

THE CYPRUS REVIEW

a journal of social, economic and political issues

Oliver Richmond

Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Cyprus 1974-1994

Christos Iacovou

The Evolution of the Maronites of Cyprus as a Religious Entity

Niyazi Kizilyürek

Turkey and Greece in the Realm of Western Politics towards the
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Cyprus: The Way to Full European Union Membership

Plus a Commentary Article by:

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Geschichte der Republic Zypern (The History of the Cyprus Republic)
Hoi oikonomikes ptyches kai epiptoseis mias omospondiakes lyses tou kypriakou
problematos (The Economic Aspects and Consequences of a Federal Solution
to the Cyprus Problem).

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The Evolution of the Maronites of Cyprus as a Religious Entity

Christos Iacovou

Abstract

This article presents the special historical and social conditions which affected the development of the Maronites of Cyprus as a religious entity. Since the appearance of the Maronites in Cyprus during the 6th century A.D. and up until the 20th century, their historical and social conditions were formed in line with the external powers which occupied Cyprus. These powers always defined and determined the social framework and the historical conscious of the people of Cyprus.

The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus recognizes the existence of religious entities. Article 2.3 of the Constitution defines a religious entity as a group of persons who ordinarily live in Cyprus and who adhere to the same religion. This latter means that they either belong to the same dogma or they are under the same religious administration and their number exceeded one thousand on the day the Constitution came into effect; of the above number at least five hundred must have been Cypriot citizens.

According to the said provision, citizens of the Republic of Cyprus who did not belong to the Orthodox Christian Church or to the Islamic religion and therefore did not belong to either national communities recognized by the Constitution (Greek and Turkish) had the right to choose *collectively* to which of the two communities they should belong within a specified period following the application of the Constitution.

The above right of choice was created for the Latins and the Maronites who finally both chose to belong to the Greek community. The decision was taken following a referendum, the results of which were as follows:

Armenians	-	Decision to join the Greek community	1077
	-	Opposition to join the Greek community	5
Latins	-	Decision to join the Greek community	322
	-	Opposition to join the Greek community	1

Maronites	-	Decision to join the Greek community	1046
	-	Opposition to join the Greek community	0 (1)

One wonders about the reason that prompted these communities to decide to join the Greek community and not the Turkish community. The following analysis concerns the Maronite community, which is the most numerous of the religious entities mentioned above.

The Maronites are a Christian sect which developed out of Monotheletism (Seventh Century A.D.).¹ The geographical area of their place of origin lies in the mountains of Syria and of Lebanon. They are now a part of the Eastern Catholic Church and they follow the Antiochean Rite. They accepted the papal primacy during the twelfth century and they subsequently became incorporated into the Roman Catholic Church. The head of the Maronite Church is a patriarch who has his seat in Lebanon. Lebanon has served as the center of the Maronite religion's culture beginning with the eighth century.

For several centuries the Cypriot Maronites composed the second largest Christian group, after the indigenous Orthodox population. Nowadays their number exceeds 4.500. The particular conditions under which they were forced to emigrate to Cyprus - in relation to the politically dominant power on the island through the centuries - constitute an important factor of their role as a religious entity on the island.

Equally important is the fact that any evaluation of the role of Cyprus' national - religious entities must moreover take into account the evolution of the Greek Orthodox population of the island. The latter was and still is the dominant power both in respect of population and cultural dynamics and as a determinant of the overall history of Cyprus.

The first appearance of Maronites in Cyprus is well documented. The French historian and student of the Medieval History of Cyprus, Louis de Mas Latrie, argues that the Maronites probably started to settle Cyprus at the end of the seventh century, during the reign of Emperor Justinian II, a time when a movement of population emanated from Lebanon and Syria, due to religious conflicts².

Although, de Mas Latrie's view is correct, no one can reject the theory that smaller scale immigration probably began at the end of the fifth century. The latter may be true because of the fact that the Maronites had endorsed the teachings of the Fourth Ecumenical Council at Chalcedon of the year A.D. 451, which caused extensive political, social and religious upheaval in the Byzantine Empire. Nevertheless, for the Maronites of Lebanon and Syria the geographical position of Cyprus served as an ideal first refuge in periods when they were subjected to pressure from their religious adversaries.

The arrival of the Maronites in Cyprus must have occurred in three different stages spanning from the fifth century to the twelfth century. The first stage, as already mentioned, was of a small scale and took place at the end of the fifth century. The

second stage occurred at the end of the seventh century and the third stage, which was the more important, took place during the first years of the Frankish rule in Cyprus (end of the twelfth century and beginning of the thirteenth century).

The general historical causes of the Maronite settlement in Cyprus were religious conflicts which were a permanent phenomenon in the Byzantine Empire, during a period under examination. These religious controversies have also defined the character of the first organisation of their societies. There was, of course, the Ottoman factor which served as a *raison de être* of a religious community. On the other hand, the increasing needs for defence and protection of their creed contributed to their political organization on a strictly military basis.

The early religious conflicts of the fifth, sixth and seventh century forced the Maronites to find refuge and to concentrate on the mountains of Syria and of Lebanon³ where they began organizing a compact religious community. This particular geographical area that they populated forced their community to sustain itself economically through agriculture and cattlebreeding.

This situation was further intensified beginning in the year A.D. 713 when Emperor Philipicus, the last champion of the Monotheletes, was dethroned. This event brought about the condemnation and persecution of the Maronites by the Melchites since the former were linked with the heresy of Monotheletism⁴. At this particular period, the Maronites determined separate religious identity and consequently their increasing needs to unite and to defend themselves in order to survive, gradually created the conditions for their development as a distinct religious community.

The Maronites are still a religious community scattered throughout many countries, retaining Lebanon as their religious center. Furthermore, a strong national conscience or an allegiance to a particular nation is not an absolute necessity to the Maronites. This may be the reason why a nationalistic ideology has never emerged among the Maronites outside of Lebanon.

The widespread persecutions of Maronites at the beginning of the eighth century was the main cause for the wave of Maronite settlement in Cyprus. Their number, however, cannot be estimated since there is no data available.

Originally they settled on the Pendadactylos Mountain range (in Northern Cyprus). The latter may be an indication of the fact that the Greeks of the island did not welcome their presence. Thus, their religious and cultural isolation continued and, furthermore, their community remained organized on a military and agricultural basis.

Their isolation from the rest of the Cypriots had the following consequences:

- A delay of their assimilation by the Greek element.
- The preservation of their institutions which became essential to their institutional organization and to the continuation of their closed and conservative society.

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For several centuries the Cypriot Maronites composed the second largest Christian group, after the indigenous Orthodox population. Nowadays their number exceeds 1.500. The particular conditions under which they were forced to emigrate to Cyprus in relation to the politically dominant power on the island through the centuries - constitute an important factor of their role as a religious entity on the island.

Equally important is the fact that any evaluation of the role of Cyprus' national - religious entities must moreover take into account the evolution of the Greek Orthodox population of the island. The latter was and still is the dominant power both in respect of population and cultural dynamics and as a determinant of the overall history of Cyprus.

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Their isolation from the rest of the Cypriots had the following consequences:

- a) A delay of their assimilation by the Greek element.
- b) The preservation of their institutions which became essential to their institutional organization and to the continuation of their closed and conservative society.

The Maronite migration to Cyprus intensified during the same period due to the

Arab attacks⁵ and the spread of Islam which is a most impressive phenomenon in the history of the Middle East, because of its rapid development and its crucial alteration of the geographical order of the whole area. Such was the extent of the above phenomenon that it can only be paralleled by the changes which took place with the appearance and spread of Christianity. Furthermore, a new movement of population was caused that was not due to internal conflicts in the Christian Church - something which contributed to the spread of Islam, but with Islam's customary momentum.

The first period of Maronite settlement in Cyprus, extending to the 12th century, was characterized by insecurities and a tendency of isolation. The latter resulted from the continuing persecutions in Lebanon and in Syria, as well as the indifferent and sometimes hostile reception by the indigenous population of Cyprus. Nevertheless, the fact that the Greeks of Cyprus never persecuted the Maronites made the island one of the most important refuges for Maronites during these difficult years⁶.

In this way the Maronites began to secure their presence in the island. They formed separate and independent, but nonetheless isolated religious community. It was during this same period that the first Cypriot Maronite villages and monasteries were built. The Maronites' final departure from isolation occurred at the end of the twelfth century, more specifically after 1192, when Cyprus found itself under the domination of the French Catholic dynasty of the Lusignans.

Guy de Lusignan, the first of the dynasty, because of his wish to attract noblemen and militia to Cyprus invited neighbouring people to settle on the island⁷. It appears that the Maronites were the first to respond to the above invitation for the following reasons:

- a) Due to the common religious belief with the new rulers of Cyprus.
- b) Because of the strong pressures exercised by the Arab attacks.

Thus the Maronites settled in Cyprus in their capacity as warriors. The *locus tenens* of the diocese of Antiochea, Charnoine Pascal, argued that during this period about 1000 Maronites arrived in Cyprus. It is furthermore reported that land was granted to them for settlement and cultivation. They avoided, however, settlement in the big cities being used to their mountain lifestyle and so they settled in the northern, Pentactylos mountain range, of Cyprus. They consequently reinforced the existing (left over from previous centuries) Maronite communities in the area.

Initially, the Frankish period (1192 - 1489) became the golden age of their presence in Cyprus. For many years there was an increase in their population which resulted in an increase of the number of their villages. It is mentioned that in the beginning of the Frankish period the total number of Maronite villages reached sixty two⁸. It was during this period, in the year 1316, that the first Maronite Archdiocese in Cyprus was established, with its seat in Nicosia. As first Archbishop of the Cyprus Maronites is mentioned certain Ananias, who originated in Damascus⁹.

The most important event of this period, however, is the acceptance, for the first time, of the Maronites by the power structure, due to their common religious belief with the French rulers. This is the obvious reason for the rapid evolution of the Maronite community during the Frankish period. Although the Maronites achieved recognition and acceptance, the political and ideological ruling class never allowed them to take part in the government and administration of the island. They just secured their already existing religious independence and security as a distinct religious group. This may be deduced by the following facts:

- a) The only cultural activity by the Maronites during this period was simply one of a religious nature (monasteries, churches, etc.), and there is no evidence to suggest that the Maronites held any offices in the administrative machinery of the island.
- b) During the second half of the thirteenth century a massive return of Maronites to Syria occurred, mainly due to the harsh economic policies of the Lusignans, from which not even the Catholic Maronites were excluded. In addition to the above, certain natural disasters, such as earthquakes and drought, contributed to this effect.

The inability of the Franks to fully assimilate the Maronites and to make them part of the political and social structure is due mainly to the instability of the system they first established in Cyprus in order to create conditions of peaceful coexistence between the various communities that they ruled. Instead, most Cypriots were seen as a means of economic exploitation. This is certainly true for the Greek Orthodox population of Cyprus. The fact that the same effects extended to the Maronite community, despite its secure religious position, shows the great difference between social organization in Western Medieval Europe on the one hand and Eastern Europe on the other. Furthermore, more light is thrown on the historical and socio-political causes and ramifications of the Western European intrusion to the East via the Crusades.

For the Frankish, the Maronites were Catholics on the one hand while on the other they were also people of the East, of Syrian and Lebanese origin. During the second part of the thirteenth century the situation was basically the same and continued to be so even after the occupation of Cyprus by the Venitians (1489 - 1571) who, although Catholics themselves, treated the Maronites the same way as the Frankish did. Thus, the Maronites once more were not able to assimilate with the power structure.

Furthermore, the Maronites, in contrast to the Greek Orthodox majority, enjoyed far greater religious freedoms than, the Greek population. This fact was conducive to a certain degree of tension between the two communities which became more apparent during the years of the Ottoman rule, a period when the conditions of religious coexistence reversed. A relevant factor was the concerted attempt of the Latin Church to gradually absorb the Greek Orthodox population of Cyprus. This policy was not only inspired by the papal authorities but was also part of the political tactics of the Lusignians, as well as the Venitians.

In an attempt to recapitulate the Frankish period in Cyprus one may argue that the standard of living follows two levels:

- a) The level of the social and political élite, which included the rulers of the island, as well as those who could manage to participate in the power structure.
- b) The level of the religious and national religious groups under occupation.

Under the circumstances, the Maronites differentiated themselves on the social and religious level from the Greeks. As a result they managed to avoid hellenisation. Furthermore, in this same period the Maronites secured certain religious rights which enabled them to formulate a consciousness of their religious identity in Cyprus. Their localisation and political acceptance as a distinct religious group legalised their presence on the island. They were recognized by the rulers as an accepted religious community living and developing in Cyprus.

In the year 1571 Cyprus was conquered by the Ottomans and a new period in its history began. The only common characteristic with the previous Frankish period was that in both cases Cyprus continued to be ruled by a foreign power. There was, however, a significant difference in the cultural and religious aspect since the French and the Venetians, coming from the West, introduced a culture and a Christian religion different to the previous environment in the island. The Ottomans, however, arriving as conquerors from the East, brought with them a culture and a religion - Islam - totally unknown to Cyprus before then.

Nevertheless, the Maronites, being Catholics, fought bravely during the Ottoman invasion of Cyprus (1570 - 71). According to Stephan Altonezi, 18,000 Maronites were killed at the siege of Famagusta. The above number seems to be an exaggeration since their number at the end of the Venetian rule is estimated at 8,000¹⁰.

With the Ottoman occupation, those Maronites who chose to remain on the island were forced to choose either to become Muslims or to enter the Orthodox Church. The Ottomans recognized the Orthodox Church as the only institution representing all people of Cyprus who were not Muslims. In trying to explain from a historical point of view the aforementioned decision of the Ottomans, one must understand the continuing hostility between the Ottoman Empire and the Catholic West, as well as the Ottoman efforts to attain the favour of the Greek Orthodox population, following their oppression under Latin rule. Certainly, this privilege did not mean that the Orthodox Church was completely free since there were numerous pressures against the Greek Orthodox to become Muslims. This was due mainly to the system of taxation which was exercised by the Ottoman administration.

During the Ottoman rule the Maronites were placed under the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Kyrenia. Those who lived in other districts were put under the jurisdiction of the local bishops. Many of them, not being able to go through the system of taxation, had no other choice but to accept Islam, as was the case with many Greeks and

Armenians. These populations formed later on (20th century) part of the Turkish Cypriot community¹¹. Nonetheless, the number of the Maronites who accepted Islam cannot be estimated due to the lack of sources. There exists the testimony of Archimandrite Kyprianos who states that "all the Maronite churches in the villages are under the jurisdiction of the respective bishops of the Greeks according to the district they belong . . . and it was them whom they knew as their bishops"¹². It seems that the Ottoman rule was a serious blow to the Maronites because they were deprived of their ecclesiastical polity which served as an essential element of their structure as a religious community.

Beginning with the year 1673 and the death of the Maronite Archbishop Luke, the Maronite Archdiocese of Cyprus was transferred to Lebanon and the Maronites were deserted for a long period since no bishop, including their archbishop who had the title of "Archbishop of Cyprus", ever visited them until 1848¹³. The social conditions existing in Cyprus during the Ottoman rule did not permit the Maronites to return to their isolationism and their militarily organized societies. The Ottoman rule remained for the Maronites as it was for most of Cypriots, a period of captivity.

From a sociological perspective, however, an important event during the Ottoman period was a first real contact between the Greeks and the Maronites of Cyprus. This process continued throughout the following centuries and is still in effect today. Beginning during the Ottoman period the Greek Cypriots became associated as a community with the Cypriot Maronites and this was evident in their common educational and cultural perspectives. Gradually, the Arabic language vanished and the Cyprus Arabian dialect took its place, before being finally replaced by the Cypriot Greek dialect. Those Maronites who escaped Islamization and remained under the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church gradually formed the nucleus of a group which was eventually recognized in the middle of the nineteenth century by the Ottomans as a small independent religious community. In the year 1840, following efforts by the French Government, the Maronites disengaged from the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Kyrenia. Furthermore, they followed the Latin calendar and a representative of the Maronite Archbishop took his seat in Cyprus, as a general vicar (*genikos vicarios*).

The religious freedom of the Cypriot Maronites was fostered during the British rule, by the liberal policies of the British. The first census, which took place at the establishment of the British colonial government showed that there were approximately eight hundred Maronites in Cyprus. Their numbers, however, increased slightly during the following censuses, up until the Second World War.

During the twentieth century the phenomenon of the rise of Greek nationalism which took the form of a struggle for union (*enosis*) with Greece appeared in Cyprus. Following the armed struggle of 1955 - 59 and the rise of Turkish nationalism which had as a target the Greek demand for *enosis* the newly created Cypriot state developed serious constitutional problems. The intercommunal conflict that followed led to the Turkish invasion and partition of Cyprus in 1974. During the above periods the Maronites, as well as the other religious communities in Cyprus, avoided any direct involvement and

remained only marginally involved in the political events. They followed, nevertheless, the cause of the Greek Cypriot community and they have developed strong social ties with it. Thus, the strong social ties coupled with the social transformation of the Cypriot society in the 1960s, enabled the Maronites to assimilate themselves into the Greek Cypriot community. Their choice to belong to the Greek Cypriot community and their cultural ties with it, caused the majority of them to become refugees in 1974. The main Maronite villages in the years of independence, *Kormakites*, *Ayia Marina*, *Karpasia* and *Asomatos*, are today under Turkish occupation and a great part of the Maronite cultural heritage has been destroyed.

Nowadays, the Maronites, as well as the Latins and the Armenians enjoy religious independence. In 1988 the seat of the Maronite Archbishopric returned to Nicosia¹⁴. The Maronites' relation with the Greek Orthodox population, as well as with the other religious communities, is one of cooperation, and coexistence, at the midpoint of the Balkans and the Middle East¹⁵.

Notes

1. The name comes from Saint Maron (Mar - Maroon), who lived in the middle of the fourth century A.D. in the area of Kyros. The monastery of St. Maron in Lebanon was the center of Monotheletism. Monotheletism was a heresy in Byzantium which professed that Christ had only one will (*thelema*). See Knowles D. and Obolensky D., "The Middle Ages", *The Christian Centuries*. vol. II, pp. 82-84 (London, 1967).
2. Louis de Mas Latrie, *Hist. Cypr. I* (Paris, 1880) p. 100.
3. Dan Butros, *History of the Maronites* (Lebanon, 1984), p. 32.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 71
5. Kyrris C. (1970), p. 163.
6. Frangiskou A. (1989), p. 82.
7. Louis de Mas Latrie (1861), p. 44.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
9. Maronite Archdiocese of Cyprus (1991), p. 32.
10. Louis de Mas Latrie (1861), p. 117.
11. Kyrris C. (1990), p. 119.
12. Archimandrite Kyprianos (1788), p. 66.
13. Maronite Archdiocese of Cyprus, *What are the Maronites?* (1991) p. 33.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Translated from the Greek original by G. A. Tsangaras.

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TURKEY AND GREECE IN THE REALM OF WESTERN POLITICS TOWARDS THE NEAR EAST 1945-1985

Niyazi Kizilyürek

Abstract

Through the replacement of Great Britain as the World leader by the USA after the Second World War both Greece and Turkey came under US domination. With the *Truman doctrine* both countries received US assistance and became part of the American Security Strategy which aimed at securing the American influence in the Near East and to resist communism. However, the Cyprus dispute was soon to sabotage the Greco-Turkish cooperation resulting in the weakening of NATO. With the American - NATO initiative and under the pressure of Cold War, all parties came to an agreement on the Cyprus question in 1959. Nevertheless, the expectations from the Cyprus Republic had not been fulfilled and with the intercommunal crises of 1963-1964 Graeco-Turkish Cooperation turned into competition. From thereon both countries moved towards more independent foreign politics and Cyprus became their main concern. The growing anti-American public sentiment in Greece and Turkey encouraged the new course of foreign policy. While the search for independent foreign policy in Greece had been set back by the colonels-coup in 1967, Turkey continued her new orientation by approaching the Soviet Union and the Islamic countries. When the coup of 1974 occurred Turkey had already had her plans ready to invade the island and to propose a territorial federation. The growing populism and exploitation of the Cyprus problem for internal consumption by the Turkish politicians increased Denktash's room for manouvre and made the solution of the problem almost impossible.

From British to American Domination

On 21st February 1947 through a note to the USA Great Britain announced that he would cease military assistance to Greece and Turkey. According to the Paris agreement, 15 October 1946, Britain assisted Greece and Turkey militarily while the USA offered economic assistance. Great Britain's announcement was the beginning of USA world leadership in all senses. As an American diplomat put it, "Great Britain had within an hour handed the job of world leadership, with all its burdens and all its glory to the USA."¹

American assistance to Greece was already planned. In October 1946 the American Director for the Near East, Lay Handerson, stated to the Greek Ambassador in Washington that the integration of Greece in USA Mediterranean politics is vital for the American interests in the region.²

After the Second World War the Near East, due to its oil resources, became an important investment region for the USA. To secure US influence in the area was a vital American strategic goal. In this context the geopolitical importance of Greece and Turkey increased. The geographical location of both countries enabled the US to control the Eastern Mediterranean. Both countries could offer military bases for the US military operations in the region. Turkey, however, due to its greater size and proximity to the Near East became much more important.

President Truman in his speech in Congress on 12 March 1947 asked the American Congress to support the assistance program to Greece and Turkey. With this speech was born the famous Truman Doctrine which saw Greece and Turkey as a bulwark to the Soviet Union. This was also the beginning of the replacement of Great Britain by the USA in the world political order. However this was not an easy and conflict-free process. Long before the Second World War began antagonism existed between the USA and Great Britain. Although Great Britain was the leading power in world trade and in the international finance market, the USA was becoming the dominant power in industrial production. During the Second World War the State Department was seeing the British colonial system as the greatest obstacle to the American post-war ambitions. US experts were planning new strategies to develop the US military-economic influence within the British dominated areas. In 1941 the US President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill prepared the Atlantic Charter which allowed the entry of the US into the British dominated colonial world. During the negotiations for the Atlantic Charter, Churchill said the following to Roosevelt: " Mr. President, I believe you are trying to do away with the British Empire. Every idea you entertain about the structure of the post-War world demonstrates it. But, in spite of that, we know that you constitute our only hope. . . . You know that we know that without America the Empire won't stand."³

Indeed after the Second World War the balance of power between the US and Great Britain radically changed. Great Britain was now both economically and militarily far behind. "It has projected before our imagination the picture of the world without Britain", in these dramatic way the *New York Times* described the decline of Britain. Now the national security managers in the State Department and the Pentagon began to see the decline of the British power not only as an economic opportunity but also as threat to US security. They argued that, with the end of a robust British Empire, the US must fill that vacuum. With the Truman Doctrine the US began to fill the vacuum and so established its rule in Turkey and Greece and, as a result, put itself in an antagonistic position with Britain. " The Americans began now to enter as collaborators, and at the same time, as competitors with Great Britain into many of the Middle East countries. Indeed, after 1947 they started to displace Britain in Greece."⁴

In fact both countries came together between 16 October and 7 November 1947 in order to create a common strategy. This meeting became known as the "Pentagon Talks", which resulted in the diagnosis that Britain's main concern was her oil interests while the USA aimed at establishing a strategic superiority to the USSR in the area. As Woodhouse put it, "British foreign policy in the Middle East was chiefly directed towards protecting its own interests from the new nationalist dictators. British strategic thinking, contrary to that of the Americans, seemed to regard the menace of a war involving the Soviet Union as secondary to the danger of local nationalist movements."⁵ The contradictions in policies abroad between the two powers were also reflected in the case of Cyprus. Already in 1947 the American Congress had raised the issue of the strategic importance of Cyprus. Britain did not see this with a favorable eye as it believed that it encouraged Greek Cypriot nationalistic sentiments and desires for union with Greece. While Britain sought to secure and protect her colonies, the US viewed such a system as anachronistic and at the same time providing fertile ground for the growth of communist ideas. It therefore supported and encouraged the establishment of free, independent states according to the western model which would by their own will resist communism. So NATO interests and anti-communism became the major characteristics of American politics, while Britain remained confined to her oil interests. This can be clearly seen in the words of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden: "Cyprus is a NATO interest, but it is not only that. The United Kingdom's vital interest in Cyprus is not confined to its NATO aspects. . . . No Cyprus, no certain facilities to protect our supply of oil. No oil. . . unemployment and hunger in Britain. It is as simple as that."⁶

The antagonism between the USA and Great Britain reached its highest point during the Suez crisis. When France and Britain attempted to occupy the Suez Canal in October 1956 they faced the American might against them. So failed the last attempt of Great Britain to secure her own national interests without considering the American concerns in the region. Thus the US established itself as the leading power in the capitalist world and Britain had to accept its new position. This was not however pleasantly received at home. In the House of Commons complaints against the American attitude were expressed. The Americans were blamed for throwing out Britain from Middle Eastern countries like Abadan and Egypt.⁷

By the end of 1957 American President Eisenhower stated that the US would fill the vacuum in the Near East. So emerged the Eisenhower Doctrine which gave full authority to the American President to also use military power in order, as they put it, to protect the territorial integrity and independence of those countries which were under threat of communism. On the other hand the British argued that the Eisenhower Doctrine was formed to diminish their influence in the Middle East. Indeed, from the passing over of world leadership to the US "within an hour" in 1957 until the emergence of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 Britain lost its influence and dominance in the Middle East including Greece and Turkey. In the case of the "last colony", Cyprus, after 1957 the Macmillan administration

agreed to a form of independence. Although Britain considered Cyprus until 1957 an important air base she now had to be content with an air base in the island.

Greece

Greek politics have since her independence been dominated by foreign powers and especially by Great Britain. As mentioned before, in 1947 Britain ceased her assistance to Greece. This marks the beginning of the US domination over Greece as designed by the Truman Doctrine. The objective of the Truman Doctrine was to secure American interests in the Middle East by integrating Greece and Turkey in the American sphere of influence. The Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs experts had already developed a strategic plan to bring Greece, Turkey, and Iran together in order to create a bulwark against the Soviet Union. It was vital to the US to integrate Eastern Mediterranean in her security system in order to control the Middle East which was producing 75 per cent of the oil needs of the Western countries. *The New York Times* was in fact answering to some members of Congress who had some doubts about assistance to Greece: "The interest in Greece is not just emotional, Greece is controlling the strategic scheme of Eastern Mediterranean. If Greece became communist Turkey would be politically surrounded and would not stand the pressure."⁸

Although President Truman stated that the US wanted to protect democracy in Greece, Walter Lipmann in his article in the *New York Herald Tribune* clarified the US approach: "We have not chosen Turkey and Greece because they need urgent help or they are the best examples of democracy and freedom, but because they are strategic outlets to the Black Sea and to the heart of the Soviet Union."⁹

In the Paper of *Position and Recommendations of the State Department Regarding Immediate Aid* to Greece and Turkey, it was proposed by American experts to establish an American mission in Greece that would control the Greek economy program in order to assure proper use of funds and supplies furnished by the US. For the successful implementation of the Truman Doctrine the US aimed for complete control over the Greek state. How deep the American interference in Greece was can be seen by the State Department statement which described the authority of the American Embassy in Athens. According to this statement the US Embassy had the following rights in Greece:

- a) All initiatives for the creation of the Greek Cabinet.
- b) The initiative for the changes in the Greek military.
- c) The regulating of the size of the Greek Army.
- d) The coordination of cooperation between Greek, Turkish and American officers.
- e) The control of Greek relations to the US and other countries.
- f) The control of Greek government relations with Trade Unions and political parties.¹⁰

The American military attaché enjoyed close relations with Greek officers and the

Greek secret service became the fifth column of the US. At the same time American firms like *ESSO*, *Reynolds Metal*, *Dow Chemical* and *Chrysler*, controlled the important sectors of Greek economy. *The International Telephone and Telegram* took over the communication system, the *American Tobacco Co.* the cultivation and export of tobacco, the *Transworld Airlines* the air traffic and *Ulan Co.* the natural resources.¹¹ Thus Greek society became completely dominated by the US. For all important decisions Greek ministers had to take the approval of the *Mission of American Aid in Greece*. When the Liberal minister Theodoros Havinis resigned in March 1952 to protest against the American influence he said the following: "The US have driven us to a condition where the minister, and I say this with bitter complaint, is non-existent, not being able himself, nor to appropriate the agency which he heads, to have an opinion and to make responsible decisions without the prior approval of other persons."¹²

Between 1947 and 1950 the USA favored and supported center political parties rather than conservative parties. The reason behind this was the general belief that communism can be better challenged and defeated through social reforms. However this approach changed in 1950 after the acquiring of the atom bomb by the Soviet Union and the success of the Chinese Revolution. The fact that John Peurifoy had been appointed as the American ambassador in Athens marked this change in American politics towards the right. Maurice Goldbloom the Labor Information Officer at the US Economic Mission in Greece described the appointment of Peurifoy as following: "Peurifoy in Greece is later in Guatemala, was certainly more flamboyant in his interference on behalf of the right than most American diplomats would have been, the policy he carried out in both places were in all essential respects made in Washington."¹³

When in 1950 and 1951 the Liberals won the majority of votes in the election, the US threatened to seize its assistance to Greece. The ambassador John Peurifoy was trying to find ways to bring General Papagos to power. According to the American Information Officer Maurice Goldbloom the American ambassador went as far as even organizing a coup de état. "It failed, however, partly because key positions in the armed forces were still held by the rival British sponsored and Palace oriented faction led by General Ventiris, and partly because Marshal Papagos did not to take power through a coup."¹⁴

However the American ambassador was soon to find new methods to achieve his goal. On the one hand he supported General Papagos with all possible means, on the other hand he sought the introduction of a new electoral system. So, soon the pro-British Plastiras Government did fall. With the establishment of the Papagos Government in Greece the US became the only dominant power in the country and completely replaced Britain. So there was no fear to embrace the Greek Cypriot demand for *enosis* anymore. "Greek governments since 1931 had carefully avoided claims that would cause friction with Britain, and the Liberal coalition Government of 1951 was no exception in that rule. Yet the US was all the while assuming a dominant position in Greece, and as a consequence Greek inhibitions towards Britain gradually diminished. In 1954 the conservative Government of Marshal Papagos, strongly committed to the US, embraced

the cause of the Greek Cypriots."¹⁵

On 16 August 1954 Papagos Government appealed to the UN and raised the Cyprus question, despite the reactions of Great Britain. On 23 September 1954 with 30 votes for and 19 against and 11 abstentions the UN passed the appeal of the Greek government. Hence, the Cyprus question became an international issue, and has continued to be so ever since. It is not a coincidence that the internationalization of the Cyprus question began with the government of Papagos as he had full American support in replacing the pro-British government.¹⁶

Turkey

The Truman Doctrine marks a turning point in the modern Turkish history. With this Doctrine Turkey's integration with the Western world in ideological, political, economic and military fields was consolidated. At the same time, as in the case of Greece, US hegemony came to replace that of Britain.

When in February 1947 Great Britain announced to the US that she would cease assistance to Turkey, Turkish foreign minister, Saka, invited the American ambassador in Ankara and expressed the position of the Turkish government: "If press reports are true then Turkey must turn to the US for assistance it had previously sought from Britain."¹⁷

Although Great Britain was in great need to cooperate with Turkey in order to protect her oil interests in the Middle East she could not afford to finance this cooperation. For the US the importance of Turkey laid in her strategic position as a strong anti-communist country within the periphery of the Soviet Union. Turkey could have taken a key position between Greece and Iran in a bulwark constructed of Greece, Turkey and Iran could serve the US interests in the region. The US experts thought of a "division of labor" between Greece and Turkey as following:

"A Greek military establishment capable of maintaining internal security in order to avoid communist domination.

A Turkish military establishment sufficient to ensure continued resistance to Soviet pressure; and able to delay Soviet aggression long enough to permit US and allied forces to deny certain portions of Turkey to the Soviet Union."¹⁸

On 27 February 1946 the first bilateral contract was signed between Turkey and the US, which brought a credit of 10 million US dollars to Turkey, which was all spent on military material. This was followed by a second agreement on 12 July 1947 which granted major concessions to the US. As in Greece, so in Turkey in order to control the American aid the power of American experts in Turkish political and military life increased enormously, especially as the continuation of this assistance was dependent on the recommendations of these experts. The first 69 million dollars payment, as promised in the Truman Doctrine, was spent entirely for military purposes. This led to a great deficit in the balance of payment since Turkey spent 400 million Turkish liras just for the maintenance of the military equipment. 39 per cent of the budget was saved

for defense expenses which necessitated further debt in order to balance the deficit. The burden of debt and debt service charges, together with mounting military expenditure resulted in a budgetary crisis which led to further borrowing. Trapped in this vicious circle Turkey became completely dependent on foreign aid.

However, Turkey was not content just with receiving US assistance in the context of the Truman Doctrine but sought further integration with the Western world. In September 1948, the Turkish ambassador in Washington, Erkin, paid a visit to General Marshall and expressed Turkey's will to be part of the Western alliance. In October of the same year, the Turkish foreign minister announced for the first time Turkey's wish to participate in the North Atlantic Pact. In his words: "Turkey hoped for a US declaration of interest in Turkey that was broader than the Truman Doctrine."¹⁹ However, Turkey was disappointed when in 1949 NATO was established. The Turkish foreign minister expressed his disappointment in a press conference: "It was a mistake not to have included Turkey in the Atlantic Pact."²⁰

Great Britain was adamantly against Turkish membership in NATO. When the Turkish foreign minister, Sadak, on 6 May 1949 asked the British foreign minister, Belvin, for support, he stated that it was better for Turkey to receive American assistance than to become a member of NATO.²¹

In fact Great Britain was seeking a military organization separate from NATO in order to protect her interests in the Middle East. She was planning a Middle East military pact constructed of Turkey, US, France and Great Britain. Previous to NATO this prospect was widely discussed and the role of Turkey within this pact was seriously considered.²²

However, the acquiring of the atom bomb by the Soviet Union mobilized the USA in military terms. While it had been previously hesitating to establish military air bases in Turkey it now went ahead and did so. Meanwhile the Korean War began. Truman pointed to the map of Iran and stated: "Korea is the Greece of the Far East. If we are tough enough, if we stand up to them like we did in Greece three years ago, they won't take any more steps. But if we just stand by, they will move into Iran and they will take over the whole Middle East."²³

On 25 July 1950 Turkey decided to send 4,500 men to Korea. This was seen as a step towards Turkey's membership in NATO. With the support of the USA both Greece and Turkey became members of the North Atlantic Pact in 1952. About a year later, along with American support, both countries entered (along with Yugoslavia) into a new military pact, the Balkan Pact. In 1955 Turkey signed an agreement of co-operation with Iraq and with the participation of Great Britain and Iran the famous Baghdad Pact emerged. The aim of this pact, which actually divided the Arab countries among themselves, was to support American and British oil interests in the Middle East.

The Turkish dependency on the USA that began with the Truman Doctrine soon became a dominant characteristic of all spheres of political life and an especially prominent factor in foreign policy. Although Turkey had previously supported the creation of a Palestinian state, she then became the first country to recognize Israel.

Another example of Turkey's American dependency is to be seen during the Bandung Conference which brought 29 post colonial states together to find common ground on which to act in support of their interests. In this Conference the Turkish foreign minister was the spokesman of NATO and the USA. In 1956 Turkey stood against Egypt over the nationalization of the Suez Canal and supported British colonial interests. A similar stance was held during the Algerian liberation movement. Until the early 1960s Turkish foreign policy was more that of a satellite state. In the eyes of NATO and the USA, Turkey was the most reliable, most anti-communist ally.

From Loyalty to Autonomy

Until the beginning of the 1960s Turkey and Greece formed their foreign policies on the basis of NATO solidarity. This was politically expressed through loyalty to the US. In fact in the "old world" especially during the Cold War, the states subordinated their national interests to the main East-West conflict. Since the main goal in foreign policy was to support the general western interest against the East, the particular national interests had from time to time been suppressed or delayed, in other words the conflict between West and East led to the undermining of the West-West conflict.

In the 1950s the Cyprus conflict became a West-West conflict. The British colonial policy, the Greek national demand of *enosis* and the Turkish reaction of *taksim* (division) transformed Cyprus from a colonial question to a West-West conflict. So Cyprus disabled the Greco-Turkish military cooperation, set an end to the Balkan Pact and gave the chance to the Soviet Union to interfere through the UN in a conflict which was seen as a "family business" of the West.

In reaction to this alarming situation the US took the initiative to safeguard the cooperation among the rival NATO members. American Secretary of State, Dallas, with a letter to Turkey and Greece demanded the restoration of Greco-Turkish relations: "I have followed with concern the dangerous deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations caused by the Cyprus question. Regardless of the causes of this disagreement, which are complex and numerous, I believe that the unity of the North Atlantic community, which is the basis of our common security, must be restored without delay. . . because we believe that the partnership of Greece and Turkey constitutes a strong bulwark of the free world in a critical area."²⁴

In fact, after the crisis in and around Suez, NATO developed a concept for the resolution of the conflicts among its members. According to this concept, it was reaffirmed:

- (a) the obligation of members to settle by peaceful means any dispute between themselves
- (b) the declaration of intention to submit any such dispute which had not proved capable of settlement directly, to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before restoring to any other international agency,
- (c) the recognition of the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary

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General to bring to the attention of the Council, matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the allies.²⁵

After Greece removed her soldiers from the NATO garrison in Izmir NATO efforts or a settlement of the Greco-Turkish dispute were intensified. NATO Secretary general, Paul Henry Spaak, took the initiative of resolving the Cyprus question. On the other hand the US followed a "quiet diplomacy" to achieve consensus. As a result of these initiatives in 1959 Greece and Turkey agreed on a solution over the Cyprus conflict. On the one hand the "communist threat", on the other hand the loyalty to the US led the two countries to play down their national concerns and achieve a settlement satisfactory to all parties. So it seemed this West-West conflict had been resolved due to the West-East conflict and the Cold War. Therefore Great Britain gave up a colony, Greece and Turkey their demands of *enosis* and *taksim*. In other words they gave up their maximalist demands.

However, this cooperation in order to protect western interests resulted in also safeguarding particular interests of each state involved in Cyprus. The newly born Cyprus state had very limited sovereignty and gave huge control to all three NATO members. The right of self-determination and the sovereignty of the people were completely ignored in order to achieve a Greco-Turkish political-judicial-military balance in the Eastern Mediterranean. The two communities of Cyprus were forced into a constitutional accommodation on the basis of negative interdependence: On the one hand they accepted the limitations of their national will, but on the other hand they were constitutionally not allowed to achieve an integrated Cypriot society. Indeed the relations between the two communities and those between the communities and the state were constitutionally so determined to safeguard Greece and Turkey's influence and positions in Cyprus.

While the emergence of the Cypriot State satisfied the Western alliance, the two communities in the island could not uphold political stability, and in 1963-64 Cyprus was driven into inter-communal fighting. From then on the Greek Cypriot community would seek to get rid of the negative interdependence and to achieve a new constitutional order based on majority rule. Greece supported this initiative hoping to achieve strategic priority on the island. As Turkey's influence on the island depended on the direct influential participation of the Turkish Cypriot community in state affairs, Turkey sided with the Greek side with invasion.

In 1959 Greece and Turkey found themselves at the break of war and the US stepped in to prevent escalation of the conflict and to make a compromise possible. However, at the time the American initiative was not to succeed. In contrast to the 1950s Greece and Turkey were determined to make every effort to safeguard what they considered their national interests.

In fact the loyalty to the US between 1950 and 60 caused public reaction in both countries. The belief that national interests were sacrificed for the sake of the US gained more ground. Especially in the *détente* period following the Cuban crisis there was a tendency for a relatively greater autonomy in foreign politics. Another important

factor which created difficulties for the new American initiative in the case of Cyprus was the fact that public opinion in Greece and Turkey began to be more influential in forming foreign politics. In both countries the ruling opinion was that Americans did injustice to these countries' interests in Cyprus. In this political climate the American proposal (*Acheson Plan*) to resolve the Cyprus conflict was doomed to failure, especially given the fact that Archbishop Makarios stood against it.

A letter sent from president Johnson to Turkey in 1964 marked a turning point in Turkish foreign politics. The aim of the letter was to stop Turkey from invading Cyprus and threatened Turkey of deprivation of NATO support in case of a Soviet offense. This letter came as a shock to Turkey and ended the honeymoon between the two countries. During the Cuban crisis Turkey had already started to question her relation to the US when the latter made a deal with the Soviet Union about the Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey. After the Cyprus crisis of 1964 the wider opinion that the US supported the "unjust Greece" caused a strong anti-American feeling resulting in a search for a new foreign policy. Almost twenty years after this event, in 1985 Suleyman Demirel made the following evaluation: "Cyprus is in regards to Turkish American relations a very important issue, its an issue for itself. Cyprus has been the testing ground for Turko-American relations. In fact Johnson's letter has caused the first crack in Turko-American relations. . . . The stance of America against such a loyal ally in relation to a national cause such as Cyprus has caused a shock to Turkey. At that point Turkey felt the need to look at new horizons."²⁶ In the same evaluation Demirel went on to point out the changes in Turkish foreign politics: "In 1965 these new elements entered Turkish foreign politics:

- (i) first and foremost the development of relations with the Islamic countries,
- (ii) development of relations with the powerful neighbor the Soviet Union and with other socialist countries,
- (iii) revival of relations with the non-aligned countries,
- (iv) making use of every source for economic development, including Japan."²⁷

In fact this change in Turkish politics was not fundamental but pragmatic. It began by approaching the Soviet Union to secure support for Turkish politics towards Cyprus and was extended into economic cooperation as well. The approach to the Arab countries was also the result of an emotional reaction to the Western stance in the 1964 Cyprus crisis. It was only natural that with the passing of time these reactions softened.²⁸

Among the Turkish politicians the Degullean discourse, which stated that the US was using its allies for its own sake, found support among Turkish politicians. Therefore Turkey's trust in the US and NATO was increasingly replaced by mistrust. The prominent politician Ismet İnönü who played a significant role in Turkey becoming a member of NATO in 1967 stated his lack of trust in the Alliance as follows: "NATO has been always used by America as a military court to take decisions against Turkey."²⁹

The new approach of Turkey was soon to give fruit. On the one hand the Soviet Union financed major investments in Turkey and it came closer to the Turkish position

General to bring to the attention of the Council, matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the allies.²⁵

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- (iv) making use of every source for economic development, including Japan."²⁷

In fact this change in Turkish politics was not fundamental but pragmatic. It began by approaching the Soviet Union to secure support for Turkish politics towards Cyprus and was extended into economic cooperation as well. The approach to the Arab countries was also the result of an emotional reaction to the Western stance in the 1964 Cyprus crisis. It was only natural that with the passing of time these reactions softened.²⁸

Among the Turkish politicians the Degullean discourse, which stated that the US was using its allies for its own sake, found support among Turkish politicians. Therefore Turkey's trust in the US and NATO was increasingly replaced by mistrust. The prominent politician Ismet İnönü who played a significant role in Turkey becoming a member of NATO in 1967 stated his lack of trust in the Alliance as follows: "NATO has been always used by America as a military court to take decisions against Turkey."²⁹

The new approach of Turkey was soon to give fruit. On the one hand the Soviet Union financed major investments in Turkey and it came closer to the Turkish position

regarding Cyprus. On the other hand the US became more sensitive to Turkish interests especially in relation to Cyprus. For Americans any solution to the Cyprus conflict should also safeguard Turkish interests.

The search for autonomy in the beginning of the 1960s was also characteristic of Greek foreign policy. George Papandreu especially, bearing in mind the strong anti-American feeling in Greece adopted a more nationally oriented foreign policy. It was a general belief in Greece that national interests had been sacrificed for the general interests of the Western Alliance. The agreements of Zurich and London that had given birth to the state of Cyprus were in the eyes of most of the Greeks a renunciation of Greek national interests for the sake of NATO. Therefore Greece as Turkey - it is an irony of history that both countries believed their interests had been neglected in relation to Cyprus - adopted a new course of politics after the 1964 Cyprus crisis. So the Greek government made her new approach felt by rejecting the American proposal known as the *Acheson Plan*.

However, although Turkey exploited the *détente* period at its of most, by adopting an active foreign policy, Greece's search for autonomy was interrupted by the colonel's coup in 1967. As the German historian, Klaus-Detlev Grothusen pointed out, the military régime was at its worst in its foreign policy and caused Greece the greatest damage. No doubt Cyprus was to be the victim of the Colonels' mishandlings.

Soon after the colonels came to power Grivas launched an offense on the Turkish Cypriot village of Kofinou slaughtering more than 20 innocent people. Turkey once again threatened invasion, and came close to Greece. The American initiative managed once again to avert the escalation but this time by imposing Turkish demands on Greece. So Grivas and 10,000 Greek soldiers were called back to Athens. As a result Greek military influence in Cyprus was diminished while Turkey set off on more concrete plans for a future invasion, with the hypothesis that the junta would create the necessary preconditions. After 1969 Turkey began specific sea-landing military exercises.

Already in 1967 during the Greco-Turkish negotiations in Keshan and Alexandroupolis the Junta's blindness to reality became evident. During these negotiations the Junta chief Papadopoulos naively told Turkish Prime Minister Demirel: "Turkey is such a big country, why don't you give us Cyprus?" Turkey by exploiting Junta's naivety tried to reach a good deal with the support of the US. The Junta soon came to accept a solution of the Cyprus problem based on double *enosis*. However, Makarios' resistance against any kind of double *enosis* deprived the Junta of a victory in foreign politics which she was so much in need. When on 15 July 1974 the Junta drove the tanks against Makarios, hoping to achieve a prestigious victory over Cyprus, Turkey had already made her plans to invade the island and to propose a territorial federation.

In fact both the coup attempt of the Junta and the Turkish invasion were an indirect product of the American approach to Cyprus. Since 1964 the US were from time to time proposing a Cyprus solution to the satisfaction of Greece and Turkey based on solving the Republic of Cyprus. The US strategic thinking was rather concerned in balancing the interests of Greece and Turkey and was not necessarily encouraging

the survival of the Republic of Cyprus. Aware of this American approach, the Greek junta initiated the *coup de état*, but Turkey was also aware that the division of the island would not harm western interests. Although the Turkish invasion did not harm western interests in general, it did damage Greco-Turkish relations as never before, resulting in Greek withdrawal from NATO. In that sense the Cyprus question was yet again not resolved.

On the one hand there was growing anti-American feeling in Greece and the rapid growth of Papandreu's *Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement*, marching towards power with slogans such as "we will not submit to foreign interests". On the other hand the Turkish politicians exploited the Cyprus issue for internal consumption making the resolution of the Cyprus problem almost impossible. With the US embargo imposed on Turkey, Turkish public opinion became more sensitive than ever. No Turkish politician dared to make any step towards a compromise over Cyprus. Every single one of them was a "national leader" "resisting" American pressure. The Chief Commander of the Turkish invasion, Bedreddin Demirel, who preferred to see the Cyprus problem resolved soon after the invasion, described the behavior of Turkish politicians as follows: "The politicians who for a long time had no success in foreign politics after the Cyprus success of our army became prestigious both home and abroad. With their approach of wait and see they kept the Cyprus conflict unresolved and led it to deadlock. In this way they left the army with all responsibility."³⁰ As Turkish politician, Demirel put it, "no Turkish government dares to make concessions in order to get rid of the Cyprus conflict". This gave the opportunity to Denktash to enlarge his room for maneuver. By exploiting the legitimization crisis in Turkey, Denktash was preparing the ground for his own solution to the Cyprus conflict which was a rather loose confederation. Of course the politicians who participated in Turkish coalition governments after 1974, such as Erbakan and Turkish, made the job of Denktash easier, especially as Erbakan strongly resisted a federal solution and had developed his funny notion of "scarf federation": "It should be such a constitution that from the outside it looks like a federation, but when the scarf is removed what is seen is a divided Cyprus."³¹ Although such views were restricted in the beginning, they later on found fertile ground among Turkish politicians. In 1989 when the author of this essay asked Mümtaz Soysal what the Turkish position was the answer was simple and clear: "We tell the world federation but we defend confederation."³²

Indeed the Turkish proposals made in 1977 were based on confederation. Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand, evaluating the 1977 Turkish proposals, wrote the following: "In fact Turkish proposals denoted confederation. There were some mechanisms proposed which could lead to a federation in the long term after mutual confidence had been created, but from the beginning these proposals foresaw two small separate states."³³ Nobody was of course satisfied by the Turkish proposals. The US insisted on greater concessions from Turkey in order to lift the arms embargo, but this led to a wider crack in Turko-American relations. A Turkish politician, very close to the then Prime Minister Demirel, told *Le Monde*: "We can no longer be 100% in harmony with

the US in a military and political sense. Until a few months ago I never spoke in this way, but the embargo and what has happened in Vietnam (US desertion of pro-American Saigon and Phnom-Pen régimes after their collapse) have been determinant factors for me. America does not have a global mode of thought. The given situation always plays a role in their decision making. American diplomacy is similar to western, cow-boy diplomacy. It is characterized by psychological reactions without feeling and thought. We have to think of an alternative and the only solution I can think is Europe. General De Gaul's slogan "Europe to Europeans" seemed to me in the past as a dangerous and an unrealistic idea, but I have now changed my mind."³⁴

Indeed towards the end of the 1970s Turko-American relations were evidently bad and Turkey's reservations about America led the country closer to socialist and non-aligned countries. The military co-operation between Turkey and America was strictly restricted within NATO. Turkey hesitated to be part of any American initiative which went beyond her NATO obligations.³⁵ Turkish foreign politics was mainly concerned with what was considered as national interests.

The regional developments during this period increased Turkey's importance enormously. With the revolution in Iran and the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, Turkey was made the center of American attention. It was therefore easier at that time to lift the arms embargo against Turkey as besides regional changes the Greek Cypriot side had also rejected the so-called Nimetz Plan.

A New Turning Point

In 1980 the military coup in Turkey changed the scene completely. It was not a secret that before the military coup the west was concerned about Turkey. As mentioned above after the regional changes Turkey became more important than ever. Professor Wohlstetter, who twice received an honorary medal from the US defense ministry for his contribution to American security, held the view that Turkey was the country on which the US should rely for the protection of their interests in the Near East. However, the political situation in Turkey before the coup was not adequate for the protection of US interests. On 15 August 1980, the *New York Times* read that from the western point of view, Turkey was in a crisis to which the west should find ways out because after the loss of Iran Turkey had become the buffer zone between East and West.³⁶

Indeed, after the coup Turkey's approach to NATO but especially to the US changed radically. The generals in power would not hesitate to cooperate with the US for the protection of western interests in the Near East. An example of friendly behavior was the acceptance by Turkey of Greece's return to NATO, something the Americans had tried but failed to convince Turkey of before the coup. After the Iranian revolution America was working on a new strategy, based on the cooperation with and among friendly Islamic countries. The National Security advisor to President Carter, Brezinski, developed a new strategy: to use Islam in friendly countries against communism. This new approach also shaped the new Turkish politics which on the one hand sought full cooperation with the US and closer ties with the pro-American Muslim countries in the region.³⁷

As the American strategists put it, since Turkey did not have a clear-cut identity it could do more in the region than the US itself.³⁸

Until 1980 Turkey had only restricted relations with the Islamic Conference, as well as the US (with which it cooperated only within the NATO framework), but after the military coup her ties with both parties were strengthened. During this period Turko-American relations were said to have reached their peak. Two military bases were established in Eastern Anatolia to support American Rapid Deployment Force, designed to take quick action in the Near East. Besides this, Turkey also made evident her readiness to fill the gap in the case Papandreou realized his threats to close down American bases in Greece. Her ties with Saudi Arabia in the economic and military fields were also strengthened.

As a Turkish diplomat openly stated to *Newsweek* magazine, after the 1980 coup, Turkey was a defender of the western interests in the Middle East.³⁹ This was the end of autonomy in Turkish foreign politics. It was like history repeating itself. As in 1958 with the *Eisenhower doctrine*, so in the 1980s Reagan politics imposed a role upon Turkey which was based on the strategic importance of the country in relation with the Middle East. The only difference to the 1950s was the fact that this time Turkey was ready to play this role on her own without Greece. Even though this close military cooperation with the US was completely satisfactory to the latter there was an important issue which remained a worry to the US: The state of the Greco-Turkish relations. As Jed Snyder, one of the strategists that participated in the American National Security Council put it, the problems between Greece and Turkey were a great threat to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Because of these problems the data collected by Awacs, flying over Turkey and Greece, could delay in reaching the Sixth fleet. Besides, Greco-Turkish problems hindered the handling over to NATO of the two British bases in Cyprus. Of course this could be done unilaterally by Britain. It was thought that in case of a reaction of the Warsaw Pact, Greece and Turkey would react in different ways. Greece, to win a victory in a future Greco-Turkish war, would move her soldiers from her northern border to the Aegean, but this would leave behind a defence gap in the North. Papandreou, in order to guarantee that this defence gap would not be exploited, moved closer to his socialist neighbors. The moving of the Greek army from North to South made it impossible for Greece to fulfill her NATO obligations in a possible attack from the Warsaw Pact. The problems between Greece and Turkey could force America, in a situation of crisis, to keep a distance from both countries and under certain conditions even not react at all.⁴⁰

Within this framework a solution to the Cyprus problem was desirable to the US. Reagan taking advantage of the Turko-American honeymoon, persuaded the head of the state in Turkey, Kenan Evren, to act and make Denktash move towards a compromise on the Cyprus conflict. Thus Denktash gave up his demand for rotation of presidency and settled for territorial concessions under 30 per cent (29+ per cent).

What the UN Secretary General managed to secure by the end of the proximity talks

was an agreement by both sides to a document spelling out the basic elements for a federal, bi-zonal republic. The federal government would have a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president. At the same time, the two communities would have equal standing in the federal government. The federal cabinet positions would be divided on a 7:3 basis with the provision that the foreign ministry or other major portfolio would be assigned to a Turkish Cypriot. The agreement provided for a federal legislature with two chambers: the Lower House would have a 7:3 ratio in favor of Greek Cypriots, but there would be equal representation in the Upper House. Legislation on major matters would require separate majorities in both chambers.⁴¹

However, contrary to expectations, the January 1985 Summit Meeting failed, as the Greek Cypriot leader Kyprianou wanted to use the draft agreement as a basis for further discussions, while in the eyes of Denktash and the Secretary General the purpose of the Summit was to sign the draft agreement and then move on to set up working committees to finish the task.

The blame for the failure went to Kyprianou and Turkey was seen as the party willing to compromise. But soon after Denktash made it clear that he was as uncompromising as Kyprianou. He stated publicly, that he accepted to sign the draft agreement only because he was sure Kyprianou would have not signed it.

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The Economic Aspects and Consequences of a Federal Solution to the Cyprus Problem

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Abstract

This paper briefly analyzes the economic aspects and consequences of a federal solution to the Cyprus problem. The analysis is carried out within the framework of two models - "loose" and "strong" federation. Both short and long term aspects and consequences of a potential federal solution are addressed. Political, social, legal and other perspectives are dealt with circumstantially and only when this is necessary for the general structure and understanding of the issues under examination.

Introduction

The main objective of this paper is to briefly analyze the economic aspects and consequences of a federal solution, be that of a "loose" or "strong" nature, to the Cyprus problem.¹ The focus is on both the short and long term aspects and consequences of a solution, comparing a "loose" and "strong" federal model. Political aspects and other relevant perspectives are dealt with only as required when this is necessary to examine the general structure of the issues under examination and gain an understanding of them. Likewise, any legal and social considerations are addressed only in cases when they are closely related to the economic aspects of the problem.

The term *federation*, although not absolutely concrete, incorporates a wide range of relations.¹ Furthermore, federation is not a static concept, as it may evolve over time.

Consequently, several aspects must be examined - within the framework of a federal solution to identify the best possible option for Cyprus under the present circumstances. In principle, a solution should be viable and functional and should deal with all necessary requirements for the eventual reinstatement of the unity and territorial integrity of Cyprus in the reasonably near future. This paper also addresses the prospects as well as the risks arising from a federal settlement. At the same time, an effort is made to single out the forces and tendencies towards unification, on the one hand, and division, on the other, which may very well develop in the aftermath of a federal solution.