STALIN ON CHINA

[NOVEMBER 1926
AUGUST 1927]

526

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STALIN ON CHINA

[A COLLECTION OF FIVE WRITINGS OF COMRADE STALIN ON THE CHINESE QUESTION]

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People's Publishing House, Ltd.,
Bombay

February 1951

Price: Rupee 1-8

Printed by Jayant Bhatt at the New Age Printing Press, 190-B, Khetwadi Main Road, Bombay 4, and published by him for People's Publishing House, Ltd., 190-B, Khetwadi Main Road, Bombay 4.

ON the basis of concrete analysis of the concrete conditions in China, Stalin, this great scientist of dialectical materialism, the teacher of world revolution, formulates at the time of the first Great Revolution of China, a series of questions concerning the Chinese revolution, to which he offered extremely brilliant solutions. By this means he demolished the nonsense on the question of China advanced by the counter-revolutionary Trotskyites and assisted the Communist Party of China to embark on the path of Bolshevism. Stalin's many writings on China during this period are models in the integration of revolutionary theory with revolutionary practice; they constitute an important portion of the treasury of Marxist-Leninist theory concerning the fate of mankind. They were not only correct at that time, but have been proved completely correct by the practice of the Chinese revolution during the last twenty odd years....

From a speech by Chen Po-ta on the occasion of the Seventieth birthday of Stalin.

From **China Digest,** No. 7, 1949.

PUBLISHERS' NOTE

This volume contains five writings of comrade Stalin on the Chinese question written in the period between November 1926—August 1927. Four of these writings have been translated here by the translator of the Peo-Ple's Publishing House, Bombay. The fifth article "China" is reproduced from "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question" published by Lawrence & Wishart, London—Ed.

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ON THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE REVOLUTION IN CHINA

[*Speech delivered in the Chinese Commission of the E.C.C.I. on November* 30, 1926.]

COMRADES,

Before I go over to the question, I consider it necessary to say that I have not had at my disposal exhaustive material on the Chinese question such as would be necessary to unfold a complete picture of the revolution in China. I am, therefore, compelled to confine myself to some general remarks of a fundamental nature which have a direct bearing on the question of the basic direction of the Chinese revolution. The theses of Comrade Petrov, the theses of Comrade Mif, two reports of Comrade Tang Ping-shan and the remarks of Comrade Rafes' on the Chinese question are in my possession. In spite of their merits, all these documents have, in my opinion, the great defect that they evade a number of fundamental questions of the revolution in China. I think that our attention should be above all directed to these defects, and for this reason my observations will at the same time be of a critical nature.

I

THE CHARACTER OF THE REVOLUTION IN CHINA

Lenin said that the Chinese would soon have their 1905. Some comrades understood this to mean that exactly what took place in Russia in 1905 would necessarily repeat itself in every detail in China. This

is wrong, comrades. Lenin certainly did not say that the Chinese revolution would be a replica of the Russian revolution of 1905. Lenin merely said that the Chinese would have *their* 1905. This means that, apart from the features common with the revolution of 1905, the Chinese revolution will also have its own specific peculiarities, which would place their special imprint on the revolution in China.

What are these peculiarities?

The first peculiarity is that the Chinese revolution being a bourgeois-democratic revolution is at the same time a revolution for national liberation with its edge directed against the rule of foreign imperialism in China. It is this which distinguishes it above all from the revolution in Russia in 1905. The point is that the rule of imperialism in China is manifested not only in its military power but above all in that the foreign imperialists have the power of disposal over the main threads of industry in China, the railways, the factories, the plants, the mines, the banks, etc. From this it follows that the problems of struggle against foreign imperialism and its Chinese agents cannot but play a serious role in the Chinese revolution. Thereby the Chinese revolution is directly linked with the revolutions of the proletarians of all countries against imperialism.

The Second peculiarity of the Chinese revolution consists in that the national big bourgeoisie in China is extremely weak, incomparably weaker than the Russian bourgeoisie of the 1905 period. This is easy to understand. If the main threads of industry are concentrated in the hands of foreign imperialists, the national big bourgeoisie of China cannot but be weak and backward. In this respect Comrade Mif's observation about the weakness of the national bourgeoisie in China as one of the characteristic facts of the Chinese revolution is completely correct. And from this it follows that the role of initiator and guide of the Chinese revolution, the role of leader of the Chinese peasantry, must inevitably pass into the hands of the Chinese proletariat and its party.

Neither should the third peculiarity of the Chinese revolution be overlooked; it is that, side by side with China, there exists and develops the Soviet Union whose revolutionary experience and help cannot but facilitate the fight of the Chinese proletariat against imperialism and against the feudal-mediaeval remnants in China.

These are the fundamental peculiarities of the Chinese revolution which determine its character and its direction.

II

IMPERIALISM AND IMPERIALIST INTERVENTION IN CHINA

The first defect of the theses before us is that they bypass or underestimate the question of imperialist intervention in China. If one were to read into the theses attentively, then one might think that really speaking what is happening in China at the present moment is not imperialist intervention but only a fight of the North against the South or of one group of generals against another group of generals. Besides, by intervention we are inclined to understand invasion of foreign troops in Chinese territory and we think if this does not take place then there is no intervention.

This is a very big mistake, comrades. Intervention is not at all confined to invasion by troops and invasion is not the main feature of intervention. In the present condition of the revolutionary movement in the capitalist countries, when a direct invasion by foreign troops may evoke a number of protests and conflicts, intervention assumes a more subtle character and a more diguised form. In the present situation imperialism prefers to intervene by organising civil war inside a dependent country, by financing counter-revolutionary forces against the revolution, by giving moral and financial support to its Chinese agents against the

revolution. The imperialists were wont to represent the fight of Denikin and Kolchak, Yudenich and Wrangel against the revolution in Russia as an exclusively domestic matter. But we all knew, and not we alone, but the whole world knew, that these counter-revolutionary Russian generals were backed by the imperialists of Britain and America, France and Japan, without whose support such a serious civil war in Russia would have been absolutely impossible.

The same must also be said of China. The fight of Wu Pei-fu, Sun Chuang-fang, Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsun-chan against the revolution in China would have been quite impossible if the imperialists of all countries had not encouraged these counter-revolutionary generals and supplied them with money, arms, instructors, "advisers" and so on.

What does the strength of the Canton troops lie in? It lies in the fact that they possess an idea, a passion, which inspires them in the fight for liberation from imperialism, and in that they are bringing liberation to China. What does the strength of the counter-revolutionary generals lie in? It lies in that they are backed by the imperialists of all countries, by the owners of all kinds of railways, concessions, factories, workshops, banks and commercial houses in China.

Therefore the question is not merely one or not so much one of invasion by foreign troops, but the support which the imperialists of all countries are rendering to counter-revolution in China. Intervention through cats' paws — here lies now the root of imperialist intervention.

Therefore imperialist intervention in China is the undoubted fact against which the edge of the Chinese revolution is directed.

Therefore any one who evades or underestimates the fact of imperialist intervention in China, also evades or underestimates that which is most important and most fundamental in China.

It is said that the Japanese imperialists are displaying certain signs of "goodwill" to the Cantonese and to the Chinese revolution in general. They say

that the American imperialists are not lagging behind the Japanese in this respect. This is self-deception, comrades. One must be able to discern the real nature of the policy of the imperialists including the Japanese and American imperialists from its disguises. Lenin used to say that it is difficult to intimidate revolutionaries with a club or with fists but that at times it is very easy to take them in by kind words. Comrades, we must never forget this truth told by Lenin. In any case, it is clear that the Japanese and American imperialists assimilated quite well the significance of this truth. Therefore we must differentiate strictly between the cajolery and flattery addressed to the Cantonese and the fact that the imperialists, who are most generous with their flattery cling most resolutely to 'their' concessions and railways in China, which they do not wish to renounce at any price.

III

THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY IN CHINA

My second observation in connection with the theses before us concerns the question of the revolutionary army in China. The point is that the question of the army is either bypassed or underestimated in the theses. (*A voice from among the audience: "Correct."*) This is their second shortcoming. The advance of the Cantonese towards the North is generally regarded not as the unfolding of the Chinese revolution but as a fight of the Canton generals against Wu Pei-fu and Sun Chuan-fang, as a fight for supremacy of one group of generals over another group of generals. This is a very serious mistake, comrades. The revolutionary armies in China are the most important factor in the fight of the Chinese workers and peasants for their liberation. Is it then a mere coincidence that until May or June of this year the situation in China was regarded as showing the rule of reaction which had set in after the defeat of

Feng Yu-hsiang's armies, but that later in the summer of this year it was only necessary for the victorious Canton troops to advance northwards and occupy Hupei in order to change the picture fundamentally in favour of the revolution? No, it is not a mere coincidence; for the advance of the Canton troops is a blow aimed at imperialism, a blow aimed at its agents in China, it means the freedom of assembly, freedom to strike, freedom of the Press, freedom of organisation for all revolutionary elements in China in general and for the workers in particular. In this lies the peculiarity and the most important significance of the revolutionary army in China.

In former times, in the 18th and 19th centuries, revolutions began in such a way that usually the people rose, for the greater part unarmed or bady armed, and encountered the army of the old regime. They made every effort to disintegrate this army or at least partially to win it over to their side. This was the typical form of the revolutionary outbreaks of the past. Exactly the same thing took place in Russia in 1905. In China, things developed in a different way. In China we see not the unarmed people against the troops of the old government, but the armed people in the form of their revolutionary army. In China, armed revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution. This is one of the peculiarities and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution. In this, too, lies the special significance of the revolutionary army in China.

That is why an underestimation of the revolutionary army is an impermissible shortcoming of the theses before us.

And from this it follows that the Chinese Communists must pay special attention to work in the army.

Firstly, the Chinese Communists must intensify political work in every way in the army and succeed in making the army an effective and exemplary bearer of the idea of the Chinese revolution. This is particularly necessary because the Canton troops are now being joined by all kinds of generals who have nothing in common with the Kuomintang, and who join it as

a force which is destroying the enemies of the Chinese people, and who, by joining the Canton troops, introduce disintegration into the army. It is only possible to neutralise such "allies" or to turn them into genuine adherents of the Kuomintang by intensifying the political work and by organising revolutionary control over them. Unless this is done, the army may fall into a most difficult position.

Secondly, the Chinese revolutionaries, and among them also the Communists, must take to a close study of military affairs. They must not regard military affairs as of secondary importance because in China military affairs are at present the most important factor of the Chinese revolution. The Chinese revolutionaries, which means also the Communists, must make a close study of military affairs in order to gradually advance and occupy some leading post or other in the revolutionary army. This is the guarantee that the revolutionary army of China will proceed on the correct path, directly towards its aim. Without this, vacillation and wavering inside the army may become inevitable.

IV

THE CHARACTER OF THE FUTURE POWER IN CHINA

My third observation concerns the fact that in the theses the question of the character of the future revolutionary power in China is taken into account inadequately or not taken into account at all. Comrade Mif closely approaches this question in his theses and in this lies his merit. But having approached it closely he feared something and decided not to pursue the thing to the end. Comrade Mif believes that the future revolutionary power in China will be a power of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie under the leadership of the proletariat. What does this mean? At the time of the February revolution in 1917, the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries were also petty-bourgeois

parties and to a certain extent revolutionary. Does this mean that the future revolutionary power in China will be a Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik power? No, it does not mean this. Why? Because the Socialist-Revolutionary Menshevik power was a power which was essentially imperialist, whilst the future revolutionary power in China cannot but be an anti-imperialist power. This is the fundamental difference. The MacDonald Government was even a "Labour" power but it was at the same time imperialist, since it was based on the maintenance of British imperialist power, for instance in India and Egypt. The future revolutionary power in China will have this advantage over the MacDonald Government that it will be an anti-imperialist power. The question is not of the bourgeois democratic character of the Canton Government which forms the nucleus of the future all-China revolutionary power; the question above all is that this power is and cannot but be an anti-imperialist power, that every advance of this power signifies a blow aimed at world imperialism and therefore a blow in favour of the world revolutionary movement. Lenin was right when he said that, while earlier, before the beginning of the era of world revolution, the national-liberation movement was a part of the general democratic movement, now, after the victory of the Soviet revolution in Russia and the beginning of the era of world revolution, the national-liberation movement is a part of the world proletarian revolution.

This peculiarity was not taken into consideration by Comrade Mif.

I think that the future revolutionary power in China will in general be similar in character to the power we spoke of in 1905, *i.e.*, something in the nature of a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, with the difference, however, that it will be predominantly an anti-imperialist power. It will be a power marking a transition to China's non-capitalist, or, more exactly, Socialist development.

This is the direction in which the revolution in China must proceed. This path of development of the revolution is facilitated by three circumstances: firstly, in that the revolution in China, as a national-liberation revolution will have its edge directed against imperialism and its agents in China; secondly, in that the national big bourgeoisie in China is weak, weaker than the national bourgeoisie was in Russia in 1905, which facilitates the task of the hegemony of the proletariat, the task of the leadership of the proletarian party in relation to the Chinese peasantry; thirdly, in that the revolution in China will develop under circumstances which make it possible to make use of the experience and the help of the victorious revolution in the Soviet Union.

Whether this path is victorious, absolutely and certainly, depends on many circumstances. In any case one thing is clear, that the main task of the Chinese Communists is the struggle for precisely this path of the development of the Chinese revolution.

Hence follows the task of the Chinese Communists on the question of their relation to the Kuomintang and to the future revolutionary power in China. It is said that the Chinese Communists ought to leave the Kuomintang. This is incorrect, comrades. It would be the greatest mistake for the Chinese Communists to leave the Kuomintang at the present time. The whole course of the Chinese revolution, its character, its perspectives, indicate without doubt that the Chinese Communists must remain in the Kuomintang and intensify their work in it.

But can the Chinese Communist Party take part in the future revolutionary power? It not only can but it must participate in it. The course of the revolution in China, its character, its perspectives, speak eloquently for the fact that the Chinese Communist Party must participate in the future revolutionary power of China. This is one of the necessary guarantees that the hegemony of the Chinese proletariat would be implemented in practice.

V

THE PEASANT QUESTION IN CHINA

My fourth observation concerns the question of the peasantry in China. Comrade Mif believes that a slogan for the formation of soviets, must be immediately given, *viz.*, peasant soviets in the Chinese countryside. I believe that this is a mistake. Comrade Mif is running ahead. It is not possible to organise soviets in the countryside bypassing the industrial centres of China. Moreover, the question of organising soviets in the Chinese industrial centres is not on the agenda at the moment. Furthermore, we must bear in mind that soviets must not be regarded independent of their relation with the situation surrounding them. It would only be possible to organise soviets, in the present case peasant soviets, if China were passing through a period of the maximum upsurge of the peasant movement, which would be smashing the old and creating a new power, and in the hope that the industrial centres of China had already broken down the barrier and entered on the phase of forming a soviet power. Can it be said that the Chinese peasantry and the Chinese revolution in general has already entered this phase? No, it is impossible to say this. Therefore to speak of soviets at the present time, means to run too far ahead. Therefore, at the present moment, we must not raise the question of soviets, but of the formation of peasant committees; I have in mind peasant committees, elected by the peasants which are capable of formulating the fundamental demands of the peasantry and of taking all the necessary measures for realising these demands in a revolutionary manner. These peasant committees should serve as the axis round which the revolution in the countryside will unfold.

I know there are certain people among the members of the Kuomintang, and even among the Chinese Communists, who do not consider it possible to unleash the revolution in the countryside, because they fear that if the peasantry is drawn into the revolution the

united anti-imperialist front will be undermined. This is a profound mistake, comrades. The anti-imperialist front in China will be the stronger and more powerful the sooner and more solidly the Chinese peasantry is drawn into the revolution. The authors of the theses, especially Comrades Tan Ping-shan and Rafes, are perfectly right in affirming that the immediate satisfaction of a number of the most urgent demands of the peasantry is the most essential condition for the victory of the Chinese revolution. I think the time has come to do away with this inertia and 'neutrality' towards the peasantry which is noticeable in the activities of certain elements of the Kuomintang. I think that both the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang, including the Canton Government, must without delay pass from words to deeds and now raise the question of satisfying the most vital demands of the peasantry. What should be the perspectives in this respect and to what limits one can and must go—that depends on the course of the revolution. I think that things must finally lead to the nationalisation of land. In any case we cannot renounce such a slogan as the slogan of the nationalisation of land.

What are the paths and ways through which the Chinese revolutionaries should pass in order to rouse the multi-million peasantry of China to revolution?

I think that in the present conditions we can speak of only three paths.

The first path is the path of formation of peasant committees and the penetration of Chinese revolutionaries in them in order to influence the peasantry. (*Voice: "And what about the peasant Unions?"*) I think that the peasant unions will group themselves around the peasant committees or the peasant unions will be transformed into peasant committees possessing some kind of authority necessary for implementation of the demands of the peasants. I have already spoken of this path above, but this path is inadequate. It would be ridiculous to think that in China there are enough revolutionaries for this work. The population of China is nearly 400

million. Of these 350 million are Chinese and more than nine-tenths of them are peasants. To assume that a few tens of thousands of Chinese revolutionaries can fully permeate this ocean of peasantry is a mistake. Therefore we must have still other paths.

The second path is the path of influencing the peasantry through the apparatus of a new people's revolutionary power. It cannot be doubted that in the newly liberated provinces a new power will be formed on the pattern of the Canton power. There is no doubt that this power and the apparatus of this power must engage in satisfying the most urgent demands of the peasantry if it really wishes to advance the revolution. The task of the Communists and of the revolutionaries in general in China consists in penetrating into the apparatus of this new power, bringing this apparatus nearer to the masses of peasants and helping the peasant masses to satisfy their most urgent demands through this apparatus, either by confiscating the landowners' land, or by reducing taxes and rents—depending on the circumstances.

The third path is the path of influencing the peasantry through the revolutionary army. I have already spoken of the greatest importance of the revolutionary army in the Chinese revolution. The revolutionary army of China is the force which is the first to penetrate into the new provinces, which is the first to go right into the thick of the peasantry, and above all through whom the peasantry judges the new power, its good or bad qualities. The attitude of the peasantry towards the new power, towards the Kuomintang, and towards the revolution in China in general depends above all on the behaviour of the revolutionary army, on its attitude towards the peasantry and towards the landowners, on its readiness to help the peasants. If we bear in mind that there are quite a few doubtful elements which have joined the revolutionary army in China, that these elements can alter the physiognomy of the army for the worse, then one can understand the great importance of the political physiognomy of the army and, so to speak, of its peasant policy in the

eyes of the peasants. For this reason the Communists and the Chinese revolutionaries in general must take all possible measures to neutralise the anti-peasant elements in the army, retain the revolutionary spirit in the army and direct things in such a way that the army helps the peasants and rouses them for the revolution.

It is said that the revolutionary army in China is welcomed with open arms, but that later, after it has established itself, there is a certain disillusionment. The same thing happened with us in the Soviet Union during the civil war. This is explained by the fact that the army, when it has liberated new provinces and established itself in them, is compelled to feed itself in some way or other at the expense of the population of the district. We, Soviet revolutionaries, usually succeeded in making up for these disadvantages by endeavouring to help the peasants through the army against the landlord elements. It is essential that the Chinese revolutionaries should also learn to make up for these disadvantages by carrying out a correct peasant policy through the army.

VI.

THE PROLETARIAT AND THE HEGEMONY OF THE PROLETARIAT IN CHINA

My fifth observation concerns the question of the Chinese proletariat. I think that in the theses sufficient emphasis has not been laid on the role and the importance of the Chinese working class. Comrade Rafes asks: " Towards whom should the Chinese Communists orientate—towards the Left or the Centre of the Kuomintang?" A strange question! I believe that the Chinese Communists should orientate themselves above all towards the proletariat and orientate the active workers of the liberation movement in China towards the revolution. Only then will the question be posed in the right way. I know that there are among

the Chinese Communists certain Comrades who regard strikes of the workers for the improvement of their material and legal position as undesirable and who dissuade the workers from resorting to strikes. (*Voice: "That happened in Canton and Shanghai."*) That is a big mistake, comrades. That is seriously underestimating the role and specific gravity of the proletariat in China. This must be pointed out in the theses as an unquestionably negative phenomenon. It would be a great mistake were the Chinese not to take advantage of the present favourable situation in order to assist the workers in improving their material and legal position, even by strikes. For otherwise what is the revolution in China for? A proletariat whose sons are flogged and tortured by the agents of imperialism when they are on strike, cannot be a leading force. This mediaeval abuse must at all costs be ended to rouse a feeling of strength and a feeling of their worth among the Chinese proletarians and make them capable of leading the revolutionary movement. Without this the victory of the revolution in China is unthinkable. For this reason the economic and legal demands of the working class in China, which aim at a serious improvement of its conditions, must be given a due place in the theses. (*Comrade Mif: "The theses do speak of them."*) Yes, the theses do speak of them, but unfortunately these demands are not set forth with sufficient prominence.

VII

THE QUESTION OF THE YOUTH IN CHINA

My sixth observation concerns the question of the Youth in China. It is strange that this question is not considered in the theses, for the question of the youth in China is of extreme importance. This question is, it is true, referred to in Comrade Tan Ping-shan's reports, but unfortunately it is not sufficiently emphasised. The question of the youth is at present of primary importance in China. The student youth (revolutionary students), the working-class youth, the peasant youth — all of them form a force which might drive the revolution forward with giant strides, if it were brought under the ideological and political influence of the Kuomintang.* It must be borne in mind that no one experiences the oppression of imperialism as deeply and as acutely and no one feels so sharply and so painfully the necessity of fighting against this oppression, as the youth in China. This circumstance must be taken into consideration in every respect by the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese revolutionaries in order to bring about an intensification of work among the youth throughout the country. Youth must find a place for itself in the theses on the Chinese question.

VIII

SOME CONCLUSIONS

I should like to note some conclusions—one with regard to the line of the struggle against imperialism in China and the other with regard to the line on the peasant question.

There can be no doubt that the Chinese Communist Party cannot now confine itself to demanding the abolition of the unequal treaties. Even a counter-revolutionary like Chan Suen-lyan now stands by this demand. It is obvious that the Chinese Communist Party must go further.

It must set itself further the question of nationalisation of the railways as its perspective. This is necessary, and things must be directed towards that end.

*Note: Under those conditions such a policy was correct since then the Kuomintang represented a bloc of the Communists and the more or less left Kuomintang elements pursuing an anti-imperialist revolutionary policy. Later on this policy was changed, since it did not correspond any longer to the interests of the Chinese revolution, since the Kuomintang deserted the revolution and was further converted into a centre of struggle against the revolution and the Communists left the Kuomintang, and broke away from it.

It must further have in mind as its perspective the nationalisation of the most important factories and plants. This raises above all the question of the nationalisation of those undertakings whose owners have been distinguished by special hostility and special aggressiveness towards the Chinese people.

Further, the peasant question must be advanced by linking it with the perspective of revolution in China. I think this should lead finally to the confiscation of the landlords' land in favour of the peasants and to the nationalisation of land.

The rest is self-evident.

Comrades, these are all the observations that I wished to make.

[From the journal: *Communist International*—No. 13 (71), 10th December, 1926.]

PROBLEMS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

[Thesis for Propagandists approved by the C.C. of the CPSU(B)]

I

PERSPECTIVES OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

THE MAJOR FACTS which determine the character of the Chinese Revolution are:

a. China's semi-colonial status and the economic and financial domination of imperialism;
b. The deadweight of feudal survivals, aggravated by the oppression of militarism and the bureaucracy;
c. The growing revolutionary struggle of the working-class and peasant millions against feudal-bureaucratic oppression, militarism and imperialism;
d. The political weakness of the national bourgeoisie, its dependence on imperialism, its fear of the sweep of the revolutionary movement;
e. The growing revolutionary activity of the proletariat, its growing prestige among the toiling millions;
f. The existence of a proletarian dictatorship as a neighbour of China.

Hence the two paths of development of events in China.

Either the national bourgeoisie crushes the proletariat, enters into a compact with imperialism and with it launches campaign against the revolution, in order to end it with the establishment of the rule of capitalism;

Or the proletariat pushes aside the national bour-

geoisie, consolidates its hegemony and wins the following of the toiling millions of town and country in order to overcome the resistance of the national bourgeoisie, secure the complete victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and then gradually switch it to the path of Socialist revolution, with all the consequences that follow therefrom.

One of these two paths.

The crisis of world capitalism and the existence of the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. whose experience may be effectively utilised by the Chinese proletariat, substantially enhances the possibility of the Chinese Revolution being carried out by the second way.

On the other hand, the fact that imperialism is attacking the Chinese Revolution in the main unitedly, that amongst the imperialists there exist at present no splits or wars as there existed for example in the camp of imperialism before the October Revolution and which weakened imperialism — this fact means that the Chinese Revolution is meeting with much greater difficulties in the path of victory than the revolution in Russia and that the desertions and treacheries in the course of this Revolution will be incomparably more than in the period of the civil war in the U.S.S.R.

Therefore, the struggle between these two paths of revolution is the characteristic feature of the Chinese Revolution.

It is just because of this that the fundamental task of the Communists consists in the struggle for the victory of the second path of the Chinese Revolution.

II

FIRST STAGE OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

In the first period of the Chinese Revolution, in the period of the first expedition to the North, when the Nationalist Army approached the Yangtse river and

attained victory after victory and a mighty movement of workers and peasants had not yet been developed, the national bourgeoisie (non-compradore) marched with the revolution.[1] This was revolution of the *general united national* front.

This does not mean that there were no contradictions between the revolution and the national bourgeoisie. This only means that the national bourgeoisie, while supporting the revolution, attempted to utilise it for its own aims, limiting its scope by directing it in the main along the line of territorial conquests. The struggle between the Rights and the Lefts in the Kuomintang in this period was an expression of these contradictions. The attempt of Chiang Kai-shek to expel the Communists from the Kuomintang in March, 1926, was the first serious attempt of the national bourgeoisie to curb the revolution. It is well known that the C.C. of the CPSU (B) already then considered it "necessary to carry out a line of keeping the Communist Party within the Kuomintang," and that it considered it necessary "that matters must be so arranged as to secure the resignation or expulsion of Rights from the Kuomintang" (April, 1926).

This was a line of the further development of the revolution, of close cooperation of the Lefts and the Communists within the Kuomintang and within the national Government, of the consolidation of the unity of the Kuomintang and simultaneously an exposure and isolation of the Right-wing Kuomintang elements, of subjugating the Rights to the discipline of the Kuomintang, the utilisation of the Rights, their connections and their experience in so far as they are subject to the discipline of the Kuomintang or the expulsion of the Rights from the Kuomintang in so far as they break this discipline and betray the interests of the revolution.

The subsequent events fully confirmed the correctness of this line. The powerful development of the peasant movement and the organisation of peasant unions and peasant committees in the countryside, the powerful strike-wave in the towns and the formation

of Councils of Trade Unions, the victorious advance of the national troops on Shanghai, which was besieged by the navy and troops of the imperialists—all these and similar such facts testify to the fact that the line adopted was the only correct line.

Only this circumstance can explain the fact that the attempts of the Rights in February, 1927, to split the Kuomintang and create a new centre in Nanchang suffered defeat in face of the united rebuff of the revolutionary Kuomintang in Wuhan.

But this attempt was an indication of the fact that a regrouping of class forces was taking place in the country, that the Rights and the national bourgeoisie were not keeping quiet and that they would intensify their work against the revolution.

The C.C. of the CPSU(B) was, therefore, right when in March, 1927, it said that:

> "(a) At the present moment, with the regrouping of class forces and the concentration of imperialist armies, the Chinese Revolution is living through a critical period and that its further victories are possible only if a definite line towards development of the mass movement is adopted;
>
> (b) It is necessary to take to the course of arming the workers and peasants, and converting the peasant committees in the localities into actual organs of power with armed self-defence;
>
> (c) The Communist Party must not screen the treacherous and reactionary policy of the Right-wing Kuomintang elements and must mobilise the masses round the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party for an exposure of the Rights." (March 3, 1927.)

It can, therefore, be easily understood that in the future the powerful sweep of the revolution on the one hand, and the onslaught of the imperialists in Shanghai on the other, cannot but throw the Chinese national bourgeoisie into the camp of counter-revolution, while the seizure of Shanghai by the national

troops and the strikes of the Shanghai workers cannot but unite the imperialists for stifling the revolution.

This was just what happend. The Nanking shootings served in this respect as a signal for a new demarcation of fighting forces in China. By the shooting in Nanking and by presenting ultimatums, the imperialists wanted to say that they were seeking the support of the national bourgeoisie for a common struggle against the Chinese Revolution.

By opening fire at workers' meetings and organising a *coup*, Chiang Kai-shek as though said in reply to the appeal of the imperialists that he was prepared to enter into a compromise with imperialists along with the national bourgeoisie against the workers and peasants of China.

III

THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

The *coup* of Chiang Kai-shek marks the departure of the national bourgeoisie from the revolution, the birth of a centre of national counter-revolution and a deal by the Right-wing Kuomintang elements with imperialism against the Chinese Revolution.

Chiang Kai-shek's *coup* signifies that in South China there will be henceforth two camps, two governments, two armies, two centres — the centre of revolution in Wuhan and the centre of counter-revolution in Nanking.

Chiang Kai-shek's *coup* signifies that the revolution has entered the second stage of its development, that the *turn* has commenced from a revolution of a *general and united national* front to a revolution of the many millions of *workers and peasants*, to an *agrarian* revolution, which is intensifying and extending the struggle against imperialism, against the gentry and the feudal landlords, against the militarists

and the counter-revolutionary group of Chiang Kai-shek.

This means that the struggle between the two paths of revolution, between the adherents of its further development and the adherents of its liquidation, will become sharper from day to day, and cover the entire present period of revolution.

This means that the revolutionary Kuomintang in Wuhan, by waging a resolute struggle against militarism and imperialism, will be converted in practice into an organ of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry and the counter-revolutionary group of Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking, by breaking away from the workers and peasants and making a rapprochement with imperialism will share finally the fate of the militarists.

But from this it follows that the policy of preserving the unity of the Kuomintang, the policy of isolating the Right-wing elements within the Kuomintang and utilising them for the aims of the revolution has already ceased to correspond to the new tasks of the revolution. This policy must be substituted by a policy of a resolute expulsion of the Right-wing elements from the Kuomintang, a policy of a determined struggle against them down to their complete political elimination, a policy of concentrating the entire power in the country in the hands of the *revolutionary* Kuomintang, the Kuomintang without its Right-wing elements and the Kuomintang as a bloc of the Left-wing Kuomintang elements and the Communists.

From this it follows further that the policy of close co-operation of the Left-wing elements and the Communists within the Kuomintang assumes a special force and a special importance at the present stage, that this co-operation reflects the alliance of the workers and peasants formed outside the Kuomintang, and that without such a co-operation, the victory of the revolution is impossible. From this it follows further that the main source of the force of the revolutionary Kuomintang is the further unfolding of the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants and the consolidation of their mass organisations—the revolutionary peasant committees, trade unions of workers and other mass revolutionary organisations as preparatory elements of the Soviets in the future, that the main guarantee of the victory of the revolution is the growth of the revolutionary activity of the millions of toiling masses and the main antidote against counter-revolution—the arming of workers and peasants.

Finally, from this follows that while fighting shoulder to shoulder with the revolutionary Kuomintang elements, the Communist Party must more than ever before retain its independence, as a condition necessary for ensuring the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

IV

THE MISTAKES OF THE OPPOSITION

The fundamental mistake of the Opposition (Radek and Co.) consists in not understanding the character of the revolution in China, in not understanding which is the stage that the revolution is passing through at the present time, and in not understanding its present international set up.

The Opposition demands that the Chinese Revolution should develop at approximately the same speed as the October Revolution did. The Opposition is dissatisfied that the Shanghai workers did not take up a resolute fight against the imperialists and their myrmidons.

But it does not understand that the revolution in China cannot develop with a rapid speed because among other things, the international situation at present is less favourable than in 1917 (there is no war between the imperialists).

It does not understand that one must not wage a decisive battle under unfavourable conditions, when the reserves are still not drawn in, just as the Bolshe-

viks, for instance, did not take up decisive battles either in April or in July 1917.

The Opposition does not understand that not to avoid a decisive battle under unfavourable conditions (when it can be avoided) means facilitating the cause of the enemies of the revolution.

The Opposition demands the immediate formation of Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies in China. But what does the formation of Soviets *now* signify?

In the first place, Soviets cannot be formed at any moment; they are formed only in the period of a special upsurge of the revolutionary wave.

Secondly, Soviets are not formed for babble, they are primarily formed as organs of struggle against the existing power, as organs of struggle for power. It was so in 1905. It was so in 1917.

But what does the formation of Soviets *at the present moment* in the region of the activities, for example of the Wuhan Government, mean? It means giving the slogan of struggle against the existing power in this region. It means giving a slogan for the creation of new organs of power, giving a slogan of struggle against the power of the revolutionary Kuomintang, which the Communists who have formed a bloc with the Kuomintang Lefts have joined and since there is no other power now in this region apart from the power of the revolutionary Kuomintang.

This means further to confuse the task of forming and strengthening the mass organisations of workers and peasants in the form of strike committees, peasant unions and committees, trade union councils, factory and mill committees, etc. on which the revolutionary Kuomintang is now already relying, with the task of the creation of a Soviet system as a new type of State power substituting the power of the revolutionary Kuomintang.

This means, finally, not to understand which is the stage of the revolution that is taking place in China at the present moment. This means giving the enemies of the Chinese people a new weapon for struggle

against the revolution, for creating new legends that it is not a national revolution which is taking place in China but an artificial implantation of "Moscow Sovietisation".

Thus the Opposition by advancing the slogan of the formation of Soviets *at the present moment* is playing into the hands of the enemies of the Chinese Revolution.

The Opposition considers it inexpedient for the Communists to participate in the Kuomintang. The Opposition therefore considers it expedient for the Communist Party to leave the Kuomintang. But what does withdrawal by the Communist Party from the Kuomintang signify now when the whole pack of imperialists with all their hangers-on are demanding the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang? This means to abandon the field of battle and to throw our allies in the Kuomintang at the mercy of the enemies of the revolution. This means weakening the Communist Party, undermining the revolutionary Kuomintang, facilitating the task of the Shanghai Cavaignacs and giving away the banner of the Kuomintang, the most popular amongst all the banners in China, into the hands of the Right-wing Kuomintang elements.

This is just what the imperialists, the militarists and the Right-wing Kuomintang elements are demanding at the present time.

Thus it turns out that by speaking in favour of the withdrawal of the Communist Party from the Kuomintang *at the present moment* the Opposition is playing into the hands of the enemies of the Chinese Revolution.

The recent Plenum of the CC of our Party was, therefore, absolutely right in rejecting resolutely the platform of the Opposition.[2]

Pravda No. 90,
21st April, 1927.

[From J. V. Stalin's COLLECTED WORKS, Vol. 9, Dec. 1926-July 1927, State Publishing House of Political Literature, Moscow, 1948.]

TALK WITH STUDENTS OF THE SUN YAT-SEN UNIVERSITY

(13th May, 1927)

COMRADES,

Unfortunately I can spare only two or three hours today for the talk. Perhaps we shall arrange a longer talk next time. But today I think we could confine ourselves to the examination of such questions as have been formulated by you in writing. I have received altogether ten questions. I shall answer these in today's talk. If there are additional questions—and it is said there are—I shall try to reply to them in the next talk. And now let us get down to work.

FIRST QUESTION

Why is Radek's assertion that in the Chinese countryside the struggle of the peasantry is directed not so much against the remnants of feudalism as against the bourgeoisie incorrect?

Can it be affirmed whether it is commercial capitalism or the remnants of feudalism which are predominant in China?

Why it is that the Chinese militarists, while they are owners of big industrial enterprises are at the same time representatives of feudalism?

In fact, Radek does affirm something in the nature of what is mentioned in this question. As far as I remember Radek in his speech to the active members of the Moscow Party Organisation either denied altogether the existence of the remnants of feudalism or did not recognise the serious importance of the remnants of feudalism in the Chinese countryside.

This, of course, is Radek's great mistake.

Had there been no remnants of feudalism in China, had these remnants not possessed the most serious

importance for the Chinese countryside, then there would not have been any ground for the agrarian revolution now and there would be no point in speaking of the agrarian revolution as one of the main tasks of the Communist Party at the present stage of the Chinese revolution.

Does commercial capital exist in the Chinese countryside? Yes, it does exist and not merely exists but no less than any feudal lord sucks dry the life-blood of the peasant. But this commercial capital of the type of primary accumulation *combines* peculiarly in the Chinese countryside with feudal domination, with the domination of the landlord, borrowing from the latter the mediaeval methods of exploiting and oppressing the peasants. This is how the question stands, comrades.

Radek's mistake consists in that he did not understand this peculiarity, this *combination* of the domination of feudal remnants with the existence of mercantile capital in the Chinese countryside with the retention of the feudal mediaeval methods of exploiting and oppressing the peasantry.

Militarism, *jujunes,* all the governors and the entire present-day callous, predatory military and non-military bureaucracy constitute the superstructure over this peculiarity in China.

Imperialism supports and strengthens this entire feudal and bureaucratic machine.

The fact that certain militarists while possessing estates are at the same time the owners of industrial enterprises does not alter the matter basically. Many Russian landlords also possessed mills and other industrial enterprises in their time which, however, did not prevent them from remaining the representatives of the feudal survivals.

If in a number of provinces 70 per cent of peasant incomes belongs to the landlords and gentry, if the landlord in fact enjoys not only the economic, but also the administrative and judicial authority, if to this day the buying and selling of women and children continues in several provinces—then it must be admitted

that the dominant force in this mediaeval set-up is the force of feudal survivals, the force of the landlords, the force of the landed bureaucracy, both military and non-military, combining peculiarly with the force of commercial capital.

These peculiar conditions are also creating the soil for the agrarian movement of the peasantry which is growing and will grow still more in China.

Without these conditions, without the feudal remnants and the feudal oppression there would have been no question in China of the agrarian revolution and of the confiscation of the landlord's land etc. Without these conditions the agrarian revolution in China would be incomprehensible.

SECOND QUESTION

Where does Radek's error lie in asserting that since Marxists do not recognise parties of several classes, the Kuomintang is a petty-bourgeois party?

It is necessary to make a few observations on this question.

Firstly, here the question has been posed incorrectly. We have not at all said and do not say that the Kuomintang is a party of several classes. This is incorrect. We have said and we say that the Kuomintang is a party of a *bloc* of several oppressed classes. That is not the one and the same thing, comrades. If the Kuomintang were a party of several classes then it would have meant that not one of the classes that are united in the Kuomintang would have its own party outside the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang itself would have represented one common and *single* party for all these classes. But is this how matters stand in reality? Does not the Chinese proletariat, which is associated with the Kuomintang, possess at the same time its own party, the Communist Party, distinct from the Kuomintang and possessing its own specific programme and organisation? It is clear that the Kuomintang is not a party of several oppressed classes but a

party of a *bloc* of several oppressed classes which possess their own party organisations. Consequently, here the question has been posed incorrectly. As a matter of fact in present-day China we can only speak of the Kuomintang as a party of a *bloc* of oppressed classes.

Secondly, it is incorrect to say that Marxism does not admit in principle of a party of bloc of oppressed revolutionary classes, that it is impermissible for Marxists on principle to join such a party. This, comrades, is absolutely incorrect. In actual fact Marxism not only recognised (and continues to recognise) the permissibility in principle of Marxists joining such a party but it also effected such an entry in practice under certain historical conditions. I could refer to the example of Marx himself in 1848 at the time of the German Revolution when Marx and his adherents entered the famous bourgeois-democratic alliance in Germny[3] and co-operated with the representatives of the revolutionary bourgeoisie there. It is well known that apart from the Marxists the representatives of the revolutionary bourgeoisie also joined this bourgeois-democratic alliance, this bourgeois-revolutionary party. *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*[4] which was then edited by Marx was the organ of this bourgeois-democratic alliance. It was only in the spring of 1849, when the revolution in Germany began to subside, that Marx and his adherents left this bourgeois-democratic alliance and decided to set up a completely independent organisation of the working class with an independent class policy.

As you see, Marx went even further than the Chinese Communists of our time who are joining the Kuomintang precisely as an independent proletarian party with its specific organisation.

It is possible to dispute or not to dispute the *expediency* of the entry of Marx and his adherents in the bourgeois-democratic alliance of Germany in 1848 when it was a question of the revolutionary struggle against absolutism jointly with the revolutionary bourgeoisie. That is a question of *tactics*. But that Marx recognised

the permissibility *in principle* of such an entry—of this there can be no doubt whatsoever.

Thirdly, it would be absolutely wrong to say that the Kuomintang in Wuhan is a petty-bourgeois party and to leave it at that.

Only those who understand neither imperialism in China nor the character of the Chinese revolution can characterise the Kuomintang thus. The Kuomintang is not an 'ordinary' petty-bourgeois party. There are different kinds of petty-bourgeois parties. The Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia were also petty-bourgeois parties but they were at the same time *imperialist* parties, since they were in a fighting alliance with the French and the British imperialists and together with them *conquered* and *oppressed* other countries—Turkey, Persia, Messapotamia and Galacia.

Can it be said that the Kuomintang is an *imperialist* party? It is clear that it is impossible to say this. The Kuomintang is an *anti-imperialist* party just as the revolution in China is an anti-imperialist one. The difference here is fundamental. Not to see this difference and to confuse the *anti-imperialist* Kuomintang with the Socialist-Revolutionary and the Menshevik *imperialist* parties means to understand nothing of the national-revolutionary movement of China.

No doubt, had the Kuomintang been an *imperialist* petty-bourgeois party, the Chinese Communists would not have made a bloc with it and would have sent it to all the archangels.* But the fact of the matter is that the Kuomintang is an *anti-imperialist* party, waging a revolutionary struggle against the imperialists and their agents in China. In this sense, the Kuomintang stands head and shoulders above each and every one of the *imperialist* 'socialists' of the type of Kerensky and Tsereteli.

Even Chiang Kai-shek, the right-wing Kuomintang leader — Chiang Kai-shek who *before* the coup effected by him was weaving all kinds of machinations

* Translator's Note: It means "to the devil".

against the left-wing Kuomintang elements and the Communists—even Chiang Kai-shek then stood above the Kerenskys and the Tseretelis, since the Kerenskys and Tseretelis were waging a war *for* the enslavement of Turkey, Persia, Messapotamia, Galacia, *consolidating* imperialism thereby, while Chiang Kai-shek waged a war, whether good or bad, *against* the enslavement of China, thereby *weakening* imperialism.

Radek's mistake and that of the opposition in general consists in that he turns away from the semi-colonial position of China, does not see the anti-imperialist character of the Chinese revolution, and does not see that the Kuomintang in Wuhan, the Kuomintang without the right-wing Kuomintang elements, is the centre of struggle of the Chinese toiling masses *against* imperialism.

THIRD QUESTION

Is there no contradiction between the appraisal made by you of the Kuomintang (in a speech at a meeting of the students of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, on 18th May, 1925), as a bloc of two forces —the Communist Party and the petty bourgeoisie—and the appraisal, given in the Comintern resolution on Kuomintang, as a bloc of four classes including also the big bourgeoisie?

Is it possible for the Communist Party to enter the Kuomintang during the dictatorship of the proletariat in China?

Firstly, one must note that the definition of the actual position in the Kuomintang, given by the Comintern in December 1926 (7th Enlarged Plenum), is referred to incorrectly and not quite accurately in your 'question'. You say in the 'question' "including also the *big* bourgeoisie". But the compradores are also big bourgeoisie. Does this mean that in December 1926 the Comintern considered the compradore bourgeoisie as a member of the bloc in the Kuomintang? It is clear that this is not what is meant, since the compra-

dore bourgeoisie was and remains a sworn enemy of the Kuomintang. The Comintern resolution speaks not of the big bourgeoisie in general but of a "*section* of the capitalist bourgeoisie". Therefore, there cannot be in this case a question of the entire big bourgeoisie, but of the national bourgeoisie of a *non*-compradore type.

Secondly, I must state that I cannot see the contradiction between these two definitions of the Kuomintang. I cannot see it because here we are dealing with a definition of the Kuomintang from two different points of view, out of which not one can be called incorrect, since both of them are correct.

When I spoke in 1925 of the Kuomintang as a party of a bloc of workers and peasants, I did not at all have in mind a characterisation of the *actual* state of affairs in the Kuomintang—a characterisation as to which were the classes that had joined the Kuomintang *in actual fact* in 1925. When I spoke of the Kuomintang I then had in mind the Kuomintang only as a *type* of organisation of a special people's revolutionary party in the oppressed countries of the East, particularly in such countries as China and India, as a *type* of organisation of such a people's revolutionary party, as must rely upon a revolutionary bloc of the workers and the petty bourgeoisie of the town and the countryside. I had then said plainly that "in such countries the Communists *must pass* from the policy of a *united national front* to the policy of a *revolutionary bloc* of the workers and petty bourgeoisie."[5] *

Therefore I had in view not the existing but the *future* people's revolutionary parties in general, and the Kuomintang in particular. And here I also was absolutely right, since organisations of the type of the Kuomintang can have a future only if they try to rely upon a bloc of the workers and petty bourgeoisie, and, moreover, while speaking of the petty bourgeoisie, one must bear in mind mainly the *peasantry* which represents

* Cf. Stalin: "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East"—**Problems of Leninism**, p. 264.

the basic force of the petty bourgeoisie in the capitalistically backward countries.

The Comintern was interested in another aspect of the matter. In its Seventh Enlarged Plenum it regarded the Kuomintang not from the point of view of its future, not from the viewpoint of what it must become, but from the point of view of the *existing*, from the viewpoint of what was the *actual* situation inside the Kuomintang, *viz.*, which were the classes that had entered the Kuomintang *in actual fact* in 1926. And the Comintern was absolutely right when it said that at that moment, at the moment *when there was as yet no split in the Kuomintang*, the Kuomintang comprised *in practice* of a bloc of workers, the petty bourgeoisie (of the town and countryside) and the national bourgeoisie. Here I may add that not only in 1926 but also in 1925 the Kuomintang relied upon a bloc of precisely these classes. The Comintern resolution, in the working out of which I took a most active part, said clearly that "the proletariat is forming a bloc with the peasantry and actively coming forward to wage a fight for its interests, with the urban petty bourgeoisie, and with a section of the capitalist bourgeoisie", and that this combination of forces found its political expression in a corresponding group in the Kuomintang Party and in the Canton Government." (*Cf.* Resolution.[6])

But insofar as the Comintern did not confine itself to the *actual* state of affairs in 1926 and also touched upon the future of the Kuomintang, it could not but say that this bloc is only a temporary bloc, that in the near future this bloc must be replaced by a bloc of the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. It is just because of this that the Comintern resolution says further that "at the present moment the movement is on the threshold of the third stage, on the eve of a new regrouping of classes", that "at this stage of development, the main force of the movement is the bloc of a still more revolutionary character—the bloc of the proletariat, peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie *with the elimination* of a big section of the big capitalist

bourgeoisie." * (Cf. *Ibid.*)

It is this very bloc of workers and petty bourgeoisie (peasantry) on which the Kuomintang had to rely and which is already being formed in Wuhan after the split in the Kuomintang and the departure of the national bourgeoisie and about which I spoke in my speech to the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in 1925 (*cf.* above).

Thus, we have therefore a characterisation of the Kuomintang from two different aspects:

a) from the aspect of its *present,* from the aspect of the actual state of affairs in the Kuomintang in 1926;

b) from the aspect of its *future,* from the aspect of what the Kuomintang ought to be as a type of the organisation of a people's revolutionary party in the countries of the East.

Both these characterisations are equally correct; since they encompass the Kuomintang from two different aspects, and they give in the final analysis an exhaustive picture.

The question arises: where is the contradiction here?

For the sake of greater clarity, let us take the 'Labour Party' in Britain. It is well known that in Britain there exists a special party of the workers relying on the trade union organisation of workers and employees. No one entertains any doubt about calling this party a labour party. It is termed thus not only in British literature but also in all other Marxist literature.

But can it be said that this party is in actual fact a working-class party, a class party of the workers, opposed to the bourgeoisie? Can it be said that it is *in practice* a party of one class, a party of the workers and not a party, shall we say, of two classes? No, it is not possible to say this. *In practice* the Labour Party in Britain is a party of a bloc of workers and urban petty bourgeoisie. *In practice,* this party is a party of a bloc of two classes, and further if we wish

* Italics mine—J.S.

to say whose influence is more powerful in this party —the influence of the workers in opposition to the bourgeoisie or the influence of the petty bourgeoisie— then it must be said that the influence of the petty bourgeoisie is dominant in this party.

This practically accounts for the fact that the labour party in Britain is *in practice* an appendage of the liberal bourgeois party. And yet it is called *labour* party in Marxist literature. How is this contradiction to be explained? It is to be explained by the fact that in defining this party as a *labour* party, what is usually held in view is not the actual state of things in this party *at the present time,* but that *type* of organisation of workers' party, by virtue of which under certain conditions it should be converted *in future* into a real class party of the workers, in opposition to the bourgeois world. This does not exclude but on the contrary pre-supposes the fact that *in practice* this party is, for the present, a party of a bloc of workers and urban petty bourgeoisie.

Here too there exists no contradiction, just as there is no contradiction in all that I have just said with regard to the Koumintang.

Is it possible for the Chinese Communist Party to join the Kuomintang during the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat in China?

I think it is inexpedient and consequently impossible. The entry of the Communist Party is inexpedient not only during the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat but also during the formation of soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies. For what does the formation of soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies in China mean? It is the creation of a dual power. It is a struggle for power between the Kuomintang and the soviets. The formation of soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies is the preparation for a transition from a bourgeois-democratic revolution to a proletarian revolution, to a Socialist revolution. Can such preparation be conducted under the leadership of *two* parties, which have joined one common revolutionary democratic party? No, it is impossible. The history

of revolution says that the preparation for the dictatorship of the proletariat and the transition to a Socialist revolution can be made only under the leadership of *one* party—the Communist Party, if, of course, we are meaning a real proletarian revolution. The history of revolution says that the dictatorship of the proletariat can be achieved and developed only under the leadership of *one* party—the Communist Party. Without this there does not and cannot exist a real and complete dictatorship of the proletariat in the conditions of imperialism.

Therefore, not only during the dictatorship of the proletariat but also before such a dictatorship, during the formation of the soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies, the Communist Party has to leave the Kuomintang in order to conduct the preparation for the Chinese October under its own exclusive leadership.

I think that in the period of the formation of soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies in China and the preparation for the Chinese October, the Chinese Communist Party will have to replace the present bloc *within* the Kuomintang by a bloc *outside* the Kuomintang, say, like the bloc which we had with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in the period of the transition to October.

FOURTH QUESTION

Is the Wuhan Government a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, and if not, what are the further paths of struggle for the attainment of a democratic dictatorship? Is Martynov's assertion that the transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat is possible without a 'second' revolution correct, and, if so, where is the dividing line between the democratic dictatorship and the dictatorship of the proletariat in China?

The Wuhan Government is not yet a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. It can become this. It can certainly become a democratic

dictatorship if the agrarian revolution develops in full swing, but it is not yet the organ of such a dictatorship.

What is needed so that the Wuhan Government should be converted into an organ of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry? For this two things at least are necessary.

First, it is necessary that the Wuhan Government should become a government of the agrarian-peasant revolution in China—a government which supports this revolution in every way.

Secondly, it is necessary that the Wuhan Government should reinforce its leading top stratum with new leaders of the agrarian movement from amongst the peasants and workers, and extend its local organisations by including in them peasant unions, workers' trade-union councils and other revolutionary organisations of town and countryside.

At present the Kuomintang comprises of about 500,000 members. This is a small number, a very small number for China. It is necessary that the Kuomintang should include within its fold millions of revolutionary peasants and workers and thus transform itself into a revolutionary-democratic organisation of many million.

It is only under these conditions that the Kuomintang will obtain the opportunity of giving rise to a revolutionary government, which will be transformed into an organ of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

Did Comrade Martynov really speak of a peaceful transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat? I do not know this. I have not read Comrade Martynov's article and I did not read it because it is not possible for me to cover all our daily literature. But if he has really spoken of the possibility of a peaceful transition in China from a bourgeois-democratic revolution to a proletarian revolution—then that is a mistake.

The other day Chugunov asked me: "Well, Comrade Stalin, can it not be arranged in such a way that we can pass over immediately through the Kuomintang and without any circumvention to the dictatorship of the proletariat by a peaceful path?" In my turn, I

asked him: "And what do you have in China, Comrade Chugunov; have you the right-wing Kuomintang elements, the capitalist bourgeoisie, and the imperialists?" He replied in the affirmative. "Then, you cannot do without a fight"—I told him.

This was still before Chiang Kai-shek's coup. One can, of course, raise in principle the question of the possibility of the peaceful development of the revolution in China. For instance, Lenin found the peaceful development of the revolution in Russia through the Soviets possible at one time. This was in the period from April to July 1917. But after the July defeat, Lenin recognised that a peaceful transition to a proletarian revolution must be considered as ruled out. I think that in China one ought, all the more, to consider a peaceful transition to the proletarian revolution as ruled out. Why?

Because, in the first instance, the enemies of the Chinese revolution, both domestic (Chang Tso-lin, Chiang Kai-shek, the big bourgeoisie, the gentry, the landlords, etc.) as well as the external enemies (the imperialists), are far too numerous and powerful for us to think that it would be possible to do without serious class battles and without serious splits and desertions during the further development of the revolution.

Secondly, because there is no basis to consider the Kuomintang form of state organisation as an expedient form for the transition from a bourgeois-democratic revolution to a proletarian revolution.

Finally, because if in Russia, for instance, a peaceful transition to the proletarian revolution through the Soviets, which were the classic form of the proletarian revolution, did not succeed, then what grounds are there to pre-suppose that such a transition can succeed through the Kuomintang?

I, therefore, consider that a peaceful transition to the proletarian revolution must be considered as ruled out in China.

FIFTH QUESTION

Why is the Wuhan Government not carrying out an attack against Chiang Kai-shek and why is it carrying out an attack against Chang Tso-lin?

Is not the simultaneous attack of the Wuhan Government and Chiang Kai-shek in the north a slurring over of the front of struggle against the Chinese bourgeoisie?

Now, comrades, you are asking for too much from the Wuhan Government. Of course, it would be very good to defeat simultaneously both Chang Tso-lin and Chiang Kai-shek, and Li Ti-sin and Yan-sen. But at present the position of the Wuhan Government is one which does not permit of an attack immediately on all four fronts. The Wuhan Government undertook operations against the Mukdenites for at least two reasons.

Firstly, because the Mukdenites are swarming on Wuhan and wish to liquidate it, in view of which the operations against the Mukdenites are a defence measure which cannot absolutely admit of any delay.

Secondly, because the Wuhanites want to unite with the troops of Feng Yu-hsiang and move forward and extend the base of the revolution, which again constitutes the most important military and political task for Wuhan at the present moment.

A simultaneous attack on two such important fronts as the fronts against Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Tso-lin constitutes at the present time a task which is beyond the capacity of the Wuhan Government, not to mention the offensive in the west against Yan-sen and in the south against Li Ti-sin.

During the civil war, we, the Bolsheviks, were stronger, nevertheless we were not able to develop successful offensive operations on all fronts. What basis is there to ask for more from the Wuhan Government at the present moment?

And further what is the significance of attacking Shanghai now when the Mukdenites and the suppor-

ters of U Pei-fu are advancing on Wuhan from the north? It means to facilitate the work of the Mukdenites, to postpone indefinitely the unification with Feng's troops, without having gained anything in the east. For the time being, it is better that Chiang Kai-shek should flounder in the Shanghai region and get himself entangled with the imperialists.

For Shanghai there will be still more battles, and not like those which are now taking place for Chanchow, etc. No, there will be more serious battles there. Imperialism will not yield Shanghai so easily, since Shanghai is a world centre of the interlocking of the most important interests of imperialist groups.

Will it not be more expedient to unite first with Feng, to build up sufficient military strength, develop fully the agrarian revolution, intensify the work of undermining Chiang Kai-shek's rear and front, and then, after that, to raise the whole question of Shanghai? I think it will be more expedient thus.

Therefore the question here is not at all one of "slurring over" the front of struggle against the Chinese bourgeoisie because in any case it cannot be slurred over if the agrarian revolution is going to develop, and it is developing and is going to develop—of this there can now be no doubt. The question, I repeat, is not one of "slurring over" but of building up suitable tactics of struggle.

Some comrades think that an offensive on all fronts now is the basic symptom of being revolutionary. No comrades, this is not true. An offensive on all fronts, at the present moment, is stupidity. It is not being revolutionary. Never mix up stupidity with being revolutionary.

SIXTH QUESTION

Is a Kemalist revolution possible in China?

I consider it improbable and hence impossible in China.

A Kemalist revolution is possible only in such

countries as Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan where an industrial proletariat is completely or almost non-existent and where a powerful agrarian-peasant revolution does not exist. A Kemalist revolution is a revolution from the top, of the national mercantile bourgeoisie, a revolution which arises in the struggle against foreign imperialists and which is directed in its further development essentially against the peasants and workers, and against the very possibilities of an agrarian revolution.

A Kemalist revolution is impossible in China because:

a) there exists in China a certain minimum of militant and active industrial proletariat, enjoying tremendous authority amongst the peasantry;

b) there is a developing agrarian revolution, sweeping away from its path the survivals of feudalism.

The many millions of peasantry, who have already seized the land in a whole number of provinces and who are led in their struggle by the revolutionary proletariat of China — here lies the antidote against the possibilities of a so-called Kemalist revolution.

One must not place the party of the Kemalists and the party of the left-Kuomintang in Wuhan on the same plane, in the same way as we cannot place Turkey and China on the same plane. In Turkey, there are no such centres as Shanghai, Wuhan, Nanking, Tientsin, etc. Angora is as far removed from Wuhan as is the Kemalist party from the left-Kuomintang.

One must also bear in mind the difference between China and Turkey from the point of view of the international situation. With respect to Turkey, imperialism has already won a whole number of its main demands and snatched away from Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Messapotamia and other centres important for imperialists. Turkey is now reduced to the dimensions of a small state with a population of 10-12 million. It constitutes neither a serious market nor a decisive base for imperialism. Among other things, this could happen because the old Turkey represented a conglomeration of nationalities and there was a compact Turkish popu-

lation only in Anatolia.

It is not so with China. From the nationality viewpoint China constitutes a compact country with a population of several hundred million, and constitutes the most important market for their sales and for export of capital over the entire world. While in Turkey imperialism could be satisfied by tearing away a number of the most important regions in the East, by utilising the national antagonisms in the old Turkey between the Turks and the Arabs, here in China, imperialism had to beat the living body of national China, hacking it into small pieces and wresting away entire provinces in order to maintain its old positions or at least a part of them.

Hence, though in Turkey the struggle against imperialism could end with the unfinished anti-imperialist revolution of the Kemalists, in China it must adopt a profoundly popular and clearly national character, and must deepen step by step until it reaches a desperate battle with imperialism, shaking the very foundations of imperialism throughout the world.

The greatest mistake of the opposition (Zinoviev, Radek, Trotsky) lies in that it does not see this whole difference between Turkey and China, confuses the Kemalist with the agrarian revolution and lumps them all indiscriminately into one heap.

I know that amongst the Chinese nationalists there are people who nurse the idea of Kemalism. There are at present quite a few pretenders to the role of Kemal. The first amongst these is Chiang Kai-shek. I know that certain Japanese journalists are inclined to consider Chiang Kai-shek a Chinese Kemal. But all these are the dreams, the illusions of the frightened bourgeoisie. In China, *either* Chinese Mussolinis like Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-chang will win and thereafter be overthrown by the sweep of the agrarian movement, *or* Wuhan will win.

Chiang Kai-shek and his followers, in trying to find a middle road between the two camps, must inevitably collapse sharing the fate of Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-chang.

SEVENTH QUESTION

Should the slogan of the immediate seizure of land by the peasantry in China be raised at once and how should the facts of the seizure of land in Hunan be evaluated?

I think the slogan should be raised immediately. In actual fact the slogan of the confiscation of land is already being carried out in certain districts. In a whole number of regions like Hunan, Hupeh, etc., the peasantry is already seizing the land from below. They are setting up their judicial-executive authority and their own self-defence. I think that in the near future the entire peasantry will pass over to the slogan of the confiscation of land. In this lies the strength of the Chinese revolution.

If Wuhan wishes to be victorious, if it wants to create a real force both against Chang Tso-lin, against Chiang Kai-shek and against the imperialists, it must support in every way the agrarian-peasant revolution for the seizure of the landlords' land.

It is stupid to think that feudalism and imperialism can be overthrown in China with military forces alone. Without the agrarian revolution and without the active support rendered to the Wuhan troops by the many millions of masses of peasants and workers it is impossible to overthrow such forces.

Chiang Kai-shek's *coup* is often evaluated by the opposition as a decline of the Chinese revolution. This is a mistake. Men who evaluate Chiang Kai-shek's *coup* as a decline of the Chinese revolution, in actual fact stand for Chiang Kai-shek, and stand in fact for bringing back Chiang Kai-shek to the Wuhan Kuomintang. They obviously think that had Chiang Kai-shek not broken off, then things would have been better for the revolution. This is stupid and non-revolutionary. Chiang Kai-shek's *coup* had in actual practice led to cleansing the Kuomintang of filth and to a shift in the core of the Kuomintang to the left. Of course, Chiang Kai-shek's *coup* could not do without a partial defeat of

the workers in a number of regions. But this was only a partial and temporary defeat. In actual fact, with Chiang Kai-shek's *coup* the revolution has *as a whole* entered a higher phase of its development—the phase of the *agrarian* movement. In this lies the force and the might of the Chinese revolution.

Revolutionary movement must not be looked upon as a movement rising on an upward trend all the time. This is a bookish and unrealistic concept of revolution. Revolution always advances on a zigzag line. In some places it launches offensives and destroys the old system, while in some other places it suffers partial setbacks and has to retreat. Chaing Kai-shek's *coup* is one of these zigzags in the course of the Chinese revolution which was necessary in order that the revolution should be cleansed of filth and move forward on the path of a powerful agrarian movement.

But in order that this agrarian movement should take a shape, it must have its general slogan. This slogan is the confiscation of the landlords' land.

EIGHTH QUESTION

Why is the slogan of the organisation of soviets incorrect at the present time?

Is not the Chinese Communist Party threatened with the danger of remaining at the tail of the movement due to the fact of soviets of workers being organised in Yenan?

Which are the soviets under discussion, *proletarian* soviets or *non-proletarian* soviets, soviets of 'peasants', soviets of 'toilers' or soviets of the 'people'? In his thesis at the 2nd Congress of the Comintern, Lenin spoke of the formation of 'peasant soviets', 'soviets of toilers' in the backward countries of the East. He had in view such countries of Central Asia where "an industrial proletariat is almost or completely non-existent". He had in view such countries as Persia, Afghanistan, etc. This particularly accounts for the fact that in

Lenin's thesis there is not a single word about the organisation of soviets *of workers* in such countries.

But from this it is obvious that Lenin's thesis did not have in mind China, about which it cannot be said that there "an industrial proletariat is almost or completely non-existent" but other more backward countries of the East.

Consequently, the question under discussion is one of the immediate creation of soviets of *workers'* and peasants' deputies in China. Consequently in deciding this question, one must have in mind not Lenin's thesis but Roy's thesis, adopted by the same 2nd Congress of the Comintern, which spoke of the formation of *workers'* and peasants' soviets in such countries as China and India. But it is said there that *workers'* and peasants' soviets in these countries must be created during the transition from a bourgeois-democratic revolution to a proletarian revolution.

What are soviets of *workers'* and peasants' deputies? Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies are mainly organs of uprising against the existing power, organs of struggle for a new revolutionary power, organs of a new revolutionary power. Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies are at the same time centres of the organisation of revolution.

But the soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies can be centres of the organisation of revolution only if they are organs of the overthrow of the existing power, only if they are organs of a new revolutionary power. If they are not organs of a new revolutionary power, they cannot also be centres of the organisation of a revolutionary movement. The opposition does not want to understand this, and fights against the Leninist understanding of soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies.

What does the formation at the present time of soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies signify in the region of the operations, say of the Wuhan Government? It means the creation of a dual power, the creation of organs of uprising against the Wuhan Government. Should the Chinese Communists now over-

throw the Wuhan Government? It is clear that they must not do so. On the contrary they must support it, while converting it into an organ of struggle against Chang Tso-lin, against Chiang Kai-shek, against the landlords and the gentry, and against imperialism.

But if the Communist Party must not now overthrow the Wuhan Government, then why must it create *now* soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies?

One of the two things:

Either soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies are formed now, in order to overthrow the Wuhan Government—which is incorrect and impermissible at the present moment.

Or, while forming soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies now, the Communists do not carry out a line of the overthrow of the Wuhan Government, soviets are not converted into organs of new revolutionary power and then they, the soviets, die out, being converted into a parody of soviets.

Lenin always cautioned precisely against this when he spoke of the formation of soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies.

In your 'question' you speak of the emergence of workers' soviets in Yenan and that the Communist Party is running the risk of remaining at the tail of the movement, if it does not go to the masses with the slogan of the formation of soviets. This is nonsense, comrades. There are no soviets of workers' deputies at present in Yenan. This is a canard let loose by the British press. There are 'Red Lances',[7] there are peasant unions, but there is no mention yet of soviets of workers' deputies.

Of course one can form soviets of workers. This is not a very difficult matter. But the task is not of forming workers' soviets but of converting them into organs of a new revolutionary power. Without this, soviets are without meaning and a parody of soviets. To form soviets of workers prematurely and for them to fail later and be converted then into a meaningless thing, means precisely to facilitate the transformation of the Chinese Communist Party from being the leader

of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into an appendage of all kinds of 'ultra-Left' experiments with soviets.

Khrustalev, the first chairman of the soviets of workers' deputies in Petrograd in 1905, also demanded the restoration, meaning the formation of soviets of workers' deputies, in the spring of 1906, thinking that soviets are by themselves capable of altering the correlation of class forces, regardless of the situation. Lenin then came out against Khrustalev and said that soviets of workers' deputies must not be formed in the summer of 1906 since the rearguard (the peasantry) had not as yet come up to the vanguard (the proletariat), and under such conditions to form soviets and to give at the same time the slogan of an uprising was risky and inexpedient.

But it follows from this that, firstly, one must not exaggerate the role of soviets by themselves and, secondly, that in forming soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies, one cannot do without considering the situation around.

Should soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies be formed in general in China?

Yes. They must be formed. They must be formed after the consolidation of the Wuhan revolutionary government, after the development of the agrarian revolution, and during the transition from an agrarian revolution, from a bourgeois-democratic revolution to a proletarian revolution.

To form soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies means to lay the foundation of a soviet power in China. But to lay the foundation of a soviet power means laying the foundation of a dual power and taking to the course of substituting the present Wuhan Kuomintang power by soviet power. I think the time has not yet come for this.

Your 'question' refers to the hegemony of the proletariat and of the Communist Party in China. And what is required to make it easy for the Chinese proletariat to assume the role of leader, the role of hegemon in the present bourgeois-democratic revolution.

For this it is necessary above all that the Com-

munist Party should be a well-knit organisation of the working class, with its own programme, its own platform, its own specific organisation and its own specific line.

For this it is necessary, secondly, that the Chinese Communists should stand in the forefront of the agrarian-peasant movement, that they should teach the peasants, particularly the poor amongst the peasants, to organise themselves in revolutionary unions and committees and conduct the movement towards the confiscation of the landlord's land.

For this it is necessary, thirdly, that the Chinese Communists should consolidate their position in the army, revolutionise it, transform and convert it from being an instrument of individual adventurists into an instrument of revolution.

For this it is necessary, finally, that the Chinese Communists should participate in the local and central organisations of the Wuhan Government and the local and central organs of the Wuhan Kuomintang, and there carry out a determined policy for the further unfolding of the revolution both against the landlords as well as against imperialism.

The opposition thinks of retaining the independence of the Communist Party by isolating it from the revolutionary-democratic forces and withdrawing it from the Kuomintang and the Wuhan Government. But this would be quite a dubious kind of 'independence', like the one about which our Mensheviks talked in 1905. It is well known that the Mensheviks, taking a stand at that time against Lenin, said: "We need *not* the hegemony, *but* the independence of a workers' party". Lenin replied correctly at that time that this is a denial of independence, since to counterpose independence to hegemony is to convert the proletariat into an appendage of the liberal bourgeoisie.

I think that the opposition while speaking now of the independence of the Chinese Communist Party and, in addition to this, in demanding or hinting at the withdrawal of the Chinese Communist Party from the Kuomintang and the Wuhan Government, is sliding

down the path of the Menshevik 'independence' of the 1905 period. The real independence and the real hegemony of the Communist Party can be preserved only if it becomes the leading force both inside the Kuomintang as well as outside it, among the broad masses of toilers.

It is not the withdrawal from the Kuomintang but the ensuring of the leading role of the Communist Party both inside the Kuomintang and outside it—this is what is now demanded of the Chinese Communist Party, if it wants to be really independent.

NINTH QUESTION

Can one raise at the present moment the question of the formation of a regular Red Army in China?

I think that this question must necessarily be held in view as the perspective. But if the question is raised as a practical one, then now, at the present moment, to replace the present army by a new army, the Red Army, is not possible simply because there is nothing to replace it now.

The main thing *immediately* consists in, while improving the existing army and revolutionising it with all the means accessible, to lay the foundations now of new revolutionary regiments and divisions from among the revolutionary peasants, who have passed through the school of the agrarian revolution, and from amongst the revolutionary workers, and to form a number of new and really reliable corps with reliable commanders, and to make them a bulwark of the revolutionary government in Wuhan.

This corps will also be the core of the new army, which will then develop into a Red Army.

This is necessary both for the fight at the front as well as in particular for the fight in the rear, against all kinds of counter-revolutionary upstarts.

Without this there is no guarantee against disor-

ganisation in the rear and at the front and against betrayals and desertions.

I think that, for the time being, this path is the only possible and expedient one.

TENTH QUESTION

Is the slogan of seizure of Chinese enterprises possible immediately at the time of struggle against the bourgeoisie?

Under what conditions is the confiscation of foreign factories in China possible and will this lead to the simultaneous seizure of Chinese enterprises?

I think that generally speaking the time has not matured for us to go over to the seizure of Chinese enterprises. But it is not ruled out that the persistent sabotage by the Chinese entrepreneurs, the closing down of a whole number of such enterprises and the artificial creation of unemployment can compel the Wuhan Government already to begin now the nationalisation of some such enterprises and set them in operation by the forces of the Wuhan Government.

It is possible that already now the Wuhan Government will be compelled to implement *in individual cases* such a measure, as a preventive measure against the specially vicious and counter-revolutionary Chinese entrepreneurs.

As regards the foreign enterprises, there the question of the nationalisation of these enterprises is a question of the future. The nationalisation of these enterprises is a declaration of open war against the imperialists. But in order to declare such a war, a different and more favourable set-up than the present one is necessary.

I think that at the present stage of the revolution when the revolution has not yet consolidated itself, such a measure is premature and therefore inexpedient.

The task now consists not in this, but in fanning

the flames of an agrarian revolution, in ensuring the hegemony of the proletariat in this revolution, in consolidating Wuhan and converting it into a centre of struggle against all the enemies of the Chinese revolution.

We cannot take upon ourselves all the tasks at once or we would overstrain ourselves and all the more so since the Kuomintang and its government are not capable of solving such cardinal tasks as the task of the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, both Chinese and foreign.

For the solution of such tasks a different set-up, another phase of the revolution and other organs of revolutionary power are necessary.

[J. Stalin, *Revolution in China and the Mistakes of the Opposition.* M.—L. 1927.]

COMMENTS ON CURRENT AFFAIRS ON CHINA

[Article in "Pravda", July 28th, 1927.]

NOW, WHEN THE REVOLUTION IN CHINA has entered a new stage of development, we can sum up to some extent the path that has been traversed and consider the question of examining the line of the Comintern in China.

There are certain tactical principles of Leninism, and without taking them into account, neither a correct leadership of the revolution nor a verification of the line of Comintern in China is possible. Our oppositionists have already forgotten these principles long ago. But it is just because the opposition suffers from forgetfulness that it is necessary to recall them again and again.

I have in view such tactical principles of Leninism as:

a) The principle of the necessity of taking into account the national peculiarities and the national characteristics of each nation while working out the guiding instructions of the Comintern for the workers' movement of that nation.

b) The principle of the necessity for the Communist Party in every country of utilising the smallest possibilities of securing mass allies for the proletariat, even if they are temporary, vacillating, wavering or unreliable.

c) The principle of the necessity of taking into account the truth that propaganda and agitation alone are not enough for the political education of millions of the masses, but that this demands the political experience of the masses themselves.

I think that the taking into account of these tactical principles of Leninism is the necessary condition without which a Marxist verification of the line of the Comintern on the Chinese revolution is impossible.

Let us examine the problems of the Chinese revolution in the light of these tactical principles.

Notwithstanding the ideological growth of our Party, it unfortunately still contains a certain type of 'leaders' who sincerely believe that it is possible to direct the revolution in China, so to speak, by telegraph on the basis of the well-known universally acknowledged general principles of the Comintern, and *who do not consider* the national peculiarities of Chinese economics, Chinese politics, Chinese culture, Chinese customs and traditions. These leaders are distinguished from the real leaders by the fact that they always have in their pockets two or three ready-made formulae which are suitable for all countries and 'obligatory' under all conditions. For them, there is no problem of taking into account the national character and national peculiarities of each country. For them there is no problem of linking the general principles of the Comintern with the national peculiarities of the revolutionary movement in each country and no problem of adopting the general principles of the Comintern to the national state peculiarities of each country.

They do not understand that the main task of leadership at the present time, when Communist Parties have already grown up and become mass parties, consists in finding out, mastering and skilfully combining the national peculiarities of the movement in each country with the general principles of the Comintern in order to further and carry out in practice the basic objectives of the Communist movement.

From this follows the attempt to stereotype the leadership for all countries. From this follows the attempt to apply mechanically certain general formulae regardless of the concrete conditions of the revolutionary movement in each country. From this follows the endless conflict between formulae and the revolutionary movement in each country, which is

the essential outcome of the leadership of these unfortunate leaders.

Our oppositionists belong to the category of such unfortunate leaders.

The opposition heard that a bourgeois revolution was going on in *China*. It knows, besides, that the bourgeois revolution in *Russia* took place against the bourgeoisie. Hence, the ready-made formula for China: "Down with any joint actions with the bourgeoisie!" "Long live the immediate exit of the Communists from the Kuomintang!" (April 1926.)

But the opposition forgot that China, as distinct from Russia in 1905, constitutes a semi-colonial country, oppressed by imperialism, that because of this the revolution in China is not just a bourgeois revolution but a bourgeois revolution of an anti-imperialist type, that in China imperialism holds in its hands the main threads of industry, trade and transport, that imperialist oppression affects not only the toiling masses of China but also certain sections of the Chinese bourgeoisie, that in view of this the Chinese bourgeoisie can under certain conditions and for certain period support the Chinese revolution.

As is well known, this was what happened in actual practice. If we take the Canton period of the Chinese revolution, the period when the nationalist troops reached the Yangtse, the period before the split in the Kuomintang, it is impossible not to admit that the Chinese bourgeoisie supported the revolution in China, that the line of the Comintern on the permissibility of joint actions with this bourgeoisie for a certain period and under certain conditions, turned out to be completely correct.

The result was the retreat of the opposition from its old formula and the proclamation of a 'new' formula—joint actions with the Chinese bourgeoisie are necessary, the Communists must not leave the Kuomintang. (April 1927.)

This was the first penalty suffered by the opposition because it did not wish to take into account the national peculiarities of the Chinese revolution.

The opposition heard that the Peking Government was quarrelling with the representatives of the imperialist states on the question of the customs autonomy of China. The opposition knows that customs autonomy is necessary, above all, to the Chinese capitalists. Hence, the ready-made formula: The Chinese revolution is national, anti-imperialist, because it has as its main aim the attainment of customs autonomy for China.

But the opposition forgot that the strength of imperialism in China consists in the main not in the customs restrictions of China, but in that it owns there the factories, mills, mines, railroads, steamers, banks, commercial houses, which suck dry the blood of millions and millions of Chinese workers and peasants.

The opposition forgot that the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people against imperialism is to be explained above all and in the main, by the fact that in China, imperialism is that force which supports and inspires the direct exploiters of the Chinese people—the feudalists, the militarists, the capitalists, the bureaucrats, etc., that the Chinese workers and peasants cannot conquer these exploiters of theirs without waging at the same time a revolutionary struggle against imperialism.

The opposition forgets that precisely this circumstance is one of those most important factors, which make possible the growing over of the bourgeois revolution in China into a Socialist revolution.

The opposition forgets that he who stands for the Chinese anti-imperialist revolution as a revolution for customs autonomy, denies the possibility of the growing over of the bourgeois revolution in China into a Socialist revolution, for he restores the Chinese revolution to the leadership of the Chinese bourgeoisie.

And, indeed, facts show why customs autonomy is in actual practice the platform of the Chinese bourgeoisie, since even such hardened reactionaries like Chang Tso-lin and Chiang Kai-shek declare now for the abolition of the unequal treaties and the establishment of customs autonomy in China.

Hence the double-facedness of the opposition, the attempts to wriggle out from their own formula on customs autonomy, the attempts to renounce it on the quiet and to stick to the Comintern position on the possibility of the growing over of the bourgeois revolution in China into a Socialist revolution.

This is the second penalty that the opposition has suffered because it does not wish to study seriously the national peculiarities of the Chinese Revolution.

The opposition had heard that the mercantile bourgeoisie had penetrated into the Chinese countryside and had rented the land to the propertyless peasants. The opposition knows that the merchant is not feudal. Hence the ready-made formula: The remnants of feudalism—meaning also the struggle of the peasantry against the survivals of feudalism—has no serious significance in the Chinese revolution, that the main thing in China at present is not the agrarian revolution, but the question of the state—customs independence of China from imperialist countries.

But the opposition does not see that the peculiarity of Chinese economy does not consist in the penetration of mercantile capital in the countryside but in the combination of the *domination* of feudal survivals and the existence of mercantile capital in the Chinese countryside *with the preservation* of the feudal and mediaeval methods of exploitation and oppression of the peasantry.

The opposition does not understand that the entire present-day military bureaucratic machine in China, which despoils and oppresses the Chinese peasantry inhumanly is in essence the political superstructure over this combination of the *domination* of feudal survivals and feudal methods of exploitation with the existence of commercial capital in the countryside.

And, indeed, facts showed later that a great agrarian revolution developed in China which was directed, above all and in the main, against the small and the big feudalists of China. Facts showed that this revolution embraced tens of millions of peasants and it tends to extend over the whole of China.

Facts showed that feudalists, real and live feudalists, not only exist in China but also hold power in their hands in a whole number of provinces. They are subjecting to their will the command of the army, are subjecting to their influence the leadership of the Kuomintang and are dealing blow after blow to the Chinese revolution.

After this to deny the presence of feudal survivals and the feudal system of exploitation as the main form of oppression in the Chinese countryside, not to admit after this the agrarian revolution as the main fact of the Chinese revolutionary movement at the present moment, would mean going against obvious facts.

Hence the retreat of the opposition from its old formula on the question of feudal survivals and the agrarian revolution. Hence the attempts of the opposition to depart on all fours from its own old formula and tacitly admit the correctness of the Comintern position.

This is the third penalty that the opposition suffered for its reluctance to reckon with the national peculiarities of China's economy. And so on and so forth.

Discord between formulae and reality—such is the lot of the unfortunate leaders in the opposition.

And this discord is the direct result of the break made by the opposition from the famous tactical principle of Leninism, of the necessity of taking into account the national peculiarities and the national-specific features in the revolutionary movement of each individual country.

This is how Lenin formulates this principle:

> "The whole point now is that the Communists of every country should quite consciously take into account both the main fundamental tasks of the struggle against opportunism and 'Left' doctrinairism and the *specific features* which this struggle assumes and inevitably must assume in each separate country in conformity with the peculiar features of its economics, politics, cul-

ture, national composition (Ireland, etc.), its colonies, religious divisions, etc. Everywhere we observe that dissatisfaction with the Second International is spreading and growing, both because of its opportunism and because of its inability, or incapacity, to create a really centralised, a really leading centre that would be capable of directing the international tactics of the revolutionary proletariat in its struggle for a world Soviet republic. We must clearly realise that *such a leading centre cannot under any circumstances be built on stereotyped, mechanically equalised and identical tactical rules of struggle.* (Emphasis mine—*J.S.*) As long as national and state differences exist among peoples and countries—and these differences will continue to exist for a very long time even after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world scale—the unity of international tactics of the Communist working-class movement of all countries demands, not the elimination of variety, not the abolition of national differences (that is a foolish dream at the present moment), but such an application of the *fundamental* principles of Communism (Soviet Power and the dictatorship of the proletariat) as will *correctly modify* these principles in *certain particulars*, correctly adapt and apply them to national and national state differences. The main task of the historical period through which all the advanced countries (and not only the advanced countries) are now passing is to *investigate, study, seek, divine, grasp that which is peculiarly national, specifically national in the concrete manner in which each country approaches the fulfilment of the single international task, the victory over opportunism and 'Left' doctrinairism within the working-class movement, the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of a Soviet republic and a proletarian dictatorship."* (Emphasis Mine—*J.S.*)*

*Lenin: **Selected Works**, Moscow 1947, Vol. 2, p. 626.

The line of the Comintern is the line of necessarily taking into consideration this tactical principle of Leninism.

The line of the opposition is, on the contrary, a line of break with this tactical principle.

In this break also lies the root of mishap of the opposition on questions on the character and perspectives of the Chinese revolution.

* * *

Let us pass on to the second tactical principle of Leninism.

From the character and perspectives of the Chinese revolution arises the question of the allies of the proletariat in its struggle for the victory of the revolution.

The question of the allies of the proletariat is one of the fundamental questions of the Chinese revolution. The Chinese proletariat is confronted with powerful opponents; the small and the big feudalists, the military bureaucratic machine of the old and new militarists, the counter-revolutionary national bourgeoisie, the imperialists of the East and the West, who have taken into their own hands the main threads of the economic life of China and who have reinforced with army and navy their right to exploit the Chinese people.

In order to defeat these powerful opponents, what is necessary, apart from anything else, is a flexible and well-considered policy of the proletariat, the ability to utilise every fissure in the camp of the opponents, the ability to find allies for itself, even if these allies are vacillating and wavering allies, on condition that these allies are *mass* allies, that they do not *restrict* the revolutionary propaganda and agitation of the party of the proletariat, *do not restrict* the work of the Party in organising the working class and the toiling masses.

Such a policy is the basic requirement of the second tactical principle of Leninism. Without such a policy, the victory of the proletariat is impossible.

The opposition considers such a policy incorrect and un-Leninist. But this only speaks of the fact that it has lost the last remnants of Leninism, that it is as far removed from Leninism as heaven from the earth.

Were there such allies for the Chinese proletariat in the recent past?

Yes, there were such allies.

In the period of the first stage of the revolution, when the revolution was revolution of a nationwide *united* front (Canton period) the allies of the proletariat were the peasantry, the urban poor, the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia and the national bourgeoisie.

One of the distinctive features of the Chinese revolutionary movement consists in that the representatives of these classes worked jointly with the Communists within one bourgeois-revolutionary organisation called the Kuomintang.

These allies were not and could not be uniformly reliable. Certain of them were more or less reliable allies (the peasantry, the town poor), the others less reliable and vacillating (the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia), the rest completely unreliable (the national bourgeoisie).

Then the Kuomintang was indisputably a more or less mass orgnisation. The policy of the Communists within the Kuomintang consisted in isolating the representatives of the national bourgeoisie (the Rights), utilising them in the interests of the revolution, impelling the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia (the Lefts) to the Left and rallying the peasantry and the urban poor round the proletariat.

Was Canton then the centre of the revolutionary movement of China? Undoubtedly, yes. Indeed, only the insane can deny this now.

What were the gains of the Communists in this period? The expansion of the territory of the revolution inasmuch as the Canton troops reached the Yangtse, the opportunity of openly organising the proletariat (trade unions, strike committees), the formation of Communist organisations into the Party, the creation of the first nuclei of peasant organisations (the peasant

unions), the penetration of Communists inside the army.

It turns out that the guidance of the Comintern was absolutely correct in this period.

In the period of the second stage of the revolution, when Chiang Kai-shek and the national bourgeoisie went over to the camp of counter-revolution and the centre of the revolutionary movement was shifted from Canton to Wuhan, the allies of the proletariat were the peasantry, the urban poor and the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia.

How can we explain the going over of the national bourgeoisie to the camp of counter-revolution? In the first place, by the fear of the national bourgeoisie in face of the sweep of the revolutionary movement of the workers, and, secondly, by the pressure of the imperialists in Shanghai upon the national bourgeoisie.

Thus, the revolution lost the national bourgeoisie. This was a partial loss for the revolution, but it entered now into a higher phase of its development, the phase of the agrarian revolution, drawing more closely towards itself the broad masses of the peasntry. This was a gain for the revolution.

Was the Kuomintang then, in the period of the second stage of the revolution, a mass organisation? Yes, undoubtedly it was. It was indisputably more of a mass organisation than the Kuomintang of the Canton period.

Was Wuhan then the centre of the revolutionary movement? Yes, undoubtedly, it was. Only the blind can deny this now. Otherwise, the territory of Wuhan (Hupei, Hunan) would not then have been the base of the maximum development of the agrarian revolution led by the Communist Party.

The policy of the Communists with respect to the Kuomintang consisted then in impelling it to the Left and converting it into the core of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

Was there then the possibility of such a transformation? Yes, there was. In any case, there was no

ground to consider this possibility as ruled out; at that time, we said plainly that for the conversion of the Wuhan Kuomintang into a core of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, at least two conditions were necessary: a radical democratisation of the Kuomintang, and the direct assistance of the Kuomintang to the agrarian revolution. It would have been stupid for the Communists to give up attempts at such a transformation.

What were the gains of the Communists in this period?

The Communist Party grew in this period from a tiny party of five to six thousand members into a big mass party of 50-60 thousand members.

The workers' trade unions developed into the tremendous all-China federation, numbering nearly three million members. The primary peasants' organisations expanded into tremendous federations, embracing several tens of millions. The agrarian movement of the peasantry developed on an immense scale and occupied a central place in the Chinese revolutionary movement. The Communist Party gained an opportunity of openly organising the revolution. The Communist Party became the leader of the agrarian revolution. The hegemony of the proletariat began to be transformed from a wish into a fact.

It is true that the Communist Party of China was not able to utilise all the opportunities of this period. It is true that the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party committed a number of very big mistakes in this period. But it would be absurd to think that the Chinese Communist Party can become a real Bolshevik party at one stroke, so to speak, on the basis of a directive from the Comintern. One has only to recall the history of our Party, which passed through a number of breaks, splits, betrayals and treacheries in order to understand that real Bolshevik parties are not born at one stroke.

Thus, it follows that the leadership of the Comintern was completely correct in this period also.

Has the Chinese proletariat allies now? Yes, it has. These allies are the peasantry and the urban poor.

The present period is characterised by the going over of the Wuhan leadership of the Kuomintang into the camp of counter-revolution, the desertion of the revolution by the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia.

This desertion can be explained, firstly, by the fear of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia in face of the growing agrarian revolution and the pressure of the feudalists on the Wuhan leadership; secondly, the pressure of the imperialists in the district of Tientsin, demanding from the Kuomintang a break with the Communists as the price for being allowed to go to the North.

The opposition doubts the existence of feudal survivals in China. But now it is clear to all that not only are feudal survivals present in China, but that at the present moment, they are even stronger than the onslaught of the revolution. And it is precisely because the imperialists and the feudalists in China turned out to be stronger for the time being that the revolution suffered a temporary defeat.

This time the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia was lost to the revolution.

It is just this which is a sign of the temporary defeat of the revolution.

But then it rallied more closely around the proletariat the broad masses of the peasantry and the urban poor, creating at the same time the basis for proletarian hegemony.

This was a gain for the revolution.

The opposition explains the temporary defeat of the revolution by the policy of the Comintern. But only people who have broken with Marxism can speak like this. Only those who have broken with Marxism can demand that a correct policy should always and necessarily lead to an *immediate* victory over the opponent.

Was the policy of the Bolsheviks correct in the 1905 revolution? Yes, it was. Why did the revolution of 1905 suffer defeat in spite of the existence of the Soviets, in spite of the correct policy of the Bolsheviks? Because the feudal survivals and the autocracy proved

then to be stronger than the revolutionary movement of the workers.

Was the policy of the Bolsheviks correct in July 1917? Yes, it was. Why did the Bolsheviks suffer defeat then, in spite of the presence again of the Soviets, which then betrayed the Bolsheviks and in spite of the correct policy of the Bolsheviks? Because then Russian imperialism turned out to be stronger than the revolutionary movement of the workers.

A correct policy must not at all lead always and necessarily to an immediate victory over the opponent. Immediate victory over the opponent is determined not only by a correct policy, but also, above all and in the main, by the correlation of class forces, by the obvious preponderance of the forces on the side of the revolution, by the disintegration in the camp of the opponent and by a favourable international situation.

A correct policy of the proletariat can lead to immediate victory only under these conditions.

But there is another essential demand that a correct policy must satisfy always and in all conditions. This demand consists in the fact that the policy of the Party should raise the fighting capacity of the proletariat, multiply its links with the toiling masses, raise the authority of the proletariat among these masses and convert the proletariat into the leader of the revolution.

Can one assert that the maximum favourable conditions for the immediate victory of the revolution in China exist in the present period? Clearly, it is impossible to assert this.

Can one assert that the Communist policy in China has not raised the fighting capacity of the proletariat, not multiplied its links with the broad masses and not raised the authority of the proletariat among these masses? Clearly, it is impossible to assert this.

Only the blind can fail to see that the Chinese proletariat has succeeded this time in weaning away the broad masses of the peasantry, both from the national bourgeoisie and from the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia in order to rally them round its banner.

The Communist Party entered into a bloc with the national bourgeoisie in Canton in the first stage of the revolution in order to extend the territory of the revolution, form itself into a mass Party, create for itself the opportunity of openly organising the proletariat and clear for itself the path towards the peasantry.

The Communist Party entered into a bloc with the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia of the Kuomintang in Wuhan in the second stage of the revolution, in order to multiply its forces, extend the organisation of the proletariat, wean away the broad masses of the peasantry from the Kuomintang leadership and create the conditions for the hegemony of the proletariat.

The national bourgeoisie passed over into the camp of counter-revolution and lost its links with the broad masses of the people.

The petty-bourgeois intelligentsia of the Kuomintang in Wuhan, alarmed at the agrarian revolution and having finally discredited itself in the eyes of the millions of masses of the peasantry, followed the national bourgeoisie.

But, on the other hand, the millions of masses of the peasantry rallied round the proletariat more closely, looking upon it alone as their reliable leader and guide.

Is it not clear that only a correct policy could lead to such results?

Is it not clear that only such a policy could raise the fighting capacity of the proletariat?

Who, except the unfortunate leaders of our opposition, can deny the correctness and the revolutionary nature of such a policy?

The opposition affirms that the turning of the Wuhan Kuomintang leadership to the side of the counter-revolution speaks of the incorrectness of the policy of a bloc with the Wuhan Kuomintang at the second stage of the revolution.

But only those who have forgotten the history of Bolshevism and lost the last remnants of Leninism can speak in this way.

Was the Bolshevik policy of a revolutionary bloc with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in October and after October, right upto the spring of 1918, correct? I think that no one has yet decided to deny the correctness of this bloc. What did this bloc end in? In the revolt of the Left Socialst-Revolutionaries against the Soviet Power. Can one assert, *on the basis of this,* that the policy of a bloc with the Socialist-revolutionaries was incorrect? Clearly, it is impossible to assert this.

Was the policy of a revolutionary bloc with the Wuhan Kuomintang in the second stage of the Chinese revolution correct? I think that nobody has yet decided to deny the correctness of such a bloc during the second stage of the revolution. The opposition itself asserted then (in April 1927) that such a bloc was correct. How can one now, after the desertion of the revolution by the Wuhan leadership of the Kuomintang and on the basis of this desertion, assert that the revolutionary bloc with the Wuhan Kuomintang was incorrect?

Is it not clear that only men without character can manipulate with the help of such "arguments"?

Has anybody asserted that the bloc with the Wuhan leadership is permanent and interminable? Do such permanent and interminable blocs exist at all in actual fact? Is it not clear that the opposition has understood nothing, positively nothing, of the second tactical principle of Leninism on the revolutionary bloc of the proletariat with the non-proletarian classes and groups?

This is how Lenin formulates this tactical principle:

> "The more powerful enemy can be conquered only by exerting the utmost effort, and by *necessarily,* thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skilfully taking advantage of every, even the smallest, 'rift' among the enemies, of every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries, and *also by taking advantage of every, even the smallest opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional. Those who do not understand this do not understand even a particle of Marxism, or of scientific, modern Socialism in general.* (Emphasis mine—*J.S.*) Those who have not proved by *deeds* over a fairly considerable period of time, and in fairly varied political situations, their ability to apply this truth in practice have not yet learned to assist the revolutionary class in its struggle for the emancipation of toiling humanity from the exploitors. And this applies equally to the period before and to the period after the conquest of political power by the proletariat."*

Is it not clear that the line of the opposition is a line of break with this tactical principle of Leninism?

Is it not clear that the line of the Comintern on the other hand, is a line of necessarily taking into account this tactical principle?

* * *

Let us pass on to the third tactical principle of Leninism.

This tactical principle concerns the question of change of slogans and of the form and methods of this change. It concerns the question of how to transform the slogans for the Party into slogans for the masses, the question of how and in what manner to bring the masses to revolutionary positions, so that the masses should become convinced through their own political experience of the correctness of the Party slogans.

But propaganda and agitation alone cannot convince the masses. For this, the political experience of the masses themselves is necessary. For this it is necessary that the broad masses should realise through their own experience the inevitability of overthrowing the present system and establishing new political and social order.

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*Lenin: **Selected Works,** Moscow 1947, Vol. 2, pp. 609-10.

It is good that the advanced group, the Party, was already convinced of the inevitability of overthrowing, say, the Provisional Government of Milyukov and Kerensky in April 1917. But this was still inadequate for them to come forward for the overthrow of this Government in order to put forward the slogan of overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet Power as the *slogan of the day.* In order to convert the formula "all power to the Soviets" from a *perspective* of the immediate period, into the *slogan of the day,* into a slogan of immediate action, one more decisive circumstance was necessary, namely, that the masses themselves should be convinced of the correctness of these slogans and render the Party some kind of support or the other in carrying them out in practice.

One must differentiate strictly between a formula, as a *perspective* for the immediate future and a formula as the *slogan of the day.* The group of Bolsheviks in Petrograd headed by Bagdatyev failed precisely in this in April 1917, when they raised *prematurely* the slogans "Down with the Provisional Government, All power to to the Soviets!" At that time, Lenin characterised this attempt of the Bagdatyev group as dangerous adventurism and stigmatised it publicly. (Cf. Lenin: *Collected Works,* 3rd Russian ed., Vol. XX, pp. 224-25.)

Why? Because the broad masses of the toilers in the rear and at the front were not yet prepared for the adoption of this slogan. Because this group confused the formula of "All power to the Soviets!" as a perspective, with the slogan of "All power to the Soviets" as a slogan of the day. Because *it ran ahead,* threatening the Party with complete isolation from the broad masses, from the Soviets who then still believed in the revolutionary character of the Provisional Government.

Should the Chinese Communists have, say, six months back, raised the slogan of "Down with the Kuomintang leadership in Wuhan"? No. They should not have done this.

They ought not to have done this, since this would have been dangerous *running ahead:* it would have made it more difficult for the Communists to reach the broad masses of toilers, who still believed in the Kuomintang leadership and this would have isolated the Communist Party from the broad peasant masses.

They ought not to have done this since the Wuhan Kuomintang leadership, the Wuhan C.C. of the Kuomintang had not yet managed to exhaust all possibilities as a bourgeois-revolutionary Government and had not yet disgraced and discredited itself in the eyes of the broad masses of toilers by its struggle against the agrarian revolution, by its struggle against the working class and by its turn to the side of counter-revolution.

We have always said that it is impossible to take the course of discrediting and substituting the Wuhan Kuomintang leadership till it has not as yet exhausted its possibility as a bourgeois-revolutionary Government, that it must be allowed to exhaust all its possibilities before posing, in a practical manner, the question of changing it.

Should the Chinese Communists now raise the slogan of "Down with Kuomintang leadership in Wuhan"? Yes, they must necessarily do this.

Now, when the Kuomintang leadership has already discredited itself by its struggle against the revolution, taken up an attitude hostile towards the broad worker and peasant masses, this slogan will find a powerful response amongst the mass of people.

Now every worker and every peasant understands that the Communists acted correctly in quitting the Wuhan Government and the Wuhan C.C. of the Kuomintang and advancing the slogan of "Down with the Kuomintang leadership in Wuhan." Because the question confronting the peasant and working class masses is to make a choice between *either* the present-day leadership of the Kuomintang—and, in that case, a refusal to satisfy the urgent demands of these masses, a renunciation of agrarian revolution—*or* the agrarian revolution and a radical improvement in the position of the working class—and, in that case, a change in the

Kuomintang leadership in Wuhan becomes the slogan of the day for the masses.

Such are the requirements of the third tactical principle of Leninism on the question of change of slogan, on the question of the methods and the paths of leading the broad masses to new revolutionary positions, on the question of assisting the broad masses of toilers to perceive through their own experience the correctness of the line of the Party, by its policy, its activity and *timely* substitution of certain slogans by other slogans.

This is how Lenin formulates this tactical principle:

> "Victory cannot be won with the vanguard alone. To throw the vanguard alone into the decisive battle, before the whole class, before the broad masses have taken up a position either of direct support of the vanguard, or at least of benevolent neutrality towards it, and one in which they cannot possibly support the enemy, would be not merely folly but a crime. *And in order that actually the whole class, that actually the broad masses of toilers and those oppressed by capital may take up such a position, propaganda and agitation alone are not enough. For this the masses must have their own political experience.* (Emphasis mine—*J.S.*) Such is the fundamental law of all great revolutions, now confirmed with astonishing force and vividness not only in Russia but also in Germany. Not only the uncultured, often illiterate masses of Russia, but the highly cultured, entirely literate masses of Germany had to realise, through their own painful experience, the absolute impotence and spinelessness, the absolute helplessness and servility to the bourgeoisie, the utter vileness of the Government of the Knights of the Second International, the absolute inevitability of a dictatorship of the extreme reactionaries (Kornilov in Russia, Kapp and Co. in Germany) as the only alternative to a dictatorship of the proletariat, in order to turn them resolutely toward Communism.
>
> "The immediate task that confronts the class-conscious vanguard of the international labour movement, *i.e.*, the Communist Parties, groups and trends, is to be able *to lead* the broad masses (now, for the most part, slumbering, apathetic, hidebound, inert and dormant) to their new position, or, rather, to be able to lead *not only* their own party, but also these masses, in their approach, their transition to the new position."*

The main mistake of the opposition consists in that it does not understand the sense and the importance of this tactical principle of Leninism, it does not admit it and systematically violates it.

They (Trotskyites) violated this tactical principle in the beginning of 1917, when they attempted to skip over the still uncompleted agrarian movement. (*Cf.* Lenin.)

They (Trotsky-Zinoviev) violated it when they attempted "to skip over" the reactionary nature of the trade unions by not admitting the expediency of Communists working in reactionary trade unions and denying the necessity of temporary blocs with them.

They (Trotsky-Zinoviev-Radek) violated it when they attempted "to skip over" the national peculiarities of the Chinese revolutionary movement (Kuomintang), the backwardness of the mass of people in China, by demanding in April 1926 the immediate exit of the Communists from the Kuomintang, and raising the slogan of the immediate organisation of Soviets in April 1926, under the condition of the still unfinished, unexhausted Kuomintang phase of development.

The opposition thinks that if it has understood, perceived the half-heartedness, the vacillation and the unreliability of the Kuomintang leadership, if it has perceived the provisional and the conditional character

* Lenin: **Selected Works**, Moscow 1947, Vol. 2, p. 627.

of the bloc with the Kuomintang (and it is not difficult for any qualified political worker to perceive this) —then this is quite sufficient to start "decisive actions" against the Kuomintang, against the power of the Kuomintang, and that it is quite sufficient in order that the masses, the broad masses of workers and peasants, should "immediately" support "us" and "our" "decisive actions."

The opposition forgets that "our" understanding is far from adequate in order that the Chinese Communists should be able to bring the masses behind themselves. The opposition forgets that for this it is necessary still that the masses should perceive, through their own experience, the unreliability, the reactionary and counter-revolutionary character of the Kuomintang leadership.

The opposition forgets that revolutions "are made" not only by the advanced group, not only by the Party, not only by individual, and, howsoever "big" "personalities" but, above all and in the main, by the millions of masses of people.

It is strange that the opposition forgets the state of the millions of masses of people, their understanding and their preparedness for decisive actions.

Did we, the Party and Lenin, know in April 1917 that we would have to overthrow the Provisional Government of Milyukov and Kerensky, that the existence of the Provisional Government is incompatible with the activity of the Soviets, that power must pass into the hands of the Soviets? Yes, we knew this.

Why then did Lenin brand as adventurist a certain group of Bolsheviks in Petrograd with Bagdatyev at their head in April 1917, when this group put forward the slogan of "Down with the Provisional Government, All power to the Soviets!" and when they attempted to overthrow the Provisional Government?

Because the broad masses of the toilers, a certain section of the workers, millions among the peasantry, the broad masses in the army and finally the Soviets themselves, were not yet ready to adopt this slogan as the slogan of the day.

Because the Provisional Government and the petty-bourgeois parties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, had not yet exhausted their possibilities, were not as yet sufficiently discredited in the eyes of the millions of masses of toilers.

Because Lenin knew that for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power, only the understanding, the consciousness of the advanced group of the proletariat, the party of the proletariat, alone is insufficient, for this it is still necessary that the masses should themselves be convinced through their own experience of the correctness of such a line.

Because it was necessary to pass through the whole coalition bacchanalia, through the betrayals and treacheries of the petty-bourgeois parties in June, July, August 1917, it was necessary to go through the infamous attack on the front in June 1917, through the "honourable" coalition of the petty-bourgeois parties with Kornilov and Milyukov, through the Kornilov revolt, etc. in order that millions of toiling masses could be convinced of the inevitability of the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power.

Because only in these conditions the slogan of Soviet power, as a *perspective* would be converted into the slogan of Soviet power as the *slogan of the day.*

The misfortune of the opposition lies in that it very often commits the very same mistake that was committed by the Bagdatyev group in its time, that it, while adandoning the path of Lenin, prefers "to march" along the Bagdatyev path.

Did we, the Party and Lenin, know that a Constituent Assembly is incompatible with the system of Soviet power when we took part in the elections to the Constituent Assembly and when we convened it in Petrograd? Yes, we knew this.

Why then did we convene it? How could it happen that the Bolsheviks, the enemies of bourgeois parliamentarism, after having built a Soviet power, not only took part in the elections, but also themselves convened

the Constituent Assembly? Was this not *"Khvostism"* (tailism), lagging behind events, "holding back the masses" and violation of the tactics of "distant aim"? Of course not.

The Bolsheviks took this step in order to make it easy for the backward masses of the people to be convinced of the ineffectiveness of the Constituent Assembly after seeing this with their own eyes, and of its reactionary and counter-revolutionary character. Only in this way was it possible to draw millions and millions of peasant masses towards themselves and to facilitate the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly.

This is what Lenin writes of this:

> "We took part in the elections to the Russian bourgeois parliament, the Constituent Assembly, in September-November 1917. Were our tactics correct or not? Did not we, the Russian Bolsheviks, have more right in September-November 1917 than any Western Communists to consider that parliamentarism was politically obsolete in Russia? Of course we did, for the point is not whether bourgeois parliaments have existed for a long or a short time, but how far the broad mass of the working people are *prepared* (ideologically, politically and practically) to accept the Soviet system and to disperse the bourgeois-democratic parliament (or allow it to be dispersed). That, owing to a number of special conditions, the urban working class and the soldiers and peasants of Russia were in September-November 1917 exceptionally well prepared to accept the Soviet system and to disperse the most democratic of bourgeois parliaments, is an absolutely incontestable and fully established historical fact. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks did *not* boycott the Constituent Assembly, but took part in the elections both before the proletariat conquered political power and *after*....
>
> "The conclusion which follows from this is absolutely incontrovertible; it has been proved that participation in a bourgeois-democratic parliament even a few weeks before the victory of a Soviet republic, and even *after* such a victory, not only does not harm the revolutionary proletariat but actually helps it to *prove* to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be dispersed; it *helps* their successful dispersal, and *helps* to make bourgeois parliamentarism politically obsolete." *

This is how the Bolsheviks applied in practice the third tactical principle of Leninism.

This is how the tactics of Bolshevism must be applied in China, whether it is a question of the agrarian revolution, or the Kuomintang or the slogan of Soviets.

The opposition is apparently inclined to think that the revolution in China has already sustained a complete defeat. This, of course, is not true. There is no doubt that the revolution in China has sustained a temporary defeat, but what this defeat is like and how deep it is, that is the question now.

It is possible that it is almost as prolonged a defeat as that which took place in Russia in 1905, when the revolution was interrupted for a whole twelve years for it to burst forth later in February 1917 with renewed force, to remove autocracy and clear the path for a new Soviet revolution.

This perspective cannot be considered as ruled out. As yet, there is no complete defeat of the revolution in the same way as the defeat in 1905 could not be considered as the final defeat. There is no complete defeat since the main tasks of the Chinese revolution at the present phase of development—the agrarian revolution, the revolutionary unification of China, the liberation from imperialist yoke still await their solution. And if this perspective were to become a reality, then there can be no question of the immediate creation of soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies in China since soviets are formed and flourish only in a situation of a revolutionary upsurge.

But can one consider this perspective as probable?

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* Lenin: **Selected Works**, Moscow 1947, Vol. 2, p. 601.

In any case, for the present, there is no reason to consider it probable. There is no reason since counter-revolution has still not united and will not unite soon, if in general it is destined to unite at any time.

Among the old and new militarists themselves war has broken out afresh and this cannot but weaken the power of counter-revolution, and ruin and embitter the peasantry.

In China there is not yet any group or government capable of carrying out reforms similar to Stolypin's which will serve as a lightning conductor for the ruling group.

It is not easy to bridle and suppress the millions of peasants who have taken possession of the land of the landlords. The prestige of the proletariat among the working masses is rising from day to day and its strength is far from being destroyed.

It is possible that the defeat of the Chinese revolution is similar in its extent to the defeat sustained by the Bolsheviks in July 1917, when the Menshevik and the Socialist-Revolutionary soviets betrayed them, when they were forced to go underground and when a few months later the revolution once again came out in the open in order to sweep off the imperialist government of Russia.

Of course, this analogy is conditional. I admit it only with all the reservations which are necessary if we bear in mind the difference in the situation in China of our day and Russia in 1917. I draw this analogy only to depict approximately the extent of the defeat of the Chinese revolution.

I think this perspective is more probable. And if this perspective becomes a reality, if in the near future —not necessarily after two months, but after six months, after a year—*a new upsurge of the revolution becomes a fact,* then the question of the formation of soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies can become next in turn as the slogan of the day and as a counterpoise to the bourgeois government. Why?

Because, in the conditions of a *new upsurge of the revolution* in the present stage of development, the formation of soviets will become an absolutely urgent question.

Yesterday, a few months ago, the Communists of China ought not to have raised the slogan of the formation of soviets since it would have been the adventurism peculiar to our opposition and since the Kuomintang leadership had not still discredited itself as the enemy of the revolution.

Now, on the contrary, the slogan of the formation of soviets can become a really revolutionary slogan, *if* (if!) in the near future a new and powerful revolutionary upsurge is set ablaze.

It is, therefore, that till the advent of the upsurge along with the struggle for the substitution of the present Kuomintang leadership by a revolutionary leadership, we must carry on the broadest propaganda among the broad masses of the toiling people for the idea of the soviets, without running ahead and without forming soviets right now, with the knowledge that soviets can flourish only in conditions of a mighty revolutionary upsurge.

The opposition may say that it was "the first" to say this and that it is what they termed as the tactics of a "distant aim".

That is not true, my dear ones. It is completely untrue! These are not the tactics of "distant aim" but the tactics of groping, the tactics of perpetual overstepping or of falling short of the mark.

When the opposition demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Communists from the Kuomintang in April 1926, then these were the tactics of *over-stepping* the mark since the opposition itself was compelled to admit later that the Communists must remain in the Kuomintang.

When the opposition declared the Chinese revolution to be a revolution for customs autonomy, then these were the tactics of falling short of the mark, since the opposition itself was compelled later to crawl away from its own formula.

When the opposition declared in April 1927 that feudal survivals were an exaggeration in China having

forgotten about the existence of the mass agrarian movement, then these were the tactics of *falling short of the mark* since the opposition itself was compelled later to admit the mistake tacitly.

When in April 1927 the opposition raised the slogan of the immediate formation of the soviets, then these were the tactics of over-stepping the mark, since the oppositionists were themselves compelled to recognise then the countradictions in their camp, among whom some (Trotsky) demanded that the line of overthrowing the Wuhan Government be adopted, and others (Zinoviev), on the contrary, demanded "every assistance" to this very same Wuhan Government.

But since when have we begun to proclaim the tactics of groping, the tactics of perpetual over-stepping and of falling short of the mark, the tactics of "distant aim"?

As regards the soviets, it is necessary to say that the Comintern had spoken of the soviets in China as the *perspective* in its documents long before the opposition. As regards soviets *as the slogan of the day,* as raised by the opposition in the spring of this year, as opposed to the revolutionary Kuomintang (the Kuomintang was revolutionary at that time; otherwise, what was there for Zinoviev to shout about "every assistance to the Kuomintang"), that was an adventure vociferously running ahead, the same kind of adventure and the same running ahead which Bagdatyev practised in April 1917.

From the fact that the slogan of soviets can become the slogan of the day *in the near future* in China, it does not at all follow that the slogan of soviets raised by the opposition *in spring of this year* was not dangerous and harmful adventurism.

Similarly, from the fact that the slogan "All power to the Soviets" was recognised by Lenin as necessary and timely in *September* 1917 (the famous decision of the C.C. on the uprising)[8] it does not at all follow that the raising of this slogan by Bagdatyev in April 1917 was not harmful and dangerous adventurism.

Bagdatyev could have also said in September 1917

that he was "the first" to speak of the power of the Soviets already in April 1917. Does that mean that Bagdatyev was right and Lenin wrong in characterising this action as adventurism in April 1917?

Evidently the "laurels" of Bagdatyev do not give any rest to our opposition.

The opposition does not understand that the question is not at all one of saying things "first" by running ahead and spoiling the cause of the revolution, but of saying a thing *in time* and saying it in a manner as would be caught up by the masses and *transformed into deeds.*

Such are the facts.

The departure of the opposition from Leninist tactics and the "ultra-Left" adventurism of its policy—such are the results!

CHINA

[Extracts from a Speech on "The International Situation and the Defence of the U.S.S.R." Delivered at a Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (B), August 1, 1927.]

LET US NOW pass to the question of China. I shall not dwell on the mistakes committed by the opposition on the subject of the character and prospects of the Chinese revolution. I shall not do so because enough has been said, and said quite convincingly, on this subject, and it is not worth while repeating it. Nor shall I dwell on the assertion that in its present phase the Chinese revolution is a revolution on behalf of customs autonomy (Trotsky). Nor is it worth dwelling on the assertion that there are no feudal survivals in China, and that, even if there are, they are of no great significance, which renders the agrarian revolution in China absolutely incomprehensible (Trotsky and Radek). You no doubt already know from our Party press of these and similar mistakes of the opposition on the Chinese question.

Let us pass to an examination of the fundamental positions of Leninism on which the solution of the problems of revolution in colonial and dependent countries is based.

What is the fundamental position from which the Comintern and the Communist Parties generally approach the problems of the revolutionary movement in colonial and dependent countries?

It is a strict *differentiation* between revolution in imperialist countries, countries that oppress other peoples, and revolution in colonial and dependent countries, countries that suffer from the imperialist oppression of other states. Revolution in imperialist countries is one thing: in those countries the bourgeoisie is the oppressor of other peoples; it is counter-revolutionary in all stages of the revolution; the national element, as an element in the struggle for emancipation, is absent in these countries. Revolution in colonial and dependent countries is another thing: in these countries the oppression exercised by the imperialism of other states is one of the factors of revolution; this oppression cannot but affect the national bourgeoisie also; the national bourgeoisie, at a certain stage and for a certain period, may support the revolutionary movement of its country against imperialism, and the national element, as an element in the struggle for emancipation, is a revolutionary factor. Not to make this differentiation, not to understand this difference and to identify revolution in imperialist countries with revolution in colonial countries, is to depart from the road of Marxism, from the road of Leninism, and adopt the road of those who support the Second International.

This is what Lenin said on the subject in his report on the national and colonial question at the Second Congress of the Comintern:

> "What is the *most important and fundamental* idea of our theses? It is the *distinction between oppressed and oppressor* peoples. We emphasise this distinction, unlike the Second International and the bourgeois democrats." (*Collected Works*, Vol. XXV, p. 351. My Italics—*J.S.*)

The fundamental mistake of the opposition is that they do not understand and will not admit this difference between the one type of revolution and the other type of revolution.

The fundamental mistake of the opposition is that they *identify* the 1905 Revolution in Russia, an imperialist country, which oppressed other peoples, with the revolution in China, an oppressed country, a semi-

colonial country, which is forced to resist the imperialist oppression of other states.

With us in Russia, in 1905, the revolution was directed against the bourgeoisie, against the liberal bourgeoisie, in spite of the fact that it was a bourgeois-democratic revolution. Why? Because the liberal bourgeoisie of an *imperialist* country is bound to be counter-revolutionary. And that is why the Bolsheviks at that time did not and could not consider temporary blocs and agreements with the liberal bourgeoisie. On these grounds, the opposition assert that the same attitude should be adopted in China in all stages of the revolutionary movement, and that temporary agreements and blocs with the national bourgeoisie in China are impermissible at all times and under all circumstances. But the opposition forget that only people who do not understand and will not admit that there is a difference between revolution in oppressed countries and revolution in oppressor countries can talk like this, that only people who are forsaking Leninism and joining the followers of the Second International can talk like this.

This is what Lenin said as to the permissibility of temporary agreements and blocs with the *bourgeois* liberation movement in colonial countries:

> "The Communist International must join in a *temporary alliance* with the bourgeois democrats of the colonies and backward countries, but not merge with them, and must unconditionally preserve the independence of the proletarian movement even if it is in a quite incipient form." (*Collected Works*, Vol. XXV, p. 290.)
>
> "....We, as Communists, should, and will, *support the bourgeois liberation movements* in the colonial countries only when these movements are truly revolutionary movements, and when their representatives will not hamper us in educating and organising the peasantry and the masses of the exploited in the revolutionary spirit." (*Collected Works*, Vol. XXV, p. 353. My Italics—*J. S.*)

How does it "happen" that Lenin, who fulminated against agreements with the bourgeoisie *in Russia*, regarded such agreements and blocs as permissible *in China*? Perhaps Lenin made a mistake? Perhaps he turned from revolutionary tactics to opportunist tactics? Of course not. It "happened" because Lenin understood the difference between revolution in an oppressed country and revolution in an oppressor country. It "happened" because Lenin understood that at a certain stage of its development the national bourgeoisie in the colonial countries may support the revolutionary movement of its country against foreign imperialism. This is what the opposition do not want to understand; and they do not want to understand it because they are breaking with the revolutionary tactics of Lenin, because they are breaking with the revolutionary tactics of Leninism.

Have you observed how carefully the leaders of the opposition in their speeches evaded these directions of Lenin's, how they feared to refer to them, in spite of the fact that Comrade Bukharin in his report bluntly confronted them with these directions of Lenin's? Why then do they evade these well-known directions given by Lenin on tactics in relation to the colonial and dependent countries? Why do they fear these directions? Because they fear the truth. Because Lenin's directions on tactics refute the whole ideological and political position of Trotskyism on the problems of the Chinese revolution.

Now as to the stages of the Chinese revolution. The opposition have got themselves so entangled that they are denying that there are any stages whatever in the development of the Chinese revolution. But were there ever revolutions without certain stages of development? Did not our revolution have its stages of development? Take Lenin's "April Thesis" and you will see that Lenin discerned two stages in our revolution: the first stage was the bourgeois-democratic revolution, with the agrarian movement as its main axis; the second stage was the October Revolution, with the seizure of power by the proletariat as its main axis.

What are the stages in the Chinese revolution? In my opinion they should be three: the first stage was the revolution of the general national *united* front, the Canton period, when the revolution was striking chiefly at foreign imperialism, and the national bourgeoisie supported the revolutionary movement; the second stage is the bourgeois-democratic revolution, after the national troops reached the Yangtse River, when the national bourgeoisie deserted the revolution and the agrarian movement grew into a mighty revolution of tens of millions of peasants (the Chinese revolution is at present in the second stage of its development); the third stage is the Soviet revolution, which has not yet come about, but which will come about. Whoever does not understand that there are no revolutions without definite stages of development, whoever does not understand that there are three stages in the development of the Chinese revolution, understands nothing either of Marxism or of the Chinese question.

What is the distinguishing feature of the first stage of the Chinese revolution?

The distinguishing feature of the first stage of the Chinese revolution is that, firstly, it was a revolution of a general national united front, and that, secondly, it was directed mainly against foreign imperialist oppression (the Hongkong strike, etc.) Is it true that Canton was then the centre, the *place d'armes* of the revolutionary movement in China? Absolutely. One must be blind not to see that now.

Is it true that the first stage of a colonial revolution must bear precisely such a character? I think it is true. In the Supplementary Theses for the Second Congress of the Communist International, which deal with the revolution in China and India, it is explicitly stated that in those countries "foreign domination perpetually hinders the development of social life" and that "therefore the *first step* of a revolution in the colonies must be to overthrow foreign capitalism." (*Stenographic Report of the Second Congress of the Communist International.* My Italics—*J.S.*)

The distinguishing feature of the Chinese revolution is that it has already made this "first step," that it has already passed through this first stage of its development, the period of the general national united front, and has entered the second stage of its development, the period of the agrarian revolution.

The distinguishing feature, for instance, of the Turkish revolution (the Kemalists), on the contrary, is that it has come to a standstill at the "first step," in the first stage of its development, in the stage of the bourgeois liberation movement, without even attempting to proceed to the second stage of its development, the stage of the agrarian revolution.

What was the nature of the Kuomintang and its government in the first stage of the revolution, the Canton period? They then consisted of a bloc of workers, peasants, bourgeois intellectuals and the national bourgeoisie. Was Canton at that time the centre of the revolutionary movement, the *place d'armes of the* revolution? Was it a correct policy at that time to support the Canton Kuomintang, as a government which stood for the struggle for emancipation from imperialism? Were we right when we supported Canton in China and, let us say, Angora in Turkey at a time when Canton and Angora were fighting imperialism? Yes, we were right. We were right, and we were then following in the footsteps of Lenin; because the struggle of Canton and Angora was causing a dispersion of the forces of imperialism, and enfeebling and undermining imperialism, and was thus facilitating the development of the hearth and home of the world revolution, the U.S.S.R. Is it true that the present leaders of the opposition at that time joined with us in supporting both Canton and Angora by rendering them certain assistance? Yes, it is true. Let nobody dare to doubt it.

But how are we to conceive a united front with the national bourgeoisie in the first stage of a colonial revolution? Does that mean that Communists must not stress the struggle of the workers and peasants

against the landlords and the national bourgeoisie, that the proletariat must sacrifice its independence in the slightest degree or for a single moment? No, it does not. A united front can have revolutionary significance only if and when it does not hinder the Communist Party from conducting its independent political and organisational work, only if it does not prevent it from organising the proletariat into an independent political force, rousing the peasantry against the landlords, openly organising a revolution of workers and peasants and thus preparing the conditions necessary for the hegemony of the proletariat. I think that Comrade Bukharin in his report has fully demonstrated, on the basis of generally known documents, that it was precisely this conception of the united front that the Communist International was inculcating in the Chinese Communist Party.

Comrades Kamenev and Zinoviev have here referred to a single, solitary telegram sent to Shanghai in October 1926, stating that for the time being, until Shanghai was captured, the agrarian movement should not be forced. I am far from admitting that this telegram was right. I have never considered, and do not consider, that our Central Committee has never sinned. Individual mistakes are sometimes made, and this telegram was unquestionably a mistake. But, in the first place, *we ourselves cancelled this telegram* a few weeks later (in November 1926), without any directions whatever having been given by the opposition. In the second place, why have the opposition till now remained silent on this matter, why have they remembered this telegram only *after a lapse of nine months*, and why are they concealing from the Party the fact that this telegram was cancelled by us *nine months ago?* It would therefore be a malicious slander to assert that this telegram was characteristic of the line of our leadership. As a matter of fact, it was an isolated, episodic telegram which was absolutely not characteristic of the line of the Communist International, of the line of our leadership. That is apparent, I repeat, from the fact that it was cancelled within a few weeks by

a number of documents, which laid down a line and which were undoubtedly characteristic of our leadership.

Permit me to quote from these documents.

Here, for instance, is an extract from a resolution adopted by the Seventh Plenum of the Communist International *in November 1926,* i.e., one month after the telegram mentioned above was sent:

> "The peculiar feature of the present situation is its transitional character, in that the proletariat must choose between the prospect of a bloc with large sections of the bourgeoisie and the prospect of the continued consolidation of its alliance with the peasantry. *If the proletariat does not put forward a radical agrarian programme, it will be unable to draw the peasantry into the revolutionary struggle and will forfeit its hegemony in the national liberation movement."* (My italics—*J.S.*)

And further:

> "The Canton People's Government will not be able to retain power in the revolution, will not be able to achieve a complete victory over alien imperialism and native reaction until the cause of national emancipation is *identified with the agrarian revolution." (Resolution of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.* My italics—*J.S.*)

Here you have a document which indeed lays down the line of the leadership of the Communist International.

It is strange indeed that the leaders of the opposition make no mention of this generally known document of the Communist International.

Perhaps it will not be immodest on my part to refer to the speech I myself made in *November of that same year, 1926,* in the Chinese Commission of the Communist International, in which, not without my participation, of course, the resolution of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum on the Chinese question was drawn up. This speech was subsequently published as a sepa-

rate pamphlet entitled *The Prospects of the Revolution in China.* Here are some passages from this speech:

"I know that there are certain people among the members of the Kuomintang, and even among the Chinese Communists, who do not consider it possible to unleash the revolution in the countryside, because they fear that if the peasantry is drawn into the revolution the united anti-imperialist front will be undermined. *This is a profound mistake,* comrades. *The anti-imperialist front in China will be the stronger and more powerful the sooner and more solidly the Chinese peasantry is drawn into the revolution."*

And further:

"I know that there are among the Chinese Communists certain comrades who regard strikes of the workers for the improvement of their material and legal position as undesirable and who dissuade the workers from resorting to strikes. (*Voice:* "That happened in Canton and Shanghai.") That is a big mistake, comrades. That is seriously underrating the role and weight of the proletariat in China. This must be pointed out in the theses as an unquestionably undesirable thing. It would be a big mistake were the Chinese Communists not to take advantage of the present favourable situation in order to assist the workers in improving their material and legal position, if only by strikes. For otherwise what is the revolution in China for?" (*Cf.* Stalin, *The Prospects of the Revolution in China.*)

And here is a third document, dated *December 1926,* written in a period when the Communist International was being bombarded from every city in China with the assertion that the extension of the struggle of the workers would lead to a crisis, to unemployment and the stoppage of mills and factories:

"A general policy of retreat in the towns and the winding-up of the struggle of the workers for

the improvement of their conditions would be *a mistake.* The struggle in the countryside must be extended, but at the same time advantage must be taken of the favourable moment in order to improve the material and legal position of the workers, while striving in every way to lend the struggle of the workers an organised character, so as to preclude excesses and extreme precipitancy. Efforts must particularly be made to have the struggle in the towns directed against the big bourgeoisie, and especially against the imperialists, so that the Chinese petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie should as far as possible be kept within the united front against the common enemy. We regard the system of conciliation boards, boards of arbitration, etc., as expedient, provided that a correct working-class policy is ensured in these institutions. At the same time we deem fit to issue the warning that decrees directed against the right to strike, workers' meetings, etc., are absolutely impermissible. In view of the importance of this subject, send us regular information."

Here is a fourth document, relating to a period one and a half months prior to the *coup* of Chiang Kai-shek:

"The work of the Kuomintang and Communist cells in the army must be intensified; they must be organised wherever they do not now exist and wherever their organisation is possible; where the organisation of Communist cells is impossible, intense work must be carried on with the help of concealed Communists.

"Our course must be steered towards *the arming of the workers and peasants,* the *transformation of the peasants' committees in the localities into the actual organs of power, accompanied by armed self-defence,* etc.

"The Communist Party must everywhere come out as such; a policy of voluntary semi-legality is impermissible; the Communist Party must not act

as a brake on the mass movement; *the Communist Party must not screen the treacherous and reactionary policy of the Kuomintang Rights; in order to expose them the masses must be mobilised around the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party.*

"The attention of all political workers loyal to the revolution must be drawn to the fact that the Chinese revolution at the present moment, owing to a regrouping of class forces and the concentration of the imperialist armies, is passing through a critical period and that its further success is possible only provided vigorous effort is made to develop the mass movement. Otherwise a tremendous danger threatens the revolution. The fulfilment of directives therefore becomes more than ever essential."

And even earlier, in *April 1926,* a year before the *coup* of the Kuomintang Rights and Chiang Kai-shek, the Communist International warned the Chinese Communist Party and pointed out that "matters must be so arranged as to secure the resignation or expulsion of the Rights from the Kuomintang."

That is how the Communist International conceived, and still conceives, the tactics of a united front against imperialism in the first stage of a colonial revolution.

Do the opposition know about these guiding documents? Of course they do. Why then do they hush up these guiding documents? Because they are out to cause trouble and not to achieve the truth.

And yet there was a time when the present leaders of the opposition, especially Comrade Zinoviev and Kamenev, used to have some inkling of Leninism and in the main advocated the same policy with regard to the Chinese revolutionary movement as was pursued by the Communist International and was foreshadowed in his theses by Comrade Lenin. I am referring to the Sixth Plenum of the Communist International, held in *February and March 1926,* when Comrade Zinoviev was

Chairman of the Communist International, when he was still a Leninist and had not yet migrated to the camp of Trotsky. I refer to the Sixth Plenum of the Communist International because there is a resolution of that plenum on the Chinese revolution, which was adopted unanimously in February-March 1926, and in which approximately the same estimate is given of the first stage of Chinese revolution, of the Canton Kuomintang and of the Canton government, as is given by the Communist International and by the C.P.S.U., but from which the opposition are now dissociating themselves. I refer to this resolution because it was voted for by Comrade Zinoviev and because it was not objected to by a single member of the Central Committee, including Comrades Trotsky and Kamenev and the other leaders of the present opposition.

Permit me to quote certain passages from this resolution.

This is what is said in the resolution *on the Kuomintang:*

"The Shanghai and Hongkong political strikes of the Chinese workers (June-September 1925) marked a turning point in the struggle of the Chinese people for emancipation from the foreign imperialists... The political action of the proletariat served as a powerful impulse to the further development and consolidation of all the revolutionary-democratic organisations in the country and especially of the people's revolutionary party, the Kuomintang, and the revolutionary government in Canton. The Kuomintang party, the main body of which acted in an alliance with the Chinese Communists, represents *a revolutionary bloc of workers, peasants, intellectuals, and the urban democracy* based on the community of class interests of these strata as against the foreign imperialists and the whole military-feudal form of life, and aiming at the independence of the country and a single revolutionary-democratic government." (*Re-*

solution of the Sixth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. My Italics—*J. S.*)

Here we have the Canton Kuomintang described as an alliance of four classes. You will see that this is very much like "Martynovism,"[9] sanctified by no less a person than the then Chairman of the Communist International, Comrade Zinoviev.

On the Canton Kuomintang government:

> *"The revolutionary government created by the Kuomintang Party in Canton* has already succeeded in establishing contact with wide masses of workers, peasants, and the urban democracy, and, basing itself on them, has smashed the counter-revolutionary bands supported by the imperialists (and is working for the radical democratisation of the whole political life of the Kwantung Province). Thus, representing as it does the vanguard in the struggle of the Chinese people for independence, *the Canton government serves as a model for the future revolutionary-democratic upbuilding of the country."* (*Ibid.* My Italics—*J.S.*)

It appears that the Canton Kuomintang government, which represented a bloc of four classes, was a *revolutionary* government, and not only revolutionary, but even a *model* for a future revolutionary-democratic government in China.

On a united front of workers, peasants and the bourgeoisie:

> "In face of the new dangers, the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang must develop widespread political work, organising mass action in support of the struggle of the people's armies, taking advantage of the internal contradictions within the camp of the imperialists and opposing to them a *united national revolutionary front of the wide strata of the population* (workers, peasants, *and the bourgeoisie*) under the leadership of revolutionary-democratic organisations." (*Ibid.* My Italics—*J. S.*)

It accordingly appears that temporary blocs and agreements with *the bourgeoisie* in colonial countries at a certain stage of the colonial revolution are not only permissible but definitely necessary.

This is, is it not, very like what Lenin says in his well-known recommendations regarding the tactics of Communists in colonial and dependent countries. Only it is a pity that Comrade Zinoviev has already managed to forget it.

On the question of *withdrawing from the Kuomintang:*

> "Certain sections of the Chinese big bourgeoisie, which had for a time grouped themselves around the Kuomintang Party, have during the past year withdrawn from it, which has resulted in the formation on the Right wing of the Kuomintang of a small group who openly opposed a close alliance between the Kuomintang and the masses of the toilers, were in favour of expelling the Communists from the Kuomintang and were hostile to the revolutionary policy of the Canton government. *The condemnation of this Right wing at the Second Congress of the Kuomintang* (January 1926) *and the re-affirmation of the necessity for a militant alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communists endorse the revolutionary tendency of the activities of the Kuomintang and the Canton government and assure the Kuomintang the revolutionary support of the proletariat."* (*Ibid.* My italics—J.S.)

It appears then that for the Communists to have withdrawn from the Kuomintang in the first stage of the Chinese revolution would have been a serious mistake. Only it is a pity that Comrade Zinoviev, having voted for this resolution, managed to forget it only a month or so later. For it was no later than April 1926 (within a month) that Zinoviev demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Communists from the Kuomintang.

On the deviations within the Chinese Communist Party and the impermissibility of desiring to skip the Kuomintang phase of the revolution:

> "The political self-determination of the Chinese Communists will develop in the struggle against two equally harmful deviations: Right Liquidationism, which ignores the independent class aims of the Chinese proletariat and leads to a loose amalgamation with the general democratic national movement, and the extreme Left sentiments which tend to skip *the revolutionary-democratic stage of the movement* and directly to adopt the aims of the proletarian dictatorship and the Soviet government, *forgetting the peasantry,* that basic and decisive factor in the Chinese movement for national emancipation." (*Ibid.* My italics—J.S.)

Here, as you see, are all the grounds for now convicting the opposition of desiring to skip the Kuomintang phase of development in China, of underestimating the peasant movement, and of a premature sally towards Soviets. It hits the nail on the head.

Is this resolution known to Comrade Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky?

One must assume that it is. At any rate it must be known to Comrade Zinoviev, under whose chairmanship at the Sixth Plenum of the Communist International the resolution was carried, and who himself voted for it. Why are the leaders of the opposition now evading this resolution of the highest body in the world Communist movement? Why are they hushing it up? Because it turns against them on every question of the Chinese revolution. Because it upsets the whole present Trotskyist standpoint of the opposition. Because they have parted ways with the Communist International, with Leninism, and now, fearing their past, fearing their own shadows, are obliged faintheartedly to evade the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Communist International.

That is how matters stand in respect to the first stage of the Chinese revolution.

Let us now proceed to the second stage of the Chinese revolution.

While the first stage was distinguished by the fact that the edge of revolution was directed mainly against foreign imperialism, the distinguishing feature of the second stage is that the edge of revolution is now directed mainly against the internal enemies, and primarily against the feudal lords and the feudal regime. Has the first stage achieved its aim of overthrowing foreign imperialism? No, it has not. It has bequeathed this aim as a heritage to the second stage of the Chinese revolution. It only gave a preliminary jolt in rousing the revolutionary masses against imperialism, only to end its course and leave matters to the future. It must be presumed that neither will the second stage of the revolution entirely succeed in achieving the aim of expelling the imperialists. It will give another jolt in rousing the masses of Chinese workers and peasants against imperialism, but it will do so only to leave the consummation of the cause to the next stage of the Chinese revolution, the Soviet stage. There is nothing surprising in this. Do we not know that there were analogous facts, although in a different situation and under different circumstances, in the history of our revolution? Do we not know that the first stage of our revolution did not entirely achieve its aim of completing the agrarian revolution and that it bequeathed this aim to the next stage of the revolution, the October Revolution, which fully and completely achieved the aim of eradicating the survivals of feudalism? It will therefore be no matter for surprise if the second stage of the Chinese revolution does not entirely succeed in completing the agrarian revolution, and if the second stage of the revolution, having given a jolt to the peasant millions and roused them against the survivals of feudalism, bequeaths the completion of this cause to the next stage of the revolution, the Soviet stage. This will only be to the advantage of the future Soviet revolution in China.

What was the aim of the Communists in the

second stage of the revolution in China, when the centre of the revolutionary movement had been patently transferred from Canton to Wuhan and when, the addition to the revolutionary centre in Wuhan, a counter-revolutionary centre was set up in Nanking? It was to take full advantage of every opportunity for the open organisation of the Party, the proletariat (trade unions), the peasantry (peasant unions), and the revolution generally. It was to impel the Wuhan Kuomintangists to the Left, towards the agrarian revolution. It was to make the Wuhan Kuomintang the centre of the fight against counter-revolution and the nucleus of the future revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

Was this the right policy? The facts have shown that it was the only right policy, the only policy capable of training the masses of workers and peasants for the further development of the revolution.

The opposition at that time demanded the immediate formation of Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies. But this was sheer adventurism, an adventurist sally, for the immediate formation of Soviets at that time would have meant skipping the Left Kuomintang phase of development. Why? Because the Kuomintang in Wuhan, supporting as it did in alliance with the Communists, had not yet managed to discredit and expose itself in the eyes of the masses of workers and peasants and had not yet exhausted itself as a bourgeois revolutionary organisation. Because to have issued the call for Soviets and for the overthrow of the Wuhan government at a time when the masses had not yet grown convinced from their own experience of the worthlessness of that government and the necessity for its overthrow would have meant to rush ahead, to become divorced from the masses, to forfeit the support of the masses and thus to bring about the collapse of the cause undertaken. The opposition think that since they themselves have realised the unreliability, instability and insufficiently revolutionary character of the Wuhan Kuomintang (and it is easy for any qualified political worker to realise that), the masses

must necessarily also realise all this, and that this is sufficient for the Kuomintang to be replaced by Soviets and for the following of the masses to be secured. But this is a customary ultra-Left mistake of the opposition, who confuse their own consciousness and understanding with the consciousness and understanding of the many millions of workers and peasants. The opposition are right when they say that the Party must go ahead. This is an ordinary Marxist proposition, failing the observance of which a Communist Party is not a real Communist Party. But it is only part of the truth. The whole truth consists in the fact that the Party should not only go ahead, but should also *lead* the millions. To go ahead and not lead the millions is in fact to fall behind the movement, to lag in its tail. To go ahead and to lose contact with the rearguard and not to be capable of leading the rearguard is to make the kind of sally which may ruin the advance of the masses for some time. Leninist leadership in fact consists in the vanguard being capable of *leading* the rearguard, in the vanguard going ahead *without losing contact* with the masses. But in order that the vanguard should not lose contact with the masses, in order that the vanguard may be truly capable of leading the millions, one decisive condition is required, namely, *that the masses should have become convinced from their own experience that the instructions, directions and slogans of the vanguard are correct.* The misfortune of the opposition in fact is that they do not recognise this simple Leninist rule for leading the millions; that they do not realise that the Party alone, that an advanced group alone, without the support of the millions, is incapable of accomplishing a revolution, and that in the final analysis a revolution "is made" by the millions of the toilers.

Why in April 1917 did we Bolsheviks not put forward the practical demand for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of a Soviet government, although we were convinced that in the very near future we would be faced with the necessity of overthrowing the Provisional Government

and establishing a Soviet government? Because the masses of the toilers both in the rear and at the front and, finally, the Soviets themselves were not in a position to subscribe to this demand and still believed in the revolutionary nature of the Provisional Government. Because the Provisional Government had not yet managed to disgrace and discredit itself by supporting counter-revolution in the rear and at the front. Why did Lenin stigmatise the Bogdatyev group in Leningrad in April 1917, who put forward the demand for the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of a Soviet government? Because Bogdatyev's attempt was a risky sally and created the danger that the Bolshevik Party might be cut off from the millions of workers and peasants.

Adventurism in politics, Bogdatyevism in the problems of the Chinese revolution—that is what is now so fatal to our Trotskyist opposition.

Comrade Zinoviev says that when I talk about Bogdatyevism I am identifying the present Chinese revolution with the October Revolution. That, of course, is nonsense. In the first place, I myself made the reservation in my article "Notes on Present-Day Themes" that "the analogy here is a conditional one" and that "I grant it with all necessary reservations, bearing in mind the difference between China in our day and Russia in 1917". In the second place, it would be stupid to assert that generally one must not draw analogies with revolutions in other countries when describing given tendencies and given mistakes committed in the revolution of a given country. Does not a revolution in one country learn from revolutions in other countries, even if these revolutions are of a different type? If not, what is the science of revolution reduced to? Zinoviev, in fact, denies the possibility of a science of revolution. Is it not a fact that in the period just prior to the October Revolution Lenin accused Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Steklov and others of the "Louis Blanc-ism" of the French Revolution of 1848? Examine Lenin's article "Louis Blanc-ism" and you

will realise that Lenin made extensive use of analogies with the French Revolution of 1848 in describing the mistakes of various political figures before the October Revolution, even though Lenin was very well aware that the French Revolution of 1848 and our October Revolution were not revolutions of the same type. And if one may speak of the "Louis Blanc-ism" of Chkheidze and Tsereteli in the period prior to the October Revolution, why cannot one speak of the "Bogdatyevism" of Zinoviev and Trotsky in the period of the agrarian revolution in China?

The opposition assert that Wuhan was not a centre of the revolutionary movement. But why then did Comrade Zinoviev declare at the time that "it is necessary to give every assistance" to the Wuhan Kuomintang, so as to make it the centre of the struggle against the Chinese Cavaignacs? Why did the Wuhan territory, and no other, become the centre of maximum development of the agrarian movement? Is it not a fact that it was precisely the Wuhan territory (Hunan, Hupeh) which at the beginning of this year was the centre of maximum development of the agrarian movement? Why may Canton, where there was no mass agrarian movement, be called "*the place d'armes* of the revolution" (Trotsky), whereas Wuhan, on the territory of which the agrarian revolution began and developed, must not be regarded as the centre, the *place d'armes* of the revolutionary movement? How in that case are we to explain the fact that the opposition demanded that the Communist Party should *remain* within the Wuhan Kuomintang and the Wuhan government? Can it be that in April 1927 the opposition favoured a bloc with the "counter-revolutionary" Wuhan Kuomintang? Whence this "forgetfulness' and confusion on the part of the opposition?

The opposition are jubilant over the fact that the bloc with the Wuhan Kuomintang proved to be short-lived; they moreover assert that the Communist International did not warn the Chinese Communists of the possibility of the collapse of the Wuhan Kuomintang. It need hardly be shown that the jubilation

of the opposition only testified to their political bankruptcy. The opposition apparently think that blocs with the national bourgeoisie in colonial countries should be long-lived. But only people who have lost the last remnants of Leninism can think that. The fact that the feudal lords and imperialists in China proved at this stage to be stronger than the revolution, that the pressure exercised by these hostile forces induced the Wuhan Kuomintang to swing to the Right and led to the temporary defeat of the Chinese revolution, can be a cause for jubilation only for people infected with defeatism. As to the assertion of the opposition that the Communist International did not warn the Communist Party of China of the possibility of the collapse of the Wuhan Kuomintang, this is only one of the usual slanders with which the arsenal of the opposition now teems.

Permit me to cite several documents in refutation of the slanders of the opposition. The first document, relating to May 1927:

> "The most important thing in the internal policy of the Kuomintang now must be to develop the agrarian revolution systematically in all the provinces, and particularly in Kwantung, under the slogan 'All Power to the Peasant Unions and Committees in the Rural Districts.' *This is fundamental for the success of the revolution and of the Kuomintang.* This is fundamental for the creation in China of a big and powerful political and military army against imperialism and its agents. Practically, the slogan of confiscating the land is quite timely in the provinces infected by a powerful agrarian movement, such as Hunan, Kwantung, etc. *Without this the extention of the agrarian revolution is impossible....* (My italics—*J.S.*)
>
> "The organisation must immediately be undertaken of eight or ten divisions of revolutionary peasants and workers with an absolutely reliable command. This will serve as a guard for Wuhan both at the front and in the rear for the disarming of

unreliable divisions. This must not be delayed.

"Work must be intensified in the rear and within the divisions of Chiang Kai-shek, in order to disintegrate them, and assistance must be given to the peasant insurrectionaries in Kwantung, where the rule of the landlords is particularly intolerable."

Here is a second document, relating to May 1927:

"*Without an agrarian revolution victory is impossible. Without it the Central Committee of the Kuomintang will be converted into a wretched plaything of unreliable generals.* Excesses must be combated, not however with the help of troops but through the Peasant Unions. We are decidedly in favour of the land actually being seized by the masses from below. The fears regarding Tang Ping-shan's visit are not devoid of foundation.[10] You must not sever yourselves from the worker and peasant movement but must assist it in every possible way. *Otherwise you will ruin the cause.*

"*Certain of the old leaders of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang are afraid of what is taking place, they are vacillating and compromising.* A large number of new peasant and working class leaders from the ranks must be drawn into the Central Committee of the Kuomintang. *Their bold voice will stiffen the backs of the old leaders, or throw them into the discard.* The present structure of the Kuomintang must be changed. The leadership of the Kuomintang must be freshened and reinforced by new leaders who have come to the fore in the agrarian revolution, while local organisations must be enlarged by bringing into them the millions belonging to the working-class and peasant unions. *Otherwise, the Kuomintang runs the risk of becoming divorced from realities and losing every atom of authority.*

"*This dependence upon unreliable generals must be put an end to.* Mobilise about 20,000 Communists, add bout 50,000 revolutionary workers and

peasants from Hunan and Hupeh, form several new army corps, utilise the students of the school for commanders and *organise your own reliable army before it is too late. Otherwise there can be no guarantee against failures. It is a difficult matter, but* there is no other course.

"Organise a Revolutionary Military Tribunal headed by prominent non-Communist Kuomintangists. *Punish officers who maintain contact with Chiang Kai-shek or who set the soldiers on the people, the workers and peasants.* Persuasion is not enough. It is time to act. *The scoundrels must be punished. If the Kuomintangists do not learn to be revolutionary Jacobins they will be lost both to the people and to the revolution.*" (My italics —*J.S.*)

As you see, the Communist International foresaw events, it gave timely admonition of the dangers and warned the Chinese Communists that the Wuhan Kuomintang would perish if the Kuomintangists failed to become revolutionary Jacobins.

Comrade Kamenev said that the policy of the Communist International was responsible for the defeat of the Chinese revolution and that we "bred Cavaignacs in China." Comrades, this sort of thing can be said of the Party only by one who is ready to commit a crime against the Party. This is the sort of thing that the Mensheviks said of the Bolsheviks during the July defeat of 1917, when the Russian Cavaignacs appeared on the scene. In his article "On Slogans," Lenin said that the July defeat was "a victory for the Cavaignacs." The Mensheviks at that time were burning with malice and asserted that Lenin's policy was responsible for the appearance of the Russian Cavaignacs. Does Comrade Kamenev think that the appearance of the Russian Cavaignacs during the July defeat of 1917 was due to the policy of Lenin, the policy of our Party, and not to some other cause? Is it decent for Comrade Kamenev in this case to imitate the Menshevik gentlemen? (*Laughter.*) I did not suspect that the comrades of the

opposition could sink so low... We know that the Revolution of 1905 suffered defeat and that, moreover, that defeat was more profound than the present defeat of the Chinese revolution. The Mensheviks at that time said that it was the extreme revolutionary tactics of the Bolsheviks which were responsible for the defeat of the 1905 Revolution. Does Comrade Kamenev here too propose to take an example from the Menshevik interpretation of the history of our revolution and cast a stone at the Bolsheviks? And how are we to explain the defeat of the Bavarian Soviet Republic? By the policy of Lenin, perhaps, and not by the relation of class forces? How are we to explain the defeat of the Hungarian Soviet Republic? By the policy of the Communist International, perhaps, and not by the relation of class forces? How can it be asserted that the tactics of a party can abolish or reverse the relation of class forces? Was our policy in 1905 correct, or not? Why were we defeated at that time? Do not the facts go to show that if the policy of the opposition had been followed the revolution in China would have suffered defeat sooner than actually was the case? What are we to say of people who forget the relation of class forces in time of revolution and who try to explain everything by the tactics of a party? Only one thing can be said of such people—that they have abandoned Marxism.

What are the conclusions? The chief mistakes of the opposition are as follows:

1. The opposition do not understand the nature and prospects of the Chinese revolution.
2. The opposition can see no difference between the revolution in China and the revolution in Russia, between revolution in colonial countries and revolution in imperialist countries.
3. The opposition are abandoning Leninist tactics in the attitude to be adopted towards the national bourgeoisie in colonial countries in the first stage of revolution.
4. The opposition do not understand the participation of Communists in the Kuomintang.
5. The opposition are violating the foundations

of Leninist tactics in the question of the relations between the vanguard (the Party) and the rearguard (the mass of toilers).

6. The opposition are departing from the resolutions of the Sixth and Seventh Plenums of the Communist International.

The opposition noisily brag about their policy in the Chinese question and assert that had their policy been adopted in China the situation would now be much more favourable. It need hardly be shown that, in view of the gross mistakes committed by the opposition, the Chinese Communist Party, had it adopted the anti-Leninist and adventurist policy of the opposition, would have completely driven itself into an impasse. The fact that the Communist Party in China grew in a very short period from a small group of 2,000 into a mass party of 60,000 members; the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded in organising nearly 3,000,000 proletarians in trade unions during this period; the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded in arousing millions of peasants from their torpor and in drawing tens of millions of peasants into the revolutionary peasant unions; the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded during this period in winning over whole regiments and divisions of national troops; the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded during this period in converting the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat from the wish into a fact—the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded in so brief a period in gaining all these achievements is due incidentally to the fact that it followed the path outlined by Lenin, the path indicated by the Communist International.

It need hardly be said that if the policy of the opposition, with their mistakes and their anti-Leninist line in the problems of colonial revolution, had been followed, these achievements of the Chinese revolution would either never have been secured at all or would have been reduced to a minimum.

Only ultra-Left renegades and adventurists can doubt this.

EXPLANATORY NOTES

[1] Compradores-intermediaries between foreign capital and the local market, comprising a section of the native big trading bourgeoisie in the colonial and dependent countries. The compradore bourgeoisie in China exposed itself as an agent of foreign imperialism and a sworn enemy of the Chinese Revolution in 1925-27).

[2] The Plenum of the CC of the CPSU(B) which took place from 13th to 16th April, 1927, is referred to here. The Plenum discussed a number of questions connected with the Congress of Soviets of the USSR and R.S.F.S.R. and decided the question of the dates for the convening of the 15th Congress of the CPSU (B). On 13th April, J. V. Stalin spoke on the agenda of the day for the Plenum and in the discussion on the Report of M. I. Kalinin "Problems of the Congress of Soviets of USSR and RSFSR". After discussing the Report of the Polit Bureau of the CC of the CPSU (B) on the decisions adopted by them in connection with the international events—the events in China, etc.—the Plenum approved the policy of the Polit Bureau of the CC on the international question and resolutely rejected the anti-Party platform of the Trotskyite- Zinovievite Opposition.

[3] The Cologne Democratic Society which arose in Germany in the period of the bourgeois revolution of 1848 is referred to here. Along with the bourgeois democratic elements the workers also entered this society. Karl Marx was elected to the District Committee of the Democratic Societies of Rhine and Westphalia and was one of its leaders.

[4] The **Neue Rheinische Zeitung** was published in Cologne from 1st June 1848 to 19th May 1849. K. Marx and F. Engels guided the paper and K. Marx was the Chief Editor. On **Neue Rheinische Zeitung** cf. K. Marx and F. Engels, **Collected Works**, Russian edition, Vol. XVI, Part I, 1937, pp. 165-173.

[5] **Cf.** Stalin: **Collected Works**, Vol. 7. p. 147-246.

[6] The resolution of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on the question of the situation in China, which was adopted on 16th December 1926 is referred to here. Resolution of the Plenum **Cf.** in the book **Theses and Resolutions of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International**—M.L. 1927.

[7] 'Red Lances'—armed detachments of self-defence in the Chinese countryside, fighting against the oppression of the landlords and militarists. In the period of the Chinese revolution of 1925-27, the 'Red Lances' and similar peasant organisations ('Yellow Lances', 'Black Lances,' 'Big Knives,' 'Tightened Belts', etc.) rendered considerable assistance to the national revolutionary army in the struggle for the independence of China.

[8] V. I. Lenin in his article and Letters from underground to the Central Committee and to the Bolshevik organisations put forward in September 1917 the slogan of "All power to the Soviets" as the imme-

diate task for organisation of an armed uprising (cf. **Collected Works**, 3rd Russian edition, Vol. XXI, pp. 137-148, and 193-99). At the discussion of V. I. Lenin's letter at the session of the Central Committee of the Party on 15th September, J. V. Stalin gave a resolute rebuff to the capitulator Kamenev, who demanded the cancellation of these documents, and proposed the circulation of letters of V. I. Lenin for discussion in the biggest Party organisations. On 10th October 1917, with the participation of V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin, Y. M. Sverdlov, F E. Dzherzhensky, M. S. Uritsky, the historic session of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party was held at which a decision was adopted on the armed uprising about which V. I. Lenin had written. (Cf. V. I. Lenin: **Collected Works**, Vol. XXI, 3rd Russian edition, p. 330.)

[9] **Martynovism**—after A. Martynov (a former Menshevik who was admitted into the ranks of the C.P.S.U. at the Twelfth Congress). In one of his articles on the Chinese revolution Martynov advocated a peaceful passage to the dictatorship of the proletariat "without decisive collisions and acute conflicts with the existing government, without a second revolution." The anti-Party Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc endeavoured in every way to lay the responsibility for this erroneous thesis of Martynov's on the leadership of the Communist International and the C.P.S.U.

[10] **Tang Ping-shan** was a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and at one time its representative on the Executive Committee of the Communist International. In 1927, while Minister of Agriculture of the Wuhan Government, he endeavoured in every way to hinder the development of the agrarian revolution in China. He was later expelled from the Party and went over to the counter-revolutionaries.