

The Cyprus problem has been on the international agenda for very many years. Gaziöglu shows in this timely book that the dimensions of the Cyprus problem are wider than is commonly thought. Through a close analysis of the original international treaties, Gaziöglu underlines the fact that the Cyprus Republic was not a Greek state but a functional federation in which power was shared between the Turks and Greeks on the island. This political partnership was destroyed by the Greek side in 1963/4, in a bid to make Cyprus Greek and to unite the island to Greece (enosis). Unfortunately, through their interpretation of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) the international community seemed to sanction an all-Greek government in Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots were reduced to the status of a much maligned 'minority', a situation which prevailed until 1974 when Turkey had to intervene according to the Treaty of Guarantee to prevent another attempt at enosis. The island was then divided, with the Greeks in the South and the Turks in the North. Eventually, in 1983, the Turkish Cypriots formed their own state, The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus which, underlines the fact that, as Gaziöglu's title indicates, there are indeed two equal and sovereign peoples in Cyprus. By a careful scrutiny of all the factors that led to the present situation Gaziöglu makes an important contribution to our understanding of what will be required if a new Federal Republic of Cyprus is to come into being.

* * *

Ahmet C. Gaziöglu is a noted journalist, editor, and historian of modern Cyprus. After a youthful career as a history teacher, and eventually a headmaster, in Cyprus, he was sent to London as the Turkish Cypriot Representative during the difficult years of 1960s. He studied international relations at the University of London and spent many years carrying out research on the vast quantity of Cyprus documents kept in the British Public Records Office. He is managing director of the Cyprus Research and Publishing Centre which he founded in 1983. This centre regularly produced monographs and published books dealing with all aspects of the current political situation in Cyprus. Gaziöglu is a regular contributor to the Turkish Cypriot press and makes frequent appearances on Bayrak Television as a presenter and chairman of discussions on Cyprus. Since 1991 he has been also an adviser to president Denktaş. Among his most recent books are: *The Turks in Cyprus 1570-1878* (Oxford, 1990); *Kıbrıs'ta Türkler 1570-1878* (Turkish edition of the *The Turks in Cyprus*, CYREP 1994), *İngiliz Yönetiminde Kıbrıs 1878-1952*, (*Cyprus Under British Rule*, CYREP 1996).

TWO EQUAL AND SOVEREIGN PEOPLES

A. C. GAZIOGLU

CYREP

Ahmet C. GAZIOĞLU

TWO EQUAL AND SOVEREIGN PEOPLES

A documented background
to the Cyprus problem and
the concept of partnership



CYREP (NICOSIA) 1997

Scanned / Transcribed by
The Socialist Truth in Cyprus – London Bureaux

<http://www.st-cyprus.co.uk/intro.htm>

<http://www.st-cyprus.co.uk/english/home/index.php>



TWO EQUAL AND SOVEREIGN PEOPLES

**A documented background
to the Cyprus problem and
the concept of partnership**

© 1993 CYREP

**Published by CYREP,
P.O.BOX:327 LEFKOŞA,
TRNC, MERSİN 10-TURKEY**

**Tel Fax: 0392-22 72 592
Tel:0392-22 78 194 and 0392-82 18 822**

THE EQUAL AND
SOVEREIGN PEOPLES

First published 1997

This book is copyrighted under the Bern Convention. All rights are reserved by the author. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers:

© A. C. GAZIOĞLU 1997

Yayıncı (Yazar)
Kema Press
Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti

Printed in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC)
by Kema Press

TWO EQUAL AND SOVEREIGN PEOPLES

A documented background to the Cyprus problem and the concept of partnership

BY
Ahmet C. GAZIOĞLU

CYREP (LEFKOŞA) 1997

Yayıncı (Yazar)
Kema Press
Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti

CONTENTS

| | |
|---|---------|
| FOREWORD by Michael Moran: | Page |
| | iii-v |
| I- ENOSIS, AUTONOMY, INDEPENDENCE | 1 - 19 |
| 1. Hellenic Idea and Enosis | |
| 2. A Few Remarks about the Turkish Rule | |
| 3. British Attitude and Policy | |
| 4. Upsetting the Principle of Equality | |
| 5. Failure of First Steps towards Self Rule | |
| II- TWO EQUAL PARTNERS | 20 - 54 |
| A- Macmillan Plan: Tripartite condominium | |
| B- The Implementation of Partnership | |
| C- First Hints for Guaranteed independence | |
| D- Political Equality, shared Sovereignty | |
| E- Conditional Cession of Sovereignty | |
| F- The Agreements and Basic Documents | |
| APPENDICES | |
| 1. Treaty of Establishment | 55 |
| 2. Treaty of Guarantee | 58 |
| 3. Treaty of Alliance | 60 |
| Additional Protocol I and II | 61 - 62 |
| III- THE BASIC PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH CYPRUS REPUBLIC WAS ESTABLISHED | 63 - 83 |
| 1. Key Concepts | |
| 2. Averoff on the Main Principles | |
| 3. The Reasons of the Failure | |
| 4. The 1963 Coup and The Greek Onslaught | |
| 5. Occupation By Greece | |
| 6. Conclusion | |
| APPENDIX | |
| The Akritas Plan | 82 - 90 |

| | |
|---|-----------|
| IV- BRITISH SOVEREIGN BASES | 91 - 123 |
| 1. Foreword | |
| 2. A new initiative | |
| 3. The question of Sovereign Bases and Turkish Security | |
| 4. Turkish Guarantorship for the Bases | |
| 5. Legal and Moral Obligations | |
| 6. Makarios's Blackmail Attempt | |
| 7. The Future of the British Bases | |
| 8. Turkey Should Have a Say | |
| 9. Turkish flexibility | |
| 10. Future of Sovereign British Bases | |
| 11. Legal Aspects of the Issue of Cession | |
| V- FOREIGN FACTORS AND THE PEACE PROCESS | 124 - 132 |
| 1. Relations Between Two Motherlands | |
| 2. The Role of Foreign Elements | |
| 3. The UNSG's Mission of Good Offices | |
| 4. Special Representatives and Coordinators | |
| 5. Turkish Cypriot position | |
| 6. Conclusions | |
| APPENDICES | 133 - 154 |
| 1. Joint Declaration of 20 January 1997 | 133 - 137 |
| 2. Resolution of the Grand National Assembly | 138 - 139 |
| 3. Turkish Cypriot objections to the Greek Cypriot application for membership of the EU | 140 - 144 |
| 4. 'Gentlemen's Agreement' reached between Karamanlis and Menderes | 145 |
| 5. Minutes of the Meeting on 11 February 1959 between the Foreign Ministers of Britain, Turkey and Greece | 146 - 150 |
| 6. Minutes of the Meeting on 12 February 1959 between the Foreign Ministers of Britain, Turkey and Greece | 151 - 154 |
| VI- Index | 155 - 157 |

FOREWORD

As this book goes to the press the situation in Cyprus is once more becoming quite alarming. The very unfortunate events in the summer of 1996, when a number of people were killed and others wounded in the buffer zone between the two communities was bad enough. Whatever may be said about Turkish over-reaction during those events, it must not be forgotten that things would have remained entirely peaceful if the Greek Cypriots had not indulged in the propaganda exercise of organising a large group of motorcyclists to 'drive to Kyrenia', a piece of mindless folly that was bound to lead to trouble. And now – at the beginning of 1997 – the Greeks have signed an agreement with Russia to install missiles of advanced design, and with a range of 95 miles, in a military base they are building in Paphos as part of their so-called 'defence pact' with mainland Greece. Turkey, feeling herself at risk, somewhat like the US did at the time of the Cuba Crisis, has threatened to take 'appropriate' (i.e., military) action against this installation and the US and the other Western Powers are telling both the Greek and Turkish sides that their behaviour is not conducive to a freely-negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem. And, of course, the Western Powers are right.

In this volume Ahmet C. Gazioğlu provides us with some of the essential data that have to be taken into account if we are to understand how, since at least 1958, the conflict between the two Cypriot communities has persisted.

It is a remarkable story. The 1960 Accords gave Cyprus independence from Britain and established the partner status of the two very different ethnic communities, both of whom still looked to their motherlands for guidance and security. But the Greeks never took the 1960 Accords seriously. Makarios had every intention of abrogating those Accords as soon as he could and of joining the island politically to Greece. In the process he did his best to destroy the Turkish Cypriot community. As we know, he failed in this attempted genocide. In 1974 Turkey intervened in Cyprus to prevent *enosis* and since then the island has been divided.

Unfortunately, however, the international community has, since Security Council resolution 186 (1964), recognised the Greek Cypriots alone as 'the government of Cyprus'. At the same time the UN has encouraged the two Cypriot sides to negotiate freely, and

on a basis of political equality, under UN auspices, to resolve their differences and form a bizonal federation. There is a contradiction here, of course, which has seriously hampered the attempted negotiations. The Greek Cypriot unilateral application in 1990 to become a full member of the EU has only served to make that contradiction stand out more clearly. For the Greek side, as the recognised Government of Cyprus, applied on behalf of both communities without even consulting their Turkish compatriots! Moreover, the EU accepted the application as a perfectly proper one. So much for the notion of 'political equality'.

To understand how this situation became possible, and how so far in its dealings with Cyprus the international community has done scant justice to the Turkish Cypriots, it is necessary to take a searching look at the circumstances that led to Cyprus's independence and the nature of the international agreements between Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, and the two Cypriot communities which constitute the 1960 Accords. This is what Gazioğlu does here. He shows that it was entirely contrary both to the spirit and the letter of those international agreements that there should ever be a purely Greek Cypriot government in Cyprus, as there is now and has been since 1964, when the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President and the three Turkish Cypriot ministers were prevented, by force of arms, from continuing in their posts.

In fact, given the international and *sui generis* nature of the 1960 Accords one may well wonder if Cyprus was ever intended to be a genuinely independent nation at all. Britain retained 99 square miles of the island for military purposes. This was to be regarded as British sovereign territory, not part of the Republic of Cyprus. As Gazioğlu reminds us through his examination of the documents recording the original discussions between Turkey, Greece, Great Britain about the establishment of the Bases, the existence of the Bases is inseparable from the existence of the Cyprus Republic in the sense that both were brought about by the international 1960 Agreements. Turkey is a signatory to all those Agreements and consequently Turkey must be consulted and give her consent to any change in them.

Another unique aspect of Cyprus's 'independence' was that both Greece and Turkey were permitted to retain indefinitely in the new Republic military contingents of their own. Since the events of 1974 these (originally almost purely symbolic) contingents have

been replaced by Turkish troops in the North and a 'defense pact' between the Greek Cypriots and Greece in the South where currently something approaching 2 million American dollars per day is being spent on arms, making Cyprus one of the most heavily militarised countries in the world. Despite the obvious danger inherent in this situation there is still, after 33 years of attempted rapprochement, a political stalemate between the two Cypriot communities. Gazioglu's book makes a most useful contribution to our understanding of how this situation came about; and, by implication at least, he also gives some indication of the kind of solution that should be sought.

The US, the EU, as well as Britain and Russia, have all chosen 1997 as the year when the Cyprus problem should be solved. As the long cold war on the divided island threatens to become a short hot war, the publication of this book is timely.

Michael Moran

14 March 1997

Bellapais

I - ENOSIS, AUTONOMY, INDEPENDENCE *

1. HELLENIC IDEA AND ENOSIS

We owe a great debt to the British historian Sir George Hill, who luckily completed his colossal work on Cyprus history before he died. He stated in his fourth volume, edited by Sir Harry Luke, that "*Hardly a year has passed since the occupation (1878), without the 'Hellenic idea' finding expression in some form or other*" and added that "*its symptoms were noticed as early as 1830*".¹

82 years later in 1960, after having been elected the President of the independent Cyprus Republic, Archbishop Makarios declared that "*the struggle of the people of Cyprus will go on*" and that "*the Zürich and London Agreements were a starting point and bastion for further struggles...*" As always, by '*the people of Cyprus*' Makarios meant, of course, the Greek community in Cyprus.

He continued:

... Greek Cypriots must continue to march forward to complete the work begun by the EOKA heroes.... The struggle is continuing in a new form and will go on until we achieve our goal.²

And he stated openly to *Unsi Suomi* of Stockholm, on 5 September 1963, the following:

It is true that the goal of our struggle is to unite Cyprus with Greece.

Makarios had never deviated from that '**national goal**' on which he took an oath on the occasion of his enthronement as Archbishop, on 20 October 1950:

I take the holy oath that I shall work for the birth of our national freedom and shall never waiver from our policy of uniting Cyprus with mother Greece.

* A paper contributed to a conference entitled 'Cyprus and the Colonial Experience, 1878-1960', held at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 28 Russell Square, WC1, on Friday 27 October, 1995.

The oath of the members of 'the fighting committee for Enosis' on 7 March 1955, which included Makarios and Grivas, was a vow "to keep secret everything regarding the union of Cyprus with Greece".

These well-known statements and oaths, among many others, prove clearly that the Enosis aspiration had been the main goal of the Greeks in Cyprus, not only during the 82 years of British Colonial period, but even after the realization of the independent Cyprus Republic.

MEGALI IDEA

Let us consider briefly the meaning and origins of Enosis before trying to define how this movement affected the political and social life of Cyprus during the British Colonial Rule.

According to Kyriakos C. Markides, "Enosis was a manifestation of an Pan-Hellenic Ideology that arose in 1453, the very year Constantinople fell to the Turks."

That ideology was based on the 'Great Idea' (*Megali Idea*) which was a dream shared by Greeks that some day the Byzantine empire would be restored and be united into a Greater Greece.

Because the Greeks of Cyprus had absorbed this Pan-Hellenic ideology and have considered themselves, historically and culturally, to be Greeks in some much wider sense than that merely of Greek-speaking Cypriots, the 'Great Idea' has had an immense appeal.

"Thus", says Markides, "when the church fathers called on the Cypriots to fight for union with Greece, it did not require much effort to heat up emotions. It was the interplay of cultural-ideological factors with the structural strains of Colonialism that gave birth to Enosis as a social movement".³

While negotiating the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 which aimed at partitioning not only the remaining parts of the Ottoman Empire but the Turkish homeland, Anatolia, as well, the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos stated his belief in the necessity of building up a greater Greek state "of the two continents and the five seas" to cover all the Greek-speaking territories including Cyprus.

According to Zenon Stavrinides, "During the heyday of the 'Great Idea'" the Greeks developed a conception of their national identity which included the following:

- a) Present-day Greeks are the descendants of the Hellenic Heroes and the Greek-speaking Christians of Byzantium. They are rightful heirs of that distinguished civilization and language.
- b) The Greek nation is much larger than the modern Greek state
- c) It is the patriotic duty of all 'true' Greeks to work for the liberation of all historically Greek lands, now inhabited by Greeks under foreign rule.

Thus to be a 'true' Greek, one would have to conceive of oneself as a member of a great nation and further to believe that this national state must grow steadily until it encompass the whole of the ancient and Byzantine Hellenic world.

... Greek children at schools were taught modern history as a record of the gradual fulfillment of national aspirations, mainly by fighting against Ottoman Turks.

... So by a combination of various historical factors, state controlled education, propaganda and political demagogy, Greek nationalism and patriotism came to mean, pride in being a member of a superior nation, belief in the necessity of extending the boundaries of the Greek state to include all historical lands.⁴

Another Greek author, Stephen G. Xydis quotes the well-known passage from Greek premier John Kolettis who described the essence of the Megali Idea in a speech delivered in January 1844 as follows:

The Kingdom of Greece is not Greece; it is only a part, the smallest and poorest of Greece. A Greek is not only he who lives in the Kingdom but also he who lives in Yannia, or Thessaloniki, or Serres, or Adrianople, or Constantinople, or Trebizond, or Crete, or Samos, or in whatever country is historically Greek, or whoever is of Greek race...

...There are two great centres of Hellenism: Athens and Constantinople; Athens is only capital of the Kingdom.

Constantinople is the great capital, the city, the joy and hope of Hellenes.⁵

This wishful thinking which was called the **Megali Idea** involved considerable fanaticism and has been a peculiarly dangerous source of expansionist adventurism.

Hans Kohn, says that the '**Megali Idea**' displayed a tendency to create, "*out of myths of the past and the dreams of the future, an ideal fatherland, closely linked with the past, devoid of any immediate connection with the present and expected to become some time a reality*".⁶

In other words, like many other European nations emerging in the 19th Century, the Greeks invented an identity for themselves which was self-flattering and inspirational. But unlike most of the others, the Greek sense of identity included the problematic belief that the so called 'lost lands' presumed to be theirs historically, should be '*redeemed*'.

During the British Colonial Administration, both the Greek Cypriots and the Kingdom of Greece were encouraged by some misguided British politicians and philhellenes to demand the union of Cyprus with Greece, having in mind the handing over by the British government of the **Ionian islands** to Greece in 1864. A few years later the Greeks were awarded **Thessaly** and part of **Epirus** (1881). A Greek revolt against Turkish rule in **Crete** (1866) was followed by landing Greek forces there in 1897. Crete was finally united with Greece during the Balkan Wars in 1912-1913.

After having gained the Ionian islands, Thessaly and part of Epirus, the Greeks were convinced that "*the tragically anachronistic vision of a new Greek empire that would rise, like the phoenix, from the ashes of Ottoman defeat*" would be realised.⁷

According to the Megali Idea, Cyprus was also a Greek territory to be redeemed, and Britain by taking over the island from the Turks, in 1878, would facilitate its transfer to Greece as she had earlier accomplished the union of Ionian islands. This British generosity, inspired the Greek Cypriot Church leaders in their demand for *Enosis*, when they welcomed the first British Administrator, Sir Garnet **Wolseley** in 1878.

2. A FEW REMARKS ABOUT TURKISH RULE

Before we move on to examine '**the British Colonial experience**' we must recall some relevant characteristics of the Turkish Rule in order to judge fairly and understand better the British attitude and policy concerning Cyprus.

Turkish Rule in every part of the Ottoman Empire was based on, as is well-known, the '**Millet**' system, which considered each religious community within the Empire as a separate '**millet**' (*nation*) and granted them autonomy in their communal affairs. The main purpose of this system was to promote harmony among the many different religious communities within the Empire and maintain a good balance between them and *vis-à-vis* the ruling power, by winning their hearts. This policy of **leniency and tolerance** towards the different peoples under Turkish Rule had been a success and for centuries the Empire had witnessed little resentment from its various Christian subjects.

In Cyprus it was the same policy of leniency and great tolerance towards the Greek Orthodox Community that prevailed. The abolition of Latin serfdom, freedom of worship, the rights of re-ownership of properties, re-opening of Orthodox Churches and the recognition of the Greek Archbishop as the head (*Ethnarch*) of his community and similar privileges, helped and encouraged the Greek Cypriot community to get organized so as to revive and develop their prosperity and become both economically and numerically the strongest, wealthiest people of the island.

When Britain took over the administration of the island as a result of the 1878 Anglo-Turkish Convention, the Greek Cypriots were in a position of sharing power with the Turks.

According to Sir Harry Luke, "*The Archbishop of Cyprus, whose office had been created by the Turks after lying dormant for three hundred years, secured in the 17th and 18th centuries the supreme power and authority over the island, and at one period wielded influence greater than that of the Turkish Pasha himself*".⁸

Hepworth **Dixon**, one of the first British officials who arrived in Cyprus in 1878 with Sir Garnet **Wolseley**, the first British High Commissioner, was so impressed with the '**Dual System**' and the balanced Turkish administration that in his book about Cyprus he says, "*on one side of this dual system was the Pasha (the*

Governor) of Cyprus ruling from the Konak in Nicosia, while on the other there was the Archbishop of St John's Cathedral. For the sake of peace and order, Konak and Cathedral came to terms. This was achieved not by articles or treaties but by consent".⁹

This also explains why intercommunal strife or clashes during the 308 years of the Turkish period, were unknown.

It is necessary to recall these facts about the Turkish period, because when someone ventures to talk about the 'British Colonial experience', this briefing will help us in understanding better the difficulties the British were confronted with and why the colonial policy failed to achieve either a working autonomy or the required control over the Orthodox Church. In particular, it will help us to understand the emergence of extreme Greek nationalism, agitation and fanaticism, which caused so much trouble: intercommunal fighting, hatred, mistrust, bloodshed, and instability.

3. BRITISH ATTITUDE AND POLICY

When Cyprus was acquired by Britain in 1878, and even many years later, prominent British statesmen and authors were divided about its importance and value for the Empire.

Disraeli described Cyprus to Queen Victoria as 'the key to Western Asia' and after the conclusion of the Cyprus convention, he stated that 'in taking Cyprus, the movement is not Mediterranean; it is Indian', thus emphasizing the strategic importance of Cyprus for the British Empire.¹⁰

However, there were military experts, as well as statesmen such as Mr Gladstone, who disputed the value of Cyprus, and described the convention as an 'insane covenant' and as an 'act of duplicity'. But when he assumed political responsibility, as Prime Minister, a few years later, Gladstone refused to surrender the island to Greece and declared that his Government had not contemplated anything like that. 'Nor indeed entertained the subject'.¹¹

Although, according to the Convention, Cyprus was part of the Turkish Empire, British indifference to this reality and their attempt to change the well-established and respected system of Turkish administration, encouraged the Greek Cypriot leaders to think that Cyprus would not be returned to Turkey at all, and therefore the demand for union with Greece would be considered sympathetically by the British.

Britain took over the administration of Cyprus under the terms of the Anglo-Turkish Convention temporarily, but acted as if the island's sovereignty was transferred to Her Majesty's Government.

Greek Cypriot nationalists made much use, both of this British attitude and of statements by British political leaders favourable to Enosis, such as Gladstone, Edward Grey, Ramsay MacDonald, Lloyd George, Sydney Webb, Aneurin Bevan, Barbara Castle and many others...

As a matter of fact British policy until the unilateral annexation of Cyprus by the British Empire in 1914, had been that the possession of the island was 'temporary and provisional' but "the strength of philhellene sentiment and the expectation that sooner or later a British government would yield to the pressure for Cyprus to be handed over to Greece had a similar inhibiting effect both before and after annexation".¹²

John Reddaway, who served in the island as the Administration Secretary in 1950s, commenting on this point says that "the result was that for most of the period of British Rule there was in a sense no British policy for Cyprus at all".

The only persisting imperative which dictated British actions and conduct was the island's importance for imperial defence. This had been the main concern of Britain and the other imperatives, such as the promotion of political, economic and social development in the island had been of secondary consideration.

The British insistence to keep sovereign bases on the island even after its 'independence' was achieved, and the continued retention of two British Bases under full British sovereignty, proved how right Disraeli had been about the strategic value of Cyprus.

Even a few years before Cyprus's independence, the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden declared:

*No Cyprus, no certain facilities to protect our supply of oil. No oil, unemployment and hunger in Britain. It is as simple as that.*¹³

FALSE HOPES ENCOURAGED

The above mentioned British statesmen, and the British philhellenes in Parliament and some of the members of the British press consistently encouraged the campaign for Enosis. They

advocated the Greek case that Cyprus was entitled to be annexed to Greece and even Archbishops of Canterbury occasionally supported this claim.

Regretfully, HM Government did not hesitate to violate the Convention of 1878 by ruling Cyprus as a colony from the start. The fact that Cyprus was under Ottoman Sovereignty was used only as an excuse by Britain, in order to avoid meeting Greek Cypriot demands for *Enosis*.

It may be instructive to consider a few examples of British violations of the Anglo-Turkish Convention:

For instance:

- a) Britain acted as if she was the sovereign power and by the issue of an **Order in Council** on September 14, 1878 which made no reference to the **Porte** (Turkish Government) treated Cyprus like Malta which was a British Colony.
- b) Although the absolute sovereignty of the Sultan was not formally disputed, the application of certain privileges granted by capitulations or treaties was denied and the Consuls who were accredited to the Turkish Government had to seek recognition from the British Government.
- c) The first British High Commissioner Sir Garnet Wolseley took action to prevent the sale of the Sultan's private property in Cyprus, claiming that it was irregularly purchased.

(Despite the explanation made by Mr. Layard, the British Ambassador in Istanbul, that the Sultan's purchase of property in the Paphos district was legal, because the purchase was concluded before Cyprus was handed over to Britain, Wolseley insisted on his unreasonable stand.)

- d) The appointments to the high offices of Moslem institutions were preserved for the Turkish Government. However, when the position of **Chief Kadi** fell vacant, Wolseley, refused to accept the person nominated by the **Grand Vezir**. *(The Turkish head of the Government).*

A similar question had to be settled when the **Sheikhul-Islam** wanted to appoint a Kadi to Famagusta. HM Government informed the Porte that the Turkish Government would no longer have any such right in Cyprus.

- e) Britain violated the convention also by allowing Greek officers to come to Cyprus and purchase mules at the time of Greek mobilization and preparation for war against Turkey in 1880. This action started a wave of nationalistic enthusiasm among Greek Cypriots who volunteered to join the war against Turkey.

(As a matter of fact, 150 of these Greeks, who were still Ottoman subjects, were allowed by the British colonial administration to go as volunteers together with purchased and freely contributed mules.)

According to Hill, "what is extraordinary, about the whole affair is that the government, in the face of these demonstrations of hostility to Turkey by Ottoman subjects, maintained an attitude of complete indifference. No measures were taken to restrain the effusions of the people in public demonstrations or articles in the press".¹⁴

When Greece started the 'Thirty Days War' against Turkey in 1897, more Greek Cypriot volunteers were allowed to join the Greek army. The then British High Commissioner, Sir Walter **Sendall**, who was a sympathizer with Hellenic aspirations, took no steps to prevent their going despite the 'Neutrality Order of 1881'.

- f) The transfer of the direction of the affairs of Cyprus from the Foreign Office to the control of the Colonial Office in December 1880, was rightly interpreted as an actual sign of British intention to rule the island not as an Ottoman land but as a colony.

'Since then', wrote Hill, 'it has always been administered as a Crown Colony, although it was, until 1914, recognized as being a part of the Ottoman Empire, nevertheless its formal erection into a Crown Colony was delayed until 1925'.¹⁵

The paradoxical and politically indecent attitude of British colonialism, defying the terms of the Cyprus Convention even in the early years of British rule, as if Cyprus was a Crown Colony, encouraged the Greek Cypriot Church and leaders to assume that Britain would one day concede the island to Greece as has been the case with the **Ionian Islands**.

The Cyprus Greek Orthodox Church, encouraged by this British duplicity and hesitation, was the main instigator of the *Enosis* campaign throughout the period of British colonial rule and created

conditions of mistrust and animosity among the Greek Cypriot population against both the British and Turkish Cypriots.

4. UPSETTING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY

The first Legislative Council in Cyprus, established in 1878, was similar to the Turkish 'Meclis-i İdare' (*Administrative Assembly*) which provided **equality for both communities**. This equality was applied also for the appointments of judges.

When the Greeks complained and demanded that representation of both communities should be decided according to their respective numbers, Britain accepted this argument and made the mistake of upsetting the equality which was so vital for a balanced and amicable relationship among both communities.

The British introduction of a new element called the '**Casting Vote**' had been the '**Sword of Democles**'. It was used by the British when the Turkish representatives voted with *ex-officio* members and thus equalled the Greek votes. And **as long as the Greeks agitated for Enosis the Turks had no alternative but to vote with the British**.

When in 1882 the British Government changed the constitution and laid down the functions of the new Legislative Council which was to consist of 9 Greek and 3 Turkish Cypriot elected members against 6 British Officials as *ex-officio* members, **Esseid Ahmet Asım Efendi**, the Müfti, wrote to Lord **Kimberley**, the Colonial Secretary complaining that "*By this arrangement our ancient and present privileges shall be trodden under foot.*"

... We reject most positively the proposed system... And inform your eminence that we shall not abstain, in the least, from exerting ourselves to the utmost of our ability through persistent application to superior authorities for a remedy in the matter.

The Turks of Cyprus rightly thought that the British Government was ruling Cyprus temporarily on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan and the '**superior authority**' was the Turkish Government who would have the final say on any changes in their status. Therefore they informed the '**Sublime Porte**' about the new constitution imposed by Britain and asked for remedy.

A further memorial from the Turkish Cypriot leaders sent to Lord Kimberley in April 1882 contained the following points:

- The number of the elected Greek and Turkish members has been inserted without a contemplation of serious consequences which it involves and without a sense of justice.
 - We are able to substantiate by many proofs that during the long period of our rule we supported good will and justice, holding all classes on an **Equal Footing** in our proceedings without distinction of creed or faith.
 - We willingly submitted to HM's Rule and took refuge under the equitableness and graciousness of British Government, without paying any attention and without attaching the least importance to the constant incitement and instigations of our Christian Compatriots.
 - We have zealously applied ourselves to the speedy observance and carrying out all the orders and inhibitions of the British Government.
 - While we expected to be rewarded for our zealous services, it is proposed that the Greek community whose thoughts and intentions of oppressing and vexing us are made manifest and whose endless cries of Enosis are still echoing, should all at once be granted a privilege for which they claim no grounds.
 - The proposed concession is nevertheless a very great one. Even the Moslem inhabitants of Her Majesty's Indian possessions, who constitute 40-50 millions of the population, do not enjoy a similar franchise.
 - The west region of Anatolia is full of Moslems and its **Christian inhabitants** constitute a very small minority, but nevertheless they are, up to the present, allowed an equal representation.
- Nicosia, the most advanced and richest town of the island, contains a majority of Mohammedans over Christians.
- We once more repeat that the proposed proportional representation in the Legislative Council, is in every respect detrimental to our rights and destructive to the safety we now enjoy.
 - If the franchise in question which is incompatible with local requirements is enforced, that will absolutely compel us all to leave the island for some other place.

Meanwhile the Turkish ambassador in London, **Musurus Pasha** (a Greek by origin) conveyed to the Foreign Office, on 6 April

1882, the telegram from the Turkish Government protesting the proposed composition of the Legislative Assembly, emphasizing the fact that within Turkish Empire Christians, even where they are in minority, are represented equally in assemblies (Divans) of this kind.

The British Official reply, dated 22 April, was that, "*HM government cannot admit the right to the Porte to intervene as to the manner in which Her Majesty may think fit to regulate the mode of administering the island.*"

And that was that... Although similar complaints and protests were repeated later, on several occasions, on the same grounds by the Turkish side, Britain paid no attention at all, and ruled the island as it pleased her.

Another cause of complaint was about Greek Cypriots' arrogant behaviour towards Turkish Cypriots.

Several representations were made by Turkey, drawing HM Government's attention to the *Enosis* agitation and insults by Greeks. The Christians were very menacing and Turkey pointed out that Turks in Cyprus feared that there would be attacks upon them.

The Grand Vezir **Said Pasha** asked the British Ambassador **Philip Corrie**, on 9 May 1895, to convey to London that many Moslems in the island were in consequence obliged to leave the island.

The British High Commissioner **W.J. Sendall**, when informed about this representation, sent a letter to Philip Corrie, saying that "*Although there had been a good deal of political tension of late, between Christians and Moslems in Cyprus, nothing occurred to justify the apprehension of any serious collision between the two races.*"

The Turkish Cypriot leaders who threatened not to participate in the Legislative Council unless equal representation was reinstated, did not realize their threat and thus this well-established principle was not applied. Hill quoted *The Times* which commented:

If the Turks refused (as they threatened) to serve on the Legislative Council, the Government would be in a perpetual minority, for the 3 Turks with the 6 Officials were meant to counterbalance the 9 Greeks.

Thus the Turks were left in a position of having no other choice but to support the British.

This dependence on the British which was imposed upon the Turkish Community was used by the colonial regime to check Greek antagonism and Hellenic nationalism on the one hand, and on the other to guarantee the perpetuation of the Turkish Cypriot support for the maintenance of colonial rule.

WHY NOT AUTONOMY?

Lord **Radcliffe**, the constitutional commissioner who worked on a new constitutional proposal, in his report of December 1956 observed that "*It is a curiosity of history that their [the Cypriots'] political development has remained comparatively immature*".¹⁶

John **Reddaway**, the Colonial Secretary in the 1950s, who by marriage to a Greek Cypriot lady was regarded as a pro-Greek, and had acquired a command of Greek, justifies the lack of political and constitutional development during British Rule on the ground that the well-intended advocates of constitutional improvement "*never succeeded in showing how constitutional progress could be started in Cyprus in the face of a boycott by the Church and Greek Cypriot politicians, nor how it could lead to a satisfactory conclusion in view of the diametrically opposed wishes of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.*"

Mr Reddaway goes on to elaborate his point and adds this:

The people of the island passionately believed themselves to be Greeks and Turks and to them the issue of overriding importance was that of sovereignty and the final status of the island. Self-Government was irrelevant except in so far as it could be exploited either to promote or to obstruct Enosis.

In other words, during the British period, the Cypriots – Turks as well as Greeks – did not aspire to a sovereignty of their own. For them the question was: when the British go which regional power will take over the island, Greece or Turkey?

*The theory of 'Cypriotness' has been an illusion, at best only a theory which a few people thought corresponded to the facts. The Greeks and the Turks of Cyprus had never accepted to identify themselves as part of an imagined 'Cypriot Nation' which actually never existed during Cyprus's long history.*¹⁷

The natural result of the opposed views of the two main peoples of Cyprus was, for quite different reasons, a strong suspicion by both communities towards any British efforts to improve the constitutional situation of the island. The Greek Cypriot leadership persuaded itself that any proposals for Self-Rule which would not lead to Enosis was a British trap designed to dissuade them from their attachment to mother Greece. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots were suspicious about any Self-Rule, because they feared that it would end in transferring power to the Greeks and, consequently, in bringing about Enosis.

Thus one of the main impediments to the establishment of a proper autonomy in Cyprus has been the existence of two distinct communities and their different concerns.

Neither an improved self-government based on Greek Cypriot majority, nor the demand for self-determination, later in the 1950s, were relevant for Cyprus due to the bi-communal character of the island. Because, **to do justice to both Cypriot peoples, required the application of the right of self-determination separately for the Turkish and Greek Cypriots; for if it was a right for the Greeks, it was a right also for Turkish Cypriots to determine their own future.**

5. FAILURE OF EVEN THE PRELIMINARY STEPS FOR SELF-RULE

The set up of the Legislative Assembly was based on a 'balanced' system which provided a casting vote for the British Administrators when votes cast were equal. This was guaranteed on almost all issues when Turkish Cypriot elected members voted together with the ex-officio members, who were all British Colonial Officials. As the Turkish-British combined votes were equal to the elected Greek Cypriot members, by using the **Casting Vote**, the British High Commissioner or Governor could impose the imperial will over the elected Greek representatives.

When, on those rare occasions, Turkish Cypriot members of the Assembly voted with the Greek members and defeated the government's bill and thus the British administrator was not able to use his casting vote, the British could still overrule the Assembly's will by introducing '*Orders in Council*' issued by the **High Commissioner and thus enforce the application of the bill rejected by the Legislative Assembly.**

Robert Stephens says:

*This power pattern, became a permanent feature of the administration of Cyprus... It became a source of intense frustration to the Greek Cypriots and served to widen the gulf, politically between them and the Turkish Cypriots. Britain believed that the sole aim of her Greek subjects in Cyprus was the replacement of British by Greek Rule in the form of union with Greece. It was not surprising, therefore, that a longstanding alliance developed between British officials and Turkish Cypriots to prevent Enosis.*¹⁸

The most striking of the very rare Turkish-Greek collaborations in the Assembly was on the issue of Turkish Tribute, demanding its payment to be made directly from the British Treasury; another such occasion was the rejection of the 1927 budget and the government's bill increasing taxes and customs duties in 1931.

Following the October 1931 uprising of the Greek Cypriots, the Colonial Government abolished the Legislative Council by **Letters patent** dated 12 November 1931 and the sole power to legislate was given to the Governor¹⁹

From then onwards, Government business was carried by the Governor with the assistance of a nominated '**Advisory Council**'. There was no elected representation in any legislative or executive organ during the remaining colonial period of 29 years and **Cyprus was ruled almost single-handed by the British Governors and Officials.**

EFFORTS FOR A 'PROGRESSIVE REGIME'

The failure to establish Self-Government had disastrous long-term consequences for Cyprus and has been second only to the Enosis movement as a basic cause of the present division of the island.

The early attempts to make even a very restricted constitution work, repeatedly came up against the obstructiveness of the Greek Cypriot nationalists sponsored by the Church.

The British were eager to establish self-rule without handing over the key functions related to their main and vital interests which they wanted to be preserved.

In the 1930s the critical situation created by the dictatorial regimes of Nazism and Fascism, and the establishment of dictatorship in Greece by General Metaxas in 1936, encouraged a trend in favour of a movement for Cypriot autonomy within the British Empire: *"pending the final settlement of the Cyprus question in accordance with the wishes of the people when normality would return to Europe"*.²⁰

An organization called 'The committee for Cyprus autonomy' was established in London in 1937, by Greek Cypriots which was supported by British sympathisers for the Greek cause in order to encourage self-rule in Cyprus. Ormsby Gore stated in 1937 that the policy adopted by the British Government was to encourage the people to take an interest in the management of their local affairs and to develop representative institutions locally before extending them to the central machinery.²¹

Malcolm MacDonald, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, said in 1938 the plan was to establish democratic forms of Government in the councils and build on that.²²

Later in 1942, it was stated in Parliament that steps were being taken to restore municipal elections which took place in 1943.

In 1946, it was announced in Parliament that the British Government proposed to *"Seek opportunities to establish a more liberal and progressive regime in the internal affairs of the island."*²³

In 1947, the new Governor Lord Winster, actually promised a *"more liberal and progressive regime"*.²⁴

Accordingly, a Consultative Assembly of 28 persons was formed to advise the Government on a new constitution based on Self-Rule.

The Archbishop and Greek nationalists boycotted the Consultative Assembly giving as their reason that **their sole political aim was union with Greece.**

The left-wing Greek Cypriots of Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta and Larnaca as well as PEON's (*left-wing Greek Trade Union*) representative and one Greek member of the committee of the Co-operative Central Bank participated; but later they also were pressurized to boycott the Assembly, protesting the British proposals for restricted Self-Rule and demanding full Self-Government, thus leaving the door open to union with Greece.

Meanwhile Turkish Cypriot representatives who participated wanted Enosis to be prohibited and their right of effective participation in the government to be guaranteed.

Lord Winster, had to dissolve the Assembly on 7 May 1947, because it was impossible for it to proceed with its task after the participating left-wing Greek Cypriot members voted against the constitutional proposals and then withdrew.

Thus the efforts of setting up a new constitution which envisaged a Greek Cypriot majority in the Legislative Assembly, but ruled out any proposal for union with Greece, failed.

As they were persistently accused of betraying Enosis, the leftists had no other choice then but to reject any constitutional reforms providing autonomy.

The dissolution of the Consultative Assembly strengthened the Greek Nationalists and the Church. The fervour of '**Nationalism**' and the Enosis campaign became so strong towards the end of the 1940s that in March 1949 AKEL's leaders publicly admitted that their support for Self-Government was a serious error. Consequently, AKEL and right-wing Greek leaders began competing in a race towards Hellenism and Enosis. Thus, both the nationalists and AKELISTS campaigned under the banner of **Enosis** during the municipal elections of May 1949.

Kyriacos C. Markides says that when, after the Second World War, the British decided to install a more liberal constitution based on the principle of local Self-Rule, **the Enosis movement was the most central political issue**, as the post-war era signalled the beginning of an uncompromising struggle for union with Greece. Any cooperation with the colonial Government was now branded as **betrayal**.

'**Enosis and only Enosis**' was characterized as a single minded demand and any proposals for reforms were dismissed by the Church as **colonial plots to divert the attention of the population from Enosis.**

*Society was polarized between the church and the communists, and Enosis became the key to political supremacy. It became clear that whoever controlled Enosis, ultimately controlled the society.*²⁵

It was the Church which dominated Greek Cypriot politics by exploiting nationalistic feelings; and AKEL, together with its

left-wing associates, had to accept the supremacy of the Church. The 1950 **Enosis plebiscite** was followed by the outright rejection of new constitutional proposals, including the Radcliffe and Macmillan plans, by both the right and left-wing Greek Cypriots, because they feared that self-rule would eventually lead to independence instead of **Enosis**, and consequently some moderate and more realistic leaders might emerge who might stick to independence instead.

In fact, in 1967, seven years after independence, and despite the fact that he was still president of the Cyprus Republic, Makarios put his signature to a joint declaration in Athens that he would not sign any new agreement which barred Enosis. Hence the continuation of "*the national struggle*" to this day.

For the Greek Cypriot side, independence had never been a final objective. The subsequent declarations and acts of the leaders of both Greece and the Greek Cypriots proved, beyond any doubt, that they remained firmly attached to the Enosis cause. The day the 1959-60 Agreements providing an independent bi-communal partnership republic was signed, sinister plans were made by the instruction of Makarios for the destruction of independence in order to create conditions for the achievement of Enosis. The 1963 *coup* by Makarios and leading Greek Cypriot leaders against the state, and finally the 1974 *coup* masterminded and engineered by Athens, were both put into operation for one and only one objective: to unite the island with Greece.

Had it not been for the effective resistance of the Turkish Cypriot people, the co-partner of the independent republic, to prevent Enosis, and if the Turkish military intervention in 1974 had not taken place in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee, following the second *coup*, Cyprus would now be part of Greece.

According to Reddaway, "*the core of the objection to it (independence) is the same as that which later condemned the 1960 constitution. That is, that it obstructed the realisation of Enosis*".²⁶

NOTES

- 1 Hill, Sir George, *The History of Cyprus*, vol IV (Cambridge University press, 1952), p. 496
- 2 In a sermon at Kykko Monastery, on 15 January 1962
- 3 Markides, Kyriakos, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic* (Yale University press 1977) p. 10-11

- 4 Stavrinides, Zenon, *The Cyprus Conflict And National Statehood*, (Nicosia 1975), p. 19
- 5 Xydis, Stephen, *Modern Greek Nationalism*, p. 237
- 6 Kohen, Hans, *the Idea of Nationalism; a study in its origins and background* (New York 1961) p.330
- 7 Holden, David, *Greece Without Columns. The Making of Modern Greece* (New York, 1972) p. 122-124
- 8 Luke Sir Harry, *Cyprus, a Portrait and an Appreciation* (London 1975), p. 77.
- 9 Dixon, Hepworth, *British Cyprus* (1879) p. 44
- 10 House of Commons Debates, Hansard, vol 241, col, 1773
- 11 Hill, op. cit, p. 279
- 12 Reddaway, John, *Burdened With Cyprus, The British Connection* (London 1986) p. 12
- 13 Eden's speech at Norwich on 1.6. 1956, quoted by Reddaway, p. 11
- 14 Hill, op. cit, p. 411
- 15 Ibid, ,
- 16 CO. 883-7085, No:2
- 17 Cmnd. 42, p.8, para.13
- 18 Reddaway, op. cit, p. 14-15
- 19 Stephens, Robert, *Cyprus, A Place of Arms* (London 1966), pp.107-108
- 20 Hansard, 12 November 1931, Col. 255
- 21 Alastos, Doros, *Cyprus In History*, (London 1955) p. 364
- 22 Hansard, 16 March 1937, col. 2882
- 23 Hansard, 14 June 1938, col. 186, and 8 Feb 1939, col. 934
- 24 Hansard, 23 Oct. 1946, col. 396
- 25 The Times, 7 April 1947
- 26 Markides op. cit. pp. 12-13
- 27 Reddaway op. cit, p. 19

II - TWO EQUAL PARTNERS

HOW THE CONCEPT OF THE PARTNERSHIP REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS CAME INTO BEING

A- MACMILLAN PLAN: TRIPARTITE CONDOMINIUM

Since the end of the Second World War, both the left and right wing Greek Cypriot leaders under the guidance of the Greek Orthodox Church had consistently rejected all initial and subsequently improved British proposals to adopt a liberal system of self-rule in the island.

Even the most comprehensive and meticulous proposals, called the Macmillan Plan, submitted to the British parliament on 19 June 1958 failed to satisfy Athens and the Greek Cypriot leaders.

The simple reason for their rejection of any system of liberal self-rule was the fear and suspicion of both Athens and the Greek Cypriot leaders that such proposals would promote a desire for independence rather than for their sole aspiration: The union of Cyprus with Greece (*Enosis*).

On 14 June 1958, the Greek Cabinet held an emergency meeting to examine the new British plan for Cyprus, initiated by Prime Minister Macmillan. Its unanimous decision was that the Macmillan plan could not be accepted. A few days later on 24 June, Averoff, the Greek Foreign Minister, handed to the British Ambassador in Athens Karamanlis's reply, explaining the reasons for their rejection of the plan.¹

Karamanlis also informed the British Prime Minister that he was in favour of meeting him, but he would not accept a meeting of three Prime Ministers. Thus he rejected the idea of having a tripartite meeting between the Turkish, Greek and British Prime Ministers, to discuss the Plan.

Archbishop Makarios, who was in Athens, after having consulted the Greek Cypriot mayors of the six towns, together with the Bishops of Kyrenia and Kition and the suffragan Bishop of Salamis sent a negative reply to the Governor of Cyprus, on 20 June, saying that the plan was "*unacceptable*".

The Turkish Prime Minister's reply was also negative at the initial stage because the plan did not envisage the partition which, according to the Turkish Premier, Adnan Menderes, was initially mooted by Averoff and then accepted by A. Lennox Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, and put forward first on Boyd's trip to Istanbul and finally in the British House of Commons on 19 December 1956.

During that debate in the House, the British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd underlined the fact that "*for Turkey Cyprus is an offshore island covering the approach to its southern ports*".²

The Secretary of State for the Colonies Alan Lennox Boyd, had been more precise on this issue and particularly about the right of **self-determination** for both communities.

He said that, when the international and strategic situation permitted, and self-government based on the Radcliffe Plan worked satisfactorily, HM Government would be ready to review its application. He then underlined the following:

*When the time comes for this review, that is, when these conditions have been fulfilled, it will be the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty's Government recognise that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options.*³

FURTHER SUPPORT FOR SEPARATE SELF-DETERMINATION AND PARTITION

The fact that the Macmillan plan was received favourably by the British opposition Labour Party had caused a lot of worries in Greece. Both the Greek Cypriot leaders and the Greek Government had always thought that the British Labour Party was more sympathetic to their cause and they heavily counted on their support. However, the debate in the House of Commons on 26 June displayed a united front in favour of the Macmillan Plan and **the right of both Turkish and Greek Cypriot Communities to decide their own future by applying the principle of**

self-determination. Particularly the speeches of Aneurin Bevan and James Callaghan had diminished the Greek hopes and disappointed them.

What worried the Greeks most, as Averoff admitted, was the line James Callaghan took on self-determination. Labour, said Callaghan, "*accepted the principle of self-determination for all the peoples of the Commonwealth, but it should be applied with the assent of the whole population and not against the wishes of the minority, nor as a result of civil war*" and that "*Labour had no intention of imposing it by force*".

Averoff, referring this issue, goes on to describe a recent private talk between the Greek Ambassador in London, Seferiades, and Aneurin Bevan who was one of the Labour Party's most forceful members and had consistently given the Greeks strong support over the Cyprus question:

In a recent private talk with our Ambassador, Seferiades, he (Bevan) had said something enormously significant: He declared that England could not be drained of its life-blood for an island it did not need and expressed the fear that the Macmillan Government might suddenly withdraw the British troops, limit itself to two bases and call on Turkey to take over the whole area north of 35th parallel (which passes through Nicosia) and Greece to take the area south of the line.

Averoff also mentions Bevan's sudden switch "*to an exceptionally moderate line*" when he suggested that, "*full self-government was a final phase*" and advised both Greeks and Turks not to reject the plan too hastily.

Evaluating the closing speech of the British Prime Minister, who declared that, "*Greeks of Greece and Greeks of Cyprus - either accept my plan or I will partition the island*", Averoff concludes that if the plan did not succeed the British Government would revert to the policy it had announced in December 1956. This was a reference to the statement made by the Colonial Secretary on the separate self-determination right of both communities.⁴

Meanwhile in Cyprus, fighting between the two communities continued and more people from both sides were killed. Macmillan asked the Greek and Turkish premiers to make an appeal to their communities to stop violence, to which in due course both agreed.

Thus diplomatic discussion between the three governments had intensified. Macmillan concluded that both "*Athens and Ankara were becoming increasingly anxious and more ready to consider accommodation*". The British Premier adds that the chief concern of the Greeks was the proposal that each Government should appoint its representative to the Governor's Council "*that a Turkish representative should act officially in this capacity seemed to the Greeks an admission of the Turkish interest, contrary to the legal and constitutional basis on which they had rested for so long*".⁵

Initial rejection of the Macmillan plan by both the Turkish and Greek Governments were based mainly on two reasons. The Turkish Prime Minister, in his reply to Macmillan "*had declared that nothing short of partition, itself a great sacrifice, on the part of Turkey, could assuage Turkish fears*". On the other hand the Greeks in their reply, on 21 June (1958) "*took a new and unexpected position and objected to Turkey playing a part in the controversy on the grounds that by the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey had surrendered all her rights*". According to Macmillan "*this seemed a strange argument since under the same Treaty, Greece had equally accepted the British annexation*".⁶

At the end of July, Macmillan had the opportunity to talk to the Turkish Premier Menderes and Foreign Minister Zorlu who were in London for the Baghdad Pact meeting. They met at **10 Downing Street**, on 29 July. Macmillan's own account of this meeting, was as follows:

Turkey now accepts, in full, the British plan for Cyprus. The Turkish Government (which a few weeks ago was inciting riots against it, both in Cyprus and in Turkey) now regards it as fair, honorable, statesmanlike, well balanced! But- and here is the point-it must be THE PLAN, THE WHOLE PLAN, AND NOTHING BUT THE PLAN. It is so beautifully constructed say the Turks - that the slightest alteration or amendment will destroy its equilibrium and 'mar its symmetry' (the object, of course, is to make it quite certain that the Greeks who want some important amendments - will reject the plan). If we, the British, will undertake to carry out the plan without amendment, the Turks will

*cooperate - will call off violence - and will abandon all their other claims - partition, a military base, etc.*⁷

Macmillan stated how gratified they were to feel that the Turks now thought the British plan was a good one and that they meant to go along with it and thus Britain could rely on Turkish help. He also made it clear that although the Turkish acceptance was conditional on the plan remaining substantially unchanged he retained the right to discuss, and perhaps accept, Greek amendments which would then be put to the Turks.

The next day the both Premiers, together with their Foreign Ministers met again. A long discussion took place on a paper prepared by the Turkish side. *"The British put up a simpler counter proposal"*. An agreement could not be reached. The Turkish side who planned to leave in the early afternoon decided to stay a few more hours and discuss the plan further. Talks resumed in the evening. Macmillan says that *"it ended up by my re-stating what I thought our agreement was. I made it clear that I should not hold them to their acceptance of the British plan (as was indeed probable). I had to ask them to consider amendments later (to meet the Greeks). They would be absolutely and honourably free to accept or reject them. Finally, I said I thought all these attempts to put into a sort of legal form what we had agreed as gentlemen, had better be torn up - which they were. The Turks had no alternative [but] to accept this - which they did as gracefully as possible"*.⁸

TURKISH CYPRIOTS' SECURITY

Meanwhile the intercommunal strife in Cyprus continued to gather momentum. From time to time it took the form of a civil war. Every day there were killings from both sides and the security forces were not in a position to prevent even daylight hostilities. Turkish Cypriot civilians were the target of Greek gunmen in every part of the island. The Turkish inhabitants in mixed villages where they were fewer than Greeks had been threatened and forced to leave their properties, lands and all belongings behind and move to safer areas. Thus the first Turkish refugee groups arrived in areas, villages and towns where Turks had maintained their own security.

Both the Turkish Cypriot leaders and the Turkish Government demanded from the British authorities effective protection for Turkish Cypriot people and were not satisfied with the measures

taken. The Turkish Government had made further protest about the internal situation in Cyprus and handed a note to the British Embassy in Ankara, listing incidents which had resulted in Turkish Cypriot casualties. The Turkish Government's note stated that existing security measures were inefficiently or incompetently applied and warned that if violence against Turkish Cypriots did not cease, *"it will no longer be possible to restrain them from retaliating in defence"*.

The Turkish Government also stated its readiness to give *"whatever assistance it can"* to restore law and order. According to the British Embassy report (*sent by telegram No.1076*) in handing over the note, the Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry explained that the Turkish Government was ready to give, if requested, whatever assistance it can to assist the Government by sending Turkish troops to Cyprus.

On the other hand, on July 12, the Greek Foreign Minister gave a note to HM *Chargé d'Affaires* protesting against alleged discrimination by the Security Forces and Administration in Cyprus against Greek Cypriots and accused them of encouraging the Turkish Cypriots in acts of violence against the Greek community.⁹

The British Embassy in Athens reported that *"M. Averoff was adamant that no Greek Government could agree to discussions on the basis of the plan as it now stands, and again pressed for an undertaking by HM Government to alter the plan so as to offer either self-government followed by UNITARY SELF DETERMINATION at an unspecified time, or GUARANTEED INDEPENDENCE with the exclusion both of partition and Enosis"*.¹⁰

THE FIRST WAVE OF TURKISH REFUGEES

Meanwhile intercommunal clashes in the summer of 1958 continued and particularly during the month of July, a migration movement of Turkish Cypriots to safer areas started to take place.

This situation alarmed the Colonial Administration of the island and created great anxiety. First in hundreds and then in thousands, Turkish Cypriots were on move. The Federation of Turkish Cypriot Associations and Clubs headed by Mr. Rauf R. **Denktas** which had emerged as the only well organised and effective Turkish institution and recognized by the Turkish Cypriot people and

Ankara as a leading factor, prepared plans and made arrangements to transfer those Turkish Cypriots whose lives were in imminent danger to safer areas. It was estimated that in the first stage 6,000 Turks had to be removed. The plan for the second stage involved the removal of 16,000 persons, but it was hoped that such a stage would not arise. The programme was prepared by the Federation for the consolidation of small Turkish communities in the outlying areas into larger and more viable communities. The people concerned felt their lives were in danger. In a single day (28 July 1958) Dr. Küçük had received applications from 15 more villages in the Paphos and Limassol Districts to be moved.

The intercommunal clashes and diplomatic discussions for a new order in Cyprus could not go hand in hand and be productive. The governor of Cyprus therefore regarded the developments as urgent and grave and met the Turkish Cypriot leaders, Küçük and Denктаş to discuss the matters concerning,

- (a) the security and protection of Turkish Communities, particularly in the outlying areas, and
- (b) the migration of Turkish Communities, of which he had received disturbing reports particularly from Paphos.

This meeting took place at Government House on 28 July, 1958. The Governor said that important discussions were going forward at international level regarding the future of Cyprus and it was equally important that the fullest possible understanding and co-operation should be established locally between the Government and people of the Turkish Community.

Dr. Küçük said the Turkish leaders were ready to co-operate fully in order to bring the terrorist activities to an end. He also explained that the migration of Turkish Communities was the result of fear and insecurity.

When Foot enquired if the movement of Turkish Cypriots to safer areas was intended to be temporary or permanent, both leaders explained that it was arranged primarily with a view to the immediate protection of the Turkish communities concerned, but that once they were being moved, it had seemed best that they should be removed to as safe an area as possible, and that it was therefore necessary to take into account the long term possibility that migration would be permanent. Certainly there was no reason whatsoever for them to move at the present time for merely

political reasons and it ought to be clearly understood that the motive was **security**.

Küçük and Denктаş added that, "*there could be no assurance of security for these Turkish communities as long as the Greeks were determined to continue their efforts to bring about Enosis*".¹¹

Sir Hugh Foot in reply said it seemed to him that the communities in question were preparing to move under the stimulus of a panic into which they had been thrown by the attacks on Turks in rural areas.

Küçük and Denктаş agreed that no further action would be taken on their part to organize more removals, with the exception of **Akoursos** and **Lemba** villages where arrangements had already been completed, pending a review of measures that might be taken for better protection of the Turkish Cypriots exposed to the danger of Greek attacks in the outlying areas. It was decided that the Administrative Secretary would visit Paphos and discuss with the District Security Committee there the proposed removal of Turks of the two villages in question.

It was also decided at this meeting that Küçük and Denктаş would give the Governor a list of villages in various districts which they considered to be most in danger for the purpose of improving security measures in these areas.

Sir Hugh Foot referred to the messages which Dr. Küçük was reported as having dispatched to Ankara about the need of Turkish troops to be sent to Cyprus to ensure the security of the Turkish communities and said that such messages only served to increase panic and animosity between the two communities.¹²

MACMILLAN'S EFFORTS TO SELL HIS PLAN

Macmillan thought that it would be a good idea to visit the three capitals in order to explain the basics of his plan to Turkish, Greek and Cypriot leaders. His willingness to go to Athens and Ankara had a positive response from both capitals in early August. He arrived first in the Greek capital on the 7th. The Governor of Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot, flew to Athens as well to take part in discussions.

The first meeting with the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Averoff took place on the morning of the next day.

Macmillan says that "*he began with a big appeal for peace and the seven years period*" and added that "*partnership was a fine ideal, and a noble one*". However Karamanlis in a long reply opposed the British plan and **rejected** any suggestion of **partnership with the Turks**. According to Macmillan, in the end he got them to agree to two principles as desirable:

- 1) End of violence
- 2) Seven years period, with a provisional solution but without prejudice to a final solution.¹³

However when they met the next morning, Macmillan found the Greek side's position hardened and had to remind them of some **missed opportunities** and warn about the consequences of their rejection of this new plan. He recalled that they had rejected the **Radcliffe Plan** two years ago which they now regretted and wished devoutly that they had not done so. Now they had another opportunity in front of them and "*if they rejected this new plan, or made it unworkable by violence and terrorism, the end would certainly be partition in its worst form, territorial partition, with Turkish bases, etc*".¹⁴

Macmillan found the Greek Government unable to rise to the level of world events and thought that they were also acting contrary to their real interests. He described Karamanlis as very emotional about his feelings against the Turks whom "*they hated and would fight them for Greek liberty wherever and whenever they could. A Turkish veto on Greek aspirations was humiliating*".

After having more discussions, it seemed to Macmillan that it was only really the point about governmental representatives that they deeply distrusted; the other matters could easily be solved. But as a matter of fact Macmillan's rather optimistic assumption had not been realized and the Greeks turned down the plan amended in their favour. He noted that the Greek Government was frightened of Makarios, frightened of parliament and frightened of the rise in the communist vote at the last Greek elections.

Averoff, who was present at all meetings with Macmillan in Athens admits that their [The Greeks'] "*attitude was less conciliatory on matters of substance*".¹⁵

From Athens Macmillan flew to Ankara, and before he left the Turkish capital on 11 August for Cyprus he sent a secret message

to the Foreign Secretary in London giving a summary of his contacts there.

In his message, Macmillan informed the Foreign Secretary that he had explained to the Turkish Premier, Menderes, the impressions he had formed of the Greek Government's attitude to the British plan. He said that "*the Greeks accepted the need for a period of peace and agreed that there should be a PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENT for the next seven years. Turks liked a good deal of the plan itself but saw difficulties about the four points*".¹⁶

Macmillan said: "*Menderes confirmed that the Turkish Government liked the plan as a whole. They expected us to put it into effect as it stood*".

The Turkish Foreign Minister, Zorlu, told Macmillan that he wanted an equal number of Turks on the Governor's Council as Greeks; and partition to be added to partnership as the final solution. Zorlu also said that, there were two methods to be applied: either negotiation or a "*policy of action*". He thought that Britain wanted negotiation. Therefore there must be a **tripartite** meeting and it was better here and now to make it known what improvements the Turkish Government would want on the plan in order to offset concessions which the British Government meant to make to the Greeks.

Macmillan found Zorlu's case rational enough, and was satisfied with the full Turkish support if the plan was put into effect as it stood.

According to Macmillan "*what the Turks chiefly feared was that we would interpret any readiness to discuss points as amounting to a concession and that we would then go back with a new position to the Greeks, who would then raise further objections. The Turks maintained that they had already been pushed back to please the Greeks from annexation to partition, then from partition to partnership, and next would have to give up even partnership*".

Macmillan continued his talks with Menderes and Zorlu in the afternoon and told them that he thought "*we now fully understand each other. If we put the plan into operation as it stood Turkey would give us full support, but if we introduced modifications they were under no obligations to support us*".

During the afternoon meeting Zorlu's memorandum elaborating Turkish points of view was distributed. According to Macmillan this seemed to go beyond the scope of a provisional seven-year arrangement.

The British side took the opportunity at various levels to assure the Turks that it had never been their intention to go back to the Greeks.

Macmillan concluded his report saying that the decision before them now was "*whether to go ahead with the plan as it stands or to take a chance on introducing some slight modifications which might soften the blow to the Greeks without causing the Turks to run out*".

PARTITION AND PARTNERSHIP ARE NOT INCOMPATIBLE

After the talks were concluded, the Turkish Foreign Minister issued a statement late on 11 August which said that the Turkish delegation emphasized the gravity of the situation regarding the Cyprus problem and warned about the likely occurrence of further strife unless the international political status of the island was determined without delay.

The Turkish Government is convinced that peace and tranquility can return to the island only if partition is put into effect and that the idea of partition and the idea of partnership put forward by the British Government are not incompatible.

The Turkish Foreign Minister's statement reiterated that the Turkish Government and Turkish public opinion were, more than ever before, attached to the Cyprus cause and they were firmly decided to continue to the end on this point.

It said the Ankara meetings had been very useful and the importance of the Cyprus question would surely necessitate the continuation in the future of **bilateral** negotiations at the highest level between the British and Turkish Governments. The hope was also expressed that the bilateral negotiations would have developed into **tripartite** discussions.

The statement ended with more hopes that "*the just Turkish claims on the Cyprus question, which is of primary importance*

for the future of Anglo-Turkish relations, will be considered with due attention".¹⁷

Earlier in Istanbul, Zorlu told the British Ambassador Sir James Bowker that the Turkish Government was in favour of the British Plan provided it was applied integrally.

In his report to A.D.M. Ross of the Foreign Office, dated August 6, 1958, the British Ambassador described his conversation with Zorlu who defined his conception of partition as well.

Zorlu said that his idea of reconciling the British plan with partition was genuine and practical. His conception of partition was not to draw a line across the island and say that one side should be Turkish and the other Greek, but rather to group the Turkish urban and rural communities into cantons with their separate administration.

Zorlu did not demur when the Ambassador told him that what he had in mind then was in effect "*administrative rather than geographical partition*". He also assured James Bowker that the Turkish Government fully accepted HM Government's idea of **tridominium**, thus manifestly expressing how flexible and compromising was the Turkish policy for a partnership agreement.

Zorlu also referred to Turkish nationality for the Turkish Cypriot Community as an essential part of the plan and went on to say that "*the essential requirement now was that HM Government should decide to apply the plan in its entirety and announce their intention of doing so. As soon as this was announced they could rely on the Turkish Government's full support and the latter would be ready forthwith to appoint a Turkish High Commissioner*" as envisaged by the plan. He added that Turkey's anxiety had arisen not from fear that the United Kingdom intended to stay in the island but that she meant one day to leave.

From Ankara Macmillan flew to Nicosia. His visit to Cyprus was kept secret for security reasons until he arrived.

TURKISH CYPRIOT MEMORANDUM

The British Prime Minister stayed a few hours in Nicosia, meeting the Turkish and Greek delegates and conferred with the Governor and security authorities.

Dr. Fazıl Küçük and Denktaş delivered a memorandum to Macmillan explaining the Turkish Cypriot concerns and asking Turkish troops to be called in to help the Security Forces against the common enemy: EOKA. They said:

Turkey's participation in the rule of the island should start at this critical period, otherwise it may be too late to save us from complete massacre by EOKA.

The Turkish Cypriot leaders' memorandum ended with a summary of their demands as follows:

- (a) Adequate measures for protecting Turkish interests in Cyprus (including life and property); To this end the presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus is indispensable;
- (b) Assurance on international level that self-determination can be applied in Cyprus if applied to both communities separately;

The continuation of the present Greek agitation for Enosis and Self-determination is bound to keep Cyprus as a dangerous powder-keg. Turkish rights to rule themselves under Turkey must be recognised immediately in order to counterbalance the resultant political instability;

- (c) The arming of Turkish villagers against EOKA;
- (d) Immediate recognition and application of separate Turkish Municipalities;
- (e) Adequate measures for maintaining public services in Turkish quarters by opening Turkish branches of the Government departments.

THE AMENDMENTS

The British Government issued a statement on August 15, 1958 about some amendments to the plan. This required a few modifications which according to the Turkish Government gave the impression that the plan in its new form offered further concessions to Greece and would cause an undesirable change in the balance of the original plan. Therefore Mr. Macmillan on August 26, said that in order to eliminate this impression it would be appropriate to consider the following:

i) The Government representatives should be allowed to be present at the meetings of the Governor's Council at least to follow its deliberations.

ii) Since Mr. Selwyn Lloyd stated in New York that the functions and prerogatives of the Government representatives are as set forth in paragraph vii of the Parliamentary Statement of Policy of June 19, 1958, (Cmd Paper 455), and since the Turkish Government has thus taken note of this fact, this should be publicly announced.

iii) As regards the postponement of the proposal of dual nationality envisaged in the statement of August 15, 1958, this should be so presented as to make it clear that the provision has been deferred pending the completion of the necessary legal formalities, which have already been initiated.

The Turkish Government accepted even this altered British plan for Cyprus. The Turkish Premier Menderes in his reply said:

We consider your plan for partnership in Cyprus compatible with the idea of partition and think it would be possible and useful if the two ideas were to be given effect in such a manner that they would be superimposed on each other.

Menderes also stated on what grounds Turkey decided to support the Macmillan Plan, saying this:

Due to the fact that the Government of the UK had confirmed to us that in the event the principle of self-determination would be applied to the island, the possibility of giving effect to the idea of partition would be reserved.

This point he said:

was repeated by your Excellency during the conversations in London and in Ankara, and was again confirmed to our Foreign Minister in New York by Selwyn Lloyd, who also added that Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to give a written answer containing this confirmation to question in writing of the Turkish Government in this report.¹⁸

The Turkish Prime Minister concluded that while the Turkish Government invited its ally to make a further statement on the points above it would "take the necessary steps in order to

support actually and morally the UK Government as a new manifestation of good will, and send its representative to Cyprus as requested".

B - THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARTNERSHIP PLAN

As a result of the intercommunal clashes during June-July 1958, **thousands of Turkish Cypriots had taken refuge in safer areas and thus the physical separation of two communities first came into being, not for political but only for security reasons.**

As we have seen, when the Turkish Cypriot leaders met with the Governor on several occasions in 1958, they raised the security concern of the Turkish Cypriot Community and demanded adequate measures to safeguard the lives and properties, particularly of those who were confronted with an imminent Greek onslaught.

Küçük and Denктаş demanded also separate Government offices of adequate size for maintaining public services in Turkish quarters.

These demands were considered favorably by the British Authorities as they were in conformity with the Macmillan Plan. The Governor, for instance, met Küçük and Denктаş on 15 September and told them about the plans for **the establishment of separate Turkish branches of the Education Department and the Department of Social Welfare.** He also told them that the Government had in mind to appoint a commission to deal with **separate municipalities.**

The Governor then went on to talk about forming the Turkish House of Representatives, and told the Turkish Cypriot leaders that the preparation of the electoral list was in hand.

During this meeting Turkish Cypriot leaders pressed for the release of the Turkish detainees and **the establishment of additional police posts in Turkish rural areas.** In response, the Governor explained the difficult period ahead and asked for the closest cooperation and full self-discipline of the Turkish community.

THE TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE

As the dateline for appointing the Turkish Government representative approached, the United States *Chargé d'Affaires* in Turkey, saw the Turkish Prime Minister on 25 September in the town of Aydin and proposed that instead of appointing a new person from Ankara, the Turkish Consul-General in Nicosia should initially, at least, be appointed as the Turkish Representative to the Governor's Council. Menderes, as a good-will gesture responded positively and thus Mr. Burhan Işın, the Turkish Consul-General in Nicosia, was appointed as the Turkish Government's Representative in conformity with the Macmillan Plan and started his new mission on 1 October 1958, the day the plan was officially due to be implemented.

On 30 September, Sir Hugh Foot sent a letter of personal congratulations to B. Işın and in return received "*a very cordial message*". Later in the day, when Foot met him, Işın said that he expected the next day many representatives of the Turkish Community to call on him in order to express their feelings of satisfaction and to congratulate him.

However the governor asked Mr. Işın to use his influence with the Turkish Cypriot leaders to prevent any form of public demonstrations during the next few days. Işın agreed to do so. On 1st of October, on information that arrangements had been made for Turkish demonstrations, the Governor sent one of his officials, Mr. Faiz to see Mr. Işın to urge him to use his influence for the cancellation of any demonstration or procession and Reddaway, the Colonial Secretary, got in touch with Dr. Küçük for the same purpose. As a result of these representations the arrangements for demonstrations to support this historic occasion were cancelled.

The Governor reported:

Leaflets and radio notices were issued by local Turkish leaders calling on the Turkish Community to avoid any form of public demonstrations today. In consequence there have been no Turkish demonstrations and when I saw Işın, I warmly thanked him for the action which he took.¹⁹

TRIPLE CONDOMINIUM

The implementation of the Macmillan plan had been a form of gentle pressure on the Greeks. Because the plan, which was officially described as a "*partnership and cooperation*" experiment, envisaged the share of the sovereignty of Cyprus with Greece and Turkey on condition that Britain should retain military bases and facilities.

Averoff says that, if this experiment failed it was widely rumoured that the idea of **separate self-determination for the two communities** would be revived.²⁰

He remarked that:

There could have been no worse solution. To all intents and purposes the Macmillan plan meant a temporary de facto, triple condominium over Cyprus.

*The Greek Government had to find some way to forestall the implementation of the Macmillan plan.*²¹

Among the steps that were taken for this purpose, the most significant one was Greece's withdrawal from the NATO Headquarters in Izmir. Averoff admits that this was not enough and more effective measures had to be taken.

The appointment of the Turkish Consul-General in Nicosia, as the Turkish Government's Representative, was a clear and concrete sign that Britain and Turkey had taken a decisive and firm stand in Autumn 1958 on the implementation of the Partnership Plan for Cyprus.

C- FIRST STEPS TOWARDS GUARANTEED INDEPENDENCE

The new situation created by the partnership plan had alerted the pro-Greek British MPs and caused anti-British demonstrations in Greece. Mrs **Barbara Castle**, a leading Labour MP, went to Athens, Ankara and Nicosia at the end of September to meet Makarios and the Greek and Turkish Governments as well as the British Authorities in Cyprus and Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders.

Before her journey she had some discussions in London with Birgi, the Turkish Ambassador.

In Athens Mrs Castle first met Archbishop Makarios at the Ethnarchy Office. Makarios started emphasizing the dangers of the appointment of a Turkish representative on 1st October, and agreed that the British Plan would bring partition one way or another. Makarios's main concern was to prevent partition and for this he was prepared to foil the implementation of the British Plan by drawing attention to '*a new concept*'.

He expressed his view that Britain would bring partition directly if the Greek Cypriots collaborated with them in their plan; or they might effect it if in the course of the Greek opposition to it there were outbreaks of violence by the Turks. This, he thought, might result in international opinion that partition on the lines of what happened in Palestine was the only solution.

When Mrs Castle suggested that the Greeks must say that *ENOSIS* should be ruled out, Makarios agreed. He said, the Greeks were planning to put forward an independence motion at the UN; and that if Britain accepted this at the UN, then he would also accept it.

This revelation of Makarios indicated that he had already discussed this new approach with the Greek Government **only as a tactical move in order to foil the partnership plan.**

Mrs Castle then saw Karamanlis, the Prime Minister, who told her that he was overjoyed at the proposal which had emerged from the meeting with Makarios. He said, "*he himself had raised this a year ago in the North Atlantic Council*".

Karamanlis also insisted that this announcement should first come from Makarios and once this was publicly done, then the Greek Government would announce its acceptance as well.

Mrs Castle had the impression that Makarios was very worried about the future, as was also his Greek Cypriot entourage.

After having learned and discussed the common new strategy of policy devised by both Makarios and Karamanlis, she went to Ankara. There she had discussions with the HM *Chargé d'Affaires*, with Parliamentary deputies of the opposition and also with Melih Esenbel of the Turkish Foreign Office. According to Mrs Castle "*the Turkish opposition Parliamentary deputies considered possible guarantees for independence, including NATO as a possible guaranteeing authority*".

Esenbel, the high level Turkish Foreign Ministry official, told Mrs. Castle that *'the partnership was not enough for Turkey and Turks had written guarantees of partition'*.

However, the British Secretary of State denied that any written guarantees had been given to the Turks about partition but warned that it might nevertheless come. He added that the Turks kept quiet about their feelings on Cyprus while *Enosis* had appeared to be an academic matter; but once they realised that the climate of feeling in Britain was changing and that a British Government might agree to *Enosis*, they had changed over to this tough line.

In Cyprus, Mrs Castle met the Governor as well as Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders. She reported that Dr Küçük and the Turkish Consul-General said that they accepted the partnership plan as a first step to partition. On the other hand the Greek Cypriots seemed to her to be frightened and anxious for a way out.

On her way back to England Mrs Castle stopped at Athens and had a third interview with Makarios. They had discussed alternatives to the UN as a guaranteeing authority, including the possibility of a **four power treaty**. They also discussed a short interim period of self-government prior to independence. Makarios's line had then been that the period of years of self-government should be negotiated.

Back in London, Mrs Castle told the British Secretary of State for the Colonies at Lancaster House on 13 October that she herself was convinced that the right policy for Cyprus was *'guaranteed independence'* and that Makarios accepted to rule out *Enosis*. **She argued that the mood of the Greek Cypriots had changed and they would now be prepared to accept membership of the British Commonwealth in order to keep Turkey out of Cyprus.** However the Secretary of State interjected that Makarios's technique was designed to block the interim British plan.

According to secret documents recently opened for researchers at the Public Record Office in London, Makarios and the Greek Government had then the thought that in the event of having independence for Cyprus, guaranteed by the United Nations, **there will always be a possibility of that status to be changed in the event of a new UN resolution carried envisaging majority rule in Cyprus, thus leaving open the possibility of an eventual *Enosis*.** As a matter of fact when the Secretary of State raised this point, Mrs Castle said that she had asked Makarios what would be

the guarantees for the Turks, and Makarios had replied that a formula might be that there should be no change of status **unless this were agreed by the United Nations** ²².

This explanation of Makarios makes it perfectly clear why Makarios and the Greek Government started to adopt a new tactic which obviously would have been more attuned to current world opinion, as no one was expected to oppose a guaranteed independence.

In Cyprus, the governor Sir Hugh Foot was encouraged by Mrs Castle's discussions in Athens and Makarios's decision to shift his policy from *Enosis* to guaranteed independence. He started to send messages to London urging an early tripartite conference between Britain, Turkey and Greece suggesting that at such a conference Britain should try to get a declaration against both *Enosis* and partition. He suggested that, Britain *"should set the aim of working for a solution which is neither Enosis nor partition and that we should say so publicly"*. He thought he might be able to get the Turks to see that the danger of *Enosis* could be effectively eliminated by a tripartite treaty. ²³

THE UN DEBATE IN 1958

In view of this new development concerning independence, the full implementation of the Macmillan Plan had not taken effect other than the appointment of the Turkish Government Representative on 1st of October 1958. In December the issue was put on ice pending a tripartite conference, or some other developments which would affect the situation one way or the other.

In fact this expectation was realised during the annual UN General Assembly meetings in mid-December which brought together the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers, Zorlu and Averoff, who started between themselves cordial but difficult negotiations leading to the agreements on the guaranteed independence.

Greece had raised the Cyprus question once more at the UN General Assembly, in Autumn 1958 and in early December heated discussions took place in the Political Committee. Indian, Iranian and Colombian delegates prepared draft resolutions and a lot of backstage activities and negotiations took place to amend these resolutions in favour of one or the other party. Zorlu and Averoff

debated against each other for more than one hour in the Political Committee about the amendments and on the final Iranian draft, which was carried on 4th of December, by 31 votes against 22 with 28 abstentions. It reads:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Cyprus;

Recalling Resolution 1013 (XI) of February 26, 1957;

Believing that a conference between the three governments directly concerned and the representatives of the Cypriots, at which there would be discussion not only of the interim arrangements for the administration of Cyprus but also of a final solution, with the assistance, if desired, of governments and personalities acceptable to the interested parties, offers the best hope for peaceful progress towards an agreed solution of the Cyprus problem;

Considering that self-government and free institutions should be developed in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Cypriots;

Urges that such a conference should be convened, and that all concerned should cooperate to ensure a successful outcome in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Following this resolution of the Political Committee and after having the issue debated in the General Assembly in the afternoon of 6 December a resolution (1287 - XII) sponsored by the Delegate of Mexico was unanimously adopted. It reads:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Cyprus,

Recalling Resolution 1013(XI)

Expresses its confidence that continued efforts will be made by the parties to reach a peaceful, democratic and just solution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

During the two weeks debate on the Cyprus question in the UN, the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs took the opportunity to give a full explanation of HM Government's policy. He described in detail the British Plan and the efforts to reach an

agreement for the holding of a conference at which the British plan could be discussed and amendments to it agreed, and at which the final solution could also be discussed.

Meanwhile Mr Macmillan made a statement in the House of Commons on 10 December 1958 saying that "*the proceedings in the General Assembly revealed a wide measure of understanding of the Cyprus problem.*"

He also said:

*We are ready to discuss with our Greek and Turkish allies the INTERIM ARRANGEMENT for the administration of Cyprus described in my statements of the 19th of June and the 15th of August; and we are willing to put into effect any amendments to our announced policy on which agreement can be reached.*²⁴

THE TURKISH INITIATIVE AND GOOD-WILL GESTURE

When the Greeks lost, in Averoff's words, "*the Final Battle*" in the UN in December 1958 by the decision of the Political Committee calling "*the 3 governments directly concerned and the representatives of the Cypriots to start discussions for a final solution to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Cypriots,*" the Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu went to see Averoff to urge him to have a dialogue. He said to Averoff:

You insist that the population of Cyprus is 'one people' with a small minority, and you refuse to admit that there are in fact two totally different communities co-existing there.

And after pointing out this reality, acceptance of which was essential for a final settlement, Zorlu suggested this:

Tomorrow, after the General Assembly has adjourned, you and I should get together on our own to see if we come to some arrangement.

A face saving compromise resolution passed by the General Assembly was reached only after the talks between Zorlu and Averoff on former's initiative. It was in fact this initiative that started the dialogue leading to the creation of an independent, bi-communal partnership state.

Averoff admits that the Greek Government, although they had recently talked about guaranteed independence for purely tactical reasons, had not paid serious consideration to it until Zorlu's approach. This revelation of the Greek Foreign Minister is interesting because it shows the world how the Turkish side had contributed to the establishment of an independent state in Cyprus while the other side was trying to unite it with Greece.

During the course of later talks between the two Foreign Ministers, Turkey insisted on a **federal system** in the belief that **federalism could easily resolve all aspects of the Cyprus problem.**

Averoff – despite his insistence at the early stages of talks that the Turkish Cypriots were a minority – and should be treated as such and have minority rights, later **admitted that there were two separate Cypriot communities and different arrangement for them were necessary.**

According to Averoff, Turkey and Greece could have resolved their differences if left on their own. He commented:

Zorlu did know that if we were left to ourselves, without outside interference, we would talk things over with absolute honesty.

Thus did our conversation sow the very first seeds of a united, independent Republic of Cyprus.²⁵

D- POLITICAL EQUALITY AND SHARED SOVEREIGNTY

Zorlu gave an account of his talks with his Greek counterpart Averoff to the British Secretary of State on 16 December, at the British Embassy in Paris, in the presence of Sir Frank Roberts and to Mr. Addis from the Foreign Office and two Turkish top level diplomats, Esenbel and Sarper.

Zorlu explained that while talking to Averoff in New York, after the passing of the UN Resolution, he had taken the line that EOKA violence and the conduct of the Greek Government were forcing the Turkish Government in the direction of partition. **If violence ceased and the Greek Government changed their attitude it would be possible for the Turks to cooperate.** The Turks did not want a victory over the Greeks but success for all three governments.²⁶

According to Zorlu the second meeting amounted to a turning point in the sense that the fundamental aspects of a Cyprus settlement based on **guaranteed independence** were put on the table and openly discussed.

Zorlu told Averoff that the Turkish Cypriots must not be regarded as a minority but accepted as a separate community, on an equal footing. Although Averoff first hesitated and expressed objection to it, by suggesting that the position of Turkish Cypriots should not be equal but equivalent to 30%, Zorlu insisted on equality. (*This suggestion of Averoff was later accepted by the Turkish side only as a basis for the number of Turkish Cypriot civil servants in the Government offices and has formed one of the main provisions of the Cyprus agreements*). He also said that Cyprus should be a joint enterprise between Turks and Greeks, with the Turkish language and the Turkish Community on an equal footing with the Greek Community.

When Averoff said that he must consult Karamanlis, the Turkish Foreign Minister urged him not to present his ideas as being official Turkish proposals and warned that this might be the last chance. According to Zorlu, his Greek counterpart had in fact been prepared to discuss a form of **federation** for Cyprus, on the basis that **the Greek Community could not govern the Turkish Community.**

Zorlu while talking to the British Secretary of State also recalled that during the UN debate, Averoff had spoken in favour of independence with sovereign British bases. On this point the British Secretary of State said that in some ways **HM Government regarded independence as the worst solution, because of the danger of letting the Russians in.** However the Turkish Foreign Minister tried to remove the British suspicion about the Russians, explaining that what was discussed with Averoff **was not really a form of full independence and it would be necessary to write into the constitution the alliances and also the right of VETO of both sides.** He added:

The island must be Turkish-Greek, not Greek and not Cypriot. the sovereignty outside the British bases must be shared between Turkey and Greece.

The Secretary of State emphasised the following 3 points over which HM Government were principally concerned:

- a) To retain sovereign British bases

- b) To keep the Russians out
- c) To set the seal of Turkish-Greek agreement on the present and future status of the island

Zorlu said, he thought the Greek Foreign Minister was sincere and he had agreed on the alliances and VETO right for the Turkish side in regard to foreign policy and defence and that they should be written into the constitution.

The British Secretary of State was under the impression that the Greeks were getting bored with the Cyprus question and it was now perhaps a good time to write down the points on which both Foreign Ministers were agreed. Zorlu expressed his keen interest to use this opportunity before some event would occur to destroy it.

During this conversation it was emphasized by the Turkish Foreign Minister that the British presence in Cyprus should continue; secondly, there should be a Turkish-British cooperation and thirdly a Turkish-Greek cooperation. If the third point could not be achieved then the British and Turks would go on together. However an agreement would be a great success for all three governments.

According to the British Secretary of State it would be excellent to have first a Turkish-Greek agreement and it looked as if Averoff's own position in the Greek Government might have been strengthened, since he had been in favour of a conference arising out of the NATO discussions and opposed to Greek tactics in the UN. On the other hand, Makarios was depressed and had lost some influence as a result of the UN debate.

During the course of this meeting, complete confidence was expressed by the British Minister in Zorlu's handling the talks with his Greek counterpart and safeguarding the Turkish-British interests.

A follow up meeting took place between Zorlu and Averoff in Paris after the initial talks in New York on 15 December. Both Foreign Ministers gave an account to the British Minister of State of their second meeting when they met him at the *Palais de Chaillot* in Paris on December 18, 1958. Zorlu said they tried to reach a final agreement on the Cyprus question and they also felt that the restoration of harmony and alliance between Turkey and Greece would help a great deal towards establishing cooperation between **the two communities in Cyprus.**

What had emerged from this new round of bilateral talks was that if HM Government were prepared to surrender sovereignty of the island outside the British Bases to the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots an agreement of cooperation between the two communities would be possible.

Averoff explained that if they could not reach an agreement on independence, each side would work for its preferred solution during the interim period and would thus perpetuate the antagonism between Greece and Turkey both in Cyprus and outside. As HM Government had told them that in a final solution they would require sovereignty over the bases only, the question presented no difficulty. From their exchange of views, they thought that they could work out a form of collaboration between the two communities. There was the difficult question of percentage, which was not yet settled; Averoff asking for 80% and Zorlu for 50% for their respective communities. **However they agreed that the new state should always be in permanent alliance with Turkey and Greece.**

Averoff added that, on economic matters, Greece and Turkey should have most favoured nation rights in Cyprus.

The British Secretary of State Selwyn Lloyd responded with an encouraging reply and said that this was a hopeful development:

If the problem could be tackled in the context of Greek-Turkish friendship, this might make all the difference. This would be a tremendous step forward.

He also asked what HM Government could do to help immediately in the discussions.

When Averoff told him that all that was required was HM Government's agreement that the discussion could go ahead on the basis described, the Secretary of State reiterated the only British condition of retaining the Bases under British sovereignty with appropriate facilities:

There would have to be proper provisions for the relations between the British Bases and the rest of Cyprus.

TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY AND ALLIANCES

The British Secretary of State thought it useful to enquire a bit more on the Greco-Turkish talks and asked:

Was the intention that the remainder of the island outside the British bases would be a SOVEREIGN STATE?

Averoff said.. "YES" and Zorlu explained that the alliance with Turkey, Greece and the UK would have to be written into the constitution.

Averoff added that, there would be a special alliance governing matters such as access to the bases and facilities.

Would there be a quadripartite treaty between Turkey, Greece, Great Britain and Cyprus?

Zorlu suggested that there might be an agreement between Turkey, Greece and Gt. Britain guaranteeing the integrity and independence of Cyprus and the basic provisions of the constitutions.

How was it intended to prevent Cyprus coming under communist influence?

Zorlu said some safeguard might be written into the constitution.

Averoff suggested that this matter might be dealt later and added that it was already agreed that **in regard to external affairs there would be a limitation on sovereignty.**

Zorlu referred to 'vetoes' of both communities in certain areas.

Averoff added that EOKA being strongly right-wing, had influenced Greek Cypriot youth away from communism. Therefore there was no great danger of communism. Despite this explanation the British Secretary of State told both Foreign Ministers that he would like them to consider further the provision of safeguards against communism in Cyprus. He said that **HM Government had always seen the danger of communism in the idea of independence for Cyprus.**

Has some special link between each community and its parent country been considered?

Averoff suggested as an alternative that there might be a provision in the constitution that Cyprus could

not contract any alliance in opposition to Greece, Turkey or Great Britain.

It seems that even this suggestion of Averoff was considered to be insufficient for Britain. The Secretary of State S. Lloyd thought that there should be more reliable provisions to stop the proposed Cyprus state in taking part in undesirable alliances which might risk British interests and therefore he said:

If HM Government were to give up their sovereignty over the remainder of the island, they would have to be able to intervene in an emergency. They would also like to feel their friends (Turkey and Greece) had the right to intervene.

Thus the right of intervention and the basis of the Treaty of Guarantee was initiated by the British side at this meeting. They referred to the Austrian Treaty as an example for the renunciation of the right to contract alliances. The British Secretary of State also reminded the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers that they had to try to devise a form of government in which the rights of the two communities would be preserved.

"If it was possible to reach agreement between the TWO COMMUNITIES" said the British Minister of State, he personally did not think that there would be difficulty over the surrender of British sovereignty.

By emphasizing the need for an agreement of the two communities the British had clearly indicated that the transfer of sovereignty could only be achieved if both Turkish and Greek Cypriots accepted the terms of independence, being worked out by the Foreign Ministers of their respective motherlands and the sovereignty over the remainder of the island outside British Bases had to be transferred to both communities conjointly. There should also be provisions in the constitution safeguarding the rights of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots; and Britain, Turkey and Greece would have a right to intervene if there was attempt to alter the agreed status or if Cyprus attempted to form any alliance not approved by them.

The British Foreign Minister sent a message to both Zorlu and Averoff on 23 December through the embassies in Ankara and Athens that he had informed his colleagues of the Paris talks on Cyprus and that they wish to give the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers all possible help in the efforts to make progress. After

reiterating "the primary importance that there should be secure British Bases in Cyprus under British sovereignty to enable us to discharge our international responsibilities" the British Foreign Minister said:

Her Majesty's Government would welcome a scheme for the future of Cyprus based on cooperation between the two communities in the island and between the Greek, Turkish and British Governments".²⁷

He also emphasized that "Zorlu and Averoff should continue discussions on cooperation between the two communities in Cyprus with a view to drawing up an outline of institutional arrangements to protect and preserve the interests of the two Cypriot communities in a new form of Government".

In this message it was also stated that once sufficient progress was made on internal matters, there should be further discussions between the three governments in order to consider the arrangements proposed for **cooperation between the two Cypriot communities** in a new form of Government, and secondly to discuss and draw up a plan for settling the international aspects. Such a plan would include the necessary treaties and the necessary safeguards for British rights in respect of the Sovereign Bases.

He also warned that the British Government could not bind itself to any precise formula or course of action with regard to the sovereignty of Cyprus before agreement has been reached on all the relevant matters.

EQUALITY AND FEDERALISM

On 23 December 1958, after having received the message of the British Foreign Secretary which was handed to him by the British Ambassador in Ankara, Zorlu summarized his objectives in the present phase of discussions with Averoff to arrive an agreement which would,

- (a) safeguard British sovereignty over the military bases and provide facilities for their maintenance;
- (b) Establish cooperation between the two communities on the basis of **equality** and of a **federal constitution**.²⁸

According to Zorlu, many of these arrangements would have to be covered by a treaty between the UK, Greece and Turkey,

somewhat similar to the treaty guaranteeing the independence of Austria, as suggested by the British side.

The British Ambassador in Ankara reported that Zorlu thought it essential to continue steadily with the British interim plan in order to maintain gentle pressure on the Greeks. "He emphasized that this was the last attempt which Turkey could make towards an agreement and that if this failed, there would be no alternative but partition".

From this conversation, as reported by the British ambassador, it has emerged that Ankara was against having Cyprus linked to a "quasi neutralist" chain and had been concerned about the dangers pointed out to him by the British Foreign Secretary that an independent Cyprus might be exposed to Communism and worried about Averoff's attitude advocating friendship with Nasser.

As a matter of fact in a speech he made before NATO Averoff had drawn an analogy between Tito and Nasser and advocated friendship with the latter, because he argued the friendship with Yugoslavia had turned out so well. Secondly Averoff told Zorlu that he found difficulty over the idea of the UK participating in the Greco-Turkish alliance arising out of the proposed Cyprus settlement, and that in particular **he had a certain understanding with Nasser about military bases in Cyprus.**

E- CONDITIONAL CESSION OF SOVEREIGNTY

Zorlu told the British Ambassador that after they discussed the full complexity of the proposed Cyprus settlement, Averoff expressed the hope that he could explain the matter to Nasser by telling him that Cyprus could achieve its independence only on condition that UK would retain its bases.

The above points, namely, the danger of Communism which was raised by Britain and Nasser's involvement, influencing an independent Cyprus to join in the neutralist line of policy, led Zorlu's formulation of the idea that the arrangement should derive from a **conditional cession of sovereignty by Britain combined with a Treaty of Alliance and a Treaty of Guarantee.**

On the other hand, Sir Hugh Foot in a top secret despatch sent from Nicosia on 24 December 1958, urged the British Government not to hand over sovereignty of the island before making sure that "A workable system of Government is evolved; and there would

be serious risk of break down if a hasty hand over to some untried regime were attempted". For a long term policy he suggested that. "The eventual aim should be a **TRIPARTITE TREATY** providing for self-government (with Communal autonomy) amounting to **GUARANTEED INDEPENDENCE**. In order to achieve that there must be some interim system of developing it". He insisted that some interim arrangement was still inevitable. Foot also expressed the hope that, "the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey will increasingly come round to this view as they face up to all practical difficulties of a final solution right away".

According to Averoff, "One thing which the Turkish Foreign Minister no longer made any attempt to conceal was his preference for an independent federal state. Every time an obstacle cropped up he would remark that all those difficulties would be avoided if we decided to establish some form of **FEDERAL STATE** comprising a number of cantons".²⁹

Later he stated that the Turks were very sincere in their propositions and the Turkish Government genuinely wanted to reach a settlement.

Averoff's revelations include also the following:

- a) The Greek Cypriot leadership, particularly Makarios, considering the squalid and beset situation of the Turkish quarters of the towns which would need much money to spend for their improvement, preferred to have separate Greek and Turkish municipalities in all towns.³⁰
- b) The Turks demanded a base in Cyprus to meet their security requirements and insisted on the creation of a federal state.

We flatly rejected both proposals, but said we would gladly make honest efforts to allay their misgivings in other ways. To set their deepest fears at rest we were prepared to accept a treaty of guarantee and a treaty of alliance.³¹

F- THE AGREEMENTS AND BASIC DOCUMENTS

The 1959-1960 Cyprus agreements were the result of hard work and substantial negotiations between Ankara and Athens and the concurrence of the British Government which **accepted to transfer the sovereignty of the island to the co-partnership state of the two communities**.

They were called '*Zürich and London Agreements*'; because the negotiations mostly took place in those two cities.

The agreements were based on those main principles which had been the basis of the Cyprus constitution and formed the following four documents:

- 1) Basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus
- 2) Treaty of Guarantee
- 3) Treaty of Alliance
- 4) 'Gentlemen's Agreement' (*Not circulated*)

The provisions of all these documents were to be applied in order to make the Cyprus Republic a legal entity in international law. Had the terms of any of these four documents not been applied, or if any of them were later unilaterally abrogated, then the legality of the state would become invalid.

It has to be underlined here once more that clause 5 of the '**Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus**' ruled that executive authority should be vested in the president and vice president jointly who had to be elected separately by their own community, and each would have the right of VETO.

The documents also, together with many other provisions and the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, laid down and **confirmed the principle of political equality of both communities in a partnership state based on functional federalism**.

Thus the state of two equal partners was formed in 1960.

BAD FAITH AND DUPLICITY

With the establishment of an independent republic the Hellenic aspirations of *Enosis* (*union with Greece*) had to be abandoned, at least in official dealings with the international community. Therefore the Greek side developed new tactics which aimed at achieving a **Second Greek State** in the international arena.

Evangelos Averoff, explains how he and the Greek Government had justified their acceptance of the agreements, as follows:

*The dream so many of us had cherished was thus coming true; the dream of seeing Cyprus as a second Greece in the international arena, a lesser Greece, no doubt, still bound by some obligations towards Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community; but such obligations did not prevent her from being seen in the family of nations as Greek, in fact even more so than was justified by the racial composition of her population. Our hope of an assured future for the second Greece appeared to be well founded.*³²

This admission, considered together with the statements of the Greek Cypriot leaders and clergy, unfortunately constitutes clear and indisputable evidence of the concealed bad faith and double faced policy of Greece and the Greek Cypriot side. For instance, when the prospect of independence was mentioned as a potential settlement, Anthimos, the Bishop of Kitium openly declared in September 1958:

Independent Cyprus will be a little Greece, which will be able to prepare for its union with the motherland.

The Greek Foreign Minister Averoff stated, in March 1959, only a few weeks after the Cyprus agreements were signed that "Anyone who, in order to realise Enosis is not willing to accept independence as a transitional stage deserves to be criticised."

And the day independence was declared on 16th of August 1960 Archbishop Makarios, the President of the Republic said in his inauguration speech:

Independence was not the aim and purpose of the EOKA struggle. Foreign factors have prevented the achievement of the national goal, but this should not be a cause of sorrow, because new bastions have been conquered and from these bastions the Greek Cypriots will march on to complete the final victory.

He confessed the following to *The Times* before he put into operation the sinister Akritas Plan:

The union of Cyprus with Greece is an aspiration always cherished within the hearts of all Greek Cypriots. It is

*impossible to put an end to this aspiration by establishing a Republic.*³³

The British historian, diplomat and politician C.M. Woodhouse, an authority on Greek political history observed that "Whatever the text of the agreements, neither Karamanlis nor Makarios looked on the settlement as finally excluding Enosis."³⁴

When in exile in Paris, Karamanlis wrote to Kanellopoulos on 2 March 1974 describing the tactics he had recommended to Makarios soon after the agreements were signed and claimed that if Makarios had followed his advice, then they should easily have arrived at Enosis.

The lesson to be learned from this experience is that reaching an agreement of this kind and having it signed by all sides does not make it work in conformity with its provisions, as long as concealed bad faith and ill intentions of some of the signatories are not removed for good, or alternative measures are not taken based on separate sovereignty.

NOTES

- (1) Averoff, Evangelos, *Lost Opportunities, The Cyprus Question, 1950-1963*, New York, 1986 p. 239.
- (2) *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)*, 19 December 1956, vol. 562, No. 32, Col. 1272 & 1276.
- (3) *Ibid*, col, 1271
- (4) Averoff, *op. cit*, p. 243
- (5) Macmillan, Harold, *Riding The Storm, 1956-1959*, London 1971, p.672
- (6) *Ibid*, p. 668
- (7) *Ibid* p. 672
- (8) *Ibid* p. 673-674
- (9) Athens telegram to FO. No: 513
- (10) Athens telegram No:514
- (11) FO 371/136282
- (12) *Ibid*
- (13) Macmillan, *Op. Cit*, p.675
- (14) *Ibid* p. 676
- (15) *Ibid*, p. 250
- (16) FO 371/136340
- (17) *Ibid*
- (18) *Ibid*
- (19) FO 371/136293
- (20) Averoff, *op. cit*, p.237
- (21) *Ibid*, p. 238

- (22) FO 371/136374
 (23) CO 926/592
 (24) CO 926/892
 (25) *Averoff, op. cit.*, p.303
 (26) FO 371/136414 - 152864
 (27) *Ibid*
 (28) *Ibid*
 (29) *Averoff, Op. cit.*, p.312
 (30) *Ibid*, p. 322
 (31) *Ibid*, p. 332
 (32) *Ibid*, p. 392
 (33) *The Times*, 19 April 1963
 (34) *Woodhouse, C.M.*, *Karamanlis, The Restorer of Greek Democracy (Oxford, 1982)* p 87.

DRAFT TREATY CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey of the one part and the Republic of Cyprus of the other part;

Desiring to make provisions to give effect to the Declaration made by the Government of the United Kingdom on the 17th of February, 1959, during the Conference at London, in accordance with the subsequent Declarations made at the Conference by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, by the Representative of the Greek Cypriot Community and by the Representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community;

Taking note of the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee signed to-day by the Parties to this Treaty;

Have agreed as follows:-

ARTICLE I

The territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall comprise the Island of Cyprus, together with the islands lying off its coast, with the exception of the two areas defined in Annex A to this Treaty, which areas shall remain under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. These areas are in this Treaty and its Annexes referred to as the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area.

ARTICLE II

(1) The Republic of Cyprus shall accord to the United Kingdom the rights set forth in Annex B to this Treaty.

(2) The Republic of Cyprus shall co-operate fully with the United Kingdom to ensure the security and effective operation of the military bases situated in the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, and the full enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights conferred by this Treaty.

ARTICLE III

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult and co-operate in the common defence of Cyprus.

ARTICLE IV

The arrangements concerning the status of forces in the Island of Cyprus shall be those contained in Annex C to this Treaty.

ARTICLE V

The Republic of Cyprus shall secure to everyone within its jurisdiction human rights and fundamental freedoms comparable to those set out in Section I of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on the 4th of November, 1950, and the Protocol to that Convention signed at Paris on the 20th of March, 1952.

ARTICLE VI

The arrangements concerning the nationality of persons affected by the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus shall be those contained in Annex D to this Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

The Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom accept and undertake to carry out the necessary financial and administrative arrangements to settle questions arising out of the termination of British administration in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. These arrangements are set forth in Annex E to this Treaty.

ARTICLE VIII

(1) All international obligations and responsibilities of the Government of the United Kingdom shall henceforth, in so far as they may be held to have application to the Republic of Cyprus, be assumed by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

(2) The international rights and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the Government of the United Kingdom in virtue of their application to the territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall henceforth be enjoyed by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

ARTICLE IX

The Parties to this Treaty accept and undertake to carry out the arrangements concerning trade, commerce and other matters set forth in Annex F to this Treaty.

ARTICLE X

Any question of difficulty as to the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty shall be settled as follows:-

(a) Any question or difficulty that may arise over the operation of the military requirements of the United Kingdom, or concerning the provisions of this Treaty in so far as they affect the status, rights and obligations of the United Kingdom forces or any other forces associated with them under the terms of this Treaty, or of Greek, Turkish and Cypriot forces, shall ordinarily be settled by negotiation between the tripartite Headquarters of the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey and the authorities of the armed forces of the United Kingdom.

(b) Any question or difficulty as to the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty on which agreement cannot be reached by negotiation between the military authorities in the cases described above, or, in other cases, by negotiation between the Parties concerned through the diplomatic channel, shall be referred for final decision to a tribunal appointed for the purpose, which shall be composed of four representatives, one each to be nominated by the Government of the United Kingdom, the Government of Greece, the Government of Turkey and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, together with an independent chairman nominated by the President of the International Court of Justice. If the President is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or of the Republic of Cyprus or of Greece or of Turkey, the Vice-President shall be requested to act; and, if he also is such a citizen, the next senior judge of the Court.

ARTICLE XI

The Annexes to this Treaty shall have force and effect as integral parts of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XII

This Treaty shall enter into force on signature by all the Parties to it.

Appendix II

TREATY OF GUARANTEE

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part;

I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,

II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution.

Have agreed as follows: -

ARTICLE I

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE II

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE III

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom

sovereignty at the time of the establishment of Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.

ARTICLE IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

ARTICLE V

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Appendix III

TREATY OF ALLIANCE

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey,

I. In their common desire to uphold peace and to preserve the security of each of them,

II. Considering that their efforts for the preservation of peace and security are in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Have agreed as follows: -

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate for their common defence and to consult together on the problems raised by that defence.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

ARTICLE III

For the purpose of this alliance, and in order to achieve the object mentioned above, a Tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

ARTICLE IV

Greece and Turkey shall participate in the Tripartite Headquarter so established with the military contingents laid down in Additional Protocol NO. 1 annexed to the present Treaty.

The said contingents shall provide for the training of the army of the Republic of Cyprus.

ARTICLE V

The Command of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation, for a period of one year each, by a Cypriot, Greek and Turkish General Officer, who shall be appointed respectively by the Governments of Greece and Turkey and by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.

ARTICLE VI

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature.

The High Contracting Parties shall conclude additional agreements if the application of the present Treaty renders them necessary.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible with the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations in conformity with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

NO: I

I. The Greek and Turkish contingents which are to participate in the Tripartite Headquarters shall comprise respectively 950 Greek officers, non-commissioned officers and men, and 650 Turkish officers, non-commissioned officers and men.

II. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in agreement, may request the Greek and Turkish Government to increase or reduce the Greek and Turkish contingents.

III. It is agreed that the sites of the cantonments for the Greek and Turkish contingents participating in the Tripartite Headquarters, their juridical status, facilities and exemptions in respect of customs and taxes, as well as other immunities and privileges and any other military and technical questions concerning the organisation and operation of the Headquarters mentioned above shall be determined by a Special Convention which shall come into force not later than the Treaty of Alliance.

IV. It is likewise agreed that the Tripartite Headquarters shall be set up not later than three months after the completion of the tasks of the Mixed Commission for the Cyprus Constitution and shall consist, in the initial period, of a limited number of officers charged with the training of the armed forces of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish contingents mentioned above will arrive in Cyprus on the date of signature of the Treaty of Alliance.

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

No. II

ARTICLE I

A Committee shall be set up consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. It shall constitute the supreme political body of the Tripartite Alliance and may take cognisance of any question concerning the Alliance which the Governments of the three Allied countries shall agree to submit to it.

ARTICLE II

The Committee of Ministers shall meet in ordinary session once a year. In a matter of urgency the Committee of Ministers can be convened in special session by its Chairman at the request of one of the members of the Alliance.

Decisions of the Committee of Ministers shall be unanimous.

ARTICLE III

The Committee of Ministers shall be presided over in rotation and for a period of one year, by each of the three Foreign Ministers. It will hold its ordinary sessions, unless it is decided otherwise, in the capital of the Chairman's country. The Chairman shall, during the year in which he holds office, preside over sessions of the Committee of Ministers, both ordinary and special.

The Committee may set up subsidiary bodies whenever it shall judge it to be necessary for the fulfillment of its task.

ARTICLE IV

The Tripartite Headquarters established by the Treaty of Alliance shall be responsible to the Committee of Ministers in the performance of its functions. It shall submit to it, during the Committee's ordinary session, an annual report comprising a detailed account of the Headquarter's activities.

III- BASIC PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH CYPRUS REPUBLIC WAS ESTABLISHED

INDISPENSABLE BACKGROUND INFORMATION

- Cyprus is the homeland not only of Greeks but of Turks as well.
- The cooperation and peaceful co-existence of two communities on the island had prevailed throughout 308 years of Turkish rule (1570-1878).
- Intercommunal friction and strife started and continued during the British period when Greek Cypriots, with the encouragement, help and agitation of Greece, started a campaign to unite the island with Greece, without taking into consideration the strong opposition of Turkish Cypriots to this Greek aspiration and ignoring or underestimating the historical, strategical and geo-political interests and rights of Turkey which was, of course, only 40 miles away.
- When in the 1950's Athens aided and abetted EOKA's underground terrorism against British installations and civilians in the island, and after having established the fact that both Turkey and Turkish Cypriots would not allow Cyprus to be united with Greece, Britain agreed to share the power and sovereignty in Cyprus with Turkey and Greece according to Macmillan's partnership plan of 1958.
- The British Government publicly accepted and announced in the House of Commons on 19 December 1956 the right of both communities to decide their own future separately. The statement made in the House by the then Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox Boyd, was as follows:

It will be the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community,

shall in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty's Government recognise that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options.

*...Then, at that later stage, when those circumstances arise, and when the conditions have been fulfilled, there would be a test of the public opinion in Cyprus. If that test was in favour of a change of sovereignty, there would be a second test of the views of the Turkish population, and they would be entitled to the same right to choose their destiny as the majority of the island.*¹

This statement reflected the island's historical reality and was a fair basis on which the future of Cyprus would depend.

Immediately after the defeat of the Greek Government's latest appeal to the UN on the Cyprus question in Autumn 1958, Turkey, being fully aware of this and having consciously appreciated the importance of a sincere dialogue in order to achieve a viable and just settlement, took the initiative. The Turkish Foreign Minister offered to his Greek counterpart to sit around a table and discuss the whole matter in a friendly way, until they could agree on a final settlement. It was this Turkish gesture of goodwill and initiative that started the negotiating process which led to establishing **the bi-communal partnership Republic of Cyprus**.

As we saw in the last chapter, the basic principles on which negotiations for the 1960 independence were based, and later were incorporated in the agreements and the Cyprus constitution, can be traced in the following developments:

Greece responded positively to the Turkish initiative and thus a dialogue started between the two Foreign Ministers, Zorlu and Averoff, during the following months, first in Paris and then in Zürich.

On 23 Dec. 1958 the Foreign Office (FO) sent a secret telegram to British Ambassadors both in Athens and Ankara which was addressed to the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers, expressing the British Parliament's gratitude for Greco-Turkish talks on the Cyprus problem.

In the second paragraph the British policy on Cyprus was described in the following terms:

- i- *HM Government are deeply conscious of their responsibility to all Cypriots for their progress and well being.*
- ii- *It is of primary importance that there should be secure British Bases in Cyprus under British Sovereignty*
- iii- *The future of Cyprus should be based on cooperation between the two communities in the island and between Greece and Turkey.*
- iv- *HM Government are very willing that Averoff and Zorlu should continue discussions on cooperation between two communities in Cyprus with a view to drawing up an outline of institutional arrangements to protect and preserve the interests of the two communities in a new form of government.*²

KEY CONCEPTS

Now let us look at the original emergence of the key concepts that have recurred throughout the long negotiations for a settlement in Cyprus.

a) EQUALITY

Mr. Zorlu, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, insisted that the Turkish Cypriots must not be regarded as a **minority** but as a **community on equal footing**. Mr. Averoff, the Foreign Minister of Greece, **accepted this and wanted to discuss a form of federation** for Cyprus, so that **the Greek community would not govern the Turkish community**.

When Zorlu stated that the future status of the island should be **Turkish-Greek, but not Greek and not Cypriot** and that the sovereignty should be shared between Turkey and Greece, **Averoff agreed that the system would be federal**, that 35% of the civil service should be Turkish and that there should be **two communal assemblies**. He also accepted the idea of veto on both sides in regard to **foreign policy, security and constitutional matters**.

b) BI-COMMUNALITY

A most important point made by Selwyn Lloyd at the Lancaster House meeting on, 19th February 1959, was that, the British government *"understood that the Greek and Turkish*

governments were acting with the knowledge of the leaders of the two Cypriot Communities in drawing up those agreements."

This declaration of the British Foreign Secretary on behalf of the UK government, was a definite recognition of the fact that any proposed or negotiated Cyprus settlement could not be valid, legal and binding without having separate concurrence of both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities.

This principle, which was accepted in the 1950s obviously should not be ignored today while the establishment of a new Cyprus Republic (*the second Cyprus Republic*) is being negotiated.

This basic principle requires the two Cypriot leaders to negotiate freely and to reach an agreement acceptable to both communities. Any outside interference, any foreign efforts to impose a solution, even under the cover of the UN Security Council, are against the essence of the agreements on which the 1960 Cyprus Republic was based.

c) THE ISSUE AND TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY

The British Secretary of State told both Averoff and Zorlu on 18 December 1958 at a joint meeting at the *Palais de Chaillot* in Paris that *"if it was possible to reach agreement between the two communities there should be no difficulty in surrendering the British sovereignty over the remainder of the island outside British bases, to the Turkish and Greek Cypriot Communities"*.

It was decided between the three Foreign Ministers at their meeting in the FO on 12 February 1959 that, *"there would be a unilateral declaration by the U.K. that, provided the Greek and Turkish Governments and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were agreed, she would hand over sovereignty outside her bases, to the Cypriot People (Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot Communities)"*.

During the third plenary session of the Cyprus Conference on 19 February 1959 held at Lancaster House, Mr Selwyn Lloyd, the then British Foreign Secretary, underlined the fact that the new state of Cyprus *"would be created on the basis of friendship, on the basis of the agreement between Greece and Turkey and between the two communities in the island. And the British Government would approve the transfer of sovereignty to a new state of Cyprus of two communities"*.

d) RIGHT TO INTERVENE

The British Secretary of State also insisted that *"if HMG were to give up their sovereignty, they would have to be able to intervene in an emergency. They would also like to feel their friends, Turkey and Greece, had the right to intervene."*

More fundamentally, he emphasised that *"the Treaty of Guarantee empowered Greece, Turkey and Britain jointly, and in emergency separately, to take action to maintain its provisions, which are really fundamental provisions of the new state of Cyprus."*³

e) TREATY OF ALLIANCE AND GUARANTEE

Both Averoff's idea of having alliances and the British opinion on the right to **intervene** were in due course realised by concluding the **Treaty of Alliance** between the Cyprus Republic, Turkey and Greece and the **Treaty of Guarantee**, between Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and the UK.

According to the first article of the Treaty of Guarantee, the Republic of Cyprus had undertaken to ensure the maintenance of independence as well as respect for its constitution. But regrettably Archbishop Makarios, the first President, in defiance of this undertaking, flagrantly violated the constitution and started a new campaign immediately after the Cyprus Republic was established to unite the island with Greece, not only by diplomatic means, but also by armed attacks on the Turkish community which were launched on 21st December 1963.

Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee is as follows:

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the U.K. undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible each of the guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present treaty.

Thus, Turkey had a right to intervene under this clause when in December 1963, Makarios attacked the Turkish Cypriot community and when he declared that provisions of the Cyprus constitution, which according to the Archbishop had given "excessive rights" to the Turkish Community, were 'invalid'. And

if not then, at least a little later, when Makarios unilaterally declared that the Treaty of Guarantee was abolished, the guarantors should have intervened to re-establish the original state of affairs. But despite the open breach of fundamental provisions of the 1960 agreements and the constitution, and despite the sufferings of Cypriot Turks because of the Greek onslaught and oppression, Turkey showed extreme patience with the hope that the world community would not allow the Greek oppression and usurpation of the partnership state to continue.

f) CONTRACTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND MEMBERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Another principle which was laid down by Averoff and accepted by Britain and Turkey was that there should be "a provision in the constitution that Cyprus could not contract any alliance in opposition to Greece, Turkey and Britain".⁴

Later, when on 11th of February 1959 the three Foreign Ministers met in London, this issue was related to the foreign affairs of Cyprus and formulated as follows:

*In respect of foreign affairs, however, there would be no VETO on Cyprus joining alliances and international organisations of which both Turkey and Greece were members.*⁵

This provision was later incorporated in article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee, saying that, "*the Cyprus Republic undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever.*"

At a meeting held at the Foreign Office on 12 February 1959, the three Foreign Ministers discussed certain aspects of the agreement reached between Averoff and Zorlu at earlier meetings in Paris. When the British Secretary of State enquired about article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee and if for instance "It intended to preclude Cypriot membership of all international associations, as for example the free Trade Area, if that ever come to existence", Zorlu and Averoff both made it clear that **there would be no objection to Cypriot membership of international associations of which both Greece and Turkey were members; e.g. the postal union and any Free Trade Area.**⁶

g) BRITISH SOVEREIGN BASES

On 16th of January 1959, ideas and correspondence had been exchanged between the Foreign Office and Colonial Office stating how vital it was to have full sovereignty over the British bases on Cyprus together with military installations and training areas attached to them.⁷

Mr. J.D. Higham from the Defence Ministry wrote to Mr. A. Campbell in the Foreign Office, stating that "**the Ministry of Defence hold the view that full sovereignty should be retained over all localities containing installations for defence purpose**".

He also attached papers about "*Mr. Amery's inclinations*" and Sir John Martin's response to his points, saying that, "*the most we can hope for would be the right to intervene in internal security in the event of emergency and possibly some specific safeguards provided by treaty*".⁴

In reply to Campbell, Higham wrote:

The Minister of Defence is a 'sovereignty' man and if we are to lease Cyprus I am quite sure that he would regard it as essential that our vital rights should be secured by sovereignty rather than by some kind of an agreement with an independent Cyprus which would put us to their discretion.

h) MFN AGAINST ECONOMIC ENOSIS

At the meeting at Lancaster House on 12 February 1959, Lord Perth enquired about the most favoured nation (MFN) provision which was among the clauses of "**Basic Structure**", and suggested that it might do economic harm to Cyprus. Both Averoff and Zorlu told him that "*the intention was to exclude more favourable bilateral agreements between Cyprus and countries other than the three powers (Turkey, Greece and the UK)*", and also "*to avoid the possibility of either Greece or Turkey securing a more favourable economic position in Cyprus than others - or Greece for example, establishing a kind of economic enosis*".⁸

AVEROFF ON THE MAIN PRINCIPLES

1- BI-COMMUNALITY

Averoff accepted that the Cyprus Republic would be based on the principle of bi-communality. He later wrote the following:

*I readily admitted that there were two communities, and that was why we should make different arrangements for them where necessary.*⁹

2- FEDERALISM

*All problems could easily be resolved if Cyprus acquired independence as a federal republic. But if we refused to accept a federal system, we would have to find some way of giving the Turks watertight guarantees on these two points. (to save Turkish Cypriots from liquidation and to safeguard Turkey's security at the same time).*¹⁰

3- TREATY OF GUARANTEE

Averoff deals also with guarantees and says apropos the Turks' desire to have a base in Cyprus in order to ensure their vital concerns:

*To set their deepest fears at rest we were prepared to accept a Treaty of Guarantee and a Treaty of Alliance. These two treaties eliminated the risks of the regime's being overthrown by a coup or of an infringement of the new state's territorial integrity.*¹¹

GREEK DUPLICITY

However, after the establishment of the Cyprus Republic was concluded and it had become a member of the UN, the British Commonwealth, and the Council of Europe, Averoff commented with satisfaction:

For some considerable time the problems facing Cyprus as a state and the two communities in their relations with each other were of no real significance; they were no worse than those that are to be found in every human society and are never regarded as matters of international importance.

The above statement of Averoff illustrates only too clearly what the Greek side's motives were when in 1959 they concluded an agreement with Turkey providing for a 'bi-communal' Cyprus Republic. As we said earlier they regarded it as a **second Greek state** (See page 54).

When Averoff took the chair at the third plenary session of the original Cyprus Conference held at Lancaster House in London in February 1959, he gave firm assurances to Turkish Cypriots, saying that "*the way of the administration is such that the Turks of Cyprus would not feel they are at the mercy of the majority if the majority wanted not to be fair. Also provisions were made for the security of Turkey*".

He went on to give further assurances that Greece would stick to the agreement and declared that, "*the Greek Government has always honoured its decisions, and it will honour its decision also in this case. This is an official agreement signed by our Prime Minister and we will stand behind this agreement. What the agreement contains is now the foreign policy of Greece on the question of Cyprus*".

It was a tragedy that, despite these firm assurances, the Greek Government acted otherwise. Not only did she pretend to be unable to stop Makarios's illegal attempts to change the constitution, but also when, in December 1963, the Greek Cypriot side usurped the state powers, attacked Turkish Cypriots, uprooted thirty thousand (one third) of them, burned Turkish villages and declared the Treaty of Guarantee abolished and Turkish Cypriot rights accorded by the agreements and the constitution null and void, the Greek Government raised not even a single, genuine and strong objection.

On the contrary, it was disclosed later that they were fully behind all this duplicity and intrigue. As a matter of fact when Makarios launched his onslaught on Turkish civilians in 1963-64, the Greek Government sent secretly to Cyprus over 25 thousand fully equipped Greek troops with their commanders in order to prevent any Turkish intervention according to the Treaty of Guarantee¹². That move of Greece obviously encouraged the Greek Cypriot leaders to do their utmost under the Greek Army's protection, to violate vital human rights of the Turkish Cypriots, to change the constitution unilaterally, and turn the bi-communal republic into a Greek state. In this way they expected to facilitate

the realization of Enosis at a second stage during a more opportune moment.

However, the provisions of all those basic documents were to be applied in order to make the Cyprus Republic a legal entity in international law. If the terms of any of the four documents were not applied, or were unilaterally abrogated, then the legality of the state would have become invalid.

EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

The first clause of the 'Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus' says:

The state of Cyprus shall be a Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and Vice-President Turkish, elected by universal suffrage by the Greek and Turkish communities of the island respectively.

And according to Clause 5,

Executive authority shall be vested in the President and Vice-president.

The President and Vice-President shall have the right of final veto and the right to return the decisions of the Council of Ministers under the same conditions as those laid down for laws and decisions of the House of Representatives.

Thus the 1st and 5th clauses, together with many other provisions of the 'Basic Structure' and the **Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance**, had laid down and confirmed the principles of political equality of both communities in a **partnership state** of functional federalism.

That was the Cyprus Republic which emerged in 1960. A state, the executive authority of which should be vested in the Greek Cypriot president and Turkish Cypriot vice-president **elected separately by their respective communities**. A state of two equal co-founder partners.

THE REASONS OF THE FAILURE

WHY DID THE REPUBLIC DISINTEGRATE?

a) GREEK INTENTION OF NONCOMPLIANCE

Despite the satisfaction of Greece as expressed by Averoff that "*the dream we cherished was thus coming true*" because Cyprus was emerging "*in the family of nations as Greek and as a second Greece*", Makarios had different thoughts. Although he regarded independence as a stepping stone to *Enosis* and declared that now they had new bastions from where to advance for their final goal, he could not tolerate and digest the idea of partnership of two communities, separate municipalities and other constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriots.

In his book Averoff, describing "**the hope and misgivings**" of the first years of the Republic, deals with the attitude of Makarios towards separate municipalities and says:

There was no justification for the failure to act on the clause which expressly provided for separate municipalities, and the Turkish Cypriots, with backing from Ankara, kept pressing for its implementation.

*It was Archbishop Makarios himself who had forced us to accept the inclusion of this clause, in spite of our strong opposition. But now he was totally unwilling to put it into effect. At first he found various pretexts to justify his delay, but as time went on he made it clear that he had no intent of complying.*¹³

On the same issue, Glafcos Clerides, the veteran Greek Cypriot politician and first President of the joint House of Representatives who has recently been elected as 'President' of the Greek Cypriot State at the South, states the following in his memoirs:

*On the issue of creating separate municipalities, the constitutional provision could have been implemented and the question of their unification could have been examined after a period of five years, as provided by the constitution.*¹⁴

b) ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION

Was it workable or not?

Regarding the workability of the constitution and intention of Makarios to unilaterally amend it Averoff commented as follows:

At the end of 1962 (after only 2 years of independence) the Archbishop turned his thoughts to a different kind of action: the amendment of agreements.

...it was a question of amending several material provisions of the Agreements, and hence of the constitution. When we questioned him on the subject, the Archbishop gave fairly reassuring answers. He added that, he had something in mind, that he would do nothing spectacular and that, whatever he did, he would inform us in advance.

Our information, however, gave a different picture of the situation. From our own and foreign diplomats and from reliable sources we learned that the amendments he was contemplating concerned all the basic provisions.

*In effect they amounted to abrogation of agreements.*¹⁵

It has become obvious from the memoirs of both Averoff and Clerides that Makarios intended to change the basic articles of the constitution and abrogate the Treaty of Guarantee without consulting properly even Greece, despite the obligation of consulting and obtaining the concurrence of Britain, Greece and Turkey as the guarantor powers.

Clerides, criticising this attitude of Makarios, says:

An honest evaluation of the situation during the period 1960-63 divorced from propaganda tendencies would lead to the conclusion that there was no need to press for constitutional amendments, that such a move was premature, that it was made before bridges of confidence were built between the two communities.

He also stressed that *"When both communities were questioning the sincerity of each other, over their real commitment to independence, it was not the proper time to request constitutional amendments on the grounds that the constitution was unworkable, when in fact unworkability could not be established"*.¹⁶

Averoff's opinion on the **workability of the constitution** was similarly positive. He rejects the argument that the constitution was "unworkable" and says that this argument was based on the false premise that the agreements could not be implemented.

The fact is that they were implemented and did work smoothly for quite some time.

...the records show that they were workable and did work and their implementation brought prosperity to majority and minority alike, ensuring unity and independence, freedom and prosperity for Cyprus.

Well then, if Averoff's above conclusion is right – and according to impartial observers Averoff was certainly right – and if the implementation of agreements ensured unity, independence and freedom and also brought prosperity to Cyprus, obviously the premature attempts to change these agreements unilaterally amounted only to creating conditions against freedom, independence and prosperity on the island. That had been in fact, what the Greek Cypriot leadership embarked upon. They wanted to destroy the independence and freedom of Cyprus and make it a province of Greece.

Here is how Averoff, one of the main architects of the Cyprus agreements finally concluded:

*Of all lost opportunities for finding a happy ending, or at least a tolerable settlement of the Cyprus question, the tearing up of Zürich and London agreements was the most tragic. And that, alas, is another indisputable fact.*¹⁷

And while the identity of the party who had torn the Agreements up is so clearly obvious, how could the other two guarantor powers (Greece and the UK) and the world community at large, allow such an injustice to prevail for so many years, by recognising the usurpers as "The Government of Cyprus"?

This is a question the UN Security Council would do well to think about at the present time. This error of judgement should be put right and any forthcoming UN resolutions should reflect a balanced and sound understanding of these vital issues.

Clerides revealed in his memoirs that the Greek Cypriots, immediately after the Cyprus Republic was established, had decided to draw up a plan, *"by virtue of which stage, by stage, by unilateral actions they would abolish the 'excessive rights' granted the 'Turkish minority', beginning with those amendments that were easier to make unilaterally and leaving the*

most difficult ones after our right for unilateral amendments was established by a de-facto process".¹⁸

He also discloses that the aim of this secret plan, (the notorious Akritas Plan) "was to free the people of Cyprus [by which was meant solely the Greek Cypriots, of course] from the fetters imposed by the Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance, so that we would be free to exercise the right to self-determination".

Thus, 'self-determination' had become during 1960-63, once more a slogan synonymous with 'Greek hegemony'!

* * *

THE 1963 COUP AND THE GREEK ONSLAUGHT

The world press, particularly the British papers, described extensively the Greek Cypriot attacks of 1963-64 on Turkish Cypriots in order to demolish the Cyprus Republic and achieve Enosis.

Below are assembled just a few lines from European and American newspapers of the time:

A few days ago 1,000 people lived here in the village of Skylloura. Then in a night of terror 350 men, women and children vanished. They were all Turks.

....In the neighbouring village of Ayios Vassilios, a mile away, I counted 16 wrecked and burned homes, they were all Turkish. From this village more than 100 Turks also vanished; in neither village did I find a scrap of damage to any Greek house.

Peter Moorehead, Daily Herald, 1.1.1964

* * *

On the Greek Cypriot side they have preferred the fighting to continue, leading to the extermination of the Turkish Community.

The Times, 4 January 1964

* * *

On Christmas eve many Turkish people were brutally attacked and murdered in their suburban homes...

The Manchester Guardian, 31 December 1963

I asked President Makarios whether it was true that there was an underground committee of Greeks which had armed people and drawn-up plans for action.

He answered "it is quite true".

It is clear that a conspiracy exists to wreck the constitution which if it was workable, is unworkable now. But this does not entitle Greek Cypriots to scrap the constitution and opt for Enosis.

The Daily Telegraph, Editorial, 2 January 1964

* * *

The constitution gives the Turks numerous guarantees. These have not prevented bloodshed. They need to be transformed into something more effective.

The Times, editorial, 4 January 1964

In the light of these facts, which Turkish Cypriots cannot easily forget, the question that needs a proper answer is this: Now that the Turkish Cypriots have guaranteed their freedom, independence and safety of lives under the protection of mainland Turkey, and both communities have realized a complete safety and reasonable prosperity within their own regions, how on earth could any world statesman ask for the withdrawal of that real peace-force and risk a tragic situation which might be similar to the one recently experienced in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

One has to remember that it was the Turkish army which stopped the Greek Cypriot oppression and prevented the disintegration of the Cyprus Republic and Enosis. It has been that army which achieved and maintained peace on the island for the last 23 years, in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee.

Moreover, one has to be clear about the fact that UN forces are not renowned for their abilities to prevent armed conflict or terrorism.

UNFICYP, for all its usefulness, has been little more than an 'observer' force since it arrived in Cyprus in March, 1964. How could anyone now imagine that a final settlement and safety for both communities could be achieved by the withdrawal of the real peace force, namely the Turkish army, replacing it with a UN force, or any similar international force, which usually fail in their mission on different parts of the world?

The Greeks will, of course, argue that the Turkish army is an army of 'occupation', and armies of occupation are unpleasant things; that it is natural to feel it should be removed. But any reasonable person with a sound knowledge of the Cyprus problem should know that this notion of 'occupation' is little more than a Greek propaganda slogan.

Rather than being misguidedly preoccupied with the removal of the Turkish peace-keeping force in Cyprus which is stationed only on the Turkish part of the island, on the request of the Turkish Cypriot people, we believe the UN, the USA, the EU and the European Parliament should turn their attention to ways of limiting the massive arms build-up in the South of the island, and to other trouble spots of the world which need urgent attention, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Karabagh in Azerbaijan where the brutal violation of human rights, honours and dignity of innocent civilians have become a daily routine and extreme savagery.

OCCUPATION BY GREECE

As regards 'occupation', the international community should bear very much in mind that the Cyprus Republic had been, as a matter of fact, under the occupation of Greek troops for 11 years, until Athens engineered and put in action the 1974 **Enosis coup** which forced the Turkish intervention in order to comply with Turkey's obligation under the Treaty of Guarantee.

Makarios himself declared in the Security Council, on the 19th of July 1974, after having narrowly escaped from an attempt on his life during the **Enosis coup** 4 days earlier, that "*Cyprus was under the invasion of Greece*".

He himself revealed, *inter alia*, the **military** involvement and conspiracy of Greece against the Cyprus Republic.

Among other things he said the following:

** What has been happening in Cyprus since last Monday morning (15 of July 1974) is a real tragedy. The military regime of Greece has callously violated the independence of Cyprus.*

** There is no doubt that the coup was organized by Greece and was carried out by Greek officers commanding the National Guard and by the officers and men of the Greek contingent stationed in Cyprus.*

** The coup did not come about under such circumstances as to be considered an internal matter of Greek Cypriots. It is clearly an invasion from outside, in*

flagrant violation of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus.

** After the coup the agents of the Greek regime in Cyprus appointed a well known gun-man, Nicos Sampson, as President who in turn appointed as ministers, known elements and supporters of the terrorist organization of EOKA B, whose purpose was stated to be the union of Cyprus with Greece and whose members called themselves unionists.*

Greece, in effect, occupied Cyprus for 11 years (1963-74) and then attempted with a bloody military take-over to unite the island with Greece, in order to complete the so-called "*national aspiration*" envisaged by the the "*megali idea*". Whereas Turkey intervened under the Treaty of Guarantee in order to prevent *Enosis* and bloodshed.

The purpose of the Treaty of Guarantee was to maintain the independence of a bi-communal republic. Had there not been such a treaty and the right to intervene, Cyprus would have become part of Greece. It was 'divided' in 1974 in order to prevent the total annihilation of Turkish Cypriot people, the complete disintegration of the Cypriot state and its union with Greece, which was the sole aim of the 15 July 1974 Coup inspired and engineered by Athens and put into action by both Greek army officers and Greek Cypriot underground organization called EOKA B.

Thanks to the Turkish intervention based on the Treaty of Guarantee, as a result of which, the island of Cyprus is still an independent republic, democracy returned to Greece, and since 1974 both communities have been living in peace without intercommunal violence, clashes and killings. This is what in practical terms the peace operation of the Turkish army has achieved.

CONCLUSION

On 5th of March 1959, the British Foreign Secretary sent a message to his Turkish counterpart expressing great personal satisfaction with the arrangements for Cyprus and congratulated him on the restoration of full harmony between the three allies in a vital area. He said:

*The wisdom and understanding of the Turkish Government had been a constant source of reassurance to my countrymen. Nor shall we easily forget how much the happy outcome of the final negotiations owed to your own courageous and imaginative statesmanship.*¹⁹

It seems that the Turkish sacrifice and concessions, the goodwill and fairness exhibited during the crucial 1959-60 Cyprus negotiations, have since been entirely forgotten. Many British politicians and some Euro MPs, like members of the Greek lobby in the UK called 'Friends of Cyprus' (and now a similar group in the US), seem or pretend to know nothing about how and on what basis, the Cyprus Republic was established. And as regards the events of 1974, they seem equally ignorant of Turkish motivation and rights, being apparently wholly taken in by the Greek propaganda slogans of 'invasion' and 'occupation'.

Since 1963-64, the Greek Cypriot administration, has been most arbitrarily accepted by the world community as the "Cyprus government". Whereas the administration of 'the Cyprus Republic' at the present time does not contain the basic elements and the basic structure of the agreements which made the original Republic legal. The 1963-64 Makarios coup and the 1974 Enosis coup destroyed the basic structure of the original Cyprus Republic and made the Turkish intervention an absolute necessity, without which the state of Cyprus would have no longer existed.

Through this brief historical examination of the background and origins of the present division of the island of Cyprus, into the Turkish North and the Greek South, we hope to have focused the reader's attention on facts that are frequently overlooked by contemporary policy makers who concern themselves with the 'Cyprus problem'. In whatever way this problem is conceived, the above facts must be squarely faced and accommodated in any proposed solution, in any Cyprus settlement, which will be just, equitable, and lasting.

If a lasting and just solution other than the present *status quo*, is genuinely sought, the following actions should be considered as imperative:

1- The political error made by the 4th March 1964 Security Council resolution has to be corrected without any further delay, i.e. the error of recognizing an administration consisting wholly of Greek Cypriots as the legal administration of the Republic of Cyprus.

2- The legitimacy of a Turkish Cypriot state has to be acknowledged.

3- A viable, workable, and lasting settlement has to be based on the cooperation, political equality and sovereignty of two separate independent entities.

We ask you to see the realities as they are.

If you genuinely want to contribute to a just settlement, don't hesitate to help both Cypriot peoples without any prejudice, on the basis of understanding and equal footing.

NOTES:

- 1 Hansard, vol. 562, No:32, col:1272 and 1276
- 2 FO 371/136414
- 3 FO, 371/1444641-163661
- 4 FO 371/136414 - 152 864
- 5 FO 371/1441640-163526
- 6 FO 371/144640-163526
- 7 CO. 926/724 - 173515
- 8 FO 371/144640
- 9 Averoff, Evangelos Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities, the Cyprus Question, 1950-1963* (New York, 1986), p.302
- 10 *ibid*, p. 312-3
- 11 *ibid*, p. 332
- 12 Papandreou, Andreas, *Democracy at Gun point*, p.100.
- 13 Averoff, *op.cit*, pp. 394-5
- 14 Clerides, Glafkos, *My Deposition*, vol I, p.128
- 15 Averoff, *op.cit*, pp. 424-5
- 16 Clerides, *op.cit*, p.130
- 17 Averoff, *op.cit*, p. 419
- 18 Clerides, *op.cit*, p. 207
- 19 FO 371/144619-173607

THE AKRITAS PLAN

TOP SECRET

FROM HEADQUARTERS

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The recent public statements of the Archbishop have prescribed the course which our national issue will follow in the immediate future. As we have stressed in the past, national struggles are neither judged nor solved from day to day, nor is it always possible to fix definite time limits for the achievement of the various stages of their development. Our national cause must always be judged in the light of the conditions and developments of the moment; the measures which will be taken, the tactics and the time of implementing each measure is determined by the conditions existing at the time, both internationally, and internally. The entire effort is trying and must pass through various stages, because the factors which influence the final result are many and varied. It must be understood by everyone that each measure taken is the result of continuous studies and, in the meantime, forms the basis for future measures. It must be recognized that the measures which are prescribed now constitute only the first step, one simple stage towards the final and unalterable national objective, to the full and unfettered exercise of the right of self-determination of the people.

Since the purpose remains unalterable, what remains to be examined is the subject of tactics. This must necessarily be separated as internal and external (international), since in each case both the handling and the presentation of our cause will be different.

A. EXTERNAL TACTICS (INTERNATIONAL)

During the recent stages of our national struggle the Cyprus problem has been presented to world public opinion and diplomatic circles as a demand for the exercise of the right of self-determination of the people of Cyprus. In the exercise of this right, the subject of the Turkish minority was introduced under the well-known conditions and with the argument of violent intercommunal clashes, it had been tried to make it accepted that

co-existence of the two communities under a united administration was impossible. Finally, for many international circles the problem was solved by the London and Zürich Agreements, a solution which was presented as the result of negotiations and agreement between the contending parties.

- a) Consequently, our first target has been to cultivate internationally the impression that the Cyprus problem has not really been solved and the solution requires revision.
- b) First objective was our endeavour to be vindicated as the Greek majority and to create the impression that:
 - (i) the solution given is neither satisfactory nor fair;
 - (ii) the agreement reached was not the result of a free and voluntary acceptance of a compromise of the conflicting views;
 - (iii) the revision of the agreements constitutes a compelling necessity for survival, and not an effort of the Greeks to repudiate their signature;
 - (iv) the co-existence of the two communities is possible, and
 - (v) the strong element on which foreign states ought to rely is the Greek majority and not the Turks.
- c) All the above which required very difficult effort, have been achieved to a satisfactory degree. Most of the diplomatic representatives are already convinced that the solution given was neither fair nor satisfactory, that it was signed under pressure and without real negotiations and that it was imposed under various threats. The fact that the solution has not been ratified by the people, is a significant argument in this connection, because our leadership, acting wisely, avoided calling the people to give its official approval to the agreement by a plebiscite or otherwise, which the people, in the 1959 spirit, would have definitely approved. Generally, it has been established that the administration of Cyprus up to now has been carried out by the Greeks and that the Turks was confined to a negative role and acted as a brake.

d) Second objective. The first stage having been completed, we must programme the second stage of our activities and objectives on the international field. In general terms, these objectives can be outlined as follows:

- (i) The efforts of the Greeks are to remove unreasonable and unfair provisions of the administration and not to oppress the Turks;
- (ii) The removal of these factors of the administration must take place today because tomorrow will be too late.
- (iii) The removal of these provisions of the administration, although it is reasonable and necessary, is not possible because of the unreasonable attitude of the Turks and therefore, since it is not possible by agreement with the Turks, unilateral action is justified;
- (iv) The issue of revision is an internal affair of the Cypriots and does not give the right of intervention, by force or otherwise, to anyone;
- (v) The proposed amendments are reasonable, just, and safeguard the reasonable rights of the minority.

e) It has been generally proven that today the international climate is against every type of oppression and especially the oppression of minorities. The Turks have already succeeded in persuading international opinion that union of Cyprus with Greece amounts to an attempt to enslave them. Further, it is judged that we have greater possibilities of succeeding in our efforts to influence international public opinion in our favour if we present our demand, as we did during the struggle, as a demand for exercising the right of self-determination, rather than as a demand for Enosis. However, in order to secure the right to exercise complete and free self-determination, first of all, we must get rid of all those provisions of the Constitution and of the Agreements (Treaty of Guarantee, Treaty of Alliance etc) which obstruct the free and unfettered expression and implementation of the wishes of our

people and which may open the way to dangers of external intervention.

It is exactly for this reason that the first target of attack has been the Treaty of Guarantee, which was the first that was stated to be no longer recognised by the Greek Cypriots.

When this is achieved no power, legal or moral, can stop us from deciding our future alone and freely and exercising the right of self-determination by a plebiscite.

From the above, the conclusion can be drawn that for the success of our plan a chain of actions and developments is needed, each of which is a necessity and a must, otherwise, future actions will remain legally unjustified and politically unattainable, while at the same time we will expose the people and the country to serious consequences. The actions to be taken can be classified under the following headings:

- a) Amendment of the negative elements of the Agreements and parallel abandonment in practice of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. This step is necessary because the need for amendments of the negative aspects of the treaties is generally accepted internationally and is considered justified (we can even justify unilateral action), while at the same time external intervention to prevent us amending them is held unjustified and inapplicable;
- b) After the above actions, the Treaty of Guarantee (the right of intervention) becomes legally and substantially inapplicable;
- c) Once Cyprus is not bound by the restrictions (of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance) regarding the exercise of the right of self-determination, the people will be free to give expression to and implement their desire.
- d) Legal confrontation by the forces of State (police and even friendly military forces) of every internal or external intervention because then we shall be completely independent.

Therefore the actions from (a) to (d) are absolutely necessary and must be carried out in the above order and in time.

It is therefore obvious that if we hope to have any possibility of success internationally in our above actions, we cannot and must not reveal or declare the various stages of the struggle before the previous one is completed. For instance, if it is accepted that the above four stages are the necessary course, then it is unthinkable to speak of amendments (stage (a)) if stage (d) is revealed. How can it be possible to aim at the amendment of the negative aspects by arguing that this is necessary for the functioning of the State and the Agreements.

The above relate to targets, aims and tactics in the international field. And now on the internal front:

B. INTERNAL FRONT

The internal actions are judged by the interpretations that will be given to them internationally and by the effects that our actions will have on our national cause.

1. The only danger which could be described as insurmountable is the possibility of external intervention. Not so much because of material damage, nor because of the danger itself (which, in the last analysis, it is possible for us to deal with partly or totally by force), but mainly because of the possible political consequences. If intervention is threatened or implemented before stage (c), then such intervention would be legally debatable, if not justified. This fact has a lot of weight both internationally and in the United Nations.

From the history of many recent instances we have learnt that in not a single case of intervention, even when legally unjustified, has either the United Nations or any other power succeeded in evicting the attacker without serious concessions detrimental to the victim. Even in the case of the Israeli attack against Suez, which was condemned by almost all nations and on which Soviet intervention was threatened, Israel withdrew, but received (kept) the port of Eilat on the Red Sea as a concession. Naturally, much more serious dangers exist for Cyprus.

But if we consider and justify our actions under (a) above well, on the one hand the intervention will not be justified and, on the other, we will have every support from the beginning, since by the Treaty of Guarantee, intervention cannot take place before consultations between the Guarantor Powers, that is Britain, Greece and Turkey. It is at this stage of consultations (before intervention)

that we need international support. We shall have it if the amendments proposed by us appear reasonable and justifiable.

Hence, the first objective is to avoid intervention by the choice of the amendments we would propose in the first stage.

Tactics: Reasonable Constitutional amendments after efforts for common understanding with the Turks are exhausted. Since common agreement is impossible we shall try to justify unilateral action. At this stage the provisions in (ii) and (iii) of page 21 are applicable in parallel.

2. It is obvious that for intervention to be justified, more serious reasons and a more immediate danger must exist than mere constitutional amendments.

Such reasons could be

- (a) an immediate declaration of Enosis before stages (a)-(c),
- (b) serious inter-communal violence which would be presented as massacre of the Turks.

Reason (a) has already been dealt with in the first part and, consequently, only the danger of inter-communal violence remains to be considered. Since we do not intend, without provocation, to massacre or attack Turks, the possibility remains that the Turks, as soon as we proceed to the unilateral amendment of any article of the constitution, will react instinctively, creating incidents and clashes or stage, spurious killings, atrocities or bomb attacks on Turks, in order to create the impression that the Greeks have indeed attacked the Turks, in which case intervention would be imperative, for their protection.

Tactics: Our actions for constitutional amendments will be open and we will always appear ready for peaceful talks. Our actions will not be of a provocative or violent nature. Any incidents that may take place will be met, at the beginning, in a legal fashion by the legal Security Forces, according to the plan. All actions will be clothed in legal form.

3. Before the right of unilateral amendments of the constitution is established and is accepted, decisions and actions which require positive violent acts from us, such as the unification of municipalities, must be avoided. Such a decision compels the Government to intervene by force to bring about the unification and seizure of municipal properties, which will probably compel the Turks to react forcefully. Therefore it is easier for us, using

legal methods, to amend, for instance, the provision of the 70 to 30 ratio, when it is the Turks who will have to take positive violent action, while for us this procedure will not amount to action, but a refusal to act.

The same applies to the issue of the separate majorities with regards to taxation legislation.

These measures have already been studied and a series of similar measures have been decided for implementation. Once our right of unilateral amendments to the constitution is established *de facto* by some such actions, then we shall be able to advance using our judgment and our strength more forcefully.

4. It is, however, naive to believe that it is possible to proceed to substantive acts of amendment of the constitution, as a first step of our general plan, as has been described above, without the Turks attempting to create or to stage violent clashes. Exactly for this reason, the existence and strengthening of our Organisation is imperative because:

- a) In the event of spontaneous Turkish reactions, if our counter-attacks are not immediate, we run the risk of having panic created among Greeks, particularly in the towns, and thus we run the danger of losing substantial vital areas irreparably, while on the other hand an immediate and timely show of our strength may bring the Turks to their senses and confine their actions to insignificant, isolated acts, and
- b) In the event of a planned or spurious attack of the Turks, staged or not, it is imperative to overcome it by force in the shortest possible time, because if we succeed in gaining command of the situation in one or two days, no outside intervention would be possible, probable or justifiable.
- c) In all the above cases, the forceful and decisive confrontation of any Turkish effort will greatly facilitate our subsequent actions for further Constitutional amendments. It would then be possible for unilateral amendments to be made, without any Turkish reaction, because they will know that their reaction will be impossible or seriously harmful for their community, and

- d) In the event of the clashes becoming widespread and general we must be ready to proceed immediately with the actions described in (a) to (d), including the immediate declaration of Enosis, because then there would be no reason to wait nor room for diplomatic action.

5. At all these stages we should not overlook the factor of propaganda, and to counter the propaganda of those who do not know or cannot be expected to know our plans, as well as of the reactionary elements. It has been shown that our struggle must pass through at least four stages and that we must not reveal our plans and intentions publicly and prematurely. Complete discretion and secrecy is more than a national duty. **It is a vital necessity for survival and success.**

This will not deter the reactionaries and the irresponsible demagogues from indulging in an orgy of exploitation of patriotism and provocations.

The plan provides them with fertile ground, because it gives them the opportunity to allege that the efforts of the leadership are confined to the objective of constitutional amendments and not to pure national objectives. Our task becomes more difficult because by necessity, and depending on the prevailing circumstances, even the constitutional amendments must be made in stages. However, all this must not draw us into irresponsible demagoguery, street politics or bidding higher in the stakes of nationalism. Our acts will be our most truthful defenders. In any event, because the above task must make substantial progress and yield results long before the next elections, in the relatively short time in between we must show self-restraint and remain cool, for obvious reasons.

At the same time, however, we must not only maintain the present unity and discipline of the patriotic forces, but increase it. We can only achieve this by the necessary briefing of our members and through them of our people.

Before everything else we have to expose the true identities of the reactionaries. They are petty and irresponsible demagogues and opportunists, as their recent past has shown. They are negative and aimless reactionaries who fanatically oppose our leadership, but at the same time without offering a substantive and practical solution of their own. In order to promote all our actions we need a steady and strong government until the last moment. These are known as

verbalists and sloganists, with pretty words and slogans, but they are unable and unwilling to proceed to concrete acts or to suffer sacrifices. For example, even at the present stage they offer nothing more concrete than recourse to the United Nations, that is, words again without cost to themselves. They must, therefore, be alienated and isolated.

In parallel and at the same time, we shall brief our members about the above plan and intentions, but **only verbally**. Our Sub-headquarters must, in gatherings of our members, analyse and explain fully and continuously the above, until each one of our members understands fully and is in a position to brief others. **No written report is permitted. the loss or leakage of any document on the above amounts to high treason.**

No act can damage our struggle as vitally and decisively as the revealing of the present document or its publication by our opponents.

With the exception of word-of-mouth briefing and guidance, all our other actions, specially publications in the press, resolutions etc, must be very restrained and no mention of the above should be made. Similarly, in public speeches and gatherings, only responsible persons may make, under the personal responsibility of the Chief of Sub-headquarters, references in general terms to the above plan. And this only after the explicit approval of the Chief of Sub-headquarters who will also control the text. Even in this case, **on no account are references to these texts in the press or any other publication are permitted.**

Tactics: All the briefing of our people and of the public by **word of mouth**. We should make every effort to appear as moderates in public. Projection of or reference to our plans in the press or in writing is strictly prohibited. Officials and other responsible persons will continue to brief the people and to raise their morale and fighting spirit, but such briefing excludes making our plans public knowledge by the press or otherwise.

NOTE: This document will be destroyed by fire on the personal responsibility of the Chief of Regional HQ, in the presence of all the General Staff within 10 days from its receipt. Copies in full or in part are prohibited. Members of the staff of the Regional HQ may have the plan on the personal responsibility of the Chief of Regional HQ, but may not take it out of the Regional HQ.

The Chief
AKRITAS

IV- BRITISH SOVEREIGN BASES

A BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDING LEGAL AND FUTURE ASPECTS OF THE BASES

FOREWORD

Hambis Chimonas, a Greek Cypriot potato farmer, defied British Bases authorities and disobeyed court orders several times in 1994 and unlawfully cultivated land which lies within the Bases firing ranges. When a British Bases' judge sent him to jail he started a hunger strike in protest which caused a feeling of animosity towards the British among many Greek Cypriots.

Almost every month protests take place in regard to the legitimacy of actions taken by the British Base authorities towards Greek Cypriots who feel that they are mistreated. At the time of writing, the latest incident took place when the police station at the British military base of Episkopi was stormed on 14 April 1997 by a group of Greek Cypriots who were protesting the arrest of Angelos Panaratos of Trachoni village. Panaratos was arrested by the Base authorities for building illegally within the British Sovereign Base area (SBA). Scuffles broke out between Greek Cypriots and British military police and arrests were made. Following the scuffles the Base authorities set up roadblocks, to restrict access to the Episkopi SBA. Air Marshall Peter Millar, the Commander-in-chief of the Bases warned that "*no one is above the law and the behaviour of protesting Greek Cypriots is unacceptable*".

In a written statement Greek Cypriot leader, Clerides, condemned those who "*instigated or encouraged the incidents under the mistaken and misguided impression that in doing so they brought into question the rights of the Bases as covered by the Treaty of Establishment*".

These are, of course, minor incidents which raise occasional tension between Greek Cypriots and the British Bases Authorities. As a matter of fact, however, the existence of the sovereign Bases

Two Equal Partners

is subject to Greek complains on a much more significant scale on the grounds that they are not consistent with the independence and sovereignty of the 'Cyprus Republic'.

A pressure group calling itself, *the initiative group for the expulsion of the British Bases from Cyprus*, accused the Greek Cypriot Government and the '*interior Committee of the Greek Cypriot House*' of maintaining a policy "*forbidding them to speak on the bases, the Treaty of Establishment, the violations of human rights and generally on everything that has relation to the terrorist and other violations by the British in Cyprus*".

Speaking to a gathering in Larnaca in March 1995, '*On the status of the bases in Cyprus*', the former Attorney General of the Greek Cypriot Administration, Michalakos Triantafyllides, called on anyone who feels that his or her human rights have been violated by the British Bases Authorities to sue the UK at the European Court of Human Rights. According to Triantafyllides, "*there is nothing that separates the British Bases politically from Great Britain and Britain takes responsibility for what happens on Bases.*"

The continued presence of the British Bases is opposed by AKEL, the Greek Communist party of Cyprus, and a general resentment about their existence seems to be gaining ground.

I therefore thought it might be useful to study the documents concerning the background diplomacy and negotiations first between Britain, Greece and Turkey and then between the two Cypriot sides and the UK concerning the Bases, and to try to come to some rational conclusion about their present status and future prospects.

A NEW INITIATIVE

Just before Christmas (1958) a sudden and unexpected development took place in which were to be found the seeds of a final settlement. During a meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council in December the Foreign Secretary was asked by the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers whether the British Government would see advantage in their pursuing an agreement on Cyprus, under which the U.K. would hold the bases in full sovereignty and the two communities would enjoy a measure of autonomy in an independent Cyprus.

*... Accordingly Selwyn Lloyd and I decided, after much consideration, to let the matter develop without interference from us, and the two foreign ministers were told that Her Majesty's Government welcomed their new initiative and wished them every success.*¹

Harold Macmillan

* * *

The British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, then goes on in his memoirs, to describe how on 10th of February 1959, late in the evening, his Foreign Secretary rang up to say that Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers, Zorlu and Averoff proposed to visit London the next day. He remarked:

What one fears is that they may join in asking us more than we can concede. But we only need our 'Gibraltars'.

When the two Foreign Ministers arrived in London and stated publicly that the Turkish and Greek Governments had reached a compromise solution subject to agreement with Great Britain, the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, was authorized to continue the talks on certain understandings:

According to Macmillan those understandings were as follows:

- 1- Our 'Bases' to be under British sovereignty
- 2- Other points, e.g., Radar stations to be ours in perpetuity
- 3- Full facilities, harbours, roads, etc...
- 4- Special arrangements for Nicosia Airport².

Harold Macmillan underlines the fact that according to the agreement, "*Cyprus should be an independent republic subject to the retention of British sovereignty over the base areas, together with such rights as were necessary to ensure that they could be used effectively as military bases, these to be guaranteed by Greece and Turkey as well as the new republic*".³

THE IDEA OF HAVING A CYPRUS REPUBLIC

The final battle in the United Nations, before the talks started between Turkey and Greece for a final settlement, had been a disastrous defeat for the Greek side.

The draft Resolution submitted by Iran and carried by the political committee by 31 votes to 22 with 28 abstentions on 4th of December 1958, urged a conference to be convened between the

three governments directly concerned (*Turkey, Greece and the UK*) and the representatives of the two communities for a final solution.

It was also considered that the new status of the island should be developed "*to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Cypriots*" and that obviously meant, the two peoples of Cyprus.

Averoff states that this resolution was a victory for Turkey and "*the battle of the Greek side was lost*"⁴

According to Averoff, the phrase "*the legitimate aspirations of the Cypriots*" was open to interpretation as a '**Green Light**' for partition.⁵

He then describes how when their morale was at its lowest ebb, the Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu walked toward the Greek delegate and to their great surprise congratulated him on putting up such a good fight. Zorlu then talked about the need for reconciliation. When direct talks started between the two Foreign Ministers, Averoff was surprised that Zorlu was so clear and straightforward about a form of independence for Cyprus and cooperation between Greece and Turkey and about the fact that Cyprus is vital to Turkey's security. Zorlu also explained to Averoff that to insist that the population of Cyprus is '**one people**' with a small '**Turkish Minority**' is wrong and that there are in fact two totally different peoples co-existing there. After having relaxed the atmosphere and smoothed the Greek tension, Zorlu suggested that the next day he himself and Averoff should get together on their own and see if they could come to an agreement.

As we saw earlier, the result of this friendly and encouraging approach by Zorlu created an atmosphere of understanding and contributed to a draft resolution which was introduced by the Mexican delegation and adopted unanimously by the General Assembly in the afternoon without being put to the vote.

This resolution (1287-XII), recalling Resolution 1013 (XI) "*expressed the confidence that continued efforts would be made by the parties to reach a peaceful, democratic and just solution*".

This background has been repeated here to make the reader conscious about the fact that the creation of the Cyprus Republic was the direct result of efforts and negotiations between Greece and Turkey which started on the Turkish Foreign Minister's initiative, and that the draft agreement they prepared was later accepted and signed by Britain and both Cypriot peoples in London.

Therefore Turkey and Turkish Cypriots have been and are still the directly concerned parties of the settlement which created the Republic and any new status cannot be legitimized and put into effect without the consent of the Turkish side.

THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGN BASES AND TURKISH SECURITY

When Britain was informed about the talks between Greece and Turkey for the future status of Cyprus the British position was encouraging, and the only condition they put forward was that they would retain on the island two sovereign bases.

Turkey had a similar concern as well. Zorlu raised the question of the safeguards for Turkey, underlining the fact that Cyprus was situated opposite her southern coast and therefore it had a vital importance to his country's strategic position which affects the security of the Turkish Republic.

He said that Cyprus's status could not depend only on the current situation when vital strategic concerns are involved and they had to consider the probable developments of the future. Zorlu concluded that as partition was ruled out, the only safe solution for Turkey was to have two coastal areas in Cyprus, under its sovereignty, in which it could establish military bases.⁶

Averoff rejected this proposition; but offered to make "*honest efforts to allay Turkish misgivings in other ways*" ... "*to set their [the Turks'] deepest fears at rest we were prepared to accept a treaty of guarantee and a treaty of alliance*".

Although Turkey insisted to the last moment on having a Turkish base on the island, Greece resolutely rejected the idea. But when Menderes and Karamanlis, the two Prime Ministers, met in Zürich on 11th of February 1959 for a last bid to reach a settlement, Karamanlis "*proposed Allied Headquarters garrisons [be set up] comprising a number of Cypriot soldiers, a Greek contingent of 900 officers and men and a Turkish contingent of 600 officers and men*".⁷

As a matter of fact, to station a significant number of Greek and Turkish troops in the island was originally proposed by Zorlu at the beginning of the talks.

According to Averoff, there had been a dispute at the beginning between the two Prime Ministers on the number of men in the two contingents, but in the end that was also resolved when Menderes

asked for the numbers to be raised by 50, "so that the officers would not be included" in the totals proposed by Karamanlis.

Thus the agreed number of the Greek contingent was raised to 950 and the Turkish contingent to 650.

All the agreements were initialed the next morning by the two Prime Ministers in Zürich and then signed in London on 19th of February 1959 by the British, Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers and the leaders of two Cypriot peoples.

The First Article of the Treaty of Establishment between the UK, Greece, Turkey and Republic of Cyprus defines the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and underlines that the two areas defined in Annex A to this Treaty and referred to as the **Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area** and **Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area**, shall remain under the sovereignty of the UK.

Annex B, section 1 of the Treaty of Establishment provides that *"the Government of the UK shall have the right to continue to use, without restriction or interference, the sites in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus listed in schedule A to this part of this Annex"*

According to paragraph 2 the sites listed in schedule B were also to be used without restriction or interference but their use would be terminated as soon as practicable.

It also provides that the UK authorities shall have the right to exercise complete control within the sites.

There are two more categories of sites which were referred to in schedule C and D and were not regarded as vital as those referred to in schedule A.

Although it was clearly stated that the use of the sites listed under schedule B were to be terminated as soon as practicable, such a commitment was avoided in regard to sites mentioned in schedule A and C. Therefore any British action to terminate the use of any of the above sites, and particularly to hand it over to the Cyprus Republic which represents since 1964 only one of the two co-founder partners, cannot be justified as an act of good faith.

Therefore, handing over Cape Greco, one of the sites scheduled as A, to the Greek Cypriot Administration in December 1994, after a secret deal and without even consulting the other two parties to the relevant agreements, namely Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side, could not be justified as an act of good faith.

TURKISH GUARANTORSHIP FOR THE BASES

After the agreement was reached between the Turkish and Greek governments for the future status of Cyprus and was duly initialed by the two Prime Ministers, Menderes and Karamanlis on 11th of February 1959, Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers, Zorlu and Averoff, went to London in order to give a full account of the agreement to their British counterpart.

During the meeting which took place in the Foreign Office on 12 February 1959.

*The British Secretary of State said that one indispensable prerequisite for the United Kingdom in any agreement would be that the British bases and facilities must not only be accepted by the Cypriot government, but must also be guaranteed by the governments of Greece and Turkey. Otherwise, there would be a danger that the Cypriots might seek to repudiate their agreement with the United Kingdom.*⁸

M. Averoff and Zorlu agreed that this British requirement should be met and that, if necessary, extra articles should be added to one or other of the Treaties.

This British requirement was later openly endorsed in the statement made by the United Kingdom Government on the conclusion of the meetings held in London on 16 February 1959 between the Foreign Ministers of three Guarantor Powers.

After considering the agreements concluded and signed in Zürich on 11 February, and after having taking into consideration the consultations which took place between the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the UK in London from 11th to 16th of February, the British Government made a unilateral declaration by which it was stated that:

- A. It accepts the documents approved by the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey provided the following conditions are accepted:
- B. The area to be left under the full sovereignty of Britain are:
 - a) Agrotiri-Episkopi, Paramal and
 - b) Dhekelia-Pergamos, Aynikola, Xylofagu

Britain's sovereignty over the remaining parts of the island of Cyprus outside the above areas will be transferred to the Cyprus Republic under the following conditions:

All facilities included in the enclosed list of rights which are required for the use of the two areas as military bases will be provided for the UK government. **Greece, Turkey and Cyprus Republic will guarantee the integrity of the British Sovereign Areas and the effective use of the facilities by those provided according to the list.**

The annex to this declaration stated the rights to be recognized for the UK which would be used freely and without any interference. Thus the UK enjoyed the rights of using many sites over the island which were categorized under schedules A, B, C and D.

This declaration was signed by Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary and Alan Lennox Boyd, the Secretary of State for Colonies.

The Secretary of State underlined that "*there would be no security if the facilities were dependent solely on the Republic of Cyprus*".⁹

LEGAL AND MORAL OBLIGATION

By securing Turkish and Greek guarantees for the sovereign bases and free use of all sites and facilities, Britain achieved its objectives and under the additional article, Greece, Turkey and the Cyprus Republic guaranteed the use and enjoyment by the UK of the rights secured to the UK in accordance with the declaration **transferring the sovereignty of the island to the co-partnership Republic of two Cypriot peoples.** But before Britain transferred the sovereignty, except over the two base areas, further arguments on the legal and moral obligations on the part of the sovereign bases took place between the parties as well as certain departments of the Foreign and Colonial Offices. Letters, opinions and comments exchanged on this issue are worth considering in the light of recent developments. These concerns the transfer of certain sites to the Greek Cypriot administration without even consulting the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey who guaranteed both the sites and bases and also the activities of certain Greek Cypriot groups to prevent British military exercises on certain sites.

This provision of guaranteeing the UK bases and facilities is given under article 3 in the Treaty of Guarantee. It says:

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under UK sovereignty at the time of establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the UK of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus.

Article 3 of the Treaty of Guarantee, which was first proposed by Britain as an '**Additional Article**' had caused a lot of discussion and counter arguments, particularly between Britain and Greece.

The 'Additional Article' to the Treaty of Guarantee, originally agreed by Turkey and Greece, was proposed by Britain on February 16, 1959 and read as follows:

*The Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus guarantee the integrity of the areas to be retained under the sovereignty of the UK, upon the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and the use and enjoyment by the UK of the rights to be secured to the UK in accordance with the declaration by the Government of the UK of today's date.*¹⁰

Mr Averoff pointed out that this would commit his Government to **guarantee the integrity** of the British Sovereign Base Areas against all comers.

This objection of Averoff was accepted by the British Foreign Secretary who agreed to amend the Draft Article to the wording used in the **White Paper**. Thus the obligation which the Greek Government, together with Turkey and Cyprus, assumed under the second part of the Article 3 of Treaty of Guarantee has been to undertake "*to respect the integrity of the Areas retained under UK sovereignty*" and to **guarantee** only the use and enjoyment by the UK of the rights secured to the UK with the Declaration by the British Government and with the Treaty of Establishment.

British side emphasized that a guarantee by Turkey and Greece of their rights was an essential condition for them.

While the Greek government insisted vigorously to drop the word of '**guarantee**' concerning the integrity of Base Areas on grounds that this word would oblige them to defend British military installations in the island against any '*fifth*' power with whom the UK might be involved, the Turkish Government strongly supported

the British in all joint Committee meetings in London that the word 'guarantee' should be restored in its proper place.

The Greek Government later explained their misgivings to the British Embassy in Athens saying that their understanding was that the British intention in using the word 'guarantee' was that that provision should operate against the Cypriots.

This point was discussed again in the 'London Joint Committee' meeting on September 9, 1959 and after having more views exchanged on the issue in the end the British decided that "on balance it was more important to preserve Greek goodwill at that stage of the negotiations".

TURKEY SUPPORTED BRITISH STAND WHILE MAKARIOS WANTED TO SATISFY NON-ALIGNED FRIENDS

Makarios was one of the prominent leaders of the Non-Aligned Third World movement. He had become a leading figure in the movement since the Bandung Conference in early 1950s and had been a close associate of Nehru, Tito and Nasser. Accordingly he inclined to follow a policy of non-alignment and gave the impression of being against military bases. Consequently, when he was faced with the awkward situation of having consented to British sovereign military bases in a country which was going to be an independent Republic under his presidency, Makarios had to prove to the Non-Aligned States that he had in fact strongly resisted and that his consent was the result of a *fait accompli*. He had to give the impression that he fought hard to reduce the size of the British sovereign bases and the military facilities to the minimum, and to make it clear that he was against the use of the bases in Cyprus against 'friendly' Middle-East Countries; particularly against the United Arab Republic of President Nasser.

The Greek Government also had been engaged in certain efforts, towards the end of the 1950s, to establish good relations among Non-Aligned countries and particularly with the United Arab Republic (UAR) which was established between Egypt and Syria. Nasser, the leader of Egypt, was the architect of the UAR and had very warm relations with Makarios.

When the 'restricted independence' for Cyprus was agreed between Greece and Turkey on the condition that Britain, the arch-enemy of the Egyptian leader, was to retain sovereignty on its

bases in the Island, Nasser had become very worried and wanted to use his influence over Makarios to reduce the danger of probable use of those bases against the UAR.

Both Makarios and Greece had given assurances to Nasser that they would secure terms of guarantee not to utilize the bases against the Arab world, particularly against his country. There had been close contact and exchange of information on this issue between Nasser and the Greek side.

A friendship and non-aggression treaty to be concluded between Greece, Yugoslavia and Egypt was also proposed during the Greek Prime Minister's official visit to Belgrade in early July 1960.

Nasser paid an official visit to Athens in early June during which the British bases in Cyprus were most probably one of the topics discussed.

The British Ambassador, Sir Roger Allen, reported on 8 June 1960 that the Greek Government's hardening attitude concerning the size of the British Bases in Cyprus and on other unsettled issues probably was "due to the fact that the Greeks had entered into, or are about to enter into, some sort of commitment to Nasser over Cyprus". He also informed London about the possibility of a treaty between Greece, Yugoslavia and Egypt and said: "Nasser's interest in the future of British bases in Cyprus, (namely, that they should not go to Turkey for instance, or even to Israel) may well cause the Greeks to promise him that they will not sign any agreement which does not ensure that the reversion to our sovereign areas rests only with the Republic of Cyprus".¹¹

ZORLU USED PRESSURE ON KÜÇÜK

Meanwhile Dr Küçük, the Turkish Cypriot leader, soon to become Cyprus's Vice-President, proposed more concessions from the British side on the size of the two sovereign bases and a 'condominium' over the areas to be used as facilities. The British Ambassador in Ankara called on Zorlu on 9th of February and said that he was personally a little surprised that Dr Küçük had made his condominium proposal which he thought would encourage Makarios to feel that he could obtain some further concessions from Britain.

Zorlu responded that there was no need for Britain to be alarmed at this, and for a quick settlement with maximum Cypriot goodwill it might be a good idea to safely go for a condominium arrangement retaining a larger area under complete sovereignty,

e.g., 80 or even just under 100 square miles for the sovereign bases and putting the rest, up to a total of 120 square miles, under condominium.

Zorlu told the Ambassador that if Britain did not find it possible to accept these considerations, he would not hold this against them and he would think it the right course for the UK to stick on the last offers they made. He also indicated that he did not approve of the tone of Dr Küçük's press statement and he had asked the Turkish Cypriot leader to issue a new statement which, among other things, would list the concessions offered by HM Government; **emphasize the importance of the British bases for the security of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus itself**; emphasize the importance of maintaining solidarity between the Turkish and Greek communities; and suggest that, **in view of the inability of HM Government to make any further concessions, means should be found of bringing about independence without risking the dangers to it which might derive from further delay.**¹²

In his reply to Zorlu, Küçük indicated that for him to issue a statement on those lines would create difficulties between the two communities and would be a contradiction to his earlier statement. Zorlu replied back saying that he was not pleased with Küçük's attitude and that the maintenance of good understanding between Britain and Turkey was as important as that between the two Cypriot communities.

Zorlu told the British Ambassador that Dr Küçük might add to his statement a further reference to his **condominium** proposals and that it appeared that it was not possible for HM Government to accept them. Küçük also was required to conclude, as before, that the existing British bases in Cyprus should not be regarded as unfavorable to Cypriot interests.

The British Ambassador said that any reference to condominium and to further compromises would cause considerable embarrassment to Britain and it was better for Küçük to omit them completely. Zorlu promised to sent a further message to Dr. Küçük on this matter.

MAKARIOS'S BLACKMAIL ATTEMPT

On the other hand, Makarios, was becoming more intransigent every passing day by following a hard line during the negotiations on the bases with the British delegation, headed by **Julian Amery**, the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies. Küçük informed

Zorlu in early February 1960, that after the last conversation with Amery, Makarios had talked to Küçük in a wild manner for two hours suggesting among other things that **they should immediately proclaim independence**, that they could obtain money from America by threatening to go **communist**, and from Greece and Turkey on various other pretexts. Dr. Küçük refused to fall in with this irresponsible suggestion and attempt of blackmail.

At the meeting between Makarios and Julian Amery on the same day Küçük received Zorlu's above mentioned request not to issue any statement. This provided Küçük with a face-saving device, enabling the Turkish Cypriot leader not to make a statement along the lines suggested by Zorlu. News reached Ankara the next day informing the Foreign Ministry that Amery had come down to the figure of 100 square miles on the size on the Sovereign British Bases as a possible compromise which his Government could accept. It was suggested to Küçük that he should then press Makarios to agree to this formula and if Makarios continued to be intransigent, he (*Küçük*) would announce publicly that he disassociated himself from Makarios on this point.

The British Ambassador in Ankara informed London on 11th of February, after having talked to the Political Deputy Secretary-General that, *"several members of the Ministry have recently drawn our attention to the fact that Dr Küçük is tending to pay considerably more attention to the views of Makarios and not to be so blindly obedient to the requests of the Turkish Government as previously"* and that they detected in this a growth of *'island mentality'* *"in which the provincial interests of the Cypriot politicians were beginning to weigh more strongly than the wider international considerations"*.¹³

Makarios gave his own account of what had taken place on 10th of February to Governor Sir Hugh Foot next day, telling him that he had discussed the number of square miles that should be allotted to the Sovereign Base Areas. Then Küçük talked to Amery and put the figure up to 80 square miles. Mr Amery was prepared to resume discussions only if the Archbishop gave a firm agreement on all the other UK propositions.

EQUILIBRIUM NOT TO BE DISTURBED

A secret message from the Foreign Office addressed to the British Ambassadors in Ankara and Athens was sent on 12 February 1960. It pointed out that the 80 square miles proposition

came at the eleventh hour, and in response Amery made it absolutely clear that he had no authority to discuss any reduction but if, and only if, Makarios and Küçük were willing to express final agreement then and there with the British position on the other outstanding points he would be prepared to stay to discuss with the military authorities whether a small reduction of 5 or 10 square miles could be made.

The Foreign Office suggested that, in those circumstances, the most helpful way of proceeding would be for Turkish and Greek Governments to exert maximum possible influence with the Cypriot leaders urging them to accept the British proposals on all outstanding points, other than the extent of the Sovereign Base Areas. The Ambassadors were asked to speak to Averoff and Zorlu on these lines, underlining that condominium was not acceptable to Britain and if all other aspects were settled first the adjustment of boundaries would be considered.

Zorlu sent a personal message to his British counterpart on 12 February 1960 confirming that he was constantly urging Küçük to exert his influence upon Archbishop Makarios in order to reach an agreement on the bases, that he had no objection in principle to the reduction of Base Areas to 100 square miles. However he wanted to know the ultimate limit of the British concessions in order to put the case accordingly and with firmness before Makarios.

Secondly he pointed out that the existence of militarily efficient British Bases provided with all the necessary facilities was one of the essential conditions of the Cyprus settlement. He warned that, *"a failure to meet this condition would disrupt the equilibrium of the whole situation arrived at. This has to be always kept clearly in mind by all parties to the Zürich and London Agreements"*.

A FIRM STAND BY AMERY AND KÜÇÜK

Zorlu also stated that it was only because the firm stand on the part of Amery and Küçük which had obliged Makarios to show a more flexible attitude.

If we therefore wish to reach a speedy agreement we should continue our efforts along the same lines.

Dr Küçük is continuously trying to convince Makarios to agree to the final UK proposals as stated by Amery on February 10. If he should fail, he will make a public statement in which he will stress the reasonable character

of the UK's proposals and disassociate himself from the position taken by the Archbishop.

The above paragraphs which were part of Zorlu's message to his British counterpart delivered by the Turkish Embassy on 12 February 1960 were a clear indication of Turkish support for the British proposals concerning the Sovereign Bases, without which Britain would most probably have not obtained a satisfactory result from negotiations with Makarios.

Zorlu used a lot of pressure on Dr. Küçük who, at one stage, even threatened to resign, but nevertheless acted in accord with Zorlu's request and told Makarios that if Rossides (*Makarios's representative in the London joint committee*) continued his irreconcilable attitude he could not continue to collaborate with Makarios. He also stressed that he wished to be sure within the next 48 hours whether or not Makarios was going to adopt a positive attitude in the negotiations. If not, Küçük said, he would be obliged to state his position in a press conference.

This, of course impressed as well as depressed Makarios who later adopted a conciliatory attitude.

Another concern of Zorlu was the willingness of US to be involved in the negotiation process. Zorlu thought that US should avoid being involved, and he told the American Embassy in Ankara that he hoped the American Consul-General in Nicosia would be instructed to keep quiet and not get drawn into the negotiations.

The British Ambassador thanked Zorlu for this action and confirmed that HM Government shared the view that such an involvement by the Americans would complicate matters.¹⁴

According to the American Embassy in Ankara, Turkey regarded Cyprus as so vital to her own defence that, if the UK Government were manoeuvred by Makarios out of their insistence that the Sovereign Bases should be of adequate area, Turkey would revert to the demand she was making in 1958 for a wholly Turkish base in the island. This impression of the American Embassy officials, was based on the theory that Turkey accepted the British Bases as an alternative to a Turkish Base, with the hope and trust that Turkish and British interests in the area would not conflict but support each other.

Turkey tried to influence Makarios not only by urging Küçük to warn Makarios to abandon his stubborn attitude but also by sending İsmail Soysal, the head of the press Department at Foreign

Ministry, to Cyprus to meet Makarios and Rossides. Soysal urged both of them to take a larger view and not to haggle about a few square miles.

BRINKMANSHIP AND ILL-INTENTIONED ADVISERS

A.D.M. Ross of the Foreign Office in response to suggestions spelled out by the British Ambassador in Athens about the tactics to obtain a Cyprus settlement, and action which should be taken if current negotiations failed, agreed with the Ambassador that, for Makarios, the whole business had been an "*essay in brinkmanship*".

Ross did not support the idea that Britain should impose the re-installation of a full colonial regime if the negotiations with Makarios were unsuccessful, as suggested by some British diplomats, and stated that "*other threats might be more effective, such as partition or offering Turkey a base*".¹⁵

The governor, Sir Hugh Foot, was of the opinion that the difficulties arising were not completely the creation of Makarios, but partly of his advisers. Foot reported to the Foreign Office on 14 March 1960 that the date of independence had to be delayed once more, and that this was not the fault of HM Government. Because, he said, the main questions affecting the Sovereign Base Areas could have been tackled by now but "*the discussions were delayed by a long wrangle lasting over ten sessions in which Greek Cypriots conducted a filibuster against NAAFI exemptions and privileges*".

Foot accused mostly Makarios' advisers and stated that "*Makarios has not been strong enough to override Rossides and Theocharis*".

..."*There have been scenes of open disagreement between Makarios and Rossides in conference; and Küçük has protested at the way Makarios lets himself be overruled by his advisers*".

Foot concluded; "*the miracle of Zürich is threatened by bad advice Makarios is getting from inexperienced or ill intentional counselors*".¹⁶

THE FUTURE OF BRITISH BASES

After having almost reached to an agreement about the size of two Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) another difficulty had arisen on the question of civil administration within the base areas and the

future of the bases. Makarios insisted that the area of the bases should be transferred to the Cyprus Republic if at any time the UK considered that the bases had ceased to be of military use to her.

Makarios issued a statement on 17 May 1960 declaring that "*the lengthy and exhaustive negotiations on the subject of the SBAs did not result in agreement*" and they were faced with a deadlock.

The most alarming part of this statement was this warning: "*if the British Government continues its present policy we shall find it necessary to reconsider our entire attitude*".

This new situation started the exchange of a lot of legal arguments and opinions on the matter.

A few hours after the statement of Makarios was released Dr Küçük issued a counter statement accusing Makarios of creating confusion in the minds of ordinary people by declaring an intention on the part of the Greek side to reconsider their entire attitude.

Küçük expressed his anxiety that, attacking and belittling the Zürich and London Agreements created an air of suspicion and sowed seeds of future unrest and trouble. The sooner the agreements were implemented the better it will be for all, he thought.

Küçük stated that he did not agree that a deadlock was reached and referring to the future of the bases said this:

*On the question of the future of the bases an undertaking by the British Government that she will not abandon the bases and never will cede them to any country should be quite adequate in so far as the interests of Cyprus are concerned.*¹⁷

Athens seemed to be firmly behind Makarios over the question of cession. The Greek Consul General in Nicosia told the Turkish Consul General Vecihi Türel informally at a party on 19 May 1960; that he thought Makarios was quite right in his stand on 'cession', moreover, the Greek representative in Cyprus, Christopoulos anticipating the negotiations over implementation of the agreements told the correspondent of *The London Times* that the Greek Government supported Makarios on his demands about the future of the bases.

TURKEY SHOULD HAVE A SAY

The British Foreign Secretary felt obliged to contact his Turkish counterpart and enquire about his opinion on the question of

cession. He cabled the British Ambassador in Ankara on 21 May 1960, and asked him to see Zorlu as soon as possible and to follow up the brief discussion which he had with him in Paris about cession, and to say that he still thought the best answer was to repeat that Britain did not intend ever to give up the sovereign areas. But as Makarios and the Greek Government were saying that this was not enough for them they had to see whether he could find a better formula.

Paragraph 4 of this cable was highly significant:

*The retention of areas under British Sovereignty forms an integral part of the London Agreements. It seems to me implicit that before there is any variation the consent of the other parties to the treaty of establishment will be required. Also in my view the republic itself, under its constitution, could only take a step such as acquiring the British SBAs with the concurrence of the Turkish Cypriot vice president. Therefore cession by Her Majesty's government to the Republic would be subject to Turkish agreement in this double way.*¹⁸

The British Foreign Secretary assured Zorlu that if Turkey did not like such a proposition, "*The Turkish position would be completely safeguarded*".

Foreign Office telegram No: 539 of 21 May 1960 to the Governor of Cyprus included a secret message to Amery from the Secretary of State, underlining the fact that "*the situation in Cyprus deteriorated and Makarios may have made up his mind not to make an agreement*" therefore it was "*undignified*" for Amery to "*hang about in Cyprus at Makarios's pleasure*".

Amery was asked to indicate to Makarios in the next few days that Britain wished to bring negotiations to a head and to put to him a new package deal. Possible ways of doing this were either to call a Foreign Ministers' meeting or to send out a senior Minister to present the package and to say that if it is not accepted Britain would proceed to discuss with the Greek and Turkish Governments **some more radical solution**.

"The form of the package should be as follows:

CESSION:

a) HM Government will say that they do not intend to give up the Bases but if they ever do, they agree **not to cede them to**

anyone without the consent of the republic (or of all parties to the settlement)

b) IF THE TURKS AGREE, we might improve on this to the extent of saying that if ever we do cede the Bases, we for our part will be prepared to cede them to the Republic [but] **as a matter of Law cession would need the consent of the parties to the London Agreements**".¹⁹

The British Ambassador in Ankara informed the Foreign Office on 25 May 1960, only two days before the Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu was arrested and put in jail by the Turkish Military, that he finally had been able to see him. According to the British Ambassador Sir B. Barrows, Zorlu took the line at first that **there was no need for Britain to give in about cession**. But when the Ambassador said that Britain could not agree to say that they would never give up the Bases Zorlu then discussed the relative advantages of two alternative formulas:

a) **Her Majesty's Government have no intention of ceding the sovereign base areas**, but if a situation should ever arise in which they wished to do so they would, while maintaining all their other responsibilities under the treaty and with regard to the guarantee of the constitution and the defence of the island, **be ready, so far as they were concerned, to cede them to the Republic**". He overruled a suggestion by Zeki Kuneralp (his under Secretary) who was present, that the vetoes hidden in this formula should be spelt out and was quite clear it was better simply to deal with this point by the words "*so far as they were concerned*".

b) as an alternative which he suggested, "*Her Majesty's Government will never cede the bases to a third power*". The last word would mean, to anyone other than the Republic. But this should not be spelt out.

After some discussion in which Kuneralp unfortunately expressed his dislike of formula (a), Zorlu nevertheless said that he preferred it.

I then thought it as well to make sure that if it was found in our negotiations that we could get away with less than this, Zorlu would also agree to a formula like "*Her Majesty's Government will not cede to anyone without the consent of the parties to the agreement*". Zorlu said that this would of course be much better.²⁰

Zorlu thought that as a tactic Dr Küçük should put forward a new formula as a compromise coming from himself while Turkey

and Britain maintained a firm position. He also agreed to a meeting of Foreign Ministers if all else failed.

BAD LUCK FOR THE TURKS

As the proposed visit of Menderes and Zorlu to Athens from May 26-30 was off, because of dramatic developments in Turkey, a good opportunity for promoting such an agreement was lost. The 27 May Revolution and military take over in Turkey was a final blow to all efforts to achieve a compromise on terms favoring the Turkish point of view and security concerns. The military take over and imprisonment of Zorlu and Menderes put an end to all chances of securing a definite formula about the future of the British Bases as envisaged by Zorlu.

The Foreign Office was pleased to have Zorlu's response and replied the same day that *"all this would in fact have to be discussed at the time as part of the consultations with the other parties which we are agreed would be necessary"*.

This remark and the following paragraph in the same FO cable made it clear once more that HM Government followed a policy based on the view that **the future of the bases could not be decided without the consent of the parties to London Agreement, and thus without having obtained Turkey's approval, a decision could not be taken.**

The Foreign Office cable to the British Embassy referred above, continued in paragraphs 2 and 3 as follows:

I should therefore much prefer to deal with this problem by saying something on the following lines. The Cypriots have raised the question whether, if at any time we should relinquish the SBAs, we would cede them to the Republic. Her Majesty's Government have no intention of relinquishing the areas but they are advised that, if this contingency arose, it would not be legally possible to relinquish them without the agreement of the parties to the London Agreement. They are, however, prepared to say that, if the contingency arose, then they for their part would propose that the territory in question should pass to the Republic of Cyprus.

I hope that M. Zorlu would agree to our trying to find a formula on these lines. He will note the use of the word "propose", which implies that consultations with the other parties would take place, in which the Turkish

Government would be able to make their own requirements known.

The British Ambassador in Athens informed the Foreign Office on 26 May that he had not hinted to the Greeks that **cession would need the consent of all parties as a matter of law** and in view of the importance attached to this whole question by the Greek Government he asked to be authorized to discuss it with them before any approach was made to Dr Küçük.

Another cable the British Ambassador, Sir Roger Allen, sent to London only half hour earlier, transmitted Averoff's serious suspicions about Turkish intentions regarding the British Bases. Therefore, Averoff said to Sir Roger Allen that whereas the Greeks had previously been prepared to accept the formula that Britain had no intention of ceding the areas and therefore the question did not arise, they were no longer able to do so.

Sir Roger Allen affirmed that it was M. Averoff himself who had originally suggested the formula which he now said was no longer satisfactory.

According to Sir R. Allen, the Greek Government had let Makarios know that they no longer regarded the formula as adequate. He told Averoff that *"the Greek Government must realize that even if Britain were prepared to accept what Makarios wanted, it would be useless for Britain to put forward a formula which was unacceptable to the Turks. The Turks were after all one of the parties to the agreement"*.²¹

Averoff said that he quite saw that British position as regards the Turks was a delicate one, but if Britain put forward a formula it might be discussed with the Turks.

According to Sir Hugh Foot, the Governor, Makarios's attitude on cession and his refusal to continue the talks were largely due to the support he was getting on this issue from the Greek Government representatives in Cyprus. He informed the Foreign Office on 26 May 1960 that Greek representative, Christopoulos, admitted that the Greek Government was supporting Makarios over cession.

On the other hand the British Ambassador in Ankara sent a third cable on 26 May, in the early evening, to the effect that from Zorlu's reactions to the formula at (b) in paragraph I, as explained in his message earlier during the day, *"HM Government will never cede the bases to a third power"*. The Turkish Foreign Minister, he said, would prefer not to put the matter in this negative way since it

draws more attention to the exclusion of the possibility of cession to Turkey than either of the other formulas.

This happened to be the very last message concerning Zorlu's views about the future of the British Bases. The next day, on 27 May a Military Coup overthrew Menderes' Government and jailed them all. This dramatic and tragic event, turned the tide in Cyprus in favour of Makarios and Greece.

AFTERMATH OF TURKISH COUP

The National Unity Committee who took power on the Turkish mainland on 27th issued its second communique on 28th of May which contained the announcement on Cyprus by the Committee made on 27th. It said that the National Committee would observe to the letter the Zürich and London Agreements and would work for their implementation in the shortest possible time. It expressed the firm belief that the few matters under discussion would soon be finalized and the independence of the Cyprus Republic would be announced very soon.

The next day Makarios felt it was necessary to make both Britain and the new regime in Turkey recognize that he was the leading figure who would have to be considered seriously if an agreement was to be reached and implemented. He said, "I wish to state categorically that I am not prepared to resume the talks as long as the British Government insists on its views".

The Archbishop's statement went on to say that the only reason for Britain to retain SBAs was British military needs and added this:

It is, therefore, obvious that Great Britain cannot transfer or lease these areas to another country; because, in such a case, the terms and presuppositions under which these areas have been retained under sovereignty will have ceased to exist. Therefore in the event of GB considers that these areas are not militarily useful to her, they should be returned to the Cyprus Republic. This claim of Cypriot people is both just and natural. They will be used for GB's purely military needs and not for other purposes or for military needs of another country.

If British Government does not agree with this view there is no hope of reaching agreement. We shall not yield...²²

Averoff told the British Ambassador the next day that although he did not agree with the Archbishop's refusal to resume talks, he did agree basically with his views on cession. He also said that if this issue was solved the Greek Government would come out with a public statement telling Makarios categorically that he must accept the British positions on other outstanding matters. If not, he would have no alternative but to say that the agreements signed did not mean what he thought they meant. "The question was as important for Greece as that".

The British Ambassador reminded Averoff that the Greek Government should realize that the Bases were an essential part of the settlement. Regarding Makarios's press statement, Sir Roger said that if that was what Makarios thought there was nothing more to be said to him. Coming back to Averoff's views, the British Ambassador told him that he thought Averoff's attitude was that Britain would be in Cyprus not only for its own military purposes but to fulfill her obligations under the Treaties of Guarantee and Establishment. If the settlement was altered by withdrawing from the Bases, Britain should be bound to consult all the other parties to the treaties.

Averoff said that this would be quite impossible for the Greek Government. In that case, asked the British Ambassador, "why should we not stand on the 'non-relinquishment' formula". Averoff replied that the matter could not just be left open, because technical advances might make the bases unnecessary to Britain in a few years.

On 30 May 1960 while Makarios continued his firm stand not to negotiate until Britain changed its mind on the problem of cession, M. Necati Münir (Ertekün) following on a talk with the Governor, took the opportunity of a meeting on the constitution with Clerides and Criton Tornaritis to propose a resumption of unofficial talks on the issue of cession.

Foot, informed the Foreign Office about Münir's acting as intermediary between the British and the Greek Cypriots and that Clerides and Tornaritis agreed that it would be helpful, on condition that any such discussions should be entirely unofficial. It was, however, understood that they would keep Makarios informed.

After consultation with Makarios, Tornaritis produced a draft exchange which was cabled to London by the Governor. This text, prepared as a draft letter from Makarios to Küçük **to be exchanged with the UK Government**, envisaged that, in case the sovereignty over those areas was to be relinquished by HM Government, or HM Government was to divest itself of any control over those areas, the said areas should be ceded to the Republic of Cyprus.

Another draft text was prepared to be the reply of the UK to the above letter, saying that any cession or handing over of the use or possession thereof shall not take place without prior consultation with the Republic of Cyprus.

The Foreign Office informed the Governor on 31 May that draft texts of letters about the future of the base areas "*seemed to offer foundation*" on which an agreement could be build.

During the following few days Münir (Ertekün) was the intermediary between the British and Greek sides and helped in preparing texts which could be acceptable to all sides. Drafts of letters had been altered several times by the British and Greek sides and discussed thoroughly.

The British side resisted the words: "*which were retained by the UK for the sole purpose of being used as military bases*" and instead they preferred to replace them with the words "*in accordance with the documents agreed in London in February 1959 and as an integral part of the final settlement*".

The British side also insisted that instead of having the words "*be of opinion that the aforesaid Sovereign Base Areas are no longer required for the purpose for which they were retained*", which were included in the third paragraph of the Cypriot draft, the following words were proposed: "*wish to relinquish the aforesaid Sovereign Base Areas*".

The main objective of Britain was to underline that it would be at her own absolute discretion to decide whether or when she needed to relinquish the Bases.

TURKISH FLEXIBILITY

Meanwhile Averoff told the British Ambassador on 1st of June 1960 that he thought there had been a change in the attitude of the new Turkish government, who were very anxious to see a conclusion of the negotiations. Mr. Selim Sarper, the new Turkish Foreign Minister, was in Athens on 30th May and he had promised

to do what he could to introduce flexibility into the Turkish attitude over the future of British Bases.

The Turkish interest in the future of the bases were underlined once more in a confidential note from the Secretary of State prepared by A.D.M. Ross, on 2nd of June 1960 which says:

Meanwhile, we have tried to bring it home to the Greeks that the facts of the situation simply do not allow us to give reversion to the Republic and that TURKEY HAS A SAY IN THE MATTER. They (the Greeks) dislike this greatly but seem to be coming round to accepting it, providing that we do not make it too obvious.

Ross after having received Mr. Ormsby Gore's general approval sent a telegram to Amery in Cyprus, authorizing him to use the following wording to meet the Turkish point of view:

Nevertheless should the Government of the United Kingdom, having regard to the provisions of the Treaties of Guarantee and Establishment, at any time consider that they no longer require the Sovereign Base Areas...

The Turkish point of view both in Ankara and in Nicosia was that there would be an acknowledgement of Britain's continuing obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee, even if there is a cession. The Governor of Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot, supported the Turkish view on this point and observed in a cable to London on 1st of June that "*Since, Britain signed the Treaty of Guarantee without any limitations on its duration, it would be embarrassing for Britain to take a position which might suggest that we contemplate defaulting on our obligations, particularly towards the Turks*".²³

Averoff told the British Ambassador on 3rd of June that he had received a reply from the Turkish government through the Turkish Ambassador which suggested a formula whereby the Sovereign areas should be ceded to Cyprus, but **with the agreement of all three interested parties**, i.e., Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.

Osman Örek, the Cypriot Minister of Defence, [One of the 3 Turkish Cypriot Ministers in the Cyprus Government] explained to the Governor on 4 June that they wanted "*to disqualify any successor to the Republic which might be set up in the future contrary to the terms of the Zürich settlement, e.g. by some form of Greek Cypriot coup.*"

Foot observed that, maybe the same thought is what lies behind the Turkish Government's reference to the agreement of all parties in their latest formula.

Averoff rejected this suggestion as completely unacceptable to Greece. Averoff also said that he still believed that Sarper would not try to insist on such a formula, but he was rather apprehensive about the intentions of the Turkish military government.

On the Turkish Cypriot side Dr Küçük, together with Denktas and his two ministers, Örek and Plümer went to Ankara for discussions with the Turkish Government on 3rd of June.

The Turkish Government wanted to guarantee that there would be nothing in an agreement about the future of the bases which would be contrary to the Treaty of Guarantee and particularly its Article III. It seems that a few days later Turkey, in order to have the Cyprus settlement implemented and not be delayed any longer, ceased to insist on this point. Thus opened the way to an agreement on the future of the bases.

In return for this concession, the Turkish Government's view was that, as explained by Adnan Kural, the Turkish Ambassador in Athens, to the British Ambassador in Ankara on 10 June 1960, **Britain should be prepared to indicate in some very carefully worded manner that some further stage would be necessary if cession took place.** In order to clarify Kural's idea, Sir Roger Allen asked him whether it would be enough if in reply to a question, it was stated in Parliament that **if, contrary to present expectations, a change were ever to be made in the status of the Sovereign Base Areas, this would, of course, have to be registered in an appropriate legal form.** Mr Kural said that this might be acceptable to the Turkish Government.

Sir Hugh Foot informed the Foreign Office, on 10 June, that Dr Küçük returned from Ankara and had seen him saying that the Turkish Government would put a formula to Athens as soon as they cleared its terms with Britain. Once this was ready Küçük would put the formula forward on behalf of the Turkish community. He told the Governor that *"he thought the Turkish Government put rather too much confidence in Greek assurances"*.

When Turkey ceased to insist on having a veto in any change of the status of the SBAs, the Greek Government and Makarios became more resolute and hardened their attitudes in favour of a definite guarantee of reversion to the Republic.

Mr. Kural, returned to Athens on 11th of June and presented to Averoff the Turkish formula. After having made slight alterations the Greek and Turkish Governments agreed on a final text which was as follows:

1. The British letter:

The British Government do not intend to relinquish their sovereignty or effective control over the Sovereign Base Areas. Therefore the question of their cession does not arise.

2. The Cypriot reply:

We acknowledge and take due note of the British letter. We wish to assure you that the Republic will not demand that the United Kingdom should relinquish their sovereignty or effective control over the SBAs.

In the event, however, that the United Kingdom should at any time decide to divest themselves of the aforesaid sovereignty or effective control over the Sovereign Base Areas or any part of them, it is understood that such sovereignty or control shall be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus.

3. The second British reply:

We acknowledge and take due note of the Cypriot letter. We are in full agreement with the views therein contained.

When this formula reached Cyprus, Makarios asked Dr Küçük whether he knew of the formula and whether he accepted it. Küçük replied that he accepted the formula for the sake of getting agreement. Küçük then asked Makarios whether he, for his part, accepted it. Makarios replied that the formula would enable them to resume the talks. He declined to say that he accepted the formula. Küçük had the impression that Makarios was intending to bargain on each point.

According to Foot, Küçük told him on 22 June that **he regard the formula as a big concession on the part of the Turkish Government** and only hoped it would be justified by early agreement.

Another week past with objections raised by Makarios, but in the end, on 29 June 1960, the following agreed communiqué was issued after a meeting between Makarios, Küçük and Foot.

Begins:-

A broad measure of agreement has been reached on all the major issues which have been under discussion in

the last few days. It remains to settle the total of financial aid and certain points of detail.

On 1 July 1960 another joint communiqué declared that an agreement was reached between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders and the UK delegation on all outstanding questions under the following heads:

- a) The text of the Treaty of Establishment
- b) The boundaries of the Sovereign Base Areas
- c) The Future of the Sovereign Areas
- d) Administration within the Sovereign Areas
- e) Financial Aid

Concerning the Financial Aid it was agreed that HM Government's financial assistance to the Republic of Cyprus would amount to 12 million pounds sterling in the first 5 years, plus payments for particular purposes amounting to £2,340,000, making a total of £14,340,000.

Thus the formula accepted concerning the future of the SBAs omitted any reference to Article III of the Treaty of Guarantee and the agreement on this issue finalized in Draft Exchange of Notes which had been published in the official papers (Cmnd. 1093) as below:

FUTURE OF SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS

Draft Exchange of Notes between the Representative of the United Kingdom authorised to sign the Treaty of Establishment and Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk.

A.- Draft Note to Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk

Your Excellencies.

I have the honour to refer to the Sovereign Base Areas mentioned in Article I of the Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and in this connexion to state that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland do not intend to relinquish their sovereignty or effective control over the Sovereign Base Areas and that therefore the question of their cession does not arise.

B.- Draft Reply by Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk

Your Excellency.

We have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Note of to-day's date, which reads as follows:-

[Text as A above]

2. We wish, on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, to assure you that the Republic of Cyprus will not demand that the United Kingdom should relinquish their sovereignty or effective control over the Sovereign Base Areas. In the event, however, that the Government of the United Kingdom, in view of changes in their military requirements, should at any time decide to divest themselves of the aforesaid sovereignty or effective control over the Sovereign Base Areas, or any part thereof, it is understood that such sovereignty or control shall be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus.

C.- Draft Note to Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk

Your Excellencies,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Note of to-day's date which reads as follows:-

[Text as B above]

2. I have the honour further to state that the Government of the United Kingdom are in full agreement with the views contained in that Note.

BRITISH STATEMENT

The Secretary of State For the Colonies made a statement on 4 July 1960, in the House of Commons, announcing that agreement has been reached between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders and the UK delegation on all outstanding questions.

The third and fourth paragraphs were about the Sovereign British Areas. They were as follows:

3. The Sovereign Base Areas will comprise two separate areas totalling some 99 square miles. The villages of Ormidhia and Xylotymbou and the Dhekalia power station will be enclaves of Cypriot territory within the Sovereign Base Areas and there will be special arrangements for access to them. Akrotiri, which is too closely adjacent to the main airfield to permit of an enclave solution, will be the only village under British sovereignty. Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that, with the arrangements for training and other

facilities in the Republic itself which have been agreed in full detail, the Sovereign Base Areas are adequate for our requirements.

4. A point which was not susceptible of easy and rapid solution and which involved lengthy and involved consultations between all the parties was the future of the Base Areas. Her Majesty's Government's view on this is that since we have no intention of relinquishing sovereignty the question of cession does not arise. Nevertheless, in view of the importance attached by the Greek Cypriots to this issue, an understanding has been reached that should Her Majesty's Government in future decide, in view of changes in their military requirements, that sovereignty should be relinquished, it shall be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE OF CESSION

The legal aspects of this issue were discussed during exchange of views by legal experts of the concerned British Ministries. On 27 May 1960, E.J. W. Barnes from the Foreign Office in a secret minute asked F.A. Valliant "if he could provide some ammunition to answer the Colonial Office point" that "while we should admit that there is a legal obligation to consult the other parties to the settlement, we need not insist on having their consent".²⁴

F.A. Valliant replied same day saying that in his view Britain "could not escape from the fact that retention of the Sovereign Areas by the UK was an integral part of the settlement".

He expressed the opinion that according to the London Agreement the two areas were to be retained under full British Sovereignty and said:

The [British] declaration also calls for satisfactory guarantees by Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus, for the integrity of the areas retained under British sovereignty.

He then makes the following legal points:

a) The legal interests of all four parties is confirmed by the fact that they are all to be parties to the Treaty of Establishment. This, it may be agreed, gives them a *locus standi* for maintaining that each provision of the Treaty is of concern to all the parties and can not be changed without their consent.

If they were transferred to any other power, this structure would either collapse or require very substantial modification. I think that it would be legally unsound to say that such a basic modification of the Treaty of Establishment could be made without the consent of all the parties to the Treaty.

b) There are also points arising out of the Treaty of Guarantee, Article III of which relates to 'areas retained under UK sovereignty' not under the sovereignty of some other power.

c) There is in all this, as it were, a personal element by which TRUST is placed in the UK. This TRUST could not be properly transferred to any other power without the consent of Turkey, Greece and Republic of Cyprus.

d) These points are sufficient to show that there is a strong legal case for saying that the UK would not be at liberty to cede the Sovereign Base Areas without the consent of the other parties".²⁵

F.A. Valliant a few days later, on 8 June 1960, sent a minute to the Foreign Office about a point raised by Mr Darwing that there may be little legal difference between an obligation not to cede and an obligation not to cede without the consent of the parties to a treaty, because it is always open to the parties to agree upon variation in its obligations.

He pointed out that, "if there is an express obligation not to cede, although it is true that under international law cession may take place with the consent of all the parties, there is no provision on the face of the treaty allowing such consent to be sought. This means that in approaching the other parties with a request for cession, it is necessary to ask for permission to break or go contrary to the terms of the treaty."²⁶

CONCLUSION

The establishment of the Cyprus Republic was the direct result of the agreements negotiated and reached between Turkey and Greece during 1958-59.

The retention of the British Sovereign Bases was an integral part of those agreements and therefore their present and future status have to be considered accordingly.

Turkish national interests and security are obviously closely related. Turkey regards the British Sovereign Bases in Cyprus as vitally important not only for the Western interests provided for by

NATO but also for maintaining stability in the region in which Turkey has an increasingly important role and responsibility.

Taking into consideration Turkey's role and contribution in the 1950s to the establishment, both of the independence of Cyprus and of the British Sovereign Bases, and after having a careful study of those documents concerning the background diplomacy and efforts for its achievement, it is abundantly clear that Turkey should be consulted and her approval would need to be obtained if any measures by the British were envisaged either to relinquish the Bases altogether or to alter their sovereign status.

The 1960 agreements are the only basis for the existence of the British Sovereign Bases. Consequently the alteration or termination of the agreements directly affects their retention and legality.

The British presence in Cyprus is part and parcel of the 1960 accords. Those accords form an organic whole and neither that whole nor any part of it can be changed without the prior agreement of original signatories: the UK, Greece, Turkey and both Cypriot communities. It is to be hoped that Britain especially will not forget this.

NOTES:

- 1 Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959*, (London 1971), p. 689-690
- 2 *ibid*, p. 693
- 3 *ibid*, p. 696
- 4 Averoff, *Lost Opportunities, The Cyprus question, 1950-1963*, p. 293
- 5 *ibid* p. 295.
- 6 *ibid*, p. 301
- 7 *ibid* p. 334
- 8 FO 371/144640 - 1635260
- 9 FO 371/144640-163526
- 10 FO 371/144649-163719. *Confidential, from FO to Athens*
- 11 FO 371/152845-180911
- 12 FO 371/152851-XC/80475
- 13 FO 371/152875-XC/80403
- 14 FO 371/152851 - XC/80475
- 15 FO 371/152856 - 184815
- 16 FO 371/152857 - 184815
- 17 FO 371 - 152921-184913
- 18 *ibid*

- 19 FO 371/152882 - 185354
- 20 FO 371 - 152922 - 184913
- 21 *ibid*
- 22 FO 371/152922 - 184913
- 23 FO 371/152922 - 184913
- 24 FO 371/152922 - 184913
- 25 *ibid*
- 26 FO 371/152923

V- FOREIGN FACTORS AND THE PEACE PROCESS *

- Why do we have an 'unresolved conflict' which is called 'The Cyprus Problem'?

and

- What are the main causes of this conflict?

Unless a clear and accurate reply is given to the above questions, and the substance of that reply is seriously considered, all proposals to solve the problem would be baseless, irrelevant and artificial. As a matter of fact, such artificial and superficial proposals have always been a negative factor, delaying a just and final settlement for so many years.

Let us then have a quick look at those main causes which created the problem. Briefly, they are:

- 1) **The bi-communal character of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot populations and their opposite political aspirations.**
- 2) **The different socio-cultural characteristics of the two communities.**
- 3) **The different structure of the two societies.**
- 4) **The absence of a common ground and a common goal on which a united independent Cypriot state or nationhood could be based.**

Within this context it has to be recalled that it was the Greek national aspiration of Enosis and the Turkish opposition to this Greek aspiration which negatively affected the one time harmonious days of the two communities under Turkish Rule. Thus the British period witnessed, from the beginning to its end, periods of tension and occasional violence which were also stimulated by external events, namely Greco-Turkish wars since 1821 and

* The full text of the paper submitted by the author to the seminar held in London on 20 June 1996 on the 'PROSPECTS OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT' organised by the 'Association for Cypriot, Greek and Turkish Affairs.'

particularly the attempt of Greece to invade Turkish homeland, Anatolia, during 1919-1922.

RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO MOTHERLANDS

It is a historic fact that the relations between Turkey and Greece, the two motherlands, have always had direct effects on two Cypriot communities. Therefore, one should not underestimate this factor if an accurate evaluation of the relations of two communities is to be made.

Nevertheless despite the good relations which prevailed in the late 1920s and early 1930s as a result of the peaceful approach of Atatürk and Venizelos, the agents of Greece, even during those years of friendship, continued to agitate for Enosis which created intercommunal tension and provoked attacks on the Turks.

The 1931 Greek Cypriot Enosis revolt and burning down of the Governor's Konak (residence) was a direct result of this agitation.

Much earlier than A. Kyrou, who had been a very active agitator, another Greek Consul, Philemon, was the main instigator of agitation. He insistently and provocatively used almost every occasion, including even sports festivities, for Hellenic propaganda, in order to foster the idea of Union with Greece. In 1897 he was active also in recruiting volunteers for the Greek Army fighting against Turkey.

In Greek Cypriot schools the teachers were engaged in Hellenic propaganda and the text books, coming from Greece, usually contained selections of material intended to inflame Greek patriotism and enmity towards the Turks.

In 1902, Canon F. D. Newham, the inspector of Schools reported that whenever he asked in the Greek elementary schools to hear a song it was a war song which said:

Forward, Follow The Drum that leads us against the Turks.

As a matter of fact Greece had all along influenced and directed the course of political events in Cyprus. The Cypriot Turks, on the other hand, had to rely on the British Administration and Turkey for its protection and survival. Consequently, the two Cypriot peoples had always been ready to be swayed and deeply influenced by the advice and direction of Ankara and Athens.

THE ROLE OF FOREIGN ELEMENTS

In addition to the two motherlands, there were also external influences on Cyprus's affairs. For instance, Soviet Russia used AKEL, the strong Communist party in Cyprus, to create conditions through which the Kremlin could have a say in future developments concerning the island.

The geopolitic and strategic position of Cyprus had always made it an attraction for big powers. Imperialism of both, the West and the East, competed with each other and engaged in a struggle to control the Suez Canal and the routes to India in 19th century, and later to dominate the oil rich Middle East, Arabia and the Gulf Area. **Holding Cyprus has always been vital for this power struggle in the region.**

Even today, after the end of the cold war, Cyprus is still considered to be an important place concerning the security of the Western Alliance and has been described as a valuable and unsinkable 'aircraft carrier'.

Towards the end of the 1940s and in the 1950s the growing influence of Moscow through AKEL caused considerable anxiety among Anglo-Americans. Thus Washington suggested to the British Government that they were willing to provide support for the nationalist Greek Cypriot candidates against the Akelists during the municipal elections following the Second World War.

Meanwhile the British Colonial Administration took severe measures to deal with the strikes and disturbances of AKEL. In 1945, 18 left-wing trade unionists, including Ziartides and a member of AKEL's Central Committee were imprisoned on charges of '*sedition conspiracy*'.

AKEL's growing influence, and its victory in the May 1946 municipal elections in 4 main towns, had increased Western anxiety, particularly of the Americans and NATO.

Therefore, the Anglo-Americans followed a policy of tolerance towards the Orthodox Church of Cyprus under the leadership of Makarios II and then Makarios III in order to help their intensified campaign against the growing left. At one stage, according to Sulzberger, the Americans even proposed that the Enosis movement should be supported in order to forestall the Communist influence in Cyprus, and thus keep the island within the sphere of Western influence.¹

It is worth recalling here that Ziartides and some leading members of the Central Committee of AKEL visited Eastern Bloc countries behind the '*Iron Curtain*'² towards the end of 1948 to seek guidance. They also saw the Greek Communist party leader who advised them to support the **Enosis campaign**.³

Moscow was against the British military bases in Cyprus; so was AKEL.

Towards the end of the 1940s and early 1950s the rivalry between AKEL and the Church reached its peak. Ziartides the leader of PEO, the largest workers union which was functioning as a branch of AKEL, warned the Ethnarchy, in July 1952 that "*so long as the Archbishop insisted on ignoring the largest trade union movement in Cyprus, he will neither be able to organise a strike nor start a battle for Cyprus*".⁴

The policy of Soviet Russia towards Cyprus was based on trying to limit British military presence on the island and stirring up trouble in the Western Camp. **The conflict between Turkey and Greece, two NATO members, over Cyprus was to be used in its full extent so as to weaken the Western Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean.** That is why, Nikolaos Zachariades, the leader of the Communist Party (KKE) in Greece raised the Cyprus issue, and relentlessly pursued the Enosis cause.

Makarios who was elected as Archbishop in 1950, had vigorously pursued a policy of internationalisation. He was in America in late 1940s studying theology and had since established close contacts with the leading members of AHEPA (*American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association*). The Greek bishops in the USA and AHEPA were eager to help him to internationalize the issue.⁵

Consequently both Bishop Ezekiel and leading AHEPA members started a lobbying movement and circulated petitions based on the 1950 **Enosis plebiscite** results. Although The State Department had been unsympathetic, some Senators, including Senator Fulbright, promised to place a Cyprus resolution before Congress the following year.⁶

In 1951 Senator McCarran drafted a resolution recommending that the US delegation in the UN should support the wishes of the Greek Cypriots, in the event the Cyprus issue was discussed in the UN.

Makarios wanted to draw the attention of NATO to the idea that both the Greek Government and the 'Cypriot people' (*meaning of course the Greek Cypriots*) were willing to secure a base for the Alliance in Cyprus as well as in any part of Greece, once Enosis was realised.⁷

However the main concern of the West then, was to maintain the strength of NATO and in its defense plans Turkey was an important member of the Alliance. Therefore the Turkish interests and the concerns of the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus had to be taken seriously into account. This view had led the British Government to call a conference in London in October 1955 'to consider the strategic and other problems affecting the UK, Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean'.

Consequently the Cyprus problem had developed into an issue which could only be solved if Greece, Turkey and the UK reached an agreement about the island's future status, which was not first and foremost a 'Cypriot' concern. This was because there wasn't a Cypriot nation, and the Cyprus population was composed of two national communities with divergent national identities, culture, religion and aspirations; and because **both communities always sought their motherland's guidance for their future status.**

It is a historic fact that 'Cypriotness' had never emerged as a national identity and as a strong factor uniting the two peoples. Thus there had never been a national unity or a common cause among Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S

MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES

The Security Council Resolution 367/75 dated 12 March 1975 requested the UN Secretary-General, *to undertake a new mission of good offices and to that end to convene the parties, under new agreed procedures and place himself personally at their disposal, so that the resumption, the intensification and the progress of comprehensive negotiations, carried out in a reciprocal spirit of understanding and of moderation under his personal auspices and with his direction as appropriate, might thereby be facilitated* (Para 6).

Thus the mission of good offices of the UN Secretary-General started in 1975 and is still the only procedure by which the UN is involved in searching for a final settlement of the Cyprus problem.

With Paragraph 2 of the same resolution, the Security Council, expressed its regret that part of the Republic of Cyprus would become a "*Federated Turkish State*", as *inter alia*, tending to compromise the continuation of negotiations '*between the representatives of the two communities on an equal footing*, the objective of which must continue to be to reach freely a solution providing for a political settlement and the establishment of a **mutually acceptable constitutional arrangement**'.

The UN had earlier, in 1960s, also attempted to solve the problem through mediation.

The 4 March 1964 Resolution (186) not only provided for the establishment of the UN peace Force (UNFICYP) in Cyprus, but had also ruled for the appointment of a mediator.

However both mediators, Tuomioja and Galo Plaza, appointed in accordance with this resolution, failed to achieve any agreement.

The important differences between the mediation and the mission of good offices is that the mediator could propose ways to settle the problem. He could submit a formula and concrete proposals to the parties concerned. Whereas, under the mission of good offices, the Secretary-General cannot submit such formulas or proposals. What he can do is to submit some 'ideas'. As a matter of fact first Waldheim, then Perez de Cuellar and lastly Boutros Ghali, presented, one after another, first the '*indicators*', or '*Evaluation document*', and later the '*food for thoughts*' and lastly the '*set of ideas*' and '*Suggestions*' but not any proposals as Galo Plaza had done in 1965.

Since 1975, the intercommunal talks have always been conducted under the Secretary-General's mission of good offices. The latter acts only to help the two sides to come together and to negotiate freely under his auspices, in compliance with the Resolution 367 of 1975 which provided that the talks between the two sides had to be conducted **on equal footing** in order to reach freely a mutually acceptable settlement.

According to the Turkish side this still is the best procedure to solve the problem. Because if mediators, arbitrators or other factors are involved in this process, the interests of other parties would obviously become a decisive factor creating more complications.

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES AND COORDINATORS

The missions of the Special Cyprus Representative of the UN Secretary-General and the special representatives or coordinators who act on behalf of their countries could not and should not be mixed up. The UN Special Cyprus Representative is bound to act in conformity with the Resolution 367 of 1975. Therefore neither the UN Secretary-General, nor the agent representing him can make any proposal or recommendation or propose a solution. His job is to encourage the two sides to find a solution themselves.

The Cyprus problem, being a special issue, some countries find it necessary for themselves to appoint a diplomat to deal with it on a full time basis so as to facilitate their government's understanding of new developments, new ideas or new positions. Of course in this way, they hope to follow the issue more accurately and to decide their policy based on their own national interest accordingly.

First, we had only an American special coordinator, whereas now we have many; but the question is, how helpful have they been so far in solving the Cyprus problem?

It seems that so far they have not achieved much in that respect. As a matter of fact they are only entitled and expected to help and support the Secretary-General's mission of good offices. The USA, the UK, the EU have declared openly that by appointing a special Cyprus representative or coordinator they just want to help the Secretary-General's good offices mission. **The idea is that the special representatives or coordinators can help the UN to act in a more precise and effective way. The other assumption is that more pressure can be brought to bear on both sides to agree on certain basics which could lead to a comprehensive settlement** - a settlement which would serve not only the interest of the Cypriots themselves but also the national interests of those countries and the wider interests of those organisations the special Cyprus representatives belong to.

TURKISH CYPRIOT POSITION

The Turkish Cypriot side welcomes any help, anybody can give. But this should not take the shape of interference or imposition. They should not do anything which will be an interference with the good offices mission of the UN Secretary-General. Their help should neither replace, interfere

with nor obstruct the UN mission. Neither should their efforts negatively affect the direct bilateral talks between the two Cypriot sides. If these efforts can help the two sides within the above limits and principles, the Turkish Cypriot side would not have any objections.

But in the end, in order to achieve a final, just and integrated overall settlement the leaders of both Cypriot peoples should come together and have direct negotiations on a non-committal basis. **It has to be a package deal. Agreement on certain issues during the course of talks would not be binding on its own unless there is an agreement on all issues.**

The former UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar who was more experienced and knowledgeable on the Cyprus problem than any other UN diplomat, referring to the Cyprus talks, once said:

Nothing is final until everything is final.

CONCLUSION

It seems clear enough that if the present status 'is not acceptable' and if an agreement is essential for a final settlement, we should not waste our time any longer and we should try to establish as soon as possible a new pattern of relationship.

If the sincere wish is to have a successful marriage, both sides should consider seriously to regard themselves engaged and try to know, to understand, to respect and love each other. That is the only way to expect a genuine, lasting and healthy partnership.

But the present intransigence of Clerides not to meet the Turkish Cypriot leader on an equal basis and to negotiate on a comprehensive settlement and the Greek Cypriots' massive armament activities involving the importation of Russian S-300 missiles and other highly sophisticated weapons are not at all helpful or conducive to a just and final settlement. The intransigence of the Greek Cypriot side encouraged by Greece, is particularly based on the hope that the EU membership of 'Cyprus' will one way or the other be realised and thus the Turkish Cypriot side will be reduced to a 'minority', protected by some special provisions, similar to those minority rights in Western Thrace.

Undoubtably this attitude of the Greek side and all efforts to this end is based on just another illusion which plainly seeks to ignore Turkish vital interests and consequently can only lead either to renewed conflicts of a highly dangerous kind or force the Turkish

Cypriots to complete the integration of the TRNC with Turkey. It is important to understand that the Turkish side would regard such integration, if it proved necessary, as analogous to the de facto integration that South Cyprus is effecting with mainland Greece, which is designed to be completed under the umbrella of EU membership. As we see it, the Greek Cypriot unilateral application for full membership of EU (made in total disregard to 1960 Cyprus agreements, and international law) is merely their latest ploy to achieve their historic ambition of Enosis under a new pretext. If the international community, particularly the EU, allows them to do this, despite being fully acquainted with well-founded Turkish objections, then it is only natural that the world should accept the exact counter-measure of closer integration with Turkey on the part of Turkish Cypriots.

NOTES:

¹ *New York Times*, 2 January 1945.

² *Crawshaw, Nancy, the Cyprus Revolt (London 1978), p. 41.*

³ *Cyprus Mail*, 4 July 1952.

⁴ *Crawshaw, op.cit.*, p. 60

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁶ *Cyprus Mail*, 28 February 1952.

Appendix I

JOINT DECLARATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS SIGNED ON 20 JANUARY, 1997, ANKARA

The Presidents of the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Recalling their Joint Declaration issued on 28 December 1995:

Reaffirming their desire and determination to develop in a spirit of full solidarity and cooperation, the relations between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in all fields:

Recalling that Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have spent every effort for the finding of a peaceful solution to the Cyprus question and that a just and realistic settlement in Cyprus can only be achieved through negotiations based on the free will of the two parties:

Emphasizing the rights of the Turkish Cypriot people emanating from international agreements and their political and legal equality stipulated by these agreements:

Reaffirming that the system of guarantee established by the 1960 Treaties will continue to be valid and in force under all circumstances as it has been up to now and that under these treaties no threat can be directed at any of the guarantor powers:

Reviewing the latest developments which have threatened peace, security and stability in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean:

Announce the following joint views and decisions:

1. The continuing intensive military build-up by the Greek Cypriot side, the "Joint Defence Doctrine" between Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration and the construction of air force and navy bases for Greece in southern Cyprus have created a situation which threatens stability and security in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean.

2. The decision to deploy missile systems in Southern Cyprus has aggravated the crisis of confidence between the two peoples of the island to such an extent that reconciliation has become extremely difficult.

3. The claim that these missiles have a defensive purpose and the so-called "assurances" to the effect that they will not be deployed in the island for some time are meaningless. The point to be borne in mind is that the joint Greek-Greek Cypriot front, despite all warnings, has turned its back on reconciliation and opted for conflict as its priority objective, forming a de facto military alliance between Greece and Southern Cyprus.

4. Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, without losing sight of a responsible, common sense approach, will take the necessary measures, in order to preserve the balance in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, and to render ineffective policies which threaten the peace in the region.

In this context:

- The Republic of Turkey, in accordance with the 1960 system of guarantees, will continue to provide full effective guarantee to the Turkish Cypriot people and will not let the security of the Turkish Cypriots come under threat.

- Any attack against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will be considered as an attack against the Republic of Turkey.

- In the event that the joint Greek-Greek Cypriot front continues its endeavours to alter the balance between Turkey and Greece in Cyprus or in the region, and to endanger the security of the Turkish Cypriot people, reciprocal military and political measures will continue to be put into effect without hesitation. Within this framework, Turkey strongly supports the views put forward and measures envisaged by the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, H.E. Rauf Denktas, in the statement he made on 10 January 1997.

- In view of the fact that with air force and navy bases, Greece is entrenching itself in Southern Cyprus, and in the event that such activity continues, work will commence to establish in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus similar air force and naval facilities.

Any aggression or *fait accompli* directed against Turkey or the TRNC will be jointly confronted, and the military planning and coordination necessary for this will be done. To this end, a joint military concept between Turkey and the TRNC will be established.

5. Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus consider the activities and provocations planned and carried out by the joint Greek-Greek Cypriot front in order to escalate tension in

Cyprus as part of its efforts to dilute Turkey's effective guarantees by bringing in a multinational force. This shall not be allowed. In the event that an attempt is made to alter either directly or indirectly the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance, the Turkish side will consider it as a flagrant violation of the 1960 Treaties and will take the necessary measures and political decisions.

6. The efforts for the finding of a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus question reached an impasse about five years ago because of the Greek Cypriot side's rejection of the U.N. Set of Ideas; while the efforts to establish confidence between the two peoples of the Island came to a deadlock about three years ago due to the other side's rejection of the Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) package.

During the time that has since elapsed, the Greek Cypriot side has totally distanced itself from the parameters of a reasonable solution.

7. It will be seen that the Greek Cypriot side, together with Greece has been seeking tension and conflict, rather than reconciliation.

8. Ever since 1963 when the Greek Cypriots, with the support of Greece, destroyed by force of arms the partnership which had been established between the two peoples under the 1960 Agreements, there has been no joint state, government, parliament, judiciary or administration competent to represent the two equal peoples and speak on behalf of the island as a whole.

9. The claim of the Greek Cypriot administration in the south of the island to the title and privileges of the 1960 partnership, which it itself had destroyed by its own aggression as well as all those deeds and actions including the purchase of weaponry, are illegal under international treaties. This claim utilized by the Greek Cypriot administration in presenting itself to the outside world cannot confer upon it any legitimacy. The administration in South Cyprus which attempts to introduce itself under the banner of the "Republic of Cyprus" is factually a Greek Cypriot administration. At the root of the lack of a solution to the Cyprus question in the last 34 years are the Greek Cypriot side's efforts to perpetuate its illegal title and claims.

10. So long as these facts, realities, and the sovereign rights of the Turkish Cypriot people are not recognized and the two sides are not treated in an equal manner, the achievement of a just and

lasting settlement in Cyprus will not be in reach. 11. The point that has been reached shows that the green light given by the E.U. as a result of the pressures exerted by Greece to the full membership of the Greek Cypriot administration in the Union constitutes a historic error which has had a destructive effect on the negotiating process. The Greek Cypriot side has no other interest than entering the European Union as a second Greek state and thus achieving an indirect integration with Greece, without having to seek a settlement with the Turkish side in Cyprus. 12. To ensure that this wrong track does not lead to further damages, it must be made known that:

- Under International Treaties Cyprus can only become a member of a union of which Turkey and Greece are both members.
- The membership of Cyprus in the EU can only be entertained after a settlement.
- The two peoples of the island have to approve such a decision through separate referenda as foreseen in the UN Set of Ideas.

- The Turkish side will consider the start of accession negotiations between the Greek Cypriot administration and the EU, based on the unilateral application of the Greek Cypriot side for full membership in contravention of international law, as the complete abolition of the framework and parameters for a solution which have emerged during the negotiating process in Cyprus. Each and every unilateral step to be taken by the Greek Cypriot Administration towards EU membership will accelerate the integration process between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

13. The continued isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus from the international community cannot be accepted under any circumstances. Turkey will take the necessary steps to ensure the integration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus with the international community. TRNC Representatives will be included in the ranks of the Turkish Delegations which attend any international meeting concerning Cyprus where the Turkish Cypriot people do not have a voice.

14. Economic relations between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will be expanded within the framework of the comprehensive Economic Protocol signed on 3 January 1997 at the Prime Ministerial level and the TRNC

economy will be strengthened through specific cooperation projects.

15. The standing political consultation mechanism instituted by the 28 December 1995 Declaration issued by the Presidents of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will be expanded so as to include defence issues, and the existing solidarity between the two sides will be strengthened.

Appendix II

**RESOLUTION BY THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY ON 21 JANUARY, 1997**

The Turkish Grand National Assembly,

Declaring that it adopts and endorses the Joint Declaration signed by the President of the Republic of Turkey H.E. Süleyman Demirel and the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus H.E. Rauf R. Denktaş, in Ankara, on 20 January 1997.

Welcoming with appreciation and respect, the address made today by the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus H.E. Rauf R. Denktaş, to the Plenary Session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly,

Has resolved to announce the following to Turkish and international public opinion:

1. The continuing intensive military build-up by the Greek Cypriot side, pursued with the encouragement and support of Greece, has reached a new dimension with the protocol concerning the deployment of Russian missiles on the Island. It is not possible to tolerate the conduct and behaviour of the Greek/Greek Cypriot side, aimed at threatening the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey.

2. The guarantee system established by the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance, continue to remain in full force as hitherto. Any modification of these Treaties directly or indirectly which would upset the existing balance in Cyprus and in the region between Turkey and Greece will not be allowed.

3. The Republic of Turkey will continue to exercise its effective guarantee in Cyprus. Any aggression against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will be considered as an aggression against the Republic of Turkey.

4. The unilateral application of the Greek Cypriot Administration for membership in the European Union is contrary to the 1960 Treaties. The realisation of such membership will only pave the way to the division of Cyprus and the responsibility will be long to the European Union.

5. The embargo and double standard applied towards the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus can in no way be accepted.

6. Turkey will continue to provide the necessary support to overcome the economic problems of the TRNC and to strengthen its economic infrastructure.

7. The Turkish Grand National Assembly believes that the Cyprus issue can be solved not through rearmament efforts and use of force but by respecting the rights of the two peoples living on the Island to establish their own administration through their own true will.

Experience has shown that outside interventions makes a solution more difficult. The world must know the fact that the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Turkish Nation are in a full unity on this national cause."

Appendix III

**SUMMARY OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT OBJECTIONS
TO THE GREEK CYPRIOT APPLICATION FOR FULL
MEMBERSHIP OF THE EU.**

On 3 July, 1990, the Greek Cypriots, under their assumed title of 'the government of Cyprus', made a unilateral application for EU membership. Although their application was presented as being on behalf of the whole island and of both communities, the Greek side didn't consider it necessary to **first consult** their Turkish Cypriot partners. Nor did they consult the UN, despite the fact that for a considerable time negotiations between the two Cypriot communities, under the auspices of the UN, had been in progress with a view to forming a bizonal federation in Cyprus on the basis of political equality between the two communities. It was thus perfectly clear to the Turkish side at the time that the Greek Cypriot application was yet another act of diplomatic belligerence through which the Greeks hoped to reaffirm their own hegemony in Cyprus. For, if the Greek side could persuade the EU -- or the EEC as it was then called -- to accept an application issuing solely from themselves, as 'the government of Cyprus', they would surely have an excellent chance of furthering their perennial goal of reducing the status of the Turkish Cypriots from that of an equal partner, as enshrined in the 1960 Accords and as accepted in the ongoing UN negotiations, to that of a political minority in a Greek Cypriot state. The fact that as recently as February, 1990, Perez de Cuellar, the then UN Secretary-General, had reaffirmed **univocally** that the relationship between the two Cypriot communities "*is not one of majority and minority, but one of two communities in the state of Cyprus*" (UN doc. S/21183, p. 7) might well have made the Greek side wish to test international opinion as regards their own status as '*the government of Cyprus*'.

The Turkish Cypriot reaction to the Greek Cypriot EU application was remarkably prompt. In a '**Memorandum Addressed to the Council of Ministers of the European Communities in respect of an "Application" for Membership by "The Republic of Cyprus"**', dated 12 July, 1990, the Turkish Cypriots pointed out that the unilateral application of the Greek side had no legal basis, despite the fact that the Greek Cypriot

community 'has in a number of contexts succeeded in assuming the mantle of "the Republic of Cyprus" (para. 2).

There was both a *constitutional* and an *international* aspect to the illegality of the Greek Cypriot application.

Despite the well-known fact that beginning with resolution 186 (1964) the world community had given 'recognition' to the all-Greek Government of Archbishop Makarios -- even though the Security Council knew that the Archbishop had, by force of arms, excluded the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, the Turkish Cypriot Ministers and all Turkish civil servants from their government offices in flagrant defiance of the 1960 constitution - the continuing *de facto* international recognition of solely Greek Cypriot governments in Cyprus did not mean, that these 'governments' were the governments of Cyprus *de jure*. The 1960 Cyprus Accords, including the fundamental constitutional requirement that the government of the country would be shared between the two communities, were still valid. They were valid because the original signatories to those agreements -- the two Cypriot communities, Greece, Great Britain, and Turkey -- had not agreed to change them. Consequently the Greek Cypriot application had no legal basis in the Cyprus constitution and in international law and therefore the EU should not entertain it.

Moreover, the Turkish side drew the EU's attention to how the Greek application was 'misconceived' in a number of other respects:

- (1) the application '**suggests a unity of the island which is not supportable either in law or in fact.**' The Turkish Cypriot Memorandum outlined the well-known (but doubtless insufficiently understood) history of the separation of the two communities: from the Greek attempt to implement the notorious Akritas Plan in December, 1963, to the declaration of the present Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in November, 1983;
- (2) the application violates the ban on *enosis* in article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee (and in Article 185 of the Constitution) which commits the Republic of Cyprus '**not to participate in whole or in part in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever.**' Clearly, whether or not the EU itself were properly regarded as 'a State', if the Greek Cypriots joined the EU they would

have effected the closest possible ties with their 'mother country' Greece, who was already a member. This would be nothing less than *enosis* in contemporary guise. It would simply mean 'a second vote for Greece' in the EU;

- (3) taking the Greek Cypriot application seriously would involve the EU Council of Ministers in complicity with Greece in violating the most recent Security Council Resolution (649 of 12 March, 1990). For this resolution had called upon **'the parties concerned to refrain from any action that would aggravate the situation'** in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot move to join the EU, aided and abetted by Greece, was plainly a most serious attempt to destroy **'the equality of status between the two communities that is the essential foundation for the continuance of negotiations on the wider question [viz., of how a federation could be achieved]'**. The EU could hardly wish to become involved in the Cyprus question to the extent of actually taking sides with the Greeks.

What is more, any consideration of the 1960 Accords, or indeed of the UN negotiation process which began as long ago as 1964, could not fail to bring to mind the *international* implications of the Greek Cypriot application. It was clear that the Greek side was not only violating the Cyprus constitution in its posture (indeed, imposture) as 'the government of Cyprus'; it was also acting in disregard of international law. This was because the 1960 Accords, which gave legitimacy to the original bi-communal Cyprus government, were of a uniquely international character.

In 1960 Britain did not simply grant the Cypriots (Greek and Turks) independence and remove herself from the country as had happened in other colonies. On the contrary, as part of the final settlement in Cyprus, Britain retained 99 square miles of the island as her own sovereign territory (for the purposes of her military bases); even more important, the 3 Treaties and the Constitution, which together made up the 1960 Accords, were agreements designed not only to give the Cypriots **'independence'** but also to ensure that the interests of their **mother countries'**, Greece and Turkey -- as well as the interests of Britain -- were adequately catered for. Hence the Accords were a *sui generis* arrangement not only between Britain and the actual natives of the island, the two Cypriots communities, but between Britain, the Cypriots, Greece,

and Turkey. The *five* parties to these Accords had not agreed together, formally or informally, to change the Accords in such a way that the unilateral Greek Cypriot application could have the slightest validity. The fact that the Greek Cypriots had managed to get themselves recognised since the 1964 UN Resolution as 'the government of Cyprus' was, from the point of view of international law, irrelevant. The Security Council was not itself a judicial body. It could not rescind valid international treaties. 'The internationally unlawful character of the authority [i.e., the Greek Cypriot 'government of Cyprus'] that purports to make the application deprives it of the capacity so to act ... It is a nullity. In law, therefore, there exists no application that the Council of Ministers may refer to the Commission for an opinion and no application that the Commission may properly receive.'

These were the essential points of objection in the Turkish Cypriot Memorandum. The Turkish side hastened to add, however, that they had no objection in principle to the eventual inclusion of Cyprus among EU members. But it should be clear to everyone who understood the situation in Cyprus that the Cyprus problem would need to be solved *first*. Then, and only then, could a properly constituted Cyprus federal government, consisting of representatives of both communities, make a proper application.

In 'A Supplementary Note' dated 3 September, 1990, the Turkish side sent the EU some historical material which supported their contentions in the earlier Memorandum.

Referring to documents recently released by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, notably to the minutes of the meetings preparatory to the London Conference at the end of which the Zürich and London Agreements were signed on 19 February, 1959, the Turkish side defended its claim that the intention of the 1960 Accords was the creation of **'a bicomunal partnership Republic... in which the two constituent communities of that Republic... were to be politically equal'** (para. 3), and that the 1960 Accords were of a uniquely international character.

Among the various passages cited were the following:

- * The insistence of the then Greek Foreign Minister that *"it was indispensable that the conference should be between the three Governments [Britain, Greece, and Turkey] and representatives of the two communities."*

- * The very explicit statement, made by both Averoff and Zorlu (the then Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, respectively), that **"the present settlement would be based not on the British Government granting a Constitution to the Island but on their signing an international treaty under which they would recognize the existence of the new Cypriot State together with its Constitution. The position under international law [would be] that the United Kingdom was agreeing with Greece and Turkey to guarantee an independent State of Cyprus and the maintenance of certain essential elements in its Constitution."**
- * Averoff's remark that **"in theory the Republic of Cyprus would be free to conduct foreign policy, but in practice the mechanism of the veto [the veto the constitution grants to both the Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President of Cyprus] would ensure that foreign policy was conducted only in agreement with Greece and Turkey."** And Averoff's characterisation of the establishment of the new Cypriot regime as **a joint Greek-Turkish venture.**
- * The two Foreign Ministers agreed that **"there would be no objection to Cypriot membership of international associations of which both Greece and Turkey were members..."** But they said that their intention was **"to avoid the possibility of either Greece or Turkey securing a more favourable economic position in Cyprus than the other - of Greece, for example, establishing a kind of economic enosis"** - 'an almost prophetic statement' as Averoff himself underlined.

It is regretted that despite all these compelling arguments produced by the Turkish side, the EU proceeded to welcome the Greek Cypriot application for membership.

We herewith enclose the aforesaid British documents as a further reference.

TOP SECRET

Appendix IV

TEXT OF THE "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENTS" REACHED BETWEEN
M. KARAMANLIS AND M. MENDERES

1. Greece and Turkey will support the entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

The establishment of NATO bases in the Island and their composition require the agreement of the two Governments.

2. It was agreed between the two Prime Ministers that they would make representations to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus respectively in order that the Communist Party and Communist activities may be prohibited.

3. The first commander of the tripartite Headquarters envisaged in Article 3 of the Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey shall be chosen by lot.

4. It was agreed that immediately after the signature of the Treaties all the emergency measures now imposed in Cyprus should be lifted and a general amnesty should be proclaimed.

5. The Constitution shall be drawn up within the shortest possible time by a committee consisting of a representative of the Greek Cypriot community, a representative of the Turkish Cypriot community and two representatives who shall be appointed by the Governments of Greece and Turkey respectively.

This committee, which shall be assisted by a legal expert, in the capacity of adviser, chosen by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Greece and Turkey, shall in its work have regard to and shall scrupulously observe the points contained in the documents of the Zürich Conference and shall fulfil its task in accordance with the principles there laid down.

Done at Zürich, February 11, 1959.

Appendix V

| |
|---|
| SECRET |
| THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT |
| RGC 1073/28 |
| Foreign Office (Secret) and Whitehall (Secret) Distribution |
| ARCHIVES COPY. Copy No. 13 |
| NOT FOR CIRCULATION. |

**RECORD OF A MEETING AFTER DINNER AT 1 CARLTON GARDENS
ON FEBRUARY 11, 1959**

Present:

| | | |
|--------------------|----------|---------------|
| Secretary of State | M. Zorlu | M. Averoff |
| Lord Perth | M. Birgi | M. Seferiades |
| Mr. Profumo | | |
| Sir Norman Brook | | |
| Sir John Martin | | |
| Mr. Laskey | | |
| Mr. Addis | | |

Cyprus

M. Averoff opened the discussion by saying that the central point was that Greece and Turkey wanted Great Britain. Greece and Turkey were now, as traditionally, threatened by the Russian menace. The only defence was Greek-Turkish friendship. This was a geographical and political necessity. It was necessary to reinforce this friendship. To-day the reinforcement came from the United States. It was also necessary to have a strong and friendly Great Britain in the area.

2. *M. Zorlu*, recalling the discussion between the three Foreign Ministers in Paris, said that in their recent discussions the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers had been guided by the interests of the people of Cyprus and the interests of Greece and Turkey. They proposed the conclusion of a treaty between Great Britain, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, and that the provisions of this treaty should be linked with the new constitution of Cyprus by a specific article. There would also be a tripartite guarantee providing for joint action in the event of a breach of the treaty or of the constitution, and providing also that if agreement on joint action could not be achieved, each of the three Powers would have the right to act unilaterally to ensure observance of the constitution. Greece and Turkey were also ready to defend Cyprus against external threats, and therefore proposed a joint Military Headquarters in Cyprus in command of Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot troops. This joint Headquarters would also have the function of training the Army of the Republic of Cyprus, which would consist of 2,000 men—40 per cent. Turkish and 60 per cent. Greek; this ceiling could be increased by a joint decision of the Greek Cypriot President and Turkish Cypriot Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus. It would be for Her Majesty's Government to conclude an alliance with the Republic of Cyprus in respect of the sovereign British bases. He thought that there would be no difficulty for Her Majesty's Government in this matter, since the United Kingdom had sovereignty over the whole island to begin with and would retain all that the United Kingdom required. The question of the securities to be provided for the British bases was a matter for discussion. Both Greece and Turkey were glad that there would be British bases in Cyprus. Provided Her Majesty's Government agreed, the Greek and Turkish Governments wished to propose the Republic of Cyprus for membership of NATO. As regards the constitution, there would be a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, each elected by his respective community, and each having two kinds of vetoes: an absolute veto in respect of foreign affairs, defence and security,

SECRET

2

SECRET

and a suspensive veto in respect of laws and decisions. In respect of foreign affairs, however, there would be no veto on Cyprus joining alliances and international organisations of which both Turkey and Greece were members. In the joint assembly and in the administration and in the police, the proportion of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots would be 30:70. There would also be separate communal assemblies with competence in such matters as education and religion, and also with some rights in respect of taxation. In the event of a conflict of competence, there would be provision for appeal to a Supreme Court consisting of one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot and one neutral. There would also be a High Court of Justice consisting of two Greek Cypriots, two Turkish Cypriots and one neutral. Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot Judges would try cases where only one community was involved, and there would be a Mixed Court for cases involving both communities. The Cabinet of Ministers would consist of 7 Greek Cypriot and 3 Turkish Cypriot Ministers. Appointments and promotions in the Army and in the Civil Service would be made by the President and Vice-President. The High Command of the joint Military Headquarters would rotate between Greek, Turkish and Cypriot.

3. *M. Averoff* said that they had also drawn up a "Gentlemen's Agreement" under which the two Prime Ministers undertook to impress on the leaders of the two communities the need to outlaw Communism. They had also agreed that relations could not be established between Cyprus and Communist States. The wide powers attributed to the President and Vice-President were very important because of their powers of veto. In their bilateral discussions the Greek and Turkish Ministers had deliberately left the interests of Great Britain on one side, but hoped that the constitution which they had outlined would provide a firm basis to safeguard the United Kingdom's interests. On external matters, the Greek and Turkish Ministers had gone as far as they could before engaging in discussions with Her Majesty's Government. The proposed alliance and Treaty of Guarantee were difficult matters for Greece to accept.

4. *M. Zorlu* said that the juridical basis of the agreement would be Her Majesty's Government's declaration surrendering sovereignty. This fact would make the proposed arrangements easier of acceptance to Greek and Turkish public opinion.

5. *The Secretary of State* asked what procedure the two Foreign Ministers had in mind for the present discussions in London.

6. *M. Zorlu* said that this would be for Her Majesty's Government to decide. *M. Averoff* and himself were in favour of proceeding as rapidly as possible. They thought that the settlement must be concluded in a short time, for example, within six months. Both Turkey and Greece had difficulties. Turkey was bound by the Turkish Assembly's decision in favour of partition. Greece had given up the claim for Enosis in favour of the claim for independence; but the form of independence now proposed was "shackled," and the Treaty of Guarantee would also be difficult of acceptance. *M. Zorlu* also mentioned the danger of leakage of the substance of the discussions and of the effect that this might have in whittling away the agreement.

7. *The Secretary of State* said that the political decisions might be reached quickly but that the administrative details might be difficult to settle.

8. *M. Zorlu* emphasised that there was no objection to United Kingdom bases and facilities. The United Kingdom would now have the bases and the security for them without the burden of administering Cyprus. There was a mutual advantage: Greece and Turkey would have the security of the United Kingdom bases in Cyprus, and the United Kingdom would have the security of Greek-Turkish agreement. It was agreed between the Greek and Turkish Ministers that Her Majesty's Government should have all the necessary facilities in connexion with the United Kingdom bases. They thought there would be no difficulty in reaching agreement on these matters, and it was for this reason that they were not covered in the documents drawn up at Zürich.

9. *The Secretary of State* said that the first point was that the British bases should be sovereign. He asked how it was proposed that the bases should be defined.

SECRET

SECRET

3

10. *M. Averoff* and *M. Zorlu* said that this was now for discussion.
11. *The Secretary of State* asked about facilities in connexion with the bases.
12. *M. Averoff* and *M. Zorlu* said that the facilities required by Her Majesty's Government in connexion with the United Kingdom bases would be guaranteed by Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus.
13. *The Secretary of State* said that there would be no security if the facilities were dependent solely on the Republic of Cyprus.
14. *M. Averoff* said that the agreement of the Cypriots must be obtained from the outset. Therefore, before the conference, it would be useful if Her Majesty's Government could tell the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers of the bases and facilities they required so that they could win the support of the Cypriots.
15. *The Secretary of State*, summing up, said that the Greeks and Turks would give the United Kingdom a treaty guarantee of the rights and facilities required. There would also be a quadripartite treaty to provide a safeguard against Cyprus drifting towards Communist associations. He asked what was proposed for the armed forces of Cyprus.
16. *M. Averoff* said that the Republic of Cyprus would have an Army of 2,000 men and in addition a Police and Gendarmerie force of not more than 2,000. In the latter, the proportion of Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots would be 60:40, not 70:30, because of the greater proportion of Turkish Cypriots in the police at the present time. The proposal was that where the Chief was Greek Cypriot the Vice-Chief would be Turkish Cypriot, and this balance would be maintained throughout the administration.
17. *M. Zorlu* said that of the three important Ministries, of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Finance, one would be entrusted to a Turkish Cypriot.
18. *M. Averoff* said that it was agreed that the proportion of 70:30 should be followed as closely as possible throughout the administration.
19. *M. Zorlu* said that Ministers would be appointed by the President and Vice-President. There was also provision for five Turkish municipalities and that this arrangement should be reviewed after four years.
20. *Lord Perth* said that the proposal to set up the new State in a period of six months was very difficult. The Cypriots had no experience of government, and electoral rolls, &c., would have to be prepared. In the transition period Great Britain, Greece and Turkey would have to work closely together. There was also the question of the minority communities.
21. *M. Averoff* said that the period of six months was not in itself important. What was important was to reach the political agreement and to bring peace to the island.
22. *Mr. Profumo* asked whether it was proposed that there should be a referendum.
23. *M. Zorlu* said that Archbishop Makarios and *M. Kucuk* must participate in the tripartite discussions. They had already been informed in general terms of the agreements reached at Zürich. He did not expect that there would be difficulty from these two. It would be necessary to explain to them the line of policy, and they would then be able to deal with criticisms in their own communities.
24. *M. Averoff* said that a referendum could be dangerous. If there were to be a referendum, Archbishop Makarios might find it difficult to adhere to the agreement. EOKA was another question. EOKA was stronger than the Archbishop. He hoped that EOKA would not oppose the agreement, and it was possible that they might help.
25. *The Secretary of State* asked for further elucidation on the question of foreign affairs under the proposed arrangement.
26. *M. Averoff* replied that in theory the Republic of Cyprus would be free to conduct foreign policy, but in practice the mechanism of the veto would ensure that foreign policy was conducted only in agreement with Greece and Turkey. He described the new régime as a joint Greek-Turkish adventure. The foreign policy

SECRET

SECRET

4

- of the Republic of Cyprus would be in harmony with Greece and Turkey if relations between Greece and Turkey were good; and with the Cyprus problem settled there was no reason why relations should be other than good.
27. *The Secretary of State* asked what was intended in regard to membership of the United Nations.
28. *M. Averoff* replied that membership of the United Nations was indispensable for the Republic of Cyprus. It was also proposed that the treaty would be deposited with the United Nations so that there could be no departure from the treaty without the consent of the United Nations.
29. *The Secretary of State* asked for further information on the proposed ban on establishing relations with the Soviet Union.
30. *M. Averoff* replied that in the first place there would be a power of veto vested in the President and Vice-President. Secondly, there would be the strong force of the alliance with Greece and Turkey and the presence of Greek and Turkish troops. They had proposed that this alliance should be tripartite (*i.e.*, not including the United Kingdom) because they thought that in this way it could exert a more direct influence on the Cypriots: it would be a family matter.
31. *Mr. Profumo* asked what sanctions Greece and Turkey could apply in respect of the British bases in the event of difficulties.
32. *M. Averoff* replied that there would be the tripartite guarantee of the maintenance of the Constitution, including the provision for individual action in default of agreement for joint action.
33. *The Secretary of State*, summing up, said that our essential facilities would be guaranteed not only by the Republic of Cyprus, but also by Greece and Turkey.
34. *M. Averoff* said that the central fact was that Greece and Turkey had agreed to collaborate. In this framework everything fell into place.
35. *M. Zorlu* said that the presence of Greek and Turkish troops in Cyprus was necessary as the symbol of Greek-Turkish collaboration.
36. After further discussion, *the Secretary of State* asked what guarantees there would eventually be that the elected President and Vice-President would be acceptable to Greece and Turkey. Her Majesty's Government for their part had more confidence in Greece and Turkey than in Cyprus.
37. *M. Zorlu* said that the safeguard was the Treaty Guarantee prohibiting alliances unacceptable to Greece and Turkey.
38. *Sir John Martin* pointed out that three of the Greek Cypriot Mayors were at present Communists.
39. *M. Averoff* said that the Turkish Cypriot municipalities would be proof against penetration. He said that Communism existed only in a few places in Cyprus. Even in these places there had been changes since the last elections, and the influence of the new trade unions loyal to Archbishop Makarios was increasing. There was also the factor that EOKA belonged to the Extreme Right.
40. *M. Zorlu* said that there was also the proposed law prohibiting Communist activities.
41. *Mr. Profumo* asked about Grivas.
42. *M. Averoff* replied that activities in favour of either Enosis or partition would be outlawed in the Constitution.
43. *M. Averoff* said that at Zürich the two Prime Ministers had attached great importance to convening the five-part conference as soon as possible. If arrangements for the visit of the British Ministers to Moscow made this impossible, the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers felt that they would have to present the substance of the Zürich agreement to their Parliaments very shortly.
44. *M. Zorlu* emphasised that the best arrangement would be an immediate five-part conference.

SECRET

SECRET

5

45. *The Secretary of State* said that on the basis of what the two Foreign Ministers had explained to him, the ideas contained in the Zürich agreements did not seem impossible of acceptance.

46. *Lord Perth* suggested that it might be possible to reach early agreement on principles.

47. *M. Zorlu* said that Archbishop Makarios and M. Kucuk were being informed of the substance of the agreement. It was not likely that they would be opposed to them.

48. *Sir Norman Brook* asked whether a public declaration by the three Governments might make acceptance by the two communities more difficult.

49. *M. Averoff* said that it was indispensable that the conference should be between the three Governments and representatives of the two communities.

50. *The Secretary of State* asked if it was intended that the Prime Ministers should attend the conference.

51. *M. Averoff* said that this would be preferable.

52. *M. Zorlu* suggested that representatives of the two communities might attend the conference as advisers to the Greek and Turkish Governments.

53. *M. Averoff* said that it would be preferable to have representatives of the two communities present at the conference as participants.

54. *The Secretary of State* suggested that it would not be necessary for Prime Ministers to attend.

55. *Sir Norman Brook* suggested that if the three Foreign Ministers reached agreement it might be possible to convene early next week a conference with the participation of representatives of the two communities, which might reach agreement on a public declaration. There might then be a later conference to settle the details.

56. *The Secretary of State*, confirming this suggestion, said that there seemed to be a basis for reaching agreement. The quicker we proceeded the better.

57. *M. Birgi* said that the agreement reached was like a soufflé, which must be eaten at once, otherwise it would collapse.

58. *M. Averoff* spoke of the restoration of Greek-Turkish friendship and of the security this would provide not only for the two countries but also for the Middle East. Cyprus would no longer be a weakness which could be exploited by our enemies. Both sides had made concessions at Zürich.

59. *M. Averoff* raised the question whether Archbishop Makarios should be allowed to return to Cyprus before coming to the conference. He said that Archbishop Makarios should be the sole invited representative of the Greek Cypriots. The six Mayors should not be invited, since in his opinion they did not represent anyone and were not recognised by EOKA. *M. Averoff* would himself telephone to Nicosia the following day to instruct the Bishop of Kitium to go to Athens to give Archbishop Makarios the latest information from inside Cyprus. He suggested that it would be very desirable to raise the ban on Makarios' return to Cyprus before inviting him to attend the conference in London, even if in fact there would be no time for a prior visit to Cyprus.

60. *The Secretary of State* said that this last suggestion would be very difficult for Her Majesty's Government on political grounds.

SECRET

SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

RGC 1073/28

Foreign Office (Secret) and Whitehall (Secret) Distribution
NOT FOR CIRCULATION

Copy No. 13

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE AT 4 p.m.
ON THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1959

Present:

| | | |
|-----------------------|---------------|--------------|
| The Foreign Secretary | M. Averoff | M. Zorlu |
| Lord Perth | M. Seferiades | M. Birgi |
| Mr. Profumo | M. Palamas | M. Tepedeten |
| Sir John Martin | | |
| Mr. Melville | | |
| Mr. Mothershead | | |
| Mr. Addis | | |
| Mr. Laskey | | |
| Mr. Wade-Gery | | |

Cyprus

The Secretary of State, after welcoming the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers to the meeting, read out the text of the Parliamentary Answer which he had just delivered in the House of Commons. He explained that he had not yet studied the documents of the Zürich Conference sufficiently to be ready for an exhaustive discussion. But he had a number of questions he would like to ask; these were largely technical, and were not a sign of any hesitation on the part of Her Majesty's Government. He hoped to have a meeting with his colleagues on the morning of February 13, and that by that afternoon he would be in a position to say both what Her Majesty's Government were able to accept and Her Majesty's Government's requirements. If agreement between the Three Powers could be reached in this way on February 13, it should then be possible to invite the Greek and Turkish Cypriot Delegations to London for a Conference. Sir Hugh Foot had already been asked to come back and the Colonial Secretary would probably interrupt his travels and return also.

M. Averoff said that his Prime Minister had explained the Zürich agreement to Archbishop Makarios, whose reaction had been favourable. It was, however, important to pin him down to the actual documents, which he would be seeing that evening. *M. Averoff* hoped to be able to report the Archbishop's final reaction that night or the following morning. The current attitude of the Greek community in Cyprus itself was that they would agree to anything which the Archbishop accepted. *The Secretary of State* said that he thought the Archbishop's latest statement, as reported in the Press, had been helpful.

In answer to a question from the Secretary of State, *M. Averoff* and *M. Zorlu* confirmed that the documents would not be published yet. When they were, it would be simultaneously in both the Greek and Turkish Parliaments. Publication would never, in any case, extend to the "Gentlemen's Agreements" which would remain permanently secret.

The Secretary of State then said that he would prefer for the moment not to discuss British requirements for military bases. This was a technical matter, and one on which all three delegations were in any case agreed in principle. He therefore turned to the Zürich documents beginning with the Treaty of Guarantee. Was the second paragraph of Article 1 intended to preclude Cypriot membership of all international associations, as for example the Free Trade Area if that ever came into existence?

SECRET

SECRET

M. Zorlu explained that the paragraph was intended to prohibit partition and Enosis (either with Greece or with any other country). *M. Averoff* agreed; he explained that the wording was specifically designed to exclude possible Greek devices in the direction of Enosis, such as a personal union of Cyprus and Greece under the Greek crown. *M. Zorlu* and *M. Averoff* both made it clear that there would be no objection to Cypriot membership of international associations of which both Greece and Turkey were members; e.g. the Postal Union, and any Free Trade Area. Nor did they exclude either Commonwealth membership for Cyprus or membership of the Sterling Area. They would, indeed, welcome Commonwealth membership, and had already so informed Mrs. Barbara Castle and Mr. Francis Noel Baker. Article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee could be amended if necessary to make clear that neither Commonwealth nor Sterling Area membership were excluded. But the final decision on such memberships would, of course, rest with the Cypriots themselves.

In answer to the question from the Secretary of State, *M. Averoff* and *M. Zorlu* confirmed that the "basic articles" of the constitution referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee were all the articles set out in the document on the Basic Structure of Cyprus.

Turning to the Treaty of Alliance, the Secretary of State said that the United Kingdom would have to share in the external defence of Cyprus, partly because of her need to defend the immediate neighbourhood and the British bases, and partly because in practice the United Kingdom alone would have the necessary forces on the spot. It would be advisable for the British commanders to have a common defence plan worked out in concert with the commanders of the other military forces in the island. *M. Averoff* said that if the Island were ever invaded, the interests of Britain, Greece and Turkey would alike be in danger. He recognised that in practice the British forces would need to defend their bases and the neighbourhood of their bases. It should be possible to arrange the necessary co-ordination between the proposed tripartite Headquarters and the British forces, and for the tripartite Headquarters to make it known that a common plan worked out with the British would be necessary. But he would prefer not formally to include the United Kingdom in the tripartite Headquarters, which for presentational reasons it would be better to keep entirely "in the family."

After further discussion *M. Averoff* and *M. Zorlu* promised on behalf of their Governments that the Greek and Turkish representatives in the tripartite Headquarters would state that defence co-ordination with the British forces would be necessary. It was generally agreed that a British share in the responsibility for the Island's external defence was in any case established by the Treaty of Guarantee, under which Britain would be pledged to ensure the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus.

M. Averoff said that joint defence planning would follow naturally if Cyprus became a member of NATO. Cypriot membership of NATO was foreseen in the "Gentlemen's Agreements" and was very strongly desired by Greece for three reasons:—

- (a) It would discourage the extremists in Cyprus, who might at some future date be tempted to agitate against the maintenance of the present settlement.
- (b) It would help to bind Cyprus securely to the West.
- (c) It would encourage the development of Cypriot national consciousness (*M. Averoff* admitted that *M. Zorlu* was less enthusiastic than himself about this last point).

The Secretary of State said that he was not opposed in principle to Cypriot membership of NATO. But was it really likely that the other members of NATO would all agree? *M. Averoff* and *M. Zorlu* said that NATO agreement ought not in their view to be unobtainable; *M. Zorlu* added that he personally expected even the Scandinavian members to be amenable.

In reply to a question from *M. Averoff*, the Secretary of State said that he was not yet in a position to say what bases and facilities the United Kingdom would need to retain. In addition to the British areas, there would have to be provision for such matters as freedom of access. For reasons of administrative convenience alone these requirements would naturally be kept to the minimum.

SECRET

SECRET

In answer to a question from the Secretary of State, *M. Averoff* and *M. Zorlu* said that they hoped that the amnesty and the lifting of the emergency, envisaged in the "Gentlemen's Agreements," could take place at the end of the Conference to be held the following week. This would naturally be on the assumption that EOKA did not seek to oppose the settlement. The amnesty would, of course, exclude non-political criminals. *M. Averoff* pointed out that it would be fatal to the success of the agreement if the British Security Forces were to capture Colonel Grivas after the Conference had been successfully held. In the unlikely event of any continued violence in Cyprus it would be the responsibility of the Greek Government and Archbishop Makarios to denounce it.

The Secretary of State and Lord Perth said that it would be impossible to promise a complete amnesty and a complete end to the emergency for the coming week. But as much as possible would be done in this direction. The Governor would be consulted on his return to London. *M. Averoff* pleaded for some announcement about relaxations to be made straight away if possible.

Turning to the documents on the "Basic Structure" of Cyprus, the Secretary of State asked what would be the position of the minor communities in Cyprus (e.g., Maronites and Armenians). *M. Averoff* and *M. Zorlu* replied that they had discussed the problem and thought that the minor communities might be told to choose whether they wished to be regarded as members of the Greek or the Turkish Community for the purposes of such matters as voting and public service. *M. Averoff* pointed out that they were not numerous enough to merit any parliamentary representation. *M. Zorlu* said that small minorities did not normally have special protection in other countries. Following a suggestion of the Secretary of State, *M. Averoff* and *M. Zorlu* agreed that wording could be inserted in the constitution to guarantee the basic human rights of the minor communities and to make provision for their religious and educational affairs. The constitution could also provide that, by consent of the President and Vice-President, members of the minor communities could be employed within either the Greek or the Turkish percentage of the public services, including the Police and Armed Forces.

In answer to a question from the Secretary of State about the second section of paragraph 14 of the "Basic Structure," *M. Averoff* and *M. Zorlu* made clear that the Cypriot Army, like the Cypriot Security Forces, could be increased or decreased by agreement between the President and the Vice-President.

Lord Perth pointed out that it would be necessary to provide for compensation to be paid for the United Kingdom government officials and Police officers employed by the present Cyprus Government (other than those on direct secondment from the United Kingdom, who of course presented no problem). *M. Averoff* asked whether these persons could not be re-employed within the British bases, or whether the British Government could not pay their compensation out of the money which they would save as a result of the new settlement in Cyprus. The Secretary of State explained that Her Majesty's Government were anxious to avoid setting an undesirable precedent which could be quoted against them in other Colonial territories reaching independence; the normal pattern in such cases was for the newly independent Government either to retain the services of expatriates or to compensate them.

In answer to a question from the Secretary of State about paragraph 22 of the "Basic Structure," *M. Averoff* and *M. Zorlu* explained that by "separatist independence" was meant the possibility of Cyprus being partitioned into two independent States (in contrast to "partition" which implied the union of part of Cyprus with Turkey).

On paragraph 23 of the "Basic Structure," Lord Perth said that the most-favoured-nation provision as drafted might do economic harm to Cyprus. *M. Averoff* and *M. Zorlu* said that the maintenance of Commonwealth Preference would not be excluded. The intention was to exclude more favourable bilateral agreements between Cyprus and countries other than the Three Powers, and also to avoid the possibility of either Greece or Turkey securing a more favourable economic position in Cyprus than the other of Greece, for example, establishing a kind of economic enosis.

The Secretary of State said that the Governor would have to be consulted about the provision, in paragraph 26 of the "Basic Structure," for the Treaty to enter into force within three months from signature. This period might well need

SECRET

SECRET

5

to be longer. *M. Averoff* agreed, and *M. Zorlu* suggested six months as a possibility. It was agreed that this problem would be considered further. *Lord Perth* stressed the advantages of naming a particular date for the achieving of independence, rather than specifying a lapse of time.

In answer to a question from the Secretary of State, *M. Averoff* and *M. Zorlu* said that they did not exclude the possibility of altering the "Basic Structure" before it was finally published. For example, changes might be made to take account of Commonwealth Preference and of the minor communities.

The Secretary of State drew attention to a number of points which were not covered by the Zürich documents and which would need to be considered:—

(a) Nationality; it would be difficult to settle this finally until it was known whether Cyprus was to be a member of the Commonwealth.

(b) A legal definition would be required for the Republic of Cyprus; i.e., the exact extent of its territory would have to be laid down.

(c) External financial aid would be required by the new Cypriot State at least initially; the United Kingdom would probably be willing to help and it is expected that Greece and Turkey would also be willing.

M. Averoff expressed some doubts about (b), and both he and *M. Zorlu* were evasive on the subject of Greek and Turkish financial aid. *M. Averoff* appeared to be genuinely astonished to learn that apart from the cost of the emergency Her Majesty's Government was at present giving Cyprus an annual subsidy of some millions sterling.

After agreement had been reached on the attached Press communiqué⁽¹⁾ the meeting adjourned at 6.10 p.m.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

SECRET

- Addis, A.D, 42
- Agreements, London and Zürich,
1, 18, 39, 43, 51-53, 61, 64,
66, 68, 69, 71, 74, 75, 80, 83,
85, 86, 96, 97, 104, 107-109,
112, 113, 121, 122, 132, 133,
135, 141, 143
- AHEPA, 127
- AKEL, 17, 18, 92, 126, 127
- Akritas Plan, 52, 76, 141
- Akrotiri, 55, 96, 120
- Allen, Sir Roger, 101, 111, 116
- Allied Headquarters, 95
- Amery, Julian, 69, 103-105, 108,
115
- Anthimos, Bishop, 52
- Asim Efendi, 10
- Austrian Treaty, 47
- Averoff, Evangelos, 20-22, 25,
27, 28, 36, 39, 40-50, 52-54,
64-71, 73-75, 93-97, 99, 104,
111, 113, 115-117, 144
- Ayios Vassilios, 76
- Bandung Conference, 100
- Barnes, E.J.W, 120
- Barrows Sir B., 109
- Bevan, Aneurin, 7, 22
- Bi-communal, 14, 18, 41, 64, 71,
72, 79, 124, 142
- Birgi, Muharrem Nuri, 36
- Bosnia, 77, 78
- Bowker, Sir James, 31
- Boyd, Alan Lennox, 21, 63, 98
- Callaghan, James, 22
- Campbell, A., 69
- Cape Greco, 96
- Casting Vote, 10, 14
- Castle, Barbara, 7, 36-39
- Christmas, 76, 92
- Clerides, Glafkos, 73, 74, 76, 91,
113, 131
- Co-partnership Republic, 98
- Communism, 46, 49
- Condominium, 36, 101, 102, 104
- Constitution, Colonial, 10, 15-18
- Constitution, Cyprus 1960, 43,
44, 46-48, 51, 58, 61, 64, 67,
68, 71-75, 77, 85, 87, 88, 108,
109, 113, 141-144
- Corrie, Philip, 12
- Council of Europe, 70
- Coup, (1963 and 1974), 18, 70,
76, 78-80, 112, 115
- Crete, 3, 4, 36, 90, 129
- Cuellar, Perez de, 129, 131, 140
- Cypriotness, 13, 128
- Daily Herald, 76
- Daily Telegraph, 77
- Demirel, Süleyman, 138
- Denktaş, Rauf, 26, 27, 32, 34,
116, 134, 138
- Dhekelia, 55, 96, 97, 120
- Disraeli, Benjamin, 6, 7
- Doctrine, Joint Defence, 133
- Eden, Anthony, 7
- Enosis, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10-15, 17, 18,
20, 25, 27, 32, 38, 39, 51-53,
69, 72, 73, 76-80, 85, 87, 89,
125-128, 132, 142, 144
- EOKA, 1, 32, 42, 46, 52, 63, 79
- Epirus, 4
- Equal footing, 11, 43, 65, 81, 129
- Equality, 10, 43, 48, 51, 72, 81,
133, 140, 142

Ertekin, Necati M., 113, 114
 Esenbel, Melih, 37, 38, 42
 Ethnarch, 5
 Ethnarchy, 37, 127
 EU, 78, 130-132, 136, 140-144
 European Parliament, 78
 Federal State, 50
 Federalism, 42, 51, 72
 Foot, Sir Hugh, 10, 27, 35, 39, 50, 103, 106, 111, 113, 115-117
 Gentlemen's Agreement, 51
 George, Lloyd, 1, 7
 Gladstone, 6, 7
 Gore, Ormsby, 16, 115
 Greek Contingent, 78, 95, 96
 Greek Officers, 9, 61, 78
 Grey, Edward, 7
 Guardian, 76
 Hellenism, 4, 17
 Higham, J.D., 69
 Hill, Sir George, 1, 9, 12
 Işın, Burhan, 35
 Ionian, 4, 9
 Iron Curtain, 127
 Karabagh, 78
 Karamanlis, Constantine, 20, 27, 28, 37, 43, 53, 54, 95-97
 Kimberley, Lord, 10
 Kohn, Hans, 4
 Kolettis, John, 3
 Küçük, Dr. Fazıl, 26, 27, 32, 34, 35, 38, 101-107, 110, 111, 114, 116, 117
 Kunalp, Zeki, 109
 Kural, Adnan, 116, 117
 Kyrrou, Alexis, 125
 Lancaster House, 38, 66, 69, 71
 Layard, Henry, 8
 Legislative Council, 10, 11, 12, 15
 Lloyd, Selwyn, 7, 21, 33, 45, 47, 66, 93, 98
 London Joint Committee, 100, 105
 Luke, Sir Harry, 1, 5
 MacDonald, Malcolm, 7, 16
 Macmillan, Harold, 18, 20, 22-24, 27-36, 39, 41, 53, 63, 93
 Makarios, Archbishop, 1, 2, 18, 20, 28, 36-39, 44, 50, 52, 53, 67, 68, 71-74, 77, 78, 80, 100, 101, 103-108, 111-114, 116-119, 126-128, 141
 Markides, Kyriakos C., 2, 17
 Meclis-i İdare, 10
 Megali Idea, 2, 3, 4, 79
 Menderes, Adnan, 21, 23, 29, 33, 35, 95-97, 110, 112
 Metaxas, 16
 MFN, 69
 Millet System, 5
 Moorehead, Peter, 76
 Musurus Pasha, 12
 Nasser, Colonel, 49, 100, 101
 National Guard, 78
 NATO, 36, 37, 44, 49, 92, 122, 126-128
 Nehru, 100
 Newham, Canon F.D., 125
 Non-Aligned, 100
 Örek, Osman, 115, 116
 Pan-Hellenic, 2

Partition, 21-25, 28-31, 33, 37-39, 42, 49, 58, 64, 94, 95, 106
 PEO, 127
 PEON, 16
 Philemon, 125
 Plebiscite, 18, 83, 85, 127
 Plümer, Fazıl, 116
 Radcliffe, Lord, 13, 18, 21, 28
 Reddaway, John, 7, 13, 18, 35
 Roberts, Sir Frank, 42
 Ross, A.D.M., 31, 106, 115
 Rossides, Zenon, 105, 106
 Said Pasha, 12
 Sarper, Selim, 42, 115, 116
 Second Greek State, 51, 71, 136
 Seferiades, 22
 Self-determination, 14, 21, 22, 32, 33, 36, 64, 76, 82, 83, 85
 Self-Rule, 14-18, 20
 Sendall, Sir Walter J., 9, 12
 Skylloura, 76
 Sovereignty, 7, 8, 13, 36, 43, 45-51, 53, 55, 59, 63-67, 69, 79, 81, 92, 93, 95-99, 101, 102, 108, 112, 114, 117-121
 Soysal, Prof. Mümtaz, 106
 Stavrinos, Zenon, 3
 Sublime Porte, 10
 Suez, 86, 126
 Sulzberger, 126
 The Times, 12, 52, 54, 76, 77, 91, 107, 114, 132
 Thessaly, 4
 Third World, 100
 Tito, 49, 100
 Tornaritis, 113, 114
 Treaty of Alliance, 49-51, 61, 62, 67, 70, 85, 95
 Tridominium, 31
 Triple Condominium, 36
 Türel, Vechi, 107
 Turkish contingent, 95, 96
 Turkish intervention, 72, 78, 79, 80
 Turkish Republic, 95, 133-138, 141
 UN, 1, 30, 37-44, 64, 66, 70, 75, 77-79, 88, 127-131, 136, 140, 142, 143
 UNFICYP, 78, 129
 United Arab Republic, 100
 Unsi Suomi, 1
 US, 1, 18, 20-27, 29-36, 38-53, 55-83, 85, 86, 87-89, 92-108, 110-122, 124-144
 Valliant, F.A., 120, 121
 Venizelos, Eleftherios, 2, 125
 Veto, 28, 43, 44, 51, 65, 68, 72, 116, 144
 Waldheim, Dr. Kurt, 129
 Webb, Sydney, 7
 Winster, Lord, 16, 17
 Wolseley, Sir Garnet, 4, 6, 8
 Woodhouse, 53, 54
 Xydis, Stephen G., 3
 Zartides, 126, 127
 Zorlu, Fatin Rüstü, 23, 29-31, 39-46, 48, 49, 64-66, 68, 69, 93-95, 97, 101-105, 108-112, 144
 Zürich, 1, 51, 64, 75, 83, 95-97, 104, 106, 107, 112, 115, 143