

SECRET

THE AIMS OF COMMUNISM IN CYPRUS.

I think that there is some confusion about the aims of Communism in Cyprus. This Note is written in an attempt to reach a clearer estimate of the Party's probable line of action.

A. The Communist Party inside Cyprus.

It is sometimes said that the Communists wish to gain control of Cyprus and that it must be the first aim of British policy to prevent this. What is meant by these statements?

1. The Communists cannot expect to gain control as they have in e.g. Czechoslovakia. Nor can they expect to gain control to the extent they have in e.g. Malaya. The Island is too small, too prosperous, and too easily policed and held. It is very difficult to think of circumstances in which it could not be easily reduced by a very small military force. Nor are there any openings for industrial warfare as in e.g. France and Italy. There are no important industries and no ports worth mentioning. The only targets of strategic value are the air field and wireless installations. It seems extremely doubtful whether these are worth professional attention as long as the war remains cold. It would be foolish to take "direct action" too soon if the result were likely to be crippling reprisals. It therefore seems likely that, in the field of physical control, the Party is unlikely to do more than prepare for the sort of action that would harass and extend the occupying power if war were imminent. In other words we may expect them to try to improve their intelligence, and to continue their efforts (hitherto unsuccessful) to infiltrate into the Civil Service and Police, and to keep a reliable and well disciplined organisation in being for use when the occasion should arise. There does not seem any particular reason to expect e.g. dynamite at the moment.
2. In building up a reliable organisation, the Party has advantages in some fields and difficulties in others. Advantages are that there is no other political party of the Left nor any other organisation interested in political ideas. Thus both those who, for whatever reason, dislike the forces of the Right and those who demand more of politics than the Enosis clichés of the Ethnarchy should be easy to get into the fold. On the other hand many Cypriots are resistant to mental discipline (party officials have been had up before now for indulging in "egoistic theorising" instead of concentrating on the job in hand) and have not the inducement of extreme poverty to pursue a revolutionary policy to its extremes. The problem of the genuine Communist cadre will therefore be to keep the large tail of fellow travellers loyal. How will they do this? The following would seem to be their most promising lines.
 - (a) By discrediting other political movements in the Island and in particular suppressing as far as possible any independent left wing movement.
 - (b) By associating themselves as far as possible with democratic or socially valuable causes (note their recent campaign against the threatened liquidation of the Vine Growers Co-operative).
 - (c) By encouraging minor conflicts with authority through which Government can be shown in an unfavourable light, fellow travellers committed to the Party's line, and their bonds strengthened by Government victimisation.
3. If this analysis is correct particular attention should be directed to (c). Even in this country the Communists have developed a fairly efficient technique of getting themselves manhandled by the Police (c.f. the recent May

/Day

Scanned / Transcribed by
The Socialist Truth in Cyprus – London Bureaux

<http://www.st-cyprus.co.uk/intro.htm>

<http://www.st-cyprus.co.uk/english/home/index.php>



Day procession). The Governor's view is known to be that repression in small doses will eliminate the need for larger doses later (in other words that the Communists, by engaging on a campaign of pin pricks against Government, may over-call their hand and lose followers as a result). It is extremely difficult to judge how far his analysis is correct; but if the Cyprus Communist Party is any good at all small doses of repression are likely to have a very tonic effect. If however the Governor is right and a little repression does in fact deter the fellow travellers from following their leaders, then we need not have much fear of Communism in Cyprus as an effective force.

CONCLUSIONS.

4. In the internal field therefore it appears likely that the Communists will:-

- (i) Concentrate on developing the internal organisation and discipline of the Party.
- (ii) Encourage the Government to embark on a series of minor repressive measures and engage in a number of unimportant brushes with authority.
- (iii) Avoid direct action of the more violent type.

B. Cyprus and International Communism.

5. If Cyprus were in a vacuum no particular embarrassment would be caused by the programme outlined above. But it seems likely that in the cold war Cyprus can be used very effectively:-

- (i) To embarrass relations between the U.S.A., U.K., Greece and Turkey.
- (ii) To discredit the U.K. as a colonial power.

x sometime
[111] (i) Stability in the Eastern Mediterranean largely depends on an united front being maintained between Greece, Turkey and the Anglo-Saxon powers. All Greeks consider that Greece should have Cyprus. X Turkey does not want Greece to have Cyprus. The Greek Government depends on Anglo-Saxon support and has to contend with a large anti Anglo-Saxon opposition. The U.K. wants to retain Cyprus. The U.S.A. is likely to be torn between the strategic advantages and the political difficulties of maintaining the present position. Consequently the more the Cyprus question can be kept in front the more embarrassment will be caused all round. The one thing that would not suit the Communists would be an agreed international solution. It is therefore to their interest both to take every opportunity of urging the question upon the attention of international bodies and to see that the case for cession is made on the one hand as plausible and on the other hand as difficult as possible. The more authoritarian and oppressive the local government is, and the stronger the local Communists, the easier it will be to do this.

(ii) The necessity of the oppressed colonials rising against capitalist exploitation by the Imperialist powers is of course one of the Communist articles of faith (and planks in the programme). Nothing has been more inconvenient to this campaign than the British policy of "no unwilling members of the Commonwealth" (c.f. India). But any territory which can be shown to be kept in the Commonwealth against its will is a substantial asset both in Left wing circles in Western Europe and America and in other Colonial territories. The existence of such a possession immediately throws doubt upon our good faith elsewhere. The Cyprus Communists are at present

/spending

spending much energy in developing the themes that the Island is run in the economic interests of the Imperialists and that it is held on to against its will as an Anglo-American war base. There is very little truth in the first of these contentions but quite enough in the second. Consequently, as under (1) above, the more vociferously Cyprus demands union with Greece and the more repressive and illiberal the local government is, the more the Communists will expect to profit.

6 CONCLUSIONS.

- (1) Cyprus is more important and useful to Communism as a pawn in the international game than for its own sake.
- (2) From the international point of view the more repressive and autocratic the rule of the Island the better in the long run for the Communists' purposes.
- (3) It still remains to be seen how far the local party will be able to go on carrying out the provocative policy demanded by external considerations; and to some extent also by internal.

I would myself incline to the two following views. These must however remain matters of opinion.

- (4) Bearing in mind that the cold war may well last in one form or another for the greater part of our lifetime we should not lose sight of the long term advantages of settlement in Cyprus that would appease Hellenic feeling without alarming the Turks.
- (5) Meanwhile, provided that control is maintained over the Police and the appointment of judges, it would be worth taking considerable risks at a suitable opportunity for the sake of establishing internal self-government in the Island. Apart from international considerations I see no prospect of splitting the majority of Left wing Cypriots from the Stalinists as long as all political activity remains unrecognised, unaccompanied by responsibility, and to a large extent clandestine.

1/2 16.6.50
1/2 16.6.50
J.M.

Mary Kiker
16.6.50.
(16.6.1950)

END
R. J. W.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of.....

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 50....

JP(59)163(D) Revised T. of R. ('A' Section)

31st December, 1959.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS - ADMISSION TO NATO

Note by the Secretary

On 30th December, 1959, the Official Committee on Cyprus considered a paper⁺ by the Foreign Office entitled "Cyprus - Membership of International Organisations." In the course of discussion it became clear that there was an urgent need for an up-to-date expression of the views of the Chiefs of Staff on the admission of the Republic of Cyprus to NATO.

2. In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Joint Planning Staff is required^g to prepare a paper on the admission of the Republic of Cyprus to NATO for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on Tuesday 5th January, 1960.

3. The 'A' Section is invited to prepare the required report for consideration of the Directors of Plans on Friday, 1st January, 1960.

D. E. LAWKINS

for Secretary,
Joint Planning Staff

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

+ CI(0)(59)75
g COS.1598/31/12/59

TOP SECRET

END
R. J. W.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of.....

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 100

CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

JP(59)163(Final)

1st January, 1960

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS - ADMISSION TO NATO

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff, we have examined the military implications of the admission of the Republic of Cyprus to NATO.

2. Our report is at annex. We have consulted the Foreign Office.

Recommendation

3. We recommend that, if the Chiefs of Staff approve our report, they should forward it to the Ministry of Defence as an expression of their views.

(Signed) D.L. POWELL - JONES
P.T. PHILPOTT
J.O.C. HAYES.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

OS. 1595/31/12/59

TOP SECRET

END
R. J. W.

TOP SECRET

Annex to JP(59)163(Final)

REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS - ADMISSION TO NATO

INTRODUCTION

1. The Foreign Office in a memorandum⁺ dated 21st December, 1959 have assessed from H¹ Government's point of view the desirability or otherwise of Cypriot membership of the principal international organisations and what action, if any, H¹ Government should take in each case. The Republic of Cyprus will, in general, be free to apply for membership of any international organisation she chooses. She is debarred only from entering into anything which could be called a union with another state.
2. The Foreign Office Memorandum⁺ considers two separate ways in which the Republic of Cyprus might be associated with NATO:-
 - (a) As a full member.
 - (b) By extending the NATO area to cover Cyprus.

It concludes that if the decision is in favour of associating Cyprus with NATO, the better solution from the United Kingdom point of view would be to make her a full member rather than simply to include her in an extended NATO area.

AIM

3. The aim of this paper is to examine the military implications of the admission of the Republic of Cyprus to NATO.

BACKGROUND

4. When we approved^a a report^b on the strategic requirements in Cyprus we concluded, inter alia, that the responsibility for the external defence of Cyprus should not be given to NATO, though Cyprus might be brought within the NATO area. We did not examine whether or not the Republic of Cyprus should become a member of NATO.
5. Since then Greece and Turkey have concluded a "Gentlemen's Agreement", initialled on 11th February, 1959 but not published, in which they agreed "to support the entry of the Republic of Cyprus into NATO". It is also relevant that the Greek and Turkish Governments have been aware for some years that H¹ Government was opposed to their own entry into NATO: any United Kingdom opposition to Cypriot admission to NATO would therefore, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, result in a deterioration of Anglo/Turkish and Anglo/Greek relations.
6. Article 3 of the Draft Treaty of Establishment prepared by H¹ Government provides for consultation and co-operation by the Governments of the United Kingdom, Cyprus, Turkey and Greece in the planning and execution of measures that may be necessary for the common defence of Cyprus.

+ CY(0)(59)76
 © COS(59)3th Mtg., Min. 5
 £ COS(59)25

TOP SECRET

END

R. J. W.

TOP SECRET

Annex (Continued)

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF CYPRUS TO NATO

7. Cyprus is important to NATO for the communications and radar facilities located there which are NATO installations though manned by the Royal Air Force. The Island itself is not within the NATO area. No United Kingdom combat forces based in the Island are assigned to or earmarked for NATO.

8. The external threat to Cyprus is an air threat. The proposed Cypriot Army and the Greek and Turkish contingents to be stationed in Cyprus are for IS purposes only. They are too small (of the order of 3,500 all told) to be anything but an embarrassment to SACUR if they were offered to NATO in an operational role, nor are they strategically required by him.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS JOINING NATO

9. We consider below the military advantages and disadvantages of the Republic of Cyprus becoming a member of NATO.

Advantages

10. From the strictly military point of view we can see no advantages, but there are military undertones in the following political advantages:-

- (a) It would encourage Cyprus to think of herself as a Western rather than as a neutralist Middle Eastern State.
- (b) It might increase the goodwill and co-operation of the Cypriots without which the smooth running of the Sovereign Areas and the NATO installations would be severely prejudiced.
- (c) It would avoid any deterioration of Anglo/Turkish and Anglo/Greek relations which would occur if the United Kingdom were to oppose Cypriot entry into NATO.
- (d) It would make it easier for the Status of Forces Agreement to be applied. This is unlikely to be secured for non-Commonwealth forces in the current negotiations.

Disadvantages

- 11. (a) Membership of NATO would entitle Cyprus to a voice in NATO military councils. Because of the unanimity rule this could amount to a power of veto.
- (b) Apart from the facilities already made available to NATO by the United Kingdom (see paragraph 7 above) Cyprus has nothing military to offer to SACUR and might well be nothing but an embarrassment to him.
- (c) The facilities already made available to NATO by the United Kingdom are in retained sites, control of which might be demanded by the Republic of Cyprus. These demands might also be extended to other installations such as Nicosia airfield.

£ COS(59)25

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Annex (Continued)

- (d) The access of the Cypriot Government to NATO plans and documents would present a serious security risk, particularly in view of the strength of the Cypriot Communist Party.
- (e) Membership of NATO might make it easier for the Republic of Cyprus, and possibly for the Greeks and Turks, to cause political embarrassment should the United Kingdom wish to use her bases and facilities in the Island for purely national ends outside Cyprus.

Other Implications

12. It has been suggested in the Foreign Office memorandum⁺ that the establishment of a NATO Headquarters in Cyprus to coordinate the four national forces in the Island has political but not military attractions. We agree that there are no military advantages in the suggestion of a NATO headquarters and we strongly oppose it. Cyprus has nothing further to offer, and Greece and Turkey already make their contribution to NATO through CINCSOUTH.

13. The proposed arrangements for the external defence of the Island (see paragraph 5 above) would require re-examination if Cyprus were to join NATO.

Deductions

14. From the above we deduce that the military advantages of Cyprus joining NATO are slight. On the other hand there might be grave disadvantages both from the point of view of the Government and of NATO generally in giving the Republic a voice in the military councils of NATO that could amount to a veto of the military plans of the Alliance. In any event NATO interests in Cyprus can be looked after by the three Powers with special responsibilities in the Island.

15. If for political reasons it is necessary to support the Republic's admittance to NATO, it might be possible to overcome this disadvantage. The security risk at paragraph 11(d) above would, however, remain.

CONCLUSIONS

16. We conclude that, while it might well be politically necessary for Cyprus to become a member of NATO, from the military point of view:-

- (a) Any advantages are heavily outweighed by the disadvantages.
- (b) Full membership could give the Republic a voice in the military councils of NATO that could amount to a veto of the military plans of the Alliance.
- (c) There would be a serious risk of NATO security being compromised.
- (d) United Kingdom freedom to use her bases in the Island in defence of her national interests outside Cyprus might be affected.
- (e) The proposed arrangements for the external defence of the Island would have to be re-examined.

+ OY(0)(52)76

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

MR DENKTASH

From a very early age I stayed with the idea and belief that under no circumstances, under no threat and no conditions whatsoever was I afraid to tell the truth and was I afraid to do what I thought was right.

But the fight in Cyprus during the last four years has done things to us and to you which was beyond comprehension and beyond understanding. We found ourselves forced into corners from which we thought the only way out was hitting back, hitting in blind fury, in anger and hatred. We found ourselves in circumstances in which we saw no hope for survival but to hit back and hit again in anger and hatred. We thought then that that was the only right course to do, that it was the only right thing to do, and that there was no other alternative.

And now, in the quiet of Caux, where I came as an extremely tired worried man, smoking 30 cigarettes a day, and where I am leaving this afternoon, still tired, still not very clear, but not as much as when I came here, but in any case going as a non-smoker. Looking back on those days I feel and I know that we as a community and I as a person missed quite a chance and lost quite valuable days and months in finding the true answer to the problems of Cyprus. If I had to live, God forbid, the same four years again, I know now what I would have said and what I would have done at particular periods and times and how I would have stood up to all that was happening around me.

I know, as my friend has said and has so kindly admitted, that practically one hundred per cent of the Greeks blamed me personally for the attitude of the Turks in Cyprus, an attitude which I will try to explain, was one of being cornered and of trying to get out of the corner safely. I can assure them, with all humility, that in the stands the Turks took during the four years, whatever I did, whatever action I tried to communicate, hatred of the Greeks was not my motive. My motive was to save the Turkish community from the blind fury of the Greeks, from the blind course which they were following, from the precipice to which they were taking us. That was my motive. I still say that is the motive under which I acted, but I cannot vouch now that at the back of that motive there was no other motive in the form of hatred of the Greeks. It is therefore necessary and one must admit that without judging our motives in the cool of Caux but in the heat of Cyprus - not only in the heat of summer but the human heat around us - it was difficult for us to choose the correct course.

We have a future now to look to. The past is dead and if we are wise we shall all take our lessons from it and I think we must take our lessons from the past. In these days we must ask ourselves this question - what was the trouble of Cyprus? What was the reason for it? The answer is clear, now, if we can see it. The answer is this. The trouble in Cyprus was the British, the Colonial rule, lack of liberty. We could not call ourselves Turks; we had to call ourselves Moslems, lest we became nationalistic. The Greeks were orthodox Christians not Greeks. We could not wave our flag. We could not celebrate our national holiday. That was the rule which the British tried to impose on Cyprus with the help of insincere, selfish Greeks and Turks around them. The revolt against the British was justified, was fully justified,

But there was fault in the Greeks too, because they failed to see and realise that it was God's will that Turks and the Greeks should be in Cyprus together. They failed to realise that there was a

/community....

COPY to ISD/AE.7

CONFIDENTIAL

community as formidable as they, as old as they and historically, in fact, as determined to get liberty as they. They thought in terms that we are the majority and we shall get our liberty and all that the Turks can have shall be numerical liberty as a minority, a percentage of as a mere minority and they have no other right whatsoever. That was the trouble. That was the position in which we found ourselves, cornered, when half of Cyprus was shouting for liberty and for justice we, the Turks, could do nothing of the sort because we knew that the liberty and justice which the Greeks would get would mean slavery for us. It would not mean liberty and justice for us.

We tried with all our might, We did our best to show them that we were in Cyprus, entitled by God, entitled by history, to live on equal basis as partners side by side with them. We tried to tell them that we have nothing against you. We don't want your rights. We don't want to curb your rights. All that we want is that you do not affect our rights. Let us be partners in this affair. But that infuriated them more. That was the trouble. That was the whole root of the trouble.

In Zurich after blood was flown - and blood was flown because we failed to realise that it was God's will that we should live here in Cyprus as partners - revolt against the will of God. We tried not to see each other. That is why blood flowed. That is why we had violence. After all that at Zurich, men who had seen the vision of God, sat around and they put these facts into view and they formed an agreement for partnership. That partnership is a difficult partnership. It gives us security. It gives the Greeks what they want - liberty. It gives us liberty too. It gives us justice too. The thing is, and my fear is, whether from now on we shall lose that vision of partnership, we shall lose that - all the report that we must live in Cyprus on equal terms, in peace, in friendship, in co-operation.

What has happened since the Zurich agreement is this, We have had extremists declaring that the agreement was no agreement and that the fight for full liberty must go on. They thought that the rights given to the Turks, the guarantees given to the Turks, were rights and guarantees which curbed their full liberty. They do not understand partnership. They look upon Cyprus as a Greek land and Turks as a mere minority who ought to be ruled by the majority. These were a few extremists in the form of Grivas, in the form of the Bishop of Kyrenia, and a few people around him. We believe, and sincerely believe, that the rest would not repeat them.

When I say that, my fear and my community's fear was this youth which for four years and more has been ordained by Grivas to die for anything. That youth which was brought up by the Greek schools under the British, but I do not understand why, under Turkish teachers. I had my doubts, my sincere doubts, whether this youth provided us with a guarantee for the future - whether they would ever change or whether they would take the fight again. I heard Marula the other day and I was satisfied.

I had a restful night because I realised that the youth is an honourable youth, and that if the vision is showed to them, if the light is shown to them if they are shown the way they will go and live as Cypriots and co-operate and bring the happiness and prosperity which is our share from God to Cyprus. Marula is the one who gives me hope. She also gave me much food for thought. We have our youth on our/.....

our hands, our youth equally determined not to bow to Greek rule, equally determined to be as proud as the Greek youth and not to bow to them, not to shake hands with them. The move has to come simultaneously from both sides. It is a strong move. It needs strong leadership. It needs the sacrifices of a great number of things which we have vowed we shall cling forever. But we must do it. We must do it because, if we do not, if the division, if the suspicion, if the fear in Cyprus continues, there is no one to benefit except the Communists. And the Communists all four years have waited, and waited, very patiently.

Greece, at the United Nations, found her best supporters to be the Communist bloc. I am sure Greece now knows, everybody knows, they knew at the time, it was not because love of Greece, love of justice, love of right, that the Communist block was supporting Greece. It was because they knew that by supporting Greece they would separate Greece from Turkey, from the NATO Alliance, and that they would divide Cyprus into a miserable lot and they would gain the aim of their strategy.

That is the danger ahead of us. Communists are still looking forward - are still waiting for their chance - and we can give them the chance if we do not apply the Zurich Agreement with the same spirit in which it was made. If the Greeks still say that the Turkish community does not matter for us, let them look after themselves, let them support themselves, we don't care for them. If they do that then there is danger because if we consolidate our position as a separate community for all things, and we don't want to do it, then it will be very difficult for the two communities to intermingle and to be an one.

We know our economic problems. We know all our social problems. We have still 4,000 refugees on our hands and we have a great number of unemployed. Are we going to treat these problems as Turkish problems? If we are, then it is very difficult for us later on to come back and say this was a Cypriot problem. Or are we going to face them as Cypriot problems now, sit around the table, look at it as a problem of the country and try and find remedies? This is what we should do. That is what we expect from the Greek leadership, the Greek leadership which has a lot to give to the Turkish community, which wants nothing but an understanding and an extension of the hand.

We have ahead of us a very difficult road. On this road the Zurich agreement has made the Turks and the Greeks partners. Will the Greek partners ride in a chariot along this road and expect the Turkish partners to keep up pace with them on foot. Or will they extend a hand and take the Turkish partner on the chariot and give him part of the reins and say it is plain sailing from now on? That is what we expect them to do and they are in the position to do it, if they open their hearts, if they have big hearts, if they understand the Turkish position.

In order to understand the position I must tell you what the position of the two communities happens to be. The Greek community is four-fifths of the whole population, or three-fourths. The Turkish community forms the major part of the rest. The industrial economy is in the hands of the Greeks. We have always been small tradesmen buying from the Greek merchants. We have always lived as labourers and a few artisans and tradesmen, policemen and so on. We have very few big merchants. We blamed the Greeks for it. We blamed the British for it. But then we realised that the fault was ours. We were not protecting ourselves as the Greeks were protecting themselves

by/.....

-4-

CONFIDENTIAL

by buying from each other, by keeping their economy, their money in their pockets and so on. And we said to ourselves, if the Zurich agreement has created us partners, the two partners must be at least on par on many grounds and economic grounds was one of them.

So we urged the Turks to buy from the Turks. If the article existed in a Turkish shop, buy from the Turkish shop. And we thought this was justified - justified by the circumstances. We said in what we were doing there was no anti-Greek feeling. It was in order to have some money in our pocket in order to start to create a small industry and to show to the Greek side that unless you heed us, and co-operate with us, we can close one-fourth of the market for you. That was our objective.

Had I been in the place of the Greek position I would have said immediately, "The Turks say that this is the object of their purchasing. Let us have a meeting with the Turks and let us see what we can offer them in our place, in our industry." We want employment in their industry. We must have employment from their industry, so that Greek industry, Greek trade did not exist but a Cypriot industry and a Cypriot trade exists. As long as we were down there, not able to do anything, not able to close the markets to them, they would not feel the need to do it. So we had to create this boycott.

The Greek reaction was very anti. They said we were trying to undermine the Zurich agreement, and the Zurich agreement, we know, gave us all that we wanted. There was no reason for us to undermine it. And so far none of the Greek leaders and no Greek newspaper has come forward to say it is our duty as a community which has all the industry in hand all the money in hand, to help the Turkish community. Otherwise this partnership will be Greeks in the chariot and Turks running, barefoot, to catch up with them. And we are certainly not going to leave that as the position of the Turkish community. Not because we are against the Greeks, or we have Greek hatred, but because we can't afford to.

Just before we came here we got very bad news from England. Two Turks for years trained Communists in Czechoslovakia, who went back to London have just been sent to Cyprus to start Communist activity in the Turkish community. Are we, as Cypriot Turks and Greeks going to give these two men the chance which they are looking for? Are we going to leave an unemployed Turkish community, a poor Turkish community, as a nest of Communism in which they will be able to work? We are not going to do it. And unless our Greek friends see our troubles and see ourselves in the position we are, we have to go on with our own limited resources the way we have done. I repeat, in our hearts, in our conviction we have absolutely nothing against the Greeks. We can co-operate with them to the full. We can help them, and we can walk hand in hand and make a model world for the whole world to see. And that is our desire. That is what we want. I am sure this is what God wants.

Before I finish all that I have to say I should like to extend one apology to a man whom I also respect for a long time, first as a colleague and an advocate, and then in politics. Last year, about January, we appeared on a television program with Mr. Rossides. You remember the January events. We didn't know how the United Nations debate would come out. We had just stopped killing each other. Feeling was high. After the television program, Mr. Rossides said that I had lied in that program. He shocked me. I had not lied. So I shouted at Mr. Rossides, I even tried to hit him. But from that day onward I didn't feel the same. In my heart

I/.....

CONFIDENTIAL

-5-

I was a little beast. I was'nt a hero. I was'nt a man. I was a little beast. And although after that incident I met Mr. Bossides several times, neith er he nor I mentioned the incident nor did we show that we had anything about it in our hearts. I had the sorrow, nothing more, the sorrow, for having acted like that in America and I apologise.

AB The way to us is clear, and I think if we approach the way in the right spirit, the ~~right~~ spirit, and with open hearts, the end is clear. It is an honourable end for us and a happy end for the world.
I thank you.

*Statement by Dr. Jeter,
made at Camp
4/9/1959*

1	2	3	4
1	2	3	4

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
CYPRUS.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

sent 27/10
15/11
6/11/60
and in a report
to the
26/11
22nd October, 1959.

My dear John,

SECRET

I am sending you a note which I made this morning on a report of Denktash's conversation with Averoff in Athens.

It seems outlandish that Denktash should speak in these terms to the Greek Foreign Minister and I am asking, through other channels, whether our Embassy in Athens can obtain any confirmation or refutation of this report. Nevertheless, the violent language which Denktash is reported to have used is in line with some statements he has made here recently in private to the Governor and others.

I realise that the Turkish Government has already hauled Denktash over the coals once or twice. The Turkish Ambassador to Athens will no doubt have reported this matter direct to his Government but we may, sooner or later, have to let the Turkish Government know how dangerous Denktash's influence is becoming here.

I will let you know what information Athens is able to give us on Denktash's statements at this interview.

Yours sincerely,

George Sinclair.

J.D. Higham, Esq., C.M.G.,
Colonial Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

SECRET

NOTE BY ACTING GOVERNOR

A well-informed source to whom I spoke this morning told me that he had received from a well-placed source a report of a meeting in Athens between Mr. Denktash, the Turkish Ambassador in Athens, Mr. Vergin, and Mr. Averoff, the Greek Foreign Minister, on the following lines :-

Denktash, referring to the provisions of the Zurich Agreement, asked what would happen if the Turkish community wished, under the new constitution, to build a factory and had permission refused by the Minister concerned acting on behalf of the Government.

Averoff is reported to have replied that if the Turks had a complaint about discrimination they could, through their Vice-President, ask that this matter should be referred to the Supreme Constitutional Court, which would be presided over by a neutral.

Denktash then asked "And what if that Court turned down our request?"

Averoff is said to have replied "In that case, you would not be able to build your factory".

Denktash then commented "We should certainly, if we wished, go ahead and build the factory and, what is more, we should be prepared to defend it and, if necessary, to burn down a Greek factory to make our point".

22. 10. 59