Vanezis

Makarios: Pragmatism v. Idealism

Abelard-Schuman

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MAKARIOS

PRAGMATISM *vs.* IDEALISM

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Dr P.N. VANEZIS

Foreword by Lord Caradon

Abelard-Schuman
London

By the same author:

Makarios: Faith and Power

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This book is dedicated to all those Cypriots who have been heroically and stoically under-going the test of independence for the past fourteen years, and to their friends everywhere who have been loyally supporting them in the cause of justice, truth and freedom.

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Kykko monastery.

Foreword

Many years ago I was speaking in the United Nations about the British achievement in converting, all within a quarter of a century, a great empire into a free Commonwealth. This was too much for the Soviet representative. 'All the leaders of the countries referred to by the British delegate,' he said, 'have been in British prisons – from Nehru of India to Kenyatta of Kenya and Nyerere of Tanzania and Makarios of Cyprus.' I replied that the Soviet Ambassador would no doubt agree that 'it is better to make Prime Ministers out of prisoners than prisoners out of Prime Ministers.'

Archbishop Makarios was not in a British prison, but he was deported to the Seychelles, and when I came back to Cyprus in 1957 he was still in exile in Greece.

One of the most exciting days of my governorship in Cyprus was the day I went to the airport in 1959 to welcome Archbishop Makarios back, and certainly one of the most satisfying times of my life was the next eighteen months when he and I worked day by day, together with the Turkish leaders, to create the independent State of Cyprus.

When, as the last Governor of Cyprus, I sailed away in August 1960, I had had some small part in making a President out of an exile. But the achievement of creating an independent Cyprus was predominantly that of Makarios. Many had contributed – I pay specially respectful tribute to Foreign Minister Averoff of Greece and Foreign Minister Zorlu of Turkey – but it was the Archbishop whose personal leadership made the success possible. Without him the settlement of 1959 could not have been accepted, and although at the time of the settlement he had grave

misgivings and serious reservations, when once he had signed the agreement he loyally stood by his undertaking. True, some years later dispute and conflict were revived, but on his return to Cyprus in 1959 I can vouch for the fact that the Archbishop faithfully set himself to make the settlement work. It did not even occur to him to go back on his word.

I remember one particular decision he took soon after his return to Cyprus. Under the agreement there were to be seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers. It was at first proposed that the portfolios to be allotted to the Turkish Ministers would all be of minor practical importance, and the dispute over this threatened to bring the newly-won settlement to early disaster. Archbishop Makarios intervened to persuade his own people that the important portfolio of Agriculture should be given to a Turkish Minister. The crisis was averted; the work of reconciliation and construction could go ahead. The Archbishop had taken a major and difficult and generous decision.

I welcome the opportunity to pay my affectionate respects to him. My direct dealings with him lasted for little more than eighteen months, and that was nearly fifteen years ago. But I do not remember anyone I have ever met who has impressed me so strongly.

In Dr Venezis's book he refers to the Archbishop's 'Byzantine qualities', a phrase which he says is sometimes used in a sense to suggest 'extreme duplicity and deviousness', and indeed during the days of the E.O.K.A. rebellion in the 1950s, when most of the time Makarios was away in exile, a sinister picture of him was spread in England. He was represented as a callous leader of terrorism, a perfidious priest, unreliable, shifty, unscrupulous. So widely was this picture accepted that one of the main difficulties we had to face in working for reconciliation and a settlement was the suspicion and distrust harboured against Makarios by the British public. The picture was unfair and untrue, and I am glad to give my testimony from working with Makarios persistently in close association on a whole range of awkward and pressing problems.

I do not necessarily accept all Dr Venezis's conclusions

(and in his comments on questions of policy regarding the time when I was in Cyprus I have a number of differences with him), but I am glad to attempt to summarize my own assessment of Makarios's character.

The Archbishop has outstanding qualities of devotion, self-discipline, shrewdness, patience and humour. That may sound enough, but I would put other qualities higher still. His chief characteristic is, I believe, cold courage coupled with a liking for risks, a positive enjoyment of danger, and a readiness, indeed an eagerness, to test his lonely judgment if necessary against the whole world. I well realize that such single-minded and courageous confidence has dangers, but I could not withhold admiration when I saw him at the London Conference facing the combined and insistent demands of the British and Turkish and Greek Governments and being brave enough first to resist and then to accept the intense pressure. Both needed courage.

I think of him too when his helicopter was shot down and when in such a shattering experience his immediate concern was only to save the wounded pilot by himself rushing him to hospital.

Let me tell again the story of the end of the painfully protracted negotiations over the British bases to remain in Cyprus (negotiations conducted on behalf of the British Government by Julian Amery).

On the night following the agreement over the bases the Archbishop asked Julian and Catherine Amery and my wife and myself and many other guests to a celebration dinner at Kykko Monastery near Nicosia. After dinner, without explanation and without any reference to the long and awkward negotiations we had just concluded, he told us a story.

'You see over there,' he said, 'my old teacher the Abbot of Kykko. Here it was that he brought me as a boy from my mountain village to study. He had heard from the monks of the monastery of my own village of Pano Panaiya that I had done well at my lessons. I became his pupil. He had confidence that I would become a priest and a scholar and he loved me as he would his own son.' As the Archbishop told

the story he looked across at the old Abbot of Kykko, a great favourite of us all, with his long grey beard and twinkling eyes. 'Then the time came,' the Archbishop continued, 'when the Abbot told me that I was going into the Church and I must therefore grow a beard. I told the Abbot that I did not propose to grow a beard until later. He was astonished at such insubordination. "Then I must beat you," he said. I replied that that would make no difference. He beat me, and I remember that every time he raised his arm I would turn and say "No". The next day he pleaded with me. I must obey him. What would my father, the shepherd and my poor mother say if I were sent home with all hopes of a career in the Church lost? It would break their hearts. I insisted that in such a matter I must be allowed to decide for myself. The Abbot became beside himself with frustration and grief. If I would not obey him I must go home in disgrace. The next day I was sent to fetch a few belongings from a relative in Nicosia. The Abbot ordered the local taxi from Strovolos. The time came for me to go. He pleaded with me once more to change my mind. I made no reply. Sadly he led me out of his study down those steps over there, out to those great gates. And I remember that I actually put my foot on the step of the taxi before he broke down and threw his arms about me and said, "My boy come back, I cannot let you go." '

All along the Archbishop had known that in the negotiations about the bases he had us where he wanted us. We could not afford to abandon the wider settlement of the London Agreement. He could negotiate up to the very last minute and win his way.

I like to tell the story since it illustrates the Archbishop's confidence even on the edge of the precipice. My comment at the time was, 'I greatly admire the Archbishop's nerve and his political skill and his confidence in his own opinion. But I sometimes think that he enjoys the gamble, to go right to the edge, to pit his wits against everyone else.'

I have spoken of the Archbishop's calm and courage. There is another outstanding quality for which I myself, like

countless others, have good reason to be more than grateful, and in which he sets a fine example in international public life. Even in the most alarming of crises, facing daunting odds, having to make frightening decisions in a hurry, badgered by foes and friends too, he is invariably courteous. Even at moments of high drama his courtesy remains unruffled, and his wit will often break the tension.

What of his future? I do not doubt that it will not be dull. He would not wish it so. The path ahead of him and the road ahead of Cyprus is full of pitfalls and dangers, dependent to some extent on international events outside his control, but whatever happens his reputation is secure. He led his people from a dead end of violence to the destination of constructive independence, and as he said when the London Agreement was concluded, 'Positiveness of unity and co-operation' prevailed over the 'negativeness of division and strife'.

What a triumph it will be if he can complete his historic service to his people by a magnanimous and lasting settlement with the Turkish community in Cyprus. He has the prestige and the power and, I believe, the generosity to win that crowning achievement.

LORD CARADON

Acknowledgments

This book continues the story of Archbishop Makarios and the birth of independent Cyprus from *Makarios: Faith and Power*. The author has used mostly the same sources and materials as in his previous work. Since the present book deals with very recent developments, which have not yet been fully recorded, it has been necessary to rely much more on interviews, discussions with colleagues and personal contacts than in the case of the first work. In this respect the author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to all those who have been kind enough to co-operate with him in making their contribution.

In this country the author has obtained valuable assistance from various friends, both English and Greek, who have made valuable suggestions and have helped with research and correction of the text. My acknowledgments are also due to various authors from whose works I have used tables and other material.

Finally the author wishes to express his gratitude to Lord Caradon for his masterly foreword. Although it expresses some points of disagreement with the text, it must be acknowledged that in the circumstances no better man than Lord Caradon could have provided such a preface and expressed such points. His achievement as the last Governor of Cyprus and his close association with Archbishop Makarios at a vital point of time gives him an insight into the ramifications of the problem of modern Cyprus and the character of the Archbishop.

Author's Note

While the manuscript of this book was at the printers, the news was announced that General George Grivas, the E.O.K.A. leader, died of a heart attack in Limassol on 28th January 1974, at 1.45 p.m.

On the confirmation of this news, President Makarios called a Cabinet Meeting at which it was decided to grant an immediate amnesty in respect of all E.O.K.A. members serving sentences—including those involved in the assassination attempts—as well as those in custody pending investigation into their activities. Also an appeal was made to all those still engaged in E.O.K.A. activities to surrender their arms within a five-day amnesty period. In addition, the cabinet decreed a three-day official mourning period during which the flag of the Republic of Cyprus was to be flown at half-mast and all the schools were to remain closed. On the day of the funeral of the late General Grivas, 30th January, all Government offices were closed.

Introduction

Ever since the formation of the modern Greek state in the third decade of the nineteenth century, an important objective of successive Greek governments, and desire of the Greek peoples severed from the motherland, and still living under Turkish rule, has been the union of their territories with Greece (*enosis*). Greece grew territorially by enlarging her lands under the *enosis* slogan. Between 1863 and the end of the Second World War Greece absorbed various Hellenic territories mostly by means of war or conflict with the decaying Ottoman state. However, some territories intimately associated with the main stream of Greek history, or inhabited by a predominantly Greek population, such as Constantinople, Western Anatolia and Cyprus, remained outside the Greek national state—either belonging to the new Turkey of Kemal Atatürk or being under British colonial rule. Britain, a friend and ally of the Greek national struggle, was also a successor to the disintegration of the old Ottoman Empire. The conflict in Cyprus is the result of this three-cornered clash between the ambitions and interests of former allies and friends and the fears of the insecure new Turkish state. It is set against the background of the Middle East which has developed since the end of the Ottoman Empire into an arena for a headlong clash of interests of the major world powers.

Under the Ottoman Empire Cyprus preserved its medieval way of life, which was enhanced by the conservative nature of Ottoman rule. Like all medieval and feudal conceptions the Ottoman Empire was not based on centralization but on the payment of tribute to the Moslem overlords.

Under such a system all the conquered nationalities were left to their own devices, sometimes with maximum autonomy in the spheres of religion, education, culture and economic affairs. It is evident that under this system of government the principle of nationality played no part—the Ottoman Empire was purely a religious concept. Christians of various denominations, Moslems, and Jews all lived side by side under the rule of the Moslem Turkish overlord. Groups of Turkish Moslems were settled as garrisons in strategic spots throughout the Empire. For centuries they had little contact with the non-Turkish Christian peoples among whom they lived: they fulfilled a purely military role in the functioning of the Ottoman Empire and it did not take long for the native Christian communities to assume an economic role in the maintenance of such garrisons. Such was the way in which the pattern of Turkish rule developed in the island of Cyprus. Without the Turkish soldiers on Cyprus the island could not have been held by the Ottomans. On the other hand, the garrison could only have been maintained by the economic enterprise of the Greek Cypriots, i.e. in Cyprus the Turk wielded the sword while the Greek ploughed the land and attended to trade. In this way two different communities lived side by side on the island, the Greek majority and the Turkish population introduced after the conquest of 1571, and as such they were transferred in 1878 from Ottoman to British colonial rule.

Disraeli's acquisition of Cyprus from the Porte in 1878 was due to the necessity of supporting a weakening Turkey against the Russian drive on Constantinople. During the Russian-Turkish War of 1877 the Russian assault on Constantinople was halted only by the appearance of the British Mediterranean fleet in the Bosporus. This experience, together with that of the Crimean War, made it imperative for the British government to acquire a base in the Eastern Mediterranean from which it could render effective assistance to its Turkish ally in case of need. Thus, the acquisition of Cyprus was a cementation of the Anglo-Turkish alliance. It was also a part of the unashamed imperialism launched under Disraeli which consisted in acquiring territory wherever and

whenever possible. In 1882, this policy led to the British seizure of Egypt and the Suez Canal. However, in Britain, Greece and Cyprus, the British occupation of Cyprus in 1878 was interpreted as a liberation and a milestone on the road of the reunion of the island with the Greek motherland—*enosis*. This was underlined by philhellenic enthusiasm in Britain and the appointment of Sir Garnet Wolseley, a prominent philhellene, as the first High Commissioner in 1878. On July 22 1878, Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived at Larnaca in *H.M.S. Himalaya*. Bishop Kyprianos of Kition welcoming the High Commissioner said: 'We accept the change of government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with mother Greece, with which it is naturally connected.' To the Cypriots Britain had not only been in the forefront of the struggle for Greek independence but was also the homeland of liberal sentiments, which inspired the struggle for constitutional government in Greece and countered the autocratic ambitions of the pro-Russian party. In 1863 Britain had ceded the Ionian Islands to Greece, having occupied them since the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

The best evidence that the arrival of the British troops was viewed as a prelude to *enosis* was contained in the address of the Bishop of Kition to the first British High Commissioner. And Archbishop Sophronios, welcoming the British High Commissioner, expressed the wish that the island of Cyprus 'may enjoy the fruits of a true civilization and of a just rule'. The Archbishop continued: 'We hope, therefore, that from now on a new life begins for the people of Cyprus; a new great period which will become memorable in the annals of the island. We hope that all shall be instructed without distinction of race or creed, that law is the king of all; that all shall have equal rights and equal responsibility before the law, for equality of rights implies also equality of responsibility; that all shall be used to treading the good road, that is to say, the road of truth, of duty and of liberty.' No mention was made at this date or indeed, subsequently, of the Turkish minority and this question did not become a preoccupation for the British Administra-

tion until the period following the First World War.

The First World War produced an entirely changed situation in the Middle East with the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire. The menace of Russia continued in the area but was now transformed into an ideological threat as a result of the Russian Revolution of 1917. The new Turkey of Kemal Atatürk constituted the only barrier to Soviet expansion into the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The vital position of Turkey has not been lost sight of by the Western Powers even today. Turkey has become the keynote to the defence of the area. Furthermore, the deep British involvement in Egypt and in the promotion of Zionism in Palestine under the Mandate made any further anti-Moslem moves highly inappropriate in the circumstances. Hence, the very negative British response to the renewed demand in Cyprus for *enosis* in the interwar period culminating in the events of 1931.[1]

The stage was now set for the next act in the Cyprus drama. Following the Second World War the Turkish factor became even more important than previously owing to the immense accretions of strength of the Soviet Union. Turkey, together with Greece, became a member of N.A.T.O. in 1950. The establishment and the continued success of the Zionist state of Israel against the Arabs made it a fact of paramount importance for the Western Powers to prevent any alignment between Turkey and her fellow Moslem Arabs. This situation strengthened the position of the Turkish minority in Cyprus. The renewal of the agitation for *enosis* on the island now encountered the concerted opposition of the Turkish inhabitants backed by the Ankara government, which, in turn, could not be alienated by the Western Powers. Thus, it came about that the idealism of the cause of *enosis* pursued so far by the island's leaders and given a fresh lease of life by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, ran headlong into the cold reality of international politics and interests. The government which succeeded Kemal Atatürk in Turkey encountered great economic and political difficulties. The recent history of Turkey has not been a happy one, and any defeat of the Turkish cause in Cyprus

could, undoubtedly, have resulted in grave disorders in Turkey itself. Such disorders could have produced a left-wing overthrow of the present Turkish regime and the link-up of Turkey with the Soviet Union in the Cold War. This would have given the Soviet Union an ideological and military access to the Mediterranean (the very reason for which N.A.T.O. had been extended to Greece and Turkey) and the Arab countries of the Middle East. Because of their antagonism for the West arising out of the Israeli imbroglio the Arab nations could prove an extremely receptive ground for the spread of Communism, and Soviet military aid could flow unhindered across Turkish territory. Such a contingency could only be described as catastrophic for the Western Powers, not the least for all the Greek regimes after 1945. It is, therefore, easy to understand the periodic lack of enthusiasm for the Greek Cypriot cause in Greek official circles. Against such a picture of reality it is no wonder that the Greek Cypriot leadership had to lower its sights and accept in 1959 something less than *enosis*.

It is evident that in the circumstances an all-out pursuit of *enosis* would have been unacceptable to all parties concerned. Therefore, when in 1959 negotiations were at last initiated to solve the four years long insurgency in Cyprus, the quality of the Greek Cypriot leadership became an all-important factor. Not only Cyprus but all parties concerned were fortunate in the fact that the spokesman for Cyprus was Archbishop Makarios III. His prestige as Ethnarch and leader since 1950 for the struggle of *enosis* was such that only he could be trusted to accept and carry out any compromise solution which would not mean the immediate union of Cyprus with Greece, while providing peace for the island. Makarios has been able to perform his task not by abandoning the cause of *enosis*, as he has repeatedly pointed out, but by calling a halt on the road to it while pursuing a policy of independence. Such an attitude was not only that of an astute politician but also of a charismatic leader who felt sure he could counter any fanatical opposition to his policies on the part of his ultra-nationalistic followers. The present-day detractors of the Archbishop's change of front

take refuge in parochial blindness and ignore the fact that Greece would not be able to face up to the consequences of the policy of *enosis* which might entail a war with Turkey and the collapse of the whole Near Eastern *status quo.*

It is interesting to note that similar criticism has been aimed, in recent history, at another statesman of this century, the late General de Gaulle. Like Makarios in respect of *enosis* de Gaulle was regarded as the champion of the French presence in Algeria and brought to power by the partisans of such a policy. However, once in office de Gaulle took one look at the consequences of trying to retain Algeria by force of arms and had the courage to cut himself loose from such a course. There is no doubt that history will long applaud his statesmanship. Makarios, like de Gaulle, has proved his statesmanship by measuring up to reality. It is still the ideal aim of the Archbishop's policy and, indeed, of his life. No one can accuse him of abandoning it. Reality, however bitter it may be, has to be faced with courage, virtue and piety and not by slogan-mongering. Makarios has not abandoned *enosis.* He has, for the time being, and in the face of tremendous odds and obstacles which have assumed a world-wide scale, merely chosen a different path to attain it. Last, but not least, in this situation due reference must be made to the state of affairs in Greece and Turkey. Certainly no one in his senses who has been a witness of the Cyprus drama since 1959 can accuse Makarios of dereliction of duty in this respect.

PART A

I
Historical Survey up to 1878

There is no need to seek the Greek origins of Cyprus in dim myths and legends, or to invoke the heroes of the Trojan War. Franz George Maier says: 'The settlement of the Greeks on Cyprus is reflected in legend and epic. Historically, though not necessarily in detail, part of Greek mythology can be traced to facts. Heroes of the Trojan War are credited with the foundation of the Greek cities of Cyprus; Teucer founded Salamis. . . .' There is also no need to conduct anthropological research on the lines that one can associate ethnic and cultural characteristics with the shape of skull or shape of eyes. The facts speak for themselves and as Sir Ronald Storrs says: '. . . the Greekness of Cypriots is in my opinion indisputable. Nationalism is more, is other, is greater than pigmentations or cephalic indices. A man is of the race of which he passionately feels himself to be. No sensible person will deny that the Cypriot is Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking, Greek-feeling. . . .'[1]

In Cyprus, from the end of the fifth century B.C. there has been a continuation of Greek culture in the ethnic sense. The definite departure point was the reign of King Evagoras I (411 B.C.—373 B.C.) of Salamis who ruled towards the end of the fifth and the beginning of the fourth centuries B.C. and under whom the definite Hellenic character of the island emerges. Of course, Hellenic Cyprus was not Periclean Athens, but neither were other Greek territories. No one is going to suggest that at that time Syracuse in Sicily was not Greek, yet it was very unlike the Athens of the classical age. The confusion lies in the idea that only the Homeric and Athenian-classical is Greek. Many false analogies have been

based on this misconception. The Greek character of Cyprus emerges most clearly from the fact that the Greeks in Cyprus (unlike the Phoenician cities on the island) rose together with the Ionian Greeks against Persian rule in the Great Revolt of 499 B.C.

King Evagoras I of Salamis was able to extend his power for a time over the whole of the island because of his identification with the Greek struggle against Persia. 'Evagoras's foreign policy raised Cyprus to the level of an international power for a period of twenty years. . . . For the first time in its history he made Cyprus united and independent'.[2] He invited many Athenian teachers to Cyprus. His capital, Salamis, soon became the most famous educational centre of the island. Because of many internal troubles in Greece a considerable number of educated Greeks left their city-states and settled for a while in Cyprus at Salamis. They brought along with them the Hellenic civilization and culture. Thus, a systematic co-operation between Evagoras I and Conon of Athens began having as its goal the spread in Cyprus of the Hellenic culture.

In the course of the Persian War the Persians, although defeated in Greece, were able to assert themselves for the time being over the Greeks of Asia Minor and Cyprus. The triumph of Alexander the Great over the Persians linked Cyprus permanently with the expansion of Hellenism. After the death of Alexander in 323 B.C. Cyprus passed to Egypt and was ruled by Ptolemy from Alexandria. According to Sir Ronald Storrs, it 'was one of the most valued possessions of the Egyptian crown, the timber of Mount Troödos being used for the construction of her ships, while the metallic and agricultural products of the island helped to swell the Egyptian revenue'.[3] The Ptolemaic occupation of the island brought a radical change to Cyprus politically. The system of city-states was now replaced by the administrative bureaucracy of a centrally-governed monarchy and as Alastos says: 'At the top of this economic-political pyramid stood the King'.[4] However, despite this highly-centralized system of government, the economy of the island developed since only the island's wines and forests were placed under state

control: 'The lively trade with the Hellenic world, encouraged by the rise of new industries, provided Cyprus with all the advantages of a clearing house for east and west; wine, grain, textiles and metalwork were among the chief exports. The reputation of the island's shipyards was still unsurpassed. . . . The temples, theatres, gymnasia, schools and aqueducts of the Ptolemaic foundations (all three of which were called Arsinoë) as well as those of the older cities bear witness to the high level of Hellenistic town planning and the comfortable living standards of their inhabitants. This city-culture was the expression of a high degree of Hellenization in the arts and in the intellectual life'.[5] The island remained part of the Kingdom of the Ptolemies for nearly 250 years—until 58 B.C.—when together with all the Hellenic lands in the Eastern Mediterranean, including Egypt itself, it passed under Roman rule. In the Eastern Mediterranean the Roman Empire simply confirmed for the period of its duration the Hellenic character of all the countries it had taken over. For Cyprus, the years of the *Pax Romana* formed an uneventful, though rather contented period.

The next important development for Cyprus, as well as for the rest of the Roman Empire, was the establishment of Christianity. The Christian church in Cyprus was the first Christian church among the Greeks to be established by St. Paul and St. Barnabas[6] in A.D.45. Christian Cyprus subsequently became a province of the Eastern Roman Empire, which as Byzantium became an essentially Greek state based on the Greek Orthodox Church. The beginnings of modern Greek nationality are the Byzantine Empire and its faith, and not Homeric pre-history which, belonging to pagan mythology, was relegated by the church to library shelves. In the Byzantine Empire a complete identification was achieved between the Greek language, Christianity and the imperial idea. Modern Greece is orientated in its national consciousness to its Constantinopolitan past, and this includes Cyprus as well as all Greek communities which have survived in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Cypriots are Greek because they are Greek Orthodox; and nothing can possibly defeat the simplicity of this fact. That they have subsequently suffered

centuries of foreign rule does not in the least detract from their Greek character, because all the Greek people suffered centuries of foreign rule—Arab, Turkish, Venetian, British and French. To claim that Cypriots are not entirely Greek because they had not participated much in the civilization of Periclean Athens must also imply that the Greek inhabitants of Constantinople are not entirely Greek because Constantinople did not exist at the time of Pericles!

'Cyprus belonged to the Byzantine Empire for almost nine centuries, longer than to any other power. No other epoch was as decisive in the fate of the island as the years of East-Roman-Byzantine domination; every aspect of its culture, landscape and national character was moulded for all time in the centuries within the Graeco-Christian world. It was the first step into a historic context that is still valid today.'

The greatest historical event in the life of Cyprus as a part of the Byzantine Empire was the emergence of the Church of Cyprus which in 478 became fully autonomous and independent of the jurisdiction of any other Patriarchate. The Archbishops of the Church of Cyprus were granted extensive privileges[7] and have always since been the guardians of the ecclesiastical, as opposed to the political, independence of Cyprus, although the question of political independence could not arise as long as the Byzantine Empire existed. This state of affairs continued during the periods in which the Byzantine Empire was strong, that is from the time of Constantine to the Arab invasions and from the ninth to the eleventh century.

Alastos's remarks of the Byzantine influence on Cyprus are very accurate and present us with the real picture of the era: 'From the national point of view Cyprus had found freedom in the Byzantine Empire. For three hundred years its inhabitants lived in conditions of peace and the economy of the island advanced considerably. But this did not last for long. From the middle of the seventh century till the second half of the tenth, Cyprus was to undergo a series of invasions which left it exhausted, bleeding and impoverished.'

Cyprus was the first part of the Byzantine Empire to be

conquered by the crusaders as early as 1191; after Richard Coeur de Lion had defeated Isaac Comnenos, he married Princess Berengaria of Navarre in Limassol on May 12, 1191. As Sir Harry Luke points out, Cyprus thus became 'the only British overseas territory to be the scene of the wedding of an English King and Queen and of an English coronation'.[8] Richard, however, sold[9] the island, in July 1191, to the Knights Templar for one hundred thousand bezants. In May 1192, Guy de Lusignan took possession of Cyprus and the island remained continuously under foreign rule until 1959. The conquests of Cyprus preserved the island from Mohammedan rule until the sixteenth century. This was due to the establishment in Cyprus, after 1192, of a kingdom ruled by the House of Lusignan propped up by a military French aristocracy.

The House of Lusignan ruled Cyprus until 1489. The island was organized as a feudal kingdom on the western model. At the end of the thirteenth century it became the sole Latin-crusader state left in the Levant and the Lusignan Kings of Cyprus began to style themselves also Kings of Jerusalem and Armenia. It is to be understood that the continuation of the Kingdom of Cyprus represented the only hope (and base) which the West had for the reconquest of the Holy Land. The Kings of Cyprus grouped round them some brilliant military adventurers and maintained this outpost of the West against the growing Moslem menace. The most interesting of the Lusignan Kings was Peter I who stormed and sacked Alexandria in 1365, and who went on a prolonged tour of the courts of Europe in order to secure support for his planned crusade. After the assassination of Peter in 1369 the Lusignan dynasty became increasingly dependent on the military and financial support of the Italian maritime powers of Venice and Genoa, which were the only Western states which could provide Frankish Cyprus with the means to resist its Moslem enemies. As the Lusignan dynasty ebbed away, Venice assumed more and more responsibility for the defence of the island until, finally, in 1489, on the extinction of the Lusignans, it formally acquired Cyprus.

The crusading Lusignan kingdom in Cyprus obtained a

very 'good press' in contemporary Europe. Chronicles and travellers' tales go out of their way to stress the splendours of the Lusignan courts, the magnificence of the Western-style churches, cathedrals and convents built in Cyprus during this period, and, in general, the splendours and festivities of a Western European feudal society transplanted to the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet, when all is said and done the 'splendid' Lusignan kingdom was a failure. It was the only crusading state which collapsed without a Moslem conquest. The root of the basic instability of the Lusignan rule in Cyprus was the conflict between the two churches—*de facto* two religions—which precluded the emergence of a viable state.

The Lusignans and their followers were a purely Western French ruling class. They condemned themselves to this state of affairs because of their religion and by allowing the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus to survive, albeit in a subordinate role. The 'Latin' aristocracy, although a very small group, could never be absorbed by the population of the island. It and its followers remained an isolated class, ruling in 'colonialist' isolation from the bulk of the population; the assimilation of the new rulers and the synthesis of the different cultures proved to be impossible. The key to this situation was the repression of the Orthodox Church. This repression, culminating in the Bulla Cypria of 1260, subordinated the Orthodox Church to the imported Latin Church. The Church was deprived of its wealth and banished to the villages and mountain regions. However, in spite of all this, because it was enabled to survive in this subordinate status, it grouped round it the loyalty of the Greek population. The wealth of the entire island was transferred into the hands of the Lusignan nobility and of their Church. Thus religions and economic factors combined to delineate a deep gulf of social differences. And it is for this reason that the gap between Franks and Greeks, rulers and ruled, never closed. An added impetus to this division was the attempt to introduce serfdom into the island, which was identified with the alien religion. Three centuries of Lusignan rule were soon to be over. As Alastos says, 'The part played by the Lusignans in building up the civilization of Cyprus was practically nil.

Whatever they did was for the glory and gratification of the alien, feudal order and began to disappear with their passing, to be completely swept away with the conquest of Cyprus by the Turks in 1570-71. Only some magnificent monuments remained. Beyond these and some traditions and echoes of gallantry and grand passions which have enriched the storehouse of Cypriot folk-lore, nothing. Upon the character of the Cypriots or the development of Cypriot history, art, literature, or political thought, they left no imprint. They belonged to a different world from that of the Cypriots, and they remained throughout encased in their own closed world.

'The Cypriots also remained in their world, held tenaciously to their traditions and beliefs and nursed through oral repetition their cultural inheritance, their own Akritic epics symbolizing what their nation had fought for, suffered and endured without losing either faith or hope'.[10]

The above shows Lusignan Cyprus to have been what would be called in modern terms a 'colonial' society: a small ruling foreign class, never ceasing to be foreign, ruling over and exploiting a native majority, while never establishing any lasting social or cultural contact with it. Cyprus was not the homeland of this class; it was more in the nature of a profitable estate managed by it and eventually going bankrupt. The epitaph of Lusignan Cyprus is pure and simple: they were unable to establish a state which could defend itself as they were only a colony and finally they had to rely on the colonial rule of Venice.

The direct rule of Venice in Cyprus was established in 1489, reducing the former Lusignan Kingdom to the status of a Venetian colony. The change from Lusignan to Venetian rule made very little difference. The Venetians continued to maintain the serf or tenant farmer status. Because of the Ottoman menace they taxed the population heavily while the political structure of the island remained essentially the same, save that instead of a King there was now a Venetian governor assisted by two counsellors. The rising power of the Ottomans forced the Venetians to turn Cyprus into a military garrison. The Venetians showed no interest in the economic

development of the island but like every military administration produced corruption,[11] oppression and decadence. This last period of Western rule in Cyprus came to an end in 1571 when the Ottomans conquered the island. When Latin rule ended the descendants of the crusaders and Italian merchants left Cyprus *en masse,* while the Gothic cathedrals of the Latins in Nicosia and Famagusta were turned into mosques, and thus according to Sir Harry Luke: 'With the advent of the Turks, Cyprus sinks into a long sleep'.[12]

The net result of the Ottoman conquest was that the island got rid of its Roman Catholic ruling class and their political system. The Greek Orthodox natives of the island were again masters of their own land in so far as this was possible under the Ottoman Turks. One cannot help feeling that the Ottoman conquest amounted to a liberation of the suppressed Greek Orthodox community. The Turks abolished serfdom so that everybody became a free man again; distributed the wealth of the Latin Church among Orthodox religious and secular bodies and re-established the Orthodox Archbishopric after a lapse of three hundred years. It was obvious that, as elsewhere under Ottoman rule, the head of the Orthodox community would be invested with special powers to assist in the government of the Empire. Thus, the arrival of the Turkish rule in Cyprus must have raised similar hopes of emancipation among the Orthodox population as the arrival of the British in 1878 did the ultimate hope for union with Greece.

The Turkish rule in Cyprus was, in fact, no better or worse than in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. It was characterized by inefficiency, corruption and oppression. 'Poverty, monotony and obscurity overshadow the new epoch; after the splendour of the Latin rule there was nothing but decline in every sphere, political, cultural and economic, encouraged by a corrupt administration'.[13] In spite of all this, however, the privileged position and wealth of the Orthodox Church grew in time. This is no wonder, as for administrative purposes, if for no other reason, the Turkish overlords treated the Archbishops as Ethnarchs or leaders of their people. The powers of the Archbishops progressively increased during the period of Turkish rule of the island: '. . . the Turks had no time either to develop their own specific political system or their own institutions of administration. They grafted themselves on the existing civilizations but only to drain them of all vitality. Like the Arab Caliphs earlier on, the Ottoman Sultans staffed their administration with competent persons from among their dependent peoples, particularly from among the Greeks, but unlike the Caliphs, they did not try to learn from them or allow themselves to be influenced by the cultures which they had engulfed'.[14]

In 1660 the Bishops of the Church of Cyprus were officially acknowledged as spokesmen of the Greek Christian community of Cyprus, with direct access to the Porte. In 1754, by the Firman of that year, the Church of Cyprus was recognized by the Sultan as a *millet*[15] of its own. The Church already had powers to collect taxes for the Sultan from the Christian community. Now, in addition to this it also became responsible for the collection of the fixed Moslem poll tax which used to be imposed on the Christians in the Moslem countries—the *Kharaj.*[16]

It must never be forgotten (as it often is) that throughout most of its history the Ottoman Empire had a predominantly feudal character, with large degrees of local independence based on the collection of taxes and payment of tribute.

The administrative and financial powers of the Archbishops of Cyprus reached their climax towards the end of the eighteenth century, when from 1783 Archbishop Chrysanthos together with the Dragoman[17] Hadji Georgakis Kornesios (a Greek Cypriot in the service of the Sultan) became responsible for a period of 25 years for the collection of taxes not only from the Christians but also from the Moslem minority now established on the island. According to Michael de Vezin, British Consul in Cyprus, 'The Turkish Governor never does the least thing except on the advice of the Archbishop, his three suffragans and the Dragoman.' Thus, for almost half a century the Archbishop and the Dragoman were in charge of the government of a semi-autonomous province with the Turkish administration almost eliminated.

William Turner, an official in the British Embassy at Constantinople, wrote at that time: 'Cyprus, though nominally under the authority of a Bey appointed by the Kapudan Pasha, is in fact governed by the Greek Archbishop and his subordinate clergy'.[18]

This unexpected culmination of Ottoman rule in Cyprus was in reality a stepping stone on the road to the coming Greek-Turkish conflict. In 1804 the Turks in Cyprus were in revolt against their oppression by the Christians. This left a legacy of bitterness in Cyprus which exploded in the Turkish atrocities practised against the Church of Cyprus in 1821 on the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence. The martyrdom of Archbishop Kyprianos and other bishops as well as a number of abbots and Greek notables still overshadows the relationship of Greeks and Turks today. 'This bloodbath also had one positive result, since the tension between Church and laity was much reduced after the loss of the clergy's political power. Greek Christians were once more able to unite against their Turkish overlords'.[19]

After the Greek War of Independence, which did not spread to Cyprus, relations between the Greeks and Turks on the island showed signs of mending. The poll tax on Christians was abolished and efforts were made to improve the administration by again including Greeks in it. Finally, the Turkish Governor of Cyprus had an Advisory Council (*Mejlis*) which consisted of nine Turkish Members and the Archbishop together with three other Greek Members. It is true that many changes were carried out which helped the improvement of conditions then prevailing in Cyprus. Phrankoudes[20] maintains that from about 1840, 'Cyprus was the best-governed province of the Turkish Empire, and the island began to recover and develop; the population increased[21] and trade revived. . . . The Turks got on well with the Christians.' However, the Ottoman Empire was generally in decline by this time, and even the best governed provinces of the Empire could not escape from the consequences of this creeping sickness: Ottoman rule had to lead to an ultimate decline.

The decay of the Ottoman Empire enhanced the fear of

powers such as Great Britain of Russian domination. If it had not been for the British intervention the Tsar would have been able to impose on Turkey the Treaty of San Stefano (signed on March 3, 1878), which would have placed Constantinople within the range of Russian and Bulgarian guns. Britain was in the forefront of stemming the Slav flood and the occupation of Cyprus was considered necessary by Disraeli, in order that British military power in the Mediterranean should be available to prop up Turkey in case of any further danger from the north. Cyprus was a useful acquisition as a military base. It was to remain a possession of Britain's ally Turkey though occupied by British troops and placed under British administration: 'Three centuries of Turkish rule had ended. Though they had brought little benefit to Cyprus, their legacy lived on. Turkish communities and their buildings as well as the Turkish system of administration, to some extent adopted by the British, became part of the life of the country. Above all, a permanent Turkish minority—in 1881, 46,389 Turks out of 186,084 inhabitants—remained, providing the background to the problem of modern Cyprus'.[22] The Cypriot chronicler writing in 1878 says that 'England came to Cyprus and the robbers ceased from troubling',[23] while Orr remarks that the history of Cyprus 'under Turkish rule can only be regarded, broadly speaking, as a sad record of oppression and misgovernment'.[24]

II
The British Rule

By the signing of the 'Convention of Defensive Alliance' by Great Britain and Turkey, on June 4, 1878, Cyprus became a British responsibility.

'If Batoum, Ardahan, Kars or any of them shall be retained by Russia, or if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia, as fixed by the definitive treaty of peace, England engages to join His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms.

'In return, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, promises to England to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, into the government and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in those territories; and in order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagement, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan further consents to assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England'.[1]

Thus, a new chapter began in the history of Cyprus in which the island although it nominally continued to be a part of the Ottoman Empire, was equally recognized to be an essentially Greek island placed under the colonial administration of Britain. In 1878 such an arrangement had somewhat unforeseen consequences, as it was regarded by the majority of the Greek population as a logical step towards the union of the island with a new free Greek state: 'No sooner was the British flag raised over Cyprus in 1878 than the Cypriots began to struggle and agitate to be united with Greece'.[2] Politically, this fact set the tone for the whole

history of Britain in Cyprus right down to the period of the more militant struggle for *enosis* which began in the early 1950's.

The history of Cyprus under Britain has been divided into three main periods:

A The period between 1878 and 1914 during which although the island was administered by Britain it remained part of the Ottoman Empire.

B The period from 1914 to 1925 which marked the annexation of Cyprus by Britain in November 1914, when Turkey joined Germany as an enemy in the First World War, until the proclamation of Cyprus as a Crown Colony in 1925.

C The period from 1925 to 1959, when Cyprus was a British colony, which in turn should be sub-divided by the year 1931 when Cyprus passed from a colonial constitution to an authoritarian regime which culminated in 1955 in the uprising of E.O.K.A.

The fact that Cyprus was still nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire did not prevent genuine philhellenic sentiment in the British governing class from giving their newly acquired 'base' a new political administrative structure. In 1882 the Liberal and philhellenic government of Gladstone endowed Cyprus with a new Constitution. It was proposed that the Legislative Council of the island should consist of six Official Members and twelve Elected Members, of whom nine were to be Greek and three Turks in accordance with the contemporary ratio of population.[3] The Legislative Council was to be presided over by the High Commissioner (the Chief of the British Administration in Cyprus had to have such a title at this period because Cyprus was not a British possession but still part of the Ottoman Empire). Except for certain reserved subjects, i.e. salaries, and expenses of the High Commissioner, of the six Official Members, of the Courts and Judges, and all charges concerning the tribute, all other matters were to come within the competence of the Council. Ultimate power to legislate by Order in Council was reserved for the British crown as represented by the High Commissioner. The vote was extended to all Cypriot

males over the age of twenty-one who were tax-payers.

The gift of the Constitution was received with rejoicing by the Greek population and the Archbishop sent a telegram of thanks to the Colonial Office. It raised the fears, on the other hand, of the Turkish minority who saw in it, at first, the advent of Greek majority rule which, they held, 'will ultimately become a prelude to the independence which is the motto constantly repeated by our Christian compatriots, and on which those designs and acts are concentrated'.[4] It is obvious from such sentiments that the Turks in Cyprus regarded British rule as a prelude to the independence of Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire and, logically, to its ultimate union with a free Greek state. As a matter of fact the workings of the 1882 Constitution brought about a state of affairs diametrically opposed to the fears of the Turks because the Turkish Members of the Council, together with the official Members, formed a permanent majority which deprived the Greeks of the power to exercise any influence over the conduct of public affairs. This, in turn, made the Greeks into a permanent opposition against the British administration of the island which, in its turn, made the British entirely dependent on the Turkish votes. Thus, during the constitutional period of British Cyprus the island was ruled by an Anglo-Turkish coalition against the opposition of the Greek majority, which, reduced to impotence, took refuge in ever-growing Hellenistic nationalism, the logical culmination of which had to be *enosis*. Hellenism became the politics of the Greek population, as the Legislative Council, instead of being the centre of political life, became a boring debating society, because all issues were always settled in advance by the axiomatic government majority; the Greeks could only create the nuisance of an endless and sterile opposition on principle. In 1925 the Council was enlarged, but, as Alastos says, again on the principle that the official British Members, plus the Turkish, exactly equalled the number of Greek members: 'There were now twelve Greeks, three Turks and nine officials plus the Governor's casting vote'.[5] Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Cyprus from 1926 to 1932, writes that this Anglo-Turkish combination

'could carry any measure against the united opposition of the twelve Greeks representing 80% of the total population of the island'.[6] Sir Ronald adds very epigrammatically that the Legislative Council was an 'exasperating and humiliating nuisance to all concerned'.[7]

In the meantime a diplomatic revolution was changing the European alignments. Britain and Russia were moving towards an alliance, while Turkey, under the Young Turks, was drifting towards Germany. In October 1914 Turkey was at war with Britain and on November 5, 1914, Cyprus was annexed by Britain by Order in Council. During the next eleven years it had no status whatsoever but was merely classified as a British possession. In 1915 the Western Allies desperately needed to prop up their position in the Balkans by saving Serbia and capturing Constantinople as a means of opening up communications with Russia. An incredible tangle resulted—a veritable Balkan imbroglio. The Western Allies needed the alliance of Greece, which had a pro-German monarchy. But Russia rejected any Greek alliance, in the meantime, because of its fear of the spread of Hellenism in an area which it had earmarked for itself, namely, the Straits, Anatolia, Cyprus and Syria. Meanwhile, owing to the incredible confusion and division of Greek internal politics, the Allies managed to establish a small force at Salonika while Greece remained officially neutral. In the circumstances, in order to launch their offensive against the Dardanelles the Allies tried all diplomatic means to induce Greece to join them in the war (despite Russian objections), and the British Representative in Athens, Sir Francis Elliot, was instructed to offer Cyprus to Greece in exchange for a Greek declaration of war against the Central Powers. The offer was refused by the Greek Prime Minister, Zaimes. However, at Versailles in 1919 Venizelos, Prime Minister of Greece, received verbal assurances from Lloyd George that H.M. Government would reconsider the whole position of Cyprus in due course. The departure of Venizelos as Prime Minister and the Greek disaster in Anatolia in 1922 left the Cyprus issue unaltered.

The years that ensued brought a deadly blow to the Greek

enosis movement. On March 10, 1925, Cyprus was declared a British Crown Colony. Between 1925 and 1931 it is associated with the name of Sir Ronald Storrs, the first and last Governor-General of Cyprus under the Constitution of 1882. The period of his Governorship forms a real paradox because Sir Ronald Storrs was, undoubtedly, one of the most capable and enlightened Governors of the island. Nevertheless his Governorship brought the 1882 Constitution crashing to the ground in 1931. From then on Cyprus was governed directly by the Governor and his officials. The imposition of colonial rule, especially after the 1931 uprising, constituted a harshness which challenged the aspirations of the Greek Cypriots. It could be said that the irreversible struggle for *enosis* began there and then, acquiring in time a more militant interpretation.

The cause of the crisis of 1931, which meant the end of the Cyprus Constitution, must be seen in its proper perspective. The status of Cyprus as a Crown Colony was galling to the Greeks, who felt degraded and humiliated by it. This created a detrimental atmosphere for economic difficulties which began to mount up as a result of the world economic crisis of 1929. An acute problem was the Turkish tribute. Under the Convention between Britain and the Sultan, signed in 1878, Cyprus was made responsible for an annual tribute, the sum of which came to £92,800 per annum. The payment of this tribute was to be levied from the revenue of Cyprus, but it ceased to be paid with the outbreak of the First World War although Britain continued to collect the money to defray the holders of the Ottoman Debt. By 1927, after forty-eight years, the Cypriots had paid to the British exchequer just over 2½ million pounds.[8] Although the tribute was abolished in 1927, Britain refused to release the accumulated surpluses and continued to assess Cyprus for its share of the Turkish Debt at £92,800. In 1931, owing to the defection of one Turkish Member of the Legislative Council, one tax bill was lost for the first time. The Governor imposed the bill by an Order in Council. This measure led to a campaign of civil disobedience and a boycott of British goods. Thus, in October 1931, fighting broke out in which six

people were killed and the Governor's House was burnt down. The result was that on 'November 12, 1931 the Governor was given all power to legislate, i.e. empowered to rule by decree. Thus an absolutist regime, with the Governor as paramount lord, was established'.[9] The Legislative Council was now abolished, municipal elections were abolished, political parties were made illegal and the press was placed under strict censorship.[10]

In the years preceding the Second World War a series of government measures restricted further the liberties of the subject. All articles in the press dealing with either local or international questions were placed under censorship. This even applied to the reporting of articles which had appeared in the London press and to reports of proceedings in Parliament. All meetings were forbidden, and all manifestations of Greek (and for the time being Turkish) nationality were repressed. Education was placed under complete government control, and the teaching of Greek and Turkish history in the schools was severely restricted. These repressive measures were prompted by the fact that the disturbances of 1931 occurred under the Greek flag and the leadership of the Greek Orthodox Church. They represented the beginning of the militant struggle for *enosis* and it is no wonder that two bishops—Nicodemos of Kition and Makarios of Kyrenia—were among ten Greek political leaders who were exiled from the island.

The rising of 1931 brought all discussion of reform to an end: henceforth, Cyprus was governed directly by the British Governor and his officials. During these years, propaganda for *enosis* continued, scarcely abated, though hampered by censorship and official interference. This was done through the activity of the Church, though at the time it was leaderless. The propaganda conflicted with the official attitude of the Venizelos government in Athens and its 'condemnation of the events of October 21, 1931'.[11] In the meantime the Committee for Cypriot Autonomy was founded in London in 1937 and it became very active.[12]

Cyprus entered the Second World War, which was supposed to have been waged against dictatorship, while itself

living under a dictatorial regime. The police had the right to enter any house or stop any person in the street to carry out a search and possession of 'socialist' literature was a punishable offence. Nevertheless, the outbreak of the war produced a similar patriotic euphoria in Cyprus to the outbreak of the First World War: the inevitable next logical step on the road to union with Greece.

By 1940 Britain and Greece were fighting against the same enemy, and in 1941 the Prime Minister of the Greek government, in exile in London, Mr. Constantine Tsouderos, announced that he visualized Cyprus within a greater Greece after the war. More than 25,000 Cypriots in the Cyprus Regiment and other branches of the British services fought bravely on the Allied side. In such circumstances the regime in Cyprus had to be relaxed under the existing war conditions. The net result of this was the emergence of political groupings, mostly left-wing, which received the government's blessing. Municipal elections were held in March 1943 and saw the formation of the Progressive Party of the Working People (A.K.E.L.)[13] whose candidates were successful in Famagusta and Limassol. In the meantime the Cyprus National Party (K.E.K.), a right-wing middle-class party, supported by the Church, and encouraged by the then Archbishop Makarios II, was formed in 1947. In the early years of peace after the Second World War political life in Cyprus polarized between the above two parties. Other lesser parties came into being, the most important of which was the Agrarian Party, P.E.K. (Cyprus Rural Union) with a national political outlook. By 1949 all the national parties and groups accepted the leadership of the Ethnarchy Council and they were thus able to poll 60% of the votes in the municipal elections of May 1949.[14]

Meanwhile, the post-war British Labour government had to come to terms with its mandate and the much-wanted principles of the Atlantic and United Nations Charters. The legal continuation of the 1931 regime in Cyprus was an anachronism. In October 1946 the newly appointed Labour Secretary for the Colonies, Creech Jones, in a statement to the House of Commons announced a plan for a new and

more liberal Constitution for Cyprus, including the establishment of a Central Legislature, and the repeal of certain anti-ecclesiastical measures of 1937, which had prevented the election[15] of a new Archbishop (a Locum Tenens held the office). No mention was made of the issue of *enosis* or the future of the island. This was a great mistake on the part of the British government, because in the post-war situation, and in the face of the United Nations Charter the drive for self-determination and decolonization had become the only political issue which could really matter to the Cypriots. This was amply borne out in a letter to the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, from the London Cypriot Committee in November 1946:

'We have carefully read the statement on Cyprus which the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Creech Jones, made to the House of Commons on 23 October, according to which His Majesty's Government have had the question of Cyprus under review and have decided to seek opportunities to establish a more liberal and progressive regime in the internal affairs of the island. Mr. Creech Jones outlined the forms by which this "liberal and progressive regime" is to be achieved and permitted the impression to be gathered by the House, as well as by the Press, that His Majesty's Government were earnestly attempting to grapple with the Cypriot problem and to provide some form of settlement of the political and economic affairs of the island . . .

'From the very beginning of British rule there has been a definite tendency on the part of the British authorities either in London or in Cyprus to ignore the Cypriots . . .

'Your Government, Sir, has completely ignored the national sentiments of the Cypriot people and the ever repeated national demand for Union with Greece. That this demand is basic and unalterable, part and parcel of the Cypriots' ethnical life, must be known to His Majesty's Government. It has been constantly voiced by the Cypriots since the very first day of the British occupation . . .

'In conclusion we want to register our protest at the decision of His Majesty's Government to turn Cyprus into a permanent naval, military and air base'.[16]

This stand of the London Cypriot Committee was backed by a telegram from the Ethnarchy Council rejecting categorically and with indignation any solution of the Cypriot question not granting their national liberty by union with Greece. The government, however, remained adamant[17] and on November 1, 1947 Lord Winster, the Governor of Cyprus, convened a Consultative Assembly, which was attended only by Greek Left-wing elements and Turkish representatives: the Ethnarchy Council boycotted it and described Britain as offering the Cypriots 'a knife with which to cut in pieces their own national rights, for the people were asked to endorse the perpetuation of their enslavement'.[18] Nevertheless, the left-wing Members of the Consultative Assembly, the Mayor of Limassol, P. Servas, and the Mayor of Larnaca, L. Santamas, pressed on with a demand for full self-government. This was answered in 1948 by the Creech Jones–Winster Constitutional proposals which envisaged a Constitutional Legislature of 22 elected Members, four of them Turkish plus four official Members. Wide reserved powers were to be left to the Governor and his Executive Council. But, above all, the 'status of Cyprus' within the British Commonwealth was to be precluded from discussion. The Turkish Members and three others who had been personally invited by the Governor to participate in the work of the Assembly and who together constituted the majority, accepted the proposals. But all the Greek Members reiterated their demand for responsible government and walked out (they were all left-wing). Without the co-operation of the Greek Members it was impossible to carry on the consultations and they were thus adjourned on August 12, 1948. The attitude of the right-wing Greek majority was even more uncompromising. The Archbishop, Makarios II, declared in May of the same year that the terms were wholly unacceptable and called upon the Greeks of Cyprus to fight for '*enosis* and only *enosis*'.[19]

Politics in Cyprus began to be affected by the civil war in Greece which was waged by the Greek Communists against a fundamentally right-wing government supported by Great Britain and the U.S.A. The Greek civil war brought about a

split between A.K.E.L. and the national pro-*enosis* movement. This remained in evidence throughout the whole of the forthcoming struggle which now reached the United Nations in the form of a memorandum from the London Cypriot Committee to the 'Special Assembly Committee of U.N.O. for the non-self-governing territories'.

The split in Cyprus between the forces of A.K.E.L., which were now ranged against a 'monarcho-fascist Greece', the appeal to the United Nations and a rising determination to implicate officially the Greek government in the Cyprus struggle were almost totally ignored and, as already mentioned, united all the Cypriots in their common cause. The result was the referendum of January 15, 1950 which proved of the greatest 'publicity value' for the Cypriot delegation who visited Greece, France, England and the United Nations. For the first time the King of Greece in a speech from the throne to the Greek parliament declared as the concern of all Greeks 'the sacred national claim of the union of Cyprus with Greece'.[20] However, the most important event in the story this far was the death of Archbishop Makarios II and the election in October 1950 of his successor, Archbishop Makarios III.

Although Archbishop Makarios III ascended the historic throne of St. Barnabas at the age of 37 in an atmosphere supercharged with the emotional aftermath of the referendum, the fact emerges that the outbreak of subsequent violence in Cyprus was delayed for over four years by two sets of factors: diplomatic manoeuvring between Britain, Greece and Turkey, both direct and at the United Nations level; and by the personality of the new Archbishop, who strove to wring every advantage from these diplomatic negotiations to reach a peaceful solution until he was shoved aside by the more radical of his followers, who had been provoked beyond all patience by the continuing stalemate.

Archbishop Makarios in 1952 and 1953 headed Cypriot delegations to Athens, London and New York in the hope of settling the Cyprus dispute—for so it now became—between Britain and Greece by diplomatic means. Yet it must be conceded that the Archbishop was unlucky in that his arrival

on the scene coincided with a change of government in Britain. From 1951 onwards, Britain was under a Conservative government, headed by Churchill, Eden and Macmillan. This government had to face a rapidly deteriorating position for Britain on the Suez Canal and in the Middle East in general owing to the rise of Arab nationalism and the subsequent Nasserist Revolution in Egypt. In these circumstances the Tory politicians found it convenient to forget the democratic principles and promises they harped upon in war time. They became obsessed with the all-important task of keeping Britain 'Great' and maintaining the integrity of the British Empire, and reverted to their traditional 'keep-the-wogs-under' policy.

It is hardly surprising that after Nasser the British saw in Cyprus their only safe remaining foot-hold in the Middle East. Accordingly the Conservative leadership chose to shut its eyes to reality. Lord Avon (then Mr. Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary) in a famous informal conversation with Marshal Papagos, the then Greek Prime Minister, rendered the answer of 'never' to a polite suggestion to discuss the future status of Cyprus. As Papagos recounted afterwards, Eden disdained even to say 'we shall see', but simply barked out 'never'.[21] Such diplomatic bludgeoning was followed up by his official declaration in the House of Commons in March 1954 that 'Her Majesty's Government cannot agree to discuss the status of Cyprus'.[22] The turning point, however, came on July 28, 1954 when the then Minister of State for the Colonies, H.L. Hopkinson, declared in an answer to an opposition question in the House of Commons that: 'There are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent'.[23] No reference was made to Cyprus in this declaration, but as the Cyprus question was under general discussion at that time the damage was done and an indelible insult had been hurled in the face of the rising tide of anti-colonialism. The patient efforts of the young Archbishop for peace and reason were stifled by the British Conservative politicians, and guns were placed in the hands of his more impatient followers, whom he could no longer restrain,

because of the bankruptcy of these same politicians. The inevitable followed: gunfire and bloodshed brought to a sad end the British period in the history of Cyprus.

III
Cyprus:
Cultural and Educational Background

Since the time of Evagoras I of Salamis (411 B.C.—373 B.C.) the culture of Cyprus has been continuously Greek, that is, Cyprus, in common with other Greek lands, followed the general pattern of classical Hellenic culture, which passed through the imperial stage under the Roman Empire into the Byzantine and Christian period. Cyprus, because of its geographical position, was not one of the centres of Greek Hellenic culture such as Athens, Alexandria and Antioch, but it nevertheless made its contribution to that culture, which was quite rich and varied. Even in the pre-classical period a Greek Cypriot poet, Kinyras, is mentioned as a lyric poet of the Aphrodisiac cult at Paphos. None of his verses has, unfortunately, survived. Euclos is the first Cypriot poet whose verses are recorded. But the most famous poet of Cyprus is deemed to be Stassinos, the author of epic poems in the Homeric vein, who has even been confused with Homer himself.

Cultural activity in Cyprus was stifled after the death of Evagoras I by the Persian imposition, and it was only the victories of Alexander the Great which re-established Greek cultural life on the island. This period was marked by extraordinary literary activity. One can cite such authors as Aristos of Salamis, Asclepiades the Cypriot, Herminax the Cypriot, the author of *Phrygika*, Clearchos of Soli, Demetrios of Salamis and Onassimos the Cypriot.[1]

During this period Cyprus produced its most famous literary figure to date and one of the greatest figures of Greek thought, Zeno[2] of Kition, the Stoic philosopher. Zeno, although a native of Cyprus, is identified with Athens

where he established his philosophical school. The same applies to another Cypriot philosopher, Eydemos, one of the original pupils of Plato and a friend of Aristotle, who also passed most of his life outside Cyprus. Concerning Zeno and Evdemos it has been said that the better Cypriot philosophers 'did not find the air of their native land congenial'.[3] However, it must be borne in mind that then as now metropolitan cultural centres attracted provincials, and drew on the best talents available.

During the period of the Roman Empire the centre of Hellenistic culture shifted from Athens to Alexandria, where it remained until the triumph of Christianity. The coming of Christianity began a new phase in the cultural development of all Greek peoples, because a fusion took place between the Greek language and religion,[4] the synthesis of which constituted the vital and dynamic factors which moulded and preserved the character of all the Greek subjects of the Byzantine Empire whether in Constantinople, Smyrna, Athens, Alexandria or elsewhere. Cyprus participated fully in this formation of the Greek Orthodox Byzantine culture.

During the Byzantine-Christian period, which lasted from the fourth to the twelfth century, Cyprus renewed its cultural life by drawing inspiration from Christianity. 'Certainly, Cypriot art remains essentially Byzantine to this day, while in many other parts of the Byzantine Empire the inhabitants made use of the Greek *Koine*, but have retained few Byzantine cultural legacies.' The island distinguished itself by producing such famous churchmen as Spyridon of Trimythus, Tychon of Amathus and Epiphanios of Constantia. However, the greatest monuments of the Byzantine Christian civilization were the churches and monasteries and their art. In this respect Cyprus was one of the most famous centres of Byzantine art and civilization. In the architectural sphere this was enhanced by the fact that all the building in Cyprus was executed in stone in contrast to the mainland Byzantine tradition of building in brick. Famous churches with mosaics and paintings representative of this period are the church of Angeloktistos at Kiti, and Kanakaria of Lythrangomi (fifth and sixth century). The churches at

Asinou and Araka at Lagoudera are famous for some of the finest Byzantine frescoes of the period.[5]

In the literary field the Byzantine period prior to the Frankish conquest of 1192 produced a Cypriot variation of the epic of Vassilios Dighenis Akritas,[6] the Byzantine popular epic of Christian heroism common to the whole Hellenic world. A further development took place after 1192. The humiliation and suffering of the Greek Cypriots for their faith had to be recorded for posterity. St. Neophytos (1134-1225) produced numerous works on moral and social conduct during this time of challenge. He was followed by Leontios Macheras (late thirteenth century to early fourteenth century), a chronicler considered to be the first writer of modern Greek prose. Macheras is seen as one of the most human and spirited chroniclers of the Middle Ages. His work was continued by George Boustron who, although a member of the Latin community, wrote in the Greek Cypriot dialect.

The Turkish conquest of the island put an end to the Frankish period in the history of Cyprus. It extinguished the flourishing Cypriot-Lusignan culture. Culturally, as was usual with them, the Turks brought no alternative culture. On the other hand, the Turkish conquest removed all non-Hellenic elements from the island. The cultural life of Cyprus, now entirely under the Greek Orthodox Church, became re-Hellenized. In the eighteenth century Cyprus shared in the cultural revival of Hellenism, which manifested itself also on the mainland of Greece, in Constantinople and in Rumania. In 1788 the Archimandrite Kyprianos published in Venice the first scientific history of Cyprus, in the spirit of eighteenth-century enlightenment. In 1812 this intellectual ferment influenced the then Archbishop of Cyprus, Kyprianos, to establish at Nicosia the first modern school on the Western European pattern in the Greek world. Subsequently it became known as the Pancyprian Gymnasium.

Following this period, the liberation of Greece in 1830 marked the turning point in the cultural life of Cyprus as the intellectual life of the island became orientated towards the national centre of revived Greek culture—Athens. Paradoxically, cultural bonds between Athens and Cyprus were

tightened after the onset of British rule in 1878, which brought about the almost complete emancipation of Greek culture with, of course, the toleration of the new occupiers. Accordingly, as the British regime rendered possible closer intellectual and educational links between Cyprus and Athens, it would not be inaccurate to say that any marked cultural distinction between Cyprus and mainland Greece tended to disappear. The last prominent representatives of the local tradition, who were influential poets in the Cypriot dialect as distinct from Athenian Greek, were Vassilis Michaelides and Demetris Lipertis. The former has been compared to Solomos because of his stirring epic on the martyrdom at the hands of the Turks of Archbishop Kyprianos and the other bishops and Cypriot dignitaries on July 9, 1821. The latter has been hailed as the new Theognis of Greek poetry because of his lyrical descriptions of country life in Cyprus in all its simplicity before it became spoiled by modern civilization.

Education in Cyprus will be considered from the time of the Turkish occupation of the island, i.e. 1571. The Turkish conquest at first, according to eye witnesses and travellers, brought about the ruin and impoverishment of Cyprus and ignorance and illiteracy, even among the clergy, were commonplace. Any attempts by enlightened Cypriot churchmen to secure an improvement in this respect did not meet with much success prior to the eighteenth century. However, after the middle of the eighteenth century the condition of the Greek Cypriots began to improve, a fact which was not unconnected with the rising power of the Archbishops of Cyprus. This had a favourable effect on the education of the Greek Cypriots. The first Greek school[7] was founded in Larnaca in 1733 to be followed by one in Nicosia soon after. These two schools survived until 1780 when they were closed by the corrupt Turkish Governor, Haji Baki. The revival of Greek learning took place in 1812 when Archbishop Kyprianos founded the famous Hellenike Schole in Nicosia, which was not only a school for the Greeks but a school run on western lines. Despite the fact that the school was suppressed in 1821, when Kyprianos was put to death, it was

allowed to reopen in 1830: 'Ever since its foundation it has always been the "vanguard" of the island's cultural as well as national life. It became the model for all the other Greek secondary schools which were founded later on, first in the towns and then in the island's big villages'.[8] By 1840 Larnaca and Limassol too had their 'Hellenic' schools all modelled on the school at Nicosia.

The most remarkable and historic event which, from the educational point of view, can be described as the beginning of Cypriot national education took place in the 1840's. Archbishop Panaretos called the 'General Assembly' to decide about the foundation of a common fund for schools, to draw the budget for school years, to appoint the first educational committee and to state their duties. But from 1843 it seems that the common fund idea was discontinued and every town became responsible for the appointment and payment of its teachers. The Bishop of the district was the President of the school committee. For the schools in the villages, the parents of the pupils were responsible for the payment of the teachers, while the village authorities undertook the responsibility of supplying the teachers. Many villages as well as town schools received grants for educational purposes from the local churches. Indeed, throughout the nineteenth century all schools in Cyprus were supported either by the Church and the monasteries or by fees paid by the pupils.

In 1878 when the British rule of the island began, there were 83 Greek schools in the island, but attendance must have been low as most of the people were illiterate. This was the natural concomitant of the Turkish occupation which favoured the economically dominant minority.

By 1880 the first British Director of Education was appointed. He was the Rev. Josiah Spencer, who became very unpopular because of his desire to suppress the Greek language in education by imposing the English language.[9]

After a period of frustration, the British government ordered the establishment of a Board of Education for the island—soon to be replaced by one for the Greeks and one for the Turks—to assume responsibility for the management of

the education of its respective community. The Chairmanship of the Greek Board was offered to the Archbishop but because of disagreement as to the purely advisory character envisaged for the Board, the scheme did not materialize until 1895.

In 1901 Canon F.D. Newham succeeded Spencer as Director of Education, and he proved himself to be more popular than his predecessor. By 1901 the number of Greek schools on the island had increased to 273 with 15,712 pupils.

The next important development in education took place in 1923. By means of an education law of that year the government took over responsibility for the appointment and dismissal of Greek teachers in the elementary schools who had previously been appointed by the local education committees. This law, from the point of view of Greek nationalists, 'Constitutes the first real interference by the government in the Greek elementary education of the island and is the beginning of the conflict between the government on the one hand, the Church and the people on the other, with regard to the question of education'.[10]

The further course of education in Cyprus became conditioned, as everything else, by the events of 1931. By the Education Law of 1933 the Governor became the 'Central Authority of Education'.[11]

As far as secondary Greek education was concerned the schools of the island were left free from any interference (almost) from the Education Department. They continued to be Greek (Church-administered); they continued teaching a Greek curriculum approved by the Ministry of Education in Athens, and they continued to be fee-paying. Indeed, during the first fifty years of the British rule in Cyprus the government pursued a policy of indifference.

From 1935 right up to 1959 a hard and bitter struggle raged between the Greek Orthodox Church and the government both trying to secure the complete control of secondary education. In opposing the Church the government—especially after 1945—established[12] many secondary schools, the fees of which were extremely low compared with those

of the secondary Church[13] schools. But very few parents were prepared to send their children to these government schools, for fear of being branded as traitors. In this long and bloodless struggle between Church and government the Church finally emerged victorious.

All later moves by the government in the field of secondary education, particularly after 1950, cannot, unfortunately, be divorced from its struggle against *enosis,* and belong to the examination of that topic.

By 1960, when the British rule of the island was officially terminated, more than 90% of the children of elementary school age (6-12) and approximately 25% of the children of secondary school age (12-18) attended school.

PART B

IV
Makarios and the Orthodox Church

To the casual observer it seems that Cyprus has been projected on to the stage of world affairs by its Church. Under twentieth-century conditions this seems, at first, highly undesirable and anachronistic. This is due to the fact, which is often forgotten by liberals brought up in the Western tradition, that Cyprus, like much of the Near East, 'is not yet of our epoch'.[1] Religion and history have both conspired to produce this state of affairs. The Church of Cyprus has, since the fifth century, made much capital of its autonomy derived from its Apostolic origins through the missionary efforts of St. Paul. 'It is not often realized that the Orthodox Church of Cyprus is one of the oldest Christian churches of the world, much older than the Patriarchate of Constantinople itself or the Church of Metropolitan Greece'.[2] However, such independence was purely ecclesiastical, and as long as Cyprus remained a province of the Eastern Roman Empire the Church of Cyprus, like the other autocephalous Churches of the Empire (Alexandria and Antioch) exercized no political power whatsoever. The political prominence of the Church of Cyprus is entirely due to the Turkish conquest and the peculiar conditions prevailing within the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkish conquerors on the fall of Constantinople in 1453 conferred considerable civil authority on the Orthodox Patriarch, making him directly responsible *vis-à-vis* the Sultan in respect of all his Christian Orthodox subjects. The Turkish conquerors were primarily military and comparatively primitive in the political and administrative sense, and were forced to rely on the greater experience and sophistication of their

conquered Greek subjects. Moreover, in conferring civil authority on the prelates of the Christian Churches within their jurisdiction they were only following the precedent adopted by previous Arab conquerors. In this way the *millet* (nation) system became established in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the Christian prelates became not only the spiritual guides but the heads of their nations within the vast structure of the Ottoman Empire. In this way the Turkish conquerors provided themselves with an admirably organized and self-financing civil service, something which it would have been impossible for them to have provided in the circumstances.

With the conquest of Cyprus in 1571 similar powers were bestowed on the Archbishop of Cyprus, whose office the Turks permitted to be revived after a lapse of three hundred years under the Lusignans. The fact that Cyprus was conquered by the Turks considerably later than the other Greek territories meant that the Turkish authorities were not too keen on placing the Greek population under the direct control of the Patriarch of Constantinople and the Archbishop would 'constitute a useful check on the activities of the local Turkish officials'.[3] This authority conferred on the Archbishops was contained in an official patent signed by the Sultan himself and known as the *berat*. On the authority of the historian Kyprianos the first of these *berats* issued to Archbishops of Cyprus is recorded in 1660. The *berat* recognized the Archbishop of Cyprus as the Ethnarch—head of a separate *millet* or nation of Cyprus, a title which the Archbishops themselves did not use before the nineteenth century. In addition, from an early stage in the Ottoman period the Archbishops came to be popularly elected by the whole Greek-Cypriot Community.

In the course of time the efficient financial administration of the Archbishops made them more important from the point of view of the Ottoman government than the Turkish officials on the island. The Archbishops wielded greater influence than the Turkish Pashas. Ali bey el Abbassi visited Cyprus in 1806 where he met the Governor, the Church leaders and other officials. Of the Archbishop he writes: 'The

Archbishop, an independent Patriarch in communion with the Greek Church, is also the prince or supreme spiritual and temporal chief of the Greek community in the island. He is responsible to the Grand Seigneur (Sultan) for the taxes and conduct of the Greek Cypriots. To avoid entering into the details of circumstances, and excuse himself from the burden of part of the temporal administration, he has delegated his powers to the Dragoman of Cyprus who has thus become the chief civil authority; he has practically the rank and attributions of a prince of the community, because the Turkish Governor can do nothing to a Greek without the participation and the presence of the Dragoman, who is also entrusted with the duty of laying at the foot of the Grand Seigneur's throne the wishes of his fellow Christians'.[4] This unchallenged rise of the power of the Archbishops and Bishops continued until the Greek War of Independence in 1821. It was during this period that the Archbishops assumed in fact the title of Ethnarch. This amazing power of the Archbishops of Cyprus was, no doubt, due to the insular nature of the country and its closely-knit population, apart from the Turkish garrison.

In 1878 the Ottomans departed and were replaced by the British. In reality the *berat*[5] system, and the ethnarchic powers of the Archbishops derived from it, ended with the departure of the Ottomans. However, after so many years the position of the Archbishop of Cyprus was so entrenched as the head of the Greek community that he was the most important figure on the island and recognized as such by the British authorities. It was in this capacity, and as the champion of the Hellenic ethnic idea, that the Archbishop of Cyprus collided with the British colonial administration in the period of nationalism following the First World War on such subjects as *enosis* and education. This collision led to the riots of 1931 and the virtual abolition of the office of Archbishop by the British authorities in 1937.

The partial liberalization of the British colonial regime in Cyprus during the Second World War led, as far as Church affairs were concerned, to the British authorities sanctioning the election of a new Archbishop in 1947. The new incumbent,

Leontios, died after 36 days in office, and the next Archbishop to be elected was the militant Makarios II, one of the exiles of 1931.

No sooner was Makarios II enthroned than he lost no time in renewing his feud with the British colonial administration. The climate, however, had changed. Greece and Britain had been close allies in the war and Britain had fully participated in the restoration of the Greek monarchy in 1944 and was also fully participating in the anti-Communist civil war in Greece. The time of anticolonialism and the United Nations Charter had also arrived. The Archbishop precipitated this issue, after some abortive moves on the part of the British administration to introduce constitutional reforms, with his call for a plebiscite on *enosis*, under the prompting of his brilliant young lieutenant, the Bishop of Kition, the future Archbishop Makarios III, who was the organizer and moving spirit of the whole enterprise. The resulting plebiscite vote was a triumph for the old Archbishop. However, he did not survive it long, dying on June 28, 1950. Once again the archiepiscopal throne was vacant. The Church of Cyprus and the whole Greek community were now on the threshold of a momentous struggle evolving from many years of frustration. It was at this historic juncture that the choice of the electors, that is of the Greek community, fell on the 37-year-old Makarios, who had returned in 1948 from further theological studies in the United States and became Bishop of Kition on June 13, 1948. He was enthroned as Makarios III on October 20, 1950, having inherited the battle commenced by his predecessors. With this young, popular and energetic primate —the youngest the throne of St. Barnabas had ever seen—the cause of *enosis* not only gained a new vitality but also a leader of universally acknowledged stature.

Almost from the first, because of his commitment to the cause of *enosis* bequeathed to him by his predecessor, the new Archbishop was denounced by the British press and by political opponents as a power-hungry politician. The truth is far removed from these political and journalistic fantasies. If his career and personality are closely and dispassionately examined, Michael Christodoulos Mouskos, Archbishop

Makarios III of Cyprus, emerges as an essentially spiritual personality fulfilling all the qualifications needed for an occupant of an episcopal throne which alone has endowed him with the charismatic attributes needed in a great leader. He represents a revolution not so much in politics but rather in the Church in that he is obviously one of the few ecclesiastical leaders in the world today to acknowledge the need for the Church to understand the nature and issues of the world in which it exists.

Makarios was born into the family of a poor shepherd-farmer in the small village of Pano Panayia, Paphos, on August 13, 1913, and it is a commentary on the limited means of his family that, despite the fact that Cyprus is a small island, he did not see the sea until the age of 18. Despite these handicaps he distinguished himself sufficiently at the elementary school of his village to be admitted at the age of twelve as a novice at Kykko Monastery, the oldest and most distinguished centre of monastic learning in Cyprus. He remained at the monastery for twelve years, and was singled out from among the novices to attend the three top classes at the Pancyprian Gymnasium in Nicosia. He thus received the best education which the island could then provide for its future ecclesiastical leaders. However, this was not the end of his academic prowess. In 1938 he was awarded a scholarship to study theology at the University of Athens after being ordained deacon. He remained in Athens during the German occupation studying theology and then law. On graduation in 1942, being cut off from his homeland, he became a curate at the Church of St. Erene in Athens. He was ordained as priest on January 13, 1946. But his thirst for knowledge and academic excellence was not quenched. He obtained one of the ten scholarships offered by the World Council of Churches for study in the United States and left Athens in September 1946 for the Methodist Theological College at the University of Boston, Massachusetts.

In the U.S.A. the young priest continued his programme of assiduous theological studies and also paid considerable attention to oratory by joining the debating society at his College. His sojourn in the U.S.A. is evidence enough that he

was both a widely educated and travelled man when he came to be elected Bishop of Kition in 1948, though the acceptance of the election went against his original inclination of becoming a Professor of Theology. This deep academic disposition of Makarios must not be underplayed. He holds theological views not dissimilar to those of Origen. Such a theological orientation is expressive of a broad and acute mind, alive to all the moral, philosophical and scientific issues at stake in the modern world. Makarios, in short, is a model of what a modern progressive churchman should be. He is liberal in his views, but at the same time he is extremely devout and simple in his life: he can never outgrow his early monastic training with its accent on Spartan simplicity and hard intellectual work. All this is indicative of the fact that Makarios would have made his mark either as an academic or as a churchman had he not chosen to shoulder the political burden imposed on him by his Cypriot origins. He has been accused of politicizing his spiritual office, but the contrary is true: by his essentially spiritual personality he has spiritualized the political struggle into which he has been forced by circumstances. Herein lies the secret of Makarios's charismatic personality, which produces in people who come into contact with him either deep admiration or deep dislike, which is a typical phenomenon associated with spiritual men. This is why he commands such a wide devotion in his followers and those who have had personal contacts with him, and excites such detestation in his enemies such as some sections of the British press and the Turkish political leaders.

Once enthroned as Archbishop Makarios showed his organizing abilities by enlarging the Ethnarchy Council to make it fit for a systematic campaign in favour of *enosis*. This was followed in 1952 by the establishment of P.E.O.N. (Pancyprian National Youth Organization) and a parallel body called O.H.E.N. (Organization of Orthodox Christian Youth). At the same time Makarios, as befitted his political skill and broad-mindedness, established contact with all the political groupings of the island.

One of Makarios's greatest achievements has been the

gaining of international recognition for the Church of Cyprus. This was achieved by his strenuous travels to various countries in 1952-53, a move which showed his ultra-modern and non-parochial approach to the problem facing him. He was able to enlist the enthusiastic support of Archbishop Spyridon of Athens, who became the head of the Panhellenic Committee for the Cyprus struggle and put considerable pressure on the Greek government to take the Cyprus issue to the United Nations. This policy was such a marked success because previously the Greek government had tried to deal with the Cyprus problem by way of direct negotiations with Britain. The policy bore fruit when on August 29, 1954, Greece appealed to the United Nations over the Cyprus issue, a move greatly helped by the undiplomatic treatment of Papagos by Lord Avon (then Mr. Anthony Eden).

Makarios struck one final moral blow of defiance at the colonial administration of Cyprus before the struggle entered a more deadly phase. This was on August 15, 1954 when, despite the threat of five years' imprisonment for sedition for advocacy of *enosis*, Makarios defied the law[6] in a speech at the Troödítissa Monastery. Not a hand was raised to apprehend the Archbishop. He had defied the colonial government and rolled it in the dust. From now on he displayed truly heroic proportions and, in retrospect, it seems obvious, when one remembers the course of events in other parts of the British Empire (cf. Gandi in India), that his final victory over an antiquated colonial system was inevitable. That the victory was protracted and blood flowed has been entirely due to the false pride and short-sighted policy of British politicians and their advisers. Whatever future historians may say about the Cyprus settlement of 1959 they will not be able to deny that it was a personal triumph for Makarios and for the ancient tradition of the Church of Cyprus which he so ably maintained; a true alliance between ancient traditions and progressive thinking.

V
The Turkish Minority in Cyprus

'The Turks,' wrote Giacomo Diedo, 'found no opposition on the way, the inhabitants, through inconstancy of temperament, or because the yoke of slavery imposed on them by the Cypriot nobles made them flatter themselves that they might find better luck under a new master, even offered them provisions, and gave them the fullest information as to the position of affairs and the condition of the island'.[1] The conquest of Cyprus by Turkey from Venice in 1571 introduced a Turkish army into the island. The Turkish garrison remained because of the danger of a Venetian reconquest, as the Venetians still held Crete and other islands. The Turkish garrison came to form a semi-feudal military autocracy, their 'religion' insuring their superior status over the Christian population.

In a comparatively short time about 20,000 demobilized Turkish soldiers were settled on lands seized from the Venetians and Latins. When the Turkish forces which had effected the conquest were disbanded, some 20,000 Turks were left in the island, or brought thither, to serve not merely as a garrison but as settlers. The Sultan insisted from the beginning that it was very important that fiefs should not be held by absentees but by men who would settle in Cyprus. At first, it was illegal to sell such fiefs, since they were really state lands; later, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Sultan began to sell land to the rayahs, who in their turn acquired the right to sell or lease out state lands. Fiefs went to the highest bidder, not to the most worthy person. It even came about that persons who had been deprived of governships elsewhere acquired land in Cyprus, and oppressed the

peasantry. The new Turkish administration found that Cyprus was somewhat underpopulated and strenuous efforts were made to supplement the depleted population of the island by transferring to it people from Anatolia (both Christian and Moslem). By the Sultan's firman addressed to the Kadis in Anatolia, Karaman, Rum and Zulkadir one out of every ten households was to be transferred to Cyprus. In 1573, it was reported by Queen Elizabeth's intelligence in the Levant that from Anatolia 'three households in every street shall go to people Cyprus, where there are few Turks and many Christians'.[2] Specific Turkish quarters were established in the principal towns of Cyprus, particularly at Famagusta, and all the Roman Catholic churches and cathedrals were converted into mosques. 'It has been said that the Turks did not build in the island, but merely made use, cuckoo-like, of the buildings of others'.[3] As in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, powerful Turkish landlords—the Aghas—acquired large estates in Cyprus.

Although Cyprus became a province of the Ottoman Empire, in many ways its conquest and subsequent administration by the Turks were different from those of other parts of the Empire. The stationing of a large military force in Cyprus after the conquest is significant. This was due to the peculiar strategic conditions prevailing in the Eastern Mediterranean at that time. The Ottomans had made themselves the masters of the Middle East and held Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt and Libya. They had just conquered Cyprus from Venice. But Venice, still a considerable maritime power in the Mediterranean, held on to Crete until 1669 and several other Greek islands, the Ionian Islands and several strong points in the Morea. A Venetian counter-offensive in Cyprus would have enabled the enemies of the Ottoman Empire, using Cyprus as a base, to cut off communications both by land and sea between Anatolia and Palestine and those provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the Levant and Africa. For this reason, as long as Venice remained strong and warred with the Ottomans, Cyprus had to be guarded and garrisoned, and this Turkish garrison, more than anything else, was the origin of the Turkish population of Cyprus.

The military origin of the Turks in Cyprus should be borne in mind when speculating about the racial origins of the Turkish minority. To say that a considerable number of the present-day Turkish minority are merely Islamized Greeks bears no relation to the historical truth. The Turkish soldiers were Turks, and the definition of a Turk is that he was a Moslem. In this content the actual origins of the Turks themselves—a mixed nomadic people—does not matter. A Turkish soldier was a Moslem and Turkish-speaking even if he was a janissary born of non-Moslem and non-Turkish parents. Within the Ottoman Empire the concept of Turkishness was as much a cultural concept as the concept of Hellenism. In fact, numbers tell their own story. The first Turkish census of Cyprus in 1572 shows a population of 20,000 Moslems, that is Turks, who were the military garrison. The size of the Turkish population after that was given as 50,000 in 1745, 20,000 in 1815, 33,000 in 1841, and 25,000 in 1846. These figures reflect very closely the number of the military garrison. Thus a Turkish historian, Evliya Efendi, put down on record that in 1675 the Moslem (Turkish) population of Cyprus was 30,000 warriors, i.e. soldiers. The proportion of the Turkish population to the Greek population in Cyprus was also affected by the phenomenon of Greek emigration and immigration in Cyprus, that is to say, the Greek population tended to leave the island when times were bad and to return when they became better. In 1881, the first census under British rule showed a population of 140,000 Christians (Greeks) and 45,500 Moslems (Turks).[4] In 1901, the Moslem population of Cyprus was estimated to be 51,309, compared to a Greek population of 172,739. This figure should be compared to figures derived from classifying the population by languages, which give in 1901 a Turkish-speaking population of 48,864. When this figure is adjusted against the figures for the Moslem population (which included 1,131 Arabic-speaking people) the residue among the Moslems who were neither Turkish nor Arabic-speaking amounted to 1,314. It is presumed that this residue spoke Greek and must have represented the Moslemized Greek element in the Turkish

Moslem population of Cyprus which was less than 3% of the total.[5] Actually the population figures for 1901 show that the Turkish population was just under 20% of the combined Greek-Turkish population of the island. It is a fair estimate that throughout the Turkish presence in Cyprus this must have been the average proportion of the Turks to the Greeks in the island.

Another feature of the Turkish occupation of Cyprus affecting the Turkish minority on the island was the territorial basis of its settlement. A different pattern became established for urban and rural areas. In the urban areas the Turkish conquerors seized for themselves what were at that time the best quarters of the towns. In Nicosia they became at one time the majority of the inhabitants, and they seized entirely the city of Famagusta from which they evicted the Greek population (to the suburb of Varosha). This pattern was similar to what happened in other parts of the Ottoman Empire upon conquest. Outside the towns, however, the story was different. The present troubles in Cyprus have focused attention on the irregular nature of the settlement of the Turkish rural population. Not only is there a lack of a regular distribution of Turkish settlement throughout the island but also the Turkish villages are dispersed at random among Greek villages. Moreover there are hardly any purely Turkish villages in Cyprus. According to the Cyprus census of 1960 only 6.7% villages were purely Turkish. The rest of the Turkish rural population lived in 43% of the island's villages which had a mixed Greek and Turkish population. This situation in the country reflects historically a total lack of any attempt at a separation between the two communities, contrary to what is evidenced in the towns. The failure to establish solid blocks of Turkish population in Cyprus, occupying definite areas, was perhaps due to the fact that, after a lapse of time, the insular character of the country provided comparative safety from attack. The Turks thus availed themselves of their privileged position to occupy the best land whenever available without paying any attention to a regular pattern of settlement. This is the territorial root of the present Cyprus problem, and it contrasts with the settlement of Turkish peasants in other conquered provinces

of the Ottoman Empire (cf. the Balkans) where the Turks always formed compact blocks. Nevertheless the Turkish population in Cyprus never lost their original military character. There was never any intermarriage between the two communities and the Turks preserved their language in a purer form than any other Turks who settled outside the main Turkish ethnic area.

This is no place to deal with the history of the Turkish administration of Cyprus because the Turkish population of Cyprus was not directly involved, and they were governed with the rest of the Greeks rather than governing over others. The Turks in Cyprus had to pay the same taxes as the Greeks, as indeed, all the subjects of the Empire, with the exception of the *Kharaj* paid only by non-Moslems. The chief landmark in the history of the Ottoman administration was the transfer of Cyprus (1670) to the administration of the Kaputan Pasha, the High Admiral of the Turkish fleet. The Admiral then appointed the actual Governor of the island and also sold the right to collect taxes to a Muhassil or a tax-farmer. The opportunity for inefficiency and corruption under such a system is easy to imagine and it is, therefore, no wonder that about the same time the Archbishop of Cyprus received his famous *berat*. This gave him direct access to Constantinople, thus providing the only direct link between the Sultan and the island. As the *berat* conferred on the Archbishop the right to collect the *Kharaj* from the Greeks, this became the only direct revenue forwarded from Cyprus to the Porte and marked the rise of the Archbishop to his position of prominence, which was soon to rival the creaky and chaotic Turkish administration. From 1703 the island was transferred to Grand Vezir who farmed it out to a Governor who also acted as a tax-farmer. In 1785 Cyprus reverted to the Kaputan Pasha again. From 1849 until 1878 Cyprus was placed under various Ottoman administrations as the Ottoman Empire began to go through the convulsions of disintegration. The Turkish population was subject no less than the Greek to all these Ottoman vagaries. Indeed, after 1860, their position was worse than that of the Greeks, as they did not have the machinery of the Church to protect them. Cyprus became

the scene of some spectacular Turkish rebellions against the financial oppression of Ottoman rule. 'In a conquered, colonized country it is the settlers, not the subject population, from whom most trouble is to be apprehended, at least until such time as the occupying power has become internally weakened. Then the indigenous inhabitants reassert themselves, if still in sufficient numbers, and the settlers become more and more dependent on their parent nation. So it has been in Cyprus'.[6]

The very nature of the Ottoman Empire, which was a semi-feudal, military autocracy, which exercized comparatively little control over subject territories, was responsible for bringing about this situation in Cyprus. The system of the Kaputan Pasha produced the revolt of a Cypriot Turkish Agha called Mehmet Boyajoglou who kept a rebellion going among the Turkish population for over ten years. Again, in 1765 there was a rebellion led by Halil Agha against the Turkish Governor Chil Osman, who held the whole island for nearly a year. Next the Turks joined the Greeks in rebelling against the native Cypriot Governor, Hadji Baki, whose tyranny lasted from 1771 to 1783, and who spared neither Greek nor Turk. Kyprianos writes of Hadji Baki that 'for the first year or two, with consummate craft, he feigned a kind of good nature and made no attempt to resist the just demands of the bishops, and bore himself mildly as became a poor and friendless man. He inspired evil doers with fear and it cannot be denied that he won the good opinion of the public, and that he did not try to load the rayahs with new burdens'.[7]

The next stage in the history of the Turkish population of Cyprus, corresponding to the second stage in the history of settlers quoted by Purcell, occurred with the outbreak of the War of Independence in 1821. The Ottoman Empire received a mighty blow from which, as events proved, there was no recovery. Revolts by Cyprus Turks against oppression were now out of the question. Nor could there be any common front between them and the Greeks. The seeds of the present-day trouble were now sown with the massacre of the Archbishop, the bishops and other dignitaries on July 9, 1821. Up to this time it could have been said that relations

between the Turks in Cyprus and the Greeks on the island had been the best possible as between Moslems and non-Moslems anywhere in the Ottoman Empire. The Turks had become dependent on the Greeks, had often made common cause with them, and on the whole had been more active against the imperial government than the Greeks. This was no longer true after the Greek War of Independence. The fight for Hellenic Liberation was joined and had to be fought all along the line, and this line crossed Cyprus. Alienation resulted between the two communities in Cyprus, and was enhanced by economic factors. Since the sixteenth century, because of inflation and the change of trade routes the Eastern world had become impoverished. In Cyprus the Turkish peasants and townsmen proved much more vulnerable than the more enterprising Greeks. Turkish quarters in the towns, once the best ones, were now poverty-stricken slums compared to the more prosperous Greek quarters. This atmosphere of strife increased every day, as the Ottoman Empire suffered reverse after reverse and as the Porte was forced to make 'concessions to its Christian subjects'.[8] The British occupation of the island in 1878 served only to underline the hostility of the island's Turks to the Greek majority because the arrival of the British produced an outburst of enotist enthusiasm which was deeply resented by the Turks. This shows that bitterness between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus is not of recent history, as has been claimed in certain quarters. It was the inevitable result of the bloody strife of Hellene-*v.*-Turk.

The in-fighting between the Turkish community and the Greek majority in Cyprus commenced almost upon the arrival of the British: 'Three centuries of Turkish rule had ended. Though they had brought little benefit to Cyprus, their legacy lived on. Turkish communities and their buildings as well as the Turkish system of administration, to some extent adopted by the British, became part of the life of the country. Above all, a permanent Turkish minority—in 1881 46,389 Turks out of 186, 084 inhabitants—remained, providing the background to the problem of modern Cyprus.'

With the introduction of the Legislative Council in 1882

the Turks objected to 'any move towards majority rule' and, although a minority, demanded equal representation. In 1893 a Turkish deputation came to London to complain against articles published in the press about the plan to cede Cyprus to Greece proposed by Sir Charles Dilke. In 1895 fighting broke out in Cyprus between Greeks and Turks on Greek Independence Day. In the continuing state of crisis caused by tension between Greece and Turkey over Crete fresh incidents took place in Cyprus to alarm the Turks. In 1902 Ahmet Rashid, a Turkish ex-Member of the Legislative Council, sent a telegram to London saying that the cession of Cyprus to Greece would be 'to deliver peaceful people into the hands of wild beasts and ruin and destroy them'.[9] The demand was made that if Britain was to give up Cyprus, it should be returned to Turkey. In 1911 violent Turkish protests were registered against anti-Turkish articles appearing in the Greek Cypriot press. By this time the government of Turkey had been seized by the Young Turks and the Ottoman Empire was in the death throes of violent dissolution. It began with the Austrian annexation of Bosnia in 1908, and was now leading to the war with Italy over Libya and the Balkan War of 1912. These wars caused fighting to break out in Cyprus between the Turks and Greeks, resulting in loss of life, and ending in intervention by British troops. The reaction of the Turks was that the Turkish elected Members of the Legislative Council prayed that if the status of the island was to be changed, it should either be annexed by Britain or by Egypt if the island was not to be restored to Turkey. In 1914, when Cyprus was annexed by Britain as a result of the First World War, this measure was supported loyally by the Cypriot Turks. On the whole, before and during the First World War, the Turks of Cyprus were essentially on the defensive, complaining of provocation and opposing enotism.

The situation of the Turkish minority was totally altered by the First World War which resulted in a defeat for the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Kemalism in its place. However, the Turks of Cyprus persisted in protesting against any plans for the cession of the island to Greece and sent

representatives to London in 1919, praying that they might remain under British rule. The new Turkey distinguished itself early by defeating the Greeks in 1922, which cooled the Greek-Cypriot fever for *enosis* for a time. The Turks of Cyprus thereupon passed to the offensive and began demanding the return of Cyprus to Turkey and copying the Greeks by despatching delegations to Ankara. However, Mustapha Kemal was well satisfied with the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which was soon to be signed, and had no intention of antagonizing Britain.

The proclamation of Cyprus as a Crown Colony in 1925 produced a spate of protests from the Turks against the handing over of Cyprus to Greece, which it was felt that Britain could well do, as all bonds with Turkey had been severed. Following this period Kemalism began to grow in Cyprus. This new Turkish nationalism was not to the liking of traditional British colonial administrations. But, strangely enough, the Governor, Sir Ronald Storrs, procured the recall of the Kemalist Turkish Consul, Asaf Bey, who, following the Kemalist line, strove to procure co-operation with the Greeks wherever, as at that time in Cyprus, Turkish interests were not involved. It was Asaf Bey who procured the election of a Turkish Member of the Legislative Council, who in April 1931 voted together with the Greeks, thus precipitating the uprising of the same year.

The government of Cyprus under the emergency laws, following the insurrection of 1931, made Turkish nationalism as much an offence as Greek nationalism; for instance, Turkish flags were forbidden to be flown, etc. Nevertheless, during this period the British colonial administration of Cyprus was more dependent on the Turks of the island than ever before. Even before 1931 the government could rely on the automatic votes of the Turkish elected Members of the Legislative Council, which reduced debates in that body to a farce. Furthermore, the police force, the backbone of any colonial regime, was mainly Turkish. In 1919, out of 26 officers and 763 other ranks, 420 were Turkish, and there is no reason to think that this proportion altered at any time subsequent to that date. On the whole the Turkish minority

was not unhappy with the British regime in Cyprus between 1931 and the outbreak of the Second World War, despite the fact that, counter to Kemalist nationalism they continued to be designated as Moslems and not Turks. The entry of Greece into the war as an ally of Great Britain again caused fears among the Turks of Cyprus that immediate *enosis* was going to follow the war. For this reason a National Party was formed among the Turkish Cypriots and 'showed some signs of favouring Germany'.[10]

It is interesting to note the first reactions among the Turks of Cyprus after the Second World War. The Turkish minority opposed any union of Cyprus with Greece and any autonomy of Cyprus within the British Empire because it would have made their position as a minority untenable. They expressed the view, in a telegram to Lord Winster, that if Britain were to give up Cyprus it should be returned to Turkey, 'its previous suzerain and nearest neighbour, and in a better position than any other neighbouring state to defend it'.[11] They stated, however, that they were not happy under the present British rule, as the 1931 regime discriminated against their religious and 'educational affairs'. In this spirit the representatives of the Turkish population welcomed Lord Winster in March 1947 during his unfortunate and ill-considered visit to Cyprus with the Proposals for a new Constitution. The intensification by the Greek Cypriots of the struggle for *enosis* did not bring any open response from the Turks until 1954. The reason for this was that the Turks of Cyprus had always been opposed to the Hellenic ambitions of uniting Cyprus with Greece: they demanded the return of Cyprus to Turkey or they stuck as limpets to the British administration. The political formulation of opposition to the Greek aspirations in the form of partition of the island was dictated by the Turkish government, which came to the conclusion that Cyprus, after all, was a vital Turkish national interest and the prestige of the Turkish Republic was at stake. This attitude was welcomed by the Conservative British government at the time, who did their best, in turn, to encourage Ankara in its attitude, despite the fact that by the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey had abdicated all its rights in

Cyprus and that a new quarrel with Greece ran counter to the established Kemalist policy.

The present-day Turkish minority in Cyprus can now be said to have developed similar characteristics to the mainland Turks, namely a new Kemalist attitude no longer based on religion. There is no doubt that the outburst of the struggle for *enosis* after 1950 'had the effect of making the Cypriot Turks more Turkish-minded'[12] than they had ever been before. They could never look to the old Ottoman Turkey in the same way as they now look towards the more efficient Ankara Republic. In this way, despite the British attempt in the 1930's to isolate them from Turkey, the Turkish minority in Cyprus reflects fully the new Turkey and this makes it extremely difficult to integrate them in any new structure proposed as a solution of the present Cyprus problem, barring actual partition, which in itself is impossibly impracticable.

The economic contribution made by the Turkish minority to the life of Cyprus has given rise to many controversies. The Turks in Cyprus have tended to be mainly agricultural. Agriculture was still the main pursuit of the Turkish minority at the time of the declaration of the Republic in 1960. This is not surprising, if one bears in mind that most of the Turks of Cyprus are the descendants of Turkish garrisons who were paid for their services with land. There was also a class of large Turkish landowners in Cyprus—the Aghas. But in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries their indolence and carelessness led to the break-up of their estates and most of their property passed into the hands of the thrifty Greeks, who alone could buy them out, as the other Moslems were no better off than the ruined landlords. In this way the Greek population of Cyprus, as it increased, came to acquire most of the real property on the island. Turkish land ownership tended to disappear from the towns and by the British period became almost confined to the countryside.

The fact that Cyprus had been a former Turkish province encouraged the idea that the Turkish element were still substantial landholders. As late as 1957, during a debate in the House of Commons, it was asserted that the Turkish

element in Cyprus owned 45% of the arable area of the island. At that time the Turkish population amounted to 17½% of the total population, and it was mooted that, in case of a possible partition the proportion of the island to be assigned to the Turks should correspond, on a percentage basis, not to their numbers but the amount of the land held by them, i.e. 42%.

As a matter of fact, according to the official census of Cyprus in 1946 the amount of land held by the Turkish minority amounted to just over 98,000 acres, which constitute 18.2% of the total land ownership in Cyprus. Thus, the amount of agricultural land held by the Turks was actually proportionate to their numbers. The latest position, after some displacements caused by the events of 1963, is that the Turkish population, which now amounts to about 18% of the total, holds 17% of land in Cyprus.[13]

These figures are important in that most of the plans advocating partition of the island would assign to the Turkish portion more territory, on a numerical basis, than is actually held by them. As some of this territory would be inhabited by Greeks, this would produce quite a considerable Greek displacement, e.g. if the Turks were assigned 30-40% of the island. On the other hand, if the island were to be partitioned on a strictly proportional basis, with the Turks obtaining 18-20% of its surface as the Turkish portion, then there would be no need for any Greek to be displaced, but the Turkish portion would be too small to be economically viable. In other words, one fifth of the island is too small for one fifth of its population, and the alternatives are, in such a contingency, either the displacement of a considerable number of Greeks or the creation of an impossibly small Turkish enclave. This is, perhaps, an aspect which the promoters of partition have not troubled themselves to grasp clearly.



Taken from T.W. Adams, *Akel: The Communist Party of Cyprus*, Hoover Press, California, 1971

VI
Enosis as a Political Concept

Although at the time of writing the union of Cyprus with Greece (*enosis*) has not been achieved, it has nevertheless provided the English vocabulary (if not international vocabulary as well) with a new word, sometimes with a loaded meaning. It is also interesting to note the reactions of the official establishment to the rise of this slogan. The response was a classic of colonialism in retreat. The proposition was put forward that the desire in Cyprus for union with Greece was entirely the work of a small minority of agitators cum terrorists, which imposed itself on the usual 'contented', simple-minded peasant majority, who wanted nothing better than to remain faithful and law-abiding colonials under the glorious protection of the British Empire on which the sun never sets. The implication here is that both the political movement and the word *enosis* were something recently fabricated by these inconvenient 'agitators'.[1]

This pretence that all broad movements of national emancipation in the colonies are always the work of a fringe minority, having no support from the majority, has been the stock-in-trade of all colonialists from the days of the American War of Independence onwards. As a matter of fact the history of the desire for union with Greece is much older than either Archbishop Makarios or E.O.K.A., to whom the ignorant and the prejudiced seem determined to assign the honour of having invented it.

Enosis, or 'Union', is the concept of 'Hellenism', that is to say the union of all territories with Greek majorities or which have had Greek majorities in the past. This idea was conceived just after the American War of Independence by

the first hero and martyr of modern Greece, the Phanariot aristocrat, Constantine Rhigas at Bucharest in Rumania, then a predominantly Greek city.[2] Rhigas was executed by the Turks in 1798 when planning an uprising with French aid, but his political organization, Philike Hetaereia (Society of Friends for Hellenic Liberty), continued its work for the preparation of a Greek uprising from Russian territory. From 1818 onwards emissaries from the Hetaereia were visiting Cyprus, planning with the leaders of the Greek community their part in the coming national struggle against the Turks. However, in 1821 when the uprising broke out, Cyprus, in common with such Greek territories as the adjacent islands and Western Anatolia, because they were surrounded by Moslem territory found it impossible to join in the armed struggle.[3] However, during the war, in 1823 and 1826 two Greek naval expeditions made ineffectual forays against the island, but were too weak to affect the issue. In 1830 the Russian-supported Greek President, Count John Capodistria, declared a desire for the incorporation (*enosis*) of Cyprus with the Greek motherland. Three years later two revolts took place in Cyprus, one of them led by Nicholas Theseus, a Cypriot general in the Greek army, and a member of a leading Hetaerist family on the island. Both the revolts failed because the Turks proved too strong. Finally during the Crimean War enotist revolt on the island was only prevented by strong action by the Archbishop for fear (quite justified) of Turkish repression.

In 1862 there was a change of dynasty in Greece. One of the reasons for the fall of King Otto was the fact that he had allowed himself to be bullied by the British and the French during the Crimean War to remain neutral. The new King of Greece was to be the young Prince George of Denmark, who reigned as King George I of Greece. The reign of King George (1862) was prominent for two reasons: firstly, the strictly constitutional nature of the King's reign; secondly, the title of the new King was to be King of the Hellenes instead of King of Greece. The connotation 'King of the Hellenes' was a political manifesto of an *enotist* nature. It signified that the King and his government stood for the union of all Greek

peoples everywhere with the Greek motherland. Cyprus and other territories were high on the list of Greek soil to be redeemed from the grasp of a decaying Ottoman Empire, and the whole national destiny of Greece became henceforth devoted to the realization of this Megale Idea of Greek statesmanship.[4]

During the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, begun by the Bulgarian atrocities, Greece did not join Russia in the war against Turkey, but in the final stages of the war encouraged risings in Thessaly and Epirus. At the subsequent Congress of Berlin in 1878 Greece obtained Epirus and most of Thessaly with British and French support. For obvious reasons the acquisition of such territories was more vital for Greece than the acquisition of any islands, and the Greek government did not view with any dissatisfaction the simultaneous acquisition of Cyprus by Britain. However, it was assumed in Greece that this fact would be understood in Britain and that eventually Britain, the great and benevolent liberal power, would help the Greek people everywhere to realize their Megale Idea. This is why the Cypriots welcomed the commander of the British occupying force by the famous statement made by Bishop Kyprianos of Kition correlating the arrival of the British with the future union of Cyprus with mother Greece. The inability of Britain, after two World Wars, to fulfil this deep-rooted sentiment of all the Greek people has been overlooked by most British commentators as the cause of the disillusionment which turned *enosis* into an anti-British movement.

From the above it should be clear that, far from being a recent invention, the sentiment of *enosis* in Cyprus goes back to the very beginning of the emergence of modern Greece and the struggle of the new nation to liberate all Greek people from Turkish rule and to unite them under the aegis of one Greek state. As the most exacting historian of Cyprus, Sir George Hill, has said: 'Hardly a year has passed since the Occupation without the "Hellenic idea" finding expression in some form or other.' Actually, the whole course of political development in Cyprus and the cause of *enosis* were prophetically summed up by Gladstone in 1880, when he

said: '. . . the bulk of the people of Cyprus are Greeks; and rely upon it that if matters continue as they are, Greek sympathies, with the opening and extending emancipation of the East of Europe—Greek sympathies will prevail in the island; and instead of earning, even by the benefits you may confer upon them, far less earning by ordinances such as I have described, gratitude and attachment in the form of a disposition to continue in political connection with you, the more you improve their condition the quicker will be the development of this strong sentiment of nationality, and the more earnest the desire of the Greeks of Cyprus to be united with the free Greeks of the rest of the world'.[5]

Gladstone did not err. The introduction of the Legislative Council into Cyprus in 1880 provided a platform for the Greek elected Members to make periodical ritual demands calling for union with Greece. By 1887 disappointment in Cyprus as the non-fulfilment by Britain of the Greek national aspirations had reached such a level that Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee was boycotted by the Greeks. In 600 Orthodox churches the clergy spoke for union with Greece, and sports meetings were organized so that the 'English celebrations failed for lack of attendance'.[6] In 1895 there was an outburst of agitation for *enosis* occasioned by the proposal by Sir Charles Dilke to cede Cyprus to Greece. Resolutions for union with Greece were passed in various towns in Cyprus, typical being the first paragraph of a very rhetorical notion adopted at Limassol: 'The Hellenic people of the District of Limassol, in concord with the rest of the Hellenic people of the Island, who form the great majority of the whole population, has always desired, desires and will desire one and only one solution, and today solemnly demands that Union with Hellas, to which it belongs by race and blood, be effected with the least possible delay. Until that moment the Hellenic people of the Island, while putting up patiently with the liberal and equitable English Governments, as favourable to this desirable solution, rejects and will always reject with indignation any plan for its transfer to any other Government whatsoever'. Every Greek crisis concerning Crete or any other clash with Turkey found an

enthusiastic echo in Cyprus, including willing volunteers to fight for the cause of Hellenism, and pan-Hellenic propaganda was rife throughout the island. Greek flags were to be seen everywhere, together with portraits of the King of Greece and other Greek national heroes. At a meeting in Limassol in July 1899 the headmaster of the school in Limassol called for union with Greece and for cheers for 'Our King, King George'.

Meanwhile in Athens the Patriotic Cypriot League, formed by the journalist Phrankoudes, came into being in order to advance the cause of *enosis,* while in May 1903 the elected Greek Members of the Legislative Council in Cyprus managed to include a paragraph concerning union with mother Greece into the reply to the High Commissioner's opening speech.

The evidence for the existence of a growing tide of enotist sentiments in Cyprus is evident. Such technicalities as taxation and the tribute, which were periodically raised by the elected Greek Members of the Legislative Council, were only an excuse for the unleashing of enotist sentiments. This is not surprising because of the continuing emergence and expansion of Greece at the expense of the decaying Ottoman Empire. Each triumph of the Hellenic cause in Crete or in Thessaly had its immediate repercussions in Cyprus and was seized upon by the nationalists and the Church in order to renew their demands for union with Greece. Even the coronation of King George V of England in 1911 was seized upon by the Archbishop in his telegram of congratulations to remind the new sovereign of the aspirations of the people of Cyprus for their 'national restoration'. While when King George V passed near Cyprus, on his way to India, the Archbishop and the Greek Members of the Council sent a telegram of greetings containing the usual demand 'for union with Greece'.

This was the state of affairs on the outbreak of the First World War when Turkey became an enemy of Britain (in October 1914), while Greece remained neutral. Britain, taking advantage of the war, annexed Cyprus unilaterally on November 5, 1914. This move was greeted with jubilation by the Greek population which assumed that the final stage in

the progress towards cession to Greece had been reached and it was reported that Venizelos, then Prime Minister of Greece, had said that: '. . . the annexation of Cyprus must be characterized as the last stage towards the national restoration of this great Greek island. And according to private information in the possession of this government, it may be considered that the union of Cyprus with its mother Greece will be realized in the near future'.[7]

The annexation of Cyprus could have been the desired stepping stone towards union with Greece if Venizelos had remained Prime Minister. The vagaries of the war, however, swept him from office and in October 1915 the pro-German King Constantine of Greece installed the Conservative Alexander Zaimes as Prime Minister. It was then that Britain made the offer of Cyprus to Greece if Greece were to intervene in the war against Bulgaria and Turkey. The offer was refused, despite the fact that an allied expeditionary force had landed at Salonika, and within a few days the offer lapsed.

Ultimately Venizelos returned to power and brought Greece into the war on the side of the Allies. The hopes of the Greek Cypriots were then centred on his diplomacy. When Venizelos visited London at the end of 1917 the leaders of the Greek community in Cyprus and the Archbishop sent him telegrams.

Nevertheless, Venizelos, engrossed in finding support for Greek aspirations in Asia Minor, did not press the matter very energetically, and the Greek government soon came to overlook Cyprus in the situation in which it found itself. Likewise deputations from Cyprus headed by the Archbishop found little response from the British government. The upshot of this disappointment was the formation of the National Assembly (1921), afterwards called the National Organization, a permanent body to direct the political work for union with Greece. The Archbishop of Cyprus was to be the President of this body organization. At the same time the Greeks began to boycott the elections to the island's Legislative Assembly. This state of affairs and passive resistance to British rule lasted until the Treaty of Lausanne

between Greece and Turkey in 1923, which halted the Greek expansion in Asia Minor envisaged by Venizelos. In 1925 the island was declared a British Crown Colony and a new Constitution was introduced which, however, proved a bitter disappointment to the enotists.

A deputation from the National Council approached the new Labour government towards the end of 1929 but the Colonial Secretary, Lord Passfield, declined to discuss the question of *enosis* which he regarded as definitely closed.

The events of 1931 have been dealt with elsewhere, and although the cause of *enosis* was not the only motive for the outbreak, the interpretation given to it subsequently and the support it received from public opinion in Greece made it appear as an uprising to achieve the dearly cherished union with Greece. One of the reasons for the British success in stemming the 1931 insurrection[8] was the fact that on this of all occasions there was no support coming from Greece. Venizelos who was again Prime Minister announced that the Hellenic government could not interfere in a question which was an internal affair of Great Britain. As far as he was concerned there was no Cyprus question between the Greek and British governments. Interference in the affairs of Cyprus might have alienated Britain and Turkey and, subsequently, Italy because of the position of the Italian Dodecanese. After 1931 the open agitation for *enosis* died down. However, the courageous Bishop Leontios of Paphos (locum tenens) continued making speeches in favour of *enosis* and facing court action as a result. Also from time to time Greek flags were flown in defiance of anti-seditious laws brought in after 1931.

During the Second World War history tended to repeat itself to some extent. Greece and Britain were again allies and the hopes of the Cypriots were aroused that Britain might recognize their aspirations once and for all. These hopes were sustained by a message sent by Churchill to the Prime Minister of the Greek government in exile (in Egypt) on the first anniversary of the Italian attack on Greece (October 28, 1941), which contained the following: 'Their [the Greek people's] martyrdom will be avenged by the Pan-Hellenic Army of liberation. The unity of all her sons and daughters behind

their King and Government in the cause of their Fatherland will bring its own reward'.[9] The Greek Prime Minister, Mr. E. Tsouderos, is reported to have responded to the spirit of this message by declaring publicly in London on November 15, 1941: 'I visualize Great Greece as including North Epirus, the Dodecanese, Macedonia, Cyprus'.[10]

The end of the war affected the question of the union of Cyprus with Greece in a twofold manner. Firstly, Greece was in the throes of a bloody civil war between the Communists and the right-wing. Secondly, there was the question of the still repressive regime established in 1931. This envisaged a double tactic of demanding the right of self-determination, i.e. the union with Greece and demands for a new constitutional structure. Of great significance in this respect were the tactics followed by the left-wing A.K.E.L.[11] Party. While the civil war was being fought in Greece, A.K.E.L. demanded self-government for Cyprus through constitutional advance rather than immediate *enosis*. After the Communist defeat in the Greek civil war (1949), A.K.E.L. switched back to supporting *enosis*, because there was no point in waiting for a Communist government in Greece, and by that time the attempt to introduce a new constitution had failed.

The end of the civil war in Greece and the rising tide of anti-colonialist agitation made any British constitutional proposals short of self-determination unacceptable. The Winster Proposals compared unfavourably with the independence of full self-government being offered to other former colonies or imperial territories which were far less politically and economically advanced than Cyprus. Lord Winster's Proposals were attacked and at the 'specific request of the Archbishop right-wing circles refused to attend, since England was merely offering the Cypriots a 'knife with which to cut in pieces their own national rights, for the people are asked to endorse the perpetuation of their enslavement'.[12] The Archbishop declared the Proposals unacceptable and called on the Greeks to fight for '*enosis* and only *enosis*'.[13] The British government went out of its way to insult Greek Cypriot opinion by asserting publicly that 'the question of *enosis* was closed'.[14] Such a high-handed attitude on the part

of the post-war Labour government alienated opinion in Cyprus both on the left and right and in such circumstances it is no wonder that the plebiscite on *enosis* of January 15, 1950, organized by the Ethnarchy Council, received such widespread support. As Maier says, 'The referendum, however, was of great publicity value when a Cypriot delegation subsequently visited Greece, France, England and the United Nations'.

It can be seen from the examination of the facts cited above that the ideal of *enosis* in Cyprus is something which had its roots in the history of the island and that of the entire Greek struggle to wrest the independence of the Hellenic people from under the Turkish yoke. It was not something invented by Archbishop Makarios or fostered by the Soviet Union. If anyone has fostered the sentiment of *enosis* in Cyprus it has definitely been the British colonial administration of the island. The British found a Greek education system operating in Cyprus at the time of the occupation. Naturally, being only the occupying power until 1914, Britain could not interfere very much with arrangements she found in force prior to 1878. Greek education in Cyprus was entirely Hellenic both on the elementary and the secondary level. More important as far as the secondary schools were concerned, they followed the curricula of the Ministry of Education in Athens. Moreover, the teachers in the secondary schools were either Greeks from the mainland or Greek Cypriots who had received their training in Greece, and these teachers were apostles of Greek nationalism in its extreme form.

After the annexation very little changed in this respect. Attempts made to interfere with the Hellenic nature of education were on the whole unsuccessful. English was never made a compulsory subject in the secondary schools and it was only introduced into the top forms of some elementary schools in 1947-48.[15] These schools were severely attacked by the island's religious and political leaders who had always opposed and condemned the introduction of English in the elementary schools. Dr. C. Spyridakis was by now convinced that the Model School, as these schools were called, 'was

consistent with the principle of Anglicizing the elementary schools'.[16] It seems that the Colonial Office in London was psychologically inhibited from altering the educational structure in Cyprus, which had been found serviceable until 1914 even after Cyprus had been annexed. The consequences of this policy were foreseen as early as 1872 by Sir Samuel Baker who wrote: 'One of the most urgent necessities is the instruction of the people of Cyprus in English, because it is not to be expected that any close affinity can exist between the governing class and the governed in the darkness of two foreign tongues that require a third person for their enlightenment. The natives dread the interpreters; they know full well that one word misunderstood may alter the bearing of their case. . . . It is highly important that without delay schools should be established throughout the island for the instruction of the young. . . . Until then a void will exclude them from social intercourse with their English rulers and they will naturally gravitate towards Greece through the simple medium of a mother-tongue'.[17]

It seems that in Cyprus this policy tended to be reinforced after 1925 by the Colonial Service who ignored the study of Greek and Turkish while serving in Cyprus: 'But with the quickened tempo of subsequent, less leisurely times and more rapid transfers within the Colonial Service the Near Eastern expert became rare in the island. Officials tended, particularly in the District Administration, to regard duty in Cyprus more as a stage in their careers than as an end in itself. They came to know less of the local languages; the intervention of interpreters attenuated their contact with the people. And ignorance of the languages of other races can lead all too often to its mischievous corollary, social exclusiveness'.[18]

A wall came into being between the British administration and the Cypriot Greeks which the latter found more and more arrogant and insulting. The British underestimated the pride engendered by the Hellenic renaissance brought about by the emergence of a free and independent Greece. The Winster Proposals, as already seen, placed a people with one of the richest cultural heritages (both classical and Byzantine)

on a lower level than less evolved peoples in other parts of the British Empire. Therefore, it is no surprise to all logically thinking people that the nationalism of nineteenth century Hellenism should have kept the idea of *enosis* alive in Cyprus and that this idea should have been fanned to a glowing heat on the rising tide of anti-colonialism after the Second World War. Indeed, if the idea of *enosis* had originally been the property in Cyprus of the Church hierarchy and the propertied educated classes, it undoubtedly became the common property of all the Greek inhabitants of the island after 1945. This was a natural reaction to a frustrating lack of imagination shown by all the post-war British governments. It was a foolish illusion on the part of all British administrations to imagine that the British presence in Cyprus had somehow managed to quench the natural national aspirations of the Greek population, which it had cherished under Turkish rule ever since the beginning of the Hellenic renaissance: 'The municipal elections in March 1943 were significant. Undertakings were freely given by candidates to advance the cause of *enosis*, and there were perhaps more seditious utterances during this month than at any time since October 1931. But of opposition to the war there seems to have been little or no sign. Thus the newly elected Council of the Limassol District passed a resolution asserting that, while all the Council's measures would be taken in accordance with the war effort, the only claim of the people when the war ended, would be for the realization of the national wishes; asking for the repeal of all laws and orders affecting the national dignity of the people of Cyprus; and demanding that the Greeks should be officially called Greeks and not merely Christian-Orthodox and the Turks Turks and not Moslems. National education should be left free, and Greek and Turkish history should be taught'.

VII
Makarios, Grivas and E.O.K.A.

It is a great pity that British rule which came peacefully to Cyprus and was welcomed in 1878 should have ended in bloodshed and violence. Cyprus, therefore, belongs within British imperial history to the same unhappy category as Ireland, Egypt, and, although this is an exceptional case, Israel. It is not without significance that out of the four examples cited three are situated in the Eastern Mediterranean. It seems as if the long period of Turkophile policy left Britain unwilling or incapable of dealing with anybody else in that area except the Turks: British officials fell out of their depth except when negotiating with the familiar Turks.

It seems ridiculous, if not horrible, that something like the 1959 settlement could not have been arrived at in 1954 or 1955, thus saving nearly five years of bloodshed and strife. The only excuse—if any excuse there is—could be that prior to 1959 there were no personalities in power in Britain who could grasp the futility of senseless violence in Cyprus, while on the Cypriot side any other settlement except '*enosis* and only *enosis*' seemed also unacceptable at that time. It is to be thought that this is the only rational explanation for the course of events, because otherwise history is 'a tale told by an idiot'.

The story of E.O.K.A. (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) is simply the story of how Archbishop Makarios, both as a political leader and churchman, was driven by circumstances beyond his control to accept as inevitable some militant action to impress on the British the sterility of their policies. Despite the embittered commentaries by the majority of the British press, Makarios detested violence,

regretted it, never expected it to escalate to such an extent, hoped for its speedy termination, and, when given a chance in 1959, made every sacrifice and compromise, after a deep spiritual struggle, to obtain peace. He gave way on the principle of *enosis* which had been and still is the aspiration of his whole life. The end of bloodshed by honourable means and peace[1] for his people was the only consideration of the Archbishop when he signed the Zürich and London Agreements.

In a technical sense the Churchill-Eden governments were the architects of E.O.K.A. They were faced in Cyprus with a situation parallel to Ireland and pre-1948 Palestine. It was obvious that without a settlement there had to be some outburst and that some form of violence was looming on the horizon. Perhaps it was thought that the events of 1931 would repeat themselves or that there would be disorders and rioting and civil disobedience which would be quelled and pass away after a period of short duration. It was also felt that because of its policy and its membership of N.A.T.O. Greece would not give its open support to any revolt in Cyprus, as indeed it did not in 1931. What was ignored, and herein lies the root of the tragedy, is the rising tide of anti-colonialism, and the start of the crumbling of all colonial empires. Vietnam, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, etc., had all emancipated themselves either without violence or by means of anti-colonialist uprisings and wars. Even more to the point was the case of the Israeli use of violence against the British forces prior to 1948. With very small resources at their disposal the Jewish fighters managed to focus world opinion and enlist sympathy for their cause, which made Britain recoil. The object of the Israeli fighters was political and not military. The example was not lost on Cyprus. The situation was similar and on the whole the Cypriot even had an advantage over the pre-1948 Israelis in that before 1948 the Israelis were a minority in Palestine, whereas the Greeks in Cyprus were the majority. What a minority in Palestine could do could surely be achieved by the majority in Cyprus. These were the considerations which the British governments

of the day completely failed to take into account and drifted into a situation which reflects little credit on them.

A typical example of the British attitudes described above was the official British stand towards Archbishop Makarios from 1950 to 1954, indeed, to 1956. Makarios succeeded to the archiepiscopal throne in the same year as the plebiscite. His election was identified with the plebiscite, of which he was one of the principal organizers and, as stated elsewhere, he developed an intense international activity for the cause of *enosis*. No official contact[2] took place between him and any British Governor of the island, because it was an axiom of British policy that there should not be any contacts with any Cypriot religious or political leaders. British officialdom was quarantined from the Cypriots. It was only in January 1956, after the beginning of violence, that a Governor of Cyprus, Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, met Makarios for talks for the first time. Such a situation had in it the seeds of conflict. On the one hand, Makarios could not hold back frustrated hot-heads and a people who had been humiliated throughout their history. On the other hand, it was obvious that something different from what happened in 1931 was needed to persuade Britain that the continued colonial regime in Cyprus was bankrupt. Some kind of militancy had to be organized, orientated at first towards propaganda acts of sabotage. What it was hoped to do was to persuade international public opinion, and Britain itself, that Cyprus was under colonial oppression, and that the British government would thus be pushed into giving up the island to Greece.[3]

It might be asked why in such circumstances violence came to Cyprus only in 1955. This is a very important question for those who accuse Makarios of being the archpriest of violence as well as the Archbishop of Cyprus. The truth of the matter is that Makarios tried everything and persuaded the Greek government to try everything but to no avail. The year of decision was 1954[4] when Greece failed in its attempt to have the Cyprus issue discussed by the United Nations. The attitude of Greece itself was not clear either until the famous Eden-Papagos encounter when they both met in Athens in

the autumn of 1953. After this encounter and the failure to discuss Cyprus at United Nations level there is no doubt that the Greek government saw no reason to restrain militant action in Cyprus, provided that there was no question of Greek instigation. Finally, as a last straw in July 1954 the British government made another offer of representative government in Cyprus. The new Constitution proposed a Legislative Council which was far less democratic than that of 1948 and afterwards. The new Council was to have a majority of non-elected Members. The reasoning behind this hamfisted offer was that as the Greek Cypriot nationalists would not co-operate, a more liberal Constitution might have handed over the government of the island to the Communists.

Makarios had no option but to reject such a Constitution making perhaps the strongest statement of his career by saying: 'No one will wish to forge the bonds of Cypriot slavery by co-operating with the ruler, thus becoming a shameful traitor to his country'. Later in a sermon he declared: 'We shall consider as enemies of our national cause those who may give in to the government's constitutional pressure. We shall brand such persons as traitors, and we shall be unable to protect them from the people's rage and shame.'[5]

While the political situation in Cyprus was lodged in an *impasse*, the more militant forces which would finally have to be unleashed were shaping themselves below the surface. These forces became personalized by one man and one man only, Grivas. Makarios had been in constant contact with Grivas since 1951, and there is no doubt that he knew that Grivas was sending small amounts of arms into Cyprus from Greece. This was not the idea of Makarios but of Grivas and his supporters in Athens. Makarios had to recognize their organization because he realized, though he was in principle opposed to violence, that some militant demonstration might have to be made in time. It is evident that without Grivas there would have been no armed struggle. Militarily from the start all the operations were controlled by Grivas. Makarios was a political leader who could only point out to both

England and Greece: 'This is not my doing and I do not know what goes on. But I do know that unless an acceptable solution is found I am quite powerless to stop it'.

It is now opportune to explain, in some detail, the career of Grivas and the character of E.O.K.A. of which he was the creator and inspirer, in order to understand its particular relationship to Makarios and his policy.

George Grivas was a Cypriot by birth born in the Nicosia hospital on May 23, 1898. He came from the village of Trikomo, about twelve miles from the town of Famagusta. He was the offspring of the Cypriot middle-class which took great care of the education of its children. The young Grivas was carefully educated at the Pancyprian Gymnasium in Nicosia, but his boyhood and education were illuminated by Greek successes in Crete and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. He decided to devote himself to the Hellenic national idea by service in the Greek army. In 1916, in the middle of the First World War, he was admitted to the Military Academy in Athens, which was known as the 'School of the Promising Ones'.[6] He graduated from the academy in 1919 and took part until 1922 in the unfortunate Greek campaign in Anatolia.[7] After the end of the war, Grivas became a captain in the Greek regular army at the age of 26. Between the wars he attended various courses at military institutions in France.

In October 1940 Grivas was a Lieutenant-Colonel and became the Chief of Staff of the Second Division on the Epirus front. When the Germans attacked Greece and the Greek army was scattered, Grivas characteristically wished to continue guerrilla warfare in the mountains. This proved impossible owing to the Greek capitulation, but Grivas did not capitulate to the Germans, he 'hid in the hills'[8] for some weeks where he buried his arms, and then escaped through the German lines to Athens still carrying his revolver. In 1943 Grivas went 'underground' in order to avoid the Germans. While in hiding he formed a resistance group composed of about twenty ex-army officers like himself, which went under the name of 'Xhi'.[9] Nevertheless, despite the fact that Grivas established contact with the Greek government in exile and the British, his group, instead of fighting the

Germans, dedicated itself to combating Greek Communists.

The hour of X came with the German departure from Greece in 1944. Athens was immediately plunged into a civil war with the Communists, with the British forces intervening against the Communists. By this time Grivas and his X army claimed to have control of a force approximately three hundred strong in various parts of southern Greece and to have played a major role in the defeat of the Communists.

Perhaps because of his rather tempestuous and controversial character and record Grivas was retired[10] from the army with the rank of Lieutenent-Colonel in March 1945. 'His army career was at an end, because of his political ambitions. In politics he had no success'.[11] From 1945 onwards Grivas claimed that the X organization was solely a political party[12] and had no responsibility for any assassinations or reprisals against the Communists. Yet throughout Greece many right-wing groups operated during the white counter-terror from 1945 to 1947 under the symbol of X. It is true that the relationship of all the X bands to Grivas was very doubtful. This, however, did not help him in politics when 'he failed twice to be elected as leader of his own political organization in 1951',[13] or later when he stood for Parliament again as a Populist candidate. 'The Populist Party and its satellites won the election with a large majority, but Grivas failed miserably'.[14] Having been rejected[15] by the electorate Grivas 'swore then that he would give up politics for ever'.[16]

In his retirement from the army and mainland Greek politics Grivas came, naturally, to think about Cyprus, the country of his birth, where the struggle for *enosis* was coming to a head after 1950 and where the new Archbishop, Makarios III, was known to him both as a fervent enotist and personally from wartime Athens. Grivas was engrossed in the study of Communist terrorist tactics during the civil war in Greece, particularly in the Communist Youth Movement, and he had made contacts with young Cypriots devoted to the enotist cause who were studying in Athens. He also became worried about the growing influence of Communists in

Cyprus who, if nothing was done about them, might have acquired an ascendancy over the anti-British colonialist movement. Grivas felt that 'Britain would continue to talk for years about constitutional assemblies until finally the Communists took over as they had tried to take over in Greece'.

In 1951 Grivas went to Cyprus with his wife for the first time in twenty years. It is believed that he went on an invitation from Archbishop Makarios who wanted Grivas to help him with the organization of the Pancyprian National Youth Organization–P.E.O.N. Grivas, as it turned out, had no time to undertake this task but drew a detailed plan on how it was to be done; his aim was to build up a militant and fanatical youth movement to serve as a reservoir for his future organization. In reality Grivas made a military reconnaissance of the island and returned to Athens to work out a plan of operations, though he admits that the Archbishop was rather sceptical and had 'grave doubts'.[17] In July 1952 Archbishop Makarios chaired in Athens the first meeting of a secret liberation committee at which Grivas was present. Makarios asked Grivas not to come to Cyprus again unless he asked him and thus Grivas once more felt doubts as to the Archbishop's determination to seek a forceful solution. Nevertheless, Grivas returned to Cyprus at the beginning of 1952, with the blessing of Archbishop Spyridon of Athens, and began organizing recruitment for his movement and arranged for small shipments of arms to be landed. For this purpose Grivas used Andreas Azinas, Secretary-General of P.E.K., who became also his liaison with Makarios.

In February 1953 Grivas returned to Greece and devoted his time to drawing up an overall plan which, he says, 'with only minor modification, acted as a guide to my operations from start to finish of the struggle'. On March 7, 1953 another meeting of the secret liberation committee took place in Athens with Archbishop Makarios being present. The twelve members at this meeting took the following oath of secrecy and obedience: 'I swear in the name of the Holy Trinity to keep secret all I know or come to know about the cause of *enosis*, even under torture or at the cost of my life. I shall obey

without question the instructions given to me at all times'. The results of this meeting were not too happy. Makarios later insisted, in a private interview with Grivas, that all use of force must be restricted to sabotage. Pressure was also put on Grivas by Marshal Papagos not to attempt to ship arms to Cyprus but to leave Cyprus to his diplomacy. Furthermore on June 7, 1953 Makarios informed Grivas that he did not want any guns in Cyprus, only materials for sabotage: nor did he want any one to come from Greece. Grivas's answer to both was that 'no one could stop me from building up a revolutionary movement in Cyprus: it was my right and my duty as a Greek Cypriot'. Grivas was adamant: 'Once more, on June 7, 1953, Makarios sent word, through Andreas Azinas, that he wanted only sabotage: mines and grenades could be sent to Cyprus, but not guns; nor did he want any one to come from Greece. This, of course, meant me. I was amazed at his attitude. How could he expect to impose our will on the British without plan, programme or a capable leader? Did he really suppose that they would give way to a few sabotage attempts after three or four months? I began to believe that Makarios did not want to use force at all, and that he had merely yielded to pressure in going this far. I could only assume that his hesitations were due to a fear that he would be exiled if a revolution began. I told Azinas that I could not associate myself with these tactics which, while they would mean hardship and reprisals for the Cypriots, would certainly not compel the British to negotiate. Other members of the committee agreed with me and said that we should go ahead regardless of the Archbishop's views'.

In other words, whether the Archbishop liked it or not Cyprus was to have a revolutionary movement if the British did not change their minds. Furthermore, if he were to resist it and Grivas too, there would still be violence completely outside his influence. Grivas recounts that for the rest of 1953 and during the first half of 1954 he faced further opposition from the Greek government and from the Archbishop. Makarios opposed his plan to begin action as soon as possible. He still opposed the dispatch of arms to Cyprus, and it was only in March 1954 that the first

considerable shipment reached Cyprus. Makarios still refused to allow Grivas to ship a good supply of arms before operations began. He saw Grivas in Athens in October 1954 and warned him that he should not carry out any operations without receiving a signal from him in the United States where he had gone for the United Nations debate on Cyprus. Grivas then took a decision to go to Cyprus at once and to undertake operations when he was ready to do so and not to pay any attention to the hasty and changeable decisions of Makarios, which he branded as unrealistic.

On October 26, 1954 Grivas left Athens for Cyprus entering in his diary the following: 'God guide me. . . . I leave with faith and courage. . . . I shall succeed.' On November 10, 1954 he landed in Cyprus by night having been refused a British visa. Grivas was at last in Cyprus but he still did not have his organization or the blessing of the Archbishop. Actually, some organization to carry on the militant struggle was being planned before Grivas had arrived. The idea came from P.E.K. and P.E.O.N. There was also a Communist underground movement and E.M.A.K. (National Front for the Liberation of Cyprus) which was associated with Socrates Loizides.[18] On his arrival Grivas gathered all these elements into one organization designed by himself to fulfil his purpose. On January 11, 1955 Grivas met Makarios at Larnaca and was informed by him that he had secured the support of Papagos for their aims (which were still to be sabotage). It was also at this meeting that the organization was christened E.O.K.A.

Before Grivas began his operations he suffered one of his greatest defeats. An informer gave away the arrival of a considerable shipment of arms, and the British navy was able to intercept the caique, *Agios Georgios,* while on shore the police arrested Loizides and eleven companions. The loss of the shipment cost Grivas his main supply of explosives and hampered his initial operations. He also had difficulties with his organization, and Makarios vetoed the idea of starting guerrilla operations. Grivas had to comply, as he had not yet built up a hard-core organization which would have enabled him to defy instructions. It was only on March 29, 1955 that

the Archbishop gave Grivas permission to start his sabotage actions. The period of E.O.K.A. operations had begun. On the whole Grivas at last proved a successful and resourceful commander of this type of action. During the course of the struggle he rapidly built up an organization which in many ways could serve as a model. There is no doubt that in E.O.K.A.'s later stages when it became successful, Makarios, although he could influence it, could not control it as long as he met only opposition from the British authorities. E.O.K.A. became popular with the Greek people of Cyprus and its fighters became national heroes. In a runaway situation Makarios could do nothing to force Grivas's hand without some major concession on the part of Britain. As it turned out, Makarios, in order to negotiate with Britain, had to shelve in 1959 the slogan of *enosis.*

In a way, if the Cyprus problem had not become complicated during the past ten years by the difficulties with Turkey and later with Greece as well, Makarios's shelving of the idea of immediate *enosis,* which animated the E.O.K.A. struggle, would certainly have been the main difficulty dominating Cyprus politics. As will be seen later, the Archbishop escaped from one difficulty into another, and the recent rift with Greece might in future make the ideology of Grivas[19] and E.O.K.A. unintelligible to most Cypriots.

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES

	Fatal		Wounded
SERVICES			
RN	1		
Army	80		
RAF	16		
RM	7		
		104	601
POLICE			
United Kingdom	12		34
Greek Cypriot	15		43
Turkish Cypriot	22		108
Others	2		2
		51	2
CIVILIANS			
United Kingdom	26		49
Greek Cypriot	203		154
Turkish Cypriot	7		64
Others	2		21
		238	
INTER-COMMUNAL (June–August 1958)			
Greek Cypriot	56		26
Turkish Cypriot	53		55
		109	
INTER-RACIAL RIOTS			
Greek Cypriot	4		72
Turkish Cypriot	2		31
		6	
TOTALS	508		1,260

Source: W. Byford-Jones, *Grivas and the Story of E.O.K.A.*, Robert Hale, 1959

FATAL CASUALTIES BY YEARS

	British	Greek	Turk	Others	Intercommunal	
					Greek	Turk
1955						
June		2				
August		3				
October	1	1				
November	5	1				
December	6	5				
Total for 1955	12	12				
1956						
January	3	4	1			
February	2	7				
March	6	9				
April	5	13	1			1
May	10	3	4		2	1
June	8	9	3	1		
July	5	11		2		
August	1	12	1			
September	10	8	1	1		
October	6	14				
November	23	10	1			
December	2	13				
Total for 1956	81	113	12	4	2	2
1957						
January	5	8	1		1	
February	4	2	1		1	
March	1	3				
October		4				
November		2	1			
Total for 1957	10	19	3		2	
1958						
January		2				
March		1				
April	1	1				
May	2	11	2			
June		5	1		16	2
July	2	11	4		28	44
August	2	10	3		12	5
September	5	14				1
October	16	12	3			1
November	9	5	1			
December	2	2				
Total for 1958	39	74	14		56	53

Source : W. Byford-Jones, *op. cit.*

VIII
The End of British Cyprus

From the military point of view the story of the E.O.K.A. struggle is a sorry chapter in the annals of British colonial rule. Faced with a very difficult situation, the British authorities made mistake after mistake: they 'seemed to have learned little or nothing from their previous experience'[1] of guerrilla fighting or terrorism elsewhere. On reflection the E.O.K.A. campaign was successful and the British measures to combat it were inadequate and mistaken.

The British mistakes, when faced with E.O.K.A. insurgency, were both political and military. In the military sphere they tried to combat an underground movement by military means, whereas it is a well known fact that regular armed forces are not the best instruments for security operations. The main reason for E.O.K.A.'s success in this field lay in the tactics adopted by Grivas. He did not make the same mistake as the Communists in Greece, who had tried to hold territory. In any case, open confrontation in a small country with such good roads would have been suicidal under the circumstances. His aim was to present an enemy with no firm front and no fixed targets by keeping himself, his own men, and the British constantly on the move. So the enormous British advantage in war material was largely nullified. In such circumstances, superiority of fire power cannot be used without hitting the population indiscriminately (which the Americans discovered in Vietnam). As Grivas says, 'One cannot chase monkeys with elephants. The British in their armoured cars, keeping to the roads and avoiding night-moves, might just as well have been hunting field-mice. Mountain and forest sweeps were conducted like

manoeuvres, and the large numbers of troops were slow to move and react.' This mistake way typified by the appointment of Field Marshal Sir John Harding, a distinguished soldier, as Governor and Commander-in-Chief. He was required to deal with an underground movement, operating in small groups, by means of large scale military movements. In a small and fairly densely populated island, which affords little space for manoeuvre, regular forces can achieve nothing against a well-organized and disciplined underground movement which moves on a different plane. The guerrilla fighters produce and take advantage of the breakdown of security; with a well-organized resistance movement in the field regular armed forces have nothing to strike at. This is the essence of effective guerrilla warfare and resistance movements (i.e. urban guerrilla warfare).

The political mistakes made by Britain were the failure to realize that the objectives of a well-fought out resistance campaign are never military but political. This was the objective of Grivas, and it was defined by him as such in his plan of operations to which he adhered. The essence of the plan was not to achieve military successes but psychological effect by rousing world public opinion which would make itself felt outside Cyprus, in Greece, Britain, the U.S.A. and the United Nations. The success of such a plan depends on the length of time the fighters can operate. The limited number of fighters necessary to carry on their activities ensures that in certain circumstances they can carry on the struggle indefinitely. There is one precondition, however, which must be realized: the comparatively small number of active fighters must have at least the passive support of the majority of the population. But this is nearly always the case in colonial countries where the issues are ethnic and are guided by basic sentiments and loyalties and not by logic. The tiny group of guerrillas are thus, in the words of Mao Tse-tung, the fish while the population is the water. The ethnic character of the struggle makes it easy to isolate and eliminate collaborators with the occupying power, while the frantic attempts of the colonialist military to deal with the guerrillas remain ineffective but succeed, through ineptitude

and harshness, in alienating the bulk of the population.

In Cyprus the blow which shook the basis of the colonial power was directed at the police. The Greeks in the police force were either eliminated as obvious collaborators or became E.O.K.A. informers voluntarily. The authorities had to rely on the Turkish population to staff the police but with the obvious disadvantages to security inherent in communal antagonism which this bred. 'The British authorities were embittered by the struggle but did little to change its course by involving the Turkish community in the fighting. The recruitment of Turks into the police and the incitement of latent racial antagonisms produced some bloody civilian massacres and a tragic toll of innocent lives on both sides; but divide and rule as an instrument of British policy failed in Cyprus'.[2] This was consistent with the observed basic inability to appreciate the political nature of the conflict. The aim of E.O.K.A. was not to fight the British army out of Cyprus but to blackmail Britain out of the island. In this the movement succeeded because in the military sphere the British authorities persistently ignored the fact that they were opposed by the entire Greek population and not only by a handful of gunmen, i.e. a handful of gunmen would not have been able to campaign against a whole army for four years without the support of nearly the whole of the population. With the security basis undermined, armies can only use superior fire power against guerrillas and this is ineffective precisely because superior fire power cannot be brought to bear on a tiny group of men who disappear underground after each lightning attack. In such circumstances the success of E.O.K.A. against the British army in Cyprus, although the latter was commanded by some very able officers, was a foregone conclusion. 'But the British could scarcely claim to have won even a partial victory. They had paid a heavy price in money, lives, and prestige during four years of futile fighting, and had nothing to show for it but a paper compromise that was worse than outright defeat; where there had been a troublesome colonial question, an explosive international issue was created, and one that remains to date a grave threat to peace in the Mediterranean,

a threat not least of all to the British themselves.'[3]

The political reasons advanced by the British government, now headed by Sir Anthony Eden, for the retention of Cyprus were the necessity of preserving the island as a British base in the Middle East, where the Arab-Israeli conflict was rapidly eroding the remnants of British influence. The second reason was the presence of the Turkish minority in Cyprus. Britain had no intention of alienating Turkey, and, as Turkey occupied a vital strategic position in N.A.T.O. the British government could count here on the active support of the U.S.A. This was at the root of a remarkable solicitude for the Turkish minority, which, as was aptly observed, was far greater than any solicitude for British minorities in African countries (even Rhodesia).[4]

Although in Cyprus remarkably little political initiative was shown at this time by the British government in the international sphere, as befitted a government headed by such a skilful diplomat as Sir Anthony Eden, approaches were made to both Greece and Turkey thus bringing these two countries officially into the arena for the first time. A Tripartite Conference was convened to examine the Cyprus question to which the Cypriots were not invited. The idea of the Conference was to propound some plan for self-government in Cyprus under a Tripartite guarantee. Mr Harold Macmillan, Foreign Secretary, stated that '. . . British sovereignty over Cyprus was beyond dispute, and Her Majesty's Government regarded it as essential that the United Kingdom should continue to remain in possession of Cyprus in order to enable her to carry out her obligations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, and nothing had since occurred to modify that view nor did he see any prospect of any change in the foreseeable future. . . . We do not accept the principle of self-determination as one of universal application. We think that exceptions must be made in view of geographical, traditional, historical, strategical and other considerations.'[5] The Conference was convened in London on August 29, 1955 but it was fore-doomed to failure because, while the Conference was sitting, Turkish agents made bomb attacks against the Turkish Consulate in

Salonika on September 6, and the house in which Atatürk was born. These incidents enabled the then Prime Minister of Turkey, Adnan Menderes, to launch a pogrom against the Greek and other Christian populations in Constantinople and Smyrna. Mob violence got out of hand; excesses were committed far beyond those planned by the Menderes Government.[6] No wonder that in such circumstances the London Tripartite Conference broke up indecisively on December 7, 1955.

The next move by the new Eden government was a change of Governors in Cyprus. The new Governor was picked from outside the ranks of the Colonial Service. He was Field Marshal Sir John Harding (now Lord Harding) the retiring Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The choice of a soldier was obvious because of the insurrectionary situation in Cyprus, although, as discussed above, his talents were not suited for the task assigned to him of hunting down 'monkeys with elephants'. Militarily Harding made many mistakes. Politically, however, paradoxically enough, the new Governor did get through to Makarios with whom he established a good understanding and mutual respect. A dialogue was started and had it not been for a dramatic turn of events in the Middle East and the intransigence of some of the extreme supporters of *enosis,* an equitable settlement might have been reached in 1956, except that Harding was never given a free hand on the political level.

Harding began his term by a meeting with Makarios, the first meeting between the Governor and the Archbishop. Harding brought with him a development plan for Cyprus based on an injection of 38 million pounds into the economy. This economic aid was made contingent on a plan to introduce limited self-government, with the possibility of self-determination at some future date. In a letter addressed to the Archbishop in January 1956, there appeared the following statement of British policy: 'Her Majesty's Government adheres to the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the Potomac Charter and the Pacific Charter, to which they have subscribed. It is not therefore their position that the principle of self-determination can

never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition on account of the present situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Her Majesty's Government have offered a wide measure of self-government now. If the people of Cyprus will participate in the constitutional development, it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to work for a final solution which will satisfy the wishes of the people of Cyprus, be consistent with the strategic interests of Her Majesty's Government and their allies and have regard to the existing treaties to which Her Majesty's Government are a party. Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to discuss the future of the island with representatives of the people of Cyprus when self-government has proved itself capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the Community.'[7]

The Greek government, now headed by the conservative Constantine Karamanlis, greeted the new British proposals with enthusiasm. Makarios, however, was not so enthusiastic and technically rejected the proposals because of extremist pressure. In some quarters this was regarded as a great mistake because, as the future was to show, the Harding proposals were the best terms which Cyprus could ever have secured.

Negotiations between the Archbishop and Harding continued into February 1956, against the background of increasing E.O.K.A. activity. The climax came on February 26, when the then Colonial Secretary, Lennox-Boyd (now Lord Boyd) flew to Cyprus ostensibly to 'clinch the deal' with Makarios.[8] Apparently he had a single meeting with Makarios after which the talks collapsed and Lennox-Boyd returned to London. Agreement had been very near, as emerges from the correspondence and a statement made to the House of Commons by Lennox-Boyd on his return. Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that the Archbishop was not prepared to accept his offer as a basis for co-operation. He objected to the amnesty terms and to the reservation to the Governor of security powers.[9]

The reason for the breakdown seemed to have been Britain's 'crumbling position in the Middle East'.[10] Robert

Stephens says that the 'Rightwing Conservative opinion in Britain was looking for a show of force from the Prime Minister to reassert British prestige in the Middle East. It was outraged by Nasser's campaign against the Baghdad Pact, and the last straw was King Hussein's expulsion of Glubb Pasha.' Anti-British riots were now sweeping the Kingdom of Jordan and with the removal of Glubb Pasha, the British Commander of the Jordanian Arab Legion, it looked as if Jordan was going to line up with Cairo. In these circumstances the British Cabinet suddenly decided that no concessions at all should be made in Cyprus.

Meanwhile, Harding had proclaimed a state of emergency in November 1955 and declared his intention to fight E.O.K.A. into the ground. The authorities used the powers derived from the state of emergency to arrest and deport Archbishop Makarios on March 9, 1956, when he was flown to a remote albeit comfortable exile on the island of Mahé in the Seychelles.

The removal of the Archbishop from the scene meant that Grivas was now in sole command, politically as well as militarily. This was proved by the events which followed immediately when the guns of E.O.K.A., instead of being used almost exclusively on Greek and Cypriot policemen, were now turned on British servicemen. However, the Eden government hoped to find safety by sending reinforcements to Cyprus, where the number of troops was increased to over 10,000 and to try for a political solution by means of constitutional proposals, entrusted to a Commissioner, which were foreshadowed in the Makarios-Harding-Lennox-Boyd talks. The outcome of this move was the mission of Lord Radcliffe and the Draft Constitution which bears his name. The Radcliffe Proposals, as events turned out, were less generous than the terms held out by Harding. Nevertheless, in the light of subsequent events the Radcliffe Constitution was superior to the final Cyprus settlement, as it excluded from Cypriot affairs any interference by Greece and Turkey and thus truly implemented the Treaty of Lausanne.

The Constitutional Commissioner chosen by the British Government, the eminent British Jurist, Lord Radcliffe,

arrived in Cyprus in July 1956. By December of the same year he had his constitutional proposals ready. 'Lord Radcliffe's terms of reference had included the conditions that Cyprus must remain under British sovereignty; that Britain must have the use of the island as a military base; and that external affairs, defence and internal security were to remain in British hands. He also had to ensure that the special interests of the various communities on the island were protected. Within these limits he produced a Draft Constitution which gave the Greek Cypriot majority more power than they had ever been offered before. There would have been an effective Greek majority in a fully elected Assembly, except that the consent of two-thirds of the Turkish members of the Assembly would be needed for any law affecting Turkish communal affairs. There was to be one Turkish minister in the Cabinet *ex officio*. He was to head an office of Turkish Cypriot affairs, with its own budget allocation, which would deal specially with education. Guaranteed Turkish communal rights were to be watched over by two institutions: a Supreme Court and a "Tribunal of Guarantees"—both of which would have equal numbers of Greek and Turkish members with a neutral chief justice for the former and a neutral chairman for the latter. Both these institutions, with some variations and a change of title, were later incorporated in the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.'[11] Lord Radcliffe, according to Charles Foley, did a brilliant job: 'He gave the Greeks their elected majority in the Assembly and six out of seven Ministers: the rights of the Turks were safeguarded by a new system of checks and balances. But in one important respect it offered less than Harding had promised Makarios during their talks a year ago.'[12] The most important aspect of the Radcliffe Proposals was that they excluded any partition of the island, as was the often stated Turkish desire, or any form of federation on the grounds that the island was too small and the minority population was not contained in one particular area. 'Still less would partition suit Cyprus, an ethnographic fruitcake in which the Greek and Turkish currants were mixed up in every town and village and often in every street.' The

Radcliffe Constitution envisaged immediate full self-government for Cyprus except in the spheres of foreign affairs, defence and internal security. However, the Constitution did not exclude the transfer of these reserved fields at a future date from the Governor to the elected Legislative Assembly. Furthermore, although the Constitution provided that Cyprus was to remain under British sovereignty (i.e. part of the Commonwealth) the adoption of the proposals would not exclude changes in this respect, even union with Greece in the future. What in fact the Radcliffe Constitution contained was a promise of gradual full self-government for Cyprus, which in turn would not exclude future self-determination on a communal basis.

The Radcliffe Constitution proved to be a dead letter. The Greek government of Karamanlis rejected the proposed Constitution even before its terms had been announced to the Cypriots. Archbishop Makarios rejected them on the grounds that he could not consider any proposals while he remained in exile. Finally the Turkish government, after initially greeting the proposals, reverted to its demand for partition. It took over ten years for the Cypriot politicians to fathom out the wisdom of the Radcliffe Proposals, which insisted on 'the creation of a unitary state, the ultimate evolution of which would not have excluded independence and or self-determination'.[13] The Constitution contained safeguards for the unity of the state while paving the way for future self-determination without interference by any outside powers. The Radcliffe Proposals stand in the history of Cyprus as a monument to lost opportunities. Although it was not realized at the time the rejection of the Radcliffe Proposals began the process of British back-peddling on the Cyprus issue. The reason for this was the Suez disaster which spelt the end of direct British influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, the British disengagement from its colonial heritage, and Britain's entire deference to the U.S.A. In such circumstances, it was completely illogical for a typical colonialist struggle, such as Cyprus, to be carried on by orthodox military means. This transition to a new course was marked after Suez by the change over in 10 Downing



Makarios blesses the people of Cyprus from the balcony of the Archbishopric.



Makarios with President Nixon and Dr Kissinger at the White House, 25th October 1970.

Discussions in Moscow, 2nd July 1971, with President Podgorny and Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Makarios, accompanied by the President of Libya, Colonel Gaddafi, inspecting a guard of honour in Tripoli, 9th November 1973.

Arrival of Makarios in the capital of Ethiopia on 1st November 1973, where he was met by Emperor Haile Selassie.

From right to left: Archbishop Makarios, Patriarch Nicholaos of Alexandria, Patriarch Elias of Antioch and the Representative of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, after a Mass in Nicosia, 8th July 1973.



Kykko monastery, built in the 11th century, is dedicated to the Holy Virgin. It is the richest monastery on the island, and the icon of the Holy Virgin kept there is one of the very few painted by Apostle Luke himself.

Street—from Eden to the more business-like and flexible Harold Macmillan.

Macmillan's rethinking of the Cyprus strategy was influenced by the resurgence of the United Nations following the Suez incident which enabled it to acquire some momentary prestige. The Greek government had tabled two resolutions before the Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in February 1957. The Committee finally adopted by 76 votes (including those of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey) to none a resolution moved by India. This declared: '. . . that the solution of the problem of Cyprus required an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression; expressed the earnest desire that a peaceful, democratic and just solution would be found in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter; and the hope that negotiations would be resumed and continue to this end'.[14] There were, however, differences of interpretation among the members of the Political Committee as to the nature of the negotiations referred to in the resolution. The representatives of Great Britain and Turkey understood that these would be tripartite, while the Greek representatives (claiming the support of the Indian representative who had proposed the resolution) understood that they would be Anglo-Cypriot.

Harold Macmillan released Archbishop Makarios from exile provided that the Archbishop did not try to return to Cyprus. On April 17, 1957 Makarios arrived in Athens to a 'hero's welcome'.

In the autumn the Cyprus issue was debated in the United Nations although the Greek resolution failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority to make it into a recommendation of the General Assembly. At the same time Sir John Harding resigned as Governor upon completion of his two year term of office. After the Suez campaign, with all the troops at his disposal, he had started a massive operation against E.O.K.A., which continued throughout 1957 punctuated by various truces. At the end of the year, however, E.O.K.A. was still very much in evidence. Macmillan replaced Harding, who left the island on

November 4, 1957, by the agile and liberal colonial civil servant, Sir Hugh Foot, who had had a distinguished record of service elsewhere in the British Empire and particularly in Jamaica.

The arrival of Foot in Cyprus on December 3, 1957 announced impending changes in the British attitude, though the year 1958 was going to prove, perhaps, the most bloody one of the emergency. The new Governor proposed a truce, which was originally accepted by Grivas while confidential negotiations were carried out in Athens between the Greek and British governments and the Archbishop. The bone of contention was the question of the right to self-determination and Makarios's refusal to admit the right of the Turks to take a direct part in any negotiations on the future of Cyprus. The Turkish government again raised the question of partition. The dispute had its repercussions in Cyprus where bloody clashes occurred between the Greeks and the Turks. E.O.K.A. had to fight on two fronts both against the Turks, whom it had always avoided in the past, and against renewed British military forays. In the inter-communal clashes, which were of a most brutal nature, there were many instances of the British military adopting a passive[15] attitude whenever they could do this with impunity.

Meanwhile in Athens the Greek government began to exercise pressure on Makarios to settle for something less than self-determination and union with Greece. The idea was a united and independent Cyprus with self-determination left for the future. At this stage Macmillan was able to pose very clearly as a disinterested party making the Cyprus problem appear as a Graeco-Turkish dispute with Britain holding the balance. American pressure had convinced the British government that the Cyprus issue must be settled within the context of N.A.T.O. As both Greece and Turkey were N.A.T.O. powers it was felt that a solution could be reached which could safeguard the interests of all. The Greek government was after all anxious to maintain good relations with Britain and Turkey. An ideal settlement from the Greek point of view would not be the immediate union of Cyprus

with Greece but rather the end of the colonial regime in Cyprus and a constitution for the island which would give the Athens government some voice in its affairs. Pressure was brought on the Archbishop to fall in line, while direct negotiations between Greece and Turkey took place, of which the Archbishop was not informed. The object of these negotiations was to secure an agreement between Greece, Turkey and Britain, which would be based on such a structure of words as to satisfy the prestige of all parties concerned. Needless to say, the Cypriots were excluded from these negotiations and arrangements. When the time came, as it will appear, the Archbishop and his advisers were presented with a *fait accompli* which ignored the basic realities of the situation in Cyprus, and was responsible for the subsequent state of crisis.

PART C

IX
The Zürich and London Agreements

Officially the British government was pledged to changes in the status of Cyprus after 1956 when the Radcliffe Constitution was put forward. The Radcliffe Constitution, as has already been said, meant to provide Cyprus with a system of self-government. For the reasons explained it was unequivocably rejected. The principal reason now for combating the desire for union with Greece was the apprehension of alienating Turkey. The Menderes government in Turkey was now in the midst of serious economic and political difficulties and, whether or not the idea of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus was fathered in London, there is no doubt that the Turkish regime was in no position to survive *enosis*. On the other hand, the British government came to realize that it could not chalk up any permanent successes against terrorism in Cyprus. These conclusions were reached in the course of 1957 by the Macmillan government in the wake of Suez, which had gravely affected the Eastern Mediterranean flank of N.A.T.O. The failure of British measures in Cyprus made likely the danger of a line-up between Greece, the Cyprus enotists and Arab nationalism. The latter was now riding high under Nasser, who had survived his ordeal by fire. Behind there now loomed larger than ever the spectre of Russian intervention. Russia, so it seemed, was supporting Arab nationalism, and could by the same token line up behind Greek nationalism.

Under these circumstances the Macmillan government released[1] Archbishop Makarios from internment and appointed Sir Hugh Foot as the new Governor of Cyprus early in December 1957, thus signalling that it was ready to

contemplate a rethinking of the entire situation. This resolve must have been strengthened by the events of July 1958 in Iraq which spelt the end of the Baghdad Pact and marked the height of Britain's misfortunes following the Suez fiasco. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization had now only two allies in the Eastern Mediterranean—Greece and Turkey, and it would be fatal to alienate either of them. Failure to satisfy the Cypriot demands would tend to alienate Greece from N.A.T.O., while the fulfilment of *enosis* would deflect Turkey from its adherence to the West. On September 20, 1958 the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Constantine Karamanlis wrote to the Secretary-General of N.A.T.O.: 'Greece has proved her devotion to the Atlantic Alliance by showing patience and moderation for four years in the face of injustices committed against her by certain of her allies. Nevertheless, the British government's insistence today in applying its plan unilaterally—an action which we judge to be inadmissible—will be so shocking to public sentiment in Greece that it will render Greece's position within the Alliance problematical.'[2] It was felt by now that Britain would be ready to give up its sovereignty over Cyprus if only this were not to result in *enosis* and the alienation of Turkey. A solution was required that would satisfy the honour of Cyprus and Greece within the terms of twentieth-century realities without the price of partition, which was being demanded by Turkey in case of any changes in the status of Cyprus.

An obvious opening for a new initiative by Britain was the fact that after the death of Marshal Papagos the interest of the Greek government in *enosis* was, to put it frankly, only skin-deep. The government of Constantine Karamanlis was only paying lip-service to the cause of *enosis* in Cyprus because of public opinion in Greece.[3] In reality they were looking for any other solution of the Cyprus problem which could be presented as honourable. Clearly some form of independence for Cyprus without partition would be very welcome. There were only two obstacles to such a solution, namely, public opinion in Cyprus itself and the Turkish demands for territory in Cyprus. The first obstacle could be

overcome by capitalization of the position and prestige of the Archbishop: if Makarios were to accept a Cyprus settlement he would be followed by the rest of his flock. The Turkish demand for partition, which at that time was viewed unfavourably by both Greece and Britain, as well as the Greek Cypriots themselves, could be countered by equipping the Turkish minority in Cyprus with entrenched rights and privileges and giving Turkey some rights on the island without actual cession of territory. By the same token Greece could then be given equal rights without cession of territory thus achieving some aims of *enosis* without an actual constitutional union. Thus, the ambitions of both Greece and Turkey would balance each other in a new-found harmony, and the Greek Cypriots would be liberated from the yoke of colonialism. If Britain could induce Greece and Turkey to consider such a settlement, she could preside over the termination of the Cyprus episode and also retrieve some of her credit, sadly tarnished after Suez, as a champion of decolonization. In all this, however, the interests of the Greek Cypriots were neglected. They were not to be consulted but only used to effect a tripartite deal between Britain, Greece and Turkey to strengthen the Eastern Mediterranean buttress of N.A.T.O. This is, indeed, what happened, and it explains the origin of the Zürich and London Agreements and of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus arising from them, together with the fact that it proved unworkable.

The prelude to the Cyprus settlement of 1959 was the so-called Macmillan Plan of June 19, 1958. This Plan was called 'the partnership plan' because for the first time it officially brought Greece and Turkey into the affairs of the island. 'The proposals,' wrote Foley, 'were of striking originality, bringing two foreign Powers into a colony in which Britain had fiercely resisted foreign intervention. The country would be run by a council headed by the Governor, flanked by representatives from Greece and Turkey and by six Cypriot Ministers—four Greeks and two Turks. The sensitive departments of internal security, defence, and foreign affairs would all be reserved to the British. In each

town there would be separate municipalities for Greek and Turkish residents.'

The main features of the Macmillan Plan were that it was to run for a seven-year period and that it was based on a policy of 'separation' between the two communities in Cyprus. The essence of the Plan was a tripartite condominium for Cyprus. The Plan was rejected by both the Greek and Turkish governments. The Greek government rejected it on the grounds that, while it was designed to exclude *enosis* it did not exclude partition because of its emphasis on separation between the Greek and Turkish communities. Archbishop Makarios rejected the Plan stating that it ran 'counter to the fundamental and inalienable right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination.'[4] The Turkish government, on the other hand, rejected the Plan on the grounds that it did not include partition as the final solution of the Cyprus problem, while the Cypriot Turkish leader, Denktash, second-in-command to Dr. Kutchuk, described the Plan as 'a stepping-stone to *enosis*.'[5]

Despite this discouraging start the British government made preparatory steps to implement the Macmillan Plan. These measures were accompanied by a rise of communal violence in Cyprus to such an extent that Archbishop Makarios in Athens began seriously considering the possibility that Britain might either withdraw from Cyprus, abandoning the island to communal violence, or impose partition to suit the Turkish government. Sir Hugh Foot, after his discussions with the Macmillan government in London, returned to the island on September 10, 1958 and announced that 'the Macmillan Plan would be implemented with the co-operation of the Turks alone.'[6] Accordingly, Archbishop Makarios in an interview on September 21, 1958 with Mrs. Barbara Castle, indicated that he was prepared to accept the status of independence for Cyprus. This was very much in accordance with the real desires of the Greek government. The main problem was to stop the implementation of the Macmillan Plan which, in any case, was not going ahead very strongly because of E.O.K.A. resistance and hostility to it by both the Turkish and Greek governments.

Grivas rejected the Macmillan Plan, describing it as a 'monstrosity': 'The Greek Cypriot people do not want counterfeit constitutions. We make one unalterable claim: "self-determination". We shall fight for this to the end.'[7]

Towards the end of 1958, after a series of manoeuvres at the United Nations, where Greece had tabled a fifth resolution concerning the Cyprus problem, Britain promoted direct contacts between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, which continued at the N.A.T.O. meeting in Paris in December 1958.[8] It was understood that the British government was now willing to consider any arrangement for the settlement of the Cyprus problem acceptable to both the Greek and Turkish governments. These governments were to work out proposals by themselves without any reference to the Cypriots. An imposed agreement was in the making. If the Cyprus problem were to be solved the Greek Cypriots who had fought and died for four years were not to be consulted about it: such proceedings constitute a record without precedent in the history of post-1945 decolonization and must stand as a reproach to Britain because of this grave dereliction of her responsibilities towards her former colonial subjects.

The Cyprus Agreement, which formed the basis of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, was negotiated between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers, first in Paris and then at Zürich, in January and February of 1959. Upon reaching agreement the two Premiers made their way to London to present their proposals to the British government. After reaching a suitable accommodation with the latter, they summoned Archbishop Makarios from Athens to join in the negotiations. In fact he was required to sign on the dotted line, without any prospect of amendment, the agreement thrust upon him. 'Greece, Turkey and now Britain were united in pressing for Makarios's signature. The Archbishop replied: "If you insist on my saying 'Yes' or 'No' tonight then the answer must be 'No'." The meeting was adjourned until next morning. In the hours between Makarios faced a final showdown. Karamanlis warned that if he could not get his delegation to support the Zürich pact then Greece, which

was committed to it, must wash her hands of Cyprus. At 8.30 a.m. he told the Cypriot delegates that he could get no more concessions and they agreed at last to accept.' The first reaction of the Archbishop was to accept the agreement worked out by the three governments as a basis for a fair and just solution of the Cyprus problem, particularly as during the course of the negotiations the Cypriots had not been informed of any details. However, the Archbishop was subjected to a *diktat*: he could either accept or reject. Great pressure was exerted on him by both the British and Greek governments. To all this the Archbishop could only reply: 'I was under the impression that I came to discuss a solution of the Cyprus question and not to sign what your three governments have already agreed upon. You put me in a difficult situation when you say take it or leave it.'[9]

Finally, Makarios was forced to yield when faced with an ultimatum from the British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, to the effect that if he did not agree partition might be carried out unilaterally by Britain. Makarios, deprived of all support and pressed by the Greek government, had no alternative but to sign the Agreement. His signature was followed by that of the Turkish leader Dr. Kutchük who was also faced with the same predicament. Makarios returned to Cyprus on March 1, 1959 and the crowds in Nicosia were estimated at two hundred thousand. At last the colonial regime of the island came to an end. Violence was over and 'tragedy was resolved by the victory of common sense.'[10] One could no doubt add that for the first time in twenty-seven centuries Cyprus had become an independent country.

It now remains to examine in some detail the nature of the Cyprus settlement of February 1959 drawn upon the basis of the Zürich and London Agreements. These Agreements were acceptable to the three governments concerned, that is Britain, Greece and Turkey, because they constituted a general compromise.[11] To Mr. Karamanlis the settlement reached was 'the best solution, because its main foundation was co-operation between Greeks and Turks both in the island and in our two countries.'[12] Mr. Zorlu declared that

Turkey believed 'the agreed solution represents an equitable and fair settlement of the Cyprus question.'[13] Archbishop Makarios, representing the Greek Cypriot community, said that the 'positiveness of unity and co-operation' had prevailed over 'the negativeness of division and strife.' A new era, the Archbishop firmly declared, opened up for the people of Cyprus 'an era of peace, freedom and prosperity.'[14] Dr. Kutchük, the Turkish Cypriot representative, said that 'whatever the Turks of Cyprus had sacrificed or conceded had been worthwhile because they felt that in return they had gained the full co-operation and friendship of the Greek community.'[15] A compromise was thus achieved; Britain abandoned sovereignty over Cyprus while Greece and Turkey abandoned *enosis* and partition (*taksim*) respectively.

The Turkish point of view had always been that, in case of changes in the status of Cyprus, partition must be the final solution. The Turkish government maintained that it would only accept a Cyprus settlement if it were to lead to this final solution. By the Zürich and London Agreements, however, the Turks agreed to shelve the idea of partition as a final solution in exchange for a Constitution which, being in practice a variant of the Macmillan Plan, provided for the separation of the two communities and a Turkish say in the internal affairs of Cyprus without the consequences of virtual partition. In other words the Zürich and London Agreements, if implemented to their logical consummation, were a means of introducing partition by the back door.

The Greek side, on the other hand, had to abandon officially its claim to self-determination with its implication of *enosis*. But since independence and sovereignty implies a right to self-determination, the Greek leadership could interpret the disappearance of *enosis* as a temporary pragmatic expedient which could very well be set right in the future. This has been the line adopted by Archbishop Makarios after his signature of the Agreements, and he has tried to implement his policy in as far as circumstances allowed him. However, from a purely political point of view, the settlement was unsatisfactory, because both sides were bound to interpret it differently and the Archbishop was

entirely justified in resisting it to the last minute. The unworkability of the settlement is simply illustrated by the fact that, at best, the settlement would become transformed into something different, i.e. *enosis* or partition, and at worst would lead to bloodshed and disaster. Unfortunately, the latter alternative seems to have come about although, through the leadership of Archbishop Makarios, a major disaster has so far been averted. Nevertheless, the qualities of Makarios's leadership should serve as no excuse for the unsatisfactory settlement of 1959 and the pusillanimity of the Greek government in not standing up to it.

It would now be useful to examine some outstanding points of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus as it emerged from the negotiations between the British, Greek and Turkish governments. This is particularly necessary after a lapse of more than ten years during which the Constitution has had ample time to prove its 'Achilles' heel.' The fatal flaw of the Constitution was that the principle of separation between the two communities ran through it like a fissure through a landscape which had been rocked by an earth tremor. This idea of separation, of course, is the legacy of the Macmillan Plan where it was euphemistically disguised as 'partnership.' It is the contemplation of this Constitution, and of its inevitable fatal results which makes the Radcliffe Constitution stand out like light shining in darkness.

First of all the Agreements provided that the new Republic should be headed by a President and a Vice-President, the President being elected by the Greek community and the Vice-President by the Turkish. This arrangement negates, in a most ridiculous way, any concept of a unitary state, as it provides each community with its own separate head and produces a complete lack of loyalty to the man elected by the other. A head of state is only a head of state if he is elected or represents the entire population of the state. If he represents only a part of the population of that state, the other part of the population cannot owe any allegiance to him and the very unity of the state cannot be maintained. Furthermore, the President and Vice-President, representing the executive power, were not to have any authority in the

sphere of communal affairs of the respective Greek and Turkish communities. This ensured the widest possible separation[16] of the two communities and a built-in formula for the prevention of the growth of any Cypriot national feeling which it was the avowed purpose of the foundation of the Republic to foster. Under this provision the two communities in respect of such vastly important affairs as education, religion, culture and important economic matters were to be encouraged to look outside Cyprus to Athens and Ankara respectively. In other words this was a provision for complete cultural partition. Lastly, the Turkish Vice-President was given the same right to veto over the decisions of the cabinet in the matter of foreign affairs, defence and security as the Greek President representing 80% of the population. The Turkish Vice-President also had the same right as the President to send back the budget for reconsideration to the House of Representatives. In truth, there is really no need to examine the Constitution further, as the points already cited prove beyond any reasonable doubt that any constitution containing such provisions becomes automatically unworkable.

The House of Representatives under point 6 of the Agreements was to be elected on separate communal rolls in the proportion of 70% Greek and 30% Turkish Members although the Turkish population numbered less than 20%. And this Assembly does not constitute a united Parliament, as the Constitution provides that separate majorities, both Greek and Turkish, are required to pass legislation concerned with the modification of the electoral law or any legislation concerning municipalities or the imposition of taxes or duties. This arrangement provides for the Turkish minority, if it so wishes, to block the passage of legislation vital to the existence of the state. The question of municipalities, where the two communities are most mixed, constitutes a matter of life or death, because the blockage of legislation concerning this aspect of local government makes these municipalities ungovernable and ensures paralysis not only at the central but also at the local government level.

But perhaps the idea of separation fostered by the

Macmillan Plan made itself most effectively felt in the Zürich and London Agreements in the matter of the Communal Chambers already mentioned. The importance of the Communal Chambers in destroying any chance of Cyprus surviving as a united state cannot be overestimated. The Communal Chambers were granted absolute powers in such matters which could not but lead to the separation of the two communities. Their control of co-operative and credit societies was of vital importance because these societies formed an important feature of Cyprus agriculture. This economic divorce between the two communities was reinforced by the Chambers being given the right to levy their own taxes in addition to the grant from the Annual budget. This was the only way to ensure any levying of taxes given the veto powers in taxation matters embodied in the Constitution.

Virtual territorial partition, although excluded from the Cyprus settlement, nevertheless appeared on the municipal level. The five main towns of the island—Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos—were to be divided into separate Greek and Turkish municipalities, hence the importance of the blocking of legislation concerning local government in the House of Representatives.[17]

The Turks were granted the same generous 30% ratio in all grades of the civil service. The same ratio was also to apply to the police and the gendarmerie. But the most flagrant departure from mathematical reality was the provision that 40% of the army of the new Republic was to be composed of the Turkish element. The last provision was clearly designed to give the Turkish minority a parity of armed strength with the Greek majority in case of an internal conflict, but the very existence of this armed parity encouraged and generated the possibility of such a conflict.

One other interesting, though unhelpful feature of the Constitution was the provision that both the Supreme Constitutional Court of the Republic and the High Court were to be presided over by a neutral judge who was not to be a Cypriot or a native of Greece, Turkey or Britain. The Constitutional Court was thus to be composed of one Greek

and one Turkish judge with a neutral President. The High Court, which was a Court of Appeal, was to be composed of two Greek judges, one Turkish judge and a neutral President disposing of two votes. But the idea of separation in justice under the Agreements comes out in the fact that under point 17 no Greek or Turk can be judged by judges not of his community. It is difficult to imagine a provision less likely to promote confidence between the two communities. The concept of justice defies separation. This provision implied a slur on the impartiality of the judges and helped to establish the idea that a judge is no more than an advocate for his community.

In addition to being faced with such a Constitution, Makarios and his advisers in London had to accept under point 21 of the Agreements the provision for signing, after the inauguration of the Republic, a Treaty of Guarantee with Turkey and Britain, which in its four articles infringed the right of self-determination of the people of Cyprus. The idea of this Treaty was to allay any fears on the part of the Turkish government that Cyprus independence would be a stepping-stone to *enosis*. Also under point 21 a Treaty of Alliance between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey was signed to ensure both Greek and Turkish rights in Cyprus. Both Greece and Turkey obtained rights to interfere with the internal affairs of Cyprus and to station token armed forces in the island for the purpose of training the army of the new Republic. This Treaty, as far as Turkey was concerned, cancelled the Treaty of Lausanne and even the cession of 1878, as Turkish troops were back in Cyprus. The Turkish government was able to present this as quite a respectable substitute for territorial partition. As far as Greece was concerned, she secured for the first time certain rights in Cyprus, which again could be presented as a respectable substitute for *enosis*, but these prestige gains by the Greek and Turkish governments only prepared the ground for the disintegration of the political structure which they had so laboriously erected in Cyprus. As Abraham Lincoln had said: 'A house divided against itself cannot stand.' The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus derived from the Zürich and

London Agreements, is perhaps unique in history as it provided for the creation of a house divided against itself.

The above analysis of the constitutional structure of the Cyprus Republic as hammered out by the British, Greek and Turkish governments shows clearly its impossible nature. Unfortunately, the Constitution-makers proved unequal to the problem they had to face. The course of events before the signature of the Agreements clearly demonstrated that the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus would not live together in harmony. The point was that the Turkish population was promoted from being a minority to a national entity sharing equal rights with the Greek majority. In such circumstances, with the two communities living in a state of civil war, no genuine constitutional solution was possible unless the Constitution emanated from the freewill of the people itself, but because this was impossible without upsetting the balance of power, a Constitution had to be imposed by force. The Greek people of Cyprus had no opportunity to make their own Constitution or even to express an opinion about a Constitution made for them. This was a course followed by monarchs in the nineteenth century who granted constitutions as a gift to their peoples, without caring whether they accepted them or not. The acceptance of such a constitution on the part of Archbishop Makarios was an act of tremendous responsibility intimating supreme courage. He took upon his shoulders a seemingly impossible burden of trying to govern under such circumstances in the hope that the future might bring what the present denied. Such a course is the supreme example of the pragmatic approach to politics of which Makarios has proved himself to be a master.

X
The New Republic: The Tangled Legacy of Imperialism

After the signature of the Zürich and London Agreements Makarios, as the undoubted political head of the island, inherited a situation for which he had not bargained when he began his struggle nearly ten years previously. He had been first and foremost a churchman and his fervent desire had been to procure the union of his native island with mother Greece. To have led the struggle for *enosis* and Hellenism was well within the traditions of the Orthodox Church under Moslem domination. His ambition had been to preside over the union of Cyprus with Greece and then to retire from the political scene and devote himself exclusively to his ecclesiastical office. There is no reason to believe that he has ever wished it to have been otherwise. Now, however, he found himself marooned in a political role. He had to accept the creation of a state he did not want to exist; he had to accept for that state a Constitution he did not wish; he had to become a head of state which he did not wish; and, as an unwilling head of state, he had to sign treaties which he did not approve of.

In such circumstances it is not surprising that Makarios signed the Zürich and London Agreements with the greatest possible reluctance. He had always felt deeply that he was the representative of his people and that they should have the right freely to decide what kind of government they wanted and the kind of status the island should have, whether independence or *enosis*. He had to accept in 1959 what was thrust on him because he had no alternative. He could only hope that a patient attempt to try to reinterpret the Agreements and the Constitution based on them would make

reason triumph. The representatives of the Turkish minority, too, although they had had no say in the drafting of the Agreements, and although they were denied their aim of partition, nevertheless were bound to interpret the Agreements and the separatist regime they implied in the light of an interpretation pointing towards partition. Thus, at the very beginning both sides interpreted the Agreements according to their principles which had not been fulfilled. This situation was fostered by the Constitution which was drafted in accordance with the Agreements, and which clearly 'contained the seeds'[1] of future disruption. The reason for this was that, on the whole, the settlement favoured the Turkish aspirations. While *enosis* was excluded for the Greeks, partition was entrenched in the Constitution because of its practical insistence on the separation of the communities. All that the Turks had to do was to stick to their privileged position, granted to them by the Constitution, in order to bring about its revision in such a way as to make a mockery of the principle of a unitary state. That they would try to do so was a fact as plain as daylight.

The independence of Cyprus could not solve the basic problem long extant between the two ethnic communities. 'The situation thus evolved into one of the island Greeks versus island Turks. Latent attitudes and dormant irritations came to the fore, magnified by the communities with their respective fatherlands.'[2] The independence, on the whole, could only lead to the magnification of the old quarrels which had been festering for centuries. The entire Eastern Mediterranean area has been continually subject from the time of Alexander the Great to various kinds of imperialism. Each tide of imperialism in the area was buttressed by various treaties and limited forms of sovereignty which provided the necessary feudal ingredient in imperialism. The latest tides of imperialism in the Eastern Mediterranean had been the Ottoman Empire and nineteenth century British colonialism. The shifts of sovereignty, treaties and rights under treaties which the legacy of these systems produced constitute a tangled web of truly Byzantine intricacy. Thus it has been in Cyprus. The island was set up to be a republic within the

British Commonwealth but bound by treaties to countries outside the Commonwealth which prevented it from exercising the right of self-determination which is the right of every Commonwealth country. The treaties by which the Republic of Cyprus is bound also give to foreign countries, which are outside the Commonwealth, the right to interfere to some extent with the internal affairs of the island and to station troops on it.[3] Furthermore, the Constitution of the Republic was not of its own making but imposed on it, in flagrant contrast with all other countries of the Commonwealth. Finally, the Constitution, although affirming the unitary nature of the state, was aimed at separating the two communities on the island and allowing a small minority of the population to carry out a virtual partition by entrenched constitutional means.

The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, drafted in 1960 in accordance with the 27 points of the Zürich and London Agreements, consists of 199 articles. The Constitution together with the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance and the Treaty of Establishment, which concerns British bases, occupies a volume of more than two hundred[4] pages, but as stated by Ierodiakonou: 'This highly detailed and elaborate document did not necessarily imply, however, that the Constitution would also be workable.'[5] There is no doubt that at this stage Makarios regarded the unsatisfactory status of Cyprus and the unsatisfactory Constitution as an intermediate stage although, at the time, the majority of Greek Cypriots were in a temporary state of euphoria brought about by the setting up of an independent state and of ruling themselves for the first time in their history since Evagoras of Salamis. It emerged from the Archbishop's declaration that, although his present policy was independence, 'the national aims [i.e. *enosis*] remained unchanged.'[6] In another statement on April 1, 1960, the fifth anniversary of E.O.K.A.'s first attack, Makarios stated publicly that the Agreements were merely 'a bastion and starting-point for peaceful campaigns'.[7]

Thus, from the very beginning of the establishment of the Republic the two communities seemed 'to adopt antagonistic

standpoints.'[8] This, bearing in mind the nature of the Constitution, tended to paralyse the state machinery, which in turn enhanced the antagonism between the communities still more. The state of affairs existing between the two communities was described at the time as 'not a marriage of consent but a shot-gun wedding'.[9] The two communities during the last few years of the British colonial administration had been in a state of open conflict. The establishment of the Republic of Cyprus could not remove the memories of the past. The Constitution was imposed on those who had fought for *enosis* and those who had fought for *taksim* (partition), and they were the same people who had fought against the British colonial administration and those who had co-operated with it. The Turks, therefore, had every reason to suspect that the Greek majority had not voluntarily abandoned enotism but had lowered its flag for the time being out of 'necessity'.[10] Besides, differences in national temperament contributed to the creation of tension. In such an atmosphere it did not take long, after the abatement of the euphoria of 1960, for the two communities to begin drifting towards total antagonism because of the broad issues outlined above. In addition to this general antagonism, and feeding from it and on it, the Constitution brought into relief several definite points of conflict which were the actual cause of the armed communal conflict which broke out in December 1963 and destroyed the Zürich and London Agreements. The points of issue under the Constitution were the veto power of the Turkish Vice-President in respect of the army and foreign affairs; the separate majority right in the case of tax legislation; the 70:30 per cent proportion in the civil service, and the establishment of separate municipalities.

The quarrel over foreign policy was due to the fact that Makarios and his Greek Cypriot colleagues naturally decided to align the new Republic in the international field with the non-aligned and emerging countries. Cyprus followed this approach to international affairs at the United Nations (of which it became the 99th member in September 1960), and within the British Commonwealth (March 14, 1961), and at

various Conferences of the non-aligned powers particularly the Belgrade Conference of 1961. Most of these moves in the arena of foreign politics were made by Makarios and his Foreign Minister without informing their Turkish colleagues so that they would not exercise their power of veto through the Turkish Vice-President under Articles 50 and 57 of the Constitution. The Turkish Vice-President, Dr. Kutchük, issued a statement in December 1961 saying that he had been excluded from the foreign policy moves of Makarios in every respect by not being informed, which amounted to the denial of 'almost any say in executive power', and that his veto power had been restricted to 'certain unimportant matters'. Kutchük appealed to the Supreme Constitutional Court against what he considered to be the misuse of the Constitution in regard to his veto power in foreign affairs.

The Turkish Vice-President, however, was able to exercise his veto in the matter of the proposed Cyprus army. The dispute arose on the interpretation of Article 129 of the Constitution which deals with the army by providing that it should be based on a 60:40 per cent Greek-Turkish basis. The Article is silent on the question of the degree of integration in the army. The Turks demanded the establishment of separate units down to platoon level, whereas Makarios stuck out for an integrated army. Dr. Kutchük vetoed the Greek decision to establish an integrated army in October 1961. As a consequence of this Makarios decided that for the time being Cyprus should have no armed forces at all. This was a momentous decision because, as will be seen later, it was to lead to the formation of secret irregular units by both sides.

Another disastrous constitutional crack was produced by the all-important question of taxation, which was given such a prominent place in the Zürich and London Agreements. The Turkish government insisted that all other guarantees would be worthless if the Greek majority could tax the Turkish minority. The idea was that both communities should exercise control over the taxation of their members by means of the Communal Chambers and the veto of separate majorities in the House of Representatives. This was due to the fact that taxation is used as a weapon in the Near

East for robbing and 'crippling minorities.'[11] The Turkish government during the Second World War financially crippled its Greek minority in Constantinople by the imposition of a ruinous capital levy, and it now feared that this situation might recur in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot community came to use this separate majority clause for the quite different purpose of blocking tax laws in order to immobilize the machinery of the state. This power was enshrined in Article 78, paragraph two, of the Constitution, which states that any bill intended to modify the electoral law or relating to the municipalities or imposing duties and taxes shall require a separate, simple, majority vote of the Greek and Turkish Members of the House of Representatives. The Turkish Members of the House of Representatives from March 1961 blocked any attempt to pass long-term tax legislation. The most they would agree to was legislation limited to an annual or biennial review which would leave the sword of Damocles of the veto hanging over such legislation. This was totally unacceptable to the government, as it would deprive Cyprus of the security of income from taxation. Makarios, on April 1, 1961, ordered the collection of taxes and dues as usual without any legislation. Later on he used the powers of the Greek Communal Chamber to impose a temporary income tax on the Greek population. The Turks retaliated by paying their taxes to the Turkish Communal Chamber. As a result of this dispute Cyprus never managed to pass any tax legislation under the Constitution as it functioned up to 1963.

Another dispute between the two communities arose from the composition of the civil service. The civil service under Article 123, paragraph one, of the Constitution, embodying the provision of the Zürich and London Agreements, envisaged a 70:30 per cent proportion between Greeks and Turks on all levels. In this vital struggle for jobs—a common feature of all new countries—the Turks pressed for a rapid implementation of these provisions, and soon complaints arose that the Public Service Commission, which had a majority of Greek Members, was sabotaging this provision on the grounds that there were not enough qualified Turkish candidates for the jobs being offered. By 1963 the 70:30

ratio was not attained, not because of discrimination against the Turks but because in the lower grades, where the Turks were allocated the same proportion, many Turks were illiterate and could not be appointed. Only in the top grade of the civil service did the Turks manage to fill their quota, but there was no reason why this should not have been in time the case in the other grades too.

The final constitutional dispute, which led directly to armed conflict, was the dispute concerning the establishment of separate municipalities for a trial four-year period. The separate Turkish municipalities had in fact been in existence since the communal disturbance of 1958 and had been recognized as such by the Macmillan Plan. But, in the atmosphere of sharpening conflict after independence, Makarios and his government began to realize that the separate Turkish municipalities were the first stage on the road to partition. For the Turks the question of separate municipalities now became the vital test of how far the Greeks would genuinely accept them as a separate community. The law creating separate municipalities was extended for a six-month period after independence until in December 1962, Makarios voiced his opposition to any further extension and urged the passage of legislation to create unified municipalities. A compromise plan for the operation of a unified municipal system for an experimental period of one year was rejected by the Turkish leader Dr. Kutchük after a provisional agreement over Christmas of 1962. In January 1963 the Council of Ministers set up 'Development Boards' to run the five municipalities but the Turks refused to put themselves under their jurisdiction. The Turkish Communal Chamber had already passed a law providing for the maintenance of separate municipalities in the five towns of Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos. The Turks tried to resolve the municipal dispute once and for all by appealing to the Supreme Constitutional Court. The Court ruled in March 1963 that both the Development Boards and the Turkish attempt to legalize separate municipalities were invalid. The President of the Court, Dr Ernst Forsthoff, resigned his post on May 21, 1963.

By 1963 the constitutional structure envisaged for Cyprus was in the process of breaking down. The government had no authority to collect customs duties and income tax. The army was non-existent. The dispute over the municipalities meant that local government was now threatened with paralysis as well. The basic provisions of the Constitution served to put the two communities in opposing antagonistic positions. One dispute led to another and it was an obvious fact that the Constitution, instead of providing harmony between the communities, only tended 'to increase tension and mistrust.'[12]

Another reason for the disruption between the two communities was a purely financial factor. The Turkish community, being much smaller than the Greek community, was much poorer and backward. They required a much greater outlay on education, welfare services and economic development. The money for this would have had to come from the richer and more numerous Greek community but when it came to sharing out development aid, the Greeks objected to more than the proportion of 20% being allocated to the Turks. Makarios himself raised this proportion to 28.5%, but the Turks still felt dissatisfied. A more realistic figure would have been 40%. Another difficulty contributing to this unhappy situation was due to the existence of the separate Communal Chambers which taxed their own communities to meet communal needs, and accordingly, the Greek and Turkish communities were unwilling to impose a second round of central government taxation on their constituents to provide the necessary supplementary grants for education and welfare. The increasing frustration over the failure of the Constitution to produce harmony between the two communities on the island and its contrary effect of increasing strife could only play into the hands of extremists on both sides, with the concomitant danger of the revival of armed conflict.

Both sides took precautions. On the Greek side there was the hardcore of E.O.K.A. while the Turks revived their own military organization the T.M.T., the military arm of Volcan (Secret Turkish underground organization). Even before

independence in 1959 history repeated itself in a perfect reduplication of the *Agios Georgios* affair, when a Turkish motorboat, *Deniz,*[13] was intercepted while smuggling ammunition from Turkey to Cyprus. On the Greek side there were 5,000 fully trained Greek irregulars, all ex-E.O.K.A. men and a further 5,000 partially trained. The training was provided by the Greek army officers of the Greek contingent stationed on the island. The Turks were also training irregulars, although under the circumstances they were outnumbered and outgunned. The breakdown of the budgetary structure favoured the concealment of the cost of all these preparations. Violence started with the murder[14] of two Turkish Cypriot politicians, Hikmet and Gurkan, who led a small Turkish group favouring co-operation with the Greeks. The murders were ascribed to Turkish extremists. Bomb attacks were made against the office of Rauf Denktash, the Deputy Turkish leader, and Turkish extremists were caught setting off an explosion at the Turkish Government Information Office in Nicosia in 1963.

The gradual collapse of the constitutional structure in Cyprus was hastened to some extent by the course of events in the two 'allied countries', Greece and Turkey. First of all, the Menderes government in Turkey was removed by a *coup d'état* in 1960. In Greece the Karamanlis-Averoff government was forced out of office in 1963, and it was highly probable that the forthcoming elections in Greece would bring to power the opposition headed by the veteran politician, George Papandreou, which pledged itself in advance to work for the achievement of *enosis*. In these circumstances it would have been difficult for Makarios to take a different line from those who would be soon at the helm in Greece. At the same time the Republican Party government of Inönü which had been in power in Turkey since 1960 was forced out of office early in December 1963 by the heirs of Menderes. Thus, the lines of conflict hardened in Cyprus. The Greeks were expecting a government in Greece sincerely devoted to the cause of *enosis* while in Ankara the party of Menderes, which stood for the policy of partition, was back in power.

Meanwhile, the Archbishop had gone on record officially in August 1963 as saying that the Constitution should be amended because of its 'utopian and inapplicable character.' On November 30 he handed to the Turkish Vice-President and to the governments of Greece, Turkey and Great Britain, a plan for the revision of the Constitution of the Republic. The plan consisted of 13 proposals and became known as 'Makarios's Thirteen Points.' The gist of the 13 proposals was to end the separate political existence of the two communities in Cyprus, which was paralysing the functioning of the state, while preserving wider privileges for the Turkish minority. It would be fair to describe Makarios's 13 proposals as attempting to alter the position of the Turks in Cyprus from a separate community to a privileged minority within a unified state. The fate of these proposals was that they were rejected on December 16, 1963 by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs before the Vice-President, Dr. Kutchük, had had time to express his opinion on the matter. In reply, the Archbishop stated on December 18 that the revision of the Constitution of the Republic was an exclusively internal affair of Cyprus and that the circulation of these proposals to the three governments concerned was only 'to keep them informed' and not 'in expectation of either a positive or negative reply'.[15]

Evidence exists that the Turks had plans to assert partition by arms at any attempt to alter the Constitution, although they did not expect immediate intervention by Turkey and there were no plans for any mass movement of the Turkish population from outlying areas into strategically placed enclaves until the fighting had started. At all events the T.M.T (Turkish Defence Organization) was not taken by surprise when fighting started 'because fortified positions had been prepared in advance'.[16]

On the other hand, subsequent information revealed by quarters close to Grivas seems to suggest that by 1963 Makarios had formed a four-point plan for the solution of the problem to his satisfaction. The plan was the following:

1. To amend the negative parts of the Constitution.
2. To abrogate the international agreements.

3. To advocate anew the case for self-determination.
4. To materialize *enosis* by means of a plebiscite.

The document goes on further to declare that in the case of armed resistance by the Cypriot Turks the strategy and tactics to be followed must be based on those of the Israelis. These implied the strategy of a rapidly achieved *fait accompli* while exploiting the double standard applied by 'world public opinion' (i.e. the international press) to such exploits.

It is obvious that what Makarios had in mind in 1963 in order to find some way out of the impossible situation created by the Zürich and London Agreements was a show of firmness in the face of Turkish provocations. In the event matters turned out somewhat differently with tension rising as a result of the rejection of the 13 points by the Turks. An exchange of fire on December 21, 1963 in Nicosia led to major fighting because some of the Greek irregulars and Turkish irregulars got out of hand. This led to an escalation of ugly atrocities committed by both sides.

The violence which ensued after December 1963 in Cyprus led to the final and irrevocable collapse of the Zürich and London structure and was engendered by the rising tide of bitterness caused by disputes over the application of the Agreements. These disputes created a heavy burden of suspicion and fear, and each side prepared for the worst without actually wishing it to come about. Thus, the situation which led to violence had been directly created by the Constitution of 1960, and there is no doubt that the unfortunate nature of this Constitution was the legacy of Ottoman and British imperialism. There is every reason to believe that Makarios in 1963 was only thinking of the first point of his four-point plan, which did not envisage any use of violence, and he genuinely thought that he was making moderate proposals designed at least to make Cyprus a more workable independent state. However, as events turned out, the legacy of imperialism denied him success here. But by surviving this ordeal, he achieved success later in a new and unexpected way and rendered a service to Cyprus perhaps greater than any possible union with Greece.

XI
The Foreign Policy of the New Republic and Its Chief Architect

Because of its geographical situation the foreign policy of Cyprus has been conditioned by power-political realities of the area. Throughout the nineteenth century, as new states arose in the Balkans, carved out of the Ottoman Empire, they were initially subject to a regime of limited sovereignty and partition. This was the case with Rumania and Bulgaria. Both states advanced from this status to unity and full sovereignty. Now as then the problem of full sovereignty and partition has been the predominant factor in both the internal and the external policy of Cyprus.

It is a matter of common knowledge that those close to the Archbishop know that his experiences in 1950 and later in 1959, when confronted with the Zürich and London Agreements, have taught him the necessity of a pragmatic approach to fulfilling his objectives. These objectives have always been the welfare of his people of whom he had now become the political as well as the religious guide, and the union of his homeland with mother Greece in fulfilment of his sincere adherence to the cause of Hellenism. He had to deal with a situation in which his country was saddled with an impossible constitution and a regime of contradictory treaties: 'The foundation of the independent Republic of Cyprus was the result of a compromise between highly contrasting interests, involving substantial concessions from all sides. Great Britain surrendered the last colonial base in the Eastern Mediterranean; Greece and the majority of Greek Cypriots had to renounce union with Greece, the Turks withdrew their demand for *taksim*. No other solution was possible in view of the international situation and the

conditions in Cyprus in 1959. A compromise of this kind inevitably contained the seeds of many new problems. As yet, the new state could be no more than an experiment which still had to prove its capacity to survive. The fact that even Archbishop Makarios and his government could not fundamentally change the past any more than they could escape the ramifications of international politics was apt to be disregarded in the first flush of triumph.' Thus, the constitutional aspect of the Cyprus problem was intimately linked with any shaping of the foreign policy of the Republic. From a pragmatic point of view Cyprus had to free itself from treaty obligations which hampered its full independence in order to carry out self-determination which would be a stepping-stone to *enosis*. The means to achieve this was to be the United Nations. The limited sovereignty which Cyprus derived from the Zürich and London Agreements and the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance conflicted directly with the status of the Republic as a Member of the United Nations, which under the United Nations Charter implies full sovereignty. The liberation of Cyprus from the obligations which hampered its sovereignty could only come in a legal way from the United Nations, which is, in the present understanding of international law, the only source of legitimate sovereignty. But this recognition could only be bestowed on an orderly constituted state, and this, therefore, necessitated a smooth working of the Constitution. Hence, the intimate tie-up between the constitutional position in Cyprus and its foreign policy.

Makarios came to believe that the foreign policy to strengthen the claim of Cyprus to be a fully independent and sovereign state, could only be a policy based on non-alignment, because such a policy was expected from a state emerging from colonialism and would appeal to all the other ex-colonial and emerging nations which held the balance of power at the United Nations. That such a policy could not always be pleasing to Greece and Turkey—both members of N.A.T.O. (and Turkey of C.E.N.T.O. as well)—is beyond dispute. Thus, as already stated, Makarios himself participated in September 1961 in the Belgrade Conference of

twenty-five non-aligned countries, while in the United Nations the Cyprus representative followed the policy of the Afro-Asian countries. Such a policy had immediate constitutional effects at home: it was not to the liking of the Turkish leaders, that is of Ankara which guided their opinions in this matter. This was the reason for Dr. Kutchük's vehement protest at the 'unconstitutionality'[1] of Makarios's course, as if the issue could have mattered alone in the Cyprus content. Likewise Makarios developed a friendly relationship with the United Arab Republic, and particularly with President Nasser, then still a leading figure of non-alignment. However, Makarios did not forget the need to establish an understanding with both the United States and Turkey because of close foreign policy ties between these two countries. He visited the U.S.A. and in November 1962 also visited Turkey. However, his non-alignment policy, even though its military significance was limited by the presence of British, Greek and Turkish troops in Cyprus, was unpopular with the Turkish Cypriots, with the Greek and Turkish governments and with the United States. It would not be unfair to describe Makarios's policy during this period as a balancing act between N.A.T.O. and non-alignment. This was due to the paradoxical fact that, although the objective of his policy was the union of Cyprus with a state which was a N.A.T.O. member, this could only be achieved by the courting of the non-aligned flock at the United Nations. The fact that such tactics were unpleasing to the Greek government of the day comments on the sincerity of their pronouncements on *enosis* and establishes the Archbishop in a much more consistent position in this respect.

Consistent with the long-range policy aims of Makarios was the smooth functioning of the Constitution. But, as we have seen, this was dragging along after the lapse of three years. Cyprus needed a completed constitutional structure in order to establish a basis to make it fit for self-determination. Accordingly, in December 1963 Makarios submitted his famous 13 proposals for constitutional revision:

1. The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be abandoned.

2. The Vice-President of the Republic to deputize for the President of the Republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.

3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present the President by the Greek Members of the House and the Vice-President by the Turkish Members of the House.

4. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputize for the President of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.

5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.

6. Unified municipalities to be established.

7. The administration of justice to be unified.

8. The division of the security forces into police and gendarmerie to be abolished.

9. The numerical strength of the security forces and of the defence forces to be determined by a law.

10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the public service and the forces of the Republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

11. The number of Members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to five.

12. All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority.

13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished.

The result was not constitutional revision but civil war between the two communities and almost, on several occasions, a full-scale war, between the powers in the time-hallowed Balkan manner. The civil war in Cyprus, euphemistically described as the 'Cyprus Problem', was bound to produce some changes in the foreign policy aims of the Archbishop, and by the same token in the foreign policies of various states involved in the Cyprus problem—particularly Greece and Turkey. One of the salient features of the situation arising out of the events of 1963 was the complete

dependence of the Turkish Cypriot community in Ankara to act as their spokesman at the international level, while Makarios showed increasing independence of Athens both before and after 1967; the policy of the Cyprus government has never been an appendix to the foreign policy of Greece. 'Makarios wanted to have the last word. He seemed to resent the various attempts by Athens and Ankara to hold talks, and he did not omit to remind the negotiators that no agreement between Greece and Turkey could be regarded as binding on the Cypriots.'

The gravest danger posed to Cyprus by the events of 1963 was partition, which has always been the objective of the Turkish government. Makarios, now President of Cyprus, and bearing in mind his experiences in London in 1959, was determined that there should be no repetition of the situation in which Greece and Turkey settled the fate of Cyprus over his head. This was to be the principle which has guided the Archbishop ever since, and to this purpose he has been willing to shelve *enosis,* if *enosis* were to be accomplished by partition or any other cession of territory.

The events of December 1963 and their consequences have, in fact, constituted a secession of the Turkish community from the Republic of Cyprus. They have also constituted a *de facto* partition, as the Turks seized enclaves. That a separate Turkish state in Cyprus has not been recognized, that the Turkish enclaves have not been claimed territory of the Republic of Turkey, and that on the international level the Cypriot Turks only appear as represented by the Ankara government while Makarios's government is recognized as the legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus, testifies to the success of the Archbishop's foreign policy in a period of immense stress and pressures.

The foreign policy followed by the Archbishop throughout the crisis seems to fall into two categories. The first has been to adopt great caution when dealing with the Greek government in order to prevent the eventuality of a deal between Greece and Turkey, which although it would imply *enosis*, would also include partition or cession of territory to

Turkey. The second has been the reliance on a United Nations presence in Cyprus in order to protect the Greek Cypriots but not to control them. This is the reason why British troops from the sovereign base areas could not do the job properly of separating the two communities because Britain is a member of N.A.T.O. Makarios was determined now more than ever to maintain his freedom of action and the ability of the Cypriots to determine their own future. In this respect he had suspected N.A.T.O. of desiring to impose some sort of 'trusteeship', as a solution of its own, without any consideration of Greek Cypriot wishes. His aim throughout has been to secure the backing by the General Assembly of the United Nations of the claim for 'unfettered' independence and self-determination for Cyprus. However, he never intended the United Nations to impose its views if they were different from his own. He used the United Nations to protect Cyprus from Turkish intervention, and repudiated the Treaty of Alliance with Greece and Turkey—under which Greek and Turkish troops were stationed in Cyprus—and began to build up his own armed forces. In this way Makarios decreased his military reliance on the United Nations without becoming totally dependent on Greece. He thus increased his ability to manoeuvre between Athens and the United Nations, which, after all, should be the chief objective of any foreign policy.

By now the situation created by the Turkish revolt had launched Cyprus well and truly upon the troubled waters of international power politics. By virtue of its geographical position, Cyprus is a part of one of the most explosive areas in the world. 'The real Cyprus problem had little, if anything, to do with relations between the two ethnic groups on the island. It revolved around the strategic importance of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean basin. . . . When the moment came, it [Britain] wanted to maintain a military foothold on the island, whose importance could not be underestimated in the light of the fluid situation in the Middle East and the political, if not directly military, presence of the Soviet Union in that part of the world.'[2] The problem is implicated both in Graeco-Turkish rivalry and in the upheavals in the Middle East—both being the legacy of the break-up of the

Ottoman Empire. When one bears in mind that the area is also a strategic crossroads and repository of the largest oil reserves in the world and that it also borders on the U.S.S.R., the stage is set for a situation which with the greatest of ease could lead to the unleashing of an international conflict of the first magnitude. This is precisely what the Cyprus problem has done, and Makarios's foreign policy has had to adapt itself to this fact. From this followed Makarios's subtle approach to the Soviet Union, which was calculated to procure an insurance policy in case of a Turkish attack, which was always hanging in the air, as Greece could not supply a sufficient deterrent, and it was also unthinkable for the U.S.A. to adopt military measures against its principal, and up to a point most loyal ally in the area. The approach to the Soviet Union was also calculated to procure the Republic the supply of necessary modern arms, as the supply of such arms from N.A.T.O. countries could have always been vetoed by Greece and Turkey.

Soviet support for Makarios manifested itself in a message sent by Nikita Khrushchev in May 1964, which expressed in clear terms that the Soviet Union would not remain indifferent in the case of military aggression against the island. At the same time the Soviet Ambassador to Cyprus, speaking in Nicosia, gave blanket support for the cause of *enosis* by stating that independence includes the right of self-determination. Soviet support came in August of the same year when Khrushchev, following the battle of Mansoura and Kokkina, warned Turkey that the Soviet Union would not stand by if Turkey were to attack Cyprus. In a message to Makarios, Khrushchev declared that the sympathies of the Soviet Union were 'on the side of the Republic of Cyprus, which is upholding its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.'[3] A few days later the Soviet government announced officially that in the case of a foreign invasion of Cyprus, the Soviet Union would help the Republic to defend its freedom and independence, and suggested immediate negotiations to that effect. Nevertheless, as the union with Greece would have meant the extension of

N.A.T.O. territory, the Soviet Union preferred to view 'self-determination' as the continued independence of Cyprus rather than a stage to *enosis*. At this juncture Makarios succeeded in projecting himself as a supporter of such a cause rather than immediate *enosis* and signed, on September 30, 1964, an agreement with the Soviet Union which assured him of an arms supply. This policy was consistent with tactics followed at the United Nations where *enosis* was played down. As early as January 11, 1964, Makarios declared, 'If Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots fear that Cyprus will be united with Greece, let them express those fears to the Greek government and ask for guarantees that *enosis* will not materialize.' The Foreign Minister, Mr. S. Kyprianou, went a stage further and said: 'We are realistic and we realize that *enosis* is not achievable.' Therefore, from the very first, Makarios realized that on the United Nations level the best policy was to agitate for 'unfettered independence.' This new slogan was calculated to draw more support than the previous insistence on self-determination.[4]

Makarios's whole approach to relations with the Soviet Union underlines his pragmatic attitude to what is feasible within the framework of independence, which he has consistently displayed since his experience in London in 1959. It did not in any way deter him from his continued identification with the policy of non-alignment. In October 1964 he obtained in Cairo a declaration from the heads of state of 47 countries calling upon 'all states in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations... to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and refrain from any threat or use of force or intervention directed against Cyprus and from any efforts to impose upon Cyprus unjust solutions unacceptable to the people of Cyprus.' This incessant activity of the Archbishop tended to isolate Turkey and forced the Ankara government to try to secure a better relationship with the Soviet Union. The Soviet government was only too pleased with this development, as it enabled it to support both sides, but prevented Turkey from exercising armed force.

As a matter of fact *enosis* was no longer a safe factor in the foreign policy of Cyprus as in the consideration of the Western Allies it was coupled with partition. The worst contingency with which Makarios had had to cope had been a N.A.T.O. solution for Cyprus, which implied a Greek-Turkish condominium under N.A.T.O., that is virtual partition, with the whole island becoming a N.A.T.O. base. This solution meant the practical elimination of Britain from Cyprus, and Makarios had very unobtrusive British support in resisting this manoeuvre which was sponsored by the N.A.T.O. chief, General Lemnitzer, and the American Under-Secretary of State, George Ball. They attempted to bully Makarios, but with no success. 'Makarios, however, proved adamant. Kennedy's trouble-shooter, George Ball, was despatched to Cyprus, but he could not change the Archbishop's mind. Nevertheless, the United States kept up the pressure. Lemnitser is said to have tried to impose *de facto* partition. He sent telegrams to both Greek and Turkish governments urging them to land troops on the island, which would have led to the landing of a N.A.T.O. mixed force to interpose itself between Greeks and Turks and confront Makarios with a *fait accompli*. But, Makarios's determination prevailed in the end.'

The same fate was meted out to another American initiative implying partition, the so-called Acheson Plan, which differed only from the N.A.T.O. Plan in that after the cession of territorial bases in Cyprus to Turkey and to N.A.T.O. what was left of the island was to be united with Greece, another N.A.T.O. power. The Plan proposed:

1. The union of the island with Greece.
2. The cession to Turkey of Castellorizo (a small island lying close to the Turkish coast).
3. The establishment of a Turkish military base (on the Karpas Peninsular in north-eastern Cyprus).
4. The formation of two 'cantons' under Turkish Cypriot administration.
5. The payment of compensation to Turkish Cypriots wishing to emigrate.

'The Plan was therefore thoroughly unrealistic, for even if

the Greek government were to accept it, the Greek Cypriots never would. Indeed, the Plan would have had to be imposed on Cyprus by the force of Greek arms.'[5] Strengthened now by the election in Greece of a friendly and democratic government, headed by the late George Papandreou, Makarios wasted no time in consigning the Acheson Plan to the waste-paper basket.

Meanwhile, Makarios's careful and subtle tactics at the United Nations secured him a triumph on March 4, 1964 in a Security Council Resolution which referred to the sovereign Republic of Cyprus as responsible for the maintenance of law and order, and called upon all nations to refrain from the threat or use of force against its territorial integrity. This resolution provided for an initial United Nations Peace-force of 7,000 men to separate the two communities in Cyprus, and also for the appointment of a mediator to promote a settlement of the problem. The mediator appointed was Mr. Sakari Tuomioja of Finland, who was acceptable to the Turks on the grounds of their 'distant kinship with the Finns'![6] However, by September 1964, Tuomioja died and was succeeded by Galo Plaza, formerly President of Ecuador, on September 28, 1964.

Galo Plaza's Report, although it excluded *enosis*, re-affirmed the unitary nature of the Republic of Cyprus, thus excluding partition as well. The Report was a vindication for Makarios and his point of view, as it recognized the unity and full sovereignty of Cyprus and had the additional advantage of extending to the Turkish minority the protection of a United Nations High Commissioner.[7] The main points of the Galo Plaza Report were:

1. Cyprus should remain an independent state and should voluntarily renounce its right to choose union with Greece.
2. The island should be demilitarized, the question of the British sovereign bases being left aside for further consideration.
3. There should be no partition or physical separation of the Greek and Turkish communities, but Turkish Cypriot rights should be guaranteed by the United Nations and supervised by a United Nations Commissioner in the island.

4. A settlement must depend in the first place on the agreement between the people of Cyprus themselves and talks should take place between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Any objections concerning the exclusion of *enosis* should recede in retrospect, as the adoption of the Report at the time would have led in the circumstances to an equitable solution of the Cyprus problem.

However, both the Report and Galo Plaza as mediator, were ruthlessly rejected by the Turkish government. Makarios's main objections at the time were concerned with the proposed demilitarization (although this applied also to the British sovereign bases) because this would have put the clock back to the period prior to 1963, when Cyprus had no armed forces. A demilitarized, independent Cyprus would be defenceless—'a feather floating on the waves' was how Polycarpos Georgadjis, then Minister of the Interior, described it to Robert Stephens.[8]

In the meantime, however, changes were taking place both in Greece and Turkey. In Turkey the successors of Menderes were returned to power in the October elections of 1965, while in Greece the Papandreou government was forced out by a Palace intrigue, which led to succeeding weak governments. Perhaps because of this Makarios, sensing coming changes, intensified diplomatic activities at the United Nations. In December 1965, after a good deal of speech-making by the Foreign Minister Mr. S. Kyprianou, on the themes of non-alignment and unfettered independence, he succeeded in winning from the General Assembly a resolution stating that: 'The Republic of Cyprus, as an equal Member of the United Nations is, in accordance with the Charter, entitled to, and should enjoy, full sovereignty and complete independence without any foreign intervention or interference.' It could be argued here that this resolution was the turning point in determining the status of Cyprus. The links with Greece and Turkey under the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance were, in international law, broken by it and, therefore, rendered inapplicable as being repugnant to the United Nations Charter. Anyone who now argues that the Treaties of 1959 have binding force can be said to be on the wrong side of international law.

The following year, in 1966, there occurred a deterioration to some degree in the diplomatic position of Cyprus. This was due to the fact that following the rejection of Galo Plaza by the Turks and the change of government in Greece, Makarios had to face the prospect of direct Graeco-Turkish negotiations, which in a way signalled a return to the 1959 situation. On the other hand, accusations were levelled at him that he had given up the ideal of *enosis*. There is no real evidence that Makarios had shelved the idea of *enosis* before the end of 1967, and if he had it was only, as will be shown, because of circumstances outside his control. He continued, however, to keep a line open to Moscow where, although the successors of Khrushchev were not as outspoken, and bent on cultivating Turkey, they could still be relied upon to oppose any solution forced on Cyprus from outside. This provided Makarios with a safety-valve, in case of any eventuality. At the same time Makarios intimated to the Greek government that any settlement reached by its negotiations with the Turks would not be acceptable to the Cypriots if it excluded *enosis* and included partition. Naturally such an independent and courageous stand could not endear Makarios to the Athens government and 1966 can be said to mark the beginning of a three-cornered dispute involving Makarios, Grivas (who came back to Cyprus in 1964 to organize the National Guard) and the Athens government. Despite these difficulties the objective of Makarios's foreign policy at this period was still *enosis,* but *enosis* on his terms, and not forced on him by Greece or any agreement between the powers.

The year 1967 marked a turning point in the evolution of Cyprus's foreign policy. Firstly, the April military *coup* in Greece produced a government in Athens of a type and style of which Makarios and his advisers had no experience and which was not always sympathetic to Cypriot aspirations. 'In Athens, lacking a statesman of the calibre of Makarios, *enosis* was not a slogan that the politicians could afford to reject unscathed. No one had the political courage of the Cretan Venizelos who early in the century had opposed the unionist moves of his countrymen because he considered them untimely. The Cyprus issue tended, in fact, to become a

Helladic more than a Hellenic problem, and one whose perpetuation or solution was not always pursued with the interests of the Cypriots themselves as the main consideration. It also became the main issue in Greek-Turkish relations.'[9] Furthermore, the rapid Israeli triumph over their Arab adversaries, and particularly Egypt, altered the balance of power in the Middle East and it must be admitted that this was a drawback for Makarios's policy. The military government in Greece, for reasons which will appear later, 'adopted a more concessive policy'[10] towards Turkey on the Cyprus issue as well as trying to apply pressure on Makarios. In July 1967 it issued an official statement demanding the dismissal of Greek Cypriot leaders who on the eve of decisive developments laid down groundless conditions and subversive prerequisites which would make *enosis* impossible. The statement then went on to call upon those leaders who 'unhappily' include those 'who hold the highest posts in the state and influence the leadership of the Cypriot people' to make room for leaders who trusted the national Greek government and who had 'the realistic spirit needed for a final solution that will be both profitable to the nation and generally acceptable.'[11]

In the spirit of this statement the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers began negotiations to solve the nagging Cyprus problem. It is obvious that the new Greek government would have probably accepted a cession of a part of the island to Turkey in exchange for *enosis*, but this could not be achieved because of a warning from Makarios that such a solution would be unacceptable to his government. Makarios had now once more secured the renewed support of the Soviet government which was opposed to the new Greek regime because of its fanatical adherence to N.A.T.O.

The emergence of the military regime in Greece turned out to be a considerable blow to Makarios's foreign policy which up to then had been based on a close understanding with Greece and on the certainty of Greek military support in case of any Turkish military threat. The military regime, however, because of the internal situation in Greece, was obsessed by the alleged Communist danger. Even more than the Western powers they saw in Turkey a bastion between

themselves and the might of the Soviet Union. They argued that any erosion of Turkish strength would place Greece, with its inadequate resources, against an enormously strengthened Eastern Bloc. In other words, fear of Russia and anti-Communism replaced the shades of Hellenism in Athens, and a desire for a strong Turkey, that is the strengthening of the eastern flank of N.A.T.O., became the cornerstone of the foreign policy of the new government. Such a policy was militant and pro-American and could not regard with favour a non-aligned and neutralist Makarios in Cyprus.

The test came in November 1967 over a Turkish manned road block between the villages of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou on the road from Nicosia to Limassol. Shooting had occurred there earlier in the year, but on the night of November 14-15, Grivas himself launched a well-co-ordinated attack against the Turkish positions which resulted in 26 Turkish dead. The Turkish government was stung into action and addressed an ultimatum to Greece requesting the removal of Grivas from Cyprus and of all the Greek troops over and above those they were entitled to have on the island under the Zürich and London Agreements (although after 1964, from the Cypriot point of view, the presence of both the Greek and Turkish army contingents was illegal). The ultimatum also demanded the disarming of the Greek-officered Cyprus National Guard. The Greek government accepted some of the demands such as the recall of Grivas, but, in the circumstances, could not accede to the demand that the Cyprus National Guard—the army of a sovereign state—should be disarmed by it. Turkey then began preparations for the invasion of Cyprus once more. The holocaust was only averted by the prompt action of President Johnson of the U.S.A. who sent his special envoy, Cyrus Vance, to Ankara to deter the Turkish leadership from armed action, while the U.S.A. Sixth Fleet was waiting in the wings. This initiative succeeded mainly because of the restraint exercised by the Athens junta. Makarios, however, refused to disarm his army and the result was that both Greek and Turkish forces in Cyprus over and above the contingents stipulated in the Agreements left the island by January 16, 1968.

Thus a vacuum was created in Cyprus and the Makarios government now officially fell back on the 'independence' solution because *enosis*, as explained by the Cypriot Foreign Minister, Mr. S. Kyprianou, was unattainable within the forseeable future, especially as point 3 of the Agreements negotiated by Vance between Greece and Turkey provided that Greece and Turkey should respect the independence of Cyprus.

Thus, it seems that a point of no return was reached in the relationship between Makarios and the Athens regime, as the fear would always persist that Athens and Ankara now had a common interest in reaching a deal at the expense of Cypriot interests. The progressive deterioration of the relationship with Athens has had important repercussions, as will appear later, in the internal political life of Cyprus. In these circumstances, the Makarios government has improved its relations with Western countries, but remains firmly attached to its non-alignment policy. Makarios himself has described this policy as a cultural adherence to the West, but political non-alignment. Also because of the *rapprochement* between Athens and Ankara, relations with the Soviet Union are more cordial than they were before 1967. Significantly enough, the Soviet government did not make any anti-Turkish gestures during the November 1967 crisis. This new cordiality was signified by Makarios's state visit to the Soviet Union in 1971 which angered both the Ankara and Athens governments.

Although the Archbishop has shown in his foreign policy that his immediate objective is the preservation of the interests of Cyprus, which he has served adroitly, nevertheless, the long-term objective of his policy must still be *enosis*. There is no proof that Makarios is anti-enotist. *Enosis* is for him a matter of faith, if not always policy. It remains his ideal to be achieved under the best possible conditions but not at the cost of a conflagration or the dismembering of his country. In the circumstances, patience, which the Archbishop seems to have in abundance, is the chief ingredient of his foreign policy. Time, he believes, is on the side of the just. This has been the pragmatic evolution of the man who has been regarded, for nearly a quarter of a century, as the

firebrand of *enosis*. This ideal still remains the ultimate goal of the policy of His Beatitude, as was stressed by him to the author in an exclusive interview on October 26, 1972. This aspect of the Archbishop's policy is conveniently ignored by some of his political opponents who parade as the paragons of patriotism and Hellenism.



Taken from M. Harbottle, *The Impartial Soldier*, published by Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Reprinted by permission.

XII
The Sovereign British Bases and their Future

During the struggle for Cyprus independence, the problem for Britain was often expressed in the formula 'a base in Cyprus rather than Cyprus as a base.' The partisans of *enosis* always asserted that Britain would be welcome to bases in Cyprus after the union of the island with Greece. At this time Britain could, with justification, plead need of a base in the Eastern Mediterranean for the fulfilment of her obligations in the area under N.A.T.O. and also as a staging post for the protection of her interests east of Suez. There was also the confrontation with Arab nationalism with the concomitant support for Israel. The original bargain offered was a British base or bases in Cyprus in exchange for *enosis*. As it turned out *enosis* was postponed, but some British demands had to be satisfied for the sake of a face-saving formula.

At the London Conference in January 1959, the British Government in an official Declaration made its accession to the Cyprus settlement under the Draft Treaty of Establishment conditional on the creation of sovereign base areas in Cyprus. The two main base areas were located in the south of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia. In addition the Declaration laid claim to various other smaller areas and to extensive rights to use other areas for the purposes of training, etc. The initial British proposal was for an area of 160 square miles and this is how the news reached Grivas in Cyprus, sent to him through the Bishop of Kition, who pointed out to him that the only people who objected to this arrangement were the Communists. 'No one has opposed the agreement except the Communists whose ostensible objections to the bases question were prompted by Moscow. . . . I

hope, therefore, you will have no more hesitation over issuing a proclamation in favour if it.'[1] Grivas viewed the British demands with alarm, pointing out that in an annexe to the proposed Treaty the British claimed the right to make use of roads, ports, airfields and public services of all kinds, together with a variety of other privileges. Grivas commented that: 'If this news is true we shall have British soldiers all over Cyprus. . . .'[2] He pointed out that, as proposed, the British could at any time take control of the island and have the use of all the facilities they needed. In other words Cyprus was to remain under British occupation and nothing had changed.

As a matter of fact, Makarios saw the issue of the British bases differently. On the contrary he saw a good opportunity to even the score for the humiliating circumstances in which he had been forced to sign the Agreements. The original British proposal had been for an area of 160 square miles,[3] but Makarios countered this with an offer of only 36 square miles which excluded all Cypriot villages. These proposals were first made in May of 1959 and were followed by 14 months of tedious and tough bargaining. This long haggling match forced several postponements of Cyprus independence until agreement was finally reached in June 1960. In the final agreement Britain received an area of 99 square miles.[4] The British demands and conditions were formulated in Annexes A, B, C, D and E to the Draft Treaty of Establishment running from pages 16 to 82 of the relevant Document.[5] As a result of such detailed work Britain obtained somewhat less than complete sovereignty while Cypriots retained extensive rights over administration and employment of the British bases as well as freedom of access. Britain also agreed to cede the bases to Cyprus if ever she decided to give them up and offered Cyprus a payment of 12 million pounds in aid over a five-year period.

In the protracted haggling over the British bases, and the dispute going on with the Turks over the interpretation of the Constitution, Makarios received constant support from the Turkish leader, Dr. Kutchük, in trying to cut down the area of the bases. One explanation for this unusual support was the claim that Britain would yield on the question of the

bases, and he considered it to be foolish to back the losing side, which would delay independence and the Turkish Cypriot right which went together with it.

The Akrotiri base is excellently sited, and contributes the biggest British air base outside the U.K. and it contains the biggest striking force of the R.A.F. outside Britain, including bombers with nuclear capacity as well as missiles. The army base at Dhekelia has also got a transit airfield but 'it is not so easily defensible.'[6]

However, before the events of 1963 it was a debatable point whether Britain could have used unhampered its bases in Cyprus against the Arabs—at whom they are principally aimed. Makarios had repeatedly stated that he would 'react in many ways' if the bases were to be used in such a way. As early as September 1960, Makarios declared in an interview in Cairo that he looked towards the day when there would be no more bases in Cyprus. He declared: 'Personally, I believe that all bases, particularly atomic bases, should be put under the supervision of the United Nations. The world seeks peace and does not want to be in the shadow of fear. At any rate it was not Cyprus that gave the bases to the British. Those bases must return to Cyprus one day.'[7]

The whole question of the sovereign British bases was drastically altered by the events of 1963. British troops from the bases were used initially to separate the combatants and thus, perhaps, to prevent a war between Turkey and Greece. They were able to do this because of the existence of the bases and the fact that the troops had at their disposal other facilities as well under the Treaty of Establishment. With the arrival of United Nations forces in 1964 (UNFICYP)[8] the sovereign British bases proved invaluable in providing logistic and local labour requirements as well as ensuring that the British contingent of UNFICYP should not be a direct strain on United Nations resources. As a matter of fact an opinion has been expressed that 'but for the British bases the UNFICYP operation would never have worked.'[9] On the other hand, as the Cyprus emergency continued the British troops in UNFICYP found it difficult not to be regarded by the Greek population as an extension of the bases which,

whatever the views of Makarios, were not popular with some sections of the population (the extreme right and the extreme left). As a matter of fact, the extreme right combined with the extreme left in organizing demonstrations against the British bases. There was even an indication from the British during the period of the visit to Cyprus by the United Nations mediator, Galo Plaza, that the British government was prepared to give up its bases in Cyprus. The move was unofficial, and was later officially denied. It was made in the hope of solving the Cyprus problem by demilitarization and represented an initiative by the newly-elected British Labour Party of 1964.

In May, 1967, Makarios made his statement that he would 'react in many ways' if the British bases were to be used against the Arabs. As events turned out, the Israeli victory was so swift that no British intervention against the Arabs was necessary as in 1956, but the security of the British bases in Cyprus was shown to be questionable because of local hostility. Actually with the changed situation in the Middle East after 1967 the very necessity of the bases came into question. It would hardly be likely for British forces stationed in Cyprus to be used against the Arabs without grave local repercussions. On the other hand, the necessity to use them against the Arabs on behalf of Israel had disappeared. The purpose of the bases is, therefore, questionable at least for the time being.

The existence of the British sovereign bases in Cyprus has prompted the idea in Greece that the Cyprus problem could be solved by the creation of a sovereign Turkish base in Cyprus. However, the only place indicated as convenient for such a base has been suggested as the British base at Dhekelia. Such a transfer of a base from one power to another is in keeping with the scheme of establishing a N.A.T.O. base in Cyprus in the event of *enosis*, but there is no reason why the Turks should be content with such an offer. In the last resort the presence of the British sovereign bases in Cyprus is connected with the very essence of the Cyprus problem. There is no doubt that the Turkish minority feels reassured by the presence of the British bases. The Turks fear that the

demilitarization of Cyprus could only work in the interest of *enosis*, because an independent, demilitarized Cyprus without British bases would be a permanent temptation for its neighbours. Furthermore, demilitarization and the liquidation of the bases would diminish the protection of the Turkish Cypriot community. Therefore, it seems that twelve years after the independence of Cyprus both sides find the presence of the British bases convenient for them. The Turkish minority feel protected while the Greek majority are the principal economic beneficiaries of the bases. However, if ever the present difficulties between the two communities are solved and Cyprus continues to be an independent state, the usefulness of the British bases would come very much into question. In such a contingency the running down of the bases would not constitute the demilitarization of Cyprus because with the restoration of inter-communal relations the Republic would have sufficient armed forces to deter any attack against its sovereignty. The existence of the British sovereign bases is a legacy of the Zürich and London Agreements and orderly development in Cyprus can only be ensured if these Agreements are swept away. In such an eventuality the survival of the British sovereign bases, when the Agreements which have enabled them to come into existence have disappeared with all their intricacies and contradictions, would constitute an anachronism and impede the exercise of sovereignty which Cyprus needs if it is to acquire self-respect as a fully independent state.

UNFICYP operational zones in Cyprus, December, 1964 – July, 1965, and deployment of contingents in December, 1964.



Adapted from UN Doc. S/6102, 12 December 1964, attached map, and taken from J.A. Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus,* Ohio State Univ. Press, 1968.

PART D

XIII
Makarios and Party Politics

The political life of Cyprus at the time when it became a British Crown Colony in 1925 can only be described as sleepy. Under the colonial constitution the Greek-elected Members of the Legislative Council did not represent any organized political party, but were simply sponsored by the Church on a purely enotist platform. The only deviation from this lack of political life and organization in Cyprus was constituted by the Communists outside the Legislature. As a matter of fact Cyprus can boast of the second oldest Communist party in the Commonwealth (after Great Britain). The first Communist group in Cyprus began to be organized in 1921 and the first Communist newspaper (*Pyrsos*) was published shortly afterwards.[1] In 1924 Dr. Nicholas Othon Yiavopoulos, a Greek of mainland extraction born in Cyprus and a Greek subject, returned to Limassol from medical studies at the University of Athens and organized a Labourers' Club there. Yiavopoulos established contacts with the Communist parties of Greece and Moscow and soon his group were publishing a newspaper called *Neos Anthropos* (New Man), which openly declared itself to be the organ of the Cyprus Communist Party (K.K.K.). Though Yiavopoulos was deported by the colonial administration of the island in 1925 as a Greek subject, the party founded by him thrived under the leadership of a Moscow-trained Cypriot, Haralambos Vatiliotis, 'who had resigned his post in the Agricultural Department of the Colony in order to study in Russia'[2] and who published in 1926 the Constitution of K.K.K., which was formulated at the First Party Congress on August 14, 1926.

In 1931[3] the K.K.K., although denouncing the *pro-enosis* forces in Cyprus, found that it had a common interest with them in stirring up militant opposition to British colonialism. The party took part in the October riots of 1931 and, as a result, the K.K.K. together with other political forces were proscribed[4] in August 1933 by the repressive measures of the colonial government. This resulted in the Cypriot Communists going underground where they were ably led by the Savvides brothers and particularly by Ploutis Savvides, known as Servas. He and his brother devoted all their energies to the fostering of trade unions. In this they were helped by the colonial government which hoped to distract Greek workers, by means of concentration of trade union activities, from the cause of *enosis* and the hold of the Church. Servas, while engaged in his organizing work, kept a weather-eye open on events in Greece and on the international scene. The outbreak of the Second World War, the Axis invasion of Greece and the fall of the Metaxas dictatorship, and finally, Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, played into his hands. It was now hoped that Greece would emerge from the war as a democratic country, and this enabled the left-wing to embrace the cause of *enosis* thus capitalizing on the ethnical aspirations of all Greek Cypriots. The Soviet Union was also now a principal ally in the war against fascist imperialism. Even before the invasion of Russia the Cypriot Communists changed their name to that of the Progressive Party of the Working People (A.K.E.L.), and from 1941 onwards the party enjoyed full freedom for its political activities. As a result, in 1943, at the first municipal elections for twelve years the party scored considerable electoral gains and won control of both Limassol and Famagusta.

The next stage in the development of A.K.E.L. was very much influenced by the events in Greece and the outbreak of the Cold War. The Communists in Cyprus could not have favoured any union with Greece after 1935. The official aim of Communist policy was an 'independent' Cyprus, freed from colonialism. But, from 1944 onwards A.K.E.L. expected a Communist takeover in Greece. This was expected again in 1945 and 1946, during the Greek civil war, and from

1947 to 1949 when the war in Greece shifted to the north. Naturally, the defeat of the Communists in Greece made *enosis* an unpalatable proposition for A.K.E.L. The adhesion of Greece to N.A.T.O. in 1951 made it even more unwelcome. However, on the other hand, the British colonial administration was frustrating the earlier hopes for constitutional reform and progress towards full self-government. In such circumstances the *enosis* slogan became the expression of all anti-British sentiments or, as it was put by an illegal Greek Communist newspaper, *Neos Kosmos* (New World): 'The *enosis* slogan permits the strongest anti-imperialist mobilization under the conditions existing at present.'[5] Accordingly, A.K.E.L. had technically to become enotist. It differed only in its tactics from the other partisans of *enosis*.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the political spectrum, there emerged in 1941 the Cyprus Nationalist Party (K.E.K.) which was the Church-sponsored party standing for *enosis*. This party, besides representing the Hellenic national aspirations, was also the party of the wealthier element of the Greek Cypriot population of the island. The main political success of K.E.K. was the 1950 referendum which was a triumph over both the British colonial administration and the left, as the British refused to conduct it themselves. The supporters of A.K.E.L. voted in favour of *enosis* as an act of defiance of the colonial administration.

It could be said that from 1950 onwards, which coincides with the emergence of Archbishop Makarios as the undisputed political leader, the political life of Cyprus polarized into being for or against *enosis*. *Enosis* had such an appeal that even the left had to make it its own policy as well. Charles Foley says: 'Although A.K.E.L., the Communist party, was little more than a tiny nucleus of Iron Curtain graduates and their hangers-on, the left in general had a steady hold on the trade unions and had captured the mayoralties of three towns out of five. But nowhere at Communist meetings was there a hint of red. The comrades carried Greek flags, with crosses at the tops of the poles, the stewards wore blue and white arm bands. The crowd, mostly

youngsters, roared "E-NO-SIS" — union, not with Soviet Russia, but with "monarchofascist" Greece, where Communism was banned and its exponents jailed. The left might support *enosis* only with words; but it would do nothing against E.O.K.A.'[6]

A.K.E.L. desired *enosis* because it was popular but it desired to achieve it (if it really wanted to achieve it) by purely political means. The right, on the other hand, as represented in K.E.K., were resolved on some form of an armed struggle, which they were determined to force on the left as well as on Makarios himself. The organization of E.O.K.A. evolved from the right-wing partisans of *enosis*, although from the very beginning there were some in E.O.K.A. who represented the non-Communist left. The E.O.K.A. struggle from 1955 onwards could be said to have been the continuation of K.E.K. politics by other means, while the left, although it unofficially approved of the objectives of the struggle, disapproved strongly of the methods used to attain it. Charles Foley says: 'The local Communists had been caught on the hop by 1 April. . . . Their leader, Mr. "Pappy" Papaioannou, at first denounced E.O.K.A. as an Anglo-American organization of agents provocateurs, but as it grew in strength he changed his tune.'[7]

During the period of E.O.K.A.'s struggle from 1955 to 1959 there were many ups and downs in the attitude of A.K.E.L., which itself had been banned by the colonial government in 1955, to the cause of the struggle and *enosis*. Though forced by circumstances to advocate *enosis* outwardly its heart could never be in it. The best evidence that A.K.E.L. would avail itself of any opportunity to abandon the cause of *enosis* came in 1955 when, as the result of the Turkish communal troubles, it came out publicly in favour of the independence of Cyprus rather than *enosis*. This lukewarm attitude of A.K.E.L. to the nationalist struggle was considered to be a splitting action calculated to play into the hands of Britain. Consequently, the guns of E.O.K.A. were turned away from the British targets onto the A.K.E.L. politicians advocating independence. The whole issue was summed up by Grivas in

his leaflet entitled *The Communist Leadership against the Cyprus Struggle*.[8] In his *Memoirs* Grivas writes: 'So, indeed, did every Greek organization and institution with the solitary exception of the Communist Party, A.K.E.L. In opposing us, the Cypriot Communists were simply taking orders from behind the Iron Curtain; this was clearly shown in the first month of our campaign, when in a broadcast from Moscow, the leader of Greece's Communist Party, Zachariades, denounced E.O.K.A. and treacherously revealed the identity of "Dighenis", which he had learned from one of his Athenian spies.'[9] A.K.E.L.'s policy of independence coincided with Makarios's policy which he adopted after his meeting in Athens with Barbara Castle. Whatever reservations A.K.E.L. had about the London Agreements, Makarios could rely on them to accept and support them. Actually, it gave its qualified support to the Agreements two days before Grivas had been persuaded to accept.

One of the reasons why A.K.E.L. looked upon the policy of independence—albeit limited independence—with such favour was that it was the only well-organized political party on the island. It belonged to that variety of Communist parties which concentrate primarily on organization. Many years of effort and devotion and particular attention towards the organization of trade unions gave the Communists a mass following of between 30% and 40% of the voting Greek population.

With the establishment of the Republic the acumen of A.K.E.L. was soon rewarded by tangible gains. The policy of the party could only be described as a series of complicated deals with Makarios. The nature of these agreements was that in the Presidential Elections the Communists on the whole supported the alternative lay candidate, Mr. John Clerides, Q.C., and helped him to secure 35% of the vote. On the other hand, the party obtained five unopposed seats on the Greek roll in Parliament by not opposing E.O.K.A.—nationalist candidates in other constituencies. Thereupon the party gave unstinted support to the government on major issues, particularly as it was in full agreement with Makarios's policy of non-alignment. 'In the foreign policy area,' Adams writes,

'A.K.E.L. has no trouble lining up with Makarios, and by following him in all other areas the party hopes to give itself a "patriotic" image in order to cover its failure to participate in the self-determination struggle of the late 1950's.'[10]

The political line which A.K.E.L. followed was based primarily on opposition to the Zürich and London Agreements which John Clerides described as 'a political disaster.'[11] However, he was against repudiating them, because that would have 'incalculable consequences.' So, on the one hand, A.K.E.L. voted against Makarios because they were opposed to the Zürich and London Agreements, while on the other hand, they gave Makarios support in Parliament as the only person capable of carrying them out, because any failure to carry them out would have been, in their own words, disastrous.

Whatever the party trends were in the young Republic and whatever political plans were entertained by the Communists, the constitutional crisis which overtook Cyprus and culminated in the events of 1963 had a stultifying effect on the development of political life. The political spectrum was made up of the Communists on the left and the nationalists stretching from John Clerides via Makarios to followers of Grivas on the extreme right: there were no political tendencies in between.

The period between December 1963 and November 1967 prevented, on the whole, any general development in the political situation. This was naturally the effect of continued danger, which demanded a degree of unity within the two communities. Among the Greeks there was less fear than among the Turks and perhaps because of inherent Greek characteristics, the political groups were seeking, even during this period, though in a moderate way, to advance their cause. Thus, the pro-Grivas newspaper *Patris*, campaigned throughout against Makarios, was joined by the newspaper *Ethniki* which supported Dr. Dervis, the nationalist Mayor of Nicosia who had been passed over by Makarios in the formation of his government. During this period A.K.E.L. stood by Makarios with only some reservations where Soviet policy towards Turkey was concerned. Throughout this time

A.K.E.L. was the only well-organized and effectively functioning political party. The parties which have come into existence since 1967 are all new and, therefore, do not present a clear political outline. All that can be said about them is that these parties represent the non-left-wing forces of the island. They represent positions from the moderate right to Social Democratic.[12]

Most of these new political parties seem to have only a paper existence. In the true Near Eastern tradition they are 'personality parties' rather than mass parties with ideological political programmes. In addition the party jockeyings have been largely offset by the prestige of Archbishop Makarios who has risen above all parties, even A.K.E.L., and thus can afford 'to play a pan-Cyprian role.' His popularity among all classes of the population, as a symbol of Cyprus both during the years of the struggle and after 1963, continued to rise. In the Presidential Elections of 1968 he defeated his right-wing enotist opponent, Dr. T. Evdokas, by polling 95.45% of the votes cast.

In July 1970 elections were held by the Greek community for the House of Representatives in an atmosphere of rift between Makarios and the government in Athens. The elections proved a triumph for A.K.E.L. and E.K. (Unified Party) which emerged as the two major political parties in the island. A.K.E.L. contested and won 9 seats; E.K. won 15. The right-wing parties were almost completely eliminated.

The result of the elections was favourable to Makarios, because the pro-Makarios forces obtained a majority even if A.K.E.L. were to go into opposition. For the present, particularly because of the situation in Greece, the party is still behind Makarios. However, although its present policy is independence, its long-range political aims are dominated by Soviet policy. On the whole the Soviet Union has been trying to improve its relations with Turkey, which is vital to Soviet interests in the Middle East. There is no doubt that Soviet policy would sacrifice Cyprus for a meaningful understanding with Turkey. For geographical and strategic reasons Russia must be more interested in Constantinople than in Nicosia. Also, on the other hand, any settlement of the Cyprus

problem resulting in a harmonious functioning of the Republic would, undoubtedly, undermine the position of A.K.E.L. At present the Soviet Union is sitting on the fence as far as the clash of the two communities in Cyprus is concerned. It must be also mentioned that just as in the past the Soviet Union was opposed to *enosis*, it is now opposed to any solution of the Cyprus problem to the detriment of the Turkish minority. A.K.E.L., although it backed Makarios in 1963 and 1967 during the Turkish invasion threats, has otherwise not been an outspoken opponent of the Turkish Cypriots with whom it would like to reach an accommodation just as it has done with Makarios. The Soviet Union has moved towards a two communities solution of the Cyprus problem, that is federalism and virtual partition. The choice for A.K.E.L. is either to promote such a solution or support *enosis* with a post-1967 Greece. A.K.E.L. in this had no choice but to 'adopt a dualistic and highly contradictory position. . . . *Haravgis* expressed gratitude to the U.S.S.R. for its "great help" in preventing the Turks from invading Cyprus and endorsed a pro-Makarios position. Papaioannou spoke critically of certain aspects of Soviet policy concerning Cyprus.'[13] However, the rift between Athens and Nicosia which had come out into the open, as will be seen later on, has made *enosis* a non-practicable, let alone desirable, solution for most Cypriots. Makarios, standing as he does above politics, must interpret the desires of the majority and incorporate them in his policy. Thus with Makarios standing for the independence and unity of Cyprus a situation has been created in which A.K.E.L. needs Makarios more than Makarios needs A.K.E.L. and this dependent status of the party within the Cyprus reality goes a long way to deflate its comparatively great political strength reflected in elections and in its control over the trade unions.

To sum up the development of party politics in Cyprus it would not be inaccurate to say that they reflect faithfully on the domestic level the entangled external aspect of the Cyprus problem. The right-wing, once strongly represented in E.O.K.A., has failed under the conditions of independence to promote a strong party dedicated to the achievement of

enosis. On the other hand A.K.E.L., proportionately the strongest Communist party in the Commonwealth, cannot aim at a takeover of the island because of Turkish and Greek rights under the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, which these two countries still hold to be valid. There is also the possibility of action by Greece and Turkey, if not under the treaties then as N.A.T.O. powers, as well as the position of Britain and her bases. In such circumstances the best policy for A.K.E.L. is a wait-and-see one which in turn makes its support of Makarios's policies the best course for it to adopt in the circumstances. In this the party is fortunate for in Makarios they are dealing with a broad-minded statesman who alone in Cyprus can ensure tolerance and a harmonious relationship between A.K.E.L. and the rest of the Greek community.

Into the context of party politics in Cyprus must be fitted the nearly successful assassination attempt on Archbishop Makarios on March 8, 1970[14] and the successful and brutal assassination of the former Minister of the Interior and Defence, Polycarpos Georgadjis on March 15, 1970. It must be understood that one of the major phenomena of the Cyprus political scene has been the failure of E.O.K.A. to establish a political party to carry out its aims. Most of the E.O.K.A. fighters obtained honourable positions in the government and elsewhere upon the establishment of the Republic. However, those who were not fortunate in obtaining the positions they wanted became embittered and tended to retire into the underground. Both events have had a profound influence on the thinking of Greek Cypriots in respect of *enosis*. There was widespread belief on the island that both attempts had been inspired by quarters from abroad hostile to the policy of the Archbishop.

As the prospect of *enosis* became deferred to the future owing to the uncertainty of the situation in Greece, political life in Cyprus crystallized between the moderate element represented by E.K., which had decided to support Makarios on the issue of independence, and the Communist A.K.E.L. which had been in favour of independence all along. The classical right-wing was, for the time being, eliminated from

the political scene. Such an alignment is in keeping with the personal views of Makarios. As long as it lasts, Makarios or his successor will continue to guide the destinies of Cyprus along the path he has chosen. Yet all things are possible, and the balance in the internal political situation in Cyprus can be altered by events outside the island. A change in Soviet policy or internal changes in Turkey would find their immediate repercussions in Cypriot politics. On the other hand, a return in Greece to the pre-1967 government would induce A.K.E.L. to support *enosis* and thus the extreme left would complete the work begun by the extreme right.

At the present stage party politics in Cyprus differ little from party political manoeuvres in the Near Eastern area. They are less the expression of any definite ideology than a struggle for jobs and the conflict of personalities. This alone explains the formation of parties by individuals, which differ very little in name and programme. What is at stake is the promotion of the personal political aspirations of those who organize these parties. In this situation the benign, icon-like personality of the Archbishop-President adds not only the element of unity but also dignity to what otherwise would appear to be unseemly squabbles. Greek mainland politics have been less fortunate in the absence of a dominant personality since the death of King George I.

THE GROWTH OF TRADE UNION MOVEMENT IN CYPRUS 1932–1968

YEAR	OLD TRADE UNIONS (PEO)		NEW TRADE UNIONS (SEK)		TURKISH TRADE UNIONS		FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT TRADE UNIONS		DEMOCRATIC LABOUR FEDERATION (DEOK)		OTHER (INCLUDING CIVIL SERVICE UNIONS)		TOTAL	
	Unions	Members	Unions	Members	Unions	Members	Unions	Members	Unions	Members	Unions	Members	Unions	Members
1932	1	84	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	84
1933	1	84	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	84
1934	1	84	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	84
1935	2	99	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	99
1936	5	285	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	285
1937	6	367	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	367
1938	14	772	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	772
1939	46	2544	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	46	2544
1940	62	3389	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	62	3389
1941	68	3854	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	68	3854
1942	73	9991	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	73	9991
1943	82	9607	—	—	1	43	—	—	—	—	1	78	84	9628
1944	89	10596	25	758	7	456	—	—	—	—	1	75	122	11865
1945	91	12961	31	1032	13	843	—	—	—	—	8	644	143	15480
1946	87	11101	30	991	19	681	—	—	—	—	8	641	144	13414
1947	51	11259	31	1145	15	640	—	—	—	—	10	792	107	13836
1948	33	9604	36	2641	9	190	—	—	—	—	11	695	89	13130
1949	31	9447	61	3599	7	160	—	—	—	—	9	1368	108	14574
1950	32	8924	52	2625	5	131	—	—	—	—	9	1886	98	13566
1951	39	10281	54	2270	6	130	—	—	—	—	10	2027	89	14708
1952	42	12540	56	2702	8	444	—	—	—	—	12	2368	118	18054
1953	47	14427	54	2123	9	477	—	—	—	—	16	4263	126	21290
1954	48	18085	56	2882	10	740	—	—	—	—	15	4959	129	26666
1955	43	22925	67	5374	16	2214	—	—	—	—	31	8502	156	39015
1956	45	27143	69	5129	16	1813	12	2954	—	—	25	5889	167	42928
1957	40	30375	130	9767	15	1268	13	2506	—	—	30	8549	228	52465
1958	38	31723	190	12862	8	1137	12	2036	—	—	36	8794	284	56542
1959	34	33770	236	16867	36	4829	15	2591	—	—	21	7324	342	65381
1960	30	35544	246	15587	38	4381	16	2416	—	—	24	7452	354	65380
1961	25	36442	232	13321	37	4288	14	2211	—	—	26	7919	334	64181
1962	24	37849	57	12158	38	4060	13	1740	19	1189	28	7165	179	64770
1963	18	37378	47	14285	39	4000	11	1436	17	1507	28	7500	160	66106
1964	18	36190	48	13179	48	3733	10	1360	19	1606	18	5895	161	61963
1965	19	36055	46	13179	48	2784	9	1277	25	1666	19	6500	166	61461
1966	18	35847	42	15388	36	3702	7	1233	23	1674	26	8558	152	66402
1967	18	35325	44	16901	22	3771	7	1030	15	1181	24	8942	130	67150
1968	17	35500	40	17000	20	3500	7	1000	13	1000	26	9000	123	67000

Source: Republic of Cyprus, *Annual Report of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance for the Year 1968*, Nicosia, 1969, p. 108.

PERSONS AT SKARINOU MEETING TO FOUND AKEL, APRIL 14, 1941

	Name	Occupation, 1941	Occupation, 1969	Residence, 1969
1	Ploutis Servas*	Commission agent Ex-Mayor of Limassol	Official of auto agency	Nicosia
2	Lyssandros Tsimillis	Journalist	Journalist, *Neoi Kairoi*	Nicosia
3	Miltiades Christodoulou*	Journalist	Chief, Public Information Office	Nicosia
4	Minos Perdios*	Commission agent	Newspaper, *Haraughi*	Nicosia
5	Costas Kononas*	Journalist	Newspaper, *Patris*	Nicosia
6	Stavros Pandzaris*	Textile Merchant	Textile merchant	Nicosia
7	Nicolaos Stratos*	Merchant tailor	Merchant tailor	Nicosia
8	Tefkros Anthias	Poet	Deceased	
9	George Mannouris*	Barber	Coffee industry	Nicosia
10	Andreas Fantis*	Construction worker	AKEL Secretariat, 2nd in line	Nicosia
11	Lazaros Christophides*	Construction worker	Building materials producer	Nicosia
12	Pavlos Georghiou*	Shoemaker's worker	AKEL Secretariat, 3rd in line	Nicosia
13	Kypridimos*	Bakery worker	Deceased	
14	Savvas Ioannou*	Shoemaker's worker	Newspaper, *Haraughi*	Nicosia
15	Christos Savvides*	Merchant tailor	Deceased	
16	Costas Ioakim	Chemist and druggist	Deceased	
17	George Vassiliades	Advocate	Chief Justice, High Court	Nicosia
18	George Christodoulides*	Ex-Mayor of Larnaca	Private business	Larnaca
19	Charalambos Solomonides*	Barber	Deceased	
20	Demetrios Stephanides*	Commission agent	Artisan	London
21	Marcos Marcoulis, M.D.*	Physician	Physician	Czechoslovakia
22	George Christophorou*	Trade union	Deceased	
23	Vassos Vassiliou, M.D.*	Oculist	Oculist	Limassol
24	Photo Vassou Vassiliou, M.D.*	Dentist	Deceased	
25	Lefkios Zenon	Advocate	Retired judge	Limassol
26	Achilleas Argyrides	Agriculture	Merchant	Limassol District
27	Zenon Rossides	Advocate	Ambassador to U.S.	Limassol
28	Phedias Kyriakides	Advocate	Retired	Limassol
29	Phaedon Kalodikis	Advocate	Advocate	Larnaca
30	Michael Constantinides*.	Professor of English	Retired	Nicosia
31	Adamos Adamantos	Professor of Literature Ex-Mayor of Famagusta	Deceased	
32	George Ladas	Advocate	Advocate	Nicosia
33	Costas Shakallis	Advocate	Advocate	Larnaca
34	Andreas Stavrinos*	Clerk	Merchant	South Africa
35	Kyriakos Yerodiakonou*	Suitcase maker	Importer	Nicosia
36	Costas Carnaos*	Worker	Tailor	Limassol

* Indicates member of KKK.
Source: This list was prepared by Stavros Pandzaris from memory, Nicosia, May 1969.

XIV
Graeco-Cypriot Relations

In retrospect the relationship between Greece and Cyprus has been different from the relationship between Greece and other Greek territories under foreign rule. This, perhaps, has been caused by many factors and among them the special and venerable status of the Church of Cyprus, the centuries of Latin rule and, last but not least, the period of British rule on the island with its legacy of an institutional infra-structure. As has been noted before, all Greek governments desired to maintain a friendly relationship with Britain and, on an official level, did not mount pressure for *enosis*. This was also due to the fact that until 1922 the expansionist and nationalist ambitions of Hellenism had been directed elsewhere, with Constantinople and Asia Minor as more glittering prizes.

This Greek governmental attitude to Cyprus is well illustrated by the fact that successive Greek governments twice failed to accept Cyprus from Britain during the First and Second World Wars. This failure of the Athens governments in respect of Cyprus has been aptly described as having been promoted by 'cupidity and stupidity.'[1] The great Greek statesman, Eleftherios Venizelos, when in power considered it more important to establish a good relationship with the Turkey of Kemal Atatürk rather than to encourage enotist aspirations in Cyprus. His proudest boast was that after the conclusion of his conversations with Atatürk, he was able to declare: 'We have agreed on the future of the Near East.'[2]

The future of the Near East was put into jeopardy the next year, in 1931, by an enotist outbreak in Cyprus against British colonial rule. This outbreak was supported by public

opinion in Greece but Venizelos adopted a pro-British attitude by repressing vigorously pro-*enosis* agitation in Greece and declaring that there was no Cypriot problem between the Greek and British governments, only between Britain and its Cypriot subjects. Agitation and revolt were useless, as nothing could alter the determination of the powers (this included Italy in the Dodecanese Islands); and it was essential that nothing should come in the way of Anglo-Greek friendship. Hill says: 'The attitude of the Hellenic government towards the whole affair was correct, and Venizelos did his best to moderate the passion of his compatriots.[3] He announced that the Hellenic government could not interfere in a question which was an internal affair of Great Britain. There was no Cyprus question between the British and Greek governments. He could not find words to express his sorrow; and if only the Greek press would listen to him he would recommend it to rebuke these excesses. No sensible person could imagine that disorders of the kind that occurred could force the British government to realize the national desires of the Greeks of Cyprus. The recent excitement of the islanders had perhaps been provoked in some measure by the fact that serious organs of the British press cast doubt on the genuineness of the Greek sentiments of the Cypriots, who desiring that their sentiments should not be misinterpreted endeavoured to manifest them more clearly. Unfortunately, this manifestation acquired an anarchical character and led to the recent regrettable disorders.'

Personally, of course, Venizelos hoped that *enosis* for Cyprus would not be abandoned for ever. In this his attitude was not very different from that he adopted in 1912 to his native Crete which, nevertheless, became ultimately united with the Greek motherland. Such an attitude of statesmanship, however, could only have been maintained by a political leader of Venizelos's stature. As a matter of historical truth Venizelos already suggested as a solution the maintenance of British bases in Cyprus in the event of the ultimate absorption of the island by Greece.[4] Nevertheless, some authorities ascertain that Venizelos's restraint over Cyprus in 1931 alienated his supporters and led to his downfall. It has

been said that 'the success of the Cretan revolution started Venizelos on his upward career and the failure of the Cypriot revolution finished that career.'[5]

Up to the 1950's Cyprus and the cause of Cypriot *enosis* were largely ignored by successive Greek governments, and this despite the fact that hardly a year had passed since 1878 without the cry of *enosis* having been raised by the Greek Cypriots.[6] However, in the 1950's after the German occupation of Greece during the war, the resistance movement and a period of bitter civil war, the cause of Cypriot *enosis* arrived in Athens riding on the crest of a wave of anti-colonialism. In such circumstances the Cyprus issue tended to unite the right and left in Greek politics, which was necessary to heal the wounds of the civil war. Previous Greek governments had all adhered to the policy of Venizelos in respect of Cyprus. They all depended on British friendship. In 1946 the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Constantine Tsaldaris, stated that, 'The question of Cyprus is not a demand and it should not be posed in a vindictive manner; it only concerns Greece and her friend Great Britain.' This was the policy followed by all the successive Greek governments until the Premiership of Marshal Papagos.[7] Thus, in 1950, when a Cypriot delegation passed through Athens on its way to New York to place the results of the plebiscite on *enosis* before the United Nations, it received no support from the Greek governments of the day, which expressed hopes that the British response would be favourable, but stressed that it would like to see the question solved in time within the framework of the traditional friendship with Britain. Papagos, however, represented originally the American interests in Greece and was not dependent on the traditional British friendship. However, the Americans expressed no interest in the cause of Cypriot *enosis* and Papagos, who was a national hero, was finally forced by circumstances to adopt an independent attitude in respect of the United States as well as of Britain. In 1954 Papagos brought the Cyprus problem before the United Nations. At the same time, in the spirit of Venizelos he severely repressed anti-American riots in Athens and Salonika which broke out when the U.S.A. voted against the inclusion

of the Cyprus question on the U.N. Agenda in 1954.

When death removed Papagos from office in October, 1955, he was replaced, at the instigation of King Paul, by his Minister of Communications and Public Works, Mr. Constantine Karamanlis, an able politician but comparatively unknown. The reason for the King's choice was based on the hope that Karamanlis, owing his appointment to the Palace, would follow a less adventurous policy on Cyprus. It was felt that Papagos's policy could only strain the bonds between Greece and her Anglo-American allies, particularly as the British involvement with Turkey was threatening the stability of the eastern wing of N.A.T.O. The new Greek government soon showed its true intent by expressing alarm at Archbishop Makarios's alignment with the neutralist anti-colonialist Afro-Asian countries at the Bandung Conference of April 1955, and by assuring Britain that it would not renew the Greek appeal to the United Nations. It was only the deportation of Makarios in the spring of 1956 that forced the unwilling Karamanlis to renew the appeal. The policies of the Karamanlis government on the Cyprus question from 1956-58 were carried out as if in a dream under the pressure of public opinion, with Karamanlis and his ministers going through the various motions without their hearts being in it. The Greek Cypriots were soon to realize that although they could count on the support of the Greeks they could not count on the support of the Greek government. Karamanlis was swimming against the tide of nationalist emotion, and obviously regarded Cyprus as an unnecessary embarrassment. His government was looking for any available way out from the labyrinth without paying any regard to the long-range interests of the Cypriots or in that respect to the cause of Hellenism itself.

Karamanlis's policy on the Cyprus issue and in general concerning the relationship of Greece to her allies can only be described as devious. He managed, however, to increase his majority in parliament in the general election of March 1958, which was fought by the opposition mainly on the issues of Cyprus and foreign policy. Karamanlis's success was due to his deft manipulation of the fact that Greek radio was

allowed to indulge in anti-British propaganda while he was able at the same time to point to the release of Archbishop Makarios and the arrival of Sir Hugh Foot on December 3, 1957, as Governor in Cyprus, as visible marks of the success of his policy. He was accordingly able to pursue his policies on Cyprus with more confidence and was ready to avail himself of any and all opportunities when the time came. He quickly seized upon Archbishop Makarios's temporary option for independence rather than *enosis*, adopted as the result of the Macmillan Plan, in order, at the instigation of Britain, to open direct negotiations with Turkey, which were carried on in secret. The *enosis* crisis in Cyprus had lasted for eight years after the January plebiscite of 1950, whereas Karamanlis and his suave Foreign Minister, Averoff, reached an understanding with the Turks over the head of Makarios and other Greek Cypriot political leaders with extraordinary rapidity in a matter of days. It could be said that, comparatively speaking, Pontius Pilate took more time to wash his hands than Karamanlis and Averoff took to rid themselves of their responsibility towards Cyprus and Hellenism as a whole. Karamanlis gave his agreement to Cyprus being saddled with an impossible Constitution, and Makarios, when all is said and done, had little reason to thank the Greek government for its support; he could have obtained far better terms without the Greek intervention. Thus, the responsibility for the Zürich and London Agreements and their unfortunate consequences falls entirely on the Greek government of the day and not, as has been repeatedly stated, on Makarios or any other Cypriot leader who was faced with a *fait accompli.*

The emergence in Greece of a government under the late George Papandreou, which could have done justice to the cause of *enosis*, was postponed until early 1964 by which time Cyprus was already suffering from the strife resulting from the collapse of the unworkable Zürich and London Agreements imposed on it by Karamanlis and his government. The fact that during the post-1963 crisis Makarios excluded any solution which might have entailed partition, even at the price of *enosis*, led Papandreou to accuse him of sabotaging the cause of *enosis*. The truth is that the Greek

government was thinking of compensations for Turkey, while on the Cypriot side independence rather than *enosis* had its attractions. Makarios felt justified in shelving *enosis* except on terms acceptable to him, because otherwise this would have been a grave dereliction of his duty as Ethnarch. In other words, Makarios as President was not now going to accept any solution based on a deal between Greece and Turkey as in Zürich and London. Makarios's suspicions of Greek government policy had been strengthened by the fact that the Greek government had agreed to the proposals of the N.A.T.O. Commander in Europe, General Lemnitzer, that the island should be virtually partitioned between Greece and Turkey and turned into a N.A.T.O. base.

Eventually Makarios and Papandreou arrived at a new statement of policy, which was based on unrestricted independence for Cyprus with the right of self-determination. Papandreou's message to President Makarios was: 'I greet you from the United States where I am at the invitation of President Johnson, and struggle for the cause of Hellenic Cyprus. I defend the policy which we have drawn up together during our meeting in Athens. Our aim is unrestricted independence which includes the right of self-determination, as well as full guarantees for the protection of the rights of the Turkish minority. The means for the achievement of our aim are peace and recourse to the international justice of the United Nations. On this point I wish to call on your concern. I know of your continuous struggle for peace, but the Turkish government, violating the Charter of the United Nations, threatens continuously to invade the island, under the pretext of defending the allegedly persecuted Turkish minority. It is certain that invasion means war.

'It is, therefore, a measure of precaution on our part and a supreme patriotic duty to increase our vigilance for the pacification of the island. Under no circumstances should we allow ourselves to fall into the trap of premeditated provocation.

'There must also be maintained absolute co-operation with the U.N. Force in Cyprus whose mission is the restoration of normality and pacification jointly with the Cypriot govern-

ment. This was our agreement in Athens, and circumstances prevailing today make its application imperative. I am sure that the presence of General Grivas whose patriotism and political judgment are known, constitutes an additional guarantee of the application of this policy.

'Please convey to the Hellenism of Cyprus my patriotic greetings as well as my optimism for the success of the national struggle.'

This declaration is still the basis of Makarios's policy and he has not departed from it. He showed that he would resist manoeuvres by any Greek government to turn Cyprus into a N.A.T.O. base and thereby impairing its unity.[8]

The continuation of Makarios's collaboration with Papandreou was based on the Greek government's guarantee of the independence of Cyprus with *enosis* being only the ultimate target and any bi-partite talks between Greece and Turkey being excluded. The Greek government, so it is alleged, then backed Makarios by the dispatch of 20,000 troops to Cyprus, who arrived as clandestine volunteers disembarking mostly by night. As a consequence of the strengthening of the Cypriot position both the Greek government and Makarios rejected the Acheson Plan for the settlement of the Cyprus dispute. Although it proposed *enosis* the plan also included an element of partition. Unfortunately, even though Papandreou was still Prime Minister, the rejection of the Acheson Plan enabled certain personalities in the Greek government to launch attacks on Makarios accusing him of having betrayed the cause of *enosis*, and being aided and abetted in this by Andreas Papandreou, the son of the Prime Minister, for whom a death sentence was demanded. At the same time the first rumours began to circulate that the new King of Greece, Constantine, was searching for ways to get rid of the Papandreou government in order to form a government of national unity, which would proceed to liquidate the Cyprus question on the basis of the Acheson Plan. Moreover, Papandreou's Foreign Minister, Mr. S. Kostopoulos, began on his own initiative talks in London with the Turkish Foreign Minister, during the N.A.T.O. meeting, with a view to a bipartisan solution of the

Cyprus problem. This could only lead to the partition of the island and brutally contradicted the essential basis of the Papandreou-Makarios agreement. Next the Greek Deputy Premier, S. Stefanopoulos, attacked Makarios by blaming him for the torpedoing of the Acheson Plan which allegedly would have led to *enosis*! The Cyprus press counter-attacked and demanded the resignation of both Stefanopoulos and Garoufalias, Greek Minister of Defence, and at the same time announced that a move for the overthrow of the Papandreou government was on the way. In the circumstances the outlook for harmonious Graeco-Cypriot relations was hardly favourable if Greek politicians within Papandreou's Centre Union were working to close a deal with Turkey over the heads of the Cypriots and at the expense of the partitioning of the island.

That pressure against the Papandreou government did exist is proved by his forced resignation on July 15, 1965. The King then appointed as Prime Minister Mr. S. Stefanopoulos, who ditched Papandreou at the first opportunity. Stefanopoulos stood for the Acheson Plan. He was a 'bitter personal enemy' of Makarios and a partisan of the solution of the Cyprus question by means of a bilateral agreement with Turkey. He belonged to that group of Greek politicians who put N.A.T.O. interests above everything else, and relied on a close co-operation between Greece and Turkey in the cause of their protection from the 'Communist menace.' Stefanopoulos immediately agreed to hold secret talks with the Turks at the instigation of the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. At the same time, by means of the press he threatened Makarios by stating that the Greek troops in Cyprus 'were there to impose the policy of the Athens government, rather than to defend the island from the Turks, and went on to ignore Makarios entirely in his October 18 message to the Cypriot people.

General Grivas then took a hand in provoking trouble for Makarios. Early in 1966 he declared in Athens that Cyprus must be united immediately with Greece. Furthermore he announced that he would obey only the orders of the Greek government and not the government of Makarios. This state

of affairs led to the resignation of Tsirimokos, the Foreign Minister in the Stefanopoulos government, who gave it to be understood that he did so because the Stefanopoulos government was planning the partition of Cyprus at the instigation of foreign powers. The Paraskevopoulos government which followed continued to seek a solution of the Cyprus problem along the Acheson lines. Paraskevopoulos tried to entrap Makarios into accepting the Acheson Plan by inviting him to a meeting of the Crown Council in order to force his hand. However, the Crown Council when it was held was dominated by George Papandreou and the Paraskevopoulos Plan could not obtain the required support. Paraskevopoulos then announced that his government would continue negotiations with the Turkish government on its own responsibility. Makarios spoke to the press: 'Speaking on behalf of Cypriot Hellenism, I wish to reiterate that we are determined to stand firm. We will not succumb to Turkish blackmail. I do not doubt that this is the decision of the whole nation.'[9] The failure of the Crown Council (a Council of ex-Prime Ministers) was a triumph for Makarios and Papandreou, both of them democratically elected leaders who were now looking forward to the Greek general election of May 1967, which was called to save the King from the governmental impasse into which he had let himself by his destruction of the Papandreou government. But the election never took place.

Instead of the election, scheduled for May 1967, the Greek military decided to seize power and did so with ruthless efficiency on April 21, 1967. It was evident that George Papandreou would triumph at the coming election, and he was pledged to purge the armed forces. He had alleged a right-wing conspiracy in the army and was immediately confronted by his adversaries with an alleged left-wing conspiracy—the celebrated Aspida affair, which was connected with the Greek expeditionary force in Cyprus. The inference was obvious—the left-wing elements in the army were conspiring with the Cyprus government. Therefore, the military anti-Aspidists who seized power in Greece were not exactly the friends of Nicosia but on the contrary very good

friends of N.A.T.O. and the C.I.A., according to Andreas Papandreou. It is also significant that the moving spirit behind the military *coup* of April 21, 1967, Colonel Papadopoulos, had served with the Greek forces in Cyprus in 1964 and had come away from the island with reasons to resent the actions of some Cypriot political leaders.

The new Greek government, true to its orientation, lost no time in making pro-Turkish overtures in the classical spirit of N.A.T.O. Colonel Papadopoulos himself, when he paid a visit to Cyprus in August 1967, brought with him the declaration of his Prime Minister, Mr. Kolias, who announced that Greece and Turkey were obliged 'to confront jointly the common enemy—Communism—and to consider all outstanding differences of view as secondary to this primary interest.'[10] But Colonel Papadopoulos did more in Cyprus than lecture Makarios and his government on the necessity of keeping in step with Turkey. He had also come to lecture the Cypriots about the manners of their press. The truth is that Cyprus had not welcomed the Greek *coup,* something which was enough in itself to offend the Athens regime.

The Papadopoulos government then went on to do what Makarios most abhorred, i.e. it engaged in secret bilateral negotiations with Turkey over the heads of the Cypriots. The Greeks, it is believed, went on to suggest a solution of the Cyprus problem on the lines of the Acheson Plan. But the Turks were not interested in this solution without the withdrawal of the Greek troops and Grivas himself from Cyprus. The position of the Greek government seemed to be weakening in the face of Turkey. They were now faced not only with the partition of Cyprus but with the withdrawal of the troops as well, which would leave the island defenceless and rebound against their political prestige. In this situation there took place on November 15, 1967, the unhappy Agios Theodoros/Kophinou incident. As far as the results of this incident were concerned it is not important whether Grivas acted on his own accord or on orders from Athens as he himself has always insisted. What matters, however, is that upon the outcry in Turkey and the threat of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus the Greek government promptly evacu-

ated the excess troops from Cyprus and recalled Grivas. They did this in the name of statesmanship to preserve peace and N.A.T.O. unity. It seems as if they had been searching for such an opportunity to disengage their forces from Cyprus and to appease the Demirel government in Turkey.

It should also be added that reports in the international press suggested that the Greek government now considered Archbishop Makarios as the main obstacle to a settlement with the Turks. They were now more inclined to consider the partition of Cyprus according to the Acheson Plan which had already been flatly rejected by Makarios. However, it was now not even the question of the original Acheson Plan. The Acheson Plan envisaged partition as a consequence of double *enosis*. Now, however, in the post-November 1967 situation, the Turks were to be handed over two military bases and 10% of the island's territory without the union of the rest of Cyprus with Greece. The policy of the Greek government towards Cyprus now settled into a definite channel. N.A.T.O. desires had been met and Turkish interests had been safeguarded. The Cyprus government was asked to engage in bilateral talks with the Turkish community, the so-called intercommunal talks.[11] The object of these negotiations, which had the full backing of all the parties concerned and the United Nations, was to find a just and fair solution to the island's problem. The situation was complicated by the fact that the Turkish minority now demanded the virtual partition of the island on the basis of two parallel states even without *enosis*. This is something which Makarios's government has always fought against, but on this issue it did not receive the full support of the Athens government, which, in its desire to achieve a common front with Turkey, did not seem to care much for the unity of Cyprus and the vital interests of the island.

It is obvious from the examination of the foregoing facts that apart from Makarios's sincerely libertarian principles, there are more material grounds for the rift between him and the post-1967 Greek government. There is no doubt that both the Turkish government and the Turkish minority in Cyprus have been vastly strengthened by the new government

in Greece. One of the reasons for this is the fact that in order to achieve a settlement with Turkey, the Greek military government must always pay a higher price than any parliamentary government. This is due to the fact that a government lacking a popular base cannot afford to antagonize its allies.

In this context it is also evident that Makarios had had to make a reappraisal of his attitude to the Athens government. As this government was not based on parliament, it was not under the influence of public opinion in Greece. Makarios's trump card in his dealings with Athens, prior to 1967, was always his appeal to Greek public opinion. Thus, it has been the very nature of the post-1967 Greek government which has removed, for the present, the basis for *enosis*. Makarios had now become the rallying point for all patriotic Greek Cypriots, irrespective of their political allegiance. The removal of the Greek troops from the island—where they had been dispatched by George Papandreou—had removed the one bargaining point on the Greek side because in any negotiations between Makarios and the Turkish community, Turkish terms could not be posed with ease. The obvious inference here is that Athens was not prepared to undergo risks for the sake of *enosis*. Therefore, the policy of unfettered independence is seen by the Archbishop as the only true guarantee of the unity of the island and, ultimately, true *enosis* in the future without partition or foreign bases.

The open rift between Makarios and the government in Athens came to the surface in 1968 as the result of the Panagoulis-Georgadjis affair, which itself was a continuation of the Aspida affair in that Georgadjis, Makarios's Minister of the Interior and Defence, was accused of trying to organize the assassination of the Greek military leaders. Under full pressure from Athens, Makarios was forced to dismiss Georgadjis, but this was the limit of his compliance. Thereafter, a campaign was mounted against Makarios to the effect that he had betrayed the cause of *enosis*, and this culminated in the assassination attempt of 1970. This recoiled on the heads of its perpetrators, as it only enhanced the prestige and position of Makarios as the champion of a truly free,

democratic and independent Cyprus. Athens and Nicosia were no longer speaking the same language or sharing the same sentiment and ideals. In these circumstances Grivas returned secretly to Cyprus—in order to mount a conspiracy against the Archbishop. This conspiracy, like its leader, remained underground.[12]

Mr. John Bulloch, *Daily Telegraph* correspondent, says: 'Greece who had clearly "planted" Grivas as a time bomb ticking away in the Archbishop's back garden, had reached a quiet understanding with Turkey, her N.A.T.O. partner, that a settlement of the intercommunal problem in Cyprus should be arranged.'[13] Since the Grivas move had apparently failed, the Athens government decided on February 11, 1972, to return to the Georgadjis affair and commanded the Archbishop to do the following:

1. To surrender the Czech arms he had imported to the U.N. peace force.
2. To agree to the formation of a national unity government in Cyprus.
3. To acknowledge the primacy of Athens, as the centre of Hellenism in shaping Cyprus policy.[14]

The first demand concerns a shipment of arms from Czechoslovakia bought by the government in order to strengthen the defences of the island. While the future of these arms was under negotiation, the three Metropolitan Bishops in Cyprus mounted a movement calling for the retirement of the Archbishop as Head of State claiming that his appointment was incompatible with Canon Law. The *Observer* correspondent says: 'Senior Bishops of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus apparently woke from a 12-year coma this week to denounce as contrary to the Canon Law of the Church the role of their Ethnarch, Archbishop Makarios, as Head of State and to demand that he relinquishes the latter post. The Archbishop has unofficially exercized these combined duties ever since he was elected Ethnarch in 1950 and officially since his election as President of the Republic in December 1959. During that time the Bishops, sitting in Holy Synod as the ruling Princes of the Church, have never questioned their leader's authority. So their present concern

for the niceties of Canon Law must, it would seem, have been inspired from outside Cyprus.'[15] This move, as well as the demand that Makarios should appoint Ministers amenable to Athens, have both, so far, backfired on Athens, because public opinion has been outraged in Cyprus. The vast majority of Cypriots have rallied round their President to such an extent that any political ties between Cyprus and Greece as at present have for a while become impossible and any agreement which does not have the blessing of Makarios 'will not work for five minutes.'[16] Recent events have proved, beyond any doubt, that Makarios is irreplaceable and no alternative leader on the island will dare to supplant him. 'It is an invitation to a lynching; it isn't practical politics'[17] as a possible rival of Makarios has put it.

The above short history of Graeco-Cypriot relations since 1955 shows that Archbishop Makarios was sincerely dedicated to the principle of *enosis* up to 1967. Until that year a form of *enosis* with Greece was still practical politics as a government could have emerged in Greece, as it did under George Papandreou, which could have carried out the task of *enosis* and faced up fully to its responsibilities and any consequences. The policy of the Greek government of 1967 was directed to other priorities. For it the Cyprus problem became a secondary issue. Consequently, because of the Greek political situation Makarios has had no pragmatic alternative except to adopt as his present policy the unity and independence of Cyprus. Both Makarios and his people have been accused as a result of insularity and selfishness if not Napoleonic ambition. The truth of the matter is that even if the Cypriots appear to be selfish and narrow minded this is only a temporary deviation from their desire for *enosis,* which still remains the political objective but has merely been postponed by events outside Cyprus.

XV
The British Legacy

Britain was present in Cyprus for eighty-two years, and her presence on the island has left its imprint in many ways. One reason for this was the fact that Britain took over control of Cyprus in a peaceful way and British rule was welcomed at its inception by both the Greek and Turkish communities. Another outstanding feature of British rule was the fact that Cyprus was not at the beginning officially a part of the British Empire at all. Until the First World War British presence in Cyprus was only justified by the imperialistic spirit of the time which could not allow the British flag to be withdrawn where it had once been hoisted, although the British government might not be too sure what to do with the territory over which it flew.

The problem was that Cyprus, although not actually misgoverned in 1878 by Ottoman standards, was greatly neglected and under-developed. The Ottoman authorities, as usual, had been negligent, indolent, corrupt and badly organized. Hepworth Dixon writes: 'Each village in Cyprus is a rustic republic; living its own life, obeying its own chief, and standing by its local law. Nothing suits these small republics better than to have a satrap in the nearest town who only eats and sleeps.'[1] The population of the island in classical times had been about two million.

Under the Lusignan dynasty Cyprus was the emporium of the Levant, but in 1878, it was inhabited by a struggling agricultural community of about 180,000 persons, both Greeks and Turks. Lack of irrigation had reduced the once fertile plane of Mesaoria to a wilderness. The famous forests of Cyprus had been wantonly destroyed by Ottoman

cupidity. There was hardly any road system, and ruined and abandoned houses were the main features of most of the villages. The object of the Ottoman government had been solely the extraction of taxes from the inhabitants. Out of an annual average revenue of £176,000 only £29,000 was expended upon all public services.[2] Under this system law and order could hardly exist, and justice was a farce, since despite the fact that under the Tanzimat reforms the law to be administered was supposed to be the *Code Napoléon*, only £250 was spent on the administration of justice, the judges being paid the equivalent of fourteen shillings per month. The Turkish police force, such as it was, was not concerned with the repression of crime but only with the collection of taxes. Sir George Hill says: 'But, in so far as hopes of the reform of Turkey were seriously entertained by the British statesmen, they underestimated the weight of the passive resistance of the Sultan and of Turkish officials who had a vested interest in the maintenance of the old regime. "The whole history of the Ottoman Empire," it was truly said at the time, "since it had been admitted into the European Concert by the Treaty of Paris in 1856, showed that the Porte was powerless to guarantee the execution of reforms in its provinces by Turkish officials who accepted them with reluctance and neglected them with impunity".'[3] Education was practically non-existent. In the absence of any police force crops all over the island were constantly destroyed by wandering shepherds and their flocks.[4] Crime under such conditions was a daily pastime.[5]

Accordingly, Britain was confronted with a difficult and complicated task. It was necessary to secure the preservation of law and order and the setting up of a civilized system of justice. Agriculture had to be stimulated, commerce revived by the construction of a road system. Above all, the health and education of all the inhabitants had to be improved. The successes and failures of the British in Cyprus in implementing these objectives constitute the bulk of the British legacy which can be observed in Cyprus today. The Greek Cypriots obtained real benefits from British rule, and these were: a system of impartial justice; an efficient security

system; an honest administration and tax system; and—until the events of 1931—freedom of speech and of the press and of assembly, and above all almost complete liberty to develop their education and culture on Greek lines.[6]

The British rule in Cyprus introduced into the island the principles of the English civil service. It was evident that given educational improvements the Cypriots could rapidly provide a nucleus from which a modern administration of the island could be recruited. This training and recruitment of the native population for all grades of the administration was aided in Cyprus, more perhaps than anywhere else in the British Empire, by the fact that the financial situation precluded the recruitment of officials from Britain, even for the superior grades. The reason for this was that Cyprus was not really a part of the British Empire, and in the actual words of the Government Report of 1882 expenditure of money on Cyprus amounted 'to a speculation with the proceeds of English taxes in an effort to change the face of nature and the characters of the seasons in an island not exactly our own.' The same Report then actually went on to advocate the fixing of the 'establishment of the island on an efficient but somewhat parsimonious basis.'[7] On the other hand, the Greek-elected Members of the Legislative Council adopted an equally parsimonious attitude with regard to official salaries which, under the Constitution, they could fix. The reason for this attitude was the resentment over the continued levying by H.M. government of the Turkish Tribute which was still paid to the Porte. Moreover, most British officials soon sensed that in Cyprus they could leave the everyday running of affairs to their Cypriot subordinates. From the time that Cyprus became a Crown Colony, on March 10, 1925, Greek Cypriots, having filled most of the lower ranks of the civil service, also began to occupy the higher posts as well. This situation, however, did lead to an alienation between the rulers and the ruled. While the British government could rely on the native Cypriots, it did not send many capable officials to relatively poorly paid posts in Cyprus. Those who came left most of the work to Cypriots and retired into the club life of the English resident

community. While this produced an educated and ambitious middle class of Cypriots capable of administering the affairs of the island, by the very fact of broadening the horizon and stimulating ambitions it made the colonial regime itself more unbearable. As Sir Ronald Storrs so aptly remarked: 'Alien rule is not so easy to bear, save by the lowest savages. Without a modicum of human intercourse or the incentive of legitimate ambition, it may become intolerable.'[8]

Britain, again piecemeal and partly against her own will, eradicated from Cyprus most of the Ottoman tax structure which was orientated towards the main principle of Ottoman rule: money.[9] Tax farming was eradicated and various tithes both Turkish and episcopal were progressively abolished, particularly after 1925. However, this simplification of the tax structure carried with it the disadvantage that, with the introduction of an efficient tax system, taxes were now collected in full. Britain attached a particular importance to the question of taxes as until 1940 all her colonies had to be self-sufficient. It is significant that when grants-in-aid began to be made to the colonies after 1940, British income tax was introduced in Cyprus in 1941. The progressive administration after 1940 by Cypriot officials of colonial development grants and the introduction of income tax created in Cyprus one of the most effective tax structures in the Commonwealth, and the transfer of financial administration in 1960 from British officials to their Cypriot successors was one of the smoothest in the history of British decolonization.

Another monument to the British presence in Cyprus is the present legal system of the country. It is derived from the system established in 1882 which provided for the Supreme Court of Cyprus, six Assize Courts, six District Courts, six Magisterial Courts and Village Judge Courts. This system was amended by the Cyprus Courts of Justice Order of 1927. At the same time the Ottoman Law binding in Cyprus started being gradually replaced by local statutes based on English enactment laws, modelled on English statutes. These were introduced to govern companies, trade marks, registration, the carriage of goods by sea and dangerous drugs. The Ottoman Penal Code and the Ottoman Commercial Code

were replaced by enactments based on English Law. English Law, with its political associations and social repercussions, is perhaps the most important part of the British legacy in Cyprus. It provided the means whereby generations of Cypriot lawyers proceeded to be educated at Oxford and Cambridge and the Inns of Court in London.

In the sphere of education, as explained in Chapter III, the most remarkable achievement of Britain was the fostering and encouragement of primary and secondary education on the island. This, combined with the traditional respect and desire for education of the Greek element, produced an educational system remarkable in any colony in the former British Empire. Illiteracy was almost completely wiped out. This part of the British legacy, perhaps, has had the most important consequences. The spread of education tends to foster an educated and responsible population, which then demands political rights and a say in their own government. It was the newly educated class in Cyprus which was primarily responsible for the revolt of 1931 just as economic development during and after the Second World War produced the ultimate move of enotist agitation. In a more restricted sense the British cultural legacy, however, has been very limited. This was due to the fact that the British colonial government omitted to encourage the teaching of English until it was too late. Only one English school was established by the government in Nicosia and it remained the only teaching establishment which used English as the medium of instruction until the opening of the Teachers' Training College. In the post-Second World War period the Cyprus government, in order to neutralize the enotist aspirations inculcated by Greek education, began a widespread campaign to facilitate studies for Cypriots in British universities. At the same time plans began to be worked out for the establishment of a university in Cyprus. The aim of this university was to cut off the Cypriots from Greece and Turkey. This was recognized as such by the Greek nationalist leaders, and ferociously attacked. However, this new policy of Anglicization came too late to affect the course of events. It is only now, when psychological factors have been removed, that an

institution of higher education—a Higher Technological Institute—has been established with English as the medium of instruction. This would have been unacceptable during the British rule of the island.

But perhaps the most lasting and visible part of the British legacy bequeathed to Cyprus has been the political life of the island. The Legislative Council, which functioned from 1882-1931, although it left much to be desired, nevertheless proved a training ground for parliamentary politics. Parliamentary politics in turn encouraged the formation of political groups and parties, which again stimulated the development of a free press, except during the period of 1931-1941. Apart from those years, the habit of free discussion, free association and a free press took a firm root in Cyprus. This included the growth of trade unions which were encouraged directly and indirectly by the government, especially in war time. The legal position of the trade unions was greatly improved during the war through the influence of the British Labour Party on the wartime coalition government. The relationship between the left-wing trade unions and A.K.E.L. is similar in many ways to the relationship between the trade unions and the Labour Party in Great Britain. Without this legacy of British liberal traditions it is difficult to imagine how the institution of the Republic of Cyprus could have survived for nearly ten years the grave intercommunal crisis which began in 1963. Cyprus is still a free country; political parties exist and function and so do their press organs; parliament is independent; and the electorate expresses its opinions fully in presidential and parliamentary elections. In this respect Cyprus provides a startling contrast to all neighbouring countries in the Middle East.

Yet, in retrospect, the British legacy in Cyprus is ambiguous. The benefits of British rule were, in the long run, not negligible, though strictly speaking not commendable either. The Report of 1882 has already been mentioned. Under the policy initiated by this Report the first fifty years of British rule were a period of very slow progress, if not stagnation. The island did not attract the full attention of the British

government, because it was not a proper British possession and had to pay tribute to the Porte. Even after Cyprus had been annexed by Great Britain and had become a Crown Colony, very little was done to improve the basic economic position of the island which, being mainly agricultural, suffered from low standards typical of most farming countries in the twentieth century and in particular in the depressed years of the 1930's. The British government reversed this policy during the Second World War and initiated a programme of large-scale development under which very considerable progress was made in practically every sphere of the economy.[10] The trouble with the last British period in Cyprus was that the economic advantages were not matched by the satisfaction of perfectly reasonable political demands. Hence the British administration, well-meaning though it was, succeeded in arousing a sense of oppression and even intense anti-British feeling. The changed British policy came too late. In the post-war conditions of anti-colonialism the feeling grew that Cyprus as a whole was being deprived of great opportunities by the British government. This was the result of a certain lack of imagination on the part of Britain. People remembered the years of inertia and the extraction of the tribute from Cyprus. This encouraged the widespread belief that Britain's economic plans for Cyprus were not aimed at benefiting the Cypriots, and lack of political concessions encouraged the persistence of this view. Material improvement made people only more eager for national liberty, even with diminished economic prospects. This had already been admirably expressed by one of the Greek Members of the Legislative Council in 1928 who said: 'Liberty under the Greek flag is more precious than any material prosperity.'[11]

What would have been the fate of the British legacy in Cyprus in the case of *enosis* with Greece is something which is now of academic interest only. Today the independent Republic of Cyprus must, owing to the pressure of circumstances, preserve and cherish its British legacy. The institutions which function on the island are derived from the period of British rule; cultural ties between Cyprus and

Britain have become more intimate after independence; British education is highly valued and popular, and Cyprus remains a member of the Commonwealth and directs the majority of its exports to the U.K. under Commonwealth preferences.[12] As long as this state of affairs continues the legacy of Britain cannot disappear from the island and this fact, it is to be hoped, will benefit both countries.

XVI
Challenge and Survival

It is quite conceivable that future historians, when looking back at the history of the Cyprus problem, might come to the conclusion that time, although it heals all wounds, creates new problems. The essence of the situation which came to face the Archbishop in the mid 1960's, was that the intercommunal situation in Cyprus could not be solved by any forces at his command. Like all people in such a position the Archbishop could only wait on time to bring a solution. Time, however, instead of providing a solution seems only to have created new problems. Nowhere did the situation remain static. Changes occurred in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus which have affected in an entirely new way the course of events.

As has already been pointed out, the change of regime in Greece in 1967 produced an entirely different orientation of the Greek government towards the solution of the Cyprus problem. The new Greek government was a government entirely dedicated towards the stemming of all left-wing movements and manifestations. Greece seemed to have returned to the initial N.A.T.O. stand of 1949. In this context a united front between Greece, the United States and Turkey is necessary to stop any Soviet infiltration of the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore Athens informed Turkey that it no longer officially supported the policy of *enosis*. This move was welcomed by Turkey, and the Cyprus problem is no longer a stumbling block between the two countries. But, on the other hand, the Turkish Republic is passing through a period of constitutional instability, and no one can predict the reaction of any Turkish government in

the present circumstances to a possible new intercommunal crisis in Cyprus.

However, the most significant transformation has occurred within the Greek community in Cyprus itself. The seeming impossibility of arriving at a solution of the Turkish problem and Makarios's official departure, for the time, from the policy of *enosis* had enabled the hardcore of partisans of immediate *enosis* to band themselves round the uncompromising figure of General Grivas. The General thereby became within the Greek community the most dangerous and dynamic rival political leader to the Archbishop. The General seemed to be reliving his old E.O.K.A. days. He had returned[1] to the island clandestinely, while under house observation, had remained in hiding, had revived his old E.O.K.A. organization, had openly denounced Makarios as a traitor, and had engaged in his usual political activities waged with bullets and bombs. Thus the failure to find a solution to the Cyprus problem has produced a new problem of division and terrorism within the Greek community.

A strange triangular situation had developed between Makarios, Grivas and the government in Athens. It is obvious that both the Papadopoulos government and Grivas represented right-wing forces. But while Grivas in Cyprus had come out for *enosis* arms in hand, the Papadopoulos government was in agreement with Makarios (although for different reasons) that *enosis* was not now feasible. Therefore, the view that Grivas represented the policy of the Papadopoulos government of February 1972, which tried to force Makarios from office, is rather naive. The Papadopoulos Government valued Grivas not as an architect of *enosis* but as a watchdog against Communism and all left-wing heresies. He was most probably sent[2] to Cyprus in 1971 for this purpose, when relations between Athens and Nicosia were anything but cordial. But Grivas, as indeed always, was prepared to play his own game irrespective of the wishes of any government in Athens or elsewhere. In this respect his fanatical individualism and single-minded devotion to the cause of *enosis* must be appreciated. The personality of Grivas highlights the complexity of the problem because such was the prestige of the

old E.O.K.A. chief that he could not fail to command the admiration of at least 5% of the island's population, and it is a widely known fact that, although the Cyprus government knew where Grivas was in hiding, it could not afford to apprehend[3] him. The latest move in the situation is that Grivas had come out for *enosis* in opposition to not only Makarios but the government of Athens as well. His supporters have accused both Makarios and President[4] Papadopoulos of Greece of trying to destroy the Hellenic character of the island. It seems that Grivas and his supporters were prepared for the sake of their ideal to defy the whole world and he became discredited in the eyes of Athens, which was a temporary relief for the Archbishop.

In the triangular conflict between Makarios, Athens and Grivas another card was played against the Archbishop when the Greek Ambassador to Cyprus, Mr. C. Panayiotakos, failed to pressurize Makarios out of office in February 1972. As described earlier, a move was mounted to attack Makarios's ecclesiastical status and thus force him into a dilemma. After thirteen years of office as President of the Republic of Cyprus, the three Metropolitan Bishops of the Church of Cyprus suddenly came out with the assertion that the Archbishop could not exercise his spiritual office while remaining President. Politics and religion, they asserted, were incompatible. This was more than a coincidence, and the Bishops were obviously relying on support from Greece and opponents of Makarios in Cyprus and they had hopes of wearing down the Archbishop's conscience as a churchman where they failed to outmanoeuvre him as a politician. This manoeuvre failed, however, because the conspirators did not take into consideration two factors, namely, the large measure of popular support for the Archbishop and the lack of the same support for themselves, and the lack of the canonical capacity of the Church of Cyprus to enforce the removal of the Archbishop if he failed to comply with their demand for his resignation.

The upshot of this affair was a crisis between the Archbishop and his Bishops which lasted for over a year during which the Bishop of Paphos was ejected from his See.

The eighty-three-year-old Bishop had completely misjudged the temper and political orientation of his flock; he could never set foot in his diocese again. The three Bishops proceeded after a year to proclaim on March 13, 1973 the unfrocking of the Archbishop for non-compliance with their demand that he should abandon his political office or resign as Archbishop. But by this time the Archbishop was ready to move against them both on the political and ecclesiastical level. First, fortified by a vast popular mass rally on February 8, 1973, which was held in Nicosia to nominate him as a candidate once more for the presidential elections, he announced that he was captive of the Greek Cypriot people, and only they could remove him from his office. The Archbishop addressing the crowds, estimated to exceed 200,000, said:

'I feel a captive of the love and confidence of the Greek Cypriot people, and it has not been possible for me to refuse the popular demand that I should continue offering my services for the post of President. It is with deep emotion that I accept the renewal of the people's mandate.

'Those who disagree with the political course charted jointly with the Greek government pose and describe themselves as enotists. And they accuse the vast majority of the Greek Cypriot people of being anti-national. We reject the accusation. As I declared in the past all the Greeks of Cyprus are enotists. It is to Greece that our soul and heart will always be turned. Greek ideals will always inspire our thinking and conscience. Greece will always be the feeder of our existence and life. And if factors and situations beyond our control do not make *enosis* possible, this does not mean that we shall cease to be Greeks. We have remained Greeks throughout the centuries and shall continue to be Greeks.'[5]

Secondly, the Archbishop announced that all the proceedings of the three Bishops were uncanonical because the Church of Cyprus lacked the necessary canonical quorum of at least thirteen Bishops to constitute a valid canonical authority and that only the Archbishop of the island could convene a Synod of the island's Church. Makarios declared the Bishops' Synods illegal and announced: 'I pray to God

that they may be forgiven for they know not what they do.'[6] He then proceeded to invite to Nicosia the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch and fourteen Bishops from three Patriarchates, i.e. Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem. A Major Synod was thus convened on July 5, 1973 in Nicosia and by July 14, 1973 the three offending Bishops were themselves dethroned and unfrocked and new elections were ordered to fill their places.

The Archbishop then went on to announce the reorganization of the Church of Cyprus consisting of the creation of two new Bishoprics, the creation of a number of Suffragan Bishops and the possible elevation of the Abbots of the three major monasteries of the island to the status of Suffragan Bishops. This, together with the Archbishop would provide the Church of Cyprus with an adequate number of Bishops to constitute a canonically valid Synod. This was the number of Bishops in the Church of Cyprus prior to the Lisignan dynasty, without which the Church could not be truly autocephalous. Therefore, in the future, there will be no need to invite Bishops from outside the Church of Cyprus to constitute a valid canonical Synod capable of dethroning and unfrocking Bishops. This re-construction of the Church of Cyprus, which seems to revive its former glory, and which was forced on the Archbishop by political intrigue, might one day be counted as perhaps his greatest achievement in the history of the island. During the enthronement of the new Bishop of Kition on October 25, 1973, the Archbishop declared:

'The Church of St. Barnabas has recently received blows and was deeply wounded as a result of the well known acts by the three former Bishops of Paphos, Kition and Kyrenia, who motivated by evil spirits, caused a terrible ecclesiastical crisis. But we are confident that the Church will emerge renewed and strengthened from the crises. The healing of the wounds of the Church has already begun and the end of the crisis seems to be near.'[7]

The triumph of the Archbishop both in the Presidential elections as well as at the Major Synod convinced the government of President Papadopoulos that the Archbishop

was the best guarantee for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus question which would ensure the desired good relationship with their N.A.T.O. partner Turkey. Both Athens and Makarios have staked their cards on the enlarged[8] inter-communal talks. Even though these talks exclude *enosis*, as long as they also exclude partition, they are welcomed by the Archbishop, Athens and Ankara. Thus, apart from the last-ditch stand by Grivas, Makarios may be moving towards his greatest diplomatic triumph. The only possible obstacle to such a solution at present is the suspicion of the Turkish Cypriots who continue to suspect Makarios of trying to secure Greek domination through intercommunal talks and then to achieve *enosis* through self-determination.[9]

These Turkish suspicions are fed by the emotional appeal to *enosis* still made by the Archbishop and most of his Ministers. It is a pity that the Cypriot Turkish leaders seem not to understand that if Makarios ceased to preach what he no longer practised, this would have placed Grivas and his supporters in an impregnable position, as the only true guardians of Greek patriotism. Only the future can resolve this dilemma, but the double triumph of Archbishop Makarios in 1973, politically as well as ecclesiastically, has insured that he will remain completely in command of the situation in the years to come, and this is the best guarantee for the ultimate solution of the island's problems. Makarios, endowed with a supreme political sensitivity, prefers to float through crises like a smoothly-running spaceship making minor corrections for speed and direction only when absolutely necessary. As long as Makarios is in command there is still hope that Cyprus will not once more be turned into an island of terror.

Conclusion

For the first time since antiquity there exists a separate Hellenic state outside of an independent Greece. As has been indicated, the renascent Greek state had at every stage of its expansion managed to absorb territories inhabited by Greeks. This expansion had been inevitably carried out at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, which had engulfed in conquest practically the whole of the former Byzantine Empire. The only exceptions were the Ionian Islands which fell to Venice, passed from Venice to Great Britain and from Great Britain to Greece in 1863. The island of Cyprus is the first and, perhaps, the only instance where a portion of the former Ottoman Empire, inhabited by a Greek population, has become an independent state instead of being absorbed by Greece.

This phenomenon can be accounted for by the fact that Turkey has interposed, for the present, its veto on *enosis*. Greece in the twentieth century cannot challenge Turkey, as she often did up to the First World War, because she lacks its powerful ally Russia—the former champion of Orthodoxy. On the other hand, Turkey is now more than ever needed by the West as an ally against Russia. Therefore, Turkey has kept its British ally and gained the U.S.A. as an ally, while Greece has lost its ally, and this state of affairs controls the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is the reality into which the struggle for freedom in Cyprus has projected its people. To keep an even keel in such a situation requires astuteness, sagacity, and patience to be found more often than not in a Byzantine icon rather than in a human being. The Cypriots can count themselves fortunate that they have

produced an Archbishop Makarios who approaches, as far as it is humanly possible, the idea suggested by such a Byzantine icon. He has displayed utter dedication to his ideal of fighting at all times for the best possible solution for Cyprus.

The pattern which this book has followed has been more political than historical. The events which have been dealt with here have been predominantly those which have tended to show the pragmatic attitude adopted by the Archbishop to the problems confronting him and the people of Cyprus. There is no doubt that the Archbishop has been and still is a devoted partisan of *enosis*. But how could he achieve *enosis* without Greek power to back him? Greece alone could not and cannot provide power, as already explained. To believe otherwise is an illusion emanating from ignorance. This illusion forced the Archbishop to reject a number of feasible solutions of the Cyprus problem, and forced him to accept in 1959 an extremely unfavourable settlement. In these circumstances he set himself the task, first of all, of trying to govern Cyprus with such a Constitution. Then he obviously had in mind a revision of the Constitution to make it more workable. He hoped that the status of Cyprus under a more or less smoothly working Constitution would enhance its prestige to such an extent that self-determination would form a natural aspect of its sovereignty. Union with Greece would then be achieved in circumstances which would make a Turkish veto inapplicable in the face of world public opinion.

The hopes of the Archbishop, however, were dashed by the events of 1963. Instead of a happy constitutional future, Cyprus was faced with intercommunal war. The intercommunal outburst escalated into the threat of a Turkish invasion. In the absence of an effective Greek countermove the Archbishop could only save Cyprus by securing the intervention of the United Nations, and this required the dedication of Cyprus to the policy of independence. Also, it must be remembered that the Archbishop did not always have a happy relationship with successive Greek governments—a possible exception being made in the case of the Papagos government—whose attitude to the Cyprus question from 1950 onwards can only be described as ambivalent.

Only after 1964, when the late George Papandreou was in power, was there a government in Athens which was prepared to do something for Cyprus. Unfortunately the course of internal Greek politics toppled Papandreou, led to a revival of ambivalence concerning Cyprus, and this same ambivalence and weakness led to the seizure of power in Athens by the military.

After the events of 1967 it is on the whole fair to say that Greece was more keen on keeping a common front with its allies, including Turkey, than on *enosis*. If the new Greek government talked of *enosis* for Cyprus it did so without enthusiasm and with readiness to concede the partition of the island. But nobody could really expect the Archbishop to be a willing partisan of the partition of his own homeland, especially after so much blood had been shed and so much suffering had been undergone to ensure its freedom and unity. The Archbishop was thus constrained by circumstances to adhere to a policy of independence for the time being.

Many accusations have been levied against the Archbishop by his opponents. Frankly, only those who are completely politically naive and ignorant of the realities of present-day life in Cyprus can find any substance in such unjustified charges. The most recent preposterous charge, however, is that the Archbishop is a patron of Communism. This has been reiterated not only by the extreme right-wing on the island but also by the three Metropolitan Bishops in their recent demand for the Archbishop's retirement from his office as President of the Republic. (This attempt has, so far, undermined their own position.) The accusation is based on the fact that because the Archbishop is a strict constitutionalist, he recognizes the existence of the A.K.E.L. Party in Cyprus. It is based also on the fact that he has achieved a good relationship with the Soviet Union, which has been necessary primarily for political reasons during the Turkish invasion threats and in order to procure much needed arms, which Cyprus could not obtain from any other quarters. If the detractors of the Archbishop would only take stock of the situation they would realize that if Cyprus has survived

for ten years the ordeal of communal strife and the threat of Turkish invasion and is still today an independent state with a flourishing economy, this is primarily due to the efforts of the Archbishop and no one else could have carried through such a policy to a successful conclusion.

Beset by so many dangers the Archbishop has managed to tower above all his detractors and critics. This has been due, indeed, to his Byzantine qualities. The word Byzantine is sometimes used to suggest extreme duplicity and deviousness, but it is forgotten that it can also imply extreme political sagacity and saintliness. The Archbishop has certainly proved himself to be a consummate politician. He may have made mistakes but his tradition fostered by his study of both Church and Civil Law is that of a constitutionalist.

Makarios presides over a full spectrum of political life in Cyprus stretching from the extreme right to the extreme left. He refuses to repress any political orientation and is willing to collaborate with all towards the common good. Moreover, his thorough monastic theological training and profound Christian faith have moulded his character and endowed his mind with the qualities of subtlety and charity. For instance, although it is obvious that he has always abhorred violence, he nevertheless refused to condemn outright and openly those who had indulged in it. Likewise, he has a profound abhorrence of any blind, head-on opposition to Communism, atheism or free thought. Despite his traditional and hieratic demeanour, he is a man of the people, a profoundly broadminded and modern man who has seen much of the world. This spirit of broadmindedness and toleration is the very cornerstone of Christianity, and the Archbishop has always stressed that he is first an Archbishop and then a head of state.

Finally, pragmatism implies success. The Archbishop has always believed that time is on his side. So far he has been proved right. He is conscious of the fact that both the Greek and Turkish governments are unstable and nobody can make a long-range forecast concerning their future. It is conceivable that the general situation might alter considerably. The Archbishop is clearly waiting for such a contingency to arise.

In the meantime, since the economy of Cyprus has proved highly viable, development and progress are the best guarantees for success in the long run. Liberty under the Greek flag must be the goal of the successful comsummation of such a policy, but it must be liberty and the flag must be truly Greek. This is the only justification of the Archbishop's past and present policy and it is going to be without doubt its inspiration in the future. If this objective is achieved it will constitute the triumph of a pragmatism pursued and interpreted by a statesman of a truly international stature.

Notes

Introduction

1 Riots instigated by the nationalist leaders took place in October 1931. They resulted in the abolition of constitutional rule by the British government.

Chapter I

1 Sir R. Storrs, *Orientations*, Ivan Nicholson & Watson, 1937, p. 550.
2 F.G. Maier, *Cyprus: From Earliest Times to the Present Day*, Elek, London, 1968, p. 30.
3 Sir R. Storrs and B. J. O'Brien, *The Handbook of Cyprus*, Christophers, 1930, p. 12.
4 D. Alastos, *Cyprus in History*, Zeno, London, 1955, p. 83.
5 F. G. Maier, op. cit., p. 48.
6 Both the apostles are said to have landed at Salamis in A.D. 45. Barnabas was a native of Cyprus. He travelled with St. Paul to Paphos where they converted to Christianity the Roman pro-consul, Sergius Paulus. Barnabas was martyred by the Jews at Salamis and buried there with a copy of the Gospel of St. Matthew. The discovery of the tomb and the Gospel by Archbishop Anthemios of Constantia was most significant for the history of the island. In 478 the Emperor Zeno confirmed the autocephality of the Church of Cyprus.
7 Emperor Zeno granted the Archbishops of Cyprus the privilege to: (i) sign their names in red ink, like the Emperor; (ii) wear a purple cloak at church festivals, and (iii) carry an imperial sceptre instead of a pastoral staff.
8 Sir H. Luke, *Cyprus: A Portrait and an Appreciation*, Harrap, London, 1957, p. 39.
9. Neophytos, a native monk of Paphos, wrote: 'The wicked Englishman achieved nothing against his fellow criminal Saladin, only this, that he sold our country to the Latins for 200,000 pounds of gold.' *Excerpta Cypria*, C. D. Cobham, Cambridge University Press, 1908, pp. 10-13.
10 D. Alastos, *Cyprus in History*, p. 224.
11 On conditions then prevailing on the island see: (i) D. Alastos, *Cyprus in History*, pp. 229-34; (ii) Cobham, op. cit., pp. 55, 57; (iii)

Histoire de l'ile de Chypre sons le regne de la Maison de Lusignan, Vol. III, Mas Latrie, Paris, 1852-61, pp. 560-3; (iv) *Historia Chronologiki Tis Nesou Kyprou*, Kyprianos (Archimandite), Venice, 1788, Nicosia editions, 1902 and 1933.
12 Sir Harry Luke, *Cyprus*, p. 73.
13 F. G. Maier, op. cit., p. 113.
14 D. Alastos, *Cyprus in History*, pp. 259-60.
15 *Millet* means 'nation'. *See*: Sir H. Luke, *The Old Turkey and the New*, London, 1955, Chapter IV.
16 This tax continued to be paid until 1855 when the Sultan, at the request of his allies in the Crimean War, had it abolished.
17 Originally he was an interpreter; later on he became an official of the court.
18 W. Turner, edited by Cobham, 'Journal of a tour in the Levant'. *See: Excerpta Cypria*, p. 447.
19 F. G. Maier, op. cit., p. 123.
20 G. S. Phrankoudes, *Kypris*, Athens, 1890, pp. 358-9.
21 Vice-Consul White's *Report for 1862, Accounts and Papers*, LXX, pp. 459-67.
22 F. G. Maier, op. cit., p. 126.
23 *Kypriaka Chronika*, Vol. VII, p. 95.
24 C. W. J. Orr, *Cyprus under British Rule*, Robert Scott, London, 1918, p. 34.

Chapter II

1 *A Handbook of Cyprus*, compiled by Sir J. T. Hutchinson and C. D. Cobham, London, 1909, pp. 47-8.
2 D. Alastos, *Cyprus in History*, p. 319.
3 In 1881 the total population of Cyprus was 186,048. Of this 136,639 were Greeks, 46,389 Turks, 691 English and just under 2,400 other nationalities.
4 D. Alastos, *Cyprus in History*, p. 322.
5 Ibid., p. 324.
6 Ibid., p. 552.
7 Quoted in ibid., p. 553.
8 H. D. Purcell, *Cyprus*, Ernest Benn, London, 1969, p. 243.
9 D. Alastos, *Cyprus: Past and . . . Future*, Committee for Cyprus Affairs, London, 1943, p. 53.
10 A. Merton, reporting from Cyprus in 1938, wrote: 'The film of the funeral of Ataturk and one of a recent wedding in the Greek royal family were banned on the grounds that either might furnish an occasion for the manifestation of pro-Greek or pro-Turkish sentiment! *Daily Telegraph*, 21.12.1938.
11 F. G. Maier, op. cit., p. 148.
12 D. Alastos, *Cyprus in History*, pp. 363-6.
13 A.K.E.L.'s predecessor was the K.K.K. (Komounistikon Komma

Kyprou), founded in Cyprus in 1926 and recognized by Comintern in 1928. The K.K.K. was officially banned by the British colonial government in 1933. A.K.E.L. was formally founded in 1941 and at first was far from being hard-core Communist. By 1946 it had become the strongest political organization in Cyprus when it won the local elections in five major cities.
14 Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Cyprus: the Dispute and the Settlement*, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 10.
15 After the death of Cyrillos III on November 16, 1933, the Cypriot Church remained without an Archbishop until June 20, 1947 when Bishop Leontios of Paphos was elected Archbishop.
16 D. Alastos, *Cyprus in History*, pp. 370-3.
17 *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946*, Oxford University Press, p. 171.
18 *The Times*, London, July 11 and 14, 1947.
19 Leontios died after 36 days as Archbishop and was succeeded by Makarios, Bishop of Kyrenia.
20 F. G. Maier, op. cit., p. 152.
21 P. N. Vanezis, *Makarios: Faith and Power*, Abelard-Schuman, London, 1971, pp. 93-4.
22 *Hansard* (Commons), 15.3.1954, 8f.
23 Ibid., 25.7.1954, 504f.

Chapter III

1 *Cyprus: A Handbook on the Island's Past and Present*, Greek Communal Chamber, Nicosia, 1964, p. 77.
2 Sir George Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 4 vols., Cambridge University Press, 1952. Hill says that it is one of the ironies of history that the island proverbially notorious for luxury should have produced the founder of the Stoic philosophy.
3 Sir G. Hill, op. cit., Vol I, p. 213.
4 P. Arnold, *Cyprus Challenge*, Hogarth Press, London, 1956, p. 13.
5 A. and J. Stylianou, *The Painted Churches of Cyprus*, Research Centre: Greek Communal Chamber, Nicosia, 1964.
6 Dighenis was for the Cypriots the Greek *par excellence*, the sleepless fighter of evil and the champion of the weak.
7 P. N. Vanezis, op. cit., p. 76.
8 P. N. Vanezis, 'A Study of the Development of the Teaching of English in Cyprus with Special Reference to Political and Social Factors', M. A. Thesis, London University, 1963, p. 80.
9 Dr. C. Spyridakis, *The Educational Policy of the English Government in Cyprus* (1878-1954), Cyprus Ethnarchy office, Nicosia, 1954, p. 4.
10 Ibid., p. 11.
11 Sir R. Storrs, op. cit., p. 11.
12 By 1959 there were eight secondary intercommunal schools

established by the government.
13 All the public or community schools were under the control of the Church.

Chapter IV

1 Sir R. Storrs, op. cit., p. 555.
2 P. N. Vanezis, *Makarios: Faith and Power*, p. 38.
3 P. N. Vanezis, M.A. Thesis, p. 52.
4 C. D. Cobham, op. cit., p. 395.
5 The last *berat* to be issued was in 1865.
6 *Manchester Guardian*, 3.8.1954. *See also: Daily Mirror*, 4.8.1954.

Chapter V

1 C. D. Cobham, op. cit., p. 92.
2 *Foreign Office State Papers*, March, 1573, No. 808.
3 H. D. Purcell, op. cit., p. 184.
4 *Cyprus: Census of Population and Agriculture, 1946*, Crown Agents, 1949.
5 Sir R. Storrs and B. J. O'Brien, op. cit., pp. 40, 42, 44.
6 H. D. Purcell, op. cit., p. 189.
7 C. D. Cobham, op. cit., p. 364.
8 H. D. Purcell, op. cit., p. 191.
9 Sir G. Hill, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 510.
10 H. D. Purcell, op. cit., p. 244.
11 F. N. Korkut, *Picture Post*, 11.1.1947, p. 13.
12 Sir. H. Luke, op. cit., p. 183.
13 *Cyprus Republic, Summary of Main Statistical Data*, Statistics Dept., Cyprus, December 1964.

Chapter VI

1 Sir H. Luke, op. cit., p. 169.
2 Rumania was ruled under the Sultan by Greek Phanariot princes who greatly developed the provinces.
3 On July 9, 1821 the Archbishop of Cyprus was hanged, the Bishops were executed and some 200 leading personalities of the Orthodox Church were massacred. *See*: Sir R. Storrs, op. cit., p. 539.
4 R. Stephens, *Cyprus: A Place of Arms*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1966, p. 74. Megale Idea is Greek for Great Idea, i.e. the idea that all Greeks still under alien (Ottoman) rule should be reunited with Mother Greece to form a Greater Greece, a worthy successor to the Byzantine Empire.
5 Sir George Hill, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 497.
6 Ibid, p. 498.
7 Ibid., pp. 521-2.
8 The insurrection of October 21, 1931 was condemned by Venizelos.

9 Sir G. Hill, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 560.
10 Ibid., p. 560.
11 *The Communist Party of Cyprus*, T.W. Adams, Hoover Press, 1971.
12 *The Times*, London, 14.7.1947, p. 3.
13 Ibid., 12.5.1948 and 15.5.1948, p. 3.
14 R. Stephens, op. cit., p. 128.
15 *Cyprus: Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1948-1949*, Cyprus Government Printing Office, p. 15.
16 Dr. C. Spyridakis, *The Educational Policy of the English Government in Cyprus*, The Cyprus Ethnarcy Office, Nicosia, 1954, p. 23.
17 Sir G. Baker, *Cyprus As I Saw It in 1879*, London, 1879.
18 Sir H. Luke, op. cit., p. 175.

Chapter VII

1 D. Alastos, *Cyprus Guerrilla*, Heinemann, London, 1960, p. 4.
2 Charles Foley, *Island in Revolt*, Longman, London, 1962, p. 45.
3 D. Barker, *Grivas: Portrait of a Terrorist*, Cresset Press, London, 1959, p. 76.
4 On December 15, 1954 the General Assembly decided not to consider the Cyprus question further.
5 D. Barker, op. cit., p. 69.
6 *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, edited by Charles Foley, Longman, London, 1964, p. 3.
7 In August 1922 the Turks attacked, routed the Greek army, sacked and burnt Smyrna and massacred most of its Greek inhabitants.
8 *Memoirs of General Grivas*, p. 5.
9 'Xhi' in the Greek alphabet is represented by X, which is the symbol of the unknown.
10 Barker says that Grivas was sacked from the army because he was too embroiled in extreme right wing politics.
11 D. Barker, op. cit., p. 47.
12 After 1946 Grivas reformed his party and called it the National Agrarian Party 'X'.
13 H. D. Purcell, op. cit., p. 258.
14 W. Byford-Jones, *Grivas and the Story of E.O.K.A.*, Robert Hale, London, 1959, p. 39.
15 The National Agrarian Party 'X' polled 0.84% of the votes cast.
16 W. Byford-Jones, op. cit., p. 43.
17 *Memoirs of General Grivas*, p. 17.
18 On January 26, 1955, Loizides was arrested with 11 other men for smuggling arms into Cyprus.
19 Field-Marshal Sir John Harding had this to say about Grivas: '. . . a highly skilful organizer . . . an expert guerrilla leader . . . a man of great personal courage and endurance, a stern disciplinarian and austere in his habits . . . unsparing with his subordinates as with himself.' *Daily Telegraph* 3.1.1958.

Chapter VIII

1 Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea*, Paladin, London, 1970, p. 117.
2 Ibid., p. 119.
3 Ibid., p. 119.
4 'If the Cyprus minority were British rather than Turkish it would, on African precedents, have been abandoned years ago.' *Sunday Times*, 12.7.1964.
5 Cmnd., 9594, pp. 36-7, Sept. 1955.
6 Following a *coup d'état* Menderes was executed after a trial during which he was charged with instigating the 1955 riots. The true story of the riots has not yet been revealed to the world.
7 Cmnd., 9708, p. 3, March 1956.
8 Charles Foley, *Legacy of Strife*, Penguin, London, 1964, p. 48.
9 *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 549, coll. 1715-19.
10 C. Foley, *Legacy of Strife*, p. 48.
11 R. Stephens, op. cit., p. 148.
12 C. Foley, *Legacy of Strife*, p. 86.
13 D. Alastos, *Cyprus Guerrilla*, p. 151.
14 *The Times*, London, 23.2.1957.
15 I am referring here particularly to the massacre of nine Greeks at the Turkish village of Guenyeli, just outside Nicosia.

Chapter IX

1 *Cyprus: The Problem in Perspective*, Public Information Office, Nicosia, 1968, p. 3.
2 L. Ierodiakonou, *The Cyprus Question*, Stockholm, 1971, p. 198.
3 Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, Macmillan, London, 1971, p. 658.
4 *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, October 18 to 25, 1958, pp. 16, 45.
5 *Manchester Guardian*, 21.6.1958.
6 *Memoirs of General Grivas*, p. 161.
7 Ibid., p. 161.
8 After the defeat of the Greek resolution at the United Nations, a meeting was arranged between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, Averoff and Zorlu. They met in Paris on December 18, 1958. The talks continued throughout January 1959 and on February 5, 1959 the two Prime Ministers, Menderes and Karamanlis, met with their Foreign Ministers for a conference in Zürich. In six days they drew up the outline of a settlement for which neither the Greek nor the Turkish Cypriots were consulted.
9 R. Stephens, op. cit., p. 165.
10 D. Alastos, *Cyprus Guerrilla*, p. 200.
11 T. W. Adams and A. J. Cottrell, *Cyprus between East and West*, Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, p. 6.
12 Cmnd., 680, p. 4, March 1959.

13 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
14 Ibid., p. 6.
15 R.I.I.A., p. 57.
16 *The Roots of the Evil*, Cyprus Government Press Office, 1964.
17 C. G. Tornaritis, *Constitutional and Legal Problems in the Republic of Cyprus*, Nicosia, 1968, p. 14.

Chapter X

1 F. G. Maier, op. cit., p. 160.
2 T. W. Adams and A. J. Cottrell, op. cit., p. 9.
3 M. Harbottle, *The Impartial Soldier*, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 8.
4 *Cyprus Cmnd.*, 1093, July 1960.
5 L. Ierodiakonou, op. cit., p. 232.
6 H. D. Purcell, op. cit., p. 311.
7 Ibid., p. 306.
8 L. Ierodiakonou, op. cit., p. 232.
9 S. Kyriakides, *Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government*, Philadelphia, 1968, p. 87.
10 L. Ierodiakonou, op. cit., p. 241.
11 R. Stephens, op. cit., p. 163.
12 S. Kyriakides, op. cit., pp. 94-8.
13 A British minesweeper intercepted *Deniz* on October 18, 1959. The three men aboard (all Turkish nationals) were arrested and brought to trial.
14 They were both murdered on April 24, 1962, apparently by Turkish extremists. They were joint editors of *Cumhuriyet*, which had a policy of accommodation with the Greeks.
15 L. Ierodiakonou, op. cit., pp. 250-1.
16 H. D. Purcell, op. cit., p. 321.

Chapter XI

1 L. Ierodiakonou, op. cit., p. 235.
2 A. Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint*, Deutsch, London, 1971, p. 98.
3 L. Ierodiakonou, op. cit., p. 261.
4 Ibid., pp. 263-4.
5 A. Papandreou, op. cit., p. 105.
6 H. D. Purcell, op. cit., p. 342.
7 L. Ierodiakonou, op. cit., p. 265.
8 R. Stephens, op. cit., p. 203.
9 *Greece Under Military Rule*, edited by R. Clogg and G. Yannopoulos, Secker & Warburg, London, 1972, p. 193.
10 L. Ierodiakonou, op. cit., p. 268.
11 *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, September 30 to October 7, 1967, pp. 22-8.

Chapter XII

1 *Memoirs of General Grivas*, pp. 190-1.
2 Ibid., p. 191.
3 J. A. Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*, Ohio State University Press, 1968, p. 27.
4 R. C. Kingsbury and N. Y. G. Pounds, *Atlas of Middle Eastern Affairs*, Philadelphia, 1968, pp. 58ff.
5 *Cyprus Cmnd.*, 1093, July, 1960.
6 H.D. Purcell, op. cit., p. 34.
7 *Arab Observer*, 4.9.1960.
8 By its resolution of March 4, 1964 the Security Council set up a peace-keeping force to take over from the British.
9 M. Harbottle, op. cit., p. 132.

Chapter XIII

1 T. W. Adams, *A.K.E.L.: The Communist Party of Cyprus*, Hoover Institution Press, 1971, p. 12.
2 Ibid., p. 14.
3 F. G. Maier, op. cit., p. 147.
4 S. Mayes, *Cyprus and Makarios*, Putnam, London, 1960, p. 18.
5 F. G. Maier, op. cit., p. 72.
6 C. Foley, *Legacy of Strife*, p. 29.
7 Ibid., p. 28.
8 H. D. Purcell, op. cit., p. 202.
9 Ibid., p. 35.
10 T. W. Adams, op. cit., p. 4.
11 S. Mayes, op. cit., p. 237.
12 L. Ierodiakonou, op. cit., pp. 280-1.
13 T. W. Adams and A. J. Cottrell, op. cit., p. 46.
14 *Cyprus Bulletin*, Vol. VII, No. 10, 15.11.1970.

Chapter XIV

1 C. M. Woodhouse, *The Story of Modern Greece*, Faber & Faber, 1968, p. 210.
2 Ibid., p. 220.
3 *The Times*, London, 24.10.1931, p. 10.
4 C. M. Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 223.
5 D. Alastos, *Venizelos*, Lund Humphries, London, p. 251.
6 C. M. Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 270.
7 *Inside the Colonels' Greece*, 'Athenian', Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, pp. 35-6.
8 C. M. Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 286.
9 A. Papandreou, op. cit., p. 208.
10 Ibid., p. 208.
11 These talks started in May 1968 with Mr. G. Clerides representing the Greek side and Mr. R. Denktash the Turkish side.

12 *Daily Telegraph*, 28.3.1972.
13 Ibid., 28.3.1972.
14 *Sunday Times*, 5.3.1972.
15 *Observer*, 5.3.1972.
16 *Guardian*, 6.3.1972.
17 Ibid., 6.3.1972.

Chapter XV

1 *British Cyprus*, W.H. Dixon, Chapman & Hall, London, 1879, p. 32.
2 Sir R. Storrs and B. J. O'Brien, op. cit., p. 32.
3 Sir G. Hill, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 278.
4 Sir R. Storrs and B. J. O'Brien, op. cit., pp. 32-3.
5 Agnes Smith, *Through Cyprus*, Hurst & Blackett, London, 1887, p. 317.
6 Sir R. Storrs and B. J. O'Brien, op. cit., pp. 34-5.
7 D. Alastos, *Cyprus in History*, p. 310.
8 Sir R. Storrs, op. cit., p. 559.
9 D. Alastos, *Cyprus Past and . . . Future*, p. 16.
10 H. D. Purcell, op. cit., p. 215.
11 F. G. Maier, op. cit., p. 141.
12 This was the situation before Britain joined the Common Market.

Chapter XVI

1 *Financial Times*, 27.2.1973, p. 7.
2 '. . . he came with its blessing, if not actually at its instigation.' *Guardian*, 2.2.1973.
3 The Archbishop emphasizes that he is not prepared to arrest General Grivas because that would only make him a martyr.
4 King Constantine was dethroned and Greece was declared a Republic with George Papadopoulos as its first President, June 1, 1973—November 25, 1973. At the moment of writing the President of Greece is Lt. Gen. Ph. Gizikis.
5 *Cyprus Bulletin*, Vol. X, no. 6, 14.2.1973.
6 *Sunday Times*, 18.3.1973.
7 *Cyprus News Digest*, P.I.O., Nicosia, 26.10.1973.
8 Besides the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representatives there are now two constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey and the special representative of the U.N. Secretary-General. The first meeting took place on June 8, 1972.
9 *Guardian*, 15.5.1973.

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