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CYPRUS



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MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP

The **MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP** is an international research and information unit registered in Britain as an educational trust under the Charities Act of 1960. Its principal aims are –

- To secure justice for minority or majority groups suffering discrimination, by investigating their situation and publicising the facts as widely as possible, to educate and alert public opinion throughout the world.
- To help prevent, through publicity about violations of human rights, such problems from developing into dangerous and destructive conflicts which, when polarised, are very difficult to resolve; and
- To foster, by its research findings, international understanding of the factors which create prejudiced treatment and group tensions, thus helping to promote the growth of a world conscience regarding human rights.

The Minority Rights Group urgently needs further funds for its work. Please contribute what you can. MRG is eligible to receive a covenant if you prefer.

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For details of the other reports published by the Minority Rights Group, please see the back cover.

CYPRUS

CONTENTS

From the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1948:

Article 1
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 10
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 19
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.



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

Percentage distribution of Greeks and Turks of Cyprus from 1921 to 1970

Communities	1921	%	1931	%	1940	%	1960	%	1970	%
Greeks, etc.	249,376	80.3	283,721	81.5	369,566	82.1	473,265	81.9	518,617	81.9
Turks	61,339	19.7	64,238	18.5	80,548	17.9	104,350	18.1	114,383	18.1
TOTAL	310,715 (1)	100.0	347,959 (1)	100.0	450,114 (2)	100.0	577,615 (3)	100.0	633,000 (4)	100.0

Sources: (1) Report of the Census of 1931 prepared by C.H. Hart-Davis, Nicosia, 1932.
(2) Census of Population and Agriculture, 1946, Report by D. Percival, Nicosia, 1949.
(3) Census of Population and Agriculture, 1960, Government Printing Office, Nicosia, 1962.
(4) Demographic Report for the year 1970, Department of Statistics and Research, Nicosia.

MAP SHOWING THE DISTRIBUTION OF GREEK AND TURKISH VILLAGES OVER THE ISLAND.

(Reproduced by permission of Dr. P. G. Polyviou)

PART ONE

When, on the morning of 20 July 1974, an armada of 22 Turkish warships and landing-craft appeared off the northern coast of Cyprus, a seemingly insoluble problem moved, tragically and irrevocably, towards a solution. It was not exactly a solution coveted by diplomats, peacemakers and civilized people throughout the world; least of all by the half-a-million Greek Cypriots who constituted at that time 80% of the island's population. For the following three days and during the subsequent 'second round' of the Turkish military advance, all the Greek Cypriots could do was to offer haphazard, often heroic but basically pointless, resistance.

The Turks did not land in Cyprus out of spite, a policy of irredentism, or because of a whim of Bulent Ecevit, who was at that time Turkey's prime minister. Ecevit may have boosted his popularity because of his decision to invade Cyprus but it did not spare him from a government crisis barely two months later. Turkey's move was motivated by issues and feelings which have plagued this island ever since its independence from British rule in 1960. In short, since the Union Jack was hauled down in Cyprus, the Turkish minority of barely 18% of the island's population felt they never had a chance.[1]* Their prospect, in their own eyes as well as in those of many impartial students of the Cyprus problem, was a status of permanent second-class citizenship. Cyprus had become a Greek island, particularly after the two communities ended their efforts to govern together in December 1963. The bloody clashes of that month and the subsequent intercommunal tension brought a UN peace-keeping force which still remains on the island, its mandate duly renewed every six months. After the Turkish intervention, the UN force became hardly more than a silent witness to the island's difficulties and an occasional escort for Red Cross food supplies.

What triggered the Turkish invasion was the military coup which took place on 15 July against the island's Greek Cypriot president, Archbishop Makarios. The coup was hatched and directed by the military junta which at that time ruled Athens. It constituted an act of intervention in a theoretically independent island. The naming of the former anti-British Eoka terrorist and Turk-hater Nikos Sampson as president was the last straw. Turkey could hardly tolerate an Athens-directed Sampson government in Cyprus, only 40 miles from its coast. Successive Turkish governments could tolerate the stalling tactics of Archbishop Makarios and the difficulties of the Turkish minority. But with the Greek junta in charge in Nicosia, for its own security, self-respect and international aspirations, Turkey felt she had little choice but to seize the northern portion of Cyprus and regroup the Turkish Cypriot minority under its guns.

The invasion, at first, resulted in the seizing of only a fraction of Cypriot territory before a ceasefire was imposed by the United Nations. Turkish troops succeeded in controlling a small triangular area stretching from the Turkish sector of Nicosia to a coastal strip of about 12 miles on both sides of the northern port of Kyrenia. Even a determined Turkish effort to capture the Nicosia international airport was beaten back, mainly by the fierce resistance of the Greek mainland battalion stationed in Cyprus as part of the Independence agreement. Little if anything has been written about the reasons for the absence of an immediate Turkish military success in Cyprus. For years before the invasion the prevailing theory was that Turkey, with one of the largest and reputedly most combative armies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), could occupy Cyprus in a matter of hours. Clearly, the invasion proved this contention wrong. Watching the hundreds of parachutes over the plain outside of Nicosia on the day of the invasion, the constant shuttle of helicopters, raids by Skyhawk and Phantom aircraft and the impressive movement of warships off Kyrenia, one had a distinct feeling that all was going to be over, as expected, in a matter of hours. But the rag-tag Greek Cypriot National Guard, armed with bolt-action rifles, Second World War stenguns and some 50 old Russian T-34 tanks held its ground against overwhelming odds. The hastily mobilized and only partly-uniformed barmen, hotel waiters and shepherds held back a modern invading army for nearly three days at the Five Mile Beach, west of Kyrenia – and without any air cover whatsoever. Only the change of sea current on the third day allowed the Turks to land a large number of tanks and break through to Kyrenia – barely two hours before the cease-fire. The Turks appeared hampered by poor intelligence data and their own over-confidence of success. Later, Turkish commanders complained bitterly that the United Nations violated its objectivity by not making public the existence of Greek fortifications on the slopes of the Kyrenia range dominating the coastline. Be that as it may, from the strictly military point of view the invasion – despite years of contingency planning – appeared to be a somewhat haphazard action; but today this is merely a footnote in history.

The real tragedy – for the Greek Cypriots – occurred in the invasion's wake, during the abortive effort to find a solution in Geneva in August. At that time, despite the scars of war and the massive Turkish military presence on the island, much could have been salvaged. The Cypriot economy, although dealt a serious blow, was not totally shattered. The Greek Cypriot National Guard suffered heavy losses but was not destroyed. Nicosia was hardly damaged. The victims of the first round were comparatively few. A number of observers are convinced that more people 'disappeared' during the bloody purges conducted by Sampson's Eoka B gunmen than were killed by the attacking Turks.

The Turks went to Geneva, having implanted a massive military force of over 30,000 men in the small Cyprus triangle they controlled, and demanded sweeping concessions from the Greeks. They wanted a federal government in Nicosia in which the Turks had an equal voice, or Turkish Cypriot administration for half-a-dozen 'cantons' in which the local Turks would be regrouped and a share in the control of the airport and main ports of entry. There were logical reasons for such demands: for a period the Greek Cypriot administration had hampered the free movement of Cypriot Turks in and out of the country for a variety of reasons. While emigration visas were issued readily, Turkish Cypriots capable of bearing arms were not allowed to return to Cyprus. There were, as usual, some exceptions.

What shattered the Geneva talks was Greek misconception about the extent of their political leverage. In the period between the first cease-fire and the start of the Geneva conference, Sampson resigned under a barrage of pressures and Glafkos Clerides took his place. Archbishop Makarios, who survived the attack on his palace and was airlifted from the island by the British from the sovereign base of Akrotiri,

*for footnotes, see page 25

remained 'the elected president of Cyprus'. Although not participating directly in the talks, the uncompromising spirit of Makarios weighed heavily over the Greek Cypriot delegation. Greece itself was in the throes of political convulsions following the removal of the junta. There was little coordination, little awareness of Turkey's determination and the unfortunate overconfidence that somehow, unbelievably, the status quo could be restored, mainly with pressure from Britain and the United States. The Turks had gone to Geneva with definite demands and a firm blueprint which they were not about to change. Greek Cypriot demands for 'additional consultations' were reminiscent of years of political haggling during which the Greek side had not yielded an inch. Convinced that the Greeks had learned nothing from the coup or the invasion, that all they wanted was to procrastinate, the Turks broke off the talks and attacked at dawn on 14 August, this time in a more coordinated and determined fashion. Another reason for the 'second round' probably had to do with logistics. By mid-August, the small triangle of Cyprus occupied by the Turks was jammed by a mass of men and vehicles and little room to manoeuvre. The sector was vulnerable from both flanks and the Turkish commanders reportedly clamoured for more 'elbow room'. This they were willingly allowed to make for themselves when the Greeks – conveniently for Ankara – began to stall in Geneva.

The result was the seizure of 37% of the island's territory, the establishment of the so-called 'Attila Line' cutting across Cyprus roughly from south of the port of Famagusta to the Bay of Morphou, the flight of some 180,000 Greek Cypriots from the north to the south and the eventual regroupment of some 100,000 Turkish Cypriots in the homes abandoned by the Greek Cypriots in the north. Another consequence was the settling of over 10,000 mainland Turks in northern Cyprus under the pretext of the need for more qualified agricultural workers. The process, at the time of writing this, continues.

The side effects on the international scene were far-reaching. Greece has all but withdrawn from NATO, leaving the pact's southern flank in a shambles with Turkey its sole defender. The influence of the pro-Greek lobby in the US congress led to the arms embargo on Turkey, subsequently partially lifted. But the damage to American-Turkish relations was serious and it led to the takeover by Turkey of 26 American bases on the mainland, many of them equipped with ultra sensitive electronic devices to monitor the Soviet Union. The Greeks claim that the Attila line was an old Turkish concept, dating back to Cyprus independence. Tassos Papadopoulos, at the time of the invasion deputy chairman of the Cypriot House of Representatives, claimed that a map showing the line was found in the safe abandoned by the Turkish agriculture minister when the two communities broke up their joint government in 1963.

Whether the Turks had intended to seize nearly 40% of the island or would be satisfied with the solution they proposed in Geneva early in August is now only a matter for debate. Nearly two years after the invasion, the reality in Cyprus was the presence of a strong Turkish expeditionary force which the Turks regard as the sole guarantee for their community and the only deterrent against further interference from the Greek mainland. The two communities, which have never really interpenetrated each other, drifted farther apart, separated by bunkers, barricades, and ancient prejudices reinforced by more recent mutual claims of atrocities. Atrocities, real and alleged, pitting one community against the other have been frequently a macabre feature of tension in Cyprus – though there was only one instance of really serious intercommunal fighting in the decade after 1964 (in November 1967). Each side has its martyrs, graves and gruesome disclosures. Nearly every Cypriot Turk has had relatives killed or injured and many Greeks can claim the same. It is difficult to trace the authors of some of the massacres but until the Turkish invasion the Greeks had an overwhelming superiority in numbers and hence more successes against the local Turks with resulting carnage. Many senior United Nation officers feel, with some resignation, that both sides 'deserve each other'. But the long list of recent victims makes the prospect of a peaceful solution, never easy, even more difficult.

Archbishop Makarios returned to the island in December 1974 and proposed a federation with a strong central Government. The gist of his proposal was that Cyprus must return to the status quo, that the Turks can enjoy full rights due a small minority, the Greek refugees must return to their homes and most of the Turkish army must withdraw from the island. Although obviously aware of the fact that the Turks will never totally evacuate their portion of the island, the Greeks continued demanding sizeable territorial concessions.

The Turkish view – so far unchanged – is that only a federal bi-zonal Cypriot state is viable. Short of that, they see any dialogue as pointless. From the political point of view, the stalemate seems total and no amount of half-hearted negotiations is likely to solve it. The Greek Cypriots have conveniently forgotten about the real cause which triggered the Turkish intervention, which was the junta coup against Makarios. 'Cyprus for the Cypriots' is now their password, although less and less is heard about the concept of *enosis* or union with the Greek motherland. Needless to say, *enosis* was doomed to failure from the word go: no Turkish government could allow the linking of Cyprus with Greece which was 500 miles distant. Besides, any reasonably informed Greek Cypriot politician became painfully aware of the fact that, when the chips were really down, Greece was incapable and unwilling to help its Cypriot cousins.

Thus de facto, with tragic loss of life, destruction of property and human suffering, the problem of modern Cyprus has been given a brutal solution. What happens now can merely be a limited adjustment of the present situation – but only if the Greek side recognizes that its own possibilities for leverage are weak in the extreme, as well as Turkey's political imperatives. In the best of circumstances, Cyprus can become a federated state, with both ethnic communities leading their separate lives but maintaining vague links. Unless this happens in the near future, the creation of two separate mini-states, a Greek Cypriot one dominated by Athens and a Turkish Cypriot one directed from Ankara, seems likely.

* * * *

To understand the island's present tragedy, a glance backward is essential. It will help to explain why Cyprus has been the source of tension for centuries and particularly in the period following its independence. Few countries the size of Cyprus have had a more eventful history. Conquests, plundering expeditions and a succession of civilizations followed one another throughout the centuries. Cyprus has played many roles: a staging area for conquests and military expeditions into Asia Minor and the Levant, a coveted trading post, an occasional military bastion, a crusaders' base.

The island, of 3,572 square miles, does occupy a strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean and was seen as such long before the modern powers started vying for a permanent foothold in that part of the world. From the strictly military standpoint, it is hardly suitable for defence. It is about 140 miles long from Paphos in the west to the tip of the Karpass Peninsula which stabs like an accusing finger into the Mediterranean roughly in the direction where modern Turkey meets with Syria. The island measures between 40 to 60 miles across, from north to south. Its area is divided about equally between the plain and the two mountainous regions, the forest-covered Troodos in the south-west and the Kyrenia range in the north. It has a typically Mediterranean climate characterized by very hot dry summers and rainy winters, with snow covering the peaks of the Troodos. Between May and October hardly a drop of rain falls on Cyprus, making it an ideal tourist attraction in the package-tour era. In late winter and early spring, wild flowers dot the valleys. Citrus groves are heavy with fruit. The foothills of the Troodos grow some of the best wines in the Mediterranean area. After the first autumn rains, the parched Messaoria plain in the heart of the island is covered with lush greenery.

In modern times a number of poets, writers, historians and simple travellers have fallen in love with the island's scenery – much more than with its people. One notable exception is Lawrence Durrell who 'discovered' Cyprus for many modern readers with his *Bitter Lemons* set mainly in the hillside village of Bellapais near Kyrenia. But today the world depicted by Durrell does not exist any more. Most of his Greek characters have fled before the advance of armoured columns, shrines have been abandoned and the red Turkish flag with its star and crescent has been hoisted over the ruins of Bellapais abbey.

It is impossible in this Report to describe the many ups and downs of some 4,000 years of known Cypriot history, going back to the New Stone Age. But it should be noted that the early settlers came, most likely, from the mainland of Asia Minor some time in the fourth millennium before Christ. Subsequent Bronze Age settlers brought with them the copper industry from which Cyprus derives its name. They were followed by Ancient Greeks, Phoenicians, the Ptolemies, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Lusignans and finally, in 1571, by the Ottoman Turks who ruled the island for 300 years.

Throughout the Turkish rule the island's character has remained predominantly Greek and Christian. The Turks, of course, introduced their own administrative system based traditionally on a military society, and collected fairly heavy taxes from Christians as well as from Moslem settlers. But the Turks – in those days – did not seem to be interested in keeping Cyprus as a permanent possession. The Turks, it seems, brought little of permanent value to the island. They turned it over to their British ally in 1878 when Disraeli pursued his grand design of British imperial presence in the Levant, in return for a British guarantee of Ottoman Asiatic possessions. Although the British flag was hoisted in Nicosia, the capital, on 12 July of that year, theoretically at least Cyprus continued under Ottoman sovereignty. Only in November 1914, when Turkey entered the First World War on the side of the German-Austro-Hungarian coalition, did Britain annex the island. In 1925 Cyprus was formally proclaimed a crown colony of Britain.

Britain's entry on the Cyprus scene in 1878 was welcomed by Greek Cypriots as possibly presaging their union with Greece (*enosis*). It was equally welcomed by the local Turks who feared domination by the island's Greek majority. The so-called legislative council set up by the British under the first constitution of 1882 reflected the existing population pattern of 136,000 Greeks and 46,000 Turks: out of the council's 12 elected members (in addition to the six 'official' members) nine were Greek Cypriots and three were Turkish Cypriots. This pattern remained for years, even though the population ratio changed in favour of the Greeks.[2] This led to considerable Greek Cypriot bitterness and periodic explosions at a time when Pan-Hellenism was the dominant political idea of most Greek-speaking people. Although Cyprus had never been ruled by Greece, Greek Cypriot thoughts (at least among the intelligentsia) often turned towards Athens. The fact that in 1915 Greece turned down Britain's offer of Cyprus was of little relevance. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire as the dominant power in the Middle East after the First World War helped to inflame the desire for *enosis*. Conversely, every Greek Cypriot outburst in favour of union with Greece was countered by Turkish Cypriot clamour to have the island returned to Turkey. The British government understood the explosive nature of the island's population makeup but did little to try to remedy it. British policy, in general, consisted of safeguarding the rights of the Turkish minority as best as possible under the difficult circumstances. Some British statesmen, including Sir Winston Churchill, recognized publicly the predominantly Greek character of Cyprus but never committed themselves to its union with Greece. During the period between the two world wars,, the Cyprus scene was marred by a number of Greek riots, some of them extremely violent. One of the worst disturbances took place in October 1931, when, inflamed by a manifesto of the Orthodox Bishop of Kition, the rioters burned down Government House in Nicosia. The British reacted swiftly: troop reinforcements were rushed in, stiff fines were imposed and two bishops and a number of other religious and political leaders were banished from the island.

The outbreak of the Second World War and the role of Greece on the side of the allies led to a considerable relaxation of the stringency imposed on the Greek Cypriots, who remained undaunted in their craving for *enosis*. The fact that Greece during that period was one of the most unstable nations in Europe had little significance. '*Enosis* and only *enosis*' was the frequent Greek Cypriot cry. Athens, needless to say, had other preoccupations: during the period between the disastrous war with Turkey in 1919-1922 and the Second World War, there were three major changes of political regime in Greece, 19 changes of government and several military coups. Greece's stubborn resistance to Nazi Germany rekindled political passions in Cyprus, to some extent with Britain's uneasy blessing. Political parties were allowed again in 1941 and soon proliferated beyond anybody's imagination. Within a couple of years Greek Cypriots were represented by as many as 32 political parties and groupings while the Turkish Cypriots had three. The doctrines of these parties generally reflected the cleavage between the two communities and their radically opposed national aspirations.

The disintegration of the British colonial empire in the years which followed the Second World War understandably helped to contribute to the unrest in Cyprus and proliferating demands – for *enosis* by Greek Cypriots and for partition by Turkish Cypriots. It was also a period of several tragically missed opportunities. One of them was the rejection by the Greek Cypriots of the so-called Winster constitution proposal which aimed at creating a legislative

mechanism in which the Greek Cypriots could have an effective and working majority. In 1950, Greek Cypriot nationalists backed by the Orthodox church which was inseparable from political agitation organized a referendum on the question of *enosis* with a predictable result: 96% of the Greek Cypriots eligible to vote signed what amounted to a petition for union with Greece. The man who is believed to have been instrumental in organizing the vote was subsequently elected as Archbishop Makarios III of Cyprus. This was the first known political act of a man who was to play the leading part in the destiny of the island during more than a quarter of a century. It should here be stressed that in Cyprus the leader of the Greek Orthodox church has also been considered the political leader of the Greek Cypriots – the so-called ethnarch. Few have exercised this power with more acumen than the wily former monk who was born Michael Muskos.

In the 1950s independence was still a vague and hardly mentioned concept although periodic discussions centred on the idea of a self-government under British tutelage. The talks got nowhere and Greek Cypriot nationalists, under the influence of a right-wing Greek army colonel by the name of George Grivas who was born in the Cypriot village of Trikomo, began organizing for a terrorist fight against Britain. Arms and explosives were smuggled to the island and, in April 1955, an organization known as EOKA (the Greek initials for the National Organization of Cypriot fighters) set off bombs which wrecked police stations and other public buildings in scattered parts of Cyprus. Thus began a four-year period of terror and repression, arson, murder and inter-communal clashes which eventually resulted in the London and Zurich agreements creating an independent Cyprus Republic.

During that period conferences and proposals followed one another but they resembled little more than Britain's beating her head against the wall of the intransigence of the two Cyprus ethnic groups and their respective backers. British military measures to restore security in Cyprus predictably led to the stiffening of the Greek Cypriot resistance. To this the Turkish Cypriots countered with their own terrorism by the underground VULKAN organization aimed at Greek Cypriots. To the slogan of '*enosis*' Turkey for the first time answered publicly with its own solution: '*taxim*' (partition). Suspecting that Makarios was in active contact with the Grivas-led EOKA terrorists, the British expelled the Archbishop to the Seychelles Islands in 1956. The measure was rescinded in April 1957 but Makarios was not allowed to return to Cyprus. Instead he was given a hero's welcome in Athens. Greek Cypriots – and to some extent Greece – had a new hero. From then on Makarios busied himself with political activity the aim of which was the independence of Cyprus as a stepping stone to a union with Greece. There are, as usual in Cyprus, conflicting theories as to whether the Archbishop really wanted *enosis* or only paid lip-service to the concept espoused by most of his constituents. Surely, one school of thought argues, if Cyprus became a mere Greek island such as Crete or Rhodes, Makarios would lose his international standing and all the standing of a head of state, including impressive diplomatic representation hardly commensurate with the island's size. There are also those who claim – and they include some Western diplomats – that Makarios had larger designs aiming at political leadership in Greece itself. It is hard to confirm or disprove any of these views. Early in 1967, when pressed about *enosis*, Makarios told the author of this report: 'union of Cyprus with Greece has always been and continues to be the national aspiration of the Greek people of Cyprus.' Few could argue with this statement. The Archbishop, clearly, had to consider the predominant feelings of the island's majority. And when, in 1974, he took measures that indicated that perhaps *enosis* was not exactly his idea of a solution, he triggered an Athens-inspired coup and nearly paid with his life for his political over-confidence. By then, however, Makarios had become accustomed to attacks on his life, some real and some said to have been staged to justify periodic arrests of his opponents. Some attacks provided a convenient stage for his unparalleled showmanship designed to rally the Greek Cypriot masses around him. Thus, after he almost miraculously missed a machinegun burst fired at his helicopter early in 1970, he told an hysterical rally of followers in Famagusta: 'they have murdered me but I have not died and here I am unharmed amongst you.'

It is essential to this study to give at least a brief sketch of the man who led Cyprus to independence.[3] A Western diplomat who spent long years in Cyprus feels that Makarios will never turn his back on *enosis* although he may never work for it actively. The same man claims that Makarios does not believe in tackling any issue head on – unless it challenges his own authority. He described the system headed by Makarios between 1960 and 1974 as a 'permissive, benign, inert government'. Such was the man to whom the British turned over the rule of Cyprus after the so-called London and Zurich agreements of 1959 and 1960. But then the British had little choice after an exhausting and basically fruitless hunt for several hundred EOKA terrorists which consumed the time and effort of nearly 30,000 British troops and only exacerbated local tensions. More than 500 people had been killed (of whom 142 were British).

One of the major reasons which persuaded Britain to grant independence to Cyprus was the conviction that not all of the island was needed as a major military base. When Makarios agreed that an independent Cyprus would grant Britain two sovereign base areas, around Dhekelia in the south and Akrotiri in the southwest, all that remained to do was to hammer out details of a compromise. This was done with the active participation of Greece and Turkey which together with Britain became 'guarantor powers' of the newly born state. The settlement consisted of a draft constitution and three subsidiary treaties dealing mainly with military matters and alliances between Cyprus and the three powers. Britain, Turkey and Greece formally guaranteed Cypriot independence. Greece was allowed to keep a military contingent of 950 and Turkey one of 650 troops in Cyprus. However, within a few years, in violation of the agreement the Greek forces in Cyprus had swelled to an estimated 9,000 men.

The constitution was as fair as could be accomplished under very trying circumstances, after years of fruitless efforts and considering the passions and prejudices of the two ethnic groups involved (although it was also unworkable so long as the Turks were determined to use their power of veto). The president of the new republic was to be Greek and the vice-president Turkish. The two leaders were to be elected by their respective communities. Three out of the seven cabinet ministers were to be Turkish Cypriots. Although majority decisions were to be the rule, the president and vice-president had the power of veto in matters concerning foreign affairs and defence. 30% of the seats in the House of Representatives were allocated to the Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots were to hold 40% of posts in the 2,000-man army (National Guard). The police force and civil service were to be recruited on a 30-70 ratio.

One reason for the generous allocation to the Turkish community was the fact that Turkish Cypriots already held a disproportionately high number of police and military commissions and could not have been easily dismissed. According to the Cyprus department of Statistics and Research, at the time of 1960 independence, Greek Cypriots constituted 82% of the population and Turkish Cypriots 18%. Other minorities such as the Maronite Christians and Armenians were included in the Greek Cypriot percentage. They seldom weighed on the Cyprus problem and had no political aspirations although they did have considerable influence on trade and commercial matters. The distribution of the ethnic groups varied throughout the island. Out of the whole, there were 62.9% purely Greek towns and villages, 19.1% purely Turkish and 18% mixed. The Greek-dominated office of statistics claims that 50.3% of the Greek Cypriot population lived in purely Greek areas. The two communities differed considerably in their literacy rates, standard of living and property ownership. Although today Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot statistics tend to vary to some degree about these points, the most commonly accepted figures are the 16% illiteracy rate for the Greek and 23% for the Turkish Cypriots at the time of independence. Although the Turks claim they own 30% of the land in Cyprus – and some claims were as high as 37% – the Greeks dispute the figure. According to them, at the time of independence Greek Cypriots owned 80.6% of the land. The figure, again according to Greek Cypriot accounts, grew to 81.7% by 1964.

Greek Cypriot statistics are an outspoken source on the island's economic makeup in which the Turkish Cypriot had little share. The Turks, according to these figures, accounted for only 12% of agricultural production and their contribution to manufacturing was only 6%. The Turkish community consumed only 3% of all foreign imports. Much of the haggling at the time of the London and Zurich talks centred on the costs of independence and budgetary appropriations for the respective communities. In the end that too was worked out on a proportional basis. Each community was also allowed to have its own municipal councils in the five biggest cities (Nicosia, Famagusta, Limassol, Larnaca and Paphos).

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Thus Cyprus became an independent republic on 16 August 1960, with Britain pledging £12 million in aid over the following five years. The Union Jack was replaced by a new flag showing a map of Cyprus in yellow over two olive branches. The flag resembled airline or hotel emblems more than a banner around which the new nation was likely to rally. But it was flows only on official buildings and police stations. The two communities continued displaying the flags of their national aspirations, those of Greece and Turkey. This hardly contributed to the forging of one society on the feud-wracked island, which finally, for the first time in its history, was allowed to rule itself.

Dr. Fazil Küchük, a Swiss-educated physician, joined Makarios as vice-president in an uneasy partnership that was to last barely three and a half years. It was not long before the wobbly foundations of the new state began to crumble. The disputes were endless and concerned virtually every field of activity, from whether there should be separate communal units in the Cypriot army, to the administrative and military appointments specified in the constitution. The Greek Cypriots claimed the Turkish Cypriots had no qualified men to fill the vacancies allotted to them and the Turkish Cypriots steadfastly insisted on their quota. Whenever one side proposed a compromise, the other torpedoed it. The formation of an army never really got off the ground and each community began building its own semi-clandestine force.

Despite its small size and limited scope of economy, Cyprus was by no means an unviable proposition – provided its inhabitants were willing to cooperate. True, its agriculture was poor and farmland plots small and dispersed. But it still had the highest *per capita* income in the eastern Mediterranean (second only to Israel), and also one of the best rates of growth. It maintained this level of comparative prosperity until the 1974 coup and invasion. However, as some statistics cited above point out, there was a considerable disparity in the standard of living of the two communities. Soon the Greek Cypriots complained that they had to pay too heavy a burden to support the poorer Turkish municipalities. It is no exaggeration to state that, although partners in the same independent state, the Greek Cypriots showed total lack of interest in the poverty of the Turkish Cypriots. The conviction of the average Greek Cypriot is that Turks are lazy, inefficient and uncivilized. And there was no manifested desire on the Greek side to improve the status of the Turkish community.

The breakdown of the independence agreement seemed inevitable. Hardly anything went according to the blueprint worked out in Zurich. The crisis which was to pit the communities against each other openly was precipitated in November 1963, when Makarios presented Küchük with a memorandum proposing drastic changes in the constitution. The aim of the changes was to remove the provisions guaranteeing the Turkish Cypriots some of their privileges – the inordinately high number of civil service and army jobs, separate municipalities and such – and create a unified state. Küchük, backed by the Turkish government in Ankara, rejected the proposal. The events then raced beyond control of the leaders of the two communities. On 21 December, an incident involving a carload of Turkish Cypriots and a Greek Cypriot police patrol led to shooting in which two Turks were killed and one Greek policeman injured in Nicosia. The escalation of tension was followed by raids, counter-raids, reprisals and other facets of inter-communal struggle which littered the streets of Nicosia and other Cypriot towns with corpses, resulted in massive flights of population and in effect killed any hope for a Greek-Turkish partnership in Cyprus. The worst incident occurred in the Nicosia suburb of Omorphita, a mixed area. The Greeks living there had been surrounded by Turks and a 'rescue' party of Greek Cypriot irregulars, including Nikos Sampson, ran amok, killing men, women and children. The Christmas Eve incidents sent a warning flight of Turkish mainland jets screaming over Nicosia and alerted the world to the potential dimensions of the tragedy. Britain stepped in with troops from sovereign bases to police the cease fire, broken on a number of occasions. By early 1964, Cyprus was laced with barbed wire, villages resembled armed camps, death lurked at virtually every corner of areas where Turks lived next to Greeks. Nicosia itself was divided in the middle of the old walled-in part of the city by the so-called green line. The division, with some alterations, persists today. It is difficult if not impossible to evaluate the various claims and counterclaims of the two Cypriot communities. Virtually every incident has two or more, often widely differing versions. But generally, through their sheer numbers, the Greek Cypriots had the upper hand while the Turkish Cypriots felt vulnerable and overwhelmed. Although there was some talk of pos-

sible military help from Turkey, the political situation in that country combined with lack of military preparedness for a Cyprus emergency generally ruled it out.

The United States was pushing for a solution under which a mixed force of NATO armies would police a Cyprus peace. This was unacceptable to Makarios who managed to acquire some status among non-aligned nations, and eventually it was decided that the United Nations should take a hand. In March, advance units of a six-nation UN force that eventually numbered close to 7,000 men began to land in Cyprus. The United Nations became directly involved in efforts to find a Cyprus solution – without success. The arrival of the UN troops did not entirely stop inter-communal fighting. In fact the biggest battle of that year took place in August around the Turkish enclave of Kokkina on the north-western coast. When the Greek Cypriots succeeded in getting the upper hand in that clash, Turkish fighter bombers from the mainland were dispatched to strafe and bomb Greek Cypriot positions. All the UN troops in the area could do was watch the battle. The UN mandate defined as 'peace keeping', as usual, lacked teeth. Members of the United Nations force were allowed to use arms only in self-defence. They could and did use persuasion countless times and prevented a number of potential massacres. Still few honest officers serving with the UN in Cyprus were ever happy with the situation. Some senior officers in talks with the author were scathing in their condemnation of a decision which sent them to the Cyprus cauldron without any ability to behave as a military force. This feeling persisted – or even intensified – after the Turkish invasion.

By 1965, long after the embittered Küchük withdrew to the barricaded Turkish sector of Nicosia with the dramatic announcement 'the Cyprus Republic is dead', the two communities had settled down to their separate lives. Some 24,000 Turkish Cypriots who fled mixed villages camped in the enclave north of Nicosia in primitive conditions. The world at large, in general, paid little attention to the plight of these refugees – something the Turks have never forgotten. Years later, when the plight of the Greek Cypriot refugees was mentioned, the Turkish Cypriots would invariably cite the fate of their own people who fled their homes – and got little in the way of sympathy or support. The Greek Cypriots claimed that some of the exodus was ordered by Turkish leaders who wanted to reinforce the enclaves. Most reliable and impartial Turkish Cypriots reject this version. Security was the main preoccupation of the Turkish Cypriots in the months which followed the breakdown of the joint government.

The period between the arrival of the first UN troops and the landing of a Turkish expeditionary force west of Kyrenia over ten years later, saw a continuing process of cleavage between the two communities. They lived their separate lives, often side by side without open animosity, but more often in a state of dormant hostility. Each side had built up its own small armed force. The Greek Cypriots had their national guard, animated by Grivas until his expulsion in 1967; the Turkish Cypriots had 'Turkish fighters'. The Turkish Cypriots were hampered by the fact that all ports of entry and major roads were controlled by the Greek Cypriots. For about three years the Greek side allowed only a limited amount of cement and petrol into the Turkish enclaves, claiming they constituted strategical material. The Turks retaliated by not allowing Greek Cypriots into their areas – for security reasons. Many Turkish Cypriots, however, entered the Greek sector to work. (There were even some mixed villages in rural areas.) As time went by and the island's prosperity increased, some benefits came the Turkish way. But the Turkish Cypriots participated only in a very limited way in the increasingly booming tourist industry.

To the outside world, the Cyprus Republic was essentially a Greek operation. On arrival at the Nicosia international airport a traveller felt as if on a Greek island – until he crossed the checkpoint at Nicosia's Ledra Palace Hotel. The shabbiness of the Orient began at that barricade, made more dramatic by the neat, prosperous appearance of the Greek side of the capital. The Greek Cypriots had a more efficient propaganda apparatus and were better equipped to handle the journalists who visited the island. The Turkish Cypriots capitalized on the plight of their refugees and Greek Cypriot atrocities during the inter-communal clashes; but in a world accustomed to massive flights of population and tribal massacres in Africa claiming thousands of lives, Cypriot statistics of misery did not look alarming. Meanwhile a new generation of Cypriots was growing up, often without ever talking to the other ethnic group. Greek Cypriots celebrated Greek national holidays and national guardsmen swore allegiance to the King of Greece. The Turkish Cypriots venerated Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, and roared Turkish slogans to commemorate Turkish military victories over Greece. The striped flag of Greece flew over Greek Cypriot towns and villages. Armed men bearing the Turkish national emblem barred roads leading to purely Turkish Cypriot villages. There was some cooperation between members of the two communities, if only in domains profitable to both of them. Commerce was one. Greek and Turkish Cypriots may have mistrusted and despised one another but as far as business was concerned they were Cypriots. In a way, it was a healthy phenomenon. Unfortunately, it made no impact on the political situation.

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In 1968, after considerable prodding by the United Nations, the two communities began exploratory inter-communal talks. The on-again-off-again negotiations lasted until the Turkish invasion. The profusion of meaningless communiques which marked them can only show how easily official jargon can delude public opinion without a single concrete result.

The talks were conducted by Glafkos Clerides on the Greek Cypriot side and Rauf Denktash on the Turkish Cypriot side. Both men represented some of the best qualities of their respective communities. Both were lawyers, moderate by local standards, highly intelligent and aware of the stakes involved. It was unfortunate that every time a semblance of an agreement emerged, Clerides was hampered by the intransigence of Makarios and Denktash by the objections of Ankara. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be said with reasonable certainty that Makarios did not want a settlement that would change the island's status quo. And why should he? The Greek side flourished and, with the growth of mass tourism, its future appeared bright indeed. *Enosis* was the official slogan but little was done to implement it. The Turkish Cypriots, as far as the Greek Cypriot majority was concerned, had stopped being a nuisance except when Nicosia Greeks wishing to enjoy the beaches of Kyrenia had to drive via a roundabout route or take a United Nations convoy.

The intercommunal clashes all but ceased after a series of incidents in November 1967, during which 25 Turkish

Cypriots were killed and Ankara alerted its armed forces for a move to Cyprus. Intense diplomacy by the United States, concerned with the fate of NATO's southern flank, succeeded in preventing a Turkish military move and forced the regime of the 'colonels' in Athens to pull out some of the 9,000 mainland troops who had illegally infiltrated Cyprus. Grivas also left – only to return in 1971 to exploit the pro-*enosis* sentiment and organize a reborn EOKA, the so-called 'EOKA B'. Within a year the Cypriot problem to the world at large, had stopped being that of a Greek-Turkish confrontation but of an internal feud pitting the militant right wing pro-*enosis* forces led by Grivas against the regime of Makarios. Bomb explosions again shattered the calm of the island, the special tactical police reserve created by Makarios raided arms caches, gunmen were hauled into courts – just as during the first EOKA emergency. Of course, the scale of these incidents was much smaller and most tourists pouring into Cyprus were undeterred by scare headlines.

For a long time, Makarios did not come to grips with the EOKA B problem in a determined fashion, which was true to his character. He did however act with determination when his authority was challenged by three senior bishops of the Cyprus church in 1973. The bishops – two of them said to be senile and all three ardent supporters of Grivas – demanded Makarios's resignation, claiming he was guilty of a violation of church rules by assuming a permanent political role. In July, obviously under strong influence by Makarios, the major synod of the Orthodox church defrocked the three critics of the Cypriot ethnarch. Since then the Cyprus church has ceased to be a problem and challenge to Makarios. But EOKA B was, even after the death of Grivas early in 1974. Although deprived of an historic and almost legendary leader, EOKA B had not changed its aim or terrorist tactics. The aim was *enosis* and the tactics consisted mainly of bomb attacks which claimed few victims but kept up a state of insecurity on the island. The terrorists are believed to have had active support among the 650 mainland Greek officers and senior non-commissioned officers who formed the backbone of the Greek Cypriot national guard. Needless to say, the Greek junta in Athens, despite official denials, was generally thought to be behind the anti-Makarios movement.

The big powers watched Cyprus with increasing concern. Britain's aim was to preserve whatever was left of the Zurich agreement and Cypriot legality, as well as safeguard its sovereign bases occupying an area of 100 square miles. The Soviet Union's objectives were twofold: (i) to force Britain out of its Cyprus bases; and (ii) to set up a broad power-structure for future use through the Greek Cypriot AKEL (communist) party, which has the strong backing of the well organized trade union movement and represents a major political force on the island. The United States, above all, wanted a settlement between the Greek and Turking Cypriots which would eliminate any crisis potential over Cyprus. Washington tolerated Makarios – but only just. The Archbishop was too involved with Third World non-aligned politics to be considered a reliable ally. In addition, the United States government and particularly the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had strong links with the Athens junta which more and more openly headed towards a confrontation with the Cypriot clergyman-statesman. In addition, Cyprus was an arena for espionage and political activity by Israel and Arab states, including the Palestine commandos. For a small island, Cyprus represented an unusual web of international intrigue. At the beginning of the summer of 1974, Cyprus could easily be described as the proverbial slow-ticking time bomb.

The anti-Makarios coup which paved the way to Turkish military intervention was, perhaps ironically, precipitated by one of the rare blunt political acts of the normally cautious Archbishop-president. In July 1974, Makarios openly accused Athens of controlling EOKA B, demanded withdrawal of the 650 Greek officers and announced plans to cut the 10,000-man national guard to half its strength. According to several Greek Cypriot sources, a plot to unseat Makarios was then well on its way but the timetable was speeded up. In the morning of 15 July selected units of the Greek-led Cypriot national guard attacked the Archbishop's palace, police stations and other key points throughout the island. The Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, almost immediately occupied by the plotters, kept repeating 'Makarios is dead, stay indoors', but the Archbishop's proverbial luck held: he escaped through the back exit of his burning palace and was driven to his stronghold around Paphos in the west of the island – unbelievably unnoticed by the columns of national guardsmen rolling by to topple his administration. The British then flew him to a five-month exile.

It took about three days for the plotters to seize all their objectives, and no exact figures are available about the number of people killed during the clashes and subsequent mass arrests. The figure of 3,000 is frequently cited. There were cases of heroic resistance by Makarios' supporters. Most Greek Cypriots were shocked by the coup. Makarios was still the most popular statesman among the Greeks and the appointment of Sampson as president was seen by most as a tragic omen. Sampson first gained notoriety as an EOKA gunman during the fight against the British. (As he was also a news photographer, he was invariably able to get the first pictures of his own victims.) He was caught and sentenced to death. An amnesty linked to the independence agreement saved him literally by weeks from the hangman. He later became an outspoken critic of Makarios through the newspaper *Makhi* which he edited. It can be said that he was obsessed by his hatred of the Archbishop and by extremist ideas which he proclaimed to all and sundry. Shortly before the coup, in a conversation with the author, he described Makarios as a 'tyrant surrounded by secret police, simulating assassination plots to be able to arrest his opponents'. 'He will not last long', he grimly announced. His political doctrine – if he had one – was confusing. He regarded the British with some respect and described Americans as 'political imbeciles working for the Russians'.[4] After the coup, he claimed – and this was corroborated by other sources – that he had not been involved in the plot and was merely the fifth choice for the presidency. On the fourth day of the coup, when the plotters were generally in control, he said 'nothing can really be changed in Cyprus. All we can do is to try and talk with the Turks'. But to the Turkish Cypriots, Sampson was anathema. He had acquired considerable notoriety as a Turk-killer during the 1963-64 intercommunal strife, particularly during the battle of Omorphita. Perhaps, if Sampson had not been made the front man for the plotters, the events in Cyprus might have taken a different turn. But this, again, is now academic.

Five days after the coup, the Athens junta was firmly in control in Cyprus. Several planeloads of Greek policemen and other 'experts' had landed at Nicosia airport, held by the national guard commanded by Greek officers with drawn pistols. In the Turkish sector of Nicosia, Denktash, by then the leader of the Turkish community, told the

author 'Turkish intervention is now inevitable'. Indeed, within hours, after the failure to secure British cooperation or American political pressures, a Turkish armada sailed from the naval base of Mersin towards Cyprus.

It is not the purpose of this brief report to give a military account of the invasion and of the subsequent 'second round' which followed the breakdown of the August Geneva talks. There are several notable features which should be stressed, however. One of these was the failure of American diplomacy to exercise control over the events, despite Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's telephone contacts with Greek and Turkish leaders and the trip by Under-Secretary of State Joseph Sisco to the area. Another is the fact that while Turkish troops battled for a foothold on the island from the air, sea and on the ground, the Greek Cypriot national guard turned on Turkish Cypriots, notably in Famagusta and Larnaca, shelling Turkish areas and arresting thousands of Turkish Cypriot men capable of bearing arms. These acts confirmed the Turkish government in its conviction that the only security Turkish Cypriots can enjoy is under the protection of the Turkish army in a firmly-defined sector of their own. 'Security for the Turks, all we want is security', exclaimed a Turkish Cypriot schoolteacher, herded with other men to a school outside Larnaca by the Greeks. 'If we find it in hell, we'll go there'.

World opinion was shocked by the plight of some 180,000 Greek Cypriots who fled before the advance of Turkish troops, mainly during the August military operations. The modern part of the prosperous port city of Famagusta, Varosha, was abandoned by all its Greek inhabitants and became a ghost town, for months virtually untouched by the Turks, who hoped to use it in their bargaining for the establishment of a 'cantonal' system of enclaves for those Turkish Cypriots who still lived in the Greek-held southern portion of the island. But the Greek Cypriots also missed that opportunity, stubbornly demanding a withdrawal of the Turkish expeditionary force and the return of their refugees to the northern portion of the island. As time went by it became increasingly clear that Turkey held most if not all the cards in Cyprus. Diplomatic persuasion by the United States and Britain and some efforts at interference by the Soviet Union proved futile if not counter-productive. Britain did succeed in playing a major role in rescuing thousands of foreign nationals and many Greek Cypriots during the fighting as well as sheltering large numbers of Greek and Turkish Cypriots at the sovereign bases. In time of stress, Cypriots of both confessions rushed invariably for the protection offered by the Union Jack. One of the most efficient operations took place along the northern coast where the helicopter carrier *Hermes* assisted by several other ships took to safety all those, including Cypriots, who turned up on the beaches. That, basically, was the extent of the British role. There are some who argue that, as a guarantor power, Britain should have come in on the side of Turkey to intervene against what was clearly a foreign (Greek) coup in Cyprus. But in 1974 Britain seemed incapable of military adventures in the Mediterranean. Its diplomatic efforts in Geneva turned out unrewarding too.

The American Sixth Fleet left the role of the saviour of refugees to the British, preferring to stay out of the Cyprus crisis altogether. The failure of the Americans to act in any concrete way during the crisis led to bitter Greek Cypriot anti-Americanism, often officially inspired and culminating in the attack on the US embassy in Nicosia on 19 August, during which Ambassador Rodger Paul Davies was killed by a high-velocity bullet which penetrated the embassy's walls. Eighteen months after this event, despite the fact that a film of the shooting has been made available, the assassin was still at large and, apparently, holding a government appointment. His arrest and trial would undoubtedly lead to sensational disclosures, almost certainly pointing to complicity in high quarters. It is fairly easy to understand Greek Cypriot bitterness against the United States – and everybody else who failed to help them. For years many of the Greek Cypriots have been self-centred and self-righteous. They seldom admitted any wrong-doing against the Turkish Cypriots and the abandoned and gutted Turkish Cypriot villages which dotted the island's scenery have never stirred their conscience. During the invasion's bitter aftermath, the coup has been rarely mentioned. The Greek Cypriots – at least most of them – prefer to delude themselves with the belief that the Turks invaded because for years they had waited for this opportunity. What prompted the invasion is rarely analysed in a critical, objective manner.

When Sampson resigned his 'presidency' after barely seven days in office, the role went, in the absence of Makarios, to Clerides. Tragically for Cyprus, Clerides was unable to turn his comparative popularity with the Turkish Cypriots and his negotiating talent to the benefit of his community. He was, basically, the victim of Greek Cypriot passions, threats of 'fight until death' and a stubborn refusal to admit defeat. Commendable as it has been in many historic circumstances, this attitude contributed to the undoing of the Greek Cypriots. Clerides himself told the author privately that a compromise was possible 'had it not been for some quarters'. Clearly, he did not mean Turkey in this particular instance.

Military operations in a strict sense ended in Cyprus on 18 August, but some sporadic clashes and 'territorial adjustments' by the Turks continued for a further day or so. The war represented a shattering blow to the island's economy and its hopes for the future. While the south was crowded by nearly 200,000 refugees clamouring for comfort, the Turkish-occupied north lay like an open wound in the August heat. Picture-postcard towns and villages lay looted and abandoned. Herds of sheep grazed, masterless, in the parched fields. Steel-helmeted, tough Turkish troops were everywhere – on a 40-mile stretch of road between the port of Famagusta and the outskirts of Nicosia there were 17 military roadblocks. The Greeks claimed that the northern part occupied by the Turkish army represented 70% of the island's economic potential. The figure – as most Greek figures – was disputed by the Turks. One thing was certain: as long as Cyprus remained in a state of uncertainty tourism – formerly one of the biggest money earners – was doomed.

Years before the invasion the Greek Cypriots rejected all Turkish Cypriot demands for a regroupment of the population as being impossible to carry out. It would have involved the movement of 190,000 people – Greek and Turkish – and their transfer from the mountains to the seashore, from cities to villages and vice versa. The invasion and its aftermath performed this brutal surgery and it is highly unlikely that a return to the *status quo ante* is possible. According to Greek Cypriot figures, the war displaced exactly 183,517 Greek Cypriots as well as deprived 14,285 others of their means of livelihood (shops, hotels and other business) now in the Turkish sector. In the spring of 1976, over 9,000 Greek Cypriots continued to live in the north, mainly in the enclave of the Karpass Peninsula and a few villages around Kyrenia. In official terminology, they have become 'enclaved persons'.

Initially, over 100,000 refugees were in make-shift camps and collecting government rations. Within four months the number dwindled appreciably. Most refugees found shelter with friends and families in the south. In the spring of 1976, 16,081 refugees were reported living under tents and 8,451 in shacks such as empty garages, tool-sheds, etc. The government's measures to house these refugees were two-fold: it authorized, under some conditions, the takeover of abandoned Turkish houses and it launched a massive programme to construct eight large housing developments. The construction is largely financed by an American grant of $25 million. A second grant of similar size is being considered and its approval seems virtually certain. There was an emotional problem connected with this resettlement programme aimed at housing some 35,000 people. 'If we are to return to our homes in the north, as the government promises, why spend so much money on "permanent housing"?' the refugees ask, not without reason. But in 1976 few Greek Cypriots, at heart, believed that there was even the slightest chance of return. Yet no leader would say it publicly. This would be tantamount to admitting defeat. The Greek Cypriots, basically pragmatic and enterprising businessmen, remained victims of a stubborn political slogan. The Greek Cypriot population continues to be asked by its leaders for 'sacrifices'. Needless to say, no politician of stature has lived in a tent and when he had to flee – as some did – it was in a car. Some leading Greek Cypriots lost property in Famagusta and on the northern coast but, on the whole, their standard of living did not change much. Thus it is comparatively painless for them to speak of sacrifices.

Within a year of the invasion, the economy of the southern portion of Cyprus, almost miraculously, sprang back to life. Although all fields of activity originally suffered from the effects of the events, most have recovered and some are doing better than before 1974. Thus, for example, more clothing and shoes were being produced in the south early in 1976 than in 1973. By 1977 the production of plastic was expected to reach new heights. The Greek Cypriots are assembling trucks and buses in increasing quantities and recently started more industrial projects. The unemployment rate – for a country faced with an enormous refugee problem – was comparatively low. The government, in 1976, claimed an unemployment figure of 22,000. Perhaps 10,000 other Greek Cypriots chose not to work for personal reasons and collected the food and cash allowance granted under the refugee programme and equivalent to roughly £4(Cypriot) monthly per person. (The Cypriot pound is officially worth 20% more than the pound Sterling). The currency, mainly due to the influx of foreign aid, the compact nature of the economy and comparatively large gold and foreign currency reserves, remained generally healthy. By the autumn of November 1975, the reserves available to the central bank amounted to £C95 million and represented roughly 12 months of imports. The prospect of further foreign aid, mainly American, made Cyprus a good investment and loan risk for foreign banks.

The Turkish-controlled zone offered a sharp contrast. Shortly after the invasion, the press in Turkey was full of news of projects intended to transform the northern section of Cyprus into a thriving oasis of prosperity. Plans, apparently, were being made to install generators to operate wells and water pumps on the notoriously water-short island; a turbine to provide electricity for northern Nicosia and Kyrenia, at that time relying on power supplied from the Greek sector; feasibility study of a water pipeline from the 40-mile distant Turkish mainland and a host of other industrial and agricultural projects. Little of these grandiose schemes saw the light of day by early 1976 and there were few signs that any massive economic renaissance of the north was under way. Such a state of affairs had several underlying reasons, the foremost of them being that the Cypriot Turks had no industrial or business infrastructure, were under strict control of the military authorities and had to face the more urgent problem of settling some 40,000 Turkish Cypriots who moved north from the Greek-controlled areas in 1975. It also appeared clear that Turkey was not rushing to spend vast sums of money on the 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus', the name adopted early in 1975. It was not because Turkey did not regard the division of the island as a permanent prospect but because it had its own economic difficulties. Some political observers tend to think that maintaining a comparatively large force (at present about 30,000 men) in Cyprus is a heavy drain on Turkish resources. This is not exactly the case. Turkey maintains a conscript army of some half a million and whether some of these troops are stationed on the frontier with Greece, in Anatolia or in Cyprus does not appreciably increase their cost. The Turks did activate regular ferry services between Cyprus and the mainland and transformed an old British airstrip at Tymbou (Ercan) into a small airport capable of handling short-range jet aircraft. In the winter of 1975-76 all fields were ploughed and a number of reforestation projects undertaken, with American financing. In granting its aid to Cyprus, the United States has tried to keep the distribution ratio based on population figures. Few statistics are available in the Turkish sector where the administration does not have the tradition of bombarding the press with facts and figures, or even of keeping track of its activities, true or false. Unemployment appears to be large and the inflation high, there are heavy duties on all imported products and many essential goods are not available. Turks moving from the south have been given abandoned and in many cases badly looted Greek shops for exploitation as compensation for their own lost businesses. Many merchants soon discovered they had no cash to pay for new stocks from Turkey and credits were not easily available. Vaguely clandestine trade with the Greek south went on but this was, clearly, not in Ankara's interest. Small as it is, northern Cyprus represents an additional 'captive' outlet for Turkish goods, otherwise hard to export. A few months after the invasion Turkish mainland currency became the common tender throughout the north. The first two years following the invasion, in the Turkish Cypriot sector, were marked, on the whole, by much disillusionment and bitterness. The Cypriot Turks finally got their security but many regretted the advantages of their old economic system. Needless to say, as with everything else, there were exceptions: a number of enterprising Turkish Cypriot businessmen succeeded in establishing reasonably prosperous existences.

Much has been said about the prospects of reviving the tourist business, once thriving in the northern sector with the picturesque coast around Kyrenia and the modern hotels near Famagusta. But package tourists are not keen on coming to an area bristling with guns, where passes are required to move almost anywhere beyond the main Nicosia-Kyrenia-Famagusta roads. The Greek Cypriots were also quick to point out that the Turks have seized the hotels illegally and have threatened to sue any company which entered into a tourist venture with the Turkish sector. It was not an inviting prospect and as the summer of 1976 approached, few foreign visitors ventured into the north, other than in organized tours from Turkey. An added difficulty was that of entry points. A visitor landing

at the Turkish Cypriot Ercan airport or any of the Turkish-held ports was automatically banned from the Greek sector. Countering this Greek decision, the Turks also declared Greek entry points as 'illegal' although the application of this decree was haphazard. A word should perhaps be added about the fate of the British community in and around Kyrenia, numbering close to 700 before the invasion. Most of them were retired people who chose Cyprus as an ideal 'place in the sun'. Eighteen months after the invasion there were slightly more than 200 Britons in the area. The Turkish authorities, according to their standard, gave them a privileged position: with some exceptions, they were allowed to cross the checkpoint separating the two sectors and purchase goods in reasonable quantities from the Greeks. Yet there was a difficult period in the autumn of 1975, when the Turks closed the barricade to everybody except diplomats and United Nations personnel. During that period families were separated and even urgent medical cases received little immediate consideration. But eventually the ban was relaxed. After the initial orgy of looting which followed the invasion, many British residents prefer the security situation in the north to that of the south: there is little room for lawlessness in a strictly controlled military society. One cannot move far in northern Cyprus without encountering roadblocks and police and military patrols.

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From the political point of view, the outlook for northern Cyprus vacillates between some vague hope for a federated state and a mini-independent Turkish Cypriot state. The latter prospect implies almost total if not unconditional dependance on Ankara and many Turkish Cypriots have discovered that this can be a mixed blessing indeed. Periodically, Denktash has threatened to make a Rhodesian-type 'unilateral declaration of independence' but in the autumn of 1975 Turkey poured cold water on such a scheme. Whether Turkey will change its mind is another matter but Denktash himself, in an interview with the author, admitted there is not much he can do without Ankara's backing. The prospect of UDI was further set back by the resumption of contacts between the two sides in February 1976. The contacts represented, in a way, continuation of the intermittent dialogue which started between Denktash and Clerides in 1968. Permanently optimistic diplomats feel that the fact that the talks continue is already a good sign. But whether some more concrete result is possible appears doubtful. Denktash has to reckon with an opposition represented mainly by the 'populist party' headed by Alper Orhon, an economist who once taught at Dartmouth College in the United States. The overall opposition aim is the same: security for the Turkish Cypriots in a bi-zonal Cypriot state. But the opposition resents the overall domination of northern Cyprus by the Turkish military and blames the area's economic difficulties on a combination of military interference and administrative mismanagement. Although Denktash, at the time of writing, has Ankara's backing, its continuation depends to some extent on the growth of the opposition.

On the Greek side, in the spring of 1976 the picture was dominated, as in the past, by Makarios. The Archbishop has changed little since the invasion and his methods and tactics, since his return early in December 1974, showed the same basic approach: in a tight situation wait for some other element to change; keep all possible options open without making a firm commitment. Needless to say, in the context of post-invasion Cyprus such an attitude has hardly contributed to a settlement. In his statements to diplomats, Makarios claims he has two basic options: a negotiated solution or what he refers to as 'a long struggle'. The 'long struggle' concept is based on the hope that the Greek sector will soon have a flourishing economy while the economy of the Turkish Cypriot zone will crumble and Turkey will be be forced to 'become more reasonable'. Most observers regard this as wishful thinking. In its recent history, Turkey has shown little concern for economic vicissitudes, especially if they do not concern the mainland. Having secured a military foothold in northern Cyprus, the Turks do not feel obliged to make sure that the area thrives as well. It is not impossible that northern Cyprus, as far as Turkey is concerned, will be regarded as a mere buffer zone, a convenient garrison and training area but hardly more. Many Greek Cypriots still cling to the concept that one day American policy will change and that strong pressures will be put on Turkey. That theory is dismissed by knowledgeable diplomats. The United States lost too much through its arms embargo to try more such tactics. Experience has shown that the more Turkey is pressured in any way, the more intransigent it can become. Having acknowledged to his various interlocutors that Turkey is an 'immovable force' in his external strategy, Makarios spends a lot of time manoeuvreing the various political forces among the half a million Greek Cypriots. In addition to several private armies which are, basically, teams of bodyguards for various politicians, Makarios has to keep in check and often cajole three main groupings:

(i) The communist AKEL with the affiliated trade union movement;
(ii) The EDEK socialist party of Vassos Lyssarides, a man with considerable Arab, Third World and Soviet connexions;
(iii) The extreme right wing in which Nikos Sampson and former EOKA B gunmen still talk of *enosis*, guerrilla war against the Turks and the 'continuation of the struggle'.

Of these, AKEL is by far the most serious force to reckon with, generally obtaining 35% vote in elections. Despite its communist label, AKEL is more a bourgeois than a revolutionary party. Significantly, it kept a very low profile during the brief Sampson era. This, however, does not mean that one day AKEL will not demand a bigger share of power. Yet, despite AKEL and EDEK, the basic Cypriot orientation has remained, if anything, centrist. Makarios, with his aura of an Orthodox clergyman and some international stature, appeals to most Greek Cypriots. Neither the leftist and intellectual ideas of Lyssarides nor the hysterical outbursts of Sampson can rally sizeable masses of Greek Cypriots.

Whatever he does, Makarios has to take into consideration the presence of some 9,000 'enclaved' Greek Cypriots in the Turkish zone. These men and women are ready hostages in the event of any attempt at guerrilla warfare by the Greek Cypriots. They have been allowed to stay in their homes in some villages, expelled from other to more concentrated areas and those who apply are readily given permission to leave. In the Karpass peninsula, the social structure has basically remained unchanged. Elsewhere, mainly old people, too weary to move, have remained. These 'enclaved persons' receive regular Red Cross rations and cash allowances depending on their financial status. Their movement outside the village is subject to restrictions. The Turks are tolerating these Greek Cypriots, hoping that gradually, one by one, they will leave. Meanwhile they represent an additional deterrent to any Greek Cypriot guerrilla adventure – something most observers consider as hardly likely, in any case.

Thus, divided by gun positions and barricades, Cyprus is waiting. It is waiting either for a breakthrough in the seemingly endless and unproductive diplomatic dialogue or for a definitive split into two separate – and hostile – mini-states. Meanwhile, each side appears to be digging in its heels and organizing its own, separate life. Already the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots have their own separate airports and other transportation services. The Greeks are making plans to build their own water reservoirs to stop being dependant on the present ones in the Turkish-held territory. The Turks are talking of building their own power station and establishing an autonomous communication system. Still, in 1976, it was difficult to make an overseas telephone call from the Turkish sector of Nicosia and even a call to Kyrenia, 16 miles distant, often required a long wait. Meanwhile, the Greeks have established an efficient telephone and telex dial system on their side of 'The Attila Line'.

One thing appears certain: short of another war which would, this time, possibly involve other powers, a return to the pre-1974 status can be ruled out. Greece did not go to war in defence of Greek Cypriots in 1974 because of obvious strategic disadvantages in distance and the strength of its armed force. Turkey, a military nation *per se*, is more than likely to continue its superiority, the American arms embargo notwithstanding.

To find a Cyprus solution, both sides have to be willing to sacrifice something – the Turks enough territory to pacify the Greeks and the Greeks a considerable share in any future federal government. So far such signs have not been discerned on the cloudy Cypriot political horizon. Exploratory conversations have centred on the area the Turks would cede, the nature of the common government and its powers. It is fairly obvious that, at the time of writing, the Turks are holding much more land than is needed for the economy of the Turkish Cypriot minority. And there has been no indication that Ankara would be willing to make more than marginal concessions. The Greeks are insisting that any Turkish share in the federal government should be strictly proportional – something the Turks are unlikely to accept. The Greek Cypriots, according to high diplomatic sources, are ready to accept the idea of a two-zone geographical federation although nothing of the kind has been said on the record. It is clear why: a formal admission would deprive the Greek Cypriot side of a major negotiating factor. It should be pointed out that the government which succeeded the military junta in Athens is, for the first time in years, interested in settling the festering Cyprus problem. On the other hand, early in 1976 Turkey had a weak government, unable to make a binding and lasting decision or even willing to consider the problem from any other than the Turkish viewpoint. There was one thing Ankara seemed to be keen on – to legalize its partial occupation of Cyprus. The United Nations could become dangerous if it were to vote economic sanctions against Turkey. Consequently, Ankara would welcome any settlement that would allow a strong Turkish military presence in Cyprus to protect its safely regrouped minority. And the Greek Cypriots, obviously aware of this overall design, are not likely to give in easily. To the Turkish Cypriots, the continuation of Makarios as Greek Cypriot ethnarch is a bad omen and one of the main obstacles to a solution. Some Western diplomats agree that unless Makarios steps down, no compromise in Cyprus is ever possible. They feel that Makarios would be ready to give up the presidency once a solution is in the offing – and blame his successor for what is bound to amount to an act of capitulation. Others simply cannot see the strong-willed Makarios, a fixture in Cypriot politics for over a quarter of a century, willing to revert to the role of a self-effacing clergyman. An impartial arbitrator imported, for example, from Latin America and given facts and figures could find a feasible Cyprus solution. But to someone who has been exposed to Cypriot passions, hatreds and prejudices, even the most logical and just solution seems remote. 'How can we live with Greeks after all they've done?' exclaimed a Turkish Cypriot whose sister was wounded in a Greek Cypriot machinegun attack on defenceless women and children. 'Turks have raped and killed and as men our only answer can be to throw them back into the sea', shouted a Greek Cypriot. Machismo, the curse of many societies on several continents, should not be dismissed as a factor in Cypriot politics. Then there is the middle class on both sides of the demarcation line, so far silent but increasingly concerned. The Greek Cypriot middle class would want a solution but is unable – or unwilling – to exercise any political pressure. The Turkish Cypriot middle class increasingly feels a victim of military occupation. As time goes by, it is becoming convinced that Ankara does not have the interests of Turkish Cypriots at heart.

Unless the inhabitants of Cyprus stop being Greeks and Turks first and finally become Cypriots willing to speak up, there can be no hope for a Cyprus solution. Assuming that reason, one day, precails, only a federal system such as proposed (but not yet formulated) by Turkey can be viable. If, however, the Greek Cypriots continue to refuse to recognize the brutal political situation created to a great extent by their own mistakes, and the Turkish Cypriots leave the conduct of their affairs entirely in Ankara's hands, then Cyprus will cease to become even a vague entity. Denktash, with reluctant Turkish blessing, will have his UDI and Makarios will continue praying for the return of the refugees to their homes.

Except that the existence of two separate and hostile states in Cyprus is bound to lead, sooner or later, to another crisis. On the basis of present assessment, it is hard to see how Greek Cypriots, faced with a Turkish army, could emerge victorious. They miscalculated Turkish stubbornness and intentions three times in 1974 – after the Sampson coup, during the Geneva talks and the events which followed the second round of military operations. At the same time they overestimated the possibility of diplomatic pressures. Surely, the message, by now, must be reasonably loud and clear to both protagonists?

PART TWO: An Alternative Analysis

by Dr. Peter Loizos

1. The Basic Problems

There has never been simply one Cyprus problem, but several problems, differently defined by different persons. The responsibilities for the current situation are shared by a number of major parties including (in no special order) Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Britain, Greece, Turkey, the USA and the USSR. The problems have at least four levels of social reality and power relations, which affect each other, but can be analysed as if separate.

The first level is that of the mass of ordinary Turkish and Greek Cypriots, in villages and towns. Most of these people, for a very great deal of the time, have been able to live close to members of the other community without friction. Very few of them have inter-married, and this is normally frowned on by both sides. But they have had both some social relations and economic cooperation, and although there has been consciousness of difference, and sometimes antagonism and mistrust, the ordinary people have never found it hard to 'live together', i.e. to share the island, villages, suburbs, coffeeshops and wedding festivities. Both communities have, of course, contained small numbers of individuals who publicly voiced their hatred of the other side and who in a real crisis were ready to attack members of the other community. Such attacks were very rare between 1830 and 1958, although brief periods of tension occurred every ten or twenty years.

The second level involves formal and informal relations between the political leaders of the two communities. These have been set on a collision course at various periods during the last twenty years but have also, between 1968 and 1974, shown signs of growing maturity, pursuing intercommunal negotiations rather than armed conflict. Political leaders must imagine the worst eventualities and plan, defensively, for their constituencies, but the Cypriot political leaders found themselves in power before they had matured; caught up in rapidly changing international events beyond their experience, they have not always been particularly imaginative about just how their policies might rebound upon their people.

The third level includes the foreign policy-makers of Britain, Greece, and Turkey, their responses to their internal needs and external alliances.

The fourth level involves the UN, NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the general rivalry of the superpowers in the Eastern Mediterranean. Increasingly, the EEC and various non-aligned blocs have come to play small parts in the Cyprus crisis too. Small wonder that at both the first and second levels (above), Cypriots sometimes believe that the whole of international politics revolves around their island.

To talk, then, of 'solutions' means to talk of agreement at some or all of these levels. A lasting agreement means that a large number of interested parties must be satisfied, and that no-one has a strong interest in keeping the problem open.

As soon as one writes about an ethnic group as if it was a single thing with one mind ('the Greeks maintain' or 'the Turks believe') a step in the wrong direction has been taken, but one no author can completely avoid. Both Cypriot communities have complex class structures, and a range of political opinion, from communist, and revolutionary socialists, through laissez-faire pro-capitalist liberals, to traditionalist conservatives, and extreme rightists of fascist persuasion. These groups tend to have different views and policies on relations with the other ethnic community. While the ethnic communities tend to express unified 'Greek' or 'Turkish' opinions in times of *intense* conflict with each other, when such conflict subsides they are shown to have sharp differences with their own more extreme co-religionists. Briefly the right-wingers tend to dislike the other ethnic community most sharply, and to pay great attention to what its extremists say. The socialists and communists, whilst sometimes following a 'national' line of ethnic solidarity, are usually more ready to compromise on relations with the other ethnic group, and are able to form alliances and have dialogues (unless stopped by force) with fellow-socialists on the 'other side'. This is one striking asymmetry in relations between the two communities. The rightists hate and fear opposed rightists, the leftists are more prepared to cooperate with fellow leftists.

There is a facile view that the tragedy of the island's peoples is a simple result of the inability of Cypriot Greeks and Turks to live together, 'a problem of Greeks and Turks', with the suggestion that the Greek majority dominated the Turkish minority, repressed it to the point that the 1974 invasion by Turkey was inevitable, if not justified.[5] This view is wrong, as is the view that but for the influence of Britain, and later the USA, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots would to this day be living together in harmony.

To understand the complexity of causes and responsibilities, an analogy may help: A man takes his car to a garage for a general overhaul; the mechanic, his mind on other things, does not detect a serious fault in the brakes. Later the driver is proceeding at high speed on a poorly surfaced road. He is dazzled by the headlights of an oncoming car, whose driver does not dip his bright lights. His brakes fail. Both cars crash with some deaths and severe injuries. Who is responsible for the accident?

The mechanic who did not detect the brake fault is partly at fault; passengers in both cars who did not ask the drivers to drive more slowly; the drivers themselves for not reducing speed to match poor conditions; the authority responsible both for the poor condition of the road surface, and for not posting warning signs. The weather, grit on the road, chance factors play a part. In one frame of reference, perhaps, only the car drivers are to blame; in another, all the factors must be assessed.

2. Historical Sketch

The Cyprus situation must be understood first and foremost in the context of mainland Greece and Turkey, whose historical inter-relation was marked between 1821 and 1922 by a series of wars, which led to the bloody birth of the two modern states.[6] Effectively, Greece fought her way out of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey mistrusts Greece to this day. The Cypriots have been involved in these events only peripherally, and fairly late in the day, as their nationalist leaders began to assert the political – as opposed to the merely *cultural* – links between the island communities and the mainland ones.

The Greek Cypriots have tended to have a more intense nationalist interest in Greece than the Turkish Cypriots in Turkey, and one that started earlier. This reflects the fact that Greek nationalism developed out of opposition to Ottoman rule. A study in the 1960s of Cypriot school textbooks suggested that the Greeks laid heavy emphasis on their historical sufferings at the hand of the Turks, and on their resistance to this, glorifying their national struggle.[7] The Turkish books more or less ignored the Greeks, and devoted little space to wars between Turks and Greeks. Both island communities have been sharply aware of dialect and social differences between themselves and their mainland 'parents' and can, under certain circumstances, feel sharp opposition to them. Fifty years of completely secular education, in English, in schools where Greek and Turkish children had sat together and shared a common syllabus, *might* have produced a genuinely Cypriot citizenship. But would the mainlanders have ignored the islanders?

Cyprus presents a complex 'double minority' issue. The Turkish Cypriots are a minority *in the island* who have developed less rapidly than the Greek Cypriot majority. In 1877 they were identified with the Ottoman rulers, and the Greek Cypriots were subjects of the Sultan. In 1878, when the British became the new rulers of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots lost their special status, and joined the Greek Cypriots as colonial subjects. From then on they were aware of the Greek Cypriots developing more rapidly, and this, coupled with their loss of privilege, made them defensive and resentful.

The Greek Cypriots are a minority *in the Eastern Mediterranean*, when the nearby mainland Turks are brought into the reckoning. As a very large majority in the island they would not see why their communal industry and political aspirations should be blocked or modified by a dissenting minority, formerly their invaders and rulers. From the ominous signs of Turkey's interest in Cyprus, declared in the mid-1950s, the Greek Cypriot leaders were concerned with the possible use of Turkish Cypriot areas of the island as a possible Trojan Horse for a mainland Turkish intervention, and much of the apparent irrationality of their public adherence to *enosis* (Union with Greece) from 1960 onwards can be understood as an attempt to bind successive Greek Governments in a public commitment to defend the Greeks of Cyprus against a possible partition by Turkey. But Greece, militarily, is too far from Cyprus to be able to defend the island against Turkey, and has only a quarter of Turkey's population.[8]

Both communities started independence on the wrong foot. The Turks would have preferred *taxim*, partition, and the Greeks, *enosis*. The previous ten years, the period of the most intense Greek struggle for *enosis*, had seen a worsening of intercommunal relations, which was sharpened by the British recruitment of Turkish police to be used against Greek crowds, and to hunt for EOKA fighters. In 1958 there was the first serious bloodletting between the two communities since 1912, itself a rare outburst. On the surface there was an attempt to make a go of independence. But the Greeks continued to speak of *enosis* as their goal, and once trouble had started did not hesitate to use force against Turkish Cypriot opposition. The Turks were planning for the armed defence of their community in the event of constitutional breakdown, and had not forgotten partition. But the Greek Cypriots, as the larger group, must bear a heavy responsibility for not renouncing *enosis* in the period 1960-63, and not making sufficiently conciliatory moves to relax Turkish Cypriot defensiveness. Pursuing the 'accident' analogy if the communal leaders were the vehicle drivers, then the three Guarantor Powers were the mechanics who had 'serviced' the vehicle, with the very inadequate 1960 Constitution.[9]

Two other introductory points must be born in mind. Between 1968 and 1974 there was no major incident between Greek and Turkish Cypriots which led to killing or injury. During this period there were continuous intercommunal negotiations which Dr. Polyviou, an informed scholar, argues came close to an agreement at least once in the middle of 1973.[10] However from 1969 there were sporadic, and then more intensive, terrorist campaigns against President Makarios by disaffected extreme right-wing nationalist Greek Cypriots, and these had support from Athens. The anti-Turkish views of such extremists gave no comfort to the Turkish Cypriots.

The other point concerns the context of Turkey's intervention as the 'inevitable' reaction to the anti-Makarios coup and the imposition of the Sampson regime in Cyprus. This intervention was portrayed by Turkey as a peace-keeping operation and an attempt to restore the 1960 Constitution. But it must be understood as a possibility long expected and awaited by Turkey, and made with Turkish mainland interests (rather than those of either the Turkish Cypriots or the Republic of Cyprus) at heart. Turkey, after studying the recent State Department diplomatic messages, and rightly assessing her own indispensability to NATO, was confident that the USA either would not, or could not, prevent this move. It was a political gamble which, had it gone right, would have allowed Bulent Ecevit a long period of internal stability in which to implement his reform plans; in the unstable and economically precarious position of Turkey today he may have supposed that an unopposed landing in Cyprus was a small price to pay for the benefits it would bring his country. He would have contained right-wing nationalist agitation for action over Cyprus, given the military the additional security they desired against possible adventures by Greece, and bought time for himself to institute badly needed social reforms at home. For a few July days numbers of democratic Greeks believed that the Turkish intervention would liberate Cyprus from the horrors of a Greek fascist government. Such beliefs were forgotten with the reports of rape and killing of civilians; and the 'second round' when Turkey seized 38% of the island left no further grounds for accepting the Turkish campaign as a 'peace' operation.

3. British responsibility

Few would deny that British administrative reforms did much good for Cyprus, though always on a shoe-string. She did not invent Greek nationalism, by 1878 already fifty years old in the Eastern Mediterranean; but in pursuing her imperial policies she provided the preconditions for its intensification: alien rule, uneven development, the politicization of cultural pluralism, and blocked mobility. In all probability a Greek nationalist movement would have developed in Cyprus whoever was ruling it; but the nature of British rule led to its intensification, by its very liberalism.

British responsibility for the current situation has long historical roots. First, there was the continuous alliance with the Turkish Cypriots, particularly from 1900-1931. During this period, when the Legislative Council was in operation, the British could usually rely on Turkish Cypriot support against the Greek members. The alliance was not formed with the aim of creating violent ethnic

conflict in the future; it was rather an *ad hoc* relationship which assured the colonial government an almost permanent majority in council.[11] It is not clear what the Turkish Cypriots received materially, if anything. But the alliance allowed them to express their antagonism to the idea of *enosis*, rather frequently voiced by the Greeks. It was also a way of expressing Turkish 'loyalty' to Britain, a pattern reminiscent of Ulster Orange 'Loyalism', which could serve as a guarantee against a future transfer of the island to Greek rule. Whatever the British and Turkish motives for the alliance, it had the consequence of emphasizing a tradition in which the two communities took opposite sides in politics. The British did not educate them in partnership; they played on the existing antagonism. A guardian should not exploit the minority of his wards. Many Greeks believe that Britain practically created Turkey's involvement in Cyprus, but this view confuses diplomatic silence with an absence of interest. What are the facts?

In 1951 Turkey made a strong public statement of her interest in Cyprus, that she would have to be consulted in the event of any change of sovereignty in Cyprus.[12] But after that she remained fairly quiet, behaving with great diplomatic caution towards both Britain and Greece, since like Greece she was on her 'best behaviour' with the hope of entering NATO. Furthermore, Greece herself was silent, and Britain firmly in control. But Eden in 1955 deliberately encouraged Turkey to make her case more strongly, and once Britain had legitimated this policy, Turkey adopted measures which led to vicious rioting against Greeks in Turkey, 6 September 1955.[13] Later, the British Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, in January 1958, visited Ankara to discuss Cyprus with the now highly belligerent Turkish government. Riots went on at the same time in favour of partition. Foot's comment to a British journalist, on returning to Cyprus was: 'I have looked into the pit of hell'[14] – a curious judgement for a British colonial official on some of the consequences of British foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Far worse, and far more deliberate, were the measures taken by Britain to combat EOKA in the Emergency, 1955-9. The problem they faced was that EOKA attacked Greek policemen loyal to the colonial government, and they resigned in large numbers. The British then replaced them with Turkish Special Constables and used these men for control of the Greek community. When EOKA attacked and then killed the Turkish police (the first political attacks by Greeks on Turks of any importance) the Turkish Cypriots responded by forming VOLKAN, in November 1957, a 'defence organization' of counter-terrorists. In June and July 1958 some 80 Greeks and 35 Turks were killed in rioting and revenge killing. To quote a Turkish Cypriot scholar: 'The extensive use of Turkish policemen against EOKA was nevertheless instrumental in hastening Greek-Turkish confrontation on the island.'[15] If it merely hastened an inevitable process, this is serious enough. But it is also possible that it put the Cyprus problem on a quite different footing.

To this was added the Western Alliance factor: partly because of her membership in this alliance, Britain changed the status of the Cyprus problem from one of simple decolonization to one which involved Guarantees by three sovereign states within NATO – herself, Greece and Turkey. She achieved this through diplomacy, because she viewed with alarm, as did the USA, the growing strength of AKEL, the Cyprus Communist Party, in the 1950s. The Western Allies asked themselves what would happen if AKEL came to power after independence, and acting as an advanced, 'passed' pawn for the USSR, invited her to set up bases on the island? Such questions became particularly pertinent after Suez, and with the collapse of British power in the Middle East, and efforts by the USA to fill the power vacuum. Cyprus looked much more secure if guaranteed by three NATO members, than politically afloat, an unsecured feather on the Eastern Mediterranean. Pentagon planners did not start calling Makarios a 'Mediterranean Castro' until he showed himself opposed to the Cyprus problem formally entering NATO's orbit. Along with Greece and Turkey, Britain designed the 1959 Zurich-London Agreements, which provided the Constitution under which the Cypriots entered independence. Few writers have supposed this settlement could have worked, given the forces and interests already in motion. Its supporters claim that the Greek Cypriots didn't try hard enough to make it work; but such supporters are usually Tory backbenchers trying to exhonerate Britain from *any* share in responsibility for the Cyprus debacle. Moving rapidly from 1960 to 1974, it has been argued that Britain as a Guarantor Power failed to live up to her obligations in 1974 and subsequently. When the coup was launched against President Makarios, Britain had troops and aircraft on the island, a right of intervention and a moral obligation to intervene; she was apparently invited by Ecevit to cooperate in the Turkish intervention, but Wilson feared any action in which British soldiers might be killed, because of the Ulster problem.

What could Britain have done? Britain could have convened the UN Security Council, but did not do so, possibly fearing that this would give the USSR a voice in the problem. Could British troops have been deployed to protect Turkish Cypriots? Such a move might have triggered EOKA B attacks on those who were not so protected. The British Government has pleaded either ignorance or impotence in a 'confused situation' and a recent Parliamentary Select Committee has been very critical of this defence.[16] If Britain was a second-class power before the Turkish invasion, she has been shown to be a third-class power by its aftermath. In the words of one experienced commentator on Middle Eastern affairs, the treatment of Cyprus by Britain and the USA at this juncture was 'shabby'.

As with her period of colonial rule, Britain again did some good things for Cyprus: she saved the life of Makarios, gave food and shelter to thousands of refugees, and admitted numbers of them to Britain, where she also waived educational fees and extended other benefits for a short period. All of which was highly laudable, but not a fulfilment of her Treaty obligations. If she was not willing to recognize these obligations, she should have told the Cypriots a little earlier.

4. Greek Cypriot responsibility

From the Greek War of Independence in 1821, sections of the tiny Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie looked admiringly towards Greece; in this year the Ottoman Governor had the Cypriot Archbishop, and scores of other Greek Cypriot notables, killed for alleged complicity in the mainland uprising against Ottoman rule. The arrival of the British in 1878 altered the power relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish minority ceased to enjoy the privileges of a ruling elite (although their poor hardly enjoyed these anyway) and joined the Greek Cypriots as

second-class, colonial citizens. Some Greeks welcomed this change of fortunes. In 1878 the British set up a Legislative Council. Greek leaders then campaigned for greater representation on it, and in 1882 the British decided to revise the scheme so that representation would be according to population recorded in the 1881 Census. This would give the Christians nine members to the Muslims' three. The Muslims immediately protested, and the substance of their protest, while probably exaggerated, shows a fear of Greek domination. Aware that the mainland Greeks had freed themselves from Ottoman rule by armed struggle, the Turkish Cypriots feared that the tables might be turned on them by the Cypriot Greeks.[17]

This communal defensiveness was to be the pattern of Turkish Cypriot politics for a long time. The Greeks misunderstood this. If the Turkish Cypriots were silent, the Greeks assumed all was well. But this silence was that of a group which saw itself inevitably losing ground numerically, economically and politically, and did not know what to do about it. The Greek Cypriots were thinking about business, farming, sometimes *enosis*, not about Turkish Cypriot fears, and could not imagine that this was a subject on which a small minority, bypassed by history, could have a worth-while opinion. This failure of insight or imagination is hardly very culpable – up till 1945. But once the Greek Cypriot political struggle against British rule began to have a mass basis, matters changed. The Greek Cypriot leaders did not reassure or conciliate the Turkish Cypriots, some of whom were actively assisting the British. Why was this?

The *enosis* movement was spearheaded by Orthodox Churchmen, passionately right-wing, and lacking insight into Turkish thinking; nor were they particularly sophisticated diplomats. Instead of considering gradual changes in colonial status, and cooperating with the British, they rejected the Winster Constitution in 1948, which would have offered important measures of self-government, and leftist Greeks welcomed; then they rejected the Radcliffe Proposals of 1956 which would have given their people substantial power, and which might have proved acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots. It had to be *enosis*, said the church, or nothing.

Greek Cypriot leaders have one clear-cut responsibility for the way things developed: they entered Independence regarding it as second-best, and subject to revision, instead of an essential compromise to be accepted. The Turkish Cypriot leaders also regarded the Constitution as second-best, and would have preferred partition. Greek leaders continued to talk of *enosis* between 1960-63 as if it was by no means unattainable, even though the Constitution ruled it out. Meanwhile Greek popular feeling against the job allocations and Turkish veto rights enshrined in the Constitution gathered force. Had the Greek leaders now insisted that these difficulties had to be lived with, the Turkish Cypriots might have themselves been more ready for compromise. As it was, they dug themselves in.[18] It is still not clear what part the Akritas plan played in this process: was it essentially a military contingency plan for responding to a threatened UDI by the Turkish Cypriots, with or without a mainland Turkish invasion? Or was it pre-emptive? In either case it shows the extent of intercommunal mistrust since it clearly stated that military operations against the Turkish Cypriots were on the cards. The equivalent Turkish Cypriot plan has not come to light, but even before independence, arms shipments designed for Turkish Cypriot paramilitary forces were seized by the Cyprus government,[19] and impartial sources have noted their military preparations.

Makarios and his advisors envisaged a scheme to revise the Constitution, in which it has been claimed the British may have encouraged them.[20] Makarios, during a state visit to Turkey, sounded out the Ankara leaders on this and received a definite rebuff. Instead of giving this rebuff the weight it deserved, the Greek Cypriots made the proposals public. On the island fighting began within a few days, sparked off by a minor incident. In 1964 there was continual fighting between the two communities, all over the island. The Greek Cypriots fought to prevent a patchwork partition, and the Turkish Cypriots fought to prevent possible domination. The UN intervention of 1965 sought to freeze the status quo, which was that Turkish Cypriots maintained a number of defended enclaves around the island, and sought to marshall their community within them. The Greek Cypriots responded with an economic blockade of what they defined as strategic supplies.

The Greek Cypriots were now completely convinced of the justice of their case; they conducted a long series of arguments in the UN and elsewhere contesting the validity of the treaties which had in their eyes, 'fettered' their independence in such a way that the majority community could not revise the Constitution. The highpoint for the Greek Cypriots was reached when the UN mediator Galo Plaza produced a report, in March 1965, which seemed in many respects favourable to their position. When Turkey rejected it, the Greek Cypriots supposed that the unreasonableness of this rejection would help their position in the long run. By offering the Turkish Cypriots a Bill of Minority Rights (1965) Makarios had made his attitude to their re-entry clear.

The second major Greek error involves the period after 1967, when fears of a Turkish invasion has nudged Makarios to abandon his pro-*enosis* position. His tactic now became to wait and see, to wait for the Turkish Cypriots to 'come to their senses' and 'end their rebellion'. This was the time when bold concessions might have ended the problem. Instead the Greek Cypriots concentrated on winning international diplomatic recognition, which they did easily, and to the lasting discredit of the international community, who seemed to have written off the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots from 1968 on successfully presented themselves as the Government of Cyprus. This recourse to legalism was sociologically blind: if the Turkish Cypriots were rebels, they were rebelling about *something*, not *nothing*, and the best approach would have been to meet them more than half way. Why didn't Makarios do this? There are two kinds of reasons.

First, the security problem felt by the Greek Cypriots as minority facing Turkey: if Greek concessions meant Turkish Cypriot control of Cypriot territory (rather than 'functional' autonomy), then how could Turkish Cypriot extremists be prevented from inviting Turkey into Cyprus? Rightly or wrongly, this fear undoubtedly constrained Greek Cypriot leaders during the negotiations, and only the strongest international guarantees could have calmed them. Secondly, Makarios from 1969 onwards was in constant fear of a right-wing coup d'état from pro-*enosis* guerrilla supporters of Grivas. A negotiated settlement which gave Turkish Cypriots more rights, and closed the door to *enosis* might, he feared, have produced a civil war in the Greek community. By 1973 this civil war was in full swing – without the concessions! Easy to say that Makarios should have crushed the Grivas guerrillas, but

they were at times in receipt of mainland Greek support. Had he taken stronger action between 1969 and 1972 he might have discouraged the pro-*enosis* extremists once and for all. But this is far from certain: neither Britain nor Ireland have had much success with crushing the IRA to date.

Makarios' critics, particularly the supporters of Clerides, argue that the President did not pay sufficient public attention to the negotiations, or convey to the Cypriots at large any sense of urgency about coming to terms.[21] The Greek Cypriot economy was booming, and the elite seemed unconcerned at the fact of a strong President who governed in a setting of weakly developed political institutions. With the exception of the Grivas camp, Greek Cypriots left 'the problem with the Turks' to Makarios and Clerides. There was little public attempt to critically examine what was happening, where the leaders were leading. Far too many people, including the present author, kept their doubts to themselves, or did little to conduct vigorous public debate where it was most needed. Greek Cypriots have been insensitive to the position and point of view of the Turkish Cypriots, and short-sighted about how their treatment would influence mainland Turkish public opinion; prior to 1964 in underestimating nationalist feeling in Turkey they failed to imagine the likelihood of a Turkish invasion. Thereafter, having understood the danger, Makarios and his advisors moderated their policies, but they could not easily control Grivas and his supporters, who *never* understood the threat of Turkish invasion and recently had mainland Greek encouragement. Grivas nearly provoked a Turkish invasion in 1967 whereupon Makarios gladly accepted his removal from the island. Thereafter Makarios no longer spoke of *enosis* as a practical possibility. He had learned one hard lesson.

Makarios is seen by some Americans as 'intransigent' and 'unreliable'. This means he has a mind of his own, he doesn't fall in with State Department plans, and he is prepared to turn to Russia, her allies or the unaligned nations for support in a crisis. National leaders cannot escape judgement. While Makarios obviously bears major responsibility for some of the mistakes of the Greek Cypriot leadership, there is no need to take Dr. Kissinger's view of him or that of his other enemies. Makarios has been disliked by the Turks perhaps because as Kemalists they cannot accept a religious leader in such a key secular post but more concretely, because he was in earlier life an ardent Greek nationalist. But there is no reason why the Greeks should conduct their political life on Turkish cultural principles, and Makarios has always been a popularly elected leader who never needed to tamper with the ballot box to get his huge majorities. Undoubtedly, a proportion of the majorities is a free bonus conferred by his archiepiscopal robes – religious women, in particular, find it very hard *not* to vote for him.

As a passionate young Greek nationalist he came to power in the early 1950s by challenging British colonial rule. He was reluctant to give Grivas a green light for armed struggle, as the General complained bitterly later in his memoirs. Makarios had no love for the Turks and was most unhappy over the 1960 Constitution, pressed upon him by Britain, Greece and Turkey, since he probably foresaw that its over-generous protection of Turkish minority rights would lead to friction with the still-armed EOKA element in Cyprus. However, Makarios had never been in real control of EOKA, and there were, both during and after the Emergency, continuing crises between him and Grivas. Makarios' greatest failing was that between 1960 and 1963 and again 1971-2 he did not take a strong, hard line with these right-wing militants. Had he renounced *enosis*, and led his community towards the Turkish Cypriots, history might have been different. Instead, with Clerides, Yorgadjis and others, he embarked on the attempted revision of the Constitution. This was his greatest failing as a national leader: he could not see that the pursuit of *enosis* would inevitably infuriate the Turkish Cypriots and involve Turkey. Later, fearing the Grivas *enosis* fanatics, he could not bring himself to conciliate the Turks. Since 1969 Makarios has been a man with his back to the wall. He might have wanted to move away from it, but who would then have replaced him?

5. Turkish Cypriot responsibility

The Turkish Cypriots have made a number of mistakes, and it must be said that at the moment they too are paying a very high price for them. Although Turkish official propaganda is that the Turkish Cypriot community now has 'security', it is also now composed of people a good third of whom are refugees, some for the second time in their lives. For a variety of reasons, the Turks are unlikely to produce a satisfactory society in the north very quickly, and the level of dissatisfaction will probably remain high. Effectively the north continues to be under military government.

The Turkish Cypriots failed a hundred years ago to understand what the Greek interest in *enosis* was about, in its origins, and momentum, and never grasped Greek Cypriot insecurity produced by the 'double minority' aspects of the Cyprus situation. They are in the classicly irresponsible position of the little brother who feels free to start a fight with a bigger child, knowing that he has a *much* bigger brother who can bail him out if he yells for help. Initially, the Turkish Cypriots saw the Greek Cypriots as disorderly subjects of the Sultan, rather than as people with as much right to political autonomy as anyone else. They failed to see that without the appeal to *enosis* the Greek Cypriots in the early twentieth century would have simply been a very small cultural group lost in a quiet corner of the Eastern Mediterranean, bought and sold between different imperial owners like so many goats. The Greek Cypriot elite's attraction to *enosis* was complex but, whatever else it was, it was some kind of search for allies, roots, and dignity by claiming a connection to a more prestigious culture, that of mainland Greece. The Turkish Cypriots saw only the issue of a change in sovereignty, and nothing more, and they interpreted it as a straightforward Greek desire to get into a situation where they could dominate the Turkish Cypriots. They did not understand that the Greek Cypriots were in the main unconcerned with the Turkish Cypriots, rather than actively hostile to them.

Was it a mistake for the Turkish Cypriots to side with the British in politics from 1878 to 1960? There is no obvious answer. A more farsighted leadership might have discouraged Turkish Cypriots from becoming Special Constables during the 1955-59 Emergency. Had they thought about the possible futures, they might have adopted a wait-and-see attitude to the struggle of the Greeks against the British. Then perhaps they would have entered independence in genuine partnership with the Greeks. The Turkish Cypriots entered Independence with most generous provisions and safeguards. Particularly, while only 18% of the population, they were to enjoy 30% of all civil service posts at all levels, and a 40% share of the army. In addition they had effective vetoes over all legislation. To quote one of the more impartial sources:

'While Makarios failed to win Turkish confidence, the Turkish Cypriots on their side showed little forbearance in the exercise of the disproportionate and potentially crippling powers they had been given under the Zurich Constitution. Conscious of Turkey's power at their back and Turkish troops on the island itself, they were intransigent in claiming their full rights as a separate community, even where these rights were likely to be unworkable in practice or to conflict with the interests of the state as a whole.'[22]

In effect, this meant that they insisted on the immediate employment of Turkish Cypriots at all levels of the civil service, even when properly qualified candidates were not available; and that in 1960-63 they used their veto powers to bring government to a standstill,[23] and to create a constitutional crisis. The most serious Turkish Cypriot mistake was to form armed groups for protection in the event of intercommunal hostilities. Instead of being content with Turkey's right of intervention and with the presence of Turkish troops, Turkish Cypriot nationalists imported arms and were detected. This gave fuel to Greek extremists' claims that the Turkish Cypriots were going to provoke partition. It led directly to intercommunal violence, the creation of enclaves and subsequent stagnation. It is important to note that Stephens absolves the leaders of both communities from *planning* the violent breakdown which began on 21 December 1963. 'Despite their clandestine activities, both sides were ill-prepared militarily and politically when the clash came.'[24]

6. Did the Greeks impoverish the Turks?

One of the commonest Turkish propaganda claims is that the Greek Cypriots systematically exploited and impoverished them. What are the facts behind this charge? Data are hard to come by. In the 19th century some Greek Cypriots were emerging (as they did elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire) as a mercantile bourgeoisie, seeking modern education and professional and economic prosperity. The Turkish Cypriots tended to be either peasants, like the Greeks, or to go into government and police jobs, avoiding commerce as demeaning to the descendants of a military elite. After 1878 more Greeks went into the civil service. Figures from 1901 show Greek Cypriots as strongly over-represented in medicine, pharmacy and law, and Turkish Cypriots greatly over-represented in the colonial police.[25] It seems clear that the Greek Cypriots prospered as a community more rapidly under British rule than did the Turks, but that this was due to chance factors, and neither to British favours, or any concerted effort to do down the Turks.

Turkish Cypriots were certainly complaining to the colonial authorities in the late 1950s about the relative poverty of their municipalities in comparison with the Greeks; they wanted unified municipalities to take advantage of the possible subsidies by wealthier Greek taxpayers and the Greek Cypriots were against this. After independence, during the first three years of the republic, the Greeks switched their positions, for political rather than economic reasons.

At independence the Turkish Cypriots seem to have an average *per capita* income of some 20% lower than Greek Cypriots.[26] This was the time when Greek economic generosity would have paid handsomely as an investment in future good social relations, and Makarios tried to take a wise lead on this. But many Greeks were irritated at the 'extra' civil service jobs allocated to the Turks, and were reluctant to add taxes as well, while the Turks wanted more than Makarios was offering. To quote a careful study of the progressive separation of the two communities: 'There were a number of reasons for such economic disparities between the communities. However, on the whole, up to December 1963, it was due to social and cultural differences, rather than to any policy of 'exploitation' by Greek Cypriots.'[27]

However, after the intercommunal fighting had started, and many Turkish Cypriots had gathered into fortified enclaves, the Greek Cypriots carried on an economic blockade which lasted on and off from August 1964 to November 1967 but in severe form for under four months, August to November 1964, when supplies and personal movement in or out of the enclaves were heavily restricted. Thereafter, this was greatly relaxed, and only 'strategic materials' were restricted, particularly building and maintenance materials, and spare motor and electrical parts. This blockade policy was designed to weaken the political will of the Turkish Cypriots to resist the Greek government; while it hurt them economically it probably strengthened their political resistance. The Turks stagnated and the Greek economy developed. After 1967 a period of more normal relations began with substantial numbers of Turkish Cypriots working outside the enclaves and having economic dealings with Greek Cypriots. In 1971, six years after the blockade ended Greek *per capita* income was roughly twice that of the Turks, according to an informed estimate.[28] But this figure must be understood as having a complex cause. First, in the late 1950s the Turkish Cypriot leaders instituted a 'buy Turkish' campaign, which meant, since they were as a market only a fifth the size of the Greek Cypriots, that economies of scale would not be available. Secondly, after the 1963-4 fighting, they attempted to build a separate economy within their enclaves, enclaves which involved only a small amount of land and resources, and by no means all the available Turkish Cypriots.[29] The Greek Cypriot blockade then, undoubtedly *added to* their stagnation, but was not its sole cause. The policy of arming led to the enclaves; the enclaves led to poverty.

The UN Secretary General's report, 11 March 1965, states that:

'The Turkish Cypriot policy of self-isolation has led the community in the opposite direction from normality. The community leadership discourages the Turkish Cypriot population from engaging in personal, commercial or other contact with their Greek-Cypriot compatriots, from applying to Government offices in administrative matters or from resettling in their home villages if they are refugees.'

For the Turkish Cypriots there was now a real danger that the 'problem' of the Turkish 'rebellion' (to use Greek terms) would 'solve itself' by the effective reabsorption of the Turkish Cypriots, leaving Denktash to bargain without being any longer the effective representative of an organized community. Perhaps this is what the Greek leaders hoped would happen if they simply waited. This 'solution' would not have been a just one. It would have meant that Turkish Cypriot rights remained cloudy and undefined, unless formally guaranteed, as in the Galo Plaza Plan. It is perhaps because the Turkish Cypriots seemed to be losing the political and economic struggle that Turkey decided that invasion was the best 'solution'. The Greek defence on

why after 1968 they did not make major and rapid concessions to the Turkish Cypriots and re-integrate them by generosity into the republic, is always twofold. Firstly, that the Turkish leadership changed its bargaining terms; and secondly the Greeks feared that a major concession of communal autonomy would have resulted in disguised partition. But the most compelling reason was that Makarios and his advisors feared the increasingly violent opposition of the pro-*enosis* followers of Grivas. So the Greeks adopted a wait-and-see policy.

7. Other responsibilities: Greece, Turkey, the USA

The foreign policy-makers of Greece and Turkey share major responsibilities for the current situation. They have reacted to Cyprus in terms of their own internal political problems. Usually when either mainland government is weak at home, it takes a hard line on the protection of its co-religionists in Cyprus. Both countries' leaders have always been far more concerned with their NATO membership than with the quality of ethnic relations in Cyprus. They appear to have discussed partition as a possible 'solution' as early as September 1956.[30] The question seems to have been where the line would be drawn, and Turkey was studying the 35th parallel (rather more than the current Attila Line) although she would probably have settled for less.

The Cypriot conflict cannot, then, be understood as simply or mainly due to the inability of the two island communities to live together. The coup launched by *Greece* against Makarios gave the excuse for an invasion by *Turkey*. In no useful sense did these events result directly or mainly from the treatment of Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot leaders cannot be held responsible for the actions of mainland Greece. The USA had more influence with Papadopoulos and Ioannides than did the Greek Cypriots. Greece and Turkey were both members of NATO at the time, and the senior partner in NATO is the USA. It is well known that the USA has a number of interests in the Eastern Mediterranean – the containment of the USSR, and the limiting of the spread of communism in the area; the security of Cyprus-based early-warning installations, and aerial surveillance of the arena of Arab-Israeli conflict. The risk of war between Greece and Turkey would jeopardize all these interests and destroy NATO's eastern wing. The USSR can be said to have a set of interests roughly the opposite of those just mentioned.[31]

Prior to 1974 the Cyprus problem nudged Greece and Turkey towards war in 1958, 1964, and most seriously, in 1967. The US response, particularly in 1967, was to defuse the immediate crisis, and to prevent a Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The sorts of proposals usually made by American representatives or NATO mediators, insofar as their details are known, tend to involve territorial concessions to the Turkish Cypriots, a base for Turkey, and Gordian knot 'solutions' which lean towards partition of the island, with inevitable population exchanges. Polyviou suggests that after the NATO Ministerial Conference in Lisbon in 1971, the intercommunal talks between Denktash and Clerides were in effect downgraded as methods of solution.[32] Colonel Papadopoulos, in Athens, wanted a solution to the Cyprus problem for domestic purposes. He is said to have made a secret agreement with Ankara in 1971 to this end. The obstacle appeared to be Makarios. Hence, Papadopoulos started to support EOKA B, to pressure Makarios into concessions, by allowing the terrorists to blow hot or cold, at his will.

Greece was an American client-state, and Washington was hardly unaware of this strategy. Was there nothing the USA and the UK could have done to restrain Papadopoulos? Did the strategists conclude that it was in Western interests for the Athens Junta to clip Makarios' wings? Opponents of such theories argue that they ignore the flexibility of American responses to what are in essence uncontrollable situations. They argue that to have ideal policy preferences does not mean one will go to *any* lengths (including the risk of a Greco-Turkish war) to achieve preferred goals. One of the difficulties in assessing the situation is that foreign policy can be implemented in so many ways, some covert, some overt, and through the sending of ambiguous political messages, through turning a blind eye, calculated delays, inaction, or a perfectly correct aloofness. To give one small example. In November 1973 the author attended a conference on the Cyprus problem, in Rome, at the American Universities Field Staff offices. Present were a number of American, British, Greek and Turkish diplomats,[33] some academics, and Clerides and Denktash. The diplomats had mostly served in the capitals of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, but were not presently in office. The meeting was handled as if it were an unofficial exercise in which informed men of goodwill provided a forum where the Cypriot negotiators could continue their deliberations. Manlio Brosio, the former NATO Secretary General, came for tea one afternoon. Averoff launched a '3 wise men' plan for settling the outstanding issues of the Intercommunal Talks. The rapporteur's summing up, having stressed the possibility of increased Soviet involvement over Cyprus, said:

'there is no guarantee that the United States would once again find it possible or desirable to exert itself in order to prevent hostilities between Greece and Turkey: the NATO alliance is today in disarray and the character and assumptions of the policy of the United States towards Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean may be profoundly changed'.

What was the significance of this message? Was it purely and simply an opportunity for Clerides and Denktash to do some negotiating before a sympathetic audience? Was it also a low-level and subtle diplomatic message to the Cypriot leaders: 'hurry up and settle your differences, or . . .' Or what? How would Ankara understand this warning? As an invitation to get tougher? Very soon after this the Turkish Cypriots, with Ankara's support, put forward a new, and much tougher demand for federation. Was this a coincidence?

The events which then happened can hardly have been part of any American plan. Following the Polytechnic riots in Athens, Ioannides came to power in Greece, a pro-*enosis*, anti-Makarios and anti-Turkish extremist. Bulent Ecevit, a popular and ambitious social democrat, came to power in Turkey, and Grivas died in Cyprus. Makarios' open letter demanding that Ioannides' EOKA B terrorists be called off was the fourth major unforeseeable event. It is argued on all sides that from this point on America could and should have acted differently, but that in a flurry of crisis diplomacy, Dr. Kissinger decided to 'tilt' towards Turkey, the key NATO power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Any or all of the following actions could probably have prevented the current situation in Cyprus:

1. The USA could have given Ioannides massive discouragement, when warnings came through intelligence operatives of the impending coup.

2. During the coup, an immediate and clear-cut refusal to recognize the Sampson regime in Cyprus might have forestalled Turkey's intervention.

3. When Ecevit was soliciting British assistance for his intervention, a firm joint UK-US policy statement would have limited the scope of the invasion.

4. During the Geneva Talks, in August 1974, a stronger US statement could have kept Turkey at the negotiating table.

The Americans had no direct responsibility to preserve the territorial integrity of Cyprus. Only Britain, Greece and Turkey had that obligation. America had signalled her unwillingness to alienate Turkey, who shares a long frontier with Russia. In 1965 the Russians had made an attempt to wean Turkey from NATO, so for the USA the stakes were very high. It was better, Kissinger seems to have decided, to sweeten the Turks, by standing aside while the Attila line was established, than take risks for the Greek Cypriots who in American eyes had had ample chance and warning to mend their fences with the Turks. Once Karamanlis returned to power in Greece, the US knew there was no danger of Greece leaving the West for good: the Greek withdrawal from NATO was chiefly for domestic consumption, and hardly a disaster for Washington, any more than French independence from NATO.

That is how a number of observers, including critics of Kissinger in the US Senate and leading Washington journalists, have interpreted the hastily improvised US diplomacy of July and August 1974. The Eastern flank of NATO was in chaos and something had to be salvaged from the mess. something bigger than the independence of Cyprus. Until more is known, such rough and ready interpretation will have to do, unsatisfactory as it is. The 'plan' was one of dozens of contingency plans for reacting to possible crises, not a steelcast matrix into which the Eastern Mediterranean could be poured. But US diplomacy in 1974 and subsequently has given the Greek Cypriots little reason for gratitude.

The Future: four key problems

(i) The refugees, and how many of them will return to their former homes; and, if they return, will it be to stay, or merely to wind up their affairs? It is perfectly possible to imagine forms of settlement in which many refugees, particularly the poorer ones, prefer not to return, since the short-term prospects may look too uncertain.

(ii) The territorial issue, the question of Turkish Army withdrawals from occupied territory. The Turks occupy 38% of the island but all major parties are verbally committed to ambiguous phrases such as 'a just settlement'. Nearly half the Greek Cypriot refugees could return if Famagusta city and a section of the Morphou region returned to Greek control, and this would not in terms of area greatly reduce Turkish-held territory. It seems most unlikely that any probable settlement will see all refugees of both communities returning to their former homes.

(iii) The constitutional form of the state. The Greek Cypriots now accept the principle of federation. They would undoubtedly prefer it to be comprised of a number of small Turkish zones, rather than one large one. The Turkish Cypriots seem determined to have a two-zone federation, in which the central government has a bare minimum of powers; the Greeks would like a stronger central government. One key provision will combine issues (i) and (ii); what will be the rights of residence, and property ownership for members of each community in the zone of the other? Will some refugees be excluded by law from returning to their old homes? Will they have a legal right to return, which for political and sociological reasons, they will not take up? For example, the Greek community in Istanbul has dwindled from 100,000 to 10,000 in about twenty years. It has been under varied pressures and harassments. The refugee issue and the structure of the new state seem socially (although not logically) inextricable; one has only to imagine the problem of a man who is allowed to visit his former home area, but not to own property there. Nor can there be a federated state in which some citizens may not visit some zones. This suggests, perhaps, one reason why the negotiations have so far been so fruitless.

(iv) The question of guarantees: who will guarantee the new state, the Cypriots ask. The Greeks would prefer international guarantors, the Turks that Greece and Turkey take this role; the proximity of Cyprus to Greece and Turkey surely does create special problems. It is quite possible that after a long period of peace the republic could dissolve the guarantees and enjoy the normal status of other nation states.

To have mentioned the issues is not the same as suggesting what future political options face the Cypriots. The political options to some extent cut across those just mentioned. They depend on the strength of the governments-of-the-day in Athens, Ankara, Nicosia and Washington. At the moment the Ankara government is weak, but a delay of several years could alter the political picture in all four capitals.

Options:

A. Stalemate: the status quo continued

The status quo is a divided island. The Greek section is well organized, prospering in spite of the disaster, with very substantial freedom of press and movement, international recognition and influence; but it is dominated by the refugees, and even though they are being skilfully incorporated into society intelligently, their future capacity for bitterness and disruption cannot be ignored.

The Turkish section is less well organized, under military occupation and still dependent on mainland subsidies; it has no international diplomatic status to speak of, little support or sympathy outside Turkey and there is an increasingly vocal opposition to Denktash. But it is protected by the Turkish Army. The Greek Cypriots do not wish to accept a settlement that will simply legitimate the current situation, but the longer it goes on the less likely it is that Turkish leaders will yield territory on which Turks have been settled. Naturally they are keeping their plans on this issue very closely secret, and seeking to frighten the Greeks into hasty concessions.

The stalemate means an unsolved problem between Greece and Turkey as well; much as Greece would like to see the Cyprus problem closed once and for all, she cannot cut her ties to the island's Greeks. The current Turkish government is weak and cannot make large concessions over Cyprus, unless it gets something in return. It may be that

the desire of Turkey for Aegean oil rights and for better territorial rights in that sea will be part of a package. Both countries have now made new military agreements with the USA, and American mediation is likely, since her long-term interest is still to have both countries at peace and in NATO.

How long can stalemate continue? The longer it goes on, the harder it becomes to break it. Makarios would have the dubious historical distinction of having refused to bow the knee (as he sees it) to Turkish aggression. But where would he have led his people? The Greeks fear a further Turkish bite out of the island if the North stagnates and the South booms, or if Greek extremists cross the border on terrorist campaigns. There is a fear that stalemate will be converted into:

B. Double *enosis*

This means that the South becomes part of Greece and the North part of Turkey. It could come about by drift, over a long period of stalemate; by war; or by negotiated settlement. Turkey is thought to dislike this option, since her generals would not like to give Greece such a good forward position close to the underbelly of Anatolia. Greece would be more inclined to favour it, but not at the price of a war with Turkey, a war in which the whole of Cyprus might fall under Turkish control. The Turkish Cypriots might favour becoming part of the Turkish mainland, but only if military government in the North is relaxed. Greek Cypriots might see joining Greece as the end of their defence problem, and the best way of taking their minds off the lost lands and the dangerous frontier. Such an option might, if negotiated, allow about half the refugees to go home, and the Turks to make major territorial concessions; they could possibly get Greece to waive her right to place strong military forces in the South, and sign a treaty to this effect.

C. Negotiated settlement

This could be on lines discussed in (B) above; but it could be based on a sovereign state, with either bizonal or multi-regional federation. There are an almost infinite number of possible 'mixes' of refugee demography, territorial splits and constitutional arrangements which are possible. So far, one thing has been achieved: the Greek side have understood that the Turks are in a strong position and mean what they say about the state being federal in form. Perhaps both sides will soon reach a stage where their proposals will come close to each other. So far they have still been a long way apart.

Has the 'Cyprus problem' been solved?

During the period of Cypriot intercommunal bloodshed in 1958-67, roughly 1,000 Greek and Turkish Cypriots died. The 'peace keeping' operation by Turkey is estimated to have cost between 4,000 and 6,000 lives in under thirty days. This is one way to view the problem. If the entire Cypriot population is now guaranteed peace, security and prosperity, then it might be argued by future historians that at the cost of uprooting and exchanging one-third of all the islanders, the two ethnic communities achieved a way of living through being separated. But if the issues left unsolved by the Turkish invasion fester, the judgement will have to be very different.

Loss of life is only one measure. The psychological losses suffered by people forced to leave homes, jobs, communities, the familiar structure of their lives, are hard to measure precisely. But they are the very real cost of the alleged 'solution' and their consequences will plague all parties for generations to come.

It is possible that out of the pain and waste which marked these first fifteen years of Cypriot independence, some real improvements in political and civic wisdom may emerge. At this stage only the most obtuse optimist would wager that this is the last blood to be shed between the Greeks and Turks, whether those of Cyprus or the mainland. Diplomacy must seek new avenues to bring peace with justice to the island's people.

FOOTNOTES

1 Robert Stephens comments: Some of the Turkish leaders must share the blame, because they were determined to keep the possibility of partition open through e.g. separate municipalities, just as the Greeks were trying to keep the door open to *enosis*. Cyprus was the concluding chapter in a long Turko-Greek struggle and disentanglement, and the Turkish government's attitude to it was concerned with security fears as much as with the Turkish minority: fears dating from previous Turko-Greek encounters (including the Anatolian episode in the 1920s) as well as the nightmare of being encircled by a coalition of pan-Hellenism and Great Powers such as Britain, France or Russia.

2 from 25% Turk and 73% Greek at the first census in 1881 to 18% Turk and 80% Greek by 1960.

3 For a contrasting view of Makarios and interpretation of his policies, see Peter Loizos in Part Two of this report.

4 But on the CIA, see the US Senate Judiciary Committee's Report on Cyprus, 1975.

5 See, for example, Purcell, H.D. *Cyprus*, Benn, 1969.

6 See Stephens, pp.11-104.

7 See Hodge and Lewis.

8 See Stephens, p.210.

9 See Kyriakides, Polyviou for assessments of the constitution and its breakdown.

10 See Polyviou, 1976 pp.179-206.

11 See Hill, pp.403-568

12 See Bahcheli, p.58.

13 See Stephens, pp.130-156.

14 See Foley, p.112.

15 See Bahcheli, p.55.

16 See Barry et al.

17 See Hill, pp.488-568.

18 See Stavrinides, pp.29-55, Kyriakides, Stephens pp.181-191.

19 For some details of the Akritas Plan, see Patrick, p.2 and Foley, p.163, 167.

20 See Reddaway, 1974.

21 See Polyviou, 1976.

22 See Stephens, p.174.

23 See Stephens, pp.168-180.

24 See Stephens, p.181.

25 See Attalides, *passim*.

26 See Nötel.

27 See Patrick, pp.1-8.

28 See Nötel.

29 See Attalides, *passim*.

30 See Stephens, p.149.

31 See (ed.) Kouloumbis, U.S.Govt.1974, 1975 and Polyviou 1975, 1976 are the main sources for the rest of this section.

32 Polyviou, 1976, p.195, pp.179-206, pp.241-264.

33 Evangelos Averoff, Dimitri Bitsios, Prof.Aydio Yalciu, Sir Michael Stewart, Lucius Battle, Phillips Talbot, Cyrus Vance, were among those present.

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APPENDIX

Some statistics from official Greek-Cypriot sources:

Land owned by the community of Cyprus

District	Greek ownerships (in donums)	%	Turkish ownerships (in donums)	%	Armenian Maronite etc.	%	Villages, roads, rivers, etc.	%	State forest & land	%	Total area by district	%
Nicosia	1,205,000	59.2	263,000	12.9	32,600	1.6	32,700	1.6	503,600	24.7	2,036,900	100.0
Kyrenia	260,000	54.3	61,100	12.8	48,000	10.0	6,100	1.3	103,600	21.6	478,800	100.0
Famagusta	924,200	62.6	179,900	12.2	3,900	0.3	26,700	1.8	341,800	23.1	1,476,500	100.0
Limassol	699,700	67.3	99,700	9.6	11,400	1.1	21,792	2.1	207,600	19.9	1,040,192	100.0
Larnaca	446,000	53.1	139,300	16.6	12,100	1.4	8,600	1.0	235,100	27.9	841,100	100.0
Paphos	557,700	53.5	149,600	14.4	1,000	0.1	17,100	1.6	316,500	30.4	1,041,900	100.0
TOTAL	4,092,600	59.2	892,600	12.9	109,000	1.6	112,992	1.6	1,708,200	24.7	6,915,392	100.0

Sources: (1) Census of 1946; (2) Census of 1960; (3) Village cadastral plans; (4) Village land property lists; (5) Two Ph.D. theses by foreign students on the land tenure structure of Cyprus.

Area of Cyprus occupied by the Turkish troops

District	Area occupied (in donums)	% of the total area of Cyprus	% of the total area of the district	Occupied Greek or mixed villages	% of the total No. of Greek or mixed villages
Nicosia	708,340	10.2	37.7	54	10.7
Kyrenia	479,220	6.9	100.0	40	7.9
Famagusta	1,326,497	19.2	89.7	63	12.5
Larnaca	152,368	2.2	18.1	5	1.0
TOTAL	2,666,425	38.5	–	162	32.1

Hypothetical exchange of populations based on the present separation line

District	GREEK-CYPRIOT POPULATION IN THE TURKISH OCCUPIED PART OF CYPRUS				TURKISH-CYPRIOT POPULATION IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS			
	Population	Affected Greek Villages	Affected mixed Villages	No. of affected Villages	Population	Affected Turkish Villages	Affected mixed Villages	No. of affected Villages
Nicosia	53,000	30	24	54	3,000	11	12	23
Kyrenia	30,000	28	12	40	–	–	–	–
Famagusta	90,000	46	17	63	–	–	–	–
Larnaca	6,000	3	2	5	13,000	8	20	28
Limassol	–	–	–	–	16,000	10	15	25
Paphos	–	–	–	–	17,000	38	14	52
TOTAL	179,000	107	55	162	49,000	67	61	128

Geographical distribution of population in the villages of Cyprus

NUMBER OF GREEK, TURKISH AND MIXED VILLAGES OF CYPRUS BY DISTRICT

District	Greek	%	Turkish	%	Mixed	%	Total	%
Nicosia	116	18.50	31	4.94	36	5.74	183	29.18
Kyrenia	28	4.47	7	1.12	11	1.75	46	7.34
Famagusta	53	8.45	26	4.15	17	2.71	96	15.31
Limassol	90	14.35	10	1.60	14	2.23	114	18.18
Larnaca	29	4.63	11	1.75	21	3.36	61	9.74
Paphos	76	12.12	38	6.06	13	2.07	127	20.25
TOTAL	392	62.52	123	19.62	112	17.86	627	100.00

Sources: Census 1946, Census 1960, Cyprus Population Distribution map 1960.

Facts on Turkish Cypriot migrations

According to figures provided by the Government Statistics and Research Department, during the 1963-1971 period, a total number of 5,469 Turkish Cypriots emigrated of whom 3,935 (72%) went to the United Kingdom, 1,021 (19%) to Australia, 209 (3.8%) to Turkey and the rest to various other countries.

Figures are given below concerning the emigration of Greek and Turkish Cypriots from 1963 to 1971:

Year	Total	Greeks	Turks	Others
1963	2,933	2,305 (78.6)	453 (15.4)	175 (6.0)
1964	5,081	3,995 (78.6)	992 (19.5)	94 (1.9)
1965	2,967	2,380 (80.2)	566 (19.1)	21 (0.7)
1966	3,408	2,855 (83.8)	538 (15.8)	15 (0.4)
1967	3,470	2,540 (73.2)	900 (26.0)	30 (0.8)
1968	2,676	2,169 (81.1)	503 (18.8)	4 (0.1)
1969	2,378	2,027 (85.2)	337 (14.2)	14 (0.6)
1970	2,318	1,741 (75.1)	567 (24.5)	10 (0.4)
1971	1,271	1,649 (72.6)	612 (26.9)	10 (0.5)

The decline of mixed communities in Cyprus, 1891-1970

[Table by Dr.Loizos]

	Total population centres	Mixed
1891	702	346
1931	694	252
1960	623	114
1970	602	48

A community was considered as 'mixed' if 10 or more people of a second ethnic group lived there.

[data from Patrick, 1972.]

The writer of Part I is a journalist who has lived in Cyprus for a number of years, but who wishes to remain anonymous.

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