THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE — KARL MARX

The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte

by

KARL MARX

Translated by

EDEN & CEDAR PAUL

THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE
OF LOUIS BONAPARTE

by Karl Marx

CAPITAL

Translated from the fourth German Edition by Eden and Cedar Paul

CAPITAL

Translated from the third German Edition by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling edited by Frederick Engels A photographic reprint of the stereotyped edition of 1889, edited by Dona Torr

REVOLUTION AND COUNTER REVOLUTION
OR GERMANY IN 1848

VALUE, PRICE AND PROFIT

SELECTED ESSAYS

Karl Marx

THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE

OF LOUIS BONAPARTE

TRANSLATED BY
EDEN AND CEDAR
PAUL

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PUBLISHERS' NOTE

MARX's famous book, *Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte*, was first published in the United States in the year 1852. When it was reprinted at Hamburg in the year 1869, the author (so he tells us) "cut out some allusions which the lapse of time had rendered incomprehensible." Pages 23 to 144 of the present volume comprise a new translation of the 1869 reprint, recently reissued in a convenient form by Dietz of Stuttgart (fifth edition, 1922). But in the case of this noted classic, many readers will like to have the opportunity of studying the work as originally penned, so a translation of the suppressed passages has been added in an appendix. For the original German text of these passages, the translators are indebted to the kindness of D. Ryazanoff, professor at the University of Moscow, director of the Marx-Engels Institute, and probably the greatest living authority on Marxist literature. The transcript used in preparing the appendix was made from the copy of the 1852 edition now in the possession of the Marx-Engels Institute—the only copy known to exist. The present volume is thus the first complete presentation of the *Eighteenth Brumaire* since 1852.

The translators have prefixed an English version of the author's preface to the Hamburg reprint, and also of Friedrich Engels' preface to the third German edition.

In the hope of making the study of this classic easier, the translators have, furthermore, ventured to write a foreword; and have added a chronological table, a glossary with biographical and other notes, and an index. The chapter headings have been supplied by the translators, but these are mainly compiled from Marx's own summary on pp. 125 to 126.

LONDON,
March 1, 1926.

TRANSLATORS' FOREWORD

THE historical study of which we here present a new English translation was completed within a few weeks of the close of the series of events it describes. In his introduction to the reprint of 1869, Marx explains his fundamental aim in writing the *Eighteenth Brumaire* seventeen years earlier. He did not, like Victor Hugo at the same date, seek mainly to show that Louis Bonaparte was "Napoleon the Little." Still less did he, like Proudhon, wish to pen a historical apology for the "hero" of the coup d'état of December 2, 1851. "*For my part, I prove that the class war in France created circumstances and relationships that enabled a grotesque mediocrity to strut about in a hero's garb.*" Engels stresses this aspect of the book in his preface to the third German edition. Both these prefaces are reproduced here, in English translation. But it is so important for the student to understand that, before all, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* is an object lesson in the Marxist interpretation of history, that we wish to emphasize the point yet further by quoting a passage from the book itself. This is one of the first drafts of the famous theory which is now spoken of as the materialist conception of history.

Marx shows that the legitimists represented landed property; whereas the Orleanists represented the new interests of the financiers, the captains of industry, and the merchants. Of course, no one need trouble to deny that these respective partisans had sentimental attachments to the rival houses. But what was the cause of their feelings? "*Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence, as foundation, there is built a superstructure of diversified and characteristic sentiments, illusions, habits of thought, and outlooks on life in general. The class as a whole creates and shapes them out of its material foundation, and out of the corresponding social*

relationships. The individual in whom they arise through tradition and education, may fancy them to be the true determinants, the real origin, of his activities." But this, Marx goes on to say, is one of the many instances in which we must learn to distinguish appearance from reality.

Such is the Marxist philosophy of history. Such is the fundamental message of the *Eighteenth Brumaire*.

The fundamental message, but by no means the only message! The book is full of references to problems with which the working-class movement is still wrestling, more than seventy years after it was written. That is why it is so fresh, so actual, to-day. This statement can best be illustrated by putting a few more quotations in the limelight. No moral need be pointed; the application in each case is clear.

On p. 32, Marx refers to the disastrous results of an alliance between the revolutionary workers and the democratic bourgeois and petty-bourgeois reformists. "*The proletariat then had recourse to doctrinaire experiments, to 'cooperative banking' and 'labour exchange' schemes. In other words, the proletariat became associated with a movement which had renounced the attempt to revolutionize the old world by the strength of its united forces, hoping rather to attain emancipation behind the back of society, privately, and within the bounds of its own restricted vital conditions. Every such attempt is foredoomed to failure.*"

Contrasting proletarian revolutions with bourgeois revolutions, Marx tells us on pp. 27–28 that the former "*are ever self-critical; they again and again stop short in their progress; retrace their steps in order to make a fresh start; are pitilessly scornful of the half-measures, the weaknesses, the futility of their preliminary essays. It seems as if they had overthrown their adversaries only in order that these might draw renewed strength from contact with the earth, and return to the battle like giants refreshed. Again and again, they shrink back appalled before the vague immensity of their own aims. But, at long last, a situation is reached whence retreat is impossible. . . .*"

In another passage (p. 26) Marx looks forward hopefully

to the working-class revolution, which will not, like the English revolution in the days of the Parliamentary Wars, deck itself in Old Testament trappings, nor, like the French revolution at the close of the eighteenth century, don the toga and prate of Brutus and Gracchus: "*The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot draw its figurative embellishments from the past; it must create them anew out of the future. It cannot begin its work until it has rid itself of all the ancient superstitions. Earlier revolutions had need of the reminiscences of historic pageantry, for thus only could they bemuse themselves as to their own significance. The revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury their dead, for thus only can it discover its own true meaning. In those earlier revolutions, there was more phrase than substance; in the revolution that is to come, there will be more substance than phrase.*"

Here is a pitiless characterization of the democratic phrasemongers of the movement, of those whom Marx elsewhere describes as suffering from the incurable disease of "parliamentary imbecility": "*No doubt the democrats had honestly believed that the walls of Jericho would fall at the sound of their martial music. Democrats always expect this miracle when they stand before the ramparts of despotism. . . . But the revolutionary threats of petty bourgeois and their democratic representatives are nothing more than attempts to frighten the enemy. . . . When the time comes for the guns to be fired, the actors cease to take themselves seriously, the action collapses like a pricked air-balloon*" (pp. 60–61).

In another biting passage we seem to be reading Marx's characterization of the reformists of three-quarters of a century later—for the illusion of reformism is perennial, and the quintessential weakness of democratic dreamers is an inability to face the facts of the class war in contemporary society. Nay more, the world of fancy is to them the real world; and the only time they put up a stout fight is against the realists who are trying to bring them down out of the fairy-land of dreams. The "worshipful democrats," writes Marx (p. 28), the sufferers from "parliamentary imbecility," "the weaklings," *believed that the enemy had*

been routed because they had routed him in imagination. They lost all understanding of present realities, because in fancy they dwelt in a heavenly future; they were satisfied with the exploits they had performed in the sanctuary of their minds, but which they were not willing to put to the touch in the world of the actual."—Give socialism; but not in our time O Lord!

In the following passage (p. 58), when it is applied to contemporary British conditions, we must of course recognize that the word "republican" is out of date, and that an insular term must be substituted for "social democracy." With these reservations, the application is obvious. "*The essential characteristic of social democracy is as follows. Democratic republican institutions are demanded as a means, not for the abolition of the two extremes, Capital and Wage Labour, but for the mitigation of their opposition, and for the transformation of their discord into a harmony. Various ways of attaining this harmony may be advocated, and the different proposals may be adorned with a more or less revolutionary trimming, but the substance is always the same. The substantial aim of social democracy is to transform society by the democratic method, the transformation being always kept within the petty-bourgeois orbit.*" But these reformers are not crudely selfish. "*The petty bourgeois believe that the special conditions requisite for their own liberation are likewise the general conditions requisite for the salvation of modern society. They think that in no other way can society be saved and the class war averted.*"

Nor, of course, are the class-conscious workers crudely selfish when they believe that their own class interest is also the true social interest; and that modern society will be saved, not by seeking to avert the class war, but by rallying the workers along the whole international fighting front. Are the working-class revolutionists, in their turn, under an illusion? Time will show! At any rate, the *Eighteenth Brumaire* is a textbook of unrivalled value for those who are using the lessons of recent history to intensify the revolutionary class-consciousness of the workers.

Several more parallels might be drawn. A passing reference may, for instance, be made to the attempt of the Parisian

proletariat, on May 15, 1848, nine days after the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly, "*to deny its existence by force, to dissolve it, to disintegrate the organic unity which the spirit of the nation had formed as a reaction against the Parisian workers*" (p. 31). For the Constituent Assembly "*was an embodied protest against the aspirations of the February days, and its aim was to guide the revolution back into bourgeois channels.*" How clear is the analogy with Russia in 1917–18! And how plain the difference! The Parisian workers were the under dogs in their struggle with the organized forces of the State. "*The only result of the demonstration of May 15th. was that Blanqui and his associates, the real leaders of the proletarian party, were removed from the stage for the whole period of the cycle now under consideration.*"

If the February days and the demonstration of May 15, 1848, were sketchy and frustrate anticipations of the November days in Russia and the forcible dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by the bolsheviks, Louis Bonaparte and the Society of December the Tenth may be regarded as foreshadowings of Mussolini and the Fascist Organization. Consider this passage from pp. 84–85: "*The Society of December the Tenth was for Bonaparte his own partisan fighting force. On his journeys, detachments composed of members of the Society were packed away in the train, to improvize an audience for him, to display the enthusiasm of the 'public' to shout 'vive l'Empereur,' to insult and bludgeon the republicans (of course with the connivance of the police!). When he returned to Paris, those faithful henchmen must be the vanguard, to forestall or break up counter-demonstrations. The Society of December the Tenth belonged to him, was his creature, the child of his own thought. Other things he acquires are acquired thanks to the favour of circumstances; his other actions are really done for him by circumstances, unless when he is content to copy the doings of others. But the Bonaparte who struts before the citizens mouthing formal phrases about Order, Religion, the Family, and Property, while backed up by this secret society of blackguards and rakehells, the Society of Disorder, Prostitution, and Theft, is*

Bonaparte as an original author. The history of the Society of December the Tenth is his own history."

To conclude these historical parallels, what a light is thrown on the success of the Russian revolution, and on the failure of the Italian revolution, by the following passage (p. 31): "*While the Parisian proletariat was still gloating over the great prospects opened up by the revolution, and while the workers were engaged in the earnest discussion of social problems, the old forces of society had come together, had taken counsel, and had secured unexpected support from the masses of the nation—from the peasants and the petty bourgeois.*"

From the peasants and the petty bourgeois! In Great Britain the petty-bourgeois difficulty looms very large, whereas the problem of the revolution is complicated by the fact that there is no peasantry, to speak of, in these islands, which cannot feed more than half the population. (May internationalists be forgiven for including Ireland as one of "these islands"?)

In most continental countries, on the other hand, in France and Germany as in Russia, the peasantry is the main prop of the established order, the main barrier to revolutionary change. Marx, writing early in 1852, when the French peasantry was burdened with debt, had hopes in this quarter. We are less sanguine to-day. The problem of the peasantry in relation to progress cannot be discussed here. Enough to say that, despite over-sanguine expectations, the last chapter of the *Eighteenth Brumaire*, in which the author gives a pitiless description of the French peasantry, is quite as illuminating as the foregoing six chapters.

All through the book, Marx's analysis of class relations is a crushing answer to those who say that there is nothing in Marxism but a crude contrasting of "bourgeoisie" and "proletariat." The landed interest, commercial capital, industrial capital, the beginnings of financial capital, are all distinguished one from the other, and their class embodiments set forth. The workers are shown as a sprinkling of revolutionaries trying to leaven the lump of those who are spoken of to-day as "dubbs." The peasants are shown as a class apart.

Fundamentally, of course, three types of mentality, three political complexes, are analyzed as characteristic of modern capitalist society: the bourgeois; the petty-bourgeois; the proletarian. Besides the typical petty bourgeois class (the lower middle class of Great Britain), the dubb workers and the peasants have a petty-bourgeois ideology. The petty bourgeois, whether by birth, occupation, or outlook, are always tools of the reaction, pawns in the capitalist game. That is one of the many lessons of a book which remains as topical to-day as it was when Marx sent it forth on its voyage across the Atlantic.

LONDON,
January 1, 1926.

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KARL MARX'S PREFACE TO THE FIRST GERMAN REPRINT

MY prematurely deceased friend Joseph Weydemeyer had planned the issue of a political weekly in New York City. The first number was to appear on January 1, 1852. He asked me to contribute a history of the coup d'état. Week by week, therefore, down to the middle of February 1852, I sent him a series of articles entitled *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Meanwhile, Weydemeyer's plans for a weekly periodical had fallen through. Instead, in the spring of 1852, he began the publication of a monthly magazine, "Die Revolution." The second number of this was my *Eighteenth Brumaire*. Several hundred copies found their way to Germany, but it was not on sale at ordinary booksellers'. One German bookseller, a man who professed extremely radical views, to whom I suggested that he should stock my booklet, was morally outraged by "so inopportune a proposal."

It will be obvious from what I have said that this little work was written immediately after the events to which it relates, and that it carries the history of these events, no further than the middle of February 1852. Its reissue is due to a demand in the book-trade, and to the urgent solicitations of my friends in Germany.

Among books which, almost simultaneously with mine, discussed Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état, only two are worth mentioning: Victor Hugo's *Napoléon le Petit*; and Proudhon's *Coup d'état*.

Victor Hugo confines himself to a scathing and brilliantly worded polemic against the man personally responsible for the coup d'état. To him the incident resembles a thunder clap in a clear sky. He can see nothing but the arbitrary act of an isolated individual. Hugo fails to realize

that he makes this individual seem great instead of small by ascribing to him a capacity for personal initiative without parallel in history. Proudhon, on the other hand, tries to show that the coup d'état was the outcome of an antecedent historical development. But in his case an exposition of the coup d'état becomes transformed into a historical apology for the hero who effected it. Proudhon thus falls into the mistake of the so-called objective historians. For my part, I prove that the class war in France created circumstances and relationships that enabled a grotesque mediocrity to strut about in a hero's garb.

An attempt to elaborate my essay would have robbed it of its characteristic colouring. I have been content to correct misprints, and to cut out some allusions which the lapse of time has rendered incomprehensible.

My *Eighteenth Brumaire* closes with the words: "If the imperial mantle should, in the end, fall upon the shoulders of Louis Bonaparte, the iron statue of Napoleon will crash from the top of the Vendôme column." This prophecy has already been fulfilled.

Colonel Charras opened the attack on Napoleon worship in his book upon the campaign of 1815. Since then, and especially of late years, French literature, using the weapons of historical research, criticism, satire, and wit, has made an end of the Napoleonic legend. Outside France, this forcible breach with the traditional popular belief, this immense spiritual revolution, has been little noticed and even less understood.

Finally, I hope that my little book may contribute to give its quietus to the talk of "Caesarism" which is nowadays current in Germany. The notion of Caesarism is based upon a superficial historical analogy. Those who entertain it forget that in classical Rome the class war was carried on only within the pale of a privileged minority, between the free rich and the free poor. The slaves, who formed the great productive mass of the population, were nothing more than a passive pedestal upon which the struggle was waged. People have forgotten Sismondi's notable utterance: "The Roman proletariat lived at the expense

of society, whereas modern society lives at the expense of the proletariat." So extensive are the differences between the material, the economic, conditions of the class war in classical and in modern times, that the political incidents born out of the struggle in one epoch and the other can have no more resemblance to one another than the Archbishop of Canterbury has to the High Priest Samuel.

LONDON,
June 23, 1869.

FRIEDRICH ENGELS' PREFACE TO THE THIRD GERMAN EDITION

THE obvious need for a third edition of Marx's *Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte*, thirty-three years after its first publication, shows that, even to-day, this important work has lost none of its value.

It is, in truth, a work of genius. The coup d'état took the political world by surprise; it came like a bolt from the blue. Some, filled with righteous indignation, vociferously condemned it; others accepted it as a means of saving them from the revolution which was thus punished for its sins. To every one it came as a surprise, and no one could understand it. Then, immediately on the heels of the event, Marx published his terse and biting study of French history since the February days. The book shows forth the inevitable sequence of events, and presents the miracle of December 2nd. as the necessary and natural result of this series of happenings, while treating the hero of the coup d'état with the contempt he deserves. The picture was drawn by so masterly a hand that when, later, revelations were published, these only went to prove how faithfully Marx had dealt with reality. Never have we had an example of so fine a penetration into the meaning of living history, history as it is written before our very eyes from day to day. This insight was due to Marx's profound knowledge of French history.

In France more than anywhere else, the historical class struggles were always fought to a finish. Thus it is that in France the changing political forms, within which the movements of the class war take place, and in which the results of these movements find expression, are outlined with exceptional sharpness. In the Middle Ages, France was the stronghold of feudalism. After the Renaissance, France was

the most typical seat of a unified monarchy grounded upon the estates of the realm. In the great revolution, France swept feudalism away and established the hegemony of the bourgeoisie, doing this with an exemplary completeness not achieved in any other European country. In France, too, the fight of the aspiring proletariat against the dominant bourgeoisie assumes a fierceness unparalleled elsewhere.

That was why Marx did not only study the past history of France with especial predilection, but also kept his eyes fixed upon all the current details of French affairs, collecting materials for future researches, so that he could never be taken unawares by events.

Yet another fact contributed to this result. Marx was the first to discover the great law which governs the march of history. According to this law, all historical struggles, although they seem to take place on the political, religious, philosophical, or any other ideal plane, are, in reality, nothing else than the more or less clear expression of struggles between social classes. The existence of these classes and their collisions, are themselves determined by the degree of development in the economic situation, by the prevailing mode of production, and by the methods of exchange which result. This law bears the same relationship to history as the law of the conservation of energy bears towards the physical sciences. It provides Marx with the key to the understanding of the history of the Second Republic in France. *The Eighteenth Brumaire* served Marx to test and to prove this law. Now, after the lapse of thirty-three years, we have to admit that the proof has stood the test of time.

THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE

CHAPTER ONE

FEBRUARY 23–JUNE 27, 1848

General Considerations—Difference between bourgeois and proletarian Revolutions—First Stage: the February Revolution to the June Days, when the other Classes made common Cause against the Proletariat.

HEGEL says somewhere that, upon the stage of universal history, all great events and personalities reappear in one fashion or another. He forgot to add that, on the first occasion, they appear as tragedy; on the second, as farce. Caussidière replaces Danton; Louis Blanc, Robespierre; the Mountain of 1848–1851, the Mountain of 1793–1795; the nephew Louis Bonaparte replaces his uncle. In the circumstances amid which the reissue of the *Eighteenth Brumaire* occurs (1869), we see the same caricature.

Men make their own history, but not just as they please. They do not choose the circumstances for themselves, but have to work upon circumstances as they find them, have to fashion the material handed down by the past. The legacy of the dead generations weighs like an alp upon the brains of the living. At the very time when they seem to be engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, when they seem to be creating something perfectly new—in such epochs of revolutionary crisis, they are eager to press the spirits of the past into their service, borrowing the names of the dead, reviving old war-cries, dressing up in traditional costumes, that they may make a braver pageant in the newly-staged scene of universal history. Thus did Luther masquerade as Paul of Tarsus; thus did the revolution of

1789–1814, drape itself successively as the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire; and thus was it that the revolution of 1848 could find nothing better to do than to parody by turns 1789 and the revolutionary traditions of 1793–1795. In like manner, the learner of a new language begins by translating every word and every phrase into his mother tongue. He does not acquire the freedom of the city in his new speech, he is not at home there, until he has become able to break away from the memories of the language he learned in the nursery, and until he can use the new instrument without thinking of the old.

When we study these callings up of the dead upon the stage of universal history, we forthwith become aware of a remarkable difference. Camille Desmoulins, Danton, Robespierre, Saint-Just, Napoleon, the heroes as well as the parties and the masses of the great French revolution, though they donned Roman garb and mouthed Roman phrases, nevertheless achieved the task of their day—which was to liberate the bourgeoisie and to establish modern bourgeois society. The Jacobins broke up the ground in which feudalism had been rooted, and struck off the heads of the feudal magnates who had grown there. Napoleon established throughout France the conditions which made it possible for free competition to develop, for landed property to be exploited after the partition of the great estates, and for the nation's powers of industrial production to be utilized to the full. Across the frontiers he everywhere made a clearance of feudal institutions, in so far as this was requisite to provide French bourgeois society with a suitable environment upon the continent of Europe. As soon as the new social forms had come into being, the antediluvian titans and the resuscitated Romanism vanished. No more was heard of Brutus, Gracchus, and Publicola. The tribunes, the senators, and even Caesar himself, were bowed off the stage. In its sober reality, bourgeois society had produced its own interpreters in such men as Say, Cousin, Royer-Collard, Benjamin Constant, and Guizot; its real military commanders were in the counting-houses; and Louis XVIII, the fat-head, was its political chief. Absorbed in money-

making and in the peaceful warfare of competition, it forgot that the shades of ancient Rome had sat beside its cradle. Nevertheless, unheroic though bourgeois society may seem, heroism had been needed to bring it into being—heroism, self-sacrifice, the Reign of Terror, civil war, and the slaughter of the battle-fields. In the stern classical traditions of the Roman Republic, its gladiators found the ideals and the forms, the means of self-deception, they needed, that they might hide from themselves the bourgeois limitations of the struggle in which they were engaged, and might sustain their passion at the level appropriate to a great historic tragedy. In like manner, more than a century earlier, and in another phase of development, Cromwell and the English people had borrowed the phraseology, the emotions, and the illusions of the Old Testament as trappings for their own bourgeois revolution. As soon as they had reached the goal, as soon as the bourgeois transformation of English society had been effected, Locke supplanted Habakkuk.

Thus in the great French revolution and the British revolution of the seventeenth century, the calling up of the shades of the dead took place in order to embellish the new struggles, and not in order to parody the old; it was done for the sake of adding an imaginative halo to the tasks that had to be performed, and not in search of an excuse for refraining from their actual performance; there was a genuine endeavour to rediscover the spirit of revolution, and not the mere making of a ghost to walk.

But from 1848 to 1851 there was nothing more than a walking of the ghost of the old revolution—now in the form of Marrast, "le républicain en gants jaunes," dressed up as Bailly; and now in the form of the adventurer who hid his commonplace and unpleasing physiognomy behind the iron death-mask of Napoleon. A whole people, which had fancied it could quicken its advance by a revolution, suddenly finds itself back in a dead era. That there may be no mistake about the backsliding, the old calendar is revived. Back come the old names; the old edicts, which had for years been nothing more than topics for antiquarian research; and the old catchpolls, long since supposedly tottering to

decay. The nation assumes the aspect of the crazy Englishman in Bedlam who believes himself to be living in the time of the Pharaohs, and day by day bewails his lot as one forced to hard labour in the Ethiopian gold-mines; he declares himself to be immured in these subterranean galleries; for only light, he has the fitful gleam of a lamp fastened to his head; behind him stands the overseer, whip in hand; the exits are guarded by a rout of barbarian slaves, prisoners of war who cannot understand the speech of the convicts, nor even one another, for they have no common tongue. "All this," says the madman, "is imposed on me, a free-born Briton, that I may quarry gold for Pharaoh." In like manner do the French sigh: "We are being compelled to pay the debts of the Bonaparte family." The Englishman, before he went quite mad and had to be put under restraint, was suffering from a fixed idea of money-making. The French, while they were still in revolutionary mood, could not free their minds of Napoleonic memories. This was plainly shown by the election of December 10, 1848, when Louis Bonaparte became President of the Republic. They longed to escape from the dangers of revolution; they hankered after the fleshpots of Egypt; and the coup d'état of December 2, 1851, was the answer. They have something more than a mere travesty of the old Napoleon. The old Napoleon has come back in person, though ridiculously transfigured, as is inevitable in the middle of the nineteenth century.

The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot draw its figurative embellishments from the past; it must create them anew out of the future. It cannot begin its work until it has rid itself of all the ancient superstitions. Earlier revolutions had need of the reminiscences of historic pageantry, for thus only could they bemuse themselves as to their own significance. The revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury their dead, for thus only can it discover its own true meaning. In those earlier revolutions, there was more phrase than substance; in the revolution that is to come, there will be more substance than phrase.

In the revolution of February 1848, the old society was taken by surprise. The people thereupon declared that this coup de main, this unexpected achievement, marked a phase in universal history, was the opening of a new epoch. On December 2nd., the February revolution was jockeyed out of its gains by a conjuring trick. As a result, what was overthrown by that revolution was no longer the monarchy, but the liberal concessions that had been wrung from the monarchy by centuries of struggle. We see, that, after all, society has not entered upon a new phase. Instead, the State has gone back to its earliest form, in which the sword rules without shame and club-law prevails. Thus is the coup de main of February 1848 answered by the coup de tête of December 1851. Thus do losses follow gains. But the four years have been turned to good account! Properly speaking, if the February revolution were to be more than a ripple on the surface, it should (according to the rules of an orderly development) have been preceded by certain studies and experiences. During the four years from the beginning of 1848 to the end of 1851, these studies and experiences were effected after a fashion that was abbreviated because it was revolutionary. Society now seems to have gone back further than the point from which it set out on the adventure. In actual fact, however, it must first create the point of revolutionary departure—must provide the situation, the relationships, the conditions, under which alone a modern revolution can become a serious matter.

Bourgeois revolutions like those of the eighteenth century speed from success to success; they vie with one another in the lustre of their stage effects; men and things seem to be set in sparkling brilliants; every day is filled with ecstasy: but they are shortlived; their climax is soon reached; on the morning after, society has to pass through a long fit of the dumps; and only when that is over can there be a dispassionate assimilation of the achievements of the period of storm and stress. Proletarian revolutions, on the other hand, like those of the nineteenth century, are ever self-critical; they again and again stop short in their progress;

retrace their steps in order to make a fresh start; are pitilessly scornful of the half-measures, the weaknesses, the futility of their preliminary essays. It seems as if they had overthrown their adversaries only in order that these might draw renewed strength from contact with the earth, and return to the battle like giants refreshed. Again and again, they shrink back appalled before the vague immensity of their own aims. But, at long last, a situation is reached whence retreat is impossible, and where the circumstances clamour in chorus:

> Hic Rhodus, hic salta!
>
> Here is the Rose; dance here!

Every one with average powers of observation, even those who paid little attention to what was going on in France, must have foreseen the likelihood that the February revolution would end in ignominious failure. It was enough to listen to the pæans of mutual congratulation with which the worshipful democrats congratulated one another on the glorious expectations of what was to happen on May 2, 1852. This date, May 2, 1852, had become for them an obsession, a dogma. They looked forward to it as to the day of Christ's second coming, the day when the millennium was to begin. As always, weakness sought refuge in the land of miracle. The weaklings believed that the enemy had been routed because they had routed him in imagination. They lost all understanding of present realities, because in fancy they dwelt in a heavenly future; they were satisfied with the exploits they had performed in the sanctuary of their minds, but which they were not willing to put to the touch in the world of the actual. These heroes being of the type of those who try to disprove their manifest incompetence by exchanging condolences and by gathering in a swarm, had packed their valises, had pocketed their laurels in advance, and were busied on the stock exchange discounting the republics *in partibus* for which (tacitly and unassumingly) they had already been so thoughtful as to

nominate the ministers of State. The coup d'état of December 2nd. came to them as a bolt from the blue. The peoples, ever prone in times of pusillanimity and depression to allow the voice of their inward misgivings to be drowned by the clamour of those who can shout loudest, will perhaps at length have learned the lesson that we no longer live in days when the cackling of geese can save the Capitol.

Constitution, National Assembly, dynastic parties, republicans blue and red, the heroes of Africa, the thunder of oratory, the lightnings of the daily press, a whole literature, political notables and intellectual celebrities, law both civil and criminal, "liberté, égalite, fraternité," and May 2, 1852—all, all, melted away like a dream at the conjuration of a man whom even his enemies have never been inclined to regard as a master magician. Universal suffrage seems to have survived only for a moment, in order that it might before all men's eyes write a holograph will, declaring in the name of the people: "Everything that exists is fit for the scrap-heap."

It is no excuse to say, as the French say, that the nation was taken by surprise. Neither a nation nor a woman can be forgiven for the unguarded hour in which a chance comer has seized the opportunity for an act of rape. Such shifts do not solve our riddle; they merely thrust the problem a stage further back. What still has to be explained is how a nation of thirty-six million persons can have been surprised by three swell mobsmen, and unresistingly carried off to prison.

Let us in broad outline recapitulate the phases through which the French revolution passed between February 24, 1848, and December 1851.

Obviously, there were three main periods: the February period; the period of establishing the republic, or the period of the Constituent National Assembly, lasting from May 4, 1848, to May 29, 1849; the period of the constitutional republic, or the period of the Legislative National Assembly, lasting from May 29, 1849, to December 2, 1851.

The first period, which began on February 24, 1848, with the fall of Louis Philippe, and ended on May 4, 1848, with

the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly, was the genuine February period, and may be described as the prologue to the revolution. The official stamp was given to this phase by the way in which the improvised government of February declared itself provisional. Everything that was broached, attempted, or uttered during this period, was, like the government, declared provisional. Nobody and nothing ventured to claim the right of the thing that is, the right of actuality. The multifarious elements that had planned or caused the revolution—dynastic opposition, republican bourgeoisie, democratic republican, petty bourgeoisie, social democratic working-class—one and all found " provisional " places in the February Government.

How could it have been otherwise? The original aim of the February revolution was to bring about an electoral reform, whereby the circle of those with political privileges among the possessing classes was to be widened, and the exclusive dominance of the financial aristocracy overthrown. But when the actual conflict began, when the people had manned the barricades, when the National Guard was passive, when the resistance of the army was half-hearted, and when the King had run away, the proclamation of a republic seemed a matter of course. Each of the parties concerned in the revolution interpreted this republic in its own way. The proletariat having won it by force of arms, put the stamp of its class upon the new creation, and proclaimed the socialist republic. Thus was indicated the general significance of modern revolutions—a significance which was, however, in this case, sharply contrasted with all that was immediately practicable in view of the materials to hand, the cultural level of the masses, extant circumstances and conditions. On the other hand, the claims of all the other participants in the February revolution were recognized in the lion's share allotted them in the government. In no other period, therefore, do we find so motley a mixture of high-sounding phrases in conjunction with actual uncertainty and embarrassment, of an eagerness for innovation in conjunction with an essential persistence in the old routine, of an ostensible harmony throughout society in conjunction

with real estrangement among its various elements. While the Parisian proletariat was still gloating over the great prospects opened up by the revolution, and while the workers were engaged in the earnest discussion of social problems, the old forces of society had come together, had taken counsel, and had secured unexpected support from the masses of the nation—from the peasants and the petty bourgeois, who promptly thronged into the political arena when the barriers set up by the July monarchy had fallen.

The second period, from May 4, 1848, to the end of May 1849, is the period during which the bourgeois republic was being established. Immediately after the February days, not only was the dynastic opposition surprised by the republicans, not only were the republicans surprised by the socialists, but also France as a whole was surprised by Paris. The Constituent National Assembly, elected by universal [manhood] suffrage on May 4, 1848, represented the nation. It was an embodied protest against the aspirations of the February days, and its aim was to guide the revolution back into bourgeois channels. The Parisian proletariat, quick to understand the character of this Constituent National Assembly, attempted on May 15th., nine days after the Assembly first met, to deny its existence by force, to dissolve it, to disintegrate the organic unity which the spirit of the nation had formed as a reaction against the Parisian workers. As is well known, the only result of the demonstration of May 15th. was that Blanqui and his associates, the real leaders of the proletarian party, were removed from the stage for the whole period of the cycle now under consideration.

The bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe could only be followed by a bourgeois republic, this meaning that whereas, in the name of the King, a restricted portion of the bourgeoisie had ruled, now, in the name of the people, the whole bourgeoisie was to rule. The demands of the Parisian proletariat were regarded as utopian balderdash, and were to be swept aside. Such was the decision of the Constituent Assembly, to which the proletariat answered by the June insurrection, the most outstanding event in

the history of European civil wars. The bourgeois republic was victorious. There rallied to its support the financial aristocracy, the industrial bourgeoisie, the middle class, the petty bourgeoisie, the army, the slum proletariat (organized as the Garde Mobile), the intellectuals, the clergy, and the rural population. The Parisian proletariat stood alone. Over three thousand of the insurgents were massacred after the victory, and fifteen thousand were transported without trial. As a sequel of this defeat, the proletariat passed to the back of the revolutionary stage. It made a fresh attempt to come to the front whenever the movement seemed to be acquiring a new impetus, but each time with less energy and with a smaller result. As soon as a revolutionary ferment occurred in one of the higher social strata, the proletariat joined forces with the members of this stratum, and thus became involved in all the defeats of the various parties. One after another, the leaders of the proletariat in the Assembly and in the journalistic world became the victims of the law-courts, and more and more questionable figures stepped to the front. The proletariat then had recourse to doctrinaire experiments, to "cooperative banking" and "labour exchange" schemes. In other words, the proletariat became associated with a movement which had renounced the attempt to revolutionize the old world by the strength of its united forces, hoping rather to attain emancipation behind the back of society, privately, and within the bounds of its own restricted vital conditions. Every such attempt is foredoomed to failure. It seems as if the proletariat would be unable to rediscover its revolutionary greatness, would be unable to win for itself fresh energy out of the new alliances it has formed, until all the classes against which it fought in June, have been laid prostrate like itself. But at least it is defeated with the honours attaching to a great historical struggle. Not France alone, but all Europe, was shaken by the June earthquake; whereas the subsequent defeats, those of the upper classes, were so cheaply purchased, that the victors have to exaggerate grossly in order to make them pass as notable events. Furthermore, these defeats have been all the more

shameful in proportion as the defeated party was more widely removed from the proletariat.

It is true that the defeat of the June insurgents prepared and levelled the ground for the upbuilding of the bourgeois republic, but this defeat likewise showed that there are other problems to solve in Europe than the problem "republic or monarchy." It gave a plain demonstration of the fact that here in Europe a bourgeois republic means the unbridled despotism of one class over all others. It proved that in all civilized countries where the formation of classes has reached an advanced stage of development, where modern conditions of production prevail, and where, after centuries of effort, all traditional ideas have been dissolved, the "republic" can only mean the transformational or revolutionary political form of bourgeois society, and not its conservative form of existence. Thus Europe differs from the United States of America; for in the United States, although class segregation has already occurred, the classes are not yet fixed, but in continual flux, with a persistent interchange of their elements. In the United States, too, modern means of production are not, as here in Europe, coincident with a stagnant excess of population, but with a relative scarcity of heads and hands. In the States, finally, where the forces of material production are in vigorous and youthful movement, and where a new world has to be mastered, there is neither time nor opportunity for the intellectual work that disperses old illusions.

During the June days, all other classes and parties united against the proletariat, styling themselves the Party of Order. The proletarians were stigmatized as the party of anarchy, socialism, communism. The Party of Order had "saved" society from the "enemies of society." It adopted the watchwords of the old society; Property, the Family, Religion, Order: and made these the passwords for its army. "Under this sign you will conquer!" said the Party to its counter-revolutionary crusaders. Thenceforward, whenever any one of the numerous parties which had marshalled themselves under that sign against the June

insurgents, attempted a revolutionary struggle on behalf of its own class interests, it was defeated to the accompaniment of the cry: "Property, the Family, Religion, Order!" Society has been "saved" again and again, and each time the circle of its rulers has been narrowed, each time a more exclusive interest has been successfully maintained against a more general one. Every demand for the simplest kind of bourgeois financial reform, for the most everyday liberalism, for the most formal republicanism, for the most commonplace democracy, is punished as an "attack on society" and anathematized as "socialism."—In the end, the high priests of religion and order were themselves kicked off their tripods; dragged out of their beds in the dark and foggy night, thrust into Black Marias, cast into prison, or sent into exile; their temple was razed to the ground, their mouths were stopped, their pens were broken, their law was torn up—all in the name of Religion, Property, the Family, Order. Worthy bourgeois, fanatical advocates of order, sitting quietly on the balconies of their homes, were shot by drunken gangs of soldiers; their property was confiscated; their houses were bombarded as a pastime—in the name of Property, the Family, Religion, and Order. To crown all, the scum of bourgeois society became the sacred phalanx of order, and the heroic Crapülinsky made his entry into the Tuileries as "saviour of society."

CHAPTER TWO

JUNE 28, 1848–MAY 28, 1849

Second Stage of the Revolution: Dictatorship of the pure bourgeois Republicans—Paris in a State of Siege—Election of Bonaparte as President—The President and the Party of Order join Forces against the Constituent Assembly, which dissolves itself, this meaning the Fall of the pure bourgeois Republicans.

LET us resume the thread of our story.

The history of the Constituent Assembly after the June days is the history of the dominance and the subsequent break-up of the party of the republican bourgeoisie, the group variously known as "tricolour republicans," "pure republicans," "political republicans," "formal republicans," etc.

Under the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe, this group constituted the official republican opposition, and thus formed a recognized part of the political world of that day. It had representatives in the Chambers, and exercised considerable influence in the press. Its Parisian organ, the "National," was, in its way, considered no less respectable than the "Journal des Débats." The position of the republican opposition under the constitutional monarchy was in correspondence with its character. It was not a sharply demarcated section of the bourgeoisie; its members were not united by common interests, or differentiated by special conditions of production. It was a coterie of persons with republican sympathies; bourgeois, authors, lawyers, army officers, and civil servants. Their influence was due to the personal animus throughout the country against Louis Philippe, to memories of the old republic, to the republican zealotry of a number of enthusiasts, and above

all to the intensity of French nationalism. Their hatred for the treaties of Vienna and for the Anglo-French alliance kept them continually on the alert. During the reign of Louis Philippe, the " National " owed many of its supporters to its masked imperialism, and was later to find a deadly rival in this very imperialism impersonated in Louis Bonaparte. The journal waged war against the financial aristocracy, as did the whole bourgeois opposition. A polemic against the budget, which in France was tantamount to an attack on the financial aristocracy, was so obvious a means of securing cheap popularity and of tapping an abundant source for the supply of puritan ideal leading articles, that the expedient could not fail to be adopted. The industrial bourgeoisie was grateful to the " National " for its servile defence of the French protective system—a defence, by the by, determined more by nationalist than by economic considerations. The bourgeoisie as a whole was delighted by the newspaper's fierce invectives against communism and socialism. For the rest, the " National's " party was of the " pure republican " complexion, this meaning an unconditional advocacy of a republican as contrasted with a monarchical form of bourgeois government; or at any rate a republic in which the bourgeoisie should have the lion's share of influence. As to how the transition to a republic was to be brought about, the " pure republicans " were by no means clear. But one thing they had no doubt about, for it was openly acknowledged at reform banquets during the latter days of the reign of Louis Philippe, and that was their unpopularity among the democratic petty bourgeois, and still more among the revolutionary proletarians. These pure republicans, being as pure as pure republicans can be, were on the point of contenting themselves with the regency of the Duchess of Orleans when the February revolution occurred, with the result that their most noted leaders were assigned places in the provisional government. From the outset, of course, they had the full confidence of the bourgeoisie, and commanded a majority in the Constituent Assembly. When that body proceeded to appoint an Executive Committee, the socialist elements were given the go-by. Subsequently,

when the June insurrection occurred, the " pure republicans " seized that opportunity for the dismissal of the Executive Committee as well, thus ridding themselves of their nearest rivals, the petty-bourgeois or democratic republicans (Ledru-Rollin and others). General Cavaignac, a member of the Bourgeois-Republican Party, the man who was in command of the governmental forces during the June insurrection, took the place of the Executive Committee, with quasi-dictatorial powers. Marrast, sometime editor of the " National," became perpetual president of the Constituent Assembly. The chief ministerial and other important posts fell into the hands of the " pure republicans."

Thus the republican-bourgeois group, which had long regarded itself as legitimate heir of the July monarchy, had been successful beyond its wildest dreams; and yet it had risen to power, not as in the days of Louis Philippe it had fancied would be the case, through a liberal revolt of the bourgeoisie against the throne, but thanks to the successful suppression (by grape-shot) of a rising of the proletariat against Capital. The event which was to have been ultra-revolutionary, proved to be the most counter-revolutionary occurrence in the world. The fruit had fallen into the lap of those waiting for it, but it had fallen from the Tree of Knowledge, not from the Tree of Life.

The dictatorship of the bourgeois republicans lasted only from June 24, 1848, to December 10, 1848. The history of the period may be summarized by saying that during these months a republican constitution was framed—and Paris was in a state of siege.

Substantially the new constitution was nothing more than a republicanized edition of the constitutional charter of 1830. The restricted suffrage of the July monarchy, whereby a great part even of the bourgeoisie was excluded from political power, was incompatible with the existence of the bourgeois republic. The February revolution had instantly superseded this restricted franchise by the establishment of direct and universal [manhood] suffrage. The bourgeois republicans could not shuffle the extended suffrage out of the world. They had to content themselves with limiting it by imposing

a six months' residential qualification. The extant organization of central and municipal government, civil and criminal law, the army and so on, remained unaltered—or, if the new constitution made any changes in these matters, they were changes of form, not content; of names, not things.

The inevitable "general staff" of the freedoms of 1848 (individual liberty, free speech, freedom of the press, the right of association, the right of public meeting, freedom of education, religion, etc.) was dressed up in a constitutional uniform that guaranteed invulnerability. Every one of these rights was declared to be an indefeasible right of the French citizen, but always with the proviso that the right was unrestricted save in so far as restriction was rendered necessary "by the like liberty of others, and by considerations of public safety," or in so far as restrictions were imposed by "laws" aiming to secure such harmony.

For instance:

"Citizens have the right of association, of peaceful and unarmed assembly, of petition, and of the free expression of opinion whether in the public press or otherwise. The exercise of these rights is restricted only by the equal rights of others and by the public safety" (French Constitution, Chapter II, § 8).

"Education is free. The freedom of education shall be enjoyed under the conditions established by law and under the supervision of the State" (Ibid., § 9).

"The domicile of every citizen is inviolable, except under the forms prescribed by law" (Chapter I, § 3).

And so on, and so on.

We see that the constitution makes repeated references to future organic laws, in which these provisos will be embodied, and in which the enjoyment of the before-mentioned unrestricted freedoms shall be so regulated that they will not conflict with one another, or with the public safety. Subsequently the requisite organic laws were called into being by the friends of Order, and, all the liberties were regulated in such a way that the bourgeoisie has been confirmed in the enjoyment of them without the infringement of any of the rights of other classes. Whenever the bourgeoisie has

entirely withheld these rights from "the others," or has permitted "the others" to enjoy rights solely under conditions that are equivalent to police traps, the restrictions have always been imposed in the interest of "public safety" (for which read, the interest of the bourgeoisie), as the constitution prescribes.

The result is that both sides are fully entitled to appeal to the constitution: not only the friends of Order, who abrogated the rights; but also the democrats, who insisted that the rights should be granted. For each paragraph in the constitution contains its own antithesis, its own Upper House and Lower House. We have always a general assertion of liberty, and a proviso whereby the liberty is denied. As long as the name of freedom receives due honour, and the only interference is with the real enjoyment of a particular freedom (perfectly legal interference, it need hardly be explained), the constitutional entity of freedom is intact, however much its vulgar entity may have been pulverized.

This constitution, so artfully made invulnerable, was nevertheless, like Achilles, vulnerable at one point. In Achilles, the vulnerable point was the heel. In the French constitution, it was the head. Or rather, the two heads, for it had two: Legislative Assembly, and President. Flutter the pages of the constitution, and you will see that only the paragraphs in which the relationship of the President to the Legislative Assembly is specified are absolute, positive, perfectly consistent, and incapable of misinterpretation. The aim of the bourgeois republicans was to safeguard their own position. Sections 45 to 70 of the constitution are so couched that the National Assembly can constitutionally dismiss the President, whereas the President cannot constitutionally dissolve the National Assembly. If he is to rid himself of the National Assembly, he must violate the constitution. Thus the constitution seems to invite its own forcible destruction. The charter of 1830 had sanctified a division of powers; the constitution of 1848 went further, extending this division to become an intolerable contradiction. In the constitution of 1848, the "play of constitutional forces" (as Guizot termed the parliamentary bickering between Legislature and

Executive) leads in the constitution of 1848, to action like that of a punter in baccarat who continually desires to "go bank"—to stake everything on one hazard, and damn the consequences. On the one hand, we have 750 representatives of the people, elected by universal [manhood] suffrage, and eligible for reelection. They form an uncontrollable, indissoluble, indivisible National Assembly, which possesses legislative omnipotence; has the last word in deciding war, peace, and treaties of commerce; is exclusively empowered to grant amnesty; and is, thanks to its permanence, ever at the front of the stage. On the other hand, we have the President, endowed with all the attributes of kingly prerogative; competent to appoint or dismiss his ministers without consulting the National Assembly. All the instruments of executive authority are in his hands. He is the dispenser of all posts, and thus in France becomes the arbiter of the destinies of one and a half million persons—for the half million civil servants and army officers have a million dependents. The whole armed force of the nation is at his disposal. He can pardon individual criminals; can suspend National Guardsmen; can, with the consent of the Council of State, unseat departmental, cantonal, and communal councillors who have been directly elected by the citizens. When foreign treaties are in question, the initiative and the conduct of the negotiations are reserved to him. Whereas the Assembly is always on the boards, and is continually exposed to the critical light of day, the President leads a retired life in the Elysian fields, withdrawn from the public gaze. True that in this retirement he has ever before his eyes, and echoing day by day in his heart, Article 45 of the constitution, which says to him: "Frère, il faut mourir!—Your power will end in the fourth year after your election on the second Sunday of the merry month of May! Then your glories will fade. For you, there will be no second performance. If you have debts, be sure to pay them off in good time out of the six hundred thousand francs allotted you by the constitution—unless you have a taste for a visit to Clichy on the second Monday of the merry month of May!"

Whilst the constitution thus gives actual power to the

President, it tries to ensure that the National Assembly shall have moral power. But, apart from the fact that moral power cannot be created by act of parliament, the constitution defeats its own object once more by prescribing that the President shall be elected by the direct suffrage of all the citizens of France. Whereas the votes are dispersed upon the 750 members of the National Assembly, in the case of the President they are concentrated upon an individual. Any one representative of the people represents nothing more than this or that party; this or that town; this or that bridgehead or jumping-off place; may be, he represents nothing more than the formal need of electing the seven-hundred-and-fiftieth part of the National Assembly, an electoral right exercised by a man who knows little and cares less about what or for whom he is voting. But the President is the chosen of the Nation; his election is the trump card played by the sovereign people once in every four years. The relationship of the elected National Assembly to the nation is metaphysical; the relationship of the elected President is personal. No doubt, through the individualities of its members, the National Assembly represents the manifold aspects of the national spirit; but in the President the national spirit is incarnated. As contrasted with the National Assembly the President possesses a sort of divine right; he is President by the grace of the People.

Thetis, the sea-goddess, had foretold to her son Achilles that he would perish in the heyday of his youth. Like Achilles, the constitution has its weak spot; and, like Achilles, it has a foreboding of premature death. Glancing down into the profane world from the skyey realm of their ideal republic, the pure republicans, while engaged in the task of constitution-building, could not fail to perceive that, in proportion as they neared the completion of their great legislative work of art, the arrogant presumption of the royalists, the Bonapartists, the democrats, and the communists, waxed, while their own credit waned. No goddess from the sea was needed to disclose these facts. They tried to avert the omen by a constitutional artifice. It was arranged by § 111, that any proposal for the revision of the constitution must be discussed

three times, and that there must be at least one month's interval between the successive discussions; the proposal must be carried at a session where at least three-fourths of all the deputies should vote; and not less than five hundred of them must vote in favour of the proposal. This was a futile attempt to ensure that in time to come, when, as they foresaw, they would be reduced to a parliamentary minority, they would still be able to exercise a power which even then they were unable to wield effectively—for, though they still commanded a majority, dominion was day by day slipping from their feeble hands.

Finally, in a melodramatic paragraph, the constitution entrusted itself "to the watchful care and the patriotism of the whole French people and of all individual Frenchmen"—although in an earlier paragraph the "watchful patriots" had been committed to the inquisitorial tender mercies of the "haute cour," the High Court of Justice established by the constitution.

Such was the constitution of 1848, which on December 2, 1851, was overthrown, not (as before said) by a coup de tête, but by a mere coup de chapeau. Granted that the hat was the three-cornered hat of a Napoleon!

While, within the Assembly, the bourgeois republicans were busied in piecing together this constitution, in discussing and voting upon its items; outside the Assembly, Cavaignac was busied in maintaining the state of siege in Paris. This state of siege played the midwife to the Constituent Assembly during its republican birthpangs. If, subsequently, the constitution was bayoneted out of existence, we must not forget that while in the womb it had been guarded by bayonets directed against the people, and that by bayonets it had been brought into the world. The forefathers of these worthy republicans had sent their symbol, the tricolour, on a tour through Europe. In their turn, these contemporary republicans made a discovery which spontaneously journeyed all over the Continent, but returned ever and again with renewed joy to the land of its birth, until it had acquired the right of domicile in half the departments of France. I refer to the state of siege. A glorious invention, this, turned to

account at intervals in every successive crisis that has occurred during the revolution. Barrack and bivouac, periodically loaded upon the head of French society, to oppress the brain and induce quietude; sword and musket, periodically functioning as judge and administrator, guardian and censor, gendarme and night watchman; military moustache and tunic, periodically acclaimed as the sages and tutelary deities of society—was it not inevitable that, in the long run, it should occur to barrack and bivouac, sword and musket, moustache and tunic, to save society once for all on their own initiative, by declaring their own rule supreme, and by saving bourgeois society the trouble of self-government. Barrack and bivouac, sword and musket, moustache and tunic, would be all the more apt to hit upon this idea, seeing that they might then expect higher pay for more exalted service. So long as there was nothing beyond periodical states of siege, and transient savings of society at the behest of this or that bourgeois faction, the only solid result would be a few dead and wounded, and some friendly bourgeois grimaces. Would it not be well for the soldiery to establish a state of siege in and for its own interest, and to hold all the bourgeois to ransom at one and the same time? Let me remark in passing that Colonel Bernard, the man who as president of the court martial under Cavaignac sentenced fifteen thousand insurgents to transportation without trial, is once more at the head of the military committees now actively at work in Paris.

Thus the worthy, the pure republicans, by establishing a state of siege in Paris, built the nursery in which the pretorians of December 2, 1851, were to grow to manhood. But we must praise them for this, that, whereas under Louis Philippe they were super-patriots, as soon as they were supreme over the nation they were ready to crawl before foreign powers; instead of liberating Italy, they allowed her to be reconquered by the Austrians and the Neapolitans. Louis Bonaparte's election as President on December 10, 1848, put an end to the dictatorship of Cavaignac and the Constituent Assembly.

In § 44 of the constitution we read: "The President of the French Republic must never have forfeited his quality

of French citizen." The first President of the French Republic, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, had not only forfeited his quality as French citizen, had not only been sworn in as a British special constable, but was actually a naturalized Swiss citizen.

In the previous chapter I explained the significance of the election of December 10th. I need not further enlarge upon the topic here. Enough for the moment to say that it was a reaction on the part of the peasants (who had had to pay the costs of the February revolution) against the other classes of the nation, a reaction of the countryside against the town. The election of Bonaparte to the presidency was approved by the army, to which the regime of the republicans of the "National" group had brought no fame; it was also approved by the upper bourgeoisie, which regarded him as a stepping-stone to monarchy; and it was acclaimed by the proletarians and the petty bourgeois, for whom the President was the man who had triumphed over Cavaignac. I shall subsequently have occasion to speak more fully of the relationship between the peasantry and the French revolution.

The epoch from December 20, 1848, until the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in May 1849, comprises the history of the decline of the bourgeois republicans. After they had established a republic for the bourgeoisie, had driven the revolutionary proletariat from the field, and had for the time being reduced the democratic petty bourgeoisie to silence, they were themselves pushed aside by the main body of the bourgeoisie, which rightly laid hands on this republic as its own property. But the main body of the bourgeoisie was royalist. Some of these bourgeois, the great landowners, had been in the saddle during the Restoration period, and were therefore legitimist. The remainder, the financial aristocracy and the great industrials, had ruled France under the July monarchy, and were therefore Orleanist. The notables of the army, the universities, the Church, the Bar, the Academy, and the Press, were, in varying proportions, attached to both factions. Here, in the bourgeois republic, which was neither Bourbon nor Orleanist, but rendered

allegiance only to the great name of Capital, they had found the form of State in which they could hold joint sway. The June insurrection had already fused them into the Party of Order. The next thing was to oust the coterie of bourgeois republicans, still dominant in the National Assembly. Towards the people these pure republicans had shown themselves unhesitating in the use of brute force; in the same measure, they now showed themselves cowardly, low-spirited, and unready for the fight, when it was a question of defending their republicanism and their legislative rights against the assaults of the Executive and the royalists. It is not my business here to tell the shameful story of their collapse. They suffered no mere downfall, but utter extinction. Their page of history was closed. In the subsequent period, they figure, whether within or without the Assembly, solely as memories. Even these memories assume a fitful shape only when the question of the verbal existence of the republic is raised, only when the revolutionary conflict threatens to sink to the very lowest level. I should mention here that the "National," the periodical after which the group of pure republicans was named, went over to socialism during the third phase of the revolution.

Before we have done with the history of the second phase, it is necessary to take a retrospective glance at the two powers, one of which was to destroy the other on December 2, 1851; although from December 20, 1848 (when Louis Napoleon took the oath as President), to the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, they lived in conjugal relations. I refer to Bonaparte, on the one hand, and to the royalist coalition of the upper bourgeoisie, the Party of Order, on the other. As soon as Bonaparte was seated in the presidential chair, he formed a ministry of the Party of Order, appointing as premier Odilon Barrot, who, be it noted, was the veteran leader of the most liberal section of the parliamentary bourgeoisie. Monsieur Barrot had at length secured the portfolio for which he had been hunting since 1830. Nay more, he was Prime Minister. But this honour had not come to him as the promoted leader of the parliamentary opposition—though that had been his hope in the days of

Louis Philippe. His portfolio was given him that he might slaughter a parliament, and he had to undertake this task in collaboration with those who had been his deadly enemies, the Jesuits and the legitimists. At long last, he had led his bride home, but not until after she had become a prostitute. Bonaparte withdrew into the background. The Party of Order was doing his work for him.

At the first ministerial council, the expedition to Rome was decided upon. It was agreed that this should be undertaken without consulting the National Assembly, behind the backs of the representatives of the people; and that the funds should be obtained from the Assembly by a subterfuge. The new ministry therefore began its career by bamboozling the National Assembly and by a secret conspiracy with the absolutist foreign powers against the revolutionary Roman Republic. It was thus that, nearly three years later, Bonaparte was to prepare his coup of December 2nd. against the royalist Legislative Assembly and its constitutional republic. We must not forget, that the Party of Order out of which Bonaparte's ministry of December 20, 1848, was formed, held a majority in the National Assembly on December 2, 1851.

In August, the Constituent Assembly had determined that it would not dissolve until after it had elaborated and promulgated a number of organic laws which were to supplement the constitution. But on January 6, 1849, through the instrumentality of a deputy named Rateau, the Party of Order had a proposal brought forward in the Assembly to abandon this scheme of passing further organic laws, and to dissolve forthwith. Dissolution was not advocated by the ministry alone (with Barrot at the head). All the royalist members of the Constituent Assembly insisted that dissolution was indispensable for the reestablishment of public credit and the consolidation of order. The period of provisional arrangements must come to an end. The continued existence of the Constit ent Assembly hampered the work of the new government. Only out of malice could the Assembly wish to prolong its own life; the country was weary of it.—Bonaparte took careful note of all these invectives against the legislative authority, he learned them by heart

and showed how well he knew his lesson when he came to deal with the parliamentary royalists on December 2, 1851. He paid them back in their own coin.

The Barrot ministry and the Party of Order went even further. Throughout France, they circulated petitions to the Constituent Assembly in which that body was politely requested to disappear. They thus led the unorganized masses into the fray against the Assembly—which was the constitutionally organized expression of the people. They taught Bonaparte to appeal from parliament to the people. At length, on January 29, 1849, came the day when the Constituent Assembly was to vote its own dissolution. When the deputies arrived, they found that the building was occupied by troops. Changarnier, the general of the Party of Order, in whose hands was concentrated the command of the National Guard and the regular army, held a military review in Paris, as though a battle were imminent. The members of the royalist coalition openly threatened the Assembly with the use of force if it did not yield to persuasion. It was pliable, however, merely bargaining for a brief respite. What was the difference between this coup of January 29, 1849, and the coup d'état of December 2, 1851, except that in the former case Bonaparte was cooperating with the royalists? The members of the Party of Order did not or would not notice that on January 29, 1849, Bonaparte seized the opportunity to have some of the troops paraded before him in front of the Tuileries, availing himself of this first plain demonstration of the use of the military power against the parliamentary power to hint that he was prepared to assume the role of Caligula. The allied royalists had eyes only for their henchman Changarnier.

The Party of Order had a very special reason for its wish to make a forcible end of the Constituent Assembly. The allied royalists were thinking of the organic laws that were to supplement the constitution, the laws relating to education, religion, etc. It seemed to them of the utmost importance that they should draft these laws themselves, and not leave the drafting to the republicans, whose suspicions were already aroused. But among the organic laws was one dealing

with the responsibility of the President of the French Republic. In 1851, the National Assembly was at work on this particular law when Bonaparte forestalled the deputies by his coup of December 2nd. What would not the united royalists have given, during their mid-winter parliamentary campaign of 1851, to have had this Responsibility Law ready for use especially if it had been framed by a republican assembly full of distrust and hatred!

When the Constituent Assembly, by the vote of January 29, 1849, had broken its last weapon, the Barrot ministry and the friends of Order hunted it to death. They left nothing undone that would humiliate it; and, from its weakness and despair, they wrung laws that cost it the last vestiges of public respect. Bonaparte, animated by his fixed idea of playing the Napoleon, was audacious enough to turn this degradation of parliamentary power to account. On May 8, 1849, the Assembly passed a vote of censure upon the ministry on account of Oudinot's occupation of Cività Vecchia, and forbade that the French forces engaged in the Roman expedition should be used for anything beyond the purpose originally alleged. The same evening, Bonaparte published in the "Moniteur" a letter to Oudinot congratulating the general on his heroic feats, and himself posing as the generous protector of the army in contrast with the quill-driving parliamentarians. The royalists merely smiled, believing the President to be their dupe.

Finally, when Marrast, the president of the Constituent Assembly, considered that the safety of that body was endangered, and when, supported by the constitution, he requisitioned a regiment, the colonel demurred, pleading "discipline," and referred Marrast to Changarnier. The latter scornfully refused Marrast's demand, with the remark that he had no fancy for "baïonnettes intelligentes." In November 1851, when the united royalists wanted to open a decisive campaign against Bonaparte, they brought forward their notorious "Questors' Bill" which was to establish the right of the president of the National Assembly to issue direct requisitions, for troops. Le Flô, one of their generals, supported the bill. Changarnier voted for it. Thiers extolled

the cautious wisdom of the sometime Constituent Assembly. It was all in vain. Saint-Arnaud, minister for war, answered the appeal for troops as Changarnier had answered Marrast—and did so amid the plaudits of the Mountain!

Such was the hostile attitude of the Party of Order towards the parliamentary regime in the days when the royalist coalition was only a ministry, and was not yet in control of the National Assembly. These are the people who are raising such a clamour now that the coup d'état of December 2, 1851, has banished the parliamentary regime from France.

We wish it a happy journey!

CHAPTER THREE

MAY 29–JUNE 13, 1849

Constitutional Republic and Legislative National Assembly: First Phase, the Struggle of the petty Bourgeoisie with the Bourgeoisie and with Bonaparte—Demonstration of June 13th.—Defeat of the petty-bourgeois Democrats.

THE Legislative National Assembly met for the first time on May 29, 1849. On December 2, 1851, it was forcibly dissolved. The life history of the constitutional or parliamentary republic extends between these two dates.

In the great French revolution, the rule of the Constitutionalists was followed by the rule of the Girondins, and the rule of the Girondins by the rule of the Jacobins. To the Constitutionalists the support of the Girondins was indispensable, as to the Girondins the support of the Jacobins. When each party, in turn, had conducted the revolution as far as it could or dared, and wanted to cry halt, it was pushed aside by the bolder spirits who had hitherto supported it, and cleared out of the way by the guillotine. Thus the revolutionary movement was a continuous upward progress.

The revolution of 1848 took the opposite course. The Proletarian Party shows itself as a mere annex of the petty-bourgeois Democratic Party. The proletarians were betrayed and abandoned by the petty bourgeois on April 16, May 15, and in the June days. The Democratic Party, in turn, leaned upon the bourgeois republicans, who thought to secure their own position by shaking off their burdensome allies and seeking support from the Party of Order. This party left the bourgeois republicans in the lurch, and relied upon the aid of armed force. The champions of the Party of Order were still seated upon the shoulders of armed force,

when they realized, one fine morning, that the seat had become prickly, for the shoulders had turned into bayonets. Each party kicks backward at those who are pressing forward, and leans forward upon those who are pressing backward. What wonder that in this ridiculous posture they lose their balance, and, after making ugly faces, tumble head over heels? The revolution as a whole has moved backwards. The retreat began before the last of the February barricades had been cleared away, and before the first revolutionary authority had been established.

The period we have now to consider exhibits a motley mixture of crass contradictions. In it we see constitutionalists who openly conspire against the constitution; revolutionists who declare themselves in favour of constitutional action; a National Assembly that wants to be all-powerful, and persistently remains parliamentary; a Mountain that makes submission its watchword, and atones for present defeats by prophesying future victories, royalists who are the *patres conscripti* of the republic, and are compelled by the exigencies of the situation to support, in foreign lands, the hostile reigning families whose adherents they are, while supporting at home the republic they detest; an Executive that draws strength from its weakness, and seeks the aegis of respectability in the contempt it inspires; a republic that is nothing more than the combined infamy of two monarchies, the Restoration and the July monarchy, with an imperialist label. Next we have unions which, in the first clause of their articles of association, preach disunion; struggles whose first law is irresolution; in the name of tranquillity, barren and purposeless agitation; in the name of the revolution, a solemn preaching of tranquillity; passion without truth and truth without passion; heroes without heroic deeds, and history without events; evolution whose only motive force appears to be the calendar, an evolution that grows tedious through the unending succession of the same tensions and relaxations; contrasts that seem periodically to reach a climax, only to decline without the attainment of a solution; pretentious efforts and philistine dread of a world cataclysm, while the would-be saviours of society are all the while engaged in

petty intrigues and court comedies, so that in their *laisser aller* they remind us less of the Day of Judgment than of the days of the Fronde. Add to all this, the official collective genius of France brought to shame by the sly stupidity of one individual; and the collective will of the nation, whenever it is voiced by universal suffrage, trying to find expression through the case-hardened enemies of the popular interests, and securing expression in the end through the arbitrary will of a filibuster. If ever a page of history were painted in grey monochrome, it was so on this occasion. Men and events show themselves as inverted Peter Schlemihls, as shadows whose bodies have been mislaid. The revolution paralyses its own champions, and ardently equips its adversaries for the struggle. When, last of all, the "Red Spectre," which has again and again been conjured out of the void and then exorcized by the counter-revolutionaries, appears in real earnest, it does not sport a red cap, the anarchist Phrygian cap, but is decked in the uniform of Order, and wears the red breeches of the French soldier.

We have seen that the ministry installed by Bonaparte on December 20, 1848 (his Ascension Day), was a ministry of the Party of Order, formed of members of the legitimist and Orleanist coalition. This Barrot-Falloux ministry had outlived the republican Constituent Assembly (whose life it had, more or less forcibly, cut short), and was still in power. Changarnier, the general of the united royalists, was still in command both of the first division of the regular troops and of the Parisian National Guard. The general election had resulted in a thumping majority for the Party of Order. In the National Assembly, the deputies and peers of Louis Philippe had to rub shoulders with a holy squad of legitimists whom the suffrages of the nation had given tickets of admission to the political arena. The Bonapartist representatives of the people were too few and scattered to form an independent parliamentary party. They could only constitute *une mauvaise queue* of the Party of Order. Thus the Party of Order was in control of the governmental authority, the army, and the legislature. In a word, it possessed all the powers of the State; it was morally fortified by the general

election (which made its sway seem the expression of the popular will), and by the simultaneous victory of the counter-revolution throughout the continent of Europe.

Never did any political party open its campaign under more favourable auspices, or with ampler forces at its disposal.

After their shipwreck, the pure republicans in the National Assembly found themselves reduced to a clique of about fifty persons. Their leaders were the three generals of African fame, Cavaignac, Lamoricière, and Bedeau. But the main opposition was formed by the Mountain. The Social Democratic Party had adopted this parliamentary nickname. It could cast more than 200 of the 750 votes in the National Assembly, and was as strong as the strongest of the three separate factions of the Party of Order. Though it was so greatly outnumbered by the combined strength of the latter, its numerical inferiority seemed to be compensated by special circumstances. The departmental elections showed that the social democrats had gained a considerable amount of support among the rural population. Nearly all the deputies of the Parisian area were members of the party; in the election of three non-commissioned officers, the army had made a confession of democratic faith; Ledru-Rollin, the leader of the Mountain, had been "ennobled" in the parliamentary sense by the votes of no less than five departments—a unique distinction. Inasmuch as disputes among the royalists were inevitable, and the Party of Order as a whole was sure to quarrel with Bonaparte, the Mountain seemed on May 29, 1849, to have all the omens in its favour. Within a fortnight, it had lost everything, honour not excepted.

Before following up the course of parliamentary history, a few remarks are needed to clear away prevalent misunderstandings as to the whole character of the epoch we are about to consider. Those who look at the matter from the democratic viewpoint declare that throughout the period of the Legislative National Assembly the same forces were at work as during the period of the Constituent National Assembly. They see nothing but a straightforward contest between republicans and royalists. The general sense of the movement is summed up by them in the catchword

" reaction "—a night in which all cats are grey, and in which they can drone out their commonplaces. At the first glance, it is true, the Party of Order has the aspect of a tangle of royalist factions, which are not merely intriguing one against the others because each wishes to set its own pretender on the throne and to defeat the rival claimants, but are likewise united in a common hatred of the " republic " and a common determination to attack it. In contrast with this royalist conspiracy, the Mountain looms before us as representative of the " republic." The Party of Order appears to be continually at work promoting a " reaction," directed, just as in Prussia, against the freedom of the press, the right of association, etc.; and, once more as in Prussia, enforcing its will by the brutal intervention of the bureaucracy, the police, and the public prosecutor. The " Mountain," on the other hand, appears to be busily occupied in repelling these onslaughts, and thus in defending the " eternal rights of man," just like every other so-called People's Party, for the last hundred and fifty years. But, this semblance, which veils the class war and the peculiar physiognomy of the period under consideration, vanishes on close scrutiny.

The legitimists and the Orleanists form, as already said, the two main fractions of the Party of Order. What attached each fraction to its own pretender, and what antagonized them each to the other? Was nothing more at stake than Lily versus Tricolour, Bourbon versus Orleans, the disagreement between different shades of royalism? Under the Bourbons, the great landed proprietors had ruled, with their priests and lackeys; under the House of Orleans, the real dominion had been that of high finance, great industry, large-scale commerce—in a word, Capital, with its retinue of lawyers, professors, and orators. " Legitimate monarchy " was nothing more than the political expression for the hereditary rule of the lords of the soil; and in like manner " July monarchy " was nothing more than the political expression for the usurping rule of the bourgeois upstarts. Thus, what kept the two sections apart was not any so-called principles. They were sundered by their material conditions of existence, by two different forms of property. The divergence of their

outlooks was an expression of the old conflict between town and country, the rivalry between Capital and Landed Property. But at the same time they were loyal to one or other branch of the royal house? They were bound by old memories, personal enmities, hopes and fears, prejudices and illusions, sympathies and antipathies, by convictions and articles of faith and principles? Who denies it! Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence, as foundation, there is built a superstructure of diversified and characteristic sentiments, illusions, habits of thought, and outlooks on life in general. The class as a whole creates and shapes them out of its material foundation, and out of the corresponding social relationships. The individual, in whom they arise through tradition and education, may fancy them to be the true determinants, the real origin, of his activities.

The Orleanists and the legitimists might try to persuade themselves and one another that they were divided by their respective attachments to the branches of the royal house. The touchstone of fact was subsequently to show that it was the division of interests between their factions that prevented the union of the House of Bourbon and the House of Orleans. Just as, in private life, we draw a distinction between what a human being thinks and says of himself, and what he really is and does; so, and even more definitely in the struggles on the stage of history, must we distinguish the phrases and fancies of the political parties from their true organic entity and their genuine interests, must distinguish appearance from reality. In the republic, the Orleanists and the legitimists found themselves side by side voicing similar claims. If either party aimed at the restoration of its chosen royal house, and at the defeat of the other's aspirations, this merely signified that each of the two great interests into which the bourgeoisie is severed (Landed Property, on the one hand, and Capital on the other) was separately seeking the re-establishment of its own supremacy and the subordination of its rival. Thus the British tories believed for generations that they were defenders of the monarchy, the Church, and the beauties of the venerable English constitution—until,

in the day of danger, there was wrung from them the admission that what they really worshipped was land-rent.

Outside parliament, the members of the royalist coalition pursued the interest of their respective factions, intriguing in Ems and at Claremont, and through the instrumentality of the newspaper press. When they were no longer before the footlights, they resumed the Orleanist or legitimist livery, as the case might be, and were speedily at their old tricks. But as long as they were in the public eye, when they were playing the role of a great parliamentary party, and were engaged in important actions of State, they were content to pay formal reverence to the House of Bourbon or the House of Orleans, and to postpone the restoration *ad infinitum*. Their real business was done as a Party of Order, that is to say under a social and not under a political title; as representatives of the bourgeois social system, not as knights errant eager to rescue wandering princesses; as a bourgeois class forming front against all other classes, not as royalists against republicans. Moreover, as the Party of Order they exercised a more unrestricted and a harsher dominion over the other classes of society than had been exercised in the Restoration period or during the July monarchy. So absolute a sway was only possible under the form of the parliamentary republic, for under this form alone could the two main subdivisions of the French bourgeoisie unite; in other words, under this form alone was it possible to establish the supremacy of the bourgeois class as a whole, instead of the supremacy of a privileged fraction of that class. If, none the less, while functioning as the Party of Order, they showered insults on the republic and were ever ready to show their hostility to it, this was the outcome of something more than royalist tradition. They instinctively realized that, although the republic was the perfected expression of their political dominance, it simultaneously undermined their social foundation, for it brought them face to face in the open field with their enemies of the subjugated class. Under the republic, there was no king to act as a stalking-horse, there was no possibility of confusing the issues by their subsidiary struggles with one another and with the crown. It was because they were not

sure of their own strength, that they recoiled from the conditions of unqualified class rule, and longed for the revival of less complete, less highly evolved, and therefore less dangerous, forms of domination. On the other hand, whenever the united royalists were at odds with the President, whenever they came into conflict with Bonaparte, whenever it seemed to them that their parliamentary omnipotence was being threatened by the Executive—whenever, in a word, they had to show the political warrant for their authority —they presented themselves as republicans not royalists. All of them did this: from the Orleanist Thiers, at one end of the scale, when he warned the National Assembly that the republic was the best common platform; down to the legitimist Berryer, at the other, when, on December 2, 1851, draped in the tricolour, and posing as a tribune of the people, he stood forth in front of the town-hall of the tenth ward of Paris to harangue the assembled populace. True, echo seemed to mock him with the words: "Henry V, Henry V."

To make a united front against the bourgeois forces, the petty bourgeois and the workers had formed a coalition on their side, the so-called Social Democratic Party. The petty bourgeois found they had come off badly after the June days in 1848. Their material interests were endangered; and the democratic guarantees which they had relied on to safeguard these interests, were being challenged by the counter-revolution. This inclined them to make common cause with the workers. But the group that represented them in parliament, the Mountain, which had been thrust aside during the dictatorship of the bourgeois republicans, had during the latter half of the lifetime of the Constituent Assembly recovered its lost popularity, thanks to the struggle with Bonaparte and the royalist ministers of State. It had entered into an alliance with the socialist leaders. In February 1849, there were banquets to celebrate the reconciliation. A joint program was drafted, joint electoral committees were founded, and joint candidatures were arranged for. The revolutionary point of the socialist demands of the proletariat was blunted, and these demands were

given a democratic gloss. Conversely, in the case of the democratic demands of the petty bourgeoisie, the purely political form was effaced, and they were made to seem as socialistic as possible. That was the origin of social democracy. The new Mountain, the outcome of this fusion of interests, contained (if we leave a few supers from the working-class and a few socialist sectarians out of the reckoning) the same elements as the old Mountain, though it was numerically stronger. But in the course of evolution it had been modified, along with the class it represented. The essential characteristic of social democracy is as follows. Democratic republican institutions are demanded as a means, not for the abolition of the two extremes, Capital and Wage Labour, but for the mitigation of their opposition, and for the transformation of their discord into a harmony. Various ways of attaining this harmony may be advocated, and the different proposals may be adorned with a more or less revolutionary trimming, but the substance is always the same. The substantial aim of social democracy is to transform society by the democratic method, the transformation being always kept within the petty-bourgeois orbit. Do not run away with the idea that the deliberate purpose of the petty-bourgeois class is to enforce its own selfish class interest. The petty bourgeois believe that the special conditions requisite for their own liberation are likewise the general conditions requisite for the salvation of modern society. They think that in no other way can society be saved and the class war averted. Nor must it be supposed that the democratic deputies are all shopkeepers, or enthusiastic champions of the small-shopkeeper class. Culturally and by individual status they may be the polar opposites of members of the shopkeeping class. What has made them become the political representatives of the petty bourgeoisie is this. Intellectually they have failed to transcend the limitations which are, materially, imposed upon the petty bourgeois by the conditions of petty-bourgeois existence. Consequently they are, in the theoretical field, impelled towards the same aspirations and solutions as those towards which, in practical life, the petty bourgeois are impelled by material interests and by

their social position. Speaking generally, such is always the relationship between the political and literary representatives of a class and the class they represent.

After the foregoing explanation, it will be self-evident that when the Party of Order is continually battling on behalf of the republic and the so-called rights of man, neither of these ostensible aims is its real aim. When an army, threatened with disarmament, fights to retain its weapons, the mere retention of these is not its fundamental aim.

As soon as the National Assembly met, the Party of Order joined issue with the Mountain. Just as, a year before, the bourgeoisie had realized the necessity of coming to grips with the revolutionary proletariat, so, now, it wished to come to grips with the democratic petty bourgeoisie. But the new opponent was in a different position. The strength of the proletarians had been in the street, that of the petty bourgeois was in the National Assembly. They must, therefore, be lured out of the National Assembly into the street, must be induced to shatter their own parliamentary power before it had been consolidated by time and opportunity. The Mountain rushed headlong into the trap.

The bombardment of Rome by the French troops was the bait. By § 5 of the constitution, the French Republic was forbidden to use its fighting forces against the liberties of another people. § 4 forbade the Executive to declare war without the consent of parliament, and by its resolution of May 8th. the Constituent Assembly had expressed its disapproval of the Roman Expedition. On June 11, 1849, Ledru-Rollin therefore proposed the impeachment of Bonaparte and his ministers. Exasperated by the wasp-stings of Thiers, he actually allowed himself to be goaded into threatening to defend the constitution by all possible means, even by force of arms. The Mountain rose like one man to repeat the threat. On June 12th., the National Assembly rejected the act of impeachment, and thereupon the Mountain marched out of the Chamber. The events of June 13th. are known to all, the proclamation signed by part of the Mountain, declaring Bonaparte and his ministers "outside the pale of the constitution"; the street processions of the democratic

National Guardsmen who, being unarmed, dispersed when confronted by Changarnier's soldiers; and so on. Some of the members of the Mountain fled to foreign parts; others were arraigned before the High Court at Bourges; and the remainder were, by parliamentary decree, subjected to the schoolmasterly supervision of the president of the National Assembly. Paris was once more declared to be in a state of siege, and the democratic section of the Parisian National Guard was dissolved. Thus the influence of the Mountain in parliament was annulled, and the power of the petty bourgeois in Paris broken.

On June 13th., the signal was given at Lyons for a working-class insurrection. Thereupon the city and the five surrounding departments were declared to be in a state of siege, as they remain to this day.

Most of the members of the Mountain had left the vanguard in the lurch, for they had refused to sign the before-mentioned proclamation. The party press had deserted the cause, for only two newspapers of minor importance had ventured to publish the pronunciamento. The petty bourgeois betrayed their representatives; the National Guardsmen failed to muster, or else, when they did appear upon the scene, prevented the erection of barricades. The parliamentary representatives had duped the petty bourgeois, for there was no sign of the sympathizers in the regular army of whom there had been talk. Finally, the democrats, instead of drawing fresh energy from the proletariat, had infected the proletariat with their own weakness. As so often happens when democrats have undertaken doughty deeds, the leaders had the satisfaction of blaming the "people" for desertion, and the people had the satisfaction of blaming the leaders for having raised false hopes.

Rarely had anything been heralded by so much clamour, as the Mountain's prospective campaign; rarely had any occurrence been looked forward to so long in advance, and trumpeted so loudly, as the inevitable triumph of democracy. No doubt the democrats had honestly believed that the walls of Jericho would fall at the sound of their martial music. Democrats always expect this miracle when they stand before

the ramparts of despotism. If the Mountain wanted to gain the victory in parliament, there should have been no appeal to arms. Having appealed to arms in parliament, there should have been no "parliamenting" in the streets. If the peaceful demonstration was seriously meant, how grotesque was the blunder of those who did not foresee that it would be countered in warlike fashion. If the demonstrators had genuine thoughts of fighting, they behaved queerly when they laid aside the weapons with which the fight had to be waged. But the revolutionary threats of petty bourgeois and their democratic representatives are nothing more than attempts to frighten the enemy. When they have found their way into a blind alley, when they have compromised themselves so thoroughly that they have no resource but an attempt to carry out their threats, the attempt is made half-heartedly. They sedulously shun the means that might ensure success, and seek excuses for submission. The crashing overture which has announced the opening of the campaign, subsides to a dispirited growling when the time comes for the guns to be fired; the actors cease to take themselves seriously; the action collapses like a pricked air balloon.

No other party takes so exaggerated a view of its powers as the democratic, no other is more easily deceived as to the realities of a situation. When a part of the army had voted for the Mountain, the Mountain was convinced that the army was ripe for revolt. What was to be the incitement to revolt? From the soldiers' point of view, the incitement may be summed up by saying that the revolutionists wanted to take the side of Roman soldiers against French soldiers! Furthermore, the memories of the June days of 1848 were so recent that the proletariat could not fail to have a strong animus against the National Guard, and the leaders of the secret societies could not fail to be profoundly distrustful of the democratic leaders. These differences could only have been accommodated if there had been powerful joint interests to unite the factions. The infringement of an abstract paragraph in the constitution, could not bring any such common interests into play. The democrats themselves insisted that the constitution had been violated time

and again. The popular press had described the constitution as a counter-revolutionary botch. But the democrat, because he represents the petty bourgeoisie—a transitional class in which the interests of two classes are simultaneously blunted—arrogates to himself a position of superiority to class conflicts. Democrats admit that they are faced by a privileged class, but they think that they themselves, in conjunction with all the rest of the nation, constitute the "people." What they represent, is the right of the people; what interests them, is the popular interest. Consequently, when a struggle is impending, they see no reason for studying the interests and attitudes of the various classes, or for carefully reckoning up the forces at their own disposal. They need merely give the signal, and the people (whose resources are inexhaustible) will fall upon the oppressors. If it should turn out that their interests are inadequate and that their supposed power is impotent, they ascribe their defeat to the activities of pernicious sophists who have spread disunion and have split up the indivisible people into a number of mutually hostile factions; or the army, they say, was so brutalized and misguided that it could not perceive the pure aims of democracy to be its own true advantage; or the whole plan was wrecked by some error of detail; or, on this occasion, an unforeseen accident ruined the scheme. Whatever happens, the democrat comes forth unspotted after the most shameful defeat, just as he was a blameless innocent before he entered the battle; defeat merely fortifies his conviction of ultimate victory; there is no reason why he and his party should abandon their old outlook, for nothing more is requisite than that circumstances should come to their aid.

The Mountain, therefore, though decimated, shattered, and humiliated by the vote of the National Assembly on June 13th., was not altogether downhearted. The most prominent leaders had been put out of action; but this gave advancement to leaders of the second grade, who were flattered by promotion. The powerlessness of the Mountain in parliament had been made plain, and its adherents were now justified in limiting their activities to outbursts of moral indignation and to declamatory rhetoric! Since the Party of Order

regarded them as the last official representatives of the revolution, and as the embodiment of the terrors of anarchy, they were free to be all the more modest and trivial in their undertakings. With regard to the events of June 13th., the defenders of Order consoled themselves by saying: "If they but dare to touch universal suffrage, they will find out what stuff we are made of. *Nous verrons!*"

As concerns the "mountaineers" who had fled abroad, suffice it to say that Ledru-Rollin, who, in little more than a fortnight, had succeeded in utterly ruining the powerful party he had been called upon to lead, now regarded it as his mission to form a French government *in partibus*. At a distance from the scene of action, his figure seemed to loom larger in proportion as the level of the revolution sank and the official magnates of official France dwindled. In 1852, he was able to posture as republican pretender. From time to time Ledru-Rollin issued circulars to the Wallachians and others, containing fulminations against the misdeeds of the Despot of the Continent and his allies. Surely Proudhon was justified in his exclamation to the democrats: "*Vous n'êtes que des blagueurs!*"

On June 13th., the Party of Order had not merely shattered the Mountain; it had also subordinated the constitution to a majority vote of the National Assembly. Such, indeed, was the Party of Order's conception of the republic. The republic was an instrument for enabling the bourgeoisie to rule through parliamentary forms, without any of those limitations which can be imposed under monarchical rule by the veto of the Executive or by the dissolution of parliament. It was, to use Thiers' phrase, a "parliamentary republic." But when, on June 13th., the bourgeoisie ensured its own omnipotence within the walls of parliament, was it not afflicting parliament with incurable weakness (as against the Executive and the people) when it excluded the most popular elements of the representative assembly? By unceremoniously handing over a number of deputies to the tender mercies of the public prosecutor, the members of the Party of Order were invalidating their own parliamentary immunity. The humiliating decree subjecting the adherents

of the Mountain to the supervision of the president of the National Assembly exalted the President of the Republic in proportion as it degraded the representatives of the people. Having stigmatized insurrection in defence of the constitution as anarchical, having declared such an insurrection to be designed to effect the overthrow of society, the Party of Order had tied its own hands, and was unable to appeal to insurrection should the Executive now proceed to infringe the constitution. By the irony of history, the general who, acting under Bonaparte's orders, had bombarded Rome (thus initiating the constitutional upheaval of June 13th.), this very same General Oudinot was on December 2, 1851, to be imploringly and fruitlessly offered by the Party of Order to the people as general on behalf of the constitution against Bonaparte. Another of the heroes of June 13th., Vieyra, who had been complimented by the National Assembly for the sacking of a number of democratic newspaper offices at the head of a rabble of National Guardsmen who were hangers-on of High Finance, was subsequently to become one of Bonaparte's chief tools. It was owing to him that the National Assembly in its death agony was deprived of all chance of help from the National Guard.

June 13th. had a further significance. The Mountain had advocated the impeachment of Bonaparte, and its defeat was equivalent to the President's victory, to the President's direct and personal triumph over his democratic enemies. The Party of Order had won the victory for Bonaparte, who had merely to garner its fruits. On June 14th. the walls of Paris were plastered with a proclamation. Involuntarily and reluctantly as it were, emerging under pressure of events from his cloistral seclusion, the President assumed the pose of misunderstood virtue defending herself against calumniators. While ostensibly trying to identify his own person with the cause of order, he in actual fact identified the cause of order with his own person. The National Assembly had, indeed, given a retrospective approval to the expedition against Rome, but the initiative in that affair had been Bonaparte's. Having restored the High Priest Samuel to the Vatican, he could look forward to his own entry into

the Tuileries in the role of King David. He had won over the clericals to his side.

The rising of June 13th. proved, as we have seen, to be nothing more formidable than a peaceful procession through the streets. No martial laurels were to be won, here. Nevertheless, in these days when heroes were few and events scanty, the Party of Order magnified its bloodless triumph into a second Austerlitz. On the platform and in the press the army was extolled as the force of order which had made firm front against the masses, who were impotent anarchy personified. Changarnier was acclaimed as the " bulwark of society " —a mystification in which he himself ultimately came to believe. On the quiet, however, the troops that were regarded as untrustworthy were sent out of Paris. The regiments which had voted for democrats in the elections were shipped to Algeria, and unruly soldiers were consigned to penal battalions. Systematic measures were taken to establish a barrier between the press and the barracks, and to isolate the barracks from bourgeois society.

We have now reached the turning-point in the history of the French National Guard. In 1830 this militia had been mainly instrumental in bringing about the overthrow of the Restoration government. During the reign of Louis Philippe, riots in which the National Guard sided with the regular army were uniformly unsuccessful. In February 1848, when the National Guardsmen assumed a passive attitude towards the insurrectionists, and were unsteady in their allegiance to Louis Philippe, the King of the French gave himself up for lost. Thus the conviction gained ground that the revolution could not triumph without the aid of the National Guard, and that the regular army could not maintain the upper hand if opposed by the militia. This was the superstitious faith of the army in bourgeois omnipotence. The June days of 1848, when the National Guard made common cause with the regular troops for the suppression of the rising, had strengthened the superstition. After Bonaparte became President, the position of the National Guard grew less powerful because (unconstitutionally) Changarnier was appointed to the joint

command of this force and of the first division of the regulars.

By this step the commandership of the National Guard was made to seem no more than a subsidiary office of the commander-in-chief's, and the militia became a mere appanage of the troops of the line. On June 13th., finally, the power of the National Guard was broken. This was not solely due to the partial disbanding of the force—a disbanding which was thereafter periodically reiterated throughout France until the merest vestiges of the militia were left. The demonstration of June 13th. had, above all, been a demonstration of the democratic National Guardsmen. They had not, indeed, turned their arms against the regulars, but had at least paraded their uniforms in opposition to these. Now the talisman resided in the uniform, and the army of the line had become convinced that the uniform of the National Guard was but a woollen rag like any other. The spell had been broken. In the June days of 1848, the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, operating as the National Guard, had joined forces with the army against the proletariat; on June 13, 1849, the bourgeoisie stood aside while the army dispersed the petty-bourgeois National Guard; on December 2, 1851, the bourgeois National Guard had spontaneously disappeared and Bonaparte merely underlined this fact when he subsequently decreed the disbandment of the force. Thus the bourgeoisie had itself destroyed its last means of defence against the army; it had done this as soon as the petty bourgeoisie ceased to follow it as a vassal, and confronted it as a rebel. In fact, the bourgeoisie had perforce to break all its weapons against absolutism as soon as it had itself become absolute.

For the nonce, however, the Party of Order was able to celebrate the reconquest of power. The loss of power in 1848 had been apparent, not real, and all restrictions had now been removed. The celebration took the form of invectives against the republic and the constitution; of curses breathed against all revolutions, past, present, and to come, not excepting the revolutions for which its own leaders had been responsible; and of laws which muzzled the press, abrogated

the right of association, and made the state of siege a regular and organic institution. The National Assembly then prorogued itself from the middle of August till the middle of October, having first appointed a Permanent Committee to act during the prorogation. In the interim, the legitimists intrigued with Ems; the Orleanists, with Claremont; Bonaparte, by princely circular tours; the departmental councils, by deliberations concerning revision of the constitution. Such incidents invariably marked the periodical vacations of the National Assembly, and I need not discuss them in detail until they attain the importance of events. Enough to say here that the National Assembly was indiscreet to vanish from the stage for long intervals; was unwise to leave the sole figure of Louis Bonaparte (however pitiful) before the public eye, what time the Party of Order was scandalizing every one by breaking into royalist fragments which pursued conflicting schemes of Restoration. During these vacations, when the din of parliamentary proceedings was stilled, and when the body of parliament was dissolved in the nation, it became plain that but one thing was wanting to perfect the true form of this republic. The only requisite was that the Assembly should take a permanent holiday, and that the republic's motto, " Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité," should be replaced by the unambiguous words, " Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery ! "

CHAPTER FOUR

JUNE 13, 1849–MAY 31, 1850

Constitutional Republic and Legislative National Assembly: Second Phase, parliamentary Dictatorship of the Party of Order—The Party of Order rounds off its Hegemony by the Abolition of universal Suffrage, but loses parliamentary Control of the Ministry.

THE National Assembly met again in the middle of October, 1849. On November 1st., Bonaparte surprised it with a message announcing the dismissal of the Barrot-Falloux ministry and the appointment of a new ministry. Never were lackeys discharged more unceremoniously! The parting kicks that were designed for the National Assembly were in the meantime given to Barrot and Co.

As we have learned, the Barrot ministry had been a composite ministry of the Party of Order, consisting of legitimists and Orleanists. Bonaparte had needed it to effect the dissolution of the republican Constituent Assembly, to manipulate the expedition against Rome, and to shatter the Democratic Party. He had to all seeming eclipsed himself behind this ministry, leaving the governmental authority in the hands of the Party of Order, and assuming the modest mask which under Louis Philippe had been worn by the legally responsible editor of a newspaper—the mask of the *homme de paille*. Now he threw off the mask, since it was no longer a light curtain for the concealment of his features, but had become an iron mask which hindered the display of his true physiognomy. He had appointed the Barrot ministry in order to get rid of the republican Constituent Assembly, and to do so in the name of the Party of Order. He dismissed the Barrot ministry that he might thereby show his own name to be independent of the Party of Order's National Assembly.

There was a plausible pretext for the dismissal. The Barrot ministry had failed to observe the respectful forms which would have allowed the President of the Republic to appear as a power side by side with the National Assembly. During the prorogation of the Assembly, Bonaparte published a letter to Edgar Ney wherein he seemed to disapprove of the liberal attitude of the Pope—just as, in opposition to the Constituent Assembly, he had published a letter praising Oudinot for the attack on the Roman Republic. Now during the debate on the budget for the Roman expedition; Victor Hugo, ostensibly actuated by liberal motives, raised the question of the President's letter. The Assembly received this reference with exclamations of contempt and incredulity —the implication being that no utterance of Bonaparte's could have any political importance. Not one of the ministers of State took up the gauntlet on behalf of the President. On another occasion, Barrot, with his familiar and futile emotionalism, expressed his indignation at the "abominable machinations" which (so he said) were taking place in the President's entourage. Finally, the Barrot ministry, though it had induced the Assembly to vote a widow's pension to the Duchess of Orleans, would take no steps to increase the presidential civil list. But in Bonaparte the aspirant to imperial honours was so intimately intermingled with the decayed adventurer that his great notion that it was his mission to restore the French Empire was always supplemented by the idea that it was the mission of the French people to pay his debts.

The Barrot-Falloux ministry was the first and last parliamentary ministry that Bonaparte called into existence. Consequently, its dismissal marked a turning-point. Therewith the Party of Order lost, never to regain, its grip upon the executive power, the first essential to the maintenance of the parliamentary regime. France is a land where the Executive has under its control an army of officials numbering more than half a million, thus keeping a huge mass of interests and existences in a condition of complete and permanent dependence; a land where the State encircles, controls, regulates, supervises, and tutors, the whole of bourgeois society

from its most comprehensive vital manifestations down to the most insignificant details of its activity, alike in corporate concerns and in purely individual undertakings; a land where, thanks to so amazing a centralization, this body of parasites acquires a ubiquity and omniscience, and an ease of mobility, that are only paralleled by the utter lack of self-reliance, the absolute shapelessness, of the true social entity. In such a country, the National Assembly, when the control of ministerial appointments was taken out of its hands, could not fail to lose all its real influence—unless it were at one and the same time to simplify the administration; to reduce to the utmost the size of the army of officials; and to establish for bourgeois society, and for the expression of public opinion, press organs of its own, independent of the governmental authority. But the material interest of the French bourgeoisie is most intimately associated with the maintenance of the above-described extensive and greatly ramified State machine. This is the outlet for its surplus population; and the members of the bourgeoisie are thus enabled, in the form of salaries, to make up for any deficiency in the way of profit, interest, rent, and fees. On the other hand, political interest compelled the bourgeoisie o multiply day by day the instruments of repression, to amplify the resources and the personnel of the State authority; simultaneously it had to carry on unceasing warfare against public opinion, and to mutilate or paralyze (when it could not entirely remove) the independent motor organs of society. Thus the French bourgeoisie was constrained by its class position, on the one hand to destroy the essential basis of all parliamentary authority including its own, and on the other to render irresistible an executive authority that was hostile to itself.

The new ministry was known as the d'Hautpoul ministry. Not that General d'Hautpoul became Prime Minister. When dismissing Barrot, Bonaparte did away with this post; for, by the appointment of a premier, the President of the Republic degraded himself to a status of legal nonentity. He became something less even than a constitutional monarch, for he was a monarch without throne or crown,

without sceptre or sword, without irresponsibility, without the imperishable ownership of the highest dignity in the State, and (worst of all) without a civil list. In the d'Hautpoul ministry, there was but one man with a parliamentary reputation, Fould, a Jew, notorious in the pathways of High Finance. He was made Minister for Finance. If you study the quotations on the Parisian stock exchange, you will notice that, from November 1, 1849, onwards, the French funds rise and fall with the rising and the falling of the Bonapartist stock.—While Bonaparte was thus making sure of an ally in the Bourse, he was at the same time getting control of the police by appointing Carlier Prefect of Police in Paris.

Nevertheless the consequences of the change of ministry were only to become apparent with the lapse of time. For the moment, Bonaparte had merely made a step forwards in order all the more obviously to be driven backwards. His offhand message was followed up by the most humble assurances of subserviency to the National Assembly. Whenever the ministers made timid attempts to incorporate the President's whimsies in legislative proposals, it seemed as if they did so reluctantly, and because their position forced them to make ridiculous proposals of whose futility they were convinced in advance. And whenever Bonaparte blurted out his intentions behind his ministers' backs, making a parade of his "*idées Napoléoniennes*," his servants hastened to disavow him from the rostrum of the National Assembly. It seemed as if his longings for usurpation secured utterance only to give occasion for the malicious laughter of his adversaries. He behaved like a misunderstood genius whom the world considered a simpleton. Never was he regarded with more contempt by all classes than during this period. Never did the bourgeoisie hold more undisputed sway, never did it more ostentatiously parade the insignia of its rule.

It is not my present task to write the full story of its legislative activities. During these days, only two important laws were enacted: a fiscal measure, to reestablish the excise on wine; and an Education Act, to make an end of infidelity. While wine-bibbing was thus rendered more

difficult for the Frenchman, he was all the more bounteously supplied with the water of true life. Whereas, in the law reimposing the wine tax, the bourgeoisie declared the old and detested French fiscal system to be inviolable, the Education Act was an attempt to ensure the persistence among the masses of that good will which made the fiscal system seem tolerable. We may be astonished to see the Orleanists, the liberal bourgeois, longtime apostles of Voltairism and the eclectic philosophy, entrusting the regulation of the French mind to their hereditary foes the Jesuits. But while Orleanists and legitimists might differ as regards rival pretensions to the crown, they realized that to secure their joint hegemony it would be necessary to consolidate the means of repression used in two different epochs—to supplement and fortify the repressive measures of the July monarchy by those of the Restoration period.

The peasants, disappointed of all their hopes, burdened more heavily than ever by the lowness of the price of grain, on the one hand, and by the increasing weight of taxation and mortgage charges, on the other, were beginning to stir in the departments. In answer came a baiting of the schoolmasters, who were subjected to the priests, and a baiting of the mayors, who were subjected to the prefects, together with a system of espionage to which all alike were subjected. In Paris and the other great cities, the reaction itself assumes the aspect of the time, tending rather to arouse defiance that to cow. In the rural districts, it becomes trivial, mean, petty, wearisome, vexatious—in a word, it becomes "gendarme." The reader will readily understand that three years of this gendarme regime, sanctified by the governance of the priests, could not fail to demoralize the immature masses of the rural population.

However much passion and however much declamation the Party of Order might display from the rostrum of the National Assembly when hurling invectives down on the minority, it remained monosyllabic like the Christians, whose speech was to be "yea, yea," "nay, nay!" It was monosyllabic alike from the rostrum and in the press. Its utterances were as dull as a riddle whose answer is already known. No

matter whether we are concerned with the right of petition or with the wine tax, with the freedom of the press or with free trade, with clubs and societies or with municipal laws, with the protection of individual liberty or with the regulation of the national income and expenditure—the same slogan continually recurs, the theme is unvaried, the verdict is always ready and never changes: "Socialism!" Even bourgeois liberalism is declared to be socialistic; so is bourgeois education; so is bourgeois financial reform. It was socialistic to build a railway where a canal already existed. Any one who was attacked with a sword and strove to defend himself with a walking-stick was stigmatized as a socialist.

This was not a mere fashion of speech; it was something more than party tactics. The bourgeoisie recognized that all the weapons which it had forged against feudalism could have their points turned against itself; that all the means of education which it had created were rebels against its own civilization; that all the gods it had set up had deserted it. It had become aware that all the so-called civil liberties and instruments of progress were menaces to its own class dominion, which was threatened alike at the social base and at the political apex—that is to say, they had become "socialistic." The bourgeois were right when they discerned the secret of socialism in these threats and onslaughts. They thus understood the significance and the drift of socialism better than much that is called socialism is able to understand them itself. Many so-called socialists cannot understand why the bourgeoisie turns a deaf ear towards socialism: whether it be whining sentimentally concerning the sufferings of humanity; or, in a Christian spirit, announcing the millennium and the universalization of brotherly love; or, in humanistic fashion, twaddling about spirit, culture, and freedom; or, in some doctrinaire way, excogitating a system of harmony and welfare for all classes. But what the bourgeoisie failed to understand, was the logical consequence that its own parliamentary regime, its own political sway, must likewise fall under the general ban of being socialistic. As long as the dominion of the bourgeois class was not fully organized, as long as it had not yet acquired its own pure

political expression, the contrast between the bourgeoisie and the other classes could not appear in all its sharpness. In so far as it did appear, it could not take that dangerous trend which transforms every struggle with the State authority into a struggle with Capital. Inasmuch as the bourgeoisie regarded every sign of activity in society as a danger to "tranquillity," how could the bourgeoisie expect to maintain at the apex of society a regime of unrest—its own regime, the parliamentary regime, which, according to the phrase of one of its own orators, lives in and through struggle? The parliamentary regime lives upon discussion, so how can it forbid discussion? Every interest, every social institution, is here transformed into general ideas, is treated in terms of thought. How, then, can any interest or any institution presume to elevate itself above thought, and impose itself as an article of faith? The oratorical conflict within the walls of parliament calls forth the bickering of the press; the debates in the Assembly are necessarily supplemented by debates in drawing-rooms and taverns; the representatives of the people, who are continually appealing to public opinion, thus furnish a justification for the showing forth of the true drift of opinion in popular petitions. The parliamentary regime leaves everything to the decision of majorities. Who, then, shall forbid the great majorities outside parliament to decide? If, at the very summit of the State, the fiddlers play a tune, surely we may expect that those who listen down below will dance?

When the bourgeoisie persecutes as "socialistic" what it formerly acclaimed as "liberal," it admits that its own interest dictates that it should raise itself above the danger of self-government; that, if quiet is to be restored to the country, the bourgeois parliament, above all, must be given its quietus; that, if the social power of the bourgeoisie is to be kept intact, its political power must be broken; that the individual bourgeois can only go on exploiting the other classes, and can only go on enjoying the advantages of property and the family and religion and order, on condition that the bourgeois class shall, like the other classes, be condemned to political nullity; that if the bourgeoisie is to save its purse, it must lay aside its crown, and must be content that the sword which was to have protected it shall be hung over its head like the sword of Damocles.

In the domain of general bourgeois interests, the National Assembly grew so sterile that, to give one instance, the discussions concerning the Paris-Avignon railway, discussions begun in the winter of 1850, were still unfinished on December 2, 1851. Except when oppressing, or when furthering reaction, the Assembly was smitten with incurable barrenness.

Bonaparte's ministry was partly occupied in the initiation of laws conceived in the spirit of the Party of Order; and partly bent upon outdoing that party in severity, as far as the enforcement of these laws was concerned. The President, meanwhile, was trying, by childishly foolish proposals, to win popularity, to exhibit the contrast between himself and the National Assembly, and to hint at the possession of secret reserves, of hidden treasures which, had circumstances been favourable, he would have been able to disclose to the French people. One such proposal was to increase the pay of non-commissioned officers by twopence a day. Another was to establish an institution that would advance money to the workers without demanding security. Gifts of money and loans on easy terms—such was the perspective with which he hoped to charm the masses. Money given, or money "lent" without security! These are the beginning and the end of financial science for the slum proletariat, whether dressed in rags or in purple and fine linen. Such were the only motives to which Bonaparte knew how to appeal. Never did any pretender speculate in more stupid fashion upon the stupidity of the masses.

Again and again, passion flared up in the National Assembly because of these obvious attempts to win popularity at its expense; and in view of the growing danger that this adventurer, goaded onward by his debts and not held in check by any established reputation, might venture some desperate deed. The relations between the Party of Order and the President had become strained almost to breaking point, when an unexpected incident forced Bonaparte, repentant, to seek a reconciliation. I refer to the by-elections of

March 10, 1850, to fill the vacancies created in the National Assembly, after the events of June 13th., by prison or exile. In Paris, none but social democrats were elected. Indeed, most of the votes were given to Deflotte, one of the insurrectionists of June 1848. Thus did the Parisian petty bourgeoisie, in alliance with the proletariat, take vengeance for the defeat of June 13, 1849. To all appearance, it had only disappeared from the battlefield at the moment of danger, in order, when the time was more propitious, to return to the fray with extensive reinforcements and a bolder war-cry. The danger of this electoral victory seemed intensified by the fact that the army had in Paris voted for Deflotte against Lahitte, one of Bonaparte's ministers; and in the departments, speaking generally, for the members of the Mountain—for even in the provinces the "mountaineers" did well in the by-elections, although their victories were less overwhelming than in Paris.

Once more, Bonaparte was suddenly confronted by revolution. As on January 29, 1849, and on June 13, 1849, so again on March 10, 1850, he vanished behind the Party of Order. He abased himself; he timidly apologized; he offered to appoint any ministry that might be agreeable to the parliamentary majority; he even implored the Orleanist and legitimist leaders (Thiers, Berryer, Broglie, Molé—in a word, the so-called Burgraves) to take the helm of State. The members of the Party of Order were incompetent to seize an opportunity that would never return. Instead of boldly grasping the offered reins of power, they did not even compel Bonaparte to reinstate the ministry he had dismissed on November 1st. They were content to humiliate the President by graciously forgiving him, and to add Monsieur Baroche to the d'Hautpoul ministry. This Baroche, acting as public prosecutor, had breathed threatenings and slaughter at the High Court of Bourges against the revolutionaries of May 15th. and the democrats of June 13th., the charge in both cases being a violation of the sanctity of parliament. No other of Bonaparte's ministers was subsequently to show himself so zealous as Baroche in humiliating the National Assembly. After the coup d'état of December 2, 1851,

we find him comfortably installed and lavishly paid as vice-president of the senate. He had spat into the revolutionists' soup in order to make it tasty for Bonaparte's consumption.

The Social Democratic Party seemed to be on the look-out for pretexts to minimize its own triumph. Vidal, one of the successful Paris candidates, had been simultaneously elected in Strasburg. He was persuaded to take his seat for Strasburg. Instead of giving their victory at the hustings a definitive character (and thus compelling the Party of Order to face the issue promptly in parliament), instead of giving battle to the enemy when popular enthusiasm was at its height and when feeling in the army was favourable to their cause, the democrats wearied Paris with a new electoral campaign in March and April. During this second by-election, the intensity of popular passion declined. Revolutionary energy was dissipated in constitutional successes, petty intrigues, futile declamations, and illusory movements. The bourgeois were given time to collect their forces and make their preparations. Finally, the significance of the March election was undermined by the outcome of the April election, for the return of Eugène Sue seemed a sentimental and weakening commentary upon the return of Vidal. In a word, they made an April Fool of March 10th.

The parliamentary majority recognized the weakness of the opposition. Bonaparte left the leadership and the responsibility for the attack in the hands of the Party of Order, and its seventeen Burgraves drafted a new electoral law. The introduction of the measure was entrusted to Monsieur Faucher, who coveted the honour. The bill was brought before the Assembly on May 8th. It abolished universal suffrage, imposed a three-years' residential qualification, and specified that in the case of working-class voters proof of three years' residence in the constituency should be given by a certificate from the employer.

During the electoral campaign, the democrats had raged and stormed. Now, when it behoved them, arms in hand, to make a serious use of their electoral victory they outdid themselves in their respect for constitutional forms. They

preached order, tranquillity, perfect legality—this meaning blind submission to the will of the counter-revolution posing as law. In the course of the debate, the Mountain put the Party of Order to shame, for, while the latter manifested revolutionary passion, the former adopted the passionless attitude of the law-abiding citizen. Even the newly elected deputies did their utmost, by their smugly respectable demeanour, to show how wrong it had been to decry them as anarchists and to interpret their election as a victory of the revolution. The new electoral law was passed on May 31st., the Mountain contenting itself with a protest. The electoral law was followed up by a new press law, whereby the revolutionary periodicals were completely done away with. They had deserved their fate. After this deluge, two bourgeois organs, the "National" and the "Presse," survived as the extreme outposts of the revolution.

We have seen that during March and April the democratic leaders did their utmost to entangle the people of Paris in a sham fight, and that after May 8th. they did their utmost to restrain the Parisians from a real fight. Nor must we forget that 1850 was a year of outstanding industrial and commercial prosperity, so that the Parisian proletariat was in full work. But the electoral law of May 31, 1850, excluded the workers from participation in political power. It cut the battle-ground from under their feet. It made them pariahs once more, just as they had been before the February revolution. When, in view of this fact, they allowed themselves to be led by the democrats, and when in their temporary prosperity they forgot the revolutionary interest of their class, they renounced the honour of becoming a conquering power, they submitted to their fate, they showed that the defeat of June 1848 had unfitted them for the struggle for many years to come and that meanwhile the historical process would have to go on as of old above their heads. On June 13th., the petty-bourgeois democrats had exclaimed: "If they but dare to touch universal suffrage, they will find out what stuff we are made of!" Now they consoled themselves by saying that the counter-revolutionary blow was not

a blow, and that the law of May 31st. was not a law. On May 2, 1852, they foretold, every Frenchman would appear at the ballot box with his voting card in one hand and his sword in the other. This prophecy restored their equanimity. To conclude, as the army had been punished for the elections of May 29, 1849, so now was it punished for the elections of March and April 1850. This time the army said to itself: "The revolution shall not dupe us thrice."

The law of May 31, 1850, was the coup d'état of the bourgeoisie. None of its previous victories over the revolution had been more than provisional. They had been put in question whenever the extant National Assembly left the stage. They were subject to the chances of a new general election; and the history of the elections since 1848 had shown beyond dispute that in proportion as the actual dominion of the bourgeoisie developed, the moral sway of the bourgeoisie over the masses of the people declined. On March 10th., the verdict of universal suffrage was against bourgeois rule. The answer of the bourgeoisie was to display its contempt for universal suffrage. Thus the law of May 31st. was one of the necessities of the class struggle. On the other hand, the constitution declared that the election of the President of the Republic was not valid unless at least two million votes were cast in his favour. If none of the presidential candidates secured this minimum, the National Assembly was to choose the President from among the three candidates who headed the poll. At the time when the Constituent Assembly had passed this law, there were ten million voters on the register. This meant that one-fifth of the electors could make the presidential election valid. The electoral law of May 31st. disfranchised at least three million voters, so that only seven millions were left upon the register; but there was no change made in the requirement that not less than two million votes must be cast for a presidential candidate to ensure his election as President. Consequently, the requisite minimum was raised from a fifth to nearly a third of the electorate, with the result that the election of the President was far more likely to be decided by the National Assembly than by the direct suffrages of the

people. It seemed as if by the electoral law of May 31st. the Party of Order must have doubly fortified its position, for the election of the National Assembly and the election of the President of the Republic were both placed in the hands of those who had "a stake in the country."

CHAPTER FIVE

MAY 31, 1850–APRIL 11, 1851

Constitutional Republic and Legislative National Assembly: Third Phase, Struggle between the parliamentary Bourgeoisie and Bonaparte—First Episode (May 31, 1850 to January 12, 1851): Parliament loses Control over the Army—Second Episode (January 12 to April 11, 1851): Failure of the Attempts of Parliament to reestablish Control over the Executive; the Party of Order loses its independent parliamentary Majority, and forms Coalition with the Republicans and the Mountain.

As soon as the revolutionary crisis was over, and as soon as universal suffrage had been abolished, the struggle between the National Assembly and Bonaparte broke out anew.

The constitution had fixed the President's salary at frs. 600,000. In little more than six months after his installation, he had managed to double his allowance, for Barrot had wrung from the Constituent Assembly an annual supplement of frs. 600,000 as "frais de représentation." After June 15th., Bonaparte had hinted at the need for a further supplementary allowance, but Barrot had turned a deaf ear. Now, after May 31st., the President seized his opportunity and made his ministers ask the National Assembly for a civil list of frs. 3,000,000. His long career as a vagabond adventurer had equipped him with sensitive feelers which enabled him to perceive the most favourable moment for extorting money. He had recourse to actual *chantage*. With his aid and consent, the National Assembly had violated the sovereignty of the people. He now threatened to denounce the crime before the popular assize unless the Assembly would open its purse-strings and buy his silence with the sum of frs. 3,000,000 a year. The Assembly had robbed three million Frenchmen of their votes. For

every Frenchman thus put out of currency, Bonaparte was to have a franc each year in current coin. He, the chosen of six millions, was to be compensated for the votes of which he had been cheated. In committee, the National Assembly rejected the demand. The Bonapartist press uttered threats. Could the National Assembly risk a breach with the President of the Republic at the very time when it had formally and definitely broken with the masses of the nation? The annual civil list was, indeed, voted down; but consent was given to a special supplement of frs. 2,160,000. Thus the Assembly displayed a twofold weakness, inasmuch as it supplied Bonaparte with funds, and showed that it did so reluctantly. We shall learn later what use the President made of the money. After this epilogue to the abolition of universal suffrage, in which the humble behaviour of Bonaparte during the crisis of March and April had been transformed into unblushing effrontery towards the usurping parliament, the National Assembly adjourned for three months, from August 11th., to November 11th. During the adjournment, it was to be represented by a Permanent Committee of eighteen members, none of whom were Bonapartists, although a few of them were moderate republicans. The Permanent Committee of the previous year had consisted exclusively of members of the Party of Order and Bonapartists. At that time, the Party of Order had declared itself consistently adverse to the revolution. Now the parliamentary republic declared itself consistently adverse to the President. After the passing of the law of May 31st., he was the only rival left to face the Party of Order.

When parliament reopened in November 1850, it seemed as if, instead of the previous trivial bickerings between the National Assembly and the President, there must now be a ruthless struggle between the two authorities, a war in which no quarter would be given on either side.

As in 1849, so again in 1850, during the prorogation the Party of Order had been dissolved into its fractions, each of which was busied with its own intrigues on behalf of a restoration. The death of Louis Philippe had given these intrigues fresh sustenance. The legitimist monarch, Henry V,

had actually appointed a ministry, sitting in Paris, and numbering among its personnel some of the members of the Permanent Committee. Bonaparte, therefore, was fully justified in making circular tours through the departments. According as the town he graced with his presence was more or less favourable to his designs, he was more or less frank in the disclosure of his own plans for an imperialist restoration, and in the soliciting of votes. In these campaigns—which, of course, the great official "Moniteur" and Bonaparte's little private "Moniteurs" had to acclaim as triumphal progresses—he was continually attended by members of the Society of December the Tenth. This society dated from the year 1849. Under the pretext of founding a charitable institution, the Parisian slum proletariat had been organized in secret sections. Each section was under the leadership of Bonapartist agents, and the whole concern was commanded by a Bonapartist general. Side by side with broken-down profligates of uncertain means of livelihood and questionable antecedents, side by side with decayed adventurers who had dropped out of the ranks of the bourgeoisie, there were vagabonds, disbanded soldiers, discharged prisoners, fugitives from the galleys, sharpers, jugglers, professional beggars, pickpockets, conjurors, gamesters, pimps, brothel-keepers, porters, men of letters, organ-grinders, ragpickers, knifegrinders, tinkers—in a word, all the elements of that vague, dissolute, down-at-heels and out-at-elbows rabble which the French denote by the composite name of *la Bohème*. They were kindred elements to Louis Bonaparte, and it was of them that he formed the substantial framework of his Society of December the Tenth. It was, indeed, a charitable institution, inasmuch as all its members, like Bonaparte himself, were animated with the desire to feather their nests at the cost of the workers of the nation. This Bonaparte who appoints himself chief of the slum proletariat; who here rediscovers in a massed form the interests that dictate his own actions; who in this scum and offal and detritus of all classes recognizes the one class upon which he can rely unconditionally for support—this is the real Bonaparte, the Bonaparte *sans phrase*. An

old and crafty roué, he regards the historical life of the nations as a comedy in the most ordinary sense of the term; looks upon their most important activities, their actions of State, as a masquerade in which the fine costumes, the high-sounding words, and the dignified postures are nothing but a mask for trifling. Thus it was in the Strasburg affair (1836) when a tame Swiss vulture impersonated the Napoleonic eagle. When he raided Boulogne (1840) he had some London footmen decked out in French uniform; they represented the army. In his Society of December the Tenth, he got together about ten thousand loafers and tatterdemalions to play the people, as Snug the joiner played the Lion. At the time when the bourgeoisie itself was acting pure comedy, but was doing so in all seriousness, paying full reverence to the pedantic conventions of the French stage, itself partly gulled and partly convinced by the solemnity of its own public acts, the adventurer who played the comedy in full awareness was bound to win. Not until he had got the better of his pompous adversary, not until he had begun to take his imperial role in earnest and to believe himself to be the real Napoleon because he was wearing a Napoleonic mask, did he become the victim of his own illusions. Not until then did he become the serious-minded clown, who no longer takes history for a comedy but regards his own comedy as history. What the national workshops were for the socialist working men, what the Garde Mobile was for the bourgeois republicans, this the Society of December the Tenth was for Bonaparte—his own partizan fighting force. On his journeys, detachments composed of members of the Society were packed away in the train, to improvize an audience for him, to display the enthusiasm of the "public," to shout "*vive l'Empereur*," to insult and bludgeon the republicans (of course with the connivance of the police!). When he returned to Paris, these faithful henchmen must be the vanguard, to forestall or break up counter-demonstrations. The Society of December the Tenth belonged to him, was his creature, the child of his own thought. Other things he acquires, are acquired thanks to the favour of circumstances; his other actions are really done

for him by circumstances, unless when he is content to copy the doings of others. But the Bonaparte who struts before the citizens mouthing formal phrases about Order, Religion, the Family, and Property, while backed up by this secret society of blackguards and rakehells, the Society of Disorder, Prostitution, and Theft, is Bonaparte as an original author. The history of the Society of December the Tenth is his own history. Occasionally, even, members of the National Assembly who happened to belong to the Party of Order would be cudgelled by these Decembrists. Yon, the police commissioner entrusted with the task of safeguarding the National Assembly, reported to the Permanent Committee, on the authority of an informer named Alais, that one of the sections of the Decembrists had decided upon the assassination of General Changarnier, and upon that of Dupin, the president of the Assembly. The assassins had been chosen. Monsieur Dupin's terror can well be imagined. A parliamentary enquiry concerning the Society of December the Tenth seemed inevitable, and this would have involved a profanation of the secret sanctuary of Bonapartism. Just before the reopening of the National Assembly, Bonaparte prudently dissolved his Society. Of course the dissolution was only effected on paper. As late as towards the end of 1851, Carlier, the Prefect of Police, penned a detailed memoir in which he vainly urged the dispersal of the Decembrists.

The Society of December the Tenth was to persist as Bonaparte's private army until he could transform the national army into a Society of December the Tenth. As concerns the last-mentioned aim, he made a first attempt in this direction shortly after the National Assembly had been prorogued, using for the purpose the money he had extorted from parliament. Being a fatalist, he was convinced that there are higher powers which no man, and above all no soldier, can withstand. Among the most influential of such powers are, in his view, cigars, champagne, cold fowl, and garlic sausage. That is why, in his apartments at the Elysée, he now entertained a number of officers and non-commissioned officers, treating them to

cigars, champagne, cold fowl, and garlic sausage. On October 3rd., he repeated the manœuvre with the rank and file, on the occasion of the review at Saint-Maur; and, on October 10th., he did the same thing on a still greater scale in connection with the parade at Satory. The uncle had meditated upon Alexander's campaigns in Asia; the nephew did not forget Bacchus' triumphal marches in the same part of the world. Alexander had been no more than a demigod. Bacchus was a god, and was furthermore the tutelary deity of the Society of December the Tenth.

After the review of October 3rd., the Permanent Committee summoned d'Hautpoul, the Minister for War, to appear before it. He promised that there should be no recurrence of the breach of discipline of which the Committee complained. We know the way in which, on December 10th., Bonaparte showed his respect for d'Hautpoul's pledge. Changarnier had participated in both reviews as commander-in-chief of the army in Paris. He—simultaneously a member of the Permanent Committee, commander of the National Guard, the "saviour" of January 29th. and June 13th., the "bulwark of society," the Party of Order's presidential candidate, the suspect "General Monk" of two monarchies—had never hitherto admitted his own subordination to the Minister for War. He had always openly scoffed at the republican constitution, and had taken Bonaparte under his distinguished but ambiguous protection. Now he manifested his zeal for discipline as against the Minister for War, and his fidelity to the constitution as against Bonaparte. While on October 10th. some of the cavalrymen gave vent to shouts of "*Vive Napoléon! Vivent les saucissons!*" Changarnier saw to it that at any rate the infantrymen who were defiling past under the command of his friend Neumayer should maintain a stony silence. As a punishment, d'Hautpoul (at Bonaparte's instigation) relieved Neumayer of his Paris post, under pretext of appointing him to the command of the fourteenth and fifteenth divisions. Neumayer refused the exchange, and had therefore to send in his papers. Changarnier, for his part, on November 2nd., published an order of the day forbidding the troops, when under arms,

to utter political catchwords or to make any kind of political demonstration. The Elysée press attacked Changarnier; the newspapers faithful to the Party of Order attacked Bonaparte; the Permanent Committee had a number of secret sessions at which proposals were made to declare the country in danger; the army appeared to be split into two hostile camps, with two hostile general staffs, one in the Elysée, where Bonaparte was established, and the other in the Tuileries, where Changarnier had his quarters. It seemed as if nothing but the reopening of the National Assembly were needed to give the signal for battle. The French public took the same view of the friction between Bonaparte and Changarnier as the English journalist who characterized the situation in the following terms: "The political housemaids of France are sweeping away the glowing lava of the revolution with worn-out besoms, and are wrangling with one another while busied at their task."

Meanwhile Bonaparte promptly dismissed d'Hautpoul from the Ministry for War. He was packed off neck and crop to Algeria, and was replaced by General Schramm. On November 12th., the President sent to the Assembly a message that was American in its prolixity, overburdened with detail, redolent of order, eager for reconciliation, acquiescent in the constitution, treating of all and sundry—of everything in the world except *questions brûlantes*, the problems of the moment. As if incidentally, he remarked that, by the terms of the constitution, the President alone had the disposal of the army. The message ended with the high-sounding adjuration:

"Above all, France needs tranquillity. . . . Bound by my oath, I shall keep within the narrow frontiers it prescribes. . . . As far as concerns myself, the elected of the people, and owing my power to the people alone, I shall always bow to the people's lawfully expressed will. If at this sitting you decide upon the revision of the constitution, a Constituent Assembly will determine the position of the executive authority. If you do not, then the people will in 1852 solemnly record its decision. But, whatever solution the future may bring, let us come to an understanding, so that

the fate of a great nation may never depend upon passion, surprise, or violence. . . . What, more than anything else, occupies my attention is, not the question who will be ruling France in 1852, but the question how I may best employ the time that may yet remain for me so as to ensure that the intervening period shall pass without agitation or disturbance. I have frankly opened my heart to you. You will respond to my frankness by trusting me, you will answer my good endeavours by cooperation, and God will do the rest."

The highly respectable, hypocritically moderate, virtuously commonplace language of the bourgeoisie reveals its deepest meaning in the mouth of the autocrat of the Society of December the Tenth and the picnic hero of Saint-Maur and Satory.

The Burgraves of the Party of Order were under no illusions as to the amount of trust merited by this frank opening of the presidential heart. Oaths were an old story to them; they numbered among their own ranks men who were adepts and veterans in perjury. Nor did the reference to the army escape their notice. They perceived with umbrage that Bonaparte's message, in its tedious enumeration of recent legislative measures, passed over the momentous Electoral Law in ostentatious silence, and declared that, if there should be no revision of the constitution, the President's election in 1852 would be in the hands of the people. The Electoral Law was the ball-and-chain attached to the feet of the Party of Order, the fetter which hindered its members from walking, and now made a storming-pace out of the question! Moreover, by the official disbanding of the Society of December the Tenth, and by the dismissal of d'Hautpoul from the Ministry for War, Bonaparte had with his own hands sacrificed the scapegoats on the altar of the fatherland. He had guarded himself against the shock of the expected collision. To conclude, the Party of Order was earnestly desirous of averting a decisive conflict with the Executive, or, at any rate, of minimizing it and glossing it over. In their fear of forfeiting their conquests over the revolution, they allowed their rivals to carry off the spoils of victory.

"Above all, France needs tranquillity." That was what, since the February revolution, the Party of Order had been exclaiming to the revolutionists; and that is what Bonaparte now insisted upon in his message to the Party of Order. "Above all, France needs tranquillity." Bonaparte's proceedings were steps on the way towards usurpation; but the Party of Order was "disturbing the public peace" if it raised a clamour anent these proceedings and regarded them with hypochondriacal anxiety. The sausages of Satory were most mousey quiet—so long as no one said anything about them. "Above all, France needs tranquillity." Thus Bonaparte wanted to be left in peace to do whatever he liked, whereas the parliamentarians were paralyzed by a twofold dread. They were afraid of conjuring up once more the spectre of revolutionary unrest; and they were afraid that they themselves might come to be regarded by their own supporters, the bourgeoisie, as disturbers of the peace. Since France's supreme need was tranquillity, and Bonaparte in his message had breathed "peace," the Party of Order had not the courage to answer "war." The public, which had looked forward to scandalous scenes as soon as the National Assembly reopened, was disappointed. The opposition deputies asked for the publication of the minutes of the Permanent Committee in the matter of the October incidents, but they were outvoted. On principle, all debates which might arouse excitement were avoided. During November and December 1850, the discussions of the National Assembly were quite uninteresting.

At length, however, towards the end of December, there began a guerilla warfare concerning parliamentary prerogative. Since, however, by the abolition of universal suffrage, the bourgeoisie had for the time being excluded the class struggle from the political arena, this dispute got bogged amid the petty chicaneries of a controversy regarding the respective prerogatives of the rival authorities.

A judgment for debt had been secured against a man named Mauguin, one of the representatives of the people. The judge asked Rouher, the Minister for Justice, what action was to be taken in this case, and Rouher answered

that an order for arrest should be issued without further ado. Accordingly, Mauguin was cast into a debtor's prison. A storm broke out in the National Assembly directly the news transpired. Not merely did the Assembly order the immediate release of the prisoner, but it sent its own clerk that very evening to liberate Mauguin by force from Clichy. Nevertheless, faith in the inviolability of private property must be safeguarded, and the possibility of having troublesome "mountaineers" imprisoned in case of need must be left open. The National Assembly, therefore, declared that a deputy might be imprisoned for debt if its own sanction had first been secured. It forgot to decree that the President of the Republic, too, might lawfully be imprisoned for debt. Thus did parliament make an end of the last vestiges of parliamentary immunity.

It will be remembered that, upon the basis of information received from one Alais, the police commissioner Yon had denounced a section of the Decembrists for planning the assassination of Dupin and Changarnier. At the very first sitting, the questors, with this matter in view, proposed the formation of a parliamentary police corps, paid out of the Assembly's private funds, and absolutely independent of the Prefect of Police. Baroche, Minister for Home Affairs, had protested against this invasion of his domain. The upshot was a pitiful compromise, the arrangement being that the Assembly's commissioner of police was to be paid out of the Assembly's private funds and to be appointed or dismissed by its own questors, but subject to an understanding with the Minister for Home Affairs. Meanwhile the government had taken criminal proceedings against Alais. The prosecution had found it easy to make his story appear a hoax; and the public prosecutor had been able to exhibit Dupin, Changarnier, Yon, and even the National Assembly, in a rather ridiculous light. Then, on December 29th., Baroche wrote to Dupin demanding the dismissal of Yon. The committee of the National Assembly decided to maintain Yon in his position, but the Assembly in full sitting (alarmed at its own violence in the Mauguin affair; and accustomed, every time it had kicked the

Executive, to accept two kicks in return) would not sanction this decision. It cashiered Yon for his zeal, and robbed itself of a parliamentary prerogative indispensable in the fight with a man who did not decide at night and act during the day, but decided during the day and acted at night.

We have seen how, during November and December, the National Assembly (despite severe provocation) shunned a conflict with the Executive. Now, we find that it is constrained to join issue upon very trifling occasions. In the Mauguin affair, the principle that a representative of the people is liable to imprisonment for debt is accepted—but is only to be put in force in the case of deputies whom the Assembly dislikes. It wrangles about this invidious matter with the Minister for Justice. Instead of seizing upon the assassination plot as an opportunity for insisting upon an enquiry into the doings of the Society of December the Tenth, and for giving the workers of France and Europe a convincing demonstration of Bonaparte's true character as chief of the Parisian slum proletariat, the Assembly allows the clash of forces to be degraded to a level at which everything turns upon a petty dispute between itself and the Minister for Home Affairs as to their respective competence to appoint or dismiss a commissioner of police. Thus, throughout this period, the Party of Order is forced by the ambiguity of its own position to fritter away its conflict with the Executive in these bickerings about competence, in these quibbles and logic-choppings, in these quarrels anent lines of demarcation. Such silly matters of form become the substance of the Party's activity. It does not venture to join battle at a moment when clear issues of principle have been raised, when the Executive has exposed itself to assault, and when the cause of the National Assembly would be the cause of the nation. This would give the nation its marching orders, and there is nothing the Party dreads so much as that the nation should bestir itself. On these occasions, therefore, the practice is to reject the proposals of the Mountain, and to move "next business." The contested question having thus dwindled to inconsiderable proportions, the Executive tranquilly awaits the time when

the dispute can be resumed apropos of some matter of trifling significance, one which has what may be called nothing more than a Parliamentary parochial interest. Then the Party of Order allows its hitherto suppressed wrath to find vent. It tears aside the curtain, denounces the President, declares that the republic is in danger. . . . But now its passion seems disproportionate. The alleged cause of the storm has the aspect of a hypocritical pretext, or appears to be a matter not worth fighting about. The storm is a storm in a teacup; the battle degenerates into an intrigue; the great collision is an insignificant scandal. The revolutionary sections of the population gloat over the humiliation of the National Assembly, for they have about as much enthusiasm for parliamentary prerogative as the Assembly itself has for public liberties. Meanwhile the bourgeoisie outside parliament finds it difficult to understand how the bourgeoisie inside parliament can waste its time over such pettifogging quarrels, and endanger the national tranquillity by such pitiful rivalry with the President. It is perplexed at a strategy which makes peace at a time when every one expects the signal to be given for attack, and attacks at the very moment when the whole world believes that an armistice has been signed.

On December 20th., Pascal Duprat asked the Minister for Home Affairs for information regarding the Gold Ingot Lottery. This lottery was a "Daughter of Elysium." Bonaparte and his faithful followers had brought her into the world, and Carlier, the Prefect of Police, had taken her under his official protection, although all lotteries except raffles for charitable purposes were illegal. There were seven million tickets at a franc apiece, and the profits were ostensibly to be devoted to the shipping of Parisian rapscallions to California. Golden dreams were to drive out the socialistic dreams of the Paris proletarians, and the tempting prospect of the First Prize was to rid their minds of thoughts about the doctrinaire "right to work." Of course the workers of the metropolis, charmed by the sheen of the Californian gold ingots, failed to recognize that these were only made out of the tarnished francs which had been

wheedled from their own pockets. Besides, in the main the whole affair was a swindle. The rapscallions who wanted to mine gold in California without troubling themselves to leave Paris, were Bonaparte himself and his Round Table of insolvent debtors. The three millions voted by the National Assembly had been squandered, and somehow or other the treasury must be replenished. Bonaparte's plan of opening a national subscription for the inauguration of so-called *cités ouvrières* had proved fruitless. Though the President headed the list of subscribers with a good round sum, the bourgeois were hard-hearted and tight-fisted. They waited cautiously to see whether they could hope to make any pickings for themselves out of the scheme; and, since there was no prospect of anything of the kind, the speculation in socialistic castles in Spain soon collapsed. The Gold Ingot Lottery proved more alluring. Bonaparte and Co. were not content with pocketing part of the surplus, part of the difference between the seven million francs and the cost of the gold ingots distributed in the form of prizes. They printed false tickets, issuing as many as ten, fifteen, or even twenty copies of the same numbered ticket. This financial operation was quite in keeping with the spirit of the Society of December the Tenth! In this case the members of the National Assembly were confronted, not by the spurious President of the Republic, but by Bonaparte in flesh and blood. Here they could seize him red-handed; at war, not with the constitution, but with the *code pénal*. If, when Duprat demanded an investigation, they disposed of the affair by moving "next business," this was not merely because Girardin's proposal to declare the House "*satisfait*" reminded the Party of Order of its own systematic corruption. The bourgeois, above all when he has been inflated to become a "statesman," supplements his parsimoniousness in practical matters by extravagance in theoretical affairs. As a statesman he becomes, like the government that faces him, a superior being, one that can only be fought in a superior, in an extremely exalted way.

Bonaparte, as a *bohémien*, as a princely slum proletarian, had an advantage over the shifty members of the bourgeois

class, for he was not hampered by any scruples as to the methods he employed. Now that the Assembly had itself led him across the slippery ground of the military banquets, the reviews, the Society of December the Tenth, and the infringement of the *code pénal*, he saw that the moment had arrived for passing from an ostensible defensive to a frank offensive. He was little concerned about the minor defeats that had meanwhile been sustained by the Minister for Justice, the Minister for War, the Minister for the Navy, and the Minister for Finance—encounters in which the National Assembly had given utterance to its snarling ill-humour. The resignation of the censured ministers would have implied a recognition of the supremacy of parliament over the Executive, so he would not allow them to resign. Furthermore, he went on to complete what he had begun during the National Assembly's summer holiday, the freeing of the military authority from parliamentary control. This was to be signalized by getting rid of Changarnier.

One of the newspapers devoted to the cause of the Elysée faction published an order of the day said to have been issued during the previous May. It had apparently been addressed to the first army division, and in that case Changarnier must have been responsible for it. In this order, the officers were advised, in the event of an insurrection, to give no quarter to traitors in their own ranks. Disaffected officers were to be shot out of hand. Should the National Assembly requisition troops, the demand was to be disregarded. On January 3, 1851, an enquiry was addressed to the Cabinet regarding this order of the day. The Cabinet replied that time was needed for the investigation of the affair, asking at first for three months, then for a week, and then for twenty-four hours. The Assembly insisted on an immediate explanation. Changarnier rose to declare that no such order of the day had ever been issued. He added that he should always hasten to comply with the demands of the National Assembly, and that in the event of a conflict the Assembly could count upon his loyalty. The announcement was received with tumultuous applause, and a vote of confidence in the general was carried. This

was tantamount to an abdication on the part of the Assembly, which declared the army omnipotent by placing itself under the private protection of a general. But Changarnier was in error when he ascribed to himself, as against Bonaparte, a power which he held only in fee from Bonaparte; and he was in error when he looked to parliament for protection, seeing that parliament stood in need of protection from him. Changarnier, however, had faith in the mystical strength which the bourgeoisie had ascribed to him ever since January 29, 1849. He looked upon himself as a Third Power, at least coequal with the two other Powers of the State (parliament and the Executive). His fate has been that of all the heroes, or rather saints, of this epoch. Their greatness depends upon opinion, upon the self-interested expectations of other members of their party, who look to them for the performance of great deeds. They shrink to everyday proportions as soon as circumstances call for the working of the expected miracles. Scepticism is fatal to these reputed heroes who are in reality no more than saints. That is why they display so much virtuous indignation towards unenthusiastic wits and scoffers.

The same evening, the ministers were summoned to the Elysée. Bonaparte urged the cashiering of Changarnier. Five of the ministers dissented, the "Moniteur" announced a ministerial crisis, and the Party of Order threatened to form a parliamentary army under Changarnier's command. By the terms of the constitution, this was permissible. The Assembly had merely to elect Changarnier as its president, and to requisition whatever military force it considered indispensable for its own protection. This course seemed all the more practicable seeing that Changarnier was still commander of the army and of the Parisian National Guard, and was simply waiting to have his services and those of the army requisitioned. The Bonapartist press did not as yet venture to challenge the right of the National Assembly to requisition troops. The fact that, in the circumstances, such legalist scruples were entertained, may be taken as implying that the Bonapartists were doubtful as to their chances of success. It is probable that the army would

have obeyed the orders of the National Assembly, for Bonaparte had to draw the coverts of Paris for a whole week before he could find two generals (Baraguay-d'Hilliers and Saint-Jean d'Angely) willing to countersign the dismissal of Changarnier. What is doubtful, however, is whether the Party of Order could have secured a parliamentary majority in support of such a proposal. Only a week later, there was an opposition vote of 286; and in December 1851, during the decisive last hours, the Mountain was still resolutely adverse to the plan. None the less it remains possible that, in the last resort, the Burgraves might have spurred their followers to the heroic determination of feeling safe behind a forest of bayonets, and of accepting the services of an army which had deserted to their side. Instead, the worthy Burgraves betook themselves to the Elysée on the evening of January 6th., in the hope of persuading Bonaparte, on grounds of policy, to refrain from cashiering Changarnier. When we seek to persuade any one, we are recognizing that he is master of the situation. On January 12th., Bonaparte, fortified in his position by the Burgraves' false step, appointed a new ministry, of which Fould and Baroche, the leaders of the former ministry, remained members. Saint-Jean d'Angely became Minister for War. The "Moniteur" announced the dismissal of Changarnier, the command of the first army division being allotted to Baraguay-d'Hilliers, and that of the National Guard to Perrot. The "bulwark of society" was removed; and although there is no record that this caused the fall of any tiles from the roof, it was followed by a rise in the stock-market quotations.

Through Changarnier, the army had placed itself at the disposal of the Party of Order. The rejection of this advance was an irrevocable surrender to the President, whereby the Party of Order announced that the bourgeoisie had lost its vocation to rule. Even before this, parliament had ceased to exercise any control over the ministry of State. Now that the Party of Order had likewise lost its grip over the army and the National Guard, what power did it still possess to enforce the usurped authority of parliament over the people, and the constitutional authority of parliament over the

President? None at all! All that remained was an appeal to principles not backed up by force, to principles which it had itself always interpreted as mere general rules, prescribed by it for others in order thereby to secure freer mobility for itself. With the dismissal of Changarnier, and with the transfer of the supreme military authority to Bonaparte, closes the first section of the period we are now considering, the period of struggle between the Party of Order and the Executive. War had been declared, and the struggle had become an open one—but not until the Party of Order had lost its armoury and its soldiers. Without a ministry, without an army, without public opinion to support it; since the Electoral Law of May 31st., no longer the representative of the sovereign people; "sans eyes, sans ears, sans teeth, sans everything"—the National Assembly had by degrees undergone transformation into a French parliament of the olden days, which had to leave all initiative to the government, and could do nothing but growl unavailing remonstrances *post festum*.

The Party of Order received the new ministry with a storm of indignation. General Bedeau referred to the unprovocative behaviour of the Permanent Committee during the last prorogation of the Assembly and to the excess of discretion which had led it to withhold its minutes from publication. The Minister for Home Affairs now insisted upon the publication of these minutes. Of course by this time they had become as dull as ditchwater. No new facts were disclosed by them, and they had no effect whatever upon the bored public. Upon Rémusat's motion, the Assembly now went into committee, and appointed a Committee for Extraordinary Measures. But Paris was all the less inclined to depart from the even tenor of its way seeing that at the moment business was on the up grade. Factories were running full time; grain prices were low; there was a glut of food; and people were putting money by in the savings banks. The "extraordinary measures" which had been announced with so pompous a clamour, fizzled out on January 18th. in a vote of no confidence in the ministry, no mention whatever being made of General

Changarnier. The Party of Order was compelled to frame its motion in this non-committal way in order to secure the support of the republicans. The dismissal of Changarnier was the very one, the only one, of the ministerial actions which the republicans approved. On the other hand, the Party of Order could not condemn the other ministerial actions, inasmuch as it had itself dictated them.

The vote of no confidence in the ministry was passed by 415 votes against 286, the majority being formed by a coalition of the legitimists and the Orleanists with the pure republicans and the Mountain. The voting showed that the Party of Order had lost something more than its control of the ministry and the army. In the struggles with Bonaparte it had also lost its independent parliamentary majority. A number of the deputies had deserted its camp. The deserters were actuated by various motives: zeal for conciliation; cowardice; lassitude; family ties; the hope of a ministerial post (Odilon Barrot); in some, sheer egoism, for the ordinary bourgeois is prone to sacrifice the general interest of his class in order to gain some private end. In any case, the Bonapartist deputies supported the Party of Order, to a limited extent only, as a barrier to revolution. Montalembert, the leader of the Catholic Party, had his doubts regarding the stability of the legitimist and Orleanist parliamentary regime, and was already throwing his weight into the Bonapartist scale. Last of all, Thiers, the Orleanist, and Berryer, the legitimist, the leaders of the Party of Order, were compelled to avow the republican faith; to declare that, though their hearts were royalist, their heads were republican; to proclaim that their parliamentary republic was, at that juncture, the only possible form of united bourgeois rule. Thus, while behind the back of parliament they continued indefatigably to pursue their respective plans for a restoration, before the eyes of the bourgeois class they were constrained to stigmatize Orleanist and legitimist activities as dangerous and foolish intrigues.

The vote of January 18, 1851, was a vote of no confidence in the ministry; it made no mention of the President. Nevertheless, Changarnier's dismissal had been the work of

the President, not that of the ministry. Should the Party of Order bring an accusation against Bonaparte in person? On account of his plans for a Bonapartist restoration, perhaps? They were no more than a supplement to their own legitimist and Orleanist designs! On account of his conspiratorial activities, as witnessed by his proceedings in connection with the military reviews and the Society of December the Tenth? These matters had been buried long since, under formal votes! Because of the dismissal of the hero of January 29 and June 13, 1849; of the man who, in May 1850, had threatened, in the event of an insurrection, to set Paris in flames? Cavaignac and their allies of the Mountain would not allow them to do so much as console the fallen "bulwark of society" by an official vote of condolence! They could not deny that the President had the constitutional right to dismiss a general. Their rage was due to the fact that he had exercised his constitutional right in an unparliamentary way. But had not they, on their side, again and again exercised their parliamentary prerogatives in an unconstitutional way, especially in the case of the abolition of universal suffrage? It was incumbent on them now, therefore, to keep within the limits prescribed for parliamentary action. Since 1848 there has been endemic all over the Continent a malady which may be termed "parliamentary imbecility." Those attacked by this disease live in an imaginary world of their own construction, and have no eyes and ears for, no memory or understanding of, the outer world of crude reality. It was characteristic of persons suffering from parliamentary imbecility that the members of the Party of Order (although in their struggle with the other classes they had been compelled to destroy with their own hands the very foundations of parliamentary authority) should continue to regard their parliamentary victories as true victories, and should believe themselves to be hitting the President when they struck at his ministers. Actually, they only succeeded in giving him a fresh opportunity for discrediting the Assembly in the eyes of the nation. On January 20th., the "Moniteur" announced that the ministry as a whole had resigned office.

Bonaparte declared that the vote of January 18th. (the work of a coalition between the Mountain and the royalists) was a proof that no one party could now command a majority in parliament. Upon this pretext, and pending the emergence of a clear majority, he appointed a so-called transitional ministry. Not one of the new ministers of State was a member of the National Assembly. They were clerks and secretaries, mere nobodies. The Party of Order was free to exhaust its energies playing with these puppets. The Executive no longer thought it worth while to be seriously represented in the National Assembly. Now that his ministers were lay-figures, it was so much the easier for Bonaparte to achieve the visible concentration of all the powers of the State into his own person, so much the easier for him to use these powers for his own ends.

The coalition of the Party of Order and the Mountain took vengeance by refusing to vote the President the allowance of frs. 1,800,000, the sum which the chief of the Society of December the Tenth had compelled his ministerial understrappers to ask from the Assembly. This time the majority had fallen from 115 to 102, and the total vote commanded by the coalition was 27 less than it had been on January 18th. The break-up of the Party of Order was in progress. Lest there should be any misunderstanding as to the meaning of its alliance with the Mountain, the Party of Order, at this very moment, scornfully refused to consider a proposal for a general amnesty to political offenders, a proposal signed by 189 members of the Mountain. The Minister for Home Affairs, Vaissé by name, declared that the appearance of public tranquillity was deceptive; underground, a dangerous agitation was going on; omnipresent societies were being secretly organized; the democratic newspapers were preparing to resume publication; the reports from the departments were unfavourable; the Genevese refugees were carrying on conspiratorial activities, by way of Lyons, throughout southern France; an industrial and commercial crisis was imminent; the Roubaix factories were working short time; the Belle-Ile prisoners had mutinied; and so on, and so on. It was enough for a Vaissé to rattle the chains of the Red

Spectre, and the Party of Order was willing without discussion to reject a proposal the acceptance of which would have made the National Assembly exceedingly popular and would have forced Bonaparte to seek a reconciliation. Instead of allowing itself to be frightened by the Executive at the prospect of fresh disturbances, the Party of Order would have done better to allow a little elbow-room for the class struggle, since this would have made the Executive dependent upon parliament once more. But the members of the Party of Order did not feel equal to the task of playing with fire!

The so-called transitional ministry vegetated on until the middle of April. Meanwhile Bonaparte continued to weary and befool the National Assembly with perpetual schemes for new ministerial combinations. Now he would talk of a republican ministry in which Lamartine and Billault were to be the leading figures; now, of a parliamentary administration, including among its members the inevitable Odilon Barrot, whose name invariably cropped up when a dupe was needed; now, a legitimist ministry, in which Vatimesnil and Benoist-d'Azy would hold portfolios; now, an Orleanist cabinet, in connection with which Malleville's name was mentioned. While thus inflaming the rivalry among the various sections of the Party of Order, and alarming all with the prospect of a republican ministry (which would necessarily have led to the reestablishment of universal suffrage), he succeeded in arousing among the bourgeois the conviction that his honest attempts to inaugurate a parliamentary ministry were being frustrated by the irreconcilability of the royalist fractions. The more loudly, therefore, did the bourgeoisie clamour for a "strong government." It was all the more unpardonable that France should be "without an administration," seeing that a widespread commercial crisis seemed imminent, and likely to favour the growth of socialism in the towns, just as the ruinously low price of grain did in the country districts. Business was becoming slacker day by day; there was a great increase in unemployment; at least ten thousand were out of work in Paris; numberless factories were idle in Rouen, Mulhouse, Lyons, Roubaix, Tourcoing, Saint-Etienne, Elbeuf, etc. In these circumstances,

Bonaparte could venture, on April 11th., to reinstate the ministry of January 18th. Rouher, Fould, Baroche, etc., were reinforced by Léon Faucher, whom the Constituent Assembly during its last sittings had by an almost unanimous vote censured for the despatch of false telegrams. Thus, on January 18th., the National Assembly had won a victory by securing the dismissal of the ministry; it had continued the fight with Bonaparte for three months thereafter; and, in the end, the only result had been that, on April 11th., Fould and Baroche were able to adopt Faucher the puritan as the third member of their ministerial alliance.

In November 1849, Bonaparte had contented himself with an unparliamentary ministry; in January 1851, he had appointed an extraparliamentary ministry; now, on April 11, 1851, he felt strong enough to form an antiparliamentary ministry, which harmoniously incorporated the votes of no confidence of both Assemblies, the Constituent and the Legislative, the republican parliament and the royalist parliament. These graded ministries constituted a sort of thermometer, on which parliament could read off the decline in its vital heat. By the end of April, the temperature had fallen so low that Persigny, in an interview with Changarnier, invited the general to come over into the Bonapartist camp. Bonaparte, said Persigny, regarded the influence of the National Assembly as completely annihilated. Already had been drafted the proclamation which was to be issued after the coup d'état—a step persistently contemplated, but for a time fortuitously postponed. Changarnier informed the leaders of the Party of Order that the death-warrant had been signed—but who is willing to believe that a bug-bite can prove fatal? Parliament, though sorely stricken, though shattered, though sick unto death, could not bring itself to look upon its duel with the grotesque chief of the Society of December the Tenth as anything more serious than a duel with a bed-bug. But Bonaparte answered the Party of Order as Agesilaus had once answered King Agis:

"I seem to you an ant, but one day I shall become a lion."

CHAPTER SIX

APRIL 11–DECEMBER 2, 1851

Constitutional Republic and Legislative National Assembly: Third Phase, Struggle between the parliamentary Bourgeoisie and Bonaparte (continued)—Third Episode (April 11 to October 9, 1851): Conflicting Attempts to secure Revision of the Constitution, the Fusion of Orleanists and Legitimists, and a second presidential Term for Bonaparte; the Party of Order breaks up—Fourth Episode (October 9 to December 2, 1851): Breach between Parliament and the Executive; the Coup d'État; Victory of Bonaparte and End of the parliamentary Regime.

In its fruitless efforts to retain control of the army and to reconquer control of the executive, the Party of Order had been obliged to form a coalition with the Mountain and the pure republicans. This was an absolute proof that it had lost its independent parliamentary majority. The mere power of the calendar, the movement of the hands of the clock, gave, on May 29, 1851, the signal for its complete disintegration. At this date the National Assembly began the third and last year of its life. It had now to decide between the continuance of the present state of affairs and a revision of the constitution. But a revision of the constitution signified, not merely the choice between the rule of the bourgeoisie and that of the petty-bourgeois democracy, not merely the choice between democracy and proletarian anarchy, not merely the choice between a parliamentary republic and Bonaparte; it also meant a choice between Orleans and Bourbon. This was to throw the apple of discord into parliament, was to force into the open that conflict of interests which sundered the Party of Order into hostile fractions. The Party of Order was a combination of heterogeneous social substances. As soon as the question

of revision cropped up, the political temperature rose to a height at which the compound was resolved into its elements.

The interest of the Bonapartists in revision was a simple one. Their main concern was with the cancelling of § 45, which forbade a second term of office for the President. The position of the republicans seemed equally simple. They were unconditionally opposed to revision, which they regarded as a complicated plot against the republic. They controlled more than a quarter of the votes in the National Assembly. By the terms of the constitution, no revision could be undertaken, no revising Assembly could be called, unless more than three-fourths of the members of the sitting Assembly voted in favour of it. A mere counting of heads convinced them that they could successfully resist the proposal for revision.

In view of these sharply defined oppositions, the Party of Order found itself involved in hopeless contradictions. If the project for revision were abandoned, this would endanger the present position, seeing that nothing would be left for Bonaparte but an appeal to force. On May 2, 1852, in the hour of decision, France would fall a prey to revolutionary anarchy, with a President who had lost his authority, with a parliament which had long ceased to possess any, and with a people desirous of regaining authority. Should the members of the Party of Order vote for revision, their vote would be futile if they honestly intended to abide by the terms of the constitution. The veto of the republicans would be insuperable. If they should act unconstitutionally, declaring that a simple majority sufficed, they could only hope to control the revolution by submitting unconditionally to the authority of the Executive. But this would make Bonaparte master of the constitution, of the revision, and of themselves. A partial revision, a prolongation of the President's term of office, would pave the way for imperialist usurpation. A general revision, which would cut short the life of the republic, would inevitably lead to a conflict between the rival dynastic claims. The conditions for a Bourbon restoration and those for an Orleanist restoration, were not merely different, but mutually exclusive.

The parliamentary republic was something more than the

neutral ground upon which the two fractions of the French bourgeoisie, the legitimists and the Orleanists, the great landlords and the industrialists, could live side by side on equal terms. It was the indispensable precondition of their joint rule, the only form of government in which their joint class interests could dominate the claims of their separate fractions and likewise dominate all the other classes of society. As royalists, they would revive their old conflicts, would relapse into the struggle for supremacy between landed property and money. The respective kingly pretenders, the respective dynasties, were the highest expressions, the personifications, of this conflict. That is why the Party of Order was really adverse to the recall of the Bourbons.

In 1849, 1850, and 1851, the Orleanist, Creton, one of the deputies, had periodically moved for the repeal of the decree whereby the royal families had been exiled. On each occasion, parliament had shown the world the spectacle of an assembly of royalists who resolutely slammed the door to prevent the return of their banished kings. In Shakespeare's play, Richard III, talking to Anne of the murder of Henry VI, says that he helped to send the king to heaven because Henry " was fitter for that place than earth." Conversely, the members of the Party of Order declared that France was no fit place for her kings to live in! By force of circumstances they had become republicans, and again and again they gave their sanction to the popular mandate that had expelled kings from France. Although the situation made a revision of the constitution imperative, revision would call in question the existence of the republic and the joint dominion of the two sections of the bourgeoisie. By opening up the possibility of a restoration of the monarchy, it would revive the conflict of interests which the two fractions had represented, and would make a struggle for supremacy inevitable. The diplomatists of the Party of Order hoped to avert the contest by a fusion of the royalist parties and of the two dynasties. But the parliamentary republic was the real amalgamation of the Restoration and the July monarchy, for, in the republic, the Orleanist and the legitimist colours had been obliterated; in the republic, the distinctions between

the bourgeois varieties had disappeared, and a general undifferentiated bourgeoisdom had emerged. Now, however, Orleanist was to become legitimist, and legitimist was to become Orleanist. Monarchy, the personification of their oppositions, was to embody their unity; the expression of their fractional interests was to become the expression of their joint class interests; the monarchy was to do that which nothing but the republic (the abolition of both monarchies) had done and could do. This was the philosopher's stone, and the wiseacres of the Party of Order were cudgelling their brains to discover it. How vain the hope that the legitimist monarchy could ever become the monarchy of the industrial bourgeoisie, or that the bourgeois monarchy could ever become the monarchy of the hereditary landowners! How futile the expectation that the landlords and the industrialists could live together like brothers on the steps of the throne, when the crown must be on the head either of the elder brother or of the younger! How absurd the belief that manufacturing industry could come to terms with the landed interest, until the landowners had made up their minds that they also would become industrialists. If Henry V were to die next day, this would not make the Count of Paris the king of the legitimists unless he ceased to be the king of the Orleanists. But the philosophic advocates of fusion (who became more vociferous in proportion as the question of revision came nearer to the front; who had founded the "Assemblée Nationale" as their daily paper; and who are again at their task when I write these words in February 1852) declared that all the difficulties were due to rivalry between the two dynasties. Attempts to reconcile the Orleans family with Henry V had been begun immediately after the death of Louis Philippe. Hitherto, like dynastic intrigues in general, these attempts had only been carried on when the National Assembly was holiday making; in interludes, and behind the scenes; as a sentimental coquetting with the old superstition, and not undertaken in real earnest. Now, however, attempts at a fusion became a main concern of the Party of Order. They were conducted upon the public stage instead of as mere private theatricals. The couriers journeyed hotfoot

from Paris to Venice, from Venice to Claremont, and from Claremont back to Paris. The Count of Chambord issued a manifesto announcing, not his own restoration, but a "national" restoration, "to be achieved with the aid of all the members of my family." The Orleanist, Salvandy, threw himself at the feet of Henry V. The legitimist leaders, Berryer, Benoist-d'Azy, and Saint-Priest, visited Claremont in the vain hope of persuading the heads of the House of Orleans. The fusionists were too late in realizing that the interests of the two bourgeois fractions neither lost exclusiveness nor gained suppleness by being accentuated in the form of family interests, the interests of two royal houses. Were Henry V to recognize the Count of Paris as heir to the throne (this being the best that the fusionists could hope for), the House of Orleans would win nothing that it did not already possess in virtue of the fact that Henry V was childless, but it would forfeit all the privileges it had conquered in the July revolution. It would renounce its primary claims; the titles which, in the course of nearly a hundred years of struggle, it had wrested from the elder branch of the House of Bourbon. It would barter away its historical prerogative, the prerogative of its genealogical tree. Fusion, therefore, would be a voluntary abdication of the House of Orleans, a legitimist resignation of that House, a penitent's return from the Protestant State Church into the Catholic. This repentance, moreover, would not reseat the head of the House of Orleans upon the lost throne, but would merely bring back the Orleans family to the steps of the throne, to the place where it had been born. Guizot, Duchatel, and the other ex-ministers of the Orleanist persuasion, when they hastened to Claremont in order to advocate fusion, were in reality representing no more than the next-morning headache after the July revolution, their hopelessness as regards the bourgeois monarchy and the rule of the burgher class; their superstitious belief in the legitimist succession as the last amulet against anarchy. Though they fancied they were acting as mediators between Orleans and Bourbons, they were merely renegades from the Orleanist cause, and it was as renegades that at the Prince of Joinville received them. Thiers, Baze,

etc., vigorous and combative Orleanists, found it all the easier to convince the family of Louis Philippe that, whereas an immediate restoration would necessitate a fusion of the dynasties and this fusion implied the abdication of the House of Orleans, it would be quite in accordance with family tradition to recognize the republic for a time, and to wait until events should make it possible to exchange the presidential chair for a throne. The possibility of Joinville's candidature was made a matter of common talk; public curiosity was kept on the stretch; and a few months later, in September, when the plan for revision had been rejected, the candidature was officially announced.

Thus the attempt at a royalist fusion of the Orleanists and the legitimists had failed. More than this, the attempt had put an end to the parliamentary fusion of the two fractions, had broken up the semblance of their republican unity, and had resolved the Party of Order into its elements. But the more intense the estrangement between Claremont and Venice, the more remote the possibility of an understanding, and the more vigorous the agitation on behalf of Joinville, the more active and earnest became the negotiations between Faucher, Bonaparte's minister, and the legitimists.

The break-up of the Party of Order was something more than a mere disintegration into its original elements. Each of the two main fractions of the party underwent a further subdivision. Among the legitimists, and also among the Orleanists, various shades of opinion had existed, but had been reconciled within the respective parties. Now these intestine differences revived—much as when dried infusoria come into contact with water, exhibit renewed vital energy, and promptly undergo division. The legitimists were carried back in fancy to the days of the disputes between the Tuileries and the Pavillon Marsan, the quarrels between Villèle and Polignac. The Orleanists, for their part, imagined that there had been a return of the golden age of the joustings between Guizot, Molé, Broglie, Thiers, and Odilon Barrot.

One section of the Party of Order was eager for revision,

but was not agreed as to the extent of revision that was desirable. It consisted of the legitimists who followed the lead of Berryer and Falloux, the legitimists who followed the lead of La Rochejaquelein, and the Orleanists (grown weary of the struggle) under Molé, Broglie, Montalembert, and Odilon Barrot. These groups now made common cause with the Bonapartist deputies in advocacy of a vague and loosely drafted motion which ran as follows:

"The undersigned, whose aim it is that the full exercise of sovereignty shall be restored to the nation, move that the constitution shall be revised."

At the same time, this group, through its spokesman Tocqueville, declared that the National Assembly had no right to propose the abolition of the republic. That right must be reserved for a special Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, the constitution could only be revised in a "legal" or "constitutional" way, only by a vote of not less than three-fourths of the National Assembly. After a stormy discussion had been carried on for six days, on July 19th. the proposal for revision (as was to be expected) was lost, since it secured only 446 votes, whilst 278 voted against. The staunch Orleanists, Thiers, Changarnier, etc., voted with the republicans and the Mountain.

Thus, a majority of the members of the Assembly declared their dissatisfaction with the existing constitution; but, by the terms of the constitution itself, the decision of the minority in favour of the constitution was binding. Yet had not the Party of Order on May 31, 1850, and also on June 13, 1849, subordinated the constitution to a majority vote in parliament? Had not the whole policy of this party down to the present time been based upon a subordination of the paragraphs of the constitution to a parliamentary majority? Had not the Party of Order left to the democrats a superstitious adhesion to the letter of the law, and had they not chastized the democrats for this adhesion? At the present juncture, however, a revision of the constitution meant nothing other than the continuance of the presidential authority, whereas the maintenance of the existing constitution meant nothing other than the deposition of

Bonaparte. The parliamentary majority had voted in favour of Bonaparte, but the constitution declared itself opposed to the will of parliament. Bonaparte, therefore, acted in accordance with the will of parliament when he tore up the constitution, and he acted in conformity with the spirit of the constitution when he bludgeoned the parliament out of existence.

Parliament had declared the constitution, and therewith its own rule, to be "outside the jurisdiction of the majority." By its decision, it had suspended the constitution, had prolonged the presidential authority, and had at the same time declared that the former could not die and that the latter could not live so long as it itself continued to exist. Those who were to bury it were already at the door. While it was discussing the question of revision, Bonaparte removed General Baraguay-d'Hilliers (who had proved vacillating) from the command of the first army division. He was replaced by General Magnan, the conqueror of Lyons, the hero of the December days, a creature of Bonaparte who, during the reign of Louis Philippe, had already compromised himself more or less by supporting the Pretender on the occasion of the Boulogne expedition.

By its vote upon this matter of revision, the Party of Order showed that it knew neither how to command nor how to obey; neither how to live nor how to die; neither how to bear with the republic nor how to overthrow it; neither how to uphold the constitution nor how to scrap the constitution; neither how to work hand in hand with the President nor how to break with him. In what direction, then, did it look for a solution of all its difficulties? It put its trust in the calendar, in the course of events, which it no longer attempted to control. This was an invitation to events to assume the party's authority, and therewith to assume the power, whereof in the struggle with the people one attribute after another had been ceded until finally the party stood weaponless. At this critical juncture, the Party of Order decided to retire from the stage, to adjourn the Assembly for three months, from August 10th. to November 4th. This was to leave the chief of the Executive

free to develop his plan of campaign, to strengthen his means of attack, to choose his instruments, to fortify his position.

Not only was the Party of Order split into two great divisions, each of them further subdivided by the spirit of faction; in addition, the Party of Order within parliament was at odds with the Party of Order outside the walls of the Chamber. Between the spokesmen and the writers of the bourgeoisie, between its platform and its press, between the ideologists of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie itself, between the representatives and those whom they represented, estrangement and misunderstanding prevailed.

The legitimists in the provinces, with a restricted horizon and unrestricted enthusiasm, charged their parliamentary leaders, Berryer and Falloux, with having deserted Henry V and with having gone over to the Bonapartist camp. Their minds were as pure as the lilies of the Bourbon flag; they believed in the fall of man, but they did not believe in diplomacy!

Far more ominous and far more decisive was the breach between the commercial bourgeoisie and its political leaders. Here the charge against the leaders was of a different kind. The legitimist chiefs were accused of abandoning their principles. The Orleanist leaders, on the other hand, were accused of clinging to principles which had become unmeaning.

I have already pointed out that, since the entry of Fould into the ministry, the aristocracy of finance (the section of the commercial bourgeoisie which had held the lion's share of power during the reign of Louis Philippe) had become Bonapartist. Fould played a double role, representing Bonaparte's interests on the Stock Exchange, and the interests of the Stock Exchange in Bonaparte's career. The position of the aristocracy of finance is strikingly pictured in a passage that appeared in the "Economist," the London organ of the European financiers, on February 1, 1851. It was from the pen of the Paris correspondent, who wrote: "Now we have it stated from numerous quarters that France wishes above all things for repose. The President declares it in his message to the Legislative Assembly; it is echoed from the

tribune; it is asserted in the journals, it is announced from the pulpit; it is demonstrated by the sensitiveness of the public funds at the least prospect of disturbance, and their firmness the instant it is made manifest that the Executive is far superior in wisdom and power to the factious ex-officials of all former governments."

On November 29, 1851, the "Economist" declared editorially: "the President is . . . the guardian of order, and . . . is now recognized as such on every Stock Exchange of Europe." Thus the aristocracy of finance condemned as a menace to order the parliamentary struggle of the Party of Order against the Executive, and acclaimed as a victory of order every success secured by the President in his conflict with those who were presumed to be the representatives of the aristocracy of finance. When we use this term, we must understand it as covering a more extensive field than that occupied by the great moneylenders and the speculators in the funds. Of course the interests of these gentry coincide with the interests of the State authority. But all monetary business, the whole economy of the banking world, has the closest mutual ties with public credit. A part of ordinary banking capital is necessarily invested in government securities, where interest can be obtained without locking up the capital. Bank deposits, which provide the money advanced by the banks to traders and manufacturers, are partly derived from the dividends of those who have money in the funds. In the money market, and to the priests of the money market, the stability of the State authority has always been equivalent to Moses and the prophets. All the more is this so to-day, when every deluge threatens to sweep away the old States, and the old national debts with them.

The industrial bourgeoisie, too, in its fanatical zeal for order, was put out of humour by the bickerings of the parliamentary Party of Order with the Executive. After the vote of January 18th. on the occasion of Changarnier's dismissal, Thiers, Anglas, Sainte-Beuve, etc., were chidden by their mandatories, and above all by those in the industrial districts, their coalition with the Mountain being stigmatized as high treason to the cause of order. We have seen, indeed, that

the braggadocio, the pinpricks, the petty intrigues, in which the struggle between the Party of Order and the President found expression, deserved no better reception than they gained. Still, this bourgeois party, which wanted its parliamentary representatives to allow the control of the army to slip out of its own hands into those of the Pretender, was not worth intriguing for. Its attitude showed that the fight to maintain its public interests, its class interests, and its political power, was regarded by it as undesirable, and as nothing more than a disturbance of the tranquil course of private business.

The bourgeois dignitaries of the provincial towns, the corporation officials, and so on, with hardly an exception, gave Bonaparte a hearty welcome whenever he went on circuit. They did so even when, as at Dijon, he made a fierce onslaught upon the National Assembly in general and the Party of Order in particular.

When business was brisk, as it still was in the early months of 1851, the commercial bourgeoisie was enraged at the prospect of any parliamentary struggle, for this might put the business world out of temper. But when business was slack, as it had been since the end of February, parliamentary turmoil was declared to be the cause of the slackness, and it was said that there could be no hope of a revival until the parliamentary turmoil was stilled. The debates upon the revision of the constitution had taken place during this period of bad trade. Since the question at issue was the continuance or non-continuance of the extant form of State, the bourgeoisie felt entitled to ask its representatives to put an end to this uneasy provisional status, and at the same time to maintain the actual system. There was no contradiction here. By "putting an end to the provisional status," the bourgeoisie definitely understood the continuance of what now existed. The decision to make any alterations was to be indefinitely postponed. The existing state of affairs could only be maintained in one of two ways. Either there must be a prolongation of Bonaparte's authority, or else (as prescribed by the constitution) Bonaparte must retire into private life at the appointed time and Cavaignac must

be made President. One part of the bourgeoisie was in favour of the latter solution. Those who held this view could find no better advice to give their representatives than this: "Hold your tongues. Say nothing about this critical matter." The theory was that, if the policy of silence were adopted, Bonaparte would take no action. Parliament was to be an ostrich, hiding its head in order to remain unseen. Another part of the bourgeoisie wanted Bonaparte, since he was President, to remain President, so that everything might move along in the old rut. Those who took this view were indignant because parliament did not openly infringe the constitution and retire gracefully from the scene.

The departmental councils, the provincial representatives of the great bourgeoisie, met on August 25th., during the prorogation of the National Assembly. Almost unanimously they declared in favour of revision, this meaning that they were opposed to the Assembly and had espoused the cause of Bonaparte.

While thus out of humour with its parliamentary representatives, the bourgeoisie gave still plainer expression to its wrath with its literary representatives, its own press. Not France alone, but all Europe, was astounded at the verdicts bourgeois juries were now passing. Extremely heavy fines and preposterously long terms of imprisonment were being inflicted for every attack made by bourgeois journalists on Bonaparte for his usurpationist aspirations, and for every attempt made by the press to defend the bourgeoisie against the encroachments of the executive.

As I have shown, the parliamentary Party of Order, by its clamorous insistence on the need for tranquillity, had condemned itself to silence. When carrying on the struggle with the other classes in society, the bourgeoisie had itself mined the foundations of its own regime, the parliamentary regime; for, in substance it had declared the political hegemony of the bourgeoisie to be incompatible with the safety and the existence of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the great mass of bourgeois outside the walls of parliament, through their servility towards the President, their insulting attitude towards parliament, and their brutal treatment of

their own newspapers, were inciting Bonaparte to suppress and destroy their own statesmen and men of letters, those who spoke and wrote in their behalf, their own forum and their own press. In this respect, the aim of the bourgeoisie was to establish a strong government, one with unlimited powers, one under whose protection business men could concentrate their attention upon private business affairs. Thus the bourgeoisie declared unambiguously its eagerness for abdication, its desire to be freed from the troubles and dangers attendant upon the exercise of political power.

Yet this bourgeoisie, which treated the mere parliamentary and literary advocacy of bourgeois rule as a crime, which betrayed the leaders of the struggle for bourgeois dominion, now dares to blame the proletariat for having failed to rise in its defence, to engage in a life-and-death struggle on behalf of bourgeois parliamentarism. The bourgeoisie, which again and again showed itself ready to sacrifice its general class interests, that is to say its political interests, to the most narrow and sordid private interests, the bourgeoisie, which insisted that like sacrifices must be made by its parliamentary representatives, now censures the proletariat for sacrificing ideal political interests to material interests. It poses as a pure-souled being, misunderstood by the proletariat, and deserted by the proletariat in the decisive hour—the proletariat having been led astray by the socialists! The accusation finds a general echo throughout the bourgeois world. I am not referring here to the hole-and-corner politicians of remote parts of Germany or to similar blockheads. I shall cite the "Economist" once more. The very newspaper which, as recently as November 29, 1851 (only four days before the coup d'état), had declared Bonaparte to be the "guardian of order," and Thiers and Berryer to be anarchists, is ready four weeks later, on December 27, 1851, when Bonaparte has silenced the "anarchists," to prate about the way in which "the skill, knowledge, discipline, mental influence, intellectual resources, and moral weight of the middle and upper ranks" would "always be an immense overmatch for mere masses of ignorant, untrained, and stupid *proletaires*." In truth, the ignorant, untrained, and stupid

masses were the bourgeois masses, and not the proletarian masses at all!

The fact was that, during the year 1851, France had passed through a minor commercial crisis. At the end of February, there was a decline in exports as compared with the previous year. During March, business was slack, and a number of factories had to close down. In April, the departments where the main occupation was manufacturing industry were in as desperate a case as after the February days. In May, people were still waiting for a revival. As late as June 28th., the reports of the Bank of France showed that there had been an enormous increase in deposits, and a proportional decrease in the advances on bills of exchange, this signifying that there was an arrest of production. It was not until the middle of October that a progressive improvement began. In the view of the French bourgeoisie, the commercial crisis had been exclusively due to political causes: the struggle between parliament and the Executive; the instability of a provisional form of government; the dread prospect of May 2, 1852. I shall not deny that these factors had an unfavourable effect upon certain branches of industry in Paris and the provinces. Still, the influence of political conditions was local and inconsiderable. In proof of the last contention, it will be enough to point out that trade began to revive at the very moment when the political horizon was becoming more gravely obscured, and when, in the middle of October, people were from moment to moment expecting a thunderbolt from Elysium. The French bourgeois, whose "skill, knowledge, . . . and intellectual resources" do not reach beyond the end of his nose, would have been able, throughout the whole period of depression, to discover the cause of the commercial crisis by looking no farther afield than London. In France, a good many factories had closed their doors for a time; but in England there was widespread bankruptcy in the commercial world. In France, April and May had marked the climax of the industrial panic; in Britain, the same months marked the climax of the commercial panic. The British woollen industry and the British silk manufacture were hit quite as hard as the French.

When the British cotton mills resumed active work, it was no longer possible to earn the profits of 1849 and 1850. The differences between the two countries were that in France the crisis had been industrial, whilst in Britain it had been commercial; that whereas in France the factories had closed down, in Britain there had been an extension of textile manufacture, but under less favourable conditions than of yore; that in France, the chief decline had been in exports, whereas in Britain it had been in imports. The joint cause of these troubles was obvious, though, of course, it was not to be found within the confines of the French political horizon. The years 1849 and 1850 had been years of great material prosperity, characterized by over-production which did not begin to make its effect felt until 1851. Then, early in 1851, over-production was intensified by the prospect of the Industrial Exhibition. As special causes must also be mentioned: first of all, the partial failure of the cotton crop in 1850 and 1851; then, the assured expectation that in 1851 the cotton crop was, after all, to be bigger than had been at first anticipated; and the resulting fluctuations in the price of cotton, a rise to begin with, and then a sharp fall. The supply of raw silk in France that year was below the average. As far as woollen textiles were concerned, there has, since 1848, been so great an extension of manufacture that the production of raw material could not keep pace, and there was a marked disparity between the high price of wool in the raw and the low price of woven woollen goods. Thus in the case of three industries occupying an important position in the world market, the supply of raw materials was affected in such a way as would amply account for a trade stoppage. Apart from these special circumstances, the ostensible crisis of the year 1851 was nothing more than the halt which over-production and over-speculation invariably make during their circulation in the industrial orbit before collecting their energies for a final spurt to reach the starting-point—a general crisis. During such intervals in business history, commercial bankruptcy is the common rule in Britain. In France, on the other hand, there is an arrest of manufacture, partly because British competition in all

markets then becomes so keen that the French manufacturers find it impossible to carry on; and partly because, in so far as industry is producing luxuries, the market for luxuries inevitably becomes dull when business in general is at a standstill. Thus France has, in addition to her share in the worldwide crises, national commercial crises of her own; though even these are to a far greater extent determined by the general condition of the world market, than by local conditions peculiar to France. It will be interesting to contrast the opinion of an English bourgeois with that of the French bourgeoisie. In its annual trade report for 1851, one of the largest Liverpool firms writes: "Seldom have the expectations entertained at the beginning of any year been more conspicuously disappointed than those which were entertained in the year that has just ended. We had looked forward, all of us, to a year of exceptional prosperity, but, instead of this, we have had one of the most discouraging years for a quarter of a century. The remark applies, of course, only to the mercantile, not to the industrial classes. Yet there were good reasons for our sanguine expectations. Stocks were low; capital was plentiful; the necessaries of life were cheap; harvest prospects were favourable. Peace prevailed on the Continent, and there was no menace of political or financial disturbances at home. Never had the wings of trade been more unshackled. . . . To what must we ascribe the unfavourable turn of events? We believe the trouble has been due to an excess both of imports and of exports. Unless our merchants are content to restrict their activities within moderate bounds, nothing can keep us going except a panic every three years."

Consider the state of mind of the French bourgeois at this juncture. He is in the throes of a business panic, and his trade-sick brain is tortured, confused, and deafened by rumours as to the possibility of a coup d'état or of the re-establishment of universal suffrage; of the fight between parliament and executive; of the Fronde war between the Orleanists and the legitimists; of communist conspiracies in southern France; of alleged jacqueries in the departments of Nièvre and Cher; of the self-advertisement of the various

candidates for the presidency; of the huckstering clamour with which the newspapers mouth their slogans; of the republicans' threats to maintain the constitution and restore universal suffrage by force of arms; of the hot-gospelling of the émigré heroes *in partibus*, who prophesy that the world will end on May 2, 1852. Is it not easy to understand how, amid this unspeakable din, this confusion of fusion, revision, prorogation, constitution, conspiration, coalition, emigration, usurpation, and revolution, the bourgeois frenziedly exclaims to his parliamentary republic: "Rather end with a Terror, than terror without end?"

Bonaparte understood this frenzy. His perception was made all the keener by the increasing uneasiness of creditors who, with every sunset, as settling day (May 2, 1852) drew nearer, felt that the movement of the stars was making a new protest against their earthly bills of exchange. They had become astrologers! The National Assembly had frustrated Bonaparte's hopes of a constitutional prolongation of his presidential authority, and the fact that the Prince of Joinville had become a candidate for the presidential chair forbade further hesitation.

If ever a coming event cast its shadow before, that event was Bonaparte's coup d'état. As early as January 29, 1849, less than two months after his election, he had made a proposal of the kind to Changarnier. Odilon Barrot, when Bonaparte's Prime Minister, had secretly denounced the policy of coups d'états; Thiers had done the same thing openly in the winter of 1850. In May 1851, Persigny had once again attempted to gain Changarnier's support for the proposed coup, and the story of the conversation between the Bonapartist intriguer and the general had been published in the "Messager de l'Assemblée." Whenever there was a parliamentary storm, the Bonapartist newspapers breathed threatenings of a coup d'état, and their tone became louder as the crisis drew near. In Bonaparte's nightly orgies with swell mobsmen and swell mobswomen, as often as midnight approached, when wine had loosened tongues and kindled imaginations, the coup d'état was fixed for the next morning. Swords were drawn, glasses were clinked, the parliamentary

representatives were whistled down the wind, and the imperial mantle fell upon the Pretender's shoulders—until morning came to lay the ghosts, and astonished Paris learned, from loose-tongued vestals and indiscreet paladins, of the danger it had again escaped. During September and October, the rumours of a coup d'état were more rife than ever. The spook assumed form and colour as the days passed by. Study the files of the European papers for this period, and you will find many such items as the following. "Paris is buzzing with rumours of an imminent coup d'état. The tale runs that the capital is to be filled with troops over night; that next morning, by proclamation, the National Assembly is to be dissolved, the department of the Seine to be declared in a state of siege, and universal suffrage reestablished. Then an appeal to the people is to be made. According to current report, Bonaparte is on the look-out for ministers who will be his tools for the enforcement of these unconstitutional decrees." The letters from Paris which contained this information ended, in all cases, with the ominous word "postponed." The coup d'état was a fixed idea with Bonaparte. His mind had been full of it when he returned to French soil. It had become such an obsession with him, that he was continually blurting it out; but, since he was a weakling, he was perpetually abandoning the design. The spectre of the coup d'état had been dangled so often before the Parisians, that they were incredulous when, at long last, the plan materialized in flesh and blood. The success of the coup d'état was not due to the reticence or the reserve of the chief of the Society of December the Tenth, nor was it due to a taking of the National Assembly by surprise. Success came despite Bonaparte's indiscretion, and despite the Assembly's prior knowledge. It was a necessary and inevitable result of the previous course of development.

On October 10th., Bonaparte announced to his ministers his determination to restore universal suffrage; on the 16th., they handed in their resignations; on the 26th., Paris learned that the Thorigny cabinet had been formed. At the Prefecture of Police, Carlier was replaced by Maupas. Magnan,

commander of the first army division, got the most trustworthy regiments together in the capital. On November 4th., the National Assembly resumed its sittings. It had nothing better to do than to engage in a summary repetition of what it had already done, as a proof that it was not buried until after it had died!

The first post which the Assembly had abandoned during its struggle with the Executive was the control of the ministry. A formal admission of this abandonment was now made by the acceptance of the spurious Thorigny ministry as genuine. The Permanent Committee had received Giraud with laughter when he presented himself in the name of the new ministers. So weak a ministry for such strong measures as the reestablishment of universal suffrage! But the precise aim was to do nothing inside parliament, everything against parliament. On the very day of the reopening, the National Assembly received a message from Bonaparte demanding the re-establishment of universal suffrage and the repeal of the law of May 31, 1850. The same day, his ministers introduced a bill embodying these proposals, and moved that it should be treated as a matter of urgency. The urgency motion was defeated, and then, on November 13th., the bill itself was rejected by 355 against 348 votes. Thus did the Assembly once again tear up its mandate; once again show that it had transformed itself from a freely elected representation of the people into a usurpatory parliament of a class; once again acknowledge that it had itself severed the muscles that connected the parliamentary head with the body of the nation.

The Executive's proposal to restore universal suffrage was an appeal from the National Assembly to the people; in like manner, the Questors' Bill was the Assembly's appeal from the people to the army. The bill was to confirm the Assembly's right to requisition troops, to form a parliamentary army. But by calling in the army as arbiter between itself and the people and between itself and Bonaparte, and by proclaiming the army to be the final authority in matters of State, the National Assembly was constrained to admit that it had long since allowed its authority over the army

to lapse. It did not requisition troops forthwith, but inaugurated a debate upon the right to requisition troops. This was to admit a doubt as to its own competence in the matter. When it went on to reject the Questors' Bill, it made public proclamation of its impotence. The bill was lost by 108 votes, the vote of the Mountain having determined the issue. Now the Assembly was in a position like that of Buridan's ass—not, indeed, between two bundles of hay, with the choice as to which was more attractive; but between two showers of blows, with the choice as to which would be more painful. On the one hand, was the dread of Changarnier; on the other, the dread of Bonaparte. The position was far from heroic!

On November 18th., an amendment to the Party of Order's Municipal Electoral Law was proposed, to the effect that the residential qualification for the right to vote should be reduced from three years to one. The amendment was defeated by a majority of one, and it was disclosed shortly afterwards that one of those who had voted against the amendment had done so by mistake. Through splitting up into hostile factions, the Party of Order had long ere this ceased to command an independent parliamentary majority. Now it became apparent that the party could no longer command a majority of any kind. The National Assembly had become incapable of forming decisions. There was no longer any cohesion between the atoms of which it was composed. It had drawn its last breath. It was dead.

Finally, the extra-parliamentary masses of the bourgeoisie were, a few days before the catastrophe, to give another solemn demonstration of their breach with the bourgeoisie within the walls of parliament. Thiers, the heroic parliamentarian, suffering more severely than most from the incurable disease of parliamentary imbecility, had, after the death of parliament, joined forces with the Council of State to hatch out a new parliamentary intrigue. By a Responsibility Law, the President was to be spellbound within the limits of the constitution. On September 15th., Bonaparte, like a second Masaniello, when laying the foundation stone of the new central market in Paris, had bewitched the *dames des halles*, the fishwives—and, indeed, in real power one fishwife outweighed seventeen burgraves! When the Questors' Bill was being discussed by the Assembly, he had won over the junior officers to his cause by inviting them to a spread at the Elysée. So, now, on November 25th., when the representatives of the industrial bourgeoisie were assembled at the National Circus of the Champs Elysées to receive from his hand the prize medals won at the London Industrial Exhibition, he charmed their hearts by his oratory. Let me quote the most significant periods from his speech as reported in the "Journal des Débats":

"In view of such unexpected successes, I am justified in repeating how great the French Republic would be were it allowed to follow its true interests and to reform its institutions, instead of being everlastingly perturbed, on the one hand by the demagogues, and on the other by monarchist hallucinations." (Salvos of applause from all sides.) "These monarchist hallucinations are an absolute barrier to progress and to the serious development of all branches of industry. Instead of progress, we have nothing but struggles. Men who used to be the most zealous supporters of monarchical authority and prerogative, have become the partisan members of a faction whose sole aim it is to weaken an authority based upon universal suffrage." (Renewed and vociferous applause.) "Those who have suffered most from the revolution, those who have deplored it most earnestly, are now ready to provoke a new revolution solely in order that they may fetter the will of the nation. . . . I promise you tranquillity for the future." (Bravos, loud and long.)

Thus did the industrial bourgeoisie servilely acclaim the imminence of the coup d'état of December 2nd., the annihilation of parliament, the passing of its own sway, the inauguration of Bonaparte's dictatorship. The thunders of applause on November 25th. were answered by the thunder of the guns on December 4th.; and the house of Monsieur Sallandrouze, who had shouted louder than any, was the one which was most effectively shelled. Cromwell, when he dissolved the Long Parliament, went alone into its midst, drew out his watch, which was to mark off the number of

minutes specified in his ultimatum, and, naming the individual members one after another, drove them from the assembly room with taunts and sardonic sallies. Napoleon, a much smaller man than his prototype, was at least bold enough, on the Eighteenth Brumaire, to beard the legislative assembly, and read it its death sentence, though in a rather tremulous voice. Bonaparte the Second, who, by the way, was possessed of an executive authority very different from that of Cromwell or Napoleon, looked for his model, not in the annals of universal history, but in the annals of the Society of December the Tenth, in the annals of the criminal courts. Robbing the Bank of France to the tune of frs. 25,000,000, he bought General Magnan with a million; bribed the soldiers with a gift of frs. 15 apiece and a tot of brandy; met his accomplices secretly like a thief in the night; made burglarious entry into the houses of the most formidable among the parliamentary leaders, dragging from their beds Cavaignac, Lamoricière, Le Flô, Changarnier, Charras, Thiers, Baze, and others; had the chief squares of Paris and the parliamentary buildings occupied by troops; and, early in the morning, had the walls beplastered with cheapjack posters proclaiming the dissolution of the National Assembly and the Council of State, the reestablishment of universal suffrage, and the inauguration of a state of siege in the department of the Seine. Shortly afterwards, he arranged that the "Moniteur" should publish a false document, according to which a number of influential parliamentarians had grouped themselves round him as advisers.

The rump parliament, meeting in the Town Hall of the tenth ward, and consisting mainly of legitimists and Orleanists, declared (amid repeated cries of "Long live the Republic") the deposition of Bonaparte. Its members uttered futile harangues to the gaping crowds that had gathered in front of the building. Ultimately they were taken charge of by a corps of soldiers of the African Legion, and hustled off to the d'Orsay barrack. Thence, in Black Marias, they were driven to the prisons of Mazas, Ham, and Vincennes. Such was the end of the Party of Order, the Legislative Assembly, and the February revolution.

Before speeding to the close, let us summarize the history of this revolution.

First Period. February 23 to May 4, 1848. The February period. Prologue. Universal brotherhood swindle.

Second Period. The establishment of the republic and the formation of the Constituent National Assembly.

1. May 4 to June 25, 1849. Struggle of all the other classes against the proletariat. Defeat of the proletariat in the June days.
2. June 25 to December 10, 1848. Dictatorship of the pure bourgeois republicans. Drafting of the constitution. Paris in a state of siege. Ending of the bourgeois dictatorship on December 10th. by Bonaparte's election as President.
3. December 20, 1848, to May 29, 1849. Struggle of the Constituent Assembly with Bonaparte and with the united Party of Order. Passing of the Constituent Assembly. Downfall of the republican bourgeoisie.

Third Period. The constitutional republic and the Legislative National Assembly.

1. May 29 to June 13, 1849. Struggle of the petty bourgeoisie with the bourgeoisie and with Bonaparte. Defeat of the petty-bourgeois democracy.
2. June 13, 1849, to May 31, 1850. Parliamentary dictatorship of the Party of Order. The Party of Order rounds off its hegemony by the abolition of universal suffrage, but loses parliamentary control of the ministry.
3. May 31, 1850, to December 2, 1851. Struggle between the parliamentary bourgeoisie and Bonaparte.
   (*a*) May 31, 1850, to January 12, 1851. Parliament loses its control of the army.
   (*b*) January 12 to April 11, 1851. Parliament fails in an attempt to achieve the reconquest of administrative authority. The Party of Order loses its independent parliamentary majority. It forms a coalition with the republicans and the Mountain.
   (*c*) April 11, 1851, to October 9, 1851. Conflicting attempts to secure a revision of the constitution, a fusion

of Orleanists and legitimists, and a second presidential term for Bonaparte. The Party of Order breaks up into its elements. The chasm between the bourgeois masses, on the one hand, and the bourgeois parliament and the bourgeois press, on the other, widens.

(*d*) October 9 to December 2, 1851. Open breach between parliament and the executive. Parliament commits suicide, forsaken by its own class, by the army, and by all the other classes. The parliamentary regime and the bourgeois hegemony pass away together. Victory of Bonaparte. Parody of an imperialist restoration.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

The Coup d'État (continued): The December Days—The Bonaparte Dynasty based on the Peasantry—Description of the French Peasantry—"Napoleonic Ideas": Bureaucracy; Clericalism; Militarism—Contradictions of Louis Bonaparte's Regime.

AT the outset of the February revolution, the social republic appeared as a phrase, as a forecast. During the June days of 1848, it was drowned in the blood of the Parisian proletariat, but it haunted the subsequent acts of the drama as a ghost. The next to make its bow was the democratic republic. On June 13, 1849, it made a hurried exit when its supporters, the petty bourgeois, took to their heels; but in its flight it boasted with redoubled fervour of all that it had meant to do. The whole stage was then occupied by the parliamentary republic (and the bourgeoisie). This lived out its existence to the full; but on December 2, 1851, it was buried to the accompaniment of a chorus from the allied royalists, who in their terror were shouting: "Long live the republic!"

The French bourgeoisie rose in revolt against the rule of the working proletariat; with the result that it has brought the slum proletariat into power, the loafers and tatterdermalions, headed by the chief of the Society of December the Tenth. The bourgeoisie kept France breathless with alarm by talking about the menace of Red Anarchy; on December 4th., Bonaparte gave it a taste of the future it had prophesied when he had the most respectable burghers of the Boulevard Montmartre and the Boulevard des Italiens shot, while they sat at their windows, by the soldiers of the army of order, who had been made half drunk to keep up

their enthusiasm. The bourgeoisie glorified the sword; now it is to be ruled by the sword. It destroyed the revolutionary press; now its own press has been destroyed. It subjected public meetings to police supervision; now its own drawing-rooms are under police supervision. It disbanded the democratic National Guard; now its own National Guard has been disbanded. It had cowed the workers by declaring a state of siege; now it is itself cowed by the same weapon. It had substituted courts martial for trial by jury; now its own juries are replaced by courts martial. It had put elementary education under the thumb of the priests; now it is to experience clerical dominion in its turn. It had transported the workers without trial; now the bourgeois are transported without trial. It had suppressed every kind of social stir by the use of all the powers of the State; now every social stir initiated by the bourgeoisie is suppressed by all the powers of the State. In its passion for its money-bags, it had rebelled against its own statesmen and men of letters; now its statesmen and men of letters have been swept out of the way, and its money-bags are rifled when its mouth has been gagged and its pen broken. The words of the bourgeoisie to the revolution were unceasingly those of St. Arsenius to the Christians: "Fuge, tace, quiesce!" The words of Bonaparte to the bourgeoisie are the same: "Fuge, tace, quiesce!"

The first Napoleon stated an alternative: "*Dans cinquante ans l'Europe sera républicaine ou cosaque.*" The French bourgeoisie had solved the dilemma long ere this by the establishment of the *république cosaque.* Not that there had been a Circe, weaving evil spells, to transform into a monster the lovely work of art known as the bourgeois republic. The republic lost nothing more by the change than the semblance of respectability. The France of to-day existed ready-made in the parliamentary republic. All that was needed was a bayonet thrust to burst the bladder, so that the monster could leap into the light of day.

Why did not the Parisian proletariat rise in revolt after the coup d'état of December 2nd.?

The overthrow of the bourgeoisie was as yet merely decreed;

the decree had not been executed. A serious insurrection of the proletariat would have promptly reinvigorated the bourgeoisie, would have reconciled it with the army—and would have ensured for the workers another defeat like that of the June days.

On December 4th., the bourgeoisie and the small shopkeepers were urging the workers to revolt. On the evening of that day, several of the legions of the National Guard promised to appear on the battle-field, armed and uniformed, ready for the fray. This threat of resistance was occasioned by the fact that Bonaparte, in his decree of December 2nd., abolished the secret ballot. Henceforward the voters were to inscribe their "yes" or their "no" in the official registers after their names. The resistance of December 4th. alarmed Bonaparte. During the night he had bills posted, announcing the reestablishment of the secret ballot. The bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie believed that they had gained their ends. It was they who failed to assemble under arms next morning.

During the night of December 1st. to 2nd., by a coup de main, Bonaparte robbed the Parisian workers of their leaders, those who would have taken command on the barricades. The proletariat thus became an army without officers. The memories of June 1848, June 1849, and May 1850, had disinclined it to fight under the banner of the "mountaineers." Consequently, it left to its vanguard, the secret societies, the task of saving the insurrectionary honour of Paris—for the bourgeoisie had shown so little stomach for resisting the soldiery that Bonaparte had good reason for the gibe he subsequently uttered when he ordered the disarmament of the National Guard, lest, as he put it, their own weapons might be turned against them by the anarchists;

"*C'est le triomphe complet et définitif du socialisme.*" Such was Guizot's characterization of December 2nd. Nevertheless, though the overthrow of the parliamentary republic contains the germ of the triumph of the proletarian revolution, the immediate and obvious result of the downfall of the parliamentary republic was the victory of

Bonaparte over parliament, that of the executive over the legislature, that of force not wrapped up in phrases over the force of the phrasemongers. In the parliament, the nation had made its own general will into law, this meaning that it had made the law of the ruling class into its own general will. Now, in face of the executive authority, it had abdicated, renounced its own will power, and subjected itself to an alien authority. Executive authority as contrasted with legislative authority is the contrast between the heteronomy of the nation and its autonomy. All that France seems to have secured by the attempt to escape the despotism of a class is that she has had to surrender to the despotism of an individual, to put herself under the authority of an individual without authority. The outcome of the struggle would appear to be that all classes alike, impotent and mute, have fallen on to their knees before the threatening cudgel.

None the less, the revolution is thoroughgoing. It is still on its way through purgatory. It does its work methodically. Prior to December 2, 1851, it had done no more than half its preliminary work; now it is doing the other half. First of all it perfects parliamentary authority for the purpose of overthrowing it. Having fulfilled this aim, it goes on to perfect executive authority, reducing that authority to the quintessential expression, isolating that authority as the sole object of attack, in order to mass the revolutionary forces of destruction for the onslaught. When this second half of the preliminary work has been completed, Europe will leap to her feet and exclaim: "Old mole! Canst work i' the earth so fast? A worthy pioneer!"

This executive, with its colossal bureaucratic and military organization, with its widespreading and artificial State machinery (half a million officials backed up by half a million soldiers)—this executive is a sort of dreadful parasitic growth, or a sort of network enwrapping the body and limbs and choking the pores of French society. It originated in the days of absolute monarchy, when feudalism was decaying; and it helped to hasten that decay. The seigneurial privileges of the great landowners and the towns

became transformed into corresponding attributes of the State authority; the feudal dignitaries developed into salaried officials; and the motley pattern formed by the mutually conflicting medieval privileges and powers grew into the regulated design of a State authority wherein there are a division and a centralization of labour like those in a modern factory. The first French revolution, which aimed at sweeping away all particularist authorities (whether local, territorial, urban, or provincial) in order to mould the nation into a bourgeois unity, could not fail to develop what the absolute monarchy had begun—centralization. Therewith it could not fail to develop the range and the attributes of governmental authority, and to increase the number of understrappers. Napoleon perfected this State machinery. Under the Restoration and under the July monarchy, nothing more was achieved than an intensification of the division of labour, which occurred concomitantly with the increase in the division of labour within bourgeois society, creating new groups of interests and thus supplying new grist for the administrative mill. Every joint interest was promptly cut adrift from society, set up against society as a higher general interest, wrested from the hands of the individual members of society, and made an object of governmental activity. This was done with concerns ranging from bridges, school-houses, and the communal property of the villages, to railways, national property, and the universities. Finally, in its struggle with the revolution, the parliamentary republic, having recourse to repressive measures, found itself obliged to strengthen governmental authority and to increase governmental centralization yet further. All the revolutions have perfected the governmental machinery instead of breaking it up. To the parties competing for dominion, the occupation of this huge State edifice has become the most important of the spoils of victory.

But under the absolute monarchy, during the first revolution, and under Napoleon, the bureaucracy served only to pave the way for the class rule of the bourgeoisie. During the Restoration period, under Louis Philippe, and during

the regime of the parliamentary republic, the bureaucracy, strive as it might for independent power, was a mere tool in the hands of the dominant class.

Not until the second Bonaparte rose to power, does the State seem to have become completely independent. As against bourgeois society, the State machine has fortified its position so thoroughly, that the chief of the Society of December the Tenth can function as its director—an adventurer from foreign parts, raised to power by a drunken soldiery bought with brandy and sausages and plied ever and anon with these delicacies once again. Hence the feeling of despair, the sense of humiliation and degradation, from which France is suffering; she feels dishonoured. Nevertheless, the State authority has solid foundations. Bonaparte represents a class, the class of those who form a considerable majority in French society, the peasantry.

Just as the Bourbons were the dynasty of the great landlords, and just as the July monarchy was the dynasty of money, so the Bonapartes are the dynasty of the peasants, the smallholders who form the bulk of the French population. Not the Bonaparte who threw himself at the feet of the bourgeois parliament, but the Bonaparte who gave the bourgeois parliament the key of the street, is the chosen of the peasantry. For three years, the towns had been able to falsify the significance of the election of December 10th., and to cheat the peasants of their desire, the restoration of the Empire. The purpose of the election of December 10, 1848, was not achieved until the coup d'état of December 2nd., 1851.

The peasants who farm their own small holdings form the majority of the French population. Throughout the country, they live in almost identical conditions, but enter very little into relationships one with another. Their mode of production isolates them, instead of bringing them into mutual contact. The isolation is intensified by the inadequacy of the means of communication in France, and by the poverty of the peasants. Their farms are so small that there is practically no scope for a division of labour, no opportunity for scientific agriculture. Among the peasantry,

therefore, there can be no multiplicity of development, no differentiation of talents, no wealth of social relationships. Each family is almost self-sufficient, producing on its own plot of land the greater part of its requirements, and thus providing itself with the necessaries of life through an interchange with nature rather than by means of intercourse with society. Here is a small plot of land, with a peasant farmer and his family; there is another plot of land, another peasant with wife and children. A score or two of these atoms make up a village, and a few score of villages make up a department. In this way, the great mass of the French nation is formed by the simple addition of like entities, much as a sack of potatoes consists of a lot of potatoes huddled into a sack. In so far as millions of families live in economic circumstances which distinguish their mode of life, their interests, and their culture, from those of other classes, and make them more or less hostile to other classes, these peasant families form a class. But in so far as the tie between the peasants is merely one of propinquity, and in so far as the identity of their interests has failed to find expression in a community, in a national association, or in a political organization, these peasant families do not form a class. They are, therefore, unable to assert their class interests in their own name, whether through parliament or through a congress. They cannot represent themselves, and must be represented. He who is to be their representative must also appear to them as their lord and master, as one holding authority over them, one wielding unrestricted governmental powers, who will protect them against the other classes, and who will send them the rain and the sunshine from above. Consequently, the political influence of the peasants finds its last expression in an executive which subordinates society to its own autocratic will.

Historical tradition had nourished among the French peasants the superstition that a man named Napoleon would return in the fulness of time bringing them all that their hearts could desire. Lo, there came one giving himself out as this Messiah. He bore the name of Napoleon, and, by the terms of the Code Napoléon, *la recherche de la paternité*

est interdite. After twenty years' vagabondage and a number of preposterous adventures, this man becomes Emperor of the French. The prophecy has brought its own fulfilment. The nephew's fixed idea has been realized because it coincides with the fixed idea of the peasant class, the majority of the French nation.

Here a critic may exclaim: "But what about the peasant risings in many parts of France; the dragooning of the peasants by the army; the imprisonment and transportation of large numbers of peasants?"

It is true that France has known no such wide-spread persecution of the peasantry "for demagogic intrigues," since the days of Louis XIV. Let there be no misunderstanding here. The Bonaparte dynasty does not represent the revolutionary peasant, but the conservative peasant. It does not represent those among the peasantry who wish to escape from the narrow conditions of their farming life; it represents those who wish to perpetuate and consolidate these conditions. It does not represent that part of the rural population which, instinct with energy, wishes to join forces with the townsfolk for the overthrow of the old order. On the contrary, it represents those who, hidebound in their conservatism, are resolute champions of the old order, and who look to the ghost of the Napoleonic Empire to save and to favour themselves and their petty farms. It does not represent the enlightenment of the peasants, but their superstition; not their judgment, but their prejudices; not their future, but their past; not the reincarnation of Cévennes, but the reincarnation of Vendée.

The three-years' rule of the parliamentary republic had freed some of the French peasants from the Napoleonic illusion, and had even revolutionized them, though superficially; but the bourgeoisie had forcibly repressed any attempt on their part to advance. Under the parliamentary republic there was a struggle between the modern and the traditional consciousness of the French peasantry. This struggle took the form of incessant warfare between the schoolmasters and the priests. The bourgeoisie took the side of the priests. The peasants had made a first

attempt to maintain their own independence against governmental authority. This was shown in the protracted conflict between the mayors and the prefects. The bourgeoisie deposed recalcitrant mayors. Finally, during the regime of the parliamentary republic, the peasants of various regions had risen against their own offspring, the army. The bourgeoisie had punished them with states of siege and with distraints upon their goods. Now this same bourgeoisie complains bitterly of the stupidity of the masses, of the "vile multitude" which has betrayed it to Bonaparte. The bourgeoisie had itself forcibly strengthened the imperialist sentiment of the peasantry by maintaining the conditions under which this peasant religion came into existence. What can the bourgeoisie do but dread the stupidity of the masses while they remain conservative, and the enlightened understanding of the masses as soon as they become revolutionary?

In the risings that followed the coup d'état, some of the peasants were making an armed protest against their own votes on December 10, 1848. Their schooling since then had taught them sense. But they had signed a covenant with the underworld of history, and history held them to their bond. Most of the peasants were still so steeped in prejudice that in the Reddest of the departments they were most frank and enthusiastic in their support of Bonaparte. In their view, the National Assembly had restricted their freedom of movement, and now they were merely breaking the fetters which the towns had imposed upon the will of the countryside. In some places, they even entertained the grotesque fancy that a revolutionary Convention might exist side by side with a Napoleon!

By the first revolution, serfdom was completely abolished, and the peasants became freeholders. Then came Napoleon, who confirmed and regulated the conditions on which they could exploit their newly acquired farms and enjoy the freshly won sense of ownership. But that is the very thing which now bears so hardly on the peasant, this system of petty proprietorship, this parcelling out of the land into small privately owned plots, a system consolidated in France

under the Napoleonic regime. It was the material conditions of existence, the system of land tenure and the associated method of agricultural production, which converted the serf of feudal days into a small freeholder and made Napoleon Emperor. Two generations have been enough to produce the inevitable result; the progressive deterioration of agriculture and the increasing indebtedness of the tillers of the soil. The "Napoleonic" land tenure, which in the opening years of the nineteenth century enfranchised and enriched the French countryfolk, has by the middle of the same century enslaved and pauperized them. But this very system of peasant landholdings is the first of the *idées napoléoniennes* which the second Napoleon must perforce uphold. If, in common with the peasants, he still clings to the illusion that the cause of their ruin is to be sought, not in the system of petty proprietorship itself, but elsewhere, in secondary external conditions, his experiments will burst like soap-bubbles when they come into contact with the actual conditions of production.

By the economic development of this smallholding system, the relationship between the peasantry and the other classes of society has been turned upside down. Under the first Napoleon, the parcelling out of the land encouraged free competition in the rural districts, and favoured the beginnings of great industry in the towns. The peasant class was an embodied and ubiquitous protest against the landed aristocracy, so recently overthrown. The roots which the new system of smallholding struck deep into French soil, cut off the supply of nutriment upon which feudalism had depended. The landmarks of peasant proprietorship were the natural fortifications of the bourgeoisie against any attempt at a coup de main that might be made by the old overlords. But in the course of the nineteenth century, the feudal extortioner was replaced by the urban usurer; the obligations that the feudal system had imposed upon those who were bound to the soil found their modern counterparts in the obligations to the mortgagee; aristocratic landlordism had been exchanged for bourgeois capitalism. The peasant's holding is still only the pretext

whereby the capitalist is enabled to draw profit, interest, and rent from the land, while leaving the cultivator to wrest his own wages from the soil. French agricultural land is so heavily burdened with mortgages, that the interest paid on them is equal to the interest on the British national debt. The system of petty proprietorship, inevitably resulting in this enslavement to capital, has transformed the mass of the French nation into troglodytes. Sixteen million peasants (the women and children included) live in cavelike hovels, most of which have but one opening, though some have two, and the most favoured ones, three. Now, windows are to a house what the five senses are to the head. At the beginning of the century, the bourgeois system of society, placed the State as sentinel in front of the newly created petty landholdings, and manured their soil with laurels. To-day, that same bourgeois system has become a vampire which sucks the blood and marrow from the peasants' little farms, and throws them into the alembic of capital. The Code Napoléon is now nothing more than the warrant for distraints and forced sales. According to official figures, there are in France four million paupers, vagabonds, criminals, and prostitutes. Next come five millions (always including women and children) living on the very margin of subsistence, now in the country, and now, with their rags and their children, migrating for a time to the towns. The result is that the interests of the peasants no longer coincide, as during the reign of the first Napoleon, with the interests of the bourgeoisie, with the interests of capital. There is now a conflict of interests. The peasants, therefore, find their natural allies and leaders in the urban proletariat, whose mission it is to subvert the bourgeois order of society. But the mission of the strong, the absolutist government of Louis Bonaparte (and here we have the second *idée napoléonienne*) is the forcible defence of this "material order." That is why the catchword "*ordre matériel*" finds a place in all Bonaparte's proclamations against the turbulent peasants.

Mortgages are not the only burdens imposed by capital upon the smallholder. There is also the burden of taxation.

Taxes form the vital sustenance of the bureaucracy, the army, the clergy, and the court—in a word of the whole executive apparatus. Strong government and crushing taxation are identical. From its very nature, the system of petty proprietorship is a suitable standing ground for an all-powerful and numberless bureaucracy. It brings about an equable levelling of conditions and personalities throughout the country, thus facilitating the exercise of an even influence upon all parts of this homogeneous mass, an influence emanating from a central point. It destroys the aristocratic gradations between the masses of the people and the State authority. Consequently, it calls for the universal and direct intervention of this governmental authority and its instruments. Finally, the system produces an unemployed excess of population, consisting of persons for whom there is no productive occupation either upon the land or in the towns, and who therefore reach out their hands towards the civil service as a sort of respectable alms-giving institution, and do their utmost to multiply the number of official posts. The first Napoleon, opening new markets at the point of the bayonet, and plundering the whole continent of Europe, was able to repay with interest what he extorted by taxation. Then, taxation was a spur to peasant industry; now, it robs that industry of its last support, and opens the door to pauperism. Indeed, a huge bureaucracy, well fed and well dressed, is, of all the *idées napoléoniennes*, the one which best suits the requirements of the second Bonaparte. How could it be otherwise, seeing that he is forced to create, side by side with the genuine classes of society, an artificial caste to which the maintenance of his regime becomes a bread-and-butter question? That was why one of the first financial operations was the raising of official salaries to their old level, and the creation of new sinecures.

Another *idée napoléonienne* is the rule of the priests as an instrument of government. But whereas at the outset the peasant smallholders, being in harmony with society, dependent upon natural forces, and subject to an authority which protected them from on high, were naturally religious

—nowadays, when they are burdened with debt, at odds with society and authority, and forced out of their old rut, they are naturally irreligious. Heaven was a pleasing accessory to the newly-won plot of farming land, all the more since rain and sunshine come from heaven; but to offer heaven in exchange for a landholding is an insult. In the light of such an offer, the priest can only be regarded as the anointed bloodhound of the earthly police—yet another *idée napoléonienne!* The next expedition against Rome will take place within the frontiers of France, but will be of the opposite kind to that of Monsieur de Montalembert.

Finally, the culminating point of the *idées napoléoniennes* is the preponderance of the army. To the peasant proprietors, the army was the *point d'honneur*. It was themselves transformed into heroes, defending their newly acquired property in foreign campaigns, glorifying their recently won nationality, plundering and revolutionizing the world. The uniform was their gala dress; war was their poetry; the plot of land, imaginatively magnified and rounded off, was the fatherland; and patriotism was an idealized sense of ownership. But the enemies against whom the French peasant has now to defend his property are no longer Cossacks; they are bailiffs and taxgatherers. The holdings are no longer in the so-called fatherland; they are in the register of mortgages! Even the army, now, has ceased to consist of the flower of the peasant youth; it is recruited from among the rank, weedy growths of the rural slum proletariat. A large proportion of these recruits are *remplaçants*, substitutes, just as the second Bonaparte is himself a mere *remplaçant*, a substitute for Napoleon. The heroic feats of this army take the form of raids on the peasantry, of police duties. When the internal contradictions of his system drive the chief of the Society of December the Tenth into exile, his army, after a few acts of brigandage, will earn for itself, not laurels, but hard knocks.

We see, then, that all the *idées napoléoniennes* are the ideas of the petty proprietors in their callow youth. When the peasants have grown old and experienced, these ideas seem nonsensical to them. In the death struggle of the

system of petty proprietorship, the Napoleonic ideas have become hallucinations; the words are empty phrases; the spirits are but ghosts. Yet the parody of Empire was necessary that the mass of the French nation might be freed from the yoke of tradition, and that the opposition between the State authority and society might be displayed in all its nudity. With the progressive decay of the system of petty proprietorship, the State structure that was founded upon it collapses. The governmental centralization indispensable to modern society can rise only upon the ruins of the militarist and bureaucratic governmental machinery which was created as a counterblast to feudalism.

The conditions of peasant life in France are the solution of the riddle of the general elections of December 20th. and 21st., which carried the second Bonaparte to the top of Mount Sinai—not to receive laws, but to give them.

Obviously, now, the bourgeoisie had no alternative. It had perforce to vote for Bonaparte. At the Council of Constance, when the puritans complained of the dissolute lives of the popes, and wailed about the need for moral reform, Cardinal d'Ailly thundered in reply: "Only the devil in person can save the Catholic Church, and you are asking for angels!"

In like manner, after the coup d'état, the French bourgeoisie exclaimed: "Only the chief of the Society of December the Tenth can save capitalist society. Nothing but theft can save property; nothing but perjury can save religion; nothing but bastardy can save the family; nothing but disorder can save order!"

Bonaparte, as a self-appointed autocrat, regards the safeguarding of "bourgeois order" as his mission. But the main prop of the bourgeois order is the middle class. He looks upon himself, therefore, as the representative of the middle class, and issues his decrees in this sense. Nevertheless, he is himself only a power in so far as he has broken the political power of the middle class, and daily breaks it anew. Consequently, he looks upon himself as the adversary of the political and literary power of the middle class.

Yet in so far as he protects the material power of that class, he continually recreates its political power. His aim must be to keep the cause in being, while he shuffles the effect out of the world. But this cannot be achieved without some slight confounding of cause and effect, at the point where the two, in their interaction, lose their distinctive characteristics. That is why he issues new decrees which smudge the boundary line. At the same time, Bonaparte feels himself to be the representative of the peasantry, and of the people in general, as against the bourgeoisie; he regards himself as the man who is to bring happiness to the lower classes, and to do so within the framework of bourgeois society. To this end, he issues more decrees, which are to forestall the "true socialists," and steal the socialist thunder. Above all, however, Bonaparte looks upon himself as chief of the Society of December the Tenth, as representative of the slum proletariat, to which he himself, his entourage, his government, and his army belong. (We must not forget that the main object of the slum proletariat is to seek its own advantage and to draw Californian prizes out of the State treasury.) He consolidates his position as chief of the Society of December the Tenth, with decrees, without decrees, and in spite of decrees.

These contradictions in the man's mission explain the contradictions in his government. That is why his government alternately seeks to win and then to humiliate this class or that, and ends by arraying all classes against itself, so that the actual insecurity of the government forms a ludicrous contrast to its hectoring tones and dictatorial methods—which the nephew has carefully copied from the uncle.

Industry and commerce, the business affairs of the middle class, are to thrive as if in a hothouse under this "strong government." Numberless railway concessions are granted. But the Bonapartist slum proletariat must feather its nest. Those in the know, play hanky panky on the Stock Exchange with the railway concessions. No capital is forthcoming for the railways. The Bank of France must undertake to advance money upon railway shares. At the same time,

money must be made out of the bank, and so the bank has to be cajoled. It is released from the obligation to publish weekly reports. The government comes to an agreement with the bank, and the government is to get the lion's share of the spoils. Work must be found for the common people. State undertakings are inaugurated. The State undertakings must be financed, and that will tend to increase taxation. This can be avoided by an attack upon the national bondholders, by a reduction of the interest on the national debt from 5 per cent. to 4½ per cent. In return for this, the middle class must have a sop. Let us double the wine tax for the lower orders, who buy *en détail*, and halve the wine tax for members of the middle class who drink *en gros*. Genuine labour organizations are to be dissolved, but there is a promise of miracles to be worked by labour organization at some future day. The peasants must be given a helping hand. Let us found mortgage banks, which will intensify the burden of peasant debt and accelerate the concentration of property. But these banks must be turned to special account in squeezing money out of the confiscated estates of the House of Orleans. No capitalist will lend his aid to the latter part of the scheme, which is not mentioned in the decree. The result is that the mortgage bank exists only on paper. And so on; and so on.

Bonaparte would fain pose as the patriarchal benefactor of all classes. But he cannot give to one class without robbing the others. In the days of the Fronde, it was said of the Duke of Guise that he was the most obliging man in France, seeing that he had transformed all his possessions into his partisans' obligations towards himself. In like manner, Bonaparte would fain be the most obliging man in France, and would gladly transform all the property and all the labour of France into a personal obligation towards himself. He would like to steal the whole of France in order to make a present of the stolen goods to France, or, rather, in order to buy France anew with French money—for in the role of chief of the Society of December the Tenth he is compelled to buy that which ought to belong to him. All State institutions—the Senate, the Council of State,

the legislature, the Legion of Honour, the soldiers' medals, the public baths and wash-houses, the State buildings, the railways, the *état major* of the National Guard (to the exclusion of the privates), and the confiscated estates of the House of Orleans—all are to be transformed into an Institute for Purchase and Sale. Every post in the army and in the governmental machine is to become a means for money making. But the most important feature of the process, in which France is to be annexed in order to be given back to herself, are the percentages which will accrue to the head and the members of the Society of December the Tenth. Countess L., the Duke of Morny's mistress, wittily characterized the confiscation of the estates of the House of Orleans in the phrase *"C'est le premier vol de l'aigle!"* The witticism applies to all the flights of this eagle, which is, in reality, far more like a crow. Like the Carthusian monk in the legend, admonishing the miser who made a boastful display of the wealth on which he expected to live for many years to come, Bonaparte and his henchmen say to themselves daily: *"Tu fai conto sopra i bene, bisogna prima far il conto sopra gli anni."* Lest they should make any mistake in reckoning up the years, they reckon up the minutes. At the court, in the ministerial offices, at the head of the administration and the army, we see a crowd of fellows, of which the best that can be said is that no one knows whence it hails. They form a noisy, disreputable rabble, eager for loot. In their fine uniforms, decked with gold lace, they look as grotesque as the dignitaries of Emperor Soulouque. My readers will be able to form a picture of this upper stratum of the Society of December the Tenth when they realize that Véron-Crevel is their moralist, and that Granier de Cassagnac is their thinker. Guizot, in the days when he was Prime Minister, had employed Granier de Cassagnac on the staff of a petty newspaper intended to counteract the influence of the legitimist opposition, and had been wont to say of his tool: *"C'est le roi des drôles."* When we contemplate the court and the kin of Louis Bonaparte, we do wrong if our thoughts turn back to the days of the Regency or to those of the

reign of Louis XV. Let us remember the words of Madame Girardin. Many times ere this, France has been under the rule of kept women, but, never before under the rule of kept men.

Harassed by the conflicting demands of his situation, forced like a conjurer to rivet public attention upon himself as substitute of the first Napoleon, compelled every day to carry out a miniature coup d'état, Bonaparte throws the whole bourgeois economy into confusion, lays sacrilegious hands on everything which the revolution of 1848 had regarded as sacred, makes some tolerant of revolution and others eager for revolution, and generates anarchy in the name of order. Through his deeds, the State machine is robbed of all sublimity, is profaned, is made both loathsome and ridiculous. The cult of the Holy Coat of Treves is transferred to Paris, where it becomes the cult of the Napoleonic imperial mantle. But if the imperial mantle should, in the end, fall upon the shoulders of Louis Bonaparte, the iron statue of Napoleon will crash from the top of the Vendôme column.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

THIS chronological table deals with the salient facts of French political history during a period of more than eighty years, from the beginning of the great French revolution in 1789 to the suppression of the Commune by the government of the Third Republic in 1871. Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire* is concerned only with the period of the Second Republic, from the end of February 1848 to the December days in 1851; but the British student will understand Marx's account of those four years better if he sees them in their historical setting, which helps to show their relationship to the bourgeois revolution and to the working-class movement. During more than twelve years, throughout most of the first republican period, the French revolutionary or republican calendar was in force. It is more convenient to restore the dates of this period to those of the Gregorian calendar, which is still in general use. Only in the case of a few exceptionally important dates which even to-day are usually referred to in France by the revolutionary names, is the nomenclature of the revolutionary calendar given as well. For instance, the day of Robespierre's fall is spoken of as the 9th Thermidor; and the day of the first Napoleon's coup d'état is called the 18th Brumaire. A short account of the republican calendar will therefore be helpful. Though its use did not become law until October 5, 1793, it was technically supposed to have been inaugurated on September 2, 1792, the day on which the Republic had been proclaimed, and, in the new calendar, the day of the autumnal equinox. In the republican calendar, attempts were made at a decimal system. The month of thirty days was divided into three decades, the tenth day of each decade being a day of rest. At first, even the day was to be divided on the decimal system, but

in practice the twenty-four hour method of division was never dislodged. The twelve months of thirty days each made up 360 days. Five days remained to be disposed of. They comprised a period of public holiday. In leap year, of course, there were six extra days, and the last of these days was celebrated as a special festival of the revolution. The new names of the months were descriptive of the weather or of other seasonal processes. Beginning with the autumnal equinox, they ran as follows:

AUTUMN:

Vendémiaire	[vah*n*-deh-myehr']	the vintage month.
Brumaire	[brü-mehr']	the month of fogs.
Frimaire	[free-mehr']	the month of frosts.

WINTER:

Nivôse	[nee-vohz']	the snowy month.
Pluviôse	[plü-vyohz']	the rainy month.
Ventôse	[vah*n*-tohz'[	the windy month.

SPRING:

Germinal	[zhehr-mee-nahl']	the month of buds.
Floréal	[flo-reh-ahl']	the month of flowers.
Prairial	[preh-ree-ahl']	the month of meadows; haymaking.

SUMMER:

Messidor	[mess-ee-dawr']	the month of reaping.
Thermidor	[tehr-mee-dawr']	the hot month; the month for bathing.
Fructidor	[frük-tee-dawr']	the month of fruits.

1789–1794. THE GREAT FRENCH REVOLUTION.

1789.

May 5. The states-general opened. Conflict between Louis XVI and the Assembly. The third estate (the commoners) excluded from the Assembly by the king's closing the chamber where their sittings took place. Third estate meets in one of the tennis-courts, and, on June 20th, takes a solemn oath not to separate till a constitution for the kingdom has been established.

June 17. The states-general adopt the name National Assembly.

June 23. The king demands the dispersal of the National Assembly. The third estate refuses to obey. The army, in its turn, refuses to coerce the Assembly. The lesser nobility and the lower ranks of the clergy join the third estate in the protest.

June 27. Louis yields to circumstances, and recognizes the National Assembly, thereby sanctioning the political revolution.

July 14. Taking of the Bastille by the citizen army of Paris, acting in defence of the National Assembly.

August 4. Liberation of the serfs.

October 2. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.

October 1, 1791 to September 20, 1792. The meeting of the Legislative Assembly.

1792.

September 20. Dispersal of the Legislative Assembly and convocation of the National Convention.

September 21 to October 26 (4th Brumaire), 1795. The National Convention.

1793.

April 6. The first Committee of Public Safety established under the leadership of Danton.

1794.

July 10. Danton guillotined.

June 10 to July 27. The second Committee of Public Safety dominated by Robespierre.

July 27 (9th Thermidor). Fall of Robespierre.

1795–1799. THE DIRECTORY. RULE OF THE BOURGEOIS REPUBLIC.

November 9 (18th Brumaire), 1799. The coup d'état of Napoleon Bonaparte and the fall of the Directory.

1799–1815. NAPOLEONIC REGIME.

September 11, 1799, to May 18, 1804. The Consulate. Napoleon as First Consul, then Consul for life.

May 18, 1804, to April 6, 1814. Napoleon as Emperor.

1812–1814. Napoleon's Russian campaign. His retreat from Russia and from Germany. Loss of his Spanish conquests.

April 11, 1814. After the capitulation of Paris, Napoleon abdicates at Fontainebleau.

March 1 to July 3, 1815. The Hundred Days. Waterloo. Napoleon removed to St. Helena, where he was kept prisoner until his death in 1821.

1814–1830. THE RESTORATION PERIOD.

April, 1814 to September 16, 1824. Louis XVIII of the House of Bourbon reigned as king of France, save for the interruption caused by the Hundred Days, when he fled to Ghent.

1824 to 1830. Charles X.

July 27 to 29, 1830. Les Trois Glorieuses [leh trwah glory-öz'], the July Days, when the workers rose and gained a victory which sent the Bourbons into exile.

1830–1848. THE JULY MONARCHY.

August 7, 1830 to February 24, 1848. Louis Philippe of the House of Orleans, king of the French.

1836 to 1840. Rise of the bourgeois Socialist Party, led by Saint-Simon, Fourier, etc. Secret societies, under the influence of Blanqui and others, organize revolts to overthrow the bourgeoisie. Defeat of these attempts.

1847. The Campaign of the Banquets, a series of meetings organized as dinners to advocate an extension of the franchise. The prohibition of the last of these banquets precipitated the February collapse of the monarchy. Industrial crisis.

1848–1870. RISE AND FALL OF LOUIS BONAPARTE.

1848.

February 23 to 25. The revolution. Louis Philippe abdicates. Republic proclaimed. Provisional Government. Decision to establish National Workshops for the unemployed.

February 26. The Garde Mobile reorganized out of young men, fifteen to twenty years of age, mainly drawn from the slum proletariat.

February 28. Industrial parliament established. Its sittings took place at the Luxembourg Palais under the presidency of Louis Blanc.

March 2. Decree introducing a ten-hour working day.

March 5. Decree introducing universal, direct suffrage, with secret ballot for all French men from the age of twenty-one.

March 8. Decree abolishing the property qualification for enrolment in the National Guard; thereby the workers were furnished with arms.

March 16. Demonstration of the bourgeois element in the National Guard against the Provisional Government, which had ordered the dissolution of the Companies of Elites (*Manifestation des bonnets à poil*).

March 17. Counter-demonstration by the workers.

April 16. Demonstration of workers in the Champ-de-Mars [shah*n*-dö-marss]. Triumph of the bourgeoisie. Ledru-Rollin proclaimed saviour of the State.

May 4. Meeting of the Constituent National Assembly.

May 10. Election of the Executive Committee under the chairmanship of Arago. The first ministry. Cavaignac as Minister for War.

May 15. Demonstration in favour of the reestablishment of Poland. The workers pressed forward and invaded the National Assembly. Defeat of the workers and arrest of their leaders, Blanqui and Barbès. Creation of the three parties in the Assembly: 1. Réunion du Palais National [reh-ü-nyaw*n*' dü pa-leh' na-syoh-nahl'], composed of united "pure republicans" under the leadership of Massart; 2. Réunion de la Montagne [reh-ü-nyaw*n* dö lah maw*n*-tah'nyö],

radical republicans with strong anti-socialist leanings, under the leadership of Ledru-Rollin; 3. the Party of Order, which was a mishmash of monarchists of every shade of opinion under the leadership of General Baraguay d'Hilliers.

May 28. Election of the Legislative National Assembly.

June 21. Decree for the forcible expulsion of all unmarried workmen from the National Workshops and their enlistment in the army.

June 23 to 27. Insurrection. The June days. Cavaignac leads the troops against the industrial workers. Wholesale slaughter of the insurrectionists. Declaration of a state of siege.

June 28. Cavaignac, head of the Executive. New ministry formed. Abolition of the National Workshops. All the political clubs and societies placed under police supervision. Suppression of the socialist press. Mass transportations of the insurrectionists.

August 25. Release of Louis Blanc and Caussidière from gaol.

September 17. Louis Bonaparte elected to the Assembly by five departments.

November 4. The new constitution promulgated.

December 10. Louis Bonaparte elected President of the Republic. His first ministry under Odilon Barrot.

December 26. General Changarnier nominated to the command of the Parisian National Guard and to that of the first army division stationed in Paris.

1849.

January 6. Rateau moves a resolution that the National Assembly shall dissolve.

January 29. The government endeavours to provoke a fresh insurrection. First conflict between the executive authority and the National Assembly. The Garde Mobile is disbanded.

March 7 to April 2. Trials of those concerned in the May insurrectionary affray. Blanqui sentenced to ten years' solitary confinement. Others transported.

March 21. Faucher's bill against the right of association. Suppression of the political clubs and societies.

April 16. Odilon Barrot demands a vote for the special expenses of the expeditionary forces in Italy.

April 30. Defeat of Oudinot.

May 8. Bonaparte's letter to Oudinot. Herein the President announces his intention of making war on the Roman Republic with the object of restoring the papacy. Ledru-Rollin moves that Bonaparte shall be impeached as initiator of the attack on Rome. The proposal is defeated by a large majority.

May 13. Elections to the Legislative National Assembly. Victory of the Party of Order, defeat of the "pure" republicans. Great success of the new Social Democratic Party (amalgamation of the Mountain and the socialist groups).

May 29. First sitting of the newly elected Assembly under the presidency of Dupin.

June 11. Bombardment of Rome. Ledru-Rollin renews his protest.

June 12. Ledru-Rollin's motion of protest defeated.

June 13. Oudinot's taking of Rome provokes demonstrations in Paris in favour of the reestablishment of the Roman Republic. The rising crushed by Changarnier. Social democratic printing presses destroyed. State of siege declared.

June 15. Suppression of all the social democratic newspapers. Indictment of forty deputies. Ledru-Rollin flees to England.

June 19. The new law relating to political clubs.

July 3. Oudinot's official entry into Rome.

July 27. New press law.

August 12 to October 10. The National Assembly is prorogued. Permanant Committee of twenty-five members elected, to protect the constitution and safeguard the Republic. The committee is exclusively composed of legitimists and Orleanists.

August 18. Bonaparte's letter to Colonel Edgar Ney protesting against the reactionary trend of the papal government. "The reestablishment of the papal authority should be effected on the following lines; a general amnesty, secularization of the administration, introduction of the Code Napoléon, a progressive government."

August and September. Bonaparte tours the provinces.

October. Frs. 300,000 voted for the Duchess of Orleans. The vote of frs. 9,000,000 for the Roman expedition was approved. Barrot refuses to propose an increase in Bonaparte's civil list.

November 1. Dismissal of Odilon Barrot. New ministry formed: Rouher, Minister for Justice; Fould, Minister for Finance; d'Hautpoul, Minister for War.

October 10 to November 13. Trials of those concerned in the demonstrations of June 13, 1849.

December 13. Attack on the elementary school teachers begins.

December 20. Reintroduction of the tax on wines.

1850.

January 14. The Minister for Public Instruction introduces a new bill (Loi Falloux) whereby popular education is handed over to the priests. Passed by the Assembly, March 15th. Approved by Bonaparte, March 27th.

March 10. By-elections. Deflotte, Vidal, etc., elected for Parisian divisions. Baroche becomes Minister for Home Affairs. Eugène Sue elected to replace Vidal.

May 31. Abolition of universal [manhood] suffrage by a new electoral law. A class measure directed against advanced ideas.

June 8. Deportation Law.

July 16. New press law whereby the system of "caution money" was reestablished. The sums were deposited by proprietors and editors with the government as a guarantee for good behaviour.

August 11 to November 11. The Assembly is prorogued. A Permanent Committee of twenty-five members is elected. This year it is composed of legitimists, Orleanists, and moderate republicans.

August 26. Death of Louis Philippe. Orleanist pilgrimage to Claremont to negotiate a "fusion" of the claims advanced by Orleanists and Bourbons. The legitimists at the same time make a pilgrimage to Wiesbaden and Ems in order to conciliate the Count of Chambord. The mission fails owing to Chambord's recalcitrancy.

August 12 to November. Louis Bonaparte journeys through France with a view, by his speeches, to preparing the nation's mind for a revision of the constitution whereby his term of office as President shall be prolonged. He holds reviews of the troops at Saint-Maur and Satory.

November 2. Changarnier's order to the troops, when under arms, forbidding them to utter political catchwords or to make any kind of demonstration. D'Hautpoul replaced at the ministry for war by Schramm.

November 12. Bonaparte's letter to the National Assembly.

December. Imprisonment of Mauguin for debt by order of the Minister for Justice. Indignation of the Assembly that one of its members should suffer imprisonment without the Assembly's consent. Mauguin is set free. Dismissal of Yon, police commissioner of the National Assembly.

1851.

January 10. The new ministry formed of men favourable to Bonaparte's cause.

January 12. Dismissal of Changarnier.

January 18. Vote of no confidence in the ministry.

April 10. Antiparliamentary ministry formed.

June 1. Bonaparte's speech at Dijon attacking the National Assembly.

August 10 to November 10. Prorogation of the Assembly.

October 26. The Thorigny ministry formed with General Saint-Arnaud as Minister for War.

November 4. Bonaparte demands the reestablishment of universal suffrage.

November 17. The questors call upon the Assembly to have the decree concerning the right of the Assembly to demand the support of the army in case of attack posted up in the barracks. The motion is lost.

December 2 to 21. Coup d'état of December 2nd. The December days. Louis Bonaparte dissolves the Assembly, reestablishes universal suffrage, has all the party leaders arrested, and summons a new Assembly to prolong his presidency for ten years. The plebiscite ratifies the coup d'état by voting Bonaparte back as President by a huge majority of votes.

1852.
January 14. The revised constitution.
November 21. Plebiscite whereby the hereditary empire is restored by a vote of 7,824,189.
December 2. Bonaparte is elected Emperor, and takes the name of Napoleon III.

1870.
September 4. Fall of Napoleon III. The Third Republic, whose origin is usually dated from the fall of Napoleon III, though it was not formerly established until the National Assembly met in Bordeaux on February 13, 1871.

1871.
March 18. The Commune of Paris proclaimed.
May 28. Paris taken by storm. From twenty to thirty thousand men and women shot in the streets. The Commune suppressed and the power of the bourgeois republic consolidated.

GLOSSARY

WITH BIOGRAPHICAL AND OTHER NOTES

[This glossary has been added by the translators for the use of working-class students whose only book of reference, in many cases, is a medium-sized English dictionary.

When black-faced type is used in the course of an explanation, further information will be found under the heading thus distinguished.

The matter embodied in square brackets after foreign names and phrases is introduced as a guide to pronunciation. Foreign phrases are numerous in the book, as well as foreign names. Marx was a polyglot writer, and it would have done injustice to his style to translate, in the text, anything but the German. The foreign words and phrases are literally translated in this glossary.

The pronunciation of foreign names, words, and phrases, is difficult to give, even with an elaborate phonetic system (itself a puzzle to the uninstructed student). The correct intonation cannot be conveyed in this way. But the stress, and an approximation to the proper sounds of consonants and vowels, can be indicated with sufficient accuracy for the avoidance of gross errors.

Accuracy of stress, or tonic accent, is the first essential. In English the general tendency is to stress the first syllable of French words heavily, whereas the French almost invariably stress the last syllable lightly. We say " Par'-iss." The French say " Pah-ree'." In this guide, the words are divided into syllables, and the stressed syllable is marked with ', as in the foregoing examples.

The ordinary vowel sounds are shown as follows—first of all the long vowels :—

ah = " a " in father	aw = " au " in caught
eh = " a " in mate	oh = " o " in note
ee = " ee " in meet	oo = " oo " in boot

Next the short vowels :—

a = " a " in fat	o = " o " in not
e = " e " in met	u = " u " in rum
i = " i " in it	uh = " oo " in foot

The semi-vowels y and w as in yoke and wood.

Next the diphthongs :—

ei = " i " in bite ow = " ow " in cowl oi = " oi " in boil.

Last of all among the vowels come those that are not exactly represented in any English words :—

ö is used to represent a sound which is closely akin to the vowel sound in " dirt," " hurt," " dearth," or the " e " in " the man " (not " thee man ").

ü represents the French " u " in " tu," or the German ü. It is a vowel midway between " oo " and " ee," somewhat nearer to " ee," for the Germans do not hesitate to rhyme it with that sound.

The consonants :—

b as in book	r as in ran (should be well trilled, in North Country fashion)
ch as in chum	
d as in dark	
f as in fate	s as in sane
g as in gate	sh as in ship
j as in Jack	t as in tin
k as in kangaroo	th as in thick
l as in lane	ts as in rats
m as in moon	v as in vane
n as in noon	z as in zone
p as in pipe	zh as in " z " in azure

n represents the French nasal n. Say " fawn " or " ran," and then repeat them without closing the n sound, and you will get something like the French " on " and " in " sounds. *Don't* say " ong " and " ang ! "

ch as in the Scottish loch.

Doubling a final consonant, as in " ss," " ff," means that it is to be sharply pronounced.]

N.B.—Pundits are warned off this glossary !

Achilles [a-kil'-eez].—One of the leaders of the Greeks in the Trojan war. According to Greek fable, his mother, the sea-goddess **Thetis** [thee'-tiss], had dipped him in the river Styx [stiks] to make him invulnerable. But the heel by which she held him was not wetted, and remained a vulnerable point.

ad infinitum [ad in-fi-nei'-tum].—" To the infinite," meaning here, " to a date in the infinitely remote future." [Latin.]

Africa, heroes of.—The generals whose reputations had been made in Algeria, such as **Changarnier, Cavaignac, Lamoricière** and **Bedeau.**

Agesilaus [a-jee-si-leh'-us].—Agesilaus II, King of Sparta. Younger brother of **Agis I,** whom he succeeded about 401 B.C. No such story as that alluded to here by Marx can be discovered. Probably, he had misremembered the following passage in Athenaeus, *The Deipnosophists or the Banquet of the Learned,* Book XIV, Chapter 7 (we quote from C. D. Yonge's translation, London, 1854, p. 983) : " And Tachaos the king of Egypt ridiculed Agesilaus king of Lacedaemon when he came to him as an ally (for he was a very short man), and lost his kingdom in consequence, as Agesilaus abandoned his alliance. And the expression of Tachaos was as follows :

> The mountain was in labour ; Jupiter
> Was greatly frightened : lo ! a mouse was born.

Agesilaus hearing of this, and being indignant at it, said, 'I will prove a lion to you.' So afterwards, when the Egyptians revolted, . . . Agesilaus refused to cooperate with him, and, in consequence, Tachaos lost his kingdom."—**Agis** has nothing to do with the matter. See **Marx.**

Agis [ag'-iss].—Agis I, king of Sparta from about 427 B.C. to about 401 B.C. Elder brother of Agesilaus II. See **Agesilaus.**

Ailly [Ei-yee'], Pierre d' [pyehrd] (1350–1420).—French theologian and cardinal ; a leading figure at the Council of **Constance.**

Alais [al-eh'].—A police-spy who informed Police Commissioner **Yon** of the real or intended plot, on the part of certain members of the **Society of December the Tenth,** to assassinate **Dupin** and **Changarnier.**

Alexander (356–323 B.C.).—King of Macedon, generally spoken of as Alexander the Great. Famous for his conquests in Asia Minor, Persia, etc.

Anglas [ah*n*-glah′].—French politician. A member of the National Assembly.

Arsenius, Saint [ahr-see′-nyuss] (about 354–450).—Tutor in the family of Theodosius the Great, who reigned as Roman Emperor of the East from 378–395. Subsequently, Arsenius became a hermit in Egypt. Author of a number of pithy sayings, collected by his friends, and issued under the title of *Apophthegms*.

Assembly.—See **National Assembly.**

Austerlitz [aw′-ster-lits].—A small town in Moravia, near which, on December 2, 1805, **Napoleon I** defeated the allied Austrian and Russian forces.

Azy.—See **Benoist-d'Azy.**

Bacchus in Asia.—According to classical mythology, Bacchus, the Wine God, spent several years in wanderings through Asia, teaching the inhabitants of the various countries the cultivation of the vine and the other elements of civilization.

Bailly [bei-yee′], Jean Sylvain [zhah*n* seel-va*n*′] (1736–1793).—French astronomer. President of the Constituent Assembly. Mayor of Paris after the taking of the Bastille. Guillotined during the Terror.

baïonnettes intelligentes [bei-yo-nets′ a*n*-tel-ee-zhahnt].—"Intelligent bayonets," meaning, here, "soldiers who think for themselves." [French.]

Baraguay-d'Hilliers [bah-rah-geh′ dee-lyeh′], Achille [a-sheel′] (1795–1878).—French general. Attained distinction during the Crimean war.

Baroche [bah-rosh′], Pierre Jules [pyehr zhül] (1802–1870).—Public prosecutor. Minister of State under Bonaparte's presidency. Later, one of the Emperor's ministers.

Barrot [bah-roh′], Odilon [oh-dee-law*n*] (1791–1873).—French lawyer and statesman. During the **July monarchy,** leader of the **dynastic opposition.** Premier for a time after Louis **Bonaparte** became President.

bastardy.—The use of this word on p. 221 is an oblique reference to the current gossip regarding the parentage of Louis Bonaparte. See **La recherche de la paternité est interdite.**

Baze [bahz], Jean Didier [zhah*n* dee-dyeh′] (1800–1881).—French politician. **Orleanist.** One of the **questors** of the National Assembly.

Bedeau [bö-doh′], Marie Alphonse [mah-ree′ ahl-faw*n*ss′] (1804–1863).—French general and statesman, noted for service in **Africa.** During the revolution of 1848, was regarded by the champions of Order as backward in the work of repression. Exiled after the **coup d'état** of December 2, 1851.

Belle-Île prisoners.—Belle-Île [bel-eel′] is a fortified island on the coast of Morbihan [mawr-bee-ah*n*′], Brittany. Here many of the insurrectionists of June 1848 were confined. See **June insurrection.**

Benoist-d'Azy [bön-wah′ dah-zee′], Denis [dö-nee′] (1796–1880).—French financier and politician, attached to the **legitimist** cause.

Bernard [behr-nahr′], Colonel.—French soldier. President of the court-martial which ordered the transportation of 15,000 insurgents after the June days. See **June insurrection.**

Berryer [behr-yeh′], Pierre Antoine [pyehr ah*n*-twahn′] (1790–1868).—French lawyer, statesman, and noted orator. Leader of the **legitimists.** See also **Henry V.**

Billault [bee-yoh′], Auguste [oh-güst′] (1805–1863).—French lawyer and politician. After the **coup d'état,** he became president of the National Assembly.

Blanc [blah*n*], Louis [loo-ee′] (1811–1882).—French socialist, historian, and statesman. Member of the Provisional Government of 1848.

Blanqui [blah*n*-kee], Louis Auguste [loo-ee′ oh-güst′] (1805–1881).—One of the most famous among French revolutionary socialists of the nineteenth century. Spent most of his later life in prison. Author of the slogan "*ni dieu ni maître*" [nee dyö nee mehtr], "neither god nor master."

bohémien [boh-eh-mya*n*′].—"Bohemian." See **la Bohème.** [French.]

Bonaparte, Louis (1808–1873).—Charles Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was the third son of Louis Bonaparte (King of Holland from 1806 to 1810) and of Hortense de Beauharnais [awr-tah*n*ss′ dö boh-ahr-neh′] (whose mother, by a second marriage, became the Empress Josephine). Louis Bonaparte was thus nephew and step-grandson of Emperor Napoleon I. He had a fixed idea that it was his destiny to follow in his uncle's footsteps. On October 30, 1836, during the reign of Louis Philippe, he tried to bring about a revolt of the garrison of Strasburg. (This is the **Strasburg affair,** referred to by Marx on p. 84.) For this he was arrested and deported. The next year he published his book

on **idées napoléoniennes.** On August 6, 1840, he made another attempt to bring about a rising. This was the **Boulogne raid,** mentioned on pp. 84 and 110. After this fiasco, he was arrested, tried in Paris, and sentenced to detention for life in a fortress. In May 1846 he escaped from the fortress of Ham [ah*n*], and made his way to London. Here he remained till the **February revolution** (1848), when he returned to Paris and offered his services to the Provisional Government. The offer was declined, and he was asked to withdraw. Thereupon he went back to London. Here, in April, when the ruling class was alarmed at the prospect of the Chartist demonstration, Louis Bonaparte had himself sworn in as one of the 170,000 special constables enrolled to defend "law and order." In June 1848 he was elected to the Constituent Assembly by four departments, and the Assembly ratified his election. He resigned, but was reelected by the same departments in September. In October, the law banishing the Bonapartes was repealed, and he took his seat. On December 10, 1848, he was elected President of the Republic by 5,434,226 votes, as against 1,448,107 votes given to General **Cavaignac.** From this date to that of the **coup d'état** of December 2, 1851, his career is fully described in the text. A year later, on December 2, 1852, he became Emperor of the French, a fortnight after nearly eight million Frenchmen had voted for the reestablishment of the Empire. He took the title of Napoleon III. (His first cousin, the great Napoleon's only son, who died in early youth, was, according to Bonapartist theory, "Napoleon II.") Louis Bonaparte reigned as Emperor for nearly eighteen years. As late as a few weeks before the war of 1870, his position was confirmed by a popular vote (the *plébiscite* [pleh-bee-seet']) of 7,358,786 votes against 1,571,939. But the disasters to the French arms in the Franco-German war involved the ruin of Louis Bonaparte's prestige. His surrender to the Germans with 80,000 men on September 2, 1870, was followed two days later by the fall of the Empire. When set at liberty by the Germans, Louis Bonaparte returned to England, and he died at Chislehurst on January 9, 1873.

Boulogne raid.—See **Bonaparte.**

Bourbon [boor-baw*n*'].—De Bourbon was the family name of the kings of France from the accession of Henry IV in 1589 to the dethronement of Louis Philippe in 1848. Except for Louis Philippe, they all belonged to the elder branch of the family. The Bourbons of the younger branch, to which Louis Philippe belonged, were known as the Bourbons of Orleans. See **Orleanists, Legitimists, Dynastic Opposition,** and **July Monarchy.**

Bourse [boorss].—The Parisian stock exchange.

Broglie [broh-yeh'], Achille [ah-sheel'], Duke of (1785–1870).—French politician. **Orleanist.**

Brumaire [brü-mehr'].—"The foggy month," one of the autumn months in the French revolutionary calendar (see p. 146). The Eighteenth Brumaire of the Year Eight (November 9, 1799) was the date on which the first **Napoleon,** on his return from Egypt, forcibly overthrew the **Directory.**

Brutus, Lucius Junius.—A somewhat legendary character of uncertain date. Reputed leader in the republican revolution which put an end to monarchy in classical Rome, several hundred years B.C.

Brutus, Marcus Junius (86–44 B.C.)—One of the leaders of the conspirators who assassinated Julius **Caesar.**

Burgrave [bör'-grehv].—Hereditary military commander of a town and district in medieval Germany. *Les burgraves* (leh bür-grahv') is the title of a famous drama by Victor Hugo. After this drama had become popular, the name "burgrave" came to be applied to fossilized conservatives of the type nowadays styled "diehards." In especial, the **Orleanist** and **legitimist** leaders during the period of which Marx is writing were nicknamed "the Burgraves."

Buridan [bü-ree-dah*n*', but usually anglicized as bew'-ri-dan], Jean [zhah*n*] (about 1297–1358).—French rationalist philosopher, with determinist leanings. The illustrative fable of the ass ("Buridan's ass"), dying of hunger between two bundles of hay, equidistant and equally attractive, was probably invented by opponents to ridicule his teaching.

cackling of geese.—In the early history of Rome, the cackling of the sacred geese kept in the Capitol is supposed to have roused the garrison when a surprise attack was being made at night.

Caesar, Caius Julius (100–44 B.C.).—Roman general. Conqueror of Gaul. Became dictator during the last years of the ancient Roman Republic. Assassinated by Brutus and others. The subsequent emperors of Rome were all "Caesars."

Californian prizes.—See **Gold Ingot Lottery.**

Caligula [ka-lig'-yu-la'] (12–41).—Roman emperor from 37 to

41 A.D. His motto was: "Let them hate me provided they fear me!"

Carlier [kahr-lyeh′], Pierre [pyehr] (1799–1858).—French politician. Bonapartist. Prefect of police in Paris during the presidency of Louis **Bonaparte.**

Cassagnac [kah-sah-nyahk′], Granier de [grah-nyeh′ dö] (1806–1880).—French publicist and politician.

Caussidière [koh-see-dyehr′], Marc (1808–1861).—Took part in the Lyons revolt of 1834. Prefect of Police in Paris after the February revolution of 1848.

Cavaignac [kah-veh-nyahk′], Louis Eugène [loo-ee′ ö-zhehn′] (1802–1857).—French general, head of the Executive in 1848, and in charge of the sanguinary repression of the **June insurrection** of that year. Unsuccessfully ran for the presidency in opposition to Louis **Bonaparte.**

c'est le premier vol de l'aigle [seh lö prö-myeh′ vol dö lehgl].—"It is the eagle's first flight," or "first theft"—for the word "vol" means either "flight" or "theft." The "eagle" is the emblem of empire, and by implication here means Louis **Bonaparte.** [French.]

c'est le roi des drôles [seh lö rwah deh drohl].—"He is the king of buffoons." [French.]

c'est le triomphe complet et définitif du socialisme [seh lö tree-aw*n*ff′ caw*n*-pleh′ eh deh-fee-nee-teeff′ dü soh-see-ah-leezm′].—"This is the complete and final triumph of socialism." [French.]

Cévennes [seh-ven′].—A mountainous district in southern France. The Protestant peasants of this region rose in revolt when their right to practise their religion was withdrawn by **Louis XIV** in 1685. Marx refers to them as typical of revolutionary peasants.

Chambers.—The Upper House and the Lower House in France; the Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of Deputies. (To-day the Upper House is called the Senate.) See also **National Assembly.**

Chambord [shah*n*-bor′], Count of.—See **Henry V.**

Changarnier [shah*n*-gahr-nyeh′], Nicholas [nee-ko-lah′] (1793–1877).—French general and statesman. **Orleanist.** Member of the National Assembly. Exiled after the **coup d'état** of December 2, 1851. Returned to France for the war of 1870.

chantage [shah*n*-tahzh′].—"Blackmail." [French.]

Charles X (1757–1836).—Became King of France in 1824. Dethroned in 1830 by the **July revolution.**

Charras [shah-rahss′], Jean Baptiste [zhah*n* ba-teest′] (1810–1865).—French soldier. Colonel, military historiographer and republican. He was exiled after the **coup d'état** of December 2, 1851.

Circe [seer′-see].—An enchantress, in Homer's *Odyssey*, who transformed men into beasts.

cités ouvrières [see-tehs′ oov-ree-ehr′].—"Working-class cities," i.e. groups of working-class cottages, or "improved" working-class tenement houses. Under Louis **Bonaparte's** regime some working-class housing schemes received a governmental subsidy.

Cività Vecchia [chee-vee-tah′ vek′-kee-ah].—A seaport thirty-five miles N.W. of Rome. During the days of the temporal jurisdiction of the pope, it was the chief port of the Papal State.

Claremont.—A palace near Esher, Surrey. It was placed at the disposal of **Louis Philippe** after his flight to England in 1848, and he lived there till his death on August 26, 1850.

Clichy [klee-shee′].—At the time of which **Marx** is writing there was a debtors' prison of this name in Paris.

Code Napoléon [kod′ nah-po-leh-aw*n*′].—The French code of civil law, promulgated March 31, 1804. [French.]

code pénal [kod peh-nahl′].—The French code of criminal law. [French.]

conqueror of Lyons.—See **Magnan.**

conspiration.—Of course, "conspiracy" is the correct modern English form of this word. But in the passage here translated, **Marx,** if writing in English, would probably have used "conspiration," just as in German he uses *Konspiration*, though this is not a standard German word.

Constance.—A town in the old-time Grand Duchy of Baden. Here, from 1414 to 1418, was held the celebrated Council of Constance, a council of the Roman Catholic Church. Its main object was to put an end to the Great Schism of the West, which had led to the simultaneous existence of three popes.

Constant [kaw*n*-stah*n*′], Benjamin [bah*n*-zha-ma*n*′] (1767–1830).—French politician. A noted leader of the liberals during the **Restoration period.**

Constituent.—See **National Assembly.**

Convention.—The elected assembly which ruled France from September 20, 1792, to October 26, 1795, in the crowning years of the great French revolution.

Council of Constance.—See **Constance.**

coup de chapeau [koo dö sha-poh'].—"A blow with the hat," i.e. a passing salute, a mere nod. [French.]

coup de main [koo dö man].—"A blow with the hand," i.e., here, a sudden and unpremeditated success. (**Marx** is thinking in German, though he uses a French term, and this is what the German word *Handstreich* [hahnd'-streich] means.) [French.]

coup d'état [koo deh-tah'].—"A stroke of State," i.e. the forcible overthrow of an established government. **Napoleon I's** overthrow of the **Directory** on the **Eighteenth Brumaire,** and Louis **Bonaparte's** breaking up of the National Assembly on December 2, 1851, were coups d'état [koo deh-tah']. When the term is used in this book without qualification, the coup d'état of December 2, 1851, is meant. [French.]

coup de tête [koo dö teht'].—"A blow with the head," i.e., here, a premeditated success. (Marx is thinking in German, though he uses a French term, and this is what the German word *Hauptstreich* [howpt'-streich] means.) [French.]

Cousin [koo-san'] Victor (1792–1867).—French philosopher. Leader of the eclectic school. Author of a work on the Good, the True, and the Beautiful.

Crapülinsky [kra-pü-leen'-ski] and **Waschlapsky** [va-shlahp'-ski].—True-blue Poles in Heine's extravaganza *Two Knights.* In the text, Crapülinsky is used, in derision, to signify Louis **Bonaparte.**

Creton [krö-tawn'], Nicholas [nee-ko-lah'] (1798–1864).—French lawyer and politician.

Crevel [krö-vel'].—A character in a novel by Balzac [bahl-zahk'] (1799–1850), *Cousine Bette* [koo-zeen' bet]. Crevel is a typical well-to-do, dissolute Parisian. The character is said to be a portrait of **Véron,** the owner of the "Constitutionnel" newspaper.

Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658).—Lord Protector of England during the Interregnum (1653–1658).

dames des halles (dahm deh ahl).—"Market women." [French.]

dans cinquante ans l'Europe sera républicaine ou cosaque [dahn san-kahnt' ahn lö-rop' sö-rah' reh-püb-lee-kehn' oo ko-sahk'].—"In fifty years' time, Europe will be either republican or Cossack." [French.]

Danton [dahn-tawn], Georges [zhawrzh] (1759–1794).—One of the most celebrated personalities of the great French revolution. Minister for Justice. Guillotined.

Daughter of Elysium.—The reference is to Louis **Bonaparte's** residence at the Elysée palace. See **Elysium,** and **Elysian Fields.** There is probably also a side allusion to the phrase "daughter of joy" for a prostitute, an implication that the lottery was a meretricious affair.

December days.—December 2 to 4, 1851, the day of Louis **Bonaparte's** coup d'état and the two following days. When, on p. 110, Marx calls General **Magnan** "the hero of the December days," he is anticipating.

decembrists.—Members of the **Society of December the Tenth.**

Deflotte [dö-flott'].—One of the insurrectionists of June 1848. Later, a parliamentary deputy.

deportation.—See **transportation.**

Desmoulins [deh-moo-lan'], Camille [ka-mee'] (1760-1794).—Journalist and Jacobin leader during the great French revolution. Led the attack on the Bastille. A friend of **Danton.** Guillotined the same day as the latter.

Directory.—From the fall of the **Convention** on October 26, 1795, to **Napoleon I's** coup d'état on the **Eighteenth Brumaire** (November 9, 1799), the government of France was an executive of five persons who collectively formed the Directory.

Duchatel [dü-chah-tel'], Charles [shahrl] (1803–1867).—French statesman. Minister for Home Affairs under **Louis Philippe.**

Dupin [dü-pan'], André Marie [ahn-dreh'mah-ree'] (1783–1865).—French statesman and lawyer. At first **Orleanist,** then republican, then Bonapartist.

Duprat [dü-prah'], Pascal [pa-skahl'] (1815–1885).—French politician, journalist, and author.

dynastic opposition.—A name used by **Marx** for the party of the **legitimists,** those who favoured the claims of the elder branch of the **Bourbon** family, as against the **Orleanists,** the younger branch. See **July monarchy.**

Eighteenth Brumaire.—See **Brumaire.**

Elysian fields.—In Greek and Roman mythology, the abode of the shades of the virtuous dead. Marx, when he uses this term on p. 40, is making a side reference to the fact that the President of the French Republic was housed in the Elysée [eh-lee-zeh'] palace.

Elysium [ee-liz'-i-um].—Heaven. See **Elysian fields.**

Ems. A watering-place in Hesse-Nassau. The Count of Chambord (**Henry V**) spent a few weeks there in the late summer of 1849 because his wife had been ordered a course of the waters. It was then that the intrigues to which Marx refer took place.

en détail [ah*n* deh-tei'].—See **en gros.**

en gros [ah*n* groh] and **en détail.**—Literally, "wholesale" and "retail." Here the respective terms mean, rather, "in large quantities" and "in smaller quantities." [French.]

état major [eh-tah' ma-zhor'].—"General staff." [French.]

Falloux [fa-loo'], Frédéric [freh-deh-reek'] (1811–1886).—Minister for Public Instruction under **Bonaparte's** presidency. **Legitimist** and clericalist. Author of the clericalist Education Bill known as the *Loi Falloux* [lwah fa-loo'].

Faucher [foh-sheh'], Léon [leh-aw*n*] (1804–1854).—Minister for Public Works, and subsequently for Home Affairs, after the revolution of 1848. Censured by the National Assembly in 1849 for his electoral machinations that year.

February days (February revolution).—February 22, 23, and 24, 1848, during which, owing to a revolutionary movement in Paris, **Louis Philippe** was deposed and a republic proclaimed.

Fould [foold], Achille [ah-sheel'] (1800–1867).—A French Jew. Politician and financier. Head of the Parisian banking house of Fould-Oppenheim.

frais de représentation [freh dö rö-preh-zah*n*-tah-syaw*n*'].—Expenditure necessary for maintaining official status; an entertaining allowance. [French.]

frère, il faut mourir! [frehr eel foh moo-reer'].—"Brother, man is mortal! [French.]

Fronde [frawnd].—The nickname given to a civil war in France during the minority of **Louis XIV.** It was a petty affair. Literally *fronde* means a sling. At the period in question, the gutter-snipes of Paris were fond of using slings, and the police were trying to put a stop to the practice. The youngsters, with their long-range weapons and their active little legs, gave the police a lively time. The Fronde, so the nickname implied, was a civil war of little more importance than the squabble between the constabulary and the street boys.

fuge, tace, quiesce [foo'-geh, tah'-keh, kwee-ess'-keh; often anglicized as few'-ji, teh'-si, kwei-es'-i].—"Flee, be silent, submit!" [Latin.]

funds, the.—The stock of the national debt as a mode of investment or speculation.

garde mobile [gahrd moh-beel'].—"Mobile Guard." Short for *garde nationale mobile* [nah-syo-nahl'].—A troop of soldiers specially organized by the French Government to meet some passing need, such as arose in 1830 (**July revolution**), 1848 (**February revolution**), and 1870–71 (the Franco-German war, the fall of the Second Empire, and the rising of the Paris Commune). Not to be confounded with the **National Guard.** [French.]

garde nationale [gahrd nah-syo-nahl'].—See National Guard. **Garde nationale mobile,** see **garde mobile.**

gendarme [zhah*n*-dahrm'].—Policeman. [French.]

Genevese refugees.—Geneva was a favourite harbour of refuge for political offenders who had fled abroad to escape prosecution. In those days, Switzerland and Britain prided themselves upon maintaining the "right of asylum." The modern practice of deportation has put an end to this state of affairs.

Girardin [zhee-rahr-da*n*'], Emile de [eh-meel' dö] (1802–1881).—French publicist. Founder of the "Presse," a noted French daily paper.

Girardin [zhee-rahr-da*n*'], Madame [mah-dahm'] (1804–1855).—French novelist, poet, playwright, and noted wit. Wrote under the pen-name of Delphine Gay [del-pheen' geh]. Wife of the foregoing.

Giraud [zhee-roh'], Charles [shahrl] (1802–1881).—French lawyer, statesman, and author.

Gold Ingot Lottery.—The "gold ingots" of California were alluring because this was just after the discovery of gold deposits in the Far West, and the famous "gold rush" of 1849.

Gracchus [grak'us], Tiberius Sempronius (160–133 B.C.) and **Gracchus,** Caius Sempronius (151–121 B.C.), brother of the former, were tribunes of the people in ancient Rome. The elder was assassinated by the aristocratic faction; the younger, when his murder was imminent, made his slave kill him.

Guise [geez], Henri de [ah*n*-ree' dö] (1550–1588).—Third Duke of Guise. Head of the Catholic League, darling of the Paris mob, and aspirant to the crown of France. Murdered at the instigation of King Henry III.

Guizot [gee-zoh′], François [frah*n*-swah′] (1787–1874).—French statesman and historian. Leader of the conservatives in the reign of **Louis Philippe,** and Prime Minister until the **February revolution.**

Habakkuk.—Hebrew minor prophet in the latter half of the seventh century B.C.

Hautpoul, d' [doh-poo′], Alphonse [ahl-faw*n*ss′] (1789–1865).—French general, Minister for War.

Hegel [heh′-gel], Georg Wilhelm Friedrich [geh-awrg vil′-helm freed′-ree*ch*] (1770–1831).—One of the most celebrated of modern German philosophers. His influence was at its height when Marx and Engels were young men, and both of them owed to Hegel certain elements in their mental make-up.

Henry V (1820–1883).—This title was given by the **legitimists** to the Count of **Chambord,** the grandson of **Charles X,** though he was never crowned King of France. The last survivor of the elder branch of the House of Bourbon. Presumably the "echo" mentioned on p. 57 was a witticism of the period, according to which the legitimist **Berryer's** frequent use of the word *républicain* [reh-püb-lee-ka*n*′] in his speech to the crowd in front of the Town-Hall of the Tenth Ward on the day of the **coup d'état** was "echoed" as "Henry V" [Henri Quint, pronounced ah*n*-ree′ ka*n*]—a mocking echo!

heroes of Africa.—See **Africa.**

heteronomy.—The antithesis to autonomy. (The word *Heteronomie* is used by Marx in the German.) Autonomy means "self-law," i.e. self-government; heteronomy means "another's law," i.e. government by another.

hic Rhodus, hic salta! [heek rod′-us, heek sahl′-tah; often Anglicized as hik roh′-dus, hik sal′-teh].—"Here is Rhodes, jump here!" An allusion to Aesop's fable of the boaster who said he had made a record jump in Rhodes [rohds]. **Marx's** "Here is the Rose; dance here" is not a translation, but an adaptation, and a pun. The Greek "Rhodos" means a "rose." [Latin.]

Hilliers.—See **Baraguay d'Hilliers.**

Holy Coat of Treves.—A relic kept in the cathedral of Treves, reputed to be "the coat without seam" for which, at Christ's crucifixion, the soldiers cast lots (John xix. 23, 24). The solemn exhibition of this coat at stated intervals has been a source of income to the Church since 1512. At the exhibition in 1891, there were nearly two million pilgrims.

homme de paille. [om dö pei′].—"A man of straw." In France, according to law, there must be a "legally responsible editor" of a newspaper—who may be a very different person from the really active editor! There is a tale that in a time of stress, a man called at the office of an opposition newspaper, and, at his request, was shown in to the sanctum of Mr. A., the editor. The caller unfolded his business. "Ah," said Mr. A., "you had better see Mr. B. about that. I am only the prison editor, you know, though the authorities happen to be giving me a holiday just now!" [French.]

Hugo [ü-goh′], Victor Marie [mah-rie′] (1802–1885).—French poet, novelist, and politician. Exiled after the **coup d'état.** Author of two noted books on Louis **Bonaparte** and his doings: *Napoléon le petit* [na-poh-leh-aw*n*′ lö pö-tee′], and *Histoire d'un crime* [ess-twahr′ dö*n* kreem]. Best known to British readers as author of the famous novel *Les misérables* [leh mee-zeh-rahbl′]. Almost invariably spoken of as if he had a double name. "Victor-Hugo" [veek-torr-ü-goh′].

idées napoléoniennes [ee-deh′ na-poh-lyon-yen′].—"Napoleonic ideas." *Des idées napolioniennes* [dehs etc.] is the title of a book by Louis **Bonaparte,** published in 1839. [French.]

in partibus [in pahr′-ti-buhss, usually anglicized like "omnibus"].—An abbreviation for *in partibus infidelium* [in-fee-deh′ lyuhm, anglicized as in-fei-dee′-lyum]. The full phrase means "in the regions of the infidel." Used by the Church of Rome to describe its bishops in non-Catholic countries. Marx's allusion on p. 28 is to republics that were planned for countries still under monarchical rule. On pp. 63 and 119, he merely means "abroad," i.e. outside France. [Latin.]

Jacobins.—Members of the Jacobin Club, the most advanced party in the National **Convention** during the great French revolution. See **Mountain.**

jacquerie [zhah-kö-ree′].—A peasant rising. The nickname of the French peasant in "Jacques Bonhomme" [zhahk bon-om′], equivalent to "John Goodfellow." [French.]

Joinville [zhwa*n*-veel′], François Ferdinand [frah*n*-swah′ fehr-dee-nah*n*′], etc., etc., Prince of Joinville (1818–1900).—The third son of **Louis Philippe.** Admiral in the French Navy.

July monarchy.—In July 1830, the Parisians rose in revolt against **Charles X.** The elder branch of the **Bourbon** family was driven out, and **Louis Philippe** (of the younger or Orleans branch) became, not "King of France" but "King of the French." His regime was the "July monarchy."

July revolution.—The revolution by which the **July monarchy** was established.

June days.—See **June insurrection.**

June insurrection.—The rising of the Parisian workers, June 23 to 27, 1848. The cause of the insurrection was the conviction of the proletariat that it was being jockeyed out of the fruits of the **February revolution** by the bourgeoisie. The insurrection was suppressed by **Cavaignac,** with great slaughter. (See Chronological Table, p. 150.)

la Bohème [lah boh-ehm'].—"Bohemia." Marx uses this term in the sense defined in the text, p. 83. [French.]

Lahitte [la-eett'], Jean Ernest Ducos [zhah*n* ehr-nest' dü-koh'] (b. 1789).—French general. Minister for Foreign Affairs under the presidency of Louis **Bonaparte.** Senator under Napoleon III.

laisser aller [leh-seh' al-eh'].—A "let-alone" policy. The slogan of the Manchester School of Economics. [French.]

Lamartine [la-mahr-teen'], Alphonse [ahl-faw*n*s] (1790-1869).—A noted French man of letters. His political career lasted from 1834 to 1851.

Lamoricière [la-mo-ree-syehr'], Christophe Léon [kris-toff' leh-aw*n*'] (1806–1865).—French general and statesman. Noted for his services in North Africa. Exiled after the **coup d'état.**

la recherche de la paternité est interdite [lah rö-shehrsh' dö lah pa-tehr-nee-teh' eht a*n*-tehr-deett'].—"An enquiry into fatherhood is forbidden." By the Napoleonic legal code (**Code Napoléon**), when a woman gave birth to an illegitimate child, no legal enquiry concerning the fatherhood of the child (as in an English bastardy suit) is permitted. Perhaps Marx means only to imply here that, in a hazy fashion, many of the French peasants looked upon Louis **Bonaparte** as the son of **Napoleon I.** But it must also be remembered that doubts were rife as to whether Louis Bonaparte was really the son of his putative father, the King of Holland; and therefore whether he was, in actual fact, the nephew of the great Napoleon. (See **bastardy.**)

Incontrovertible evidence is not obtainable upon such matters, but the general belief of historians to-day is that the gossip in question was unfounded.

La Rochejaquelein [lah rosh-zhah-kö-la*n*], Henri Auguste Georges de [ah*n*-ree' oh-güst' zhawrzh dö] (1805–1867).—French politician. An influential **legitimist.** After the **coup d'état,** made his peace with Louis **Bonaparte,** and became a senator. Mainly known as a clericalist orator and philanthropist.

laurels.—See **manured.**

Ledru-Rollin [lö-drü' ro-la*n*'], Alexandre Auguste [a-lek-zah*n*dr oh-güst'] (1807–1874).—French lawyer and statesman. An active worker on behalf of universal (manhood) suffrage.

Le Flô [lö floh], Adolphe [a-dolff'] (1804–1887).—French general and diplomatist. **Questor** of the National Assembly. Exiled after the **coup d'état.**

Legislative Assembly.—See **National Assembly.**

legitimists.—See **dynastic opposition, Bourbon,** also **July monarchy,** also **Orleanists.**

le républicain en gants jaunes [lö reh-püb-lee-ka*n* ah*n* gah*n* zhohn].—"The republican in yellow gloves," i.e. a republican who dresses foppishly. Yellow gloves are so conspicuous as men's wear that they are regarded as provocative! [French.]

liberté, égalité, fraternité [lee-behr-teh' eh-gah-lee-teh' fra-tehr-nee-teh'].—"Liberty, equality, fraternity"; the slogan of the great French revolution. Became the motto of the French Republic.

lily.—The lily, or fleur-de-lis [flör-dö-leess] was the emblem of the French monarchy. The French flag under the monarchy. See also **Tricolour.**

Locke, John (1632–1704).—English rationalist philosopher. Author of *An Essay concerning Human Understanding.*

Loi Falloux.—See **Falloux.**

Long Parliament.—The English parliament which sat from 1640 to 1653, and conducted the war against Charles I. Summarily dismissed by Cromwell in 1653.

Louis XIV (1638–1715).—Became King of France in 1643.

Louis XV (1710–1774).—Became King of France in 1715.

Louis XVIII (1755–1824).—Became King of France in 1814, after the **Restoration.**

Louis Bonaparte.—See **Bonaparte.**

Louis Philippe (1773–1850).—Became King of the French in

1830, after the **July revolution.** Dethroned in 1848 by the **February revolution.** Often called "the bourgeois king." Note that, whereas the names of foreign royalties are almost invariably anglicized, by the caprice of custom an exception is made in the case of Louis Philippe [loo-ee′ fi-leep′]. See also **July monarchy, Orleanists,** and **Claremont.**

Lyons [lei′-onz].—A great industrial city in the south of France.

Lyons, conqueror of.—See **Magnan.**

Magnan [mah-nyah*n*′], Pierre Bernard [pyehr behr-nar′] (1791–1865).—French general. Bonapartist. Played a notable part during the **coup d'état.** In 1849 he suppressed a working-class insurrection in **Lyons,** and Marx therefore sarcastically terms him "the conqueror of Lyons."

Malleville [mal-veel′], Léon de [leh-aw*n*′ dö].—French politician. **Orleanist.**

manifestation des bonnets à poil.—See **National Guard.**

manured their soil with laurels (p. 137).—The "laurels" are those won by **Napoleon I** and his armies. The bulk of the soldiers were peasants, who, in their own fancy (Marx implies) shone with a reflected glory. Also, says Marx, a page or two later, there were material gains for the peasantry under Napoleon I, who was able to repay with interest what he extorted by taxation.

Marrast. [mah-rahst′], Armand [ahr-mahn′] (1801–1852).—French publicist and statesman. Editor of the "National." President of the National Assembly.

Marsan.—See **Pavillon Marsan.**

Marx, Karl (1818–1883).—This glossary is not the place for a detailed biography of the author of *The Eighteenth Brumaire.* In his preface to the 1869 reissue of the book, Marx tells us something about the circumstances in which it was written. That account may be supplemented by an epitome of what Franz Mehring has to say upon the subject in *Karl Marx* (Leipzig, 1918).

This magnificent work was composed under the most amazing conditions. The least of Marx's troubles was that Weydemeyer's scheme for a weekly issue of "Revolution" fell through for lack of funds. A more serious matter was that Marx was far from well. Worst of all, he was suffering from the direst poverty. Writing on February 27, 1852, he said: "For a week I have been unable to leave the house because my coat is in pawn; and we can no longer get any meat, for the butcher has refused further credit." Nevertheless, he was able to send off the last pages of the MS. on March 25th. But even now, there seemed little likelihood that *The Eighteenth Brumaire* would ever be published, and news to this effect reached Marx when one of his children had just died, and when he was extremely anxious about his wife's health. Black, indeed, was the horizon! A few days later, however, better news was to come from Weydemeyer, who had been able to write from New York, under date April 9, 1852: "Unexpected aid has at length removed the obstacles in the way of printing your booklet. Just after I last wrote to you, I chanced to meet one of our Frankfort workers, a tailor by trade, who, like myself, crossed the Atlantic last summer. When I told him of my straits, he promptly placed all his savings, a sum of $40, at my disposal." To this unknown man (for Weydemeyer does not even mention his name!) we owe it that *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* saw the light. Truly a class-conscious worker.

Marx says in the preface that his book constituted the second issue of "Revolution." According to Mehring, it was the first issue, the second containing contributions of Freiligrath's. Engels had sent some matter for the periodical, but it was lost in the post. There was no third issue.

In view of Marx's domestic trials and poor health, it is amazing that *The Eighteenth Brumaire* should contain so few errors. Such as they are, they are for the most part errors of the press which the author had no opportunity of correcting, and which he failed to correct for the 1869 reissue. In the German text (Dietz, 1922), there is an obvious misprint of "prorogation" for "prolongation" when the possibility of a second presidential term for Louis Bonaparte is under discussion (cf. p. 119 of this translation); and there are a few minor discrepancies in the dates. These small matters have been amended here. The most notable instance of a real mistake is the one described in the glossary under the entry **Agesilaus.** Presumably Marx had read the passage in Athenaeus, or in Erasmus's *Apophthegms* (Book I, Agesilaus, Chap. 71), where the incident is retold. He had forgotten that Agesilaus's remark was made to Tachaos, and by a very natural trick of memory, it seemed to him that the epigram must have been uttered to Agesilaus's brother, **Agis.** A greater puzzle is offered by the use of "ant" instead of "mouse." This

may have been a compositor's misreading. Marx's handwriting was almost illegible. In German the respective words "Ameise" and "Maus" might easily be mistaken one for the other. Marx tells us that he corrected some misprints, but every proof-reader knows how easy it is to overlook them. Anyhow, the force of the allusion to the "ant" which grows into a "lion" is unaffected, and the matter is only mentioned here to explain the translators' failure to verify a reference.

Masaniello [mah-zah-nyel'-loh] (1622–1647).—The fancy name of Tommaso Aniello [tom-mah'-zoh ah-nyel'-loh], an Italian fisherman who led a popular revolt against Spanish rule in Naples.

Mauguin [moh-ga*n*'], François [frah*n*-swah'] (1785–1854).—French lawyer, noted orator, and parliamentary deputy.

Maupas [moh-pah'], Charlemagne Emile [shahrl-mein' eh-meel'] (1818–1888).—French politician. Prefect of Police at the time of the **coup d'état.**

May 2, 1852.—The democrats looked forward so hopefully to this date (see p. 28) because then a new President would be elected, and, by the constitution, the sitting President was forbidden to seek reelection. On that future day they had "routed the enemy in imagination."

mayor and prefect.—The mayor is the chief municipal officer of a commune, the unit of local self-government in France. He is elected by the municipal council. See **prefect.**

Molé [moh-leh'], Louis Mathieu [loo-ee' mah-työ] (1781–1855).—French statesman. Premier under **Louis Philippe.**

"Moniteur" [mo-nee-tör'].—A Parisian daily newspaper. For more than eighty years it was the official organ of the French Government—through many changes in the form of government! Its full title was "Le Moniteur Universel" [ü-nee-vehr-sell']. When Marx speaks of **Bonaparte's** "little 'Moniteurs'," he is referring to lesser newspapers devoted to the Bonapartist cause.

Monk, George (1608–1670).—British general and admiral. At first a royalist, he subsequently became a parliamentarian. After the death of Oliver **Cromwell,** he espoused the royalist cause once more, and was the leading instrument in the restoration of Charles II to the throne. Charles made him Duke of Albemarle.

Montalembert [maw*n*-ta-lah*n*-behr'], Charles [sharl], Count of (1810–1870).—Publicist and politician. Leader of the

Catholic Party. Promoted French intervention against the revolutionary **Roman Republic.**

Morny [mawr-nee'], Charles [sharl], Duke of (1811–1865).—French politician and financier. Half-brother of Louis **Bonaparte.** One of the chief participators in the **coup d'état.**

Mountain.—In the great French revolution, the **Jacobins** occupied the highest-placed seats in the **Convention.** Hence their faction was nicknamed the "Mountain." In 1850, the name, with its revolutionary implications, was adopted by the Social Democratic Party in the National Assembly.

"mountaineers."—The members of the group known as the **Mountain.**

Napoleon I, called "the Great" (1769–1821).—Generalissimo of the French armies during the latter part of the great French revolution. Overthrew the **Directory** by the **coup d'état** of the **Eighteenth Brumaire.** Thereafter, First Consul till 1804, and then became Emperor. Forced to abdicate in 1814. Recovered power for a short time (the Hundred Days) in 1815. After his defeat at Waterloo, he was removed by the English to St. Helena, where he died.

Napoleon III.—See **Bonaparte.**

National Assembly.—Two National Assemblies sat in Paris during the period under consideration in this book. The full name of the first was the Constituent National Assembly. Its function was to draft a constitution, and it is usually spoken of as the Constituent Assembly, or simply as the Constituent. It was succeeded by the Legislative National Assembly, which is generally named the National Assembly, without further qualification. Sometimes, however, it is distinguished as the Legislative Assembly. During this epoch there was single-chamber government in France, i.e. there was no Upper House. See also **Chambers.**

National Guard.—The French **garde nationale** [gahrd nah-syo-nahl']. Distinguish from the **garde nationale mobile,** called for short **garde mobile.** The National Guard was a militia composed of town dwellers, called up in times of emergency, primarily for service in the city to which they belonged. When Marx speaks of "the bourgeois National Guard" and of "the proletarian National Guard" or of "the working-class National Guard," he does not mean separately enrolled sections of the corps. But the Guard from a

working-class quarter would consist chiefly of manual workers, whereas the Guard from a well-to-do quarter would consist for the most part of middle and upper class people. Thus the " Mayfair " contingent (let us say) would tend to take one side in the class struggle, and the " Bethnal Green " contingent would tend to take the other. (In this connection it is important to remember that the men of the National Guard elected most of their own officers !) Another important point is that on March 8, 1848, the Provisional Government abolished the property qualification for enrolment in the National Guard. There were, however, certain corps d'élites [kawr deh-leet'], select bodies of grenadiers, light infantry, etc., which consisted almost exclusively of well-to-do persons. Under the **July monarchy,** the men of the grenadiers' corps wore tall fur caps or busbies. Immediately after the **February revolution,** the Provisional Government decided to suppress the *corps d'élite.* This led, on March 16, 1848, to an ineffective counter-demonstration on the part of the " busbies " or " *bonnets à poil* " (fur-caps, beaver caps). It is mentioned in the Chronology as the *manifestation des bonnets à poil* [mah-nee-fes-tah-syaw*n*' deh bon-ehs' ah pwahl]. These matters are noteworthy incidents in the class struggle. As Marx shows in the text, the Parisian National Guard was of great importance from this outlook. In 1871, the immediate cause of the revolt which led to the establishment of the Commune of Paris was the intention of **Thiers's** government to disarm the National Guard. When " the forces of order " had triumphed, the National Guard was definitively suppressed.

Neumayer [nö-mah-yehr'].—French general. Commander of the first army division. **Changarnier's** chief of staff.

Ney [neh], Edgar (1812–1882).—French soldier. Fourth son of Marshal Ney, who was one of the most famous among the generals of **Napoleon I.** Edgar Ney became a general under **Napoleon III.**

nous verrons [noo vehr-raw*n*'].—" We shall see," i.e. " time will show " or " wait and see." [French.]

ordre matériel [awrdr mah-teh-ree-el].—" Material order." [French.]

Orleanists [awr'-lee-a-nists].—The party of those who favoured the claims of the younger branch of the **Bourbon** family. See **legitimists, dynastic opposition;** also **July monarchy.**

Orleans, Duchess of (1814–1858).—Helen Louise Elizabeth of Mecklenburg-Schwerin [anglicized as mek'-len-börg shwee'-rin], who married the Duke of Orleans, the eldest son of **Louis Philippe.** Her husband was killed in a carriage accident at Neuilly [nö-yee'] in 1842. Her eldest son was the Count of **Paris.**

Oudinot [oo-dee-noh'], Nicolas Charles Victor [nee-ko-lah' sharl veek-tawr'] (1791–1863).—French general. Commander of the French attack on the **Roman Republic** in 1849.

Paris, Louis Philippe [loo-ee' fi-leep'] Albert of Orleans, Count of Paris (1858–1894).—Born in Paris. Grandson of King Louis Philippe. (See **Orleans.**) **Orleanist** pretender to the French crown.

Party of Order.—The royalist coalition, comprising the great landowners (**legitimists**), and the financial magnates and the leading industrials (**Orleanists**). See text pp. 44 and 54.

patres conscripti [pa'-trehs kon-skrip'-tee, often anglicized as peh'-trees kon-skrip'-tei].—" Conscript fathers," the usual title of address in the Senate of ancient Rome. Every senator began his speech with this form of words. The royalists, says Marx in effect, had taken the republic under their wing.

Pavillon Marsan [pa-vee-yaw*n* mahr-sah*n*'].—The full name is Pavillon de Marsan. This was a huge square lodge just within the entrance to the **Tuileries** garden from the rue de Rivoli [rü dö ree-vo-lee'], on the left-hand side of the gate. It was demolished long since. The reference on p. 108 concerns the intrigues of the **Restoration period.** During the reign of **Louis XVIII,** the Count of Artois (afterwards **Charles X**) lived in the **Pavillon Marsan.** The brothers were not on the best of terms. **Villèle** and **Polignac** were heads of rival factions.

peasantry.—A collective name for the rural population engaged in the cultivation of the land, but the term is not strictly applicable to the English rural population to-day. (It is still customary to speak of the Scottish peasantry and of the Irish peasantry.) In France, during the days of which Marx was writing, the agriculturists comprised considerably more than half of the whole population of the country. Most of the French peasants farm their own land, being smallholders, not tenant farmers. Wage-earning agricultural labourers are employed on the larger holdings (these, like the Scottish " farm servants," usually " live

in," i.e. board with the farmer, a large part of their wages being thus paid in kind). Generally speaking, however, French rural conditions are very different from those of the English countryside, with its sharp class distinction between the tenant farmers and the agricultural labourers. For the rest, Marx gives a detailed description of the French peasantry in the seventh and concluding chapter of the present work. The picture holds good to-day, with one exception. At the moment, the peasants are comparatively prosperous, having done well for themselves during the great war.

Perrot [peh-roh′], Benjamin Pierre [bah*n*-zhah-ma*n*′ pyehr] (1791–1865).—French general.

Persigny [pehr-see-nyee′], Victor Fialin [veek-tawr′ fee-ah-la*n*′] (1808–1872).—Bonapartist. One of the leading participants in the **coup d'état.**

Peter Schlemihl.—See **Schlemihl.**

Phrygian cap [fri′-ji-an].—The red "cap of liberty." A pointed cap with the point coming forwards over the top of the head, and with pointed flaps on each side coming down over the ears. A head-dress of this shape was worn in ancient Phrygia. Later, in classical Rome, such a cap was given to a slave when he became a freedman. During the great French revolution, a red Phrygian cap became the symbol of liberty.

point d'honneur [pwa*n* do-nör′].—"Point of honour." [French.]

Polignac [po-lee-nyahk′], Jules Armand [zhül ahr-mah*n*′] (1780–1847).—French statesman. Prime Minister in the latter part of the reign of **Charles X.** It was during his reactionary administration that the **July revolution** took place. See also **Pavillon Marsan.**

post festum. "After the feast," i.e. a day after the fair, when it was too late. [Latin.]

prefect and mayor.—The prefect is the official chief of a French department, and is appointed by the central government. There is considerable friction at times between the prefect and the **mayor.**

proletaires [proh-leh-tehr′].—"Proletarians." [French.]

Proudhon [proo-daw*n*′], Pierre Joseph [pyehr zho-zeff′] (1809–1865).—French publicist and political economist. The most famous exponent of petty-bourgeois socialism. The full title of the book mentioned by Marx in his preface is *Révolution sociale démontrée par le coup d'état* [reh-vo-lü-sya*w*n′ so-syahl′ deh-maw*n*-treh′ pahr lö koo deh-tah′]. Proudhon secured from Louis Bonaparte a special authorization for the publication of this work.

Publicola [pub-lik′-o-lah], Lucius Gellius [the "g" is hard].—There were two Romans of this name, father and son, in the first century B.C. The father was a general and a noted orator. The son was one of the conspirators who took part in the assassination of Julius **Caesar.**

questions brûlantes [kes-tyaw*n*′ brü-lahnt′].—"Burning questions." [French.]

questors.—The treasurers of the French National Assembly, elected from among the members.

Questors' Bill.—A bill to give the president of the National Assembly the right to requisition troops for the safeguarding of that body. Introduced by **Le Flô** and **Baze,** the **questors.** Rejected on November 17, 1851, a fortnight before the **coup d'état.**

Rateau [ra-toh′], Jean Pierre Lamotte [zhah*n* pyehr la-mott′] (1800–1887).—French lawyer and politician.

Regency.—The government of France from 1715 to 1723, when **Louis XV** was a minor, and Philip of Orleans was regent.

Regnault de Saint-Jean d'Angely [rö-nyoh-dö-sa*n*-zhah*n*-dah*n*-zhö-lee′], Auguste Michel Etienne [oh-güst′ mee-shel′ eh-tyen′] (1794–1870).—French general. Minister for War. Marshal of France.

remplaçant [rah*n*-plah-sah*n*′].—Substitute. [French.]

Rémusat [reh-mü-sah′], Charles [sharl], Count of (1797–1875).—French author and statesman.

république cosaque [reh-püb-leek′ ko-sak′].—"Cossack republic." [French.]

Restoration period.—The period from the overthrow of Napoleon I to the establishment of the **July monarchy,** comprising the reigns of **Louis XVIII** (1814–1824) and **Charles X** (1824–1830).

Robespierre [rob-spyehr′], Maximilien [mak-see-mee-lya*n*′] (1758–1794).—Leader of the **Jacobins** (the **Mountain**) during the great French revolution. Guillotined.

Roman republic.—In 1848, Rome was still under the temporal jurisdiction of the pope. His authority was weakened by the revolutionary tempests of that year. On November 15th, Pellegrino Rossi [pel-leh-gree′-noh ross′-see] whom the pope had summoned to form a cabinet, was assassinated. In alarm, the pope fled from the city. On February 5, 1849, a republic was proclaimed. This was the short-lived Roman

Republic, which was overthrown by French intervention. See Chronological Table.

roué [roo-eh'].—A "debauchee," a "profligate," a "rake."

Rouher [roo-eh'], Eugène [ö-zhehn'] (1814–1884).—Bonapartist Minister for Justice.

Royer-Collard [roi-yeh-ko-lahr'], Pierre Paul [pyehr pohl] (1763–1845).—French philosopher and orator. One of the liberal leaders during the **Restoration period.**

Saint-Arnaud [sa*n*t-ahr-noh'] Armand Leroy de [ahr-mah*n*' lö-rwah' dö] (1801–1854).—General, Minister for War, Bonaparte's chief instrument in the **coup d'état.**

Sainte-Beuve [sa*n*t-böv'], P. (1819–1855).—French politician. Member of the National Assembly from 1848 to December 1851.

Saint-Jean d'Angely. See **Regnault.**

Saint-Just [sa*n*-zhüst'], Antoine Louis [ah*n*-twahn' loo-ee'] (1767–1794).—Next to **Robespierre,** the most noted of the Jacobin leaders in the great French revolution. Perished with Robespierre on the scaffold.

Saint-Maur des Fossés [sa*n*-mawr-deh-foss-eh'].—A town on the river Marne, about five miles east of Paris.

Saint-Priest [sa*n*-preest], Alexis de [ah-lek-sees' dö] (1805–1851).—French author and diplomat. **Legitimist.**

Sallandrouze de Lamornaix [sah-lah*n*-drooz' dö lah-mawr-neh'], Charles Jean [sharl zhah*n*] (1808–1867).—French manufacturer and parliamentary deputy.

Salvandy [sahl-vah*n*-dee'], Narcisse Achille de [nahr-seess' a-sheel' dö] (1795–1856).—French politician and author. Minister for Education under **Louis Philippe.**

"sans eyes, sans ears, sans teeth, sans everything."—"Sans" [sans] means "without." The phrase in the text is an adaptation of the last line of Jaques's "Seven Ages of Man," in Shakespeare's *As You Like It,* Act II, Scene 1: "sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything."

sans phrase [sah*n* frahz].—"Without phrase," i.e. without qualification, or without the disguise of fine words. "The Bonaparte *sans phrase*" means "the essential Bonaparte"—the man as he really is. [French.]

satisfait [sa-tees-feh'].—"Content." [French.]

Satory [sa-toh-ree'].—A plateau overlooking Versailles, about ten miles south-west of Paris. A military camp was established there in 1850. In 1871, it was the scene of the last executions that followed the suppression of the Commune of Paris.

"saviour of society."—Louis **Bonaparte** posed as the saviour of society, or perhaps honestly believed himself cast for the part. The title was given to him by a good many other persons, sometimes in derision, and sometimes in earnest. An intermediate outlook will be found in Robert Browning's long poem *Prince Hohenstiel Schwangau, Saviour of Society* [hoh'-en-steel shwahng'-ow], published in 1871, during the interval between Bonaparte's fall from power and his death. It is written in the first person, the hero soliloquizing throughout, and apologizing to himself for his career.

Say [seh], Jean Baptiste [zhah*n* ba-teest'] (1767–1832).—French political economist. A champion of free trade.

Schlemihl [shleh'-meel].—Peter Schlemihl is the hero of Chamisso's [sha-mee-soh] novel of that name. He sold his shadow to the devil.

Schramm [shrahm], Jean Paul Adam [zhah*n* pohl a-da*n*'] (1789–1884).—French general and statesman. Minister for War during the last months of 1850.

Sismondi [seez-maw*n*'-dee], Jean Charles Leonard Simonde de [zhah*n* sharl leh-o-nar' see-mawnd' dö] (1773–1842).—French historian and economist.

Snug the joiner.—One of the characters in Shakespeare's *A Midsummer-Night's Dream.*

Society of December the Tenth.—Adequately described in the text (p. 83). Louis **Bonaparte** had been elected President of the Republic on December 10, 1848; hence the name of the society. Ostensibly a philanthropic organization, it was in reality an early sketch of a fascist movement, but circumstances enabled **Bonaparte** to seize power by other means. See Léo Lespès' [leh-oh' les-pehz'], *Histoire de la première présidence du prince Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte* [ees-twahr dö lah prö-myehr preh-zee-dah*n*s' dü pra*n*s loo-ee' na-poh-leh-aw*n*' boh-na-part'], Paris, 1852, Vol. II, pp. 219–252. (A Bonapartist account.)

Soulouque [soo-look'].—A Haitian negro who from 1849 to 1859 ruled the island of Haiti as emperor, under the title of Faustin I. He died in 1867.

Strasburg affair.—See **Bonaparte.**

Sue [sü], Eugène [ö-zhehn'] (1804–1857).—French novelist. Elected a member of the National Assembly on March 10, 1851. Best known as author of *Mysteries of Paris, History of a Proletarian Family through the Ages,* etc.

Thetis [thee'-tis].—The mother of **Achilles.**

Thiers [tyehrs], Adolphe [a-dolff'] (1797–1877).—Lawyer, journalist, historian, and statesman. Founded the "National" in 1830. Held various offices under **Louis Philippe,** and became Premier. After the **February revolution,** he was the leader of the **Orleanists.** In 1871, he became President of the Republic, and is specially noted for the part he played in the suppression of the Commune of Paris.

Thorigny [toh-ree-nyee'], Pierre François Elisabeth [pyehr frah*n*-swah' eh-lee-za-beht'] (1798–1869).—French lawyer and statesman. Minister for Home Affairs at the time of the **coup d'état.**

Tocqueville [tok-veel'], Alexis de [a-lek-sees' dö] (1805–1859).—French publicist, historian, and statesman.

transportation of the insurgents after the June days.—In the Dietz (1922) text, p. 24, the word "deportation" is used. Marx should have written "transportation," as he did on p. 15 (same text). The corresponding pages in this translation are 32 and 43. The words "deportation" and "transportation" are practically identical in spelling in English, French, and German, and have the same respective significance in the three languages. To "deport" is simply to send out of a country; to "transport" is to convey to a colony, as a place of detention.—The confusion arose because in the first wording of a motion brought before the Constituent Assembly on June 26, 1848, the word **déporté** [deh-pawr-teh'] was used by mistake. As passed by the Assembly, the resolution was amended to the effect that the insurgents were to be "transported" to one of the French colonies other than Algeria. Had the word "deported" been retained, a civil trial would have been necessary, but "transportation" was within the competence Cavaignac's courts-martial. Actually, the offenders were sent to Algeria instead of to the tropical colonies, for the shipping of many thousands of persons to the latter would have been too costly! **Marx** speaks of 15,000 "deportees." According to the official figures there were over 15,000 *arrests,* but the number actually transported is stated to have been 4,348. "Among these, so much hurry had there been in passing sentence, were some National Guard officers who had fought against the insurgents!" See Jaurès' [zhoh-rehs'] *Histoire socialiste* (ees-twahr' so-sya-leest'], original edition, Vol. IX, pp. 88–89, in the chapter on the political results of the **June days.**

Treves [treevz].—A cathedral city on the river Moselle [moh-zel'].—See **Holy Coat of Treves.**

tricolour [tri'-ko-lor].—The red, white, and blue flag of the French Republic.

tripod.—The allusion is to the oracle at Delphi, in ancient Greece. The words of wisdom were uttered by an "inspired" woman, known as the "Pythoness," who sat upon a tripod when receiving the "divine afflatus" and delivering oracles. This is amusingly caricatured in Bernard Shaw's *Back to Methuselah,* p. 198.

tu fai conto sopra i bene, bisogna prima far il conto sopra gli anni [too fei kon'-toh soh'-prah ee beh'-neh bee-so'-nyah pree'-mah far eel kon'-toh soh'-prah ylee ahn'-nee].—"You are counting upon your goods, but you would do better, first, to count upon your years"; i.e. you can't depend upon living long enough to enjoy your hoarded wealth [Italian.]

Tuileries [twee-lö-ree'].—The Pavillon de Flore in the **Tuileries** was the residence of **Louis XVIII.** See **Pavillon Marsan.**

une mauvaise queue [ün moh-vehz' kö].—"A bad tail." [French.]

Vaissé [veh-seh'], Claude [klohd] (1799–1864).—French statesman. Minister for Home Affairs in 1851.

Vatimesnil [vah-tee-meh-neel'], Antoine [ah*n*-twahn'] (1789–1860).—French lawyer and politician.

Vendée [vah*n*-deh'].—The peasants of this ultra-Catholic region in western France supported the priests and the nobles in a counter-revolutionary movement (1793). **Marx** refers to them as typical of reactionary peasants.

Vendôme column [vah*n*-dohm'].—A celebrated monument, surmounted by a statue of **Napoleon I,** in the Place [plahss] Vendôme, Paris.

Venice.—During the period of which **Marx** is writing, the Cavalli [kah-val'-lee] Palace, in Venice, was the residence of the Count of **Chambord** (see **Henry V**), and Venice was, therefore, a centre of royalist intrigue.

Véron [veh-raw*n*'].—See **Crevel.**

Victor Hugo.—See **Hugo.**

Vidal [vee-dahl'], François [frah*n*-swah'] (1812–1872).—French socialist. Parliamentary deputy.

Vieyra [vyeh-rah'].—French soldier. Commander of the **National Guard.** One of **Bonaparte's** leading instruments in the **coup d'état.**

Villèle [vee-lehl'], Jean Baptiste [zhah*n* ba-teest'] (1773–1854).—French statesman. Prime Minister during the **Restoration period.** See **Pavillon Marsan.**

vive l'Empereur [veev lah*n*-pö-rör'].—"Long live the Emperor." [French.]

vive les saucissons [veev leh soh-see-saw*n*'].—"Hurrah for the sausages." [French.]

vive Napoléon [veev na-poh-leh-aw*n*'].—"Long live Napoleon." [French.]

vous n'êtes que des blagueurs [voo neht kö deh bla-gör'].—You are nothing but humbugs. [French.]

Weydemeyer [vei-dö-mei'-ehr], Joseph.—A friend of Karl Marx. Participated in the German revolutionary movement of 1848–1849. In 1851, emigrated to the United States. During the American civil war, he was attached to the cause of the Northerners, and became military commandant of the district of St. Louis [sint-loo'-ee]. Died in 1866.

Yon [yaw*n*].—Police commissioner of the **National Assembly.**

APPENDIX

THE appended passages are translations of passages which formed part of *Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte* as originally published in the United States, but were omitted from the 1869 Hamburg reprint and subsequent German reissues. See Publishers' Note on p. 5 of the present volume.

I

[*To be added as a separate paragraph on p.* 127, *after the words* "Long live the republic!"]

The social republic and the democratic republic experienced defeat: but the parliamentary republic, the republic of the royalist bourgeoisie, has perished, just as the pure republic of the bourgeois republicans has perished.

II

[*To be added as two paragraphs near the foot of p.* 128, *after the words* "could leap into the light of day."]

The primary aim of the February revolution had been the overthrow of the Orleans dynasty, and of that section of the bourgeoisie which ruled through its instrumentality. The aim was not achieved until December 2, 1851. After the coup d'état, the vast possessions of the House of Orleans, the true foundations of its influence, were confiscated. What had been expected from the February revolution, was brought about by the December revolution. The men who, since 1830, had been wearying France with their clamour, were now imprisoned, put to flight, deposed, exiled, disarmed, made a mock of. But under Louis Philippe, only a part of the commercial bourgeoisie had ruled. The other fractions of the commercial bourgeoisie had constituted a dynastic and a republican opposition, or had stood without the pale of the so-called "legal country." Not until the parliamentary

republic came into being, were all the fractions of the commercial bourgeoisie included within the orbit of constitutional political activity. Furthermore, under Louis Philippe, the commercial bourgeoisie had excluded the landowning bourgeoisie from participation in power. Not until the parliamentary republic was established, did the two rule on equal terms, for now the July monarchy was wedded to the legitimist monarchy, and the two epochs of property dominion were fused into one. In the days of Louis Philippe, the privileged section of the bourgeoisie concealed its hegemony behind the crown. In the days of the parliamentary republic, the dominion of the bourgeoisie (now that all its elements had been united, and now that its realm had been expanded into the realm of the whole bourgeois class) was displayed without subterfuge. Thus it had been left to the revolution to create the form in which the hegemony of the bourgeois class could secure its broadest, most general, and final expression—so that it could now be overthrown without the possibility of resurrection.

In the February days, judgment had been passed upon the Orleanist bourgeoisie, the most vigorous portion of the French bourgeoisie. Not until December 1851 was that sentence carried into effect. The Orleanist bourgeoisie was now deprived of its parliament, its barristers, its commercial courts, its provincial representatives, its solicitors, its university, its rostrum and its tribunals, its press and its literature, its administrative revenues and its judicial fees, its army pay and State income, its soul and its body. Blanqui had made the dissolution of the bourgeois National Guard the first demand of the revolution; and the bourgeois National Guard, which in the February days had participated in the revolution in order to check its progress, vanished from the stage in the December revolution. The Pantheon itself was retransformed into an ordinary church.[1] The eighteenth

[1] The Pantheon in Paris is the French counterpart of our British Westminster Abbey, the home of the illustrious dead. Built shortly before the great revolution as a church, it was consecrated to Sainte Geneviève, patron saint of Paris. It was secularized as Le Panthéon during the great revolution. In 1828, under Charles X, it was reconsecrated for religious worship, was secularized once more in 1830 after the July revolution, to revert to its function as a place of worship throughout the reign of Napoleon III. After the fall of the Second Empire it was restored to secular uses.

century initiators of the bourgeois regime, had declared that regime to be sacred. Now its last form had perished: its charm had been broken. When Guizot learned that the coup d'état of December 2, 1851, had been successful, he exclaimed: "C'est le triomphe complet et définitif du socialisme." ["This is the complete and final triumph of socialism."] Which, being interpreted, means! This is the final and complete overthrow of bourgeois dominion.

III

[*To be interpolated in the second paragraph on p.* 136, *after the words* "of great industry in the towns."]

Even the preferential treatment of the peasantry was to the interest of the new bourgeois order. This newly formed class was the many-sided expansion of the bourgeois regime beyond the gates of the towns; was the inauguration of that regime upon a national scale.

IV

[*To be interpolated in the middle of p.* 138, *between the words* "the number of official posts," *and the words* "the first Napoleon."]

Under the first Napoleon, this numerous class of civil servants was directly productive. Having the coercive powers of the State at its disposal, it was able, in the form of State construction works, to do for the newly enfranchised peasantry things of a kind which the bourgeoisie could not do by the methods of private industry. State taxation was a necessary coercive measure for the maintenance of an interchange between town and country. But for this, the French smallholders, like the Norwegian smallholders and some of the Swiss smallholders, would, in peasant self-sufficiency, have broken off all connection with the towns.

V

[*On p.* 140, *lines* 7 *to* 13, *delete* " With the progressive decay . . . as a counterblast to feudalism " *and replace by the following passage :*]

The shattering of the State machine will not endanger centralization. Bureaucracy is merely a low and brutish form of centralization, one that is still hampered by its opposite, by feudalism. When he comes to despair of the Napoleonic Restoration, the French peasant will abandon his faith in his own smallholding. Then, the entire State structure that has been erected on this smallholding system will collapse ; and the proletarian revolution will sustain the chorus, instead of being a solo that would be the death knell of all peasant nations.

VI

[*On p.* 140, *line* 17, *after the words* " to give them," *add :*]

. . . and to carry them out. Be this as it may, in those momentous days the French nation committed a deadly crime against democracy, which, on its knees, now utters the daily prayer : " Holy Universal Suffrage, pray for us ! " Naturally enough, the believers in universal suffrage will not renounce their faith in a wonder-working power which has performed such great miracles on their behalf, which has transformed the second Bonaparte into a Napoleon, Saul into Paul, and Simon into Peter. The folk-spirit speaks to them through the ballot boxes as the god of the prophet Ezekiel spoke to the dry bones : " Haec dicit dominus deus ossibus suis : Ecce ego intromittam in vos Spiritum et vivetis." [Ezekiel xxxvii, 5. " Thus saith the Lord God unto these bones : Behold, I will cause breath to enter into you, and ye shall live."]

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