

Melody last year, when he sang for Carnival. He sang a tune commenting on some trivial problems and the people listening, the masses, were *extremely* hostile. They wouldn't accept a calypso like that in *this* time. When you speak about the masses have achieved material benefits in health, education, house repair and all the other social benefits, and you coming up here in front of thousands of people quarrelling about two holes in the road, then you're not understanding the development of the consciousness of the people. Because in the days of Gairy you find any damn thing to comment and quarrel about – that was your role, as a part of the struggle you had to undermine the regime. Therefore, every hole in the road you meet, every time the electricity black out, every time the radio station blank off the air the artiste had to make it a political issue. You had to reflect in your tunes the inefficiency of the regime, you had to push it in that way. It would have been correct in those times for a fellow to come up and sing 'Look the roads not good, and I pack up my car two months now!' But in the context of *now times*, because that artiste was not up to date with the politics of the masses, he got a lot of hostility and he had to learn a lesson. It is illogical to come out now and sing about two holes in the road! People want to hear you come out in defence of the Revolution, people want to hear you come out and rage hostility upon imperialism, rage hostility upon Reagan and American interventionist attitudes. That was the secret of the success of 'The Lion', from Carriacou who won the Third Anniversary Festival of the Revolution competition last month [March 1982]. He came out and he blaze imperialism! Or the fellow from Gouyave, Awful, and his 'No Dictator, No Way'! So Melody find he have to change, but he learned the lesson and is writing revolutionary calypso now and getting back his popularity.

But if you look back to the time of the dictatorship, what caused an artiste to change then? He changed his line either because of the threats or the deprivation of his rights to get his song out. What is causing the artiste to change now? It's the masses! The calypsonian has to go with the masses, so calypso itself is becoming a part of the people's democracy of the Revolution. A calypsonian once said: 'If the people ent doing nothing, then calypso have no work to do.' For the masses themselves have to create the basis for calypso, they have to create the material. So if the people make the Revolution, then the Revolution is going to make the subject of their songs.

A selection of Flying Turkey's lyrics is published in the Notes and documents section of this issue.

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Ethnicity and class in Cyprus

The Cyprus conflict is a pertinent reminder of the complexities of nationalist phenomena and the intractable territorial and political problems often implicated in them. A dominant feature of the conflict internally has been a different claim to territory by the two main ethnic groups on the island, the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot. Such claims have taken different forms in different periods, ranging from the desire for *Enosis*, or union with Greece, from Greek-Cypriots, to *Taksim*, or partition, desired by the Turkish-Cypriots. These have been articulated most forcefully by right-wing and chauvinist political and social groupings. Conflicting territorial claims have been 'resolved' through the military invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974, the aftermath of a coup led by the fascist EOKA B and the Greek junta. Such a 'resolution' can only be a temporary one, but negotiations over the last eight years between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot political leaders have been more or less abortive in finding a 'political' solution (some form of federation) which is acceptable to both sides.

Cyprus is a classic case of a small island with no intrinsic interest for colonialism but which has suffered continuous colonialism. A determining factor has been its geographical position in the Eastern Mediterranean which has made it a strategically desirable possession. In 1571 the Ottomans captured Cyprus from the Venetians and

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introduced a Turkish-Cypriot presence. Sultan Selim granted fiefs to about 20,000 Turkish soldiers, whose numbers were added to by the Ottoman practice of shifting populations. The Byzantine period (AD300–1192) had established very strong bonds between mainland Greece and the Cyprus periphery. The subsequent insertion of European feudalism and Ottoman rule failed to nullify the Greek cultural presence, partly because the Ottoman *millet* (nation in Arabic) system gave a degree of internal autonomy to separate religious communities. Britain was leased the island in 1878 and formally annexed it at the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, finally to be made 'independent' in 1960. The constitutional arrangements of 1960 failed to overcome inter-ethnic conflict and, subsequently, a series of political events led to the Turkish invasion of 1974, after which 40 per cent of the island was declared a separate Turkish Republic of Cyprus.

Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot relations in historical perspective

According to available records, Orthodox Christians have always outnumbered the Muslims in Cyprus, although the ratio between them has not remained constant. By the time Britain took over administration of the island in 1878, the Muslims accounted for about 25 per cent of the population, which was then to decline to about 18 per cent by 1974. It has been argued that some of the population shifted by the Ottomans to Cyprus were Christians originally and may have been Greek. In addition, it has been demonstrated that neither the ethnic and religious composition of the population which was shifted to Cyprus, nor the size, can fully account for the numbers who comprised the Muslim community from the sixteenth century onwards. During the early years of Ottoman rule, conversions from Christianity to Islam appear to have been fairly common, since those who converted were then treated as full Ottoman citizens, and thus were able to avoid the exorbitant and discriminatory tax rates that Christians were subjected to and the social and economic disadvantages they suffered. Papadopoulos has presented specific evidence for this,¹ and additional evidence is the existence of whole Muslim villages where inhabitants spoke only Greek, and the sect of *Linobambakoi* (Linen-Cotton) who were crypto-Christians and as time went by reverted to Christianity. Even in 1881, three years after British rule had been established, there were 2,454 Muslims (about 1.3 per cent of the total population and 5.8 per cent of the Muslim population) who regarded Greek as the mother-tongue. In addition to the demographic fluctuations and the 'interchangeability' of Christians and Muslims, the number of mixed villages in Cyprus until the 1963 intercommunal riots testify to what has been termed 'traditional coexistence'.

There are other elements which appear to give some validity to the view that certain solidary bonds developed between Muslims and Christians, partly related to those families including both through the conversion process, but mainly structured by the common economic conditions of peasants. This is shown by a number of peasant revolts, under Christian or Muslim leaders, which included members from each faith. According to Beckingham,² Muslims and Christians often shared religious shrines. They also shared customs and traditions such as celebrating religious feasts and marriages. A Greek-Cypriot dialect evolved that incorporated many Turkish words and was spoken by Christians and many Muslims, although 'within' the two communities the separate mother-tongues were dominant.

Extremely important within this pattern of co-existence are economic processes and structures. The merchant-intermediary relation to the peasant producer was crucial. For what tied both Christian and Muslim together was their relation to merchant middlemen who supplied credit and provided marketing outlets.³ Yet commerce, both before and after 1878, was monopolised by the Orthodox Christians. This was to give rise to accusations of exploitation of Turks in later years. Peasant producers relied on credit to tide them over in times of poor yield or until the crop was harvested and sold. Interest rates were high, corruption was widespread and merchants often claimed repayment by seizing part of the peasants' crop on which they set the price. Through the existence of a 'patronage' power relation, political control of peasants was also established. Another economic link was through the 'feudal' sharecropping system, whereby landless labour worked plots provided by the landowner and shared the crop.

It would be wholly wrong, however, to assume that the commercial intercourse that took place between Christians and Muslims created horizontal or local alliances strong enough to overcome the ethnic and religious differences. Prior to 1878, the Ottoman Muslims were the colonial power and the Orthodox population was denied the freedom that its leaders, at least, desired. The two populations had different religious beliefs and practices, their own language, largely separate familial and social life and a low degree of intermarriage. Moreover, one significant effect of Ottoman rule was the establishment of the Greek-Orthodox Church to a position of leadership within the Christian community through the *millet* system. This granted the autocephalous Archbishop of Cyprus ecclesiastical and lay jurisdiction over the Orthodox population and reinforced the communal nature of group relatedness along religious lines in opposition to Islam, which further resulted in a desire on the part of Orthodox leaders for union with Greece, particularly after the Greek War of Independence of 1821. Beckingham claims that there was no serious rebellion or even dangerous conspiracy against Ottoman rule in over 300 years.⁴

Nevertheless, in 1821 the Muhassil Kuçuk Mehmed Silahsor had several Orthodox leaders executed, including the Archbishop, the Metropolitans and the Abbot of Kykko, even though there is no evidence that any of the victims were deeply implicated in the revolt in the Balkans. This indicates that the Ottoman rulers regarded the Orthodox Church as a potential threat to their power and were intent on keeping the Christians firmly under control.

The development of nationalism

In 1878 Cyprus was ceded to Britain under the Cyprus convention, and this provided the necessary, although not sufficient, conditions for the emergence of Greek Cypriot nationalism. When Britain took over the administration of Cyprus, it began with the assumption (as it did for its other multi-ethnic and multi-religious colonies) that each of the Cypriot communities had diverse interests and aspired to separate development. This was reinforced by the quick representation made by Church leaders for union with Greece. The first British High Commissioner (Sir Garnet Wolseley) was met in 1878 by the Bishop of Citium with the words: 'We accept the change of Government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is naturally connected.'⁵

Already then, before the onset of British rule, we find the desire for Enosis (union with Greece). This was predicated on the *Megali Idea*, the panhellenic ideology which involved the dream that the Byzantine Empire would again be recreated, and which included Cyprus in its irredentist claim.

Since 1830, when Greece was freed from the Ottoman yoke, Greek-Cypriot leaders had wanted to become merged with the 'motherland'. Though not of itself chauvinist, the nationalist form that the desire for union took was chauvinistic, romantic-idealist, thrived on the mythology of a glorious Hellenic past, and was aimed at the aggrandisement of the Hellenic world. It was also largely conservative and, significantly, its most forceful purveyors were the Church; and after the 1940s (with the growth of left syndicalism and communism in Cyprus), it had an explicitly anti-communist character.

The development of Greek-Cypriot nationalism and the ideology of Enosis were given freedom to flourish under British colonial rule. The political system that Britain introduced under the 1882 constitution gave the Orthodox community participation in the administration of the island, but, in doing so, formalised ethnic divisions and gave an impetus to bi-national consciousness. The relations that had developed between Muslims and Christians during Ottoman rule became transformed under British rule. Each of the communities was endowed with certain 'national' attributes and regarded as a 'natural extension'

of Greece and the Ottoman Turks respectively – and this was reflected in (and reinforced by) the constitution itself. In the Legislative Council each ethnic group was given proportional representation, with Britain maintaining ultimate control. There were nine Greek-Cypriot, three Turkish-Cypriot and six British members, which gave Britain the deciding say in any ethnic conflict.

In addition to writing in inter-communal divisions at the level of political representation, the constitution also gave the Greek community the right to fly the Greek flag in opposition to the Ottoman flag. In education, Britain encouraged a rapid expansion of schools organised on religious lines (with separate schools for Muslims, Orthodox, Catholics, Armenians and Maronites), forcing the two main communities to become dependent for personnel and literature on mainland Greece and Turkey. This, in turn, exacerbated existing group differences and fostered national political elites concerned with protecting the political interests of their own communities.

Enosis – the form of Greek-Cypriot nationalism and its constituents

Enosis, the form that Greek-Cypriot nationalism took under British rule, was expressed in mass political action for the first time in the 'great October events' of 1931, when the Governor's house in Nicosia was burnt down. This led to the instigation of direct rule and the abandonment of the constitution. The main disturbances were triggered by the resignation of the Bishop of Kitium from the Legislative Council on 17 October over the imposition of crippling taxes. They were led by the Church, which was clearly nationalist and opportunist, although the young Communist Party of Cyprus (KKK formed in 1926) was also implicated, some of its leading members indeed being outlawed or exiled.

Although Enosis was a social movement which was founded on chauvinist ideological constituents and aimed at the enlargement and greater glory of the Hellenic world, the movement also represented a struggle against colonialism, and it was partly through this struggle that the Orthodox Church was able to transform Enosis into a mass movement.

The material conditions for this transformation must be located in the extreme economic exploitation and oppression of the Cypriot peasantry and the discrimination against indigenous capital. The bourgeois elements, the merchants and intermediaries, had an interest in fighting colonial rule, because the British colonialists clearly privileged British capital at the expense of local capital.⁶ The Greek Legislative Council members were, of course, drawn from this class. In 1926 Sir Ronald Storr, noted that eight of the Greek members were advocates (three of them moneylenders, one landowner/moneylender),

one was a merchant, one was a farmer and one was a Bishop – the Bishop of Kitium, who was the most politically active member and the effective leader of the Orthodox contingent.

Since the Archbishop was regarded as the leader of the Orthodox community and the Church played a dominant role in the Legislative Council, it became the agency for the pursuit of Greek interests and there was thus an alliance between the bourgeoisie and the Church leaders. In addition, the bourgeoisie could readily take to an ideology based on elitist and reactionary elements, specially since Enosis would facilitate its growth as a bourgeois class unhampered by a colonial power which disadvantaged it. It is interesting that British capital in this instance did not seek for the cooperation of local capital. The failure to begin to develop a true comprador bourgeoisie was related to the limited extent to which colonialism found a truly 'economic' expression, for it was political domination that the British sought to maintain and military power was sufficient for this.

The peasantry, on the other hand, was at the mercy of the merchant/intermediary class and to articulate its opposition to this class, the British sought to appeal to the peasantry through the encouragement of credit cooperative societies. However, Britain's failure to ease the crippling colonial taxation prevented an alliance with the peasantry, which was also being hit by the economic crisis of the 1930s. Economic discontent found, in part, its expression in anti-colonialist and 'nationalist' sentiments in the 1931 riots. Thus, anti-colonialism and nationalism were firmly married in the consciousness and political action of the Greek-Cypriot peasant and working class. Enosis, despite the nature of its specific formulation by the powerful leaders of the Church and the bourgeoisie, also contained within itself national-liberationist and anti-colonialist tendencies which were to achieve expression within the national-liberation struggle of 1955-60.

After 1931 Enosis was not only the official ideology of the Church but also of the Greek-Cypriot bourgeoisie and large sections of the peasantry and working class, thus setting it up as the dominant form of Greek-Cypriot ethnic consciousness. Its constituent elements were the following:

(a) A resurrection and amplification of a Hellenistic *Megali Idea* tradition – which was originally forged in Greece in opposition to Ottoman rule. Thus, it was an affirmation of 'Greekness', as opposed to 'Turkishness' or 'heathenism'. Religious and linguistic ingredients were present; it was a unification of all Greek-speaking and Greek Orthodox lands that was posited – a *Graikos* (Greek) was Greek-speaking and Christian Orthodox.

(b) Enosis was also formulated as a political ideal of national liberation from the colonial rule of the British. What Greek-Cypriots

opposed was the 'enforced' and 'illegitimate' rule and economic exploitation of a 'foreign' bourgeoisie and 'foreign' capital – this was indeed also to find expression in the socialist movement. However, although it was national-liberationist, in as much as it sought freedom from British colonial rule, it nevertheless sought incorporation into another nation-state which was seen to be its legitimate ruler – Greece. The conception of national 'freedom' thus differs from that of most secessionist nationalist movements.

(c) Ethnic consciousness in Cyprus was able, at the popular level, to articulate class elements. This occurred through the development of the progressive movement in Cyprus, which was able to see national liberation as a first stage in the struggle against the international bourgeoisie. But nationalist ideas came to be over-represented in the class struggle in a way which prevented the complete development of horizontal class interests in the struggle for independence.

The development of class ideology

The Cypriot Communist Party (KKK – known as AKEL since 1941) was formed officially in Limassol on 15 August 1926. Its slogan from its inception was 'A united anti-British front of Greek and Turks'. The events of October 1931 led to the outlawing of KKK and many of its leading members were imprisoned or exiled. An authoritarian and oppressive exercise of colonial rule under the Governor of Cyprus, Sir Richard Palmer, ensued. In the period 1931-41 communism was channelled into the syndicalist movement (known as PSE until 1946 and then PEO, the Pancyprian Federation of Labour). It re-emerged as AKEL (the Progressive Party of Cyprus) in 1941, which by 1946 had become the strongest single political party in Cyprus, winning the majority of seats in local elections in five major cities.

The social basis of KKK and AKEL is to be located within the peasant and industrial working class and has always been local or village based. The roots of this village-based support are found under colonialism when conditions were poor, and there was poverty, squalor, primitive housing and complete dependence on the merchant broker and debt-collector. In the 1920s a small group of individuals with a left ideology created clubs in certain villages which educated villagers into 'socialist' developments and fostered political ties, utilising pre-existing family and village social networks. These individuals were actively involved in local struggles.

The development of KKK is linked to the growth of syndicalism, which took off in the 1930s. The economic crisis of 1929-34 was instrumental in the development of class consciousness, for thousands of peasants were transformed into proletarians and came to the towns

from rural areas. There was a rapid growth of PSE, with membership rising from 2,544 in 1935 to 12,961 in 1945.⁷ With PEO, formed in 1946, there was common struggle with Turkish Cypriots. In the famous mining strike at Maurovouni, against the American Mining Corporation, 700 of the 2,100 on strike were Muslims.

According to British government sources, KKK took only an indirect and belated part in the 1931 uprising, using the event to launch its own campaign for national liberation. Certainly, after 1931 KKK and later AKEL, stressed the national issue almost exclusively, for the questions of socialism and national liberation were theorised in terms of the Leninist position – the national liberation struggle being the first stage in the struggle for socialism. There is no doubt that this implied, although it did not formally specify, union with Greece. There were various theorisations possible for supporting Enosis. First, there was the strategic question of building socialism with Greece, rather than on the small island of Cyprus, and the joining of the struggles of Greek workers and Cypriot workers. The communist uprisings in Greece in 1937 and 1947 favoured this argument. Secondly, there was the 'realistic' political ground that Greek-Cypriots would choose to join forces with what was by now regarded by Greek-Cypriots as the Greek 'Motherland'. AKEL's explicit position on Enosis was shifting, and unsympathetic observers have seen its sporadic support for Enosis as opportunist – for example, in 1950, when it supported the Church plebiscite which showed almost universal Greek-Cypriot support for Enosis.

As Crouzet has shown,⁹ both the right and left were drawn into the Enosis movement, for no group could denounce the form in which nationalism/anti-colonialism was articulated – since to be opposed to one was to oppose the other. It was the theoretical and necessary link established between these two analytically different positions that was responsible for this. AKEL's mass support, which was partly an effect of its local participation in economic and class struggle, was also bounded by the traditional authority of the Church and its linkages with the 'national' or 'internal' bourgeoisie. The educational system, dominated by the Church and by Greek mainland texts and ideas, is involved here, as is the role of the village priest in local affairs and in gaining peasants' allegiance.

The support, then, for AKEL was always at best an economic/local/practical based support, rather than expressing a level of socialist political consciousness that could allow for a recognition of the chauvinist element in the Enosis ideology. What AKEL was unable to provide was the ideological leadership necessary – in particular, it failed to develop a positive practice in relation to the Turkish-Cypriot population, for whom Enosis would have meant political subjugation. Greek national and Turkish national conflicts served as a reminder to

Turkish-Cypriots of the possibilities of such subjugation – as, for example, the fate of the Turkish population in Rhodes and Kos appeared to testify.

AKEL's policy on Enosis was effectively to support it as the pragmatic outcome of self-determination. Such a policy has to be judged in terms of its political effects and in terms of unifying the working class and should be voluntary for that class. But Enosis, as it was formulated, could only be voluntary for a section of the population and was increasingly unpalatable to the Turkish-Cypriot minority. During the 1940s and 1950s the anti-communist taint also grew – the Church and Greek-Cypriot bourgeoisie using it to cut across horizontal class allegiances. Enosis was a reactionary form of nationalism, since it joined the proletariat and bourgeoisie of each community and kept the proletarians of those communities apart.

More and more, Enosis came to express spiritual, religious and anti-Turkish sentiments. AKEL's failure, despite its avowed proletarian internationalism, was its inability effectively to neutralise these sentiments and to incorporate Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot workers fully into the anti-colonial and 'socialist' or 'class' struggle. This was due to its 'pragmatic' support for self-determination, which was known to imply Enosis, and its practical failure to oppose Hellenistic chauvinism. It was also a result of certain developments within the Turkish-Cypriot community itself, which we now turn to.

Turkish-Cypriot nationalism

In terms of political practice, there can be no doubt concerning the disastrous effects of the Enosis movement in the development of ethnic conflict and the growth of a polarised bi-nationalism in Cyprus. Turkish-Cypriot anti-Enosists had existed in the early part of this century, but these came mainly from the Turkish-Cypriot urban elite who favoured the continuation of British rule. Even after the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Turkish-Cypriot nationalism remained dormant. In 1924, Headlam Morley, the official British historian could write: 'The Mahometan population, being as they were a minority, regarded British rule as a safeguard and accepted the new situation [annexation], showing no tendency to identify themselves with the Turks.'¹⁰

However, in the 1930s, and particularly in the 1940s, as the Enosis movement gained in strength, there grew a concomitant Turkish-Cypriot nationalism fostered by Turkish extremist elements, which was primarily a response to the form that Enosis was taking. Developments in Turkey also had an impact. Turkey's reputation as the strongest power in the Middle East was enhanced during the 1930s, and the conclusion of the Montreux Convention in 1936 testified to her international status. It was inevitable that the Turkish nationalist

movement in Cyprus would be boosted by the success of Ataturk's revolution. In addition, Turkish-Cypriot nationalism was purveyed by the educational system, which was staffed and organised through Turkey.

The 1940s also witnessed the growth of separate Turkish-Cypriot political parties and trade unions. Although many Turkish-Cypriots belonged to AKEL, the pro-Islamic Turkish National Party in Cyprus gained in strength, partly due to the equivocation of AKEL over Enosis. The first Turkish-Cypriot trade union was formed in 1943 with the Nicosia Turkish Carpenters' Trade Union, which had a membership of forty-three. By 1945 there were thirteen Turkish trade unions, with a membership of 843, although this was considerably less than the number of Turkish workers in PEO; and even in 1955, while there were 2,214 Turkish-Cypriots in separate Turkish trade unions, there were still about 3,000 Turkish workers in PEO.¹¹

By 1948, Turkish-Cypriot leaders were demanding the return of Cyprus to Turkey, 'its previous suzerain and nearest neighbour, who is in a better position than any other neighbouring state to defend it'.¹²

In December 1949, 15,000 Turkish-Cypriots marched through the Turkish quarter of Nicosia in opposition to Enosis. It was not, however, until 1955 that the Turkish national cry for partition or Taksim took off as a main Turkish-Cypriot demand. The notion of partition was the full expression of Turkish-Cypriot ethnicity, but had in fact been raised formally in 1955 by the British.¹³ Britain encouraged Turkey's claim to Cyprus (renounced in 1923 at the Lausanne Conference) in order to contain Greek and Greek-Cypriot pressures and by emphasising the important strategic needs of the western alliances.

The growth of ethnic conflict

On 1 April 1955, EOKA (Union of Cypriot Fighters), the Greek-Cypriot rightist guerrilla movement, launched its attack on British rule under the leadership of Dhigenis (General Grivas), and it is important to consider the implications of this for ethnic conflict.

For one thing, the activities of the British during the 1955-9 EOKA struggle helped to cement even further inter-communal divisions. As well as encouraging the idea of partition, Britain used large numbers of Turkish-Cypriots as auxiliary policemen and specially trained commandoes during this 'Emergency Period'. More significantly, by 1958, Turkish-Cypriot nationalists, possibly under the direction and pay of the colonial government, began military activities with their organisation TMT (Turkish Resistance Organisation). According to Kyrris,¹⁴ a considerable number of Turkish-Cypriot auxiliary policemen were members and collaborated with the local agents of the British intelligence service. The British in 1955 had allowed the formation of

Kuçuk's party 'The Cyprus is Turkish Party' - which began to emphasise the Turkish claim to Cyprus. In the ensuing conflict between the two communities, the activities of EOKA and TMT finally split the tenuous horizontal links between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, as the two military organisations took up a distinctly anti-communist position so that Turkish-Cypriot workers were forced to leave PEO and AKEL. The failure of AKEL, the self-avowed revolutionary party, to emerge as the leader of the independence struggle removed the only possibility that Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots could be integrated in a common fight.

Yet it is doubtful if AKEL was in a position to integrate Turkish-Cypriot workers and peasants into the national struggle. This was partly due to its implicit assent with Enosis, and also to its theorisation of Turkish-Cypriots *not* as a political representational group but as a 'minority' with common interests to Greek-Cypriots. They were thus to be left to the mercy, politically, of a possible Greek nation state that could not *yet* be proletarian internationalist.* Partly, though, it was due to AKEL's inability to enter into Turkish-Cypriot communities and, after Independence, its inability to attempt at the local level to break down the inter-communal divisions, which had been legitimised through the Independence agreements - or indeed prevent them from being further amplified. AKEL has always been extremely careful not to alienate popular nationalist feelings, justifying this theoretically by the need to maintain 'democratic' support. In addition, it failed to take up effectively and consistently the issue of economic conditions in the Turkish-Cypriot sector, which were, on the whole, less developed. Nor did it struggle for an integrated educational system or for the breaking of religious-based and dominated ideas and their divisive effects. Of course, it is clear that there were practical constraints, such as the TMT and EOKA terrorism and also the facts of religious and educational practices. However, the 'class' element was too bound to the 'ethnic' category at the level of political practice for a socialist organisation to act effectively.

Ethnic divisions and conflicts were thus structured by the growth of the Enosis movement, the utilisation of Turkish-Cypriots to counter Greek-Cypriot demands by the British, the increasing involvement of Ankara and the interests of Turkey in the dispute and the development of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism and claims for Taksim. Enosis and Taksim stood in opposition as the representation of Greek-Cypriot

*This is partly a problem of marxist theories, of the failure to consider the full import of ethnic and national divisions and *how* they should be used strategically to further the cause of 'socialism'. To write them away by effectively arguing that divisions are reactionary and should not exist does not advance the common struggle.

and Turkish-Cypriot ethnicity. Ethnic divisions were further to be exacerbated by the Independence agreements of 1959-60 which made up the Zurich Agreement.

The Zurich Agreement established the form of the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and set up three treaties allowing the retention of colonial rule, albeit in a different form.¹⁵ The Treaty of Establishment defined the territory of the Republic and gave Britain two major military bases on the south shore of the island and thirty-two other points all over Cyprus, in total representing 3 per cent of the island.

The Treaty of Alliance provided for a permanent presence of Greek and Turkish troops on the island, initially comprising 950 Greek and 650 Turkish soldiers, and set up a tripartite headquarters (with Cyprus) to control military contingents on the island.

The Treaty of Guarantee prohibited either union or partition and states:

In the event of a breach of the provision of the present treaty, Greece, Turkey and the UK undertake to consult together with respect to the representation or measures necessary to ensure observance of these provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

This was to allow Turkey in 1974 to invade Cyprus on just such a pretext. The Treaty of Guarantee especially linked constitutional developments in Cyprus to the interests of the guarantor powers, for they could intervene *if they believed* that the state of affairs created by the Treaty had been changed. In addition, the development of a Cypriot national consciousness was made almost impossible by the legitimization of separate Greek and Turkish ethnicity through their military presence. This Treaty also had the significant effect of establishing Greek rights in Cyprus and formally re-establishing Turkish rights in Cyprus ceded in 1923.

Thus, while formal internal state power was passed to indigenous hands, the three treaties curtailed the autonomy of local developments and gave right of interference to three foreign powers -- so extending colonial domination from one state to three. Colonialism in Cyprus has always taken a 'political' form. As Sir Ronald Storrs, ex-Governor of Cyprus, says in his autobiography: 'England occupied Cyprus for strategic and imperial purposes.'

The constitution of 1960 established thoroughgoing bi-communalism in all spheres and all levels of government. For example, the Turkish-Cypriots (18 per cent of the population) were given 30 per cent parliamentary representation, with fifteen out of fifty seats. The president was always to be 'Greek' and the vice-president a 'Turk',

each elected by his own community, deriving authority from each and responsible and accountable to them. Bi-communalism was also written into the Civil Service and security forces (70:30 Greek/Turkish) and in the army (60:40) and at every level of government and administration.

Clearly such constitutional provisions required a great deal of collaboration and agreement between the communal representatives to work. Within three years these had broken down, the Turkish-Cypriots withdrawing from government and forming Turkish enclaves. One of the problems was that Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders conceptualised the constitution in different ways. The Turkish-Cypriots endowed it with a federal character and saw it as protecting their rights -- they thus argued for its rigid implementation. Greek-Cypriots saw it as representing the interests of Turkey and other foreign nations and giving unfair representation to Turkish-Cypriots. They indeed desired an integrated unitary state. In fact, Makarios, the first President of the Republic, still publicly expressed support for the Hellenic ideal, which was hardly conducive to ethnic cooperation. The Turkish-Cypriots clung to their constitutional rights tenaciously and the crunch came when President Makarios issued constitutional proposals to amend them, which led to inter-communal fighting, the entry of Turkish troops and the de facto withdrawal in 1963 of Turkish-Cypriots.

Ethnic politics

Given the role of the constitution in the amplification of ethnicity and ethnic conflict, it is important to consider how the political parties within the two communities reacted. After the first presidential elections, when Archbishop Makarios won a decisive victory, largely through the public acclaim of his EOKA involvement, a 'patriotic front' was formed which united all Greek-Cypriot political groupings, including AKEL. Makarios sought AKEL's support in the interests of the overall unity of Greek-Cypriots, irrespective of ideological differences, with the aim of building Greek-Cypriot strength to fight the constitutional structure decided at Zurich. Makarios's 'patriotic front' was thus premised on ethnic unity. The practical activities of the 'patriotic front' centred around the constitution and this could hardly appeal to the Turkish-Cypriots. The constitutional amendments proposed by Makarios in 1963, with the full support of the 'patriotic front', could not guarantee the positive discrimination in favour of Turkish-Cypriots that they required.

The Cypriot bourgeoisie was mainly Greek and there were always more wealthy individuals within the Greek-Christian population than the Muslim. In 1963 only 15 per cent of all car-owners were Turkish-Cypriot. In 1961 the average per capita income of Turkish-

Cypriots was 20 per cent lower than for Greek-Cypriots - indicating the higher number of Greek commercial and professional workers. Turkish-Cypriots also remained disproportionately concentrated in government employment, and were more urban than Greek-Cypriots - a result of their position under Ottoman rule as administrators and their subsequent orientation towards this. Under British colonialism, Greek-Cypriots developed commercially, whereas Turkish-Cypriots remained mainly peasants or administrators.

The 'popular unity' that all Greek-Cypriot political parties participated in until 1974 was an ethnically constructed one. From 1960 to 1974 the 'class' element also submerged itself in Makarios' party, which made political cooperation between the two communities even more difficult.

The rejection of Makarios' constitutional amendments by the Turkish-Cypriots in later 1963 was followed by violent clashes between the two communities which led to the withdrawal of Turkish-Cypriots into separate enclaves. During the next three years there was a gradual settling down of the two communities to their respective and separate lives, only for the violence to emerge once again in 1967. Turkish threats of invasion in support of the Turkish-Cypriot minority were effectively removed by the force of international opinion in 1964 and 1967; on the latter occasion, it was also a condition that Athens withdraw illegal mainland troops. In this period US and NATO plans to partition the island were also consistently rejected by the Greek-Cypriots. After 1967 inter-communal clashes effectively ceased until 1974 (inter-communal talks had begun in 1968).

From the time of the two communities' separation - in effect partition - the economic position of Turkish-Cypriots worsened in relation to that of the entrepreneurial Greek-Cypriot community. Behind the barricaded Turkish sector the activities of TMT and the pressure from Ankara ensured that the Turkish-Cypriots were effectively united in their opposition to the constitutional arrangements envisaged by Makarios. Yet there were political divisions within the Turkish-Cypriot community which had their origins in pre-independence Cyprus and which eventually emerged in the early 1970s with the more or less simultaneous formation of the National Unity Party (NUP) and the Republican Turkish Party (RTP). NUP, the right-wing party of Rauf Denktaş, was pro-Turkish and favoured an independent Turkish state of Cyprus. RTP, a left-wing party with informal links with EDEK (The Socialist Party) and AKEL on the Greek side, favoured a united Cyprus, albeit with strong safeguards for the security and rights of the Turkish minority.

It has been argued that during the boom period of the 1960s Makarios began to take a long-term view of the Cyprus problem, namely, that in the end the Turkish-Cypriots would be drawn back into

mainstream Cypriot life for economic reasons. Ironically, this view could never be tested because of political developments within the Greek-Cypriot community. After the 1967 inter-communal clashes, General Grivas, the former leader of EOKA, was forced to leave the island, but he returned in 1971 to campaign for Enosis once again through the formation of EOKA B. This period was marked by violent clashes within the Greek-Cypriot community and several attempts on the life of Makarios by the ultra-right pro-Enosis EOKA B. The death of Grivas in early 1974 did not diminish the aims or tactics of EOKA B, which probably had the support of officers within the Greek National Guard. In July 1974, after Makarios had publicly accused the Colonels in Athens of being in league with EOKA B, he demanded that the mainland officers (650) and half the National Guard of 10,000 be withdrawn. A few days later, on 15 July, the Junta-dominated National Guard attacked the Archbishop's palace and took control of the island. Makarios once again survived and escaped to Akrotiri, from where he was airlifted to safety. After the coup, Sampson, with the support of the Athens' Junta, became President. Turkey, already in dispute with Greece over the Aegean, used the coup as the pretext for intervention and subsequent territorial expansion.

Recent developments

Events since 1974 have led to a stalemate on the Cyprus problem. Attempts to mediate by the then UN Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, with proposals for inter-communal discussion repeatedly failed to produce any agreement. Whenever the two sides have got together for peace talks the same stumbling blocks have emerged time and again. The Greek-Cypriots want a federal solution to the constitutional form of the state, while the Turkish Cypriots, led by Denktaş and under the influence of Ankara, have favoured a tenuous confederation of two separate states.

It was not until August 1981 that the Turkish side finally came forward with firm proposals for a settlement to the Cyprus problem. It was proposed that about 4 per cent of the territory occupied by the Turks should be returned to the Greeks, which would allow about 40,000 refugees (out of perhaps 180,000) to return home. On the constitutional issue, the Turks proposed that there should be equality between the two communities in the Central Cabinet and in the administration of a united Cyprus, with the post of President alternating between a Turk and a Greek. These proposals were totally unacceptable to the Greek side and were firmly rejected.

There can be no simple solution to the Cyprus problem, largely because the dispute is manifested at several levels, but also because the years of conflict and violence have left the two communities in a state

of mistrust. Yet there are signs of a genuine desire to resolve the Cyprus problem by members of both communities on the island and this is reflected in recent political developments. On the Greek side, in the months immediately following the invasion there was an attempt to recreate a united popular front to negotiate with the Turks. The first elections after the invasion took place in 1976 and an alliance of AKEL (the Communist Party), EDEK (the Socialist Party of Lysarides) and the Democratic Party of Kyprianou took all the seats, depriving Clerides and his right-wing Rally Party of any parliamentary representation. Any possibility that a solution to the Cyprus problem could be achieved at this time, which would have required the Greek-Cypriots to make concessions to the Turks who were negotiating from a position of strength, was set back by the death of Makarios in 1977. The new President, Kyprianou, could not claim the same widespread popular support as his predecessor and was in no position to concede the safeguards that the Turks demanded and that Makarios may have been able to make.

The elections of 1981 revealed the extent to which Greek-Cypriot politics had become fragmented. AKEL had 32.8 per cent of the vote (12 seats), Rally Party 31.9 per cent (12), Democratic Party 19.5 per cent (8) and EDEK 8.2 per cent (3). The alliance between AKEL and Kyprianou's Democratic Party has survived the 1981 elections, but EDEK has begun to take a more independent line. Furthermore, in the presidential elections of February 1983 there was a three-way contest between Kyprianou, who got 56.5 per cent of the vote, Clerides, with 33.9 per cent and Lysarides, with 9.5 per cent. They each represent a different view on the Cyprus problem. Lysarides adopts a somewhat uncompromising position and is in favour of a solution based on the UN resolution, with refugee rights fully safeguarded and the right to settlement, property and free movement guaranteed. Kyprianou, the re-elected President, in alliance with AKEL, stresses the need to find a negotiated, federal solution through the inter-communal talks. Clerides takes a similar line to Kyprianou on the federal issue, but favours a more 'western' position on foreign policy. These obvious divisions within the Greek-Cypriot community represent an important change since the days of almost total support for Enosis, but the overwhelming support for Kyprianou may indicate a gradual willingness, other interested parties permitting, to find an acceptable long-term solution to the problem.

There are similar signs of a softening of the Turkish-Cypriot position on the problem. In the early days of the self-declared Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, there was a widespread belief among Turks that perhaps the Cyprus problem had been resolved once and for all. Developments within the Turkish sector, however, have shown these views to be too simplistic. There is discontent in the Turkish sector with

the lack of economic progress, the high levels of unemployment, the uncertainty of refugees from the south living in occupied areas and the continuous interference of Ankara in domestic issues. In the elections of June 1981,¹⁶ Denktash's NUP, which in the past has taken a pro-Turkish position and stressed the need for an independent Turkish state of Cyprus, obtained less than 50 per cent of the vote. It is, perhaps, significant that even Denktash and his party no longer openly state the pro-Turkish position, recognising that it is unrealistic. The main opposition, the Communal Liberation Party (CLP) obtained 28.5 per cent of the vote in 1981, coming some way behind NUP, while advocating a negotiated solution. Nevertheless, there are fundamental differences even between CLP and the various Greek positions, since they argue for a weak central government or confederation, which no one in the south of the island is willing to concede at the moment. Moreover, even if a confederation is agreed, there remains the issue of who will secure the boundaries and how far freedom of movement will be permitted.

There is, however, another crucial level of involvement in the Cyprus problem that constrains the Cypriots themselves - namely that created by the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 and the de facto occupation of the north by Turkey in 1974. Turkey has been arguing for the past thirty years that its national security would be threatened if Cyprus became part of Greece and the approaches to the southern ports of Antalya, Mersin and Iskenderun were therefore dominated by Greece. For this reason, many Greek-Cypriots fear that Turkey's long-run objective is to take over the whole of the island, and her treatment of eight million Kurds within Turkey, who are denied even the freedom to speak their own language, shows clearly that Ankara would be willing to carry out mass oppression under the excuse of the national interest. Any action by Turkey on Cyprus, however, has to take account of Greece, one of the other Guarantor Powers. Relations between Greece and Greek-Cypriots have improved considerably since the election of Papandreou in 1981, who has emphasised the priority of finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. At this level of Turkish-Greek relations it is difficult to envisage any agreement over the Cyprus problem without some progress being made over Aegean rights, which itself may depend on the extent of oil and other mineral deposits to be found there. There is also the vital question of political developments in Turkey itself, and until the restoration of civilian democratic government one cannot anticipate any concessions being made on Cyprus.

Finally, there are the interests of NATO to be taken into account. At the moment these are protected by the Treaty of Establishment, which gives Britain two major military bases on this strategically vital island. But in the long-run the existence of the bases is uncertain as both AKEL and the Democratic Party are committed to dismantling them. An independent Cyprus might establish links with the USSR. This

possible outcome is given credence in US circles because of the continued widespread electoral support achieved by AKEL. Furthermore, long-term US interests require that Greece and Turkey co-exist peacefully within NATO. This scenario would seem to suggest that the US and Britain would be opposed to any solution to the Cyprus problem that would not guarantee NATO strategic interests, and that this might best be achieved by a permanent Turkish and/or Greek presence on the island.

The prospects for an agreement between the two communities in Cyprus, which is arrived at without coercion and within the spirit of the UN resolution, seem to be daunting, but not hopeless. It is impossible to go back to the situation as it was prior to 1974 and means have to be established to provide the Turkish minority with the rights and safeguards they need, whilst giving Greek-Cypriots the freedom to return to the homes and land they have occupied for centuries.

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- 14 C.P. Kyrris, op. cit., p. 46.
- 15 For details, see *Cyprus* (Cmnd 1093, HMSO, July 1960). For a fuller discussion of the effects of the constitution on internal political developments, see F. Anthias and R. Ayres, 'Constitutional struggle in Cypriot left politics', paper presented to the BSA Conference, 1979.
- 16 For details, see Friends of Cyprus, *Report* (No. 23, Winter 1981-2).

Notes and documents

Lyrics by The Flying Turkey

Freedom Day

Revolution, Revolution they cry,
 Everybody fighting, don't know who go die.
 Tuesday March 13th, 1979
 Is a day every West Indian will bear in mind,
 When a people driven with their backs to the wall
 Responded in answer to their leaders' call,
 Smooth and efficient, spontaneous was their cry,
 No one was afraid then to die.
 The people from the ghetto, Lord,
 The people from the town,
 The country areas everywhere
 The people moved like one
 Forging towards their destiny
 And the dawn of a new day,
 Our new and bright dimension
 Is really here to stay.

Chorus:

The people call it FREEDOM DAY
 Old people say FREEDOM DAY
 Young people say FREEDOM DAY
 I and I say FREEDOM DAY