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TOURISM DEVELOPMENT
IN CYPRUS

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Abstract

This paper provides an overview of the tourism industry in Cyprus. Touris
Cyprus' most important export and its contributions to the economy anc
growth are invaluable. The paper demonstrates the extent to which the ex
of tourism is integrated into and affects the entire economy through
examination of economic linkages and leakages. Briefly, the paper
discusses concerns that have been raised about socio-cultural
environmental impacts of tourism on the island. Although, further expansio
tourism must take these negative effects into consideration, it is argued thai
benefits associated with tourism development outweigh the costs.

The Nature of the Tourism Trade

Until World War II tourism, and recreation and leisure activities in gen
were privileges of the rich. However, during the beginning of the post-war
this privilege became available to a larger group of people. The introductio
paid holidays, the invention of the jet engine, the decreasing cos
transportation, urbanization, the impact of communications and the media.
increasing levels of education, the new attitudes toward leisure, and espec
the increase in per capita income in the Advanced Developed Countries h
contributed significantly to the expansion of the tourism industry. It is still i
however, that tourism is a luxury product, whose income elasticity is gre
than one, and it is demanded only after an entire range of more basic needs
satisfied.

Table 1 presents the global growth of tourism since 1950. It illustrates
the number of international tourists has increased from 69.2 million in 196
340 million in 1986. Receipts from tourism increased from 6.8 billion US$ in
to $115 billion in 1986. The percentage increase in the number of tourists
the receipts from tourism has shown an increasing pattern, except for a
cases, such as in 1982 and 1983 when a recession had stricken the w
economies. The increase in tourism arrivals and receipts is expected to cont
as long as economic development and per capita income continue to incr
around the world.

Table 1 reveals that tourism has become an important export commodi

nternational trade. However, it has seldom been recognized as an important ndustry. This lack of attention has changed lately since tourism has not only)ecome the backbone of many small economies, but also has taken on a more significant role in larger economies.

Tourism, per se, is considered to be a service--essentially a personal or consumer service.[1] However, as Christine Richter argues, "...even though economists put tourism in the tertiary service sector, tourism is a composite product, i.e., a combination of both material goods (hotels, swimming pools, etc.,) and immaterial goods and or services (climate, personnel)."[2] She actually classifies tourism in what she calls a "mixed-service sector."

An essential characteristic of the tourism industry is that production and consumption take place in the same location. As Richter notes, the consumption of tourism services leads to their destruction--"...the only residual value that remains is the experience, the memory, etc,"[3] i.e., the services produced can not be reproduced exactly.

Tourism is no doubt a special type of service export; the export of this composite commodity takes place on the territory of the exporting country, and the success of this industry depends on a few factors that exports in manufacturing do not. Unlike the manufacturing export industries in countries such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, the very success of tourism depends on the social and cultural differences between hosts and visitors, as well as their ease of interaction, trust, and comfort with each other.[4] Therefore, tourism cannot be thought of as a competitively produced good. There will always be a clear case of product differentiation not just by the variety of activities that host countries offer to tourists, but also by the type of interaction that takes place between the residents and the visitors. The only way to ignore this factor is to think of tourism as an "enclave" with little or no interaction between tourists and locals. However, the extent to which tourism affects the economy does not allow one to examine tourism in this manner.

As an export, tourism contributes to the invisible account of the balance of payments. It is a source of foreign exchange and domestic employment and output. Tourism exchange receipts are reduced when the import cost of goods and services consumed by visitors, as well as the cost of capital investment in tourism infrastructure, is taken into account. However, it can be argued that for a revenue- earning sector such as tourism there should be no reason why the government could not recover its expenses on promotion and infrastructure.[5] Furthermore, it should be noted that the residents of the host country could benefit from the infrastructural development as a result of the tourism sector. A unique factor in the export of tourism services is that unlike the export of manufactured or primary commodities, the exporting country does not have to worry about certain types of trade quantitative restrictions such as tariffs and quotas since tourist consumers are "imported" into the country. This advantage allows the tourism industry to grow and expand at internationally determined prices.

Tourism expenditures affect not only the tourism industry, but they also indirectly affect other sectors of the economy, such as agriculture and manufacturing, as well as other service-oriented activities. Money spent by tourists provides income in the form of wages, rent, interest, dividends and profits for the employees and employers in the tourism sector. In addition to providing direct employment to the hotel and catering industries, it also indirectly generates employment in the sectors which supply the industry, such as agriculture, manufacturing, banks, insurance, et cetera. Tourism is a highly labor intensive industry and creates a variety of jobs ranging from the unskilled to the highly specialized. Tourism's significant role in economic development becomes more apparent because increasing tourism revenues, in the form of foreign exchange, help to meet the import requirements of capital goods and technology used in the process of industrialization. As a result of tourism expenditures, economic dependence is reduced and diversified.[6]

Traditional tourism literature has shown tourism as a development target to be both beneficial and detrimental. For small economies, especially island economies, with little potential for industrialization due to the smallness of the domestic market, alternatives methods of stimulating the economy must be considered. Tourism often appears as the most viable method of exploiting the natural endowments of small islands. In Cyprus' case, tourism is also seen as a method of diversifying the economy.

Tourism may also be encouraged by an appeal to the standard factor proportions theory of international trade.[7] If an economy harbors an excess of a certain resource, and it consumes only a small amount of it, then it could benefit from becoming an exporter of this resource. Developing tourism as a service export for small island economies (as well as many non-island, larger countries) whose natural endowments, such as landscape, beaches, sun or historical and archaeological sites attract visitors from abroad is a healthy venture for the economy. For many countries, therefore, the relative abundance of this natural resource would call for production and export of goods and services that use this resource relatively intensively.

Following this line of thought, tourism is a good tool for growth in trade. The implications of the standard trade theory, however, grossly understate the role of exports of the tourist product as a development tool for small island economies. However, as the following section illustrates, the export of tourism services in Cyprus has been the driving force for the economy of the island.

Tourism in Cyprus

The tourism industry began to develop in Cyprus during the 1950s, the last years of colonial subjugation. The cooling mountains were the major reason why tourists--mostly from the Middle East--visited Cyprus.

The importance of international tourism to the economy of the island has been increasing rapidly since 1960, particularly during the last decade. Tourism was one of the main sectors on which the recovery and expansion of the Cypriot economy was based after the Turkish invasion in 1974. By 1985, tourism receipts' contribution to the GDP was higher than that of the agricultural sector and that of the manufacturing sector (See Table 4). Furthermore, 47 percent of the total invisible earnings in 1987 came from tourism receipts.[8] It is important to mention here that these gains were made in spite of the serious blow which the Cypriot tourism industry suffered as a result of the invasion in 1974 (See Tables 2 and 3). Eighty-two percent of the tourist accommodation, ninety-six percent of the hotels under construction, the two well-developed tourist provinces of Famagusta and Kyrenia, and the Nicosia international airport were no longer accessible assets of the Republic's economy.[9]

Table 2 illustrates the number of foreign persons who have visited Cyprus since 1960, as well as the total receipts from tourism. The table indicates that in 1988 there were close to 1.3 million visitors, almost double the size of the Greek population of the island. The table also demonstrates that during the years of upheaval (1964, 1974 and 1975), the flow of tourists and the total receipts from tourism declined. Therefore, as Papadopoulos claims, the main factors which determine whether a country can maintain a high rate of tourist arrivals are the political and economic conditions both in and around the country. Lack of security, wars and acts of violence are detrimental to the tourist industry because tourists will shift toward other destinations.[10] However, as the table exhibits, tourism is also a resilient business whose instability is relatively non-existent in the long run.

By comparing Table 3 with Table 1, it is evident that Cyprus tourism exhibits a higher rate of growth of arrivals and receipts, than does international tourism. The table, however, indicates that the rate of growth of tourist arrivals as well as receipts is slowing down. This could be a result of the frequent ups and downs of the tourist industry and may not be a permanent phenomenon,[11] or it may be a permanently unstable pattern.

Table 4 shows the contribution of tourism, manufacturing, and agriculture to the GDP since 1962. As the table illustrates, during the 1960s and the mid-1970s agriculture's share of the GDP was the highest. During the late 1970s and 1980s manufacturing became strong. Tourism has been steadily increasing its share of the GDP, and during the 1980s its contribution has increased significantly. The growing importance of tourism is indicated by the tourism

revenue which has increased from 3 percent of Cyprus GDP in 1962 to 7.1 percent in 1973 and 18.5 percent in 1988.

Table 5 presents the percentage share of tourism receipts relative to the export of goods and the invisible earnings (see also Figure 1). It is clear from the table that the share of tourism receipts has been increasing steadily since 1977. In 1988 it constituted 121.2 percent of the export of goods and 46.2 percent of the invisible earnings. Furthermore, the table indicates the high dependency of Cyprus on tourism concerning foreign exchange earnings.

Table 6 shows the receipts from tourism compared to the value of certain imports, capital goods and fuel. This table illustrates the importance of foreign exchange revenues from tourism in paying for the import goods or resources that are not domestically produced. The revenue from tourism has covered, especially during the last couple of years, more than 40 percent of the total value of imported goods. Hence, the contribution of tourism receipts to the economy of the island is of great significance. The data presented in this table also indicates how vulnerable the economy of the island is to external shocks.

The post-invasion boom in tourism created the necessary stimulus for the provision of tourism-related infrastructure, especially in hotels and hotel apartments. Because of the sluggish economic conditions, the lack of hotels and apartments, and the lack of organization by the local authorities, strong incentives for the construction of hotels were given without consideration of building zones or the environment. In some cases, therefore, the supply of such facilities has increased beyond the required levels. However, in the last few years the Cyprus Tourism Organization has regulated the number of construction permits in an effort to control the expansion.

Direct and Indirect Effects of Tourism

Tourism expenditures not only directly support a substantial tourism industry, but its effects are also felt indirectly by other sectors of the economy--including agriculture, light manufacturing, food processing, banking, foreign exchange transactions, postal services, and

transportation. However, tourism creates leakages. The industry needs imported goods and services to satisfy the demand of its foreign visitors. Imported goods and services are also required for the infrastructural development of the industry. These imports drain the external account.

Tourism creates backward and fiscal linkages to the rest of the economy, but it does not offer any forward linkages because of its nature, and therefore it cannot be used as an input into other productive activities.[12] However, while it may not produce forward linkage (as an input), it does create complementarity in consumption. It creates expatriate tourism, health tourism, conference

tourism, shopping tourism, cruise tourism, sand and sea tourism, athletic tourism, and agro-tourism. These are differentiated products, each with their own complementarity.

Table 7 shows the value of inputs going into restaurants and hotels (a proxy for tourism) for Cyprus in 1981. The table illustrates that the direct linkages and the value of the gross inputs required in restaurants and hotels for 1981 was 81.12 million pounds. The table shows that the value of total intermediate inputs was 35.95 million pounds. The value of imports needed directly in the production of tourism was 5.96 million pounds, which constituted 7.3 percent of the total value of inputs required. This import requirement is referred to as the direct leakage related to the restaurant and hotel industry. However, this section of the tourism industry provides indirect linkages to the economy that outweigh the leakages.

A further examination of the table reveals that restaurants and hotels demanded from agriculture inputs whose value was 4.22 million pounds--5.2 percent of the total input requirement. This amount constitutes direct income to the rural sector. Manufacturing provided restaurants and hotels with 9.98 million pounds worth of inputs, 12.3 percent of the total value of gross inputs. Finance, real estate, insurance and business services sales to the sector were 6.35 million pounds, 7.8 percent of the total input requirement. Indirect taxes (fiscal linkage), revenue going directly to the government, were close to one million pounds. Wages to employees were 14.5 million pounds, 17.8 percent of total gross inputs, and the operating surplus of 26.97 million pounds constituted 33.2 percent of the total gross inputs requirement. Value added created in restaurants and hotels was 45.17 million pounds, 55.7 percent of the value of total gross output. It is interesting to note that in the same year the value added of manufacturing was 31 percent of the total gross output of the sector, while its operating surplus was only 10.4 percent and wages were 15.5 percent of the total. Value added in agriculture was 51.1 percent, and its operating surplus was 43 percent of its total gross output. Therefore, value added in restaurants and hotels was above that of manufacturing and agriculture.

Table 8 exhibits the distribution of output of restaurants and hotels for 1981. The table indicates that 7.09 million pounds of the total gross output of restaurants and hotels was attributed to intermediate demand. Therefore, the sales by this sector to other productive sectors could be considered a type of forward linkage. From the total gross output of 81.12 million pounds, 20.76 million were private final consumption and 53.25 million were sales registered under exports. Twenty six percent of total gross output was attributed to private final consumption, while almost 65 percent met export demand. Therefore, the leakage component of tourism-related activities for Cyprus was not 5.96 million pounds, but only 3.87 million pounds. Since only 65 percent of this sector's

output was exported, the direct leakage factor attributed to the export component of the restaurants and hotels output is smaller than 7.3 percent of the total value of imports required.[13]

Tourism often brings with it an increase in the import of food products due to tourist demand. However, within an economy that supports an agriculture sector that is adequately diversified, like Cyprus,' the majority of tourist demands can be supplied through domestic sources. In Jamaica, another small island economy with a large tourism industry, domestic food production cannot meet the demands of the tourists.[14] Demand for luxury items such as caviar and lobster are certainly not satisfied by local production. In this sense, Cyprus' lack of high income tourism is a plus--the demand for these luxury imported food items has not been significant.

According to a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Cyprus for the year 1984,[15] the total income to the factors of production (labor and capital), as a result of tourism expenditures was 15.5 percent of the GDP, while the direct leakage component related to tourism expenditures was 25 percent.[16] These results strongly support the thesis that the impact of tourism on the economy of the island has been beneficial with relatively low leakage effects.[17]

Table 9 provides an overall view of tourism's affect on the economy by showing the extent to which tourism weaves through the entire economy via direct and indirect effects of tourism expenditures. The table shows that directly and indirectly tourists spent 172.2 million pounds on manufacturing, while services and agriculture received 162.2 million and 35.1 million pounds, respectively.

Other Impacts of Tourism

In addition to the above economic impacts of tourism, there are social and environmental issues related to the tourism industry. Economists, anthropologists, sociologists and environmentalists have raised concerns about the possible negative effects of tourism on the environment, as well as on the society which receives the tourist flows.

While tourists visit the island they display to the local population something of the lifestyles of their native countries. Sociologists have shown that this "demonstration effect" can have harmful consequences for a traditional society. Tourists advertise foreign consumer patterns, and local residents may attempt to adapt and imitate foreign values if they view these new patterns as representative of the "good life." As the domestic population begins to imitate a foreign way of life, they will begin to demand new products--imported products. If the economy succumbs to these demands, the increase in imports will be detrimental to the balance of payments.

Concerns have also been raised concerning the affect to which the bonds of a traditional society will be loosened if the younger generations adopt foreign values. Traditions and customs may change. In fact, there is evidence in Cyprus that social patterns are changing, family bonds have loosened and generation gaps have widened.[18] However, Cyprus is an ex-colony, and has therefore been exposed to foreign values for a long time. As a member of the Commonwealth, Cyprus has long had access to work, study and travel opportunities abroad. International trade has always been very active in the economy as well. For some time Cyprus society has been exposed to foreign values through foreign movies, television programs, periodicals, and other media. One cannot attribute the loosening of traditional social patterns solely to tourism on an island that has been influenced by many years of foreign interaction.

The conspicuous display of wealth exhibited by tourists may cause resentment within the local population. Also, tension may rise between tourists and local residents due to competition for existing facilities and services. Although nationals may take offense at these actions, Andronicou has noted that this is not the case in Cyprus.[19] He notes that in Cyprus tourists have not been labelled as 'invaders,' and their spending patterns have not been viewed as a sign of superiority.[20]

Some authors have argued that foreign visitors sometimes show disrespect toward local people,[21] and that sexual conflicts are on the rise. Also deserving of mention is the increasing incidence of crime as well as other serious social problems such as prostitution and abortions, whose occurrences increase during or after the tourist season.[22] In Cyprus, during the summer season when the tourist arrivals reach their peak, crime increases, but micro-thefts are the only incidents.

According to a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report,[23] a number of Cypriots prefer the way of life in Cyprus as it was before tourism invaded the island. The report contains complaints, especially by the old, of noise and immodest dress. However, the socio-cultural patterns of Cyprus life are not so dissimilar to those of European countries. Since the differences are minimal, the extent to which they affect society, culture, and attitudes must be considered negligible.[24]

Since tourism in Cyprus depends to an extent upon a clean and healthy environment, environmental concerns must be taken into account. As the tourism sector expands and new hotels sprout along the coast, greater pressure is put on the environment, existing infrastructure and natural resources. The increase of people using the island's facilities means increasing pressure on the inadequate sewage facilities and increased pollution which affect the coastal waters. In fact, a report has shown that sewage capacity in Cyprus needs improvement.[25] Because Cyprus is an economy that holds little land, the pressure can not be easily released through expansion. Cyprus must also be concerned because of its limited supply of fresh water.

Such environmental concerns have been raised by the UNDP. The organizations's recommendations to the government in terms of the further development of tourism stress the need to protect the undeveloped coasta areas. The UNDP plan for Cyprus advises diversification of the tourism produc by developing the mountain areas of the island and attracting tourists from higher economic strata.

Depending on the premises of their discussion of tourism and the particula cases studied, authors have expressed views for, or against development withi small island economies. Tourism development clearly involves some trade-off: It is claimed that tourism development results in the assimilation of foreig values and consumption patterns by the local population. The direct contac with foreigners also raises some questions, given the subservient nature of some of the services provided to tourists. It is also claimed that the foreig exchange earnings received by the host country usually find their way back to the countries generating the tourist flows due to leakages. Therefore, th dependency of the host countries, which use tourism as a development tool of the Advanced Developed Countries, which generate the tourist flows, is furthe exacerbated. However, one could argue that the natural advantages of su sea, and dryness, which were factors detrimental to development in the pas can now be exploited in order to reduce dependency.

The foreign exchange earnings that the tourism sector provides ma definitely play an important role in economic development: the provision foreign exchange necessary for the purchase of imported capital goods ar technology used in the process of industrialization. The development of touris in Cyprus created new jobs, especially for women.[26] The types of jobs creat range from low skill occupations to more "dignified" ones. The dire employment created in the "broad tourist sector," i.e., in hotels, restauran travel agencies, airports, hotel construction, et cetera, is approximately 20,0(jobs.[27]

Tourism development in Cyprus has also aided the preservation ai revitalization of traditional handicrafts. If it were not for tourism "[t]here is lit doubt that some of these [traditional crafts and handicrafts] could have becon completely extinct."[28] These aspects of tourism--demand for visits to historic sights, and increased demand for domestic handicrafts--also have direct ai indirect benefits to the local residents by increasing the variety of goods ai leisure activities available to them. Such benefits are especially great in tho economies where the initial development of tourism was based only on sun ai beach. For example, tourists with higher levels of education and income may

drawn to archaeological sites, and as a result cause an increasing appreciation of the host country's culture by its own residents.

Conclusion

Tourism has been the driving force of the economy of Cyprus since the Turkish invasion in 1974. By 1988 receipts from tourism reached 365 million pounds, 18.5 percent of the GDP. Tourism development also created employment opportunities for the local population, and it has been estimated that more than 10 percent of the population is absorbed by the sector, directly and indirectly.

Some social and environmental concerns have been raised as a consequence of the expansion of tourism. However, since Cyprus has long been closely integrated with Europe the significance of tourism's affect on the social patterns must be considered minimal. The environmental impact of tourism, however, is of great concern, and thus there is a need to balance the long-term environmental effects with the economic benefits that accrue to society from such activity.

FIGURE 1

Tourism Receipts and Export of Goods and Service

In millions of Cyprus Pounds

□ Export of goods and services   +Tourism   O Goods

TABLE 1 - ARRIVALS OF TOURISTS FROM ABROAD AND TOURISM RECEIPTS FROM INTERNATIONAL TOURISM

YEAR	A	B	C	D	E
1950	25282	2.1	-	-	-
1960	69296	173.9	6.8	228.6	-
1961	75281	0.8	7.2	5.8	-
1962	81329	8.0	8.0	9.6	-
1963	89999	10.7	8.1	11.2	-
1964	104506	16.1	10.0	13.5	-
1965	112729	7.8	11.6	14.9	184.1
1966	119797	6.3	13.3	14.7	203.4
1967	129529	8.1	14.5	9.0	214.5
1968	130899	1.1	15.0	3.4	239.5
1969	143140	9.3	16.8	12.0	273.0
1970	159690	11.6	17.9	6.5	312.0
1971	172239	7.8	20.9	16.8	349.4
1972	181851	5.6	24.6	17.7	414.7
1973	190622	4.8	31.1	26.4	574.0
1974	197117	3.4	33.8	9.0	836.0
1975	214357	8.8	40.7	20.4	873.0
1976	220719	2.9	44.4	9.3	991.0
1977	239122	8.3	55.6	25.2	1125.0
1978	257366	7.7	68.9	23.9	1303.0
1979	273999	6.5	83.3	20.9	1635.0
1980	284841	4.0	102.4	22.8	1985.0
1981	288848	1.4	104.3	1.9	1970.0
1982	286958	-0.7	98.6	-5.5	1842.0
1983	293944	2.4	98.3	-0.3	1901.0
1984	315359	7.3	102.5	4.2	1901.0
1985	332991	5.6	109.6	6.9	1930.4
1986	340000	2.1	115.0	5.0	2250.0

A: Arrivals of tourists from abroad (thousands).
B: % change over previous year.
C: Receipts from international tourism (US$ billions).
D: %change over previous year.
E: Total value of world exports (US$ billions).

Source: World Tourism Organization, 1989, *Yearbook of Tourism Statistics*, Madrid: WTO Publications.

TABLE 2 - NUMBER OF TOURISTS AND RECEIPTS FROM TOURISM 1960-1988

YEAR	TOURISTS AND EXCURSIONISTS IN MILLION	RECEIPTS FROM TOURISM*
1960	.086	2.3
1961	.106	2.8
1962	.136	3.5
1963	.156	4.5
1964	.080	1.0
1965	.117	2.2
1966	.142	3.6
1967	.140	4.3
1968	.198	5.8
1969	.228	7.8
1970	.235	8.1
1971	.307	13.6
1972	.405	19.2
1973	.432	23.8
1974	.231	13.9
1975	.079	5.4
1976	.206	20.7
1977	.225	23.8
1978	.288	33.3
1979	.357	50.1
1980	.403	71.7
1981	.498	102.4
1982	.606	138.7
1983	.717	174.8
1984	.826	212.0
1985	.921	232.0
1986	.986	256.6
1987	1.156	320.7
1988	1.311	365.0

Note: Tourist is considered any person who is a temporary visitor staying at least 24 hours in the country visited, and the purpose of whose journey can be classified under one following:

a. Leisure (recreation, holiday, health, study, religion, sports).
b. Business, family, mission, and meetings.

An excursionist is a visitor spending less than 24 hours in a country visited.

* In millions of Cyprus pounds at current market prices.

Source: Department of Statistics and Research, Annual Economic Report, various issues.[29]
Cyprus Tourism Organization, Annual Report, various issues.[30]

TABLE 3 - RATE OF GROWTH OF TOURISTS AND TOURISM RECEIPTS

YEAR	TOURISTS: % CHANGE OVER THE PREVIOUS YEAR	RECEIPTS FROM TOURISM: % CHANGE OVER THE PREVIOUS YEAR
1960	-	-
1961	55.6	21.7
1962	25.1	25.0
1963	48.5	28.5
1964	-78.4	-77.7
1965	106.7	120.0
1966	62.7	63.6
1967	26.3	19.4
1968	29.3	34.8
1969	33.8	34.4
1970	7.2	3.8
1971	41.0	167.9
1972	27.8	41.1
1973	15.6	23.9
1974	-43.0	-41.6
1975	-68.7	-61.1
1976	265.4	283.3
1977	1.7	15.0
1978	22.1	39.9
1979	37.5	50.4
1980	49.1	43.1
1981	-3.4	42.8
1982	25.2	35.4
1983	13.0	26.0
1984	11.0	21.3
1985	15.6	9.4
1986	7.5	10.6
1987	14.5	24.9
1988	17.2	13.8

Source: Cyprus Tourism Organization, Annual Report, various issues.[31]

TABLE 4 - SHARE OF TOURISM, MANUFACTURING AND AGRICULTURE TO GDP IN PERCENTAGES 1962-1988

YEAR	GDP	MANUFACTURING %	AGRICULTURE %	TOURIST %
1962	116.2	9.7	18.3	3.0
1963	121.8	10.2	16.5	3.5
1964	113.3	10.9	15.4	0.8
1965	137.4	10.2	20.3	1.6
1966	147.2	10.5	18.8	2.4
1967	161.7	10.7	20.8	2.4
1968	175.7	10.5	19.7	3.3
1969	211.9	10.5	18.5	3.6
1970	227.0	11.2	15.7	3.5
1971	262.1	11.4	17.6	5.2
1972	297.6	12.7	16.3	6.4
1973	335.8	12.9	12.1	7.1
1974	299.7	12.8	16.8	4.6
1975	257.0	14.3	15.7	2.1
1976	330.6	17.4	16.2	7.7
1977	419.7	17.9	13.3	5.6
1978	501.3	18.5	11.0	6.6
1979	629.8	17.5	10.2	8.0
1980	760.4	17.5	9.5	9.4
1981	876.4	17.6	9.2	11.6
1982	1024.6	17.0	9.3	13.5
1983	1136.6	16.5	7.9	15.3
1984	1335.6	16.1	9.0	15.8
1985	1479.9	15.6	7.5	15.7
1986	1598.0	15.0	7.3	16.0
1987	1778.7	13.4	7.4	18.0
1988	1976.5	15.5	7.3	18.5

Source: Department of Statistics and Research, Economic Report, various issues.[32]
  Central Bank of Cyprus, Annual Report, various issues.[33]
  * In millions of Cyprus pounds at current market prices.

TABLE 5 - RECEIPTS FROM TOURISM, EXPORTS AND INVISIBLE EARNINGS
PERCENTAGE OF RECEIPTS FROM TOURISM IN RELATION TO

YEAR	EXPORT OF GOODS (1)	INVISIBLE EARNINGS	EXPORTS OF GOODS	INVISIBLE EARNINGS
1973	57.2	97.4	41.6	24.4
1977	124.2	137.5	19.2	17.3
1978	122.5	150.4	27.2	22.1
1979	149.5	196.6	33.5	25.7
1980	172.7	245.7	41.5	29.2
1981	213.9	311.4	47.9	32.9
1982	238.1	390.8	58.3	35.5
1983	230.7	455.4	75.8	38.4
1984	307.5	534.6	68.9	39.7
1985	255.4	582.3	90.8	39.8
1986	234.0	599.6	109.7	42.8
1987	272.0	689.2	117.7	47.0
1988	301.2	790.2	121.2	46.2

Source: Cyprus Tourism Organization, 1989, Annual Report 1988, CTO, Nicosia: Printing Office of the Republic of Cyprus.
Note: In millions of Cyprus pounds at current market prices. The invisible earnings include transfer payments.
  (1) Includes re-exports.

TABLE 6 - RECEIPTS FROM TOURISM AND VALUE OF IMPORTS OF CERTAIN GOODS*

YEAR	TOURISM RECEIPTS	IMPORTS OF CAPITAL GOODS	IMPORTS OF FUEL	TOTAL IMPORTS OF GOODS
1973	23.8	19.9	8.8	140.5
1977	23.8	31.6	35.2	228.1
1978	33.3	34.4	31.0	255.4
1979	50.1	39.3	44.5	321.2
1980	71.7	40.9	78.5	381.0
1981	102.4	43.0	105.3	439.4
1982	138.7	52.0	117.3	518.3
1983	174.8	53.4	119.9	575.9
1984	212.0	66.9	144.8	720.7
1985	232	69.4	136.9	687.2
1986	256.6	71.7	82.9	591.5
1987	320.7	65.3	87.3	638.3
1988	365.0	95.1	78.3	778.8

Source: Cyprus Tourism Organization, 1989, Annual Report 1988, CTO, Nicosia Printing Office of the Republic of Cyprus.
  * In millions of Cyprus pounds at current market prices.

TABLE 7 - INPUTS INTO RESTAURANTS AND HOTELS, 1981

Agriculture	4.22
Manufacturing	9.98
Electricity, gas and water	3.96
Construction	0.48
Wholesale and retail trade	2.52
Restaurants and hotels	0.16
Transport, storage and communication	1.23
Finance, real estate, insurance and business services	6.35
Community, social and personal services	0.69
Public administration	0.12
Public services	0.38
Other producers (non profit institutions)	0.06
Intermediate inputs for local production	29.99
Total imports (duties included)	5.96

Total intermediate inputs	35.95
Depreciation	2.88
Indirect taxes	0.90
Compensation of employees	14.50
Operating Surplus	26.97
GDP value added at market prices	45.17
Total primary inputs	51.13

Total gross inputs	81.12

Source: Department of Statistics and Research, June 1988, Input-Output Tables of Cyprus for 1981, Nicosia: Printing Office of the Republic of Cyprus.

Note: The term total primary inputs includes, total imports (duties included), depreciation, indirect taxes, compensation of employees and operating surplus.

Note: Inputs going to restaurants and hotels from agriculture comprise 0.9 percent of the total intermediate inputs from local production; those coming from manufacturing comprise 3.2 percent, while those from services constitute 2.6 percent of the total intermediate demand.

* In millions of Cyprus pounds at current market prices.

TABLE 8 - DISTRIBUTION OF OUTPUT OF RESTAURANTS AND HOTELS IN MILLION OF CYPRUS POUNDS *

Agriculture	0.01
Mining and quarrying	0.01
Manufacturing	1.35
Electricity, gas and water	0.01
Construction	1.13
Wholesale and retail trade	1.78
Restaurants and hotels	0.16
Transport, storage and communications	0.70
Finance, insurance, real estate, and business services	1.03
Community, social and personal services	0.18
Public administration and defense	0.54
Public services	0.04
Other producers	0.15

Intermediate demand	7.09
Private final consumption	20.76
Gross fixed capital formation	0.02
Exports	53.25

Total gross output	81.12

Source: Department of Statistics and Research, June 1988, Input-Output Tables of Cyprus for 1981, Nicosia: Printing Office of the Republic of Cyprus.

* In current market prices.

TABLE 9 - DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF TOURISM ON THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY FOR 1984

	A	B
LABOR PROFESSIONAL	1.6	19.0
WHITE COLLAR	8.9	50.9
SKILLED	5.1	32.7
UNSKILLED NON AGRIC.	3.6	6.1
UNSKILLED AGRICULTURE	0.2	13.8
CAPITAL UNINCORPORATE	0.0	36.4
CORPORATE NON-AGRIC.	0.0	44.0
CORPORATE AGRICULTURE	0.0	0.5
HOUSEHOLDS RURAL	0.0	48.4
URBAN LOWER	0.0	31.7
URBAN UPPER	0.0	81.9
PRIVATE	0.0	34.1
PUBLIC	0.0	15.0
ACTIVITIES AGRICULTURE	0.0	29.8
MINING	0.0	0.3
MANUFACTURING	0.0	125.8
ELECTRICITY	0.0	20.9
CONSTRUCTION	0.0	2.2
TRADE	0.0	19.5
RESTAURANTS	0.0	84.9
TRANSPORT	0.0	22.1
FINANCE	0.0	46.8
PUBLIC	0.0	0.3
OTHER	0.0	11.9
COMMODITIES AGRICULTURE	8.0	34.8
DOMESTIC MINING	0.0	0.3
MANUFACTURING	82.1	149.1
ELECTRICITY	8.3	20.9
CONSTRUCTION	0.0	2.2
TRADE	0.0	0.2
RESTAURANTS	76.5	85.9
TRANSPORTATION	12.1	16.8
FINANCE	13.5	47.5
PUBLIC	0.0	0.3
OTHER	0.0	11.9

Source: Michael Kammas, Unpublished Ph. Dissertation, University of Utah, 1991.

A Direct Tourist Expenditures

B Total domestic income effects of tourism spending.

In millions of Cyprus Pounds at current market prices.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAREER IDENTITY IN CYPRUS: A FAMILY SYSTEMS APPROACH

Stelios N. Georgiou

Abstract

This article describes the environmental influence on the individual's ability to decide about future courses of action. More specifically, it presents the findings of a study which examined the effects that certain structural and functional characteristics of the Cyprus family system have on the adolescent's own readiness for career decisions.

The article consists of three main parts. After a brief rationale on the topic's importance, the most notable theories of career development are reviewed. Then, the study's methodology and basic findings are presented and discussed.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE WORLD OF WORK

Why is this article's topic important? Is there any clear connection between the role of the worker and other socially defined roles? Can we say that the readiness for career decision-making (or the degree of career identity development) is related to other meaningful personality constructs? Finally, how are Cypriot adolescents different in this respect from other adolescents and why should this difference be of any concern to us? These questions will be addressed in the sections that follow.

Today's society is work-oriented. Recent reports suggest that "individuals tend to make a more permanent commitment to their work [rather] than to their first marital partner."[1] For most people, work seems to be a vital part of their psychological functioning. Job and career-related concerns have a direct impact on physical and mental health, as well as on intimate and social relationships.

For example, stress and anxiety caused by work-place friction are well-known marital problem-makers. These problems inevitably influence job performance which may lead to career advancement difficulties. These difficulties, in turn, affect among other things the individual's self-esteem which sparks more troubles at home and the cycle repeats itself endlessly.[2]

In everyday life, the role of the "worker" has a central position among the

.ny other socially defined adult roles. In fact, it is one of the nine major roles ntified by Super in describing the life space in which most individuals in a ɔstern type of society live.[3] Among the other eight roles are "student," "citizen" J "parent." The growing interest of social scientists and policy makers in ˉeer-related issues is thus not surprising.

Within the field of education, this interest is concentrated around the concept career identity development and the factors that influence it. In a United ıtes survey, a representative sample of adults was asked to rank the ɔortance of several given goals of education.[4] The majority of the respondents ve the highest ranking to the ability to speak and write correctly. The second hest ranking was given to developing standards of right and wrong and the ˙d to developing an understanding of the requirements and rewards of erent careers. This finding suggests that the general U.S. public expects ne form of career education to take place in the schools.

No comparable study exists in Cyprus that will show the public's expectations career education programs in the local schools. A look in the daily vspapers, however, can be quite revealing. Articles that voice concern about ˸ existing issue of unemployment among college graduates appear often. me persons argue that the existing vocational guidance services should be ˙re directive in channeling people to specific occupations according to the ɔds of the labor market. Others disagree. The discussion on this issue has ɔn going on for years.

Both students and parents worry about higher education too early (and ˙haps too much). Their main concern seems to be concentrated around what ɔoing to happen *after* schooling and not during it! What Markides observed ɔut the general attitude toward education several years ago seems still to ɔ true:

Competition for status, so characteristic of Cypriot society in general, is the main motivation for the accumulation of diplomas. Knowledge for the sake of knowledge ıs not the primary concern.[5]

In Cyprus the interest in education continues to be governed by its utilitarian ˙ue: education is thought of as the means through which the individual can ain higher social status and a better paid position in the world of work. This ıation makes Cyprus an interesting site for studying issues concerning career ntity development.

THEORIES OF CAREER IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT

Historically, the examination of career identity development has gone through ˈeral stages. These stages are well represented in three widely accepted ɔretical perspectives: the developmental, the contextual and the systemic.

The Developmental Perspective

The concept of career identity development is relatively new. Before the mid-1950s, the prevailing views about vocational behavior were almost entirely non-developmental. Vocational decision-making was largely characterized as a time-bound static event that took place when the adolescent compared himself or herself to the offerings of the world of work and defined a choice of occupation.

The antecedents and the consequences of this choice were seldom mentioned in the counseling literature of the 1940s and early 1950s. The field was dominated by differential psychology and by the assumption that once an individual found his or her "ideal" occupation, the search and the development were over. Therefore, for several decades, the emphasis was placed on the construction of trait-and-factor measures designed to facilitate the process of "match-making" between people and jobs. Some of these approaches persist even today.[6]

The outcome of the career selection process was that the factor was studied and not the process itself. As Super noted, "those who have proposed theories have almost always dealt with occupational choice rather than with career development."[7] A number of pioneer voices tried to call for the application of developmental principles to theory and research pertinent to vocational behavior, but it took time for the concept to be established in the literature.[8-10]

Today, the acceptance of the developmental nature of the career-related issues by both the theoreticians and the practitioners in the field is almost unanimous. However, as Crites pointed out, more work is needed in this area.[11] Longitudinal and other process oriented studies are especially missing. In his own words:

Although the field of vocational psychology has been dominated by the developmental point of view for the past 30 years, sophistication in developmental data design has lagged behind conceptualization.[12]

What is Career Identity Development?

As is true with most social science concepts, there is no single and uniformly accepted definition of career identity development. Herr defined it as the aspect of the total human growth which pertains to,

the lifelong behavioral processes and the influences upon them that lead to, or interrelate with one's work values, choice of occupation(s), decision-making style, role integration, self and career identity, understanding of educational opportunities, work adjustment and related phenomena.[13]

He proceeds to comment that this process is not independent of the individual development in the physical, emotional, cognitive and psychomotor areas, nor is

it divorced from the social and cultural *milieus* of which the individual is a member.

In a joint position paper, the National Vocational Guidance Association and the American Vocational Association defined career development as

the total constellation of psychological, sociological, educational, physical, economic and chance factors that combine to shape the career of any given individual. [14]

Integrating the developmental and the systemic perspectives, Herr and Lear defined career development as, "progressive growth and learning operating from infancy through adulthood within a network of impinging forces internal and external to the individual."[15]

A high rate of career development seems to be a desirable characteristic in the competitive Cypriot society, especially for youth. According to Marcia, the completion of identity formation in early adolescence is evident in two particular areas:

a) the development of a philosophical/political belief system, and

b) the development of an occupational role.[16]

Thus, most of the contemporary vocational psychologists see career development during adolescence as a part of the general identity issue that the developing person faces.[17-19]

The Contextual Perspective

A major problem inherent in most theories of career development is that they focus their attention on the ontogenic level (the level of individual differences) and accept the importance of the person-context interaction only in principle. As a result, their reference to the context in which career development occurs remains vague, and as Vondracek justifiably comments, "one is left with the explanatorily problematic depiction of stages unfolding by themselves, as if led by a teleological agent." [20]

Reviewing the vocational behavior literature published in the year 1981, Fretz and Leong concluded that,

a greater number of researchers attended to environmental and organizational variables as major factors in career development. The affirmative results from this emphasis will have to be asserted repeatedly to counter the impact of several generations of intra-psychically oriented career counselors and researchers. Understanding both the unique and interactive contributions of environmental and organizational as well as organismic variables to the development and implementation of careers may well be a challenge we can meet in the 1980s. [21]

The above thesis was recently echoed by Sandra Scarr who said the

owing about the contextual view of human development in her presidential address of the Division of Developmental Psychology of the American Psychological Association in 1984:

This view is discrepant from the prevailing psychology-of-main-effects, in which everyone is affected in the same way by the same, observable events. I predict that (this view) will become the dominant psychological lens for the 1980s. Psychological studies will focus on person-situation interactions and invent new facts" about the differential effects of environments on individuals.[22]

The role of the family in the child's career related developmental process has been recognized by many theorists.[23-25] In his most recent writings, Super accepts the notion that the way in which self-concept is expressed vocationally depends not only on personal determinants, but also on situational ones, the immediate of which is the family.[26]

However, this recognition by Super and other authors is made only on the basis of common sense, because empirical data to support it is lacking. Osipow summed up his observations on the issue as follows:

It is striking that so little theorizing has been done to relate explicitly the role of the family to occupational behavior, particularly when extensive data exist showing that the family background influences the kind of initial choice made and the manner in which it is implemented.[27]

The same observation was made by Newman and Murray. Regarding the contextual elements that influence and are influenced by work identity in early adolescence, these authors point out that, "little is written about the implications of the family system for the content or the process of emerging identity." [28]

Bronfenbrenner's ecological framework is useful in defining the family context. He sees the individual as being embedded in a certain environment, or system, which can be divided into several sub-systems. The portions of context that contain the individual as a member are called microsystems. According to him, a microsystem is "a pattern of activities, roles and interpersonal relations experienced by the developing person in a given setting particular physical and material characteristics."[30] Thus, the family system can be thought of as the most direct environmental influence on individual's career development. Young describes a model of adolescent career development intervention based on the above ecological framework.[31]

The Systemic Perspective[32]

The systemic perspective goes one step beyond the contextual one, since it offers the person-context relationship as being a two-way interaction rather than a one-way influence. A number of human development writers propose the adoption of a family systems perspective in the study of identity formation during

early adolescence, with emphasis on the reciprocity of the intra-familial relations and the dynamic interdependence of family members.[33-35]

Also, the number of authors within the counseling field who suggest incorporating systems thinking into career identity development research is growing.[36-40] This type of thinking has its roots in the General System Theory (GST).[41] GST was put forward in the 1940s as a model for conceptualizing complex phenomena which do not lend themselves to analysis and explanation by mechanistic reasoning and the reductionism of pure, classical science. It uses the ideas of wholeness, organization and dynamic interaction of parts to describe social and ecological systems.

One of the first applications of GST in the social sciences was family therapy. Even though it is relatively new, this type of therapy is widely used, especially for the treatment of families of alcoholics. According to Walrond-Skinner, the appearance of GST in the repertoire of psychotherapeutic treatment was aided by two post-war developments: the emphasis on social psychology and the advances in computer technology.[42] The knowledge produced in these two seemingly unrelated areas was able to offer new insights into group dynamics, cybernetics, system analysis and communications.

Family therapy was influenced by all of them. Its methods are based on the systemic principles of circular causality and dynamic person-context interaction. It utilizes terms such as interdependence of sub-systems and information feedback. Generally, it can be seen as the clinical expression of a much larger movement that cuts across the fields of psychology, sociology and anthropology, as well as the philosophy of science.

The systemic perspective has several formulations that are potentially useful to the present discussion. It views the individual as the lowest level of a hierarchy of interrelated and interdependent systems (person-family-community-society). These systems, open for at least one property, can interact with other systems that exist in their environment. Through this continuous, reciprocal interaction, both systems experience each other's influence and tend to change as a result.

Of course, the most meaningful interaction can be seen between systems that are immediately connected, as is the case of the individual and his or her family. Aldous described very well the developmental changes that families go through as a result of the changes experienced by their growing members.[43] In addition to the contextual emphasis of human behavior are the following two key concepts of the systemic perspective.

Circular Causality

According to this postulate, events can be regarded as being either stimuli or responses, depending on how the total sequence of events is punctuated.[44] "Punctuation" is the set of points in time where the series of the action patterns that surround the phenomenon is interrupted in order to give certain meaning to the observed event. Thus, behavior is viewed in terms of cycles of interaction during which actions are regulated by their consequences.

This view of reality implies a new epistemology. The questions, "why does this phenomenon occur?" (linear type of thinking) and, "what triggered it?" (cause-effect scheme) are replaced by the question, "how does the process work?" The systemic type of thinking also implies a new methodology. Scientific research is not conducted in the traditional input-output paradigm by manipulating independent variables and measuring their effects on other variables defined as dependent ones. Rather, in systems oriented research, variables are seen as both affecting and being simultaneously affected by other variables.[45]

For the purpose of the present discussion, the career related behavior of the adolescent (especially his or her demands for autonomous decisions) could be conceptualized as being affected by family system cohesion and at the same time as directly affecting that very characteristic. Olson predicted that families with moderate levels of cohesion will be more functional and less problematic than families on either extreme regarding this variable.[46] The assumption is that more functional families will allow their younger members more flexibility to define their own career identity and will support them during their struggle.

System Self-regulation

The GST assumes that all the living systems exhibit a basic tendency toward a state of equilibrium. Information that comes from the environment in the form of a feedback signaling a deviation from the desired state of affairs activates the system's regulating mechanism. This mechanism then attempts to maintain the set order (homeostasis) by altering the system's internal condition.

In addition to the negative (status quo preserving) feedback loop that was described above, the family system can sometimes operate under positive (deviation amplifying) feedback. While the former (negative) tends to create pressure to conserve system properties, the latter (positive) tends to create pressure to throw the system out of control exponentially. For example, as the adolescent's demand for autonomy increases, the level of parental permissiveness may change in response to it and at the same time cause further changes to the initial demand. If these two variables are connected through a positive feedback loop, a "snow-ball" kind of behavior should be expected within the family, often with problematic consequences for its members. If, on the other hand, the above variables are part of a "thermostat"

type of feedback loop, then it can be said that the family has found a successful way of maintaining the regularity of its system.

Newman and Murray expressed similar concerns when they described the different tensions that are felt by family members and by adolescents.[47] The tensions for the family members are between allowing individual freedom and facing threats of family disintegration, while the tension for the young adolescent is between separation from the family and loss of the group's support.

Summmury of the Theoretical Review

The current trend in the literature is to look outside the individual in order to understand what goes on inside the individual. The dynamic interaction between personal and environmental attributes is now considered to be the main factor that shapes the development of certain aspects of personality such as career identity.

This thesis has the following crucial implication: theories based on research conducted using samples from a specific population (for example, American students) cannot be generalized on people from other cultures. The particular characteristics of the culture are part of the developmental process. The individual can never be totally separated from the ecosystem of which he or she is, or has been, a member. Therefore, in order to study the development of a personality characteristic of Greek Cypriots (in this case career identity) one has to take into consideration the physical and social systems within which these individuals live and function.

THE EMPIRICAL STUDY

The study that will be described here has attempted to investigate the relationship between personal and familial characteristics in order to understand the development of career related attitudes and skills.[48] It utilized local cross-sectional samples of adolescents and interviewed their family members repeatedly. Its conceptual framework followed the systemic model and used developmental theoretical formulations.

Methodology Overview

The study was divided into two distinct phases. The first one was based on written inventory and self-report data that were collected from a large sample of ninth grade Republic of Cyprus students. Its objective was to test specific hypotheses concerning the relationship that exists between adolescent career development and family cohesion (a structural characteristic of the system). This phase followed the quantitative research paradigm and utilized traditional statistical techniques for data collection and data analysis (such as Analysis of Variance—ANOVA).

The information for the second, qualitative phase was gathered via in-depth, semi-structured interviews with and observations of a small number of families whose ninth grade student members had participated earlier in the first phase of the study. Two rounds of interviews were scheduled with each family unit. The first round took place at the beginning of a period of time during which the participants were faced with an important micro-decision directly related to the career development process of the family's adolescent member. This round of interviews aimed at identifying other elements of the family system (besides cohesion) that are related to career identity development. The second round of interviews took place right after the above decision was made and its main function was to study the parental contribution to the adolescent's decision-making process. What went on in each of the two phases will be presented in summary form below.

Phase One: Structural Aspects of the Family

This part of the study included the collection of cross-sectional data through the administration of two instruments to a sample (N=396) of ninth grade students. These instruments were the Career Development Inventory (CDI) and the Family Adaptability and Cohesion Evaluation Scale (FACES III), both of which were translated into Greek by the present author.[49-51] The CDI measures the individual's level of functioning regarding career related attitudes and skills. The FACES III measures the cohesion of the family system as perceived by the adolescent (or any other family member).

Career Identity Development and Family Cohesion

The main hypothesis concerning the statistical relationship between career identity development and family system cohesion was supported by the findings of the study. The correlation between these two key variables was found to be statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) and in the predicted direction (positive).

The highest correlation coefficient found was between family system cohesion and career orientation, or the total CDI score ($r = 0.32$). Family cohesion was also significantly correlated with the other CDI sub-scales, especially with career exploration ($r = 0.30$) and career attitudes ($r = 0.31$). All of the above relationships were significant at the 0.01 level. The same variable was related to the remaining four sub-scales of CDI (career planning, decision making, world of work knowledge and skills) also, but only at the 0.05 level of significance (see Table 1).

In addition to the computation of the correlations reported above, the two main variables of this study (career development and family cohesion) were treated by means of other statistical tests (one way analysis of variance and

multiple comparisons) on an *a posteriori* basis. For this purpose, the subjects of the total sample were divided into three levels of family cohesion (Low, Medium and High) depending on their relevant score on the FACES III. Those who scored one standard deviation below the mean were classified as Low in family cohesion.

Table 1. Correlation Matrix Between All Variables (CDI Sub-scales and FACES).

Correlation Matrix

	coh	adpt	plan	expl	dec	know	att	skls	orin
coh	1.00								
adpt	0.25**	1.00							
plan	0.21*	0.18*	1.00						
expl	0.30**	0.09	0.48**	1.00					
dec	0.12*	0.06	0.53**	0.05	1.00				
know	0.11*	0.05	-0.03	0.03	0.43**	1.00			
att	0.31**	0.14*	0.73**	0.95**	0.06	0.02	1.00		
skls	0.13*	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.78**	0.90**	0.04	1.00	
orin	0.32**	0.04	0.72**	0.94**	0.16*	0.14*	0.99**	0.17*	1.00

Notes

1. Abbreviations

coh= family cohesion   adpt= family adaptability   att= career related attitudes
plan= career planning   expl= career exploration   skls= career related skills
dec= decision making   know= world of work knowledge   orin= career orientation (total CDI score)

2. Statistical Significance
  (*) the correlation found was statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
  (**) the correlation found was statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

Similarly, those who scored one standard deviation above the mean were classified as High in family cohesion, and those who scored between one standard deviation below and one standard deviation above the mean were classified as belonging to the Medium level in terms of family cohesion. The mean scores of these groups were compared through a one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and a test of multiple comparisons. A summary of the ANOVA results found appears below in Table 2. It can be seen there that the

difference between the three means was statistically significant (p<0.001) for four out of seven sub-scores of the CDI (career planning, exploration, attitudes and orientation).

Table 2. Results of ANOVA Between the Mean Scores Received by Low, Medium and High Family Cohesion Students for Each One of the CDI Sub-scales.

	Level of Family Cohesion			
CDI Sub-scale	**Low**	**Medium**	**High**	**F Ratio**
Planning	96.66	100.15	102.66	11.28***
Exploration	95.65	100.49	103.11	18.29***
Decision	98.40	100.26	101.05	2.20
Knowledge	98.61	100.10	101.03	1.77
Attitudes	95.43	100.44	103.37	20.89***
Skills	98.26	100.20	101.22	2.68
Orientation	95.26	100.46	103.49	22.61***

Note: Statistical Significance
*   p<0.05
**   p<0.01
***   p<0.001

A multiple comparisons test using the Scheffe Method revealed that the difference between the mean scores of the Low and the High family cohesion levels for these four CDI sub-scores continued to be significant, (p<0.01) even under the test's very demanding criteria. In the Low vs. Medium comparison, the difference in the same scores passed the Scheffe test also, except in one case (planning) where the difference was significant at a less dependable probability level (p<0.05). In the third pair of comparisons (Medium vs. High) the difference was significant (p<0.05) only for the attitude and career orientation scores (see Table 3).

To summarize, the hypothesis of non-independence between the individual's career development and the family's degree of cohesion was supported by the results of this research. A statistically significant (p<0.01), positive and linear relationship seems to exist between these two variables. Furthermore, it was found that the mean score of the high family cohesion group of students was

Table 3. Multiple Comparison (Scheffe Method) Between the Mean Scores Received by Low, Medium and High Family Cohesion Students on the CDI Sub-scales Where a Significant F Ratio was Found Initially.

CDI Sub-scales				
Comparison	Planning	Exploration	Attituation	Orientation
Low vs. Medium FamilyCohesion	F= 8.3*	F=16.1**	F= 17.8**	F= 19.4**
Low vs. High Family Cohension	F= 22.5**	F= 36.0**	F= 41.2**	F= 44.5**
Medium vs. High Family Cohesion	F= 4.7	F= 5.3	F= 6.7*	F= 7.2*

Note: Statistical Significance
No star= Not exceeding the Scheffe criterion
One star (*)= Significant at the 0.05 level.
Two stars (**)= Significant at the 0.01 level.

significantly higher than that of both the medium and the low family cohesion groups on the attitude sub-scales of the CDI. A visual presentation of the above relationship appears in Figure 1.

What this finding suggests is that adolescents who come from cohesive families tend to score higher on career development inventories. Thus, a factor external to the individual is shown to be directly related to an internal, personal characteristic.

The findings regarding the main hypothesis of this study are consistent with those reported by earlier researchers who examined the same issues in different settings and with different populations.[52,53] In addition to the main hypothesis that was presented above, a number of supplementary hypotheses were tested in relation to the data collected in this first phase of the study.[54] The most important of the findings will be discussed separately below.

Career Development and Place of Family Residence (Urban vs. Rural)

The students who participated in the sample for this phase of the study came from two different schools, one urban and one rural. The mean career development scores received by urban and rural family students were

FIGURE 1
Average Career Development by Family Cohesion Level

1 = Planning   3 = Decision   5 = Attitudes   7 = Total
2 = Exploration   4 = Knowledge   6 = Skills   CDI score

compared through ANOVA. In the predominantly cognitive sub-scales of the CDI (knowledge of the world of work and career skills) these scores differed significantly ($p<0.001$). In some of the attitude related sub-scales the difference was less dependable ($p<0.05$), but still significant statistically, while in the total CDI score the difference was not significant at all (see Table 4). These results should not be surprising because the average achievement score of the urban students was significantly higher than that of the rural students, and the cognitive aspects of the CDI are known to correlate highly with academic achievement (the correlation found in this study was 0.44).

One way to interpret this finding is that the rural areas offer less cultural and educational opportunities to their residents than do urban areas and, therefore, on the average, achievement levels are lower in the rural areas. In addition to this, the rural subjects of the study were at a disadvantage compared to the urban ones regarding variables such as family size and socio-economic status (SES) that are usually associated with school achievement (i.e., they came from

Table 4. Results of ANOVA Between the Mean Scores of Each One of the Sub-Scales of the CDI and the FACES III in the Two Types of Schools (Urban and Rural).

	Type of School		
Sub-scales	Urban	Rural	ANOVA Results (F Ratio)
CDI			
Planning	99.03	101.00	3.85
Exploration	98.94	101.10	4.70*
Decision	100.29	99.70	0.34
Knowledge	102.22	97.66	21.66***
Attitudes	98.83	101.22	5.72*
Skills	101.67	98.25	11.91***
Orientation	99.07	100.96	3.55
FACES III			
Cohesion	100.54	99.44	1.20
Adaptability	99.57	100.44	0.74
Average Achievement	75.00	65.00	

Note: Statistical Significance
* p<0.05
** p<0.01
*** p<0.001

families of larger size and lower SES).

Interestingly enough, the differences found in career development scores were in favor of the rural school students for the career attitude component of the CDI, and in favor of the urban school students for the cognitive component of the CDI. There was no significant difference between the total CDI score of the CDI. There was no significant difference between the total CDI score of the two types of schools. What this received by the students of each one of the two types of schools. What this suggests is that, in terms of attitudes, the rural students are more nearly ready for career decisions than urban students, but they know less about the world of work and possess less decision-making skills than their urban counterparts. The trends that make up these three variables' relationships appear below in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2
Average Achievement, Cognitive and Attitudinal Scores by Type of School

Career Development and Gender

The pattern of the career development differences between males and females was similar to the one found in the urban vs rural students. As can be seen in Table 5, the female students scored significantly higher than the males (p<0.001) on three out of seven CDI sub-scales (decision making, knowledge and skills).

These three scores are related to the cognitive aspects of the career development construct. The scores that are related to the attitude component of the same variable did not produce significant differences between the two sexes. Among them is career planning, the only area where males had a slight superiority over females. It should be mentioned here that female students in the sample had a mean academic achievement score significantly higher than that of males (F ratio=22.52, p<0.01). The two differences found between males and females (in achievement and in the cognitive component of the CDI) are most likely related to each other.

An additional finding regarding the differences between males and females in terms of career development is perhaps noteworthy. The correlation matrix between the CDI sub-scales and the FACES sub-scales presents a different pattern for male and female students. The coefficients found appear on Table 6.

Table 5. Results of ANOVA Between the Mean Scores Received by Male and Female Students in Both the Urban and Rural Schools for Each One of the Sub-Scales of the CDI.

	Gender			
CDI Sub-Scale	Males	Females	F Ratio	Total "Sample"
Planning	100.33	99.67	0.43	
Exploration	99.48	100.51	1.04	
Decision	97.29	102.71	31.75***	
Knowledge	96.17	103.77	66.62***	
Skills	99.72	100.28	0.31	
Attitudes	96.03	103.92	72.70***	
Orientation	99.18	100.81	2.62	

Note: Statistical Significance
(*)   p< 0.05
(**)   p< 0.01
(***)   p< 0.001

An inspection of Table 6 reveals that the connection of the two main variables career development and family cohesion) is much stronger among females than it is among males. This relationship can be seen more clearly in Figure 3. This finding supports the idea expressed previously by King that:

a girl's own sense of control over events in her life, coupled with a cohesive family that provides a variety of cultural opportunities is important for the development of career maturity. For boys, the process has more to do with chronological age, internal focus of control and, to a lesser extent, family cohesion and parental aspirations. [55]

Gilligan argued the same idea when she proposed a theory of female development suggesting that in contrast to males who understand their growth as a movement away from their families ("separating"), females develop by "connecting" to people.[56] Since career development is seen here as one aspect of the total process of human development, the findings of the present study that tend to differentiate between male and female profiles deserve further investigation.

Table 6. Correlation Coefficients (Pearson "r") Found Between Family Cohesion and Each of the Sub-scales of the CDI for Male and Female Students as well as for the Total Sample.

	Family Cohesion		
CDI sub-scale	Males	Females	Total
Planning	0.20	0.22	0.21
Exploration	0.25	0.34	0.30
Decision	0.10	0.08	0.12
Knowledge	0.00	0.17	0.11
Attitudes	0.27	0.35	0.30
Skills	0.05	0.16	0.13
Orientation	0.27	0.36	0.32

**Phase Two: Functional Aspects of the Family**

Statistical formulas and their products may be useful in many respects, but they are incapable of explaining or even describing the process by means of which a relationship between two variables is developed. The present study was interested in this process. Therefore, it did not stop after the end of its cross-sectional data collection and analysis but went on in an attempt to understand through qualitative and descriptive methods of research the career development process from the adolescents' own view point and within the family context.

The second phase of this study was based on data collected through interviewing and observing the members of eight volunteer families in their own living environment. Each one of these families included a ninth grader who took part in the first phase of the study (i.e., the phase that examined the relationship between individual career identity development and family cohesion). Half of them were "successful" in terms of having produced an adolescent with a high degree of career identity development. The other half were considered to be "unsuccessful" by comparison.

The general purpose of the second phase was to give more insight into the processes by means of which the relationship between the variables is formulated and to generate more hypotheses about other contextual factors (in addition to family cohesion) that are involved in moulding the individual's level of career development.

A more specific goal of this phase was the examination of the intra-familial

FIGURE 3
Strength of Relationship (r) Career Identity
Development and Cohesion

Pearson r Size

CDI SCALES
1 = Planning
2 = Exploration
3 = Decision
4 = Knowledge
5 = Attitudes
6 = Skills
7 = Total
CDI score

■■■ Males
\\\ Females

nteractions and activities that were directly or indirectly related to adolescent :areer development. For this purpose, a period of time was chosen in which the)articipants were faced with a natural decision-making problem. The period :hosen was the time in the academic year when the ninth graders (i.e., students :nrolled in the Third Grade of the Gymnasium) must submit to the school a form ndicating the type of education they want to pursue during the following year Lyceum, Technical School, etc.). Using the methodology specified above, the uthor attempted to follow the students' own decision-making process.

The qualitative phase that lasted for about six months can be divided into two)arts: the first one started at the beginning of the school year when the)articipating students became aware of the forthcoming decision, and ended vhen the decision was made and the track selection form was submitted to the :chool. At that point, the second part of this phase started.

The "Successful" Families

The four "successful" families of this study (i.e, the families of the high career levelopment adolescents) differed in a number* of attributes that 3ronfenbrenner would call their "social address." [57] In terms of socioeconomic tatus, one of these families was at the top of the possible range, one was at the 'ottom, and the other two were in between.

A similar pattern held true for other related variables such as parental level of education and employment status as well as family size. The individual profiles of the students themselves were also different. Two of them had high grade point averages and two had low scores. One of the students was first born, one last born (out of six) and two were second born (see Table 7 for a complete view of these comparisons). The table includes the characteristics of all eight volunteer families who took part in the second phase of the study.

Despite these differences, these four families shared several characteristics that are related to the systems' internal dynamics. As will be seen later, the same is true for the other group of four families. Some of these characteristics describe the general pattern of behavior exhibited by the parental sub-system, and some describe the behavioral pattern of the siblings' sub-system.

Parental Sub-system

The parents in these four families shared the following behavioral and attitudinal characteristics:

■ They expected their children to be responsible for their own actions and decisions.

■ They monitored regularly their children's school related work or (when their own abilities did not allow them to do that) they monitored the children's behavior that was related to this work (i.e., they made sure that the children were actually sitting down and were doing the homework).

■ They had made at least some contacts with the school teachers during the current year.

■ They trusted their children's judgement (even at this early age) and let them know it.

■ They participated in their children's decision-making process (they did not keep their distance), but they behaved in a way that allowed their child to play the leading role.

■ Both the mothers and the fathers were involved in the children's daily lives through various activities.

■ They allowed or even promoted a democratic system of decision-making in the family.

■ They facilitated their children's individuation process (separating "smoothly" from the family).

A concept that seems useful in describing the predominant child-rearing practices in the successful families and the general parent-child relationships is that of sponsored (as opposed to un-sponsored) independence. Clark defined "sponsored independence" as the result of a family atmosphere "marked by

Table 7. Summary of Demographics for the Eight Volunteer Students and 1eir Families Who Took Part in the Second Phase of the Study.

Demographies of Second Phase Students

.D. Name	Family Size	SES	Occupation (Father/Mother)	Birth Rank	GPA
HF Artemis	3	2	Absent/Janitor	2 of 2	10
HM Orpheus	5	7	Veterinary/Teacher	2 of 3	17
HF Eleni	5	3	Machinist /Baker	1 of 3	20
HM Nestoras	8	4	Military/Gardener	6 of 6	11
LF Hera	5	6	Economist/Economist	1 of 3	18
LM Ares	6	3	Salesman	4 of 4	7
LM Laios	2	3	Absent/Secretary	1 of 1	9
LF Rhea	6	2	Truck Driver	3 of 3	8

Notes

1. I.D. Code Explanation
U= Urban Residence
R= Rural Residence
H= High Career Development Score
L= Low Career Development Score
M= Male   F= Female

2. Socioeconomic Status (SES)
The lowest SES is 1 and the highest is 7.
3. Grade Point Average (GPA)
Highest Possible Value is 20.
Minimum Passing Value is 10.

:quent parent-child dialogue, strong parental encouragement in academic rsuits, clear and consistent limits set for the young, warm and nurturing eractions, and consistent monitoring of how they used their time".[58]

In his ethnographic study of how families promote their children members' ademic achievement, Clark compared the families of academically successful olescents to those of failing ones. He concluded that parents of successful .dents were most likely to exhibit the following types of behaviors: initiate quent contacts with the school; be emotionally calm when interacting with the ild; expect to play a major role in the child's schooling; have high educational d vocational aspirations for the children; engage in frequent, deliberate hievement/training activities with them.[59]

It appears that the characteristic behavioral patterns of the successful Black 1erican parents in Chicago that Clark studied were very similar to those of :cessful Greek Cypriot parents in Nicosia. It should be noted, though, that the iccess" in the first case referred to academics, whereas in the second case it erred to readiness for career planning.

Siblings' Sub-system

In addition to the identified similarities in the parental behavior and attitudes, the four high career development adolescents who participated in this study had some common characteristics. The most important of these were the influence between siblings and the individuation process.

The two second-born adolescents of this group, Orpheus and Artemis (see Table 7), seemed to benefit from the presence of the older sibling in their family. That other child served as both a model to follow and a challenge to surmount. For example, Orpheus and his brother were engaged in a rivalry similar to the one that Morgan described.[60]

According to Morgan's theory, brothers reinforce each other's career aspirations during the critical years of identity formation through a competition that is not only allowed to unfold by the parents but is also encouraged by them. In the present case, the mother reported that she enjoyed watching the boys "trying out their muscles on different things." Orpheus did try many of the areas where his brother had already succeeded, but he soon abandoned all of them and got involved in music, the only one where the older boy did not make it. Eventually, music became more than a hobby for Orpheus; it marked his whole identity.

Artemis, too, was influenced by her sister's presence in the house and by her relative success both in the school and in the labor market. Even though Artemis looked beyond her sister's secretarial job and into college education, it was obvious from her interviews that she appreciated the fact that her sister's status was much higher than that of her other point of reference--her mother. Both her career and life perspectives could have been much different if her sister had not been there to widen them.

During her interview, Eleni (the only first-born of this group) talked about her educational goals in relation to those of an older cousin. The same pattern that was observed between Orpheus and his brother was noticed also between Eleni and her younger sister. While taking her turn with the tape recorder, this younger sister found it important to mention that "She (Eleni) is better than me in Math, but I am better in Greek language. I want to be a literature teacher!" Finally, Nestoras made numerous references to his older brothers, one of whom appeared to be his mentor.

In summary, the siblings sub-system is very important to the understanding of total family dynamics. For present purposes, the influence of an older sibling (or its substitute, such as a cousin) was found to be a profound contributor to the adolescent's career development process.

It should be noted that the positive influence that older siblings have on younger ones seems to work only (or to work best) when the family system is

hesive enough to allow its members to maintain an interest in each other's
es. In Clark's study the author emphasizes the fact that in the successful
milies "siblings interact as an organized sub-group," in contrast to those of the
n-successful families who are less structured and lead separate lives.[61] As will
: seen later during the presentation of the low career development families, the
dings of the present study were similar in this respect. The absence of a
neficial influence between siblings and the absence of a minimum level of
mily cohesion were found to coexist.

The "Unsuccessful" Families

The central elements of the families that included the low career development
lolescents were the leadership style of the parents (including child-rearing
actices, level of involvement in child's life, etc.) and the family system's level
differentiation.

Leadership and Child-rearing Practices
Authoritarian methods were used in two of the four families (those of Ares and
lea). These methods included physical discipline of the children, ridicule,
ection and various degrees of criticism, from mild to severe. In the case of
ios, (the boy from the single-parent family) leadership was totally absent. This
sulted in a chaotic situation which caused confusion regarding what should
d what should not be done. In Hera's case the father did not seem to be
spotic at all. To the contrary, he was quite democratic and accepting of his
ildren's opinions. However, his frequent absence from the house because of
. job responsibilities and his wife's dominating personality pushed him down to
 second rank of the family hierarchy. The mother, who took over the child-
aring was quite authoritarian. Her practices did not include physical
nishment, but were felt oppressive and patronizing by the two children.

Non-involvement
Most of the parents reported that they were not involved in their children's
ily lives, including homework, other educational activities and entertainment.
is was especially true of fathers. The opposite trend was true in the high
reer development group of families where participation of all the family
mbers in common projects was not uncommon.

Blaming the Children for Their Failures
This particular type of behavior was noticed on several occasions during both
inds of interviews. The parents of this group reported that their children were
"irresponsible," "lazy" and "non-appreciative" for what their family was doing for
them, and therefore, deserved whatever happened to them. None of these
parents accepted any part of the responsibility for their children's failure.

Individuation vs Differentiation

Another important consideration of this part of the present study was to
examine that aspect of family dynamics that affects the adolescent's
individuation or identity formation. There is a clear connection in the literature
between the concepts of identity formation and career development. The latter
is seen as a special instance of the former.

Individuation involves the "subtle but crucial phenomenological shifts by
which persons come to see themselves as distinct within their relational
context.[62] Differentiation, on the other hand, is a family system property that
refers to the adaptations made in order to regulate or maintain the psychological
distances among the group members. Bowen distinguished between poorly and
well differentiated family systems.[63] The former are characterized by a tendency
to block the psychological separation and autonomy experienced by the
members. The latter type of family system, though, is characterized by an
optimal pattern of emotional cohesion that allows the feelings of separateness
and connectedness to coexist.

The individual and the family system are engaged in a dynamic
interdependence. Newman and Murray express this idea as follows,

> The dynamic tension of family relations during early adolescence is the extent to
> which the family as a group can permit individuation of a family member without
> feeling threatened by disintegration. The dynamic tension for the individual (...) is
> the extent to which the young person can define his or her separateness without
> losing the support of the family group.[64]

In the present study, the families of the low career development adolescents
had difficulty in facilitating their members' individuation because they were not
properly differentiated. Three of them were overly controlling (those of Ares,
Rhea and Hera) and one (that of Laios) was chaotic and permissive.

Recent research findings tend to associate situations such as the above to
identity diffusion, part of which may be the exhibited low rates of these
adolescents' career development process.[65,66] Hera and Laios in particular can
each be considered to be a perfect example of Marcia's two low career
statuses, diffusion and foreclosure.[67] The first of these two students
demonstrated a lack- of exploration or commitment to a career goal and the
second one demonstrated a premature commitment to an occupation without
real consideration of other available alternatives.

Summary of Phase Two

he interviews and the observations of the eight volunteer families revealed eral important points about the relationship between family system dynamics l adolescent career development. In general, the well-differentiated families t utilized democratic child-rearing practices and in which the interpersonal itions were based on mutual respect produced the adolescents who ctioned at high levels of individuation and career identity development. The iavior of the two types of families ("Successful" and "Unsuccessful") as tched by their members' own reports is summarized graphically in Figure 4.

Adolescent Career Development and the Cypriot Family

3ome of the characteristics of the traditional Cypriot family were detected in practices followed by the members of the families who participated in the ;sent study. The vast majority of them were associated with the attitudes and iaviors encountered in the low career development, or "unsuccessful" iilies. Such characteristics were the authoritarian child-rearing methods, the crimination on the basis of gender and the neutral to unfavorable attitude vard the value of education.

In contrast to the above, high levels of family system cohesion were found to associated with the "successful" families. The traditional Greek Cypriot family <nown to be quite cohesive. Good descriptions of this cohesiveness can be ind in several locally conducted sociological studies.[68-72] Can one say, then it cohesion is a positive characteristic of the Cypriot family in relation to its :mbers' career identity development? It depends.

More recent studies have shown that the modern Cypriot family has retained me of the characteristics of the traditional one, especially in the rural areas.[73] The most relevant characteristics for the present discussion are authoritarian renting, sexist attitudes and poor family differentiation. These characteristics iy be part of a "collective" (as opposed to "individualistic") culture profile, but :y constitute extreme levels of family cohesion. They are not the family stem attributes that allow the individuation of its members, a process ·cessary for high career development functioning. Rather, they make the stem boundaries strict and rigid, they prolong the period of adolescence by her despotic or overprotecting parental behavior and can cause retardation to ıung family members' career development. Thus, the high cohesion that, iaracterizes the traditional (and to some extent the modern) Cypriot family can ıve both positive and negative effects on the career development of youth, ;pending on how this cohesiveness is expressed.

The present study was able to identify a number of the system's iaracteristics that seem to facilitate career development: a reasonable sense

FIGURE 4
Family Behavior: "Successful" vs. "Unsuccessful"

Percent Reported   ■ Successful   ⧅ Unsuccessful
Type of Activity

More Democratic   More Authoritative
1. Models Behavior   4. Encourages   7. Sets Expectations   10. Rejects ideas
2. Gives Feedback   8. Sets Limits   5. Dialogues   11. Takes over
3. Shows Interest   6. Allows freedom   9. Challenges Ideas   12. Monitors

of family cohesion or "stuck togetherness;" the ability of the parents to allow their children to individuate without rejecting their inter-dependence with the other family members; a democratic atmosphere in the house; flexible but regularly monitored rules; high parental aspirations for the future; a system of decision-making based on dialogue and parental-involvement; and finally parental encouragement for self-actualization.

Conclusions

The argument proposed and defended here was that family dynamics (both structural and functional) are important determinants of career identity development during early adolescence. The analysis of the collected data (both quantitative and qualitative) has shown that the family unit does not operate as a constant in the individual's career development process. Rather, it participates

ally in this process through a number of its systemic characteristics and
s.

atement made above concerning the importance of the family micro-
or the individual's career development can be carried one logical step
and encompass the external community within which the family is
ed. The properties of this community influence the family--even though
ote fashion--and through it the individual. Therefore, the realities that
he Greek Cypriot community played a role in the shaping of the familial
vidual pictures that the researcher observed while collecting the data.
peaking, none of the findings of this report can be transferred directly to
nt community, or even to a different set of families than the ones
d.

Summary of the Findings

/ cohesive (but not authoritative) families tend to include adolescents
ng at high levels of career development in comparison to their peers.

ents of rural areas have better developed attitudes about careers than
s of urban areas. However, the latter have better developed knowledge
s than the former. This allows them to act upon their opportunities in a
oductive way.

elationship between career development and family cohesion is much
r among girls than among boys. It could be argued that girls who
at high levels of career development value more than boys the
n of their families (and/or benefit more from it).

in parental behaviors and attitudes, as well as the family system's level
entiation, can either facilitate or hinder the individuation process of the
amily member. The unique characteristics of the Greek Cypriot family
central role in this process.

Policy Recommendations

he basis of what was found in the study described here the following
endations can be put forward:

e the parents constitute such an important factor in the identity formation
r children, parent education programs should be offered in the
nities at times and in places convenient to the working citizens. These
ms could include courses on adolescent psychology, methods of
e communication, decision making techniques, etc. Also, these programs
rovide the parents with educational and vocational information relevant
children's goals and aspirations.

The school personnel (teachers, counselors and administrators) should try to strengthen the home-school connection by bringing the parents (especially those who are considered hard to reach) closer to the school. Parent participation is very important for many reasons, including the child's own school achievement and career development.

Family support schemes should be introduced at the national and local levels. The poor and disadvantaged families are more likely to include adolescents with special needs. Counseling services should be available to and easily accessible by these socially marginal families.

The existing educational system in Cyprus demands that the students make serious and practically irreversible decisions early in their school career. This demand causes a great deal of tension not only for the students themselves (who do not possess the necessary skills or the maturity to make these decisions), but also for their families. Immediate policy changes are necessary so that either these decisions are postponed for everyone, or the system becomes flexible enough so that the individual students can avoid dead ends.

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THE EVOLUTION OF ETHNO-NATIONALISM IN CYPRUS UNDER THE OTTOMAN AND BRITISH SYSTEMS

M. Hakan Yavuz

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine how the need of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots for security and rights had been met during two different time periods. The two periods are the Ottoman system period (1571-1882) and the period of British colonial rule (1882-1960).[1] Each period had a unique political framework. The situational factors that played a significant role in the construction and transmutation of ethnic conciousness will be examined. How and why did these religious and ethnic identities become politicized and ultimately transformed into Greek and Turkish nationalism? In Cyprus, like other ex-Ottoman territories, religious lines had set the parameters for the construction of future national identities.

The examination of each of these two epochs will demonstrate that the partition of the island is not an outcome of a single ephemeral action but, rather, of a long modernization process that started during the last years of the Ottoman Empire and intensified under the British occupation. This process resulted in the crystallization of two distinct ethnic communities. Also, the transformation from religious attachment to ethno-nationalism may be explained as a result of instrumental and primordial factors. These two influences cannot be separated completely. The function and magnitude of primordial factors are shaped by instrumental forces. In the case of Cyrpus, attachment to primordial habitats was mobilized by instrumental forces.

Introduction[2]

Why Cyprus? What is unique in the Cyprus case? Cyprus is, in a way, a forgotten island. Lying in the Mediterranean Sea, so close to the two major Middle Eastern battlegrounds--Lebanon and Israel--Cyprus has received little attention. Yet the experience of this small island offers insight that is crucial in understanding the nature of other plural societies. The bicommunal experience in Cyprus challenges some of the major assumptions concerning the emergence

egmented nature of Middle Eastern society on the basis of kinship or religion, the Middle Eastern state is often too weak to manage the society.

Furthermore, the state can only gain control of a particular ethnic group by allying itself with it.[15] Even the politics of the socialist Baath party function along ethnic and regional lines, not class lines as was originally claimed. In Syria, the French mandate "promoted certain Alawite leaders"[16] of the Matawira tribe, but in Iraq the small Tikriti kinship dominates all of the positions. In Cyprus, the Turks were at one point more powerful than their numbers indicated. They allied themselves with Britain, which gave them leverage against the Greeks.

When the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960, it meant different things to both communities. In the communal consciousness of the Greeks and Turks the definition of a "modern" state was not the same, yet each community realized the necessity of the state for the achievement of communal goals. So, when the unitary state in Cyprus was formed, "each group sought to ethnicize the state in its favor."[17] The competition over the control of the state not only intensified but also deepened the conflict between the Muslims and Christians. Therefore, the notion of a modern state and the notion of contemporary political process have played an important role in undermining the coexistence of the communities of Cyprus and introducing communal separation.

Middle East, minorities have always been caught up in interregional power politics because various players have used ethnic issues to further their own programs. At the same time, other countries try to play minorities against the capital.[18] Relations, between the citizens of Cyprus became an extension of Turco-Greek relations, and the island was made an arena for conflict. This conflict then gained importance and began to shape Turco-Greek foreign relations. However, both the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus unlike other minorities in the Middle East, have the support of a separate state of the same ethnicity.

Also, religious ties are more important in these minority societies than linguistic or racial ties. Assimilation or cooperation is more likely where religious divisions do not exist. Religion polices the public and private space and sanctions the groups or individuals who find themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time. In other words, the boundaries of the space in which a group ves are formed along religious lines. A once shapeless and formless space is shaped and organised by religious leaders. When the two groups share the same religious identity, differences in language assume more importance. The cooperation with, if not assimilation into, the dominant group is fairly successful or the Turkish minority in Iran because of religious ties. In the case of the Christian-Greeks and the Muslim-Turks, it is almost impossible. Finally, because these minority communities tend to be restricted within rather narrow territorial bounds, conflicts over lands, language and religion arise rather easily, and there

are generally no trends toward integration with other minorities. This case fits Cyprus: between 1959 and 1963, conflict was simmering in mixed towns and villages.

The study of Cyprus is a study of disintegration. Cyprus was an integrated society during the time of the Ottoman Empire. Although there were religious differences, the Cypriot society was economically and politically integrated with the Empire until the British occupation of the island in 1882.[19] The major reason for this integration was that religious differences were not seen as an obstacle to harmonious political, economic or social coexistence. On the contrary, religion unlike nationalism, was a unifying force.[20] Each group had autonomy to regulate its own affairs within the parameters set by the central authority in Istanbul. This state of affairs reflected the Ottoman reality of diversity and practicality more than it reflected the teachings of Islam. Under Istanbul's interpretation of Islam and the Qur'an's statements on the position of non-Muslims, the concept of law (orf, or kanun) was empasized more than sharia.

This depolitcized Ottoman commonwealth came to an end as a result of modernization. The elements of modernization, such as centralization, better communications and education, and the politicization of cultural artifacts tend to create a political unit on the basis of language and ethnicity. The disintegration and communal conflict in Cyprus was a result of modernization and its derivative, popular sovereignty. Unfortunately, the principle of "what touches all must be approved by all" tends to be unworkable in segmented societies.[2] Popular sovereignty means that all communities are governed in accordance with the will of the majority. However, any minority group such as the Muslim-Turks in Cyprus, is bound to be denied some basic communal rights.

The Ottoman Period: Millet System

Under the millet system, communities within the Ottoman Empire were distinguished on the basis of their religious, not ethnic ties. Moreover, ethnic ties were important to many of the members of the religious millets. So, religion tended to be the determinant of ethnic identity. The liturgical language used in scripture and rituals, regardless of the spoken language of the members of the religion, was an additional tie and identity mark. For example, the Turks, Albanians, Pomaks, and Kurds all had Arabic as a liturgical language, while the Armenian Gregorian religious scripture employed a special alphabet. The Greek Orthodox used their own scripture due to the Church. The millet system allowed the communities to administer their own education and cultural and religious lives. Each community kept its own vernacular language and lived under the jurisdiction of its own legal system. Communal lines between millets were not fixed or immutable, but malleable. Although the millet system derived from the Islamic principles of dhimma (Ahl al-dhimma, or people of the covenant of

obligation) and *umma*, its evolution within the Ottoman Empire was the result of special historical contingencies.[22] The millet system communalized the core values of each community. [23] Since it was composed of diverse cultural groups, the Ottoman Empire was a "plural" state. And by securing certain civil and economic rights of those groups and creating an equilibrium among them, the Empire became a "pluralistic" society.

In order to understand the functioning of the system, one must examine both the relationship between the state and the church and the historical genesis of this system.[24] A study of the Greek Orthodox Church under the millet system shows the difficulty of bridging the gap between the official imperial policy and the practical operation of the system. One finds innumerable inconsistencies between the established Ottoman tradition and the practiced policies.[25] Therefore, one should be careful not to accept without reservation either the Turkish view that tolerance towards the Orthodox Church was always the case or the Greek view that the Ottomans persecuted the Orthodox Church. The truth lies between these two claims.[26] The Ottoman policy of toleration was very much conditioned by practical factors.[27]

When Sultan Mehmet conquered Constantinople he tried to protect the rights of the Church via a royal degree (*berat*) which was reissued to each succeeding patriarch. A *berat* was also issued in the provinces. The major reason Sultan took these steps were economic. Sultan was aware of geographical discoveries and the pouring of gold from America to Europe. In order to maintain possession of major economic centers and trade routes in the Ottoman Empire, he gave a number of economic, cultural and religious concesssions to diverse groups.

The *berat* encouraged ethnic toleration, and diverse religious groups were able to exercise communal rights in order to nourish their cultural institutions within the millet system. The rules were: 1) the millet had complete religious freedom; 2) the administrarion of religious institutions was under the control of the church; the Ottoman state had no right to dismiss or punish religious officials, which was the job of the patriarch; 3) it was the duty of the church to collect its parishioner's dues; 4) the private status of Christians was under the sole jurisdiction of the patriarchate.[28] Thus, the rules governing marriage, inheritance, education, and like matters were entirely the church's business.

The church served as an administrative center, as well as a religious institutiion. However, the Greek Church, contrary to Cassia's claim, was not a "tax-collecting" agency.[29] The Church was the "political representative of the Greek *ravah* (flock)."[30] Kemal H. Kerpat asserts that, in fact, it was not the duty of the patriarch to collect taxes, but rather, that of the headmen (*ciorbaci,* or *kocabasi*) of the villages and neighborhoods. In Cyprus it was the duty of the dragoman to collect the taxes. The dragoman's office was in the goverment's palace. The dragoman was elected by the synod and the archbishop.[31]

The Ottomans, after taking Cyprus from the Venetians in 1571, fully implemented the millet system. Muslim-Turks immigrated to the island after the conquest and joined the Christian-Greek population. In fact, over 20,000 Turks from the eastern part of Asia Minor were forced to settle in Cyprus.[32] The Turk were settled upon land that had belonged to the Latin nobility and the Catholic Church.[33] Because of the millet system, Cyprus, along with the entire Middle East, was able to enjoy a relatively peaceful period.

The archbishop of Cyprus was "made ethnarch, that is, the official representative before the Ottoman government to the Greek (Cypriot) community."[34] The ethnarch was the civil, as well as the spiritual leader of his community. However, the archbishop was not made part of the Ottoman bureaucratic apparatus. The Orthodox leaders actually welcomed Ottoman rule because the Sultan protected the Church against the Latin oppression in Cyprus. The Greek Orthodox Church clung to the Byzantine ideological dream of a single Christian world empire centered in Constantinople. This tradition survived during the rule of the Ottoman Empire because the Church remained the universal, that is, ecumenical, center of the Orthodox millets.[35]

The State and the Millet System

A state that fulfills only certain limited functions helps to create an environment conducive to communal coexistence. The Ottoman state assumed four major duties: 1) the collection of taxes; 2) correspondence; 3) the maintenance of law and order; 4) and national defense. It did not guarantee life, liberty, and happiness, but peace, order, and fair government to its citizens.[36] This state was not of, by, and for the people. Negative liberty was the character of the polity; external obstacles were removed, allowing each community to realize its cultural and economic potential.

Since the Ottoman state was not a welfare state it did not try to interfere in the internal affairs of the ethno-religious communities. The practical life of the community under the millet system was ordered by religious institutions. Each community's education was under local control. The revenues from the *vakii* (pious endowment) went to pay the salaries of teachers and religious leaders. Religious institutions operated libraries and soup kitchens.

Due to this limited notion of state there was no reason to politicize the society. Politics was a matter of ruling, rather than distributing goods. Instead, the church played the intermediary political and economic role by protecting the rights of the producer (*ravah*). The Ottoman Empire saw the Church as a balance against the possible concentration of local power. The Church property enjoyed the same status as *vakif* property.[37]

Christodoulou states that:

both the Greek Orthodox Church and *evqaf* (plural of *vakif*) amassed large properties from donations. The Church received donations from pious people but received also grants from people who feared the envy of officials and usurpation. Once the properties passed into the name of the Church or monastery they were safe. The *evqaf* received large donations from the Royal Family, from wealthy landowners and from people who feared usurpation or feared that their heirs might dissipate the property.[38]

Both *evqaf* and the Church's land were subject to taxation, but immune from, usurpation. The Church gained large resources and became very powerful. For example, by 1909 the Church owned 5.4% of the total agricultural land of Cyprus.[39]

Although a relative harmony prevailed under Ottoman rule, conflicts also existed in Cyprus. These conflicts did not stem from ethnic cleavages but from inequalities in the distribution of economic wealth and political power and the religious reflection of social problems. Furthermore, such conflicts were not violent or permanent. Before 1876, there was no strong feeling of identity between the ruler and the ruled. Thus, one's ethnic identity was not a political concern. The Muslim and Orthodox peasants were mostly living in mixed villages and participating together in communal activities, such as weddings and funerals. The power structure throughout the Empire, was not vertical but horizontal; those persons closer to the center of the political power had better positions and opportunities. This horizontal mobilization was open equally to the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots.

The official link between the peasant and the ruler was, for the Christians, the Orthodox bishop. As corruption spread into all aspects of the Ottoman administration, peasants were taxed heavily. This heavy taxation generated a deep discontent in the Muslim and the Christian population alike. A major revolt against heavy taxation took place in 1765 when mobs of Muslims and Christians killed Governor Cil Osman. Similarly, there was a peasant revolt in 1804 in reaction to new tax regulations.

Furthermore, intermarriages and conversion from Christianity to Islam were not rare.[40] The borders between the religious groups were not sharply defined. Intermarriage, conversion, learning Turkish, and adopting the dress and customs of the Ottoman ruling class were the major avenues of social mobility. Crossing these borders was not considered a momentous step because the borders were not rigid.[41] The most important indicator of integration was the common village councils with Muslims and Christians as jointly elected members. There was no municipality that consisted of a single religious community.

The Modernization of the Ottoman Empire

Identity formation started with the modernization process of the Ottoman Empire, and was enhanced with the War of 1821. The Ottoman Empire in the beginning of the nineteenth century tried to balance or constrain the influence of emerging non-Muslim commercial and professional groups. Sultan Selim III imposed codes that determined the mode of dress and forbid bearing arms and riding on horseback. These imposed modes of dress and conduct made distinguishable the Muslims from the non-Muslims and initiated the notion of "difference" among the non-Muslims. These policies not only lead to the division in society but also set the ground for a European power to force the Ottoman Empire to adopt equality.

The causes of the rebellion of 1821 had no national dimension in Cyprus. The violence erupted as a result of the landing of Egyptian troops who plundered and killed many Orthodox Christians, as well as some Catholics. In these revolts, Greek nationalism played no role because of the significant efforts of the Greek Orthodox Church.[42] The Church had always tried to protect its own interests. By 1820, the archbishop and the dragoman formed the most dominant power center on the island. This concentration of power in the hands of the Church spawned discontent from the Ottoman officials. The 1821 incident provided pretext for the governor to get rid of this dominant power center which was blocking the governor's oppressive policies.

The bloodshed in 1821 enhanced the popularity of the Church, and the clergy became more deeply involved in political issues. The Ottoman's harsh response (Governor Kucuk Mehmet Silahsor hanged Archbishop Kyprianos) directed at the Church had given it a political cause. This revolt also provided a pretext for England to deeply involve itself in the domestic politics of Cyprus. Other European countries soon followed suit. The Greek-Cypriots turned for protection to the European consulates who, in turn, brought economic trade to the island, for which the Greek-Cypriots acted as middlemen. Supported by the European consulates, the Greek Cypriots gained control of all commercial activities on the island. Greeks were also involved in trade with Syria and Lebanon.[43] The rise of the Greeks as a new bourgeoisie finally gave a strong impetus to Greek nationalism on the island.[44] The Greek mercantilists' nationalism created a cohesive society capable of responding to external threats.

The major transformation in the millet system came in 1839 with the Tanzimat Edict, implemented by the Ottoman officials in order to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. However, these "policies, undertaken after 1839, instead of bringing integretation contributed to the further national awakening of the Christians and Muslims" by granting equality to all individuals, regardless of their religion. The Tanzimat Edict, by opening all spheres to diverse groups, contributed to competition which led to ethnic awakening.[45]

The implications of the Tanzimat Edict undermines the arguments of Pollis, Attalides and Cassia that ethnic revival was an outcome of the colonial policies. Pollis is right to indicate that there was close cooperation between the two communities and lack of ethnic consciousness was the fact of life. However, he is wrong to treat the Ottoman experience as a whole and static. The Empire experienced a major transformation in the early twentieth century.[46] The political developments indicate that communal division did not lead to political separation; rather, political competition took ethnic form. Therefore the conflict in Cyprus is not an outcome of religious and cultural rivalry per se, but political and economic competition.

When competition in economy, politics and education and other spheres started, new legal and political problems emerged. The Ottoman officials had to introduce new laws in 1856 with the Islahat Edict. As a result of the 1856 reform, municipal councils were established. These reforms raised fundamental questions about the traditional fabric of society. The reforms of 1839 and 1856 aimed to integrate diverse groups into the Empire through legal citizenship. This contractual relationship between the state and its citizens was a turning point in the history of the Empire. However, this legal citizenship destroyed or transcended the individual's membership in the millet system.

These reforms modernized or transformed the millet system and placed it into a modern framework.[47] As a result of these reforms, one is faced with national groups. For example, the first two censuses of 1831 and 1844 classified the people on the basis of religion but the classification of 1870-71 was based on language, religion, and most significantly ethnicity. As early as 1856 ethno-religious identity factors were included in the definition of the millet. After the Islahat Edict, the number of millets was increased from three to eleven. The Bulgarians were not part of the Orthodox millet but a new millet based on their own ethnicity, language and history. Finally, in the period 1862-1867, democratic elections became the accepted way of choosing religious leaders, and the synods as well. These three changes were responses to European pressures upon the Ottoman government. By 1878, therefore, the basis of the millet had shifted to somewhere between religion and ethnicity.

Thus, the process of politicizing religious affilations began under Ottoman rule, but the process continued and intensified. These affiliations transformed into nationalism more dramatically during the period of British rule. What have been presented as national Greek and Turkish cultures was shared only by a small segment of intellectuals.

British Colonial Rule: Politization of Ethnicity (1882-1960)

The Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 4 June, 1878, placed Cyprus under British administration,[48] but the island legally remained under the sovereignty of the

Sultan until Turkey conditionally relinquished its legal claims via the Lausanne Treaty on 24 July, 1923. As pointed out above, the religious differences between the Muslim-Turks and Christian-Greeks were in the process of being transformed into political differences during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. However, these primordial, religious and cultural identities gained new impetus as a result of the political institutions and policies created and implemented by the British.

Gellner argues that the major precondition of ethno-nationalism was modernization.[49] Modernization in a community takes place with the increases literacy, communications, interaction, and urbanization. The increase of the latter three also facilitates the development of the individual's sense of identity British rule resulted in the introduction and implementation of several reforms modernize the island. When the state becomes the major force in reforming society and the main distributor of goods, ethnicity becomes the major rallying point for political power, cultural rights, and economic opportunities Modernization gives ethnic groups a new rationale to employ to challenge and reshape existing social and political patterns. The effect of situational factors such as politics, law, urbanization, education, press, transportation, and the secularization of communal life, on primordial factors is clearly illustrated in the changes that took place during the British era in Cyprus.

After arriving on the island, the British High Commissioner introduced a new constitution (effective 1882-1931). This constitution "gave the Orthodox community participation in administration of the island, but in doing so formalized ethnic divisions and gave an impetus to bi-national consciousness. The 1882 constitution introduced several changes in the island's legislative, administrative and educational systems. The Legislative Council gave proportional representation to the Christian and Muslim sections of the community. The 1882 Legislative Assembly consisted of nine Greeks, six British and three Turks. In 1925 these numbers increased to twelve Greeks, nine British and three Turks. These numbers were a reflection of the British policy of divic et impera. The British and the Muslim representatives votes were equal to the Orthodox votes. In the case of a tie the High Commissioner had the right to vote.[51] When the British sided with the Turks on any issue they could easily neutralize the Greek representatives.

The institutionalization of policies along ethnic lines at the national level was extended to the rural areas. Municipalities and village councils were supposed to be held separately by each community, with no common candidate to bring the communities together. Thus, the colonial administration had a means of playing one community against the other. This segregation policy was not entirely effective at the local level, however, because in the mixed villages of the countryside it was necessary to work together.

The island was officially annexed by Britain on 5 November, 1914. The Orthodox Church welcomed this annexation because they had been hopeful that this would lead to unification with Greece (enosis). Although the Church raised the issue of enosis, the masses were not a part or even aware, of the Church's demand.

Politization of the masses was completed with the shock of the 1931 Riot. Accumulative effects of the policies of Britain in 1931 generated a violent riot on the island. At least three major reasons existed. The 1929 Education Law transfered control of school teachers from local boards and communities to the colonial administration. By implementing this law the governor was trying to prevent the schools from becoming the hotbed of anti-British indoctrination. The second reason was the issue of the tribute. Although the British officials acknowledged that 600,000 pounds had been illegally collected, they neglected to return it and used it as payment for the outstanding debt of the Ottoman Empire. The third and the most important reason was the issue of collecting taxes. The Greek members of the Council with the support of the Muslim members defeated the tax bill of the Governor. The Governor tried to impose the bill through an imperial order. This caused an uproar among the Christian and Muslim communities. Although the causes of this riot were economic, one of its major consequences was political: the national consciousness of the Greek Cypriots took political form and the policies of Britain provided only one alternative--unity with Greece.

This riot marks a turning point in Cyprus' history. The colonial government abolished the 1882 Constitution and tightened its control. The governor sent six prominent Greek communal leaders, including two churchmen into exile and announced new laws banning the flying of unauthorized flags, limiting the ringing of church bells to Sundays, and giving the power to appoint village heads to the Governor. The outcome of these policies was the institutionalization of the Enosis movement.

When the colonial government allowed trade unions to be established in 1932, they hoped to create a diverse power center and eventually undermine the position of the Church, the sole power center. Instead of challenging the Church's demand for enosis, the unions became a tool for Greek Cypriots in their drive for enosis. In 1933, the British extended limited representation to the Cypriots. The representatives were to include "two Muhammedan and six non-Muhammedan" Cypriots. The use of the term "non-Muhammedan" instead of "Greek" exacerbated the situation. In 1941 the reestablishment of local political parties was allowed, and the organized labor movement promoted the establishment of the Communist Party of Cyprus, known as AKEL.[52] This party shaped the debate of the future of Cyprus and struggled with the Church over the leadership of the Enosis movement.

When the Greek demand for enosis became clear after 1931, the Muslims saw Enosis as a threat, but were too weak to develop their own independence. The Turkish community began cooperating with the British rulers in order to protect their interests. The cooperation allowed the Turks more access to government and security jobs. The British tried to counter the Greek majority by providing favorable conditions for the Turkish community. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's military victory over Greece and subsequent secular reforms were welcomed by the Turks of Cyprus and implemented in the Turkish Cypriot institutions. Like the institutions in Turkey, they accepted Latin script and other modernizing reforms. However, the ethno-nationalism of the Cypriot Turks was shaped by a reaction to the threats of Enosis more than through these reforms.

Max Weber argued that urban life has two major characteristics vis-a-vis rural life. First, the urban population is active in social, economic and political spheres. Second, urban centers create and reinvent diverse forms of rules and conduct. In other words, urbanization facilitates ethnic mobilization in transforming ethnic ties to connect rural immigrants to urban life. Ethnic had become instrumental in a competitive urban setting and provide access to the job market and housing. When individuals realize this functional role of ethnicity they do not hesitate to exploit it.

Urbanization in Cyprus also gave new impetus to ethno-religious processes. The first census of Cyprus in 1881 indicated that there were more Turks, the ruling group, living in urban centers. The urban population of Greeks was o thirteen percent, but twenty-five percent of the Turkish population was urban. However, from 1881 to 1946 the total island population increased from 186,173 to 462,318. And in 1946, the Greek urban population was nineteen percent and the Turks twenty-seven percent. Table 1 indicates that there was a moderate increase in urbanization on both sides. In 1951, the total population was 517,000, but the ratio of Greek to Turkish population did not change.[53]

TABLE 1

	1881	**1946**
GREEKS	137,631	361,373
% OF TOTAL	79%	80%
% URBAN	13%	19%
TURKS	45,358	80,361
% OF TOTAL	24%	18%
% OF URBAN	25%	27%
TOTAL	186,173	462,318
% URBAN	17%	21%

Source: Cyprus Government, *Cyprus Blue Books*, 1881, 1946 (Nicosia: Government Printing Office, 1882, 1947).

The Ottoman state did not begin involving itself in formal mass education until
94. Education was the responsibility of the religious institutions, and the
erwhelming majority of the villages did not have a school. According to the
31 census, the literacy rate was less than five percent overall. Greek Cypriots
d a the higher rate. A formal mass education system was introduced and
olemented by the British. By 1918, there were 729 elementary schools and a
v high schools. As a result, in 1946 the majority of Cypriots were literate
ough to constitute a "newspaper public."[54] By 1955, ninety percent of school
e children were attending classes. However, the British system supported the
ucational division between the two communities. They, in fact, created two
parate systems. (A third was added for the Armenian at a later period). Thus,
eek and Turkish boards were established. The control of these boards rested
Athens and Istanbul. The boards determined which texts should be used and
ected the teachers, who were brought from Greece and Turkey.[55]
By bringing teachers from Turkey and Greece, the British rulers also
oorted the political rivalry of the two mainland countries to the island. As Pollis
jues, "on one level the history of the Greek Cypriots has become the history
Greece, and the history of the Turkish Cypriots, the history of Turkey."[56] Thus,
tain's introduction of a formal education to the island not only facilitated the
bilization of religious consciousness, it aided also in the transformation of this
sciousness into two national identities by permitting the teaching of two
erent versions of history. As a result, the tensions caused by different Greek
d Turkish ethno-religious ideologies increased.[57] As Michael Attalides aptly
ites, "Greek Cypriot nationalism developed under the political leadership of
Orthodox Church, and the demand of the Greek Cypriot population for
osis was extended through the educational system."[58]
The introduction of English as the lingua franca of the island and the
osequent modernization of the school system both played roles in the
ation of a large "newspaper public." English did not become a common,
fying language, but those who were literate began to read British history.
ey began to ask questions about their own history and society. Young
ellectuals were motivated to establish newspapers. In 1883, *Saadet,* the first
rkish paper, began publication. Then, in 1900, the pro-Young Turk journal,
'at-i Zaman was established. It addressed the question of the unity of the
ipire. As more and more Cypriots became literate, the number of newspapers
w. By 1914 there were seventeen weekly (Turkish and Greek) and four daily
pers (two Turkish, one Greek and English) being printed. In 1919 there were
ee major Turkish papers--*Dogru Yol, Soz,* and *Ankebut.* By 1946 there were
enty Greek and three Turkish papers.[59] According to the *Cyprus Annual*
port, 1950, "between 40 and 50 newspapers and magazines were published
Cyprus, most in Greek and some in English or Turkish. No fewer than eight of

the papers are dailies."[60] These newspapers were effective as intensifiers of the
consciousness of ethnic identity, and since the Greek communtiy was openly
demanding unity with Greece, the Turkish community was forced to formulate its
own political agenda. The newspapers *Dogrue Yol* , and *Soz* played an
important part in designing the response to Enosis on the basis of Turkish ethnic
identity.[61]

Transportation also saw incredible improvements during British rule. Railways
between Famagusta and Morphou were constructed, and a road network was
developed which served over 800 vehicles in 1924. By 1954, the number of
registered vehicles had climbed to 18,369. The *Cyprus Annual Report, 1954*
states that "every village of any size is linked with its market town by one or
more public transport vehicles stationed in the village. Frequent bus and taxi
services serve the main centers of population."[62]

Transportation increased interaction between the two ethnic groups, and
competition for jobs and education intensified. In order to feel secure and have
access to social and economic goods such as education and jobs, individuals
see the ethnic group as a vessel. Due to the individual's desire to have access
to social goods beyond his reach, group formation formulates along political
lines. Increased competition for economic goods and education also politicized
the ethno-religious boundaries between the Greeks and Turks.

Caroline Ifeka-Moller, in her correspondence with Peter Loizos , argues,

In common with many other peasant communities in the twentieth century, Greek
Cypriot society changed radically after the first world war, when Western
capitalism penetrated into the rural heartland. Old hierarchies and customs
declined as production developed for the market...; new agricultural techniques
spread; village society became more differentiated. New social relations emerged
that were based on these privately owned resources: wells and tractors, long-
maturing citrus trees, knowledge of intensive farming techniques, access to
"outside" incomes and salaries, contracts with central bureaucracies. Village
society reformed on class lines during 1930 to 1950. Many were released from
their ties with the land and sought a livelihood overseas or in the urban centers of
Greek Cyprus.[63]

This argument supports Gellner's thesis that nationalism is an outcome of the
modernization process. The emergence of a Greek bourgeoisie, coupled with
Greek nationalism, destroyed the traditional fabric of Cypriot society.

Under British rule, most of the merchants were Greeks and Armenians. Thus,
although under Ottoman rule "class structure cut across religious division, by
the time of Cypriot independence in 1960 an affluent bourgeoisie was emerging
that was almost exlusively Christian."[64] The emergence of a central market not
only defined more sharply the relations between the two communities but also

inged the pattern of conduct in each community.[65]
Britain's policies destroyed the religious underpinning of the two Cypriot mmuntities and replaced these with secular ethnicity.[66] The muftu and the hbishop were out and elected officials became the source of rule. The last oman Archbishop of Cyprus, Sophronios II, was appointed in 1865 and died 900. The Greek Archbishop complained that the British administration did not ognise the privileges he was entitled according to the Ottoman *berat*. wever, Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, argued ainst these claims, "the clergy have used the weakness of the Turkish rule in Jer to consolidate a power over their people which is inconsistent with all idern views of civil government."[67] The 1908 Cyprus Law VIII regulated the action of the archbishops and required the approval of the High Commissioner. is law undermined the religious authority of the Archbishop and secularized a authority of the island. The 1937 Cyprus Law XXXIV limited the activities of a archbishop to religious and ceremonial rights. The tension over public power aated a gap between the Church and the colonial administration. The Church, order to preserve its position of power against the colonial rule emphasized ity with Greece and nationalized the tension. When the British administration ity with Greece and nationalized the tension. When the British administration alized that the Church was shaping communal dissidence, the Church Laws 1908 and 1937 were repealed in 1946. The tension between the colonial ivernment and the Archbishop facilitated the efforts of the Church to mobilize e masses for Enosis. The Greek Cypriot nationalism was shaped and jorously advocated by the Orthodox Church. Rabuska states that the Church, strong promoter of Enosis, continually refused to cooperate with British institutional proposals."[68]

The British also "secularized" the Turks religious establishment, but this easure was not the rallying point that it was for the Greeks--mainly because of e lack of hierarchical authority in Islam. Haci Hafiz Ziyadi, the last mufti of the uslim Cyprits to be appointed (in 1909) by the Ottoman Sultan, retired in 1927. he British governor appointed the new mufti. Moreover, in 1928 the governor fficially abolished this office. The daily life of the Muslim community was not ffected because the duties of the mufti were simply transferred to the *vakif*.[69] In 353, the British allowed and organized the election of a new mufti as a result of emand from the Turkish community;[70] Mehmet Dana was elected to the osition. Having no authoritative clergy or powerful politico-religious institution uch as the Orthodox Church in place, the Turks had no organisation of leaders balance against the Greeks when the nationalist push started. Turkish Cypriot thno-nationalism was slower to develop. Thus, Cyprus provides an outstanding xample supporting the thesis that communities that have highly organized aligious institutions are more likely to be affected by the first wave of ationalism than those that do not.[71]

The Muslim self-consciousness took national form in the late 1940s as a reaction to militant attempts of the Church to actualize enosis. The transformation of the Ottoman-Muslim identity to Turkish was reflected in the establishment of many institutions and the hoisting of the Turkish flag on the minarets of mosques.[72] In the 1940s the Turkish community began forming some of its own institutions. Among them was the first Turkish trade union, established in 1942. But the Party of the Turkish Cypriots, an openly Turkish political party, was not organized until 1955.[73] Because of these institutional weaknesses, and because of the concern for their security in the face of the increasingly strong Greek nationalism, the Turkish community agreed to ally itself with the British. Their only choices were Enosis and the status quo. They opted for the latter as the best hope for their community.

They were not getting any support from Turkey itself, but later the British convinced Turkey that it would be wise to support the policy of partition (taksim) in order to prevent the island from becoming part of Greece. In fact, it was with Turkey's help that the Cypriot Turks established their own underground group-- the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT). This group was led by military personnel of Turkey. In some cases, TMT bombed mosques and other Turkish institutions to generate reaction in Turkey and provide means within the international forums to criticize Greece.[74]

The main factor that convinced Turkey to take a hand in the ethnic conflict in Cyprus was the increasing power of the Greek Cypriot Communist Party. Both Britain and the USA supported this involvement, and Turkey's agreement was in line with the general trend of its post-WW II foreign policy--alignment with the West in opposition to the Soviet Union. So, in 1954 Turkey's foreign minister criticized the idea of self-determination for Cyprus and asked Britain to maintain the status quo. Then in 1955, Britain invited Turkey to participate in a London Conference to decide the fate of the island.

Conclusions

Thus, one can see that the development of ethno-nationalism in Cyprus was strongly influenced--if not actually caused--by British policy.[75] Some of the instrumental factors were the natural result of the effort to modernize the island's infrastructure: the higher mobility and increased urbanization that came with the improvement of communications and transportation, the development of flourishing trade, the higher literacy rate and greater public awareness that were the result of the introduction of a modern mass education system.

Other factors were less natural and the result of deliberate British policies on education, administration, and political participation. The creation of two separate school systems that were allowed to teach Greek and Turkish versions

of history instead of a standardized Cypriot version resulted in the institutionalization of differences. The system of administration allowed the British governors to play one group against the other in order to keep both in line. Also, the election system requiring seperate voting by the Greek and Turkish communities destroyed chances for cooperation in government, especially in urban areas. Finally, in its efforts to control the powerful Greek Orthodox Church by controlling its selections of an archbishop, the British authority aided the church leaders immeasurably in their drive to accumulate mass support for the cause of Enosis. All of the cultural peculiarities that had existed and defined the two communities without separating them during the period of Ottoman rule now attained political significance. As Kedourie argues, "inhabitants for a thousand years considered themselves Sunnis, or Shi'ites, or Druzes, or Maronites, or Greek Orthodox, or Jews. Of course, they spoke Arabic, but this fact until very recent times was of no political consequence.[76]

By 1940, as a result of Britain's policies, as well as the efforts of the Greek Church toward the realization of enosis, the two communities saw themselves as two distinct national groups.[77] This psychological separateness was formally recognized in the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.

Notes

1. I would like to thank Prof. Crawford Young for reading and commenting on this papers and Prof. Kemal H. Karpat for allowing me to use his books, documents, and archival material on Cyprus.

2. Michael A. Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 162-80. Attalides's book is one of the best objective studies on the communal conflict in Cyprus. Arend Lijphard, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 158-61; T. W. Adams, "The First Republic of Cyprus," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (September, 1966), pp. 475-490; Pierre Oberling, *The Road to Bellapais*, Atlantic Studies No. 25 (New York: Atlantic Studies, 1982), pp. 147-171.

3. E. Gellner, addressing the communal conflict in Cyprus, argues that "it is amusing to reflect that the running of an incomparably larger political unit, in the same region of the world--the Ottoman Empire--was perfectly possible on the basis not of two, but of even more autonomous cultural (religious) units, millets"; see, *Thought and Change* (Chicago: Univeristy of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 167.

4. Nancy Crawshaw, "A New President for Cyprus," *The World Today*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (May 1988), pp. 74-76; Leonard Doob, "A Cyprus Workshop: Intervention Methodology During a Continuing Crisis," *The Journal of Social Psychology*, No. 98 (February 1976), pp. 143-144; Paschalis M. Kitromilides and Theodore A. Couloumbus, "Ethnic Conflict in a Strategic Area: The Case of Cyprus," in Abdul Said and Luiz Simmons (eds.), *Ethnicity in an International Context* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1976), pp. 167-203; Adamantia Pollis, "International Factors and the Failure of Political Integration in Cyprus," in Stephanie Neuman (ed.), *Small States and Segmented Societies* (New York Praeger Pub., 1976); James H. Wolfe, "Cyprus: Federation Under Internationa Safeguards," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 18 (Spring 1988), pp. 75-89.

5. Throughout the paper, I shall prefer to use communalism to "ethnicity," "communa conflict" to "ethnic conflict." Ethnicity reminds us of primordial features. Since conflict very much evolve around who gets what and how much, I think "communalism" is th more useful term to describe such end-oriented conflicts.

6. Harold Isaacs, *Idols of the Tribe Group Identity and Political Change* (New York Harper and Row, 1975).

7. Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981 p. 105.

8. David Brown, "Ethnic Revival: Perspectives on the State and Society," *Third Worl Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 4. (October 1989), pp. 2-3.

9. Charles Keyes (ed.), *Ethnic Change* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 198? p. 17.

10. Joseph Rothchild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbi University Press, 1981), p. 30.

11. Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Politics and Plural Societies: A Theory (Democratic Instability* (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merill, 1971), p. 31.

12. Cynthia Enloe, *Police Military and Ethnicity: Foundation of State Power* (New Brunswick, London: Transaction, 1980), pp. 12-14.

13. Brian Barry, *Democracy Power and Justice* (London: Oxford University Pres 1989), p. 158.

14. Patricia J. Higgins, "Minority-State Relations in Contemporary Iran," A. Banuazi and M. Weiner (ed.), *The State Religion, and Ethnic Politics* (Syracuse University Pres 1986), p. 191.

15. Hisham Sharabi, "The Dialectics of Patriarchy in Arab Society," in Samih k Farsoun, (ed.), *Arab Society* (New Hampshire: Croom Helm Ltd., 1985), pp. 83-105.

16. Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalis 1920-1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 13.

17. Joseph S. Joseph, "International Dimension of the Cyprus Problem," *The Cypru Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 1990), p. 23.

18. Moshe Zak, "Israel and the Kurdish Minefield," *The Jerusalem Post*, Internation. Edition (April 13, 1991), p. 5. For example, one dimension of Israeli foreign policy, know as the periphery strategy, is to use or agitate non-Arab minorities against the Ara States.

19. A. Pollis, "International Factors," *op. cit.*, p. 45.

20. Elie Kedourie, "Nationalism," *Encyclopedia Britannica Year Book*, (1978), pp. 24-9

21. Kedourie, "Ethnicity, Majority, and Minority in the Middle East," in Milton J. Esma and Itamar Rabinovich (ed.), *Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle Ea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 29.

22. Paul Saint Cassia, "Patterns of Covert Politics in Post-Independence Cyprus

NEGOTIATING THE CYPRUS PROBLEM: LEADERSHIP PERSPECTIVES FROM BOTH SIDES OF THE GREEN LINE

Reed Coughlan

Abstract

This paper provides an analysis and assessment of the current status of ʃotiations in Cyprus between the Greek and Turkish communities. It begins ʃotiations in Cyprus between the Greek and Turkish communities. It begins ʃ a brief overview of the historical background of the conflict and leads into a cussion of the various efforts to achieve a settlement between 1960 and the ʃsent.[1] The main body of the paper focuses on the contemporary situation. ʃ interests and negotiating positions of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots are ʃ interests and negotiating positions of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots are ʃlored through an analysis of interviews conducted with the leadership of the ʃ communities in May, 1991. The author interviewed Mr. Rauf Denktash, a ʃder in the Turkish community since 1955, when the present troubles ginated, and currently President of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." ʃ interview was also arranged with the Greek Cypriot President, George ʃssiliou who was elected to lead the Republic of Cyprus in 1988. He came to ʃfice with little political experience, having established himself as a successful ʃsinessman. He had the unofficial support, nonetheless of the Communist ʃrty, AKEL. Two additional interviews were completed. The first was with Mr. ʃafkos Clerides, who has been an active participant in the political arena for ʃrty years. He served as acting President for a brief period in 1974, has been ʃ leader of one of the major political parties and a negotiator for the Greek ʃypriot community at the U.N. sponsored intercommunal talks for a number of ʃars. He opposed Mr. Vassiliou in the most recent presidential race, losing by a ʃrrow margin in run-off elections. Finally, Mr. Oscar Camillion, special envoy of ʃe U.N. Secretary General shared his views regarding the status of ʃegotiations and the prospects for a settlement.[2]

The viewpoints expressed in these interviews are taken to reflect the ʃontrasting interests of the two communities. It should not be assumed however, ʃat there are no differences of opinion within each of the communities. The ʃiversity of perspective among both Greek and Turkish Cypriots is quite ʃubstantial. Nonetheless, for heuristic purposes, we will treat the perspectives articulated by these interviewees as if they fairly represent the constituencies from which they have been drawn.

The interviews reported in this paper were structured to shed light on the current status of negotiations. In the course of these conversations references were frequently made to the historical contexts that have shaped the contemporary realities. Following a very brief review of the significant developments and initiatives over the last thirty years we will lead into a discussion of the current views of the leadership on both sides of the Green Line.[3]

The initial stages of negotiation of the Cyprus problem were also, in a sense, the most bizarre because they did not involve the direct participation of the principle parties. Greece, Turkey and England effectively agreed upon a settlement of the Cyprus problem in Zurich and London more than three decades ago. The uneasy truce between the Greek and Turkish communities that had been imposed upon them in 1959 broke down in December, 1963, when the President of the newly independent Republic, Archbishop Makarios III, introduced proposed changes in the constitution which the Turkish Cypriots deemed unacceptable. There had been numerous difficulties encountered in the implementation of the London-Zurich Accords. Disagreements between the two communities centered on constitutional issues and on the proportional allocation of civil service jobs. Turkish Cypriots comprised 18% of the population but had been guaranteed 30% of the security and civil service jobs. The strength of the safeguards written into the agreements and the relatively favorable terms that accrued to the Turkish Cypriots reflected the unequal distribution of power between Greece and Turkey at the bargaining table in Zurich and London. The proximity and military superiority of Turkey, combined with it's importance to NATO and Western security provided leverage in the negotiations that Greece was unable to match.[4]

While the Turkish Cypriots argued that the disproportionate allocation of public sector jobs would redress imbalances evident during the period of British rule, Greek Cypriots resented the concessions that had been made, and refused to comply. Intercommunal fighting occurred throughout Cyprus in December, 1963. Peace was restored in March, 1964, when the United Nations introduced a Peace keeping force to quell the violence. The effective exclusion of the Turkish Cypriots from political power led to the establishment of separate judicial, administrative and legislative structures within the Turkish enclaves scattered across Cyprus.

The period 1964-1971 witnessed a number of unsuccessful efforts to bring about a reconciliation. In 1971, EOKA-B, was formed to attempt to force a union of Cyprus with Greece; the resulting terrorist campaign was directed at the Makarios regime and received military and financial assistance from Greece

the next three years. On July 15, 1974, EOKA-B, supported by the military
a in Athens, staged a coup d'etat which succeeded in overthrowing
arios. Having escaped the violence, Makarios went to New York where he
cribed the coup to the U.N. Security Council as an invasion. The Turkish
munity through it's leader, Rauf Denktash, sent out a cry for help to Turkey
top Greece from taking over the island. Turkey invaded Cyprus from the
h, quickly taking control of the Northern third of the Island, and thereby
ting a safe haven for the embattled Turkish Cypriots. The Greek military
ne which had supported the coup in Cyprus collapsed on July 23, and the
ership of the Cypriot Government was taken over by the President of the
se of Representatives, Mr. Glafkos Clerides, until Makarios' return in
ember. The Turkish army had by now wrested control of the northern third
he country where the Turkish Cypriots then arranged their own
nistration. Over the course of the next year arrangements were worked out
eby approximately 160,000 Greek Cypriots moved to the South and 45,000
sh Cypriots joined their compatriots in the North. The combined number of
ees was roughly equal to one third of the population of Cyprus.

1975, Rauf Denktash was declared President of the "Turkish Federated
of Cyprus." Sporadic and basically unsuccessful intercommunal talks
held under U.N. sponsorship between 1974-1976. Then, in January 1977,
Denktash and Archbishop Makarios reached an historic compromise
ment in which the basic parameters of a settlement were laid out as
s:

independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, federal Republic.

territory under the administration of each community should be discussed
he light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.

estions of principle like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the
t of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion taking
consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system
certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot
nmunity.

powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to
eguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal
racter of the State. [5]

ile this outline agreement serves as a contemporary reference point it
reached any form of ratification. Talks seemed to flounder over the
e to which the new central government would assume a federal or a
deral form. The death of Archbishop Makarios in August of that year
rarily halted further initiatives.

gress was uneven over the next two years. In 1979, however, a new set

of agreements was worked out. The second round of high level talks was held
between the President of the Republic, Mr. Kyprianou, and Mr. Denktash. The
following ten points were incorporated in the agreement:

1. It was agreed to resume the intercommunal talks on 15 June, 1979.
2. The basis for the talks will be the Makarios-Denktash guidelines of 12
   February, 1977, and the U.N. resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question.
3. There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all
   citizens of the Republic.
4. The talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects.
5. Priority will be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha
   under U.N. auspices, simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration
   by the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a
   comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached it
   will be implemented without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other
   aspects of the Cyprus problem.
6. It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome
   of the talks, and special importance will be given to initial practical measures
   by both sides to promote good-will, mutual confidence and the return to
   normal conditions.
7. The demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, all matters
   relating thereto will be discussed.
8. The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the
   Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union, in whole or in part,
   with any other country and against any form of partition or secession.
9. The intercommunal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained
   manner, avoiding any delay.
10. The intercommunal talks will take place in Nicosia.[6]

In the course of these talks the notion of a bizonal state was introduced.
Various proposals also specified adjustments to the boundary demarcations by
which portions of the Turkish held territory would be ceded to the Greek Cypriot
side. In the late 1970s and early 1980s such territorial proposals were put
forward by the two sides though no agreement was ever achieved. The
intercommunal talks stalled for another year. Then, in August, 1980, the U.N.
Secretary General outlined the areas of agreement that had been reached to
date:

a) Both parties have reaffirmed the validity of the high level agreements of 12
   February, 1977, and 19 May, 1979;
b) Both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federal solution of the
   constitutional aspect and a bizonal solution of the territorial aspect of the

Cyprus problem;

Both parties have indicated that the matter of security can be raised and discussed in the intercommunal talks. It is understood that this matter will be discussed, having regard to certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community, as well as to the security of Cyprus as a whole;

Both parties appealed to the Secretary-General for the continuation of the intercommunal talks.[7]

At various points in the negotiation process the Greek Cypriots have empted to internationalize the Cyprus problem in an effort to mobilize support their goals in the global arena. The Turkish Cypriots resent these initiatives cause, from their viewpoint, the Greek Cypriots thereby consolidate the oression that theirs is the legitimate government of Cyprus struggling to deal h a secessionist minority. In fact, this view has been established within the ernational community. The U.N. has consistently sided against the Turkish sition. U.N. resolutions bearing on Cyprus have been issued by both the neral Assembly and the Security Council.[8] In 1974, following the invasion, the N. demanded an end to foreign military intervention and the General sembly sought to restore to Cyprus its fundamental right to independence, vereignty and territorial integrity. Various resolutions were passed over the ars (1975, 1977, 1979) designed to remove the Turkish troops from the North.

It is perhaps ironic that these efforts by the Greek Cypriots to bring about Jnification of the island through international diplomatic pressure has had ite the opposite effect. Every time a new initiative is launched in the U.N. or her international fora, the Turkish Cypriots have responded with moves that ectively consolidate partition and the de facto reality of two separate states the island. In May, 1983, for example, when the U.N. General Assembly ssed resolution 37/253 reiterating its call for the withdrawal of foreign troops, affirmation of the three freedoms and the halting of the importation of ttlers in the North, Denktash threatened to boycott the intercommunal talks. veral months later the Turkish Cypriots made a Unilateral Declaration of Jependence through the creation of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus RNC)." Predictably, the U.N. Security Council responded with Resolution 541 ich deplored the Declaration of Independence and dubbed it illegal and alid. Further, it called upon all states not to recognize the "TRNC." Other ernational fora such as the Commonwealth Conference and The Council of rope concurred with the U.N. judgement.[9]

Having defied international pressure, the "TRNC" continued to present emselves at the negotiating table but did so now with the insistence that any w settlement talks be aimed at a bizonal federation based on the partnership two politically equal communities. A new round of U.N. sponsored

discussions, known as the proximity talks, was begun in September, 1984. Over the next several months Mr. Kyprianou, President of the Republic in the South and Mr. Denktash, President of the "TRNC," talked via intermediary Secretary General De Cuellar. This arrangement by which the Secretary General played a sort of shuttle diplomacy made some form of communication possible in spite of Mr. Kyprianou's refusal to negotiate unless the Declaration of Independence was withdrawn.

The optimism engendered by the proximity talks subsequently led to direct high level talks conducted in New York in January, 1985. Despite the impression that differences between the two sides had dissipated no agreement was ultimately reached. The failure of the summit was met with disappointment on both sides. The Draft Agreement presented by the Secretary General had stipulated a recommitment to the high level agreements of 1977 and 1979, the establishment of a bi-communal Federal constitution and a Bizonal territorial arrangement. The legislature was to be composed of a lower chamber with a 70-30 composition and an upper chamber with a 50-50 representation. The President and Vice President were to symbolize the equality of the two communities and the unity of the country. The issues surrounding the three freedoms, that is, the freedom of movement for all Cypriots, the freedom of settlement and the right to own property anywhere on the island, were to be addressed by a special working group. Territorial adjustments were to be specified, and a time table for the withdrawal of non-Cypriot troops and the provision of security guarantees for the two communities would be arranged.

The impasse that led to the breakdown of the summit arose over the degree to which the details of the agreement were to be determined before the signatories put pen to paper. Mr Denktash wanted to conclude the agreement as it stood. Mr. Kyprianou felt the need for closure on particulars before he would sign the document. The following year a new draft agreement was forwarded by Mr. De Cuellar with no more movement or success. In 1988-89 a round of initiatives was launched on the heels of a meeting between the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Papandreou, and the Turkish President, Mr. Ozal, at Davos, Switzerland. This effort at rapprochement between the two motherlands combined with the optimism arising from the electoral success of Mr. Vassiliou in the Greek Cypriot Presidential race led to an atmosphere of high expectation. In 1988 interviews,[10] both leaders expressed cautious optimism and referred to the positive environment created by the Davos initiative, the improved international relations associated with the easing of cold war tensions, and the commitment of their respective communities to seek a negotiated settlement. Mr. Denktash and Mr. Vassiliou met in Geneva and then New York. Their efforts quickly foundered, however.

A close reading of the reasons given for the breakdown of the most recent

:rcommunal talks will contribute to our understanding of the divergent :rests between the two communities in Cyprus. It will pave the way for a more ailed analysis and assessment of their respective demands and of the spects for a settlement in the first half of the 1990's. In the quotation which ows, Mr. Denktash provides his view of what transpired at the New York eting. As we shall see, the Greek Cypriots claimed that Mr. Denktash had] his heels in over the right to self-determination for the Turkish Cypriots. Mr. ıktash's account ends, significantly, with his contention that Mr. Vassiliou v refuses to talk with him about the Cyprus problem at all. Mr. Denktash:

At the time, Mr. Vassiliou and I went to New York, and I saw that the Secretary General had prepared a draft agreement which he put before us. I looked at it. First, I complained. I said I thought this was our business and the Secretary General said "it is your business. I am putting it as a paper before you, for your consideration." In the first line there was a reference to the two communities. I said I only wanted to mention that communities and peoples in our language, political and normal, are synonymous. And, therefore, the right of self-determination of my people exists even though we are called a community. We were a community when the British conceded that we had this separate right of self-determination. Well, Mr. Vassiliou had come ready for that because there had been arguments in the press about it. He said unless I withdraw the right of self-determination he is not going to continue. I said I cannot withdraw what my people have established. I am trying to say that the community will use this right for entering a federation with you. They already have the right of self-determination. You have made an issue of it in the literature and you claim that we shall use it for partition. Are you not aware that I am offering the continuation of the treaty of guarantee which prohibits partition and Enosis? How can you accuse me of using this right for partition when I say it will be used for federation and in conjuction with existing treaties which prohibit partition and federation. It is you who want to remove these. And I said, all right you seem to disagree. Let us put this in brackets as a point of disagreement and let us continue down the list. If there are any other points of disagreement we mark them in brackets and we see what we have agreed, and then we go over the disagreed things again and that is how we have been dealing with problems so far. He said, no, unless you withdraw your claim to the right of self-determination, I am going to stop talking to you. I cannot talk to you. Well, I was also prepared for that because we had been reading their press before we went there. I had a complete proposal about the settlement of the Cyprus problem. I didn't want to be accused of not wanting to settle it, so I put it before him. I said, all right, since you refuse, here is my proposal for the whole settlement. I hope you will reply to me. He said, you have no right to give a paper to me. I said, "I'm sorry. I'll leave it with the Secretary General. You can take it if you wish." And he walked away and he has never seen me ever since. He has not spoken to me. He has never come to the

telephone. When I tried to ring him up, his secretary said, "is it for the Cyprus problem, or a personal problem?" So I said, "I have nothing personal to discuss with him, of course, it is the Cyprus problem. I want to ask him a question about a meeting or something." He said, "He is not going to talk to you." Everyone all over the world, Margaret Thatcher included, heard his version of what had happened and I have been accussed ever since of breaking up the September talks. It is an unfair world. We cannot even argue our case.

A different view of these events is provided by Mr. Vassiliou:

Mr. Denktash interrupted the talks at the moment when the Secretary General submitted his ideas as food for thought, in order to contribute to the process of finding a solution. Mr. Denktash insisted that the Secretary General had no right to submit his "ideas." After that, for a few months there was a lot of diplomatic back and forth and then we went to New York for a high level meeting, with the understanding that this time we would have real talks that would lead to a solution. Mr. Denktash, from the first moment, started insisting that the right to self-determination should be recognized for the Turkish community. This was a new demand in full contradiction with the agreed basis of the talks. And it has always been. You see the Cyprus problem has its origin in the demand by the Greek Cypriot community, which forms 80% of the population of Cyprus, in the fifties and sixties, of the right to self-determination. The Turkish Cypriots refused to acknowledge that the Greek Cypriots had such a right because that would lead to union of Cyprus with Greece. This is why the conflict broke out in the fifties and sixties. So, it was a bit ironical to hear Mr. Denktash raising this issue now. Anyhow, after he had raised it, the United Nations' legal department said to him that, in their view, the people of Cyprus had exercised their right to self-determination when they accepted the Zurich agreements and Cyprus became an independent country. They also said that the right to self-determination cannot be interpreted as a separate right of each community to self-determination but can only be exercised by the people of Cyprus as a whole. Mr. Denktash listened to the legal opinion of the U.N. and was very unhappy about it, and the next day, for the first time since the Cyprus intercommunal talks began, Mr. Denktash started talking about his "people". The Secretary General then asked him what he meant by that and Mr. Denktash responded that since yesterday he was told that a community has no right to self-determination, he will now call his community a "people" so that it can have the right to self-determination. That's how the talks collapsed. Truly, they had never really started. The Secretary General, after he made every possible effort to convince him and failed, told him that in that case he had to suspend the talks and have recourse to the United Nations Security Council to ask for guidance as to whether the demands for self-determination and the recognition of the Turkish Cypriot community to the status of a people can be accepted and at the same time clarify the mandate of the Secretary General, that is, whether the Secretary

General had no role to play during the talks, but simply act as a waiter or cater by supplying them with menu and food as Mr. Denktash claimed, or whether he had another role to play. Well, it is known that the Security Council unanimously rejected the Turkish claims regarding self-determination and the claim that the Turkish Cypriot community had the status of a people, and reaffirmed the need for a federal solution. That's the story of the talks; that's how it happened.

Mr. Clerides' view of this exchange sheds further light on the issue:

I think that the Turkish side did not like the last outline the Secretary General had prepared. They tried to block it by saying that the Secretary General has no right to make recommendations for the solution of the Cyprus problem. His good offices do not extend to that. And the Secretary General went to the Security Council and the Security Council said, yes, the Secretary General does have the right. When Mr. Denktash saw that they would have to go back to an outline which they did not like in the first place and discuss it, he said, "I don't reject the outline, but before we look at the outline, the right of separate, self-determination must be recognized." He went on to say, "and I must be recognized and then two equal states will get together to negotiate." In other words, rather than shoot down the recommendations of the Secretary General because internationally it doesn't sound very good. He prefers to say," before we discuss it you must recognize the right of self-determination. I must ask my people whether they want to go to the federation, and if they do, you must recognize me, and then we must negotiate as two separate, independent, equal states," and that broke down the negotiations.

There were, then, three points of disagreement. The first, which was ⸀erruled by the Security Council, had to do with Denktash's objection to the ⸀cretary General's active role in preparing a draft agreement. The second, ⸀ich Vassiliou apparently refused to concede, was Denktash's insistence on ⸀e right of the Turkish Cypriots to self-determination. The third point hinged on ⸀ether the talks could proceed before the second point was resolved. ⸀nktash suggested that they could; Vassiliou that they could not. Yet Vassiliou ⸀d Clerides claimed that Denktash had put forward the issue of self-⸀termination as a prerequisite to a consideration of the draft agreement.

The motivation to achieve a negotiated settlement provides another focus for ⸀scussion and debate. Both sides claim to want to proceed in good faith, and ⸀th sides attribute to the other intransigence and a lack of interest in bringing ⸀out a change in the present situation. President Vassiliou, for example, ⸀aintains that:

The main constraint in solving the Cyprus problem is the desire of Mr. Denktash and ⸀me people around him and of President Ozal of Turkey to maintain the status quo. ⸀hen I met with Mr. Denktash in New York I went there with the intention of negotiating a ⸀ttlement. I wanted to find a solution through discussion. There was no such discussion. ⸀as trying to discuss in order to find a solution; Mr. Denktash was discussing in order

not to try to find a solution. Mr. Denktash has said, and that's in the record, "let us consider that a non-solution is another option." That the non-solution was the option, and that was really his thinking. His main idea was not to find a solution, but to gain time, so that a non-solution would become the solution, that is, the partition of Cyprus would be considered as the solution to the problem.

Mr. Clerides made a similar point when he said that,

Mr. Denktash has lost interest in a solution to the Cyprus problem. If he had to choose between being Vice President of a slightly larger state, or the President of a smaller state, he would opt to be President of a smaller state, and I think that Mr. Denktash is much more concerned in perpetuating the situation in the hope of being recognized than in the hope that a solution will be found.

Mr. Denktash is also skeptical of the other side's goodwill. He attributes the lack of interest among the Greek Cypriots to the success with which they have convinced the world community that the Republic in the South constitutes the legitimate government of Cyprus. Mr. Denktash:

We have every interest in reunification. It would benefit us economically and politically. We would gain a great deal. But the Greek Cypriots look at it from the point of view of the Republic of Cyprus, and they say, since we are the Republic of Cyprus and its legitimate government vis a vis the world, what need have we got to take back a partner that we threw out in order to become the Government of Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus? What forces us to take them back in order to become what we already are? Their only hope is that the Turkish army will leave, but they say, we shall make the Turkish army leave in any case. It may be in ten or twenty years, it doesn't matter since we are the government of Cyprus. When we shout invasion, the whole world is backing us up so Turkey will have to leave. We are damaging Turkey's interests internationally. We are stopping Turkey from entering the EEC and so on, so this is the way to win the Cyprus problem, not to take back the Turkish Cypriots and therefore come down from where we are.

The assessment of the prospects for a settlement and the concrete steps that will be required to reopen the talks differ markedly. The Greek Cypriot view that Mr. Denktash has lost interest seems to have a counterpart in Mr. Denktash's claim that Mr. Vassiliou will not even talk with him. In fact, when asked what will be necessary to get things started again from the present stalemate, Mr. Vassiliou ignored Mr. Denktash, and focused on Mr. Ozal, the President of Turkey. This is, of course, quite consistent with the Greek Cypriot strategy of "internationalizing" the problem, and conveying to the global community their definition of the situation: Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974; since that time, it has garrisoned a 35,000 man army of occupation on the northern third of the island. As Mr. Vassiliou stated:

It is all a question of President Ozal deciding that the solution is to his country's

benefit. Unfortunately, judging by some of his latest remarks, I am not very encouraged. You see, in Turkey there has always been a conflict between two basic schools, two policies. The first one, which we can call the Attaturk school, is a European-oriented school, and the second one is what we could call the Ottoman school. Attaturk had tried to create a modern Turkey against the Ottoman traditions. For many years this school prevailed. Unfortunately, during the last two or three decades the Ottoman school has been reasserting itself and we had the worst expression of that kind of thought recently by President Ozal himself. During his visit in Australia, where he talked about Turkey regaining its influence in the Balkans, about the Dodecanese islands belonging to Turkey on the grounds that they were part of the Ottoman empire and so on. Now, of course Mr. Ozal is presenting himself as a man that wants peace, that he is European and wants to reaffirm the European orientation of his country. To speak metaphorically, Mr. Ozal may well be two characters in one person. I hope that the European President Ozal will prevail, because I think the Ottoman President Ozal will lead Turkey and the region to destruction. You cannot think of reviving the Ottoman empire today.

President Vassiliou believes that progress must begin with the withdrawal of Turkish troops and he thinks that decision must be made by President Ozal of Turkey. He exhibits little interest in negotiating with Denktash both for this reason and because he refuses to acknowledge Denktash's claims for self-determination. Mr. Denktash has no more regard for the legitimacy of the government in the South. He makes the argument that the Turkish troops came in 1974, not as an invading force to occupy Cyprus, but as an army of liberation whose continuing presence guarantees the continued security of the Turkish Cypriots. In a recent paper, Mr. Denktash quotes Mr. Clerides' assessment of the motivations of the two communities: "Just as the Greek Cypriot preoccupation was that Cyprus should be a Greek Cypriot state, with a protected Turkish Cypriot minority, the Turkish preoccupation was to defeat any such opinion the Zurich Agreement created between the two communities."[11]

Mr. Denktash goes on to explain:

So it is clear, the Turkish Cypriot preoccupation was to preserve the rights which they had recieved in the Zurich agreement as a partner in a partnership. This is a principle on which Greeks or Turks will talk forever, but never compromise, and if necessary, they will fight for it. We'll not compromise on our partnership status. They will not compromise the status which they now have as the Greek Cypriot Republic, but they have managed to use the title of the government of Cyprus, and people think that we are opposing the legitimate government of Cyprus. They don't realize that our fight is against a Greek Cypriot Republic which is trying to impose itself in place of the government of Cyprus which was bi-communal. They don't realize this, but this is what the fight is about and I say if we make the people, countries, governments, leaders realize that this is what we are fighting against,

then we shall probably have a better hearing. Then people will not listen just to these Greek Cypriots who go to international fora as the government of Cyprus and manage to get any resolution they like in our absence and succeed in getting us condemned without being heard. This frustrates us. This destroys us. It destroys our belief in international fora, in countries like the United States, or Britain. How can they do it? For twenty-eight years august bodies have been deciding that in Cyprus the Greek Cypriots are our government. If Greeks Cypriots are our government, then we are what the government says we are: a rebellious nuisance of a minority helping an enemy to divide Cyprus and keep Cyprus occupied. How can we be treated like this? And this is at the base of our mistrust of not only Greek Cypriots, but also of those people from all countries who pretend to be friends of Cyprus and who are really trying to help us come to a solution. We find in every formula which they work out there is the weight of the government of Cyprus. Therefore, we cannot accept it and because we don't accept it, we are intransigent.

Mr. Denktash's perspective is that the problem is domestic, internal to the island of Cyprus. It arose as a consequence of the attempt by the majority to impose a political arrangement on the minority which was unacceptable. The minority-majority relationship was a quintessential case of ethnic conflict. Referring to the Turkish Cypriot insistence on a bizonal territorial solution, Mr. Denktash says:

Bizonality arose because of our need for security. Integrated, we could not live. They made it impossible. So our people moved to the North, theirs moved South, and we agreed on this bizonality. Bizonality provided a sense of security which is one of the underlining factors of any settlement.

In contrast, Mr. Vassiliou's definition of the situation not only focuses on the international arena, and emphasizes the external dimensions, but also goes so far as to deny that the problem should be seen as a case of ethnic conflict:

I don't believe that the term ethnic conflict is a proper way of describing the situation in Cyprus. There has been very little overall in our history, especially among ordinary Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots who have coexisted peacefully on this island for centuries. What we had was organized conflict very artificial in its essence, and this hardly coincides with a sociologist's definition of ethnic conflict. What I want to say by that is that whatever conflict there has been in Cyprus, it has not essentially mobilized the emotions and the being of ordinary Cypriots who have mostly been the innocent victims and quite often the mere spectators of a situation involving their own existence. If you had had an opportunity to witness meetings with Greek and Turkish Cypriots, you would easily see what I mean. Unfortunately very few such meetings were and are permitted by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

Mr. Clerides expressed a similar view in as much as he argued that Greek

nd Turkish Cypriots had little trouble living side by side, though he readily admits that the mutually exclusive ethno-nationalist aspirations of the two communities lie at the heart of the problem. He was asked a slightly contentious question about the resettlement of the refugees:

> Question: There are many differences that set aside any particular situation, but Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka and Cyprus have some things in common. One significant difference though between Cyprus and Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland is that the two ethnic groups in Cyprus have been forcibly separated. This was a violent and a traumatic event. It was a tragedy for many people and continues to be that. Since 1974, however, violence has been virtually non-existent in Cyprus in sharp contrast to the other two situations. Might it not, therefore, be wise to avoid any settlement plan that re-introduces ethnic group interaction at the community level?

> Answer: The reason there hasn't been any inter-communal conflict since the Turkish invasion is not the fact that the two communities are living in separate areas. The reason is that one side is very strong militarily and the other side is very weak militarily. The side which is weak militarily does not make any effort to return to their homes for fear of getting involved in military conflict which it is not in a position to face. Since mainland Greeks are reluctant to enter into a military confrontation with Turkey, wisdom tells us that we must look but not touch. During the period when we had mixed villages and mixed areas, the conflict did not arise as a result of the fact that Greeks and Turks were living side by side. It was not like Ireland where the Protestants and the Catholics were at each other. The trouble in Cyprus started at two different periods: the first conflict arose when the Greeks attempted to throw the British out and to unite Cyprus with Greece. This led to an alliance between the Turks and the British and the fighting was not because the Greeks did not like the Turks or the Turks did not like the Greeks. They lived in proximity, they went to each others weddings and christenings. The conflict itself was purely political. Now, the second conflict was a result of the disappointment of the Greeks in failing to achieve their political objectives and in having to concede far too many rights to what they called a minority, and I think the fact that the political leaderships of both sides remained in tact was also a problem. I don't think that the people have any difficulty living side by side if you solve the Cyprus problem in a way that is accepted by both sides. However, they would blow up again if either side tried to break the agreement but that may happen whether or not they are living in two separate areas. If the political leadership on either side decides that it is going to tear up the agreements, or decides that for one reason or another it is going to try and either unite Cyprus with Turkey or with Greece then there will be fighting whether they live next door to each other or whether they live in areas that are separated by a boundary.

The Greek Cypriots deny that there is a problem in their interaction with Turkish Cypriots and they tend to recount the history of the problem with reference to the invasion of 1974. Mr. Vassiliou refers to the lack of conflict in daily interaction; Mr. Clerides cites the friendliness of the exchanges between attorneys in an office setting. There is no question that Greeks and Turks can live "side by side." Mr. Denktash is vehement in his assertion that this is not the case. Denktash cites hardships which the Turkish Cypriots have suffered in the past. Mr. Denktash also recounted the fate of the well-to-do Turkish Cypriots who were imprisoned for the duration of World War I, whose positions and wealth were ruined as a consequence. For Turkish Cypriots village life held no sweet memories of harmonious communal relations; rather, the recollections of inter-ethnic conflict has led them to conclude that partition and separate territorial jurisdiction is the only possibility.

Oscar Camillion serves as the special envoy of the U.N. Secretary General in Cyprus. His assessment of the obstacles to a settlement hinges on the historically accumulated mistrust that characterizes the relationship between the two communities. The attribution of motives elaborated by the leadership on both sides demonstrates this attitude. It is also symptomatic of the intransigence of double minorities.[12] Mr. Denktash states, "At the center of the conflict there is the fear of one community which is smaller in size, but bigger and stronger in the area, trying to protect its identity and its political equality."

The boldness of the Turkish Cypriot community derives not only from their perception of the strength of their position given the proximity and military superiority of Turkey in the region, but also from the historical memory of group superiority that lingers from the three centuries of Ottoman rule.[13] Mr. Clerides observed the social psychological dynamics of the perception of group position and group identity in this context:

> Although the Greek Cypriots are the majority on the island because of the proximity of Turkey and the interest Turkey shows in the Turkish Cypriot community, they feel threatened by the possibility that one day Turkey would use the Turkish community as a bridgehead to occupy the entire island. I am not saying that their fears are justified, but they are there and whether they are justified or not, you have to take them into consideration. Talking now about the Turkish community, you have to bear in mind that they feel that they are in minority on the island. They are afraid that one day the majority will get its way and unite Cyprus with Greece, which they don't want, so they believe that in order to be safeguarded, they must have Turkish guarantees and the Turkish right of intervention. But what satisfies their fears is what increases our fears, and so we have this paradoxical situation that unless we can find a way in which the fears of both communities are put at rest, it would be extremely difficult to find a solution to the Cyprus problem.

Mistrust and the history of failed negotiations weigh against a settlement. On the other hand, the present international conjuncture suggests the possibility

at new initiatives may enjoy some prospects for success. The outcome of the Gulf War points to the potential and strength of the U.N. in settling and/or mediating trouble spots in the global arena. The U.N. Secretary General is approaching the end of his term of office, and he has said that he does not intend to run for a third time. He has a long standing interest in resolving the Cyprus conflict. There may be an added urgency and boldness to his efforts. In this regard, neither Mr. Vassiliou nor Mr. Denktash expressed much optimism; but both acknowledged that renewed efforts would likely emerge in the summer of 1991. Both Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash were concerned over the prospect that the Secretary General might attempt to forward a draft proposal that had not benefited from consultations from both sides of the Attilla line.

The Gulf war has been used as an analogy in several ways. Some have argued that the Turkish intervention in 1974 was similar to the American led counter-offensive against Iraq. The Greek Junta had supported the overthrow of a sovereign government. Turkey exercised it's prerogative that was enshrined in the Treaty of Guarantee, and prevented the takeover of Cyprus by Greece. This scenario suggests that once the coup d'etat had been foiled and Makarios reinstated, Turkey should have withdrawn. The second analogy suggests a parallel between Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait and Turkey's invasion and occupation of Northern Cyprus. This would lead one to conclude that the weight of world opinion and appropriate pressure from the U.S. and others could be brought to bear to force Turkey to comply with the various U.N. resolutions calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cyprus. Political realism seems to prevail among the Greek Cypriot leadership on this issue, however. While the Gulf War has helped to highlight the efficacy of the strategy of internationalization, as Mr. Clerides put it:

Nobody believes that the Cyprus problem is of such importance that they are going to give up and say, "my God, we forgot about Cyprus. These resolutions have not been implemented. Lets rush in and twist the ear of Turkey to comply with the resolutions." Those who have a better understanding of international politics say it hasn't changed very much. After the war in the Gulf, it seems to have been realized, both by the United States and by the Soviet Union, that if they are going to avoid another Saddam being created somewhere in the Arab world, there must be a solution of the Middle East problem, and we see some signs of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States and some other countries to promote the solution to the Cyprus problem. If this comes about, considering the detente in Europe, considering the detente which will be in place in the Middle East, Turkey will no longer be such an important country from a geo-strategic point of view, and, therefore, perhaps more pressure could possibly be exercised in order to be more flexible in the solution of the Cyprus problem. I share this view that if a solution to the Middle East problem is found then the solution of the Cyprus

problem would become easy.

Mr. Denktash provides another interpretive lens. He points to the different conditions pertinent in 1974 and 1991. The cold war atmosphere of an earlier era dictated a determined stance to prevent escalation in the region either between two NATO powers, or worse, between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He goes on to suggest that if the U.N. looked at the facts of the case,

They should say this to the Greek Cypriots: "Saddam destroyed the sovereignty of a neighbor. He was pushed back. The Greek Cypriots did something worse. They destroyed the shared sovereignty of their Turkish Cypriot partners, and then they dishonored their own signature and destroyed the partnership. They pretend to be the government of the whole island when they were not able, even at their highest moment, to control these people and to impose their political will on them. The Turkish Cypriots continue to resist the Greek Cypriots. They never accepted them and then they saved themselves when Greece tried to take over Cyprus and they established their own republic in the North. The U.N. did not recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Now the U.N. sees it was wrong. The U.N., should have recognized the Turkish Cypriots so as to give the Greek Cypriots motivation for finding a solution on the basis of partnership again. The U.N. should have recognized them, but they did not. That was wrong. The Greek Cypriots are taking advantage of that wrong, and the U.N. is not going to permit this to continue. If they don't admit that the Republic in the South represents only the Greek Cypriots, then their aggression against these people continues and the U.N. shall take the side of the Turkish Cypriots." This is how we see the Cyprus problem, and, therefore, when looked at coolly and objectively, the Gulf War is an example in our favor.

Denktash does not recognize the Greek Cypriot government. It does not represent the Turkish Cypriots, according to Denktash, and has not done so since December, 1963, when the Late Archbishop Makarios attempted to curtail the Turks' constitutional rights; the Turkish Cypriots consequently refused to participate in the central government. Denktash points to the constitution of the Republic which stipulates that the Presidency is constituted by the bi-communal offices of President and Vice President, respectively occupied by a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot. Vacancy in one of the offices, he claims, abrogates the authority of the other, and thereby undermines the legitimacy of the Presidency.

The Turkish Cypriots demand recognition as political equals and they require an arrangement by which the Presidency is rotated between the two communities. They want guarantees that they will not be relegated to a minority status and the best way to do that is to ensure that the two communities remain territorially separate, and for Turkey to be written into any agreement as a guarantor nation.

The issue of legitimacy and official recognition is one of the major stumbling

blocks to negotiations past and present. The Greek Cypriots refuse to acknowledge the Turkish Cypriot administration in the North. They are determined to avoid even the appearance of recognition and therefore shun any official governmental interaction. Further, President Vassiliou takes the position that talks need to be undertaken with President Ozal of Turkey, both because Denktash has no official standing and because, in Vassiliou's view, the main source of the problem is the presence of Turkish troops on Cypriot soil. In the instances when Mr. Vassiliou and Mr. Denktash have met, the negotiations were mediated by the U.N. and Vassiliou was careful to make it clear that he spoke with Denktash only in his capacity as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. Denktash insists upon formal recognition and extends his claim to political equality for the Turkish Cypriots in the negotiation arena and in any subsequent administrative arrangements on the island. Turkish Cypriots want an agreement in place before the Turkish troops withdraw. They want constitutional guarantees.

Greek Cypriots seek reunification with a strong central government. They want Turkish troops out as a precondition for settlement. The Greek Cypriots also want all settlers to leave. They want the three freedoms--freedom of movement, freedom to own property anywhere on the island and the freedom of settlement, including the right of all refugees to return to their homes.

The two sides appear to have mutually exclusive aspirations, yet there have been several moments in the negotiation process when agreement was reached, concessions were made and a settlement was very nearly consummated. (1960, 1977, 1979, 1985). It seems unreasonable to expect that the Greeks and Turks on Cyprus will live peaceably "side by side." A loose confederation, however, may be possible; it may take the form of a bi-communal constitution, bizonal in its territorial aspect, and it will be shorn up by guarantees that satisfy the perceived security needs of both communites.

Conclusion: Prospects for Change

The global environment of the 1990's may well presage real change in Cyprus. The rapprochement between East and West, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact which had been so significant in shaping the alliances in the Middle East and in the entire Mediterranean, suggest that what might have been unthinkable five years ago may be thought of as commonplace tomorrow. Furthermore, as Mr. Camillion pointed out, the structural conditions of group conflict within Cyprus have been inalterably transformed. Changes brought about in Cypriot society as a consequence of the shift from a rural agricultural economy to an urban service economy have eliminated the conditions under which communal strife had been spawned. Villages have become cities and the parochialism of rural life has been supplanted by the cosmopolitanism of a

modern economy dominated by tourism, insurance, banking, and multi-national commerce.

Nonetheless, in a divided society such as Cyprus change will be possible only if it is desired. The political leadership on both sides must want change, and they must believe that their counterparts on the other side of the Green Line are interested in helping to bring it about. The themes of mistrust and suspicion that run through the conversations reported in this paper point to the difficulties faced by this divided society. The second problem highlighted by these interviews has to do with the definition of the problem and the proposed solutions that are consequent upon those definitions. Each side casts the problem as an exclusive matter. That is, the Greek Cypriots see it solely as a matter of foreign intervention. The Turkish Cypriots view it as a domestic ethnic conflict. Any successful negotiation will need to address both dimensions of the problem, and it will be necessary for both sides to recognize the other's viewpoint.

These interviews were arranged in the anticipation that the political leadership on both sides might express a willingness to participate in a new dialogue and to move toward a resolution of this long standing stalemate. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the realignment of geopolitical realities, the presumed boost to the status and leverage of the United Nations as a consequence of the Gulf War might have been seen to have opened the door to change. The thrust of these interviews presents a much less optimistic forecast however. The views of history and of the origins and present nature of the conflict expressed by the leadership do not appear to have changed substantially. Their positions on various issues have hardened if they have changed at all. Denktash's persistent fears about the Greek Cypriots' aspirations for Enosis, Vassiliou's concerns over the lingering effects of the Ottoman influence and Clerides' reference to the Greek Cypriot fear of Turkish expansionism seem redolent of an earlier period in history.

Further, developments in the global arena tend to be interpreted by each side in such a fashion as to support their previously formulated world-view. The differing perspectives on the lessons drawn from the Gulf War, and from the upsurge of ethnic conflict in the Soviet block illustrate this selective perception.

Certainly the optimism that characterized the set of interviews published in 1988 is no longer in evidence[14]. At that time it appeared that relations between Greece and Turkey showed prospects for improvement and Mr. Vassiliou brought a new and presumably untainted perspective to the negotiating table. Since that time Mr Vassiliou has decided that discussions with Mr. Denktash are pointless and Mr. Denktash, in turn, has become discouraged with the unresponsiveness of the Greek Cypriot leader.

It may well be that the political constraints within which the Cypriot leadership

operates suggest the wisdom of adopting a rather different and much less public set of strategies for reaching a settlement of the problem. Assuming that the will to change is there, and recognizing the difficulties inherent in that assumption, we might introduce the notion of "Track Two Diplomacy." It has been described by J.V. Montville as follows:

"Track Two Diplomacy" is unofficial, informal interaction between representatives of adversary groups or nations which aims to develop strategies and create an environment which could contribute to the resolution of their conflict. It must be understood that track two diplomacy is in no way a substitute for official, "track one," government to government, or leader to leader contact. Rather, track two activity is designed to assist official leaders by compensating for the constraints on them imposed by the psychologically understandable need for leaders to be, or at least be seen to be, strong wary and indomitable in the face of the enemy ... Track two diplomacy, then, is conceived of as several levels of process designed to assist official leadership in the task of resolving, or in the first instance managing, conflicts by exploring possible solutions, out of public view, and without the requirement to formally negotiate or bargain for advantage. Track two diplomacy on its more focused level seeks political formulas or scenarios which might satisfy the basic security and esteem needs of all parties to a dispute. On its more general level, it seeks to promote an environment in a political community, through the education of public opinion, that would make it safer for public opinion to take risks for peace.[15]

The tenor and substance of these interviews provide an important barometer for assessing the mood and atmosphere for negotiation. It is equally true, however, that the articulated viewpoints are developed in large part for public, and political consumption. The mass media and the political culture in Nicosia, on both sides of the Green Line, as well as those in Athens and Ankara also intrude on the ideas expressed by political leaders in Cyprus.[16] To the extent that Mr. Vassiliou and Mr. Denktash feel the need to put forward the appearance of being "indomitable in the face of the enemy" it may be that their public expressions are more inflexible than the more private postures that could be adopted through track two diplomacy. Again, such an initiative presumes a measure of goodwill which is not immediately evident. Reticence and intransigence, on the other hand, are perhaps the trademarks of conflicting parties in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Such progress as has had made or anticipated in recent months and years has been facilitated by pressure from third parties. Mr. Clerides may have been correct in his assessment of the best prospects for a solution of the Cyprus problem. He argued that, once a settlement is imposed in the Middle East, the geo-strategic strength of Turkey will shift and negotiation of the Cyprus issue will then be made possible.

Clearly, it would be preferable to settle this dispute without outside interference. However, the analysis presented here leads to the conclusion that the attitudes of the leaders on both sides of the Green Line are entrenched; developments outside of Cyprus that might have been expected to make progress possible, indeed, likely, have little or no effect. The only plausible scenario out of which real change seems likely to occur involves the active intervention of third party actors. The role of the United States in bringing about agreement in the Middle East peace conference presents one such model. It seems likely that the Green Line and all that it represents will remain firmly in place until the world turns its attention from the Middle East to a resolution of the difficulties that beset Cyprus.

Notes

1. For a more detailed discussion, see Nancy Cranshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1978) and Kyriacos Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic* (New Haven: Yale, 1977).

2. The author would like to express his appreciation for the courtesies extended to him by those who so graciously agreed to the interviews. Thanks are also due to his colleagues, Professors Ken Abrams, Tom Rocco, Ellen Rocco, Karen Pass and Otto Jones for their collegiality and to The Frederick Polytechnic Institute for their generous hospitality.

3. For a fuller discussion of history of these negotiations, see Joseph Joseph, "The International Dimensions of the Cyprus Problem" *Cyprus Review,* Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 1990) pp. 15-39; *The Cyprus Problem* (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, 1989); Rauf Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1982); Ziam Necategil, *The Cyprus Question and The Turkish Position in International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989).

4. Joseph Joseph, *Cyprus Ethnic Conflict and International Concern* (New York: Lang, 1985).

5. *The Cyprus Problem* (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, 1989).

6. Zaim Necatigil, *The Cyprus Question and The Turkish Position in International Law* (Oxford: Oxford Univerisity Press, 1989 p. 135.

7. *Ibid*, p. 136

8. See Stephen Ryan, "Explaining Ethnic Conflict: The Neglected International Dimension" *Review of International Studies,* 14 (1988).

9. For a discussion of resolutions and measures draw up by the EEC, see Charalambos Tsardanidis, "The European Community and the Cyprus Problem since 1974," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology,* 16 (1988) pp. 263-277.

10. "Flashpoints," *World Marxist Review,* 31 (1988), pp 43-39.

11. Rauf Denktash, "What is the Cyprus Problem?" Unpub. ms. (June, 1991).

12. Douglas Neville, *(eds.), Integration and Division: Geographical Perspectives on the Northern Ireland Problem* (London: Academic Press 1982). The concept may be applied to Cyprus and suggests the parallels that may be drawn between Cyprus, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka with regard to territorial and demographic relationships, and their common experiences British colonialism. Some of these connections have been sketched out in Eamonn Breen, *The Three Islands: International Agreements in Northern Ireland, Cyprus and Sri Lanka* (Belfast: Queens University Press, 1990), but see also, Dominick Coyle, *Minorities in Revolt: Political Violence in Ireland, Italy and Cyprus* (Rutherford, N.J.: Farleigh Dickenson University Press 1982), and Stephen Ryan, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations* (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing 1990).

13. Worsley says, for example, that while the Ottoman Empire contained and tolerated many different ethnic groups, "All others, certainly, were inferior in status to Turks and Muslims, amongst whom the ruling class exercised a singularly ruthless repression to any challenge to its authority." (1979: 3) As Worsley suggests, the consolidation and institutionalization of religion and ethnic community under Ottoman rule may well account for the singular cohesion of ethnic identity in contemporary Cyprus.

14. "Flashpoints," *op. cit.*

15. J.V. Montville, quoted in Paul Arthur, *Ibid,* p. 403.

16. Clearly the political culture is not intimidatory in the way that Belfast might be described, as in Paul Arthur, "Negotiating the Northern Ireland Problem: One or Two Track Diplomacy?" *Government and Opposition,* 25 (1990), pp. 403-418. It is nonetheless, a deeply divided society in which the two ethnic communities are highly politicized, and to that extent, pronouncements by political leaders are closely scrutinized in the press and in politics.

A REVIEW ARTICLE

Cypriot Women in the Labour Market: An Exploration of Myths and Reality: Women, Work and Development (UN Publication No. 10), by William J. House (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1985), 143 pp.

Mise a jour

The 1980s is generally believed to have been a decade of intense development for Cyprus' economic affairs. If the average man on the street (or in the coffee shop) were asked if economic conditions had changed over this decade he would certainly cite the phenomenal growth of hotels and services for tourists, the development of new and unprecedented manufacturing industries, the enormous growth in previously embryonic towns such as Limassol, Larnaca and Ayia Napa--centres which are now classified unhesitatingly as cities and areas of surprising urban density. A more highly educated class of respondent would consider the level of overall unemployment and comment that unemployment of university graduates at the beginning of the 1980s was relatively high and remains high now. He would comment that, "Yes, definitely there has been tremendous change and growth," but that in some ways conditions remain much the same, and some of the most urgent concerns of individuals have not been addressed satisfactorily.

If a woman were asked to comment, especially a 'gainfully employed' woman, it is likely that her first thought would be to consider the great wage disparity between men and women in the Cyprus labour force. If this woman happened to be a widow or were attempting to raise children on her own income, she would wax very bitter not only about the size of the disparity, but also about its generality of differential which extends across almost all the economic employment sectors and levels of the economy. This woman would not feel that development had been distributed justly among the island's inhabitants, that certain classes of persons are unfairly discriminated against by the contemporary and persistent economic structure. She would probably not express much hope of any real improvement during the decade of the 1990s, unless of course, she extended her consideration to the "upcoming union with the EEC," that Panadora's box promising and threatening no end of violent changes and probably equally radical reactions.

According to the Bank of Cyprus *Bulletin* for the first quarter of 1990, changes in the labour market can be summarized as the following:

(a) The labour market continued to tighten; evident problems of labour

shortage in the economy resulted from the low level of unemployment: 2.3% at the end of 1989 relative to an international rate usually above 5% and occasionally as high as 35%;

(b) On a seasonally adjusted basis the level of unemployment stood at 2.2%; many school-leavers and university graduates who were unemployed during the summer had by this time been taken into the labour market and were employed;

(c) The year-on-year decline in unemployment (down by 21.7%: December, 1988 to December, 1989) was distributed through all economic sectors;

(d) Although growth in the manufacturing sector was low during the year (3%), unemployment fell in this sector by 8.1%. "This is partly explained by the low preference exhibited by newcomers to the labour market for technical/ manual occupations in the manufacturing industry." We will see presently why this disinclination occurs;

(e) Unemployment in construction fell by 39.3%; in trade it fell by 22.3% reflecting the strength in imports and retail sales; it was down by 33.8% in the tourist industry as a "result of the excellent performance in the tourist industry," and was reduced in the service sectors--23% in the areas of finance, insurance and business services, and 12.4% in the sector of social and community services.

The three areas showing the greatest unemployment decreases were: mining and quarrying, 68%; agriculture, 45%; and construction, 39%. Note that the three sectors are largely male-dominated industries.

The tertiary sector's share in total employment expanded from 54.9% in 1988 to 55.7% in 1989. The largest portion of this increase was "in the fast-growing tourist industry of restaurants and hotels." In terms of production for the GDP the tertiary sector's contribution rose by 10%--up from 45.8% in 1980 to 55.7% in 1989. The secondary sector's share, on the other hand, dropped from 33.7% to 29.3%, and the primary's share from 20.5% to 15.0% over the same 10 years.

From an economist's standpoint the above shifts in employment share are generally related to shifts in productivity. As the service sector in Cyprus grows, the pattern of economic distribution comes to resemble more closely the sectoral distribution pattern in highly industrialized 'service states,' such as the United Kingdom (where the service sector absorbs more than 70% of the total). The fact that the service sector grows while the primary and secondary sectors decline relatively, may indicate a number of non-exclusive trends:

(a) The service sector is increasing its share through its own internal dynamism and health and through rising demand for services--both internal and external or domestic and imported;

(b) The primary and secondary sectors are also healthy but show a lower level of growth due to relatively lower demand for their goods and services;

(c) The primary and secondary sectors are not particularly 'healthy' and are experiencing growth/development/adaptation difficulties;

(d) The primary and secondary sectors are experiencing a qualified labour squeeze--qualified personnel prefer to go elsewhere; this option is a definite possibility in a state where unemployment is no higher than 2%;

(e) The primary and secondary sectors experience low growth in demand for their products because they are not competitive relative to other producers and/ or relative to imported goods;

(f) A low level of competitiveness is tied to a low level of worker qualification and/or productive output, and/or to an inefficient structure/machinery/equipment base;

(g) Due to a relatively low level of productivity, industry incomes are low, salaries paid to employees are low, investment funds available for upgrading are difficult to accumulate and the cycle is perpetuated;

(h) A final possibility is that which is the story of agriculture in the United States: the sector is so machine-intensive that employment per unit of output has dropped to an unprecedentedly low level--however, in this case productivity is enormously high whereas employment as a percentage of the total is as low as 10 to 15%.

The reasons why a disproportionate percentage of all unemployed persons are university and college graduates include:

(a) Non-availability of jobs in fields in which the graduate surplus is greatest (flux of grads in popular but restricted fields);

(b) A temporary imbalance between chosen career-training emphases and sectors of the economy growing to absorb more qualified personnel (e.g. marketing graduates);

(c) Rapid obsolescence of limited professional specializations;

(d) Low wages offered to prospective employees in sectors where unemployed graduates are available and willing to work, but not willing to accept minimum wages, low promotional opportunities, or poor working/ remuneration conditions.

Precisely which of the above possibilities apply to which sub-sectors of the Cyprus economic scene is a question to be answered by competent economists. Certain it is, however, that wages are low in exactly those sectors which show the lowest levels of growth. Whether or not this condition is a cause, an effect, or both is always debatable.

The distribution of employees by economic activity at the end of 1989 is shown in Table 1. Four of the sectors--Trade, Tourism, Finance and Social Services--have increased relative to the total. Women are heavily employed in

Trade & Social Services. Manufacturing has seen a slight decline (21.2% to 19.6%), and Agriculture, a heavily labour-intensive sector where women are concerned, has fallen almost 5%.

TABLE 1
As Percentage Share of Total

	1980	1989
Agriculture	19.6	14.7
Mining & Quarrying	0.9	0.3
Manufacturing	21.2	19.6
Electricity, Gas & Water	0.8	0.5
Construction	11.7	9.2
Trade	12.9	14.5
Restaurants & Hotels	5.0	9.2
Transport, Storage & Communication	5.1	5.8
Finance, Insurance & Business Services	4.4	5.8
Social and Community Services	18.4	20.4
TOTAL	100.0	100.0

Source: Bank of Cyprus *Bulletin* (1.90), pp. 24-27.
Note: Concerning agricultural labour, many women (86%) work on family farms/land and receive no payment, and are, therefore, not considered to be 'gainfully employed.' Also 54% of all agricultural labourers were women. A high percentage of all employed women, 37%, are in agriculture.

In *Labour Statistics, 1989,* produced by the Cyprus Ministry of Finance Department of Statistics and Research, certain statistics and conclusions concerning women in the labour market are relevant to our discussion. This publication claims that the pay differential between the sexes is widest in the case of sales workers and narrowest for professional, clerical and managerial workers. It is very wide for service, agricultural and production workers also *(Labour Statistics,* Series II, Report No. 89, p. 15). This noteworthy statement is followed by the breakdown shown in Table 2.

Not only is the wage differential 'very wide,' it is over 50 percent on average. This means that for two persons doing the same or related jobs in the same sector (although it is possible that women fill the lower level positions), if the man receives 400 pounds per month for his labour, then the woman would

TABLE 2
Differential of Male Pay Over Female Pay (%): 1989

Professional, Technical and Related Workers	37.1%
Administrative and Managerial Workers	39.5
Clerical and Related Workers	38.8
Sales Workers	102.5
Service Workers	88.1
Agricultural, Animal Husbandry and Forestry	75.1
Production, Transport and Labourers	68.5
TOTAL	53.5

Source: *Labour Statistics*, Series II, Report No. 89, pp. 15-16.

receive 47% as much--186 pounds per month. This situation is unconstitutional and illegal in many of the 'industrialized' states of the world.

The Department of Statistics and Research also presents data relating to the level of women's economic activity by age and educational level. This information is summarized in Table 3. Note that for this table the highest distribution of employed women is in the category 25-29 years old, the curve is skewed significantly to the left, and that there is no bi-modality of distribution. It is also a reasonably smooth curve from apex to right.

Notice in Table 4 that 42% of all working women have completed only elementary school versus 40% for men, and 27% are in the group having completed secondary school-level 2 versus a corresponding 23% for men. The median for women is at the top of secondary school-level 1; for men the median is slightly above this level in the bottom of the category of secondary school-Level 2. Women currently in the labour force and working, according to this table, appear to be slightly less well-educated than men. Nevertheless, if the totals for the last two categories are added together (college and university education), men above the school level total 17.5% and women total 19.1%. Therefore, for the highest levels of education women actually lead the labour force.

Mise en scene

In terms of structural development, Cyprus is slowly 'catching up' with parts of Europe. To make a generalized statement of relative position is beyond the powers of this reviewer as 'position' can be related to so many complex variables. However, let us take a look at the relative position of women in Japan, one of the international states in which labour, and especially female labour, has traditionally had the worst of whatever has been going.

TABLE 3

Economically Active Population for Women by Age

Age Group	Thousands of Persons	Percentage of Total
15-19	6.2	6.1%
20-24	12.2	12.1
25-29	14.1	14.0
30-34	13.3	13.2
35-39	12.6	12.5
40-44	11.5	11.4
45-49	9.8	9.7
50-54	8.0	7.9
55-59	5.8	5.7
60-64	4.1	4.1
65 and over	3.4	3.4
TOTAL	101.0	100.2

Source: *Labour Statistics*, series II, Report No. 89, p. 53.

TABLE 4

Employed Population in Cyprus by Sex and Educational Level, 1989

Educational Level	Males (1000s)	Percent	Females (1000s)	Percent
No Schooling	1.3	.085%	3.9	4.0%
Primary	61.6	40.3	40.3	41.8
Secondary--1st Stage	13.5	8.9	6.4	5.6
Secondary--2nd Stage	34.9	22.9	26.0	27.0
Technical--Vocational	14.5	9.5	1.3	1.3
College	9.8	6.4	11.0	11.4
University	16.9	11.1	7.4	7.7
TOTALS	152.5	99.2	96.3	98.8

SOURCE: *Ibid,* p. 53; and percentages calculated by the author.

According to a *Newsweek* (January 22, 1990, p. 50) article, at the end of the 1980s Japanese women were doing everything they could possibly do, including driving dump trucks. For Japan this situation is indeed culturally innovative. Politically, women only started coming into their own in the 1980s when they helped force the resignation of two [corrupt] prime ministers." Today in Japan the average age of new brides is 25.7 years, compared to a mean of 23.6 years in the United States. This relatively high age means that an increasing number of Japanese women work before marriage. More than 33% of both women and men in Japan go on to post-secondary school. This rate is roughly equivalent to the corresponding rate in Canada--which has the highest percentage (in the world) of secondary school-leavers proceeding to post-secondary or further education. In Japan, 40% of the labour force is female. In other words, all things being equal, out of every ten persons in the Japanese labour market, four of them are women and six are men. For a country in which women have always been relegated to the home, this achievement is impressive (this total is close to the current total for Cyprus). The article ends by triumphantly remarking that there were 62,000 Japanese women engineers in 1985, contrasted to only 14,000 in 1975. This rate of growth is a remarkable 343% for a ten year period similar to the one we are studying.

Although Japan is exuberant in its dynamism, it must also be viewed as radically different from Cyprus in terms of its clout. Japan is that one Eastern economic power which the United States wants least to see re-militarized. And when they wish to borrow money, many states do not go to the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, they go to Japan. To compare Cyprus with Japan is to compare apples and peas. But, the comparison is illuminating in that it demonstrates how far Cyprus has not yet gotten.

The Book

William House's research on Cypriot women in the labour market took place at a time when Cyprus was just showing satisfactory recovery from the 1974-1975 invasion. Hence, when the status of women is investigated one must remember that the situation which existed in 1980 was both the product of evolution over Cyprus' history and also a matter of sheer economic necessity. The book in itself, little longer than an extended pamphlet, says little about the situation—either pro or con. It is a United Nations publication, almost pure and simple. But, while the book is mediocre, the subject matter is dynamite.

House, as a United Nations representative, is imminently discreet. His thesis and its purported terms of reference are couched in the most unoffensive of terms. The publication is divided into nine progressively specialized chapters followed by a bibliography and an appendix:

There are forty-eight tables and six figures. The distribution of tabular material throughout the book is convenient, and the whole is quite easy to read for anyone who has studied statistics, economics or research methods. This book is not for the average layman.

House attacks the main subject of his investigation--pay discrimination among women and occupational segregation--from the first page. His terms of reference are impeccable. He hypothesizes that the reasons for discrimination may include inferior skills, lower education and/or job experience, higher turnover rates and relative immobility. The book is designed to "be of immediate use to the planners in Cyprus." It is a working text. "The central issue of concern is the extent to which the government's expressed goals in raising female labour force participation and halting the decline in fertility are in conflict, and to explore how best this potential conflict may be resolved" (p. 2).

House is not interested in raising the salaries of women per se or in correcting perceived labour force imbalances. His purpose restricts itself to informing government policy. The subject matter is important not only insofar as it relates to the relative disadvantage of approximately one half of the population of Cyprus, but it is crucial in that women in the labour force are perceived to be the key to labour shortages which have been felt since before 1980 and are still being experienced.

The data which was collected for this study does not include the Turkish-held side of the island. The most recent data is taken from the Multi-Round Demographic Survey (MRDS) conducted by the Cyprus Department of Statistics and Research in the initial half of 1980--more than one decade ago. The database was developed to include over 23,000 individuals, "6,500 of whom were married women" (pp. 15-16).

House's presentation of research findings displays several notable positive and negative features. On the positive side are the following:

(a) An effort is made to present matching statistics from states at a similar level of economic development, and especially from Europe and the Middle East, the area of the world of most interest to planners (see unusual and intensive comparison of women vs. men in House's Table No. 6, p. 26). This comparative data is interesting, but is not taken seriously enough to allow anyone to rank Cyprus in the scale of economic or labour market development. Most of the comparative statistcs are given largely for the sake of establishing reference points rather than for serious study;

(b) House attempts to give clear and unambiguous definitions which can be tied down as closely as possible to those used by other states. Where this is not the case, he says so: "However, in the case of other countries listed above, it is unclear how labour force participation is defined. In addition, the quoted rates for other countries refer mainly to the years 1970-1971, and they have risen in the subsequent decade...." (p. 16);

(c) The discussion proceeds from the relatively simple to the complex. He 'lays the scene' in which he is operating, quickly and efficiently. His first discussion concerns historical background and the effects of the invasion. He progresses to consider the urban-rural dichotomy and to show how labour force distribution is quite different for each one. His first table deals with 'Age and Residence of Women in the Labour Force.' It is interesting that in 1980 the largest number of employed women in urban areas was between 24 and 29 (31%) years old. The largest number of rural women was almost exactly 46 years old--ten percent higher at 41% (p. 17). House approaches the labour force as a living and aging entity--his picture permits the planner to foresee what the situation will look like in ten or even twenty years time. Obviously, if the national birth rate falls, and only a marginally larger percentage of women join the work force and women prefer not to work after they reach 35 years of age (as is strongly projected by Figure 1), then given the inevitable aging of the work force, there will be significantly fewer women ready and able to work by the year 2000, an undesirable situation from the perspective of the economic labour planner;

(d) House investigates both the what and the why. He suggests that the reason there are more older women doing rural work than younger ones is not that older women have no desire to retire but that younger ones feel less desire or compulsion to work rurally. He cannot prove this point without a longitudinal back up study, but he points out both the trend and also its implications for the future of farm labour supply. "While women make up 38% of the total employed labour force, they constitute only 32% of the total outside agriculture" (pp. 18-19). Thirty-seven percent of all employed women are located in agriculture, and 86% of these are unpaid family workers;

(e) Comparable statistics to those generated by the Department of Statistics

and Research are clearly tabulated. In fact, House uses sources such as the Manpower Survey of 1979. This leads to ease of comparison between data collected during different years and even different decades. Note Table 5 which partially matches its 1989 counterpart. However, the publication contains almost no fabulations of raw data. Nearly all tables are highly processed, rounded and/ or reduced to percentages. This shortcoming makes further analysis of the findings difficult or impossible. Female labour was concentrated most heavily in Agriculture, Manufacturing, Trade and Services in 1979. This pattern is almost the same pattern which is found in 1989. Noticably, although House had no longitudinal data to work with to 'prove' his hypotheses, the Ministry of Finance now has plenty of it six years after House published his study;

TABLE 5
Distribution of Female Employment by Non-Farm Sectors: 1979

Sector	Females	% Females	Female Employment
Mining	63	3.4%	0.1%
Manufacturing	17,231	48.4	40.1
Utilities	68	5.0	0.2
Construction	1,488	8.5	3.5
Trade	9,605	35.4	22.3
Transport & Communication	1,225	15.1	2.8
Finance, Insurance, etc.	1,834	35.5	4.3
Services	11,489	30.9	26.7
TOTAL	43,003	32.1	100.0

Source: House, p. 27.

(f) House produces many interesting discussions, such as the effects of higher levels of education in removing the worst of pay discrimination, and the effects of having children on mothers' labour force participation and how this effect is tempered by family income;

(g) The last chapter dealing with policy implications is refreshingly specific and deserves close reading.

Limitations of the work:

(a) The greatest shortcoming of the compilation is that it starts in 1980 and stops in 1985; no sequel appears to have been forthcoming;

(b) The publication is well produced on the whole, although it contains the usual number of reproduction errors (e.g., see pp. 18 and 20);

(c) Some of the tabular material cannot readily be compared with statistics

TABLE 6
Gainfully Employed and Economically Active Population by Branch of Economic Activity and Sex: 1989

Branch of Economic Activity	Total in Thousands	Women in Thousands	Women as % of Total	% of All Women in this group
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	35.90	16.80	46.80	17.57
Mining and Quarrying	0.70	0.00	0.00	0.00
Manufacturing (including cottage industries)	48.10	22.60	46.99	23.64
Electricity, Gas and Water	1.30	0.10	7.69	0.10
Construction	22.40	1.40	6.25	1.46
Wholesale & Retail Trade, Restaurants & Hotels	58.10	25.20	43.37	26.36
Wholesale and Retail Trade	35.50	15.30	43.10	16.00
Restaurants and Hotels	22.60	9.90	43.81	10.36
Transport, Storage and Communication	14.10	3.40	24.11	3.56
Financing, Insurance, Real Estate & Business Services	14.30	6.40	44.76	6.69
Community, Social and Personal Services	50.00	19.70	39.40	20.61
Gainfully Employed Population for Production of the G.D.P.	244.90	95.60	39.04	100.00

Source: House, pp. 38-39. The reviewer has supplied all percentages and the final column.

prepared later in the decade because of format or definitional changes. For example, compare Table 6 with Table 5. It is impossible to say whether or not the percentage of all women shown in Trade has increased or dropped to 1989 as the table immediately above does not include agriculture in its calculation of the percentage base;

(d) This book was written for labour researchers and planners. As such it is commendable. However, for the general reader it is more than one level too high for comfortable reading. The technical discussions are very technical and it is assumed that the reader is familiar with even the most complex statistical procedures;

(e) Many definitions are given in painstaking detail, but many more terms commonly used in research are not elaborated. For example, the survey used

House appears to have been: complex, systematic, random, stratified, multi-
ge and proportionate. In addition, sampling was done in a spiral fashion "from
central areas to the perimeter of the zone" (p. 15). Also, Cyprus is likened to
ng in the "late expanding stage of the demographic transition theory." The
iewer can guess what this theory is, but a footnote giving the reference
uld be helpful;

(f) House puts his statistics and tables to telling use. He always makes his
nt. His use of data and research procedures is professional and highly
npetent. However, definitions do change over time and some of the tables in
book are not comparable to statistics presented in the 1990s. Further, he
es not follow some of his material to its logical conclusion. Take, as an
imple, the figure on page 28 which displays "Age Earning Profiles by Level of
ication (Primary and Incomplete Secondary) by Sex." This figure plots four
ellent curves for wage-earning men and women in these two educational
ups. Wages are shown for each and also for plotted ages. A simple
culation added to the figure would also show that the wage differential for
s and boys between ages 14 and 16 (as an illustration) is already in the realm
80 per annum. This disparity then grows by leaps and bounds to around age
where it assumes an astonishing £1115 difference between men and women
annum--and this figure is for persons earning between £1000 and £2400
ually;

g) The author may be justified in leaving the Agricultural sector out of many
is tables (thereby concentrating on urban development and trends), but it
es rapid comparison difficult.

or sake of illustration, this reviewer is going to combine the materials in
se's Tables 5 and 7 in order to produce a table (Table 7) which is
iparable with the table reproduced earlier in this review. Not only does the
e compiled from House's statistics show the distribution of women among
various earning levels and economic sectors in such a way that we can
that the percentage of all women in Agriculture has dropped to 17.6%
ill of over 51%) and of women employed as Service Workers has risen to
% (a rise of 94%)--assuming the definitions used to be equivalent (a large
irical leap)--but we can much more confidently say that the average woman
loyed in Cyprus in 1980 earned only 54% of the salary brought home by her
counterpart. Notice that the situation has deteriorated by 7.5% over the
ide reflected in the statistics for 1989.

able 8 (House, p. 27) reveals that not only are women most discriminated
nst in those sectors in which they are most heavily employed (Agricultural,
ice and Production work), but they are also most penalized at those levels
come where they can least afford it: below 200 Cyprus pounds per month.

TABLE 7

Mean Monthly Earnings By Occupational Group and Sex, 1980 (including Agriculture) and Showing Percentage of All Female Employment Per Sector

ISCO Occupational Code	No. of Females Employed	% of All Female Employment	Female Pay as % of Male Pay
Agricultural (approximate)	25,141	37.00	48.00
Professional & Technical	5,167	7.60	65.00
Administrative & Managerial	264	0.39	69.00
Clerical	8,655	12.74	72.00
Sales Workers	4,320	6.36	42.00
Service Workers	7,228	10.64	59.00
Production Workers & Labourers	17,175	25.28	51.00
TOTAL	67,950	100.00	53.98

Source: J. A. Mourides.

House concludes, not unnaturally, that not only is this severity of discrimination unjustified by the sum total of explaining variables, but it is also bad policy.

Since the government of Cyprus is interested in drawing more women into the labour force in future years, it continues to be bad policy in the 1990s. In 1980 the mean labour force participation of urban women (regardless of age) was 34.3%. For rural women the mean was 44.4% (p. 16) with an overall mean of 38.6%.

According to Labour Statistics: 1989, the total number of employed women in 1989 (p. 53) was 101,000 compared with 170,400 men. Women comprised, at that time, only 37.2% of the actively employed labour force. This data can be reworked to indicate that as the total of women for 1980 was 38.6% for labour force participation, the country has fallen behind 1.4 percentage points or 13.6% in the past ten years. Whether or not it is true by the official definitions this reviewer does not know, but it does help to show that there has not been very much progress in this regard since 1980, nor is there likely to be progress in the the labour force in future years, it continues to be bad policy in the 1990s. In much progress in this regard since 1980, nor is there likely to be progress in the

TABLE 8

Distribution of Earnings Per Month in Cyprus by Sex, 1980

Earning Per Month	% of Employees	
	Male	Female
Less than 50 Cyprus Pounds	0.1	0.9
CY Pounds 50-99	1.5	36.5
CY Pounds 100-149	12.9	31.8
CY Pounds 150-199	32.7	12.6
CY Pounds 200-249	18.7	7.6
CY Pounds 250-299	10.7	6.0
CY Pounds 300 and Over	23.4	4.6
TOTAL	100.0	100.0

Source: House, p. 27.

future unless planners and industrial leaders are able to generate more positive incentives for women to work outside the home.

Summary

This publication is interesting and well written. It was planned and executed by an expert and displays an unmistakable level of competence. The chapters and subject materials are thoroughly developed and coherently linked. Conclusions drawn are clearly traced to their source material and entirely justified. As an aid to planning it has unquestionable value, and it contributes uniquely to standing literature about the position of women in the Cyprus work force. It is certainly worth reading and comparing with more recent documentation on the same subject. Special reference should be made to the concluding chapter written for planners.**--J. A. Mourides**

Cyprus: My Deposition, Vol. 2, by Glafkos Clerides (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing Co., 1989), (English Edition), pp. 487, ISBN 9963-586-05-8.

The publication of the first volume of Clerides' memoirs in early 1989 created considerable excitement among Cyprus specialists. Sotos Shiakides, a reviewer for this journal, justly lauded the work for its "valuable insights" for scholars and political leaders alike.[1] The second volume fulfills the same promise. The narrative encompasses a ten-year period embracing the turmoil between the December intercommunal conflicts of 1963 and the crisis leading to the invasion of 1974. Interpretations of these events are controversial, and the author has performed a service by dispelling the misunderstandings which often distort the issues.

The tone of the reminiscences is intellectually honest as evidenced by the opening assertion that the Greek Cypriots were their own "worst enemies" in the ongoing tragedy of the Cyprus dispute. Clerides develops the theme by demonstrating that factionalism and fighting within the Greek Cypriot community increased in direct proportion to the degree of stalemate in the intercommunal talks. The greater the frustration in endeavoring to achieve a constitutional solution, the more the leaders on the Greek side, both in Athens and Nicosia, seemed to turn on each other.

The outbreak of intercommunal violence on December 21, 1963, signaled an end of the constitutional order imposed three years earlier by the Guarantor Powers--Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey. The text details the search for remedies by the U.N. Security Council and the Secretary-General, whose intercession was either personal or through intermediaries. The author does not question the good intentions of third parties, but he leaves no doubt that he regards their approach as too abstract for the realities of the Cyprus Problem.

For example, he discusses the Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964, which authorized the formation of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and describes in detail the behind-the-scenes negotiations leading to this decision. The presence of UNFICYP helped to defuse the crisis and to forestall armed intervention by Turkey, but the dispute as to whether or not the Treaty of Guarantee (1960) entitled a Guarantor to intervene remained open. On this vital point the Security Council failed to take a position, and the consequences were disastrous.

In his assessment of the various efforts aimed at mediation, Clerides tries to be charitable but rarely suceeds. Sakari Tuomioja, the first mediator selected by the Secretary-General, is described by Clerides as being too willing to defer to the United States and the guarantors without first consulting the Government of Cyprus. Into this setting US President Lyndon Johnson sent a personal envoy, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who was nominally to work with Tuomioja. The outcome of this effort was the Acheson Plan (July 28, 1964), which failed to attract the support of the parties concerned.

Working from documents quoted in their entirety, Clerides describes in detail the international diplomacy which undergirded the plan, and he rightly points out that, "a lot of wrong information has been disseminated about its provisions." The text of the plan is reproduced in full, but inexplicably the sequence of ideas is somewhat skewed. The plan did make reference to the

Free City of Danzig and to the Saarland after 1919, but not in the place mentioned. Moreover, Acheson used the word "eparchies" and did not refer to territorial districts with carefully delimited boundaries. Finally, a brief concluding paragraph is missing. These difficulties notwithstanding, Clerides has done students of the Cyprus Problem a favor by eliminating much of the uncertainty surrounding the Acheson mission and its effect.

Clandestine warfare and the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community into enclaves followed. Clerides is at pains to remind his readers that acts of violence, such as the fighting between Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriot National Guard at Kophinou (November 14-15, 1967), were the result of miscalculations on both sides, but he seems unaware that in a time of internal crisis government must act with restraint in order to bring about reconciliation. The need to compromise the majesty of the state in the interest of a peaceful solution was never recognized, and the Government of Cyprus pursued a dogmatic policy with tragic results.

In the wake of the presidential election of 1968, Archbishop Makarios called for an unspecified "feasible" settlement. The result was the initation in 1968 of an intercommunal dialogue, in which Clerides and Rauf Denktash were the interlocutors of their respective communites. Through a personal narrative enriched by hitherto unpublished documents, the author describes both the human and the substantive aspects of the efforts to reach a constitutional settlement. By 1971, the talks showed little progress, for the Greek Cypriot side was unwilling to grant the Turkish Cypriots local autonomy or to permit them to return to their homes in "sensitive areas."

For his part, Denktash showed no disposition to compromise the constitutional doctrine of bicommunalism, but he did indicate a willingness in December, 1969, to set aside discussion of the legal powers of municipal authorities in order to achieve consensus in other areas. Makarios rejected the offer and insisted that any agreement cover all contentious points. Clerides sadly concludes that this curt response sacrificed an opportunity never to come again.

The Clerides-Denktash talks revealed the dualism of attitudes toward the Cyprus question. On the personal level the two interlocutors treated each other with respect and consideration. The memoirs by Denktash as well as those of Clerides agree on this point.[2] Indeed, the two memoirs should be read in tandem. As representatives of their communities, however, each failed to comprehend the other's needs. The Greek Cypriots sought to preserve the unity of the state by offering to grant only "minority rights" to the Turkish Cypriot community, which demanded for itself the status of an equal partner in the governing of the Republic.

In the face of mounting political violence within the Greek Cypriot community

and growing friction between Makarios and the military government in Athe the Greek Cypriot leadership only hardened its stance. Clerides convincir argues that his government pursued an unrealistic policy, which made compromise impossible. The memoirs are a tale of human frailty, the powe historic antagonisms, and the destructive effect of intervention by exter forces. In weaving these threads together, Clerides has done a masterful jo the best tradition of Greek historiography.--**James H. Wolfe.**

Notes

[1] Sotos Shiakides, "*My Deposition,* Vol. 1, by Glafkos Clerides," *The Cyp Review,* Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall 1989), pp. 128-33.

[2] Rauf R. Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle,* 2nd ed. rev. (London and Nico K. Rustem and Brother, 1988), p.58.

Burdened With Cyprus: The British Connection, by John Reddaw (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1982), 237pp.

British policy in Cyprus, and throughout the Empire, was set in Whitehall a Parliament, but executed by those on the spot. Whatever one's view of Britai actions in Cyprus, the island's colonial administrators were a talented and gift group of officials dedicated, as they saw it, to the welfare of the Cypriots. Jo Reddaway was a good example of the "Cyprus hand" at his best—articula possessing a good fund of common sense, with good knowledge of the islar its people and languages, and holding a genuine sympathy for those governed.

He came to Cyprus in 1938, and spent the majority of his career on the isla exhausting the entire gamut of positions available in the Cyprus Governme He was an insider in the Cyprus Government over three decades, and his bo on Britain's role on the island warrants careful attention. The book is organiz into fourteen chronologically arranged essays, each one capable of standi alone.

Reddaway sets out "not to justify, but to explain, British actions" in Cypr (Preface). He does so clearly and without recourse to many of the standa justifications for British rule. He states early that "any normally sensitive Briti official serving in Cyprus could hardly fail to be aware that he was dealing with civilized and highly intelligent and capable people," (p. 23) and that "there w no doubt about the capacity of the Cypriots, Greek and Turk, to ru themselves" (p. 81). He further acknowledges the Greek and Turkish identity the Cypriots (p. 15) and states that there was nothing intrinsically ignoble in t Greek Cypriot aspiration for Enosis (p. 15). The book was obviously produc by a clear and independent thinker.

The author argues that Britain's rationale for its uncompromising attitude toward Cyprus was not due to paternalism but, rather, to the desire to prevent the inevitable chaos which any form of British evacuation would bring about. "The British were stuck with Cyprus not because they wanted to maintain imperial rule," (p. 78) but because of the intercommunal conflicts, Greek-Turkish conflict and danger to NATO, which the lapse of British sovereignty would cause. He goes on to state that imperialism was a non-existent motive for Britain's Cyprus policy (p. 78). Many readers will disagree with these assertions, but Reddaway does not flinch from sticking his head out on the issue. Britain, he says, was stuck, burdened with Cyprus, because of the international aspects of the island's situation.

The book's controversial declarations do not stop there. Reddaway does not see any element of divide and rule tactics in enlisting Turks into the security forces to combat EOKA (pp. 64, 91), and he feels that the infamous "Hopkinson never" of 1954 was not an unequivocal statement of Britain's intent to remain in Cyprus (pp. 79, 85). The author does not whitewash British policy, however. He is extremely critical of Britain's conduct as one of the guarantors of the 1960 Constitution and sees Britain as one of the culprits in the troubles of 1964 and after (pp. 138, 153). He speaks for himself and makes his case well.

It is surprising that Reddaway does not tell us more about the need for a British base in Cyprus. That, after all, was a major stated reason for British stubbornness over any transfer of power. Beyond reference to NATO solidarity and strategic requirements, he does not deal with the need for a base or the establishment of the British Sovereign Base Areas. Perhaps these issues were not important considerations to officials on the island, but the question highlights a problem in the book's construction.

This is an insider's book, based on the author's unique experience. In the main, he refers to standard secondary works and government pamphlets; the work's value is derived from the personal knowledge and experience of the author. He would have been more convincing had he been more explicit about his involvement and personal knowledge of the issues he discusses. Some specific reference to what was being said at Government House about the Cyprus base and the enlisting of Turkish police auxiliaries, for example, would have strengthened his arguments.

Reddaway exhorts historians of the Cyprus question to become more even-handed and Thucydidean. One wishes he had not followed his own advice so well and had put more of himself into his book. Apart from occasional references to what the Governor told his staff, one must read between the lines to discern the author's personal insight.

Such criticism does not detract from the work's value. It is an important book, a landmark which will take its place among the standard literature of the Cyprus

question as a clear exposition of the colonial official's view. It is recommended to all those wishing to understand the conflicting interests and ideologies which have led to the island's current situation.--**George H. Kelling.**

Reminiscences From My Life, by Ezekias Papaioannou (Nicosia: Pyrsos, 1988), (in Greek), 271pp.

Another Requiem--*Reminiscences From My Life* by Ploutis Servas (Nicosia: Zavalli, 1989?), (in Greek), 159pp.

In many ways we are coming to the end of a generation: Archbishop Makarios III, the first President of the Republic of Cyprus and President until he passed away in 1977, has been the subject of a plethora of books. George Clerides, the first President of the Republic's House of Representatives and for many years a leading figure in Cypriot politics, has recently published three volumes of *My Deposition*. Ezekias Papaioannou, the leader of AKEL, the communist party of Cyprus, and the largest communist party of Western Europe, 1949-1988, passed away in 1988 by which time he had apparently finished his *Reminiscences*. This book has now been now followed by the biography *Another Requiem--Reminiscences From My Life*, apparently published in 1989.

Reminiscences From My Life

This reviewer was eager to read the above edition to gain further insight into the troubled modern history of Cyprus from the point of view of AKEL and Papaioannou. Sadly, there was little that was new in this book. The book certainly has no illusions of grandeur. There is a chapter for every small part of Papaioannou's life, and many of the chapters contain digressions, as well as repetitions from previous chapters. Papaioannou does not even attempt to contribute to the history of the nation, and there are no documents to provide enlightenment of key areas of the Cyprus problem. Many areas such as the intercommunal talks are completely ignored.

Having started the review of the book negatively, one is inclined however to say that it was interesting reading. Although the book fails to provide any key insights into AKEL and the history of Cyprus, it does however provide insight into the struggle of a working class Cypriot. The book is in fact an excellent description of the many hardships Papaioannou endured as a typical member of the Cypriot working class: from childhood poverty to worker at the time of the economic depression. After reading of his hardships and workings class sufferings it is not hard to understand why Papaionannou adopted the communist ideology. Papaioannou clearly explains that what he has written is not intended to be memoirs but impressions from his life. Through these

memoirs, he wished to convey the way he felt at critical times of his life.

Papaioannou spends much time describing his early life, from the time he spent working hard on the land, through his first job in the mines of Phoukassa of the American firm CMC (which he describes as "hell"), and his short time in Greece. When he finally reached England, he was practically penniless. Papaioannou's description of the experience of being a new immigrant is well done. His working class background allowed him to easily integrate into the traditional class segregation in Britain. The struggle of the worker through class inequality creates an almost natural development for the worker to become a believer of communism.

There is no question that Papaioannou's beliefs were strongly influenced by the time he spent in Britain, where he obtained his first political lessons from the British communist party. Often he sounds like a member of the British working class. Before returning to Cyprus he was active in two wars: the Spanish civil war, in which he was injured and returned to Britain early; and the second world war in which he worked by day in a military factory and by night in civil defence. His graphic description of the bombing of London brought to life the recent destruction of Baghdad.

Over a third of the book is dedicated to his experiences prior to his forty years as AKEL's general secretary--evidence that the book is by no means intended as a political testimony. In 1949, Papaioannou took over as AKEL's general secretary--a position he held until 1988. Papaioannou describes the youth of the members in 1946, with excitement while missing the irony that the same people, forty-two years older, were still running the party in 1988.

In 1955, the armed EOKA struggle began. AKEL did not support it, though they were not against Enosis. They believed instead in protests through mass rallies and that armed struggle would be damaging to Cyprus. EOKA strongly criticised AKEL, called them traitors, and murdered some of their members.

Papaioannou often appears to be obsessed with not having been taken seriously by the country's leadership. This is particularly surprising, as AKEL was responsible for electing every President of Cyprus, excluding the first, whom they would subsequently also support. Often Papaioannou gives examples of Makarios showing favour toward Clerides and Lyssarides, and ignoring AKEL. Certainly the most tragic example of Makarios not taking AKEL's warnings seriously enough was the coup of 1974. Kyprianou has also been presented as having used AKEL for his rise to power and then rejecting them.

Notable omissions from the book include Gorbachev which may be taken as Papaioannou's dislike of *perestroika*. Vassiliou, also, is not mentioned. Reasons regarding his choice of presidential candidate would have made interesting material.

According to Papaioannou the most serious matters faced by his party during his time as general secretary were:

(a) The fight against the opportunists, resulting in the expulsions of 1952. Papaioannou often refers to democratic collectivism in the way party decisions were made. One then wonders why AKEL needed the proclaimed sweeping changes for democratisation in 1990;

(b) The EOKA uprising and subsequently the position AKEL took to avoid civil strife with EOKA;

(c) The position, correct in his opinion, his party took regarding the Prague uprising, which went against the positions of other Euro-communists. Obviously, the book was written before the Czechoslovakian invasion was condemned by the Czechoslovakian and Soviet Communist Parties, and AKEL in turn. Here AKEL failed to take the lead in criticising the Soviet Union where it had obviously interfered in the internal affairs of another country; AKEL is often criticised for never taking the lead and for just following Soviet footsteps. He tells us that anti-Soviet is anti-communist and is meant as criticism of the Euro-communists which Gorbachev has since welcomed. Surely healthy criticism is not anti-anything;

(d) Not supporting the Zurich-London agreements, and believing instead in a continuation of mass struggle until the attainment of complete independence;

(e) The minimum programme with DIKO, and Kyprianou's later withdrawal from the collaboration with AKEL. Kyprianou continued in power with only a minority of the people who had voted for him still supporting him, and the Cyprus Parliament asked him to step down.

No doubt Papaioannou's communist beliefs were strongly influenced by his working class experiences. Certainly there were compelling reasons for the blue collar worker to believe in communism in order to rid capitalism of its exploitation of the worker. AKEL and Papaioannou and indeed most of the leftist parties of Europe have failed to take into account the fact that what was relevant to the blue collar worker of the first half of the 20th century is not necessarily relevant at the end of the 20th century.

Another Requiem-Reminiscences From My Life

Servas, born in 1907, served as general secretary of AKEL (1941-45), and mayor of Limassol (1943-49). In 1952, he was expelled from AKEL and has since worked as a journalist. His book is a biography of Papaioannou, though one may also consider it to be a review of Papaioannou's autobiography. There are two major parts to the book: first, a macabre introduction, and second, a serious review of Papaioannou's political history.

Servas' book is a far more serious review of Papaioannou's political life than the autobiography itself. It is altogether a more professionally written book by a

man who has been a journalist for many years. Servas ought to have briefly described in what capacity he knew Papaioannou, especially since the beginning of the book amounts to a personal attack.

Servas seems to have taken an insult from the publication of Papaioannou's autobiography. In the present biography, he attempts to discredit every sentence published in the autobiography. Certainly, the book is a serious political analysis with sound ideas, but the pages of direct quotation and discussion of every minor point from the autobiography was excessive.

The introduction consists of a virtual replica of the cover and title of Papaioannou's autobiography. The book is dedicated "to those who would not like to be, live and teach as Ezekias Papaioannou." The introduction quotes numerous reminiscences from Papaioannou's childhood from the autobiography. Servas awkwardly highlights Papaioannou's relationship with his father. Papaioannou does not find his father's hard stance toward him peculiar, and regards his mother's kind nature as a balance. This emphasis in Servas' introduction is presumably meant to indicate that Papaioannou's childhood lead to a contemptible, hard character. Papaioannou tells us in the epilogue of his autobiography that perhaps he may have been hard at times due to a tough life. No doubt Servas agrees with this, but the emphasis created in the introduction is not related to the rest of the book. Surely, if Papaioannou admired his hard father, this is not unique.

The first point of the analysis concerns Papaioannou's political beginnings. Interestingly we are presented a picture of AKEL at that time far from its present *Realpolitik* Servas says Papaioannou's belief in enosis was far from realistic and a more correct line would have been self-government-enosis. The possibility of self-government arose during the discussions with the colonial British government in 1947. AKEL initially attended these discussions despite the criticism of the right, but then abandoned them.

The armed EOKA struggle was criticised by AKEL as wrong. AKEL said that it would lead to results outside its aims, and that a struggle through mass rallies would have been far more effective. Servas praises AKEL for this line but regards it as a prophecy of doom and says AKEL should have done far more to develop their own party line. However, it is hard to be convinced that AKEL could have changed EOKA's aims. EOKA did not want AKEL to be a part of the struggle and branded them as traitors. The colonial government had declared AKEL illegal and imprisoned many of its members.

Servas rightly mentions that colonial Governor Harding's proposals have been totally ignored in the autobiography. Servas regarded them as positive, though it is generally believed that they contained a clause for self-determination for each community.

The second prophecy of doom which Servas credits to Papaioannou followed the 1967 coup in Greece. Papaioannou had said that Cyprus would also pay dearly. This prophecy came true with the 1974 coup in Cyprus, and the subsequent Turkish invasion. Servas credits this disaster to Makarios and AKEL equally for not having taken precautions. Servas reminds us that Papaioannou was willing to offer as many men as Makarios requested, but Makarios took only 1,000 AKEL supporters. AKEL also organised rallies and published articles against the prophesied coup. Servas believes all of these actions to have been insufficient.

Since the time of EOKA and the first presidential elections, AKEL has attempted to remain close to the leadership of Cyprus. It is not clear whether or not it is because at the time of EOKA they were alienated from the decision-making, and earned much criticism for not supporting EOKA. More likely, AKEL, in helping elect Cypriot presidents since then, has attempted to keep the right--the imperialists--away from power. Servas regards the support of Kyprianou and the minimum programme to have been a failure. He says that during the period 1978-83, Kyprianou's first term as President was enough to prove this. Therefore the minimum programme was opportunist on the part of Kyprianou, who used AKEL to stay in power. Servas tells us at the time he was working for the Greek daily *Kathimerini*, and to continue his work he received a subsidy from the Cypriot government. Kyprianou terminated this subsidy after Servas published his disagreement with the minimum programme in *Kathimerini*.

Servas' analysis of Papaioannou would have been more interesting had he avoided the personal introduction and discussed solely Papaioannou's political past. The analysis of every detail of Papaioannou's autobiography was tiring. However, the political analysis was well done and contains many noteworthy opinions.--**Nicholas Anastasiou.**

Proceedings of the First International Symposium on Cypriot Immigration: An Historical and Sociological Review, (Nicosia: *The Cyprus Research Centre, 1990), (in Greek), 382 pp.*

This book contains the proceedings of a symposium held in Nicosia, Cyprus, on August 29-31, 1986. The realization of such a conference involved the concerted efforts of the Ministries of Education and Foreign Affairs, a governmental agency on immigration, and the Centre for Scientific Research, as well as the participants and experts who presented papers. The participants represented six countries with large Cypriot communities--England, Canada, United States, Australia, France, and Greece. The symposium was the first genuine effort to deal with a number of historical and contemporary issues of

Cypriot immigration. The conference covered a wide variety of issues, reflected in the 25 presentations given by a roster of professional experts from Cyprus and other countries. Due to the vast extent of the issues covered, the reviewer can only summarize the major issues as outlined by Aikaterine H. Aristidou (pp. 21-36). Finally, some general comments and observations about the book as a whole will be made.

The historical antecedents of Cypriot emigration were covered by George Giorgis of the Cypriot Embassy of Athens in a paper entitled "Emigration and Movement of Cypriots in Greece During the First Half of the 19th Century." This analysis was based on unpublished documents. The early contributions of the Cypriots in Greece were mainly in the ecclesiastical, educational, cultural, and artistic fields. A large number of Cypriots distinguished themselves during the Greek Revolution of 1821, and many tried to acquire Greek passports.

In "Elements of Cypriot Emigration Between 1886-1924," Foivos Stavrides, a representative of the journal *Kyklos,* Larnaca, bases his analysis on the diary of Savva Tsierkeji, a much traveled Cypriot who kept a journal about his travels. The journal (an extensive 419 pages) reveals many of the economic and social conditions that confronted Cypriots searching for a better life in Cyprus and abroad. In "History of the Cypriot Communities through Newspaper Reports," Andreas Sophocleous of the Office of Press and Information, Nicosia, provides useful information about the life of Cypriot communities in Australia, Canada, England, and the United States as outlined in six issues of the newspaper, *Eleflera Phoni* (1946-1947). However, it is a very limited sample of Cypriot life overseas.

In "Emigration from Cyprus: Tradition and Change--A Geographical Appraisal," Pierre Yves Péchoux of the University of Toulouse, France, identifies the major periods of Cypriot emigration to various countries. He includes the last fifteen years during which the nature of Cypriot emigration has fundamentally changed. According to the author a number of highly specialized technicians and scientists have been forced to emigrate either temporarily or permanently to Middle Eastern and other countries due to the lack of opportunities in Cyprus (p. 25).

Almost half of the participants' presentations dealt in one way or another with the Greek Cypriots of England. Stavros Constantinou, for example, from Ohio University, U.S.A., argues in "Cypriot Emigration to England" that Cypriot emigration in general, and to England in particular, is connected with the political history of Cyprus, especially in the years following its independence in 1960 and the Turkish invasion in 1974. Constantinou identifies four major phases of Cypriot emigration: 1900 to 1954, 1955 to 1959, 1964 to 1974, and 1974 to the present (p. 26).

In his article, "Evdoros Ioannides and the Political Organization of the Cypriot Community of London," Rolandos Katsiaounis of King's College, London, examines the role and efforts of the Cypriots of London in promoting the national interests of Cyprus. Similarly, in her presentation, "The Cypriots in Haringey," Susie Constantinides discusses the largest Cypriot community of London (40,000 members) living in the Borough of Haringey. She divides the Cypriot community according to three periods of Cypriot emigration: a) those who emigrated in the 1930s and following WW II for economic and educational reasons; b) those who emigrated in the mid-1950s and 1960s mainly for political reasons; and c) those who emigrated following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 (p. 27).

Floya Anthias of Thames Polytechnic, London, presented "Aspects of Ethnicity, Class and Generation Amongst Greek Cypriots in Britain." She dwells on the problems of ethnic identity among the Greek Cypriots in London. Sasha Josephides, in "The Relevance of Associations in the Community Life of London's Greek Cypriots," examines various organizations, clubs, and institutions. Maria Pavlides examines Cypriot migrant women in England. Andreas Tillirides, of Cyprus, discusses the role of "Ieronynus Myrintheas (1838-1893)," an important figure of Hellenism who had friendly relations with Prime Minster Gladstone of England. Ioannis D. Antoniades of the Cypriot Educational Mission, London, explores Cypriot migration and the educational policies of Greek Cypriot schools in England.

In conjunction with Greek Cypriots in England, Natia Anaxagoras explores the Greek Cypriot dialect and bilingualism in England. Maria Roussou of the Centre for Bilingualism, London, presents the teaching of the Greek language in English elementary schools. The notion of "Ethnic Identity and Summer Vacations in Cyprus" is presented by Vicky Aloneftis of Brunel University, London. Prodromos Panayiotopoulos from the University of Swansea, discusses "Cypriot Entrepreneurs in the Clothing Industry in Northern England." "Cypriot Poets and the Union of Literary Cypriots in England" was presented by Ioannis Afantites, London.

Three more papers by Stavros Epaminondas of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia, Andreas Kapartis of LaTrobe University, Australia, and M.A. Sophocleous of the Philip Institute of Technology, Victoria, Australia, respectively deal with the "History of the Cypriot Community," "Cypriot Immigrants: Law and Crime," and the contribution of Cypriot literary individuals to Greek Australian literature. In addition, two papers by the team of M. Palaiologou, P. Theophanous, and G. Michaelides (University of Montreal) deal with the "Cypriots of Montreal" and the "Cypriot Students in Canada." P. Samaras, a Cypriot educator in Athens wrote "Etiology of Repatriation and Problems of Cypriots in Greece in the 19th Century." G. Georgiades of Lyon, France, contributed "Post-graduate Emigration of Cypriot Scientists--Roots and

Dimensions of the Problem." John Antoniades from the International Institute for Educational Planning, Paris, examined "Educational Policy and Emigration."

Overall, the symposium was successful in bringing together many individuals and government policy-makers to discuss the various aspects and problems of Cypriot emigration. As one would expect in most conferences of this nature, the content and the quality of the presentations varied. There was no effort to abide by the strict canons of social science conceptual research procedures and methodology. However, many presenters made a genuine effort to use census material, historical documents, archives, anecdotal data, survey questionnaires, and interviews in their analyses.

As published proceedings, almost all of the papers include references and endnotes. As far as the reviewer knows, this is the first time a group of experts and policy-makers have come together under the auspices of a research center to tackle an important issue such as emigration. In most conferences of this nature social scientists (mostly academics) present papers on emigration without a coordinated effort to address all aspects of the problem as it affects one country. Many issues and conclusions identified in this conference are also applicable to other countries with similar emigration problems--for example, Greece.

Those who planned and participated in this conference and those whose work is represented in the published proceedings made valuable contributions to a better understanding of the important issue of emigration. They must be commended for their initiative. This publication can be recommended to all scholars, historians, sociologists, social scientists, policy-makers, and concerned citizens and friends of Cyprus. This comprehensive treatment of Cypriot emigration compares favorably with similar efforts by other countries and professional organizations to examine the multifarious nature of emigration. **George A. Kourvetaris.**

Friede in der Ägäis? Zypern--Ägäis--Minderheiten, by Heinz A. Richter (Köln: Romiosini, 1988).

The primary focus of this book is to provide an overview of the historical genesis of the Greece-Turkish conflict in Cyprus from the beginning until present. Essentially the book is bifurcated: the first part presents a review of the Greece-Turkish conflict until 1986; the second part details the Greece-Turkish conflict from 1986 to present. The former is based on a study conducted for the Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien (Federal Institute for Eastern and International Studies, Germany). The latter was added later to show the development of this conflict since 1986.

Richter divides the subjects reviewed in Part I into the following: the matter of conflict; the conflict until 1974; the development after 1974; problems of the minorities; Moscow and the conflict. The most valuable aspect of this section is the fact that the author goes beyond the literature on this matter and tries to consider thoughts from all points of view, even the minorities and the Soviets. He does an excellent job of working the original documents, interviews, and newspaper articles into a cohesive framework for further studies. For instance, he comprehensively presents the role of Soviet policy in the Middle East (p. 2). The major criticism of this section is that the original Soviet resources are not considered. Those who are interested in this field could have benefited greatly if the related literature on Soviet/Middle East policy and the policy of the European Community had been considered.

The second section of this book presents the development of the crisis until February 1987, the crisis in March 1987, the Davos Conference, the visit of Özal to Athens in June 1988, and the developments since August 1988. Richter states that:

> The changes in world policy during the last two years have had their effects on this conflict: the positions have become more flexible and the crisis in March 1987 speeded up this process. In January 1988 the conference of Davos was held and the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, Papandreou and Özal, started a dialogue. But a settlement of the Cyprus crisis has not yet been reached. Both sides agree that peaceful negotiations are the only way to solve the conflict.

Richter acknowledges that since the start of the peaceful negotiations in Davos there have been many problems. But he mentions at the end of the book that the European Community will play an active role in solving this crisis between Greece, a member state of the European Community, and Turkey, which hopes to become a member state of the European Community.

The reader must exercise some skepticism in reading the second part of the book. Richter wrote in 1988 that "the international community of nations has put the Cyprus problem on the list of problems which must be solved immediately," and he believed in 1988 "that in spite of the internal problems in Greece a solution of the Cyprus conflict could be reached in 1989." In 1991 everyone can see that the nations of the world have put on their list of political and economical problems which must be solved immediately not the crisis in Cyprus, but the crises in the Middle East, in the Soviet Union, in South Africa, and in Latin America.

In the larger field of research on this topic, Richter's work is better conceived and better executed than most. However, the book suffers from a less than clear connection between the review in the first section and the study results in the second. Also, a much more complete and critical coalescence of the relevant literature on the global policy of the United States, Western Europe

and the Soviet Union could have resulted in a more useful and comprehensive study.--**Saiedeh and Wolfgang von Keitz.**

Kypria Perivallontika by Costas Papastavrou, (Nicosia: Cyprus Ecological Movement and K. Epiphaniou Ltd, 1989) ISBN 9963-5-5786-08-7.

The book contains a series of articles by Papastavrou previously published in the local press. The articles cover environmental issues both at the local and international level. The topics of discussion include the ozone, development and ecology, European Community legislation, lead and its effects, the greenhouse effect, economics, salt lakes, Akamas and other important Cyprus ecosystems. Although, a better organizational structure of the articles would have helped the reader become better acquainted with the situation, the author successfully manages to combine the articles to enable the reader to get a relatively well rounded picture of the environmental issues in Cyprus, as well as in other countries. Born in Cyprus, Costas Papastavrou received his Bachelors degree in Natural Science and his Masters degree in Pollution and Environmental Control at the University of Manchester. Currently, he is the director of ECOZOE Consultants, an environmental consulting firm in Nicosia.

Papastavrou criticizes the manner in which Cypriot authorities have handled environmental issues. He cites irresponsibility, lack of expertise, and self interest as the three dominating factors contributing to the destruction and degradation of the environment in Cyprus.

The author deals considerably with the campaign for Akamas, one of the "hottest" environmental issues in Cyprus history. More than 80 organizations are demanding the establishment of a National Park in the area and the revitalisation of the surrounding rural economy. The environmental movement's basic demands for the future of the Akamas are:

a) The termination of all military exercise uses of the area;

b) The establishment of a properly protected and managed National Park;

c) The revival of agriculture, the establishment of an appropriate agro-industry, and the development of non-intrusive tourism.

The writer believes Akamas is a national symbol. On page 108 he cites the various demonstrations held in the area aimed at stopping British military exercises, and believes they echo the 1956 struggle to end colonial rule.

Our society's values, the writer continues, are based on self-interest and the gratification of material desires; he points to the popularity of schemes offering instant wealth," such as lottery and raffle tickets, and gambling on horseracing. The author believes that these values are reflected in people's attitude towards natural resources. Since Akamas represents one of the last, unspoiled natural

habitats on the island, the writer feels that the government should be providing a careful and well-planned policy for its preservation.

Papastavrou also provides a description of the ecological balance, using plant-life as an example. Through photosynthesis plants produce hydrocarbons which later enter the food chain and become available for fauna. The plants produce substances used by flora as well. These exchanges provide an ecological balance. When man introduces his technological "superiority," the consequence is pollution which has had damaging effects on the ecological balance. Since the advent of the Industrial Revolution, this problem has had increasing significance.

Ecology is the science of studying ecosystems and the environment (especially, in the author's view, the natural environment). He notes that ecologists not only study the interrelations within an ecosystem, but also the sociological and technical aspects of a problem. As a result, ecology has become a fully intergrated global movement, standing against such abuses as nuclear power, urban mismanagement, and the extinction of species. But, it has yet to make much impact in Cyprus.

The author questionably links the "green" movement with ecology. Ecology is nothing more than the science of ecosystems--the study of the relationships between organisms. Although the author describes these relationships, he ignores the economic, and above all, the developmental and social factors involved in the preservation of nature.

The concept of ecology may have widened, but it does not yet cover the broad dimension encompassed by the environment. Because of this difference the term "environment" is more widely used in relation to the preservation of nature--it includes social and economic connotations. Thus, the term appears in the titles: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the World Bank's Environment Committee, and the European Investment Bank's Environment Committee, and many others. These all aim to preserve the natural, as well as, the anthropogenic environment. Ecology is, therefore, only a part of environmental science.

The writer goes on to explain the scientific composition of ozone, and describes the problems associated with it. He refers to its importance, and to various international efforts to protect it. He mentions an international scientific program which is measuring ozone concentrations around the world and supports the idea of the participation of Cyprus in this program.

The author stresses the fact that once Cyprus joins the European Community, the island will be obliged to implement the Community's environmental policies. Compared with the EC's environmental programs, Cyprus' programs are virtually non-existent. Furthermore, the writer stresses the

fact that Cypriot membership in the Community does not simply imply financial aid, but it will require effective attention to Cyprus' deficient "green" legislation.

Solomon Ioannou

One Day in the Life of Cyprus: Images Through The Lenses of Leading Photojournalists (Nicosia: Rotoract Club, 1990), 110 pp.

One Day in the Life of Cyprus looks like a refreshing collection of photographs--something about Cyprus, finally, which is neither a compendium of archeological sites, nor about an 'isle of love' for the transient trysts of tourists. On the book's cover, small Cypriot schoolchildren stare out and around, at their peers, and at their world.

Culled from photojournalism, all of the book's photos are in simple, lucid black and white. Historically, this element relates them to the various scenes of everyday life in Cyprus taken by photographers at the turn of the century, now often obtainable in postcard form. Esthetically, it forms a link with the stunning black and white photos taken by the Greek poet George Seferis and published last year by the Popular Bank.

Documenting his own Cypriot odysseys of the '40's and '50's, Seferis may have taken the odd touristic photo of deserted monuments or of smiling companions, but, in its best examples, *One Day in the Life of Cyprus* steers clear of ancient ruins and folkloric faces. Relationships here are internal studies of Cypriots dynamically bonded to each other and their landscape. See, for instance, number 44 by Nicos Avramides: young goatherds, their animals, and traces of some hypnotic melody between them, the trees, and the hills. Or see Avramides' Number 45, playing cards in the foreground, player in the middleground, and pictures of old heroes posted in the background. Number 28, by Robert Voskeritchian, shows the reflection in the wardrobe of an old lady sitting by her bed, communicating in mute harmonies with the faces on the walls around her.

On the other hand, there are photos which murmur or cry out about acts, stories or events. Number 23 by George Tsiortzios glances at a Cypriot woman, not seated sedately weaving a web of lace, but out heaving and hauling fishing crates on a pier. In Number 49, Makarios Drousiotis catches a moment in church as two old women are lighting their candles, one scrutinizing the other whose eyes are averted—the flaming up and damping down of some neighbourhood rush. Then, there is Number 52 by Makarios Droussiotis, the rousing photo of a real newspaper story: priests in protest, charging resolutely toward the camera and into politics, robes in full swirl.

In its best examples, this book does show what its title promises, both photos and journalism: life in Cyprus in its private convolutions and hidden interstices

and the opposite—fragmentary, indeterminate moments of living just one day in that life.

The book's text, however, is a disaster and does a total disservice to the photos. It squashes the book's two visions, one on top of the other. It takes momentary existence and flattens it into timeless essence; it sucks the blood from the photos. Take, for instance, photo Number 49: the two old ladies in church. The explanatory text here is irrelevant waffle about the importance of Easter in Cyprus. The same is also true for Number 45: the player, his cards, and local heroes are explicated through wan verbiage on the status of coffee shops in Cyprus. Since the book is apparently derived from an exhibition of photojournalism's best, one has the impression that the text is just glued on, an afterthought written in tour book style, intended to make everything in Cyprus look not only exemplary but stultifyingly edifying.

If that was the intent, the disservice is even greater, as the English of the text is just plain bad. There are not only many spelling mistakes (Number 27: "dowary" for dowry, Number 30 "sowing" for sewing, Number 41 "flouer" for flour), but syntactic malapropisms (Number 51 "... where the sea is not at reach...") and semantic misappropriations (Number 25 "... some company, a chit-chat and a little sun"). Perhaps, understandable on some teensy Greek isle; this is inexcusable in Cyprus.

It is not just the text that undermines the book, however, it is also its lack of any discernible editorial responsibility. "Created by: Rotaract Club Nicosia" it reads, but apparently supervised by no one. There is no table of contents. Leafing through the pages one comes across several sections. In fact, there are eight sections, but it is hardly worth listing them since the contents of one are often indistinguishable from those of the next. Marriages identical in style turn up under both "Cultural Life" (Number 62) and "People" (Number 81). On the other hand, some photos seem thrown in at random. What is one to make of a section titled "The City" whose last photo is that of a desolate beach? Entire sections seem redundant. Opening with photos of Greek Cypriots peering through barbed wire at the Green Line, and closing with photos like that of Archbishop Makarios inspecting his ruined Presidential Palace, it is hard to understand the book's differentiation between the first section called "The National Cause" and its last called "The Political Scene."

In fact, the last section is the most questionable of all; it looks tacked on after the fact. Not only are credits for the last six photos (Numbers 100-105) missing from the book's index, but the four previous ones (Numbers 96-99) are simply dredged up archival material, commemorations of the past in a book ostensibly celebrating life in the present. Is this truly about 'one day' as it could be seen through the eyes of the Cypriot schoolchildren on the cover, or a botched attempt at enlightenment for foreigners?**--Elizabeth Malkmus.**

Maps and Atlases compiled by Andreas Hadjipaschalis and Maria Iacovou. (Nicosia: Bank of Cyprus, 1990), 265 pp.

"It must be emphasised that this book is a descriptive catalogue and not an original cartographical work" (p. 8). *Maps and Atlases of Cyprus* is just that, an unpretentious catalogue of the Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation's collection of maps and atlases. It falls somewhere between being a serious scholarly work and a glossy coffee table catalogue. That is not to say, however, that it is a failure. On the contrary, *Maps and Atlases* has succeeded in being of interest to keen map collectors and also to anyone interested in Cyprus history, geography or art.

There is much interest in Cyprus in maps of the Island. Cyprus has the distinction of being the only country with a map of itself on its flag. The Bank of Cyprus is one of the most avid collectors of maps and *Maps and Atlases* was written in order to catalogue the Bank's sizeable collection. Work on *Maps and Atlases* was begun in early 1989 and was completed in time for the Seventh International Symposium on the Cartography of the Shores and Islands of Greece which was held in October of that year. Hadjipaschalis is the Chairman of The Cyprus Association of Map Collectors and the author of "Printed Nautical Charts of Cyprus in the Dutch Pilot-Guides of the Seventeenth Century." Iacovou is the Cultural Foundations' administrator.

The text of the catalogue is given both in English and Greek (translation by Niki Marangou), but unlike so many bilingual publications, the two different texts do not appear to intrude upon each other. The clear and spacious layout of the catalogue, designed by Lefki Michaelides, ensures that readers can locate the appropriate sections with a minimum of turning backwards and forwards.

Maps and Atlases is divided into two sections. It begins with a twelve-page introduction which gives a concise history of Cypriot cartography. The first section opens by informing the reader that "The earliest surviving reference to a map in Western literature includes Cyprus and occurs in Herodotus' history"-- 500 B.C.-- and ends by talking about aerial photography. The intervening pages briefly take the reader chronologically through the major milestones in map-making. Despite its brevity, the account manages not to be unduly bland thanks to its anecdotal style. The language is refreshingly straight-forward: "There was not much travelling by sea or campaigning to be done during the Middle Ages, so Cyprus was just a blob on the World Map!"

A politically impartial tone is maintained throughout the catalogue, the contribution--the cartography at least--of each successive breed of invaders is acknowledged. The English receive a particularly glowing entry: "The importance of Kitcheners' Map (1885) cannot be over-emphasised. It remains the most brilliant milestone in the history of the cartography of Cyprus."

Perhaps the only invaders to be criticised are the Turks: "(The) retrogression in the development of Cypriot cartography during the seventeenth century and up to 1849 was mainly due to the fact that Cyprus was at the time occupied by the Turks who had neither the ability to chart maps nor cared about mapping their territories."

The second section of *Maps and Atlases* is subdivided into two smaller sections. The first part catalogues the Foundation's main collection of 24 maps acquired in the '60s and '70s and entrusted to the Foundation upon its establishment in 1984. The second part, which comprises 64 items, catalogues the collection of Mikis and Agnes Michaelides which Mrs. Michaelides donated to the Foundation in 1988.

A short analysis accompanies each item which is based on reports by Andreas Hadjipaschalis and the work of Andreas and Judith Stylianou (*The Cartography of Cyprus,* 1980). Much of the information is technical; it lists the name of the cartographer or author, the title of the map or book, and its measurements. This information, we are told, is aimed at the scholar. However, the fact that the accounts go on to relate each map to the history of Cyprus and the development of Cypriot cartography, makes them of interest to the layman too and herein lies the main strength of this catalogue--it will appeal to almost everyone.**--Belinda Keheyan.**

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