

SOVIET-ISRAELI RELATIONS

A Collection of Documents

Volume 2: 1949-1953

M.: Internar. relationship, 2000

Source: SOVIET-ISRAELI RELATIONS. Documents. 1941-1953
СОВЕТСКО-ИЗРАИЛЬСКИЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ. Документы. 1941-1953 [coldwar.ru]

Language: Russian

Translated into English and transcribed.

E-Book: May 2021

The Socialist Truth in Cyprus Direct Democracy (Communist Party)
London Bureaux

<http://www.st-cyprus.co.uk>

www.directdemocracy4u.uk



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**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT
OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN
WITH THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE USSR IN
ISRAEL, M.I. MUKHIN. May 17, 1949**

At the request of the Minister in the telegram, I invited an adviser to the Soviet mission (in the absence of the ambassador, he is the Charge d'Affaires) to convey current information on a number of issues.

I reported on the situation in Lausanne on the events of recent days, and also outlined our position in general, based on the Minister's report to the Knesset Foreign Affairs Committee on 2 May 1949. When I reported, I also mentioned that the Minister had a conversation with a politician about Transjordan.

I said that in Lausanne we are not ready to negotiate with everyone together and on the whole set of problems. As an example, I cited Jerusalem, of which we are only prepared to speak with Transjordan, since everyone else has nothing to do with the city, either legally or in practical terms. I also stressed that there will be no negotiations with Syria until a ceasefire agreement is signed, and this agreement is possible only after the Syrians have liberated the part of our territory that is in their hands. In this regard, I have noticed that, although this is a relatively small area, it is of great value to us because it gives us access to water control in the north. I added that we are ready to come to an agreement in all areas, including economic relations, and it is no coincidence that our delegation in Lausanne includes a representative of the economic unit of the Foreign Ministry. If we reach an understanding in this area, we will insist on respect for the principle of reciprocity, including the abolition of the Arab boycott, and we will raise the question of The Jews living in those countries- the protection of their

lives, rights and property, the right to go to Israel for all comers and the right to take out capital.

I added that on one issue, the refugee issue, we would probably not be able to insist on separate negotiations with each Arab country, since it could not be solved within that framework. I said that we may be willing to return refugees for family reunification, but even then we do not guarantee that people will return exactly where they left, as in many cases these places are already occupied by others. In fact, their very return to Israel is resettlement, and if so, there is no reason to prefer their resettlement to us resettlement in any other country. We, for our part, are ready to assist, including financially, the settlement of refugees in other countries. Abandoned property will be regarded as property to be confiscated by the government (similar to what happened in Pakistan on a much larger scale). We will be ready to recognize the right to receive compensation, but only for the land. For our part, we will file a counter-claim and demand compensation for the damage caused to us by the war. I talked about the British's attempts to regain influence in Iraq by helping to settle refugees with American money. In this way, they benefit from both Iraq and the Americans in their economic infiltration into the East. But Americans, apparently, have other calculations, they are not inclined to solve problems through British channels. In this regard, I announced the existence of a plan to set up a commission first, and then a large company for the development of the Middle East under the patronage of the United Nations and in cooperation with American financial institutions. At the head of this company will be a representative of the United States, his deputy will be an Englishman. This will be a very large-scale programme, which should also include Israel. For my part, I have noted that we have no intention of participating in this program (the interlocutor has shown special interest in this part of our information). Returning to the refugee problem, I reported that we were under considerable pressure to accept a

significant number of Arab refugees in Israel. In this regard, I mentioned Hare's findings that the refugee problem cannot be solved in neighbouring countries unless we accept several hundred thousand people.

I particularly focused on our relations with various Arab countries, our readiness to reach a final settlement as soon as possible, particularly with Egypt, and of the unwillingness to force the process of signing a peace treaty with Transjordan at a time when this would mean full recognition of the annexation of the Triangle. I have noted that there is the opposite tendency on Amman's part to reach an agreement with us as quickly as possible. At the same time, they stress that they are ready to conclude an agreement independently of other Arab countries and against their will. In this context, I have listed a number of specific issues that we should discuss with Transjordan, partly in Jerusalem, partly in Lausanne. Among the latter are the potash plant, the Nahariya power plant, etc. Egypt, in turn, is ready to abandon the Gaza Strip because it is too heavy a burden for it (100 OCS refugees). For the same reason, the situation with the Gaza Strip is also causing considerable difficulties for us.

In conclusion, I referred to the intransigence of the Arab position held by both Syrians and Transjordanians, reflected in the new demands put forward after the resumption of the Jerusalem negotiating process within the framework of the boundary commission. I also spoke about the Arab tendency to speak together in Lausanne, their cohesion under Anglo-American pressure and the sudden departure from that line by the Egyptian delegation, which stated that it was prepared to discuss various issues with us if we made a statement on the principles of dealing with the refugee problem. My interlocutor asked what we explain the harshness of the Arabs' position and what role England plays in all this. In this regard, I have described the fact that Palestinian Arabs, those who were previously against the Mufti and who oppose the annexation of the Trans-Jordan

Triangle, are seeking to establish a small autonomous region there, and their emergence in Lausanne.

Finally, the conversation switched to a loan, which we would like to receive from the USSR. I read out the relevant paragraph from the transcript of Golda Meyerson's conversation with Vyshinsky. Mukhin told me that the Israeli Finance Minister had spoken to him about it and that the topic came as a surprise to him. I asked how, in his view, it was best to solve this issue, he answered that it is desirable to act through the channels of our representative office in Moscow, that is, that it should go to the government structures, provide materials and proposals. In this regard, I have said that we would like to cooperate with them and with the West in a variety of fields. As an example, I have cited the issue of training our young officers. I said that the U.S. seems ready to take our officers to study, but we would like to get the same opportunity in the USSR. In this regard, he said that, without a doubt, they have much to learn in this area. At the very end of the conversation, Mukhin again, as in a number of previous conversations with him and with the envoy, raised the issue of Russian property in Israel. He asked for the procedure to be expedited and gave examples of the consequences arising from the unresolved issue. I explained to him again that the proposal to repeal the decrees introduced during the mandate period had already been put on the Government's agenda by the Legal Department. As soon as the decrees are repealed, we will return to this problem and be able to find ways to solve it.

The conversation lasted about an hour and a quarter.

S. Friedman

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN
THE USSR M.NAMIR TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHARETT. June 2, 1949**

(a) Over the past three months, our trading activity here has effectively ceased, mainly due to a lack of currency. I must warn that if the situation does not change, it can lead to negative political consequences. Every effort must be made to renew the trade links that have made such a good start. Only in this way can we hope to achieve the signing of a trade agreement with the USSR on the basis of reciprocity and maybe even get a loan on preferential terms. I ask you to make a special effort to ensure that a portion of the defrosted in England pounds was booked for the USSR, or to provide currency in other ways.

b) The same goes for a military attache. In a letter to Friedman on 9 May, I opposed the idea of eliminating the post, then I repeatedly argued the need to appoint a new person to place Ratner. It gives a lot of importance here. Please answer.

Namir

**LETTER FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN
THE USSR M. NAMIR TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN. June 5, 1949**

Secret.
Personal.

Dear S. Friedman!

In connection with your letter about the League of Friendly Relations (No. 11351, undated) I inform the following: I understand well the desire of our comrades to leave this organization, in its current capacity at times, even to the incitement of hostility to the State of Israel. They proceed from the inept assumption that in this way it is possible to evoke the Soviet Union's sympathy for the "Israel of tomorrow."

At one time I was against the creation of the League and now I believe that it was a serious mistake. But we are all strong with the "back mind." I am afraid that our withdrawal from the League will now harm us, because under the influence of our domestic left we will be labeled and blamed for all mortal sins, and we will not be able to explain the true reasons for the step taken. In any case, you need to weigh everything carefully and not to hurry. Personally, I would oppose leaving the league now. At the same time, as long as the situation remains unchanged, it seems that our colleagues, especially those holding prominent public posts, should openly and sharply denounce its current sectarian course, which causes tension between the USSR and Israel, and ultimately undermines the traditional sympathy for the Soviet Union in the State of Israel, at official, public events of the League. I have no illusions about the difficulty of such

work, but it seems to me preferable than a demonstrative exit.

From afar, I sometimes get the impression that our party is behaving in general towards the Russians and communism in the most wrong way possible. It seems that in our foreign policy we should not skimp on public displays of respect, compliments and assurances of friendship to the USSR. At the same time, we should refrain from any speeches that might offend the Russians. It is necessary to seek to expand trade ties, which have only now begun to develop, not to neglect the opportunity to develop cultural and social ties, even to us and it seemed that the prospects for this are minimal, given the current resumption of the anti-zionist campaign in the eastern bloc countries. I'm afraid we have a lot of omissions here, especially if we take into account the numerous official reasons for expressing compliments to the United States. Undoubtedly, the reason for this is the rigidity of Soviet diplomacy and the isolation of society. But we must act within the framework of the existing conditions not to create the impression of unilateralism in our public statements and at least to some extent to achieve a "fair distribution" of compliments. I would not say that we do not mention the USSR in a positive context, but almost always it happens at the same time as expressing gratitude to the United States, and not vice versa. You may not feel it. But we've already worked out a special sniff here on this kind of subtlety, and it seems to me that you can trust us in this matter.

M. Namir

**ALEVAVI'S ANALYTICAL NOTE TO ALEVAVI, AN
ADVISER TO THE ISRAELI MISSION TO THE USSR,
"GLOBAL POLITICS AND ISRAEL". June 6, 1949**

Secret With a Courier

1. Israel's accession to the Un is particularly acute, putting on the agenda the challenge of developing our political line in international affairs and choosing diplomatic tactics that meet the objectives. In this regard, it makes sense to sketch out a number of talking points on this issue, as they are presented to the Israeli observer working in the USSR.

2. The first result of the Second World War in international politics was that, for the first time in history, a balance of power had emerged between communist-dominated States and countries led by non-communist political forces.

This balance of power is reflected in the following facts:

a. The Soviet Union has a military advantage on land, non-communist powers - at sea and in the air.

b. Non-communist countries produce much more, but in communist much higher rates of economic development. That is, communist countries have quite high economic and social chances to reach a stable standard of living in the near future. Of course, it will be lower than in non-communist countries in terms of consumption of manufactured goods, but at the same time it is quite acceptable and providing a sufficient level of culture and development of the population. It should be taken into account that this population has no less individual potential of activity (not to mention the potential of collective) than the inhabitants of Western countries.

In the communist states, political power and cultural and political influence are fully concentrated in the hands of the

national leadership, a factor that ensures absolute stability in peacetime.

3. The October Revolution was the result of the First World War. The rooting of communist regimes in the countries of popular democracy was the result of three factors caused by the Second World War. This is a catastrophic fall of the previous regimes (in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania), the occupation by the Red Army and, finally, the role of local communists in the anti-Nazi struggle. On the other hand, the current balance of power means that in the future there can be no armed conflict between the powers without the participation of the USSR: at the same time its allies will be only neighbouring countries with communist regimes, not belonging to the category of great powers. Germany and Japan will not rise again to a serious and independent military force in the near future, and a war between the Western powers themselves is impossible. Wars between communist and non-communist countries can, of course, expand the territories under the rule of the Communist Parties, but there can be no doubt that in the current international balance of power the Soviet leadership will not bet on war to expand its sphere of influence.

If there is a real choice between freezing the boundaries of the Communist political power zone (and, accordingly, stabilizing non-communist regimes west of these borders) and war between the great powers, the USSR will choose peace.

4. Another question is how the USSR will react to the new strengthening of West Germany and Japan (to a lesser extent Also Italy) as U.S. allies. The problem of Germany's reinforcement is the most difficult from the point of view of the security of Poland and Czechoslovakia. The potential of Ruhr alone (especially the steelmaking capacity of this region) can change the balance of power on the European stage in many ways. The unresolved German problem is one of the factors that prevents the elimination of tensions between the communist and non-communist worlds.

However, there are other reasons for the deepening of the confrontation between the two systems:

a. The communist model of the world rejects any alternative type of socio-political system, wherever they exist. This model of peace serves as an ideological and educational basis in all the states of the Eastern bloc. Of course, this does not conclude in favour of an aggressive war for the establishment of communist regimes everywhere in the world. But this means solidarity and support for any class or anti-colonial struggle as a factor that can lead to revolutionary changes and bring closer the assertion of the power of the Communists. The Greek civil war, the attempt to separate the Azerbaijanis of Iran, the civil war in China - in all these regions we were shown the Russian tactics of actions outside the zone of state power of the Communist Parties: everywhere it was more about expanding the sphere of influence than about strengthening positions under threat. It cannot but be acknowledged that this intervention was, and is very cautious and restrained, but it is quite effective and effective.

b. In much of today's world, non-communist regimes are highly unstable. It is necessary to emphasize the situation in South Asia (Indochina,

Malaya, Burma). In all these countries, the communist movement is trying to turn national discontent, growing against the backdrop of foreign oppression, poverty and social inequality, into a revolutionary process led by the Communist Parties.

There is the possibility of an economic crisis in the United States or serious failures in the post-war reconstruction of Western Europe.

There is also a fear of communist expansion, in one form or another this phenomenon is very widespread in the various social strata of the West. In turn, the fear of encirclement or aggression by the imperialist coalition largely determines the foreign policy of the USSR.

5. At an hour when China's fate is almost settled and in the South Asian region, the contradictions are constantly growing, non-communist forces are consolidating their positions in an arc stretching from the Japanese islands through Formosa, Ceylon, India and Pakistan. As a result, the Middle East has so far been sidelined by the revolutionary processes that have engulfed Central and South Asia. However, in our region, tensions between communist and non-communist forces are likely to increase in the near future. The Balkan dividing line between the two blocs is too close to us, and the region itself borders the USSR, and even in such a strategically important area as Baku. The western boundary of the Middle East region is the Mediterranean Sea, and here Western countries are actively strengthening a number of islands, turning them into bases for offensive actions in case of war. The Middle East has the largest oil reserves, while in the USSR it is one of the few raw materials produced in relatively small volumes. It is possible to continue to make arguments, but it seems that enough is enough to draw the following conclusions about the geopolitical situation of the region:

A. The Middle East is in the sphere of Anglo-American influence.

The region is economically, politically, socially and militarily underdeveloped.

There is no national-revolutionary enzyme for development in the region according to the Chinese or South Asian model.

The Region borders the vital areas of the Soviet zone of influence.

Given the fundamental contradictions between communist and non-communist policies, we must draw a number of conclusions from the above:

“The USSR does not now hope for close opportunities for its infiltration into the Middle East, similar to those that exist in relation to other regions bordering it.

“The USSR is interested in maximizing the development of the Middle East by Western powers, so that the region does not become a solid base of the West against the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Caspian region.

“The risk of military conflict between the two blocs as a result of developments on the northern borders of our region appears to be negligible. Also, there is no need to fear a world war because of this or that development of events inside the Middle East.

“In the event that the war does begin, the Middle East will immediately become a war zone, a location of advanced bases. In this regard, its importance is second only to the importance of Central and Western Europe. Politicians and generals in Western countries are aware of all this.

On the basis of the above, the West should be expected to make efforts to reorganize and strengthen the Middle East economically, politically and militarily. Accordingly, the activities of the USSR here will be aimed at slowing down the process of consolidation and strengthening of the region under the influence of the West. At this stage, the USSR is interested in the rivalry between the United States and Great Britain, in maintaining the contradictions between Western countries, between national and religious minorities in the Arab world and the governments of the Arab states; The USSR is interested in awakening class fermentation, in maintaining contradictions between Israel and Arab countries (or at least between Israel and some Arab countries).

The State of Israel is interested in peace and the development of the Middle East. Israel has no national, local or direct interests that are contrary to the reorganization of the region under Western influence, since this process alone does not bring the danger of world war closer to the threat of turning the Middle East into a war zone. At the same time, Israel's foreign policy must ensure that our national interests are respected in the process of such a reorganization of the region. These are territorial, ethnic, economic and military interests. In any situation in the Middle East, Israel should

take care to balance power with its neighbours, not only because of the level of military readiness, but also of the pace and nature of Israel's social, economic and ethnic development on the one hand, and the Arab countries on the other.

7. Israel's public interest in maintaining friendly relations with the countries of the communist bloc stems from the following considerations:

A. These relations are necessary, although not always sufficient, to continue the process of significant Jewish repatriation from various countries of the communist bloc. And the importance of this reason is directly dependent on the real ensuring continuity of the flow of returnees. The termination of repatriation for any long period of time drastically reduces the chances of its resumption, since such a turn of events is fundamentally contrary to the accelerated process of aligning the social structures of the countries of popular democracy with the same structures of Soviet society.

b. Israel has enjoyed and continues to enjoy the consistent support of the delegations of the communist bloc countries to the UN. It is possible that Israel will need such support in the future.

Israel's ties to the communist bloc could, under certain circumstances, serve as a means of exerting pressure on Western powers, forcing them to reckon more with Israeli interests in the Middle East.

In the case of a world war, it is very possible that the entire Middle East was occupied by the Soviet army.

8. If the Cold War continues (and now there is no indication of its imminent cessation), Israel will face ever-increasing difficulties in pursuing a friendly policy towards the communist bloc:

A. There can be no repatriation without absorption and there can be no absorption without investment. The Jewish capital, whether in the form of donations or investments, is unlikely to solve the problem of the absorption of returnees

and the development of the State of Israel. The non-Jewish capital is unlikely to come if Israel is the only country in the Middle East that is slowing the region's cohesion as a zone of strategic influence for the non-communist bloc.

b. There would be a threat that Western powers would develop the Middle East in a way that would harm Israel's public interest, even in the form of accelerated Arab economic development than Israel.

In the event of a world war, Israel is likely to be unable to maintain its status as a fully neutral State for a long time and will certainly be subjected to aggression. In this regard, it is useful to recall the experience of the world war, when both Sweden and Switzerland were forced to allow the Germans to transit through their territory, and other non-military countries provided serious assistance to one of the warring parties by participating in its production.

In the UN and in general in the sphere of foreign policy, neutral status and freedom of manoeuvre are associated not only with advantages, but also with considerable risk. It is also capable of a situation where the United States will be guided in its policy by considerations that worsen our economic situation (see subparagraphs "a" and "b" of this paragraph).

The problems outlined in this paragraph can be sharply exacerbated if the Western powers take real steps to organize the Mediterranean Alliance, whether within the framework of NATO enlargement or as a parallel NATO military and economic structure. In this case, the only chance for Israel to move away from the decisions that would cause a crisis in our entire foreign policy would be for the West to win the concept of rejection for a variety of reasons in membership in such an alliance to both Israel and arab countries.

The main question facing Israel, given the foregoing, is this. As long as we continue to adhere to a neutral political line, can we hope that the Western Powers will exert strong enough influence on the Arab countries. pressure to make

them make peace with Israel on terms that are in our national interest? And can we expect the Arab States to be ready to make peace with us on such terms without decisive Western pressure?

9. In connection with the above, it should be recalled that Britain still views the development and strengthening of Israel as a process that is, to some extent, detrimental to British interests. It should be prepared to propose from time to time that proposals would be made to eliminate this contradiction by explicitly reorienting Israeli foreign policy to the West.

Foreign policy is not reduced to a list of arithmetic actions that allow different numerical values of the same algebraic equation to be obtained. On a case-by-case basis, a specific approach is required to move from the level of baseline principles to the level of decision-making required of heads of State in an ever-changing international reality. However, it seems possible and desirable, given all of the above, to formulate somewhat more specifically the basic principles of Israel's foreign policy, in one way or another linking them with possible decisions taken by various world political forces, and with the most major political actions in the field of international relations (such as the conclusion of certain military alliances, non-aggression treaties, friendship and cooperation agreements, agreements on bases, voting in the UN signing trade agreements, cultural relations agreements, etc.). Of course, all these patterns apply only in peacetime, because in the case of regional or world war, foreign policy inevitably takes on extremely unstable forms, and decisions are taken solely by applying to specific military circumstances.

11. At the schematic level, we can only identify a few borderline cases, such as:

the "a" situation, the communist and Western blocs continue to pursue their current policy towards Israel without changes;

situation “b” - Western countries do not change the political course towards Israel, and the attitude towards us of the communist bloc is deteriorating dramatically, whether in matters of repatriation, whether in the UN and in foreign policy, or in all these areas at the same time;

situation “in” - communist countries do not change the political course towards Israel, and the attitude towards us of Western powers is sharply deteriorating in the political and/or economic area.

Obviously, we could consider a few more “border situations” (for example, one of the blocks just improves the attitude towards us, while our relations with the other bloc remain unchanged), but it seems that the analysis in the three chosen areas will be optimal in practical terms. It is also obvious that “border situations” in general are only abstractions, some auxiliary logical fiction. In real life, there are and will be only “intermediate situations” that are special combinations of circumstances, with the list of such combinations seeking infinity, and theoretical analysis is incapable of describing them in advance in a form that guarantees any applicability of the findings in practice.

...

Jerusalem

January 1950

After visits in September to Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Bakulin (then head of the Middle East Division of the Soviet Interior Ministry), we were unable to determine the USSR's position on The Question of Jerusalem. This gave rise to assumptions and fears, which were subsequently actually confirmed. At the end of September 1949, I reported in a telegram about a conversation with a Western diplomat about the Soviet Union's position on giving Jerusalem international status. I noted that while I had neither the opportunity nor the desire to speak more clearly and unequivocally on the issue, I nevertheless stressed that the USSR joined the Guardian Council in 1947 and that “there are various options for

internationalization that can create opportunities for influence from different political elements”.

1. Nevertheless, the importance of the Soviet Union's desire to gain additional political influence in Israel by subordinating Jerusalem to the Guardian Council of which it is a member should not be exaggerated. The Soviet leaders certainly consider this possibility mainly for propaganda purposes. If Jerusalem is granted international status, a stable majority will be established in the Guardian Council, which will prevent the USSR from exerting influence in administrative matters. The Soviet representative will, of course, defend the rights of the part of the population that opposed the so-called international government, which will inevitably and under any circumstances become part of the anti-Soviet forces in the international arena. Soviet representatives will emphasize the identity of the international government in Jerusalem and the imperialist, anti-Soviet front. In fact, the Soviet representative will support the principles of democracy and self-government. It will direct the public's anger against the specific, tangible manifestations of international governance by distorting the otherwise camouflaged imperialist rule. It can be assumed that the majority of the inhabitants (for whom the Soviet Union would be their representative and interested ally in the highest international institutions) will soon forget the fact that at first the USSR itself had a hand (albeit with various reservations) in establishing an international regime in Jerusalem and its surroundings. We can confidently assume that if meetings on the international status of Jerusalem begin, the USSR will be in opposition. The USSR will demand the expansion of the rights of urban residents, will propose such a constitutional agreement, which, as it turns out, will be both contradictory, and support the principles of international government and self-government, will constantly warn about the aggressive intentions of the imperialists. One can draw attention to a typical example from the past, to a position that entails erroneous legal logic

and is unpromising from the point of view of implementation, but useful as a temporary manoeuvre of the opposition. I am referring to the vigorous campaign of the Yugoslav representative to the UN Special Commission of Inquiry in Palestine (UNSCOP) in favour of the establishment of a bi-national state in Palestine.

2. The reasons put forward by the Soviet representatives should be perceived as genuine but secondary: their desire is to put an end to British influence in East Palestine and to prevent the King of Transjordan from taking control of part of Jerusalem. Of course, there is no need to go into detail, as the issue is clear and often analysed.

3. We should not downplay the importance of the Soviet voice in terms of the propaganda needs of Arab communist organizations and in terms of Soviet tactics against other Arab elements, which in some cases may be willing to support (albeit in part, temporarily, for a short period) Soviet policy in the Middle East. Because of its long, consistent support for Israel, the USSR has certainly weakened the ability to exert influence and ability to conduct communist propaganda in the Arab states. To begin with, these opportunities and prospects were limited from the outset. The Soviet leaders are certainly aware of this. Yet there is no shortage of evidence that the Soviet Union certainly does not intend to leave this "front" entirely simply because it is not worth it. The facts include:

(a) Anti-zionist radio propaganda to Arab countries (here we can probably refer to the visit that Lutsky is rumoured to have paid to the Lebanese envoy to Moscow).

b) Soviet propaganda in articles on the Middle East, which draws a clear distinction between the interests of the leadership and the masses (in some articles you can find some agreement with the line of non-communist Arab opposition groups, such as the justification of the Syrian opposition's objections to unification with Iraq during the rule of Hinnawi).

At the moment, the USSR has developed a position that can be used to refute the argument that communism and Zionism are allies in the fight against Arab interests.

We should consider whether the Soviet vote on Jerusalem will serve the purposes of communist propaganda intended for Arab refugees from Jerusalem and, in particular, Christians or Russian Orthodox Christians.

4. The Soviet leaders are no doubt aware of the obstacles that will inevitably arise as a result of support for the internationalization of Jerusalem.

(a) The prospects for internationalization were vague from the outset. This greatly reduces the weight of the “1” argument mentioned above (strengthening new diplomatic and propaganda positions and influence in Palestine) and makes paragraph “2” of the memorandum (Abdallah's expulsion) completely irrelevant.

b) Such a policy of the USSR will inevitably encourage Israel's foreign policy to move closer to the major Anglo-American trends that are beginning to emerge in the Middle East. (It is also possible, although, from the Soviet point of view, such a rapprochement will continue under any circumstances, so they will have to lose less.)

(c) The influence of Maki's propaganda has undoubtedly declined dramatically as a result of “remorse” on the question of Jerusalem. Perhaps more important to the policy makers of the Soviet Community is that such actions diminish the prospects for cooperation between Mapam and Maki, which emerged after the Mapai and Mapam negotiations failed. It should not be forgotten that the Communists are making great efforts to create a united front with opposition forces in many countries.

(d) We should also not discount the fact that the relationship we mentioned between the Soviet position on the Jerusalem issue and the future of Russian property in Jerusalem is not a common aspect from the point of view of the USSR. Perhaps the Soviets are not seriously afraid of the “victory of the Vatican.” The contemptuous underestimation

of the forces of the Catholic Church may force the USSR to consider its diplomatic successes as imaginary and not having sufficient political and social support.

These arguments, which can be supplemented, are no less important than the three we have given above, when we have suggested that the Soviet Union welcomed the internationalization of Jerusalem. Such a solution is possible, assuming that it stems from general, basic conclusions about Soviet policy and vital interests in the Middle East.

Some argue that the main task of the USSR, which explains Soviet policy in the issue under discussion, is to prevent the strengthening of Israel, as a stronger state, with a larger population and greater border security will become more dependent on the United States because of its numerous and broad economic needs. The author of the memorandum considers this interpretation to be erroneous.

What does it mean, in light of this argument, Israel's "optimal strength" from the point of view of the USSR? Why should the USSR assume that a weak Israel, unsure of the physical possibilities of self-defence, will more successfully pursue an independent foreign policy and resist the temptation to "buy" security through a complete compromise with the Western powers? How does this analysis of Soviet policy towards Israel be reconciled with the Soviet assistance we have received in the past and the emigration policy that Russia's allies are currently pursuing? Moreover, the policy of the USSR towards Israel is both the policy of a great power and a major international action. It's a link, part of a single, indivisible whole.

This policy cannot be analysed outside of regional geopolitics, in this case the Middle East region.

The main argument for the USSR in favour of voting for the internationalization of Jerusalem is diametrically opposed to the principles defining the cool attitude of the Anglo-Saxon states to this proposal. This is not a fear of the enlargement of Israel; crucial for the USSR is the fear of political stabilization in the Middle East. After all, from the

point of view of the USSR, stability in the region, among other things, will lead to the creation of a military and political zone hostile to the Soviet Union, a political and social springboard aimed against the communist movement.

Let us hope that the new difficulties on The question of Jerusalem will not lead to a new outbreak of hostilities. It is clear that such a development of the situation may prevent Israel from establishing peaceful, good-neighbourly relations with at least some Arab States.

Any UN decision on the Jerusalem issue could increase tensions in the Middle East and delay the final decision for a longer period of time.

The USSR does not get involved in the conflict for the sake of the conflict itself. However, in accordance with their basic principles, the leaders of the Soviet foreign policy should seek to divide and prevent compromise in territories outside their influence. After all, these territories are influenced by those who are seen in the USSR as mortal enemies, plotting to attack the Soviet Union and representing imperialist, monopolistic, capitalist regimes, the sunset of which is already marked on the horizon of history. They want these decadent regimes to cease to exist more quickly because of the growing internal economic, social and political contradictions.

Thus, the statements of the Soviet representatives that their position in the vote on the Jerusalem issue should not be interpreted as a change in attitude towards Israel are true.

The attitude of the USSR towards Israel is determined by the same unchanging principles on which the Soviet Union voted in favour of internationalization. Israel's support in the eyes of Soviet leaders is justified to the extent that Israel's existence impedes stability, cohesion, consolidation in the Middle East through Western powers and in the spirit of their world politics. We will return to this issue later in our memorandum.

Immigration policy

At this stage, the current policy of the Soviet bloc regarding the immigration of Jews to Israel has become abundantly clear. In order to assess the positive aspects of this policy, it should be remembered that the very fact of issuing exit permits to citizens of the bloc countries is contrary to the main prevailing policy trends of regimes in these countries. In fact, the borders are closed. Officials and diplomats are on the trains and planes that cross them. Ordinary citizens cannot enter or leave; exceptions are Jews, who continue to travel by the thousands. Moreover, in various ways and for various reasons, the authorities are directing the flow of emigration to Israel, not to any random place. Numerous facts show that it was decided that the emigration of Jews would be carried out for some time from the countries of popular democracy, not from the Soviet Union. At the same time, the decision seems to provide room for manoeuvre. It is clear that it gives various Governments sufficient freedom to continue or change the pace and shape of emigration. In addition, the decision is conditioned by a time frame, the limits of which have not yet been defined.

In fact, on the issue under discussion, the States of popular democracy are divided into two groups. On the one hand, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland: the issue of Jewish emigration from these countries is not the number one issue for Israeli foreign policy at the moment. On the other hand, Romania and Hungary. The crux of the problem is how much the governments of these countries will agree to allow Jewish emigration. The desire of Jews to immigrate to Israel is the result of a real opportunity to cross the border, the situation in the diaspora and conditions in Israel. We will not be too optimistic about Israel or too pessimistic about the diaspora if we assume that a large, growing wave of immigration would come to us from Hungary if its borders were opened.

Three groups of factors can influence the immigration policy of the Hungarian and Romanian governments and persuade them to be more rigid or condescending within the

borders of the total emigration from the Soviet bloc. Two of these factors are outside our sphere of influence, namely:

1. The internal situation in Romania and Hungary is an increase in anti-Semitism, the pace at which the Jewish masses are getting used to new, changing socio-economic conditions, and the general internal problems of the ruling regimes in these countries.

Impact of international tensions, security considerations, etc.

However, Israel is still able to influence the attitude of Romania and Hungary towards Jewish emigration. This applies both to our policy on the special issue of Jewish emigration from these countries, to our foreign policy and diplomatic actions in Hungary and Romania, as well as to foreign policy towards the USSR and the countries of popular democracy with which we have already managed to reach an understanding on Jewish emigration.

What can we do about this?

1. We must not stop exerting pressure, even for a moment. Of course, its form, weak or rigid, direct or indirect, should be corrected from time to time, but under no circumstances should the opportunity be missed in diplomatic contacts or other meetings, as well as at public events. Of course, form is important and the need to preserve the prestige of the authorities in these countries should not be ignored.

2. The essence of our requirements must be clear, clear, unchanged: a permit to leave for Jews who wish to immigrate in Israel. The permit is valid for one year.

3. From time to time, we must come up with specific proposals that we could and would like to implement in order to demonstrate our willingness to meet them in response to permission to leave.

4. Even limited exit permits are to be welcomed, but with criticism of such restrictions and the confirmation of our general emigration requirements.

5. Every effort must be made to avoid the impression that our friendly relations with the countries of popular democracy will cease once we have successfully resolved the problem of Jewish emigration from those countries. An important example is that we have the right, and even the obligation, to reduce the number of our mission staff in countries where consular work on departures or contacts with the Jewish population has been reduced to a minimum, as most Jews have gone to Israel. But we have no right to weaken diplomatic ties with these states, closing missions or appointing envoys who do not live permanently in the country, where we used to appoint authorized permanent representatives.

6. Recent events in Romania³ under no circumstances justify the prolonged delay in appointing our envoy there. It is appropriate to treat all the fluctuations of our political line with the influence of random and even personal factors.

7. We should not deceive ourselves into believing that we will be able to separate the issue of Jewish emigration from Romania and Hungary from the general political and economic relationship with the Soviet bloc. Moreover, we will not be able to isolate this problem even from issues that are supposedly more distant from it, such as our relationship with Transjordan or the vote and position at the UN. Of course, Israel cannot subjugate its Middle East policies and policies in general only to the scale of the emigration of Jews from Romania and Hungary. On the other hand, there is no denying that this is a matter of paramount importance to Israel. Every time we have the opportunity to pursue a policy favourable to the Soviet bloc, it is necessary to point this out to the Soviet representatives and try to link this possibility with the problem of Jewish emigration. Every opportunity should be used to present our actions as appropriate compensation (in the spirit of paragraph 3, see above).

8. All attempts by the USSR to state that the USSR had nothing to do with the issue of emigration of Jews from Romania and Hungary should be rejected. Undoubtedly, this

issue should be the subject of discussion with the representatives of the USSR at a higher level, and not only through the usual diplomatic channels. Perhaps in this way we will be able to overcome various obstacles. Logic dictates that the local Romanian and Hungarian authorities, including a variety of small officials, have more power to ban and postpone than to permit and facilitate.

9. It should be understood that the Governments of Hungary and Romania may be interested in the fact that information on the emigration of Jews from those countries should not be made public, primarily for reasons related to the ideological upbringing of the population, and perhaps because of communist propaganda in the Arab States and political tactics against those countries.

We must strictly adhere to all our commitments to remain silent on this issue. In this context, this is no less important, and perhaps more important, than at the time when the Jews were leaving Yemen. Moreover, if we can propose an agreement on our part that is less public, it is advisable to do so in an exchange of views on the issue with the Governments of Hungary and Romania.

10. Attention should be paid to the manifestation of social activism in Israel by new immigrants from countries of popular democracy. Immigrants from countries where the problem of departure has been resolved positively should be encouraged to actively participate in friendship societies, such as Israeli-Polish, Israeli-Czechoslovak, Israeli-Bulgarian. Such societies should not only exist on paper. One of the most desirable forms of activity of these societies is the sending of gifts to the countries with which they are associated (e.g. citrus children in Poland).

As for former Romanians and Hungarians, it was not clear whether the time had come to encourage friendly public action. At the same time, it should be remembered that demonstrations by these circles against the Governments of former countries of residence are an extreme, serious means of exerting pressure and can do more harm than good. They

can be perceived as creating a bloc of hostile emigrant forces and cause strong concern to the political leaders of the Soviet bloc.

At the moment, huge efforts are being made to speed up the political, economic, ideological, military, social unification of the countries of popular democracy into a kind of centralized "Soviet commonwealth" created around the USSR. It should be understood that the Soviet leaders are now striving to achieve this goal actively and steadily, in spite of any difficulties and dangers.

National differences are not a major obstacle. In fact, economic, political and military centralization has already been achieved. Cohesion in the spiritual sphere is developing rapidly. There has been considerable progress in levelling the social structure in the cities, and no doubt we will soon see an increase in efforts in this direction also in rural areas, where until now the Communists have shown moderation and restraint, mindful of the experience of collectivization in the USSR. If everything is formed in this way, there are much more similarities between the social systems in the USSR and in the countries of popular democracy today than during the accession of the Baltic republics to the USSR. There is little doubt that the decision has recently been taken to completely change the pace of this association in response to Tito's actions, the constant escalation of the Cold War and, perhaps, the victory in China.

The author of the memorandum is not able to answer which of the countries of popular democracy is closer to achieving the ultimate goal, and which is next, given the concept of the political leadership of the USSR on the need to distinguish among the states of popular democracy. It was difficult to answer the question of whether Hungary and Romania should be considered among those who were lagging behind. In any case, the direction and possibilities of accelerating the unification process are quite obvious.

The issue of Jewish emigration from Romania and Hungary is closely linked to this process. Hence the urgency

in its decision. It should be quite clear that, despite all sorts of zigzags in politics, the prospect of the “exit gate” being wide open is constantly diminishing, of course, in this historical context. This provision should not be regarded as theoretical and abstract. We can pay hard for being too hesitant, mired in routine and petty “practicality” on the scale of Jewish emigration from Romania and Hungary. It is time to put on the scales all the political authority of Israel. According to the author of the memorandum, time is so running out that we should not retreat even in the face of possible risks. We should not see the preservation of the thin stream of emigration as the main factor determining our political position on the issue under discussion.

Let us try to persuade the leadership of Romania and Hungary to allow mass departure within a year, stipulating that at the end of the year a statement will be made to end Israel's influence on the fate of Romanian and Hungarian Jews. With regard to Germany, we are pursuing a similar independent line without objective or subjective political pressure from outside. Thus, we will link the demands for Jewish emigration with the desire for Sovietisation in Romania and Hungary—we will do it specifically, obviously, powerfully.

The problem of Arab refugees

Until now, the Soviet bloc has shown little interest in this problem. Concepts such as displacement and population migration are somewhat removed by Soviet politicians and consider them inevitable under certain historical circumstances. On the other hand, the Soviet bloc strongly opposed all methods of treatment of refugees, which were approved in the past and agreed for the near future. Soviet representatives did not vote in favour of the Technical Committee's proposal⁴. The Soviet press stressed that the entire public works project, which develops the problem of employment of Arab refugees, as well as any activities that Clapp has led in the past and recommends for the future, are

nothing more than a ploy to unite and strengthen the position of imperialism in the Middle East.

However, the Soviet position on refugees - whether the Russians are critical - is still unclear. So far, the political leaders of the USSR have not expressed a positive or positive proposal to positively solve the problem of Arab refugees.

In this regard, the Soviet Union retained the freedom of political manoeuvre. There are a lot of possibilities. Let's try to highlight the most important of them:

1. The USSR will certainly refrain from presenting its position on the issue of Arab refugees and will continue to be generally critical, as it has done so far. The Communist movement will try to develop active activities among refugees. The latter can become a fierce, rebellious mass and partly even more active than the rest of the Arab population, which has no idea of the high standard of living in the mandated Palestine and whose life has not been an unexpected, revolutionary crisis that has taken them from their native land, and has not had the experience of living in camps, which are characterized by elements of mass organization.

The probability that the USSR will take such a passive political position on the issue under discussion will be higher if the issue is not raised again for deeper discussion at the UN. However, even in such circumstances, an undesirable initiative on the part of the USSR is possible if tensions between Arab states and Western powers on the refugee issue increase.

2. The USSR will fully approve the organization of settlements of Arab refugees outside Israeli territory in connection with rehabilitation and development projects within the framework of the "fourth point" of the Truman program, the Programs of Clapp and McGee, etc.

3. Offensive Soviet propaganda on the issue of refugees in the absence of open demands for the repatriation of refugees to Israel. In that case, an attempt could be made to link the refugee problem to the demand for an independent

Arab State in parts of Western Palestine. In the event of such a development, we should be cautious about the undesirable unification of refugee and border issues, and to a lesser extent the unification of the refugee problem and the demand for an international regime in Jerusalem that would supposedly be able to accommodate former Arab residents.

4. The darkest prospect is the unconditional or even conditional demand of the USSR for the return of Arab refugees to Israel. This is a likely scenario under certain conditions. Circumstances are such that we are deprived of a real opportunity to monitor how the policy of the USSR towards Israel is formed, through a free exchange of views, informal impressions, etc. and you're absolutely wrong about that." In extremely unfavourable circumstances, the Communists may counter our demand to "accept" Jewish immigrants from the countries of popular democracy to our reluctance to allow the return of Arab workers who were forced to leave their villages as a result of the war provoked by the imperialist conspiracy.

The general conclusion is that Israel cannot count on serious political support from the USSR on the issue of Arab refugees. Under the various circumstances that can be foreseen, at best we can count on the neutral position of the USSR. Under less favourable circumstances, the position of the USSR may even be negative.

Given our relations with the USSR and in the light of the analysis, it seems highly desirable to prevent the discussion of the refugee problem at the UN and to seek its resolution in such a way as not to leave room for interference by the USSR.

Naturally, this is not the only and not the main consideration that determines Israeli policy and tactics in this matter. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to ignore this aspect of the problem.

The question of boundaries

On this issue, the political leadership of the USSR has also so far refrained from promulgating its position and is

very likely to refrain from specifying it altogether. On the other hand, some of the Soviet Union's preliminary political intentions in this matter are already clear.

1. The USSR still insists on the establishment of an independent Arab State in part of Western Palestine and opposes the accession of any part of Western Palestine to Transjordan.

2. On the other hand, under certain circumstances, the USSR would be willing to accept Transjordan as a member of the United Nations, as opposed to South Korea, where the Soviet leadership believed that their country's more immediate and vital interests were at stake.

3. The Soviet Union's recognition of de jure should not be interpreted as a recognition of the de facto Israeli governance within the borders of the current border, as the Jerusalem question shows.

4. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union is ready to support Israel's access to the Red Sea, if only it will prevent the political-territorial, spatial unification of the region

Suez Canal and region including Transjordan, Iraq, Iran.

If the USSR makes a clearer statement on its position on borders, we can expect both a positive and a negative development.

1. It can be assumed that the USSR will oppose any "correction" of borders to the detriment of us, which will be proposed by the Conciliation Commission and will enjoy any support from the West. In this case, the Soviet arguments will not necessarily be pro-Israel and will be formulated in a way that does not adversely affect the Arabs. In any case, it is unlikely that the representatives of the USSR will support the program, which will be the result of the U.S.-French-Turkish compromise, supported by the British.

2. It is obvious that the Russians will firmly oppose any transfer of territory to Transjordan.

3. On the other hand, there is a danger of more or less active support from the USSR of arab countries, which will call for the establishment of an independent Arab state in

Western Palestine, intended to create an Arab state under the UN resolution of November 29, 1947. accumulated in the Arab sector of Western Palestine. Assumptions of this kind inevitably lead, if not to a return to the situation of November 1947, then at least to the sympathetic attitude to proposals to implement border changes in favour of an independent Arab State. In this regard, the USSR can also support, rather evasively, the implementation of the plan of the economic union of Israel and the independent Arab state.

Prospects for the approval of the USSR of the above policy will be better if tensions between Arab states and Western powers on the issue of Israel's borders increase. If there is a heated debate between the United Kingdom and Egypt over British bases in the Canal area, the possibility that this could affect the Soviet position on the Gaza Strip cannot be ruled out.

In summary, it could be concluded that, while we have no reason to expect serious assistance from the USSR on the issue of borders, the Soviet position is currently virtually neutral, as it is not defined, is most convenient in the circumstances and in the conditions that may develop in the near future. This is especially true if we are to make progress in finally resolving our political borders through the resumption of relations with the kingdom of Abdullah or an agreement with it. It is doubtful whether we will be able to implement this policy without causing some cooling of the USSR's relations with Israel.

Our conclusions: Given the essence of the USSR's position on Israel, it is desirable that the issue of our borders be resolved, first of all, outside the UN. The policy that Israel recently endorsed with respect to the Conciliation Commission is also convenient in terms of prospects for this memorandum, provided that we can prevent the transfer of the border issue from the Conciliation Commission to the UN General Assembly or the transition of the issue in one form or another to international policy.

Israeli neutrality from the point of view of the USSR

To what extent is Israeli neutrality positive from the point of view of the Soviet political leadership and, moreover, what, in their view, is the essence of this positive moment? It is not difficult to make rather accurate assumptions on this issue by the method of exclusion.

1. The internal social system in Israel itself is not particularly important in this context, despite many differences when compared to social systems in other countries of the Middle East.

According to Stalin-Leninist doctrine, a direct transition from feudal to socialist order is possible at the present historical moment. The existence of the Soviet superpower makes it possible and facilitated by such a daring step. A radical example is the Mongolian People's Republic, where, according to the Soviet view, a nomadic feudal or pre-feudal society is making a direct transition to a socialist society. The attitude of the USSR over a period of time, on the one hand, to India and on the other to Pakistan is instructive. It proves that the political leadership of the USSR does not attach much importance to the fact that the labour movement is both organizationally and ideologically much stronger in India. The USSR continues to regard the right-wing Social Democrats (i.e. those who oppose the merger with the Communists within the united party) as the main enemies wherever social democratic movements enjoy great political influence. The number of participants in cooperative movements in different countries certainly does not affect the political attitude of the USSR towards these countries.

However, there is now no need to delve into the analysis of the theory. The struggle that has begun between the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia shows that, from the Soviet point of view, there is only one decisive factor now that the global solution is beginning to be quickly realized. This factor is the political and military cohesion of communist forces around the world in the face of the danger of a single imperialist offensive, which will preserve the essence of Soviet, socialist, communist ideology, as well as neutralize the

counter-actions of the imperialists who seek to prevent the spread of revolutionary processes in other parts of the world.

The basis of Stalin's strategy is a comprehensive, complete focus on the main issue. Therefore, any move, any deviation, any temporary political disagreement (and, of course, fundamental disagreement) is unacceptable heresy, in contrast, no importance is attached to social democracy, nationalization, agricultural cooperatives, etc.

The infiltration of Western capital into the sovereign states of Asia is accelerating the development of the industrial proletariat and the changing social structure in these countries. However, all indications are that for the USSR this positive factor is of no importance in the current period, as it is necessary to resist the penetration of Western capitals, which can strengthen the unity of imperialist forces by increasing the dependence of Asian states on Western powers through the mechanism of governance in these states and the social classes ruling in them at the moment.

2. Some believe that the USSR positively assesses the social system of Israel, as there are more opportunities for the victory of communism than in other countries of the Middle East. Objectively, this assumption is not really obvious and requires careful analysis that goes far beyond this memorandum on Israeli foreign policy. However, there is even more doubt that, in determining their Middle East policy, Soviet leaders are guided by assessments of the prospect of communist conquests in Israel and the Arab States. Probably, the USSR does not expect to see in the near future a decisive victory of communist forces anywhere in the Middle East, due to local circumstances.

The policy of the USSR towards Italy, where there is a strong Communist Party, is no more friendly than in relation to many other countries, where the influence of the Communists is negligible. The policy of the USSR on the internationalization of Jerusalem shows that the USSR does not attach decisive importance to the fate of Maki.

3. There are global differences between the situation that Western Powers hold in Israel and their status elsewhere in the Middle East. Turkey is affiliated with the Western powers with a direct military alliance. British military forces are stationed under contract in Egypt, Transjordan and Iraq. Ties between the United States and Persia were demonstrated and consolidated during the Shah's visit to America. U.S. positions in Saudi Arabia are steadily strengthening, etc. Nothing like this can be found in Israel, and we can hope that this fact did not go unnoticed by the leadership of the USSR and that it is not indifferent to them. On the other hand, they understand that Israel cannot remain fully, and far from pleasant, isolation, and that all the talk in Israel about economic autarkia is inappropriate and groundless. Moreover, it is clear that the super-Powers share the view that, in the event of a war between them, they will, at least temporarily, ignore the sovereignty and territorial neutrality of small States that will be on strategic tracks.

4. There is probably no need to delve into the details to show that trade relations between the Soviet bloc and Israel are not important for the political leaders of the USSR.

Recently, the leaders of the USSR have demonstrated that they have little interest in trade with countries outside their bloc. The economic negotiations that took place in the last two years between the USSR and various Western states have not produced serious results in general. The statement transmitted through TASS by Mao Tse-tung that China is trying to get a loan from the USSR gives an idea of the new problems of global construction and development, which are currently on the agenda in the Soviet part of the world. On the other hand, no progress has been made during the year on the issue of commercial credit for Israel from the USSR. There are no signs that trade relations between the two countries will expand significantly in the near future, more this should be explained by the lack of interest and initiative on the part of the USSR.

Nevertheless, based on our political interests, we should not allow our trade relations with the USSR to be completely destroyed, even if there is an extreme limited economic opportunity. At the moment, our capabilities with regard to the USSR are wider than our trade ties with some countries of popular democracy. In this case, we also cannot expect the other side to be prepared to make economic concessions for political reasons. Most likely, such concessions will be required of us. No doubt, the Soviet bloc is still interested in accumulating dollars.

In any case, it is far from clear whether the size of our trade with the Soviet bloc will be able to significantly exceed trade relations between the bloc and the Arab countries, especially with Egypt. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the leaders of the USSR are deceiving themselves, believing that in the near future any balance of Israel's economic ties with the bloc and its ties with the West is possible. Our economic relations with the Soviet bloc are not without political significance. Under the circumstances, some economic activity could determine much in our relations with one of the countries of popular democracy. However, we should consider trade and economic relations as having a secondary, temporary, symptomatic nature, taking into account the main directions of the Soviet union's policy towards Israel.

5. The United Nations is in an exceptional situation in which Israel's clear, independent position, especially its neutrality, certainly makes a worse impression on the USSR. The number of Soviet bloc represented in the UN is very weak. This is not enough to maintain the balance of power in the world. Under the circumstances, Soviet leaders, of course, should view the UN General Assembly meetings mainly from the point of view of the propaganda effect. Statements of representatives of non-Soviet bloc states with attacks and harsh accusations against Western powers are almost always published in the Soviet press, while the list of states that voted in support of the Soviet union's proposals is

usually not published in full. Soviet emergency proposals are usually rejected. Representatives of the USSR obviously do not attach much importance to whether or not their proposal will receive one or two votes from the outside.

However, Israel's policy does not allow its representatives at the UN to sharply criticize any power, especially on matters of world politics. It is representatives of various Arab states that sometimes allow themselves pathetic statements against imperialism, etc.

Israel's neutrality, from the point of view of the USSR, is not an important factor for statistical voting figures. In fact, our representatives at the United Nations, given this aspect, cannot take a position that, from this point of view, would be very different from that taken by countries such as India or even Yemen.

Far-reaching changes in Israeli policy expressed through statements and votes are obviously impossible without changing the essence of Israel's independent position.

6. What is the answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section? What is the main positive factor from the Soviet Union's point of view justifying Israel's support in the past and continued, albeit partial, limited, support today, for example, on the important issue of the emigration of Jews from the countries of popular democracy?

The only logical answer seems to be that Israel's very existence in the Middle East is an objective factor that in many ways impedes the economic, social, political and military consolidation and integration of the Western-led region. It is very possible that, were it not for the existence of Israel, the Western Powers would have already been able to completely unify the region, even if there was rivalry between the Powers and contradictions among the Arab States.

Today, however, we are witnessing a new development. Western powers have come to terms with the existence of Israel. It is also very likely that western (and Arab) pressure is easing on both the refugee issue and the issue of borders.

On the other hand, Western powers seek, more or less jointly, to neutralize the tensions that have arisen in the Middle East as a result of the establishment of a Jewish State. Israel, for its part, wants peace with its neighbours. Israel does not agree to gain peace at all costs, but it also does not wish to make peace one of the conditions, such as the non-accession of the Arab sector of Palestine to Transjordan.

Israel will not agree to the deployment of foreign military bases on its territory and will not join any alliance against the USSR. However, we have seen that our policy is not of strategic importance in this matter.

In other words, objective processes can begin that will reduce the positive importance of Israel in the eyes of the Soviet leadership.

By the way, this is another argument in favour of our assumptions that the issue of Jewish emigration from Romania and Hungary is extremely urgent and we must be prepared to make the most vigorous political effort to resolve this problem in a way that would be acceptable at this historic juncture before it is too late.

**TELEGRAM OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY S. FRIEDMAN TO THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR M.NAMIR. June 12, 1949**

Rumours of arrests in Russia of Yiddish writers, based on various and increasingly numerous sources, are becoming more and more reliable. Dawar would like to publish in a very restrained manner an article on the issue, which would include a request to refute or explain this fact. In our view, this should not be prevented. What do you think?

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
HEAD OF THE MIDDLE AND MIDDLE EAST
DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY
I.N.BAKULIN WITH THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL
IN THE USSR M.NAMIR. June 21, 1949**

Secret.

Accepted Namir at his request. Namir told me that the United States had recently taken unofficial pressure on the State of Israel to accept Arab refugees by Israel, as well as to renegotiate and change existing borders in favour of Arab states. Namir stated that the Israeli government had rejected the American intervention as contributing to the Arab interventions against the State of Israel. At the same time, it insists on continuing direct negotiations with the Arab States.

At the end of the conversation, Namir, referring to his conversation with me on 19 May 1949 on the issue of the recognition of the Red Shield of David as the national society of Israel, stated that he was very pleased with the change in the position of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva conference on this issue. However, he added that if the delegations of the USSR, Ukraine, Belarus abstain in the vote of the Israeli proposal, according to the Israeli delegation, 15 delegations will vote for their proposal - to recognize the "Red Shield of David" as the national society of Israel. In this regard, Namir continued, I, on behalf of my ministry, once again ask the Foreign Ministry of the USSR that the delegations of the USSR, Ukraine and Belarus support our proposal. If the delegation of the USSR could not vote for the Israeli delegation's proposal for any reason, it would be good if the delegations of Ukraine and Belarus voted in favour of the proposal at the forthcoming plenary session.

I replied that I would bring Namir's request to the attention of the leadership of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

The conversation lasted 10 minutes.

The second secretary of the OBSV, T. Podvigin, was present at the conversation.

I. Bakulin, Head of the Middle East Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry

**LETTER FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE USSR
IN ISRAEL, M.I. MUHIN TO THE HEAD OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE USSR
FOREIGN MINISTRY I.N.BAKULIN. June 27, 1949**

Secret.

While directing the report of the COMMISSIONER of VOCS T. Fedorin on the holding of Soviet exhibitions in Israel, I want to draw your attention not only to the actual side of this case, which in itself is of great importance in the direction of the deployment of political propaganda, but also to the new conditions that we begin to face in conducting our events through the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR.

I have already reported on the pressure that the Israeli government is putting on the League. Now this pressure is intensifying, which has been reflected in the stubborn desire of the leadership of the government party to ensure the preservation of the old charter of the League, which includes clauses, to the failure of the saturated Zionist ideology. Moreover, the head of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Friedman, acting on behalf of the government, summons the leaders

The league literally declares to them that it is not satisfied with the real activities of the League, as the latter does not adhere to the government policy of "neutrality", and completely stands for the USSR against the Anglo-American bloc.

Friedman went on to say in the last of these conversations that if the League did not re-build its work, government officials would not participate in the League's mass events, and that he could assure the League's leadership that the Soviet mission in Israel would also not participate in them. If necessary, Friedman said, he is willing to formally negotiate with the mission.

We have also learned that the leadership of Mapai is preparing at the upcoming League congress to fail the desire of the Mapam and the Communists to build the League on a non-partisan principle - that is, free membership in the League on an individual basis.

In order to secure his overwhelming majority and influence in the League, Mapai wants to maintain the principle of party representation in the League based on the results of the Knesset or Histadrut elections. Thus, Mapai, concerned about the activities of the League, is trying to turn it into a reformist, toothless appendage to his party.

We believe that such a position of Mapai is tantamount to the liquidation of the League as an organ of real friends of the USSR, actively fighting for the cause of peace.

In these circumstances, we believe that it is necessary, through our ties with progressives, to oppose the policy of Mapai, up to the possibility of leaving the latter formally to participate in the work of the League.

I ask for your instructions.

M.Mukhin

P.S. In view of the materials contained in the Fedorin report and my comments in the accompanying letter, I ask you to support our request to the BOARD of VOCS for the allocation of funds for our political events.

M.M.

On the litter document: "I.N. Activities proposed by Mukhin have actually already been implemented, and we should no longer offer anything to the management. 4.07 A.Shiborin."

Application

Letter from the second secretary of the SOVIET mission in Israel, the commissioner of THES in Israel, M. P. Fedorin to the board member of THE RUSSIAN State, L.D. Kislova, and

the head of the Middle East Division of the USSR Foreign Ministry, I.N. Bakulin

June 25, 1949

Secretly

Israel Exhibition Report

I. "Military Art of the Soviet Army." (Tel Aviv, April 2 - May 9, 1949)

On April 2 this year, the exhibition "Military Art of the Soviet Army" was inaugurated in Tel Aviv. (A report on the organization of this exhibition in Haifa in January-February this year was sent.) The opening of the exhibition was attended by prominent cultural and public figures of Israel, officials, Knesset deputies, representatives of the government, representatives of the General Staff of the Israeli army, etc. Total more than 400 people were present.

All speakers (representatives of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR, General Staff, etc.) noted the power of the Soviet army, its liberation role in the Patriotic War and its decisive role in the struggle for world peace. (Dr. Eisenstadt's speech is attached).

The exhibition was arranged in one of the halls of the Habima Theatre. The central wall of the hall was decorated with a portrait of Stalin and a large model (1.5 meters in diameter) of the Order of Victory. On the other walls hung slogans about the Soviet army. The whole hall was beautifully decorated with flowers. Special posters about the exhibition were hung all over the city. The image of two fighters with a banner and weapons in their hands symbolized the exhibition. It was printed on posters, on invitation tickets, on entrance tickets. A special badge, the Order of Victory, with the words: "The exhibition "Military Art of the Soviet Army" was issued.

Various cultural events were organized at the exhibition:

1. Soviet films were shown in a separate 300-seat hall next to the exhibition hall. Twenty Soviet films were shown in total, including "Berlin," "zoya," "She Protects the Motherland," "There was a girl," "Two fighters," "It was in Donbass," "The Pig and the Shepherd," "Stone Flower" and others.

2. Three concerts were organized. Concert programs were varied (excerpts from Soviet plays, music and songs by Soviet composers, etc.).

3. Three lectures were held: "The Soviet Army," "The Heroism of the Soviet Army in Soviet Literature," "On Biological Science in the USSR."

4. Finally, the evening of remembrance of Mayakovsky - "Mayakovsky and the Soviet Army" organized on April 15 in connection with the date - 19 years since Mayakovsky's death - should be noted separately. The poet Alexander Peng made a report on Mayakovsky's life and work. He then read several of Mayakovsky's works, translated into Hebrew. In the second part of the evening the working choir "Rona" performed Soviet songs - a song about Stalin, about the Soviet army and others. The evening passed with a big rise.

The ceremonial closing of the exhibition took place on Victory Day - May 9.

The exhibition was a great success. It was visited by up to 12,000 people (more than 3.5 thousand of them military), which is a very large figure for Israel.

Many Israeli newspapers (Al Hamishmar, Kol Ghaam, Gaorel, etc.) have received good reviews of the exhibition. Large articles about the exhibition were placed in some Jewish newspapers of other countries (France, Poland). Visitors praised the exhibition, which was a very important and great event in Tel Aviv. Many progressives in Israel noted the timeliness of its organization as a reminder to the warmongers of the power and invincibility of the Soviet army.

It should be noted that the popularity of the exhibition largely depended on the good organization of it, on the

choice of premises, beautiful design, on the events held at the exhibition (films, lectures, concerts), on popularization of it with posters, ads in newspapers, etc. In total, about 1000 pounds were spent on organizing the exhibition. Of these, about 200 pounds were paid for the premises; for film equipment and film mechanics - about 250 pounds; more than 100 pounds spent on posters, newspaper ads, invitation tickets, etc.; about 100 pounds for the maintenance of the room (cleaning, etc.); then there are the costs of the exhibition, tax collections, etc.

In view of the fact that neither the Tel Aviv Committee of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR, nor the authorized VOKS had any funds to repay even the most necessary expenses for the organization of the exhibition, the entrance to it and film screenings were paid. This has significantly reduced the number of visitors. The costs of the exhibition could not be fully covered by the amount received from the sale of tickets. As a result, the committee had a deficit in excess of 250 pounds. (At the same time, the translation of an article about the exhibition from the newspaper Al-Hamishmar, samples of invitation tickets, tokens, newspapers published in Poland and France.)

I. "Russian and Soviet art." (Rishon-le-Cion, April 2-28, 1949)

An exhibition of paintings, sculptures and graphics was organized in the small town of Rishon-le-Cion through the local committee of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR. The exhibition was composed of the albums "All-Union Art Exhibition 1947" and "State Tretyakov Gallery", issue 1.

The exhibition was located in the people's club premises. The grand opening took place on April 14 this year, closing on April 28. About two thousand people visited the exhibition in two weeks. Paid entrance to the exhibition, of course, reduced the number of visitors.

Visitors to the exhibition showed great interest in Soviet art and expressed their desire to see such an exhibition in the originals.

The exhibition hosted a lecture on Russian and Soviet painting, two concerts of Soviet music (one of them in gramophone recordings) were held. The Soviet film "At 6 p.m. after the war" was screened in a 1000-seat cinema.

The exhibition had very positive reviews.

At the end of May, the exhibition was organized in one of the large agricultural settlements (kibbutz). En Gahorash. Within a few days, it was visited by up to 500 people, including members of neighbouring kibbutzim. According to representatives of kibbutz, the exhibition was also a great success.

III. "Education and Education in the USSR." (Jerusalem, April 28-May 18, 1949)

In Jerusalem, an exhibition "Education and Education" was organized through the local (Jerusalem) committee of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR (the report on the organization of this exhibition in Tel Aviv in January this year was sent).

The exhibition was visited by about 2,500 people.

IV. On the day of May 1st, we organized small exhibitions in agricultural settlements about the achievements of the Soviet Union using separate photo-selections.

1. The exhibition-photo collection "XXXI year of the Great October Socialist Revolution" was organized in the agricultural settlement, the kibbutz "En Gahorash".

2. The exhibition-photo collection "The Care of the State for Children in the USSR" was organized in the kibbutz "Givat Haim".

Naturally, we did not have the opportunity to visit these exhibitions in person. According to the representatives of the kibbutzim, the settlers showed great interest in them.

V. "Michurin's teaching is the basis of modern biology."

It should be noted separately the organization in agricultural settlements of the exhibition-album "Michurin's teaching is the basis of modern biology." The exhibition has already been shown in ten kibbutzim. Together with the exhibition, lectures were given on the basis of the report of

the academician T.D. Lysenko on the situation in biological science. The album-exhibition has been an extremely successful one. We continue to use it in other settlements.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the League has taken over the financial side of all the activities we are doing. As a result, the League has a significant debt to various institutions and individuals. As a result, it is not currently in a state of emergency to bear the cost of organizing any high-cost activities.

As you know, during the entire stay of the Soviet mission in Israel (since August 1948), the board of VOCS transferred only 70 Israeli pounds (in April this year) to the work of the WOKS commissioner in Israel. As I have noted in previous letters, due to lack of funds, we cannot even contribute a small subsidy to the costs that the League makes in organizing our events. Naturally, the lack of funds sometimes forces us to abandon the organization of very important activities. This is a totally unacceptable fact. We should not underestimate the importance of our events (the aforementioned exhibitions, lectures about the Soviet Union, concerts of music and songs by Soviet composers, demonstrations of Soviet films, etc.).

Currently, Americans are beginning to increase their influence in the cultural life of the country. In addition to the monetary assistance they provided to the university, the Tel Aviv Museum, and the Artists' Union, they are beginning to organize events in Israel. For example, on June 19 this year, the American Ambassador to Israel MacDonald opened an exhibition of American painting and sculpture in Tel Aviv, consisting of 145 original exhibits. In his speech, McDonald expressed hope that such an exhibition of Jewish art would be opened in America to strengthen cultural ties between Israel and the United States.

Holding our events in Israel will help neutralize American influence and strengthen cultural ties between the USSR and Israel.

In view of the foregoing, I would consider it necessary for the VOCS board to discuss this issue and find the means to continue the work of the WOCS Commissioner in Israel.

Appendix: mentioned.

Second Secretary of the USSR Mission in Israel

Fedorin

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
A.Y.VYSHINSKY AND THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR
M.NAMIR. June 29, 1949**

Secret.

At 1 p.m. received the newly appointed envoy of the State of Israel, Namir, who presented me with a draft credentials.

When I asked about Meyerson, Namir said that she now has a very difficult job involved in emigrating Jews to Palestine.

Referring to the general situation in Palestine, Namir pointed to the considerable economic difficulties associated with the resettlement of 220,000 new emigrants. At the same time, Namir stressed the need for early settlement of the Negev region in order to avoid Arab claims to the area.

Referring to the talks in Lausanne, Namir said the talks had stalled because Jews could not agree to Arab demands to accept Arab refugees before peace was concluded, which would mean allowing a "fifth column" into the country.

Asked if there were Any Arab troops in The Palestinian Territory, Namir said that there were no Arab troops in The Palestinian Territory, except for one point near the Syrian border.

Asked about the situation in Jerusalem, Namir said that there was a modus vivendi: in New Jerusalem—Jews, and in Old Jerusalem - Arabs.

Then Namir raised the question of the desirability of expanding trade relations with the USSR on the basis of granting credit to the Council - the Union. At the same time, Namir reminded that this question was already raised by Meyerson during a farewell conversation with me.

I replied that this was a big question and that it would need to be discussed.

In conclusion, Namir stated that he had been instructed by his government to formally invite a representative of the Soviet Union to pay a visit of friendship to the State of Israel. "Don't accept interference in your internal affairs," Namir added jokingly, "but our people and government would be especially happy to welcome Andrei Andreevich Gromyko, whose name is known by every schoolboy in Israel."

I thanked and, having promised to pass the invitation to the government of the USSR, I noticed that, speaking informally, it is not customary for us to send government delegations to other countries on a visit of friendship.

The conversation lasted 20 minutes. The conversation was attended by T. Gorokhov.

A. Vyshinsky

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR
M.NAMIR TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
CHARETTA. June 30, 1949**

In the continuation of telegram no. 633, sent by the Claire.

Vyshinsky was kind and very cordial, as in previous conversations. This time the conversation took the form of a kind of "crossword" which he kept asking questions that I was answering. Below is a summary of the conversation.

At the beginning of the conversation, Vyshinsky asked about Golda Meyerson's health and her functions in government. In describing Golda's work in the area of housing for returnees, I cited the figures and mentioned the need to distribute returnees by profession and to all regions of the country to meet the needs of a healthy national economy and rapid Israeli settlement, which is necessary for our security. The need to settle the Negev, which will excite the appetite of foreign states as long as it remains deserted, was particularly stressed. Vyshinsky noted that projects in the Negev will require huge investments in irrigation. To this I have informed that Jews all over the world are providing a lot of financial assistance, and the state itself is directing all its forces in the direction of progressive changes, but we will also need the loans of friendly countries. In this regard, I repeated Golda's request to expand trade links on a credit basis; Vyshinsky, in turn, repeated his promise to find out what can be done here. He then asked a number of questions about Syria and the situation in the Mishmar Hayarden area, Jerusalem and the situation at the Lausanne talks. I gave the necessary explanations, detailing our position on Arab refugees; my response was in the spirit of your statement in the Knesset⁶. Here Vyshinsky roughly repeated the assessment of Zorin, which I telegraphed to you on May 5: we are unnecessarily modest in assessing our achievements, our position is quite strong and there is no reason to worry. To

this I replied that we are very pleased with the joy expressed by our friends, but sometimes they see our current situation more optimistic than we are analysing the situation on the ground. Yes, the war has stopped, but there is no peace yet and there are still threats of revenge. It is possible that such a position is warmed up by certain forces from outside. It is our duty to be vigilant and to take care of the growth of our power in all areas for peace and security. In this Vyshinsky agreed with me.

At the end of the conversation, I extended to him your invitation to Gromyko, along with your arguments in his favour. Vyshinsky expressed sincere gratitude for the honour and for the invitation and said that he would have to bring it up for discussion, but in a personal manner (especially asking not to pass it on to you in any case) he said that the USSR usually does not send official government emissaries with visits of courtesy or friendly visits abroad, except when it comes to solving a particular problem. For example, the conclusion of a trade agreement, etc., the Soviet Union temporarily withered this rule only during the war years, when its special emissaries paid visits to allied countries. He doubts that the Soviet government will agree to allow a new precedent even for such an honourable invitation. In order to give more weight to his words, Vyshinsky gave an example illustrating the differences in the diplomatic practice of the USSR and other states: representatives of the Soviet government are strictly forbidden to accept foreign orders and medals, so every time a state decides to award one of them, for the Russians it is a severe headache. After that, he again asked not to give you his personal opinion and wait for the official answer to come. Moscow may not accept the invitation, but in no way should this be interpreted as a display of insufficient appreciation of your invitation: in this case, it can only be a matter of respecting the existing order. On the other hand, the WOKS society often sends artists and artists abroad, but not on behalf of the government.

From all this, I can conclude that the invitation will not be accepted, but the very fact of its transfer has had a positive impact to the full extent, as it has caused a clear satisfaction in Vyshinsky. When we talked about Gold, I didn't mention her stay in the U.S., nor did I mention the names of Americans who were visiting Israel. The conversation did not oblige to this.

With respect.

Namir

**LETTER OF A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF VOCS L.D.
KISLOVOVA IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY (B). July 4, 1949**

Secret.

At the request of T. Silence send you the information available to us about the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR in the State of Israel.

Appendix: mentioned, on 4 sheets.

Member of the Board of VOCS L. Kislova
application

Help about the League of Friendly Relations with the
USSR

Secret.

The League of Friendly Relations with the USSR was established in 1946 on the basis of the pre-existing Vi League. The general secretary of the League is a member of the Central Committee of the party Mapam Tarnopoler. The league is headed by the Central Committee, consisting of representatives of various parties in Israel: the Communist Party, the Workers' Party of Mapai, the united Workers' Party Mapam and other parties. This principle of party representation allowed the right-wing elements, i.e. the Mapai party, to dominate the League, which in practice led to the weakening of the League. Therefore, we cannot consider the League an organization of the type of cultural communication and friendship societies with the USSR, uniting broad segments of the Jewish population, party and non-partisan progressive figures of science, culture and art of the State of Israel.

Currently, the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR together with the commissioner of THES is conducting

preparatory work to reorganize the League and turn it into a more effective organization. In the near future, it is planned to convene a conference of the League, at which a new charter of the organization should be adopted and a new leadership is elected.

The work of VOCS in the State of Israel began after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the State of Israel, upon the arrival of the Soviet mission in Tel Aviv in August 1948.

The WOCS Commissioner in Israel relies mainly on Lyu, organizing with her various activities to promote the achievements of the Soviet Union: the exhibition of photo exhibitions of VOCS, the demonstration of Soviet films, lectures and reports on the life and culture of the Soviet Union, etc.

Thus, on January 1, 1949, the exhibition "Education and Education in the USSR" was opened in Tel Aviv, organized by the COMMISSIONER of THE VOKS together with the Lik of York friendly ties with the USSR. Five lectures were given to the Israeli intelligentsia: Lenin is a generational teacher, Education and Education in the USSR, New Soviet Literature, Soviet Theatre, Soviet Cinema. Four Soviet films were shown and four musical and literary evenings were organized with the participation of local performers. The exhibition and cultural events associated with it attracted the attention of the entire Israeli press, and a number of newspapers (Kol Haam, Al-Hamishmar, Dawar, Haaretz and Gaolam Gaza) have received positive reviews about the exhibition and articles on education and upbringing in the Soviet Union.

On April 28 this year, the same exhibition was organized in Jerusalem in the premises of the People's House together with the Jerusalem Committee of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR. At the opening of the exhibition, about 500 people gathered, including members of the Constituent Assembly of Israel, representatives of the municipality, the General Federation of Jewish Workers (Histadrut), political parties and public organizations,

educators, scientists and cultural figures. Weizmann, a member of the local committee of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR, who opened the exhibition, spoke about the great successes of the Soviet Union in education, education and education. Speakers at the exhibition spoke about the flourishing of science and culture in the multi-ethnic Soviet Union, where they serve the people, and called on scientists and educators in Israel to unite to protect peace.

On January 8, 2017, an exhibition entitled “Military Art of the Red Army” was opened in Haifa, organized by the COMMISSIONER of THE VOKS in conjunction with the Haifa Committee of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR.

About 5,000 people visited the exhibition in 15 days, more than half of whom were soldiers and officers of the Israeli army. The exhibition read the report “Soviet Army in Soviet Literature” and exhibited books and magazines on the subject of the exhibition. Explanations at the exhibition were given by lecturers of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR, mainly from the Israeli army. Large articles detailing the exhibition were placed in a number of Israeli newspapers (Al Hamishmar, Dawar, etc.), which noted the heroic struggle of the Soviet army with the Nazi occupiers and expressed gratitude to the Soviet army for the defeat of Hitler's Germany.

On April 2 this year, the same exhibition was organized in Tel Aviv in conjunction with the Tel Aviv League Committee. The opening of the exhibition was attended by members of the Constituent Assembly, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the headquarters of the army, public organizations, as well as cultural and art figures.

Speakers spoke of the great role of the Soviet army, which it played in the defeat of fascism, while emphasizing the liberating role of the Soviet army—a new type of army. Speakers also noted that the exhibition is very relevant: it demonstrates the power and military art of the Soviet army -

a faithful guard and bulwark of world peace. Dr Eisenstadt, a member of the Tel Aviv League Committee, called on Israel's progressive forces to mobilize to protect peace. On the first day the exhibition was visited by about 1500 people. It organized a screening of Soviet films, lectures about the Soviet army, and concerts of Soviet music.

All of these exhibitions have enjoyed great success in Israel.

Yu.Kosikina

**LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE
USSR I.N.BAKULIN TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE USSR
N.M. SHVERNIK. July 5, 1949**

In connection with the upcoming presentation of credentials, the newly appointed envoy of the State of Israel, Mordechai Namir, sent you a brief certificate about the State of Israel and a characterization of the envoy of Namir.

Head of the Middle east

I.Bakulin

Application

1. State of Israel
(brief reference)

July 5, 1949

Secret.

On May 14, 1948, a Jewish state called the State of Israel was created in Palestine on the basis of a decision of the UN General Assembly of November 29, 1947, and in connection with the end of the English mandate for Palestine. The area of this state, according to the UN plan, should be 14.1 thousand square kilometres.

Israel as of November 1948 is 782 thousand people. Of these, 713,000 Jews.

From 14 May 1948, the Jewish National Council in Palestine, from the founding of the State of Israel to 25 January 1949, it functioned as the Provisional Council of State and the provisional government it established as its executive body. ...

The State of Israel has a modern army consisting of aviation, tank units, artillery and other types of modern weapons. In Israel, there is universal conscription for men

between 18 and 40 years old and for childless women between 18 and 26 years old.

Even before the formation of the State of Israel, the Jewish Agency for Palestine paid great attention to the issue of Jewish immigration to Palestine. The Israeli Government is still paying exceptional attention to this issue. According to official figures, 120,312 immigrants arrived in Israel in 1948, of whom 27,756 arrived in December 1948. In the first quarter of 1949, about 75,000 people arrived. Most of the immigrants came from Eastern Europe. In total, according to the plan of 1949, at least 150,000 Jews are expected to arrive. Thus, if the Israeli Government implemented this immigration plan, by the end of 1949 the population of the State of Israel would be about 1 million people.

As a result of the British and Arab-Jewish war, the economic life of the State of Israel has been significantly undermined, and the planting area, food and basic necessities for the population have been reduced. In this regard, there is a great lack of food in the country, and it is distributed strictly by the card system. Speculation and inflation are flourishing. Unemployment has increased recently.

The Israeli Government has set up an economic coordination centre whose main task is to combat inflation and the rising cost of living. However, there have been no noticeable improvements in economic life yet. Workers in the Jewish and Arab populations are experiencing enormous hardship and hardship.

Citrus fruits occupy a large place in foreign trade. By the end of March this year, 5.5 million boxes of citrus fruits were sent abroad. The harvest of citrus fruits is expected to increase to 9 million boxes in 1949 and to 12-14 million in the following season.

On August 16, 1948, Israel announced the introduction of a new monetary system. In the past, Palestine had a Palestinian pound equal to the British pound sterling. The

new currency is called the "Israeli pound" equal to the Palestinian pound and the pound sterling.

Reactionary circles in the Israeli government have pursued anti-democratic policies towards progressive organizations and individuals. The Ministry of the Interior denied the Palestinian League for National Liberation's request to publish the newspaper Al Ittihad, which was closed by the British in March 1948, arresting the heads of the Congress of Arab Workers, dismissing communists and democratically minded persons from the State apparatus.

To date, the State of Israel has been recognized by 52 states and has been admitted to the UN. On May 15, 1948, the U.S. government recognized the state of Israel as de facto, and a few months later de jure. The United States is particularly active in strengthening its position in the State of Israel. U.S. infiltration began under British rule. In 1937, American investments in Palestine amounted to \$37 million, and in 1945 - 150 million dollars. But U.S. policy on the Palestinian issue is contradictory. This is because, on the one hand, the United States is home to an influential group of Jewish bourgeoisie, which supported the formation of the State of Israel and demanded from the ruling circles of America recognition of it and providing him with all possible assistance. On the other hand, the ruling circles of America are under intense pressure from the interests of large oil companies interested in the oil sources of Arab countries. In early 1949, the U.S. Export-Import Bank provided the state of Israel with a \$100 million loan.

The Israeli government is focused on the United States in its foreign policy. This was openly stated by Foreign Minister Moshe Charette on August 15, 1948 at a conference of Zionist socialists: "We have the right to hope that the USSR will understand that the state of Israel, which is a country of mass immigration and widespread resettlement, cannot be created without American Jews, without the American government."

The Government of England recognized the State of Israel as de facto at the end of January 1949. If earlier it could count on the fact that as a result of the war between Israel and the Arabs the parties will appeal to It England with a request to restore order, now that the State of Israel has already been established and exists, the British are fighting to regain control, if not the whole of Palestine, then at least part of it, by annexing it to Transjordan. In turn, the israeli Government's position on this issue has also changed many times.

From the first day of the discussion of the Palestinian issue at the UN, the USSR took a consistent and principled position. The Soviet delegation voted on 29 November 1947 to partition Palestine and form two democratic independent States, Arab and Jewish, there, and the USSR continues to believe that a solution to the Palestinian problem can be achieved on the basis of these general Assembly decisions.

On May 18, 1948, the Soviet government decided to formally recognize the State of Israel and its Provisional Government, and on May 24, 1948, to exchange diplomatic missions. The clear and direct policy of the Soviet Union in the Palestinian issue has led to a great increase in sympathy among the general population and the army of the State of Israel, despite the fact that the right wing of the ruling party, supported by representatives of other bourgeois and religious parties, seeks to diminish the importance and role of the USSR in the formation of the State of Israel.

According to our information, the Israeli mission in Moscow, consisting of Mapaists, tried to establish broad ties with the Jews of the USSR in order to create an immigration mood among Soviet Jews. On the part of the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, T. Sorin V.A., made an oral statement to the former Israeli envoy to the USSR Meyerson for the illegal activities of the Israeli mission, encouraging Soviet citizens to withdraw from Soviet citizenship, and on the distribution of the mission's newsletter to public organizations and individual Soviet citizens. At present,

Israel's reactionary circles are presenting anti-Soviet articles in the press and trying to undermine the authority of the Soviet Union in Israel.

The Arab States had taken the position of preventing the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine and were in favour of making Palestine a single Arab State, with the right of Jews to form local autonomy. From May 15, 1948 to January 1949, there were military actions of Arab troops against Israel. However, the Jews not only defended the borders of their state, but also occupied part of the territory of Palestine, intended by the UN to the future Arab state, which the Israeli government is now claiming.

On February 24, 1949, a truce agreement was signed between Israel and Egypt, a truce agreement was signed with Transjordan and Lebanon in April 204, and negotiations on a truce with Syria were underway. In addition, from April 1949 to the present, negotiations between the State of Israel and Arab countries, except Iraq, are taking place in Lausanne, with the participation of the UN Reconciliation Commission on the peaceful settlement of the Palestinian problem. The Arabs insist on Israel accepting Arab refugees and handing them over territories captured by Jews outside Israel's borders established by the UN. Jews do not agree with the proposals of the Arabs. Negotiations have stalled.

I. Bakulin

2. Characteristics on the Israeli envoy to the USSR M. Namir

July 5, 1949

Secret.

Namir was born in 1897 in the town of Bratolyubovka in Kherson region.

Prior to the revolution, he graduated from the economics department of the University of Odessa and the Odessa

Conservatory in the violin class. During the revolution he was one of the leaders of a youth Zionist organization in Odessa. He was arrested and left for Palestine after his release in 1924.

In Palestine, Namir was active in the Zionist movement, he is a member of the Israeli Labour Party Mapai.

At the time of the founding of the State of Israel, he traveled to the countries of popular democracy: Romania, Czechoslovakia - on the issue of Jewish immigration to Palestine.

In 1948, Namir arrived in the USSR as an adviser to the mission of the State of Israel.

In the Soviet Union live relatives of Namir: in Kherson - mother and sister, in Odessa - the sister of his wife.

According to reports, the leadership of the Mapai party at the departure of Namir to the USSR instructed him to establish contact with Jewish nationalists in the Soviet Union, through which to excite among Jews in the USSR the desire to emigrate to the state of Israel.

However, according to the IGB, so far there are no data on the anti-Soviet nationalist actions of Namir during his stay in the USSR.

I. Bakulin

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR
M.NAMIR TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
CHARETTA. July 8, 1949**

(a) During the conversation after the graduation ceremony with Schwernik and Gromyko, the first one showed interest and asked many questions to which I answered. He was interested in the problems of repatriation, industry, the situation in the labour market, in the field of housing, the absorption of new immigrants, the demographic situation, the problem of Arab refugees. As a result, my answers turned into a kind of forward-looking report, and Schwernik constantly interrupted me with new questions. I used Gromyko's presence to once again emphasize the importance of the early settlement of the Negev, as it is said in Russian, "badly lies" and, while remaining deserted, causes an appetite for the establishment of military bases. But the settlement of the Negev requires large investments and loans, which we also asked during the conversation with Vyshinsky (while waiting for a response). Speaking of demographics, I cited, in particular, the number of indicators on repatriation and for Arab refugees (used cautious language in accordance with your instructions in telegram 154).

b) Schwernik eagerly caught all new information. Gromyko intervened twice. For the first time on the issue of the settlement of the Negev, he stressed that this should be the way to curb the appetites of foreign expansionists. The second was when it came to the number of Jews in Israel who grew up on Ch in a short period of time. Gromyko asked me to stop for a moment and explained to Schwernik that human history does not know such precedents. At the end of the conversation, he stressed it once again. The atmosphere of the conversation was very good. Hello.

Namir

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.A.
GROMYKO WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR
M.NAMIR. July 11, 1949**

Secret.

Namir said he had come on a protocol visit.

I have noticed that it is obviously not difficult for Mr. Namir to begin his duties as a messenger, as he is not a new man here.

Namir stated that he was indeed familiar with the situation. The fact that he had to be the Charge d'Affaires of the Israeli Mission for 9 months helped him to get used to his job and made his current position as an envoy easier.

Namir went on to say that he would like to address some substantive issues. First of all, he was interested in the question already raised earlier about the possibility of obtaining a loan from the Soviet Union. He added that he had also spoken with Vyshinsky on the issue a few days ago.

I replied that I was aware of his conversation with Vyshinsky. I said further that this matter is being studied, but that at present I am not yet able to give it a definite answer.

Namir requested that the issue be expedited as far as possible, citing the fact that the Government of Israel would like to maintain trade relations with the Soviet Union.

Namir stated that he was asking the Soviet Union to support Israel's application to join the World Postal Union. He said that the Soviet Union had already once supported Such a request by Israel at the end of 1948, but that request had not collected the necessary majority of votes because some countries had either voted against Israel's admission to the World Postal Union or abstained, which was also considered a negative vote. In view of this outcome, his Government decided to re-apply when considering Israel's first request. At present, when the State of Israel is already recognized by

many countries, he said, there is a better chance that this request will must be collected by the necessary majority.

I replied to Namir that there was no doubt that the Soviet Union would take on the same position as it did when Israel's first application to join the World Postal Union was considered. In the end, Namir recalled the request he had made to Vyshinsky, as well as by Foreign Minister Charette, to send a Soviet friendship mission to Israel.

I replied that I was aware of the invitation, but that I was not yet able to answer the question.

That was the end of the conversation.

Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

A.Gromyko

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY B.F. PODCEROB
WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR M.NAMIR. July 12,
1949**

Secret.

Namir appeared on his own initiative with a protocol visit.

After exchanging protocol pleasantries, Namir said that the post of envoy to the Soviet Union was not entirely new to him. He was an adviser to the mission and therefore gradually entered the course of relations between Israel and the Soviet Union under Meyerson.

Asked what position Meyerson took in the government, Namir said she was the Minister of Labour, Social Security and Housing. The post, Namir added, is one of the most difficult in the government, especially with regard to the housing problem. A large number of immigrants should be resettled in Israel. Meanwhile, the construction of the dwellings was suspended by military action, which also required a large amount of money. However, the Government of Israel hoped to resolve the difficulties it faced within 5-10 years. In particular, Israel expects to receive construction materials and construction equipment from the Soviet Union on credit.

"We," Namir said, "are a country of imports. We expect to import a large number of different goods from the Soviet Union. After a while, we will be able to present to the Soviet Union a list of the goods that we would like to supply to it."

Namir asked me if the post of Secretary General had been in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a long time. I replied that such existed until 1943, after which it was abolished and recently restored.

At the end of the conversation, I wished Namir success in his work as an envoy to the Soviet Union.

The conversation lasted 15 minutes.

Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
USSR

B. Podcerob

**NOTE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR A.Y. VYSHINSKY TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
(B), CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE
USSR I.V.STALIN. July 14, 1949**

Secret.

On June 29 this year, in an interview with me, the envoy of the State of Israel in Moscow, Namir, stated that he had instructed his government to formally invite the representative of the Soviet Union to pay a visit of friendship to the State of Israel.

Namir said that the people and the government of Israel would be especially happy to receive as such a guest T. Gromyko A.A.

On 7 July, the invitation was also conveyed by Israeli Foreign Minister Charette to the Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Tel Aviv, Mukhin, and on July 11, Namir was repeated in a conversation with Gromyko.

I believe that the Israeli government intends to use such a visit of friendship to strengthen its positions in further bargaining with the United States and England in order to obtain a new loan and to ease the pressure of the Anglo-Saxons on the issue of borders, Arab refugees and Jerusalem. On the other hand, this visit will be used by official propaganda to raise the prestige of the reactionary ruling party Mapai in the masses of the national population.

In addition, the visit to Israel of the Soviet representative will cause a lot of different crooks abroad, which will undoubtedly try to use the U.S. and England to strengthen their influence in the Arab countries and to worsen our relations with them.

In view of the stated Foreign Ministry of the USSR considers it impractical to send a special Soviet representative on a visit of friendship to Israel and proposes

to give a negative response to the government of Israel, citing the fact that the Soviet government does not practice sending special missions to other states.

I'm asking for my consent.

A. Vyshinsky

**TELEGRAM OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY S. ELASHIVA TO THE ENVOY OF ISRAEL TO
THE USSR M.NAMIR. July 24, 1949**

In Milan, The Histadrut's delegation had a lengthy conversation with Kuznetsov and Korneev. They are interested in having Histadrut remain in the organization. They expressed their readiness to contact the workers of the West, but they reacted negatively to the desire of our delegation to bring the issue of repatriation to the plenary. At the initiative of Kuznetsov and under his chairmanship, a meeting was held with Romanians and Hungarians: they promised to support our demands to their governments and asked to submit them a written memorandum on this issue from our delegation. For the first time, The Soviet representatives agree to put our repatriation requirements from the Eastern bloc countries up for discussion. Kuznetsov demonstrated a desire to solve the problem to everyone's satisfaction.

Eliashiv

**REPORTING BY A.S.SEMIOSHKIN, ATTACHE OF THE
SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL, ON THE TRIP TO
NAZARETH AND TIBERIA. August 8, 1949**

Secret.

I. Property issue

In Nazareth, the Spiritual Mission is a garden on the central street. Currently, this area is cut off by an expensive road and the main part of it has long been rented by the owner of a restaurant built on the site.

Palestinian society has a large house in the city ("Moscow"), which houses all government agencies (governor, police, customs, post office, etc.). Next to this building is a plot with a small house ("Magli"), on one of the hills surrounding Nazareth, the society bought before the First World War to build a gymnasium a huge stretch by the road to favour; It's a bare place now. In the centre of the city is the so-called seminary garden (garden and old two-room guardhouse), which is rented to one Arab woman.

In Kafr Can, the Spiritual Mission has a spring garden on the road between Tiberias and Nazareth. The Arabs renting the site built temporary housing on it. The area of the site is obviously 5-6 thousand sq m (rather than 1,800 sq m, as stated in the English note). The society has a site here, surrounded by a stone fence; there are no buildings or trees on the site.

Near the ruined Arab village of Lubia is a section of the Spiritual Mission planted with wild oil trees.

In Tiberiad on the waterfront is a very old house of the Spiritual Mission. It was damaged by explosions of neighbouring buildings.

Between Magdala and Tiberias the church is a large garden on the shore of the lake near mineral springs. This section is cut into two halves; According to the stories of the

Russians living there, the northern part of the plot was cut to a neighbour by the court.

Currently in the Magdal garden, Sheiko said (Russian women also remember this) that the mission had a large plot of land in Tiberiad near the hot springs, but

Meletin (then the mission manager) refused to pay tax (5 pounds) and the plot seemed to have passed to the city.

In addition, near Lubia, the mission had a small piece of land to the left of the road to Tiberiada from Nazareth. These sites are not listed for

A spiritual mission in an English note, but information about them needs to be verified.

On the issue of our property, we visited the Mayor of Tiberias, who promised to renovate the waterfront house if the costs were not very high; in the latter case, he had promised to seek help from the Government of Israel.

Second. Russian possessions among Arabs

The Orthodox community of Nazareth received a lot of financial assistance from Russian institutions before the First World War. Palestinian society had more than 100 schools in Palestine and Syria; Nazareth opened a seminary (in the 1980s) in a rented building that housed up to 40 full-time students. Arab old men told us about a very good way to teach: the Arabs who graduated from our schools were the most educated people, even in Arabic. Special Arabic textbooks were produced for Russian schools in Palestine. In addition, Russia acted before the Turkish government as a defender of Christian Arabs. After the First World War, the White Guard Palestinian Society ceased any activity in terms of assistance to the Arabs. The last head of the emigrant Spiritual Mission Antony never served in Nazareth churches.

Currently, Nazareth has only one government school for the Orthodox, but at the same time Americans and Catholics are opening their schools to attract Orthodox Arabs to their side. It is reported that the Americans have already bought a plot near Nazareth to build a high school there.

Orthodox Arabs have always looked at Russia as a protector, and during Nazareth's visit by Archimandrite Leonid, they urged him to resume Russian activities in the sense of opening schools and more broadly protecting Christians (refugee, return, etc.). At the same time, it is necessary to note the great influence of the Communist Party among the Arab population of Palestine, in particular among young people. The Communist newspaper Al-Ittihad is now published in 2.5-3-thousand copies (this is a pre-war circulation that has not fallen, despite the fact that the number of Arabs in Palestine has decreased by almost 10 times), the government newspaper in Arabic "Al-Yaum" is published in circulation only in 200-300 copies.

Our interests demand that after receiving the property of Palestinian society, part of its income will go to the cause of education among the Arabs, because there is a very favourable ground for deepening the sympathy of the Arabs to the USSR.

Church Affairs

The Arab Orthodox clergy have been fighting the Greek priests for a long time, as the Greek patriarchy puts the Greek parishes at the head. At the same time, the Arabs receive no help or protection from the Greeks. Therefore, for example, in Nazareth and acre there are no Greek metropolitans, and the patriarchy sends only temporary representatives, which are replaced when the friction between the Greeks and the Arab clergy reaches a great tension. Dislike of the Greeks was manifested, for example, in the fact that during the reception in honour of Archimandrite Leonid, an Arab priest raised a toast only for Patriarch Alexis, and not for the Jerusalem and Greek patriarch Timothy.

With regard to our property interests in the Arab part of Palestine and the historical relationship between Orthodox churches here, we now obviously have to maintain normal

relations with the representatives of the Greek Church, while strengthening the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate among the Arabs.

Mission attaché Semioshkin

**TALKING POINTS TO THE SPEECH OF THE USSR
DELEGATION AT THE FOURTH SESSION OF THE UN
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE ISSUE OF ASSISTANCE TO
PALESTINIAN REFUGEES. August 31, 1949**

Secret.

1. The issue of Palestinian refugees is an inseparable part of the Palestinian problem as a whole. The radical resolution of this issue, as well as the whole problem, now depends on the early implementation of the UN General Assembly's decision of 29 November 1947 in terms of the establishment of an independent Arab state in the territory of the Arab part of Palestine, which will enable the return of a significant part of the refugees to their homes and peaceful creative work.

2. The problem of Palestinian refugees arose as a result of the policies of certain monopolistic circles in England and the United States, which were interested in delaying the overall settlement of the Palestinian question by attempting to revitalize the General Assembly's decision of 29 November 1947 in order to secure favourable military, strategic and economic positions to the detriment of the Arab and Jewish peoples.

3. It is known that the imperialist circles of England and the United States, through their policy of thwarting the peaceful resolution of the Palestinian issue and by attempting to revitalize the UN General Assembly's decision of 29 November 1947, have created the conditions for military action in Palestine, which have caused great suffering for the Jewish and Arab peoples and created the problem of Palestinian refugees. In this regard, the Egyptian newspaper South al-Umma wrote on March 18, 1949, that "the aggressive policy of the United States is the root cause of the tragedy experienced by Arab refugees."

4. Now these same circles, whose efforts have actually created the problem of Palestinian refugees, are trying to exploit the suffering of the victims of their own policies by continuing to resist the common peace settlement in Palestine and replacing it with palliative, ostentatious measures that can only partially alleviate the plight of refugees, but fail to resolve it and solve the whole problem.

5. Reports from the international press indicated that the Palestinian refugee problem had been the subject of a behind-the-scenes bargaining and pressure on the Jewish and Arab Governments, and that the UN Reconciliation Commission had, as might be expected, become an instrument of the monopolistic circles of the United States, which sought to dictate their solution and thus developed more and more plans, thus complicating the situation in Palestine and prolonging the overall solution to the Palestinian question.

6. These reasons can be explained by the fact that the Reconciliation Commission speaks not the language of the United Nations, but the ruling circles of the United States. Thus, the press reports that the U.S. representative to the UN Reconciliation Commission Porter allowed himself on July 31, 1949 to promise Arab countries immediate dollar aid if they agree to accept a certain part of the refugees. It has been repeatedly reported in the press that the ruling circles of the United States put a lot of pressure on the government of the state of Israel. The fact of the press is also confirmed by the memorandum of the Israeli Representative to the UN, Mr. Eban dated 29 July 1949.⁸

7. In this regard, Al Hamishmar (Tel Aviv) wrote on 20 June 1949 that "all issues related to the establishment of peace between the Jewish and Arab States - the issues of borders, the future of Jerusalem, the future of Jerusalem - are discussed by the Americans as if the United States, not the United Nations, were a legitimate international body that could advise on the question of Palestine. The United States now regards Palestine as a sphere of special influence, and

President Truman demands an ultimatum to the Israeli government, while the “mediators” and “conciliators” do their best to prevent direct contact between Jews and Arabs in Lausanne.”

8. The UN Conciliation Commission does not heed the demands of the Palestinian refugees themselves. This can be seen at least from the decision of the Congress of Arab Refugees, which took place on July 28, 1949 in the city of Sahle (Lebanon). At this Congress, representatives of Arab refugees currently in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Transjordan and the Arab part of Palestine, supported the decision of the UN General Assembly of November 29, 1947, categorically rejected Bernadotte's plan, opposed the partition of the Arab part of Palestine between the Arab states or its accession to any of them. Congress favoured the establishment of an independent State in the Arab part of Palestine and opposed refugee projects where they were currently located, considering them to be projects by foreign imperialists.

9. Consequently, the drafts of the UN Reconciliation Commission run counter to the genuine aspirations of Palestinian refugees, who see a solution to the refugee problem only in the spirit of an honest and sustained implementation of the UN General Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947. and from the aspirations of the monopolistic circles of the United States and England.

10. The Reconciliation Commission acknowledges in the third report, paragraph 15, that it has achieved nothing in the implementation of the General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948. The UN Conciliation Commission proved to be an unsuitable and incapable instrument for dealing with the critical issues of Palestine. On this basis, the Soviet delegation proposes to dissolve the commission and to place the monitoring of the cessation of hostilities and peace in Palestine on the Security Council.

11. The United Nations could no longer tolerate the protracted radical solution to the refugee issue and its

substitution by palliative measures, temporary voluntary assistance.

It must focus its efforts on reaching a solution that would enable Palestinian refugees to use their labour effectively and thus provide reliable and sufficient means for their livelihood.

12. The Soviet delegation believes that a radical solution to the refugee problem is the conclusion of peace between the Arab countries on the one hand and the State of Israel on the other, as well as the swift implementation of the General Assembly's decision of 29 November 1947 to establish an independent Arab State in the territory of the Arab part of Palestine. Such a solution was in the interest of the cause of peace and for a radical solution to the refugee issue.

**LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF VAO
“INTOURIST” V. ANKUDINOV TO THE HEAD OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE USSR
FOREIGN MINISTRY I.N.BAKULIN. September 3, 1949**

Secret.

A certificate of licensing and parcel operations from Palestine and the State of Israel is sent to the government.

Appendix: mentioned, on 1 sheet.

Chairman of the Board of WAO Intourist

V. Ankudinov

APPAL Help on licensed parcel operations

August 31, 1949

secretly

On July 20, 1942, “Intourist” concluded a contract with the Palestinian firm “Pelturs” to send parcels to the USSR with payment of duties and other fees in foreign currency, charged to senders on the spot. In addition, Intourist receives 10% commission on the amount of goods contained in parcels.

This one-year contract was extended between 1943 and 1948 on the basis of telegram exchange. On February 24, 1949, with the permission of the leadership of the SOVIET MWT, Intourist signed a new contract with Pelturs for a period of two years, that is, until February 24, 1951.

At the same time, on April 30, this year, Intourist signed a contract with Shub and Maryanovsky in Tel Aviv on terms similar to that of Pelturs.

Currency proceeds for parcel operations from Palestine (now from the State of Israel) are presented in the following form (thousands of rubles):

1942 - 85.7 1946 - 1,300.0

1943 - 138.9 1947 - 736.0

1944 - 244.0

1945 - 4,206.6, 1949 - 158.0 (7 months)

Since there was no postal convention between the USSR and Palestine, parcels were sent until 1948 through Iranian and English mail.

Currently, parcels from the State of Israel are sent to the Soviet Union mainly through Swiss mail.

Chairman of the Board of WAO Intourist

V. Ankudinov

**FROM THE REFERENCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
MIDDLE EAST OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY
“PALESTINIAN ISSUE”. September 3, 1949**

Secret.

Positions and objectives of the great powers on the Palestinian issue

1. The Palestinian question reflected the deepening of the general crisis of the capitalist system and the bankruptcy of the colonial policies of the imperialist Powers. It is connected with the struggle of monopolistic groups for the possession of oil resources of the Middle East and the aspirations of England and the United States to turn the Middle East into a military-strategic foothold against the Soviet Union.

It should be borne in mind that the Palestinian coast is of great importance for the transportation of Middle Eastern oil, the refuelling of the navy's fuel and the organization of air communications. Consequently, the loss of Palestine is a major blow to British colonial interests in the Middle East. On this basis, the British and American imperialists cling to Palestine and deliberately complicate the Palestinian question.

2. It is known that the Arab aggression in Palestine was provoked by the British, who used the low-lying nationalist aspirations of the Arabs and pushed them to war against the Jews. In its policy on the Palestinian issue, Britain had the following objectives: to consolidate its position in the Arab countries, to strengthen its shattered prestige and to clear the way for the conclusion of allied treaties, to divert the national liberation movement from the demands for revision of bonded treaties.

On the basis of these goals and fearing the sharp discontent of the Arabs, Britain sided with the Arab countries in order to implement their intentions with the hands of the

Arabs themselves. Initially, the British expected to occupy the Arab part of Palestine with Transjordan troops, but when it became clear that other Arab countries would not allow it, the British recommended a new plan to occupy Palestine in parts by the Arab armies.

Particular attention was paid to the Trans-Jordanian troops, who were tasked with capturing most of Palestine and securing access to the Mediterranean. This stemmed from the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty of 1948 and England's desire to preserve the strategic bridge linking the Mediterranean Sea with the Persian Gulf, as well as to ensure the reliability of communications and the access of Iraqi oil to the ports of the Mediterranean Sea. However, the calculations of the British have not yet been justified, as the region of the Negev has moved to the state of Israel, and the latter does not express a desire to cede the southern part of the Negev, seeking to preserve the access to the Red Sea.

3. The U.S. position on the Palestinian issue is very inconsistent, as it faces sharp contradictions of internal and external nature: oil monopolies seek to seize Arab oil and for this purpose do not want to aggravate with the Arab countries, military expansionists seek to oust the British from Palestine and get there military-strategic bases, political parties seek to enlist the support of influential Jewish financial circles of the United States. Under the influence of these contradictions, the U.S. position is undergoing sharp fluctuations, which undermines the political prestige of the United States in Arab countries.

In its efforts to revitalize the decisions of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947, the United States aims to consolidate its position in the Middle East and to dictate the solution of the Palestinian question to its advantage. Now the British and Americans are engaged in behind-the-scenes bargaining, trying to agree among themselves on the issue of delineating zones of influence in Palestine. Moreover, the British are trying to extend their control to the Arab part of Palestine and the Negev region in order to annex this part to

Transjordan, and the Americans are trying to consolidate their positions in Israel and create military and strategic bases there. This bargaining is covered by the British and American imperialists unbridled anti-Soviet propaganda designed to hide their true intentions, intimidate the reactionary elements of the Arab countries with “Soviet danger” and persuade the governments of Arab countries to create all sorts of anti-Soviet blocs.

4. The Soviet Union was the only great Power to take a principled position on the Palestinian issue that was in line with the true aspirations of the Arab and Jewish peoples. Soviet representatives at the UN have consistently defended the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, and it was only through this consistency and determination that the British and American imperialists failed to impose their solution to the UN.

Now that the State of Israel has become a reality, and the policy of the British and American imperialists on the Palestinian issue has been strongly exposed by Soviet delegates, the Arab peoples are beginning to get rid of the nationalist snout and realize that only the policy of the USSR is aimed at a just solution to the Palestinian question.

Given that the United States and Britain continue their attempts to revitalize the General Assembly's decisions of 29 November 1947 and seek to secure their imperialist interests in Palestine, the position of the USSR should be to defend the decision, especially with regard to the establishment of an independent Arab state in the Arab part of Palestine. Under this provision, this position may receive support from some Arab States (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon), which will paralyse the possibility of the Arab part of Palestine joining Transjordan and facilitate the adoption of the international statute of Jerusalem.

findings

1. Over the past two years, the Palestinian problem has not been off the UNITED-Off agenda. This is also due to the fact that the interests of the British and American

imperialists who seek to strengthen their positions in that country are interbred in Palestine, and the decision of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947 confused the imperialist plans and made their implementation much more difficult. These reasons can be explained by the desire of the British and American imperialists to audit the general Assembly's decision of 29 November 1947 and to dictate their decision.

2. Interest in the Palestinian problem of both British and American imperialism and the ensuing intrigues, behind-the-scenes negotiations and pressure on Arabs and Jews have created a difficult political environment and a protracted solution to the Palestinian problem. Out of interest, the British and American imperialists are stalling the peaceful settlement of the Palestinian question and seeking to use the tense situation in the country as a means of exerting pressure on Arabs and Jews to secure advantageous positions.

3. The Arab aggression provoked by British imperialism in Palestine revealed the military weakness of the Arab States, exacerbated the contradictions in the Arab camp and further undermined the political prestige of England. At the same time, the Arab aggression in Palestine has brought a number of new and very serious problems: the issue of the State borders of the State of Israel and the Arab part of Palestine, the question of Arab refugees and their improvement, the issue of peace between the State of Israel and the Arab countries.

4. Despite the best efforts of the British and American imperialists, they failed to prevent the emergence and strengthening of the State of Israel, which has become a reality and is now recognized by 57 States, as well as adopted at the third session of the General Assembly as a member of the United Nations. At present, the British and Americans agree among themselves on mutual concessions at the expense of the Arab part of Palestine. In this regard, the United States does not raise the issue of the formation of an independent Arab state in the Arab part of Palestine, and

Britain takes all measures to ensure that this part of Palestine was annexed to Transjordan, and seeks to persuade Israel to hand over to the Arabs (Transjordan) the southern part of the Negev and receive in return all Galilee.

5. The most important task of the United Nations in solving the Palestinian problem should be: the establishment of an independent Arab state in the Arab part of Palestine, which would enable a large part of the refugees to return to their homes and peaceful creative work; the conclusion of peace between the Arab countries on the one hand and the State of Israel on the other; resolution of all contentious issues through direct peace talks between Arabs and Jews; establishing the international statute of Jerusalem and protecting the “holy sites”. Such a solution to the Palestinian question would be in the interest of the cause of peace and the true aspirations of the Arab and Jewish peoples.

Bakulin
Hare
Gnedich

**LETTER FROM ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. S
HERETTE TO ISRAEL'S ENVOY TO THE UK, M. ELIAS.
September 11, 1949**

Soy. Secret.

Read your commemorative note of September 210. The problem that you have been able to formulate so extensively is indeed one of the most painful in our politics, and I have no doubt that we will have to find solutions for a long time.

It is obvious that we cannot yet deviate from the general line of our official policy.

First, it is impossible for us to express open solidarity with the West because of the negative consequences it will have for the repatriation process. Such a change in our position would eliminate any possibility of resuming repatriation from Romania and Hungary. At the same time, this will lead to the abolition of the promises made to us by Poland and Czechoslovakia. In addition, the hope for repatriation from the USSR itself has not been lost, and our turn to the West will completely bury this hope.

Secondly, a departure from the principle of non-alignment to the West will be seen by Eastern European Jews as evidence that we are abandoning them to their fate. As for the Soviet Jews, such a move by Israel would have to cause a rupture of spiritual connection with the Jewish state.

Thirdly, it would be a blatant ungrateful attitude towards the USSR and its allies, especially given the invaluable political and practical assistance they to us at a crucial stage. If it were not for their position then, it is highly doubtful that we would receive U.S. support for the idea of creating a Jewish state, a resolution of November 29, 1947, the rapid recognition of Israel by the United States and admission to the United Nations. And now our path to the UN is rather thorny, and we have no right to neglect the help, no matter who it comes from. In practical terms, it seems that

neither the political line taken against us by the UK at all stages of the UN debate, nor the current position of the US State Department on vital border and refugee issues are not the reasons that could force us to abandon the search for assistance from the USSR on the international stage. Finally, morally, Israel should not demonstrate in the international arena an example of black ungratefulness and train its citizens to pay evil for good.

Fourthly, such a change in our official policy can lead to serious internal upheaval. The constant confrontation between the current coalition and the left-wing opposition may seem like a childish prank compared to the hell that will turn into the internal life of the country and the situation in the trade union movement, if there is a turn in the policy of Israel. At this stage, when we are grappling with the enormous difficulties associated with the absorption of mass repatriation, the need to reduce the cost of electricity, the establishment of a regular army, etc., we should categorically avoid any steps that could exacerbate discord and discord between rival political camps and create confusion among the Israeli public. Such an internal crisis will have a negative impact on foreign policy relations, will exacerbate the existing tendencies of certain forces to establish independent ties with foreign states. And in fact, it is unlikely that the benefit of a turn in politics will outweigh the harm done to them.

It seems to me that the first three reasons can serve as arguments (of course, if appropriately formulated) in conversations with credible politicians. The fourth argument is not for external use, as it contains an indirect recognition of the seriousness of our internal problems. At most, one can hint at such problems, pointing out that haste in foreign policy steps can only exacerbate internal conflicts, which can be overcome more easily and more effectively by careful and moderate steps.

At the same time, such conversations should emphasize that Israel's foreign policy is one thing and its position on

major social, economic and cultural issues is another. The State of Israel is by no means passive and neutral in the global debate. Israel will not deviate from the essence of the concept of democracy. Both in its present and in its vision of the future, Israel is an integral part of the democratic Western world, adhering to the best traditions of internal democracy developed by countries such as Great Britain, the United States and the Scandinavian States. On issues of ideology, Israel takes a clear anti-communist stance.

At the same time, it should be relentlessly explained that foreign policy based on non-alignment to any of the world's blocs is the only way for Israel to minimize difficulties and maximize efficiency in addressing pressing problems at this stage of development and the formation of a State. First of all, it allows Israel not to get involved in the Cold War. As a member of the UN, Israel is not ready to give up hope in advance to prevent another war, so it considers it its duty to make efforts to find common ground and areas of cooperation between the democratic world and the communist bloc.

First of all, no one has the right to condemn Israel for what it sees as the greatest danger to its own existence, to the Jewish people and to the world in the threat of a third world war. We have the right to hope and to expect that the world will be saved from a devastating catastrophe. In our conversations with credible politicians, we should openly acknowledge the positive importance of NATO, the restoration of Western Europe, the show of power by Western powers as a means of stopping Russia and persuading it to compromise. The Communist wave has already been brought down in Italy and in France, true democracy and democratic socialism are making major strides in raising the living standards of the masses, and this can stop the spread of Communist influence. It is difficult for us to assume that the West will declare war on the USSR in a situation when it is already retreating. Wouldn't the enlightened public opinion

of western democracies oppose the idea of a “preventive strike”? We think he's going to perform.

As for the arguments comparing the USSR to Nazi Germany, referring to their aggressive tactics of absorbing victims, one by one, it seems to me that, although all totalitarian regimes have something in common, in principle there is a huge difference between the two powers. It would be wrong to accuse Stalin of committing crimes of Hitler's scale. Germany sought to conquer the West from the moment when individual principalities united into an empire; it did not give up trying to seize control of the sea, acquire or return the colonies. Hitler initially set the task of achieving world domination and sought to realize it by force of arms. The USSR and its allies behave differently. Propaganda and organization are the main weapons of the Soviets. Of course, they do not neglect the power of weapons, but they do not give themselves hope that they will be able to conquer the world through a bloody war. The Soviet bloc extends over vast areas, but it can be closed to itself, to be self-sufficient. Bolshevik Russia has repeatedly argued that if its national and state status is threatened by the exacerbation of contradictions between communism and capitalism or between communism and democratic socialism, it is able to mobilize propagandists abroad to defend the “socialist homeland”. If relations stabilize against the background of the cessation of communist expansion or the imposition of “people's democracy” regimes in new countries, there will be real prospects to remove the military threat and even completely eliminate it.

If war becomes inevitable, especially if the countries of real democracy are subjected to aggression by totalitarian regimes, there will be a situation where Israel will be forced to determine its position. In this case, the essence of such a “definition” is beyond doubt. Israel will not remain neutral in the face of the fateful choice between freedom of the human spirit and enslavement. But we should not be required to make an immediate choice out of fear of such a development

at any time in the future, as hasty self-determination can be an obstacle to our growth and development. Israel's principled position on the fundamental problems of the democratic world can serve as a sufficient guarantee for the Western Powers and prevent their attempts to put our State before the choice of refusing their assistance or publicly and immediately declaring their full solidarity with them.

The question of preparation and coordination remains. Within certain limits, this problem is solved without a clear turn in our foreign policy or other practical manifestations of solidarity with the Western bloc and joining the world front. However, before we claim that we are not conducting general preparations for repelling Soviet aggression (the danger of which we are imaginary) and that we are the weakest link in the democratic front in the Middle East, our views should also be taken into account. It is that the necessary steps are not being taken to protect the region from the real threats of communist invasion, an invasion that can be carried out not through outside occupation but through propaganda and organizational work within. The Middle East can avoid this threat only if efforts are made to develop the region on a large scale, not to strengthen existing regimes, but to improve the standard of living of the masses and meet their needs. This requires not only direct assistance to arab countries, but also a real opportunity for Israel to play a creative role in this development of the region, an example and a driving force.

Attempts to contain and weaken Israel not only hinder the successful development of the Middle East, which could be a barrier to Sovietisation, but encourage and reinforce in Israel itself such tendencies that are totally contrary to the stated objectives of the Western Powers.

In this regard, comparisons between Israel's political position and those of the Arab countries are comparisons aimed at presenting Arabs in a favourable light and us at a disadvantage and insulting both our common sense and our sense of self-respect. The Arab States, after all, will always

support those in whose hands the power. The origins of their anti-communism lie in nothing more than in the natural fear of certain ruling groups, for which the victory of the USSR in the Middle East would mean social and physical death. Israel, on the other hand, opposes communist expansion because such a position has deep roots in the hearts of people, relies on the power of free consciousness of the masses, who honour the values of human freedom and are ready to give their lives for them.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.A.
GROMYKO WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY S. ELASHIV. September 19, 1949**

Secret.

It's 3:00 p.m. Eliashiva accepted at his request. Eliashiva was accompanied by Israel's envoy to Moscow, Namir.

After exchanging the usual greetings, Eliashiv said hello to me from Israeli Foreign Minister Charette.

I thanked and asked to say hello to Charette.

Eliashiv stated that he had visited a number of Eastern European states to inspect Israeli missions in those countries. Eliashiv then said that among the difficult issues to be discussed in the General Assembly was the question of the Jerusalem Statute. The proposals of the Conciliation Commission published a few days ago¹¹ provoked a sharply negative reaction in Israel. The main points of these proposals are: the demilitarization and neutralization of the Jerusalem zone, the division of the city into two zones, the formation of self-governing bodies of each zone, the appointment of a UN commissioner with greater powers, the prohibition of immigration, the establishment of an International Tribunal to deal with conflicts between the authorities of the zones, as well as all disputes over the Holy Places.

These proposals are unacceptable to Israel not only because they circumvent the question of sovereignty and prohibit Jewish immigration, but also because they do not provide security for the Jewish part of the city, which is surrounded on three sides by Arab territory. The city of Jerusalem cannot be separated from Israel because it is an integral part of it. Otherwise, Jerusalem is at risk of degradation.

When I asked what Israel's proposals were, Eliashiv replied that Israel believes that part of Jerusalem (The New City should be transferred to Israel, the Holy Places in the Old City should be placed under international control, and this control should be not geographical, but functional.

I have noticed that Israel's current position on The question of Jerusalem is different from its position a year ago. Eliashiv replied that changes had taken place over the past year, which had changed Israel's view on the issue.

Then Eliashiv asked what the position of the USSR is in the issue of the Statute of Jerusalem. I replied that our position would be expressed at the General Assembly. The principled position of the USSR is known as far as details are concerned, it will be easier to talk about it in the Assembly, especially since there has always been contact between the Soviet and Israeli delegations on the Palestinian issue.

At the end of the conversation, Namir asked me if the issue of trade relations with Israel had been resolved.

I replied that the matter was still being studied. Namir asked me to speed up the resolution of this issue and said that in connection with immigration economic issues are vital for Israel, which is very interested on the political and economic side in maintaining economic ties with the USSR, considering it an important factor in the development of the state, especially since Israel stands on a position of neutrality and is interested in maintaining friendship with all states.

The conversation lasted 15 minutes.

V.Gnedych was present at the conversation.

A.Gromyko

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE
USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY I.N.BAKULIN WITH THE
DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT
OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY S. ELIASHIV.**

September 20, 1949

It's 3:00 p.m. Eliashiva accepted at his request. Eliashiva was accompanied by the Israeli envoy to Moscow, Namir.

The conversation was mostly protocol.

At the end of the conversation, Eliashiv raised the issue of Russian property in Palestine and, in particular, the property of Russian Palestinian society, stating that the Israeli authorities were prepared to hand over the property immediately to the representative of the society as soon as he arrived in Israel.

I replied that a representative of the society would soon be leaving for Israel.

The conversation lasted 20 minutes.

The attaché of the OBSV T. Gnedykh was present at the conversation.

I. Bakulin, Head of the Middle East Division

**NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
MIDDLE EAST OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR
I.N.BAKULIN TO THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE USSR A.A. GROMYKO. September 29,
1949**

Secret.

I am sending you a note of Ershov "On the Situation in Israel" and an attached draft of instructions to the Soviet envoy to Israel, prepared by him with our participation.

Due to the fact that in August 1948 Ershov, together with the composition of the entire mission, traveled as a matter of urgency and the situation in the then state of Israel was still unclear, no directives were prepared for Ershov.

At present, with regard to his impending return to Tel Aviv, it would be appropriate to give him guidance on the main issues of our mission in Israel.

Appendix: mentioned, on 9 sheets.

I. Bakulin

On the document of the litter: "The instructions to Ershov were not approved. In the case. 15/11 A.Shiborin."

application

Commemorative note of the Soviet Envoy to Israel P.I. Ershov "On the Situation in Israel"

September 29, 1949

Secret.

1. The State of Israel is a young, yet fragile state. The population (about 1 million people) retained the influence of culture and the difference in the dialects of the Jewish language of the former host countries. In social nature, its main part consists of small bourgeoisie and persons of free professions. The working class has no more than 35,000 people. There are 14 political parties in the country, including two Communist Parties until recently. In the elections to the Constituent Assembly on January 25 this year with 425,000 voters ran 21 electoral lists.

However, along with differences in population composition and political fragmentation, almost the entire population is Zionist, fanatically believes in Zionism and considers it its only correct ideology. All political parties, with the exception of the Communist Party of Israel and one religious party, recognize Zionism.

2. Israel's economic situation was dire and there were no indications that it would change for the better in the near future. With the outbreak of war in Palestine and the withdrawal of the Arab population from its Jewish part, the acreage and livestock population were significantly reduced. The country is not supplied with its own food and raw materials and is totally dependent on imports. There is a lack of food products, rising prices and speculation. Newly arrived immigrants do not go to agriculture, but try to settle in trade and industry, which cannot absorb them. As a result, unemployment is increasing in the country.

3. The domestic political situation is now characterized by an escalating struggle between Israel's reactionary and progressive forces. The social composition of the population and the weakness of the working class allowed the reactionary forces, represented by the reformist right-wing Socialist Party of Mapai, the bourgeois-clerical parties and the fascist Party of Herut, which emerged from the terrorist group Irgun tswai leumi, to win the elections to the Constituent Assembly and to create a majority in it, providing support for the government and the adoption of its

bills. Reaction forces seek to create a state of Israel like the bourgeois states of Western “democracy”, call for the full encouragement of private initiative and the attraction of foreign capital to the country. In foreign policy, they favor the orientation to the United States and England with a hostile, but so far restrained attitude to the USSR.

Israel's progressive forces are clustered around the United Workers' Party (Mapam) and the Communist Party. Mapam is the second largest (after Mapai) party. It recognizes Zionism, but is a left-wing direction in the Zionist movement. He considers himself a Marxist party and tries to combine Zionism with Marxism and “develop” the position of Lenin and Stalin on the Jewish issue “in new historical conditions” in the conditions of the existence of an independent European state. In his practical work, Mapam fights for the effective independence of Israel, criticizes the pro-American policy of the government and advocates the establishment of friendly relations between Israel and the Soviet Union and the countries of popular democracy. The party has a group of individuals, led by former Hagana commander Dr. Moshe Snee and Central Committee Secretary Jacob Riftin, which over time could make the party more progressive.

The Communist Party of Israel is insignificant in terms of number and influence in the country. He makes mistakes on tactical and organizational issues. Needs serious help.

Recently, Mapam and the Communist Party have been working together on separate issues.

4. The Government of Israel, formed on 8 March this year by Ben Gurion, is a bloc of reformist Mapai party with bourgeois-clerical parties without the participation of the Mapam and the Communist Party. During the war, the Government's domestic policy was aimed at creating, strengthening and supplying the army. Currently, it is to strengthen the country's financial base, improve the economic situation, accommodate and accommodate immigrants. The Government is clearly not up to the task,

with the vast majority of immigrants remaining in camps, unemployed and struggling, as evidenced by the violent demonstrations of the unemployed in Tel Aviv and Haifa. In its programme, the Government aims to double the population of Israel within four years at the expense of new immigrants, to involve them in production and agriculture, to carry out major irrigation and plantation activities in the Negev and other uninhabited areas. The plan includes the promotion of private initiative and the attraction of foreign capital into the country, import regulation and tight controls on currency expenditure. The government declares freedoms, but at the same time restricts them.

5. Since the founding of the State, Israel's foreign policy has sought to ensure diplomatic recognition of Israel, to prevent its borders from being cut under the Bernadotte plan, to consolidate the territories obtained by military action, and to achieve Israel's acceptance at the UN. It used consistent support from the Soviet Union and the countries of popular democracy and the contradictions between the United States and England and between the Arab countries. As a result, the State of Israel is recognized by 56 countries, has concluded truce agreements with Arab countries and is a member of the UN.

As the state strengthened, its foreign policy under the guise of "neutrality" increasingly slid toward the orientation of the United States. The United States influences Israeli policy by controlling the flow of funds from Jewish communities in America, an important source of income from the Israeli budget, through its investments (about \$150 million) in Israeli enterprises, in particular the Palestine Economics Corporation, and finally by giving Israel a \$100-million loan that puts the State of Israel under U.S. control. In addition, the United States exerts direct political pressure on Israel's policies. True, sometimes the government of Israel, pursuing domestic political goals and fear of losing the support of the USSR, has some resistance to the pressure of the Americans, but this resistance is indecisive and

inconsistent. In the event of intense pressure, backed by the threat of an end to the transfer of funds from Jewish communities to the United States and a ban on imports, the Ben-Gurion government could fully capitulate to the United States, become a tool for their expansionist plans in the Middle East, and even allow them to establish military bases inside Israel.

Israel's ruling circles are also seeking friendly relations with Britain, although for obvious reasons this aspiration has not yet come to the fore. At the same time, they are friendly to the British puppet, King Abdullah of Transjordan, and, in fact, do not object to the transfer to him of the territory of the Arab part of Palestine, where an independent Arab state should be established.

6. The Government of Israel understands how much assistance the Soviet Union has done to the struggle of the Jewish people for national self-determination and the strengthening of the State. It also has to reckon with the popularity of the USSR in Israel and is interested in continuing support for the USSR and establishing economic ties with it. At the same time, based on its class interests and fear of increasing influence of opposition parties (Mapam and the Communist Party), the government is taking steps to reduce the popularity of the USSR and Soviet influence in Israel. It encourages anti-Soviet propaganda, restricts the entry of Soviet literature and films into the country, and obstructs the activities of the Friendship League. It also delays the transfer to us of the vast assets of the Russian Palestinian society and state property. In addition, the government believes that it will inevitably "collide" (Sharet's expression) with the USSR on the issue of the emigration of Jews from the countries of popular democracy and from the Soviet Union.

Thus, the policy of the current Israeli Government towards the USSR is hostile, although it is not yet sharp and open.

In the light of this, I believe that in its practical work the soviet union's mission in the State of Israel should be guided by the following instructions (draft instructions are attached).

P. Ershov

**LETTER FROM THE SECOND SECRETARY OF THE
SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL, THE COMMISSIONER OF
THE VOCS IN ISRAEL, M.P.FEDORIN I.O. HEAD OF THE
MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF VOKS YU.I.KOSYAKINA.**

September 29, 1949

1. The teaching of history and geography in Israeli schools is mainly in English and American textbooks.

A group of progressive teachers asked us to provide them with Soviet textbooks on the history of the USSR, on the new history of capitalist countries and on the economic and political geography of the world, as well as the USSR - to compile in Hebrew textbooks for students and manuals for teachers.

We have only "History of the USSR," Volume 1, edited by AK. Grekova, Bakhrushin and Lebedev.

Please send with the next mail the above literature.

2. In 1948, we received from THES works of Lenin (4th of the 1st), volumes from 1 to 17 and works by Stalin, volume 1-7.

Please send us the newly released volumes of works by Lenin and Stalin (if possible, in 2 copies), which we desperately need.

I also ask you to send us a collection of decisions and rulings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (B).

Second Secretary of mission M.Fedorin

**NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
MIDDLE EAST OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR
I.N.BAKULIN TO THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE USSR A.A. GROMYKO. September 30,
1949**

Secret.

On April 14, 1949, Israeli envoy Meyerson, on behalf of his government, raised the issue of the possibility of obtaining a loan to the USSR to expand trade between Israel and the USSR.

All materials on this issue, together with the draft report to the court, were submitted to Vyshinsky A.Y. Tov. Vyshinsky A.Y. believed that the issue of credit should be considered together with other requests of Jews (questions about military assistance). However, these questions were raised by Jews during the war in Palestine. Now, after the end of the war and the stabilization of the situation in Palestine, the Jews no longer returned to them. Given that the requests of a military nature were not put seriously by the Jews, we consider it appropriate to delay the answer to them and to put before the court only the question of credit, especially since Namir in a conversation with you on September 19, 1949 asked to expedite our response.

A draft report is attached to the court.

I ask for your instructions.

I. Bakulin

application

Draft note of the First Deputy Foreign Minister

USSR A.A. Gromyko and Minister of Foreign Trade of the
USSR

M.A. Menshikova in the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Ukraine (B)

Secret.

On April 14 this year, the Government of the State of Israel, through the then ambassador to Moscow, Meyerson, raised the question of the possibility of obtaining a loan to the USSR to expand Israel's trade with the Soviet Union. The new Israeli envoy Namir in conversations in the Foreign Ministry of the USSR persistently sought our answer on this issue.

The question of credit by the Government of Israel was motivated by political considerations. The Government of Israel expects to strengthen its position within the country and to deflect criticism from opposition parties for the Government's policy of political and economic subordination to Israel to the United States.

The economic provision of credit to Israel does not give us practical benefits, as Israel cannot compensate for this loan with the goods of interest to us.

In view of the foregoing, we do not consider it appropriate to grant the Israeli Government's loan request. We believe that our negative response should be communicated to the Israeli envoy orally if he raises this question again, on the grounds that our refusal is that the obligations of the Soviet Union under the agreements already concluded with other countries do not allow us to satisfy the request of the Government of Israel at this time.

A draft resolution is attached.

Please consider.

M. Menshikov A. Gromyko

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A draft resolution is attached.

Please consider.

M.Menshikov A. Gromyko

**TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. S
HERETTE TO THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR
M.NAMIR. October 4, 1949**

On telegram Eliashiva 251 (P1)12. Ask for a meeting with Bakulin and let him know that in response to their request you have received instructions to inform the following:

a. The assumption that our army will be organized in the American model is puzzling in our General Staff, since nothing of the kind can happen, including for purely practical reasons related to the fundamental differences between our countries and the scale of the defence objectives being solved.

b. In the construction of our armed forces, we do not use ready-made recipes developed by other countries, but go our own way, taking into account our special needs and limited opportunities. The combination of agricultural labour with military training, the gradual formation of major strike forces, the establishment of a belt of defensive settlements along the borders demonstrate the originality of our approach to problem-solving.

In any case, it is clear that our young State and our army, which is built on a conscript basis, have a deep interest in arming ourselves with the modern experience and knowledge of long-established States in the organization of armed forces. In addition, we have important experience in administration, legislative development, service, research and all other areas of government. Therefore, we asked the USSR to send experienced officers for professional studies in a number of specialties in the educational institutions of the Red Army.

Until now, such assistance has been provided only through the voluntary efforts of Jews from different countries who have come to Israel and offered their services in economics, science, medicine, administrative, etc. Only a few came for a while while they needed their help.

For our army, such assistance was of great importance in both terms and quality. Our army is staffed by volunteers from 55 countries, including valuable professionals who play an important role in organization, technical training (South African pilots and engineers, navy officers and staff officers from England and America). There are tankers from Czechoslovakia and experienced staff officers from Poland. They are all Jews, and whether they choose to live permanently in Israel or intend to return to their countries, their only motivation was and remains their dedication to the establishment of the State of Israel.

e. At your discretion: if their question arises from the col-gaam publication of the American general who allegedly heads our General Staff, the following facts can be reported as you see fit. There is no such general. There was Colonel Marcus, a high-ranking American officer who came here as a Jew, on his own initiative. His death forced his friend to come and offer his services. He is an experienced military specialist, but a retired lieutenant colonel, he came to us voluntarily as a journalist. Neither we nor he negotiated his service in our army. As a U.S. citizen, he has the right to travel wherever he pleases and offer his services. He works as a counsellor in one of the departments. After the publication of the fake in "Kol Gamam" the American Embassy asked us whether the facts corresponded to the truth. We have informed them of the same things I am writing to you now.

Charette

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE
USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY I.N.BAKULIN WITH THE
ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR M.NAMIR. October 5,
1949**

Secret.

Today, at 11 o'clock., received Namir at his request. After exchanging the usual greetings, Namir said that he had been instructed by the Israeli Foreign Ministry on behalf of the Prime Minister to ask the Soviet government to send a prominent Soviet forestry specialist to Israel to work as an adviser to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister of Israel is the Economic Planning Commissioner of the State of Israel. He outlined a plan for high-speed landscaping and afforestation on a large scale of the Negev region. The Government of Israel knows that the USSR is conducting extensive activities in this area and therefore Soviet specialists are, of course, among the most competent. Israel is therefore very interested in the assistance of Soviet foresters. The Soviet specialist, Namir added, will also be interested in getting acquainted with the Negev and gaining experience useful for the USSR. The Israeli government is ready to provide the Soviet specialist with all the most favourable conditions for work and is given a full choice of the form of his activities (either as an adviser to the Prime Minister, or as a forestry attache during the Soviet mission in Israel). The Government of Israel would be very grateful for the speedy response of the Soviet Government on this issue.

I promised to report the prime minister's request to the leadership.

Namir went on to say that last year Israel had asked for support for his request for Israel's admission to the World Postal Union. The Soviet Union, Ukraine and Belarus supported the request, but Israel did not collect the majority

of votes needed to join the union. The issue had been postponed for one year and had now been raised again. On 11 July, during a visit to Mr. Gromyko, the latter confirmed that the USSR would once again support Israel's request. At present, the Israeli Foreign Ministry again asks the Soviet Union to take a positive position on this issue and asks for an expedited response, as the deadline for filing a response expires on November 13, 1949.

I promised Namir to find out.

Namir then said that on September 13, 1949, Israel's mission to the USSR sent a note to the USSR Foreign Ministry asking him to accept Colonel Barnea as a military attaché on the mission in place of Colonel Ratner. However, so far no answer has been received and Barnea has not received a visa to enter the USSR. I replied that the consular office was dealing with visa issues and that I would review the case.

Namir went on to say that in the Soviet press there are sometimes telegraph reports quoting the press of other countries, that various projects of the Mediterranean pact are being developed and that the United States, Britain and other powers are trying to include the State of Israel as part of the pact. I am instructed to reiterate and reiterate Ms. Meyerson's statement that the current Government of Israel will not back down from its firm neutrality line and intends to maintain friendly relations with all UN member states, and that there is no question of the current Israeli Government's intention to include Israel in any pact against any UN member. In addition, I am instructed to report that the information in the Soviet and foreign press that the Israeli Government has invited an American military mission to reorganize its army is untrue and is a fiction.

I promised to bring this statement of the envoy to the attention of the foreign ministry leadership.

The conversation lasted 15 minutes.

The attache of the OBSV T. Gnedykh was present at the conversation.

I. Bakulin, Head of the Middle East Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry

On the document of the litter: “t. Bakulin. We need a note to the court—a draft resolution. It is clear that the answer is no. A. Lavrentyev. 8.10.”

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR
M.NAMIR TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
CHARETTA. October 5, 1949**

Regarding Jewish affairs:

A. Like last year, we were received with great honour and sympathy in the synagogue. We were again put on the podium and invited to the Torah. On Judgment Day, a memorial ceremony was also held for our Jewish brothers who fell on the battlefield of battle for our holy land in the name of its freedom and independence. The synagogue was packed to capacity, thousands of people, including many young people, stood in the street. But unlike last year, no one dared to turn to us. Only a thousand eyes were fixed upon us as we passed back and forth; many cheered, but rather cautiously. There were police posts on the street and at the entrance to the building. Information about the memorial ceremony is not for publication: it could damage the leadership of the synagogue.

A local Jewish source reported that in Moscow and , on a much larger scale - in the province (in Ukraine) Jews are being fired en masse from state institutions, from outlets and industrial enterprises and even from small studios and shoe shops. Cutting off Jews from economic sources creates a critical situation, thus encouraging an increase in the flow of migrants to Birobidzhan, although theoretically there is no coercion. He had heard of forced deportation that there were cases only in Moldova: the authorities officially claimed that they were people belonging to or belonging to anti-social elements, as reported in reference to another Jewish source in telegram 258. This year, the dislike of Jews has increased. Grassroots officials describe Jews as a disloyal element suspected of espionage. Open calls are made in enterprises and institutions: "Get out to your state, to Israel." Courts impose the harshest sentences against Jews, often the trial itself is biased. Many have been imprisoned

and sent to camps this year because of their sympathy for Israel or their desire to repatriate, as well as for participating in a street demonstration last year in honour of our mission. Among the prisoners, he named Mordechai Dubin, the head of Agudat Israel in Latvia. If it were not for the risk of arrest, many Jews would pour into our mission, as almost all of them are ready to immigrate in Israel at any moment. The Jews here live in fear and uncertainty about the future. Many fear that deportations from Moscow, which has become a refuge for survivors of the Nazi extermination, will soon begin. Continuation follows.

Namir

**TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
SHARETTA TO THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
ISRAEL TO THE UN A. ERBAN. October 14, 1949**

About the meeting tonight. Do not use my instructions if there is even a small chance of making it difficult to understand issues that need to be addressed immediately; instead, he should hear from us the following: first, refer to their publications about Israel as a reactionary force, servile before the imperialists, which causes deep indignation, cools the sympathy. Second, the Jewish commitment to Zionism is unchanged, inclusive, ineradicable, independent of the political climate. The last paragraph should be interpreted indirectly and in the case of the USSR.

Charette

**TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. S
HERETTE TO THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR
M.NAMIR. October 15, 1949**

Still appalled by the review no 7. In tragic circumstances, the slightest information about the events and the transfer of it to us is the most important public task. At the same time, lessons must be learned from the action itself. First, in my opinion, the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb can push back the danger of world war, but at the same time will strengthen the Cold War, that is, we should not count on rapid improvements in relations between East and West. Secondly, we cannot be condemned to prolonged inaction.

My conclusions: the first, if I go to the U.S., the decision on what has not been made yet, I will try to meet with Vyshinsky not to repeat the Paris conversation, but to reach a new stage and raise the problem of Soviet Jews in connection with Israel. I do not mean to make any demands, but it is necessary to point out the fact that there is a problem. Obviously, they are concerned about this problem, and they are discussing it. Perhaps their final position has not yet been decided, and our responsibility prompts an attempt to influence. One of the arguments that I am going to make will be that the most reliable guarantee of Israeli-Soviet friendship and our non-alignment to any enemies of the USSR will be the creation of a living connection between the Jews of the Soviet Union and Israel.

Second. We should launch a campaign in the international Jewish press, especially in the United States, as well as in the non-Jewish press on the issue of Soviet Jewry, giving the press all the reliable information at our disposal, as well as rumours. In fact, you can publish all the material from your last review, as well as from a series of telegrams the day before and after Rosh hash, including a list of names. New York and Paris are suitable places for publication, from there it will be reprinted in newspapers of other countries

and Israel. It is particularly important, and it is worth hundreds of testimonies, to publish a poem that, in my view, is a humane and historical document. I propose to publish it anonymously in a prestigious Jewish magazine in the United States, for example, in "Comments" or "Frontier" in Russian with English translation in verse. I am sure that it will be replicated and published all over the world in different languages: French, Spanish, etc. I frankly admit that the poetess may suffer, even if we do not print her name, it will undoubtedly be established, nevertheless I believe that we should not be deterred - the poem should fulfill its mission in the war of the Jewish people for its existence and future. Both the case of the conversation with Vyshinsky and the organization of this publication are additional arguments in favour of my trip to Moscow. Immediately telegraph your opinion and opinion of Le Vavi. Shalom, fasten.

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR
M.NAMIR TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
CHARETTA. October 21, 1949**

On your telegram 233. Sorry for the delay in replying, had a cold, spent a few days in bed.

(a) The suggestion that you may be absent from the General Assembly session surprised us greatly, even without regard to the problem of Russian Jews. After all, this session of the Assembly gathers many heads of foreign policy departments and allows them to hold talks with them outside of the influence of rumours and sensations accompanying diplomatic visits to some countries in the current climate. Your meeting with Vyshinsky would be especially important, the opportunity to talk to him is quite rare for representatives of any country, so it should not be missed. I am not talking about issues concerning Israel on the agenda that you know better about than I am. I think we should put aside our doubts and go.

b) The international situation is seen from here as somewhat more threatening after the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb. According to some estimates, this did not provide a balance of power, but only further exacerbated and undermined the already precarious situation. If the use of an atomic bomb is ever possible in a war between the two blocs, the main question now is not the possession of nuclear secrets, but in quantitative indicators: how many ready-made bombs and who is ahead of the pace of their creation. Therefore, the creation of the Soviet bomb can push America to reduce the transition period from a "cold" confrontation to a "hot" one, so as not to give the Soviets the time necessary to equip its army with new weapons. The rapid development of events in China and East Germany can only add to the West's arguments in favour of an early transition to armed conflict, until the USSR has had time to fully deploy its military capabilities, which can turn the balance of power

on the world stage. From this point of view, we cannot rule out an accelerated slide towards war. It is not so important whether this is the true state of affairs or whether it is merely the Soviet Union's fears about Western designs, in practice all of this will inevitably lead to increased concern and caution about ethnic elements susceptible to foreign influences and attempts to completely block all opportunities of the latter to communicate with abroad; in other words, any attempt to raise the issue of repatriation from Romania and Hungary will be perceived negatively, as directed at Russian Jewry as well. This was warned by Orenburg in an interview on December 1 last year (see my telegram 46).

c) On the other hand, it is very possible that the Jewish problem is in a state of study here, and it can be solved if we stand aside and remain calm. Therefore, despite and in no way ignoring the above, I would suggest in the first stage to act in accordance with your idea: that is, not to demand, but to probe the situation, and to expand the area of sensing to other issues, including the question of repatriation. I mean, it would be worth asking Vyshinsky why they are not responding to our repeated proposals to establish strong economic and cultural ties, why they are giving up opportunities and missing out on the chances that could ultimately benefit them both today and in the future. They could, for example, influence the creation of our army and the supply of weapons for it, when we asked for it, to train officers; Expand, as we have proposed, trade links; to direct the director for the Habim Theatre, soloists and musicians for the orchestra, the Soviet representative to the institute of H. Weizmann and a specialist in forestry. All of our proposals have not been answered. There was also no official response to Gromyko's invitation. As for the problem of population, their contribution has so far been limited to the dispatch of four elderly Jews and several priests; The Soviets refrain from assisting in the repatriation of Romania and Hungary. Of course, I am not proposing to provide them with a list of our claims, but only a few examples from the experience of our

mission, which are quite positive and constructive and can serve as the basis for the development of a full-scale programme for the development of friendly relations. It is also obvious that the general direction will be based only on the needs of the State of Israel without any interference in the fate of Jews in the USSR.

And secondly, as for the situation of the Jews and the repatriation of here, it is necessary to use workarounds, first of all to try to use the influence of Henry Wallace, Paul Robson, the writer Howard Fast - the only Americans who are highly valued here.

d) I unequivocally agree that the relevant sections of my material should be published, but the source should be camouflaged as much as possible. From here it is difficult for me to advise how best to do it. Perhaps it is worth pushing back the publication date so that it cannot be linked to Eliashiva's stay here. We need to omit the name of the poet and turn her into a man. Ask Eliashiva to carefully check the list of Jewish names to avoid mistakes. Even after all this, it should be emphasized that there may have been errors in the definition of nationality, and it should be emphasized that it is impossible to conclude from the fact of the announcement of these names that all these people are dismissed from their posts and that Jews are not praised or honoured today. Do not specify the names of the newspapers listed in the "sources" section, as local authorities know which newspapers write the mission. I will inform my opinion about Levavi's considerations by a separate telegram.

Shalom and all the best.

Namir

**TELEGRAM OF THE ADVISER OF THE ISRAELI MISSION
TO THE USSR A. LEVAVI TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHARETTA. October 21, 1949**

On your telegram 233.

A. A global febrile arms race has begun.

b. Now more than ever before, our living connection with Soviet Jewry will be perceived by the Soviets as a blow to the foundation of their ideological policy, as an extremely dangerous crack in the wall of isolation they have built. This applies even to countries of popular democracy, much less non-communist governments; is referring to the danger of espionage and the emergence of the "fifth column." I would like to warn against any awakening of this issue.

I have a rather risky proposal for talking to Vyshinsky, a kind of over-strength for breaking the blockade. We cannot abandon the Jews of Romania and Hungary who seek to repatriate. Let them be given the right to leave for a year. About a quarter of a million people immigrating per year. After that, there will remain only those Jews who easily and willingly adapt to the new government, and we will officially declare that the function of Zionism in the countries of popular democracy is exhausted. We will then declare non-alignment with any political bloc without the consent of the great powers.

As long as there is any possibility of realizing what was said in the previous paragraph, I suggest that any information on the situation of Jews be published here only if the Israeli source of information can be well disguised. Perhaps it is worth hinting at a semi-official American source, such as Newsweek, which is close to the State Department, which boasts that it managed to deal a heavy blow to the American Communists by publishing materials about anti-Semitism in the USSR. Public speaking will not improve the situation of Soviet Jews, but may worsen Israeli-Soviet relations. The

positive impact will be felt primarily on public opinion in Israel.

Remark for history. Note: in the next decade, if Israel exists, a considerable number of Jews from the USSR will be repatriated to us. why? One of two things: or international tensions will be defused, and this will be possible; or a war will break out that will solve the problem one way or another.

Levawi

**TELEGRAM OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY S. ELIASHIVA TO THE ISRAELI MISSIONS TO
THE USSR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, POLAND AND HUNGARY.**

November 4, 1949

The conclusion that Ben-Gurion's speech is directed against the USSR and the countries of popular democracy is a distortion and slander. The speech emphasizes that the dispute is not about socialism or communism, but between socialist Zionism and the world-wide Esection.

The speech was directed against the Jewish communists, who suppressed any free speech of Jews and efforts on immigration, and favourably stood out non-Jewish communists in the governments of the countries of popular democracy, who behave differently. These blunders of the Jewish faction are a thing of the past. Ben-Gurion noted the existence of a plutocratic eusection in the world and sent the full text of the speech to the American Jewish Committee by airmail.

Eliashiv

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN M.A.
MAKSIMOV AND THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR, M.
NAMIR. November 10, 1949**

Secret.

It's 3:00 p.m. 30 min. accepted Namir at his request. After exchanging the usual greetings, Namir said that at the direction of Israeli Foreign Minister Charette, he should inform the USSR Foreign Ministry that the British representatives had asked the Israeli government to inform them of the possibility of obtaining a place for the British in the management of the port of Haifa. The British motivated their request by the traditional interests of England in the area and the presence of an English oil refinery in Haifa. The Israeli Government had considered the request and had not considered it possible to grant it, which had been brought to the attention of the British.

In Namir's view, such a request by the British represents a minimum requirement for the British after they failed to implement broader plans for Haifa.

I replied to the envoy that I would bring this message to the attention of the foreign ministry leadership.

Namir went on to say that, as it is known, the UN Reconciliation Commission is currently located in Palestine. Even during the discussion on the establishment of the commission, Israel opposed the proposed composition of the commission, demanding greater participation of other countries, including the USSR and the countries of popular democracy.

After several months in Palestine, it became clear to the Government of Israel that the commission's work had a negative impact on relations between Israel and the Arab countries. This view is now officially expressed by the Prime Minister of Israel, Ben Gurion, who stated in Parliament on 9 November that the Reconciliation Commission does no good

in resolving disputes between Israel and the Arabs, but rather harms the establishment of understanding, since the very existence of the Reconciliation Commission creates a barrier between the parties concerned and prevents them from directly agreeing with each other.

Israel, the envoy added, could see that the mediation of the commission was far from objectivity. According to the Government of Israel, before the commission's arrival in the Middle East, the Arab League was on the verge of complete collapse. One of the tasks of the commission was to restore the League, which it partially managed to do. At the initiative of the commission, there were frequent meetings of arab representatives to coordinate their policy against Israel and to develop a single aggressive minimum of demands. "I would ask," the envoy concluded, "to bring the above to the attention of the leadership of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR."

I promised to do it.

The envoy then said that on behalf of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, he was asking for the following issue.

The Government of Israel would be very grateful to the Soviet Government if the Soviet representatives, in the event of the visit of the Prime Minister of Pakistan to Moscow or in meetings with the Ambassador of Pakistan in Moscow, if it would certainly be convenient for the USSR, even in the most remote and most convenient form for themselves, would give the Pakistanis a hint that the USSR would be positive about Pakistan's recognition of the State of Israel, which would contribute to the preservation of peace and security in the East. It would be important for Israel if a Muslim state, like Pakistan, a remote Muslim state, recognized the State of Israel and thus drove a wedge into a single bloc of Muslim countries. The Israeli government knows that there is a certain flow in Pakistan's ruling circles (including the Pakistani Foreign Ministry) for recognizing Israel.

I replied that I would inform the foreign ministry's leadership of the request submitted by the envoy.

Namir informed that he was leaving for Paris the other day, where he was summoned for a meeting by Israeli Foreign Minister Charette, who was going to the General Assembly in New York.

The conversation lasted 20 minutes.

The attaché of the OBSV T. Gnedykh was present at the conversation.

Deputy Head of the Middle East Division of the USSR Foreign Ministry

Maximov

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P. IERSHOV AND ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTER M. CHARETTE. November 15, 1949**

Secret.

He visited Charetta at his request. Charette said that in connection with the draft organization of the Arab security pact, which is currently much talked about in neighbouring capitals, as it has U.S. support and will be discussed at a meeting of American diplomats in Istanbul, the Israeli government has taken a negative stance on the pact. Such a pact would lead to the consolidation of revanchist sentiments in Arab countries and active preparations for the "second round" of the war against Israel. On the other hand, it is possible that it will also be directed against a friendly country - the USSR. Therefore, firmly following the policy of neutrality, the Government of Israel decided to take a negative position and informed U.S. Ambassador MacDonald, who will attend the meeting in Istanbul.

Sharett went on to note that The former American correspondent in Moscow, Newman, who had recently published a "number of indecent articles" in the Soviet Union, had been removed from the lists of foreign correspondents invited to receptions on Israel's mission in Moscow. In this regard, I said that I did not understand the significance of the Minister's remark if the Israeli press reprinted these "indecent articles". Charette replied that there was freedom of the press in Israel and that newspapers could print whatever they wanted. "Including offensive articles at representatives of foreign and even friendly states?" I asked. I replied that I did not put this question on purpose now and reserved the right to return to it, but in this case I only wanted to find out whether the Israeli freedom of the press had any specific limits, since the Minister said that newspapers could print whatever they wanted.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHARETTA WITH THE SOVIET
ENVOY TO ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV. November 15, 1949**

The Minister told the envoy that we were not accepting of the plan of “defensive alliance” of the Arab states. He noted that this union, if it is created, will have an anti-Soviet orientation, and the USSR is a friendly state. That alone is enough for us to be against such a union. By creating a structure against the Soviet Union, Arab countries expect to receive American support. At the same time, it can be assumed that, having emerged under the “defensive” cover, such an alliance will act against us; this is the second reason for our position. According to the minister, he highlighted these two points in a conversation with the American ambassador, before he went to the consultations of the U.S. ambassadors in the East, and warned him against supporting such a union.

Newman's articles in the Herald Tribune were discussed. The Minister pointed out that Newman, during his time in Moscow, had a bad relationship with our diplomatic mission: he was the only foreign journalist who was removed from the list of invitees to the Israeli mission.

The envoy remarked, “And yet your press reprints his articles.”

The minister said: “We have a free press - prints what he wants.”

The envoy asked, “What, can she publish even materials offensive to foreign representatives?” He was referring to articles that appeared in Maariv and Ediot Ahronot after being admitted to the Soviet Mission on 7 November. The Minister and I expressed displeasure at the appearance of these articles. At the same time, the minister stressed that there are no legal means to prevent the appearance of such publications, but it will be necessary to understand what can be done.

From here, the Minister immediately went to the meetings of the League of Friendly Relations, which were held in the presence of representatives of the Soviet mission in various settlements of Israel and at which there was a sharp criticism of our government. The Minister stressed that he had no doubt that the envoy was not aware of the contents of the speeches in advance, but as a result both the envoy and his staff were in an awkward position. The envoy fully agreed that there should be no place for discussion of domestic political issues at meetings dedicated to the development of friendship with foreign countries.

When we left the Minister's office, the envoy told me that this time he had raised the appearance of articles in the newspapers by accident, without any intention, and that he reserved the opportunity to return to the problem.

**TELEGRAM TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
SHARETTA TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY, W. EITAN, FROM NEW
YORK. December 1, 1949**

The conversation with Vyshinsky was promised to arrange, but the deadline has not yet been determined. So far we have managed to talk to Tsarapkin - in a friendly tone, but sharply. I said that if Jerusalem had been granted international status as the Russians wanted, they would have lost their property in the city permanently. Tsarapkin tried to downplay the significance of obtaining property in Jerusalem, saying that it had always been in the hands of the Russian church. To this I countered that the facts speak somewhat of the other way and it is strange that he so raises the question. Now the property belongs to the Councils, it is their only property in the East, their flag flies in the centre of Jerusalem. If the city was governed by a U.N. envoy doing the will of the United States, they would never have been able to get anything like that. We have passed a special law to resolve this issue and have paid the price for it with tensions with the Americans. He tried to step aside, declaring his support for the principles of the resolution on 29 November 1947, accusing us of moving away from it. In response, I listed well-known facts. He retreated and began to explain that the USSR was not trying to redraw the borders and, of course, had nothing against the Jews; first of all, they need to deprive Abdallah of power, because he is a British puppet. I said that it is internationalization that means the power of the British, Americans and the Vatican throughout the city. The choice is this: either the sphere of power of the British expands or narrows. We narrow down, they expand. Tsarapkin countered that in the case of the internationalization of Jerusalem, he would fall under the control of the Guardian Council. To this I replied that, firstly, it is not guaranteed, as the majority can make the opposite

decision, and secondly, even if the city is transferred to the Council, the Russians will have only one vote in it and it will not help much. He noted that if decisions were made by a majority vote, it would be prolonged indefinitely. I said that indignation in the case would not help; the problem is not the strict adherence to abstract principles, but the ability to anticipate the course of events and the development of realistic tactics.

It's all about the conversation. I invite you to invite Ershov, to present to him the above and strongly condemn their position, which means in practice support for the de facto greed of the Vatican and the false tricks of the Arabs. He should be asked to send a telegram to Moscow. It is also worth telegraphing Levavi, so that he also expressed similar motives. In both conversations, it should be emphasized that we do everything to return their property, and they are so ungrateful. In fact, I'm not particularly worried. If we protect our status in Jerusalem without their help and seemingly even contrary to their position, it will be very good. At the same time, it is impossible to give up vigorous advocacy to try to change their position in the final vote in the General Assembly (it is possible). To date, the Russian, Arabs, who have become supporters of this idea in the hope of ousting us from the city, Latin American countries and Australia, which has become an exception for obvious reasons, are in favour of the internationalization of Jerusalem. Against them are the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada and progressive Latin American countries. Greece and India have so far abstained, but in private conversations the Indian representative says that he supports us.

Charette

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN
THE USSR A. LEVAVI TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTRY S. ELIASHIV. December 4, 1949**

December 21 is Stalin's 70th birthday. This date will be celebrated here and in all countries of the Eastern Bloc. Diplomats of the countries belonging to it still do not know whether the heads of their governments will send congratulations on the anniversary. Apparently, this will be determined only at the last moment. We believe that such congratulations will be sent, as this is a round date. It seems that the head of the Israeli government should congratulate Stalin in case there is at least one more congratulation from countries not belonging to the eastern bloc. It seems to me that the text should be similar to congratulations to the heads of state to Weizman, although Stalin is the head of government, not the head of state. To avoid overlays, it is advisable to send us a text of congratulations from the Prime Minister and authorize the envoy to convey this greeting in French, if he joins. Please hand over my telegram and Tomir to Paris.

Levawi

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY, W. EITAN, WITH THE SOVIET ENVOY TO
ISRAEL, P.I.ERSHOV. December 6, 1949**

The Soviet envoy was invited to talk to the Director General of the Foreign Ministry W. Eitan. He was initially invited to December 5, but the Soviet mission said it was soviet Constitution Day, and the envoy would be happy to come for a conversation any other day. If it is an urgent matter, the meeting may take place on Sunday, 4 December. As a result, we agreed to hold it on Tuesday.

The conversation focused on the problem of Jerusalem. Dr. Eliashiv also participated. The day before, the text of the Prime Minister's speech to the Knesset had been sent to foreign envoys.¹⁴ Ershov said that he had received the document and read it.

The following was stated to the Soviet envoy.

The Government of Israel is disappointed with the development of the Lake Saxes debate. We do not consider ourselves entitled to tell the Soviet Union how its delegation should behave at the UN, but we consider it our duty to make a number of comments on the merits. We understand the commitment of the Soviet delegation to the Resolution of 29 November. However, attention should be paid to what was meant in the part of the resolution that referred to the status of Jerusalem. The UN City International wanted to achieve two goals: to guarantee freedom of access to Holy Places for all religions and to ensure the safety of the Jewish population of Jerusalem. Both of those goals could be achieved by implementing the proposal made by the Israeli delegation. With regard to the first objective, the Government of Israel is fully prepared to ensure absolute freedom for all religions, including freedom of worship in Holy Places. The Government of Israel, by its own will, agrees to international control over the Holy Places. It should

be noted here that no authority that existed before in Jerusalem has ever offered international control over the Holy Places, as the Government of Israel now proposes. As for the second objective, it should not be forgotten that the UN General Assembly had once expanded the territory of international Jerusalem to include a number of surrounding settlements, such as Moza, only to ensure the safety of the inhabitants of those points, who would otherwise have remained in the Territory of the Arab State, cut off from the Israeli army. There is no doubt that the inclusion of these settlements within the borders of the State of Israel and the link between Jewish Jerusalem and the State of Israel constitute the most serious guarantee of security for local residents. Thus, while there are changes in the form, the overall content of the Israeli proposal is consistent with the main objectives of the UN resolution of 29 November on Jerusalem.

Hence the consequences of a more practical nature, namely the issue of Russian property in Jerusalem. The Government of Israel pursued a line aimed at transferring Russian property to the Soviet government and Soviet religious organizations. Part of this goal has already been achieved, and further steps will be taken in the same direction. The Government did not intend to change its approach to the problem, but felt it necessary to point to the contradiction between the Soviet Government's demand for the return of property to Israel, a requirement to be taken as the master of Jerusalem, and the position taken by the Soviet delegation to the United Nations, which denied Israeli sovereignty as far as Jerusalem was concerned. We understand the desire of the Soviet Union not to allow the dominant British influence to spread to the Old City of Jerusalem under the guise of the Jordanian State. However, it cannot be ignored that the proposal to give Jerusalem international status would not solve the problem, but would only expand the scope of Anglo-Saxon and Catholic influence throughout the city. For at best, if control of Jerusalem is

transferred to the Guardian Council, the Soviet bloc will have only a small minority in the leadership of that Council, with an overwhelming majority in the hands of the West. Instead of localizing and reducing the sphere of Western influence of the USSR, supporting the proposal to give international status to Jerusalem, will achieve only an expansion of this influence.

**LETTER FROM THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE
USSR A.I. LAVRENTYEV. December 7, 1949**

Secret.

At the same time, I send you a certificate "Anti-Soviet Propaganda in the Israeli Press" compiled by the mission attaché T. Popov M.P. The certificate shows the main methods and directions of anti-Soviet propaganda in the Israeli press and collected extensive material from May to November this year, showing that the reactionary press of Israel conducts systematic anti-Soviet propaganda.

As we have not yet had a proper diplomatic or press response, anti-Soviet propaganda in the Israeli press is intensifying at a growing pace and is moving beyond normal diplomatic relations. In support of this, it should be noted the mocking speech of the newspaper "Maariv" on November 11, 1947 against the Soviet representatives in Israel.

Since it has been considered inappropriate to make a sharp presentation to the Israeli Foreign Ministry on this issue, you may find it useful to use the accompanying materials in our press.

Appendix: help and translations of a number of articles of Israeli newspapers.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

On the document of the letter: "t. zotov, Give a brief annotation of the reference for T. Gromyko, think about the proposals (along with the t. Gnedykh). 2/1 - 50 Yiborin."

Application

Reference of the attaché of the Soviet mission in Israel M.P. Popov "Anti-Soviet propaganda in the Israeli press"

December 7, 1949

The Israeli press conducts systematic anti-Soviet propaganda, publishing defamatory articles about the Soviet

Union, its foreign and domestic policies and the leaders of the Soviet government.

The exceptions are the newspapers Kol Ghaam (the Communist Party' body) and Al Hamishmar (the organ of the Joint Workers' Party Mapam), which publish positive articles about the Soviet Union, including articles sent by the Soviet Information Bureau.

The leading role in anti-Soviet propaganda is played by the newspaper Gador, the body of the main government party Mapai. Gador is joined by Herut (the organ of the fascist Herut party), Gaboker and other bourgeois newspapers.

The instigators of anti-Soviet propaganda in Israel are the reactionary American press, the American Jewish bourgeoisie, which has a great influence on life in Israel, and the reactionary circles of Israel itself, starting with Prime Minister D. Ben-Guri- she, who actually directs all anti-Soviet propaganda in the country, although formally he “does not interfere” in the affairs of the press, referring to the “freedom of the press” in Israel.

Anti-Soviet propaganda is carried out in a variety of ways, the main ones are:

1) Reprinted anti-Soviet articles from the foreign, mainly American, press;

2) anti-Soviet articles of local authors are published;

3) published “letters” and “interviews” of an anti-Soviet nature, which are often simply a letter, not a letter or an interview;

4) reviews are placed, mainly on Soviet films aimed at anti-Soviet slander;

5) articles are published - comments of various speeches of representatives of the Soviet Union on international issues; in such articles, the author usually tries to bring the reader to the conclusions of the anti-Soviet nature.

Except for petty but vicious attacks against the Soviet Union under all sorts of pretexts, such as: “Paul Robson... the last conquest of Kominform” (Gaboker, June 12, 1949);

“Is Prof. Einstein banned?” (Davar, July 31, 1949); “If Russia was not a Soviet system, but, say, a democratic one...” (Herut, August 21, 1949) Anti-Soviet propaganda in the Israeli press is in the following main areas:

1. Foreign policy of the USSR, relations between Israel and the USSR, relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia.

2. The inner life of the Soviet Union; the situation of workers and, in particular, the situation of Jews in the USSR; Soviet culture.

3. Slander on the leaders of the party and the Soviet government.

- 2) “Davar,” August 26, 1949, the newspaper's editor Dan Pines wrote in the article “Israel, America and the USSR”: “Why did both powerful states change their attitude towards Israel? They certainly supported us because of their interests.”

Referring to the Soviet Union's attitude towards Israel, the article says: “Moscow is usually not content with “good behaviour.” It requires obedience and submission to its instructions, identification with its interests. It is possible that Moscow understands the special situation of the young state and is therefore ready for special treatment to it. It is prepared not to make strong and clear demands, nor to force Israel into immediate political, economic and military obligations. It is ready to adopt the formula of “neutrality” between the West and the East... Moscow wants to “bargain, increase the price, calculate and measure every step in relation to Israel.” ...

- 4) Israel's reactionary seal, following in the footsteps of the American yellow press, not only distorts the Soviet Union's efforts to ensure peace, but also ascribes to it imperialist intentions.

Gador (July 18, 1949) wrote that the military budget in the USSR is 19.2% of national income, and in the United States - only 6.2%. “Russia is building a giant submarine fleet” (Herut); “Communist agents smuggle weapons into Saudi Arabia to arm tribes for guerrilla attacks against

Americans building the Aramco oil pipeline (United Press correspondence from Cairo, placed in Ediot Maariv on September 8, 1949), correspondence of The United Press (in Herut, September 1, 1949) that an unknown plane crashed in the Mediterranean Sea near Tobruk, which at a critical moment “called itself Soviet”.

On July 17, 1949, Gaboker published an article by J. Kimha, which stated, “For the last four years, the Soviets have supported the Kurds against Iran and Iraq.”

On November 1, 1949, Gador, in the article “Pakistan is the centre of Moscow's interest,” referring to the report of the International Commission for the Study of European Problems, writes: “Russia is following the advance of the Chinese Communists step by step and is plotting to “catch the communist takeovers” and Pakistan and turn it into a center of communist activity in order to expand Soviet hegemony to South Asia.” The newspaper goes on to write: “The Russians have already built more than 30 airfields in communist China; Thousands of Soviet agents were sent to the newly occupied areas. Mao Tse-tung has a constant connection with Marshal Malinovsky, and therefore, they say, “there is no hope that china will repeat the history of Tito, because Russia understands this danger and stands guard ... Soviet propaganda never ceases to tell the Chinese people that it is their duty to free all other peoples of Central Asia from imperialist hegemony.”

5) The entire Israeli press responded to TASS's report that the Soviet Union had long since discovered the secret of the use of nuclear energy. Reactionary newspapers used this message for a new wave of anti-Soviet campaign.

“Gador” (September 26, 1949) wrote in a mocking tone: “... at the disposal of mankind in addition to the imperialist American bomb, enbing the people, there is also a progressive bomb, Lenin-Stalinist, a supporter of peace.”

“Gaboker” (September 29, 1949) posted a message from an English Middle Eastern radio station under the headline “Muslim population—guinea pigs” which reads: “... Russian

scientists arrange their experiments in one of the Muslim countries of Soviet Russia. These experiments are the cause of death for thousands of people.”

In one of the reprints from foreign newspapers “Gador” (October 11, 1949) in the article “Atomgrad No. 1” writes that supposedly in Armenia there is an atomgrad, where tens of thousands of Russian “convicts” and prisoners of war, mainly Germans, live and work in hard labor conditions. ...

9) The appointment of K. Rokossovsky Marshal of Poland “Gador” (November 8, 1949) was used for new attacks against the policy of the Soviet Union. In its editorial, the newspaper writes: “The Plan of Sovietisation in the countries that are the “security belt” of the USSR is carried out at a rapid pace...”. Referring to “cleansing” in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the newspaper writes that the argument of Rokossovsky’s new appointment - “almost sentimental” - is the Polish origin of the marshal. “Rokossovsky almost forgot the Polish language,” the newspaper continues, “although now it will refresh the language of his ancestors in his memory, but his Polish language will not be freed from the Moscow accent...”

Repeating the vicious anti-Soviet gossip, the newspaper writes: “Rokossovsky’s favor to Poland had a very instructive precedent in Soviet practice: Georgi Dimitrov was also “given at the disposal” of his Bulgarian homeland. There are rumours that this “favor” was unsuccessful and in the end, as gossip tells, Dimitrov became too befriended Tito, befriended to the fact that he was forced to go to a sanatorium near Moscow and die there, surrounded by a holy halo...”

10) On July 13, 1949, Gador published a large defamatory article by Secretary General Histadrut Lubyankaer, “When the Hot War Breaks Out,” in which he writes: “... It became clear to the West that not the working class and not even the Communist Party rule in Russia and in the countries of its protectorate, there is a “line” ... They are executed for only one crime - for the fact that a person at a certain period had

an opinion different from the opinion of the Politburo or the opinion of the lord.” On foreign policy, the author writes that the USSR prepared “its Marshall Plan” and that “Russia's hostility to Tito” is caused by Tito's violation of the “unity of the system.”

The betrayal of Judas-Tito received a “big press” in the Israeli press. The whole reactionary seal is jubilant at the betrayal of Tito's clique. The fascist newspaper Herut and the right-wing gay newspaper Gador prove that the Tito regime in Yugoslavia is an ideal communist regime.

These newspapers are trying to convince readers that the USSR is preparing to attack Yugoslavia. Thus, Gador (August 31, 1949) published a Reuters report on the “movement of Soviet units towards the borders of Yugoslavia”; Commenting on the election of Yugoslavia to the Security Council, Yediot Maariv (September 3, 1949) slanders the Soviet Union and its representatives and declares the Tito Yugoslavia the ideal of a communist state. The newspaper writes: “When you take into account the speeches of the Russians at the UN Assembly, you are surprised first of all by the form of their speeches, their sharp style, their aggressive note from the podium of the world parliament.” Comparing Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the newspaper writes: “The Tito government is communist. The regime of Yugoslavia is an entrenched, notoriously communist regime.” Yugoslavia is “a country where communism is more entrenched than in the rest of the Eastern bloc.” In Czechoslovakia, “there is a country that has adopted the existing system not by its own will, but under pressure.”

“Herut” wrote on October 28, 1949: “According to information from London, Kominform is preparing a number of steps to overthrow the Tito regime. Kominform intends to stage border incidents, as a result of which troops from the Countries of Kominform will seize part of the Yugoslav territory and proclaim there a new government.”

Reporting that the Soviet Union was waging an intense “diplomatic and propaganda war against Tito”, the

reactionary press states that “the Soviet Union will find it difficult to cope with Yugoslavia if it comes to armed conflict.” On October 31, 1949, Gador reprinted from The Washington Post the article “Tito will fight if he is attacked.” This article reads: “Tito fears invasion by Soviet troops and their satellites, possibly through an uprising by Stalin's supporters inside the country... True, Tito is not particularly fond of the majority of Croats and Slovenians, and even less Serbs and Montenegrins, but still they prefer it to the dictatorship of the Kremlin, the first act of which upon reaching power will be collectivization.”

Publishing (October 6, 1949) accusing Piade of “Russian communists of deviation from the principles of Marxism-Leninism”, “Gador” clearly sided with Tito.

The apogee of slander on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and personally on Stalin is reached by the newspaper “Gaboker” (August 24, 1949) in the article by J. Kimhe “Stalin wants Tito to switch to the side of the West”, which states: “The hidden intention of the campaign conducted by the USSR is the desire to force Yugoslavia to move to the Western camp... This is the only way left for Stalin to eliminate a movement that is growing in all eastern European countries and supports Tito's policy of defending national independence against Soviet intervention.

The living Tito in the western camp, the newspaper continues, matters more than the dead Tito, for it will prove that Stalin's accusations against Tito as an agent of Western imperialism were correct. Stalin took advantage of this system when he allowed Trotsky to leave Russia alive and thus had the opportunity to declare all Trotsky's supporters enemies of the Soviet system.”

In the front line “Cleaning in the Hungarian Communist Party” “Gador” (September 12, 1949), stating that “Titoism extends on the other side of the borders of Yugoslavia”, and defending Tito from just condemnation by the newspaper Al Hamismar, writes: “Yugoslavia Tito is a communist country

no less than the Soviet Union... Tito's only crime... is that he refused to be a blind gun in Moscow's hands."

It should be noted that Gador and other reactionary Israeli newspapers mourned Rijka amicably, defeating the Soviet Union and the countries of popular democracy.

II

The reactionary Israeli press slanderously depicts the inner life of the Soviet Union. She pays most attention to the depiction in the anti-Soviet and Zionist spirit of the "position of the Jews" in the USSR. Defending the capitalist system, it slanderously illuminates the living conditions of workers in the USSR, tries to diminish the achievements of Soviet culture, thus trying to paralyze its influence on the workers of Israel.

1. In a review of the film "A Tale of a Real Man" "Gador" (June 1, 1949) wrote that it is "the weakest of the films ... It's all done... almost in clerical form" that in it tears and joys are measured with mathematical precision.

"Herut" on July 10, 1949 printed "Letter to the Editor." The author sees it as a threat in "the rooting of Russian music among us." He urges not to turn a blind eye to the "extremely serious danger" as "political propaganda is carried out by means of culture". He writes: "It is not surprising that the Russians took care of using songs for propaganda purposes, songs that would be accepted by all the population." The author laments that "in our country (in Israel. M.P.) songs occupy an unnaturally large place" and - worst of all - they are sung mostly in Russian.

2. On August 30, 1949, "Herut" in the article "How much does a Russian worker earn?" and September 15, 1949, "Gador" in the advanced "Working in the United States and the USSR", referring to the conclusions of the "Norwegian trade union delegation visiting the United States and the USSR", slanderously depict the situation of workers in the Soviet Union, indicating that "a Russian worker needs half a working day to buy one kilogram of rye bread," indicating that "a Russian worker needs half a working day to buy one

kilogram of rye bread, two days of working to buy one kilogram of refinae, five working days to buy one kilogram of beef” etc.

In connection with the recognition of Varga's mistakes in his book on changes in capitalist countries after the Second World War, Davar (June 14, 1949) published an article entitled “Varga's Mistakes”, in which it is annoying that Varga has retreated from his original views, as they are, in the opinion of the newspaper, quite correct. Gador (October 16, 1949) published an article entitled “Varga left, but his views are back” (reprint from United States News and World Airport). The article reads: “Varga's views contradicted the views of several people from the Politburo: Andrei Yudanov and Voznesensky, who overcame Varga and pushed him back.” “Now, according to various sources, it turns out that Stalin came to the conclusion that Varga is right. Yudanov is dead, and Voznesensky is no longer the head of the State Plan and a member of the Politburo.”

Then there is the idea that the capitalist system is strong, that the Marshall Plan is not an instrument of American imperialism for enslaving other countries, but simply “the result of the impoverishment and depletion of Europe.”

3. Reactionary newspapers write that the situation of Jews in the USSR is “threatening”, that the struggle against cosmopolitanism is intended to incite people to anti-Semitism, that Jews in the USSR are Zionist and would like to go to Israel for the most part if they were allowed to do so.

On May 26, 1949, Gador printed a “literal translation” of three letters, as if received by the editorial office from Moscow; On June 2, 1949, Davar posted “A Letter from a Soviet Engineer to a Friend in Israel.” The author of the letters to Gador expresses indignation that this newspaper publishes anti-Soviet articles. The purpose of publishing such “letters” is to show the “objectivity” of the newspaper: although, they say, these letters are condemned by the newspaper, but it publishes them. Believing in the

“objectivity” of the newspaper, the reader will easily believe in the attachment of Soviet Jews to Israel, as it is told: “On May 15, 1948, when the telegraph brought the news published in all Soviet newspapers, - the author writes, deep joy gripped all Soviet Jews on the occasion of the creation of the Jewish state Israel. The dreams and efforts of forty generations of Jews were finally successful.”

Even further goes the “Soviet engineer” I. Kiselhof (letter to “Davar”), who proclaims on behalf of the Jews of the Soviet Union a health service in honor of the state of Israel and its first president Weiz-man. The fore being the falseness of these letters, at least the latter, is evident from the fact that the “Soviet engineer” considers it his duty first of all to congratulate a friend on “moving to Palestine, to a historical homeland”, which took place 35 years ago, as stated elsewhere in the letter.

On May 13, 1949, Davar published a report on the congress of the “Jewish Workers' Committees” of America, at which D. Dubinsky “talked about the “immigration” of Jews from the Countries of the Soviet Bloc, who, they say, are not allowed into Israel. The same newspaper in May this year published a number of articles about the “campaign against cosmopolitanism” in the Soviet Union. The newspaper is touched not so much by the “fight against cosmopolitanism” as by the fact that many Jews were among the “cosmopolitans” who were criticized.

Gador (August 29, 1949) published a report on the “Congress of Bessarabian natives in Israel expressing alarm over rumours of the expulsion of Jews to Siberia.” Characteristically, at this congress there were guests - American Jews, born in Bessarabia. ...

In the reactionary press repeatedly appeared correspondence “from Paris” a certain L.Arie, according to our assumption, Levavi Arie - an adviser to the Israeli mission in the USSR. These correspondences described the author's alleged encounters with Jews who left the USSR, who complained about the “persecution of Jews in the USSR”.

The author insists that a delegation be sent to the USSR to examine the situation of Jews on the ground and to find out "the fate of thousands of Zionists who have been in Kazakhstan and Yakut forests for many years."

Dr. Grossman, 47, an old Zionist and Polish lawyer, "a Jew who came from Russia" in an interview with the newspaper *Ediot Ahronot* (November 2, 1949), reports on the "growth of anti-Semitism and expulsions of Jews" in an "interview" to the newspaper *Ediot Ahronot* (November 2, 1949).

Gador, Davar, Gaboker, etc., and especially the evening newspaper "*Ediot Ahronot*" from May to early November of 1949 repeatedly wrote about "attacks on Prof. I. I. Mints," about "the arrest of Jewish writers in Moscow," about the "disappearance of Jewish writers Fefer, Bergelson and Marchish," about "the exile of 400,000 Jews in Russia," about the "possibility of resettlement of a million Jews from Ukraine and Belarus. that "all Jewish officers in the Russian army who are in Germany have been returned to Russia. Many of them were arrested in connection with the fact that in recent years a lot of Jewish soldiers of the Russian army fled to the western parts of Germany to cross to Israel" ("*Edioth Ahronot*" for July 19, 1949), about the departure of Jews to Siberia, as it is necessary to "change the climate" etc.

The greatest part of this anti-Soviet slander comes from "our New York correspondent," from "various American circles," from the club of "Jewish writers in the United States," from "American Correspondents," from the "American Jewish Committee for the Fight Against Communism" or simply presented as a review: "American newspapers on the anti-Zionist campaign in the USSR" ("*Davar*," November 9, 1949), which reprinted the report of former Moscow correspondent Joseph Newman. In this "report," Newman writes that "measures have been taken to isolate Soviet Jews from the Israeli mission. The mission staff were placed under close supervision both at and outside the

hotel.” He also writes about “anti-Semitism (in the USSR - M.P.) under the guise of anti-Zionism.”

III

Anti-Soviet propaganda achieves special disgust in dirty provocative attacks and slander on the leaders of the Soviet Union and personally on Stalin and Lenin.

In addition to gossip about the son of T. Gromyko (“Herut,” November 1, 1949), an anecdote about t. Vyshinsky (“Ediot Ahronot,” June 19, 1949), gossip about “General Basil Stalin” (Gador, August 4, 1949), about “the love adventure of Svetlana Stalina” (“Ediot Ahronot,” October 7, 1949) and “The First Lady in the Soviet Union” (this gossip is presented as an interview with the News Review in Paris by “Svanidze, Stalin's cousin, newspapers publish a lot of vile gossip and provocative articles about Comrade Stalin himself. “Em-Em” (June 14, 1949) wrote that the jury of the competition for the best statue of Pushkin awarded the first prize for “the statue of Stalin, Pushkin's book, “Herut” (June 13, 1949) published an article entitled “The Protection of Stalin's Life,” the same newspaper (June 24, 1949) - the article “Stalin seeks funds against death” and “Em-Em” (June 27, 1949) printed an article by Nathan Gordus “Stalin is sick?”).

Dirty slander on Lenin - a man, Lenin - the leader and the Bolshevik party is the article “Lenin” by H. Greenberg (leader of Mapai in America), which appeared in the July issue of the magazine “Bte-rem.” The author slandered Lenin as a human being; theorizing, he slandered the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the driving forces of the October Socialist Revolution. He writes: “In 1917, Lenin had neither a strong and numerous organization nor contact with the army. There was no clear plan for the Bolshevik strategy. All of Lenin's equipment consisted in some irrational formula that he returned to Russia to perform a great historical mission. At the same time he had a willingness to sign bills, even though he knew that he would not be able to pay them... With a sense of the jungle beast, he accurately assessed the

strength and weakness of factors in Russia” that is, positive and negative factors.

Even more disgusting slander on the leaders and so on Stalin is an article in “Gaboker” (September 30, 1949), reprinted from the Swiss magazine Veltvocher.

After the celebration of the 32nd anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, a new wave of anti-Soviet propaganda has risen in the reactionary Israeli press.

On November 10, 1949, Gaboker published an advanced “Lesson on Organization” that commented unfavourably on the mission's October anniversary.

In the October issue of “Bterem” the anti-Soviet article “The Great Lies” is published by B. Shvivi, in which the author slanders the foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet Union. He writes: “The essence of such a lie is that for a long time there is no shadow of socialism in the Soviet Union. Years have passed since the signs that distinguish the Soviet regime from fascist regimes were destroyed.”

On November 11, 1949, Yediot Ahronot placed an “Open Letter to Mr. Ershov” in which the author, Dr. Rosenblum, offended that he was not invited to the mission, in a mocking tone polemizes with the soviet envoy and admits a number of anti-Soviet attacks.

On November 11, 1949, Maariv published an article in the form of a feuilleton entitled “The Vain Anxiety”, in which the editor of the newspaper, the author of the article Karlbach in an ironic and mocking tone, conveys an alleged conversation between the Soviet envoy and the mission adviser in connection with the demonstration of the youth of the Mapai Party on November 5, 1949 (article attached). ...

Appendix: 15 articles from the Israeli press.

Attaché of the SOVIET mission in Israel

M. Popov

**REFERENCE OF THE SECOND SECRETARY OF THE
SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL M.P. FEDORIN "ON THE
CELEBRATION IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL 32ND
ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST
REVOLUTION". December 7, 1949**

Secret.

This year's celebrations in Israel of the 32nd anniversary of the October Revolution were held mainly by the Lygo friendly ties with the USSR. Timely preparations for the celebrations enabled the League to hold ceremonial meetings in many of the country's cities and towns. Several meetings were also organized separately by the Communist Party of Israel and the Mapam Party. In total, about 40 ceremonial meetings were held, including in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem, Nazareth, Jaffa, Rishon-le-Tsion, Gede-re, etc.

On November 4, a large solemn meeting was held in Tel Aviv. More than 3,000 people were present. The hall was decorated with banners of the USSR and Israel, on the stage - large portraits of Lenin and Stalin and the slogan "Long live the 32nd anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution."

At the beginning of the meeting, the national anthems of the Soviet Union and Israel were sung. The League's Secretary General, Dr. Snee, has made a great report on the achievements of the Soviet Union in its 32 years of existence. In the report, Sne showed a vivid picture of the rise of the national economy of the Soviet Union, the heyday of industry and agriculture, culture and science in the USSR.

"The achievements of the Soviet Union, led by Lenin's party Stalin," the speaker said, "are the achievements of the international proletariat." Sne went on to highlight the Soviet Union's leading role in the struggle of the progressive forces of all mankind for peace. The report was based on materials sent by VOCS.

After the report, Dr. Sne spoke to the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Israel Mikunis, who focused in his speech on the historic victories of the October Revolution, on the leadership of Lenin's party Stalin, on the inevitability of the victory of communism and the destruction of capitalism. He called for strengthening friendly relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of popular democracy, and strengthening the camp of forces of progress in the struggle for peace.

Then the secretary of the Central Committee of the party Mapam Riftin spoke, who pointed to the development of culture and science in the Soviet Union, the consistency of the foreign policy of the USSR.

Delegations of workers of large enterprises of Tel Aviv welcomed the meeting and congratulated the Soviet envoy to Israel T. Ershov P.I. on the day of the 32nd anniversary of the October Revolution.

T. Ershov delivered a brief response, which was met with a storm of applause.

After the speeches, the participants of the meeting standing, a standing ovation, which lasted several minutes, received a welcome telegram in the name of Stalin.

Musical works and songs of Soviet composers were performed in the artistic part.

With great success, ceremonial meetings were also held in other cities.

The 1,500-person meetings in Haifa and Jerusalem, which were attended by 1,500 people on 5 November, were also marked by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel, Wilner and Dr. Sne, on the achievements of the Soviet Union. Participants of all meetings expressed their sympathies with thunderous applause at the mention of the name of Stalin, the Soviet government, the consistent peaceful policy of the Soviet Union, etc.

It should be noted that this year's gatherings across the country were more than massive and took place in a friendly

attitude towards the Soviet Union by the general population of Israel.

On 4 November, the day of the ceremonial meeting in Tel Aviv, the newspapers Kol Ghaam (the organ of the Communist Party of Israel), Al Hamishmar (Mapam Organ) and Bashaar (the organization of the Mapam Youth Organization) were dedicated to the day of the October Revolution, the achievements of the Soviet Union in economics, culture, science, etc.

In addition, the League issued a special bulletin dedicated to the 32nd anniversary of the October Revolution.

On November 5, Mapam organized a youth demonstration to commemorate the 32nd anniversary of the October Revolution. A column of demonstrators with red flags passed the USSR mission building. The delegation of demonstrators congratulated the Soviet envoy T. Ershov P.I. on the day of the October Revolution and handed gifts from the progressive youth of Israel to Lenin Komsomol.

On November 7, the mission received numerous congratulations and bouquets of flowers from various progressive organizations of the Soviet Union.

After such celebrations held by the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR, the Committee of Friendly Relations with the USSR of the Ma-Pai party was uncomfortable to keep quiet in front of the public. He also decided to organize a committee meeting dedicated to the 32nd anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The meeting took place on November 10 in a small hall of the Tel Aviv Museum. About 300 people were present. The scene was not decorated with anything. The national anthems were not sung either at the beginning or at the end of the meeting. The meeting was opened by the chairman of the committee, Prof. Dinaburg. Then came: Klinov, head of the information and film department of the Ministry of the Interior, on the relationship between the USSR and Israel; Khalevi, artistic director of the Ohel Theatre, about the Soviet theatre, and Eliashiv, director of the Eastern Europe department of the

Foreign Ministry, with impressions of his trip to the Soviet Union.

None of the speakers even mentioned the October Revolution, its role, significance, etc.

The meeting was purely academic in nature, had nothing to do with the ceremonial celebration; by its restraint it was in stark contrast to the mass ceremonial meetings held by the Likago friendly ties with the USSR.

In conclusion, the massive display of friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union, which took place during the celebrations of the 32nd anniversary of the October Revolution, caused a certain alarm among the reactionary and governmental circles of Israel. In order to reduce the importance of sympathies shown by the progressive masses of the country's population to the USSR, the clearly inspired reactionary press began immediately after November 7 anti-Soviet campaign and campaign against the progressive forces of Israel, in particular the Communist Party and Mapam, accusing them of instigation, etc.

The progressive press reacted in a timely manner to these attacks of the reactionary press, brushed them aside and advocated for the Soviet Union and in the name of strengthening the friendship between the USSR and Israel.

Celebrations in Israel of the October Revolution, the active participation of the masses in these celebrations show that the progressive forces in the country have significant influence among the population of the country and they, under the right leadership of the Communist Party and Mapam, with the close cooperation of these parties have considerable weight in Israel.

Appendix: Kol Ghaam, Al Hamishmar and Bashaar newspapers, League bulletin - 2 copies.

Second Secretary of the USSR Mission in Israel

M.Fedorin

**LETTER FROM THE ADVISER OF THE ISRAELI
PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UN, G. RAFAEL TO THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M.
SHARETTA. December 13, 1949**

On the day of the vote on Jerusalem, I met with Tsarapkin. I wanted to explain to him the difference between municipal expenditures and the overall budget of government services, as in his speech he gave figures based on the municipal budget of Jerusalem. After my clarification, a conversation took place between us, during which Tsarapkin expressed his opinion in a specific form on the whole complex of the Palestinian problem. Below I will try to summarize his words without giving my answers.

1. The division of Jerusalem between Israel and Jordan practically means the division of Palestine between us and Abdullah.

2. Approving this section would mean agreeing that the British would take root in Jerusalem and East Palestine, since Abdallah acts as a direct agent of the United Kingdom.

3. The rooting of the British means helping the United States in its aggressive preparations for the Third World War.

4. Our agreement to partition of Jerusalem contributes to these plans and strengthens Anglo-American positions in the Middle East.

5. The people of Jerusalem would oppose the implementation of the UN decision only if the Anglo-American coalition incited it. Just as the Arabs would not have attacked Israel a year ago without active Anglo-American incitement, Israel will not oppose a UN resolution of its own free will.

6. If we do oppose the UN resolution, the Security Council will be forced to demonstrate its authority.

7. The Soviet policy on the Palestinian issue is absolutely consistent. The programme contained in the resolution of 29 November includes three components: first, the

establishment of a Jewish State, which has already been implemented; secondly, the establishment of an international regime in Jerusalem that is about to be implemented; thirdly, the establishment of an independent Arab State, which would follow the implementation of the first two parts of the plan, and the USSR would strongly advocate that an independent Arab state should indeed emerge in eastern Palestine.

8. Our statements at the General Assembly prove that we are clearly leaning towards the United States. On any issue we did not speak unequivocally against the Americans, and on many issues vital to the USSR and the UN, we voted against the Soviet position. As an example, he cited our vote on a draft resolution condemning the preparation of a new world war by Britain and the United States. He stressed that, in their view, the proposal was the most important one on the agenda of the session. We not only voted against it, but also joined the Anglo-Saxon draft resolution. He added that he is not going to discuss with me about the motives of our vote, as we are free to vote of our own choosing.

9. After all he had said, I asked him a direct question as to whether he considered our state to be the most independent in the Middle East. After some reflection and hesitation, he replied, "More or less."

**THE NOTE OF THE TREATY AND LEGAL DEPARTMENT,
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE USSR
FOREIGN MINISTRY TO THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE USSR A.A. GROMYKO. December 14,
1949**

Secret.

In accordance with article 2 of the rulings of the Ussr Foreign Ministry's Board of Foreign Affairs of November 28, 1949, the "Project letter of T. Kafta-new S.V. on the political map of Asia" Treaty and Legal Office, the Division of Southeast Asia and the Division of Middle East countries report the following:

...
2. In the depiction of Palestine, we consider it appropriate to follow the decision of the UN General Assembly of November 29, 1947 on the partition of Palestine. In accordance with this decision, Palestine will be shown without an explanatory signature the "mandate of Britain" by painting its territory in a colour different from the colour adopted for displaying British possessions. On the map, keep the inscription—"Palestine."

In Palestine, the State of Israel is shown within the boundaries set by the UN General Assembly," painting its territory in a stronger tone of the same colour, with the inscription "State of Israel."

A special creep to allocate the territory of the city of Jerusalem within the boundaries established by the same solution.

On the map, place a note: "The borders of the State of Israel and the city of Jerusalem are shown in accordance with the UN General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947."

In the remainder of the Palestinian territory, the so-called Arab State, place the number “1”, as shown in the attached map. In the legend of the map to give an explanation of this sign, stating that it is “the territories that, according to the resolution of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947, form an Arab state.”

M.Buev K.Mikhailov A.Shiborin

**LETTERS OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE TO THE ISRAELI
MISSION TO THE USSR, COLONEL I. BARNEA TO THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M.
SHARETT. January 2, 1950**

Dear Moshe!

I want to tell you, the military attaché has nothing to do here. And I dare say, disdaining my natural modesty, that I can't even blame myself for it. Once again, as long as the existing circumstances are what they are (both in the Soviet Union and around the world), I have absolutely nothing to do here. No results will be achieved in the current circumstances.

After all, my work is based on relationships maintained with the local military. With this relationship, the person in my position should have access to official and legal sources of information in order to extract from them something useful to study. In peacetime, so, at least, accepted around the world, he is given the opportunity to be present at manoeuvres and exercises, at military parades, in the testing of weapons, from which the seal of secrecy is removed. In wartime, he gets the opportunity to closely monitor the course of combat operations. In addition, it is accepted that the authorities provide information to military attaches both at their request and on their own initiative, again with the exception of classified information relating, for example, to the deployment of troops, the number of troops on active duty, etc. (although there are exceptions, for example, in the Times three weeks ago, the British Ministry of War released data on the number of soldiers in three types of troops).

But because of the state of affairs in the USSR and in the world that developed long before I arrived in Moscow, no normal relations with the local military is possible, it is not practiced here. The maximum that the authorities provide to the military attaché is contact with the Foreign Relations

Directorate of the Ministry of Defence. This is the only channel to address the authorities and the only channel through which the authorities turn to military attaches, that is, give them invitations to official receptions on November 7 and similar important events. In short, this office, headed by the general, serves as a kind of invitation expedition: on all matters beyond postal functions, it simply does not work. You address them on such a question - there is no answer. If you apply orally, you are required to file an appeal in writing; you send a letter and you're silent in response. Everyone in Moscow knows this well, but no one asks questions.

It's just that the government doesn't want anything else. And this situation defines the scope of my capabilities and the capabilities of my colleagues in the corps of military attaches. Why do they tolerate it? I don't know. It is possible that in other countries military attaches this state of affairs is not concerned, because salaries are paid carefully, and seniority accumulates. Only I eat myself, can not forget that I sit here for no use and only eat public money - 400 pounds a month (and even in dollars!), on the one hand, and that if I stayed in Israel, maybe would have done something useful - on the other.

In my opinion, there is no reason to be here in my current capacity, at least under the current state of affairs (and it must be assumed that this situation will only get worse). And if someone says that my stay in Moscow is necessary to give more weight and representation to our mission, let me ask the question with all seriousness: "What price?"

Please, Moshe, think about it! If you can think of anything, please let me know.

I say goodbye to this, hello to you and Tziporah, and to the children - from Shoshana and from me.

With a friendly greeting.

Israel Barnea

And say hello to Haim Radi, Walter Eitan and Ms. Plaum.

**NOTE OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL OF THE
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY. January 23, 1950**

The mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics received from a number of Soviet citizens living in the territory of the State of Israel, applications for conscription under the law of the State of Israel "On conscription", which came into force on October 1, 1949.

The Mission considers it necessary to draw the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the fact that such an inset of foreign conscription does not correspond to the generally accepted principles of international law, under which the State cannot forcibly bring in foreigners living in its territory for protection in the absence of an appropriate agreement with the Government of the country in which these persons are national.

The Mission expects that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will take appropriate measures to free The Soviet citizens living in Israel from serving in the troops of the State of Israel.

**LETTER FROM ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR M. NAMIR
TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHARETT. January
25, 1950**

Owls. Secret With a Courier

Dear Mr. Charette!

The report number 4 of our military attaché, Colonel I. Barnea, says the following on the last page:

“The conclusion

In the situation described above, we cannot even dream of developing friendly relations - absolutely not. However, in addition to relations in society, there are, of course, also formal. But they begin and end with a visit to Major General Saraev in connection with the arrival of attaches in Moscow and congratulations at the annual parades: May Day, in honor of Air Force Day, which is held in September, and November 7. There's no more. Going beyond the strict necessity, I initiated another meeting with Saraev in December. I came to him for information (recording the conversation I sent you the next day). As you would expect, I didn't learn anything from what I wanted to find out, but the meeting surprised me.

Do not go into details to come to the conclusion that in these conditions my stay here is meaningless, except that personally me and my wife enjoy living as a resort. Although I must admit that this pleasure begins to fade, because it lasts almost three months.

Therefore, I suggest, taking into account: a) the futility of my stay here, b) lack of prospects for a change in the situation, c) too high a price that the State pays from the budget of the Ministry of Defence for my stay here, d) and some benefit that I could bring while in Israel, once again carefully consider the need for the continued presence of a military attaché here.

Careful observation, personal, almost three months of experience and study of the situation in other missions

allowed me to form a balanced opinion that the attache is not needed here. If the management decides otherwise, it will be unjustified.

For your information: out of 44 missions in Moscow, only 17 have military attaches, 9 of which belong to the eastern bloc, while 27, including the representations of countries with the Soviet Union have no common border.”

I think it is necessary to accompany this with some observations.

First of all, I am not going to dispute the original position: indeed, from a military-professional point of view, based on the real possibilities to learn something here, there is no sense to keep a military attaché in Moscow. However, all this is not new, we knew about it well here and in Israel, and Barnea himself spoke about it in conversations with his predecessor Colonel Ratne-rom long before the appointment. If it was decided to leave a military attaché in Moscow, I believe that two main reasons for this are:

(a) It was impossible to leave the entire eastern bloc without a single military attaché, despite the fact that in the United States we have already appointed him a deputy, or even two, and the press in the meantime speculates that we are building an army by American standards, that “American generals” are providing us with technical assistance, etc.

b) We cannot allow the impression abroad that we are completely disillusioned with this sphere of relations, especially when we consider that we do not lose anything (rather even acquire), if the West will occasionally suspect: “It is not for nothing that the Israeli military attaché is spinning here, and what if the Russians and Israelis have common interests?”

I will not comment on the rest of Barnea's findings. But it seems that the two arguments I have given (especially the first one) are enough. At the same time, it seems to me that the complete cessation of purchases of Soviet goods over the past 7-8 months (due to the fact that the issue of Soviet credit has not yet been resolved) is a serious political

mistake, which will one day still play a role: the Russians will use it to give more weight to their other (not so well-founded) claims to us. However, this is separate.

If we reason so, it is easy to conclude that in the current international conditions there is no sense in diplomatic relations between the East and the rest of the world, in the allocation of significant funds for the maintenance of embassies, etc. Therefore, it is often necessary to refrain from steps that today seem very logical and timely, if there is no certainty that tomorrow or the day after tomorrow they will not be a mistake (and even a harmful mistake). This is especially true of our very specific mission. Who knows if the “good times” will come in the very near future in relations with the eastern bloc. At first glance, there is no reason for optimism. But in any case we should not take steps that will accelerate negative processes without having the extreme need. Who can be sure that the current Cold War will last forever? On the one hand, if it continues to heat up the situation, it could end in a war of “hot”, with completely unpredictable, horrific consequences. And if not, sooner or later some temporary “modus vivendi” will be found in the relations between the two blocks, and then some things might have changed for the better. At this stage, our policy should be kept within the framework of stable maintenance of “friendly relations” with the eastern bloc, even if we suspect that there is nothing real behind these words.

On the basis of these same general considerations, I would like to add a few words about our relations with Romania following the withdrawal of their envoy from Tel Aviv. By the way, this has not improved our position in relations with the West. But when I was already writing the letter, newspapers came from Israel. Having read all that demagoguery and speculations published by various opposition groups on this issue, I psychologically lost the opportunity to deal with this topic. In hindsight, as you know, we are all strong, so I will limit myself to the facts: when Dr. Eliasviv was in Moscow, I shared with him in detail my

thoughts on this, emphasizing that the very fact of sending to us Churoy (one of the few Romanian diplomats who is said not to have been seen in distasted to Israel) requires us to replace and leave Mr. Regwen to serve office. , and in the meantime to demonstrate to Cheuro the maximum, even stressed affability, and wait patiently in which direction the relationship will develop. Dr. Eliashiva fully agreed with my point of view.

Perhaps I am not all aware of the circumstances of this case; maybe there could be no other outcome by the logic of events. In any case, if I am allowed this time to go beyond my “jurisdiction”, it seems to me that everything should be done to prevent further expansion of this crack and try to patch it up as soon as possible. At the very least, we must preserve the status of our envoy in Bucharest, without extending the mission's activities to several neighbouring countries.

As for our relations with the East as a whole, I would like to say this: patience is first and foremost necessary. Patience and restraint, even when it seems that the limits are exhausted. Exceptions can be made only those issues that are really fateful for us.

Our concept of friendly neutrality cannot be implemented by the same means in relation to both blocs. In order to gain friendship and support from Western countries, our politicians can afford to speak critically about the activities of a country's government, even try to restore free public opinion against it there, or rely on opposition parties capable of winning elections and replacing the existing cabinet. In any case, it is not a manifestation of hostility to the criticized country, but a means to achieve friendly relations. In the East, the situation is completely different. There is no other “public opinion” but a government one, and there is no hope of changing the government. Therefore, any external criticism of the local government, its authorized representatives or leaders is perceived as an attack against the state itself. Relations with the East are relations with

and only with governments. Our neutrality with respect to the Eastern Bloc must be based on the constant consideration of these differences, and this should be taken into account in the planning of each of our steps.

The above may be considered a manifestation of unworthy moral opportunism. But that would be both unfair and superficial. I hope that you will not give me any intention but to warn against hasty actions and conclusions about the prospects of our relations with the Eastern Bloc and to deal with the practical question of what we should do and what should not be done to prevent the deterioration of relations with this bloc within the framework of the existing realities in this part of the world.

Returning from such a long excursion into the analysis of non-original ideas on the question of Mr. Barnea, I would not like my comments to give the impression that I am against the removal of the post of military attaché in Moscow under any circumstances. I do not ignore the fact that Colonel I. Ratner was repeatedly invited to the Ministry of Defence for conversations that at one time gave reason to hope that we received some Soviet weapons, and in the end nothing came of it. During our meeting in Paris, I expressed the opinion that if this year the military attaché will have nothing to do in Moscow, it will be possible to think about the elimination of this post. But I do not think that anything unforeseen has happened in the last three months that would force us to revise our general approaches, and I strongly oppose the practical conclusions of Mr. Barnea.

Let's say we would agree with his conclusions and withdraw the military attaché. What exactly will this achieve? The Russians, of course, will take this step with absolute indifference, but do not think that they do not use this decision against us when they see fit.

And one more thing. If the escalation of the cold war continues, some danger of a complete breakdown of diplomatic relations, perhaps only de facto, between East and West should be taken into account. It is possible that this

will start just with the withdrawal of military attaches. Should we once again give a reason to suspect ourselves of “the service of the West”?

In other words, I would like to suggest that we should not rush to a decision, but to return to the discussion of the issue in May-June, after our Independence Day and the May Day parade in Moscow.

With respect.

M.Namir

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR
M.NAMIR TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY S. ELASHIV. February 1, 1950**

On your telegram 30315. The north Koreans' intentions cannot be as determined here. If we vote in favour, it will infuriate the entire Eastern bloc, especially the Chinese, because they regard South Korea as their sworn enemy. The Attention of the Soviets is now focused mainly on East Asia, for them it is the highest priority. After the actual partition of Korea comes The turn of Vietnam; it cannot be ruled out that the establishment of several hostile Governments would also encompass other countries in the region where armed uprisings were taking place. It is best for us to refrain on all matters relating to this conflict region. In Korea, we have no interests that could lead us to deviate from the principle of non-interference in the apparent inter-block confrontation. Our "for" vote will be perceived as a step towards political recognition, not as a technical action. At the same time, if we abstain in the vote (whatever its outcome), it will at least leave the door open for any change in our position if the circumstances change accordingly. At the same time, it should be taken into account that it is in recent weeks that the local press has attacked us in connection with Morgenthau¹⁶, the Process of Kol Ghaam, etc. After all, our state did not accept the World Postal Union for a long time, the International Red Cross did not recognize our right to use the symbol of the Red Shield of David - all this was unpleasant, but not catastrophic. By the way, in both cases the eastern bloc supported us.

My conclusion is that we should continue to abstain from voting. The same opinion is held by Levavi and Barnea.

Namir

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR
M.NAMIR TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY S. ELASHIV. February 2, 1950**

Answer to your telegram by Claire 7829. I do not ignore the fact that more and more negative information about Israel has appeared in the local press lately. At the same time, I think it is necessary to state the following:

a. Based on the concepts adopted here and when compared with TASS reports from other countries, the reports from Tel Aviv are formulated in relatively moderate tones, in any case no worse than notes from other neutral States (Sweden, Switzerland and even Pakistan, with which the Soviets are now seeking to make friends).

Except for one or two cases, the Telegrams quoted the Israeli press as saying.

v. As far as I know, all attempts to challenge tendentious information in the local press are fended off by the standard answer that in the USSR the press is free and is not controlled by anyone.

I think that there is no point in talking to either the mission staff or the correspondent, except in some extremely important cases, or if the Russians start complaining about attacks on them in our press.

Namir

**NOTE OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY OF ISRAEL'S
MISSION TO THE USSR. February 2, 1950**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shows its respect for the Mission of the State of Israel and in response to the note of Mission 2694 of November 25, 1949, has the honour to report that the soviet law does not provide for the appointment of pensions to persons living outside the Soviet Union.

**LETTER FROM ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR M. NAMIR
TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHARETT. February
3, 1950**

Secret.

Dear Mr. Charette!

We haven't had a trade attaché for five months, we don't buy anything here for almost three quarters. According to the dates, we have stopped any trade ties since we submitted to Vyshinsky a request for a trade loan. There are no indications that this loan will be given to us in the near future, but it is clear that the complete cessation of procurement is politically unjustified, even if from a purely economic point of view there is no sense in them. (And before we had to fight with the Ministry of Finance every time you had to buy something in the USSR, and it always turned out that all fears of losses were untenable.) Trade policy towards the USSR on the principle of "all or nothing" will not bring us any benefit, just as such a method has no place in the political sphere as a whole.

I use the term "purchases", that is, I do not write here about the possibilities of our exports to the USSR, because, in my opinion, we should resume here exactly purchases, even if not on the basis of reciprocity. So far, our political situation does not absolve us from the need for certain "investments", even if they do not promise immediate profits.

I do not know where and how trade issues with Russia were discussed. But if my assumptions are correct and this problem is solved without full consideration of its political aspect, it is a wrong tactic, and the decisions taken on its basis are wrong.

I note that since Mr. Becherano's departure from here, we have not received a single offer from Israel to conduct any trade. Russian foreign trade will live well without us. We

can regret it, but we cannot change it, just as we will have to seek Russian support on this or that issue for a long time. The line in the "USSR" of our foreign trade balance will not make us stronger.

In fact, I ask you to complete the search period and appoint a candidate who will be both a sales representative and an adviser to the embassy. During our conversation in Paris, I said (and repeated this in Israel to Eitan, Eliashiva and Radai) that these two positions can be combined and that this position is supported by A. Levavi, who, incidentally, would like to return to his previous job or to a similar position in the Foreign Ministry.

I would like to emphasize once again that we do not necessarily need a businessman to work successfully in the field of trade relations. It is better that it was a lawyer by training or a person with experience in compiling legal documents (contracts, etc.). Of course, it all depends on the conformity of this candidacy to the objectives of our common political activity here.

M.Namir

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
DEPUTY HEAD OF THE CONSULAR DEPARTMENT OF
THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY I.B. KONJUKOV WITH
THE ADVISER OF THE ISRAELI MISSION IN THE USSR A.
LEVAVI. February 3, 1950**

Secret.

Today at 3 p.m. Levavi was received at his request.

He reported that the mission received many letters from persons living in Israel asking them to send certificates signed by persons who had previously married them. These certificates would express the latter's consent to the dissolution of the marriage. He asked what should be done in such cases.

However, Levavi could not give a single specific case and did not know what kind of marriage in these letters is in question and which state are the citizens of these persons. He promised to clarify it.

Some authors of these letters, Levavi added, indicate in their letters that they were removed from Soviet citizenship due to their long stay outside the USSR. To this I noticed that although I do not know specific cases, but the Soviet law on citizenship does not recognize the automatic withdrawal from Soviet citizenship, and this exit should be formalized by law. Levavi expressed his wish to talk to me about these issues in the near future. I said yes.

The conversation lasted 10 minutes.

Konjukov

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
February 9, 1950**

According to Riftin, at the meeting of the cross-party subcommittee on foreign affairs, Charette gave the following answers to the questions of Mapam representatives:

1) Israel will have a mind in the Small Assembly of the United Nations and so far sees no reason to vote against its decisions. The USSR is wrong to believe that the existence of the Small Assembly is contrary to the UN Charter and that it replaces the Security Council.

2) Israel will support the organization of the UN armed forces, as they are exclusively police in nature, will be few and are created for policing.

3) Israel supports the Soviet union's proposal to reduce weapons. On the issues of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the peace pact, he would refrain from taking a position.

4) On Israel's policy towards the Bonn Government, Charette said that it should not be recognized in principle, but given that Israel has huge property interests in West Germany and that direct negotiations will have to be held on this issue, it goes without saying that this fact will be indicative of the recognition of the Bonn Government.

5) Asked about Histadrut's position, since it owns the majority of Mapai, in relation to the World Federation of Trade Unions and the unification of schismatics, Charette replied that Histadrut would not join the new divisive association of trade unions, but it is also possible that he will not, that is, leave the World Federation of Trade Unions.

Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR M.
NAMIR TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY. February
10, 1950**

In the continuation of our telegram 360:

a. As a result of the inspection, there was no evidence of total deportation of Jews from the suburbs and other places. At the same time, there is full confirmation of reports of numerous acts of individual expulsion on charges of Zionism, sympathies to Israel, application for the right to repatriate, links with relatives abroad, speculation and belonging to anti-social elements, including the authorities recall sins from the distant past. There is no way to assess the extent of the expulsion. In some places, many, exclusively Jews, have been declared criminals and exiled. Apparently, from here came rumours about the deportation of entire Jewish women. However, from credible Jewish sources we have learned that many Jews, especially in Ukraine, speculate on the black market, enrich, lead a defiantly wasteful way of life and by their behaviour provoke envy and hatred on the part of non-Jews.

b. The process of dismissal of Jews is increasing, often for no reason or under obviously irrelevant pretexts. The main process affected management systems; the purge of state institutions from "cosmopolitans" continues (in the eyes of the public they are the same Jews). The scale of anti-Semitism is growing markedly, the atmosphere is extremely burdened; the central authorities do not prevent this in any way, and local authorities in some regions even join the anti-Semitic campaign themselves, where secretly and where openly. It is these local authorities that determine who is considered a "criminal" and whom to expel. Jews are in a very serious condition for fear of dismissal, confiscation and exile. The Jewish craftsman, who was holding a workshop near the mission building, hastened to liquidate the case, sold the apartment and went somewhere - for fear

that the property would be confiscated, and he was exiled. Now in his place sits Russian. Sometimes it seems that the authorities deliberately inflame such fears. Having come to us from various sources (including Barnea heard it in Odessa) rumours that Golda Meyerson was allegedly expelled from the USSR for propaganda of Zionism and repatriation, serve, apparently, the same purpose—to catch up with fear of Jews and at the same time discredit Israel in their eyes.

In terms of political allegiance, it seems that the authorities have a fairly clear gradation of peoples on the principle of loyalty: Slavs led by the Great Russians form the basis of the regime, Mongols and primitive tribes are also considered to be very loyal; The devotion of the inhabitants of large Muslim areas might need to be verified, so the authorities are investing heavily in their economic and cultural development, contributing to their national self-esteem, emphasizing their national identity and historical ties with Russia, despite all the differences between it and the foreign Islamic world. A similar policy is also in place for the Karelo Finns. On the other hand, Jews, Greeks, Turks, to some extent Armenians are considered quite suspicious; the most suspicious in this group are Jews. I explained the reasons in previous reports. If Jews were persecuted less than the Greeks and other such national groups, it was simply because, in the case of Jews, the problem was much more complex in terms of quantity and quality. Simple administrative measures will not solve it.

It is worth paying special attention to some paragraphs in the article on nationalism in “Economics Issues” (last issue). The author quotes Stalin, comments on it and concludes: “The characteristics of the nation are the commonality of language, territory, economy and culture. It is enough that even one of these signs is absent, so that a group cannot be considered a nation. Each nation has its origin and its end, and only the Bundians and other opportunists put forward the rotten concept of granting freedom to peoples not tied to their land.” Namir

**NOTE OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE
SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL. February 22, 1950**

1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is honoured to inform the USSR Mission that the law quoted in the above note (National Defence Act) applies to all persons of certain age groups living in the State of Israel without regard to nationality, bearing in mind that immigrants from various countries who have come to Israel have done so in order to settle here permanently. As a result, such persons enjoy all the rights that can facilitate their settlement, such as the right to housing, work and social assistance. At the same time, these individuals must fulfil the duties assigned to them by the State, including the duty to protect it. It follows that the release of permanent residents from their duties is contrary to the principles of full integration into the life of the State, binding on every immigrant, regardless of their country of origin, and could result in the fact that the rights and privileges granted to persons performing their duties towards the State would not be available to those who demand such release.

2. The Ministry also considered the problem from the point of view of international law and concluded that, given that many countries had similar laws requiring foreign nationals not to be exempt from military service, there was no contradiction between the aforementioned National Defence Act and international law.

3. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not agree with the view expressed in the note of the USSR Mission, it is nevertheless prepared, as an exception, without setting any precedent, to consider each request on a case-by-case basis. These requests should be sent and supported by the Mission if the persons in question make an official statement that they insist on their release from military service in connection with their repatriation.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes the opportunity to reassure the Soviet Mission of its very high regard.

**LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY S. ELIASHIV TO THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE
USSR M. NAMIR. February 28, 1950**

I mentioned in a previous letter that our contacts with the Soviet Mission had recently weakened. There are two reasons:

a. Sometimes, in addition to meetings on my initiative, official conversations and casual contacts at different receptions, I met with them at the events of the League of Friendly Relations. Each time such a meeting turned into a conversation. Now I do not go to such events. In recent months there have been many holidays: November 7, Lenin Day, Red Army Day; at all these events, an envoy and other Soviet diplomats appear, but they meet and talk only to others.

b. The minister has not had any conversations with the envoy since his return from Lake Saxess. Previously, he often invited him, reported current information, including on secondary issues. The main thing the Foreign Ministry cares about now is our tactics on the Jerusalem problem and with it the problem of Abdallah. Both of these issues cannot be the subject of conversation and communication of information to the Soviet envoy in the current situation. Several times we wondered whether it made sense to inform him of the situation in negotiations with Abdallah, but Ben-Gurion objected.

I think in the very next few days, perhaps, this week, when the negotiations reach a certain point, it will be possible to invite Ershov and tell him about the state of affairs. I've already talked about this with Moshe Pzaret. You can imagine their reaction to what is happening in advance, even if it is not expressed in the words of the messenger himself. If you happen to talk about it in Moscow, remind them that they have always been against the Conciliation

Commission and negotiations through mediators, and have advocated direct negotiations between us and the Arab states. It can also be noted that this agreement is not yet a peace treaty, but only a step towards a permanent peaceful settlement and that it in no way cancels the un-agreed truce agreements.

With respect.

S. Eliashiv

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR M.
NAMIR TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY. March 2,
1950**

In the continuation of the telegram Claire 1019:

a. Levavi was yesterday at the deputy head of the Middle East Division of Yiborin and argued, criticized the publications in their press in detail: all reports from Tel Aviv are negative and distort the reality. Our government appreciates the public opinion of the USSR, and we cannot but be alarmed by the attempt to create a distorted view of us. The one-sided and hopeless “negative” can also influence the perceptions of the Soviet people about the problems of our region. Particular attention of the Soviet side was drawn to Lutsky's article in “Economics Issues” and the article Silence in the New Time. Yiborin did not try to refute our claims, confining himself to the statement that the Israeli press contains much more strident anti-Soviet propaganda and publishes fabrications about such Soviet representatives as Ershov and Fedorin. He did not explain what fabrications were involved. Levavi said that our serious and representative press does not ignore the positive aspects of life in the USSR and, as a rule, demonstrates understanding and sympathy. As for criticism and attacks, everyone gets from the press, including even their own ministers. In any case, there is no reason to say that our press selects only “negative” as TASS does in Tel Aviv. If there are serious attacks, especially of personal order, our Foreign Ministry, of course, will not refuse to take measures within its means. Yiborin wrote everything down and promised to hand it over to the management. He spoke cold enough. I'll send a full report to the diplomatic courier.

Steamed like that with friends in the bath, I wanted that was all to the full, and for this lack of fucking to us, called, ordered, long wait did not have to, came quickly, decided to drink first for a complete relaxation, then began directly to

sex that these fucks from the brothel Spb made, we were delighted, sucker was to cheers, this I have not experienced, each of them sucked everyone, they constantly changed, from this excitement was even stronger, then began to fuck. Mine, I enjoyed it so much.

b. The article appeared after the conversation, there was no talk about it. If the situation does not change for the better, I myself will have to return to this topic in a conversation with Maximov.

Lately, the press began to appear with materials condemning anti-Semitism in the United States. Perhaps the attacks on Israel in the Soviet press are mainly for domestic consumption, to defame us in the eyes of local Jews.

Namir

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
March 3, 1950**

On March 3, Heretta visited at his invitation. He informed about the results of Israel's negotiations with Transjordan²⁰. The starting point of these negotiations, Charette began, was the fact that Israel, despite the conclusion of armistice agreements that stabilized only martial law, continues to be isolated from Arab countries. However, Israel needs long-term calm in the area to successfully build a State. Israel has 180,000 Arabs and is interested in not being a fifth column, especially when Israel's borders are extremely stretched. These reasons have forced Israel to seek all measures to strengthen relations with Arab countries. But to do this, it is necessary to make a hole in the Arab world and to agree first with any one country. It would be desirable for Israel to make peace with Egypt in the first place, since it is the most stable country of all other Arab countries. However, a new government came to power there, and its attitude towards Israel is still unknown.

The weak link in the chain of Arab countries, Charette continued, was Transjordan, which wants to gain a foothold in the Arab part of Palestine. Israel did not like it, and it would prefer to have a new, democratic State on its border, but since there were no political forces in that territory that could organize a new State, it had to put up with the status quo, since Israel did not intend to fight for that new State.

Negotiations with Transjordan have been going on for a long time, but only recently there was an opportunity to conclude a non-aggression treaty. This is not a peace treaty, but only a step towards it. On the other hand, it did not oblige Israel to recognize the annexation of the Arab part of Palestine, but it prohibited the use of that territory by troops from other countries. If such a treaty had been concluded (I

adhere to Charette's style), it would have given Israel a number of advantages:

1. It would have broken a hole in the Arab camp, which has great moral and propaganda significance.

2. It would be concluded without UN mediation through direct negotiations and would set a precedent for other Arab countries.

The treaty would be even more important if it were to re-start economic relations.

4. He would not say anything about the return of Arab refugees, since Transjordan did not raise the issue, but Israel would have to pay compensation for the losses suffered by the refugees.

5. The Treaty would also provide for access to Mount Scopus, the opening of the Old Jerusalem Road through Latrun and a number of other small reciprocal concessions. It is possible that under the Trans-Jordan trade agreement a "free zone" in Haifa will be allocated and the issue of reopening the Dead Sea potash plants will be agreed.

The treaty would enshrine the status quo of Israel's borders, including the Negev. If this conversation had been yesterday, he, Charette, could have said that the contract would be signed in 2-3 days. Today, however, it became known about the resignation of the Trans-Jordan government. Of course, this is a demonstration against the treaty, but Abdallah will obviously create a government that will not prevent him from entering into a treaty with Israel. Charette added that he was currently interested in what position England would take. So far, she has taken a wait-and-see attitude, not interfering in the negotiations and putting no pressure on Transjordan, ended Charette.

Using this visit, I handed Charette a note of mission according to your instructions.²¹ The content of the note made a strong impression on Charette and Elyashiva, who was present at the conversation. Charette said he would do everything in his power to "come to a mutual agreement and eliminate the state of conflict on this issue." He asked about

the practical significance of the issue for us, and I replied that it was both fundamental and practical. Eliashiv tried to start a discussion about the civil rights of those who refuse to serve in the Israeli army, but I interrupted Eliashiva and said that his point was expressed in the foreign ministry's note of February 22, to which the full response was given in the note of the mission of March 3. In conclusion, Charette repeated that he would do his best and that the mission note would be dealt with due consideration.

Ershov

**LETTER FROM ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
CHARETTA TO THE MILITARY ATTACHE OF THE
ISRAELI MISSION TO THE USSR TO COLONEL I. BARNEA.
March 6, 1950**

Dear Israel!

Thank you sincerely for the letter. I have been waiting for a personal letter from you since the moment you took up your duties in Moscow, and when I finally got it, I didn't feel any irritation because of the delay, only joy.

However, my joy was overshadowed by the content of your letter. Of course, I suspected that in Moscow you will not be too intense and nervous work, but the fact that you will find yourself in such a vacuum, I could not even imagine! And yet you will have to put up with it and carry the cross of relative idleness with love. The state is a company operating according to its own laws, according to its logic. When there is a decisive state interest to do something or conclude a treaty, there is nothing you can do: no complaint will help, no arguments, nor, especially, the fair delicacy of one person.

Even if it were clear to us in advance that you are so doomed to idleness, our decision would not change one iota. The fabric of our relationship with the superpower where you are is so thin that by our own free will we will not cut off a single thread that connects us to it. You may not be acutely aware of the importance of your mission in your daily life, but I have no doubt that eliminating the position of military attaché today would be a serious damage to the whole set of relations. It is possible that one day we will face the question whether there is any sense in the future stay of the military attaché in Moscow, but now the question is not worth it.

I would hope that my attempt to explain the situation is nothing fundamentally new to an old soldier and an experienced officer like you. After all, you know perfectly well how the military machine works and how, obeying the

laws of the military charter, a person is sometimes forced to leave the centre of high tension and continue service somewhere in the back of nowhere, seemingly far from the heart of life. But such transfers are necessary to ensure the normal functioning of the military machine as a whole and all its parts.

Just don't think that I too consider you a victim and call for patience and humility before a bitter fate. Nothing like that; although your letter breathes sincerity and everything in it is true, I am not convinced that you are remorseful that you have taken on this mission. What you encountered in Moscow, without a doubt, gives you abundant food for thought. To look at this country from the inside, to look at the whole world with its eyes - all this greatly enriches the intellectual baggage of man and gives him something that will be useful in the future. Especially if this experience is acquired not in the framework of personal needs, but in the service of society and for the sake of society. We were very pleased with the news that you were able to see your parents. You can imagine how much they felt and Sho-shan, and we, believe me, rejoiced for you. I have not met your Rachel since you went to Moscow, I hope to visit her during the next visit to Haifa. I hear she's fine.

When Shoshana arrives, of course, we will learn a lot from her. Of course, I am in no hurry to do it, the longer she stays in Moscow, the better for you and the better for our representation. But any day, whenever she comes, we'll meet her with open arms.

I wish health and strength.

**LETTER FROM ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. S
HERETTE TO ISRAEL'S ENVOY TO THE USSR, M.NAMIR.
March 8, 1950**

Dear Namir!

I'm sorry I haven't written to you all these months since I got back from New York.

Of course, you know that I didn't manage to meet Vyshinsky, and it was very depressing for me at the time. At first the conversation was promised to me, but the Russians warned that they would have to wait until the end of some discussion, which completely takes his time. Several times we reminded about this promise to Tsa-Rapkin, and he always answered that the meeting will take place, we just have to wait a little longer. I have the impression that the Russians are confident that I am going to this conversation mainly to make our claims about their position on the issue of Jerusalem, and they would like to avoid this unpleasant clarification of relations. Since I had no intention of drawing special attention to this particular issue, I was even afraid that the hot Jerusalem problem would not prevent us from discussing the main issue for which we sought to meet. I have therefore decided not to put pressure on them and to be patient until the vote on the international status of Jerusalem is completed.

I assumed that, as last year, Vyshinsky would pull until the end of the session (in Paris, our main conversation took place the day after the closing of the General Assembly session). But he left unexpectedly. When I reminded Tsarapkin of the promise given to us, he only spread his arms: according to him, Vyshinsky's departure was accelerated for a week due to completely unforeseen circumstances, and he had to cancel several more scheduled meetings. I expressed my extreme disappointment to Tsarapkin, stressing that this was a very rare opportunity for

me. I asked to convey my regrets to Moscow that the meeting did not take place, and he promised to do so.

Thus, the main point of my "Soviet" plan failed - it was connected with my presence in the General Assembly. As for the second paragraph, I arranged a special meeting with Haim Greenberg, brothers Jacob and Nechemia Robinson and Marie Sirkin. The poem made a huge impression - one of the men wept. I also read to them the original text of a poem by Marguerite Aliger. The majority supported your, not my opinion, that the original you received in handwritten form does not belong to the pen of the same author, but is a new variation on the same theme with the inclusion of whole pieces from the old text. Marie, in particular, insisted that this option was the original source of the poem. She convincingly proved that the new poem contained lines that could not be written by such a talented poetess - a lyricist with such a mighty poetic vocation as Margarita Aliger, it can be seen from the text of the poem published in that magazine. At the same time, everyone agreed that the tragic significance of the poem and its political importance in no way weakens its vague authorship.

Marie Sirkin agreed to translate the poem and publish it with a corresponding explanation. I don't know yet if she was able to do it. Just telegraphed to New York to find out what happened.

In the meantime, I received your latest report, which caused me deep concern about recent events and the situation among Soviet Jewry. Before this scourge, we are completely powerless. And just in these days we were rewarded with a great deliverance for another Jewish community, which also seemed condemned to complete annihilation and impotently trembled in the grip of the repressive regime: I mean, of course, the decision of the Iraqi authorities to allow the Jews to leave for Israel. This unexpected turn of events has been achieved thanks to our tireless efforts.

In Iraq, a country of ignorant fanaticism and brutal tyranny, we have been able to create points of influence, maintain a lively connection, act and exert influence. In the USSR, we can only observe and record events, and even then only in a very incomplete way.

From time to time we again have the idea of the need to travel to Moscow to get to the highest level of power. But for now, this thought is held back by serious doubts, and will we be allowed to come? And if so, will this visit bear any fruit? After all, if it fails, we will only lose from it, we will have to pay a high price for this unsuccessful attempt in other areas of our foreign policy. Such considerations confuse us and block the initiative.

It is hard for me, of course, to conclude this letter on such a sad note, but the tragedy of Soviet Jewry sharpens my soul and darkens the lives of each of us.

Yours sincerely

Moie Charette

**LETTER FROM ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. S
HERETTE TO ISRAEL'S ENVOY TO THE USSR, M.NAMIR.
March 8, 1950**

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Yours sincerely

Moie Charette

FROM THE REPORT OF THE MISSION OF THE USSR IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL FOR THE PERIOD FROM THE FORMATION OF THE STATE IN MAY 1948 TO DECEMBER 1949.”. March 10, 1950

Secret.

The situation in the countries of popular democracy and in the Soviet Union is presented in a perverted form, according to Anglo-American sources. Anti-Soviet propaganda is growing every day and in its nature is becoming more dirty and slanderous. The Israeli press comes to the publication of nefarious articles at the addresses of the leaders of the Soviet government. The anti-Soviet campaign has reached a particularly broad scope in connection with the SOVIET position on the issue of Jerusalem and the UN decision on the internationalization of Jerusalem. At the same time, the Israeli government in every way extols the “assistance” and “merit” of the United States. Although the American loan was sold on January 1, 1950 for only 15 million dollars, this fact is hidden from the population. The government invites us to serve in the state apparatus, including the General Staff, American advisers and “specialists.” The influence of these advisers, as well as the U.S. Embassy, whose official staff reaches 85 people, affects the foreign policy of the Israeli government primarily in the resolution of issues of Soviet-Israeli relations.

Focusing on the United States, Israel's ruling circles at the same time seek to establish friendly relations with England, while acting mostly through the mediation of the British puppet - Transjordan, with which Israel almost did not fight, fearing that it may in the future interfere with relations with England. The contentious issue of financial settlements, and in particular the blocked Palestinian account in London²², has somewhat delayed the establishment of friendly relations, but there is no doubt that they will be established. This is facilitated by Israel's existing relations with Transjordan, the de facto recognition of the

annexation of the territory of the Arab part of Palestine by transjordanation and negotiations on an economic agreement and a treaty on non-aggression and friendship.

Thus, Israel's foreign policy, turning into a tool of the Anglo-American bloc, leads the State of Israel to the loss of its independence, which was achieved only a year and a half ago with the support of the Soviet Union.

Israel's policy towards the USSR and the countries of popular democracy

The Soviet Union's position on the Palestinian issue at the UN, which played a decisive role in the creation of the State of Israel, the official recognition of Israel on the third day of its existence and the establishment of normal diplomatic relations, followed by the arrival of the Soviet mission in Tel Aviv, the first foreign diplomatic mission, caused universal approval and the growth of friendly feelings among the working masses of Israel. Numerous rallies and gatherings held in cities and agricultural settlements on the occasion of the revolutionary holidays of the USSR are a demonstration of the friendly attitude of Israeli workers towards the Soviet Union. A particularly striking example of appreciation towards the USSR and the Soviet government was the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the birth of Comrade Stalin by Israel's workers, when mass rallies and ceremonial meetings in honour of the leader of all progressive humanity I.V. Stalin were held all over the country, in all major cities and many towns.

It is clear that in its policy towards the USSR, the Government of Israel cannot underestimate or ignore these sympathies of the people. In one of his first conversations with us, Foreign Minister Charette had to admit that "Jews' sympathies for the USSR have increased, and they have realized that in their aspirations for the creation of a nation-state they will not be left without the support of the Soviet Union. The latter's recognition of Israel lived up to that hope and was greeted with great joy and enthusiasm as a fact of great historical significance." Moreover, while it is interested

in further support from the Ussr, both in and beyond the United Nations, the Government of Israel refrains from formally and openly speaking out against the Soviet Union, even when the policy of the Ussr does not meet the intentions of Israel's ruling circles, as was the case, for example, on the Jerusalem issue.

However, the Government of Israel cannot hide its negative attitude towards the USSR and the countries of popular democracy. No matter how covered by its supposed "independent policy", no declarations or statements by the leaders of the ruling so-called "worker" Mapai Party will cover up the reality of its pro-American orientation.

From the first days of the Soviet mission to Israel, the Israeli government authorities showed their "neutrality", causing public outrage in the country over the "incident in the opera" on August 21, 1948, when the director of the protocol department of the Israeli Foreign Ministry during the performance of the American and Israeli anthems was not sung the national anthem of the Soviet Union, although along with representatives of the United States in the theater were representatives of the Soviet mission. The newspaper "Kol Ghaam" in this regard wrote that "anti-Soviet provocation, which took place in the opera on August 21, caused a wide wave of protest throughout the country. The reports from the country's towns and villages, from the fighters on the front, show a general sense of bitterness and indignation at the abusive behaviour of our foreign policy leaders towards the representatives of the State that led to the founding of the State of Israel." According to the newspaper Al Hamishmar, "the ban (to perform the Soviet anthem) was a gross mistake and tactlessness towards the state, which first sent its diplomatic representatives in full, while the representative of the United States is only a "special representative" of the state, which has not yet recognized us de jure." And even a newspaper such as Gamashkiv responded to attempts by government newspapers to give the incident a "protocol" character, in which she wrote that

“the essence is that our diplomatic overture has begun. The melody on the theme “East and West” is already coming to our ears...”

Less than a month after the incident at the Opera House, the official Davar newspaper found it necessary to inform readers widely that “the so-called Palestinian Council of Magen, a society of assistance to the arrested Zionists in Soviet Russia, had gathered in Tel Aviv to discuss the situation of the arrested Zionists and the demand for their release and immigration here”.

The pro-Western orientation of the Mapai government party, combined with the nationalism of the leftist Mapam Workers' Party, which is a reflection of Zionist ideology, brings them together in some cases with all reactionary forces. On the surface of political life, this “unity of souls” is vividly demonstrated every time Zionism is touched upon. In this respect, there is a reaction in Israel to the well-known article by I. Ehrenburg, published in Pravda on September 21, 1948, Genin's booklet and Lutsky's article in the journal Economics. The Maariv newspaper reported that “there was nervousness in Israel's circles about the publication of Ehrenburg's article in Pravda and on the radio..; it is not yet clear to us why Russia now needed to withdraw its support for the state of Israel.” According to the Palestine Post, “sympathies for the state of Israel and antipathy to Zionism are, as one might think, two feelings, hardly reconciled.” The Mapam Party has produced a special edition entitled “Notes on the margins of the Genin pamphlet” in which it denies the author's statement; Mapam's party body, Al Hamishmar, agreed that “without the state of Israel and without Jewish workers in it, the victory of progressive forces in the world will not create any possibility of normal national Jewish life. It will not create conditions under which Jews will no longer be slaughtered.” The newspaper “Gamashkiv” stated that “it is impossible to separate the state of Israel from Zionism” and that “we strive to ensure that... Jewish children, citizens of the USSR, studied Hebrew and Jews

could join the camp of the builders of their state, that is, go to Palestine.” According to Davar, “the struggle against cosmopolitanism is the elimination of Jewish culture.”

Here are just a few examples of the reaction of the Israeli press, examples that can somehow be attributed to political debate, while other press statements are anti-Soviet in nature and are based on slander, fabrications and crude attacks against the Soviet Union and countries of popular democracy.

The fact of tendentious selection of the Composition of the Israeli mission to Moscow draws attention to itself. Despite the fact that during this period the Mapam party was represented in the government and took part in all other state and public bodies respectively, this time its participation was categorically rejected on the grounds of the “pro-Soviet orientation” of the party. One of the Mapaev figures, Al. The schoolboy, opening a meeting of the Tel Aviv branch of the Histadrut dedicated to the wires to Moscow of the Israeli mission, read: “The reassessment of values in relation to Zionism by the Soviet Union is one of the decisive events in the recent history of our people... With trepidation we see them on the way. They will no doubt represent Israel without bending their heads, as befits the heroic history of our people and our working class. We know that our interests have been placed in the right hands and that we have chosen the real defenders of our cause in the USSR.” The members of the Histadrut from Mapam, invited to the wires, did not appear at the meeting and explained their act in an open letter, in which they said that they refused to come to the wires because of the “shameful history in the selection of people in the representation in the USSR.” The letter went on to say that the “thirst for sole party power” led to an “act of one-party power grab within the embassy”, which ultimately undermined unity in the working movement and did not serve the purposes of mutual understanding and better representation.

Subsequent appointments to the Israeli mission in Moscow, in particular the replacement of Golda Meyerson by Namir, do not sign of Israel's desire to impose serious tasks on its mission in Moscow that contribute to the development of relations between the two countries. This appointment, as it did not elevate the Israeli mission, led Charette to repeatedly tout the figure of Namir and, in particular, to state that "the desire to appoint an envoy to the Soviet Union of Namir should not be seen as a reduction in the importance of the mission", and in addition, they "would very much not like to lose in Moscow a diplomatic figure who understands the common objectives and interests." The appointment of Colonel Barnea (Boganov) to the post of military attaché in Israeli army command circles was perplexing, as Barnea enjoyed militarily the reputation of the most mediocre man to join Mapai's party for career reasons. Thus, it can be concluded that the special selection of leadership and staff in the Israeli Mission had only one fundamental objective: to carry out tasks that correspond only to Mapai's party objectives, rather than to promote the relationships that progressives think of. As mentioned above, the consistent foreign policy of the Soviet Union, the speeches of the Soviet delegation to the UN Assembly and the Security Council on the Palestinian issue, the recognition by the Soviet Union of the State of Israel at the most difficult moment of its formation, the arrival of the Soviet mission in the country - all this caused a huge increase in sympathy for the country of socialism in the masses of Israel and serves as a solid foundation for the growth and development of progressive forces. The most typical example in this regard is the activities of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR. Having left the lith league, the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR, despite a difficult period of inter-party debate, has grown relatively rapidly into a serious organization with up to 20,000 members. The League's work to strengthen sympathies for the Soviet Union initially caused a deep displeasure of the government and the reactionary

press, and in the future the Mapai party decided to withdraw from the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR, unquestionably pursuing the sole purpose of intimidating progressive elements with its exit, weakening the work of the League in order to weaken the scope and importance of its activities. In order to mask in the eyes of public opinion its clearly expressed anti-Soviet position in this act, the Mapai party resorted to accusing the League of allegedly becoming on the path of party struggle, and therefore its activities do not correspond to the “neutral” policy of the state. Having left the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR, Mapai's party created for the form of the “Committee of Friendly Relations”, the task of which is to use a loud name, hiding behind some academic nature of events, to stop in fact a large mass work.

It should be noted that in order to implement the same “neutral” policy, Mapai, this time in partnership with the pro-fascist Party Herut, created the League to strengthen “friendly ties” between the United States and Israel. This organization, with the help of American “friends” is now one of the sources of anti-Soviet propaganda.

Efforts from The Ruling Circles of Israel to weaken the activities of progressive forces are not limited to attacks against the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR. The organized obstacle (albeit in a hidden form) is met by those Israeli firms that are engaged in the implementation of Soviet literature and print publications of the countries of popular democracy. The difficulties in obtaining Soviet books were initially explained by the lack of foreign currency for this purpose. When, with the consent of our traders and financial organizations, payment of literature received from the USSR can now be made by local currency, new complications began to arise in the form of various kinds of censorship, customs and other obstacles. The fear of everything Soviet takes such a character that local collectors have actually lost the opportunity to obtain stamps. It should be emphasized that everywhere bookstores and newspaper

stalls have in great choice literature and periodic press of foreign publishing houses, including anti-Soviet direction.

A special place in the policy of the ruling mapai party is occupied by the organization of broad anti-Soviet propaganda in the press. In this respect, the newspapers and magazines of the “working” party are not inferior to bourgeois publications. Various fabrications and slanderous attacks against the Soviet Union and the countries of popular democracy are systematically published.

Anti-Soviet publications affect all aspects of the internal life and foreign policy of the USSR, its relations with the countries of popular democracy. Soviet statesmen are constantly under attack. Particular attention is paid to the fabrications related to the lives of Jews in the Soviet Union, Romania and Hungary.

For the purposes of falsification and distortion of reality, all kinds of techniques are used, ranging from political reviews of “own correspondents” to feuilletons, reviews and chronicle notes. The Israeli official and bourgeois press on all international events looks through the eyes of the United Press and Reuters. Any anti-Soviet provocation receives the widest coverage and tendentious comments. Events and activities that speak of the achievements of the Soviet Union are hushed up or misrepresented. Even information such as Soviet art news and sporting achievements are not reflected.

The position of the Israeli government in relation to the USSR and to the countries of popular democracy has never been direct and sincere neither in political matters, in economic relations, nor in cultural ties. Throughout its stay in the country, the Soviet mission has been trying to resolve with the Government of Israel an absolutely clear question regarding the property interests of the USSR in Israel. However, the Government of Israel has not been benevolent in consolidating the property rights of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, it is trying to avoid the substantive issue through various delays and legal complications, and is also trying to use our interest in the registration of property

rights as a factor in achieving its political objectives. Foreign Ministry officials have repeatedly hinted at, for example, the link between the transfer of Jerusalem property to the Soviet Union and the Attitude of the Soviet Government to the future statute of the city. On the other hand, the local Jewish authorities, using the direct patronage of the government, are trying to seize some property in the direct order, hoping to secure them for themselves in the future.

The volume of commercial relations between Israel, on the one hand, the Soviet Union and the countries of popular democracy, on the other, shows that the level of export-import operations is declining all the time, and Israel is moving away from its treaty obligations with the countries of popular democracy. It is becoming clear that the Israeli Government, despite its obvious mutual benefit, does not intend to expand trade with democratic countries. Many Israeli firms have worked hard to obtain customs and currency licenses to purchase goods in the USSR, but all their actions are met with stubborn resistance from government agencies. The arrival in Israel of a representative of our trading organizations (i.e. Lopukhin from Export) and all his proposals have not received support, although the government press seeks to show the case in such a way that it is as if Israel conducts free and expanded trade with the whole world without making preference for any political orientation.

The “neutrality” of the Israeli Government is also reflected in the country's cultural ties, as was the case when a group of Israeli democratic youth were sent to the World Youth Festival in Budapest. The Israeli Government had delayed the issuance of exit visas and travel money until the very last moment, and it was only under intense public pressure that it risked denying the delegation's exit.

Numerous visits to Israel by Western politicians, anti-democratic, anti-Soviet, and ultimately anti-Israeli statements of the latter could not pass by the general public, and the progressive press has repeatedly criticized the

unilateral “hospitality” of the Israeli government. In order to some extent to neutralize this phenomenon, which has become too visible in the political life of the country, the Government came up with a move that the Foreign Minister presented to us as follows: “I must tell you frankly that in the context of numerous visits to the country by representatives of Western states, the arrival of Gromyko, the most popular person in Israel, would be especially important for us in terms of our chosen policy of unconditional neutrality. Assuming that Mr. Gromyko, by virtue of his official employment, would no longer be able to come to Israel, the arrival in Israel of any other person elected by the Soviet Government would be met with great enthusiasm by us.

Charette’s “enthusiasm”, however, did not prevent the Mayor of Tel Aviv, Rocaha, from finding a plausible excuse to reject the proposal of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR to name one of the streets of Tel Aviv after Andrei Gromyko, although the municipality at one time found it possible to assign the streets of the city names that come from the names of such “figures” as Balfour or General Alenbi, which may symbolize the beginning of British colonial rule.

It is absolutely undeniable that both Sharett’s proposal for the arrival of Gromyko and the desire to get a delegation of Soviet trade unions to Israel were intended to improve the shattered reputation of the “policy of unconditional neutrality” and to earn political baggage, lost in endless travels in the Western Hemisphere.

Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, in the eyes of the country’s public opinion, stressed in his speeches that in addition to the arms embargo there is an “embargo on people”, referring to the Soviet Union and countries such as Romania and Hungary. He was echoed by mapai’s party body, the Newspaper Gador, filling its pages with attacks on the Communists. “We all know,” the newspaper wrote, “that if it were not for the policy of banning the communist

governments of Romania and Hungary, we would now witness great immigration from these countries. Both communist governments now play the same role that the British government played when it closed the gates of immigration to the country.”

As you know, the delegation of The Hestadrut during the Milan Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions tried to drag the debate on Jewish immigration to Israel to Congress and thus use the authority and podium of the WFP to attack the governments of the countries of popular democracy. When such a discussion did not take place, the Mapaev newspapers began to accuse the representative of the Soviet trade unions at the congress of T. Kuznetsov of carrying out “special tactics” that thwarted “raised demands for immigration from Romania and Hungary at the forum of trade union internationals.”

The newspaper Davar, the official body of the Histadrut, citing some data on immigration, presented them to readers in this treatment: “By all indications, explicit and hidden, the hearts of the majority of Russian Jewry are inseparable from the population of Israel and their relatives in the country, defenders of the historical homeland, its creators and resurrections both for themselves and for the entire Jewish nation. And here's the first result... of the 320,000-plus souls who have immigrated to the country since the establishment of the Israeli state, only 4 people immigrated from the Soviet Union. How tragic and strange it is!.. Does this mean true support for Israel by the Soviet Union if security is obstructed?” “We will not give up the immigration of Jews from Russia,” Ben-Gurion repeatedly stressed.

After the Constituent Assembly elections that gave the Victory to Mapai's party, which the Palestine Post said “delighted both the State Department and the White House,” Ben-Gurion, who was tasked with forming the government, said that Israel's foreign policy would be based, in particular, on “loyalty to the basic principles of the UN Charter and

friendship with all peace-loving states, especially the United States and the USSR.”

In their statements at different times and in different ways, the President, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs gave such interpretations, which, in combination with the practical activities of the Government, provide sufficient grounds for assessing Israel's foreign policy. In his speech to the Council of State in September 1948, President Weizmann said that the creation of the State of Israel “we owe great work to this land over the past 30 years” and that “the Balfour Declaration marked our first political achievement.” Speaking on the radio in May 1949, Ben-Gurion stated that “without departing from the dedication and respect of the United Nations and those states that helped us at the UN General Assembly, we are satisfied with the fact that the State of Israel was not created by a UN decision, but by the determination of the Jews and the heroism of the Israeli defence army... The State of Israel will be created by absorbing broad immigration and creating a large number of new settlements, the borders of the state will be determined not by the strength of our army or by the efforts of our diplomatic representatives, but by our creative force.”

Official policy seeks to distort historical facts in the face of the masses, especially new immigration, in order to downplay, first of all, the role and importance of the Soviet Union in the formation of the State of Israel, to obscure the assistance of the countries of popular democracy and, on the contrary, to emphasize the actions of the Zionist factors, of which the main is the supposedly led Ben-Gurion Party Mapai, which managed to realize the Zionist aspirations and from our historical aspirations. created the current state of Israel.

During a discussion in the Knesset in June-July 1949 about the government's foreign policy, which arose in response to American pressure on Israel to prevent a peaceful settlement of Israeli-Arab relations, the Foreign Minister, starting the debate, did not find the right words for

a strong rebuff to the U.S. attempt to interfere in Israel's affairs. In this regard, the Knesset member Communist Wilner, referring to the pro-American policy of the government, pointed out that "when America votes for us together with the USSR, Charette reminds of this, but when the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe help us without America, Charette silences it." When Charette spoke about the countries of popular democracy, in this case the minister could not resist attacking the Communists and some Governments of Eastern Europe. Referring to the trial of the Zionists in Hungary, Charette said: "With a bitter sense of pain and insult, we read about the verdict handed down in Budapest. This process is an additional chapter in the way of suffering of Jewish immigrants... The contradiction between the declaration of friendship with Israel and the non-recognition of its vital interests should be established. Now immigration has been slandered as an aid to imperialism... We see in acts that prevent immigration, the deprivation of Jews' right to life and equality. The suppression of Zionism means the denial of the right to national existence." And further: "If Israel had the kind of democracy for which the Communists stand, Mr. Wilner and his friends would be sitting not in the Knesset, but elsewhere."

Charette's campaign against the countries of the People's Democracy and the Communist Party of Israel was immediately picked up by the entire reactionary seal, which included the leftist opposition Mapam. Al Hamishmar wrote: "The process in Hungary and the arrests in Romania in connection with immigration to Israel are deeply troubling. This line weakens the position of the left-wing Zionist bloc. The Government's policy was no excuse for banning immigration to Israel. The interests of the Jewish people and the political line of the Israeli government are not the same."

During the last Knesset debate (first in January 1950) on foreign policy, the government was seriously indicted by the left-wing opposition Mapam party. The party's MP, Riftin, said

in a statement: "It could be assumed that Israel would act at the international forum as a state pursuing an independent policy on the basis of equality and reciprocity; that he would be among the Nations fighting relentlessly against a new world war; that he would actively fight against the restoration of fascism; that it, as a state created in the storm of liberation war, would steadily support the liberation struggle of the colonial peoples. Unfortunately, in all these matters, the position of this Government gives us great disappointment." In support of his words, Riftin cited the following facts: at the last session of the UN General Assembly, when the Assembly was elected President, the Israeli delegation voted for the candidacy of the Filipino General Roma-lo, rather than for the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Clementi-sa, despite the considerable assistance provided by the Czechoslovak People's Republic of Israel during the darkest days of his struggle. According to Riftin, "this was not the only time Israel joined the imperialist bloc. On the other hand, Israel has never joined the Soviet People's Democratic Bloc unless other capitalist states joined it." The Israeli delegation voted with the imperialist bloc to put the report of the so-called Small Assembly on the agenda of the UN Assembly. In the final debate on the Small Assembly, the Israeli delegation only abstained from voting. Israel voted against the very basis of the UN's existence on the issue of the powers of the Security Council- the binding agreement between the great powers. Israel did not vote against the discussion of the UN armed forces. Israel did not support the peace proposals of the Soviet Union, which insisted on arms reduction, the prohibition of atomic weapons, but embarked on the path proposed by the imperialist powers. The Israeli government has yet to raise its voice against the imperialists' efforts to legalize Hitlerism. The Israeli delegate was duplicitous about Libya's independence. In words, independence was supported and the vote did not correspond to this statement. Based on these facts, Riftin stated that "the government's policy on

the major world problems was misguided in terms of the liberation struggle of progressive humanity... and she could alienate her regular friends in search of false or temporary friends.”

Responding to criticism of the opposition, the Prime Minister described the speech of MP Riftin as a “lecture of the preacher of Kominform”, and his attitude to the question stated as follows: “We heard from Mr. Riftin a complaint against the Government of Israel for not joining the Cominform vote at the UN on general international affairs. I want to tell him that the State of Israel does not intend to join the Kominform and Kominform did not demand it from him. At the head of Kominform are not members of the Mapam, and the Communists. The Communists who run the Soviet Union are statesmen, and they understand that Israel has its own approach, its need, its connections necessary for it, and they would not think to offer us this. It is clear that if they had offered us this, we would have rejected it very politely, but firmly.”

The decision at the fourth session of the UN Assembly on Jerusalem was widely discussed in all circles and the press of Israel. At the same time, the leaders of the Ben-Gurion and Charette governments set a reactionary press such a tone that, despite all the efforts of the Israeli government to be useful to the Soviet Union in solving international issues, the USSR did not take into account the changed political and economic factors in the part of the Statute of Jerusalem and, based on its own interests, chose to remain on its former position of internationalization of Jerusalem. As a result, a united front was formed against Israel, which includes the “Soviet bloc”, the Catholic bloc and the Arab bloc. Ben-Gurion, meanwhile, expressed the Israeli government's hope that “the Soviet bloc will change its mind about Jerusalem.”

Al Hamishmar newspaper, summarizing the speeches of reactionary circles, wrote in an editorial: “The enemies of the Soviet Union in our country tried to interpret the Soviet position as follows: the Soviet Union is based on the decision

of November 29, 1947, and it requires the abandonment of Galilee, Jaffa and other places on our part.” Analysing the Jerusalem problem and the attitude of the USSR to it, the newspaper further states that “the speech of the Soviet Union and its representative Tsarapkin on the Jerusalem issue did not raise any doubts about the friendly position towards Israel, although in this matter, important and sensitive, his position differed from ours.”

Israel's official position on the Jerusalem issue has been repeatedly expressed. Ben-Gurion, speaking in the Knesset on 5 December 1949, stated in particular: “Today we cannot consider the decision of 29 November 1947 as having any other moral force, since the United Nations has not been able to implement its own decisions. In our view, the decision of 29 November on Jerusalem has expired.”

If in the first, most difficult months of the existence of the state sometimes still appeared in the official press publications claiming to be an objective assessment of relations with the USSR, then in the future, as the economic and political dependence on the United States increased, as the bureaucracy and police forces in the hands of the ruling circles strengthened, the anti-Soviet and anti-democratic direction in the policy of the current Israeli government increased. In the 1948 issue of 27 December, the newspaper Davar, in an article headlined “The Soviet Union is consistent in its allegiance to the decisions of November 29,” quoted the following words: “The Soviet delegation has proved a firm and consistent commitment to last year's UN decisions. It cannot be assumed that she will look obliquely at our conquests in Galilee or that she has no understanding of Jerusalem. But it now considers the main task is to fight off the threat of decisions from November 29 and therefore opposes any revision of this decision, even if it is in our favour.” Foreign Minister Charette, speaking at a meeting of the Mapai Party Council, said (according to Haaretz on January 19, 1949): “America must understand that we cannot join it against the USSR, and the Soviet Union should know

that we cannot refuse to help the Jews of America and the United States themselves. We will not renounce immigration from Eastern Europe and will not abandon the Jewry of the West. There were demands from the West that we refused to fulfill, and there may be demands from the East that we will have to refuse to fulfill.” Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, in his speech to the Knesset (according to the newspaper Davar, 11 March 1949), was already responding to criticism from the opposition, who accused the Government of Western orientation: “We will continue the policy of the Provisional Government, and it is known. You are for increasing hostility towards one side and for praise without tact and taste to the other side. It's not neutrality.” Referring to the Soviet Union and the countries of popular democracy, Ben-Gurion said that “they helped us only with speeches.”

This statement of the prime minister provoked a particularly sharp reaction of the progressive public. In Tel Aviv and Haifa, broad popular meetings were held expressing gratitude and gratitude to the Soviet Union and the countries of popular democracy for their decisive efforts in establishing the State of Israel.

The pro-American orientation of Israel's foreign policy also affects the Israeli Government's attitude towards the treacherous Tito clique. Relations between Israel and Yugoslavia are of particular importance. Although Charette assured us that there are “no political considerations” in the development of Israeli-Yugoslav economic relations, there are systematic support for Tito's clique in the pages of newspapers close to the government suggest otherwise. It is interesting that during the entire period of the state's existence in Israel was the only large foreign sports group—a Yugoslav football team, the performance of which was very advertised. At present, he has taken great care in terms of the distribution of Yugoslav film production histadrut, under whose “patronage” in the working villages and agricultural settlements of the country are going to show the films that arrived from Yugoslavia.

All this is particularly coloured in light of the fact that the events held by the Likago friendly ties with the USSR, not only do not meet the sympathy of Histadrut, but also direct opposition in such issues as the provision of premises, funds, etc.

The Mapaev majority of Histadrut refused to fight strongly against trade unionists in favor of strengthening the unity of the World Federation of Trade Unions. It also refused to support the world progressive public in the struggle for peace, for the convening of a congress of peace supporters. The newspaper "Gador" for sending a welcome telegram to the initiative committee of the Congress of Peace Supporters in Paris ill-ishly accused the League of Friendly Relations of the most terrible "crime" because "by this step the League of friendly relations with the USSR went beyond its activities, took a certain party position and got involved in the unfortunate problem, which is a burning point in the battle between the Western and Eastern blocs."

While captive to the policies of the imperialist States, the Government of Israel took a wait-and-see attitude on the issue of the recognition of the People's Republic of China. It made recognition only after the example of capitalist states, in particular England.

Thus, the so-called "neutrality policy" declared by the Government of Israel becomes a direct political, economic and ideological cooperation with the West.

The policy of the current Israeli government towards the USSR and the countries of popular democracy is disingenuous, evasive and unfriendly policy....

The state of Israel is a bourgeois state of the type of Western European "democratic" states. Just as in most of these states, where there are "socialist" governments that carry out the will of monopolistic capital, and in Israel the power belongs to the government, which is a coalition of reformist Party Mapai with bourgeois-clerical parties, which firmly stands on the guard of the interests of the large Jewish bourgeoisie and foreign capital. The "Working" Party

of Mapai is the party of representatives of the working aristocracy and the petty bourgeoisie, and in its program and practice does not differ from the British Labour, French Socialists and German Social Democrats, and its leaders—Ben-Gurion, Charette, Aharonovich and Lubyanyker—from Ettley, Bevin, Blum and Schumacher.

In its economic policies, the Government of Israel, having failed to cope with the difficulties of military action and mass immigration, has been attacking the living standards of the working masses, encouraging private initiative and profits of local capitalists and trying to attract foreign capital to the country, thereby jeopardizing the independence of the as yet-to-be-strengthened State. Domestic politics is beginning to move to police methods of suppressing the democratic movement, dispersing demonstrations and arresting its participants, reinforcing nationalism based on Zionist ideology, and there has been an increase in chauvinistic sentiments supported by the practical activities of the ruling circles to oppress the Arab population of the country. The government's reactionary domestic policy has led to the revitalization of all reactionary forces and pro-fascist groups and organizations. Finally, in foreign policy, the Israeli government is moving towards direct orientation towards the United States, without even masking it as a form of “neutrality”, as it did in the first period of the state's existence, when it needed the support of the Soviet Union and the countries of popular democracy. Attitudes towards the USSR are beginning to take a hostile character, although more for domestic political reasons than others, is not yet manifested openly. However, with the growing campaign against the country's progressive forces on demand and following the example of its patron, the United States, as well as the issue of immigration of Jews from the USSR to Israel - an issue that has already been put before us and on which Israel “will inevitably face,” according to Charette, with the USSR, it is to be expected that hostility to the

Soviet Union will manifest itself in a more open and undisguised form.

Anti-people's domestic politics and the anti-national pro-American foreign policy of the Israeli government have angered the country's progressive forces, which are clustered around the Communist Party of Israel, the United Workers' Party of Mapam and the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR. The growth of labour strikes and demonstrations, exposing the anti-national nature of foreign policy, mass rallies and gatherings in connection with the revolutionary holidays of the USSR, and especially on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of Stalin, suggest that progressive forces are growing and multiplying and will seriously resist the transformation of Israel into an Anglo-American springboard for attack on the Soviet Union. It follows that we should, in the press and by other means, expose the anti-popular and anti-national policies of the bourgeois-clerical Government of Israel leading the country to the loss of its independence, while at the same time supporting progressive forces fighting to strengthen Israel's independence and for friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**NOTE OF THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR
V.A. ZORIN TO THE SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (B) M.A. SUSLOV.
March 22, 1950**

Secret.

In addition to the report on Zionism, compiled from the materials of the Committee of The Reformation and sent to you on March 21, I send two copies of the report on this issue, compiled by the Middle East Division of the Ussr Foreign Ministry, which cites the speeches of the leaders of Zionism, characterizing their attitude to the USSR and the countries of popular democracy. The report also cites the activities of the mainly representatives of the State of Israel, which are hostile to the Soviet Union and the countries of popular democracy, during the last period.

If the need is met, the USSR Foreign Ministry may send materials from Israeli newspapers and magazines, characterizing more fully the position of the leaders of Zionism in relation to the USSR and the countries of popular democracy.

V. Sorin

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
April 1, 1950**

Sne said that the publication of Prudkov's article in the Literary Newspaper was a big surprise to Charette and, when he got acquainted with the contents of the article, was depressed. Charette believed that Soviet diplomacy understood his predicament and believed that he was doing everything possible to pursue a non-hostile policy towards the USSR. He did everything he could, and the UN often dared to vote not for the U.S. proposal, and this fact for Israel is a courageous act. Further, in contrast to Ben-Gurion, who allowed himself to make disguised attacks against the USSR and open - against the countries of popular democracy, such as against Spider, he, Charette, did not say anything against the USSR, but, on the contrary, tried to correct the performances of Ben-Gurion. Finally, of all the countries of the Middle East, only Israel has the freedom to operate pro-Soviet organizations - the Communist Party, Mapam and the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR. Sne added that he was told about it by a member of Mapai, who was close to Charette.

Sne said that in the left circles of Mapai and partly the center (Yaari and Hazan) met Prudkov's article with great satisfaction. As it is known, Sne, Ben-Gurion and Charette, responding to criticism from Mapam and the Communist Party, repeatedly said that the USSR understands their situation and difficulties better than these parties, because he does not criticize the Government of Israel and its foreign policy, as do Mapam and the Communist Party. Now this argument is knocked out of the hands of Ben-Gurion and Charette.

Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR M.
NAMIR TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY. April 3,
1950**

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Namir

**TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY TO THE SOVIET ENVOY TO
ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV. April 19, 1950**

That. Malik is tasked with making a statement to Trygve Lee:

“In connection with the discussion in the Guardian Council on the question of the statute of Jerusalem, the government of the USSR instructed me to state the following:

As you know, the delegation of the USSR at the fourth session of the General Assembly, based on the position taken by it at the previous sessions of the Assembly, voted in favour of Resolution 303/1V of December 9, 1949.

regarding the establishment of a permanent international regime for Jerusalem, with the UN Board of Control responsible for governing power. The USSR delegation held the same position at the last discussion on the issue of Jerusalem.

It has now emerged that the General Assembly's decision does not satisfy either the Arab or Jewish populations of both the city of Jerusalem and Palestine as a whole. Under such conditions, the Government of the USSR does not consider it possible to support the general Assembly's ruling. The Soviet Government is nevertheless confident that the United Nations will be able to find a solution to the question of Jerusalem acceptable to both the Arab and Jewish populations of that city.

I ask you, Mr. Secretary-General, to bring this statement to the attention of the Member States of the United Nations.”#

Vyshinsky

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
April 19, 1950**

On April 18, Charette visited at his invitation. Charette said he wanted to make me “a report about an article in the Soviet body”’s Literary Newspaper of March 25.” In the Soviet Union, he continued, under the existing system the press strictly adheres to the official line, especially in matters of foreign policy, so this article has taken us very much care. The article uses such profanities as “liar,” “slanderer” and the like, and he, Charette, does not think to answer them.

Having interrupted it, I noticed that I did not intend to enter into a discussion about this article, as the Literary Newspaper is not the body of the Soviet government.

In response, Charette stated that an article in the Literary Newspaper touched on Israeli policy issues and should provide a number of clarifications. Charette denied that Israel was becoming an American colony and that Israel's delegation at the UN session had lashed out at Acheson. He said that the U.S. loan does not provide any bonded conditions, that Israel asked the USSR for a loan, but received no response. In the first place, Israel did not apply to the United States for a new loan, but it is looking for loans and capital wherever possible. He needs them to strengthen the state and its independence.

To my observation that foreign investment, as it is known, does not strengthen, but weakens independence, Charette replied that to strengthen the independence of Israel it is necessary to increase the population, build factories, houses, and for this we need money.

The U.S. loan does not open the way for them to conquer Israel's economy. The United States is a powerful power, and if they wanted to press us, it would be very difficult for us, and the United States would not have to use the loan to do so. I do not know whether the Soviet Union, voting for the

creation of a Jewish state, what consequences it causes, namely, that we can not exist with a population of 600,000 people and with a weak economy.

Sharett went on to say that the Israeli government had invited Laudermlk as a private citizen, as an irrigation specialist, and noted that Israel had asked the SOVIET Union to provide a forestry specialist as an adviser to the Prime Minister, but there was no response. As for the Kaiser assembly plant in Hai-fe, it will allow Israel to export cars to neighbouring countries—Turkey, Bulgaria and others. A number of countries of popular democracy have asked us to obtain American goods that they cannot purchase directly in the United States. For example, we supply Romania with penicillin, the semi-finished product of which we get from the United States. The Kaiser plant will not have key positions in the industry. If the USSR wanted to build a plant in Israel, we would willingly discuss this issue. With regard to Israel's supply of weapons, Charette continued, it should be noted that it was not the United States that offered to import weapons into Israel, and Israel had to ask them for weapons. We will seek it because it is necessary because the Arab countries have far outpaced us in a number of weapons. We asked for weapons from the USSR, but we did not receive a response, except for a line by Vyshinsky to one of the representatives of Israel at the UN: "If we give you a revolver, they will shout that we gave an atomic bomb." Charette then said that the article from the Literary Newspaper was very upsetting for him, and this explains his agitated state. The article did not have a positive impact on our relationship.

In response, I indicated to Charette that he had no reason to make such statements, referring to a single article from the Literary Newspaper. Look at your press and you will see that it is waging a systematic campaign of slander about the Soviet Union and its leaders. In a conversation on November 15, 1949, I drew your attention to such a publication of the Israeli press and expected that the Israeli

Foreign Ministry would take appropriate measures to stop the publication of articles of a hostile and defamatory nature, but there was no change in the position of the Israeli press, on the contrary, the anti-Soviet campaign intensified. I gave a number of examples and pointed out that the newspaper of the government-run Mapai Gador party and the Bterem magazine played a leading role in the anti-Soviet campaign. Stressing that the Israeli press is allowing systematic attacks personally against the Chairman of the Council of Ministers J. V. Stalin, I gave a number of examples and stated that such speeches of the Israeli press make an unfavourable impression in the circles of the Soviet public. I added that before talking about an article in the Literary Newspaper, the anti-Soviet smear campaign of the Israeli press against the Soviet Union and the head of the Soviet government should have stopped. In conclusion, I expressed hope that the Foreign Ministry will take measures to stop the anti-Soviet campaign in the Israeli press.

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primarily on Israel. Sharett then said that the Israeli Foreign Ministry had prepared a response to the last note of the mission on the issue of the involvement of Soviet citizens living in Israel and handed me a note, which is based on the previous view of the Foreign Ministry, referring to international law.

Saying goodbye, Charette expressed the hope that the exchange of views on the press would serve mutual benefit. I replied that I would like it to be so, and Charette said he was sure of it. I said, "We'll see from tomorrow's Israeli newspapers."

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Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY S. ELASHIV OF THE ISRAELI MISSION TO THE
USSR. April 19, 1950**

Ershov was invited to the minister, there was a long conversation in connection with an article in the Literary newspaper. The Minister analysed each paragraph, pointed to frauds and frank fabrications, expressed everything in an open text. The envoy replied that the newspaper was not a government publication and expressed only the opinion of the editorial board; cited a long series of anti-Soviet quotations from our press, said that he expected action on our part when he complained to us about the personal attack of the press against him. I received an answer that we have freedom of the press and the government has no right to restrict it. The conversation was interesting, the details of the letter. During the meeting, Ershov was given a detailed and reasoned note on the issue of conscription of Soviet citizens.

Eliashiv

FROM THE REFERENCE "THE ATTITUDE OF THE USSR TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL, SINCE THE DISCUSSION OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AT THE UN". April 19, 1950

Secret.

THE USSR'S RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

On May 18, 1948, the Soviet Union was the first to recognize the state of Israel de jure and established diplomatic relations with it on May 26, 1948. On August 9, 1948, the Soviet diplomatic mission arrived in Tel Aviv. On August 17, 1948, the Soviet envoy to Israel presented credentials to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. The Soviet Union supported Israel in its admission to the UN and Israel's accession to some international organizations, such as the World Postal Union.

The Israeli ruling circles (the Zionists) linked the support of the Soviet Union in the creation of the State of Israel with the permission of the free emigration of Jews from the USSR to Israel. The negative response of the USSR on this issue was regarded as a hostile act against the State of Israel and served as a pretext for the widespread deployment of anti-Soviet propaganda in Israel, which forced the Soviet mission in Israel to make a corresponding representation to the Israel Ministry (November 15, 1949).

At the same time, Israel's mission in Moscow launched illegal activities, encouraging Soviet Jews to leave the civil society and go to Israel. In addition, the mission launched a bulletin with Zionist propaganda, which was distributed to public organizations and individuals. This activity of the mission was terminated only after the intervention of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

The Government of Israel, in order to deflect accusations of the opposition criticizing the pro-American orientation of the government, has taken through its mission in Moscow a

number of steps that were to show the “neutrality of the country between the West and the East” (requests for weapons, the sending of Israeli officers to study in the USSR, for credit). In addition, questions were raised about the visit of a Soviet forest specialist, doctors, delegations to celebrate the anniversary of the Weizmann Institute, etc.

The actual attitude of The Israeli ruling circles towards the USSR can be judged by the following facts:

1. The pages of the right-wing Israeli press do not take off the vicious slanderous articles against the Soviet Union and its leaders, with the ruling Mapai Party (Gador, Bterem, etc.) playing a leading role in the campaign.

2. The Israeli Government is delaying the transfer of our property to us in Israel and is protecting the illegal actions of its official authorities, who have seized some of the property.

3. The Israeli Government does not issue import licences to Israeli firms wishing to trade with the USSR, but at the same time encourages the importation of American goods at clearly inflated prices.

4. The Israeli government imposes restrictions on book firms selling Soviet literature, while the Israeli book market is filled with American tabloid literature and “works” by Trotsky, Ruth Fischer, etc.

5. The Israeli Government Party Mapai withdrew from the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR and together with the fascist party Herut organized the League to strengthen friendly ties with the United States.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
DEPUTY HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE
EAST OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY A.D. ZHYBORIN
WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR M.NAMIR.
April 19, 1950**

Secret.

It's 3:00 p.m. accepted Namir at his request. After exchanging the usual greetings, Namir said that he had come to inform me and talk about a number of issues:

1. He reported that Dr. Eliashiv, head of the Department of Eastern European Countries of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, was appointed by Israel's envoy to Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The new head of the department of Eastern European countries will obviously be Levavi, the current adviser to the Israeli mission in Moscow.

2. Israel's Minister of State Charette invited members of the Guardian Council, with the exception of The Kuomintang China and Iraq, with whom Israel does not have relations, to visit Jerusalem during the break of the Council's work to see the mood of the city's population. It is desirable for the Israeli Foreign Ministry to know whether the representative of the USSR, T. Tsarapkin, will be able to accept the invitation.

I replied that I could not inform him of anything on the matter.

3. On April 13, 1950, Israeli radio broadcast a special broadcast dedicated to the memory of V.V. Mayakovsky. In addition, the Society of Friendly Relations with the USSR (organized by the ruling Mapai party after its withdrawal from the progressive League of Friendly Relations with the USSR—A.Y.) staged a concert of Soviet music, which was attended by representatives of the Soviet mission Mukhin and Fedorin. In addition, with the help of materials received from

the Soviet mission in Israel, the society organizes an exhibition "Restoration of Donbass." It would be desirable for the USSR Foreign Ministry to inform VOCS about this.

I promised to do it.

4. The Israeli Foreign Ministry instructed him to inform the USSR Foreign Ministry about the Israeli government's point of view after the Arab League session. The Government of Israel believes that the resolutions and the entire work of the Arab League session have demonstrated the League's sharply aggressive intentions towards Israel, although this has no basis in question. This position of the Arabs is a step backwards. The undeniable reason for this aggressiveness is Egypt's desire to take on the task of uniting arab countries and strengthening the League, which is in the process of disintegration. To do this, Egypt tried to mobilize all Arab countries, even Iraq, which found it difficult to go against the peaceful intentions of Transjordan. Egypt has set all Arab countries against the informal Transjordan talks with Israel on the establishment of permanent peace instead of a truce. Egypt's position is an expression of the aggressive sentiments of the Egyptian royal court, which is known for its anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli sentiments. The current government of Egypt, made up of wafdists, according to the Government of Israel, does not fully share the position of the court, but for internal tactical reasons does not want to resist the court. The rise of aggressive Arabs coincides with Bevin's visit to Arab countries. Bevin's scathing anti-Israel speech in the House of Commons a week ago is very characteristic. Apparently, Bevin sought to divert Egypt's attention from Sudan and direct it to Israel.

The Arab collective security pact may have far-reaching objectives, but it is now clearly directed against Israel. Israel, under any government, will not join any bloc against UN members. This neutrality is an objective necessity for the entire Jewish people, regardless of class. The Jewish people are more interested in peace than anyone. The Arab League

and the forces behind it are well aware of this feeling, and Israel is therefore interfering with it.

From Israel's point of view, as well as all progressive elements of peace, this aggressive unity of the League must be broken. Now the Arab League has managed to force Transjordan to join the resolution in which Transjordan is not interested. Egypt allowed itself to summon a forgotten fascist agent, the Palestinian Mufti and his imaginary government in Gaza, to the scene, although this threatened complications with Iraq and Transjordan.

I thanked Namir for the information.

5. A commission has now been set up under the Government of Israel to collect photographs from Hebrew manuscripts in all countries. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, as chairman of the commission, asks the USSR Foreign Ministry to indicate whether it will be possible to receive regular photographs of the Soviet Union's manuscripts in Hebrew.

In addition, in connection with the response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR about the possibility of obtaining photocopies of a number of manuscripts of the Israeli mission, it is desirable to know the order ordering procedure.

I said that on the first question I find it difficult to give any answer now and that I will bring the request of Mr. Ben-Gurion to the attention of the leadership of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR, but I can notice that the library of Lenin, which stores these manuscripts, is extremely loaded with orders in connection with the replenishment of the book funds of the libraries of the USSR, which suffered during the war. As for the second question on how to obtain a photocopy, it should be done through the USSR Foreign Ministry.

6. The Israeli mission has not yet received a response from the Ussr Foreign Ministry to the Israeli Government's request for a Soviet forest specialist to be sent to Israel. The USSR would have great interest in the fact that the Soviet forester, working independently as an adviser to the Prime

Minister, would study the problems of forest planting in hot and desert areas. The work of a Soviet specialist would also be a great help to Israel.

I replied that I could not inform the envoy, as I do not know anything about the solution of this issue.

7. New Time magazine No. 14 published a note criticizing the prohibition of the Soviet film "The Court of Honour" in Israel and in rather ironic tones an assessment of the situation in Israel. However, "New Time" apparently did not know that the Committee for the Control of Films under the Israeli Interior Ministry recently banned five American films in which the Soviet Union directly or indirectly touched. Namir handed over a note listing the banned American films "Iron Curtain," "The Conspirator," "Red Danube," "On the Wrong Path" and "Give Me Freedom." The committee did not allow films that affected any State with which Israel was friendly. The film "Court of Honor" was banned only for these reasons.

I said that I would take note of this message from the messenger and bring it to the attention of the management.

8. The Soviet press published a report on Jules Mock's arrival in Israel at the invitation of the Mapai party and that Jules Mock was in talks with Histadrut about the latter's withdrawal from the IFP.

According to the Israeli mission, mapai's party did not invite J.Moka, and Histadrut did not negotiate with him. J.Mok came to Israel at the invitation of the organization, which under the British occupation conducted illegal immigration to Palestine and which J.Mok provided great services at the time. Moka's visit has no political purpose.

9. Namir went on to say that, by addressing and explaining some of the reports of the Soviet press, it would be biased not to mention the article in the Literary Gazette concerning the Israel Charette's Minindela. He stressed that he had not yet received any instructions from the Israeli Foreign Ministry on this issue and wanted to say so on his own initiative as a reader of the Literary Newspaper. "This note,"

Namir said, “deeply struck me, and as far as I can tell, all the friends of the USSR in Israel, regardless of political views.”

I interrupted Namir and told him that the Literary Newspaper, which expresses the views of the literary circles of the Soviet public, has the opportunity to freely express its opinion and comment on certain events. The Soviet public is even more surprised and amazed that the pages of the Israeli press systematically publish articles of slanderous and hostile nature towards the USSR and even containing insults at the address of the head of the Soviet government I.V.Stalin. As an example, I pointed to a recent article in the magazine “Bterem” and a number of other publications in the newspapers “Gador” and “Gaboker”.

Namir tried to shield the press and stated that they did not represent Israeli public opinion, while repeating the usual assurances of Israel's neutrality.

In conclusion, the envoy said that he would inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Charette, about my statement.

The conversation lasted 1 hour. The third secretary V. Gnedich was present at the conversation.

Deputy Head of the Middle East Division A. Yiborin

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR
M.NAMIR TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
CHARETTA. April 20, 1950**

Yesterday there was a meeting with Yiborin, it lasted an hour and a quarter, one of the secretaries kept the protocol. Bakulin did not recover. Below is a report on the conversation.

About the Arab League.

I have detailed our assessment (based on your telegram 334, pp. 1 and 3). He persistently stressed the problem of the mufti in order to "get it." Yiborina was interested in the topic and the conversation went about the League: why it was necessary to revive it, if it means the creation of a collective security pact; whether there is indeed a struggle for influence between the Arab countries themselves; whether indeed the League's aggressive resolutions are directed only against Israel; does there be an anti-Soviet orientation of the bloc? I seized on the last question and, for my part, added: our assessment is based both on published documents and statements of the League, and on other sources of information. As for the clandestine plans, I personally think that the League and the external forces behind it are making far-reaching plans, but there is no contradiction between open hostility towards Israel and the hidden desire for greater aggression. Apparently, the League's fury is caused not only by the very existence of Israel within the current borders, but also by its independent policy. The forces supporting the League are well aware that all the periodically appearing publications about our supposedly pro-Western orientation have no ground under their soil (in Russian, "empty nonsense"). They know that neutrality, world peace and friendship with all UN member states reflect not only the subjective aspirations of our government, its official position and real policies, but also

the objective need of our state and the Jewish people to live with everyone in the world. Israel was created to gather Jews from the diaspora, and it would not jeopardize the needs of this very diaspora, which feeds it with human and financial resources. The attempt to recreate the reactionary League and its aggressive resolutions from the ruins is damaging not only to Israel and to peace in the Middle East, but also to peace-loving forces throughout the world.

However, a neutral Israel, which seeks peace with all Arab countries and is ready for such a peace, is the first and foremost obstacle to Arab aggression, a factor that can undermine the unity of the Arab countries, which is entirely based on the negative factors and is not constrained by strong internal ties. Therefore, our state is the first and the main object of hatred. This dictates that my Government take a course, including our attempts to achieve peace with our adversaries. Hence, in particular, our efforts towards a peace agreement with Abdullah. At the moment, it is the only correct and reasonable policy that can help Israel to break the aggressive front created in the Middle East and at the same time to disrupt the larger machinations. Yiborin asked which external forces are most interested in the League. I replied that I had no concrete evidence, but the coincidence of Bevin's visit to Cairo, the League meetings and the hostile performance of the same Bevin in Parliament made me suspect that by directing the Egyptians' hostility against Israel, London would like to distract them from the problems of the Suez Canal and the Sudan. This development does not frighten us, but, of course, does not please us. We will not give up any opportunity to obtain effective means of self-defence against the threat of the use of force. Yiborin listened attentively and, as it seemed to me, made certain conclusions. He said he'd give the information to his intended destination.

b. Invitation of Tsarapkin.

In telegram 338, I wrote that the Israeli Foreign Minister believed that the first-eye view received on the ground

would lead to a change of position, a rejection of simplified schemes and a better understanding of the problem of Jerusalem by the Soviet Government. I asked him if there was a chance that the Russians would accept the invitation, he replied that Ershov had sent a telegram, but he does not know yet what decision will be made. We learned about Malik's letter regarding Jerusalem from a radio broadcast seven hours after the conversation, so, of course, he was not at the meeting.

Israel in the Soviet press.

I listed the names of American films banned from showing (based on your telegrams 8877 and 342) and drew his attention to the fraud in "New Time." Reported about Jules Moca (based on your telegrams 346 and 347). As for the pasquilla in the "Literary newspaper" said that he was extremely amazed and annoyed with both falsifications of facts, and rude style, direct insults. Our press took this publication as an insult to the state. The spokesperson of our Foreign Ministry said that it is simply difficult for him to believe the fact of the appearance of such an article and he wants to get it and read it in person. Yiborin replied that the press was free of them, the government was not responsible for it. At the same time, he repeated several times the following thesis: the attacks were started not by us, but by you, the Israeli press, now it is overflowing with anti-Soviet propaganda and has reached the point that insults the head of our state. I asked exactly what newspapers he meant; he replied that it was Bterem, Gador, Gaboker and Gazofe. Thus, in early April, they received information that "Bterem" published vicious attacks on Stalin (here he hinted that Ershov constantly complains about us in his telegrams). I stressed that there can be no comparison between the various information that the Israeli reader receives about the USSR and the information that the Soviet reader receives about Israel. The most serious and influential newspapers in Israel, Dawar and Ha'aretz, take a very dignified and correct position. In addition, the Israeli press has the opportunity to

publish refutations of parties, organizations and individuals, including those who adhere to different political orientations, standing on the positions of friendship with the USSR. The Soviet press, Israel, only condemns and vilifies. In this part of the conversation at times there was quite a lot of tension, but the conversation was conducted in a polite tone. Both of us promised to pass on the information to our ministers.

On my behalf, I reported on the broadcast of Mayakovsky's poems, about the concert in the museum (based on the information received from you) and about the preparation of the League "Vi" for the exhibition "Donbass". He promised to pass this information on to THE VOCS.

I have made an official request to allow photocopies to be removed from the manuscripts in accordance with your telegram 341. On this issue I will telegraph additionally.

Namir

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UN
A. EBAN WITH THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE USSR TO THE UN J.A. MALIK. April 20, 1950**

Confidential.

The conversation took place in the premises of the Soviet permanent mission to the UN and lasted 50 minutes.

I began the conversation with a highly commendable letter on Jerusalem, which was circulated by Mr. Malik through the Secretary-General. The decision of the Soviet government to reconsider its position on this issue, as well as the conclusions to which it came, made a deep impression on us. The principle set out in Mr. Malik's letter, namely, that the Un must find a solution acceptable to the people of Jerusalem and Palestine as a whole, we fully accept and support. My Government is busy preparing the proposals it will submit in June to the Guardian Council and then to be on the agenda of the General Assembly in September. These proposals will satisfy the principles set out in Mr. Malik's letter to the Secretary-General. However, I will be glad to be able to discuss this issue with him in the future, when our proposals become clearer and before they are formally submitted or published.

Mr. Malik replied that the Soviet Government, although artificially excluded from the Geneva Guardian Council, had been closely monitoring the negotiations. The Government was particularly impressed by the argument that the population of Jerusalem would be under a colonial regime under the statute, and that it would fundamentally change the role that the United Nations had to play in such matters. In addition to not wanting to see the UNITED Nations as a "colonial power," he also agreed that the main conclusion of the Guardian Council meeting was that the draft was doomed to remain unfulfilled in advance. It is therefore more

realistic to look for a solution that can be considered and implemented.

He then asked whether the United States had committed itself to supporting the statute in Geneva.

I replied that, on the contrary, neither the United States nor the United Kingdom had made any commitments. They did not vote for the text of the statute and actively prevented its implementation. Mr. Malik had shown great interest in what had proved to be news to him, namely, the Guardian Council had evaded further consideration of the statute's legality (Article 41 of the Statute).

I explained that my delegation had made great efforts to achieve such a solution. As a result, the statute does not have any legal force, even from the point of view of the Guardian Council itself. He said the fact could be "useful."

Continuing to discuss his letter to the Secretary-General, I stated that there was no doubt about what would be acceptable to the 115,000-member Jewish population of Jerusalem. This population will insist on full preservation and expansion of integration with Israel. I couldn't say with certainty what the Arabs wanted. However, I could try to guess what they don't want. They would not want to live under the oppressive governance envisaged by the draft statute. He replied, "No nation in the world consciously wants to be a colonial slave."

We have concluded this part of our conversation with an agreement to resume it when our position on the Guardian Council resolution of 4 April 1950 is fully defined.

If we look at this conversation only from our point of view, we must conclude that the reason for the change in the Soviet position is mainly ideological and is based on the inability to reconcile the General Assembly resolution with the principle of self-determination. An important factor influencing their position was the similarity of the statute to that of the backward colonial countries. Moreover, the impasse over the implementation of the statute in Geneva could have hurt their dominant sense of common sense. They

have no particular interest in this matter in order to seriously get involved in a company doomed to failure.

In the light of some of the comments made by Mr. Malik at the end of the conversation, it can be concluded that the USSR attaches great importance to public opinion and influence that Israel has, especially in the United States. The second aspect, which was not touched on in our conversation, is related to the relationship between the Vatican and the USSR, especially in connection with the UN. Catholics are constantly under pressure to prevent China's representatives from entering the UN, which has a very negative impact on the international position of the USSR. The Vatican also draws a consistent line on the Spanish issue and against the Soviet Union on human rights. I believe that the USSR is concerned about the claims of the Catholic Church to consider itself as an influential force in the UN.

Mr. Malik began the second part of our conversation by stating with interest that he had read with interest a memorandum I had prepared on our relationship with the Arabs and the final peace settlement in the Middle East. He asked if he was right to assume that the document had been handed over to the Conciliation Commission, to which I replied in the affirmative. (I didn't find out I regret that he received the document, but I believe that the document came from the Secretary-General's office through the Acting Secretary-General, Mr. Sinchenko. invited to visit Jerusalem. And I have no doubt that we would have made a mistake if we hadn't done so.)

Referring to the contents of the Israeli memorandum to the Conciliation Commission, Mr. Malik expressed the view that the Arab League was totally unrealistic and misjudged the situation by refusing to make peace with Israel. If they don't want to make peace, what do they offer? Are you going to start a war? He considered it unacceptable for a group of States to refuse to accept the reality.

In response, I expressed the view that those who refuse to accept the realities may well still expect to change them.

Our concern for the Arabs, and especially the rearmament of Egypt, is only natural. Now British foreign policy in the Middle East is largely focused on Egypt. In order to ensure the resumption of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, the UK is ready to make additional diplomatic efforts. The treaty was never popular with Egypt's nationalist population, even when it was signed in 1936. And since the general trend indicates an increase in nationalist sentiments rather than a decrease in them, it is safe to assume that the ratification of the treaty will now face even greater obstacles. Aware of the situation, the UK is obviously ready to prove to Egypt that treaty relations give tangible advantages to both Egypt and the UK itself. In any case, whatever the reasons for this rearmament, it has serious consequences for Israel.

Mr Malik said he found the analysis of UK policy in Egypt to be very interesting. He added: "I think the British are arming the Egyptians against us, not against you."

I replied that this was the kind of "confidence" we received in London when we raised this issue. But even without taking into account the peculiarities of this global strategic problem, the fact remains that weapons can be used against anyone. Mr. Malik replied that this was the case. "If the rifle is received, it can be aimed in any direction."

I said that, even assuming that Egypt has no intention of attacking Israel at the moment, a sense of military superiority could easily excite such a desire. Political intentions are born out of specific political situations, not just under the influence of subjective desires and positions. Opportunities determine intentions. Mr. Malik noted the complete convergence of views on the importance of objective circumstances for historical development.

I added that in the case of Egypt there is no shortage of a subjective desire to attack Israel. We have reliable information that plans for war-retribution are being seriously discussed in royal circles, if not in the near future, at least as soon as the opportunity arises. It must be understood that in Egypt the king is a defining political figure.

Mr. Malik confirmed this. Unfortunately, the King of Egypt does not fully devote himself to solving his “internal problems.”

He then asked if I believed that the United States fully supported the UK's overall strategy in the Middle East, particularly with regard to the rearmament of the Arabs.

I replied that I personally doubted the existence of any significant objective differences between the two Western Powers in the Middle East. But I am more concerned with our own question. We have the impression that the United States understands Israel's interest in stabilizing Arab-Israeli relations by resolving the issue as soon as possible. The U.S. leadership is categorically opposed to the resumption of conflict in the region. If such concern were the only determinant of U.S. policy, we could probably count on winning U.S. support in our fight against Arab rearmament. However, there is another aspect of American foreign policy, namely the UK's influence on U.S. policy in the Middle East region. Israel is trying to persuade the United States to put the interests of prudence and stability first and thus force the UK to abandon its unilateral policy of rearmament.

Mr. Malik noted the importance of the public influence mobilised by Israel on the issue in the United States. He also noted that the policy of arming Arabs was criticized in the British Parliament. In the context of this observation, it begs the conclusion that we have a good chance of success, as, he added, the Us clearly has the power to prevent the UK from pursuing a policy on which there is no consensus even within the UK itself. He went on to say that there could be nothing worse for the Middle East and Israel than to spend his time and money on armaments. He believes that the warplanes sent to Egypt will even be piloted by English pilots.

Throughout the conversation, he made it clear that the USSR would like to limit the supply of weapons to the Arabs. I was very surprised, however, to remember that the USSR did not support us in the Security Council when the issue of arms

transfers to the Middle East was discussed there in August, which was not decided in our favour.

Mr. Malik then asked whether he had the right impression that Israel was now more successful in receiving financial assistance from the United States. He hastened to clarify that he was referring to voluntary donations from the Jewish public.

I said that's true. The reason is probably the atmosphere of the potential threat posed by the Israeli issue of Arming Arabs, whereas a year ago it seemed that everything had been resolved and there was no security threat. The greater the sense of danger facing Israel, the more effective support and sympathy we could count on. This has always played an important role in the balance of Israel's forces and its adversaries.

Mr. Malik replied that there was an old saying in Russia that fit the case: "There would be no happiness, but unhappiness would help." I noticed that in this situation an even more ancient statement in Hebrew may be appropriate: "the sweet came out of the strong".

At the end of the interview, Mr. Malik added that, since his delegation's place in some international bodies had been taken by the "Go-Mindan clique", he was partly unaware of some of the issues. Do I know of any rumors or opinions about the possibility of resolving the political crisis at the UN in the near future?

I replied that Geneva was too far removed from the rest of the world and that, upon my return, I had the only conversation with Mr. Trygve Lee on the subject. I took this opportunity to say to the Secretary-General that we are unwaveringly sympathetic to his vigorous efforts to resolve the crisis by adopting a new functioning Chinese Government at the United Nations, which Israel recognizes as the legitimate Government of China. Mr. Malik stated that he knew and appreciated our attitude; Israel was among 18 UN member states that recognized the Chinese government. The question is whether the United States is sympathetic to Mr.

Lee's admirable efforts, but cannot openly support them, or, on the contrary, seek to prolong the current crisis and nullify the Secretary-General's attempts to resolve the problem. Mr. Malik discussed the issue with U.S. Ambassador Ernest Gross and was outraged by his response that the United States would "join the majority opinion of the Security Council." The assumption that the U.S. view has nothing to do with the majority position and that there is no connection between the two concepts, from Malik's point of view, is strained. He told Gross, "The majority opinion is up to you." I stated that, at the fourth session during the general debate, Israel took a clear stand in support of the comprehensive nature of the Organization and for the preservation as the main feature of the United Nations of the possibility of joining states with different, diverging interests. Mr. Malik stated that it was for this reason that the Soviet Union had proposed a resolution to accept states into the UN without any restrictions. I replied that, for the same reason, Israel had voted in favour of the resolution.

In the end, he asked me a few questions about our relationship with other Asian states, in particular Turkey and India. Judging by some of the points of our conversation, he was interested in Turkey. I answered his questions on the basis of the facts, linking the improved relations with Turkey with our success in countering the supply of arms to the Arabs. He replied that he thought such an explanation was reasonable because "no one is interested in a weak ally". He suggested that our relations with India are better than with Pakistan. I have confirmed this, although we are disappointed that Mr. Neh has not had the courage to establish a normal relationship with us so far. Mr. Malik said that it was, of course, strange because Nehru "dares to pursue an independent Indian foreign policy, despite strong external pressure." I said that there are no contradictions in India and Israel's approaches to the international situation, but there are many similarities and similarities. He nodded in agreement. He told me that U.S. Ambassador Gross had

previously sought his opinion on amendments to the UN Charter so that India could become a permanent member of the Security Council after several more years of its independence. Mr. Malik replied that he hoped that India “will be able to maintain its current status as an independent State for a few more years to come.”

Since we no longer have disagreements on the issue of Jerusalem, this conversation on both the tone and the content reminded me of the days of the closest cooperation with the USSR on our issues at the UN. New to me was his frank view that Israel enjoys influence in international affairs mainly due to its ties to the United States. However, in assessing the impact that the latter's new policy on the Jerusalem issue had on the relations between Israel and the USSR, it should be remembered that among Soviet diplomats, Mr. Malik has always been the most friendly to us. He was the first to suggest that we should not consider the Jerusalem issue in the last Assembly as a turning point in Soviet-Israeli relations.

What I have not been able to reflect in this report, which is certainly complete, is Malik's clear, albeit veiled, hostility towards the Arab League, and in particular his distrust of Egypt. Probably, the USSR noted a more active rapprochement between Cairo and Western powers and is not averse to try to take revenge.

When I left, Malik told me that he had watched the film *Song of the Negev* with admiration, which made a huge impression on him. He hastened to add that he had visited Stanley Blue on Eighth Avenue to watch a Russian film, which was supplemented by the film “*Song of the Negev*”.

A. S. Eban

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.I.
LAVRENTIEV WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR
M.NAMIR. April 22, 1950**

Secret

At a reception to mark Israel's national holiday, envoy Namir told me that he officially thanked the Soviet government for the position it had taken on the issue of Jerusalem. He believed that the most sensible solution to the question of Jerusalem should be one that would be acceptable to both the Arab and Jewish populations of the city.

I replied that the United Nations must find such a solution to the question of Jerusalem.

This conversation took place in the presence of Polish Ambassador Nashkovsky and Czechoslovak Ambassador Lashtovichka.

Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

A. Lavrentyev

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
April 25, 1950**

The Committee of Friendly Relations with the USSR, which is under the control of the government party Mapai, decided to organize a banquet on Thursday, April 27, on the occasion of the change of the USSR's position on the Jerusalem issue.

All members of the mission are invited to the banquet. Charette will be present. In addition, the committee decided to send a delegation to me on April 27 to express gratitude to the Soviet government. It is understandable that these demonstrative measures are designed to give Malik's letter the character of the Soviet Union's recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. At the banquet and at the reception of the delegation, the members of the committee will make welcome speeches, to which we will have to respond.

I ask for instructions on our participation in these events and the nature of the response.

Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY TO THE SOVIET ENVOY TO
ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV. April 27, 1950**

You should avoid the reception of the delegation and the banquet under a specious pretext. Instruct Fedorin to receive a delegation and attend a banquet with two employees. No speeches to utter, to limit yourself to a few words, to thank for attention. You should keep in mind that we are not interested in such banquets and thanks.

A. Vyshinsky

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
May 24, 1950**

Czechoslovak envoy Goldstucker informed that the Israeli government is trying to find out through him and its mission in Prague the possibility of purchasing weapons in Czechoslovakia. Dr. Eliashiv, now the director of the Eastern Europe Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was leaving for Prague in early June, was given the authority to negotiate with the Czechoslovak government to buy a batch of aircraft, tanks and artillery on loan. Recently, two representatives of Skoda plants came to Israel.

Ershov

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UN
A. EBAN WITH THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE USSR TO THE UN J.A. MALIK. June 12, 1950**

On 27 May, I sent Mr. Malik a copy of our memorandum on the Holy Places in Jerusalem and expressed my readiness to meet with him upon the conclusion of our proposals by the Soviet Government. Since this letter was sent to me the day after the publication of the Western Triple Declaration, I added that I was ready to discuss other issues in the Middle East with him. A week later, Mr. Malik invited me to a conversation that took place on 9 June at the Office of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. The adviser of our delegation, Gidon Raphael, also participated in this conversation.

The conversation lasted more than an hour, but after so long it was not easy for us to persuade Mr. Malik that it was time to break up. As the Soviet representatives severely boycott the UN agencies, they are free from the burden of current work in various international committees and commissions and have the opportunity to conduct long and thorough conversations with their guests. Moreover, in the Soviet mission, which found itself in self-isolation, there is a spirit of detachment from real life, hence the thirst for any information from outside. This desire to absorb all impressions and assessments from any possible sources is particularly evident in us, as it seems that, according to the Soviet representatives, we have such extensive connections in the United States that we can get to the very roots of explicit and secret policy.

At the beginning of the meeting, Mr. Malik cordially congratulated me on my appointment to a new, "very important and responsible" post. After expressing my gratitude for my congratulations, he asked us to explain to him the meaning of the statement of the three Western

Powers, especially the changes it could bring to the Middle East.

I replied that the statement consisted of two main blocs, on the issue of armaments and on the prevention of acts of aggression. The first bloc uses very cautious and non-binding language, so that only the development of events can show whether the policy of unilateral arming of Arabs has changed in practice. We have drawn attention to three aspects on which it is appropriate to compare the provisions of the declaration and the requirements of the States of the region. Our requirements have always been and will continue to be based on two principles, "internal security" and "state protection," but even they are still not satisfied. The third principle of assessing each State's contribution to regional security is, in my view, the sole purpose of justifying special arms transfers to those States that have assumed strategic responsibilities (i.e. Egypt, Transjordan and Iraq, three States associated with treaties with the British military structure). The purpose of such a document seems to be not only and not so much to hold Israel to regional responsibility, but to justify the supply of heavy weapons to British allies without making similar commitments to the State of Israel, which does not assume regional responsibility beyond the limits of necessary self-defence. It is far from certain that the initiators of the document deliberately wanted to influence the foundations of Israeli policy: in any case, this policy, which seeks peace with all countries and peoples, will remain unchanged. It is not subject to change because of statements made by other States. In our view, the publicly expressed will of all Powers to consolidate peace in the Middle East in itself should in itself justify the imposition of the principle of equilibrium into the policy of military supplies. On this consideration, we base the hope that, following the declaration, changes will be made to the policy of the three Western Powers in the field of arms transfers. Today, however, we can only speak of opportunities and hopes, not fait accompli.

With regard to the provisions of the declaration, where peace was concerned, the Powers had resorted to clearer and more unambiguous language. We commend their warning against the resumption of hostilities. However, it should be noted that such a commitment existed without any declaration, and not only on the part of the signatories. As early as last August, all Powers pledged to guarantee armistice agreements and to act together against any violations of those documents. Thus, from a legal and political point of view, the current declaration does not create any new reality, although, of course, the fact that the three Powers with special responsibilities in the region have publicly and unequivocally reaffirmed their previous commitments is of particular value. Perhaps the promise to act immediately, by all means and in its means, against the resumption of aggression will affect the mindset of our neighbours and dampen their hopes for a new round of military provocations.

Malik listened intently and nodded in the affirmative when I stressed that all members of the Security Council were already bound by an obligation to act against violators of the Armistice Agreements. Responding to Malik's questions, we explained that this is a permit to purchase weapons on the commercial market, not the right to obtain them under government agreements. Mr. Malik said that after our last conversation, he addressed the Egyptian representative and told him, "I believe that you intend to turn your newest British weapon north against us." The Egyptian replied, "To the north, but not against you. We have no interests north of Palestine." To this I have noticed that our Egyptian friend is particularly flexible in the wording, there is no doubt that the Chief of the British General Staff, General Slim in Cairo, was given a very different response in support of the Egyptian demands for large supplies of military aviation and artillery.

From this topic we have moved on to the problem of Jerusalem. I have detailed the current situation, stressing

that the atmosphere has improved considerably since the publication of our plan. We hope that this plan will receive support from all the benches of the General Assembly and thus the internationalization of the city will be finally buried. I particularly focused on the Vatican's intentions to declare the previous decision a sacred principle, a departure from which is impossible even in the case of its notoriously unrealizable™. Mr. Malik said that Mr. Garro was not, apparently, such a zealous Catholic because he undermined the Vatican's efforts to blame Israel for the failure of internationalization. Jordan, although it had formally abstained and did not participate in the discussion, was gradually beginning to act as the main obstacle to the problem. In any case, we should know that the Vatican is a strong enemy. Mr. Malik asked a few questions about whether our proposal provided for the introduction of a state regime for a group other than its will, and he was particularly interested in "the number of residents in Holy Places". He was pleased with our response that the proposals call for the introduction of UN governance not by a group of people, but only by certain functions relating to holy places. At the same time, Mr. Malik refrained from mentioning the Soviet position on the issue of Jerusalem or promising any assistance. It was only at the very end of the conversation that he allowed himself to speak out on the matter, and in a very determined spirit.

Malik then asked about our opinion of the latest memorandum, Trugwe Lee. We replied that, after the first reading, we came to the conclusion that it was certainly an important document for the improvement of the international situation, but even Mr. Li himself recognized that the decision on China's representation was a prerequisite for the implementation of the remaining items of the programme, which was entirely dependent on cooperation and consultations among the great Powers. From this, Malik moved on to a detailed and very interesting presentation of

the international situation from the Soviet point of view. Here's his position in a nutshell.

The source of tension in the world is, in his opinion, exaggerated fears of the ruling circles of the United States, which are unable to cope with political and social upheavals in different parts of the world and naively believe that all this fermentation is solely a consequence of the existence of the USSR, that, without the Soviets, the world would not have boiled and shaken. These are children's illusions. The strikes in Mexico, the revolution in China, the liberation movements in Asia, the uprisings in Latin America- all of these events that threaten the collapse of existing regimes, are the result of the shortcomings and vices of the organization of society in most countries of the world. Only the fundamental elimination of these shortcomings can restore stability to the world. Conservative America has no desire to understand this simple truth, because in this case it will be necessary to recognize the need to renew and revolutionary correct the world. Hence the desire to attribute all the upheavals in the world to the soviet Union and turn the competition between social concepts and ideas into a traditional political interstate confrontation, accusing the USSR of aggressive pro-regions. However, for the Russian people such accusations sound to say the least strange, because it was the United States that surrounded the USSR with military bases and troops, not the other way around. If the USSR had established one base in Mexico and another in Canada, if it had sent a military mission to Panama and taken up arming all of the United States' neighbours, then it could indeed be argued that the Russians harbor aggressive intentions against the United States. But in this case, it is the Americans who are setting up military bases in Turkey and Iran, they are making efforts to intensify anti-Russian sentiments in all the states bordering the USSR...

The main factor in support of peaceful coexistence is, in Malik's view, the desire of the peoples of all countries to live in peace. The Russian people were particularly affected by

the wars. Those who undertake to count the number of victims suffered by this people, only during the modern period of history, will be horrified at the sight of the enormous destruction that has befallen Russia during the lifetime of each generation. All the waves of barbarism were broken against this stronghold. Russia, which saved Europe from the Tatars in the Middle Ages, once again saved it from the Nazi threat in recent years. Traditional cultures of Europe continue to exist only because they were saved at the cost of countless sacrifices made by the Russians (in this emotional and felt speech Malik spoke from a purely national position, without any “dialectic” in characterizing the purpose of the Russians in European history).

Malik went on to say, “The conflict in which the United States and the Soviet Union became embroiled after the end of the Second World War is not natural and inevitable. It is the fruit of the efforts of Churchill, the creator of the Cold War. Provoking Soviet-American confrontation is a typical manifestation of London's traditional “divide and conquer” policy throughout modern history. To Mr. Raphael's remark that it was Churchill who was now at the forefront of those demanding an early end to the Cold War, Malik replied that Churchill was a “demagogue of the highest standard”, it was possible that he felt how great the desire of the peoples of Europe for peace was, and, soberly assessing the situation, would be ready to change his position to preserve the laurels of a wise and sober-minded politician.

Moving from the analysis of the world situation to the problems of Israel, Malik added: “It will be very difficult for you to maintain independence and avoid the temptations of “total diplomacy.” The objective difficulty for you is that you are surrounded by enemies, and your enemies serve forces outside the region and ready to do anything to prevent the Middle East from concentrating on peaceful construction and development.” In response, we stressed that we want only one thing, “that our enemies cease to be enemies.” The establishment of peace in the region would enable it to

choose the path of independent development, progress and cooperation, far from the epicentres of a world confrontation that has no positive prospects for us.

From Malik's words, and especially the tone to which they were spoken, we had the impression that for him we are representatives of a small country that really aspires to independence and quiet creation, but some influential forces are pulling their hands to our region and eventually bringing him into the orbit of world confrontation. He seems to believe that we really would like not to get involved in this confrontation, but he doubts our ability in this direction. At the same time, given our ideological independence and sincere desire for peace, it seems appropriate to agitate us so that we are not deceived by persistent propaganda about the Intentions of the USSR on the world stage.

As we got up and were about to leave, I made a last-ditch attempt to return the conversation to the problems that were closer to us and to get Malik to take a position on Jerusalem. I said that we were very sorry that, because of his absence, we would not be able to fight together in the Guardian Council against plans for the internationalization of Jerusalem. He asked if we were concerned about the possible outcome of this political campaign. I replied that we had not yet succeeded in forcing the Vatican to accept the status quo, and he himself, Malik, had warned us how strong and dangerous the enemy was. To this Malik said: "They are especially strong in the UN." I agreed with him, adding that this power is not only manifesting itself in the problem of Jerusalem; there are still problems of Spain, China, the question of "religious freedom in Eastern Europe"; and everywhere the Vatican acts as an interested and proactive party. I also said, "If we and those who support us on the question of Jerusalem will stand together and succeed in this particular cause, perhaps it will be of global significance." After much deliberation, Malik said emphatically, "Yes, yes, that's why we will do everything in our power to help you with the question of Jerusalem."

**LETTER OF I. RABINOVICH TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY. June 19, 1950**

In addition to my letters dated April 28, 1950 and May 24, 1950, I inform you that I made a trip with Bishop Vladimir to Haifa, Nazareth, Afulu, Tiberias and Jaffa on June 11-12. The purpose of the trip is to streamline issues related to Russian property registered in the name of the Russian Orthodox Mission in Israel.

1. Invitation for consultations to Moscow

During the trip, Vladimir confidentially informed me that the Patriarch invited him to come to Moscow on June 8 for consultations on Russian property in Palestine. According to the bishop, the Invitation of the Patriarch has a connection with the meeting of representatives of the USSR in the Middle East, which is to be held in Moscow on the same days. He believed that he had received such an honourable invitation because he had a clear position on the internationalization of Jerusalem.

“Don't give any importance to the words of Archimandrite Leonid, who is trying to prove the correctness of the line for the internationalization of Jerusalem,” Vladimir added.

In this regard, he consulted with me and expressed his desire to know my opinion that we Jews could recommend Russia as opposed to the American campaign of friendship, which had the purpose of dragging Israel to its side.

Vladimir also said that the Soviet Minister for Religious Affairs G. Karpov enjoys great influence in all matters related to religion and the church, including in the Middle East.

The bishop believes that J.V. Stalin should be recommended to send G. Karpov to Palestine in order to clarify issues related to Russian property and the situation of the Orthodox Church. We must use the opportunity presented and pass through Vladimir our demands to the Soviet government (repatriation, technical assistance, etc.).

2. Meeting with the Archimandrite of the Jerusalem Greek Patriarchate Narkis

I regret that you were unable to attend a solemn meeting on 24 May 1950 chaired by Bishop Vladimir, which was also attended by representatives of the Jerusalem Greek Patriarchate led by Archimandrite Narkis.

As I have already told you, the Greeks have claims to the Office of Abandoned Property Supervision in Jaffa. They are dissatisfied with the poor treatment of the monks, who are not paid rent for the premises occupied by the Jews in the courtyard of the Jaffa Monastery.

The same is true, according to Narkis, the situation is in Ramla. In this regard, he asked me for the same support that the Russians had. I promised the archimandrite that, for my part, I was ready to help him as much as possible.

Narkis said that the Greek Patriarchate had always opposed the internationalization of Jerusalem. "We cannot, while in Jerusalem, speak against both Arabs and Jews at the same time. When Russia announced that it was in favor of internationalization, it came as a big surprise to us. But now the Soviets no longer support this plan, and fortunately we can go hand in hand with our friend Bishop Vladimir."

A week later I met again with Vladimir and Narkis. The latter this time did not express displeasure with the Jews and Dr. Aaron, the secretary of the kibbutz in Caesarea. Narkis entered into a lease agreement with Dr. Aaron in the vicinity of Caesarea, owned by a Greek church. He should soon inform me through Vladimir about the abuses in Jaffa and Ramla.

3. Nazareth

Mr. Adi Halk, a trustee of the Russian Mission and the Russian Orthodox Society in Nazareth (a former pupil and teacher of the Russian seminary in Nazareth), told me that, unfortunately, two of the three Orthodox members of the Nazareth City Council had moved to Beirut. Now there is only one member of the Orthodox representatives, while there are three Muslims and Catholics.

A. Halk asked me to put before the competent authorities the question of appointing two more representatives of the Orthodox community to the city council. I believe that it is necessary to pay attention to the candidacy of A. Halk himself and, if possible, to appoint him one of the two representatives of the Orthodox.

4. Meeting with Rozhkov and Yegorov

After I brought to your attention the above facts, I met with the first secretary of the Soviet mission Rozhkov and the consul general Yegorov. In a lengthy conversation, the issue of Russian property in general and the ownership of the Soviet mission in particular was raised. During the conversation, it became clear that Mr. Rozhkov was about to travel to Moscow, presumably to attend a meeting that Bishop Vladimir had told me about.

As you know, a year ago Rozhkov asked me to tell in detail about the Zionist movement, the revival of Hebrew, etc. During the conversations, he took notes and then asked me to write everything I said so that he could convey to others, as he put it, "the truth about zionism." I processed the material and eventually I got a 50-page brochure. Before handing over the papers to Rozhkov, I applied for permission from the Department of Propaganda of the Jewish Agency' Board, from where I was forwarded to you.

Dr. Eliashiv received these papers from me, but before his trip to Eastern Europe he did not find time to review them. After his return, they have already lost their relevance.

I do not think that the issue of handing over the papers I have prepared to Rozhkov in connection with his trip to Russia should be raised again. At the same time, it is imperative that he be presented with a small memorandum with our demands to Russia at the moment (with appropriate explanations) so that he can bring them to the Soviet side at the forthcoming meeting.

Of course, the note for him will be drawn up from me personally on the grounds that I had appropriate

conversations with him. It will be able to replace the voluminous document that I had prepared for it earlier.

In conclusion, I would like to ask you to make an urgent decision on whether to continue to talk about the above-mentioned topics and, if so, to give me guidance on what to look out for in the run-up to the meeting on Palestinian affairs that the Russians intend to hold in the near future.

As you may have seen, I have the opportunity to express our wishes informally through two channels, church and diplomatic. I'm waiting for your decision on whether to use them or not.

With deep respect.

Yitzhak Rabinowitz

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
June 19, 1950**

On June 19, Charette visited at his invitation. Charette said that he had long had the intention to go to Moscow and told me about it once in early 1949 (reported by telegraph). He has now decided to carry out this intention. He asks to tell the Soviet government that he wants to go to Moscow if the Soviet government has no objections to it and is ready to accept it. Speaking about the purpose of the trip, Charette noted that it will help strengthen friendly relations between Israel and the USSR. On the other hand, a trip to Moscow will make a favourable impression among American Jews, who enjoy considerable influence in the United States. In addition, Charette considers discussing with the leaders of the Soviet government a number of practical issues for Israel, such as the question of the USSR's position on the Statute of Jerusalem, the immigration to Israel of Jews from the USSR, the issue of trade and credit, etc. Charette would like to undertake this trip in August or the first half of September, before the opening of the session of the UN General Assembly. In July, he will be busy with "other things," but if the Soviet government deems it necessary to accept him in July, he will not object. He would also like to visit Leningrad and maybe Odessa, if the consent of the Soviet government is obtained, but now he is talking about visiting these cities only in advance. Together with him intends to take his wife and secretary.

In conclusion, Charette said that he would wait for the Soviet government's response. Namir was present at the conversation.

Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
June 22, 1950**

On June 22, near the village of Havorma in a solemn atmosphere, the opening of the monument of the Soviet army and the planting of the forest took place. There were: acting chairman of the Knesset Nir, Ministers Remez and Shazar, many Knesset deputies, members of the public, the Soviet mission and the countries of popular democracy. The rally, dedicated to the beginning of the planting of the forest, was opened by the former Minister of the Interior, a member of the Grunbaum Peace Committee, then spoke to Professor Dinaburg—on behalf of the Committee of Friendly Relations and the retired colonel Sade - on behalf of the League of Friendly Relations. The Jewish Agency also made greetings, from the Jewish Agency, from the Secretary of the Central Committee of Burstein, from the Jewish Land Fund, Kamini, and the Government of Israel, minister of communications Remez. All speakers expressed gratitude to the Soviet army for the defeat of Hitler's Germany and the salvation of the Jewish people from fascist bondage and extermination. This was particularly highlighted in Colonel Sade's speech. The soviet envoy delivered a brief response.

It should be noted that in the speeches of Zerubavel and Remez there were indirect calls for the Soviet Union to assist in the gathering of Jews in Israel (i.e. in immigration).

Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR
M.NAMIR TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
CHARETTA. July 6, 1950**

He visited Yiborin, verbatim translated the government's statement to him (on the basis of your telegram by Claire 10 086), added that the text itself confirms our commitment to the idea of non-alignment, but my Government authorized me to explain it and orally. I spoke in accordance with your telegram 46, only about Trugve Lee did not mention, because at that moment he was sharply criticized in the statement of Gromyko.

Yiborin said that the second paragraph of the Israeli statement was ambiguous, expressing its commitment to the UN Charter in words, and that the Security Council was supporting the Charter by encouraging unilateral military intervention. I countered that our document does not address formal legal disagreements or questions about who was to blame yesterday; it is about finding political ways to restore peace tomorrow. In this regard, we stress that cooperation among all great powers is necessary. In addition, you should not take a single paragraph out of context, here all three paragraphs are connected to each other and form a single whole. Yiborin asked to translate the second paragraph again and then reiterated that he remained in his opinion. After a brief exchange of remarks, which did not make anything new, he promised to pass on my explanations to his superiors. I also promised to report his reaction to those who directed me to him.

Namir

SPEECHES OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR M. NAMIR AND THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY S. ELIASHIVA AT A MEETING OF ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES IN TEL AVIV. July 17-21, 1950

M. Namir (July 17, 1950, 1st meeting).

Jews in Russia make up one percent of the total population, half of the percentage, compared to the period before the Second World War. Leaving for the Soviet Union, we did not know exactly what we were going to do there, but both consciously and intuitively our hearts turned to the Soviet Jews. We have gone through great days marked by important events, of which I will not repeat myself. Golda Meyerson recently spoke about them.

I have a few minutes at my disposal, and I will touch only two-thirds of the moments.

With regard to the inner national sense (if we are not very wrong in our perceptions), there is basically no great difference between Soviet Jews and other Jewish communities living a full (Jewish) life. External manifestations are quite another: they smooth, erase, mask their hidden feelings, their true sense of belonging to the Jews. The revival of Jewish identity occurred in the post-war years, but the roots come from the period of war.

The Jewish youth who grew up in the post-revolutionary period were brought up in his spirit and did not feel any discrimination, but came face to face with the horrific reality of the Jewish problem during the war. After Stalingrad, when the Soviet army (the name "Red Army" was changed) began an offensive against the Germans, pushed them to the West, began to occupy some cities and settlements, the Jewish soldier saw that his fellow non-Jews found his home - true, in distress, without young men, as they were in the army, and often without young women who were driven to Germany. But, as a rule, he found his elderly parents and something

left over from the farm. The Jew found (if at all) only cemetery graves of his parents and other tribesmen. Then he learned that among those who took part in the destruction were his Soviet fellow citizens, and even friends, who were born there and with whom he grew up.

The second thing that caused excitement in the hearts of young people is our struggle against England in this country, which preceded the creation of the state. The Soviet press often wrote vividly and sympathetically about our struggle, quoting the programs of the underground “Voice of Israel”, thus opening new horizons to the youth who were shocked by the picture of the tragedy of the Jews during the war.

Then there was the creation of a state, the war waged by the Israeli defence forces, and their victories over the Arab countries, the recognition of Israel by the USSR, the opening of our mission in Moscow, with all that followed.

There is reason to think that all these events gave rise to fantastic ideas among the Jews of the Soviet Union (as far as we can appreciate their thoughts and feelings) about the power and capabilities of the State of Israel, perceptions that are largely exaggerated.

Everyone agrees: non-Jews and Jews, including the diplomatic corps, are convinced, including the veteran diplomats in Moscow, who knew Russia even before the imposition of severe restrictions on contacts with the local population, that if Soviet Jews are allowed to immigrate in Israel, then, as they say, Smolensk Square will not accommodate all those who are ready to stand in line for a visa before our mission.

The Soviet government lacks intelligence or information to avoid it.

As for the question: is there any prospect of Jewish immigration from the USSR?

From my point of view, the one who is in a hurry to exclude the possibility of Jews leaving the Soviet Union for good is blind and does not grasp the essence of events. It is

obvious that only those who are in Russia are able to feel that:

(a) Anti-Semitism exists at the lower levels, and the Government wants to end it. The government does not impose it. Laws against it, legal norms, party ideology remain unaffected. But the serious facts that Jews dealt with and witnessed are also known to the Government.

b) After 30 years of deliberate efforts by the Soviets, they suddenly discovered that the Jewish problem had not been solved, either in terms of the Jews themselves or in terms of the attitude of the non-Jewish population. The “experts” who preached that there was no longer a Jewish problem, especially after the decision to create something like this in Birobidzhan, proved untenable. This became clear to any person from the street when the mission opened in Moscow. What happened there was unprecedented for the Soviet Union over a period of decades: a mass Zionist demonstration - spontaneous, huge, bubbling - took place in the heart of the capital, not being organized by the government, without its consent, not foreseeable to them. This may have been one of the reasons, though not the only, for the dismantling of Jewish institutions after about three months. There are other reasons. Among them, I would call the Government's anger against the “experts” on Jewish affairs who misled him, undermined his plans, teaching him for 30 years to consider “fact” that in a matter of days was devoid of foundation. The Jewish problem is the only national problem in the USSR that remains unresolved.

(c) The fact that Russian Jews are part of a strong world Jewish bloc puts them in a very difficult situation with regard to the Soviet government now during the Cold War, while the Soviet government is also in a difficult position with regard to the Jews and has not yet set its course.

Nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to assume that the Councils will leave this serious problem indefinitely unresolved, especially since they have a wealth of experience in “radical” decisions in this area. Last year,

within 3-4 hours, about 40,000 Greeks were evacuated from the southern borders and transported to Kazakhstan (by the way, the government is helping them to settle in a new place). The same was done with fewer Turks. It is known what happened earlier to the Tatars in Crimea, displaced by the Urals, as well as with Chechens and Ingush in the Caucasus.

In theory, the same could be done with Jews, but the difficulties were so great that there were doubts that the authorities would choose this path from all other possible options as the main solution. The Government had concluded that the Jewish problem existed and should be solved. It seems, however, that the Government is also aware that, technically and psychologically, the solution to this problem cannot be the same as it was with the Turks or Greeks, or Tatars, or Chechens and Ingush. Jews are not concentrated geographically, their 2 million people and hunting would have to lead to each of them separately. Moreover, the response that such an attack on Jews would have provoked around the world cannot be easily discounted.

In theory, there are three ways to solve the Jewish question: forced concentration in one territory (Birobidzhan); accelerated assimilation, also with coercion and when pushed by the authorities, or immigration. There is no indication that they will choose only one of these ways. It is very possible that they will not bypass any of these paths to find a short and comprehensive solution to the Jewish question. Consequently, we must also take into account the possibility that exit permits will be given to a certain number of Jews if we are so lucky that there will be a favourable international environment. In any case, this is the only positive line that can be guided in our policy regarding the Jewish problem in the USSR. It is clear that this opportunity places a number of responsibilities on us with regard to our common policy towards the Soviet Union.

And let us not be stopped by the sober conclusion that all this does not seem logical. True, they have fundamental

principles from which they do not deviate, but within the framework of principles works dialectic. This is evident both at the theoretical level and in everyday life. As well as “acceptable” excessive use of prisons, etc. to achieve the promised future freedom, or that to create a society of total abundance many years suffer from hunger and deprivation, or that in order to achieve a true international brotherhood it is possible to incite hatred and chauvinism of this kind, which have few parallels in our world, and if in the name of freed labour the most difficult works are declared the most sacred duty and if war can be waged for peace, there is no reason to rule out the “dialectical” possibility of immigration in the name of anti-Zionism or in the campaign against the zionists.

S. Eliashiv (July 17, 1950, 2nd meeting. “Israel between the West and the East”).

Dr. Eliashiv fears that, while everyone agrees with the policy of non-alignment, in practice we do not adhere to it fully, because the pro-Western trend, which has penetrated deeply into our hearts, prevails over principle. To this we should add the pressure of the West, and it is no secret that for us the West is more than just one half of the world as opposed to the other. We cannot maintain a genuine balance between the two halves. However, from time to time we have to wake up and hurriedly return to the middle, because in the countries of the Eastern Bloc live significant Jewish communities, which are, in fact, hostages. As long as we are teetering on the brink without crossing it, we have the opportunity to maintain ties with the Jews of the East and to realize our main task of taking them out. No Jewish social activity in these countries is possible; when the maximum of returnees from there is exhausted, we will no longer be able to work in the Eastern Bloc countries.

In order to be able to continue to take out the Jews, we must make every effort and make every conceivable sacrifice at the expense of our relations with the West. It must be remembered that in the eastern countries much more than in

the West, attention is paid to everything that is done and said on the issue of competition between the two systems. Therefore, even the non-aligned measure, which seems to us quite honest, does not always look the same in their eyes. In the eastern bloc, no one has any illusions that one day we will become a country of popular democracy peacefully. They do not count on it and do not require us to behave as if we are about to change our entire socio-political system. But they want to make sure that we don't turn into the West's blind weapon against them. This should be emphasized, given that our demands for them, i.e. the departure of Jews, seem to them almost blasphemous (in any case, very far-reaching). Thus, we should try very hard to ensure that our envoys can sit down at the same table with the leaders of the Eastern countries and negotiate with them on the departure of the Jews. Here, any unfortunate expression, whether in the Foreign Minister's speech or in a newspaper publication, can play a fatal role. If it is possible to buy something in the East (weapons, etc.), it is necessary to try to implement such a deal, even if the conditions offered by the Western market are preferable. Mechanical comparisons here are ridiculous, but if we have the opportunity to make some kind of deal with the East or we commit to do something before it, it is necessary to make every effort to make the transaction and the obligations were fulfilled. It is always necessary to remember that they see the world in a black and white palette, and their eternal question is: "With us or against us?"

M. Namir (July 17, 1950, 2nd meeting. "Israel between the West and the East").

Namir is convinced that the Russians do not demand anything more from us than neutrality and independence in assessing their actions, and that if we were to show a tendency to become their satellites like the countries of popular democracy, it would not be desirable for the USSR. The reason for this lies in Soviet calculations and considerations; in the current situation, as it seemed to the

Russians, Israel could either truly serve as the base of the West or be free and not provide bases. Taking into account the existing balance of power, if we turn to the East, the West will eliminate us in the terminology of political independence and turn our country into its base. As long as this is the case, the maximum that the Russians can hope for is Israel's neutrality and refusal to provide bases to the West. Therefore, from all points of view, and not only because of immigration from the East, the right line will be to choose a policy of non-alignment against both the West and the East.

We stand for something in the eyes of the West and its leaders take us into account only as long as we are independent and free to follow our intentions. The same is true for the East. The world will respect only those who have a choice, not those before whom there is only one way. This principle obliges Israel to make every effort to prevent a situation in which the West would have the impression that we have done away with all affairs with the East, and to be extremely careful not to move away from neutral policy. Moreover, we are charged with trying to make this neutrality obvious to all and to demonstrate it at every opportunity.

Our experience with the Soviet Union shows that the most insignificant resentment to the East on our part causes a violent reaction and disrupts our normal relations with the East. As for issues of crucial importance in international politics, which are the focus of east-West rivalry, the Russians are satisfied with our position.

M. Namir (July 21, 1951, 8th meeting. "Israel and the diaspora").

Contacts with Soviet Jews

Most of what was said in the Foreign Minister's speech is still practically not applicable to the USSR. The main task of our mission there is to gather information and try to understand what is going on around, because it lives with the same feelings that exist in thousands of Jews who look at it and evaluate it without being able to say the word. We would

do a disservice to ourselves and to the entire Jewish people if we accepted the idea that Russian Jewry was lost to us.

The USSR does not have a law that prohibits citizens from maintaining contact with foreigners, even with foreign diplomats. But the fact remains that few Soviet citizens can risk talking to a foreigner in public. The operation to isolate the diplomatic corps in Moscow has been completed for the last few years. In terms of the terms of contacts that we have in this area, diplomats are left only the opportunity to meet with official representatives of the Foreign Ministry, THE IWT and moD, with VOCS activists and local service personnel. All other meetings on the street, in the store, in the theatre or at the concert are random.

However, the fact remains that of all foreign missions in Moscow, only we have managed to overcome the existing procedures of contacts of the foreign mission with local residents. We had no special intentions in this regard, but it turned out in practice because we Jews are the only diplomatic mission to which two million people have a kind of "involvement" here. It is enough for our diplomat to enter the subway, bus or train, and at the same time accidentally (or not accidentally) a corner of Friday "Davar" will look out of his pocket, and you can be almost sure that at the nearest station with him will start a conversation of some Jew, attracted by the text in Hebrew. We have no right to complain about limited contact with local residents: compared to the rest, we are in a privileged environment. Our mission is visited by locals (although in the second year the flow of visitors has drastically declined). People come to watch, listen and express what they have in their heart. Each such visit becomes not only a huge event for the guest and for us, but mainly a source of important information and an opportunity to say hello to many thousands of Jews. This is evidenced by our visit to a large Moscow synagogue, with all its details. Stories about it are spread in a variety of versions, passed by word of mouth throughout the Jewish diaspora in the USSR.

The very existence of our mission (building, car, flag, staff, language) in this country is already a huge “zionist provocation”.

Opposition of Soviet Jewry to the world

If the third world war, which seems to be approaching, is delayed and does not begin in the near future, it is hoped that a certain part of Soviet Jewry will be saved by repatriating to Israel. But if a military catastrophe happens soon, we should expect extremely dire consequences. I risk to talk even about the prospect of a fundamentally new Jewish policy.

In 1949, there were both attacks on Jews and cases of outright oppression, but all this was not anti-Semitic, as anti-Semitism is fundamentally contrary to the general concept of the ruling regime. There was only a desire to suppress as quickly as possible the growth of Jewish national identity, which was revived, on the one hand, by the tragedy of Hitlerism, and on the other - by the creation of Israel. Therefore, the authorities decided, apparently, to choose a path of intimidation and insulation. As part of this policy, the following measures have been taken: the closure of Jewish cultural institutions in Yiddish, arrests of Jewish cultural and public figures, dismissal of Jews from high positions, accusing them of cosmopolitanism, in some areas - individual deportations under certain pretexts, incitement of hatred against Jews of the West - “Sharks of Wall Street”, self-serving businessmen or their followers- cosmopolitans (see caricatures of Bernard Baruch, Albert Einstein, Leon Blum, etc. - at times in the same company include Christian Andre , and it is easy to guess how the Russian reader perceives the phonetic sound of this name in the general context of the names of Jewish “traitors”). There is a campaign to discredit the State of Israel as a “war arsonist” or ready to “sell” by having an aggressive alliance with British agent Abdullah or by joining the Marshall Plan; Israel is accused of inviting American “sharks of capital” and cringing before them, entrusting the fate of its young army into the hands of

American generals, pursuing a frankly reactionary course in its domestic policy, persecuting Arab citizens protesting against discrimination and trampling on their civil rights, etc. , the Jewish “bourgeois nationalism” again retreated and went underground. The “involvement” of the State of Israel (contrary to Ehrenburg’s artificial formula: “sympathy for Israel, hatred of Zion”) became in the eyes of the Jews not only useless, but also simply dangerous. From the point of view of the authorities, it is possible to somewhat mitigate the incitement of gross Russian chauvinism, provoking traditional anti-Semitism, that is, hatred of Jews as Jews, and to return to some old Soviet formulas of “equality”. It should not be forgotten that in parallel the very important side goal of a purely practical nature was achieved: power structures were to some extent freed from the preponderance of Jewish influence in vital areas.

In the event of a world war, the possibility of propaganda preparations for the mobilization of Soviet Jews against their “treacherous and corrupt” foreign brothers, that is, perhaps an attempt not to destroy the Jewry, and to revive and reorganize it as a national unit, in order to use, perhaps even in the form of some Soviet Jewish army, against the Jews of the Western countries, will be put on the agenda.

Ehrenburg argued in December 1948 that “we and you,” that is, Soviet and non-Soviet Jews, could be on opposite sides of the barricades.

In this regard, it makes sense to consider as a real possibility the creation of Jewish regiments and battalions in the USSR and the countries of popular democracy. Perhaps this movement will be led by two “fragments of past eras”, it is unknown why the semi-official representatives of Soviet Jewry - Ehrenburg and David Saslavsky. Or maybe it will rise from oblivion Yitzik Fefer and Peretz Marchish, and David Bergelson, and all the others - all this in order to start a new “Jewish war.” As you remember, during the war with Hitler, the Soviets actively used Mihoels and Fefer as Jews, and not only and not so much in the USSR, as overseas.

In terms of loyalty to the Soviet Union and the regime, peoples and national communities seem to be divided into four groups:

- the most devoted and, accordingly, privileged are the Great Russians, the population of the only territory where there were no special complications in Bolshevik times;

- are the second most loyal tribes of Mongolian origin;

- In third place are Muslim republics, their loyalty is not fully ensured, because the highest religious centers of Islam are located outside the USSR, and the culture of Soviet Muslims is rooted in Iran and the Arab world. In addition, during the last war, at least two Muslim peoples (one in the Caucasus, one in Crimea) actively cooperated with Hitler, so that after the war their autonomy was eliminated;

- Greeks, Turks and Jews are considered to be the most disloyal. As for the Jews, one should not ignore the extremely important fact in the history of the USSR and in the history of the Jews that a large Jewish community from Poland, 150-200 thousand people, was saved from extermination exclusively by the Soviet authorities. For several years these Jews lived and worked in the USSR, but as soon as they were given the free choice to return to Poland or stay in Soviet Russia, they all chose Poland. The only experiment with allowing free emigration to a large group of people, conducted in the USSR during 33 years of Soviet rule, showed the ruling elite that the loyalty of Jews is at least weak. This conclusion was extended to all Soviet Jews. As for the Greeks and Turks, there are too few of them, they can be treated at any time as the authorities did with the Crimean Tatars. The problem of Jews - their numbers, dispersal and connections - poses much more complex challenges. Therefore, it is possible that the Soviet authorities will try on the Jews methods, which are used in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, more positive than those, apparently, expect the Greeks and Turks. Perhaps the authorities will go to organize the Jews in a kind of "national alternative" to foreign Jewry.

Arrests and links

There is sketchy evidence that the “prisoners of Sion” who have served their sentences have been expelled again, although not in such harsh places. New arrests have been made on charges of Zionism. Thus, in the western parts of the USSR, annexed on the eve of the war, the first arrests were made immediately after the annexation, and now, in 1949-1950, there is a second wave.

When it comes to deportation and exile, it is necessary to distinguish between rumours and actual facts. We had a personal testimony from a member of Ha-Shomer ha-tsair that “masses of Jews” were being deported from Moldova to Siberia. After checking, it turned out that the picture presented was inaccurate. In fact, many people were indeed exiled, but this process was not of the nature of mass repression. Each of the deportees was sentenced to this punishment on a case-by-case basis - who for the old transgressions, who for the new, who for the actual violations of the law, who on the basis of false accusation. But there was no mass expulsion of Jews, as there was no expulsion on national grounds. In other words, Jews are not deported because they are Jews. It also seems that sometimes Jews exaggerate their own fears. For example, we have no evidence that people who came into contact with us or attended a mission in Moscow were repressed for it. It is clear, however, that the number of visits is constantly declining; now the visits are almost gone, and the age of visitors is constantly growing.

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
July 18, 1950**

On July 18, I received the following letter from Charette:
“I am honored to confirm that I received your letter dated July 13, 1950, with an application containing threats. The note was immediately handed over to the relevant authorities for investigation.

Preliminary investigation suggests that we are dealing in this case with an unbalanced subject. However, in order to prevent possible incidents, the relevant authorities have been instructed to strengthen security and vigilance against the SOVIET mission.”

Ershov

**LETTER FROM THE ADVISER OF THE ISRAELI
PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UN, G. RAFAEL TO THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M.
SHARETTA. August 31, 1950**

A few days before Mr. Eban returned to the United States, I met with Malik at a reception, and he was willing to meet with us to exchange views on the situation. On August 23, Eban visited Malik's office and I accompanied him.

Mr. Soldatov, the chief adviser of the Soviet mission, also took part in the conversation.

Immediately after exchanging traditional questions about health and the weather, Malik asked about the political "weather" in the Middle East in light of the changes in the international climate. Mr. Eban shared his impressions of his stay in Israel and noted that there had been a truly remarkable change since his last trip home. He mentioned his visit to Eilat, saying that three new beginnings had taken place in the city that day: telephone communication had been established between the Dead Sea area and the centre of the country, and the construction of a water pipe had begun and the first stone of a new quarter of 50 houses had been laid. Malik interrupted this colourful description: "I have heard that you have managed to significantly increase the population." When we replied that the population of Israel had grown to 1.25 million, Malik expressed open admiration for this, noting that it was without a doubt a huge achievement. He added that the power of workers and ideological enthusiasm can turn the desert into a flowering garden and that the main thing is the consciousness of workers.

Malik then asked again about the political situation in the region. He wanted to know whose influence (English or American) prevailed in the Middle East. We replied that the situation in each country is different. When Mr. Eban hinted that there were even countries where there was a struggle

between British and American interests, such as Egypt, Malik pretended not to believe in such an opportunity. After Mr. Eban completed an analysis of the prevailing trends in various Arab countries, I observed, "And Israel is dominated by Israeli influence." Malik was particularly interested in whether the British continue to supply weapons to the Arabs. He also wanted to know what we thought of Turkey's candidacy for the Security Council. Mr. Eban noted that, given our friendly relations with Turkey, the first Muslim State to recognize Israel, we would support its desire to represent the Middle East in the Council.

Malik took the opportunity to say with a smile that we were probably interested in the 20th agenda item of the session, the Jerusalem issue. Mr. Eban described to him the present image of the city, the simmering life in it. Malik said he, too, knew that life in Jerusalem was in a normal rut. He did not repeat his words from the last conversation that the USSR will support us on the issue of Jerusalem. He may have refrained from reporting problems at the session because he did not want to give us a clear impression of the Soviet Union's participation in its work.

Malik then turned the conversation on the issue of relations between Islam and the Vatican, noting that they had recently found a tendency to rapprochement. Mr. Eban explained that, from a theological point of view, one should not assume that the Vatican and Muslims were indeed capable of achieving a serious rapprochement. But the Vatican seems to see Islam as a factor that can be connected against the "forces of darkness," one of the first places it places to give to Israel. The Vatican generally argues in confrontational terms, which makes it easy to find like-minded Arabs. Malik nodded in agreement.

The conversation then turned to the issue of Arab refugees. Malik said Protich and Cordier noted that the situation of refugees is better now than that of Arabs on their land. Malik described the refugee problem as disdainful, as something artificial, and noted that the Arabs were not

interested in solving it. He laughed at my observation that refugee status was a social and economic step forward for the Arab. He was interested in the use of UN aid funds and said that most of the money, of course, “stuck” to the hands of Arab politicians. From here, the conversation moved to the position of the UN. Mr. Eban said that he believed that The main stumbling block for the UN was China's problem. We had hoped that it would be resolved with the return of the Soviet representative to the Security Council. Malik replied that in the current situation, there should be no expectation of an early solution. The U.S. president and the State Department can't take a clear position here before the election because of fears of criticism from Republicans. He asked what we thought of the Democratic Party's chances in the upcoming congressional elections. We replied that much depends on the development of the situation in Korea, but so far the impression is that the president's position has strengthened and he enjoys broad support.

To our question whether, in his view, it is possible to find a solution to the problem of China and the general crisis in the General Assembly, where the weight of the non-aligned countries is greater, Malik replied that he does not place any hopes on the General Assembly, since two thirds of the member states are oriented towards the United States. A case in point: A few weeks ago, the U.S. Senate decided to end any assistance under the Marshall Plan to states not cooperating with the United States on the Korean issue. The Marshall Plan covers 16 countries, and there are 21 other Latin American states “bound by the tentacles of the northern octopus.” These two blocs already have a two-way majority, Malik continued, and the non-aligned countries are unable to influence the course of the General Assembly, which is only distressing and does not clarify anything.

When we pointed out that there was an interesting item on the agenda that could help defuse tensions (The 20-year Plan of Trygve Lee), Malik stated without appeal that it was an American project. We expressed our doubts about this,

pointing out that one of the points of the plan envisages the representation of the People's People's China in the UN, but Malik did not deviate from his position and said that the memorandum of the Secretary General was drawn up by Cordier and Feller, acting under the dictation of the State Department. He added that the two are a kind of think tank and that's what Trugwe Lee listens to.

The United States also dominates the Security Council thanks to its subordinate automatic majority. About the speech of Austin Malik spoke with disdain and mockery. Commenting on this really extremely unsuccessful performance, he and the Soldiers constantly exchanged some sharpness in Russian, and then The Soldiers without much success tried to translate them into English.

Malik said that while the Security Council in the current situation could not contribute to a peaceful solution to the Korean problem, it was important that the members of the Council now had an opportunity to listen to the arguments of the other side, which had not been heard all the time while the Americans had put the Council in their chariot.

Speaking about the speech of the Americans in the Security Council, Malik noted that they do not understand the problems of the peoples of Asia, where there are national revolutions and wars for liberation from social oppression. Americans are incapable of assimilating the magnitude of the changes that are taking place in the lifetime of our generation. The Korean people are fighting for their independence with the same enthusiasm with which the Israeli people defended themselves in the war of independence. Just as the armies of Lebanon and Egypt could not defeat us because they did not know what to fight for, so did the soldiers of South Korea. Like Israel in its war and as the USSR in the Patriotic War against Fascism, the forces of the northerners are fighting for the holy goal of independence. Malik demonstrated his knowledge of the map of Israel, which he bought in Paris during the Security Council's discussion of the implementation of the resolution

of 4 November 1948: he inquired about what was happening in Beersheba and In Fallujah, whose fate had not been decided at the time.

When Mr. Eban extended a greeting from the Minister to Malik and noted that he would be attending the General Assembly, Malik remarked, "This is the sixth Foreign Minister to announce his arrival." Asked if we could count on Vyshinsky's arrival, Malik said, "I still have no information about his participation and about the Soviet delegation at all."

Some of the results of the conversation:

- a. Throughout our meeting, Malik showed cordiality.
- b. He reacted with enthusiasm to all the achievements in Israel.

Although the Korean issue was raised in the conversation, Malik did not ask, either directly or indirectly, about the Israeli position on the issue.

Usually Malik is humorous, this time he has impressed a man tired, oppressed and anxious.

During the conversation, we had the impression that the USSR's position towards the UN had not yet finally developed. It seems that the frustrations experienced by the Russians are forcing them to begin to reassess their attitude towards the UN.

**FROM A LETTER FROM THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY TO ISRAEL'S DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN
EASTERN EUROPE. September 1, 1950**

Secret.

A. Immigration.

It is too early to shout "Hurray!" because it will be about the immigration of individuals and the interesting characteristic circumstances accompanying the right to leave.

A Jew from Venezuela, who arrived in the country about four months ago to deal with his sister's immigration from the USSR, sent a letter to Stalin and asked to allow his sister to come to him. The sister was invited to the local authorities, who stated that Stalin was ready to respond positively to her brother's request and to allow her to go to Israel. They promised to give her a passport within a few weeks.

In another case, a woman (Christian) whose husband is in Israel, asked Stalin to allow her to go to Israel. She was given a passport and asked to submit a document indicating that her husband really wanted her to come to Israel, as well as written confirmation that she would be granted an entry visa. In the third case, a woman who was a citizen of the USSR was allowed to leave Poland for Israel when the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw made a note on her passport that it was valid for Israel as well. Of course, from these cases dating back to the last month, far-reaching conclusions should not be drawn.

B. Press.

Over the past month, the Soviet press has not published too many reports about Israel. Our decision on the Korean issue has not led to a significant increase in publications

about our country. The few notes and articles that have been tracked do not indicate a tightening of style, it has been kept in negative tones before. Of course, you know that the Literary Newspaper has twice made particularly strident attacks on the Foreign Minister in connection with his two speeches. Israel is often mentioned in the Soviet press indirectly, in reviews of Middle East events. The source of information, a TASS correspondent in Israel, endlessly sends telegrams to Moscow, not missing a single, even the most insignificant, event, which can be given a negative interpretation. Sometimes there are notes with reference to "Kol Ghaam" or "Al Hamishmar." But, as mentioned above, in recent weeks there has not been any serious increase in the interest of the Soviet press towards Israel.

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR
M.NAMIR TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
CHARETTA. September 5, 1950**

A. Secret, Foreign Minister. Odessa. It is estimated that up to 200,000 Jews live in the city, a third of the population. The streets are full of Jews, seemingly much larger than their share of the city. Their energy, turbulent temperament and assertiveness, characteristic of the former Jews of Moldovans, make a strong impression. Unlike Moscow, Yiddish can be heard on the street. About 30 per cent lived in the city before the war, while the rest were refugees from other places, mainly from places and villages, from where almost all Jews had left for fear of isolation and anti-Semitism. In Odessa itself, relations with non-Jews are also friendly, but the size of the Jewish population and vague memories of the traditional heroism of Odessa Jews increase the sense of security. In addition, the material level in the port city is slightly higher than in other places. Together, this is a strong centre of attraction. At the same time, there is a decline of spirit and great anxiety. Propaganda against cosmopolitans is weakening, but Jews claim that the process of their ousting from power structures continues: they are sure that it is not the arbitrariness of local officials, but an order from above. The building of the large synagogue Brodsky is used for the state archive, there is only one small synagogue on Pushkin Street. But authorities recently said they were going to move the synagogue to a house on the outskirts of the city, which caused widespread despondency among Jews. The Jewish cemetery has survived, but there are no other Jewish institutions. Jews are afraid to talk about Zionism and Israel. Outwardly we are ignored, but many constantly listen to Israeli radio and deep down remain loyal. There is a great fear that war will break out—fear for themselves and incomparably more - for the fate of Israel.

Namir

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
September 7, 1950**

Riftin informed that on September 1, at a meeting of the parliamentary commission on foreign affairs, the Israeli delegation's position at the fifth session of the UN Assembly continued to be discussed and Charette's communication on the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel was heard.

Speaking on the first issue, in addition to his and Eban's message at the previous meeting of the commission (previously reported), Charette noted the following:

1. Discussion at the session on the Jerusalem Statute may be postponed at the suggestion of the United States. The Government of Israel has not yet decided whether to accept or object to the proposal, and there are both for and against data.

2. At the initiative of the Arab countries, the issue of Arab refugees was on the agenda of the session, but the position of the Arab countries did not feel the persistence with which they had raised the issue before, on the contrary, there was some moderation. The Israeli delegation might propose the colonization of refugees in Arab countries and declare Israel's agreement to assist the plan with material means.

3. Representatives of Pakistan and Iran are expected to nominate the President of the session on the question of the President of the session. Arab countries will support the former and Israel the second.

4. The Dutch and Brazil are nominated to the Security Council for the seats of Norway and Cuba. The Israeli delegation will vote along with the majority of the session.

5. The Israeli delegation would support the decision of the International Court of Justice that the Security Council should take into account the views of the Security Council when accepting new members at the Un.

6. The International Court of Justice called for the invitation of representatives of Romania and Hungary to discuss the issue of civil rights protection. The Israeli delegation will vote with the majority of the session in connection with the arrest of Zionist leaders in Romania.

7. On the issue of Eritrea, the Israeli delegation would support Burma's proposal to the Eritrean Statute Commission to federally merge it with Ethiopia.

8. On the question of Spain, the Government of Israel was under pressure from Latin American countries, which linked the issue to the question of Jerusalem. Charette believes that these countries will be satisfied if the Israeli delegation abstains from voting.

After Charette, Harari came from the Progressive Party, Cook from Herut and Riftin from Mapam. At the suggestion of the Chairman of the Commission, Secretary General Mapai Aharonovich, a decision was made: the commission heard Charette's report on the position of the Israeli delegation at the fifth session of the UN Assembly and instructs him to inform the government about the discussion of the issue at the Foreign Affairs Commission. It was also decided to hold a discussion at the commission on the government's general policy towards the West and the East.

On the second issue, about the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, Charette, noting that he will not say everything, said the following. Prior to Gromyko's speech in November 1947, Charette believed that the Soviet Union viewed the Zionist movement as an instrument of imperialism, but after this speech he began to think that the Soviet Union, taking such an important decision, analyzed to the end all the issues arising from the fact of the formation of the Jewish state. He wanted to be confirmed and spoke once with Vyshinsky, who replied that he could not express the government's point of view, and personally did not think about the consequences. He also spoke with Gromyko, Ershov, but did not receive a proper answer. Then he talked with Malik and put the question directly: can the USSR allow

immigration to Israel 50-100 thousand Soviet Jews? Malik responded with a joke: what will America say about the arrival in Israel of such a group of Soviet citizens? Charette told him that this would establish a lively Israeli connection with the Soviet Union and would prevent Israel's rapprochement with the United States.

Meanwhile, Charette continued, the situation of Jews in the USSR is very difficult. The campaign against cosmopolitanism affected only Jews. In the USSR there is distrust of Jews and in governing institutions, such as the Council of Ministers, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b), the Foreign Ministry, the IGB, the IWT and others, they have very few Jews and they are disguised, that is, do not recognize themselves as Jews. The formation of the state of Israel caused great excitement among Soviet Jews, revealed their desire to be immigration to Israel.

Charette spoke out against the explicit agitation in Israel for the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, pointing out that it would worsen the situation of Jews in the USSR. He also objected to the proposal to adopt a special Knesset declaration on the subject. He stated that, under the present circumstances, it would be most appropriate to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Government and added that the Government of Israel would seek to start these negotiations.

The chairman of the commission Akharonovich supported Sharetta in this and said that the Cold War against the USSR on this issue can only harm the interests of the state.

Charetta was asked whether the Soviet Union's attitude towards Israel had changed after the Israeli government's decision on the Korean issue, and Charette replied that no changes had taken place. Recently, Eban spoke with Malik, the conversation was very cordial and Malik did not mention the issue of Korea, he listened to Eban with attention and was interested in the issues of internal construction of the state.

The meeting of the commission was interrupted. Discussions on the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel have been postponed to the next meeting.

Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
September 23, 1950**

On September 22, he visited the Director General of the Foreign Ministry Eitan at his request. He said he should brief me on the following three issues related to the fifth session of the UN Assembly:

1) The Israeli delegation will vote at the session to elect Turkey to the Security Council. Since Israel's position on this issue is at odds with that of the USSR, which is likely to object to Turkey's candidacy, it must be explained that the reason for Israel's vote for Turkey is only to deprive the Arab League of the monopoly right to represent the Middle East countries in the Security Council. According to Eitan, this will set a precedent and allow Israel to nominate itself to the Security Council in the future.

(2) The Israeli Government and his delegation at the session did their utmost to support the proposal to invite representatives of the People's Republic of China to the session. Some time ago, the U.S. State Department sent out a note to a number of governments stating that the U.S. government would object to inviting Chinese representatives to the session and calling on other governments to support that U.S. position. The Israeli Government replied that it did not share this view and, following the principle of independence of its foreign policy, would vote in favour of inviting China. Indeed, Eitan said, the Israeli delegation voted in favour.

3) The Israeli delegation will fight against Syria's proposal to give the Arab League the right to send its representatives to the UN session as observers.

As the U.S. State Department welcomed the proposal, the Israeli government challenged it, but the State Department replied that Israel's considerations on the matter would be examined. Due to the fact that the State

Department has previously informed a number of governments of its positive attitude to the Syrian proposal, the Israeli government does not expect a change in the U.S. position on this issue.

Noting that the Arab League is not a regional organization entitled to representation of the Middle East countries at UN sessions under Article 52 of the UN Charter, Eitan handed me the following commemorative note:

“The Government of Israel outlines below its view on the 59th paragraph of the temporary agenda of the fifth regular session of the United Nations Assembly entitled: “Invitation to the Arab League to attend the General Assembly on a permanent note.”

1. The Arab League, even by virtue of its charter, is not an organism accessible to all the countries of the Middle East, but is an exclusively ethnic organization strictly limited to the Arab States.

2. Contrary to the custom of modern international organizations, Arab League meetings are held behind closed doors, their reports remain secret and all their decisions are not published. The Representative of the United Nations has never been invited to attend as an observer at any league session.

3. Far from being a factor of peace in the Middle East, the Arab League was the instigator and main organizer of the Arab war of incitement against Israel. Since the end of hostilities, the Arab League has been a major obstacle to the efforts made by the United Nations and Israel to reach a peaceful settlement between Israel and the Arab States.

For all these reasons, the Government of Israel considers that the Arab League cannot be regarded as a regional organization under Article 52 of the United Nations Charter. An organization whose accession is conditioned by ethnic data, whose meetings are held in secret and which is an element that jeopardizes international peace and security of the Middle East, cannot be considered an organization

“appropriate to the purposes and principles of the United Nations”.

If the Arab League had received the official recognition mentioned above, it would not have been a means to promote peace and stabilization of the Middle East. At the same time, this recognition would result in the league's increased claim to the monopoly of representation of the entire Middle East in the elected bodies of the United Nations, a trend that is grossly unfair to non-Arab States in the area and detrimental to their interests.”

Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR
M.NAMIR TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTRY W. EITAN. September 27, 1950**

On Monday he visited the Foreign Ministry and met with Bazarov. This new person is actually head of the Middle East Division. Bakulin has been sick for about a year, is unlikely to return to work. I have clarified our position in accordance with the instructions you have received.

Elections to the Security Council. Explained why we are against Lebanon. Bazarov made a rather vague and confusing remark, which can be interpreted as a reminder of the events of the last session, when Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia fought for the right to represent their region in the Security Council, and then the Russians and we took the side of the Yugoslavs. Even before the visit, I thought that it was possible to use this moment in favor of Lebanon, so I said that there are no analogies, because the Arab countries have only 35 million inhabitants and are not entitled to claim the monopoly representation of the Middle East, where there are still at least 30 million non-Arab population - Israel, Turkey, Iran, and if you add more Afghanistan, it will be more than 40 million Bazarov. In any case, if the Russians, as we expected, vote for Lebanon, they may be using this argument as well.

b. Syria's demand to accept the Arab League as an observer. I spoke strongly negatively in the spirit of your telegram and added that it makes no sense for the forces of peace to support this racist and chauvinistic organization, artificially enhancing its shattered authority. The league is torn by internal squabbles, every day there are splits, and its open attacks on us and hidden machinations against other peace-loving peoples are aggressive and reactionary.

My statement that we would vote for the people's China, he was, as you would expect, welcomed.

Bazarov praised our arguments and analysis of the first two paragraphs and promised to immediately pass on my words to his superiors. But he limited himself to this and was extremely careful, tried not to give out their position. Since their vote and their attitude to our vote are, of course, not related to the validity of our arguments, but stem from their own political needs and manoeuvres in the General Assembly, this conversation was a good opportunity for me to explain why Israel is based.

I did not address the refugee problem primarily because I have not yet received instructions from you. If you deem it necessary, I am prepared to have an additional conversation, but I will ask you to provide the talking points of our arguments.

Namir

**TELEGRAM OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY W. EITAN TO THE ISRAELI
ENVOY TO THE USSR M.NAMIR. October 5, 1950**

In the continuation of your exchange of telegrams with zia ErenN Akharonovich. The Prime Minister has ordered me to ask you to return to Israel as soon as possible, if possible, no later than the 15th or 20th. The government has decided to send an envoy to Moscow, Salman Shazar, we ask the consent of the Russians through Ershov. Since the Minister and Zyama Ehrenn are in Lake Saxesse, I can't add anything about the government and the party's plans.

Best wishes

Eitan

**TELEGRAM OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY A. LEVAVI TO THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE
USSR M.NAMIR. October 13, 1950**

The Soviet mission renews the requirement to transfer property. Prior to the decision on the international statute of Jerusalem, we had pledged in writing to transfer virtually everything. However, the decision on the international statute is a stark change.

Levawi

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT
OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY A. LEVAVI WITH
THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN
ISRAEL V.I.ROZHKOV. October 20, 1950**

Speaking about the note of the Soviet mission on the issue of Russian property, and noting that he did not think it was right to pull the answer, Mr. Levavi noted that our principled position on this issue has not changed. He went on to briefly describe the state of affairs with the property of the Spiritual Mission and the property of the former tsarist government: the former is actually in the hands of the Spiritual Mission and is governed by a representative of the church, as for the second - everything that is registered in the books has already been rewritten by the Soviet government. If there are buildings and plots of land that have not yet been re-registered, this is a purely technical problem. The reason for the Soviet diplomats is known - the lack of necessary data to find and find registration documents. This difficulty can be overcome, it is desirable to pass the issue into the hands of an experienced lawyer. With regard to the rest of the property, Mr. Levavi said that the turn to resolve the issue would come after a just solution to the Jerusalem problem had been fully implemented. He described the UN35 resolution as both unfair and unrealistic and expressed hope that it would be repealed. At the same time, Mr. Levavi noted that some delegations had already changed their position and that at one time we were very pleased to hear that the USSR was now opposed to the internationalization of Jerusalem.

After hearing this comment, Rozhkov said that Malik had stated at the time that the SOVIET position on the Jerusalem issue had changed, and that Mr. Levavi had not been informed about the clarifications, and that after the Mission

had presented Dr. Eliashiva with the necessary evidence, he did not understand this position. Mr. Levavi reiterated that we would like to overcome the current phase in the development of events around Jerusalem. Our letter, to which Mr. Rozhkov refers, dates back to August 1949, and the decision to internationalize Jerusalem was taken later, in December 1949, Mr. Levavi reiterated that our principled position had not changed and that the delay was caused solely by complications. As for the property of Grand Duke Sergei and the Orthodox Society, Mr. Levavi noted, this is a new issue that cannot be considered as long as the current abnormal situation exists. For example, this conversation itself takes place in Tel Aviv, not in our capital, Jerusalem. Until now, there are consulates in the Jewish part of the city without accreditation under the Israeli government.

Rozhkov was satisfied with this explanation and moved on to the problem of church property, stressing that this problem, despite our specific promises made in the letter of August 19, 1949, has not yet been solved.

Mr. Levavi asked what, in fact, we should do after all the property of the church actually went into the administration of Bishop Vladimir? Vladimir's status is not in fact inferior to that of other church hierarchs. Rozhkov replied that the property had been handed over by the mandated authorities in 1917 to opponents of the Soviet regime and that its transfer to the representative of the church after the formation of the State of Israel was only oral, not legally binding until Rabinovich's signature on behalf of the Israeli Government was confirmed. It is also important for them to confirm the fact of the appointment of Bishop Vladimir as the church representative of the Moscow Patriarchate by the Government of Israel.

To Mr. Levavi's comment, expressed in the form of a question whether they fear that we would allow Antipov to return, Rozhkov replied that since they knew the benevolent attitude of the Israeli Government towards the USSR, they were convinced that such a threat did not exist.

Mr. Levawi asked for time to study the matter.

Rozhkov took out of his pocket a commemorative note handed over by the mission on July 25, 1949, read out several paragraphs and settled on the demand concerning the property of the tsarist government. He took a particular interest in the consulate building, a large house in Migrash Ha Rusim in Jerusalem, saying that the general public knew that it was their property, but it had not yet been handed over to them.

When Rozhkov asked why the issue was still unresolved, he expressed bewilderment, saying that the building for some reason was not listed in the register of households, although the Turkish authorities carefully monitored the issuance of permits for any stone construction and that all data were listed in the registers of households.

Mr. Levavi suggested that Rozhkov refer the matter to his lawyer and promised our intervention in case the lawyer could not find the record.

Returning to the property of the Great Prince Sergei and the Orthodox Society, Rozhkov asked a specific question, did he understand correctly that we postpone the decision at a later date?

Mr. Levavi repeated the previous explanation, stressing that the positive aspect of his words should be taken into account.

Rozhkov tried to draw a conclusion, noting that Levavi's explanations are seen to him as leaving the question open.

Mr. Levavi replied that we would not leave the Jerusalem problem open indefinitely.

Rozhkov then raised the issue of the building occupied by the state hospital and the prison building, pointing out that no contracts with the tenants have yet been signed and that the USSR has no control over these buildings, although they are in every respect legal homeowners.

Mr. Levavi suggested that Rozhkov exercise their right to file a complaint with the court, noting that this was a relationship between the landlord and the tenant.

Copies were sent to: Israel's diplomatic mission in the USSR, the ministry's affairs management, and the government's legal adviser.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.A.
GROMYKO WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR M.
NAMIR. October 24, 1950**

Secret.

Today received Namir at his request.

At the beginning of the conversation, Namir stated that in connection with the end of his tenure as envoy to Moscow and the upcoming trip to Israel in two weeks, he came to express to me his sincere gratitude for the assistance provided by the Foreign Ministry in his work in Moscow.

Namir expressed his best wishes to the Soviet people.

In return, I wished him a happy return to Israel.

Afterwards, Namir gave me his personal request for the following content. Since 1939, he lost all connection with his father, mother and young sister, who before the war lived in the USSR in Ukraine. During the war, Namir's brother tried unsuccessfully to connect with his parents by sending letters and telegrams to their old address in Kherson. At the end of the war, Namir allegedly learned from a letter from a friend in Tel Aviv that his father had died in Ukraine from the Germans. However, despite Namir's repeated appeals to the Soviet Red Cross Society, he was unable to learn about the fate of his mother and sister.

Namir further stated that about two weeks ago he had received a letter from his brother from Tel Aviv in which the latter allegedly reported that a resident of Kherson had sent him (Namir's brother) a letter stating that Namir's elderly mother had recently visited the resident's apartment in Kherson.

In informing me of this, Namir did not give the name or address of the resident in Kherson. He indicated, however, that he had requested the information from his brother by telegram. In this regard, Namir asked me to assist him in obtaining permission for his urgent departure to Kherson by

train or plane for a possible meeting with his mother. Namir noted that he could not go to Kherson without permission, as the city was in a restricted area. He expects to go to Kherson with his secretary and stay there one day.

In response, I told Namir that after the question of the possibility of his trip to Kherson, he would be informed.

At the end of the conversation, Namir expressed his wish that I would not be able to attend the farewell reception at the mission on 2 November.

I thanked him for the invitation, saying that if circumstances allowed, I would attend the reception.

The conversation lasted 20 minutes. The first secretary of the OBSV T. Tatiana A.I. was present.

Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

A.Gromyko

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR M.
NAMIR TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY. October
30, 1950**

a. During the final conversation, Gromyko showed great cordiality, expressed regret at the end of my service, wished success in the future, and even brought a somewhat surprising aphorism: "You are fine because you are coming home, and we are sad because you are leaving us." Political and similar issues were not raised, except for one case raised on my initiative (details of a separate telegram). I thanked him, the minister and assistants for his kind attitude, conveyed my best wishes to the people and the government of the USSR. In response, Gromyko conveyed a heartfelt greeting to our state, the government and personally To Charette. The day before yesterday, at a celebratory reception with the Czechs, I spoke again with him and his wife. The latter mostly squandered compliments and regrets about my departure. As before, it was impossible to perceive without emotions these simple and heartfelt words, pronounced with special Russian warmth, without a shadow of diplomatic etiquette.

b. Foreign correspondents report that the All-Union Congress of Peace Supporters, held here about 10 days ago, was attended by the heads of various religious communities - representatives of Orthodoxy, Lutheranism, Islam, even one Buddhist lama. They gave very long speeches. Some of them are elected to the Central Committee. A representative from Judaism did not participate. According to journalists, there was bewilderment in the atmosphere of the congress. It is believed that this is not accidental.

I must stress once again what has happened in previous telegrams: local press reports from the General Assembly emphasize the rapprochement of Arab positions (especially Syria and Lebanon) and the USSR on issues of war and peace and a number of other issues. Sometimes moderately

criticized moments in the speeches of the Arabs, but in most cases their statements are presented with sympathy, albeit cautious. It is worth noting that after the inclusion of representatives of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in their delegation, the press actively promotes the achievements and successes of Muslim peoples in the USSR. The illustrated weekly "Ogonek" recently devotes a lot of space to articles and pictures about the life of Muslim communities. It seems that there is a large-scale pro-Muslim propaganda campaign, which branches out borders. On the other hand, although the intensity of conventional anti-Israeli propaganda has visibly subsided and the press has commented positively on Sharett and Eban's speeches to the General Assembly, it is impossible to speak of a turn for the better. Widely cited by Kol Ghaam, with reference to it published a disgusting article about the government crisis (the summary sent by an open telegram), this alone is enough to discredit us in the eyes of the public, especially in the eyes of Jews. That may have been the main purpose. The Foreign Ministry responded to my verbal request and ensured the travel of all employees of our mission, accompanied by a protocol service official to the collective farm, about 40 km from Moscow. The visit lasted several hours, we learned a lot. It was a big surprise for us when it turned out that the chairman of the collective farm, an agronomist (aka the secretary of the party organization) and one secretary - Jews, and the only Jews of 400 Christian families in the farm. The name of the agronomist Moses, he knows Hebrew, studied in the Jewish gymnasium in Ekaterinoslav with Abraham Schlensky and Dan Pines. Then I was very jealous of the French ambassador. He also asked for permission to go to the collective farm, he was promised, but despite all the requests, said that they will not be able to show him the same collective farm, which we visited. As a result, he will go somewhere else. The reason for the refusal is unclear - in fact, I cannot say unequivocally, intentionally or accidentally we were taken to the farm, where the Jews run.

Please tell my brother that Lisa, my sister-in-law from Odessa, came here last week and I saw her four times in an informal setting.

Namir

**TELEGRAM OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY ALEVAVI TO THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE
USSR M. NAMIR. November 3, 1950**

For your information, personally. The Foreign Minister spoke with Vyshinsky, raised the problems of repatriation from the USSR. The answer is negative in content, but polite. Vyshinsky almost made excuses. He did not try to claim that there are no Jews in the USSR who would like to repatriate, but pointed out that the issuance of exit visas contradicts the very essence of the Soviet system. He gave the example of Soviet citizens of Polish origin, who cannot be allowed to leave for Poland. During the conversation, Vyshinsky said, "You don't expect us to let a million Jews leave?" Our minister remarked: "Give 50,000, at least ten." But Vyshinsky continued his explanations why it is impossible to release Jews from the USSR. He hinted that there was no point in our minister's visit to Moscow, as they meet and talk at the UN General Assembly. At the same time, Vyshinsky expressed satisfaction with the repatriation from Romania.

Levawi

**TELEGRAM OF THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
OF THE USSR A.A.GROMYKO TO THE SOVIET UNION IN
ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV. November 9, 1950**

In the next conversation with the Foreign Minister or Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, you should refer to Rozhkov's conversation with Levavi on October 20, 2017, and state that the intention of the Israeli government to postpone the practical resolution of the issue of transferring Russian property to us, as Levavi said, you consider to be unjustified. Point out that, in your opinion, the resolution of the UN General Assembly on the question of Jerusalem and the government of Israel's satisfaction with the legitimate demands of the Soviet Union for the return of property to it are completely independent and should not be made dependent on each other.

Inform us about the results of the conversation.

Gromyko

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR M.
NAMIR TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY. November
13, 1950**

a. Last Thursday he went to say goodbye to Zorin. After the usual declarations of politeness and mutual wishes, without any provocation on my part, began a conversation about the international situation. The main idea is a restrained in form, but a very sad in fact complaint to the outside world, inciting against the USSR and perverting its inner life and foreign policy course. He attributes these “perversions” in part to ignorance, misunderstanding and adherence to erroneous concepts, but for the most part, he says, it is a malicious slander. As if casually and briefly, he expressed regret that a part of the Israeli public had descended into hostile positions, asked me, since I had had the opportunity to look at the Soviet Union from within for a long time and visited various parts of Russia, to help “dispel prejudices, unfounded fears and fight back against deliberate misinformation”. Peace is an urgent need for the peoples of the Union. The war has left a heavy legacy, the standard of living is not yet high, every corner of the country requires the restoration of the destroyed, improving living conditions to create conditions for long-term economic creation and the reclamation of deserts. Now the implementation of huge projects of reclamation and planting of forests—it is not manoeuvres, not an attempt to divert attention, but the fruit of a well-thought-out energetic policy, which the enemies are trying to defame. Usually, he looked like a tough and dry official, this time he spoke emotionally, with sincere concern, at times with outright sadness, which can be interpreted as a fear that, from the point of view of the Russians, the West will attack them anyway, no matter how events develop.

In response to the situation, I refrained from expressing my opinion on the global situation, and I limited myself to

expressing the hope that discussions and informal face-to-face meetings between the parties in Lake Saxesse would allow for some modus vivendi. I then took advantage of some of his positive remarks to Israel and openly made all our claims about TASS telegrams and publications in the Soviet press, about the failure of all our attempts to establish trade and cultural ties, to reach the level of personal political contacts through mutual visits of high-ranking officials, to provide at least a little help in the form of exit permits on a case-by-case basis, to obtain a trade loan to acquire military equipment, to establish cooperation in the field of medical research and to implement education projects. All this ended in nothing, I said, but our requests were quite modest. I expressed the hope that the new envoy would be able to do what Golda Meyerson and I failed to do, and that would benefit both our nations. In conclusion, I have identified two main points of convergence between our interests. First, it is the focus on the restoration and development of the economy, the irrigation of the deserts, the rapid and inclusive gathering of diaspora, for which we are ready to make any sacrifice. Secondly, the desire for world peace, which for my Government is not a subjective choice, but an urgent objective necessity for the Jewish people in the country and in the diaspora: after all, we lost a third of our people in the last war, now we in Israel need to build a new state, and our brothers in different regions of the world can, if war breaks out, face a tragic and absurd situation when they have to shoot each other. We, I stressed, have a policy of non-alignment, although it often causes misunderstanding and claims on the one hand. But we have come to terms with this inconvenience in advance, and as long as the current government exists, we will not deviate from the chosen path. He listened to me with great tension, but did not answer, and after repeated congratulations and wishes, we parted in a state of cordiality. The secretary recorded the conversation. I think that, describing the situation in the world (and this was the main part of his

speech), he expected that through us his words would reach the representatives of the West.

b. During the conversation with Zorin and the next day in a conversation with the head of the protocol department Molochkov deliberately mentioned the appointment of Shazar, but never received a response, as things are with the agreman. Yet I believe that this is a regular red tape and there is nothing more behind it. In the meantime, I have received several stories about the gratuitous and long delays in the extradition of the agreman.

In the course of the farewell conversation with Moochekov it finally became clear that the trip to the collective farm was specially organized so that we got into the farm, which is run by Jews.

The Embassies of France, Sweden, Australia and Switzerland, as well as united Press correspondents, Agence France-Presse and the Associated Press, held farewell dinners in my honour with all the usual compliments and speeches. All surpassed the dinner of the French ambassador - he gave a felt speech, full of absolutely non-diplomatic expressions of sympathy and personal friendship.

I propose to publish first that I paid a visit to Zorin and that in this regard there was a conversation on various political issues, as well as information about farewell receptions (see the previous paragraph).

Namir

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
ISRAELI ENVOY TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY S.
ELIASHIVA WITH THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE USSR TO THE UN J.A.MALIK. New York,
November 21, 1950**

Secret.

I had a long conversation with the Soviet ambassador to the UN, Jacob Malik. The conversation took place at a dinner hosted by our delegation to the UN for foreign heads of delegations. We sat next to each other at the table and were able to speak long and without interference.

Even before everyone sat down at the table, he asked me how our business was, especially on the question of Jerusalem, and where were the mysterious Swedish-Dutch proposals that were so much talked about but never published. They know the contents of the proposals, he spoke to Eban about it, and I talked to Scratchkin several times. By the way, we also passed the text to them. The Foreign Minister also participated in the conversation, informing Malik that it might be possible to secure the Vatican's consent to the initiative. Malik asked if we would accept the Swedish-Dutch proposals and was told that, with certain amendments, they might be acceptable. Malik then asked what position the Arabs were taking on the issue.

During the conversation at the table, we touched on a wide range of issues, of which I will point out a few main issues. He praised our work in Israel, said that the world may not yet understand how important what we are building is. When I told him about the scale of repatriation, he remarked, "It's like America has accepted 70 million people." He asked to what extent we needed external assistance. I explained that our need for such assistance from abroad stems mainly from the need to finance repatriation and absorption, and that we focus on helping foreign Jews. In this regard, I spoke about the meeting in Washington³⁷ and the

large appropriations we require of American Jewry. He listened carefully to the problems of repatriation, its composition, multilingualism, countries of origin, etc. As a positive example in this direction, I have cited changes in repatriation from Romania. Malik asked many questions about the irrigation and development of the Negev, listened with surprise to my story about the irrigation project in Revivim, told about similar problems and solutions they have in Central Asia, and that they are now discussing plans to turn large rivers in order to flood new territories and use water resources more efficiently. Here he added: "If only we were not prevented from working quietly, if only we did not have to spend billions on weapons!"

Malik was interested in our government crisis and its consequences, and asked to tell about our parties.

We also talked about the USSR's relations with other countries and about America's attitude towards them. He said that Americans in their judgments about the USSR are deprived of a sense of historical perspective. On the one hand, they forget about the historical examples of numerous invasions in Russia, which were repeated during the life of almost every generation and always ended with the victory of the Russians. On the other hand, when they talk about the achievements of the Soviet Union in various areas of daily life, they usually downplay the significance of these achievements by comparing the situation "we" and "they". At the same time, they again ignore the historical perspective and do not remember the situation that was in Russia before the Soviet regime, about its then level of development.

I asked him what he thought of the UN's performance during his time here. His response was a rather positive assessment. He said that the very existence of constant contact between States should be appreciated, and personal contacts between representatives of States allowed for simple and human conversations and mutual understanding.

I will not be cited here as other topics of our conversation, during which Malik showed a high cultural level and understanding. S.Eliashiv

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN
THE USSR Z. ARGANA TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTRY A. LEVAVI. December 30, 1950**

Upon the rabbi's return from a long vacation, we asked him, as expected, to set a day to meet with Argaman. After a long bargaining and evasion, he eventually declared that it was best to arrange a meeting during prayer. His tone gave us an opportunity to imagine the scale of the changes that have taken place. Details with the diplomatic courier.

Argaman

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE HEAD OF
THE CONSULAR DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN
MINISTRY A.P. VLASOV WITH THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR Z.ARGAMAN. January 2, 1951**

Secret.

Accepted Argaman at his request.

Argaman said that in the mission's affairs there are several statements of Israeli citizens who ask for a divorce from Soviet citizens. Israeli law requires divorce not only on the state line, but also on the religious line. In this regard, Argaman said, it would be desirable to get a certificate from the registry station and a certificate from the rabbi.

I asked Argaman to report the request in writing.

Argaman promised to send a note.

2. Then Argaman asked how to get a witness testimony from Soviet citizens with hereditary cases in Israel.

I advised him to go to Inyurcollegia on this matter.

3. In connection with the establishment of a permanent diplomatic link between Tel Aviv and the Israeli mission in Moscow, Argaman asked whether entry and exit visas for permanent Israeli diplomatic couriers could be obtained.

I asked Argaman to write a formal request on this issue with the names of the diplomatic couriers.

The conversation lasted 20 minutes.

Vlasov

**LETTER FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN
THE USSR TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY A. LEVAVI. January 8, 1951**

Dear Levavi!

I will try to address in this review a number of issues related primarily to our mission in Moscow.

But before a few personal comments.

Undoubtedly, the departure of Namir immediately after my arrival here seriously affected the process of my acclimatization to “diplomatic” work in Moscow. It took a long time before I was able to deal with the specific problems here, to assimilate the local view of things, to meet people and, as far as possible, to separate significant problems from insignificant ones. Organizing the day-to-day work of the mission (staffing, minimum order in accounting, etc.) took a very long time and required considerable effort. Considering that the mission now employs almost one newcomers who have not yet adapted sufficiently to the Moscow conditions, one can imagine how difficult it was without any prior instruction to put my work here in a certain framework, to focus on the assessment of the facts and events available and to draw conclusions from them.

Although I still can't be called an expert in many areas, I will try to summarize some of the events and processes I see from here.

Our mission in Moscow, its status and scope of activity.

Contacts with the authorities

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It is unlikely that it will be news to you if I express the general opinion of all diplomats in Moscow: there is no diplomatic work, in the sense that it is given in any other country, is not carried out here. Meetings with the authorities take place only in exceptional cases, and even then only one problem has to be discussed, without the

slightest opportunity to have a general conversation on a political issue.

Unfortunately, during my stay here I have not had the opportunity to visit the Foreign Ministry (except for a visit of courtesy, together with Namir, to the acting head of the protocol department). Therefore, I cannot refer to personal experience, although I have no doubt that the above assessment is true.

I had only two opportunities to meet with zorin - the Albanians and the Finns. In both cases, however, the circumstances prevented a political conversation. From the conversations with Budenny at the celebration on November 7 and the Albanians and Bushuyev (the acting head of protocol, of course, the latter should not attach special importance) I concluded that at least these interlocutors have no idea about our activities in terms of building the state and gathering diaspora, about our special situation among the peoples of the Middle East. Their attitude towards us is based on the reports of the Soviet press, on our behavior at the UN and on our position on a set of issues arising from the Korean problem. The briefest explanations were enough, and they began to speak with respect about our creative activity.

I do not want to entertain myself with the illusion that by focusing a great deal on propaganda, we will be able to solve all our problems. But I think that we should use any opportunities (more precisely, it is necessary to create such opportunities) for more frequent meetings with representatives of the Foreign Ministry and during these contacts to talk about what is happening in our country. After all, it cannot be that for a whole few months we did not have a single meeting with officials of the Foreign Ministry! A number of serious issues, both domestic and international, have been on the agenda in recent years. It seems that, at least on issues directly related to Israel, such as the status of Jerusalem, the refugee situation, the Suez Canal, etc., we should try to clarify the position of the Soviet

Government. It can be said, of course, that this is not necessary, since there are Soviet and Israeli delegations in Lake Saxesse and there is constant communication between them, but in my view, we would not be harmed if there were conversations about our specific problems. In any case, on the issue of the closure of the Suez Canal, there is no doubt a sense to talk to the Foreign Ministry, especially after the Soviet press enthusiastically supported the Egyptian demands to evacuate British troops from the Canal zone. Something can certainly be done on the problem of the attitude of the Soviet press to us. I am well aware that the local authorities are responding to our concerns about this, and I have little hope that this attitude will change, at least as long as international tensions are at that level. But we should not leave the problem without any reaction from us. It seems to me that since the Soviet authorities claim that they have no control over the press, we can suggest that we send a refutation of a material, such as the publication in the New Time, through the channels of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Of course, I have no idea that the refutation will be published, but the very fact of making such a request is, in my opinion, the answer. In addition, it will give us an opportunity to discuss this issue with the Russians.

As for the attitude of the press towards us recently, in my opinion, it is not too different from its attitude towards any other country that is not on the list of "people's democracies". During my time here, I have not had the opportunity to read any articles, not even a single note, where there is a positive assessment of the activities of anyone's Government, even India and Pakistan. True, the press refrains from attacking Arab countries and has some sympathy for Egypt, but this applies only to one area: its struggle with Great Britain. This press, it seems to me, is not able to write otherwise, it cannot inform readers of any constructive, positive actions in any field, if these actions are taken in a country where the social and political system differs from the system in the USSR or the countries of

“people's democracy” because the main, if le only, function of the press here is to prove that no other system is able to provide the people with such a beautiful and happy life. as in the USSR and the countries of “people's democracy” who see the USSR as a role model and a guiding star.

Therefore, personally, I am not particularly worried about the negative attitude towards us of the Soviet press. I do not think that this deprives us of the opportunity to explain appropriately the nature of our activities and policies in the light of our special situation in the world in general and in the Middle East in particular. To this end, we are obliged, given the specific conditions of diplomatic work in the USSR, to find opportunities for greater contact with the authorities than it has been so far. This should be done by drawing the attention of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to our international problems. Perhaps I will show you an experiential, who has no idea about the Soviet reality and looks at the world through pink glasses (in fact, my glasses are rather black). Even if you really think so, maybe it's worth trying to give the empirical people a chance to try your luck. It's better than doing nothing anyway.

Specifically, I advise you from time to time to authorize the mission in Moscow to draw the attention of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to a particular problem on which the position of the Soviet Union is of significant importance to us.

2. Ministry of Foreign Trade.

I have met with representatives of this ministry twice. Once with the head of the protocol Kuzminsky and once with the acting head of the department of international trade treaties Smirnov. The first meeting was of an introductory nature and focused on procedural issues. Although the conversation took place, as they say here, “in a friendly atmosphere”, in fact it was entirely reduced to the exchange of on-duty compliments. The second meeting was more interesting. I told Smirnov about the development of our industry and the needs associated with the reception of mass

repatriation, construction and development of the state. He listened very carefully, and it was noticeable that he still knew nothing about many things. He was particularly surprised by the extent of repatriation and our development plans. I explained to him our interest in stable and normal trade and economic ties with the USSR - ties that should be largely based on direct trade. In the letter I sent to the economic department on this issue (copy attached), you will find all the details of our conversation.

In this context, I would like to point out that we have not yet received instructions on the nature of the negotiations I should negotiate with the Soviet Government on the issue of trade links. It was clear that I could not buy and sell certain goods at my own risk, I had neither knowledge nor experience to do so. I saw my role in preparing the ground for negotiations on a trade agreement with the USSR, and that is what I am trying to do.

As for the question of Smirnov (somewhat surprised me), whether I am proposing a trade agreement on behalf of our Government, if I am not mistaken, such negotiations have already been conducted by Mr. Bezherano and from correspondence stored in the mission archives, it follows that at some stage Becherano was forced to interrupt negotiations because of the inability of our Government at that time to offer our goods to the Soviet Union. If I understand correctly, the very question is a serious attitude towards our proposals for a trade agreement. Therefore, I am waiting for clear instructions from the management of the economic department and will be grateful for your help in this matter and for your comments on this issue, if any.

Other government agencies.

Apart from routine work, we had no contact with any government agencies.

At the reception of the Albanians, Bushuyev (on his own initiative) introduced me and Arokh to the chairman of VOCS Prof. Denisov. I'm going to use getting books from the

National Library for the Academy of Sciences in Moscow to meet him for a chat.

Continuation follows.

With respect

Argaman

Charge d'Affaires of the Israeli Mission in Moscow

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE USSR
IN ISRAEL M.I.MUHIN TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF
THE USSR. January 14, 1951**

I visited Charetta today. At first, I made a statement on the property matter as directed by you.

After listening, Charette said that Israel was indeed sensitive to the Jerusalem issue; as for the property problem, he had fallen behind many cases during the Assembly's work and was now difficult to formulate an answer, but he would try as a matter of urgency to clarify the situation and return to the question.

I reminded Charette that we had reached a full agreement on the property rights of the Soviet Union on the whole range of the issue, this agreement was reflected in the exchange of notes, but instead of implementing the agreement, the Israeli side, as I understand the Levavi statement, is trying to evade its promises.

Charette said that he attaches serious importance to the issue raised, states that Israel feels disciplined for its commitments and promises and that the people concerned will take up the matter.

Sharett then said that he was happy with my visit, as he intended to invite me about a very protracted response with Agreman Hazara. Charette added that he reminded him of this, saying goodbye to Vyshinsky, who made a note in his notebook, promised to inform on arrival in Moscow. My statement on that was your instruction. Charette clearly did not expect such an answer. He remained silent for a while, and then began to say that Israel had sought to raise the meaning of its mission in Moscow and that they had recommended a member of the Shazar government as an envoy. The answer was terribly upsetting for him, and not just him. It is with great sadness that this response will be accepted by the Prime Minister. Addressing me, Charette asked, "So this answer should be understood as a denial of

Shazar's agreman without explanation.” I replied that I had nothing to add to what I said.

Charette once again expressed regret and, addressing Levavi, said, “So we have to deal with two issues.”

The conversation lasted 25 minutes.

Mukhin

**LETTER FROM ISRAELI ATTORNEY GENERAL H.KOGNA
TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN
DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY A.
LEVAWI. February 2, 1951**

In connection with the political discussion that you are going to have with the Foreign Minister on the issue of Russian property, please draw attention to the instructions I gave to the General Guardian in a letter dated January 28, 1951.³⁹ (a copy sent to you), as well as the contents of paragraphs 8 and 9 of my report note to the Minister of Finance dated 26 June 1950, namely:

“If the Soviet government demands the property of the Orthodox Palestinian society in Israel (whether under Russian law, taking into account the termination of society; Based on Soviet laws that claim to nationalize the property of society; or under any other pretext), The Soviet representatives must be sent to a competent court in Israel. Without a court verdict, we cannot recognize their rights neither to the management of property, nor to transfer it to the Soviet Union, nor to re-register it in the name of the USSR. When the claim is brought to court, I will be able to intervene on behalf of the Government on the basis of my authority under paragraph 6 of the 1934 procedural law.

The same applies to any property in Israel registered to individuals or the Russian Orthodox Mission; the Government does not have the power to change the current registration of property ownership resist names without an order from the appropriate court.”

Israeli Attorney General

H.Kogn

**LETTER FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN
THE USSR TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY A. LEVAVI. February 16, 1951**

Secret

Mission and Soviet Jews

I have no intention of trying here to analyze the general situation in which Soviet Jewry found itself in the light of the policy of the authorities. Of course, this will be done as part of a special review, after a more in-depth study of the facts and data. I will only try to briefly examine the situation with regard to the work of our mission in Moscow and the issues arising in this context.

In no case should two concepts be confused: “diplomatic mission” and “Soviet Jews”. These are two completely different worlds, the distance between which grows day by day. So far, there is no reason on the horizon for any hope that this process will stop or, let alone change direction.

I am convinced that there is no diaspora in the world that needs to be so much in the existence of an Israeli mission, the function of which the Prime Minister described in the summer at a seminar of envoys abroad with the words “Israeli mission for the Jewish diaspora”. The Russian diaspora is now the most miserable and most dejected of all the Jewish communities in the world. At the same time, there is no other Israeli mission whose ties with the Jewish community are so limited.

From the reports on the meetings of our diplomats with Jews in Moscow, we can draw the following conclusions about the real state of affairs:

1. Except for one case, none of the Soviet Jews visited or addressed the mission in writing (we are talking about four months of my stay here).

2. The only exception was in November, when a resident of Hrodna, temporarily in Moscow, came to us and tried to

find out the fate of his sister living in Israel. It was an extraordinary event in the life of the mission, and some even expressed suspicions about the true intentions of the visitor. But now, having compared and analysed the facts and circumstances, it is possible to say with full confidence that the purpose of the visit coincided with the announced one.

3. The unstable and formal contact we had with the rabbi was almost completely interrupted after the rabbi had evaded familiarity with me. True, several times we visited the synagogue on Friday evenings and during the Sabbath prayer of the blessing of the new month, but with the exception of one brief conversation with the rabbi, who came down to an exchange of ordinary pleasantries, we had no opportunity to speak to any of the worshippers. This whole Jewish community keeps us in the position of the outcasts.

4. Conversations with Jews occur only occasionally and purely by accident, and even in these cases it is not always possible to lead the conversation in the right direction.

5. Not only do meetings with diplomats or visiting missions carry danger (for Jews) - there is a sense that the very mention of the "Israeli mission" or "State of Israel" is terrifying local Jews. Few take the risk of talking to Israelis.

6. In fact, we are deprived of the opportunity to find out what the real threat to Jews who come into contact with us is, what are the fears of Jews in this regard. I would like to note that none of our interlocutors could tell about cases where such contacts would lead to certain consequences. They know only one thing - contact is completely prohibited. And what happens to those who violate such prohibitions here, they know it well.

7. Despite all this, Moscow Jews crave a living word about Israel. There is a sense of repatriation, the hope that the State of Israel will develop and prosper. But Moscow Jews do not hope that they will ever be in Israel.

8. It is clear that the authorities are careful to prevent any contact between us and local Jews. All our movements

are constantly monitored, and we need great care and careful planning of every step if we are to get away from the "accompanying".

9. Apparently, in the province Jews are not so nervous about contact with foreigners and are not afraid as in Moscow. But it still needs to be checked so that it can be argued definitely.

10. It is generally seen that it is easier for Jews to talk to foreigners from other countries than to us.

As I pointed out above, in this letter I have no intention of analysing the background, causes and related factors of the situation described. I just want to emphasize that under the circumstances there can be no question of the relationship between the mission and the Soviet Jews - these ties do not exist at all, the mission is not able to support them and exert any influence on the Jews (or even just take a place in their thoughts).

The situation seems to me to be this: we are witnessing the agony of a large Jewish community with rich traditions and, despite everything, subconsciously imbued with the strongest national spirit. All the roots of the spiritual and cultural Jewish life of this community are torn out and systematically broken out by a cruel hand: on the one hand, this community is threatened by open and covert racial destruction, on the other hand, it strongly suppresses all national feelings. Young people are cutting off their last ties with the Jewish nation and looking for a way out in full assimilation. At the same time, although the process of assimilation of the younger generation of Soviet Jews is not so fast and comes across numerous obstacles, it is obvious that all the aspirations and efforts of this youth are going in this direction. If in the near future we do not find a way to keep the Soviet Jews with a spark of hope for deliverance, this youth and the entire Jewish community of the USSR will be lost for us.

With this in mind, I cannot help but ask the question: what should our mission do in this area?

About this in the next letter.

Yours sincerely

Argaman

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
February 27, 1951**

In connection with the 33rd anniversary of the Soviet Army, solemn meetings organized by the Friendship League with the USSR were held in a number of Israeli cities. On 23 February, at a meeting in Tel Aviv attended by representatives of the Soviet mission, the League's Secretary General, Dr. Snee, stated that "our country will not be an anti-Soviet base and our soldiers will not be at the disposal of the Robertsons". (The commander of the British forces in the Middle East, General Robertson, was in Israel on February 19-21 and was negotiating with Ben Gurion, the contents of which are being investigated.) At the same time, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Mikunis said in his speech: "The rulers of Israel are making serious steps to join our state in the aggressive Mediterranean bloc. The envoys of the Atlantic Union are studying the military and industrial potential of our state, and the demonstrations against General Robertson were an expression of popular conscience, popular concern and popular protest." In the greeting of the meeting of the Soviet army it was said: "We will not give our sons and our brothers as cannon fodder for the anti-Soviet war."

In response to these statements, the newspaper of the ruling Mapai Party "Gador" on 26 February published a note with the significant headline: "Interference in internal affairs".

The note states that there is "interference in our internal affairs by the Soviet mission in Israel." As evidence of this, the newspaper states that during the celebration of the 33rd anniversary of the Soviet Army, the "good name of the Israeli Government" was allegedly vilified and that the meetings were a continuation of "fruitless demonstrations against the visit of the official guest of the Israeli State, General

Robertson". Noting further the presence of "representatives of a foreign mission" at the meeting, the newspaper asks, "Since when does the Israeli State have an obligation to tolerate such interference in its internal affairs by representatives of a foreign power?"

This belated article of the Newspaper Gador is undoubtedly inspired by the Israeli Foreign Ministry and is designed to send a signal to strengthen anti-Soviet propaganda in the press, as well as to reveal our attitude towards it.

I believe that in the next conversation with Charette should draw his attention to the inadmissibility of such publications against the official representation of the USSR in Israel , the Soviet mission. This is the first time that the mission has been accused of interfering in Israel's internal affairs.

P. Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
March 5, 1951**

According to Riftin, in a closed session of the parliamentary commission on foreign affairs, Charette briefed on the negotiations between Ben-Gurion and Chief of Staff Yadin with the commander of British troops in the Middle East, General Robertson, during his stay in Israel from 19 to 21 February. Charette noted that Robertson characterized the international situation as a pre-war situation and assured the Israeli government that Britain would defend the Middle East on a par with the United States. Robertson asked what Israel would do in the event of war, and in connection with Ben-Gurion's response that Israel would defend itself with all its might, the Englishman said that Israel's actions should be fully aligned with the actions of the British troops, since the defence of the Middle East under the agreement with the United States is entrusted to the British troops, which will be supported by American aircraft and navy. Ben-Gurion pointed out that Israel was in dire need of weapons, and Robertson replied that the issue was a technical issue and would be resolved in due course. In addition, Robertson offered to train a group of Israeli officers to send them to study in England.

Robertson informed Ben-Gurion of the talks with the Arab heads and stressed that they all agreed to military cooperation with Britain, but also demanded weapons. He was sceptical of the Arab forces, with the exception of Transjordan, and pointed out that the Israeli army should play an important role in the defence of the Middle East.

Ben-Gurion replied that the issue depended to a large extent on the conclusion of peace with the Arab countries, and Robertson said that London fully understood this and intended to put pressure on Arab countries, especially Transjordan, to secure a peace treaty with Israel. Anti-Israeli

sentiment in Arab countries was still strong, particularly in Egypt, but British diplomacy would work to reconcile Arabs with the existence of the State of Israel. The Arab governments have already been told that the declaration of the three powers of 25 May 1950 is a guarantee of inviolable: the tee of borders in the Middle East.

Robertson further reminded Ben-Gurion of the role of Palestinian industry in the Second World War, when it was a base for supplying British troops with medicines, uniforms, etc.

Robertson was interested in the situation of Jews in the USSR and asked about the presence of pro-Soviet forces in Israel.

According to Riftin, Robertson visited a number of major military camps in Israel and became familiar with the state of the Israeli army. He also discussed with Ben Gurion the use of Israeli roads to transport British troops from the Sinai Peninsula to the north. Robertson's visit to Israel was undertaken with the consent of General Eisenhower.

P. Ershov

**LETTER FROM THE ADVISER OF THE ISRAELI
PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UN, G. RAFAEL TO THE
ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, TO
THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE
UN, A. BAN, IN WASHINGTON. March 7, 1951**

Yesterday, I visited Lake Saxes during a Security Council meeting to talk to Jebb about the observer commission and to follow the debate on Kashmir. At the end of the Council meeting, when I was standing in the deputy's salon and talking to a journalist, Malik came up to me, shook his hand with emphatic cordiality and thanked me for the welcome letter sent on your behalf in connection with his recovery, for the chocolate and a bottle of Israeli brandy attached to the letter. He spoke with delight about the high quality of Israeli products, expressed admiration for the fact that we are able to produce food and drinks of this class. He especially liked chocolate, and the phrase about its taste served as an "informational occasion" for a political conversation with me.

"I don't like American chocolate, it's sour," Malik said, "and your chocolate is very similar to the one we eat in Russia." After these words, he took me aside, away from reporters and photojournalists. First I asked, "How are you?" Then he said, "I mean Far Eastern affairs." I said that I think it is time to end the Korean War, which, from a military point of view, has finally reached a dead end and is only leading to further destruction and terrible losses among the peaceful Korean population and Chinese soldiers. There is no point in solving the problem by military force, when the front has stabilized at the 38th parallel anyway. Malik replied, "We have always stressed the need to resolve the Korean problem by peaceful means, but the Americans have no interest in ending the war." I told him that I think he is wrong in assessing the mood at the Un regarding the Korean War. The UN has consistently taken decisions in support of the

Americans, subject to a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement of the problems. It is not necessary to try to interpret the American moods in any way, it is better to help them understand the goals that China pursued when entering into this war. He did not give a direct answer to these words, but asked whether there was still a tendency among delegations to support the negotiations. I replied that the Entezam Commission was waiting for a response from Beijing to its contact request. Some delegations interpret the words of Marshal Stalin ... "Then he corrected me, "Generalissimo Stalin"... words of Generalissimo Stalin as an invitation to resume negotiations. Malik replied: "I said that the USSR from the very beginning of the Korean War was in favour of the need for a peaceful solution."

He then went on to ask me what we had in our opinion and that of other delegations about the talks that had just begun in Paris at the level of deputy foreign ministers. I replied that Israel would support any efforts to reduce international tensions and for direct negotiations. We are also very concerned about the German problem, are opponents of the remilitarization of Germany and fear the resurgence of Nazism. "How can you afford such a position that is fundamentally contrary to the position of the United States?" he asked. I replied that Israel defined its policies in accordance with its own understanding of the world situation and with its interests. In this regard, I mentioned that the Knesset had recently adopted a resolution condemning the remilitarization of West and East Germany and that the resolution had been passed to the UN Secretary-General. Malik was very interested in this and asked if it was published in the New York Time and whether the text of the resolution could be read. He went on to say that only those peoples who had experienced the horrors of fascism were able to foresee the catastrophe of the remilitarization of Germany. To implement aggressive machinations against the USSR, Americans do not hesitate to use even fascist "bandits" whose hands on the elbow in the blood. To this I said that we

do not believe, as he does, that the United States is preparing a war against the USSR, and listed several arguments that go against this assumption. Here I noted that the masses of the United States will not support an aggressive war. I also stressed that there are large and influential forces in American public opinion, especially American Jewry, who oppose arming Germany.

Malik said with full conviction that the masses have no means to influence the policy of Washington and that they are not able to understand what the horrors of war, imagine the war destruction and nightmare of concentration camps. They act like spoiled children. Of all the wars in which America participated in this century, it came out with fabulous profits, so Americans are thinking that they will only benefit from the future war. The current campaign of militarization is an attempt to prevent an economic crisis, the first signs of which have already appeared on the horizon a year and a half ago. As for the American Jews, they are also unable to assess the scale of the catastrophe that struck their brothers in Europe. To this I objected that Jews, wherever they are, always empathize with their suffering brothers. The Jewish people in all countries of the diaspora have always felt responsible and reacted not only to events in the country of residence, but also to what happened to the most remote communities. The same applies to American Jewry, who is committed to the idea of mutual Jewish responsibility. It should not be forgotten that the older generation of American Jews is mostly made up of immigrants from Eastern Europe, meaning that they themselves were persecuted and discriminated against in Tsarist Russia. As for the rest of his assumptions, I noted that it is necessary to understand that the large-scale military efforts of the United States were a direct consequence of the aggravation of the world situation due to the Korean War. If he is interested in knowing what most moderate delegations to the United Nations think about the chances of the Paris consultations for success, I must say that they are confident

that the meetings of the four ministers are unlikely to yield results until the Korean War stops. Therefore, all countries interested in defusing international tensions must make serious efforts to eliminate the military hotbed in the Far East.

To this Malik remarked with a friendly grin: "Is there any suggestion that Israel has on this?" We have made our proposals more than once; unfortunately, Beijing could not decide to accept them as the basis for negotiations. But each time the Chinese leadership came closer to the principles and proposals adopted by the first conference. If the people's government at some stage expressed in principle, things would quickly improve." Then Malik asked me for clarifications, noticed that ,as he heard, we have some new thoughts. To which I replied, "Indeed, we are trying to finalize some ideas in relation to the current situation."

In the end, Malik asked if there was sometimes Eban in New York and asked him to say hello. With that, he left me. The conversation lasted about 20 minutes.

G.Raphael

**THE FINAL PART OF THE POLITICAL REPORT OF THE
SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL IN 1950 "ON THE
INCREASING ROLE OF ISRAEL IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND THE CHALLENGES OF THE SOVIET FOREIGN
POLICY IN THIS REGION". March 28, 1951**

Secret

Thus, in 1950, the transitional year for the State of Israel, the ways of development of the State of Israel for the near future were determined quite clearly and clearly.

In economic policy, it is a way of further subordination of the country's economy to the interests of American capital, limiting the growth of national production and turning Israel into a market for American goods, a way of focusing on foreign loans and subsidies, which make Israel's economy completely dependent on American monopolies.

In domestic politics, it is the further impoverishment of the masses, the suppression of democratic freedoms, persecution and repression against progressive organizations on the one hand, and the promotion of reactionary and pro-fascist forces on the other.

In foreign policy, which is already at the service of the interests of the ruling circles of the United States, it means, first, increased hostility to the Soviet Union and the countries of popular democracy, the conduct of unbridled anti-Soviet propaganda, and secondly, the final loss of the independence of the state.

The Government of Israel is continuing mass immigration, which in reality strengthens the reactionary forces in the country and makes the State of Israel one of the strongest States in the Middle East, despite the fact that its population is much smaller than that of neighbouring Arab countries. In a favourable international environment and in the absence of objections from the United States, Israel will not fail to take the opportunity to annex the territory of the Arab part of Palestine, now occupied by Transjordan.

By providing economic assistance to Israel and arming it, the United States and Britain are not without reason counting on the state of Israel to play a significant role in their anti-Soviet aggressive plans in the Middle East.

In light of this, Israel is becoming an important point for us in the Middle East.

Hence the need for the full exposure of the Anglo-American machinations in Israel, the anti-people domestic and pro-American foreign policy of the Government of Israel. Our press rarely responds to facts of this kind by publishing individual notes only on a case-by-case basis.

At the same time, we need to expand our work to disseminate truthful information about the USSR (the work of VOCS, etc.). Americans and the British conduct their propaganda in Israel in a wide scale, open large libraries and reading rooms, exhibitions, etc., sparing no expense for this. Our work is very much linked to the limited resources released by VOCS.

Bearing in mind that Israel has the ability to gather information not only about Israel itself, but also on the Middle East and other countries, since the Israelis have quite broad ties with the Jews of almost all countries, it would be necessary to strengthen the mission by four to five diplomatic staff, to send a trade adviser with two or three employees of a departmental nature. This could greatly expand our information work.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE
USSR V.A.ZORIN TO THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV. April 3, 1951**

We consider it impractical to make a formal presentation to the Israeli Foreign Ministry once again, as such a demarche can hardly be expected to be effective. As you know, you have already drawn the attention of the Secretary General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry to such publications in the Israeli press, and it is possible that the appearance of the article "On the same issue" in the newspaper "Ediot Ahronot" is a kind of response to your presentation to Eitan.

We therefore consider it more expedient to give a proper rebuke to the slanderous attacks of the Israeli press in the Soviet press. If, after the publication of the relevant materials in the Soviet press, representatives of the Israeli Foreign Ministry address you with an official presentation, you should answer that The Soviet newspapers have the right to speak freely, expressing the opinion of various circles of the Soviet public about current events in different countries. Including the Soviet press can, of course, concern Israel, especially since the Israeli press systematically publishes on its pages all sorts of fictions about the Soviet Union and even allows hostile attacks on the address of the Soviet government and the Soviet mission in Israel.

V. Sorin

**LETTER FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN
THE USSR BY ARGAN TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI
INTERIOR MINISTRY A. LEVAVI. April 4, 1951**

Some comments on current issues in light of the information received from the last post.

A. Since I first wrote to you about my contacts with the Foreign Ministry, I have had two conversations with Yiborin. The contents of the first I outlined in the letter of February 20, 1951 No. 1/2341, the second - in a telegram dated February 25, 1951 No. 629.

During the second meeting, which was held urgently at my request, there was no opportunity to discuss the Israeli issues extensively. Only the question of Hebrew was raised by chance; He wanted to know the extent to which we were able to teach Hebrew new repatriants. Naturally, he also asked about the difference between Ashkenazi and Sefard pronunciation.

The conversation lasted no more than 10 minutes, and we agreed to meet later for a larger conversation. For purely technical reasons, this conversation has not yet taken place: yesterday we spoke on the phone and agreed to meet next week.

From the above, it is obvious that I do not postpone the conversation, and it will take place in a week.

b. From telegram 638 You are aware of the contents of the conversation with the acting Minister of Foreign Trade Yeremin.

The conversation lasted about 40 minutes. I expressed our interest in trade relations with the USSR on the basis of direct exchange. I stressed that before I could present a detailed list, I would like to know whether the Soviet government in principle agrees to direct exchange of some of the goods that I immediately named. I noted that until now,

for reasons unknown to us, all our offers to buy grain and wood in the USSR and sell citrus fruits have been rejected.

In the same context, I spoke about our significant needs for the absorption of returnees and the extent of housing and industrial construction.

In response, Yeremin noted that the USSR usually does not conduct direct trade, except when there is a trade agreement between the two countries. In such an agreement, the parties define the types of products that each of them undertakes to accept from the other. In the course of negotiations on the signing of a trade agreement, the parties usually reach a mutually acceptable compromise by mutual concessions on the positions listed in the treaty.

This does not mean that the IWT is not interested in trade relations and without an agreement. But in such cases, there is only one possibility - to provide the relevant departments of the Ministry with separate proposals for each type of goods offered for sale and sale.

Each sale offer to the Soviet Union must contain a full description of the type of product, its quality, price, and time and mode of delivery.

The same, except for the price, applies to offers to buy goods from the USSR. Offers can be submitted directly to department heads or to them in person. Each department will consider the proposals received in terms of benefits and benefits for the USSR and will give an answer.

Eremin stressed that we should not consider the refusals received before as evidence of unwillingness to trade with us. On the contrary, the USSR is as interested in trade with Israel as it is with any other country. He suggested that the failures were caused by an objective inability to perform them at this particular moment. There is no doubt that the departments will respond positively to any new proposal.

In accordance with your instructions, I did not address the issue of the trade agreement, but Yeremin twice noted the advantages of such treaties. I have the impression that the Soviet government would positively appreciate the start

of negotiations on a trade agreement. I have used all diplomatic moves to avoid discussing this issue, confining myself only to the observation that our situation is unlikely to allow us to now assume trade commitments in volumes that correspond to the desired scale of trade with the USSR, and we would like to reach a temporary settlement on trade for the time being.

Unfortunately, I still haven't received a response to the 638 telegram where I requested instructions. In my opinion, it is worth submitting separate applications to the relevant departments, even if there is no immediate result.

I'm waiting for instructions on this issue with the application of all data for each individual case, that is, the type, quality, time and method of delivery, and sales - the same plus price.

Unfortunately, the economic department has not sent me this information so far.

Sometimes we listen to the radio shows "Col Tsion la Gola." Content, for the most part, is of interest, and even more so it can interest the listener here. The materials edited by Gross-Timmerman are especially good. As far as I know, many people listen to our radio for the diaspora here. In the notes of Aro-ha about the visit to Odessa and about the conversation in the East it is noted that the Jews listen to these programs.

We will try to get feedback from the audience. The sound quality is usually quite high, although sometimes there are interferences. But interference is "natural" in nature, that is, transmissions do not jam.

With respect

Argaman

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
April 11, 1951**

Riftin informed that a meeting of the parliamentary commission on foreign affairs was held on April 8 and 10 to discuss the issue of the border conflict between Israel and Syria. The Commission heard speeches by Chief of General Staff Yadin and Director General of the Foreign Ministry Eitan. Yadin said that the conflict in the Al-Hamma area arose as a result of the disloyal attitude of the Arab police of the village towards the representatives of the Jewish Agency, who had arrived there but had been met with stones and hostile cheers. Immediately after the incident,

El-Hamma was sent by a police unit in two trucks. It was shelled from Syrian territory. In retaliation, Israel bombed Syrian border guard positions and destroyed four Arab villages, two of which were abandoned by Arabs who had gone to Syria and the other two villages had been taken to the Arab population in advance. Yadin pointed out that Syria was seeking to establish a border along the middle of the Jordan River and lakes Hule and Tiberia. In his speech, Eitan noted that the representatives of the United States, England and France were interested in three questions:

1) the resettlement of Arabs of the demilitarized zone in the interior of the country;

2) Bombing Syrian positions and

3) the destruction of Arab settlements.

All three representatives recommended caution and hinted that the London Declaration of 25 May 1950 was a guarantee of borders in the Middle East. The French envoy suggested that France should be mediated in the conflict. U.S. Ambassador Davis pointed out that Israel's actions could negatively affect the U.S. attitude toward Israel. The position of the English envoy was restrained and polite. Eitan did not say what response was given to them to the questions

and recommendations of the representatives of the three powers. Asked whether the Soviet mission had asked for clarification on the conflict, Eitan said no, adding that, for its part, the Foreign Ministry did not consider it necessary to inform the Soviet mission.

Eitan went on to report on the Telegram of the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Eban, stating that the bombing of Syrian positions and the destruction of Arab settlements had made an adverse impression in the United States and hindered the implementation of Israel's financial policy in the United States (an independence loan and a \$150 million subsidy). At the UN, representatives of many states asked Eban about the causes of the conflict, what Israel is interested in and what its attitude towards Syria as a whole is. The representatives of Turkey and Yugoslavia were particularly active in this.

Eitan pointed out that Eban had been instructed to explain to members of the Security Council and other representatives at the United Nations that continued drainage work in the Lake Houle area was a vital issue for Israel and could not abandon them. As for Israel's attitude towards Syria, it is interested in an early resolution of the conflict and a peace treaty with it, as well as with other Arab countries.

Almost all members of the commission took part in the discussion of this issue at the commission. Mapam's representatives criticized the Government's decision to bomb Syrian territory and destroy Arab villages, as well as the government's failure to respond to Davis's gross intervention and threats. Other members of the commission noted that it was too late for the Government to negotiate land acquisition in the demilitarized zone and the elimination of the English concession for draining the swamps of Lake Houle, under which 1/3 of the land should be given to the Arabs.

The discussion was concluded by Ben-Gurion, who stated that the bombing of Syrian positions was intended to show

the strength not only of Syria, but also of other Arab states. Israel will resist Syria's intentions to establish a border on the Jordan River and, if it is supported by the United States, will argue even with the United States, although it would not like to do so due to the friendly attitude of the United States towards Israel. The Prime Minister repeated that the Israeli government sought to establish friendly relations, but did not receive a proper response to a number of its appeals to the USSR. It has no claims to the USSR, but will protest against the fact that Soviet Jews do not have the right to assist Israel, as Jews in the United States freely do. Other issues raised in Ben-Gurion's speech are of no interest.

At the next meeting of the commission should consider two issues:

1) the arrest of a number of Zionist leaders in Romania and

2) about McGee's negotiations with the Israeli government.

The latter issue has long been on the agenda of the commission's meetings, but is constantly postponed at the request of the Government.

Ershov

TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN THE USSR Z. ARGANA TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY A. LEVAVI. April 29, 1951

Yesterday we returned from Tbilisi. On the eve of the last day of Passover, I prayed in a large synagogue of Georgian Jews, talked to many Jews, including Haham. The next day he prayed in the synagogue of Russian Jews, went out to the Torah and said a prayer "haftar." At the request of the rabbi and the head of the council was also at the synagogue at Saturday's meeting. At the head of the Ashkenazi community is a rabbi from Nikolaev, serving as both a cantor and a rabbi in the Georgian community. Everywhere we were received with great warmth. Jews, especially Georgians, are more confident and less afraid than residents of Moscow or other cities. Many Jews from both communities met and talked to. Many, especially Ashkenazi, regularly listen to the programs of "Kol tsion la gola". We visited the ethnographic museum of Georgian Jewry, and spent three hours inspecting the exhibition accompanied by the chairman of the council and his deputy. The vice-chairman of the Community Council is an educated man who speaks fluent Hebrew. The next day I met him again. The information regarding the number of Jews in the city is contradictory. According to Georgian Jews, there are about 15,000 Jews in the city (counting Ashkenazi). According to Ashkenazi themselves, among them many old-timers, only their community has up to 12,000 people, and Georgian Jews even more. Both communities are registered by the authorities as Jewish religious communities. In Tbilisi, he also met with Christian Georgians, including Professor Shakidze, a philologist and historian who reads Hebrew and Arabic. We learned a lot about the life of Jews in Tbilisi and in Georgia in general, about their desire to repatriate, etc.

b. The Protocol Department requested an estimated date for Eliashiv's arrival.

Note the maps in the Literary Newspaper on the 28th.

Argaman

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
April 30, 1951**

I consider it impractical to send a welcome telegram on behalf of T. Schwernik on the occasion of Independence Day this year. The State of Israel, which gained independence three years ago, largely lost it by joining the imperialist camp of the United States and England. This year, the Israeli government is celebrating Independence Day more solemnly not in its own state, but in the United States, where four ministers have already left and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion is leaving the other day. The negotiations between Ben-Gurion and the U.S. government over the so-called "independence loan" and the \$150 million "relief" will surely end with a series of new concessions from Israel and further loss of independence. Attitudes towards the USSR became hostile. Anti-Soviet propaganda is systematic and on a larger scale.

Ershov

**REFERENCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MIDDLE EAST
FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR "TO THE SOVIET-
ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TRANSFER OF
"RUSSIAN PROPERTY" IN ISRAEL TO THE SOVIET
UNION". May 8, 1951**

Secret

In accordance with the decision of the Soviet Council of Ministers of May 31, 1950 on the "Russian property" in Israel, the Soviet envoy to Israel, T. Ershov, handed a note on June 6, 1950, to the Israeli Foreign Ministry about the acceleration of the Israeli government's transfer of all "Russian property in Israel to the representatives of the Soviet Union. The note of June 6, 1950 was in its contents was a response to the Israeli note of August 19, 1949.

Until October 1950, the Israeli Foreign Ministry did not react to our note of June 6, 1950.

At the same time, from Ershov's conversations with Israeli officials it could be concluded that the Israeli government was deliberately delaying the resolution of the transfer of "Russian property" to its rightful owners. For example, on June 7, 1950, the former head of the Eastern European Division of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Eliashiv, told Ershov that, in his opinion, the issue of property should be resolved after discussing the issue of Jerusalem at the fifth session of the UN General Assembly. According to him, it is difficult for the Israeli government to consider the issue of Soviet property taking into account the interests of the USSR until the Jerusalem problem is resolved.

In connection with this position of the Israeli government in October 1950, Ershov was instructed by a new note to remind the Israeli Foreign Ministry of the acceleration of the response to our note of June 6, 1950.

On October 5, 1950, the Soviet Mission presented the Israeli Foreign Ministry with a new note on the issue.

On October 20, 1950, the head of the Department of Eastern European Affairs of Israel Levavi invited the first secretary of the Soviet mission T. Rozhkov for a conversation and said that he invited him to convey to the Government of the USSR the view of the Israeli government on the issue of "Russian property."

The Israeli government, he said, reported that his principled position and attitude to the Soviet Union's demand for the transfer of Palestinian society's property and the property of former Prince Sergei had not changed and remained the same. However, due to the decision of the UN General Assembly in December 1949 on the internationalization of Jerusalem, the Israeli Government does not now consider it possible to begin a practical solution to this issue and postpones it until the UN General Assembly makes a final decision on the issue of mountains. Jerusalem (2894 of November 4, 1950).

On the instructions of the Ussr Foreign Ministry, T. Mukhin, the Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Israel, visited Israeli Foreign Minister Charett on December 14, 1949, and, referring to Rozhkov's conversation with Levavi on October 20, 1950, made a statement on his property issue on his behalf. He said that he considers the Israeli government's intention to postpone the practical resolution of the transfer of "Russian property" to us, as reported by Levavi.

That. Mukhin pointed out that, in his view, the resolution by the UN General Assembly of the question of Jerusalem and the Israeli Government's satisfaction with the legitimate demands of the Soviet Union for the return of undisputed property were entirely independent issues and could not and should not be subject to each other.

In response, Charette noted that Israel was sensitive to the Jerusalem question, as far as the property problem was concerned, that it had fallen behind many cases during his time in the Assembly and was now difficult to formulate his answer. He promised, however, to clarify the situation in the near future and to revisit the issue.

That. Mukhin reminded Sharetta that a full agreement on the property rights of the Soviet Union had been reached at the time, but instead of implementing and implementing the agreement, the Israeli side, as he understood Levavi's statement, was trying to evade its own promises.

To this, Charette said that he attaches serious importance to the issue raised and states that Israel feels disciplined for the commitments and promises made and that the people concerned will take up the matter (in the 276 January 31, 1951).

On January 19, 1951, Israeli Foreign Minister Charette invited Mr. Mukhin to visit him at home.

Charette began the conversation by saying that, according to Mukhin's request, he had personally reviewed all materials concerning the property interests of the Soviet Union and "came to the conclusion that the case could be advanced".

Specifically, he promised to enter next week with his proposals to the government and expressed hope that a favorable decision will be taken. He warned that he was giving this information informally until the relevant government decision (in the 278/OBSV of January 31, 1951).

On February 14, 1951, Mukhin visited Charette, who received him at home. Referring to a conversation dated 14 December 1950, Charette said that he had reported to the Government on the property requirements of the Soviet mission and had decided to form a commission of three ministers, justice, finance and foreign affairs, to finalize the issue.

That. Mukhin noted to Sharetta that the Israeli Foreign Ministry had already "finally" made a note on the transfer of property, but more than two years had passed and the case had not been completed.

Charette replied, "Believe me, the case is moving forward, I hope to notify you of the consequences in the near future" (H. 525/OSSV of March 8, 1951).

Compiled by K. Sotov

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN
THE USSR, ARGAMAN TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF
THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY, W. EITAN. May 18,
1951**

On your telegram number 50844. Tonight I was at Yiborin's and gave an explanation in accordance with your instructions for No. 13708. He expressed his belief that the position of the USSR and ours do not contradict each other, asked that their representative in the Security Council speak out against the proposal of the West. He added that, because of the lack of time, it would be useful for their representative to demand that the vote be postponed and further serious consideration of the issue taken place. He asked what I thought was the chances that the proposal would pass, and whether I had received clear instructions from the Government before that visit. I replied that it was difficult to say anything definite about the chances, and the instructions I did receive were unequivocal. He asked a number of questions on the merits of the case and promised to immediately convey my words to the court. He was very friendly.

Argaman

**LETTER FROM THE ADVISER OF THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY D. TESLER OF THE ISRAELI MISSION TO THE
USSR. May 20, 1951**

For information.

Last week we were visited by the first secretary of the Soviet mission and introduced the new second secretary of Raevsky. They visited our department, the protocol and the consular department.

Rozhkov raised the issue of the procedure for issuing exit visas for Soviet citizens wishing to return to the USSR. Avnon briefly explained the order, but Rozhkov said they would be happy if the consular department took over the issues of registration. According to Rozhkov, they intend to send several dozen cases to the consular department so that consular officials will hand over each of them separately to the Ministry of Repatriation. Avnon suggested that each of those in question should contact the Ministry of Repatriation himself, but Rozhkov said that they prefer not individual work with each, but direct contact of the mission with the Foreign Ministry. On the issue of exemption from military service, which is a precondition for obtaining a visa to leave, Rozhkov said that Soviet citizens do not serve in foreign armies and the Soviet mission carefully ensures that no Soviet citizen served in the Israeli army. To his knowledge, there were no such cases, so the issue was automatically removed from the agenda.

Mr. Avnon explained that, in addition to conscription, there was also the problem of reservists subject to the military service law, so in each case it would be necessary to obtain an exemption from military service in order to obtain a visa. He eventually agreed that requests for an exit visa should be made through the consular department.

Mr. Avnon also raised the issue of obtaining various documents from the USSR - diplomas, birth certificates,

divorce, etc. Rozhkov replied that the consular department of the mission has special questionnaires, and anyone who wants to get documents from the USSR, must fill out a questionnaire, and the mission will pass it to the appropriate authorities. We have indicated that, in doing so, we have not yet received a single document. Rozhkov did not know what to answer, and said only that he would try to find out why the delay came out, and then inform us about the results.

The third issue discussed during this conversation concerned the issue of the document's confirmable record. Recently, the mission has refused to confirm Avnon's signature on repatriation certificates sent by Israeli residents to their relatives in the USSR in accordance with the requirement of the local authorities, for whom this document is the basis for issuing exit visas and passports to those wishing to travel to Israel.

According to Rozhkov, such documents are not necessary, for them it is a completely excessive procedure. He thought that there was no need for repatriation certificates at all, since the issuance of repatriation documents was within the pur force of the Israeli mission in Moscow. Once in the USSR there is an Israeli mission, let it decide who to give a visa to enter Israel, and who does not. If doubts arise, any Soviet citizen can apply to the mission, order such a document and present it to the local authorities as proof that the permit will be issued.

We explained to him that, according to the soviet procedure, our mission has the right to maintain contact with Soviet citizens only through the Foreign Ministry. Experience shows that Soviet citizens do not turn to the mission, but ask relatives to send them invitations for repatriation directly from Israel. Rozhkov promised to revisit the text of the explanations they received on this matter. At our request, he also promised to give us a full written response.

According to Mr. Rozhkov, there was a simple misunderstanding. Local authorities are not interested in visas to enter Israel, they need a request confirmed by the

mission, which should ensure that, arriving in Israel, the citizen will not be without a roof over his head and without means of subsistence, like many Soviet citizens in Israel. This is the reason for the concern of the authorities, which is why there are delays in the paperwork required for the travel of Soviet citizens to Israel.

Mr. Avnon commented in etrm that the mere fact of issuing a repatriation permit by the Ministry of Repatriation confirms that all guarantees - housing, material assistance to relatives, etc. - will be provided to the person who decides to come. Only if the Ministry is convinced that the conditions of existence for the new arrival are guaranteed, it issues a permit.

With respect

D.Tesler

**LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY A. LEVAVI TO THE DIPLOMATIC
REPRESENTATIVES OF ISRAEL IN EASTERN EUROPE.**

May 21, 1951

The conversation between Sharett and Ershov on May 7 took place at the minister's initiative and lasted about 45 minutes. The director of the Eastern European Department was present.

The Minister informed the envoy that he had sent a telegram to the President of the UN Security Council demanding to convene a special meeting of the Council in connection with the aggressive actions of the Syrians, which resulted in heavy fighting in the central sector of the demilitarized zone near Tel al-Mutla. Since the Minister asked the President of the Security Council to bring the text of the telegram to the attention of its members, its contents will be known to J. Malik. At the same time, the Minister would be grateful to the envoy if he, for his part, sent a text of the mentioned telegram to the Soviet Foreign Ministry (a copy was given to him) and informed Moscow about the Israeli assessment of the development of events and their background.

The Minister said that after the Arabs who had settled in Tel al-Mutla (located on Israeli territory, the vier demilitarized zone) were dislodged from there, the Israelis found irrefutable evidence on the battlefield of the participation of parts of the Syrian regular army (Syrian weapons, ammunition and ammunition). The Minister detailed the evidence found, including boxes of ammunition and samples of weapons with Syrian markings, which show the names and numbers of units, packages from under the goods of the Syrian military, etc., the Minister stressed that the evidence was taken on film, and the pictures were signed by UN observers. The incident near Tel al-Mutla was the

result of Aggressive actions by Syria, because this time the Syrian regular units entered not the demilitarized zone, but the area under Israeli military control, and were knocked out of there only after heavy fighting.

This incident should be seen as a vivid illustration of the true intentions of the Syrians, who lead to violence and loss of life and prevent the establishment of calm in the demilitarized border areas.

At some stage of the escalation of tensions, we were forced to evict Arab residents from the demilitarized zone.

But this was not the cause of the incident, but only one of the intermediate links in the chain of events.

The Minister also stressed that since the end of the First World War, there were serious disagreements over the Syrian-Palestinian border when the British mandated government was introduced in Palestine and the French one. The French insisted that the border pass through Tiberias Lake and Lake Houle. The British, for their part, demanded that both bodies of water with tributaries be included in Palestine so that the border would pass along their eastern shore. By the way, it is the only major Israeli source of fresh water, while Syrians have other water sources in abundance.

On this issue, our and British interests coincided. The British, as the stronger of the Allies, then prevailed over the French, and the border was held in accordance with their demands. Now the Syrians have joined the fight, which is trying to gain a foothold in the territories through aggressive actions, under the armistice agreement not belonging to them.

For this reason, the Minister, through the French envoy, strongly demanded that Paris exert influence on the Syrian Government in order to renounce its intention to resuscitate border disputes and to try to resolve them through aggression. When the Minister drew up a telegram addressed to the President of the Security Council, he received a message from our observers in the kibbutz of Ein Gev, who recorded the movement of armed groups from Syrian

territory towards the small Arab village of Nukeib, located in the demilitarized zone north of Ein Gev. Then, from there, gunfire was fired at Ein-Gev. Bullets hit the walls of several houses, including a kindergarten building.

The Soviet envoy during the conversation with short remarks, with the face of the head, nods, showed that he was sympathetic to the minister's explanations and even shared his opinion. For example, he has made it clear that he accepts our position on the issue of the eviction of Arab residents from the demilitarized zone. After the minister had finished speaking, the envoy asked a few questions. He asked, in particular, what decision General Riley had made on the issue of the drying of Lake Houle. The Minister summarized the contents of General Riley 45's commemorative note, as well as the considerations he presented later.

Responding to the second question of the envoy, the Minister said that the Arab countries were not ready to establish peace with Israel. They have in vain hopes that 'Israel will not be able to cope with the difficulties of accepting returnees, which will bring us to full economic collapse, and then we will either be forced to accept their conditions of peace or have no peace at all, because the desired will be achieved without it.

In connection with the third question of the envoy, who stressed that the incidents took place not only in the area where the reclamation of Lake Hoole was being carried out, the Minister gave him on the map the exact location of the three demilitarized zones on the Israeli-Syrian border.

Then the minister moved on to the following topic - An article by Kudryavtsev in the newspaper Izvestia, where the author writes that an important result of McGee's trip to the Middle East was the agreement of Turkey and Israel to conclude a defensive alliance between them. The Minister stated that he did not have a Russian text of the article, and therefore he was doing a reverse translation into Russian from Hebrew. Nevertheless, the meaning of what the author

writes, he conveys correctly. In this regard, the minister told the envoy that Kudryavtsev's fabrications have no basis, as no union was ever discussed. According to the minister, this issue was especially important, as Kudryavtsev's article was published in one of the central Soviet newspapers.

The messenger, who at first could not remember the articles, then during the conversation not only remembered about it, but even gave an accurate quote from it in Russian. He said that the article does not mention the "agreement" to conclude the contract (as translated by the minister). It says about the "agreement" (however, the difference between the two Russian words is very small).

In response, the minister assured the envoy that there is no "agreement" between Israel and Turkey, no "agreement", or even "ideas."

The envoy expressed satisfaction that this fact exists only in the imagination of the newspaper's correspondent.

The third issue raised during the conversation was the refusal of The Soviet representatives in Israel to come to the kibbutz givat Brenner for the Easter meal, which was jointly arranged by the members of the farm and the Committee of Friendly Relations with the USSR of the Mapai Party. The refusal was motivated by the fact that the dinner "is of a religious nature."

The Minister stressed that his opinion on the matter was purely personal, but he would like to express it. He regretted that the Soviet representatives did not consider it possible to accept the invitation. The Minister explained that the Passover festival is primarily a celebration of national liberation, although it is true that the peculiarities of the history of the Jewish people have led to their preservation of the historical tradition in the religious shell.

Now this holiday has acquired not only religious, but national and social content. The custom requires hospitality during the Easter meal, which is why its organizers in Givat Brenner have invited the Soviet representatives, who are considered to be guests of honour here. Passover is a holiday

celebrated in the spring and therefore in kibbutz it seeks to give a new, more modern character - the nature of the spring festival. We attach great importance to the search for new forms for the holiday. At times, these searches are unsuccessful in terms of artistic form and internal content. Nevertheless, we can be proud of the great achievements made as a result of the search for modern significance for the Passover holiday. By the way, the brother of the minister, who is a member of a large kibbutz in the vicinity of Haifa, works a lot in this direction. The envoy asked if it was true that the kibbutz Givat Brenner often invited guests. The Minister explained that, firstly, it is easy to reach the kibbutz by any transport, and secondly, all its economic, social and cultural facilities are relatively compact, and therefore it is convenient to conduct excursions there.

As for the invitation to the Easter meal this year, it, as the envoy assured, "will be considered in due course."

A.Levavi

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY OF
ISRAEL'S MISSION TO THE USSR. May 23, 1951**

Yesterday Ershov was invited to the CEO, Levavi was present. The Director-General expressed satisfaction that the Soviet delegation had abstained in the Security Council vote and described the developments after the Minister's conversation with Ershov on 7 May. He explained our position against a unilateral and unjust resolution that essentially encouraged the aggressor. Draining the swamps of Houle is an urgent necessity. We do not believe that we have to stop working on Jewish lands. As for the land owned by the Arab inhabitants of Israel, in any case Syria could not be a party to the decision-making process. Ershov also asked how we feel about the demand for Arabs deported from the area.

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
May 25, 1951**

On May 25, he visited Charette at his invitation. Charette said that relations between Israel and Romania had recently deteriorated in connection with a number of arrests of Zionist figures. I interrupted him and stated that on this matter he should turn to the Charge d'Affaires of the Romanian People's Republic, as I have no reason to pursue this case. Charette countered that he understood the formal side of the issue, but, despite this, should inform me about the state of Israeli-Romanian relations and asked to pass this information on to Vyshinsky. Charette added that at the end of 1949, when there was a delay in the departure of Romanian Jews to Israel, he spoke with Vyshinsky in Lake Sak-Sesse and after that immigration to Israel was "full." Charette pointed out that 50-60 activists of the Zionist movement had been arrested in Romania, they were not charged, the case was not dealt with in court and all of this was of an unfavourable impression in the Government and in the Israeli public. He addresses me on this issue, as earlier the Israeli envoy, and now the Charge d'Affaires can not talk not only about this, but even about other, secondary issues with the responsible employees of the Romanian Foreign Ministry. Every time the charge d'affaires ask someone for a visit, he is referred to the assistant head of the protocol department.

In recent days, the Israeli mission has even stopped taking in Sorumtrans, where they have to pay the bills for the transportation of immigrants. The Government of Israel has repeatedly commented to the Government of Romania, but no reply has been received. These facts, Charette repeated, make a bad impression. I have noted that the main thing in Israeli-Romanian relations is, first and foremost, the fact that Romania allows tens of thousands of its citizens to leave

for Israel, and for that the Government of Israel should only be grateful. Charette replied that the permission to leave for Romanian Jews was not due to the benevolent attitude of the Romanian Government, but only to his desire to get rid of those who disapproved of his regime. I countered that this view was not true.

In conclusion, Charette said that in order to normalize Israeli-Romanian relations, it was necessary to release and send arrested Zionists to Israel. I replied that the matter was an internal matter for the Romanian People's Republic itself.

Sharett then stated that a note entitled "Israel is an American fiefdom" had been published in the Pravda newspaper of May 13. It states that Ben-Gurion's trip to the United States "completes a certain stage in turning Israel into an American fiefdom and should pave the way for an even broader and faster "development" of Israel by the American military."

I must say, with all responsibility, Sharett continued, that the Prime Minister has not conducted or conduct any military negotiations in the United States and has no authority to negotiate any bases, etc. , in the huge construction in Israel and secondly that this construction is ahead of the development of Arab countries and therefore it is necessary to contain it. The result of this impression was the American resolution on the Syrian-Israeli conflict and the subsequent decision of the Security Council. The performance of such an authoritative newspaper as Pravda has taken us care, because the incorrect information it used gives millions of people confidence that Israel is indeed an American fiefdom.

After listening to Charette, I said to him:

1. I take note of his statement that the Prime Minister does not conduct any military talks in the United States and does not have the authority to negotiate military bases, etc.

2. Mr. Charette considers it possible to give me a third presentation about the Soviet press. The Soviet press reacts to current events in different countries, including Israel,

especially since the Israeli press publishes daily slanderous fictions against the Soviet government and the Soviet mission in Israel. I paid attention to this three times by the Israeli Foreign Ministry, but no action was taken. The Israeli press continues to publish defamatory fabrications at the address of the Soviet Union.

The last time I spoke to Eitan was in March and I told him that it was unacceptable to attack the Soviet mission. But no action was taken, so a week later in the newspaper "Ediot Ahronot" there was an article "On the same issue", which combines all together: first, an attack against the head of the Soviet government J.V. Stalin, and then against the Soviet mission and the Soviet envoy.

It should be concluded that the Government of Israel intends to tolerate this hostile slander and does not wish to take any measures to stop it.

Charette was clearly embarrassed by this reaction to his presentation and began to say that the attacks against the Soviet mission were probably caused by the fact that opposition party leaders were making anti-government statements in the presence of its representatives. I replied that there were no such statements and the leaders of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR are well aware that in the presence of mission representatives it is impossible to talk about the policy of the Government of Israel. Sharett then said that in Israel everyone criticizes the government and "expects it to fall." I said that I am not interested in this issue, as it is an internal matter of the State of Israel, but I need to know what the Government of Israel will do to stop the propaganda hostile to the USSR. Charette replied that it was very difficult for him to do anything in his current state, but that he would try to influence the press.

Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
June 2, 1951**

On June 1, he visited Charette and introduced Kalugin. Having read Kalugin's mandate and proxy, Charette said that the mission's notes on property were considered at a meeting of the government commission, which has now completed its work and submitted a number of proposals to the Government. Charette did not specify what the proposals were, but noted that there were many difficulties in the issue of property because of the complexity of the problem. According to Charette, the commission's proposals will be discussed by the government after the return of Ben-Gurion from the United States, who will arrive in Israel in a week. Charette believes that the government's decision will take place in 2-3 weeks. I drew Charette's attention to the need to accelerate the transfer of property in accordance with the earlier promises of the Foreign Ministry and personally by the Minister. Charette said he was not reneged on his promises, but reiterated that the issue of property was a complex one. He added that after the prime minister's arrival, the issue will be considered at the second or, at least, third meeting of the government.

Ershov

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SOVIET
ENVOY TO ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV WITH THE ISRAELI
POLITICIAN DR. M.SNE. June 14, 1951**

Secret

Sne said that yesterday the Israeli government sent an order to ambassador to Washington Eban to sign a treaty with the United States on friendship, trade and navigation, which has been negotiated for the past year. The text of the treaty would not be put up for discussion by the Knesset, but would probably be published later. The end of negotiations on this treaty is one of the results of Ben-Gurion's trip to the United States. Sne said that he had read in an American newspaper some excerpts of the published memoirs of the former U.S. Ambassador to Israel, McDonald. His book was supposed to be out of print, but for some reason the publication of it is delayed. MacDonald says that at the Istanbul Conference of American Diplomats in early 1951, the issue of the Middle East Pact was discussed and it was found that the United States was not ready to support such a pact with weapons and money. Therefore, it was decided that separate treaties between the United States and the countries of the Middle East should be concluded, which would thus be closely related to the United States. The Treaty of Friendship, Trade and Navigation between the United States and Israel marks the beginning of the implementation of the Istanbul conference.

Another result of Ben-Gurion's trip is an oil agreement that he appears to have concluded with the American oil trusts. Characteristically, after Ben-Gurion's return to Israel, Bartley Kramm, Rockefeller's legal adviser, came to Israel. Negotiations in Washington with Under Secretary of State McGee, then DeColer, one of the directors and owners of Aramco, the largest oil company, are also indirectly confirmed.

As for the so-called independence loan, Ben-Gurion's trip essentially ended in failure- only about \$20 million in cash and \$30-35 million in bonds between 1951 and \$30 million.

Sne went on to say that the discussion between Al Hamishmar and Kol Ghaam newspapers in connection with Betov's statement in the Knesset was the result of a misunderstanding. Bentov said that a year ago, one of the countries of popular democracy offered Israel to buy weapons from Israel, but the Israeli government, hoping to obtain weapons in accordance with the declaration of the United States, England and France of May 25, 1950, refused to do so. This statement was understood to be that the weapons from the countries of popular democracy went to the Arabs. In this regard, Mikunis made his statement in the Knesset that it is not Bentov who is competent to talk about weapons from the countries of popular democracy, and he, Mikunis. Sne said that in reality the issue of buying weapons offered by Czechoslovakia was discussed last year at a conference of Israeli envoys, and Eliashiy, who was then an envoy to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, insisted that the purchase be made, but disagreed with him.

Sne then reported the results of the Mapam congress. He rates them as positive compared to what Mapam used to be. For example, when the issue of joining the government coalition was decided in 1949, 45% of Mapam's council voted to join the coalition unconditionally, and at this congress all 100% voted for the terms of entry into the government, identical, according to Sne, with the conditions put forward by Juyuklo for the entry of the French Communist Party into government. During the congress, Ahdut Avoda⁴⁶'s group discussed a possible withdrawal from Mapam at its internal meeting, but this was strongly opposed by about 40 delegates, who said that in case of a split they would remain in the party. Among these delegates was Dorman, who was present at the conference of the Socialist Party of Ninni in Italy.

Sne said the Mapam center has now reached the limit at the convention and can't go further to the left. Therefore, Sne believes that now the left elements need to create a core that, without being a faction, would push the whole party to the left.

Referring to yesterday's elections for the Zionist congress, Sne said that the voters showed great passivity. Across Israel, about 35% voted, and in Tel Aviv only 28% of those eligible to vote. Sne said it may have been the last election for the Zionist congress. In order not to be elected to Congress, Sne put his candidacy at the very end of the Mapam list, and that there were no complaints that he had completely moved away from Zionism, he achieved that next to him on the list was also Galili, one of the most right-wing leaders of the Mapam.

Sne said that recent articles appearing in the press with fabrications directed against the USSR and the countries of popular democracy were fabricated by the Israeli Foreign Ministry and published without signatures or with a signature from a "special correspondent". He knows for sure that today's Jerusalem post about the eviction of 40,000 "unproductive Jews and non-productive Jews" from Budapest was written by Walter, deputy director of the Eastern Europe department of the Interior Ministry.

Sne complained that the work of the left-wing elements in Mapam was being undermined by the existing misunderstanding on the part of the Communists. For example, last week the newspaper "Davar" published an article that the Central Committee of the Communist Party sent to its offices instructions that it is necessary to fight against the left elements of the Mapam as pseudo-revolutionary and not leading the party to the revolutionary struggle. Mapam's leaders are demanding that Sne writes an article against it, which puts him in a quandary, as he does not want to publicly polemicize and criticize the Communist Party. "Kol Ghaam", the body of the Communist Party, did not even bother to put a rebuttal on the article "Davar."

Another example. In his article in Kol Gamam, Mikunis indiscriminately criticized all three platforms put forward for the Mapam congress, instead of pointing out that the platform of the "consolidation front" (centre and left) is a definite progress, albeit utterly insufficient, that there are such and such shortcomings, etc. Sne also gave an example of Mikunis's deliberate misrepresentation of Mapam's position even when it was correct. When the Knesset discussed the Israeli budget, Mapam in the financial commission suggested that instead of two parts of the military budget - 25 million Israeli pounds in the usual budget and 25 million Israeli pounds in a secret military budget - it would be only 40 million Israeli pounds, but entirely in the usual budget. Mikunis (communists not involved in the financial commission) asked Sne why Mapam instead of 25 million is offering 40 million Israeli pounds for the military budget, and Sne explained that Mapam is struggling to reduce the military budget from 50 million to 40 million. pounds, and explained what was going on. However, in "Kol

Gaame" article appeared accusing Mapam of wanting to increase the military budget.

In conclusion, at the request of Yaari, the chairman of the peace committee, explained to me the latter's position in the collection of signatures under the peace pact. Yaari and Bar-Yehuda believe that the signature-gathering campaign should begin after the Knesset elections, as: 1) Mapam and the Communist Party do not have enough personnel to run two broad campaigns at once, and this would damage both the signature-gathering campaigns and the election campaign; 2) A signature-gathering campaign during the election campaign would inevitably connect with the Mapam and Communist Party parties and limit the number of people signing up for the petition. Yaari asked to clarify his position because the Communist Party launched a campaign of pressure on mapam to start collecting signatures now, and this prompted attacks from the right, who write that there is no peace in the "peace committee". This undermines the

prestige of the peace committee and may adversely affect the outcome of the signature-gathering campaign.

The second secretary of the mission, T. Popov M.P., was present at the conversation.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE
USSR A.I. LAVRENTIEV TO THE SOVIET ENVOY TO
ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV. July 11, 1951**

On July 10, the USSR Foreign Ministry visited Badi Hakki, the Charge d'Affaires of Syria in the USSR, and, citing an order from the Syrian government, said that the Syrian government had prepared a draft of the settlement of the Syrian-Israeli conflict. Outlining the substance of the project, Haqki stated that the current border between Syria and Israel in the Lake Houle area was artificial. The Syrian Government proposes to establish a border in the area in the middle of Lake Houle. If the proposal were adopted, Haqki continued, it would be possible to exchange the population living on the shores of Lake Houle, especially since Arabs who remained on Israeli territory were persecuted by Jews. Haqki said that the project had recently been brought to the attention of the envoys of the USSR, the United States, England and France

Damascus in order to find out the opinion of the governments of these countries on the merits of the project. The French government, according to Haqki, supports the project.

“With friendly relations between Syria and the USSR in mind,” Haqqa said, “the Syrian government is asking the Soviet government to support this project and assist in its implementation.”

Haqki also asked for help from the Syrian government to prevent Israel from carrying out a project to establish a dam and to divert the Banias and Gaspani rivers flowing into Lake Houle into Lake Tiberias in order to drain Lake Houle.

Haqki was told that his message would be brought to the attention of the leadership of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

The uncle's information is reported.

Lavrentyev

**LETTER FROM THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR S.
ELIASHIV TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY A. LEVAVI .July 12, 1951**

Strictly confidential

Below are my first impressions of Moscow. I hope they will allow you to better understand the conditions in which we work.

1. In one of the first days in Moscow something incredible happened to me. At the exhibition I accidentally met with an old friend, a friend of his youth, and we have common relatives in Israel. He was a little shaken, and he went up to her. She was very happy to meet, I gave her greetings from relatives, then she began to talk about herself. She said she had an adult son and I'd see him soon. Then I interrupted her, told her what position I was in, and added that she would have to decide for herself whether it was convenient to meet me. Her face changed, she cut off, then said, "No, it's uncomfortable." On this we parted, a few minutes later she left the exhibition. It was the first lesson I learned from my own experience.

2. Two weeks ago, our lives were filled with new content. We had a feeling that we had managed to establish ties with the Jews in two directions. About one of them - in the letters of Arokh (and in our telegram number 700), about the other - in the letters of Argamman. The first conversation was very important, as if for the first time in complete darkness we blinked semaphore - "the way is free." Finally, we got an idea of the life of Jews in a city that was once considered a major Jewish centre. But the connection broke down and left only a sense of bitterness that people had suffered for trying to contact us. The second case seemed a little strange to us, because the woman in question was too interested in questions we did not want to answer. For a while, we all suspected that she was looking for contacts

with our representatives for a reason. But then the suspicions dispelled.

3. Once, while walking down the street, we clearly saw surveillance (pedestrians and in the car). The night after this walk I woke up from a loud exchange of cues in the street. To paraphrase the psalm, “the guard of the Israeli mission will not fall asleep and his eyes will not close.” In short, I was woken by the same detective who shouted on the phone about where we were walking, what was going on in the mission building, what we were doing when we came back and how happy the servants were working, the messenger and his wife. Some time passed, he calls again and again reports in a loud voice. It's all in the dead of night. In the morning our staff explained that he was reporting on one of the local employees, who was to return from the absence and was late, the vigilant guard reported upstairs the reasons for the delay.

4. My wife was incognito at one exhibition. A woman, a museum employee, accepted her very politely, offered a tour, etc. But suddenly her name is to the phone, she departs, picks up the phone, utters only a few incoherent words and disappears, but so hastily that even the tube on the lever forgets to put. When the wife came out, a man came up with her, without turning around, threw: “Follow” and went on.

Well, what's it like? And that's how we live every day.

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL
P.I. ERSHOV AND THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
RUSSIAN PALESTINIAN SOCIETY AT THE ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES OF THE USSR M.P. KALUGIN TO THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY OF THE USSR. July 13, 1951**

Gromyko

In an interview with us on 1 June this year, Charette stated that the issue of the transfer of property belonging to the USSR and Palestinian society would be resolved within two to three weeks. The delay in the decision, Charette said, was apparently caused by the absence of Ben-Gurion, who was in the United States at the time.

Despite the fact that six weeks have passed since the conversation with Charette, the mission has not received any answer on the merits of its notes dated June 6, 1950 and May 9, 1951.

This situation is obviously created because the Government of Israel is trying to delay the transfer of property to us under various pretexts. We believe that the Government of Israel is delaying the response to our notes on property until after the Knesset election campaign. It would therefore be appropriate to send a personal note to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion:

“Mr. Prime Minister,

As you know, there is significant property in the territory of the State of Israel and territory controlled by the Government of Israel in the form of buildings and land belonging to the USSR and the Russian Palestinian Society at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

The Soviet Mission has repeatedly appealed to the Israeli Foreign Ministry on the transfer of all this property, respectively, to the Soviet mission in Israel and to the representative of the Russian Palestinian Society at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, who, duly authorized, arrived in Israel in April this year. However, despite a

number of reminders, the Israeli Foreign Ministry has not yet given an answer to the notes of the Soviet mission on the issue of Soviet property. The mission, in particular, did not receive a response to its notes dated June 6, 1950 and May 9, 1951.

The mission also did not receive written confirmation of the appointment of a representative of the Moscow Patriarch as the head of the Spiritual Mission, with an annex to this list of property previously transferred to the office of the representative of the Moscow Patriarch.

In an interview with me on 1 June this year, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Charette, informed me that the Government Commission, which had been set up to deal with the transfer of property, had completed its work and had come up with proposals that were to be approved by the Government, and that the delay in resolving the matter was allegedly due to your absence from Israel. Mr. Charette assured me that the transfer of property would be resolved in two to three weeks. Meanwhile, six weeks have passed since that conversation, and the mission has not received an answer on the substance of these questions.

This situation was created, apparently, because the relevant Israeli authorities are trying to delay the transfer of Soviet property to its rightful owners under various pretexts.

Considering that such a long delay in the transfer of Soviet property is unacceptable, as it causes great material damage to its rightful owners, I ask you, Mr. Prime Minister, to give the necessary indication that the above-mentioned property should be transferred in the near future to the SOVIET mission in Israel and to the representative of the Russian Palestinian Society at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

With respect.”

Please consider.

Kalugin Ershov

**LETTER FROM ISRAEL'S PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN, A. EBAN, TO ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTER M. SHARETTA. July 16, 1951**

Secret

Conversation with Jacob Malik, the USSR representative to the UN

On 4 July, I visited Mr. Jacob Malik, an adviser to the Israeli mission to the United Nations, accompanied by Gideon J. Malik, at the residence of the Soviet mission to the United Nations. There was a cordial and very meaningful conversation, which began with a discussion of the region's problems and was then translated by Malik into the world's mainstream.

The very fact of such a conversation has caused special interest of the public and UN circles, as since his sensational speech on June 26, Malik stubbornly refused to engage in political conversations with his colleagues at the UN. Immediately after the speech, he was approached by the President of the General Assembly and representatives of the United States and The United Kingdom and requested a meeting to clarify a number of positions, but none of them managed to reach Malik; everyone was told he was unwell. Thomas Hamilton of New York Times, the oldest journalist accredited to the United Nations, used all his influence to try to get to Malik, and also to no avail. However, on the last day of June, Malik decided to recover in order to participate in the traditional monthly reception held by the current President of the Security Council in honour of the members of the Council. Rumoured circulating in the corridors of the UN, he finished lunch at the Waldorf Astoria with Soviet-made delicacies and "royal wine in large quantities," but all the conversations boiled down to an exchange of pleasantries without ever touching the world's problems. The next day he locked himself in his residence again.

The meeting with him left the impression that he invited me first of all to learn about the responses and effects of his speech in the U.S. and the United Nations, but he did not intend to explain or add anything. Obviously, if such a conversation had taken place with Entesam, Gross or Jebb, they would have demanded clarification and additions, and then he would have faced an unpleasant dilemma: to say too much or to be silent and “lose face” in the eyes of colleagues. It is quite another matter to meet with a representative of a small country that does not have special responsibility for the UN action in Korea (and even if the representative of this did not receive instructions from his government to obtain further clarification from Mr. Malik).

First of all, I congratulated Malik on his recovery, he thanked and politely noticed that my face was written full health. I thanked him for the gifts he sent me through Lurie. He replied, “This reflects two basic principles of Soviet foreign policy - reciprocity and equality” (a reference to a bottle of Israeli wine and a box of Elite chocolate that I sent him during his previous illness).

I told Malik that we had firmly decided to bring the issue of the blockade of the Suez Canal to the Security Council. After the UN representative on the ground described the blockade as a “hostile and aggressive act” and called on Egypt to put an end to this vicious practice, it is clear that it is our right and duty to raise this issue with the body responsible for maintaining international security. Since the USSR has always called for peace between Israel and the Arab countries, we are sure that even now Moscow will join the efforts aimed at ending the blockade, because without the renunciation of hostile actions there can be no peace.

Malik nodded and asked several questions about the extent of the economic damage caused by the blockade on Israel. I have explained about the refineries, about our desire to develop trade ties with the countries of Africa and the Far East, but I stressed that our concern is caused not only and not so much by the economy. The main question is whether it

is permissible to carry out hostile acts of aggression 2.5 years after the signing of the armistice agreement. Malik agreed with the remark, but added that we must take into account Egypt's desire to end its independence. Here we explained to him that we clearly distinguish between the blockade and Egypt's demand for the withdrawal of foreign troops. Rafael recalled that Israel had always been very sympathetic to such demands, and that was a principled position. I added that even after the withdrawal of foreign troops, free and independent Egypt would be obliged to comply with international obligations governing its relations with other countries - the UN Charter, the Suez Canal Treaty and the Armistice Agreement. It seemed to me that these words impressed him, at least he never objected.

During the conversation, it seemed that the USSR would act on this issue in the same way as it acted in the dispute over the incidents in the area of Naharia and Hula, that is, he would remain silent during the discussion and abstain in the voting. The fact that Israel will raise this specific issue while the UK will put the general problems of Anglo-Egyptian relations to the discussion largely guarantees us against Moscow's negative position. It is worth noting that before, during discussions in the Security Council in August 1949 and November 1950, the Soviets never came to Egypt's aid when there was sharp criticism of the blockade of the Suez Canal.

Mr. Malik asked me to explain the situation in our conflict with Syria. He asked if we considered the Security Council resolution of 18 May to be a negative turn towards us (in UN circles there is an opinion that it was Britain, not the United States, who initiated the resumption of discussion of this issue after the ceasefire on 8 May). Malik added that the May 18 resolution made the situation worse because arabs had received support for their extremist stance. For the first time we heard from the Soviet representative at the UN the words of condemnation of the action of The Western powers on the issue of Houla.

At the end of the discussion of regional issues, I was not going to touch on the Korean problem, but Malik asked me, "Well, what's going on here?" I informed him that there was a strong desire in Washington to end the Korean War and that the American people breathed a sigh of relief when the Soviet representative's speech opened up such ample opportunities for peace. Rafael recalled that in all our previous conversations with Mr. Malik, we strongly rejected the suggestion that the American people and their leaders were seeking to foment war (in a previous conversation that was very tense, Malik completely brushed off our assessments on the issue and stated that the position of the American public was irrelevant because it was entirely dependent on the hegemonic aspirations of leaders).

Malik said his latest speech was very sympathetic to the U.S. masses. He himself received letters and telegrams from all over the country, all of them welcomed the Soviet initiative. A nun from Chicago sent him an encrusted cross and a letter wishing him success. A woman from New York sent a medallion in the form of a heart with wishes for a speedy recovery from heart disease. "Everyone is happy except General Marshall and Mr. Wilson," Malik said. And immediately moved on to a sensitive speech about the growing will for peace and the fears of the "ruling circles" of the United States, that the ceasefire in Korea will lead to a general de-escalation of tensions and will hit the production of weapons. The American people crave peace, especially after tens of thousands of soldiers died in Korea. But official policy continues to be based on the threat of war.

It is clear that Malik's speech was intended to influence American weapons policy, which was no less important than achieving a result in the Far East. In any case, during the conversation he was more interested in the American, rather than the Korean front.

Then the conversation turned to the analysis of prospects, first of all the possibility that Malik's speech would serve as a turning point not only to peace in Korea, but also

to the restoration of security around the world. Malik said that at the reception on behalf of the President of the Security Council he was asked this question by representatives of the United States and England, who pressed him on the topic of "closed peace", arguing that there can be no peace between governments until there is cultural and other relations between peoples. Malik said he strongly rejected the suggestion that Eastern Europe was a "closed world" and culturally self-isolated: "Here is our famous ballerina touring France, the famous violinist plays in Rome, the footballers perform in Norway." (Malik said nothing about the possibility of retaliatory visits.) He explained to Gross and Jebb that their criticism was only related to the outside of the problem, not to the point. "I told them: remove your aggressive bases from Europe and Asia, then, if you like, we will flood the West with our ballet troupes." When Malik spoke about the aggressive expansion of the United States in Turkey and Greece, we tried to refute his words, explaining that after the Second World War, which led to the collapse of such powers as Germany and Japan, to the weakening of Britain and France, there was a kind of vacuum of influence, where the two great powers- the United States and the USSR. This should not be seen as a conscious desire for aggression. Mr. Raphael added that the process of creating a new balance of power was now coming to an end and the world would become more stable as a result. As for the United States, it has always sought disarmament and self-isolation. Malik countered that after two world wars, there was no chance of Self-isolation of America.

Mr. Raphael reminded Malik of his recent remark that the four-party meeting had no chance of success as long as the Korean War continued. Malik replied: "Maybe you're right. But the cessation of hostilities in Korea will put to the test the sincerity of the U.S. desire for a comprehensive settlement." He went on to agree with my observation that in the U.S. Congress no one (even those who supported

Makar's extremist proposals) offered to reject Malik's proposals, as there is no policy in the whole country that would dare to demand the continuation of the war. Malik said he also paid attention to it. At the time, Rafael noted that Israel had pursued a consistent policy on the Korean issue, constantly advocating a ceasefire as a necessary precondition for resolving political problems. Malik did not respond to that. Returning to his radio speech regarding his personal role, he said that fate often put him in the position of peacemaker. Even as the Soviet ambassador to Japan in 1945, he became the first to whom the Japanese reported their readiness to surrender: apparently, they could not find General MacArthur, so the surrender to the United States occurred later. Malik then managed to end the blockade of Berlin, and now the Korean War is coming to an end as a result of his speech. Rafael suggested he switch now to peace between Israel and the Arab countries, Malik laughed and said that his talents did not extend so far. Especially since another angel of peace, Dr. Bunch - has already staked this territory, and to compete with other intermediaries Malik does not intend.



А. Я. Вышинский (слева) и М. Шаретт (справа) на четвертой сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН. Париж, 1949 г. (*Ma'ariv Book Guild, Tel Aviv.*)



Выступление посланника СССР в Израиле П. И. Ерцова на митинге, посвященном посадке «Леса Красной армии» под Иерусалимом. 22 июня 1950 г. (*АВП РФ, ф. 779, д. 3073/4.*)



Выступление П. И. Ершова у монумента, установленного в «Лесу Красной армии». 22 июня 1950 г. (АВП РФ, ф. 779, д. 3073/1.)



Совещание дипломатических представителей Израиля за рубежом. Сидят по главе стола: М. Шаретт (слева) и Д. Бен-Гурион, стоит — Ш. Эльяшив. Тель-Авив, 17—21 июля 1950 г. (*Government Press Office, Jerusalem.*)



В ходе одного из заседаний Совета Безопасности. Слева направо: С. К. Царанкин, А. Эбан и А. Лурье. Начало 50-х годов. (*The Abba Eban Centre for Israeli Diplomacy, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.*)



На дипломатическом приеме. Слева направо: г-жа Малик, Я. А. Малик, А. Эбан, М. Комэй, Р. Кидрон, г-жа Кидрон, А. А. Соболев. Нью-Йорк, начало 50-х годов. (*The Abba Eban Centre for Israeli Diplomacy, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.*)



Заседание комиссии по иностранным делам и безопасности кнессета. Во главе стола — председатель комиссии М. Аргов (слева) и премьер-министр Израиля Д. Бен-Гурион. Тель-Авив, 11 декабря 1951 г. (*Israeli State Archives.*)



Беседа посланника СССР в Израиле П. И. Ершова (справа) с президентом Израиля И. Бен-Цви на приеме для дипкорпуса. Тель-Авив, 8 января 1953 г. (*АВП РФ. ф. 779. д. 3067.*)

When I asked him about the plans for the summer, he said he was leaving in two days. Now, in his opinion, there are no conditions for political discussion on Korea and the Far East; it is clear that this will lead to nothing until the right of China to sit at the UN is recognized, and the Americans strongly reject such a statement of the question. It is therefore better at this stage to confine ourselves to a ceasefire. When we were about to leave, Malik expressed hope for a new meeting not in New York, but in Paris. It was a clear hint of his desire not to return to the post of permanent representative to the UN. The faint voice and constant coughing felt that he was unwell. We parted very cordially, exchanging all possible congratulations and wishes. Malik took us all the way out, which he'd never done before. A little more, and he'd show up with us in broad daylight on Park Avenue.

When I told Malik about the appointment of Shmoyel Eliashiva as an envoy to Moscow, he gave him high praise, especially noting the deep knowledge of our envoy in Russian literature.

If Malik is really going to leave the service in New York, the most interesting period of Israeli-Soviet relations is coming to an end. During these three years, he has consistently shown sympathy for our cause and has always shown an interest in the formation of Israel. Even the process of our rapprochement with the West and the support of several anti-Soviet resolutions did not affect this attitude; at least I have never heard him criticize us. Lately, after taking us to the Un, he used to have long and interesting conversations with me and with Mr. Raphael on world issues; when the workload prevented me from visiting him, he found a way to express his frustration and desire to resume contact. As far as can be seen from these contacts, we have not lost in the eyes of the Soviet Union neither its significance nor its dignity.

After Malik's departure to Moscow, I learned that the meeting with us was the only conversation on political topics that he held between June 26 and the day of his departure.

With respect

Abba Eban

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.A.
GROMYKO WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR S.
ELIASHIV. July 17, 1951**

Secret

It's 2 p.m. received Eliashiva, who came to me on a protocol visit.

In the conversation, Eliashiv referred to Israel's appeal to the Security Council about the obstacles Egypt has imposed on the passage of ships carrying goods for Israel through the Suez Canal, and asked for support in this matter of the Israeli view.

I replied that our position on this issue would be set out by the Soviet representative in the Security Council. Eliashiv said that the Israeli complaint will be dealt with by the Security Council, probably on July 26.

When I asked how the Americans and the British were behaving in this Israeli-Egyptian conflict, Eliashiv said that the Americans do not feel any immediate inconvenience because there are few American ships carrying supplies to Israel through the Suez Canal. As for England, she said she "feels a hindrance" as some of its vessels are delayed by the Egyptians. However, the Scandinavian countries and South Afri-afri suffer the most from the obstacles imposed by Egypt. Kan Union.

Eliashiv also raised the issue of allowing Soviet citizens with close relatives in Israel to travel to Israel. At the same time, he said that a positive solution to this issue "will cause a wave of sympathy for you in Israel."

I replied that this is a complex question and before I answer it, I need to make the necessary inquiries and thoroughly understand the issue. At the same time, I added that this is a very serious issue - the departure of Soviet citizens abroad, and our position on this issue, obviously, the envoy is aware.

Eliashiv also raised the issue of the permission to travel to Israel the mother of the former Israeli envoy to the USSR, Namir. He said that Namir had already made a written request to the Soviet mission in Israel.

I said I'd ask what the situation was.

At the end of the conversation, Eliashiv stated that he saw his task as promoting a more friendly relationship between the USSR and Israel.

I said that such a statement was welcome, since there was no reason why relations between our countries should not be normal.

The rest of the conversation was of a protocol nature.

The conversation lasted 15 minutes.

The third secretary of the OBSV T. Polyakov was present at the conversation.

Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

A. Gromyko

On the document litters:

“T. Malt D.S. Please trace. 18.06.

T. Polyakov v. Check whether the case of Namir's mother on the department, if not, should contact the secretariat of T. Gromyko A.A., send it to the consular office. 19.07.51».

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR S.
ELIASHIVA TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY. July
17, 1951**

Visited Gromyko. From previous conversations in the Foreign Ministry of the USSR, this conversation was more lively, as well as questions and comments from Gromyko. He asked me a number of questions and made a few comments. Please pay attention to the position of the Russians, which is evident from his words.

(a) Suez. He set out our position. Gromyko's remarks: from the point of view of international law, Egypt has every reason to say that it is at war with Israel. However, it is difficult to judge whether the actions of customs officials belong to the category of military. This remark can be echoes of my conversation with Bazarov. Gromyko asked about the position of England and the United States. I replied that Britain would support, and the United States, whose interests were less affected, was unlikely.

b) Repatriation of relatives. He said that the issuance of exit permits in connection with family reunification would be highly appreciated in Israel. Gromyko asked how many permits had been issued. I said i'm a lot. He added that this issue is extremely complex, as it is about Soviet citizens. It can't be solved by osprey. Gromyko said he could not give an answer without having read the materials prepared by the relevant department. He pointed to cases of positive resolution of the issue. I see this as a sign that the Soviets do not object to reunification in principle. He asked Gromyko to study the question as soon as possible and give a positive answer. Gromyko replied that he was ready to receive me at my request at any time.

(c) Gromyko promised to find out how things were with the issuance of the permission of Namir's mother.

He concluded by telling him that I consider it one of my tasks to explain our positions to the Russians and their

positions to our government in order to improve our relations. In return, he wished me success and said that there are all grounds for the normal development of relations. The conversation took place with benevolent attention on his part. Gromyko recalled that he knew Ben-Gurion, Charette and Ebon. Please give a message in the press about the conversation without publishing its contents.

Eliashiv

**TELEGRAM OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE
USSR A.I. LAVRENTIEV TO THE SOVIET ENVOY TO
ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV. July 19, 1951**

You should visit Foreign Minister Charette and orally, citing your previous conversations with him, to raise the issue of expediting the transfer of the soviet mission's assets and to the representative of the Russian Palestinian society, as well as the registration of the transfer of the spiritual mission to the representative of the Moscow Patriarchate.

A. Lavrentyev

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
July 23, 1951**

On July 23, he visited Charetta and, in accordance with your instructions, raised the issue of accelerating the transfer of Soviet property to us. Referring to previous interviews, I noted that since Charette's assurances had not yet been implemented, it seemed that the transfer of property had been deliberately delayed and asked when the property would finally be transferred. Charette said in response that the Delay in the Israeli government's decision was due to a number of reasons, namely the large number of urgent cases accumulated during Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's stay in the United States, as well as the employment of ministers in connection with the election campaign. On the other hand, the current Government cannot now take such a serious decision as the decision to Russian property, as it would give unnecessary weapons to certain political parties for the election campaign. I stated that the issue of the transfer of property had nothing to do with the election campaign and therefore Sharett's explanation could not be considered thorough. Charette said that maybe it is formal and so, but in reality the government's positive decision would be criticized by the right, negative - from the left. Moreover, the Government does not have a kind of moral right to make such important decisions on the eve of the elections. After the elections, when a stable government is formed, it will not slow down the issue of Russian property.

In conclusion, Charette summarized Elyashiva's conversation with Comrade Gromyko, noting that the envoy had two questions:

1) on the departure from the USSR to Israel of relatives of Israeli citizens and

2) on the passage through the Suez Canal of ships bound for Israel (in connection with Israel's complaint to the Security Council).

It follows from a conversation with Charette that the Government of Israel intends to take a compromise or even a negative decision on the issue of Soviet property. For this reason, it postponed the decision until after the elections, which would result in the formation of a "sustainable government". Characteristically, both in the conversation on June 1 and now Charette did not mention the words "transfer of property", although on our part it was said about the transfer of property to us. It is possible that the Israelis will raise the issue of the transfer of property depending on the question of leaving the USSR relatives of Israeli citizens. This trend was evident when Charette, in responding to my statement, immediately pointed out that Eliasvish was with Comrade Gromyko the other day and had raised the question of the departure of relatives. With Charette's answer outlined above, we have made a suggestion to address Ben-Gurion directly on this issue. We believe that it is useless to talk to Charette about the transfer of property in the future and it is necessary to address the prime minister and then the president. This will show the Israelis that we attach great importance to the issue of property.

Ershov

**ANALYTICAL NOTE OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTRY A. LEVAVI. Moscow, July 27, 1951**

The main lines of Soviet policy on Middle East issues are:

1. The imperialists are trying to expand and consolidate their dominion in the region to turn it into an anti-Soviet springboard.

2. Americans are gradually displacing the British.

3. The imperialists are not interested in war between the States of the region, but a certain degree of tension between them can help them to consolidate their dominion here.

4. Today, the USSR is not interested in a big war in the Middle East (between Israel and the Arabs), because it fears that it will lead to the most serious military intervention of the West and strengthen the position of the latter. At the same time, the USSR is not interested in a full-scale settlement in the region and strongly condemns the statement of the three Western powers and plans of regional defensive alliances. From the Soviet point of view, peace in the Middle East is possible only on Anglo-American terms at this stage.

5. Eliminating the “dialectical contradiction” between pp. 3 and 4: The imperialists are interested in maintaining tensions in order to mediate and advance their own interests, ostensibly overcoming these tensions. The Soviets, on the other up, have an interest in maintaining the causes of tensions that imperialist “mediators” will not be able to extinguish and which will create sources of constant tension conducive to the consolidation of revolutionary forces.

6. Therefore, at this stage, the USSR will not support efforts to reach an Israeli-Arab peace settlement, although it will not speak out against such efforts; but he will raise his friends to fight against the pro-Western side in any possible settlement.

7. The Soviet bloc will support any action in the Middle East aimed at weakening Western rule, nationalizing oil companies, withdrawing British troops, refusing to accept aid (e.g., Syria's refusal to accept aid under the "fourth point" of the Truman program), etc.

The region's social problems remain unresolved. Therefore, there remains a significant field for communist activity and the danger of a social revolution under the guise of a military coup. According to the Soviet concept, Arab countries are semi-colonial and semi-feudal, and Israel is a bourgeois state, relatively more stable, but also at risk of social upheaval due to the economic crisis.

9. The forces in the Middle East behind the Soviets will always be waving the flag of "national independence" more actively than everyone else. In Iran, for example, Mosadzyk is able to compromise with the Americans and even with the British, and the pro-Soviet Tude Party strongly advocates nationalization and, when Mosadzyk and his supporters exhaust the potential of their anti-imperialism, it will accuse them of betrayal and offer an alternative - the Soviets.

10. The demands of the communist peace movement, the slogan of non-alignment with world blocs, the struggle against concessions or imperialist bases are all effective means in the Soviet struggle against the consolidation of Western forces in the Middle East.

11. The USSR knows that Israel is a catalyst in the Middle East, both nationally and socially. The USSR also hopes to rise the communist movement among Israeli Arabs and spread its influence to other countries in the region.

12. Thus, the USSR is interested in the existence of Israel. Despite the anti-Israeli orientation of Soviet propaganda, characterizing Israel as an American puppet, the USSR will be ready to positively assess the manifestation of Israel's independent political initiatives. It is possible that Israeli propaganda, if it emphasizes the direct relationship between the weight of Israeli independent initiatives and the growth of the population and the national economy, will

have an impact on the Soviets. Of course, this factor cannot be exaggerated, nor should it be hoped that Israel will be able to receive significant and permanent assistance from the Soviets in any of the current or future political problems. On one issue, however, the results can indeed be achieved: repatriation from Eastern Europe.

13. The USSR will continue to resort to various techniques in order to win the sympathy of well-known circles in Israel and in Arab countries. Sometimes it will be a tactic of demonstrating neutrality (e.g. on the issue of Arab refugees or on the issue of Jerusalem at the last session of the General Assembly, or on the issue of Lake Houle in the Security Council). But sometimes the USSR will definitely stand on one side or another. Maximum vigilance should be exercised, given the possibility of a dramatic change in the Soviet position on Middle East affairs.

14. If a world war were to begin, it should be assumed that the Soviets would try to occupy the Middle East first, both on the basis of general strategic considerations and, apparently, from The Soviet assessments of the social image of the region.

15. As long as the Cold War continues, the USSR will operate in the Middle East with the utmost caution in the above-mentioned areas.

**FROM THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
MISSION OF THE USSR IN ISRAEL FOR THE SECOND
QUARTER OF 1951. August 13, 1951**

With regard to the Soviet Union, the Government of Israel continues to pursue a hostile policy. Anti-Soviet propaganda is taking on more and more dimensions, and the issue of the situation of Jews in the USSR has become a leading issue. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israeli mission in Moscow are among the main suppliers of anti-Soviet press fabrications: a number of newspapers have so-called “special correspondents” behind whom the above-mentioned institutions are hiding. Not limited to anti-Soviet propaganda, the Israeli government begins, until semi-official, to raise the issue of immigration of Jews from the USSR to Israel. Israel's new envoy to the SOVIET Union, Eliashiv, was tasked, as he himself once put it, to “break the ice of silence” on immigration. At the same time, the activities of Zionist organizations in Israel, connected to varying degrees with immigrants from the USSR, are being intensified. For example, at a meeting of the Society of Zionist-Socialists, it was decided that the issue of the immigration of Jews from the USSR to Israel should be put to the discussion of the 23rd Zionist Congress, which opens on 14 August in Jerusalem. The Israeli press was widely noted in July that a woman, described as “the first immigrant from Russia”, had arrived in Israel.

At the same time, the Government of Israel continues to delay the transfer of Soviet property, for various “technical reasons”. Despite the arrival in Israel of the Russian Palestinian Society, his property remains untransferred.

The anti-Soviet direction of foreign policy also affects Israel's attitude towards the countries of popular democracy. During the second quarter, the Israelis raised the issue of Jewish immigration from Hungary and the release of a number of Zionist leaders allegedly arrested in Romania.

Only the fact that immigration from Romania continues to continue has somewhat deterred the Government of Israel from taking openly hostile acts against the countries of popular democracy. It is known that at a meeting of a foreign commission in April, a proposal was made to organize a series of demonstrative activities demanding the release of Zionist leaders in Romania, but Charette prevented it, saying that these actions would prevent the continuation of immigration from Romania or could cause a complete cessation of it.

This is, in general terms, a characterization of the foreign policy of the Israeli Government in the second quarter of 1951.

In these circumstances, we should, first of all, intensify the exposure of the Anglo-American machinations in Israel, the anti-popular domestic and pro-American foreign policy of the Israeli ruling circles. The Soviet mission has repeatedly put forward such proposals, but our press still publishes notes on Israel only on a case-by-case basis. It seems to us that the intensification of the Soviet press's views on Israel will help to weaken the effectiveness of the Zionist propaganda that advocates the immigration of Jews to Israel, including from the Soviet Union. Secondly, we need to be more forceful in defending our property interests. Since the Israeli authorities continue to delay the transfer of property and are discouraged by various "technical reasons", it would be more appropriate to raise the issue of the transfer of property directly to the Prime Minister and then the President. Thirdly, it is necessary to step up the work under the WOCS in every way, increasing the funds being provided for this work.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
August 25, 1951**

More than three weeks have passed since the Israeli elections, but a new Government has not yet been formed. Negotiations between leader Mapai Ben-Gurion, whom the president has instructed to form a government, are proceeding very slowly. Ben-Gurion negotiates with four parties: Mapam, The Common Zionists Progressive Party and Hapoel ha-Mizrahi⁴⁸. The last three parties have sought concessions on the government's economic and domestic policies.

Ben-Gurion's talks with Mapam on foreign policy issues are noteworthy. The Mapam representatives demanded Ben-Gurion to develop a coherent government programme, including the terms of the Mapam platform adopted at the Congress in Haifa on 30 May to 4 June, namely, to ensure Israel's true neutrality, to ensure the non-establishment of bases for foreign states, non-conclusion of treaties and agreements that undermine the independence of the state, the non-acceptance of bonded loans and other monetary assistance, support for the peace movement and the conclusion of a peace pact between the five great powers. (The materials of the congress were sent to the Ussr Foreign Ministry with dippochta on August 1.)

Dr. Sne told me that in response to this demand, Ben-Gurion told the Mapam representatives the following:

1. He is against the policy of neutrality and prefers it to freely resolve each foreign policy issue separately, respectively. He does not believe in the demand for macam neutrality, as this essentially means Israel's orientation to the USSR against the United States.

2. It cannot accept Mapam's demand not to participate in the implementation of unilateral UN decisions; he believes that UN decisions are binding on all UN member states.

Asked if the Korean war would continue, whether the government would again send penicillin and orange juices to U.S. troops, Ben-Gurion said no hypothetical questions should be asked. Asked whether it was true that the prime minister was the only member of the government who insisted on sending military medical units (sisters and doctors) to Korea, Ben-Gurion said he was not obliged to answer such questions.

3. Ben-Gurion stated that he could not support the peace movement and the prohibition of atomic weapons, since it was considered to be only communist propaganda. The Russians have few atomic bombs and therefore support the prohibition of atomic weapons, but they do not propose to ban, for example, artillery, which they have quite a lot.

4. He is against any occupation of Israel, but must note the difference between the American and Soviet occupation, the first will not affect the regime, immigration and Zionism, the second - will put in power Maki (Communist Party), which will mean the end of immigration and Zionism. It is ready to make an alliance even with the devil to prevent the Soviet occupation of Israel, but it will also fight against the American occupation if it is undertaken without Israel's consent.

5. He could not accept Mapam's requirement not to take money from the United States in aid, at least under the Marshall Plan or the fourth paragraph of the Truman program. This does not mean that Israel is subject to U.S. policy, as such agreements do not have any political or military obligations to the United States.

After answering questions, Ben-Gurion said that he firmly believed that Israel's foreign policy should be based on a strong friendship with the United States and Britain, without Israel making commitments against other countries. He is ready to go to the formation of friendly relations with the USSR, but there are no real opportunities for this, as the USSR does not give help (refused to give credit), does not allow the immigration of Jews from the USSR to Israel. Ben-Gurion noted that some people in the U.S. State Department

view Israel as a potential enemy of the United States, but it is gratifying to note that this view is not shared by the U.S. government. It is necessary to be careful, Ben-Guri said, so that Mapam's involvement in the government does not lead to the approval of this opinion of individuals of the State Department by the U.S. government and personally Truman. I don't want, Ben-Gurion, that Moscow also considers Israel a potential adversary, but I'm afraid to think that Israel could be an enemy of the USSR, because if it (the USSR) wins in Israel, we will all be landowners. Ben-Gurion added that he would not provide bases to the Americans for money, but in case of Soviet aggression, the issue should be reconsidered. Mapam's participation in government is a guarantee that foreign countries will not provide bases. He agreed that Israel would not join the Atlantic bloc, but when asked that if Israel's participation in the Middle East pact was a condition for peace with Arab countries, he replied that it was a hypothetical question. In conclusion, Ben-Gurion stated that Israel's foreign policy should remain unchanged.

In negotiations with Ben-Gurion, Mapam is still sticking to the haifa programme, but there are many supporters of joining the government without conditions. The Mapam Political Commission decided that the Haifa program was the basis for Mapam's entry into government. Negotiations on domestic political issues will begin next week.

As Leader Mapam Yaari told me, negotiations with Ben-Gurion are under way to expose both the ipai's foreign and domestic political agenda. However, Ben-Gurion, starting negotiations on the formation of a government primarily with Mapam, aims to show the public that he is in charge of the formation of a government of the working parties—Mapai and Mapam, but if the negotiations with the Mapam end in vain, he is likely to make a declaration that, despite all attempts to involve Mapam in the government, she refused to participate in it and therefore he, Ben-Gurion, due to the circumstances forced to join the bloc with the General

Zionists. Ben-Gurion acknowledged that the holding of the elections was a mistake.

Negotiations on the formation of a government are continuing.

P. Ershov

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV AND ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTER M. CHARETTE. August 31, 1951**

Secret.

He visited Charette at his invitation. He stated that the Government of Israel was extremely surprised by Tsarapkin's speech to the Security Council on the issue of the Suez Canal⁴⁹. After the Israeli envoy's talks in Moscow with representatives of the Foreign Ministry, and in particular with Gromyko, it seemed that the Soviet Union, if it does not support the Israeli point of view, will at least abstain from voting. However, at present, when the majority of the Security Council was fully determined in favour of Israel and a vote was to be held, the Soviet representative demanded that the vote be postponed until Saturday, and the motivational part of Tsarapkin's statement showed a propensity to support Egypt's position, in addition to the fact that the request for a postponement of the vote was moral support for Egypt, which he did not deserve. As is well known, the Egyptian Government, by blockading the Suez Canal and not allowing ships bound for Israel through it, is violating the armistice agreement with Israel and undermining the cause of peace in the entire Middle East. Charette noted that in 1947, a joint vote of the representatives of the United States and the USSR at the UN General Assembly and the adoption of a resolution on the formation of a Jewish state played a decisive role in the creation of the state of Israel. At present, at a tense time for world peace, the same joint vote of the representatives of the USSR and the United States in the Security Council could greatly enhance the authority of the Security Council and give the impression in world public opinion that the Soviet-American relations on which the cause of peace depends are beginning to be smoothed out. In conclusion, Charette said, "It would be highly desirable for us for the representative of

the USSR to join the draft resolution of the four Powers on the issue of navigation through the Suez Canal or that it should not interfere with the adoption of this resolution.” Charette asked to hand over the request to the Soviet government. I replied that his application would be submitted as intended.

The conversation lasted 12 minutes.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE SOVIET
ENVOY TO ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV WITH THE ISRAELI
POLITICIAN DR. M.SNE. September 3, 1951**

Secret.

Sne informed that in negotiations with Mapam representatives on joining the government coalition, the economic and domestic policy of the government was discussed. The Mapai delegation was led by Finance Minister Kaplan. Mapam's representatives posed questions or made suggestions, and Kaplan and other Mapai delegates, including former Israeli envoy to the USSR Namir, answered these questions.

1. Mapam asked whether the Government believed in nationalizing foreign concessions and what intentions it had with regard to oil exploration and exploitation concessions, particularly in the Negev. The Mapai delegation stated that it objected to the nationalization of Haifa refineries, potash companies and the electric company, believing that it was necessary to increase the work of refineries in every possible way, and for the other two companies to obtain 51% of the shares of these companies in 1951-1952. With regard to the new concessions, she pointed out that Ball, an American expert who had studied the issue of oil in Israel, was preparing a draft Knesset law on the concession for oil exploration and exploitation. However, the Government believes that it is more expedient to hand over this concession not to one company but to several companies, although it is obvious that it is impossible to obtain a controlling stake, i.e. 51% of the shares.

2. Representatives of Mapam supported the Government's adoption of a single public plan, binding on all enterprises, both cooperative and private. The Mapai delegation replied that it was not appropriate to adopt such a plan because it might frighten private entrepreneurs and weaken their initiative and investment. She said she did not object to the

adoption of the general plan, but not the obligatory one for businesses.

3. Representatives of Mapam proposed to oblige all local capitalists to invest at least 20% of their capital in the expansion of production. The Mapai delegation refused to accept the proposal, arguing that the investment should be voluntary, not ordered.

4. Representatives of Mapam also proposed the issue of a mandatory domestic loan, under which all wealthy individuals are required to purchase bonds. The Mapai delegation rejected the proposal, saying that the distribution of bonds was a voluntary matter.

5. Representatives of Mapam indicated that it would be appropriate to confiscate gold from individuals and concentrate it in the hands of the State in order to secure the Israeli pound. The Mapai delegation stated that the event would affect and displease the interests of a large number of people. She spoke only for the registration of gold.

6. Representatives of Mapam proposed to establish a progressive income tax. The Mapai delegation replied that the proposal was noteworthy, but that it would not be possible at present.

These are the main issues of the economic policy negotiations between Mapai and Mapam.

With regard to the Government's domestic policy, the negotiations addressed the following issues:

1. Representatives of Mapam demanded the adoption of the Constitution of the State. The Mapai delegation replied that it was too early to adopt the constitution, and Ben-Gurion, who was present at the final conversation, stated that there was no need to adopt a constitution at all, since all the laws of the state were the same and binding on the citizens of the state.

2. Representatives of the Mapam proposed the adoption of a law on the basic democratic freedoms in the country so that it would be an unshakable law of the State and could be changed only if two thirds of the Knesset deputies voted to

change it. The Mapai delegation objected to the law, pointing out that since there were democratic freedoms in Israel, there was no need to enact a law on those freedoms.

3. Mapam representatives noted that it would be appropriate to return the land or compensate for the value of the land to those Arabs who had returned to Israel. The Mapai delegation, in agreement in principle with the proposal, stated that it was virtually impossible to implement it.

4. Mapam representatives raised the issue of the dismantling of the military districts system in Arab-populated areas. The Mapai delegation rejected the proposal, stating that it would be premature at present, but that it agreed to some measures to facilitate the situation of Arabs (it was issuing permits for a longer period of time to travel around the country).

5. The Mapam representatives stated that the same salary for Arab workers should be established on a par with that of Jews, since unequal wages discriminated against Arabs. The Mapai delegation rejected the proposal, as did the suggestion that Arabs should be able to register on single labour exchanges.

Thus, Mapam's main proposals for both economic and domestic policy were rejected by the Mapai delegation. The partial concessions that the Mapai delegation agreed to deal with were only minor and third-degree issues.

Meanwhile, inside Mapam, Ahdut Avoda's group continues to push for government membership. In this regard, a major discussion has begun in Mapam. Sneh believes that by seeking a split in Mapam, namely the withdrawal from the Ahdut Avoda group, Ben-Gurion can promise that Mapam representatives in the government will be entitled to opposition on issues on which they, by virtue of the decisions of the Haifa Congress, cannot support the government.

At the end of the conversation, Sneh said that he had recently gone to Switzerland to participate in the World Jewish Congress. The congress will discuss participation in

the so-called “peace congress” convened by the Titus government in Belgrade. She decided to accept the proposal of the party leadership to participate in the Jewish Congress in order to achieve the rejection of the proposal of the Titians to participate in the “peace congress” in Belgrade.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A.Y.
VYSHINSKY AND THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR
S.ELIASHIV. September 13, 1951**

Secret.

At 14.00 he received Eliashiva, who appeared on a protocol visit.

At the end of the conversation, which was protocol-based, Eliashiv asked my point of view on the so-called "family reunion" and asked what his appeal to the Soviet government to allow Soviet citizens whose families live in Israel could be affected.

I replied that I needed to review the specifics in advance. As for his official appeal, his attitude could be expressed after such an appeal, and depending on its content.

Eliashiv said that in the future he will address this issue officially.

The conversation lasted 15 minutes. T. Suslov was present.

A. Vyshinsky

On the document, the litters: "T. Yiborin. We need to prepare our position on this issue in case of sudden appeal. 14. IX. Bogomolov.

T. Sotov. For execution. 15. IX. Yiborin."

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR S.
ELIASHIVA TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY.**

September 13, 1951

The conversation with Vyshinsky took place in a good atmosphere, he asked about Charette and recalled their meetings. He showed interest in our problems and, when I wanted to bow out because of his ill health, asked me to stay and continue the conversation. I told him about repatriation from different countries, highlighting the critical role of immigrants from Russia in the past and the current contribution of returnees from Eastern Europe because of their high cultural level and commitment to the social foundations of our activities. Pointing to the mass repatriation from Romania, I recalled his conversations with Sha-ret. When I spoke of the difficulties of absorbing the returnees and revitalizing the desert in the Negev, he expressed admiration for the talents of the Jewish people and the confidence that we would overcome all difficulties. He stressed the high qualities of those people he knows from their political and party work. I noticed that some talents are not enough, there are still problems of professional retraining and many... He objected to this: and we will overcome this - Birobidzhan will prove. At the end of the conversation, I raised the issue of the repatriation of relatives for humanitarian reasons, noting that, judging by the separate permits issued, the Soviet Union did not have a principled rejection of such an approach and that the fact of issuing exit permits had provoked many positive responses in our country. We agreed that I would present our arguments in writing, and Vyshinsky said to me with a laugh, "I understand that you have to do this to justify your stay here and to do something for the tribesmen." The most surprising thing in this conversation is that he spoke to me not just as an Israeli diplomatic representative, but as a representative

of Jews in general, even Soviet Jews, he called “my tribesmen.” They didn't talk about political issues.

Eliashiv

**ELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR S.
ELIASHIVA TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY.**

October 4, 1951

On the eve of the Jewish New Year and on two holidays visited the synagogue. As always, thousands of worshippers are in great crowding, among them many young. There is an atmosphere of tension around us, fear of approaching, some attempts to exchange remarks. The two managed to pass us notes with important information on the situation of the Jews. Spies inside the synagogue were watching our every move.

Eliashiv

**PERSONAL NOTE OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR
S. ELIASHIV TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY. October 21, 1951**

Secret.

Your Excellency,

In a conversation I had the privilege of having with you on September 13, 2017, I allowed myself to raise the issue of disparate families, some of whom live in the Soviet Union and some in the State of Israel. Even before that, I had been raised by me in a conversation I had the privilege of having on 13 July this year with the Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. A.A. Gromyko. At the end of the conversation, which I had the privilege and pleasure to lead with Your Excellency, I allowed myself to invite you to present my address on this matter in writing and received your kind consent to consider my appeal, and I allow myself, Your Excellency, to state in this personal note the essence of the question in question.

1. The population of the State of Israel is overwhelmingly made up of people from around the world. This is not a random phenomenon, but the result of a long and not yet completed process of returning the Jewish people to their historical homeland. This process has not been interrupted for centuries, it has intensified in recent times since the end of the last century and especially in the years of the Existence of the State of Israel. At one time, in 1947, the Jewish people were particularly pleased with the memorable speech of the Representative of the USSR to the UN, Mr. A.A. Gromyko, which recognized the existence of the historical roots of the Jewish people in Palestine and their right to establish their own state.

2. Many of the inhabitants of the State of Israel originate from different republics of the Soviet Union. Some of them arrived in

Palestine before the First World War, others - in much greater numbers—in the period between the two world wars.

Among them are many people who have close relatives in the Soviet Union, who were going to move to Palestine in 1939 and who were prevented by the world war.

3. With the end of the world war, a new tide of immigrants, who endured the torment and horrors of the Nazi extermination in the ghetto and in the death camps and who were displaced after the destruction of the Nazi regime, began. looking for their families, and arrived in Palestine without finding them. Other members of these disparate families, wandering, in turn, in search of relatives who survived the extermination, found themselves in the territory of the Soviet Union. In addition, there are people in Israel whose families, who lived before the war in Poland and Romania, took refuge in the Soviet Union during the war and, for various reasons, did not have time to return to their former residence during repatriation.

Thus, there are now many disparate Jewish families who survived the Nazi extermination, one in the State of Israel and the other in the Soviet Union. The desire of the members of these families to reconnect with their families is natural and justified.

4. The degrees of kinship between persons living in the Soviet Union and their relatives in Israel vary. Among them are single elderly people who have children, grandchildren or nephews in Israel, husbands and wives whose spouses are in Israel, sons and daughters whose parents live in Israel, orphans who have older brothers, sisters or relatives of lateral degrees in Israel, ready to take care of their upbringing, people who remain completely alone after the death of their closest relatives and have different relatives in Israel.

5. The problem of reuniting disparate families is everywhere and always paramount and deserves to be treated humanely. It is greatly exacerbated and requires a lot of attention when it comes to disparate Jewish families who survived the Nazi massacre. It is understandable their spiritual need and desire to be together with a few of their

loved ones, survivors and far away from them. The members of these families in Israel are eager. At the same time, they take full responsibility for the maintenance of the relatives who will come to them. This wish is fully supported by all the inhabitants of the State of Israel.

6. The Mission entrusted to me is aware that there is no principled objection on the part of the Soviet Union to the departure of its citizens to join their families in Israel. In the years leading up to the Second World War, there were many cases in which persons living in the Soviet Union were allowed to visit relatives in Palestine. Also after the Second World War there were cases when Soviet citizens were issued passports to go to Israel.

7. On behalf of my Government, I allow myself to ask, through your Government of the USSR, to pay attention to the above and to allow the persons referred to in paragraph 4 to visit their relatives in Israel. I consider it my duty to solemnly state that the Soviet Government's granting of a broad opportunity to reunite these disparate families will be perceived by all citizens of the State of Israel as a friendly act by the Soviet Union towards the State of Israel.

8. I fully understand, Your Excellency, that permits to leave the Soviet Union for the State of Israel should be preceded by an individual review on a case-by-case basis. My request is that the Soviet Government take a general positive decision on this issue and that, on the basis of this general decision, each individual review should be conducted with a favourable approach. At the same time, I allow myself to request that, following the general positive decision taken by the Soviet Government, the exit permit procedure will be simplified and expedited as far as possible, as the persons in question, after all their experience, have been separated from their families for years.

9. I allow myself to hope that the foregoing will be met with a positive decision by the Soviet Government. In this case, I am honoured to ask Your Excellency to deign to order that the Ministry entrusted to you soon begin to discuss with

the Mission of the State of Israel the order and details of the implementation of this decision. I take this opportunity, Your Excellency, to once again show your deep respect.

S. Eliashiv Extraordinary Envoy and Full Minister of the State of Israel

**NOTE OF THE THIRD EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE USSR
FOREIGN MINISTRY TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY. October 27,
1951**

Secret.

In connection with the oral appeal to the Foreign Ministry of the USSR of the Israeli envoy Eliashiva on October 23, 2017 regarding our response to the

the Israeli Government's 12 March this note (attached) is reported as follows:

1. In a note dated 12 March 1951, the Government of Israel declared its right to demand reparations from Germany for the Jewish people. The amount of reparations in the note is determined at one and a half billion dollars and consists of the costs incurred by Israel during the resettlement and arrangement of Jewish emigrants who came to Israel from countries under Nazi rule. The Government of Israel expressed the hope that the USSR would recognize the validity of Israel's claims and requested that "the occupying powers not transfer authority to any German government without making clear reservations about the payment of reparations to Israel". Finally, the Government of Israel requested that the Government of the USSR's opinion be informed of the practical measures that could be taken to implement the proposals.

Israel sent similar notes to the governments of the United States, England and France.

It should also be noted that that in its note of January 16, this year, the Government of Israel, assigning the Germans full responsibility for the damage caused to the Jews, requested that the Soviet authorities in Germany decree measures to rectitude or compensate all Jews who were deprived of this property illegally for the time from

January 30, 1933 to May 8, 1945. that the interested parties will have to agree on.”

3. With regard to Israel's demand for reparations from Germany, T. Semichatnov and Ilyichev reported that, in their view, we should have evaded the substantive response of the requirement and responded to the Israelis in a general manner that the Soviet Government would not object to hearing and considering Israel's claims for reparations from Germany when concluding a peace treaty with Germany.

4. On May 19, 1947, according to the DPU, OBSV and III EO, instructed the Embassies of the USSR in the United States, England, France, as well as the Soviet mission in Israel to find out whether the governments of the United States, England and France gave answers to the notes of the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

From the responses of T. Panyushkin, Zharubin and Ershov, it became clear that the Israeli government had not yet received any official answers to its notes to the Western powers and that the United States was cautious about Israel's claims.

That. He agreed with the proposal of the DPU, OBSV and III of the EDA of 2 August this year that we should refrain from responding to Israel's notes on restitution and reparations from Germany for the time being.

5. When the Soviet Foreign Ministry visited on October 23, The Israeli envoy Eliashiv asked to expedite our response to a note dated March 12, 1947, on the question of Israel's demand for reparations from Germany.

At the same time, he said that the governments of the United States, England and France on this issue responded that since the issue of reparations with Germany had already been discussed, including in Paris, they could not put it again now, but that, in their opinion, the issue of Israel's claims for reparations with Germany should be considered open until the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

Based on this, we are making the following proposals to your consideration:

1. The Israeli Foreign Ministry's notes of January 16, 1951 and March 12, 1951 on the issue of restitution and reparations are not given.

2. If the Israeli envoy to Eliashiv were to revisit the issue of reparations in conversations with the Ussr Foreign Ministry, he should verbally answer that, since the issue of reparations with Germany was once the subject of discussion among the various States that had suffered material damage as a result of the German aggression, and since well-known international agreements had been reached on that issue, the Soviet Union could not assume any obligations on the matter.

A draft oral response to the Israeli envoy is attached.

M. Gribanov S. Bazarov

**LETTER FROM THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
OF THE USSR A.A. GROMYKO TO THE SOVIET ENVOY TO
ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV. November 15, 1951**

Secret.

To your No. 260/s from 13.08.51

Confirming the receipt of the report of the Soviet mission in Israel for the second quarter of 1951, the Ussr Foreign Ministry considers it necessary to point out that, although this report addresses the main issues that should be reflected in such a document, nevertheless there are a number of significant shortcomings in the report, namely:

1. The question of Israel's financial situation is vague and vaguely laid out.

The report did not provide any detailed analysis of the Israeli Government's revenues and expenditures, and the tables in the report on the subject appeared to be mechanically written from a handbook, not systematic for the purposes of the report, and therefore they were basically only cluttered up by the report.

2. The report provides only two paragraphs on the state of the country's agriculture, which give no idea of the subject (p.9).

3. The report only casually (p. 15) mentions that, due to the lack of cooperation between the Mapam party and the Communist Party, there has been a recent stagnation in the peace movement in Israel. This assertion, concerning such an important issue as the peace movement, is unconfirmed and is not developed in the report.

In addition, the report is generally poorly edited, contains repetitions and inaccurate language (p. 3, 7, 8, 12, 14, 19).

With regard to the mission's practical proposals outlined in the report, we report the following:

a. The proposal to intensify the revelation in the Soviet press of the Anglo-American machinations in Israel, the reactionary domestic and pro-American foreign policy of the

Israeli government is correct. The mission needs to send more specific materials on the subject to the centre for use in the Soviet press.

b. The mission's suggestion that the issue of the transfer of Soviet property to us should be brought before the Prime Minister and then the President is not motivated sufficiently to make a decision on it now.

You must expedite the submission of concrete proposals together with the Commissioner of the Russian Palestinian Society in accordance with the decision of the USSR Foreign Ministry's panel of February 19, this year on the question of our further position in this regard.

The mission's proposal to strengthen and increase funds for the work of THECO in Israel is also not motivated. If you believe that the work of a WOCS commissioner needs to be expanded and that this will require additional funds, you should justify this in detail, indicating exactly what the purpose is and how much money will be needed. Without it, it is impossible to consider this proposal.

You need to take steps to address the above shortcomings, particularly in the next quarterly mission reports in the future.

Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

A.Gromyko

A NOTE FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL. November 21, 1951

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the following to the Government of Israel.

On October 14, this year, the press published proposals of the governments of the United States, England, France and Turkey, with which they formally addressed to the Government of Egypt on the creation of the so-called Allied Middle East Command for joint defence of the Middle East. It is also known that these proposals were passed on to the Governments of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Israel and Transjordan. On 10 November, the Declaration of the Governments of the United States of America, England, France and Turkey on the same issue was issued to the Governments of those countries.

The proposals include the establishment of a “union command in the Middle East”, the deployment of foreign armed forces in Egypt and other countries in the Middle East, as well as the deployment of the headquarters of the command in Egypt and the provision of military forces, military bases, communications, ports and other facilities to Egypt, as well as to other countries in the area. However, the proposals stipulate that the so-called Middle East Command will be associated with the organization of the Atlantic Bloc.

It follows from the proposals and the Declaration of the Four States that the requirement of the United States to establish a joint command in the Middle East area is intended to involve the States of the Middle East region in the military activities carried out by the Atlantic Bloc under the pretext of organizing the “defence” of the area.

As the Soviet Government has repeatedly stated in its official documents, the affairs of the Atlantic bloc have nothing to do with the defence objectives of its participants. On the contrary, the facts show that this bloc pursues aggressive goals and is directed against the USSR and the countries of popular democracy. However, the objectives of

the Atlantic Bloc run counter to the basic principles of the United Nations, whose task is to maintain peace and establish friendly relations between peoples, rather than to create blocs of some States against others.

Events held by the organizers of the Atlantic Bloc in Europe and elsewhere show that it is a tool of the aggressive imperialist policy of its organizers, led by the United States of America. This alone shows that the plan for the four Countries of the Middle East Command envisaged by the proposals has nothing to do with the interests of maintaining peace and security in the Middle East, as well as with the genuine national interests of the States of the region. This is also evident from the fact that the organization of such a command is associated with broad plans to establish new and expand existing military bases in Egypt, Iraq and other countries in the Middle East, to extend their stay in these countries, and to introduce new foreign forces on their territory against the expressed will of the people of those countries.

Implementation of the plan for the establishment of the so-called Middle Eastern Command would result in the de facto military occupation of the countries of the Middle East by the troops of the Atlantic bloc, especially the United States, England, and several other states, including Australia and New Zealand, located 12-15 thousand km from the area. What would mean such a situation for the countries of the Middle East, it is not difficult to see the example of some of these countries, which were subjected to occupation decades ago by foreign troops, who continue to be there to this day, despite the legitimate demands of the peoples of those countries for the withdrawal of foreign troops from their territory.

The occupation of the Middle East by foreign troops and the establishment of foreign military bases on their territory in accordance with the plans for the formation of the Middle East Command cannot but lead to the loss of independence and sovereignty by these countries and to the subordination

of them to some major Powers attempting to use their territory, their material resources - oil, cotton, etc.- for their aggressive purposes.

Any reference to the defence interests of the Middle East countries is in fact only a cover for the involvement of the Countries of the Middle East in the military activities of the Atlantic bloc against the Soviet Union and the countries of popular democracy.

In this regard, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to emphasize the well-known fact that the Soviet Government from the early days of the Soviet State was sympathetic and sympathetic to the national aspirations of the peoples of the East and to their struggle for national independence and sovereignty. Unlike those Powers that are accustomed to seeing the countries of the Middle East as their colonies, the Soviet Union, following its unwavering policy of supporting the just national demands of peoples, both large and small, has always recognized their right to self-determination until the establishment of an independent state, as is well known to the people of Israel. Such a policy of the Soviet Union is in line not only with the fundamental national interests of the peoples of the Middle East, but also in the interests of maintaining universal peace.

The Soviet Government has always pursued a policy of peace, as evidenced by its concrete proposals aimed at strengthening peace and security, with which the Soviet Union has repeatedly spoken in the past and is now at the United Nations, calling for an end to the arms race, a ban on nuclear weapons, a one-third reduction in the armed forces of the five great powers, an end to the aggressive war in Korea, a peace pact.

All this shows how absurd any kind of statement about any threat to the countries of the Middle East, the references to which they are trying to justify the need to establish a so-called Middle Eastern command, and what are the real objectives pursued by the governments of the United States,

England, France and Turkey in connection with their proposals for such a command.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw the attention of the Government of Israel to the fact that Israel's participation in the so-called Middle East Command will seriously damage the existing relations between the USSR and Israel, as well as the cause of maintaining peace and security in the Middle East.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE FIRST
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.A.
GROMYKO WITH THE ENVOYS OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT
AND WITH THE TEMPORARY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF
IRAQ, LEBANON AND SYRIA IN THE USSR. November 21,
1951**

Secret.

Reception

Egyptian envoy Anis Azer-bey,

The Charge d'Affaires of Syria, Badi Hakki,

Lebanon's Charge d'Affaires, Najara,

Israeli envoy S. Eliashiva and Iraq's Charge d'Affaires
Hussein al-Ghailani

On 21 November, Egypt's envoy, Anis Azer-Bey, the Charge d'Affaires of Syria, Badi Hakki, the Lebanese Charge d'Affaires Najara, Israel's envoy to Elyashiwa and Iraq's Charge d'Affaires Hussein al-Gailani, were summoned and handed the notes of the Soviet Government on the establishment of the so-called Middle Eastern Command (enclosed).

Badi Hakki, Najjara and Hussein al-Ghailani said they would immediately report the contents of the note to their governments.

Anis Azer-bey, reading the note, stated that the Egyptian government had rejected the proposal of the four states for Egypt's participation in the establishment of the Middle Eastern Command. I replied that the Soviet government was aware of the Egyptian government's decision.

Anis Azer-bey asked me what he should do: send the contents of the note he received to Cairo by diplomatic mail or telegraph. I replied that it depended on the envoy himself, but added that the text of the note handed to him would be published in the Soviet press, so if the note was delayed, the Egyptian government would not be able to find out about its contents before the note was published here.

Anis Azer-bey stated that he would take all necessary measures to convey the contents of the Soviet government's notes to his government by telegraphing the contents of the note.

Eliashiv, having read the note, stated that the Israeli Government had not received an official invitation from the governments of the United States, England, France and Turkey to participate in the Middle East command and that it had allegedly received only information from those States about their proposal to Egypt.

I replied that the statement of the four Governments on the organization of the Middle East Command referred to the entire middle east and the Middle East, and that all Arab countries and Israel were known to have received the relevant appeals from the Governments of the four States.

Eliashiv agreed and said that he would hand over to his government the contents of the soviet government's note.

When asked by Eliashiva whether the Soviet government's note sent to the Israeli government would be published, I replied that similar notes had been given to other countries in the Middle East and that one of them would be published in the Soviet press in the near future.

At the end of the conversation, Eliashiv asked to be accepted if he received a response from his government to the soviet government's note.

I agreed.

The conversations lasted from 3 to 6 minutes each. The conversations were attended by: with Anis Azer-bey, Eliashiv and Hussein al-Ghailani - the first secretary of the Middle East Division T. Tatianachenko, in conversations with Badi Hakki and Najjar - the first secretary of the First European Division T. Shvedov.

Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

A.Gromyko

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR V.A.ZORIN
WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR S. ELIASHIV.**

December 8, 1951

Secret.

Today, December 8, 1951, at 1 p.m. 30 min. received the Israeli envoy at his request.

Eliashiv said that he was authorized to make a statement on behalf of the Government of Israel in response to a note from the Soviet government dated 21 November 1951 regarding the establishment of the Middle East Command.

After that, Eliashiv read out the text of the statement (attached).

After listening to Eliashiv's statement, I told the envoy that it would be brought to the attention of the Soviet government.

Without touching on the entire content of the statement, I merely noted that the reports in the Soviet press regarding the presence of foreign military bases in Israel, referred to in the statement, are, as is known, based on foreign press reports, including the Israeli press, and that, on the other hand, we have much more reason to reproach the Israeli press for the lack of loyalty to the USSR, given the hostile materials against the USSR, if we take into account those hostile materials against the USSR. that are systematically published in it.

I added that I do not believe it is possible at this time to address other issues contained in the Israeli Government statement.

In response to my statement, Eliashiv said that the Government of Israel, in its statement about articles published in the Soviet press regarding the existence of foreign military bases in Israel, wished to emphasize once again that these reports have no basis.

In conclusion, Eliashiv said that he would like to have the opportunity to discuss further with me the issues raised in the Israeli statement.

I replied that the need for such a discussion would be visible after studying the Israeli Government's statement.

The conversation lasted 12 minutes. The first secretary of the Middle East Division T. Tatiana A.I. was present.

Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR

V.Sorin

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO THE SOVIET UNION. December 8, 1951

Presented by Israel's envoy Eliashiv T. zorina V.A. during a conversation on December 8, 1951.

1. The Government of the State of Israel carefully and thoroughly considered the veering note of 21 November 1951 sent to it by the Government of the Soviet Union.

2. The State of Israel was not invited to join the Middle East Command and was not asked to join at all. The Government of Israel has therefore not defined its views on the nature of the command and its form. It is clear from this that the Government of Israel has not decided to join the command. At the same time, the State of Israel was informed by the Powers organizing the Middle East Command that it had no aggressive intention or purpose.

3. The State of Israel sees a crucial security issue in the threat against it by the Arab States, which refuse to make peace with it. Since peace is undivided, the State of Israel believes that all members of the UN, with great powers at the helm, have an obligation to act vigorously and concretely to address this threat for the sake of Israel's security and peace in the Middle East.

4. The State of Israel sees the protection of world peace as the most lofty goal of international policy. Similarly, it knows that world peace is necessary to ensure its own security, its existence, its future and development.

5. The State of Israel has, and will always protect, its independence and its national sovereignty, a valuable treasure it has gained in the long struggle and at the cost of many sacrifices. The State of Israel remembers perfectly well and will not forget that in the decisive political phase of its struggle for independence, generous and very significant assistance from the Soviet Union was provided.

6. The State of Israel has not agreed and will not agree to promote aggressive action or preparation against the Soviet Union or any other peace-loving State.

7. In connection with the above paragraphs 4-6, the State of Israel has drawn the attention of the Soviet Government to the fact that for about two years the entire Soviet press, including its most responsible bodies, have been repeating the information that military bases of foreign states are allegedly being established in Israel. This information is completely untrue, as there are no foreign bases in our country, the publication of such information can, unfortunately, damage the relations existing between our states. On the part of the Government of Israel there is a great desire to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

8. As the Government of the Soviet Union knows, the main task of the State of Israel is to return the Jews to their historic homeland. The Government of Israel knows that the development of our country and the absorption of all Jews wishing to return to their historic homeland are only possible if there is peace and orderly relations between different States. In this regard, the Government of the State of Israel appeals to the Soviet Union to allow Jews who wish to move from the Soviet Union to Israel. The Government of the State of Israel believes that this wish is in line with the policy of the Soviet Union, built on national equality and on the right of every people to self-determination.

9. The Government of the State of Israel expressed its sincere hope that the exchange of views between the Soviet Union and the State of Israel on the issue under discussion would clarify the issues at hand and would further improve relations between the two States.

(The spelling and punctuation are preserved in the original.)

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
December 16, 1951**

We have learned for sure that according to Charette's telegram, his conversation with Acheson on 19 November in Paris related to the following issues:

1. Charette expressed his full satisfaction with Acheson's speech at the UN session and assured him that Israel would carefully protect the democratic way of life and, if in danger, would be able to defend democracy.

2. Charette asked whether there might be a situation in which Western troops would leave the Middle East, recalling that during the Second World War, General Wavell had told the Jewish representatives that he might have to retreat from Palestine to the east and from Egypt to the south. If we had to do it, our case would be destroyed. If such a situation arises in the future, it will mean the liquidation of our cause, the establishment of a dictatorship and the death of many people. Will the US and England send enough military forces for the defence of the Middle East? Noting that he had not received Acheson's answer, Charette points out in brackets that he did not expect an answer, but only wanted to put the question.

3. Referring to the Middle East command, Charette said that Israel's restrained position on its participation in the command was due to two reasons: the first was the unresolved relations with Arab countries. Western powers have invited Egypt, which is Israel's strongest adversary. He declined the invitation, but maybe reconsider his position. Acheson noted that now Egypt will not join the command. Charette said Eden's last speech said the door to Egypt's participation was still open. The second reason, Charette continued, is the need to continue immigration from Eastern Europe. If Israel takes part in the command, in the USSR and

other Eastern European countries Jews will be considered disloyal.

Immigration is not just for Israel. The West wins nothing if immigration is stopped. Acheson asked how many Jews lived in the USSR and the countries of popular democracy, individually, and Charette called the figures, and Ambassador Palmer, who was present at the conversation, recorded them.

For this reason, Sharett said, Israel cannot yet act as an open enemy of the USSR. It is possible that we will not always vote with the West, "but this should not deprive you of sleep even for one minute." (Charette notes that Acheson was very pleased with this phrase.) Thus, Israel's abstention from an open hostile position towards the USSR stems from our national interests. However, there is some common interest between Israel and the West in this matter: "Councils will feel more free to talk to us." Israel is not interested in formal participation in the command, but "in a special and practical agreement" that will establish a direct link with Britain and the United States.

Acheson replied that he was well aware of that position and was pleased with Charette's proposal for a direct link, which would not address the issue of Arab countries and help bring them to command. There is now a new concept of command management due to the difficulties that arose in the first period. A centre will be set up to cooperate with states that have expressed their desire to do so. But if there is a war, this cooperation will take new forms and will be the closest. Responding to Acheson, Charette explained that the special agreement should be connected with the country's development plan, especially communications, military forces and industry.

England, for example, proposed to Israel to transfer the production of a number of goods that could offload the British industry. Israel is interested in receiving the same offer from the United States.

4. Charette referred to the issue of a new grant to Israel for 1952 and, while emphasizing the favorable attitude of the United States Government to Israel's previous requests, expressed the hope that the State Department would support the consideration of a new subsidy. Acheson said he believed support would be provided.

5. Charette explained Israel's position on reparations from Germany and asked whether the United States could help Israel receive reparations from the Bonn Government. Acheson said he could not yet give a definite opinion. He has nothing against Germany's reparations from its own funds. But since Germany is actually in the U.S. custody, it should not be allowed to pay American money to other countries.

6. Charette concluded that the remilitarization of Germany would pose a threat to world peace, but Acheson left that remark unanswered.

Ershov

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE AND
MIDDLE EAST OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY A.D.
YSHBORIN WITH THE CHARGE D.ARGAMAN. December
21, 1951**

Secret.

December 21, 1951, at 4 p.m. accepted Argaman at his request. After the usual greetings, Argaman told me the following:

1. The Israel Research Council plans to hold a conference of scientists in May 1952 on the study and development of deserts with the participation of foreign experts in this field. The Israel Research Council is holding this conference in collaboration with UNESCO International.

The Israeli mission was tasked with reaching out to Soviet desert scientists with an invitation to participate in the upcoming conference. The Research Council of Israel wishes to invite the famous Soviet scientist Professor Lebedev to the congress, paying all his expenses for a trip to Israel. During his stay in Israel, the Soviet scientist will be a guest of the Israeli government. However, the Council would like to know in advance whether Professor Lebedev would be able to accept the Invitation of Israel. If, for whatever reason, he is unable to attend the conference, the Israeli mission asks the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to help it send an invitation to another Soviet scientist who would be known for his research in the desert area. Initially, the Israeli mission wanted to resolve this issue through VOCS in Moscow, but according to the protocol department of the Ussr Foreign Ministry, the board of VOKS in Moscow has no direct connection with foreign missions. This forced the Israeli mission to contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

Summing up the above, Argaman stressed that, in this way, he makes a request of a two-sided nature: first, to help the Israeli mission by the council, which way and how

scientists can send invitations to participate in the conference, and, secondly, that the USSR Foreign Ministry would assist the mission in ordering any of the Soviet scientists to participate in the work of the planned conference.

In response to this communication, I told Argaman that on the first side of his request, I needed to pre-OD the relevant order of invitation to Soviet scientists and to find out how the Ministry would be able to assist the Israeli mission in this matter. As for the second side of the issue - the assistance of the mission by the Ussr Foreign Ministry to ensure the participation of Soviet scientists in the planned conference, I promised to inform the leadership of the Ussr Foreign Ministry about this request of Argaman. At the same time, I told Argaman that he apparently knew that the Soviet Union was not a member of UNESCO.

In response to this comment, Argaman replied that UNESCO's cooperation in holding a conference of scholars in Israel was likely to be expressed only in providing Israel with some additional funds for this important event for Israel, and that the conference would be purely scientific in nature. Argaman added that the Israeli Government was seeking to facilitate its mission to develop the Negev Desert; the participation of the Soviet scientist will undoubtedly be of great benefit to Israel, as the Soviet Union is known to carry out huge works on the development of desert areas.

I promised Argaman to make the necessary inquiries and inform him about the results.

2. Then Argaman asked me to advise him on how to restore the existing connection on book exchange between agricultural institutions in the USSR. Argaman asked if there was a representative of THEOCS in Israel.

I replied to the adviser that the representative of VOCS in Israel was the second secretary of the Soviet mission in Israel, Popov, and that, in my opinion, the issue of book exchange between the agricultural institutions of the USSR

and Israel could be resolved through the representative of VOCS in Israel.

Argaman agreed and said he would advise Israel's interested agencies to use this way of communication with the scientific institutions of the USSR.

3. Then Argaman raised the issue of the Israeli mission's appeals to the protocol department of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

Argaman immediately remarked that he wanted to talk about it not as a complaint, but simply to help the Middle East Division help Israel's mission to familiarize itself with manufacturing and cultural institutions in the Soviet Union.

Argan went on to say the following.

In August this year, the Israeli mission appealed to the protocol department of the Ussr Foreign Ministry with a request to organize a tour to the collective farm, but until now this tour has not taken place.

The mission requested a tour of the factory, but the tour was conducted at the Red October Chocolate Factory, where Israeli mission staff were unable to get to know the cultural and social institutions of this production. This issue is of great importance to the mission in terms of using the experience of the Soviet Union for its young State.

I replied to Argaman that the issues raised by him were entirely within the purview of the protocol department of the USSR Foreign Ministry and that I would inform the department of the Israeli mission's desire to be more familiar with the various Soviet institutions.

At the end of the conversation, Argaman raised the issue of the work of the session of the UN General Assembly.

According to Argaman, there is no such people and government in the world, except perhaps the U.S. government, which would like war. Argaman was closely following the Assembly's work, and he had come to the conclusion that the main obstacle to achieving universal peace was some fear of Western powers over the Soviet Union.

To this I have noticed that the Soviet Union, through its concrete proposals for a peace pact between the great powers, arms reductions, the prohibition of atomic weapons and international control, has made it clear to the world that the world has sincerely sought peace and international cooperation.

The conversation lasted 40 minutes.

The first secretary of the OBSV T. Tatiana A.I. was present.

A.Yiborin

On the document, the letters: "t. Bazarov. Give suggestions on the mission's requests. 13.XII.

Tatianachenko. Please talk. 26.XII.

**TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
OF THE USSR, FROM PARIS. December 23, 1951**

On December 22, he accepted, at his request, Charette, who re-started a conversation about facilitating the resettlement to Israel from the USSR of Jews who expressed such a desire. At the same time, Charette said that our policy in this matter goes against the history of the Jewish people and that the obstacles to the resettlement of Jews from the USSR to Israel are incomprehensible to them. He also recalled the Israeli Government's request to allow those whose relatives were in Israel to leave the USSR to travel to Israel.

I strongly rejected Sharett's claim that the USSR was going against the history of the Jewish people, as he put it, and reminded him of the Soviet Union's position on the Israeli state from its inception.

I also pointed out that his observation that we were counteracting those wishing to go to Israel was unfounded, saying that there were no groups of Soviet citizens in the USSR who wanted to leave the USSR and move to Israel.

With regard to the policy of the Soviet Union towards Israel, I drew Charette's attention to the policy of the Israeli Government towards the USSR and stressed that during this session the Israeli delegation always supported aggressive American policy and even voted against our resolution on the law on the 10 October appropriation of \$100 million. to subversive activities against the USSR and the countries of popular democracy, supporting the United States and in this case against us.

Charette tried to justify himself by pointing out that the Israeli government was economically dependent on the United States and was unable to act freely for fear of losing American credit and American supplies.

The conversation lasted about half an hour.

In connection with yesterday's conversation, Charette sent me a letter today in Russian the following language:

“The respected Mr. Vyshinsky,

I consider it a duty and a sincere need to express gratitude to you for a sincere conversation and for the personal trust placed in me.

In connection with our vote in the First Committee yesterday, I missed mentioning the main reason. The draft resolution of the Soviet Union called for the rejection of the entire American law on mutual security, an event by which we, the State of Israel, received an appropriation of \$65 million. We could not but vote against a resolution that denied this, for us, invaluable assistance, which is now turning into food, fuel, raw materials and machines. I saw fit to add this substantial and crucial explanation.

I wish you a good rest and full health.

I sincerely hope that the resolution of the issue of the relatives of Israeli residents will move forward soon.

With sincere respect

M. Charette”

**LETTER FROM THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO BELGIUM S.
KADDAR TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY. January
2, 1952**

I bring to your attention a case that seems so fantastic to me that I would treat it with great doubts if I heard from others. But it happened to me.

These are very open and friendly conversations with the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Brussels and their promise to facilitate the repatriation of Jews from Russia.

Here's how it happened. At a reception on December 20, 1951, organized by Cercle diplomatique de Bruxelles (a private institution headed by Belgian citizens seeking to maintain regular contact with the diplomatic corps and thus giving diplomats the opportunity to meet with each other), I was approached by the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy Gennady Nikolaevich Karpov and started a "salon conversation" with me about all sorts of things.

While we were standing and talking, I was approached by a group of students and diplomats from different countries - Belgians, Haitians, Indonesians, Iranians, etc. and invited to join them to continue this informal event. I turned to Karpov (pre-arranged that he would find an excuse to refuse) and invited him to join. To my great surprise, he agreed. For most of the time, while the others were having fun, we continued the conversation, complaining of isolation, lack of contact with the local population and organizations. Little by little the conversation turned to Russian affairs, Israel's problems and finally the problem of repatriation, including, of course, the repatriation of Soviet Jews. When we got to this point, Karpov said that it was too large-scale and serious to discuss it in such an environment. He offered to arrange a meeting and then deal with the problem comprehensively. When I gave him a ride to the embassy (I will not say that the hour was late, rather early), we parted as friends, even kissed. Perhaps it is worth noting that there were several

other people in the car—a Haitian and two Belgians. Saying goodbye, he asked me to contact him one of the next few days to set a place and time to continue the conversation.

The second conversation took place on December 29 during a joint lunch. Karpov again complained about loneliness in Brussels and stressed that in three years of work he has the opportunity to dine in a restaurant for the first time. The conversation lasted two and a half hours, mostly talking about the problem of Soviet Jews. I will not give here all Karpov's statements and all my counter-arguments, all this is quite known. But here's what he said at the end: "I admit you're right. I especially want to note that for the first time I heard from a foreigner an analysis of the internal problems of the USSR without attacking my country or its system. Since I'm not used to stopping halfway, I want to ask if there is anything I can do to help implement the idea of repatriating Soviet Jews to Israel. If you are interested, I can send a detailed memorandum to our Foreign Ministry."

To this I said that I have no right to give recommendations to whom and what to write to him in the Foreign Ministry—it is their internal business and I do not need to interfere. At the same time, I cautioned him against hasty steps that could hurt him and not be of any benefit to the cause. At the end I said, "Since we meet tomorrow (meaning a reception in the Romanian mission), think about it for now, and tomorrow you will tell me that you have decided."

After this conversation, I pondered for a long time and hesitated whether to write about it. The contrast between Karpov's behaviour and that of all the other diplomats from the countries of popular democracy I have met in recent years was so obvious that I was simply afraid of becoming a laughing stock by sending a report on proposals most likely to be based on nothing.

But then there was another event that prompted me to write to you about everything: on December 30, a reception was held in the Romanian mission. And so, when I was

standing and having a long conversation with the wife of the rector of the University of Brussels, Ms. Berzin, I suddenly noticed that in three different places of the hall there are three Russians and do not take my eyes off me, clearly in search of an opportunity to talk. The three were Karpov, the ambassador to Belgium, Dmitry Petrovich Pojidayev, and another first secretary, Alexander Anikin.

As soon as the conversation with Ms. Berzin was over and she stepped aside, Pexpectationa came up to me and asked with a grin, "What do you have in common with this American agent?" (Ms. Berzin, a Jewish woman from Antwerp, is an activist of the Friendship Society of the United States). Then Karpov and Anikin came up, and Karpov said to me, "Yesterday I told my comrades about our conversation, and they think the same way as I do. He continued: "This is a very serious issue, because for us we are talking about several million Soviet citizens. And for you it can be a fateful state problem. The solution can't be quick. First, you need to slowly prepare the soil. It seems to us that if Karpov sends a regular report to the Foreign Ministry about your conversation, this paper will fall into some dusty folder forever. So we decided that each of us would write private letters to our friends in Moscow." And Karpov added: "Although there are legislative officials among our friends, we will not offer anything yet, we will just start a discussion on correspondence. It is customary for us to discuss important issues first. Now we have learned a point of view that seemed logical to us, so we want to hear the opinion of friends in our homeland."

That's the whole story. I'm trying to figure out what this is, after all, a strange thing, so similar to fantasy. I confess that all my attempts to explain what happened do not lead to anything. I am sure that you, with a broader understanding of what is happening, will be able to give me such an explanation. I can assume that they will follow the continuation of these conversations: I will be very grateful to receive instructions from you. With respect. S.Kaddar

**RECORDING OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTER M. SCHARETTA AND SOVIET
FOREIGN MINISTER A.Y. VYSHINSKY. January 6, 1952**

Confidential.

The conversation took place at the Soviet Embassy, where Mr. Vyshinsky stayed for the session. Knesset member David Hakogen came with me to the meeting. Mr. Vyshinsky was unaccompanied.

I introduced D. Hakogen as a member of the delegation, a member of the Knesset, my old friend and a party comrade. "An old friend of the party?" asked Vyshinsky with a grin.

At first, I said that I would like, with Mr. Vyshinsky's permission, to clarify the problem that has already been raised in our conversations, and I hope that I will not abuse his patience. The question is simple, will there ever come a time when Soviet Jews will be able to come to Israel?

Vyshinsky wanted to give an answer at once, but when I saw that I had not finished, he was silent, took a piece of paper and a pencil and began to write down.

I said that the USSR is the only country in the world from which there are no Jewish returnees to Israel. The creation of our state is a worldwide Jewish action, but Soviet Jews, almost 2 million people, do not take part in it. This is very depressing and disturbing, we cannot accept the situation. The revolution in Russia, which led to the creation of the USSR, was the greatest act of liberation of the Russian people. The Russian people then showed mighty will and threw off the yoke of tyranny. The USSR has always supported the movements of oppressed peoples fighting for liberation and rebirth. However, the fate of the Jewish people is different from that of all other nations in the world. All peoples live on their land, firmly rooted in it. They just need to throw off the yoke of foreign oppression to become free. The Jews were expelled from their land and

scattered all over the world. The national liberation for them should begin with the return of their homeland and the gathering of diaspora. It is this process that is taking place before our very eyes. It is an act of the greatest national will, an imperative of Jewish history. I will allow myself to take advantage of even a very sharp turn - I know that we talk with all sincerity, and it is very important for me to express the idea precisely - we do not understand why the USSR should put obstacles in the historical path of Jews. Vyshinsky shook his head, threw a stern look at me and said that there may be different points of view on the historical path.

I replied that we have no doubt on what direction modern Jewish history is moving. The facts support our assessment. Our state was created as a result of the historical process of returning Jews to their homeland from all sides of the world. We were dust scattered on the face of the earth, but, thanks to a strong-willed effort, we were able to come together and become a force. The USSR helped us to make us a state. This help will never be erased from the tablets of our history. But with the achievement of independence, our formation is not completed, independence has only laid new foundations for it and gave a significant incentive. The gathering of diaspora is now on an incomparably larger scale than it was before the formation of the state. Only Soviet Jews do not take part in this process. Recently, our envoy in Moscow had the opportunity to discuss with Mr. Vyshinsky the issue of repatriation of close relatives, i.e. the issuance of visas to go to Israel to citizens or residents of the USSR whose family members live in our country. After that meeting, our envoy sent a written memorandum to Mr. Vyshinsky. Can we hope that a solution will be found and, at least in this part, the separation of Soviet Jews from Israel will be overcome?

Vyshinsky began to respond, from time to time casting a glance at his recordings. From the very beginning, his voice could be heard barely restrained irritation, then it broke out.

He said that my statement about the contradiction of the policy of the Soviet Union in the course of Jewish history has no basis. I myself cited the proof, pointing to Soviet assistance to the establishment of the State of Israel. The USSR stood on the side of Israel in the most difficult moments. He would like to be wrong, but he has the impression that difficult moments await Israel in the future; in each case, he can firmly count on the support of the USSR. And how does Israel itself behave towards the Soviet Union? When does it help the USSR? After all, in interstate relations it is not customary to ask for help without reciprocity. He, Vyshinsky, sits and looks at us at this session, and what does he see? Not only do we not help, but we even take an unfriendly position towards the USSR. What happened yesterday during the vote on the draft resolution of the USSR on the American proposal to finance hostile and aggressive actions against the USSR and its allies? What the Americans have done is an incredible scandal; they have openly bitten on the security of the Soviet Union! He knows full well that it is not easy for us to clash with the United States. We depend on Americans economically, and it is in the difficulties of our situation. But couldn't we at least abstain in the vote? Our support for the American position deeply upset him and his comrades. They don't care how Costa Rica or Honduras vote, but Israel?! They are convinced that Israel has moved to consistent support for the enemies of the Soviet Union.

Then I interrupted him and said that he was well aware of how we voted for Belarus's candidacy for the Security Council, contrary to the position of the United States. This remark caused a new explosion of indignation. He did not believe that Israel deserved a special award for that. By voting for Belarus, Israel did its duty primarily to itself, not to the USSR. It was a matter of respect for the fundamental principle trampled by Americans. How can Israel even rely on the friendship of a power like the United States? Americans will only help as long as Israel can be used. The United States always acts only in self-interest; their calculations will

change, and these robbers will not hesitate to simply strangle Israel. And in such a situation, the Israelis still come to ask for help from the USSR?! Israel has no right to such assistance! If it was an official conversation, he would have concluded it here by confining himself to the observation that, since we do not understand the essence of Soviet policy, he does not have to give us an explanation. But this is not just an official conversation, but a conversation with Sharet, to whom he always had feelings of personal sympathy and respect. For me, Charette, he's ready to explain the situation.

Indeed, our envoy discussed with him the issue of family reunification. This issue has been raised at several of our previous meetings. But over the past year, he's been sick for six months (heart refraction) and couldn't deal with government matters. And now he has to take great care of himself. But on his return from Paris, he promises to tackle the problem closely. He estimated that interested parties would be given the opportunity to apply for departure, and then each request would be decided on a case-by-case basis. When it comes to elderly people with children in Israel, or young people with parents in Israel, or some similar cases, there is no reason to make people suffer in vain. Family reunification has been allowed before. But in this case the problem is raised differently, in terms of emigration (why he uttered this word with a Ukrainian accent, with a frictional "g"). There is nothing to talk about emigration. The state system in the USSR does not allow this. Moreover, there is no problem in this regard. Soviet Jews breathe other air, and should not be confused with Jews in other countries. He has many Jewish acquaintances, and none of them contemplates emigrating from the USSR to Israel or any other country. In any case, none of them expressed such a thought to him. And it's not surprising. Jews in the USSR enjoy full equality. They hold important positions in all areas of life, including public service. Suffice it to mention Lazar Kaganovich, one of the most famous and beloved figures in the Soviet Union.

Vyshinsky then made several more general comments designed to prove that Soviet Jews do not need or contemplate repatriation to Israel.

When he finished, I said first of all that I appreciate the personal trust on his part and I will speak with all sincerity too.

He interrupted me, saying that no transient circumstances could change his personal attitude towards me, accompanying the phrase with a few compliments. The tension of the conversation was defused, but then he added: "A few minutes ago I broke down a bit, which is very sorry. Forget about it."

I said that I fully understand what he wanted to explain to me, and for my part, I ask permission to make a few comments. Of course, it was our duty to vote for Belarus in relation to the principles we adhere to. But the fact remains that it has greatly damaged our relations with the United States. And given the full economic dependence on American aid -- by the way, I was glad to hear that the need for this assistance, you know -- this decision, of course, was not easy for us. Moreover, great Britain and France, which first voted with us together for the candidacy of Belarus, suddenly left us and switched to the side of Greece. As for yesterday's vote, if the American draft, which provides for the right to allocate funds for this purpose, were put to the vote, then our situation would be quite different. We would not support such a proposal. But on the agenda was the Soviet proposal, which accused the United States of all mortal sins. If we did not support the United States in these conditions, it would call into question the whole system of Israeli-American relations. And we can't afford that.

This answer of mine has not exhausted the topic of conversation. In preparation for the trip, I did not attend the First Committee meetings on the last day before the holiday holidays, when the vote took place, so I did not have a chance to read the text of the Soviet proposal. Only later, after a conversation with Vyshinsky, this text fell into my

hands, and I learned that the purpose of the initiative was to condemn the law on mutual security in full, and this law includes a special paragraph on the provision of gratuitous assistance to Israel. So in any case, we had no choice in voting. I sent him a note explaining this aspect of the problem, while thanking him for the opportunity to meet with him and expressing the hope that progress would be made on the issue of family reunification.

I told Mr. Vyshinsky that I don't know if he realizes how much all our state-building activities depend on U.S. aid. We have no hope of coming to economic independence and, as a result, to true state independence in any other way. Using only local resources, we cannot create an economy that could accept 700,000 already arrived returnees and hundreds of thousands of those who will come. We need external assistance as air, and the only major source of such assistance is America: not only American Jews, but also the U.S. administration. By the way, the assistance of American Jews depends on the benevolent attitude of the administration, on their recognition of the fact that Israel is a friendly state of the United States. American Jews are patriots of the United States as much as Soviet Jews are patriots of the USSR. I mentioned an example that Malik and Sobolev had at my dinner a few days ago: if a person is lying without strength on the ground, someone needs someone to reach out to him and help him stand up. He himself will not rise without help, but when he is already on his feet, he will no longer need help.

Vyshinsky said that he understands my approach, but, to be honest, does not share it. However, this is a personal opinion, and we can talk about it not as representatives of states, but as two former students of the same university. He personally believes that the path we have chosen leads not to independence, but to economic and political enslavement. The USSR was also going through a period when the economy was in ruins and there was a chance to get out of the crisis by handing out concessions to foreigners. But the decision

was made otherwise. It was necessary, however, to go through very difficult tests, but in the end the state coped on its own.

I replied that, unfortunately, this experience does not apply to us. This is not a question of transient difficulties, not even a question of hunger. We are in much greater danger, it concerns our very material existence as a people and a state. So far we are only in the process of becoming, and if we fail to create a state and absorb the returnees, we will collapse. And then all the work and all the sacrifices laid on the altar of independence will be in vain. In this regard, we have nothing to lose: if, out of fear of being “enslaved”, we will refuse American aid, very soon we will simply be gone. And it is not a matter of economic assistance alone. We need a lot of weapons. We are surrounded by enemies on all sides, and hostile peoples outnumber us by an order of magnitude. We can only get weapons today from the United States and its allies. It is not our fault that we have come to this world at a time of international tension and mutual preparation for a new war. We're not the reason. But for us, the question of life and death is to gain strength right now, with the current state of the world, which we cannot change. Gaining strength means getting help, but this assistance is only a means to an end: to strengthen independence. For all our need for foreign aid, we are determined not to promote any aggressive arrangements against the USSR. We know that the Soviet press constantly publishes fictions about the supposedly built American bases, that we are supposedly a tool in the hands of the United States to achieve dark goals, but all these publications have no ground.

Vyshinsky said, “We've never said anything like this about you.”

I replied that, nevertheless, the Soviet press constantly publishes such information. Vyshinsky was silent.

I went on to say that we are interested in maintaining balance in our international position, but the USSR is not helping us to achieve this. The Americans have a strong

trump card, which seems to have the Soviet Union, but for some reason Moscow does not use it at all. As a result, it turns out that in this respect the advantage on the American side. This trump card is the free ties between the Jews of the diaspora and Israel. Our ties with American Jews are constantly expanding, and there are no contacts with the Jews of the USSR.

Vyshinsky reacted violently to this. "How does Israel not understand that America promotes these ties just for its own benefit?" he exclaimed. American Jews arriving in Israel, engaged in pro-American propaganda, are a tool for the implementation of Washington's plans! Of course, in the end these plans are not destined to come true, because American Jews who settle in Israel become Israeli, not American patriots, but the meaning of the U.S. position is just that.

I noticed that I didn't mean American Jews repatriating to Israel (by the way, there are very few of them). We are talking about American Jews visiting Israel, the opportunities we are given to visit Jews in the United States, and other forms of free contact between us.

"This is a different matter," Vyshinsky said, and immediately turned the conversation to the issues of Soviet tourism, as a result of which the conversation reached a dead end. They in the USSR recognize only collective tourism, that is, visits of organized delegations. Over the past year, 40,000 people have visited the USSR in this way. Indeed, tourism in the Soviet Union suffers from a lack of funds, the state is engaged in post-war reconstruction and does not have free money to develop tourism and create the necessary institutions. But time will pass, and the situation will change.

I returned the conversation to the main channel and talked about the future of Soviet Jewry. The Soviet regime took a clear position on the national issue, granting absolute self-government to every people within the Union. But this solves the problems of compact national groups, and for Jews scattered throughout the country this approach is not applicable.

Vyshinsky immediately responded: "This is wrong, we created a Jewish republic in Birobidzhan."

I said that this experiment, in our impression, leads to three conclusions: first, only a tiny minority of Soviet Jews live in Birobidzhan.

Vyshinsky interrupted me: "Who is to blame if it is more convenient for them to stay in Moscow?"

I agreed, but indicated that, in any case, the goal had not been achieved. The second conclusion is that Jews in Birobidzhan are a minority.

Vyshinsky: "It's not true, they make up the majority. Apparently, you were misled by the last name. Many surnames look like Russians, but in fact they belong to Jews."

I said that we are not well versed in Birobidzhan affairs or in Soviet statistics to determine who is hiding under what name. I am talking about the general impressions that come to us, including from afar. And the third conclusion - the majority of the Jews of Birobidzhan live in cities, attempts to accustom them to village life, to agriculture have failed.

He didn't answer that.

Then I again stressed that the problem of Soviet Jews is of a special character, different from the problems of other peoples of the USSR. To put all the points above the "i" and explain our position on this issue, we would like to meet Stalin someday.

Vyshinsky replied: "Mr. Stalin is well aware of the problem."

I added that it is also clear to us that many Soviet Jews consider themselves flesh from the flesh of the Soviet system and do not even think about leaving the USSR. But perhaps there are many who would choose to repatriate to Israel if they were given the opportunity.

Vyshinsky reiterated that no one expresses such a desire.

I said, "That's because there's no way."

He said, "No one is applying for an exit visa."

I said it's because there is no decision at the state level to comply with such requests. It turns out to be a vicious circle. If it could be broken, at least for members of separated families, and reports of the arrival of Soviet Jews in Israel began to emerge, that would be great news for Israelis and for Jews around the world. The Jewish public would be convinced that the USSR is strong enough to change its line if it concludes that such a change is justified.

Vyshinsky reiterated that reunification issues would be decided on a case-by-case basis, taking into account specific circumstances in each case. Then I added that the appearance of Soviet Jews in Israel is unlikely to appeal to America. We demand this because we need it - that's our line on all issues.

Vyshinsky noted that communist Jews, of course, would not want to go to Israel to be persecuted there. He understood that Israel could not become a communist country today and did not demand it. Either way, they're not going to send agents to us.

I said that I should just mention the fact that the communists in Israel are not persecuted, but we do not have the special force. The existence of the Communist Party is perfectly legal, its representatives sit in the Knesset, who express their position very vociferously.

Then the conversation went in a circle, we returned to the problems of development and American aid. D. Hacogen gave several examples of vital development projects in agriculture and industry, the implementation of which is impossible without the participation of foreign capital. Discussions on repatriation continued in general terms, without any decisions being taken.

Vyshinsky repeated several times that "no one is turning" and "we are not aware of anyone who would like to leave." Again and again he stated that the desire to leave the USSR could not arise naturally, since Jews are fully integrated into Soviet life and are an organic part of society: "If you came and looked, you would see for yourself."

I said that, generally speaking, I would like to ask permission to come. These words of mine somewhat confused Vyshinsky, he clearly understood that he said something superfluous. But immediately he recovered and politely remarked, "I'm always glad to see you."

At the end of the conversation, I stressed that Jews are a patient but stubborn people and we do not intend to give up on the possibility of repatriating Soviet Jews to Israel.

We parted in a friendly way, Vyshinsky accompanied us with a broad smile.

**LETTER FROM THE ADVISER OF THE PERMANENT
MISSION OF ISRAEL TO THE UN G. RAFAEL TO THE
AMBASSADOR OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED STATES, THE
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UN
A. BAN, IN NEW YORK. Paris, January 29, 1952**

At a reception at the French Foreign Ministry a few days ago I had the opportunity to talk with Sobolev, the Russian ambassador to Poland. He spoke with admiration about the restoration of the destroyed Warsaw. When he said that new residential quarters were being built on the site of the former ghetto and that soon there would be no memory of the ruins, I noticed that I had heard from our representatives in Poland about the rapid progress of reconstruction, but we can never forget that this is a construction site on the ruins of Polish Jewry. Then the conversation moved to the position of the surviving Polish Jews. To my amazement, Sobolev frankly said that anti-Semitism is still survivable among Poles and finds an open expression in everyday conversations. He added that after the extermination of 3 million Jews, this is surprising, as there are almost no contacts or friction between Poles and Jews. For a moment of reflection, he said, "Among Poles, there are many who do not like the high percentage of Jews in government and state structures, maybe this is the reason for the survivability of anti-Semitism in this state."

I was astonished to hear such an unequivocal and dangerous remark from the mouth of the Soviet representative, the real ruler of Poland. However, he made this statement with a clear dislike, leaving no room for suspicion that he shares such a view. But the very fact of explaining the current state of affairs, in my opinion, does not bode well for the Jews employed in the power structures.

I suggested that the Polish government would make every possible effort to eradicate anti-Semitism, but Sobolev shied

away from a clear answer. At that time, I used the opportunity to address the situation of Jews in the USSR, noting that the Nazi occupation of the western parts of the country had caused anti-Semitism there, and I believe that the authorities have done everything necessary to eradicate it. Sobolev stressed that there is no problem of anti-Semitism in the USSR, that information about alleged mass anti-Semitism in Ukraine as a result of the German occupation is clearly exaggerated and untrue. He added that there is no other country in the world where the situation of Jews is as secure as in the USSR, but agreed with my observation that Israel is also a safe place for Jews. I noted that we know this, we are glad that Jews are not discriminated against in the Soviet Union, but we are not prepared to accept that Soviet Jews are not able to participate in our national renaissance in Israel. The USSR is committed to self-determination, and we would very much like to see progress in this issue for Soviet Jews. I explained to Sobolev that we need a healthy element that is repatriated of its own free will, not necessarily because the country of residence has been persecuted. To this he replied that he did not see among Soviet Jews signs of desire to leave the country. True, in recent years he spends most of his time abroad, so can not judge how they actually feel, but when meeting with his Jewish friends in Moscow, he never heard of the desire to repatriate to Israel. I noted that as long as the Soviet policy was based on a principled opposition to repatriation, Jews should not be expected to speak out about their desire to repatriate. Sobolev accepted this comment. At the end of the conversation, he reiterated that he could not consider himself an expert on the situation of Soviet Jews, but was concerned about the situation surrounding the Jews in Poland.

When we talked about the Warsaw ghetto, I asked if he had read Hershey's book *The Wall*. Sobolev had no idea of the very existence of such a book. I recommended that he read it and sent a copy a few days later.

With respect
G.Raphael

**THE REPORT OF THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES VOCS N.N. CHIGARKOV
ON THE WORK ON THE LINES OF VOCS IN ISRAEL IN
1951. January-February 1952**

Work on the LINE of VOCS in Israel is carried out through the authorized VOCS and the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR. Working conditions in 1951 became even more complicated. The Main Branch of the League in Tel Aviv did not have its own premises for organizing the planned events: exhibitions, ceremonial evenings, film demonstrations, etc. The Central Leadership of the League had no connection with its offices. The collection of membership fees was unregulated, which led to the material weakness of the League. In this regard, the Presidency of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR planned to hold the 4th Congress of the League in 1951, at which all these issues were to be resolved. However, we have not yet received any information about the convening of the congress.

The main part of the league's friendly relations with the Soviet Union in 1951 was the organization of the exhibition of photo exhibitions of VOKS. In 1951, three exhibitions were exhibited in Israel:

1. "Academic Small Theatre of the Union of the USSR";
2. "The Soviet Book";
3. "Soviet schedule."

The exhibition "Soviet Book" was organized by the League together with the Israeli firm Haifalepak. It was opened on May 12, 1951. Numerous recordings of benevolent and even enthusiastic nature were made in the book of reviews. All Israeli, including the right, the press has placed good reviews and articles about the exhibition. The exhibition "Soviet Book" increased interest in Soviet culture and increased the demand for Soviet literature in Israel. From 5 to 15 May this year, an exhibition (exhibiting) "Soviet Graphics" was opened in Rishon-le-Tsion after exhibiting in

Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem. It was visited by about 2.5 thousand people.

The COMMISSIONER of THES in Israel notes that “some of the exhibitions sent by the VOCS do not meet the needs of the general political agitation in their quality and design. Such, for example, an exhibition as “Small Theatre” is small in volume and poor in design, and thus cannot properly reflect the work of one of the best Soviet theatres. The exhibition about the Small Theatre, unfortunately, is no exception.”

More exhibitions such as the Soviet Graphics (i.e. R.L.) should be sent to Israel. In 1951, libraries in Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem, established by the local branches of the League, continued to operate in Israel, based on literature sent by the WAOC; Russian language courses consisting of two groups: the first year of study and the second year of study. These courses are attended by 20-25 members of the League. The lack of a Russian language textbook for Hebrew speakers hinders the attraction of new students to the courses. In addition to the Russian language courses, the Tel Aviv branch of the League organized a “Seminar on the Study of the USSR.” This is a kind of series of lectures about the Soviet Union, the theme of which is: “State System of the USSR,” “Constitution of the USSR,” “People’s Buildings in the USSR,” “Industry and Agriculture of the USSR” etc. Lectures are given by the activists of the League and are accompanied by a demonstration of diafilms and diapositives on relevant topics.

In 1951, the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR continued to publish its organ , the magazine “Israel-USSR.” However, for the whole year, due to financial difficulties and censorship slingshots, in the hands of government officials, the League managed to release only three numbers.

In 1951, the department received 15 requests from VOCS commissioners in Iraq, Egypt and Israel. Of these, 10 requests are granted ... sent to the relevant Soviet institutions for their implementation.

Among the requests made is a request by the WOCS Commissioner in Israel to send several Soviet operettas for the newly created Israeli Music Theatre, which would help the theatre to provide a repertoire free of American influence to which most of Israel's cultural institutions are exposed. We sent librettos and claviers of operetta "Trembita" and "Free Wind." Ready to send the clavier and libretto of operetta "The Wedding in Malinovka."

Three requests were denied because of the impossibility of fulfilling their VOCS.

J. Chigarkov

**LETTER FROM ISRAEL'S ENVOY TO THE USSR S.
ELIASHIVA TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
SHARETTA. February 1, 1952**

Secret.

Dear Moshe!

I carefully read the content of your conversation with Vyshinsky. In the telegram I tried to briefly note the main provisions, as I see them. Here I will try to solve the problem more broadly in connection with two other issues that go with it in a single context, namely our line at the UN General Assembly and the impact of our policy on Soviet Jewry.

I'll start with the main one. The most important thing is that you presented the problem in all dimensions and made an offensive statement. The question is open. It seems to me that we have not yet presented our case to them, although from your previous conversations with Vyshinsky, from the statements of the Prime Minister and your speeches, as well as from the memorandum that I once handed over to Vyshinsky, and our response to their note they should be well aware of what we want. It is very important that you started the conversation with the main one and that your interlocutor could only draw one conclusion - that you wanted to meet with him for this very reason and this is the main issue facing us in the whole complex of Israeli-Soviet relations. It is also very important that you expressed a desire to meet Stalin; we have never said so far. That is, in terms of questioning a great deal has been done.

But the most important thing in such conversations is the position of the other side. And here it must be said that I have a heavy impression. In the telegram, I noted the positives: the promise that in difficult times we will be able to count on their help; Understanding the problem of our relationship with the United States; the fact that they distinguish between us and other countries; their particular interest in our position in the voting ("He sits and looks at

us”), an acknowledgement that they have no complaints about us on the issue of foreign bases. But the counterbalance to all this was his particular irritation with our course, manifested in unexpected outbursts of anger, as well as the repeated remark twice (according to the protocol) that we cannot ask for their help without respecting the principle of reciprocity and that, judging by the current situation, we are not entitled to ask for help. It's serious enough. In fact, we are told that until we change the policy, we should not expect them to meet us in our business. Turning to the problem of repatriation, you find one positive thing - there is no reason to make people (including the young) suffer in vain. But it is the only light ray in the dark realm of completely negative ratings. He persistently repeated that none of the Soviet Jews are interested in leaving the country. The answer is that each case will be dealt with individually, seems very clever, but nothing good is promising. Link this to his previous words that we have no right to ask for their help- and here is the bitter outcome of the conversation.

It is quite possible that he was influenced by external circumstances, the atmosphere around him; maybe under other circumstances he wouldn't have said it all. After all, the conversation took place the day after the vote, which outraged him, at the most inopportune time, which could be chosen. Maybe in a few days, after our other votes (there were others!) he would have said otherwise. I understand that the timing did not depend on you, that it was before you left, and you did not set a date for the meeting; I'm not writing all this to in hindsight that we may have made a mistake; in any case, such reasoning is useless and it is not worth wasting time on them. I just think it might make sense to take a little comfort and tell ourselves that we shouldn't view this conversation in such gloomy tones as it seems now. M.6., it is to be hoped that in reality everything is not so bad and in a calm atmosphere one can count on other formulations and other results. And one more thing that

could have had a negative impact on the conversation is that I'm referring to an aspect that we could really change. I think it was a mistake on your part not to go to this meeting alone. Your companion was a random person for him, never met before and in any case not among close acquaintances. Vyshinsky came alone, which is completely out of their customs. That is, he was ready for a free conversation with you, and perhaps the very appearance of an outsider, whose participation in the conversation was incomprehensible to him, led him to even more irritation and at the same time provided the audience for public speech. It's hard for me to imagine Vyshinsky getting out of your mind when you're sitting against each other without prying eyes.

Here, I think, are two incoming aspects that should be taken into account as negative factors that influenced the course of the conversation. But that is not the main point: there is a deeper reason and this is our conduct in the General Assembly. In one of the letters to the Foreign Ministry at the very beginning of the session, I wrote: "As far as I follow our vote in the General Assembly, it is clear that we are following an independent line and no open-minded observer will say that we are leaning on someone's side." Now, unfortunately, I can't do it again. There has been a serious departure from the line to non-alignment, although formally we continue to adhere to it. I can't judge from afar, but I don't think it's possible to keep quiet. I know very well what factors have an impact on us, and from my own experience in Lake Sak-Sesse I know the power of this impact. But we have now chosen the line of least resistance, and that's what I saw last year, too. I do not know, maybe our behaviour is due to the fact that after internal struggle we have come to the conclusion that this is the only possible line. Or maybe they just succumbed to external pressure without trying to resist it. From here, I watched with regret some of our votes. I don't know, for example, whether we could not even try to split the vote on the American law, which caused such irritation to Vyshinsky. If we seriously

expect to receive anything from the USSR in the field of repatriation and if the problem of Soviet Jews is really so important to us, we should also take into account the interests of the party on which the solution of this problem depends.

We must not forget that we are asking for a solution that runs counter to the whole reality here. It is fundamentally contrary to all rigid practice of hermetically closed borders. We have no reason to hope that they will go against their own ideas if, for our part, we look in their eyes an integral part of the camp hostile to them. If all our talk about Soviet Jews is serious, we must feel pressure on the other side every day and hourly. Now I return to the paragraph that I pointed out in a private letter to you, but here, only for reasons of goodness of the case. I am very sorry that there was no one in our delegation who would have felt this pressure from the "other side" and tried to make it feel to other members of the delegation. One example: we know how we voted on a proposal accusing the USSR of aggression against nationalist China. Why couldn't we have voted like this before meeting Vyshinsky? And one more thing. After all, even in this session, for all their flirtation with the Arabs, the Russians did not take action against us, and on our issue they did not vote with the Arab countries. And now I turn to another, no less serious question for us. We cannot ignore not only the light in which we and our policies are presented to the Soviet representatives. There is another factor - Soviet Jews. On the basis of conversations with Jews and our staff, I come to a clear conclusion: Soviet Jews are infinitely sensitive to everything that concerns our policy, they are really very afraid that Israel will be in the same camp as the enemies of their homeland. These people are as devoted to their homeland as Jews in other countries. We talked to different people and the responses were different, but the essence remained the same. Ordinary Jews, the Jewish masses already hate us and do not hesitate to make it clear. To get to the Jewish solidarity lurking deep in their souls,

you need to unload a thick layer of indignation at our politics, and their intellect is not enough for this. As a result, they remain in the shell of hostility. Educated people who have found their way of being here ignore us and do not want to know us because they believe that we belong to a hostile camp. Those we rely on are more difficult. In parallel with the distance from the Soviet Union, their hope that their Government will agree to allow them to repatriate or maintain any contact with us in the foreseeable future is less. In addition, they are increasingly afraid to come into contact with us and our state. They simply pray that Israel does not appear in the eyes of the Soviet Union as an enemy, they fear every movement, every vote, they suffer doubly and triply every time they see a newspaper article or a note about some of our unfriendly actions. Here, dear Moshe, you have to take my word for it. After all we've heard here from the Jews, I have no doubt that I've correctly guessed their sentiments.

Here, of course, one can answer this: the Jewish community is not responsible for The policy of Israel, and Israel determines its policy in accordance with its needs and interests. However, this question also in other places gives dogmatism, and in the case of the country where I am, it is simply detached from life. There are completely different emotional and reasonable categories than in any other place. Moreover, this answer does not stand the test of reality. In fact, in shaping our policy, we take into account the life situation of other Jewish communities. I well remember that at the last session, when Spain was discussed⁵², we developed a course of action, taking into account, not least the needs of the various Jewish communities. True, in the end we made a decision for other reasons, but the Jewish factor, at least, was not ignored by us. And at this session? Why did we decide not to do anything that would hurt South Africa (a decision that put us in a rather strange position)? Isn't it because we remembered the interests of the South African Jewish community? Here in the USSR, we also have a

Jewish community, unhappy and silent, but it is taking into account this situation, we should listen especially carefully to the whisper, which miraculously still comes from here. If we continue our old line, we will simply lose these Jews. Some of them, and apparently a lot, we have already lost. I hope that these words of mine will not seem lightweight to you or to the other people who determine our politics, people whom I deeply respect. It was only these days that I read the Prime Minister's remarks about Russian Jewry at a kibbutz federation seminar in Beit Burl. These words oblige a lot. The situation is serious and tragic, we have no right to simultaneously bring it to the national discussion and ignore it when forming a foreign policy course. Let me doubt that the various decisions of our delegation to the Un, often taken in haste and under pressure from one of the parties, have always taken this factor into account.

Perhaps I went beyond that letter. Of course, it is not customary for the envoy to write to his minister. A thousand times I've been excused. But I can't talk about it any other way, but I can't say it either, so close to the scene of a horror play about a large Jewish community, only part of which is still fighting for its connection with us, while we are only complicating the conditions of its struggle with ourselves and the elements surrounding it.

What's next? I have already written in the telegram that I would like to come to Vyshinsky with some materials in my hands, to give him a list of cases on which I could ask for a positive decision first. Because of my ill health, I have to leave here for a very short period of time. I'll be back in mid-February. If Vyshinsky is healthy at work and if our materials are ready, I will ask to accept me. I'd be happy to get any instructions from you.

Sincerely your friend

S.Eliashiv

NOTE OF THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.A. GROMYKO TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (B), CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR J.V.STALIN. February 23, 1952

Owls. Secret.

Comrade Stalin J.V.

On December 8, 1951, Israel's envoy to the USSR, Eliashiv, on behalf of his government, made a statement to the USSR Foreign Ministry in which, along with the response on the merits of the Soviet government's note of November 21, 1951 on the creation of the so-called Middle East command, the Israeli government puts before the Soviet government the question of allowing the Departure of Jews from the USSR to Israel.

The statement stated that "the return of the Jews to their historical homeland" was the main task of the State of Israel and that the Israeli Government's appeal was "completely consistent with the policy of the Soviet Union, built on national equality and on the right of every people to self-determination".

It should be noted that the issue of Jewish departure from the USSR to Israel is not the first time the Israeli government has raised the issue. On October 22, 1951, Israel's envoy to the USSR, Eliashiv, sent a personal note to the Foreign Ministry asking for the permission of Soviet citizens with relatives in Israel to "reunite disparate Jewish families" to the Foreign Ministry.

The note asked "that the Soviet government take a general decision on this issue and that, on the basis of this general decision, each individual review should be conducted with a favourable approach" and that "the procedure for issuing exit permits should be simplified and expedited as far as possible".

In conclusion, the note expressed the hope that the Soviet government would make a positive decision on this issue.

In addition to this official statement of December 8, 1951 and in a note dated October 22, 1951, the issue of allowing the mass departure of Jews from the USSR to Israel was repeatedly raised in the order of probe in oral interviews of the Israeli envoy to the USSR in the Foreign Ministry, as well as in the conversations of the Foreign Minister

Israel Sharetta with Vyshinsky (October 21, 1950 in New York, December 22, 1951 in Paris).

Taking into account that the Government of Israel has repeatedly raised the issue of the departure of Jews from the USSR to Israel in various forms, the USSR Foreign Ministry considers it appropriate to instruct the Soviet envoy to Israel T. Ershov to give an answer on the substance of this question to Israeli Foreign Minister Charette. In this answer, Ershov must point out that the statement of the Israeli government of December 8, 1951, the statement of this question is essentially interference in the internal affairs of the USSR, as well as to clarify the general procedure for all Soviet citizens to leave the USSR, established by the current legislation.

This answer should be given by Ershov during another visit to the Israeli Foreign Ministry in connection with any other issue.

A draft resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) is attached.

Please consider.

A. Gromyko

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
February 24, 1952**

Today, 24 February, he visited Charette and made a statement on the issue of our property in Israel. Charette reacted very painfully to my statement and, at the end of the reading, made two comments:

1. The mission of the USSR, in his opinion, does not take into account local legislation that protects the rights of tenants.

2. It was not known to the Government of Israel whether it had the right to deal with the difficult issue of the transfer of property. It is believed that the issue of Russian property should be referred to the decision of the judicial authorities.

After listening to Charette, I told him that the issue of property was very clear and that the Government of Israel should transfer the property to its rightful owners, that is, the mission of the USSR and the Russian Palestinian society. I rejected his claim that we did not take into account local legislation protecting the rights of tenants and pointed out that this legislation primarily ensures the rights of property owners. I added that the transfer of the issue of property to the permission of the judicial authorities would only delay the transfer of property. Charette replied that there was no political reason for the matter and he believed that the Government would make a decision in about a month, that is, after his return from a trip to England, where he was leaving on 28 February. Charette added that my application would be properly examined and a response would be given after the government's decision. I referred to Charette's previous statement and said that I expect the transfer of the property as soon as possible. Charette reiterated that this could not be done before his return from England, but he will report to the government on my application today or tomorrow. I repeated that I insist on resolving this clear and

indisputable issue, that is, the transfer of property in the very near future.

Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR S.
ELIASHIVA TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY. March
25, 1952**

A. Yesterday we were invited by Bazarov and made an oral statement: the Government of Israel raised the issue of German restitution and reparations for property in favor of Israel. According to the Soviet government, this issue falls into a category that can be discussed within the framework of the signing of a peace treaty with Germany.

Asked how the USSR views this problem in principle and to what extent he is ready to support us, he said that he does not know and that he has instructions to give us only the above statement. He added that the issue should be resolved by Germany itself.

b. Perhaps the point of the statement is that the Russians do not recognize our agreement with Bonn until there is no single peace treaty. It is also possible that this is the usual propaganda to acquire the location of different states to the Soviet position on peace with Germany. Maybe it makes sense to tell the Russians here or by publishing in the press that they themselves did not wait for the peace treaty and took the reparations with a full handful?

Eliashiv

**DRAFT NOTE OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY
ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE
SOVIET COUNCIL OF MINISTERS V.M.MOLOTOV 6 April
1952**

Owls. secretly
Comrade A.Y.

On your instructions, I submit to this draft note in the name of Molotov on the issue of the departure of citizens of the USSR - Jews to Israel for permanent residence.

B. Podcerob

Comrade V.M. Molotov on the departure of Soviet citizens to Israel for permanent residence

In accordance with the instruction not to prevent the departure of citizens of the USSR - Jews to Israel for permanent residence, I report the following.

1. According to the General Police Department, in 1952, citizens of the USSR filed six applications to the police with a request for permission to leave for Israel for permanent residence. Decisions on these applications have not yet been taken. Cases are prepared by the General Police Department for transfer to the Commission on Exits at the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b).

For previous years, these data are available:

1948 - 6 applications were filed, 2 permits were granted;

1949 - 20 applications were filed, 4 permits were granted;

1950 - 25 applications were filed and no permits were issued;

1951 - 14 applications were filed, 4 permits were granted.

2. An introduction to the cases of citizens who applied for permanent residency in Israel this year showed that those requests could be granted.

All 6 applicants for permanent residence of Soviet citizens from the USSR are Jews between the ages of 52 and

77 and ask for permission to go to their children who are in Israel and are ready to accept their parents for their dependents (the certificate is attached).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR believes that the Ministry of State Security of the USSR (i.e. Ignatieff), the General Directorate of Police of the USSR (i.e. Leontiev) and the Commission on Exits at the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) (i.e. Savchenko) should be instructed to allow the departure of these persons to Israel permanently.

3. With regard to the applications filed in 1951 by Jews to leave for Israel, on which negative decisions were taken, I consider it appropriate to instruct the Commission on Exiting the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) to re-examine these cases and to allow travel to Israel, unless there are any obstacles of particular nature.

4. The same instruction should be given to the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, the General Directorate of Police and the Commission on Exiting persons who may receive further applications from persons of Jewish nationality wishing to leave the USSR for Israel.

Please consider. Reference to those who applied to leave the USSR for Israel

April 4, 1952

Secret.

1. ABRAM Isaakovich, born 1888, a native of the mountains. Radzin Lublin Province, Poland. He currently resides in the mountains. Vilnius. From 1918 to 1940 he was a Lithuanian citizen. Since 1940 he has been a Soviet citizen. non-party. From 1900 to 1906 he studied in the Jewish spiritual seminary. From 1906 to 1920 he was dependent on the first wife, who worked as a tailoring master. From 1920 to 1934 he owned a small business (the nature of the enterprise is not specified). From 1934 to June 1941 he lived in the mountains. Kaunas and worked on the study of the Talmud and existed with the funds of the Jewish public foundation. In 1941 he worked as a loader at the

Himplastmass plant and as a caretaker of the Moscow-Kuibyshev railway construction office.

Since July 1946 he has lived in the mountains. Vilnius. Not working, exists on funds received from children living in Israel. In 1936, his son Shalom Abramovich, 1915, and daughter Of Sterm Frida Abramovna, 1910, were sent by a Jewish emigration organization to Palestine. The children currently live in Natania, Israel. The son works in agricultural work for hire, the daughter is dependent on her husband, working plaster on the construction.

His wife, Gaia Lipovna, born in 1900, is a native of the Vinnitsa region of the USSR. Jewess. Education 4th grade of primary school. Soviet citizen. In 1917 she married NUHIMOV-E.L. and by 1929 she lived as a dependent husband in the Vinnitsa region. From 1929 to 1941 she worked as a master in a hat factory in the mountains. Odessa. From August 1941 to 1945 she was evacuated. In the Rostov region she worked in a collective farm, in the mountains. Uralsk did not work and worked as a nurse in the hospital in The Tashkent Region. Since 1945 he has lived in the mountains. Vilnius. In 1946 she married accountant Abram Isaakovich.

On March 3, 1952, the accountant's wife filed an application to leave the USSR for Israel for permanent residence to the son of accountant Shalom Abramovich, from whom there is a call received by accountant Abram Isaakovich through the Israeli mission.

Accountant A.I. has no relatives in the Soviet Union. His wife Accountant H.L. in the Soviet Union is home to the son of Nukhimov-Lev Efimovich, 1918, works as a doctor in the Soviet army and lives in the mountains. Vladivostok, Olga Bay, military unit 131/68. Nukhimovskaya's daughter Hariya Efimovna, 1920, works as a doctor in the mountains. Vilnius. Nurimovsky's son Leonid Efimovich, 1926, works as a chauffeur in the mountains. Vilnius. Daughter of Rachel-Tuna Efimovna, 1927, a student of the 1st year of Kaunas Medical Institute.

The case of the couple's departure from the OVIR GUM MGB of the USSR has not been considered.

It is advisable to allow the departure from the USSR.

2. FALIX Selman Nusimovich, born in 1883, in the village of Kassovka Sorokov county of the Moldovan SSR. Jew. Since 1940, he has been a Soviet citizen. Education is inferior. From 1899 to 1903 he worked as a clerk on the railway. From 1903 to 1905 he served in the Russian army. He participated in the Russo-Japanese War. From 1906 to 1914 he worked as a clerk and salesman at the station of Rogozhena Moldovan SSR. From 1918 to 1920 he was unemployed. From 1921 to 1940 he worked as a receptionist at the Uniuni Romaina Bank, at the mill and at the oil factory in the mountains. Balti. From 1940 to 1941 he worked as secretary of the sanitary and malaria station in the mountains. Balti. From 1941 to 1945 was in evacuation on. He worked at an oil factory in the North Caucasus. In the South Kazakhstan region he worked in a collective farm. Since 1945 he has lived in the mountains. The Beltsy of the Moldovan SSR.

His wife, FALIX, Esther Aronovna, 1883, in the village of Kapreshta in the Sorokovsky county of the Moldovan USSR. Jewess. The Soviet citizen since 1940 is illiterate. From 1899 to 1905 she worked as a student at the fashionista's place of birth. From 1906 to the present he is dependent on her husband.

In the Soviet Union, the couple's Falix is home to the son of Falix Hazkel Selmanovich, born in 1911, in the mountains. The drafts. He works as an accountant in the Carpathian Forest Party. There are four daughters in the state of Israel:- Falix (by her husband Caulker) Leia, 1907, who left for Palestine in 1931. He currently resides in Haifa. He works as an accountant. Falix (by Feldman's husband) Tusha, 1908, left for Palestine in 1933. He currently resides in the mountains. Tel Aviv. She works as a nurse. Falix (by her husband Silberstein) Armor, 1921, left in 1938 for Palestine. He currently resides in the colony of Dganiya-2. She works as a nurse.

In March 1952, the FALIX couple filed an application for permanent residency with their daughters in Israel. The call to his daughter was received through an Israeli mission in Moscow.

The case of the departure of the spouses of The FALIX OVIR GUM MGB of the USSR has not been considered.

It is advisable to allow the departure from the USSR.

3. KAUSHANSKY zlotá Moiseevna, 1884, in the village of Odoneshty Moldovan USSR. Jewess. Soviet citizen since 1940 Widow. Education is inferior. From 1894 to 1913 she worked in her household. From 1913 to 1927 she was dependent on her husband. Since 1927 (after the death of her husband) she was dependent on her sons. From 1936 to 1941 she was employed. From 1941 to 1945 she was in evacuation. In the Stalingrad region she worked in a collective farm as a calf, in the Saratov region she worked on the protection of MTS. She did not work from 1945 to 1947. In 1947 and 1948 she worked in the Artel "30 Years of October" in the mountains. Chisinau, fired by illness. From 1948 to the present he works as a housekeeper at the Gr. Israel Solomonovich's Buchner.

In the Soviet Union, KAUSHHANSka has no relatives.

In Israel live two sons of Kaushansky: Kaushansky Baruch Itskovich, 1916, who left in 1936 for Palestine, a worker, lives in Pares Khan, near Haifa, and Kaushansky Abram Itskovich, 1918. He lives in Tivon near Haifa. Both are Israeli citizens. Sons are obliged to take the mother on their dependent. The call was received through an Israeli mission in Moscow.

In February 1952, KAUSHHANSKA filed an application to go to Israel to visit her sons permanently.

The case of the OVIR GUM MGB of the USSR has not been considered.

It is advisable to allow the departure from the USSR.

4. GORERNSTTEIN Haim-Leib Gershkovich, 1875, in the mountains. Benders of the Moldovan SSR. Jew. Soviet citizen since 1940 widower. Education is inferior. He lives in the mountains. The drafts. From 1888 to 1937 he worked as a

painter in Bender, Chisinau and Renee. From 1937 to 1941 he was a watchman in a shop and an artel of disabled people in the mountains. Bender. From 1941 to 1946 he was in evacuation. In krasnodar region and Kazakh SSR worked as a watchman. From 1946 to 1950 he worked at the post office in the mountains. Chernovit tsy and caretaker of private apartments. It hasn't worked since 1950.

In the Soviet Union, GORENSTEIN has no relatives.

In Israel, the daughter of DRUBETSka Ida Haim-Leibovna, 1904. He lives in the mountains. Tel Aviv. An Israeli citizen. Husband of the daughter of DRUBETSka zema Leibovich, 1893. An Israeli citizen.

In January 1952, GORENSTEIN filed an application for permanent residence to visit his daughter in Israel. The call to his daughter was received through an Israeli mission in Moscow in 1951.

The case of the departure of GORENSTEIN OYYR GUM MGB of the USSR is not considered.

It is advisable to allow the departure from the USSR.

Head of the Consular Office

A.Vlasov

Deputy head of the OBSV

A.Yiborin

**TELEGRAM OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE
USSR V.A.ZORIN TO THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV. April 19, 1952**

In an interview with you on 24 February this year on the issue of the transfer of property to us, Charette said that the Government of Israel will make a decision on this matter a month after the return of him, Charette, from England.

According to reports, Charette returned to Tel Aviv on 31 March.

You need to visit Charette, refer to your conversation with him on February 24 and his promises, to point out the continuing cases of arbitrariness regarding Soviet property (e.g., attempts to move spontaneously into the premises of the Venyaminovsky Compound) and once again demand the acceleration of the transfer of all Soviet property to its rightful owners, namely, the missions of the USSR, the representative of the Russian Palestinian society and the Russian spiritual mission.

Telegraph the results.

V. Sorin

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
April 24, 1952**

On April 23, Charette visited and, citing his promises made in an interview of 24 February, pointed to the continuing delay in the transfer of Soviet property to its rightful owners and the facts of the unauthorized occupation of rooms in the Veniamin compound. Charette interrupted me and stated that the Preparation of the Government's decision on the matter was over, and he believed that the Government would adopt it at a meeting on 27 April or, at a last-date, the first meeting since Independence Day. I replied that I accept this statement and ask for instructions to the relevant authorities on the immediate transfer of property following the Government's decision. Charette said that the decision of the government of the Soviet mission will be reported in a timely manner.

Charette went on to say that he should take the opportunity to report that the Israeli Government did not agree with the Soviet Government's response to the restitution of Jewish property and reparations from Germany. On the recommendation of the occupation authorities, the Government of West Germany accepts and in most cases responds positively to the claims of individuals and Jewish organizations concerning property confiscated by the Nazis or the property left in Germany. The Government of East Germany initially took the same position, but then stopped accepting and satisfying these claims. On the recommendation of the occupation authorities, Adenauer issued a formal declaration and appeal to the Israeli Government for reparations, which allowed representatives of Israel and Jewish organizations to enter into negotiations with the delegation of the Bonn Government. No statements had been made on the part of East Germany, and the Government of Israel could not directly address the East

Germans for moral reasons. The Government of Israel hopes that the Soviet Government will reconsider its views and make recommendations to the East German Government.

Charette asked to pass this statement to the Soviet government. I promised.

Ershov

**LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY A. LEVAVI TO THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF
ISRAEL IN THE USSR, ARGAMAN. April 27, 1952**

Dear Argaman!

I will start the letter from Ershov's last visit to the minister. The conversation can be divided into two parts. The first ended, as I reported in the telegram, with the promise that before Independence Day Ershov would be handed the position of the Israeli government on the issue of Soviet property claims. Since you know the previous stages of this story, I will limit myself to an annex to the letter copy of the relevant Israeli note. There is no reason to believe that the Soviets will accept this position of ours - they will certainly try to challenge it. On the other hand, it seems to me that our position is fair and logical and that we have made such great concessions before that we simply cannot repeat this line now.

In the second part of the conversation, the Minister touched on the Soviet response to our appeal for help in obtaining East German reparations (see Eliashiva's telegram of March 25, 1952). We were quite surprised when Ershov tried to state that the USSR did not receive any reparations from East Germany, but only "took military trophies". I immediately recalled the exchange of telegrams between Stalin and Grotevol. Then he tried to claim that nothing like this had ever happened. To this I wrote him within 48 hours a short letter, to which I attached a copy of Stalin's telegram to Grotvol (copies are attached). As for the second Soviet statement, which applies only to Israel and Germany (Ershov tried to emphasize this by noting that there was no direct Israeli appeal to East Germany), the Minister noted that there was no progress on this issue in East Germany, comparable to Adenauer's statement in the Bundestag and his letter Tod. It was these statements and the letter that paved

the way for the talks in The Hague. Moreover, on the issue of restitution, the Government of East Germany had taken such a negative stance that there was no point in contacting it until that position changed radically. I attach a copy of the Israeli note in response to Bazarov's statement of March 24, 1952. Our demand that the USSR use its influence to encourage the East German government to take a positive position in the issue of restitution of Jewish property and reparations to the Jewish people remains in force. Please note that it is not yet a decision whether to hand over this note in Moscow or to limit yourself to an oral conversation in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Of course, the telegraph can agree on minor changes in the text. My opinion: it is desirable that you hand this note in writing.

During the second part of the conversation Ershov actively recorded, as if wanting to show the desire to understand our position. It is difficult to say whether it should be given any importance. I don't think so.

Yours sincerely

A. Levavi

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL P. IERSHOV AND ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTER M. CHARETTE. April 29, 1952**

Secret

He visited Charette at his invitation. Charette said that the Government of Israel had made a decision on the issue of Soviet property, and he was honored to give me a note outlining the substance of the decision.

After reading the text of the note, I told Sharette that its contents contradicted the assurances given earlier by the former Director of the Eastern Europe Department and personally by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and also contradicted the note of the Israeli Foreign Ministry of August 1949.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**NOTE OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY OF ISRAEL'S
MISSION TO THE USSR. May 10, 1952**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shows its respect for the Mission of the State of Israel and in response to the note of Mission 82/177 of 23 April 1952, it is an honour to report that the Academy of Sciences of the USSR will naturally not be able to participate in the International Conference on Desert Research, because the invitation to the conference was received a few days before its opening.

**THE FINAL SECTION OF THE POLITICAL REPORT OF
THE MISSION OF THE USSR IN ISRAEL FOR 1951. May
12, 1952**

Secret.

Thus, 1951 was a year of loss of independence for Israel, both in the economy and in domestic and foreign policy.

The Economic Policy of the Israeli Government, based on American loans and investments, leads the country to a catastrophe, the way out of which the ruling circles see in the American occupation of Israel, which, in their opinion, will cause the development of industry and agriculture and thus increase the profits of the Jewish bourgeoisie. U.S. intervention and control over the Israeli economy give it a military character so that it can serve U.S. troops in the Middle East in the future.

Israel's internal political situation is characterized by increased class differentiation- the concentration of reactionary forces around the party of the large bourgeoisie of the Common Zionists, which is already claiming power in the state, on the one hand, and the gradual strengthening of the democratic camp grouping around the Communist Party and the left wing of the Mapam, on the other. There has been an increase in the class identity of Jewish workers, who for the first time began to speak out against their Jewish, national bourgeoisie. This is confirmed by the major Israeli strikes and demonstrations that took place in 1951. However, the strengthening of the forces of the democratic camp is hindered by the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie on large segments of the population, expressed in the form of Zionism. The reaction to Israel's transformation into a police state should be expected to intensify further.

Israel's foreign policy is in the service of the U.S. State Department and is subject to American diktat. Israeli ruling circles are ready to join Israel in the emerging Middle Eastern anti-Soviet aggressive bloc or to perform U.S. missions

without formal participation in this bloc, on the basis of separate secret agreements.

The plans of the American warmongers and their Israeli accomplices, plans to turn Israel into a military base for attack on the USSR is increasingly resisted by the movement of peace supporters and friends of the Soviet Union in Israel.

The Attitude of the Government of Israel towards the Soviet Union in 1951 became more hostile, as expressed in a number of anti-Soviet speeches by members of the government, in the systematic anti-Soviet campaign of the reactionary Israeli press, in the refusal to satisfy the legitimate demands of the USSR on the issue of the transfer of property and in limiting the distribution of Soviet literature in Israel. The hostility of the Israeli government to the USSR will continue to increase, and it is possible that the Israelis may go to a political conflict with us, using as a pretext the issue of immigration of Jews from the USSR to Israel.

Based on the foregoing, it would be useful to take into account the following factors in our attitude towards Israel:

1) Ending all political support for Israel in matters before the UN and its bodies.

2) Stopping the immigration of Jews from the countries of popular democracy to Israel, as this immigration enhances Israel's potential.

3) Resumption of the publication in the Soviet press and press of the countries of popular democracy of materials exposing the anti-popular internal and pro-American foreign policy of the Israeli Government.

4) Providing effective assistance to the country's progressive forces and expanding the work to disseminate truthful information about the USSR.

5) Increased demands for the transfer of Soviet property to its rightful owners and some pressure on the Israeli Government in this matter.

6) Strengthening the mission apparatus, including technical personnel, qualified personnel, taking into account

the peculiarities of Israel, increasing the mission staff for two or three diplomatic workers of the USSR Foreign Ministry, which will significantly expand the information work of the Soviet mission in Israel.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE USSR
IN ISRAEL A.N.ABRAMOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
OF THE USSR. June 13, 1952**

At the last meeting of the foreign commission of the parliament, Israel's envoy to Moscow, Eliashiv, answered questions from Knesset members. Eliashiv said that in the USSR, members of the diplomatic corps do not have wide opportunities to study the country, as it is provided to them in other countries, where diplomats have extensive contact with the public circles and individuals. Moscow usually offers foreign diplomats to contact their work on cultural ties with VOCS. It is only necessary to touch any, even minor political issues, it is invariably recommended to address the Foreign Ministry. Referring to the mission bulletin, he stated that the mission had once issued its own bulletin and had sent out to individuals. However, we were advised to distribute the bulletin through the USSR Foreign Ministry. Now we have to distribute some of our publications through other diplomatic missions and send some part to the Foreign Ministry. We don't know if the newsletter gets the person it's intended to receive.

Answering the question about the standard of living in the USSR, Eliashiv said that he was in Moscow three years ago and should note serious improvements in the nutrition of the population in the Soviet Union. Shops, restaurants and markets have enough goods and products, but it should be added that the products are still expensive. Almost all the earnings of the worker are spent on food. Eliashiv added that even low-income groups can eat well. It is noticeable to all foreigners that Muscovites began to dress well, but the housing situation of the population in Moscow is very difficult, despite the increasing construction. Soviet people do not have the opportunity to compare their standard of living with the Western people. They compare with their recent past, and this gives them strength and admiration for

the living conditions in the USSR. Eliashiv focused on the development and dissemination of television, which has become the property of the general population. As he was told, in other cities of the Union with food is also well and there is no need for housing, as in Moscow.

There are almost no visitors to the mission, from local people. During his entire work, the mission was visited by two people: one of them requested advice on divorce from his wife living in Israel, and the other wanted to go to Israel. Eliashiv emphasized the mission's lack of ties with the Jews of the USSR. Asked about the fate of the Zionists arrested in the post-war period, Eliashiv said that he did not know anything, pointing out that there are specific features in the USSR that should be taken into account: if in the countries of popular democracy, such as Czechoslovakia, there are still Zionist organizations, in the USSR they are eliminated, and these organizations do not have the appropriate ground for their existence. Referring to his conversations with T. Vyshinsky, Gromyko, and Sorinsky, to the conversation between Vyshinsky and Shalette on the issue of Jewish immigration from the Union, Eliashiv said that the leaders of the Foreign Ministry made it clear that there is no opposition to the individual departure of Jews from the USSR to Israel. However, the Foreign Ministry did not respond to the mission's note on this issue. Eliashiv expects to present in the near future the USSR Foreign Ministry with a specific list of persons wishing to go to Israel.

Asked what was the link in Israel's response to the issue of the Middle East command with the question of the arrival of Jews from the USSR, Eliashiv said that this section of the note was poorly received by Zorin. In fact, he did not even consider it necessary to answer this question. The Israeli Foreign Ministry should not have raised the issue of Jewish immigration in that note. Eliashiv also considers the reference in this note to criticism of Israel in the Soviet press and the lack of loyalty on the part of the USSR towards Israel. Eliashiv said that the campaign in the Israeli press on

the immigration of Jews from the USSR would not bring much benefit, and even vice versa, could cause harm.

In response to this remark, Eliashiva, the chairman of the foreign commission, Aron, stood up and said that he was uncomfortable listening to the speech of his party comrade.

Speaking about the economic conference, Eliashiv concluded that it was not only a political demonstration; the conference has produced concrete practical results on the expansion of economic ties with foreign countries. According to Eliashiva, the batch of Israeli oranges was well received in the USSR. It was possible to sell oranges much more and even give Italian oranges for their own. Eliashiv concluded that Israel should develop its trade relations with the USSR, but added that there was no initiative on the part of Soviet trade organizations to sell various goods and machines to Israel.

Asked by a member of the foreign commission whether there is a deterioration in relations between the USSR and Israel, Eliashiv categorically replied that no. While the Soviet press speaks ill of Israel, the press is even more sharply critical of other capitalist countries as well. It should be emphasized that the coverage of The Life of Israel is not the focus of attention of the Soviet public, and recently the Soviet press does not write about Israel at all.

Referring to the position of the USSR at international diplomatic meetings, Eliashiv said that the delegations of the USSR do not vote against the proposals of Israel. As an example, he pointed to the Soviet Union's position on the passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal.

Eliashiv said that in the USSR all the people are sure that the West is preparing a war against him. It is clear to me that the USSR does not want war, but makes serious preparations for war. If there is no war within two years, the USSR will become the strongest and invincible country in the world. Eliashiv said that the USSR does not trust the assurances of neutrality of countries such as Sweden and Switzerland. In the USSR, everyone firmly believes that America is waging a bacteriological war in Korea. Speaking about the mission's

work in Moscow, Eliashiv said that the mission is thoroughly studying the Soviet press. The mission is closely linked to other foreign missions, which consider the mission's employees to be the most competent people who know Russian and Soviet living conditions well.

Asked about the possibility of broadcasting from Israel in Russian language, Eliashiv said that broadcasts in Russian language from abroad are usually drowned out. He considered such transfers to be totally inappropriate. However, the nature of the broadcasts matters. If the broadcasts are agitated and Zionist in nature, we can say in advance that they will not have the proper success in the USSR.

In conclusion, Eliashiv stated that the problem of exchange of research delegations between the two countries has not yet been solved.

According to those close to us who were present at the meeting of the foreign commission, Eliashiv's speech did not please his fellow party members from Mapai, especially in the part where he speaks about the hopelessness of Zionist propaganda in the USSR and when he disapproved of Israel's note regarding the Middle East command. The entire Israeli press was silent on Eliashiv's speech to the commission. Usually, reports by Israeli representatives abroad, practiced at parliamentary commissions, are widely covered by the entire press.

Abramov

**TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY TO THE SOVIET ENVOY TO
ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV. June 27, 1952**

In connection with the Israeli Government's efforts to move the Israeli capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and, in particular, in connection with the recent decision to transfer the Israeli Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem, the Syrian Foreign Minister has handed our Charge d'Affaires a memorandum stating that these Israeli government activities are being carried out in violation of the decisions of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Guardian Council and other UN bodies on the internationalization of Jerusalem. In view of this, the Syrian government asks "that States refrain from transferring their diplomatic missions from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem."

On June 20 this year, a note of similar content was received by the USSR mission in Beirut and from the Lebanese Foreign Ministry.

You need to closely monitor the reaction of representatives of the United States, England, France and other countries in Israel to the Israeli government's efforts to move the capital to Jerusalem and inform us in a timely manner.

Please give your opinion on our possible position in this matter.

A. Vyshinsky

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE USSR
IN ISRAEL A.N.ABRAMOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
OF THE USSR. July 10, 1952**

The internationalisation of Jerusalem is unacceptable to us, as it would mean openly acknowledging by the Americans the occupation of Jerusalem under the UN flag. Our refusal to support the UN proposal for the internationalization of Jerusalem does not mean that we should recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Jerusalem is now in fact divided into two parts, a new one with Jews and a number of Israeli government offices, and an old part occupied by Transjordan, which includes the so-called Holy Places (The Tomb of the Lord). Our previous position at the UN on the two-state partition of Palestine, Israeli and Arab, would be more in line with the view of the partition of Jerusalem between Israelis and Arabs. It should be kept in mind all the time that more than 800,000 Arab refugees, savagely expelled by Jews from Israel, are still eke out their miserable existence.

Our recognition of the city of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel would worsen the attitude of the Arab countries, as well as some Muslim and Catholic countries, towards us, and would not do us any good in the international arena in our relations with Israel, which is strongly opposed to the United States. Our mission should not be moved to Jerusalem. In the event that the Israeli Foreign Ministry's move to Jerusalem is followed by diplomatic missions

The U.S., England, France and others then the issue of moving our mission should be discussed in particular, using our move as a measure of pressure on the Israeli government to obtain our property in Jerusalem.

Diplomatic circles say that the French and Turks do not intend to move to Jerusalem. Apparently, the British will stick to such a position.

The press reported that the Israeli Foreign Ministry will move to Jerusalem in November this year.

Abramov

**LETTER FROM THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF RED CROSS
AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES OF THE USSR V.A.
KHOLODKOV. July 11, 1952**

Secret.

The USSR Foreign Ministry believes that the delegations of the Soviet Red Cross at the 18th International Red Cross Conference should not object to the recognition of the Red Shield society of David as the national red-cross organization of Israel and its admission to the League of Red Cross Societies.

Foreign Minister of the USSR A. Vyshinsky

**LETTER FROM A.N. ABRAMOV, THE CHARGE
D'AFFAIRES OF THE USSR IN ISRAEL, AND THE SECOND
SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL, M.P.
POPOV, TO THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE
USSR, G.M. PUSHKIN.. July 28, 1952**

Secret.

Regarding the spread of Soviet literature in Israel, we inform you the following.

Soviet literature, both fiction, science, technology and political, enjoys a large and increasing demand in Israel from year to year. This is due primarily to the composition of the population (about half of the inhabitants speak Russian) and the increasing authority of the USSR, which is at the head of the camp of peace and democracy.

It is clear that the local reaction and the American Embassy, actively interfering in the internal affairs of the country, would like to completely stop the spread of Soviet literature in Israel.

From the second half of 1951, the Israeli authorities began to put increasing obstacles to the spread of Soviet literature. Since September 1951, customs has been delaying book parcels for the book trading firm Haiflepak. Later, parcels were delayed for Boleslavsky and finally for Lepak.

The pretext for delaying the books to the firms Haiflepak and Boleslavsky was that these firms imported books much more than the import licenses issued to them allowed. The delay of the books for Lepak was made after the customs found the head of "Lepak" Moshkevich in a forgery, purely technical, of some invoices. A few days ago, Lepak was able to prove that it was illegal to delay the number of book parcels for it. The firms Haiflepak and Boleslavsky managed to obtain a part of the seized books after great efforts, and Haiflepak did so at the cost of renunciation of import licenses for the whole of 1952, but remain detained up to 10,000 parcels with the number of 90-100 thousand books.

As a result of these and other interferences by the local authorities, the distribution of Soviet literature in Israel has already been significantly reduced and will be limited in the future by the size of licenses.

All local firms working with the International Book receive licenses to import Soviet literature in 1952 at a cost of about 30,000 pounds, which is paid at a new rate of 60,000 Israeli pounds, of which the three firms have only half of the licenses.

The reason for the delay of Soviet literature is the increasingly specific anti-Soviet course of Israeli foreign policy and the intervention of the U.S. Embassy.

Despite the fact that payment for Soviet literature is made in Israeli pounds to a "blocked" account at a local bank, customs delayed in September 1951 parcels for the firm "Hyflepak" along with the delay of literature from third countries, for which Israel did not have enough foreign currency. All requests by firms to increase, in accordance with increased needs, the amount of licences established a few years ago were refused by the Israeli authorities.

In early July this year, responding to the demand of MPs from the Communist Party and Mapam for the release of detained books and the increase in licenses for the import of Soviet literature, the Minister of Education and Culture Dinaburg said that the Israeli government could not increase the amount of licenses, as the money from the sale of Soviet books goes to the maintenance of the mission of the USSR, which therefore does not receive foreign currency transfers, and therefore, therefore, does not receive foreign currency transfers, and therefore, therefore, does not receive foreign currency transfers. , Israel ultimately does not receive solid foreign currency.

By preventing the spread of Soviet literature, the Israeli government promotes the dissemination of American literature, including pornographic and criminal.

On June 9 this year, an agreement was reached between Israel and the United States (see my conversation with Sne

dated July 11, 1957) on the virtually unlimited import into Israel of American literature with payment in Israeli pounds, which can be easily spent by the U.S. Embassy for “cultural, educational and other” activities in Israel.

The signing of the agreement on the unrestricted import of American literature made apparent discrimination on the part of the Israeli government against Soviet literature.

At the initiative of the Communist Party and with the participation of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR, a special public committee was established to fight against restrictions on the distribution of Soviet literature in Israel. The Public Committee intends to prepare a number of articles for the press and launch a massive campaign to secure the release of the detained books and a significant increase in the licenses for the import of Soviet literature.

In addition, a delegation of League activists visited the Director of the Eastern Europe Department of the Foreign Ministry A. Levavi on July 14, 1957, and a few days later the General Secretary of the League Dr. Snee spoke with the Director General of the Ministry of Finance, Avriel. Both Levavi and Avriel promised to facilitate the release of the detained books and increase licenses. However, a fundamental change in the situation cannot be expected from the intervention of these officials.

We would have believed that, in negotiations with the Israeli delegation on the purchase of oranges, it would have been necessary to raise the question that some of the payments for oranges would not be covered by dollars but by Israeli pounds derived from the sale in Israel of new large quantities of Soviet literature.

With the growing American imperialist anti-Soviet propaganda in Israel, including through American literature, through the creation of a shop to sell books in Russian language published in the United States, through the “gift” of 10,000 American gramiez records from American quakers, etc., we should look for ways to increase the spread of Soviet

literature, and “International Book” to eliminate a number of shortcomings in its work:

1. “International Book” often sends books to firms that are not in demand, which burdens meagre licenses.

2. “International Book” has not yet given a definitive answer to several requests for the sale of Soviet gramophone records in Israel, in particular to the requests of the Haifa branch of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR and Boleslavsky, which could obtain special licenses for the import of Soviet treath records.

3. “International Book” in its open letter No. 519/36 of June 19, 1952 confirmed to the firm “Boleslawsky” the receipt of 5,100 Israeli pounds from him, which exposes Boleslavsky to the risk of criminal prosecution, as Boleslawsky, on the instructions of the “International Book”, contributes directly to the mission of the USSR certain sums of money to repay his debt, without import licenses and in addition to the bank. There can be no open correspondence about such operations of Boleslavsky and representatives of The Highflepak and Lepak companies, but through the Soviet mission in Israel.

Albramov, Second Secretary of the Mission M. Popov, Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Israel

**TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY TO THE SOVIET ENVOY TO
ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV. August 14, 1952**

Secret.

Recently, numerous reports have resurfaced in the foreign press that the U.S. and British governments are making new attempts to establish the so-called Middle Eastern Command under the guise of the so-called “defense” organization of the Middle East.

Urgently tell you what you are aware of this, as well as how the Israeli government and the Israeli public are concerned about these plans of the U.S.-English bloc.

You should continue to follow this issue closely and inform us of all the most important statements made by the Israeli authorities and the public in this regard.

A. Vyshinsky

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE USSR
IN ISRAEL A.N.ABRAMOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
OF THE USSR. August 16, 1952**

Disagreements between the United States and England over the establishment of the Middle East Command are the result of heightened tensions between these countries in the Middle East. In contrast to the British plans to establish a defence planning command headquarters in Cyprus without the participation of middle Eastern countries other than Turkey, the United States proposed the creation of an advisory organization of The Middle East Defence (MEDO)⁵⁴, in which Arab states, Turkey and Western states "could discuss the best form of defence of the Middle East".

A spokesman for the Israeli Government stated on 10 August that the Government had not yet received any treatment in connection with the alleged establishment of MEDO.

Some politicians I have spoken to believe that the United States is not inclined to establish a Middle East command until the United States has the support of the Middle East. Disagreements between England and the United States affect the fact that in case of war, England considers the Middle East as a line of defence of its communications between the metropolis and its possessions, and for the United States the Middle East is important in terms of aggression and offensive from the area. The U.S. command plan calls for separate consultations with Israel on its "contribution" to the defence of the Middle East. While the Arab states will receive U.S. military assistance under the MEDO, Israel will receive it separately "in order to maintain equilibrium in the Middle East." There was no dissatisfaction with the plan in the Israeli press.

From my conversations with the members of the Israeli Parliament, it can be concluded that there are supporters of the English plan in Israeli military circles - in particular, the

Chief of the General Staff of the Israeli Army Yadin agrees with the plans of England, which considers the Middle East as a line of defence, and that he is against receiving military assistance from the United States, believing that under this situation the Israeli army falls under the full control of the United States. According to Yadin, in case of military action with the USSR, Turkey, which is the first line of attack of the USSR, will be occupied; the second line, Egypt, would also be broken, and thus Israel would be left to its own devices. It is reported that Prime Minister Ben-Guri, who is also Minister of Security, is under pressure from the United States to replace Yadin McLef, who recently returned to Israel from the United States.

The pro-English circles of Israel are alarmed by the continued American pressure on Israel to obtain concessions in favour of Arab countries and believe that the English plan to establish a headquarters in Cyprus without the participation of Arab countries is preferable to the American proposal, even if it is accompanied by a promise of free weapons. The Jerusalem Post also advocated a plan to establish a command independently of Arab countries on 11 August.

The Israeli government focuses on the United States in its policy. This is also confirmed by the agreement with the United States on 23 July this year, published here only 12 Austa, granting Israel the right to purchase weapons in the United States⁵⁵ and the statement of the Israeli government on readiness to increase the length of service in the army from 2 to 2.5 years.

Speaking to me, the head of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR, A member of the Sne parliament, referring to the government's position on Israel's participation in the Middle East command, said: "The Israeli government fears that the command can be created with the participation of Arab countries without the inclusion of Israel. The Government would be supportive of Israel's participation in the command with the Arab countries. In

such a situation, Israel could count on its recognition by the Arab States. Finally, the most desirable option for Israel's participation in the command is to include Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, without the participation of Arab countries.

The current Israeli Government is well-prepared to participate in any aggressive grouping of countries against the Soviet Union. However, by asking the United States and Britain, Israel takes advantage of the existing contradictions between these countries.”

Abramov

**LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF VOCS
A.I.DENISOV TO THE SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (B) M.A.
SUSLOV. August 20, 1952**

Secret.

The Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Israel, Abramov A.N., conveyed to THE VOCS a request from the Secretary General of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR, Dr. Sne, that VOKS, in connection with the 10th anniversary of the League, send a delegation of cultural figures to Israel in October and invite a delegation of friendly relations with the USSR to Moscow.

Doubtful of the expediency of inviting a delegation from Israel to the USSR, as well as sending to Israel a delegation of Soviet cultural figures, we intend to limit ourselves to sending a welcome telegram to the Secretary General of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR.

The VOCS board asks for your instructions.

Chairman of the Board of VOCS A.Denisov

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE USSR
IN ISRAEL A.N.ABRAMOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
OF THE USSR. August 20, 1952**

Ben-Gurion said in an interview with the United Press on 17 August that Israel had not yet been approached on the issue of its participation in the Middle East Command. Asked about Israel's position on command, he said: "Israel is ready to defend its sovereignty and democratic freedom by all means at its disposal. To do this, he is ready to cooperate with all who have this goal in his heart." The entire local press views Ben-Gurion's statement as a direct consent to participate in the command. Referring to Israeli-Egyptian relations, he said that Israel was not interested in the Sudan, but that Israel was demanding that the Security Council's decision be respected and that Israeli courts should be given the right to use the Suez Canal. It should be noted that during the history of Israel, not a single Israeli vessel or vessel carrying cargo for Israel has been allowed through the canal.

Ben-Gurion told the same correspondent that Israel had not yet received a response to a request for permission for Soviet Jews to immigrate in Israel. "If there is peace in the world, I see no reason why Jews wishing to immigrate in Israel will not be allowed to do so. I think that the government of the Soviet Union understands that the decision that is being taken in respect of all nationalities of Russia, namely internal autonomy within the Framework of the Soviet State, has not settled the Jewish question, because the experience of Birobidzhan has not been successful and the Jews now represent the only extraterritorial grouping in Russia."

Ben-Gurion, in a speech to Parliament on 18 August⁵⁷, flirting with Arab countries to ensure joint participation with the Arabs in command, praised the existing Egyptian government and stated that there was no reason for disputes

with Egypt and that “cooperation between Israel and Egypt would help Egypt overcome the political and social difficulties it is struggling with”.

The Israeli press considers it an inescapable fact that Arab countries will be brought into command and react painfully to every hostile speech by Arab figures, seeing them as an obstacle to an agreement on Israel's participation in the command.

I am sending a detailed statement on the position regarding the Middle East command.

Abramov

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE USSR
IN ISRAEL A.N.ABRAMOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
OF THE USSR. August 21, 1952**

On August 21, I was visited by a member of Parliament, Dr. Snee, and told me about the declaration made by Charette on 19 August at a well-known meeting of the Parliament's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. Charette made a surprise statement to the members of the commission.

He stated that Israel was in a position where it should follow the United States without any preconditions or reservations. As an excuse for Israel's policy, he referred to Israel's close ties to the United States. This connection should be understood somewhat more broadly than Israel's dependence on the United States in economic and other respects. This relationship is long, deep and comprehensive. In order to create something substantial in Israel, its external dependence on the United States is necessary. Once Israel achieves substantial, it can then achieve independence, thanks to the internal forces of this substantial. If we reject dependence on the U.S. now, we will never build our state. Therefore, we will never achieve independence. For example, for the development of the Israeli economy we need oil, and for this it is necessary to depend on the United States on the issue of oil, that is, to grant them concessions, and after we have developed oil production, it will be possible to seek independence in the exploitation of its oil. If we follow the advice of the left on this issue, we will not have dependence on the United States, but there will be no oil. In order to achieve independence, Israel must go through a stage of dependence. Charette said that there are about 8 million Jews living in the U.S.-controlled world, while 2-2.5 million people live in the Soviet world as individuals. The number of 8 million Jews includes Jews of all capitalist countries.

Party spokesman Mapam Ben-Aharon asked whether Charette had discarded any link between Israel and Jews living in socialist countries. Charette replied that if the USSR changed its attitude to the Jewish question, Israel could also change its attitude towards the USSR. But, frankly, in the future we cannot expect a change from the Soviet Union to the Jewish question. Now there is only the American world and the Soviet world. Israel cannot exist without external economic and financial assistance. The state regime in Israel is democratic, so it receives help from the United States without changing its regime, and in order to get help from the USSR, we need to change our regime to the Soviet one, with which the people of Israel do not agree. Therefore, we should receive assistance from the United States without fear of changing our regime.

Israel binds itself to the United States based on the country's future technological progress. When I was in the United States, I visited a well-equipped factory, where the head is Lilienthal, who showed me all the things that the U.S. has achieved technically. Lilienthal told me that Israel can take advantage of all the technical advances of the United States. Because we want to develop our culture and technology, we don't need to waste energy and energy to reach U.S. level. We can just copy everything that's in the U.S. The USSR also has great successes in the field of technology, but the USSR will not share its achievements with us. We are objectively connected to the United States both during the peace and during the war.

MP Mapam Ben-Aharon, ostensibly appalled by Charette's message that Israel should be associated with the United States even during the war, said that even if everything That Charette says is correct - and this, in his opinion, is wrong - how can Israel's ties with the United States during the war be justified?

Charette replied that even if Israel was not now associated with the United States, Israel would be on the same side with the United States during the war.

Sharett went on to say that there comes a point when American aid to Israel stops. Already, the receipt of the allowance in 1952 was very difficult, as in the U.S. there were many opponents in Congress and in the Senate, opposed to the continuation of economic assistance to Israel. Opponents say that if economic aid to Israel continues, it will never balance its economy. If the aid stops, the economy will be balanced, although, however, at a lower level. U.S. military assistance to Israel, Charette said, is another matter. The U.S. is ready to give us military assistance at all times. Do not think that military aid is not economic assistance at the same time. For example, for the Israeli economy we need to expand the Seaport of Haifa, but we do not have money, and America is ready to give them to us under the guise of military assistance. Undoubtedly, with U.S. military assistance, a military mission will arrive in Israel and that mission will distribute U.S. weapons to Israeli army units in accordance with Americans' own plans. McDaniel's economic mission provides extensive assistance to Israel. We manage to use it (mission) to send dollars for military purposes. It is possible that the same situation will be with the military mission. We hope that Israel will be able to get through the military mission all that we need. Sharett went on to say that there is a difference between the American system and the Soviet system. Americans throw nets at peoples, but in these networks there are holes, so we can manoeuvre, and the USSR throws a solid carpet, extending without breaking from one territory to another territory - a carpet that has no holes.

After Charette's speech to the commission, Sne said, there was an atmosphere of deep depression. However, members of the foreign commission representing the government bloc supported Charette's declaration.

We will send a recording of the speeches of the commission members with another diplomatic post. I will limit myself to the presentation of the speech by the representative of the Progressive Party Harari, who said that

he had always been in favour of Israel's neutrality, but since that was not possible, he agreed with the line outlined by the Government. However, he noted that there is a huge distance between the foreign policy declared here and the reality. Public opinion in Israel has no idea how far the government has gone in its orientation towards the United States, so it is necessary to start preparing Public Opinion of Israel in the direction of the actual policy pursued by the government.

Given Sharett's statement and Ben-Gurion's official statement on Israel's readiness to participate in the Middle East Command, we believe that the USSR Foreign Ministry should issue a statement and warning about the responsibility of the Israeli government, which draws the people of Israel into an aggressive bloc against the USSR.

Abramov

**LETTER FROM THE ADVISER OF THE ISRAELI
PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UN, G. RAFAEL TO THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M.
SHARETTA. September 3, 1952**

Secret.

Conversation with the representative of the USSR Jacob Malik

About a month ago, when it became clear that Malik was going to return to the USSR (whether on vacation, or forever), Mr. Eban asked to meet with him. The meeting did not take place, as Malik was not in the city at the time.

On 22 August, I was on the Disarmament Committee. Before the meeting, Malik approached me, expressed regret that he could not answer Eban's request, and asked if I was ready to talk to him at a convenient time for me.

The conversation took place on August 26 in the Soviet mission. It lasted an hour and a quarter. Malik Polyakov's personal assistant also participated (he recorded and at times also translated).

First of all, Malik said that removing the Palestinian problem from the agenda of the session had brought him relief. Since the issue was first brought to the UN in 1947, the USSR has advocated for the parties to resolve their differences in direct negotiations. The USSR has always been against the Conciliation Commission and advocated its dissolution. The development of the Palestinian problem in and outside the United Nations proved that this Soviet approach was just and pragmatic. The USSR therefore welcomes the exclusion of the Palestinian issue from the agenda of the seventh session. I replied that we did not see any particular benefit in continuing the commission's activities, but given the political relations between us and the member states, we had to be cautious in phasing out the commission. I outlined the course of our negotiations with

the Commission on the unblocking of frozen accounts of Arab refugees.

I then moved on to the activities of the UNITED Nations Middle East Agency for Palestinian Refugees and Work Organization, noting that it was possible to remove his report from the political committee's agenda and refer it to one of the technical commissions. Malik showed no interest and did not even ask if there was any progress in solving the refugee problem.

In order to fully clarify the current position of the USSR on the Palestinian knot, I turned the conversation to the question of Jerusalem. That morning, an editorial appeared in the New York Times, warning that the USSR was showing interest in the activities of Russian religious institutions in the city. Malik replied that he had read the article, and believed it was a smokescreen designed to divert attention from the machinations of the United States. "What do they want from us? He asked with a laugh. "When we pray in churches, it is bad; when we are not praying, it is even worse; when we are interested in church affairs, it is terrible; when we are interested in church property - in general a nightmare!"

He noted that the Arabs had made a terrible fuss about the transfer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem. "But who pays attention to them?" he said, adding, "It is not clear why your American friends are interfering in your internal affairs and opposed to the transfer of your Foreign Ministry?" I explained that the American position on this issue should not be resented, as we believe that it is transient and expressed only to appease the Arabs. "You don't have to worry about the fate of our relationship with the Americans," I said, "everything will be settled as before." Here I added with a grin that we will offer the Americans a new version of the mutual assistance agreement: Washington will refuse to give advice to Israel, where to place its Foreign Ministry, and we in return will not take an official position on the location of the State Department. Malik laughed for a long time, but

then noticed in a serious tone: "From the point of view of the USSR, only the government of Israel has the right to decide where this or that ministry will be located. Neither the UN nor other governments have the right to interfere in this." I closed the subject with a joke: "So we can assume that you will not insist on discussing the issue of Jerusalem at the upcoming session." He said, "That's right. We have no interest in discussing either the Palestinian or Jerusalem issues. We hope that no one else will raise these issues either."

Then Malik asked me what was the point of the Prime Minister's address from the Knesset podium to Naguib. He added: "Are you really hoping to negotiate with this military dictator?" While we are waiting for the Egyptians to respond. We do not believe that we have the right to choose regimes with which we should be prepared to live in peace. We adhere to the principle of coexistence on the world stage and are convinced that this is the only way to achieve world peace and in the Middle East. We are surrounded by autocratic, reactionary and socially backward regimes; we are not responsible for their existence and we have no right to act against them. For us, the criterion is the same: whether they are ready to live with us in peace and to recognize our sovereignty. If it turns out that Naguib's office is stable and ready to establish relations with Israel, we will welcome it." Malik agreed with our position, emphasizing the importance of coexistence. At the same time, he noted that there had been many changes in our region, and the most important of these was the process of replacing older kings with infants and adolescents. From his point of view, it is a prologue to the elimination of monarchies in the Middle East. "Farook was right," Malik said, "when he said that in the end there will be only five kings left in the world - four card and a British monarch."

Since then, I have turned to the Suez problem and reported on developments since the adoption of the resolution of 1 September. Malik interrupted me with the

question, "What, really no progress? And you did not find any cracks to deliver goods to Israel?" Malik said that the USSR is against any naval blockade and does not agree with such a blockade in the area of the Suez Canal. We have done the right thing by addressing the initiators of the resolution, so that they will now take care of its implementation; hope that they will succeed.

I recalled last year's discussion in the Security Council and mentioned Tsarapkin. Malik interrupted me: "Poor Tsarapkin, how can he live without the Palestinian problem? He felt like a fish in the water in it" (in 2 days we received a message from Moscow that Tsarapkin had been transferred to another job and would not return to the UN).

Then the conversation came about the Middle East command. To Malik's remark that all Middle East problems will probably be resolved in the near future, to the delight of the United States, by the establishment of the Middle East Command, I said that this issue had already been discussed during his last conversation with Eban, in which I participated (at the Soviet Embassy in Paris, at the end of the General Assembly session). At the time, Eban noted that the establishment of the command was far from complete, and no one had approached Israel with an offer to participate in a non-existent structure. I am ready to subscribe to these words even now: we are still far from creating a regional defensive structure, and no one has approached Israel with an offer to participate in it. At the same time, we read with disappointment in the Soviet press reports that we are allegedly building foreign military bases. Malik said that he could not discuss with me about publications in the Soviet press, because he did not know what he was talking about. But he read publications in the American press that the U.S. considers Israel its Middle East outpost. I have noticed here that this was not a military outpost, but an outpost of democracy, and it is not surprising that Americans are surprised by Israeli democracy, which is the only island of stability in a turbulent sea of upheaval and change. Since the

establishment of the State, it has been headed by the same Prime Minister, and at least 20 governments have fallen around us during this time, not as a result of democratic parliamentary procedure. In the Arab world, the formation or fall of offices is determined by violence, murder and conspiracy. Against this background, it is not difficult to understand why the American administration and the people of the United States with such friendship and such respect for Israel.

Malik replied, "The U.S. government doesn't do anything for humane reasons, it always has a cold political calculation." Here he laid out a complex philosophical concept in this spirit: the existence of the Soviet threat to the world for the benefit, because it helps the weak to strengthen at the expense of the strong. This is the case with Israel. He is not at all opposed to Israel's use of the opportunities available to build its homeland. The Soviet threat also helps the strong - it gives them an excuse to pump their muscles even more. That's the real danger. Were it not for the spectre of the Soviet threat, the world would have long ago erupted sharp conflict between England and the United States, but in the face of this imaginary threat, they are still successfully smearing their contradictions. This is also the contribution of the USSR to the cause of peace. Then Malik chuckled and interrupted his lecture.

He then returned to reality, saying that he wanted to exchange views on the future General Assembly. First, he asked if there was any chance that the United States would agree to seriously discuss the Korean issue this time, or whether they were going to limit themselves to procedural issues again. I took the opportunity to ask him himself what he thought was his chances of achieving peace. He said: "We should not expect progress in the negotiations on Korea in the coming months. The United States army is not interested in peace, because detente in the region could lead to a general reduction of tensions in the world and a reduction in arms production. The exchange also reacts to every

optimistic news by falling the share price. Clarke's military operations, especially the bombing, prove that the U.S. is not interested in peace right now." I mentioned a rumor published in the press that the Democratic Party is interested in a truce to strengthen its position before the elections. Malik noted that there is an agreement between Eisenhower and Stevenson not to attack each other because of the Korean problem. If Truman had been the candidate, it would have been different, since he was considered the initiator of the Korean War. Truman would be interested in retaxing that charge. I stressed that, judging by our contacts with American politicians and the mood of the street, it is clear that both the American administration and the American people now want an end to the war. It would be a mistake to assume that the only street in the United States is Wall Street: there are a lot of streets, each goes in its own direction, there is no "centre" where they all intersect. Making political forecasts on the basis of some stock reports, it is hardly possible to come to accurate scientific conclusions.

Asked if I should count on a new Soviet initiative, something like his speech last year, Malik said that now the time is not to take any initiatives. And when I asked, "What if the initiative comes from a third party?" he replied that at this stage there is no point in putting forward initiatives, from whomever they come from. If Americans want peace, let them remove their artificial objections to the issue of prisoners of war. But in reality, the United States wants to end the militarization of Germany first, and for this they need an environment of heightened tension, which they are provided by the war in Korea.

Already, we can assume that the negotiations on Germany in the form of exchange of notes will soon end. It is known that the U.S. administration is against the four-party meeting at the level of foreign ministers, as proposed in the last Soviet note (from Malik's words it seems that until the negotiations on Germany are completed, the USSR will not

contribute to the end of the Korean War). I said that Israel opposes the resurgence of a strong and militarized Germany and sees it as a threat to world peace. However, the remilitarization of Germany is a consequence of international tensions that have reached their peak in the Korean conflict. Therefore, every State wishing to contribute to defusing tensions and indirectly preventing the remilitarization of Germany must make every effort to end the Korean War.

Malik asked why the entire Arab and Asian bloc had demanded that the issue of Tunisia be put on the agenda, and that only Iraq had raised the question of Morocco. From my point of view, he said, the Demarche of Iraq was made under the influence of London. I allowed myself to doubt this view and said that the whole problem of the Maghreb is explained by the internal struggle in the Arab world. He interrupted me, saying, "Between Egypt and Pakistan?" "Not only," I remarked, "there is still competition between Iraq and Egypt, Baghdad's political courage tends to be inversely dependent on the proximity of the problem to the Iraqi borders and vital interests. For example, Iraq has no common border with Israel, from the danger of direct military confrontation it is separated from Jordan and Syria, so on extremism anti-Israeli position Iraq is unparalleled in the Arab world. Iraq did not play any significant role in the Tunisian question, so Baghdad had to find another problem where it could appear in all its glory. In the end, Morocco was chosen. In general, it must be understood that the concern of the Arab regimes about the fate of the peoples of North Africa is not due to their desire to contribute to the liberation of these peoples, but to the Muslim neo-imperialism manifested in different regions of the world."

I asked if we should prepare for the question of disarmament to be put on the agenda at the next session of the Soviet Union. Malik said he did not think the issue would take an important place in the session because the Disarmament Committee had almost "exhausted its spirit."

At the end of the conversation, I asked about the POSITION of the USSR on plans to shorten the session and make it more effective, as well as the creation of a permanent commission for work in the inter-session period. He said that the UN is gradually coming to the Soviet position: a few years ago the USSR opposed the creation of an “interim committee” (Small Assembly), and now everyone sees that its formation was a complete failure. I said with a grin that on all issues where the USSR and Israel hold the same positions, the UN ultimately decides that. For example, the resolution of November 29, 1947, the resolution on the Conciliation Commission, and now the Small Assembly. Malik answered with a sincere laugh.

Unlike our previous meetings, Malik spoke mostly Russian, and his assistant Polyakov translated into English. Apparently, this was due to the desire to be as accurate as possible in the statements, as his words were recorded by the assistant in the protocol.

Malik escorted me to the exit and said goodbye: “Good luck.”

With respect.

G. Raphael

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE ISRAELI
ENVOY TO THE USSR S. ELIASHIV WITH THE DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR G.M.PUSHKIN.**

September 4, 1952

As part of the personal changes, two new deputy ministers, Pushkin and Podcerob, have been appointed to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The first was ambassador to Budapest when Ehud Avriel worked there, then was transferred to Berlin. His appointment to the post of deputy minister is associated with the importance attached to German affairs in the USSR Foreign Ministry. Podcerob was previously Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry and has participated in recent years in the UN General Assembly. Both give the impression of people well-mannered, cultural and friendly. I knew Podcerob before, even paid him a visit just before his appointment to Moscow. Then he showed interest in our affairs and praised our achievements in development and construction. He expressed similar feelings later, during one or two cursory conversations we had. I did not consider it necessary to visit him now, confining myself to congratulating him on his appointment to a high office at one of the receptions. I had not known Pushkin before, so through the protocol department I asked for a meeting with him, deciding to use it not only for acquaintance, but also to raise one of the problems that I had to convey to the Foreign Ministry.

As I said, Pushkin gives the impression of an intelligent and benevolent person. The conversation lasted about 20 minutes, we quickly moved from one topic to another. He knows Ehud, remembered some details about him (for example, about his Viennese origin or that when he came to Budapest, he stayed in a hotel without having his own apartment). He willingly accepted the idea of a "visit for acquaintance" and even thanked me for it. As usual in such conversations, he began by praising my Russian language,

then we switched to Russian literature, and he emphasized that after the decision of the Central Committee of the Party on Literature in 1946, there is considerable progress in this area (to be honest, I do not share this opinion in the slightest).

I then informed him that the French and British missions in Israel had upgraded their status to embassies.⁵⁸ He expressed in this regard everything that was authorized to convey. He showed interest and promised to give an answer soon. In this regard, I asked him whether they had a geographical-area division between the Deputy Ministers, i.e., if I needed to meet with the Deputy Minister on regional issues, whether anyone should be approached specifically. He replied that there was no regional division, so I could choose the deputy minister I would prefer to talk to. But it is possible that depending on the question at hand, they themselves will offer me the most suitable interlocutor. As an example, I cited the issue of reparations with Germany, noting that, in my opinion, he would be the best interlocutor on this issue, given his experience in German affairs. He said that he was ready for such a conversation, but while he could indeed be considered an expert on Germany, he was not tempted in Israeli affairs. Here, in a few words, he spoke of the impressive successes in the development of East Germany, which he had witnessed in recent years, contrasting these successes with the situation in West Germany, which he spoke of with disdain as a normal Western country.

Pushkin was interested in the events in Israel, I told him about some aspects of the absorption of returnees, focused on our relations with neighbouring states, their stubborn refusal to negotiate with us and our experience with the Conciliation Commission. He asked who was part of the commission, and whether I believed that the countries represented in it were really interested in achieving peace between us and the Arabs. He went on to ask what I thought of the events in Egypt. When I noted that very little was

being done there to improve the internal situation and pointed to the very modest scale of the agrarian reform, he interrupted me and began to defend such reforms (land-free land-free population for a fee). At the same time, he noted that land reform in Hungary after the Second World War was being built on similar foundations.

S. Eliashiv

September 15, 1952

The Mission of the State of Israel shows its respect for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and, in response to its communication to the Charge d'Affaires of the State of Israel on 25 March 1952 on damages and payments to the State of Israel from the German Democratic Republic, is honoured to convey to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the objections of the Government of the State of Israel.

The Government's requirement for payments from Germany is not essentially a requirement of military reparations, such as those stipulated in the 1945 Potsdam Agreement or which may form part of a peace treaty with Germany that has to be concluded in the future. The mass extermination of the Jews of Europe and the looting of Jewish property by the Nazi authorities far leaves behind the most horrific military actions. Most of these atrocities are completely irreparable. However, the Jewish people are still suffering from the consequences of destruction, which can be largely corrected through economic measures. These activities, related to the reimbursement of material losses on the part of the Germans, including the residents of the German Democratic Republic and their Government, do not suffer from delay. From the exclusivity of the requirement set out in the note of the State of Israel to the Government of the USSR of 12 March 1951, it is certain that its satisfaction is not related to and does not depend on a peace treaty with Germany. Moreover, the conditions in the State

of Israel, as a result of its absorption of the majority of Jews who survived the Nazi extermination and bearing the enormous burden of the costs of their absorption, make it necessary to meet this requirement as soon as possible.

At the same time, the Government of the State of Israel allows itself to note that a number of States have already received and continue to receive reparations from East Germany, and mentions in this regard the report of the President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR I.V. Stalin to the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic O. Grotevol, published in the newspaper Pravda of May 16, 1950.

With regard to the question of damages and the return of property to individuals, the Government of the State of Israel notes that the German People's Republic has not only failed to establish satisfactory legislative orders in this area, but has even placed a hand in the property and deprived the interested parties of the opportunity to identify it. In this regard, it should be particularly mentioned that the order issued in the GDR of 6 September 1951, according to which all property of persons living abroad is transferred to the government bank and in fact excludes the possibility of returning property to Jewish victims of Nazism who do not wish to re-settle on German soil.

Moreover, in recent months, administrative decrees have come into force in the GDR, completely annulling the rights of Jews victims of Nazism who have fled Germany and do not wish to return to the country in which they have suffered so much; their property, looted by the Nazis, is in cash and is now in the hands of the authorities of the German Democratic Republic.

This attitude on the part of the Government of the GDR to the question of the return of property and the lack of goodwill on its part to compensate for the material damage caused by the Nazis to the Jewish people precludes any possibility of direct communication between the State of Israel and the Government of the German Democratic

Republic, until there is a fundamental change in the course of the GDR's behaviour on this issue.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Government of the State of Israel expresses its firm hope that the Government of the USSR will use its full influence over the Government of the German Democratic Republic to persuade it to make the change, thereby paving the way for a just solution to the issue of payments and damages by the German Democratic Republic, according to the notes of the State of Israel to the Government of the USSR dated 16 January 1951 and 12 March 1951.

The Mission of the State of Israel takes the opportunity to express its deep respect to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

Moscow, September 15, 1952

18 September 1952.

Secret.

Israeli volleyball players' visit to Moscow

Sending Israeli athletes to Moscow can be analysed from many points of view. But here I would like to tell only about the feelings and experiences that caused our guys to stay in the capital of the USSR with us and some of the local Jews.

Due to changes in the travel program and late telegrams, we did not know until the very last moment when the team would arrive. Arokh just accidentally "overheard" a conversation in "Metropolis" about ordering rooms for Israelis. Without receiving a clear answer from the airport, we contacted the hotel and there we were told that "the Israelis have been arriving for almost an hour".

Without losing a minute, we rushed to Metropol - Arie and Dvor Arokh and I. Guys were still tired from the road, but very happy with the warm welcome faced in Moscow. They were also happy for our arrival.

The team was given two local escorts, a young man and a girl speaking English. Our arrival confused them somewhat

(“not on the program”), the young man quite sharply stated that now our team is preparing a meeting on the first floor - it is desirable that we “do not delay” them. We all went down together. In the hall of ours were waiting for 17 young guys with bouquets of flowers, they lined up, congratulated the guests and each was handed a bouquet. Since there were only 14 people in our team, we got flowers. The ceremony ended with a collective photograph.

A crowd has already gathered outside the hotel. The symbol of magendavid and inscriptions in Hebrew on the lapels of jackets of our athletes attracted the attention of both passers-by and hotel visitors. We invited the management to be our guests on Friday night.

That night the mission was a special holiday. We are not used to guests from Israel, and here together gathered and a delegation of citrus growers, and athletes. Guests shared their road impressions and talked about the warm welcome they receive here.

The next day the team started training. Only members of the leadership—Ben Tsvi, Kaspi and Pirhi—went with us to the synagogue. Because it was the “Mevarhim Sabbath, the hall of the synagogue was full of worshippers. Some of them crowded at the elevation to read prayers, keeping their eyes on our guys with the symbols of magendavid on their clothes. Many nodded in silence and cheered. The guests were honoured with an invitation to read the Torah, and The Caspian was honoured to read the “maf-shooting”. He did it with taste, proclaiming a blessing, highlighted the words “Sion and Jerusalem.” Many people had tears in their eyes.

Saying goodbye, the rabbi asked everyone where he was from, and when Ben-Tsvi promised that the whole team would show up next Saturday, he replied: “We will be very happy. We won't be able to talk about your affairs, but participation in a common prayer will be with great honour.”

The opening of the competition was very solemn, the hosts were perfectly prepared. The Dynamo stadium was decorated with flags of all participating countries. Our white-

and-blue flag hung with all along, drawing the eyes of hundreds of Jews who came to the stadium. In general, among the tens of thousands of fans who watched the parade of teams, there were many Jews, all of them cordially welcomed the Israeli team with us. The teams came out to the stadium in alphabetical order, ours were third after the Hungarians and in front of the Indians. The sign "Israel" and the flag were carried by a young man and a girl from the locals, walked beautifully and received a storm of applause. After the parade, the participants were gave welcome speeches, and then the competition began.

The organizing committee provided our team with a bus with the inscription "Israel Delegation" in Russian. The bus was driving through the streets all day, and the guys were going to sing Israeli songs every now and then. Some of those who looked at our guys saw only one of the "foreign teams" participating in the competition, but others stopped, saw our team with views, listened to the words of songs so close to their hearts. The picture we saw in the synagogue was repeated: tears in our eyes, sighs, head nods and welcome gestures. Sometimes, passing through the streets, the guys met Jews, who carefully approached, touched the coat of arms, said "shalom" and disappeared.

At the competitions our very unlucky, their first opponents were the Russians, world volleyball champions. Tens of thousands of fans watched as our team fought the famous Soviet team. Despite the impressive physical training, they certainly looked like "David vs. Goliath" compared to the Russians. The miracle didn't happen again, Goliath won. The Russians did not even try hard and did not demonstrate all their abilities, the victory was given to them easily. Before the match there was a brief ceremony of exchanging pennants and greetings, and after the end of the team said goodbye cordially.

The next match was against Lebanon. We all came to the stadium, praying for the victory, all attached great importance to the result of the meeting. But first there was a

long bargaining between the attendants about the welcome ceremony. According to the regulations, both teams should exchange greetings and national flags. The Lebanese stood up in a position, did not bring their flag and declared that they refused to accept ours. The guys consulted with the envoy, after which we demanded that everything happen in accordance with international regulations. The Lebanese were forced to surrender. True, they did not bring their flag, but our team captain took it, immediately passing it to the judge.

The game turned out to be very tense, but in the end our team won. The desire to beat these Lebanese brawlers was too strong. The audience here is objective, the attitude to the teams is friendly, and our game was repeatedly applauded.

As a result, the score was 3-0 in our favour. And so our flag slowly crawls on the flagpole up in the centre of the platform. The audience stands on the stand “peacefully”, the orchestra of the Red Army performs “Atikva”.

We all felt good, and when we looked from the waving flag to the fans, we saw many Jews among them. What are they going through at this moment? For us it is a great event, the efforts were not in vain, the result lived up to expectations and it is not a sporting success, but a Jewish-Zionist victory on Soviet soil. The “flag and anthem” inspired many Jews. We congratulated the guys on our common victory and wished them new success.

I will not talk in detail about the continuation of the competition, I am not entitled to express an opinion about the professional side of the game. The second game against the Lebanese brought disappointment and disappointment; probably, our guys relaxed and were too confident to win. But for the match with the Finns, they tuned in combat and deservedly won. Again the flag, again the anthem, again the crowd of thousands standing greets Israel.

On free days and after matches, our guys received from the organizers a wide range of excursions, trips, trips to

theatres, opera and concerts. They kept in touch with us, consulted and reported everything. We spared no effort to make them feel at home in our mission. Every Saturday they were greeted together, they were also our guests at the reception in connection with Mr. Arnon's departure and at a farewell meeting organized in their honour.

A week after the arrival, the whole team visited the synagogue. The elevation intended for the guests could not accommodate everyone, and when a few people came down and sat among the public, I was approached by one of the head of the synagogue and asked them to go back. No my objections helped, he kept saying: "It is not necessary for such honorable guests to sit among the public." I had to get the boys back.

During the prayer, a familiar picture was repeated: hundreds of eyes stared at you, catching every lip movement, a group of Israeli guys standing among a crowd of local Jews, but no one comes up, asks, does not talk. The guys felt it, they could not imagine that this is the real state of affairs. Here, and the most inveterate sceptics had to believe. As we were leaving the synagogue, a few Jews still plucked up the courage to greet us aloud, and one even shouted, "Say hello to our dear country!" and immediately disappeared into the crowd.

The reception at the mission was attended by more than a hundred foreign guests from the diplomatic corps, Soviet representatives and, of course, our team. They all made a pleasant impression, some had time to talk to the guests, and later, when the "foreigners" dispersed, we stayed in a close Israeli company and for a few more hours sang and danced together.

On Friday night, a modest ceremony took place in the presence of the guests invited that day. Caspi presented us with a pennant of the team as a sign of gratitude for the cordial attitude of the envoy and the mission staff, stressing that they did not expect such a warm reception and will never forget it. The messenger responded on behalf of all of

us, thanked the athletes for the joy and pleasure that gave us their visit.

On the last day before the team returned home, we held a farewell reception in her honour. Everyone sat down at the covered tables - us, athletes and citrus growers, who were going to come back that night. The mood was elated and solemn, the atmosphere - purely Israeli, free. In Moscow, we almost got used to it. The envoy opened the ceremony with the following words: they should know that they were in a city with a large Jewish population, in a country where the Zionist movement was particularly developed, where the Jewish labour movement and culture in Hebrew originated. There was no trace of all this, half a million Jews living here were deprived of any contact with them. Nothing like this could happen in any other place, even where there are far fewer Jews, and let everyone draw conclusions for themselves. Then the messenger asked everyone to decide for himself, freely and independently, what this trip was for him. The country you have visited, he said, has one undeniable achievement: it is undeniably proven that workers are capable of managing a huge state and its economy on their own. Whether it is necessary to run the country and build socialism exactly as it is done here, let everyone decide for themselves. If someone, on reflection, will give a positive answer, God help him. If someone thinks that there are things with which he does not agree, let him not be afraid of criticism and will have the courage to defend his position without taking blindly routine arguments. The Jewish workers' movement has always been courageous, strong and resilient in defending its views, even when the country did not yet have a powerful working class, and the support in the diaspora was weak and shaky. Bund fought hard for the right to exist for the Jewish organization for many years in line with the general Russian labour movement, when he was opposed by the greatest thinkers of Russian social democracy from Lenin to Plekhanov. The Socialist Party and Poalei Tsion fought for the right to join

Socintern as independent Jewish organizations and also for many years did not give up their ideas and principles, even when everyone was against them. Even that wing of Poalei ion, which adopted communist ideology, agreed to enter the Comintern only on certain conditions and, although it was a small group, did not give the Comintern rest for many years and many meetings. This independence of thought, which has always distinguished our movement, is now urgently needed, including to assess what is happening in this country and to what its experience is applicable to our conditions. In conclusion, the envoy stressed the high value of our team's visit to the USSR, thanked all those who participated in the organization of the trip and made it possible, and wished the team further improvement of skill and success.

In response, the boys three times proclaimed a health service in honour of the Israeli mission in Moscow, drank "lehair" and thanked for the honour and care.

Finally came the hour of farewell, the bus with the sign: "The delegation of Israel" was waiting at the gate of the mission, and when he drove away, we all sang "We brought you peace" (Heven Shalom Aleichem) to the amazement of a few passers-by.

Our feeling - the guys have withstood the test, and we have fulfilled a pleasant duty of hospitality. This holiday - a few weeks in the company of young Israelis - for the first time visited the employees of our mission in Moscow. After these days, we will once again be overwhelmed by the loneliness and nervous tension that have become our constant companions here.

All those who helped to make this visit deserve all the thanks. Do not spare work and energy for such events to be repeated in the future.

With respect.

M.Kehat

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR B.F.
PODCEROB WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR S.
ELIASHIV. October 8, 1952**

Secret.

Eliashiv appeared on his own initiative. He stated that, with regard to the appointment of him as a member of the Israeli delegation to the General Assembly, he had come to say goodbye before leaving for New York.

In the conversation, Eliashiv said that the Israeli government initially intended to apply for participation in the Economic and Social Council, but then decided to refuse to do so. Israel, Eliashiv added, expects its representative to be elected as vice-presidents of the General Assembly session. Eliashiv expressed hope for the support of the Soviet delegation in this matter.

I replied that it was best for the Israeli delegation to engage directly with the Soviet delegation on that issue. Eliashiva agreed.

Eliashiv went on to say that he believed that the session was unlikely to seriously address Palestinian issues, including the fate of Jerusalem. In that regard, he referred to the Soviet Union's position on Jerusalem, saying that, to his knowledge, it was not at odds with Israel's view, since Israel was against internationalization.

The rest of the conversation was of a protocol nature.

At the end of the conversation, Eliashiv said that the First Secretary Arokh remained the Charge d'Affaires of Israel during his absence. I wished Eliashiva a happy journey.

The conversation lasted 12 minutes.

First Secretary E. Novikov was present.

Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR
B. Podcerob

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE USSR
IN ISRAEL A.N.ABRAMOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
OF THE USSR. October 19, 1952**

Recently, the Israeli government has dramatically changed its attitude towards the USSR. This is reflected in the openly hostile speeches of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, Foreign Minister Charette, in inspired press speeches against the USSR, slanderous, full of fiction books and articles against the head of our party, the Soviet government, as well as against the leaders of the party. The Israeli Government, with regard to our legitimate property rights in Israel, has taken a position of total disregard for these rights, as can be seen from the music correspondence, which is essentially mocking. Even with regard to property that used to be recognized by the Israeli Government as legally owned by the USSR, now through various artificial manipulations, the Israeli Government deprives us of the opportunity to exercise our legitimate rights to it.

There is no doubt that, through further delays and re-references, the Israeli Government will do in every way to impede the exercise of our legitimate rights.

The import of Soviet literature into Israel is in fact prohibited, while the Americans are allowed to import it into definitely; strict censorship only of Soviet films, essentially excluding the demonstration of our films, which was not the case before, all of which demonstrates that the Israeli government has embarked on a path that cannot be compatible with normal diplomatic relations.

In our view, this raises the question: is it appropriate for our envoy to Israel to emphasize the existence of a normal relationship between Israel and the USSR that does not really exist? Wouldn't it be better to delay the arrival of the envoy for a while and, especially, to convert the mission into an embassy, as the Israeli Foreign Ministry formally asks, and at the same time to make it clear to the Israelis about the

abnormality in the relations between the USSR and Israel at the fault of the latter?

Due to the fact that the correspondence of TASS, which was sent to you on October 17, is incomplete and inaccurately given the message about Ben-Gurion's speech, we separately send you an excerpt from the text of his letter published here in the newspapers.

Abramov

**LETTER OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR S.
ELIASHIV TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY, FROM
NEW YORK. October 28, 1952**

From a conversation with V. Sorin

I have already telegraphed about the general content of the conversation. In this letter I give some details.

We decided to start the first conversation with the Soviet delegation to the UN with Zorin, as he is a member of the Ad hoc Committee. He willingly agreed to accept us. I introduced A. Eban. At first, there were difficulties with the language, as he did not speak English or French. He offered German, but I rejected the offer. Eventually decided that I would translate Eban.

Eban began by recalling the friendly relations he had with the former Soviet representatives at the UN, Gromyko and Malik, and expressed hope that the same relationship would be established with Zorin. He replied that there was no reason to believe that it would be any different. Eban summarized our main problems. He noted that it would be desirable for us to remove the Palestinian problem from the agenda of the session altogether. Since this has not happened, we believe that the General Assembly should appeal to both sides to engage in direct negotiations without mediators, without preconditions and without reference to any previous resolutions. He stressed that, as far as we know, this approach is in line with the SOVIET position on the Palestinian issue, which was evident at the fifth session, and we hope that this position has not changed.

He replied that he had not yet studied the question, so he could not give an unequivocal answer right now. He noted that the British and Americans were trying to impose a discussion on the Palestinian issue and asked what we thought about the reasons for this, why they were interested in putting the issue on the agenda and what was behind it. He repeated the words "what is behind this" several times; in

general, they were present in almost every replica of him. We said that, in our view, this position of the Anglo-Americans was not so much aimed at highlighting the Palestinian problem as it was about delaying the discussion of some of the other issues on the agenda. To this, he replied that in that case they could have brought to the discussion some other issues, not necessarily the Palestinian problem.

Eban replied that certain forces seemed to prefer to allow the Arabs to attack us rather than France. This answer was clearly liked by Zorin. He then repeated that intuitively he felt that "something was behind all this", Britain and the United States were not just so interested in the Israeli-Arab conflict, they have some hindsy thoughts. It seems that they intend to start fanning this conflict again. He and Zorin, and we'd be advised to be interested. In this regard, he noted that the USSR has no reason to help fan the Arab-Israeli conflict. He had not yet understood the substance of the issue, since he had not had time to deal with it, but believed that the Palestinian problem had been put on the agenda artificially, that the issue was outside the main course of the session' work. He agreed that in principle the USSR was in favour of resolving the disputed issues through direct negotiations between the interested parties, but for the time being he would like to study the issue more deeply and listen to what the representatives of other countries would say.

Eban said that we do not yet know whether we will propose a draft resolution in the spirit of the position he has expressed to Zorin or whether the proposal will be made by other countries. We would like to consult with the Soviet delegation before the proposal is put on the table of the commission, to listen to its opinion. He replied that he was always ready for such consultations.

As you can see, he is extremely careful in his expressions, trying not to make any preliminary commitments. At the same time, this man is very sympathetic and pleasant in treatment, to talk to us went willingly.

With respect.

S. Eliashiv

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
November 9, 1952**

On November 8, the mission hosted a reception to mark the 35th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The present were: The Acting President and Parliament President Sprintzak, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, Ministers, Chief of the General Staff, Mayor of Tel Aviv Jaffa, Heads of Foreign Embassies and Missions, members of the public and the press. The president's aide-turned-congratulations from Weizmann. A total of about 275 people were present.

Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
November 9, 1952**

In connection with the 35th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR organized about 100 mass gatherings in cities and agricultural settlements. Ershov, Abramov, Rozhkov and Rajewski attended the meetings in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jaffa and Rishon.

On November 8, Tel Aviv hosted the opening of the League Club (called the "House of Friendship Israel—USSR") and a large exhibition "Soviet Book."

The Democratic Press published articles on the anniversary of the October Revolution for several days. The Communist Party and Mapam translated into Hebrew the work of Comrade Stalin "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", a report by T. Malenkov and speeches by T. Beria and Bulganin at the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Ershov

NOTE OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR J.A. MALIK TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR I.V.STALIN. November 10, 1952

Secret.

On November 9 this year, the President of the State of Israel, H. Weizmann, died, which was officially notified by the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR and the Foreign Ministry of the USSR.

Although the report of Weizmann's death is addressed to the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR, the Ussr Foreign Ministry considers it appropriate to send, according to the existing practice, a telegram on behalf of Comrade N.M. Schwernik and the acting president of the state of Israel Sprin-tzaku.

As a certificate, I report that condolence telegrams were sent on behalf of tt.N.M. Schwernik and A.A. Gromyko in connection with the death of the Swedish King Gustav V in 1949; on behalf of the so-called N.M. Shvernik and on behalf of T.Y. Vyshinsky in connection with the death of King George VI of England in 1952; on behalf of T.M. Schwernik in connection with the death of Icelandic President Bjornsson in 1952.

A draft telegram is attached.

It's agreed with the Schwernik.

Please consider.

Ya. Malik

application

Draft telegram of the Chairman of the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR N.M. Schwernik

Acting President of the State of Israel I. Sprinzaku

Tel Aviv

I ask you, Your Excellency, to accept my condolences on the passing of the President of the State of Israel, Dr. H. Weitzman.

Chairman of the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR.

N.Schwernik

**LETTER FROM THE SECOND SECRETARY OF THE
SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL, THE COMMISSIONER OF
THE VOCS IN ISRAEL, M.P. POPOV, TO THE HEAD OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF MIDDLE EASTERN VOCS, N.N.
CHIGARKOV. November 19, 1952**

I inform you that on November 8 this year, a club of the local branch of the Israeli League of Friendship with the USSR was opened in Tel Aviv. The club is officially called the "House of Friendship israel-USSR." Simultaneously with the opening of the club, exhibitions "Soviet Book" and "Soviet Graphics" were opened in its two halls. Representatives of the mission were present at the opening of the club: councillor T. Abramov and the second secretaries T. Popov and Ishchenko. Dr. Snee, Eidelberg, Stavi and with a short greeting - T. Popov - gave speeches.

Although the wide advertising of the new club and exhibitions has not yet begun, there are 100-120 visitors every day. Preparations are under way for the organization of collective exhibition facilities and for the deployment of normal club work.

Received by me from THE VOCS narrow-film film equipment and epidiascope I expect to soon transfer for use in the club.

One of the friends of the Soviet Union gave the new club a good radio.

Various documentary, scientific, technical and educational short-films would be needed for the club's work, as well as for non-commercial rentals through the League and other progressive public organizations. Watching channels at night, I felt a slight excitement, which with a second of the second grew. I didn't want to masturbate, I decided to [order a whore here](#). Not the beauty who was on the TV came, but so will go. I fucked her without any interest, just to merge. Then he paid off and fell asleep.

If VOCS were able to supply its commissioner in Israel with such films, the workload could be greatly increased.

Due to the expansion of the League's work, especially in its small offices, there is an acute lack of material in various materials.

I ask you to regularly send to our address books, gramophone records, exhibitions, narrow-film movies, etc.

I ask you to take into account our needs and fully satisfy them.

At the same time I direct you:

1. Two copies of the Hebrew translation of Stalin's work "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", published by the publishing house "Syfriot Poalim" of the Mapam party in the amount of about 5,000 copies.

2. Translation into Hebrew of G. Nikolaeva's novel "Harvest", published in two books in early October this year in the amount of 4-5 thousand copies.

WOCS Commissioner in Israel

M. Popov

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
December 8, 1952**

Over the past week, the anti-Soviet and anti-communist campaign in Israel has intensified. Reactionary press publishes articles daily against the Soviet Union. The Mapai Party organized more than 100 mass gatherings across the country to protest against the trial in Prague of a gang of conspirators and agents of American imperialism. On December 3, the “Unity of the Nation” semi-fascist society, which had shown no activity before, staged a “demonstrative public court” in Tel Aviv, which smeared the USSR, Czechoslovakia and the Communist Party of Israel and tried to “accuse” them of anti-Semitism. Several rallies were organized by the fascist party Al-Manar and the party of common Zionists. Leaders of the right wing and the centre of Mapam, following their Zionist ideology and under the influence of pressure from Mapai and the Jewish Agency, also joined the campaign.

Two acts of sabotage were carried out against the Czechoslovakian mission:

1) On 23 November, a stone was thrown through the window of the Attorney's Office;

2) On 4 December, a bomb was thrown into the garage wall under the mission building, smashing a wall and damaging a vehicle.

The Government of Israel is drafting a law to ensure the security of the state. The Act provides for the death penalty or life imprisonment for all persons accused of undermining the sovereignty of the State, attempting to overthrow the Government, changing the state system, preparing a civil war, handing over to the enemy or disseminating information about closed meetings of the Government and parliamentary commissions.

The attitude of the Israeli ruling circles and the Zionist parties towards the Prague process is an additional confirmation to the materials of this process that Zionism and its pre-posing, put and participants are direct agents of American imperialism.

Ershov

**TELEGRAM OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT
OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY TO THE ISRAELI
MISSION TO THE CENTRAL. December 10, 1952**

Yesterday, unknown people tried to set fire to the car of the Soviet mission. Lotan and Setet expressed regret for the mission on behalf of the Foreign Ministry and reported that the police have launched an investigation, the perpetrators will be found and punished to the fullest extent of the law. The mission representative replied that he accepted our application, but the envoy reserved the right to respond in accordance with instructions from his Government.

**CIRCULAR TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER
GENERAL W. EITAN TO ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC
REPRESENTATIVES ABROAD. December 23, 1952**

Relations with representatives of the Cominform countries

In light of the Prague process, Israeli representatives should continue to build their relations with the representatives of the Kominform countries, including the Soviet Union, on the following principles:

a. If the Israeli mission organizes a reception to which all heads of diplomatic missions are invited (e.g. Independence Day or other similar occasion), representatives of the Kominform countries should also be invited.

b. If a private reception is organized (lunch, dinner, etc.), diplomats from the Kominform countries can be invited only if there is a relationship of personal friendship between the host and the guest. Representatives of Czechoslovakia are not invited.

In situations not described by paragraphs a and "b," it is necessary to refrain from inviting representatives of the Cominform countries, unless it is in our special interest.

Israeli diplomats should not refuse invitations to the mission of the Cominform countries in circumstances similar to those in the paragraphs "a" and "b". We do not expect an Israeli diplomat to be invited to the Information Mission under other circumstances. If suddenly there is an invitation from the Czechoslovak mission, do not accept.

If an Israeli diplomat is invited by a third party to a reception or dinner attended by diplomats from the Kominform countries, it should not be refused. Representatives of the Cominform countries should be treated with cold courtesy, in any case not to look for opportunities for conversation. If a representative of the Cominform country joins the conversation during the reception, the opportunity should be used to express our

feelings towards the Prague process and its anti-Jewish, anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli character. It is necessary to refrain from talking with representatives of Czechoslovakia, without going beyond the basic rules of politeness.

W. Eitan

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO THE
UNITED STATES, ISRAEL'S PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN A. EBAN TO THE ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTRY. January 5, 1953**

The Prime Minister. Among the Jewish leaders there was a split and confusion about the process in Prague. Disagreements concern the question of whether the USSR should be accused of an overtly anti-Semitic concept, so putting it on a par with the Yidophobes-pogroms that the last differences of the Soviet regime from the Nazi regime disappear. The U.S. Administration, of course, wants us to adopt this approach and draw practical conclusions, first of all, by adding our powerful voice to the global front of political and propaganda opposition to the Councils. Some Jewish organizations, mainly close to the labour movement, share this position, and Goldman, Halperin and others advise for the time being to show restraint, i.e. to continue to condemn Prague for all its anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist attacks, but not to conclude that the Communists in terms of anti-Semitism are no different from the Nazis. Now there was a dispute between them about a pamphlet, which was intended to be published by the Council of the Zionist council and which was held in a sharply anti-Soviet tone, describing Russia as an anti-Semitic state. Goldman stopped publishing the pamphlet. In the end, they agreed to hand it over to me so that I could speak on behalf of the Government of Israel. I had such a strange feeling from the photo, and I want this young lady, and somehow even repellent. In general, I did not understand myself, and came to the salon, there everything fell into place. Even if we can solve the problem by replacing some harsh language with more moderate language, the issue will not be removed from the agenda and we will have to deal with it daily and hourly.

Please send instructions and give advice until Thursday, because on this day there will be consultations in New York.

It seems to me that it makes sense for us to continue to condemn the Prague process as a purely anti-Semitic exercise, raising serious concerns about the Soviet approach, but not to state that anti-Semitism has become a permanent part of Soviet politics.

Eban

**CIRCULAR TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER-
GENERAL W. EITAN TO ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC
REPRESENTATIVES IN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND
YUGOSLAVIA. January 14, 1953**

So far, there are no reports from Eliashiva regarding the case of doctors. Please note that Israel is not mentioned in the Soviet statement. So far, no Israeli representative should make official statements in this regard. If Jewish or Zionist leaders ask for advice, say that we are not against them making statements pointing out the following.

A. It's crazy to accuse Joynt of orchestrating such crimes, especially since Joynt hasn't worked in Russia since 1938.

b. Jews in the free world are concerned about the fate of their brothers behind the Iron Curtain.

C. The use of the words "Jew" and "Zionist" as expletives indicates the Russian leaders' search for scapegoats and indirectly shows the difficult internal situation of the USSR.

Keep in mind that Israel is not interested in entering into an open conflict with Soviet Russia, because it is vital for us to maintain our positions in Moscow and in the capitals of satellite countries as much as possible.

Eitan

**LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY
S.T.BAZAROV TO THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN
ISRAEL P.I.ERSHOV. January 15, 1953**

Secret.

At the same time, I send you to send to the Israeli Foreign Ministry the text of the soviet Mission in Israel approved by the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to the note of the Israeli Foreign Ministry of August 11, 1952 on the issue of Soviet property in Israel.

A copy of the note, which will be sent by you to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, you should be forwarded to the SVS.

Appendix: by text, on 3 sheets.

Head of the Middle East Division

S.Bazarov

Application

NOTE TEXT

In response to a note from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated August 11, 1952, for No. The mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is honoured to announce the following:

1. As the Ministry knows, most of the buildings in the "Russian buildings" in Jerusalem and belonging to the Soviet Union were occupied at various times by various Israeli institutions and organizations, including the Ministries of Justice, Police, Labour, Transport, the Supreme Court, the Municipality of Jerusalem and others, without the knowledge and consent of the Soviet Mission. The USSR mission appealed to the Central Housing Commission, which is responsible for hiring premises for these institutions and organizations, with a request to resolve with the Mission the issue of the conditions of operation of these buildings. However, the Central Housing Commission refused to do so, citing the lack

of instructions from the Ministry. In this regard, the Soviet Mission, in notes dated May 25 and July 18, 1952, twice asked the Ministry to provide the necessary instructions on the settlement with the Soviet Mission of all issues related to the operation of buildings belonging to the Soviet Union by Israeli institutions and organizations. Despite this, the above-mentioned Israeli institutions and organizations continue to use the property of the USSR for a number of years without the consent of the Soviet Mission and without paying the appropriate fee for the use of the property.

The mission of the USSR cannot accept the statement contained in the Ministry's statement that the matter is subject to the jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this regard, the Soviet Mission insists that the Ministry give the necessary instructions to all institutions and organizations that occupy Soviet-owned facilities to settle the issue of their exploitation with the SOVIET Mission.

2. The Soviet Mission has repeatedly provided the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs with exhaustive evidence that the Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society, due to changes in the Russian state system, has been renamed the Russian Palestinian Society. Consequently, all rights, including property rights registered to the former Orthodox Palestinian society, belong to the Russian Palestinian Society at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

As a result, the SOVIET Mission once again insists that the Ministry take the necessary measures to ensure that the property of the society is properly re-registered and transferred to the office of the Russian Palestinian Society at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in Israel.

At the same time, the Mission considers it necessary to note that the question of the status of a society, in particular its name, is known to be determined by the national law of society. Therefore, the Ministry's proposal to refer to the Israeli court the question that the Russian Palestinian Society is the owner of property previously registered in the name of the Orthodox Palestinian society cannot be accepted.

The Government of Israel, despite the indisputable evidence presented, has decided to transfer the property of the Russian Palestinian society to the Guardian General. This decision cannot be seen as anything other than a violation of the rights of society and an infringement on its property. In this regard, the Mission again insists on the re-registration of the property in the name of the Russian Palestinian Society at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and its transfer to the office of this society in Israel.

3. With regard to property registered in the name of former Grand Duke Sergei, the Ministry has already been informed, as requested, that the property was in fact the property of the former Russian Imperial Government and is now the property of the Soviet Union. The mission of the USSR therefore considers that by transferring the property to the general guardian, the Israeli authorities ignore the right of ownership of the USSR on this property.

The Mission hopes that the Ministry will order the re-registration of this property in the name of the USSR and transfer it to the Soviet Mission.

Drawing the attention of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the fact that the settlement of all the above-mentioned issues relating to Soviet property in Israel and in the territory controlled by the Israeli Government has been delayed for a long time by the Israeli authorities, the Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expects that the Ministry will immediately take all necessary measures to re-register and transfer the property to the Soviet Mission and the Russian Palestinian Society Mission at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in Israel.

LETTER FROM ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER D.BIN-GURION TO GOVERNMENT MEMBERS. January 20, 1953

Yesterday I learned that my letter to the cabinet on 14 January had not been passed by the day before yesterday.

Meanwhile, there has already been a debate in the Knesset, I have received a report on Sunday's meeting of the government and I think it is necessary to make some comments.

It seems that our general confusion, including in the course of the debate in the Government, stems from terminological confusion.

(a) USSR and Maki

From the speech of my colleague Shapira it is possible to conclude that there is no difference between the USSR and Maki at all and our struggle with Maki is perceived as an "anti-Soviet action". Indeed, Maki is fully in solidarity with the USSR and without hesitation fulfills all instructions from Moscow, whatever they may be. It is also true that the USSR in one way or another cares for the communist movement everywhere in the world and considers the Communists their agent, intelligence, support and support.

But the USSR, like any other country, has no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the state of Israel. Maki is not part of the USSR, but part of Israel, it operates (at least should operate) on the basis of Israeli laws and enjoys the rights of a political party under Israeli law. The resolution or prohibition of Maki activities of the Soviet Union does not apply.

b) Attitude to the USSR as a communist power and attitude to hostile actions of the USSR against the Jewish people

These are two completely different things. I strongly do not accept the Bolshevik regime. This is not a socialist state, but a paddock for slaves. It is a system based on murders, lies and suppression of the human spirit, denial of freedom of workers and peasants. This is an even more brutal and

extremist continuation of tsarist imperialism. But against the system and its influence outwards it is possible to fight only by means of ideological agitation; people who believe that socialism is in Russia and the USSR is the liberator of all mankind are not criminals, but only misguided ones. Fighting them is only possible as a struggle of ideas.

In cases where Russia commits hostile actions against the Jewish people and makes bloody slanders on them, perhaps even dirtier and more dangerous than the bloody slanders of the Middle Ages, this is not the case. I understand my colleague Shapira's concern that we should not do things that could worsen the situation of Jews in Russia. I also understand that we are powerless against this giant. And yet we cannot and should not remain silent. There is a conscience in the world, there is public opinion, and although Russia openly challenges even the strongest power of the free world, the United States, it does not mean that it does not care about world public opinion. If that were the case, the Soviets would not have joined the UN. In fact, the USSR struggles to drag public opinion in Asia, Africa, America, and in Western Europe to its side. The Soviets look at things realistically enough, they understand that each state has its place and its value. I have no doubt that the campaign against Jews and Israel, in addition to the domestic political objectives of the USSR and the communist bloc, is also intended to influence public opinion in Germany, in Arab and Islamic countries, as well as on anti-Semitic groups in the West as a whole.

We should not exaggerate our strength and our ability to influence the situation. At the same time, we cannot downplay them, claiming that it is not in our power to influence anything. Our quality value exceeds our number several times. The State of Israel and the world Jewry are a powerful moral force if we can use it in the right direction, even a giant and brute Russia cannot ignore it.

It's not just about efficiency. There are moments in the life of a nation when moral imperatives should be obeyed,

even if it does not, at first glance, bring any benefit. You can't be silent now. What started yesterday in the Knesset, we must steadily continue to lead in two directions - to protest against the bloody slander and demand (in advance realizing that in practical terms there will be no answer) freedom of repatriation: "Let my people go."

(c) It is necessary to distinguish between the hostile actions of a foreign State and its own citizens. Political considerations may force us not to react to hostile actions of a foreign state: of course, we cannot declare war on Russia, and we are not interested in a complete severance of relations with it. And in both campaigns we have planned, we will try not to overdo it, although we will not be able to mumble, let alone hush up.

But it is necessary to act decisively in relation to the hostile actions of our own citizens. I mean first of all, Mackie. In this case, I will say that by hostile acts I do not mean their communist beliefs or propaganda. The democracy we believe in requires tolerance even by communist propaganda against democracy itself. I strongly oppose any restriction, any discrimination against the Communists, although I clearly see their lies and the dangers emanating from them. Even in Histadrut I have always voted and will vote against the exclusion of communists for their beliefs.

But it is necessary to distinguish between communist ideology and the promotion of direct anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish activities. Russia or any other state "can" commit hostile actions against another state, and citizens of this state cannot. The activities of Israeli citizens against the State of Israel or the Jewish people constituted a crime that could not be tolerated. In this case, tolerance is a rejection of sovereign rights and the responsibility of the state. I cannot understand how, so far, the State of Israel, without abandoning its national destiny, could allow the existence of an organization based in its activities by enmity to Israel and the Jewish people, helping forces abroad (not organizations

and non-States) to spread the bloody slanders to Israel, Zionism and Jewish organizations.

d) Democracy and permissiveness

The State of Israel cannot exist without democracy. Similarly, from my point of view, it cannot exist if there is no Zionism. But many of us have a distorted view of democracy. Is the freedom of action for every human being, a prerequisite for democracy, bounded by anything? Are there no laws that severely punish certain acts? Does a person have the right to invoke freedom to justify lawless actions? Is freedom in a democratic society not limited to the security of the state and the rights of other citizens? And the freedom of organizations—is it so limitless? Does it imply the freedom of organizations for thieves, counterfeiters, murderers or rapists?

I was unpleasantly surprised, even astonished, reading the report on the debates in the government and seeing that some of my colleagues ignored the degree of moral and political threat posed by the Prague and Moscow processes. We are not in a position to prevent the authorities of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Russia from committing this heinous crime against our people. But we are quite able to rein in our own traitors, our own “fifth column.”

Is it possible that in Israel, with the permission of the Government, in accordance with the laws there was a newspaper that dared to publish what was published by Kol Ghaam on the 14th and on? I note that this newspaper is published on the paper purchased by the government, printed on the printing machines provided by the state, enjoys complete freedom of distribution. And what does it spread in such freedom? Here are just a few headlines: “A gang of killer doctors in the service of Anglo-American spy services”; “A terrorist organization closely linked to Joynt”; “The real face of this Zionist spy network was disguised as the guise of a charitable organization.” I was trembling when I learned that the only response of the State of Israel to this bloody slander, not against one Bayliss, but against millions

of Jews and Zionists, was... "warning"! And after this "warning" - no action, nothing!

This newspaper continues to be published. And I believe that Maki still convenes assemblies where statements are made in this spirit! Both our naive youth and even more naive new immigrants see that all this is happening in the Jewish state with the consent of the government, under the protection of the law, and draw appropriate conclusions. I have to admit that I'm just appalled by this pathological and criminal communist concoction. I think I'm no less a Democrat than my colleagues Shapira, Rosen and Serlin, but I don't understand how the law, state and government in Israel can tolerate such phenomena.

The case of one man, Dreyfus, at one time stirred up the conscience of the world, and then there was no state of Israel. I know that we live in a more cruel world now. And I understand the logic of nazi actions, which are resorted to by the Soviets. The end justifies any means, so this regime considers. But I am talking about what is happening in the state of Israel, a state that has become the quintessential Jewish national spirit in all generations, for we are being watched not only by those Jews who live now, but also by dozens of generations of ancestors, millions of victims of Nazism, gangs of Khmelnitsky, crusaders, pagans, etc., until the destruction of the Second Temple.

I'm ready to be a realist and a materialist. After all, it's a Jewish state. Can it tolerate collaborators collaborating with Yudophobes abroad?

Soviet Russia is not an anti-Semitic state. Hitler was not an anti-Semite either. Haj Amin al-Husseini, a Semitic family no less than you and I, was Hitler's closest friend and aide. I do not believe that the press will make a fuss if Stalin invites the mufti now, but it is obvious that Stalin is not an anti-Semite. What does he care about the Semites? Just to achieve certain political goals, he needed today to build in vain on the Jews and the Jewish state. It incited hatred of Israel and Jews in the world. Maybe we can't do anything

against him, but will we allow the Yudophobes in Moscow to keep here, under the protection of our laws, their agents, collaborators who contribute to the spread of yudophobia?

This is the issue on the agenda. Unfortunately, in the report of the meeting of the government, I found nothing similar to the answer.

With respect
D.Ben-Gurion

**NOTE OF DEPUTY HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
MIDDLE EAST OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR
AD. SHCHIBORIN AND S.T.BAZAROV TO THE MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A.Y.VYSHINSKY.**

January 24, 1953

Secret.

In accordance with your resolution, Ershov reports:

The bourgeois seal reacts to the arrest in the USSR of a group of pest doctors:

1. An attempt is made to question the published facts and accusations against the exposed pest doctors, calling them fantastic (TASS, January 21, 1953, l. 85-r). Some commentators take under their protection the arrested doctors-killers and want to protect and whitewash them (TASS, January 15, 1953, l. 78th; January 14, 1953, l. 56th). Thus, "the deputy head of the European branch Of Joynt stated that the Soviet accusations are a clear fantasy" (TASS, January 13, 1953, l. 56-r).

2. The use of this message for anti-Soviet propaganda follows the statements that the accusation against the doctors who are killers, many of them Jews, is allegedly anti-Semitic. Thus, the Vienna newspaper "Vener zeitung" spreads slander about "persecution of Jews in the USSR", about "Soviet anti-Semitism" etc. (TASS, January 15, 1953, l. 14th). The representative of the Government of Israel demanded urgent discussion in Parliament on the "anti-Semitic nature of the accusations against the nine Soviet doctors" (TASS, January 19, 1953, l. 78-r).

3. The anti-Soviet campaign is also being carried out on the line of fictitious accusations that there is a plan for the deployment of anti-Semitism common to all countries of popular democracy. Paris Radio reported: "Observers believe that the Soviet leaders decided to give an unprecedented scale of the anti-Zionist campaign launched by the process in Prague, and to eliminate in the Soviet Union and the

countries of popular democracy the last Jews suspected of sympathizing with the West” (TASS, 14.01.53, l. 19-r). New York Radio made a similar statement: “The Kremlin's current anti-Semitic campaign, which has not yet gone beyond the Eastern European satellite countries, has now embraced the Soviet Union itself openly” (TASS, January 13, 1953, l. 73-r).

4. With regard to Israel, it should be noted that in that country the slander from the rostrum of parliament and in the press against the Soviet Union in connection with the arrest of pest doctors had reached unprecedented proportions. In addition, such issues are raised and discussed:

(a) Israel's Minutedel Charette once again “expressed hope that the gates of Romania and even Russia would be opened, allowing Jews to emigrate to Israel” (TASS, January 17, 1953, l. 84-r). Paris Radio reported on January 19 that the Israeli parliament “intends to make a secondary appeal to the Soviet Union to allow the emigration of Russian Jews to Israel” (TASS, l. 71-r). Charette stated in the Knesset on January 19, 1953, that “the Government of Israel will continue to demand even more insistently the right to immigration to Israel of all Jews who aspire to Sion.”

b) The seal raises the question of a possible rupture of relations between the USSR and Israel. For example, in connection with the appearance of the article “The Zionist agency of American intelligence” in the “New Time” London newspaper “Daily Telegraph and Morning Post” wrote: “Russia soon hopes to break off relations with Israel. It is believed that this may happen after the trial and sentencing of the Kremlin doctors accused last week of murder” (TASS, January 22, 1953, l. 23rd). It should be borne in mind that Charette said in Kolkata on January 17 this year that it was “unwise to sever relations with the Soviet Union, and we will not take the lead in this direction” (TASS, January 19, 1953, l. 8th).

(c) Israeli statesmen are threatening to raise the issue of “anti-Semitism in the USSR and the countries of popular democracy” at the UN. Charette stated in the Knesset on

January 19, 1953, that “the Government of Israel will stigmatize the agitation in the United Nations and from every other rostrum against the Jewish people, and the dirt thrown at their organizations, and will signal the dangers that threaten the well-being of millions of Jews in these countries.” Eban, Israel's representative to the UN, said his delegation would raise “the issue of the process in Czechoslovakia” and the “consequences of anti-Semitism and the campaign against Israel in some countries” before the UN; stipulating that this issue will not be the subject of a formal complaint, but will be raised when considering the issue of U.S. interference in the internal affairs of other states (para. 71 of the UNGA agenda) (TASS, January 15, 1953, l. 21st).

In the latest reports, Ershova emphasizes that the Israeli press's responses to the Knesset debate on 19 January this year do not discuss the threat of Charette to raise the issue of “anti-Semitism” in UN bodies.

In connection with the foregoing, the SDS considers it appropriate at present:

1. To instruct the press department to publish an article in the central newspaper giving a rebuke to the defenders of the killers' doctors.

2. To instruct our missions in the countries of popular democracy to prepare factual materials on the hostile activities of Zionist organizations in case the issue of pest doctors is raised at the UN.

It is currently undesirable to take any steps of diplomatic order against Israel in connection with the statement mentioned by Charette and other Israeli figures in the Knesset, as it is not yet clear how far the Israeli Government will go. In our opinion, we should wait and see what the hype that is now being raised in Israel will be.

With regard to our position in the event of some form of substantive submission to the seventh session of the UN General Assembly, which is resuming its work in February, please be allowed to submit proposals at a later date, upon

receipt of additional materials necessary to prepare the issue.

S.Bazarov A. Yiborin

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR S.
ELIASHIVA TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY.**

January 28, 1953

I am amazed by the publication in Dawar ha-Shavua of a Moscow photo with Golda Meyerson. The publication will provide an excuse to accuse the mission of “forbidden ties” in the USSR and the organization of unrest. The whole tone of the speeches and articles in Israel, Eban's speech in the United States fills me with anxiety and anxiety. They leave the impression of a demonstrative challenge and a desire to accelerate the end of our relations with the USSR. This is contrary to your telegram number 78, paragraph 7: very sorry that you have never found it necessary to seek my opinion on the style of our statements and publications.

Eliashiv

**A COMMEMORATIVE NOTE BY THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY, A.
LEVAVI, TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTRY, W. EITAN. January 29, 1953**

It is widely believed that the development of the Soviet policy towards Israel will necessarily weaken our position towards the West. The current communist policy unequivocally puts us in a situation where we have no choice but to join the West, while the Arabs have the freedom to manoeuvre. As a result, the West is forced to make certain concessions to them in order not to allow communist expansion in the Arab world. I would like to refute that view.

A. Israel's economic dependence on the West was well known before the current phase of communist policy towards us began.

b. The Soviets did not use their anti-Jewish policy in propaganda on Arabs. This, by the way, is one of the reasons for the State Department's view that it does not believe that the current Soviet policy is somehow aimed at Arabs. This position of American and British diplomacy has been clarified during contacts in recent weeks.

In the second world war, for example, someone warned King Farook of Egypt, "If Rommel did not support us, Rommel would come," he would surely have thought, "Well, let me deal with him as well as with Montgomery." And, by the way, such a conclusion had the right to exist - at least it was very common among many Arab leaders.

The situation was very different in the face of the threat of a new world war. No Arab leader in power or able to come to power in the foreseeable future can be under the illusion of what would happen to him if his country was taken over by the Soviets. That is, here the West should say to the Arabs: if you do not help us now, allowing us to make proper preparations, in the end your countries will be occupied by Soviet troops in case of war.

Although Israel has been economically dependent on the West since its inception, communist, pro-communist and neutralist views have gained considerable influence in the country (primarily among the most important sectors in the professional and social terms, as well as among the most promising age groups). Now the national leadership is struggling with these sentiments with growing success. The Council's current hatred of Israel has undermined the influence of these views in the country. The development of events in Israel since the manifestation of the anti-Israeli nature of Soviet policy has the potential to bring the entire people together, with the exception of a tiny minority, to awaken a national willingness to actively, courageously and faithfully defend democracy.

This spiritual development can slow down and even reverse only one thing: if the pro-Arab policy of the West, manifested in the strengthening of Arab military power and the creation of regional defensive alliances, creates a situation that a large part of the Israeli public will interpret as a threat to the security and independence of the State itself. In this case, it is indeed possible to revive neutralist sentiments. There is no doubt that the Communists and those close to them will resort to all possible propaganda manoeuvres to increase the mood of frustration, bitterness and neutrality among Israeli society.

Since there are no forces in the Arab ruling circles that the Communists could persuade to reach serious compromises with them, it is possible that the wave of disillusionment with the West will strengthen political groups in Israel (already with certain weights and capabilities), among which communist propaganda can give rise to the illusion of the transient nature of the anti-Israeli component of Soviet politics and the possibility of achieving with the Soviets such coexistence, which would not harm the aspirations of these groups.

The West's preference for Arabs can thus undermine the current mindset in Israeli society. However, the

strengthening of Israel, on the one hand, and the Soviet danger on the other, can lead Arab leaders to recognize that their policy of blackmail towards the West has stalled and it is time to abandon the traditional course by clearly pledging to meet the main forces of the defenders of democracy; the continuation of the “failure policy” bluff will only do them harm.

It is impossible to ignore the significant difference between Arab countries, for example, Iran. In the Arab states there is no movement, at least any similar to the openly communist, influential and well-organized Iranian Tude. There is no chance that something like this will arise here in the foreseeable future, except as a result of the Soviet occupation of the Middle East.

j. Attempts to achieve internal stability in Egypt or Syria at the cost of increasing instability in the region as a whole (such attempts are made by some Arab leaders seeking to consolidate dominion in their countries) are illusory. In fact, the factor of instability and lack of peace between Israel and the Arabs only calls into question the strength of the positions of these Arab leaders. The contest in nationalist anti-Israel extremism between the opposition and the “party of power” in Syria and Egypt will be daily and hourly to push Arab leaders to make new demands on Israel. Any Western concession in this area will inevitably lead to new Arab demands or hostile actions. Until the problem is addressed in principle, the situation will rotate in an enchanted circle, or, more precisely, move on a narrowing spiral to further escalation of the situation.

This chronic disease is contagious and can only be cured surgically. For example, the refugee problem could only be solved by resettling them in Arab countries, and stabilizing the situation in the region was only possible through the signing of peace between the Arabs and Israel.

If the regime of a dictator like Shishekli collapses in such a process, there will be no regime closer to the Councils in Syria in any case. On the other hand, if the Arab leadership is

convinced that the West is not blackmailing and is not prepared to prefer the Arabs to Israel in either the military or the military-political field, and that the “policy of refusal” does not prevent the West from acting to protect the region in the name of the interests of democracy around the world, and to enter into bilateral agreements with forces willing to contribute to this protection, effectively strengthening Israel by providing it with military assistance. , in this case, the Arab leaders will have a liberating crisis and will open the way to the establishment of genuine stability in the region as a whole and in each Arab country individually. It would then be possible to resettle refugees, establish peace between Israel and the Arabs, provide economic assistance in the name of co-, cynical progress in Arab countries, provide military assistance to the Middle East and establish regional organizations. This will serve the interests of independence and democracy, to protect the region from external threats.

Only a real imperative caused by the hopelessness of the situation and the lack of prospects for such an exit can lead the Arab countries on this path, and the sooner this happens, the better. In any case, the West will have to pursue a course to achieve the desired settlement of the situation in the Middle East. If suspicion or illusions prevail, a historic chance may be missed.

**THE FINAL SECTION OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
REPORT OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL FOR THE
FOURTH QUARTER OF 1952. January 31, 1953**

Secret.

The position of the Arab countries towards Israel remains hostile. In recent statements, Arab officials have reaffirmed their willingness to comply with the Arab League's decision to boycott trade with West Germany if it ratifies the treaty with Israel. Among the industrialists and traders of West Germany there are many opponents of this treaty. The Adenauer government, in an attempt to find a way out, offered the Arab countries the conclusion of treaties on the most favourable trade and agreed to the UN's control over supplies to Israel under the reparations treaty. Finally, according to a December 24 message, Adenauer said, "We will not resist if the UN decides to give some of the reparations to Arab refugees." Negotiations between West Germany and Egypt have been taking place for a long time, in which the issue of repatriation is also being discussed.

In connection with the trial in Prague over a group of conspirators, spies and saboteurs led by Slan, the Israeli government tried to inflate the country's unprecedented anti-Soviet campaign. The press denied all the facts presented at the trial, in particular concerning the so-called Morgen-tau plan. However, on December 1, 1952, United Press confirmed that Ben-Gurion and Charette were indeed in the United States when Acheson was secretary of state. The press was subjected to a frenzied hysteria allegedly in connection with the campaign of anti-Semitism in the countries of popular democracy, as the Israeli Government and the press tried to present the trial of a gang of traitors of the Czechoslovak people. The tone of the campaign was set by Charette, who made an angry slanderous statement in the Knesset on 24 November 1953 about the Prague process. All this flow of vicious slander and accusations of anti-Semitism by the USSR was necessary to mask the acts of

espionage and sabotage carried out by the imperialist camp and its Israeli agents in the countries of popular democracy.

The Israeli bourgeoisie amicably picked up the slanderous statements of the Israeli government about the “existence of anti-Semitism” in the USSR, knowing, however, the falsehood of such allegations. The American reactionary Rabbi Silver, for example, stated, “I cannot believe that alleged anti-Semitism was any factor in the Prague process” (Kol Ghaam, December 22, 1952). All Israeli parties, except the communist one, are involved in fanning anti-Soviet hysteria, which had its consequences of the bombing of the Czechoslovakian mission on December 4, the arson of a Soviet car near the Soviet mission building on December 8, 1952, and, finally, the arson of the Soviet book store in Jerusalem on January 15, 1953.

The new stage of anti-Soviet hysteria began with the publication in the Soviet press on January 13, 1953 of an official report on the disclosure of a group of doctors who carried out medical means of terror against the leaders of the party and the government and the command of the Soviet army. The fact that some of these criminals are Jews was the reason for the vicious attacks against the USSR. On January 19, 1953, a special meeting was held in the Knesset in connection with the so-called “anti-Jewish campaign” in the USSR. Opening the debate on the issue, the chairman of the Knesset's foreign affairs and defence committee, Argov, said: “The current fraud charges against the seven Jewish doctors guilty only of being Jews cannot pass without strong protest, not only because they are slanderous, but because they involve the possible extermination of two million Jews under the control of the Kremlin.” At the same meeting, a new anti-Soviet statement was made by Charette, in which he juggled the words “fabrication”, “anti-Jewish course, officially adopted in the USSR”, “campaign of atrocities, propaganda and terrorism, undertaken by the Soviet authorities against their Jewish citizens” etc., stood up to protect the criminals and organizations from which they

acted. Charette repeated the allegations of alleged repression of Jews in the Soviet Union and ended with a demand to allow Jews to emigrate to Israel.

The aim of this new anti-Soviet campaign is to:

1) Show the United States and, in particular, the new government of the Republican Party that the Israeli government stands firmly on the side of the United States and that they can fully rely on its support in the implementation of its aggressive plans in the Middle East and continue to use Israel as a spy centre to work in the countries of the socialist camp.

2) Increase the activity of American Jews in raising funds and providing other types of assistance to Israel. The requirement to emigrate Jews from the USSR, in the face of a significant reduction in immigration as a result of economic difficulties, is demagogic and is designed to strengthen Israeli requests for "assistance".

3) Strengthen the highly shattered position of the Mapai Party in the country and present it as the main defender of Jews and a fighter for Zionism and immigration.

4) To divert the attention of the population from the economic difficulties, which have recently increased significantly.

5) Use the rise of nationalist sentiment in the country in order to strengthen the offensive on the democratic rights of workers, progressive organizations and, above all, Maki.

Soviet Envoy to Israel P. Ershov

**REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE MIDDLE EAST
DEPARTMENT OF THE VOCS ON ISRAEL. Late January to
early February 1953**

Secret.

In 1952, WORK on THE VOCS in Israel was carried out through the AUTHORISED Commissioner and the Israeli League of Friendly Relations with the USSR.

The League's activities in 1952 were carried out under extremely difficult conditions. The ruling circles of Israel - the hired American imperialism - encouraged nefarious anti-Soviet propaganda, bullied the League in the press and in every way prevented the League from holding any events. Throughout the year, the League did not have its premises, many of the events planned by the League were disrupted. The rabid enemies of the Soviet people, the Zionists who infiltrated the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR and its governing bodies, undermined the work of the League from within.

Particularly strong resistance is met with attempts of the progressive part of the League members to move the work of the League to the masses. Right-wing Mapamians, who have a significant share in their party, according to the COMMISSIONER of the VOKS, simply sabotaged the massive work of the League as a whole and especially its local offices.

However, contrary to the attempts of the agents of Zionism to interfere with the work of the League, in 1952, according to information received from the commissioner of VOCS in Israel, the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR managed to carry out a number of measures.

The work was carried out in the following main areas:

1. Celebration of the significant and jubilee dates of the Soviet Union.
2. Exhibition of photo exhibitions of VOCS.
3. Demonstration of Soviet films.

4. Israel-USSR magazine issue and other publishing activities.

5. Lecture work.

6. Learning Russian in special groups.

Celebrating the significant and jubilee dates of the Soviet Union

1. In 1952, the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR celebrated the 34th anniversary of the Soviet Army in the country. Ceremonial meetings were held in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem, Jaffa, Ramat Gan, Rishon-le-Tsion and other cities and many agricultural settlements in Israel. After the ceremonial meetings, Soviet films were watched, as well as amateur concerts with the performance of Soviet songs and music. These assemblies covered several thousand Israeli workers.

2. In May 1952, the League held several solemn meetings to mark the 7th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany. The largest event in connection with this date was a mass solemn meeting at the monument in honor of the Soviet army in the mountains of the Jerusalem district (May 10, 1952). About 5,000 people participated in this meeting.

Celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR

On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the league's establishment, numerous ceremonial meetings were held in various cities and agricultural settlements in Israel.

The meetings were held in Tel Aviv (2,000 people), Haifa (800 people), Ramat Gan, Jerusalem, Lidz, Safad, Mitgal Gad, Salama, Beit Dagan and other cities and settlements.

3. Exhibiting photo exhibitions of VOCS

The exhibition of PHOTO exhibitions of VOKS was usually held in the form of a set of events: lectures and presentations were organized at the exhibition, Soviet films were shown and concerts of Soviet music and songs were held (in gramophone recordings).

In 1952, the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR organized the exhibition of the following photo exhibitions:

1. From April 26 to May 17, an exhibition on the great Stalinist constructions of communism was exhibited in Haifa. It was visited by about 2,000 people. As part of the exhibition, a musical evening, an evening of Soviet music (in gramophone recordings) were organized and Soviet films "Popov," "Happy Encounter" and "Festival of Youth" were shown. The exhibition received good feedback in the progressive Israeli press (for example, in the newspaper "Al Hamishmar" of May 18).

2. On April 18, an exhibition about Soviet trade unions was opened in Rehovot, which had previously been exhibited in other Israeli cities.

3. In November 1952, in connection with the opening of the Club of Tel Aviv Branch of the League, the club's halls exhibited "Soviet Book" and "Soviet Graphics."

4. Publishing league

In 1952, the League produced only one issue of the magazine "Israel-USSR" with a circulation of 3,000 copies. In addition, The League of friendly ties with the USSR in 1952 was published in Hebrew (ancient Hebrew): I.V. Stalin's works "On Dialectical and Historical Materialism" (the circulation is 3,000 copies) and "Economic problems of socialism in the USSR" (the circulation is about 5,000 copies), as well as a brochure - a report by the T.P.

In 1952, the League published in Hebrew "Novgorod Feuilleton" from the first issue of "New Time" in 1952. The brochure went on sale on February 8, 1952 with a circulation of 2,000 copies. As you know, in this feuilleton exposed the U.S. military plans, promoted by the American magazine "Collier." The League of Friendly Relations with the USSR used the edition of the feuilleton to organize a demonstration in defence of peace in various cities of Israel.

In early October 1952, the League published G. Nikolaeva's Hebrew novel Harvest.

There was no information from the WOCS commissioner about other types of work of the League. It should be noted that the information from the COMMISSIONER of WOCS in

general comes in an unethically and does not reflect the full picture of the state of the League. Despite repeated requests from the department, the WOCS Commissioner in Israel has not yet answered a number of critical questions related to the League's activities.

In 1952, various information materials, equipment and literature were sent to help the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR (see annex). The use of all these materials was not reported by the WOCS Commissioner. Appendix: 1. A list of materials sent to the COMMISSIONER of THES in Israel in 1952.

2. A reference about the League's organ, the magazine Israel-USSR.

Representative of the Middle East department of VOKS

Arutyunov

**TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
CHARETTE TO THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO THE
UNITED STATES A. BAN. February 2, 1953**

My thoughts on Moscow's hostile actions:

a. This is not the main policy line, but rather a general trend towards strengthening the regime, including perhaps in preparation for war. This trend is manifested in bloody actions, tightening internal surveillance, searching for a scapegoat and preparing the soil for the mass destruction of all unreliable.

b. Even if for Moscow its anti-Jewish actions are secondary, for us they are the main thing.

These actions are the fruit of cold calculation, and one should be prepared for their continuation and for a long confrontation.

Israel has too little money to stand up to this confrontation, so the possibility of constant public outbursts there should be neglected on the assumption that Moscow does not care about what the world says about its policies and what impact it has on its sympathies.

In order to maintain public tension, it is impossible to limit yourself to a dry list of facts. The public must be continuously encouraged to act.

That is why, first of all, I took the initiative of the World Jewish Conference to respond to the Soviet challenge. Now it is the position of the whole government. It is desirable to convene a conference in Paris to provoke the maximum public response in Europe. The Government of Israel will neither initiate nor participate in the discussions, confining itself to the premise of the observer. The conference of Jewish representatives of organizations on reparations with Germany could serve as a precedent in terms of composition, which, of course, would be desirable to expand as much as possible. The objectives of the conference are condemnation and determination (but at the same time reasoned and

sustained in a dignified spirit) to rebuff the anti-Jewish propaganda of the Soviets, to unite the Jewish public and isolate the apostates, to address the world community and, finally, to put forward the slogan "Let my people go."

This forum should not go beyond the demands for the protection of the honour and dignity of the Jewish people and their organizations, the expression of concern for the fate of thousands of Jews, their protection and demands for their repatriation, and condemnation of anti-Jewish outings and the call for the world community to fight back. The Conference should not condemn communism as a political system or openly join the front of the political struggle against the USSR. Those who see such a struggle as an urgent necessity should realize the importance of the forum in this regard precisely because it will look like an independent and free expression of the mood of the Jewish people, and not a spectacle, whose directors are hiding behind the scenes.

The convening of the forum is possible only if the Jewishness of the United States is well involved. It seems that it was among the Zionists that opinions diverged. Goldman and Lockyer are arriving this week to resolve the issue. It is important for the Embassy to participate in internal consultations to explain the government's position and instruct participants in the spirit of this position. You can show this telegram to members of the leadership of the Jewish Agency.

Charette

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
February 9, 1953**

On 9 February, at 10:35 p.m., a large bomb exploded inside the mission. All the windows, window frames and doors on the first, second and part third floors have been broken. The envoy's wife, the wife of the caretaker and the chauffeur Grishin were seriously wounded, who were sent to the hospital by ambulance. The mission building was damaged. The police officer on duty tried to call the police but could not be contacted. Police and ambulances were called by the envoy. Half an hour later, Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Levavi and head of the Department of Eastern European Countries Ben-Tsur arrived on the mission. They tried to express regret, but I did not accept their apology and stated that the bombing was the result of a systematic anti-Soviet campaign and formal protection of the mission building established after the arson of the mission vehicle in December 1952.

Glass and doors were also broken in the buildings around the mission. The Swiss envoy, who lives opposite at least 50 metres away, came to confirm that the windows in his mission had also been broken. The inspection established that the saboteurs entered the mission territory, cutting through the passage in the net, which enclosed the mission territory, with scissors.

This terrorist and sabotage act against the Soviet mission in Israel is the result of the recent anti-Soviet campaign by the Israeli Government.

I ask your permission to visit Charette tomorrow and to declare to him the most severe and decisive protest. I believe that in this case it would be appropriate to cut off diplomatic relations with the Israeli Government.

I ask you to telegraph immediately.

Ershov

**NOTE OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE
SOVIET MISSION IN ISRAEL. February 10, 1953**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel expresses deep respect for the Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Israel and has the honor to draw attention to the following: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1. The Mission of the Soviet Union deeply regrets and apologizes to the Government of Israel for the heinous crime committed yesterday against the Mission, its staff and its building.

2. The Government of Israel is prepared to pay compensation for the material damage.

3. States the Mission that the Government of Israel issued the following statement yesterday:

“The Government is shocked and outraged by the criminal attack committed this evening against the Soviet Mission in Tel Aviv. Every honest citizen is outraged by this insane action, which has caused damage not only to the foreign diplomatic representation, but also to the spirit of our state itself. Every effort will be made to identify the perpetrators, who will be brought to justice immediately and will be punished. The Government expresses its deep regret and sympathy to the Ambassador of the USSR, the Mission's staff and especially to the victims who are now being cured.”

4. The Mission asks the Mission to allow police specialists to conduct investigations at the site of the explosion as soon as possible in the mission yard to locate shrapnel or other evidence that could facilitate the task of catching the perpetrators of yesterday's heinous act against the Mission.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes the opportunity to reiterate the mission's perfect reverence.

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
February 10, 1953**

Yesterday, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion made the following statement in Parliament:

“It is with deep regret that I must report to the Knesset on the abomination committed in Israel last night: an explosion in the courtyard of the Soviet mission that damaged the building and injured some of the mission's personnel, including Ms. Ershova, the envoy's wife (who was slightly injured), the wife of a mission officer (whose most serious injuries) and the mission's driver. All three were immediately taken to the hospital, where they received medical treatment, and the messenger's wife was able to return home soon. On behalf of the Government, I express to those who have suffered our heartfelt good wishes for a speedy recovery, and I am confident that the Knesset and the people of Israel will join us in these feelings.

The buildings of several missions, including the Soviet mission, are guarded by the police. The yard, which was the scene of yesterday's incident, is guarded by the mission itself. Although the Government offered the mission police protection there, the proposal was not acceptable to the mission and, consequently, the Israeli security forces did not have access to the yard. Immediately after the explosion, high-ranking police officers arrived at the scene, and Mr. Ershov showed them what had happened in the yard and in the building, but did not allow the police experts to immediately investigate whether there were any traces of explosive material in the yard or traces of the perpetrators of the crime.

The police investigation is, of course, ongoing and will continue with maximum energy.” (Ben-Gurion read out the text of the note of the Israeli Foreign Ministry.)

“After receiving this note, the envoy agreed to allow the experts to investigate the site of the explosion.

To this note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I consider it my duty to state to the people of the country the following:

The hooligans who committed this vile crime are more enemies of the State of Israel than the haters of a foreign state.

If a kind of Jewish patriotism was the driving force behind their dirty work, and if their intention was to fight for the honour of Israel, then let me say that it was they who desecrated the honour of Israel with this senseless crime.

The State of Israel maintains and will continue to maintain normal relations with all peace-loving countries. The missions of States, large and small alike, which are accredited in our country, enjoy special status of honour, security and privilege among us, not only because of international and Israeli laws and customs, but also because they are guests of nation and State. Whoever violated them has violated first and foremost the honor and prestige of the State of Israel.

Our state is based on the law, and only responsibly selected representatives of the state can determine its internal and external relations. The criminal and immoral act committed last night in the mission yard undermines the sovereignty of the State of Israel and blackens the honour of the Jewish nation.

We cannot avoid the fact that the heinous crime committed yesterday in the courtyard of the Soviet mission is not the first. The criminals planted a bomb in the home of a minister of the Israeli Government, the late Mr. Pinkas. Then there was an attempt to place a time bomb in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Israel. And now the bomb has been placed on the mission of a strong State with which Israel has maintained normal relations almost since the day of their establishment.

The Government considers it its duty to do everything possible to uncover the sources of crimes that threaten the security of the State and to root out the ulcer of acts of violence directed both from within and from outside.

We must now allow the police to continue their investigation so that criminals can be uncovered, brought to justice and punished with the full rigour of the law.”

After Ben-Gurion's speech, the President of the Sprin-Tsak Parliament read out a statement on behalf of the Parliament (Knesset):

“The entire Knesset is united in its condemnation of this barbaric act and considers the perpetrators of this heinous act as savages who lack national responsibility and civic consciousness.

The Knesset expresses its sincere sadness about all that has happened and wishes the envoy's wife and the injured mission staff a full speedy recovery.”

The representative of the Communist Party, Wilner, demanded that Ben-Gurion's application be discussed in Parliament, but the chairman rejected the request and did not allow the speaker to speak.

The Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Affairs and Security Affairs, as reported by the Jerusalem Post, “asked the government to do everything in its power to find the perpetrators, and recommended strengthening security measures to protect foreign missions in Israel.”

From Ben-Gurion's statement, two questions should be noted: 1) The Government, the Foreign Ministry or the police department did not ask us about the protection of the mission yard. The police officers on duty sometimes entered the mission grounds on their own, checked the documents of the visitors, which was the reason for our appeal to the Israeli Foreign Ministry with the permission of the center. The police were able to guard the building from the other two sides without being on the mission site, but instead of guarding the visitors. Ben-Gurion's statement is a clear

attempt to absolve the Government of responsibility for the act of sabotage.

After calling the police, I took two officers and showed them the scene and some of the injuries, but did not allow several people who called myself secret police agents to be unformed. This led Ben-Gurion to state that I did not allow the “experts” to investigate. Ben-Gurion's statement on this constitutes an attempt to acquit the Government in advance in the event that the perpetrators are not apprehended, which is very likely. In our statement or note on the sabotage, it would be appropriate to respond to Ben-Gurion's 5 attempts to absolve the Responsibility of the Government of Israel for the attack on the mission.

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
February 10, 1953**

On the evening of February 10, I received the following letter from the President of Israel:

“Dear Mr. Ershov,

I was extremely shocked by the news of a criminal attack by unknown persons on the Soviet mission, an attack that wounded three mission members, including Ms. Ershova.

The Government of Israel condemned the criminal act as heinous and said that it was taking all measures to uncover the perpetrators who would be punished.

I look at every terrorist act of this kind as a heinous act, threatening the lives of public figures, representatives of friendly governments, performing their duties with honor. I see this act as a demoralizing and criminal act against the State of Israel, as a crime that desecrates Israel's dignity among peoples.

Please accept my sympathy and convey my sympathy to Mrs. Ershova and the rest of the mission affected by this heinous attack.

Yitzhak Ben-Tsvi, President.”

(Given in translation by the Israeli Foreign Ministry.)

This letter to the President has the same purpose as the government statement reported in the previous telegram.

Ershov

**LETTER OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR S.
ELIASHIVA TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY.**

February 10, 1953.

Secret.

On the case of doctors and the campaign to increase vigilance

1. Almost a month has passed since January 13, 1953, when the charges against the doctors were brought. Since then, nothing new has been brought to the public either on the merits of the case or during the course of the investigation. No additional facts or new defendants were reported. Only on the anniversary of Kuibyshev's death was mentioned in the press that both he and Menzhinsky were victims of pest doctors. At the same time, newspapers do not leave this topic and muss it on any occasion, without end mentioning the doctors, then Joynt, then zionism. In newspapers and speeches, word for word repeat the same phrases and even whole paragraphs.

2. Zionism and Joynt became abusive words. When it comes to Joynt, the adjectives "zionist" and "Jewish" are necessarily added.

At the same time, along with Joynt, they also mention local Jews, who are supposedly henchmen of this organization and "bourgeois nationalists". In Gideon's press review, you can find examples of this. In articles and speeches there is a line: there are many dangerous external enemies, at the hands of which play internal hostile elements from the so-called "former".

The State of Israel has not yet been targeted. Until now, it has not been said that it interferes in the internal affairs of the USSR, as it was openly stated in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Sometimes the articles slip reproaches against our leadership, but this is not news. At the same time, in a hysterical tone they write about zionism and zionists. It is quite natural that articles from "New Time" are reprinted in

local newspapers, and minaev's defamatory article was published by almost all the official bodies of the Union republics. This alone can bear witness to the importance of the struggle against zionism.

3. The case of doctors, Joynt and zionism is in the wake of a broader campaign for comprehensive vigilance and offensive propaganda on all fronts. The struggle against nationalist tendencies in the union republics has been going on for a long time, and I have repeatedly paid attention to articles of literary critics in letters. At the same time, ideological and literary discussion is accompanied by attacks on internal enemies and calls for vigilance. Although there have been mostly calls recently to strengthen vigilance against Ukrainian and Lithuanian nationalists, "bourgeois Jewish nationalists" have been mentioned twice in this regard.

4. The campaign of ideological struggle against false worldviews and teachings in various fields has been going on for a long time. Recently, however, it has become particularly rabid. The defendants are credited with sins far more serious than various ideological biases. Thus, economists are accused of the fact that they, adopting the theory of weakening the struggle of the outside world against the state of the victorious socialism, thus contribute to the reduction of vigilance. After all, according to official theory, it is believed that as socialism is built in the Soviet Union, the struggle against the USSR and its regime on the part of external enemies and their internal accomplices is growing. In this regard, the name of Bukharin, who was prone to concysion, was mentioned again, and the term "Bukharin" was again applied to all sorts of traitors and outcasts.

5. In a number of areas, the debate has not yet gone beyond the ideological struggle against false theories. This applies, in particular, to jurisprudence and philosophy. However, representatives of these scientific disciplines may at any time be the victims of a campaign for increased vigilance. If it occurs to anyone that lawyers and

philosophers preach ideas that somehow echo the ideas of those who have already been accused of sabotage, they will find the same.

6. At the same time, there is a growing flow of publications about theft, fraud, embezzlement and affidavits. There is no newspaper that does not consider it their duty to write about it. Such materials have appeared in the press before. However, now it is striking their number. And two more new circumstances. First. Articles and feuilletons usually refer to the names of “heroes.” In the past, Jews were only occasionally involved, and I wrote in this regard that the alarm should not be sounded before the time. Now, especially in the press of the republics, where there is a significant Jewish population (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova), the number of feuilletons and articles about Jewish criminals is growing. Moscow newspapers approach the publication of such materials more carefully. Mentions of Jews in them are dosed. However, recently the central press writes about Jews more often than before. Moreover, the name of the “hero” has now been added to the name and middle name, so that readers have no doubts about his nationality.

Second. Recently, in the feuilletons and articles about fraudsters more attention is paid not to businessmen who plunder socialist property, but to intellectuals, in particular doctors, who work with fake diplomas about medical education. It is the falsifiers of doctors' diplomas that often carry Jewish surnames. It seems that the tightening of the line to increase vigilance and the detection of pests among intellectuals is due, in particular, to the fact that among them it is possible to gain significant dirt on Jews.

7. In conclusion, the case of S.D.Gurevich. We have already reported that a large article has been published in Pravda, in which he is accused of espionage and sabotage. It is emphasized that he grew up in the family of a Menshevik-Bundovets. Gurevich is a famous man here. He worked for a number of American news agencies and at the same time

officially cooperated with the Soviet press, in particular edited the newspaper "Abroad".

The Menshevik Bundovets, in whose family he was brought up, is one of the former prominent figures of Bund Lipetz, who switched to the Communists in 1918 and changed his surname to Petrovsky. During one of the great purges of the party he was eliminated. The article about Gurevich was completely reprinted "The Truth of Ukraine."

Gurevich's case is of great importance here. Apparently, they want to reach out to foreign correspondents after he "confesses" to their ties to them. It is possible that he will tell something about the American Embassy. They can also make a visit through it to those who in the past were activists of Jewish organizations in the USSR, for example, to stretch the threads to the former Bundians.

S.Eliashiv

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
A.Y.VYSHINSKY AND THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR.
February 12, 1953**

Today, February 12, at 1 a.m., Eliashiva received, read out and handed him a note of the Soviet government in connection with the terrorist act committed on February 9 against the Soviet mission in Israel (attached).

Eliashiv tried to argue that the statements of the Government of Israel expressing regret over the terrorist act were not a false game, but expressed the sincere conviction of the Israeli people.

I replied that the Israeli people were one thing and the Government of Israel was another. There is no doubt that the terrorist act perpetrated against the Soviet mission in Israel is a direct result of the unbridled and hostile campaign against the Soviet Union, which was carried out in Israel by direct incitement of the Israeli Government. The Government of Israel bears full responsibility for the above criminal act.

The reception lasted 7 minutes.

February 11, 1953

On February 9, on the territory of the Soviet Mission in Israel, the attackers, with the apparent connivance of the police, detonated a bomb, seriously injuring the wife of the Messenger K.V. Ershov, the wife of the Mission officer A.P.Sysoev and a member of the Mission I.G. Grishin. The explosion damaged the building of the Soviet Mission.

On 10 February, the President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel sent letters to the Soviet Mission apologizing for the atrocity and declaring the condemnation of the criminal act by the Government of Israel and its measures to track and punish the perpetrators.

However, in the light of the well-known, undeniable facts of the participation of representatives of the

Government of Israel in the systematic incitement of hatred and hostility to the Soviet Union and incitement to acts hostile to the Soviet Union, it is clear that the statements and apologies of the Government of Israel over the terrorist act of 9 February in the territory of the Soviet Mission are a false game aimed at citing the crime committed against the Soviet Union and to evade the Responsibility of the Government of Israel for this atrocity.

Not only articles published in the press of Israel's ruling parties, but also speeches in parliament by representatives of these parties and members of the Government of Israel, in particular the speech of minister of Foreign Affairs Charette on January 19, which openly incite hostile actions against the Soviet Union, are provocative.

The terrorist act of 9 February demonstrates the lack of basic conditions in Israel for the normal diplomatic activities of the representatives of the Soviet Union.

In view of this, the Soviet Government withdraws the Soviet Union Envoy and the composition of the Soviet Mission in Israel and terminates relations with the Government of Israel.

The Soviet Government, however, declares that it is impossible for the Israeli Mission to remain in Moscow and demands that the Mission's personnel leave the Soviet Union immediately.

**CIRCULAR TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY TO ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES
ABROAD. February 12, 1953**

The severance of diplomatic relations by the Soviet Union is the use of a convenient pretext for taking a step, which is the final stage of the political process initiated by the Communists a year ago. The roots of this process lie in an even more distant past. First of all, we are talking about the gravitation of Jews from the Soviet bloc to Israel, despite the fact that the regime does not tolerate any independent influence on its subjects. Secondly, Israel is a free democratic country - and the very existence of our mission in Moscow was like a toothache for the regime. Therefore, it can be argued that the severance of relations with Israel is intended primarily to solve the internal problems of the Soviet regime.

The speed with which the whole process was carried out indicates that the Soviets believe in the possibility of war in the near future. At first, they tried to corrode the Jewish attachment to Israel solely by means of internal pressure on the Jews: police pressure, dispersal of Jewish organizations, campaign against "cosmopolitans" in 1949. In the satellite countries, it was expected that after the repatriation of a small part of the Jews, the rest would internally accept the entry into homogeneous society. There was also hope for increased communist influence in Israel. In the spring of 1952, repatriation from Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary ceased. Promises that repatriation would resume, albeit on a limited scale, have been broken. In November 1952, the Slansky process was a then unbridled anti-Israel propaganda campaign. Mid-January 1953 - Arrest of Jewish doctors in Moscow and unwinding a campaign linking the "Slansky case" and "doctors' case" and accusing all mortal sins of zionists, cosmopolitans, Jewish nationalists, Israel, Joynt, etc. Arrests and suicides of local workers of our

missions. Attempts to blackmail two of our diplomats, who were tried to recruit by communist special services. The Poles, and especially the Czechs, handed the notes, paving the way for the breakdown of relations, which were uniform and, on the one hand, containing accusations in the spirit of the “Slansky process”, and on the other hand, complaints about diplomats' visits to synagogues and visits to missions by local citizens on repatriation issues, to “incentivize the zionist activities” and so on. Now we are concerned about the fate of Jews in the countries of the communist bloc.

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
P.I.ERSHOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR.
February 13, 1953**

The report on the severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel was published yesterday in the emergency editions of the evening newspapers. The comments are very contradictory and inconsequential. It is evident that the government circles, through their hypocritical statements, hoped to avoid a break, and after learning about it, were confused. There is still no government communication. The foreign ministry spokesman said in a meeting with journalists that "the formal motivation of this step (i.e. our decision to break) is only a pretext." Today's newspapers comment on the issue of severing relations in this spirit. In addition, the newspapers state that the rupture of relations was supposedly prepared long ago, that the USSR by this act intends to cut off the ties of the Jews of the USSR with Israel, that the fate of the Jews of the USSR will now be unknown and that they will allegedly be subjected to repression, persecution and the like. Speaking at a meeting in Petah Tikva, Golda Meyerson stated that "the day of the severance of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union is a black day for Israel, the Israeli people and especially for the Jews of the USSR." Some newspapers agree to the statements that the decision to break is intended to attract Germans from the GDR to the Soviet Union and to increase sympathy for the USSR among the Arabs.

The progressive public is reacting correctly to the Soviet government's decision to sever relations with Israel. Responsibility for the rupture lays with the government of Ben-Gurion, which by inciting hostility to the USSR pushed fascist elements to terrorist acts against the Soviet mission.

Ershov

**LETTER FROM DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE
USSR J.A. MALIK TO THE SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE
SOVIET UNION G.M. MALENKOV. February 15, 1953**

Owls. Secret.

In connection with the cessation of diplomatic relations with the Israeli government, the USSR Foreign Ministry submits the following proposals:

1. Agree with the Bulgarian Government that it should take over the protection of the interests of the Soviet Union in Israel.

There are currently diplomatic missions in Israel from Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Bulgaria's mission is headed by the envoy. The missions of the other three countries are headed by temporary charge d'affaires. Poland has only consulates in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

2. At the same time as the withdrawal of the Soviet mission from Israel to recall also THE correspondent of TASS T. Kobelev D.I. and the representative of "Sov-exportfilm" T. Dzubkov G.I.

3. Leave in Israel the representative of the Russian Palestinian Society at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, T. Zaitsev I.I., located in Jerusalem, and the Russian Orthodox spiritual mission, also located in Jerusalem, consisting of six people of Soviet citizens, commanded by the Moscow Patriarchate: the chief of mission Archimandrite Polykarpa (Priimak T.K.), members of the mission of the proto-jeremy Gromov A.S. and the priest Khomutov G.T., mission secretary Miroshin V.N., mission doctor Miroshina N.M.

A draft resolution of the CPSU Central Committee is attached.

Please consider.

Ya. Malik

On the litter document: "The question is exhausted. Instructions were given for the departure of the TASS correspondent and a representative of Sovexportfil-ma. The Bulgarian government has been agreed. 3/3. J. Malik."

APPAL Draft resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (issue of the USSR Foreign Ministry)

Owls. Secret.

1. To instruct the Ussr Foreign Ministry to agree with the Bulgarian government that it would take over the protection of the interests of the Soviet Union in Israel.

2. Recall from Israel a TASS correspondent and a representative of V/O Sovexportfilm.

3. To instruct the Council for the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (i. Karpov) to recommend the Moscow Patriarchate not to withdraw from Israel the Russian Orthodox spiritual mission.

4. Allow the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (i.e. Topchiev) not to withdraw from Israel the representation of the Russian Palestinian society.

NOTE OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR J.A. MALIK TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR J. V. STALIN. February 16, 1953

On 12 February, Polish Foreign Minister Sksheeszewski handed the Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Warsaw a memorandum stating that in connection with the terrorist act against the Soviet mission in Israel and the totality of the hostile activities of the Israeli Government, the Polish Government considers it appropriate to undertake a joint statement of the countries of popular democracy against Israel and that the Polish Government considers the most appropriate form of response to such a provocation by Israel. At the same time, Sksheeszewski said that they were instructed by the Polish ambassadors in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria to find out the views of the governments of these countries on the Polish proposal.

On February 12, Romanian Foreign Minister Bugic informed the Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Bucharest that due to the cessation of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel before

The Hungarian Government notified the Soviet Ambassador that in connection with the cessation of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel, it had an intention to sever diplomatic relations with Israel, especially since the Hungarian authorities had materials on the espionage work of Israeli mission personnel in Budapest. The process of exposed spies is being prepared on these materials, but the issue of the termination of relations with Israel is not necessarily associated with this process.

The Hungarian Government also reported that the Polish Government was proposing that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria collectively protest a

terrorist act against the Soviet mission in Israel, and that the Hungarian Government was in principle in accordance with the proposal.

In connection with the Polish proposal mentioned above, the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry informed the Charge d'Affaires of the USSR that the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry agreed to send the relevant note to the Israeli government.

The governments of Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria have asked through the embassies of the USSR to inform the opinion of the Soviet government on these issues.

On February 16, the Foreign Ministry of Czechoslovakia appealed to the Foreign Ministry of the USSR through the ambassador in Moscow with a request to inform our opinion on whether whether Czechoslovakia should continue to maintain relations with Israel, especially given the Czechoslovakian note to Israel of 4 February this year, in addition to the Czechoslovak Government's earlier demand for the recall of the Israeli envoy from Czechoslovakia, it was pointed out that the Israeli Government had provoked and supported the anti-Czechoslovak campaign and that all responsibility for the deterioration of Israeli-Czech-Czech relations was attributed to the Israeli government.

The USSR Foreign Ministry considers it appropriate to instruct the Ambassadors of the USSR in Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria on the proposal for a joint speech of these countries to give the following answer:

The Soviet government responded to the terrorist attack against the Soviet mission in Tel Aviv by severing diplomatic relations with Israel. Moscow considers it impractical to reinforce this with a joint statement from friendly countries.

The question of the cessation of diplomatic relations with Israel raised by the governments of Poland, Hungary and Romania, which Moscow believes should not be linked to a terrorist act against the Soviet mission in Tel Aviv and the cessation of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel. The continuation of diplomatic relations with Israel

should be considered depending on the state and the specific conditions of those relations.

The Foreign Ministry of Czechoslovakia, through the Czechoslovak ambassador in Moscow, also responded.

A draft resolution of the CPSU Central Committee is attached.

Please consider.

**NOTE OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR J.A.
MALIK TO THE SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE
SOVIET UNION G.M. MALENKOV. February 21, 1953**

Secret.

I inform you that the former Israeli mission in Moscow left the Soviet Union, passing through the Soviet-Finnish border on February 20 at 11 p.m. 35 mins

According to a cable telegram received by the USSR Foreign Ministry from Ershov, the composition of our mission in Israel finished landing on the Turkish steamer "Kadesh" in the port of Haifa (Israel) on February 20 at 7 p.m. Moscow time.

According to the Bulgarian envoy to Sofia Bogdanov, the steamer "Kadesh" left Haifa on February 20 at 10 p.m. 50 mins Israeli time (23 hours 50 mins Moscow time).

J. Malik

**TELEGRAM OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT
OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY TO ISRAELI
DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES IN EASTERN EUROPE.**

March 6, 1953

Urgent.

1. On the occasion of mourning in connection with Stalin's death, flags should be lowered on half a flagpole, similar to the missions of Western countries.

2. Condolence visits should not be made and/or written in books of condolence.

3. If the host government invites you to mourning ceremonies, you should go.

4. Immediately telegraph everything.

Eastern European Department

**NOTE OF ISRAEL'S MISSION TO THE NETHERLANDS BY
THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTRY. March 9, 1953**

The Israeli mission shows its respect for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, based on the consent of the Dutch Government to represent the interests of the State of Israel in the USSR, is honoured to ask the Dutch Government to convey to the Government of the USSR the condolences and expressions of sympathy of the Government and people of Israel on the occasion of the death of the head of the USSR, Generalissimo Stalin.

The Israeli mission is taking this opportunity to renew its highest respect for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**STATEMENT BY THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE PRESS. April 4, 1953**

The Government of Israel was very pleased with the official statement published in Moscow that the accusations against Jewish doctors had been fabricated and that their “confessions” of alleged acts had been obtained through illegal methods. This is practically confirmed the fairness of the position taken by the Government of Israel on this issue and expressed during the Knesset meeting on 19 January 1953.

In connection with the “doctors’ case” unfounded accusations were made against such international Jewish organizations as Joynt and the World Zionist Organization. The crackdown on doctors served as the basis for an anti-Jewish campaign, one of the manifestations of which was the severance of diplomatic relations with the State of Israel.

The Government of Israel hopes that the correction of the perversions will lead to an end to the anti-Jewish campaign and welcome the restoration of normal relations between the USSR and Israel.

**LETTER FROM B. RAZIN I.ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTRY S.BENZURU. April 10, 1953**

On April 4, I was invited with my wife to a reception at the Hungarian Embassy. As soon as we entered the main hall, I saw that the Soviet ambassador, Mr. Bodrov, was standing about 10 meters away and talking to the Polish ambassador, pointing to the corner where we were standing with one of the Western representatives. A few seconds later Bodrov came up to us, shook hands and asked how things were. At first I thought that he just did not recognize us, as we met only once, at a reception in the garden at the Soviet Embassy last September, and the very next day he left Sofia and returned only in early March.

The ambassador struck up a general conversation. Then the French ambassador and his wife came into the hall and joined us, and I translated them

from Russian to French and back, then spoke himself. During the conversation, one of the Soviet diplomats came up and wanted to recall the ambassador to the side, but he did not go, and continued to tell how well he was cured at home. Then he jokingly added: "You can rely on Soviet doctors" - and immediately asked me if I had read today's "Truth" and whether I already knew about the release of doctors. I answered that it is known, adding that today we have Passover - a holiday of freedom, so I even drank for the health of the Soviet government, for the courage shown by it and hope that all the problems caused by this sad story will find a speedy resolution. The ambassador thanked and said that he too was "happy and proud" of the courage of his government and that it was a "characteristic example of the course of the Soviet government" and then asked me to translate all this to the French ambassador. I asked him to translate only his words or mine too, he nodded his head: "Everything, everything." The Ambassador of France replied

that he was also glad of the events of today, well understood the feelings of his colleague (i.e. me) and fully shared them. I told the Ambassador that after the charges against Jewish doctors were dropped, it made sense to restore relations with my country. The ambassador chuckled and asked me how I knew Russian so well, that is, changed the subject. The conversation lasted 7-8 minutes and was interrupted when the Prime Minister entered the hall.

The halls were overcrowded, and all the Western representatives were present, and all the Western representatives who were amazed to see me in Mr. Bodrov's company for so long. Some , those who stood nearby, also heard the contents of the conversation.

The rest of the eastern bloc treated us with politeness and warmth and entered into conversations about all sorts of "neutral" things. Workers of the Hungarian Embassy showed a special cordiality. Of all the employees of the Soviet Embassy, I was greeted only by the second secretary in charge of the embassy's protocol department. From here I conclude that all this was not just an accident. ...

I would like to know whether our colleagues in other missions had similar contacts with representatives of the Eastern Bloc, especially the Russians.

With respect
Razin Ben-Tsion

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN
BULGARIA B. RAZIN TO THE EASTERN EUROPEAN
DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY.**

April 14, 1953

During a meeting with the Czech ambassador and his wife at their home, I asked to issue an emigration passport to a Czech Jew living in Bulgaria. It was promised to "do everything." In addition, the Ambassador, on his own initiative, informed me that:

1. It is to be hoped that Soviet-Israeli relations will soon be restored.

2. Everyone was waiting for Israel to respond, and were glad that it was ready to reach out.

3. Now it can be believed that the bomb was thrown by an embittered loner.

4. The Soviet Ambassador, returning from Moscow in mid-March, ordered contacts with Westerners, especially Austrians and Israelis.

5. The Czech Ambassador is convinced that most Israelis are socialists and that the stronger they are, the weaker Israel's dependence on the West will be.

Now it is clear that the Polish and Romanian ambassadors visited Avner not by accident. The source of the information is not for publication.

Razin

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI DELEGATION TO THE
SEVENTH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN
THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY. April 25, 1953**

Secret.

The delegation met for a comprehensive analysis of the course of the debate at the session in light of the reaction of the Soviets at the last meeting of the First Committee⁶⁵. We came to the following conclusions unanimously:

A. Vyshinsky's words were harsh and gallbladder, it would be better if he did not say them. At the same time, the speech of the representative of Israel in defense of the people and the movement is measured not by Vyshinsky's response, but by the importance of his own content. It is a mistake to believe that the lack of reaction on the part of Vyshinsky proves the correctness of our line, and the hostile reaction shows that we made a mistake. Evaluating our position on the basis of the opinion of a foreign representative, especially known for his haste and the bile of Vyshinsky, would mean Israel's rejection of the sovereign right to freedom of opinion and speech.

b. It was noted that both statements, on Monday and Thursday, had gone through the same procedure of reconciliation- - the final responsibility and the final choice of wording belonged to the head of the delegation. In both cases, the wording at all stages was prepared by Ebaen and then tested and analysed by the delegation's veterans.

The delegation checked the texts of the statements, trying to find out whether Vyshinsky had in fact been challenged there. We came to the conclusion that every word in both speeches was true, without slander and slander. Both texts have a deliberate intention to praise the USSR (maybe more than necessary) for what it did on April 4. Moreover, there was a tendency to ignore the fact that Moscow had corrected only one of its sins (the case of doctors) and left in its former form all the unpleasant things for Israel

(accusations, the failure of which is proved by the very fact of the cancellation of the “doctors’ case”, the severance of relations, the flirtation with the Arabs and the encouragement of their extremism, especially manifested in Vyshinsky’s positive reaction on Wednesday to the poisonous speech of the representative of Syria, as well as condemnation and condemnation of the “dissolution of the”. Some members of the delegation expressed concern that our enthusiastic reaction after 4 April gave Moscow the feeling that all these remaining problems were not a criterion of relations and that it was enough for them to declare the release of doctors. From the point of view of the whole delegation, it was necessary to state that 4 April did not mean that all issues should be removed for us. If the Soviets are sincere in their efforts to correct what they themselves have spoiled, it is precisely this clash that has reflected our dissatisfaction with the partial and timid step forward taken on 4 April. This position was especially necessary after the Czechs and Poles made their statements in response to our first, more moderate statement. It was clear to all of us that the response should give them a worthy rebuff, that our silence would be interpreted as agreeing to the accusations. The debate was about how to respond, and we decided to resort to the most lenient language in relation to the Russians.

In accordance with the instructions received, we made sure that other delegations joined the condemnation of the Soviet campaign of hatred. In response, the Russians also attacked them, Poles and Czechs - after the Russians. It was impossible not to stand up for them and not to express to them the deserved gratitude.

While many delegations strongly condemned anti-Semitism, none stood up for zionism, so the historic choice between the folding or raising of the zionist flag fell on the shoulders of only our representative.

e. Conclusions: despite the atmosphere prevailing at the session, the Councils, the Jewish people and the world were

made to understand that the statement of 4 April had not exhausted the problems existing between the USSR on the one hand and Israel, the Jewish people and zionism on the other. At the same time, the link between Eastern European events and the rise of Arab hatred, a factor that Israeli foreign policy should never ignore, was highlighted.

At the same time, we have come to the conclusion that the development of the world as a whole reduces the chances that our cause will receive an appropriate response. At the same time, we have heightened the irritation of the Soviets, which have discovered that we are snatching propaganda victory directly from their hands and depriving them of their laurels of the main fighters for peace, brotherhood and justice. At the end of the meeting, it was noted that such an opportunity had been mentioned in consultations with the Minister, when he indicated that the transient parliamentary circumstances should not prevent the Israeli delegation from fulfilling the historic mission as a representative of the Jewish people. Golda Meyerson will give a full report on all of the above points on her return.

Israeli delegation to the UN

**BULGARIA'S FOREIGN MINISTRY'S NOTE TO THE
SOVIET EMBASSY IN BULGARIA. Sofia, May 8, 1953**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria expresses its respect to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Sofia and is honoured to convey the following message received from the Mission of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in Israel:

The Chairman of the Committee on International Trade Negotiations in Israel and the delegate of the Economic Meeting in Moscow, Shlomo Rosen, officially told the Trade Representative of the Mission of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on May 7 that on behalf of the Director of Economic Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, Moshe Bartura, he was asking whether the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR, despite the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries, would agree to a new deal, like last year's one, for the purchase of fruit in Israel. Moshe Bartur told Shlomo Rosen that the request was made with the consent of Israel's Ministry of Commerce, which wanted the deal and would have made an offer if it knew there would be no rejection. The Israeli side considers May to be the most convenient month for negotiating this deal.

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN
HUNGARY AND BULGARIA G.AVNER AND THE FIRST
SECRETARY OF THE ISRAELI MISSION IN BULGARIA B.
RAZIN TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY. Sofia, May
14, 1953**

To the Eastern European Department.

A. The main point in Razin's conversation with the Pole is the latter's question whether Israel is ready to send a letter to Moscow and if so, what we are ready to write. He meant that he could find out whether there was a positive response in the light of the proposed wording. Apparently, he believes that without the first approval of the text of the letter, no progress in our case is possible, that the letter itself will be sent only after the parties have agreed on the wording and such a response will be guaranteed. He also asked Razin if he had the authority to talk about all this.

b. Your answer to Razin not only came too late, but also did not give him the opportunity to go further, as he asked for offers, and you demand from him first again to listen to the Pole and tell him about the telegram Shapira.

He said that he was acting on his own initiative, but, on the other hand, during the farewell meeting he asked if there was an answer; If he comes, he must be handed over to the Charge d'Affaires, who will find a way to convey the message further; answer will surely follow. In deciding, however, whether to continue to act on his proposed plan, it should be taken into account that he did act at his own risk, just as a friend, even if we send a letter and nothing from this story comes out. On the other hand, we think that if there is a chance at all now to restore relations, we should not expect them to take the initiative; preliminary negotiations about a letter or something like that would be required, according to the Pole.

Given all this, you should decide whether to continue on the Polish channel and offer a version of the letter. We will

first be able to find out from the Polish Charge d'Affaires whether the Ambassador has spoken to him and whether he is really ready to continue contacts on this issue.

If we are interested in finding out any possibility of a resumption of relations, why not try to propose a draft that summarizes the course of events that led to the breakdown of relations, and ends with the release of doctors, the statement of the Government of Israel and the expression of hope that, in Israel's view, the roots of the crisis can be torn out, etc.

Telegraph your decision. I intend to return to Budapest on Wednesday if I do not receive any other instructions.

Razin Avner

**REFERENCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE
EAST OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY "ON ISRAEL'S
ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
WITH THE USSR". May 18, 1953**

Secret.

After the publication of the Soviet Interior Ministry's report on the rehabilitation and release of a group of doctors by Israel on April 4, 1953, attempts were made to restore diplomatic relations with the USSR.

On April 4, 1953, Israeli Foreign Minister Charette told reporters in New York that his country would welcome the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union" (a Reuters telegram from New York published in the Jerusalem Post on April 5, 1953).

On April 4, an Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman said on behalf of the government: "False accusations against doctors also served as the basis for the anti-Jewish campaign, one of the steps in which was the end of diplomatic relations with Israel by the Soviet Union. The Government of Israel hopes that the eradication of injustice will be completed by the end of the anti-Jewish campaign and will welcome the restoration of normal relations between the Soviet Union and Israel" (Jerusalem Post of April 5, 1953).

In addition to these official statements, the Israeli government has launched a probe into the possibility of restoring diplomatic relations with the USSR through diplomatic and other channels.

(a) On 7 April this year, A. Gelblum, a New York correspondent for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, sent a telegram to the Soviet Embassy in Washington in which he expressed his wish to receive the answers of Comrade Molotov V.M. to the following questions:

1. In view of the statement by Israeli Foreign Minister Charette of 3 April in New York and the official statement made by the Government of Israel in Jerusalem on 4 April

that the Government of Israel would welcome the resumption of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel, what was the position of the Government of the USSR on that issue and how could the resumption of relations be implemented?

2. Would the Government consider allowing its Jewish citizens who might wish to immigrate to Israel?

3. Does the Soviet government still believe that the proposed Middle Eastern defensive organization and participation in it are acts unfriendly to the USSR?" (telegram by T. Karavayev in the 9142 of April 7, 1953)

On April 10, 1953, the Soviet Embassy in the United States was instructed by the Minister's signature, which stated that the Telegram Gelblu-Ma was of no interest (telegram to Washington Lsh. 7417 of April 10, 1953).

b) On 9 April this year, the Mexican envoy to Denmark, Manrique, in an interview with the Soviet envoy in Copenhagen, T. Vetrov, expressed his opinion on the expediency in the current situation to restore diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel, offered his mediation in this matter. Manrique stated that if his considerations were found appropriate, he was prepared to travel to Stockholm for a preliminary informal conversation with the Israeli envoy to the Scandinavian countries, Nissen, so that Nissen could subsequently make contact with T. Vetrov (Telegram t. Vetrov in 3 April 1953).

On April 11, T. Vetrov was instructed not to respond to this appeal by the Mexican envoy, and if Manrique puts the question again, He must answer that he is not dealing with this issue (telegram 7542 of April 11, 1953).

(c) On April 13, Vyshinsky said that the director of the Eastern Europe Department of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Levavi, and Israel's Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Rafael, visited Poland's permanent representative to the UN, Beretsky, and asked him whether the Poles would help restore Israel's relations with the SOVIET Union. According to Beretsky and Sksheeszewski, the representatives of Israel, speaking about the assistance of the Poles, meant to find out

whether they can expect that the Soviet representatives will positively respond to the establishment of contact with representatives of Israel.

That. Vyshinsky expressed the opinion that in the present conditions we should not rush to react to the probe of Israel, but wait for the end of the investigation into the explosion and how Israel will behave in the future (Telegram T. Vyshinsky in the 9387 of April 13, 1953).

d) On 27 April, the Polish Ambassador to Bulgaria, Barhac, informed the Soviet Ambassador to Sofia, T. Bodrov, that the Israeli representative in Bulgaria, First Secretary Ben-Cion Razin, had told him that the Israeli Government was looking for a way to ask the Soviet Government to restore normal diplomatic relations, and it would be good if the Polish Government showed interest in the matter. Razin said he has instructions from his government to talk to Barhach on the matter. and he will confirm that in writing.

These are Israel's attempts to restore diplomatic relations with the USSR.

It should be noted that the Arab countries, which generally welcomed the news of the cessation of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel, are now showing interest in the further development of Soviet-Israeli relations.

Thus, on April 13, the Syrian envoy to Pakistan, Javad al-Moura-beth, told the Soviet Secretary of State in Karachi, T. Dorofeev, that if the Soviet government restored diplomatic relations with Israel, it would "seriously upset the entire population of the Arab countries" (Telegram T. Dorofeev No. 128-129 of April 14, 1953).

Assistant Head of the OBSV P.Gerasimov

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN
HUNGARY AND BULGARIA G.AVNER AND THE FIRST
SECRETARY OF THE ISRAELI MISSION IN BULGARIA B.
RAZIN TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY. May 28,
1953**

Please from the Eastern European Department not to allow widespread distribution.

1. The Ambassador of the USSR received us in his office with great cordiality. The meeting took place in the morning, the first secretary was present, the conversation did not enter, so we asked for a meeting in order to listen exactly what we had to convey. We read out the April statement of the Government of Israel, explained its contents, linked it with the general international atmosphere and the course of our government on friendly relations with all, as well as Malenkov's speech on solving problems and the need to maintain normal relations, etc. The Ambassador replied that he had to convey everything exactly and would do so immediately. He does not know whether the answer will come through Sofia, but thinks that it will be so and that the answer will follow without much delay. He stressed that he was well aware of the need to agree on the wording first in order to avoid unnecessary correspondence or a negative response. The Ambassador asked whether we intended to establish diplomatic relations or develop friendly ties, and it looked as if he saw a difference here. "The very fact that I agreed to accept you shows my desire to contribute" (a verb expressing personal interest was used). He concluded the conversation by categorically insisting on maintaining the confidentiality of this and subsequent meetings. At the farewell again switched to a very cordial tone.

2. You have undoubtedly noticed that the Russians are normalizing their diplomatic presence in Belgrade and Athens; perhaps they plan to do so in all countries with which

relations are not yet normal, but they have a substantive friendly relationship (hence the ambassador's question).

3. With all due respect: could it not be explained to Americans bias in the history of the flag without emphasizing our hostility to communism, when even such staunch haters as Churchill or Tito refrain from doing so, in order to maintain a positive atmosphere and perhaps even improve the state of relations and affairs? Don't we agree that if refraining from attacking speeches and presses does not guarantee proper results, the actions of a provocative nature in a particular tactical situation may harm or at least give them additional arguments against Israel and increase suspicion of the Jews of Eastern Europe? Excuse us.

Razin Avner

**TELEGRAM BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY, W. EITAN, THE CHARGE
D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN HUNGARY AND BULGARIA,
G.AVNERU. June 5, 1953**

Visit the Soviet Ambassador, make the following statement and leave him a copy in English: "I was instructed to recall the note of the Government of Israel dated 10 February 1953 to the Soviet mission in Tel Aviv, in which the Government expressed deep regret and apologized for the vile crime committed against the Soviet mission the night before, the mission was handed the text of the government's statement, published immediately after the act of violence became known. and full compensation was offered for damage and material damage.

The Israeli police did their best to identify and bring the perpetrators to justice.

The police carried out extensive searches, both in the offices of certain organizations and in private homes, and detained persons suspected of complicity in the crime for questioning. Unfortunately, the investigation gave a negative result, no significant evidence was found. The police now assume that the perpetrators did not rely on any organized group, but were individuals who plotted to commit the crime and who managed to cover their tracks.

The police are continuing their investigation in the hope of finding evidence that could still make arrest and trial of offenders possible, as well as the application of the punishment they deserve.

With regard to the future relationship between the USSR and Israel, the Government of Israel believes that maintaining diplomatic relations between any two States should not depend on their approaches to current international issues. At the same time, it was officially recorded that there was no military pact between Israel and any other Power and that Israel had no intention of entering

into or joining such a treaty. Israel has no hostile intentions towards the USSR, and under no circumstances will it take part in aggressive plans or actions against the USSR. It would be appropriate to recall that on December 8, 1951, in response to a note from the Ussr Foreign Ministry of November 21, 1951, the Government of Israel stated: "The State of Israel did not agree and will not agree to promote aggressive actions or preparations directed against the Soviet Union or any other peace-loving state." This policy remains unchanged.

The Government of Israel appreciates the statement of the Soviet Government that it is ready to maintain in the future, as in the past, the friendly attitude towards Israel that was shown during the creation of Israel, and for its part seeks to reciprocate this friendly attitude."

Before your visit to the ambassador, also read our telegram number 65.

Eitan

**LETTER FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN
HUNGARY AND BULGARIA, G. AVNER TO THE DEPUTY
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY A. LEVAWI. June 6, 1953**

Dear Arie,

That night, you deciphered the note you had prepared for the transfer to the Soviet side. It is clear to you, of course, that by coincidence this is not so much a statement as a proposal on our part on the wording of the letter, which will also contain a formal appeal on the issue of the resumption of relations. It is possible that after exchanging statements the Russians will refuse a formal letter about the resumption of relations. We'll find out. In any case, together with the transfer of the note, we will ask them to explain to us the procedure of further action.

I don't think the ambassador will argue with us, he's not authorized to do that. He only conveys what he gets from the center and what we pass on to him. But it is possible that comments will be received from Moscow.

While the second part about the relationship between the blocs etc is formulated very well, I feel that the first part regarding a terrorist act sounds unconvincing. It is full of conventional and routine phrases, in which there is not much frankness: it looks like a unsubscribing. Finally, on this issue, they actually have the right to demand an explanation, and we, instead of re-expressing regrets, etc., only quote our previous statement. Instead of explaining exactly how many people have been arrested and what investigations have been carried out, we repeat empty words like "multiple," "intense." It seems to me that it is necessary to strengthen the seriousness of this part, focusing on the accuracy and details of the work done. I think even if it was appropriate to insert a phrase, as we did in relation to the Swedes in the Bernadotte case, explaining that our people are in the process of unification, that it consists of different elements

that have gone through a lot of suffering in the countries where they were born. And as a result of the influence of these social factors, we have unmanageable elements and even people of criminal orientation, who are not alien to force methods. I think that this would be good for both Russians and Israel, and the public would understand that cases of this kind force the government to sometimes give explanations that embarrass it.

You assume that we should not work too hard in explanations of this kind and that, in any case, the Russians have decided to resume relations, and it is not so important that we tell them, in particular, about this issue, which is less important from a political point of view.

This brings me to the heart of the problem that I would like to put to your attention. I believe that if relations resume, we will have to think more carefully about our actions towards the Soviet Union than at first. In any case, a new page will open and you will need to plan all over again. In order not to be misunderstanding, I want to explain that I consider every effort to develop relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe not as aimed at overcoming the obstacles between us and communism, the government and the regime (our views on this issue coincide), but as a means and an attempt to prepare the ground for action for the sake of Russian Jewry and Jewry of satellite countries. That's the only way I see this case.

I have the impression that there is a certain fatalism in this whole case, which can be said something like this: "No matter how you try, they are hostile to us and therefore it does not matter how we behave towards them, what we say and write about them." By the way, the repatriation from Romania continued even after we ceased to be "non-aligned" (these are your words in zurich). There is a long-standing contradiction between communism and zionism - it is so. I think "such a position" includes many moments of self-justification after the fact. When it comes to libel, we say

that no matter how hard you try, nothing affects them, so don't give it a go.

By the way, the same fatalism exists in Eastern Europe and in terms of the arrangement, security and other problems of our missions. There are no constipation on the doors, as they penetrate everywhere. There is no security in the missions (at least in one case), because in any case the authorities know everything. Doesn't that mean laziness or negligence?

You've been telling us in zurich that it's a mistake to think that diplomatic curtseys left and right can get serious things out of them. And so the purpose of my letter is to tell you that I have come to the conclusion that such a line is wrong if we are to actually do everything we can to achieve something in saving the Jews.

I ask you to carefully analyze what the Hungarian envoy to Sofia told me, as it were, a few days ago. I have already written that after his visit he invited me to talk on various topics and was very relaxed. An old revolutionary from the Hungarian commune of 1920, who after the war was the head of the police (not a secret), he is very close to the top of the Hungarian government. He has already aged and got a post in Sofia, as it is seen, for health reasons. Let me quote as accurately as possible:

"I heard that you were at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Budapest and asked that there decide in principle whether Hungary will improve relations with Israel, and to demonstrate this with a few practical steps. I'd like you to understand a few things. This decision has not been made and will not be taken in the form in which you ask. You are well aware that politics is based on interests, interests, as each country and every regime understands. Let us join me in counting my country's interests in relation to you and your demands on us. There are three blocs in the world: the Soviet Union and its allies, neutrals and enemies. Among the latter there are more or less hostile - strong and dangerous, weak and less dangerous. The second bloc, for example,

includes Switzerland, Sweden, Finland and Lebanon. In the third block are you.

That's right, you also have interests and you decide what's best according to your interests. As you can see, your interests dictate to you to take a course to the West - to England and the United States; you have enemies - Arabs, repatriation, problems in financing, here they are your considerations. As we understand, these calculations will lead your country to loss and destruction, but this is your decision. You cannot complain about the conclusions we draw on the basis of your reasoning - you are in the camp of our enemies, you are an opponent of our worldview and our regime. Our whole policy is based on the assumption that one day we will be attacked from a hostile camp in order to destroy. You are inside this camp and seek to participate in the activities of a regional defensive association, which is nothing more than an element of America's preparations for the day of the attack on us. If so, what is our interest in doing you a favor?

You always talk about your desire to strengthen friendly relations with the Soviet Union and with us. You say that very often. Let's speak openly. This is a diplomatic phrase that you pronounce so that immediately after that to build on it the demands of the departure of our Jewish citizens (by the way, I am not Jewish, but grew up in a Jewish environment and know a few words in Yiddish). You are not our friends, but you are talking about friendship to put forward your demands on this basis. Your leaders and the press are actually showing that you are not our friends. It is true that the press is free, as we have, but also in Switzerland, and in Sweden, as in Finland and Lebanon, it is also free, but it will not find slander and attacks on us, which can be found in The Israeli. Maybe they don't like what we're doing either, but they try not to show hostility. So, based on all that has been said, our interests do not dictate to us the expediency of doing you special favors. But your specific requirements add more reasoning to what I said.

Our system of power is stable and constant, you know. Our regime does not allow its citizens to emigrate. Look, even within the countries of popular democracy, we do not allow people to change their countries of residence. During my three years here, I have had cases where Bulgarians wanted to move to Budapest, and vice versa, but usually this was not possible, despite the fact that these two states are in a close socialist commonwealth. The regimes of the two countries have come to an agreement not to allow this, because it does not comply with the laws of our system.

Your demand for the departure of Jews in this case is inherently and of character contrary to all the principles of our system with regard to the migration of the population. Even if you had a regime of popular democracy, such a thing would not be acceptable. And you are hostile to our bloc, so why do you think it would be in our interests to meet your demands? In addition, there are also arguments concerning the youth labour force factor, as well as security considerations that speak out against it: it is clear where the interests are.

But even that's not all. You know that we have a serious interest in trading with the whole world, including hostile countries. In the presence of trade and exchange of goods there is a certain mutual interest. For example, we allow some citizens to travel to Switzerland because we see that by trade they are doing something in our favor; thus, there is a two-way relationship. Of course, they buy products from us too, but when we see that in any country trying to do something for us, there is a mutual interest. And so you appear and base the relationship with us on such requirements, which in any case is difficult to fulfill, despite the fact that in matters of trade you do not show any interest at all. Here again the balance of interests works against you. To top it off, find at least one argument that would make it appropriate for us to meet your requirements.

This does not mean that it is impossible to maintain normal diplomatic relations. This is possible, and I hope that

in the future we will be able to maintain relations of the same kind as with Belgium or Italy, but not as with Switzerland, Finland or Lebanon.

One more word, and I'll let you go. Belgium and Italy do not do work in Budapest through their offices that we do not like. You do it, and therefore it is up to you whether the relationship will be the same as with Belgium and Italy. In this area, I have experience, since I was the head of the police and at times faced with your zionists. Keep in mind that you need to adapt to the authorities of another country. Under us, the zionist organization was liquidated, and now it no longer has a legal right to exist. Anyone involved in this activity does so illegally, with the same consequences as other activities against the law in any State. I know that as one of the steps to restoring friendship, you have asked for the release of the "prisoners of Zion." You may think what you want, but we don't have a place for a zionist organization. This is the state of things, and it is necessary to be able to adapt. These people acted against the law. But the main point is that it is not their fault, but you; your representation is to blame for their arrest because you were the agent who pushed them to act against the law. If you stop such activities, they will not arrest people because they will not act without your support and encouragement. Thus, this stone lies with you. I heard that our Polish colleagues wrote to you quite clearly on this occasion. I'm not familiar with the contents of the note, but you'll certainly be able to make sure what's written there.

Thus, normal relations without bilateral attacks are possible. I'm not saying either that a couple or ten pairs of returnees won't come to you one day. But the balance of interests, as we present it, does not allow us to do such a complex thing as permission to leave thousands of citizens. Think about all this and apologize for holding you so long."

He shook my hand and, before I could catch my breath and say anything, he retired to another part of the room.

It was during the reception on the occasion of the coronation of the English queen. I do not know whether he said all this in accordance with the instructions he had received: it is possible that he may have shown some form of interest in relations with us (he flies to Budapest every two months for a few days), and he has been instructed to do so. It is possible that he showed interest after learning about our conversation with the Pole about the resumption of relations with the Soviet Union, or he had the impression of our interest in friendship with the Russians and with the East in general, because he asked in Budapest what the relations were in general and why they deteriorated to such an extent. (I once wrote to Benzur that we heard a Russian adviser say in public that, judging by the actions of the Israeli representative in Sofia, "Israel is on the right track." Perhaps what he said points to the discussion of relations with us as a result of my meeting with the director of the Political Department of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry in April, or at least someone who tried to explain the situation to him. Perhaps the Hungarians know that in Sofia we are talking with Poles and Russians, and decided to give us an answer through Sofia. All these are just assumptions. What is important is that his words demonstrate the frankness and reasonableness of their line towards us. Among other things, the Russians are changing their line in international affairs to more restrained - without labels and defamation (from the statements of "Truth").

This statement reinforced my opinion, which I had before the conversation, that it is wrong to think that everything is irrational, therefore, everything we do does not matter to them.

It is absolutely clear to me that on the "big issues" we have no way to change our line in international relations. The prevailing importance of relations with the United States is fundamentally clear and inevitable to me.

But there are also "less important big problems" and there are nuances in political behavior. In my view, if we are

to create the conditions for acting in the interests of the Jewry of Eastern Europe, we must try to create a balance of interests in relations with the East as much as possible in the context of relations with the United States; in any case, we must go in that direction and make an attempt. In the past (for example, since 1950) we have not tried to take seriously the less complex and petty problems in such a way as to create a balance of interests in our favor if possible. I say "maybe" because there is no guarantee that such efforts will give a positive result in the Jewish question. But isn't it the matter for states to follow the advice: "Let your bread go through the waters because after many days you will find it again." And with regard to the United States, are we only taking steps on which we have confidence that they will bear fruit? No. We make many small steps besides large ones so that they get into the common piggy bank in the hope of results. In any case, if you do not try, then it is clear from the beginning that we will not succeed.

The same is true of relations with the Soviet Union. We should not despair in advance and declare that we will not do anything, because in any case we will not achieve repatriation. Similarly, the question of the Jews of Eastern Europe is a matter of conscience. If we want to have a clear conscience, we must do everything we can to make good. Even if we cannot say in advance what will benefit, at least it will strengthen the base of our demands. There is another aspect: we are interested in the safety of Jews, they remain in the east of Europe. Even if our activities do not entail repatriation, it may (again "maybe") reduce suspicion of Jews as people associated with hostile Israel. Similarly, if such activities do not benefit, at least it will not hurt, and we must act so as not to endanger Jews as long as they live in eastern Europe.

In conclusion: as long as Jews are in their countries and therefore they are opposed to Israel and since our demands are contrary to the principles of their regime, I suggest that we forget about fatalism such as "this will not help" and

make a decisive effort to create a balance of interests through friendly behavior within the limits of the possible. The border is: harm or serious fear to harm our relationship with the United States. But such an effort requires hard work, it should be addressed to all possible trifles.

This, in my opinion, implies the following:

1. A principled and firm decision to go the way that I have proposed.

2. A more demanding analysis of our efforts to find those responsible for the bombing of the Soviet Mission (this will not hurt anything in relations with the United States, but should, in accordance with what was said above, start small).

3. Our diplomatic missions in Eastern Europe must be restored at the proper level, both in rank and in people as far as possible (e.g.: a solid envoy to the Soviet Union, an envoy to Warsaw and Prague, a permanent charge in affairs in Budapest and Sofia, or, preferably, an envoy to the Soviet Union, an envoy to Warsaw and Prague, an envoy to Budapest, Bucharest and Sofia. , an attorney in the rank of counselor in Bucharest. Anyway, you know what I mean).

4. We must open a mission in Beijing in the coming months after the armistice and the Korean ceasefire. We need to restore clarity on the vote in favour of the People's Republic of China at the United Nations, even as opposed to the United States, because in this we are in good partnership with Britain and Western Europe, and I cannot believe that anything could happen in this relationship with the United States. Eban needs to explain that for the sake of Eastern European Jewry, his life must be a little more complicated.

5. The planned principle of trade means that there is a need for a real shake-up in the economic department of the Israeli Foreign Ministry with regard to the East. They should be told that they should look together with the export center of the Ministry of Trade and Industry to develop trade with the east of Europe. Even if much has not happened because of the lack of an economic basis for exchange with Eastern Europe, every effort must be made, and not as it is done now

- simply without showing interest. And if sometimes a deal costs the state a little more, say, a little more than elsewhere, it is necessary, despite this, sometimes to offer such a deal. It is necessary to forget about your statement in zurich, that in order to achieve the goal it is not necessary here or there to turn to the effect of trade and move to systematic work in the opposite direction.

6. To instruct our representatives in the United States to beware of mentioning enemies in their speeches. Israeli leaders should shy away from long and frequent speeches and forget children's explanations that such speeches "educate young people".

(a) The speeches themselves will never force a member of the Mapam or the Communist Party of Israel to withdraw from the ranks of his party.

b) In any case, there is no danger of a serious increase in the number of Mapam and Maki at the expense of young people. Since there is no serious communist danger in Israel, it is necessary to abandon "education" in this form. We have to be self-possessed.

7. To have a serious conversation with the editors of Haaretz, Dawar, Omer, Maariv, Gador, Gaboker and other newspapers belonging to the coalition camp, including youth newspapers and others, to refrain from criticizing the communist regimes. It must finally be explained that this is necessary in view of the situation of the Jews of Eastern Europe, who are of interest to all. Critical articles can be printed only on Jewish topics (community life, "prisoners of Sion"), and then only after the Eastern European Department of Foreign Affairs checks the veracity of the facts.

8. Try to negotiate with Jewish or at least zionist leaders in the United States the texts of their speeches. This task is more difficult, but at least the zionists will have to meet the Israeli authorities.

9. We must refrain from attacking the communists of Israel, except in extraordinary cases. The line we should follow is to let them shout and write: in any case, what they

write is not serious. There is no need to deter their activity or attack them more than when they threaten our security.

10. Stop all activities in the collection of information on events that go beyond Jewish subjects. Let the Americans do it themselves and pay the bills.

11. To reach a clear agreement with journalists in Haifa, with the caution that they should not slander the words of the returnees about the countries from which they came. Everything the returnees from Bulgaria say is not true. The article in Maariva, in the words of the immigrant from Russia, is quite truthful, but when the Russians read it, should they, and not without reason, ask themselves whether it is necessary to issue exit permits.

12. To instruct the new representative in Moscow to refrain from any illegal actions, including in Jewish affairs; return to this question in nine months.

13. Refrain from obstructing the peace movement when its representatives wish to travel abroad to conferences, even if we have to pay with foreign currency. All this for the sake of the Jewry of Eastern Europe.

14. To take good care of the diplomats of Eastern Europe, to find decent neighbourhoods in Jerusalem, provided they moved with the Ministry. There should be no discrimination in this matter.

15. Our cases at the United Nations need to be seriously reviewed, if possible, to refrain from voting rather than voting against the Russians: we sometimes vote with the United States against our own conscience. If there is a small problem that does not spoil our relations with the United States, it is better to abstain or vote with the Russians; it is worth doing, even if we do not 100% agree with the position of the Russians. We must pay tribute for the Jews of Eastern Europe!

16. We must join those who oppose the new armaments of Germany, both Germany. You can find language that will not offend Adenauer or affect the reparations treaty. It is a matter of time and phraseology. In order not to offend

Adenauer and to face the United States, we can express our fears, citing our past experience.

Now about the main thing (I come to the end) - we need to look with extraordinary permanence any, even small, opportunity to demonstrate friendliness in practice, creating a balance of interests. I am sure that if we are seriously concerned about the fate of the Jews of Eastern Europe, we must make such an effort. In the right shape and at the right time, we will need to talk about immigration from Russia and make efforts to influence our allies. There is no certainty that the line I have proposed will lead to any large-scale result. But I am sure that if we continue to act in accordance with the old line of ignoring relations, continuing to say empty words about friendship, it will not improve the situation. And I repeat: I approach everything from the point of view of the possibility to act in the interests of the Jews. This has nothing to do with my or our attitude to communism or regimes in these countries. I hope you carefully weigh everything I said with your colleagues, and maybe with the minister himself. It would be worth it for him to pay attention to the words of the Hungarian. Another word about the note to the Russians. It is a pity, for a number of reasons, that it is sent in English:

(a) There is no one in the Russian Embassy who knows English, so they asked us to give them the Russian version as well, and we couldn't refuse. You gave them the order to give them the English version, so even if I could prepare a good version in French, they would have an English version. We had no choice, so we gave them the Russian version, and I hope that Razin's translation is not bad. I worked with him on the whole document, explaining exactly the meaning of each English word.

b) It is a pity that the document is written in English, as the English language is cold, protocol-official, while the French version would fill it with a large heat, which could be conveyed in Russian translation. This cold style is bad in terms of achieving maximum effect on people who speak

Slavic (for English speakers it is, of course, in the order of things). Let's say, if the French text was read in Moscow with the same ideas embedded in its content, it would have the best effect on the readers. Every little thing is important! (And that's not worth anything about the relationship with the United States.) In any case, French is more diplomatic than English.

I'm sorry for another handwritten dispatch, you know there's no secretary here.

Best wishes to you and Riquet

Your G. Avner

**LETTER FROM DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY A. LEVAWI TO THE
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN HUNGARY AND
BULGARIA, G.AVNER. June 23, 1953**

Dear Gershon,

I got your letter from Baruch Bagh, and I hasten to answer it. I must warn you that my answer will be incomplete and largely negative, but I think it is better to acknowledge the fact that no one has the right to ignore reality: we cannot achieve anything if we ignore reality. I will postpone until another time a full analysis of the words of the Hungarian and your reaction to them, now only to touch on your basic practical proposals - not because I underestimate their content, on the contrary, I believe that they are of great importance, but I do not think that we will be able to discuss them properly because of the limited possibilities of correspondence. Let me just ask you, have you studied deeply Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist literature, new and classical? Believe me, it is very important if you want to evaluate, for example, the words of a Hungarian with all their insincerity, when he talked about "neutrality" etc.

So let's move on to your suggestions. I think you've already realized that the Soviets don't attach much importance to the story of the explosion and our apology. This is confirmed by similar cases that took place in the history of diplomacy of the USSR (your offer No. 2).

We believe that it would be desirable to raise the level of our diplomatic missions in Eastern Europe, but it should be done on the basis of reciprocity. We have two facts yet: Poland does not have a diplomatic mission here, only consulates. Czechoslovakia and Hungary have offices headed by the Charge d'Affaires; second, despite this situation, we have had envoys in Czechoslovakia and Poland for quite some time. The results are memorable, and they are not encouraging. Until Oren and Orenpggane are released,

Czechoslovakia is still not covered by trade debt, there are still no signs that might inspire hope (except for the exemplary cessation of slander from November 1952 to March 1953), and there is still no progress on the representations of the East here; and it is difficult to expect the prospect of steps in this area from different angles. In case of resumption of relations with the USSR, I am considering the appointment of a person to the post of envoy to Moscow, who would be accredited in Sofia, and in Budapest there will be a permanent charge d'affaires only of this country (your offer No. 3).

The issue of representation in China is worth considering. It is clear that we will not be able to compete with the West, which has already begun to take root there. From this we can conclude that we should not exaggerate, thinking that our relations with the Councils will gain a boost from this, but it is possible that the benefits in Asia will be greater. I write this when the situation with Korea is undecided, and it does not give grounds for quick steps on our part (your offer number 4).

trade. First, I'd advise you to get rid of your skepticism about the economics department. I don't think there are a few obvious factors that don't help the cause: a) we can't get the embargo on "strategic goods" lifted, Americans include countless goods; b) The whole East is mainly interested in those products, not in some of our imported goods, such as citrus fruits, textiles, clothing, etc. (except the USSR in the past); (c) Czechoslovakia and Poland have struggled to evade trade debts; (d) Israel will not make purchases on heavier terms from anyone, and under no circumstances will it make serious concessions unless the political dividends are explicit (your offer No. 5).

We cannot completely abandon the ideological struggle against communism. I think it's illusory, not just because we can't do it, but mainly because we shouldn't. I do not understand the reasoning why any former member of the Mapam and the Communist Party of Israel cannot speak.

Ideological struggle is not only speeches, but all together - speeches, press, literature, radio, etc. It is enough that we are guided by the generally accepted rules of conduct and do not respond to the slander of our government by Maki slandering the government of the USSR (which controls the activities of Maki). And what is the situation in Holland or Sweden (with their trials over the Communists)? Are they shy about attacking the Communists? Of course, this is not about the fight against the core of Maki, the group of Snee and Mapam, we are talking about the masses - here the fate is decided, and it is connected with both high hopes and serious dangers. You're wrong when you think Mapam and Maki don't have a good chance of success today. Of course, what is being said today in the United States is completely wrong, but do you have any idea what is happening in the United States and how Jews feel about it. Against the background of general "McCarthyism" it is possible to distinguish shades and nuances, and it turns out that the speeches of Israelis, zionists and Jews concerning Soviet affairs seem to Americans still liberal. If we talk about our official attitude towards Maki, is it worse than in Lebanon or Egypt? Israel is the only non-communist Asian country where the Communist Party is allowed and where the Communists know that they are not persecuted (about the case in India under Nehru) (your proposals No. 6-9.)

As far as I know, peace advocates have been able to freely attend their conferences without discrimination in comparison to other people going to other conferences, despite the fact that Israelis go to conferences to raise the profile of the country, and "peace movement supporters" often use them to slander Israel, as Mikunis, whose words were published in Pravda, did. All this, in my opinion, is mainly for the "enlightenment" of the Jews of Eastern Europe (your proposal number 13).

Naturally, diplomats in Eastern Europe should not be discriminated against in accommodation, etc.

I absolutely agree with the importance of our behaviour at the UN, but I am not inclined to exaggerate: (a) it will be difficult to compete in these things with countries such as Afghanistan, Syria, etc.; b) It is difficult to feel the effect of the line that we have adopted as opposed to the wishes of the Americans in matters such as the People's Republic of China; (c) Experience and analysis point to a clear difference in Soviet political planning between routine problems at the UN and the problem of the repatriation of Eastern European Jews. It is impossible to draw an analogy between the U.S. and the USSR in this matter, the same means can not give the same political results in different situations, but at least there is something to delve into and what to emphasize in legal terms, without much hope of success (your proposal No. 15).

There are a few more of your suggestions that I haven't touched on for all sorts of reasons. But it seems that the overall picture will not change if we consider these proposals.

Despite all this, I join Deutscher's recent predictions that there are good prospects for repatriation from the USSR in the next 5-6 years, so I, like him, do not think that this will be the result of Israel's tactical moves. There are processes (and again I cannot speak about it in more detail within this letter) that can stop the expansion and expansion of the communist world in a form that the Hungarian and his spiritual fathers did not think about 35 years, not 100 years, not even a year ago. Against the backdrop of interconnected historical processes, his so-called "balance of interests", about which he lectured you, looks far-fetched and distorted. His "yes" doesn't look real, his "no" isn't necessarily a "no" for a long time.

Nevertheless, we must live and act. Let's imagine that we would be looping, inventing tricks or resorting to tricks, in any case it will not help to avoid disappointments and failures, if we suddenly forget that the situation of Jews in the USSR has remained unchanged for 35 years. If we ignore

the historical prospects, the blockade will remain, history will repeat itself in the same sequence, because there is no reason to assume that it will stand still. It is moving forward, and its outlines are beginning to emerge in a hazy future, indicating not only the grave dangers to the Jews of Eastern Europe, but also of encouraging opportunities and liberation.

With friendly wishes,

A.Levavi

**LETTER FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN
HUNGARY AND BULGARIA, G. AVNER TO THE DEPUTY
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTRY A. LEVAWI. July 1, 1953**

Negotiations with the Russians and further actions

I sent you an analytical note with the last mail regarding all the stages of negotiations here. I would now like to add a few thoughts on how events have evolved to this day, as well as on what to do next.

1. It is in our own interest to try again to analyse how the process leading to the resumption of relations began. As for Sofia, the events had the following chronology: Stalin dies on March 9, the Russian ambassador returns to Sofia after a long vacation on March 15 and on April 4 speaks with Razin in the presence of other diplomats at a reception with Hungarians, asking his opinion on the rehabilitation of convicts in the "doctors' case". Apparently, he already knew from the return from Moscow that such a step was expected. A Czech colleague told Razin in mid-April that the Russians had sent instructions on rapprochement with the Austrians and Israelis; in other words, they were already aware of the expected change of attitude in favour of Austria and Israel. This means that a principled decision against us was made in March or mid-April. At a reception with the Czechs in early May, a TASS correspondent told Razin that he "thinks" that there will soon be changes for the better in relations between the Soviet Union and Israel. In the same week, the Pole began to probe the ground as to the possibility of our initiative, set out in the form of a letter. On May 15, at our reception, all Bulgarians said with one voice that we should send such a letter. Perhaps at that stage they also had instructions to discuss our first step with us.

2. When the Russian Ambassador read out the text of their reply to us this week (you will receive it in the original with this post), which refers to the report of the Government

of Israel on 28 May, Razin and I could hardly hold back from the smile. But it is worth remembering that our first meeting with him (it took place when I already knew that they had received assurances that we would take the first steps) the ambassador began by saying: "I was told that you want to see me and tell me something. I'd like to hear what you have to say." In other words, despite the fact that the Poles in general only informed us, etc., he began to act as if it were our initiative addressed to the government of the USSR, and as if their letter had it been that if the whole process had started on May 28 with our appeal, it would have been...."

3. I turn from here to our last meeting with him, which happened two days earlier than planned, so I returned from Budapest earlier than planned. To tell you the truth, we were not in a good mood all this time because we were sure they would protest the weakening of our obligations towards the blocs. We thought they'd do it to annoy us, even if they agreed with the second version of the wording. I'll tell you the truth: your telegram on this issue did not inspire much optimism. Among other arguments (what other arguments can anyone else make a claim?): may say that there are differences in the construction of phrases, that the change in political content is obvious. Yes, we cannot justify the weakening of political obligations by referring to the fact that we have accepted two purely technical comments on their part, and have not included a whole political proposal concerning the terms. Does that justify weakening our commitments? Similarly, we do not understand how our Ministry of Foreign Affairs works today, instead of planning a line of conduct in such cases from start to finish. What happened? Has it been oversilected by Foster in the past two weeks or is it happy about the favorable development of affairs with the Russians? I can hardly believe that the intention was planned to offer more in the beginning. I am afraid that there are also reasons associated with the whole system of our work. I'd be happy to hear the opposite. They had a change in the issue of friendly relations, probably

planned in advance. They told us things they would never say publicly because of their flirtation with the Arabs. When I disagreed, one after another the following answers followed: first, their desire to renew the relationship in itself is a sign of a friendly disposition, and there is no need to demonstrate this in any particular way. Secondly, normal relations and friendly relations should be the same. Thirdly, what we ask will appear in the final version, because what he is sending to us now is a project. Fourth, he telegraphs our request to Moscow. Fifthly, he sees no reason why not to include what we ask, because what is written now and what we ask is the same thing... Each of these points was a response to my arguments. Of course, he did not directly respond to my objections that this was included in the first draft, but then disappeared. At some point I reminded him that even at the first meeting he asked us whether Israel wanted diplomatic or friendly relations. In other words, that they share these two concepts (this was said in the context of his statement that normal and friendly relationships are the same thing). The answer was that when he said this, he meant something else: whether Israel wanted only diplomatic or also normal relations, and since we replied that we were striving for both, then then it was about normal relations. It's just a dialectical ploy. In this regard, it is interesting that Tito does distinguish between diplomatic and normal relations. From the clippings that I attach, it follows that it distinguishes three stages: diplomatic relations, normal relations, friendly relations. Therefore, we can assume that in relation to us the Russians go to stage number two. But these are also only academic calculations.

4. I would like to analyze the essence of events: it is absolutely clear to me today that the decision of the Russians in relation to us is similar to that of the Russians

their decision on Yugoslavia, and this brings me back to the idea that I telegraphed to you immediately after our first meeting with the Russian ambassador, when I tried to interpret his question of mere relationships or friendship,

and when I advised to establish the work of our missions in practical terms in places where they are not present at the moment, for example in Belgrade, Athens, Berlin Vienna, and maybe in some Latin American countries with which relations were severed long ago. This does not mean that a truly friendly relationship should be established, as it will be necessary to solve a set of problems, which requires readiness. However, such an act, albeit a formal one, will have an impact on Russia's opinion, because gestures are beneficial in situations where something needs to be demonstrated. This is usually inexpensive, but it pays huge dividends, especially in terms of public opinion in Eastern Europe. I came to this view as a result of my stay and negotiations in Budapest, after I saw that there was no change or concessions, both in matters relating to Jews, even in small matters, such as caravans, and in the case of Yugoslavia and diplomatic contacts with the West. This is confirmed by the fact that, as I saw, the word "friendly" was absent from the draft letter of the Russians to us. They, of course, informed their allies of their intention to restore relations with us and Belgrade, and at the same time informed them that at least for now this does not mean a willingness to make concessions in private, non-international, matters. Notice my conversations with the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the Pole in Budapest.

I have no doubt that on major international issues they are seeking multilateral negotiations. There they may be willing to make some concessions (I am, for example, sure that they leave the Austrian issue in reserve because they do not want to make concessions on it now, but will follow them when it will be beneficial for them in the context of comprehensive negotiations with the Western powers). For the main negotiations, they want to prepare the atmosphere and public opinion in a way that achieves their demands, and this is achieved through current gestures. They want to organize a kind of "second Yalta," that is, a general agreement that would be based on maintaining the status

quo between the two blocs, which would give the Russians guarantees of non-aggression by the U.S.-Western bloc (which is why Churchill's words about guarantees have got to the very center of their desires, because their goal is to really reach a security agreement for Russia and the Satellite countries). In response to such an agreement, they will be ready to make serious concessions somewhere (Austria, etc.).

Thus, the intention to prepare the atmosphere and public opinion is absolutely clear. On our problems, as well as the problems of Yugoslavia and Western diplomats related to the domestic political system, concessions will not follow either now or later. Another thing is the requirement of compensation for nationalized property. This question has to do with money and there is something to talk about (French and Swiss in Sofia). However, emigration, repatriation, exit permits, the activities of Yugoslav missions in the bloc countries are things that affect domestic politics and contradict the order on which concessions will not follow. In this area, concessions can only be made if domestic pressures within the country require this; then concessions on Germany's problems and maybe in other matters, but nothing more. They do not believe that there is a direct link between preparing the ground for general negotiations or even the negotiations themselves and the demands on emigration, because these things relate to domestic policy, would mean serious concessions of an internal nature and cannot be resolved at the stage of gestures and the preparation of public opinion.

From this I conclude that the resumption of relations in itself does not mean any significant progress in solving our problems in Russia or satellite countries. Perhaps we will make any progress if a Russian-friendly agreement is signed during the main negotiations—the agreement is so good that they will make some easing on the issues of the internal regime. But there is no reason to assume that general negotiations, if they take place, will lead to anything conducive to them. Perhaps some progress is achievable if

the Western Powers demand concessions on Jewish repatriation as partial compensation for a favourable agreement. This cannot be seen as a real thing, although I think that the Foreign Office should at least provide for the possibility of approaching Churchill to ask him to raise the issue in conversations with the Russians, if they take place; I think it is worth making an effort: if there is no agreement, we lose nothing. I am sure that we must make such an attempt for the sake of the Jews of Eastern Europe.

How can any concrete success be achieved in eastern Europe? First of all, we should see in the resumption of relations with Moscow an opportunity to return there. I see nothing but resumption of contact. But there is one way that they can get something from them, and that is the way to create a balance of interests, for which they may dare to help us with something. I've already written to you about it. I know that we are constrained in this regard, because we are not Finland with a strong economy that does not need American assistance, or even Lebanon, but because of Lebanon and other Arab countries, we feel the need for United States assistance.

Despite this, I think we have an opportunity and a moral duty towards the Jews of Eastern Europe to do everything in our power. We must not neglect the small, even if we do not have the confidence in advance that it will lead to something. On this occasion it will be interesting to note that the head of the Austrian government, a man of right-wing views, in his speech in parliament 10 days ago, opening a debate on foreign policy and talking about the need to seek some concessions from the Russians against his state, not only clearly demanded that the press not irritate the Russians with their actions and not slander them, but, moreover, hinted that in order to get concessions from the Russians it is necessary to find a way to get concessions from the Russians. where it is possible to meet the political interests of the Russians, seeking their favorable location. He spoke with caution, picking up the words, while the representative of

the Communist Party unequivocally said that only if Austria does anything in the sphere of international relations to meet the interests of the Russians, can we expect that Russia will do something in the interests of Austria.

I think we should try to tap into the small things I wrote about in a previous letter and try to create a balance of interests in our favor. In any case, we should not demand from the Russians what we do not demand from the Americans or other powers. All act in accordance with reciprocity and their practical interests. In this case, the moral and ideological side is more important for them, but nevertheless it is a question of political interests. If we do not make an effort to do something they are interested in, we should not be surprised that they have not responded positively to us, especially in an area where it is difficult for them to respond subjectively, since repatriation is incompatible with all the foundations of their system.

As a priority, take the following steps (this is an attempt to build something on the basis of the very fact of resuming relations, although this does not correspond, as I explained earlier, to my view that we should not expect that the resumption of relations will automatically bear fruit):

1. In order to eliminate the dangers that may arise from the publication of a statement on the resumption of relations, it is necessary to strictly instruct the press of the coalition parties, properly explaining that our demands to the Soviet Union and the bloc countries relate to the future and should not be accompanied by condemnation of the events of the past, even if there are objective reasons for doing so in connection with the activities of communist regimes in different countries.

2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must urgently send instructions to all our representatives in Eastern Europe to formally inform the foreign ministries of these countries of the contents of the letters of both sides. Even if they are already aware, such a step is necessary on our part.

3. The Ministry should oblige the heads of our missions in Eastern Europe to pay official visits to Russian ambassadors or their deputies. In addition to different topics for discussion, we should pay attention to our focus on friendly relations, etc.

4. The Ministry should order our representatives in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania within 10 days of the announcement of the resumption of relations to visit the relevant foreign ministries and re-examine secondary requirements: for example, in Poland, permission to leave for family reunification; bucharest- on the release of Israeli prisoners and family reunification permits for single Israeli women and wives; Prague on the liberation of Oren and Orenstein; Budapest—about the departure of the wives of Israeli citizens. I do not advise raising the issue of large-scale repatriation.

I think it should be done in any case, and I have a few considerations to do that: maybe if we put forward these demands in all the capitals, one or two of them will turn to the Russians to find out whether at this stage it is necessary to make concessions of this kind for Israel and perhaps in this case the Answer of the Russians will come, that such trifles do not matter. as a result, we will get at least some small.

I fear that you are beginning to suspect me that I have become a communist or think that the Russians are right in their policy towards us, with the trial of Slansky, etc. However, in thinking about our relationship with the Russians, I cannot disregard the balance of interests that plays a role in the relations between nations, as well as in the relations between the United States and England with us. All they do is not “for the sake of beautiful eyes”; the public policy of the United States as well as England clearly shows this. Even Churchill's beautiful speech is not only “for the sake of the eyes”! However, perhaps we will not be able to achieve changes even in small matters, then the conclusion is clear. I attach to the letter a few newspaper clippings, which are related to what was mentioned above. Gershon Avner

**LETTER FROM ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
CHARETTA TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV. July 6, 1953**

Your Excellency,

The Government of Israel has recently noted a marked improvement in the international situation and a renewed desire to reach a peaceful and constructive solution to major international issues still awaiting resolution. Following its constant policy of seeking friendship with all peace-loving countries and promoting, to the best of their abilities, the establishment of normal and harmonious relations between all peoples, the Government of Israel, under the present circumstances, wishes to raise the issue of the resumption of diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Israel.

2. The Government of the Soviet Union severed its diplomatic relations with Israel following the bombing of the Soviet Mission in Tel Aviv by unknown criminals there and the damage to persons and property caused by the explosion. The Government of Israel recalls that it, in its note of 10 February 1953, the SOVIET Mission in Tel Aviv expressed its deep regret and apologies for the crime committed against the Mission, and offered full compensation for the damage and material damage suffered by the Mission and its personnel. The Israeli police have made every effort to identify and punish the perpetrators. It is known that, for reasons beyond the control of the Israeli police, the investigation of evidence at the crime scene could not have begun until 15 hours after it had been committed. Extensive searches were carried out in the offices of some organizations, as well as in private homes, and dozens of persons suspected of possible complicity were detained for questioning.

Unfortunately, the investigation has so far failed to produce positive results, but the case has in no way been

dropped and the search for evidence continues with full energy in the hope that the arrest and trial of the perpetrators and their deserved punishment may still be possible.

3. The Government of Israel takes the opportunity to recall its reply of 8 December 1951 to a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR dated 21 November 1951, in which it stated:

“Israel has never agreed and will not agree to support the implementation or preparation of acts of aggression against the USSR or any other peace-loving state.” This policy remains unchanged. Without hostile feelings towards the USSR, but rather, being concerned about establishing and maintaining friendship and peaceful relations with it, Israel will not be a party to any alliance or agreement pursuing aggressive objectives against the Soviet Union.

4. The Government of Israel officially proposes to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to restore, in the spirit of genuine international friendship, normal diplomatic relations, which were interrupted on February 12, 1953.

I take this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency my very high respect.

M.Charette

Israeli Foreign Minister July 6, 1953
news. — 1953. July 27.

**LETTER FROM SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER V.M.
MOLOTOV TO ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
SHARETT. July 15, 1953**

Mr. Minister,

In connection with your letter of July 6, 1953 I inform the following. As you know, on February 9, on the territory of the Soviet mission in Israel, the attackers detonated a bomb, resulting in the mission personnel and family members of some of the mission were seriously injured, and the Soviet Government recalled the Soviet Union envoy, as well as the composition of its mission in Israel, and cut off diplomatic relations with the Government of Israel.

On 28 May, the Israeli Government asked the Soviet government to restore diplomatic relations between Israel and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government took into account the proposal that the Government of Israel had expressed its deep regret and apology for the crime committed against the Soviet mission in Tel Aviv, and that, although the search for those responsible had not yielded positive results, the Government of Israel, it claimed, was continuing to search for those responsible for their arrest and trial.

The Soviet Government also took into account the Israeli Government's statement that it would not be a party to any alliance or agreement with aggressive objectives against the Soviet Union.

Given the above assurances of the Israeli Government, as well as its concerns about establishing friendships with the Soviet Union and following its policy of maintaining normal relations with other countries and strengthening cooperation between peoples, the Soviet Government, for its part, also expresses its desire to have friendly relations with Israel and considers it possible to restore diplomatic relations with the Government of Israel.

Please, Mr. Minister, to accept my high esteem.
V. Molotov

**NOTE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST OF
THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY TO THE DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR V.A.SORIN. July 28,
1953**

Secret.

In connection with the restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel in the foreign press appeared Agence France-Presse with reference to well-informed circles

Tel Aviv said that the Soviet mission would probably be in Jerusalem, where the Israeli Foreign Ministry was recently transferred. The Arab countries, for their part, are concerned about the location of the Soviet mission in Israel, as expressed in a statement by the Charge d'Affaires of Syria in the USSR, made to me on 24 July this year, that "the transfer of the Soviet mission to Jerusalem would be an unfriendly gesture against Syria and other Arab countries".

The UN General Assembly in 1947 adopted with the support of the Soviet Union the decision to internationalize Jerusalem, but during the Israeli-Arab war in 1948 the city was occupied by the forces of Israel (western) and Transjordan (Old City of Jerusalem) and the UN decision on internationalization was not implemented.

On April 17, 1950, the Soviet government issued a statement on Jerusalem stating that the 1947 UN decision "does not satisfy the Arab or Jewish populations of both the city of Jerusalem and Palestine as a whole. Under such conditions, the Government of the USSR does not consider it possible to support the general Assembly's ruling. The Soviet Government is nevertheless confident that the United Nations will be able to find a solution to the question of Jerusalem acceptable to both the Arab and Jewish populations of that city."

In order to strengthen their position in Jerusalem, the Israeli authorities declared the occupied part of the city as the capital of Israel in 1949. The Jewish part of Jerusalem is

currently home to the President of the State, the Knesset (Parliament), the Government and ministries. On July 12 this year, the Israeli Foreign Ministry was transferred to Jerusalem, and only the Foreign Ministry department was left in Tel Aviv to communicate with foreign missions.

The embassies of the United States, England and France are currently in Tel Aviv and they have rejected the Israeli government's offer to move to Jerusalem. The diplomatic missions of most other countries have also been deployed in Tel Aviv. According to the USSW as of November 1952, only the Dutch mission and the Greek diplomatic mission were in Jerusalem.

Upon the arrival of the Soviet mission in Israel, the Israeli authorities will obviously ask us about the deployment of the Soviet mission in Jerusalem and may be motivated by the fact that all the central Israeli institutions, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are located in Jerusalem, and that it is difficult to find a suitable location for the mission in Tel Aviv, while Jerusalem has several Soviet-owned houses suitable for our mission.

The establishment of our mission in Jerusalem would provoke a sharp backlash in the Arab States. It may also lead to accusations by the Soviet Union of supporting Israeli claims to Jerusalem.

Based on the foregoing, we believe it is possible:

1. The Soviet mission in Israel should be opened in Tel Aviv, and the question of its possible move to Jerusalem would be resolved later, taking into account the position of other great Powers with diplomatic missions in Israel.

2. To ask the Israeli Foreign Ministry to provide the mission with a space in Tel Aviv, at least equivalent to the one rented by the mission prior to the end of relations.

As for the question of the place of the awarding of credentials by our envoy to the President of Israel, the following thing should be kept in mind: the majority of diplomatic representatives handed over their certificates in Tel Aviv, but with regard to the relocation of the President's

office to Jerusalem, the Dutch envoy on 4 May 2017 and the Chilean envoy on 16 June this year handed their credentials in Jerusalem.

The Jewish authorities will obviously offer us credentials in Jerusalem as well. In this regard, we consider it appropriate to allow the Soviet envoy to Israel, if it is not possible to hand over the certificates in Tel Aviv, to give the Israeli authorities consent to the hand over them in Jerusalem.

G. Dice in

On the first page of the document at the top of the litter: "T. Molotov V.M. I think the proposals (p. 2, 3) T. zaitsev are acceptable. I ask for your consent. 31. VII. V.Sorin."

A note is attached to the document: "T. zorina. We need to talk about it. V. Molotov. August 6, 1953."

On the first page of the document at the bottom of the litter: "T. zaitseva, I.e. Abramov. According to the instructions of T. Molotov V.M. We should ignore Avner's appeal in Budapest to change the location of our mission in Israel and proceed from the need to be stationed in Tel Aviv. 20. VIII.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE ADVISER
OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BULGARIA M.I.IVLIEV
WITH THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN
BULGARIA B. RAZIN. July 29, 1953**

Secret.

On July 29 this year, Ben-Tsion Razin, the Charge d'Affaires of Israel in Bulgaria, asked him to accept it.

In connection with the illness of Ambassador T. Bodrov M.F. I received Razin.

In an interview with me, Razin said that he had the power of his government to pass on the request to the Soviet government to give the agreman to Samuel Eliashiva, appointed by the envoy of the State of Israel to the USSR. At the same time, he presented in writing a brief biographical data of Samuel Eliashiva.

At the same time, Razin asked to inform him of the decision to be taken by the Soviet government on the issue of the requested agreman.

I told Razin that the embassy would inform him as soon as a decision was taken on the matter.

Razin then said that the publication in the newspapers of Tel Aviv of the letters of the foreign ministers of the USSR and Israel on the restoration of diplomatic relations caused a wide and positive response in all circles of the population of Israel. According to Razin, even the most right-wing newspapers in Tel Aviv have published approving reviews about establishing relations with the Soviet Union.

The third secretary of the embassy, T. Edatin I.I., was present at the conversation.

Appendix: original and translation of data to S. Eliashiva, only to the first instance.

Adviser to the Ussr Embassy in Bulgaria

M.Ivliev

**LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE
USSR G.T. SEITSEV AND THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
A.N.ABRAMOV TO THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF
THE USSR V.A.SORIN. September 2, 1953**

Secret.

On May 31, 1950, the Soviet Council of Ministers established a representative office of Russian Palestinian society in Jerusalem. The Mission was to accept the property of the former Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society and to manage property belonging to the Soviet Union.

From the very first days of the Mission's existence, the Israeli authorities had slowed down his work and had not yet handed over to him either the property of the former Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society or property belonging to the Soviet Union.

The Academy of Sciences of the USSR, which is run by the Palestinian Society, in its letters to the Foreign Ministry of the USSR repeatedly raised the issue of the termination of further activities of the mission in Israel. The letter dated 23 December 1952 stated that the Palestinian society owned a small part of the Soviet property located in Israel, that the Israeli authorities had not yet handed over any property to the mission and therefore "it seems appropriate to discuss in the Foreign Ministry the issue of the substance of the further work of the mission". This question was also put to the USSR Foreign Ministry in letters to T. Topchiev on February 16, April 4 and 16 and August 21 this year.

In deciding on the activities of the Mission, we have every reason to demand that the Israeli authorities hand over our property, including the property of the former Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society. Negotiations with the Israeli Government on this property are not over, and the liquidation of the mission could now be regarded by the Israeli authorities as a waiver of our rights to the property.

We also need the Palestinian Society as an information centre, because there are no other Soviet institutions in Jerusalem, where it is located and where the Israeli Government is located.

It should also be borne in mind that the Palestinian Society's office in Jerusalem was established in accordance with the right acquired by the Russian Government at the time. The liquidation of the representation, as T. Topchiev suggests, would mean the renunciation of this right.

In connection with the above, it would be useful to inform Topchiev that the USSR Foreign Ministry sees no reason to liquidate the representation of palestinian society in Jerusalem, and believes that the Academy of Sciences of the USSR will take appropriate measures to staff the representation of staff and to intensify its activities.

Draft letters attached.

G. Seytsev

A.Abramov

**LETTER FROM THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF
THE USSR V.A.SORIN TO THE CHIEF SCIENTIST OF THE
PRESIDIUM OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE
USSR A.V.TOPCHIEV. September 5, 1953**

Secret.

On IO-2/02895 on August 21, 1953

The Ussr Foreign Ministry considers it impractical to liquidate the representation of the Russian Palestinian society in Jerusalem. Such a move could be regarded by the Israeli authorities as our rejection of claims for Soviet property in Israel.

In our opinion, the work of the mission should be intensified. For this purpose, it is necessary to fully staff the office in the near future with trained staff.

Deputy Foreign Minister of the Ussr Union

V.Sorin

**HELP THE Middle East DEPARTMENT OF the SOVIET
UNION ON THE TRADE OF the USSR with ISRAEL FOR
THE PERIOD 1950-1952.. October 13, 1953**

Secret.

In 1950-1951 we sold to Israel for pounds sterling cladding tiles, porcelain products, typewriters, counting machines, paraffin, carpets and on the local currency - movies and literature.

In 1952, films and literature were sold to Israel.

Our purchases in Israel in 1950-1951 consisted of essential oils. In the first quarter of 1952, 6.8 thousand tons of oranges worth 3.7 million rubles and a trial batch of bananas for 34 thousand rubles were imported from Israel.

At the end of 1952, contracts were signed for the purchase of 15,000 tons of oranges in Israel, worth about 9 million rubles with delivery in the first quarter of 1953.

Israeli oranges are of good quality, stored for a long time and cost us a little less than Italian oranges: for example, under the contracts for 1953, the cost of Italian oranges is 640-650 rubles a ton, and Israeli - 605 rubles. Israeli firms supply us with oranges neatly, in terms of contracts.

Payments for Israeli goods are made in pounds sterling. The local currency we received from the sale of movies and literature until recently was spent inside Israel, in particular for the needs of the Soviet mission. However, since August 1952, the Israeli bank began to block these amounts, allowing their use only for the purchase of real estate in Israel.

From capitalist countries, in addition to Israel, oranges are also purchased by us in Italy.

Head of the Middle East Division
I.Efanov

**TELEGRAM OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF ISRAEL IN
THE USSR TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY.**

November 23, 1953

To the economic department of the Foreign Ministry. This morning, together with Yehuda Gideon, Kummykin, deputy minister of foreign trade, were present: the head of the Middle East trade department and the Trade Attache of Israel. There was a conversation about the possibilities of expanding bilateral trade and its forms. Kummykin stressed that in recent years trade has been one-sided and it is desirable to make it mutual. His attitude towards expanding trade with us is positive. He realized that most of our products are suitable for import into the Soviet Union and emphasized textiles. They were willing and willing to discuss an agreement or trade treaty through intergovernmental negotiations, but noted that most of their treaties were based on clearing. Discussion is possible in two forms:

1. First, a delegation of experts, and in the second stage - a government delegation.

A mixed government and expert commission that will discuss in parallel.

They are ready to accept any form acceptable to us. The second form suits them better. Once you have received your response to the form of negotiations, he will report it to the Minister and the Government. Telegraph your opinion as soon as possible.

Argaman

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV WITH
THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR. December 1, 1953**

Secret.

After the mutual greetings, Eliashiv hands V.M. Molotov a copy of his credentials and a copy of the speech he intends to give at their presentation, and says that he would like to state first of all that the Government and people of Israel are deeply satisfied with the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This is a great event in the life of Israel.

In response, Molotov notes the positive importance that the Soviet Union and Israel have agreed to resume diplomatic relations and that the Government of Israel has made certain commitments in connection with the restoration of relations with the Soviet Union. We, says Molotov, also attach importance to this event.

Eliashiv says that in its relations with the Soviet Union, Israel continues its previous policy. The Government of Israel hopes that Soviet-Israeli relations will develop successfully.

Molotov expresses hope that these relations will develop in accordance with the agreement reached during the restoration of relations.

As soon as the opportunity arises, Molotov continues, Eliashiv will be received by the Chairman of the Presidency of the Supreme Council for the awarding of credentials. He will be informed of the date of admission.

Eliashiv says that later he will ask for an appointment with V.M. Molotov to discuss some business issues.

This is where the five-minute conversation ends.

Recorded by Troyanovsky

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
SOVIET ENVOY IN ISRAEL, A.N.ABRAMOV, WITH
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M. CHARETTE. December
2, 1953**

Secret.

It's 11 o'clock today. arrived in Jerusalem for a protocol visit to senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Charetta.

First, I was received by the head of the protocol department, Simon, who introduced me briefly to the upcoming ceremony of awarding credentials to President Ben-Tsvi. At the same time, he gave me a list of the diplomatic corps, a list of senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a printed edition of the Israeli protocol.

I was then introduced to the Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Eitan, Deputy Director General Of Levavi and head of the Eastern European branch of Smoreak. The interviews with these persons were mostly protocol-related. Eitan and Levavi noted that, according to their information, negotiations between the Israeli trade delegation, based in Moscow, and representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR are successful and we can hope for the speedy conclusion of a trade agreement between our countries.

At 12 o'clock. I was accepted by Charette. Charette took me outwardly very kindly and throughout the conversation spoke in Russian language. I handed Charette copies of my credentials and a copy of the speech I was supposed to give at the hand of credentials. Charette spoke fluently, saying that he was happy to mention the desirability of cultural and trade relations between our countries. He, for his part, considers all development of cultural and other relations as a prerequisite for further rapprochement between our countries. He pointed out that among a large part of the Jewish population, the Russian language is very common and

there is a great interest in Russian culture and science. This, according to Charette, should facilitate the work on the cultural rapprochement of our countries.

In this regard, I commented on our intention to publish a bulletin of the Soviet mission in Israel in Russian language.

Charette immediately lowered his tone and said that the issue required careful study and that it would probably be possible to publish such a publication on the basis of reciprocity, but not language, but distribution.

Sharett went on to tell me that Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had finally resigned and negotiations were under way with various political circles to form a new Government. Ben-Gurion's resignation will be officially announced tomorrow, December 3. He also said that there might be difficulties in forming a government, but he hoped that those difficulties would be overcome.

Referring to the overall development of Israel, Charette drew attention to the widespread housing and cultural construction in the country, as well as the growing unification of the Jewish nation. In this regard, they place a special task on the Jewish youth and the army. Charette said that the strengthening of the nation can be judged, in particular, by the increasing penetration into the life of the Jewish language. The whole new generation already speaks Hebrew, Charette said. He noted, however, that English as the language of the peoples with whom Israel was associated by economic and other conditions had recently become very important. For example, large groups of students, military and others have recently been sent from Israel to the United States, England and other countries.

At the end of the conversation, Charette expressed his satisfaction at the restoration of relations between our countries and wished me every success in carrying out my mission. He also promised to assist in finding a mission space.

The conversation lasted 25 minutes. T. Fomin and Medyanik were present.

Soviet Envoy to Israel Abramov

**TELEGRAM OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER M.
SHARETTA TO ISRAEL'S ENVOY TO THE USSR S.
ELIASHIV. December 3, 1953**

My best wishes. During my explanations of the process of building a state, integrating people from different countries in Israel, introducing them to the language Abramov asked whether the English language does not make a difference. I said no and said that we definitely need a cultural connection with the world, and English is the international language and language of most Jews with whom we are in touch. I added that the languages spoken in Israel reflect the origin of the new immigrants, are associated with the relevant diaspora, facilitate travel and learning opportunities, tourism development, etc. I saw that Fomin understood me well, but Abramov's glasses concealed his reaction. I added that I was interested to learn from the text of his statement about the desire to establish cultural ties; Abramov said that they want, for example, to publish a ballot on Russian about their achievements in the economy and culture, I noted that this should be published on a reciprocal basis. He asked, "Will you publish a bulletin in Hebrew in Moscow?" I replied that we would discuss this topic: the main thing is reciprocity in matters of publication and distribution. Telegraph your comments.

Charette

**LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE PROTOCOL
DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY, D.A.
SHCHUKOV, TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE
USSR. December 12, 1953**

To the secretariat of the Chairman of the Presidency of
the Supreme Council of the USSR

t.A.Scherbakov

I am sending the text of The Response of Comrade K.E.
Voroshilov approved by Comrade V.M. Molotov at the
ceremony of the credentials of the Israeli envoy Eliashiv on
December 14, 1953.

Head of the Protocol Department of the USSR Foreign
Ministry

D.Shukov

application

Speech of the President of the Presidency

Supreme Council of the USSR K.E.Voroshilov at the
presentation of credentials by the envoy of the State of Israel

Mr. Messenger,

Accepting your credentials, I welcome you as the
Extraordinary and Comprehensive Ambassador of the State of
Israel, accredited under the Presidency of the Supreme
Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I fully share your view that the resumption of diplomatic
relations between the Soviet Union and Israel

has a positive political significance and is welcomed in
both our countries. For my part, I am confident that Soviet-
Israeli relations will develop in the interests of our States in
accordance with the agreement reached in restoring
relations between them.

The Soviet Union has consistently pursued a policy of
peace, a policy of strengthening cooperation between all
peoples, large and small. All the peoples of the multi-ethnic
Soviet Union, united in a single close-knit family, are

engaged in peaceful creative work and care about the further economic and cultural rise of their homeland. Therefore, the efforts of other peoples and States to preserve and consolidate peace will find full understanding and support from the peoples of the Soviet Union.

You can be sure that your efforts to strengthen and develop friendly relations between the State of Israel and the Soviet Union will be supported by the Soviet Government.

Thank you, Mr. Messenger, for your well wishes to the Soviet people and their Government and I take this opportunity to wish the people of the State of Israel and their Government well-being and prosperity.

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR S.
ELIASHIVA TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY.**

December 14, 1953

A. Today at noon he handed credentials to Voroshilov. There were: Zorin, Gorkin, Shchukov, deputy head of the Middle East Department Gerasimov and one of his assistants Chernyshev, on our part - Gideon and Levanon.

I gave a speech in Hebrew, and Chernyshev read out the translation. The main thoughts of my speech: we are satisfied with the resumption of relations, are very interested in maintaining friendly relations, appreciate their support in the creation of the state, immediate and full recognition of it. Our young country faces a two-pronged task: to bring back to life a generation imbued with the spirit of wandering in the desert, to absorb the Jewish people scattered around the world, to create a revived free nation. Without peace, there is no creation and no opportunity for creation. We remember the horror of the last war and therefore stand against war with all our might and welcome the desire of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving States for lasting peace. Our country is watching the creative activities of the Soviet Union with great attention. Each nation goes its own way, but there are main features, common to both their enormous and our humble cause. We look forward to their understanding of our actions; we wish the president long years and happiness, success to the government of the Soviet Union in its activities for the benefit of all people and citizens.

The President responded by congratulating me on the appointment that they are happy to resume relations and hope that the relationship will develop in accordance with the agreements. They will support the efforts of large and small peoples for peace. Their multi-ethnic country welcomes the aspirations of different peoples for development. He promised support to my efforts to maintain

friendly relations with them, conveyed greetings to the Jewish people, the State of Israel and its citizens, wished me good luck in my work.

We were secluded for a conversation with him and with him, the conversation lasted a quarter of an hour, proceeded in a kind-hearted and warm atmosphere. After the ceremony, a reception was held in his apartment with the participation of the head of protocol.

B. We mailed my speech. When you get it, publish it in full. We asked the protocol department to give us the contents of the president's speech for publication.

Eliashiv.

**TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO ISRAEL
A.N.ABRAMOV TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE
USSR. December 19, 1953**

In the League of Friendship of Israel with the USSR created an abnormal situation. In February 1953, the right-wing leaders of the Mapam (left-wing Zionist Workers' Party) organized a split of the League, leading to the formation of two leagues: one led by representatives of the democratic circles and the other by the right-wing leaders of the Mapam party.

From the conversations we had with representatives of both leagues, we had the opinion that the split is political. While progressive circles advocate friendship with the Soviet Union without any conditions, Mapamovian leaders condition friendship with the Soviet Union support the Soviet Union with Zionist ideas.

In addition, The Mapam leaders want to turn the league into a tool of their party and to use the growth of sympathy for the Soviet Union for their partisan purposes. The leadership of this league is also an opponent of the unification of both leagues.

In the current situation and taking into account the presence of a significant mass of members in the Mapam League (according to one of the leaders of Cizling, about 90,000), we consider it appropriate to refrain from demonstrative support of the events conducted by both leagues. In particular, I refused to participate in the Meeting of the Mapam League, held on December 11 in honor of the arrival of the Soviet mission in Israel. On December 25, the league, led by progressive circles, is scheduled to send two mission staff to the same concert. At the same time, in conversations with representatives of both leagues, I will find out the situation in the organization, the mood of the rank-and-file members of the league and in a cautious form I will express the wish for the unification of both leagues.

We will offer further our position in relation to both leagues.

Abramov

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR A.A.
GROMYKO WITH THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR S.
ELIASHIV. December 21, 1953**

Secret.

It's 3:00 p.m. received Eliashiva, who paid me a protocol visit.

After the mutual greetings, Eliashiv touched on the Palestinian issue being discussed in the Security Council. In particular, Eliashiv stated that the Israeli Government was not satisfied with the Security Council's decision on the border incident in Kibia, as the decision greatly increased General Bennike's authority as chief of staff of the UN Armistice Monitoring Authority in Palestine. As for the discussion in the Security Council of the resolution of the United States, England and France on Syria's complaint against Israel, Eliashiv stated that the Israeli Government did not see any obstacle in the draft to continue its irrigation work on the Jordan River.

To Eliashiva's statement that the Israeli government is interested in the position of the Soviet Union in this matter, I said that the position of the USSR is visible from the statements and proposals of the Soviet delegation in the Security Council. Israel and the Arab States would have to agree mutually to resolve their differences. It is bad when third countries intervene in Arab-Israeli relations, and sometimes not to help the cause of a just settlement of the issue.

Elyasiv tried to explain the sharpness of Arab-Israeli relations only by the reluctance of the Arabs to go to peace talks.

Eliashiv further touched on the issue of Jewish immigration to Israel and expressed the wish that the Soviet government should meet the requests of Jews - citizens of the USSR to allow them to go to Israel.

From the very beginning, I took this question away and stated that it was not clear to me why the envoy was discussing the issue of Soviet citizens. I further indicated that I saw no reason to discuss the matter with good business.

Eliashiv noted that perhaps we should be approached on this issue in the usual consular order.

In connection with this comment, I said that, as far as I understand the situation, the issue he raised is not just a consular issue.

The rest of the conversation was of a protocol nature. The conversation lasted 15 minutes. The first secretary of the OBSV T. Tatiana-chenko A.I. was present.

Deputy Foreign Minister of the Ussr Union

A. Gromyko

**TELEGRAM OF THE ISRAELI ENVOY TO THE USSR S.
ELIASHIVA TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY.**

December 21, 1953

A. He had a conversation with Gromyko in accordance with the telegram of Minister No. 5069. He knew our case in the Security Council, and he said that the USSR had already made a statement on the issue. He listened and said that it was bad when the other party also appealed for justice, and the third force did not help or even hinder, and that it would be good if we came to an agreement with the Arabs.

I replied that it is even worse when the other side is not ready to talk to us and seeks to block every step towards progress. When asked for support, I received the standard answer that they had a delegation there, led by Vyshinsky, who knew how to proceed.

On the question of repatriation, I received a negative response with a firmness that we had never heard of. It is clear that he was ready for an answer, immediately closed and said that it was about their citizens and he was surprised that I touched on this topic. He knew that I did not mean private consular matters, and repatriation was much broader. He categorically reiterated that there was no real basis for discussing the issue. My impression is that they were waiting for me to put this question, and decided to immediately make it clear that there is nothing to talk about. As you can see, their policy, along with ending the negative attitude towards Jews and turning (at least for the public) towards friendship with us to appease their Jews, is at the same time unequivocally against repatriation.

B. Sorin asked what was happening in Israel and the prospects for settling relations with the Arabs. I mentioned two issues discussed at the UN, noted the negative impact of the resolution on Kibia⁷⁰, and explained the domestic political situation. At the end, he raised the question raised

in your No. 2871, and he replied that he would report it to Molotov. Details in the letter.

Eliashiv

**REPORT BY ISRAEL'S ENVOY TO THE USSR S.ELIASHIV
TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY. December 30,
1953**

Secret.

A. Jews

We have a common idea about the state of the Jews here and their moods. There were several conversations with Argaman, with people we had known before; he met a Jew who had previously been unknown; There was a long conversation with the journalist Ralph Parker, who is interested in this issue; Mrs. Eliashiv had a conversation with a woman she had previously known; there is a report from Levanon on his trip. There was a conversation with the rabbi.

When you combine all the material, you will make the following conclusion: in early 1953 there was a heavy feeling and oppressed state, the Jews tried to stick together without raising their heads. There was an unfriendly atmosphere around them. This is felt or rather felt in the circle of educated people, in places where many Jews work, and not among ordinary people, as would be more likely. In Moscow, Jews have to listen to threats that all of them will be driven out of the capital. One man said that the children in the kindergarten gave the teacher the nickname "Jewish doctor", which is close to the nicknames "traitor", "Fritz" during the war. According to Parker, there are other revelations of this kind. Seeing that the Jews felt bad, many non-Jews tried to show them their friendliness. It's similar to what it was during the war. This year the synagogue in Tbilisi was closed. At its opening, the chandeliers and other utensils that were there were returned again. The end of relations with Israel was also a bitter news for the Jews, which exacerbated their experiences. When the doctors were released, relief ensued. Everything has gone like a nightmare, and now there are no Jews who would feel bad attitude to themselves. We have already reported that

Professor Lina Stern has been released. This may have been done as part of a general amnesty. Ralph Parker believes he has seen it with his own eyes, but there is no further information on this. The resumption of relations with Israel is viewed with great joy, as is the prospect of what will follow. Every report in the newspapers about the arrival of the head of the mission and his visit to Molotov meets with approval. The publication of the awarding of credentials attracted everyone's attention. It welcomes the significance of this event. Some, comparing this message to the same previous reports of the reception of other ambassadors, counted the number of words and lines. One Jewish woman, a longtime acquaintance of Mrs. Eliashiv, literally fell in tears on her chest as they were alone in the room, kissed and said, "How glad we are to have you back!"

However, there has been no substantive change. That woman uttered those words when no one else could hear it. The newspaper, which is published by the new university, counts representatives of different nationalities among students, give their group photos, but among them you will not find a Jew, in the list of nationalities they are not.

B. In the synagogue

One Saturday, after the credentials were presented, I, accompanied by Gideon, went to the synagogue. We have previously informed about our visit. It seems that the synagogue has become beautiful and clean. There is no previous neglect that has acted so depressingly. Repairs were made here. There were quite a few praying. More than I expected to see on a normal Saturday, all the elderly. Many said hello, some shook our hands as we walked to the elevation. As a custom, out of respect we were invited to read the Torah: Gideon is the sixth part, and I am haftar. I had a little chat with the rabbi. He was more outspoken than ever before and was not as tense as he was at the last meeting before our departure. Blessing us on the occasion of our arrival, he said in Hebrew, "We expect deliverance" and asked if there was any hope for aliyah. When I asked how

things were here, he replied to Yiddish: "We have gone through very dark times," although now everything is behind us. He asked, referring to the explosion in the Soviet mission in Tel Aviv: "What turned out? Was it a provocation?" To my question, whether it would be convenient if I visit him again and we talk, answered positively and offered to call in advance.

After reading the Torah, the rabbi recited a prayer for peace, which he himself composed. He recites this prayer every Saturday. Its text in Yiddish and Russian can be read on the board hanging on the wall. Hazan sang, "Blessed is the one who is" to the glory of Voroshilov and Malenkov. In the past, "Blessed is the one who" read only in the glory of Stalin.

When we went out, we asked a Jew about his relative living in Jerusalem. When he heard the question, he hurried to move away from me.

B. Israel

You can't find things in the papers that offend Jews anymore. Nor have we met any reports from Israel or statements about Israel in the form it was before. I do not vouch for the future, but I note the fact that this has not happened before. As for the change of the head of the government, there were two short news without comment. No word has been printed on the Security Council's consideration of the Kibia incident. On the topic of work on the Jordan River there was one telegram about the proposal of the three powers, but not in all newspapers. Vyshinsky's role in this regard is not reported at all. We have already informed you that his second appearance in the Security Council has been reported in the newspapers.

Best wishes

S. Eliashiv