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**TURKISH  
VIEWS  
ON  
CYPRUS**

**1965**



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## SOME FACTS ABOUT THE ISLAND OF CYPRUS

1 — Cyprus is an Island 40 miles off the shores of Turkey and nearly 700 miles from the shores of Greece. Throughout its history, the Island has belonged to the Assyrians, Persians, Arabs, Eastern Roman Empire, Venetians and lastly to the Turkish Empire. Not only during 350 years when it was part of Turkey, but in all its history, the fate of this island has always been linked with that of Asia Minor which is the Turkish mainland. It has never been part of Greece.

Cyprus became part of Turkey in 1571 and remained so for more than 300 years. In 1923 Turkey ceded, by the Treaty of Lausanne, its sovereignty over Cyprus to Great Britain which had acquired effective administration of the Island in 1878 on the basis of a special agreement whereby Great Britain agreed, in exchange for this transfer of administration, to support Turkey against a Russian aggression in order to check the Russian advance towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

There is no Cypriot nation as such. Cyprus is an Island on which two distinct communities live - Turkish and Greek - and these communities have completely different cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic and national backgrounds, traditions and aspirations. The Turks and the Greeks living in Cyprus are parts of two nations whose centres of gravity are situated outside the Island. In 1923 Turkish Cypriots formed 33 percent of the population of the Island. A considerable emigration took place after the sovereignty of the Island was transferred to Great Britain and today 80 percent of the population is Greek and 20 percent Turkish. The total population is about 577,000.

## ORIGIN OF THE QUESTION

2 — The Greek population of the Island had from time to time sought the annexation of Cyprus by Greece, but until the

1950's these demands and actions supporting them remained limited in scope. Thereafter however, these movements gained momentum with the diplomatic action undertaken by Greece on the one hand and through the underground activities of EOKA, (the terrorist organization on the Island, against the British administration) on the other.

The attempt of the Greek Cypriots aiming at the annexation of the Island by Greece was from the very outset opposed by the Turkish Community on the Island and by the Turkish Government. The main reasons for this opposition can be summarized as follows :

(a) The terrorist organization EOKA and the other extremist groups had manifested so much hate and hostility towards the Turkish Community in Cyprus, that the Turks in the Island had reasons to be in fear for their very existence and, therefore, were bitterly opposed to be left at the mercy of the Greek Community or to be put under the domination of Greece. Since the arrival from Greece of extremists for organized terrorism in an attempt to intimidate the Cypriots who were opposed to ENOSIS, cooperation and coexistence between the two communities had become totally impossible. The terrorist organization EOKA had been responsible not only for the loss of innocent lives among the Turkish Cypriots, it had also forced the Greek Cypriots to cease all contacts with the Turks.

(b) The Island is only 40 miles from Turkey's southern shores and occupies a commanding strategic position, controlling the navigation between Turkish ports in the south and the access to such important Turkish ports as Iskenderun and Mersin. It is because of this geographic proximity and the very important location of the Island in the Mediterranean that Turkish defence and security interests are closely linked with the status of the Island.

(c) Turkey has a great stake in the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the Eastern Mediterranean. Every time that the peace of this vital region is disturbed Turkey risks being involved in a conflict. Therefore Turkey has a genuine interest in having such a status in Cyprus as would allow both communities

to live in peace. The only way of achieving such a status is obviously to eliminate any possibility for one of the communities to oppress the other. In consequence, Turkey has strongly felt from the very outset that the only reasonable and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem would be one which should provide appropriate guarantees for the Turkish Community.

(d) In the 1920's Greece and Turkey had been involved in a fatal confrontation. Greece, willing to profit from the defeat of Turkey after World War I, had attempted to conquer Western Anatolia as part of its drive to attain the «Megalo Idea», which means the «Grand Idea», symbol of Greek imperialism. Following the defeat suffered by Greece in Anatolia, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed and the whole range of problems in suspense between Greece and Turkey were settled. The aim of this Treaty was to bring about a political and military equilibrium between the two countries and to open the way of friendship and cooperation between them. In this settlement the sovereignty of Cyprus was granted to Great Britain. Any change in the status of Cyprus in favor of Greece would have affected the whole delicate equilibrium of the Lausanne arrangement and threaten the good relations which were established after Lausanne between the two countries.

3 — Despite the opposition and misgivings of Turkey, Greece and the Greek Cypriots continued after 1950 to press for the annexation of the Island by Greece. The EOKA terrorists perfected their organization and methods and committed many crimes not only against the British and the Turks but also against the Greek Cypriots who were reluctant to espouse their views. At the same time the Greek Government immersed itself more and more in the cause of ENOSIS and passions in Greece were inflamed by the revival of Greek imperialist designs. Archbishop Makarios who became later the President of Cyprus was the main protagonist of this cause and he used his authority as the head of the Orthodox church in Cyprus to promote the imperialist policy of Greece. The Orthodox church thus became an accomplice of the terrorist organization and undertook a violent campaign for the realization of the Pan - Hellenist dream.

## THE CYPRUS CONFLICT BETWEEN 1954 AND 1958

4 — Eventually the Greek Government brought the question before the United Nations in 1954 and requested the annexation of Cyprus by Greece under the guise of a demand for self-determination. But the Greek hope for a solution of the Cyprus question in the form of a «diktat», without taking into account the historic, geographic and defence interests of Turkey in Cyprus and the legitimate rights of the Turkish Community was never realized. The question was discussed in the General Assembly several times after 1954, and each time the U. N. General Assembly refused to admit the validity of the Greek claims and recommended that this issue be solved through peaceful negotiations among the interested parties. The last resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1958 was as follows :

«The General Assembly,

«Having considered the question of Cyprus,

«Recalling its resolution 1013 (XI) of 26 February 1957,

«Expresses its confidence that continued efforts will be made by the parties to reach a peaceful, democratic and just solution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations».

### THE ZURICH AND LONDON AGREEMENTS

In 1958 the Greek demands for ENOSIS and the intensification of the EOKA terrorists' intimidation campaign had exacerbated dangerously the hostility between Turkish and Greek communities on the Island and between Turkey and Greece. As a result a serious crisis was threatening peace and stability in the Mediterranean area.

It is under these circumstances that the Turkish and Greek Governments, realizing their responsibilities towards the two communities in Cyprus and towards maintaining peace, arrived at a compromise formula at the Zurich Conference in 1959 in

full consultation with the leaders the two communities. This compromise formula, later endorsed by Great Britain and the two Cypriot communities at the London Conference, is the very basis of the present status of the Island. *V. C.*

The purpose of the Zurich and London Agreements was to ensure equilibrium and harmony between the communities living on the Island, to safeguard the interests of Turkey, Greece and Great Britain and to bring peace and stability to the area.

To this effect, independence was granted to Cyprus with a special constitution and the relationship of Turkey, Greece and Great Britain with Cyprus was defined in several treaties.

The Constitution stipulated that Cyprus would be a republic under a presidential regime, the president being a Greek Cypriot and the vice-president a Turkish Cypriot, both elected by their respective communities. Complete communal autonomy was granted in the Constitution to the two groups of population, Greek and Turkish; put in other words, the autonomy of the two communities was recognized and endorsed by these agreements. The Constitution also included many provisions designed to ensure equitable participation by the Turkish Community in legislative and governmental functions. Against a possible danger that the Greeks, who were in numerical majority might disregard completely the interests of the Turkish Community, the Constitution stipulated that the president should obtain the consent of the vice-president on certain matters in the fields of foreign policy, defence and security. As far as taxation was concerned, the Constitution required the concurrent majorities of both the Turkish and Greek members of parliament in order to prevent discriminations.

In addition to the Constitution, three Treaties were concluded in order to guarantee the status of the Island under the new Constitution and the political and defence interests of Turkey, Great Britain and Greece. With the Treaty of Establishment between the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus which sanctioned the independence of Cyprus, the full sovereignty of Great Britain over strategically

important base areas was recognized. The Treaty of Guarantee concluded between the same Governments was designed to safeguard the independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus as well as the basic articles of its Constitution. According to this treaty the Republic of Cyprus undertook to respect its Constitution. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, for their part, guaranteed the state of affairs created as a result of the basic articles of the Constitution of Cyprus. They further undertook, in the event of a breach of the Treaty and Constitution, to consult together, with respect to the measures necessary to ensure the observance of the commitments. The Treaty provided also that if common and concerted action should prove impossible, each of the Guaranteeing powers would have the right to take individual action with the aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the Treaty. A final Treaty, the Treaty of Alliance between Turkey, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus established a tripartite headquarters and provided for the stationing of small Turkish and Greek contingents in Cyprus.

It should be borne in mind that these Treaties and the basic articles of the Constitution represented a compromise formula acceptable to all parties and constituted the very «raison d'être» of the independence of Cyprus. Without the safeguards for the Turkish Community contained in the Constitution and without the caution of the Treaty of Guarantee, the independence of Cyprus would have been unthinkable and impossible. The importance of the Zurich and London Agreements was, at the conclusion of the conference in London, emphasized by the Greek Foreign Minister Mr. Averoff in these terms :

«We think that in this task of finding a solution we shall cover relatively the interests of every party. And we have been successful. After long talks, after long negotiations, which many times were not very easy, because the problem was complicated, I think we have arrived at a solution, an agreement in which the principles of democracy and of modern humanity are upheld and also the fundamental principles of everyone».

«We signed these Agreements because this is in the common interest of our countries in the middle of a world which is

full of dangers and dangers which do not allow us to ignore them. We signed these Agreements because we felt that they cover relatively and absolutely satisfactorily the interests of the people of Cyprus as a whole. We also signed these Agreements because the respected man at the head of the Greek Community in Cyprus Archbishop Makarios and whom we considered in all our deliberations as representing the will of the Greeks of Cyprus, having been informed by us, said that he was in agreement with these Agreements. I do not think that we signed only because we had his agreement. We signed I think because it was our conviction that we have reached the relatively best possible solution.

But I want to add that we took into consideration his opinion for the fundamental reason that we had declared during our discussions that we will not impose these decisions by force or by other ways on the Greek Cypriots».

#### CYPRUS AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE ADMISSION TO U. N.

5 — The Zurich and London Agreements were signed in February 1959 by Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and the representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus. These accords were of course, only a framework which established the main principles of the future status of Cyprus. The Constitution itself was drafted in a mixed committee with the full participation of the Greek and Turkish communities and negotiations to this effect continued from April 1959 until July 1960. During these long and arduous negotiations the Greek representatives had the opportunity to express completely their views and many of their proposals were accepted and incorporated into the Constitution. The minutes of the mixed committee show that the Greek Cypriot delegates, including Mr. Rossides, now the permanent representative of Cyprus at the United Nations, have put forward several proposals which were accepted by the committee. At the outcome of these negotiations five Treaties and documents were signed in Nicosia on August 16, 1960, the day the Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed. Therefore, the claim that the Constitution was imposed upon the Greek Cypriots and that they were unable to express their views is utterly without foundation.

6 — The day the Republic was proclaimed the Government of Cyprus applied for membership to the U. N. and Cyprus was admitted to the U. N. in the next session of the General Assembly. Cyprus subsequently became also a member of the British Commonwealth as a free and independent nation.

It should also be noted that when President Makarios applied for membership to the U. N. the letter he sent to the Secretary General of the U. N. included this wording: «The Republic of Cyprus being established on August 16, 1960 as an independent and sovereign state...» This application clearly indicates that Makarios at that time regarded the State of Cyprus as an independent State as all the other members of the U. N. and that he did not consider that this independence was limited in any way. Furthermore the Security Council and the U. N. General Assembly which were seized of the application of Cyprus for membership had full knowledge of the Treaties signed by the Republic of Cyprus. None of the members of the Security Council or the General Assembly considered the existence of these Treaties as limiting the sovereignty of the new State. The subsequent Greek Cypriot claim that the Treaties are in contradiction with the principles of the U. N. Charter cannot, therefore, be taken seriously. The Greek Cypriot demand for self-determination is equally without any justification since there can be no question of granting self-determination to an already independent and sovereign state. Independence is by its very nature the result of the use of the right of self-determination.

#### ATTEMPTS TO VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TREATIES

7 — The Constitution of Cyprus and the interconnected Treaties could have formed the basis of a lasting peace and harmony in the Island and among all the parties concerned if they were implemented in good faith. It was vital however, that all parties accept the Zurich and London Agreements without any mental reservations and with a sincere desire to make the system work efficiently and smoothly. Unfortunately it became apparent very soon that Makarios, the President of the Republic, who had not raised any objections at the time of the signing of the Agreements was determined to bring about

changes in the status of the Island, to do away with the guarantees accorded to the Turkish Community and ultimately to impose upon the Turkish Community the annexation of Cyprus by Greece.

Makarios not only refused to implement the fundamental provisions of the Constitution, but he also made plain in a number of statements that he was looking for the first opportunity to try to amend the basic articles. On August 1963 he publicly announced that he would consider 1964 as the appropriate year for changing the Constitution in the way he desired, despite the Turkish Community's warning that the time was inopportune for re-opening this issue.

In his drive to change the Constitution, not through negotiations with the Turkish Community, but unilaterally, Makarios did not hesitate to flout the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court whose President was according to the Constitution a neutral member of foreign nationality. His attitude towards the Supreme Court and his refusal to abide by its decisions show how little respect he has for the rule of law. The following statement of Professor Forsthoff, President of the Supreme Court and distinguished lawyer, is a clear condemnation of Makarios' disrespect for law and legality. «I am convinced that if the Government of Cyprus would have been able to stick to the Constitution for five years, most of the problems would have been mastered. All this has happened because Makarios wanted to remove all Constitutional rights from Turkish Cypriots».

8 — In November 1963, Makarios submitted to the Turkish Vice-President Dr. Fazıl Küçük, a memorandum in which he put forward 13 proposals for amending the basic articles of the Constitution. These proposals were designed to alter radically the present status of the Island and to take away from the Turkish Community the rights which were considered as essential for its protection by the Zurich and London Agreements. The Turkish Community indicated that it could not accept such proposals which would endanger its very existence.



That the object of this attempt to change the Constitution was not bona fide and that the so-called «need for amendment» was propagated and engineered by the Greek - Cypriots as a mask for attaining the union of Cyprus with Greece has been fully established by a recent statement of Mr. Glafcos Clerides, the president of the House of Representatives who declared : «The purpose of amending the Constitution was to open the way to ENOSIS - to remove the obstacles placed on our way by the Zurich regime».

And General Karayannis who was sent to Cyprus by the Greek Government to command the illegal and unconstitutional forces of Archbishop Makarios has publicly stated that «Archbishop Makarios had planned to achieve ENOSIS by a number of steps, the first of which was the amendment of the Constitution».

#### THE MASSACRES OF 1963

9 — The attempt of Makarios to change the very principles of the Constitution was the signal of a campaign of intimidation and terrorism against the Turkish Community. Archbishop Makarios made clear that he had no intention to negotiate and to compromise with the Turkish Community on his proposals, but that he was determined to impose his will by the use of force and aggression. The Greek Cypriot press and radio broadcasts on the Island increased immediately their virulent anti-Turkish propaganda and instigated the Greeks to terrorize the Turkish Community by violent means. The extremist newspapers started to urge in open words the total extermination of the Turkish Community.

Apart from this campaign of the press and radio, the Greek underground organizations increased their preparations, distributing arms to their supporters and putting into effect their plans for military action for an all-out attack against the Turks.

As these preparations were being made Makarios continued to press for his demands and the campaign of intimidation and violence gained momentum. Districts inhabited by the Turkish Cypriots were gradually surrounded by Greek policemen, who, assisted by armed civilian members of the EOKA terrorist

organization, strived to put pressure on the Turkish population with a view to intimidate them into submission.

10 — On December 21, 1963, the action started when two Turks, a man and a woman were shot and killed by armed Greeks who opened fire indiscriminately on a group of Turks.

The following day there were peaceful gatherings in the Turkish sector of Nicosia in protest of the previous night's outrages and while pupils of the Turkish High School were out in the schoolyard, armed Greek policemen fired at them severely wounding two pupils. This is how these incidents were reported in the Manchester Guardian: «...in the early morning of December 21, a Turkish man and woman were killed. There is no doubt that certain Greeks had been deliberately provoking the Turks to action. For a week or two before this, Greeks in civilian clothes had been demanding to see the identification papers of the Turks in Nicosia which caused bitter resentment. On December 23, armed Greek police shot at the Turkish school boys».

With this onslaught, Turkish members of the police and gendarmerie were deprived of the weapons which they were normally entitled to possess for the performance of their duties and those who had reported for duty were detained under inhuman conditions and held as hostages. On the other hand, Greek members of the security forces were armed to the teeth with a variety of heavy arms which are normally issued to the army and not to the police forces. At the same time many hundreds of terrorists suddenly appeared on the scene and were supplied with weapons and uniforms, an operation which by its very nature requires long and careful planning.

Again, General Karayannis who commanded these forces for almost a year has written in the greek press explaining how these secret Greek armies, under the direction of Archbishop Makarios and commanded by the Minister of Interior, Mr. Yorgadjis, had been prepared one year before the beginning of the Greek onslaught against the Turks. General Karayannis wrote : «When the Turks objected to the amendment of the Constitution Archbishop Makarios put his plan into effect and the Greek attack began in December 1963».

These attacks in Nicosia were followed by an all-out action of the Greek Cypriots against the Turks throughout the Island. On Christmas eve, Greeks staged the outrageous attack on the residential district of Kaymaklı near Nicosia. It was during this attack that the greatest number of defenceless Turkish women and children were brutally murdered.

Groups of Greeks accompanied by members of the so-called «legal forces of the State» broke into hundreds of Turkish homes and fired at the unarmed innocent occupants, killing at random many Turks including women, children and elderly persons. They also carried away as hostages more than 700 Turks, including women and children, whom they forced to walk barefooted and in their nightdresses, across rough fields and riverbeds. Even holy places such as mosques were attacked and bazookas were fired at minarets.

The Turkish Cypriots were obliged to take whatever defensive measures they could improvise, but as they only possessed hunting rifles and other small arms and were in short supply of ammunition, they suffered heavy casualties.

#### EFFORTS TO RESTORE PEACE ON THE ISLAND

11 — From the very beginning of these tragic events the Turkish Government did all in its power to put an end to the communal fighting.

When the appeals to the leadership of the two communities brought no results, the Turkish Government appealed to Greece and the United Kingdom for joint efforts in restoring peace. The three guarantor powers, Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom appealed through their ambassadors in Nicosia to the responsible leaders on the Island. On December 24, 1963, the three Governments issued a joint statement and also offered their good-offices to the two communities. When all these efforts failed and the atrocities against the Turks assumed the proportions of a massacre, Turkey proposed that the forces of all three guarantor powers in Cyprus ensure effectively a cease-fire. This proposal of Turkey did not receive an immediate response and pending such joint action, Turkish aircraft flew over Cyprus

on December 25, in an attempt to remind the Greek Cypriot leaders of their treaty obligations. On the same date the three guarantor governments informed the Turkish and Greek elements of the Government of Cyprus of their readiness to assist in restoring peace and order, by means of a joint peace-keeping force under British command and composed of the forces of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey already stationed in Cyprus by virtue of the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Alliance. On December 26, this offer was accepted by Archbishop Makarios and the Vice-President Dr. Fazıl Küçük.

The joint Peace-Keeping Force was accordingly established under a British General, Major General Young. On December 29, a Political Committee consisting of the United Kingdom High Commissioner, the Turkish and Greek Ambassadors and representatives of the Turkish and Greek communities in Cyprus, was established in order to give guidance to the joint Peace-Keeping Force. On January 2, 1964, it was announced that an agreement was reached to hold a conference in London with the participation of the three guaranteeing powers and the two communities. At the same time, the Governments of Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and Cyprus jointly requested the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint a representative to act as United Nations observer in Cyprus, whose role would be to observe the progress of the peace-making operation, and report on it to the Secretary General. The Secretary General also agreed to send Mr. Rolz Bennett, his Deputy Chef de Cabinet, to London in response to an invitation from all the Governments participating in the Conference of Cyprus.

12 — Despite the cease-fire agreement, the Greek Cypriot forces with the participation of the so-called Cyprus security forces, continued their campaign of intimidation by way of murder, arson and looting. The international press reported fully this campaign of terrorism. The Chicago Daily News of December 31, wrote : «Skyloura is a town of 200 Turks and 750 Greeks... only the Turkish half is burning... Skyloura was set to the torch three days after the Christmas day cease-fire». The London Times of January 2, 1964, reported that «Fires have been raging in the Turkish suburb of Omorphita... Greeks set

fire to a number of Turkish houses». Bernard Jordan wrote in the London Daily Mail of January 7, 1964, «Homes are blazing again tonight in Omorphita. I counted eleven fires in the area where Turks fled from their houses last week».

A week later, the Daily Telegraph of January 14, reported that «bodies of Turks were found crudely buried outside the village of Ayios Vasillios.. Shallow graves had apparently been hurriedly scooped by a bulldozer. The bodies appeared to have been piled in two or three deep. All had been shot».

### THE LONDON CONFERENCE

13 — The London Conference opened on January 15, 1964, amidst renewed attacks against the Turkish Community in violation of the cease-fire agreement. The representatives of Turkey and Greece and of the two Cypriot communities stated their positions, but no common ground could be found between diametrically opposed viewpoints. The Greek Cypriots insisted on a revision of the Zurich and London Agreements and of the Constitution in a way that would not only have deprived the Turkish Community of all its rights and guarantees and put it at the mercy of the Greek majority whose intolerance and passion for an oppressive domination had become obvious after the tragic events on the Island but also would have opened the way to ENOSIS as originally planned by the Greeks. The Turkish Government and the Turkish Community put forward proposals designed to ensure peace on the Island without delay and to bring about a long term solution which would prevent the recurrence of violence through some adjustments in the present Constitution and particularly through the setting-up of a federation that would physically separate the Greek and Turkish communities by grouping them into two distinct provinces.

It soon became evident in London that it would be impossible to reach agreement while the violence continued in Cyprus and that the preservation of peace on the Island had to be given priority. The urgency of this problem had become more acute since the British Government had informed the interested parties that it could not continue to bear the burden of keeping the peace in Cyprus alone any longer.

### EFFORTS TO SEND A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE TO CYPRUS

14 - On January 31, 1964 the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom communicated to the interested parties proposals for augmenting the Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus. The Governments of Turkey and Greece accepted these proposals which were thereafter put to Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Küçük on February 2.

The January 31 proposals envisaged the establishment of an enlarged Peace-Keeping Force drawn from countries friendly to Cyprus. This force would remain in Cyprus for a period of not more than three months. The Turkish and Greek contingents in Cyprus would be part of the Peace-Keeping Force. Meanwhile, the Governments of Turkey and Greece would undertake not to exercise their rights of unilateral intervention under Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee for three months on the understanding that the Peace-Keeping Force would be in charge during that period. A mediator would be appointed to assist in the search for a solution to the conflict.

On February 9, Archbishop Makarios rejected these proposals. He argued that the terms of reference of the Peace-Keeping Force and of the mediator were vague, that the proposals reasserted the provisions of Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee which he disputed, and that the force would not be under the Security Council.

Upon the refusal of Archbishop Makarios, the United States and the United Kingdom Governments revised the 31st January proposals in order to make them more acceptable to the Archbishop. The Governments of Turkey and Greece agreed to the terms of the revised proposals which were presented to the Archbishop on February 12. These fresh proposals provided for the establishment of an international Peace-Keeping Force comprising contingents from those countries whose Governments agreed to participate. The Turkish and Greek contingents would be included in this force. The mission of the international force would be to prevent a recurrence of inter-communal fighting, to suppress disorders, to reduce inter-communal tension

and to create conditions in which free movement and the ordinary life of the people could be resumed. The force would operate under a British commander which would receive guidance from the Governments concerned, acting through an inter-governmental committee in London.

Britain, Greece, Turkey and the two Cypriot communities would jointly appoint a mutually acceptable mediator with a view to finding an agreed solution to the conflict. The mediator would act as an independent agent and would keep the Secretary General of the United Nations informed about the progress of his task. Finally, the Cyprus Government would ask the Security Council to take note by consensus of the arrangements made for the creation of this peace-keeping force and for the appointment of the mediator.

There is no doubt that these proposals represented a genuine attempt to bring peace to Cyprus, and also to open the way through mediation to negotiations among all the parties for an agreed solution. Almost all the objections raised by Archbishop Makarios to the previous proposals of January 31 had been taken into account. His desire to create the force under the authority of the Security Council had been met by the provision whereby the Security Council would take note by consensus of the arrangements for the creation of the peace-keeping force. The measures contained in these proposals did not in any way infringe upon the rights and responsibilities of the Republic of Cyprus as defined in its Constitution and the proposals specified that the creation of the international force shall not affect treaty rights and obligations of the British, Greek and Turkish Governments relating to the Republic of Cyprus, including obligations in respect of the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

Nevertheless, Archbishop Makarios rejected outright the revised proposals and announced that he would take the issue to the Security Council.

## THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION CONTINUOUS MASSACRES GREEK-CYPRIOT MILITARY BUILD-UP

15 — During these negotiations with Archbishop Makarios, the situation on the Island deteriorated steadily. The Greek irregulars, now numbering several thousand, were equipped with all kinds of weapons imported in violation of the cease-fire agreement from some neighbouring countries and were undergoing intensive military training. The plight of the Turkish Community had attained tragic proportions. More than 15 thousand Turks, fleeing from terror, had taken refuge in Nicosia and some other Turkish cities with substantial Turkish population. In those cities they were living under great hardship, in a state of siege, receiving food from Turkey or from international relief and welfare organizations. But throughout the Island, the scattered Turkish communities were assaulted, day after day, by the Greek irregulars who, assisted by the Greek policemen, were attacking with mortars, machine guns, bazookas, homemade tanks and bulldozers, killing their women and children, burning and looting their houses and obliging them to evacuate their ancestral homes and to migrate.

One of the most tragic incidents happened at Ayios Sozomenos, 12 miles away from Nicosia. On February 7, the Greek Cypriot gendarmes, armed with a variety of heavy weapons surrounded that tiny village and began an attack that raged several hours. The Greek Cypriot gendarmes set fire to Turkish Cypriot houses and used Turkish Cypriot women and children as a shield in the assault. After the Turks suffered seven dead and several wounded, the British troops enforced a cease-fire. The Greek Cypriot gendarmes withdrew taking fifteen Turkish women and children as hostages. The next day, the 200 survivors of Ayios Sozomenos with their flock of sheep and a few cattle left their village and took refuge in Louroudjina.

On February 12 and 13, a brutal attack was launched against the Turkish quarter at Limassol. The Turks suffered a loss of sixteen dead and thirty-five wounded. The onslaught was described by «Le Figaro» of Paris as follows: «It is a real military operation that the Greeks launched against the six

thousand inhabitants of the Turkish quarter yesterday morning. A spokesman of the (Greek) Cypriot Government has recognized this officially». The well-planned and deliberate attack was reported in these terms by General Young on 13 February: «This morning in the early hours, the Greek side launched a deliberate attack supported by a homemade tank, armored bulldozers, and assorted weapons such as bazookas and, it is alleged, mortars. We were forewarned the evening before, but I was assured that it would not take place, by a very senior Minister in the Government».

In the town of Paphos the Greek Cypriots mounted an attack on the Turkish Cypriot quarter on the afternoon of 19 February.

On the same date, Greek Cypriot irregulars surrounded the Turkish Cypriot sector of Polis and two Turkish Cypriots were killed. Some 800 Turkish Cypriots, including women and children were bottled up in a school building while Greek Cypriots besieged them closely. Every night, Greeks aimed searchlights at the school, and shouted threats and insults through loudspeakers.

While these systematic attacks were ravaging the Turkish Community, the secret inflow of all kinds of arms to the Greek Cypriots was continuing. It was reported in the press that more than 11 million dollars - one fifth of the budget - had been spent for the procurement of weapons in only six weeks. The secret was broken on February 15 at Famagusta. On that day, while crates described as containing printing machines were being unloaded from the Greek ship Demetrios, one of the crates burst open and was found to contain arms and ammunition. Immediately after this discovery the Demetrios left the port in a hurry.

#### THE QUESTION BEFORE THE U. N. SECURITY COUNCIL

16 — In view of the grave deterioration of the situation in the Island and the obstinate rejection by Archbishop Makarios of the proposals for the establishment of a Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus, the Government of the United Kingdom took the issue to the Security Council on February 15, 1964.

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During the discussions at the Council, the Greek Cypriot representative, Kyprianou alleged that Turkey was envisaging an invasion of Cyprus. He thus sought to induce the Council to adopt a resolution which the Greek Cypriot administration could interpret as abrogating the international treaties which were the very foundation of the independent State of Cyprus. The Turkish representative, Ambassador Menemencioglu, called the attention of the Council to these manoeuvres and to the fact that the Greek Cypriots were trying, by levelling false charges against Turkey, to cover up the abhorring crimes that were committed in Cyprus against the defenceless Turkish Community. He laid down before the Council the atrocities perpetrated on the Island and appealed for the adoption of urgent measures in order to stop the violence and bloodshed. The Turkish representative also reminded the Council of the fact that the United Nations Charter demands respect for the obligations arising from treaties and pointed out that the violations of the treaties by the Greek Cypriot administration was contravening the principles of the Charter.

He called attention to the grave consequences which would result for the international community if treaties in force were to be abrogated unilaterally, or if the Security Council was considered authorized to decide on the validity of treaties. As a matter of fact, the great majority of the Council members repeatedly emphasized the irrevocability of the Treaties and stressed that the Council had no authority whatsoever for passing a judgement on the validity of a treaty. The main Greek Cypriot contention was therefore rejected by a consensus of opinion in the Security Council.

17 — During the Security Council debate another claim advanced by the Greek Cypriot delegation was that it represented Cyprus as a whole, including the Turkish Community and that it was therefore expressing the views of the «Government of Cyprus». At the outset of the debate the Turkish representative, on the basis of a message sent by the Vice-President, Dr. Fazıl Küçük, called the attention of the Council to the unconstitutional character of this claim. He explained that according to the Constitution of Cyprus, any decision pertaining to foreign policy should be taken only after consultation with the Turkish

members of the cabinet and with the assent of the Turkish Vice-President and that the Greek Cypriot Ministers had failed to do so. He therefore requested that the representative of the Turkish Community should equally be given the right to present its case to the council. Later in the debate, this request was considered and agreed upon. Accordingly, the President of the Turkish Communal Chamber, Mr. Rauf Denktas, was given the opportunity to address the Council and to express the views of the Turkish Community. As a result, the contention of the Greek Cypriot representative that he was entitled to speak for the whole of the Island was rebuked by the council.

18 — After more than two weeks of deliberations the council adopted on March 4, 1964, a resolution asking the Government of Cyprus to take measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus and recommending the creation of a U. N. Peace Force in Cyprus. The composition and size of this force would be established by the Secretary General in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The force was asked to use its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and the return to normal conditions.

This resolution further recommended that the Secretary General designate in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, a mediator who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and with the four interested Governments for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem of Cyprus in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

#### THE AFTERMATH OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

19 — The resolution which was voted unanimously by the Security Council was hailed by all people of good-will as an important landmark towards the restoration of peace on the Island and a step towards a permanent settlement of the conflict. It was hoped that the speedy dispatch of the U. N. troops

to Cyprus would prevent the recurrence of acts of violence, that, the appeal of the Security Council would exert a powerful moral influence upon those who resorted to bloodshed and that with the return of peace and tranquillity in the unhappy Island it would be possible to hammer out a solution through the efforts of the mediator.

Some observers however felt that the Greek Cypriot leaders would use the three-month period during which the U. N. force would be stationed in Cyprus to establish their full control over the Island and condemn indefinitely the whole Turkish population to a life of siege. This opinion was unfortunately confirmed by the fact that the Greek Cypriots, while avoiding violence during the Council debates, nevertheless proceeded with their plans of strengthening their armed forces, by continuing the import of heavy armaments and by perfecting the military training of irregular bands now totalling more than 20,000 men. It is during the same period that the Greek Cypriot leaders announced the formation of an additional police force of 5,000 men in open violation of the Constitution of Cyprus which limited the police force to 2,000 including the Turkish Cypriot policemen. This new police force was established by converting the irregulars into uniformed policemen. It was clear that the Greek Cypriots, hoping to use the U. N. Peace Force as an auxiliary to their own security forces, had seen fit to cloak the irregulars under the guise of policemen.

The intentions of the Greek Cypriots were unveiled immediately after the adoption of the Security Council's Resolution of March 4. In fact on March 5, the Greeks started their attacks in several places. One Turk was killed in the assault against the Turkish Community in Kazafani, in the Kyrenia range, and in Nicosia five Turks were injured when a bomb was exploded at the Turkish Communal Chamber. But this was only a beginning. On March 9, the Greek Security Forces launched an all-out attack against the Turkish population of Paphos on the Western shores of Cyprus killing at least 14 Turkish Cypriots and wounding 22. The Greeks attacked as usual with bulldozers, bazookas and machine guns. They refused to heed the appeals of the British forces for a cease-fire and continued their merciless attack fanatically. The Baltimore Sun, on March 10

described as follows the tragic ordeal of the Turkish inhabitants of Paphos (Ktima) :

«An Associated Press photographer who flew over the stricken area in a British helicopter reported «it was just like a war operation». He said a heavy smoke rolled-up from unchecked fires blazing in the Turkish quarter and bullets were glancing off the last remaining minaret in town... The fighting in Ktima appeared to be an effort to show that the Greek Cypriots were running the show on the Island - not the British or the Turkish Cypriots».

### THE U. N. PEACE FORCE

20 — The U. N. Peace Force became operational on March 27, 1964, and was placed under the command of Lt. General P. S. Gyani of India. As of June 8, 1964, the strength of the force was 6238 men composed of Contingents from Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and the United Kingdom. In addition to the peace force a U. N. police force of 173 men was constituted to which Australia, Austria, Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden contributed policemen. The police force had mainly the mission of conducting inquiries in certain incidents in which people were killed. On May 11, 1964 Mr. Galo Plaza of Ecuador was appointed by the Secretary General of the U. N. as his special representative in Cyprus to conduct discussions and negotiations with the parties concerned towards achieving the objectives of the UNFICYP's mandate.

### HAMPERING OF THE U. N. OPERATIONS BY GREEK CYPRIOTS CONTINUOUS POLICY OF REPRESSION

21 — The Turkish Community had awaited with great expectations the arrival of the U. N. peace force. The beleaguered Turkish Community was hoping that the presence of the force would prevent the recurrence of the Greek attacks and that its hardships would be alleviated. But the Turks were disappointed in their hopes for it soon became apparent that the Greek Cypriots had no intention to relax their drive to annihilate the Turkish population. The Greek Cypriots

continued to build up their arms and war equipment by persisting to purchase heavy weapons, ammunition, aircraft and vehicles from abroad and particularly from Greece. The Turkish communities remained surrounded by the overwhelming Greek forces and constantly subjected to all kinds of abuse, vexations and pressure. Freedom of movement on the Island was totally denied to the Turks, their economic situation continued to deteriorate rapidly, as they were not allowed to sell their produce in the markets, to cultivate their fields, to graze their flocks and to go to their jobs in areas dominated by Greeks. In the villages which the Turks had abandoned in the face of Greek attacks, the houses were put on fire, the properties looted and the harvest confiscated. From March to June the Turkish Cypriots continued to be murdered and the Greeks did not give up their abhorring method of taking hostages among the innocent people.

On May 11, a serious incident took place inside the Turkish quarter of Famagusta. A car carrying three Greek army officers and one Greek-Cypriot policeman entered into the quarter, the occupants got out of the car, drew their revolvers and started shooting. The Turkish Cypriot policemen returned the fire and two Greek officers and the Greek-Cypriot policeman were shot. The Greek officers were members of the Greek army and were carrying NATO travel documents. This incident was one of the first manifestations of the attempt by Greece to send members of its regular army into Cyprus and to occupy the Island forcefully.

Upon this incident a total of 32 Turkish Cypriots were abducted from Famagusta and surrounding districts by the Greek Cypriots. None of these was ever traced and the Secretary General of the U. N. reported to the Security Council that little hope remained that they were alive.

The Secretary General also reported that 78 Turkish Cypriots were missing since the peace force became operational on March 27. He further pointed out that the total number of missing Turkish Cypriots was 483 and that their fate was unknown.

## FIRST RENEWAL OF THE MANDATE OF THE U. N. PEACE FORCE

22 — The Security Council met on June 19-20 to consider the extension of the mandate of the U. N. Peace Force, for another three month period. The Greek Cypriot delegate, supported by the delegate of Greece brought again unfounded charges against Turkey, alleging that Turkey was threatening the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The Turkish representative pointed out that each time the council meets the same charges are repeated in order to cover up the crimes that were committed on the Island by the Greek Cypriots and he emphasized once again that Turkey's only concern was to preserve peace and security on the Island and to relieve the distress of the Turkish Community. He drew the attention of the council to the attempts by the Greek Cypriot administration to use the U. N. Peace Force in order to establish authority over the whole of the territory of Cyprus and to enslave permanently the Turkish Community, to disintegrate the independent State of Cyprus and unite it with Greece, by resorting to violence.

At the end of the meeting the council adopted unanimously a resolution extending the stationing on Cyprus of the U. N. Peace-Keeping Force for an additional period of three months ending September 26, 1964.

## SECOND RENEWAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE

The Security Council met on September 16, 1964 to consider the renewal of the U. N. Peace-Keeping Force for another 3 month period. The publication of the report of the Secretary General, which had brought to light the many aspects of the barbarous economic blockade imposed upon the Turks and the report of General Thimayya, the U. N. commander, on the situation in Kokkina had had a great effect on world public opinion. The Greek Cypriots, seeing that their brutal treatment of the Turks had been condemned by the whole civilized world, felt the need to make a conciliatory gesture and Archbishop

Makarios, in a message to the Secretary General, announced that he was lifting the economic restrictions throughout the Island. But it was clear to the Turks in Cyprus that this was merely a maneuver to soothe the world opinion and that they could no longer trust the word of Makarios. They refused to be lulled by his promises. Dr. Fazıl Küçük, the Vice-President, in a message sent to the Secretary General, pointed out that the criminal responsibility of Makarios cannot be absolved simply by a mere gesture of benevolence. He stressed further that it was a familiar tactic of Makarios to adopt a conciliatory attitude whenever he felt he abused the patience of the civilized world and whenever the Security Council met to review the situation in Cyprus, with the intention however to revert to his ruthless and merciless policy at the first opportunity. He also emphasized that the Turkish population of Cyprus would feel secure only if the measures designed to alleviate their sufferances were carried out with the participation in the Government of Turkish Cypriot ministers. The Turkish Community therefore rightfully demanded to put their fate not in Makarios alone but in a government which had legality under the Constitution of the land.

## SUBSEQUENT RENEWALS OF THE MANDATE OF THE U. N. PEACE FORCE

It was the view of all concerned that this further time given to the interested parties would suffice to bring about an agreed and peaceful solution. And, indeed, had the Greek-Cypriot authorities abandoned their idea of imposing the union of Cyprus with Greece on the Turkish Community, a solution would have been found quite easily. But, as stated by Mr. Glafcos Clerides, the President of the House of Representatives, the Greek-Cypriots looked upon the present anti-Turkish campaign as a «continuation of the 1955-58 struggle for the realization of union of Cyprus with Greece». With this pre-determined policy and the aim of union always uppermost in its mind, the Greek-Cypriot leadership was not prepared to settle the question until the Turkish Community was rendered physically incapable of objecting to or preventing union with Greece. Hence, the continued Greek-Cypriot defiance of the resolution of the Security Council and continued acts and declarations which aimed at keeping the tension high and of disrupting the Turkish Community's political, social and economic structure.



It became obvious from the outset that the Greek-Cypriot authorities would try to use the Peace Force as a tool in furtherance of their designs against the Turkish community. Under the plea of being a Government they sought to stop the members of the Peace Force from doing their duty according to their mandate. Under the excuse of preserving the sovereignty of Cyprus they refused free access to the Peace Force in Cyprus. The Secretary-General drew the attention of the Security Council to these facts repeatedly. In his report of 10 September, 1964 (S/5950) the Secretary General clearly stated that «the UNFICYP was given a very heavy responsibility without any precise definition of its general mandate to guide it so that it might know clearly just what it is entitled to do and how far it may go, particularly in the use of force. This inadequacy and lack of clarity in the mandate of the Force has been, obviously, a handicap to its operation». The Secretary General pointed out that due to this handicap the Force had not been able to prevent altogether «a recurrence of fighting» for there have been serious engagements (due to the defiance of the Force and the Security Council by the Greek-Cypriot authorities) at St. Hilarion and Tylliria area since the arrival of the Force.

Turkey and the Turkish - Cypriot authorities continuously demanded that the mandate of the Force should be extended so as to enable it to stop all Greek attacks on the Turks if necessary by use of Force, but the Greek - Cypriot authorities continued not only to resist to the enlargement of the mandate but they defied the Force commander in Cyprus and they demanded the restriction of the mandate of UNFICYP so that they would be free to assail the Turkish community at their will, under the umbrella of the Peace Force in Cyprus.

It is under these circumstances that the mandate of the force had to be renewed for a third time in December, 1964 for a further period of three months. The Security Council was once again informed of the tragic conditions under which the Turkish community was forced to live. The number of refugees had not decreased. Due to economic restrictions imposed on the Turks no steps could be taken to rehabilitate these refugees.

Turks continued to be killed or taken as hostages. Arbitrary searches and arrests were the rule of the day. The Greek-Cypriot authorities had become more intransigent in their approach to the final settlement of the problem. On 18 December 1964 the mandate was renewed.

Under the same circumstances the mandate was further renewed on 19 March 1965. Even while the Security Council was in session the Greek-Cypriot authorities did not desist from taking aggressive action against the Turks at Lefka-Ambelikou area, which obliged the Secretary-General to submit an addendum to his report explaining this new Greek outrage.

The fifth and last renewal was effected by the Security Council at its meeting of 10 June 1965 this time, at the request of the Secretary General, for a further period of 6 months until 26 December 1965. It was hoped by all concerned that this further time would be used in reducing the tension and in paving the way for the beginning of negotiations between the parties. But unfortunately the Greek-Cypriot authorities have used the time given to them in trying to consolidate their illegal and unconstitutional position and in adapting additional measures against the Turkish community. Inhuman economic blockades were clamped down on the Turkish community and lifted at will as a means of proving the superiority of the Greeks in Cyprus. Laws in complete contravention of the Constitution were attempted to be passed from an unconsitutional House of Representatives and declarations defying the Security Council and all those who advised a settlement through compromise and negotiation continued to be their policy.

**THE ATTITUDE OF GREECE**  
**ATTEMPT TO OCCUPY THE ISLAND**  
**PAN-HELLENISM AND GREEK IMPERIALISM**  
**POLICY OF HOSTILITY TOWARDS TURKEY**

23 — There is no doubt that the attitude of Greece throughout the crisis has been an important factor in the gradual deterioration of the situation. The Zurich and London Agreements were the result of joint efforts by Turkey and Greece to

solve a very dangerous dispute threatening to engulf the two countries in a terrible confrontation. Greece and Turkey had then realized that the long term interests of the two countries required the healing of the wounds created by the Cyprus dispute and that the peace of the Island depended on good and harmonious relations between Turkey and Greece. By the Treaties signed in 1960, they had assumed great responsibilities towards Cyprus.

Unfortunately, the Greek Government from the very outset of the crisis refused to cooperate with Turkey for restoring peace on the Island and instead of using its great moral authority to refrain Makarios, has extended its full support to him and embarked upon a policy of hostility towards Turkey. Greece not only did not agree to cooperate with Turkey in redressing the situation, but went even further and disputed the rights of Turkey deriving from the Treaties to which it had solemnly apposed its signature.

The most dangerous aspect of Greek policy is, however, that the Greek Government has deliberately revived the imperialist claims of Greece which had in the past brought so many misfortunes to it. The idea of Pan-Hellenism which is the symbol of Greek imperialism not only over the territories held by Turkey and over Cyprus, but over other areas in the Balkans, received a new impetus and Greek propaganda stimulated the expansionist dreams. Despite its commitments in the Treaty of Guarantee that it had abandoned the policy of ENOSIS, which means the annexation of Cyprus by Greece, the Greek Government proclaimed ENOSIS as its objective and took steps to attain this objective by use of force. Mr. Papandreu, has on many occasions advanced his claims for ENOSIS in no uncertain terms. This is what he said on August 25, 1964: «There is no diversion between the Greek and the Cypriot leadership. There is complete identity of views... the only thing that can be said at this present stage is that ENOSIS is the natural solution of the problem».

On September 5, he again spoke in favor of ENOSIS in these terms: «It is now generally acknowledged that the only solution for the Cyprus problem is ENOSIS. ENOSIS is a guarantee for peace and an obligation towards justice».

Therefore the proclaimed policy of Greece is the disintegration of the independence of Cyprus, the oppression of the Turkish Community in Cyprus and the annexation of the Island by Greece. This policy, disguised under a demand for self-determination is to be achieved by resorting to force and by violating all the treaty commitments of Greece. In fact, Greece has been massing troops on the frontiers of Turkey, notwithstanding the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 and the Treaty of Peace with Italy of 1947 which have demilitarized the islands along the coast of Turkey, has undertaken to concentrate its forces on these islands. Concurrently, the build-up of Greek forces in Cyprus has been continuing at a rapid pace, specially after June. This build-up of Greek armed forces in Cyprus has reached such proportions that it can now be fairly said that an invasion of the Island by Greece has already taken place. According to reliable and confirmed information, the strength of the Greek military forces now in Cyprus is as follows :

- a. A Greek military contingent composed of 950 officers and men, is stationed in Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty of Alliance.
- b. On June 13, 1964 a Greek military unit estimated at 240 men arrived in the Island.
- c. Between June 19 and 20, a larger unit, composed of 4 infantry batallions and 2 artillery batallions, altogether amounting to 3750 men arrived in Cyprus.
- d. On June 22, another military unit of 950 men arrived in the Island from Greece. Thus on June 22, 1964 the Greek military forces on the Island amounted to 5890 men.
- e. During the first week of July 1964, additional Greek forces having arrived in Cyprus the strength of these forces reached 7400 men.

The above-mentioned figures are also confirmed by information received from the United Nations sources. In fact, taking into consideration the passenger capacity of the busses used, at least 4900 men have been transported by 122 busses

from Limassol to the North of the Island. Also, truck loads of military equipment were transported from Limassol to different points of the Island. Among these were 30 pieces of artillery referred to as 25 pounders, 30 pieces of field artillery of 40 mm. caliber and 19 pieces of 6 pounders. The transportation of military personnel and equipment took place in the Limassol area under heavy security measures aimed at preventing United Nations patrols from performing their duty of observation.

These military measures do not leave any doubt on the strange way the Greek Government wishes to grant the right of self-determination to the people of Cyprus. As stated by General Grivas, now commanding the Greek Forces in the Island, «The Greek Army officers from Greece are here to help us impose our will on the Turks of Cyprus. We want ENOSIS. Turks oppose it. With the help of the Greek Army we shall impose our will on the Turks». The aggression perpetrated against the independence of a country and the policy of neo-colonialism can no longer be hidden. The last report of the United Nations Secretary General has divulged to the whole world the extent of the Greek military build-up. In addition to the military build-up, the Greek Government is also endeavouring to accomplish ENOSIS through an organizational integration between Greece and Cyprus in several fields; notably in the fields of trade unions and education. This movement is represented as an attempt to «start the unity of Greece and Cyprus from the bottom» as advocated by the Greek Prime Minister himself. Among the steps taken in this direction, the Greek and Greek Cypriot trade unions of civil servants and of physicians have been merged and the educational system in Cyprus has been remodelled along the lines of the new system adopted by Greece. On the other hand, in Cyprus, the Greek military units are taking part in celebrations and military parades. Greece is therefore openly treating Cyprus as a province of Greece. The Greek Government can not escape anymore from its responsibilities in the exacerbation of the conflict. The use of force and attempts against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent country are explicitly condemned by the Charter of the United Nations and if Greece brings the matter to the General Assembly, as it intends to do, its representatives would have to account for this breach of the lofty principles of the Charter.

## MILITARY AND ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE LARGE SCALE MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS

24 — After the month of June 1964 the Greek Cypriots undertook to crush completely the Turkish Community by assaulting areas heavily inhabited by the Turks and by a premeditated policy of economic blockade designed to condemn the whole Turkish population of the Island to starvation.

By that time the military forces of the Greek Cypriots had increased from 15.000 to an estimated 24.000 and this force was equipped with heavy armaments such as field artillery, howitzers, tanks, armoured vehicles and planes. Early in July this force mounted its first operation in the Kyrenia range which is heavily populated by Turks. The Greek forces sent into the area of the Temblos village a detachment of nearly 200 together with 25 pounder guns and armoured cars. On July 17, they issued an ultimatum that they will attack the village unless all the Turkish Cypriot fighters evacuated it. This attack was prevented only by the quick deployment between the two opposing sides of a U. N. peace force detachment. Another potentially dangerous incident occurred shortly thereafter near the Saint Hilarion Castle, which is an important outpost of the Kyrenia area. On August 1, the Greek Cypriots attacked heavily the Turkish positions in this area and fired several thousand rounds. The U. N. peace force again succeeded in arranging a cessation of fire.

25 — The decisive Greek Cypriot attacks occurred in the Tylliria area in the Northwest of Cyprus. In this area Turkish Cypriots were occupying the villages of Kokkina, Mansoura, Alevga, Selain t'Api and Ayios Theodoros as well as having defensive positions on the surrounding hills. The Greek Cypriot build-up of troops and equipment in this region began during the last few days of July and continued up to August 7. On August 4, the Greek forces around the Turkish positions totalled about 1.500. Roads and artillery positions were also under construction. On August 7, a large convoy including armoured cars and six 25 pounder guns moved into the Pomos area where the guns were positioned facing Kokkina. This convoy brought the

the total of the Greek forces to approximately 2,000 troops with six 45 pounder guns immediately able to bear on Turkish positions, two four-barreled Oerlikon 20 mm. guns, several mortars and a number of armoured cars. There were also twenty 25 pounder guns and two more 20 mm. Oerlikons in the Paphos forest area to the South. This large force facing only 500 Turkish Cypriot fighters who were trying to defend their women and children and who were armed only with light weapons.

The U. N. peace force had become most anxious about the build-up and had expressed several times his fears to the Greek Cypriot administration. On August 4, the U. N. Commander received from Archbishop Makarios the renewed assurance that the Greek Cypriots had no intention of attacking Turkish Cypriot positions and that, should they find it necessary to do so, he would give due warning to the Force Commander. Nevertheless the attack came. The Greek Cypriots unleashed their offensive in the Kokkina-Mansoura area on August 5. The momentum of the attack steadily increased, a number of Turkish positions were occupied and the village of Mansoura had to be evacuated by the Turks. On August 6, Greek forces mounted an attack supported by mortars from the Greek Cypriot village of Ayios Yeoryios against Turkish positions to the North. On August 7, they resumed their attack by opening heavy fire on the Turkish Cypriot village of Ayios Theodoros from the Greek Cypriot village of Piyenia. They also began to advance on Kokkina from the Greek Cypriot village of Pakhi Amos. The U. N. force commander sent a strong written protest to the Greek Cypriots and asked that the operations be stopped. But the Greeks were undeterred and they intensified the onslaught.

26 — Under these circumstances it was evident that the whole Turkish population of the Mansoura-Kokkina area was facing total annihilation and that the U. N. peace force was unable to interpose itself in the fighting and to stop the aggression. The Turkish Government therefore ordered its aircraft to carry warning flights over the area and simultaneously requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to adopt immediately the necessary measures to stop the attacks. The Security Council was not able to meet promptly and on the 8th the Greek attacks were renewed. The only remaining Turkish

Cypriot defensive position was Kokkina, where many of the Turkish inhabitants of the other villages had taken refuge. They were subjected to a heavy bombardment from land, were fired upon by patrol boats from the sea and the Greeks attempted to effect a landing on this beach from about ten motor-boats. Furthermore, the attempt by the U. N. peace force to secure a cease-fire in order to evacuate women and children had failed in the face of Greek refusal. The Turkish Government had, therefore, the choice of leaving the Turkish population in Kokkina to a certain death or to undertake a preventive action pending the decisions of the Security Council. As all self-respecting governments would do, the Turkish Government decided to effect a limited operation in self-defence for the legitimate purpose of rescuing nearly 2,000 men, women and children and ordered its aircraft to strike at purely military targets in the hope that this action would hamper the Greek attacks. This measure was also immediately notified to the Security Council and the Council was again requested to adopt urgent measures to ensure a cease-fire.

Following the Turkish limited air action the Greek Cypriots stopped their attacks. But meanwhile Archbishop Makarios gave to the whole world a new proof of his ruthlessness by announcing that he would order the massacre of all the Turks throughout the Island. On August 9, the President of the Security Council appealed for a prompt cease-fire on all sides. The Turkish Government immediately sent a positive reply and announced that orders were being given to stop the limited air action.

### ECONOMIC BLOCKADE

27 — Ever since the outbreak of violence on December 21, 1963 a variety of restrictions had been imposed upon the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek administration on the Island. The isolation of the Turkish Cypriot Community due to the restrictions placed on their movement, brought hardship on the members of the community as well as a serious dislocation of their economic activities. In addition, great damage was inflicted to the Turkish properties throughout the Island. As indicated in the report of the Secretary General of the U. N., on

September 10, 1964, in 109 villages 527 houses belonging to Turks have been destroyed while 2.000 others have suffered damage from looting. In Ktima 38 houses and shops have been destroyed totally and 122 partially. In the Omorphita suburb of Nicosia 50 houses have been totally destroyed while a further 240 have been partially destroyed. Apart from losses incurred in agriculture and industry the Turkish Community had lost other sources of its income including the salaries of over 4.000 persons who were employed by the Cyprus Government and by public and private concerns located in the Greek Cypriot zones. The trade of the Turkish Community declined considerably and unemployment reached a very high level as approximately 25.000 Turkish Cypriots had become refugees. The number of persons receiving some kind of assistance from the Turkish Red Crescent relief amounted to about 56.000 including 25.000 displaced persons, 23.500 unemployed and 7.500 dependents of missing persons, disabled and others.

All these statistics are contained in the report of the U. N. Secretary General and they eloquently describe the extent of plight of the Turkish Cypriots under the merciless oppression of the Greek Cypriots. On September 4, 1962 Archbishop Makarios had made this revealing statement: «Unless this small Turkish Community of Cyprus forming a part of the Turkish race which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered as terminated» By reducing 56.000 Turks out of a population of 120.000 to practically a status of prisoners deprived of all means of livelihood and stripped out of all their properties and goods, he can be satisfied that he is on the point of attaining his cynical objective.

28 — Around the middle of July 1964 the Greek Cypriots took two steps which helped to impose further hardship on the Turkish Cypriot Community. The U. N. peace force was officially informed that some 25 articles were considered as strategic materials, the purchase of which were forbidden by the Turkish Cypriots. The articles included building materials, cement, iron in bulk, iron rods, wire netting, electrical equipment, transistorized and other batteries, timber, large bags, automobile accessories and parts, tyres, sulphur and other

chemicals, as well as fuel in large quantities. Secondly, restrictions were imposed on the imports of Red Crescent supplies for the relief of the population. When a shipment of emergency and relief supplies arrived on July 15, obstructions were placed on its unloading by the Greek Cypriot administration. After a series of demarches by the U. N. peace force, only 390 tons out of a cargo of 900 tons, could be unloaded. The Greek Cypriot administration also insisted on control over the distribution of the relief supplies. Persistent representations made by the U. N. peace force and the International Committee of the Red Cross were unsuccessful. In spite of the U. N. peace force's efforts to escort Red Crescent convoys carrying relief supplies throughout the country, obstructions were frequently placed on the movement of those convoys.

There was no doubt that the Greek Cypriots had engaged in a new attempt to crush the resistance of the Turkish Community and force them into submission. The leaders of the Turkish Community considered naturally the new directives as nothing but a determination of the Greek Cypriot Government to condemn them to starvation and Dr. Küçük, the Vice-President of Cyprus strongly protested against these policies.

The Greek Cypriot administration, however, was determined to stick to this brutal and inhuman method. Immediately after the Tylliria fighting, the Greek Cypriots announced that they would cut all movement of supplies into the areas inhabited by Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia, Lefka, Kokkina and Limnitis. Following this announcement, convoys of food and other essential supplies were prevented from reaching their destination and the situation of the beleaguered Turkish Cypriots became untenable.

The United Nations command carried a survey of the situation concerning food and other essential supplies, covering 142 villages and 5 cities of the Turkish Cypriot population. The survey showed that more than 40% of the villages had no flour, that some had bread for only a few days, that the need for milk and dairy products, rice and even salt was acute, while kerosene was in extremely limited supply. Furthermore, medical attention in villages was notably low. In the cities the situation was deteriorating rapidly since the stock of relief supplies on

hand was extremely limited. All these facts were ascertained by the report of the U. N. Secretary General. But the Greek Cypriots in their fanaticism were still claiming that the situation continued to be normal. The situation was particularly critical in Kokkina where 2.000 Turks were facing the danger of starvation if supplies could not be sent in one or two days. The Turkish Government seriously alarmed by the situation in this village, asked that the U. N. Commander, together with the representatives of Red Cross and Turkish, Greek and United Kingdom embassies, investigate the situation on the spot. A mission, with the participation of the U. N. Commander went to Kokkina and reported that the situation there was indeed very grave and that food and supplies should be forwarded to Kokkina immediately. Thereupon the U. N. Commander dispatched two tons of supplies by helicopters and arrangements were made for the forwarding of supplies directly from Turkey.

The report of the U. N. Secretary General of September 10, 1964, and that of the Commander on the situation in Kokkina left no doubt as to the extent of the inhuman blockade that was imposed by the Greek Cypriots on the Turkish Community. As the Secretary General noted in his report, «the economic restrictions being applied against the Turkish Community in Cyprus were so severe as to amount to a veritable siege, indicating that the Greek Cypriots seek to force a potential solution by economic pressure as a substitute for military action».

This public condemnation of the imposition of blockades and other economic restrictions on the Turkish Community had no effect on the Greek administrators who squeezed or lifted the blockade according to their particular whims and fancies. The U. N. authorities did their utmost to alleviate the hardship of the Turkish Community and from time to time the Greek administration felt obliged to «agree» to the lifting or easing of the blockade or the economic restrictions only to defy such agreement at the next available opportunity. The Secretary General, in his report of 10 September 1964, puts the point succinctly in the following words :

«My special representative protested to the Government about the obstructions still made by its officials in violation of

the understanding reached. The Government expressed its regret. But on 3 September a supply of fresh meat and cheese in authorized quantities was prevented by Greek Cypriots from entering the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia, in violation of the understanding. UNFICYP took this matter up urgently with the Government authorities in Nicosia. But far from easing the prevailing situation, the Government decided on 5 September to add the Turkish Cypriot sectors of Famagusta and Larnaca to the restricted areas.

.....This hardening of position was reflected on the local level at check-points where obstructions, harassments and actual confiscations of foodstuffs took place after 2 September».

UNFICYP's efforts to abolish altogether or reduce the number of articles prohibited to be sold to the Turks as «strategic materials» had no effect on the Greek administration. These articles which were 25 in number when the Secretary-General wrote his report in September 1964 had been increased to 30 and a complete ban was enforced on the movement of all persons into and out of the Turkish sector of Nicosia. In his report 12 December 1964 the Secretary-General reported as follows :

«The Government has maintained road-blocks and check-points on all main roads.... Turkish Cypriots have claimed, not without basis, that they have been subjected to harassment, delays, humiliation, excessive searches and arbitrary arrest by Government personnel manning such posts.

The restrictions were most keenly felt in Nicosia. During September, the Government authorities enforced a complete ban on the movement of all persons into and out of the city.

.....The frequency of the searches and the fear of arrest discouraged many Turkish Cypriots from moving through Greek Cypriot areas and caused them to appeal to UNFICYP for escorts of commercial supplies, especially in Nicosia and Paphos districts.

The restriction on the supply of petrol to Turkish Cypriot areas are, on the other hand, still in force. No progress has been made on the de-restriction of building materials. At present the list of prohibited materials contains some thirty items, some of which have a direct military application while others - mainly fuel, spare part, tyres, batteries and building materials - although having some strategic significance, affect primarily the return to economic normality».

Even this strong censure had no influence on the Greek administrators. The number of «strategic articles» has since been increased to 47. The full list is as follows :

«Accumulators	Studs for boots
Ammonium Nitrate	Sulphur
Angle iron	Telephones
Automobile spare parts	Tents and tent material
Bags	Timber
Cables	Tyres
Camouflage netting	Wire including barbed wire
Cartridges, shotgun	Wire-cutters
Cement	Woolen clothing (if capable of military use)
Circuit testers (galvanometers)	
Crushed metal	Motorboat
Crushed stone	Land rower
Detonators, electrical	Truck
Exploders	Tractor
Explosives	Excavator
Fuel in large quantities	Rubber boots
Iron pickets	Leather jackets
Iron poles and rods	Thermos
Khaki cloth	Glove
Mine detectors	Raincoat
Radio sets	Leather shoe-laces
Safety fuses	Plastic and coal water pipes, imported
Sand	Socks for men
Steel plate, thick	Fire extinguishers».

But the worst was yet to come and it did on 15 April 1965. One can do no better than quote the impartial words of the Secretary-General on the full blockade which was imposed on 56,000 people for 18 days. A blockade which shattered the conscience of all the civilized world and brought forth unreserved condemnation from church authorities the world over :

«Para. 60. During the morning of 15 April, 1965 a Greek Cypriot visited his long closed shop, situated on the north side of Paphos street, across from the new District Labour Office. He had vacated the shop eight months previously, but made periodic visits to ensure that the premises remained in good order. On this occasion, the Turkish Cypriots had not received prior notice of his visit, and, on entering his premises, the owner was confronted by a Turkish Cypriot fighter who had gained entrance through a hole in the wall at the rear of the shop. The fighter fired two shots, which fortunately missed.

61. Within less than one-half hour, the Cyprus authorities ordered that all Turkish Cypriot movement into and out of Nicosia city should cease forthwith. All Turkish Cypriots attempting to enter or leave the town were turned back by the Cyprus Police at the checkpoints. This ban on the movement of Turkish Cypriot civilians was put into operation very quickly, without prior warning; some 900 Turkish Cypriots were stranded in Nicosia, unable to return to their villages; visitors outside Nicosia found themselves in a similar predicament.

62. In the Political Liaison Committee meeting held on the same morning, the UNFICYP representative deplored the broad retaliatory measures by the Government which were causing hardship to innocent civilians».

## OBSTRUCTIONS TO THE U. N. PEACE FORCE

29 — The report the Secretary General submitted to the Council had revealed the many obstructions to which the Greek Cypriots resorted in order to prevent the U. N. Peace Force from carrying out its mission effectively. The Secretary General was therefore requesting an increased authority for the U. N. Peace Force and he asked consequently the council to approve the following three main assumptions :

a. That in establishing the force and defining its important function, the Security Council realized that the force could not discharge that function unless it had complete freedom of movement in Cyprus which would only mean such unrestricted freedom of movement as may be considered essential by the force commander to the implementation of the mandate of the force.

b. That the force, in carrying out its mandate to prevent the recurrence of fighting is reasonably entitled to remove positions and fortified installations where these endanger the peace, and to take all necessary measures in self-defence if attacked in the performance of their duty.

c. That in seeking to prevent a recurrence of fighting, it may be demanded by the commander that the opposing armed forces be separated to reasonable distances in order to create buffer zones in which armed forces would be prohibited.

The Greek Cypriots immediately opposed the adoption of these proposals realizing that these would hamper their freedom of action in their drive to oppress the Turkish Community. They had the audacity to suggest that the resolution of the Security Council refer only to the message of Archbishop Makarios omitting completely the report of the Secretary General. This suggestion could not of course be taken seriously by the majority of the members of the council and ultimately the resolution which extended the mandate of the U. N. Peace Force referred explicitly to the report by the Secretary General and no reference whatsoever was made to the much publicized message of Makarios.

In order to ease world-public opinion the Greek authorities issued false news to the press and the radio to the effect that 30 tons of flour had been allowed to go into the Turkish sector on 17 April. In his letter of 20th April, Dr. Küçük, the Vice-President, informed Senhor C. A. Bernardes, the Special Representative of U. N. Secretary-General in Cyprus, as follows :

«You are aware that the inhuman blockade imposed on the Turkish Community in the Nicosia area has been continuing in all its severity for the last five days. During this period not an ounce of grain or any other foodstuffs has been allowed to enter the Turkish sector of Nicosia by armed Greeks. ....Despite this, the Greek leadership, through their radio and the press, and it appears also that in their communications to the Greek Government in Athens and to diplomatic representatives in Nicosia, have been giving and disseminating false information deliberately to the effect that 30 tons of grain was allowed through for the Turks on Saturday last. In addition to this they have been trying to give an appearance of truth to their lies by claiming that the U. N. authorities could testify for the delivery of food supplies to the Turks».

The U. N. confirmed that no wheat had been delivered as announced by the Greek authorities.

The villagers who had come to Nicosia on a day's visit were stranded in Nicosia for 18 days as indicated in the Secretary-General's report. Weaning babies had been separated from their mothers and as a result one baby died of malnutrition. Even the sick people in urgent need of medical care were not allowed to enter the Turkish sector of Nicosia. The UNFICYP exerted all its influence and it was only, after days of waiting in agony and pain, that «a number of sick people from the outlying villages were admitted to the Turkish Cypriot hospital in Nicosia after clearance by the Cyprus police». It was not till after 3 May 1965 that the ban was lifted and the stranded villagers allowed to go to their villages while prohibition of the sale of so-called «strategic materials» to the Turkish Community and road checks and searches by mobile Greek patrols or at surprise check points continue to this day with the result that no proper houses can be built for 25,000 refugees, who are not allowed to have winter clothing or boots and shoes owing to these restrictions.



The following excerpts from the Secretary General's report dated 10 September 1964 will be sufficient to show the spirit in which the Greek-Cypriot authorities saw the UNFICYP in Cyprus. They were prepared to use the Force as an auxiliary to their nefarious plans against the Turkish Community but did their utmost to stall the force from functioning as a Peace Force proper, helping to maintain Law and order and preventing a recurrence of fighting as its mandate demanded:

«On 6th August 1964 Archbishop Makarios assured me that the United Nations Force in Cyprus would enjoy full freedom of movement throughout the territory of the Republic ....However, during the discussions on 5 and 7 September the President handed the force commander a map of the island which showed 16 areas which may not be visited by anyone in UNFICYP; 15 areas which may be visited only by the force commander having given due notice to the military authorities; and 57 areas which may be visited only by senior UNFICYP officers after due notice. This was contrary to the assurances given to me by the President. «It should also be mentioned (as an example of the deterioration which is taking place in the relationship between UNFICYP and the Cyprus authorities) that the Swedish contingent in the Paphos zone has been prevented from occupying an empty hotel in which they had intended to establish their headquarters».

Further down in the same report the Secretary General gives full particulars of the arms build up by the Greeks and concentration of troops from Greece and states: «The question as regards Cyprus is whether at the present time and in the present circumstances the importation and manufacture of arms by the Government of Cyprus is consistent with the letter and spirit of the Security Council resolution of 4 March».

Needless to say, in spite of this hint and the warning issued by the Security Council anew Archbishop Makarios continued with his arms build up and in his defiance of the UNFICYP.

Again, in the same report the Secretary-General draws attention to the efforts exerted by the UNFICYP to alleviate the difficulties of the Turkish Community in compliance with the mandate given to it to help to reduce tension and bring the

island back to normality and outlines the steps taken by the Greek-Cypriot administration in order to frustrate the implementation of this policy in the following words:

«The freedom of movement of Turkish Cypriots in the areas under control of the Government, has in practice been restricted by reason of excessive checks and searches and of many unnecessary obstructions put in their way by the Government police at check points, as well as by the feeling of insecurity and the fear of arrest or abduction. ....In exceptional cases, generally for humanitarian reasons, UNFICYP has also organized escorts and provided transport facilities for the movement of food, essential merchandise and individuals. As indicated later in the report, UNFICYP has escorted Turkish Cypriot judges to courthouses located in Greek Cypriot areas. It has also ensured the protection of harvesters when they have had to work in the fields near or outside the boundary of their community. It has become a common practice for Turkish Cypriots who are compelled to travel outside their areas to call first the UNFICYP Civilian police before setting out on their journey. On receiving such calls the UNFICYP civilian police have always endeavoured to keep a careful watch on the road to be taken by the traveller in order to ensure his safe passage».

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UNFICYP authorities from the beginning of the mandate in Cyprus gave serious consideration to the question of the re-employment of Turkish civil servants and on several occasions they raised it with the Cyprus Government. «All negotiations on the possible re-employment of the Turkish Cypriot Government civil servants in Nicosia and their financial compensation from January 1964 have ended in a deadlock up to now, as it is considered by the Government to be a highly political matter linked closely with the final settlement of the Cyprus question. It is clear that a major step towards normal conditions could be made only when the position of Turkish civil servants and the matter of their salaries since December have been clarified.... The Turkish civil servants felt that due to the prevailing conditions since December 1963 they were unable for physical and security reasons to attend their offices on the Greek Cypriot side of Nicosia.

As one step towards preparing for a return to normality, UNFICYP urged strongly that efforts be made to square accounts up to the end of 1963 and with this end in view made many approaches to Government officials and to senior Turkish Cypriot civil servants but, except for the provision of some information, the Government was unable to offer any cooperation.

Many Turkish Cypriots were not receiving old-age pensions, widows pensions and other benefits to which they were entitled under the Social Insurance Law of 1956. There has been no basic improvement in this field since my report of 15 June, 1954, UNFICYP repeatedly urged the Government to discuss this matter with it and make practical arrangements together. However the Government has not responded so far».

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«The Government has, since 25 April 1964, sent no international or domestic correspondence or parcels, except one category, across to the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia».

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«As a consequence of the events of December 1963, the electricity and water supplies and the telephone service in the Turkish sector of Ktima were interrupted in 1964. An agreement concluded between the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot leaders early in March... provided for the restoration of these facilities, but it had not been implemented. The Turkish Cypriot sector was therefore deprived of electricity and telephone service and the water supply, while not completely stopped, was frequently interrupted».

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«390 tons out of a cargo of 900 tons could be unloaded as the government demanded duty on this relief supply. «The Government also insisted on control over the distribution of the relief supplies. Persistent representations made to the Government by UNFICYP and the International Committee of the Red Cross were unsuccessful. In spite of UNFICYP's effort to

escort Red Crescent convoys carrying relief supplies throughout the country, obstructions were frequently placed on the movement of those convoys».

And in his report of 11 March, 1965 the Secretary-General reported :

«On five occasions UNFICYP vehicles were prevented from entering areas alleged by the Cyprus police or the National Guard to be restricted. On six other occasions, UNFICYP vehicles travelling on public roads used by National Guard convoys, or passing through restricted areas, were stopped, threatened, forced off the road by National Guard vehicles, deliberately pushed or forced into collisions, or prevented from overtaking National Guard convoys.

It had been observed on a number of occasions that machine guns were apparently being trained on UNFICYP aircraft, and on 9 February General Grivas warned that he had given orders to the National Guard to fire at United Nations planes flying over restricted areas. On 16 February, an UNFICYP light aircraft in reconnaissance duty over such an area was actually fired at from the ground.

There have been five incidents in which UNFICYP personnel have been detained and searched by the Cyprus Police and National Guard, sometimes at gun point.

On sixteen occasions it was necessary to protest to the Government about obstructions on UNFICYP freedom of movement.

There has been an increased influx of various types of light and heavy military equipment (by the Government). This activity has enhanced the Government's ability to meet a threat of foreign invasion; at the same time, it has tended to increase tension. Much of the material has been introduced through the ports of Famagusta and Limassol... A great deal of additional material, however, much of it of strategic importance, has been introduced through the new port of Boghaz, some sixteen miles north of Famagusta. Unloading here and inland transport has taken place without informing UNFICYP as required by the 10 September 1964 agreement.

On 13 January 1965 and again on 5 February, the Force Commander sent written inquiries to the Minister of Interior about the reports of large-scale importing of arms. General Thimayya drew Government's attention to the relevant portions of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 and to the Secretary General's views on this subject».

**WORLD PUBLIC OPINION**  
**CONDEMNATION OF MAKARIOS' CRIMES**  
**BY THE CIVILIZED WORLD**

30 — The crimes committed by Archbishop Makarios and the Greek Cypriots who supported his policies have shocked the civilized world, which was unanimous in condemning the massacres in Cyprus. The press, the radio and the television reported in detail in all countries the atrocities witnessed in Cyprus by more than 150 correspondents. Editorial comments severely criticized and indicted the policies of the Greek Cypriot leader. Many religious leaders also were stunned by the crimes perpetrated and condoned by Archbishop Makarios, head of the Cyprus Orthodox Church, and found his behaviour incompatible with his religious personality. Some editorial comments and some statements by religious leaders are annexed.

**RE-SETTLEMENT OF TURKISH REFUGEES**

31 — Time and again the, inhuman and miserable conditions under which the unfortunate Turkish refugees, «victims of limitless ambitions of the Greeks» are living, were brought to the attention of the so-called Cypriot Government and of the world public opinion.

The Secretary-General gave a lucid account of the misery, want and dire need for relief of the Turkish community and the difficulties created by the Greek-Cypriot authorities in the way of UNFICYP, in all his reports. The following excerpts from his report dated 10 September 1964 are very instructive :

«Ever since the outbreak of violence on 21 December 1964 a variety of restrictions have been imposed upon the Turkish

Cypriots. The isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community, due to the restrictions placed on their movement on the roads, brought hardship on the members of the community as well as serious disruptions of their economic activities. In addition to losses incurred in agriculture and in industry during the first part of the year, the Turkish community had lost other sources of its income including the salaries of over 4,000 persons who were employed by the Cyprus Government and by public and private concerns located in the Greek Cypriot zones. The trade of the Turkish community had considerably declined during the period, due to the existing situation, and unemployment reached a very high level as approximately 25,000 Turkish Cypriots had become refugees. ....a yearly subsidy formerly received by the Turkish Communal Chamber from the Government had ceased to be granted in 1964.... Approximately half of the Turkish population came to be on relief. The number of persons receiving some kind of assistance from the Red Crescent relief amounted to about 56,000, including 25,000 displaced persons, 23,500 unemployed and 7,500 dependents of missing persons, disabled and others».

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«In refugee camps near Nicosia, many hundreds of children living in crowded temporary quarters and exposed during the great heat of the summer months to the risk of de-hydration survived without serious illness partly because an UNFICYP architect and military engineers planned and, with local help, built provisional matting roofs to give shelter from the sun as well as open air showers.

UNFICYP carried out a detailed survey of all damage to properties throughout the island during the disturbances, including the Tylliria fighting. It shows that 109 villages, most of them Turkish Cypriot or mixed villages, 527 houses have been destroyed while 2,000 others have suffered damage from looting. In Ktima 38 houses and shops have been destroyed totally and 122 partially. In the Omorphita suburb of Nicosia 50 houses have been totally destroyed while a further 240 have been partially destroyed there and in adjacent suburbs.

In many Turkish villages, crowded by the arrival of displaced persons, there is an acute shortage of medical facilities».

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«The Turkish Cypriots claimed that they were being starved and the Greek Cypriots contended that the Turkish Cypriots had enough food in store for many months to come. UNFICYP carried out on 16 August, a preliminary survey of the situation concerning food and other essential supplies, covering 142 villages and five cities of the Turkish Cypriot population. The survey showed that more than 40 percent of the villages had no flour, that some had bread for only a few days, that about 25 percent of the villages had flour for only one or two weeks, and that in any event the flour would only last up to a month in the best of circumstances. The need for milk and dairy products, rice and salt, was acute, while kerosene was in extremely limited supply. Medical attention in villages was notably low. In the cities although the situation was better than in the villages, it was deteriorating rapidly. The restrictions (imposed by the Greek authorities) had brought about a shortage of currency and that this was causing unemployment and other hardships. The stock of relief supplies on hand was extremely limited.

After strong representations by UNFICYP Greek Cypriot authorities agreed to ease the restrictions. But in spite of this agreement Cypriot military authorities held up, on 27 August 1964 a Red Crescent convoy carrying thirty-nine tons of assorted food-stuffs from Famagusta to the non-restricted area of Ktima. Also a much needed car load of Red Crescent supplies was kept from moving into Lefka on the same day. «My special representative protested to the Government about the obstructions still made by its officials in violation of the understanding reached. The Government expressed its regret. But on 3 September a supply of fresh meat and cheese in authorized quantities was prevented by Cypriot forces from entering the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia, in violation of the understanding. UNFICYP took this matter up urgently with the Government authorities in Nicosia. But far from easing the prevailing situation, the Government decided on 5 September, to add the Turkish Cypriot sectors of Famagusta and Larnaca to the list of restricted areas. The Government further informed the UNFICYP

that it reserved the right to impose economic restrictions in other areas if circumstances made it necessary to do so. This hardening of position was reflected on the local level at check-points where obstructions, harassments and actual confiscations of foodstuffs took place after 2 September».

Dr. Küçük, the Vice-President called upon the President of the Republic and the Greek leadership to stop violating the Constitution and resume work with the Turks within the framework of the Constitution pending the finding of a solution agreeable to all parties to this dispute. Furthermore, he added that all his appeals in this respect had fallen unfortunately on deaf ears.

He expressed his firm conviction that for the success of any measure for returning to normality and for the establishment of law and order, it was essential to secure the assistance and the aid of the United Nations and particularly in a matter affecting the Turkish Community, like that of the rehabilitation of Turkish refugees, the participation of the competent authorities and representatives of both communities for discussions under the protection and auspices of UNFICYP should be ensured. He said that if the president was really sincere in his offer of assistance to displaced Turks, and if he was indeed contemplating to abandon his anti-Turkish policy, it was up to him to prepare the ground so that a comprehensive plan could be carefully studied and considered at a meeting of the Council of Ministers. Dr. Küçük pointed out that the plan which Archbishop Makarios advertised in order to ease world public conscience was a peacemeal and regional one put forward as an eye-wash. It was no use to ask a handful of Turks to go and settle in their destroyed properties amongst tens of thousands of armed Greeks while the bulk of the Turkish refugees were denied access to their destroyed houses in and around Nicosia area specially in Omorphita. The Vice-President said that he thought the only way which would give confidence to the members of the Turkish Community concerning the measures taken for the resettlement and rehabilitation of the Turkish refugees was to take this matter up at Government level with the participation of the Turks and that if this were done a firm and lasting feeling of security would be installed in the Turkish Community. But Archbishop Makarios turned down this request as «unacceptable».

The question of rehabilitating the Turkish refugees is as acute as ever. The Turkish Cypriot offer to study this problem at Government level still stands, but the Greek authorities are reluctant to agree to discuss this question as a constitutional Government. They choose to dictate to the Turkish refugees their own terms for accepting these people back to their homes and properties. One of these terms is that these Turks should forego their constitutional rights, denounce their leaders and accept full Greek domination.

### SIXTH MUSLIM CONFERENCE

32 — The Sixth Muslim Conference met at Mogadishu on 27 December, 1964 and lasted for a week. The question of Cyprus formed an important part of the conference. The Cyprus question was introduced by a personal representative of Dr. Fazıl Küçük, the Vice-President of Cyprus.

Delegates from various nations spoke and condemned the Greek atrocities against the Turks in Cyprus and they urged all nations to help to stop the bloodshed and suffering caused by Greek-Cypriots.

The Conference adopted a resolution on 2 January, 1964 calling upon the Greek Cypriot authorities to respect the Constitution of Cyprus and «strongly urging and supporting the establishment of a federation in view of the continued violent Greek policy of union of Cyprus with Greece».

The aforesaid resolution in full is as follows :

«The Sixth World Muslim Conference,

Noting that in Cyprus two separate and distinct communities (Turkish and Greek) live with completely different religious, ethnic, cultural and linguistic backgrounds, traditions and aspirations,

Noting that the island of Cyprus is only forty miles away from Turkey's southern shores and occupies a commanding strategic position, controlling the navigation between the Turkish ports in the south,

Noting that after prolonged negotiations five Treaties and/or Documents were signed in Nicosia on August 16th, 1960, when Cyprus was proclaimed an independent Republic,

Affirming that the Constitution of Cyprus and the Treaties connected therewith could have formed the basis of lasting peace and harmony in the Island, had the Greeks shown understanding and good faith,

Recording that Makarios has constantly refused to implement the fundamental provisions of the Constitution, repeatedly expressed the desire of uniting Cyprus with Greece and launched a campaign of intimidation and terror against the Turkish Community, which this conference strongly condemns, and;

Demands that the Constitution as a whole be respected both in letter and in spirit and in view of the continued violent policy of union with Greece (ENOSIS), this conference.

Strongly urges and supports the establishment of a federation, whereby two autonomous States (one Greek-Cypriot and the other Turkish-Cypriot) will be created, each having its own geographical limits and jurisdiction and enjoying equal status in the federal authority.

This Conference appeals to all Muslim States to support the rights of the Cyprus Turkish-Moslems by all means within their power».

### GENERAL ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

The question of Cyprus came before the General Islamic Conference held at the Muslim World League Headquarters in Mecca Mukarrama from 17 April 1965 to 24 April 1965.

All members condemned the attempt by the Greek Cypriots to rob the Turkish-Cypriots of their constitutional rights through terror and violence and adopted unanimously the following resolution :

«The independence of the island was the aim of all the religious groups of the island for which they sacrificed and tried very hard to achieve. As a result of this, five agreements were concluded on 16th. August 1960, the day of declaration of the independence of Cyprus. During the independence time it was clear that president Makarios was ruling with the spirit of religious and sectarian prejudices against the Muslims and was trying his best to assimilate Cyprus with Greece despite the protest of the Muslims.

Thus the Muslims became under suppression and killing despite the knowledge of the United Nations and the allies of Turkey. Therefore the Muslim World Conference deplores the ill-treatment of the Muslims in Cyprus and maintains that the Greek Cypriots have not adhered to the fundamental statements of the constitution and have declared, many times, their wishes to join Greece (ENOSIS Project) as it is clear from the subversive and frightening actions towards the Turkish Muslim group. These actions are very strongly condemned by the conference.

Because of the continuation of the hostile ENOSIS Project Policy, the conference strongly supports the necessity of the establishment of two internally independent states the Turkish Cypriot state and Greek Cypriot state, each one having known geographical boundaries and special internal laws joined on the basis of equality in a central federal union.

The Conference also requests all the Muslim countries to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and to work for the prevention of the acts of aggression committed by the Greek community in Cyprus by every possible means».

### EXCLUSION OF TURKISH CYPRIOT STUDENTS FROM CYPRUS

33 — The UNFICYP has made public in the last week of June 1965 that the Greeks will not allow Turkish Cypriot students over the age of fifteen, male or female, to return to Cyprus from abroad where they have been studying, under the threat that any student who does so will be arrested and detained.

This arbitrary restriction imposed on those citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, who are of Turkish origin, by the present Greek Cypriot usurpers of administration is not only in direct contravention of article 14 of the Constitution of Cyprus which stipulates that «no citizen shall be banished or excluded from the Republic under any circumstances», but it also disregards article 13 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which sets forth that «Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country».

The conscience of the civilized world will not fail to condemn this inhuman Greek Cypriot mentality which seeks to deny the most elementary human need of uniting children with their families.

Originally, the Greek Cypriot administration had forbidden the return to the island of all Turkish Cypriot students over fifteen years of age irrespective of their sex and the country in which they were pursuing their studies. Thanks to UNFICYP intervention and other factors, part of this illegal restriction has now been lifted in respect of female students and of those travelling from countries other than Turkey. Nevertheless, this relative relaxation of an illegal measure cannot give the remainder any validity. The Greek Cypriot administration cannot relieve itself of responsibility by taking one step backward when it had earlier taken two steps into the realm of illegality. The Turkish Community feel justified to expect that UNFICYP will not refrain from exerting its full authority for the annulment of this inhuman and illegal banishment of Turkish Cypriot students from their homeland.

### DEFIANCE OF THE U. N. PEACE FORCE SIEGE OF AMBELIKOU FORTIFICATIONS AT FAMAGUSTA

34 — The Greek Cypriot authorities have repeatedly defied the U. N. authorities in Cyprus and the 4th March Resolution and they have attempted to improve their military and political position at the expense of the Turkish community.

The Saint Hilarion attack, Kokkina onslaught are but two of these aggressions.

On 12 March 1965 the Greek armed personnel encircled the Turkish village of Ambelikou in defiance of the U. N. authorities in Cyprus, thereby rendering it impossible for the Turkish inhabitants to carry on with their normal work of grazing their flocks and attending to their fields and gardens. On 14 March 1965 the Greeks launched an attack on the village and transgressed at the same time on the Lefke area, squeezing the encirclement of Turks further. As a result hundreds of Turks working at Mavrovouni mines were prevented from going to work. Sheepfolds belonging to Turks were cut off from the village, preventing shepherds from feeding their animals. On 15 March 1965, heavy guns were placed around the village and the Greeks dug themselves in. On the same day Lefka came under Greek attack and the Greeks dug themselves in around Lefka as well.

All attempts by the U. N. authorities to effect a Greek withdrawal proved to be futile. Thus, while the Security Council was in session, the Greek authorities proved once again that they would not desist from their attempts to defy the Council's Resolution and to improve their military positions at the expense of the Turks.

35 — Famagusta was the only city which had been spared attack by the Greeks since the outbreak of the crisis. On May 11, 1964 however, three Greek army officers and a Greek Cypriot police officer entered the Turkish sector of the town ignoring the 'halt' sign and killed a Turkish woman whereupon the Turkish guards opened fire on them and killed two Greek army officers and the Greek Cypriot police officer. In reprisal, the Greek authorities abducted 32 Turks indiscriminately from their place of work or from the roads and 'executed' them in cold blood. Tension mounted. The United Nations authorities in Cyprus intervened and an agreement was reached aimed at reducing tension.

On February 3, 1965 the Greeks defied this agreement and occupied the Poor House and the Polish Barracks as well as some of the buildings around the Turkish sector of the city in

such a way as to endanger or threaten the security of the Turkish inhabitants. Tension rose again and all attempts by the U. N. authorities to reach a compromise were turned down by the Greeks. The Turks insisted on the application of May 15 agreement but the Greeks refused to do so. They also refused the mediation efforts of General Thimayya who suggested the employment of policemen instead of army personnel in the place unjustly occupied. Thus in defiance of the May 15 agreement and the force commander of the U. N. troops in the island the Greeks advanced their military positions further to the disadvantage of the Turks. The only reason which forestalled Turks from action in order to protect their rights was the fear that they would thus be defying the 4 March resolution of the Security Council and the hope that the Security Council would tackle the matter in a just and fair way. To this day the Greeks continue to enjoy the fruits of their illegal gains.

#### RED CRESCENT RELIEF

36 — The aim of the violence directed against the Turkish Community was two-fold: (1) to subdue the community through terror and bloodshed and (2) to destroy its economic and social potential which had been steadily increasing during the days of independence. With this aim in view, properties and homes in Turkish villages which had been abandoned by the Turks for reasons of security were methodically destroyed. The merchandise imported by Turkish merchants were detained at the ports or their transfer to the Turkish parts of Cyprus was prevented by brute force.

A survey of the damage done to Turkish property was carried out by Red Cross and U. N. experts. This showed that in 109 villages 527 houses belonging to the Turks were completely destroyed, while 2000 were partially destroyed and looted.

25,000 refugees were rendered workless and penniless while 56,000 Turks were prevented by brute force from earning their livelihood. But for the Turkish Red Crescent help and assistance half of the Turkish population would have starved to death.

Through the auspices of UNFICYP and Red Crescent organization, Red Crescent dispatched to the Island, tents, blankets, flour, rice, beans, sugar, olive oil, olives, tea, soap and other basic items on 14 occasions from 23rd December 1963 to 15th December 1964, at a cost of 1,8 million dollars.

Although the need of the refugees for improvised houses was great, the Cyprus Greek authorities refused to allow such articles as cement, iron in bulk, wire netting, iron rods, and all building materials from reaching the Turks on the ground that these were «strategic items» with the result that thousands of children, women and the aged have been forced to live under torn and dilapidated tents, in caves and public places for two cold winters and scorching summers.

Although half of the Turkish population has been without any means of livelihood since December 1963, the Greek administration has not desisted from creating difficulties each time Red Crescent aid arrived in Cyprus. Shoes sent to the bare-footed refugees have been confiscated by Greek authorities. Some of the supplies which were allowed to enter the Island were destroyed at the so-called check-points by the Greek-Cypriot police; different kinds of foodstuffs were mixed together purposely, bags torn open and their contents poured over the pavements; textiles sent for the needy were either confiscated or destroyed.

Nevertheless, thanks to the help and assistance of the UNFICYP and world reaction to economic blockades of the innocent as a means for securing political ends 56.000 Turks have been saved from complete starvation.

#### VIEWS OF SOME U. N. MEMBERS

37 — Some member states of the United Nations had the opportunity to express their views on the Greek-Cypriot allegation that the agreements which had brought about the Republic of Cyprus were invalid and of no effect. The considered opinion of these states can be summarized as follows:

a) international agreements and the constitution of Cyprus are valid until changed by agreement between the interested parties,

b) peaceful negotiations are recommended between the parties concerned for an agreed solution to the Cyprus problem and the attempt to settle the question by «fait accompli» is condemned as contrary to the 4th March resolution of the Security Council,

c) the existence of the separate Turkish community in Cyprus is recognized and its rights must be secured and guaranteed.

Some of these views are set out below:

#### Norway

«As we see it, there is no merit in the Council discussing whether these treaties and the Constitution that was adopted were good or bad. It is the view of my Government that it is not for the Security Council to pronounce upon the Constitution of a member State, nor to pass judgement on a set of treaties which were negotiated as an integral part of the whole process of granting independence to that State.

We do not see any conflict between the membership of Cyprus in the United Nations and the Charter of the United Nations on the one hand, and the Constitution of Cyprus and the treaties on the other hand.

May I be permitted to recall that this issue was not raised when Cyprus was admitted as a member State. Revision and amendments of the Constitution and the treaties are matters for decisions by the people of Cyprus and the parties to the treaties».

Security Council  
February 1964



### Ivory Coast

«We are forced to recognize that we have no power to interpret or abrogate international treaties.

Nevertheless, and especially in the present case, we have the obligation to recommend to the States and parties to adopt these clauses to the new conditions through revision and negotiation, and also the obligation to give them our assistance».

Security Council  
February 1964

### Morocco

«We feel that if the Turkish Cypriots seem to hold desperately to the agreements of Zurich and London, it might be because in these texts they see the only guarantees on which they can count in order to ensure that their rights will be respected as a contracting party».

Security Council  
February 1964

### France

«Whatever one may think of the provisions therein and however one may interpret these provisions, it is not for the Security Council to give an interpretation of them, nor to modify its contents, as this can result only from negotiation among the parties».

Security Council  
February 1964

### United Kingdom

«This Council has its responsibility for preserving international peace, but that must be exercised in a manner consistent with the treaties upon which the independence of Cyprus and the Constitutional rights of the communities depend».

Security Council  
February 1964

### United States

«I think we all know the Treaty of Guarantee forms an integral part of the organic arrangements that created the Republic of Cyprus. In fact, it is a so-called basic article of the Constitution of Cyprus.

That Treaty assures the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic, as well as respect for its Constitution. It assigns to the Guarantor Powers certain responsibilities regarding the maintenance of the Constitution and of the Treaty itself, including the carefully negotiated balance and protection of the two Cypriot communities. It was signed after literally years of soul-searching negotiation and approved by all of the parties. **This Treaty or any international treaty cannot be abrogated, cannot be nullified, cannot be modified either in fact or in effect by the Security Council of the United Nations.** The Treaty can be abrogated or altered only by agreement of all of the signatories themselves or in accordance with its terms».

Security Council  
February 1964

### American - Turkish Joint Communiqué

Prime Minister İnönü of Turkey and President Johnson have discussed all aspects of the problem of Cyprus. Both leaders welcomed the opportunity presented by the Prime Minister's visit at the President's invitation for a full exchange of views.

**The discussion, proceeding from the present binding effect of existing treaties, covered ways in which present difficulties might be adjusted by negotiation and agreement. The urgent necessity for such agreement upon lasting solutions was underlined.**

The Prime Minister and the President also considered ways in which their countries could strengthen the efforts of the United Nations with respect to the safety and security of the communities on Cyprus.

The cordial and candid conversations of the two leaders strengthened the broad understanding already existing between Turkey and the United States.

The President and the Prime Minister expressed their conviction that their peoples are devoted to common democratic principles, to individual freedom, to human dignity and to peace in justice.

Washington, June 1964

### Turkish - British Joint Communiqué

The Prime Ministers of Turkey and Great Britain have taken the opportunity of Monsieur Inonu's visit to London as the guest of Her Majesty's Government to have a full and frank exchange of views on the question of Cyprus. **Basing themselves on the continuing validity of the existing Treaties and the Constitution**, and having regard to the responsibilities of the two Governments under the Treaty of Guarantee, the two Prime Ministers agreed on the urgent necessity for the attainment of a lasting solution to the problems of Cyprus. They discussed ways in which the present difficulties might be resolved by negotiation and agreement.

The two Prime Ministers also considered ways of strengthening the efforts of the United Nations to provide for the safety and security of the communities in Cyprus and for the maintenance of law and order in accordance with the Constitution. The two Prime Ministers are convinced that their exchanges have served to strengthen the broad understanding already existing between Turkey and the United Kingdom.

London, 29 June 1964

### Turco - Soviet Joint Communiqué

«The Turkish side, furnished the Soviet Government with comprehensive information on Turkish Government's attitude on the Cyprus issue. The two parties expressed their support for a peaceful solution, which will enable the peaceful coexistence of the two national communities, on the basis of recognition of the existence of two national communities on the Island, adherence to the legal rights of two national communities and to the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.»

Moscow, November 1964

### Statement of the Foreign Minister of the USSR

«The people of Cyprus will be able to choose independently and sovereignly any form of the organisation of their State including a federal form which would make it possible to take into account the specific position of the national communities — the Greek and the Turkish — within the bounds of a single, sovereign and united Cypriot State and would be in line with their interest».

Moscow, January 1965

### Yugoslavia

«Dans ses prises de positions jusqu'ici, la Yougoslavie a tenu compte des intérêts de tous les groupes ethniques de l'île. Ce n'est que de cette manière qu'il faut interpréter l'expression «AS A WHOLE» qui figure dans le communiqué Yougoslavie - Grèce».

February 1965

### Tunisia

#### Communiqué Conjoint Turco - Tunisien

En ce qui concerne Chypre, le Président de la République et le Président du Conseil turc ont exprimé leur profonde préoccupation concernant la pression à laquelle est soumise la Communauté turque de l'île. Le Président de la République tunisienne a déploré la continuation du conflit de Chypre et la récente détérioration de la situation dans l'île.

Les deux gouvernements ont exprimé leur inquiétude au sujet des sérieuses répercussions du problème chypriote sur le maintien de la paix dans cette région de la méditerranée. Ils estiment que la communauté chypriote turque a le droit à l'abri de toute pression, et dans le respect de ses droits légaux et au même titre que la communauté chypriote grecque à des conditions de vie normale qui doivent lui être pleinement assurées. Ils considèrent que les parties intéressées doivent s'abstenir de tout acte susceptible d'accroître la tension dans l'île. Ils expri-

ment leur espoir de voir cette question trouver rapidement une solution juste et équitable par la voie de négociations entre les parties directement intéressées, notamment entre la Turquie et la Grèce.

Ils sont convaincus qu'un tel règlement ne manquera pas de consolider la paix et la stabilité de cette zone et permettra aux deux communautés de coexister dans la concorde et la sécurité, de réaliser leur bien-être et leur progrès dans une atmosphère de confiance retrouvée et d'assurer, enfin, le rétablissement des relations amicales entre la Turquie et la Grèce.

Ankara, Mars 30, 1965

### United Kingdom

«It further noted that this law was passed by the House of Representatives in the absence of the Turkish Cypriot members. As one of the guarantor powers, the British Government considered this action to be in breach of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, particularly article 62 and article 78 (2). But in taking this action my Government had in mind a further and major consideration. It emphasised its particular regret that the Cyprus Government should have taken this action in view of operative paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Security Council resolution of 4 March, 1964, calling on member states to refrain from any action likely to worsen the situation in Cyprus, and calling on the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint...

...I am bound therefore to take this opportunity of restating briefly the position of my Government.

It is that the Treaty of Guarantee is part and parcel of the series of treaties upon which the independence of Cyprus depends. All of these treaties and indeed the Constitution of Cyprus itself, were freely negotiated between the parties directly concerned. I believe it to follow that changes can be brought about only through negotiations, or by any other method acceptable to the parties concerned. They can neither be abrogated unilaterally nor disposed of in any other way. Members of this Council will, I believe, recognise that there

must be respect for international treaties and that if they do become a matter of dispute, such dispute can only be settled by negotiation and by agreement.

It certainly seems desirable to my Government therefore that until the Cyprus Treaties can be altered by mutual agreement, the organs of the Cyprus Government should function constitutionally. In view of these considerations, my delegation has no choice but to maintain that the recent action of the Cyprus Government was in conflict with both the spirit and the letter of the Council's resolution of March 4 last year and in particular operative paragraphs 1 and 3 of that resolution. The Foreign Minister of Cyprus has argued that there is no tension in Cyprus. But no one who has read the Secretary General's report of 29 July can doubt that the result of the enactment of the new electoral law has been to make the situation more difficult.

I therefore urge the Cyprus Government not to take any further measures seeking to put that legislation into effect».

Security Council  
August 1965

### Joint Soviet-Turkish Communiqué

«The sides voiced the conviction that by strictly observing the United Nations charter and respecting responsibilities arising from treaties or other sources of international law, the states help to strengthen peace and develop international cooperation.....»

Both sides consider that the solution of the Cyprus problem should be based on the respect for the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus with the observance of the lawful rights of both national communities — Greek and Turkish — which ensure their peaceful life and with the recognition of the existence of two national communities in Cyprus».

Moscow, August 1965

### Mediation offer of Ghana

President Nkrumah of Ghana on January 8, 1965 suggested his personal mediation to help reach a solution which would be acceptable to the parties concerned in the conflict.

This good-intentioned and benevolent proposal made by a prominent leader of modern Africa, was at once accepted by the Turkish Government which from the beginning had made itself available to offers which would bring about a peaceful solution to the problem and end the human miseries resulting from it.

But Greek Cypriots rejected outright this positive attempt of mediation.

Another chance was lost and peace was once more pushed further away.

### Foreign Minister's Visit To Moscow

Upon invitation by Mr. Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Mr. Erkin payed an official visit to the Soviet Union, between 30 October - 6 November 1964.

During his visit, Mr. Erkin discussed with the Soviet leaders issues related to the current international situation and topics concerning bilateral relations of Turkey and the Soviet Union.

In the course of these talks and during the exchange of views on the current international situation it was «proved that the Republic of Turkey and the Soviet Union share the opinion that respect for the undertakings arising from treaties and other sources of international law and adherence to the fundamental human rights are essential for preserving the peace».

Furthermore, with regard to the Cyprus issue, «the two parties expressed their support for a peaceful solution, which will enable peaceful coexistence of the two national communities, on the basis of recognition of the existence of two national communities on the Island, adherence to the legal rights of the two national communities and to the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus».

The above-indicated paragraphs excerpted from the joint Turco-Soviet official communique of November 6, 1964 are, no doubt, self-explanatory. Moreover, the relevant paragraphs of this communique constitute an unequivocal endorsement by a country which is not directly concerned with the issue, of the legitimate and rightful Turkish point of view, that the international agreements effecting the status of the Republic of Cyprus must be respected; that ENOSIS which aims to obliterate the independence and territorial integrity of a United Nations member country should not be condoned; that the constitutional rights of the national communities must be upheld.

Nothing could repudiate more the Hellenic thesis that the Turkish community of the Island must be made to yield, through various means, to the Greek Cypriot rule.

### MEDIATION EFFORTS THE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE OF GREECE

38 — The resolution adopted by the Security Council on March 4, 1964 recommended that the Secretary General designate a mediator who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the interested four governments for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the U. N., having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of the international peace and security. In accordance with this resolution the Secretary General had appointed ambassador Tuomioja of Finland, as mediator. Turkey welcomed the appointment of this distinguished diplomat and expressed forthwith his willingness to help him in this difficult and demanding task. The Turkish views on a permanent solution were simple.

Turkey was asking that the commitments undertaken by all parties with the treaties be respected by all concerned and that any change in the status of the Island be agreed through negotiations. Furthermore, Turkey had no designs against the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, as its main concern was the security and well-being of the Turkish Community. But the Greek Cypriots and the Greek Government had completely opposite views. They were first of all refusing to abide by their commitments. Secondly, they made plain that their intention was not to arrive at an agreed solution of the problem but to impose a settlement by force and «fait accompli». Lastly, instead of contributing to peace on the Island and thus helping to create an atmosphere conducive to fruitful negotiations, they were constantly exacerbating the situation and relentlessly pursuing their objective to subdue the Turkish Community. For these reasons, the earnest efforts of the mediator could not be successful.

Ambassador Tuomioja died on September 9, 1964. In his place, the Secretary General appointed Mr. Galo Plaza who was his special representative in Cyprus. Turkey welcomed this appointment and expressed immediately its willingness to support him in his efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem.

Mr. Galo Plaza continued his mediation efforts and finally submitted his report to the Secretary General on 26 March 1965. His unacceptable observations, views, and suggestions are summarized below :

1 — Mr. Galo Plaza, acting as an arbiter rather than a mediator has passed judgements on the Constitution of Cyprus as well as on the international agreements :

«...At the same time, having taken it to be the clear intention of the Security Council that the «agreed settlement» of the Cyprus problem should be one agreed upon by the very parties which adhered to the Treaties of 1960, I think it logical to expect that the agreed settlement will not be one which merely restores the situation existing before 1963 and that, by agreeing to the settlement, the parties would necessarily agree also formally to abrogate or at least modify those Treaties. It

is obvious that the Cyprus problem cannot any longer be solved by trying to implement fully the Nicosia Treaties and the Constitution, governed by the Treaties... Moreover, the very act of appointing a mediator in order to help bring about «an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus» can be said to indicate the conviction of the Security Council that some new solution would have to be found in order to bring an end to the existing crisis...»

2 — The mediator, has recognized that the claim for the so-called «unfettered independence» is a camouflage for ENOSIS. Mr. Plaza says in his report :

«...The Greek Cypriots have coupled their aspiration for «unfettered independence» with the demand for the right of self-determination... that the purpose and result of the exercise of this right would be to realize the long-cherished aspiration for ENOSIS (Union with Greece)... Serious warnings have been given that an attempt to impose such a solution would be likely to precipitate not only a new outbreak of violence on Cyprus itself but also a grave deterioration in relations between Turkey on the one hand and Cyprus and Greece on the other, possibly provoking actual hostilities and in any case jeopardizing the peace of the Eastern Mediterranean region.

3 — According to Mr. Galo Plaza, minority rights should be recognized to the Turkish Community.

«...It is the Turkish Cypriot minority which will stand most in need of them (minority rights), it would be... fair to recognize that however effective the safeguards that can be devised, any Turkish Cypriot who fails to find in them a basis for reasonable confidence in the new order of things, would have the right to resettle in Turkey, and should be assisted to do so, with adequate compensation and help in starting a new life.

4 — Mr. Plaza has also suggested that a meeting or a series of meetings take place in the first instance between the representatives of the two principal parties who belong to Cyprus : «The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities...»

5 — On the future structure of the State, the mediator says,

«...Again if the purpose of a settlement of the Cyprus question is to be the preservation rather than the destruction of the State, and if it is to foster rather than to militate against the development of a peacefully united people, I cannot help wondering whether the physical division of the minority from the majority should not be considered a desperate step in the wrong direction...»

6 — On the foreign bases the views of the mediator are as follows :

«I am encouraged to believe, however, that this question could, if it were to become a vital aspect of the settlement as a whole, be constructively discussed among the parties to the Treaty of Establishment».

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This report has been subsequently refused by both the Turkish Government and Turkish Community in Cyprus. Mediator has exceeded the terms of his mandate in disregard of his terms of reference as defined by the Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964.

The part of the letter addressed to the Secretary General by the Turkish Cypriot Community and the Turkish Government is as follows :

«It has been observed that in spite of the mediator's mandate being defined in the March 4, 1964 resolution of the Security Council as promoting «an agreed «settlement», Mr. Galo Plaza, without securing the agreement of all parties to the dispute, has proceeded to express his convictions as to the substance of the problem by way of observations, views or suggestions. On several occasions in the past, the Turkish Government had made it clear to Mr. Galo Plaza that such a course would not be compatible with his mandate and had earnestly requested him to refrain from such action in order that he may fruitfully continue his mediation attempts, the pursuance of which was also desired by the Turkish Government».

## REASONS OF TURKISH REJECTION OF THE PLAZA REPORT

Mr. Galo Plaza, without securing the agreement of all parties to the dispute, has proceeded to express his convictions as to the substance of the problem by way of observations, views and suggestions. Such a course is incompatible with the mandate of the mediator.

The mediator has over-stepped his mandate, has based his report on erroneous assumptions and has acted in a manner that would lead him to forfeit the confidence of one of the parties.

Although Mr. Galo Plaza stresses that his purpose is not to suggest, to seek to impose upon the parties a course of action, he is in fact formulating a detailed scheme for the solution of the Cyprus problem which include specific suggestions for the international status of the Island, the structure of the state, the transitional stage at the end of which the Turkish Community will become a minority, losing its historical and constitutional rights. These detailed suggestions extend even to such questions as the official language of the proposed state. It is these sections of the report which go beyond the terms of reference laid down by the Security Council. He has based himself on erroneous assumptions on such questions as the existing treaties, the legal rights of the Turkish Community, the concept of the communities and the actual circumstances in Cyprus.

In view of the terms of the Security Council's resolution, the mediator's task was essentially to make possible an agreement between all the interested parties.

The mediator has come to the conclusion, after his consultations with the parties, that there were no possibilities for an agreed settlement at this stage. His next move should have been to report to the Secretary General the result of his efforts with the parties and his above-mentioned conclusion.

The Turkish Government pointed out that the inclusion of substantive suggestions in the report would be incompatible with his terms of reference and that this would politically render future efforts more difficult for a peaceful solution. In any case the mediator could not advance such suggestions before obtaining the prior agreement of all the parties.

When the Turkish Government had made known its opposition in principle to the inclusion in the report of substantive recommendations, Mr. Galo Plaza had expressed his agreement and promised to the Turkish Government that he would put forward only procedural recommendations designed to permit the continuation of mediation efforts through multilateral consultations among the parties.

When the report was published, it was realized that the terms of a settlement advanced by Mr. Galo Plaza were, in fact, the same suggestions for a solution he had discussed with the Turkish Government during one of his tours. The Turkish Government had then informed the mediator that these suggestions were completely unacceptable. Therefore, Mr. Galo Plaza has put forward recommendations which had already been rejected by one of the parties.

Mr. Galo Plaza has misinterpreted the Security Council's resolution and the juridical elements of the problem. He has, as a result, started from false assumptions. On the question of the validity of the 1960 Treaties, the mediator expresses in paragraph 129, the view that by recommending the appointment of a mediator the Security Council has made clear its intention that «the Cyprus problem cannot any longer be solved by trying to implement fully the Nicosia Treaties and the Constitution governed by the Treaties». This interpretation is not only erroneous, but it also casts doubts on the continuing validity of the Treaties. On this point it is significant to note that members of the Security Council have expressed views quite contrary to the views of Mr. Plaza and on the contrary, by referring «to the Treaties signed on August 16, 1960» the said resolution has in fact taken into consideration the existence of these Treaties.

The Mediator, has been given no authority by the Security Council resolution to discard the existing Treaties, or to contest their validity in his report.

The Treaties of 1960 and the Constitution specifically refer to the communities, and recognize each community as a political and legal entity. The Security Council also, by mentioning the communities and by recognizing each of them as a party to the conflict has confirmed this fact.

Referring to the question of the treaties the Mediator considers himself authorized to express an opinion on the issue and to state that any solution would have the result of abrogating or modifying these Treaties. The Mediator has very seriously misinterpreted the terms of the Security Council resolution and has also ignored the basic rules of International Law as well as the principles of the United Nations Charter.

In addition to these, the Mediator says that the treaties can no longer be considered, because the treaties have been violated by one of the parties. It would mean that all treaties can be easily discarded by violating them unilaterally.

The Mediator has also expressed the conviction that the treaties and the Constitution were the main cause of the Cyprus dispute. He, thus, puts the whole blame of the events in Cyprus on the Constitution. Historically, this assertion is completely false. Any new constitution is bound to meet difficulties in the first years of its implementation. Secondly, the views of Mr. Galo Plaza are far from being shared by competent jurists. Professor Ernst Forsthoff, the neutral president of the Supreme Constitutional Court of the Republic of Cyprus expressed his conviction that «if the Government of Cyprus would have been able to stick to the constitution for five years, most of the problems would have been mastered».

Mr. Christian Heinze, assistant to Professor E. Forsthoff said that «the Greek Cypriots made no serious effort to cooperate or arrive at a compromise, but insisted with growing determination on ignoring and abolishing the existing Constitution. For this reason the practicability of the Constitution could never be

tested. The reason for its failure is rather due to the lack of good-will to make use of it».

Mr. Galo Plaza discussed in length the question of ENOSIS.

It is clear that the aim of the Greek Cypriots in asking for the right of self-determination and for «unfettered independence» is ultimately to secure ENOSIS.

Mr. Galo Plaza is certainly right when he asserts that ENOSIS would gravely endanger the peace and security of the region. The prohibition of unilateral ENOSIS is the sine qua non of any arrangement regarding Cyprus.

The reason which prompted the mediator to suggest that the prevention of ENOSIS should depend entirely on the decision of the Greek Cypriot administration in Cyprus is, of course, that he considers this self-imposed restraint as something transitional to last until the opposition of Turkey has disappeared. Mr. Galo Plaza believes that the present obstacle to ENOSIS will gradually disappear. He proposes in fact a solution envisaging a unitary state in Cyprus in which the Turkish community would be reduced to the status of a simple minority without any effective guarantee. He admits that a great number of Turkish Cypriots would find it impossible to live in such a state and that they would want to leave the Island and to emigrate to Turkey. Mr. Galo Plaza is so certain in his own mind that this will be the outcome that he very generously suggests that compensation should be provided to the Turks who would prefer to leave Cyprus.

Mr. Galo Plaza starts by rejecting the idea of a federation. This assertion of Mr. Plaza that the proposals for the creation of a federation envisage a compulsory movement of population is entirely incorrect. The creation of two distinct geographic regions, one predominantly inhabited by Turkish Cypriots and the other by Greek Cypriots could be achieved gradually without necessarily resorting to a compulsory exchange of populations. Mr. Galo Plaza abhors the idea of a movement of populations within a few miles in the tiny island of Cyprus, but sees nothing wrong with the idea of the mass emigration of the Turkish

Cypriots to Turkey. He thus objects to federation because federation, he believes, would lead to partition. Mr. Plaza who believes that a voluntary renunciation by Archbishop Makarios of ENOSIS is sufficient to bar ENOSIS does not seem to believe that international guarantees would be sufficient to prevent partition. He therefore interprets the concept of an «agreed solution» as a solution acceptable to Archbishop Makarios. Concentrating always on what Archbishop Makarios can accept has led him to yield his task to the Archbishop himself, and to make him the supreme arbitrator in the dispute.

Mr. Galo Plaza elaborates his views on the unitary state in which the Turkish Cypriots would be accorded only minority rights.

Mr. Galo Plaza admits in his report that over the centuries the Turkish and Greek communities in Cyprus have remained distinct and separate. It is difficult to see how Mr. Plaza could expect that the Turkish Community can now agree to live as a minority under the sovereignty of the Greek Cypriots who have subjected them to such an oppressive tyranny for two years. His scheme therefore envisages the gradual elimination of the Turkish Community from Cyprus, thus permitting Cyprus to become a state inhabited exclusively by Greeks. Mr. Galo Plaza advances a theory of assimilation which, if implemented widely, would result in the total eradication of national peculiarities and cultures all over the world.

The Mediator and Archbishop Makarios find themselves on the same ground in proposing that Cyprus should be an independent state with a unitary form of Government in which the Turks would be granted only minority rights. They both agree that Cyprus should be freed from its international commitments as contained in the 1960 Treaties and should sever all links with Turkey leaving the Turkish Community at the mercy of the Greeks. But whereas the Mediator suggests this remedy as a solution for ultimate peace, Archbishop Makarios sees it as a means to achieve ENOSIS which in the words of the Mediator «will gravely endanger the peace and security of the region».



The object of the mediation effort by the United Nations was to seek to find an agreed solution to the Cyprus problem. This problem arose because of the determination of the Greek side to override the existing international agreements; to silence the Turkish Community and to unite Cyprus with Greece. Turkish opposition to this attempt and to Turkish determination not to submit to Greek rule and to maintain and defend its Constitutional rights is another undeniable factor in this dispute. Once the Mediator failed to find a basis for bringing together these opposing views his mandate came to an end and he is not entitled to suggest solutions which he knows are unacceptable to one of the parties.

And finally a few words about the Greek-Cypriot reaction to the Mediator's report. The Greek-Cypriot authorities and their press looked upon the report as a further step in the direction of Enosis. They were disappointed in the fact that Mr. Galo Plaza had not favoured or supported Enosis, but they declared their intentions of using the report as a spring-board for Enosis, as they had done with the Zurich and London agreements. Responsible Greek leaders labelled it as «next best to immediate Enosis». In other words the Turkish community, would once again, be invited to compromise on its rights-as it had done at Zurich-«for the sake of securing peace and a return to normality» only to find that what has been secured at its expense will be utilized as a final step towards annexing Cyprus with Greece. That the Turkish Cypriots would reject falling into such a trap over again is understandable.

#### BILATERAL CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TURKISH AND THE GREEK GOVERNMENTS

39 — Turkey had, all through these cirisis, maintained that a solution could easily be found if the Greek and Turkish Governments sat around a conference table with goodwill and open hands. During their stay in London for the NATO Ministerial Council meeting of 5-11 May, 1965 the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece held informal talks. For the first time Greece agreed to discuss the Cyprus question with Turkey. This change of attitude in Greece was welcomed by Turkey.

Preliminary contacts between the two Governments began in Ankara and in Athens. The mere fact of these contacts was sufficient in itself to give hope to the harassed peoples of Cyprus and to ease the tension in Cyprus. But Archbishop Makarios and his Ministers immediately took position against these talks and they publicly declared that their aim was to achieve Enosis (Union of Cyprus with Greece) and that they were not ready to compromise on this aim. «Neither the Greco-Turkish dialogue nor the Turkish monologue will influence us to change our position» they declared. On May 26, 1965 Archbishop Makarios at Rizo Karpasso said that his aim was Union of Cyprus with Greece and that, unaffected by the Greco-Turkish dialogue, he would strive for the achievement of ENOSIS until the very end. On the one hand the Archbishop maintains that his struggle aims at uniting Cyprus to Greece while, on the other hand, he does not concede the right to Greece to settle the Cyprus question in a manner which will be to the interests of Greece herself as well as to the interests of the peoples of Cyprus and the overall interests of peace in the Eastern Mediterranean.

At the Security Council's meeting of 15 June 1965 Mr. Kyprianou re-stated the position of Makarios' administration on this point in the following words:

«But there is one thing that I must state emphatically and that is that any agreement between (Greece and Turkey) on the solution of the Cyprus Problem cannot bind the Government of Cyprus or the people of Cyprus».

In spite of this opposition to the Greco-Turkish talks the two Governments had preliminary contacts searching for points of agreement acceptable to all sides. Unfortunately, due to the political crisis in Greece, these talks are now suspended.

#### ATTEMPT TO CHANGE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM TURKEY'S COMPLAINT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

40 — The Greek authorities in Cyprus, believing that the time was ripe for taking a final plunge in the direction of doing away with the Constitutional regime of Cyprus, decided to

enact two laws, one prolonging the term of office of the President of the Republic and of the Greek members of the House of Representatives, and the other amending the Electoral Law in contravention of the Constitution of the Republic. By this move, Greek authorities aimed at abolishing the office of the Vice-President and rendering the Turkish community into the position of a mere minority by taking away all their constitutional rights and guarantees.

The two «laws» were tabled for discussion by the House of Representatives on 23rd July 1965. The Turkish members of the House, who had been prevented from attending the deliberations of the House since the beginning of the troubles in December 1963, decided to participate in the meeting of the House through the help and mediation of the U. N. authorities in Cyprus, but the President of the House of Representatives, Mr. Glafcos Clerides put forward unacceptable conditions to the use by the Turkish deputies of their constitutional rights.

Mr. Clerides declared that unless the Turkish Representatives agreed to accept as valid all the laws which the Greek members of the House had passed since December 1963 and accepted to forego their constitutional right of voting separately on election laws, he would not «allow» the Turks to join in the deliberations of the House. He hinted that if the Turks tried to enter the House without accepting these terms, then he would have to use force in ejecting them.

The Turkish community refused to accept these conditions which were tantamount to unconditional surrender.

The Turkish Government in its note addressed to the Government of Cyprus dated 30 July, 1965 drew the attention of the latter Government to the two proposed laws and stated :

«The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be aware that both these decisions are contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, which is under the safeguard of international treaties.

Upon learning that the Greek Members of the House of Representatives, would meet in order to adopt the above-mentioned decisions, the Turkish Members of the House informed the President of the House, that they were willing to attend the meeting in order to enable the House of Representatives to legislate on these issues, in conformity with the Constitution.

The Turkish Members have, however, been informed by the President of the House that their demand to take part at the meeting can only be accepted on certain conditions, which were all designed to take away from the Turkish Community their legal rights under the Constitution. They were also notified that if these conditions totally incompatible with the Constitution were not accepted, they would be barred from attending the meeting, by the use of force, if necessary.

The attempt to prevent the Turkish Members of the House from participating in the meeting as well as the decisions adopted in their absence, constitute a new flagrant violation of the Constitution of Cyprus and also of the Treaty commitments of Cyprus.

The decision taken by the Greek Members of the House of Representatives, to extend the term of the office of the President and of the members of the House of Representatives is devoid of any legal basis for the following reasons :

- a) To extend the term of the office of the President only, is contrary to Article 1 of the Constitution and also to its whole spirit.
- b) According to Article 78/2 any modification of the electoral law should be passed by the majority votes of both Greek and the Turkish Members of the House of Representatives.
- c) Article 52 of the Constitution provides that any law or decision cannot be promulgated without the concurrent signatures of the President and of the Vice-President.

It is not therefore possible to consider constitutional the extension of the term of office of the President and of the Members of the House of Representatives. This decision can only be regarded as a de facto measure which can have no legal effect whatsoever.

At the meeting held by the Greek Members of the House, these representatives have also purported to enact an electoral law. This decision is null and void in view of the provisions of the Constitution. From the point of view of procedure, any legislation pertaining to elections has to be adopted in the presence of the Turkish Members of the House, and with the majority votes of the Turkish Representatives as specified in Article 78/2 of the Constitution. Furthermore, this so-called law establishes a common-roll and abolishes separate Greek and Turkish electoral rolls whereas Article 1 and Article 62 of the Constitution require that the President of the Republic and the Greek Members of the House of Representatives be elected by the Greek Community and the Vice-President of the Republic and the Turkish Members of the House be elected by the Turkish Community. It is clear that the decision of the Greek Members of the House of Representatives has been devised for altering the basic articles of the Constitution.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should also be reminded that this action not only violates the Constitution and the international treaties but also contravenes the Security Council's Resolution of March 4, 1964. The Turkish Embassy therefore strongly protests this illegal undertaking.

The Turkish Government as a guaranteeing State of the Constitution of Cyprus, would like to draw the attention of the Greek Cypriot authorities on the most serious consequence which might ensue from any attempt to put into effect the unconstitutional decision amending the electoral law».

The Government of U. K. as a Guarantor Power also gave a note to the Cyprus Government drawing its attention to the unconstitutionality of the proposed laws.

All efforts of the U. N. authorities in Cyprus and all the diplomatic approaches to stop the Greek authorities from taking this most provocative step proved to be fruitless as a result of which tension in the island increased. The Turkish Government brought this matter to the notice of the President of the Security Council by its letter of 30th July, 1965, in the following terms :

«On 23rd July 1965, the Greek members of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus purported to enact two laws, one prolonging the term of office of the President of the Republic and of the Greek members of the House of Representatives, and the other amending the electoral law existing and valid under the Constitution of the Republic.

«These two purported enactments are utterly void in form and substance from a constitutional point of view and are in flagrant violation of solemn international agreements upon which the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus is based. They have in consequence created a situation of incalculable gravity in Cyprus where the peace is in imminent danger».

The Turkish note went on to point out that the Greek Cypriot Government by taking this «unlawful, provocative and dangerous measure had acted in utter disregard of the March 1964 Resolution of the Security Council and requested an early meeting of the Council» in order to consider the grave situation arising from the above-mentioned unlawful and provocative acts of the Greek Cypriot Government of Cyprus».

The Secretary General, in his report of 29th July 1965, (Doct 5/6569) stated as follows :

«I wish to draw the attention of the Security Council to certain important developments which have taken place in Cyprus recently and which have increased tension in the island». The full report of the Secretary-General is given as an annex.

The Security Council met on 3rd August 1965, 5th August 1965 and on 10th August 1965.

In order to appreciate the full meaning and effect of this Resolution it will be helpful to give a very brief summary of the consensus of opinion of the Security Council. The Turkish complaint was quite clear and was fully endorsed by the report of the Secretary-General as stated above. The Greek Cypriot reply to this, as stated by Mr. Kyprianou, was :

«The Security Council is entrusted under the Charter with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is for that reason that I submit that the complaint lodged with the Council by Turkey is frivolous and vexatious.»

After this defiance of the Security Council, Mr. Kyprianou went on to state that the Turkish Government's allegation that the action of the Greek Cypriot authorities was likely to endanger peace was «ridiculous» and «a false representation» forgetting that the Secretary General himself had drawn the attention of the Security Council to the «rising tension» as a result of these Greek measures. Mr. Kyprianou then went on in his usual manner and tried to convince the Security Council that the Greek Cypriot authorities who had defied the Constitution and had tried to take away the rights of the Turkish community by force of arms were justified in doing so and that no one - not even the Security Council - should try to stop them from eliminating the Turks from Cyprus.

The members of the Security Council were not impressed by these appeals. The Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland stated his Government's position in the following words :

«.....this law was passed by the House of Representatives in the absence of the Turkish Cypriot members..... in breach of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, particularly article 62 and article 78 (2).»

The U. K. representative pointed out that this move was a matter of particular regret to his Government in view of the fact that it was a move contrary to the 4th March Resolution of the Council. He added :

«.....the Treaty of Guarantee is part and parcel of the series of treaties upon which the independence of Cyprus depends. All of these treaties, and indeed the Constitution of Cyprus itself, were freely negotiated between the parties directly concerned..... Changes can be brought about only through negotiation, or by any other method acceptable to the parties concerned; the treaties can neither be abrogated unilaterally nor disposed of in any other way..... If any of the parties fail to act in accordance with the principles which I have just enunciated, the difficult situation on the island of which the Council has been seized since the beginning of last year can only continue to disturb tranquillity in the Eastern Mediterranean area and friendly relations between the countries in the area..... Until the Cyprus treaties can be altered by mutual agreement, the organs of the Cyprus Government should function constitutionally..... The recent action of the Cyprus Government accorded neither with the spirit nor the letter of the Council's Resolution of 4th March last year, and, in particular, operative paragraphs 1 and 3 of that Resolution.

The Representative of the Government of U. S. A. put the position succinctly in the following words :

«In so far as the Turkish Cypriots and the Government of Turkey and at least one other of the guarantor powers are concerned, this act is inconsistent with the London-Zurich agreements and the Constitution of Cyprus. But one does not have to invoke legal judgements to recognize that this action could hardly qualify as «restrained» within the terms of the 4th March Resolution of the Security Council.»

The distinguished representative then stated that in his Government's view «treaties cannot be amended or abrogated unilaterally» and that «the solution to this problem must be, in the words of that Resolution, agreed and peaceful».

On behalf of France it was stated :

«There can be no doubt that the decisions taken by the Cypriot Government and parliament have jeopardized the favourable outlook I have just described. It is just as obvious

that if those decisions are implemented they may compromise the attempts to find a peaceful solution.....»

And on behalf of U. S. S. R. the Greek Cypriot authorities were invited «to refrain from any action which might complicate matters in Cyprus».

It is obvious, therefore, that the Security Council condemned and censured the measures taken by the Greek Cypriot authorities and overruled the plea of Mr. Kyprianou that the Security Council had no authority to look into the complaint made by Turkey.

The world public opinion was quick in assessing the Resolution of the Security Council as the following excerpts will prove :

New-York Times - 8.8.1965

«...This was the first time in the 18 months of crisis in Cyprus that the powers have specifically blamed the Greek Cypriot dominated Government for new tension...»

New-York Times - 6.8.1965

«...As in the past, this crisis grew directly from what seemed to be continuing efforts by Archbishop Makarios and the 400.000 Greek Cypriots - as opposed to 100.000 Turkish Cypriots - to achieve ENOSIS or Union with Greece, something the Archbishop declares the only alternative to «holocaust...» During the debates conspicuous change in the attitude of Security Council members were apparent. For the first time, Britain, France and the United States all condemned the moves of the Government of Cyprus without the usual diplomatic pussy-footing. To the amazement of many observers the Soviet Union did not rise to the defence of the Cypriot Government this time...»

Le Monde - 10.8.1965

«...Les Cypriotes Grecs sont déçus de la tournure prise par le débat du Conseil de Sécurité. Il est évident en tout cas que

le gouvernement de Nicosie s'est trouvé cette fois isolé au Conseil de Sécurité privé en particulier de l'appui du représentant de l'URSS...»

London Times - 11.8.1965

«...The resolution which was co-sponsored by all six non-permanent members of the Council is hardly likely to be popular with the Government of Cyprus, whose Foreign Minister, Mr. Kyprianou had been trying for days to prevent the Council from adopting any resolution on the ground that the matter was within the domestic jurisdiction of His Government. However, he failed to persuade the Council that its mandate over the Cyprus question was exhausted... Innocuous as the wording may appear, it is in effect a moral victory for Turkey which had brought before the Council the changes sought to be made in the electoral law of the Island by the Makarios regime and had asked that there be no unilateral abrogation of the terms of the existing Constitution».

Le Monde - 12.8.1965

«...Bien que l'appel du Conseil de Sécurité à la moderation s'adresse essentiellement - sinon explicitement - au gouvernement chypriote, le président Makarios, à Nicosie, s'est déclaré satisfait...»

New-York Times - 12.8.1965

«Turkish and Cypriot delegates gave sharply conflicting interpretations today of the resolution on Cyprus that was adopted unanimously yesterday by the Security Council.

Orhan Eralp, the Turkish representative, challenged a statement made yesterday by Zenon Rossides of Cyprus that the resolution was «nothing new» but desirable because it reaffirmed a need for mediation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Mr. Eralp contended that the resolution definitely blamed the Government - dominated by the Greek Cypriote Majority - for the rising tension in Cyprus, although in discreet language.

Its first paragraph called attention to a report by the Secretary General, U'Thant, blaming the Government's change in electoral laws for increased tension.

Last month, after years of communal tension, the Greek Cypriots eliminated the minority's guarantee of representation in Parliament.

Mr. Eralp said at a news conference that the reference to the report «amounts to a clear condemnation of the actions of the Cypriot Government».

Abdul Monein Rifai of Jordan, one of the six elected members of the Council who drafted the resolution, said the authors considered their text «a successful diplomatic effort and not a piece of vagueness». He said they intended to call attention to Mr. Thant's comment on the cause of tension and at the same time «to avoid bitterness».

#### The Meaning Of The Resolution By One Of Its Drafters

Malaysian Delegate to the U. N. says, in his introductory speech of the resolution, on August 10, 1965: «...The resolution, as you will observe, is short and even if it is not perhaps sweet, we have endeavoured to reduce it of every accent of bitterness...»

In conclusion, the effect of the 10 August 1965 resolution can be summarized as follows:

All attempts to change the agreements and the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus by any means other than by agreed solution are Contrary to the 4 March 1964 resolution. The Greek Cypriot fait accomplis are of no effect. The agreements and the Constitution are in force and the rights of the Turkish Community cannot be nullified by speeches from the rostrum or by unilateral acts in Cyprus.

If the Greek-Cypriot authorities understand this clear message it may be hoped that they will restrain themselves from further attempts to silence the Turks of Cyprus and to abrogate their rights, thus paving the way to peaceful negotiations.

### TURKEY'S REQUEST FOR THE INCLUSION OF AN ITEM IN THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF THE XX TH SESSION CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF CYPRUS

41 — Turkey, by a letter dated 21 July, 1965 of its Permanent Representative addressed to the Secretary General, has requested the inclusion of the following item in the provisional agenda of the 20 th session: «Question of Cyprus: The grave situation created in Cyprus by the policies pursued against the Turkish Community».

#### CONCLUSION

42 — The Cyprus question results from the concerted and common actions of Greece and the Greek Cypriot leaders to bring about the annexation of the Island to Greece in violation of international treaties and of the United Nations Charter, by the use of force in order to annihilate the Turkish Community. In the twentieth century there can be no excuse for an imperialist policy, for the disregard of the sanctity of treaties, a principle enshrined in the United Nations Charter, and for a recourse to violence and genocide for attaining political objectives. There can be no tolerance towards an attempt to destroy a whole community and the trampling of sacred human rights. If the world community does not react to this policy of violence and territorial expansion, the consequences in the future will be disastrous as aggressive and imperialist designs and the instinct to use force will have been encouraged. Each country should therefore weigh seriously the future implications of its stand on this issue. The recent history has shown tragically that whenever the world community remained passive in similar cases, violence, fanaticism and lawlessness have recurred with more intensity bringing in their trail greater calamities for mankind.

Greece and the Greek Cypriot leaders have openly admitted their aim to effect the annexation of Cyprus by Greece. The policies designed to attain this objective are threefold; occupa-

tion of the Island by regular troops of Greece, annihilation of the Turkish Community and the disguise of these methods at the United Nations under a demand for self-determination.

The policy of annexation to further the Greek imperialism is in itself unacceptable and a violation of the United Nations Charter. It is also contrary to the existing treaties which gave birth to the independence of Cyprus. In fact, ENOSIS which means the annexation of Cyprus is explicitly forbidden by the Treaty of Guarantee which was signed in order to protect the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

The methods used to promote the policy of ENOSIS, the use of violence and force cannot be tolerated by the civilized world.

The fallacy of the demand for «self-determination» is evident. The peoples of Cyprus, the Greek and Turkish communities have used their right of self-determination and Cyprus became, as a result, an independent state. The principle of «self-determination» is now invoked merely to justify the claim of ENOSIS and to disintegrate an independent state. This would no doubt constitute a violation of the right of self-determination of the Turkish Community which has expressed its choice by opting for the independence of Cyprus.

The Greek authorities of Cyprus are trying to confuse world public opinion by comparing the political status and social position of the Turkish community in Cyprus with those of 'minorities proper' which exist in every nation. This is a false representation of facts. As stated by Archbishop Makarios and the President of the Greek communal chamber Dr. Sypridakis «there is no Cypriot nation. The agreements brought about a State of Cyprus and not a Cypriot nation». This is a true statement of fact. The Cyprus State was brought about upon the agreement of the Turkish and Greek communities which had co-existed as separate ethnical entities in Cyprus for almost four centuries enjoying autonomous political status, one never dominating the other. These two communities look separately to Greece and Turkey as their respective motherlands of which they form an inseparable part. The regime which was agreed

upon for Cyprus in 1959 is, therefore, a regime which has provided, in effect, for the co-existence of the parts of these two nations in Cyprus on mutually and freely agreed principles. The Greek attempt to treat the Turkish community as a minority within an existing nation is as false as it is dishonest and tends to show the nature of their approach to the whole question which can be characterized as one of brute aggression in order to wipe out an existing national political unit from Cyprus.

Another point on which the Greeks try to deceive the world public opinion is in respect of the Turkish rights under the agreements and the ensuing Constitution of Cyprus. They allege that Turks have far more rights than the Greeks and that these are privileges which should be taken away. The fact is that the Greek and Turkish communities enjoy equal rights in Cyprus as communities. The constitutional provisions which are treated by the Greeks as 'privileges to the Turks' are not provisions which deal with Turks alone but they are provisions which give the same rights to both communities without discrimination. If Turks have to resort to these rights more than Greeks, it is because they are forced to seek constitutional protection against the discriminatory and unjust Greek actions. The numerous cases which were taken to the Constitutional Court support this point to the full. Further, these so-called 'privileges' were not given to the Turks as a gift by the Greeks to be taken away at their will. These rights are the legal endorsement of the rights and status enjoyed by the Turkish community for the last four centuries in Cyprus. They are rights for the protection of which the Turks shed their blood in 1955-58 troubles in Cyprus. It is as a result of the fight which ensued between the two communities then, that the two 'warring' communities, after testing their strength, agreed to settle their dispute in an honourable compromise. For the protection of these same rights the Turkish community has been shedding its blood and tears and has been facing untold misery and suffering for the last two years. These rights cannot be taken away from them by intrigue and legal chicanery. And it is hoped that these rights will be fully safeguarded by all concerned when it is well known that the reason for the Greek attempt to take away these rights is in order to annex Cyprus with Greece.

Turkey is strongly opposed to the attempt of Greece to annex Cyprus by force. It demands that Greece respect the treaties and the United Nations Charter. Turkey also has a moral obligation as well as a treaty commitment to protect the Turkish Community and cannot acquiesce in the brutal oppression of this community. Turkey demands respect for the status of Cyprus as established by the treaties and maintains the view that any change in this status can only be arrived at through negotiations and peaceful methods, by taking due account of the legitimate rights and interests of the Turkish Community, and not by violence and force.

Turkey believes that the best solution for the conflict would be to maintain and safeguard the independence of Cyprus, while ensuring the security and well-being of the Turkish Community and preserving its distinct identity. In view of all the attacks and oppressive measures directed against the Turkish Community, any such solution would however require adequate measures to protect the Turks and to make them feel in complete security. The only way to achieve this is to set up a federation by grouping in one area the majority of the Turkish Cypriots and by granting separate administrative authority to the Greek and Turkish components of the federation. The two federated provinces would then cooperate together in a federal government in which they would share responsibility on an equitable basis.

This is, in a nutshell, the position of Turkey on the question of Cyprus. Turkey is strongly convinced that this position is in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter, with humanitarian principles and that the policy of Turkey is a policy designed to maintain peace in the area and to prevent the escalation of the dispute into a wider conflict.

## ANNEX I

### THE WORLD PRESS AND CYPRUS

The London Times April 15, 1964

#### «Political Recklessness»

«It would be taken to mean that the whole Greek community, from Archbishop Makarios downwards, is back in the old track of trying to achieve ENOSIS by force. It would, rightly or wrongly, be assumed that Greek cooperation with the United Nations was at an end and that the Turkish community was to be crushed or, better still, expelled».

The New-York Times, April 15, 1964

#### «Darkness over Cyprus»

«Will it get the time? The Greek Cypriots under President Makarios, and the Greeks, led by Premier Papandreu, evidently are not willing to see peace or a compromise on the Island except on their terms».

The Washington Post, May 22, 1964

#### «The U. N. Must Act»

«The great worry is that Turkey will finally be drawn into the conflict for the sake of the Turkish Cypriots. Turkish forbearance up until now has been remarkable, as noteworthy in its way as Archbishop Makarios' provocation has been in its. This is why effective U. N. action in the matter of the missing Turkish hostages is absolutely vital. «We are not going to stand idly by as in the past», the U. N. Chief on Cyprus has pledged. The U. N. must act now».



Excerpts from a report by Rene Maccoll and Daniel Mgeachie  
Published in the Daily Express of  
Saturday, December 28, 1963

«In the Forbidden City»

«We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in the last five days. We were the first Western reporters there and we have seen sights too frightful to be described in print - horrors so extreme that the people seemed stunned beyond tears and reduced to an hysterical and mirthless giggle that is more terrible than tears».

Daily Telegraph, January 14, 1964

«Graves of 12 shot Turks found in Cyprus village»

«Family of Seven»

«It is thought that a family of seven Turks who disappeared from the village may be buried there. Their house was found burnt, and grenades had been dropped through the roof».

Article by Giorgio Bocca, correspondent  
of Il Giorno, dated January 14, 1964

«They are Turk-hunting; they want to exterminate us».

«Discussions start in London; in Cyprus, the terror continues. Right now we are witnessing the exodus of Turks from the villages. Thousands of people abandoning homes, lands, herds: Greek terrorism is relentless. This time, the rhetoric of the Hellenes and the busts of Plato do not suffice to cover up barbaric and ferocious behaviours».

Le Figaro (Paris), January 25 - 26, 1964

«The drama of Cyprus»

«...I have seen in a bathtub the bodies of a mother and of her three young children murdered just because their father was a Turkish officer».

«Cyprus Risks All», editorial published  
in the daily Telegraph and Morning Post of  
London, February 15, 1964

«If the Turkish Army has not already landed reinforcements to its Treaty Force in Cyprus, that is simply proof of the patience of Turkey. Its right to do so cannot be denied. If international treaties mean anything, Turkey can protect the Turkish Cypriot minority from further massacre. It is racial discrimination in its most bestial form. Although there have been efforts to cloud the issue by suggesting that both Cypriot communities are to blame, by far the heaviest guilt is that of the Greek Cypriot force known as Eoka or Edma».

Excerpts from a report by Max Clos published  
in Le Figaro of Paris, February 15 - 16, 1964

«It is a real military operation that the Greeks launched against the six thousand inhabitants of the Turkish quarter yesterday morning. A spokesman of the (Greek) Cypriot Government has recognized this officially...»

«It is hard to conceive, how Greeks and Turks may seriously contemplate working together after all that has happened...»

Excerpts from «Hatred in Cyprus Makarios Enigma»  
article by Robert H. Estabrook, published in the  
Washington Post dated February 16, 1964

«Archbishop Makarios, robed and bearded cleric who serves as President of Cyprus, has a Byzantine talent for equivocation...»

«...his government deliberately provoked the clashes and is bent upon the extermination of Turkish population...»

«Some sort of federal system of two separate communities seems inevitable as the minimum to reassure Turkish Cypriots who demand outright partition...»

Excerpts from «Makarios Gains On Two Fronts»,  
A report by John Rigos published in  
The Christian Science Monitor dated February 17, 1964

«...Outnumbered ten to one the Turkish Cypriots packed most of their women and children into a movie theatre and school in their sector. As their local leader, Ramazan Cemil, a Turkish member of the Cypriot House of Representatives, stated to foreign journalists after pointing out the precarious defensive position of his men, «We are getting ready to die...»

«Cyprus Tragedy», editorial published in  
The Washington Post dated February 17, 1964

«...Greek Cypriot fanatics appear bent on a policy of genocide...»

Excerpts from «No Time To Play For»,  
Editorial from the Christian Science Monitor of  
February 19, 1964

«Cyprus is like a dagger aimed at Turkey, and Turkish concern about what happens in the Island is not so much based on emotion as on genuine concern for national security. Turkey, astride the Dardanelles, always has been in the front line in resisting Russian pressure toward warm waters. And a Soviet outpost in Cyprus - or even a government in Cyprus indebted to the Soviets - would be as much an outflanking of a Western as of a Turkish position».

«All The Perfumes Of Cyprus»  
translation from Le Canard Enchaîné published  
in Paris On February 19, 1964

«There are two kinds of assassin. The first, kills alone. His hands are red, therefore he is easily recognized. «Beast» they call him and he is led, somewhat rudely, to the guillotine or to forced labor. The second, remains aloof and watches people assassinate each other. He touches nothing, his hands are clean. Let one indignant witness speak of halting the carnage and white hands will look at him and say, severely, «Look after your own affairs». And he will put out his foot to trip him up. Only this second kind of assassination is worthy of consideration as a fine art.

Monsignor Makarios is a great artist. Each time that I see him on TV or in a newspaper, I admire his fine hands made for benediction and for prayer, his handsome looks sheltered by tabernacle-like eyelids barely allow the penetration of suave insensibility. Monsignor Makarios belongs more to the Heavens than to the earth, that is clearly visible. That is why he permits the Greeks to carry on the butchery in Cyprus. NATO wants to stop the bloodshed? «Halt. I am against it. In the holy name of our independence». The United Nations, then. «I agree, but be patient. We have time». Is not one master in his own home? And it is-after all, a few corpses gained.

Mark you, Monsignor Makarios is Greek and Christian. The Greeks are fighting the Turks, ten against one. In simple arithmetic, this must add up to nine corpses of Infidels - men, women, children, it matters little - for one chosen of the good cause. Hence, the holy gaiety, at times irrepressible, of Monsignor. Last Saturday, he was seen receiving journalists and laughing his head off during a whole minute. That day the corpses of the massacred Turks were piled up at the other edge of the Island.

Journalists know well the customs. They saluted Monsignor Makarios according to orthodoxy as «Your Beatitude». His Beatitude, sanctimoniously, was beaming. Here is a man who attains Paradise in all sweetness. He will arrive with his hands pure. And yet all the perfumes of Cyprus... yes, yes, all the perfumes of Cyprus shall never cleanse those hands».

## ANNEX II

### TREATY OF GUARANTEE

The Republic of Cyprus of the one Part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,

I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,

II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution,

Have agreed as follows :

#### ARTICLE I

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

#### ARTICLE II

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article 1 of the present Treaty, recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

#### ARTICLE III

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on today's date.

#### ARTICLE IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

#### ARTICLE V

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

## TREATY OF ALLIANCE

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey,

I. In their common desire to uphold peace and to preserve the security of each of them,

II. Considering that their efforts for the preservation of peace and security are in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Have agreed as follows :

### ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate for their common defence and to consult together on the problems raised by that defence.

### ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

### ARTICLE III

For the purpose of this alliance, and in order to achieve the object mentioned above, a Tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

### ARTICLE IV

Greece and Turkey shall participate in the Tripartite Headquarters so established with the military contingents laid down in Additional Protocol No. 1 annexed to the present Treaty.

The said contingents shall provide for the training of the army of the Republic of Cyprus.

## ARTICLE V

The Command of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation, for a period of one year each, by a Cypriot, Greek and Turkish General Officer, who shall be appointed respectively by the Governments of Greece and Turkey and by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.

## ARTICLE VI

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature.

The High Contracting Parties shall conclude additional agreements if the application of the present Treaty renders them necessary.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible with the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in conformity with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

## ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

### NO. II

I. The Greek and Turkish contingents which are to participate in the Tripartite Headquarters shall comprise respectively 950 Greek officers, non-commissioned officers and men, and 650 Turkish officers, non-commissioned officers and men.

II. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in agreement, may request the Greek and Turkish Governments to increase or reduce the Greek and Turkish contingents.

III. It is agreed that the sites of the cantonments for the Greek and Turkish contingents participating in the Tripartite Headquarters, their juridical status, facilities and exemptions in respect of customs and taxes, as well as other immunities and privileges and any other military and technical questions con-

cerning the organisation and operation of the Headquarters mentioned above shall be determined by a Special Convention which shall come into force not later than the Treaty of Alliance.

IV. It is likewise agreed that the Tripartite Headquarters shall be set up not later than three months after the completion of the tasks of the Mixed Commission for the Cyprus Constitution and shall consist, in the initial period, of a limited number of officers charged with the training of the armed forces of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish contingents mentioned above will arrive in Cyprus on the date of signature of the Treaty of Alliance.

## ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

### NO. II

#### ARTICLE I

A Committee shall be set up consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. It shall constitute the supreme political body of the Tripartite Alliance and may take cognizance of any question concerning the Alliance which the Governments of the three Allied countries shall agree to submit to it.

#### ARTICLE II

The Committee of Ministers shall meet in ordinary session once a year. In a matter of urgency the Committee of Ministers can be convened in special session by its Chairman at the request of one of the members of the Alliance.

Decisions of the Committee of Ministers shall be unanimous.

#### ARTICLE III

The Committee of Ministers shall be presided over in rotation and for a period of one year, by each of the three Foreign Ministers. It will hold its ordinary sessions, unless it is decided otherwise, in the capital of the Chairman's country. The Chair-

man shall, during the year in which he holds office, preside over sessions of the Committee of Ministers, both ordinary and special.

The Committee may set up subsidiary bodies whenever it shall judge it to be necessary for the fulfilment of its task.

#### ARTICLE IV

The Tripartite Headquarters established by the Treaty of Alliance shall be responsible to the Committee of Ministers in the performance of its functions. It shall submit to it, during the Committee's ordinary session, an annual report comprising a detailed account of the Headquarters' activities.

## ANNEX III

### STATEMENTS BY CHRISTIAN LEADERS

Leaders of various Christian Faiths in Turkey and abroad, have made the following comments condemning the acts of Archbishop Makarios :

1 — The Council of the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church convened under the Chairmanship of Patriarch Athenagoras and issued the following statement relative to the incidents in Cyprus :

«Patriarch Athenagoras and the members of the Council of the Holy Synod have viewed the tragic events of Cyprus which have caused the shedding of the blood of numbers of innocent beings. Joining in the grief of our Government and our Country, Turkey, they denounce the tragic events and express their indignation. The Patriarch and the members of the Synod Council, hoping for the speedy re-establishment of peace and security, have stated their deep sorrow».

2 — Speaking for the Armenian Community in Kayseri, religious leader, Haykazam Karabetoğlu, sent a very strongly worded telegram to Makarios. In his telegram, Mr. Karabetoğlu, pointing to the murders committed in cold-blood in Cyprus, expressed deep sorrow felt by the Armenian Community at a time when they were making preparations to celebrate Christmas in freedom and prosperity in their own country, Turkey. Quoting from the Holy Bible, he reminds Makarios that he should have loved his neighbour as he would himself and prayed for his enemies, for God had created all men as brothers. Speaking in his own capacity of a religious leader, Mr. Karabetoğlu strongly condemns the criminal actions of Makarios and considers him to be unworthy of wearing the robe.

3 — Turgut Erener, Deputy Patriarch, Archbishop of Istanbul, speaking as a representative of the Independent Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate, announced that he desired to convey to all nations the deep sorrow felt by Christian Turks in front of the latest events that occurred in Cyprus. «We have

felt the need to denounce to the whole world the crimes committed in Cyprus on this, the most holy day for all Christianity», said Archbishop Erener. «Since humanity can do nothing to compensate for the crimes committed by the Cypriot Greeks who have gone against both international law and Holy Church laws, we believe that it is best to await for God's divine justice», he stated.

4 — In a resolution of the Protestant Church of Hessen, West Germany, it has been pointed out that the attitude of Archbishop Makarios is a source of grief for the Christian World at large and that his attitude gravely lessens the effects of the call of Christianity for benevolence. The Protestant Church of Hessen has, further decided to lodge an appeal to the Council of German Protestant Churches calling for the censure of Archbishop Makarios by the Ecumenical Council for his political activities.

5 — In a declaration, the Council of the Synod of the Evangelical Church of Basle, Switzerland invited the Ecumenical Council to protest against Archbishop Makarios energetically for his attitude. The declaration of the said Church reads as follows, «the attitude adopted by this dignitary of a Christian Church which is a member of the Ecumenical Council, constitutes a disgrace to the message of Evangel».

6 — Rev. Pastor R. Suleiman of the Gospel preaching Church, Beirut, Lebanon in his letter of March 9th 1965 drew the attention of Archbishop Makarios to his duties as a man of God and stated :

«In fighting for the freedom and independence of Cyprus, our Church was with you. But now when the Turkish Cypriots are perishing in your hands we have taken our position against you. Let us take the Holy Bible in our hands and let us abandon the arms. Let us kneel and ask for forgiveness from Almighty God»;

Rev. Suleiman's letter was acknowledged by Archbishop Makarios on the 17th March 1965 who falsely stated that he was making every effort for the restoration of peace in the island when exactly on or about that date Greek Cypriot forces, in defiance of all attempts by the U. N. forces in Cyprus, had encircled the Turkish village of Ambelikou. This siege continues to this day.

Neue Zurcher Zeitung of 12 December 1964  
the warning of protestants to Makarios

7 — «We should like to state clearly that the policies followed by a Christian Society and its leaders in any part of the world draw the attention of all Christendom. In our churches we are praying for the abatement of the misunderstanding between the Christian and Moslem communities of Cyprus and for liberty, peace and humanity. We should like to remind Your Excellency that it is an unacceptable notion to disregard the fundamental human rights under the plea of state authority. All heads of states carry the responsibility not only of majorities but also of minorities. Notions of justice and peace always carry with them the necessity of compromise. Taking this opportunity we should like to remind you of the fact that in all historical and political events Christians are obliged to keep the human factor in the foreground.

We notice that in Cyprus cultural, political and religious liberties are not adequately protected and there is no respect for fundamental human rights.

We look upon you to use, as a head of state, your religious, moral and military authority in order to give an end to this violent dispute and to open the way for political discussion.

A settlement may necessitate your abandonment of certain rights and privileges but you must not forget that Christianity necessitates the giving of examples of tolerance, humanitarianism, courage and justice».

NOTE: 1) Archbishop Makarios has categorically declared that he will not accept any compromise and that the struggle will continue until Union of Cyprus with Greece is achieved.

2) The Turkish claim, after all that they have suffered in Greek hands, is to be allowed to enjoy their political and constitutional rights in their own lands under a federal regime. If accepted this will not necessitate the abandonment of any rights or privileges by Greeks. It is political greed and blind prejudice which forces Makarios to say «no» to this demand - a demand which his policy has forced upon the Turks.

8 — The German Protestant Church Council denounced Archbishop Makarios and his methods of violence and discrimination against the Turks at its meeting of April 1964.

9 — The Bishop of Berlin, Dr. Otto Dibelius, in a broadcast over the Berlin Church Radio on 3 September 1964 stated the grave concern felt by the Christian world at the methods used by Archbishop Makarios, and characterized the economic blockade by his administration as «utterly inhuman».

10 — The Protestant Churches of Hessen and Nassau, at a meeting held at Darmstadt on 17 September 1964, expressed their sorrow at the policy followed by a Christian church leader against the Turks of Cyprus.

11 — Professor of Theology at Marburg University Mr. Ernst Benz in a letter published in Christ und Welt states :

The foundations of the European community were laid after centuries of struggle. The Cyprus problem which has shaken this foundation is the result of a policy not only tacitly agreed to by the Archbishop of the Cyprus Orthodox Church but actually engineered and directed by him..... Archbishop Makarios, instead of using the opportunity afforded to him by the Zurich regime to co-exist in peace, has not only ignored this evolution but he has, through unorthodox measures egged on discontent and he has brought about a world crisis for which the whole of Europe is now suffering..... The silence of the Greek Orthodox Church in Greece in the face of the deeds of Archbishop Makarios is shameful..... This silence is the silence of condonation. It is silent because it feels that the aim of ENOSIS is a legitimate aim. But it is forgetting that, in case this aim is achieved, it will become responsible for all the discrimination and injustice which will be the fate of a community of different religion..... If Archbishop Makarios poses for photographers at a remembrance of Easter occasion at the side of a heap of guns, which will shortly be used against part of his citizens, and if he poses for photographers at the Greek Cypriot's gun positions in his episcopal uniform, then I take this as a denial of all those moral values which were obtained in Europe at the cost of much blood and tears..... If a religious leader who happens to be at the same time the head of the state cannot

prevent a civil war between his subjects, then when such war erupts, his duty is by the trenches of the minority; his duty is by the weak, by those who have been frightened and by those who have lost all hope and not by the side of the «victors»..... But alas, he has from the beginning tried to make himself the leader of the majority and, in the name of his Christian-Orthodox majority, to invent unthought-of manuevres for his political and military tactics and to treat all these as legitimate. He has thus lost the qualities of peace-maker and mediator which belonged to his positions.

.....Those who have lived under Hitler's regime the sins of Hitler-those of discrimination against the minority, arbitrary arrests and total extermination -are thought to be due to his anti-Christian beliefs and his hate against the Christian Church. These are sheer self-justifying methods. But this easy justification does not exist in the case of Cyprus. In this case we have an Orthodox Archbishop with a golden emblem of the Virgin Mary and cross dangling on his breast and an episcopal sceptre in his hand who is persecuting his own Turkish subjects and is using his pulpit, an office of peace and compromise, to follow an anti-minority policy contrary to the trends of history. What he is doing is contrary to the trend of history because he is following against the Turks a national crusade which the Churches of Europe have been trying to get rid of for the last 400 years.

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12 — Rev. Otto Dibelius, the Bishop of Berlin on RIAS radio on 3 September 1964 :

There is only one weak point in the policy of peace followed by all Christian Churches. This point is in Cyprus and his name is Makarios.....

The blockade of a non-Christian community in order to exterminate such a community through starvation by a Christian Archbishop is a tragic and sad event which the Church of the West cannot understand.

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13 — Bealingske Tidende of Copenhagen in its issue of 13 September 1964 attacked the policy of extermination followed by Archbishop Makarios and after pointing out that Makarios has left thousands of Turks to their fates, without food in caves, described as a shameful lie the statement of Makarios that Turks were not starving. The paper goes on to say : «But Turkey will give the necessary help to these people. Unlike Greece, Turkey will send food to the island and not heavy arms».

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14 — Professor Dr. Franciska Baumgarten of Bonn in a letter published in Der Bund of 11 September 1964 criticizes the unholy deeds of Makarios who has desecrated his office and suggests that the only way to find a solution is to neutralize the effect of Makarios on the people.

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ANNEX IV

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY  
COUNCIL ON MARCH 4, 1964

The Security Council,

Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless further measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution.

Considering the positions taken by the parties in relations to the treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960.

Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter and its Article 2 paragraph 4 which reads:

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations:

1 — Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus or to endanger international peace;

2 — Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;

3 — Calls upon the communities on Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint;

4 — Recommends the creation with the consent of the Government of Cyprus of a United Nations Peace Force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the force shall be established by the Secretary General in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The commander of the force shall be appointed by the Secretary General

and report to him. The Secretary General shall keep the governments providing the force fully informed and shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation;

5 — Recommends that the function of the force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions;

6 — Recommends that the stationing of the force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary General may accept voluntary contributions for that purpose;

7 — Recommends further that the Secretary General designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, a mediator, who shall use his (best endeavors) with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four governments for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary General on his efforts;

8 — Requests the Secretary General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as appropriate, for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator and his staff.

RESOLUTION  
BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, IVORY COAST,  
MOROCCO AND NORWAY  
13 MARCH 1964

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey,

Reaffirming its resolution of 4 March 1964 (S/5575),

Being deeply concerned over developments in the area,

Noting the progress reported by the Secretary General in regard to the establishment of a United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus,

Noting the assurance from the Secretary General that the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus envisaged in the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964 (S/5575) is about to be established, and that advance elements of that force are already en route to Cyprus;

1 — Reaffirms its call upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace;

2 — Requests the Secretary General to press on with his efforts to implement the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 and requests Member States to co-operate with the Secretary General to that end.

**RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY  
COUNCIL ON JUNE 20TH, 1964**

The Security Council,

Noting that the report by the Secretary General (S/5764) considers the maintenance in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force created by the Security Council Resolution of 4 March 1964 (S/5575) for an additional period of 3 months to be useful and advisable,

Expressing its deep appreciation to the Secretary General for his efforts in the implementation of the Security Council Resolution of 4 March 1964,

Expressing its deep appreciation to the Member States that have contributed troops, police, supplies and financial support for the implementation of the Security Council Resolution of 4 March 1964,

1 — Reaffirms its resolutions of 4 March 1964 and 13 March 1964;

2 — Calls upon all Member States to comply with the above-mentioned Resolutions;

3 — Takes note of the report by the Secretary General (S/5764);

4 — Extends the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under the Security Council Resolution of 4 March 1964 for an additional period of 3 months ending 26 September 1964 (S/5075).

**RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY  
COUNCIL ON AUGUST 9TH, 1964**

The Security Council,

Concerned at the serious deterioration of the situation in Cyprus,

Reaffirming the resolutions of the Security Council on this issue dated 4 March 1964 (S/5575) 13 March 1964 (S/5603) and 20 June 1964 (S/5778),

Anticipating the submission of the Secretary General's report on the situation.

1 — Reaffirms the appeal of the President of the Council just addressed to the Governments of Turkey and Cyprus, as follows :

«The Security Council has authorized me to make an urgent appeal to the Government of Turkey to cease instantly, the bombardment and use of military force of any kind against Cyprus, and to the Government of Cyprus to order the armed forces under its control to cease firing immediately».

2 — Calls for an immediate cease-fire by all concerned;

3 — Calls upon all concerned to cooperate fully with the United Nations Commander in the restoration of peace and security. and,

4 — Calls upon all states to refrain from any action that might exacerbate the situation or contribute to the broadening of hostilities.

**THE CONSENSUS**  
**REACHED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL**  
**ON 11 AUGUST, 1964**

«After hearing the report of the Secretary General and the statements of the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey and of the members of the Security Council,

«The Security Council notes with satisfaction that the cease-fire is being observed throughout Cyprus;

«Requests the parties to comply with resolution S/5868 of 9 August 1964 in its entirety;

«Asks all Governments to stop all flights over the territory of Cyprus in violation of its sovereignty;

«Requests the Commander of the United Nations Force to supervise the cease-fire and to reinforce its units in the zones which were the sphere of the recent military operations so as to ensure the safety of the inhabitants;

«Requests all concerned to co-operate with and to assist the Commander of the Force in achieving this purpose».

**RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL**  
**ON SEPTEMBER 25TH, 1964**

The Security Council,

Noting the report of the Secretary General and in particular that the Secretary General considers necessary the extension of the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force created by the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 (S/5575) beyond 26 September,

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has indicated its desire that the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus should be continued beyond 26 September 1964,

Renewing the expression of its deep appreciation to the Secretary General for his efforts in the implementation of the Security Council resolutions of 4 March 1964, 13 March 1964 and 20 June 1964,

Renewing the expression of its deep appreciation to the States that have contributed troops, police, supplies and financial support for the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of 4 March 1964,

Paying tribute to the memory of Sakari Tuomioja for the outstanding services that he rendered to the cause of the United Nations,

Expressing satisfaction that a new mediator has been appointed by the Secretary General in conformity with the resolution of 4 March 1964,

1 — Reaffirms its resolutions of 4 March 1964, 13 March 1964, 20 June 1964, and 9 August 1964 and the consensus expressed by the President at its 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964;

2 — Calls upon all Member States to comply with the above-mentioned resolutions;

3 — Extends the period in which the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force shall be stationed in Cyprus for another three months ending 26 December 1964 in conformity with the terms of the resolution of 4 March 1964;

4 — Requests the Secretary General to keep the Security Council informed regarding the compliance of the parties concerned with the provisions of this resolution.

**RESOLUTION**  
**ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL**  
**ON 18 DECEMBER 1964**

The Security Council,

Noting that the report by the Secretary-General (S/6102) recommends the maintenance in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force created by the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 (S/5575) for an additional period of three months,

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has indicated its desire that the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus should be continued beyond 26 December 1964,

Noting with satisfaction that the report of the Secretary-General (S/6102) indicates that the situation in Cyprus has improved and that significant progress has been made,

Renewing the expression of its deep appreciation to the Secretary General for his efforts in the implementation of the Security Council resolutions of 4 March 1964, 13 March 1964, 20 June 1964 and 25 September 1964,

Renewing the expression of its deep appreciation to the States that have contributed troops, police, supplies and financial support for the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964,

1 — Reaffirms its resolutions of 4 March 1964, 13 March 1964, 20 June 1964, 9 August 1964 and 25 September 1964, and the consensus expressed by the President at its 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964;

2 — Calls upon all Member States to comply with the above-mentioned resolutions;

3 — Takes note of the Report by the Secretary-General (S/6102);

4 — Extends the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 for an additional period of three months, ending 26 March 1965.

**RESOLUTION 19 MARCH 1965**  
**BOLIVIA, IVORY COAST, JORDAN, MALAYSIA,**  
**NETHERLANDS, URUGUAY : JOINT DRAFT**

The Security Council,

Noting that the report by the Secretary General (S/6228 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1) recommends the maintenance in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force created by the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 (S/5575) for an additional period of three months,

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has indicated its desire that the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus should be continued beyond 26 March 1965,

Noting from the Report of the Secretary-General that while the military situation has on the whole remained quiet during the period under review and while the presence of the United Nations Force has contributed significantly to this effect, nevertheless the position remains one of uneasiness in several points, with the consequent danger of a renewal of fighting with all of its disastrous consequences,

Renewing the expression of its deep appreciation to the Secretary General for his efforts in the implementation of the Security Council resolutions of 4 March 1964, 13 March 1964 (S/5603), 20 June 1964 (S/5778), 25 September 1964 (S/5987) and 18 December 1964 (S/6121),

Renewing the expression of its deep appreciation to the States that have contributed troops, police, supplies and financial support for the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964,

1 — Reaffirms its resolutions of 4 March 1964, 13 March 1964, 20 June 1964, 9 August 1964 (S/5868), 25 September 1964 and 18 December 1964, and the consensus expressed by the President at its 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964;

2 — Calls upon all Member States to comply with the above-mentioned resolutions;

3 — Calls upon the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to co-operate fully with the United Nations Force;

4 — Takes note of the Report by the Secretary-General (S/6228 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1);

5 — Extends the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 for an additional period of three months, ending 26 June 1965.

#### RESOLUTION

#### ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

ON 15 JUNE 1965

The Security Council,

Noting that the report of the Secretary-General (S/6426 and Corr. 1) recommends the maintenance in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force created by the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 (S/5575) for an additional period of six months,

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has indicated its desire that the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus should be continued beyond 26 June 1965,

Noting from the report of the Secretary General that, while the military situation has on the whole remained quiet during the period under review and while the presence of the United Nations Force has contributed significantly to his effect, nevertheless the quiet which prevails in the island is tenuous and, in fact, it is very likely that without the Force there would be an early recurrence of fighting,

Renewing the expression of its deep appreciation to the Secretary General for his efforts in the implementation of the Security Council resolutions of 4 March, 13 March (S/5603), 20 June (S/5778), 25 September (S/5987) and 18 December 1964 (S/6121) and resolution 201 (1965) of 19 March 1965,

Renewing the expression of its deep appreciation to the States that have contributed troops, police, supplies and financial support for the implementation of the resolution of 4 March 1964,

1 — Reaffirms its resolutions of 4 March, 13 March, 20 June, 9 August, 25 September and 18 December 1964 and 19 March 1965 and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964;

2 — Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to comply with the above-mentioned resolutions;

3 — Calls upon the parties concerned to continue to act with the utmost restraint and to co-operate fully with the United Nations Force;

4 — Takes note of the report of the Secretary General (S/6426 and Corr. 1);

5 — Extends the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 for an additional period of six months, ending 26 December 1965.

**SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION**

**10 AUGUST 1965**

The Security Council,

Noting the report of the Secretary General (S/6569) of 29 July 1965 that recent developments in Cyprus have increased tension in the Island,

Noting the further reports of the Secretary General S/6586 of 2 August 1965, S/6569/ADD. 1 of 5 August 1965 and S/6569/ADD. 2 of 10 August 1965,

Having heard the statements of the parties concerned,

1 — Reaffirms its resolution of 4 March 1964,

2 — Calls upon all parties, in conformity with the above resolution, to avoid any action which is likely to worsen the situation.

**ANNEX V**

Excerpts from the Book entitled **OUR DESTINY** by Mr. N. C. Lanitis, the well-known Greek industrialist of Cyprus and the representative of Coca Cola and other leading industries in the island. The book was published in Nicosia in 1963.

«The Zurich and London agreement is as good as the men who want to apply it.

The Greeks are in the majority and the onus of responsibility falls on their shoulders. Holding responsibility means being in a position of leadership. It also means doing a tough job. So far we have not entirely been living up to that responsibility. The Greek press has been waging a tit for tat war against the Turkish press and on several occasions it has instigated friction. We have not applied any self-restraint in our national expressions, especially on occasions of Greek national days. It is easy to indulge in these things but where are they leading us to?

We have not given enough emphasis to purely Cypriot national occasions such as the 16th August, our independence day; for this will tend to bring about unity. We have not as yet completely honoured all the provisions of the Zurich and London agreements. Some of these provisions are hard to accept and give to a minority privileges which are likely to affect the smooth running of the state machine. However, we must remember that we put our signature down and we have to honour it. If we honoured the agreement, things would become much easier for all and especially for the Greeks, for the indirect benefits that are to be derived from harmony and cooperation between the two communities are far far greater than the ostensible drawbacks - mainly connected with pride - that will result from adhering to our contractual obligations. So much so that we may gain the confidence of the Turks who may be willing eventually to cooperate with us removing by common consent - and not unilaterally - the worse provisions of the Zurich agreement..... If we go on the way we did during the last two years the ship of state will come to grief. If we are passive towards, show lack of friendship to the Turks they will of necessity have to rely

more and more on Turkey and a most unfortunate situation will be created for everybody concerned, including the Greeks and Turks..... Until unity is attained the Greek side has to be magnanimous and must give more than it can take. This is the basic rule of being in a responsible position. Tolerance is another necessary phase of responsibility. Observance to contractual obligations is another - sometimes bitter - necessity. We, the Greeks, have to gain the confidence of the Turks».

## ANNEX VI

Excerpts from «**THE CYPRUS CONFLICT**» by Dr. Jur. Christian Heinze who was an assistant of the Heidelberger Professor Dr. Ernst Forsthoff, President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Cyprus. Dr. Heinze writes :

«The western community of nations of the North Atlantic sphere claims to be able to solve international problems with the help of its system of peace, which has been developed and consolidated in the changeful course of North Atlantic, and especially of European history. This system of peace is founded on international law, and above all on the binding force of agreements. It contains, moreover, the principles of freedom and of the political right of self-determination of peoples and of individuals.

In developing an opinion on the Cyprus conflict the following facts must be taken as the point of departure. In the treaties of Zurich, London and Nicosia, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, with the consent of the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots elected in December, 1959, have agreed that the Republic of Cyprus should be established and that Great Britain should cede its sovereignty over Cyprus to this Republic, which was to be ruled according to a constitution which came into force on 16th August, 1960. In these treaties the three States undertook to guarantee the continued existence of the said constitution as regards its fundamental features. Essential points in this constitution are certain rights of co-operation by the Turkish Cypriots, the exercise of which may have the same effect as a veto, in the spheres of legislation, government and administration, as well as guarantees of a definite structure of the organisation of local government and the civil service and the judiciary, which are aimed at preventing the Turkish Cypriots from being overwhelmed by the majority of Greek Cypriots. The co-operative rights of the Turkish Cypriots are, of course, not more comprehensive than those of the Greek Cypriots; the right of veto and other guarantees of political influence apply equally in favour of the latter. The Constitution of 1960 guarantees partnership between the Greek and Turkish communities in the exercise of the right of self-

determination of the Cypriots. Since its coming into force and after the Greek Cypriots, by accepting the constitution, had succeeded in persuading Great Britain to relinquish her sovereignty over Cyprus, and Turkey to abandon her demand for a division of the island, the Constitution has been boycotted and attacked with growing consistency by Greek Cypriots, some of whom held official positions at all levels, including several ministers and the President of the Republic, who is of Greek origin. A propaganda campaign supported by the same Greek Cypriot official circles put forward the claim for Greek rule over the island, and denied the Turkish Cypriots the right of effective political co-determination in their native land. Official Greek Cypriot circles commemorated the Greek Cypriot victims of the uprising against Great Britain in official celebrations and public speeches for their support of the union of Cyprus with Greece, and contended that the Constitution of 1960 was an injustice which had been forced upon them. The partisan organization EOKA (Ellenikos Organismos Kypriakon Agoniston = Hellenic Organization for the Struggle for Cyprus), which had been the back-base of the uprising against Great Britain, was not disbanded after the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, but was, on the contrary, promoted still further by the Greek section of the Cypriot Government through the appointment of its members to what were in part important and leading official positions. Since its original and most important objective, to get rid of British rule, had been attained, the reason for the continued existence of EOKA could only be the second objective, which from the beginning had formed an important integral part of the ideological foundation of the uprising, namely the aim of uniting Cyprus with Greece, or at least of unrestricted Greek rule in Cyprus. Since union of Cyprus with Greece was prohibited by Article 135, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of 1960, this organization was unconstitutional. Its toleration and promotion contravened the obligations of Cyprus pursuant to the agreements of 1959 and 1960.

The simplification of the objectives of EOKA made the Turks Enemy No. 1; the elimination of the Turkish Cypriots from government in Cyprus was a prerequisite for the success of EOKA. Under pressure from EOKA, the Greek Cypriot parliamentary deputies refused from the time the Constitution came into force to negotiate with their Turkish colleagues in

regard to the joint taxation and organizational laws envisaged in the constitution. All they were in essentials prepared to do was to accept the confirmation of their majority decisions by the Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriot officials refused to co-operate loyally in the setting up of separate Greek and Turkish municipal administrations, for which the constitution had made provision, in the five large towns of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot President of the Republic refused to allow the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President anything approaching the influence on Cypriot foreign policy which was guaranteed to him in the Constitution.

As the part played by the Cypriot delegation to the United Nations at the beginning of 1964 showed very clearly, this foreign policy was aimed at Greek domination in Cyprus, an aim which was inconsistent with the Constitution. When at last one of the violations of the Constitution by the Greek Cypriots of the gravest political consequence to the Turkish Cypriots, namely a violation of the constitutional provision for separate Greek and Turkish municipal administrations in the five towns, was brought before the Supreme Constitutional Court of the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots lost their case. But even before, and all the more after the judgement given in April 1963, the Greek part of the Cypriot government announced that they would ignore the decision. This meant that the violation of the Constitution had now become officially judicially notorious, and that the only independent instance in Cyprus before which disputes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots could be brought, the Supreme Constitutional Court, had been rendered impotent.

On 4th December, 1963, the Greek Cypriot President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, officially announced his revolutionary plans to the guaranteeing powers, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey. When, under these circumstances, Greek Cypriot para-military irregular groups of EOKA began, around Christmas 1963, to carry out Turkish pogroms all over Cyprus in comprehensive, carefully planned operations, the organization of which had been prepared long in advance, and in which dozens, (mean while hundreds) of their Turkish compatriots — including women, old people, children and cripples — were slaughtered, the Turkish Cypriots entered the fight and defended themselves for months with the courage of desperation.



No serious doubts can arise in respect of the legal binding force of the agreements of 1959 and 1960. It is true that international law recognizes the lapse of the basis of agreements as a legal ground for the dissolution of contractual obligations, and agreements under international law may, as an exception, lack binding force, should they have been concluded under compulsion or should their contents conflict entirely with political actuality. This can however under no circumstances apply to the Cyprus agreements. The Constitution agreed upon may, perhaps, not be regarded as politically just in all respects, and it may be granted that the Greek Cypriots got the worst of the bargain. But it is an enormous exaggeration to speak for this reason of an inapplicable or even a fundamentally inappropriate Constitution. The only decisive pressure to which the partners were subjected in the matter of the acceptance of the Cyprus agreements was the pressure of their own interests in the rights which were to be granted to them by these agreements, or to the respective Cypriot national groups with which they were allied.

Breakers of contracts and revolutionaries act illegally as long as no new, consolidated and general order has been established, and as long as the usurpatory power has not finally asserted itself. As long as the revolution of the Greek Cypriots is not successful, and the Turkish Cypriots can manage to defend their Constitutional right of self-determination successfully the appeal of the Greek Cypriots to some sort of «normative force of actual fact» and to the right of success is an anticipation of a future they hope for, to which no more than the value of a political ideal and propaganda slogan can be attributed. Therefore as long as the Makarios «government», which since December 1963 has become responsible for the Greek Cypriot coup d'état aiming at the forcible suppression of the Turkish Cypriots, does not succeed in assuming governmental authority over the whole of Cyprus within the meaning of the principle of effectivity under international law, its de facto recognition by the United Nations and certain states is dubious in international law.

The violent attempt of the Greek Cypriots to overthrow the Constitution also cannot be justified politically or historically. Were it true that the Constitution of 1960 made it possible for the Turkish minority to oppress the Greek majority, although according to this Constitution the majority never enjoys less but in all important respects more rights than the minority, how much more must the minority fear suppression by the majority, as it is being denied even those rights which were accorded to it under this Constitution equally with the allegedly oppressed majority! According to the Constitution of 1960 the status of equality of the Turkish minority in Cyprus is restricted to certain official functions. But even within the framework of this partial equality of status the majority retained its natural political, sociological and economic ascendancy, and was able to increase this ascendancy still further in the period after 1960. It is the majority argument in particular, therefore, which speaks against the revolution of the Greek Cypriots: the majority is far better able to accept equality of status than the minority. In this connection majority and minority are not to be understood in the sense of the democratic principle, which the Greek Cypriots are therefore not able to put forward in defence of their point of view. One can never speak of democratic rule where a national group, the members of which are a constant factor, is permanently subjected to a majority of similar constancy, which is basically different from the minority in national customs, religion and claim to unrestricted rule. The principle of democratic majority rule can only be applied where the aims of domestic policy are uniform and based upon fundamental political equality or at least equal chances for all citizens. It presupposes that the group to which the individual citizen belongs constantly changes from majority to minority and vice versa, or at least that such a change is possible at any time not only in theory. It is specifically these conditions which do not exist in Cyprus in the relationship between Greeks and Turks.

In order to make co-government by the Turkish Cypriots possible, it is scarcely possible under these circumstances to conceive of any other guarantees than those contained in the Constitution of 1960. In so far, however, as the Greek Cypriots try to claim that national minorities are never granted equality of political status by the states in which they live, in the sense of the Cypriot Constitution of 1960, their argument is based

upon the *petitio principii* that Cyprus is a Greek country. This allegation naturally provokes the contrary assertion on the part of the Turks that Cyprus is much rather a part of Turkey, so that in truth the Greek Cypriots must be regarded as a national minority.

A further objection made to the Constitution of 1960 is that a community composed of opposing nationalities in the proportion of one to four cannot be expected to govern itself by a system under which important political and legislative measures can be taken only by mutual agreement, and that such an expectation is particularly unrealistic in the case of Cyprus, because the Cypriots are not even experienced in normal parliamentary and democratic self government. This objection has not been confirmed by actual developments in Cyprus between 1960 and 1963. During this peaceful period economy and culture experienced a surprising upswing. The achievements of the government, the administrative organs and the judiciary sufficed as basis for this development. Legislative tasks were, in the main, likely to arise only in the future, because a codification of British colonial law which suffices for all practical needs continued to be in force for the time being. Only in individual cases has the refusal of the Greek Cypriots to collaborate with their Turkish countrymen led to serious difficulties in official life. This applies in particular to the failure to achieve a joint legislation on taxation and a constitutional municipal administrative law. Separate collection of taxes for Greeks and Turks, however, remained possible to a large extent both legally and in practice, so that the lack of an overall legislation on taxation could in part be compensated. This failure to achieve a joint legislation was not due to the incompetency of those concerned, but to the fact that the ruling group of Greek Cypriots made no serious effort to co-operate or arrive at a compromise, but insisted with growing determination on ignoring and abolishing the existing Constitution. For this reason the practicability of the Constitution could never be tested. The reason for its failure is rather due to the lack of good will to make use of it.

Wherever, on the other hand, the Constitution of 1960 was put into application, despite the anti-constitutional strivings of 1960 to 1963, it stood the test. This is evidenced by the four

volumes of the collection of decisions of the Supreme Constitutional Court of the Republic of Cyprus.

The legal institution of contract would be untenable if unfavourable parts of a contract were not to be considered valid. It may be true that the Cypriot Constitution of 1960, and so the agreements on Cyprus, are detrimental to the Greek Cypriots on some points. But this disadvantage bears relatively slight political weight. In regard to the complaint of the Greek Cypriots, for example, that, although they constitute some 80 per cent of the population, they were given only 70 per cent of the posts in public services, the prominent Cypriot industrialist Lanitis, in a reasonable and courageous article published in an English-Cypriot newspaper at the beginning of 1963, pointed out that this allocation of the posts in the public services enabled the Greek Cypriots to play a considerably more prominent part in the economy than do the Turkish Cypriots, because the proportion of persons suitable for leading positions is naturally somewhat restricted in both sectors of the population.

If Greece and the Greek Cypriots had employed every diplomatic means to assert their claims to a change in the 1959 and 1960 agreements on Cyprus, no objection could have been made. If they had remained basically loyal to the Constitution, it would have probably even been possible in the course of time to effect a change in the Constitution to the advantage of the Greek Cypriots through political channels. But through its disregard of law and the agreements the Greek side has put itself in the wrong. One may respect the struggle of the Greek Cypriots for dominance of the region in which they live as the expression of an idealism — albeit a mistaken one — in so far as it is carried on in a chivalrous and responsible manner. But their fight cannot be justified either legally, politically or historically. This is, at the same time, an expression of opinion with regard to the policy of Greece. Should this policy be successful there is the danger that it would set an example, and that, when the next conflict arose in connection with the western system of peace, other western states would also ignore agreements and justice, in order to further their interests, which had not found understanding with all means, including violence.