

WANG MING

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MAO'S

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


This is the last of the writings to come from the pen of Wang Ming (1904-1974), faithful son of the Chinese people and prominent personality of the Communist Party of China and the world communist movement. The book is based on documentary evidence and the writer's own memories, and shows that until the day of his death in September 1976 Mao Tse-tung had schemed against Marxism-Leninism and internationalism, undermining the ideological and organisational pillars of the Communist Party of China.

Wang Ming shows how the Chinese leaders led matters up to a rupture with the socialist countries and the world communist movement, and how they drifted to collusion with the world's reactionary forces.

The book abounds in facts shedding new light on the contemporary Chinese political scene.

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*Translated
by Vic Schneerson*



PROGRESS PUBLISHERS
MOSCOW

Ван Мин

ПРЕДАТЕЛЬСТВО МАО ЦЗЭ-ДУНА

На английском языке

© Политиздат 1975

English translation © Progress Publishers 1979

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

B 10302-419
014(01)-79 39-79

0302090000

CONTENTS

<i>A Short Foreword</i>	5
I. FIFTY YEARS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA	7
II. "CAMPAIGN FOR THE RECTIFICATION OF STYLE"— DRESS REHEARSAL OF THE "CULTURAL REVOLU- TION"	15
1. The Preparatory First Period of the "Style Rectifica- tion" Campaign	16
2. The Second Period of "Style Rectification"	54
3. The Third Period—"Emergency Salvation"	118
4. The Fourth Period—"Self-Refutation and Rehabilita- tion"	148
5. The Fifth Period—"Summing up"	152
III. THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND THE MAOIST BID FOR COOPERATION WITH IMPERIALISM	164
1. "Cultural Revolution" in Name and Counter-Revolu- tionary Coup in Substance	164
2. Cooperation with Imperialism Is a Component of Mao's Counter-Revolutionary Coup	170
3. The Beginning of the Present Maoist Line of Co- operation with Imperialism	173
4. The Basic Reasons for Mao's Disgrace	195
IV. THE FATE OF THE "LONE MONK" AND THE MAO- IST 10TH CONGRESS	197
1. Why Mao Tse-tung Became a "Lone Monk"	197
2. The Home and Foreign Policy of the Maoist 10th Congress	204
3. Mao Tse-tung and Chin Shih Huang	224
<i>Afterword</i>	277

A SHORT FOREWORD

The first and second parts of this book, "Fifty Years of the Communist Party of China" and "Campaign for the Rectification of Style—Dress Rehearsal of the 'Cultural Revolution'", are taken from an article I wrote in 1971 on the 50th anniversary of the CPC. The third part, "'Cultural Revolution' and the Maoist Bid for Cooperation with Imperialism", was written in the autumn of 1971 to explain the "sudden reversal" in Mao's relations with the United States. Due to ill health I could not finish the manuscripts. Later, when health permitted, I continued my work. The fourth part, "The Fate of the 'Lone Monk' and the Maoist Tenth Congress", was written in the beginning of 1974.

Joining these four manuscripts under one head follows the logic of the events. Certainly, it was not accidental that Mao * betrayed Communism and the Revolution. His ultimate treason crowned a long succession of crimes. A decisive part in the chain of events leading to his apostasy was played by his reactionary "campaign for the rectification of the style of work" in the early half of the forties and by the "cultural revolution" launched in the latter half of the sixties and continuing in altered form today. Due to his counter-revolutionary turnabout, Mao won favour with extreme reactionary imperialist groups, while in the eyes of the true Chinese Communists, in the eyes of the whole people of China, and in the eyes of the world communist and anti-imperialist movements he is a despicable traitor. He knows that he is alone, abandoned

* Mao Tse-tung died at the age of 82 in Peking on 9 September 1976.

and rejected by even his once closest followers. It was this that made him say to Edgar Snow when seeing him off in the spring of 1971 that he is "a lone monk walking the world with a leaky umbrella".

The concluding part of this book deals with the latest events in China. It touches on the following questions: why has Mao become a "lone monk"; the home and foreign policy decisions of the Maoist 10th CPC Congress; why does Mao glorify Chin Shih Huang, attack Confucius, and abuse the name of Lu Hsun; Mao's second "cultural revolution" under the signboard of criticising Lin Piao and Confucius.

I am quite sure that the "lone monk" is doomed to "final, clear and complete" * defeat. This prediction needs no proof. It is predetermined by history. The Chinese Communists and the people of China are sure to throw off Mao's reactionary rule to take command of their country's destiny and build their bright and happy socialist future. This conclusion follows from the inexorable laws of history.

23 March 1974

* Mao's own favourite phrase.

I FIFTY YEARS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

On 1 July 1971 the Communist Party of China was 50 years old.

It is a Marxist-Leninist party, the vanguard of the Chinese working class. Under guidance of the Communist International and with the all-round help and support of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union it headed the long, arduous, heroic, armed and unarmed, legal and underground revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people.

Many were the splendid fighters and national heroes who grew up in the bitter contest for national and social liberation in conditions of brutal white terror and exceedingly difficult revolutionary wars. Many have laid down their lives for the cause of the Party and revolution. May their memory live forever. *

Soon after the founding of the Party, during the Peking-Hankow Railway strike of 7 February 1923 against the abuses of the Peiyang warlords, the strikers and their leaders displayed the astonishing fearlessness and mass heroism typical of the working class and its vanguard. After the enemy had chopped off his left hand, trying to compel him to order the workers back to work, Lin Hsiang-chien, chairman of the Peking-Hankow Railway Workers' Union, said: "You can chop off my head, I will not order the men back to work." Lin died a hero's death, followed to the grave by lawyer Shih Yang, who represented the striking workers and chose death to bowing before his tormentors.

* The list of fallen comrades given here was drawn up from memory and available material.

The following met a heroic death in 1925-1927, during the memorable anti-imperialist May Thirtieth Movement (1925)*: Ku Chen-hung, who headed the strike at Japanese-owned textile mills in Shanghai; Ho Peng-i, organiser of a demonstration of Shanghai University students; Liu Hua, chairman of the General Trade Union Council of Shanghai, who headed a general strike of half a million Shanghai workers.

And the following laid down their lives fighting national and class enemies: Chi Shu-feng, prominent economist and author of the well-known book, *China under the Hobnailed Boot of Imperialism*, who organised an anti-imperialist demonstration in Wanhhsien; Chen Tsan-hsien, chairman of the General Trade Union Council of Kiangsi province; Lo I-nung and Chao Shih-yen, leaders of the third armed uprising of Shanghai workers; Wang Shou-hua, chairman of the General Trade Union Council of Shanghai; Li Ta-chao, one of the Party's first theorists of Marxism-Leninism and its outstanding leader; Chiang Hsien-yun, commander of a regiment consisting mostly of Communists, which heroically stormed and captured the fortress of Chengchow held by a large force of Manchurian warlords; Kuo Liang, prominent peasant leader in Hunan province; Hsien Chin-yu, popular leader of the women's movement, secretary of the Party's Hankow city committee and member of the Central Committee; Hsiao Chu-nu, popular youth leader; Ma Chun, a leader of the May Fourth Movement (1919), member of the CPC from 1924, worked among the Dungans, and later was secretary of the Party's Peking city committee; the brothers Chen Yen-nien and Chen Chiao-nien, both members of the Party's Politbureau, arrested together and executed together; Chang Tai-lei, senior political and military leader of the Kwangchow (Canton) uprising and head of the Kwangchow Soviet government, member of the Party's Central Committee, and many other comrades.

Many comrades fell during the agrarian revolution and the anti-Japanese local war of 1928-1937, among them Su Chao-cheng, leader of the big 1925-1926 strike in Kwangtung province and Hongkong; he was elected chair-

man of the Kwangchow Soviet government* (during the Kwangchow uprising), was a member of the Party's Politbureau, died from overstrain; Chang Kun-ti (secretary of the Party's Kwangtung provincial committee) and his wife Wang Lan-ying (chief of the provincial committee's women's department), who met their death side by side, showing great courage.

Treachery and betrayal resulted in the heroic death of Peng Pai, prominent peasant leader, chairman of the Heilufeng Soviet government and member of the Party's Politbureau; Yang Ying, organiser of the great Kwangchow-Hongkong strike, member of the Kwangchow Soviet government, and alternate member of the Politbureau in charge of combatting counter-revolution; Chang Kuo-shu, secretary of the Party's Kiangsi provincial committee and his wife Yen Pi-fang, head of the committee's women's department.

At the time of the Li Li-sen line hundreds of the Party's finest military and political cadres were sent to various large and medium cities to organise uprisings, and there met a heroic death. Among them were Wu Chen-pen, Mao Chun-fan, Liu Yun, Chen Chi-ko, Ho Kun-jung, Wang Pu-wen, Chen Te-chen, Hu Chin-chai, Tung Jih-chang, Wang Tzu-ping, Lin Chen-tsiu, and Tang Yu-kun. Many others fell, too: Lo Teng-hsien, a popular workers' leader and member of the Party's Politbureau; Lin Yunnan and Li Chiu-shih, leaders of the Chinese YCL; the well-known writers Hu Yeh-ping and Jou Shih, active as party cadres in literature and art; Ying Fu, a young but already famous proletarian poet; Tsai Ho-sen, member of the Party's Politbureau; Yun Tai-ying, prominent organiser of the youth movement and member of the Party's Central Committee; Huang Kung-lueh, commander of the 3rd Red Army; Lu I, political commissar of the 2nd Red Army; Mo Ping-lan, chief of the women's department of the Party's Kwangsi provincial committee, and leader of the women's movement among the Chuang ethnic group; Tung Chiang-jung and Po Yang, secretaries of the Party's Manchurian provincial committee; Ho Ssu-mei, leader of anti-Japanese guerrilla groups in Manchuria; Fu Wei-yu, commander of the Shanghai workers' volun-

* The names are given in chronological order according to the date of death.

* At that time Su Chao-cheng was in Shanghai and, since the Kwangchow Soviet government survived for only three days, did not assume office.

teer unit in the battle for Shanghai and Woosung against the Japanese, and his deputy, Sun Hsiao-pao; Teng Chung-hsia, a pioneer leader of the Chinese trade union movement, organiser of the February Seventh Strike (1923) and of the Kwangtung and Hongkong (1925-1926) strikes, member of the Party's Central Committee; Chen Yun-tao, secretary of the CC CPC Bureau for North China and chairman of the All-China Trade Union Council; Huang Li, secretary of the Party's Kiangsu provincial and Shanghai city committees; Shen Tse-ming, deputy secretary of the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei branch of the CC CPC Bureau for Soviet areas, secretary of the Party's Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei provincial committee, and member of the Central Committee; Ho Tsu-shu, active in combatting the Li Li-sen line, a gifted organiser of the masses; Chao Po-sheng, commander of the Red Army's 5th Army Corps; Chi Hung-chang, commander of the 2nd Army of the Chahar-Suiyuan Anti-Japanese Union Army, commander of the latter's northern sector, and leader of the North China people's anti-Japanese committee for armed self-defence; Nieh Erh, China's first proletarian composer; Hsia Hsi, member of the Party's Central Committee and secretary of the CC CPC Bureau for Soviet areas branch in the western districts of Hunan and Hupeh; Tsyui Tsyu-po, prominent Party functionary, writer, and minister of education in the Chinese Soviet Republic; Ho Shu-heng, delegate to the 1st Congress of the CPC and chief of the central worker-peasant inspection of the Chinese Soviet Republic; Chung Yu, leader of a special (security) branch unit of the CC CPC who displayed courage beyond compare in fighting traitors and enemy agents; Chien Chuang-fei, who infiltrated the enemy's secret police and performed many important services for the Party's Central Committee; Fang Chih-min, founder of the Soviet area in the north-east of Kiangsi province, commander of the 10th Red Army; Hsun Huai-chou, commander of the 7th Red Army; Ho Chang, deputy chief of the Red Army's main political department; Liu Po-chien, chief of the political department of the Red Army's 5th Army Corps; Liu Chih-tan, commander of the Red Army's 26th Army and founder of the Soviet area in the north of Shensi province; Tung Chen-tang, acting commander of the western sector of the Red Army, commander of the 5th Army Corps; Ying Chien, head of the CC CPC North

China Bureau's organisational department, and many other comrades.

The following fell in the anti-Japanese war of 1937-1945: Tso Chuan, deputy chief of the 8th Army general headquarters; Hsiang Ying, prominent workers' leader and CPC functionary, deputy commander of the New 4th Army, member of the Party's Politbureau; Yuan Kuo-ping, chief of the New 4th Army's political department; Lo Ping-hui and Peng Hsueh-feng, commanders of New 4th Army formations; Chang Wen-ping, secretary of the Party's Kwangtung provincial committee, and Red Army veteran; Chen Tan-chiu, delegate to the 1st Congress of the CPC, member of the Party's Central Auditing Commission, and minister of food in the Chinese Soviet Republic; Yang Chin-yu, commander-in-chief of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Union Army and commander of the 1st Army; Chao Shang-chih, deputy commander-in-chief and commander of the 3rd Army; Tsai Shih-jung, commander of the 6th Army; Chao I-mang, regimental commissar and heroine of the anti-Japanese war, and many other comrades.

The following died during the cease-fire and the liberation war of 1946-1949. Prominent Party leader Chin Pang-hsien (Po Ku), Teng Fa, chairman of the State Political Department of the Chinese Soviet Republic and member of the Politbureau, Central Committee member Wang Jo-fei, and commander of the New 4th Army Yeh Ting died on 8 April 1946. Chu Jui, artillery commander of the People's Liberation Army, and many other comrades died in 1947. Lo Shih-wen and Che Yao-hsien, leaders of the Party's Szechuan provincial committee active in the united national anti-Japanese front of Szechuan, and many others, died in 1949.

This is an incomplete list of Communists, YCLers, revolutionary workers and peasants, intellectuals and students who gave their lives for the lofty ideals of the revolutionary struggle. Many internationalists from the Soviet Union, too, died heroically for the Chinese revolution. May their memory live forever.

Millions of revolutionary fighters inside and outside the Party took part in the heroic 28-year-long revolutionary struggle. Thousands of men and women were reared in the struggle to become the Party's leading nucleus and backbone. As a result, the CPC became a mass party,

which, furthermore, built a strong revolutionary army. This enabled it to offer leadership to many hundreds of millions of people and, with all-round Soviet assistance, to consummate the Chinese revolution. Not only did it successfully perform the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution, but it also put China on the path of socialist revolution and the building of socialism.

Those were glorious chapters inscribed by the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people in the country's 5,000-year history, and their magnificent contribution to the world revolutionary movement.

Under guidance of the Communist International and with the help of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with Leninist internationalists in the vanguard, armed with the theory and tactics of Leninism, the Communist Party of China won victory after victory in different periods of the Chinese revolution over various anti-Leninist ideas and lines. It overcame difficulties and obstacles, and continuously grew stronger.

In the summer of 1927 the Party grappled with the right-opportunism of Chen Tu-hsiu; in the spring and summer of 1928 it squashed the "left" putschist line of the November 1927 Central Committee Plenum; in the autumn of 1929 it put an end to the activity of the Trotskyite-Chen Tu-hsiu group of liquidators (who aimed at dissolving the Party), and in 1930-1931 it defeated the semi-Trotskyite Li Li-sen line and the counter-revolutionary Lo Chang-lung group. And in all periods, especially since the thirties, it continuously came to grips in long, intricate and difficult struggles with the anti-Leninist, anti-Comintern, anti-Party, anti-Soviet, and anti-people political "thoughts" and lines of Mao Tse-tung. This and only this enabled the Party to further the Chinese revolution and bring it to victory, as it also enabled the People's Republic of China to make considerable progress in building socialism with the aid of the Soviet Union.

And yet, the victories scored by Leninist ideas and the Leninist political line over the "thoughts" and line of Mao Tse-tung in different periods of the Chinese revolution are only one side of the picture. The other side consists in crimes committed by Mao in the course of the Chinese revolution. For example, after usurping military power in the Party at the CC CPC Politbureau meeting in Tsunyi in January 1935, Mao did unprecedented

damage to the CPC and the Party-led Chinese Red Army. In the early half of the forties, Mao launched a reactionary "campaign for the rectification of the style of work". This was directed against Marxism-Leninism, the Comintern, and the Soviet Union, and inflicted terrible ideological, theoretical, political and organisational damage on the CPC. At the 2nd Plenum of the Seventh CPC Central Committee in 1949 Mao replaced Leninist ideas and the Leninist line with the ideas and the line of "new democracy". In the late fifties and early sixties his adventurist "big leap" policy and the institution of people's communes set China on a course of political reaction and economic bankruptcy. The living standard and cultural life of the Chinese people deteriorated. Then, from the beginning of the sixties, Mao's home and foreign policy based on anti-Sovietism and anti-communism finally led to a counter-revolutionary coup, worked by Mao under the guise of a "cultural revolution". This counter-revolutionary putsch was an unheard-of calamity for Party and people, and did grave harm to the world socialist system, the world communist movement, the anti-imperialist struggle, and the peace movement throughout the world.*

Following the "rectification of the style of work" campaign of the forties and throughout the past 30 years, Mao twisted, distorted and falsified the history of the Communist Party of China. An editorial article published on 1 July 1971 in *Jenminjihpao*, the journal *Hungchi* and the newspaper *Chiehfangchiunpao*, entitled "The 50th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China", written on Mao's express orders, was a new collection of lies and slanders, a new falsification of the history of the CPC, and a further step along the course of anti-Sovietism and anti-communism, "glorifying" Mao Tse-tung. Only a man completely devoid of shame could inspire so foolish and shabby an article. Mao made no mention of the fallen heroes of the revolution, and this was not accidental. The traitor to Party and revolution did not want—and indeed had no moral right—to honour the memory of our dead.

The Maoist falsification of the history of the CPC was meant to portray the victory of Lenin's ideas and the Leninist line in China as a triumph for the "thoughts"

* To avoid repetition, I refer the reader to *Lenin, Leninism, and the Chinese Revolution*, where I deal with these questions in connection with the centenary of the great Lenin's birth.

and line of Mao Tse-tung. The arduous struggles and glorious victories of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people under guidance of the Comintern and with the aid of the Soviet Communist Party and Soviet Union, were depicted by Mao as his own, personal doing. His fallacious "thoughts", line and policy were passed off as "absolutely correct". Mao shifted on others the blame for his own mistakes and crimes, and to make assurance doubly sure systematically fabricated "crimes" allegedly committed by his political opponents in the Party.

By these methods he sought to win credit for himself and to discredit and defame others. He falsified the history of the CPC in every conceivable manner to depreciate Leninism, the Comintern, and the Soviet Union, and to replace revolutionary Marxism-Leninism with counter-revolutionary Maoism. By so doing he sought to deify his own person and to usurp supreme political power in Party and country. Then, at a "propitious moment", he would use this power to commit rank treachery against Party, state and people, and take a disgraceful course of action on the international scene against the Soviet Union, the communist parties of other countries, and the national liberation movement. This earned him favour with imperialists and other reactionaries. In 1966 and later, behind the screen of a "cultural revolution", Mao performed a counter-revolutionary coup. Thereafter, he openly took the road of national betrayal, seeking rapprochement and cooperation with imperialist forces and revealing his true face, so carefully concealed for many years, to the whole world.

To understand the reason for the fall and disgrace of Mao Tse-tung, we must in addition to what has already been said examine more closely the historical roots of his betrayal, for they, and more specifically his "campaign for the rectification of the style of work" in the forties, have a direct and close bearing on current events. As later developments showed, this "rectification of style" campaign was a dress rehearsal of the "cultural revolution". So, to understand the "cultural revolution" we must have a clear idea of this campaign.

II "CAMPAIGN FOR THE RECTIFICATION OF STYLE"—DRESS REHEARSAL OF THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

At the end of the summer and the beginning of the autumn of 1941 Mao Tse-tung took advantage of the international situation following on the Nazi attack on the USSR and the temporary setbacks of the Soviet Army, and of the relative majority he had managed to build by that time in the CC CPC, to mount the "campaign for the rectification of the style of work", secret preparations for which he had begun in the autumn of 1938. In so doing, he relied on the CC CPC guard regiment which was subordinate to him as chairman of the CPC military council.

The campaign lasted for four years—from the autumn of 1941 until the summer of 1945, with five distinct periods:

- 1) the preparatory period (September 1941-February 1942);
- 2) the period of the "rectification of style" campaign proper (February 1942-July 1943);
- 3) the period of "emergency salvation" (July 1943-summer of 1944);
- 4) the period of "self-refutations and rehabilitation" (summer of 1944-spring of 1945);
- 5) the "summing-up period" (spring of 1945-summer of 1945).

1. THE PREPARATORY FIRST PERIOD OF THE "STYLE RECTIFICATION" CAMPAIGN

During this period Mao made the following provisional moves:

1) By means of intrigues and compulsion he suspended all Party periodicals in Yenán

These included the CC CPC newspaper *Hsinchunghuapao* (New China), the CC CPC journals *Chiehfang* (Liberation) and *Kungchantangjen* (Communist), the journal of the CC CPC Women's Committee *Chungkuofunu* (Chinese Woman), the journal of the CC CPC Youth Committee *Chungkuochingnien* (China Youth), and the literary journal of the CC CPC *Chungkuowenhua* (Chinese Culture). These periodicals were suspended because they were controlled by Wang Ming, Lo Fu (Chang Wen-tien), and Kai Feng. Only the journal of the 8th Route Army, directly controlled by Mao, continued to appear, and a new daily, *Chiehfangjihpao* (Liberation), was founded, also completely under his control.

2) He closed down educational establishments

Mao removed the Anti-Japanese Military-Political School and the North Shensi Institute to the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Area, while the Yenán Women's University and the Courses for Youth Cadres were dissolved because Mao feared that the revolutionary youth enrolled in them would oppose the campaign for the "rectification of the style of work". The Central Party School and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism were nominally left intact, but cadres were being concentrated there to conduct the "style rectification" campaign.

3) He counterposed Maoism to Leninism

In the early half of 1941, Mao ordered the publication of a collection entitled, "Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin on China" (which included some Comintern documents). This was followed by a second collection, "From the 6th CPC Congress to Our Day", later renamed "Two

Lines" (which included documents of the Party's leading bodies and the works of some Party leaders—Mao in the first place, Wang Ming, Po Ku and Lo Fu). The purpose of publishing these collections in the course of the "style rectification campaign" was to bring home the idea that "only Mao's works are correct, while all other documents and works are incorrect".

From September 1941 on, in private conversations with members of the Politbureau, Mao often referred to his plan of creating Maoism. Here is the content of one of Mao's conversations with me:

"Comrade Wang Ming, I want to create Maoism. What is your opinion on this score?"

"For what purpose?"

"If a leader has no 'ism' of his own, he can be overthrown during his lifetime, and may even be attacked after death. With an 'ism' the situation is different. Marx has Marxism and though the Second International split into many groups, none dared to go against Marx and Marxism. Lenin has Leninism and though there were many groups and currents in the Third International and the Bolshevik Party, none acted openly against Lenin and Leninism. Sun Yat-sen has Sun Yat-senism and though there is turmoil and a great number of groups in the Kuomintang, none dares to go against Sun Yat-sen and Sun Yat-senism. If I do not create my own 'ism', I may be overthrown even though the 7th CPC Congress elects me chairman of the Central Committee."

I replied:

"It is not true that an 'ism' is a guarantee against being overthrown. Indeed, if the 'ism' is wrong, one can fall very quickly. Trotsky and Chen Tu-hsiu had their 'isms', but didn't they both come a cropper? Like the communist parties of other countries, the Communist Party of China is guided by Marxism-Leninism. Why 'stoke a separate furnace' and create an 'ism'?"

"By creating Maoism I shall preserve Marxism," said Mao Tse-tung. "All I reject is Leninism. My approach is the following: Leninism is Russian Marxism, a blend of the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Russian revolution; Maoism is Chinese or Sinified Marxism, a blend of the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution."

I tried to explain:

"What you say is untenable theoretically and also in practice. To contrast Leninism to Marxism, to accept Marxism and reject Leninism—this was deliberately done by leaders of the Second International and bourgeois scholars, who in fact reject both Leninism and Marxism. We Communists cannot do this. For us Leninism is the Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. In other words, Leninism is Marxism as it continues to develop in the new epoch. To Sinify Marxism is wrong. The very approach is un-Marxist. There are no national Marxisms, nor can there be. Marxism is and always will be an international teaching. Since you have raised this important topic, let me sincerely say: your approach is harmful not only for the world communist movement and the Communist Party of China, but will also do no good to you personally. I beg you to think long and seriously. There is no need for any Maoism."

"How can this be so?" Mao said. "Haven't I quite sincerely told you that if a man has no 'ism' of his own, he usually comes a cropper?"

"In that case, which of your writings could be used as the basis for Maoism?" I asked.

"Why—new democracy is Maoism. My book *On New Democracy* is the first and basic theoretical product of Maoism. It was for this purpose that I wrote it in 1939. But at that time I could not say so openly: now I can."

Thereupon I said:

"You will surely recall that when you showed your rough copy of *On New Democracy* to the Politbureau comrades I spoke to you twice and criticised both the title and the content. I said that *On New Democracy* is contrary to Leninism in practically all the cardinal issues of the Chinese revolution (assessment of the character of the revolution, its stages, motive forces, and perspectives, the question of hegemony, etc.). Whatever you may wish it to be, 'new democracy' is in effect an anti-Leninist and anti-socialist theory and platform; it is the theory and platform of the Chinese national bourgeoisie as opposed to the non-capitalist, i.e. socialist, perspective of the Chinese revolution. Apart from talking to you, I also wrote you a letter saying that your book may be used by Trotsky and Chen Tu-hsiu against the Soviet Communists, the Comintern and the Communist Party of China. I suggested that you give some thought to correcting your

book. But though you made a few corrections and added some passages, the basic principles remained the same. So now I sincerely say to you: if you oppose Leninism with 'new democracy', you will be bound to fail. This is why I advise you to abandon the idea of creating Maoism and to give serious thought to revising your book, *On New Democracy*."

As far as I know, Mao also spoke on this subject to Jen Pi-shih, who also criticised him. But Mao turned a deaf ear to the well-meaning advice of his comrades. In the course of the "style rectification campaign" he openly proclaimed Maoism and began a drive against Leninism.

4) He falsified the history of the Tsunyi conference

Mao demanded that the Politbureau "correct" the resolution of the Tsunyi conference (January 1935). He wanted it to say that the 5th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC had committed not merely a few tactical errors (as the resolution said), but that it had set an incorrect political line. This would enable him to denounce the 5th Plenum resolution as representing what he termed the "left"-opportunist Po Ku line and to redouble his attacks on Po Ku and other comrades. More, it would enable him to claim that the Tsunyi conference had been of crucial importance. Furthermore, Mao also intended to say that the political line of the 4th Plenum of the Sixth CC CPC, which nobody in Tsunyi had dared to reject because it was directed against the Li Li-sen line and because it urged implementation of the recommendations of the Comintern, represented "Wang Ming's 'left'-opportunist line". He was also going to say that the Tsunyi conference had criticised it. Thereupon, he would tie up the line of the 4th Plenum as falsified by him with the so-called "left"-opportunist line of the 5th Plenum, and thereby establish his myth of "four years of the third 'left'-opportunist line in the Party". This would set the stage for attacking the Comintern line and Wang Ming as its chief exponent, and for asserting the "crucial historical role" of the Tsunyi conference and his own exclusive merits during and after that conference.

In fact, however, the Politbureau conference in Tsunyi in January 1935 was part of Mao's conspiracy against the correct Comintern line. The political, military and organisational course set at the Tsunyi conference was incorrect from start to finish. Mao had called the conference to usurp military power in the Party. And the political and military line pursued after the conference inflicted heavy losses and tremendous damage on the Party and the Chinese Red Army.

One of Mao's chief political and military mistakes following the Tsunyi conference was that he completely scrapped the Red Army's basic strategic slogan—"go north to resist Japanese aggression". This slogan could have won the support of the mass of the people and, what is more, the sympathy of the troops of local power-holders and even of Chiang Kai-shek's armies. Mao also scrapped the tactical slogan, "resist Japanese aggression and fight Chiang Kai-shek", which was directed to forming alliances with various local politico-military groups on the basis of joint resistance to Japanese imperialism and to Chiang Kai-shek who was evading a confrontation with the Japanese invaders and trying to destroy the Chinese Red Army and the armies of various provincial power-holders.

Ignoring the positive experience of the Chinese Red Army (at the end of 1933 and the beginning of 1934 in Fukien province Chiang Kai-shek's 19th Army had joined the Red Army to fight together against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek; besides, when in the early part of the Western March* the Red Army was crossing Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces the local warlords refrained from attacking it, and even invited it to remain), Mao issued the slogan, "seize Kweiyang and capture Wang Chia-lieh alive".** As a result, the warlords of Kweichow, Yunnan and Szechuan provinces had no choice but to join forces with Chiang Kai-shek's troops against the Communists. This dual, political and military, mistake of Mao Tse-tung, who had no idea of either strategy or tactics and who followed an extreme "left"-opportunist plan of fighting "all comers", exposed the Chinese Red Army to the attacks of the joint forces of Chiang Kai-shek and

* Also known as the Long March.—Tr.

** Wang Chia-lieh—warlord, military and political chief of Kweichow province.

the local warlords. This could have been easily avoided.

A fairly good idea of Mao's extreme leftist political and military line after the Tsunyi conference is gleaned from the following two facts inadvertently presented by Chen Yun* in his article, "The Heroic Western March".** The first was Mao's already cited Kweichow slogan, "seize Kweiyang and capture Wang Chia-lieh alive",*** and the second was the unjustifiable execution of more than 100 people ordered by Mao in one of the counties of Yunnan province. The chief of this county, Chen Yun recalled, mistook the Red Army for Chiang Kai-shek's troops, opened the city gates, and gave it a rousing reception. "We decided to keep up the game," Chen Yun writes, "and made no move to explain that ours was not a Nanking army. After a short rest we asked: 'Have you prepared food supplies and money for us?' The reply was: 'Everything has been arranged.' Then we asked for ten local people as guides. Thereupon, chiefs of various city institutions came to pay their respects. Each gave his name and office: 'I am so-and-so, chief of the guard detachment', 'I am so-and-so, chief of the security department', 'chief of the county', etc. They told us everything about themselves, and we naturally knew what to do with them.

"Mao Tse-tung said: 'If all our enemies had been as stupid as this Yunnan county chief, the Chinese revolution would have won long ago'. And he was certainly right."****

It is proper to explain that at this time Chen Yun held that Mao had acted correctly. This was why he mentioned the incident in his article. Before submitting the article to the editors of the journal, Chen Yun showed it to me. And on reading it I suggested changes of two kinds to protect the good name of the Party and Red Army. He agreed. First, instead of the resounding phrase, "seize Kweiyang and capture Wang Chia-lieh alive", etc., he put, "take Wang Chia-lieh prisoner". Second, three more changes were made: a) instead of naming the county, he put "in a certain county"; b) instead of saying that

* At that time a member of the CC CPC Politbureau.

** *Communist International* (Chinese-language edition) No. 1-2, 1936, p. 50.

*** Ibid.

**** Ibid., pp. 54-55.

the gentry (*shenshi*), representatives of the merchants' association, other citizens, *shenshi* elders and representatives of neighbouring villages—all in all more than 100 people—had come to pay their respects, Chen Yun wrote, "several people"; c) in place of "Comrade Mao Tse-tung naturally knew what to do with them: he ordered all of them to be executed", he put, as cited earlier, "we naturally knew what to do with them."

Chen Yun wrote that Mao was very pleased with himself. This meant that he did not realise how foolishly he had behaved, and that he was unaware of the probable political and military consequences. The Red Army leaders should obviously have used the opportunity to explain to the officials, the gentry and the people of the county the true aims of the Red Army's march across the Southwestern provinces to North China. They should have explained that the Red Army was heading north to repulse the Japanese aggression, and that it was compelled to fight off Chiang Kai-shek's troops because instead of resisting the Japanese invaders he kept attacking the Red Army and local armed forces. They should also have explained that the Red Army had no intention of falling out with the local authorities and people. We could thus have let the leaders of the provinces know where we stood, informed the local population of the Red Army's policy, reduced possible resistance, and persuaded the local authorities not to regard Chiang Kai-shek as a possible ally.

As a result of Mao's two blunders, the local authorities and the population of Kweichow and Yunnan provinces, and also of Szechuan and Sikang provinces, became deeply suspicious of the Chinese Red Army. This helped Chiang Kai-shek to win over the local authorities and to use them against the Communists. For the Red Army, on the other hand, it created unfavourable conditions and led to losses that could have been easily avoided.

At that time, Chen Yun was a supporter of Mao Tse-tung. The main purpose of his article was to present Mao in a favourable light. So, some of his passages contained inevitable contradictions and exaggerations. All the same, contrary to the author's intentions, the article is a valuable historical document. If we compare the facts pertaining to the situation of the Red Army from the beginning of the Western March to its arrival in Tsunyi as

given in Chen Yun's article with the history of the Tsunyi conference as fabricated by Mao during the "style rectification campaign", we shall see many fundamental disparities. Chen Yun's article, which is based on historical facts, describes the actual state of affairs, while Mao's version is a wholesale fabrication. This is why Chen Yun's article can be accepted as fairly reliable evidence disproving Mao's version.

Another of Mao's political and military mistakes was that after the Tsunyi conference he flouted the correct Comintern plan of preserving the strength of the Red Army of the central Soviet area during its Western March to large, rich and densely populated Szechuan province, where it was to join forces with the 4th Front of the Red Army (already there) and create a new large base. The 1st, 3rd and 5th army corps of the Red Army of the central Soviet area, of which Mao had taken charge after the Tsunyi conference, made senseless marches one day to Kweichow, another to Yunnan, seeking reckless engagements with the enemy. The right thing would have been to evade battle and preserve manpower. In fact, preserving the Red Army's strength was the chief purpose of the march from Kiangsi to Szechuan. In a telegram to the CC CPC, the Comintern specially emphasised that it was most important to maintain the strength of the Red Army. This, the telegram said, was even more important than maintaining bases, because by preserving the Red Army it would be possible in due course to set up a new, larger Soviet base on arriving in Szechuan.

Before the Tsunyi conference, Po Ku, Chou En-lai, and other comrades who followed this correct Comintern policy, avoided unnecessary engagements with Chiang Kai-shek's troops. They explained the slogan, "resist Japan and fight Chiang Kai-shek", to local groups and advanced without combat. The maximum was done to preserve the Red Army, which was expected to set up a new, large Soviet area in Szechuan, and to prime for the struggle against Japanese aggression. But at the Tsunyi conference Mao attacked the correct Comintern course, describing it as a tactic of "right-opportunist flight", "reluctance to fight", and the like, though history shows the political and military line set by the Comintern for the Western March to have been correct, and Mao's political and military line following the Tsunyi conference to have

been incorrect. It caused heavy, perfectly avoidable, losses to the 1st, 3rd and 5th army corps of the Red Army.

The main Red Army forces of the central Soviet area had nearly 80,000 men when it set out on the Western March on 16 October 1934. By the beginning of January 1935 (the time of the Tsunyi conference), that is, two and a half months later, there remained approximately 48,000 men. Losses thus totalled some 32,000. According to Po Ku (Hankow, 1938), Teng Fa, Wang Chia-hsiang* (Moscow, 1936) and other comrades at different times, the army had lost men not as a result of fighting, but mainly due to the desertion of about 30,000 men recruited a few months before. There were only a few engagements before the Tsunyi conference, and none at all during the advance along the borders of Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces. Chiang Kai-shek did not learn of the withdrawal of the main Red Army force until 24 October, when he quickly sent troops in pursuit. But since he did not know the direction of the Red Army's march, and since he could not enter Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces, his units caught up with the Red Army on only a few occasions. The Red Army's logistical units had taken along comparatively heavy and unwieldy workshop equipment, printing presses, presses for printing money, and the like. On arriving in Tsunyi, the Red Army stopped for a 12-day rest, because enemy activity was not especially serious.

But after the Tsunyi conference, in a matter of two weeks foolhardy engagements and marches ordered by Mao reduced the army from 48,000 men to 22,000, losses totalling 26,000.

It was part of Mao's political and military treachery that on two occasions—in Aba in June 1935 and in Maoerhkai in September 1935—he tried to provoke splits in the Party and Red Army, thus inflicting unprecedented damage.

The events that had all but precipitated a split in Aba (Szechuan province), developed as follows.

The 4th Front stationed in the Szechuan-Shensi Soviet area and the 1st, 3rd and 5th army corps making the Western March met in Aba. The 4th Front had more

than 100,000 men, the 1st, 3rd and 5th corps only about 20,000. Teng Fa reports that Mao wanted to "swallow" the 4th Front. He persuaded Lo Fu to write an article for the wall newspaper, blaming the 4th Front commanders for right-opportunist mistakes. There was a very strong reaction, which all but ended in an outright split. Leaders and cadres on both sides conferred over the issue for nearly 10 days. As a result, Mao was compelled to admit the error of his ways and hand over the duties of general commissar of the Red Army to Chang Kuo-tao. Chu Teh, too, relinquished the post of commander-in-chief to Hsu Hsiang-chien and was made his deputy, while Wang Chia-hsiang relinquished the post of head of the Main Political Department to Chen Chang-hao, and became the latter's deputy. After repeatedly confessing and repenting his mistakes, Lo Fu managed to retain the post of general secretary of the Central Committee. A Politbureau meeting co-opted Hsu Hsiang-chien and Chen Chang-hao as members. This was the price for averting a split. The leaders of the two sides decided that the Red Army should continue the march West in two columns. The first to set out were part of the 4th Front and the 1st and 3rd army corps. They formed an advance column under Hsu Hsiang-chien and Chen Chang-hao, and were followed by another part of the 4th Front and by the 5th army corps, which formed a second column under Chang Kuo-tao and Chu Teh. But in September, on reaching Maoerhkai (Szechuan province), and again off his own bat, Mao suddenly began to move the troops, and once more brought matters to the brink of a split.

When the first column came to Maoerhkai, Mao defied the decision of the Politbureau and the Central Committee's military council concerning the joint advance north of the 1st (1st, 3rd and 5th army corps) and 4th fronts, and one night ordered the 1st and 3rd army corps to strike camp and advance alone, without informing the 4th Front, which had marched with them up to then. More, through Mao's fault the march began in adverse conditions—logistical arrangements had not been completed (supplies of food and winter equipment were short) and requisite information had not been obtained concerning weather, and natural and other conditions in this area of mountain glaciers and swamps. As a result, the 1st and 3rd corps suffered heavier losses than other units,

* At the Tsunyi conference Teng Fa was neutral, Wang Chia-hsiang supported Mao, and Po Ku was attacked by Mao. Their evidence, therefore, merits attention.

In September 1935, when they set out, they had some 17,000 to 18,000 men, but heavy losses saw their strength shrink to 5,000. And in October, after fighting two minor engagements, and after they had managed to recruit some reinforcements, they had only 5,700 men.

The blame for these two splits falls squarely on Mao Tse-tung, though the fact that the split in Maoerhkai was used to form a second CC Political Bureau with Chang Kuo-tao at its head, which only aggravated the split in the Party and Red Army, was the fault of Chang Kuo-tao. Finally, in the autumn of 1936 Mao deliberately hindered the western column of the 4th Front from getting modern weapons from the Soviet Union, which were waiting for it in Sinkiang. The column suffered very heavy losses on this account, with only 800 out of 25,000 men finally reaching Sinkiang. Mao had withheld instructions for the western column to go to Sinkiang to get the Soviet equipment. If the column had been informed in good time (and this was quite possible, for the radio transmitters of the Central Committee's military council had regular contact with it), it would certainly have collected the Soviet aid, and in the autumn of 1937 the Japanese would have been faced by a well-equipped modern army with hundreds of thousands of men in North and Central China instead of just the 8th Route Army with 40,000 men and the New 4th with 20,000. In short, not only did Mao expose the western column to heavy losses, but he also caused tremendous harm to the Party and the Chinese revolution—a most serious crime.

The Tsunyi conference and Mao's activity during and after the conference give no grounds whatever to speak of Mao's rendering any "services" to the Party and revolution. On the contrary, he had committed extreme "left"-adventurist mistakes and anti-Party crimes.

The fact that Mao continues to boast of the "merits of the Tsunyi conference" and of his own "services" is a sign of his truly unashamed immodesty.

And yet the true facts show that even the Mao-inspired anti-Party and anti-Comintern resolution of the Politbureau conference in Tsunyi criticised the 5th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee only for "committing some tactical mistakes" and did not say that its general line was incorrect. It follows, therefore, that Mao's claim since the "rectification of style campaign" that the 5th Plenum

line was a "left-opportunist Po Ku line", is totally groundless.

As for the Comintern line of the 4th Plenum, highly popular and accepted by the entire Party, nobody in Tsunyi spoke against it. Nor would anybody have dared speak against it. In short, the version advanced during the "style rectification campaign" and propagated by Mao to this day—that the 4th Plenum line was "Wang Ming's 'left'-opportunist line"—is entirely contrary to the facts.

Mao's version that the Tsunyi conference opposed "Wang Ming's 'left'-opportunist line which had reigned in the Party for four years", that it "put an end to Wang Ming's 'left'-opportunist leadership", that it "established Mao's correct leadership", that "by the time of the Tsunyi conference (i.e. by the end of 1934) the Chinese revolution had been defeated due to the third 'left'-opportunist line", that Mao "saved the Chinese revolution", and the like—all this, from beginning to end, is Mao's fabrication. Its purpose is to magnify his person, and to strike at the Comintern leadership and at those CPC leaders who followed the correct Comintern line during the Chinese revolution.

Now, let us look at the state of the Chinese revolution on the eve of the Tsunyi conference. This will show us how absurd and false Mao's version is.

Before the beginning of the Western March (up to 16 October 1934) the Chinese Red Army had approximately 280,000-300,000 men. Of this number about 90,000 men were in the central Soviet area (mainly the 1st Front under Lin Piao, the 3rd Front under deputy commander-in-chief Peng Teh-huai, and a few other armies under Tung Chen-tang, Hsun Huai-chou, Lo Ping-hui, and others); some 150,000 men in the Szechuan-Shensi Soviet area (4th Front under Hsu Hsiang-chien and Chen Chang-hao), and nearly 20,000 men in the Soviet area in western Hunan and Hupeh provinces (2nd Front under Ho Lung, including Hsiao Ko's 6th Army). There were some 10,000 men in the Soviet area of northeast Kiangsi (10th Army under Fang Chih-min and Shao Shih-ping), nearly 7,000 in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Soviet area (with the 25th Army of 5,000 under Hsu Hai-tung moving to northern Shensi), about 5,000 men (26th Army under Liu Chih-tan and Kao Kang) in the Soviet area in northern Shensi, and between 3,000 and 5,000 (under

Feng Pai-chu) in the Soviet area on Hainan, Kwangtung province.

In addition to the Red Army units that had set out on the Western March and lost 32,000 men by the beginning of January 1935, the time of the Tsunyi conference, the Red Army's guerrilla units that had stayed behind in the former central Soviet area under the command of Hsiang Ying, Chen Yi, Teng Tzu-hui, Chang Ting-cheng, Tan Chen-lin, Tseng Sheng, Yeh Fei and other comrades, numbered nearly 10,000 men. Besides, smaller guerrilla units operated in other localities. Only two troop columns were deployed on a Central Committee order from other areas to support the Western March—the 2nd and 6th army corps under Ho Lung and Hsiao Ko, the 10th Army under Fang Chih-min and the 7th under Hsun Huai-chou—which together formed the “advance Red Army column in the northern campaign of resistance to Japan”. All other Red Army units remained in their bases in Soviet areas, and suffered no losses.

In the Shanghai area, North China and other Kuomintang regions the Party had Central Committee bureaus. There were provincial Party committees in Hopeh, Honan, Shensi, Kiangsu, Szechuan and other provinces, and local Party committees in Shanghai, Soochow, Peking, Tientsin, Tangshan, Sian, Chengtu, Chungking, and other cities, and also in many county towns. Altogether, these accounted for another several tens of thousands of Party members (not including members of the YCL). They played an important part in the resistance to Japan and for national salvation, and were highly active in the working-class, peasant, student and intellectual movements.

An Anti-Japanese Union Army of between 30,000 and 40,000 men operated under the Party's leadership in areas held by Japanese occupation forces and the puppet Manchukuo regime in Northeast China. Special committees were active under the guidance of the Manchurian provincial Party committee in the east, north and south of Manchuria, with Party and YCL organisations operating in Harbin, Changchun and other large cities.

In short, there were Party and YCL organisations in many cities and villages. They fought courageously in extremely difficult conditions, continuously harassed and beset by danger, leading the Chinese nation in the resistance to Japan and for national salvation.

Reports of various local Party organisations concerning the situation in the Communist Party and the revolutionary movement in 1933-1934 are available in the archives of the CC CPC. Many of them had been published at that time in Party and other revolutionary publications. Many were printed in the *Communist International*, a journal put out in Russian, Chinese, and other languages, *Inprecorr*,* published by the Comintern in Britain, *Bolshevik*, organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and *China Tribune*, an English-language publication appearing in Shanghai. An article was contributed by me, among others, in October 1934 about the Red Army's struggle against Chiang Kai-shek's sixth anti-communist campaign and its new tactics. It dealt with Red Army operations in the central Soviet area in 1933-1934; the reasons for the setbacks during the events in Fukien province that centred round the Kuomintang 19th Army's coming out against Chiang Kai-shek and for resistance to Japan; the reasons for the Red Army's leaving the central Soviet area, its old base, after the 19th Army was defeated in Fukien, and setting out on the Western March in order to avoid a two-pronged attack by Chiang Kai-shek (in the east from Fukien and the north from Kiangsi) and due to other political, military and economic reasons. My article appeared in *Bolshevik* (No. 22) and *Communist International* (No. 32-33) in Russian, and the article, “The New Situation and New Tactics” appeared in *Inprecorr* in English. Later, the two articles were incorporated in a pamphlet, “The New Situation and New Tactics”, which appeared in Chinese.

These historical facts, supported by documents, are incontestable.

What basis is there then for Mao's inventions about the state of the Chinese revolution on the eve of the Tsunyi conference? According to his fabrications, the Chinese revolution had come to a dead end: “losses in the Soviet areas amounted to 90 per cent”, “losses in the white areas amounted to 100 per cent”, “only 26,000 men remained in the Red Army throughout the country”. Mao claims that in these conditions he “salvaged the Chinese revolution”—an out-and-out lie that is not and cannot be supported by any facts.

* *Inprecorr*—International Press Correspondence.

Chen Yun's article already cited here contains no mention of any "defeat of the Chinese revolution" on the eve of the Tsunyi conference.

Indeed, Chen Yun mentions a 12-day rest after capturing Tsunyi, but says nothing of the Politbureau conference. * I asked him at that time why he did not mention it, and he replied: "It was neither a Party congress nor a Central Committee plenum—only one of many meetings of the Politbureau, nothing more. What special need was there to write about it?"

Chen Yun related the following concerning the issues discussed at that meeting:

"To begin with, there was criticism of three past mistakes. First, there was no explicative work in the Party and Red Army, and among the population, before the beginning of the Western March ... because we had approached the question of military secrets mechanically and considered it impermissible to let Party members, soldiers and the population know the objectives of the Western March. This was remedied by the slogan, 'Capture Wang Chia-lieh alive'. Second, we had taken along too much ammunition and too much heavy machinery and equipment. This matter was easily settled: all bulky items were abandoned.

"The third mistake was purely military: we had marched along a straight line mapped out beforehand. This mistake was remedied on reaching Liping, even before arriving in Tsunyi.

"Besides, we changed men in two posts. This, in fact, was the main purpose of the conference. Since Mao had long wanted to replace Chou En-lai as General Political Commissar, he made a bargain with Lo Fu that the latter would also replace Po Ku as General Secretary. This is now a thing of the past. So, what need is there to write about it? After all, it was a very delicate thing.

"At the conference in Tsunyi Mao criticised Po Ku and Chou En-lai for their alleged reluctance to fight, and said the Western March was thus more like a 'resettlement'. On having assumed command after the conference, Mao kept sending the troops incontinently into battle and forced marches, and provoked much dissatisfaction." **

* See *Communist International* (Chinese-language edition) No. 1-2, 1936, p. 50.

** Ibid., pp. 48-49, 50.

A few explanations seem to be in order in connection with Chen Yun's account. He failed to mention that on arriving in Hueili county of Yunnan province, Lin Piao and other army commanders protested against the senseless battles and forced marches ordered by Mao Tse-tung. After entering Szechuan province, Lo Fu, who considered Mao's military tactics incorrect, decided together with Chen Yun and Lo Mai to leave the Red Army and return to Shanghai for underground work. Mao did everything he could to prevail on Lo Fu to stay and continue to support him in the "political arena": if you falter in the political arena, he said, you will not survive in the military arena either.

They reached a compromise: Lo Fu and Lo Mai would stay with the Army, while Chen Yun would go to Shanghai and then to Moscow, to the Comintern, to obtain aid for the Chinese Red Army. This was the object of Chen Yun's arrival in Moscow in December 1935. But we did not learn of this until 1936, from Teng Fa and Wang Chia-hsiang.

It follows that Chen Yun, too, was assailed by doubts about Mao's military tactics. Since Chen Yun left China before the Red Army had met the 4th Front, the version in his article about a larger Soviet base in Szechuan province was contrary to the facts. But for this he cannot be blamed: he merely cited the plan of the Western March as defined in a directive of the Comintern. None of us could have foreseen then that after the two armies met, Mao would abandon the idea of a base in Szechuan, provoke a split on two successive occasions, and finally march off separately across mountains and swamps to the Northwest, thus causing heavy losses to the Party and Red Army.

As concerned the political aspect, Chen Yun had earlier assumed that Mao's behaviour was correct. It did not dawn on him that he was mistaken until after he had seen the proceedings of the 7th Congress of the Comintern and read my pamphlet, "New Conditions and New Tactics", on the Red Army's stand against Chiang Kai-shek's "sixth campaign" and the tactics of the Western March, my speech at the 7th Comintern Congress on the united national anti-Japanese front in China, and my article, "The New Situation and New Policy", which explained the theoretical and practical aspects of Comin-

tern policy concerning a united front in China. This was how Chen Yun came to write in his article: "Our political course in the matter of a united anti-imperialist front was not a correct one. If we had followed new tactics and had a new course at the time of the Western March, we would have been highly successful. But it is not too late to make up for lost time. Today, the united front is absolutely necessary; it is the only possible correct course."*

Chen Yun also saw light in the matter of using the contradictions between Chiang Kai-shek and various local power-holding groups. He began to see that this would create more favourable conditions for the Red Army's Western March and compel Chiang to resist Japan. He wrote: "The offensive of the Japanese imperialists in North China is exciting steadily growing anger among the mass of the people. A bitter hidden struggle is going on between different groups of warlords. We must make use of their contradictions."**

Evidently, Chen Yun had begun to realise the error of Mao's political line at the Tsunyi conference and in the years that followed. The error of Mao's military line had been clear to him even before. This was why he had not mentioned the Tsunyi conference in his article.

But that is not all. At the end of his article, Chen Yun praised, and gave a relatively true estimate of the Party's work after the 4th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee. He wrote: "What assessment should one give the work of the Party? After the 4th Plenum our Party achieved truly significant success. Its prestige is very high in the Soviet areas, for there it defends the interests of tens of millions of working people. Admittedly, there were also some mistakes, but all of these were remedied. No longer is the situation anything like it was after the betrayal of Chen Tu-hsiu or at the time of the Li Li-sen and Tsunyi Tsyu-po mistakes. Now, in the new situation, our Party can set new tasks."***

Anyone wishing to compare the facts as they are given in Chen Yun's article with the actual state of affairs, and with the history of the Tsunyi conference as fabricated

* *Communist International* (Chinese-language edition) No. 1-2, 1936, p. 67.

** Ibid.

*** Ibid.

by Mao during the "style rectification campaign" (i.e. as given in the "resolution on some points of history" of the 7th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee), will see how absurd and disgraceful Mao's falsifications really are.

We can also refer to Edgar Snow's book, *Notes of a Journey to the West*, which appeared in Chinese in 1937. Quite contrary to the author's intentions, it presents reliable evidence disproving Mao's fabricated history of the Tsunyi conference. Everybody knows that Mao had "unburdened his heart" to his American friend, whom he treated as an old and trusted confidant. From him he did not conceal even his opinion on matters pertaining to the Party, the Comintern, and the Soviet Union. In the summer and autumn of 1936 in Paoyang, Mao and Snow had many confidential talks. Before the notes Snow made of these talks were published, he had them translated into Chinese for Mao's personal perusal. So, if the situation of the Communist Party and the Chinese revolution on the eve of the Tsunyi conference had really been as tragic as claimed by Mao during the "style rectification campaign", and if the Tsunyi conference and Mao himself had really been as "decisive" as Mao claimed, this would certainly have been reported by Snow to the public in the United States and the rest of the world. Snow had gone on his journey on instructions of the US authorities, with the intention of meeting Mao. He wrote his "Notes" to make Mao popular. So, if Mao had given him such material, he would have reported it with relish. Besides, Snow also talked to Lo Fu, Chu Teh, Chou En-lai, Po Ku, Peng Teh-huai, and others who had participated in the Tsunyi conference. And the notes he took were also read by each of them personally, and were eventually printed in Snow's *Notes of a Journey to the West*.

But read Snow's book from cover to cover. You will find no trace of the version of the Tsunyi conference later concocted by Mao.

Neither in the archives of the CPC nor the documents of the Comintern, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or the Communist Party of China, nor in the publications of that time, nor in Chen Yun's article, nor in the book by Edgar Snow, Mao's closest American friend—nowhere will you find anything factual to support the history of the Tsunyi conference as fabricated by Mao during the "style rectification campaign". On the contrary,

the facts of history are completely at variance with Mao's fabrication.

Mao's political and military mistakes and his insidious behaviour towards the 4th Front in the course of two years—from the Tsunyi conference until the Sian events—caused the main force of the Red Army to shrink to slightly more than 40,000 by the time it was concentrated in Wayopao. On coming to Wayopao, Mao was reluctant to stay in the North and wait for a favourable opportunity to launch anti-Japanese operations. Motivated by his right-opportunist and pessimistic views, he united the remnants of the Western March troops of 5,700 men with the 8,000-strong unit of Hsu Hai-tung and Liu Chih-tan, and set out on the adventurist march to Shansi province.

Incontrovertible historical facts show that there had been no rectification of any "four-years-old 'left'-opportunist line by Mao Tse-tung" at the Tsunyi conference, and certainly no "salvation of the Chinese revolution by Mao Tse-tung". In fact, after its 4th Plenum and until the Tsunyi conference, the Sixth Central Committee had followed the essentially correct Comintern line and after the 18 September events (1931) gradually developed the policy of a united national anti-Japanese front. To this, in fact, the Chinese revolution owed all its conspicuous success in the Soviet areas, Kuomintang-dominated areas, and regions in the Northeast under the Japanese and their Manchurian puppets. The facts also show that as a result of Mao's extreme "left"-opportunist line and insidious behaviour many of the achievements of the worker-peasant Red Army and the Soviet movement in China were quickly squandered, in a matter of two years. There is nothing to support the claim that thanks to Mao's correct leadership "the further development of the Chinese revolution" after the Tsunyi conference had been successful. On the contrary, there is ample evidence to show that through Mao's fault the Party's Central Committee and the main Red Army force of more than 40,000 men were driven into a narrow strip of land in the north of Shensi province and found themselves in an extremely difficult situation. Only thanks to the united national anti-Japanese front policy the Central Committee and the Red Army managed to extricate themselves from these sad straits.

These historical facts were admitted by Liu Shao-chi in a letter to Mao in 1936 on behalf of the CC CPC North China Bureau. Not the village had saved the town, he wrote, but vice versa. In other words, the success of the united national anti-Japanese front policy in urban areas had saved the village. (The complete text of Liu's letter was published in the earlier-mentioned collection, *Two Lines*; therefore only its main idea is cited here.) Before the "style rectification campaign" Mao had himself acknowledged these historical facts. He had said publicly, among other things, that "Comrade Wang Ming's new policy of a united national anti-Japanese front is a great discovery. Without it our Party and the Red Army would hardly have coped with the complicated situation of that time; without it the Chinese people could not have mounted the anti-Japanese war on the scale of the whole country." More, already after launching the "style rectification campaign", he said to me "in words that come from the bottom of the heart" in April 1944, and in a talk with me on the "style rectification campaign" in December 1948, that he still recognised these facts.*

Mao's unlawful organisational acts at the Tsunyi conference were chiefly these:

1. He formed a Mao-Lo bloc and began a factional struggle against the Party and its Central Committee, the correct line of the Comintern, and the top political and military leaders of the Party's Central Committee who followed this line. His aim was to usurp the posts of General Commissar of the Red Army for himself and of General Secretary of the Central Committee for Lo Fu.

2. The Politbureau conference in Tsunyi was incompetent to replace the General Secretary elected by the 5th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC.

3. The Politbureau had 12 members at that time. In Tsunyi Mao could count on no more than one-third of the votes. Out of the 12 Politbureau members five were absent (Hsiang Ying had remained in the former central Soviet area, Jen Pi-shih was with the Red Army's 2nd Front, Chang Kuo-tao was in the Szechuan-Shensi Soviet area, and Wang Ming and Kang Sheng were in the Comintern). Out of the seven Politbureau members present

* For the content of these two talks see "My three talks with Mao on 'Rectification'" in this section.

at the Tsunyi conference, Po Ku and Chou En-lai did not support Mao. Later, Teng Fa said that if there had been a vote, he, too, would not have voted for Mao. Mao could count only on Lo Fu and Chen Yun, for it was not clear which way Chu Teh would have turned. But even if he had voted for Mao, this would only have made four for Mao, and if he had voted against, the majority would have been with Po Ku and Chou En-lai. Mao knew this perfectly well. So he evaded a vote. When the army was still on its way to Tsunyi, he had resorted to petty intrigues and demagoguery to prevail on the army representatives who would attend the conference that, if necessary, they should back him up by shouting in his favour. This was how the resolution he wanted was "adopted". Po Ku was forced to yield the post of General Secretary to Lo Fu, and Chou En-lai the post of General Commissar of the Red Army to Mao.

In years to come Mao made no secret of the fact that he had formed a group against the line of the Central Committee and the Comintern to usurp military power in the Party. On the contrary, he referred to it with undisguised pride.

Here, for example, is what he said to me even before the "style rectification campaign":

"During the conference in Tsunyi I was still considered a right opportunist; I could not hope to win any influence on my own. I was therefore compelled to use the method of 'divide and oppose'. At first, I coaxed Wang Chia-hsiang and then Lo Fu into opposing Po Ku. At the same time, I created the Mao-Lo bloc and came to terms with Lo Fu that he would first seize the post of General Secretary and then appoint me General Commissar in place of Chou En-lai. After the 4th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee (1934) the Comintern line dominated. In the struggle against the Li Li-sen line and for the Comintern course you were in first place, Po Ku in second and (Wang) Chia-hsiang in third. Though Lo Fu had no part in this struggle, he was educated in Moscow and was also a follower of the Comintern course. The four of you had much influence in the Politbureau and among Party cadres. You were at the Comintern, the other three were with us. Two out of the three—(Wang) Chia-hsiang and Lo Fu—opposed one, Po Ku, and supported me. My word gained weight, people began to listen

to me.* As a result, I was able to capture military power—the post of General Commissar."

What Mao said to me agrees with the facts. The same was related to me by Teng Fa, Po Ku, and others.

Certainly, if Mao had come out against the tremendously popular Comintern line of the 4th Plenum, he would have been repulsed by Po Ku, Wang Chia-hsiang, Lo Fu, and other Politbureau comrades, because the first two had been prominent in the struggle against Li Li-sen and were committed to the Comintern line. As for Lo Fu, though he had returned from Moscow to Shanghai in the summer of 1931, that is, six months after the 4th Plenum, and had taken no part in the struggle against the Li Li-sen line, he was committed to the Comintern line. At that time none of the Politbureau members could come out against the line of the 4th Plenum—the Tsunyi conference would not have taken place at all or, if it had, would have ended in Mao's total defeat.

At that time, Mao had neither the power nor the courage to come out into the open against the Comintern line and me, Wang Ming, the main exponent of that line.

To make his falsification of the Tsunyi conference sound authentic, Mao invented countless legends and fibs or instructed others to invent them. It was alleged, for example, that Wang Ming had taken part in the Long March, and that it was not until after his removal at the Tsunyi conference in the beginning of 1935 that he was sent to the Comintern to represent the Communist Party of China. And even this: Wang Ming attended the conference of cadres in Wayopao on 27 December 1935, where he and Po Ku opposed Mao's report on the united national anti-Japanese front. Mao's falsifications were picked up by the Chinese press, and even by bourgeois publications abroad, either because they were misinformed or deliberately to make mischief. All kinds of versions were invented about my whereabouts. It is quite needless to refute each of Mao's fabrications or other false reports. But I think it is in order to clear up the following point.

I have never been in any of the Chinese Soviet areas. In the late twenties and early thirties I worked underground in Shanghai. On 18 October 1931 I left Shanghai for Moscow, where I arrived on 7 November. As of 10

* At the Tsunyi conference Mao spoke only in the debate.

November I was the CPC representative in the Comintern and performed my duties in its top organs. It was not until 14 November 1937 that I left Moscow, arriving in Yen-an on 29 November.

All other versions about my whereabouts and movements at that time are a deliberate fabrication.

5) The poisoning of Wang Ming which injured his health

This occurred during the preparations for the "rectification of style campaign".

During the night of 3-4 October 1941 Mao brought me a telegram from Comrade Georgi Dimitrov. The telegram contained 15 questions to the CC CPC, including inquiries about the measures the CPC intended to take to step up military operations against Japan on the Sino-Japanese front in order to deny Japan, an ally of Germany, the opportunity for opening a second front against the Soviet Union in support of the continuing Nazi offensive. Mao asked me to study the telegram, and added: "We will discuss our answer tomorrow."

On 4 and 5 October we had an unusually sharp argument. I said anti-Japanese military operations in China had to be stepped up to deny Japan any chance of helping the Nazi offensive against the Soviet Union. Mao objected, but did not argue his case. My arguments stumped him again and again. He glared at me and was at a loss for words. When I intimated that his line was anti-Soviet and gravitated towards alliance with Japan,* he began to shout and bang the table, though unable to say anything coherent to the contrary. On 6 and 7 October Mao invited Jen Pi-shih and Wang Chia-hsiang to take part in the discussion, and on 8 and 9 October also Kang Sheng and Chen Yun, hoping that they would support him. But all four gave to understand by their complete silence that they agreed with Dimitrov's recommendations and with my view.

This frightened Mao. To end the discussion, which was dangerously going against him, he decided to eliminate me, his chief political opponent—who opposed his anti-Soviet and pro-Japanese policy of national betrayal, the

* See pp. 175-81.

"rectification of style" he was preparing at that time, and actions falsifying the Party's history. On 14 October he forced me to go to hospital. Then (as we learned later) through Li Fu-chun, chief of the CC CPC Chancellery, he ordered attending physician Chin Mao-yao to give me mercury drugs and cause a slow poisoning. It was only the care and help of many Party comrades and doctors, especially of Li Ting-min, deputy chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area government, who was an experienced specialist in Chinese medicine, and the ministrations of the conscientious and solicitous Dr. Li Yun-shih* that brought me back among the living. My constitution was badly affected. I was bedridden for four years, and gravely ill later. My illness became chronic and was accompanied by attacks which caused terrible pain and suffering.

Since Mao has for many years spread all kinds of inventions to cover up his crime, and since he has maliciously accused me of "simulating illness" to escape the "rectification of style" campaign, I feel it is in order to refer to the matter at least briefly.

First about the poisoning, which injured my health.

As I have said, Mao and I had a heated argument in his house over Dimitrov's telegram. It went on from 4 to 9 October 1941. Each day I had at least one meal in his house. On 8 October I had a serious stomach disorder with profuse bleeding, accompanied by dizzy spells and cardiac weakness. The doctors who examined me said the symptoms were those of poisoning. On 9 October my condition deteriorated, but Mao's personal aide, Yeh Tsung-lung, practically dragged me out of bed to attend a meeting. On 10 October I could no longer rise from my bed.

Meanwhile, pleading urgency, Mao ordered Li Fu-chun to organise the construction of a conference hall and office building for the Central Committee. Within a few dozen metres of my dwelling workmen laboured day and night, blasting stone blocks out of the mountainside. The deafening explosions continued round the clock. I was deprived of peace, and my condition grew worse. I asked Li Fu-chun to stop the blasting for a day or two or to get the blocks elsewhere. But he replied: "Those are

* She was a member of the CPC, had finished the medical school of Tokyo Imperial University and headed the pediatric department of the Norman Bethune Peace Hospital in Yen-an.

Chairman Mao's orders. Work must not stop even for a minute."

On 14 October I was visited by Li Fu-chun and Fu Lien-chang (deputy chief of the CC CPC Military Council's health department and concurrently chief of the Central Committee's health bureau), who took me in a car to the Central Hospital, where Chin Mao-yao was appointed my treating physician.

Chin Mao-yao prescribed treatment which injured my health. I could not leave the hospital. From March to May 1942, Chin Mao-yao administered mercury preparations in large doses, causing a slow poisoning. At this time Mao launched the "style rectification" campaign, directed against the Comintern and the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of China, Wang Ming, and others whom Mao accused of belonging to a "Moscow group". I was often unconscious and escaped death only thanks to the care and vigilance of my wife, Meng Ching-shu, who remained at my bedside in hospital. Unfortunately, she as yet knew very little about medicine and pharmacology, but on noticing my negative reactions to the prescribed drugs she did not let me take them and, in fact, threw them away. Later, she began collecting the doubtful prescriptions, stowed them away, and turned to doctors practising Chinese and European medicine for urgent aid.

On 13 August 1942 I returned home to Yantsialin.* Chin Mao-yao continued to "treat" me. He was especially active after a telegram arrived in my name from Dimitrov in February 1943, saying: "We'll have you flown to Moscow for treatment."

Here I must explain that my one telegram to Moscow had been sent a month earlier. Two Soviet war correspondents had come to see me on 8 January 1943. I asked them if I could use their transmitter to communicate with Dimitrov. They said I could. My condition was very serious. I thought this was my last chance to perform my internationalist duty, and asked the two Soviet comrades to inform the Comintern leadership that since my return to Yen'an at the end of November 1937 and throughout the following five years Mao had committed many grave

* I had wanted to leave the hospital before, but Mao disapproved on the pretext that the construction of the Central Committee Chancellery was not yet completed and workers were still blasting stone blocks near my house.

political mistakes and crimes; specifically, for already more than a year he was conducting a "style rectification" campaign which was in substance anti-Leninist, anti-communist, anti-Soviet and anti-Party. In conclusion, I inquired if it was possible to send a plane for me and have me treated in Moscow, where I would also give the Comintern leadership particulars about Mao's crimes.

Comrade Dimitrov's reply and especially my proposed flight to Moscow badly worried Mao. He immediately ordered Chin Mao-yao to do away with me. On his orders, on 12 February 1943 Chin Mao-yao prescribed a large dose of an aqueous solution of calomel (mercury subchloride) along with sodium bicarbonate and magnesium sulfate, which, as I learned later, could turn the calomel into corrosive chloride of mercury. On 19 February he prescribed enemas with a 10 per cent solution of tannin. Both prescriptions were meant to eliminate me. But Meng Ching-shu, who had become suspicious, asked other doctors to study the prescriptions. They said the preparations were highly toxic and could not be used. She lodged an official complaint against Chin Mao-yao with the Party's Central Committee and the medical authorities. Fearing public opinion and on our firm insistence, Mao was compelled to agree for Li Fu-chun to invite consultants from the Yen'an Central Hospital, the Norman Bethune Peace Hospital, and the Yen'an Medical Institute.

The consultants began their investigation on 30 June 1943 and did not end it until 30 July. They studied Chin Mao-yao's prescriptions and the diary of the medical nurses, and heard the evidence of nurses and chemists, and drew up two documents, which they called "findings concerning the diagnosis and treatment of Comrade Wang Ming", and "provisional recommendations for his further treatment". Here is what they found:

"After taking the medicine Comrade Wang Ming vomited, had dizzy spells and acute pains in the liver. His spleen was enlarged, there were pains in the region of the heart, and his body temperature dropped to sub-normal.... In fact, the total dose of just the calomel, taken internally, was too large and led to poisoning (if the patient had continued taking it according to the instruc-

tions of head doctor Chin,* the dose would have probably totalled 20.4 grams; so large a dose can poison or kill several people), and to unfavourable effects on the heart, liver, spleen, kidneys, intestines, stomach, oral cavity, the teeth, nerves, and other organs."

The findings further said: "Calomel is insoluble in water, and yet head doctor Chin prescribed an aqueous solution of it to Wang Ming... When calomel is mixed with sodium bicarbonate, magnesium sulfate, sodium sulfate, bromine preparations, and the like, it can turn into corrosive chloride of mercury or soluble mercuric salt, which is more readily assimilated and more toxic. Yet head doctor Chin prescribed calomel with incompatible components to Wang Ming. In some cases, though prescribing the incompatible preparations and calomel separately, he advised Wang Ming to take the medicines together. After taking calomel, the patient showed symptoms of mercury poisoning, but head doctor Chin told him to continue taking it...", and so on.**

I think it is not necessary here to go into the circumstances of the poisoning and the harm to my health in the period from October 1941 to June 1943, or into the variety of methods used for this purpose. It would take up too much space. But there is no harm in citing a few documents I have kept that clinch the matter:

1. The written findings and other papers of the consultants, who had gathered in Yen-an from 30 June to 30 July 1943 (their findings were in two copies, one of which was given to me and the other forwarded through Li Fu-chun to the Central Committee of the CPC). Out of the 15 consultants, the findings were signed by 11, including Chin Mao-yao and Dr. Ma Hai-teh (George Hightam), an American doctor who took Chin's side. Faced by witnesses and incontrovertible evidence they were forced to affix their signatures to the document.

One of the four who did not sign was Chu Chen, educated in fascist Germany and a native of Shantung province like Chiang Ching (Mao's wife) and Chin Mao-yao. During the investigation he did his utmost to clear Chin, and when the time came to sign the findings he dis-

* The reference is to Chin Mao-yao, then head doctor of the gynecological and surgical departments of the Yen-an Central Hospital.

** "Findings...", pp. 7, 10-12.

appeared. Another was Hou Chien-tsun, who had studied with Chin in the medical school of American-operated Chilu University in Shantung and had also worked with him at the American-owned Hsieh-ho Hospital in Peking. He was godfather to Lina, the daughter of Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Ching, and was in charge of the children's department at the Central Hospital, where his wife was senior medical nurse. Chiang Ching often left her daughter in their care. The other two were Chu Chung-li and Soviet doctor A. Orlov, who could not attend on the day of the signing.

After the findings had been drawn up, the signing was delayed for two days due to the recalcitrance of Chin Mao-yao and the attempts of Ma Hai-teh and Chu Chen to absolve him of guilt. Most of the consultants, including Dr. Orlov, had the pharmacy fill Chin Mao-yao's prescription of an aqueous solution of calomel and the other incompatible ingredients, and had offered Ma Hai-teh, who argued that it was harmless, to drink it. Ma Hai-teh refused. A few hours later, the solution, which was in a glass phial, turned green. Then there was a sudden pop and the cork flew out of the neck of the phial up to the ceiling. Ma Hai-teh paled, and spoke not a word more in Chin's defence. Fearing that he, too, would be asked to swallow the solution, Chu Chen fled. Chin Mao-yao alone continued to argue. Then, my wife Meng Ching-shu passed round a prescription Chin had issued on 12 February 1943. At this point Chin broke down. He ran to her, fell to his knees, and said plaintively: "Comrade Meng Ching-shu, thank you for not having this prescription filled and not letting Comrade Wang Ming take it. You have saved not only your husband; you have also saved me." After this 11 out of the 12 doctors present signed the document (except Hou Chien-tsun).

After the findings had been signed, Chin Mao-yao ran up to me, knelt beside my bed and wailed with tears running down his cheeks:

"Comrade Wang Ming, it is true. I have poisoned you. It was a torment for me to prescribe the poison."

"Why did you do it?" I asked.

"Li Fu-chun told me to. He said you were a dogmatist, that you were against Chairman Mao, and that it had been decided to eliminate you. And I was to do it, because I was your treating physician. I told him I was religious

and that recently the Central Committee had decided to admit me as a secret member to the Party—so how could I do such a thing? But Li Fu-chun replied: 'This is a special case and since it has been decided that you should do it, you have no choice. You are a member of the Party and are obliged to obey Party orders.'

The next moment two men in army uniforms charged into the room. One of them shouted to Chin Mao-yao:

"We have looked for you everywhere, and here you are. Why are you on your knees, wailing and weeping? We have come to take you to Tsaoyuan. * You are a criminal and are forbidden to speak to anybody."

The two seized Chin by the collar and led him away.

2. The prescriptions issued by Chin Mao-yao to poison Wang Ming, including some found at that time in the pharmacy of the Central Hospital, and those kept by us (other prescriptions "could not be found"). Besides, some of the toxic preparations were brought by Chin Mao-yao directly from his house.

3. The written results of tests showing the mercury content in the daily volume of urine. The tests were made in July 1943 in Yen-an, during the period of the medical investigation, and also in December 1950-October 1952 in a Moscow hospital, and in October 1954 in a Peking hospital; in addition there are other tests and findings.

The consultants in Yen-an established that I was being systematically poisoned. After their investigation, Li Yun-shih, a conscientious and considerate pediatricist, was appointed my treating physician. She based her treatment on an entirely new diagnosis—mercury poisoning—and did her best to help me recover. Hope appeared of deliverance from mortal danger, and there were signs of an improvement in my health.

Besides, there were other important reasons that had helped me escape death, though many times I was on its very brink:

1. Despite the pain, the danger and the illnesses resulting from repeated poisoning, and despite predictions of approaching death by Chin Mao-yao and others, my wife

* Tsaoyuan was the headquarters of the Social (Security) Department of the CC CPC; later, Mao Tse-tung and the Politbureau moved there from Yantsialin.

and I never lost heart; we turned for help and advice to specialists in Chinese and European medicine, and also studied medicine ourselves.

2. Though Mao attacked and slandered me during the "style rectification campaign", I was convinced that I was ideologically, politically and organisationally right. My faith in Leninism, the line of the 4th Plenum, and the policy of the united national anti-Japanese front never faltered. Firm as ever was my sense of proletarian internationalism towards the Comintern and the Soviet Communist Party. I was sure that the "style rectification campaign" was reactionary and wrong, and certain, too, that Mao was falsifying the history of the CPC.

3. Despite Mao's various attempts to isolate me, most of the leaders and Party cadres either publicly approved my standpoint or expressed their sympathy and supported me covertly. I had many visitors. The absolute majority of Party cadres was against Mao's "rectification of style", as Mao himself admitted to me in a talk in April 1944. This meant, of course, that they were concerned for my fate, and that they believed in Leninism and the Comintern line.

Though many Party cadres feared persecution or arrest and could not visit me, quite a few did come regularly to the hospital or visited me at home, and this even during the two most turbulent periods—that of "rectification of style" and that of "emergency salvation". Among them were eight members and two alternate members of the Politbureau (at that time it consisted of 10 members, including myself, and four alternate members).

I was also visited by some ranking comrades who had returned to Yen-an from liberated or Kuomintang areas. To keep up appearances, Mao Tse-tung visited me, too, at the most critical period of my illness.

Comrades from Party departments in my charge came to see me many times. I had many functions. I was in charge of the United Front Department of the CC CPC (handling matters pertaining to the united national anti-Japanese front), was chairman of the Party Press Commission, Politbureau instructor-representative with the CC CPC Northwest Bureau (including the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area), chairman of the CC CPC Commission for South China (Hunan, Kiangsi, Fukien, Kwangtung and Kwangsi) and Southwest China (Szechuan,

Kweichow, Yunnan and Sikang), chairman of the CC CPC Commission for Northeast China, and secretary of the CPC faction in the National-Political Council.

I was regularly visited by Lin Po-chu, Hsieh Chueh-tsai, Chen Cheng-jen, Shen Tse-min and other comrades of the CC CPC Bureau for Northwest China and the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area, who were closely associated with me.

Of course, Ko Ching-shih, deputy chief of the United Front Department, visited me more often than the others, and we exchanged opinions on the "style rectification campaign".

True, there were also other kinds of visitors. Li Fu-chun came frequently. He was Mao's trusted agent in poisoning me. But as chief of the Central Committee's Chancellery and thus in charge of medical institutions, he could not deny me various services, and came to discuss matters pertaining to my comfort and treatment. It stands to reason that I neither wanted to nor could discuss with him the "style rectification campaign" or other Party or political matters.

By this time my duties as chairman of the CC CPC commission for work among women and as rector of Women's University, which I assumed in 1939, had dropped away by themselves. The main purpose had been to buttress the Party among women, launch the journal *Chinese Woman*, and establish the Yen-an All-China Women's University. But, as I have already mentioned, the University had been closed down in September 1941.

Towards the end of the forties and in the fifties Mao continued his attempts to eliminate me. Let me mention just a few.

1. On 25 June 1948 at the Central Hospital in Chuhao* my treating physician, Huang Shu-tse,** prescribed lysol

* Chuhao, a village in Fuping county, Hopeh province, seven and a half kilometres from Hsipeipo, then the temporary headquarters of the Central Committee. The Central Hospital was then in Chuhao.

** Fu Lien-chang appointed Huang Shu-tse my treating physician. Po Ku and Fu Lien-chang told me that Huang Shu-tse was suspected of belonging to a Trotskyite group. However, after the "style rectification campaign" Fu Lien-chang specially transferred Huang Shu-tse from the Norman Bethune Hospital to the Central Hospital and to the Central Committee's Bureau of Health headed by Fu Lien-chang himself.

instead of medical soap for washing my intestines; its use could have been lethal.

I owe it to the vigilance of my wife that this time, too, a tragic outcome was averted. This reached the ears of the chief of the hospital, Chou Tse-chao, and other doctors.

Thereupon, on 7 July, the Central Committee's Bureau of Health* issued a circular** claiming that a mistake had been committed by a chemist when filling the prescription. "By issuing lysol instead of medical soap he caused an acute aggravation of the disease; this is a serious case of negligence." The above explanation was, of course, meant to conceal a fresh attempt on my life made on orders from above.

2. On 25 October 1950 at 11 o'clock in the morning, Yang Shang-kun, chief of the CC CPC Chancellery, came to my house and said:

"At 9 o'clock this morning I was summoned by Liu Shao-chi, who said that last night Chairman Mao spoke to him of Wang Ming's departure for the Soviet Union this afternoon by the train going to Manchuria. Liu ordered me to perform all the formalities without delay. It was simple: I telephoned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and told them to issue passports to all your family at once. Here they are. You can take along whoever you wish. All I need is their photographs. I have already told the Ministry of Railways that you must have a private car in the train leaving for Manchuria at 6 p.m. today. There is little time left. Will you manage to pack?"

I asked him:

"There are rumours that at midnight our volunteer army will cross the Yalukiang bridge into Korea to repulse the American aggression, and that MacArthur has already issued orders for his air force to bomb the Shan-haikuan-Manchuria railway the moment Chinese volunteers enter Korea in order to destroy the supply lines from Peking and the Soviet Union. Is this true?"

"Yes, it is true," Yang Shang-kun replied.

"So, since we will be travelling across Manchuria tomorrow morning, we are sure to be bombed. Am I right?"

* The Central Committee's Bureau of Health then had the code name, Fifth Department of the Workers' School.

** I still have in my possession a copy of this circular and Huang Shu-tse's notes.

"Yes, and it is up to you to decide whether you leave today or not," he answered. "If you decide to stay, let me know: I must inform the Ministry of Railways."

It was clear to Meng Ching-shu and me why Mao had suddenly decided that we should depart that day. Long before Liu Shao-chi had given us permission to go to the Soviet Union, but for more than six months we had been waiting to be told the date of our departure. We wondered what to do, and finally decided to go despite the risk, for one could never tell if there will be another chance. I was going to Moscow not only for medical treatment, but because I wanted to see the Soviet Union again after its victory in the Great Patriotic War. I had not been there for 13 years.

At the reception held on our departure by five legal and administrative institutions, some comrades advised us not to risk our lives. But at 5.30 p.m. we boarded the train, and eventually set out for our destination.

We reached Manchuria without mishap, changed into a Soviet train, and arrived in Moscow safely. As the train approached the Soviet capital, Meng Ching-shu, who was very fond of music, began humming my "Ode to Moscow" *.

* The lyrics consist of five stanzas, which Wang Ming wrote in late October 1941, when in Yenai Central Hospital. The Nazis were then close to Moscow. Meanwhile, Mao not only refused to step up military operations to prevent the Japanese from opening a second front against the Soviet Union, but also launched the anti-communist and anti-Soviet "style rectification campaign". Wang Ming dedicated this ode and other anti-Mao poems (e.g. "Yantsialin", "Wolves Howling in the Night", and others, which were passed from hand to hand; Mao also read them) to the 24th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and to Moscow.

Wang Ming began writing poetry at the age of nine. He has written more than 600 poems and songs, and when gravely ill and suffering pain and anguish, did not forego the slightest chance to write—to praise labour, to propagate Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet Union, to pay tribute to fallen heroes of the revolution, to honour anniversaries of the revolutionary movement, to fight against imperialism and Maoism, and for peace and the happiness of mankind. His last lines of verse, and fragments of this book, were written three days before his passing. He often said: "To be a Communist is to give all one's strength to the last breath." He had always followed this principle himself.—
Note by Meng Ching-shu.

Moscow,
the Kremlin Palace,
five-pointed crimson star.
Tune of your chimes spreading
across the Soviet Land.
The star lights up
the five continents.
The ringing chimes
reaching all countries
of the world.
Moscow, triumphant
on one-sixth of the globe.
Symbol of things to come,
the world of communism,
the world of communism.

* * *

Moscow,
Lenin's Mausoleum.
Grandeur of spirit,
deathless deed.
Leninism has awakened
the human race from sleep.
The Soviets' victories
inspire and delight.
Ilyich, forever, everywhere,
helmsman of world revolution.
Ilyich, forever living
in the hearts of men,
forever living
in the hearts of men.

* * *

Moscow,
beacon of revolution,
the working people's ardent love,
the fascists' hate and fear.
The maniac Hitler has attacked,
and Stalin calmly orders
People and army, the Party
at their head:
Stand firm and win.
People and army, the Party
at their head,
crush the adversary,
crush the adversary.

* * *

Moscow,
the Communist
International.

All Communists of the globe
are brothers of one another.
China is aided by Soviet
Communists against the Japanese,
And Chinese Communists
must help the Soviet Union
against the fascists.
Comrades-in-arms across the world,
close your ranks for victory.
Fight shoulder to shoulder
for cherished victory,
my friends.

* * *

Moscow, the Kremlin Palace;
Moscow, the Lenin Mausoleum;
Moscow, beacon of revolution;
Moscow, the Comintern.
Moscow,
You've won in one-sixth
of the globe,
Symbol of things to come,
world of communism,
world of communism.

In the winter of 1952, during his visit to Moscow, Liu Shao-chi said to us: "You were not bombed because Truman did not want a war with China; he strictly forbade MacArthur to bomb Chinese territory."

3. In December 1953 we returned to Peking. From April 1954 to January 1956 I had seven acute attacks of cholecystitis and hepatitis. The first one was in April-May 1954. Huang Shu-tse, Fu Lien-chang and others were reluctant to acknowledge that I had a bad liver and gall-bladder, because this could revive talk of the poisoning. I stayed at home with the attack for five days. On the sixth, I was compelled to go to Peking Hospital. The doctors diagnosed acute cholecystitis, but Huang Shu-tse stuck to his own version. He said: "In addition, the patient has peritonitis."

By this time Huang Shu-tse had been promoted deputy chief of the CC CPC Bureau of Health; hence, Peking Hospital was in his charge. The doctors did not dare go against his opinion. He insisted on at once removing the gall-bladder. On my fourth day of hospital and the ninth after the attack had begun, the situation became critical. That morning Meng Ching-shu summoned both our sons to my bedside for the leave-taking. At the same time she

treated me with repeatedly tested medicines. For three days she fought desperately for my life. Gradually, my condition improved, the pain subsided, the temperature dropped, and I was able to take some food. But my doctors continued to insist on an operation. We resisted, for I had eaten nothing in six days and my weight was down from 58-60 kilograms to a mere 40. I could not hope to survive an operation. After repeated requests I was given two blood transfusions—a mere 500 millilitres. In secret, we got in touch with specialists in Chinese medicine, and I took their drugs.* As a result, my condition gradually returned to normal. But the doctors continued to insist on an operation. And when we firmly declined, they made us sign a paper to this effect.

4. In the summer of 1955, due to an aggravation, I was again taken to Peking Hospital. Surgeon Shao made an infusion of a sodium chloride and glucose solution at the rate of 60 drops a minute. He admitted this later, but said he had been ordered to do so by Dr. Wang, chief of the surgical department. A few minutes after the infusion began Dr. Shao went out of my ward. I began shivering so intensely that six hot-water bottles and three quilts did not help. I was pale, sweating profusely, and my heart was beating furiously. Then a terrible weakness set in. Meng Ching-shu asked the nurse to pull out the needle at once, but the girl refused: "Dr. Shao said the infusion must not be stopped in his absence. I'll go and look for him." When the nurse left, Meng Ching-shu immediately stopped the infusion and made a camphor injection to stimulate my heart. Gradually, I relaxed, though the cardiac weakness lingered. After a long time the nurse brought back Dr. Shao. When he saw the infusion had been stopped he showed his displeasure and said we should have waited for his return; he would have decided what to do.

Professor Y. M. Voloshin, a Soviet specialist attached to the surgical department of Peking Hospital, said when he heard about the case: "In Comrade Wang Ming's con-

* At the end of 1949 Mao declared that Chinese medicine was "old medicine" and European medicine "new medicine"; he said that "the old and dying must be thrown out and replaced by the new". This caused consternation in the country and among the 800,000 doctors practising Chinese medicine.

dition the rate should have been 20-30 drops a minute. How could anyone prescribe a rate of 60 drops a minute? If there is another infusion, you must carefully watch the rate."

In his opinion, Comrade Meng Ching-shu had acted correctly. If she hadn't stopped the infusion, he said, Wang Ming's heart may have failed. We owe Comrade Voloshin sincere thanks. He was a true and trustworthy counsellor, and strongly opposed to an immediate operation as suggested by Huang Shu-tse and others. He said: "Cholecystitis isn't the only trouble; all internal organs are affected. Comrade Wang Ming is barely alive as it is, and an operation is out of the question."

He advised us again: "Do not agree to an operation on any account. In your present condition a surgical intervention can have only the very worst of consequences." And when Liu Shao-chi again permitted me to go to the Soviet Union for treatment, he tried to hasten our departure and argued, in defiance of other opinions, that my heart was strong enough to survive the long air journey.

Apart from the above there were, between the autumn of 1941 and the beginning of 1956, many other events and facts to indicate that Mao was after my life.

6) Mao seizes the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee

During his preparations for the "rectification of style campaign" Mao Tse-tung performed a palace revolution and seized the post of General Secretary of the Party's Central Committee. Here is how things developed:

In September 1941 Mao often said half in jest to members of the Politbureau:

"Lo Fu is the Han Emperor Hsien Ti and I am Tsao Tsao. But I am not as noble as Tsao Tsao, who was content with the title of Prince Wei Wang (it was his son who later usurped the throne). I'll take up the sword and usurp the throne myself."

One day in late September, at the close of a Politbureau meeting, he suddenly demanded that Lo Fu should at once "give him" the post of General Secretary, since it was "inconvenient for him to work" without it. Jen Pi-shih instantly retorted:

"This will be ill-considered. It is best to leave the

matter to the 7th Congress, where an official decision can be taken."

The others said nothing, and the meeting ended.

After this Mao took it upon himself, without so much as a by your leave, to preside at Politbureau meetings in place of Lo Fu, and in November made the latter go "on a tour of inspection" to the liberated area in northwest Shansi. It was in this manner that Mao usurped the post of General Secretary of the CC CPC.

7) Mao forms a body of men to conduct the "style rectification campaign"

Mao Tse-tung had no political cadres of his own. So he employed a variety of methods, including threats and promises, to form a body of men to run the "style rectification campaign".

First he turned his attention to Liu Shao-chi, then secretary of the CPC Central China Bureau. According to Mao, he had often sought closer ties with Liu following the Tsunyi conference. During the 6th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee (October 1938) the two of them came to terms about a Mao-Liu bloc: after jointly seizing power in the Party they would institute for Mao the post of CC Chairman (the CPC had never had this post before). Mao would be in charge of military affairs, while the post of General Secretary would go to Liu, who would be in charge of Party work. To amass the "capital" essential for this appointment, Liu followed Mao's advice and wrote a book, *On the Self-Education of a Communist*, in 1939. Thereupon, Mao often stressed at Politbureau meetings and in private conversations that Liu's role in the Party should be enhanced. When he openly proclaimed "Maoism", he often said: "Liu Shao-chi is the first conductor and promoter of Maoism."

Using the stick and the carrot, he won the backing of Kang Sheng, who was in charge of Central Committee security, and Chen Yun, chief of the Central Committee's organisational department. Later, he summoned Peng Chen, then Secretary of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh branch of the CC CPC North China Bureau, to Yen-an. After just one talk with him, Mao declared that Peng Chen was a "born Maoist". The same description of "born Maoist" he also gave to Kao Kang, secretary of the Party commit-

tee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area and secretary of the CPC Northwest Bureau. * Thereupon he set up the Chancellery of the Central Committee and, as a sign of special trust, appointed the deputy chief of the CC organisational department, Li Fu-chun (then alternate member of the CC CPC), as its chief.

Besides, he recruited personal secretaries—Chen Po-ta (from the Central Committee's propaganda department) and Hu Chiao-mu (from the propaganda department of the YCL). During the "style rectification campaign" he used them as assistants in writing articles and falsifying historical facts.

Out of these eight people not more than three have survived, and they, too, keep disappearing from the political scene one day and reappearing the next. The rest were done to death one after the other or suffered from Mao's persecutions.

2. THE SECOND PERIOD OF "STYLE RECTIFICATION"

During this period (February 1942-July 1943) Mao openly "rectified the style of work".

On 1 February 1942 he spoke at the Central Party School (headquarters for the "rectification of style" among Party cadres). His speech was entitled, "Rectify the Style of the Party". It formally inaugurated "the cam-

* Previously, Kao Kang had been well disposed towards the Comintern, the Soviet Union and me. Between the autumn of 1939 and the summer of 1941 he brought top-ranking comrades from the Party committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area and the CPC Northwest Bureau to my lectures on the history of the Soviet Communist Party. During the "style rectification campaign" Mao went out of his way to win him. For a time, Kao Kang became Mao's follower. After the Army of the Soviet Union entered Northeast China he had frequent contacts with Soviet comrades because at that time he was in the Northeast Bureau, and, besides, came under the good influence of Kai Feng, chief of the Bureau's propaganda department. Befriended by Mao, he had an opportunity to observe Mao's untruthfulness and perfidy, and became critical of Mao's "thoughts", line and policy. In 1954, Mao accused him of forming an "anti-Party Kao (Kang)-Jao (Shu-shi) bloc", and had him eliminated. (For more details see the section, "The 'Cultural Revolution'" and the Maoist Bid for Cooperation with Imperialism", in the third part of this book, pp. 190-96.

paign for the rectification of the style of Party, educational and literary work", but was in fact the prelude to a reactionary public campaign against Leninism, the Comintern, the Soviet Union, and the Communist Party of China. On 8 February he made another speech, "Against Stereotypes in the Party", spelling out additional guidelines for the "rectification of the style of literary work". On 7 February, *Chiehfangjihpao* published a long article, "On Maoism", signed by a certain Chang Ju-hsin (previously known as Chang Shu-an), a former follower of Wang Ching-wei and suspected of belonging to a Trotskyite group that had infiltrated the Party. "On Maoism" was the overture to undisguised cavilling at Leninism and lauding of Maoism. Thereupon, in May, Mao held three conferences "on literature and art", where he made the opening and closing speeches. Known as "talks at the Yen-an forum on literature and art", they presented the basic guidelines for the "rectification of the style of work in literature and art", and were published in newspapers on 23 May.

Here, I want to deal with the following four items:

1. The Commission and subdivisions for the "rectification of the style of work".
2. The methods and objectives of the "rectification of style".
3. My three talks with Mao concerning the "rectification of style".
4. Mao's "talks at the Yen-an forum on literature and art".

1) The Commission and subdivisions for "the rectification of the style of work"

To conduct the "style rectification campaign" Mao formed a "central commission", the members of which he picked personally. The chief members were Liu Shao-chi, Kang Sheng, Chen Yun, Peng Chen, Kao Kang and Li Fu-chun—the body of men Mao had recruited during the preparatory period. They followed his bidding to the letter. Until January 1943 the commission was chaired by Kang Sheng, then Liu Shao-chi returned to Yen-an from Central China and took over.

In Yen-an, the "rectification campaign" was concentrated in three large subdivisions.

The first was the Central Party School. In addition to the students of the Party School, workers of Party committees—from county to territorial CC bureaus—were summoned here from all parts of the country to undergo “rectification”. So were army commanders and political officers (regimental and higher), cadres of administrative organs in areas (county and higher) held by the 8th Route or New 4th armies, and Communists active in the governing bodies of mass organisations. The “rectification” in the Party School was headed by Peng Chen.

The second subdivision, headed by Kao Kang, concerned workers at all levels of Party bodies, administrative organs and mass organisations in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area.

The third subdivision was for workers of CC CPC bodies, and was headed by Li Fu-chun.

The “style rectification campaign” virtually converted Yen-an into a huge concentration camp. The premises of schools, institutions and offices became places of provisional detention. Nobody was allowed to communicate with anybody—to write or telephone, or do anything, without permission of “rectification campaign” officials.

2) The methods and objectives of the “rectification of style”

Mao Tse-tung instructed all those who were subjected to “rectification” to study the documents he had prescribed, to write “confessions”, and to engage in “self-criticism”. The Commission for the Rectification of Style announced that of all documents and writings only Mao’s works were correct and should therefore be diligently read and reread as an important means of ideological re-education. The Commission specially emphasised Mao’s pamphlet *On New Democracy* because, it said, “Maoism equals New Democracy” and because the booklet was the “prime and capital Maoist theoretical work”. It followed that the works of Lenin, the documents of the Comintern and the CPC, and those of other Party leaders, were wrong and those who read them were dogmatists. The Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin-Mao formula was accordingly changed to Marx-Engels-Mao. Some of the cadres (even high-ranking) were so badly cowed that they publicly burned the listed works and documents or simply threw them away. Some of them

said, “Luckily I have never read them, for otherwise I would have become a dogmatist.”

The Commission also named the methods and objects of “criticism”:

1) Criticise your acquaintances, as well as yourself.

2) Say only derogatory things about yourself and others, and on no account say anything good; but about Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi and a few other listed persons speak well only and on no account badly.

3) The main objects of criticism were prescribed—first of all the “dogmatic group” headed by Wang Ming and Po Ku for “spreading Russian Marxism (Leninism)” and, second, the group of “empiricists” headed by Chou En-lai and Peng Teh-huai for “treading in the footsteps of the dogmatists”.

Those who had studied in the Soviet Union, the intelligentsia, and those doing theoretical or political work were told to confess to being “dogmatists”, while those of working-class and peasant background and those doing practical work were told to confess to being “empiricists”. The overwhelming majority of Party leaders, cadres and rank-and-file members were thus accused of dogmatism or empiricism. The label of “captives” or “helpers” of the dogmatists was attached to the “empiricists” in order to associate them with the “dogmatists” and thus justify striking the main blow at the latter.

In fact, there had never been any dogmatic or empiricist group in the Communist Party of China. That is a rank Maoist invention, a pretext for attacking the majority of the Party membership.

4) All were obliged to confess to the “mistake” of promoting the “left-opportunist line of Wang Ming and Po Ku during the civil war” and the “right-opportunist line of Wang Ming during the anti-Japanese war”.

In fact, there had been no such lines. They were figments of Mao’s imagination which he used during the “rectification” to hit out at Wang Ming, Po Ku, and the majority of the Party membership.

5) Everyone was required to confess that he had not known Maoism (considered the gravest of all “mistakes”) and had “blindly believed in Russian Marxism, that is, Leninism”. Everyone was required to promise “to throw away the ideological weapon of Russian Marxism and take up Chinese Marxism, that is, Maoism”.

Mao said at the Yen-an forum on art and literature that "many members of the Party had organisationally joined the Party, but had not entirely joined or even not at all joined the Party ideologically". This charge was directed against Communists working in art and literature, but also against the overwhelming majority of the Party membership. As a result the Central Commission for the Rectification of Style began demanding "confessions" to this effect from almost the whole lot of Party leaders and members. They were required to admit that they had joined the Party only organisationally, but not ideologically, which was meant to say that they had ideologically joined the party of "Russian Marxism" and not the party of "Chinese Marxism". They were required to renounce "Russian Marxism" and espouse "Chinese Marxism", and were told they would not be considered members of the CPC ideologically until they did so.

6) Everyone was also required to confess to the "gross mistake" of not appreciating "the greatness of Mao Tse-tung" and not knowing that "Mao Tse-tung was the leader of the CPC". Everyone was required to promise henceforth to consider Mao "the sole leader" and to follow his leadership. And so on.

In accordance with these instructions, leaders and cadres conducting the "rectification" in the various offices called endless big and small meetings at which everyone was made to criticise himself and others. People were continuously required to write and rewrite their "confessions", and no matter how much one did so—orally or in writing—it was still said that he had not "fully apprehended his faults", that he had not "criticised all there was to criticise" and must continue to engage in self-flagellation. This continued until people were stripped of their inner communist and revolutionary essence, even their human essence. But even when they were reduced to this state they were still told that they had not criticised "deeply enough". They were in a state of stupor and exhaustion, and were played off one against another and forced to "unmask" and slander one another at meetings and in written "confessions". This was a deliberate tactic to create an atmosphere of mistrust, suspicion, hostility and mutual slander. Everybody was told to believe only Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi and a few others.

"Any new ideology and any new 'ism'," Mao said at the time, "is very difficult to assimilate in the period of its conception, for people are accustomed to the old 'isms' and ideologies. We must therefore follow the example of Mohammed, who converted people to the new faith by force, with the sword in one hand and the Koran in the other. When rectifying the style of work we must resort to force, making people adopt Maoism." It became common practice in all subdivisions to arrest people, hang them up by their arms, beat them, even kill. In this deliberately created atmosphere of stress and terror people were continuously made to express their "determination" to resist "Russian Marxism", to war against the line of the Comintern and against "dogmatic" and "empiricist" leaders, and henceforth to believe only in "Maoism" and support only the Maoist leadership.

Mao made a succession of anti-Soviet and pro-German pronouncements, such as, "the Soviet Union is sure to fall, Germany is sure to win", "twenty-four-year-old socialism is no match for eight-year-old fascism", "Stalin cannot overcome Hitler", and "Russians are no match for Germans". And here is one more: "Stalin's strategic plan of defending Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad is a blunder. These cities should be abandoned to the Germans. Soviet troops should withdraw east behind the Urals and wait until America, Britain and France open the second front, then begin a joint counter-offensive. Until that time the Soviets should deploy only small forces and partisan detachments to conduct guerrilla warfare. Unless this is done defeat is inevitable." He tried to discredit Leninism, invented false versions of the history of the Soviet Communist Party and of Russia, expressed his contempt of, and slandered the Soviet people and the Soviet Army. All this was a guideline for the campaign officials who, with Mao's "sword" in hand, made the subjects of "rectification" repeat Mao's libel against Lenin's great party, the great Soviet Union, the great Soviet people and the great Soviet Army at meetings and in their "confessions".

Every time Mao voiced his absurd "thoughts" at Politbureau meetings in August and September 1941, Jen Pih-shih, Lo Fu, and I never failed to retort that we must keep our faith in Leninism, the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party, the potential of the Soviet Union, the

Soviet people, and the strength of the Soviet Army; the setbacks of the Soviet Army were temporary and in the long run the socialist Soviet Union was bound to win and Hitler's fascist Germany was bound to lose. Scowling ominously, Mao would reply with unrepressed anger: "Time will show. The near future will show who is correct." Here, at least, he was right—very soon the facts did show.

3) My three talks with Mao on "rectification"

In October 1941, April 1944 and December 1948 Mao and I met to discuss the campaign for "the rectification of the style of work". Mao made no bones about replying to all important questions related to the campaign, shedding light on its true motives.

In our first conversation Mao in effect replied to the question why he had pounced on me (Wang Ming), Po Ku, Lo Fu, Wang Chia-hsiang, Kai Feng, Yang Shang-kun and Chu Jui as the "chief exponents of dogmatism" and on Chou En-lai and Peng Teh-huai as the "chief exponents of empiricism". Here is how it happened.

In our talk on the night of 4 October 1941, Mao said, "there are three people popular among Party cadres. The first is you, Wang Ming, the second is Chou En-lai, and the third is old man Peng Teh-huai. You, Comrade Wang Ming, amalgamate theory and practice, you have a political mind and a sense of realism. Chou En-lai is a good diplomat, as well as a good organiser and administrator. And old man Peng is equally strong in military things and politics. To him we owe most of our big successes in North China. There are a few other very capable people among those who have studied in Moscow—Po Ku, Lo Fu, Wang Chia-hsiang, Kai Feng, Yang Shang-kun and Chu Jui."

Subsequently, Mao denounced these people as "dogmatists", "empiricists", "subjectivists", "sectarians", and the like. They were the chief target of his attacks. Through them he attacked others, using this as a means of glorifying his own person.

In our second conversation Mao explained the purpose of the "rectification of style", and told me why it encountered strong resistance among Party cadres. This was on 1 April 1944 at 4 o'clock in the afternoon.

Sitting at my bedside, Mao good-naturedly said:

"Comrade Wang Ming, you fell ill before the rectification of style began officially. This is why I had no opportunity to discuss with you some questions of the campaign. Today, I have come to tell you what is hidden deep in my soul.

"To begin with, why I needed to rectify style? The prime purpose is to rewrite the history of the Communist Party of China as my own history. How can this be done? It is necessary to create Maoism. How can one write the history of the CPC as the personal history of Mao Tse-tung if there is no Maoism?

"The Communist Party of China was always guided by Leninism. In the early period of the Chinese revolution, Lenin and Stalin helped us to solve many questions of theory and to work out our political line. From the beginning, the CPC was guided by the Comintern. The Soviet Communist Party and Soviet Government helped the CPC and the Chinese revolution in every possible way. All these are historical facts.

"At critical times in the history of the CPC when, say, Chen Tu-hsiu committed his right-opportunist mistake in 1927 and the Chinese revolution was in critical straits, Comrade Tsyui Tsyu-po took the lead in combatting Chen Tu-hsiuism. The Central Committee called its August Seventh Conference on the advice of the Comintern in support of Tsyui Tsyu-po against Chen Tu-hsiu. This was how we overcame Chen Tu-hsiu's mistake.

"In 1930 Li Li-sen committed his 'left'-opportunist mistake and created grave difficulties for the Chinese revolution. At that time it was you, Comrade Wang Ming, who took the lead in combatting the Li Li-sen line. The Executive of the Comintern sent a letter to the CC CPC criticising the Li Li-sen line and advising us to call the 4th Plenum to denounce the Li Li-sen line and supported your struggle against it. This was how we overcame Li Li-sen's mistake.

"After the 18 September events of 1931, Japan committed one aggression after another against China, while in China itself there was a civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Supported by the Comintern and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, you formulated and developed the policy of the united national anti-Japanese front, which enabled us to mount a

nationwide anti-Japanese war for the salvation of our country.

"This, too, is a historical fact.

"But if this is acknowledged, how will it be possible to write the history of the CPC as the personal history of Mao Tse-tung? So what was I to do? I decided to conduct a campaign for the rectification of the style of work, to disavow Leninism and to disavow the role of Lenin, Stalin, the Comintern, and the Soviet Union in the history of the CPC and the Chinese revolution. We say that Leninism is inapplicable to the Chinese revolution, that everything Lenin and Stalin said about the Chinese revolution was wrong, that the recommendations of the Comintern were wrong, and that the Soviet Union never helped the CPC, and that if sometimes it did help, its help was useless and harmful. We do not recognise Tsyui Tsyu-po's services in combatting Chen Tu-hsiu and say, on the contrary, that he had been wrong. We do not recognise your services in combatting Li Li-sen and say, on the contrary, that your line was still more left than Li Li-sen's. We do not recognise your services in devising the policy of the united national anti-Japanese front, and say that yours was an incorrect right-opportunist line. We also say that on the ideological plane the Communist Party of China was always guided by Maoism, that the CPC and the Chinese revolution owe all their achievements of the past twenty-four years to Mao's leadership, and that the many mistakes committed by certain leaders of the CPC at different times were rectified by Mao.

"Alas, though the rectification has now been going on for a long time, my opinions are still encountering very strong resistance.

"What am I to do?

"I have given it a lot of thought, but have found no solution. To be sure, things are a bit simpler with Leninism, the Comintern, and the Soviet Union because the Comintern has been dissolved and nobody can now force us to recognise them. Things are also simple with Tsyui Tsyu-po, for he is dead. He committed a putschist mistake after the 7 August conference, and the 9th Plenum of the Comintern Executive has criticised him for it. So did the 6th Congress of the CPC. In fact, this was the reason why it did not elect him General Secretary. The 3rd Plenum of our Central Committee (1930)

saw him commit another mistake—that of conciliation with the Li Li-sen line. So, his influence in the Party is now negligible.

"It is much harder to deal with you. You have written a book against the Li Li-sen line. The Comintern and the CPC have passed resolutions against the Li Li-sen line. People remember this. You also wrote many articles, reports and other documents on the united national anti-Japanese front. Your part in working out the policy of the united national anti-Japanese front is known not only to the Comintern and the fraternal parties, but even to the Kuomintang and other parties and groups. Our Party has followed this policy for a number of years, is following it now, and will follow it until the end of the anti-Japanese war. This is why it is very difficult for Party cadres to accept my version that Wang Ming did not fight against Li Li-sen or that his opposition to the Li Li-sen line was wrong, that Wang Ming had no part in working out the policy of the united national anti-Japanese front, and that Wang Ming stood for an incorrect policy.

"On the other hand, if I were to recognise the line of the 4th Central Committee Plenum as correct, and if I were to acknowledge that it was you who formulated the united national anti-Japanese front policy, you would occupy 15 years in the 24-year history of our Party. Could there be any Maoism in that case? How would it be possible then to write the history of our Party as the personal history of Mao Tse-tung?

"What am I to do?

"I have thought of a solution: I am going to ask you to concede your services to me. Will you agree?"

I replied:

"My views on this score differ from yours. He who rejects Leninism and the role of the Comintern and the Soviet Union in the Chinese revolution cannot be a Communist. No Communist, no matter how big or small his contribution is to the Party and revolution, should regard it as his own credit, for it is the credit of the Party, the Comintern, and Marxism-Leninism. When Dimitrov, Thorez and other comrades said to me at the 7th Congress of the Comintern: your contribution to the united national anti-Japanese front is a credit to you, for you have done a great service to the Party, the people

of China, the whole Chinese nation,* I replied: it is not my personal credit, but a credit to the Party, the Comintern, and Marxism-Leninism.

"As you know, soon after the 7th Congress Dimitrov officially informed me that Comrade A. A. Zhdanov had reported on the results of the 7th Comintern Congress to the Politbureau of the Soviet Communist Party, and that Zhdanov and the Politbureau had commended my speeches at the Congress, and in particular the new policy of a united national anti-Japanese front presented on behalf of the CPC; Zhdanov said that my arrow had hit the target.** To these words of praise, too, I gave my previous reply.

"You will probably recall that before style rectification you yourself repeatedly said at meetings and to me: 'The new policy of the united national anti-Japanese front is a great discovery; it would have been very difficult for our Party and the Chinese Red Army to overcome their difficulties without this policy; the Chinese people would not have been able to wage the anti-Japanese war on the scale of the whole country without this policy; it is a great credit for Comrade Wang Ming.' And my reply was again the same.

"But if you think those are my credits and if you want me to 'concede' them to you, let me ask you this: to 'concede' in what way?"

Mao said:

"The fact that you headed the struggle against the Li Li-sen line will not be mentioned. We will consider that I headed the struggle against the Li Li-sen line. Let us say that the Red Army of the Fukien-Kiangsi Soviet area, of which I was then political commissar, did not support the Li Li-sen line and that, therefore, I was the one who headed the struggle against the Li Li-sen line. What do you say to that?"

I asked him:

* Comrade Dimitrov repeated these words in a conversation with me in the presence of Kang Sheng and Wang Chia-hsiang shortly before my return to China in November 1937.

** At the time of the "style rectification campaign" Mao often deliberately said: "We discharge Marxist-Leninist 'arrows' at the targets of the Chinese revolution. Dogmatists discharge arrows without any target." These words were aimed against Comrade Zhdanov's remark.

"Do you think this version will convince Party cadres? The Red Army of the Fukien-Kiangsi Soviet area, of which you were commissar, attacked Changsha when the city was almost defenceless, and mounted a second attack when it was packed with enemy troops. This resulted in heavy losses for the Red Army. After the 4th Plenum, following their arrival in Chuitsin, Comrades Jen Pi-shih and Wang Chia-hsiang called a special Party conference of the Fukien-Kiangsi Soviet area, at which the second attack on Changsha was described as a 'left'-adventurist mistake. The conference adopted a resolution on this score. So, will the cadres accept your present version?"

"Quite true," he mumbled, "but there is no other choice."

Again I asked him:

"And in what manner am I to 'concede' to you the credit for creating the united national anti-Japanese front?"

He replied:

"We will simply take no notice of the fact that it was you who worked out the policy of the united national anti-Japanese front. Let us consider that I did it. From now on we will say that the united front policy of the CPC was launched on 27 December 1935, the day when I delivered a report on the united front at the conference of Party cadres in Wayopao."

I replied:

"Do you think you can convince the cadres? Consider the following facts:

"First, the Party had been working on the united national anti-Japanese front policy for a number of years before you delivered this report. On the day after the 18 September events (1934), the Central Committee set the sights on a national-revolutionary war of the armed people against Japanese imperialism. It said so clearly in its appeal to the people of China in connection with the Shenyang (Mukden) events. Putting to shame the non-resistance policy of Chiang Kai-shek. In furtherance of this course during the Shanghai battle against the Japanese, the Central Committee issued the slogan, 'Workers, peasants, soldiers, students and merchants, unite to resist Japan and save the Motherland!' This slogan was consonant with the united front policy. Accordingly our Party organised an anti-Japanese vol-

unteer army of Shanghai workers and called on the people of Shanghai to help the 19th Route Army.

"In 1932 when the Japanese occupied the three northeastern provinces and set up the Manchukuo puppet state, the Central Committee sent a letter dated 25 December to the Manchurian provincial committee, calling on it to create a united anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo front. In 1934, the CPC delegation to the Comintern sent Comrade Yang Sung to the northeastern provinces to supervise the activation of the anti-Japanese Union Army of Northeast China.

"In January 1933, the central Soviet government of China and the high command of the Chinese Red Army announced that they were ready to conclude an agreement on three simple conditions with any other Chinese army on joint armed resistance to the Japanese invaders. Chen Cheng, supreme commander of the Kuomintang 'liquidation of communists' front, and generals of other regular armies, sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, asking him to end his 'liquidation of communists' campaign and launch joint resistance to Japan. The command of the 19th Route Army and the people's government of Fukien province officially concluded an agreement with the Chinese Red Army and the Soviet government of China on joint resistance to Japan and struggle against Chiang Kai-shek. The anti-Japanese Union Army of Chahar-Suiyuan, headed by Feng Yu-hsiang, Chi Hung-chang and others, also collaborated with our Party on the basis of these three simple conditions. The three conditions were also acclaimed by the groups holding power in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Shensi, Szechuan, and other provinces.

"In the beginning of 1934, a six-point programme of the preparatory committee for armed self-defence was issued over the signatures of Soong Ching-ling* and 3,000 other prominent personalities. Welcoming this appeal, people in all our big cities and many overseas Chinese began organising local preparatory self-defence committees, which proved highly effective in uniting the mass of the people to resist Japan and save the country.

* The widow of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; also known as Madame Sun.—Tr.

"In August 1935, our Central Committee and the Chinese Soviet government issued a joint appeal to all compatriots concerning anti-Japanese resistance and national salvation, setting out concrete organisational measures and a programme of ten principles for uniting the efforts of all parties, governments and armies in China. This appeal was enthusiastically received by all parties, groups and mass organisations, including a majority in the Kuomintang.

"All these political documents on the united national anti-Japanese front adopted and issued by the CPC, were drawn up by me. And as you have just said, this is known not only inside but also outside the Party, and not only inside but also outside the country.

"Besides, in my speech on behalf of our Central Committee at the 7th Congress of the Comintern I set out the content of the August First Appeal, and gave notice of the change that had begun in all our Party work to facilitate and further the united national anti-Japanese front policy. In November of the same year I published an article, 'The New Situation and the New Policy', about the theory and tactics of the united national anti-Japanese front. The idea of joining hands with Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan for national salvation was first presented in this article. In the beginning of December this prompted Chiang Kai-shek to send Teng Wen-i, military attache of the Kuomintang Embassy in the USSR, as his own and the Kuomintang Central Executive's representative to the Government of the USSR and to the Comintern leadership with a request to facilitate negotiations between him and me as representative of the CPC in the Comintern on questions of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the anti-Japanese struggle for national salvation. Though no specific agreement was reached for objective and subjective reasons, a start was made in Kuomintang-Communist Party contacts, an exchange of opinions had taken place, and certain common viewpoints were established.

"Second (I continued), everybody knows that two days before your report, the Politbureau had adopted a resolution on the current situation and the tasks of the Party, in which it announced its decision to follow a united front policy and implement a corresponding programme.

Though the Politbureau was not fully informed of the new internal and international situation and its resolution contained several serious mistakes, it had thereby officially adopted the united national anti-Japanese front policy. Everybody knows that the resolution was based on a factual report of Chang Hao* and Liu Chang-shen,** who had been sent on my request and through the good offices of the Soviet Communist Party's Politbureau to Wayopao. Their report consisted of 1) the report and concluding remarks I had made in June 1935 at meetings of the CPC Comintern delegation in connection with the drafting of the appeal to all compatriots on anti-Japanese resistance and national salvation, i.e. the August First Appeal, and 2) that part of my speech at the 7th Congress of the Comintern which concerned the revolutionary movement in colonial and semi-colonial countries and the tactics of communist parties, specifically the united national anti-Japanese front policy in China.

- "Third, though it is now nearly nine years since your report to the conference of Party cadres in Wayopao, its text has never been published. Who knows what you reported at that time? ***

● * Chang Hao (*alias* Li Fu-sheng, real name Lin Chun-tan)—a worker, member of the Sixth CPC Central Committee. In the early thirties he represented the Chinese trade unions in the Red Profintern. He died in Yen-an in 1942, soon after the official launching of the "style rectification campaign."

** Liu Chang-shen (*alias* Lo Ying, real name Wang Hsiang-pao)—former Vladivostok docker, member of the Soviet Communist Party since 1923, twice elected member of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee. After liberation, he was deputy chairman of the All-China Council of Trade Unions. In 1967, during the "cultural revolution", he was mobbed and killed by "red guards" (*hungweipings*) on Mao's orders.

- *** This so-called report was included in the first volume of Mao's *Selected Works* 16 years later, in 1951, after considerable doctoring, entitled, "On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism". The report was not in support, but rather against, the united national anti-Japanese front policy. If we are to believe this report, the Communist Party of China lacked resources to build a united national anti-Japanese front with the Kuomintang and the local power-holding groups. The report said: "The big local bullies and bad gentry, the big warlords, the big bureaucrats and the big compradores have long made up their minds... They have formed a camp of traitors; for them such a question as whether or not they are to become slaves of a foreign nation does not exist, because they have already obliterated national demarcations and their interests are inseparable

"It is not likely, therefore, that the cadres will believe what you will now say on this score."

Mao replied:

"Quite true. However, there is no other choice but to make them believe it. This is why I have come to tell you what is hidden deep in my soul.

"But I will give it some more thought. And I beg you to help me find a way out. Let us say no more today. You are ill, too much talk tires you. But let me caution you: on no account must you tell anyone else about the content of our conversation today."

There is only one conclusion that can be drawn from this: Mao's "style rectification campaign" was motivated exclusively by selfish aims; Mao acted as a rank careerist and narrow nationalist.

Describing Mao's behaviour during the "style rectification", some Party cadres said: "Mao is a political swindler. Everything he says and does during the 'rectification' campaign is a sheer swindle", or: "Mao is without principles, without scruples, without morals, and without shame. What really needs merciless rectification is his style of these four withouts."

As I learned later, Mao had come to tell me what was "hidden deep in his soul" not only because Party cadres were strongly opposed to the "style rectification campaign", but also because shortly before our conversation ● Georgi Dimitrov had sent me a letter supporting my political positions. It had been intercepted and concealed by Mao. And Mao knew, of course, that Dimitrov was then in charge of the Soviet Communist Party's department of international information. Dimitrov's letter worried Mao. He was embarrassed by the "style rectification campaign". So, soon after this talk with me, he announced the end of "emergency salvation", and launched a period of "self-refutation" and "rehabilitation".

- In our third talk Mao admitted that he had been wrong to oppose Leninism and promote Maoism.

Also, he admitted that he had been wrong to fabricate Wang Ming's two "opportunistic mistakes".

from those of imperialism; their chief of chiefs is none other than Chiang Kai-shek." Referring to the national bourgeoisie, Mao held that only its "left wing" was likely "to take part in the struggle" against Japanese aggression.

The talk was in his Hsipeipo home on 18 December 1948. It was the fifth time we talked since October 1948, and the content of our conversation attracted the attention of the 2nd Plenum of the Seventh CC CPC in March 1949. Here are the main points of our conversation.

Mao said:

"Comrade Wang Ming, we have spoken four times and exchanged opinions four times. Today, I want you to speak your mind on certain important issues connected with the style rectification campaign, such as the question of Leninism, the political line during the civil war, the political line during the anti-Japanese war, and so on. If, on hearing your opinion, I find myself in the wrong, I will rectify my mistakes."

I said:

"You have already spoken on these matters during our talk in April 1944. As the proverb says, you have hung a cowbell round the tiger's neck and it is up to you to take it off. If you want to rectify your mistakes, do so. Why ask the opinion of others? Besides, you are impervious to the opinion of others if it does not fit your own; not only do you lose your temper, but you also persecute people."

Mao answered:

"Comrade Wang Ming, let me assure you that I have made great progress in that respect. I show no rancour, and am ready to rectify my mistakes."

"Fine," I said. "Let's discuss the questions you have raised. The first question—on Leninism and 'Mao's thoughts'. You will recall that even in the preparatory period of the style rectification campaign I advised you against creating any Maoism, and I told you not to go against Leninism. I said that this would do no good to the Communist Party of China, to the world communist movement, and even to you personally. What is your present view on this score?"

"I am now trying to decide what to do next. Mind you, I have taken no decisions. I must give it a little more thought," Mao replied.

"The second question," I continued, "concerns the political line of the 4th Plenum. At the 7th Plenum you said the line of the 4th was more left than the Li Li-sen line, because in my book about the struggle against the

Li Li-sen line* I wrote that the 3rd Plenum had failed to criticise some of Li Li-sen's rightist theoretical views. You said: 'Since Wang Ming says there were rightist elements in Li Li-sen's line, he must be still farther left than Li Li-sen'.

"Now, I ask you: did not the Leninists criticise Trotskyism for being 'left' in form and right in content? Does this warrant the deduction that they were more 'left' than Trotsky?"

"Li Li-sen's ideas about the Chinese revolution and the revolutionary situation in China were of the extreme 'left' variety. But his ideas about the forces and potentialities of the Chinese revolution were of the extreme right variety. This is why the letter of the Comintern Executive described the Li Li-sen line as semi-Trotskyite."

"Why may one point out Li Li-sen's 'left' mistakes and not his right theoretical mistakes? After all, Li Li-sen had not only ordered the Chinese Red Army to attack big cities, had not only inspired armed putsches in many big cities, and had not only called on the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic to send troops and help the insurrection, but had also urged the proletariat in all the imperialist countries to rise in support of the 'uprising' in China. Did not I in my book and the 4th Plenum in its resolution severely criticise these extreme leftist, adventurist mistakes of Li Li-sen? Did I or the 4th Plenum ever suggest that troops should also come from the Moon or Mars to help the Chinese revolution? I did not. Neither did the 4th Plenum. So how can anybody say the line of the 4th Plenum was 'Wang Ming's line' and more 'left' than the Li Li-sen line?"

"The mistakes attributed to the 4th Plenum are not my invention," Mao said. "They are the invention of Liu Shao-chi. But I accepted his opinion, and now I admit that I was wrong."

"The third question," I continued, "is that of the Party line during the anti-Japanese war. On arriving in Yen-an from Moscow on 29 November 1937, I said among other things in my report to a Politbureau meeting early in December that Comrade Dimitrov recommended us to

* The reference is to Wang Ming's *Struggle for the Further Bolshevisation of the Communist Party of China*.

study the French Communist Party's popular front experience. He also suggested the following slogans: 'subordinate everything to the united national anti-Japanese front' and 'everything through the united national anti-Japanese front'. I said that I agreed with these recommendations.

"But I never mentioned these two slogans again. Not because I considered them wrong, but simply because there was no occasion to mention them. I heard nothing about these slogans either from you or from Liu after the December 1937 meeting of the Politbureau until the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1938. After speaking at the 6th Plenum I was instructed by the Politbureau to draft the 6th Plenum resolution. Thereupon, I left for Chungking before the Plenum ended to attend the second session of the joint National Political Council. It was a time of national crisis and a critical point in the anti-Japanese war, for the city of Wuhan had just fallen, and I was to explain to the people our Party's view of the current situation, and its standpoint on closer cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, national unity, and on fighting the anti-Japanese war until final victory, supporting those in the Kuomintang who were for continuing the resistance to Japan and hitting the group of Wang Ching-wei, the national traitor who had gone over openly to Japan's side.

Comrade Liu took advantage of my departure and said at the Plenum: the slogan 'subordinate everything to the united national anti-Japanese front' is a good slogan, but the slogan 'everything through the united national anti-Japanese front' is a bad slogan, because it signifies, 'everything through Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan'.

"Now, let me ask you: according to Liu the slogan 'everything through the united national anti-Japanese front' is equivalent to 'everything through Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan', and is therefore incorrect. Also according to Liu, the slogan 'subordinate everything to the united national anti-Japanese front' is correct, though by his own logic it should be equivalent to 'subordinate everything to Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan'. What kind of juggling is this?

"What is the united national anti-Japanese front? It is the policy of our Party in a definite historical period of anti-Japanese resistance and national salvation; it is

the Party's general line during this period. What was the content and purpose of our Party's united front policy? To unite, on definite terms, all classes, all parties and political groups, all armed forces, all governments, all ethnic groups, and all mass organisations, excluding pro-Japanese elements, in order to wage a national-revolutionary war of resistance against Japanese imperialism and in defence of China's national independence, state sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time, the Party sees this historical period as a preliminary period opening the way to the victory of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution on the scale of the whole country.

"This is why the slogan 'subordinate everything to the united national anti-Japanese front' means that in a definite historical period the Party subordinates all its activity to this policy. The slogan 'everything through the united national anti-Japanese front' means that in the given historical period the Party discharges its mission through this policy. This is how I understood, and now understand, the meaning of these two slogans. They were suggested by Georgi Dimitrov and I agree with them.

"Why did Liu identify our Party policy with Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan? Liu interpreted 'everything through the united national anti-Japanese front' to mean 'everything through Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan' precisely because he identified the policy of the united national anti-Japanese front with Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan. To follow Liu's logic, the united front policy is equivalent to the policy of Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan. Can there be anything more absurd?

"As for Liu's contention that there was no organisation in China similar to the popular front committee in France through which the parties concerned could settle all affairs by negotiation—this was untrue. Though there was no united national anti-Japanese front committee in China, there was the bipartisan commission of the Kuomintang and Communist Party, which were the basis of, and the biggest forces in, the united front. There was no other political party as massive and strong as either the Kuomintang or the Communist Party. There were several small parties and groups, out of which the left followed the Communist Party and the right followed the Kuomintang. In other words, when the Kuomintang and the

Communist Party came to terms on some issue, this was tantamount to an agreement among all parties and groups in the country. This is a recognised fact.

"As you know, at that time the bipartisan commission consisted of the following: Wang Ming, Chou En-lai, Po Ku and Yeh Chien-ying for the Communist Party and Chen Li-fu, Chang Chun, Kang Tse and Liu Chien-chun for the Kuomintang, with major issues being directly negotiated with Chiang Kai-shek.

"In addition, there was the Joint National Political Council (*Kuomintsan chenghuai*), on which the Kuomintang, the Communist Party, and the other parties and groups were represented. Up to a point, in fact, this Council served as a national committee of the anti-Japanese united front, as a place of direct contacts and negotiations between the Kuomintang, the Communist Party, and other parties and organisations.

"This is why Liu Shao-chi's contention that there was no mechanism in China through which different parties could settle issues by negotiation, was contrary to the facts.

"After the anti-Japanese war began and following the emergence of the united national anti-Japanese front on a countrywide scale, all questions concerning the Communist Party, the 8th Route and the New 4th armies, and all other questions of interest to our Party, were negotiated by our Party with the Kuomintang. In fact, none of these issues could be settled without the Communist Party. This Chiang Kai-shek knew perfectly well. As for Yen Hsi-shan and other local power-holders, they were even more strongly conscious of the fact that certain things could not be settled without the Communist Party.

"This is why Liu's contention that Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan would not negotiate with the Communist Party was also contrary to the facts.

"If Liu had made these contentions before I left the 6th Plenum to go to Chungking, I would have explained at once that his understanding of the Party's united national anti-Japanese front policy is out of line with both the Leninist theory on the united national anti-imperialist front and the present state of the united national anti-Japanese front in China.

"At the end of 1938, after I returned from Chungking to Yen-an, you said to me: 'I have put Liu Shao-chi right

in my concluding remarks at the 6th Central Committee Plenum'. You also said, 'Those who think that the slogan "everything through the united national anti-Japanese front" is the same as "everything through Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan", are in error. Everybody knows that this is farthest from Comrade Wang Ming's thoughts.'

"I told you then that your statement was vague and incomplete. First, you are trying to tell me now that you said this was farthest from Wang Ming's thoughts, but in your concluding remarks at the 6th Plenum you said nothing of the sort. Second, you did not explain who exactly held this view. Who was it? It was Liu Shao-chi. Having mistakenly identified the united national anti-Japanese front policy with the policy of Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan, he said that 'everything through the united national anti-Japanese front' meant the same as 'everything through Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan'. It is unfortunate that you did not point out Comrade Liu's mistake at that time. Third, you did not explain the content and purpose of the Party's united national anti-Japanese front policy. Nor did you explain what it meant to subordinate everything to the united national anti-Japanese front and do everything through the front. As a result, Liu's speech and your own remarks on the united front created ideological and political confusion and lack of clarity. Now you must decide how this can be remedied.

"At that time you replied to me: 'After our exchange of opinions today there are no longer any differences between us on this score. At the first opportunity I will again explain everything to our comrades in accordance with our conversation today'. But during the 'style rectification campaign' you suddenly declared these two slogans to be 'Wang Ming's right-opportunist line of the anti-Japanese war period'. I had been poisoned and was gravely ill at that time, and had no opportunity either to explain or to discuss anything. What is your present opinion on this score?"

"It was not Liu's invention," said Mao. "It was all my invention. Liu made his speech at the 6th Plenum on my instructions. And it was on my initiative that during the style rectification campaign the two slogans were declared to be Wang Ming's right-opportunist line. I was wrong."

"Chairman Mao," I said to him, "you have just listened

to another man's opinion and have expressed self-criticism. You have certainly made progress, and I sincerely welcome it."

He was silent for a time. Then, suddenly, his face turned livid and he pounded his fist on the table, shouting:

"Haven't I explained my idea to you in April 1944? Didn't I tell you then what is hidden deep in my soul? If Leninism is recognised as the guiding idea of the Communist Party of China, if the line of your 4th CC Plenum is recognised as correct, and if your united national anti-Japanese front policy is also recognised as correct, then there can be no Maoism and it will be impossible to write the history of the Communist Party of China as the personal history of Mao Tse-tung. Everything you have said today shows that you still do not recognise Mao's thoughts as the only guiding thoughts of the CPC and that you still want Russian Marxism to dominate the CPC. This won't do! It says so clearly in the General Principles of the Party Rules adopted by the 7th Congress. It is impermissible for you not to accept them. As for the content of our conversation today, see that you follow the example of the gilded idol in the Temple of Royal Ancestors and sew up your lips. If you say anything to anybody about it, I want you to know that I will stop at nothing."

I rebuffed these absurdities. We argued for another two hours, but in vain. I tried again and again to prevail on him that it is best to follow the approach we had followed in the beginning of our conversation—what is right is right, what is wrong is wrong. I will say you are right where you had been right, and you will admit you are wrong where you had been wrong. Our principle should be: subordinate everything to the truth, subordinate everything to the interests of the Party and the world communist movement. That is the position of a Communist, especially a Party leader. And he explained again and again that he did not deny his errors in the matter of opposing Leninism and of ascribing "opportunistic lines" to Wang Ming, but that he was determined to create Maoism, and to write the history of the Party as his personal history.

We were deeply immersed in our argument when my wife, Meng Ching-shu, entered the room and said to me:

"I have looked for you everywhere, and here you are quarrelling again. Let's better go home and have dinner."

Chiang Ching, who sat in a corner listening to our argument, rose hastily and said:

"How fortunate that you have come, Comrade Meng. The two old fighting cocks are impossible: they start quarrelling the moment they meet, and there is no end to their argument. Take your fighting cock to have dinner, and I'll do the same with mine. Then they will have to stop fighting."

That was how our argument ended.

Clearly, Mao had admitted that his "style rectification campaign" directed against Leninism and ascribing "erroneous political lines" to others, was incorrect. He had also admitted that he committed these abominations deliberately.

It also follows from the content of our talk that being an egoistic careerist and narrow nationalist, Mao is incapable of placing the interests of the Party and the world communist movement above all other interests. He has always given priority to the interests of his own person. This is why he has never been able to recognise and correct his mistakes. On the contrary, he has always aggravated them. This is why he committed mistake after mistake on an ever greater scale and of an ever more serious character. And the more so as time went on, until his mistakes became irreparable and he himself degenerated into a traitor to communism and an accomplice of imperialism.

4) Mao's talks at the art and literature forum in Yen-an

Mao and his few followers continue to extol his *Talks at the Art and Literature Forum in Yen-an*, thus deceiving themselves and others. They describe the *Talks* as a classic exposition of "Mao's revolutionary thoughts and line in art and literature", passing him off as the sole authority on the subject. More, during the "style rectification" period and until the "cultural revolution" Mao considered it the greatest of crimes for anyone to ignore his literary "thoughts" and "line". This was the angle of his attack on revolutionary writers and artists of the fifties and sixties, whom he subsequently subjected to repressions.

● Let us take a closer look at the *Talks*—not the original text printed in the Yen-an newspaper *Chiehfangjihpao* in May 1942, which was full of mistakes, but the repeatedly touched up text published in 1953 in the third volume of Mao's *Selected Works*. This will deny him the opportunity to say we are criticising something that was put out in haste and had not been properly revised.

1) Mao's Insinuations

Spurning the facts of the revolutionary development of Chinese art and literature in the preceding 20 years, Mao levelled a whole set of accusations at China's revolutionary writers and artists. To begin with, he placed all of them "under one cap" by saying they had not yet solved or found a correct solution for the main question—whom art and literature must serve. Thereupon he said they had not yet found the right answer to the question "how to serve"—whether to raise the quality of their work (refinement) or to make their work more simple (popular). He also accused them of not understanding "the question of the united front in art and literature" and the problem of "literary and art criticism". To top this, he charged them with "ideological mistakes" and "mistakes of style".

Mao also faulted revolutionary writers and artists inside and outside the CPC in various other ways. He said, for example, that many Party members "had joined the Party organisationally but had not yet joined the Party or had not yet entirely joined the Party, ideologically". He said writers and artists inside and outside the Party were not able to distinguish between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie, that they were divorced from the masses and had no sympathy for workers, peasants and soldiers, and were therefore incapable of producing works about workers, peasants and soldiers. "Even when they try to portray workers, peasants and soldiers," he said, "all they manage is to paint the outer shell of a working man, whereas the essence they produce is the old essence of a petty bourgeois intellectual, since deep in their souls there is still a kingdom of the petty bourgeois intellectual." Mao went on to say that they did not understand that art and literature served politics and that they did not know whom they must praise and whom they must criticise. They did not even understand the distinc-

tion between "the far rear, which is under the domination of the Kuomintang, and the liberated areas, where the leading force is the Communist Party". On all these grounds Mao drew the conclusion that an "effective and serious campaign to rectify the style of work" was needed among revolutionary writers and artists.

Mao pretended that he was referring to just some of the writers and artists in Yen-an. But the ensuing events showed that he was attacking literary and art workers inside and outside the Party everywhere in the country. He did not confine his campaign to just the liberated areas. In 1943 he specially sent Hu Chiao-mu to Chungking, where the latter invited Party writers and artists to the mission of the 8th Route Army and told them they must conduct an "effective and serious rectification of style campaign" in line with Mao's *Talks* in order to "transform themselves and the content of their works".

2) The True Facts of History

Mao's groundless accusations do not stand up to the historical facts. Take his charge that revolutionary writers and artists had not yet solved or found the right solution for the main question—whom art and literature must serve. This was tantamount to saying that they did not understand that art and literature must serve the working people. Which is contrary to the facts.

The Chinese revolutionary literary movement, which came into being during the May Fourth Movement (1919), resulted from the influence on China's progressive intelligentsia and youth of the Great October Socialist Revolution, of Marxist-Leninist ideas, and Russian revolutionary literature. With the support of Lenin and the help of the Comintern, the Communist Party of China was organised in the summer of 1921. The pioneers of revolutionary Chinese art and literature, who espoused the ideas of communism, joined the Party one after another. This was how the revolutionary literary movement, of which Communists were the leading and working nucleus, became part of the anti-imperialist revolution, the anti-feudal revolution, and the struggle for the non-capitalist, i.e. socialist, perspective. Its members fought on the front of revolutionary art and literature under the guidance of the Communist Party. And the revolutionary movement

in art and literature that had arisen and developed in this manner naturally could have no other aim but to serve the proletariat and all working people.

Already in the twenties the foremost members of the revolutionary movement in literature understood theoretically and adopted in practice the basic principle of serving the proletariat and all the working people, and of promoting the revolution. Here are a few examples.

1. In the early twenties, soon after the Communist Party of China was founded, prominent Party leaders, among them Teng Chung-hsia, Yun Tai-ni, and Hsiao Chui-nu wrote in their articles that "literature must develop as a revolutionary weapon". They came to grips with the "art for art's sake" theory, and called on writers and poets to "engage in practical revolutionary activity" and "show more of the true life of society".

2. Chiang Kuang-tzu raised the same topic in his essays, *The Proletariat and Culture*, *On Revolutionary Literature*, *Russian Literature*, and others. In *On Revolutionary Literature* he wrote that "revolutionary literature is a literature that reflects the interests of the oppressed masses", "exposes the crimes and evils of the old society", and "helps the development of the new forces".

Chiang Kuang-tzu not only propagated the theory of revolutionary art and literature, but also followed revolutionary theory in his creative writing, portraying the revolutionary movement of the masses in different periods.

3. In an early article, *Our New Literary Movement*, Kuo Mo-jo urged "resistance to the ferocious dragon of capitalism". He called on the writers to show the "spirit of the proletariat". In the article, *The Revolution and Literature*, he wrote, "We need a literature that would express sympathy for the proletariat, a literature of socialist realism"; he invited young writers "to go to the people, to the factories, to the army barracks, to plunge into the whirlpool of the revolution".

4. Mao Tun said in the article *Naturalism and Modern Chinese Prose* that literature "must pay attention to social problems and show sympathy with the oppressed and downtrodden".

5. Chen Fang-wu also wrote in the article, *From a Literary Revolution to a Revolutionary Literature*, that "the worker-peasant masses should be our subject" and

"we must use a language familiar to the worker-peasant masses".

These calls for a "literary revolution", a "revolutionary literature" and a "proletarian literature" reflected the standpoint not only of the above-named authors, but also the basic direction of the revolutionary art and literature of that period.

The spread of Marxist-Leninist ideas and the influence of the movement for a new culture and literature, prompted many revolutionary intellectuals and students to engage in educational work. They held evening classes for working people in towns and villages, published popular books and art reproductions, held public lectures popularising science, and organised concerts and other performances. This set in motion the new historical process of wedding art and literature with the worker-peasant masses.

During the great revolution of 1925-1927, the drive to put art and literature in the service of the working masses was a conspicuous part of the general revolutionary movement. And in the late twenties, following the defeat of the great revolution, amid hardships and a white terror, the revolutionary writers and artists worked harder than ever for art and literature to facilitate the struggle of the workers and peasants.

The League of Left-Wing Writers was organised in March 1930 on the initiative and under the direction of the Communist Party. Its nucleus consisted of Communists, while Lu Hsun was made its chairman. * The theoretical programme adopted at the League's inaugural congress said: "We must be in the forefront of the liberation struggle of the proletariat". It also said: "The content of our art are the aspirations and feelings of the proletariat in this dismal and medieval class society". The League also had an action programme and principles, which were attached to the theoretical programme. The key provision in the action programme said, "The purpose of our literary movement is to work for the liberation of the new, developing class".

The principles of the League were:

* Tsyui Tsyu-po was closely involved in directing the League from the latter half of 1931 until the end of 1933, when he was sent to work in the Soviet areas of China.

"1) To borrow the experience of the new, progressive foreign literature, to expand our movement, and set up various research bodies.

"2) To help young writers, teach them the art of writing, and assist the development of worker-peasant writers.

"3) To accept as final the Marxist theory of art and literature, and of literary criticism.

"4) To put out journals and various 'series' and 'libraries', and the like.

"5) To produce works of literature for the new, developing class." (See *Menyah* monthly, Vol. 1, No. 4.)

Faithful to its programme and principles, the League published a journal throughout the six years in which it existed (March 1930-spring of 1936), printing works of different *genres*. League members wrote novels and stories about the life and struggle of workers and peasants, and many easily understandable poems and miniatures in verse dedicated to the working class. Some of these were put to music by China's first working-class bard, the gifted young composer Nieh Erh, and other musicians and became revolutionary songs well known at home and abroad. Stage-plays were written, too, to be performed in working-class districts, where the League organised workers' circles and mobile theatrical teams.

In response to the Party's united national anti-Japanese front policy, aimed at launching a national-revolutionary war against the Japanese invaders, a similar front was formed in the field of art and literature. In May-August 1936 a deeply motivated discussion began among League members and other writers and artists of the slogans "literature of national defence" and "mass literature of national-revolutionary war". There were divergent opinions, but taking guidance in the Party's correct united front policy, writers and artists of different views finally worked out a common standpoint. Following the dissolution of the League of Left-Wing Writers, an All-China Federation of Literary and Art Workers was formed, with the nucleus consisting of left writers. This Federation visibly contributed to the anti-Japanese resistance and national salvation movement, and to the cause of the working people.

In March 1938, during the period of KMT-CPC cooperation in the anti-Japanese war, when friendship flourished between China and the Soviet Union, the All-China As-

sociation of Anti-Japanese Art and Literature Workers was founded in Hankow, whereupon stage workers, musicians, film workers, artists, etc., formed similar associations.

The Association issued the slogan, "Literature for the Village, Literature for the Army". It formed "resist-the-enemy theatrical groups", "resist-the-enemy propaganda squads", "front-line helpers' groups", "resist-the-enemy art and literature working groups", and so on. The groups were sent to battle areas and rural districts, where they helped to mobilise the mass of the people against the Japanese, and popularised literature among working people.

Meantime, the main political department of the Kuomintang armed forces set up the 3rd Department, which conducted propaganda and explained the aims and purpose of the anti-Japanese war to enemy troops.

The leading nucleus of the All-China Association of Anti-Japanese Art and Literature Workers and of the 3rd Department consisted of members of the CPC or non-Party revolutionary artists and writers. Before the forties, defying bans and barriers raised by reactionaries, they made the maximum use of the legal opportunities for organising writers and artists who wrote and published popular poetry, songs, plays, reports, and short stories, produced traditional Chinese drawings and paintings, and made anti-Japanese war films. Various youth organisations were founded during this period to conduct literary and artistic propaganda among workers, peasants, soldiers, students and other sections of the people in the far rear and the battle areas. This made a great impact, awakened anti-imperialist national consciousness, and raised the nation's morale. They popularised the work of the CPC and the operations of the 8th Route and New 4th armies and the Anti-Japanese Northeast Union Army, calling for unity of all patriotic forces to combat the Japanese aggression and exposing the manoeuvres of pro-Japanese groups and Kuomintang reactionaries who sought to disrupt the anti-Japanese front. All this heightened the class consciousness of the worker and peasant masses.

In the former Soviet areas of China, where the Communist Party was dominant, and later in all the liberated areas, art and literature workers inside and outside the Party, working jointly with the propaganda apparatus of

the Party, governmental educational bodies and the army's political departments, conducted varied educational activities and organised literary and art groups. As a result, workers, peasants and soldiers took an ever more active part in the revolutionary art and literature movement.

During the operations of the 8th Route Army on the anti-Japanese front in North China, from the autumn of 1937 and until the "style rectification campaign" began in 1942, many professional theatrical companies were active in the North China liberated areas, including the Taihengshan theatrical company, the Theatrical Society, and others. The National Revolutionary Arts Institute, the Lu Hsun Arts Institute, and the Institute of Art and Literature trained a large group of art workers, who were highly active in rural areas and helped the peasants organise their own theatrical circles and literary and art courses. They also formed theatrical circles in the battle areas, notably the theatrical society New Epoch. In 1940 there were some 400 highly active rural theatrical circles in the Taiheng area, as many as 1,700 in the central part of Hopeh province by early 1942, and some 1,400 rural theatrical and song-and-dance groups in the Heng Mountains. Anti-Japanese songs were sung in every village. Mass theatrical groups were formed not only in liberated areas, but also in guerrilla zones, where they conducted anti-imperialist and anti-war agitation among enemy troops.

The officers and political workers of the Anti-Japanese Northeast Union Army used every possible opportunity in an exceedingly difficult situation to promote literature and art in the army and among the people in order to buttress the soldiers' morale and the people's faith in victory, and also to tighten the link between army and people. In areas controlled by the Japanese and their puppets, intellectuals and students inside and outside the Party risked their lives to stimulate the fighting spirit of the mass of the people, inflicting considerable moral damage on the enemy. They wrote and disseminated anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo novels and stories, showing the bleak and blood-stained background of Japanese-Manchukuo rule, and described the heroic exploits of the people and the anti-Japanese armed forces in Northeast China fighting the enemy under the guidance of the Communist Party.

These are facts of history. All this was done before 1942, before the *Talks* of Mao Tse-tung. Even the authors of certain histories of modern Chinese literature written in the fifties on Mao's orders to propagate Mao's legend that "the first half of the revolutionary art and literature movement in China" had developed under Lu Hsun, the "Maoist" and "exponent of Mao's thoughts on art and literature", while the "second half", that is, following Mao's *Talks*, developed under Mao himself—even these authors could not avoid citing these historical facts.

In the light of these facts Mao's claim that revolutionary writers and artists did not know "whom to serve" until he told them in his *Talks*, are entirely groundless.

Mao maintained that writers and artists in Kuomintang-dominated areas were unable, even reluctant, to come close to the workers, peasants and soldiers, that they had no sympathy for them, and could not therefore write anything about them. This accusation collapses in face of the facts.

The facts show that many works were written about the life and struggle of workers, peasants and soldiers, and this already in the twenties and thirties. Let us name a few (in the order in which they appeared).

Works depicting the life and struggle of the workers.

Lu Hsun extols the high moral code of a Peking rickshaw in a short story, *A Small Happening* (1920).

Tien Han in *Before Dinner* (also known as *Sisters*, 1921), a one-act play, portrays the life and struggle of the three Chang sisters, working in a match factory. In another of his well-known plays, *The Death of Ku Chen-hung* (1925), he depicts the heroic anti-imperialist struggle of the Shanghai working class and the death of Ku Chen-hung, a workers' leader in a Japanese-owned textile factory, at the time of the May Thirtieth Movement.

Yu Ta-fu in a story, *The Evening of the Intoxicating Spring Wind*, portraying girl-workers in a tobacco factory, and in another story, *Bodian*, about rickshaws (c. 1923), portrays the high-minded behaviour of workers and working people.

Chiang Kuang-tzu in a short novel, *Sansculottes*, which appeared shortly before the April Twelfth Events (1927) portrays the uprising of Shanghai workers in support of the Northern March of the revolutionary army.

Kuo Mo-jo in a poem, *Tramcars are Back at Work* (1928), praises the heroic spirit and iron will of the Shanghai workers, arriving at the conclusion that in the end the working class is bound to triumph.

Tien Han in a play, *The Fire Dance* (1928), dwells on class relations and the class struggle between workers and capitalists.

Yin Fu, who wrote the poems *1 May 1929, Dedicated to the Girl of a New Epoch*, and others, was a young proletarian poet who took part in the workers' youth movement and portrayed the greatness of the working class and its bright future.

Tien Han in *Autumn Rain* (1931), a one-act play, depicted the hard life and staunch struggle of spinning-mill and other workers and unemployed in Shanghai's poor quarters. His play, *Moonlight Sonata* (1932), is the story of a strike in a foreign-owned Shanghai bus company.

Yeh Lin relates the story of an anti-Japanese volunteer army formed by Shanghai's unemployed in a short novel, *Discovery*.

Shu Chin-chun (Lao She) in a short novel, *Rickshaw Boy* (1935), portrays an 18-year-old young man who, having lost his parents, goes to the city to earn his living. He becomes a rickshaw boy and runs many miles bathed in sweat before he can buy his own rickshaw; during an internecine war between local warlords, he and his rickshaw are seized by soldiers.

Hsia Yen in a play, *Slave-Girls* (1936), gives a lively, uninhibited and authentic portrayal of the tragic fate of girls from poor peasant families tricked into working in a textile factory. The author exposes the wanton oppression and inhuman exploitation of these girls by Japanese imperialist factory-owners abetted by feudal lords.

Ko Chung-ping wrote a poem in prose, *Demolition Team on the Peking-Wuhan Railway* (1938), based on stories of members of the team. It portrays the heroism of team-leader and Communist Li A-ken and his comrades.

Chang Tien-i in a short story, *After Moving*, expresses deep compassion for the children of the oppressed workers.

In the twenties and thirties many popular songs were written about the working class. Tsyui Tsyu-po wrote the *Song of the Red Breakers* in the twenties, extolling free labour and the future worldwide communist society.

The authors of some songs, such as the *Song of the Peasants and Workers*, *Song of the Young Worker*, *Song of the Ironsmith*, and many others, are unknown. Chen Yu's *Song of the Long Road*, Pu Feng's *Song of Port Coolies* and Shih Lin's *Song About the Brick* (put to music by Nieh Erh), were popular in China and abroad. Written in the early thirties, they are sung to this day. During the anti-Japanese war, Chinese writers produced many songs about the resistance and national salvation movement, known in every home and liked by workers and peasants all over the country. Furthermore, in the twenties and thirties many excellent Soviet songs were translated into Chinese, contributing visibly to the revolutionary education of the worker-peasant masses and China's student youth.

In the twenties and thirties, more was written about the life and struggle of peasants than about workers and soldiers. This is due not only to the peasants' comprising the majority in China, but also to the fact that many authors had themselves come from villages. Below, I list only some of the works as an example.

Kuo Mo-jo in *Land, Oh, Mother Mine* (1919), portrayed peasants, and also coalminers.

Lu Hsun in a short story, *My Old Home* (1921), related the sad story of peasant Jun-tu, whom "many children, famines, taxes, soldiers, bandits, officials and landed gentry, all had squeezed ... as dry as a mummy". The writer hopes that the rising generation will have "a new life—the kind of life we had never known".

Kuo Mo-jo in a poem, *Resurrection of the Goddesses* (1921), portrayed an old peasant and a shepherd who abhor war for sowing death and destruction.

The heroine of Lu Hsun's short story, *A Prayer for Happiness* (1924), is a plain-hearted, hard-working, kind and poor peasant woman, Hsien-lin, who fell prey to famine and feudal morals.

In the early twenties the journal *Hsiao-shuoyuehpao* published authors who described the situation in the Chinese countryside—Hsu Yu-no portrayed the carnage loosed by bandits and soldiers in Honan villages in *Torn Shoe*; Tien Yen depicted the hard life on the land in *Raindrops*; Wang Jen-shu described peasant life in eastern Chekiang in *Exhausted*, a short story, and Wang Sze-tien related how a destitute peasant sold his children to

escape death from starvation in *Wilting*, also a short story.

Kuo Mo-jo in *I Remembered Chen She and Wu Kuang** (1928), expressed the belief that new Chen Shes and Wu Kuangs would come to lead the peasants. He wrote: "A peasant uprising led by workers—this, my friend, is our salvation, a force that will transform the whole world".

Chiang Kuang-tzu in *Field Wind* (1930) portrays episodes of the acute class struggle in the countryside in 1927 and relates how peasants led by Communists organised peasant unions and took up arms against counter-revolutionary forces.

Hung Sheng in his plays *Wu Kui Bridge* and *Sweet-Smelling Rice*, written in 1930 and 1931, describes the wrong-doings and perfidy of the gentry and local despots, and the stamina and honesty of the peasants who rose to end the cruel oppression and exploitation, and to win the right to a decent life.

Chiu Tung-ping, who had taken part in the Heilufeng peasant rising, described it vividly and portrayed the changes wrought in the peasant mentality by the agrarian revolution in *Messenger* (1931).

Ting Ling in *Water* (1931) portrays a natural calamity—a flood that spread to 16 provinces, famine, and countless other trials faced by peasants in old China; the peasants fight against their exploiters to gain control over the fruits of their labour.

Sha Ting won the reputation of a peasant writer. Most of his works are about the village and its people—*Pancake*, *Murderer*, *Beastly Nature* (written in the early thirties) and *Back Home*, *Animal Hunt*, and others (written during the anti-Japanese war). All his stories portray the contradictions between peasants and the reactionary forces (the landed gentry and local bullies). He also shows the unity of the peasants, their increasing strength and growing solidarity.

Mao Tun in *Spring Silkworms*, *Autumn Harvest* and *Late Winter* (1932-1933) shows that under the boot of

* Chen She (also known as Chen Sheng) and Wu Kuang were peasants who headed an uprising against the tyranny of Chin Shih Huang, the first Chinese emperor, in the 3rd century B. C.

the gentry and local bullies the peasants in old China go hungry whether they till the soil or raise silkworms, regardless of the harvest. The author also describes how the young generation of peasants awakens and sets out to end the many centuries of oppression and lack of rights.

Wu Chu-hsiang writes about the greed and cynicism of the landed gentry and local despots, and about the ruined and hungry peasants rising to resist them in his *One Thousand Eight Hundred Tributes*, *All Quiet in the Celestial Empire* and *The Fan Family Shop*, written in 1933 and 1934.

Ting Ling in *On the Run* (1933) tells the story of peasants who, escaping from the exploitation of the gentry, go to Shanghai in search of work; they find no work but learn to fight for their rights. The workers tell them: "When you're hungry you must demand food from your masters. When we loose our jobs we demand work from capitalists."

Yeh Tsu devoted four of the six stories in his collection *A Rich Harvest* ("A Rich Harvest", "Fire", "Behind Charged Barbed Wire" and "The Guide", 1933-1934), to the people of his native village. He had seen his father and elder sister, both Communists, do revolutionary work among the peasants and pay for it with their lives, and himself took part in the peasants' struggle for a livelihood. He wrote in a combative spirit, giving the impression that he is among the characters of his novels, fighting at their side. In "Behind Charged Barbed Wire" old man Wang's two sons join the Chinese Red Army, and the old man, too, sets out to look for it after he has a few hard knocks. In "The Guide" Mother Liu and her three sons join the Red Army. Her sons die in battle, and old Mother Liu, too, dies for the revolution, but not before she avenges her sons and comrades by agreeing to show the way to enemy troops and leading them into an ambush.

In 1935-1936 Yeh Tsu wrote another six stories, published in the collection *Night in a Mountain Village*, and a short novel, *The Star*. All of them were devoted to the life and struggles of the people of his native village.

Hsiao Hung in *Field of Life and Death* (1934), describes the carnage, arson, and plunder in the villages of North-

east China following the 18 September events of 1931. Japanese invaders levelled whole villages with the ground. The peasants took up arms and joined the revolutionary people's army.

In the thirties Yang Han-sheng wrote a play *The Death of Li Hsu-chen*, portraying the former field worker who became the gifted leader and hero of the Taiping Rebellion. The author himself played the part of Li Hsu-chen in productions of his play during the anti-Japanese war. His *Deepening* shows the reasons for the intensification of the peasant struggle in the countryside after 1928.

Tien Han in his play *The Great Flood* (1936) describes the life and struggle of peasants in flooded areas.

On the eve of the anti-Japanese war Tien Kian wrote a trilogy in verse, *Stories of the Chinese Village* ("Famine", "The Yangtse" and "There"), depicting the hard lot and desperate struggle of the peasants.

In the thirties there were also many works devoted to soldiers. In *The General Retreat*, for example, Kuo Ching depicted episodes from the battle of 28 January 1932 in Shanghai, when Kuomintang soldiers went over to the side of those who resisted Japanese aggression.

Yeh Tsu in *Night Patrol* (1933) painted a stark picture of how Kuomintang troops terrorised the people during their "anti-communist campaigns", wreaking havoc, arson, carnage and plunder. This caused the honest ones among them to protest. Squad leader Wang Chih-ping, his deputy Li Hai-san, private Chao Te-sheng, and others revolted, liberated imprisoned Red Army soldiers and other prisoners and joined them in an attack on the enemy camp.

Hsiao Chun in the novel *The Village in August* (1934) shows how a heroic unit of the communist-led Northeast People's Revolutionary Army consisting of workers, peasants, soldiers and students, fought against the Japanese in adverse circumstances. The novel shows the revolutionary army fighting a people's war against the Japanese imperialist aggression.

Chiu Tung-ping began writing in 1931. As a young man, he had taken part in the Heilufeng peasant rising, and later in the anti-Japanese battle of 28 January 1932 in Shanghai. He was with the New 4th Army and died

in battle in 1941. An experienced soldier, he wrote expertly about the war. His *Defence of Red Flower Field* describes a revolutionary unit of three detachments, totalling 185 men, concentrated in a dense forest near Red Flower Field. The unit catches the enemy unawares and smashes two regiments. There is a thrilling description of six men defending a stone bridge—a worker, a peasant, and a soldier, and the other three students of a teachers' college. They fought bravely, killing 30 enemies.

His story, *Battalion Commander in the Union Army* (December 1940), is the tragic tale of a Kuomintang battalion commander with a communist revolutionary unit. He succeeded in breaching the Japanese lines and leading two companies to safety. For this he was rewarded by the commander of the communist-led New 4th Army, but was executed on reaching the headquarters of his own army for "not defending his positions to the last breath".

A Happening on the Road (June 1941) is the story of a New 4th Army staff officer who saved a regiment of the Union Army (the anti-Japanese part of the Kuomintang army). It describes the corruption rampant in the Kuomintang forces which, though sometimes compelled to engage the Japanese, were often hostile to their own people.

Tien Han in the short novel *Lukouchiao* (1937) describes how the men of the Kuomintang 29th Army rallied to resist Japanese aggression. This marked the beginning of the 1937 July Seventh events—the beginning of the nationwide anti-Japanese war. He also describes the help of students and working people to anti-Japanese troops.

Chang Tien-i in *Twenty-One*, a short story, portrays soldiers of a Kuomintang unit who refused to fight in the anti-communist civil war. His *Last Train* and *The Road* are also about soldiers who, wishing to fight the Japanese, came to grips with their officers, who were traitors. In his story, *Hatred*, Chang Tien-i portrays the abominations perpetrated by the old army, which earned it the hatred of the peasants.

Chou Wen in *Season of Opium Poppies* (1936) shows warlords immersed in corruption scrambling for power and privileges, and treating soldiers with inhuman cruelty.

Ai Ching's poem, *He Died a Second Time*, is the story of a wounded soldier who had grown up in a village.

Hei Yan's *The Front* describes the Northern March, and Yeh Lin's *In the Village* shows Kuomintang troops bombarding villages and exterminating peasants during the "third campaign" against the Chinese Red Army.

Apart from stories and novels specifically devoted to workers, peasants or soldiers, many of the works written in the twenties and thirties simultaneously depicted workers, peasants, soldiers, and other working people.

Many were devoted to the October Revolution and the civil war in Russia, portraying the building of socialism in the Soviet land.

In *A Journey Across New Russia* and in *The History of the Red Capital* (end of 1920-end of 1922) Tsyui Tsyu-po tells the story of the workers, peasants and soldiers of Russia who, led by the Bolsheviks, overcome difficulties and defeat imperialist interventionists and local white-guard gangs. This warm-hearted book acquainted the Chinese, especially the youth, with the part played by the Communist Party and Soviet power in liberating the people and defending its gains.

Tsou Tao-feng produced a four-volume travelogue *Letters of a Traveller* (summer of 1933-summer of 1935), a first-class piece of reportage in content and form. The first and second volumes, which describe the condition of the masses in the European capitalist countries, and the fourth volume, about conditions in the North American dollar empire, are a merciless indictment of the capitalist system. The third volume, devoted to the Soviet Union building socialism under the leadership of the Party of Lenin, is an ode to socialism. These four books are still useful reading for the Chinese of today.

Tao Hsing-chih's poetry about the life and struggle of working people has earned him the reputation of a people's poet and teacher. Unfortunately, Mao consigned the literary legacy of Tsyui Tsyu-po, Tsou Tao-feng and Tao Hsing-chih to the flames, and it is unknown to the Chinese people and youth of today.

Other revolutionary Chinese writers, too, produced books about the great Lenin, the October Revolution, and the Soviet land, contributing to the revolutionary education of the Chinese people and the spread of Soviet experience.

Books and stories about workers, peasants and soldiers were well received by readers at home. Some were translated, and commended by foreign readers. Progressive literary critics and historians, both Chinese and foreign, praised them highly.

Most of these works belong to the school of socialist realism, and some to critical realism or revolutionary romanticism.

It stands to reason that they differed in depth and breadth, and in ideological and artistic value. The same author writing on related subjects would produce works of varying merit. Everything depended on the time, place, and general conditions.

I have listed only some of the works of the revolutionary writers of the twenties and thirties—just a little over 70 works by 30 authors. But this is enough to show that Mao's slanderous charge is groundless. It is not true that the writers and artists of the twenties and thirties were unable, much less reluctant, to write about the life and struggle of workers, peasants and soldiers.

To back his charge, Mao declared that only works portraying workers, peasants and soldiers could serve and be acceptable to workers, peasants and soldiers.

This is false. It only shows that Mao does not know what kind of literature is needed by the working class as the hegemon of revolution, by the peasants as its closest allies, and by the soldiers. Books showing the parasitical nature of the imperialists, showing the enslavement and exploitation of colonies and semi-colonies, books about the reactionary Manchu Ching dynasty, about the warlords and the Chiang Kai-shek clique, books stigmatising the landed gentry and the bourgeoisie, showing the brutal oppression, exploitation and torment inflicted on the Chinese people by Japanese invaders and their puppets—aren't these books also needed by the workers, peasants and soldiers? Don't they, too, serve the interests of the workers, peasants and soldiers? It can't be true, as Mao would have us believe, that workers, peasants and soldiers want to read only about themselves and do not want to read about their enemies. Isn't the principle, "know thy enemy as thyself", formulated by the gifted military leader Sun Wu more than 2,000 years ago in his treatise *On the Art of War*, still valid for the workers, peasants and soldiers of the present-day revolutionary movement?

And for the same valid reasons we can also ask: aren't books about the life and struggle of the revolutionary intelligentsia and revolutionary students also a source of knowledge for workers, peasants and soldiers?

In his novel, *Before the Dawn*, Mao Tun showed the economic impasse of the Chinese national bourgeoisie; he tore to shreds the Trotskyite invention that capitalism can thrive peacefully in China for a long time, and at once described the struggle of the workers, peasants and soldiers. Tsao Yu demonstrated the economic bankruptcy of the bourgeoisie and showed the decay of the bourgeois family in his plays, *The Dawn* and *Hurricane*; he arrived at the conclusion that only the working class can open new horizons for China.

Pa Chin in his novel, *The Family*, depicted the degeneration of the feudal-bureaucratic family and its destructive effect on the youth, showing that if the foremost youth wants to break out of the vicious circle, it must first break with the old family. Many other books could be listed. Aren't they acceptable to workers, peasants and soldiers? Can't they, too, serve workers, peasants and soldiers? It is quite clear that apart from books about the life and struggle of the workers, peasants and soldiers, there are many others that they will accept and that can serve their interests.

Take this example, which was also witnessed by Mao Tse-tung. In 1940 comrades of the Lu Hsun Art Institute in Yen-an produced Tsao Yu's plays, *The Dawn* and *Hurricane*, on the stage of the Central Party School's conference hall. They were applauded by Party and military cadres, many of whom were of working class or peasant background. I remember their delight and enthusiasm very clearly, and Mao, too, must remember it.

In short, Mao's charge is quite groundless.

One of Mao's gravest accusations was that the revolutionary writers of the twenties and thirties wrote too much about the life and struggle of the intelligentsia and the student youth. But this should be considered a merit rather than a fault. That they chose this subject is due to specific subjective and objective historical circumstances. The subjective factors are that most of the revolutionary writers came from the intelligentsia and had been students themselves; when they began writing, they could write mainly of those whom they knew well. And the

objective factor was that the working people in China, to the extent of 80-90 per cent, were either completely unlettered or semi-literate. And so, without cultural and educational work, without promoting literature among working people, all the declarations of the progressive intelligentsia and student youth about putting art and literature at the service of the working people would never be more than empty talk. For intellectuals and students to become propagators of revolutionary culture, it was essential first to win them and to help them accept revolutionary art and literature for themselves, and then to teach them to understand the interests of the working masses. This accords with Marx's principle, "The educator must himself be educated", in the third of his *Theses on Feuerbach*. This is why revolutionary writers produced works that educated young intellectuals and students; otherwise they might have been generals without an army, and unfit for combat. In due course, taking part in the revolutionary movement, they gradually learned more about the working masses and began to produce more books about the circumstances of the workman's life and struggle.

As a result, part of the intelligentsia and students were drawn into the revolutionary movement, into the Party and the YCL, joining the worker-peasant masses; a force was thus developed that put revolutionary art and literature in the service of the working people.

The facts of history show that making his charge Mao was driven by subjectivist motives, whereas the revolutionary artists and writers were motivated by the concrete objective and subjective circumstances.

For Mao the chief "argument" was that the revolutionary movement in art and literature had, as he saw it, followed a petty-bourgeois rather than proletarian line, and was therefore at variance with Mao's "worker-peasant-soldier line in art and literature". By putting things in this way, Mao was trying to replace socialist realism with his own line, so called, in art and literature.

Now, let us see what Mao's "worker-peasant-soldier line in art and literature" amounts to from the point of view of its class orientation:

The workers are the proletariat, the peasants are the petty-bourgeoisie, while Chinese soldiers, at least the vast majority of them, come from the peasant class.

● Hence, the “worker-peasant-soldier line in art and literature” can be nothing but a mixed proletarian and petty-bourgeois line, and certainly not a proletarian line. Yet from the Marxist standpoint, the class line in art and literature is determined not by the social origin of the authors or their characters, but by what world outlook, the outlook of what class, they espouse in depicting life and the surrounding world.

This is the criterion to use in classifying art and literature as proletarian, petty-bourgeois, bourgeois, feudal, etc. What, then, is the class position Mao wants revolutionary writers and artists to take? In his *Talks* he said: “The question of position. We stand on the position of the proletariat and the broad mass of the people”. But what does he mean by “broad mass of the people”? In the first part of his *Concluding Remarks* he said: “But who are the mass of the people? The broad mass of the people, constituting more than 90 per cent of our population, is made up of workers, peasants, soldiers, and the urban petty-bourgeoisie.” It follows, therefore, that Mao wants revolutionary writers and artists to take the position of the proletariat and at the same time the position of the petty-bourgeoisie. In more specific terms this means that in their creative process revolutionary art and literature workers are expected to adhere simultaneously to the proletarian outlook and the petty-bourgeois outlook. In terms of theory this is entirely incompatible with the Marxist principles of art and literature, and in terms of practice it is simply impossible. This is why his concept was not adopted by the revolutionary writers and artists.

● In Mao's article *On New Democracy* which appeared early in 1940, and in *On the Democratic Dictatorship of the People*, which appeared in June 1949, he expanded the concept “mass of the people” to include the national bourgeoisie. And after the establishment of the People's Republic of China he took advantage of the supreme power he had usurped in Party, government and army to impose the views contained in his *Talks at the Art and Literature Forum in Yen-an* on revolutionary art and literature workers. They were expected to adhere simultaneously to the outlooks of the proletariat, petty-bourgeoisie, and bourgeoisie. It is easy to see, therefore, why a now overt now

covert struggle ensued in art and literature between Mao's approach, on the one hand, and the approach of the revolutionary writers and artists, on the other.

Mao advanced the slogan of a “worker-peasant-soldier line in art and literature” and wanted revolutionary writers “to take the positions of the proletariat and the broad mass of the people” because his views on such basic matters as the question of classes—not only in the field of art and literature, but also in other fields—were confused and completely erroneous. His fundamental mistake can be traced to his incomprehension of the Marxist criteria of classes and social strata, and of the place or role of different classes and social strata in the life of society and in revolutionary movements. Striking evidence of this is found in the works he specially devoted to the question of class identity, *An Analysis of the Classes of the Chinese Society* (1926), *How to Determine Class Identity in the Countryside* (1933) and the section on “the motive forces of the Chinese revolution” which he wrote for the article, *The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China* (1939).

Mao's thoughts on class identity, as presented in the first two of the above articles, coupled with the errors in his *Report on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan Province* (1927) and *Report on the Land Redistribution Campaign* (1933), explain the political mistakes made during the agrarian revolution in the Soviet areas of China and, on a still greater scale, during the agrarian reform in the whole country later. In determining the class and social identity of the real landed gentry and the small landowners he put both under the same head, though the latter were not of the gentry, while kulaks and well-to-do middle peasants, and even simply middle peasants, were also lumped together. As a result, there was indiscriminate confiscation of land owned by middle peasants along with that owned by the gentry and kulaks. The distribution of land, on the other hand, was egalitarian, and subsequently the land had to be redistributed over and over again with deplorable consequences for the productivity of peasant labour. Last but not least, this erroneous approach led to indiscriminate repressions, even executions.

In theory and practice, guided by his ideas of “new democracy”, Mao gave priority to the interests of the

national-bourgeoisie, while the interests of the proletariat were given secondary, or subordinate, consideration. He believed that only a "revolution of new democracy" was possible in China, while a socialist revolution and socialist construction were impossible. This was a direct result of the basic mistakes in the first and third of the above-mentioned articles on the question of classes, and also in his other articles (e.g. "The Peking Coup and the Merchants" in the journal *Hsiangtao* in 1923, etc.). Mao's notion of classes and his theoretical mistakes concerning "new democracy" were the ideological main-springs that led to his transformation into a traitor to communism.

The above may be illustrated with the following examples from Mao's practices: he systematically forces Communists and members of the YCL, and the foremost workers, intellectuals and students with a Marxist-Leninist education, to go to the village for "re-education by poor peasants and lower middle peasants".

Mao regards the socialist community, the world communist movement, the anti-imperialist national liberation movement, and the peace movement as his enemies, and treats extreme reactionary imperialist elements, the fascist states, and reaction of all hues, as friends. Anti-Sovietism and anti-communism have become the pivot of Mao's home and foreign policy.

Mao forced his elder son, Mao An-ying, who had gone to a Soviet school and had finished the Military Political Academy in the Soviet Union, and who returned to Yen'an in the winter of 1945, to live with the family of his close friend, a big Yen'an kulak, Wu Mang-yu, for "re-education" and "ideological reorientation". Mao An-ying objected. He complained that the social and ideological roots of his father's decision could be traced to Mao's origin (Mao's father was a big kulak and moneylender). But Mao used his power to make his son spend several months with the Wu Mang-yu family. Following this, Mao An-ying told his father and other comrades: "I refuse to 'learn' from a kulak; I am deeply revolted by the way of life of this big kulak family. I will always be a Marxist-Leninist, a graduate of Soviet educational establishments. Never will I consider this a disgrace. On the contrary, I am proud of it." In this clash between father

and son the truth was certainly on the son's side. Because of this I will always respect Comrade Mao An-ying.

Let me also call attention to the following. In the "Concluding Remarks" of his *Talks* Mao said: "My remarks of today cover only some of the fundamental problems of our cultural movement.... I believe that all of you, comrades, are determined to advance along these lines". As we see, Mao admits that his discussion was not confined to "some basic questions of orientation", but that he was advancing his own new line in art and literature. Yet, in his *Talks* he did not touch on the question of the classification of literature by artistic or creative method. Maxim Gorky, a writer of world renown and a pioneer of proletarian literature, said on this score:

"There are two main 'currents' or trends in literature: romanticism and realism." He pointed out that "in romanticism we must also distinguish between two distinctly differing trends—'passive romanticism' and 'active romanticism'—and in realism between critical realism and socialist realism."

Speaking of trends in art and literature (actually he referred only to the question of trends in literature), Mao wholly overlooked the classification of art and literature by artistic or creative method, which shows that he did not understand what a literary or artistic trend really is.

What was the trend followed by revolutionary writers and artists in China before Mao's *Talks*?

First adopted in the twenties, and dominant in the thirties, was the trend of socialist realism. The leading ideas of this trend—and that is its essence—were those of Marxism-Leninism. It was a new, revolutionary trend conceived by Maxim Gorky in the beginning of the twentieth century. In the new historical setting following the October Revolution it became the leading trend in Soviet literature, then gradually spread among revolutionary and progressive writers of other countries, including China.

Hence the failure of Mao's attempt at substituting his own trend for the trend followed by China's revolutionary writers and artists. It is not surprising, therefore, that a long and bitter struggle ensued.

The limits of my present work prevent me from giving a detailed explication of Mao's other accusations. But surely there is no need for one, because they are so

obviously and so completely groundless. Let us take just a few facts, with a brief explanation for each.

There are no grounds whatsoever for Mao's charge that revolutionary writers and artists had no idea of "how to serve", that is, had no answer for the question: "to enhance comprehensibility or raise the quality?" To begin with, he should not have confused the question of "how to serve" with the question of "enhancing comprehensibility or raising the quality". Because here a part is taken for the whole. Certainly, the problem of "enhancing comprehensibility or raising the quality" is an important part of the question of "how to serve". But the question is broader. Mao's vulgar and limited approach to the question of "enhancing comprehensibility or raising the quality" (popularity or refinement) shows that he has no idea of the subject. As everybody can see clearly, in the matters raised by Mao the revolutionary writers and artists stood head and shoulders above him in both thought and deed. They were aware that from 80 to 90 per cent of the working people could not read. For this reason they directed their efforts to winning the intelligentsia and student youth to their side in order to make them the "conductors" of revolutionary art and literature in the masses.

Mao's charge that revolutionary writers and artists did not appreciate the importance of the united front in art is also contrary to the facts. As we know, members of the early revolutionary literary and art societies of the twenties, such as the Creative Society, Society for the Study of Literature, and Society of the Sun had, under Communist Party leadership, begun their activity in the heat of theoretical discussions, hammering out a common viewpoint. Later, in the early thirties, by a decision of the Party, each of these societies dissolved itself. Left writers and artists inside and outside the Party formed the League of Left-Wing Writers. Subsequently, in 1936, suiting the new situation in the revolutionary movement and the Party's new policy, Communist-led revolutionary writers and artists joined hands with other left writers to establish the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Workers, and later, in 1938, the All-China Association of Anti-Japanese Art and Literature Workers.

Mao's charge that revolutionary writers and artists did not understand the problem of "literary and art crit-

icism" is also entirely at variance with the facts. It is common knowledge that they warred long and systematically against the reactionary currents represented by the *Contemporary Review* group, the New Moon group, the KMT-inspired "national literature" group, the so-called third trend, and others. This undermined the reactionary currents, and destroyed their influence. Revolutionary writers and artists also engaged extensively in criticism and self-criticism in their own midst, seeing this as an important means of promoting the revolutionary movement in art and literature as a whole and of the progressive development of each member of their organisation (though, of course, some of the criticism was erroneous and there were faults in choice of language). It was precisely to continuous criticism that the new, revolutionary movement in art and literature owed its steady progress.

In short, the three accusations made by Mao are equally groundless and unjustified.

If Mao's charges of "ideological mistakes" and "mistakes of style" had been addressed to just a few individuals, not to all the revolutionary writers and artists in the country, and if he had been motivated by the wish to help and to warn, not to create a pretext for his "rectification of style" campaign, there would have been no need to pay any attention to all this. But these accusations and insults, portraying revolutionary writers and artists as people lacking elementary political, social and cultural knowledge, were elevated by Mao to the rank of "supreme commands" or "behests of Chairman Mao". They required every revolutionary writer and artist to occupy himself month after month and year after year with endless self-flagellation, writing "confessions" and "repentances". Certainly, this was bound to, and did, anger revolutionary writers and artists, and all those who still retained their sense of justice and the capacity to distinguish between truth and untruth. In this sense, Mao is much like the reactionary judge of olden times who followed this simple scheme: on deciding to condemn a guiltless citizen, he chose the punishment he would mete out, then invented the charges, listing the imputed "crimes", and then wrested "confessions" from the accused by cruel torture.

3) Mao's Theoretical Mistakes, Utilitarianism and Pragmatism

In conclusion, it is proper to note that in his *Talks* Mao displayed his "particular" understanding and fragmentary knowledge of the basic Marxist-Leninist principles concerning art and literature. In so doing, he betrayed his utilitarian and pragmatic approach to social phenomena.

To support my contention, let me cite Mao's views on the historical periods and the class essence of art and literature. In the *Talks*, and likewise in other works, such as *On New Democracy*, Mao directly or indirectly identified the periods in the history of art and literature with the periods in the history of social formations. Besides, he maintained that the art and literature of an antagonistic society could serve none but the ruling class, and that there could be no art and literature there serving the interests of the oppressed classes.

This proves that he did not understand the following basic proposition: though, like other forms of social consciousness, art and literature cannot be isolated in their historical development from the specific development of society and from the social origins, the facts of history show that periods in the history of art and literature do not coincide with those of the development of society. Here is what Marx wrote on this score:

"It is well-known in respect of art that definite periods of its development by no means correspond to the general development of society, and, consequently, to the development of society's material basis which, in a way, constitutes the skeleton of its organisation. Take the Greeks as compared with the modern nations, or also Shakespeare. It is even accepted in respect of some forms of art, e.g. the epos, that in their classical form, which is an epoch in world history, they could not be created the moment artistic production as such began; therefore, certain significant forms in the field of art itself were possible only at a low level in the development of art. If this is so within art in the relation between its different types, it is not surprising at all that this

circumstance also prevails in the relation of art as a whole to social development as a whole."

In short, Mao's views on periods in literature are contrary both to the historical facts and to Karl Marx.

Mao's "conceptions" also show that he does not understand that in each national culture there are two national cultures—the art and literature of the oppressor class and the art and literature of the oppressed classes. Lenin explained this very clearly. In his article, *Critical Notes on the National Question*, he wrote: "There are two national cultures in every national culture. There is the Great-Russian culture of the Purishkeviches, Guchkovs and Struves—but there is also the Great-Russian culture typified in the names of Chernyshevsky and Plekhanov. There are *the same two* cultures in the Ukraine as there are in Germany, in France, in England, among the Jews, and so forth."*

Why is there in each national culture in addition to the culture of the oppressor class a culture representing the oppressed classes? Lenin answered this question as well. He wrote in the same article: "The *elements* of democratic and socialist culture are present, if only in rudimentary form, in *every* national culture, since in *every* nation there are toiling and exploited masses, whose conditions of life inevitably give rise to the ideology of democracy and socialism."**

Certainly, Lenin's thesis on two cultures applies also to art and literature. Mao's view that in a society of antagonistic classes there can be only an art and literature serving capitalists and landowners and no art and literature serving workers and peasants, is contrary both to the historical facts and to Lenin's views.

Mao's "concept" only shows that he did not understand that there are two different literatures and two different arts in a society of antagonistic classes, and that apart from the art and literature serving the class of landowners or capitalists there is also an art and literature serving the exploited and oppressed classes. This is due not only to the fact that from the ranks of the

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 32.

** Ibid., p. 24.

oppressed and exploited there can emerge intellectuals who can depict in artistic form the life, aspirations and struggles of the classes from which they come, but also to the fact that there may be people of the oppressor class who break with their class and portray the hardships and aspirations of the oppressed in their works of art. This can be illustrated by many interesting and instructive examples from the history of different countries, including that of China. The whole world knows the masterpieces of Count Leo Tolstoy, the giant of Russian literature, who for 40 years reflected as a mirror the peculiar features of an entire historical epoch (from the liberation of the serfs in 1861 to the first Russian revolution of 1905).

Lenin wrote in his article, *Leo Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution*:

"Tolstoy is great as the spokesman of the ideas and sentiments that emerged among the millions of Russian peasants at the time the bourgeois revolution was approaching in Russia. Tolstoy is original, because the sum-total of his views, taken as a whole, happens to express the specific features of our revolution."*

How could a nobleman like Count Tolstoy become a writer of the Russian peasant revolution? Lenin answered this question, too, in his article, *L. N. Tolstoy and the Modern Labour Movement*:

"By birth and education Tolstoy belonged to the highest landed nobility in Russia—he broke with all the customary views of this environment."**

That is the Marxist viewpoint on the nature of art and literature in a society of antagonistic classes. But now back to Mao's anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist views on art and literature. As we know, they led up to a final negation of cultural legacy, whether foreign or national, culminating during the "cultural revolution" in brutal crimes that eclipsed in scale and depth the barbarous "burning of books and burying of scholars" by Emperor Chin Shih Huang.

It should be noted in relation to the second of the above-mentioned points that Mao refers to Lenin's works

solely to promote his selfish utilitarian aims, while in fact openly advocating utilitarianism.

In his *Talks* he cited Lenin twice. The first time when he asked in the *Concluding Remarks*: "Whom must our art and literature serve?" Here he quotes an incomplete sentence from Lenin: "It will serve . . . the millions and tens of millions of working people." The second time he appeals to Lenin in the third part of the *Concluding Remarks* when tackling the question of "the relationship between the work of the Party in art and literature and the work of the Party as a whole".

In his article, *Party Organisation and Party Literature*, Lenin referred to the object of Party literature:

"It will be a free literature, because it will serve, not some satiated heroine, not the bored 'upper ten thousand' suffering from fatty degeneration, but the millions and tens of millions of working people—the flower of the country, its strength and its future."*

Lenin describes the services literature renders to the working people as services to "the flower of the country, its strength and its future". By so doing, he elevates the role of Party literature, linking its tasks with the Party's tasks of guiding the working people in the revolutionary transformation of their country. But this is merely one sentence in a passage that explains why Party literature is a free literature. In this sentence Lenin refers only to the object and significance of the services of Party literature. In the same passage, Lenin also says:

"It will be a free literature, because the idea of socialism and sympathy with the working people, and not greed or careerism, will bring ever new forces to its ranks."**

It follows that Party literature has its roots in the idea of socialism and reflects the interests of the working people. Continuously, it absorbs new, life-giving revolutionary forces, and this not only provides it with unlimited resources for development, but also helps to expand the Party's ranks.

Referring to the merging of scientific socialism with

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 206.

** Ibid., Vol. 16, p. 331.

* Ibid., Vol. 10, pp. 48-49.

** Ibid., Vol. 10, p. 48.

the modern working-class movement, Lenin gives a high rating to the role of Party literature. He writes:

"It will be a free literature, enriching the last word in the revolutionary thought of mankind with the experience and living work of the socialist proletariat, bringing about permanent inter-action between the experience of the past (scientific socialism, the completion of the development of socialism from its primitive utopian forms) and the experience of the present (the present struggle of the worker comrades)."*

As we see, Lenin gives an exhaustive principled appreciation of the character, role and significance of Party literature. He wants a high sense of responsibility to mark the work of Party writers. At the same time, he instils enthusiasm and faith in them, which, of course, furthers the development of Party literature. Lenin's ideas are of tremendous educational value and a source of great inspiration for the revolutionary movement in Chinese art and literature, for every revolutionary writer and artist.

Yet, Mao, in fact, threw out Lenin's appreciation of Party literature. He merely cited a few incomplete phrases from it, and, worse still, from the way he handled them even these incomplete phrases lost their true meaning. He used them to "substantiate" the charge that revolutionary literary and art workers in China did not understand "who art and literature must serve". Here, in fact, is what he said in his *Talks*:

"As far back as 1905 Lenin stressed that our literature and our art must serve 'the millions and tens of millions of working people'. Among our comrades engaged in the field of art and literature on the territory of anti-Japanese resistance bases this question, it would seem, has already been solved and there is no need to raise it again. In fact, however, this is not so."

Mao accused revolutionary writers and artists of the following: "Many comrades have by no means solved, or have not found a correct solution to, this question." He also said that this is "a basic question, a question of principle". This he used as the chief excuse for attacking revolutionary writers and artists. Mao swung this heavy cudgel at them, a cudgel he had himself

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 49.

manufactured, but which, to deceive people, he deliberately gave Lenin's name. It is more than obvious that by citing the above-mentioned incomplete phrases, Mao deliberately used the great Lenin's name to further his own purely utilitarian ends.

In the article *Party Organisation and Party Literature* Lenin dealt with the question on two planes: on the one hand, he substantiated the fact that literature was a part of Party work and, on the other, he substantiated the fact that Party literature had its own, specific features. He wrote:

"Literature must become *part* of the common cause of the proletariat, 'a cog and a screw' of one single great Social-Democratic mechanism set in motion by the entire politically-conscious vanguard of the entire working class. Literature must become a component of organised, planned and integrated Social-Democratic Party work."*

And he amplified:

"There is no question that literature is least of all subject to mechanical adjustment or levelling, to the rule of the majority over the minority. There is no question, either, that in this field greater scope must undoubtedly be allowed for personal initiative, individual inclination, thought and fantasy, form and content. All this is undeniable; but all this simply shows that the literary side of the proletarian party cause cannot be mechanically identified with its other sides."**

Lenin dealt dialectically with both aspects of the matter, which are organically tied one to the other. Neither can be neglected. Neither can be given precedence. If you concentrate exclusively on the general and overlook the particular, you will inevitably arrive at identifying Party literature with general Party work. Conversely, if you concentrate exclusively on the particular and overlook the general, you will inevitably arrive at an artificial separation of Party literature from general Party work. Neither of these approaches can benefit the general cause of the Party or Party literature.

Presenting the third of the issues raised in his *Talks*—"on the interconnection between Party work in art and

* Ibid., Vol. 10, p. 45.

** Ibid., p. 46.

literature and Party work as a whole"—Mao again referred to Lenin, though omitting Lenin's words on the peculiar features of Party work in the field of literature. And this omission was not accidental. For from Mao's point of view the methods Lenin listed as the least suitable for the Party's work in literature were, on the contrary, the most suitable. Where Lenin said that "greater scope must undoubtedly be allowed" to free activity, Mao was eager to instil army-like regimentation. Lenin's ideas were an obstacle to his aim of establishing personal control over art and literature by means of the "style rectification campaign" and making the revolutionary writers and artists serve his own, personal interests.

Mao spoke of the purpose behind his "rectification of style" in art and literature to Kai Feng, head of the Central Committee's propaganda department. He said: "In general, intellectuals are troublesome people, and those in art and literature are doubly troublesome. They have the most sensitive minds and are the most inclined to dreams and fantasies, to gossip and chit-chat, and to all kinds of convolutions. Their style must be subjected to severe rectification in order to make them more compliant, to prevent them from ever again daring to think, write or speak as the mood strikes them, and to teach them to do only what they are bid."

The following illustrates Mao's true attitude towards Lenin and Lenin's works. One day, during the "style rectification campaign", Mao asked Po Ku to find him quotations from Lenin on art and literature. He added: "It is hard to address the intelligentsia when rectifying style. If they are told that what we want is something Mao Tse-tung has bidden, if we tell them that Mao says they must behave in such and such a way, this will not have the desired effect. They do not believe in Maoism, because it has only just come on the stage. What we must do, therefore, is pull out a commodity with an old trademark. For example, 'Lenin said this and this, you must behave in such and such a way'. This they will believe and will not dare to resist."

Mao did not see Marxism-Leninism as the theory and method of scientific communism, nor as a guide in solving epistemological problems or determining a course of action. Practically in all cases when he inserted in one of his works separate phrases from the classics of Marx-

ism-Leninism (usually found for him at his request by others), it was merely to give greater weight and attractiveness to his own words, using the name of another for his own demagogic ends.

Considering the rabid anti-Sovietism Mao had implanted during the "style rectification" campaign, his call to use the method and experience of Soviet art and literature was clearly prompted by purely utilitarian considerations.

The same may be said of Mao's occasional "denunciations" of Trotsky during the "rectification campaign", when he was openly substituting "Maoism" for Leninism and expounding an anti-Leninist and anti-socialist "new democracy". Here, too, his motives boiled down to the usual trick which, like that of a thief shouting "hold, thief!", was meant to divert attention from himself.

The facts of history show that Mao has always been a utilitarianist. Personal gain was the point of departure in everything he did. He used Marxism-Leninism exclusively to disguise his true aims. True, before the "style rectification" campaign, before he mounted his open offensive on Marxism-Leninism, he went out of his way to conceal his aims. It was not until the "rectification" campaign, when he came out into the open against Marxism-Leninism, that his utilitarianism became increasingly apparent.

It was no accident that in the Concluding Remarks of his *Talks* Mao advocated utilitarianism. He said, "no person on earth stands above utilitarianism". He said, "we are proletarian, revolutionary utilitarianists," and made just one reservation, "we are utilitarianists who are concerned not with personal gain, but with the public interests". Evidently, he thought that this honeyed phrase would adorn his views and that he would be received as a new, "revolutionary", utilitarianist. But people have long since learned to judge a man not by his words but by his deeds. More, people have learned to probe deep to the ideological and social origins of ideas and actions. When Mao publicly proclaimed himself a utilitarianist, many Communists weighing his words and actions in the "rectification campaign" turned for an explanation to the old eighteenth-century utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, the subjective idealist ethical doctrine, or to the

new utilitarianism that reflected the needs of the US bourgeoisie—the subjective idealist philosophical school created in the eighteen-seventies by Charles Sanders Pierce and developed in the early twentieth century by William James and John Dewey under the name of pragmatism. Many Communists compared Mao's words and deeds with the principles of the old and the new utilitarianism, arriving at the conclusion that Mao's utilitarianism, which had assimilated the principles of the old utilitarianism, was a new American-type utilitarianism or pragmatism.

And the clearest evidence of this was that, contrary to the interests of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese revolution, and the world communist movement, Mao had launched a "campaign for the rectification of style" to further his own, extreme individualist interests. There could be no clearer manifestation of the principle of both the old and new utilitarianism (pragmatism), according to which narrowly egoistic designs and undisguised egoism are the main motives behind all moral acts—"the individual's truth is that which satisfies his personal interests". Mao's falsification of the history of the CPC and the Chinese revolution, of the history of the modern revolutionary movement in Chinese art and literature, of the character and role of Leninism, and of the history of the Comintern and the Soviet Union, is a specific manifestation of pragmatism which spurns the objective truth and considers as the truth only that which is in the personal interests of the individual. In the course of the "rectification campaign" Mao sought to build a cult of his personality, extolled the bourgeois democracy of the United States and reviled the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union, predicted "certain victory" for fascist Germany and "certain defeat" for the socialist land, the Soviet Union. All this, too, was a concrete manifestation of various pragmatic concepts in sociology—from the cult of "great personalities" (James) and the apologia of bourgeois democracy (Dewey) to outright support of racist and fascist ideas. In the course of the "rectification campaign", Mao seasoned his extreme individualist ideas with anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist and anti-Soviet pronouncements. This was a distinct manifestation of the neo-pragmatic approach, which appeared on the scene in the garb of "experimental naturalism" and which blends sub-

jective idealism with anti-Marxism and anti-communism (Sidney Hook).

Like the old variety, the new utilitarianism, or pragmatism, is a bourgeois idealist school that reposes on extreme individualism. Both the old and the new varieties are no more compatible with Marxism and communism than fire is with water. It is entirely logical, therefore, that during the "rectification campaign" Mao reviled Marxism-Leninism, persecuted Marxists-Leninists, publicly advocated utilitarianism, and called himself a utilitarianist. The "rectification campaign" was a dress rehearsal for the "cultural revolution" precisely because ever since that campaign and up to this day all of Mao's reactionary pronouncements and actions are saturated with utilitarianism.

One may legitimately ask why Mao's *Talks*, which contradicted the facts of history and abounded in theoretical mistakes, were not there and then subjected to annihilating criticism at the "art and literature forum"? After all, the "forum" was attended not only by the writers and artists residing in Yenan, but also by Central Committee leaders, by responsible Party workers, and by representatives of administrative, military, and educational institutions, and mass organisations.

To begin with, at the very outset of the "style rectification campaign" Mao had established "a principle of behaviour", namely: speak only good and never bad of Chairman Mao, and only bad and never good of those subjected to "style rectification". Second, and more important, he relied not on criticism as a weapon but on weapons as "criticism". Due to this "magic shield" Mao could afford to behave as he did and use the methods he did, with facts, arguments, and objective reasoning becoming completely redundant. His methods may, therefore, be characterised as an extreme of self-glorification. His behaviour resembles that of Lu Hsun's Hongkong Englishman towards his Chinese slave: "Since I say you are wrong, you must be wrong." It is, essentially, the behaviour and logic of every despot or tyrant towards his subjects. So there is nothing surprising about it. What other means, apart from such behaviour and such "logic", did Mao have to conduct the "campaign for the rectification of style"?

In any analysis of the content of Mao's *Talks*, as also in the case of many of Mao's other works, it might be apt to say: "They seem to sound right, but they aren't". "They seem to sound right" is the impression of people who do not understand what Mao is talking about, and "but they aren't" is the judgement of those who do understand. Mao belongs to the same breed as Proudhon, of whom Marx said in *The Poverty of Philosophy* that he looks like a specialist only to those who do not understand the topic.

Only for those who have but a faint idea of Marxist-Leninist policy Mao looks like a "political expert". And for those who do not understand art and literature from the Marxist-Leninist standpoint, he may look like an "expert on art and literature".

The above is doubly true of his philosophical views. Each of Mao's "four philosophical works", thrown together with other people's help and with resort to plagiarism (*On Practice* and *On Contradiction*, which appeared in the early fifties,* and *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*, 1957, and *Where Do Correct Ideas Come From?* which appeared in the early sixties), contain serious anti-materialist, extreme subjective idealist, and voluntarist mistakes in questions of theory, and anti-dialectical and sophistical mistakes in questions of method. His approach and his choice of examples are strongly tainted with extreme individualism and pragmatism, and are contrary to historical materialism. These "philosophical works" enable him to parade as a "philosopher" before people who are not conversant with questions of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. But for conversant people he is nothing but a half-learned dabbler. His *Lectures on Dialectical Materialism*, which were published in the late thirties, contain so many mistakes and so many puerile pronouncements that anyone conversant with Marxist-Leninist philosophy may, as the saying goes, "lose his teeth from laughing" when reading this opus. In fact, Mao Tse-tung belongs to the same breed as Dühring, whom Engels described as a man who likes saying and writing things he does not understand.

* Mao Tse-tung included these two articles in the first volume of his *Selected Works*, claiming that they were written in 1937.

Mao's *Talks* set the stage for the "rectification of style" among revolutionary writers and artists and for falsifying the history of the CPC. They played a conspicuous part in the "style rectification" campaign. With the help of his *Talks* Mao sought to deliver an unprecedentedly strong blow to revolutionary art and literary workers in order to twist their ideological, political and organisational principles, to break them morally and physically, and to provoke the mass of workers, peasants and soldiers into joining battle against revolutionary writers and artists. For Mao the purpose of the *Talks* was to try and reach two highly important aims. On the one hand, he sought to discredit revolutionary Chinese literature and art, and to write off the success of the revolutionary movement in art and literature that began in the twenties and developed so brilliantly in the thirties. It was an attempt to deny the historical fact that socialist realism had struck deep root, flowered, and was yielding rich fruit, in Chinese soil. It was also an attempt to deny that the revolutionary movement in Chinese art and literature was conceived under the immediate ideological influence of the October Revolution and the progressive Russian and revolutionary Soviet art and literature, and that it was the result of the rapid spread of Marxism-Leninism among the foremost Chinese intellectuals following the May Fourth Movement (1919), and that its successful growth was due solely to the guidance and all-round assistance of the Communist Party of China over a long period of time.

On the other hand, Mao wanted to show that his *Talks* were ushering in a "correct line in the Chinese revolutionary movement in art and literature". He wanted to parade as the "founder" of Chinese revolutionary art and literature. All this was to have justified his demand that revolutionary writers and artists should turn their backs on the literary and artistic ideas of "Russian Marxism" and "re-orient" their minds on the literary and artistic ideas of "Chinese Marxism", that is, "Maoism".

He thought that he would thereby succeed in forcing revolutionary writers and artists to declare themselves followers of "Mao's literary and artistic thoughts" and henceforth to extol Mao in their works as the sole creator of the correct line in the revolutionary movement in Chinese art and literature, and also extol him to the skies for

everything that he ascribed to himself in the falsified history of the CPC and Chinese revolution he had himself produced in the course of the "style rectification campaign". In other words, he tried to convert the Chinese revolutionary writers into court scribes singing the praises of "Maoism" and Mao's person, into trumpeters and drummers who would create a cult of his personality.

In his *Talks*, Mao described himself as a "professional revolutionary politician who has assimilated revolutionary political science or, in other words, mastered the art of revolutionary politics". All others he described as "politicians with an aristocratic twist" scheming in the seclusion of their studies, thinking themselves very clever, and continuously advertising their own selves: "we are the best of the best, so do not confuse us with anybody else". "This, in fact," he even said, "is the fundamental difference between a proletarian and the corrupt bourgeois politician". He seems to have thought in earnest that it was enough to praise himself and defame others for the Chinese revolutionary writers and artists, spellbound by his *Talks*, at once to become his proselytes and obedient tools. This is why he said in his *Concluding Remarks*: "I am sure that comrades will find the resolve to follow this direction. I am sure that in the process of rectifying style and in their subsequent long studies and work, comrades will doubtless succeed in altering their own image and that of their works."

But his expectations were dashed. His *Talks* showed clearly that he had not "assimilated revolutionary political science", that he had not "mastered the art of revolutionary politics", that he was no "proletarian political leader", and that, on the contrary, he was "a corrupt politician" with an "aristocratic twist". His *Talks* provoked contempt and loathing among the country's revolutionary literary and art workers. They abounded in incongruities, contradictions and theoretical mistakes, and have created an unbridgeable gulf between Mao and the revolutionary writers and artists of the entire country, precipitating a long and hard struggle between these writers and artists, whom he persecutes, and Mao Tse-tung, whom they resist.

4) Briefly about Mao Tse-tung's Poetry

After the "style rectification campaign" had ended, during his negotiations with the United States and Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking in September 1945, Mao published his favourite *tsi** poem, entitled "Sinyuanchun" (Snow) in *Hsinhuajihpao*. He hoped his poem would be acclaimed a masterpiece. He expected the laurel wreath of a "great poet". He also hoped to heighten his prestige among writers, which would help him impose his control over the revolutionary movement in art and literature and convince revolutionary writers and artists in the need for extolling his "greatness" and his "services". But again the results confounded Mao's expectations. Outside those organs of the press which were, in fact, controlled by him and could utter no word of criticism, the poem had a critical reception and was described as steeped in the feudal and monarchist ideology. Many revolutionary writers and artists inside and outside the Party held that the poem was saturated with feudal and monarchist ideals and should not have come from the pen of a Communist. They held that, far from being a work of socialist realism, it could not even be considered a work of critical realism. The publication of the poem only widened the gulf between Mao and the revolutionary writers and artists of the whole country.

In 1957 Mao published 18 of his poems in the Peking journal *Shih kan* (*Poetry*), and on 4 January 1964 another 10 poems in *Jenminjihpao* and the journal *Hungchi*. If we add all the other of his published poems, we will get a total of 37, out of which 12 were poems and 25 were *tsi*. Every time he had his poems published he only widened and deepened the gulf between himself and the revolutionary writers and artists. This was natural and inevitable, because many of his poems and *tsi* were simply wretched in content. Some were steeped in feudal and monarchist ideology as "Sinyuanchun" (Snow), a *tsi*, the poem "The People's Liberation Army Has Captured Nanking", and "Pehtaiho" (*Langtaosha*), a *tsi*. Others preached

* *Tsi* (literally *text*)—a specific form of versification where the poet pedantically follows the measure and rhyme of one of the ancient songs, mainly dating to the Sung dynasty (960-1276), the tunes of nearly all of which are long forgotten.

mysticism and superstition, as the poems "Seeing Out the God of Epidemics", "Dedication to a Photograph of Comrade Li Chin", "The Cave of Celestial Beings in Lushang", depicting the ascension to paradise of souls of the dead, "A Butterfly Leaves Not the Flower" (*A Gift to Li Shu-i*), and others. And in the poem "Reply to a Friend", which relates how the souls of Emperor Shun's concubines descend to earth, elements of the feudal and monarchist ideology blend with mysticism and superstition. Some tried to interpret Mao's verse as a work of revolutionary romanticism. But it is obvious that none of it can be referred to as belonging to revolutionary, whether active or "harmless", romanticism. On the contrary, Mao's poetry clearly belongs to reactionary, passive and harmful romanticism. Some of it is anti-Soviet and anti-communist, such as *Mangtsianghung*, a *tsi* (January 1963), the poems "After Seeing the Film 'Sun Wu-kung Thrice Kills the Werewolf White Bones'" (November 1961), "Winter Clouds" (December 1962), and others. Some of the verse betrays its author's ignorance of history, as for example his version of the legend of *Puchoushan* in "Yui-tsao" (*Against the First March*), a *tsi*, and his ignorance of natural science, as for example the *tsi*, "Nian-nutsao" (*Kunlun*). Some of the poems are aimed at buttressing the cult of Mao's personality and winning the youth for his nefarious schemes, such as the *tsi*, *Shui-tiaokotou* (Swimming). Artistically Mao's poetry is clumsy, awkward, shallow, stiff, divorced from reality, and lacking beauty.

Out of the 37 poems and *tsi* produced by Mao in 40 years (1920 to 1960) not a single one is dedicated to Marxism-Leninism, the Communist Party, or the working class, and not a single one depicts the life of workers, peasants and soldiers or the life and struggle of the revolutionary intelligentsia and students. There is not a single one, of course, in praise of the socialist community, the world communist movement, the anti-imperialist or national liberation movement, or the peace movement. Nor is there a single one dedicated to the memory of the thousands upon thousands of fallen revolutionaries or national heroes inside and outside the Party. Even the poem "The Long March" does not bring out the political, military or historical significance of the march, and does not mention the basic fact that the Chinese Red Army,

which fought so heroically and overcame countless hardships on the march, was an army of workers and peasants and was led by the Communist Party armed with Marxist-Leninist ideas. He depicts the Long March as little more than an entertaining hike across mountains and rivers.

It is this type of poetry that Mao, taking advantage of his power in Party and state, orders to be published in hundreds of thousands, millions, even tens of millions of copies not only in Chinese and the languages of the non-Han peoples, but also translated into foreign languages, using diplomatic, commercial and cultural channels for their dissemination. He has even put out a photolithographic edition of the manuscripts of his poems and *tsi*. No words can describe this other than as shameless and mad.

In his *Talks at the Art and Literature Forum in Yenan* he demanded of revolutionary artists and writers that the content of their works should reflect the life of workers, peasants and soldiers, and that their language should be comprehensible to the working masses. But his own poems and *tsi* are, both in content and form, the very opposite to what he demanded of others. In fact, they may be described as abstruse. He turns often to mythology and to various long-since-forgotten "instructive tales or parables". As a result his poems and *tsi* are incomprehensible not only to workers, peasants and soldiers, but even to intellectuals and students. In fact, he has had to ask poets to write stiff, wordy, and far-fetched commentaries to his poetry. Yet, due to his misuse of proverbs and old parables, and also to phraseological incongruities, some of his poems and *tsi* are incomprehensible not only to poets or to authors of literature textbooks for senior forms, but often also to himself. At least, he finds it difficult to explain them. This is why in the eyes of revolutionary writers and artists Mao is a swindler whose pronouncements are at variance with his intentions, whose words are in conflict with his deeds, who relishes defaming others, but is incapable of being critical of himself. In short, the failure of "Mao's thoughts and line in art and literature" is not accidental. As it says in *I Ching*, the ancient *Book of Changes*, "from thin rime to thick ice there is a distance of more than one day, and the origin of this is in inexorable gradualness".

5) The Outcome is Total Failure

By his pronouncements and actions during the notorious "cultural revolution", in substance a counter-revolutionary coup, Mao admitted the total failure of his literary and artistic "thoughts" and line. He was compelled to admit, on the one hand, that his many "instructions" pertaining to art and literature published in the forties, fifties and sixties had not really been obeyed by any revolutionary writer or artist* (excluding his wife, Chiang Ching). On the other hand, he consigned to the flames all the works of the revolutionary writers of the preceding 50 years and brutally persecuted the writers themselves—many of whom were physically eliminated, while some, in desperation, committed suicide. The rest are either in prison, where they are morally and physically tortured, or in May Seventh Schools, which are in fact forced labour camps in which people are "re-educated through labour" and continuously tormented. Many have already found their death in these "schools". China's revolutionary artists and writers are in sorry straits, and the revolutionary movement in art and literature is in a shambles.

Despite the ignominious failure of Mao's "literary and artistic thoughts and line", he still orders the Chinese newspapers to reprint his *Talks at the Art and Literature Forum in Yen-an* each year on 23 May and raise a clamorous propaganda uproar. It is hard to find suitable words to describe this total lack of shame and scruples. As I recall, the literary community in Yen-an composed the following ditty soon after the publication of Mao's *Talks*.

His face is thicker than a brick in the Great Wall,
And his heart blacker than a chunk of coal.

Subsequent events showed that these words were suitable and correct.

3. THE THIRD PERIOD— "EMERGENCY SALVATION"

The third period of the "style rectification campaign", known as the period of "emergency salvation", began in July 1943 and lasted until the summer of 1944.

* See *Hungchi* No. 9, 1967.

1) Fabricating the pretext for "Emergency salvation"

Mao was aware that despite 18 months of "style rectification", the cadres continued to resist all his words and actions which flouted the truth and the facts. He felt that if this went on he would not be able to attain the first of the desired aims of the "style rectification" campaign—to create Maoism and write the history of the CPC as his personal history. And if he did not attain the first aim, there would be no hope at all of attaining the second—to "substitute" Maoism for Leninism, usurp supreme power in the Party, create a cult of Mao's personality, and establish his personal military dictatorship in the Party. Yet he held that since the Comintern had been dissolved there was nothing to hinder his actions: the time was favourable for he had "freedom of action" and a completely "free hand". So he decided to resort to still more reactionary and violent anti-Party terrorism—a campaign of "emergency salvation" to further his own extreme egoistic, nationalist aims.

To launch the reactionary terror campaign of "emergency salvation", Mao first fabricated a pretext, according to which the need for the campaign was imposed by both the "objective situation" and the "subjective situation".

The "objective situation", he claimed, was that Chiang Kai-shek had decided to mount an offensive on Yen-an. Martial law was enforced in Yen-an and the entire Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area. An atmosphere of extreme military danger was artificially created.

In fact, however, neither the international situation nor the internal conditions of that time permitted Chiang Kai-shek even to think of an assault on Yen-an.

The international situation was greatly influenced by the historic victory of the Soviet Army at Stalingrad, following which Hitler's troops suffered one defeat after another. Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek was bound to have been apprehensive of making any undisguised anti-communist move. Besides, following the outbreak of the Japanese-American war in the Pacific, the United States had a stake in KMT-CPC cooperation in the anti-Japanese war theatre in China. And to the opinion of the United States Chiang always lent a respectful ear.

The internal conditions of that time were mainly characterised by the continuing Japanese occupation of extensive areas in Northeast, North, Central and South China, and, as before, Chiang was not able to fight an anti-Japanese and an anti-communist war simultaneously.

The stridently predicted "third anti-communist wave" and "Chiang's imminent offensive on Yen-an" were, in fact, nothing but another of Mao's frauds, invented to justify the "emergency salvation" campaign.

Using the atmosphere of tension he had himself artificially created, Mao announced that all leaders and most cadres and rank-and-file members of the Party—with the exception of Liu Shao-chi and a few others—were "suspected of counter-revolution". He specially declared that leaders, cadres and rank-and-file members who had at any time in the past worked in Kuomintang-controlled areas were pseudo-Communists smuggled in by the Kuomintang to carry out the "policy of red banners".* This, he said, applied especially to the present members of Party organisations of all levels in Kuomintang-controlled areas. They were all denounced as "organisations of the Kuomintang red banners policy". In reality this was malicious slander which Mao needed purely as a pretext for launching his "emergency salvation" campaign.

2) "Emergency salvation" in name and repression of leaders, cadres and Party members in fact

On Mao's orders Kang Sheng, chairman of the Central Commission for the Rectification of Style, published an article, "On the Emergency Salvation of Those Who Slipped Up", in the 1 July 1943 issue of *Chiehfangjihpao*. This was the signal for the campaign to begin. Kang Sheng said that its purpose was to "save" all those who, "having slipped up", had become "national traitors", "enemy spies", "counter-revolutionaries", and the like. Thereupon, "mass meetings" were called in all the subdivisions conducting the "style rectification campaign", where, faithful to Mao's instructions, officials delivered reports in which, pleading the exigencies of the "objective

situation" and "subjective situation", they "substantiated the need" for an immediate campaign of "emergency salvation". It was announced in all subdivisions that the second period of "style rectification" was over and the third period, "emergency salvation", had begun.

In fact, things were the other way round. The purpose of "emergency salvation" was not to save those who had "slipped up", but to slanderously accuse the majority of leaders and cadres and many rank-and-file Party members, and the revolutionary youth, of having "slipped up", and then to use brute force and mass terror to force confessions of having "slipped up" from faithful revolutionaries. The so-called Social Department of the CC CPC, headed by Kang Sheng, specialised in arrests, beatings, tortures, and executions. Officials of subdivisions conducting "style rectification" were also authorised to arrest, beat, and kill.

In practice, "emergency salvation" consisted of various methods of compulsion and deceit to force thousands of cadres and members of the Party and the Youth League, and also eminent personalities outside the Party, to write "confessions" admitting that they were "counter-revolutionaries", "enemy spies", "national traitors", "agents of the Soviet Union", and the like.

Nothing was too low for this end. People were arrested and cruelly tortured or beaten up to wrest a "confession" from them. They were blackmailed, bribed, and slandered at "mass rallies" or "persuaded" at smaller meetings, and reduced to a state of total prostration by means of moral and physical terror. From some "confessions" were wrested in "turning wheel" interrogations.* Especially brutal tortures were reserved for cadres of provincial and county Party committees from Kuomintang-controlled areas specially summoned to undergo "style rectification".

Those who admitted to being "elements" referred to above were immediately released, given the "red flower of glory", and otherwise rewarded. Those who denied committing any "crimes", were beaten up and tortured. Many died as a result. Others, unable to bear the insult, committed suicide (Chou Feng-ping, a guerrilla lead-

* With several interrogators alternating day and night the detainee lost consciousness, was revived, whereupon the interrogation continued. Sometimes, reduced to semi-consciousness, the detainee would "confess" the "crimes" ascribed to him.

* In other words, "to carry a red banner in order to fight the red banner".

er and secretary of the Szechuan provincial Party committee, who had earlier survived inhuman torture in an enemy prison; Tseng Tan-ju, head of the women's department of the Szechuan provincial Party committee, who had also previously displayed courage and fortitude in an enemy prison; Han Chun, veteran Party cadre who had led the New Shansi Army to safety, evading warlord Yan Hsi-shan, and joined up with the 8th Route Army; Hu, chairman of the All-China Students' Association whose full name, regrettably, I cannot recall, and many others). A still greater number of people were reduced to complete mental prostration or suffered other serious disorders (Wei Kung-chih, head of the organisational department of the Honan provincial Party committee, Huang Chin, who headed Party work among the youth, and many others).

Indescribably savage methods were used sometimes. For example, the "accused" would be brought to a "mass rally" and seated before a table on which lay a bayonet, a vial of poison and a length of rope. The audience was then made to chant, "Either immediately admit that you are a counter-revolutionary or commit suicide here and now", "Choose any of the three ways".

But there were many stout, unbending people who proudly replied: "I'm a Communist and no counter-revolutionary. I refuse to take my own life". They would indignantly sweep the bayonet, poison and rope off the table. These staunch ones usually became targets of especially refined tortures and brutal killings.

3) Leninist internationalists were still the main target

When the atmosphere of repression and terror reached its apogee, the spearhead was turned against the chief members of the so-called Moscow group—Wang Ming (member of the Politbureau and secretary of the CC CPC), Po Ku (member of the Politbureau and secretary of the CC CPC), Lo Fu (member of the Politbureau and General Secretary of the CC CPC), Wang Chia-hsiang (alternate member of the Politbureau and head of the Main Political Department of the 8th Route Army), Kai Feng (alternate member of the Politbureau, chief of the CC commission for work with the youth and concurrently

chief of the Propaganda Department of the CC CPC following Lo Fu's departure from Yen-an), Yang Shang-kun (alternate member of the CC CPC and secretary of the CC CPC North China Bureau), Chu Jui (alternate member of the CC CPC and secretary of the Shantung branch of the CC CPC North China Bureau), and others.

As in the "style rectification" campaign, the chief target was Wang Ming, whom Mao sometimes temperately called "the chief member of the Moscow group" and sometimes abusively described as "the biggest headman of the pro-Soviet group". Why did Mao aim his attacks chiefly against Wang Ming? This question is best answered by Mao himself. He answered it officially in public on many occasions: "The struggle between me and Wang Ming is not a personal struggle, but a struggle of principle. Wang Ming is the chief representative of Russian Marxism in the CPC, and I am the chief representative of Chinese Marxism. The struggle between us is therefore a struggle of two ideologies, two theories, two lines and two ways of the Chinese revolution. The predominance of Russian Marxism in our Party will not end without a struggle against Wang Ming. And without ending the predominance of Russian Marxism it is impossible to establish the predominance of Chinese Marxism."

Here it is necessary to give an appropriate explanation.

To begin with, there has never been anything like a "Moscow group" or a "pro-Soviet group" in the Communist Party of China. But in the Party's history, even long before Mao's "style rectification" campaign, there were two occasions when opportunists brandished the slogan of combatting the "Moscow group" or "pro-Soviet group", attacking not only those who opposed their opportunist lines, but also Leninism, the Comintern, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

First, during the Wuhan period in 1927, when right opportunism was rife in the Party, Chen Tu-hsiu, Peng Shu-chih and other right opportunists opposed the Comintern recommendation to expand the workers' and peasants' movement, to arm workers and peasants, create a new revolutionary army, launch an agrarian revolution, and fight for the non-capitalist perspective of the Chinese revolution. They countered this with their so-called concept of two-phased revolution.

This "concept", it may be recalled, was set out in an article, "The Bourgeois Revolution and the Revolutionary Bourgeoisie", in the journal *Hsiangtao*. But the clearest and most thorough exposition was given by Chen Tu-hsiu in a talk with Comrade Miff and me at the CC CPC premises in Hankow on 16 June 1927. We were then discussing why a Communist must not accept the office of county chief. Here is what Chen Tu-hsiu said about the "concept of two-phased revolution":

"The Chinese revolution has only two phases. The first phase is a civil revolution, that is, a bourgeois revolution, and the second is a socialist revolution, that is, a proletarian revolution. The Communist Party cannot direct the first phase of the revolution. Only the bourgeoisie can direct it. The government and the armed forces must be in the hands of the bourgeoisie. If a Communist were to head the army in this phase, he would become a warlord, and if he were to head the government, * he would become a bureaucrat. Mass movements must not be allowed to imperil the bourgeoisie. The victory of the revolution must belong completely to the bourgeoisie, which must be permitted to develop capitalism for a long period. The Communist Party must not begin the second revolution until capitalism develops to a degree where a proletarian revolution will be possible. Only then will the Communist Party be able to direct the revolution, and then a Communist will be able to head the army and not be a warlord, and to head the government and not be a bureaucrat. Only in these conditions will it be possible to arm the workers and peasants, to carry out an agrarian revolution, and to begin building socialism. Our system of theory and method differs from that adhered to by Moscow, but we think that our system is correct."

Chen Tu-hsiu, Peng Shu-chih and their followers called Tsyui Tsyu-po, who had written a pamphlet (*Third International or Zero International?*) in support of the Comintern line, the chief member of a "Moscow group". All those who ranged themselves with the Comintern line and shared Tsyui Tsyu-po's views, were called members of the "Tsyui Tsyu-po group" or "Tsyui Tsyu-po's Mos-

cow group". I supported the Comintern line and approved of Tsyui Tsyu-po's views. Among my duties was that of editor and editorial board member of *Hsiangtao*, of which Tsyui Tsyu-po was editor-in-chief. Besides, in No. 198 of *Hsiangtao* I published an article, "Concerning the Outlook of the Chinese Revolution and Hegemony in the Revolution", and was also immediately named a member of "Tsyui Tsyu-po's Moscow group".

The second campaign occurred in 1930, when Li Li-sen's "left"-adventurist line became dominant in the Party. At that time, Li Li-sen described Chen Shao-yu, * Chin Pang-hsien, ** Wang Chia-hsiang and Ho Tzu-shu *** (they spoke their mind to Li Li-sen and members of the Politbureau, and supported the Comintern line against the Li Li-sen line at a meeting of Central Committee cadres) as members of a "right opportunist group" or "Chen Shao-yu's Moscow group". They came under fire politically and organisationally. For opposing Li Li-sen's article, "Questions of the Eve of a Revolutionary Upswing", in a double issue (No. 4-5) of the CC CPC journal *Bolshevik*, and also the Politbureau decision of 11 June, Chen Shao-yu was given a "last serious warning" on 28 June, while Chin Pang-hsien, Wang Chia-hsiang and Ho Tzu-shu were given a "serious warning". For opposing the Chinese Red Army tactic of attacking large cities and the adventurist uprisings in large cities the "last serious warning" given to Chen Shao-yu was changed on 7 August to a stricter formula, "temporary six-months' stay in the Party for observation", **** while the "serious warning" given to Chin Pang-hsien, Wang Chia-hsiang and Ho Tzu-shu was changed to "last serious warning". Not until 25 October, when the Comintern Executive's letter to the CC CPC concerning the Li Li-sen line reached Shanghai, the disciplinary actions taken against the four of us were repealed in a Politbureau resolution of 16 December, and the whole Party was informed of this.

* Wang Ming.

** Po Ku.

*** Ho Tzu-shu was strictly reprimanded on 7 August 1930. Li Li-sen sent him to Peking for trade union work. There he was arrested, and died in a Peking military prison in 1932.

**** This could be followed by expulsion from the Party.

* The reference is to bodies of power in the centre as well as locally.

Besides, in August Chen Yuan-tao (Li Fu),* who headed the Honan provincial Party committee majority which opposed the decision of the secretary of the provincial committee and the CC CPC North China Bureau concerning armed uprisings in Chengchow, Kaifeng, Loyang and other cities, was given a "last serious warning" by the North China Bureau.

After the 3rd Central Committee Plenum he asked for his case to be reviewed, but the Politbureau took still stricter action, leaving him "in the Party temporarily for observation for three months". There is a special Politbureau resolution of 29 January 1931 and a circular concerning the repeal of the disciplinary action against Li Fu. When word of Chen Yuan-tao's opposition to the Li Li-sen line reached the Central Committee, Li Li-sen flew into a rage, and said: "Those who came back from Moscow obstruct my every step. Chen Yuan-tao is also a member of the Chen Shao-yu group".

The third campaign against Wang Ming was mounted at the time of Mao's anti-Leninist, anti-Comintern, anti-Soviet and anti-Party "rectification of style". Mao sent his men to rallies and meetings, where they heckled the "Moscow group" or "pro-Soviet group", Wang Ming, the "28½ Bolsheviks of the Moscow group", the "Wang Ming group", etc. When Mao was shown the findings of the group of doctors in August 1943, he was compelled to visit me, and I explained that there had never been any "Moscow group of Wang Ming" or "Wang Ming group". I said to him:

"The so-called Chen Shao-yu group was invented by the Trotskyites and Chen Tu-hsiuists in the winter of 1927. I had always taken part in the struggle against Trotskyism, and the Trotskyites pasted all kinds of labels to my name. On returning from Wuhan to Moscow in August 1927, I made a number of reports and explained the need for combatting Chen Tu-hsiu's right opportunism. The followers of Chen Tu-hsiu among the Chinese students in Moscow called me a Tsyui Tsyu-poist. Together with the Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern and the CPC representative in the Comintern I took an active stand against the so-called Kiangsi-Chekiang Natives' So-

ciety run by Trotskyites and Chen Tu-hsiuists. At the 6th Congress of the CPC, by decision of its Presidium, I made a report on the question of the Kiangsi-Chekiang Natives' Society. This was why the Trotskyites and Chen Tu-hsiuists began calling most of the teachers and students of the Communist University of the Toilers of China (CUTC) the 'Chen Shao-yu group'. Their purpose, in effect, was to show that since there is a Chen Shao-yu 'group', they had a right to have their own Kiangsi-Chekiang Natives' Society.

"The tale of 'the 28½ Bolsheviks' and the 'Chen Shao-yu group' was also bandied about by Trotskyites and Chen Tu-hsiuists in the autumn of 1929 during the Party purge in the CUTC. I had left Moscow for home in the beginning of February. But for selfish purposes, the Trotskyites and Chen Tu-hsiuists attacked several hundred comrades, the absolute majority of the CUTC who supported the Comintern and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and opposed the Trotskyites and Chen Tu-hsiuists, for being members of a 'Chen Shao-yu group'. They pretended that only a minority—28½ Bolsheviks headed by Chen Shao-yu—opposed them. Look at the arch-reactionary Kuomintang weekly, *The Anti-Japanese War and Culture*, appearing in Sian. Its chief editor, Yeh Ching, is a traitor, a spy, and a Trotskyite Chen Tu-hsiuist. Each issue contains malicious articles and reports vilifying the '28½ Bolsheviks'—Chen Shao-yu, Po Ku, Lo Fu, Wang Chia-hsiang and others. This alone should show you how this story originated."

Mao Tse-tung replied:

"I do not know what others say. What I do know is that you studied in Moscow and that you worked in the highest Comintern bodies for as long as six years. Since the 6th CPC Congress and the 6th Comintern Congress in 1928 you have known top-ranking comrades of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. You were associated and had friendly relations with them for many years when you worked in the Comintern in the thirties. There is no other such person in our Party exposed to their influence. In my speech on the rectification of style I referred to people who 'never fail to mention Greece the moment they open their mouth'. Everybody knows that we have no such people in the Party, and that there are

* Chen Yuan-tao was arrested in Shanghai in 1932, transferred to Nanking, and executed by firing squad.

only people like you, who 'never fail to mention Lenin and Stalin the moment they open their mouth', who 'never fail to mention the Comintern the moment they open their mouth', and who 'never fail to mention the Soviet Union the moment they open their mouth'. Hence, whatever you may say to the contrary, you are in effect the chief member of the Moscow group or the pro-Soviet group. This is undeniable. As for the Wang Ming group, it is just another name for the Moscow group. But it stands for more than just the Moscow group. Ever since the victory over the Li Li-sen line and the 4th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee you have been supported and followed only by those who had studied or worked in Moscow. So, whether there is such an organisation is one thing, and the fact that many people follow you, follow the Moscow line or the Comintern line, is another. Now, we have begun to rectify style precisely to end this sort of thing."

In the beginning of January 1943 I had a talk with Liao Lu-yen, who was then my political secretary, about the three past campaigns against the "Moscow group". He made notes of our conversation and took them to Mao Tse-tung. Learning about this, Ko Ching-shih warned me that Mao Tse-tung would probably be annoyed. But Mao did not dare to say anything publicly about the informer's notes.

This shows that Mao mounted his attack on the "Moscow group" or "Wang Ming group" as a pretext for doing away with Wang Ming and certain others. From time to time, in fact, he deliberately "spread the word" that so-and-so belonged to the "Wang Ming group", and saw to it that this should be reported in the foreign press. Thereupon he used the "report" spread by himself as the "reason" for persecuting people for belonging to the "Wang Ming group".

It must be pointed out here that there has been and still is a struggle between two ideologies, two theories, two lines and two roads in the Communist Party of China. But it is not what Mao describes as a struggle between "Russian Marxism" and "Chinese Marxism". It is a real and irreconcilable struggle between Marxism-Leninism and anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist, reactionary Maoism or the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung". This struggle between two theories is a struggle between the Marxist-Leninist

theory of the Chinese revolution and the Maoist theory of the Chinese revolution.

The substance of the Maoist theory is that "the Chinese revolution is a revolution in a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal country" and that, formally, its development consists of "two stages: the new-democratic revolution and the socialist revolution" (the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution comes under the head of new-democratic.—*Wang Ming*). In fact, however, the Maoist theory of the development of China does not go beyond the stage of the new-democratic revolution. After the victory of the new-democratic revolution, accomplished "with the proletariat participating in the leadership (that is, jointly with the bourgeoisie—*Wang Ming*) or under the leadership of the proletariat", it will be possible to build a "new-democratic republic", that is, "a republic based on new Three People's Principles, three new basic political guidelines" (i.e. a left-Kuomintang type of republic following three basic political guidelines: "alliance with Russia, alliance with the Communist Party, and support of peasants and workers"; in other words, not a republic in which leadership would belong to the proletariat and its Communist Party, but a republic led by the bourgeoisie and its political party—*Wang Ming*). It goes without saying that a "new-democratic revolution" of this sort cannot grow over into a socialist revolution. Mao, therefore, set the socialist revolution in the distant future. To all intents and purposes, Mao's work, *On New Democracy*, is therefore basically an adaptation of Chen Tushiu's "concept of two-phased revolution" to a new situation. The words given above in inverted commas are from the section, "The Policy of New Democracy", in *On New Democracy*, which appeared in Mao's one-volume *Selected Works (Tungpei shutien, 1948)*.

The essential difference between the Marxist-Leninist and Maoist theory of the Chinese revolution consists in the following: Marxism-Leninism stands with the proletariat, while Maoism stands with the bourgeoisie. This is expressed, first of all, in the different understanding of the character of the anti-imperialist revolution and the struggle against the remnants of feudalism. In the Marxist-Leninist view the anti-imperialist revolution is not merely a step objectively favouring the development of national capitalism, but also and chiefly a part of so-

cialism's struggle against world capitalism, a preparatory step and preliminary condition for a socialist revolution in China. Similarly, the struggle against the remnants of feudalism is not merely a step clearing the way for the development of capitalism, but also and chiefly a preparatory step and preliminary condition for a socialist revolution in China. This is why, in the Marxist-Leninist view, the bourgeois-democratic revolution begins to grow over into a socialist revolution at the moment of its victory.

For Maoism, on the other hand, the anti-imperialist revolution and the anti-feudal revolution are confined to creating favourable conditions and providing favourable opportunities for the development of capitalism in China. This is why, in his *On New Democracy*, which he published in the early forties, Mao denied that after its victory the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution could grow over into a socialist revolution. In his *The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China*,* Chapter 2 ("The Chinese Revolution"), point 6, referring to the "prospects of the Chinese revolution", Mao wrote:

"After the victory of the revolution, a capitalist economy will have enough opportunities for developing in Chinese society, for the revolution will eliminate the obstacles to its development. This is easily pictured, and there is nothing surprising about it." He held, at the same time, that after the victory of the revolution there can merely be a "development of socialist elements".

The difference also consists in the following. In the Marxist-Leninist view, the decisive conditions for the growth of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic into a socialist revolution are, inside the country, hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution through the Communist Party and, on the international scene, assistance of the Soviet Union. At no time did Mao accept these decisive conditions. Why? Let us briefly recapitulate Mao's pertinent pronouncements and actions of the past few decades. This will help us to see why.

* *The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China* was prepared in 1939 by a worker of the Propaganda Department of the CC CPC by name of Yang Sung (Wu Shao-yi) and other comrades. Lo Fu and then I edited it, and corrected its mistakes. Then, it was shown to all the Politbureau comrades for their opinion. When it reached Mao, he did not return it. Shortly, Yang Sung "fell ill" and died in Yenan. A few years later, Mao included it in his *Selected Works*.

In an article, *The Coup in Peking and the Merchants* (July 1923), Mao described the bourgeoisie as the "leader" of the revolution.

In his *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan Province* (March 1927), he denied the need for an alliance between the peasants and the proletariat and for the hegemony of the proletariat in this alliance, while exaggerating the revolutionary role of the peasants.

In 1931 he maintained that "the Soviet movement in China is a purely peasant movement" and did not acknowledge the leading role of the proletariat and its vanguard, the Communist Party. For this reason, he denied the non-capitalist, that is, socialist perspective of the Chinese revolution, and called for a "peasant capitalism".

In his *On New Democracy* (January 1940), he rejected the non-capitalist perspective of the Chinese revolution. As I have already said, he called for a bourgeois-democratic republic with a "new-democratic" policy, economy and culture.

In October 1940 he publicly urged an alliance with Germany, Italy and Japan, and, inside the country, an alliance with the Japanese invaders, that is, a policy of national treason (*q.v.* Part III).

From the autumn of 1941 until the summer of 1945 he conducted the anti-communist and anti-Soviet "campaign for the rectification of style" and substituted Maoism for Leninism.

In August 1944, speaking to John Service, second secretary of the US Embassy in China, Mao said: "We do not expect Russian help ... Chinese and American interests are correlated and similar ... We should cooperate." To Harrison Forman, a US journalist, he said: "We are not striving for the social and political Communism of Soviet Russia. Rather, we prefer to think of what we are doing as something that Lincoln fought for in your Civil War: the liberation of slaves."

In April 1945 at the 7th CPC Congress, in his report, *On Coalition Government*, Mao said: "We have too little capitalism", and "the struggle for new democracy will still be long". He added: "Without the development of private capitalist and other economy the building of socialism is impossible". He came out against the correct point of view that at the moment of victory the bour-

geois-democratic revolution grows into a socialist revolution.

In March 1949, at the 2nd Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee, Mao voiced the opinion that after the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China it would still be necessary, for a long time, to follow "the policy of four sides and eight directions", including "equal observance of the interests of capitalists, as well as workers", and to build "the society of new democracy". He rejected socialist revolution and building socialism. Concerning foreign relations, he said "New China will not need to be recognised, at least in the first few years ... either by Britain or the United States, or by the USSR." Mao did not want China to enter the socialist camp.

In the article, *On the Democratic Dictatorship of the People* (June 1949), Mao said that no dictatorship of the proletariat can be established in China, and the alternative was a "democratic dictatorship of the people" as a "joint dictatorship of the working class, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie".

In the fifties Mao set out to subvert the socialist gains by the extreme "leftist" policy of "three red banners". And following the failure of his adventurist undertakings—the "big leap", "everybody smelts steel", and the people's communes—he said again: "In a backward country like China it will be impossible to build socialism for tens, even hundreds, of years".

In the sixties Mao embarked on the treacherous course of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism, of struggle against the world communist movement, of a counter-revolutionary coup, and of collusion with imperialism and other reactionary forces. Concealing his counter-revolutionary deeds behind such terms as "Marxism-Leninism", "socialism", "dictatorship of the proletariat", and the like, he began changing China's political image, clinging, as before, to his reactionary Maoist theory of "new democracy".

The real struggle of two lines is a struggle between the line of the Marxists-Leninists and the line of Mao Tse-tung in different periods of the Chinese revolution. I have already written about the main content of these two lines in *Lenin, Leninism, and the Chinese Revolution*, published in 1970 on the centenary of Lenin's birth.

Below is a comparison of the two different approaches to the question of periods in the Chinese revolution.

Mao Tse-tung divided the Chinese revolution into two stages and four periods. According to him, the first stage is a "new-democratic revolution", which consists of four periods, namely: 1) the period of the first civil war (1925-1927); 2) the period of the second civil war (1927-1937); 3) the period of the anti-Japanese war (1937-1945); 4) the period of the third civil war (1945-1949). The second stage consists of the socialist revolution, whose advent is indeterminate (see Hu Chiao-mu's pamphlet, *Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China*, written on Mao's direct instructions). It was not until after Liu Shao-chi, who returned from Moscow to Peking in the beginning of 1953, passed on the opinion of the CPSU leadership that "the establishment of the People's Republic of China marked the end of the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the beginning of the socialist revolution", and after a resolution on this score was adopted by the 4th Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee in February 1954, that Mao was compelled to recognise that the socialist stage of the Chinese revolution had begun.

This shows that Mao knows neither the criteria for dividing the Chinese revolution into stages, nor the criteria for setting periods. For him the form of revolutionary struggle, i.e. war, is the criterion for periods. He does not understand that the national or social content of the revolutionary struggle is the real criterion. I wrote about this in *Lenin, Leninism, and the Chinese Revolution*, showing that the Chinese revolution consists of five periods—first, the period of the revolution of the united national anti-imperialist front and preparations for the agrarian revolution (1924-1927); second, the period of the agrarian revolution and preparations for the united national anti-Japanese front (1927-1937); third, the period of the united national anti-Japanese front, the anti-Japanese national-revolutionary war, and preparations for winning the bourgeois-democratic revolution (1937-1945); fourth, the period of the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and its growth into socialist revolution (1945-1949); fifth, the period of socialist revolution and the building of socialism, which began with the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949.

It needs a special work to look into the periods of the Chinese revolution in greater detail.

Due to the fundamental differences between Maoism (or "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung") and Leninism, the third period of the "style rectification" campaign saw the main blow being directed, as before, at the Leninists in the CPC, first of all Wang Ming.

"Emergency salvation rallies" were called in the conference hall of the CC CPC in Yantsialin (attended by all Central Committee cadres, members and alternate members of the Politbureau, including Mao, members and alternate members of the Central Committee, delegates to the 7th CPC Congress present in Yenan, and others—all in all more than a thousand people). Before a meeting would begin, people specially appointed by the "commission for the rectification of style" made deprecatory remarks against Wang Ming, calling him "dogmatist", "running dog of the Russians", "traitor", and "counter-revolutionary". This, Mao hoped, would cow the audience into submission, and nobody would dare take Wang Ming's side. He was especially anxious that nobody should raise the subject of Wang Ming's poisoning, a fact that had been proved by the group of consultants. There was much talk about this at the time, and many people guessed that the poisoning was Mao's handiwork, which fact caused him considerable worry.

When Meng Ching-shu (member of the standing bureau of the Central Committee commission for work among women, and a delegate to the 7th CPC Congress), rebuffed the slanderers at one of these rallies and said that Wang Ming had been poisoned and his life was in danger, Mao's personal secretary Hu Chiao-mu got up and shouted:

"Why did you tell people that Wang Ming was poisoned by Chairman Mao?"

"Who did I tell this to?" Meng Ching-shu asked.

Li Kuo-hua* jumped up and cried:

"You said it to me."

"Where and when did I say it to you?" Meng Ching-shu asked.

* Li Kuo-hua was a Red Army soldier. In the thirties he studied in Moscow. At the time of "style rectification" and "emergency salvation" he was slandered. What he said at the rally was obviously said under compulsion.

"Last March, when Comrade Wang Ming was in a grave condition. I visited him at the Central Hospital. That was when you said it to me," Li Kuo-hua answered.

Meng Ching-shu said:

"At that time,* many people came to see Wang Ming every day. When you came Wang Ming was in a critical condition. The guards did not let you into the ward. Neither I nor Wang Ming could have seen you there. This can be confirmed by the guards. Now, I must ask you: how could you have known last March that Wang Ming was poisoned, let alone who had done it? The fact that Wang Ming was poisoned was established this summer by the group of consultants. Who poisoned Wang Ming? I am sure it was done by imperialists, national traitors, Kuomintang spies, Trotskyites, or similar scoundrels."

Mao sat with lowered head and crimson face in the centre of the front row. Po Ku, who was in the centre of the third row, stared at Meng Ching-shu with wide-open eyes, dreading that with her usual straightforwardness she might say everything she knew.

My guards wrote a note to the chairman of the meeting, confirming the fact that they had not allowed Li Kuo-hua to enter the ward and that he had not seen either Wang Ming or Meng Ching-shu.

Mao tried to prevail on people that Wang Ming was simulating illness. This attracted still more attention to my poisoning and to the question of who was the culprit.

At the same meeting, Meng Ching-shu said:

"It was said at the meeting today that the August First Appeal was written by Kang Sheng. The Appeal has long since become a historical Party document and one would think that there is no need for discussing who wrote it. But since it is being claimed that Kang Sheng wrote it, I want to ask him—has he the nerve to acknowledge that he wrote it?"

Kang Sheng lowered his head, and did not reply.

Meng Ching-shu continued:

"I ask all of you: must a Communist obey his conscience?"

Nobody dared reply, and she answered her own question:

* In 1942.

"I think he must. The August First Appeal was written by Wang Ming. In the beginning of June 1935, on the day he returned to Moscow after a vacation and treatment in Kislovodsk, he said to the comrades who had come to see him: 'The Japanese aggression in North China is expanding. The situation is tense. At the sanatorium in Kislovodsk I came to the conclusion that there must be a new document in the name of the CC CPC, in order to promote the united national anti-Japanese front policy.' On the following day he began writing the Appeal to All Compatriots Concerning Resistance to Japan and Salvation of the Homeland, which later came to be known as the August First Appeal. For three days in succession he worked on it until three in the morning, and on the fourth day added finishing touches. On the fifth day, a meeting of the CPC Comintern delegation was called to discuss the draft. The discussion continued for several days, with Wang Ming making a report on the draft, and then also the concluding remarks. A few comrades present in this hall took part in the meeting."

Now, the "claque" led by Li Fu-chun began howling. But Kao Tzu-li * got up and said:

"I took part in that meeting, and I also attended the 7th Congress of the Comintern. I heard Comrade Wang Ming's report and his concluding remarks, and clearly recall the discussion of the draft. I can tell...."

There were howls and shrieks. Kao Tzu-li was shouted down. But Mao's attempt to pass Kang Sheng off as the initiator of the united national anti-Japanese front policy fell through.

Thereupon, on Mao's instructions, a few speakers heaped insults on me and Meng Ching-shu. She rebuffed them. A few upright comrades wanted to speak in our defence, but none was given the floor.

Mao was worried. The moment Li Fu-chun closed the rally, he began upbraiding him: "The meeting was full of lowly interests. There was nothing instructive." In

* Alias Chou Ho-shen, head of the building administration in the government of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area. In 1933 he was sent to Moscow as a CPC delegate to the 7th Congress of the Comintern. Here he was elected member of the International Control Commission. Was at one time Minister of Agriculture of the Chinese Soviet Republic.

other words, he considered the anti-Wang Ming rally a failure. He had himself been in a delicate spot on some points, and was now forced to plan new steps against Wang Ming.

Soon, a second anti-Wang Ming rally was called.

This time, Mao instructed Lu Ting-i * to say from the rostrum that "the deserter must be shot". Lu Ting-i said that in wartime, in all ages, in all armies, deserters were shot; now, while the "style rectification" campaign was at its height, there were people who had the temerity to ask the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and the Comintern to send a plane for them and take them to the Soviet Union for treatment; this was an attempt to escape "style rectification"—sheer desertion, and deserters must be shot. Then, Lu Ting-i wrote an editorial, which appeared on the following day in *Chiehfangjihpao*. Lu Ting-i did not mention Wang Ming by name either at the rally or in the editorial, but the "tale" was quickly spread that Wang Ming was meant; the atmosphere thus created was one of fear and terror.

At another rally, Li Fu-chun suddenly got up and announced that Ko Ching-shih ** was a counter-revolutionary. Ko was instantly seized, tied up, put under house arrest, and ordered to write a "confession". On the following day, on Mao's orders, Liu Shao-chi summoned Ko, and told him: "We have acted against you because you knew Wang Ming in the twenties, took part in the struggle against the Li Li-sen line under his direction in 1930, and have been Wang Ming's deputy in the united front department of the Central Committee since 1939. The style rectification campaign has been going on a long time, but you have said nothing yet against Wang Ming. Everybody knows that you are an old YCLer and Communist, and Wang Ming's deputy. Since you have been branded a counter-revolutionary, people will be led to conclude that Wang Ming, too, is probably not as reliable as they thought."

* A bitter opponent of the Comintern, the Soviet Union and the "Moscow group" who had been closely connected with the Trotskyites in the twenties and thirties.

** Later, Ko Ching-shih was member of the Politbureau, Secretary of the CC CPC Shanghai Bureau, and mayor of Shanghai. In 1965 he died "suddenly" in Chengtu, where he had been summoned to accompany Mao on his vacation.

This is a vivid example of the cynicism of these people, and of how far they departed from the principles and style of behaviour adopted in Communist parties in trying to incite people against Wang Ming.

It was in this oppressive atmosphere of fear and terror that Mao sent Li Fu-chun, Peng Chen, Kao Kang and Lin Piao* to see Po Ku in Chinliangshan, where *Chiehfangjihpao* had its editorial offices (from the autumn of 1941 to the day of his death in 1946 Po Ku was editor-in-chief of *Chiehfangjihpao*). Referring to instructions they had received from Mao Tse-tung, they told Po Ku that he had to write "a confession reviling three", meaning, as Mao conceived the formula, "reviling himself, reviling Wang Ming, and reviling the Russians," where "reviling the Russians" meant reviling the Comintern and the Soviet Union. If Po Ku had refused, he would have been arrested and shot, and the press would report that he had been a counter-revolutionary. Later, Mao told me that Po Ku had long resisted the order to write a "confession". He wept all through the night, and did not give his consent until he was about to be tied up and led away. Mao admitted to me that he used the same method with Lo Fu and Yang Shang-kun to force them to write similar "confessions reviling three". Wang Chia-hsiang and Kai Feng were gravely ill in the latter half of the "style rectification" period, which prevented Mao from forcing "confessions" from them.

Mao also used strong-arm tactics against the chief members of the "group of empiricists"—Chou En-lai and Peng Teh-huai. But it was only after nearly two years of preparing and conducting the "style rectification" campaign, which was also directed against this pair, that Mao recalled Chou En-lai from Chungking in July 1943, while Peng Teh-huai was recalled from the battle zone in North China even later—November 1943. In other words, the hysterical nightmare of "emergency salvation" had already begun when they returned to Yen-an. They were completely unprepared, either politically or morally, for the abuse heaped on them at various rallies in the situation of "accomplished facts" that Mao had created.

As I have already said, Mao admitted to me on 18 December 1948 that he had been in the wrong at that time.

* Then commander of the 8th Route Army's 115th Division.

Speaking at the 2nd Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee in March 1949, I compared Mao's pamphlet *On New Democracy*, with how Leninism and the Comintern conceived the fundamental questions of the Chinese revolution. I maintained that Mao's concept differed from that of Leninism and the Comintern over its character, stages, motive forces, and the hegemon of the revolution, its perspectives, and the like. I demonstrated, in fact, that Mao's "thoughts" were contrary to Marxism-Leninism, upsetting the claim that they were "the sole guide" of the Communist Party of China. I called special attention to the two main conditions for the growth of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution (hegemony of the proletariat and assistance from the Soviet Union), and showed that Mao's "four reasons" why the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution could not grow into a socialist revolution (the existence of imperialism, the continuing agrarian revolution, undeveloped capitalism, and the involvement of the national bourgeoisie in the revolution) were groundless.

Also, I explained that in my article, "The Soviets in China as a Special Form of Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Peasantry" (*Communist International*, 1934), I had examined the Leninist propositions of the Comintern that the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution could grow into a socialist revolution. I stressed that this would occur the moment the bourgeois-democratic revolution won a decisive victory in China. I told the Plenum that the basic concepts presented in this article had been approved by the Comintern.

Mao did not dare, at that time and for many years later, to publish his report* to the 2nd Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee. Neither did he dare to demand that a resolution be adopted on his report.

Naturally, the talk he had with me in December 1948 and my speech at the 2nd Plenum had angered Mao. In his concluding remarks at the 2nd Plenum he rebuked me for continuing to oppose the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung", and said my speech was "full of poisons".**

* Mao's report, considerably altered, was first published in 1960, in the fourth volume of his *Selected Works*.

** When the Plenum closed, Mao stayed behind. I asked him: "What did you mean by my speech being full of poisons?" He said: "There were at least eight or ten poisonous points. First,

The "theses" of his concluding remarks were later circulated among Party members. One of them was: "How to help Comrade Wang Ming rectify his mistakes". This was a signal for a new anti-Wang Ming campaign.

On 16 March 1949 at 5 p.m., Mao visited me. (We lived then in the village of Hsipeipo, Pingshan county, Hopeh province.) He showed me the "confessions" of Po Ku, Lo Fu and Yang Shang-kun, and said I must also write a "confession reviling three", that is, reviling myself, reviling them (Po Ku, Lo Fu, Yang Shang-kun and others), and reviling the Russians. Thereupon, with obvious pride, Mao told me how he had forced Po Ku and the others to write their "confessions". Suddenly, he raised his voice: "If you don't write it, I'll treat you as I treated Po Ku." I categorically refused to do the absurd and improper thing he asked. I said it would be criminal, and warned him: "If you dare stain your hands with Wang Ming's blood, you will earn the reputation of counter-revolutionary and traitor to communism, which you will never be able to wash off." I also said: "Not only do I refuse to write, but also to read anything of the kind." I asked him to take the "confessions" away.

Crimson to his ears, Mao said: "Whether or not you write a confession is up to you to decide. I will leave

in my report there was no mention of Marxism-Leninism, Lenin, Stalin and the Comintern. Your speech, on the other hand, had so many quotations and references to Marxism-Leninism, and to Lenin, Stalin and the Comintern about the Chinese revolution that the comrades will think you are the only one who recognises them, and I do not recognise them. After your speech, during the lunch interval, I ordered portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin to be hung up in the hall. In my concluding remarks, to make up for my omission, I suggested that all comrades should study twelve books of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. But this will not wipe out the impression created by your speech. Is this not a poison? Second, my report to the Plenum gave no systematic explanation of the questions of the Chinese revolution. All I said was that the Chinese revolution had urban periods and rural periods, and that the revolutionary war would continue for another three to five years; I spoke about the current stage of the revolution and the political line, questions of home and foreign policy, and so on. In your speech, on the other hand, the questions of the Chinese revolution are presented as a system and are so comprehensively set out that it looked like a summing up of historical results. This created the impression that you, not I, were making the report to the Plenum. Was this not poison?" All in all, he listed "ten poisons". I provided explanations for each of them.

these three for you to read." I remained true to my statement and did not read them. Meng Ching-shu, who glanced through them, said: "The basic content of these 'confessions' of Po Ku, Lo Fu and Yang Shang-kun was unquestionably fabricated by Mao Tse-tung."

After I had so firmly refused to write a "confession reviling three", Mao devised new intrigues against me. On 26 October 1949, for example, he told the Politbureau to include "Point No. 9" (on Wang Ming) in its resolution, and on 9 June 1950 the 3rd Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee, also on his insistence, adopted a Decision on Comrade Wang Ming. The two decisions amounted to a demand that I should acknowledge the "mistakes of Wang Ming's political lines during the civil war and the anti-Japanese war" fabricated by Mao during the "style rectification" campaign. Though the decision of the 3rd Plenum said that "Comrade Wang Ming continues to refuse to repent his past mistakes", I was certain that my position was correct: the historical truth was on my side. The decision read: "The 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee has decided that Comrade Wang Ming must at long last fulfil the decision of the 2nd CC Plenum and deeply repent the commission of fundamental mistakes in his various articles, pamphlets and other documents written during the civil war and the war of resistance to Japan". Yet, there had been no decision of the 2nd CC Plenum demanding such a statement from me. The first I heard of such a demand was on 23 October 1949 from Liu Shao-chi, whom Mao had sent to me.

The talk with Liu Shao-chi sheds light on the situation in which Mao fabricated the "two lines of Wang Ming" and explains why he wanted me to write such a statement.

"Why did you write so prolifically during the civil war and the anti-Japanese war—several million words in all?" Liu asked me. "You wrote articles, reports and documents, and even a book on the struggle against the Li Li-sen line. Look around you, has anyone else in our Party written as much as you have? Nobody has. And since you wrote so much, Chairman Mao was able to take two phrases at random during the style rectification, and turn them into two opportunist lines. Is this a lot? One could take more phrases, and easily produce 20, 200 and 2,000 lines. That Chairman Mao asks you to write a statement is nothing but a point of organisational

procedure. He knows you will not write it. Mind you, even if you wrote it, it would be of no use. Chairman Mao can then say that everything you wrote is at variance with the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, so your writing the statement will be in vain."

Most of the comrades in the Central Committee knew that in the civil war and the anti-Japanese war Wang Ming represented the correct, Comintern line, and that it was Mao Tse-tung who, in both these periods, followed an incorrect political line and committed many fundamental mistakes. This is why, despite the denunciations and threats contained in the decisions of the Politbureau and the 3rd Central Committee Plenum, I was able (knowing that these decisions had been taken under Mao's pressure and were contrary to the facts and the truth of history) to continue defending the truth and denouncing the untruth, and not writing the statement.

Here is the text of the Decision on Comrade Wang Ming of the 3rd Plenum of the Seventh CC, taken on 9 June 1950:

"In view of the mistakes committed by Comrade Wang Ming during the civil war and the war of resistance to Japan, the 2nd Plenum of the Central Committee in February 1949 instructed Comrade Wang Ming to write a statement to the Politbureau. At that time Comrade Wang Ming said that he would honour this decision. But he is continuously deferring his promise though the Politbureau has issued reminders. On 23 October 1949, Liu Shao-chi was sent to talk to Comrade Wang Ming on behalf of the Politbureau. He told Comrade Wang Ming that he must respect the decision of the 2nd CC Plenum and that it is a misdemeanour on his part to delay matters and not write the statement. He said that Comrade Wang Ming must promptly produce the statement. On 26 October 1949, having heard Comrade Liu Shao-chi's account of his talk with Comrade Wang Ming, the Politbureau informed Comrade Wang Ming of the following: 'Comrade Wang Ming is obliged to obey the decision of the 2nd CC Plenum and, abiding by the general trend of the criticism expressed against him by comrades at the 2nd CC Plenum, and also by virtue of the oral consent given by him at the Plenum, must write the statement more promptly and submit it for study to the Politbureau.' On 6 November 1949, in a letter to the Chairman, Com-

rade Wang Ming said that he had written a letter concerning mistakes at the time of the civil war to the 7th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee on 20 April 1945, expressing his readiness completely to accept the Resolution on Some Points of History adopted by the 7th CC Plenum on 20 April 1945. Though he subsequently told the Chairman that he disagreed with this resolution, he refused to make any additional statements on the grounds that he had initially expressed his readiness to accept the Resolution. As for mistakes committed during the war of resistance to Japan, he declared his readiness to abide by the conclusions of the Central Committee, but refused to make any statement on this score.

"The 3rd CC Plenum has the impression that Comrade Wang Ming is still refusing to repent his past mistakes, that he is insincere towards the Central Committee, and holds that his failure to fulfil the decision of the 2nd Plenum and his reluctance to write a statement to the Politbureau constitute undisciplined behaviour.

"For this reason, the 3rd CC Plenum has decided that:

"Comrade Wang Ming must fulfil the decision of the 2nd CC Plenum. He must express his deep repentance of the fundamental mistakes contained in various articles, pamphlets and other documents which he wrote in the periods of the civil war and the war of resistance to Japan, proving thereby that he has deeply understood and admits his mistakes, and that he has truly corrected them in theory and in practice. As soon as he writes the statement, it must be immediately submitted for study to the Politbureau of the CC. If necessary, the Politbureau will forward it for discussion to the next CC Plenum."

The following explanations are in order.

1. It is not true that the 2nd CC Plenum, held in March 1949, took any decision instructing me "to write a statement to the Politbureau". It was in a one-page stencilled circular, "Theses of the Concluding Remarks at the 2nd Plenum of the CC (13 March 1949)", that Mao Tse-tung put down the following words under Point 6: "How to help Comrade Wang Ming rectify his mistakes."

2. The 3rd Plenum's Decision on Comrade Wang Ming of 9 June 1950 was forwarded to me through the CC Chancellery as late as 30 July. I had just returned

from Tientsin, where I was on a tour of inspection, and then I fell ill. Furthermore, I was involved in the preparations for the first all-China juridical conference, for which I was hurriedly writing a report and drawing up drafts concerning a criminal code. So, it was not until 17 August that I found time to write a letter to Mao Tse-tung, in which I asked him the following:

1) How much time am I given? I need time to look through all my articles, pamphlets and other documents written during the civil war and the war of resistance to Japan, and to draw conclusions.

2) I need the notes for my report to the December 1937 Politbureau meeting, and also my notebook, which were taken from me, as they were from others, by Wang Shou-tao, chief of the CC secretariat, on Mao's orders at the end of the Politbureau meeting, and which have not been returned.

3) Before the evacuation of Yen-an in 1947, my Wuhan files of *Hsinhuajihpao* and files of the Yen-an newspaper *Hsinchunghuapao*, and much other material had, on Mao's orders, been sent to Wayopao. All trace of them was lost. In my letter to Mao I demanded that they be returned to me or that a new set be given.

Though very busy at that time, and also ill and physically weak, I wanted to look through everything I had written before producing for the Party an honest summing up of its activity based on the true facts of history, which bore no resemblance to Mao's falsifications. But Mao did not reply to my letter. And on 25 October he suddenly arranged for my immediate departure to the Soviet Union.

3. The 3rd Plenum's Decision on Comrade Wang Ming says that I had written a letter to the 7th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee on 20 April 1945, expressing my readiness "completely to accept the Resolution on Some Points of History" adopted by the 7th Plenum.

As I have said before, I had been repeatedly poisoned between the beginning of October 1941 and the summer of 1943. This was done on Mao's orders. At that time, his "style rectification campaign" was at its height. When I was in a critical condition, Mao did not expect me to survive. But thanks to my stubborn resistance, to the support of many of my Party comrades and of Com-

rade Georgi Dimitrov, thanks to the good news from the Soviet Union (having recovered from its initial setbacks, the Soviet Red Army was on the counter-offensive), and thanks to the new treatment following the doctors' consultation in the summer of 1943, my health had begun to improve, though I was still bedridden and had frequent painful attacks.

Mao was planning to convene the 7th Congress of the CPC in April 1945. This was why the 7th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee was called on 20 April. But in the beginning of the month he had sent me the draft of the Resolution on Some Points of History, and asked me to study it. Then, twice he sent Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Jen Pi-shih and Chu Teh to speak to me, and once he came himself. I was urged to write a statement acknowledging the resolution and "repenting my mistakes". I refused.

Friends came to me, and we discussed my course of action. The day of the Soviet Union's final victory over fascist Germany was swiftly approaching. It was clear that even if I refused to recognise the resolution, Mao would hardly dare to expel me from the Party. But my comrades argued that, first, the Comintern had been dissolved and there was no longer an organisation before which I could plead my case. According to the Party Rules the minority was obliged to submit to the majority. The coming 7th Congress was being prepared under Mao's complete control. At present, I had neither opportunity nor physical strength to put my views to the Congress. Besides, the Congress would not be able to alter the resolution of the 7th CC Plenum. Second, my comrades said, people in the country and abroad had not yet fully understood the reactionary essence of Mao's "style rectification campaign".

A long struggle against Mao lay ahead, they said, and by preserving me they would preserve the truth of the Party and the leader of the anti-Mao struggle. If I were to refuse to acknowledge the 7th Plenum resolution, the 7th Congress would probably "adopt" an identical resolution, and if I were again to refuse, I could be expelled from the Party, making the struggle against Mao still more difficult.

These were the reasons why I told the 7th CC Plenum that I submitted to the Central Committee decision.

On 25 December 1945 I made a report, "On the Current Situation and the Tasks of the Party", at a meeting of cadres of the CC CPC Party committee, the Northwest Bureau, and the Party committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area. It was attended by more than 1,000 people. This report, which presented my idea of the right political course, was in content diametrically opposite to Mao's report to the 7th CPC Congress, "On Coalition Government".*

After I had finished my report, a few comrades came up to me and said: "As long as there are trees on the hill, there will be wood for the fire." And later, after my two-hour speech at the 2nd Plenum in March 1949, when I showed that Mao was in effect renouncing socialist revolution and the building of socialism, there were comrades who said to me: "Did you notice that everybody listened to you in complete silence for two hours? It is a long time since we heard you speak."

This was the first and also the last time since my poisoning that I took part in a CC plenum. Later, during my stay in Peking, I could not take part in CC plenums or the all-China Party Conference for reasons of health.

In view of the fact that following 20 April 1945 I did not write a statement and continued the anti-Mao struggle, Mao made the Politbureau and the 3rd Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee adopt the aforesaid decisions.

From November 1950 to November 1953 I was in the Soviet Union.

Then, from 9 December 1953, when I returned to Peking, until 30 January 1956, when I again left Peking for Moscow, there were many other episodes in Mao's persecution of Wang Ming and Wang Ming's struggle against Mao Tse-tung. Let me describe some of them.

After Mao's mistakes—his rejection of socialist revolution and the building of socialism—were criticised at the end of 1952, many people began to understand that the line I had backed at the 2nd Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee (the bourgeois-democratic revolution grows into a socialist revolution the moment it wins throughout the country) was correct, while the

* See Wang Ming, *Lenin, Leninism and the Chinese Revolution*, Moscow, 1970.

line imposed by Mao at the same Plenum (after victory the revolution will for a long time follow the road of "new democracy", that is, the road of capitalist development) was incorrect. This was why, for a time, Mao had stopped asking me for my statement. But at the all-China Party Conference in March 1955 he read out a letter from a certain Fu Chen-sheng addressed to Mao and the presidium of the conference. The author of the letter heaped slander on me.* I was bedridden at the time. Not until 30 January 1956, through the intervention of Liu Shao-chi and other comrades, including a few Soviet comrades, was I taken from Peking Hospital to a Soviet plane, and on 1 February again arrived in Moscow, so dear to all of us.

4) Most Party leaders were declared "counter-revolutionary suspects"

Those leading members of the Central Committee, such as Chou En-lai (member of the Politbureau and Central Committee Secretary), Chu Teh (member of the Politbureau and commander of the 8th Route Army), Jen Pi-shih (member of the Politbureau), Teng Fa (member of the Politbureau), and Peng Teh-huai (alternate member of the Politbureau and deputy commander of the 8th Route Army),** who had been accused of "empiricism" and "dogmatism" during Mao's "style rectification" campaign, were charged with "counter-revolutionary activity" during the "emergency salvation" period. At various meetings people were prompted to cast slander at them. Even a renegade like Kang Sheng (member of the Politbureau), who capitalised on anything he could and for whom no misdeed was too vile, and a wily operator like Chen Yun (member of the Politbureau and alternate member of the CC Secretariat), who always held his nose to the wind, had admitted to being "wicked empiricists" during the preparatory period of "style rectification". It was only after they had done so that Mao included them among the campaign officials. Out of the whole Politbureau and Central Committee Secretariat only two men remained above criticism—Mao Tse-tung

* The letter was given to me to read, and I have a copy of it.

** Here and further we give only their chief duties.

(member of the Politbureau and CC Secretary), who himself asserted his absolute "purity and infallibility" and took it upon himself to persecute and repress others, and Liu Shao-chi (alternate member of the Politbureau and Secretary of the CC CPC Central China Bureau), whom Mao employed extensively for his own ends. Everybody was ordered and expected to speak of these two only in praise.

The unlawful acts committed by Mao during the "rectification of style" and the "emergency salvation" were not—and, of course, could not be—subject to discussion or approval at Politbureau meetings or CC plenums. From the beginning of the "style rectification" campaign Mao had completely ignored the Party's leading bodies—the Politbureau, Secretariat, and Central Committee. He formed and personally controlled a central commission for the conduct of the style rectification campaign, and issued orders and instructions in its name and as chairman of the CC CPC Military Council. Relying for brute force on the guard regiment that was directly subordinated to him, he committed all sorts of lawless and evil acts. This continued in the subsequent period. Upon launching the notorious "cultural revolution", he completely ignored all the leading bodies of Party and state, and formed a "group for the affairs of the cultural revolution", which operated under his personal direction. As before, he issued commands and orders in the name of this group and as chairman of the CC CPC Military Council. Backed by a section of the army which he had misguided, and on the "red guards", he thus accomplished a counter-revolutionary coup. The "style rectification" campaign was, therefore, in everybody's opinion, Mao's dress rehearsal of the "cultural revolution". And this description of it is, of course, correct.

4. THE FOURTH PERIOD—"SELF-REFUTATION AND REHABILITATION"

1) The reasons for the "self-refutation and rehabilitation" campaign

In this period (summer of 1944-spring of 1945) Mao Tse-tung was compelled to proclaim a campaign of "self-refutation and rehabilitation". And here is why.

The continuously advancing Soviet troops were about to clinch the final victory over Nazi Germany. Yet the vast majority of Party cadres and Party and YCL members had been branded "counter-revolutionaries". It was impossible to distinguish between real and false enemies. Out of the thousand CC CPC cadres more than 900 had been declared "counter-revolutionaries". Even pupils of the Yen-an Primary School, the children of high-ranking cadres, were among their number. In Yen-an and other liberated areas, officials in charge of "style rectification among the masses" used to summon the peasants of a village, to line them up and order them to confess to being "counter-revolutionaries", "enemy spies" or "national traitors". Those who "confessed" were allowed to go home; those who refused were subjected to processing—hung up by their arms, beaten, and put under guard. So, the vast majority of the local population, irrespective of sex and age, had "owned up" to being "counter-revolutionaries" or "enemy spies" or "national traitors". And, naturally, most of the leading cadres and rank-and-file Party and YCL members, and also people outside the Party, were shocked and disgusted.

The campaign of "self-refutation and rehabilitation" was organised on the following lines.

At a meeting of the Central Commission for the Rectification of Style, Mao said that Wang Ming and some other leaders of the Central Committee, and many top-ranking cadres of the Party, government and army, had committed dogmatic or empiricist mistakes and followed "left" or right lines. These mistakes, he said, could not be refuted, and the people who had committed them could not be rehabilitated. Yet, he added: "There are now no politically unclear questions concerning these people, that is, there is no suspicion of counter-revolution, betrayal, or any other type of political unreliability. All charges of this kind made against them may now be self-refuted."

He then said that those who had been declared "counter-revolutionaries", "enemy spies" or "national traitors" were entitled to "self-refute" their previous "confessions" and would thereupon be "rehabilitated".

Those who were in charge of "style rectification" and "emergency salvation" were ordered to "summon" and

persuade all those who had undergone "rectification" and persecution to refute their confessions, so that they could be relieved of the labels of "counter-revolutionary", "enemy spy", "national traitor", and the like. They would thus regain their freedom and win the opportunity for being rehabilitated. As a result, all those who had confessed "crimes" wrote "self-refutations", whereupon the "style rectification commission" immediately absolved them of "counter-revolutionary" and other "offenses". Mao maintained that all the injustices of the campaign stemmed from the policy of "compulsion, confession, and confidence" * followed by Kang Sheng, who had failed to observe the "nine instructions" issued to him by Mao, and, in particular, the principle of "execute no one, arrest only a few". (Kang Sheng later complained that he had never heard of any nine instructions.) Thus Mao unconsciously admitted that very many people had been killed and that the majority had been imprisoned.

It has been estimated in various quarters that a minimum of 50,000-60,000 people were killed in the "style rectification" campaign, while the number of people arrested defies calculation. And here is another, bitter and appalling fact. Obeying Mao's order of "emergency salvation", Jao Shu-shi (acting secretary of the CC CPC Central China Bureau and political commissar of the New 4th Army) declared the several tens of thousands of young men and women who had come from various parts of the country to the liberated areas in Central China to take part in the anti-Japanese war and gain revolutionary knowledge, to be "enemy spies", "national traitors" and "counter-revolutionaries", though many of them were Party or YCL members of long standing. Expelled from the liberated areas, these young people fell into the hands of the Japanese occupation forces or their puppets, and were executed.

In the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area Mao incited local cadres against cadres who had come from elsewhere. As a result, many of the latter were killed, maimed or beaten. Later, when the dust had settled,

both the local cadres and the comrades from other localities were equally bitter about the whole thing, and equally sorry.

2) The so-called policy of magnanimity

At the height of the "self-refutations" and "rehabilitations", Mao ordered his security agencies to carry out a "policy of magnanimity", urging the inmates of Yen-an prison—murderers, robbers, real counter-revolutionaries, national traitors, enemy spies, and the like—to "refute" their earlier testimony. Following this, they were all released. Dr. Chin Mao-yao,* too, who had been nominally serving his sentence (for poisoning Wang Ming) in the Social Department of the CC CPC, lost no time to "refute" his previous evidence. In short, a man who was supposed to "atone for his guilt by labour" became a man of "merit". He was allowed to go free and was at once appointed treating physician to Mao Tse-tung and members of the CC CPC Politbureau. After the liberation of Peking, Chin was made deputy chief of Peking Hospital, which had been set aside for leaders of the Party, government and army, and for other top-echelon cadres. Though in 1952 the health department of the CC CPC Military Council was compelled, due to numerous protests, to dismiss Chin from his office in Peking Hospital, he was at once appointed chief of the 2nd Central Hospital, and according to *Jenminjihpao* reports (12, 16 and 18 February 1973), is now a high-ranking official of the Health Ministry.

* As mentioned earlier, Chin Mao-yao had confessed to me that Li Fu-chun had on Mao's instructions ordered him to poison me. Neither I nor he could at that time reveal this secret. A specially organised "Chin Mao-yao tribunal", chaired by Liu Shao-chi and including Kang Sheng and Li Fu-chun, ruled: "Chin Mao-yao has confessed that he poisoned Wang Ming on the instructions of the chairman of the Kuomintang Red Cross, a person named Chu, who belongs to the Chen Li-fu group". Thereupon, the tribunal provisionally sentenced him to five years imprisonment. But the ruling also said: "In pursuance of Chairman Mao's policy of magnanimity, Chin Mao-yao shall be allowed to continue his practice as physician during the period of imprisonment in order to atone for his guilt by labour." During the "self-refutation and rehabilitation" campaign Chin Mao-yao "refuted" his earlier testimony, saying that "he had not deliberately poisoned Wang Ming" and that this had happened by an oversight.

* "Compulsion" to confess, "confession" under pressure, and "confidence" in that the evidence obtained by compulsion was true.

5. THE FIFTH PERIOD—"SUMMING UP"

During this period (spring and summer of 1945) Mao Tse-tung summed up the results of the four-year campaign of "rectifying style" in the ideological, political, and organisational spheres.

1) The ideological and political results

The ideological and political results were summed up first. They were defined chiefly in the Resolution on Some Points of History written by Mao and adopted by the 7th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, and in the instructions concerning the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" in the General Principles of the Party Rules adopted by the 7th CPC Congress. The notorious 7th Plenum Resolution was the first document in which the history of the Party was openly falsified. Below is the basic content of this Resolution:

1. It proclaimed the "great role" played by Mao Tse-tung and the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung"* in the history of the CPC. The CPC, it said, had always relied on "Mao's thoughts" and there had always been the "correct line of Mao Tse-tung" in the Party.

2. It said that the CPC owed all its achievements in 24 years to Mao's leadership and the implementation of his "thoughts", whereas all the faults and mistakes were ascribed to others.

3. It said that the political lines of the 4th and 5th plenums of the Sixth Central Committee (January 1931 and January 1934) were "left-opportunist" lines.

4. It said that the Tsunyi conference had rectified the "left"-opportunist line of the above two plenums and established "the correct leadership of Mao Tse-tung" in the CPC.

5. It said that Mao represented the correct line in the Soviet areas, and Liu Shao-chi represented the correct line in the white areas, and the like.

* During the "style rectification" campaign Mao used Marxism as a cover; actually, he opposed Leninism. This is why the original draft of the Resolution said: "Maoism is a blend of the general truths of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution". The second draft was produced at the time when the Soviet Army had already reached the approaches to Berlin, and the word "Marxism" was replaced by "Marxism-Leninism", and "Maoism" by "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung".

~~The Resolution was never published in the press.~~

And it is in order to note that the Resolution of the 7th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee published in the fifties in Mao's *Selected Works*, though dated 20 April 1945, was in fact an entirely new text. It was falsified for the benefit of Joseph Stalin and members of the CC CPSU.

For example:

1. Throughout the "style rectification" campaign Mao indulged in all kinds of anti-Soviet slander, completely negating the great contribution of Leninism and the Comintern to the Communist Party of China and the Chinese revolution. But since the Soviet Army had by then already defeated Hitler Germany, Mao did not dare to write his slanders against the Comintern into the Resolution. He simply did not mention Leninism and the Comintern in the 1945 Resolution. The Resolution published in the fifties mentions Lenin and the Comintern, and even gives the Comintern concept precedence in relation to the basic issues of the Chinese revolution, adding that Mao's opinion coincided with it. It maintains, quite groundlessly, that Mao "developed the teaching of Lenin and Stalin on the questions of colonies and semi-colonies, and the teaching of Stalin on the questions of the Chinese revolution".

2. The original Resolution of the forties claimed that the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" were the sole guide of the Communist Party of China and of the Chinese revolution. The Resolution published in the fifties does not even have the term "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung". It says: "The ideas of Marxism-Leninism as represented by Comrade Mao Tse-tung".

3. The so-called "third 'left'-opportunist line" and its comparison with the line of Mao Tse-tung, and the "importance" and "role" of the Tsunyi conference—all this was mentioned in so many words in the original Resolution, whereas the Resolution of the fifties contained a more thorough falsification. There are also other differences in the two texts.

Last but not least, these two resolutions, though differing from one another in content, have one identical feature, namely: not a word is said in them about the all-round support and aid rendered to the Communist Party of China and the Chinese revolution by the CPSU and the Soviet Union.

In sum, the Resolution concocted by Mao in the forties with the purpose of falsifying the history of the CPC, was itself subjected to falsification in the fifties. In years to come, in other times and other circumstances, Mao will not balk at new falsifications of this Resolution for the sake of some personal aim. Ever since the "style rectification" campaign he has "distinguished himself"—for self-aggrandizement and to attack others—in falsifications: he falsified history, fabricated "facts", counterfeited documents and writings. For this he resorted to "covert intrigues" and "overt intrigues".* In short, Mao Tse-tung is an adroit and experienced manager of the firm *Mao and Co.* specialising in all sorts of falsifications. But past experience shows that truth is always truth, and untruth always untruth. The truth cannot become an untruth any more than an untruth can become the truth. One can deceive people, but this only for a time. The truth is immutable. And no matter how much ink and energy Mao expends, he will never succeed in changing the facts of the history of the CPC. His exertions only emphasise his disgrace.

With a "sword" in one hand and "Mao's thoughts" in the other, Mao compelled the 7th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee to adopt his wholly false Resolution on Some Points of History; then, with a "sword" in one hand and this Resolution in the other, he compelled the 7th Congress of the CPC to write in the General Principles of the Party Rules that the CPC "is guided in all its work by the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung".

Mao hoped that with a "sword" in one hand and the General Principles of the Party Rules in the other, he would then substitute the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" for Marxism-Leninism, and that nobody would ever again dare to go against Mao's "thoughts", line and pol-

* At the 2nd Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee, Mao said: "According to Wang Ming the style rectification campaign was an intrigue. I say that it was not a covert intrigue, but an overt intrigue. I said publicly that I want to dismiss Wang Ming and take his place, and therefore wrote the Resolution on Some Points of History. I shall still write history. How can this be described as a covert intrigue? I see it only as an overt intrigue." I asked: "What did you mean when you said you wanted to take my place? I was not the general secretary." Mao replied: "Po Ku and Lo Fu were general secretaries only nominally. After the 4th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, Wang Ming was, to all intents and purposes, the Party's commander-in-chief."

icy. The facts have upset his plans. Though conditions became more intolerable, the true Marxists-Leninists continued their struggle against Mao after the 7th CPC Congress. In assessing the political situation and the Party's tasks after victory in the anti-Japanese war; in setting the course of the agrarian reform; in estimating the situation during the war against Chiang Kai-shek, and in the question of the bourgeois-democratic revolution growing into a socialist revolution at the moment of its victory—on all these points Mao committed serious mistakes, and invariably encountered firm resistance on the part of Marxists-Leninists. Thanks to the assistance of the CC CPSU and the course of events at home and on the international scene, the Party finally succeeded in rectifying Mao's erroneous political line and principles.

The 4th Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee (February 1954) criticised and corrected the political line that had renounced the socialist way.

Mao had followed his incorrect line for five years (after the 2nd Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee in 1949). His mistake concerning the basic question of the Chinese revolution was shown to repeat Trotsky's concept of "permanent revolution" and Chen Tu-hsiu's concept of "two-phased" revolution. The "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" suffered a defeat.

Furthermore, the fight against the personality cult and its consequences begun by the 20th Congress of the CPSU had a favourable effect on the climate in the CPC. Mao was compelled to consent to expunging the principle concerning the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" from the General Principles of the Party Rules. The Rules adopted by the 8th CPC Congress (September 1956) had the following formula: "The Communist Party of China is guided in its activity by Marxism-Leninism".

But Mao, that extreme individualist, careerist and intriguer, would not abandon his designs.

His "cultural revolution", in substance a military counter-revolutionary coup, completely wrecked the Party, its Rules, and the decisions of the 8th CPC Congress. The Rules adopted at the Mao-inspired 9th Congress extol the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" even more perversely than before. He uses these Rules to combat Marxism-Leninism.

We are deeply convinced that this state of affairs is temporary. Soon, the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people will throw out the Rules of the 9th and 10th congresses together with all the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung". All-conquering Marxism-Leninism will triumph on Chinese soil for good.

2) The "organisational conclusions"

In the wake of the ideological "summing up" came organisational decisions. Though no members or alternate members of the Politbureau, CC Secretariat or Central Committee were expelled from these leading bodies during the "style rectification" campaign, it was clear from the elections at the 7th Congress and the 1st Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee what "organisational conclusions" Mao would now put into effect. To befuddle the Congress delegates and Party rank-and-file, Mao repeatedly declared before the opening of the 7th Congress that the purpose of the "style rectification" had been "to achieve unity on a new basis flowing from the wish for unity after passing through struggle".

To create the impression that the whole Party was "united", Mao resorted to all kinds of stratagems. For example, about half an hour before the official opening of the Congress, he came to me, approached my bed, and said with all marks of courtesy:

"Comrade Wang Ming, on behalf of all the delegates, the Central Committee, the Politbureau and me personally, I beg you to attend the 7th National Congress of our Party, which will open presently."

"I am ill. As you see, I cannot get up from my bed," I replied. "How can I attend the Congress?"

"Two of the best porters have come with me. Let me ask Comrade Meng Ching-shu to help you dress and you will be taken there in a sedan-chair," Mao said with the same polite mien.

"I can be taken there, but I can't stay a long time," I said.

"Can you stay for about 15 minutes?" Mao asked. "Just for the opening ceremony, and better still if you stay a bit longer to hear part of my report. Comrade Wang Ming, I beg you to come. Our 7th Congress is a congress of unity. Your presence will make this clear. I have also invited Comrade Wang Chia-hsiang and sent

a sedan-chair to his house. He will have arrived by the time you come. Let me go and tell the members of the Politbureau and the delegates: 'I have invited Comrades Wang Ming and Wang Chia-hsiang. This makes our congress truly a congress of unity.' I shall go now. The Congress expects both of you to come. It will not open until you come."

When Wang Chia-hsiang and I were carried into the hall, Mao mounted the steps to the stage, made a brief speech, and opened the Congress. A presidium was elected, and the agenda announced. All this took about 15 minutes. When Liu Shao-chi announced that Mao would begin his political report, I asked to be taken out of the hall.

But even in these 15 minutes I saw that the 7th Congress bore no resemblance to a congress of unity. This was clear from how members of the presidium took their seats when the list of 15 names was read. Mao was alone on the stage and waved his arms vigorously, inviting them to join him. Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, and Jen Pi-shih ascended the stage and stood behind the long table. Meanwhile, the other ten members of the presidium kept their seats in the hall (Chen Yun, Kang Sheng, Peng Teh-huai and Chang Wen-tien, who were to be re-elected to the Politbureau; Kao Kang and Peng Chen, who were to be elected members of the Central Committee and Politbureau for the first time; Lin Po-chu and Tung Pi-wu, who were to be elected members of the Politbureau for the first time; and Ho Lung and Hsu Hsiang-chien, who were to be elected members of the Central Committee for the first time). Now, gesturing vehemently, Mao invited them to the platform. They came one by one, seemingly embarrassed, walking slowly to the corner on the right and seating themselves beside the wall at a distance from the presidium table. They were thus hidden from view even to delegates seated in the front rows.

Meanwhile, at the front of the stage, where the above-mentioned five stood beside the presidium table, Mao Tse-tung wandered from one to the other, while the rest, their faces red from embarrassment, shuffled about and prodded each other like children at a party. They did not know yet where each was expected to sit.

Before the "style rectification" campaign, Liu Shao-

chi had occupied a more modest place in the Party than the other three, and he was embarrassed to take the seat next to Mao's. Chou En-lai, Chu Teh and Jen Pi-shih (especially Chou En-lai) had been variously insulted and persecuted during the "style rectification" campaign and, of course, did not know what seats they were assigned.

At long last, Mao seated them as follows: Liu Shao-chi in second place, Chou En-lai in third, Chu Teh in fourth, and Jen Pi-shih in fifth. All five took their seats simultaneously.

The vast majority of the delegates showed no special emotions. Watching these unseemly seating arrangements, each delegate naturally formed his own opinion, observing the proceedings with a sense of estrangement.

Such strange goings-on had not been seen at any previous congress of our Party. This small episode was a reflection of the prevailing disarray.

During the "election" to the leading bodies, Mao again resorted to double-dealing. He said to the delegates: "Comrade Wang Ming was not only guilty of big mistakes, but has also performed great services. It will be a good thing to elect him to the Seventh Central Committee of the Party."

Li Fu-chun, following Mao's instructions, manipulated the elections. Among other things, he said to the delegates: "In the case of people like Wang Ming, we must follow the policy of 'shaving the bamboo'. This time let's 'shave off' his membership in the Politbureau and CC Secretariat, and leave him in the CC. Otherwise people inside and outside the Party, at home and abroad, will be confused."

The "organisational conclusions" flowing from the "style rectification" campaign mainly affected "elections" to the Party's leading bodies at the 7th CPC Congress and the 1st CC Plenum, both of which were rigged by Mao Tse-tung. Out of the seven chief members of the "Moscow dogmatic group", as Mao called it, Wang Ming and Po Ku were not re-elected either to the Politbureau or the CC Secretariat; Lo Fu (Chang Wen-tien), though not re-elected to the Secretariat, was re-elected to the Politbureau thanks to his "services" in the "Mao-Lo bloc" at the Tsunyi conference; Wang Chia-hsiang and

Kai Feng were not re-elected alternate members of the Politbureau; the former was elected alternate member of the CC and the latter not even that. Yang Shang-kun and Chu Jui were not re-elected alternate members of the CC. The only member of the Politbureau of working-class origin, Teng Fa, was not even elected to the Central Committee. Mao explained: "Teng Fa did not want to say a single bad word against Wang Ming and Chou En-lai; therefore, he is a dogmatist and empiricist". But there was a deeper reason for Mao's attitude towards Teng Fa: he was always disdainful and hostile towards leaders and cadres of working-class background. For example, he was annoyed by even the mention of Hsiang Ying, also of working-class origin, who was a member of the Politbureau and deputy commander of the New 4th Army. He simply could not bear Hsiang Ying. In January 1941, Hsiang Ying died tragically during the events provoked by Mao in the south of Anhwei. As for the other ex-members and alternate members of the Politbureau, all of them though re-elected bore the stigma of "empiricist", "dogmatist", and the like.

An "exceptional" person appeared in the Party's leading bodies, usurping the post of Central Committee chairman. This was Mao Tse-tung the incomparable, who thought himself the resurrected Yanwang (god of death). With a "sword" in one hand and the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" in the other, he strutted about, perfect in all respects, the "supreme ruler of mortals".

There also appeared an "especially influential" person. This was Liu Shao-chi, made a member of the Politbureau and CC Secretariat. With a trumpet in his left hand and a writing-brush in his right, he assiduously sounded the praises of Mao and Mao's "thoughts".

By this time the absolute majority of cadres and Party members had been branded "dogmatists", "empiricists", and the like. Their forced "confessions" to "counter-revolutionary activity" were filed away in the social or organisational departments of the Central Committee and could be dug up at a moment's notice with enough "evidence" for seizing anyone of them "by the pigtails".

This was how Mao undermined the Marxist-Leninist pillars of the Communist Party of China.

3) The results in questions of "style"

In conclusion, a "summing up" was also made in questions of "style of work". Though no resolutions were written on this score, strident calls resounded during the "style rectification" campaign for people to "learn the correct style of Mao Tse-tung" and fight the old "incorrect style". Now everybody knows that Mao's style is nothing but a blend of the despotic style of emperors and martinets and the style of a declassé gang chief—in short, the style of an extreme individualist and narrow "great Han Celestial Empire" nationalist. The style Mao opposed, the style that had always prevailed in the CPC, was the style of Communists and exponents of proletarian internationalism.

If we now look at the fate of the main representatives of "dogmatism" and "empiricism", those who had been persecuted during the "style rectification", we shall see clearly that "style rectification" was a dress rehearsal of the "cultural revolution".

Po Ku (Ching Pang-hsien) and Teng Fa died in a plane crash flying from Chungking to Yenan in an American transport on 8 April 1946.

Chu Jui, who had been artillery commander of the People's Liberation Army at the beginning of the second CPC-KMT revolutionary civil war, was killed in a mine explosion during a tour of inspection of gun emplacements near Changchun in 1947. The mine had been deliberately planted.

In 1955, shortly before the CPC National Conference, Kai Feng died suddenly after a meal on having come home from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Mao was known to have feared that he would speak in defence of Kao Kang at the conference.

In June 1966, at the very beginning of the so-called cultural revolution, Yang Shang-kun was seized by "red guards" on Mao's order. A dunce cap was placed on his head, his face was smeared with soot, and an inscription was hung round his neck, saying: "Agent of the Soviet revisionists, counter-revolutionary revisionist black bandit, traitor", and the like. He was beaten to death during a "red guard" rally.

In 1958, Lo Fu (Chang Wen-tien) was persecuted for having joined Peng Teh-huai and others in criticising

Mao's specious "policy of three red banners". During the "cultural revolution" the "red guards" tormented and beat him brutally. His later fate is unknown. "Red guards" also tormented Wang Chia-hsiang. As for me (Wang Ming), ever since the "style rectification" campaign Mao has been slandering me in the press and at meetings as the chief exponent of what he called left and right opportunism. In the early sixties, when Mao came out into the open against the Soviet Union and sought to split the world communist movement, I was accused of being a "pro-Soviet revisionist". The attacks in the press and at rallies did not stop for a minute. When the "cultural revolution" erupted, huge posters appeared in Peking and other large cities, saying: "Down with the agent of the Soviet revisionists, the counter-revolutionary black bandit, the big traitor Wang Ming". I was often the chief target of attacks in the *Jenminjhpao*, *Chiehfangchiunpao*, and the journal *Hungchi*. My wife, Meng Ching-shu, who had studied in the Soviet Union and has for many years actively combated Maoism, was also a target of attack. On Mao's orders "red guards" desecrated the remains of my father, Chen Pin-chih,* buried in the Papaoshan Cemetery of revolutionaries in Peking, ransacked my house, and beat my more than 80-year-old stepmother, Huang Lien-fang,** almost to death. "Red guards" threw her into the street, and burned or otherwise destroyed dozens of my manuscripts, and my library.

As for the chief "empiricists", Peng Teh-huai earned Mao's hostility for urging the armed forces to learn from the Soviet Union and wanting to build the People's Liberation Army into a modern force of national defence with Soviet cooperation and aid. In 1958 he spoke out against Mao's reckless "three red banners" policy, and was brutally assailed. In 1959 he was officially dismissed from the post of Defence Minister, and, in effect, put under house arrest. In December 1967 Mao sent a

* He had lived a hard life full of privations. For his participation and the participation of his sons and daughter in the revolutionary movement, he served five terms in Kuomintang prisons, where he was tortured. The last time he had come out of prison shortly before the liberation of his native Tsinchai county in Anhwei province.

** She was a housewife and came from a humble peasant family.

planeful of "red guards" to Chengtu to seize Peng Teh-huai and bring him to Peking. According to some sources he was killed by the "red guards", and according to others he was imprisoned. In any case, his fate is unknown.

The only one to survive was Chou En-lai. When the "cultural revolution" broke out, "red guards" heaped insults on him and threatened to "burn him alive". Then, Mao changed his mind and kept him on as premier of the State Council to use him as the all-enduring, obedient and hard-working official that he was (even in the thirties, Mao had nicknamed Chou En-lai "hard-working donkey").

Though the 7th Congress was said to have been a summing up of the results of the "style rectification campaign", the campaign continued. Mao kept cadres summoned from different parts of the country in the Party School premises in Yen-an, saying, "There is nothing for them to do at home. Let's wait until next summer, when US forces land in North China and assist the 8th Route Army. Then they will have their hands full at home". His true purpose, however, was to continue their "brainwashing". Not until after 9 August 1945, when the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, did Mao hastily despatch cadres to various regions. At that time, many of them said: "Our Soviet elder brothers have killed two birds with one stone: not only have their troops liberated our five provinces (the three northeast provinces, Jehol, and Chahar) and tens of millions of our compatriots, but have also saved us from concentration camp and from 'style rectification'." These words, though spoken in jest, were true.

The "style rectification" campaign had continued for four years and its consequences were immediately felt; the harm it caused the Communist Party of China and the Chinese revolutionary movement in ideology and politics, organisational matters, and style, was truly incalculable. It created very grave difficulties for the CPC in the succeeding revolutionary process.

It is now clear that the "rectification of style" campaign launched and directed personally by Mao in the forties, a reactionary, in essence anti-Leninist, anti-communist, anti-Soviet and anti-people campaign, set a dangerous precedent, followed by a succession of other cam-

paigns—"struggle against right elements", "socialist ideological education", "four purges", "struggle against revisionism", "learn from the Liberation Army", "educate successors", and the like. In substance all of them were the same. Furthermore, the "style rectification" was a dress rehearsal for the "cultural revolution" launched on Mao's personal initiative and under his personal command in the sixties. This "cultural revolution" was, in effect, a counter-revolutionary coup.

No book, however large, would suffice for a full description of the violence and terror, plots and intrigues, the suffering and anguish of the victims of "style rectification", and of the fortitude and courage of those who resisted it during four years. The facts I have cited here are no more than a bare outline of a tragic picture. But I hope it will give the reader an idea of the reactionary and criminal nature of Mao's "style rectification campaign" and convince him that it was a dress rehearsal for the counter-revolutionary military coup of the sixties.

Lastly, it is in order to stress that during the "style rectification", Mao falsified the history of the CPC. To this, in fact, he attached as much importance as he did to the campaign itself. It was only in the conditions of the campaign that he could falsify the history of the CPC, just as it was only by falsifying CPC history that he could launch such a campaign. These two factors were interdependent and mutually conditioned: one "helped" the other, and each was the cause and effect of the other. In this way, using two "poisoned arrows", Mao launched out on his career of usurper of Party leadership. This book presents only the main facts concerning Mao's falsification of CPC history. Much additional research is needed to pinpoint the many other falsifications.

III THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND THE MAOIST BID FOR COOPERATION WITH IMPERIALISM

1. "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" IN NAME AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY COUP IN SUBSTANCE

In the summer of 1966, under the flag of a "cultural revolution", Mao launched a counter-revolutionary coup directed against the CPC and the people of China, and against the Soviet Union and the world communist movement.

The chief objective of this coup was to substitute the counter-revolutionary "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" for revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and to make them the sole basis for the country's internal and external political guidelines and policies. *hark hark.*

In home policy, Mao used military force to smash the great and glorious Communist Party of China and to suppress the talented, hard-working, and revolutionary people of China. Most of the members of the CC CPC Politbureau were maliciously slandered and repressed (Liu Shao-chi, Peng Teh-huai, Tao Chu, Ho Lung, Li Chin-chuan, Peng Chen, Tan Chen-lin, Ulanfu, Chang Wen-tien *alias* Lo Fu, Lu Ting-i, and Po Yi-po) or harassed (Chu Teh, Chen Yi, Hsu Hsiang-chien, and Nieh Jung-chen). Mao Tse-tung also dealt ruthlessly with almost all the members of the CPC Secretariat—Wang Chia-hsiang, Tan Chien, Huang Ko-cheng, Lo Jui-ching, Hsi Chung-hsun, Wang Jen-chung, Liu Ning-i, Yang Shang-kun, Hu Chiao-mu, and Liu Lan-tao. Harrowing torment was the lot of some 140, or nearly four-fifths, of the 174 members of the CPC Central Committee. Party organisations of all levels—provincial, city, county, district, rural, etc.—were smashed. There was wholesale massacre and persecution of cadres and rank-and-file Party members. Army commanders and political officers, too, were attacked. Government bodies, the

YCL, trade union bodies of all levels, and various associations of creative and scientific workers, were broken up. The intellectuals who worked in them, those outside as well as inside the Party, were cruelly treated. Many were physically eliminated. Millions of the foremost workers, peasants, intellectuals, and the revolutionary youth were massacred or jailed.

The losses suffered by the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people were colossal. They were far greater, in fact, than the losses inflicted on Party and people by international imperialists, Peiyang warlords, Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, and all other counter-revolutionaries combined.

May the memory of all the victims of Mao's crimes live forever.

At the 9th CPC Congress (April 1969) Mao substituted a pseudo-party of his own for the real Chinese Communist Party. He is now trying to use it to promote his personal anti-communist and anti-Soviet ends. The Communist Party and the people of China are submerged in a vortex of unheard of calamities.

Mao's extreme crimes have made him a traitor to the Communist Party of China and to the Chinese revolution, and an enemy of the whole Chinese people.

In the field of foreign policy, Mao began an insane struggle against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. His frenzy is directed to subverting and splitting the world socialist system. He has gone to the length of making territorial claims on the Soviet Union, has mounted armed attacks on the Soviet frontier, and has tried to annex the Mongolian People's Republic. He is attacking the Marxist-Leninist communist and workers' parties of all countries, and has publicly proclaimed his intention of "putting an end" to them. He engages in subversive and divisive activity in the world communist movement, and also in the anti-imperialist national liberation movement of the Asian, African and Latin American countries. He is doing his worst to impair their friendship and solidarity with the socialist states and the world communist movement. This is helping imperialist attempts at re-establishing control over these countries and at committing aggressions against them where possible. Mao is hatching intrigues to provoke an American-Soviet armed conflict, which would grow into

a world war. He hopes that flames of war will engulf and destroy the socialist countries, as well as the imperialist states and their allies. He hopes that a thermo-nuclear war will further his maniacal dream of undivided world supremacy. He has broken economic relations with the socialist community and has hitched his country to the capitalist chariot, setting the stage for the restoration of capitalism in China.

Mao's extremely serious crimes on the international scene have made him a traitor to the world communist movement and the anti-imperialist revolutionary movement, and have turned him into an enemy of progressive and peace-loving people throughout the world.

Mao's crimes, committed in his counter-revolutionary coup, confirm the fact that home and foreign policy is indivisible: home policy being the source of foreign policy, and foreign policy being the continuation of home policy. Inside the country Mao uses anti-communism to clear the way for anti-Soviet struggle. At the same time, he tries to consolidate his positions in the anti-communist struggle by means of anti-Sovietism.

On the international scene, he uses anti-Soviet and anti-communist acts as a means of rapprochement with imperialists and reactionaries abroad.

I have given a fairly detailed account of Mao's various crimes inside the country and on the international scene during the early period of the "cultural revolution" in my article, "What Mao Tse-tung Has Started is Not a 'Cultural Revolution' But a Counter-Revolutionary Coup", published in 1969. So, it is needless to repeat the story here.

In the following years the counter-revolutionary coup continued. Its main content consisted in anti-communism, anti-Sovietism, and crimes against the people. Mao acted under such slogans as "for deep criticism of revisionism and for rectification of style", "for a further deepening of struggle, criticism, and reform", "continue the one 'down' and three 'against'", * and "prepare for

* The one "down" was the anti-communist and anti-Soviet campaign inside the country under the slogans, "Down with the handful of power-holders and capitalist roaders" and "Down with the counter-revolutionary revisionists". Out of the three "againsts" only one slogan was in actual use—"Against modern revisionism, at the heart of which are the revisionists of the USSR". This

sudden attack from the North"; he promoted his line through such campaigns as the "educational campaign in the field of ideology and politics" and "boycott the false Marxists Wang Ming and Liu Shao-chi".

These slogans and campaigns helped Mao to seek out, persecute and exterminate the country's leading Communists, YCLers, revolutionary workers, peasants, intellectuals, and the youth. Dissenters were sought and found in every office, military unit, organisation, school, enterprise, people's commune, and family. Mao's slogan, "remove the old, absorb the new", means that he will continue wiping out his enemies—and not only his own, but also those of his heiress, Chiang Ching, and his son-in-law Yao Wen-yuan. His main target are the Marxists—Leninists and internationalists, those in favour of Chinese-Soviet friendship, and also all opponents of US imperialism. In this way he expects to reach his extreme individualist and selfish aim: "Not to be overthrown during my lifetime, and not to be denounced after my death".

These slogans and campaigns helped Mao in his frenzied attempts at subverting and disrupting the world socialist system, the world communist and anti-imperialist movements, and at establishing closer ties with imperialist elements in the United States and other countries.

As before, Mao aims his attacks against the CPSU and the Soviet Union. This is natural, because:

—The CPSU and the Soviet Union are the living embodiment of scientific communism; they are Marxism-Leninism in action.

—The CPSU is the most advanced, the most experienced, the most prestigious, and the most powerful communist party, a recognised vanguard of the world communist movement, while the Soviet Union has the greatest experience, the greatest achievements, the greatest power and greatest prestige in the socialist community.

Mao used as an excuse for his anti-Soviet and anti-communist acts on the international scene. The other two "againsts" were "Fight against the imperialist group headed by the USA" (nullified by the development of Chinese-American relations), and "Fight against reactionaries of all countries" which Mao belied when, hand in hand with US imperialists he supported the reactionary Pakistan militarist, Yahya Khan, who exterminated three million Bengalis fighting for national liberation, and for democracy and freedom.

—The CPSU and the Soviet Union are the impregnable stronghold of the peoples' struggle against imperialism and reaction, and for peace, democracy, national independence, social progress, and socialism, while the Soviet Communists and Soviet people are the most dependable friends and comrades of the Chinese Communists and the Chinese people in the revolutionary struggle and the building of socialism.

—Under the leadership of the CPSU, fulfilling the historic decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress, the Soviet people are putting into effect the grand plans of building communism and the magnificent programme of world peace.

It was for these reasons that Mao made anti-Sovietism his motto and launched out against Marxism-Leninism, the socialist countries, the communist and workers' parties (including the Communist Party of China), the anti-imperialist movement, and world peace. He also uses anti-Sovietism to earn the approval and appreciation of the imperialist powers, notably the US imperialists, and reactionaries in all countries. He is eager to cooperate with them on an anti-Soviet and anti-communist basis.

Anti-Sovietism is a concentrated expression of anti-communism and pro-imperialism. Comrade Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, was absolutely right when he said that there never was and never will be an anti-Soviet communism; it follows that there never was and never will be an anti-Soviet Communist.

It is precisely because Mao's anti-Sovietism is nationalist in form and anti-communist in content that it became the foundation of his reactionary foreign policy and the core of his reactionary home policy.

From the people of China Mao concealed all word of the joint festivities held by the CC CPSU, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on the 50th anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, held in December 1972 in Moscow, in which representatives of fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties, national-democratic parties, and national liberation movements participated. He also concealed from his people the historic report of the CC CPSU General Secretary, Comrade Brezhnev, at these festivities, which brilliantly summed up the outstanding victories of Lenin's national policy and

the great achievements of the multinational Soviet socialist state in the 50 years of the Union, and elucidated the Leninist home and foreign policy of the CPSU and Soviet Government in modern conditions. Therefore, I consider it useful to quote that part of Comrade Brezhnev's report where he referred to the present relations between China and the Soviet Union, as well as most of the other socialist states, and also examined the substance of the Maoist foreign policy. I do so in order to give the Chinese Communists and the people of China a clear idea and a clear understanding of the hypocritical and incendiary nature of Mao's howls about a "Soviet threat".

Here is what Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said:

"Now, Comrades, a few words about our present relations with China or, rather, about China's attitude towards most of the socialist states.

"It is more than ten years since the leaders of the People's Republic of China took the line of opposing the USSR and, in effect, the entire socialist community, which they continue to regard as the main obstacle to their great-power designs.

"Speaking bluntly, what is Peking's foreign policy today? It consists of absurd claims to Soviet territory and malicious slander of the Soviet social and political system, of our peaceable foreign policy. It consists of outright sabotage of the efforts to limit the arms race, of the efforts to bring about disarmament and a relaxation of international tension. It consists of constant attempts to split the socialist camp and the communist movement, to stir up discord among the fighters for national liberation, to range the developing countries against the Soviet Union and the other socialist states. Lastly, it consists of unprincipled alignments on anti-Soviet grounds with any, be they even the most reactionary forces—the most rabid haters of the Soviet Union from among the British Tories or the revenge-seeking elements in the FRG, the Portuguese colonialists or the racists of South Africa.

"In substance, the purpose of doing the greatest possible harm to the USSR, of impairing the interests of the socialist community, is now the sole criterion determining the Chinese leaders' approach to any major international problem.

"What can one say about this policy?

"We hold that it is unnatural for relations between socialist countries, that it runs counter to the interests not only of the Soviet, but also of the Chinese people, that it runs counter to the interests of world socialism, the liberation and anti-imperialist struggle, peace and international security.

"It is therefore understandable why we categorically reject this policy. (*Prolonged applause.*)

"The Chinese leaders claim to be disturbed about some threat emanating from the Soviet Union. If these statements are not hypocritical, it is impossible to understand why China has not replied to our proposal, repeatedly made since 1969, to assume clear, firm and permanent commitments ruling out an attack by one country or the other. If Peking is really concerned about China's security, why has not the PRC leadership agreed to conclude a special treaty renouncing the use of force, the draft of which was submitted to the Chinese side on January 15, 1971? The draft of this treaty states unequivocally that the sides—and I quote—'shall not use against each other armed forces employing any type of arms, including: (a) conventional, (b) missile, or (c) nuclear'. No, the Chinese leaders' complaints about a mythical 'Soviet threat' quite obviously do not stand up to scrutiny."*

2. COOPERATION WITH IMPERIALISM IS A COMPONENT OF MAO'S COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY COUP

We have already pointed out that Mao Tse-tung is using his anti-Soviet and anti-communist counter-revolutionary coup as a means to win the appreciation of, and establish cooperation with the imperialists. The course of events has fully confirmed this. Mao's course, set on a counter-revolutionary coup, was applauded by imperialists and reactionaries, and first of all by the imperialists of the United States. Comrade Gus Hall, General Secretary of the CP USA, speaking at the festivities on the 50th anniversary of the USSR, said rightly that the Mao group follows a counter-revolutionary policy, and that it

* L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Progress Publishers, 1975, pp. 84-85.

is therefore natural for the capitalist press to sound the praises of Mao's "cultural revolution". Diplomatic representatives of capitalist countries flock to Peking to shake Mao's hand and express their friendly sentiments. And, certainly, the greatest attention is drawn to the "sudden change" in Chinese-American relations. After Edgar Snow, Mao's bosom friend, had spent many months in Peking and had had many secret conversations with Mao, a US ping-pong team visited China, whereupon, on 16 July 1971, the official Chinese and American press simultaneously published a communique confirming rumours that Henry Kissinger, then a national security adviser to the US President, had secretly visited Peking and held 20 hours of confidential talks with Premier Chou En-lai. Also confirmed were rumours that US President Richard Nixon had accepted the Chinese government's invitation to visit China. Thereupon, both sides reported Kissinger's second trip to Peking to prepare Nixon's visit to China, and announced Nixon's arrival in Peking on 21 February 1972.

In short, Nixon's China visit was not a fortuitous thing, but a far-reaching step by Mao and certain US elements.

It is common knowledge that ever since the inauguration of the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and some of the Afro-Asian states have systematically, at all sessions of the UN General Assembly, demanded the ousting of the Chiang Kai-shek representative and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the PRC in the United Nations. Due to the stubborn opposition of the USA and its allies, and due to US insistence that the ultimate decision needed the approval of two-thirds of the UN membership, this issue was dragged out for many years. At the 26th UN General Assembly, however, the United States and its allies "suddenly" voted for letting the PRC representative take the place of the Taiwan emissary in the UN. Obviously, this change of heart followed a preliminary agreement reached in confidential American-Chinese negotiations.

News agencies report that Peking is crowded with US "visitors" and that American guests are received in Peking with courtesy and care. It is quite certain that the cooperation of Mao and the US is expanding each day.

Mao's delegates use the 26th UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council for anti-Soviet campaigns. They heap malicious insinuations and slanders on the USSR, and stand before the world as faithful helpers of the US imperialists and other reactionaries. They voted against the Soviet proposal for a world disarmament conference. Yet, the UN session adopted a resolution on this score by a majority vote. And Mao stood unveiled before the world as an enemy of peace and a henchman of the forces of war. In the Security Council, Mao's spokesman joined the US spokesman to back the reactionary Pakistani militarist, Yahya Khan, and opposed the liberation movement fighting for the national self-determination, democracy and freedom of the 75 million people of Bangladesh. By so doing, they opposed the USSR and India, which supported the liberation struggle in Bangladesh. The Maoist stand on the Middle East favoured Israel and US reactionaries. The Maoists denied support to the just struggle of the Arab countries and the Arab people of Palestine against the US-backed Israeli aggression, and did not back the UN Security Council resolution requiring Israel to withdraw her troops from overrun Arab lands. At the same time, furthering their nefarious designs, the Maoists tried to undermine the friendship and cooperation between the Arab peoples and the Soviet Union.

In the United Nations Maoist spokesmen act hand in hand with imperialist forces, and this more and more frequently. Comrade Gus Hall, speaking on USSR Central Television on 29 April 1973, said it is almost impossible to distinguish Maoist policy from imperialist policy. Maoists and imperialists tend to act in concert. There is practically no difference, for example, between the Maoist utterances in the UN and the UN speeches of reactionary imperialist spokesmen. Perhaps the only difference, Hall added, is that the Maoists are more given to the use of coarse and abusive language.

All this is natural. It is the effect of the anti-Soviet and anti-communist policy aimed at rapprochement with imperialist forces in the United States, followed by Mao since the "style rectification campaign" for more than 30 years covertly or overtly, with or without interruptions.

3. THE BEGINNING OF THE PRESENT MAOIST LINE OF COOPERATION WITH IMPERIALISM

To understand the present-day Maoist policy aimed at cooperation with imperialist forces, we must look back at its beginnings.

1. In the autumn of 1936 Edgar Snow had long conversations with Mao in Paoyang (northern part of Shensi province). Though they had met for the first time, Mao and Snow behaved like old friends. Their conversations were frank and thorough, irrespective of whether they concerned public or personal matters, Party and state matters or matters related to the Comintern and the Soviet Union, etc. This is why it did not take them very long to become bosom friends.

Referring to the twenties, Mao Tse-tung said to Edgar Snow, "I was then a strong supporter of America's Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door." * This sentence means at least two things: first, Mao wanted to parade as a constant follower of the USA; second, he wanted to express his firm support of the imperialist and expansionist policy of the United States in China and other countries. The experienced US bourgeois journalist, Edgar Snow, was sure to draw the right conclusions.

It is not surprising that the notes of Snow's talks with Mao, when published, alerted Georgi Dimitrov. In November 1937, shortly before my return from Moscow to Yen-an, Dimitrov instructed me to explain to the CC CPC and to Mao personally that he had departed from positions expected of a Communist in talks with a US bourgeois journalist.

Snow's impression is said to have been that Mao was at most an agrarian reformer, and certainly no Communist; if Mao were to become top leader of the Communist Party and, in addition, some day hold power in China, he would not build socialism, would be an opponent of the Soviet Union, and an ally of imperialism.

2. At the end of 1937, after my return to Yen-an, I learned that Mao had negotiated with Lo Hang, a representative of Chen Tu-hsiu, and had permitted the entire Trotskyite-Chen Tu-hsiuist group to rejoin the Party (thanks to my return this was prevented). This showed

* Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China*, New York, 1961, p. 154.

even at that early date that Mao was prepared to join hands with Trotskyites, those active abettors of imperialist reaction.

3. In the summer of 1938 Mao published his article, *On a War of Attrition*, in which he divided the Sino-Japanese war into three stages: Japanese offensive—equilibrium—Chinese counter-offensive. In the first stage Japan attacked while China retreated. In the second stage neither of the warring sides was able to attack and there was a state of equilibrium. In the third stage China would wait for Japan to attack the Soviet Union, and then mount a counter-offensive.

These views, and especially the idea of waiting for a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union, were at that time consonant with the designs of the US, British and French imperialists, and also with those of Chiang Kai-shek. They were waiting for the same thing. Then, "sitting on the mountain and watching the tigers fight", they hoped to reap the maximum advantage. In short, *On a War of Attrition* let the imperialists know of Mao's anti-Soviet designs.

After the article was published in Yen-an, Mao sent it to Wuhan and asked for it to be reprinted in the *Hsin-huajihpao** (which was under my direction). Chin Pang-hsien (Po Ku), Hsiang Ying, Kai Feng, other comrades and I were against the article, because it was oriented on passive resistance and on waiting for Japan to attack the USSR. This would work against the national interests of the Chinese people and contradicted the internationalist duty of the Communist Party of China. The Party's policy was to further the nation's active resistance to the Japanese aggression in order to defend China's independence and territorial integrity, and to prevent the Japanese militarists from starting a war against the USSR. So, we decided not to publish *On a War of Attrition* in the *Hsinhuajihpao*.** I asked a Soviet comrade who was then in Wuhan to let Stalin and Dimitrov know of our opinion. Dimitrov saw to it that the article should not appear in the journal *Communist International*. (Wang

* At that time it was the daily newspaper of the CC CPC.

** Later, reluctant to betray to the enemy the existence of fundamental differences in the CPC leadership at so critical a point in the war, it was decided to publish the article as a pamphlet and distribute it as a supplement to the *Hsinhuajihpao*.

Chia-hsiang informed Mao of Dimitrov's decision, and also told me about it when he returned from Moscow to Yen-an in the autumn of 1938.)

4. In October 1938 Mao published his report, *On the New Stage*, to the 6th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee. Here he said the second of the three stages of the war—that of equilibrium—had begun. This was designed to justify his passiveness in the war of resistance. Mao's concept was instantly approved by the Japanese invaders and by Chiang Kai-shek. For the Japanese China was a staging area for an attack southward on the United States or northward on the Soviet Union. They could wish for nothing better than a standstill in Sino-Japanese hostilities. Chiang Kai-shek, too, after the fall of Wuhan, was eager to avoid engagements with the Japanese army and to preserve his armed forces for a future war against the Communist Party. He was banking on a Japanese-Soviet or Japanese-American war.

In his report, Mao also advocated "Sinifying" Marxism and rejecting "overseas stereotypes". By this demagogic slogan he was, in fact, trying to fold up the propagation of Marxism-Leninism and the use of Soviet experience, reject the guidance of the Comintern, and crush Leninist internationalists in the Party. The report *On the New Stage* also let the imperialists see that Mao made free with the national interests of the Chinese people and that his intentions were anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist, anti-Soviet, and anti-communist.

My speech at the 6th Plenum, "On the War Situation after the Loss of Wuhan", was based on Lenin's precept that anti-imperialist national revolutionary wars are progressive wars and are always victorious. I showed that the many millions of Chinese were bound to defeat Japanese imperialism with the aid of the socialist Soviet Union, provided they fought staunchly and strove for victory. This ran counter to Mao's erroneous line, as set forth in his *On the War of Attrition* and *On the New Stage*.

5. In the beginning of 1940 Mao published his *On New Democracy*. Here he openly contradicted Lenin's view of the non-capitalist (i.e. socialist) perspective of the Chinese revolution. In so doing, he defended the interests of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, opposed China's taking the socialist road, and advocated a "new-

democratic" way implying a long period of capitalist development. *On New Democracy* enabled imperialist ideologues to see Mao's ultimate intentions: defence of the bourgeoisie and hostility towards the proletariat; defence of capitalism and hostility towards socialism.

6. In October 1940 Mao publicly came out in favour of an alliance between nazi Germany, fascist Italy, militarist Japan and the Soviet Union, and inside the country an alliance with the Japanese aggressors, which amounted to national treason. Here is how it happened.

One October night a comrade from the *Sinchunghwapao* (the Yen'an newspaper of the CC CPC, which appeared every three days) came to show me the content of the following day's issue (I was then chairman of the CC CPC press commission and was in charge of the *Sinchunghwapao*). My attention was drawn to the title of the leading article—"On Alliance Between Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union".

"Where did you get this article?" I asked.

"It was sent in by Comrade Mao Tse-tung," the comrade replied. "This afternoon he held a conference with our editors and comrades from the Central Committee propaganda department. He said that we must set the sights on an alliance between Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union in international relations, and on a united front with the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei inside the country. He said he had prepared an editorial and told us to publish it in our next issue. The question is a serious one. Hasn't he discussed it with the other members of the Politbureau?"

I said I'd go and talk to him.

Mao admitted that he had held the conference, and added:

"Stalin and Dimitrov suggested an anti-fascist alliance of Britain, the United States, France and the Soviet Union against Germany, Italy and Japan. Events have proved this to be a mistake. What we want is not an alliance between Britain, the United States, France and the Soviet Union, but between Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union."

"Why?" I asked.

"Germany, Italy and Japan are poor," Mao replied. "We will gain nothing from fighting them. In case we win, we can take nothing from them. Britain, the United

States and France are rich, especially Britain. Look at her colonies. If she is crushed, great profits will accrue from just dividing her colonies. You may accuse me of a pro-fascist line, but I do not care. In China we want a united front with the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei against Chiang Kai-shek, not the anti-Japanese front suggested by you. In short, you are wrong."

"Where am I wrong?" I asked.

"We cannot overpower the Japanese," Mao said. "So why fight them? We would do better to fight Chiang Kai-shek with the help of Japan and Wang Ching-wei. Look at the large territories Chiang Kai-shek controls in the southwest and northwest. If he is beaten, we can get a piece of the northwest. This would be a gain. I know you will say that I am pro-Japanese and guilty of national treason, but I do not care. I am not afraid of being a national traitor."

"You have no right to decide anything of such international and internal importance on your own," I said. "Our argument is pointless. I propose normal procedure, namely, sending a telegram with your opinion to Comrades Stalin and Dimitrov, and discussing the matter at a meeting of the Politbureau."

"No such telegram can be sent now," Mao replied. "The two venerable old men may fly into a rage. That would be no joking matter. Neither do I want a Politbureau discussion at the present moment."

"Why?"

"The situation is not yet ripe," he replied. "In six months events will show that I am right. Then I will send a telegram saying that I had long since made these proposals in an article in the *Sinchunghwapao*. And Comrades Stalin and Dimitrov will reply: 'Comrade Mao Tse-tung, you were right, and we were wrong'. You, too, Comrade Wang Ming, will then have to admit your mistake, and say: 'Comrade Mao Tse-tung, you were right, and I was wrong.' At the next Politbureau meeting I will ask not to send any telegram to Stalin and Dimitrov, and not to discuss the matter at any Politbureau meeting."*

* Most of the Politbureau members in Yen'an did, indeed, agree with Mao's proposal because, after the 6th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, they were afraid to cross him.

"But what if the next six months prove you wrong? What then?" I asked.

"How can I be wrong? I am certain to be right," Mao replied blandly.

"That you are certain of it is one thing, and how events develop is another. Tell me what you will do if events prove you wrong? Will you send a telegram to Comrades Stalin and Dimitrov admitting your mistake? Will you also admit your mistake to me?"

Mao did not answer.

The course of events, as we know, has proved the folly of Mao's pro-fascist idea of an alliance with Germany, Italy and Japan, and of his treacherous line of alliance with Japan and Wang Ching-wei. Far from admitting his error to anyone after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, he launched the "style rectification campaign", making Leninism, the Comintern, the Soviet Union, and the Communist Party of China its chief targets.

Our conversation continued.

"In short," I said, "your article must not be published."

"It must," he said. "I have held a conference, and have sent in the manuscript. If we don't publish it, I will lose face. I want the article published, and I declare here and now, and will also declare to all members of the Politbureau, that I alone bear the responsibility for it."

205 Half pleading and half demanding, he had the article published in the *Sinchunghwapao*.

To be sure, Mao could only prattle about the policy of the world communist movement and Soviet foreign policy. Alter them he could not. All the same, events showed that this unprincipled political adventurer and intriguer had a definite purpose in publishing an article advocating alliance with Germany, Italy and Japan. His aim was to cover up his treasonable pro-Japanese outlook, and to justify the order he had issued to the troops to halt anti-Japanese operations and intensify armed conflicts inside the country. On the international plane, he meant to undermine Soviet prestige among anti-fascist forces in other countries.

Secretly, without the knowledge of the Politbureau, using the radio-transmitter of the CC CPC Military Council, Mao ordered Jao Shu-shih, Political Commissar of the New 4th Army, to send a spokesman to negotiate cooperation

against Chiang Kai-shek with representatives of the Japanese army and Wang Ching-wei. Operations against the enemy were suspended. But at that time neither the Japanese nor Wang Ching-wei would believe that Mao was capable of treason. They suspected a trap. As a result, no concrete accords were reached. *to be kept*

KMT propaganda, however, made the most of Mao's dealing with the enemy. Luckily, the CPC enjoyed tremendous revolutionary prestige among the people as the initiator of the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war and the united national anti-Japanese front. Nobody believed that there could be national traitors like Chin Kuai* and Wang Ching-wei among the CPC leaders. Chiang Kai-shek's attempts to use the above-mentioned facts in his anti-communist propaganda proved fruitless.

In 1955, on the pretext of combatting a "Kao (Kang)-Jao (Shu-shih) bloc", Mao arrested Jao Shu-shih and had him killed. He also took advantage of the campaign to arrest and execute Pan Han-nien (former chief of the New 4th Army's reconnaissance) whom Jao Shu-shih had sent to negotiate with the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei, and Hu Chun-ho, who had represented the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei at the negotiations. (In the past, Hu Chun-ho had betrayed the Communist Party, but during the negotiations Pan Han-nien persuaded him to serve our Party again.) Mao wanted all witnesses of his national betrayal out of the way.

Since Hu Chun-ho was a triple agent (for Chiang Kai-shek, for the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei, and finally, thanks to Pan Han-nien's efforts, also a counter-intelligence agent of the New 4th Army in the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei camp, and in Chiang Kai-shek's camp), the content of his negotiations with Pan Han-nien was promptly relayed to the US and British secret agents in China through Chiang Kai-shek's spy agencies. In short, the American and British imperialists were given to understand that even though the Japanese had invaded China and the nation had risen to resist the aggressor, Mao was prepared to deal with Japan and become a national traitor; this meant that in a different situation he would seek alliance with imperialism.

* A national traitor at the time of the Sung dynasty.

Since many people inside and outside the Party have no knowledge of the true implications of the "anti-Party Kao Kang-Jao Shu-shih bloc", it will be appropriate to give a brief account of it here.

The "anti-Party Kao-Jao bloc" case (1954) fabricated by intriguer Mao pursued three aims.

First, he wanted Teng Hsiao-ping and not Liu Shao-chi to be elected General Secretary of the Central Committee, reneging on his "solemn promise" (that Liu Shao-chi would get the post of General Secretary) made when the "Mao-Liu bloc" was formed. At the 1st Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee he had objected to having a General Secretary in charge of all organisational work, and suggested retaining the post of chief of the CC Secretariat, who would manage the affairs of various CC organs and certain current CC business. In 1953, however, Mao began arguing in favour of having a General Secretary. He required his closest entourage—Lo Jung-huan, Lo Jui-ching, and others—to back Kao Kang's open campaign against electing Liu Shao-chi. As a result, Liu Shao-chi was compelled to agree that Teng Hsiao-ping, one of Mao's trusted lieutenants, should be elected General Secretary.

Second, Mao wanted all power in the Party and government agencies and the army in Northeast China, a major administrative region, to pass from Kao Kang to Lo Jung-huan. This is why he suddenly stabbed Kao Kang in the back, declaring that Kao Kang's campaign against Liu Shao-chi was directed against "the emperor's closest associates" or, more plainly, "nominally against Liu Shao-chi but in fact against Mao Tse-tung". Kao Kang was seized (after his execution he was reviled as a "suicide" and "expelled" from the Party), and his posts in Northeast China passed to Lo Jung-huan. But the real reason for Kao Kang's elimination was his policy of sincere cooperation with the Soviet Union in defiance of Mao's orders.

Third, Mao wanted to use the "anti-Party Kao-Jao bloc" case to destroy Jao Shu-shih, Pan Han-nien, Hu Chun-ho, and a few others, that is, all witnesses of his treasonable line of "alliance with Japan and Wang Ching-wei against Chiang Kai-shek", dating to 1940.

7. From the autumn of 1941 to the summer of 1945 Mao conducted his "style rectification campaign" against

Marxism-Leninism, the Comintern, the Soviet Union, and the Communist Party of China. This convinced the imperialists that anti-Sovietism and anti-communism were ingrained in Mao's outlook.

In 1948 Mao said to me: "After the outbreak of the Pacific war between Japan and America, President Roosevelt has repeatedly suggested through the US liaison officer in Yen-an that I should change the name and character of the Communist Party, and break off relations with Moscow. This was to be the price for US military and technical aid to the 8th Route Army. Luckily, we did not agree. We would now be in a pretty fix if we had."

But though formally Mao did not agree to alter the name and character of the CPC, and did not break off relations with Moscow, his anti-Soviet and anti-communist "style rectification campaign" was, in substance, a token of readiness to fulfil these US demands.

During the "style rectification campaign" the White House sent a succession of high-ranking diplomats and generals (including Patrick Hurley, a personal envoy of the US President) to Yen-an. Mao spoke to them in an anti-Soviet and anti-communist vein, seeking US aid and US-Mao cooperation. On 23 August, 1944, in a conversation with John Service, political adviser to the US commander of the China-Burma-India war theatre and second secretary of the US Embassy in Chungking, Mao explained in reply to a question why he was so anxious to get US aid and support and why he said nothing of Russia. "We do not expect Russian help," Mao said. "The Russians have suffered greatly in the war and will have their hands full with their own job of rebuilding." He tried to convince Service that "Chinese and American interests are correlated and similar. They fit together, economically and politically... This is why it is so important to us Communists to know what you Americans are thinking and planning. We cannot risk crossing you—cannot risk any conflict with you."

To get US aid and cooperation Mao did not shrink from slanderous the policy and programme of the Communist Party of China, describing them as purely bourgeois or purely anti-feudal. He told Service, for example, that "the policies of the Chinese Communist Party are merely liberal", and that "even the most conservative American businessman can find nothing in our

program to take exception to".* At about the same time Mao told Harrison Forman: "We are not striving for the social and political Communism of Soviet Russia. Rather, we prefer to think of what we are doing as something that Lincoln fought for in your Civil War: the liberation of slaves. In China today we have many millions of slaves, shackled by feudalism."**

Need I say that the policy and programme of the Communist Party of China was neither bourgeois nor liberal, and not exclusively anti-feudal. Mao spoke for himself, reflecting his own ideas, his own policy and programme. What he wanted was that the American imperialists should know him as a mere agrarian reformer, not a Communist, and more hostile to socialism than to capitalism.

There are facts to prove that during his "style rectification campaign" of the forties Mao continuously begged the USA for aid, and looked for the slightest chance to establish Maoist-American cooperation.

How obsessed he was by this idea may be seen from the following episode. One sunny day in the latter half of November 1944, as I lay on a couch outside my house wrapped in a warm quilt, I was suddenly approached by a smiling Mao Tse-tung:

"Comrade Wang Ming," he said, "I have brought good news."

I asked him to be seated. He sat down and pulled a piece of paper out of the pocket of his overcoat. He gave it to me.

"Here, read this".

The paper was about 15 centimetres long and 10 wide, with three lines in English. The first line read: "Mr. Mao Tse-tung," the second, "thanks for your congratulations", and the third, "Roosevelt". In the left corner were four boldly pencilled Chinese characters: "Destroy at once after reading".

"Now that we have this telegram," Mao said, "our relations with America will be much smoother."

* See John S. Service, *The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of US-China Relations*, a publication of the University of California Center for Chinese Studies, Berkeley, California, p. 173.

** Harrison Forman, *Report from Red China*, N. Y., 1945, p. 173.

"Why?"

"In the past we dealt with Roosevelt's subordinates," Mao replied. "This time he answered personally. Now we can exchange telegrams and letters directly, maintain personal contacts, and negotiate man to man. This makes it easier to settle things."

"Judging by this telegram," I said doubtfully, "it does not look like Roosevelt wants any direct exchanges of telegrams or letters with you, let alone any settling of things."

"Why do you think so?" Mao asked peevishly.

"This does not look like an official telegram. If he had wanted to exchange telegrams directly, his reply should at least have been typed on official stationery of the US army observers in Yen-an, if not on an official US Embassy letterhead. What you received is a scrap of paper with a few pencilled English words. Can you prove that this is really a telegram from President Roosevelt? If some day the Americans should say that Roosevelt had never sent you any telegram, you will not be able to prove that he did."

He stared at me. Then he said:

"How can this be possible? A member of the US army group of observers handed it to me personally."

"And what do you think of the four Chinese characters in the left corner?" I asked.

"Roosevelt is probably afraid that Chiang Kai-shek may learn about this telegram, and wants us to burn it after reading," Mao replied.

"If Roosevelt is afraid of Chiang Kai-shek learning about a telegram like this, how can you expect him to exchange telegrams or to settle things with you directly?"

Mao's face darkened. The smile vanished from his lips. After a moment's silence, with a forced grin, he said:

"All the same, I think that after this direct exchange of telegrams things will go more smoothly."

He took back the note and went away.

I recalled that his first talk with me that year was on 1 April. He had come with a definite purpose: to speak his "words from the bottom of the heart". What had been the purpose of his visit this time? Why had he come to show me the telegram? Before this, for several

years he had stopped briefing me on his contacts with the Americans. So, I assumed that Mao had wanted to demonstrate his strength: "Look, I have direct telegraphic contact with US President Roosevelt. That is no joking matter."

Since then facts have come to light to bear out my assumption. In September of that year (1944) Dimitrov, who was about to return to Bulgaria after her liberation by the Soviet Army, had written one more letter to me. Like the previous one, it had been intercepted by Mao Tse-tung. He was afraid that I might learn about it. That was why he had come to show me Roosevelt's telegram: "Look, you may have Dimitrov, but I have Roosevelt."

8. In the autumn of 1945, after the Soviet Army entered Northeast China and militarist Japan was crushed, the situation in Asia changed radically. Mao was compelled to demonstrate friendship for the Soviet Union so that the 8th Route Army could enter Northeast China and collect the tremendous Soviet military aid. At the same time, he continued to nurse hopes of American help in uniting and building postwar China. This is why, in the autumn of 1945, on the invitation of Patrick Hurley, the USA Ambassador to China, Mao went to Chungking to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek, trusting the US Ambassador to be the arbiter. As a result, the conciliatory rightward-leaning October Tenth Agreement was concluded by the Kuomintang and CPC, which looked like a concession to the right forces.

Under this agreement the 8th Route and New 4th armies and all anti-Japanese guerrilla units under their command—nearly 900,000 men in all—were to be reconstituted into not more than nine divisions. And out of these nine, the Communists could independently form only three. The remaining six were to contain Kuomintang units. Besides, we were to relinquish all liberated areas south of the Yangtse. Furthermore, according to an understanding between the USA, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao, the US Army would open military schools in Yen-an and Changkiakow (Kalgan) for 8th Route and New 4th Army personnel.*

* Due to the hasty preparations for an anti-communist civil war by the Americans and Chiang Kai-shek, none of the points of this agreement was put into effect.

I want to describe the circumstances in which Mao signed this agreement. Since its terms were harsh and humiliating Mao was afraid that the Party and our revolutionary armies would object to them. So, at first, he was reluctant to affix his signature. Then, Chiang Kai-shek resorted to the old method of "demonstrating the execution of a hen to the ape": to intimidate Mao he arrested Lung Yun, military chief of Yunnan province. And Hurley kept saying: "These are the final terms. If you don't sign, there will be no other chance." Mao gave in, and signed. An extreme individualist, he was concerned solely with his selfish interests, and was neglectful of the interests of Party and revolution. Badly intimidated, he all but lost his head. On returning to Yen-an, he complained to comrades from the Central Committee: "In Chungking my nerves were strained to the limit. Now, I feel unwell and often have heart palpitations, dizzy spells, and insomnia." He suffered a nervous breakdown, which lasted for more than six months.

Until the day war broke out between the Kuomintang and CPC on a national scale, Mao believed that the United States would force Chiang Kai-shek to agree to a coalition government headed by the KMT and including the CPC and other parties and groups (as Mao had envisioned in his report, *On Coalition Government*, to the 7th CPC Congress).

Mao expected the United States to help China to unify peacefully. Though after the surrender of Japan the USA was reactivating and arming Chiang Kai-shek's troops for an anti-communist civil war, and though KMT troops had been attacking CPC troops (the 8th Route and New 4th armies) at different points in North and Central China since the latter half of 1946, Mao laboured under the illusion that the "ceasefire teams" with US army arbiters would help to end the KMT-CPC civil war.

In the autumn of 1946, Mao invited General George C. Marshall, President Truman's special envoy, to Yen-an, seeking his good offices in negotiating a peace with the KMT. In the winter of 1946, he was still nursing the illusion that the US would assist China's peaceful unification even though Yen Hsi-shan's army had begun large-scale military operations against the 8th Route

Army in Shansi and Chiang Kai-shek's troops mounted seven successive offensives against the New 4th Army in northern Kiangsu. The futility of Mao's hopes was obvious. In the beginning of 1947 Fu Tso-yi's cavalry captured Changkiakow (Kalgan) in a surprise raid and Chiang Kai-shek, heartened by this success, officially ordered an "anti-communist extermination campaign" on 14 March, thus precipitating a civil war on the scale of the whole country. Yet, it was not until 1 May 1947 that Mao finally said, "Down with Chiang Kai-shek", in one of the Mayday slogans.

But this did not mean a total break with Mao. In the latter half of 1948, in the final stage of the war, the White House again stretched a hand out to Mao. Chiang Kai-shek had lost the support of his army, the people had turned against him, and he was facing imminent defeat. The White House, on the other hand, did not want US troops to be involved against the CPC, fearing the reaction of the Soviet Union. Besides, it had long since understood Mao's anti-socialist and anti-Soviet essence, and was reluctant to alienate him. Its course of behaviour was clear from the following facts. In North and East China there were then more than 600,000 US troops—ground, air force, and navy—which withdrew hastily wherever the People's Liberation Army hove in sight in order to avoid a direct engagement. US Am-

bassador Stuart in Nanking let Mao know through different channels that the United States was prepared to loan a new Chinese government two billion dollars for five or ten years, provided it did not establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

- 1) "Imperialism continues to exist",
- 2) "the agrarian revolution has not been completed",
- 3) "capitalism in China is undeveloped", and
- 4) "the national bourgeoisie is still involved in the revolution".

Only one out of these four arguments—"the agrarian revolution has not been completed"—had no immediate relation to imperialism. The first argument meant that so long as "imperialism existed" Mao was not going to set the course on socialist revolution and the building of socialism. And the third and fourth showed that he gravitated towards capitalism and did not want to come to grips with the bourgeoisie.

In home policy, he favoured a "policy of four sides and eight directions", which included these four points:

- 1) "equal concern for public and private interests"
- 2) "equal concern for the interests of workers and capitalists",
- 3) "mutual aid of town and village",

4) "commerce between the internal and external markets".

The first two points are clearly non-socialist. The other two do not look objectionable. But if we recall one more passage from Mao's conversation with John Service in 1944, it will be clear that these two points were also chiefly aimed at furthering Maoist-American economic cooperation. Mao said to Service that "America and China complement each other economically: they will not compete. China does not have the requirements of a heavy industry of major size... China needs to build up light industries to supply her own market and raise the living standards of her own people... America is not only the most suitable country to assist this economic development of China: she is also the only country fully able to participate." We may also recall that Mao had made clear his wish for US manufactured goods to be supplied to China, which would pay the USA with farm produce, and the like. This shows that the latter two points apply not only to home policy, but also to foreign policy. Surely, White House officials and American students of China who followed Mao's every move were pleased with this trend in Maoist policy.

In foreign policy, Mao suggested the following course: "At least in the first few years new China does not need to be recognised by the three great powers—Britain, the USA and USSR—so that they should not interfere in our internal affairs." Here he deliberately placed the socialist Soviet Union on one plane with imperialist Britain and the imperialist USA. The purpose was the same as the one Mao pursues today with his demagogical talk of "two superpowers—the USA and USSR": to mislead the public and slander the Soviet Union, and to disguise his hostility towards the Soviet Union, while seeking rapprochement with the USA and Britain.

But at that time the international situation and the conditions at home did not permit Mao to follow an undisguised anti-Soviet and pro-imperialist policy. The CC CPSU and the Soviet Government followed a Leninist, internationalist policy towards China. The Soviet Union announced its recognition of the People's Republic of China as soon as it was inaugurated. It gave new China all-round aid and support in the political, diplomatic, economic, financial, scientific, technical, cultural, and

educational fields, and in public health. For a time, this torpedoed Mao's pro-imperialist and anti-Soviet conspiracy.

10. From the autumn of 1950 to the summer of 1953 China helped the people of Korea to repulse the US aggressor. During this period, too, Mao did not abandon hope of friendly relations with the imperialists. This is supported by facts which Liu Shao-chi revealed to me at that time.

At 8 p.m. on 10 November 1952 Liu Shao-chi (who had come to the 19th Congress of the CPSU and was still in Moscow) invited me (in Moscow for medical treatment) for a talk. "When the Anglo-American troops landed in Inchon," he said, "the situation in North Korea became critical. But Chairman Mao hesitated to send Chinese volunteers to repulse the US aggression and help Korea. The Politbureau was in session round the clock for fourteen days, but could not come to a decision. Chairman Mao said: 'The moment our army goes into action, the traditional Sino-American friendship will die. Who can tell how long it will take to restore it? And, supposing we act, what are we going to do if we fail to halt the Americans?' In short, he could not make up his mind. It was not until US troops captured Shingishu and there was only the bridge across the Yalu between them and China that Chairman Mao was forced to come to a decision. He said: 'Now we must act. If our troops begin now, we can still count on glory and gain—the glory of proletarian internationalists and the gain of fighting not on Chinese but on Korean soil. If we wait until the Americans cross the Yalu, we will lose both glory and gain.' When later, after our troops had already gone into action, Chairman Mao learned that Truman had forbidden MacArthur to bomb the Shenyang-Manchuria railway, he said ruefully: 'Have we done right to engage our troops?' And still later, when MacArthur insisted on extending the war to Manchuria and staked his job on this (either he does what he wants, or he resigns), and Truman dismissed MacArthur, Chairman Mao was deeply upset. He said: 'If we had known beforehand that the USA does not want to fight against us, we should not have involved ourselves against the Americans by aiding Korea and injuring Sino-American relations. Now, we must see how we

can put an end to the matter quickly. Until we do, it is no use seeking a gradual restoration of Sino-American friendship."

This "friendship", as we see, was more important for Mao than aiding a fraternal socialist country and her people against a US imperialist aggression. Even at the time of the Korean war he was strongly affected by America-mania, as well as America-phobia.

11. The period from 1954 to 1957 was one of continuous negotiations between China and the United States, laying the ground for Maoist-American cooperation. The 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina cleared the way for regular America-Maoist contacts. The Korean war and the American treaty with Chiang Kai-shek on joint "defence" of Taiwan had strained Maoist-American relations for a time. But at the Geneva Conference the Chinese and American representatives consigned these strains to oblivion. The two sides defined methods and stages for subsequent regular contacts. The negotiations between the Chinese and US ambassadors in Warsaw were part of this pattern. Fearing exposure of his unsavoury deals, Mao tried to keep the content of the negotiations from the Chinese people and the world. The US State Department, too, confined itself to saying that though Washington and Peking had no diplomatic relations, the progress made in the Warsaw negotiations was far greater than that of Britain and other countries which did have diplomatic relations with China. The more than a hundred meetings of the Chinese and American spokesmen in Warsaw did, indeed, pave the way to closer contacts between the Maoists and certain quarters in the United States.

12. In the period from 1957 to 1965 Mao was busy preparing the anti-communist and anti-Soviet "cultural revolution".

The 1957 "campaign against rightist elements" was personally stage-managed by Mao. At first he proclaimed the specious slogan, "may a hundred flowers bloom and may a hundred schools compete". He urged people to "say everything that is on your mind, say everything frankly. Those who talk commit no crime and those who listen get a valuable warning". On his orders people were encouraged at meetings and through the press to speak up without fear. First, Mao wanted to identify

those who were still critical of the mistakes he had made in *On New Democracy* and in his report to the 2nd Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee, that is, specifically, of his basic political stand against a socialist revolution and the building of socialism in China after the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution; second, he wanted to identify those who approved of the denunciation of the personality cult at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, those who, in one form or another, directly or indirectly, opposed the deification of Mao Tse-tung and his dictatorship. To engineer a pretext for persecuting people critical of his mistakes, he ordered his agents to persuade, even forcibly compel, certain real counter-revolutionaries and pro-KMT elements to slander the Communist Party of China and the Chinese revolution at meetings and in the press. Later, using these "facts", he pounced on those who criticised him from Marxist-Leninist positions, branding them "counter-revolutionary rightist elements".

Mao admitted that 800,000 people were nailed down in the "campaign against rightist elements". But the number of its victims was much greater. Among them were Party cadres, writers and art workers, and most of the leaders and members of democratic parties and associations.

From 1958 to 1960 Mao conducted his reckless "three red banners" policy under the slogan of outstripping the Soviet economy in a few years. This scheme failed dismally, whereupon, in April 1960, Mao threw off all disguises and began an ideological and political battle against the CPSU and the world communist movement, and charged the Marxist-Leninist parties with "revisionism". At the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties his slanders were condemned by the vast majority of fraternal parties.

In 1962, Mao launched an official campaign against "revisionists" inside the country. At first, he struck against part of the leadership, notably Liu Shao-chi, and then banished a number of writers and artists known since the twenties and thirties to remote villages, describing this as "going to the masses".

In 1963 Mao launched his notorious 25-point programme, aimed at splitting the socialist community, the world communist movement, and the anti-imperialist

national liberation movement. At the same time, using bribery and deceit, he began creating an anti-Soviet, anti-Communist and pro-Maoist fifth column in other countries.

(In 1964 and 1965) he conducted a "learn from the Liberation Army" and an "educating successors" campaign, placing the army above Party and people. He also launched other campaigns directed to deifying his person, befuddling the youth and drawing it "into the storm and turmoil together with Chairman Mao". This set the stage for deploying the youth and People's Liberation Army units in a counter-revolutionary military coup.

These anti-Soviet and anti-communist divisive moves were meant to win sympathy and favour in imperialist quarters. In 1964 and 1965 the White House dispatched Edgar Snow, and then Li Tsung-jen, to contact Mao Tse-tung.

13. The period from 1965 to 1970 saw unprecedented developments in Maoist-American relations. At the beginning of 1965 Mao publicly refused to join the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in aiding the people of Vietnam in their just war against US aggression, and even obstructed their aid. At the time when the US was escalating its aggression in Vietnam and Mao was preparing for his "cultural revolution" Snow and Li Tsung-jen came to Peking. Snow reported in the British *Sunday Times* in May 1971 that referring to the war in Vietnam Mao had said to him, "The Chinese will not fight unless the Americans attack them. Is this not clear? The Chinese have their hands full at home." In this way Mao let the White House know where China really stood in the Vietnam war, thus comforting and encouraging the aggressor. Referring to Sino-Soviet relations, Snow reported that Liu Shao-chi had wanted to send a Chinese delegation to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in 1965 with the aim of reviving the Chinese-Soviet alliance. But Mao had put his foot down. He was in favour of a people's war against both the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is common knowledge that Mao has always been hostile to the Soviet Union, but only pretended hostility towards the USA. By mentioning war against the United States he was merely creating a smokescreen for his

preparations for a war against the Soviet Union. Surely, the two old friends—Mao Tse-tung and Edgar Snow—must also have discussed the "cultural revolution", even though Snow does not mention it in his report.

Li Tsung-jen is an old lackey of US imperialism. After the collapse in 1949 of the anti-communist war, in which he had played a prominent part as the so-called Vice-President of the Chinese Republic, Li Tsung-jen emigrated to the United States. There he stayed for 17 years, then suddenly returned to China. In Peking Mao received him as an honoured guest. Banquets and receptions were held for him. Thereupon, he toured the big cities. During his travels he propagated the slogan, "to fight against imperialism it is essential to fight against revisionism", contributing thereby to the preparations for the "cultural revolution". His call for fighting against imperialism was a mere ploy, while his call for fighting against "revisionism" conformed in substance with Mao's own plans. On the international plane, this meant struggle against the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries, and the world communist movement. Inside the country, it meant struggle against the Communist Party of China, the foremost workers, peasants, intellectuals and youth, and the politically conscious revolutionary section of the People's Liberation Army.

It was an open secret that Snow and Li Tsung-jen represented the White House and expressed the opinion of official US quarters. They had a common objective: to learn more about the preparations for the "cultural revolution" and to express their approval on behalf of the White House.

In the summer of 1966, while waving the flag of a cultural revolution, Mao performed a counter-revolutionary coup. Again, he was seeking to win the confidence of imperialist reaction and to begin cooperating with it on an anti-Soviet and anti-communist basis. His designs bore fruit. US President Lyndon Johnson, State Secretary Dean Rusk, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, and others, stated that they wanted to improve American-Chinese relations, to cooperate with China in the Far East, and acted accordingly. A conference of US experts declared that the White House looked with favour upon Mao Tse-tung in the belief that "Mao's victory in the 'cultural revolution' is in the interests of the USA".

More declarations followed from influential US quarters, saying that they wanted better relations and cooperation with the Maoists. Commercial, diplomatic and political actions were taken to "stimulate mutual understanding".

In short, in the period from 1965 to 1970 both sides—Mao Tse-tung and the US quarters concerned—took the requisite steps to arrange for cooperation.

14. In the period from the summer of 1970 to the spring of 1971 Mao and Snow held long confidential talks on these issues. It will be recalled that in 1936 Mao and Snow had become bosom friends at first sight. There is evidence that Snow was the first middleman through whom Mao arranged secret contacts with imperialist US quarters. This was why Mao often referred gratefully to Snow, saying: "I owe it mainly to Snow that I have become known all over the world, especially in the USA, and that I am understood by the Americans." In February 1971, as Snow was leaving Peking after many secret conversations with Mao concerning Maoist-American cooperation, they parted close friends who had come to an understanding and whose relations were cordial and frank. This is borne out by a variety of sources and by Snow's own report in *Life* in April 1971. They had discussed a visit to China by the US President, Mao's continuing struggle against those of his countrymen who favoured friendship with the Soviet Union and opposed a rapprochement with US imperialism, and many other subjects. There is this revealing passage in Snow's report in *Life*, referring to Mao: "As he courteously escorted me to the door, he said he was not a complicated man, but really very simple. He was, he said, only a lone monk walking the world with a leaky umbrella."

The sense of Mao's sad words was that after the outbreak of the "cultural revolution" he had been abandoned or betrayed by his closest associates; a "purge" was in the offing of his most trusted friends (including his appointed "successor" Lin Biao and intimate Chen Po-ta). He was conscious of his aloneness and his failing strength, and was in desperate need of help from the United States.

Certainly, the above does not cover all the aspects of Maoist policy, directed to cooperation with imperialist forces. But it is enough to show that Mao's rapproche-

ment with imperialism is neither sudden nor fortuitous, and that it is a deliberately planned aim of Mao's counter-revolutionary activity.

4. THE BASIC REASONS FOR MAO'S DISGRACE

It is beyond question that Mao's disgraceful fall, his betrayal of the revolution, has ideological, theoretical, historical and social roots.

The ideological roots are in his counter-revolutionary ideas of feudal monarchism, anarchism, Trotskyism, militarism, and reactionary pragmatism. This is why, though Mao did join the revolutionary movement, his ideology drove him ultimately to the ranks of counter-revolutionaries.

The theoretical roots: in philosophy, political economy, and in the question of revolution and socialist construction, Mao was not simply a false Marxist who concealed his true identity behind a "Marxist" mask, but an outright opponent of Marxism. This is why, though he did penetrate the ranks of the Communist Party by pretending to be a follower of Marxism-Leninism, he ultimately substituted his unscientific and counter-revolutionary Maoism for the profoundly scientific and revolutionary teaching of Marxism-Leninism, and became a traitor to Marxism-Leninism.

The historical roots: Mao's lifestory is not only a long history of anti-Party, anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist, anti-Comintern and anti-Soviet activity, not only a history of right- and "left"-opportunist mistakes in questions of policy in all the periods of the Chinese revolution, and in many cases a history of grave crimes, but also a long history of ideological kowtowing to imperialism. This is why from a pseudo-Communist carrying the Communist banner he ultimately turned into an outright anti-communist using the Communist Party flag as camouflage.

The social roots: in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and socialist revolution Mao mainly represented the interests of the national bourgeoisie (as most clearly expressed in his *On New Democracy*). His style and method smack of the ways and morals of declassé petty proprietors and lumpenproletarians, and in some cases even of rank feudal landlordism. These are the complex social origins of the anti-proletarian character of his ideas and

actions. It was inevitable that he should ultimately betray the interests of the proletariat.

The limits of this book prevent me from going into the sources of Mao's disgrace in greater detail.

But to get a better idea of the reasons why Mao turned into a class traitor and national renegade we must, if only briefly, examine one of the important ideological sources that influenced his thinking and behaviour—feudal monarchism. The old Chinese feudal monarchism affected him chiefly in two ways: he was drawn to the egocentric "son of heaven" notion, that is, the deification of one's self in the manner of the Chinese emperors as son of heaven (god, supreme being), a superman who considers no other men his equals and cannot treat them as equals; all other men (foreigners as well as compatriots) are ordained from birth to be his subjects and slaves. This is the ideological source of Mao's disgraceful and ridiculous individualism. He deified himself, called himself "the red sun", the "magic ape Sun Wu-Kung", "the first in the Celestial Empire", "the only great man with no equals either among the ancients or among contemporaries", and the "new emperor". He was also drawn to the feudal monarchistic Sinocentric notions of the Celestial Empire—the autocrat's deification of his dynasty as the embodiment of the divine will and cause, rejecting equal relations with other countries, which are ordained to be its tributaries and vassals. This is the ideological source of Mao's presumptuous and extreme nationalism, yearning day and night for the supremacy of his Maoist dynasty in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and for world hegemony.

It should be remembered, however, that these notions apply exclusively to periods of prosperity. There were also many feudal dynasties in Chinese history which at times of decline paid tribute to stronger foreign dynasties, gave their daughters in wedlock to alien rulers, and swore allegiance to them as faithful vassals. The king humbled himself and called himself "son-emperor" to preserve his tenuous hold on power. At such times, the "sanctity of the son of heaven" and the "impregnability of the Celestial Empire" were forgotten. And this, too, affected Mao's thinking, for did he not advocate a pro-Japanese line of national treason and does he not now follow a pro-imperialist line of national treason?

IV THE FATE OF THE "LONE MONK" AND THE MAOIST 10TH CONGRESS

1. WHY MAO TSE-TUNG BECAME A "LONE MONK"

1) The inevitable result of ideological and political mistakes.

Mao Tse-tung became a "lone monk". This was not surprising. It was, first of all, a logical result of the evolution and development of his ideological mistakes and erroneous political lines. Of late, Mao has been saying, "everything depends on whether the ideological and political line is correct". And this is essentially true. If a Communist makes one ideological mistake after another, if he continuously follows an erroneous political line, turning a deaf ear to the critical remarks of leading Party organs and comrades, and if he continues to aggravate his mistakes, he is bound to end up a traitor to Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, the socialist revolution and socialist construction, to the Communist Party, the proletariat, and the toilers. This was the path of traitor Trotsky. This was the path of traitor Chen Tu-hsiu. And this is also Mao Tse-tung's path to treason.

In 28 years—from the founding of the CPC in 1921 to the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949—Mao made one serious ideological and political mistake after another, taking either "left" or right opportunist lines.

Since the victory of the Chinese revolution, with Mao's ideological and political mistakes developing in scale and depth, his evolution culminated in betrayal of communist ideas and collusion with imperialism. Detested by Communists and working people, he became what he himself described as a "lone monk".

2) The inevitable result of persecuting and exterminating all "close associates"

That Mao has become a "lone monk" was also the unavoidable result of his own intrigues and plots, and of the brutal repression of his closest and most faithful associates. The inhuman brutality Mao loosened against his revolutionary comrades and Communists is common knowledge. Here I will cite only a few examples of how perfidiously and savagely he treated people whom he had used at different times and who were counted among his "intimates" and "allies". These few examples are enough to show why he became a "lone monk" deserted by his closest confederates.

In the autumn of 1927, on orders of the Central Committee, Mao came to the mountains of Chinggangshan at the head of a troop of armed peasants. At that time peasant troops had no combat experience, and Mao could depend only on the units of Wang Tso and Yuan Wen-tsai, which consisted of peasant rebels who had long since found refuge in Chinggangshan. It was thanks to military cooperation with these units that Mao managed to survive and build a support base. In the spring of 1928 Chu Teh arrived there with revolutionary units, and in the autumn Peng Teh-huai and Huang Kung-lueh with their units. Thereupon, resorting to the old warlord trick, "a plot and a banquet", Mao executed Wang Tso and Yuan Wen-tsai, and disarmed their troops. At the end of the thirties, in one of his talks with me, Mao admitted: "After all these years I have realised that Wang Tso and Yuan Wen-tsai should have been spared. They and their troops had been fairly successfully re-educated."

It was not until Chu Teh, Peng Teh-huai, Huang Kung-lueh, and others came to Chinggangshan that it became a revolutionary base capable of independent military operations. Mao had no knowledge of warcraft. Unfortunately, Huang Kung-lueh was killed during a Kuomintang air raid in 1931. For many years, Mao relied chiefly on Chu Teh and Peng Teh-huai. Then, some years after seizing military leadership in the Party at the Tsunyi conference (January 1935), he did not hesitate to humiliate them. During the "style rectification" campaign in the early forties they were charged with

grave political and organisational mistakes. And their persecution continued during the "cultural revolution". Peng Teh-huai, especially, was treated with extraordinary brutality.

It was chiefly the "Mao-Lo bloc" that enabled Mao Tse-tung to usurp the top military post in the Party at Tsunyi in January 1935. In other words, he did it with the help of Lo Fu (Chang Wen-tien) and Wang Chia-hsiang. But in the forties, during the "style rectification", they were both attacked by him, and during the "cultural revolution" the attack was renewed.

Mao launched his "style rectification campaign" with the help, among other things, of the "Mao-Liu bloc", which he had begun to shape in October 1938 at the 6th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee. Yet during the "cultural revolution" he pilloried Liu Shao-chi as spy, strike-breaker, traitor, revisionist, chief power-holding capitalist-roader, and the like, and dealt with him cruelly.

As for Lin Piao, Mao had befriended him since 1933. At that time Lin Piao did not take Mao's offer of being his "successor" seriously. He told Po Ku about it as a funny episode.

After the Tsunyi conference, Mao took advantage of his post of General Commissar of the Chinese Red Army and, later, Chairman of the Party's Military Council to win over Lin Piao. Twice he spoke about Lin Piao to me.

The first time was in the spring of 1939. Mao said:

"Comrade Wang Ming, why are you making up to Lin Piao? He is my man, and I don't want my wall undermined."

"What do you mean?" I asked in surprise.

"Why did you praise Lin Piao at the meeting with an international youth delegation in Hankow last summer?"

"All I said was that General Lin Piao, who was in command in the battle at Pinghsinkuan, was also a young man. How can this be considered as making up to him, or as 'undermining' your wall?" I replied.

"By praising Lin Piao you were undermining my wall," Mao said. "Now listen: I have been doing military work for well over ten years, and the only friend I have won is Lin Piao. He is my man. His is the only army I can call mine, the only army I can depend on. The other units of the 8th Route and New 4th armies are not

mine. So, be careful. I'll not let anyone undermine my wall."

The second time we talked on this subject was after the closing of the 2nd Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee in March 1949. Mao had said that my speech at the Plenum contained "ten poisons". Two of them concerned Lin Piao.

Mao said to me:

"Why did you praise Lin Piao at the Plenum? Why did you say his description of the military situation had been clear and to the point? Didn't I tell you ten years ago that to praise Lin Piao was to undermine my wall? Now you have praised him again. Isn't this poisonous?"

"And didn't I tell you ten years ago," I replied, "that, as I see it, all Party cadres, including you and me, belong to the Party and that it is absurd to say that some are mine or yours, or anybody's. I did not mean to make up to Lin Piao or to make him 'my' man. You say that you and he have been close for a long time. If that is the case, can a few words of praise win him away from you?"

These two talks show how much Mao depended on Lin Piao, how much he needed him and how unsure he was of him. His relationship with Lin Piao was not that of two close associates with common aims and ideals. Though by abusing his post of Chairman of the Military Council and that of Central Committee Chairman, Mao used pressure and promises to befriend Lin Piao and make him his supporter in the army, the latter did not want to be involved in Mao's dirty tricks. During the "style rectification", for example, Mao did not tell Lin Piao of his plan of falsifying the history of the Party or of his other intrigues, for the latter would have disapproved. I can also cite a few other cases in which I was personally involved and which show that there were disagreements between Lin Piao and Mao Tse-tung.

1. In December 1937 at the first Politbureau meeting that I attended after my return to Yen-an from the Comintern, two different assessments were made of the battle at Pinghsinkuan and of our strategy in the anti-Japanese war.

Mao said that the battle at Pinghsinkuan had broken the rules of guerrilla warfare, that it had been a battle

of manoeuvre, and that no such battles should be fought in future because we were not capable of anything but guerrilla operations against the Japanese. This, he said, was our strategy.

Chu Teh, commander-in-chief of the 8th Route Army, Peng Teh-huai, his deputy, Hsiang Ying, formally deputy commander but in fact the commander of the New 4th Army, Chou En-lai, deputy chairman of the CC CPC Military Council, and others, maintained that the battle at Pinghsinkuan had shown that given appropriate preparations and favourable conditions we were clearly capable of taking on the Japanese in similar battles; certainly, so long as our army lacked modern weapons, guerrilla warfare should be our main strategic course, but when conditions were favourable we should not shun battles of manoeuvre.

We also discussed the proposals of Stalin and Voroshilov which I had brought from Moscow: the 8th Route and New 4th armies should muster available means to form units with modern arms. These arms could come from the one-fifth or one-fourth share of Soviet arms supplied to the Chinese armed forces under the accord reached some years before with Chiang Kai-shek. Stalin had also asked me to say to the Politbureau of the CC CPC:

"Artillery is the god of modern warfare. The 8th Route and New 4th armies should form artillery units. The Soviet Union can help with a workshop for repairing guns, machine-guns, rifles, and other weapons, and for making shells and cartridges. Equipment and technicians could also be supplied." All comrades of the Politbureau welcomed Stalin's and Voroshilov's proposals, with the sole exception of Mao Tse-tung.

Mao said: "Against the Japanese we must fight a guerrilla war. We need no guns. We need no workshop. They will be a nuisance." Of course, he was wrong—not only militarily, but also politically.

At that time, Lin Piao was not a member of the Politbureau. He did not attend the meeting, where he could have expressed his opinion. But as far as I know from other Politbureau comrades, he opposed Mao's viewpoint.

2. One November day in 1948, entering Mao's study, I found him in a state of extreme irritation.

"What is the trouble, Chairman Mao?" I asked.

Lin Piao's personal secretary
"It's Lin Piao," he replied.

"What has he done?"

"Lin Piao is disobeying orders," Mao said. "I have issued several orders for him to attack and take Chang-chun. He won't do it. He wants to starve the city and make its garrison surrender."

3. The following month I again found Mao in the same state of irritation.

I asked:

"Chairman Mao, what is it this time?"

"It's Lin Piao again," he said.

"What has he done?"

Mao replied:

"He is still disobeying orders. I drew up an ultimatum for Fu Tso-yi. Lin Piao was to have forwarded it to him. I demanded immediate surrender. If Fu Tso-yi were to reject it, we would mount a general offensive and wipe him out. Lin Piao has disobeyed my orders on the advice of Ten Pao-shuang and other middlemen. They say Fu Tso-yi is a stubborn northerner and is sure to refuse to surrender; they claim, on the other hand, that he may be persuaded to join us as a 'rebel'. If we present the ultimatum, he may engage his 300,000 men in a desperate assault. If defeated, he would escape by plane to Nanking, while Peking and its environs would be ravaged—something we want to avoid. So, Lin Piao is still waiting for Fu Tso-yi to 'rebel', and is ignoring my orders."

Yes, Lin Piao often had his own viewpoint. He refused to be Mao's blind tool.

Yet, in military matters Mao was compelled to depend on Lin Piao. In 1959, when he dismissed Peng Teh-huai from the post of Minister of Defence, he appointed Lin Piao to replace him and let him handle all the current affairs of the Central Committee's Military Council. Also, he ordered Lin Piao to launch the "learn from Lei Feng" campaign in the armed forces. To all intents and purposes, this meant propagating the slogan, "read the books of Chairman Mao, obey Chairman Mao, follow the behests of Chairman Mao", and inculcating a spirit of blind obedience to Mao. Thereupon, Mao launched the "learn from the Liberation Army" and "educate successors" campaigns to further the personality cult and to set the stage for officially naming Lin Piao his successor.

When the "cultural revolution" began, Lin Piao extolled Mao's person and "thoughts", and the Maoist propaganda machine kept howling day and night: "Lin Piao is Chairman Mao's closest associate", "Lin Piao is the most faithful associate of Chairman Mao and the most faithful exponent of the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung", and "Lin Piao is the finest successor of Chairman Mao". At the time of the so-called 9th Congress it was officially written into the Party Constitution that Lin Piao was Mao's "successor".

In less than two and a half years, however, there occurred the so-called September events. Lin Piao vanished from the scene together with his wife Yeh Chun, deputy minister of defence and chief-of-staff Huang Yung-sheng, commander of the air force Wu Fa-hsien, political commissar of the navy Li Tso-peng, and chief of army ordnance Chu Hui-tso. At the 9th Congress all of them had, on Mao's special instructions, been elected members of the Politbureau.

The September events occurred during the "sudden improvement" in Maoist-American relations following the two visits to Peking of Henry Kissinger, special envoy of the US President, and shortly before Nixon's visit. The foreign press deduced a cause-and-effect connection between the Maoist-American rapprochement and Mao's break with Lin Piao.

Now, a few words about Chen Po-ta. In September 1941 Mao made him his personal secretary and aide in the "style rectification campaign". Mao befriended him and furthered his career. On Mao's advice Chen Po-ta wrote commentaries and articles on crucial issues of home and foreign policy. This was to give him "weight" and influence. Mao gradually promoted him from alternate member of the Central Committee to member of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau, and made him one of his most trusted lieutenants. He declared on every possible occasion that Chen Po-ta was the principal interpreter of the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung", and saw to it that this should be universally acknowledged. During the "cultural revolution" he put Chen Po-ta at the head of the group supervising the "cultural revolution", though Chiang Ching, Mao's wife, was its actual chief. All the same, the appointment, albeit only nominal, was a token of special trust. Yet in August 1970, soon after

Edgar Snow's arrival in Peking, Chen Po-ta stopped appearing on the political scene, and according to various quarters vanished completely together with Lin Piao during the September events of 1971.

Mao had often said that he had four "old close associates" dating to the Chingkangshan period: Lo Jung-huang, Tan Chien, Lo Jui-ching and Ho Chang-kung. Following the "style rectification campaign" he said that he also had several "new close associates": Liu Shao-chi, Chen Po-ta, Hu Chiao-mu, Peng Chen, Kao Kang, Lu Ting-i and Chou Yang. Kao Kang was physically eliminated by Mao in 1954, Lo Jung-huang died of an illness in 1963, and none of his other new and old "close associates" survived the repressions of the "cultural revolution" period.

3) The inevitable result of "style rectification" and "cultural revolution"

Mao became a "lone monk" as a result of the "style rectification" campaign and the "cultural revolution", both of which he had organised himself. He became a "lone monk" due to his undisguised treachery and his collusion with imperialism and reaction on the basis of anti-Sovietism and anti-communism.

The "Lin Piao case" and its extremely grave consequences signified a major defeat for Mao's 9th Congress line. As a result, rent by strife and contradictions, the Maoist group is in sad straits and must continuously expect "storms and inclement weather". Mao's call at the 9th Congress for "unity to gain still greater victories" was in vain. There followed still greater division and still greater defeats. This is why Mao admits to being a "lone monk" who has lost prestige and the support of his followers. At the 10th Congress he was no more than "an idol in the temple of royal ancestors with thrice sealed lips".

2. THE HOME AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE MAOIST 10TH CONGRESS

According to the Chinese press, the 10th Congress of the CPC opened on 24 August and closed on 28 August 1973. But there are reliable reports that it opened ear-

lier, in mid-August. Following controversies and disagreements, the leadership finally published two reports, the constitution, a communique, and several lists of members of central organs.

The people of China and the world have not been told how many of the 1,249 delegates, all appointed by Mao, spoke in the debate, and what they said. Neither does anybody know whether Mao, who "directed the Congress", made any speech himself. But whether he did not speak or did (and does not dare publish his speech) he was obviously in difficulties. Judging from the published material, Mao's policy endorsed by the 10th Congress has become still more reactionary and its aims still more inappropriate. This is why the 10th Congress line is heading for still greater setbacks than that of the 9th Congress.

1) The main objective of home policy

We can see from the published material that the principal objective of Mao's home policy and the corresponding organisational measures is to maintain Mao's one-man reactionary rule and prepare the ground for transferring power to Chiang Ching.

First, this is confirmed by the central item dealt with by the 10th Congress—the so-called Lin Piao case. Why did Mao turn against Lin Piao, his official successor? What is behind the Lin Piao case? The Maoist political report to the 10th Congress delivered by Chou En-lai said: "Prior to the Congress, Lin Piao had produced a draft political report in collaboration with Chen Po-ta. They were opposed to continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, contending that the main task after the 9th Congress was to develop production. This was a refurbished version under new conditions of the same revisionist trash that Liu Shao-chi and Chen Po-ta had smuggled into the resolution of the 8th Congress, which alleged that the major contradiction in our country was not the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, but that between the advanced socialist system and the backward productive forces of society."

Mao rejected the draft and drew up a new report, which Lin Piao was to have delivered to the 9th Congress.

We can draw certain conclusions from the published extracts of the Maoist report.

1. Mao was in favour of "continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat", which means that he was in favour of continuing the counter-revolutionary "cultural revolution", hitting the proletariat and its vanguard, the Communist Party, on the pretext of "combatting the bourgeoisie". As for the national bourgeoisie, in the economic field Mao guaranteed the safety of its capital and profits, and trust and privileges in the political field.

2. Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta were against continuing Mao's "cultural revolution" and called for "developing production" in order to bring the "productive forces of society" in line with "the advanced socialist system" or, in other words, to end the "cultural revolution" and begin the building of socialism.

3. At the time of the 8th Congress Liu Shao-chi and Chen Po-ta, on the one hand, and Mao, on the other, fell out over the question of building socialism.

Why did Liu Shao-chi, the "standard-bearer" of Maoism, and Chen Po-ta, its "theorist", both of whom had enjoyed Mao's trust since the early forties, and Lin Piao, who had been cultivated by Mao for more than 30 years and was his official successor, become his opponents and enemies in the fifties and sixties?

To begin with, they were in daily contact with Mao for tens of years, and knew all his behind-the-scenes affairs. Furthermore, they had first-hand knowledge of the many mistakes in his "thoughts" and his home and foreign policy, and of their disastrous consequences. When Mao launched his anti-communist, anti-Soviet and anti-people "cultural revolution", which was obviously a counter-revolutionary coup, even his "standard-bearer", "theorist" and "successor" could not but rise against this counter-revolutionary and traitor.

Chou En-lai said in the same report that Lin Piao became Mao's mortal enemy because in August 1970 he started "a counter-revolutionary coup d'état, which was aborted, at the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee, then in March 1971 he drew up the plan for an armed counter-revolutionary coup d'état entitled Outline of Project '571', and on September 8 he launched the coup in a wild attempt to assassinate our

great leader Chairman Mao and set up a rival central committee."

A laughably crude version. Even before the 10th Congress, when, on Mao's orders, Chou En-lai explained the "Lin Piao case" to US and British correspondents, the latter commented in their reports that the tale did not sound true. Mao fabricated the circumstances of the case as a pretext for eliminating Lin Piao. But even if we were to accept the story as true, it is quite apparent that Lin Piao's motivations stemmed from Mao's complete ideological, political, and organisational bankruptcy. This was why Mao's intention to continue the "cultural revolution" encountered categorical objections even on the part of his "successor" and on the part of the chief of the "group supervising the cultural revolution".

The main reason why Mao destroyed Lin Piao was that he had never really meant to make Lin his successor. He had elevated Lin Piao in word, but was really setting the stage for Chiang Ching. I mentioned this in an article, "Mao Tse-tung Performs a Counter-Revolutionary Coup, Not a 'Cultural Revolution'" (March 1969). "Mao's anti-communist and anti-people group," I wrote, "consists of a handful of persons. Out of these his wife Chiang Ching is Mao's closest and most trusted associate. This is why he has contrived to put her in third place in his hierarchy, after Lin Piao." According to the communique of the 10th Congress, Mao branded Lin Piao a bourgeois careerist, conspirator, counter-revolutionary double-dealer, renegade and traitor, and had him expelled from the Party "once and for all". Chen Po-ta was described as "the principal member of the Lin Piao clique", branded an "anti-communist Kuomintang element", Trotskyite, renegade, enemy agent and revisionist, expelled from the Party and dismissed from all posts inside and outside the Party. The Congress delegates, the communique also said, "supported the decisions made on all the corresponding measures taken by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China with regard to the other principal members of the Lin Piao anti-Party clique".

Who were these "other principal members"? Mao lacked the courage to name them publicly. The whole world knows that when Lin Piao disappeared, his wife, a

member of the Politbureau, disappeared as well; so did four other members of the Politbureau, three of whom were also commanders-in-chief of three services—the ground forces, the air force, and the navy; the fourth was chief of army ordnance. But what has happened to Li Hsueh-feng, former alternate member of the Politbureau?

After the September 1971 events Mao purged the so-called Lin Piao group members in the Party, government, and especially the People's Liberation Army. Who were these people? The authors of the communique of the 10th Congress said nothing on this score. This, too, is part of the Mao Tse-tung style.

Since the September events Mao has been continuously repeating the slogan: "Practise Marxism, and not revisionism; unite, and don't split; be open and aboveboard, and don't intrigue and conspire". These three "musts" and three "don'ts" were written into the new Party Constitution as the "fundamental principles" of inner-Party struggle.

To conceal evildoings behind honeyed words is another favourite trick of Mao Tse-tung's.

For example, his anti-Leninist, anti-Soviet and anti-communist reactionary campaign he described as a "campaign for rectifying three styles", and his counter-revolutionary coup as a "cultural revolution" and a campaign "against a handful of capitalist-roaders holding power". His assault on Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta he also presents in a deliberately distorted light.

In fact, Mao has always been a juggler of truths and untruths, mixing facts and lies in order to deceive the people of China and the rest of the world and prevent them from seeing the true implications of the events.

All these are old tricks once extensively used by Chiang Kai-shek. His anti-communist coup of 12 April 1927 he described as "defence of the national revolution and purge of reactionary elements". While colluding with imperialism and selling his country down the river, he kept calling the Communists "national traitors". He was an out-and-out counter-revolutionary, yet he shouted from the rooftops that he, Chiang Kai-shek, was and had always been a revolutionary. "If you ever catch me doing anything counter-revolutionary," he used to say, "you may shoot me on the spot." Kuomintang veteran Hu

Han-min said on this score: "Chiang Kai-shek has pronounced all the fine words that exist, and has committed all the abominations imaginable." Chiang Kai-shek is one of the "three teachers" that Mao often said had influenced him (the other two are "the imperialist" and "the beggar"). In fact, Mao surpasses Chiang at spouting honeyed words to cover up iniquities. As the Chinese saying goes, "having originated from blue, bluer outdoes it"; another saying runs, "came later—went higher".

It is now apparent that the Lin Piao case has badly frightened Mao. Despite the violent reaction to the September 1971 events at home and abroad, Mao did not dare touch on the subject for a long time. Finally, he launched secret purges of military and political cadres, while officially he merely published the slogan of combatting "swindlers like Liu Shao-chi". Two years of mass purges and repressions followed. Still, the communique of the 10th Congress said: "At present we should continue to put the task of criticising Lin Piao and rectifying style of work above all else." The political report predicted that "Lin Piaos will appear again" and that events like the Lin Piao case will keep recurring.

This shows that it was Mao's continuous purges and repressions during the "cultural revolution" directed against Party, government and military cadres that had led to the Lin Piao case, and that the Lin Piao case is bound to lead to new purges and repressions. Mao is caught in a vicious circle of unsolvable contradictions in his relations with Party, government and military cadres, marked by ever increasing mutual distrust and hostility.

Second, at the 10th Congress Mao publicly declared his intention to continue maligning and persecuting Communists and the working people. The Maoist political report delivered by Chou En-lai said: "Lin Piaos will appear again and so will persons like Wang Ming, Liu Shao-chi, Peng Teh-huai and Kao Kang. This is something independent of man's will." This is the reason why Mao intends to renew his attacks on Party, government and military leaders, and also on tens of thousands of cadres employed in Party, government, military, mass and other organisations "ten, twenty, and thirty times", as he had done in the case of Lin Piao, Wang Ming, Liu Shao-chi, Peng Teh-huai and Kao Kang.

These words and deeds of Mao's have their origin in his "theory" of "removing the old and absorbing the new". What this concept means is that persecution of revolutionary cadres and working people must be as continuous as the blood circulation is in a human body. His targets are cadres and Party members of all the periods listed in the communique of the 10th Congress—not only the "older generation, which outlived the founding of the Party and the first and second revolutionary civil wars", not only "cadres who survived the ordeal of the anti-Japanese war", not only "those who took part in aiding the Korean people to repulse American aggression", and not only cadres who had grown up in the period between China's liberation and the outbreak of the "cultural revolution", but also those young leaders and cadres who had made their careers during the "cultural revolution", and the youth that joined the Party during this period.

In the beginning, the "cultural revolution group" consisted of 17 members. Out of these only Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan and Chang Chun-chiao have remained in the public eye. Its most zealous members have long since vanished from the scene. In short, Mao's intention to persecute and purge leaders, cadres and Party members is not a chance stratagem.

Though, in contrast to the earlier period of the "cultural revolution", Mao does not send "red guards" with unfurled banners and rolling drums into the streets to beat up Communists and working people or make them march in processions with dunce caps on their heads and yokes round their necks, exposed to insults and blows, his spies scour factories, mines, transport enterprises, offices, organisations, schools and homes, arresting, purging and exterminating cadres and intellectuals. This continuous persecution and extermination of whole groups of people with revolutionary experience, politically educated and able to see through his counter-revolutionary essence, is for Mao the chief means of buttressing his reactionary rule and preparing the ground for his heirs.

The "style rectification" and the "cultural revolution", the brutal persecution of "old associates" and "truly trusted persons" such as Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta, and especially the intention announced in the documents of the 10th Congress of continuing repressions, has finally

let people see Mao's perfidious and cruel nature. They have understood that Mao's treatment of any person depended exclusively on his usefulness to Mao's extreme egoistic interests. So long as a person was useful to him, Mao literally showered him with blessings, but the moment he was no longer needed he was kicked out and treated as prescribed in a memorable "cultural revolution" directive—"throw to the ground and trample with the boot". Mao's morbid suspiciousness ("better mistreat the guiltless than be deceived"), his despotism and violence, have surpassed those of Tsao Tsao, known and hated by most people down the ages for his perfidy and cupidity, but deeply revered by Mao Tse-tung.

Mao no longer believes anyone, except perhaps Chiang Ching. But neither does anybody believe Mao. The blame for this relationship of mistrust and suspicion between him and millions of Communists and working people falls entirely on Mao. And this tenuous state of incompatibility is bound, sooner or later, to precipitate great disorder, which will doubtless result in victory for the mass of the people and in defeat for the "lone monk".

Third, take the list of deputy chairmen of the Central Committee and the list of members of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau handpicked by Mao after the 10th Congress. In the past, there were always a few Party veterans in the top leadership. Mao was afraid to instal "new arrivals" made by the "cultural revolution" in high posts, lest this should cause outrage in the country. This time, however, he made Wang Hung-wen and Li Teh-shen deputy chairmen of the Central Committee, and the same Wang Hung-wen and Li Teh-shen, along with Chang Chun-chiao, members of the Standing Committee of the CC CPC Politbureau.

Since Mao has of late toned down the virulent cult of his person, and included neither Chiang Ching nor Yao Wen-yuan in the list of deputy chairmen of the Central Committee and members of the Politbureau Standing Committee, some observers concluded that he had suffered a setback at the 10th Congress or was compelled to draw back.

This is true. Mao and his "closest trusted persons" Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan found themselves in an atmosphere of disaffection created by the "cultural revolution" or, more precisely, by the bloody events of

the armed counter-revolution. So, they deemed it wiser to withdraw into the shade. But the move was purely formal.

Mao is still the dictator. He has given up none of his power. And Chiang Ching, who had moved up into second place—after Mao—at the time of the “cultural revolution” and was, in effect, general secretary of the Politbureau Standing Committee in charge of the Maoist party, continues to run the party’s affairs regardless of her formal office. The so-called single party leadership so vigorously emphasised by Mao these days, is designed to subordinate everybody to him and to his wife.

1. By making Wang Hung-wen and Li Teh-shen deputy chairmen of the Central Committee, and the same two plus Chang Chun-chiao members of the Politbureau Standing Committee, Mao set the stage for putting Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan in the same high office. What he wants to show is that since Wang Hung-wen, Li Teh-shen and Chang Chun-chiao can occupy to-echelon posts, so can Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan. At any moment, he is liable to raise Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan to the same summits.

2. The symbolic effect of Mao’s moves is still more important. He gave the country and the world to understand that China is entering a period when top party and government posts will be held by people who made their careers during the “cultural revolution”. Everybody knows that Wang Hung-wen was pushed up by the “cultural revolution”; it is known on good authority, in fact, that he played a leading part in the crimes of the *tsao-fans*, the trouble-makers, who “seized power” in Shanghai and ransacked the local organisations of the Communist Party, the trade unions, and the local government. He joined the Maoist party and was promptly made deputy chairman of the Shanghai “revolutionary committee”. Then, Mao transferred him to Peking to give him political prestige, for he was being groomed for a leading role at the 10th Congress. Mao put Wang Hung-wen in second place after himself chiefly to bring home to the people that from now on top-ranking leaders would come from among those made by the “cultural revolution”. Also, this move was to pave the way for officially appointing Chiang Ching his successor. In short, to use the classic phrase, Wang Hung-wen is now “a

typical personage in a typical situation” or, in the political jargon, the most typical representative of those made by the “cultural revolution”.

Mao’s political stratagem is designed to make people accept the idea that since Wang Hung-wen can take second place, Chiang Ching can too, for she has a greater claim.

Mao regards the counter-revolutionary “cultural revolution” as the biggest “achievement” of his life, and holds that Chair No. 1 should, therefore, forever be his. And if “credit is given where it is due”, who should occupy Chair No. 2? Lin Piao, who was his appointed heir, is no more. Chen Po-ta, chief of the “cultural revolution group”, has also been eliminated. Consequently, the deputy chief of the “group”, Chiang Ching, is a “natural” contender. Is this not clear? Mao is planning to put Chiang Ching in Chair No. 2 and appoint her his successor. For this he needs only to push Wang Hung-wen out. But this does not mean that Mao will no longer use Wang Hung-wen in his underhand dealings. On the contrary, Wang Hung-wen was promoted by him for this express purpose. Wang has already been used to deliver the Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution, which says that “revolutions like this will have to be carried out many times in the future”. And there is no doubt that Mao also intends to use Wang Hung-wen as chief of a “second cultural revolution”.

Fourth, take the list of members of the Tenth Central Committee. It contains still fewer old members and alternate members dating to before the 9th Congress, while the number of those who made their careers during the “cultural revolution” has increased. Besides, there are 40 women among them. This is unprecedented, considering that in addition there were 32 women among the 148 members of the Tenth Congress presidium. This fact cannot by itself evoke adverse comment, but in the case of the Maoist clique it has a definite purpose—to give greater weight to the person of Chiang Ching and prepare cadres to support her ascension to the throne.

Now about the rehabilitation of the score of old members and alternate members of the Central Committee. Here, too, Mao was guided by selfish ends. On the one hand, he wanted to soothe feelings in conditions of a grave crisis and, on the other, he had a definite use for

each of the rehabilitated: some were to win over certain military units, others to win sympathy among non-Han peoples, and still others were rehabilitated simply for the sake of appearances. As for the bulk of the "rehabilitated", we can still rightfully use the Chinese saying: "Though we hear the staircase creak, the ones who are descending it are not to be seen". Are these people still alive? Are they still in prison, and still being tortured? Are they doing forced labour in May Seventh cadres schools? Are they under house arrest and still exposed to insults? Or have they really regained their freedom and are really being treated as members of the Central Committee?

Let us assume that they are still alive, and that they have nominally been reinstated on the Central Committee. Let us even assume that a still greater number will return to the Central Committee and other institutions. But are they safe from being persecuted and repressed again?

Fifth, take Mao's treatment of the youth and women's movements. Prior to the 10th Congress, Mao hurriedly formed a false Komsomol. The new Maoist Party Constitution adopted by the 10th Congress says that the *hungweipings* (red guards) and *hungsiaopings* (little red guards) are legitimate organisations of youth and children. The false Komsomol is meant to deceive the public and to make the name of the Komsomol available for Mao's underhand designs. The *hungweipings* and *hungsiaopings* have been preserved for use in the successive "cultural revolutions" of the future as a blind tool for killing, manhandling, and tormenting cadres and working people.

As for women's organisations, Mao had always treated them with disdain. In the initial period of the "cultural revolution" he is known to have said: "There is nothing more useless than women's organisations". Women's organisations were crushed, and their cadres arrested. But since 8 March 1972 he has been saying: "Due attention must be devoted to work among women" and "all things men can do, women can do as well". Since the 10th Congress the women's movement is being revived. Women's conferences are being held in all provincial centres. New women's organisations are being formed. And the aim is obvious: to have mass organisations that

would sound the praises of Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Ching, and serve as pillars of support for Chiang Ching.

The above examples show that Mao is hurrying to buttress his reactionary rule and to set the stage for Chiang Ching's inheriting his "throne". But in the internal and international conditions of the seventies, Mao's attempts at making the People's Republic of China a family concern can, of course, have but one outcome—total bankruptcy.

The Maoist political report to the 10th Congress, like that to the 9th, contains no concrete mention of economic or cultural "achievements". There is not one concrete figure in it. The Maoist clique channels a considerable portion of the national income, the contributions of overseas Chinese, and the lion's share of the revenue from foreign trade into war industries, especially nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Considerable resources are being allocated for subversive activity against the socialist community, the world communist movement, the anti-imperialist national liberation movement, and the peace movement. Much money is spent on financing a fifth column in various countries to promote Mao's above-mentioned aims. Only a small portion of the national income goes to industry and agriculture, sustaining the life of the mass of the people at a minimal level. So, what could Mao have said about economic "achievements".

If he had really wanted to name figures showing the living standard of the people, he would have had to admit that during the past 20 years there was austerity and strict rationing of necessities as in wartime. Take food. All that a person can buy on a month's ration cards is from nine to 20 kilograms of bread (or root crops at a ratio of 4:1) and from 125 to 225 grams of vegetable oil. As for other commodities, specifically cloth, from five to nine metres are allotted per person annually. All the same, Mao's clique keeps urging people "to divide the food of three among five", "to eat a mouthful less at every meal" and "to prepare for war and natural calamities"—all in order "to store more grain". Speaking of housing, practically no new construction has been seen since the time of the "big leap" (1958).

Outside the biggest cities—where a modest number of higher educational establishments is still functioning

23
with a shorter training period, a curtailed curriculum, and a reduced number of students—secondary and primary education, which has been completely denied state subsidies following its “transfer to the charge of the people’s communes”, is in a truly wretched state. There are shortages of specialists in various fields of science and production. Many were repressed, many were exiled to villages. So, what could Mao have said about “achievements” in the cultural field?

It would have been self-chastisement for the Mao clique to refer to these economic and cultural facts. This is why the matter was glossed over in silence in the Maoist reports to the 9th and 10th congresses.

The spending of tremendous sums for the upkeep of the Maoist empire and for war preparations, on the one hand, and the policy of consigning the vast majority of the nation to wretched poverty, suffering and premature death, on the other, have created insoluble and increasingly sharp contradictions between the Maoist clique and the people of China.

2) The central link in the foreign policy of the 10th Congress

To judge from the documents of the 10th Congress and the accompanying diplomatic activity, Mao’s aims in foreign affairs are focussed on intensive preparations for war against the Soviet Union and attempts at provoking a world war.

First, this is made evident by the communique of the 10th Congress. It says: “Be on guard ... particularly against surprise attacks by social-imperialism and be ready to wipe out resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely any enemy that dare invade us!” What clearer evidence can there be that Mao is in fact himself preparing an anti-Soviet war?

As far back as 1964, addressing guests from Japan, Mao laid claim to large areas in the Soviet Union and to the territory of the Mongolian People’s Republic. Following the outbreak of the “cultural revolution” in 1966, the *hungweipings*, encouraged by Mao, screamed to the accompaniment of rolling drums that they want “to go to war against Moscow and hoist the red banner of the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung over the Kremlin”.

Troops were concentrated in areas bordering on the Soviet Union, and large numbers of “red guards” were settled in areas adjoining the Chinese-Soviet and Chinese-Mongolian borders.

In March 1969, on Mao’s orders, Chinese troops twice perfidiously attacked Soviet border guards, causing bloodshed on the Chinese-Soviet border. In this extremely grave situation, the Soviet Union was compelled to take all requisite defensive measures, on the one hand, and in September 1969 to offer the Chinese side immediately to begin negotiations on border issues, on the other. These negotiations have been dragging on for a number of years, but have so far yielded no results due to the intransigence of the Maoists.

Addressing the jubilee meeting on the 50th anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted that in 1971 the Soviet Government had offered the Chinese Government to conclude a treaty on the non-use of force. The Chinese side took no notice of this proposal. Speaking in Tashkent in September 1973, Brezhnev revealed that in June the Soviet Union had again offered to conclude a Sino-Soviet non-aggression treaty, and again the Chinese side saw fit to ignore the offer.

Despite this, in the past few years the Maoist propaganda machine has been howling about “Soviet intentions to attack China”. And on the pretext of countering this “Soviet threat”, Mao is calling on the people of China “to prepare for war,” “to prepare for war and for hunger”, and the like. This is meant to justify the intensive growth of war industries, the manufacture of nuclear arms and missiles of varying range, the mustering of tens of millions of people for digging bomb-shelters, and the military training of militiamen in towns and villages. An extremely tense atmosphere of imminent war is thus being created to make people submit to military controls and to reconcile themselves to poverty.

Recently, Mao advanced this slogan: “Dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony”. The first two phrases are aimed at furthering war preparations, while the third ostensibly explains the aim of an eventual war. But Mao’s double-dealing is well known. By saying “never seek hegemony”, he means that hegemony is to be sought.

Preparing for an anti-Soviet war and attempting to provoke a world war—these two aims, the substance of Mao's foreign policy, also underlie his home policy. He is hostile to everything associated with the Leninist foreign policy of peace of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, and puts himself out to defame the grand Peace Programme of the 24th Congress of the CPSU which has already helped change the world climate. As a result, Mao's loathsome image of warmonger is still better seen by the whole world.

Second, Mao is eager to throw in his lot with the extreme reactionary imperialist groups. He has gone out of his way to establish contacts with NATO, and is seeking closer relations with the Common Market. He is wooing the US military-industrial complex, the revenge-seeking forces in West Germany, the anti-Soviet and anti-communist British Tories and Japanese militarist groups. He advises against reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe, pleads for the US 7th Fleet to drag out its presence in Asia, tries to torpedo the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and is dead set against collective security in Asia.

Third, Mao is supporting, and showing friendly feeling towards the fascist coup in Chile. He expelled the ambassador of the Popular Unity government and welcomed an ambassador appointed by the fascist junta. Siding with the fascist dictatorship, he treats as enemies the Communist Party of Chile and its General Secretary, Luis Corvalan, the Socialist Party of Chile built by President Salvadore Allende, and the working people of Chile fighting courageously against fascism.

This is no accident. The targets of Mao's counter-revolutionary coup and the counter-revolutionary coup of the Chilean militarists were the same—Marxism-Leninism, the working class and its parties, the working peasantry, the progressive intelligentsia, and revolutionary youth. On the international plane both coups were directed against the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole, the world communist and working-class movement, the anti-imperialist national liberation movement, and the peace movement. In both cases the methods were the same as well—terror, brutality, physical elimination, and burning of books.

By siding with the fascist military dictatorship in Chile, Mao demonstrates support of "confederates" and joint action with US imperialist forces. This is why the Chilean militarists not only express their gratitude to Mao, but also, as reported, are aiming to send a delegation to Peking "to study the experience" of Mao's counter-revolutionary coup. And this, too, Mao and his chums probably consider a "great victory" for the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" and the "great cultural revolution".

Brotherly treatment of the Chilean junta is intended to win Chile as an ally in Mao's anti-Soviet and anti-communist drive, and, with other imperialist agents, to create one more base in Latin America for disrupting the anti-imperialist, democratic, progressive, and peace movements.

"Things are grouped by quality, and people by spiritual kinship"—this aphorism explains the friendship and sympathy shown by Mao, who has performed a counter-revolutionary coup in his own country, for all and sundry fascist dictatorships abroad.

Fourth, Mao is trying to foment conflicts in Asia and Africa. He is annoyed at the restoration of peace in Vietnam. He is sabotaging a peaceful solution in the Middle East. He is doing his utmost to prevent a negotiated solution of the disputes between India and Bangladesh, on the one hand, and Pakistan, on the other. And he does all this to further his criminal plans of turning local wars into a world war.

Mao is hostile to the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, which is tremendously important for peace in Asia and the rest of the world. He has set out to disrupt the historical friendship between the peoples of three great powers in Asia—China, India, and the Soviet Union. He is continuously stoking up tensions in Chinese-Soviet and Chinese-Indian relations, and persists in his attempts at disrupting cooperation between India and the Soviet Union.

Mao is trying to divide and weaken the movement for African unity directed against imperialism and against old and new colonialism, and also connives with the reactionary racist regime of the Republic of South Africa.

Everywhere in Asia and Africa he is spreading demagogic propaganda tales about the "two superpowers"—

the USSR and USA—with the one objective of anti-Soviet subversion. Using appeals for “struggle against US imperialism” as a cover, Mao is in fact doing his utmost to injure the Soviet Union and to win some of the Asian and African countries for the imperialist camp, to enlist them as partners to his pro-imperialist, anti-Soviet and anti-communist policy of inciting armed conflicts in Asia and Africa as a fuse for setting off a world war.

Fifth, the essence of Maoist policy is revealed in the following passage of the communique of the 10th Congress: “We must unite with all genuine Marxist-Leninist parties and organisations the world over and carry the struggle against modern revisionism through to the end.”

What Mao calls “genuine Marxist-Leninist parties and organisations” (as Trotsky had once called his counter-revolutionary organisations “Leninist”) are handfuls of renegades financed by him and serving his ends. The appeal to “carry the struggle against modern revisionism through to the end” means that Mao considers hostility towards the socialist community and all communist and workers’ parties to be his main aim. The traitors to communism, bourgeois agents, still surviving Trotskyites, “left” and right opportunists, revisionists, and the like, whom he has gathered to his fold in various countries, are doing his bidding and stridently extolling his name, and splitting their lungs in the anti-Soviet and anti-communist chorus. Today, this chorus is singing the praises of the reactionary “thoughts of Mao Tse-tung” and the counter-revolutionary “cultural revolution”, on the one hand, and of Mao’s attempts to undermine world peace, intensify war preparations, and provoke a world war, on the other.

The 10th Congress communique says: “The Congress pointed out: the present international situation is characterised by great disorder on the earth.” What does this mean? From Mao’s point of view it means imminence of a world war.

Mao’s attempts at turning local wars (such as the war in Vietnam, the war on the Indian subcontinent, the war in the Middle East, etc.) into a world war have failed. The armed conflicts he had himself provoked on the Chinese-Indian border did not develop into a full-scale war. Mao’s armed provocations against the Soviet Union did not grow into a large-scale conflict because the Soviet

Union, while repulsing the aggressor, followed a firm policy of peace.

Now Mao is resorting to other methods. He is trying to bring China into the imperialist camp, to make her an ally of imperialist groups in order one day to try and ignite a third world war. He hopes a new world war will tighten his precarious hold on power and, at once, secure his hegemony in the “third world” and, later, the whole world. But this mad dream will not come true. The imperialists will hardly want to be victims of a worldwide thermonuclear holocaust in Mao’s company. But one thing compels vigilance: Mao is in a desperate plight; there is nothing he can count on. If he manages to amass a quantity of nuclear weapons and missiles and succeeds in obtaining modern weapons in sufficient quantity from reactionary imperialist sources, he may decide to plunge into a military adventure.

The people of China and all other nations must be constantly vigilant against imperialist attempts at breaching the peace in concert with Mao Tse-tung. They must firmly repulse all such attempts.

3) Mao in the grip of insoluble contradictions

Mao’s efforts to reach the above-mentioned aims in home and foreign policy have submerged him in a quagmire of contradictions. From these there is no escape. And all the more desperate are his attempts at making the People’s Republic of China a reactionary family concern for himself and his wife, and the greater is the anger and resistance of the true Chinese Communists and the people of China. But the more clearly he feels the general indignation and the wish of hundreds of millions of working people to be rid of him, the more active he will be in forging a reactionary “family state” as his only recourse. And the more reckless are his attempts at provoking an anti-Soviet and a new world war, the more sweeping will be the condemnation and resistance of the Communists of all countries and of all peace-loving mankind, and the greater the loathing he will earn of the Communists and people of China. And the knowledge that the Chinese people and the rest of the world regard him as an enemy will make him seek

salvation all the more desperately in intensifying reaction at home and in provoking wars between nations. Besides, for him collusion with extreme reactionary imperialist groups is a stepping-stone to his aims in home and foreign policy, for they are his closest allies both in inciting wars on the international scene and in retaining his grip inside the country. This adds to the existing internal and external contradictions and increases the hostility between Mao and the vast revolutionary and progressive forces at home and abroad. And the more clearly he sees that he cannot overcome these forces, the more desperately will he seek contact with extreme reactionary imperialist groupings.

The contradictions, which are of Mao's own making, are continuously growing deeper. They are like a giant net in which Mao, this "magic ape Sun Wu-kung", has entangled himself without hope of redemption.

Since the time of the "cultural revolution" Mao has created a variety of insoluble contradictions. And these new contradictions make the old ones, the ones he created before, still sharper.

He has substituted counter-revolutionary Maoism for the revolutionary teaching of Marxism-Leninism. This has created an irreconcilable political and ideological contradiction between Mao and the Marxists-Leninists in China and the rest of the world.

He has substituted a pseudo-communist party for the real Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of China, whose organisations were ransacked and whose activists were repressed. Besides, he has been instrumental in forming anti-communist, Maoist pseudo-communist parties in other lands. This has created an irreconcilable contradiction between Mao and the Communists of China and the rest of the world.

He follows a blatantly reactionary home and foreign policy totally incompatible with the interests of the Chinese nation. This has created an antagonistic contradiction between Mao and the working class, the working peasantry, the intelligentsia, and the student youth of China. He and they have diametrically opposite interests.

He follows a two-faced policy towards the People's Liberation Army, using it in his reactionary anti-communist, anti-people and anti-Soviet crimes, on the one hand, and subjecting its commanders, political officers,

and soldiers to continuous purges and repressions, on the other. This has created a contradiction between Mao and the PLA, making their coexistence impossible.

He follows an extreme chauvinist great-Han policy towards the non-Han peoples of China. This policy is brutal to the point of barbarism, marked by discrimination, oppression, forcible assimilation, and mass repressions. This has created an insoluble contradiction between Mao and the non-Han peoples of China.

He follows an extreme reactionary foreign policy based on alliance with imperialism and reaction, and on anti-Sovietism and anti-communism. This has created a fundamental contradiction stemming from the opposite interests of the two sides between him and the world socialist community, the world communist and working-class movement, and the anti-imperialist, democratic, and progressive movements.

He follows a policy of division and subversion towards the national liberation movement in Asian, African and Latin American countries, trying to drive a wedge between them and their true friends and allies in the struggle for national independence, and against colonialism and neo-colonialism, racial oppression and racial discrimination—the Soviet Union, the socialist camp as a whole, and the world communist movement. He is trying to drag this movement into the camp of imperialism and reaction. This is creating a contradiction flowing from the incompatible interests of the Maoists and the "third world" countries.

He rejects all proposals and measures directed to furthering the peaceful coexistence of states with different social-economic systems, to easing international tension, to establishing regional collective security systems, and to safeguarding world peace. He makes no secret of his war preparations and is trying to provoke a new world war. This has created a sharp contradiction between Mao and all people of peace—a contradiction stemming from the choice between life and death, between regression and progress.

The relation of forces is clear: Mao Tse-tung and his group on one side, and the revolutionary, progressive and peace-loving forces of China and the whole world on the other. The two sides are locked in a continuous and irreconcilable struggle. And there is no doubt about

its outcome: Mao Tse-tung and his group will not escape defeat.

The contradictions within the Maoist group are also a significant element sapping the strength of the Maoists and bringing closer the downfall of the Mao dynasty.

In short, the line of the 10th Congress, which is the line of Mao Tse-tung, is bound to result in a still greater number of major setbacks than those which he suffered after the 9th Congress. This is the writing on the wall. The march of history is not subject to the will of the "lone monk".

3. MAO TSE-TUNG AND CHIN SHIH HUANG *

Following the 10th Congress, the Chinese press began a campaign in praise of Chin Shih Huang. To laud Chin Shih Huang it called down curses on the head of Confucius and abused the name of Lu Hsun.

1) Why and how Mao Tse-tung praises Chin Shih Huang

Mao began his campaign by praising the events that distinguished Chin Shih Huang's despotic rule, known as *fengshu kengjiu* (burning of books and burying of scholars). On 28 September 1973 *Jenminjhpao* printed an article entitled, "Fengshu kengjiu pien" (In Defence of Burning Books and Burying Scholars). Its author, who gave his name as *Shih Ting*, writes in the opening passages of the article:

"Burning books and burying scholars was an important political event during the rule of Chin Shih Huang. Many comments were written about this event. Though not all opinions coincide, most people regard the burning of books and burying of scholars by Chin Shih Huang as a despotic and cruel act, a reactionary measure that led to the downfall of the Chin dynasty."

Further on he quotes Chia I, a well-known man of letters and political figure of the Han dynasty. In his *Travels in Chin*, Chia I describes "the burning of books

* The first emperor of the Chin dynasty—Ying Cheng (259-240 B. C.).

and burying of scholars" as a "rejection of the course of the previous ruler", and "the consignment to fire of the teachings of a hundred schools" as an act "to befool the people". "Books were burned, and punishments became more severe", Chia I writes, and adds: "This is why the early downfall of the dynasty was only to be expected". The author of the *Jenminjhpao* article admits that "the views of Chia I had a strong influence on history", and cites the full text of a poem by Chang Chieh, a Tang dynasty poet, entitled "The Pits for Burning Books":

The bamboo and silk * were swallowed by flames;
The might of the empire vanished, too.
In vain did mountain ranges and turbulent streams
Stand guard over the dragon's lair. **
The ash of the pyres had not grown cold
Before turmoil broke out in Shantung,
Though neither Liu Pang nor Hsiang Yu
Had read many books.

The author explains that the poet "wants us to believe that as a result of the burning of books and burying of scholars by Chin Shih Huang, the Chin empire lost vigour and fell under the assault of Liu Pang and Hsiang Yu". He expresses emphatic disagreement with Chia I, Chang Chieh, and others. He describes the burning of books and burying of scholars as a "progressive measure". "Books were burned for the sake of ideological unity," he writes, "and there was no connection between the collapse of the Chin dynasty and the burning of books and burying of scholars". Might we ask, then, why the Chin dynasty collapsed? The author cannot sidestep the conclusion accepted by everybody since ancient times. "The Chin dynasty fell," he writes, "because brutal executions and punishments had led to universal disorder". Severe laws, tortures and executions "alarmed young and old throughout the Celestial Empire". *** Then he goes on to say: "The Chin dynasty fell due to an aggravation of contradictions between the feudal rulers and the broad mass of the people. The uprising of Chen Sheng and Wu Kuang was a revolutionary struggle

* Bamboo and silk—here books, which were written on strips of bamboo or on silk in those remote times.

** Dragon's lair—the capital of the Chin emperor.

*** See Ssu-ma Chien. *Shih Chi* (Historical Record).

against the feudal exploiters and hastened the collapse of the Chin dynasty. In short, the Chin empire was overthrown by a peasant revolution."

All articles extolling Chin Shih Huang were deliberately written to relate the praise heaped on Chin to Mao Tse-tung. They make Chin resemble Mao and Mao resemble Chin.

Some foreign observers note rightly that these articles were either written by Mao himself or were at least produced on his orders and with his approval. Nobody would dare to compare Mao with the most notorious despot in Chinese history without his express consent.

Now, let us see why Mao praises Chin Shih Huang and likens himself to that abominable tyrant?

Mao praises Chin Shih Huang chiefly because he is himself saturated with feudal monarchist ideas. This is confirmed by the following examples.

1. The poem, "Sinyuanchun", which Mao wrote in 1935, is nominally a description of a snow-covered landscape; in it he compares the people's revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party of China with the power struggle between emperors and princes, and himself with the ancient emperors Chin Shih Huang, Han Wu Ti, Tang Tai Tsung, Sung Tai-tsu and Genghis Khan.

2. In a Chinese-language edition of notes on his travels in West China, which appeared in 1937, US journalist Edgar Snow quotes Mao as having said that since his youth he had admired Chin Shih Huang, Han Wu Ti, and other ancient emperors.

3. Mao Tse-tung is in the habit of calling the Party's top leader emperor, and the other leaders—high officials of his majesty. Before the 1st Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee, in 1945, when he was chairman of the Military Council and not yet chairman of the Party, Mao, imitating the feudal monarchs, did not allow people to call him by his name. He wished to be addressed as chairman.

4. In the winter of 1948 and in early 1949, when the People's Liberation Army was poised to enter Peking, Mao said to members of the Central Committee: "When I was a young man, I often thought—how good to be an emperor. But I did not know how to become an emperor. Now I know. Soon, we shall enter Peking. The

moment we enter Peking I will be emperor. Isn't this so?" When Peking was taken, he began calling himself "an emperor in new conditions" and ordered the political administration of the Central Committee's Military Council to organise lectures for servicemen, saying "Chairman Mao is a new emperor".

5. In 1964 in a talk with a French National Assembly delegation Mao declared himself "an admirer of Napoleon".

6. He punished writers Tien Han, Wu Han, Teng To, Liao Mo-sha, and others for ridiculing or criticising emperors in their books. He said, to attack emperors is tantamount to attacking Mao Tse-tung.

Mao extolled Chin Shih Huang because the two have much in common.

1. Chin Shih Huang was a self-conceited and egocentric careerist, and addicted to the personality cult. He described himself as the first great emperor of the Celestial Empire. Mao, too, is addicted to the personality cult.

2. Chin Shih Huang considered himself the "sole authority" on all things. A typical exponent of one-man despotism, he "made the decisions on all affairs of state, both big and small, by himself" (Ssu-ma Chien. *Historical Record*, ch. "Principal Notes about Chin Shih Huang"). Mao, too, is an authoritarian despot.

3. Chin Shih Huang was an extreme individualist of extraordinary cupidity. He called himself Shih Huang Ti (first emperor) and wanted his "family dynasty" to be everlasting through the second, third, etc., generations right up to the ten thousandth descendant. Mao, too, wants to turn China into a "family concern" together with Chiang Ching, and to hand it down from heir to heir.

4. Chin Shih Huang was a despot for whom, as Engels put it in *Anti-Dühring*, people were "all equal, namely, equal to nil", because he did not consider people to be people. From prime minister down to plain subject all were worth not more to him than hens, dogs, cows or sheep; all were his slaves whom he could execute, imprison, or exile. Mao, too, is that kind of tyrant.

5. Chin Shih Huang was a vociferous advocate of a "Great Chin Celestial Empire". Towards states and tribes neighbouring on the Chin Empire he followed a pol-

icy of armed conquest, forcible assimilation, forced resettlement, and brutal repression. Mao, too, is an extreme great-Han nationalist; his treatment of ethnic minorities inhabiting different parts of China is the same as Chin Shih Huang's.

6. In the ninth year after the founding of the united Chin Empire (243 B.C.), Chin Shih Huang ordered all books to be burned. Among these were *Shih Ching* (The Book of Songs), *Shu Ching* (The Book of History), the works of Confucius and of exponents of all other schools, books on the history of the Chou dynasty and the histories of six non-Chin states. Only a few books on medicine, fortune-telling and agriculture were spared. There was nothing for people to read. Then, in the tenth year (242 B.C.), he ordered all scholars to be buried alive (more than 460 Confucian scholars were buried alive together, including 62 of the 70 "doctors" at Chin's own court). This made him the first ferocious despot in history to burn books barbarously and massacre scholars. But in quantity and range of subjects, the books burned by Mao during the "cultural revolution" far surpassed those burned by Chin Shih Huang, and in numbers the intellectuals physically eliminated by Mao far surpassed Chin Shih Huang's burying of scholars.

This is why Mao Tse-tung makes no bones about praising Chin Shih Huang and defends his despotic "burning of books and burying of scholars".

Worse still, Mao extols Chin Shih Huang with a definite secret political aim. Take these few examples.

1. Mao praises Chin Shih Huang for having been "a politician who stopped the attempts at restoring the slave system" (see the article in *Jenminjihpao* of 31 October 1973, signed by the "group of authors of the Shensi Teacher-Training Institute").

This betrays Mao's lack of elementary knowledge of the history of ancient Chinese society. Historians who studied China's ancient history have demonstrated that under the Shang Yin dynasty (18th-12th centuries B.C.) China saw the emergence, bloom, and downfall of the slave-owning system. In those days, on a ruler's or nobleman's death, from several dozen to 2,000-3,000 people were sacrificed for "co-burial with the deceased". In the time of Western Chou (12th-8th centuries B.C.) this sacrifice was prohibited; human beings were replaced by

clay or wooden dolls. This shows that Western Chou was no longer a slave-owning society. Historical facts show that Western Chou, which lasted from the elimination of the Shang dynasty by Chou Wu Wang and the establishment of the capital in Kaoching to the transfer of the capital east by Chou Ping Wang (1122-771 B.C.), was essentially an era of feudalism. In early Eastern Chou, which began with the transfer of the capital to Loyang by Chou Ping Wang (from 770 B.C.) and for the following about 200 years, there was a decline of serfdom, liberation of serfs, and a gradual emergence of landlords, a new class of landed proprietors. Due to the disparate economic and political development of the states, which were independent, this process differed from state to state in time and tempo. A tax whose size depended on the size of the landholding was introduced in the Lu state before 594 B.C., whereas in the state of Chin, remote, isolated, and economically relatively backward, a harvest rent was first enforced as late as 408 B.C. Yet the general trend of development in all the states was the same.

According to the *Analects* and other literary classics, the feudal system no longer existed in the lifetime of Confucius (551-479 B.C.) in the states of Lu, Wei, and others. Serfs had been liberated, and a new economic system of feudal landlords had already come into being. The new class of landlords controlled power. And in the Contending States (403-221 B.C.) society continued to develop, stimulated by the introduction of iron implements. There was unprecedented prosperity. Economy and culture grew, and a variety of philosophical and other schools emerged and engaged in free discussions. Yet there was contention and rivalry among the seven states, with continuous fratricidal wars, because each aspired to eliminating the others and creating a united empire.

The new feudal landowning economic system took deep root in the Chin state following Shang Yang's reform, which began in 356 B.C., curtailing the rights of the hereditary nobility, improving the condition of peasants and warriors, ending *corvée*, and eliminating bounds (between fields of the gentry and peasants). The slave-owning system had ceased to exist 900 years before Chin Shih Huang established his united feudal em-

(What feudalism system was it?)

pire (221 B. C.). More, in the Chin state even serf-owning had gone out some 200 years previously.* In other words, the question of "restoring the slave system" could not arise at the time of Chin Shih Huang's rule. The dispute between *chensiang* (prime minister) Wang Kuang and *tingwei* (judge of the supreme court) Li Ssu over retaining the system of states or introducing a system of prefectures and counties, and the disputes on the same subject between a group of Confucianists headed by Shun Yu-yu and another headed by Chou Ching-chen concerned the type of administration to be introduced in the Chin empire, and had no relation at all to "restoration or anti-restoration of the slave system".

Ignorant of the social system at the time of Chou and Chin, Mao mistakenly considers Chinese society prior to the Chin dynasty a "slave system" (an erroneous term; in the Marxist teaching on the history of society there is no room for a "slave system", only for a slave-owning system, for "slave system" suggests a social system in which slaves are dominant; there was no such society in history). He describes the controversy over the "system of feudal states" and the "system of prefectures and counties" as a controversy over "restoration" and "anti-restoration" of the "slave system".

As we see, Mao's portrayal of Chin Shih Huang as "a politician who prevented the restoration of slave-owners" has no substance in history.

By defying history and extolling Chin Shih Huang, Mao seeks to portray himself as "a politician who resolutely prevented the restoration of capitalism". In the early period of the "cultural revolution" he issued the slogan of combatting the "handful of power-holding capitalist-roaders" in order to attack Liu Shao-chi and the cadres of the Party, and in the past two years has brandished the slogan of combatting "conspirators and double-dealers who are restoring capitalism" in order to discredit and attack Lin Piao and the Party's military and political cadres. This exposes Mao as an intriguer who is himself a capitalist-roader and certainly no "politician resolutely preventing the restoration of capitalism".

* It is impossible to deal in greater detail with the nature of the social system at the time of Chou and Chin in this book.

Facts dating to the "cultural revolution" and later, have amply confirmed this. Not only has Mao destroyed the socialist superstructure of Chinese society; he has also altered the socialist character of China's national economy. He has crushed the state apparatus directed by the Communist Party of China and has replaced it with his one-man reactionary military-terrorist dictatorship. At present, China's state economy serves not maximum satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of the people, but the reactionary dictatorship of Mao Tse-tung and his anti-Soviet and anti-communist militarism. Elements of a capitalist economy with guaranteed capital and profit for capitalists and with capitalists heading a number of state enterprises on the pretext of being economic and technical specialists, continue to flourish under the signboard of mixed state-private enterprise. These facts, too, show the true nature of China's state economy.

The rural people's communes, though still cooperatives in name, have been stripped of the right to settle questions of production and distribution on their own, and are geared to the needs of Mao's reactionary dictatorship. With agriculture cut off from industrial and financial aid on the part of the socialist state, they are denied the opportunity of raising the material and cultural standards of their members, who are still at the level of "poor and lower middle peasants". In effect, the communes have become regimented suppliers of food and raw materials for Mao's reactionary dictatorship, and have thus lost their former character.

In short, the two components of China's national economy, industry and agriculture, retain only a few socialist elements in form of property, but have lost their socialist nature as regards the object they serve. Mao makes no secret of this. He loses no opportunity to declare that China belongs among the developing countries of the "third world". Actually, considering Mao's reactionary rule, China does not belong even among them. Because developing countries are essentially opposed to imperialism and its colonial and neo-colonial policy, with the leading ones directing their efforts to the non-capitalist perspective, that is, the road to socialism. Mao, on the other hand, is conniving with extreme reactionary imperialists and driving China into the imperialist camp.

2. Mao says that Chin Shih Huang was the founder of the first feudal dynasty in China's history and "a powerful feudal ruler who unified all China" (see "Struggle between Restoration and Anti-Restoration During the Emergence of the Chin Dynasty", signed *Lo Hsi-ting* in: *Hungchi* No. 11, 1973). In fact, Mao heaps all the credit for the establishment of the single feudal Chin dynasty on Chin Shih Huang alone. This, too, is contrary to the facts of history.

The substance of the phrase, "founder of the first feudal dynasty in China's history", may be reduced to two facts: first, conquest of the six states; second, introduction of the system of prefectures and counties.

Let us take the first fact first. History shows that Chin Shih Huang was able to eliminate the six other states because he had inherited a sound "concern" founded by Chin Hsiao Kung, which was consolidated by six generations of Chin Shih Huang's ancestors in the course of something like a hundred years. By carrying out Shang Yang's reform, Chin Hsiao Kung laid the economic foundations for enriching his state and making it militarily powerful; more, he began centralising political power by dividing his country into 31 counties. Fan Tsun established the foreign policy of the state of Chin: "friendship with distant countries in order to attack near countries", and wooing of every state separately in order to prevent the six states from joining forces against Chin. In home policy he continued what Shang Yang had begun. Chin Shih Huang inherited the throne at 13 years of age. All affairs of state were in the hands of *chensiang* Lu Pu-wei. Not until he was 22 did Chin Shih Huang assume control. By that time the foundations had long been laid for the wealth and power of his state. Also, there were many capable men in civic and military offices. All Chin Shih Huang had to do was swim with the current, issue orders, and reap the harvest.

The second of the reasons which enabled Chin Shih Huang to eliminate the six states was their lack of unity, with developments in these states favouring Chin's plans of aggrandizement. For example, the state of Chu with its large area and population was more capable than the others to compete with Chin; but due to the assassination of reformer Wu Chi by the nobles, there

was no reform there like that of Shang Yang in Chin, and, furthermore, it lost Sun Wu, a brilliant military leader. The state of Chao could also have stood up to Chin, but there occurred a tragedy between the father and his sons in the family of Prince Chao Wu-lin, a gifted leader. Later, Chao's troops led by Chao Kuoi were defeated. Chin buried alive 400,000 captured Chao soldiers, and the state of Chao never recovered from this loss. Besides, Chin Hsiao Kung and each of the succeeding monarchs captured considerable territory from neighbouring states, thus enlarging the Chin state's human and material potential. By the time Chin Shih Huang came to power all the six states were well on the way to decline, and Chin had no difficulties to defeat them one by one.

Now, about the introduction of the system of prefectures and counties. The rejection of the system of states and the introduction of prefectures and counties following the elimination of the six states was certainly not invented by Chin Shih Huang himself. This we can see from the facts of history. After Shang Yang's reform the state of Chin was divided into 31 counties. Following the annexation of the six states, the Chin empire was divided into 36 prefectures, each of which was divided into counties. This was therefore a projection of Shang Yang's policy. The conversion of states into prefectures and counties helped the Chin dynasty to set up a single feudal empire. This coincided with the political needs of the landlord class, which needed a centralised power headed by an emperor, with prefectural and county officials exercising local government. This secured a peaceful setting for exploiting and oppressing the peasants, in contrast to the ceaseless civil wars that had occurred when there were many states and "battles for a locality covered it with corpses and battles for a town filled it with dead people".

Compared with a country divided into many states, the single feudal monarchy was, of course, a step forward.

But we can see from the above analysis of concrete events that the credit for this act of progressive significance does not belong to Chin Shih Huang alone. Yet Mao ascribes it all to him. This only betrays Mao's extremely subjective voluntaristic approach to history.

Besides, it is not right to judge Chin Shih Huang on the merits of just the progressive significance of the unification into a single feudal empire of a country that had consisted of rival states. Look at the consequences of this for the toilers. From the Marxist point of view, and that of the working people, the latter aspect is much more important. Chin Shih Huang united China in the 26th year of his rule (221 B. C.). But had he done anything for the people from the time when he founded the single feudal monarchy to the day of his death? Did he ever give any thought to the welfare and needs of the people? The answer is no. All his thoughts and deeds were directed to his own interests and the institution of an "eternal empire" for himself and his family. Look at Chin Shih Huang's main works of that period.

According to Ssu-ma Chien's *Historical Record* and other sources, the following was what Chin Shih Huang principally engaged in:

1. Appropriating the credit and glory for the deeds of others, he proclaimed himself as having "eclipsed the three Huangs in merit, and excelled the five Tis in morality"*. He took the title of *Chin Shih Huang-ti*, and performed "tours of inspection" across famous mountains and large rivers, putting up graven "monuments of glory" to immortalise his "exploits" everywhere he went. He ordered that highways should be laid where his route would pass—wide enough for his sumptuous six-horse carriage flanked by mounted guards and foot soldiers. Many millions of people were pressed into building these roads, paved not simply by their labour but also by their sweat, blood and bones. The human and material waste of this is easily imagined.

2. Though internecine wars ended, Chin Shih Huang continuously loosed wars of aggression against neighbouring states and tribes. The hope of the people for deliverance from the scourge of war and military conscription proved in vain. Not only were more people forced into military service in view of the ceaseless hostilities, but there was also a far larger amount of forced labour that they had to do.

* The three Huangs are Huang Ti, Shen Nung, and Fu Xi; the five Tis are Shao Hao, Chuan Hsu, Ti Ku, Yao and Shun. These are abbreviated names of semi-mythical "wise rulers" of remote antiquity.

3. In dread of the augury of a stargazer that "Chin will be destroyed by the Hujens (Huns)", Chin Shih Huang sent an army of 300,000 under Meng Tien to engage the Huns, and mobilised millions of people to build the thousands of kilometres long Great Wall. In cold and hunger and illness, doing back-breaking work, most of them suffered death before the wall was completed. But Mao regards the Great Wall as one of Chin Shih Huang's greatest achievements, and never fails to invite foreign guests to inspect it. Yet Chin Shih Huang did not put a single brick or stone into the wall himself; it was built on the bones of millions of toilers.

4. To build himself a mausoleum, Chin Shih Huang summoned more than 700,000 "convicted criminals" and craftsmen. Then, to keep it a secret, he had all of them buried alive in its vicinity.

5. To prevent revolt and secure the throne for himself and his descendants, Chin Shih Huang made everybody turn in their weapons. Those who refused were executed in huge number. The arms were smelted down and 12 enormous idols were made out of this metal in Hsien-Yang (then the imperial capital).

6. To suppress the discontented and those suspected of discontent, Chin Shih Huang consigned hundreds of thousands of people to death, torture, incarceration, banishment, forced labour, deportation to remote border areas for building fortifications, and the like. An incalculable number of guiltless people fell prey to his savage policies.

7. Seeking immortality and wanting to live "ten thousand years", Chin Shih Huang did not hesitate to squander human and material resources, and to send monks and sectarians to all parts of the world in search of "methods of longevity" and "elixirs of life".

8. To gratify his wanton lusts, Chin Shih Huang collected vast sums of money in all parts of the country and had several million people waste their labour on building the palace of Ehrfang, which is said to have no equal in history. Its edifices covered an area of hundreds of kilometres in length and breadth. Here Shih Huang kept his concubines captured in the six conquered states, and stored his various treasures. The palace was unfinished when he died. Later, when Hsiang Yu at the head of his troops captured Hsien-Yang and set fire to

Ehrfang, the flames raged unintermittently for more than three months. This gives an idea of its size and of the amount of labour and material that had gone into building it. There were hanging bridges and underground passages between different parts of the palace, for Chin Shih Huang did not venture to walk in the open. He kept his whereabouts secret not only because he wanted "more easily to meet" the "denizens of heaven", but also and chiefly because his crimes had made him an object of universal hatred, and he saw in every man a potential threat to his life. When he was passing through Polansha on one of his "tours of inspection", a certain Chang Liang made an attempt on his life despite the heavily armed guard. Chang Liang threw a heavy iron hammer, but his victim turned out to be a "double" of Chin Shih Huang's wearing the same clothes as the emperor and seated in a carriage that was an exact replica of the emperor's. Though the emperor immediately ordered a ten-day search for Chang Liang, the man was never found. This shows that he was protected by the emperor's bodyguards and given concealment by the people. Chin Shih Huang was, indeed, a lone despot on whom even his intimates and his closest entourage had turned their backs.

His policy of befogging the people, aimed at perpetuating his tyrannical rule and leading to such barbarisms as the "burning of books and burying of scholars", has dishonoured his name for all time.

In the 13th year of the Chin dynasty, that is, a year after Chin Shih Huang's death (209 B. C.), there was a peasant uprising under Chen Shen and Wu Kuang. The empire was shaken to its foundations, and three years later (206 B. C.) it fell under the combined onslaught of the armies of Hsiang Yu and Liu Pang.

Why does Mao extol Chin Shih Huang for having "conquered six states and founded a single feudal empire"? Mainly in order to further his own designs of intensifying war preparations against the Soviet Union and neighbouring Asian countries. Like the rulers of the Manchu Ching dynasty and the reactionary warlords, he has always regarded countries bordering on China—the Mongolian People's Republic, Korea, the countries of Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Nepal and others—as Chinese territory. Besides, he wants to incorporate in China

the entire Soviet Far East. The militarisation of the country and the large-scale war preparations of recent years, are aimed not only at capturing Soviet territory, but also at occupying neighbouring Asian countries and creating a Pan-Asiatic Maoist empire as a step towards a subsequent bid for world supremacy. Mao extols Chin Shih Huang to further his self-aggrandizement and his mad designs, and also to deceive the people of China, whom he wants to pander to his arrogant egoism and chauvinist great-power ambitions.

Why does Mao make so much noise over Chin Shih Huang's rejection of the system of states and introduction of the system of prefectures and counties? Mainly, to further his plans for still more savage purges of the People's Liberation Army. It will be recalled that during his preparations for the "cultural revolution" Mao launched the campaign, "the whole Party, the whole people must learn from the PLA". This was done to play off one section of the PLA against other sections and "capture power" for Chairman Mao. When local Party and government bodies were smashed by *hungweipings* (red guards) and *tsaofans* (trouble-makers), Mao appointed commanders of military regions or provincial troops to head "revolutionary committees", and then also "party committees". But after the so-called Lin Piao case he grew still more suspicious of commanders of regional, provincial and local troops. Now he is again planning a mass purge of the People's Liberation Army. For this he will use the "militia", the "red guards", and the like, but chiefly he will play off one part of the PLA against others. This is why he is again making threats, again engaging in swindles, again issuing promises, and again resorting to incitement in order to disrupt comradeship in various PLA units and set one general against another. He has launched the "PLA must learn from the people" campaign, on the one hand, and is shuffling commanders of military regions and provincial units, on the other. This is being done to set them up for dismissal and repression in the next round of the "criticism of Lin Piao and the rectification of style" or when a second "cultural revolution" erupts. Thus, the purpose of his attacks on the "system of states" is clear—the denunciation of "separate states" and "disobedient warlords" will be a pretext for assaulting military commanders in the

localities. And the purpose of his support for the "system of prefectures and counties" is to strengthen the "absolute central power" or, more precisely, the reactionary dictatorship of Mao Tse-tung, and prepare "public opinion" for the persecution of PLA cadres in the name of the "central committee", "military council", and "central government".

Certain imperialist papers observe that local generals in China have too much power; they expect that after Mao's death, as after that of Yuan Shih-kai, this will lead to internecine strife between warlords. These comments are helping Mao to carry out his conspiracy.

In the beginning of the "cultural revolution" people said that Mao was Chin Shih Huang No. 2, that he was a still bigger tyrant than Chin Shih Huang, and that his new "burning of books and burying of scholars" was no less barbarous than Chin Shih Huang's. At that time, he would not accept this view and still tried to justify his actions. Now, like an incorrigible criminal, murderer and firebrand convicted by ample evidence and compelled to admit his crimes, Mao has launched a press campaign exonerating Chin Shih Huang and, in effect, admitting that he is a modern Chin Shih Huang.

Mao's praise of Chin Shih Huang is meant not only to forbid people to denounce crimes like "the burning of books and burying of scholars", but also to "ennoble" the tyrant's image and use it as a means for elevating himself and hitting others. He has already qualified attacks on Chin Shih Huang and on the burning of books and burying of scholars as a "crime" committed by Wang Ming, and condemnation of Chin Shih Huang for burning books and burying scholars and reading of Chang Chieh's verse *The Pits for Burning Books* as a "crime" committed by Lin Piao. Now he can level these charges at anyone whom he has decided to persecute in the campaign of "criticising Lin Piao and rectifying style" or in the second "cultural revolution", because most people, with the sole exception of the Mao clique, recall Chin Shih Huang and his atrocities with horror and revulsion. But we trust that Mao's treatment of Chin Shih Huang—this despot and tyrant known as such to every Chinese—as his prototype and teacher will not add either to his prestige or to his power. On the contrary, we trust that it will add to the people's disaffection and resistance.

2) Why and how Mao attacks Confucius

Indeed, why has Mao found it necessary to attack Confucius, while extolling Chin Shih Huang? To begin with, because Mao himself, like Chin Shih Huang, has "burned books and buried scholars". The sole difference is that Mao has greatly surpassed Chin Shih Huang in the number of books burned and intellectuals massacred. In such criminal acts as violating the grave of Confucius, destroying his monuments, and burning his dwelling and temples, Mao also followed in Chin Shih Huang's footsteps.

The other reason is that there are fundamental ideological and political differences between Mao and Chin Shih Huang, on the one hand, and Confucius, on the other. Let us consider a few examples that support this statement.

1. Confucius held that "when the people are treated as the foundation of the state, the latter enjoys well-being". Such political ideas are intolerable for Chin Shih Huang and Mao Tse-tung, these two despots who consider themselves "sons of heaven" and are accustomed to trampling and abusing the people.

2. Confucius praised rulers who gave up their high office of their own free will, as Yao to Shun, and Shun to Yu,* as the dismissal for incompetence of Tse by Tang, and likewise Wu Wang's military campaign against Chou Wang. This is as incompatible as water and fire with the way of thinking of the careerists Chin Shih Huang and Mao Tse-tung, who cling to their thrones and want to perpetuate their dynasty.

3. Confucius wanted the "monarch to treat his subjects with respect, and the subjects to serve the monarch with loyalty" (*Analects*, 4; "Pa I", 3).

By subjects Confucius meant not only big and small officials, but also ("everywhere the earth is inhabited by subjects of the monarch") the entire people. Such political ideas are a terrifying warning to all ancient and present-day despots who do not treat their "subjects" as people.

* At the time of Yao, Shun and Yu there was no state. Voluntary change of headmanship was consistent with the tradition of electing tribal chiefs.

4. Confucius was in favour of letting people increase their numbers, live prosperously, and amass knowledge. There is a special record to this effect in the *Analects*:

"On arriving in the Wei state in the company of Jan Yu, Confucius exclaimed:

"How many people!"

"Yes, many people. What else should one wish?" Jan Yu asked.

"To give them prosperity," came the answer.

"And assuming that prosperity has been achieved, what else should be added?"

"To give them an education." (*Analects*, 16; "Tsu-lu", 13).

Confucius advocated good treatment of toilers. People, he said, must not wear themselves out in toil. There is a fragment on this score in the *Analects*:

"Tsu-lu asked how the people should be governed.

"First the people must be given advantages, and thereafter they must be given work," Confucius said.

"What else is needed?"

"People must not be worn out," came the answer." (*Analects*, 16; "Tsu-lu", 13).

For Chin Shih Huang and Mao Tse-tung, who are concerned only with their own interests and give no thought to the needs of the people, these ideas are unacceptable.

5. Confucius was an advocate of education and opposed the policy of befogging the people. He said: *Ming ke shi yu chji. Pu ke shi chji chji* (*Analects*, 9; "Tai Po", 8). There are two interpretations of this passage (because there were no punctuation marks in the olden days). Some put a comma after the first *chji* in *ming ke shi yu chji*, ... Then the saying means "a people should be made to work, but must not be given knowledge". In this interpretation, one that is preferred by the Maoist press, Confucius is made out to be in favour of befogging the people. The other interpretation, *ming ke shi, yu chji; pu ke shi, chji chji*, means: "if a people wants to perform services, let this be so; if, however, the people do not want to perform services, they must be told what is what". This interpretation is obviously the correct one, because, as we know, Confucius was in favour of education and prosperity in peacetime.

Confucius advocated public education even in wartime. He said: "To plunge people into a war and not edu-

cate them is to abandon them to the vagaries of fate" (*Analects*, 16; "Tsu-lu", 13).

Chin Shih Huang and Mao Tse-tung, on the other hand, followed a policy of befogging people; for this they did not even shrink from "burning books and burying scholars". It is not surprising, therefore, that the ideas of Confucius were repugnant to them.

Chin Shih Huang and Mao Tse-tung are clearly at loggerheads with Confucius. The ideas of Confucius were more progressive compared to those of Chin Shih Huang, who lived more than 200 years after Confucius, and they are also more progressive than the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung", though Mao was born more than 2,500 years after Confucius. Confucius said: "The descendant fills one with awe: who knows whether he will concede anything to those living today". He could not have known that today it would be more right to say that "the descendant fills one with shame: he is retrograde even compared to those who lived in antiquity".

The attack on Confucius is designed to promote Mao's political aims. For example:

1. In the article, "On the Worship of Confucianism and the Struggle Against *Fa-chia*",* signed Shih Lun, Mao maintains that "Confucius was a diehard champion of the dictatorship of the slave-owning class" (see *Jenminjhpao* of 25 October 1973 or *Hungchi* No. 10, 1973). This contention betrays Mao's lack of elementary knowledge of the epoch of Confucius. We have already shown that in Confucius' lifetime the slave-owning system was long over and that serfdom, too, had begun to decline. It is, therefore, contrary to the facts of history to describe Confucius as a "diehard champion of the dictatorship of the slave-owning class". This charge is obviously groundless and cannot be taken seriously.

Mao's contempt of the historical facts has a far-reaching aim: to use specious "historical parallels" to attack those whom he wants to destroy as "followers of Confucius" in the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and rectification of style" or a second "cultural revolution", that is, accuse them of being "diehard champions of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie", and treat them accordingly.

* *Fa-chia*—legalists, champions of legalism, a political school in ancient China.

2. Mao accuses Confucius of "trying to restore the whole political system and order that existed under the rule of the slave-owning nobility in Western Chou". To "support" this charge he falsifies the sense of Confucius' saying: *ke tsi fu li wei jen*.*

The article, "Right Opportunism and the Ideas of Confucius", signed by a *Chin Yun-ko*, said the following:

"*Jen* is the core of the ideas of Confucius; its purpose is to 'revive etiquette'.** Confucius said: self-improvement for the sake of reviving etiquette—this is *jen* (*Analects*, "Yan Yuan"). 'Reviving etiquette' implies the wish to restore the whole political system and order that had existed under the rule of the slave-owning nobility of Western Chou" (see *Jenminjihpao*, 21 November 1973 or *Hungchi* No. 12, 1973).

In the article "On the Worship of Confucianism and the Struggle Against *Fa-chia*" there are identical passages, though the two were signed with different names. This shows that both were written on the orders of Mao Tse-tung.

For young Chinese readers to obtain a clearer idea of this issue, I must first of all briefly explain the original meaning attached to the terms *jen* and *etiquette* in the teaching of Confucius.

In ancient times "*jen*" meant simply "man". It says in the commentary to the *Book of Rites*: "*Jen* also means man". *Mencius* and *Shuo-wen**** also say: "*Jen* is man". And this is the right interpretation.

"Fan Chih asked, 'what does "*jen*" mean?' Confucius replied: 'Love of man'" (*Analects*, 15; "Yan Yuan", 12).

In the specific historical environment of that time "*jen* means man" and "*jen* means love of man" connoted that man should be treated humanely and could no longer be regarded a slave or serf. Relations between

* "Self-improvement in accordance with etiquette—this is *jen*".

** The author wrongly interprets Confucius' saying as follows: "Self-improvement for the sake of reviving etiquette—this is *jen*".

*** *Shuo-wen* is short for the title of Hsu Shen's great etymological dictionary, *Shuo-wen Chieh-tsu*, written in the era of Eastern Han (2nd century).

people must be human. In the language of our time "*jen*" means "humanism". Since ancient times, most Confucian scholars considered "*jen*" the progressive nucleus of the Confucian doctrine. Out of this nucleus Confucius inferred the motive for noble deeds, self-improvement, good government and peace on earth. Following "the question of Yan Yuan concerning '*jen*'" came "the question of Chung Kung concerning '*jen*'", "the question of Ssu-ma Niu concerning '*jen*'", and "the question of Fan Chih concerning '*jen*'". To each of them Confucius gave a different reply. This is evidence that Confucius was a skillful teacher who geared his explanations to the ability of his disciples. More, it is evidence of the diversity of meanings attached to *jen* in the Confucian teaching.

Etiquette originally meant "sum of rites", "ceremony", "courtesy", and in a more general sense it meant "expedience", etc. In the Confucian teaching, "etiquette" also has a broad content and meaning—including expedience of various acts, improvement of self, statesmanship, and the like.

The limits of this book restrain us from examining the different meanings and interpretations of *jen* and "etiquette" given by Confucius in the *Analects*. But it is clear from the aforesaid that *jen* and "etiquette" do not mean what Mao Tse-tung wants them to mean.

Now, let us compare Mao's interpretation of *ke tsi fu li wei jen* with the correct interpretation of this phrase from the *Analects*. This will show that Mao's falsification is wholly incompatible with the original sense of these words.

In the *Analects* ("Yan Yuan", 15), we read:

"Yan Yuan asked for the meaning of '*jen*'. Confucius replied: "'self-improvement in accordance with etiquette—this is *jen*'."

"Please explain in detail," Yan Yuan said.

"And Confucius replied: 'See not what is not in accordance with etiquette. Hear not what is not in accordance with etiquette. Speak not what is not in accordance with etiquette. Do not do what is not in accordance with etiquette'. Yan Yuan said: 'Though I am not clever, I want to behave in accordance with what you have said.'"

What connection can there be between this dialogue and "restoration of the whole political system and order

that existed under the rule of the slave-owning nobility in Western Chou"? None whatever. The conversation between teacher and disciple concerns self-improvement and has no relation to Mao's false imputation.

Further, the article signed by Chin Yun-ko misinterprets Confucius' saying, "what you do not like when done to yourself, do not do to others", as an appeal "to treat the enemy honestly and magnanimously"; in other words, do not fight the enemy, pardon the enemy, and even surrender to the mercy of the enemy. Let us, however, check the right meaning of these words in the *Analects*.

Confucius spoke these words on two occasions. The first time, he spoke them directly following the "question of Yan Yuan concerning 'jen'" in answering the "question of Chung Kung concerning 'jen'". Confucius' answer consisted of five sentences, one of which was, "what you do not like when done to yourself do not do to others". This sentence was meant to explain *jen*. The second time, Confucius spoke these words in his reply to the question of Tsu Kung: "Is there a word that one could follow all life long?" Confucius replied: "The word is *shu**: what you do not like when done to yourself do not do to others." (*Analects*, 18; "Wei Lin-kung", 15). Here Confucius spoke these words to explain *shu*. There is nothing in these dialogues to justify the interpretation of this sentence as being an appeal to treat the enemy honestly and magnanimously. Such an interpretation is just another of Mao's falsifications.

Mao's perverse understanding of the Confucian teaching of *jen*, *etiquette* and *chungshu*** only betrays his undialectical sophistry.

Chin Yun-ko's article, "Right Opportunism and the Ideas of Confucius", is based on these Maoist falsifications. After qualifying Confucius' ideas of *jen*, *etiquette* and *chungshu* as ideas of reactionary slave-owners and an appeal to surrender to the enemy, Chin Yun-ko linked them with the so-called right-opportunist ideas, maintaining that the latter fed on the ideas of Confucius. He went on to say that the ideas of Confucius were "a tool whereby right-opportunists tried to subvert

* *Shu*—here, put yourself in the place of another, kindness.

** *Chungshu*—be faithful to your duty and show concern for others, honesty.

the Chinese revolution and are trying to restore capitalism in China". Thereupon, the author of the article heaped insults and slander on those leaders of the CPC who had at different times opposed the counter-revolutionary "thoughts" of Mao Tse-tung. This was done in three large fragments. The first fragment was devoted to slandering Wang Ming and Peng Teh-huai, the second to slandering Liu Shao-chi, and the third to slandering Lin Piao.

Yet it is none other than Mao Tse-tung who has betrayed the Chinese revolution and is undermining the socialist system in China.

By attacking Confucius, Mao intends not only to justify the "burning of books and burying of scholars" and the other tyrannical acts of Chin Shih Huang and himself, but also to create a new pretext for persecuting people. In the next stage of the "criticism of Lin Piao and rectification of style" or when a second "cultural revolution" breaks out, he will be able to accuse anyone he wishes of being a "follower of Confucius", which will be tantamount to charging him with subverting the Chinese revolution and trying to restore capitalism.

Confucius lived more than 2,500 years ago. Due to the limitations and peculiarities of those times, his teaching was dual in character: backward for its "worship of the monarch" and progressive for its teaching of *jen*. Feudal rulers of all later epochs, as well as reactionary warlords, exploited the backward aspect of Confucianism, while progressive thinkers promoted its progressive aspect.

Beginning with Han Wu-ti (Liu Che) who "disbanded all other schools and revered only Confucius", all feudal dynasties up to and including the Peiyang warlords and Chiang Kai-shek, made the most of the backward aspect of Confucianism, worship of the monarch, to buttress their own reactionary rule and to attack their political opponents. The May Fourth Movement (1919), which was a struggle against imperialism, the Peiyang warlords and the feudal order, opposed the backward aspect of Confucianism and opened the doors to the new, revolutionary ideas of Marxism-Leninism. In the thirties, Chiang Kai-shek used the teaching of Confucius, Meng-tsu, Buddhism and Taoism to promote his New Life Movement which was, in effect, a camouflaged fascist movement.

When exposing Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary juggling with the teaching of Confucius and Meng-tsu, we Communists criticised the backward aspect of Confucianism. This was correct and necessary because it weakened, even neutralised, the influence on the masses of reactionary groups that used the backward aspect of the teaching of Confucius and Meng-tsu for selfish ends.

It is common knowledge that the backward aspect of Confucianism, "worship of the monarch and expulsion of foreigners", is an important ideological source and part of the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung". Worship of the monarch means worship of the "son of heaven", and "expulsion of foreigners" means China's identification with the Celestial Empire. The "son of heaven" ideology lies at the root of Mao's egocentrism and extreme individualism, while the Celestial Empire ideology lies at the root of his extreme nationalism and chauvinism. In fact, there was a time when he used to describe himself as "a politician who is outwardly a Confucianist and inwardly a Taoist". This is tantamount to admitting that he is "a politician who never tires to speak of virtue and morality, but thinks only of plots and intrigues".

Mao Tse-tung, as we see, was also one of those who used Confucianism to buttress their reactionary rule. In this respect, his purpose was the same as that of all the previous reactionary rulers of China.

But his present approach has changed—he attacks the progressive concepts of ancient Confucianism based on the teaching of *jen* in order to extol Chin Shih Huang and retain his grip on power. Having betrayed communism and having become a servant of imperialism, Mao regards all reactionary ideas and doctrines—from the reactionary ideological schools of antiquity to modern fascism—as "partners" of the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung", while Marxism-Leninism and the progressive concepts of ancient Confucianism are for him mortal enemies of his reactionary "thoughts". In fact, exploiting the backward aspect of Confucianism and attacking its progressive aspect, though antipodal in approach, pursue one and the same aim by different means and are therefore two sides of one and the same reactionary scheme.

Mao Tse-tung attacks *jen* as the nucleus of the Confucian teaching, and also attacks the traditional Chinese morality. His attacks on humanism, which is accepted

by all progressives as the foundation of morality, are especially vehement. This proves, on the one hand, that the Chinese Communists were right to describe Mao of the "style rectification campaign" and "cultural revolution" as a man totally lacking in humanity, conscience, morality, and shame; on the other, he has in effect himself admitted to being devoid of humanity, justice, honesty, kindness, and decency—a man who is perfidious, cynical and shameless, scheming to commit many other, still more immoral, abominations. It has come to a pass where he considers every ethical rule an accusation or protest or ridicule directed against him.

It is safe to say on the evidence of past history that far from helping Mao reach his aims, his conduct is likely to lead to the very opposite. All reactionaries who used the backward aspect of Confucianism as a pretext for persecuting progressive revolutionary ideas and their exponents, came to the same end—defeat for themselves and for their reactionary ideas, while revolutionary ideas and their exponents emerged victorious and covered with still greater glory. And Mao, who attacks the progressive side of Confucianism in order to persecute Marxism-Leninism and its exponents will, as the reactionaries before him, come to the same sad end—final and conclusive defeat.

Nowadays, Mao persecutes Communists and intellectuals for disliking Chin Shih Huang and liking Confucius. This shows that his campaign of extolling Chin Shih Huang and criticising Confucius is intertwined with his conspiracy against the Communist Party and the people of China on the home front, and against the Soviet Union and the world communist movement on the external front.

Let me only add that his praise of Chin Shih Huang and criticism of Confucius have two other secret aims. One of them is to divert people from the struggle and to obfuscate its character; in other words, he is deliberately creating confusion in order to portray the struggle between the revolutionary ideas and policy of Marxism-Leninism and the reactionary "thoughts" and policy of Mao Tse-tung as a struggle between those for and against Chin Shih Huang or between those for and against Confucius. The other aim is to confuse people by juggling with ancient "wisdoms". Since not only the

mass of working people, but also the younger generation of intellectuals have only a scant knowledge of ancient writings and the facts of ancient history, Mao thinks that his manipulations will identify the struggle of the present with ancient history and thereby obscure the true state of affairs.

It is our duty, therefore, to be vigilant and to expose Mao's machinations. He is very likely to resort to similar ploys in future as well. For example, he may instruct certain persons to write articles extolling Shang Chou-wang* and the latter's favourite concubine Ta-chi, saying that Chou-wang was not a ferocious despot, did not indulge the whims of Ta-chi and did not commit abominations, while Ta-chi did not encourage Chou-wang's tyranny, and that the downfall of the Shang dynasty is not to be blamed on the wrongdoings of Chou-wang and Ta-chi. All this, of course, would be designed to exonerate Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Ching. Or he may, for example, falsify the teaching of Mo-tsu, describe Mo-tsu as a reactionary thinker, and then use the stigma of "follower of Mo-tsu" to persecute people, and the like. But whatever stratagems Mao may some day use, we shall be able to see through them, to see his designs and their "subtleties", if we employ the "lie detector" of Marxism-Leninism.

3) Why and how Mao Tse-tung abuses the name of Lu Hsun

In conclusion, let us see how Mao abuses the name of Lu Hsun in his praise of Chin Shih Huang and criticism of Confucius.

He has pulled out Lu Hsun's pamphlet, *The Differences and Resemblances Between the Burning of Books in China and Germany*, written in 1933, to vindicate the "burning of books and burying of scholars" by Chin Shih Huang.

The main idea in Lu Hsun's pamphlet was correct: he held that though Hitler and Chin Shih Huang had both burned books, Hitler was the more abominable. By analogy, had Lu Hsun been alive in the latter half of

the sixties and had he written a pamphlet on the differences and resemblances between the burning of books in antiquity and the present time, his main idea would surely have been that though Mao and Chin Shih Huang had both burned books, Mao was the more abominable, and this, too, would have been correct. But in his pamphlet Lu Hsun did not denounce the burning of books by Chin Shih Huang. On the contrary, he wrote: "It is true that Chin Shih Huang burned books. He burned them for the sake of ideological unity". This, of course, is incorrect. Yet, in the earlier mentioned articles, "In Defence of *fengshu kengjiu*",* "On the Worship of Confucianism and the Struggle Against *Fa-chia*", and "Chin Shih Huang Was a Politician Who Combated Attempts at Restoring Slave-Owners", their authors, doing Mao's bidding, used this phrase of Lu Hsun's to justify not only the burning of books by Chin Shih Huang and not only the crimes of Mao Tse-tung, who burned books during the "cultural revolution", but also the fascist militarists in Chile, who are also burning books.

By this phrase of Lu Hsun's Mao is trying to justify the past, present and any future burning of books by reactionaries and, of course, above all to justify the endless destruction of culture and the persecution of intellectuals by Mao himself in his successive "cultural revolutions". But his efforts are in vain. If only because in an article, "On Two or Three Chinese Affairs", written in 1934, Lu Hsun, in effect, revised his former viewpoint on the burning of books by Chin Shih Huang. Lu Hsun wrote: "Chin Shih Huang burned books. This has earned him the reputation of a notorious personality, and his act is even referred to as a precedent for the burning of books by Hitler". Lu Hsun makes clear thereby that the burning of books by Chin Shih Huang, as well as by Hitler, was a criminal act, with the sole difference being the lapse in time. Mao avoids any mention of this, for otherwise he would not be able to use what Lu Hsun said in 1933 to justify his own crimes. But facts are facts. The works of Lu Hsun are intact. And hard as the Maoist group may try to hush up the facts, the bulk of Lu Hsun's readers know them.

* A contemptible tyrant, the last ruler of the Shang dynasty (1766-1122 B. C.).

* *Fengshu kengjiu*—the burning of books and burying of scholars.—Tr.

The authors of the above articles quote what Lu Hsun wrote in 1933 about the burning of books by Chin Shih Huang to justify the "burning of books" and the "burying of scholars" as deeds of the same order. By so doing they try to persuade their readers that Lu Hsun also approved of the burying of scholars by Chin Shih Huang. The facts show, indeed, that Chin Shih Huang of antiquity, Hitler of the thirties, Mao Tse-tung of the sixties, the fascist gang in Chile of the seventies, and all other reactionaries combined the burning of books with the physical elimination of intellectuals. The only difference is that Chin Shih Huang buried Confucian scholars, while the present-day reactionaries execute Marxists-Leninists, fighters against imperialism, and revolutionary intellectuals. It is no accident, therefore, that Mao justifies the "burning of books" and the "burying of scholars" as things of the same order.

Yet, in fact, Lu Hsun protested against the "burning of books", and also against the "burying of scholars". Take his "Short Introduction" to *Sandals* (1934), a collection of Chinese writers in English translation. Here he wrote: "All progressive writers became revolutionary writers and their suppression became increasingly vicious—bans on publication, burning of books, and execution of writers. During this dark night many young people paid for their work with their lives." This shows that Lu Hsun's 1933 reference to the burning of books by Chin Shih Huang was no more than a temporary aberration. He protested furiously against such despotic acts as the burning of books and the execution of intellectuals.

In the above-mentioned "Short Introduction", Lu Hsun protested against the burning of books and the killing of intellectuals by Chiang Kai-shek. If he had lived today, he would surely have protested still more indignantly against the burning of books and killing of intellectuals by Mao Tse-tung and the Chilean fascists.

The facts show that Chin Shih Huang did not secure "unity of ideas" or save his dynasty by "burning books and burying scholars". On the contrary, there was still greater ideological turmoil, which hastened the downfall of the Chin dynasty. Mao, too, who is burning books and slaughtering intellectuals, will suffer the same fate as Chin Shih Huang.

Few people, I am sure, will be misled by the use of Lu Hsun's criticism of Confucius to support Mao's anti-Confucian campaign.

To begin with, Mao used a sentence from Lu Hsun's article, "Confucius in Modern China", written in 1935, as an argument against Confucius. Here it is: "Quite true, Confucius drew up excellent plans of how to govern a state, but all of them were designed to dominate the mass of the people and were drawn up for those in authority; there was nothing in them for the people itself."*

To understand the implications of this phrase, we must read the whole of Lu Hsun's article. He referred with sympathy to the life of Confucius and the fate of his teaching. "The misfortunes of Confucius in his own fatherland," he wrote, "began long before the twentieth century." He showed that Confucius was "a man who had suffered much during his lifetime." Thereupon he noted that after the death of Confucius he was "presented by different rulers under all kinds of disguises by means of various face powders, and was raised to an awesome height". Lu Hsun demonstrated that in past eras an aspirant to an official post studied the *Four Books* and the *Five Books*, and wrote essays in the *paku* style, using them as "a brick for knocking on the door". "The moment the door opened," he added, "the brick was thrown away. Confucius, too, was used after his death as a 'brick for knocking on the door'." Ending his article, Lu Hsun wrote: "If we take examples from recent times, this will be still clearer." He scoffs at General Sun Chuang-fang who, "having installed himself in Kiangsu and Chekiang, chopped off the heads of villagers on the roads at will", and ridicules General Chang Tsung-chang, "who has lost count of his treasures, soldiers, and concubines". These two worthies had also tried to escape defeat by paying a tribute of deference to Confucius, and had also recited Confucian sayings. It was in his satire against the Peiyang warlords who tried in vain to escape defeat by kowtowing to Confucius that Lu Hsun made the aforementioned critical reference to the plans of Confucius as being "drawn up for those in authority". In short, the motiva-

* "The Struggle Between Friends and Foes of Confucius in the Past One Hundred-Odd Years" in: *Jenminjihpao*, 7 December 1973; the article was signed by "the Peking and Tsinghua universities group of big criticism".

tions behind Lu Hsun's criticism of the backward aspect of Confucianism were the same as those of revolutionaries and Communists at the time of the May Fourth Movement and in the thirties. While denouncing the use of Confucianism by warlords and Chiang Kai-shek as a means of buttressing reactionary rule, they criticised the backward aspect of Confucianism to lessen or even eliminate the influence of the reactionary rulers who abused the name of Confucius.

Apart from the above article, Lu Hsun passed judgement on Confucius and the teaching of Confucius and Meng-tsu in some of his short pieces (sketches, reviews, and essays) collected under the title, *Various Sentiments*. These were not specific studies of Confucius or the teaching of Confucius and Meng-tsu. They merely ridiculed contemporary reactionaries who sought salvation in laughable "worship of Confucius" and "recital of Confucian writings". Everybody knows that in his *Various Sentiments* Lu Hsun expressed his own thoughts on this score. And what he wrote coincided with the criticism of Confucius by revolutionaries and Communists at the time of the May Fourth Movement and in the thirties.

From antiquity to the present time an incalculable number of works has been written on Confucius and the teaching of Confucius and Meng-tsu. Their authors expressed disparate opinions, some of them diametrically opposite ones, and each expounded what was by and large his own view. Mao, however, not only "sanctified" Lu Hsun's pronouncements on Confucius and the teaching of Confucius and Meng-tsu as indisputable dogma, but also made them a "reason" for persecuting Communists and revolutionary intellectuals. For this there is absolutely no justification.

Of late, Mao has begun identifying Lin Piao and Confucius. In his campaign of "criticising Lin Piao and Confucius" he makes specific use of Lu Hsun's pronouncements on the teaching of Confucius and Meng-tsu. This, as we have already noted, is meant to portray the struggle between Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao as a struggle between Mao's anti-Confucianism and Lin Piao's worship of Confucianism in order to obfuscate the true motives of the struggle between Mao and Lin Piao.

It is common knowledge that Mao began abusing, distorting, and falsifying Lu Hsun's pronouncements, and

using Lu Hsun's name to promote his own reactionary aims, a long time ago. Years ago, and especially during the "cultural revolution", Mao distorted and falsified Lu Hsun arbitrarily to attack people whom he wanted to put out of the way. Here is a sample of one crude falsification. In his testament, Lu Hsun said among other things: "In Europe, when someone dies he usually performs the rite of begging the forgiveness of others, and also forgives others. I have many enemies . . . but I forgive none of them." In October 1966, at a meeting on the 30th anniversary of Lu Hsun's death, Chen Po-ta quoted these words from Lu Hsun's testament in his concluding remarks. He added—evidently on Mao's behalf: "I consider this a very important testament left us by Lu Hsun, which we must never forget." By deliberately distorting what Lu Hsun wrote, Mao tried to create the impression that the great writer would not forgive those revolutionary literature and art workers inside and outside the Party who had opposed him in the discussions of the twenties and thirties. But the facts from Lu Hsun's life contradict this arbitrary interpretation.

In the thirties, in the League of Left-Wing Writers Lu Hsun was closely associated with the revolutionary writers and artists who had opposed him in the discussions of the twenties. In 1932, in a foreword to his *Collection of a Triple Loafer*, he referred to them with warmth and gratitude. "There is one thing for which I am forever grateful to the Creative Art Society. It spurred me to reading certain works on the science of literature," Lu Hsun wrote. "This helped me to dispel the doubts which former historians of literature had debated at such enormous length that they created still greater confusion. In doing so, I translated Plekhanov's book, *On the Arts*, in order to rectify my mistake and also the mistake of those who had suffered because of me—the mistake of one-sided, all-absorbing faith in the theory of evolution." Jointly with the comrades of the League of Left-Wing Writers* (with whom he had come to grips

* The League of Left-Wing Writers, founded under the direction of the CPC, existed from 1930 to 1936. It brought together many writers—some were Communists, some were outside the Party, and all of them were revolutionaries. In 1936 the League dissolved itself in connection with the emergence of the united national anti-Japanese front and the need for uniting the country's patriotic writers.

in a discussion in the summer of 1936), Lu Hsun signed a declaration in early October 1936, entitled Declaration of brothers in literature and art on unity for the sake of resisting aggression and securing freedom of speech. Jointly with them he fought the enemy. But for his untimely death on 19 October 1936, he would surely have fought on for an anti-Japanese united front in art and literature jointly with those who had opposed him in the discussions. Lu Hsun always distinguished between friend and foe. He is the very opposite of Mao Tse-tung, who deliberately distorted Lu Hsun's testament and, what is worse, used it as a pretext for persecuting revolutionary writers and artists, and the vast majority of CPC leaders and rank-and-file members as enemies.

One more example. The discussion that erupted in the League of Left-Wing Writers over the two slogans concerning the establishment of an anti-Japanese united front in art and literature, ended in the summer of 1936. Already then, taking guidance in the correct CPC policy of a united national anti-Japanese front, the adversaries arrived at the conclusion that there was no essential difference between the slogan "literature of national defence" and the slogan "mass literature of national revolutionary war". This was why in his article, "Reply to Hsu Mao-yung on the Question of the Anti-Japanese United Front", Lu Hsun acknowledged the need for the "co-existence" of the two slogans "inasmuch as the slogan 'literature of national defence' is highly popular and is known to many, and can increase our political and literary influence". The facts of history show, indeed, that in the political climate of that time the slogan "literature of national defence" was more in keeping with the task of building an anti-Japanese united front in art and literature. This was why it won public approval and was welcomed by writers and artists. Slogans such as "poetry and songs of national defence", "plays of national defence", "films of national defence", and the like, were quickly put forward.

In substance, both slogans were based on documents of the CC CPC. Chou Yang and others of the CPC group in the League of Left-Wing Writers who advanced the slogan, "literature of national defence", in the beginning of 1936, had taken it from the August First Appeal to All Compatriots on Resistance to Japan and for the Sal-

vation of the Motherland, published on 1 August 1935 by the CC CPC and the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic to promote the united national anti-Japanese front. This Appeal advanced the slogans of organising an all-China united government of national defence and forming an all-China anti-Japanese union army. The August First Appeal and its slogans, "government of national defence" and "anti-Japanese Union Army", represented a concrete plan for resolving the most complicated problems of the all-China united national anti-Japanese front. Pro-Japanese traitor Wang Ching-wei held that the existence in China of different governments and armies precluded resistance to Japan, while anti-communist Chiang Kai-shek exploited these circumstances to "substantiate" his own slogan, "before resisting the outside enemy we must put down internal strife". Our Party's proposal of an all-China united government of national defence and an all-China anti-Japanese union army destroyed these "excuses" and "substantiations", and gave the people of China and all anti-Japanese parties and groups the happy perspective of ending civil strife and launching a joint struggle against the Japanese aggression. All of them supported the August First Appeal of the CPC, and acted on it. This is why, too, the slogan of "literature of national defence" won extensive support among writers and artists.

When in May 1936 Lu Hsun and others advanced the slogan, "mass literature of national revolutionary war", they were guided by the CC CPC appeal of 19 September 1931, issued after the Japanese occupation of Shenyang (Mukden) on 18 September, which called for a national revolutionary war by the armed people against Japanese imperialism. The 19 September appeal was directed against Chiang Kai-shek's policy of non-resistance. It was a militant appeal to the Chinese people to launch an armed struggle against the Japanese imperialist aggression. Yet, as noted earlier, at that time our Party had not yet formulated the policy of a united national anti-Japanese front directed to marshalling all anti-Japanese forces of China. Slogans furthering this policy were first issued a little over four months later during the Shanghai battle against the Japanese, which began on 28 January 1932.

The facts of history show that in the conditions creat-

ed by the continuous armed aggression of Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek's anti-communist war it was impossible to carry into effect the militant slogan of an anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, which implies unity of the whole nation, in the absence of a united national anti-Japanese front policy. Faithful to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on national revolutionary wars, the Communist Party of China first called for an anti-Japanese national revolutionary war. Subsequently, taking guidance in Lenin's theory on the united national anti-imperialist front, it worked out the policy of a united national anti-Japanese front. In the teeth of numerous difficulties, guided by the Comintern and helped by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it secured an end to the war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, established cooperation with the Kuomintang, and furthered nationwide resistance to Japanese aggression. This was a vivid example of how the Communist Party of China applied the common principles of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of the Chinese revolution. Also, it was a historical service rendered by the CPC to the Chinese nation.

When during the events of 18 September 1931 the Party issued the slogan of an anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, Mao was in one of the Soviet areas of China and learned about it only some time later. During the defence of Shanghai against the Japanese in 1932, we issued the slogan: "Workers, peasants, soldiers, students, intellectuals, merchants! Unite for joint resistance to Japan and for the salvation of the Motherland!" Thereupon, the CPC offered "three conditions" on which the Chinese Red Army was prepared to conclude an agreement of joint armed action against the Japanese invaders with the Kuomintang and any other armed forces. It advanced a six-point action programme for establishing a committee for the armed self-defence of the Chinese people. It suggested a national united front against Japan and Manchukuo, and was instrumental in activating the Northeast Anti-Japanese Union Army.

It was in these documents and the related actions that the policy of a united national anti-Japanese front was gradually evolved. In its August First Appeal and other documents, the Party consummated this basic policy of resistance to Japan and salvation of the Mother-

land. News of these developments did not reach Mao until later. He was either in one of the Soviet areas or on the Western March. So, he had taken no part, nor could have taken part, in them. It was on 27 December 1935 that Mao made his Wayopao report on tactics of struggle against Japanese imperialism. Here, complying with a Central Committee decision, he first mentioned the united national anti-Japanese front. But his report did not support the Central Committee's policy of anti-Japanese unity; Mao set forth his own left-opportunist line directed against the Party's policy. Small wonder that the report was not made public until 16 years later.

Despite these facts of history, in March 1966 the Chinese press published Chiang Ching's *Notes on the Conference on Literary and Art Work in Army Units*.^{*} These notes, and other documents published later to further the counter-revolutionary "cultural revolution", described the slogan "literature of national defence" advanced by Chou Yang and others on the basis of the August First Appeal as a "bourgeois slogan" adopted under the influence of "Wang Ming's defeatist policy of a united national anti-Japanese front". The slogan of Lu Hsun and others based on the 19 September Appeal was described as a "proletarian slogan in keeping with the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung on the policy of a united national anti-Japanese front". The discussion of the two slogans relating to anti-Japanese unity in art and literature, which was amicably settled in the summer of 1936, Mao Tse-tung now presents as a discussion between advocates of a "bourgeois slogan" and a "proletarian slogan", and as a struggle between "Wang Ming's right-opportunist line in art and literature" and "Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary line in art and literature".

The facts, which are also known to Mao, are: Chou Yang and Lu Hsun each based his slogan on one of two documents of the CC CPC, both of which were written by Wang Ming; the slogans they contain were also formulated by Wang Ming. Yet Mao Tse-tung did not hesitate to present the 19 September Appeal of 1931, which contains the slogan of a national revolutionary war, as

^{*} These *Notes* of Chiang Ching and a letter by Lin Piao saying that they were thrice corrected by Mao Tse-tung, appeared in the journal *Hungchi* No. 9, 1967.

his own correct line, and the August First Appeal of 1935 and its slogan of a government of national defence as the "right-opportunist" line and slogan of Wang Ming. Could anything be more ridiculous?

It is quite clear that by means of this sleight-of-hand Mao intends not only to elevate himself and deliver a blow at Wang Ming, but also to portray the revolutionary writers and artists of the thirties inside and outside the Party as opponents of Lu Hsun's and Mao Tse-tung's "literary-artistic line" and as followers of "Wang Ming's right-opportunist literary-artistic line"—and this in order to line them up for brutal persecution.

The greatest insult to Lu Hsun is Mao's hypocritical praise of the great writer in his *On New Democracy*, published in early 1940. Here Mao raised Lu Hsun to an "awesome height", to use the latter's words in reference to the specious praise of Confucius by those in authority. Mao posthumously proclaimed Lu Hsun a "Maoist" and an exponent of "Mao Tse-tung's literary-artistic thoughts". By so "elevating" Lu Hsun, Mao in fact elevated himself. But fearing that people may not fall for his trick, Mao made Lu Hsun's widow, Hsui Kuang-ping, say at the meeting on the 30th anniversary of her husband's death that "the all-conquering ideas of Mao Tse-tung were already then the supreme guiding principles for Lu Hsun and all revolutionary literary and art workers... Mao Tse-tung was the reddest of the red suns in the heart of Lu Hsun", and so forth. Yet, as everybody knows, the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" did not exist in Lu Hsun's lifetime, and it would not have occurred to anyone then to compare Mao with the sun.

On 11 January 1974 *Jenminjhipao* carried an advertisement of a new, revised edition of the complete works of Lu Hsun, which said: "The mistakes made in compiling and editing the previous edition have been corrected in the present edition." The meaning is clear: Mao's mouthpiece announced, in effect, that Lu Hsun's works have been distorted and falsified to suit the present needs of Mao's counter-revolutionary group. Everybody knows, after all, that Mao is a past master at garbling and doctoring his own and the works of other people.

Mao Tse-tung is trying to exploit Lu Hsun's name in his own interests and Lu Hsun's works as tools in his intrigues. We Chinese Communists and the people of

China must save Lu Hsun and his works from the diabolic clutches of Mao Tse-tung.

To save revolutionary Lu Hsun from the bloodstained hands of counter-revolutionary Mao Tse-tung is also the duty of all the true admirers of the great writer. On the one hand, we must expose the wily devices of Mao Tse-tung, who abuses the name and works of Lu Hsun; on the other, we must acquaint people with the true Lu Hsun, the revolutionary writer. We must help the mass of the people to understand that Lu Hsun's main distinction, which earned him fame as a revolutionary writer, was that in the late twenties and early thirties he opted once and for all for friendship and cooperation with the Communist Party of China and with the Soviet Union. He fought by their side, defended their interests, and attacked their enemies with his sharp pen. And inasmuch as Mao has become an enemy of the CPC, he is also an enemy of Lu Hsun, and for this reason is trying to conceal the truly remarkable accomplishments of the great writer.

Lu Hsun fought shoulder to shoulder with the Communist Party of China against the anti-communist abominations and "extermination campaigns" of the imperialists and of Chiang Kai-shek. He supported the CPC policy of a united national anti-Japanese front that was being organised for an anti-Japanese national revolutionary war. In 1933, in a foreword to the *Complete Works* of Li Ta-chao, Lu Hsun referred to Li Ta-chao's civic funeral organised by the people of Peiping* in the following terms: "It was an entirely justified ceremony." Of Li Ta-chao's literary legacy he said that it would "live eternally, because it is a brilliant monument to the history of the revolution". In 1936, paying tribute to the memory of Tsyui Tsyu-po, Lu Hsun published a two-volume collection of Tsyui Tsyu-po's translations, writing a foreword for each volume and paying homage to his comrade.

But what did we see later? Mao used armed force to crush the Communist Party of China. He massacred countless Communists. He consigned the works of Li Ta-chao and Tsyui Tsyu-po to the flames. He dug up and desecrated the graves of the two revolutionaries.

* Peking was then known as Peiping.

Their relatives—Li Ta-chao's son Li Pao-hua, and Tsyui Tsyu-po's widow Yang Chih-hua—have been brutally maltreated. If Lu Hsun had been alive today, he would surely have said to Mao: You have committed more villainies than Chiang Kai-shek and all the known national traitors combined; even they had not managed to repress so many Communists; even they had not dared to desecrate the graves of Li Ta-chao and Tsyui Tsyu-po. What you have done is an insult to elementary Chinese morality.

Lu Hsun joined battle against the imperialist warmongers. He angrily exposed imperialist slander against the Soviet Union. In an article, *Never Again Shall We Be Deceived*, which appeared in 1932, he wrote: "The imperialists want to make war on the USSR. The more successfully things go with the USSR, the greater their wish to attack and the more surely they head for a fall." To explain why imperialists slander the Soviet Union and are poised to attack it, Lu Hsun wrote: "They are going to seed. They can barely keep on their feet. They are trying to save themselves, and hate the progress of the Soviet Union. Neither slanders, nor curses, nor invocations, nor venomous hatred can help them. The only thing they can do is to prepare for an armed attack. They will not rest until they crush the USSR." This would also be a true description of Mao's attitude to the Soviet Union if we added "and Mao Tse-tung" after the word "imperialists" or substituted "Mao Tse-tung" for "imperialists". In the same article Lu Hsun explained what the attitude of the Chinese people should be towards a war against the USSR. He wrote: "If the menials of imperialism wish to go to war, let them follow their masters. We, the people, have entirely different interests than theirs. We are against attacking the USSR. On the contrary, we want to overthrow and destroy the demon who wants to attack the USSR, no matter how honeyed his speech or how noble the mask behind which he hides. This and only this is our road to salvation."

Mao Tse-tung has become a menial of imperialism. He is itching to attack the USSR. Yet the thoughts of the Chinese people on this score are the same as Lu Hsun's: "overthrow and destroy the demon who wants to attack the USSR" because "this and only this is our road to salvation".

The Chinese Communists have always treated Lu Hsun and his works with loving care and concern. In 1930 the CC CPC trusted Lu Hsun with the office of chairman of the League of Left-Wing Writers. From July 1931 to January 1934, Tsyui Tsyu-po, who had a solid literary background and much experience, helped direct the League on the instructions of the Central Committee. In 1934 he was sent to the Soviet areas of China. Jointly with the CPC group in the League, he helped Lu Hsun in matters of ideology and politics, and also in his practical work. In the late spring and early summer of 1936, on learning from Emi Siao that Lu Hsun was gravely ill, I asked Georgi Dimitrov to invite him to the Soviet Union for treatment. We sent Pan Han-nien from Moscow to Shanghai to arrange for Lu Hsun and his family to come to the Soviet Union. Pan Han-nien made all the arrangements but unfortunately Lu Hsun's health had deteriorated and he was unable to make the long journey. When he died on 25 October 1936, I wrote an obituary in the name of the Communist Party of China, "Sad Loss of the Chinese People", for the *Tsiu-kuoshipao*, a weekly appearing in Paris.* And at a public meeting in Chungking on 19 October 1939, I spoke on behalf of the CC CPC on the 3rd anniversary of Lu Hsun's death.** I referred to Lu Hsun and his works in glowing terms, calling on writers and artists, and on youth, to learn from Lu Hsun and his works the spirit of revolutionary struggle, and to redouble their contribution to the resistance to Japanese aggression.

There is nothing in common between the attitudes towards Lu Hsun of the Chinese Communists and of Mao Tse-tung. For us Lu Hsun is a comrade-in-arms and his works not only a precious literary legacy, but also a weapon furthering the revolutionary cause. Mao, on the other hand, uses Lu Hsun's name and works to disguise his counter-revolutionary tricks. He "idolizes" Lu Hsun, making him an object of blind worship. He also "idolizes" the works of Lu Hsun, trying to turn them into dogma for senseless exercise. He does this in order

* A Chinese-language weekly published in Paris by the CPC delegation to the Comintern with the help of the Comintern leadership. Wang Ming was its editor-in-chief.

** The full text of this speech appeared on the following day in the *Hsinhuajihpao*, appearing in Chungking.

to be able to use, distort, and falsify Lu Hsun's sayings and views, and to prevent anybody from ever daring to question anything.

This is why it is so vital for China today to understand Lu Hsun. We must squash the vile intrigues of Mao Tse-tung, who tries to use Lu Hsun and his works for reactionary ends by "idolizing" him. We must see to it that every time Mao exploits the name of Lu Hsun to disguise his own reactionary visage people should be able clearly to distinguish truth from untruth and see where Mao abuses, distorts, and falsifies the great writer.

Mao's treatment of Lu Hsun only shows that Mao is an inveterate pragmatist and an exponent of subjective idealism, the most reactionary of all philosophical schools.

4) "Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" and the fate of the "lone despot"

We have already shown that Mao praises Chin Shih Huang in order to praise himself, that he berates Confucius in order to vindicate persecutions, and that he abuses Lu Hsun's name for his own reactionary ends. Not only is this a part of the present ruthless "criticism of Lin Piao and rectification of style" campaign, but also a preparatory measure for a second "cultural revolution". The idea that "cultural revolutions will have to be carried out many times in the future" has been officially recorded in the "party constitution" adopted by the Maoist 10th Congress. The report to Congress on this "constitution" said that carrying out "cultural revolutions" every seven or eight years is "an objective law as revealed by Chairman Mao". The "documents of the 10th Congress" and the joint New Year's editorial of the "Maoist three newspapers and one journal" said: "There is great disorder in the whole of the earth", "a deluge is about to break out in the mountains" and "gales are blowing through the house". Yes, gales have already begun to rage in Peking, Nanking, and other Chinese cities.

On 12 January 1974 the *Jenminjihpao* announced on its front page: "The letter and extracts from the diary of Huang Shuai, the red guard girl from School No. 1 of the Peking suburb of Chungkuangchun, and an after-

word of the editors, which were published in *Jenminjihpao* and *Peichingjihpao*, have aroused deep feeling among the pupils and teachers of secondary and primary schools in Peking, and also among the public at large; they have given impetus to the unfolding criticism of Lin Piao and the rectification of style, criticism of revisionism, and criticism of the bourgeois world outlook; furthermore, they have helped to promote the revolution in the educational field."

It was clear to one and all that the so-called letter and extracts from the diary of Huang Shuai, in which she complained of being ill-treated by her teacher, were a stage-managed ploy to incite a campaign against "revisionism" in education. The paper attacked such "anachronism" as "the incontestable authority of the teacher", "emphasis on mental education", and "the system of examinations". This was meant to lead to the following conclusion: the questions raised by Huang Shuai are not questions concerning an individual, a school, or the relationship between teacher and pupil; they concern the struggle between two classes, two lines, and "the struggle against revisionism and for the prevention of revisionism".

The *Jenminjihpao* announcement was reminiscent of Mao's manoeuvres prior to launching the first "cultural revolution"; they differed only in the particulars. It was natural to expect, therefore, that he would soon shift his attack from secondary and primary schools to the higher schools, and then from the educational field to Party, government and military organs as a pretext for stepping up the "criticism of Lin Piao and rectification of style" and starting a second "cultural revolution".

As expected, on 18 January the *Jenminjihpao* published on its front page the "Application for Release from Study" of one Chung Chih-ming, a Nanking University student, son of an old military cadre, with editorial comments. This served notice that the "struggle between two classes and two lines", the "struggle against revisionism and for the prevention of revisionism", and the like, would spread from higher schools to the army, Party, government, and other areas. Clearly, a second "cultural revolution" was imminent.

The mudslinging in Mao's anti-Soviet propaganda has of late been accompanied by such inflammatory anti-

Soviet acts as the arrest and maltreatment of Soviet diplomats and members of their families by Peking security agencies. Orders had come from "high up", and worked as a signal.

As expected, on 2 February 1974 the *Jenminjihpao* carried an editorial, "Carry Out to the End the Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius". Judging by its grossness and tone of authority it must have been written or revised by Mao himself. In effect, it was the official announcement of a second "cultural revolution" with the slogan of "criticising Lin Piao and Confucius", and one more of Mao's declarations of war on the Chinese Communists and the people of China.

In its opening passage the editorial declared that "on the personal initiative and under the personal guidance" of Mao Tse-tung "a mass political struggle is being launched in all fields to criticise Lin Piao and Confucius". Abuse was heaped on Lin Piao for being a "follower of Confucius to the marrow of his bones".

To "substantiate" the connection between Lin Piao and Confucius, the editorial cited Confucius' saying, *ke tsi fu li* (self-improvement in accordance with etiquette) to "show" that Confucius wanted "to restore the slave-owning system" and Lin Piao wanted "to restore capitalism". The whole thing is a crude and clumsy insinuation. The Maoist political report to the 10th Congress shows clearly that it is none other than Mao Tse-tung who opposes building socialism and, in fact, wants to restore capitalism and turn back the clock of history.

Thereupon the article enumerated seven points to "prove" that Lin Piao was a "follower of Confucius". Inasmuch as Mao had set out to criticise Lin Piao and Confucius together and to prove that Lin Piao's words and deeds were based on the sayings of Confucius, the elementary rules of logic, let alone the scientific method, required him to cite the relevant sayings of Confucius on each of the seven points with a precise reference to the source, and alongside give the relevant words or deeds of Lin Piao, also with corroborating evidence, on the same seven points. This would have enabled the reader to draw comparisons and arrive at the due conclusions.

Yet in the seven "proofs" given by Mao, only one of the phrases was spoken by Confucius, and even this phrase Mao misquoted, as I shall show below. The "quo-

tations" in the other six points were not from Confucius. This is why Mao does not provide any precise data as to where and what Confucius said, and tries to mislead people with offhand "references", such as "Confucius and Meng-tsu maintained", "Confucius and Meng-tsu preached", and "the followers of Confucius and Meng-tsu" said or did...

One can only wonder how Meng-tsu, who was born 107 years after Confucius' death, could "maintain" or "preach" together with Confucius. As for the "followers of Confucius and Meng-tsu", there were countless numbers of them in the past 2,500 years, and it would be legitimate to ask which of them Mao had in mind. Though, all the same, whoever they may be, they cannot speak for Confucius himself.

The elementary demands of scientific logic—to be objective and specific—require that only words spoken by Confucius himself should be referred to Confucius. Neither those of Meng-tsu nor those of any other follower of Confucius can be legitimately ascribed to Confucius. Following the death of Confucius the more than 70 of his best disciples broke up into several groups, each of which had its own interpretations for many of Confucius' sayings. In short, Confucius and Meng-tsu should not be heaped together. The latter's words should on no account be ascribed to the former. Besides, out of the seven "proofs" put forward by Mao only one and a half sentences really belong to Meng-tsu and, furthermore, their interpretation is highly dubious.

In the first part of each of the seven points Mao fabricated sayings, ascribed them to Confucius, and interpreted them to suit his ends. In the second part of each point he falsified Lin Piao's words and also gave them his own interpretation. It is clear at the very first glance that the whole thing was an invention to promote "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius". One cannot help noting, moreover, that in some of his references to Lin Piao, Mao unconsciously admitted that in the matter at hand Lin Piao opposed his opinion.

Now, let us consider each of Mao's seven fabricated points.

Point One. Mao maintains that Confucius and Meng-tsu preached "knowledge from birth". There is a variety of records on this score in the *Analects*, but in so far as

Confucius is concerned, he said the very opposite. Take the *Analects*, 8; "Shu Erh", 7. There it says in so many words:

"Confucius said: 'I am not one who possesses knowledge from birth, but one who acquired it through my love of antiquity and diligence in learning'."

Mao also says, "Confucius and Meng-tsu advertised: 'If you want to govern the state with success, then who else but me is there among the contemporaries capable of doing it?'" Confucius never said anything of the sort. Besides, this sentence by Meng-tsu is incomplete. Before he uttered the above, he said: "Heaven did not wish the state to be governed with success", and thereupon he said: "Why am I downhearted?" Meng-tsu said this as he was leaving the state of Chi, where his application for an official post had been turned down. A man by the name of Chung Yu, whom he met on the way, had asked him why he looked so sad. Uttered in reply to Chung Yu, Meng-tsu's words connoted self-consolation and confidence, but not that he intended going anywhere to "govern the state with success", let alone seize power. Yet Mao juggles words that he ascribes to Confucius, and distorts the meaning of the words spoken by Meng-tsu to accuse Lin Piao of expounding a "theory of intellectual genius" and calling himself "extra-noble", and the like. More, he portrays this twisted line as Lin Piao's "anti-party theoretical programme" and brandishes it as proof of a "conspiracy to usurp the party and seize power, and an attempt at imposing his personal dictatorship". This is truly a case of lying without a twinge of conscience. The facts show that the man who thinks himself a "genius", "great", "exceptional" and "super-human", who invented an "anti-party theoretical programme", who hatched "a conspiracy to usurp the party and seize power", and who imposed his personal dictatorship, is none other than Mao Tse-tung himself.

Point Two. The sentence Mao quoted, "the highest wisdom and the lowest folly cannot change into one another," was, indeed, spoken by Confucius. But Mao either misunderstood or deliberately garbled its meaning. According to a note by Kung An-kuo to "Yang Ho" in the *Analects*, it means: "The highest wisdom cannot be made to breed evil any more than the lowest folly can be forced to become virtuous." The sentence was spoken by

Confucius to explain why he did not want to meet *ta-fu** Yang Ho. What he meant is that Yang Ho cannot force Confucius of the "highest wisdom" to be a party to evil deeds any more than Confucius can make Yang Ho of the "lowest folly" to become virtuous under the influence of others. Kung An-kuo's note is unquestionably correct, because he associated the saying with the sense of the opening words of the tale: "Yang Ho wished to meet Confucius, but Confucius did not want to see him." **

Yet Mao described the phrase as an "idealistic view of the tale about the highest wisdom and the lowest folly", claiming that it expressed contempt for toilers. This shows that the row of ancient books on Mao's bookshelf*** is no more than a display of spurious "scholarship" designed to deceive workers, peasants, soldiers, and the youth. Either he has not seriously read the first of the ancient books, the *Analects*, or has failed to understand it.

Point Three. Mao maintains: "Confucius and Meng-tsu preached morality, humanity, honesty, loyalty and concern for others". All these are distinct ethical concepts, not Confucius' sayings. Yet Mao uses his contention to "prove" that Lin Piao "opposed revolutionary force and opposed dictatorship of the proletariat". He thereby unwittingly admitted that Lin Piao opposed the brutality of Mao's counter-revolutionary "cultural revolution" and Mao's reactionary one-man military-terrorist dictatorship over Communists and working people.

Point Four. Mao says that Confucius and Meng-tsu "propagated" the *chungyung* principle.**** As we know, *Tahsueh* (Great Learning) and *Chungyung* (Doctrine of the Mean) were parts of *Li Chi* (Record of Rites). In the Sung dynasty, Chen Hao and Chen Yi described *Tahsueh* from the *Record of Rites* as the "legacy of Confucius" in order to combat Buddhism and Lao Tse. Later, Chu Hsi incorporated *Chungyung* from the *Record of Rites* with the *Analects*, *Mencius* and the *Doctrine of*

* *Tafu*—ancient title of a feudal courtier.

** For details see *Analects*, 20; "Yang Ho", 17.

*** Judging from recent photographs in the *Jenminjhpao*, Mao receives foreign guests against the background of bookshelves and a desk piled high with ancient books.

**** *Chungyung*—the golden mean.

the Mean to compile *The Four Books*. Thereafter, people began referring to the *chungyung* principle as being Confucian. Neither Confucius nor Meng-tsu ever propagated any *chungyung* principle.

The "argument" here is based on Confucius' phrase: "Since ancient times, *chungyung* as the perfect virtue is very rarely observed by people." * This was certainly no appeal for people to observe *chungyung*. On the contrary, it was a statement of fact: people very rarely acted according to *chungyung* or had completely abandoned it. Yet Mao names *chungyung* as the reason why Lin Piao evidently opposed his conduct in "the struggle against revisionism" for being "excessively extreme". Here Mao unwittingly admits that in some things Lin Piao disagreed with his candidly pro-imperialist and rabidly reactionary anti-Soviet foreign policy.

Point Five. Mao maintains that "Confucius and Meng-tsu preached a philosophy of life that amounted to 'swallowing insults for the sake of success'". Neither Confucius nor Meng-tsu ever preached any such philosophical concept. To "prove" that Lin Piao followed this "philosophy", Mao fabricated the story of his borrowing two lines of verse from the popular classic novel, *The Three Kingdoms*: "Compelled for the time being to dwell in the den of the tiger" and "discretion and a quick wit—those are the miracles one can trust." Thereby Mao admitted that as close an intimate of his as Lin Piao, who had constantly been by his side, felt that "to be in the company of the monarch was like being with a tiger", and that, for this reason, he had had to act up to Mao, relying on "discretion and a quick wit" lest this ferocious tiger devoured him. If this was the case with Lin Piao, then what could be said of the others?

Point Six. Mao maintains that "Confucius and Meng-tsu preached: 'The mental worker governs people, the manual worker is governed by people'." These words belong to Meng-tsu, not Confucius.

Here Mao tries to find the reason why Lin Piao opposed the May Seventh Cadre Schools for being "a variety of concentration camp", "banishment of cadres to the lower depths for manual labour", "a variety of unemployment", "banishment of youth to mountains and villages

for re-education by forced labour", and the like. Thereby Mao also unwittingly admits that Lin Piao opposed the persecution of cadres and the transportation of educated youth—which are, indeed, crimes that made Mao hated by everybody.

Point Seven. Mao maintains that "the followers of Confucius and Meng-tsu abolished one hundred schools and worshipped only Confucianism". But this has nothing to do with Confucius himself. The "abolition of one hundred schools and worship of Confucius only" date to the times of Emperor Han Wu Ti. Yet under Point Seven Confucius is charged with "the manner of government passed down before his death by Chou Wen-wang to Wu-Wang". An outrageous sample of misrepresentation! *

As we see, Mao resorts here to a still clumsier, still more illiterate and still more brazen falsification than those fabricated by him three years before in the so-called Outline of Project "571".

Mao Tse-tung, a past master at slandering and lying has, indeed, reached to the bottom of the barrel.

The Confucius who is being criticised by Mao is Mao's own invention, and certainly not the real Confucius. And the Lin Piao who is being criticised by Mao is also counterfeited, and not the real Lin Piao. It follows that Mao's intention to "carry out to the end the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" is an intention to combat the Lin Piao and Confucius Mao had himself fabricated. Could there be anything funnier and more cynical?

Mao displayed "personal initiative" and is "personally guiding" the campaign of "criticising Lin Piao and Confucius", in which elementary respect, justice and decency are conspicuous by their absence, and this not only to disguise the true content of the political clash between Mao and Lin Piao, but also to be able to use the labels "Confucianist" and "follower of Lin Piao" to persecute people in the second "cultural revolution". In the "second cultural revolution" Mao intends to get rid of those who are obstructing the extreme reactionary home and foreign policy of the 10th Congress, that is, those

* Chou Wen-wang died in 1135 B. C.; Confucius was born in 551 B. C.

* *Analects*, 7; "Yun Yi", 6.

who he thinks are obstructing the perpetuation of his reactionary rule, his intention to leave his "throne" to Chiang Ching and create a "family empire", the preparations for war against the USSR and incitement of a new world war, and his collusion with extreme reactionary imperialist groupings. For the imperialists and for traitor Mao Tse-tung, all Marxists-Leninists and exponents of proletarian internationalism, all anti-imperialists and friends of socialism, all revolutionaries and veterans of revolutionary wars, all people who distinguish between friend and foe and who possess knowledge and a revolutionary outlook, all intellectuals and progressive youth—all these are mortal enemies "subject to suppression".

This is why Mao's editorial portrayed his "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" as a "serious class struggle" and a "radical revolution in the field of ideology". Thereupon, he threatened: "activeness or passiveness is the test of every leader in so colossally important a matter as the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius", adding that "only with struggle can we advance; without struggle there can be only retreat, without struggle there can be only dislocation, without struggle there can be only revisionism". Then he demanded: "Leaders at all levels must be in the forefront of the struggle; they must regard the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius as a matter of paramount importance, and give it their paramount attention."

At the end of the article Mao issued this strict instruction: revolutionary cadres and the revolutionary intelligentsia must take an active part in this struggle, and work diligently to remould their world outlook. Those intellectuals who are "relatively strongly contaminated with Confucius and Meng-tsu must engage in self-education".

This amounts to an ultimatum for "every leader", "leaders at all levels", "revolutionary cadres and the revolutionary intelligentsia", and "those intellectuals who are relatively strongly contaminated with Confucius and Meng-tsu" to stand "tests", "to remould", to "be in the forefront of the struggle", and to "engage in self-education". Those who have lived through the "style rectification campaign" and the "cultural revolution" know that, spoken by Mao Tse-tung, the words "tests", "be in the

forefront of the struggle", "remould", and "engage in self-education", mean that they are being declared subject to denunciation, persecution, imprisonment, flogging, torture, banishment, and death. These words mean that millions of Communists, revolutionary workers, the intelligentsia and youth, must prepare themselves for moral torment and physical suffering, "bitter tears and blood", and that many of them will die.

Mao's editorial said: "The broad mass of workers, peasants and soldiers is the main force in the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius", adding that they "know best of all how to criticise Lin Piao and Confucius". This was said because Mao knows that the vast majority of workers, peasants and soldiers have little or no knowledge of Confucius and his teaching. So, those of them who do Mao's bidding can berate none but the Confucius fabricated by Mao and the Lin Piao fabricated by Mao. All this is nothing but sleight-of-hand: with one hand Mao fabricates a false Lin Piao and a false Confucius, and with the other he directs people to revile them.

Judging from reports, Mao has of late been devoting himself to training and arming a "militia". Now, he has transferred the "militia" from under the charge of the military administration to the charge of the Maoist "party committees" and "revolutionary committees". In Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Wuhan and other cities "militiamen" have already begun to perform the functions of policemen. It is reported that Mao intends to use them as storm-troopers in the second "cultural revolution" against Party and military cadres, and cadres of government organs, mass organisations and educational establishments. Thereupon, he will gradually convert them into regular troops to replace those PLA units which still have strong revolutionary traditions.

It has been reported that in Shanghai the so-called militiamen have already begun putting up *tatsupaos* (wall newspapers) and holding street-corner meetings. Peking newspapers have published photographs of *tatsupaos* stigmatising "class enemies". In Peking and many other cities so-called rallies are held "to criticise Lin Piao and Confucius". In other words, Mao has already sent his storm-troopers into the streets to start a second "cultural revolution".

Mao describes his counter-revolutionary actions as a display of "the revolutionary spirit that boldly goes against the current" and as "a march to meet storm and tempest". Documents of the Maoist 10th Congress, too, urge "going boldly against the current".

What is this "current" referred to by Mao and the Maoist 10th Congress? It is the revolutionary current unexampled in volume which has arisen in the hearts of the millions of Chinese Communists and the many hundreds of millions of Chinese against the counter-revolutionary thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, the counter-revolutionary rule of Mao Tse-tung, and the counter-revolutionary "cultural revolution". It is a vast current, gathering momentum with "ten fors" and "ten againsts":

for revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and *against* the counter-revolutionary "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung";

for a genuine CPC and Komsomol, and *against* the false CPC and Komsomol of Mao Tse-tung;

for people's democratic power under the leadership of the Communist Party, and *against* the one-man reactionary military-terrorist dictatorship of Mao Tse-tung;

for building socialism, and *against* Mao's policy of undermining the pillars of socialism;

for improving the material and cultural life of the people, and *against* Mao's policy of perpetuating poverty and backwardness;

for the People's Liberation Army always to be a revolutionary army defending the Communist Party and the people, and *against* its conversion by Mao into an anti-communist, anti-Soviet, and anti-people counter-revolutionary force;

for the equal coexistence and prosperity of all nationalities in China, and *against* Mao's great-Han nationalism and oppression of national minorities;

for unity with the Soviet Union and all socialist countries, and *against* Mao's collusion with imperialist forces;

for unity with all Asian, African and Latin American countries opposing imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, and *against* Mao's ideas of hegemony in the "third world" together with imperialists;

for world peace, and *against* Mao's war preparations and incitement of a third world war.

Mao Tse-tung is frightened of this mighty revolutionary current. By threats and promises he is making people join him in combatting it. He hopes to stem it by means of counter-revolutionary "cultural revolutions".

The Chinese Communists and the people of China know that they must overcome Mao's pernicious movement, which is raising a devilish gale and diabolic waves that cause incalculable calamities. Then and only then will China be saved.

The Chinese Communists, the people of China, and all men and officers of the PLA must unite against the counter-revolutionary "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" and the counter-revolutionary "cultural revolution". In face of tempest and storm, they must go forward boldly until complete victory is gained, so that Maoism never again causes anyone any harm.

Then and only then will the splendid flower of socialism burst forth in bloom, yielding prodigious socialist fruit on the soil of our beloved motherland.

Then and only then will workers, peasants, intellectuals and the youth of China live the free and happy life that is their birthright.

Then and only then will our People's Liberation Army really be a valiant revolutionary army protecting our socialist land and performing its internationalist duty.

Then and only then will the Chinese Communists and the people of China be able to stand up to imperialism and reactionaries of all countries, and to work for world peace, freedom and happiness shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community, and with the communist parties and peoples of all countries.

Mao Tse-tung and the reactionary imperialist groups wielding the conductor's baton behind his back regard successive counter-revolutionary "cultural revolutions" as the chief instrument for sustaining reactionary rule in China. But time will surely show that "cultural revolutions", which have roused the anger of the armed forces and the mass of the people, will in the long run bring about the downfall of the Mao dynasty. It is due to his counter-revolutionary "cultural revolution" that Mao has become a "lone monk" abandoned by disciples and followers and surrounded by internal and external "enemies". No matter how he manipulates, how highly he extols Chin Shih Huang, and how fiercely he attacks

Confucius and exploits the name of Lu Hsun, no matter what ploys he uses and how much he curries favour with imperialists, seeking their aid and support, nothing can prevent his imminent downfall.

As a result of his "cultural revolution", Mao is immersed in a tangle of insoluble internal and external contradictions. And the reactionary home and foreign policy of the 10th Congress has only made these contradictions more acute. There is no doubt that the revolutionary teaching of Marxism-Leninism will overcome the counter-revolutionary "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" and that proletarian internationalism will overcome Mao's bourgeois nationalism. Certainly, the revolutionary forces of China and of the world will overcome Mao's counter-revolutionary clique. The Chinese Communists and the Chinese people will surely conquer the one-man reactionary military-terrorist dictatorship of Mao Tse-tung, will rebuild the socialist pillars undermined by the Maoists, and will put China back on the radiant road of socialist construction.

Reaction inside the country and incitement of wars outside are typical of Mao's present policy. Hitler and Mussolini followed the same path to defeat. Collusion with extreme reactionary imperialist groups, anti-communism in home policy, and anti-Sovietism in foreign policy—this is the essence of Mao's present-day course. Chiang Kai-shek followed the same path to his downfall. Comparing himself to the sun is the primitive method Mao has been using for years to deceive himself and others. This, too, is a road to defeat already trodden in antiquity by Tse-wang of the Hsia dynasty. According to Fu Sheng's book, *Shangshu Tachuan* (Han dynasty), the last ruler of the Hsia dynasty Tse-wang compared himself to the sun. "When the sun perishes," he said, "then I shall perish". This was designed to deceive and intimidate people, who would thus dread his death and wish him immortality. But the people hated the despot so implacably that they replied: "Let the 'sun' die. We will be glad to perish with you just to see you die". No, identification with the sun does not save despots from defeat. And in the eyes of the PLA and the whole Chinese people, traitor and despot Mao Tse-tung is a self-declared sun like Tse-wang of the Hsia dynasty, and the people hate him just as implacably.

Mao knows that he is sitting on top of a volcano that is about to erupt. He is lonely and impotent. This is why in December 1970 he said to his American trusted person, Edgar Snow, that he is a "lone monk" walking the world with a leaky umbrella. "Lone monk" is a euphemism Mao employs for "lone despot", as the worst two tyrants in Chinese history—Shang Chou-wang and Chin Shih Huang—were called by the Chinese people. In more modern times the people "conferred" the same title of "lone despot" on two other tyrants and militarists—Yuan Shih-kai and Chiang Kai-shek. All those whom the people called "lone despots" came to a sad end. And, certainly, the new tyrant and militarist, Mao Tse-tung, whom the people have also begun to regard as a "lone despot", will not escape the same fate.

In the final count, Mao Tse-tung will be defeated. There is no doubt about that.

But this does not mean that Mao can no longer breed evil. On the contrary, the closer he approaches his end, the more recklessly he is striking back and the more energy he is spending in home policy looking for ways to prolong his reactionary rule and leave his "throne" to Chiang Ching, and in foreign policy to intensify preparations for an anti-Soviet war and to incite a world war. He stopped at nothing to achieve his aims and make China the most reactionary centre of struggle against communism, the Soviet Union, and peace and progress. He will stop at nothing gradually to reconvert China into a semi-colony of world imperialism in return for aid and support from extreme reactionary imperialist groupings. Through his first "cultural revolution" he tried to win the trust of the imperialists and pave the way for Maoist-imperialist cooperation. His second "cultural revolution" is aimed at widening the spheres and raising the "level" of Maoist-imperialist cooperation.

Under cover of "criticising Lin Piao and Confucius," Mao has, in effect, begun a second "cultural revolution" as a concrete step in carrying out these designs.

It will be recalled that since 1966, when Mao launched his counter-revolutionary coup d'état behind the screen of a "cultural revolution", the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people have been immersed in unheard-of tragedy and suffering. The world socialist system and the world communist and working-class move-

ment have suffered serious losses, and the anti-imperialist national liberation movement and the movement for peace, democracy and social progress have also incurred great losses. It has been a boon for international imperialism and reactionaries in all countries.

A "second cultural revolution" will loosen fresh calamities at home, and cause severe setbacks on the international scene.

It follows that Mao's second "cultural revolution" concerns not only Chinese Communists and the people of China, and not only the world communist movement and the socialist community, but also all progressives and all peace forces in the world.

In China, the Communists and peoples of all nationalities face a mortal, difficult and grave struggle. And as they chart their plans and determine their actions against Maoism and the "cultural revolution", they will doubtless take account of the peculiar features of the present internal and international situation. They will sum up the results of the struggle against the first "cultural revolution", and draw lessons from it. They will use all available opportunities for uniting the anti-Maoist forces and opponents of the "cultural revolution". If they succeed in uniting and organising their ranks, they will certainly be able to repulse and defeat Mao's counter-revolutionary "cultural revolution" and counter-revolutionary rule.

The Chinese Communists and the people of China trust that in all countries Communists, fighters against imperialism and for peace, and all people of goodwill will stand by them.

AFTERWORD

A Chinese proverb says that 70 years is a rare age. Comrade Wang Ming lived until 70, and succeeded in completing the final page of this book. This was not easy. He did not live to see his work published. All the same, its appearance is a big and important event. Here I want to express special gratitude to the Soviet Communists and the Soviet people for their constant friendship and support.

Of course, it is impossible to present a detailed account of events from the thirties to the present day, much less the 50 years' history of the Communist Party of China, in one book.

After finishing this book Comrade Wang Ming had planned to write a criticism of the theoretical mistakes in the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung", especially as concerns philosophy. He wanted to do this because in the past 30-odd years the Marxist-Leninist education of CPC cadres and members was seriously impaired by the criminal anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist, anti-Soviet and anti-Communist activity of Mao Tse-tung. During the "cultural revolution", which was essentially a counter-revolutionary coup, Mao Tse-tung and his group publicly declared their wish "to hoist the red banner of the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung over the world", though, in fact, the Maoists are still compelled to disguise their underhand schemes with the banner of "Marxism-Leninism" both inside and outside the country. This is why a theoretical analysis and factual evidence are required to show how Mao distorted, defamed and betrayed Marxism-Leninism, and how, under the signboard of "Sini-

ying Marxism", he engaged in ideological contraband—substituting counter-revolutionary Maoism for Marxism-Leninism. In the last years of his life Comrade Wang Ming worked very hard in this direction. Unfortunately, his health, badly impaired in the forties and fifties, failed and he departed from us before he was able to complete the next stage of his planned work.

Comrade Wang Ming's death is a very severe loss for the Chinese Communists and the people of China. Yet, he was always sure that the Chinese Communists and the people of China, who have the sympathy of the Communists and peoples of other countries, will overcome all difficulties and obstacles and bring China back into the great socialist family headed by the Soviet Union.

Meng Ching-shu

1979

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Progress Publishers would be glad to have your opinion of the translation and design of this book.

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