areas of sport.

For these reasons, we are interested in establishing direct contacts to study the organization, structure and methods that are used in the USSR, not least because the social aspects of this area are also of particular interest to us.

There are two additional reasons for our interest.

Many regions of the Soviet Union have a climate similar to the conditions in which we work, and finally, sport is one of the best means of establishing friendships, it attracts attention and is popular among the masses.

For these reasons, we attach importance:

(a) Organization of mutual visits by Soviet and our athletes in various fields of sport. First, we should think about football matches here with Soviet teams (not necessarily from big cities, but from the Black Sea coast and from the Caucasus). After that, we have to think about the visits of our teams there.

b) Opportunities for physical education coaches and teachers in schools at both secondary and higher education levels.

c) Every year in June, Moscow hosts the Day of Physical Culture, which invites representatives of foreign countries. We would like our representatives to be invited to these events, and it is desirable that they arrive well in advance of that date in order to be able to study the common problems of Soviet sport and establish contacts.

d) Next spring, The European Basketball Championship of the World Basketball Federation, of which we are a member (headquartered in Switzerland), will be held in Moscow. We would like to take part in these competitions.

(d) As you know, in September a team of the Israeli Defence Forces, under the auspices of the Israeli Football Association, will visit the United States. We think that it would be worth organizing the same visit to the Soviet Union: football there is extremely popular, and in the southern regions of the Soviet Union also play football in the winter months. We recall in this regard the visit of the Spanish team to the Soviet Union during the Spanish Civil War and the great interest it aroused throughout the country.

We are ready to provide you with any additional information.

Best wishes for the full success of your mission and the hope that you will also take the time to raise the questions we have raised in this letter.

With a friendly greeting

Emmanuel Gil

**RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE SOVIET MISSION ADVISER
IN ISRAEL, M. MUKHIN, WITH ISRAELI
CITIZEN S.V. TSIRULNIKOV. August 13, 1948**

Secret

Today he received a local citizen of Cirulnikov Solomon Vulfovich. Tsirulnikov said that his desire was to see the envoy, as his previous meetings with Soviet workers who had previously come to Palestine gave him reason to hope for the usefulness of his role at the moment.

Tsirulov said that he met with Mikhailov, Petrenko and others, and, especially with the first, was in friendly relations, passing the necessary information and materials.

"I suppose," he said, "that as a new person, you will have the pleasure of getting to know some aspects of local life." Next, Tsirulnikov reported the following.

At present, all political and social life in Israel, abstracted from military action, is a kaleidoscope of contradictions, passions, struggles between different political parties, currents and figures as a reflection of the historical course of events and the current international situation.

At present, the main political force is the Mapai Party, the Palestinian Workers' Party, which is best represented in the Council of State and in the Government. All its leaders, in particular Ben-Gurion, Schertok, Remez, etc., occupy the main government

posts. The party also dominates trade unions. The newspaper Davar, formally the body of Histadrut, actually serves as the party's body.

The Share of the Mapai Party in the labour movement is about 60% and 40% in national political life.

The second party in this respect is Mapam, the United Workers' Party, which has two portfolios in government: public works and agriculture, and a serious influence in the army, as it unites a large part of the country's agricultural communes, the kibbutz, which is the most important reserve for the recruitment not only of the rank-and-file, but also of the army commanders. This party was created by uniting Ahdut ha-avoda - "Labour Unity" with Poale zion - "Workers of Sion" and with the party Ha-shomer ha-tsair - "Young Guard". Party leaders: Tabenkin, Hari Khider, Sne (Kleinbaum). The Communist Party is extremely small and does not enjoy serious influence. The Provisional Government of Israel, in its present composition, has not actually renounced pro-English orientation and, as a tribute to the times, is ready to cooperate in many respects with the United States. The anti-English speeches of some of the leaders of the Mapai party in government have nothing to do with the actual thoughts of their authors. This is just an attempt to raise their prestige in the eyes of the British, to show that they are worth doing, that they may be of interest to them. In fact, the current government leaders have done nothing to find the right ways to develop a young state in the face of a two-camp split of the world.

All ties with the Soviet Union are only the technical design of the great events that have taken place without their participation, as the formation of the state of Israel. They only do what they can't but do. These leaders came to power in a moment of

camouflage, on the crest of international events. Their actual attitude to the Soviet Union is little defined as neutral, it is hostile. This is proved by Ben-Gurion's crudely offensive phrase against Stalin, which he admitted among his supporters, which has now become known more widely.

During a request to the State Council about the motives that led to the appointment of Golda Meyerson as ambassador to the USSR, Schertok replied that Meyerson is strong in that he is not able to be guided by feelings of sympathy and to go on about someone else's policy. At the same time, her pro-American views are well known.

As for Weizmann, he is now being kept in the shadows, because he is too confused in the English networks, and this circumstance can now harm not only his personal authority, but also general policy.

The desire of our leadership to negotiate directly with the Arabs is nothing more than a desire to find common ground with the top of the Arab circles, which are directly dependent on the Anglo-American masters.

I have now left active political life and only from friends sometimes receive information, but I understand the "neutral position" of our government. It cannot ignore the facts and at the same time seeks ways to resolve the question: "What's next?" The answer can be found in the fact that, according to some reports, our representatives from the Jewish Agency are conducting some secret negotiations in London.

Even the war itself with the Arabs was, unfortunately, in many cases not the nature of the liberation movement, but a nationalist war, accompanied by completely unnecessary repression and the robbery of the Arab population, that is, in this case, the unity of actions necessary and useful to

strengthen the prestige of Israeli policy was not ensured. These are the early days of the confusing and complex life of our state.

Tsirulnikov said that he lived in Odessa until 1928. His father was engaged in a large flour milling business, and because of his social situation, both himself and the children were deprived of political rights. Tsirulnikov led the underground youth Zionist organizations, and shared the Menshevist program. He was repressed for his activities and was in many prisons of various cities of the Union for a long time. In 1928, allegedly at the request of a number of Jewish Palestinian organizations, he was allowed to leave for Palestine. He is currently a companion to the owner of a soap company, which ensures an independent economic position. He sees political independence in his broad theoretical training ("not as an example to the current leaders of the country"), fully allegedly shares the Marxist ideology, which gave him the opportunity to free himself from the burden of old mistakes. He is not a member of the party, it gave him the opportunity to speak freely and independently in the soviet Union in difficult conditions. Recently, he was mainly engaged in personal affairs, going to write a book criticizing his former positions.

Tsirunikov leaves the impression of a rather developed and informed person.

His attitude towards us seems to be motivated by the resentful ambition and position of the unrecognized leader as a result of the political struggle in the local context and the possibility under certain circumstances of obtaining our support.

The first secretary of the mission V. Rozhkov was present at the conversation.

Adviser to the USSR mission in Israel

M.Mukhin

**INFORMATION OF THE SECOND
SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN
ISRAEL, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE
VOCS IN ISRAEL M.P. FEDORIN ABOUT THE
MEETING OF THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDLY
RELATIONS OF THE USSR. August 14, 1948**

Secret

On August 14, 1948, on behalf of envoy T. Ershov P.I., I was present as a representative of the Soviet mission in Israel and VOKS at a solemn meeting organized by the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR in honour of the arrival of our mission to Israel.

The meeting was held in the hall of one of the largest cinemas in Tel Aviv, Esther. It was attended by about 1,800 people. In addition, about a thousand people gathered on the street. Inside and outside the building was radioified. The hall was decorated with flags of the Soviet Union and Israel. Above the table of the Presidency was a large portrait of Stalin, under it the slogan in Russian and Jewish languages: "Long live the friendship between the State of Israel and the USSR!"

When I appeared in the room with the Secretary General of the League Tarnopoler, those present standing greeted us with prolonged applause.

In the presidium were: General Secretary of the League Tarnopoler, from the Israeli Communist Party - S. Mikunis, from the so-called Jewish Communist Party - Harari, from the United Workers' Party Mapam - Dr. Sne, Ilanit, Zerubavel, from the Labour Party Mapai - Friedman, etc.

Seven people made welcome speeches: Tarnopoler, Dr. Snee, Mikunis, Friedman, Harari, Ilanit and Shohat (Mapam).

All the speeches noted the gratitude of the Jewish people to the Soviet Union for their assistance and decisive role in the formation of the State of Israel; for example, Dr. Snee said in his speech: "I will allow myself to tell frankly our guest, the representative of the Soviet Union, that our people love the Soviet Union, our people believe in the Soviet Union, which has supported us and never let us down, and we, for our part, swear that we will never let the Soviet Union down and will consecrate all our forces. protector of humanity, the Soviet Union."

A bright speech was delivered by Mikunis, who called on everyone to fight against Anglo-American imperialism, for the full independence of Israel, for strengthening friendship with the Soviet Union, etc. All

the speeches were interrupted by loud applause at the mention of the Soviet Union, Soviet representatives at the UN (t. Gromyko, Manuilsky, Tsarapkin), the first Soviet envoy in Israel, etc. After greetings the choir of working youth sang the Jewish anthem, the anthem of the Soviet Union and "International", which was sung by almost everyone present in the hall. After that, the choir performed several Soviet ("March of the Gunners," "Song of Buden" etc.) and Jewish songs.

Second Secretary of the USSR Mission in Israel

M. Fedorin

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV
WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR,
MR. MEYERSON. August 14, 1948**

Secret

Meyerson made her first visit, accompanied by Levavi, head of the Eastern European Division of the Foreign Ministry, who was appointed first secretary of

Israel's mission to the USSR. After the mutual greetings, Meyerson said that she expects to leave for Moscow via Prague on August 26-27, stating that the final date of departure has not yet been set.

Referring to the issue of cultural life in Moscow, Meyerson noted the high level of culture in the USSR. I said that in Moscow she will have the opportunity to visit a number of theatres and see it even more. She agreed and noticed that some Jewish theatres are now touring the United States. Expressing regret that she did not know Russian, Meyerson said that in Moscow she would take care of it with the help of employees such as Levavi, who knows Russian well. According to her, the Jewish language is more foreign for her than Russian, because she has lived in the United States for a long time.

Meyerson went on to address the housing difficulties in Tel Aviv, which are caused by the arrival of large numbers of Jerusalem residents as well as immigrants. She stated that the issue of immigration was the most important issue for the State of Israel. Truman's declaration on the admission of 100,000 immigrants to Palestine, she called an unrealistic piece of paper. Now the total number of Jews in Palestine is about 800,000, and in 1921, when she came to Palestine, there were 60-70 thousand. A few days ago, she spoke with the American consul in Jerusalem, who said that he believed that Jews would be able to continue immigration for two years, but that they would then have to discuss the matter with the Arabs. She noted that without answering the American, she thought the U.S. would agree to discuss immigration to the United States with Mexico and other American countries in two years. Meyerson stressed that many Jews are now eager to come to Israel. Israel's industry and agriculture are fully absorbing the influx of

immigrants. In July this year, 20,000 people moved in and they all found a business.

I took this opportunity to ask Levavi to clarify the title of Ben-Gurion, because before the presentation of credentials, which will be held on Tuesday, August 17, I was offered to call him Prime Minister and Head of Government, which is the same and does not reflect his role as head of state. Levawi promised to clarify the matter in Ben-Gurion's office and report it by phone.

The conversation lasted 45 minutes.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV
WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL
D.BEN-GURION. August 17, 1948**

Secret

On 17 August, I presented credentials to Ben-Hurion, "The Prime Minister and the Head of the Provisional Government of the State of Israel." (The official title, although it does not reflect Ben-Gurion's role as head of state.) Government vehicles were brought to the Gat Rimon Hotel at 10.45am. On the first of them, owned personally by Ben-Gurion, the state flag of the USSR was raised. A large crowd gathered outside the hotel and warmly greeted us. Despite the fact that the route through the city was chosen the shortest and did not pass through the main streets, almost all crossroads were groups of people, greeting us with applause and friendly cheers. An honour guard consisting of 40 soldiers and an orchestra was erected near the Prime Minister's house, singing the national anthem of the USSR and Ha-Tikva.

Before handing over the certificates, I stated: "Mr. Prime Minister and head of the Provisional Government of the State of Israel, Presidency of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics appointed me under you the Extraordinary and Comprehensive Ambassador of the Soviet Union. Let me present the credentials that accredit me to you in this capacity." Accepting the letters, Ben-Gurion responded in Hebrew: "On behalf of the Government of Israel and the people of Israel, I sincerely wish you well. I hope that your mission will serve the benefit of our two countries and the world." Schertok then introduced me to the people present at the ceremony, after which I presented Ben-Gurion with the mission's diplomatic staff.

In the brief conversation that followed, Ben-Gurion said that the people of Israel owed the Soviet Union for their moral support at the UN. The State of Israel is

now stronger, its people and especially young people know that they are fighting for their state and their idea, and, it must be said, are able to fight, which was proved between the first and second truce. The army received a significant number of weapons from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, including artillery, which at the beginning of the war was not at all. However, the continuing period of "neither peace nor war" allows Israel to take a closer look at its internal affairs and mainly the issue of immigration, which is a vital issue for Israel. In conclusion, he wished me success in working for the benefit of our countries.

The ceremony was attended by Foreign Minister Shertok, Israeli envoy to the USSR Meyerson, Director General of the Foreign Ministry Eitan, Secretary of The Prime Minister Scherf, political advisers of Minindela Kogn and Shiloach, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Berman, head of the Legal Department Rosen, head of the Department of Eastern Europe Levavi, head of the Protocol Department Simon and others.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**NEW VERSION OF PARAGRAPH 18 (AND) OF
THE DRAFT DIRECTIVES OF THE SOVIET
DELEGATION TO THE UN GENERAL
ASSEMBLY ON THE QUESTION OF
PALESTINE. August 26, 1948**

Secret

And) Make the following suggestion:

The General Assembly recognizes the immediate withdrawal from the territory of the Jewish and Arab States in Palestine, which is envisaged by the General Assembly of 29 November 1947, of all foreign troops and foreign military personnel, and asks the Security Council to take appropriate measures to prevent the resumption of hostilities in Palestine.

A. Gromyko

**THE CREDENTIALS OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY
TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. August 26,
1948**

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF
ISRAEL CREDENTIALS

Mister

Chairman of the Presidency of the Supreme Council
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Nikolai Shvernik, Chairman,

Appreciating the friendship and mutual understanding established between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the State of Israel, and wishing to strengthen and develop these relations, the Provisional Government of the State of Israel decided to appoint Golda Meyerson as its Extraordinary and Comprehensive Envoy.

We believe that, through her personal qualities and virtues, Ms. Meyerson will be rewarded with your trust and will act to our full satisfaction in fulfilling the high mission entrusted to her.

We are honoured to ask you, Mr. President, to receive our Messenger with favour and to treat with confidence all that she will have the honour of expressing to you on behalf of the Government of Israel.

The Provisional Government of the State of Israel expresses its deep respect and best wishes to you and your country.

D.Ben-Gurion Chairman of the Provisional
Government of the State of Israel

Bonded: M.Shertok Minister of Foreign Affairs Ga-
Kiria.

Israel

August 26, 1948

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE SECOND SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET
MISSION IN ISRAEL, THE COMMISSIONER
OF THE VOCS IN ISRAEL M.P. FEDORIN
WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
LEAGUE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS OF THE
USSR L. TARNOPOLER. August 31, 1948**

Secret

Tarnopoler came to tell about the meeting of the Central Committee of the League on August 30, 1948 on the issue of approval of the League's work plan. He stated that the Central Committee had approved the work plan presented to it, which was:

1. In 5-6 weeks, convene a League Congress, which is supposed to raise a number of questions: 1. On the approval of the statute and the league program; 2. On the publication of the newspaper under the League; 3. Organizing issues - re-election of the Central Committee of the League, etc.

To prepare all the issues for the congress, to develop a plan for the work of the congress, as well as to conduct all the current work of the League before the Central Committee congress elected a special preparatory commission, or the so-called interim secretariat of five people:

1. Tarnopoler is the general secretary of the Mapam party.

2. Wilner - from the Communist Party of Israel (member of the Central Committee of the party).

3. Dr. Resnick is from the Mapai Party.

4. Biyaler is a representative of the so-called Hebrew Communist Party (a breakaway group from the Communist Party of Israel).

5. Dr. Kramer is from the Zionist Workers' Party (left wing of the Common Zionists party⁸⁵).

Tarnopoler said that the interim secretariat would first begin mass enrolment in the League, so that by the time of the congress there were at least 10,000 people. In addition, appeals will be issued for the re-registration of old members of the League. Meetings or rallies in honour of the Soviet mission in Israel will be held in separate cities and settlements, which will serve as the beginning of re-registration and registration of the League.

I. Preparation for the celebration on November 7. The Central Committee decided to organize an exhibition about the Soviet Union by November 7. The implementation of this event, Tarnopoler said, will depend mainly on the assistance of the representative of VOKS in the selection of necessary materials for the exhibition.

I replied that I welcome this event and hope that we will have an opportunity to get the necessary material for the exhibition. (Note. The mission brought with it three exhibitions from Moscow: "Education and Education," "Soviet Athletes," "Military Art of the Soviet Army" and some other materials.) In addition, the Central Committee decided on the day of November 7 to make a "ceremonial" landing of the Forest named after the Soviet army. Tarnopoler expressed the Central Committee's wish that any of the representatives of the Soviet mission should be present at the landing.

The third point of the Central Committee's decision is the publication of a special collection on the activities of the Soviet Union in the United Nations on the Palestinian issue. It will include all the speeches of

The Soviet representatives to the UN on this issue and some op-ed articles from the Soviet press. Elected editor of the collection, who would like, Tarnopler noted, to meet with me in order to ask for our help in the selection of materials, because they want to take it from Soviet sources ("Truth," "Izvestia"). He agreed to meet with the editor, noting that he might be able to help him find the materials.

IV. The Central Committee instructed the interim secretariat to organize a department of Russian language and Russian literature at the Hebrew University, which is an independent unit that does not comply with any ministry. If conditions did not allow it to be organized in Jerusalem, a university office in Tel Aviv could be established. However, the resolution of this issue, Tarnopler said, depends mainly on the VOCS, because they want lectures on this department to be read by a professor from the Soviet Union, who will be officially invited by the university and, of course, fully economically. Here they do not have the opportunity to find a person of the Soviet school who could lecture in the direction he wanted, i.e. which would give a real history of the development of classical and modern Soviet literature.

Tarnopler went on to say that a year and a half ago he formally agreed on this issue with the president (chancellor) of the university, Prof. Magnes, who readily agreed to organize a department of Russian language and literature at the university. At the same time, the department's budget was allocated in the amount of 1,500 - 2000 pounds per year. However, the negative attitude towards this event of the British authorities and the absence of any possibility to agree on the arrival of the professor from the Soviet Union did not allow to implement this idea.

I asked Tarnopler what Prof. Magnes's opinion is on this issue at the moment. He replied that they had

not yet spoken to him, as he was now in America, from where he was due to return to Israel soon. However, they are sure that his positive attitude to this could not change. In any case, Tarnopoler said, he can immediately go to Jerusalem and agree on this issue with the vice president or with Prof. Magnes himself on his return. The event, Tarnopoler repeated, depends mainly on whether VOCS can send them the necessary professor.

I expressed my desire to learn more about this interesting proposal and, in particular, to learn the present opinion of the university leaders, perhaps to meet with them to report it to the envoy.

Tarnopoler went on to say that the last point is the Central Committee's decision to resume ties with the Jewish Leagues of friendly relations with the USSR abroad: in Mexico, America, South Africa, etc.

The conversation lasted 40 minutes.

Second Secretary of the USSR Mission in Israel

M.Fedorin

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV
WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
SCHERTOK. September 2, 1948**

Secret

He visited Schertok at his invitation. The meeting was scheduled for September 1, but in connection with the mourning I offered to postpone it until September 3. Schertok said that on that day he was going to Jerusalem and asked to come on September 2. At first, he said a few words about the death of T. Yudanov and noted his achievements in the defence of Leningrad. He did not express any condolences. I stressed that He was one of the biggest figures of the Soviet state and his death is a heavy loss for the entire Soviet Union.

Schertok said he invited me to brief me on the progress of negotiations with the mediator's representatives on immigration. This issue, he continued, is a vital issue for Israel from all points of view: political, strategic and military. The Government of Israel complied with the Security Council's decision

of 29 May, although this decision was unprofitable to Israel because it obliged the Government to isolate incoming immigrants of military age. As a result, all persons in this category have been placed in camps. On the other hand, this decision infringed on Israel's sovereign rights and contradicted the basics of humanism. People who were in concentration camps and ghettos in Germany during the war, after the end of the war, in concentration camps in West Germany, Italy and other countries, and thus spent 8-10 years in detention, upon arrival in Israel again must go to the camp. Considering this situation to be abnormal, the Government of Israel entered into negotiations with the mediator and, with its consent, dismantled the camps, pledging that persons of military age would not be mobilized, and establishing a record on which the mediator could find out at any time where an immigrant of military age who had arrived in Israel during the truce was located. Speaking between us, Schertok continued, this event allowed immigrants to be hired and thus released from industry and agriculture a certain part of the people for the army. Nevertheless, the mediator has become dissatisfied with this system of in-age registration and its representatives have tried to interpret the Security Council resolution of 29 May in the sense that it allegedly prohibits the entry of immigrants of military age. The Government of Israel rejected that interpretation and stated that the Security Council's decision did not result in that prohibition and that the mediator's representatives interpreted it willfully. At the time, the latter (Landstrom and Mon) indicated that the Security Council's decision also made no mention of the unlimited immigration of persons of military age to the State of Israel. To which they were told that the resolution also did not prohibit the immigration of persons in that category. At first, the

representatives of the mediator were going to go on a scandal and put the matter before the Security Council, but then, apparently, decided that the Security Council might not support them, i.e. would not take a decision on the prohibition of immigration of persons of military age, which means the loss of the authority of the mediator, and made concessions. They suggested that the Government of Israel itself should ask the Security Council to clarify the Security Council's decision in terms of allowing unrestricted entry of persons of military age, but the Government rejected the proposal, stating that it was not necessary because immigration was not prohibited. The negotiations broke down. Representatives of the mediator said they would wait for Bernadotte's arrival.

Schertok went on to say that on the issue of immigrants, the Israeli government came into conflict with the United States and sent them a note of protest that they had banned immigration from the U.S. zone of occupation of Germany. This decision of the U.S. government is completely incomprehensible to us, and we hope that the U.S. will correct the mistake. Speaking further about the U.S. attitude to Israel, Schertok noted that the official request of Israel for a loan, the State Department responded with an official refusal. If President Truman reconsiders the State Department's decision, the loan may be given, but it is difficult to say anything definite on this issue. The same is true of the U.S. government's recognition of Israel *de jure*, but Schertok hopes that a decision on recognition will be taken during the September session of the General Assembly in Paris.

Schertok concluded by saying that he had decided to inform me of this at a time when negotiations with the mediator's representatives were in conflict with them, but now the danger of the conflict was probably no longer present, but it cannot be ruled out that it

could resume after Bernadotte's return from Sweden. He added that he nevertheless decided to tell me about all this, hinting that he would like me to tell the Soviet government about it.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE
USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK.
September 6, 1948**

We were met by the head of the protocol department and his assistant, who was escorted to Metropol. TASS published a report in Izvestia and Pravda about the arrival of Golda and the mission staff. Namir and Levavi visited the deputy head of Bushuyev's protocol department. We have the right to telegraph correspondence in any form. The exchange rate of the dollar for diplomats is 8 rubles (against 5.30). Missions here raise flags only on holidays. Golda

asked for a meeting with Molotov. At receptions to raise flags and sing hymns is not allowed. The newspapers published condolences of diplomats from both blocs in connection with the death of Yudanov, so-called Golda. Several meetings with Jews express feelings of joy about our arrival. The attitude of the authorities and everyone we met here is friendly. shalom.

Gold

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV
WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR,
MR. MEYERSON. September 7, 1948**

Secret

Molotov asks how Meyerson got there.
Meyerson replies, "Very good."

Meyerson sends Molotov a greeting from the head of the Government of the State of Israel Ben-Gurion and from Foreign Minister Schertok.

Molotov thanks for his greetings.

Meyerson hands Molotov a copy of the credentials and says that her government has instructed her at the earliest opportunity to convey to Molotov the gratitude of the people and government of the State of Israel for the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union at the United Nations.

Molotov replies that the Soviet government considered it its duty, especially since it is fully in line with the policy of the Soviet Union towards other peoples.

Meyerson is pleased that such a policy is in the interests of both the Soviet Union and the interests of the State of Israel.

Molotov says that this policy is an expression of the will of the Soviet government and the multinational Soviet people.

Meyerson says that the State of Israel, unfortunately, still has significant difficulties and therefore needs help from other countries.

Molotov notes that the State of Israel is a young state and that in order to strengthen it, it is necessary to overcome considerable difficulties.

Meyerson says the State of Israel is indeed a young state born in the midst of war.

Molotov says that the State of Israel faces many serious questions. But he, Molotov, believes that the prospects of state is favourable. There is no force that can now seriously assert that it will not allow the State of Israel to exist, as its existence is a fact.

Meyerson agrees and says that the Government of the State of Israel, although it had hoped for its friends, relied on its own strength. This allowed the creation of the state, despite strong opposition. At

present, the state's position is also favourable from a military point of view.

Molotov notes that, in his opinion, the situation of the State of Israel will improve.

Meyerson thanks for this statement and adds that she forgot to say hello to Molotov from Ershov, whom she met several times before leaving for the Soviet Union.

Molotov thanks for his greetings and expresses hope that Ershov feels good in Israel.

Meyerson replies that the Israeli authorities are doing everything possible to make Ershov and other members of the Soviet mission feel at home. Ershov had some difficulties in finding a space for the mission, but this issue has now been settled or will be settled in the near future.

Molotov asks Meyerson to inform him about the situation in the State of Israel and, in particular, what are the immediate prospects in its relations with neighbouring countries.

Meyerson replies that the problem that currently causes the most harm to the State of Israel is the truce. The fact is that the truce has nothing to do with peace. The truce is only one phase of war. The Government of the State of Israel fears that some Powers may be interested in extending the truce for a long period of time. It follows that aggressive foreign troops will be stationed in Palestine in close proximity to the borders of the State of Israel. This forces the State of Israel to hold a large number of people at gunpoint and to be constantly prepared for the resumption of hostilities. The Government and people of the State of Israel would prefer to return to peaceful work in the fields and factories, as well as to increase immigration.

Not so long ago, the State of Israel informed arab countries that it was ready to meet with their

representatives at a peace conference. However, it had no illusions about that and knew that Arab Governments would not dare to give an affirmative answer. At present, according to some indications, the peoples of the Arab countries are beginning to understand that the war has been lost for them. But the governments of these countries, feeling the fragility of their own situation, at one time directed the interests of their peoples to war. Now they have to look for a scapegoat. For example, it is known that there are significant tensions between the kingdom of Abdullah and the Egyptian kingdom.

Outside the confines of the State of Israel, there have already been some informal talks between representatives of Israel and informal representatives of Arab countries. However, the Arab representatives did not take the liberty of publishing any official statement on the matter. Frankly, the war would quickly come to an end if the Arabs were convinced that they would no longer receive assistance from other countries.

Molotov notices that this is probably the case.

Meyerson says that the Arab countries that have received the most support from one foreign power now blame the same power for the failure of their enterprise.

Molotov notes that reports about it have already penetrated into the press.

Meyerson expresses confidence that if the State of Israel were left alone with the Arab world, it would eventually, if only, and quite quickly, establish friendly relations with Arab countries.

Molotov asks if Bernadotte's plan has any ground.

Meyerson responds negatively. She said that no one in the State of Israel took the plan seriously. Bernadotte has shown from the outset that he is not in a position to mediate in this case. Either he did not

understand the issues before him or he was unable to act as a mediator for other reasons. The worst trait in Bernadotte's work is that he interprets his powers as if there were no solution at all on 29 November and that he should start working in Palestine from the outset. The people of the State of Israel and Jews around the world were outraged by Bernadotte's recommendation for Jerusalem, as well as proposals for an international regime in the port of Haifa and in the oil refineries area.

Meyerson said that as a result of the war, the Government of the State of Israel had concluded that it might have to raise the issue of borders in order to be able to defend them more successfully than the borders envisaged in the November 29 resolution.

Molotov replies that the Government of the State of Israel will have to think about this issue. However, he, Molotov, thinks that the beginning of the State of Israel is good, there is a basis for the creation of a strong state. Meyerson says she's glad to hear that.

Molotov says there is likely to be a lot of international discussion about the creation of the State of Israel and its government.

Meyerson replies that her government is not afraid of difficulties, as it faced extremely difficult challenges from the outset.

Molotov agrees that the difficulties were considerable. He hopes that Meyerson will work successfully in Moscow, and says that he is ready to assist her in her work.

Meyerson says she came to Moscow knowing that she came to a friendly country and would be accredited under a friendly government. It will do all it can to improve relations and promote cooperation between the two countries. Meyerson thanks Molotov for his willingness to assist her in her work.

Molotov asks if Meyerson has any other questions.

Meyerson replies that there is one technical question that may not be put before Molotov, as they seem to be already dealing with the relevant Soviet authorities. This is the very issue that caused Ershov's concern in Palestine: the question of the mission's placement.

Molotov replies that the ministry will assist the mission of the State of Israel in this matter.

Saying goodbye, Molotov says he will notify Meyerson when the Chairman of the Presidency of the Supreme Council can receive it.

This is where the conversation, which lasted 30 minutes, ends.

Recorded by O.Troyanovsky

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE
USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M.
SCHERTOK. September 7, 1948**

In response to my letter yesterday, I was received by Molotov in the Kremlin today. The conversation lasted half an hour, in a state of cordiality. Molotov expressed confidence in the strength of our state and government and that we will win. I mentioned the border problem. Full report letter. He'll tell us the date of the credentials.

Gold

**LETTER FROM THE DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE USSR, V.A.SORIN, TO
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL FOR
RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY AFFAIRS AT THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR,
G.G. KARPOV. September 10, 1948**

Secret

T. Ershov, the ambassador of the Soviet Union in Israel, reports that, according to the information obtained as a result of the mission's trip to Jerusalem, the former head of the so-called Russian spiritual mission in Jerusalem, Archimandrite Antony, who was subordinate to Metropolitan Anastasia, was indeed under house arrest by the Jewish authorities in May this year.⁸⁸ However, later, under pressure from the Red Cross, Antony was released and transferred to the Arabs at the end of July.

At the head of the Russian spiritual mission is now a monk Me- Fodiy, named Popovic, left by Antony as his deputy with limited rights.

Buildings and other buildings belonging to the Russian Spiritual Mission and the Palestinian Society are in general satisfactory condition, but there are a number of damages from shelling and bombardment: holes in the walls, broken glass, broken dome of the

Russian cathedral, the roof of the Sergievsky Compound, etc.

In the Gorna monastery, the abbot remained the priest Isay, a supporter of the Moscow Patriarchate. The monastery is kept in order.

Tiberias and Nazareth monasteries were left unattended, as all the inhabitants fled to the Arabs.

The archive left by Archimandrite Antony is quite large and contains correspondence with the English authorities, Metropolitan Anastasia and many church communities. Antony fled in a hurry and could not take a large number of documents with him. He told the monk Mefodia that the most important documents he "hid in the archive and they will not be found soon."

The most important documents of the Spiritual Mission were photographed by the Jewish authorities, and the film was deposited in the military archive, from where it can be taken by us at the first request.

Taking into account the situation in Jerusalem, envoy T. Ershov made the following proposals:

1. Appoint and soon send the head of the Russian Spiritual Mission from the Moscow Patriarchate, as well as a representative of the Russian Palestinian Society, giving them the appropriate legal authority and power of attorney to accept and manage property (land, buildings, etc. buildings) belonging to these organizations. That. Ershov believes that the Israeli government should not ask for the transfer of this property to us, as it can be accepted by the Jews as a sign of our own doubts about the legal continuity and belonging to us of property.

At the same time, Ershov believes that the Government of Israel will not object to the visit of our representatives now.

2. In order to preserve the remaining archives of the Spiritual Mission and Palestinian society from possible destruction or embezzlement, transfer all

documents for safekeeping to the Anglo-Palestinian Bank or take them under the protection of the Jewish authorities to Tel Aviv for safekeeping in our mission.

The USSR Foreign Ministry agrees with Ershov's proposals. With regard to the archives, in agreement with you, he is instructed to take measures to obtain them at his disposal and to be taken to Tel Aviv for safekeeping in the mission.

I ask you to take the necessary measures to select the respective candidates of the head of the Russian Spiritual Mission in Jerusalem and 1-2 priests to help him and to present and design them in the appropriate authorities.

I ask you to inform the Ussr Foreign Ministry about the measures you have taken.

Deputy Foreign Minister of the Ussr Union

V. Sorin

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE
USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M.
SCHERTOK. September 11, 1948**

My meeting with Molotov was reported by the newspapers. I visited the Chinese Ambassador's diplomatic corps, and yesterday he paid me a return visit.

Today she presented credentials in the Kremlin. The ceremony was impressive, was successful, in a friendly atmosphere. Our office looked good. Instead of Schwernik, who is on vacation, on the Soviet side was, as it should be, acting deputy Vlasov. I spoke Hebrew, the head of the protocol department was translating. Vlasov's warm words were translated into Hebrew by Levavi. I discussed political issues with Vlasov.

Gold

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE
USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M.
SCHERTOK. September 12, 1948**

The announcement of the credentials ceremony was published in the press on the front pages. All those present are listed. I had a conversation with the chief rabbi of Moscow Schlifer, we visited the synagogue. There were touching scenes, even in the street. Employees of the mission were invited to read the Torah. Ratner was in uniform. At one time in the Moscow synagogue 20 thousand people celebrated the proclamation of our state.

Gold

**LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF
THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S.
FRIEDMAN TO THE ENVOY OF ISRAEL TO
THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. September 12,
1948**

Dear Golda!

I am happy to read your first telegrams, now we are waiting for more detailed messages about the beginning of your activity. Once again I congratulate you on the first steps - God willing, our hopes and hopes associated with your mission will be justified.

Since your departure, we have been sending you newspapers and information materials from the Foreign Ministry. Please let me know if everything is coming in order. There may be linings, as always in the beginning. If so - do not be angry, we will do everything to correct the situation (now we are preparing to send additional materials).

What Pekac was doing is coming to an end. We'll send it in the next few days. We have noticed your telegram requesting the shipment to be removed.

Among the information materials I send you a special review of the session of the Zionist General Council⁸⁹. This review, along with the newspaper footage, will give you a complete picture of what was going on there.

Some details about our relationship with the Soviet mission are here. Relationships are normal, you could say - good. After your departure, Moshe Cskertok had a long conversation with the Soviet envoy. During the conversation, explanations were given on the issue, which was then relevant: the mediator's attempts to limit repatriation, the associated American action in the camps and the protest of our representation in Washington. On our part, detailed explanations of the principled position against any quantitative restriction of repatriation have also been given; explained the difference between the first truce, which was time-limited, and the current truce. We have explained why we question the very right of the mediator to make such statements and why we do not bring the issue to the Security Council for discussion, but prefer to give events their natural course. The Soviet envoy listened carefully. In a previous conversation with me, he asked about the future of another part of the country, whether it would become an independent state or join another state or state. I explained our position in the spirit of our conversation with you and the other staff on the eve of departure.

After your departure, the Ohel Theatre gave the play "King Solomon and the Shoemaker Shalmay" in honour of the Soviet representation. It went fine. A pleasant surprise was the presence of the messenger, although earlier we were told that he was not going to attend the show. The orchestra performed our and

Soviet hymns, the hall was decorated with flags, Haley gave a welcoming speech. Guests enjoyed the performance and stayed for a festive dinner after the curtain. There the envoy gave a brief speech (the only one during the reception), wished success to our folk art. Then he took a picture with the troupe.

The envoy began to make visits to members of the state leadership. While he had time to visit Sprintsak (as head of the State Council), other members of the Presidency participated in this meeting. The Minister of Labour also paid a visit to the Minister of Labour, where there was a business and interesting conversation about our plans for the country, about the conquests of the working class in terms of working conditions. In the near future he is going to visit the ministers of justice, transport and finance. I'm in all these meetings. Meanwhile, other employees of the Soviet mission are also visiting. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and some of the ministry's officials had an adviser. The First Secretary, Consul and Cultural and Press Attache also met with various staff members, including the heads of the relevant departments of the Ministry. In addition to meetings with ministers, the ambassador plans a visit to the mayor, the association of industrialists and Histadrut. Pay attention to preferences.

A lot of concerns were associated with the building of the office. Thanks to the vigorous intervention of the relevant authorities, the building on Rothschild Avenue, which we provide to them, was urgently vacated. The latest work is now under way, which will allow them to move in the coming days. The whole operation involved many difficulties, but we felt obliged to do everything to make them above: fly. We are also working vigorously on the problem of housing for Soviet diplomats, doing everything to speed up the city hall finishing work in the building, where they will

have a permanent residence. They want to enter in early November to hold a gala reception in honour of November 7.

The Soviet mission is extremely interested in the urgent establishment of a direct telegraph link with Moscow. I brought to a meeting with the adviser on this issue Friedberg (Prihar), probably within 2-3 weeks we will get some temporary solution. I'll tell you separately how this is all going. During that conversation, I raised several questions at the request of David Remez regarding regular air communication, direct navigation on the Danube, philately - all this is a single set of problems in the field of transport. I believe that these questions will be the subject of a conversation in the coming days between the envoy and David Remez.

The Consul, accompanied by one of the attaches, visited Jerusalem. We took care of the appropriate procedures of reception and escort, and everything went perfectly. I was grateful for the organization of the trip. Among other places, the Russians visited the Russian Compound and the monastery in Ein Kerem. In the coming days I. Rabinovich (who is engaged in Russian property in the country) will meet with the consul. Apparently, soon the issue of Russian property will be included in the agenda. I will inform about the development of events further.

I am engaged in building links between our cultural institutions and their cultural attache. He has already met with the Ohel troupe, visited music to the people, symphony orchestra and the National Library, and met with Klinov. If there's anything important about his conversations, I'll let you know separately.

And now about the problems I'm interested in:

A. Bulletin in Russian language.

It seems to me that the best way for you to publish this newsletter in Moscow is based on the information

you receive from us. You know more about what materials should be published and which institutions to send it to. What do you think about that?

b. Finding relatives.

The Soviet consul in Tel Aviv said that they do not deal with these problems and will not respond to requests from private individuals. I believe you've already figured out if you'll be able to deal with this issue. I would like to receive a positive answer.

That's the end of my first letter to you. Other problems are written to you separately.

We are waiting for messages about your first steps and everything that happens to you. Hello world.

S.Friedman

**RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE MILITARY ATTACHE OF THE
ISRAELI MISSION IN THE USSR, COLONEL
I. RATNER, WITH MAJOR GENERAL I.M.
SARAEV. September 13, 1948**

The meeting was attended by Major General Saraev, his deputy and an aide, who recorded the content of the conversation.

1. After the usual opening remarks, I asked whether there was a tradition for military attaches to visit the duyen of their corps. Saraev replied that he did not think such a custom and the Soviet side advised me to first visit representatives of countries that recognized the State of Israel, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.

2. With regard to the wearing of uniforms, it was explained on the Soviet side that military attaches wear uniforms only during official visits, on manoeuvres, etc.

3. Major General Saraev said that soon he was going on vacation, during his absence I can meet with his deputy. I took this opportunity to ask permission to discuss some "high-policy" issues before he left: given that the armies in Palestine are only in a state of truce, not peace, I wanted to sharpen a few problems. As an example, I cited the issue of educational literature and the possibility of training officers. Although we have had significant military successes, it is clear to us that, after such a rapid transition from underground to regular army, after the appointment of such a large number of new commanders, it is necessary to seriously strengthen the professional base, increasing knowledge and experience. Major General Saraev said it was good that I picked it up now, because otherwise we could just lose time. Such issues are a "high policy" even for the leadership of the Ministry of Defence, where decisions are made at the rules of the current level. Therefore, the shortest way is the appeal of our representation to the government of the USSR or, otherwise, the appeal of our government through the Soviet representation in Israel. The army can only express its opinion: for example, when it comes to educational literature, what kind of textbooks are undesirable to export from Russia, or on the issue of training officers - which schools are better and which

military manoeuvres are relevant to the issue. They will help me to find and select literature, but the list of books I need the representation should pass for approval to the Foreign Ministry.

4. With regard to exercises and manoeuvres, I was told that the general manoeuvres normally attended by military attaches had ended this year and would not resume until the spring. If we want special permission, we should operate through the same channels as in the case of the possibility of training officers, etc. (I have the impression that this is a very complex problem).

5. After we returned to the usual for the first visit and acquaintance issues, I was told with a grin that other military attaches do not spoil them, usually with knowledge of the Russian language.

I took it as a subtle hint and talked about my past. In this regard, I explained that many of the creators of our army come from Russia, but the younger generation of the Russian language no longer knows, so there is a danger that a good opportunity to develop contacts between us will run out if we do not resume them ourselves with the help of literature, training courses, etc.

We asked how many generals we have: I replied that we decided to be modest, we have only one brigadier general and less than one major general for every 10 SOLDIERS. On the same occasion, I said that I had been sent to Russia, finding that in the current state of affairs it is desirable for a military presence in Moscow to transmit information and explain our position on the basis of our own experience of participation in the Palestinian war, to inform about the current military situation and the military components of our political demands.

6. The style of conversation was not the same all the time. Major General Saraev himself was kept

officially, but the tone of his deputy, a naval officer, was very cordial.

7. Practical conclusions: in the next two days I will compile a small list of military literature (100-150 names) so as not to waste time and submit this list for approval to the Foreign Ministry (it will be a kind of "test ball"), and in the meantime I will prepare new lists. I propose to raise the question of studying in officer courses in the same way.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV
WITH THE COMMISSIONER FOR RUSSIAN
PROPERTY IN ISRAEL I. RABINOVICH.**

September 13, 1948

Secret

Rabinovich, who had come from Jerusalem to the Commissioner for Russian Property in Israel, who was appointed to the post by the Jewish Agency around May 20, 1948, said that he had been dealing with the issue of Russian property in Palestine since the beginning of this year and "does everything possible to transfer it to the Soviet Union". When the mandated authorities signed the law on the transfer of this property to the administrations of the Spiritual Mission and the Orthodox Palestinian Society in early May 1948, it destroyed with the help of the Palmach detachment and with the assistance of the workers and the owner of the printing house all printed copies of the law. But about 30 copies of it was left and is in the Jewish Agency. Rabinowitz promised to send one copy to our mission.

Rabinowitz said that he was currently supplying food and providing cash assistance to pilgrims and nuns and was trying to obtain rent from persons and institutions occupying Russian buildings, but here he was faced with the reluctance of tenants to cover the debt, due to the "uncertain legal situation of the property". He wanted to sign contracts with Jewish civilian and military institutions occupying Russian buildings. This contract should be common to all buildings. When I asked who could sign such a contract on the part of the owner of the property, Rabinovich replied that he was, because he is the "authorized or

guardian" of this property. The temporary system of custody of Russian property, introduced by the Jewish authorities, is modelled after the English, because otherwise the property would be "left unattended," Rabinowitz said. I told him that he had no right to enter into long-term or short-term leases on behalf of the Orthodox Society and the Spiritual Mission, but only to provide food for Russian pilgrims and nuns and collect debts from tenants. Rabinovich assured that he would do so.

Rabinovich promised to give us a photographic film of documents (merchants) of the Russian spiritual mission, as soon as the person with the edica is in storage, arrives in Jerusalem.

The conversation lasted 20 minutes.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE
EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN
MINISTRY I.N.BAKULIN WITH THE ISRAELI
ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON.
September 15, 1948**

Secret

Meyerson came to me on a protocol visit accompanied by a counsellor.

After the usual greetings, Meyerson spoke very extensively about why the state of Israel needs immigration of Jews from other countries. As a justification, she pointed out that the State was at war and therefore naturally suffered human losses. In addition, Meyerson believes that the State of Israel will become strong when its population increases several times. Speaking about the current situation with immigration, Meyerson complained that the British and Americans were obstructing the entry of Jews into the State of Israel, while a large number of Jews, especially in Western countries, would like to move to Israel as soon as possible.

I asked Meyerson what opportunities the State of Israel has on immigration. She replied that in the event of a cessation of hostilities, the State of Israel could receive 1 million Jews within five years, and in total, 3-

4 million could be accommodated within the territory of the State of Israel within the current borders.

I have noticed that the number of Jews in countries where they are discriminated against is far higher than the figure given to them. The solution to the Jewish question was therefore linked to the democratization of those countries and the destruction of discriminatory regimes. Meyerson agreed.

Continuing the conversation, Meyerson asked me how she could communicate with the ministry's employees and whether she could invite her staff to talk about issues such as the military attache.

I replied that she had the opportunity to meet with the senior officials of the USSR Foreign Ministry in the usual way.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV
WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
SCHERTOK. September 16, 1948**

Secret

He visited Shertok at his invitation. He said that on Ben-Gurion's instructions, he should confidentially inform me of the recent exchange of views between the Israeli government and the U.S. government, undertaken at the initiative of the United States. McDonald recently visited Shertok and, at the direction of the State Department, said that the U.S. government sees the creation of the state of Israel as a positive factor in the Middle East, believing that Israel's development will benefit neighbouring countries as well. The United States attaches great importance to the truce and intends to insist on its continuation. They see it as the conditions for peace talks to begin. They want the truce to continue in order to achieve peace, but not to deplete Israel and will strongly prevent the violation of the truce, and if it

does, they will insist in the Security Council on the application of sanctions under the UN Charter.

According to Schertok, in response, he noticed to McDonald that in fact there is no fulfillment of the terms of the truce. For example, it was envisaged that The water supply to Jerusalem would be resumed, but the Arabs blew up the Latrborough pumping station and went unpunished, without sanction.

McDonald went on to ask three questions:

1. Is it possible, in the view of the Government of Israel, to approach the question of peace as part of the Transjordan agreement by exchanging large parts of the Negev desert lands for that fertile part of the Western Galilee under the military occupation of the State of Israel?

2. With the conviction of the United States Government that Jerusalem should be an international city (enclave) in accordance with the United Nations resolution of 29 November, the U.S. Government is prepared to consider any other arrangement in Jerusalem acceptable to both Israel and Arab countries, provided that the security and access of the "holy places" would be ensured. (The U.S. has not made any concrete proposals on this issue.)

3. The United States Government would like to know whether the Israeli Government meant to take any constructive measures to alleviate the plight of Arab refugees, as it affected international public opinion. (No mention of the return of refugees to the State of Israel has been mentioned.)

McDonald added that the U.S. government believes Israel's demands exceed what the pp. 1 and 2 would be an obstacle to lasting peace in Palestine. If the Israeli Government notifies the U.S. government of the positive views on these items, the latter will be ready to recommend the plan to the mediator and Britain, which can influence the Arab countries. Schertok told

me that he immediately gave McDonald a preliminary answer, but since the American was interested in the general opinion of Ben-Gurion and Schertok, he was then accepted by the prime minister and received a general agreed response. We responded, Schertok continued, that the Israeli government welcomes the active U.S. interest in peace in Palestine and considers the current situation intolerable and unjust. Britain is leading the line of depletion of Israel by the truce, and the Israeli government is pleased to note that this is not the U.S. line.

The specific responses of the Government of Israel were as follows:

1. We, Schertok said, have a negative attitude towards the exchange of territories. Ben-Gurion told MacDonald: "The Arab world is abundantly rich in deserts, and humanity has not seen this. We're hoping to do something. Therefore, there is no reason to give up the Negev deserts."

We stated that the boundaries of the partition envisaged in the resolution of 29 November needed to be amended because the preconditions of those borders had not been justified and there had also been well-known developments. Even at the UN Assembly, we demanded and proved the need to include the Western Galilee in the state of Israel. The U.S. was against it. One of their arguments at the time was that the Arab population of the Arab State in Palestine needed land reserves and that Galilee had that reserve. We have now replied that the accession of the Arab part of Palestine to Transjordan will provide the Arabs of Palestine with huge land reserves of Transjordan itself. We will claim the West Galilee as a boost.

2. In posing the question of Jerusalem, we see the flexibility of the United States Government, which is also welcome. Ben-Gurion added, in his personal

opinion, that there was a difference in the way between a device obtained by arms and an agreement, and that he, as Minister of Defence, could recommend to his Government to make concessions to the Arabs for peace (this applies to Jerusalem).

3. The question of Arab refugees should be divided into two questions: (a) immediate assistance to them where they are now;

b) their installation after the end of the war. The Arab states were responsible for the situation of Arab refugees, which had started a war against Israel, which had resulted in the problem of Arab refugees. Why should international funds spend money on Arab refugees instead of the Egyptian government? Schertok MacDonald asked. We are not against the help of international funds, but we point out that there is a culprit. If we are accepted to the UN, we will not refuse to participate in international aid.

We cannot allow refugees to return while there is a war or a truce that is a form of war. But we are ready to discuss it when the issue is in the order of the day.

Asked if that meant the Israeli government was not against the return of the refugees, Schertok replied that they were keeping the doors open. They believe that the most rational would be to settle refugees in neighbouring countries, where there is a lot of land, water and working hands. It would be more convenient for Arab countries, the refugees themselves, the State of Israel and for the sake of improving relations to settle Arab refugees in neighbouring countries. Schertok added that he gave McDonald an example of population exchange between Turkey and Greece after the First World War, which resulted in a significant improved relationship between them. This solution is only a proposal, but we are ready to discuss other options.

We told MacDonald that it was not clear that the United States would recommend the mediator and England, because we are at war with the Arabs, not with the mediator and England. McDonald promised to pass on the Israeli government's response to the U.S. government.

I asked if the adoption of the U.S. proposal was due to any positive measures, such as loan, de jure recognition, assistance in admission to the United Nations, etc., and Schertok replied that nothing had been said about the loan and the recognition of de jure. There are rumours that the president intends to do something, but he will be more for recognition than for a loan. We have reason to believe that MacDonald is now recommending that his Government recognize Israel de jure. There was no talk of admission to the UN either, but we already have a promise from the U.S. delegation to the UN (but not from the State Department) to support us. The Government of Israel has considered this issue and decided to give the authority of its delegation to the UN to put the matter before the Security Council at a convenient time. We have heard from Sobolev and Trygue Lee that we should "probe the ground", but our representatives at the UN believe that it is impossible to probe the soil of other delegations without raising the issue of admission to the UN in the Security Council. The only way to find out the relationship is to "put the issue with a rib." We may not get a majority, but it shouldn't embarrass us, because we won't be alone in front of the UN. Failure to admit to the UN will encourage our opponents, but the refusal to bring this issue before the UN will encourage them even more, so we decided to take a risk. We think that next month, when an American will preside over the Security Council, it will be more convenient.

In conclusion, Schertok said that if the exchange of views with the U.S. government continues and takes place in Tel Aviv, he will inform me again.

The conversation was attended by Friedman, head of the Eastern Europe Department, and Popov, an attache.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**EXTRACT FROM THE DECISION OF THE
POLITBURO OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
(B) "ON THE DIRECTIVES OF THE USSR
DELEGATION AT THE 3RD SESSION OF THE**

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY". September 17, 1948

On the directives of the USSR Delegation at the 3rd session of the General Assembly

1. Approve the directives of the USSR Delegation on the main issues of the 3rd session of the UN General Assembly (see annex).

Secretary of the Central Committee of the PARTY

The future of the Palestinian government.

If the Palestinian issue is included in the agenda, the Soviet delegation should:

(a) To expose the background of the so-called Palestinian question by showing the valid objectives of U.S. and British policies in Palestine, which seek to strengthen their influence in Palestine and the Middle East in general in the interests of American and British monopolistic capital;

b) To show that the objectives pursued by the United States and British governments in Palestine have nothing to do with the goals and objectives of the United Nations to promote peace and security for peoples, as well as to safeguard the interests of the Jewish and Arab peoples and to exercise their right to self-determination and to independent states;

(c) To propose the immediate withdrawal from the territory of the Jewish and Arab States in Palestine, the establishment of which is envisaged by the General Assembly of 29 November 1947, all foreign troops and foreign military personnel, and to ask the Security Council to take appropriate measures to prevent the resumption of hostilities in Palestine.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE USSR, F.T. GUSEV, WITH
THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR.
MEYERSON. September 17, 1948**

Secret

On 17 September, I was paid a protocol visit by Ms. Golda Meyerson, accompanied by a mission adviser.

After the usual greetings, Meyerson said that the Israeli mission was located in a hotel and soon intended to move into a house, which she was very grateful to the Soviet government for the care shown.

I noted that there are significant housing difficulties in Moscow, but that the relevant authorities will provide the necessary assistance in the deployment of the mission.

Meyerson went on to say that Moscow had made a huge impression on her, especially because everything in her own country was much smaller. The Israeli government in Tel Aviv, Meyerson continued, was housed in the buildings of the former German colony, and she noticed that the Germans lived in the area in much better conditions during the war than the British-interned Jews on the island of Cyprus.

When I asked what conditions Jews live on the island of Cyprus, Meyerson said that about 30,000 Jews had been interned in Cyprus. The wire-held camps have a strict regime and are not even allowed to listen to the radio. The British are very afraid that Jews will not get into Palestine. At the same time, Meyerson noticed that when she was last in Cyprus, these camps contained not 30,000, but 12,000 Jews, the rest of the different ways and ways managed to move to Palestine.

Meyerson further pointed out that the State of Israel was going through the most difficult period of its life, despite the truce, because the entire population had to be kept in suspense and mobilization readiness. Meyerson stressed that while the Arab States enjoyed the encouragement of the British and had ample opportunity to mobilize human reserves in the Arab League countries, the State of Israel had extremely limited opportunities. At the same time, Meyerson noted that, despite this, the armed forces had grown and the overall position of the State of Israel had been greatly strengthened in all respects. Meyerson then suggested that the Palestinian issue would be discussed again in one form or another at the forthcoming Session of the General Assembly in Paris and expressed the hope that the Soviet delegation would continue to take a favourable position towards her country.

I said that the Soviet Union's position on the State of Israel is well known at the United Nations. Our country understands the difficulties that the young State of Israel has to endure, and it can be assumed that it will be able to overcome these difficulties.

In conclusion, Meyerson said that she would like to hope for the help of the Foreign Ministry if she needed it during her time in Moscow.

I said that the Foreign Ministry will provide the necessary assistance.

The conversation lasted 40 minutes.

S. Kudryavtsev was present.

F. Gusev

**NOTE OF THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR
G.M. MALENKOV TO THE GENERAL
SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (B),
CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS OF THE USSR J.V. STALIN.
September 18, 1948**

Comrade Stalin.

Before you left, you instructed to prepare an article about Israel. The case was somewhat delayed due to the absence of Ehrenburg in Moscow. The other day Ehrenburg arrived. Kaganovich, Pospelov and Ilyichev had a conversation with him. Ehrenburg agreed to write the article and objected to the article getting a few signatures.

I am sending you an article by I. Ehrenburg "About One Letter." If there are no other indications on your part, we would like to publish this article on Tuesday, 21.IX, in the newspaper Pravda.

G. Malenkov

ABOUT ONE LETTER

I received a mail from Munich from Alexander R. He writes:

"You may be surprised by my appeal, but I have read several of your books and I am addressing you as a writer, help me to understand the difficult question for me. I am a German Jew, of course, an anti-fascist, a medical student. In 1938 I managed to get to France; when the Nazis broke in, I went into hiding, then I was in the "Maki" for two years - I fought in the guerrilla group "Gabriel Peri". I returned to Munich after the win. I confess to you, I was naive - I thought that fascism was destroyed. Now I have to experience daily insults. When Hitler was in power, I believed it was a temporary eclipse, and I considered anti-Semitism a sign of the "brown plague." But why do I have to read disgusting inscriptions on the walls now? Why should I listen to students shout to me, "Get into Palestine"? Why didn't my friend be accepted into the profession and openly say, "Jews don't belong here"? You can't imagine how intolerable these insults are. I yearn for the simplest, the right to exist without the shameful stigma. The Nazis put a yellow patch on their chests, now everything is thinner, but the same. Under the protection of Americans, the same Nazis sit in all responsible places. You probably know about it, and I'm not writing to complain or inform. I want to know how the Soviet Union treats the state of Israel? Is it possible to see it as a solution to the so-called Jewish question? For me, it's not abstract reflections, it's a matter of my life. I read in your novel "The Tempest" terrible descriptions of the murder of Jews in Auschwitz and elsewhere. My whole family died of the Nazis. How can we ensure that these horrors do not happen again? Yesterday I heard a colleague of mine say loudly, "We need to finish off the Jews." I've never been a Zionist, but I'm starting to believe in the idea of a Jewish state. I expect you to answer- You are the writer of the country that I believe with all my heart...

I think that the question posed by a correspondent I don't know is not only of his interest, not only to Jews, but to all people of reason and conscience. So I decided to answer not with a private letter, but with a newspaper article.

Alexander R. asks how the Soviet Union treats the state of Israel. This question can be answered briefly: the Soviet government was the first to recognize the new state, vigorously protest against the aggressors, and when the Israeli army defended its land from the Arab legions commanded by The British officers, all the sympathies of the Soviet people were on the side of the offended, not on the side of the offenders. It is as natural as the fact that the Soviet people sympathize with the patriots of Vietnam, not the French pacifist, the patriots of Indonesia, and not the Dutch punishers.

However, it is possible to answer the first question of Alexander R. more extensively. Representatives of the Soviet Union in the United Nations said that our people understand the feelings of the Jews who survived the greatest tragedy and finally got the right to exist on their land. Wishing success to the workers of Israel, the Soviet people do not turn a blind eye to the tests that await all honest people of the young state. In addition to the invasion of the Anglo-Arab hordes, Israel knows a different invasion, less loud, but no less dangerous—the Anglo-American capital. For the imperialists, Palestine is, first of all, oil. The competition of predators - Standard Oil, on the one hand, "Anglo-Iranian oil company" and "Shell", on the other - interferes in the life of the fragile state. The interests of the Potash Palestine Company, the Kirkuk-Haifa oil pipeline issue, the American concession projects and military bases are what threaten Israel in the wake of King Abdullah's thugs. The head of the State of Israel is not the representatives of workers. We have all seen how the bourgeoisie of European

countries with their great traditions, with their old statehood betrayed national interests in the name of the dollar. Can the Soviet people expect that the bourgeoisie of Israel will be more conscientious and visionary than the bourgeois of France or Italy? unlikely. We trust the people, but if in Israel the people fight and fight bravely, it does not mean that the people there govern.

There are many workers, urban and rural in the State of Israel. They bear the brunt of the country's defense. At the same time they have to fight against the greed of their bourgeoisie, for which war, as well as for any bourgeoisie, is, first of all, profit. No wonder the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel Mikunis recently said: "We have no property tax, no tax on profits, we have industrialists unabashedly raised their young ladies."

I believe that the advanced people of Israel, its workers will find the right way in extremely difficult conditions. I am convinced that socialism will win all over the world, and it will win in Palestine. But if I believe in the future of Israel, then the second question of my correspondent, who asks whether the creation of this state is a solution to the so-called Jewish question, I must answer negatively.

I have always thought and continue to think that the "Jewish question" can be resolved everywhere only by a general social and therefore spiritual process. It can be allowed not by utopians, and not by diplomats, but by workers of all countries. I admired the courage of the Israeli fighters when they repelled the attacks of British mercenaries, but I knew that the resolution of the "Jewish question" depended not on military successes in Palestine, but on the victory of socialism over capitalism, on the victory of the high international principles inherent in the working class over nationalism, fascism and racism.

The obscurantists have long invented fictions, wanting to present the Jews with some special beings, unlike the people around them. The obscurantists said that Jews live separate, separate lives, not sharing the joys and sorrows of the peoples among whom they live; obscurantists assured that Jews were people deprived of their sense of homeland, eternal tumbleweeds; obscurantists swore that the Jews of different countries are united by some mysterious connections. All these inventions found their extreme expression in Hitler's vile book *Mein Kampf* and were repeated by the SS, who buried the old Jews alive in the ground and threw them into the pits and in the furnace of the infants.

Yes, the Jews lived separately, separately, when they were forced to do so: the ghetto was the invention not of Jewish mystics, but of Catholic surasures. In those days, when people's eyes were covered with religious fog, there were fanatics among Jews, as they were among Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox and Muslims. And as soon as the gates of the ghetto opened, as soon as the fog of the medieval night trembled, the Jews of different countries entered the common life of the peoples.

Yes, many Jews left their homeland, emigrated to America. But not because they emigrated, that they did not love their land, but because violence and insults deprived them of this beloved land. Some Jews sometimes sought salvation in other countries? Didn't the Italians, Irish, Slavs of the countries under the oppression of Turks and Germans, Armenians, Russian sectarians do so? Jewish workers, like all others, are firmly attached to the land on which they were born and raised.

Jews live in different countries, many live on the land where their ancestors came from time immemorial; the first Jewish monuments in Tunisia,

Georgia and Italy belong to ancient times. The obscurantists say that there is some mystical connection between all the Jews of the world. However, there is little in common between a Jewish Tunisian and a Jew living in Chicago who speaks American and thinks American. If there really is a connection between them, it is by no means mystical: this connection is generated by anti-Semitism. If tomorrow there was some kind of mentible, who would declare that all red-haired people or all snub-nosed are subject to persecution and should be destroyed, we would see the natural solidarity of all redheads or all snub-nosed. Unheard of atrocities of the German fascists, proclaimed by them and in many countries carried out the total extermination of the Jewish population, racial propaganda, insults first, the furnaces of Maidanka then - all this gave birth to a feeling of deep connection among the Jews of different countries. It is the solidarity of the offended and the indignant.

During the war, the beautiful Polish poet Julian Toowim wrote an article entitled "We Polish Jews." He wrote about his patriotism: "I am Polish, because I was told in Polish in the house, a Pole, because I was fed Polish from infancy, because my mother taught me Polish poems and songs, because when I was shocked by the first tremor of poetry, it erupted in Polish words. Pole, because I confessed in Polish in the anxieties of first love and in Polish babble about her happiness. The Pole is also because birch and willow are nicer to me than palm trees and cypresses, and Miscavige and Chopin are more expensive than Shakespeare and Beethoven, for reasons that I cannot explain by any reason. Pole, because he was born and raised in Poland, because in Poland I was happy and unhappy, because from my exile I want to return to Poland, at least somewhere else I would be granted heavenly

bliss. Pole, because I want to be swallowed up by the Polish land after my death, not the other one.” Julian Toowim goes on to explain that he was connected to the Jews: “Blood is of a two kind: the one in the veins, and the one that flows from the living. The study is the first to refer to the field of physiology. The one who attributes blood, besides physiological, some other properties, some mysterious force, the one as we see it now, sizzes cities, cuts people and, finally, as we will soon see, leads to the death of its own people. The other blood is the one that the leader of international fascism sharpens from the veins of humanity to prove the triumph of his blood over my blood, it is the blood of innocently ruined millions, the blood of the Jews, not the “Jewish blood.” Why do I say “we are Jews”? Because of the blood.”

Of course, there are nationalists and mystics among Jews. They created a programme of zionism, but they did not populate Palestine with Jews. The Jews inhabited Palestine by those ideologies of hate, those adherents of racism, those anti-Semites who drove people from their homes and forced them to seek - not happiness, but rights to human dignity - for the thirty lands. We all remember the epic ship Exodus, which brought refugees from West Germany to Palestine, people who accidentally escaped the furnaces of Auschwitz and came under fire by British soldiers. The State of Israel resembles this ship, the ark, the raft on which people are held, caught by the bloody flood of racism and fascism.

Why is my correspondent Alexander R. ready to see salvation in Israel? Because the people who have deprived him of his homeland continue to host Bavaria, because German racists have found solid patrons - racists from New Jersey and Alabama; because for a Bavarian Jew, Hitlerism is not only a terrible memory, it is something alive, protected,

cultivated. Perhaps, under such conditions, Alexander R. has no choice but to bypass the slingshots placed by various “observers” and get into Israel. But if it is a resolution of alexander R.’s personal drama, it cannot be a solution to the drama of Jews living in different countries, where money, lies and prejudices rule.

Eli Mignot, a member of the French parliament, replies to the Israel Gazette: “Only reactionary Zionist circles can it occur that the state of Israel will become an attractive force for Jews all over the world. French Jews are French citizens, they merged with the French nation, fought together and worked together. For them, as for all The French, the future is to defeat the remnants of fascism, to treason, injustice and exploitation.”

The largest number of Jews live in the United States. When I was in America, I saw zaatlantic racists insulting the dignity of Jews, Blacks, Chinese, Italians. Everyone understands that American Jews are at risk of growing racism in the United States, and everyone understands that the salvation of American Jews is not in the state of Israel, which could not accommodate even a small part of them, but in the victory of progressive America over America racists.

The Zionists say that the tragedy experienced by European Jews in recent years is due to the fact that Jews lived scattered among other nationalities. Let’s remember - in the autumn of 1942, the hordes of Hitler broke into Egypt, they were not far from Palestine. Even if there were an independent Jewish state then, it would not be able to contain the onslaught of Rommel’s armored divisions. What saved the Jews of Palestine? Stalingrad, the victory of the Soviet people over the Nazis, because instead of going to Jerusalem Hitler had to deal with defensive structures.

The Soviet people in a fateful duel defeated the enemy of all nations—bloody German fascism. Thus

the Soviet people saved the freedom of Europe, saved the lives of millions of Jews. I was in Wroclaw recently. There, the Jews invited the participants of the World Congress of Cultural Figures. Polish scholars, Negro writers, Brazilians and Czechs came. One pioneer girl addressed the Soviet delegate with the following words: "Tell the Soviet people that we, the Jewish children of Wroclaw, carry flowers to your countrymen who sleep in a mass grave. Tell the Soviet people that we know who saved us from death."

Yes, there is only one solution to the "Jewish question" - the victory of the advanced forces of mankind. If we allow for a moment a terrible picture and imagine the triumph of the world reaction, it is safe to say that the state of Israel will turn into a new Auschwitz or Maidanek.

In various countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe before the war reigned fascism. Jews there were persecuted—it is enough to recall the "Iron Guard" or the pogroms in the former Poland. The Nazis came. They encouraged looters from the scum of the population, they organized a mass murder of Jews. But under the pressure of the peoples, with the help of the Soviet army fell fascist rulers, ran across the ocean gentlemen, dreaming of the revival of pre-war orders, all these semi-liberals, half-volunteers. The authorities took over the workers. And so I saw with what zeal, with what patriotism Jews in different countries of popular democracy rebuild destroyed cities, work, study, write books, plant trees. In Poland, where before the war pilsudchiki were mocked by Jews, there seems to be no city now where there would be no "Street of Ghetto Heroes", because the heroic struggle of Warsaw Jews against the occupiers became the pride of the entire Polish people. When the fascist scum tried a few years ago to arrange a pogrom in Kielts, the people's power punished them as enemies of Poland.

The Bulgarian people managed to defend themselves against mass sending Bulgarian Jews to the “death camps”; After September 9, the people’s courts condemned the Bulgarian fascists, who smeared their hands in Jewish blood. Now Bulgarian Jews, many of them former guerrillas, together with the entire Bulgarian people are building their new democratic state. Their future is not overseas, but in the forests of Sofia, in Plovdiv or in Rusa.

In Tsarist Russia, the government caste, wanting to protect itself from the wrath of the people, portrayed Jews as the culprits of poverty, discord, disorder. Black-residents staged bloody pogroms. The dignitaries came up with more and more restrictions. But even then the Russian people were not involved in these atrocities. Maxim Gorky in the article “On anti-Semitism” correctly noted that the terrible contagion of anti-Semitism did not hit ordinary Russian people. The best representatives of the Russian intelligentsia loudly opposed anti-Semitism: remember “I can’t keep quiet” Leo Tolstoy, the sarcasm of Saltykov-Shedrin, Pirogov’s noble speech and Korolenko’s heartfelt words. Maksim Gorky fought passionately and unapologetically against anti-Semitism, calling it a “disgusting abomination”. The first bill to ensure the equality of Jews was introduced to the State Duma by representatives of the working class of Russia.

The Tsarist government artificially separated Jewish workers from their Russian comrades; but labor, struggle, blood of stiles and demonstrators were stronger than all prohibitions, all prejudices. Advanced Jewish intellectuals lived a common life with all over Russia, participated in the revolutionary movement, contributed to the cultural development of the country. The homeland for them was also at that bitter time homeland: they loved their native cities and towns,

green Belarus, the spills of Dnipro, all our great and beautiful country.

The founder of our state V.I Lenin repeatedly in angry articles and speeches smeared anti-Semitism, calling it a disgrace. The October Revolution brought freedom and equality to all citizens of the Soviet country, among them Jews. Some of them consider their native language Russian, others Ukrainian, third Jewish, but all of them consider the Soviet country their homeland and they are all proud that they are citizens of the country where there is no more human exploitation of man. In 1931, when a terrible cloud was found on Europe - two years before Hitler's seizure of power, Stalin, anticipating the atrocities of cannibals, said:

"National and racial chauvinism is a relic of hateful mores inherent in the period of cannibalism. Anti-Semitism, as an extreme form of racial chauvinism, is the most dangerous relic of cannibalism." When cannibalism tried to devour Europe, the Soviet people, led by Stalin, crushed cannibals. Soviet Jews, together with people of all other nationalities, selflessly defended the high ideas of our society, defended their native land. Girls, teenagers, old people left the ghetto of Vilna and Minsk in guerrilla groups. Even more expensive became for every Soviet Jew native land: he remembers the death of the innocent victims of fascism, he remembers the hard battles, the fallen heroes; he is associated with every Soviet man of combat friendship, he is associated with every inch of the Soviet land expensive graves.

Let my correspondent Alexander R. think about the events of the last decade, and he will understand that the "Jewish question" can be solved by one thing: the destruction of the "Jewish question".

We are sympathetic to the struggles of Israel's workers; on their side of sympathy not only Soviet

Jews, but all Soviet people - we have no supporters of Glabb Pasha. However, every Soviet citizen understands that it is not only the national character of the state, but also its social structure. The citizen of the socialist society looks at the people of any bourgeois country, including the people of the State of Israel, as travelers who have not yet emerged from the dark forest. A citizen of a socialist state will never be able to seduce the fate of people who editse the yoke of capitalist exploitation.

The fate of jewish workers of all countries is connected not with the fate of the state of Israel, but with the fate of progress, with the fate of socialism. Soviet Jews now, along with all the Soviet people, are rebuilding their socialist homeland. They're not looking at the Middle East, they're looking to the future. And I think that the working states of Israel, far from the mysticism of the Zionists, seeking justice, are now looking north to the Soviet Union, which is ahead of humanity for a better future.

Ilya Ehrenburg On the paper note: "Comrade Stalin agrees."

**RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE ADVISER OF THE SOVIET
MISSION IN ISRAEL, M. MUKHINA, WITH
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTRY, W. EITAN. September
20, 1948**

Secret

Today, on behalf of the envoy, he visited the Director General of the Foreign Ministry Eitan. I began the conversation with a reference to the fact that the envoy was going to visit Mr. Shertok in person in order to draw his attention to the utterly unsatisfactory implementation of the provisions on which a full agreement had been reached between them. I went on to say that the envoy, not wanting to disturb the Minister at present (the murder of Bernadotte⁹⁰. - M.M., occurred on 17 September), instructed me to discuss these issues with Eitan again. We are talking about the structure of the mission and other related organizational moments:

1. The absence of a permanent police post near the Hotel Gat Rimon, where the Soviet mission is currently located, enabled unknown fascists to carry out a

criminal attack against the envoy's vehicle, from which the state flag was known to have been torn off and the car itself disabled.

2. Until now, the house on Rothschild Street has not been prepared for the entry of the mission. The technical officer of the previous tenants continues to be there; not released from the tenants a small house, located on the estate, intended for the mission. Repair work is extremely sluggish. There are no phones, etc.

3. We do not have information on the status of the allocation of an apartment building to accommodate mission staff or the provision of separate 10 to 12 apartments, as an agreement has also been reached.

The nutrition of the mission staff has not been resolved at all. The hotel administration instructed the restaurant to extend local restrictions to the diplomatic staff of the mission, and it was stated that such an instruction had been given from the Chief Inspector of Food Distribution. We did not have food cards in Israel. Today, for example, there was a fact that goes beyond tactlessness. The messenger, allegedly on the basis of the above-mentioned order of the Chief Inspector, was denied a second cup of coffee.

In addition to the above, there are a number of other facts that indicate abnormalities, but on which in the light of this it no longer makes sense to stop.

In conclusion, I stressed that, in the existing diplomatic tradition, it is not customary in such cases for the interested party to put in the conditions of need to apply several times on the same occasion. In the future, and specifically on the issues raised, our re-appeal is excluded. We will expect the existing agreement to be implemented. In negative cases, draw conclusions about the undesirability of fulfilling the accepted agreement.

Eitan in my speech expressed great regret that there were so many abnormalities, and promised to

take immediate measures to eliminate them. At the same time he asked to take into account the difficulties associated with the war, with the incompetence of the apparatus. In my presence, I began to call on the phones and gave orders, in particular, to Friedman, who was present at the conversation, the head of the Eastern European Department of the Foreign Ministry.

At the end of the conversation with Eitan Friedman, seeing me off, asked to come to his office. Here he said that some Soviet citizens, referring to the oral instructions of the mission's consular officers, refuse to mobilize the Israeli army. At the same time, Friedman said that they have, for example, an agreement with the Polish consul, which does not prevent the mobilization of their citizens, but if necessary, according to his letters, they immediately release from the call any person. "For you, of course, this is not a reason," he added, "but I would like to know your personal point of view."

I replied that "as a personal point of view, I have only knowledge of the general international rule that citizens of one state are not subject to mobilization into the army by another state." He added that "I am aware of the fact that the Israeli authorities did not mobilize, but engaged a Soviet citizen, a specialist in the repair of vehicles, who was retained with a salary, to work in the military department, and he did not initiate any protest under these conditions."

Friedman ended the line that "it is really expensive, but it does not set a precedent, and one must think about it."

Adviser to the USSR mission in Israel
M Mukhin

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE DEPUTY HEAD OF THE
CONSULAR DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR
FOREIGN MINISTRY I.B. KONJUKOV WITH
THE ADVISER OF THE ISRAELI MISSION IN
THE USSR M.NAMIR. September 21, 1948**

Secret

Today, at 3 p.m., he received an adviser to the mission of the State of Israel Namir at his request. He came to make a protocol visit and find out some issues of consular practice. Namir asked what was required of the mission in order to obtain an exit visa to the Foreign Ministry for his employees and diplomatic couriers.

I replied to Namir that in such cases the mission should send notes to the Foreign Ministry of the USSR requesting the issuance of exit visas, and in respect of diplomatic couriers - also on the sight of their courier sheets. Passports and courier sheets should be attached to the note, of course.

Further, Namir was interested in the existing order of tracing persons in the USSR. I informed Namir that the Central Reference Office of the SOCC was making inquiries about the addresses of persons in the USSR. Foreign nationals contact this reference office through the relevant reference offices in their countries. As for the search of persons in the USSR for official purposes, the mission can address its requests to the Foreign Ministry of the USSR. Similarly, the relevant authorities and institutions of the State of Israel may make similar requests to the Soviet mission in Tel Aviv.

Namir thanked for the clarification.

Konjukov

**NOTE OF THE DEPUTY HEAD OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF
THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR
A.D.S. ZYBORIN TO THE DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE USSR V.A.SORIN.
September 22, 1948**

Secret

Through the Soviet Consulate General in Harbin, the USSR Foreign Ministry received two letters and lists of Jewish refugees from Germany and Poland

currently living in Harbin for transfer to the Israeli envoy to Moscow, Meyerson.

In these letters, the author, on behalf of 67 Jewish refugees, asks Meyerson to allow them to enter the State of Israel.

I would consider it possible to send these letters and lists to the Israeli mission by affiliation, and the Consulate General in Harbin to instruct in the future not to undertake such mediation functions.

By attaching a draft note to the mission of Israel, I ask for your instructions.

A.Yiborin

On the document of the litter: "Pass on the case in person, indicating that it is done by the Consulate General as an exception. V.Sorin."

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV
WITH THE SECRETARIES OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED WORKERS'
PARTY OF ISRAEL (MAPAM) J. RIFTIN AND
L. LEVIT. September 23, 1948**

Secret

Accepted Riftin and Levit at their request. Levite said that the United Workers' Party plays an important role in the political life of the country. She won about 40% of the vote in the last elections in Histadrut. It is influenced by at least 100 collective settlements out of a total of 300 Jewish settlements. In view of the fact that the settlements of this party are located in their large part on the borders of Israel, they took the main blow of the Arab troops. Prior to the creation of the Jewish army, the Palmach units, which were mostly members of the party's supporters, were the backbone of the Jewish armed forces. Currently, most of the combat commanders, including some front commanders, belong to the Mapam. The same cannot, however, be the case for the General Staff and other central military institutions dominated by the Mapaevs.

Riftin said that he had recently returned from America, where he met with Mr. Gromyko A.A. He believed that the United Workers' Party was the most progressive party in Israel, which followed "the path intended of the Great October Revolution." Currently, the party considers its main task to win the war, because only by defending its territory from the enemy, it is possible to build a democratic state.

The party initially stood for the establishment of international custody over Palestine (America, England, ussr), but then fully supported the UN decision on partition. It is constantly in favor of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the countries of popular democracy, because it sees them as the main international support by which a democratic socialist state can be built. Therefore, they seek to establish business ties with the Soviet Union in order to get some advice from it. For their part, they offer full information about Israel and Arab countries. In addition, Riftin said, it would be desirable for the

Soviet Union to provide moral support to the United Party.

I asked what the party's attitude to Bernadotte's plan was. Levite replied that the proposal to hand over to the Negev Arabs had met with strong resistance, as it narrowed the possibility of immigration for Israel. This cannot be accepted in any case, because immigration is the cornerstone of zionism. In addition, the Negev, handed over to the Arabs, would become an English base. As for Jerusalem, the party supported its internationalization, but events changed its original setting on the issue, as "during the war it was proved that the Christian Powers do not regard the sacred character of the city at all"; moreover, Abdallah, the conductor of imperialist British plans in the Middle East, has its own views of the city, which the progressive party cannot but reckon with. According to him, Levit, the progressive movement in Arab Palestine is so weak that at the moment it is not practical, but Mapam still maintains contact with him. The real force is only Abdallah, who has to fight. The party believes that if decisions are taken unfavorable to Israel, the Jews will have to start a war themselves in order to defend the Negev by force of arms. The party has nothing against joining Israel in The West Galilee.

Speaking about the upcoming elections to the Constituent Assembly and the prospects for the development of the State of Israel, Riftin said that the election platform is approved and is the following: in the field of foreign policy orientation to the countries of the new democracy and the Soviet Union. Strengthening ties with the democratic Arab movement. (On the issue of Arab refugees, Levit noted, the party's position is this: the return of refugees after the war, with the exception of the "warmongers.") In the field of domestic politics, the

fight against fascist and terrorist organizations is a decisive one. The Government currently pursues only the Stern group, while members of other fascist and terrorist groups are at large; progressive tax legislation, which would place the burden on the bourgeoisie rather than on the general public; the struggle against clericalism with freedom of confession; defending their positions in the army, because "having the support of the army, the party can represent a significant force"; removal from the apparatus of officials who served the British.

Asked what the party's response to the Communist Party's decision on the Yugoslav Communist Party was, they said that the resolution had not been discussed and there was very little material on the matter.

In conclusion, I noted that the world is now divided into democratic and imperialist camps, so each party is building its own foreign and domestic policy on the basis of this historical situation.

The mission attache Semioshkin was present at the conversation.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE
USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK.
September 24, 1948**

For your information: for all the positive assessment of the repeated statements of the authorities about the invariability of their support for Israel, as well as their open expression of friendly attitude towards our Government, the following cannot be ignored:

(a) In the friendly statements of Zorin and Gusev, who are Deputy Molotovs, as well as Bakulin slipped comments from which it can be concluded that the problem of repatriation exists only in the countries not belonging to the eastern bloc, and that our country, because of its size, is unlikely to be able to accept all those millions of Jews who live in other States. Therefore, Jews must fight for socialism in every country.

b) The press justifies our support in the war by the fact that our opponents are imperialists, our goal is true independence.

c) Ehrenburg's article in "Truth" of September 21 is essentially for Israel and against Zionism: he rejects the idea of repatriation from the USSR, Bulgaria and other popular democracies, claims that we have a capitalist system, quotes Mikunis's speech in the State Council as evidence that our power belongs not to representatives of workers.

The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee has not yet contacted us, we are going to contact them ourselves.

d) A British journalist close to us, sympathetic to us, returned from a joint trip with Ehrenburg to Poland and said that the Government of that country was discussing the issue of repatriation and was leaning towards taking a negative stance.

(d) During conversations with representatives of the Foreign Ministry and the Polish ambassador, it was felt that they were convinced of our anti-British orientation, but not in our ability to be independent of the United States. Should we raise the issue of Transjordan's accession to the UN here?

Gold

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV
WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
SCHERTOK. September 27, 1948**

Secret

He visited Shertok at his invitation. He said that yesterday at the meeting of the government the position of Israel at the UN General Assembly was defined. A closed session of the Council of State is to be held today, which will discuss and approve the government's decision.

Schertok then reported that in Paris, the representative of England, Minister of State McNeil, had spoken with The Representative of Israel Ewan on his initiative and stated that Britain would use all its influence to allow the Assembly to accept Bernadotte's proposals. Both sides, i.e. Arabs and Jews, do not agree with Bernadotte's proposals, but he, McNeil, is sure that they will have to reconcile with them. If one of the parties resists the implementation of these proposals, Britain in the Security Council will demand the strongest measures against this party (there was no question of the application of sanctions). Noting that he was saying this on Bevin's behalf, McNeil said that if Israel accepted Bernadotte's proposal, Britain would recognize Israel de jure, followed by other

European countries. In response, Eban said that the mediator's proposals for the Negev were unacceptable because, first, Israel was losing 20 Jewish experimental settlements, secondly, it was deprived of access to the Dead Sea and, thirdly, it was cut off from the Gulf of Aqaba.

Eban was also visited by Marshall's representatives and tried to probe the ground regarding Israel's adoption of the mediator's proposals, using as bait the issue of recognition of Israel by the United States *de jure* and the loan. Eban expressed surprise that Marshall so quickly accepted the mediator's proposals, which took some time to study. Eban showed the Amerite Kans a copy of Weizmann's telegram to his friends in Washington, in which he asked to use all their influence to leave the Negev behind Israel. It made an impression on the Americans.

Schertok then moved on to the Israeli government's position, pointing out that it had been adopted by a majority. We will not concede in the Negev question in any way, the minister continued. Our task in this Assembly is to prevent the creation of a majority in favour of changing the previous UN decision and accepting Bernadotte's proposals. We do not want the base of a foreign state to be established in the Negev. For us, the Negev is important because it has great economic opportunities and has access to the Red Sea.

On the issue of borders at all, the Government did not mind that the boundaries of partition should be revised in the light of the new situation. The UN decision of 29 November is still valid, but we must now take into account the experience. Amended in the light of experience in the new environment. For example, Jaffa was to be an Arab enclave, and it became a base of hostility against Tel Aviv. We proposed a truce, and the mayor of Jaffa agreed, but an Iraqi detachment

came and began hostilities. The commander of the detachment forced the mayor to stop negotiations with us, and we had to take the necessary measures. Taking into account this experience, we cannot tolerate Jaffa being a thorn in the body of the State of Israel.

When the decision of 29 November was taken, it was assumed that there would be little resistance to its implementation, which would be an economic union of the Arab and Jewish parts of Palestine. If something is missing in the accepted plan, the whole building is reeling. The boundaries proposed in the November 29 decision are almost impossible to defend. (Shertok showed on the map the boundary section and the actual situation now.) Experience has shown something else. It is impossible for us to leave our current positions in the Galilee.

The Jews also agreed to establish an international regime in Jerusalem, but the Arabs decided to seize it, and the whole world remained passive, and we had to resist the Arabs by force. For us, Jerusalem means a lot in economic, spiritual and other ways. We want to demand the inclusion of the Jewish part of Jerusalem in Israel, which should be connected with the main territory of the state by a wide corridor. An international regime may be established in the Old City. If, in order to establish peace with the Arabs, there is a need to transfer to them any part of the New Town, we will not object. Jerusalem should be connected by a wide corridor to the coastal strip.

We stand beyond the boundaries of the November 29 decision, with these amendments. We are in principle against the exchange of territories. The questions of Galilee and the Negev are different. We don't say anything about Galilee, because we are there. Lebanon does not want the remainder of the Galilee because it is inhabited by Muslims and this

would give Muslims an advantage over the Christians who dominate Lebanon.

Israel is against the transformation of Haifa into a free port, as it affects its sovereignty, but is ready to provide a "free zone" in the port of Haifa for the States concerned, of course, depending on relations with those States. We will not give, for example, Iraq a "free zone" in Haifa until it stops boycotting our goods. We agree to recognize the concessions granted to oil refineries. We will not start by abolishing these concessions.

With regard to the airport in Lidz, the Government would also not accept the conversion of it into a "free airport" but could grant reciprocal benefits. We will probably be pressed heavily by England and the United States and embarrassed by various lures in the form of a loan, de jure recognition, etc., but we will defend the position.

Returning to the question of the Negev, Shertok said that "some persons" in the government pointed to the fertile lands of Galilee as opposed to the barren Negev, especially since it is very difficult to defend the southern Negev. We told them that in the Negev we were attracted by the expanse, huge areas on which we could do something with our scope. As for Galilee, we are already holding it in our hands.

From the very beginning, the State Department was against the inclusion of the Negev in Israel. In the last Assembly, I succeeded, Shertok said, to convince Johnson and the "jury judges" from Guatemala, Czechoslovakia, etc. that the Negev should belong to Israel. Weizmann then convinced Truman that Aqaba should be Jewish, but the next day the State Department told me that they could not accept such a decision. This position of the United States continues to remain unchanged even now.

I asked about the Government's attitude to Bernadotte's proposal for the creation of a so-called conciliation commission, and Shertok replied that the proposal was not rejected, but it would depend on the function and competence of the commission. If its activities were to oversee Israel, the Government was against such a commission. The Government would not object to the commission mediating without interfering in Israel's internal affairs. She may try to "reconcile" Israel with the Arab government in Gaza, but it will be a difficult task for her, as the mufti who supports the government is the worst enemy, the executioner of the Jews. Israel in principle preferred the formation of an Arab State in the eastern part of Palestine, but it was important for Israel who would be at the head of that State. The Mufti was trying to organize an Arab state, but it was difficult for the Israeli government to agree with it. On the other hand, it is not easy to accept that the Arab part of Palestine should go to Transjordan. We will talk and consult with you. The formation of a Government in Gaza had led to a split in the Arab League, which would undoubtedly affect martial law. Egypt is our main enemy, but it seems to be against the establishment of foreign bases in the Negev. He himself had only recently been freed from the British and would not tolerate the creation of new British bases near its borders. However, the British will try to reconcile Egypt with concessions on other issues, in particular the Sudan.

Asked about Trugwe Lee's proposal to create a security force, Schertok said the proposal was unclear to him. Marshall spoke vaguely about it with intent. It's possible

Trugwe Lee hopes to convince Marshall or he believes that the U.S. will give his men in some other way, but this is not yet known. Whether these security

troops are sent to Palestine or not, Israel cannot and will not rely on them.

Schertok concluded by saying that on Wednesday he was flying to Geneva on a special plane that the Israeli government was sending for Weizmann. Shertok will meet with Weitzman there and discuss a number of additional issues. In a day Weizmann is due to fly to Tel Aviv. During Shertok's absence from Tel Aviv, the Prime Minister and Defence Minister Ben-Gurion will serve as Foreign Minister. The current affairs will be conducted by the Director General of the Foreign Ministry Eitan.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF
THE ISRAELI INTERIOR MINISTRY S.
FRIEDMAN TO THE ENVOY OF ISRAEL TO
THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. September 28,
1948**

Dear Golda!

This is my third letter to you. I got a message from you that the material we sent was delivered. I would like to ask you to confirm in the future receipt of each parcel with the date when the cargo came.

Yesterday, Moshe Schertok spoke with the Russian envoy before leaving for Paris. Explained to him our position on the proposals of the mediator. He said that in connection with the publication of these proposals, the first contact with the British (Hector McNeil) took place after a long break, and told about Eban's conversations with the Americans. Arguments and our position you know, I will not repeat. I only report the questions asked by the Soviet envoy and the answers he received: when he was told about the British position that tough measures should be taken if the parties did not agree to Bernadotte's proposals, he asked whether the British representative had spoken specifically about sanctions. The answer was negative. In relation to our position on the Negev, the envoy asked whether it was shared by all ministers or only by a majority. The answer was that some questioned whether we could defend the entire Negev on our own, including remote areas, when our prospects in that part were unclear and problematic, but they were only doubts of a small minority and the majority was united in their opinion. Moshe Schertok spoke about Eban's arguments in connection with our negative position on the Negev and about the response of the Americans, who were influenced only by the argument about 26 settlements in the Negev. The messenger was given explanations on the map: the picture of the settlement of the Negev by us influenced him as well. He was then given detailed explanations of the benefits of Galileo: it was stressed that the area was under our control, so we did not raise any questions about it and

did not agree to link the Galilee problem to the Negev problem in any way. It was also stressed that our attitude towards the Jaffa problem had changed drastically since 29 November because of the sad experience we had with this city in the first months of the war. When it came to Jerusalem, the envoy was told that we were against the transfer of the Old City to the Arabs, for the transfer of most new neighborhoods under Jewish control, and ready to change the borders in the New City if peace talks began. On the issues of Haifa and Lidda, our position is an international zone on the terms of reciprocity and good neighbourliness. Moshe Schertok outlined our position in a conspicious way, touching on all the items on the agenda.

After that, issues that had not yet been discussed were raised, such as our attitude towards the Arab Government of Palestine in Gaza and the extent to which it had influenced inter-Arab tensions over martial law. The first topic is quite delicate, but the envoy has repeatedly touched upon it in previous meetings. A: Until we can say something definite, the Arab territory of Palestine has in fact become a purely geographical concept, there are no social forces left that could be considered as candidates for power. The government in G'az simply hates us with all its soul, and we can never go to recognize it. On the other hand, our clear statement against the Government in Gaza could be interpreted as supporting the annexation of the Arab part of the country by Transjordan, and we cannot say that. In principle, we support the idea of establishing a separate Arab State in the territory of Palestine, the current situation is extremely difficult, our position needs to be corrected, which will be done during the session of the General Assembly. We will consult with Soviet representatives as well. As you can see, we did not give an answer, but

provided our interlocutor with serious material for reflection. The second question was that we do not know well enough to the extent to which the forces in the Arab world are divided, recently we have been completely cut off from the sources of information that we had there, Moshe Schertok will clarify the situation for ourselves during our stay in Paris. Moshe Schertok focused on the contradictions between Egypt and Great Britain, the possible damage to Egypt in the event of the establishment of bases in the Negev and the efforts of the British to reach a compromise with Cairo on this issue. Here I must note that during the conversation, our side expressed a sharply negative attitude towards the establishment of any bases in the Negev. The envoy also asked if we knew anything about oil reserves in the Negev. Of course, you have already received a message about Eban's talks with The Soviet representatives in Paris.

As for our relations with the Russians here, the envoy temporarily interrupted his visits to our ministers. In recent days, he visited only Rockah, and without our help. I arranged a dinner for the responsible employees of the mission, but the messenger himself was not there. The atmosphere was warm and friendly. Russians have shown interest in various aspects of our lives, such as the organization of kibbutzim, the structure of the education system. There were also questions about the mediator's decisions - we gave the same answers as the ones I wrote about above. Interestingly, they were critical of Mukhin on the issue of cooperative settlements; they doubted whether the existing system would have an impact on the economic structure of cities and whether it was not the actual work momentum but the large sums of money given to the incoming cooperatives that were decisive. Perhaps it is an echo of those conversations with different

people, which the Russians conducted here without us. From the conversation it seemed that the Russians do not attach much importance to our work in the village. The main thing, they said, is the processes in the city - the development of industry and the situation of workers.

There was a strange incident, which we can not really explain. On the evening before Bernadotte's murder, unknown people spoiled the engine of the Soviet mission's car, broke the flagpole on the car, and the flag disappeared. At night I had to hurry to visit them. Then a similar incident occurred with the car of the American mission.

We were pleased to know that you've started the work of finding relatives. We send you the first lists, in the future we will send more. What kind of responses have this activity generated among Russian Jews and how many are turning to you?

S.Friedman

**LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF
THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S.
FRIEDMAN TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SCHERTOK, IN
PARIS. September 30, 1948**

Dear Mr. Schertok!

Yesterday I had an interesting conversation with Mukhin, the brief content of which follows below.

The conversation lasted more than an hour. It was started by my interlocutor, who talked about Ehrenburg's article. They have already received the text, now this material is passed from hand to hand. I told him I had not read the article yet and would only be able to speak when I read it completely.

According to him, there is nothing in the article that could cause our negative attitude. On the contrary, the author writes a lot of good things about us. My interlocutor does not understand why the telegraph agency had to emphasize the negative points, for sure it was done in order to worsen relations between our countries. Mukhin focused on one thesis from Ehrenburg's article and repeated it several times: the State of Israel will not be able to solve the Jewish problem, even when it will be residence of three million Jews. "You won't bring all 10 million here." It

will be a weak state, and the “dark forces” will be able to destroy it. The main thing is to fight everywhere against any possibility of these forces coming to power.

I briefly explained to him the essence of zionism, pointed out various factors, because of which zionism became a necessity for our masses. Mukhin replied that the main (incentive) element in our movement he sees a negative point - anti-Semitism. “That’s what we both read from Herzl.” But anti-Semitism can disappear, it no longer exists in the USSR, and it is doomed to disappear in countries where people’s democracy will come to power.

Here I turned to the problem of Russian Jewry, mentioning various attempts made in the USSR to solve this problem, and their very small results. I also said that anti-Semitism still exists in many regions of the world, and in the Ussr it was revived during the German occupation. He agreed with me that the Russian Jews had not received culturally what other peoples had received, adding that, according to the information available to him, the autonomy project in Birobidzhan had failed and the Russian Jews in his entourage reacted in amazement to the question of why they were not going there. I have said that the State of Israel cannot be built without repatriation and without zionism, that Jews in their present-day countries are a very weak factor incapable of having a decisive impact in the fight against reactionary forces in each of these countries. As an example, I referred to the experience of the Jews of Germany. On a number of points Mukhin agreed with me, but at the same time again stressed the main thesis borrowed from Ehrenburg: the Jewish question cannot be solved by the help of zionism. During the conversation, some issues of life in Israel were also touched upon, which I

will not dwell on here. In general, the conversation was held in a constructive and friendly spirit.

S.Friedman

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL P.I. ERSHOV
WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PROVISIONAL STATE COUNCIL OF ISRAEL
H. WEIZMAN. October 5, 1948**

Secret

Weizmann visited at his invitation at his home in Rehovot. He expressed "gratitude to Soviet Russia for the help it has given israel" and then warned that he did not want to talk about political issues during the first conversation, postponing them for the future. The conversation was of a protocol nature. Weizmann was interested in the course of the restoration of the national economy of the USSR, told about his stay in pre-revolutionary Russia, mentioned the case when during the Genoese conference he was mistaken for V.I.Lenin, about life in England during the war. In this regard, he noted that "no one seems to want war now, but people can say too much and then, because of the

preservation of prestige, a war may break out." However, he thinks that "this year there will probably be no war." Showing his house and then a huge garden, Weitzman said there were many Arab-owned gardens near Rehovot, but he "still can't understand why these people left their homes." Arriving Jewish immigrants would be resettled in the area, mainly in the Negev, but if it were up to him, it would limit immigration to 70,000 a year, as the young state would not be able to "digest" too many immigrants.

Weitzman invited to come to meet his research institute and to his lunch, which he promised to inform officially through the Foreign Ministry.

Weizmann's wife, Head of the Eastern Europe Department Friedman and attache Popov were present.

**TELEGRAM OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE TO
THE ISRAELI MISSION TO THE USSR,
COLONEL I. RATNER TO THE PRIME
MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF
ISRAEL D.BEN-GURION. October 6, 1948**

Ben-Gurion from Ratner. Today I had an hour and a half of conversation with Army General Antonov, who is now Vasilevskiy's replacement. This kind of conversation is quite unusual for the level of military attaches, I was asked not to tell my colleagues from other countries about it. That's why you need complete secrecy.

It was about the course of the fighting, about the armies of the Arab coalition, especially Iraq, about the national minorities in the Middle East, about the nature of our forces, their command and armament, about the

possibility of resuming hostilities, about the importance of the Negev and Jerusalem. There was a question about their help to us. The following issues are discussed: (a) the training of the command staff (short-term and long-term courses), b) the supply of weapons from German trophies, c) ways of sending - by air or sea. According to the protocol, we must now bring these issues to the discussion of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, which will make a decision. In the run-up to this, you need to inform in the coming days what types of weapons and how much we need from this source.

Ratner

**LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
COUNCIL FOR RELIGIOUS WORSHIP AT
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR
D.D. POLYANSKY TO THE FIRST DEPUTY
CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS OF THE USSR, TO THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR V.M. MOLOTOV. October 6, 1948**

Secret

The Council for Religious Worship at the Soviet Council of Ministers informs you that the entire

composition of the Embassy of the State of Israel, headed by Ambassador Ms. Meyerson, on September 11 this year, the day after the ambassador was presented with credentials, participated in the Sabbath prayer at the Moscow Choral Synagogue. At the request of the Embassy Adviser, Mr. Namir, the male members of the Embassy were invited to read the Torah, and the Ambassador, Ms. Meyerson, who was, as required by religious tradition, during the prayers on the "female half" (in the choirs), at the end of it went down to the main hall, went to the main hall, ceremoniously worshipped him, gave him a greeting in ancient Hebrew and cried. As Meyerson and her entourage walked among the worshippers as they left the synagogue, many greeted her with applause.

On 27 September, Mr. Lapid, the second secretary of the Embassy, appeared at the synagogue and handed over to the rabbi a letter from the Jewish community from Tel Aviv accompanying the Torah scroll, which had been brought by the Embassy as a gift to the Moscow synagogue. The embassy wishes to hand over the scroll to the synagogue in a solemn manner, as Mr. Lapid asked the rabbi to schedule the day of the handover and to develop a ceremonial.

In addition, Mr. Lapid handed over to the rabbi Ms. Meyerson's business card, her New Year's greeting (October 4) and a package of 1,500 rubles. At the same time, he extended an invitation to Ms. Meyerson to visit her with two or three parishioners for a face-to-face conversation.

On 30 September, the rabbi received a telephone call from the First Secretary of the Embassy, Mr. Levawi, who asked the rabbi to perform a ritual check of food and utensils (in relation to its "kosherness") in a restaurant where members and staff of the Embassy were eating.

On 4 October, the day of the religious holiday of Rosh-hashanah (New Year), Ms. Meyerson and other members of the Embassy again visited the synagogue. As she entered the synagogue, a large crowd, both in the building and on the street, greeted her with applause, which Rabbi Schlifer tried to stop on the pretext that such forms of greeting could not take place in the synagogue, the prayer room.

Some people expressed dissatisfaction with this, saying, "We have been waiting for this event for two thousand years, how can you forbid us to show our feelings." In the synagogue and near it on the morning of October 4 there were, according to an approximate count, up to 10,000 people.

The Council for Religious Worship gave the rabbi the following recommendations, agreeing them with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR:

1. He refuses to perform his rabbinical duties towards members and employees of the embassy, limit communication with them only this and not enter into any personal relations.

2. Respond to Ms. Meyerson's congratulation by sending her a business card in which a discreet text from the Torah to thank for the gift.

3. Inviting to personally visit Ms. Meyerson to reject, first under the pretext of a recent severe illness by the rabbi, and subsequently to make it clear that a personal visit by the rabbi to the faithful, from a religious point of view, is possible only in exceptional circumstances.

With regard to the Embassy's request to organize the solemn handover of the Torah scroll, the Council, given that such a ceremony would inevitably lead to a demonstration with elements of political zionism, especially since there were direct Zionist statements in the letter accompanying the scroll, considers it necessary to recommend that the rabbi accept the

scroll only by the composition of the synagogue board and send a reply letter on his behalf to Tel Aviv confirming the receipt of the Torah.

I ask for your instructions.

Appendix: A copy of the letter from Tel Aviv.

Chairman of the Council for Religious Worship at the Soviet Council of Ministers Polyansky

At the end of the letter document: "Help. On October 7, Podcerob said by telephone that Molotov agreed with the Council's practical proposals. The signature is promiscuous. 7/H.48."

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE
USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE DIRECTOR**

**GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY W. EITAN. October 6. 1948**

Publish, but not on behalf of the mission: on the holiday of Rosh-has-shan we visited a large synagogue. Thousands of people filled the building and the entire street. Throughout the two days of the holiday, our flag flew over the main entrance of Metropol. The rest of the details are not for publication in the press: upon arrival at the synagogue we were met with thunderous applause, whoops in Hebrew and friendly "shalom". When we left, there was a spontaneous procession of a huge crowd, accompanying Golda and other diplomats to the central street.

New Time published an article accusing the British of killing Bernadotte. The article by Icic Fefer in Einikite is written in a slightly more positive spirit than Ehrenburg's article.

Gold

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV
WITH THE ISRAELI POLITICIAN M.SNE.**

October 9, 1948

Secret

Took Dr. Snee at his request. He is one of the leaders of the United Workers' Party (Mapam) and was previously Commander Hagana. In the conversation, Sne said that he recently went to the U.S. as a party delegate to establish a closer relationship with a progressive Zionist group in the United States. The group has recently been linked to Wallace's party and is backing his candidacy for the presidency. His mission is to organize in the U.S. propaganda, which will have the goal to intensify the work of the group in support of Wallace's candidacy. Since he, Sne, is a foreigner and cannot speak openly for Wallace, he will do so through the group. He believes that he will stay in the U.S. before the presidential election and on his way back, perhaps, will come to Paris.

Noticing that I had read his article "The Hour of The Trial" published in the newspaper Al-Hamishmar, where Snea warns the Government and the public about the danger of concessions and collusion on the Palestinian issue, I asked what danger he meant and how great it was. Sne said the main danger was that the U.S. and Britain were always trying to include Israel in their sphere of influence. To that end, they want to alienate the Negev from Israel to turn it into their military base. This issue does not leave them on the agenda during the entire thirty-year rule of the British in Palestine. All their proposals for the partition of Palestine included the secession of the Negev. This

was stated in Lord Peel's plan in 1937, Morrison-Grady's proposal in 1946, and the Americans insisted on this at the Assembly in 1947.⁹²

I asked whether only the Americans and the British in the Negev were pursuing strategic goals, and Sneh said that, in addition to strategic factors, there were economic reasons of great importance: 1) the Negev had oil reserves (Gaza and the southern part of the Dead Sea near Kurnube Mamshit); 2) In the Dead Sea the richest stocks of potash, manganese and bromine. In this regard, Churchill in 1922 decided to divide the Dead Sea into two parts, so that the western part went to the mandated territory of Palestine, and the eastern part - to Transjordan.

Israel's position at the UN Paris Assembly was to prevent the rejection of the Negev, but he, Sneh, did not trust the members of the Israeli delegation, which had hardly succeeded in including only one mapam representative, Lifshitz. He did not rule out that the delegation could make concessions. If the Americans insist on joining Israel only the northern part of the Negev at the expense of some territory of the Western Galilee, the Government is free to accept this, which would mean the organization of military Anglo-American bases in the Negev, and hence the loss of the state of Israel its independence. Characteristically, Sneh continued, that in the report at the meeting of the State Council on September 28, Shertok said only that the Negev is needed for new immigration, and did not touch on the question of the existence of Israel as an independent state if the Negev is turned into an Anglo-American military base. In addition, the Government could make concessions in the other direction. It now states that the fate of the Arab part of Palestine "does not concern the Jews". Such a position could, of course, lead to the accession of all Arab Palestine to

Transjordan, which would mean the return of the British to Palestine.

There are other reasons for American interest in the Negev: 1) the possibility of digging a canal between Gaza and Akaba in the future, which could replace the Suez Canal; 2) the possibility of connecting the Channel of the Mediterranean Sea with the Dead Sea, which, due to the difference in water level in these seas, opens up ample opportunities for electrification and irrigation of the entire Negev; 3) According to classified but virtually unconfirmed, uranium ore deposits in the Aqaba area; 4) At present, the British attach great importance to the defence of the Suez Canal from the east. All these factors suggest that the Negev is the key to resolving the entire Palestinian problem.

When I asked about the Israeli delegation's position on Jerusalem, Sne said that, as we know, there is now a proposal to divide the city into three parts: the Jewish, Arab and the international part, which will include all the Holy Places. Stipulating that he mentions this confidentially, Sne said that during yesterday's meeting between Shertok and Marshall, the latter proposed to divide the city into two administrative districts, one of which would be under the care of Israel and the other under the tutelage of Transjordan. An international commission must be appointed to manage the Holy Places.

Speaking about his party's position, Sne said that the party does not know now what is worse - international guardianship or partition. If the international guardianship will be carried out with the participation of the USSR, then Ma-pam - for such guardianship. "In general, we are against partition, but also against international guardianship without the participation of the USSR," Sne said. The party has major disagreements with the government over Haifa

and Lidda. Shertok told the State Council that since Bernadotte's proposal only affected the port, not the entire city of Haifa, Israel could agree with it. Mapam points out that granting Transjordan the right to use the port of Haifa would in fact mean handing the port over to the British and turning it into an English naval base. The same situation is with Lidz. Mapam therefore insists that there should be no concessions on this issue.

When I asked which parties or political groups tended to make concessions, Sne said that there are currently three currents in political circles:

1. The right wing of the Mapai Party and representatives of the major bourgeoisie, whose views in the government are expressed by Finance Minister Kaplan and Minister of Justice Rosenblat, and in the press newspaper Haa-retz, are most likely to make territorial concessions in order to achieve an agreement and support of the United States and England.

2. The extreme nationalists, the revisionists, Etzel, tacitly supported by Prime Minister Ben Gurion, speak out against the concessions and seek, under the agreement with the United States, to annex part of the Arab territories of Palestine in order to then give them under concessions to the American capital. In the press, Ben-Gurion's opinion is expressed by journalist Liebenstein in the newspaper "Yes-Var". "What Liebenstein thinks, Ben-Gurion thinks, or vice versa," Snee said.

3. The United Workers' Party and the Communist Party of Israel are fighting against any concessions and compromises with the United States and England, for a "fair compromise" with the Arabs and for the closest relations with the USSR and the countries of popular democracy.

There is often a common line agreement between the first and second movements, but their forces, although represented in the Government by 11 ministers out of 13, should not be exaggerated. This government was not elected by anyone and is essentially "self-appointed" and ministers are "impostors". It is possible that the "inter-party proportion" will be changed in the new elections. The progressive movement in Israel is just beginning. If the Government made concessions on the Bernadotte plan, it would strengthen the opposition parties, the Mapam and the Communist Party of Israel, which are currently exerting a deterrent effect on the Government and cannot be ignored. Of course, what the government holds back the most in its hesitation to the West is the Soviet Union, which has consistently pursued a policy of supporting Israel as an independent and sovereign state.

The conversation lasted about 1 hour. The second secretary Fedorin was present.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE HEAD OF THE PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN
MINISTRY V.S.VASILENKO WITH THE FIRST
SECRETARY, PRESS ATTACHE OF THE
ISRAELI MISSION IN THE USSR A. LEVAVI.
October 14, 1948**

Secret

He accepted, at his request, the press attache of the mission of the State of Israel Levavi.

The press attache made a protocol visit and at the same time informed the Press Division that the mission intended to issue, like other embassies and missions, a Russian-language newsletter. Information about the State of Israel will be included on the bulletin. The attache further noted that they intended to send a

bulletin to the newspaper offices, the Social Bureau, VOCS and other institutions.

I replied that the mission should write to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this matter.

Levavi also said that on the instructions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Israel, the mission intends to distribute a magazine in Russian language to the USSR, the magazine will be printed in the state of Israel and delivered to the USSR. He went on to ask which organization was distributing the periodic press.

I replied that the distribution of the periodical press was handled by Soyuzprint.

Levavi asked: Will Soyuzprint distribute our magazine in the same way that it distributes magazines "America" and "British Ally" in its kiosks?

I replied that Soyuzprint was an independent economic organization and it was difficult for me to say whether it would be able to take on the mission of distributing the magazine proposed for publication.

Levavi concluded that the mission had formally contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on these issues.

The conversation lasted 15 minutes.V. Vasilenko

ORDER OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR TO GO TO ISRAEL RUSSIAN SPIRITUAL MISSION. October 14, 1948

Secret

Allow the Council for the Russian Orthodox Church at the Soviet Council of Ministers to agree to leave the Soviet Union for the State of Israel to permanently work for Archimandrite Leonid (Lobachev Ilya

Christofoorovich) as the head of the Russian Spiritual Mission in Jerusalem and Vladimir Elkhovsky as a mission priest.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ussr Union

Stalin

On the document of the litter: "i.e. Yiborin. It is necessary to inform Ershov and agree on the date of departure. V.Sorin. 21/H."

**TELEPHONEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M.
MOLOTOV TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY (B), THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE
USSR J.V. STALIN. October 19, 1948**

Secret

The representatives of China and Great Britain to the Security Council submitted a joint draft resolution on 14 October in connection with the latest developments in Palestine. The draft, following the mention of the killing of Bernadotte and the fact that the Government of Israel has not yet submitted a report on the progress of the investigation into the killing, proposes that the Governments and the Palestinian authorities allow free access to truce monitoring personnel to all locations where they need to be because of their responsibilities, and to take all measures to ensure the safety of the monitoring personnel and the mediator's representatives.

In his telegram No. 388, Vyshinsky suggests not to object to this project and to vote in favour. According to Vyshinsky, Jews complain only that there are more UN observers (54 people) in the territory they control than in Arab territory (32 people). In this regard, Vyshinsky proposes to add to the resolution, which to point out the desirability of even distribution of UN observers on the territory of both sides.

Given that at the time we did not object to the creation of the Armistice Commission and insisted on the participation of Soviet representatives as observers, I believe that the proposal of Vyshinsky can be accepted.

Please approve.

V. Molotov

On the document of the litter: "Tov. Stalin agrees. Poskrebyshhev."

**NOTE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO
THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY (B), THE CHAIRMAN**

OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR J.V. STALIN. October 20, 1948

Secret

The First Committee of the General Assembly begins to discuss Bernadotte's proposals for Palestine, which boil down to the following:

1. Bernadotte proposes replacing the existing temporary truce between the parties with official peace or such a truce, which is accompanied by the complete withdrawal and demobilization of the armed forces or the establishment of a demilitarized zone between them under the supervision of the United Nations.

Bernadott's proposal is unacceptable because it circumvents the issue of the withdrawal of foreign troops (Transjordan and Egypt) and proposes the demobilization of troops in the Jewish and Arab part of Palestine.

Vyshinsky proposes to oppose this proposal of Bernadotte to our proposal, provided by the directives, on the immediate withdrawal from the territories of the Jewish and Arab states in Palestine of all foreign troops and foreign military personnel.

I propose to agree with Vyshinsky and give him an additional instruction to support the proposal for a formal peace between the Arab and Jewish States, the establishment of which is envisaged by the decision of the General Assembly of 29 November.

2. Bernadotte proposes the transfer to the Negev Arabs and to the Jews of the Western Galilee and to the Arab States to decide the fate of the Arab part of Palestine. The case for the merger of the Arab part of Palestine with Transjordan should be taken into account.

Vyshinsky considers it necessary to object to these proposals, as they are auditing the general Assembly's decision of 29 November 1947, giving four-fifths of the entire territory of Israel (The Negev) transjordan, i.e. under the control of England, and insisting on the implementation of the general Assembly's decision.

I propose to agree with Vyshinsky.

3. Bernadotte proposes that the UN give assurance that the borders between the Arab and Jewish territories will be respected and can only be changed with the consent of the parties concerned.

Vyshinsky believes that it is possible not to object to Bernadotte's proposal, but only if the boundaries set by the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947 do not change.

I propose to agree with Vyshinsky.

4. Bernadotte proposes to declare the port of Haifa, including oil refineries and oil pipeline endpoints, a free port, and Lidda Airport a free airport, with unhindered access to both ports of the Arab countries concerned.

Vyshinsky reports that Jews tend to agree on Haifa with the Arab states concerned on the basis of reciprocity.

I propose to give Vyshinsky an indication that if Jews and Arabs agree to agree on mutual concessions concerning Haifa and Lidda, this should not be objected to.

5. Bernadotte proposes that the city of Jerusalem within the borders defined by the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947 should be subject to a special solution and be placed under the de facto control of the United Nations with maximum, feasible local autonomy for the Jewish and Arab communities and with unhindered access to the city by land, air and railways.

Vyshinsky proposes that a part of the New City of Jerusalem, inhabited by Jews, be included in the Jewish state, and a part inhabited by Arabs as part of the Arab one, and to accept the proposal of the Jews to limit themselves to the establishment of an international regime under the leadership of the United Nations only over the territory of the Old City.'

Unlike Vyshinsky's proposal, I propose to give him the following instructions: to insist on the implementation of the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947, i.e. the establishment of a regime over Jerusalem in which administrative authority is exercised by the Guardian Council. Under this provision, Bernadotte's proposal for local autonomy for the Jewish and Arab population of Jerusalem could be accepted.

If a solution acceptable to both Jews and Arabs is considered acceptable in the course of the discussion of this issue, we believe it is possible to discuss such a proposal in the future.

6. Bernadotte proposes to give Arab refugees the right to return to the territory of the Jewish State and to compensate for the property that has died.

Vyshinsky proposes to give the Jews the opportunity to agree on this issue with the Arabs during the peace talks.

I propose to agree with Vyshinsky.

7. Bernadotte proposes the establishment of a Palestinian Conciliation Commission, which is responsible to the Un and acting on the instructions of the latter.

Vyshinsky proposes not to object to the creation of such a commission, provided that it has purely deliberative, advisory functions.

I propose to agree with Vyshinsky on condition that at least one of the friendly Eastern European states will join the conciliation commission. If the U.S. and

England are to be included in the commission, it is necessary to seek the inclusion of the USSR in the commission as well.

8. In addition, Vyshinsky reports that the Jews intend to propose a "corridor" for Jerusalem to link with the main coastal part of the Jewish state.

Vyshinsky suggests that the Jews should not object to the proposal if other delegations speak in his favour and have a chance of adopting it.

I propose to agree with Vyshinsky.

Please approve the proposals outlined above.

V. Molotov

On the document of the litter: "Tov. Stalin agrees.
V. Molotov. 20.H."

**LETTER FROM THE SOVIET ENVOY TO
ISRAEL, P.I.ERSHOV, DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE USSR V.A.SORIN.**

October 20, 1948

Secret

Israel has the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR, which was established in 1946 on the basis of the pre-existing League "Vi" to help the Soviet Union. The League's program notes that its main goal is to strengthen friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Palestine. The league is headed by a central committee based on the principle of party representation. This fact makes it difficult for the League to work, as it transfers party disagreements of various nature. There is constant debate about who will lead the planned event, who will make the report at a solemn meeting, etc. Some members of the United Workers' Party, such as the General Secretary of the Tarnopoler League, have come under the influence of Mapai representatives and essentially pursue their policies and policies of explicit demagoguery.

The League has a number of offices in the main cities and some of the country's rural settlements. There is also disagreement between the Central

Committee of the League, on the one hand, and the local committees of Tel Aviv and Haifa, on the other.

The League's work was limited all the time to demonstrative events (meetings, rallies). However, at present the League expects to hold a number of specific events: the convening of the League Congress, at which the central committee is to be re-elected, the new charter of the League, etc. is planned.

With the arrival of the Soviet mission in Israel among the majority of the population of the country there is a great increase in sympathy for the USSR. This gives us ample opportunities to conduct our propaganda, to organize all kinds of cultural events, despite the known opposition from reactionary elements. However, with this composition of the League's leadership, it is difficult to assume that good work can be done in this area. Therefore, we need to determine our attitude towards the League and its further work. First, we can go down the path of changing the composition of its leadership. This, of course, will require us to take a certain pressure, indirect or direct, in the re-election of the Central Committee of the League. Secondly, it is possible to create a new "Society of Cultural Communication between Israel and the USSR", but it cannot be ruled out that the Israeli parties will not declare a boycott of this society, as a result of which we will not be able to turn it into a mass organization.

I ask for your instructions.

Appendix: Help about the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR, compiled by the second secretary of the mission T. Fedorin.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

On the document of the litter: "Tov. Bakulin. Understand and give suggestions. V.Sorin."

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE HEAD OF THE CONSULAR
DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN
MINISTRY A.P. VLASOV WITH THE ADVISER
OF THE ISRAELI MISSION IN THE USSR
M.NAMIR. October 21, 1948**

Secret

With the permission of T. Gusev, I accepted Namir at the request of the latter.

Namir said that he had come to meet me and to resolve his questions along the way. He speaks Russian well and to my question where he learned Russian, Namir replied that he was a native of Ukraine and left for Palestine about 25-27 years ago. Before World War II, his parents lived in Kherson, but during the German occupation they were killed.

1. Namir further reported that there were a number of Israeli nationals in the Bukovina and Bessarabia area who had come to visit their relatives. Because of the fighting, they were unable to travel to their

homeland and were now seeking assistance from the Mission of the State of Israel to help them move back. Namir said there was no objection to their return from the Government of the State of Israel. Namir requested assistance in sending these citizens home and promised to send a formal request on the matter at a later date.

I replied to Namir that as soon as the request was received, it would be reported to the leadership of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

2. Namir brought a newspaper published in Tel Aviv, which published the announcement of the Soviet mission in Israel on the registration of Soviet citizens. In view of the fact that there were a number of subjects of the State of Israel in the Soviet Union, Namir asked him to advise him on how to communicate with them.

I told Namir that all Soviet newspapers and radios had reported on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the State of Israel and the arrival of the mission to the Soviet Union, so that all subjects of the State of Israel should be aware of this and that, in my opinion, there was no need to publish a special announcement.

3. Namir reported that through Yiborin, he had received a list of Israeli refugees from Germany and Poland, numbering some 73 people in Harbin, asking for permission to enter Israel. The government of the State of Israel agrees to the entry of these people. In this regard, Namir asked for assistance in making transit visas through the USSR, as the sea route from Harbin is impossible because the Suez Canal is closed by the Egyptians and the passage through Gibraltar is not allowed by the British. From the Soviet Union, refugees can travel to Israel by steamer from Odessa or through Czechoslovakia, from which the State of

Israel has regular air links. A formal request on this matter will be made at a later date.

I promised to report this request to the leadership of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

4. Namir said that the mission had several reports from Tel Aviv that Israeli nationals had single close relatives (elderly fathers or mothers, etc.) in the Soviet Union whom they wished to take in. The government of the State of Israel agrees to the entry of these relatives. Namir asked if the mission could count on the assistance of the USSR Foreign Ministry in sending such people to Israel. The costs of moving them from the USSR to Israel are borne by relatives in Israel, and in some cases the government will be assisted.

I told Namir that the question of leaving the Soviet Union of Soviet citizens to relatives in Israel depends on their consent and desire. If they agree, they must raise the issue of leaving for Israel before the police at their place of residence.

The conversation lasted 40 minutes.

Chief of the Consoman

A.Vlasov

**FROM THE REPORT OF ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTER M. SHERTOK AT THE MEETING
OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. October 26,
1948**

The Eastern Bloc firmly supports us. Negotiations were held on various aspects of the problem of the creation of Israel with several states - satellites of the USSR. They took an interest in our internal problems, asked about the nature of the country and what the situation would be after the elections. None of these factors affect their political position at the UN, and

there are no adverse changes. I would say on the contrary: the Soviet Union firmly supports us. All the rumors circulating in the country that the position has changed have no ground. As I thought, there is no basis also for the assertion of homegrown experts from the press that there are things that the Councils can explain, and there are things that the Councils cannot explain. The 29 November resolution is a fait accompli, a departure from which is not possible; our position on refugees will not be accepted; Moscow strongly defends the international status of Jerusalem - you can negotiate with it anything, but God forbid touch the international status of Jerusalem. Newspapers are full of such arguments. However, during the interviews it was found that they had nothing to do with the real state of affairs. Of course, we had to explain a lot, but we didn't notice any dogmatism. In any case, we have not encountered any insurmountable obstacles.

David Lifshitz also participated in our first meeting, and Vyshinsky and Malik from the Russian side. After my opening remarks (for Vyshinsky it was the first meeting with the Zionist and the first conversation on the problems of our country) I saw that he already knows something about our problems. But he said that the situation in the region is almost unknown to him. During this meeting, all the "node" issues were discussed-the Jaffa problem, the road to Jerusalem, Jerusalem itself, West Galilee, etc. Vyshinsky turned to Malik and said, "They are right." The appeal to Malik was characteristic - he did not address me, and to Malik, from which I concluded that they had a dispute on this subject. Malik must have been tough on the resolution on November 29. Then Vyshinsky said, "They are right in everything." Then he turned to me: "And still we have to think. There is a problem with the Resolution of 29 November. We must consider the extent to which this resolution will be called into

question. There is an opinion that this resolution should not be touched in any case, because it can only lose. Let's say one side adds something to it, and it will give the other side a reason to remove something from it."

Then I said, "Life is life. Of course, this resolution is the basis and the starting point, but the reality is constantly changing, and the resolution of 29 November reflected the old reality." During one conversation, I mentioned the boundary in Galilee, calling it "too deep a neckline." It turned out that this border should be protected, and as it was marked, it was simply impossible to protect it, so it was necessary to take measures to straighten the front. Vyshinsky told me that Galileo is not a problem, it is possible to agree here. The real problem is Jerusalem. There are really serious contradictions on it. I told him that we did not violate anything, there is a fundamental situation regarding the Old City. Why is Jerusalem even granted international status? Because of the Holy Places. Where are the Holy Places? In the Old Town. At the same time, I have made it clear that we do not rely on any international force. I don't know, I said, how realistic the invitation of the Russians to these international forces is, but even if there will be some Soviet presence, we can't rely on any international forces anyway. How do we know where the world is going, how do we know what other upheavals await it and what position will the armies of those countries that will send troops to Jerusalem take? Who will manage these contingents? If they have to, will they want to fight or not? We do not trust any international force, and 100 Jews of Jerusalem will not disarm: in the current situation, who will disarm them?

I also gave him American offers and saw that they seemed acceptable to him. He had not known about these proposals before. By the way, almost none of

those to whom I showed these proposals, knew nothing about them - neither Schumann, nor UN staff. He asked a question from which I concluded that the Russians were really interested: "I mean, is the New Town going to be under the control of the Guardian Council?" Then I said, "Well, if this is really a way out, all the better."

On most issues we have a very good relationship with the USSR. The Russians want to imagine our position in detail. Twice I talked with Tsarapkin, who sought to know our position in all the details, on every issue. It was more difficult with him than with everyone else, he was constantly concerned, as if not to violate the resolution of 29 November, he repeats endlessly that any departure from it will undermine our positions. But later, in an interview with Lifshitz, he said that we are right: the resolution of November 29 needs amendments (Lifshitz is a member of Mapam, in accordance with our division of labor he is entrusted with working with the Russians, he is fluent in French and Russian). During the meeting with Vyshinsky once there was a delicate moment: Lifshitz hails from Kiev and Vyshinsky too. When Vyshinsky asked Lifshitz when he came to the country, he deftly walked away from the answer - said "not that long ago." When Vyshinsky asked me the same question, I replied that I had been living here for 43 years. There were no more questions on this topic.

In the Security Council, the Russians work not just as our allies, but even as our emissaries. They take on any task. At one meeting, Malik succeeded in changing the text of the resolution that compromise should be equal for Israel and its neighbours and that no sentence could be passed until both sides were heard (we complained at the time that the decision had been taken without hearing our representative). At the same meeting, a draft resolution was presented requiring us

to retreat to our previous positions in the Negev. Eban worked very effectively here, but Malik raised the issue again and again. Time and time after time, he stressed that the cease-fire was in itself an excellent result, thus appeasing the Security Council, that the main thing was a ceasefire, and that returning to its previous positions and adopting a special resolution on the issue was no longer so important. He said that he is not a transport specialist, does not know where the convoy can pass, and where it can not, each of these problems should be dealt with, but all this should not hinder the solution of the main task - achieving a ceasefire. That is, he kept pedaling the issue of the ceasefire to remove everything else from the agenda. Mr. Eban said: "What is a return to the starting positions? Why did this war even break out? At that time the situation was intolerable, and the current situation guarantees peace and stability."

Now we have difficulties with Bunch on this issue. At that meeting, Eban asked whether he understood correctly that a decision was being taken on a ceasefire rather than returning troops to their starting positions. The Presiding Officer said that he had already explained three times that it was not a question of returning the army to its original positions.

Russia and its allies have six votes. A priori is a minority. Malik apologized for failing to remove the unpleasant moment (the point about Bernadotte) from the resolution. I told him that this was not a very important point, that he had helped us seriously and that not everything could be done.

I had an interesting conversation with Manuel. It was our first meeting. He is a very lively, contacty, flexible person. He is Ukrainian, no longer young, for sixty, but full of energy and strength. He is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. He asked a huge number of questions and in the end suddenly asked to clarify

the situation: what constitutes the Government of Gaza? I believe that there is no reason at this time to say that they are prepared to recognize the Supreme Arab Committee as the Government of Gaza if necessary. He asked about the composition of the Gaza government. I told him about who didn't join the government. I informed him that the Communists were not part of the government, and he said that they had no place in such a team. I reported on how weak their party was, that there was no Arab labour movement. This happened after a conversation between Lif-Shic and Malik, during which they discussed the prospects and Lifshitz tried to prove that there are progressive elements in Egypt - the intelligentsia and the oppressed classes. Malik said that nothing depends on them, they have no power and they cannot be taken into account. When I mentioned the Arab Communist Party and noticed that it had no influence, Manuel asked with some mischief: "Do you have a Communist Party?" I said that there were reasons for that and that the party should not remain in the positions it is in now. I stated that throughout the heroic period they did not take part in the main events, they always sailed against the current, they from the very beginning opposed the Aliyah , settlements, the construction of the socialist economy. They did not take part in Hagan and therefore alienated the working class and the youth. When I mentioned the youth, he said, "You have wonderful young people. How they fight! I take my hat off to them." He said, "Your moral and political position is so high thanks to them." He made this remark, referring to the Negev and previous victories.

**RECORDING OF A TELEPHONE
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECOND
SECRETARY OF THE MIDDLE AND MIDDLE
EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN
MINISTRY E.M. PODVIGINA WITH THE
FIRST SECRETARY OF THE ISRAELI
MISSION IN THE USSR A. LEVAVI. October
27, 1948**

Secret

Today, October 26, 1948, Levavi called by phone and asked about the response of the Soviet government of the Swiss mission to the request of the State of Israel to join the World Postal Convention signed in Paris on July 5, 1947.

On behalf of Bakulin I.N. I replied to Levavi that the USSR Foreign Ministry informed the Swiss mission that the governments of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian USSR and the Belarusian USSR had no objections to the accession of the state of Israel to the aforementioned convention. Levavi thanked for such a message.

Second Secretary of the OBSV Podvigin

**LETTER FROM DEPUTY MINISTER OF
FOREIGN TRADE OF THE USSR M.A.
MENSHIKOV TO THE MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
V.M.MOLOTOV. October 30, 1948**

Secret

Mr. Bezherano, a trade attache of the State of Israel, who arrived in Moscow, is in talks with the Minvneshtorg associations to purchase various goods, mainly grain, crude oil, fertilizers, asbestos, caustic soda and paper.

So far, there is only one deal with the State of Israel for 10 tons of gasoline and 3,000 tons of kerosene.

Mr. Becherano, speaking to me during his polite visit, expressed the hope that his negotiations with the associations would lead to other concrete deals and that this would facilitate the conclusion of a permanent trade agreement between the USSR and the State of Israel.

At the same time, Mr. Bezherano asked whether he could count on the favorable attitude of the Soviet side to the conclusion of such an agreement.

I was told that the issue would be studied accordingly.

I ask you to indicate what position the Ministry of Foreign Trade should take on the question of a permanent trade agreement with the State of Israel raised by Mr. Bezherano.

Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of the Ussr Union
M. Menshikov

On the document of the litter: "T. Menshikov. What is the opinion of the MVT itself? 1.XI. V. Molotov."

**LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF
THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR
I.N.BAKULIN TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
BOARD IN/ ABOUT THE "INTERNATIONAL
BOOK" YU.M. KAGANOVICH. November 4,
1948**

Secret

According to the Soviet envoy to Israel, T. Ershov, bookstores in Tel Aviv and other Cities of Israel are rife with a lot of books, magazines and other literature of a hostile nature to us. At the same time, there are a very limited number of Soviet books, magazines and newspapers on sale, although the situation in the country created as a result of the recognition of the State of Israel by the Soviet Union and the arrival in Tel Aviv of our mission is quite conducive to the much wider dissemination of our literature.

In this regard, I ask you to inform you whether the International Book has its counterparties in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and other cities of Israel, as well as your thoughts on our more active activities in sending Soviet literature for distribution in the State of Israel.

I. Bakulin, head of the Middle East Foreign Ministry's department

**TELEGRAM OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF
ISRAEL D.BEN-GURION TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE
USSR J.V.STALIN. November 5, 1948**

I am happy to send the best congratulations on behalf of the State of Israel and on my behalf on the anniversary of the October Revolution, which ensured national equality to the peoples of the USSR, ensured the work and existence of all workers, paved the way for the social and cultural progress of the urban and rural masses, and created a powerful Red Army, which fulfilled a great task in the war against the Nazi-fascist danger.

Our people will never forget the help given to the Soviet Union to the victims of Nazism, nor the faithful support for Israel and its struggle for the freedom and

independence of their historical homeland. I wish the peoples of your country, who are carrying out post-war reconstruction, economic and cultural progress, peace and universal agreement.

Ben Gurion

Chairman of the Provisional Government of the State of Israel

**TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE ISRAELI
ENVOY TO THE USSR G. MEYERSON
November 5, 1948**

Comments for our representative at the UN General Assembly.

1. The Bernadotte report was drafted with the assistance of The United States and England to reach an agreement between them. The emissaries of the British Ministry in Cairo and the State Department held secret meetings with Bernadotte and Bunch in Rhodes.

2. The main objective of the British in the Negev section is to create a land bridge from the

Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, a continuous strip of Gaza-Basra under British influence (half in Transjordan, half in Iraq), as a substitute for lost positions and a defensive shield against the East. The bases for control of the Suez Canal and oil fields are not the main thing, but an incoming consideration. The Gaza-Eilat canal may have been conceived as an alternative to the Suez Canal so as not to depend on hostile Egypt.

3. To achieve the main objective, the United Kingdom is ready to compensate Egypt with territorial concessions in the southern Negev - the main thing that the north of the Negev, along with Gaza, departs Transjordan. Hence the idea of the division of the Negev between Egypt and Transjordan.

4. The United States shares the desire to create a continuous bridge as a base of Western countries facing the East, but does not hold on to Gaza and is willing to compromise with us (for example, on the 31st parallel), if only we would agree to leave the southern Negev to preserve the inseparability of the Arab territory and space for airfields that can be used to protect Iran's oil fields.

5. We did not succumb to the American temptations to involve us in the negotiations on the negev compromise. Our position across the Negev remained firm. Tactically, the Russians should understand that if a decision is finally made to divide the Negev, it will be a decision against us, not the result of a compromise with us. Our arguments: first, the settlement area, secondly, the Dead Sea, thirdly, Eilat as a natural port for the export of Dead Sea products on the basis of a railway concession owned by companies producing potash, fourth, Eilat as the gateway of Israel to the eastern seas.

6. At the beginning of our campaign for the Negev, our position in Paris was vulnerable even as far as the

northern part of it was because of the Egyptian stranglehold on our throats. The mediator based the proposal on our southern border on the Negba-Ghat line, which is a prerequisite for the British. In this situation, our arguments, in addition to the existence of 25 settlements, were based on a resolution of 29 November 1947. After our victory, there was a decisive turn on the question of the Northern Negev, but it is this change in all poignancy that raises the question of the lack of our control over the uninhabited triangle and Eilat. Therefore, I believe that we need to give up all our strength to gain a foothold in Eilat and create intermediate points between him and the northern Negev. The task is difficult, but doable. It is much more difficult to dislodge us from there by force than to change or pervert the Resolution of The General Assembly.

7. Our trump card in Galilee is that we have completed real control over the region. On the question of Galilee, the Russians accepted our point of view even before the last victory, whether there was a debate about the danger of violating the resolution of 29 November. They agreed that lessons should be learned from the events that have taken place since then and that the boundaries of 29 November must be corrected. Vyshinsky unequivocally stated that Galileo is not a problem. Tsarapkin argued that there was no room for the Arab state: I said that if a separate Arab state was formed, we were ready to negotiate with it on the borders, but we would not control the situation until we conquered the whole of Palestine, so we would not ignore the possibility of annexing the remaining territory of Transjordan, because in this case the Arabs will have a huge space.

8. In Jerusalem and the Northern Negev, the Americans showed relative flexibility in relation to the mediator's report and suggested that we, as it were,

privately, consider the Israeli guardianship regime in the Jewish sector and Arab custody in the Arab sector, including the Old City. Their arguments: the unreality of the deployment of international forces and the lack of a financial base for Jerusalem without an economic union. "Trusteeship" for both parties is a synthesis of the principle of international governance and the need for real control for stakeholders. We did not agree, but we have shown positive interest, with the exception of the Old City paragraph, which we strongly opposed to the Arab State. We demanded that the Old City be subordinated to the UN direct administration. This idea has been passed on to the Russians, the French, the Australians and others. Vyshinsky considered the Israeli status of Jerusalem a serious departure from the resolution on 29 November. I am convinced that he would compromise with a heavy heart, satisfied with the preservation of this principle in relation to the Old City, but when he heard the American proposal, he was relieved, because it was a question of maintaining the power of the Guardian Council, of which Russia is a member, over the entire city. Schumann and Evatt were pleased with our proposal for the Old City to guarantee the appointment of a Christian governor on its territory and expressed their willingness to accept Israeli custody in the New City. The Russians also appreciated the benefits of the UN's direct administration in the Old City and did not reject the principle of Arab custody over some of the new neighborhoods. In all the conversations, we stressed the need for Jewish Jerusalem to join Israel. On the issue of protection, I stated that even if international forces were a reality, we would not rely on them, given past experience and prospects for world events, and would not leave only in the care of these security forces of 100,000 Jews and the fate of our people in

Jerusalem in the current, negative for us, geopolitical situation.

9. I sum up: 1) since the chances of winning a majority of votes on the borders on November 29 with all the changes are absent, 2) since almost all the changes consist of the transition of the territory under our control, 3) since the main attack on us is on the problem of the Negev, where our shield is the resolution of November 29, we are not interested in the issue of borders to be resolved at the General Assembly, our task is to decide at the General Assembly, our task is to decide at the General Assembly. to block the decision. Prior to our recent victories, there was not the slightest chance of winning a majority in support of the boundaries outlined in the mediator's report. After the victory, there is a theoretical danger that the Arabs, fearing further defeats, will grab and vote for the mediator's report as a lifeline, in which case the result of the vote may be different. Therefore, it is necessary to reinforce by force the thesis that we cannot be driven out by force, and therefore the danger of the decision to reject the whole Of the Negev is elusive. Otherwise, if a compromise line prevails and the question of the division of the Negev is put to the vote, in which case there is a real danger that the majority will vote for a territorial compromise, especially if we are not already in Eilat.

10. On the positive side, we seek a resolution that confirms the existence of Israel and calls for the elimination of the Arab invasion, the end of the war and the start of peace talks. Since we cannot get rid of the Conciliation Commission, and the international commission is preferable to a single mediator, we seek to expand its membership and reduce its powers so that the commission is limited to providing "good offices" without interfering in affairs or taking binding

decisions. At most, if no agreement is reached, such a commission could make its recommendations to the next General Assembly. It is better for us to leave real solutions to the negotiation process, if any, and, in the absence of negotiations, to rely on fait accompli. The issue of Jerusalem, with its complicated custody problems, is better discussed in the commission rather than at the General Assembly.

11. With regard to the negotiations, our stated position is that we prefer a separate Arab State, but our territorial seizures, which, of course, are not yet complete, are constantly diminishing its territory and increasing the population. These factors, among others (the political insignificance of the remainder, the danger on the part of the Mufti), favor the annexation of the remaining territory by Transjordan. Therefore, it is possible that a trans-Jordanian annexation is inevitable, but we are in no hurry to take the initiative in negotiations, so as not to lose in bargaining with the king and on the basis of the need to reckon with the position of the Russians.

Another candidate for negotiation is Egypt. The emissary of the court of the King of Egypt contacted us in Paris and entered into informal and non-binding conversations. The main thing for them is the annexation of Gaza and other territories in the Negev. When asked if we were ready to partition the Negev with them, we said that it is important for us if they take the desert part of the Arab Negev along the Egyptian border, because we abandoned it in Lake Saxes. But we do not agree with the annexation of Gaza, as it is the only way out of Arab Palestine to the sea. It is not clear what principle in Egyptian politics will prevail, which is worse for them - us or the English base in the Negev. The answer to this question depends on whether Egypt would prefer a compromise with us or with the British and Transjordan. So far,

everything is very vague, and we limit ourselves to probing positions.

13. It is clear that Russia is taking a realistic approach to the problems. Their attitude towards us is determined by our position, not by the results, because they are well aware that the result is not always up to us. Sobolev, who, as a U.N. worker, can afford more freedom of expression than the Soviet Union, said simply: the fate of the Arab part of Palestine depends on the results of the clash between the two forces - Egypt and Transjordan. The Polish representative said: "In the end, Abdallah is the most moderate. For your information: all my conversations with the Russians are with the participation of David Lifshitz, who adheres to the foreign ministry line and believes that the position of the Russians is largely based on mapam's worldview in terms of readiness to accept convincing arguments on our part, lack of any interest in the problem of Arab refugees, growing disregard for "progressive forces" in Arab countries, etc.

14. We want to raise the issue of our admission to the UN separately and present it as a condition for any progress towards a settlement and peace. I say to the Representatives of the West that the refusal to accept us at this General Assembly means a postponement of the resolution of the issue for a year, which will not only delay the establishment of peace in the region, but also represents a blatant injustice, when the interventionists who rebelled against the UN decision are its members, and we - the product of the UN and the defensive party - remain outside the organization. In this case, the blame will fall on the West, and the West's position in Israel will be undermined. At the same time, I add that during the election campaign I will not be able to explain to our citizens your refusal to accept Israel to the UN, I will not be able to justify

you to the voters. This reasoning impressed Schumann, Spaak and the Americans. They wondered whether we were prepared to say that our acceptance at the UN should not be construed as an a priori definition of borders and that we did not intend to establish definitive boundaries by using force unless we subjected ourselves to aggression. We tend to accept some such language that will satisfy them and will not infringe on us.

The end.

I hope everything is clear.

Get confirmed.

M.Schertok

**TELEGRAM OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND
MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF ISRAEL D.BEN-
GURION TO THE MILITARY ATTACHE TO
THE ISRAELI MISSION TO THE USSR
COLONEL I. RATNER. November 8, 1948**

To Ratner. The requirements of the headquarters are:

For BTv:

45 T-34 tanks with a gun of 105 mm or 75 mm and the rest of the weapons attached to these tanks;

munitions: 1,500 artillery shells,

30 Machine Gun Cartridges Ltd.; each tank has spare parts and a backup engine, equipment system and wireless communications.

25 high-speed light tanks.

150 guns 37 mm for installation on armored vehicles or guns twice as powerful.

For guns - 90% armor-piercing shells.

For artillery:

(a) 24 self-propelled 75 mm guns,

b) 180 medium-sized Bukors-class anti-aircraft guns or similar (effective fire at 10,000 feet).

For each gun of a thousand shells.

c) 72 heavy guns 88 mm or 3.7 inches or similar (effective fire at 50,000 feet).

For each gun - 600 shells.

d) 80 anti-tank guns 47-50 mm, effective fire at 600 m.

For each gun 800 shells.

i) BUT field guns 75 mm or similar.

For each gun - 3000 shells.

(e) 24 six-inch howitzers or 5.5-inch guns.

For each gun - 1000 shells.

For the Air Force:

50 Spitfire, Mustang or similar combat aircraft in maneuverability and fire force.

It is necessary to make sure that they have parts (full kit) and backup engines - based on the calculation of the operation of the machines during the year.

It should also be taken care to ensure that there is a sufficient supply of oils and special liquids corresponding to the type of aircraft purchased, if they do not coincide with the specifications of Western companies producing GSM.

Ammunition with 20,000 rounds per machine gun and 15,000 shells per gun.

In addition, tapes or shops according to the type of weapons and ammunition.

24 light twin-engine bombers of the type "Bofighter," "Mosquito-20," "Boston-25," "Mitchell" or similar in maneuverability and ammunition. Samples of suitable bombs and a full range of equipment, guidance and wireless communications are needed.

Parts, oils and ammunition - as in the previous paragraph.

Do not complete the purchase without the participation of professionals who will make decisions on all the details.

Jets.

Missiles and rocket launchers for airplanes.

Ben Gurion

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE
USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY W. EITAN. November 9, 1948**

Thank you so much for the clear and brilliant report. Golda Meyerson, Namir, Ratner and their families attended the parade, which was a magnificent show of force - the army, youth and workers, and in the evening at home at Molotov felt a special warmth. Golda was also at a celebratory meeting of the Moscow Council, where Molotov spoke. Israeli flag over the Metropol Hotel. Ben-Gurion's telegram was published in all newspapers in its entirety. Publish it all, but not on behalf of the mission. From this place is not for printing. According to information received from other missions, we were the focus of attention at the reception at Molotov. Molotov offered Golda a glass of vodka. She praised the parade and said, "If only we had some of the weapons that were at the parade." Molotov: "You will have them, even if we started

small." A long emotional conversation in Yiddish with Molotov's wife, who praised our visits to the synagogue. At her request, she was introduced to Sarah and Iael. She spoke to them as a mother and sister and concluded, "Let you be fine and then all Jews will be fine." Conversations with Popova, the head of the women's anti-fascist committee, and with the poet Mikhalkov, the author of the text of the Soviet anthem, and others. She met Orenburg twice, but he avoided talking. At the parade, Ratner was the only military attache whom Slavin, Antonov's deputy, spoke to.

Gold

**LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF
THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY
I.N.BAKULIN TO THE RESPONSIBLE HEAD
OF TASS N.G. PALGUNOV. November 12,
1948**

Urgent
Secret

In order to disseminate TASS information in the state of Israel, our envoy to Israel, T. Ershov, recommends establishing a contractual relationship between TASS and the Israeli telegraph agencies to provide them with TASS information.

Please inform your opinion on this proposal by T. Ershov.

I. Bakulin, Head of the Middle East Department of the Ussr Foreign Ministry

**LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF
THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR
I.N.BAKULIN TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
BOARD OF VOCS A.I.DENISOV. November
12, 1948**

urgent
secret

In order to strengthen and improve our cultural ties with the State of Israel, the envoy to Israel, T. Ershov P.I., proposes to hold the following events:

1. Organize exhibitions in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem, Letah Tikva on the topics: "Education in the USSR," "Military Art of the Soviet Army," "Sport in the USSR" and others.

2. Organize a department of Soviet art at the library of the museum in Tel Aviv.

3. To hold a number of evenings of Soviet music by local performers.

4. Organize special radio broadcasts of Soviet music from Moscow.

5. To hold a number of lectures about the USSR by local lecturers.

6. Organize screenings for representatives of the official circles and the public.

7. Discuss the future visit to the State of Israel by a group of Soviet artists, conductors, individual performers.

Please inform your opinion on the measures listed by T. Ershov, as well as the proposals of VOKS on the further deployment of work in the State of Israel through cultural ties.

I. Bakulin, Head of the Middle East Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry

**LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE EASTERN
DEPARTMENT OF THE SOVIET
UNION, I. SLADKOVSKY TO THE HEAD OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST
OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY
I. N. BAKULIN. November 72, 1948**

Secret
On B/No 1324/OBSV

Prior to the armed conflict between the Arab countries and Palestine, our sales of Soviet goods to Palestine were carried out by our trade attache in Beirut and, in some cases, by the relevant export associations directly from Moscow.

Currently, negotiations and the processing of deals for the purchase of Soviet goods, both on behalf of the Government of Israel and private Palestinian firms, are being carried out by the trade attache of the Israeli mission in Moscow.

Recently, the same trade attache made a proposal for a trade treaty between the USSR and Israel. This issue is under consideration in the Government.

Depending on the decision on the trade agreement, it is also meant to consider whether to send a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Trade to Israel.

The letters received through our mission by the firms we send to the relevant associations by affiliation, which are asked to respond to firms on their proposals directly.

Please report this to our mission in Tel Aviv to respond to firms if they re-apply for results on their proposals.

For our part, we send the mission a list and addresses of our associations so that the mission, if the firms subsequently appeal, can recommend to them where to turn for the goods they are interested in.

Head of the Eastern Directorate of the MVT USSR
M. Sladkowski

On the document of the litter: "t. Maximov, it is necessary to inform our mission by letter. 12/XI 48

I.Bakulin."

**LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF
THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S.**

**FRIEDMAN TO THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE
USSR, MR. MEYERSON, AND TO THE
MISSION ADVISER M.NAMIR. November 17,
1948**

A few words in the explanation of the lists of "prisoners of sion." The list that Namir made was extremely inaccurate - it's a good thing you didn't take it with you. We have now made a number of corrections.

The "A" list is a document that was given to Namir at the time, with the addition of several names. It includes people who were arrested for trying to leave the country at the end of the war and some at the beginning of the war. The list is not complete. There are prisoners who have no information at all, there are some that we can't even say with certainty whether they are in detention. If more information about this group is provided, I will send it to you with a list A.

The "B" list includes Zionist activists arrested at the beginning of the war in the territories under Soviet control. There are also several people whose place is, in fact, in the "search for relatives" section, but we have information that they have long been arrested.

I didn't want to give you these names through the usual channels - please let me know if I did the right thing or if it was an unnecessary precaution. If there are more similar cases and you do not want to use the usual procedures for finding relatives, I will send the information marked "list B."

As for the "prisoners of Sion"—if you can work on them at all, the question arises: when to start this work, whether to transfer documents at all or start with a certain group. Here I fully rely on your judgments, as you see the problem at close range.

By the way, I consider it my duty to convey to you the opinion of H. Vesta on this issue. He writes to me that he opposes the transfer of individual names because "there are repeated Magen decisions in this regard and this has been agreed in consultations with Moshe Schertok and Ben-Gurion". He goes on to write: "Our demand is the release of the Zionists arrested for zionism. This list is well known to the Soviet authorities." In his opinion, a separate action aimed at the release of those arrested for trying to flee the USSR, can "completely disrupt the general operation that our embassy will have to carry out in Moscow... Such efforts will only provide material to justify the arrests of Zionist figures in principle and will harm our cause."

If you want to know my opinion on this matter, I do not share this view and do not accept it. It seems to me that if anything can be started in this area, it will be easier to explain the essence of the case when it comes to people who have done something concrete, for example, assisted in the repatriation of young people to Israel, and even then only recently. The vast majority of them were people who were not Soviet citizens and committed their "crime" almost at the time when they were applying for Soviet citizenship. Negotiations on the fate of these people do not threaten to directly result in the problem of Soviet citizens belonging to the political underground. Besides, if we do anything about these people, it doesn't mean that there's nothing you can do for those who have been arrested before. Maybe, just the opposite: it will allow to start a certain process.

But, as I said above, it is difficult to give advice from afar, so you need to weigh all the pros and cons and make your own decision.

Yours sincerely

S.Friedman

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
SOVIET COUNCIL OF MINISTERS I.V.STALIN
TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL
D.BEN-GURION. November 18, 1948**

I ask you, Mr. President, to accept my gratitude for my congratulations and wishes on the occasion of the 31st anniversary of the October Revolution.

Stalin

**LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF
THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S.
FRIEDMAN TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK AND THE
ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR.
MEYERSON, IN PARIS. November 21, 1948.**

Secret

I inform briefly about my recent meetings with Ershov and about some events around his representation. Some of this I have already touched on in my letters to Golde, sent with the diplomatic courier (according to my calculations, they are already with her).

There were two meetings with the envoy. The first one took place on November 10 at Eitan's, and I was present. The messenger was told about the

situation on the northern and Negev fronts and the political situation as it was at the time. In the military part, he was informed of facts that were later published in the press, such as our infiltration into Lebanese territory, the encirclement of several Lebanese villages (here we pointed out the special composition of the population in the area). We also told him about the case of a member of the Lebanese Government, the owner of large estates in the border zone, who sent emissaries with a proposal to surrender. Our explanations boiled down to the

following: we have no interest in expansion into Lebanon, we hold there several strongholds temporarily, for military and strategic reasons.

During the same meeting, the Soviet envoy was told about the location of our troops in the Negev, about the situation of Gaza - how we cut it off from the south and how the signs of evacuation by sea began to show (on the nature of this process we could not stop in detail then). The defeat suffered by the Egyptian aviation during the campaign was noted. We also reported on Abdallah's aviation, emphasizing that his pilots are not Transjordanians, but British or Iraqis.

The envoy asked us why, from our point of view, Abdallah did not come to the aid of the Egyptians. Our answer is that he is not interested in the results of this operation, his main ambition is to preserve the integrity of his own forces. Moreover, he did not want to depend on the British, 30 years of ties with which did not contribute to the progress in his country. Finally, we estimate that he clearly looks forward to an agreement with us in the future. ^

In the political sphere, the envoy was informed of the intentions of the British to create a vacuum situation in the Negev and everything related to it, including the infiltration of British troops into Israeli territory. The envoy asked what we think about the prospects for consultations in Paris and what we know about the U.S. position; we explained to him that there were discrepancies between the president's and the State Department's approaches.

All of this is out of date, and I am reporting on the details of this meeting only to keep the sequence of events. Interestingly, at the end of the conversation and without any connection with its subject, the messenger told us that he had seen anti-Soviet literature in bookstores (I wrote to Gold about it). We

gave a polite answer, but limited ourselves to the usual explanations for such cases.

The second meeting took place on Friday, 19 November, and only I participated in it. We need a total of 40-50 thousand tons, Czechs produce 450,000 tons per year, but all export to Russia. They are ready to sell us, but they cannot make such a decision unilaterally. Ehud Avriel spoke to me about this when he was here, and then the representatives of Mekobot and Dr. Meron. After a number of minor incidents that have occurred recently and which I have described in Golde's letter (an invitation to a reception, events leading up to the holiday organized by the V League, a strange speech by the messenger on this holiday" and another event at which I would not like to stop now), I feared that it would be cold. To my great pleasure, it turned out that I was wrong. The messenger was glad of my coming, received me very friendly, immediately began to treat everyone that was at hand (vodka and... chocolate). He listened to my explanations about the importance of the irrigation of the Negev and other territories very carefully and without any disputes promised to give the appropriate telegram to Moscow and make every effort to ensure that our request was fulfilled. Ershov even added that there is no point in our envoy in Moscow to do this - we should rely on him and everything will be fine.

The conversation took place after our responses to two Security Council resolutions were published. The envoy expressed satisfaction with our position, praised the understanding of the situation and asked whether there was still a danger of actions to alienate Galilee from Israel and whether it was true that even before the first truce our army was ready to strike in the Triangle area. I, for my part, suggested to him, after consulting Walter Eitan about it, that Abdallah was negotiating with us without informing the British. I also

spoke about the pressure the British put on Abdallah to capture the Triangle. Then the conversation moved to our representative office in Moscow, to the high cost of Moscow life and other minor topics.

During this conversation, Ershov, answering my question, said that they do not have a trade attache in Israel and he laid a circle of economic issues on his adviser. In the coming days we will arrange a meeting with Meron, and I foresee in advance from them the question of who should pay the visit to whom. This aspect is of great concern to them.

One observation on the considerations of Moshe Pzertok regarding the "capable of acting" conversations on repatriation and Zionism in relation to the countries of the Eastern Bloc. Once I have received clear directives on this issue, I myself am prepared to have such a conversation here. But it seems doubtful that it could be completely circumvented the question of Russia itself.

I wish you well.

S. Friedman

**NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY OF THE USSR I.N.BAKULIN
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR
V.A.SORIN. November 24, 1948**

Secret

On November 11, 2017, in an interview with me, the envoy of the State of Israel in Moscow, Golda Meyerson, and the military attache of the Ratner mission, reported on the Israeli government's request to the Soviet government for assistance to the State of Israel with heavy weapons and other equipment necessary for the Israeli army. Colonel Ratner, a military attache, stated that the Israeli army needed artillery, tanks and aircraft first and that the Israeli Government's application for weapons indicated the types of heavy weapons and other equipment. I replied

that the request of the Government of Israel would be brought to the attention of the Ministry's leadership (see the interview of November 11, 1948).

Given that Meyerson and the military attache Ratner can revisit the question and ask for a response to the Israeli Government's request, it would be possible, in the event of such an appeal, to respond to them that the Soviet government, which is attentive to the fate of the State of Israel and defends its rights to independent and independent existence, nevertheless does not want to conflict with the Security Council's decision to cease hostilities in Palestine and to prohibit the members of the United Nations from supplying weapons to the armed forces. fighting in Palestine.

We have already given the same answer on a similar question through Gromyko, in New York, to the representative of Israel to the UN.

I ask for your instructions.

I. Bakulin

On the document of the litter: "t.Bakulin. Give a note in the name of T. Molotov. 25/XI.

**LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
COUNCIL FOR RELIGIOUS WORSHIP AT
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR
D.D. POLYANSKY TO THE DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE USSR V.A.SORIN
November 30, 1948**

Secret

The Council for Religious Worship at the Soviet Council of Ministers, in addition to the previously reported data on the actions of the mission of the State of Israel to the USSR related to the choral synagogue in Moscow, states that some members of the mission, and especially its first adviser, Mr. Namir, appear to be trying to establish closer relations with

the rabbi of the Moscow choral synagogue. Without entering into the discussion of the hidden objectives of such attempts, the Council considers that the mere fact of private visits by the rabbi by diplomatic representatives of the State of Israel should undoubtedly help to fuel undesirable sentiments among a certain part of the Jewish citizens of the USSR, who visit the synagogue.

On this basis, the Council recommended that the rabbi of the synagogue, Mr. Schlifer S.M., reject, under the pretext of another visit to him by Mr. Namir, which the latter intended to make on 30 November, which Schlifer had been informed by telephone by the second secretary of the Embassy, Mr. Lapid.

Given, however, that such a deviation, if made by only one rabbi, would be temporary and, besides, insufficiently convincing, and that attempts at personal visits would obviously continue, the Council was in difficulty not knowing how such attempts to prevent in the future.

The predicament of the situation is compounded by the fact that the rabbi, on the recommendation of the Council, in September this year explicitly told the visiting representatives of the Embassy that his relationship with them could not go beyond the cult-established framework, i.e. giving them only places in the synagogue at prayer meetings. But this warning by the rabbi by the mission staff, as can be seen from the above fact, is ignored.

Please give your opinion on the issue raised in this letter.

Chairman of the Council for Religious Worship at the Soviet Council of Ministers Polyansky

On the document of the litter: "The answer is given by t.Sorin and confirmed by me on the phone (Karpov). 9/XII-48. I.Bakulin."

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M.NAMIR TO THE
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTRY, U. EITAN. December 2,
1948**

At the Albanian reception, I talked to Ehrenburg for more than an hour. He knows about all the publications against him in our newspapers, claims that they contain personal attacks. In general, it

continues to hold the position that Israel should accept only victims of persecution. There is no Jewish question in Russia, and he advises to leave any attempts to draw them into Zionism and repatriation - otherwise we will be angry with the authorities and representatives of the local Jewish community. At the same time, he implicitly hinted that he had revised in a positive spirit his views on repatriation from the countries of popular democracy. In his opinion, our geopolitical situation carries with it an objective danger of America's enslavement - in the event of the third world war, Israeli Russian Jews will find themselves in two hostile camps. He spoke with horror about this possibility. Orenburg agrees to visit Israel, but not now, because now it will be regarded as a political act. He did not explain what a "political act" is. The conversation, which took place in a low-key tone, showed his entrenched anti-Semitism and the helpless oscillations between the feeling that it was his duty to support Israel and the fear that Zionist ideas would permeate the Russian Jewish community. Perhaps his position reflects some moods that exist in the power structures. Ehrenburg asked to send his novel "The Tempest" in Hebrew. Please send a few copies immediately.

Namir

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M. NAMIR TO THE
DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN
DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN**

**MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN. December 10,
1948**

The sign of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee has been removed. We believe that the organization is closed.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
SHERTOK AND THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY**

Paris, December 12, 1948

I had a conversation with Vyshinsky. I sent you a telegram about my first conversation. Malik was also present during that conversation, and David Lifshitz was with me. Then I asked Vyshinsky if he had ever dealt with our problems; he replied that it was the first time for him. In general, the conversation was satisfactory, Vyshinsky showed great understanding. At one point in the conversation, he asked if we had increased in terms of human resources during that time. I answered positively. Later I thought about his question and came to the conclusion that this person should one day have an in-depth conversation on the issue of repatriation.

On the last day before he left, I asked to see him. In between meetings, Vyshinsky came up to me and asked, "Maybe we should talk right now?" "Just not standing up," I replied, and expressed fear that he was too busy now. Vyshinsky scheduled a meeting at 2.30, and at 3.00 was to start the session - that is, he took only half an hour for the whole conversation. In fact, the conversation took much longer.

When we met, I immediately said that I wanted to take advantage of the acquaintance with him- since he is the first Soviet politician of such a high rank, with

whom we have the opportunity to talk,-to discuss some issues that go beyond the UN agenda - issues of the very existence and future state of Israel.

I also said that he had given me a reason to raise this question myself in a previous conversation when I asked if we were strengthening in terms of human resources, and now I would like to talk to him about the problems of repatriation. I told him that I did not want to repeat myself and explain once again what the Soviet statement and the Soviet Union's position towards us had for us. We are well aware that the USSR determines its position on a particular issue on the basis of an in-depth understanding of the situation. We do not intend to accuse the USSR of a superficial or inconsistent approach: as a rule, we are convinced that Moscow takes a certain position, having calculated in advance all the consequences that this can lead to. But I would like to be completely sure that all this applies to our case. I say this because it is an important issue for us, and I do not know whether it was studied by the Soviet side to the extent that it, in our view, deserves it. During the conversation I told him this: at some stage you faced this problem, read the facts, made certain conclusions, decided that our cause is right and fits into your ideas about the future of the world.

You certainly understand that our statement on this earth is not accidental. This is the result of a historical process. The 700,000 Jews who now live in Palestine did not come in one day - it was a movement, it was a long process. For us, it is the process of returning the Jewish people to their land, gathering Jewish communities scattered around the world (here I used the expression "gathering the Jewish people"), it is the return of the people to their land. The point of this movement is that the Jewish people are not safe as long as they are scattered

around the world and cannot achieve independence in other countries. It can only come to independence if the Jews gather in their own country. Therefore, what for you may seem to be a static state as if an existing state is only a stage in the dynamic process of returning the Jewish people and gathering the Jewish diaspora on home soil. We do not imagine a situation in which this process will stop. On the contrary, we have created a state to speed up this process.

First of all, a great historical issue was on the agenda: the Jewish people should be given the right to gather in their own country. But there are also urgent problems associated with the current situation. It is not enough to formally establish the State of Israel, it is not enough to successfully defend it. We have a dream of achieving peace with the Arab environment. This problem cannot be solved quickly, but if it is solved, it will happen only thanks to our real strength. And power means not only military power, although this factor is very important, but also significant masses of people living together on their land, processing it and making progress of their state. Therefore, mass repatriation is necessary, otherwise we will not survive. If you have decided to take a stand in favour of the State of Israel and believe that our cause is right, you should draw a conclusion from it and understand that our State will not stand up at the present time. And you should be interested in the state growing, especially in terms of population.

Let me give an example: the Jews fought the battle for the Negev and have so far succeeded. We won a political victory by thwarting Bernadotte's plan; military success is also still on our side. But can we be satisfied with that? No, we can't, because all these successes do not guarantee us that the Negev will be Israeli. Until this area is inhabited and economically developed, we will not be able to protect our authority

over the Negev before the world community. It is therefore necessary to give this power a real dimension, people and economic development. Without a significant influx of people, we will not achieve this.

Here I touched on a sensitive issue, saying that there is a problem of enshrining Jews in Israel. Your position with regard to Jews in the camps is that they should immigrate in Israel. But there are regions, such as North Africa, from which not all Jews should be repatriated. It is not so much a question of quantity as a question of the quality of human resources. Our role in relation to the country is a pioneering role, and we need people who have some hardening. We are very interested in the repatriation of Jews from Morocco and are making considerable efforts in this direction, but we cannot rely only on The Jews of Morocco to establish a State. I am sure you know that in the field of nation-building our main support are Jews of Eastern European origin. In the past, they were Jews from Russia.

In the period leading up to the First World War, Russian Jews made up the majority of returnees, and the results are still significant today. If you look at who is responsible for the most important areas, if you look at the composition of the government, you will immediately see that the majority of people from Russia belong here.

This does not mean that Jews from other countries did not contribute to the nation-building: we had waves of repatriation from Germany, from America, these immigrants brought with them considerable energy and initiative. But when it comes to the large collective efforts of the masses of people who are creating this initial potential with their own hands, the greatest reserve for us remains the Jews of Eastern Europe.

After the First World War, when the situation of Russian Jews changed radically, the role of the avant-garde in the creation of our country was taken by Jews from Poland and Romania. Therefore, if we are to build a state, we need to make every effort to repatriate the large masses of Jews from Eastern Europe who are your allies. For the same reason, I try to explain to you the substance of this problem. Let's discuss the situation by country: Yugoslavia is 8,000 Jews, 10% of the number that was there before the war. This country allows us to take out half of our Jews on the basis of the principle of free choice - that is, if a Jew declares himself as a potential Israeli, he is allowed to leave. The second country is Bulgaria, with 35-40 thousand Jews. A similar agreement has been reached with the Bulgarians and some of the returnees are on their way. I think that if there are a few thousand more Jews who want to repatriate, we will accept them. Poland - from 70 to 80,000 Jews. There is a principle that suits us quite well: every Jew is free to leave Poland if he does not want to stay in the country. However, this principle is accompanied by two limitations: the departure of those Jews who are needed by the State in a post should be deterred, and the departure of those fearful of leaving Poland should be prevented. I told Vyshinsky that we first want to see how these restrictions will work in reality: it is possible that we will have certain claims. In any case, this is the state of affairs today, so I do not raise the question of Poland with you.

Now Hungary. There are currently about 200,000 Jews here, and we have no doubt that some of them would like to be repatriated. So far, however, the situation with Hungarian Jews is unclear. But the most important problem we have faced, where we seem to have reached the point of crisis, is Romania. On the one hand, it is the largest and most important Jewish

community for us - 350,000 Jews (then Vyshinsky told me that of all Eastern European countries he knows Romania best). But the main thing here is not so much the number, as that they are today the most important for us potential labor reserve. There is a tradition of repatriation of workers in this country, but this is where we are faced with misunderstanding in everything. I am not going to make it easy for myself by hiding the difficulties that are in place. The question is how all this is consistent with the nature of the existing regime. But we believe that if there is any possibility to obtain permission to leave for the State of Israel, it is necessary to do so. Unfortunately, not everyone understands this.

The situation in Romania is even more confused by one specific factor: the Jewish Communists. They can be divided into two groups: there are ordinary communists, and there are those who strongly emphasize that they are Jewish communists. We have a problem with this second group. At one time, even before the USSR worked out its current position, among the Jews there was a kind of competition, a struggle for leadership between the Communists and the Zionists. The Communists claimed that we were dragging Jews into some deaf world and thereby devastate the treasure trove of Jewish power, designed for other purposes - to solve the problems of class and revolutionary struggle in the countries where Jews live.

Meanwhile, there were changes: the USSR took a clear position on the problem of Israel. But, as you can see, not everyone has drawn the proper conclusions from this. There are still great difficulties. You should know that we have organizations dealing with such problems, maybe not all of their actions are fully consistent with the nature of the regimes, but the task of our generation is to create the State of Israel and protect it. This two-pronged task cannot be

accomplished without the unity of all the forces of the Jewish people. We demand for ourselves the right to repatriate all Jews who wish to repatriate, without discrimination. We take full responsibility for these Jews and demand the right to repatriate them so that they become citizens of the State of Israel.

There is also a problem of our relations with the Jews of the United States. We will not build our state without substantial assistance from American Jewry. We are still bent under the burden of military spending. (Vyshinsky listened attentively all this time, and Tsarapkin wrote everything down. It is unrealistic to expect that 700,000 Jews of Israel will single-handedly bear the burden of simultaneous financing of the military campaign, mass repatriation and the full range of economic tasks - irrigation, construction, industrial development, etc. - American Jews demand that the money they give to all Jews, wherever they live. If they come to the conclusion that there is discrimination and that we tolerate it, the flow of aid will decrease. And if their assistance decreases, the state will collapse, and with it their policy in the region, i.e. a chain reaction will begin.

I am talking to you about this because it is important for us to reach an understanding and to enlist your support.

To which he said: I understood your position. I believe that, from your point of view, it is fair. You are quite right that you decided to meet with me and put the question so. At its core here we are talking about interstate relations, about the demands that Israel puts forward to other countries (that's how it turned it). On such grounds, there may be conflicts of interest. You say that you need these people, and Romania can say the same thing - that she needs these people. In this case, you need to find a way out. I told him, first of

all, I would like you to understand. If you can help, the better. Then he said, of course, who refuses to help?

Vyshinsky insisted that the countries I was talking about were as young as Israel, and therefore just as sensitive to anything that might seem like meddling in their affairs. He said: "It happened that Romania is familiar to me. I went there to influence them on a number of issues. And I must say that often it was very difficult. It is not a problem for a large state to give in to something, but small countries tend to exaggerate difficulties, and this is natural.

There were border conflicts between Poland and Czechoslovakia, between Romania and Czechoslovakia, and there are other complex problems that require a cautious attitude: for example, the problem of people who will leave Romania and possibly be able to harm it.

I said, what does "damage" mean? He replied: "This is an active action against his former country. I asked: do you not have democracy (he just used this word just before that)? Then he recovered and said that he meant the desire of each person or group of people to express their opinions and act on their own understanding. I said to him, well, but these people come to us precisely because they want to be part of the Jewish people and citizens of the State of Israel. In this case, they are obliged to comply with the requirements imposed on them by the State of Israel. I told him: you have no idea how much our capitalists love you. For us, one of the most important tasks is friendship with the Soviet Union, because it is extremely important for the state of Israel. He said: but there may be people who in the past helped the Maniou regime. I said that it is not about individuals, especially not about figures. However, I immediately remembered sissa, who is now in danger and whom I would very much like to help out (until his arrest was

reported, but it is obvious that his name is blacklisted). However, I stressed that we are not talking about individuals now, we are concerned about the general trend, as far as large groups of people are concerned. I said: these people, 350,000 people, have lost everything, lost their roots. The Nazis have destroyed this community, the new government has not yet re-emerged, and it will not be easy to rebuild this community in Romania, special efforts will be needed. And in our country they will immediately join the process of productive labour.

By the way, I added, if we show a common progressive humanist approach to the problem, it is not only in our national interest. I would like you to know our opinion on this matter: as soon as a group of Jews migrate to Israel, its productive potential increases tenfold. Not because it is such a wonderful place, but because it is the only country in the world where Jews as a community live with a sense of full national responsibility, when everything they do belongs to them, and in case of failure they have no one to blame. He said: perhaps these Jews need Romania. Then I put the question: let's compare what it means for us to acquire 100,000 Jews and what it means for Romania to lose 100,000 inhabitants. I asked: what is the population of Romania? He said there were 18 million people living there. Then I said: let's compare what it means for Romania to lose 100,000 and what it is for us to acquire 100,000 new citizens who will immediately be involved in the process of work, creation and protection of the homeland. After these words, he paused, and then said: You said at the beginning that you were unsure or that you wanted to be sure that when we took our position on the Middle East, we calculated in advance all possible consequences and conclusions. I cannot express the official position of the government on this

issue, but I will say sincerely on my own: as far as it concerns me, I cannot say that I have calculated everything in advance. Your words require careful study, only then it will be possible to determine any unambiguous position. I'll pass them on to the government, I'll pass them on to Molotov, maybe higher. The moment he said this, I understood the importance of Tsarapkin's records (it is interesting that the Russians write down what they say especially carefully). And then he said, we'll still have the opportunity to continue the topic. I said: if you have that to answer the questions raised, we would be very happy. You can reply through Ms. Meyerson or Mr. Ershov. He said Ms. Meyerson could talk about it, too.

That's about how this conversation went. Then we exchanged a few more remarks about the UN decisions. And then he said this: look, your relationship with America is in danger. I said, Comrade Vyshinsky, life is full of dangers, what conclusion should we draw? Stop living, hang yourself? No, you have to live in spite of the dangers. To this he said: rich American Jews who help you do so only because they are Jews; yet, they continue to be American citizens and are capable, consciously or unknowingly, of serving as an instrument of U.S. policy. I asked him what he meant. These people, I said, consider themselves citizens of the Jewish people and help their people to build their state. He said he understood me and agreed with me - they really help to meet their national Jewish aspirations. But at the same time, they can become a tool in the hands of the government on which they depend. I said, if there is such a danger, it must be fought. He said, "That's it! Exactly! I said we're building a free Jewish state, not a puppet in someone's hands. He said: at this General Assembly we won a major victory ("we" in this context sounded not as "USSR" but as "our Soviet-Israeli alliance"), thwarting

the plan of Bernadotte and the first Anglo-American resolution. It's a really big deal! But look what happened yesterday: a reconciliation commission was set up, that is, we have suffered both practically and legally defeated, because this is an American commission. What does France have to do there? What does it matter now? And Turkey? No, this commission is a toy in American hands. And the Americans will try to get their decisions through it. I said we'd stand up to it. At the time, he said, "We shouldn't be overly optimistic about America." I said it's not about optimism, but the problem is that American aid is necessary for us, without it the state will collapse. He said he knew that. I don't remember what the last words were, but in fact, the conversation ended. He did not give a date for the next meeting, and I said I would be happy if the Soviet side passed the answer through Ms. Meyerson or through someone else. He didn't answer that. I don't think we should rely too much on his words that "maybe these considerations will be passed higher."

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M. NAMIR TO THE
DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN
DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN. December 16,
1948**

"New Time," No. 51, publishes in the section "International Life" (in the section 8 articles) material on 71 lines under the headline "From someone else's voice", containing attacks on certain circles and part of the press in Israel, which have taken an openly unfriendly position towards the USSR, despite the consistent assistance of the Soviet Union to Israel. It is said that the anti-Soviet slander is particularly active in the spread of the anti-Soviet slander by the gamashkif newspaper, the Gaboker newspaper and the weekly Bterem. Regarding the latter, quotes are quoted from an article published there about Jews in the Soviet Union, the author of which tries to defame the national policy of the USSR, claiming that Soviet Jews are in a difficult economic situation, that medical care is imperfect, and freedom of speech and organizations is lacking. This is what Schwartz's article is clearly referring to in the September issue. "Gamashkif" publishes insinuations from the diplomatic front, as if on November 8 in Tel Aviv martial law was imposed, and the Soviet envoy freely moved around the city and collected information. Gaboker, followed by a number of other newspapers, paint a difficult situation in which the Israeli mission in Moscow seems to be. In "proof" of these fabrications, Gaboker reports that one of the mission's staff members was not given the opportunity to meet his mother living in Moscow (apparently referring to the number of November 30, page 2). The

article goes on to say that this reactionary line of the Israeli press downplays the importance of the Soviet position in favor of Israel at the UN session and exaggerates American influence. Acting to the detriment of the cause of the Jewish people, this press fulfills the order of American monopolies. We refuted the publication in Gaboker, especially sending a telegram open text. I think you should talk to the Russian envoy and explain to him that Gamashkif and Gaboker are opposition bodies and have little influence on public opinion, and Bterem is an independent publication that publishes attacks not only on the USSR, but also on the United States, Great Britain and our own government (at the same time there are also pro-Soviet publications). In our opinion, it makes sense that Levavi also explained this to the head of the press department in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Tell us immediately what has been done and what you think we need to do.

Namir

**LETTER FROM THE DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE USSR, V.A.SORIN, TO
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL FOR
RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY AFFAIRS AT THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR,
G.G. KARPOV. December 22, 1948**

Secret

Archimandrite Leonid told our envoy in Tel Aviv on December 17 this year:

The vast majority of nuns, pilgrims and other clerics greeted him with enthusiasm. Only 2 monks and 6 nuns from the Gorna monastery remained faithful to Anastasia, not wanting to recognize Alexia, and do not participate in the services.

Gradually, order is established, regular services are held. Relations with the Jewish authorities are normal, there are no obstacles on their part.

On December 20, Leonid is summoned by the Governor of Jerusalem Joseph and, according to Leonid, will speak with them on the issue of the transfer of property to the Spiritual Mission. Leonid will declare his readiness to accept property, contracts and financial affairs and then together with the government commissioner for Russian property Rabinovich will go to Tiberia, Haifa and Jaffa and fix the document the state of the property. At the same time, he will temporarily appoint his commissioners at these points.

The church and buildings in Jerusalem, not to mention other places, are in a neglected state and need to be repaired, which must also be done to raise the authority of the Spiritual Mission and the prestige of the Russian church in Palestine. The income from the tenants was negligible, since the bulk of the property in Jerusalem belonged to the Palestinian Society and therefore would not cover the mission's costs. With the acquisition of Palestinian society's property, the situation will change, not only will the costs of both organizations be covered, but significant amounts will also go into the income of the State. At present, the Spiritual Mission should be helped. In addition, it is necessary to order the dispatch of airmail newspapers: "Izvestia"- 2 copies, "Truth" - 2 copies and the magazine "Moscow Patriarchate" - 40 copies.

In the opinion of our envoy, Archimandrite Leonid should have been promoted to bishop after a while, as representatives of other churches in Jerusalem are older than his or her, and this circumstance puts Leonid in an unequal position and will make his work more difficult.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR asks to inform your opinion on the issues outlined.

Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR Union

V. Sorin

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF
THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL D.BEN-
GURION WITH THE SOVIET ENVOY TO
ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV. December 27, 1948**

After lunch (lunch was hearty, with a lot of dishes, organized with great taste and, I suspect, kosher) Ershov took me to a special office and talked to me for about an hour and a half. First it was about the Negev. I explained to him what was going on, where the Egyptians stood in the west and east, what was happening now and what our prospects were, and also talked about the UK's position and the reasons why it opposed keeping the Negev in our hands. In this regard, I emphasized the need for the early settlement of the Negev and the repatriation of about a million Jews to the territory in the near future, since we cannot be deterred by military force alone. The British are not ready to give up their plans so easily, and we ourselves - what is the use of owning the desert? Ershov asked if the Negev was important to us because of the possible location of oil deposits there, I explained why water is more important for us and what we have prepared irrigation programs. I then went back to the problem of repatriation; I said that

this million Jews, which is necessary for the settlement of the Negev, should be sought mainly in Europe, and mostly in the East. He asked why not in the U.S., and I explained why we should not expect mass repatriation from America in the near future. Of course, the repatriation of pioneers exists now, and there is every chance that it will increase, but the fact is that the settlement of the Negev is urgent, and immediately after the end of the war we should start a large-scale settlement of this area. In this regard, I mentioned Shertok's conversation with Vyshinsky (Ershov knows about it). Ershov asked if we meant Soviet Jews as well. I replied that we were now referring primarily to Romanian, Hungarian, Czech, Bulgarian, Polish and Yugoslav Jews, especially Romanian Jews. Ershov asked about Tito. I replied that there were no difficulties with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in terms of repatriation, but in the rest of the Eastern European countries, for some reason, efforts were being made to halt repatriation, and this dealt a heavy blow to the Negev and to our future in general. Ershov did not express an opinion on this issue, although I returned to him several times.

Then the conversation turned to the prospects for peace in the region. Ershov expressed the opinion that Abdallah would no doubt make peace without obstructing him. He spoke of Farook with blatant disdain as a "disbanded young man." I told him about the upcoming meeting with the representatives of Lebanon. From regional problems, the conversation has shifted to world problems - Great Britain, the United States, Turkey, etc. He told me a few conversations between Bedell Smith and Stalin. I explained to him what the situation in America was before the election: a weak, unelected president, a State Department, well aware of what he wants, the inconsistency of the policy of the president and the

policies of officials and the real power of the apparatus. After the election, everything changed - the president is elected and empowered, relying on progressive forces in America. Continuing the theme of Soviet-American relations, Ershov expressed an unexpected idea: he expressed confidence that soon the U.S. and the USSR will come to an agreement that all their current skirmishes are not serious and should not give them any special importance. He said it with such certainty that I was amazed. In fact, it was the only question on which Ershov expressed his opinion, and even so decisively. He spoke about England without any hatred - I think he treats it with blatant disdain, exaggerating the extent of its economic dependence on the United States.

Speaking about the differences between American and Russian politics (the first is subject to hesitation, the second is consistent), Ershov in the middle of his words recovered and added that the USSR sometimes changes its approaches. As an example, he cited Turkey: in the time of Atatürk, Soviet Russia provided the Turks with great assistance, but eventually changed this policy. He spoke about Turkey for a long time, as he worked in Ankara for several years. Since I have been to Turkey, we have a common personal aspect to talk about. I do not know, accidentally or intentionally, he expressed bewilderment that the Turks are now relying on the United States, because it is obvious that in case of war the Red Army will take over Turkey in two or three days and no American weapons will help it.

Ershov also wanted an answer to the question of where we will take the funds for large-scale settlement and irrigation projects of the Negev. The end of the conversation was devoted to his memories of life in Moscow during the war, the suffering of the inhabitants of Leningrad and several other cities.

We broke up at 11:30.

D.Ben-Gurion

**LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF
THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S.
FRIEDMAN TO THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR, M.NAMIR.**

December 31, 1948

Golda Meyers' arrival in the country gave us, of course, a sense of closeness to the events, we talked with her in detail - it seems, about everything. At the same time, I have the impression that the connection with you has somewhat weakened. I would therefore like to resume it now and make sure that it is, as it has continued, to be permanent, regular.

Recently, we had one official meeting with the envoy. By chance, this happened on the second day of the resumption of combat operations in the Negev, of course, this was mainly the case. I would like to note that during the conversation on the evening of December 22, i.e. on the eve of the resumption of fighting, he demonstrated sufficient awareness in our affairs. He knew that the operation would begin in these hours, and the next day he knew that the pace of the offensive had slowed down due to the rains. During the official meeting, Ershov stressed that he had received all this information "from an official source." I didn't want to stop there, but we need to know it and take into account their degree of awareness. He made only one mistake - in his opinion, the battles should have unfolded in the vicinity of Aqaba.

During the official conversation, Eitan and I participated, he was informed of the situation on the fronts, of Lebanon's readiness to negotiate with us, that the Lebanese had backed down at the last moment and did not appear at the official meeting already scheduled. It was stressed that there were Syrian army units on Lebanese territory, that Damascus was refusing to withdraw and that tensions had arisen between the two countries. We have also reported that we are under pressure to withdraw from the 14 villages we control in Lebanese territory: for us these points are only necessary from a military and strategic point of view, we agree to withdraw at the time of serious negotiations on armistice and peace. As for the Negev, we told him about the developments leading up to the resumption of hostilities: we agreed to the gradual withdrawal of the Egyptians from F-Luja, if negotiations simultaneously began, offered the opposing side a plan to gradually evacuate from there and a programme of meetings to prepare the

negotiations. It was noted that the Egyptians had informed Riley of their consent to this, but after numerous delays they took their words back. In doing so, they gave us the freedom to act. We informed Ershov the contents of our letter to Riley on December 22, which was to appear in the press soon.

Ershov's questions: what kind of negotiations do we insist on? Have we begun the phased evacuation of Fallujah? What is our view of the conciliation commission?

We described the long-term work that Sasson is doing in Paris and the fact that, despite Lebanon, Egypt and Transjordan's willingness to negotiate with us, there is no breakthrough in the near future and only local agreements on minor issues are possible. The reason: the Arabs do not trust each other, the usual atmosphere of the eve of the meeting of the Council of the Arab League.

We told him in detail about Aqaba geographically and politically and that the known British statement about our invasion of the prohibited territory was made only to divert the eyes. In response to his question about France's position on Jerusalem, it was explained that Paris would like to return to its former role as a defender of Christians in the hope, despite British resistance, to return to the Middle East.

At the end of the conversation, Ershov asked how we view our international situation after the Paris session of the UN General Assembly. On our part, it was emphasized that our international situation now and in the future depends to a large extent on the build-up of our forces in the country, and we emphasized the high numbers of repatriation, which is increasing every month.

Recently, there have also been several informal meetings with the envoy. Twice he gave lunch at home: once in honour of Dr. Weizmann and once in

honour of Ben-Gurion. Everything went as well as possible, the atmosphere was warm, and the table was hospitable. During each of these receptions, the envoy was secluded with a guest for a conversation - the first time with the President, the second with Ben-Gurion, this last conversation was very long. Ben-Gurion will tell me about the contents of the conversation, and I'll write to you.

I visited the messenger with Golda. We had doubts about the choice of the right form for their meeting, but because of its constant travel it was possible to organize only such a visit - because the meeting was necessary in any case. The conversation was non-specific, in the full sense of the word.

S.Friedman

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF
THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S.
FRIEDMAN WITH THE ADVISER OF THE
SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL M.I. MUHIN.
January 11, 1949**

In accordance with the agreement with Dr. Eitan, I had to inform the Soviet representative about the situation. The messenger suddenly fell ill (cold on the way from the reception of Prof. X.Weitzman), and the conversation took place with the counselor.

I informed him about the developments, about our reaction to the steps taken by the British authorities, about the materials we have against the British and which were handed over to A. Eba-nu. At the same time, I stressed the significant differences between the British and American positions at this stage. I told Reuters about the alleged Soviet offers of help, etc.

I commented on the British attempts to derail the truce and explained the reasons that, in our view, prompted the Egyptians to agree to negotiate with us. As a curiosity, I also noted the history with the "Jewish authorities."

My interlocutor listened to this information with great interest, wrote everything down, interrupted me several times with comments and questions. Below here are the most important of them, as far as I managed to remember.

1. Have we really decided to complain to the UN about the UK's actions?

2. On the basis of what we have come to the conclusion of serious differences between the English and American positions?

3. Did the British consul instruct the British to leave Israel and what did the contradictory statement made by London mean?

4. Is it true that we have British pilots in captivity?

5. Is it true that the British Navy ships were ordered to change their route and concentrate close to our shores?

6. Has our press published a duck about the "aid offer" allegedly made by Ershov, and have rebuttals been published?

7. What is new on the part of Transjordan?

Mukhin also noted that the Soviet mission appreciates the information we convey, even if it is about reports that have already been published in the press, as they have already seen that it is not necessary to rely on sensational Israeli newspapers. He was delighted with the operational capabilities we had shown in the last combat operation, asked about the mood in our circles and whether we were going to stand firm in the current conflict with the UK. He also said that in his opinion, the UN took our claims seriously, despite the fact that the claims are addressed to one of the great powers. Mukhin said that all the details of the conversation will be handed over to the envoy.

S. Friedman

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE
EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN
MINISTRY I.N.BAKULIN WITH THE ISRAELI
ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON.
January 19, 1949**

Secret

I accepted Meyerson at her request.

Meyerson came on a visit after her return from a trip to Israel. In the interview, she said that the Government of the State of Israel and the entire people were very grateful to the Soviet Government for the assistance that the Soviet Union had given to the people of Israel in the struggle for the establishment of a sovereign State. In particular, the Government and people of Israel thank the Soviet delegation, which at the session of the UN General Assembly did not allow the adoption of the Bernadotte plan drawn up by the British. In a further interview, May-erson said that in the state of Israel, despite the tense military situation, there is a lot of work to be done to the arrangement of immigrants arriving in Israel. As an example, overshadowing her stay in Tel Aviv, Meyerson cited the fact that the Israeli press published articles with fabrications about the supposedly poor working conditions of the Israeli

mission in the Soviet Union. When she assessed them, she stated that such publications were only harmful. At the same time, Meyerson questioned the validity of the assessment of the nature of the National Land Fund in Israel, which was given by the author of a small Soviet pamphlet on Palestine, Genin. She tried to explain that the organization was not of a capitalist nature, as the author wrote, since the funds that went to the organization for land acquisition were invested in charity by Jews all over the world. Meyerson, however, did not deny that the land at the disposal of the organization was leased and that those who invested in the purchase of land received interest in the capital.

An adviser to the Israeli mission, Namir, was present.

Head of the Middle East Division

I. Bakulin

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY
AND THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR,
MR. MEYERSON. January 20, 1949**

Secret

On January 20, I received Meyerson, who came to me on my first visit, accompanied by a mission adviser to Namir.

Meyerson expressed gratitude to the Soviet government for its policy towards Palestine, saying that only two powers, the USSR and England, were acting consistently, although they had diametrically opposed goals. May then touched on the situation in Palestine, describing the achievements of the Government of the State of Israel in the economic and immigration fields. She expressed confidence that the State of Israel could easily have negotiated with the Arab countries if other Powers had not prevented it.

Meyerson then raised the possibility of leaving the Soviet Union for the State of Israel of old people or children whose families and relatives are in Palestine.

I replied that such issues required specific consideration on a case-by-case basis and could not be resolved in general order.

Meyerson then asked whether the mission should provide a list of such individuals.

I replied that I could not recommend such a path, adding that such cases against Soviet citizens related to the question of withdrawal from Soviet citizenship, which presents known difficulties.

The conversation lasted 30 minutes.

T. Troyanovsky was present.

A. Vyshinsky

**LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF MIDDLE EAST FOREIGN
MINISTRY OF THE USSR I.N.BAKULIN TO
THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV.
January 21, 1949**

Secret

As you know, in recent years in the Israeli press increasingly began to appear hostile to the USSR articles and reports, which often remain without any counterbalance on our part.

At the same time, progressive elements and broad popular masses in Palestine are showing very keen interest in the reality of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy.

Under these circumstances, the issues of Soviet propaganda in Palestine are of great importance to us.

OBSV believes that the publication of a bulletin on behalf of our mission in Tel Aviv will be a serious

opposition to the propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union and will introduce the public to the real situation in the USSR and the views of the Soviet public on issues of international life. In this regard, with the next diplochta I ask you to inform the department of your opinion on this issue and your specific proposals for the organization of the publication in our mission of the mentioned bulletin.

Head of the Middle East Division

I. Bakulin

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE
USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M.
SCHERTOK. January 22, 1949**

Accompanied by Namir, Vyshinsky paid a courtesy visit. He showed a warm attitude, listened carefully to my account of the situation in the country. The conversation did not develop in the direction of general clarification of repatriation issues. I asked about the right to travel for elderly parents and minor children whose parents are in Israel for the purpose of family reunification. Answer: we are ready to discuss each candidate separately, but it is necessary to be prepared in advance for the fact that the proceedings will take a long time, as the exit is connected with the withdrawal from Soviet citizenship, and this requires

each time the decision of the Presidency of the Supreme Council. We are preparing several requests for a trial. Today we hung the national flag on the anniversary of Lenin's death.

Gold

**LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF
THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S.
FRIEDMAN TO THE ENVOY OF ISRAEL TO
THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. January 26,
1949**

Dear Golda!

These days we had another conversation with the Soviet envoy. 21.01 He was invited to Moshe Schertok in order to inform about current affairs. The basic information was on the negotiations in Rhodes, the procedure for their conduct and the content. The envoy was informed that the Egyptian representatives had stated that they intended to act on their own understanding and that they had recently accumulated

a lot of grievances against the British. At the same time, we informed the envoy of the fears that A. Eban expressed at the very beginning of the negotiation process; that the Egyptians are going to Rhodes not to conclude an agreement, but to declare their uncompromising position on the implementation of the resolution of November 4, and when the negotiations eventually fail, accuse us of violating UN resolutions, they will put themselves in favor of these decisions (because it is in accordance with the UN decision they went to the negotiations).

We informed the envoy that the evacuation from Fallujah would only pass through Gaza. The second way was more desirable for us, but it turned out that the bridge was destroyed there and it is impossible to use this route. It was stressed that all agreements to be reached in Rhodes would not and would not have any force until a general agreement on all items had been signed.

We also told the envoy about the situation in Lebanon, the preliminary negotiations and our request for the Lebanese delegation to submit a written confirmation of the authority from their Government, not a document signed by the Chief of the General Staff with whom they had come to Rhodes. The Envoy has received information that we have allowed the Lebanese to take some positions on the neutral strip, but the territory we are now holding under control will only be liberated in stages and we will demand that troops withdraw from Nakura at the same time.

At the beginning of the conversation, we told about the landing in Aqaba, about our fears that the British had crossed our territory in one place, about the confidential letter of the high-ranking representative of Transjordan that the landing in Aqaba had been undertaken without their consent, that after the British troops were stationed there, the Transjordanians were

required to make a statement that they had invited the British.

The envoy asked if the American loan was accompanied by political conditions. Here he quoted an expression from one newspaper about "political dividends." He also asked whether it was a monetary or commodity loan. The messenger received a negative answer to the first question, the second - that the loan was provided in commodity form. He also asked whether France, as a condition of recognition of Israel, demanded the liberation of Lebanese villages, and we replied that we had rejected such a condition because the problem was being resolved in our negotiations with the Lebanese, in which France was not involved. Finally, questions were raised: why does France delay in acknowledging Israel, how our people were liberated in Cyprus, and what does this move by the British authorities mean. We replied that we do not yet know whether the first signs of a change in the political line or, conversely, an attempt to relieve pressure and untie our hands to continue the old policy. The envoy was told that we have unverified information, that this is one of the decisions of the British Government leading to a change of course, followed by de facto recognition, etc.

At the end of the conversation, Moshe Schertok briefly described the British Foreign Minister.

Shalom, respectfully

S. Friedman

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF
THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S.
FRIEDMAN WITH THE SOVIET ENVOY TO
ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV. February 1, 1949**

The main topic of the conversation was the recent publications in the USSR- Genin's pamphlet "The Palestinian Problem" and reports from Moscow radio and the newspaper "Trud" about the elections. I stated that I consider these publications unfriendly, that they surprised us and disappointed us. One could understand them, treat the USSR differently to our state. But since Moscow demonstrates a positive attitude towards us, supports us, we do not understand the meaning of these publications. I noted that the allegations contained there about our alleged rapprochement with the West as a result of the parliamentary elections are not true. By the way, our Foreign Minister also spoke about this in an interview with the Daily Express. The diplomatic recognition of Israel by Western countries should not be interpreted in this spirit, since such recognition does not contain anything undesirable for the USSR. After all, didn't the Soviet Union itself advocate that the world community recognize us? The Soviet support for our application for admission to the UN can be proof. Also wrong is Mapai's characterization of Labour as the bourgeois party. There may be different assessments of its performance, but it cannot be ignored the fact that it is a Labour party. I noted that I think the authors of these publications draw information from misleading sources, and one of the main sources is probably the Communist Party of Israel. The proof is a reference to Mikunis's words not only in the note published by Labor and in Genin's pamphlet (Genin even has a few times), but also from a prominent writer such as Ehrenburg, who in his famous article also relied in part on this source.

At the beginning of the conversation Ershov asked if I wanted him to pass on my words to his

government. I replied that if he too thought those publications were wrong, I would be happy if he did.

Then he said that Genin's pamphlet was unfamiliar and that the name did not tell him anything. In general, it is not necessary to attach too much importance to each brochure published in the USSR, and consider them necessarily a reflection of the official position. This booklet is based on the text of the author's lecture, suggesting that there will be other pamphlets based on other lectures. To my remark that Genin's pamphlet was published by Pravda, he said, "Well, someone had to print it." Then the conversation turned to publications in our press, and Ershov expressed the opinion that we often print unfriendly things towards the USSR. I said that one thing is our press, and another thing - the Soviet press. We have newspapers of different parties, and there are private publications that reflect the owner's point of view. The state is not responsible for such a press. It often publishes vehement attacks on our Government itself, but to the extent that this criticism does not transcend certain boundaries, it is perfectly acceptable, in accordance with the norms of freedom of the press. In the USSR, there is a common line. Here Ershov countered that such assessments of the Soviet press are wrong: as I have certainly already been convinced, and the Soviet press is discussing various issues and expressing different opinions.

I said that it was one thing to have different comments in articles on current issues, and another to have a general focus that was felt in recent publications. Therefore, I did not consider it necessary to meet with him when New Time published an article in response to the materials that appeared in some of our media, although not with everything that the Soviet magazine wrote, I agreed. But now we are talking about publications that seem to give an

ideological definition of all our activities in Israel, and it would be very difficult for us to accept this definition. I repeated that we should not draw information about past and commentary on our work from the sources of the Israeli Communist Party, the real weight of which in our society perfectly demonstrated the elections. He asked me how I could explain her weakness. To this question I gave a detailed answer, noting initially negative and unchanged position of the KPI with regard to all activities on the construction of the state, problems of repatriation, security, economic development, etc. Ershov listened attentively, and his secretary kept the minutes of the meeting.

After that, the Soviet envoy asked several questions about the elections and their evaluation of their results, including the reason for Grunbaum's failure. He was particularly surprised by the fact that the mayor of Jerusalem had failed in his own city.

Returning to the first part of the conversation, Ershov recalled that he had already told Eitan and me that he had seen anti-Soviet literature in bookstores. He added that, judging by the information received to him, the government structures do not approve the allocation of funds for the purchase of literature and films in the USSR, and this reduces the amount of their admission to Israel. The second part of the conversation focused on the problems related to Russian property in the country. He praised the speed with which the problems had been resolved, the hope for our assistance in this area, and highlighted the property registered by the tsarist government. Here I expressed to him our position on the difference between the property of the Russian spiritual "mission" and the property of the Russian Orthodox Society, that we are going to pass a law regulating procedures related to the property of this society. At the same time, the decree of the mandated authorities

will be abolished regarding the “mission” property, and the head of the “mission” will be able to actually take possession of the property. As for the property of the tsarist government, here, I said, just there are no problems, we just need to find out what kind of property is registered in this way, and inform us about it.

The conversation lasted a little over an hour.

S.Friedman

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF
THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S.
FRIEDMAN WITH THE SOVIET ENVOY TO
ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV. February 3, 1949**

During the conversation on February 1, 1949, the Soviet envoy asked whether it was true that the United States was going to raise the rank of its diplomatic representative in Israel to the level of ambassador. I replied that we had not received an official statement on this matter. The next day, 2 February, there was a formal proposal from the American Mission, and on 3 February we gave a positive response. On the same day, I met with the Soviet envoy specifically to inform him. The conversation was brief and I pass it almost word for word as I managed to remember it.

At the beginning of the conversation, I stressed that the proposal was made to us by the Americans without any initiative on our part. At the same time, I stressed that in three neighbouring countries the United States is represented by ambassadors.

"Well, what are your conclusions?" Ershov asked.

"For now, we're just bringing this fact to your attention.

"So now you're going to have another duoyen of the diplomatic corps?

"It's up to you to have no other.

"Usually a country offers us to raise the rank of diplomatic missions, then our government decides whether to agree to it or not.

"It does not seem logical for a small country such as Israel to express a desire for its representative to be appointed ambassador. But I am ready to convey your point of view to the Foreign Office.

Don't pass it on. I say this privately. In any case, I will pass on the information to our government.

"I would be glad if you pass on the tone in which it was expressed.

After that, we talked about the difficulties we face because of the need to select a large number of diplomats in different countries. Ershov asked about the courses for diplomats that were created under the Jewish Agency at the time, and asked whether we were going to create any institute to train personnel in this area. He said, "You have a lot of problems now, you need experienced people with a wide education." He then added: "Of course, the wave of diplomatic recognition is extremely important to you. Yet there is a difference between recognition now - along with all - and the recognition that was made immediately after May 15, 1948, especially given the circumstances of that time."

I asked him if the information that he was going to go to Moscow was correct. Ershov replied that so far he was aware of this only from the newspapers, and in turn asked whether the rumours about the imminent return of Golda Meyerson to Israel were true. I said that to date no decision has been taken on this matter.

S. Friedman

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE USSR V.A.SORIN WITH
THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR.
MEYERSON. February 7, 1949**

At 7 p.m., Meyerson summoned him, who made an oral statement about the illegal activities of the mission of the State of Israel, encouraging Soviet citizens to withdraw from Soviet citizenship, and regarding the distribution of the mission's newsletter to public organizations and individual Soviet citizens (the text of the statement is attached).

Meyerson was clearly confused by what she had said. She asked to repeat the first part of the statement, and then hurried to answer that the mission had no intention of doing anything that was contrary to the laws of the USSR. Perhaps, she went on, that there were erroneous acts on the part of the mission, which can only be explained by the inexperience of the mission in diplomatic practice.

Meyerson assured that there were no cases of inducement of Soviet citizens to leave the Soviet Union to the state of Israel, there were several cases of requests to the mission of individual Soviet citizens to

issue a visa to enter the state of Israel, but in such cases the mission always explained that the visa can be issued only on the presentation of a Soviet foreign passport or the permission of the Soviet authorities to leave the USSR. In addition, there have been cases in which relatives of Soviet citizens living in Israel applied for visas to these Soviet citizens, but in such cases the mission sent letters to these Soviet citizens indicating that the mission could issue a visa only after obtaining permission from the Soviet authorities to leave.

I noticed that in the latter case the mission did not do the wrong thing, as it cannot send letters directly to Soviet citizens, bypassing the Foreign Ministry.

Meyerson replied that this was due to a lack of knowledge of diplomatic practice, and assured that such cases would not happen again. Meyerson also reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Israel and the mission received a large number of requests to help establish communication with relatives living in the USSR, and that she, Meyerson, had also received such requests during her last trip to Tel Aviv, to which she had responded negatively. Meyerson then said the search for relatives of the mission was practiced through the Foreign Ministry's Consular Office.

With regard to the bulletin, Meyerson said that she needed to verify the circumstances of the newsletter, but that, in general terms, she would like to suggest that perhaps the mission secretariat was mechanically using the list on which the Jewish Telegraph Agency had sent out its materials at the time. Meyerson asked who was allowed to send the ballot.

I replied that mission bulletins were usually sent to the diplomatic corps.

Meyerson asked then if it was possible to send ballots to libraries and newspaper offices.

I replied that no mission bulletins were sent to libraries and newsrooms.

The conversation lasted 15 minutes. T. Pastoev was present.

Meyerson was accompanied by mission adviser Namir.

Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

V.Sorin

ORAL STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF the USSR. February 7, 1949

1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ussr Union has evidence that the mission of the State of Israel in Moscow practices sending letters to Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality in which these citizens are encouraged to emigrate from the USSR to Israel and are warned that the mission is ready to send them entry visas to Israel.

The Ministry considers this activity of the mission as illegal recruitment of Soviet citizens and encouraging them to withdraw from Soviet citizenship. It is therefore proposed that the mission and its representatives cease these activities contrary to loyalty to the Soviet Union.

2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR also learned that the mission of the State of Israel in

Moscow began issuing a newsletter and sending it to Soviet public organizations, religious Jewish communities, Jewish collective farms and individual Soviet citizens in various parts of the Soviet Union.

The Ministry insisted that the mission stop its practice of distributing the bulletin, as it was contrary to the generally accepted provisions on the activities of the diplomatic mission.

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE
USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M.
SCHERTOK. February 9, 1949**

Last night I visited Zorina at his invitation. I was accompanied by Namir. He read aloud the statement of the Foreign Ministry, which contained two complaints against our mission.

A. According to their data, our mission sends letters to Soviet Jews, insisting that they renounce Soviet citizenship and immigrate to Israel. These actions are illegal and we must stop them.

B. Our mission issues a bulletin and sends it to organizations, Jewish countrymen, Jewish collective farms, and sends it to private individuals. This is

beyond the mission's authority and must be discontinued.

I replied that we should not think that we had done or were doing anything illegal or contrary to conventional practice. In the same case, as far as the charges are concerned:

A) The information is not accurate. We did not try to force Jews to immigrate into Israel either in writing or verbally. There have been several cases where Soviet Jews have contacted us and asked for immigration visas, we have responded to them in writing in the sense that we are ready to issue a visa, provided they have permission to leave their government. There have also been several cases in which Jews from Israel have asked for their relatives to leave. We informed these relatives that a family member was inviting them to Israel, that we were prepared to issue an entry visa on the above terms. To this he replied that this is what is forbidden to do. Such contacts should be carried out only through the Foreign Ministry;

B) As for the bulletin, we replied that we were using several addresses where the Jewish Agency had been mailing materials for several years. He said that the bulletin can be sent only to members of the diplomatic corps and to the Foreign Ministry. This clarification significantly narrows our capabilities and contradicts the content of the previous conversation in October with the Director of the Foreign Ministry's press department and our note to the Foreign Ministry, in which it was summarized.

The tone of the conversation was polite and cold, the content of the printed document was very sharp. In fact, we have lost the last opportunities. This means that it is completely forbidden to give answers to the letters of local Jews.

We asked to give us the text of the note, but Zorina replied that it was not a note, but an oral statement, so the text would not be passed.

Gold

**LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF
THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S.
FRIEDMAN OF THE ISRAELI MISSION TO
THE USSR. February 9, 1949**

In addition to my letter on the issue of Russian property.

Yesterday I had a conversation with the envoy and his adviser, and on their initiative. Its content surprised me. They notified me that they did not agree with the procedure we had proposed. As they understand, the appointment of a guardian (or, if not accurate, manager) over the property of the Russian Palestinian society is a measure that will not help them, but rather will result in the property being seized and transferred to the full disposal of the Ministry of Finance. They propose: to solve the problem of the property of society in the same way that we intend to settle the issue of the ownership of the Russian spiritual mission, i.e. to publish a brief order annulling the decree of the mandated authorities of April 28, 1948, then they will explain to us what to do next. They also commented on some of the items of our proposed order on which they have objections, namely: the Minister of Finance has the right to make decisions on the sale of property, limited liability for damage to property, the possibility that representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, who do not live in Israel (i.e. Russian immigrants), will also receive dividends from the property, payment of the work of the property manager. They expressed these objections in response to my questions and repeated that they objected to the whole proposal.

They also told me that they understood from Mukhin's conversations with J. Shapiro and me that we intended only to rescind the previous orders, without specifying what would happen to the property of the society.

I made it clear that they were wrong and stressed that our proposal stemmed from the principles we had already defined in our conversations with them, that we had the impression that they were in agreement with our position. I again explained the fundamental difference between the property of society and the

mission, added that their offer from a legal point of view is wrong, because it leaves a certain property, about which the owner knew nothing for decades, in a state of chaos. I noted that they themselves understood the difference between the two types of property, that it was no coincidence that the messenger himself, in conversation with Ben-Gurion, spoke only of the mission, or mentioning the society. I also said that it is no coincidence that in recent years, after the establishment of the Synod in the Soviet Union, they have not taken a single step towards the return of property. There is no doubt, I added, that even Soviet lawyers are aware of the considerable complexity of the problem. I went on to say that we must not forget that the bulk of the property in question was in Jerusalem, and what they asked us to do was not entirely consistent with the normal legal procedure.

They continued to insist on their own. I said that I would raise this issue for further discussion, let's return to it in the coming days. During the conversation I found that I. Rabinovich had taken some steps in the meantime, which put us before the fait accompli. He and the archimandrite visited several institutions, transferred the mission's property to him, and signed with him an act of transfer of property in which he described himself as "the acting legal representative of the Government of Israel". During the conversation, the Minister gave me two copies of such documents signed by Rabinovich and Archimandrite and asked us to confirm the signature of the first. They, in turn, confirmed the signature of the archimandrite on the documents.

We will let you know what we are going to do with these documents.

They again raised the issue of the ownership of the tsarist government. I stressed that there were no

issues with regard to the property; with regard to the mission's ownership, the annulment of the British decrees will de facto transfer it to the head of the mission (i.e. archimandrite). Therefore, there remains only a question concerning the property of the society, so the actions proposed by us are aimed solely at ensuring the correct registration of the transfer of property. I have said that we do not intend to use the property to receive dividends in favor of the state, that the alternative solution may be (after the appointment of the manager under the proposed procedure) finding a way to prove to them that the manager is handling the property according to their wishes. On this point I made a reservation, stated that only "I think out loud", express these thoughts only as a proposal without any obligation. Mukhin remarked, "Well, there is a way to come to an agreement."

In his comments, the envoy called the property of the tsarist government "the property of the royal family", I persistently called it "the property of the tsarist government."

I'm reporting all this for your information. There is a possibility that they will discuss this topic with you, as it is of extreme interest to them.

With respect.

**LETTER FROM THE SOVIET ENVOY TO
ISRAEL, P.I.ERSHOV, HEAD OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF
THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY,
I.N.BAKULIN. February 10, 1949**

Secret

At present, with our influence known, the Israeli League of Friendly Relations with the USSR is being rebuilt and is beginning to intensify its activities. Therefore, in order to expand our cultural propaganda in Israel, we believe it is possible to organize a large two-week illustrated magazine in Russian and Jewish languages at the Central Committee of the League, in which we could widely cover the actual political, cultural and economic life of the Soviet Union, its achievements, its struggle for peace, etc.

Part of the cost of publishing a magazine will be covered by the sale of the magazine. For the subsidy we will need a sum of about 1,800 pounds per year.

A special worker, translator and typist will be required to organize the publication of the mission's ballot. Only if this condition is in place can this issue be addressed specifically.

The publication of the magazine at the Central Committee of the League will be a more solid event and will allow us to expand our propaganda much more widely than when issuing a mission bulletin, and the cost of issuing a newsletter will exceed the cost of publishing a magazine. We expect that the above subsidy will suffice. But in order for the magazine to be published regularly, it is necessary to organize timely

and regular delivery of airmail materials and cliches. I ask you to inform about the decision of the management.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**LETTER FROM THE DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE USSR V.A.SORIN TO THE
DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL
ADMINISTRATION OF SOVIET PROPERTY
ABROAD AT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
OF THE USSR V.A.SERGEYEV. February 10,
1949**

Secret.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR agrees with the opinion of GUSIMS that it is not appropriate to enter into negotiations with representatives of the State of Israel on the establishment of a mixed steamship society for the organization of regular flights of ships between the port of Haifa and the ports of the Danube countries.

The Ussr Foreign Ministry has no objections to your proposal to arrange the transportation of goods between the mentioned ports of the ships "Tissa" and "Szeged" of the Soviet-Hungarian company Meshart.

Deputy Foreign Minister of the Ussr Union

V. Sorin

**LETTER FROM THE SECOND SECRETARY
OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL, THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE VOCS IN ISRAEL,
M.P.FEDORIN I.O. HEAD OF THE MIDDLE
EAST DEPARTMENT OF VOKS
YU.I.KOSYAKINA. February 10, 1949**

Secret

1. I inform you that we think it is quite appropriate to organize a permanent Soviet exhibition in Tel Aviv. However, the practical implementation of this exercise depends mainly on the search for the necessary for this special premises, which in the existing housing crisis is difficult to find and will cost significant funds (for a room of about 15x6 m ask for about 2,000 - 2,500 pounds of retreat and then about 30 pounds of monthly fee). If these funds are released, we will be able to negotiate the search for the premises.

2. At the same time I send a report on the exhibitions "Education and Education in the Soviet Union" and "Military Art of the Soviet Army."

By May 1, we expect to organize a large exhibition about Soviet art. We believe that such an exhibition will strengthen the influence of Soviet art in the state of Israel. Therefore, I ask you to pick up us in enough

good numbers of good exhibits reflecting Soviet art - painting, sculpture, applied art, etc.

Appendix: mentioned.

Second Secretary of the USSR Mission in Israel

Fedorin

**TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTER M. SHERTOK TO THE ISRAELI
ENVOY TO THE USSR G. MEYERSON.
February 13, 1949**

The Soviet Ambassador to Washington Panyushkin invited Elat to lunch and had an informal conversation with him about the information that appeared in the American press about the possibility of Israel joining the Marshall Plan. During the conversation, he said that the Russians are not going to require us to join their bloc because they know that the vast majority of Israeli citizens are not communists, and that they want us to be completely independent of foreign influence and domination. Elat denied the information about the Marshall Plan and stated that we were determined to go the way of independence and sincerely wish to maintain friendly relations with the USSR. Elat had the impression that the Russian ambassador had received instructions from Moscow to verify this information.

Schertok

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M.NAMIR TO THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
ISRAEL M. SCHERTOK. February 17, 1949**

The bulletin was not sent to private individuals, only to organizations, i.e. to government services, newspaper offices, libraries and scientific institutions, as well as to 30 Jewish communities and three collective farms. There are 140 addresses in total.

Letters in which we agreed to enter visas on the presentation of a passport, sent to 80 addresses, based on requests from relatives. All of them are on the initiative from Israel or from local residents. About half of these cases are in January, according to the Ministry of Repatriation's list. Please correct the number 30-40 in my fourth report for Golda, page 13, on the issues of visas to leave the USSR, freedom of movement for diplomats and contacts with local residents. So far, there is no principle of reciprocity between the USSR and the rest of the countries, except in very special cases. Foreign states do not resort to retaliatory measures against the USSR. I

believe that while it is necessary to act in this area carefully, do not click, even if you consider that it is desirable to talk to Ershov; should exclude anything that might be perceived as a manifestation of our desire to disrupt local order. Golda knows everything.

Namir

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE AND
MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR
FOREIGN MINISTRY I.N.BAKULIN WITH
THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN
THE USSR M.NAMIR. February 28, 1949**

Secret.

I accepted Namir at his request. Namir came with the mission's military attache, Colonel Ratner.

In the conversation, Namir said that he came to specifically inform about the signing of the truce agreement between Egypt and Israel. Namir read out a brief of the contents of The Minister of Foreign Affairs Schertok's address on the signing of the agreement. In the address, Schertok expresses satisfaction that the State of Israel, after 9 months of hostilities, has been able to sign the armistice agreement for the first time.

The appeal goes on to say that the concessions made to the State of Israel by the Egyptians are not final and can be changed in resolving the question of peace. Colonel Ratner showed on the map the terrain, inferior to the Egyptians. Behind the Egyptians remains a narrow strip running from the borders of Egypt along the Mediterranean coast, which ends 10 km north of the mountains. Gas. In the mountains. The Jewish troops were withdrawn to Israel. A neutral 100 sq km strip has been established around the town of Auja (near the Egyptian border). The city will have a mixed Egyptian-Israeli truce monitoring commission. The Egyptians, in turn, pledged not to have their troops on their territory against this strip.

That was the end of the conversation.

I. Bakulin, Head of the Middle East Department of the Ussr Foreign Ministry

**LETTER FROM THE SECOND SECRETARY
OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL, THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE VOCS IN ISRAEL,
M.P.FEDORIN I.O. HEAD OF THE MIDDLE
EAST DEPARTMENT OF VOKS
YU.I.KOSYAKINA. March 2, 1949**

Secret

In connection with the upcoming anniversary of the 150th anniversary of the birth of A.S. Pushkin, the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR proposes to hold a number of events.

We consider it necessary to provide full support in holding anniversary events.

In this regard, please send the following materials in advance:

1. Exhibition about the life and work of Pushkin and Pushkin on stage.

2. Various articles about Pushkin with cliches.

3. Exhibition of Pushkin's publications in the languages of the peoples of the USSR and other languages (at least bindings).

4. Grammophon records for the organization of concerts "Pushkin in music."

5. Score and voices on the opera "Eugene Onegin."

6. Notes of romances of Russian composers on the words of Pushkin.

7. Good editions of the complete collection of Pushkin's works for gifts to local pushkinists.

8. Soviet film about Pushkin.

It is necessary that the materials be sent in a timely way, i.e. a month before the anniversary.

Second Secretary of the USSR Mission in Israel

Fedorin

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M. NAMIR TO THE
DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN
DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN. March 10, 1949**

I would like to speak about Romania, Hungary and Poland. There is no reason for optimism, but I believe that it is time for Charette to talk with Vyshinsky. The matter should be postponed until the conclusion of the UN General Assembly only if there is a fear of weakening the Russians' support for our application to join the UN. It is possible to talk about the foreign

minister's visit to Moscow only if we know in advance that he will not return empty-handed. During all the time that we are here, only ministers from the Eastern bloc were visiting Moscow, and even then only for the solemn signing of treaties. Sharetta's visit, if it takes place, will become a global sensation, he will be attributed to a hidden political background, and if as a result we do not achieve our political goal, the whole loss will fall solely on our shoulders. Therefore, it is necessary to hold conversations with the Russians in Lake Saxesse and Israel, and maybe through us in Moscow. If there is a positive trend, maybe we will be asked to submit a memorandum, it is desirable to prepare it in advance. As for all the countries of the Eastern bloc, only after a principled positive response has been received will the time come for the Foreign Minister to take stock as the final friendly act. The idea to address Kominform seems doubtful. Israeli officials should not do so. It also makes sense to use pressure on ambassadors of eastern bloc countries in all world capitals through Jewish and not only Jewish channels.

Namir

**TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTER M. SCHARETTE TO THE CHARGE
D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR
M.NAMIR. March 14, 1949**

I invited Ershov. He gave him the Romanian events in accordance with the main provisions of my letter to Anna Pauker and asked him to convey our concern to his Government. Ershov tried to object that this was not their question. I replied that perhaps Romania would ask them for advice or they would consider it

possible to advise them. I noted that Rakoshi had demonstrated a deep understanding of repatriation and a willingness to seek a positive solution, but he did not agree that it was necessary to discuss these issues with Romania, as that would mean the need for joint negotiations and coordination. Ershov said in the spirit that every state has the right to ban the departure of its citizens. I replied that if all the States had accepted Romania's position from the very beginning, there would have been no Israel and the British would certainly continue to rule here. Then he asked a polemical question: how would we react if the Romanian emissaries came to Israel and began to encourage our citizens to leave the country. To this I replied that it is necessary to proceed from the existing realities: we are a state of returnees, and Romania has existed since time immemorial. The return of the Jews to Israel is an immutable historical fact that led to the formation of the State of Israel, and this obliges our friends. There is a significant difference between Russia and the rest of Eastern European countries: the process of repatriation from Russia stopped a long time ago, and from Romania, Poland, etc. it continued all these years, both during the war and after its end. I described the power of the Jewish desire to repatriate, the inability to suppress this desire by administrative measures, and stressed the urgent need to find a constructive way out of the situation. At the same time, I have described the situation of our mission in the face of a wave of demonstrations in which we are not interested but unable to prevent. The authorities asked our diplomats to intervene to stop the demonstrations, but the ban on Zionism led to the severing of ties between our mission and the Jewish masses. When the Mission wanted to publish a statement in the local press, we

were not allowed to do so and had to address Romanian Jews on the voice of Israel radio.

After my comments related to the repatriation process from Eastern Europe, Ershov admitted that he had not been deeply involved in these problems. When I expressed concern about the future of relations as a result of the prohibition of Zionism and anti-Zionist insinuations, he argued that our press was attacking Romania, and the difference was that it criticized Zionism, not Israel, but attacked the State. To this I replied that Israel is also out there, calling it a country sold for dollars, and here only react to unfounded accusations. He promised to hand everything to his government with references to my conversation with Vyshinsky. In conclusion, I stressed that we are "people stubborn", the idea of repatriation is vital for us, we will not give it up and will continue to wake up this problem. At the same time, I added that our mission in Moscow will no doubt continue this process, and I will talk about it with your representatives in New York and Washington. We think that maybe I should pay a visit to Moscow for a very serious conversation. He didn't react.

Charette

**RECORDING OF A.Y.VYSHINSKY' FOREIGN
MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH THE**

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M.NAMIR. March 14, 1949

At 1230 minutes he received Namir, who had come on a protocol visit. Namir said that his Government, represented by Foreign Minister Charette (SChertok), asks me to convey congratulations on my new appointment; Golda Meyerson and himself join these congratulations.

I thanked Namir for his congratulations. With regard to Namir's statement that the common task for the USSR and the State of Israel is to strengthen peace and international cooperation, I stressed that this is one of the main principles of the Soviet foreign policy, proclaimed 31 years ago by Lenin and now being implemented by Generalissimo Stalin. I also recalled that, based on these principles, the USSR has defined its position on the Palestinian issue.

Namir promised to hand this over to his Government and added that he had been instructed by his Government to express the hope that the friendly relations between the USSR and the State of Israel, so highly valued by the people of his country, would continue to strengthen.

I expressed the same hope.

The conversation lasted ten minutes. T. Pastoev was present.

A. Vyshinsky

**REFERENCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
MIDDLE EAST OF THE USSR FOREIGN
MINISTRY "THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF
THE STATE OF ISRAEL". March 15, 1949**

Secret. On March 8, 1949, Ben-Gurion presented the New Government of Israel to the Constituent Assembly as follows:

1. DAVID BEN-Gurion - Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence. Born in 1886 in Plonsk, Poland. Since 1900 he has been actively involved in the Zionist movement. He came to Palestine in 1906, the Organizer of the Jewish Legion in 1918.¹⁰⁹ Member of the General Council of the World Zionist organization. Since 1927 he has been Secretary General of The Gistatruth (Federation of Jewish Trade Unions). Since 1934 he has been the chairman of the executive committee of the Jewish Agency. One of the prominent leaders of the Mapai Party (Israeli Workers' Party, such as English Labour) and Zionists. In 1924 he was in Moscow for an exhibition as part of a delegation of Jewish workers.

In the past, in negotiations with Britain on the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, he agreed to provide England with strategic bases on the Jewish territory of Palestine. He was Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of the Interim Government of Israel. A supporter of Israel's strong foreign and domestic policy. It is now targeting Americans.

2. MOSHE SHARETG (SHER TOK) - Minister of Foreign Affairs. Born in 1895 in Kherson. In 1906 he came to Palestine. In 1919, he was secretary of the Zionist commission¹¹⁰. In 1924 he graduated from economics school in London. Since 1933 he has been the head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency. A member of the Mapai Party Central

Committee. For many years he was a supporter of maintaining the mandate for Palestine for England.

In the party, Mapai, unlike Ben-Gurion, takes a moderate position, sometimes enters into a dispute with Ben-Gurion, insisting on a moderate course of both foreign and domestic policy. Speaking about Israel's foreign policy, Charette said: "We have a right to hope that the USSR will understand that the state of Israel, being a country of mass immigration and widespread resettlement, cannot be created without American Jews, without the American government."

3. MOSHE SHAPIRO - Minister of The Interior and Immigration. He is a member of the executive committee of the Jewish Agency. The leader of the clerical Zionist party, Gapoel Gamizrahi ("Worker of Israel"), is the leader of the ruling Mapai Party. He also served as Minister of Immigration in the Interim Government.

4. ELISER KAPLAN - Minister of Finance. Born in Minsk in 1891, he studied at the Higher Technical School in Moscow. In Palestine since 1923 since 1933 - the head of the financial department of the Jewish Agency. A member of the Mapai Party Central Committee. He was also Finance Minister in the interim Government of Israel.

5. DAVID REMEZ is the Minister of Communications. Born in Mahilou in 1886 in Palestine in 1913, in 1925 he was in Moscow at the exhibition as part of the second delegation of Jewish workers of Palestine. In May 1943, on behalf of the Jews of Palestine, he gave a gift to the Soviet Army a car with medicines. At that time he spoke well about the USSR.

A member of the Mapai Party Central Committee. Together with Schertok he takes a moderate position in politics. In the interim Government of Israel, he also served as Minister of Communications.

6. GOLDA MEYERSON - Minister of Labour and Social Security. Born in Kiev in 1898, she came to Palestine from the United States in 1921.

After her appointment as Israel's envoy to the Soviet Union, Mr. Sarubin said that progressive circles of London Jews characterize Meyerson as an agent of American intelligence.

Mr. Meyerson is a prominent leader of the Mapai Party.

7. SALMAN SHAZAR (RUBASHOV) - Minister of Education. Born in 1889 in the Minsk region. journalist. The editor of the newspaper Davar is The Authority of Mapai. In Palestine since 1924, Odin Tzu organizers of the Mapai Party.

8. JOSEPH DOD (Bernard Joseph) - Minister of Supply and Rationing. Legal adviser to the Jewish Agency. Former military governor of the Jewish part of Jerusalem. A member of the Mapai Party.

9. JUDA LEIB FISHMAN MAIMON - Minister of Cults. rabbi. The leader of the Gamizrahi religious party. He had American citizenship. In the interim government he was also a minister of cults. In this government represents a bloc of religious parties.

10. IHAC LEVIN is Minister of Social Welfare. The leader of the religious party Agudat Israel. Former member of the former Polish parliament. He also served as Minister of Social Welfare in the Interim Government. In this government he is a representative of a bloc of religious parties.

11. FELIX ROSENBLAT - Minister of Justice. He is a lawyer by profession. Born in Berlin in 1887, the leader of the Zionist bourgeois party, Alia Hadash ("The New Immigrant"). During the elections to the Constituent Assembly of Israel, he represented a new so-called progressive party, no different from Alia Hadash. He is a member of the executive committee of the World

Zionist organization. He also served as Minister of Justice in the Interim Government.

12. BEHOR SHOLOM SHITT is The Minister of Police Forces. The leader of the Sefhardite Zionist group (a group of Spanish Jews supported by immigrants from eastern countries). Under the British he served in the Palestinian police.

Thus, the new Israeli government is formed from representatives of the Mapai Party (7 ministries), the united religious bloc (3 ministries), the so-called Progressive Party (one ministry) and the sephardic Zionist group (one ministry). In the Constituent Assembly, the opposition to the government will be made up of members of the combined Workers' Party mapam and the Communist Party, on the one hand, and the reactionary party Freedom Movement, or Herut, to which, apparently, the bourgeois party Common Zionists, on the other hand, will join.

On March 8, 1949, Prime Minister D. Ben-Gurion presented the Israeli Constituent Assembly with a government program for the next four years.

According to the press, Ben-Gurion stated that "the Israeli government will pursue the same foreign policy as the interim government, i.e. Israel will continue to be based on adheres to the principles of the UN Charter, friendship with all peace-loving states, and especially with the United States and the USSR, to seek to establish friendly relations with Arab countries, ensure freedom of immigration to Israel and maintain all activities aimed at ensuring peace and the un-establishment of the UN."

In domestic policy, Israel's four-year economic development plan calls for the deployment of broad-based construction, particularly in and around Jerusalem, the elimination of unemployment, the provision of housing for new immigrants, the revision of wages, price and profit controls, and increased

foreign trade by lowering tariffs. In addition, it is planned to maintain the system of compulsory conscription, introduce universal compulsory training, give women the same rights with men, etc.

After the discussion of the Government's programme, the Constituent Assembly voted to vote of confidence with a majority of 73 deputies against 45 and with two abstentions.

Given the fact that the new Israeli Government, as well as the interim Government, is made up of the vast majority of Mapai party members, it seems likely that it will continue to pursue a policy of targeting Americans. However, due to the fact that the State of Israel has a number of important outstanding issues (Jerusalem, borders, etc.) in which the USSR will play a significant role, the Government of Israel is unlikely to now take positions openly hostile to us. I. Bakulin

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M. NAMIR TO THE
DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN
DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN. March 18, 1949**

Continuation of my telegram number 118 . The campaign is run by Sofronov, Simonov, Korneichuk and Surkov. According to rumours and hints in the press, it seems that Jews still refuse to confess their sins and hold firm, with dignity. The foreign and Israeli newspapers we receive see only literary polemics here and do not understand that the main thing is the Jewish aspect. As for diplomats in Moscow, they actively comment on what is happening, know all the details. Representatives of the Western countries predict the beginning of a course on official anti-Semitism, and in the future, the deterioration of

Russia's relations with Israel, seeing signs of this in the attacks on Zionism. I'm not inclined to stick to this point of view, I think they betray their hidden desires. There can be no talk of anti-Semitism, as it contradicts the essence of the regime and its policy on the national issue in relation to dozens of nations and nationalities. If there are Jews in high positions now and new appointments do not stop (although in extremely small numbers), if Jews seek to go to administrative positions, the authorities are not to blame, they even tried to help by creating a state education in Birobidzhan. As for relations with our state, they can be spoiled by many other factors, and the problem of Russian Jews is the last thing. So my version isn't any better, but it's different.

continuation.

a. Now is the time for a new generation of educated people, people from all nations and peoples, a generation that was born during the revolution and was tested by war, to come to power.

b. The Multinational State is interested in preventing excessive concentration of representatives of one people in power and strategically important structures, especially if it is a national minority.

The danger of a third world war makes it particularly important to reduce the influence of those peoples who, for objective reasons, may seek to cross the border. Therefore, Muslim republics, for example, are considered a weak link in the chain, and measures are taken to strengthen them (admittedly, in other ways, about which there is no place to write: the betrayal of the Crimean Tatars was punished, but not forgotten).

From the experience of the past war, the importance of influencing Slavic and Russian national feelings is realized, especially as "immunity" against the influence of the West and its cultural temptations.

Hence the propaganda of material and spiritual Russian and Soviet superiority over the West in the present and the past. Now the arousal of these instincts is brought to the boiling point.

Based on all these reasons, Jews appear to be a "questionable element." The reason for the voluntary departure of all Jewish refugees back to Poland is quite clear to the Soviet authorities. They are not convinced that the proletarians of all countries will become their Trojan horse, nor do they believe in the possibility of acquiring the sympathy of the Jews of all countries in the current international situation. The maximum they hope for Israel is that it remains neutral and may have an impact on the Jew as a whole. When the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was signed, it was necessary to remove all Jews from the Foreign Ministry for opportunistic goals of peace, not because of anti-Semitism. Now, in the run-up to the war with the West, they need to clean up additional areas and fill them again completely "resistant to outside influence" element. All this requires the reduction and limitation of the Jewish element in the command structures of the state and society.

e. The war and the Germans raised the bottom and left behind periodic outbreaks of anti-Semitism, but all of this is marginal. The current debate may be perceived on the periphery as a trend towards anti-Semitism, and Jews themselves see it as discrimination and disenfranchisement. In any case, the Jewish question is escalating because it is the only national issue that has not been resolved here. There are three scenarios: a mass move to Birobidzhan to create a new Soviet Jewish nation there, total assimilation or permission to repatriate to Israel. In my opinion, the first decision should not be taken into account. Assimilation is not possible, and repatriation requires a different international atmosphere. But if the danger of

world war is diminished or at least extended for a few years, perhaps attempts will be made to go all three ways at the same time, if only to get rid of this disturbing problem.

All of the above does not negate the purely literary aspect of the ongoing debate. This aspect is self-important and of great importance, as it leads to the same goal of strengthening the internal front.

That's it. There is no need to publish anything on our behalf. It is worth publishing the facts from my previous telegram, but first abroad, not in Israel. And let non-Jews appear as a source - it is not necessary to know that the facts have been passed on by us.

Namir

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHIEF OF THE
INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT OF THE
GENERAL STAFF OF THE IDF OF THE
ISRAEL DEFENSE, LIEUTENANT COLONEL
H. DUKE, TO THE MILITARY ATTACHE OF
THE ISRAELI MISSION TO THE USSR,
COLONEL I. RATNER. March 24, 1949**

In connection with your telegram from the 9th: the headquarters agrees that you will find out the possibility of training in Russia. Lapid was promoted to captain and discharged from the army on 19.08.48.

Duke

**TELEGRAM OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF
THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S.
FRIEDMAN OF THE ISRAELI MISSION TO
THE USSR. April 1, 1949**

(a) Together with Ershov and Mukhin, he was with the president before his departure. A long visit to the institute and lunch in a good atmosphere. The President stressed that his trip does not mean that he is a "Westerner": he goes to the Jews, this is the 17th such visit, there is nothing new in him.

b) Secret and unverified information: Ershov told the Czech consul Neche that he did not believe the promises of our communists about the possibility of pro-Eastern orientation of Israel, that soon in the countries of the Eastern bloc will be issued orders on the issue of repatriation and that "for important reasons" a certain number of Jews will be allowed to leave Russia (but there will be no mass departure, because there will be no such possibility to live in a Jewish country).

(c) In an interview with me, Nechez stressed that the Czech authorities are positive about repatriation and have reacted negatively to Romania's position. Details by letter.

d) Three of our emissaries in Romania have been released.

(d) About 700 people a month will be able to leave Poland.

Friedman

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE
USSR G. MEYERSON TO THE DIRECTOR**

**GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY W. EITAN. April 8, 1949**

Pass a copy to the Duke. Major General Saraev of the Ministry of Defence spoke to Ratner of great interest in military and political issues concerning the Middle East Pact¹¹², was interested in the possibilities of troop movements in the mountainous areas of the southern Negev, the English control over the Aqaba-Maan railway line and further north (this road could provide communication with East Africa in the event of the closure of the Suez Canal) and our opinion about the Transi. The Russian staff officer read out on the notebook questions about the separation of the functions of the police and the Interior Ministry, about Hagan, Palms, about the party preferences of residents of new border settlements, etc. Some of the questions were aimed at finding out whether we intended to expel left-wing supporters from the army. Ratner was asked to prepare a certificate for them about our experience in the war with the Arabs. It is obvious that the Russians receive a lot of information from knowledgeable agents in Israel.

Gold

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY
AND THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR,
MR. MEYERSON. April 14, 1949**

Secret.

At 1 p.m., Meyerson, who came to me on a farewell visit, received it. Meyerson said that she leaves Moscow with a mixed feeling: on the one hand, she regrets leaving, on the other hand, happy with her appointment as Labor Minister.

I congratulated Meyerson on her new assignment.

Meyerson went on to say that she had been instructed by her Government to confirm to the Soviet Government that the Government of the State of Israel had made a firm decision to pursue a policy of strict neutrality; this position is approved by all parties in the government coalition.

I promised to pass this statement on to the Soviet government.

Meyerson added that now that the Negev is wholly Jewish and the possibility of British troops returning there has been eliminated, which ensures the foreign policy of the State of Israel and enables it to reject any attempt to establish foreign bases on its territory, she, Meyerson, can attest to this with even greater confidence.

I asked if I understood This statement by Meyerson correctly in the sense that the policy of neutrality was related to the decision not to provide bases on foreign powers on their territory.

Meyerson confirmed this and added that her country was surrounded by Arab countries in which coups were taking place, the source of which was

unknown and the results of which were difficult to predict; the State of Israel was interested in peaceful coexistence with Arab countries, and his Government had made a firm decision not to join any combinations against anyone, especially the USSR, since friendship with the Soviet Union was one of the pillars of the policy of the State of Israel.

Meyerson went on to say that the large Jewish population in the United States encourages the State of Israel to pursue a friendly policy toward the American people.

But even though the vital interests of the Jewish state require friendly relations with the United States, the State of Israel intends to strictly adhere to the above principles in its foreign policy and with regard to the United States.

I have noticed at this that every state, especially the young, must have firm principles and fight to carry them out.

Meyerson then asked me the following questions: 1) the Soviet Union's assistance to the State of Israel with the supply of weapons and the admission of a group of officers to study, and 2) the expansion of trade relations with the USSR through the granting of credit to the Soviet Union.

Meyerson added that on the first issue, the mission's military attache was negotiating with General Antonov; on the second issue, she said that trade relations with the Soviet Union were developing satisfactorily, with more goods bought in the Soviet Union in seven months than in previous years; however, that was not enough, the Government of the State of Israel wished to develop trade relations further, but monetary restrictions were hampered, which was why credit was desirable by the Soviet Union. At the same time, Meyerson mentioned a loan

from the United States, and said that the loan was granted without any political conditions.

I said that I was not aware of the negotiations with General Antonov, noting that the question raised by Meyerson was a sensitive and complex issue that could create a number of difficulties.

On the second issue, he promised to convey the wishes of the government of the State of Israel to expand trade ties to the Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR.

Meyerson then said that, on behalf of her Government, she asked the Soviet Government to support a request by the Governments of Romania and Hungary to facilitate the travel to Israel of Jews living in those countries who wished to leave. Meyerson's interest in the immigration of Romanian and Hungarian Jews was motivated, first, by the need to increase the population of the State of Israel, as it would contribute to the consolidation of peace in the Middle East, and, secondly, by the need to attract Jews from advanced countries, countries of popular democracy, which is important in terms of solving social problems.

Responding to Meyerson, I referred to my conversation on this issue with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Israel, Charette, which I had in Paris during the first part of the session of the UN General Assembly. I recalled that I then told Charette that the issue was a complex one and that it was difficult for us to get involved. I added that even now I hold the same position.

At the end of the conversation, Meyerson thanked her for the attention and friendly attitude she received during her time in Moscow.

For my part, I wished Meyerson well in her new job, and I asked to say hello to Charette.

The conversation lasted fifty minutes. T. Pastoev was present.

Meyerson was accompanied by mission adviser Namir.

A. Vyshinsky

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE
USSR, MR. MEYERSON, WITH THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY. April 14, 1949**

On the first day of the Passover festival we went to the synagogue. Immediately after the completion of the reading of the Torah Gold Meyerson and I left, because we had to hurry to a farewell visit to Vyshinsky (at 13.00).

When the conversation started, there was a hitch with languages. Vyshinsky spoke in Russian and said with a smile, "Well, they say you are leaving us?"

The secretary of his office, Pastoev, who was sitting next to him, immediately began to translate into English. That's when I thought I was going to be out of a job. But Golda answered in Hebrew and I had to translate into Russian. After the first words were exchanged, the cross-translation story was repeated.

Finally, about five minutes later, decided to put an end to it. Golda asked Vyshinsky if he spoke English: if so, they would not need an interpreter at all. Vyshinsky replied that he knew English, but did not speak enough and preferred to speak Russian. In the end, at Vyshinsky's request, I translated the whole conversation, and she was in Russian and Hebrew, and Vyshinsky jokingly warned that his translator would follow my translation.

I would like to note that the Soviet representatives at all the official meetings and conversations we had with them here spoke only Russian: apparently, they have such instructions. Typical example: Vlasov, the head of the consular department, on April 9 was at our reception and talked to Golda in very good English, but when a few days later we visited his office, he spoke to us only in Russian.

After exchanging common phrases and compliments, including questions about Golda's role as Labour minister, the following was said:

Golda: I would like to use our farewell meeting to convey on behalf of our new post-election government that we are determined to pursue a policy of neutrality in the international arena, not to join any of the blocs, and not to join any states in alliances against third countries, especially against the USSR. On my last visit to my home country, I had the opportunity to attend cabinet meetings, and I declare with full responsibility to you that our decision to remain neutral is shared by all political forces that share responsibility for the governance of the State. We would like to reiterate this to you and bring this to the attention of your Government. Now we can say this with a lighter heart than before, because we now control the entire Negev and territory all the way to Aqaba itself. We are determined to maintain independence and will not

allow the British or anyone else to have military bases on our territory.

Vyshinsky: If I understand correctly, is there a connection between the two parts of your statement? Namely, the principle of neutrality in foreign policy and the refusal to place foreign military bases are linked.

Golda: Absolutely. And I have to add one more. It is no secret that we are only a small island among large and densely populated Arab countries. We have a great desire and interest to resolve the contentious issues with them and to ensure peace and good neighbourliness, despite the fact that the existing Arab regimes are politically and socially reactionary and do not change after the "revolutions" - no matter real or sham. But even in the name of the most important goal for us - peace, we will not abandon the basic principles of our foreign policy, in particular, the principle of non-alignment to any anti-Soviet coalition. Friendship with the USSR is our principled position.

Vyshinsky: I was very pleased to hear this clear statement, which is fully in accordance with our intentions and principles.

Golda: I'm happy to pass on your words to my government. Allow me to make one sincere addition on another aspect of the same problem. Now, after the world war and the terrible extermination of the Jews of Europe, when we compile lists of those who remained, it turned out that the largest Jewish community, several million people, lives in the United States. I think you understand that we're associated with American Jewry by millions of threads. We are extremely interested in stable and friendly relations with the state of which they are citizens. This is also the principled line of our foreign policy, but for all the sincerity of our desire to maintain close ties with the United States, we will not tolerate any outside interference in our internal affairs and will remain

intact our independence and our neutrality. We are not doctrinaires, we are sober realists to understand our true position, but there are some principles that we cannot give up.

Vyshinsky: Israel is a young state. It is good that you immediately developed for yourself rigid principled positions. We, too, were very weak at the time and would not have been able to achieve what we had achieved without uncompromising devotion to the basic principles, the loyalty of which cost us a lot of blood. We are well aware that when you shape your policy towards the United States, you should take sober and realistic approaches. We also seek peace with America, so we fight against the warmongers, but even for the latter we try to be tolerant. There is no contradiction between friendship with us and friendship with the United States. We have never been sectarians, we are well aware of the need for political flexibility, but none of this should, of course, affect the foundations. Our support for the establishment of the State of Israel has also been a consequence of the basic principles of our unselfish policy.

Golda: That's how, not otherwise, our people have been accepting Soviet politics since the day you first proclaimed your position on our cause. That is why the people of Israel are so enthusiastic and sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Perhaps it would be audacity and impudence on my part to say that there is much in common between the great USSR and our small country; this has manifested itself both in the struggle for existence and in the struggle to determine one's destiny. Our government is coalition in nature, some Labor parties have remained out, but there is a majority of working class people in the cabinet, and we intend to build Israel as a socialist state.

Vyshinsky: Indeed, there are certain analogies. I am very grateful to you for these words.

Golda: And now let me move on to two questions from another area:

(a) At one time, through our military attache, we asked Army General Antonov for the supply of certain types of weapons and for the possibility of professional development for our officers. It is possible that we will have a period of peace with our neighbours, but we must remain vigilant and protect our security, and for that we must do everything to strengthen and improve our small army. Materials on the problem of arms supply were handed over to Mr. Bakulin at the time. I would like to draw your attention to this issue.

b) During the 7 months of our diplomatic mission in Moscow, we have taken the first steps in the development of trade ties. On our scale, we bought a lot in the USSR - more than in a few previous years. We met a positive attitude on the part of The Soviet foreign trade organizations. But the current level of development of trade relations does not satisfy us, we would like to expand them, and much. However, here we are faced with the limitations of our financial capabilities, we need significant loans, and long-term loans. As you know, we have received a loan to the United States, on a purely commercial basis, without any political conditions. However, we would not like to be limited to America, we are interested in trade with the USSR, of course, also on the terms of long-term credit.

Vyshinsky: As for military supplies, I'm just not aware of the events, because I was traveling in Europe for a lot of time. This seems to have been done by our defence agencies. I'll try to find out. But it should be clear to you that this is a problem with considerable difficulties and dangers. If we give you one gun, they'll say they sold you an atomic bomb. And further comments about the "special aspect" of this deal will begin: they say that the USSR-Israel alliance is

planned, because these countries are united by Karl Marx, a socialist and a Jew, and an aggressive alliance for the purposes of destruction is being formed. About Karl

Marx has already heard a lot from McNeill and Bevin. By the way, it seems that this last one, Bevin, only learned from us in Paris the terrible thing that the tomb and the monument to Karl Marx are in the heart of London. The only thing that calmed him down was to explain that Marx had already died.

Golda: I'm not sure Bevin can even understand complex matters like Marx.

Vyshinsky: Yes, there are different ministers. Even the mentally ill, like Forrestal, as it turns out now. But it turned out that he is a real Republican - because "without a king in his head."

Returning to military problems, I will try to find out the details. And as for trading, we are interested not only to sell, but also to buy. I will talk to Menshikov (the new Minister of Foreign Trade, instead of Mikoyan.- M.Y.) will talk about this.

Golda: Now, in conclusion, let me put before you another, special question. It does not directly concern your government, but we are seeking help from all possible sources, and I have dared to contact you. I am referring to the problem of the repatriation of Jews from Romania and Hungary. The USSR maintains close friendship relations with these countries, and we ask for a friendly impact on their repatriation. Our State was created to ensure repatriation, and it will exist only if there is a large-scale and rapid repatriation. While our efforts to repatriate Jews from Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria will not be successful, we will not be able to build a State based only on those people. Unless we receive a significant demographic fuel for the settlement of vacant land in the near future, there will be no peace. Half a million Jews live in Romania

and Hungary. Some of them (specialists) are necessary, of course, to ensure the economic life of these countries. Let these people stay where they live. The other part does not want to go anywhere - and will not go. It can be understood that there is a sense of inconvenience from the ongoing emigration process. So let's set an extreme date: who hasn't left to a certain number remains. But let those who are not necessary for these states and want to leave, give for this some period of time.

Vyshinsky: You have touched on the most complex and confusing problem. I've already talked to Mr. Charette about it, his last name was Schertok, but that doesn't change the way it is. We discussed everything in detail in Paris. The conversation took place on one Sunday, both of us were free from the current work and could devote enough time to discussing this problem. I then explained to Mr. Charette why we couldn't interfere. I am well aware that Israel desperately needs mass repatriation. It's only natural. But understand that Hungary and Romania are also new countries, they are now going through a period of renaissance. There's also every dozen workers on the weight of gold. Of course, compared to Israel, these are large and densely populated countries. But you know the saying: the rich man over the heel shakes more than the beggar over the ruble? In other words, it is not just a question of arithmetic, it is an important political issue. Romania and Hungary are now fighting against a very strong domestic reaction. Compared to all the rest, Jews are the most devoted to the new order: they suffered hard from Horti, Antonescu, Brathian, etc., and now more than others are interested in establishing new democratic orders. Half a million devoted citizens are not a small thing. I am not saying that Jews should be banned from leaving at all, especially since I am not saying this on behalf of

my government. But I felt it necessary to repeat the arguments I had made to Mr. Charette, which seemed to me to be significant even now. In any case, this problem seems to me very complex. We are talking openly now, without excessive diplomacy - I just want to explain what the difficulty is.

Golda: All I have to do is ask you to think about it again. And now I have to tell you "shalom" and wish you all the best. I have no words to express gratitude for the friendly and friendly attitude I have faced here at every turn. The period of my work in Moscow will forever remain in my memory as a special privilege, as a kind of compensation upfront for the hard work that I will have to carry out when I return to my homeland.

Vyshinsky: I thank you for your kind words and ask you to convey my personal greeting to Mr. Charette. Now we are all three ministers, and Mr. Charette is a mutual acquaintance. You can also convey these words as a former ambassador to your former minister. I am glad to note that your stay here was very pleasant for us.

STATEMENT BY THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, MR. MEYERSON. April 18, 1949

I am leaving my post in Moscow to take up a position in the Israeli Cabinet, to which I was recently elected. When I was sent by my government as the first envoy accredited to the Soviet government, of course, I considered it a great honour. During my stay in the USSR, I became even more aware of this honour given by my government.

While working in the USSR, I had the privilege of meeting with ministers and high-ranking leaders of the country, all of them gave me the warmest welcome. I will always remember the deep understanding on the part of the Soviet leaders regarding the problems of our young state. My main desire was to further develop friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the state of Israel. I will be proud and happy if I have managed to achieve anything in this direction. I have seen many wonderful works of culture and art of the great country of the Soviet people, its outstanding historical heritage. There is no need to mention the deep experience of art galleries, historical museums, ballet, theatre and music.

Even after only a few months in the USSR, it is impossible not to feel with all the depth enormous constructive efforts, the spirit of which permeates the entire Soviet society. Everywhere there are signs of constant economic growth and development. The healing of the brutal wounds inflicted by the Nazi invasion is only one aspect of this development.

The State of Israel was created during the defensive war of independence with almost overwhelming enemy forces. Therefore, it is only natural that I was deeply touched and delighted by the heroic history of the siege of Leningrad, the traces of which I saw during my trip to Leningrad. Is it possible to present the best evidence of the valour, determination and devotion of the people?

I am happy to use this opportunity to thank my colleagues in the diplomatic corps in Moscow. I came to Moscow at a time when most states have not yet recognized the State of Israel in one form or another. Nevertheless, my colleagues treated me attentively and friendly and tried their best to provide help and support. I appreciate their help and thank everyone.

I have learned a lot here and consider my stay in Moscow one of the most important periods of my life.

Golda Meyerson

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D’AFFAIRES
OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M.NAMIR TO THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
ISRAEL M. SHARETT. April 23, 1949**

Shapiro (United Press) with reference to the representative of Agence France-Presse in Tel Aviv conveyed the following message:

(a) Golda Meyerson was coolly received by Vyshinsky and received a negative response about repatriation. She returned home because she had failed in her mission.

b) Ershov’s trip was undertaken in response to the delay in the appointment of our new envoy to the USSR.

Give your opinion on the first paragraph and in general regarding repeated fabricated messages aimed at spoiling our relations with the USSR. Details regarding repatriation indicate the likely leak of classified information, for example, from our telegram number 59 for December. Is there any truth in the report about Ershov?

Namir

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE AND
MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR
FOREIGN MINISTRY I.N.BAKULIN WITH
THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN
THE USSR M.NAMIR. May 13, 1949**

Secret.

I accepted Namir at his request.

In the conversation, Namir told me that on behalf of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he came to convey the fervent gratitude of the government and people of Israel to the Soviet government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR for the support provided by the Soviet delegation to the UN General Assembly in the issue of the admission of the state of Israel to the UN.

I promised to bring his statement to the attention of the foreign ministry leadership.

I. Bakulin, Head of the Middle East Department of the Ussr Foreign Ministry

