

**Documents handed
by the Foreign Minister
of the Republic of Cyprus
to the U.N. Secretary-General
in Geneva
on 4 April 1979**

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**DOCUMENTS HANDED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER
TO THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL IN GENEVA
ON 4 APRIL, 1979**

We give herebelow the text of letter from the Foreign Minister of the Republic, Mr. N. A. Rolandis, to the U.N. Secretary-General, Dr. Waldheim, an aide memoire of the Greek Cypriot side and also observations of the Greek Cypriot side on the conditions set by the Turkish side to the suggestions of the U.N. Secretary-General for the resumption of the intercommunal talks.

LETTER FROM MR. ROLANDIS TO DR. WALDHEIM

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

I would like to start this letter with a tone of absolute positiveness. I am doing this because this is the attitude of my Government and particularly of President Kyprianou. We are all driven by the will and desire to solve the problem of Cyprus. To this end we are fully prepared to co-operate with you, within the spirit of your mandate, emanating from the United Nations resolutions, for a breakthrough to the existing stalemate. After all, it would be odd and unnatural to assume that a Government of a state, deprived of part of its sovereign rights, of the integrity of its territory and of part of its independence, would be unwilling to make efforts which would reverse such an unacceptable and condemnable situation.

We are therefore positive. The solution for us is not only a question of political will; it is a question of political must. But such a "will" and "must" should not be confused with submission to the laws of the jungle. You have the honour and heavy responsibility to head an organisation which constitutes the culmination of the efforts of mankind throughout the centuries to bring about a degree of justice, decency and respect in international relations. We were proud to read your ideas in your reports to the General Assembly. These ideas, which are worth the high office you represent, we shall always cherish and support.

It is not my intention to tire you with a rhetoric exposition of principles. Such an exposition is sometimes useful to remind us of the fact that the remarkable progress of man to impose law and order at a national level must be followed by a similar progress at the international level. I believe that this is the primary objective of the United Nations. I shall therefore follow a principled and at the same time a practical and positive approach in my positions.

Your efforts, Mr. Secretary-General, under adverse conditions cannot be doubted by anyone. I am personally in a position to know how difficult your task is and how persistently you have tried and are still trying to remove the hurdles from the road which leads to peace. In this effort we are standing by your side, knowing that peace and justice are interwoven because there can be no peace without justice.

In connection with your above efforts and with particular emphasis on the recent developments, I would like to ask a few questions in an effort to clarify the situation:

1. Is it not true that during our New York consultations from the 14th — 19th of December 1978 the axis of your concern was to formulate suggestions which, although informal, would be objective for both sides? The suggestions, of course, could not be formal because, according to the Security Council resolution of the 27th November 1978, such suggestions for talks would become formal if an agreed basis were to be found. But I clearly remember that you were aiming at objectivity as of course you ought to have done. And your suggestions were in fact balanced, neutral and impartial.

2. Is it not true that your suggestions were accepted by us on the 10th of January 1979?

3. Is it not true that the nature of the conditions of the Turkish side to these proposals and their stubborn insistence on them was tantamount to a rejection of your suggestions?

4. Is it not true that in our sincere wish to help towards the resumption of intercommunal talks we have accepted during the stage of consultations in Cyprus ten alterations to your original suggestions?

5. Is it not true that we accepted the inclusion of a reference to the American framework in your suggestions? Is it not true that the Turkish side emphatically deleted such reference from your text?

6. Is it not true that the Turkish side insists that there should be no reference to the United Nations resolutions in your text, despite the fact that they know that the Secretary-General of the United Nations cannot be expected to overlook the United Nations resolutions?

7. Is it not true that the Turkish side insists that your text should provide that the foreign troops should be withdrawn only as part of a solution of the problem, a provision which would be inconsistent with United Nations resolutions for an "immediate withdrawal"?

8. Is it not true that what the Turkish side calls "lifting of the economic blockade" is tantamount to sanctioning the unimpeded use of properties forcibly usurped? Properties which were taken away from us as a result of foreign invasion?

9. Is it not true that we have already displayed our goodwill to avoid polemics in international fora by our low-key attitude at the Geneva Commission on Human Rights, in March 1979? Is it not true that we did this despite the fact that the Turkish side at the same time was not showing the slightest degree of goodwill? And is it not true that President Kyprianou promised to accept an appeal on your part to "refrain from anything which will jeopardise the positive outcome of the negotiations" as long as constructive negotiations last? Can anyone dispute the positiveness of this response coming from the President of an invaded and semi-occupied country?

10. Is it not true that victims of aggression must be looked upon with sympathy and that, therefore, despite the cynicism prevailing in this world, we naturally view you as the bearer of values and the protector of the defenceless and the weak?

The above decalogue, Mr. Secretary-General, sets out certain facts which I trust will be remembered. I am looking forward to meeting you to-morrow with good faith and sincere willingness to do my utmost and assist in your titanic task for peace in a country which may be small by world standards but gigantic in dimensions for us, her inhabitants. We shall no doubt talk freely, as usual, and explore all reasonable possibilities.

Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,
N. A. ROLANDIS,
Minister of Foreign Affairs

3 April, 1979
Encl.: Aide Memoire

AIDE MEMOIRE

In view of the recent efforts for the resumption of the intercommunal talks, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus wishes to place on record its comments regarding the developments that led up to the present situation.

In pursuance of the United Nations Secretary-General's good offices, the Secretary-General put forward on 22nd December, 1978, certain suggestions which could form a common basis for the resumption of the intercommunal talks.

The Government of Cyprus inspired by its earnest desire to seek a solution to the Cyprus problem by negotiation, conveyed to the Secretary-General its acceptance of these suggestions, on 10th January, 1979, through the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. R. Galindo Pohl.

Unfortunately, however, the Turkish side did not accept the Secretary-General's suggestions. Instead, it put forward a number of extraneous conditions to be satisfied prior to commencement of negotiations on the substance which is to find a solution to the Cyprus problem by settling the territorial, constitutional and human rights aspects and providing adequate guarantees. The effect of the Turkish conditions would be to divert the talks from the real issues and to nullify any prospect for holding meaningful negotiations. The reasons why the conditions set by the Turkish side are unacceptable are explained in detail herein below :

The attitude of the Turkish side, in setting preconditions to the resumption of the talks, is in direct contrast to the attitude of the Greek Cypriot side, which is willing to negotiate even under the unbearable pressure of the presence of the Turkish forces, which still occupy 40% of the territory and 70% of the economic resources of the Republic, and of the continued displacement of 200,000 Greek Cypriots representing 40% of the Greek Cypriot population. It should here be noted that the U. N. resolutions on Cyprus expressly demand the immediate withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence from the Republic of Cyprus and call for the voluntary return of the refugees to their homes in safety.

It should also be noted that the U.N. resolutions call for the negotiations between the two communities to be conducted freely on an equal footing. Yet, in spite of the inequality

between the two sides, the truly oppressed and deprived side, the Greek Cypriot side, in its earnest desire to do all in its power to bring about a solution to the Cyprus problem by negotiation, has always been willing to co-operate for the resumption of the talks.

The preconditions set by the Turkish side for the resumption of the talks make it painfully obvious that the Turkish side still maintains the negative position towards the talks adopted by it over the past years.

It will be remembered that at the last series of talks held in Vienna in April 1977, the Greek Cypriot side fully honoured its commitment to submit concrete and comprehensive proposals on all aspects of the Cyprus problem, including detailed territorial proposals indicated on a map, in conformity with the U.N. resolutions and in pursuance of the guidelines agreed upon by the late President Makarios and Mr. Rauf Denktash in February 1977. The Turkish side, on the other hand, contrary to undertakings given before the talks, failed or refused to submit comprehensive and concrete proposals for the solution of the Cyprus problem. On the constitutional aspect, the documents it presented were contrary to the obligation to submit proposals for the establishment of a Federal State, as envisaged in the said guidelines, whereas on the vital territorial aspect no proposals were submitted at all. The Turkish side also refused either to make counter proposals or even to give any indication for the Turkish intentions regarding territory.

It was claimed by friendly countries, interested in the settlement of the Cyprus crisis that at the Vienna talks in April 1977 it was not possible for the Turkish side to present moderate proposals on the eve of general elections in Turkey. After the elections, however, and in spite of the undertaking formally given to the United Nations Secretary-General in January 1978, and announced by him, the Turkish side again failed to present proposals which could afford a basis for meaningful and substantive negotiations. The documents submitted by it in April 1978 were a retreat even from the Turkish position as reflected in the "proposals", submitted a year earlier. It was for this reason that the Secretary-General then decided not to call for a resumption of the intercommunal talks.

Thus, whereas the Turkish side pays lip service to the guidelines, it has in fact never honoured them by submitting any proposal in conformity with them.

Subsequently it was claimed that the lifting of the arms embargo by the United States Congress would bring about a more constructive attitude on the part of Turkey. Unfortunately, however, Turkish statements made over the recent past, such as those referring to "Unilateral Declaration of Independence", and the conditions now set by the Turkish side for the resumption of intercommunal talks show a more intransigent position than ever before.

It is apparent from the communication transmitted through the Secretary-General's Special Representative on the 16th March 1979, that the Secretary-General's intensive efforts over the past three months have not brought about a shifting of the conditions set by the Turkish side. Any prospect for meaningful negotiations is thus rendered much more difficult.

For this reason, it is necessary to make a reappraisal of the situation in order to have a clear view of the true causes of the present situation for only thus can appropriate remedies be sought.

An examination of the Turkish attitude shows that the unwillingness of the Turkish side to negotiate stems from the fact that Turkey, which still holds the spoils of the invasion and is therefore the side that must give, is obviously not willing to make any "concessions". The argument of the Turkish side that it is eager to negotiate in order to bring about a solution to the dire economic situation of the Turkish Cypriots is totally untenable. Had this been so, the Turkish side, which holds all the trump cards and therefore has the initiative, would long ago have given evidence of its alleged willingness to negotiate by indicating the "concessions" it would be willing to make.

On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot side has given much practical proof of its political will to arrive at a just solution of the Cyprus problem and of its willingness to negotiate meaningfully to this end. In spite of the fact that the Greek Cypriots have been deprived of everything and have nothing to give, they have even so made the maximum effort to meet the Turkish position. Thus, the Greek Cypriot side, which had supported the continued existence of a unitary state, accepted the creation of a Federation, even on a bicomunal basis. Every time the Greek Cypriot side made a move towards meeting the Turkish position, however, the Turkish side receded a step backward. Thus, the Turkish side moved from Federation to "Federation by Evolution", whilst its "proposals" were actually for the creation of

two separate states, which it described by the term "bi-zonal", and the legalisation of the present *de facto* situation. Nor has the Turkish side ever given any indication as to the territorial aspect of the solution of the Cyprus problem.

In an effort to divert world public opinion from the cause of the Cyprus problem and the true issues involved, the Turkish side has recently invented the argument that the Greek Cypriots are waging an "economic war" on the Turkish Cypriots. The nature of this argument is simply this: The Turks, having deprived the Greek Cypriots of all their properties and possessions and forcibly expelled them, want to exploit the Greek Cypriot properties freely and unrestrictively without let or hindrance. Naturally, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot owners have tried to protect their proprietary rights by resorting to the only redress available to them: recourse to competent courts and international fora. Surely, nobody can seriously argue that the effort of the rightful owner to protect, by legitimate peaceful means, his proprietary rights, which is a fundamental human right, against exploitation and confiscation by the usurper amounts to economic oppression.

If the Turkish leadership really wishes to improve the economic conditions of the Turkish Cypriots it is in its own hands and those of Ankara to do so by removing the true causes of such economic difficulties, namely by putting an end to partition and division and removing the restrictive controls, inherent in military occupation, which stultify development.

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has always advocated that partition, separation and division between the two communities and fragmentation of the economy are disastrous to both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. In an island as small as Cyprus, with scarce resources and a small market, the economy is necessarily homogenous and the various sectors interdependent. This is the reason why, although 70% of the resources of the country lie in the Turkish occupied area, and although billions of pounds worth of property has come into the hands of the present occupiers, yet that area has proved to be not viable in a divided Cyprus. It is certainly not the Government of Cyprus that has put up borders and barriers between the two communities. If the forces of occupation were to withdraw and if the foreign colonisers were to be removed and the barriers were to fall, the vicissitudes of the Turkish Cypriots would automatically disappear.

It is apparent from the above that the root cause of the present difficulties is the unwillingness of the Turkish side to negotiate, which in turn stems from its unwillingness to yield

up the spoils of the invasion and occupation. Therefore, the only hope for progress is a change of heart on the part of the Ankara Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. For this reason, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus believes that all efforts should be directed towards bringing about such a change of attitude.

The Cyprus Government on its part, in its desire to assist the United Nations Secretary-General in the exercise of his good offices under the U. N. resolutions, reaffirms its position as follows :

(A) It reiterates its strong adherence to the U. N. resolutions on Cyprus and its demand for their implementation.

(B) It repeats its commitment to the process of meaningful negotiations to find a solution to the Cyprus problem within the framework of the U. N. resolutions on Cyprus and its readiness to assist the Secretary-General in the exercise of his good offices under the U. N. resolutions.

(C) It reaffirms its willingness to negotiate on an agreed basis, as provided in Security Council resolution No. 440/78. It was in this spirit that the Greek Cypriot side accepted the suggestions presented by the Secretary-General on 22nd December, 1978, and it reaffirms such acceptance.

(D) It repeats the suggestion made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus on the 24th May, 1978, at the Special U. N. General Assembly Session on Disarmament, namely, for total demilitarisation and disarmament of the Republic of Cyprus, implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations and a mixed Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot police force, in accordance with population ratio, under the permanent guidance and control of an international United Nations Police Force.

(E) It is willing to discuss any other initiative which the United Nations Secretary-General might consider as providing a reasonable prospect for meaningful negotiations in pursuance of the implementation of the U. N. resolutions.

Nicosia, 3 April, 1979.

**OBSERVATIONS OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE
ON THE CONDITIONS SET BY THE TURKISH SIDE
IN RESPONSE TO THE SUGGESTIONS
OF THE U. N. SECRETARY-GENERAL
FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS**

I.— Analysis of conditions set by the Turkish Cypriot side :

1. "Varosha" :

The Turkish side reverts to the "proposal" contained in Mr. Denktash's open message of 20.7.1978. An analysis of this "proposal", which purports to be a gesture of preliminary good-will reveals the following :

(A) The Turkish "proposal" amounts to the offer of an "enclave" representing 14.4% of the total area of Famagusta town.

(B) The proposed "enclave" is deprived of basic infra-structures and essential public utilities and services, such as :

(i) access to main arteries and freedom of communication and movement ;

(ii) essential public utilities and services, such as the Hospital, the Police and Fire Services buildings, the Telecommunications and Electricity Establishments, the Courts, the Municipality and Government Administration buildings, the Main Secondary Education Institutions, e.t.c.

(C) The majority of the sources of economic and cultural activity (industry, archaeological sites and other places of historic interest and tourist attraction, e.t.c.) and Agriculture (particularly the citrus groves and orchards), on which the town depends, lie outside the "enclave".

(D) The inhabitants of the proposed area were only 12,939 persons before the invasion, representing a small proportion of the Greek Cypriot population of the town of Famagusta.

The statement in Mr. Denktash's "proposal" that "as many as 35,000 Greek Cypriots can be resettled" cannot be fulfilled if the area to be returned is the one prescribed in his open message.

(E) The conditions included in the "proposal" that "the future political status of Varosha is fully open to negotiations" and requiring the setting up of an "interim administration", show clearly that it is not the Turkish intention to return Varosha to its rightful owners, the Greek Cypriot inhabitants, but only to allow a small number of Greek Cypriots to return to an enclave, to be exploited and, perhaps, expelled after they have served their purpose.

(F) The further new condition requiring that the committee on "Varosha" and the committee on "initial measures by both sides for normalisation in the political and economic fields" would meet simultaneously and that "the implementation of practical steps that may be recommended by them would be carried out simultaneously or in phase", thus rendering the two committees interdependent, affords yet another opportunity for the Turkish side — under one pretext or another — to prevent the implementation of any modalities that may be agreed for the resettlement of "Varosha".

If the Turkish intentions were sincere, then the proposal would have been for all Turkish troops to withdraw from the New Famagusta town (Varosha), which was inhabited exclusively by Greeks, and the area be handed over to the Cyprus Government, so that all the inhabitants could return to their homes and properties in safety.

2. *Initial measures by both sides for normalisation in the political and economic fields:*

This makes the intercommunal talks conditional on "political truce between the parties" and "reduction of restrictions on both sides to trade, communication and travel". This is a clear indication of the unwillingness of the Turkish side to negotiate meaningfully and of their intention to use the process of the talks only as a means to lighten the pressure of world public opinion on them to negotiate, thus enabling them more comfortably to crystallise and solidify the gains acquired by the invasion.

The aim of this condition is manifold :

- (A) to divert the negotiations from the true issue ;
- (B) to afford an opportunity for endless argument, to prolong discussion on these extraneous issues and thus delay or prevent negotiations on the substance ;
- (C) to deflect world public opinion from the cause of the Cyprus problem (Turkish aggression, invasion, occupation, forcible expulsion and displacement of Greek Cypriots, importation of "colonisers", usurpation of Greek Cypriot properties and general violation of human rights) by seeking to place the Greek Cypriots, who are the victims, not only at par with those responsible for inflicting such sufferings on them, but even to misrepresent them as "oppressors" ;
- (D) to provide a scapegoat in order to appease the anger of the Turkish Cypriots who saw the "paradise" they had been promised and the wealth usurped from the Greek Cypriots converted to "hell" and "dust" by the usurpers ;

(E) by seeking to bring about an equalisation of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus with the illegal "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus", to gain recognition of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus", and thus of the *faits accomplis* and the partition brought about by the Turkish invasion.

The allegation that the Greek Cypriots are waging an "economic war" on the Turkish Cypriots is not only absurd, but also adds insult to injury. The invader comes in and deprives the indigenous population of all their possessions, drives them out by force of arms and then, because the wealth he has usurped turns to dust in his hands, he complains that the victim of his brutal aggression is responsible for his economic difficulties.

The Greek Cypriots, who are struggling for their very survival in the non-occupied area, have no defence against the seizure and plunder of their properties, which are being held by Turkish military force. They have no armies with which to regain them. Their only defence is to endeavour to protect and preserve their inalienable legitimate proprietary rights through peaceful legal means, such as recourse to the courts. The right to property (which includes the right to own, possess, deal with, enjoy and exploit one's property) is a fundamental human right recognized and safeguarded by international conventions to which Cyprus is a party. It must also be remembered that when the Turkish side talks about being prevented from exporting "their" products or of running "their" hotels, they are talking about the properties of the Greek Cypriots from which the latter have been deprived by force, and are now languishing as refugees. Not content with uprooting and decimating the Greek Cypriots and depriving them of their homes and properties, the Turkish side want to deprive their victims of their proprietary claims and the right to complain and protest about the confiscation and arbitrary exploitation of such properties.

It will be recalled that in May 1977, during the talks at the Ledra Palace in Nicosia (in continuation of the last series of Vienna talks) the Turkish Cypriot side raised the question of "economic war", including travel and communication through the illegal port of Famagusta and the illegal airport of "Ercan". The Greek Cypriot side refused to discuss these matters, not only because of the spuriousness of the allegations, but also because they were totally extraneous to the intercommunal talks and an obvious manoeuvre to deflect the talks from the substance and to absolve the Turkish side from its obligations to present concrete, comprehensive and constructive proposals. The Greek Cypriot side declared that it would not attend further meetings if these matters were brought up again. This position was accepted by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, under whose auspices the meetings were held, and these matters were

in fact excluded, the talks being resumed on the substance : the territorial and constitutional issues.

The Turkish side is now reverting to the same tactics, with the same objective : to prevent the holding of meaningful negotiations.

The true reasons for the economic hardships of the Turkish Cypriots are on the one hand the separatist policy imposed on them by their own leadership, which prevented the Turkish Cypriot population from becoming an integrated part of the whole and on the other hand the making of the occupied area economically an adjunct of Turkey. It was the Turkish leadership which invented such slogans as "from Turk to Turk", to prevent co-operation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the economic field, soon after independence. It is the Turkish side which continued the deliberate self-segregation policy, after the events of 1963, reference to which is contained in successive reports on Cyprus submitted to the U.N. Security Council by the then Secretary-General. The following extracts speak for themselves :

"The lack of movement of Turkish Cypriots outside their areas is also believed to be dictated by a political purpose, namely to reinforce the claim that the two main communities of Cyprus cannot live peacefully together in the island without some sort of geographical separation".

(Report S/5764, para. 113, 15.6.1964).

"The Turkish Cypriot leaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve having members of the two communities live and work together or which might place Turkish Cypriots in situations where they would have to acknowledge the authority of Government agents. Indeed, since the Turkish Cypriot leadership is committed to physical and geographical separation of the communities as a political goal, it is not likely to encourage activities by Turkish Cypriots which may be interpreted as demonstrating the merits of an alternative of self-segregation by the Turkish Cypriots".

(Report S/6426, para. 106, 10.6.1965).

Since the cause of the economic sufferings of the Turkish Cypriots is the division brought about by the separatist policies of the Turkish leadership, it is for the Turkish side to put an end to such sufferings by putting an end to such separation.

As to the "political truce", this is nothing more than an attempt to deprive the Government of the Republic of Cyprus of the only defence they have : the right to appeal to the United Nations and other international fora for the end of military occupation by Turkish troops and restoration of human rights in Cyprus.

3. *Setting up of committees:*

The condition that matters should be referred to committees is yet another way to perpetuate meaningless talks.

It will be recalled that attempts to set up committees have been made twice in the past and have failed for the reason that it is not possible for committees to work without an agreed basis and an agreed political framework on all issues. Nor is it possible for committees to work independently of each other unless an agreement in principle as to the overall solution of the problem has been reached.

The attempts referred to above are the following :

(A) In pursuance of a decision taken at the first round of the Vienna talks (28.4.75 — 3.5.75), a committee of experts was set up in May 1975, to discuss the powers and functions of the Central Government.

The Committee broke up without success after a few meetings because it could not proceed without political agreement.

(B) The fifth round of the Vienna talks, recognising the need for a "common basis" prior to reference to committees, specifically provided in paragraph 3 of the communique dated 21.2.1976, that "representatives of the two communities will meet again under the auspices of the Secretary-General in Vienna in May, with a view to establishing a common basis prior to referring the matter to mixed committees in Cyprus".

Because it was not found possible to arrive at a "common basis" the setting up of committees as envisaged at the fifth round of the talks did not materialize. In fact, the U.N. Secretary-General called the two sides for consultations in New York in September 1976, in an attempt to find a "common basis", in order to break the deadlock as to the resumption of the talks. When he ascertained, however, that no common basis could be found, he did not proceed to call a new round of talks or to form the mixed committees, as the Turkish side wished, because he realised that without a common basis the talks and the committees would fail.

It was only after some common basis appeared to have been found at the Makarios — Denktash meeting in February 1977, in the form of the guidelines, that new talks were called, on the understanding that comprehensive and constructive proposals would be made by both sides, as provided by the U.N. resolutions.

The need for an agreed basis is now specifically provided in paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 440/1978 adopted on 27th November, 1978.

It is worthy of note that the committees envisaged during previous discussions were committees to deal with the substantive issues of the Cyprus problem : the territorial and the constitutional aspects. The present suggestion that there should also be a committee to deal with "initial measures by both sides for normalisation in the political and economic fields" is, for the reasons set out under 2 above, totally unacceptable.

The suggestion that the committee on "Varosha" and the committee on "initial measures by both sides for normalisation in the political and economic fields would meet simultaneously and would be instructed to report to the plenary talks as soon as possible, it being understood that implementation of practical steps that may be recommended by them would be carried out simultaneously or in phase" render "normalisation in the political and economic fields" a *quid pro quo* for "Varosha", (i.e. a small enclave of "Varosha" as described in 1 above). Thus, the observations under 2 above become even more cogent.

Re *Guarantees* :

The condition set by the Turkish side that the question of guarantees — almost vital aspect of the settlement of the Cyprus problem — should not form a subject for discussion at the inter-communal talks further strengthens the fears of the Greek Cypriot side as to the true intentions of the Turkish side.

II.— Conclusion :

The conditions set by the Turkish side are not only a step back to "square one". They constitute several steps backwards to positions which have been trodden on before and have proved unworkable.

From the practical point of view, the conditions now set preclude any prospect of success. It has always been accepted that the holding of talks for the sake of talks, without any reasonable expectation for meaningful and constructive negotiations as provided by the U. N. resolutions on Cyprus, is a step backwards and not forward.

Far from providing any hope for the holding of meaningful and constructive negotiations, the effect of the Turkish conditions is to relegate the substance of the problem to be solved (the territorial, the constitutional and the human rights aspects and the question of adequate guarantees) to the background, "normalisation in the economic and political fields" taking first place.

It is indeed regrettable that, almost five years after the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey, and in spite of all promises and undertakings, the Turkish side appears more intransigent and unwilling to negotiate meaningfully than ever.

Nicosia, 31st March, 1979.

