

will strengthen the position of the Greek Cypriot side if handled in the proper manner.

4. The greatest concern such a line of thinking could cause would be the ultimate absorption of North Cyprus by Turkey, which will result in the Republic of Cyprus bordering with Turkey. Let us look into this possibility and see if such an eventuality differs very much from the prevailing situation in the island. Does not Ankara already consider North Cyprus as a part of its territory or a large military base? Does the establishment of the Joint Defence Doctrine between Greece and Cyprus change in any way the geographic and defence realities? Is it possible at all that one day the Turkish troops will no longer be an occupation force or Turkey will cease to be a guarantor power?

An independent Republic of Cyprus has the chance of joining the European Union, whereas this is impossible for Turkey. The EU membership will prove to be the best guarantee for Cyprus. For this reason, the issue of accession to EU deserves to be discussed in depth.

5. The Republic of Cyprus submitted its application for EU membership on 3 July 1990. On 30 June 1993, the EU Commission issued its avis (opinion) on this application, and on 4 October 1993 the EU Ministerial Council decided, inter alia, upon the following:

“... The Council confirms the support of the Community to the efforts deployed by the UN Secretary General in order to bring about a political settlement to the Cyprus question. In the eventuality whereby despite those efforts a prospect of settlement is not forthcoming in a foreseeable future the Council has agreed to reassess the situation in view of the positions adopted by each party in the intercommunal talks and to examine in January 1995, the question of Cyprus's accession to the European Union in the light of the situation.”

A few days after the decision of the EU Ministerial Council, the Turkish Cypriot leadership hurriedly made the following announcement:

“... The results of the negotiations with the so-called “Republic of Cyprus” will only be binding on South Cyprus and therefore only South Cyprus will become a member of the European Community. An unavoidable conse-

quence of such an eventuality will be the consolidation of the division...”

In spite of the fact that over one year has elapsed since the warning of the EU Ministerial Council to the effect that it will reconsider the situation in January 1995, the Turkish Cypriot leadership has not only failed to display a positive stance in the negotiations, but on the contrary has pursued its well known extreme position.

Furthermore, today there is no indication that would justify any expectation that the Turkish Cypriot side would move towards a single federal state. This will be the case even if the EU Ministerial Council by-passes the obstacle of political division by deciding to start negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus after 1996, despite Ankara's threats and Denktas's well known warnings.

6. Yet, no matter how events unfold under the guise of protracted talks, the de facto division of Cyprus into two separate states will be consolidated. This will deprive the Republic of Cyprus of possible territorial gains, among other negotiations on the basis of the present status quo.

7. On the other hand, an agreement between the two sides would certainly expedite Cyprus's accession into the EU, because the primary obstacle, to which the EU Ministerial Council refers in its “Avis”, i.e. the present division of the island would have been removed.

8. It should be emphasized that the benefits of accession for the Republic of Cyprus will not only be political and economic, but will also extend to the territorial security. It is still not certain what course the EU will follow towards the West European Union or how it will proceed towards a European Federation after 1996. At any rate, full membership to the EU in itself would provide an effective deterrent in the field of defence. This will be more effective than any level of military readiness or the defence doctrine.

**THE FOLLOWING IS THE UNOFFICIAL
TRANSLATION OF A GREEK LANGUAGE
EXTRACT FROM THE JOINT BOOK OF
FOUR FORMER GREEK AMBASSADORS ON
CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS ON
THE GREEK FOREIGN POLICY**

THE CYPRUS QUESTION

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1. The Cyprus Question has had a peculiar nature right from the beginning.

That is to say, the Greek Government had limited flexibility and options in handling the subject due to the rigid stance taken by the Greek Cypriot leadership, which has mostly taken the decisions about Cyprus. Following the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, this peculiarity has become more obvious. Athens and Nicosia often differed not only on their goals, but also in their views and actions. For many years, this has put the Greek foreign policy into very difficult positions vis-a-vis Turkey.

Turkey has extended the Greek-Turkish confrontation from the Cyprus question to the differences on minorities and the Aegean issues. This aimed at bringing pressure on Athens as regards "Greek" interests. The result was that the Greek position faced greater difficulties. This difficulty has been two-fold:

- On the one hand, it has had to be particularly careful in its policies and approaches towards Turkey, in order to avoid giving Ankara or Nicosia the impression that Greece was placing less emphasis on Cyprus while promoting Greek national interests in other areas.

- On the other hand, following the announcement of the "Joint Defence Doctrine" in a jubilated manner, the Greek Government faces the risk of a Greek-Turkish crisis on Cyprus which might be provoked by Nicosia.

This entails a genuine mutual understanding and a more effective coordination between the two Hellenic capitals.

2. It has become obvious that the processes and efforts pursued for the settlement of the Cyprus question have not come to a satisfactory conclusion. As time elapsed, the Turkish Cypriots have institutionalised the pseudo state and gradually increased their demands.

This imposes upon us the need to re-examine the whole matter right from the beginning. Until now, our demand has been for a single and undivided Cyprus. The course of events, however, indicates that we are moving towards either a confederation -be it loose or not- which the Greek Cypriot side rejects, or the consolidation and

perpetuation of the current status quo which resulted from the faits accomplis created by the Turkish side. It is therefore compelling to consider the option of two separate states that would secure for us those advantages -on tradeoffs- which we will deem necessary.

We all understand how difficult, both emotionally and politically, it is for the Cypriots in particular and for Hellenism in general, to accept such an idea. In the final analysis, it will be up to the Greek Cypriot side to take the final decision. Yet, discussion of this idea in a proper and responsible manner will not cause any harm. At any rate, there are at least two aspects of such a formula, which cannot be neglected. These are:

a) Firstly, an independent Cyprus Republic which will consist purely of the Greek Cypriot population that will not be subject to the difficulties created by the Turkish Cypriot element, either in the form of unavoidable Vice Presidential or parliamentary vetoes, or in the form of co-administrative and joint decision mechanisms in major foreign, defence and economic matters, neither will the affluent economy of South Cyprus be compelled to transfer funds to the poor economy of North Cyprus with a view to establishing an economic equilibrium.

A solution based on separation will also mean that there will be an international boundary between the Turkish controlled North Cyprus and Greek Cyprus and not a simple "Green Line". It would be politically difficult and dangerous to violate an internationally recognized boundary without the right of guarantorship or the emergence of "casus belli". Whereas in a federation, or even a confederation, it would be much easier for a third party guarantor to find pretexts for an intervention by arguing that the responsibilities of the central authority which are confined by vague legal/constitutional limitations have been violated.

b) One should also bear in mind the demographic projections. For example, what will be the population ratio of the two sides in Cyprus in 30 years time? Will the ratio remain the same, or will it change in favour of the Turkish Cypriots? About 60 thousand or more Turks from the mainland are already settled in the North of the island. Given the rate of population increase in mainland Turkey, coupled with the continued influx of settlers -uncontrolled due to the

present situation-, it is conceivable that in 30 years time their numbers will increase to such an extent that we will find ourselves in a very difficult situation in terms of the percentage of the Greek Cypriots in the island. This will, inevitably, have an impact on the federal or confederal arrangements to which we will have agreed. Let us not forget what has happened in Lebanon, where the constitutional arrangements were based on the population rates of the Christians and the Moslems. These arrangements in Lebanon became ineffective during the past 30 years and invoked demands for the review of the Constitution which culminated in a bloody conflict.

3. It is obvious that such a radical arrangement can only be realised through negotiations. The primary concern of these negotiations will be the land. If the Greek Cypriot side moves towards such a settlement, it will have to seek a territorial boundary that would be optimal not only for its population, but also in terms of economy and defence. No doubt, such negotiations could have been more productive had they been held a few years earlier. Today, it is difficult for us to achieve such an optimization since the Turkish Cypriots feel that they have somewhat institutionalized their pseudo state.

Following a settlement, North Cyprus can move on its own path. If, at a later stage, they decide to make an inter-state agreement -commercial or otherwise- with the Republic of Cyprus, negotiations may be initiated with them. The Republic of Cyprus will also move on its own path. With a stable currency, low inflation and unemployment, the Republic of Cyprus is in a better position for a promising takeoff. If the Turkish Cypriots prefer or are compelled to unite with their "mother country", Turkey, with the latter's huge population, unemployment and 40 year old internal unrest, let them unite. If, on the other hand, they seek some kind of cooperation and/or union with the Republic of Cyprus in the future, let them ask for it. The more we insist on a unitary state, the greater the price they will ask for it. We thus weaken our negotiating position and let the other side increase its demands. We should get the Turkish Cypriot side to realise that a united Cyprus will benefit them even more than the Greek Cypriot side. From this point of view, negotiating on the basis of two separate states will not be harmful -as against the ideas prevailing in Nicosia- but