from Trotsky to Tito

by James Klugmann

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by
JAMES. KLUGMANN

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Chapter One

THE RESOLUTION OF THE COMMUNIST INFORMATION BUREAU

THE QUESTION of Titoism—the role of Tito and the Titoites—is not a question for specialists in problems of the Balkans and of Eastern Europe. Nor is it in any sense whatsoever a private quarrel between Communists and Communists on questions of tactics and strategy, of means and methods of fighting for socialism. It is a question from which no one who wants socialism and, indeed, no one interested in the preservation of peace, can stand aside.

This is not the first time in history that there have been traitors in the labour movement, as those who have worked and fought in the British labour movement throughout its history have found out, indeed, to their cost. Capitalism always remains a force of corruption. By every method, from duress to bribery, from threats to cajolery, the capitalists seek and have sought to gain an influence inside the labour and progressive movement. Often they have failed, but sometimes in different countries and at different times they have met with a temporary success.

The betrayal of Tito and his leading confederates came as a shock to progressive people all over the world. It came as a shock partly because their treachery had been long and carefully concealed and partly because they were able to hide themselves behind the great prestige that the masses of the Yugoslav people had so rightly won in the long years of heroic struggle against reaction and dictatorship at home and against the encroachment of foreign imperialism and fascism.

The purpose of this book is to describe in detail the record of this betrayal. And it is believed that a study of the facts will show to all—Communists, Socialists, progressives and lovers of peace—that the Titoites today have become tools of the big capitalists and instruments of war, and that, therefore, every sincere Socialist and lover of peace should seek to understand the question of Titoism and the Titoites.

In June, 1948, the representatives of eight Communist Parties met in Rumania to attend a Conference called by the Communist Information Bureau. They met to discuss the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Twenty of the world's leading Communists participated in the Conference. They were the three representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A. Zhdanov, G. Malenkov and M. Suslov;

from the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists): V. Chervenkov; from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia: G. Bares, B. Geminder, V. Siroky and R. Slansky; from the Hungarian Workers' Party: M. Farkas, E. Gero and Matyas Rakosi; from the Polish Workers' Party came J. Berman and A. Zawadski and from the Rumanian Workers' Party: G. Gheorghiu-Dej, V. Luca and Anna Pauker. The French Communist Party sent Etienne Fajon and Jacques Duclos and from the Communist Party of Italy came P. Secchia and Palmiro Togliatti.

One traitor, not yet unmasked, attended the meeting-Traicho Kostov of Bulgaria. Whilst from the Yugoslav Communist Party itself, up to then the ninth member of the Communist Information Bureau, despite repeated invitations, came no representative, but only abrupt and brutal refusal.

After prolonged discussion the Information Bureau adopted a resolution Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia which was made public by press and radio. The resolution contained a series of profound criticisms of the policy of the Yugoslav Communist leadership, and above all of the four figures who in a literal sense dominated the Party-Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and Rankovic.

The Main Criticisms

The Resolution stated that in the recent period preceding the meeting of the Communist Information Bureau the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party had:

"pursued an incorrect line on the main questions of home and foreign policy, a line which represents a departure from Marxism-Leninism."

It approved the action of the C.P.S.U.(B) which had taken the initiative in exposing the incorrect policy.

It pointed out that in a whole number of ways the Yugoslav Communist leaders had been pursuing an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It revealed that, for instance, slanders were being spread about the Soviet military experts who were visiting Yugoslavia on the invitation of the Yugoslav authorities, that a "special régime" had been instituted for Soviet civilian experts in Yugoslavia, who were being watched and followed by Yugoslav security police, that representatives of the Information Bureau in Yugoslavia, like Yudin, the Editor of its journal For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy, were being shadowed by secret police, and that similar treatment was being dealt out to official Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia. Yugoslav Party and Government statements on the U.S.S.R. and the C.P.S.U.(B) remained friendly on the surface and were expressed in terms of gratitude and admiration. But at the same time anti-Soviet propaganda was being spread inside the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party: there was talk of the "degeneration" of the Soviet Union and of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, these slanders being couched in the old language of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism.

The resolution outlined three ways in which Tito, Kardeli, Djilas, Rankovic and other Yugoslav leaders were rejecting the experience of the international labour movement, and above all the experience of building socialism in the U.S.S.R., and were turning from both the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism.

(1) They were putting forward a theory of a smooth and peaceful transition to socialism, in the style and tradition of the Mensheviks and of Ramsav Macdonald.

"They deny that there is a growth of capitalist elements in their country and consequently a sharpening of the class struggle in the countryside."

(2) They were refusing to recognise any class differentiation among the peasantry. Yet if their aim of building socialism was a sincere one, they would have had to differentiate, both in theory and practice, in their attitude towards different categories of peasants.

"The Yugoslav leaders are pursuing an incorrect policy in the countryside by ignoring the class differentiation in the countryside and by regarding the individual peasants as a single entity, contrary to the well-known Leninist thesis that small, individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie, continually, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale."

(3) They were rejecting, both in theory and practice, what had been taught consistently by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and confirmed by the whole history of the working-class movement, that the working class is the only consistently revolutionary class, and that only under its leadership can the transition to socialism be realised.

"Concerning the leading role of the working class, the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party, by affirming that the peasantry is the 'most stable foundation of the Yugoslav State', are departing from the Marxist-Leninist path and are taking the path of a populist, kulak Party."

The resolution then proceeded to criticise in the severest terms the conception of the role and organisation of the Communist Party itself. revealed in the theory and practice of the Yugoslav Communist Party. It showed how the Party was being dissolved into the wide Popular Front organisation:

"In Yugoslavia . . . the People's Front, and not the Communist Party, is considered to be the main leading force in the country. The Yugoslav leaders belittle the role of the Communist Party and actually dissolve the Party into the non-Party People's Front."

Inside the Party what the resolution called a "Turkish régime", a system of military despotism exercised by a small power-group from above, had replaced the Marxist-Leninist principles of democratic centralism. A system of issuing commands from above, which had to be obeyed without questioning or discussion, had replaced criticism and self-criticism within the Party:

"There is no inner Party democracy, no elections and no criticism and self-criticism in the Party."

Far from heeding the criticisms of the C.P.S.U.(B) and of the other fraternal Communist Parties, the Yugoslav leaders withheld this criticism from their own members, took it as an insult and rudely rejected it without discussion:

"Instead of honestly accepting this criticism and taking the Bolshevik path of correcting these mistakes, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, suffering from boundless ambition, arrogance and conceit, met this criticism with belligerence and hostility."

The resolution made it quite clear that the Yugoslav Communist Party was not expelled from the Communist Information Bureau because of its mistakes and incorrect policy. Any individual, Communist Party branch or even Central Committee can make mistakes. It was not even expelled because it would not accept the criticisms made. It often takes time, a prolonged period of deep discussion, for a Party organisation or member to come to understand and correct a mistaken policy.

But to refuse to discuss criticisms made by some of the most leading and experienced Communists in the world, above all the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to withhold those criticisms from the membership, to refuse to come and meet with the representatives of the other eight Communist Parties, was a course of action which could not but place the Yugoslav Communist leadership outside the family of Communist Parties:

". . . The leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have placed themselves in opposition to the Communist Parties affiliated to the Information Bureau, have taken the path of seceding from the

united socialist front against imperialism, have taken the path of betraying the cause of international solidarity of the working people, and have taken up a position of nationalism. . . The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has placed itself and the Yugoslav Party outside the family of the fraternal Communist Parties, outside the united Communist front, and consequently outside the ranks of the Information Bureau."

The resolution closed with a stern warning. Nationalist elements, previously disguised, had in the course of the first half of 1948 reached controlling positions in the leadership of the Yugoslav Party. The Party had broken with its international traditions and taken the road of bourgeois nationalism. Tito, Kardelj, Djilas, Rankovic and their group were hoping to curry favour with the Western imperialists by making concessions to them. They were putting forward the bourgeois nationalist thesis that "capitalist states are a lesser danger to the independence of Yugoslavia than the Soviet Union". They were turning from friendship with the U.S.S.R. and looking westwards. Such conduct could only have one end:

"... such a nationalist line can only lead to Yugoslavia's degeneration into an ordinary bourgeois republic, to the loss of its independence and to its transformation into a colony of the imperialist countries."

This warning seemed harsh to some people at the time. But in the three years that have elapsed since the first publication of the Resolution, it has been confirmed in every detail. The logic of history was inescapable. Between the camp of peace and the camp of war there is no third path. And the nationalist policy of Tito's gang led straight to the camp of reaction.

Problems of the Transition to Socialism

In the course of the war and the post-war years, under the leadership of such men as Tito and Kardelj, the conception had grown up in Yugoslavia that the *peasants* and not the working class would be the leading class in the transition to socialism and the pillar of the new Yugoslav society.

This conception grew out of certain features of the Yugoslav resistance during the Axis occupation. No progressive person, least of all a Communist, would want in any way to belittle the struggles of the Yugoslav peoples, their heroism and sacrifices in the struggle for national liberation against the forces of the Axis. But despite those great military achievements, in some respects the liberation struggle in

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Yugoslavia was actually weaker than in neighbouring countries, for instance in Bulgaria.

Into the Partisan units on the rugged terrain of Yugoslavia, into the mountains and forests, the people and the youth came to fight against the occupiers. As was natural in a country like Yugoslavia, where the great majority of the population are peasants, the majority of the Partisan recruits came from the peasantry. Many of the best elements of the working class left their jobs, left their factories, left the towns and cities, and joined the Partisan units in the hills, forests and ravines. In the towns themselves, under the heavy and oppressive Axis occupation, the illegal resistance movement was not far developed. In a number of East European countries, where the armed guerilla struggle did not take on the proportions of Yugoslavia, the movement of anti-Axis sabotage inside industry, the illegal underground resistance in the towns and cities, the activity of the illegal trade union movement, was more developed. With the Liberation it was found that the working class movement in the Yugoslav towns, after three to four years of Axis occupation, was politically backward compared with that in neighbouring countries.

The leading Titoites, completely lacking in self-criticism, instead of seeing this as a weakness which would have to be combated and overcome, tried to make a weakness into a virtue by renouncing Marxism and preaching that the peasantry would be the leading force in Yugoslavia. They not only tried to revise the most elementary idea of Marxism-Leninism, the idea of the leading role of the working class, but actively discouraged the working class from playing an independent and leading role in liberated Yugoslavia.

Tito declared in Zagreb, capital of Croatia, in 1946:

"We tell the peasants that they are the firmest basis of our State not because we want to win their votes, but because they really constitute such a basis."

Djilas in January, 1947, explained that:

"It is absolutely incorrect and senseless to call special trade union meetings and special meetings of the People's Front. They should be merged into one since the trade unions, too, are affiliated to the Front."

So the trade unions were reduced to third-rate bodies, their activities hidden, and the working class merged into the broad Front that contained more than half the population of the country.

Moshe Pijade, would-be theoretician, wrote in Borba, the Party daily newspaper, in early 1948 that the Yugoslav trade unions had

played no role in the liberation struggle, and would, therefore, not represent a leading force in the system of state power of the new Yugoslavia.

This attitude of underestimation of the role of the proletariat, which turned into an attitude of contempt for the workers, was revealed very clearly in the composition of the Yugoslav Communist Party itself. There were some 12,000 members of the illegal Yugoslav Communist Party when the Axis launched its invasion in 1941. In the course of the resistance struggles 8,000 of these were killed, and only 4,000 survived till Liberation. But the Communist Party had 140,000 members when the war ended, and nearly 500,000 by mid-1948.

During the war, recruitment to the Party was carried out on the basis of attitude to the national liberation struggle. Thousands of bourgeois, petty-bourgeois and kulak elements were admitted into the Party, and the proportion of working-class members was reduced. When the war ended and large-scale recruiting was carried out, instead of remedying the position by special attention to the recruitment of industrial workers and by the promotion of proletarians to leading positions, the position was still further aggravated.

An examination of the social composition of the Yugoslav Communist Party in July, 1948, shows that not only were there tens of thousands of kulaks and bourgeois elements in the Party, including in most leading positions, but that only 30 per cent of the membership were workers, and of these the greater part were handicraftsmen. In the big factories, that should have been the main bases of the Communist Party, recruitment was very restricted. For instance, by mid-1948, in three industrial enterprises in Slovenia, each employing 7,000 workers, the total Party membership was 245. At five big enterprises in Croatia with total personnel of about 18,000, there were only 32 Party members. In one enterprise in Bosnia-Hercegovina with 7,000 workers there were 92 Communists, whilst there were 125 Party members amongst the 952 office personnel.

But what policy could more openly violate the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the experience of the Soviet Union? From the first development of scientific socialism the theoreticians of Marxism had insisted on the necessity of the proletariat playing the leading role in the socialist revolution and in the building of socialism. Marx and Engels wrote in the Communist Manifesto:

"Of all classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product."

"Marx and Engels taught that the industrial proletariat is the most revolutionary and therefore the most advanced class in capitalist society, and that only a class like the proletariat could rally around itself all the forces discontented with capitalism and lead them in the storming of capitalism." (Stalin: Short History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Chapter I, Section 2.)

The whole conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which alone could make possible the building of socialism, was founded on the hegemony, i.e. the leading role, of the working class:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is a special form of class alliance between the proletariat, the vanguard of the toilers, and the numerous non-proletarian strata of toilers (the petty-bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, etc.), or the majority of these; it is an alliance against capital, an alliance aiming at the complete overthrow of capital, at the complete suppression of the resistance of the bourgeoisie and of any attempt on their part at restoration, an alliance aiming at the final establishment and consolidation of socialism." (Lenin: Collected Works (Russian), Vol. 24, p. 311, quoted by Stalin in The October Revolution and Tactics of the Russian Communists.)

And again:

"If we translate the Latin, scientific historical-philosophical term 'dictatorship of the proletariat' into more simple language, it means just the following: Only a definite class, namely that of the urban workers and industrial workers in general, is able to lead the whole mass of the toilers and exploited in the struggle for the overthrow of the yoke of capital, in the process of this overthrow, in the struggle to maintain and consolidate the victory, in the work of creating the new, socialist social system, in the whole struggle for the complete abolition of classes." (Lenin: A Great Beginning (June, 1919) in Selected Works, Vol. 9, p. 432.)

The Yugoslav Communist leaders around Tito, neglecting, belittling, despising the role of the working class, were flagrantly violating one of the most essential principles of Marxism-Leninism.

Equally flagrant was their violation of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the role of the peasantry and on the need to differentiate between the different sections of the peasantry at the various stages of advance to socialism.

On the one hand Tito and Kardelj liked to regard the peasantry

as a single undifferentiated entity. They rejected the Soviet example. They coined slogans about the peasantry, not explaining the class structure of the peasantry, and the difference in attitude and role of poor peasants, middle peasants and rich peasants (kulaks). Because a number of kulaks had joined in the national and patriotic war of liberation against the Axis invaders and occupiers, they taught that these kulaks would play the same progressive role after liberation in the advance to socialism. When the land of the big landowners was divided by the post-Liberation land reform, they denied that the kulaks would inevitably exert every effort to exploit the small and middle peasants and resist the advance to socialist agriculture. They denied that the individual ownership of the land would give birth to capitalism unless prompt and effective measures were taken against such a development.

And finally, when criticised for such a pro-kulak policy in the letters of the C.P.S.U.(B.), they began, in a totally adventurist way, typical of the ultra-leftist utterances of Trotsky, to make boastful proclamations about the liquidation of "the last remnants of capitalism" in a few weeks or a few months.

In a letter to the C.P.S.U.(B.) dated April 13, 1948, Tito and Kardelj wrote that:

"the plenum of the Central Committee approved the measures proposed by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to liquidate the remnants of capitalism in the country."

And Kardelj declared in the Skupschina (Parliament) at Belgrade on April 25, 1948:

"In our country the days of the last remnants of the exploitation of man by man are numbered."

But the right-wing attitude to the kulaks and the ultra-leftist phrases, as always, amounted to the same thing. The refusal to analyse the class structure of the peasantry and to differentiate accordingly, and the boastful phrases and paper decisions on the "liquidation of capitalism", both led to the same passivity and to the same reliance on and favouring of the kulak element.

The great exponents of Marxism-Leninism had always shown that small-scale production engenders capitalism.

In estimating the "strength of the overthrown bourgeois", Lenin drew attention to three main factors, of which the third was:

"the force of habit, in the strength of small production" which "engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily,

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hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale." (Lenin: "Left-Wing" Communism, Chapter 2.)

Stalin wrote:

"Under capitalism the countryside followed the towns spontaneously because capitalist economy in the towns and the small-commodity economy of the peasant are, at bottom, the same type of economy. Of course, small peasant commodity economy is not yet capitalist economy. But it is, at bottom, the same type of economy as capitalist economy, for it rests on the private ownership of the means of production. Lenin was a thousand times right when, in his notes on Bukharin's Economics of the Transition Period, he referred to the 'commodity-capitalist tendency of the peasantry' as opposed to the socialist tendency of of the proletariat," (Stalin: Problems of Agrarian Policy in the U.S.S.R. (December, 1929), reprinted in Problems of Leninism.)

The teachings of Marxism and the experience of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. had shown that, in the stage of transition to socialism, the alliance of the working class with the peasantry does not mean an alliance with the whole of the peasantry. It means an alliance with the mass of working peasants, the small and the middle peasants. This alliance involves a prolonged struggle against the capitalist elements in the countryside—the rich peasants, the kulaks—whilst taking every step to aid the small and middle peasants, and to win them for the collective socialist form of agriculture.

. "We of course are decidedly on the side of the small peasant; we shall do everything at all permissible to make his lot more bearable, to facilitate his transition to the co-operative should he decide to do so, and even to make it possible for him to remain on his small holding for a protracted length of time to think the matter over, should he be unable to bring himself to this decision. We do this not only because we consider the small peasant who does his own work as virtually belonging to us, but also in the direct interest of the Party. The greater the number of peasants whom we can save from being actually hurled down into the proletariat, whom we can win to our side while they are still peasants, the more quickly and easily the social transformation will be accomplished." (Engels: The Peasant Question in France and Germany. See Marx-Engels Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 394.)

But neither Marx nor Engels, Lenin nor Stalin, ever made bureaucratic empty declarations about the liquidation of capitalism in the countryside in a few weeks or a few months. They knew, and the

Soviet experience confirmed, that in order to "liquidate" the kulaks as a class, it is necessary to win the mass of the working peasantry voluntarily for large-scale collectivisation of agriculture. And in order to win for this aim the small and middle peasants it is necessary to go through a whole period of "restricting" the kulaks, giving concrete aid from the state to the small and middle peasants, giving them the experience of joint co-operative labour through the use of advanced technical equipment, providing them with a number of models so that they can be convinced with their own eyes of the superiority of collective farming. And of course, for all this, it is essential to create an industry which will provide the necessary advanced agricultural equipment needed for the mass turn to collective farming. Any other method is bureaucratic. It either leads to hostility between workers and working peasantry instead of cementing the worker-peasant alliance, or else remains a demagogic manœuvre and mere paper decision.

For fifteen years after the October Revolution, the C.P.S.U.(B.) never lost sight of the need for measures to restrict the kulaks until a situation was reached when the kulaks as a class could be ended.

In the period of the "New Economic Policy" the Communist Party of the Soviet Union introduced progressive taxation so that the greatest burdens of taxation would fall on the rich peasants, they restricted the leasing out of land, they expanded the industry supplying agricultural equipment, they supported the small peasants with credits, rallying the small and middle peasants to the side of the working class and isolating the kulaks. This policy they continued until the precondition was created for leading the masses of working peasants, voluntarily, along the path of collectivisation. This was also the precondition for destroying the kulaks as a class.

"Prior to 1929, the Soviet Government had pursued a policy of restricting the kulaks. . . . At the end of 1929, with the growth of the collective farms and state farms, the Soviet Government turned sharply from this policy to the policy of eliminating the kulaks, of destroying them as a class. . . . This was a profound revolution, a leap from an old qualitative state of society to a new qualitative state, equivalent in its consequences to the revolution of October 1917. . . . The distinguishing feature of this revolution is that it was accomplished from above, on the initiative of the state, and directly supported from below by the millions of peasants, who were fighting to throw off kulak bondage and to live in freedom in the collective farms." (Stalin: Short History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Chapter XI, Section 2.)

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Whilst they belittled the proletariat and favoured the kulaks, the Yugoslav Communist leaders were busy preaching a new road to socialism, by which, unlike the Soviet Union, without intensifying class battles, liberated Yugoslavia would slide into socialism—capitalists, kulaks and all. Looking back, some of the formulations might have been framed by the British Fabians. Nikola Petrovic, Minister of Foreign Trade, for example, outlined the following perspective in mid-1947:

"Without constituting an insurmountable and fundamental obstacle to the socialist sector and to its development, agriculture which is closely linked with the socialist sector and is included in the general economic plan will itself gradually change its nature as the plan is realised and will gradually reach the phase where all spontaneity in economic laws will be completely and finally destroyed regardless of the spontaneity of economic laws in this sphere." (Slavyane, No. 5, 1947.)

This peaceful perspective, which would have warmed the heart of Ramsay Macdonald ("In human history one epoch slides into another"), disregards the most elementary tenet of Marxism-Leninism, that after the first serious defeats, the overthrown exploiting classes fight back ten times, a hundred times, more desperately than ever before to regain what they have lost:

"In the transition, the class struggle grows more intense. The transition from capitalism to communism represents an entire historical epoch. Until this epoch has terminated, the exploiters will inevitably cherish the hope of restoration, and this hope will be converted into attempts at restoration. And after their first serious defeat, the overthrown exploiters . . will throw themselves with tenfold energy, with furious passion and hatred grown a hundred-fold, into the battle for the recovery of their 'lost' paradise." (Lenin: The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, November, 1918.)

In Yugoslavia, as in the other countries of Eastern Europe liberated by the Red Army, the working people were faced in their struggle to advance to socialism, not only with the embittered remnants of former capitalists, landowners and displaced officials of the old reactionary state apparatus, not only with the whole strength of international capitalism operating from its main American and British centres and determined to restore, by any and every means, the old class forces to power, but also with their own kulaks. Moreover, the majority of the population engaged in individual production was

"engendering capitalism and the bourgeoisie, continuously, daily, hourly".

To combat such enemies, therefore, it was necessary that Yugoslav popular democracy should be systematically consolidated, the struggle against the kulaks undertaken, the state machine still further (and far further) purged of reactionary elements, the leadership of the working class and of the Communist Party reinforced, so that, fulfilling the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it could suppress the exploiters, defend the country from imperialist intervention, strengthen the ties of Yugoslavia with other People's Democracies and above all with the Soviet Union, detach the working masses from the bourgeoisie and cement their alliance with the proletariat, and speed on the economic advance of the country to lay the foundation for socialism.

As Lenin put it:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is the most determined and most ruthless war waged by the new class against a more powerful enemy, against the bourgeoisie, whose resistance is increased tenfold by its overthrow . . . and whose power lies, not only in the strength of international capital, in the strength and durability of the international connections of the bourgeoisie, but also in the force of habit, in the strength of small production." (Lenin: "Left-Wing" Communism.)

The leading Titoites, however, far from organising to resist international capital, were already actively engaged in collaborating with it. The propaganda of their "new road to socialism", not only aided the restoration of capitalism in Yugoslavia, but, put forward with the prestige of the Yugoslav liberation movement by those who in reality were betraying it, actively influenced, and thereby weakened, the struggle for advance to socialism of a number of other Communist Parties.

Destruction of the Party

In the period after Yugoslav liberation, the Titoite "theoreticians" were busy developing a "new" conception of the Communist Party—a "development" of Marxism which in fact went back on and repudiated every principle of Party organisation for which Marxism had ever fought.

This "theory" was that the Communist Party should be hidden from the people, that it should dissolve itself into the wider popular organisation of the People's Front, which should become the main organisation of the Yugoslav people. Should the Communist Party openly put its programme before the people and openly work to win support for it? No, replied Tito, for the Communist programme is in no way different from that of the People's Front.

"Has the Communist Party of Yugoslavia any programme other than the programme of the People's Front? No. The Communist Party has no other programme. The programme of the People's Front is the programme of the Party." (Tito's report to the Second Congress of the People's Front of Yugoslavia, September 27, 1947.)

Is the Communist Party the vanguard organisation of the working class, the highest form of class organisation of the proletariat? No, once again replies Tito:

"Since the People's Front last of all represents not only the political unity of our people, but also fraternity and unity in the national sense, it cannot be replaced by any other Party. Hence the People's Front is becoming the permanent political organisation of the people." (Tito, loc. cit.)

The first point in the Statutes of the Yugoslav People's Front ("Main Organisational Principles of the People's Front of Yugoslavia") stated that:

"The People's Front of Yugoslavia is the main political force." (My italics, J. K.)

And what was the People's Front? The People's Front played a great and progressive role in the liberation war and could have continued to do so in the period following liberation. It was developed on Communist Party initiative prior to the German attack on Yugoslavia, formed from different groups (including a number of the old political Parties) as well as individuals. It embraced representatives of the Croat Republican Peasant Party, the Republican Party of Serbia, the Democratic Party and the Independent Democratic Party, the National Peasant Party of Serbia and the Agrarian Union (which later merged to become the United Agrarian Party of Serbia), as well as representatives of the trade unions and of the mass organisations of the youth and the women, etc.

The People's Front, therefore, contained bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties, kulaks, traders and manufacturers, as well as workers, peasants and intellectuals. Djilas, reporting at the initial foundation conference of the Communist Information Bureau in August, 1947, stated that:

"There are no ideological, religious nor any obstacles to joining the People's Front."

Conceived of as a mass popular organisation led by the working class and the Communist Party, and being drawn into action against home and foreign reaction, shedding its reactionary members, the People's Front could have played an important role in consolidating the popular democratic régime. But instead of that, it was built up by the Titoites to absorb, and eventually to replace, the Communist Party.

What was the result? The Communist Party was hidden, concealed from the people. In a régime that was supposed to be led by the Communists, the Party had a semi-legal status. If you went in 1946 or 1947 to Belgrade you could find no open office of the Communist Party. There were no declarations, resolutions, statements made by the Communist Party. The membership of the Party was concealed from the working people. Even the daily organ of the Communist Party, Borba, carried next to no news or information on the life and activities of the Party. Between Liberation and July, 1948, not one Party decision was published by Borba.

Take a typical practical example of the fruits of this policy. In the big Zeleznik works near Belgrade there were some 4,000 workers employed, of whom 160 were Party members. Party meetings were held secretly. None of the non-Party workers knew where the meetings took place, what was discussed at them or what decided. None of the non-Party workers knew who were the members of the Party. Party members shamefacedly tried to put across Party decisions without saying that they were proposals of the Communist Party. New recruits were recruited by secret invitation.

Therefore for the mass of Yugoslav working people the Communist Party appeared as a type of secret conspiratorial society that dominated their lives without showing itself. Its decisions were manœuvred across the working people by individual "Communists" holding positions in the state. The habitual attacks of the enemies of Communism on the Party as a "secret conspiracy" became in the case of Yugoslavia the truth. Thus instead of acting as an open vanguard trying to raise the political level of the working class and the working people, the Party was reduced to the level of the most backward, and was merged, dissolved into the People's Front.

This was a complete break with Lenin's conception of a Communist Party and its role.

Lenin wrote:

"We are the Party of a class, and therefore almost the entire class (and in times of war, in the period of civil war, the entire class) should act under the leadership of our Party, should adhere

to our Party as closely as possible. But it would be Manilovism and 'khvostism' (i.e. complacency and 'tailing behind' reality) to think that at any time under capitalism the entire class, or almost the entire class, would be able to rise to the level of consciousness and activity of its vanguard, of its Social-Democratic (i.e. Communist) Party... To forget the distinction between the vanguard and the whole of the masses which gravitate towards it, to forget the constant duty of the vanguard to raise ever wider strata to this most advanced level, means merely to deceive oneself, to shut one's eyes to the immensity of our task, and to narrow down these tasks." (Lenin: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, quoted by Stalin in the Foundations of Leninism, Chapter VIII.)

Of course, in the period of illegality between the wars, the Yugoslav Communist Party could not hold open meetings; but despite all the difficulties its line and policy was brought before the people through illegal leaflets and publications. But now, in a period of the most complete legality, the Party was concealed, dissolved, its programme and policy hidden, its leading role abandoned. Instead of proudly appearing before the people, and proudly and publicly proclaiming their aims, the membership of the Party, on orders of the Tito clique, were losing their Party identity.

But it was not only in relation to the role of the Party that the Titoites were violating the tenets of Marxism-Leninism and throwing overboard all the most valuable experiences of the C.P.S.U.(B.). The same applied to their "theory" and practice of the internal organisation of the Communist Party.

Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and above all, in this field, Rankovic, were virtually, as a narrow dominating power-group, dictating Party policy from above. They practised the "military method" of Party leadership advocated by Trotsky. It was not by chance that Trotsky's "rightist" conception of a Party composed of all and sundry was combined with Trotsky's "leftist" conception of "orders from above". As usual the "rightist" and "leftist" practices led to the same result of destroying the revolutionary character of the Communist Party. Party elections at all levels ceased. Leaderships were organised by co-option. Internal discussion was discouraged. Criticism and self-criticism were suppressed. And Rankovic abused his position of Minister of Internal Affairs and head of the security police (U.D.B.A.) to take ruthless disciplinary measures against Party members who dared to discuss or criticise the dictates of the ruling clique.

Only a study of the organisational methods of the C.P.S.U.(B.), as taught by Lenin and Stalin and practised by the C.P.S.U.(B.), can

bring out to the full the extent to which the Rankovic régime in the Yugoslav Party was a violation of Marxism-Leninism.

Once again there was no excuse in the fact that the Yugoslav Party had been illegal between the wars and on a war footing during the Liberation struggles. The Bolsheviks had known and had taught how to move from illegality and war to a position of legality.

In 1923, after the period of War Communism in the Soviet Union, Stalin had explained the new tasks of the Party:

"First, in every way and tirelessly to combat the survivals and habits of the war period in our Party, combat the incorrect view that our Party is some kind of a system of departments and not a militant organisation of the proletariat which thinks actively, is self-sufficient, lives a full-blooded life, destroys the old and creates the new.

"Second, it is necessary to increase the activity of the Party masses by submitting for discussion all questions that interest them, since there is no reason why these questions should not be discussed openly, by ensuring the opportunity for free criticism of each and every point raised by Party organs. For only thus can discipline be transformed into a really conscious, really iron discipline, only thus can the political, economic and cultural experience of the Party masses be raised.

"Third, it is necessary to elect all Party organs and officials. An end must be put to the practice of ignoring the will of the majority of the organisation when nominating comrades for responsible Party posts. We must see to it that the election principle is carried out." (On the Tasks of the Party, December 2, 1923, Collected Works, Russian edition, Vol. 5, pp. 362-363.)

It was under the guidance of Lenin and Stalin that this adaptation of the Party to the new period was carried out. With the elimination of Tsardom, the victory of the October Revolution and the defeat of the interventionist forces, the principles of democratic centralism, as Lenin outlined them, were fully established in the Bolshevik Party.

"In order to function properly and guide the masses systematically, the Party must be organised on the principles of centralism, having one set of rules and uniform Party discipline, one leading organ—the Party Congress, and in the intervals between the Congresses, the Central Committee of the Party; the minority must submit to the majority, the various organisations must submit to the centre, and lower organisations to higher organisations. Failing these conditions, the Party of the working class cannot be a real party and cannot carry out its tasks in guiding the class.

THE RESOLUTION OF THE COMMUNIST INFORMATION BUREAU

"Of course, as under the Tsarist autocracy the Party existed illegally, the Party organisations could not in those days be built upon the principle of election from below, and as a consequence, the Party had to be strictly conspiratorial. But Lenin considered that this temporary feature in the life of our Party would at once lapse with the elimination of Tsardom, when the Party would become open and legal, and the Party organisation could be built up on the principles of democratic elections, of democratic centralism." (Stalin: Short History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Chapter II.)

Lenin and Stalin always taught that there can be no democratic centralism within the Communist Party without criticism (from below upwards as well as from above downwards) and without self-criticism:

"But testing from above far from exhausts the whole business of checking up. There is still another kind of check-up, the check-up from below, where the masses, the subordinates, examine the leaders, point out their mistakes, and show them ways of correcting them. This kind of verification is one of the most effective ways of testing people.

"The rank and file Party members verify their leaders at meetings of active Party workers, and conferences and congresses, by listening to their reports, by criticising their defects, and finally by electing or not electing some or other leading comrades to the leading organs. Precise operation of democratic centralism in the Party as demanded in our Party statutes, unconditional submission of Party organs to election, the right of putting forward and withdrawing candidates, secret ballot, freedom of criticism and self-criticism, all these and similar measures must be carried into life, in order incidentally to facilitate the check-up on and control over the leaders of the Party by the rank and file Party members." (Stalin: On Practical Work, Little Stalin Library, No. 6, p. 15.)

It has always been stressed in Marxist-Leninist teaching that you cannot proceed towards socialism smoothly and easily, nor will the Party be able to lead that advance without its members, including its leaders, making mistakes. Self-criticism is not just a passing phenomenon. It is something essential to the life and theoretical progress of the Party; it is a method of training the cadres of the working people in the spirit of Marxism. A Party or a Party member can be judged by their attitude to their own mistakes. Do they reject criticism, take it as a personal insult, a blow to their prestige? Or do they welcome it, learn from it, self-critically review their own work, recognise their mistakes, look for the reasons for them, and try to correct them?

True Communists will never be frightened of recognising their *own* mistakes. It is only bourgeois parties and bourgeois politicians who fear the truth:

"The attitude of a political party towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest criteria of the seriousness of the party and of how it fulfils in practice its obligation towards its class and towards the toiling masses. To admit a mistake openly, to disclose its reasons, to analyse the conditions which gave rise to it, to study attentively the means of correcting it—these are the signs of a serious party; this means the performance of its duties, this means educating and training the class, and then the masses." (Lenin: "Left-Wing" Communism, Chapter 7.)

"All revolutionary Parties which perished hitherto did so because they became conceited, failed to see wherein lay their strength, and feared to speak of their weaknesses." (Lenin, at the 11th Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), March 1922.)

But the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party were supremely arrogant. They not only refused to recognise their mistakes, to learn from them and correct them, they refused even to admit that it was possible that they might have made mistakes.

All the letters received from the C.P.S.U.(B.) and from the other Communist Parties in the first half of 1948 were concealed from their membership and rejected without a Party discussion. It might have been possible to consider them wrong-headed but sincere if, after full Party discussion, they had for a period held to their policy. But what did they do? Is it possible to think of any sincere and honest Party leadership, having received criticism from a Party of the experience and achievements of the C.P.S.U.(B.), rejecting these criticisms without a full discussion throughout the Party from top to bottom? Is it possible to think of an honest Communist who would not be proud to receive criticisms from the Parties whose leaders were Stalin, Dimitrov, Rakosi, Togliatti or Thorez?

And when the resolution of the Communist Information Bureau was published, and the Yugoslav Communist leaders could no longer conceal it from their members, what did they do? They sent a long 10,000-word arrogant reply, not admitting a single error, before their Party members could possibly have time to discuss the Resolution. They sent 10,000 words of reply without one word of self-criticism. Two leading revolutionaries Zhujovic and Hebrang, members of their own Central Committee, were already in prison for having dared to criticise the leading Titoites.

At the time when the Information Bureau's resolution was published (end of June, 1948) the Yugoslav Fifth Party Congress was fixed for the third week in July. Any honest Party leadership would have postponed the Congress:

"If I were asked at this moment what I would do if I had the power to do anything in relation to the Yugoslav Congress, I would postpone it for three months in order to allow internal Party discussions to take place in the factories and branches on the Communist Information Bureau Resolution, so that when the Congress takes place, the issues would have already been discussed and a certain clarity gained." (Harry Pollitt: Reply to Discussion at Aggregate Meeting of London Communist Party Members on July 7, 1949, published in World News and Views, No. 28, 1949. Bound volume, p. 302.)

Far from pursuing such a democratic course, the Titoite reply to the Information Bureau tried to distort the whole character of the criticisms made. The Titoite press immediately launched a large-scale open attack on the Resolution. Meetings were hastily summoned at which all those criticising the Titoite leadership were ruled out of order, after which many were expelled from the Party and sent to prison. Hand-picked delegations were despatched to the Party Congress which, instead of being a Congress of criticism, self-criticism and prolonged discussion, was transformed into a series of bitter harangues of the Titoite leaders against the Information Bureau. The Fifth Congress had nothing whatsoever in common with communism.

A letter sent from leading Belgrade Communist students to the Information Bureau reveals what methods were used to force on the Party membership the Titoite line. Here are a few extracts from this letter, the full text of which was published in For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy, No. 17 (20), of September 1, 1948:

"We are approaching you in this fashion since through our Party organisations it is impossible for us to express our solidarity with the Resolution of the Information Bureau. . . .

"We wholeheartedly agree with you that the slightest criticism is followed by reprisals. The Party is ruled by military methods. With regard to the case of Zhujovic and Hebrang, the first we heard was different versions of the matter from non-Party people and from abroad. Only later were we summoned to a Party meeting and informed that they had been removed from the Central Committee because of inimical activities. We were told that the matter was being investigated and that we would be kept informed. At.

the next meeting the report of the Commission which conducted the investigation and a statement of the Political Bureau of the Party was received. According to these documents, Zhujovic during the Fifth German Offensive against the Partisans influenced one of the Partisan Divisions to try and break through the enemy encirclement. . . . Due to this action, the Partisans allegedly found themselves in a critical situation. But our questions: why was Zhujovic not tried then and there as a traitor, and why was he promoted to the rank of general for his part in that particular operation, remained without answer. . . ."

The letter outlined how all genuine criticism of Titoite policy was smothered and suppressed in the Party branches at the University:

"The procedure at the Conference in the Veterinary Faculty was as follows. On the first day a meeting of all the Party members was summoned for the purpose of expressing confidence in the Central Committee. Due to disagreement among the members a unanimous vote was not forthcoming. Next day, when the majority of Party members in the Faculty were engaged elsewhere, the Secretary of the Party group and members of the University Committee got together far less than two-thirds of the Party membership and manipulated a vote of confidence in the Central Committee.

"In the Mining Faculty the meeting lasted two hours. One and a half hours were devoted to reading the two texts—the remaining half hour was given over to discussion. However the moment one of the members suggested that the Central Committee should have attended the meeting of the Information Bureau the discussion was stopped."

The letter continues with a detailed description of how, in the Polytechnic Faculty, the Technological Department and the Mechanics Department, efforts were made to suppress discussion and force decisions favourable to the Titoites on the Party members. During the meetings lists were compiled of all those daring to support the Information Bureau or disagree with the Titoite line in any way. There followed mass expulsions and mass arrests of Party students in the University. An American correspondent, June Cannon, was expelled from Yugoslavia for reporting the opposition of Belgrade student Communists to the Titoite leaders. Thus a brutal attack was made on what had always been one of the best and most combative centres of Communism in Yugoslavia, and a "purge" of progressive students carried through.

This is how the Yugoslav Communist leaders put into practice the Marxist-Leninist principle of democratic centralism.

FROM TROTSKY TO TITO

Bourgeois Nationalism

The national-liberation struggles of the Yugoslav peoples justly won the admiration of progressive people throughout the world. But when the war was over and when Yugoslavia was liberated, the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party in the clique around Tito began to paint a picture of the Yugoslav struggle which depicted it as qualitatively different from the resistance movement of other peoples, such as that of the French people or the Bulgarian people, for instance. They began to spread the myth that, unlike other peoples, the Yugoslavs had been liberated solely by their own efforts. And they began to forecast a perspective of Yugoslav development separate from and "independent" of the other People's Democracies and the Soviet Union.

In the post-war period from 1945 to mid-1948 the leading Titoites praised the Soviet Union and its Communist Party in their open pronouncements; but already in secret, in their own circles, they were attacking and defaming the U.S.S.R.; and by publishing a distorted picture of the Yugoslav liberation movement, they were trying to belittle its role amongst their own people and to weaken their gratitude to and admiration for the Soviet people and the C.P.S.U.(B.).

For what could be more distorted than a picture of the liberation of Yugoslavia from Axis occupation and of building socialism in Yugoslavia apart from and "independent" of the U.S.S.R.?

Could the Yugoslav national-liberation movement ever have taken the form that it did and reached the proportions it did, if the main Nazi forces had not been contained and then driven back and defeated by the Red Army?

Could the Yugoslav Partisan forces that were scoring such successes in the hills and forests ever have driven out the Nazis from the main cities without the Red Army? Would Belgrade and other great Yugoslav cities have been freed without the Red Army?

The Soviet troops of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts crossed the rivers Drava and Tisza in the latter half of 1944, liberated Serbia and the Vojvodina, and on October 20, 1944, fighting along-side the First and Twelfth Corps of the Yugoslav People's Liberation Army, liberated Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital.

Commenting on the role of the Red Army in those days the Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav forces, Colonel-General Arso Jovanovic, wrote in his pamphlet on *The Belgrade Operation*:

"The great Russian people has been our hope and guarantee throughout the ages. Such was also the case this time. . . . The Soviet Army gave us fraternal disinterested aid. Soviet soldiers shed

their blood on the soil of our native land—in Serbia, in the streets-of Belgrade, in Srem. Out of the joint suffering and bloodshed there grew the invincible fraternity and unity of the two Slav countries. This is the only correct foreign political orientation which corresponds to the age-old strivings, cultural and historical development of our peoples. This is the sole guarantee that our peoples will save themselves from national misfortune—and there have been many misfortunes in our bitter history."

Colonel-General Arso Jovanovic knew and recognised the decisive role of the Red Army in the liberation of Yugoslavia. But for this knowledge, and above all for the frank and open recognition of this historical fact, he was to be assassinated by the Tito clique.

The liberation of Belgrade was a mortal blow at the Nazi forces in Yugoslavia and their quisling allies inside the country. Over 150,000 German soldiers and great quantities of equipment were captured. The Soviet Army rendered every assistance in reorganising the Partisan units into a modern and regular army. It provided modern equipment—artillery, tanks and aircraft. On the request of the Yugoslavs, Soviet military experts helped to train the reorganised units.

The Red Army handed over to the Yugoslav Army all the equipment captured at Belgrade. More than ten infantry divisions were supplied with arms from the Danube supply line. When in January 1945, the Germans broke through on the Srem front and once again threatened Belgrade, Marshall Tolbukhin detached large forces from the Hungarian front around Lake Balaton, and smashed the Nazi offensive.

Could Yugoslavia or any of the other People's Democracies of Eastern Europe ever have established their People's Democracies and set the course for socialism without the aid, friendship and protection of the U.S.S.R. which alone saved them from "liberation" in the Anglo-American imperialist manner, which alone preserved them from armed imperialist intervention, as dreamed of by Churchill?

Was it not the Soviet Union that sent in without delay, and despite the devastation of its own territories, food and economic aid of all kinds in the most critical period in 1944-45, when the West was still trying to extort from Yugoslavia political concessions in return for food for its starving population?

How could it be thought, even for a moment, that in face of the greedy onslaught of Western imperialism Yugoslavia could preserve its independence except in alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies?

Indeed, what genuine Communist would have been anything but

FROM TROTSKY TO TITO

proud and content to acknowledge the decisive role of the Soviet Union in the liberation of Yugoslavia and in its advance to socialism?

The truth is that the Tito clique was following a bourgeois-nationalist and not a Marxist and proletarian-internationalist path. Though at first secretly, and under-cover, it was trying to wean the Yugoslav people away from friendship and alliance with the U.S.S.R. and other People's Democracies. No sooner had the Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau been published, than the Titoites began to come into the open as nationalists, stirring up the old chauvinist hatreds that had been played on for so long by the "Great Serbs," the old Serb chauvinists, against the Hungarian, Rumanian, Greek and Albanian peoples and gradually turning to direct open attack on the U.S.S.R. and the C.P.S.U.(B.). The open turn of the Titoite leaders to nationalism reflected their efforts to restore capitalism in Yugoslavia; they opened a fatal path before the Yugoslav people of return to the old order, of becoming once again a semi-colony in the orbit of Western imperialism.

"What is the deviation towards nationalism?... The deviation towards nationalism is the adaptation of the internationalist policy of the working-class to the nationalist policy of the bourgeoisie. The deviation towards nationalism reflects the attemps of 'one's own' 'national' bourgeoisie to undermine the Soviet system and to restore capitalism." (Stalin: Report to the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), January 1934, reprinted in *Problems of Leninism*).

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the resolution on the "Situation in the Yugoslav Communist Party" came as a shock to Communists and progressives all over the world. Most of us had made the mistake of confusing the achievements and sacrifices of the Yugoslav peoples with the actions of the group of leading Titoites. We took men like Tito, Kardelj, Rankovic and Djilas for what they claimed to be, viewed their actions uncritically, and failed to see how they were, beneath the surface, betraying the cause of the national liberation movement and leading their peoples down a false and dangerous path.

The resolution pierced the curtain of deceit. It revealed the departure from Marxism-Leninism of the Yugoslav Party leaders around Tito, pointed to the nationalism that was rising to the surface and that earlier had been concealed beneath the surface, and showed where this policy would inevitably lead.

It was in the first place the vigilance and deep political experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that pointed to the errors

of the Tito clique. It was on the initiative of the C.P.S.U.(B.) that the Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau was adopted. In years to come this resolution will be seen as one of the most decisive documents in the history of the international working-class movement. For it not only showed in the clearest terms the errors of Tito, Kardelj, Djilas, Rankovic and other Yugoslav Party leaders, but it enabled other Communist Parties which had been influenced by Titoite doctrines to correct their mistakes, and raised before all Parties deep theoretical principals which aroused profound discussion and allowed them to continue their struggles with greater understanding and clearer perspective. To the Soviet comrades who took this initiative we should express our deepest gratitude.

The discussion of the Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau which took place in all Communist Parties won the complete support of Communists throughout the world. There was not the vestige of a rift in the ranks of the Parties. All those who participated in the discussions came in the course of them to understand the correctness of the principles outlined.

But there was one question that remained open. How was it that these errors had come to be committed? Were they simply mistakes of policy or was there something else behind them? Why did British and American reaction seem to attach so much importance to the Tito clique? How could such a group of men as the Yugoslav Communist leaders around Tito refuse to discuss criticisms made by other fraternal Parties?

What explanation could be behind the totally un-Communist behaviour of the Yugoslav Communist leaders?

These questions did not receive a full answer until the Rajk, Kostov and Kochi Xoxe trials showed that the mistakes of the Titoites were part of a conscious, counter-revolutionary plan of direct agents of Anglo-American imperialism.

Chapter Two

WHAT THE TRIALS REVEALED

It was the three trials that took place in the course of 1949 in Budapest, Sofia and Tirana that proved that the dangerous situation developing in the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party was not due to mere political errors, to a mistaken policy, but that it was the result of a deliberate, counter-revolutionary, anti-Communist plot carried out by a gang of police-informers, agents provocateurs and intelligence agents, centred around the leading Titoites.

The indictment of Laszlo Rajk and his fellow conspirators in Hungary was published on September 6, 1949. The trial opened at Budapest on September 16. The Chief Prosecutor of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Dimiter Georgiev, published the indictment of Traicho Kostov and his fellow conspirators on November 28, 1949. Their trial opened on December 7. The trial of the Albanian conspirators headed by Kochi Xoxe had already taken place at Tirana in the previous May. What type of men were these conspirators who had plotted the overthrow of the new Popular Democratic régimes, achieved by so much effort and sacrifice by their peoples, and who had conspired to assassinate such men as Dimitrov, Rakosi and Enver Hoxha?

They consisted in the main of former Communists who had betrayed their Parties under duress and become police informers, and later agents of foreign imperialist intelligence, together with former right-wing officers and state officials who had assumed a left-wing mask towards the end of the Second World War. To these must be added the Yugoslav officials, Tito's envoys, who participated in the various conspiracies.

In the Hungarian conspiracy there were eight accused. Laszlo Rajk himself had been arrested when a young Communist student by the Hungarian semi-fascist police in 1931 in Budapest in connection with the distribution of Communist leaflets. To save his skin he had agreed to become an informer and agent provocateur, and had signed a paper to this effect, putting himself at the disposal of the Hungarian secret police. From then his downfall dated. First he was sent to spy on the Communist students in Budapest University, then on the illegal Communist Young Workers' League, then amongst the building workers, where in 1935 his provocations led to over 200 arrests. Thence

he was transferred first to Czechoslovakia, and from there to the International Brigade in Spain, where he spied on and disrupted the Rakosi Battalion.

He left Spain for France, where he was confined in various of the Southern French concentration camps designed for Spanish Republicans and International Brigaders—St. Cyprien, Gurs and Vernet. Here he continued his informer's and intelligence work in contact with various groups of Hungarian and Yugoslav Trotskyists. Returning to Hungary with the aid of the Gestapo, and working again as a police informer inside the illegal Hungarian Communist Party, he became, after Liberation, first the Secretary of the Greater Budapest District of the Party, then Minister of Home Affairs and finally Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Two other intelligence agents and police informers involved in the conspiracy were Dr. Tibor Szonyi, who was recruited to the United States Intelligence in 1944, sent back to Hungary to "penetrate the left" and became head of the Cadres Department of the Communist Party; and Andras Szalai, enrolled as an informer by the head of the Hungarian political police at Pecs in 1933. Szalai it was who betrayed the leaders of the illegal Young Workers' League in 1942 and who was then responsible for disclosing the planned escapes of Yugoslav and Hungarian political prisoners from Satoraljaujhely prison, leading to sixty-four murdered on the spot or later executed. After Liberation he worked in the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party.

Lieutenant-General Gyorgy Palffy was one of those opportunist Hungarians who used to be known as "insurance agents"—who tried, whatever their real political views, to "insure" themselves with the régime in power. Son of a bank director and grandson of a kulak, he received a bourgeois education, including a period at the Ludovica Academy where the old fascist corps used to be trained. This political background was further strengthened by a year's service in the Italian fascist army, where Mussolini's Italy became his political ideal. As an officer of Horthy's army he took part during the Second World War in the occupation of the Carpatho-Ukraine. In 1944, when the defeat of fascism seemed certain, he decided to insure himself for the future, and so he came to an arrangement with his colleague Captain Istvan Lancz, fellow-officer in Horthy's army.

"I agreed with him that he should go to the west with the Horthy army in which he was then actually serving. Then the stream to the west was well under way. He should make contacts there with the British and Americans, depending on who should capture him, or

under whose authority he should be. I would stay at home and would attempt to establish the strongest possible left-wing contacts, and would even try somehow to establish contacts with the Communist Party... Our idea was, that however the situation should turn out, we would... cover up for one another." (Evidence at Rajk trial, Verbatim Report, p. 84.)

By the spring of 1946, his fascist outlook well concealed beneath the new façade, he had become a General, Chief of the Military Political Department and Commander-in-Chief of the Frontier Guards. Bela Korondy, a similar personality in a lesser way, starting as a member of the gendarmerie under the Horthy fascist régime, ended in the Frontier Guards under Lieutenant-General Palffy.

Pal Justus, a Hungarian Trotskyist, was recruited as an informer after arrest by the police in 1932. He ended after Liberation in the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party, and, after unification of the two workers' Parties, on the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party.

Finally the Yugoslav Lazar Brankov, who came to Hungary as a member of the Yugoslav Military Mission in 1945 and was Counsellor of the Yugoslav Legation at the end of 1947, was the chief representative of the Yugoslav Secret Police in Hungary from 1947 to September 1948, when, on orders of Rankovic, Yugoslav Minister of the Interior, he pretended to go over to the supporters of the Communist Information Bureau taking refuge on Hungarian soil.

The men involved in the Kostov conspiracy were of a similar back-ground and a similar calibre—police informers and agents of foreign intelligence hiding inside the Communist Party, right-wing businessmen hiding their true opinions under a left cloak and members of the Yugoslav secret police pretending to be opponents of the Tito régime.

There was Traicho Kostov himself, who as a member of the Central Committee of the illegal Communist Party was arrested in April 1942, and saved his life by accepting the role of spy inside the Party for the Bulgarian police. He became, after Liberation, acting President of the Council of Ministers and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

There were Ivan Stefanov, a member of the Communist Party who was already working for British Intelligence in 1932; Nikola Pavlov, who deserted to the police at the same time as Kostov and was sent back by them to work in the Party; Nikola Nachev, Party member who made contact with British Intelligence in 1941 and who became, after Liberation, Assistant-President of the State Committee for Economic and Financial Problems; Boris Khristov, who accepted the role

of police spy when arrested in 1943 and in 1946 became Bulgarian Commercial Representative in the U.S.S.R.; Tsonyu Tsonchev, who deserted to the police and betrayed his comrades when arrested with a group of young Communists in Varna in 1924 and who contacted American Intelligence in 1941; Ivan Gevrenov, landowner and industrialist, who after Liberation pretended to be a friend of the People's Government, joined the Communist Party and worked for British Intelligence; Blagoi Hadjipanzov, who worked as a Tito spy when Counsellor of the Yugoslav Embassy in Sofia and, like Brankov in Hungary, pretended in November 1948 to go over to support of the Information Bureau. Nor is this a full list even of the main conspirators.

But one thing they all had in common—all were concealing their real identity under a cloak of falsehood. Whether they were Communists who had deserted the cause of Communism and saved their skins by becoming police informers and were then made over by their former masters to the Gestapo or French or British or American Intelligence or to all of them; or whether they were reactionary gendarmes or officers or businessmen posing as sympathisers of the new People's régimes; or whether they were Yugoslav officials pretending to be friends of the new People's Democracies or supporters of the Information Bureau—all of them worked and plotted against their countries, against their peoples and against socialism.

One other thing they nearly all had in common. They took their instructions through the intermediary of the Tito clique.

The Truth About the Titoites Emerges

The trials were long trials. The Rajk trial opened on September 16 and the verdict was given on September 24. The Kostov trial opened on December 7, and the verdict was given on December 14. The defendants had every opportunity to speak for as long as and in the way they desired. Many witnesses were called. But one fact stood out in all clarity at both the Rajk and the Kostov trial. The guiltiest criminals of all were not present.

For if in the dock were Rajk and Kostov and the Hungarian and Bulgarian conspirators, who had plotted the overthrow of their People's Democratic Governments and the brutal murder of the most beloved and outstanding leaders of their peoples, behind Rajk and behind Kostov, behind the Hungarian and Bulgarian conspirators, stood the criminal group of Titoite leaders—Tito himself, Rankovic, Kardelj, Djilas and some score of others; and behind the Titoites stood the real directors of the plots—British and American Intelligence, British and American imperialism.

From the trials emerged the real reasons for Tito's false policy condemned in the Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau. From the trials it emerged that the Titoite betrayal was of long standing. From the trials emerged the story of how that betrayal had started and how it had ended with Tito and his confederates as the direct instruments for carrying out in Eastern Europe, and indeed throughout the world, the policy of Anglo-American imperialism:

"Not only Rajk and his associates are here in the dock, but their foreign masters, their imperialist instigators of Belgrade and Washington." (Dr. Gyula Alapi, People's Prosecutor, Rajk Trial, Verbatim Report, p. 253).

It was Rajk himself who gave the clearest outline of the role of the Titoite conspirators. He contacted them in the French concentration camps set up in southern France for the ex-International Brigaders:

"In the French internment camps, in Saint Cyprien, Gurs and Vernet, I was together with the Yugoslavs. There were very strong Trotskyist political activities in the French internment camps. The chief organisers of the political activities, and at the same time their executors, were those inside the Yugoslav group. As far as I remember there might have been about 150 who were involved in such activities inside the Yugoslav group. The decisive majority of these were intellectuals, petty bourgeois and university students"
(Rajk: Evidence at Trial, Verbatim Report, p. 39).

The Trotskyites, many of whom had been sent to the International Brigade by the Yugoslav secret police, and who included some of the leading present-day Titoites, were here contacted by the Intelligence services of several nations, including the French, American and later German.

Rajk told of their contact in the camps with the French Secret Police—the Deuxième Bureau:

"As a former International Brigader, who carried on Trotskyist activities, I was on several occasions called in and asked for information about what was happening in the camp by the officer of the *Deuxième Bureau*, the French intelligence service in Gurs and later in Vernet . . . I have to add that for the French officer to call me in it was not necessary for him to know my past, because in general the Trotskyists always, and everywhere, internationally, worked in close contact with the police . . . I told the French Officer, the head of the *Deuxième Bureau*, that a strong Yugoslav Trotskyist group was active in the camp, and roughly who were

the leaders of the group. Then the French Deuxième Bureau officer took out a list which was full of Yugoslav names throughout; he carefully checked the names given by me against this list. I saw that those whom I mentioned as leaders already featured on his list as the leaders of this Yugoslav Trotskyist group." (ibid., pp. 39-

40).

He met them visiting the officials of the Deuxième Bureau:

"From this it became clear to me that these Yugoslavs were, in fact, the organised men of the *Deuxième Bureau*, and were carrying out its instructions just as I was." (*ibid.*, p. 40).

There came the Hitlerite invasion of France. The Yugoslav Trotskyists, who had been passed on by the Yugoslav secret police to French Intelligence, were now taken over by the Gestapo. Rajk told of a German recruiting commission, headed by a Gestapo or Abwehr major, visiting the camps in the spring of 1941:

"After the commission had worked for a few days, this Major called me to him and suggested to me that I, too, should report for work in Germany, and he would help me to get home to Hungary from Germany. He told me that he was making this proposal because Péter Hain, the head of the political department of the Hungarian police, had asked him to help me to get home to Hungary, as I was an organised agent, who had been working for the Hungarian police for a long time and he found no other solution for sending me home but this one. During this conversation, the Gestapo or Abwehr major took out a list and asked after certain Yugoslavs. The list from which he read out the names was the same list as the one the leading officer of the Deuxième Bureau had been looking at, when I was reporting to him on the activities of the Yugoslav Trotskyist group. . . . He said that he was asking me because if Péter Hain requested him to help me to get home, then he trusted my opinion and considered me a reliable person from his point of view; on the other hand these Yugoslavs and many other Yugoslavs-roughly those that had featured on that list, that is about 150-had asked him, that is that Major, to help them to return home to Yugoslavia. That he really did so, I consider to be proved by two facts. One of the facts is that there were very many Yugoslavs in the group with which I went to Germany. The other fact is that from time to time, biggish Yugoslav groups set out on their way home for Yugoslavia from the neighbourhood of Leipzig, where I worked, and their setting out for home in such a legal form, as it happened, could obviously not have taken place except with

the support of the German official organs, the Gestapo or other organs." (ibid., pp. 41-42.)

In the course of his evidence Rajk also told how he had been contacted by American Intelligence in the French concentration camp of Vernet.

"It was in the Vernet internment camp that an American citizen called Field, who was as far as I know the head of the American Intelligence agency for Central and Eastern Europe, visited me in the internment camp after the end of the Civil War. He referred to instructions he had received from Washington, that he should speak with me and help me to get out of the camp and return home to Hungary. He even told me that they would like to send me home because as an agent who had not been exposed I would, working in the Party according to the instructions received from the Americans, disorganise and dissolve the Party and possibly even get the Party leadership into my hands." (ibid., pp. 46-47.)

Thus from the Rajk trial it became clear that in the middle and late thirties a considerable group of Trotskyists and provocateurs remained hidden in the Yugoslav Communist Party, including in very leading positions, when similar Trotskyite groups were being successfully exposed and expelled from other Communist Parties. These traitors included such men as Kosta Nadj, Vukmanovic and others of the leading Titoites. A large group of them was despatched to the International Brigade, and later in the concentration camps of southern France, they were in constant contact with the French and German Intelligence services, as well as with similar Trotskyites and provocateurs of other countries. Already in the early forties the Gestapo and U.S. Intelligence were competing as to who would take these traitors over and send them home to carry out the disruption of the Communist Parties and progressive movements in their homelands. It was finally with the aid of the Gestapo that many of them returned to Yugoslavia.

Betrayal of the Liberation Struggle

The evidence of the Rajk, Kostov and Albanian trials showed that these spies and provocateurs, having found their way home with the aid of the Gestapo, linked up with other similar groupings inside the Yugoslav Communist Party, and, 'as leaders of the Partisan and national liberation struggle, continued their work of disruption and betrayal.

Some continued to work for the Gestapo, others made contact with British and American Intelligence; some managed to work for all

three; but a compact group of leading Yugoslav Communists, including Tito himself, Rankovic, Kardelj and Djilas, led the betrayal in the course of the war.

When the Nazi invasion had rolled over Yugoslavia in May, 1941, and when the Yugoslav peoples were being subjected to all the horrors of occupation by the Nazi chiefs and their quislings, it was, to start off with, British policy to support Mihailovic and the Yugoslav Cetniks. Despite the fact that the Cetniks were inactive against the Axis, and despite the fact that more and more evidence was accumulated of actual Cetnik collaboration with the Axis, for many months British aid in parachuted weapons and uniforms continued to be directed to the Cetniks. With British tommy-guns and in British battle-dress Cetnik units included in the Axis order of battle struck again and again against Yugoslav patriots and Partisans. The British wireless was even used to broadcast calls for the assassination of Partisan leaders.

An accumulation of different factors led eventually to a change of policy.

- (a) It became more and more clear that the overwhelming mass of Yugoslav people were turning away from the Cetniks and reguarded them as Axis collaborators. It became apparent that British reaction would gain no post-war foothold in Yugoslavia or the Balkans by basing themselves upon Mihailovic.
- (b) The Cetniks were actively aiding the Axis or else were totally inactive. With the growing difficulties in the North African campaign, the British military leadership in North Africa was calling for the development of guerilla activities in the Balkans that would lead to the cutting of Axis lines of communications, to the stopping of the flow of reinforcements to Rommel.
- (c) More and more progressive, genuinely anti-fascist people in Britain and America, even in the Army itself, were disturbed at this policy of aiding Axis quislings and demanded a change of policy.
- (d) At a certain time, and exactly how and when history still has to disclose, the British political and military leadership, on a very high and top-secret level, must have received information, some of which it may have had all along, that there were leading elements inside the Partisan forces, inside the Yugoslav Communist Party, spies and provocateurs, Gestapo elements, Trotskyites, who could be "trusted" (from the point of view of British imperialism), and could be used to betray the Yugoslav People's Liberation movement from inside, and carry out an Anglo-American imperialist policy.

This was the basis of the change of British policy from Mihailovic to Tito in the period of 1942-43. It was carried out with the maximum secrecy and with that great measure of cunning and deceit for which British imperialism, with its long and unrivalled experience of cunning and deceit, has become notorious throughout the world.

On the surface it had to be presented demagogically as support for the patriotic anti-Axis struggie of the Yugoslav Partisans. Thus progressive people in Britain and America would be disarmed, they would think that their efforts and struggles were being rewarded. Contact between British (and later American) Intelligence and the Titoite group of traitors had to be kept so secret that only a tiny group of completely "trustworthy" elements would have knowledge of it from both the Yugoslav and British and American sides. The others, including many in both the British, American and Yugoslav G.H.Q.s, would be led to believe that this was honest mutual military aid between Allies against the Axis.

Thus progressive peoples on all sides could be led into the trap and use all their efforts and energy to further the aid to Tito which was, in reality, to be used against all that they stood for. The high degree of secrecy led to confusion and dispute between pro-Mihailovic and pro-Tito elements of the U.S. and British ruling classes, including in the Foreign Office and State Department. But this very confusion and dispute gave an air of reality to the plot. Two systems of contact between the Anglo-Americans and Partisans were established. A general liaison which dealt with the more open side of military aid and contact, and an inner, parallel, top-secret network, for the use only of the initiated "trustworthy" few, through which, unbeknown to most of the leading officers and officials on all sides, the real plot could take its shape. Only now, since the revelations of the trials, has the character and organisation of this plot begun to be revealed.

Lazar Brankov, former counsellor at the Yugoslav Legation at Budapest, and one of the accused, told of the nature of the plot at the Rajk trial:

"Well they (Anglo-American Intelligence) thought that first of all there was a well-constructed plan which the British and Americans had worked out with Churchill still during the war. According to this plan, as is usually the case, they did not want to place the Balkans under their influence at the cost of the blood of Anglo-American soldiers, but wanted to achieve this through these experienced intelligence officers and they wanted in this way to place under their influence the Yugoslav leaders of these days. . . .

"While the war was still on they were trying to subjugate Yugo-

slavia, and then the neighbouring states, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, to Anglo-American influence and their primary aim was to restrict the influence of the Soviet Union, to decrease their influence, because they knew very well that the overwhelming part of the great majority of the Yugoslav people stood by the side of the Soviet Union and loved the Soviet people. At that time they planned first to win over Tito, Kardelj, Rankovic and Djilas and through them Yugoslavia. . ." (Evidence of Lazar Brankov, Verbatim Report of Rajk Trial, p. 117.)

Brankov spoke of the working out of what he called the "Churchill plan":

"The other case was—and this was more Churchill's plan—that the Anglo-Americans should during the war occupy the coast of the Adriatic Sea. This was no longer necessary, because the coast was already mainly liberated by the Partisans and was in their hands. But for Churchill it was necessary then to extend his influence upon Yugoslavia and the neighbouring countries. At that time, too, Maclean succeeded in gaining Rankovic, Djilas and Kardelj for this plan. There was a great argument in the General Staff; Tito agreed with that again, for he thought that Yugoslavia would, at any rate, be liberated by the British: . . The Soviet Command had another opinion on this question and gave Tito advice, so that he retreated, and thus Churchill's plan to invade the Balkans and the Adriatic coast became a failure during the war." (ibid., p. 119.)

Traicho Kostov, in his written testimony, gave evidence of the same betrayal of the Tito group to Anglo-American imperialism, recounting the substance of what Kardelj told him at their interview in Skoplje at the end of November, 1944:

"Then Kardelj informed me, in strict confidence, that during the war the British and Americans had supplied the Yugoslav partisans with arms and munitions, on condition that at the end of the war Tito would keep Yugoslavia away from the U.S.S.R. and would not allow the U.S.S.R. to establish its influence, not only in Yugoslavia, but in the Balkans as well. The Americans and British had taken a firm decision in no case to allow the breakaway of the countries, that might be liberated by the Soviet Army, from the Western bloc.

"On this basis, between Tito on the one hand and the British and Americans on the other, a definite agreement had already been reached during the war." (Verbatim Report of the Kostov Trial, p. 88.)

It had long been the dream of Western imperialism to build up a

confederation of puppet governments in the Balkans and Eastern Europe to act under its ægis as yet one further anti-Soviet base. In the course of the Second World War, Western imperialism became frightened of the character of the popular resistance movements that grew up in these countries in struggle against Axis domination and occupation. They saw in all this struggle and sacrifice of the people, led by the Communists, not the struggle of heroic allies against Nazi fascism, but a menace to the future of imperialism in Eastern Europe. In the very midst of the war the aims of Western imperialism remained unchanged, taking on only new forms.

Whilst the Soviet Army was meeting and defeating the main forces of Nazi Germany, Churchill's secret memorandum (now made public) of October, 1942, stated:

"It would be a measureless disaster if Russian barbarism overlaid the culture and independence of the ancient states of Europe."

British imperialism, whilst striving to avoid a real Second Front, planned to invade the Balkans, and set up in the very course of the war an anti-Soviet grouping of puppet reactionary states. In the midst of the war itself, when Britain was being preserved from invasion by the Red Army, when thousands of patriotic progressives were giving their lives in the resistance struggles of Europe, the Churchill plan was being drafted for Anglo-American domination in Eastern Europe and for the suppression, not of the Nazi invaders and the Balkan quislings, but of the resistance forces with the aid of the Balkan quislings.

And in the carrying out of this plan, in the effort to make the Churchill dream come true, the Western imperialists allotted a key role to the Tito clique in Yugoslavia.

There was considerable opposition to the policy of Tito, Rankovic and Kardelj inside the Yugoslav Communist Party already in the course of the Second World War, and led by such men as Hebrang, an outstanding Communist leader, and General Arso Jovanovic, Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Liberation Army. But even those who led the opposition to the Tito clique did not realise that they were dealing with traitors.

The Titoites had a way of dealing with opposition, whether inside or outside the Communist Party:

"Especially Rankovic was important there, because he was organisation secretary and he led the cadres department and later the intelligence service, the counter-intelligence. The whole Party apparatus was in his hands and he succeeded in putting his men

everywhere. He succeeded in removing all those who did not agree with the line followed during the war by Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and Rankovic, especially their collaboration, and spoke of them to Party members as left-wing deviators. And, for example, it also happened—the Partisans spoke very much about this already in 1944—that these people, who were considered leftists, and who were the followers of the Soviet Union, and who were not willing to collaborate closely with the Anglo-Americans—were sent during the war to places where it was sure that they would fall." (Brankov's evidence, Verbatim Report of Rajk Trial, pp. 121-122.)

Thus in the course of the Second World War the group of Trotskyites and agents inside the Yugoslav Communist Party gained still more commanding positions and, disguising themselves as leading Partisans, used their positions to get rid of those who opposed them, by all means including the most ruthless. By the end of the war, they held nearly all the key positions in the Yugoslav Communist Party. The process of getting rid of the genuine internationalists from the Party leadership was taken a step further with the arrest of Zhujovic and Hebrang in April, 1948, and by the murder of General Arso Jovanovic. Henceforth the Titoites reigned supreme.

It was not by chance that it was British imperialism that played the main role in the course of the Second World War in organising and coming to agreement with the Trotskyite clique inside the Yugoslav Communist Party. Of all imperialisms, British is the most experienced and cunning. Centuries of experience in victory and defeat have taught it tactics of subtlety and subterfuge, of how to combine seeming concession with ruthless force. So it was British imperialism on the Allied side that first planned and carried out on a big scale the policy of penetration and corruption of the left from inside.

The conspirator Ivan Tutev testified at the Kostov trial that he was instructed by a British agent at the beginning of 1943 to get in touch:

"with progressive circles, especially with members of the Communist Party, with the aim of creating connections in those circles, penetrating into the Party and becoming later on a member, with the purpose, one day when it would be very necessary, of assuming a leading position." (Ivan Tutev's evidence, Verbatim Report of the Kostov Trial, p. 225.)

It was the experienced and cunning *British* imperialism that made the running for the organisation of the Tito plot already in the course of the Second World War, and that organised for the postwar period.

"It was obvious to the British politicians, that the war was approaching its end, that the war would inevitably be lost by Hitler, that it would be won by the Soviet Union even before the second front was opened. . . And in such a development of events a predominance of Soviet influence would inevitably be established in the countries of South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. Great Britain could not tolerate and would not endure such a predominance of Soviet influence. That is why she intended to counteract the establishment of Soviet influence in the Balkans and particularly in Bulgaria by all possible means. . . In order to be able to cope with this task, the British Intelligence Service should be thoroughly well acquainted with what the Soviets and the Communist Party intended to do in connection with the forthcoming development of events." (Ivan Tutev's evidence, *ibid.*, p. 225.)

But if it was the more cunning and experienced British Intelligence and British imperialism that made the running, looking ahead to the post-war world, it was stronger American imperialism that took over at the end of the war. The agents, spies and stooges began very quickly to see which way the wind was blowing and who would be their new master:

"When I questioned Tito about the orientation of Yugoslavia's foreign policy, he expressed his disdain of the British, who according to him, were on the wane as a great power and were obliged to cede the right of way to successful American capitalism. Tito gave me to understand that Yugoslav foreign policy was orientating itself towards America, rather than, as before, towards England. He advised us Bulgarians to establish contact with the Americans . . . " (Kostov's written testimony recounting interview with Tito in summer 1946. Verbatim Report of the Kostov Trial, pp. 99-100).

By the end of the war, the Tito clique had become the direct representatives of American imperialism.

The Post-War Plots

The Churchill Plan to establish in the post-war world a reactionary Eastern Europe, subservient to Western imperialism, ended in fiasco. Eastern Europe was liberated by the Red Army. The resistance to Axis occupation had been led in these countries by the working people, who had in their turn been led by the working-class and the Communist Parties. The old ruling classes—capitalists and landlords—the old leaders of the old state machines—generals and police and judges—had to a large measure exposed themselves as quislings and

Axis-collaborators. Though unevenly, and not yet in all countries decisively, the people led by the working class were ready to march forward in friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union towards People's Democracy, where the working people would be the rulers.

The Churchill Plan had failed. But it was not given up. Far from it! Defeated for the moment, Western imperialism returned with more intense energy to the struggle to turn history backwards, and to restore to Eastern Europe the old régimes that the people had cast out. In Greece they did it by violence, assassination, war against those who had led the resistance struggle against the Axis, war against the Greek people, war waged in collaboration with the Greek quislings. In the other countries of Eastern Europe, where the strength of the Soviet Union could prevent an open war of intervention, they tried to repeat the Greek pattern, but through more disguised methods of plot, putsch and subterfuge.

First they tried to restore the old régimes by direct counter-revolution of the old ruling classes organised in fascist or secret militarist bands. In Poland, for example, the fascist bands, financed and armed by Western imperialism, cost the lives of thousands of Polish democrats. But these plans failed. Next they turned to the right-wing leaders of the old Agrarian and Peasant Parties—men like Maniu in Rumania. Ferenc Nagy in Hungary, Mikolajczyck in Poland, Gemeto Dimitrov and Petkov in Bulgaria. But these plots were foiled. Then they turned their hopes to the right-wing leaders of the old Social-Democratic, Parties, plotted against the growing unity of the working class and against the new People's Democratic régimes that were being established. But these plots also were foiled. So, by 1948, it was the hidden agents of imperialism inside the Communist and Workers' Parties and above all the organising centre of these agents—the Titoite clique in the Yugoslav Communist Party, who now became their main weapon in their imperialist plot to overthrow the People's Democratic régimes and set up East European Governments subservient to the West.

Thus by the middle of 1948 the Titoite groupings that had been an auxiliary, a reserve weapon of Western imperialism, became its principal agency in Eastern Europe.

The plots and conspiracies of imperialism against countries of socialism or People's Democracy are not simple and do not follow a single line. The imperialists work through all possible channels—dispossessed landlords or big industrialists, former leaders of the Army, police or secret police, through kulaks, nationalists, degenerate elements, drug addicts, former common criminals, through renegade

Communists or right-wing labour leaders, through agents and provocateurs inserted into revolutionary organisations. They try to keep all possible contacts, all possible counter-revolutionary elements on their string at the same time. But they usually put their main support, at any given time, on one special group, whom they hope to use to restore to power a régime of reaction that will carry out their orders.

This was shown clearly enough in the successive imperialist attempts to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union, and to restore a Russian capitalism subservient to the West. First they tried through the open war of intervention to base themselves on the Tsarist White Guards, on the Russian landlords and capitalists, the old officers and police. When this failed, for a long period they tried to base their counter-revolutionary conspiracies on the kulaks, and when the kulaks were finally eliminated as a class, it was the secret agents of imperialism *inside* the Communist Party, the Trotskyite and other parallel "opposition" groups hitherto a reserve, who became in the middle thirties their *main hope*, their main weapon, for the overthrow of socialism and the reversal of history.

So, too, in Eastern Europe after the Second World War. At first the Titoites outside Yugoslavia were a reserve weapon. They were instructed, through the medium of the Yugoslav Titoites, to help the growth of the other reactionary groupings. The Kostov trial showed how Kostov and his fellow conspirators were used to make the Bulgarian people discontented with the new people's authority. Rajk was at first instructed by the U.S. agent Martin Himmler in the autumn of 1946 to aid the right-wing Hungarian plots by weakening the left through internal disruption:

"He (Martin Himmler) told me that the different right-wing forces of Hungary are concentrated mainly under the leadership of Ferenc Nagy, Béla Kovacs and Béla Varga. The right-wing forces of the Smallholders Party, the right-wing forces of the Peasant Party led by Imre Kovacs, the right-wing Social Democratic forces led by Peyer, Szeder, Kéthly and Szélig, as well as the very active underground Horthyist and former Szalasi-fascist forces which had no organisation of their own, were very active in working to take over the power of government and to remove the left-wing revolutionary forces, that is the Communist Party and the left-wing Social Democrats, from governmental power. He wanted to give me the tasks of dissolving the forces of the greatest unit of the left-wing revolutionary forces, the Communist Party, by organising a separate fraction against Rakosi in the Party led by Rakosi, in order to

ensure the seizure of power by the right-wing-forces. . . . At the same time Martin Himmler told me that in all probability this would be my last talk with him and with the representatives of the American intelligence agencies in general, for they would hand over their whole network to the Yugoslavs, and in the future I would get instructions for further work through Yugoslav channels." (Rajk's testimony, Verbatim Report of Rajk Trial, pp. 47-48.)

Later, when other groupings of a right-wing character had been compromised, Rajk received special American instructions via Rankovic to aid the right-wing Social Democratic leaders, who were now receiving full Western backing:

"Another message from Rankovic at that time-which is closely connected with the message about the elections—was that I was to connive at the especially strong anti-people's democratic, anti-Soviet and pro-Anglo-Saxon policy of the right-wing Social Democrats during the elections, and as a member of the Secretariat to try to get them to put up with it within the Party leadership, within the Communist Party leadership. The content of the message was that I could argue with the Party that one cannot fight on two fronts during the elections; one cannot fight against a right-wing of a fascist nature, and at the same time against the right-wing of a party which is after all a workers' party, therefore one should allow free scope to the activities of the rightwing Social Democrats on the basis of the policy of choosing the lesser evil. In connection with this Rankovic's message pointed out that to his knowledge the right-wing Social Democrats-how he knew about it I do not know-were trying to use the elections, the election campaign, and later the election results, to blackmail the Communist Party and for the capture of various leading positions in the state apparatus. His message—based on the above political reasoning-said that I should argue within the Party leadership in favour of allowing the right-wing Social-Democrats various posts with the aim of neutralising them. If needs be I should argue that we are making this concession temporarily and will win them back later." (Rajk's testimony, Verbatim Report of Rajk Trial, p. 57.)

Thus at a certain stage of post-war history, due to the weaknesses of the imperialists, and not to their strength, due to their failures and not to their successes, the Titoites in Yugoslavia, who had been a reserve weapon of imperialism, were brought forward as a principal instrument of Western policy, and, similarly, their stooges in Hungary, Bulgaria, etc., were brought forward from a secondary to a primary

role. This "evolution" was well summed up in the final Prosecutors' speeches at both the Rajk and the Kostov trials.

The Hungarian People's Prosecutor, Dr. Gyula Alapi, said:

"There were two stages in the policy of the Tito clique. During the first stage, when the fight between bourgeois reaction and People's Democracy in the East European countries was as yet undecided and one could still count on reaction getting the upper hand in the struggle of the forces in the People's Democracies, the Tito clique remained in reserve, did not yet show their teeth and did not yet come forward openly as the anti-Soviet storm-troopers of American imperialism. They appeared as the storm-troopers only in the second stage of development in Eastern Europe when the democratic and socialist forces had already won a decisive victory in these countries and the organisations of the anti-Soviet, pro-imperialist political forces could no longer be entrusted to the defeated groups of open reaction. . . .

"Just as Yugoslavia was still in reserve in the years immediately after the war and only later became the open storm-troopers of imperialism, so in the same way Rajk did not immediately, in the first stages of Hungarian democratic development, come into prominence, but remained an instrument in the hands of reaction at home and abroad. Only later, after the decisive victories of the Hungarian working class and after the routing of the different reactionary forces, did he come into prominence and, as the Tito clique's candidate for the post of Prime Minister become, if only temporarily, the head of Hungarian reaction. The Titoites and their imperialist bosses did not turn to Rajk because of his beautiful eyes but because they could no longer turn to Ferenc Nagy and Mindszenthy." (Verbatim Report of Rajk Trial, p. 268.)

And the Bulgarian Prosecutor, Vladimir Dimchev, stated in his concluding speech at the Kostov trial:

"When the attempts of the American and British Intelligence to organise and hurl against the Bulgarian People's Republic the forces of reaction and fascism in our country came to nought, they then began to place their hopes on the conspiratorial group of Traicho Kostov who had long rendered them espionage services. In this conspiratorial plan of theirs against our country, the Anglo-American imperialists used as their chief tool the treacherous espionage gang of Tito and his confederates." (Verbatim Report of the Kostov Trial, p. 509.)

This is how the Titoites, who had been an important reserve weapon

of imperialism, became by mid-1948 the main tool of Western imperialist plotting for counter-revolutions in Eastern Europe.

How could the Yugoslav Titoites and their "contacts" in other East European countries best serve their Anglo-American masters? How was the Titoite's plot against the peoples of Europe to be carried through? What were the main parts and stages of this plot?

It was clear that the task of the Titoites, even when they were only a reserve weapon of imperialism, was not only to prepare counter-revolutionary putsches against the People's Democratic régimes of Eastern Europe, not only to disrupt the left, but as an essential corollary to try and undermine among the masses of Eastern Europe their love and admiration of the Soviet Union, their deep friendship and gratitude. This was no easy task. It could not be undertaken directly, frontally, but only indirectly, and as part of a whole process.

A frontal attack on the U.S.S.R. would have been indignantly rejected by the mass of the East European peoples and would have at once exposed the Titoites. The plan, therefore, was to draw the peoples away from the Soviet Union in the first place by boosting Tito Yugoslavia, and the Titoite leaders, putting them in the centre of all propaganda: by stimulating interest and enthusiasm for Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union was to be put in the background. Later, this great "prestige" could be used by the Titoites to continue the process of weaning the East European peoples away from friendship with the Soviet Union, and, step by step, into the orbit of Western imperialism. Thus Yugoslavia would not only itself be taken by the Titoites out of the family of progressive states into the avid grasp of imperialism, but would take with it the other East European nations. This process was, of course, complementary to the process of preparing right-wing putsches and right-wing Governments inside the East European states.

Such was the essence of the *Tito plan* that Rankovic outlined to Rajk at their meeting in Kelebia in December, 1947:

"... the plan was that since the right-wing forces in all the People's Democratic countries had been defeated one by one, Yugoslavia had to undertake the role of organiser and leader of the overthrow of the People's Democratic regimes. Yugoslavia, however—said Rankovic—could not in Tito's evaluation do this by openly coming out with the announcement of such a policy. She could not do this because both among the masses of the people in Yugoslavia, and in most of the People's Democracies too, friendship towards the Soviet Union had strong and deep roots and the socialist camp had immense strength. Therefore, Tito had to carry out this policy under camouflage, by deception. According to Rankovic, Tito con-

ceived this policy of deception in the following way. First of all, Yugoslavia had a great attraction for the rest of the People's Democracies because of the war, or rather because of the heroic Partisan battles of the peoples of Yugoslavia. So Tito thought that this attraction, this popularity—outwardly emphasising and stressing friendship with the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies—must be taken advantage of and emphasised in order that, rallying around Yugoslavia, various federations should be concluded between Yugoslavia and the other countries. Tito wanted to carry out this grouping around Yugoslavia in a deceitful manner, again cloaked in socialist, pro-Soviet and pro-People's Democratic guise, by referring to the fact that Yugoslavia had an important strategic role against the aggressive policy of the United States and the Anglo-Saxons in general because of her geographical situation." (Rajk's testimony, Verbatim Report of Rajk Trial, pp. 63-64.)

The Tito plan included measures to set up all manner of Balkan and East European organisations, ranging from state federations to youth organisations with Yugoslavia at the centre. The first step in weaning people and states away from the Soviet Union was to group them around Tito Yugoslavia, with the Titoite betrayers of the heroic Yugoslav Liberation movement hiding behind the great prestige that the sacrifices of the Yugoslav people had rightly won.

The Tito plan therefore involved the boosting of Tito to the skies:

"Tito's visit to Bulgaria in connection with the signing of the Treaty for Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Assistance was about to take place. I took all the necessary steps that he might be welcomed most pompously, and with greatest glamour.

"Tito arrived in all the splendour of his imagined grandeur, travelling by special train preceded and followed by two other guard trains, together with his personal guards." (Kostov's written testimony, Verbatim Report of Kostov Trial, p. 106.)

It involved the effort to form a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation in which Bulgaria would become the seventh Yugoslav state, subordinated to Yugoslavia and Tito. It involved all sorts of plans for a Danubian Confederation centred around Tito Yugoslavia. It involved the effort to set up a whole series of Balkan and East European federations of organisations—sports, youth, women, trade union, etc., etc., centred at Belgrade. Make Belgrade the centre—this was the first step in the process of weaning away from the Soviet Union and towards the West.

"Within the framework of the great plan previously mentioned, the substance of which was to wrench these countries from the side of the Soviet Union and draw them over to the American side, Tito, together with the Americans, worked out a detailed plan, a regional plan, the plan of Balkan federation. This Balkan federation would have consisted, according to the plan, of Yugoslavia as the leading power, of Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, and perhaps later . . . of Rumania." (Palffy's testimony, Verbatim Report of Rajk Trial, p. 92.)

"There was another very important message from Rankovic at this time—the second half of 1947—which again I could not explain, and he only enlarged upon in Kelebia. This message read: Should a proposal be handed to the Hungarian government from the Yugoslav government concerning the setting up of youth, women's and trade union Balkan federations, I, as a member of the government, should try to support it with all my might." (Rajk's testimony, Verbatim Report of Rajk Trial, p. 57.)

The publication of the Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau in mid-1948 struck a heavy blow at the Tito plan. The Titoites could no longer "take their time" and on American orders spurred on their Rajks and Kostovs to hasten their preparations for the assassination of the best Communist leaders of their countries and their plans for the overthrow of the People's Democratic régimes.

But the vigilance of the people, led by the Communist Parties did not allow them to carry through their plans.

Tito's Plot Against Albania

The trial of Albanian Titoites which opened in May, 1949, showed that ever since 1943 the Yugoslav Titoites had been carrying out a policy hostile to the interests of the Albanian people—that they had, indeed, with the aid of certain elements inside the Albanian Communist Party, been continuing the old imperialist policy of Mussolini.

The small but very courageous Albanian people rose up alongside the Yugoslav people to combat the Axis occupation forces. They formed Partisan units under the leadership of the newly formed Albanian Communist Party. Already in the spring of 1943, Tito sent one of his principal agents—Vukmanovic (Tempo)—to Albania, ostensibly to establish relations with the Albanian Partisans, but actually to set up a secret Titoite opposition headed by Kochi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo inside the Albanian Communist Party. With this the Titoite effort to gain control of the Albanian Party began.

The first stage of Titoite intervention into the affairs of the Albanian patriots was the accusation of opportunism made against the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, headed by Enver Hoxha,

in connection with their attitude towards the nationalist organisation, the Balli Kombetar. This organisation, formed and guided by the reactionary Albanian feudal nobility, presented itself as a national liberation movement, but in practice was holding the people back from joining the People's Liberation Army (Albanian Partisans) in resistance to the Axis occupationists. But in the ranks of the Balli Kombetar were many honest but misguided Albanian patriots.

The aim of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communists was to try, in the first instance, to win the genuine patriots in the Balli Kombetar away from their reactionary leaders. The Titoites, who demanded immediate and direct action against the whole Balli Kombetar, a seemingly "left" policy, in actual fact did nothing but aid the Italian Blackshirts who were trying to push it into direct action against the Yugoslave Partisans.

A further stage in the Titoite plot against Albania was developed at the Congress of Berat in November, 1944. Here the Albanian Titoite group, headed by Kochi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo, put forward a policy of subordination of Albania to Yugoslavia and of affiliating Albania to a "Balkan Federation" of which Tito Yugoslavia would be the centre and the leader.

At the same time a strong factional campaign was launched against Enver Hoxha and other leaders of the Albanian Communist Party. Kochi Xoxe, like his prototype Rankovic, held the key positions of Organisation Secretary of the Albanian Communist Party and Minister of the Interior. Other Albanian Titoites got hold of key positions in Party and State-Pandi Kristo in the State Control Commission, others in the propaganda department of the Communist Party, in the press and in the Ministry of the Interior. Genuine Communist and internationalist cadres were attacked, persecuted, eliminated from key positions. Nako Spiru, Minister of Industry, President of the Planning Commission, and member of the Political Bureau of the Party, was driven to suicide by the false accusations of the Titoites. Although they did not dare openly to attack General Enver Hoxha, they did everything they could to disrupt his influence and reputation, censored his correspondence and sent copies to the Ozna, Titoite secret police of Yugoslavia. All patriots who in any way resisted the Yugoslav colonisation plans were ruthlessly persecuted.

Meanwhile Albania was being colonised, economically and politically. A sort of Yugoslav Marshall Plan was carried out in Albania under the cover of customs and currency agreements, constitution of "mixed companies", co-ordination of economic plans. A two-milliard-lek credit promised by Yugoslavia was never forthcoming. Profits of the "mixed companies" were appropriated by the Yugoslavs. Yugoslav

technicians spied on and sabotaged Albanian industrial developments. The demand was made that a Yugoslav division should be stationed in Albania and, when this was refused, that there should be a unified military command.

At the same time Kochi Xoxe was endeavouring to reorganise the Albanian Party on the Titoite model; membership of the Party was concealed as in Yugoslavia; the Party was dissolved into the Democratic Front. Plots were set on foot for the assassination of Enver Hoxha and other genuine Communist leaders who resisted the Titoite policy.

Albania was saved, and the Albanian Titoites were eliminated, as a result of the vigilance of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and other Parties of the Communist Information Bureau, who, with the publication of the Resolution on Yugoslavia in mid-1948, alerted all true Communists of the danger that their country was facing.

After the Information Bureau Resolution

The publication of the resolution of the Communist Information Bureau on Yugoslavia in mid-1948 put the Communists of Eastern Europe and, indeed, of all the world, on their guard against the Titoites.

As for the Tito clique themselves, it forced them into the open, not all at once, but step by step.

At first the Titoites swore their loyalty to the Soviet Union, complained that they were being misjudged, and turned their attacks against the leading Communists of other countries of Eastern Europe, like Dimitrov and Rakosi. In a letter addressed to the C.P.S.U.(B.) on April 13, 1948 (answering Soviet criticisms of Yugoslav Communist policy) and signed by Tito and Kardelj, it was stated, for instance:

"Our only desire is to eliminate every doubt and disbelief in the purity of the comradely and brotherly feeling of loyalty of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to whom we will always remain thankful for the Marxist-Leninist doctrine which has led us unto now and will lead us in the future—loyalty to the Soviet Union which has served us and will continue to serve us as a great example and whose assistance to our people we so highly appreciate."

Such language today would mean a long prison sentence for the crime of "Cominformism", if not worse.

Covering their anti-Soviet policy with a veil of hypocrisy, the Titoites quickly began the attacks on the other People's Democracies:

"The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia must, however, emphasise that in certain countries of People's Democracy a whole series of unprovoked attacks have been committed by Party and state organs which are insulting to the people of Yugoslavia, etc., etc." (Borba statement of July 1, 1948.)

Meanwhile the most vicious slanders were launched against Communist leaders like Rakosi and (until his death) Dimitrov.

The second stage of Titoite manœuvre was that in which, while beginning to direct their attacks against the Soviet Union and the C.P.S.U.(B.), they tried to make it appear that Stalin did not agree with Information Bureau criticisms of Tito, that Zhdanov was responsible, and so on Demagogic appeals were made to Stalin to "come out against the Cominform, slanders".

But there was little scope for such demagogy; for such unscrupulous manœuvre. It was made perfectly clear to the whole world that the whole Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), including its leader Stalin, had joined in criticising the Titoite policy. Very quickly a third stage was reached in which the Titoites began openly to slander and attack Soviet policy and the policy of the C.P.S.U.(B.), to slander Stalin, to accuse him of betraying Leninism. By mid-1949 the Titoites had hoisted their real colours and were talking openly the old language of Trotskyism.

The May Day Proclamation of the Titoite Communist Party of May, 1949, denounced the "attack upon Yugoslavia coming from the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies". Though they still proclaimed, in leftist demagogic terms, the "dangers of imperialism", the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies were denounced as the "most serious obstacle to further successful development of the struggle of the workers' democratic peace-loving movement in the world". The demagogy was wearing thin! At the end of May, 1949, the Political Department of the "Communist Party" organisation of the Yugoslav Army, dominated by the Titoites, was writing of the "counter-revolutionary struggle" of the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies. By July, 1949, Djilas was attacking the Soviet Union (Tanjug, July 19, 1949) as an "exploiter" of the new Yugoslavia. The Titoite mask was lifted.

At the end of 1949, following the revelations of the Rajk and Kostov trials, the Titoite leaders and the Titoite press turned to full, unadulterated anti-Soviet slander. In 1950 they passed into the final stage—and became open propagandists for Western imperialism.

Thus the infamous Tito plan for weaning the people of Eastern Europe by stages away from the Soviet Union was defeated. The

Titoites were exposed, and were themselves forced, by stages, into the open, revealed as anti-Soviet plotters, imperialist agents. And once they were forced into the open, though they remained a dangerous weapon of imperialism, the principal danger, thanks above all to the political wisdom and vigilance of the C.P.S.U.(B.), was passed.

Conclusion

The Rajk, Kostov and Xoxe trials revealed what had not yet been clear at the time of the Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau in mid-1948. They revealed that the false policy of the Titoite leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party criticised in the Resolution—their anti-Soviet attitude, deviations from Marxism-Leninism, distortion of the role and organisation of the Communist Party, bourgeois nationalism—was not just mistaken policy, subject to correction by self-critical understanding of their errors.

The trials revealed that this false and disastrous policy was a deliberate and fully conscious policy on the part of the leading Titoites, like Tito himself, Kardelj, Djilas, Mose Pijade. It was a deliberate policy carried out by Trotskyites, agents provocateurs, who had gained over a whole period commanding positions in the Yugoslav Communist Party, and who, under the instructions of Anglo-American imperialism, were trying to use those positions to restore capitalism in Eastern Europe, to bring the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe into the orbit of Western imperialism to subject these countries to Western imperialism.

The trials were a stern warning to Communists, genuine socialists and progressives all over the world. It brought home to them in the most urgent terms the need for vigilance; the need never to forget that the class enemy is not for one moment inactive; that capitalism works covertly as well as overtly; that the leading imperialist circles will never cease from their efforts, by every means, to overthrow the states where the working people have conquered power.

They could go back with a new sense of urgency to the profound words of Stalin uttered at the meeting of Activists of the Moscow Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on April, 13, 1928:

"It would be stupid to imagine that international capital will leave us in peace. No, comrades, this is not so. Classes exist, international capital exists and it cannot calmly view the development of the country building Socialism. It is one of two things: either we continue to pursue a revolutionary policy, rallying round the working class of the U.S.S.R., the proletariat and oppressed of all countries—and international capital will then in every way hamper

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us in our forward march; or we reject our revolutionary policy, agree to a number of fundamental concessions to international capital—and then international capital will, in all probability, have no objections to 'helping' us in the degeneration of our socialist country, into a 'good' bourgeois republic." (Stalin, Collected Works, Russian edition, Vol. XI, pp. 54-55.)

The trials revealed that the Titoites had rejected revolutionary policy, that they were being "helped" by international capital in the degeneration of their country into a bourgeois state, destined, in the dreams of the imperialists, to help turn back history in the whole of Eastern Europe.

Chapter Three

SPIES AND AGENTS IN THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

"BUT THIS is monstrous", storms the capitalist press. "Do you expect us to believe in such plots? These are the inventions of the secret police of the totalitarian states, pretexts for eliminating all obstacles in their paths."

"Impossible!" echo the right-wing Labour leaders; "it is unbelievable that such conspiracies could be hatched in the Western democracies."

It is part of the role of social democracy in the capitalist countries to blunt the class-consciousness of the workers. The social democratic theory of the neutrality of the state is aimed at disarming the working class and its allies. And as part of this theory of moral and political disarmament, the right-wing Labour leaders try to teach, and above all in Britain, that spies, agents, provocateurs in the labour movement are something far from and foreign to "British democratic traditions". Perhaps such things might happen in the East, but not in the Western democracies.

But what is the truth? It was British capitalism that first used labour spies and agents provocateurs in the labour movement on a large scale. The British capitalist state has never ceased to use them, though it has learned greater subtlety and elasticity, hypocrisy and cunning, in their employment. And today it is above all in the U.S.A. that they are used. It is above all American imperialism that has become the main employer of all the filthy methods of labour espionage, not only against its own progressive organisations, but against working-class and progressive movements throughout the world. All that was most cunning in British imperialist methods and most ruthless in the methods of the Gestapo has been taken over by the American state.

The truth is that the use of spies and "agents provocateurs" by capitalism to penetrate, disrupt and provoke the labour movement is as old as the struggle of capital versus labour. It is as wide as the frontiers of capitalism. The truth is that all the open, overt methods of capitalist oppression—police, army, reactionary press, fascist thugs and vigilantes—are complemented by the secret, covert efforts of the capitalists to penetrate, spy on and disrupt the organisations of the working-class and progressive movement from inside, through spies and agents.

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The great Tito plot is nothing but a continuation of a development of the ignoble traditions of the class war of capital against labour, reaching a new depth of cunning and deception and a new scale of organisation in this present period of deepening general crisis of capitalism.

Labour Spies-A British Capitalist Tradition

The early use of spies and provocateurs inside the British labour movement is treated in detail in the works of the liberal historians J. L. and Barbara Hammond, above all in *The Town Labourer*, 1760-1832 and in *The Skilled Labourer*, 1760-1832:

"There was one danger from which the trade unionists of the industrial districts were rarely free, the danger of the serpent in their councils. . . . The use of spies was common in all times of popular excitement or upper-class panic, and in some districts in the North and Midlands they became part of the normal machinery of law." (The Town Labourer, Chapter XII.)

G. D. H. Cole in his Short History of the British Working-Class Movement also demonstrates how the use of spies and provocateurs became one of the main weapons of the British Government against the radical movement and the developing working-class movement at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth After the French Revolution, he writes:

"A great campaign of espionage was set on foot (in Britain), and informers and police agents were planted in most of the Radical bodies. This method was practised most extensively in Scotland; but it soon spread over England as well." (A Short History of the British Working-Class Movement, Chapter III.)

He explains how spies and agents were used to complement the more overt means of working-class repression:

"Pitt's measures for carrying through this policy of repression were skilfully designed. We have seen how he rooted out the Corresponding Societies and killed for a generation even the middle-class movement for reform. Legal persecution, backed up by the evidence of spies and informers and by counter-propaganda subsidised by the state, was adequate for this purpose. The factory and mining districts had to be held down by more vigorous methods. In addition to sending into every working-class body that could be found spies, informers, and even provocative agents, and so disrupting the early working-class movements, because no man knew whether he could trust

his neighbour, the Government built up a powerful armed force for dealing with all signs of disturbance." (*ibid.*, Chapter IV.)

The Hammonds, researching into Home Office papers that had been made available, found the first mention of anti-labour informers and spies in 1801. Thereafter the Home Office Documents (for as long a period as they are open to public scrutiny) are filled with such records.

From these sure sources they were able to see how the Home Office itself, a number of the officers commanding in the industrial districts, and a whole number of magistrates and their clerks, like the notorious Fletcher of Bolton, Lloyd of Stockport or May in Lancashire, made constant use of spies and informers against the workers, and especially against the trade union organisations.

These spies were recruited from the dregs of humanity. Many were ex-convicts, men over whom by one means or another the police had got a grip. Their uncorroborated statements were accepted as valid evidence. In 1813 five workers were transported for life on the unsupported evidence of a spy with a peculiarly unsavoury past. They were, already at that time, well paid. Here is a bill sent in for labour spies by Fletcher of Bolton for July 8-December 21, 1805, taken by the Hammonds from the Home Office Documents (H.O., 42.83), looking exactly like the type of documents that were extracted from the labour spy organisations by the American La Follette Commission some 130 years later:

"В.	Time Expenses	• • •	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	••	£ s. d. 9 5 0 17 2 11	£ s. d.
C. T.	Time Expenses	••, 4		••	4 12 0 4 8 6	26 7 11 4 11 0
`L.F.	Time Expenses	•			18 8 0 4 18 0	9 0 6 23 6 0 £63 5 5"

By 1816 the half-yearly bill for labour spies and agents in the same area had gone up to £226. (H.O. 42.160.)

Immense care was taken by the authorities to try and cover up and safeguard their labour spies. They were reluctant to produce them to give evidence in court, for once "expended", the spies became useless.

Mr. Coldham, Town Clerk of Nottingham in 1814, argued, for instance, against bringing one of his spies to court, since he wished to keep "the source of our information pure and uncontaminated." (H.O., 42.137 quoted by the Hammonds.) Colonel Fletcher of Bolton district wrote on April 30 (1812) of another group of labour spies:

"We are shy of bringing these witnesses forward, being desirous to cover over our Intelligence even with a shadow rather than exhibit the sources to open Day." (The Skilled Labourer, Chapter X.)

Thus it was in Britain that the use of spies, agents, provocateurs, to penetrate, spy on and disrupt the labour movement from inside was first brought by the capitalist class to a fine art:

"With local authorities as credulous as Ethelston, as arbitrary as Lloyd or Hay, with a Home Secretary like Sidmouth, to whom every poor man was a Jacobin, a detective system based on spies who had every inducement to spin legends and to promote crime, gave the excitement of peril to the daily life of the workman, and taught him honour and loyalty in the face of the temptations, not only of greed, but also of fear. Every little combination for raising wages or helping comrades lived in something of the atmosphere of a Russian revolutionary society. . . . " (The Town Labourer.)

Let us glance for a moment at some of the more notorious trials in British labour and progressive history engineered by agents and provocateurs.

In June, 1817, James Watson, a prominent member of the Reform Party, was indicted before the court of King's Bench on a charge of High Treason. Together with the famous "Orator" Hunt and a number of others he had been responsible for the presentation of a monster petition to the Prince Regent. The petition was rejected, and when this was reported a mass meeting was held in Spa Fields, London, on December 2, 1816, where a number of violent speeches were made (though not by Watson) and a certain amount of rioting took place. On the same night Watson was arrested on a treason charge. The principal witness against Watson was one John Castle, an informer who had wormed himself into the popular movement, and won a reputation through the violence of his speeches. In the course of the trial Castle was exposed as a man of infamous character, tried twice for forgery, a bigamist, etc.: this was too much even for the City jurymen and Watson was acquitted.

In the same year, in the so-called Derbyshire rising, there came to light the role of that notorious character the spy Oliver, whose life and nefarious dealings are vividly described by the Hammonds in *The Skilled Labourer*. The life of Oliver, alias Richards, alias Hobbs,

labour spy, provocateur, bigamist and common criminal, forms one of the most infamous chapters in the history of British stoolpigeons.

In 1817 you could find him touring the country, armed with false letters of recommendation from leading Radicals, presenting himself in the circles of the more staid reformers as one of the organisers of the great petition for reform, and to more left-wing and radical circles as a representative of the "physical force" grouping in London, preparing for armed uprising. He carried credentials from Whitehall (H.O., 42.165) to a very small selected "trustworthy" group of magistrates and men of authority—to the Magistrate at Birmingham, to the Mayor of Leicester, to General Byng and to the Parson Magistrate at Birmingham-but to the majority of magistrates he was known only as an extreme radical agitator. So valuable was he considered to be, that the secret was not to be shared even by the most august and respectable. (Yet 130 years later it was alleged that British Intelligence was not morally capable of restricting the secret of the Tito plot to a small and trusted circle!) When a Sheffield justice was about to arrest him there was dismay at the Home Office and Lord Sidmouth, Home Secretary, wrote to the Justice, Mr. Parker, on May 31 that:

"Oliver is employed by me, that he is travelling under my directions at this time, and that I have reason to confide in his disposition and ability to render himself eminently useful, under present circumstances; I accordingly shall be anxious till I hear again and should be much relieved by hearing that he has not been apprehended."

And "useful", indeed, he was, calling the workers of Derbyshire to armed uprising and denouncing them as he gave his call. Thirty-five working men were brought up to trial on October 16, 1817, charged, as the Hammonds put it, "by a grim stroke of irony with having been moved and seduced by the instigation of the devil' to levy war against the King and to compass to depose him." Three were hanged; others transported for life or sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The last words of William Turner (one of the condemned) on the scaffold were:

"This is the work of Government and Oliver!"

When the town clerk of Nottingham and one of the local magistrates asked the Home Secretary for permission to see Oliver's reports, Lord Sidmouth replied that it was:

"the wish of His Majesty's Government to throw a veil on the scenes of turbulence which have passed."

It is not possible in the course of this chapter to elaborate a detailed history of the use of agents by British capitalism in the following 130

years. This is a task for labour historians, and is a necessary one to combat the white-washing efforts of Tory and right-wing Labour historians. But the use of spies and informers by the capitalist state against the labour and progressive movement is not just an ugly chapter in British history which is now closed.

On the contrary. You will find agents to the fore in the notorious Cato Street "conspiracy" of 1820, when news of a "diabolical plot" to assassinate the cabinet was released to a startled Britain, and when it transpired that the agent provocateur Edwards was not only the instigator of the plot, but himself provided the weapons which he carefully distributed at the houses of those he was planning to betray. Five were hanged, four transported for life. But the ringleader, informer Edwards, was "never found".

You find the police agent and provocateur actively used against the Chartists. On August 4, 1848, the London police discovered a "great Chartist conspiracy." Raids were made on various Chartist meeting places and arms were found. The chief witnesses were police informers, and one, Powell, admitted that he had "encouraged and stimulated these men in order to inform against them." Five workers were transported for life.

You can see the agent and informer at work in the infamous Wheeldon case towards the end of the First World War, when a family actively opposing the war were saddled with fantastic charges of preparing to poison Lloyd George. It transpired that a Government provocateur had wormed his way into the confidence of the family, pretending to be a Socialist, suggesting all manner of violence, which they rejected, and finally managing to involve them in this trumped-up affair—fuel for the chauvinist campaign for men and munitions for imperialist war.

You find police agents and provocateurs used to spy on and disrupt the great militant movement of the unemployed led by the National Unemployed Workers Movement. In Chapter VIII of his Unemployed Struggles ("Police Spies and Agents Provocateurs") the leader of the unemployed movement, Wal Hannington, tells from his own personal experience of an agent who in 1922 managed to penetrate to the Control Council of the Hunger March. Suspicions were aroused "when he repeatedly proclaimed that he was more revolutionary than anybody else", when he suggested such actions as dropping inflammable material into pillar boxes, thus furnishing the police with just the material they most needed to compromise and prosecute the Hunger Marchers. Throughout all the history of the unemployed struggles and of the Hunger Marches, agents and spies abounded. (See Wal Hanning-

ton's Unemployed Struggles and Ronald Kidd's British Liberty in Danger (1940), Chapter V, "The Police".)

Today in 1950, M.I.5 and all the various agencies of secret police and intelligence are as active as ever, working to penetrate, spy on and disrupt from within the militant labour movement, and especially the Communist Party.

It is true, indeed, that over long periods, British imperialism has been able to hold back the British labour movement from revolutionary struggle by using the super-profits of its foreign trade monopoly and then of its colonial capital investments to win over an upper section of the workers; that it has used social democracy as a principal weapon to hold back the workers from militant struggle. But this never meant that it disbanded its organisation of labour espionage and provocation. On the contrary, when British workers were held back for a time by the sops drawn from the fruits of colonial exploitation, all the weapons of espionage, provocation, penetration, were strengthened tenfold and used against the national liberation movements of the colonial peoples. Very long and very ugly is the story of espionage and provocation carried out by the British authorities against the workers and people of Ireland, India, Burma, Ceylon, Africa, etc. In the whole "art" of colonial repression, developed to its highest (or lowest) level by British imperialism, besides the weapons of bribery and of open repression, the weapons of espionage and provocation have always played a principal role.

And in Britain itself the state has never disarmed. On the contrary, it has developed and perfected its weapons for use against the working class even under Labour Governments. In times of lull in the class struggle the agents and spies carry out their work "quietly". Telephones are tapped, letters opened, meetings reported, names filed, activities listed. Efforts are made to falsify revolutionary theory, to develop factional opposition groupings, to stir up personal intrigues, to organise disruption from within. In times of radical action and stiff class battles the state organs of espionage and provocation swing more openly into action.

In the recent period, as the mass movement for peace and the trade union struggle on living standards have begun to swing into action, the activities of M.I.5 and other such organisations have developed on an even wider scale. These activities are reported not only inside the Communist Party, but inside the Labour Party and the trade unions. At the end of 1950 the creation of a special squad of Scotland Yard to investigate the actions of militant trade unionists was widely commented on in the British Press. They have been especially prominent amongst the dockers and wherever the militant mood of the workers

has led to unofficial strikes.

Sections of the reactionary press have gone so far as public campaigning for stepping-up the use of spies and agents provocateurs inside the Communist Party. Thus "Maxim", writing in the Observer (5.3.50) on "Watching the Communists", calls for the recruitment for such police work of "ex" or vacillating Party members:

"Some of the ex-members have, prior to their resignation or expulsion, held prominent positions in the Party. The man who can be of most help to the security authorities is the Communist who has almost made up his mind to quit but has not yet taken the final step. If he could be given some encouragement might he not be willing to postpone that step?"

Very large sums of money, never publicly accounted for, continue to be allotted year by year to the Secret Service. The Civil Estimates for the year ending March 31, 1952, under the heading of Central Government and Finance, carry an unexplained Item No. 21 "for H.M. foreign and other Secret Services"—£4 million—an increase of £1 million over the previous year. It is no secret that the main target of the British Secret Service today, whether "foreign" or "other", is the movement of the working class and the working people for socialism and peace.

Far from being foreign to British traditions, the use of spies and provocateurs against the labour movement is part of the long tradition of the British capitalists, and has been brought by them to a fine but very ugly art.

U.S.A.—Stoolpigeon State

But if it was in Britain that the employment of spies and provocateurs against the labour movement was first developed on a large scale; if such activity was taken a stage further by the fascist Ovra and Gestapo; it is American imperialism that has now inherited and carries forward all that is worst and most disgusting in this ugly art. The use of spies, provocateurs, informers has become an integral part of the "American way of life".

In 1798 Edward Livingston, friend of Thomas Jefferson, denounced in these prophetic words the Alien and Sedition Acts about to be enacted by the Federalist Administration of President John Adams:

"The country will swarm with informers, spies, debators and all the odious reptile tribe that breed in the sunshine of domestic power. . . . The home of the most unsuspected confidence, the intimacies of friendship, or the recesses of domestic retirement afford no security. The companion whom you most trust, the friend in whom you confide, the domestic who waits in your chamber, are

all tempted to betray your imprudent, unguarded follies; to misrepresent your words, to convey them, distorted by calumny, to the secret tribunal where jealousy presides, where fear officiates as accuser, and suspicion is the only evidence that is heard."

And yet how mild and moderate are these stern words of warning when compared to the actual conduct of the corrupt and reactionary American police state in the last thirty years. The "reptile tribe" of spies and stoolpigeons, complemented by a corrupt and brutal police, has become part of the daily life of contemporary America. And we are dealing here with actions and activities—not in "Eastern" countries—but against ordinary, progressive, decent citizens of the United States itself.

It is in the hysterical witch-hunting campaign that followed the First World War that we first make acquaintance with America's stoolpigeon king, J. Edgar Hoover, present head of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.). In October 1918, the U.S. Congress, on the crest of a witch-hunting wave, passed the *Deportation Act*, ostensibly to be used against aliens. In the following year was created the infamous "Radical Division" of the Department of Justice's Bureau of Investigation, under the direction of J. Edgar Hoover.

Soon we see the Division in action. In the words of Attorney-General Palmer himself, we see the establishment of:

"a card index system, numbering over 200,000 cards, giving detailed data not only upon individual agitators connected with the ultraradical movement, but also upon organisations, associations, societies, publications and special conditions existing in certain localities."

With the aid of provocateurs and police stooges, a terror campaign was launched against the labour and progressive movement. Towards the end of 1919 (see Albert E. Kahn's High Treason, Lear, New York, 1950), the Assistant Chief of the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation, Frank Burke, dispatched a highly confidential directive to Federal Agents throughout America, informing them that the Department was about to carry out a series of raids in an all-in roundup of "Communists" and "Radicals". They were ordered to mobilise all their stoolpigeons "within Communist groups" to make every effort to arrange for these organisations to hold meetings on the designated night. As Burke put it:

"If possible you should arrange with your under-cover informants to have meetings of the Communist Party and the Communist Labour Party on the night set. . . This, of course, will facilitate

in making the arrests." (Quoted in Albert E. Kahn's High Treason, p. 11.)

Throughout the whole preceding spring and summer plans had been worked out for this anti-labour "offensive". Hundreds of spies, special agents and stoolpigeons had been sent into labour and progressive organisations. Justice Department spies were ordered not only to watch out for "subversive" literature but in a number of cases printed it themselves and then had it seized in police raids.

The offensive culminated in the great raids of June 1920, when in one swoop, on June 2, more than 10,000 arrests were made in seventy cities. Agents played a major role in the preparation of the "offensive":

"The action, though it came with dramatic suddenness, had been carefully mapped out, studied and systematised. . . . For months, Department of Justice men, dropping all their work, had concentrated on the Reds. Agents quietly infiltrated into the radical ranks . . . and went to work, sometimes as cooks in remote mining colonies, again as steelworkers, and when the opportunity presented itself, as agitators of the wildest type. . . . Several of the agents, 'under-cover' men, managed to rise in the radical movement and became, in at least one instance, the recognised leader of the district. . . " (New York Times, 3.1.20.)

During this whole period the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice worked in the closest collaboration with the labour espionage organisations of the great American corporations—two weapons of the same class against the same class enemy. The Commission of Inquiry of the Inter-Church World Movement stated in its report of the steel strike of 1919:

"Federal immigration authorities testified to the commission that raids and arrests, for 'radicalism', etc., were made especially in the Pittsburgh District on the denunciations and secret reports of steel company 'under-cover' men, and the prisoners turned over to the Department of Justice." (Quoted in *High Treason*, p. 37.)

A Federal Agent in the Pittsburgh area, giving evidence to this Commission, declared that "ninety per cent of all the radicals arrested and taken into custody were reported by one of the large corporations, either of the steel or the coal industry".

When subsequent enquiry, brought about by public protest and outcry, forced those responsible for these outrageous acts to testify before the people, it became clear that both the laws allegedly enacted against foreign spies and the hysteria organised by reaction and its press, had been used and manufactured solely for the purpose of attack

on the militant trade union and labour movement. Even Attorney-General Palmer, testifying before the Rules Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, had to admit that this was the real aim behind the smokescreen of deporting undesirable aliens:

"For I say to you frankly, Mr. Chairman, that I have looked upon this deportation statute not as a mere matter of punishing by sending out of the country a few criminals or mistaken ultra-radicals who preach dangerous doctrines but rather a campaign against . . . a growing revolutionary movement."

The agents and provocateurs organised by the imperialist state to develop a spy scare and a witch-hunt against "the Reds" were used for the attack on all militant trade unionists, and indeed on all liberals, democrats, lovers and defenders of democracy and peace. Such is the capitalist way of life.

The American state, true to the capitalist tradition, combined its covert penetration of and spying on the labour movement from inside with open police repression from outside. The Gestapo did not have to go beyond the confines of Western democracy to learn its methods. In 1929, President Hoover appointed a National Commission on Law Enforcement and Observance, headed by George W. Wickersham, former Attorney-General and Wall Street partner of another Republican President. This is how Mr. E. J. Hopkins, veteran police reporter and investigator for the Wickersham Commission, summed up in his book, Our Lawless Police, the findings of this authoritative Commission:

"In various cases which occurred between 1920 and 1930, the Wickersham Commission found that suspected persons had been starved, kept awake many days and nights, confined in pitch-dark and airless cells; had been beaten with fists, clubs, black-jacks, rubber hose, telephone books, straps, whips; beaten on the shins, under the knee cap (at the point of the patellar reflex), across the abdomen, the throat, the face, the head, the shoulders, above the kidneys, on the buttocks and legs; kicked on the shins, the torso and in the crutch; had had their arms twisted, their testicles twisted and squeezed; had been given tear gas, scopolamine injections and chloroform; had been made to touch corpses and hold the hands of murdered persons in morgues; that women had been lifted by their hair; in one case, a man had been lain flat upon the floor and lifted repeatedly by his organs of sex.

"This in modern America between 1920 and 1930, in the fifteenth decade of the constitution and for the purpose of obtaining a 'voluntary' confession of guilt."

In 1937 there took place in the U.S.A. the famous hearings on the question of civil liberties and labour espionage before the subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labour of the United States Senate, popularly known as the La Follette Civil Liberties Committee. The complete text in some thirty or so volumes was published by the American Government (not at a popular price.)

Amongst the witnesses called was Mr. Heber Blankerhorn, industrial economist in the National Labour Relations Board, who for twenty years had studied the question of labour espionage. This gentleman furnished the Committee with a list of agencies whose profitable business it was to supply stoolpigeons to capitalist employers to spy on, disrupt, corrupt and compromise the trade unions in their plants and factories. As of April 1936, there were 230 such agencies employing something like half a million stoolpigeons and spies at the average price of 175 dollars per spy per month. Three of the biggest agencies, Pinkerton's, Burns and Thiel, hired out between them 40,000-135,000 agents. During the hearings, General Motors officials, for instance, testified that between January 1934 and July 1936 alone they had paid out 994,856 dollars (and 68 cents) to Pinkerton's Agency alone. One Labour leader reported to the investigating committee that he never "knew of a gathering large enough to be called a meeting and small enough to exclude a spy". "The known total of business firms receiving spy services from these agencies", reported the Commission, "is approximately 2,500. The list as a whole reads like a bluebook of American industry."

Unwilling employers and embarrassed agency heads were forced to produce to the Committee records, catalogues, tariffs of their agents and informers. All the craft and craftiness of U.S. advertising had been employed in boosting their own particular brands of spies. "You have a union—we'll bust it. You want spies we have the best." Here is a typical letter from the Foster service to a prospective client:

"Your letter of July 28 is received. . . .

"First, I will say that if we are employed before any union or organisation is formed by the employees, there will be no strike and no disturbance. This does not say there will be no unions formed, but it does say that we will control the activities of the union and direct its policies, provided we are allowed a free hand by our clients.

"Second, if a union is already formed and no strike is on or expected to be declared within thirty or sixty days, although we are not in the same position as we would be in the above case, we could—and I believe with success—carry on an intrigue which would

result in factions, disagreements, resignations of officers, and general decrease in membership."

Posing as active trade unionists hundreds of these stoolpigeons wormed their way into leading positions in the C.I.O., A.F. of L. and the Railroad Brotherhoods—the three main U.S. trade union organisations. And once they had won those positions they used them for disruption. An agent elected secretary of an A.F. of L. Typewriter Workers' Branch in Hartford, Connecticut, "succeeded" in reducing its membership from 2,500 to 75 in one year. Here is a short extract from the testimony of a Pinkerton agent—Barker.

SENATOR LA FOLLETTE: "Mr. Barker, as a result of your experience as an undercover operator, informant and spy, what is your impression about the effectiveness, or lack of effectiveness, of this labour espionage work in breaking up or preventing unions, genuine labour unions, from organising?"

Mr. Barker: "It is very effective, especially in the local to which I belonged. . . One time at Lansing-Fisher they were almost 100 per cent organised. And finally it went down to where, as I said, there were only five officers left."

SENATOR LA FOLLETTE: "You attribute that to undercover operations?"

Mr. BARKER: "Yes; I do."

The training given by the agencies to their agents is very revealing. Here are a few extracts from a twenty-four-page Correspondence Course of Training for an Industrial Operative from the National Manufacturers' Syndicate:

From the First Instruction Sheet:

"Our work is most honourable, humanitarian and very important, and must be recognised as such."

From the Second Instruction Sheet:

"It is very plain that in order for us to be successful we must conduct our work in an invisible manner, as the ordinary worker, in his ignorance, is apt to misunderstand our motives if he knows of our presence and identity in the plant."

From the Third Instruction Sheet:

"The rules and regulations of our organisation exclude even one's close friends and families from any knowledge as to details of any assignment a representative may receive."

From the Fourth Instruction Sheet:

"Remember we are unalterably opposed to all cliques, radicalists,

and disturbing elements who try to create discontentment, suspicion and unfriendliness on the part of the workers towards the em-

ployers . . .

"As our representative you must find out first of all who are the dissatisfied ones; then cultivate their friendship and win their confidence.

"You must be prepared to throw overboard your moral scruples. You must be hard. You must lie easily and often . . . you must be slippery, shrewd, sharp, sneaky. . . ."

Is it a far step from the work of these agencies and agents, outlined in such detail in the La Follette Report, to the work of sending agents and spies into the working-class organisations of other countries? Here is the training-ground for Intelligence Operations against the working people of other countries, especially in the lands where the workers rule. It is no long distance from Pinkerton's stoolpigeons to—Tito, Kostov and Rajk.

Nor is it a long step to the witch-hunts, spy scares, purges, developing fascism—to the U.S.A. of 1950. Take, for example, the trial of the eleven Communist leaders. Of the thirteen witnesses for the prosecution, two were "regular" F.B.I. agents, ten F.B.I. undercover agents or embittered renegade Communists. There were no other witnesses. This is how Albert E. Kahn sums up some of the main witnesses for prosecution:

"Louis F. Budenz: a former managing editor of the Daily Worker who quit his post in October, 1945, joined the Catholic Church, wrote—a lurid Red-baiting book entitled This is My Story and appeared as an 'expert witness' on Communism before the Un-American Activities Committee and in various Federal deportation cases. . . .

"William O. Nowell: a renegade Communist who had been accused by auto workers of being a Ford labor spy employed by Harry Bennett in the Ford Service Department. On leaving his job at the Ford Motor Company, Nowell acted as confidential adviser on 'race relations' for the notorious fascist, Gerald L. K. Smith, ex-Silver Shirter No. 3223. At the war's end, Nowell became a F.B.I. informer, appearing as a Government witness in a number of cases involving Communists and left-wing trade unions.

"Charles W. Nicodemus: a former factory worker who was expelled from the Communist Party in 1946 for anti-Negro agitation. Arrested and indicted in Pittsburgh in the spring of 1948 on charges of carrying concealed weapons 'with intent unlawfully to do injury' to unnamed persons, Nicodemus was permitted to with-

draw this plea, and the indictment against him was quashed, at approximately the same time he became an informer for the F.B.I.

"William Cummings: a former labor spy and F.B.I. informer within the Communist Party. Among other activities as a 'Communist', Cummings recruited three of his own relatives into the Party and then furned their names over to the F.B.I.

"John Victor Blanc: a stoolpigeon within the Communist Party who recruited workers into the Party, paid their dues himself, and then denounced them to the F.B.I. Included among the names turned over by Blanc to the F.B.I. was that of his own brother-in-law, who had actually never joined the Communist Party but whose name had been signed to a Communist application form by Blanc."

(High Treason, pp. 335-336)

The trial revealed that not only the Communist Party of the U.S.A. but all progressive organisations—trade unions, youth organisations, the "Progressive Party" (formerly led by Mr. Wallace)—were continuously subjected to penetration by F.B.I. informers and provocateurs. The spies were highly paid, not only for regular services, but with special fees (sometimes 25 dollars a day) for anti-labour evidence at trials as "expert Government witnesses".

You find the same Government concern at "expending" agents by bringing them before the people as witnesses as you found in Britain already 130 years before. The *U.S. News and World Report* wrote (8.7.49):

"It [the F.B.I.] finds that it is winning its lawsuit at the expense of its underworld contacts. It sacrificed seven of its agents inside the Communist Party when it brought them to the witness stand in the trial of eleven Communists in New York. And it is losing more as a result of showing its files in the Coplon case."

American capitalism day by day is moving towards fascism. All the repressive apparatus of the state is now being strengthened, and with it the apparatus for labour espionage, now directed against every section of the progressive movement in its widest possible definition. Forms have changed, methods have been streamlined; the stoolpigeons go on! Under President Roosevelt the work of the labour spy agencies was restricted, but today the work of spying on the labour movement has been taken over by the state. Labour espionage is the first industry to be "nationalised" by the Government of the U.S.A.!

The F.B.I. apparatus has grown to huge proportions. From an arm of the Department of Justice it is being transformed into a special branch of Government. In 1950 its Budget was raised to \$57 million and J. Edgar Hoover's salary was raised to \$20,000 per year. When

F.B.I. representatives appeared recently before a Congressional Committee they reported that it had over 10,000 *full-time* operatives, that it needed a large extension, that it was working on over 20,000 cases of "subversives", that its network of informers was returning 20-200 reports on individuals every day.

The U.S. Communist leader Gilbert Green, one of the eleven, speaking at the Plenum of the National Committee of the American Communist Party on March 23-25, 1950, declared:

"Presidents and Congresses come and go, but J. Edgar Hoover and his police-state network become more powerful and ominous from year to year."

Marshall Aid in Spies

The history of the use by capitalism of spies and provocateurs inside the labour movement is as old as the struggle of capital versus labour. And wherever there is capitalism there have been its agents.

This brief interlude could be infinitely extended. It could show how Tsarism built up around its secret police, the Ochrana, its secret group of agents to penetrate the Russian revolutionary movements, its men like Asev, Tsarist agent for twenty years, who as a member of the Central Committee of the Social Revolutionaries (S.R.s) both organised acts of terrorism and denounced their perpetrators; like the priest Gapon, who organised the workers' petition to the Tsar on that bloody Sunday of January 9, 1905, when the blood of the workers was shed in the streets and squares of St. Petersburg; like the agents who worked for the Ochrana chief Zubatov; like Malinovsky, who became a member of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks and an Editor of *Pravda*, and who was only unmasked after the October Revolution, when the police archives came into the hands of the workers.

It could be extended to show the very great use made of agents, informers and provocateurs by the dictatorial Governments and their secret police and intelligence services, in the countries of Eastern Europe between the wars. In Poland the secret police, the Sanacja, specialised in training agents to penetrate the Communist Party, the peasant and radical-democratic organisations. Ten agents were sent by it into the Polish Battalion of the International Brigade. In Yugoslavia, where not only the illegality of the Party but the widespread factionalism aided the work of capitalist agents—this factionalism was in turn developed and promoted by them—both the early Communist leader Sima Markovic and the Party General Secretary who preceded Tito, Gorkic, were finally revealed as spies in the Party.

The French working-class movement has had its Doriots and its Gittons. Rakosi, speaking to the functionaries of the Hungarian Working People's Party of Greater Budapest at the end of September, 1949, on the question of vigilance, told them how at an early stage of the labour movement in Germany the followers of the social-democrat Lassalle were led by a spy named Schweitzer, who was one of the first German socialists to be elected to the Reichstag. Bebel, veteran socialist leader, always felt that Schweitzer was a spy, but he could not prove it. When at the end of the eighteen-sixties Schweitzer died he was given a magnificent funeral. Bebel declared: "While I have no material proof, I am certain this man is a spy. I am sure also that, sooner or later, proof of this will be found. Possibly it will be after my death, but my ashes will be glad that I was right." Bebel died in 1913. And in 1918, when the Kaiser's Archives were opened by the workers after the German Revolution, the receipts were found for all the payments that Schweitzer used to receive—as Bismarck's agent.

But the point of this chapter is not to write the history of labour espionage, but to demonstrate that there is nothing unusual, strange, fantastic, in the revelations of the Rajk and Kostov trials. The use of agents to penetrate the working-class movement and disrupt it from within is as old as capitalism itself. The methods of espionage and provocation exposed at the trials, far from being "un-British" or "un-American", were methods that were first developed on a wide scale by British capitalism and have been developed to their fullest extent by the stoolpigeon state of America.

Between the First and Second World Wars, it became the regular habit of the Intelligence Services of the great capitalist powers to infiltrate spies, not only into the working-class and progressive movements of their own countries, but also into those of the smaller capitalist states. The secret services of the weaker capitalist states, including the states of Eastern Europe, were trained by, and often came under the indirect supervision of, the Intelligence of the great powers. Now M.I.5, now the Gestapo, now American Intelligence, and now the French Deuxième Bureau, would issue its orders and receive its reports. Some of the stoolpigeons and even police chiefs of the smaller powers would often take orders (and money) from several great powers at the same time. In any case, whilst all the great powers were busy spying on each other, they all had an equal interest in perfecting the machinery to disrupt and spy on the working-class and progressive movements of all countries.

And if they were ready to play their part in spying on and disrupting the working-class and progressive movement of the world when

it was fighting in opposition to capitalism and reaction, how much more did the Intelligence services of the great powers endeavour to penetrate and disrupt the working-class movement in the country where the workers ruled—the U.S.S.R.! From October 1917 to spy on the Soviet Union became the central task of every capitalist Intelligence service throughout the world—to penetrate into the C.P.S.U.(B.) its highest aim. Hundreds of White Russians were employed by political and military Intelligence in Britain, France, Germany, America. Anti-Soviet hatred became the motor force of capitalist Intelligence.

It was from this that flowed the immense interest of all the capitalist Intelligence services in the Trotskyist and other factional currents in the world Communist movement in the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties. Wherever groups could be discovered in Communist Parties that were secretly covering up their existence, that were deviating from Marxism-Leninism, that were nursing personal grudges and grievances and hiding them from the Party, imperialist Intelligence became interested.

"The history of the revolutionary movement has shown that an especially advantageous atmosphere and favourable ground for the penetration in the movement of police-espionage diversion and political provocation, has been factional activity on the basis of deviation from the Marxist-Leninist line of the Party." (Boleslav Bierut, speech at Third Plenary Session of Central Committee of Polish United Workers' Party, 11.11.49.)

In the early days of the Russian labour movement the Trotskyites had represented a definite trend in the working class, that is to say, they formed a group with their own political platform and programme for which they publicly fought. It is true that their programme was against the interest of the workers, that it was a radically false programme. Right up to the October Revolution in 1917, and the years that followed, they opposed the Bolsheviks on every vital measure, on every vital decision that confronted the Russian working class and working people.

But in the course of the nineteen-twenties and particularly in the late twenties and early thirties, when the Trotskyite line had been overwhelmingly defeated *inside* the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, they ceased to be a political trend. Those who remained in the Soviet Union pretended in public to accept the line of the Party, but secretly began to work against the Party, against the Revolution. They degenerated into secret agents of capitalism, began to work for the various capitalist Intelligence services, plotted the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R. and the defeat of the Soviet Union in the

course of the aggression which was being prepared by the great capitalist powers, organised the sabotage of Soviet industry and agriculture and the assassination of leading Communists. Trotsky himself, in exile, maintained close contact with the secret groups inside the C.P.S.U.(B.), and became the centre of a world-wide network of anti-Soviet sabotage and espionage, attempting to organise similar secret groupings inside the Communist Parties and militant labour, progressive and national liberation organisations all over the world. Stalin wrote in 1937:

"Present-day Trotskyism is not a political trend in the working class, but a gang without principle and without ideas, of wreckers, diversionists, Intelligence service agents, spies, murderers, a gang of sworn enemies of the working class, working in the pay of the Intelligence services of foreign states.

'Such is the difference between Trotskyism in the past and the last seven or eight years.

"Such is the difference between Trotkyism in the past and Trotskyism at the present time." (Stalin, Speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 3.3.37.)

Thus the imperialists' Intelligence services went all out to recruit the Trotskyites and other secret groupings like Bukharinites and Zinovievites into their ranks, swelled these factions with their own specially trained agents, and above all in the thirties Trotskyism became a type of police Marxism, a platform for agents in the labour movement. In Germany and Poland, as well as in the West, police agents specialising in the labour movement were given special courses in Trotskyism.

The contradictions of capitalism, deepening between the wars, did not allow the dreams of the imperialists, the dreams of a world-wide united capitalist crusade against the Soviet Union, to come to fruition. The Second World War was not the war they had dreamed of. The Intelligence services of Germany, Britain, France and America found themselves technically at war with each other. But Western Intelligence, trained on anti-Sovietism, could not lightly give up its aims. Though Brifish and American Intelligence personnel were technically at war with the Gestapo, with the Abwehr, for the most part the real enemy remained the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties, the working-class and progressive movements of all countries.

The war forced them to enlarge their organisations, to recruit patriotic young officers and soldiers intent on fighting fascism. So there were wheels within wheels. The old anti-Soviet, anti-Communist groupings remained the pivotal inner groupings carrying on the deeper long-term war against the working class.

The British capitalists have kept their libel laws and Official Secrets.

Act to prevent the publication of data exposing the anti-Soviet direction of British Intelligence throughout the war period. American laws are somewhat laxer and more material has become available. The Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.—American Intelligence) in the course of the war recruited its senior staff from the pillars of U.S. reaction. Its head was General Donovan, partner in a big New York legal concern. Lieutenant-Colonel Corey Ford and Major Alistair MacBain, former O.S.S. officers, wrote in their book, Cloak and Dagger:

"For his key personnel he [General Donovan] recruited prominent bankers and industrialists—names like Vanderbilt, Du Pont, Morgan... He enlisted noted diplomats like Hugh Wilson, our last Ambassador to Germany, John Wiley, former Minister to Lithuania, and Allen Dulles, key figure in the secret negotiations with S.S. General Wolff and the German High Command in Italy."

Annabelle Bucar, who worked for a time for the O.S.S., wrote in The Truth About American Diplomats:

"Working in the O.S.S., I very soon discovered that the main Intelligence activities of the organisation were directed not only against Germany but also against the Soviet Union. . . The anti-Soviet direction of the activities of the American Intelligence organisations is confirmed by the fact that during the war which the United States fought in alliance with the Soviet Union against fascist Germany, the Russian subdivision was the largest in the O.S.S."

Whilst Churchill, delaying the Second Front, was agitating for an invasion of Eastern Europe, which would put the old fascist forces back in power, U.S. and British Intelligence were busy trying to "penetrate" the Resistance forces and the left, especially the Communist Parties. And it was here that they found a special weapon—in the Tito group in Yugoslavia.

Already in the course of the war it became apparent that antilabour espionage possessed a certain international character. All weapons were good enough against the working class. Spies and informers who had been handed over to the Gestapo by the secret police of occupied Eastern Europe, were kept on the Gestapo pay roll to continue their dirty work. And British and American Intelligence used every available opportunity to learn of the stoolpigeons employed by the Gestapo and by the Italian and Japanese secret police, and to take them on in their turn. This was particularly true of the Titoites.

Take the classic example of Laszlo Rajk. Recruited by the Hungarian secret police as a stoolpigeon, his name was given by them to the

Gestapo. In the French concentration camps he was visited by representatives of the French *Deuxième Bureau*, the American O.S.S. and the Gestapo. During the war the Gestapo returned him to Hungary and at the end of the war it was the old Hungarian police chief Sombor-Schweinitzer, then in Western Germany, who connected him with American Intelligence. From 1947 the Titoite group in Yugoslavia became his main intermediary with Western imperialism. What better example of the "internationalism" of imperialism?

The war ended. Western imperialism found itself confronted not only with the Socialist Soviet Union but with the rule of the working people in the countries of Eastern Europe. Henceforth to penetrate and spy on the organisations of the working class in these countries became a principal task. And when the old reactionary groupings in these countries were defeated one after the other in their plots and conspiracies, it was the hidden groupings of agents inside the Communist Parties of the countries, organised around the Yugoslav Titoites, that became, as we have already seen, the main imperialist weapon for organising counter-revolution and war.

Henceforth the development of bands of agents and stoolpigeons not only inside their own countries but in the working-class and progressive movements of the whole world, became an essential part of the work of British and above all of American Intelligence.

This was the basis of the notorious *Project X* outlined in the U.S.A. in 1948 for world espionage and world provocation. The Project was summed up in these words by the U.S. News and World Report:

"Under this plan, strong-arm squads would be formed under American guidance. Assassination of key Communists would be encouraged. American agents, parachuted into Eastern Europe . . . would be used to co-ordinate anti-Communist action."

From the old O.S.S. the new C.I.A. (Central Intelligence Agency) has been developed. On June 20, 1949, President Truman signed the Central Intelligence Agency Act, commonly known as the "Spy Bill". Amongst its provisions were plans for infiltrating American agents into foreign countries, especially into progressive organisations, and measures to facilitate the recruitment of foreign spies by waiving immigration regulations. So while wholesale deportations are being organised of progressives who have spent thirty or forty years as good American citizens, there is wholesale importation of Nazi and Japanese spies to join as "loyal Americans" the new world stoolpigeon force.

Conclusion

Why include these all too brief and sketchy notes on agents and

FROM TROTSKY TO TITO

provocateurs in the labour movements of the world in a book concerned with the role of the Titoites? The reason is clear. Tories and right-wing labour leaders try to laugh off the evidence of the Rajk and Kostov trials, to teach the workers, and especially the youth, who in this country have not yet seen a period of acute class struggle, that such things do not happen—or that even if there might be agents and informers "behind the iron curtain", such things do not happen in "Western democracy". But history says otherwise.

What conclusions can be drawn from even so cursory a glance as this at the role of spies and provocateurs employed by the capitalists to penetrate, spy on and disrupt from within the labour and progressive movement?

- (1) The bourgeoisie has used spies, informers, provocateurs against the labour movement as long as there has been a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, as long as there has been a struggle of capital against labour.
- (2) Far from being something foreign to the British and American way of life, the use of agents and provocateurs to disrupt the labour movement first developed on a wide scale *in Britain* and is today being intensified, whilst America, today the centre of world imperialism, has become the stoolpigeon state par excellence, developing the use of spies and provocateurs against the labour movement on a scale hitherto known only in Nazi Germany.
- (3) Ever since the October Revolution of 1917, the great imperialist powers have worked more and more ruthlessly to develop a system of spies and provocateurs, not only in their own countries, not only in their colonial or dependent territories, not only in other weaker capitalist states, but especially to penetrate the U.S.S.R., the country where the working people led by the working class first assumed power.

The great imperialist states worked between the wars to develop a system of spies and agents as a *fifth column* against the first socialist state. In the Soviet Union the great conspiracy of the imperialists which began with Kolchak and Denikin continued with Trotsky and Bukharin.

(4) Today, with a third of the world's population governed by people's authorities, with power in the hands of the working people led by the working class, the policy of trying to develop a system of spies and provocateurs in these countries where the people rule, and above all in their vanguard organisation, the Communist Party, has become an integral part of the war preparations of Western imperialism. In this it is American imperialism, American Intelligence, seconded by British, that plays the main role. And the work of Trotsky and Bukharin is continued by the Titoites. The Titoite clique serve Western imperialism abroad as the M.I.5 and F.B.I. agents serve it at

home. They complement each other. To wage aggressive war it is necessary for Anglo-American imperialism to try and divide the working-class and progressive movement at home, to try and divide the working-class and progressive movement in the other capitalist countries, and to try and get a fifth column set up in the rear of the "enemy", i.e. in the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies. And for this object the Titoites have become a principal weapon.

There can be no greater hypocrisy than the propaganda of imperialists who ask "how was it possible for so many traitors to be found in the revolutionary movement?" Dr. Gyula Alapi, the Hungarian People's Prosecutor, put the question well in his final speech at the Rajk trial:

"In connection with this case they ask on certain sides in the Western countries: How did so many traitors get into the ranks of the revolutionary labour movement? It is ironic that the very people ask this who would best be able to answer this question, that these spokesmen of the Intelligence services, of the imperialist trusts, call us to account for these traitors, the very ones who sent them into our ranks for the internal dissolution of the revolutionary movement. It is an old method to send hostile spies and provocateurs into the workers' parties. How is it that the workers' parties were not able to expose these traitors immediately? If only we had in our hands the files which contained the lists! As is known, the dossiers of the Hungarian police are not at our disposal but at the disposal of the American Intelligence service." (Verbatim Report of Rajk Trial, p. 272.)

When, after the October Revolution, it was discovered that Malinovsky, who had penetrated to the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks, was a tsarist spy, the Mensheviks made bitter attacks on the Bolsheviks for permitting this to happen. But Lenin answered thus:

"... when, under Kerensky, we demanded the arrest and trial of Rodzyanko, the Speaker of the Duma—because he had known even before the war that Malinovsky was an agent provocateur and had not informed the 'Trudoviki and the workers of the Duma of this fact—the Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries who were in Kerensky's Cabinet did not support our demand, and Rodzyanko retained his freedom and went off without hindrance to Denikin." (Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, footnote at end of Chapter 5.)

How much greater is the hypocrisy of the right-wing labour leaders in Britain today, who, maintaining intact and strengthening the capitalist state machine, strengthening the security apparatus that is used against Labour Party and trade union members as well as against Communists, strengthening the very apparatus of spies and provocateurs which is trying to penetrate and disrupt the lands of People's Democracy and Socialism, at the same time cry out against the Rajk, Kostov and other traitors' trials!

(5) But there is a fifth and final conclusion. The vigilance of the Soviet Government and people led by the C.P.S.U.(B.) defeated the spying efforts of the Trotskyites and their imperialists masters. With the help and initiative of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and of Stalin personally, the peoples of Eastern Europe have unmasked the Titoite plots, which succeeded only in Yugoslavia itself, and there only temporarily.

The machinations of spies and provocateurs against the labour and progressive movement at home and abroad can be defeated. But this poses the urgent problem of greater vigilance of the labour and progressive movement.

Chapter Four

ROLE AND TACTICS OF THE TITOITES TODAY (1)

From Trotsky to Tito

MR. K. ZILLIACUS, one of Tito's leading trumpeters in Britain, has discovered in Tito's policy and in the practice of Tito's Yugoslavia what he calls "a new kind of Communism"—a "kind of Communism" of which he approves in no uncertain terms. The whole right-wing in America, the Hearst press, the New York Herald Tribune, the Wall Street Journal, the right-wing press of Britain from The Times to the Daily Telegraph, allots space, and increasing space, to sound its support for this "new kind of Communism", which it finds so unlike that of the Soviet Union and which it so very much prefers.

Now this "new kind of Communism", or "national Communism" as it is sometimes called, which Zilliacus has discovered, is of the same order as the "new kind of socialism" or "national socialism" that Western reaction discovered in an earlier period in Hitlerite Germany. It is precisely as a weapon against genuine socialism and genuine communism, and against the working people, that Western imperialism needs, praises and utilises Tito. Nor were Hitler and Tito the only ones to discover "new sorts of socialism" and "new kinds of communism". Tito and the Titoites are following in the footsteps of Trotsky and the Trotskyists, of whom they are the direct descendants and disciples.

The Trotskyites, too, pretended that they were the true Communists, the real Marxists, whilst the "Stalinites" had "betrayed Marxism-Leninism". The Trotskyite doctrine, this "real Communism" as the forerunners of Zilliacus called it, also found favour with the great trusts and monopolies.

In Mussolini's Italy of the nineteen-thirties, when it meant long terms of imprisonment, and perhaps torture or even death, to be in any way connected with the Communist Party, and when not only all the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, but the works of all Italian and foreign democrats and progressives were strictly banned from Italian libraries and bookshops, the works of Trotsky, on the "new kind of Communism" were "freely" and widely translated and distributed. I remember vividly how in 1938, passing through Italy on the way to meet the anti-fascist and Communist students of Belgrade University, and spending a few hours in Mussolini's Milan, the word

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"communism" caught my eye on a number of books prominently displayed in a bookshop window. They were newly translated works of Trotsky.

In Hitler's Germany, when to be a Communist or Socialist or militant trade unionist or liberal or democrat meant arrest, the concentration camp, and often death and torture, when there was instituted one of the most thoroughgoing "purges" of literature and burning of books that the world has ever known, when Schiller's *Don Carlos*, the poems of Heine and the novels of Thomas Mann were banned or burned as "subversive", the writings of Trotsky were widely translated and distributed.

Trotsky's writings and those of his followers were freely published in the middle and late thirties by the Hearst Press in America. His works on his "new kind of Communism" were published by the Franco press at Salamanca and Burgos. The secret police of the Polish dictatorship were specially educated in Trotskyism in order to facilitate their work of espionage and disruption inside the Polish working-class movement.

Despite their ultra-revolutionary phrases the Trotskyites always found a welcome in the papers of the capitalist press lords. Indeed, it was precisely their "revolutionary" phraseology, their façade of "revolution", that made them such valuable weapons of reaction. The Trotskyites carried out a sort of division of labour with the capitalist propagandists and agents of espionage; disguised as revolutionaries, they could hope to find an echo where the open spokesmen of Toryism and reaction, and even the right-wing Social-Democrats, would have met with immediate rebuff.

By the mid-thirties the Trotskyites in all countries were serving three principal purposes for world reaction:

- (1) They acted as the main instrument by which Western reaction hoped to gain a foothold inside the land of socialism, the U.S.S.R., as a fifth column behind the lines of socialism which was to aid, and complement by espionage and sabotage *inside* the Soviet Union, the open war preparations made outside.
- (2) They acted as an arsenal of right-wing reactionary propaganda and slander against the Soviet Union, the Communist Parties, the militant socialists and trade unions, and the anti-fascist and peace forces, an arsenal of reactionary right-wing propaganda dressed up in left-wing words.
- (3) They acted as an instrument to aid the capitalists by trying to penetrate the working class, the popular and national liberation movements, above all the Communist Parties—spying on them, confusing them and disrupting them from inside.

By the mid-thirties the old hoary anti-Soviet slanders were wearing thin. Capitalist propagandists had prophesied the quick downfall of the Soviet régime, but it had not fallen down. In the columns of their "respectable" journals they had killed by "Ukrainian famines" many times the total population of the U.S.S.R. They had pronounced that the Soviet Union was on the verge of economic collapse, but it was capitalism that "collapsed" in the great world economic crisis of 1929-32. The reality of history, the triumphant victory of socialist planning, the advance of production, the victory of collective farming, contrasted ever more strikingly with the disastrous economic slump in the capitalist world. So, more and more, the capitalist press turned to the arsenal of Trotskyism to fill its pages with vicious anti-Soviet lies.

By the mid-thirties, inspired by the Soviet Union's struggle for peace, by its repeated efforts for collective security, and led by the Communist Parties all over the world, the working class and the working people were building the united front and the popular front against war and against fascism. So once again reaction leaned on the Trotskyites. Whilst Hitler, Mussolini, the Japanese militarists, Chamberlain, Laval, the right-wing Social-Democratic leaders, openly attacked the front of peace and democracy, the Trotskyites poured out their poisonous supporting propaganda under the cover of leftist phrases. The fight of the Soviet Union for collective security, they maintained, was a "betrayal of revolutionary Marxism", the Communist fight for the united and popular fronts a "betrayal of Leninism":

"The Stalinist version of the United Front is not unity for action but unity to lead all workers into imperialist war." (James, British Trotskyist.)

"The People's Front . . . is the major form of the preparation among the masses for the achievement of national unity . . . in support of the coming war." (James Burnham, American Trotskyist, and today notorious protagonist of Wall Street's drive for war.)

When in the mid-thirties all the old reactionary class forces had been defeated inside the U.S.S.R., the Russian Trotskyists, as we have seen, became the *principal weapon* for Western imperialist effort to disrupt the Soviet Union and to spy on it from *inside*. And in the fascist aggression against Spain and China, the Franco and Japanese fascists looked on the Trotskyites in their countries as hidden complementary forces, fifth columns supporting their aggressive drives:

"... We rely on four hundred men who are ready to act. These are well armed and in favourable positions on the Madrid front; the infiltration of our men into the extreme Anarchist and P.O.U.M. [Partido Obrero Unido Marxisto—i.e. self-styled United Workers'

Marxist Party, in reality semi-Trotskyite organisation active chiefly in Catalonia and Madrid] ranks is being carried out successfully.... In fulfilment of your order I went myself to Barcelona to interview a leading member of the P.O.U.M... He has promised me to send new people to Madrid to activise the P.O.U.M.'s work. With these reinforcements the P.O.U.M. will become, as in Barcelona, a firm and effective support for our movement." (From a report found during the Spanish War in the Peruvian Embassy at Madrid from a leading Franco agent in the territory of Republican Spain.)

"We must buy the opportunist parties and groups, of which there are many in North China. Of these, special mention should be made of the Trotskyists. We must help them to make progress in order that they may work everywhere for our Empire. The Chinese who are adherents of Trotsky are able to lull the Chinese intellectual elements and to destroy the unity of China with their work. Their working methods are distinguished by particular skill. We must learn from them in order to accelerate our work." (From a captured document of the Japanese General Staff in North China during the Japanese aggression against China, published on June 6, 1937, in Shun Pao, Shanghai.)

No one who studies the role of the Trotskyites in the thirties, for instance, can fail to see that Tito and his gang, most of whom have direct connections with the Trotskyites, are fulfilling an identical role today and using the same dirty methods.

Read, for instance, the testimony of Y. L. Pyatakov, one of Trotsky's leading followers and fellow conspirators inside the C.P.S.U.(B.), given on January 23, 1937, during the Trial of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre. He is recounting his interview with Trotsky in December, 1935:

"He [Trotsky] then told me that he had conducted rather lengthy negotiations with the vice-chairman of the German National-Socialist Party—Hess. . . . What properly does this agreement [between Trotsky and Hess] amount to if formulated briefly?

"First the German fascists promise to adopt a favourable attitude towards the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc and to support it if it comes to power, either in time of war, or before a war, should it succeed in doing so. But in return the fascists are to receive the following compensation: a general favourable attitude towards German interests and towards the German Government on all questions of international policy. . . .

"The next point of the agreement dealt with the form in which German capital would be enabled to exploit in the Soviet Union the raw material resources it needs. It concerned the exploitation of gold mines, oil, manganese, forests, apatites, etc. . .

"What about these concessions that we outlined in addition to a number of others that we also had in mind, and also the need for a certain pacification of the forces which we would mobilise for a fight against Stalin, that is to say, hostile forces? What I mean is the hostile sections, the kulaks. In this connection also it would be necessary, for considerations of home policy to effect a fairly big retreat in addition to concessions to foreigners. . . To put it simply, Trotsky explained that it would be a very serious retreat. . . In this connection Trotsky said that in essence our programme was the same as that of the Rights in so far as the Rights had adopted a diversive wrecking programme and considered that it was necessary to retreat towards capitalism." (Verbatim Report of the Court Proceedings in the case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre, Moscow, 1937, pp. 64-66.)

When you read of the secret agreements between the Trotskyites and German fascism, the plans for the internal sabotage of the Soviet régime, for the assassination of the Soviet leaders, and for the restoration of Russian capitalism subservient to German imperialism, you read of the precursor of the Titoite agreements with the successor of German fascism—American imperialism. There is only this difference—the Titoites have succeeded, temporarily, in carrying out their schemes in Yugoslavia.

Between the Trotskyites and the Titoites there are the closest links—links of person, links of purpose, links of method. In many cases the Titoites of today are the Trotskyites of yesterday.

Kostov in his written evidence revealed how he first met Tito in Moscow in 1934. He tells how Tito, then operating under the pseudonym of "Walter", was nominated for leading work in Yugoslavia by two still-concealed Trotskyites—Bela Kun and Valetsky—how Tito shared with Kostov his Trotskyite views:

"In one of his conversations during 1934 Tito had told me of his Trotskyist ideas. . . . In this connection he exposed his hatred towards the leadership of the C.P.S.U.(B.), headed by Stalin. Tito had a great desire to leave as soon as possible for Yugoslavia in order to work without any control and in accordance with his political ideas. Tito told me that himself, requesting me to render him the necessary assistance and to present a favourable report of him, when his personal question came up for solution. I promised to do that. Thanks only to the support of the Trotskyites Bela Kun and Valetsky, and thanks to the favourable report on Tito given by

me, the latter could in 1934 leave for Yugoslavia and assume a leading post there." (Verbatim Report of the Kostov Trial, pp. 98-99.)

By 1934 Tito, therefore, was already a Trotskyite, and was promoted in the Yugoslav Communist Party on the initiative and with the aid of Trotskyites.

Many of the conspirators in the Rajk and Kostov plots started their careers of betrayal through contact with the Trotskyites. Ivan Stefanov, one of the Bulgarian conspirators, was indoctrinated with Trotskyism by the Russian Trotskyite Rakovsky, who was Soviet Ambassador in Paris in 1925 where he met Stefanov. (Verbatim Report of Kostov Trial, p. 127.) Pal Justus, one of the fellow-conspirators of Laszlo Rajk, was a Trotskyite already in 1930-31. As such he was tolerated by the Horthy dictatorship's police and became a virtual tool of the Horthy police before he was actually organised as an agent:

"As a result of the fact that the activities of the organisation [Trotskyite organisation—J. K.] were exclusively directed against the illegal Communist Party, the Horthy police not only tolerated this movement but even supported it with benevolence, and while they allowed me and my colleagues to work with a seemingly most radical phraseology, at the same time they most brutally persecuted the Communist Party.

"Looking at all this today, I see already that it means that I was, in fact, an ally and a tool of the Horthy police before I was actually arrested." (Verbatim Report of Rajk Trial, p. 188.)

There is a close tie between Trotskyism and police espionage in the labour movement. Trotskyite propaganda prepares the path for betrayal on the one hand and, on the other, it provides the already organised police agents a useful platform for disruption within the Communist organisations. As Justus put it:

"If I look back on my career, I see one common cause for all the crimes which I committed, and that is my Trotskyite convictions. Through Trotskyite literature . . . through contact with international Trotskyite leaders and through their influence, I myself became a sworn enemy of the Communist movement. My close on twenty years of political activity are filled with the poison of Trotskyism. Already in the thirties I allied myself with the various groups and factions which fought against the Communist movement then in illegality. Through this fact I became a helper of the police even at a time when I was not yet an organised agent, though

shortly after this too happened. . . . " (ibid., p. 297.)

From Trotskyism to police agent and thence to the ranks of the Titoite conspirators in Hungary was a logical transition.

Mose Pijade, one of the leading so-called "theoreticians" of the Tito gang, exposed himself as a long-term hidden Trotskyite by his article on the Rajk trial published in *Borba* at the end of September, 1949. (Reprinted in English by Tanjug, September 27, 1949.) "It is reminiscent," he wrote in the course of a virulent attack on the Rajk trial, "of the trials in the Soviet Union in 1936, the organisers of which could have helped in staging the Budapest trial with their abundant experience." This article is significant, not because of the anti-Soviet slanders of Pijade, of which there are today legion, but because it brings into the open that Pijade had been *for long years* a hidden enemy of the Soviet Union, whilst posing as an unreserved supporter of the Soviet régime, of the policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Communist International.

Very quickly after the June, 1948, Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau, the Titoites began to adopt a more and more openly Trotskyite line in their public propaganda and educational material. The British journalist Alexander Werth remarked on this already in September, 1949:

"Among Yugoslav rank-and-file Communists 'political education' now follows a curious course, if I may judge from my train conversations with soldiers and officers—it is that the real deviationist is Stalin, and that Lenin's spirit is alive only in Yugoslavia. One soldier told me a story of something that was obviously quite new to him but which is, of course, familiar to everybody who has read his Trotsky—the story of 'Lenin's Testament'." (Manchester Guardian, 27.9.49.)

By the end of 1950 the main lines of Titoite political propaganda and political education had been brought on to a fully Trotskyite platform. Dressed up in only a very slightly modernised form, all the old Trotskyite lies and slanders were being repeated.

The mantle of Trotsky had fallen on the shoulders of Tito.

Titoite Role in Western Aggression

The Titoites, like the Trotskyites of the thirties, therefore, play a major role in Western imperialism's plans of aggressive war against the land (and today the lands) where the people rule. The difference lies only in this—the Titoites have a base. Through a process of internal trickery and putsch they have temporarily acquired power in Yugoslavia. And therefore they are able to prepare for imperialist war not only by trying to work as a fifth column behind the lines of the state frontiers of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies, and within progressive organisations in the capitalist countries, but by transforming their Yugoslav base into an armed base of Western imperialism for aggressive anti-Soviet war.

By the end of 1950 Tito had an army of over one million men, far more than the total of all the armed forces of the neighbouring People's Democracies. The budget expenditure on arms (even by Tito's whitewashed official figures) has gone up rapidly year by year from 1948 to the draft budget for 1951 which was published at the end of December, 1950.

Unofficially, American despatch of arms to Tito Yugoslavia began early in 1950. In the summer of 1950 there were periods when fifteen to twenty trains weekly were carrying captured German arms from the American zone of Western Germany through Austria to northern Yugoslavia. At the end of 1950 it was openly decided in Washington to despatch food for consumption by the Yugoslav armed forces. In October, 1950, the Sunday Observer reported (8.10.50):

"The United States, Britain and France have decided in principle to give military aid to Yugoslavia. This decision was taken during the recent Big Three Conference in New York."

Great care has been taken to hide the rearming of Tito Yugoslavia by Western imperialism, because it is realised that this fact destroys any claim of Tito to be "building socialism". The need to conceal the arming of Tito has been openly admitted:

"There can be no question of direct alliance or an open guarantee to Yugoslavia as in the case of the Atlantic Pact countries, Western Germany, Greece and Turkey, because Marshal Tito could not accept it and because it would provide additional fuel to the Soviet propaganda campaign against Tito as a tool of the West." (Observer, 8.10.50.)

For a long period Tito took the line that he did not need or desire arms from the West. In a speech at the Second "Party" Congress of his Guards Division on February 18, 1951, he was still declaring that "there could be no question at this stage of seeking arms from the West". (The Times, Belgrade Correspondent, 19.2.51.) But history was very quickly to expose the manœuvre.

On May 22, 1951, The Times Belgrade Correspondent reported a speech of Colonel-General Ivan Gosnjak in which this Titoite and

Deputy Minister of Defence revealed that the decision had now been made openly to demand Western military aid. On June 9, Kardelj announced that General Kocha Popovic, Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army, had gone abroad to U.S.A., Britain, etc., "to investigate possibilities in talks with representatives of Western Governments with regard to the purchase of equipment and arms for the Yugoslav Army". In the U.S.A. General Popovic visited the State Department and leading U.S. military authorities, including General Bradley, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. By June 19 the New York Herald Tribune reported that arms to the value of \$1 million had been shipped to Yugoslavia from the U.S.A. and by June 27 the same paper revealed that the value of arms shipped had already passed the \$3 million mark and that more were on the way.

The U.S.A. had demanded the right to supervise all distribution of arms despatched to Yugoslavia and had quickly arranged for the training in the U.S.A. of Yugoslav military personnel.

All that was most right-wing and reactionary in the U.S. press warmly welcomed this despatch of arms as a vital anti-Soviet move, the publicist Joseph Alsop commenting in the *New York Herald Tribune* (7.7.51):

"It is only necessary to consider how much cheaper it is to buy strength here than it is, for example, in France."

New roads are being built up and down the country with a specific military strategic purpose. It is one of the tragedies and ironies of history that the Belgrade-Zagreb highway, which began with the aid of the foreign Youth Brigades, has now been revealed as part of a general Western strategic plan to link Anglo-American military bases on the frontiers of the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe. It is now planned that this road should be so extended north and south as to link the Anglo-American base of Trieste through Zagreb, Belgrade and Skoplje, to the Anglo-American base of Salonica in Northern Greece. The voluntary labour detachments, which had the willing support of youth and people in the emergency period immediately following Liberation, have been transformed into compulsory labour squads, and by such squads, unpaid, and without proper equipment, this highway is now being completed. There are a whole series of airports situated along it. Several sectors of the road itself have been extended and surfaced with concrete for possible use as airstrips, and then camouflaged over with a thin layer of soil. It is remarkable that there is already rail contact between Trieste, Liubliana, Zagreb and Belgrade, whilst a transverse east-west road linking the richer areas of Slavonia and Vojvodina with the barren

FROM TROTSKY TO TITO

coast of Dalmatia is desperately needed but not being constructed. New highways are being planned, however, linking Yugoslavia with neighbouring People's Democracies, highways demanded by Western strategy such as the Nis-Caribrod project leading up to the Bulgarian frontier.

The correspondent of the Neue Zuricher Zeitung (14.5.50) had this to say on the Belgrade-Zagreb highway:

"Opinions differ about the economic value of the 'autoput' [autostrad]. It has no genuine crossroads and most of the important economic and communications centres between Belgrade and Zagreb are by-passed. It can be argued as to whether the road traffic between Belgrade and Zagreb was really worth the tremendous expenditure."

Indeed, when this correspondent journeyed along the completed sector of the road he only met four private cars and a few lorries. But this is a "luxury" about which there has been no complaint from the American Government.

Tens of thousands of acres of crop area have been taken from peasants for the construction of airfields and other military installations.

Old airfields have been enlarged and many new airfields are under construction with the help of American experts. On January 1, 1950, it was announced in Washington that the U.S.A. has granted permission to Yugoslavia to import aircraft engines and parts, and a whole number of agreements, open and concealed, have given the United States the right to use Yugoslav aerodromes. On January 17, 1950, the New York Herald Tribune correspondent in Belgrade reported that "American airliners will begin flying over Yugoslavia next week as a result of only one day of negotiations between Pan-American World Airways officials and Yugoslav Government officials". He forecast at the same time similar Yugoslav agreements with Britain, France and Italy.

In the same way a number of Yugoslav harbours on the Adriatic coast have been enlarged with American "aid" and placed at the disposal of the Western capitalist countries. On April 10, 1950, the Tito Government issued a decision on the question of the admission, navigation and stay of foreign vessels in Yugoslav territorial waters. This gives the Naval Command the right to permit at the request of foreign naval commanders, naval exercises, entry of crews into ports and the landing of armed crews "for participation in parades and funeral processions". The interest of the West in participation in funeral processions on Yugoslav soil is perhaps symbolic of the role

Titoite War Bloc

territories.

But the role of Tito's Yugoslavia in the Western war plans is not confined to that of becoming one of several American bases for attack on the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. Within the military diplomatic plans of Atlantic Pact diplomacy is the aim of making Yugoslavia into the hub, the centre of a Western war bloc on the borders of People's Democratic Europe.

With the aid of the Titoites, Western reaction is trying to build up a war bloc stretching from Austria southwards through Yugoslavia to Greece, and from Italy eastwards through Yugoslavia and Greece to Turkey. The Belgrade-Athens axis was formed early in March of 1950 as the logical outcome of the Titoite betrayal of the Greek Democratic Army. Already on December 11, 1949, Cyrus Sulzberger was writing in the New York Times of the creation of the "Vienna-Belgrade-Athens diagonal". The Sunday Times (25.5.50) explained that the Turkish press (despite the change of Turkish Government) was preoccupied with the creation of a "security bloc" composed of Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia and Turkey, and, about the same time, the Turkish newspaper Yeni Sabah described the closer relations of Athens and Belgrade as of historic and decisive significance for "changing the situation in the Balkans".

Closer political relations and military connections are being knit between Tito's Yugoslavia and Austrian reaction. It was announced in Vienna on April 28, 1950, that, following a meeting of the Austrian Minister in Belgrade with the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister, the sentences of all Austrian war criminals sentenced in Yugoslavia would be cut by half. The vacancies in the prisons made by the release of war criminals from the Nazi occupation forces were quickly filled by the arrest of Communists and partisans. Reporting an interview with a top Yugoslav official in Belgrade, the U.S. News and World Report said (28.7.50) that the reply (discussed by the Yugoslav Cabinet) to one of the questions put had stated that "relations with Greece have improved a great deal. In fact, they are almost cordial at present. The same goes for Turkey. There is also a 'bettering of relations' with Italy."

The Italian reactionary press, committing a complete somersault over the last two years, is more and more openly calling for close economic and military collaboration with Tito Yugoslavia. In a New Year 1951 leading article the *Giornale di Trieste* called for close

economic and political collaboration between Italy and Yugoslavia. Such a call, coming from Trieste, always the sharpest point of Italian reactionary attack on Yugoslavia, is all the more indicative. Meanwhile there is every evidence that while the Trieste issue continues to be discussed for home consumption in the Titoite press and the press of the Italian right, neither de Gasperi nor Tito have any desire for the recall of British and American troops from Trieste. As the New York Herald Tribune headline put it on January 21, 1951: "Neither Italy nor Yugoslavia is willing to take steps to Bring About an Agreement that would Mean Withdrawal of U.S., British Troops."

You can formulate it as you wish, axis, diagonal, or "security bloc", but it has become ever clearer that Western imperialist diplomacy is aiming at a war bloc of Austria, Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy and Turkey on the strategic frontiers of the People's Democracies; and Tito's Yugoslavia is the hub and pivot of this bloc of the reactionary Catholic Austrian Government, the Christian Democrats of Italy, the Greek monarcho-fascists and the semi-fascists of Turkey.

It is useful for a moment to study the process by which this war bloc has been knocked into shape. It does not represent an abrupt turn in Titoite policy, but is the culmination of a prolonged process of betrayal.

The open formation of the Belgrade-Athens axis in 1949-50 was prepared by years of concealed treachery towards the liberation struggle of the Greek people, treachery the facts of which are only now being revealed. In 1943 the Yugoslav Partisans made contact with the Greek Partisans, the E.L.A.S. But already the Titoite group operating secretly within the Yugoslav Communist Party had their designs on Greece and began to abuse this contact for their own ends. They began to develop their own organisation on Greek soil, recruiting agents especially from the Slav Macedonians of North-Eastern Greece. Their chief agent in this work was Vukmanovic, known as Tempo, who carried out similar tasks amongst both the Albanian and Bulgarian Partisan movements.

Late in 1944, when Churchill was preparing his offensive against the Greek people, Tito ordered the Slav-Macedonian units of E.L.A.S. to withdraw to Yugoslavia. In December 1944 Tito and Tempo were preparing Yugoslav troops, together with these Macedonian units of E.L.A.S., to seize Greek Macedonia and incorporate it in Yugoslav territory.

During the fighting between E.L.A.S. and British troops in Athens, Tito refused all aid to the Greek Partisans. Yet it was Tito who strongly urged in 1945 that the Greek National Liberation Movement (E.A.M.) should denounce the Varkiza Agreement with the British Government and continue the struggle.

When the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party was held on February 12, 1946 (first anniversary of Varkiza), the decision was taken to adopt new forms of armed struggle, and in this decision it was Tito's promise of the fullest support that played a decisive role. But at this very same time he was, in fact, developing his efforts to undermine the Greek National Liberation Movement, the Communist Party of Greece, and the Greek Democratic Army. A number of leading Greek Communists were murdered by Titoite agents, including Zevgos, member of the Political Bureau. Rankovic's organisation penetrated into the Greek Democratic Army.

After the publication of the Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau in June, 1948, the Titoites began to work more openly in Greece.

At a time when Greek monarcho-fascism was in deep difficulties, the Titoites sprang to the rescue. The group in Greece subordinated to Tito (Keramidjev, Mitrovski, Goce, etc.) increased their work of disruption inside the democratic movement and army. They organised the desertion of Slav-Macedonians to Yugoslavia. In the spring of 1949 open collaboration between Tito and the Greek monarcho-fascists began at Kaimakchalan. Finally, at the most critical moment of armed struggle between Greek fascism and the Greek Democratic Army, Tito, under the pretext of neutrality, of closing the frontier, opened the frontier to the monarcho-fascist forces, who took the Greek Democrats in the rear.

This long story of provocation and treachery prepared the way for the present Belgrade-Athens Axis.

The Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party has thus summed up their military defeat at Grammos and Vitsi in 1949:

"Why were we defeated militarily at Grammos and Vitsi?

"After three years of struggle, except for the fact that it could not solve the basic problem of reserves, a step which would have allowed it to achieve a definite result against monarcho-fascism, the Greek Democratic Army had nullified the efforts of the reactionaries, together with those of foreign imperialist intervention to wipe them out, and was building slowly but surely the conditions for victory.

"At the end of 1948 and the beginning of 1949 monarcho-fascism was passing through a deep moral crisis. Its army was showing signs of demoralisation; reaction in Greece was approaching a

military impasse, a military crisis.

"Precisely at this critical moment for monarcho-fascism, Anglo-American imperialism threw into the scales its Titoite reserves. . . ."

Tito had played throughout the classic role of agent provocateur, egging on to advanced forms of action in order to betray at the critical moment. As the same statement stated:

"This treachery of Tito in the conditions through which our movement was passing in 1948-49 was the *determining reason* that led to our temporary but necessary retreat after the battle of Vitsi-Grammos. And we must here say openly that, if from 1946 we had known the dishonest role of the provocateur Tito, then the Communist Party of Greece would not have come to the decision to take up arms again, it would have followed another road... because it is very clear that it could not have gone ahead to a new armed struggle without a secure rear at a time when monarchofascism had the full support of America and Britain."

Nor are the Greek Communists alone in recognising the decisive role played by Tito in the temporary defeat of the Greek Democrat Army. Venizelos, when Vice-President of the Council of the Greek Government, declared:

"Without the aid given by Yugoslavia we could never have been so successful."

The British Tories, in their more Aesopian language, confirmed this analysis:

"Without disparagement to Greek arms, what, has turned the balance in the Greek civil war? The quarrel between Tito and Stalin. . ." (Harold MacMillan, Tory M.P., end of 1949.)

"But most important of all has been Tito's modification of his attitude towards Greece. . . The collapse of the Greek rebel army in October [1949] was hastened by Tito's action in closing [viz., opening to the monarcho-fascists—J. K.] the Greek-Yugoslav frontier." (Anthony Eden in the Daily Telegraph, 16.11.49.)

And Mr. Hugh Seton Watson, in his book *The East European Revolution* (1950), a book which is wholly hostile to the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, writes:

"In the summer of 1949 the government forces at last attained real success. The decisive event seems to have been Tito's closure of the frontier in July."

Thus Tito was the decisive force in securing the temporary establishment of a fully Americanised Western war base in Greece, for

putting monarcho-fascism back in power at a moment when it was critically challenged. Certainly this a "a new kind of Communism".

While the "security bloc", with Yugoslavia at its centre, is preparing for eventual Western aggression against Eastern Europe, Tito keeps up a continual round of war provocations on the borders of his neighbours. Every week brings new reports of Yugoslav-provoked incidents on the Bulgarian, Rumanian and Hungarian frontiers, where large numbers of Titoite troops are concentrated. Especially against the small state of Albania is the Yugoslav campaign of war provocation concentrated, and carried out in concert with the Italian De Gasperi Government and the semi-fascist Government of Greece. The Albanian minority in Kosovo and Metohija are terrorised. Yugoslav hospitality is given to Albanian war criminals. Already at the end of 1949 (December 5) the American journalist Sulzberger reported:

"Marshal Tito has moved a so-called 'Koci Xoxe brigade' of Albanian refugees to the Scutari frontier region. Theoretically, its job is to work on land reclamation, but actually it is causing worry to the Government of Premier Enver Hoxha."

Between early 1949 and the end of June 1950, Tito's armed forces made over 150 provocative attacks on Albania by land, air and sea and since then the campaign of provocation has intensified.

Between April 2 and April 30, 1951, alone the Titoite armed forces violated the Albanian frontier eight times.

Tito Yugoslavia has become an integral and important part in the war plans of Western reaction:

- (1) By building up with Western aid an inflated army and police force directed against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.
 - (2) By transforming Yugoslavia into a Western military base.
- (3) By acting as the organiser and centre of an anti-Soviet and anti-People's Democracy "security bloc" on the borders of Eastern Europe.
- (4) By developing disruptive and espionage fifth-column work inside its Eastern European neighbours' territory.
- (5) By orientating its economy to the export to Western imperialism and its puppets of strategic raw materials needed for aggressive war.

Nor do we have to go far to seek confirming evidence for this role of betrayal. It comes from the very mouths of the spokesmen of aggressive war and imperialist diplomacy.

In their booklet, Eastern Europe Today, published by the United States Foreign Policy Association at the end of 1949, Joseph Harsch

and Emil Lengyel explain that, immediately after liberation, American diplomacy had based its "operations in Eastern Europe" on elements hostile to the new régimes. But this, they admit, did not pay. Tito, on the contrary, they declare, is an excellent investment:

"Tito is worth all the dissident elements put together. . . . It is costing us a billion dollars to equip nine French divisions, whereas Tito has brought twenty divisions potentially over to the Western side."

The U.S. News and World Report (24.11.50) explained:

"From the U.S. point of view Tito is anti-Stalin. . . . Tito's army includes thirty divisions, ready and willing to fight Stalin. . . . Tito's location is a strategic one. . . ."

On November 18, 1950, President Truman sent a letter to Congressional leaders urging immediate support for Tito, as this was required by the "strategic and political interests in that area" of the American Government. Tito, he said, "controls the largest fighting force in Europe except the Soviet Union", and this force constitutes an element in the defence of Western Europe. American policy with regard to Yugoslavia, he added, consists in giving Tito all the aid considered necessary for the protection of American strategic and political interests. In Yugoslavia the food and economic conditions were such that they could lead to serious consequences unless the U.S. Government took immediate measures before Congress met again. Tito's capacity to control subversive elements in Yugoslavia would be gravely and perhaps fatally undermined and the capacity of the Yugoslav military forces dangerously weakened, if measures of "aid" were not immediately stepped up.

This was a frank declaration by the President of the world's greatest imperialist power that Tito's Yugoslavia was following a policy in the interest of Western imperialism, in the interest of Western war policy. It was also a frank avowal that opposition to Tito inside Yugoslavia was developing fast and threatening the Tito régime. And finally it proved that Truman and Tito have the same definition of "subversive elements".

The London *Economist* (23.12.50) in commenting on President Truman's statement declared:

"The strongest factor in the Administration's favour [for giving support to Tito] was undoubtedly the importance of not losing Yugoslavia's thirty-two divisions. In his original message to Congressional leaders, the President made the following case: apart from his importance as a political symbol, Marshal Tito has the

largest army in Europe bar only Soviet Russia; it is now clear that, so long as it is in his power, the West can count on this in an emergency, and even without one, to immobilise at least an equal Russian force; but unless Yugoslavia is given immediate aid, Tito's ability to counter subversive elements will be 'seriously if not fatally' prejudiced."

By January, 1951, the right-wing American press was openly proclaiming the *central role of Tito's Yugoslavia* in the war plans of American reaction. Early in January, the *San Francisco Chronicle* wrote:

"Yugoslavia is a vital spot in the democracies' strategic line of defence. [In English this means 'in imperialism's strategic line of aggression'—J. K.] . . . should it go, Greece would go, too, and probably Turkey, with the whole Near and Middle East to follow."

Joseph and Stewart Alsop, writing in the New York Herald Tribune on "The Value of Tito" (New York Herald Tribune, continental edition, 18.1.51) wrote of:

"... the thirty Yugoslav divisions, the Turkish Army of nearly thirty divisions, and the revivified army of Greece... Taken together, they actually constitute a larger force than any that can conceivably be organised in Western Europe before at least two years have elapsed... the consequences of losing Yugoslavia [viz., the overthrow of Tito—J. K.] can quite easily add up to the equivalent of final defeat in a general war."

In other words, as 1951 opened, the concealment of Tito's role had virtually ended, and it was openly admitted that the Yugoslav Titoites were playing a central role in Western plans for aggressive war against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.

Tito, on his side, was forced by events to come more and more into the open. His denials of desire to receive war material from Western imperialism rapidly became public pleas for them. His claims of "neutrality" and of "independent policy" were rapidly transformed into public identification of himself and his clique with U.S. war policy. In an interview with an *Observer* special correspondent on September 2, 1951, Tito proclaimed, in words identical with any U.S. Embassy hand-out, that co-operation with the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies was impossible, whilst the West had given him nothing but generous and altruistic aid. He opposed the idea of a Five-Power Peace Pact. Collaboration was necessary, he said, between Yugoslavia and monarcho-fascist Greece and the Turkish dictatorship.

A few days earlier the correspondent of the New York Herald

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Tribune had published her report of an exclusive interview with the Marshal (28.6.51). Tito told her "that in the event of a Soviet attack anywhere in Europe, even if the thrust should be miles away from Yugoslavia's own borders", he would "instantly do battle on the side of the West . . Yugoslavia considers itself part of the collective security wall being built against Soviet imperialism".

This is Truman's language—the precise language of the Western war-planners. Truth is turned on its head. The Soviet Union is accused of planning the aggression which is in fact being prepared and directed against her. But now the Titoites have ceased even to pretend that they are anything other than an integral part and key instrument in the military plans of the West.

Is it surprising that Mr. Averell Harriman, Truman's special representative, visited Tito at the end of August 1951, on his way back from Iran, accompanied by the State Department's oil experts; and that they found complete identity of views when they discussed together foreign policy and war?

Tito Yugoslavia has been enrolled as a pawn in the war plans of U.S. imperialism.

Chapter Five

ROLE AND TACTICS OF THE TITOITES TODAY (II)

Arsenal of Anti-Soviet Slander

LIKE HIS forerunner Trotsky, Tito's role is not only to aid the war plans of imperialism against socialism, but to supply imperialism with a permanent stream of anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, anti-Socialist lies and slanders, dressed up in left-wing language, in revolutionary phrases. This is shown most clearly by the mass of material put out by the Yugoslav Embassies in nearly all countries of the world and also, in foreign languages, from Belgrade.

Never in history has the world been flooded with such a mass of official government-inspired propaganda, sent out in dozens of languages to hundreds of thousands of people, free, unasked for, unwanted, as appeared from Yugoslav official sources inside and outside of Yugoslavia in the last three years. From the weight (literally) in tons of wordage despatched in all directions it is perfectly clear that the payment for this propaganda does not derive only or even mainly from Yugoslav sources, but that dollars and pounds have got mixed up with the dinars. Djilas, who plays a role of the Goebbelsian type in the Yugoslav state machine, has added to the Yugoslav Information Office a special "Department for Propaganda against the Communist Information Bureau", which in 1948 received 40 million dinars, and in 1949 over 100 million. The Yugoslav radio disseminates its slanders abroad in some fourteen languages: it can now be understood why the British Government so readily acquiesced in the Yugoslav demand towards the end of the war for equipment to repair the main radio stations and to enlarge the radio service.

It is sufficient to take any series of recent Titoite publications and to do a brief mathematical analysis, to see how these "new kinds of Communists" devote their attention to attacks on Communists and progressives, whilst they leave unscathed the Western capitalists except for an odd occasional remark of mild criticism thrown in for demagogy.

Take for instance, the first thirty issues of the Yugoslav Bulletin published by the Yugoslav authorities in London between November, 1949, and June, 1950. Here is a brief analysis. No. 1 contains attacks on the World Peace Congress and the British Peace Congress; no attacks on Western imperialism. No. 2 contains attacks on the Daily

Worker, on Hungarian People's Democracy; no attacks on Western imperialism. No. 3 contains attacks on the British Peace Committee, the International Union of Students, the British-Yugoslav Association (an organisation of friends of the Yugoslav people, and therefore critical of Tito's régime); no attacks on Western imperialism. No. 4 contains attacks on the British-Yugoslav Association, the new Hungary and the Communist Information Bureau; no attacks on Western imperialism. No. 5 contains attacks on Bulgarian People's Democracy, falsehoods on Dimitrov, attacks on the Soviet Union; no attacks on Western imperialism. No. 6 contains attacks on the World Federation of Trade Unions and on the new Hungary; no attacks on Western imperialism. No. 7 contains attacks on the Bulgarian Government; no attacks on Western imperialism. No. 8 contains attacks on the Communist Information Bureau and attempts by a series of twists to justify Yugoslav trade with the West by pointing to Soviet trade policy. No. 9 contains attacks on the Soviet Union and a boost for the anti-Soviet propaganda of Mr. Zilliacus.

Numbers 11 to 20 contain, amongst other things, attacks on the Communist Information Bureau (many), on the British Yugoslav-Association, the International Union of Students, members of the British Communist Party, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Bulgarian Government, the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the Soviet Union (many).

Numbers 21 to 30 contain attacks on the International Union of Journalists, on the Communist Information Bureau (many), on the Soviet Union (many), on the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, on Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Rumania, Hungary, on the Peace Petition campaign, and on the Spanish Communist Party.

This is a very short summary of the anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, anti-progressive attacks and slanders of thirty issues. In many cases they take up the major part of the bulletin. The criticisms of Western imperialism, if enlarged, could be put in a teaspoon.

Is it surprising that this "new kind of communism" pleases the capitalists?

This type of analysis could be repeated for any section of the Yugoslav press in the last two and a half years. Take, for instance, For the Defence of Peace, published by the so-called "Yugoslav Committee for the Defence of Peace". No. 1-2 for January-February, 1950, contains, amongst other items, attacks on the Communist Information Bureau, on the World Federation of Trade Unions, on Soviet science plus articles on Yugoslav mediæval art, and on Mo-tse, a Chinese

philosopher contemporary with Confucius. There is an attack on capitalism in a reprint of a speech made in 1910 by a Serbian Socialist, but nothing more modern along these lines. No capitalist warmonger or high financier would hesitate to give this to his children. Here is a thoroughly "nice" kind of peace movement, a joy to the warmongers.

Or take the first issue of the so-called Review of International Affairs, published in July, 1950, by the Federation of Yugoslav (Titoite) Journalists in English and other languages. This peculiarly reactionary journal, the aim of which is to create an international Titoite forum, contains amongst other things: attacks on the Communist Information Bureau, the Communist Party of Italy, the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of Israel, Soviet philosophy, the Soviet magazine Znanye, the Italian Communist organ Unita, on Izvestia, on the Soviet writer Simonov, on the Moscow radio, the Czechoslovak Government, the Belgian Communist organ Drapeau Rouge, Radio Prague, Radio Budapest, on the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Communist Party of Western Germany, and on the Spanish Communist Party. Most of the articles are written in "left-wing" language. It would be difficult to find in any Tory journal, or even in any old publication of Goebbels, so much concentrated anti-Soviet and anti-Communist slander in so relatively short a space. It should be added that this is a "mild" issue compared with more recent numbers.

Or take the organ of the so-called Yugoslav Communist Party Borba. In the 105 issues starting from January 7, 1949, covering four months, there is not one editorial or signed article attacking British or U.S. imperialism. In these same 105 issues there are 174 leading articles and long reports containing general attacks on the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies. Between March 1 and May 1, 1949, Borba contained thirteen long articles attacking Albania, fifteen attacking Bulgaria, eight attacking Hungary, etc., etc. But all this belongs to the earlier, "milder", more "impartial" period of Titoite propaganda. In 1950 the attacks on the Soviet Union, People's Democracies, Communist Parties, peace and democratic organisations, grew larger, louder and more frequent. And the silence on Western capitalism was replaced by more openly whitewashing articles lauding the home and foreign policy of the imperialist powers.

Is it difficult to understand, therefore, why Tito's Borba is one of the most quoted papers in the right-wing press and the press of the right-wing Labour leaders in Britain, America, France and Western Germany?

The anti-Soviet, anti-democratic slanders of the Titoite press are taken up avidly by the right-wing press of the capitalists. Tito's Yugo-slavia has become a principal arsenal of such fabrications.

Amongst a whole section of the people the *open* sources of the Tories, trusts and their ilk in other lands are suspect. The more cunning and twisted Titoite lies are taken up, therefore, as those of the Trotskyists were taken up in the thirties. The Times and Telegraph, Daily Express or Daily Mail, New York Times or New York Herald Tribune, Hearst press or Wall Street Journal repeat almost verbatim, sometimes with acknowledgement and sometimes without, the inventions of their colleague, Borba.

The New York Herald Tribune correspondent in Belgrade writes in the continental edition of April 6, 1950, "Belgrade charges the Cominform every few days with new obscure anti-Yugoslav acts of an unsavoury nature". He cites a few of the "charges" of the first few months of 1950-"acts of Rumanian secret police", attacks on Czechoslovak Government, "acts of Bulgarian secret police", attacks on Danube Commission, etc., etc. All these slanders were widely reproduced in the capitalist press. All the capitalist press in Britain and America joyfully recorded the Titoite version of the alleged "slow murder" in a Czechoslovak prison of a Yugoslav D. M. Dimitrievic. Borba's inventions, disseminated all over the world in the Tanjug Bulletins and other Titoite publications, gave rise to countless articles in the capitalist press on the evils of the "police states behind the iron curtain"-for all the red-baiting and red-hating editors a cheap source of iron curtain stories. In fact, Dimitrievic was arrested in Prague along with a number of other Yugoslavs as a party to a conspiracy against the Czechoslovak Government and to illegal currency dealings. He died, medically well cared for, from a long-standing heart disease.

Ten thousand examples could be given. The New York Herald Tribune (continental edition) of July 4, 1950, headlines a sensational story of Russians seizing Czechoslovak oil fields. In this story there is not a grain of truth, but its acknowledged source—Belgrade. The same paper on July 6, 1950, splashes the headline "Eugene Varga called Boss of Hungarian Trade", with the sub-title "Tito Newspaper Glas says Soviet Economist is 'Economic Dictator'". There is not a grain of truth in this, but its acknowledged source is—Belgrade. The Communist leaders of Italy and France, Palmiro Togliatti and Maurice Thorez, both very ill, receive much-needed medical treatment in the Soviet Union. The capitalist press wants a "gutter story", some special piece of anti-Communist nastiness. The New York Herald Tribune (continental edition) of January 11, 1951, carries the story that they

have been summoned to Moscow to receive orders for the subordination of their countries to the U.S.S.R.

Even the capitalist press seems to jib at inventing this on their own initiative, so it is reproduced with the date-line—Belgrade. A patient study of all that is most reactionary in the right-wing press of the capitalist world would show that it has one of its most fertile sources for anti-Soviet, anti-People's Democratic, red-baiting material—the press and information offices of Tito's Yugoslavia.

If in 1949 the main line of the Titoite press was to launch attacks and slanders on the countries of socialism and People's Democracy, leaving the West unmentioned, in 1950 it began to pass more openly to praising and whitewashing Western imperialism. Exactly as had been disclosed at the Rajk trial, the plan of campaign was: first, to boost Yugoslavia, make Tito Yugoslavia the centre of attraction of all eyes, distracting attention from the role of the Soviet Union; secondly, to pass by stages into open attack against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies, ignoring the West except for a few faint criticisms to add realism to the anti-Soviet slanders; and thirdly, to pass more and more openly to whitewashing Western capitalism.

On April 7, 1950, Tito interviewed *The Times*. His theme was "the West is better than the East". On April 27, 1950, Tito addressed the joint session of both Houses of the Yugoslav National Assembly.

The Daily Herald (28.4.50), reporting him, headlined "Tito says We Turn to West" and described it as "his most conciliatory speech to the West". On April 29, 1950, Alexander Werth reported in the Manchester Guardian Tito's press conference of the previous day in these words:

"Tito remarked that there had been no political pressure from the West. Altogether, he suggested, development of economic ties with the West had made up economically for the damage inflicted by the Cominform boycott . . ."

The American Government, the Tories and Transport House were trying with increasing difficulty to justify the Marshall plan and to disguise the colonising nature of American "aid". They were meeting with increasing resistance. So Tito was thrown in to explain the "generous" nature of Western imperialism, to explain that capitalism had ceased to be capitalism.

But on what issue do the capitalists most need the assistance of Titoite propaganda? Surely it is in carrying out their central purpose—the preparation of aggressive war against the countries of socialism and People's Democracy.

As step by step the people in the rear of capitalism begin to feel

the danger of approaching war, imperialism needs the help of Tito to lull them into inaction.

As step by step the people in the rear of capitalism begin to see that it is their own governments, their own rulers who are preparing aggression, the capitalists try and cover up their war preparations by disguising their aggressive aims and plans as defence against the alleged aggression of the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies. Truth has to be turned on its head, what better instrument than Tito?

As step by step the people in the rear of capitalism hear the Soviet Union's concrete proposals for peace, for the peaceful solution of all problems and issues arising between West and East, between the great powers, and come to see that the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies want peace and are working for peace, Western imperialism tries to conceal and then to distort the peace policy and all the peace proposals of the Soviet Union. Here again is a role for the Titoites.

As step by step the peoples in the rear of capitalism, together with the peoples of the new world of Socialism and People's Democracy, begin to band together, unite, organise in a world movement for the defence of peace, isolating and exposing the warmongers, it becomes essential for the Governments of the U.S.A. and Britain, for the trusts, Tories and right-wing labour leaders to attack, compromise, disrupt this movement, which they so much hate and fear. So to complement the open attacks on the peace movement from the open reactionaries, the wily arguments of the Titoites are thrown into the struggle.

An essential role of the Titoite propaganda is to try and break the unity of the international progressive movement—the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students and above all the World Peace Movement.

Under the cover of their usual pseudo-revolutionary phrases the Titoites set out to lull the peoples into a false sense of security by denying the imperialist drive to war:

"I do not think there is any immediate danger of war. . . . A hot war is unlikely to replace a cold war." (Tito: Interview with *The Times*, 8.4.50.)

Next they set out to prove that the ceaseless efforts of the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies for peace are nothing but an insincere and hypocritical manoeuvre. This became increasingly important as the continued and patient efforts of the Soviet Union and People's Democracies for peace, their repeated concrete peace proposals and attempts at peace negotiation began to impress even right-wing people

in the capitalist countries. So the big capitalists turn on the Tito tap:

"In a leading article on the fifth anniversary of V.E. Day, Borba, the official organ of the Yugoslav Communist Party, attacked Soviet policy as 'essentially imperialist', and said that the insincerity of the slogans for peace was manifest in the Russian attitude towards Yugoslavia, with its propaganda campaign, economic blockade, and 'warmongering speeches'." (The Times, 10.5.50.)

Next the Titoite propagandists set out to prove that the danger of war comes not from Western imperialism but from the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. Whenever the Western capitalists are launching some new campaign of aggression—in Viet Nam or Korea or Malay—or preparing some new warlike bloc or some new rearmament the Titoites are put up to launching a "war scare" replete with slanders against the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. Whenever the Titoites themselves take some new war-like step on their frontiers they try to throw the responsibility on to their neighbours. If Western war propaganda is "threatened" by a spell of peace, the Titoite press is put up to discovering some new "menace" on their borders.

Thus in Belgrade on May 17, 1950, the Titoite Information Chief Dedijer proclaimed that there were hostile troop movements on Yugoslavia's frontiers. This was propaganda invented specially for foreign consumption:

"It is perhaps significant that the more alarming statements in M. Dedijer's speech on Soviet war preparations in the neighbourhood of Yugoslavia were not quoted in today's Belgrade press. it would seem probable that the statements were primarily intended to put foreign opinion on the alert." (Manchester Guardian correspondent in Yugoslavia, 18/5/50)

In mid-July a new incitement campaign was launched—the Narodna Armija (Army paper at Belgrade) invented reports about Bulgarian troop movements together with "extraordinary measures" adopted by Rumanian troops on the Yugoslav borders. On July 23, 1950, Eric Bourne, Sunday Times correspondent in Yugoslavia, reported, from the usual Titoite sources, Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian troop movements on the Yugoslav frontier. This corresponded with a particularly urgent need to whitewash the movements of American troops in Korea. On December 29, 1950, the New York Herald Tribune correspondent in Belgrade took up the same refrain. U.S. aggression in Korea needed to be forgotten. Yugoslav rearmament coinciding with a desperate economic situation needed to be "justified", so:

"Marshal Tito charged Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria tonight

with having 600,000 men under arms . . . the Marshal accused them of carrying out widespread military preparations against his régime." (New York Herald Tribune, continental edition, 29/12/50)

This was at a moment when events in Korea were leading towards a widespread movement in Britain, America and the West generally for a negotiated peace. So, along with Truman and Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek, Marshal Tito's aid was required to divert the peoples from the path of peaceful settlement:—

"Assailing at length the notion of peace at any price with Soviet Russia, the Marshal denounced what he termed the 'Munich type of peace'. [See also Hearst press for this slogan—J. K.] It is the peace of the aggressor . . . in which one or several nations are enslaved in the hope that eventually the aggressor will be satisfied. This peace is only fiction. It is not peace." (*ibid.*, 29.12.50.)

So whenever Truman or Churchill or Morrison need an excuse for their warlike moves, the Titoites provide the pretext.

And, finally, in their work of abetting the Wall Street drive to war, the Titoites set out to prove that the world-wide popular movement for peace is a Communist manoeuvre, just as the Trotskyists in the thirties set out to show that the world-wide movement for collective security and against fascism was a manoeuvre of the Communist International. When the world petition against the atomic bomb was in the first place in the popular struggle for peace, it was against this campaign that Tito, banning the petition in Yugoslavia, directed his propaganda machine. To compromise the organised peace drive of the World Peace Committee the Titoites set up a phoney Yugoslav Peace Committee whose sole efforts were to try and divide from within the broad peace committees of other countries.

"Cominform propaganda slogans for peace are hypocritical." (The Times, 10.5.50, reporting a Borba article.)

"Marshal Tito said 'precious time' was being wasted in debates on the outlawing of the atomic weapon. . . . No empty declarations and catchwords but concrete acts can show who is for peace and who is not." (United Nations Correspondents' Association interview with Tito by telephone, reported in Manchester Guardian, 26.5.50.)

So at a time when the fight for peace, in the face of the war drive of Western imperialism, is the central task facing all progressive people in the world, the Titoites set out to whitewash the warmongers, to turn truth on its head and put the onus of blame on the peaceloving powers, to slander the peace proposals of the Soviet Union,

Titoites at U.N.O.

propagandists" working along these lines.

This same role has been played by the Titoites inside the United Nations Organisation.

By the end of 1949 it was becoming increasingly difficult inside U.N.O. to hide from the peoples in the capitalist countries that the obstacle to peace came from imperialism, that the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies were loyal to the U.N.O. Charter and were ceaselessly putting forward concrete plan after concrete plan for the preservation of peace according to the U.N.O. Charter. The "Molotov says no" myth was wearing very thin; it was Bevin, Hector McNeil, Acheson, Truman who were saying "no" to every concrete peace proposal. The Soviet representatives proposed the abolition of the atomic bomb with international control. The answer was "no". They proposed a reduction by one-third of the armaments of the five great powers. The answer was "no". They proposed a Five-Power Peace Pact. The answer was "no". They made proposal after proposal, concession after concession, the answer remained always—"no".

Public opinion became restive, impatient. Some new weapon was needed to throw cold water on the Soviet proposals, to justify the Bevin-Acheson rejection of every proposal for peace. This was the special role of the Titoite representatives at U.N.O. The right-wing attacks on the Soviet proposals were threadbare—so throw in attacks from the "left". There followed the usual division of labour.

At the fourth and fifth General Assemblies of U.N.O., both at the plenary sessions and in the sessions of all the committees, whenever Soviet or People's Democratic representatives rose with a concrete proposal, up jumped the Titoites-Kardeli or Vilfan or Dedijer or another—violently attacked the proposal in pseudo-revolutionary phrases, branded it as "hypocritical", "insincere", launched a savage series of slanders on the country of the proposer, and sat down to the applause of the U.S., British, Chiang Kai-shek, Philippine and other U.S. satellite delegates. Then up got the U.S. or British representative, heartily agreed with the intervention of their "colleague from Yugoslavia", took up the slanders, and rejected even discussion of the original proposal. Here and there the Yugoslav delegate would abstain to prove his "independence", but on all critical issues he voted "westwards". When sectors of the U.S. right-wing press objected to these occasional abstentions, other sections, more far-sighted, would answer: "These abstentions are necessary to show the independence of Tito', because if he was not 'independent' he could not remain a really useful satellite."

At the beginning of October, 1949, the Soviet representatives were making concrete peace proposals at the plenary session of the Fourth General Assembly. The ball was passed to Kardelj for the Titoites:

"In debate last week before the General Assembly, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Kardelj specifically charged the Soviet Union with interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. He also said that a nation 'cannot profess peaceful intentions while heaping upon Yugoslavia the threats the Government of the U.S.S.R. is showering upon her'." (United States Information Bulletin, put out by U.S. Embassy in London, 7.10.49.)

Of course, Mr. Kardelj, our colleague, is correct, echoed British and American representatives. How can we even discuss so hypocritical a proposal? And the capitalist press, concealing or distorting the Soviet proposals, headlined the Titoite slanders.

Or a few days later, in the Economic Committee of the same General Assembly, the Soviet Union and People's Democracies drew attention to the policy of boycott of East-West trade followed by the U.S. Government and put forward concrete proposals for better and wider East-West trade relationships in the interests of peace and of the economic conditions of the people. Up jumps the Titoite Dr. Vilfan:

"The United Nation's Economic Committee has been presented with an analysis showing the sharp contrast between Soviet methods in international economic relations and the proposed United Nations programme for technical assistance to under-developed areas.

"The comparison was drawn by Dr. Joza Vilfan of Yugoslavia, who accused the Soviet Union of imperialist practices. . . ." (United States Information Service, 10.10.49.)

"Of course", echo the British and American representatives, "Dr. Vilfan is right. The Soviet Union is imperialist. Long live Truman's Point 4."

The debates continue. The socialist and people's democratic representatives make proposal after proposal. With demagogic phrases the Titoites launch their attacks:

"Yugoslav delegate Sava Kosanovic said it was a glaring contradiction for the Soviet Union to urge a new peace pact while its Cominform allies were being urged to use 'any means' to overthrow the Yugoslav Government." (United States Information Service, 2.12.49.)

The United States press service throughout the world distributed the

Titoite slanders, boycotting the peace proposals. The capitalist press echoed the Titoite slanders keeping silent on or distorting the peace proposals. The imperialist delegates, happy to learn from the Titoites that socialism was imperialist and imperialism generous, agreed with, supported and echoed—Titoism.

At the U.N.O. Economic Committee for Europe, meeting at Geneva in mid-1950, the same role fell to the Titoites. Once again the representatives of the countries of Socialism and People's Democracy were calling attention to the reactionary trade policy of the U.S.A., its orders to its "dependants" to cut trade with Eastern Europe, and the delegates of imperialism felt embarrassed.

Feeling in countries like Britain, France and the Scandinavian states was growing more and more resentful of American economic dictatorship. The understanding was growing that submission to U.S. orders to boycott or cut trade with the East was leading step by step to increased colonisation and subordination to crisis-ridden U.S. economy. Opinion was growing for a turn to increased East-West trade. How could submission to the dictates of Wall Street be justified? Once again the ball was passed to the Titoites:

"Mr. J. Vilfan of Yugoslavia replied that his country had had the opportunity to become 'a colony—a colony of the Soviet Union, but had refused the offer, and that 'apparently the Soviet Union can think only in terms of satellites and masters, never of independent states'." (United States Information Service, Information Bulletin of Yugoslav Embassy in London, 10.6:50.)

"Splendid", say the representatives of capitalism, "isn't it clear as our 'Communist colleague' says, that it is the Soviet Union and not imperialism that is imperialist? What is all this nonsense about the U.S.A. forbidding trade with the East? Think of poor little Yugoslavia boycotted by the imperialism of the socialist countries," and their eyes fill with tears as they think of it:

"The Yugoslav delegate has made grave and convincing charges against the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe . . . The fact is that a small country finds itself completely and unilaterally cut off from trade with certain of its nearest neighbours . . ." (Mr. Asher of the U.S. delegation speaking after the Yugoslav Representative at U.N.O., Economic Committee for Europe reported in United States Information Service as above.)

How the Tito-Truman lie of "Soviet imperialism" is the precise opposite of the truth, of the facts of history, we examine in detail in Chapter VII.

And at the Fifth U.N.O. General Assembly at the end of 1950 the

same comedy continued, not only on the general issue of peace, but on the concrete issue of Korea. Now the Titoites have been rewarded by U.S. imperialism with a seat on the Security Council, to the joy of Churchill. There, too, an occasional abstention was permitted to the Titoites to add emphasis and increased "prestige" to their general support of American aggression in Korea. There, too, there was division of labour, and whilst the openly right-wing press justified directly the American invasion and the illegal U.N.O. decision, the Titoites concentrated on twisting the issue by endeavouring to show that the Korean war was the fault of the Soviet Union and the Communist Information Bureau.

When at the end of June, 1951, the Soviet proposals were made known by Mr. Malik for a cease-fire and for peace in Korea, it was the Titoites who privately took the initiative in "advising" the U.S. Government against acceptance:

"It has been the Yugoslavs who have taken the initiative and have been warning the Americans against any let-down of anti-Soviet alertness . . . [they] have gone so far as to caution the Americans against the danger of falling into a Soviet trap in the Korean affair. This type of uncompromisingly anti-Russian advice to the United States is reported to be relatively rare in other European capitals." (New York Herald Tribune, 9.7.51.)

Indeed such "advice" as given by the Titoites came only from Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek.

When the Political Committee of the Fifth General Assembly of U.N.O. discussed the Soviet proposal for a "Declaration for the elimination of the war danger and for strengthening peace and the security of nations", Kardelj denounced the proposals and declared that he would vote against. When the violation of human rights was discussed, the Titoites denounced, not British authorities' shooting down of Nigerian miners, not the Union of South Africa's treatment of its African population, the overwhelming majority, not the U.S. treatment of Negroes-but Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania. The Titoites supported the illegal re-election of Trygye Lie as General Secretary of U.N.O. But above all they have thrown in their weight on Korea. When the Soviet representative challenged the legality of the Security Council's decision on Korea of June 27, Yugoslavia abstained. When the Soviet delegates called on the U.S.A. to cease bombing the towns and civilian population of Korea, Yugoslavia abstained.

The Titoite Foreign Minister Kardelj blamed the Soviet Union and the Communist Information Bureau for American aggression in Korea. It is not, he declared, a struggle of the Korean people for independence, but:

"the liberation hopes of the broad body of that nation here too, as in many other parts of the world, have been misused to serve the purposes of an alien hegemonistic policy. . . . The peoples of Yugoslavia cannot help comparing the events in Korea with the fact that we are now in the third year of the incessant rabid aggressive campaign of the Cominform Governments led by the U.S.S.R. . . ." (Kardelj's speech on eve of departure from Belgrade to the General Assembly of U.N.O.—Yugoslav Fortnightly, 15.9.50.)

Not one mention of American aggression, of the mass despatch of American troops to Korean soil, of the total absence of Soviet troops from Korean soil, not one word that could offend Truman or Churchill or Chiang Kai-shek!

In December, 1950, Vladimir Dedijer, described by *The Times* correspondent in Belgrade as a "member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Yugoslav People's Assembly, and a close associate of Marshal Tito", published an article on Korea in the *Communist*, organ of the Central Committee of Tito's "Communist" Party. What caused the untold suffering of the Korean people? What is behind the ceaseless bombing by U.S. planes and shelling by British and U.S. warships of Korean towns and villages? Why are U.S., British Turkish, Siamese, Philippine troops killing Koreans on Korean soil thousands of miles from their homelands? Mr. Dedijer has an answer:

"Mr. Dedijer sees events in Korea as a manifestation of the Soviet will to dominate the world . . . if this is to be resisted successfully . . . the workers of the world must 'realise that yet another pretender to world domination has appeared, and get rid of illusions about the Soviet Union representing some alleged force of democracy and peace'. . . . The 'basic task of the Soviet bureaucracy is to slow down the development of the Chinese revolution and to complicate her international situation for her. . . '." (The Times, from Belgrade correspondent, 27.12.50.)

Not even a word of concern about U.S. policy. With all its pseudo-Marxist phraseology, Dedijer's article makes *The Times* editorials or Walter Lippman's articles in the *New York Herald Tribune* look like the writings of "reds", and make the declarations of Jawaharlal Nehru appear like those of a dangerous revolutionary. Can it be wondered that the Titoite articles and speeches on Korea are headlined in the Hearst press?

One of the most right-wing weeklies of imperialist America, the

U.S. News and World Report, published on July 28, 1950, a long interview with "a top Yugoslav official in Belgrade". "The interview", it declared, "that appears on these pages contains the answers made by a top official of the Yugoslav Government. Both the questions and replies have been discussed by the Tito cabinet, so the views expressed here represent the authoritative opinions of the Tito-Communists." To the question "What is your interpretation of the Korean situation?" the "top official" gave the following "authoritative opinion":

"This conflict in Korea is sheer camouflage on the part of the Russians. The U.S.S.R. wants to confuse and complicate the situation in the Far East. It wants to provoke a war between the U.S. and China. This is the key to the entire issue . . . Russia's action in Korea is rank aggression. The U.S.S.R. is planning aggression not only against Yugoslavia, but also against other countries in Europe. It would like to subordinate all of Europe."

The U.S. News and World Report almost weekly calls for the arming of Western Germany, Japan, Franco-Spain and Tito Yugo-slavia. It is more critical of Mr. Attlee's Britain than of Tito's Yugo-slavia. And can it be wondered? Can it be wondered that in November, 1950, Truman declared that Tito Yugoslavia fully corresponds to America's "strategic and political interests?"

In November, 1949, the Communist Information Bureau, in its resolution on Yugoslavia declared that:

"the transformation of the Tito-Rankovic clique into a direct agency of imperialism and accomplices of the warmongers, culminated in the lining up of the Yugoslav Government with the imperialist block in U.N.O., where the Kardeljs, Djilases and Beblers joined in a united front with the American reactionaries on vital matters of international policy."

The year that followed brought a still closer and more open identification of the Titoites with the war policy of Wall Street.

Like the Trotskyites of the thirties, the Titoites, under the cover of pseudo-revolutionary phrases, provided an arsenal of anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, anti-progressive slanders, that complemented the open propagandists of Tories, press lords and right-wing Labour leaders. Like the Trotskyites, their successors the Titoites supply endless copy to satisfy the requirement of everything most filthy, reactionary and warmongering in the press of the United States and the capitalist world.

Disrupting the Left from Within

The role of the Titoites is not confined to turning out in press and

speeches a ceaseless stream of right-wing propaganda disguised in leftist phrases that is re-echoed through the world by the reactionary press and radio. Their third role, like that of their predecessors the Trotskyites, is to try and penetrate into the heart of the working class and progressive movement, to spy on it, confuse it, divide it, and disrupt it from inside. The open attacks of open reaction are complemented by the boring from within of covert reaction. The stronger the progressive and revolutionary movement grows, both in the countries of socialism and People's Democracy, where the working people rule, and in the rear of capitalism, the more important for reaction becomes its Titoite secret weapon.

The German Gestapo, even in the last days before the defeat of Hitler, saw the need to lay the basis for a comeback by a secret "international" within the left. Already on September 28, 1944, Paul Ghali, correspondent of the Chicago Daily News and New York Post, reported from Switzerland:

"This scum of the French population is now being trained for Bolshevik activity in the tradition of Trotsky's . . . International under the personal orders of Heinrich Himmler . . . They are being instructed to tell their fellow-countrymen that the present-day Soviet represents only a bourgeois degeneration of Lenin's original principles and that it is high time to return to 'sound' Bolshevik ideology. This formation of groups of 'real' Leninists is Himmler's most recent policy, aimed at creating a fourth international, amply contaminated by Nazi germs. . . ."

It is such an international, with the control and leadership passed from the hands of Himmler of the Gestapo into the hands of Hoover of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.), with the same "scum", the same "Nazi germs", the same "platform", that the Titoites represent today. The U.S. News and World Report of January 5, 1951, discusses the possibility of a "Big War in 1951". They weigh up the assets of American imperialism. They discuss the atom bomb, the American policy of scorching other people's earth. Then they come to "Titoism, the kind of national Communism sponsored by Marshal Josip Broz Tito". They see it as another weapon against the Soviet Union. They explain that "Tito-type Communists are active within the Communist Parties of many countries. In all-out war they would make a bid for party control". They are seen by this organ of U.S. reaction as a fifth-column inside the labour and progressive movement of the world, of special use to imperialism in time of war.

In the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe the Titoites have tried and are trying to establish groups of agents centred around Belgrade *inside* the Communist and Workers' Parties. We have seen something of their attempts along these lines in Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania as revealed in the Rajk, Kostov and Xoxe trials. These activities have not in any way been confined to these three countries. In early August, 1950, a trial of twelve agents of the Titoites was held in Bucharest, showing a wide network of espionage controlled from Belgrade and dating from the Red Army's liberation of Rumania in 1944. In the same month a group of Titoite agents was brought to trial in Prague, headed by Sefik Kevic, a former Yugoslav Vice-Consul in Bratislava. This network, too, had been established immediately after the liberation of Czechoslovakia. Intensive efforts have been made by the Titoites to gain a foothold in Poland.

In Eastern Europe the Titoites have attempted to gain an influence in the Communist Parties and indeed in the whole progressive movement, not only by recruiting former agents and reactionaries who are concealed inside the popular organisations, but also by putting forward distorted "Marxist" theories calculated to appeal to unstable and weaker elements inside the progressive movement.

In Eastern Europe in general their main platform has been one of narrow bourgeois nationalism. They know that for centuries the best elements of the Balkan and East European peoples have been fighting against national oppression—against the Turkish invaders, the old Austrian-Hungarian domination, and later against the imperialism of the West. They know that national minorities have been persecuted, and that reaction has kept its rule by developing and inciting people against people in national feud and hatred. But now a new era has opened up in the People's Democracies. Real independence has been achieved at last. The domination of one people by another has ended. The economic and political basis for the old bourgeois nationalism has been abolished and the economic and political basis established for a new progressive socialist patriotism to be developed alongside real international solidarity, friendship and co-operation between the East European peoples. Moreover, it was the close friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union that brought them liberation. This friendship and co-operation is helping them to build up economically strong independent states and is necessary in order that the newly won national sovereignty can be preserved.

The Titoites hope to trade on the remnants of the old nationalism surviving in the minds of men. For the old bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism cannot be wiped out overnight. And even the memories of the old just democratic national liberation struggles can

be distorted by the bourgeois nationalists into reactionary chauvinism, if a strong and ceaseless campaign of ideological explanation is not carried out.

So the Titoites make bourgeois nationalism a principal platform in Eastern Europe. They try and incite hatred of the Yugoslav peoples against their Hungarian, Rumanian and Albanian neighbours. They try to foster a narrow Macedonian nationalism against the Bulgarian and Greek peoples and to put forward visions of an all-Macedonian grouping inside Tito Yugoslavia. They bring back to life all the old nationalists, Cetniks and Ustashi, Great Serbs and nationalist Croats. They try above all to develop a narrow nationalism inside the left wing of the East European peoples and to direct it against the Soviet Union.

It is the Soviet Union that made and is making national sovereignty possible for the People's Democracies, but the Titoite line is first to separate the People's Democracies from friendship with the U.S.S.R., and then to incite nationalist elements against the Soviet Union. Whilst Tito Yugoslavia is becoming a semi-colony of U.S. imperialism, the Titoites make their principal slogan in Eastern Europe—the fight against "Soviet imperialism". This is truth exactly on its head—the Truman-Acheson ideological line.

It is with this knowledge that Western reaction pays tribute to Tito's "nationalism".

"Nationalism is still a potent force in Eastern Europe . . . the downfall of Marshal Tito would be a heavy blow to millions who secretly—or openly—side with him. . . ." (*The Times* editorial on "Titoism in Eastern Europe", 20.6.49.)

"... Tito's movement lends heart to such hopes because its strength is drawn from nationalism. ... " (Mr. Eden in Daily Telegraph, 16.6.49.)

"It is of the utmost importance 'to encourage the line of thought developed by Marshal Tito in opposing Russia's attempt to eliminate nationalism among the peoples of Eastern Europe'." (Hector McNeil in address to Canadian Clubs and U.N.A. in Canada, quoted in *The Times*, 25.10.49.)

In Eastern Europe, where the task before the peoples is to build socialism; where, in the People's Democracies, national sovereignty has been achieved with the aid of the Soviet Union; where the sacrifices made by all those who fought throughout history for the national liberation of their countries have been rewarded; the platform of the Titoites is "nationalism", that is, bourgeois nationalism.

It is very interesting to compare with this the role of the Titoites in the colonial and dependent countries, particularly in India and Africa and in the Middle and Far East. Like their Trotskyite predecessors, the Titoites have been charged by their masters to play a role of special importance in these areas.

The colonial people cannot be easily turned from their national liberation struggles by social democracy. Whilst the exploitation of the colonial peoples provides an economic basis for social democracy in the imperialist exploiting countries, there is no corresponding economic basis for social democracy in the colonial countries themselves. Imperialism, therefore, has had to look for new ideological weapons to divert the colonial and dependent peoples from anti-imperialist struggle.

It is for this reason that already in the 'thirties the Trotskyite agents of the bourgeoisie played a specially important disruptive role, not only inside the Communist Parties but inside Socialist Parties, where they existed, and inside the national movements. Abusing the ardent revolutionary spirit of these people, trading on the fact that in a number of colonial countries the theoretical level of the Marxist groupings was low and the progressive political organisations were weak, the Trotskyites, under ultra-leftist slogans, tried to break the broad unity of the anti-imperialist front, separate the vanguard from the masses, and divide the struggle of the colonial and dependent peoples from the struggle of the working class in the imperialist countries.

They called for an immediate struggle for socialism when the revolutionary movement had not yet reached such a stage, they branded (in Ceylon, India, North Africa) the struggle against fascism as a manoeuvre of imperialism, they put forward bourgeois nationalist slogans which played into the hands of the fascists ("against white imperialism" etc.). In this way great harm was done to the anti-imperialist struggle in Indo-China, in Ceylon, in North Africa, in Indonesia. The Japanese secret police and the Gestapo set great store on the development of such groupings in the colonial lands.

Today, on this issue too, Trotsky's mantle falls on Tito's shoulders. The national liberation movement has made giant strides forward. Whole vast areas have won their independence. The working class has stepped or is stepping into the leadership of the liberation struggle. In many colonial and dependent countries strong Communist Parties have developed or are developing. In all these countries the task is the struggle for national independence, the struggle against imperialism. The working class is faced with the task of building, under its leadership, the unity of the overwhelming majority of the people—workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie—against

foreign imperialism, the feudal landlords and that section of the bourgeoisie—the big ("bureaucratic") bourgeoisie—who have sold out to imperialism. The people's democratic rule, the new régime of People's Democracy for which the colonial and dependent peoples are striving, will not be in its first stage a dictatorship of the proletariat. The tasks of the revolution are, in the first instance, anti-imperialist, anti-feudal. The revolution has not yet got socialist tasks.

So what is the main platform of the Titoites in the colonial and dependent countries? It is to preach immediate socialism, immediate socialist revolution. By urging the people to skip essential stages in the revolutionary struggle, they are trying to draw the proletarian vanguard far in advance of the masses, to "provoke" them in the traditional manner of agents provocateurs, to lead them forward too far and fast and thus lay them open to be repressed and broken by imperialism. Wherever the level of Marxist understanding is not yet high, the Titoites seek to confuse the people and the revolutionary groupings by high-sounding, ultra-revolutionary phrases. They try to cash in on the people's intense revolutionary fervour, their readiness for struggle and sacrifice, in order to distort, divert, divide and disrupt the anti-imperialist struggle, and transform the people's desire for national independence into blind bourgeois nationalism.

This is why the Titoites are especially active in their efforts to contact the colonial people. It is now clear why already in 1945-46. Kardeli, posing as an expert in international affairs, made a "special study" of the colonies, why the Yugoslav Embassies in the imperialist countries contacted the revolutionary organisations, asking for information on the colonial struggle, why the Yugoslav Foreign Office has a special section dealing with colonial problems, and asks for every publication in the colonial world and especially the publications of the left-wing organisations. This is why the Titoites went out of their way to invite colonial revolutionary leaders to Belgrade in the postwar period. This is why the Yugoslav Embassies in Britain, Belgium, France, Holland etc. have as a special task to contact the colonial students in these countries in order to inveigle them to visit Yugoslavia. And this is why the imperialists, who are alarmed at the slightest contact of the colonial peoples with the Soviet Union and People's Democracies, go out of their way to encourage and promote contact with Tito Yugoslavia.

The Titoites made a special drive on India. They sought to advise the Indian Communist movement that Belgrade was the new centre of the world revolutionary movement. They tried to promote ill-will between Indian revolutionaries and the British and other Communist Parties. They sent their delegates, including Dedijer. a leading Titoite, to attend the Second Congress of the Indian Communist Party. They put forward both publicly and off the record what they called Kardelj's new development of Marxist theory—"the intertwining of the national liberation struggle and the socialist revolution." They quoted and requoted Kardelj's report to the first meeting of the Communist Information Bureau as a basis for development in India. These were the points that they stressed:—

"It can be said that the development of the national liberation uprising and the people's power in Yugoslavia represents a specific example of the linking up of a national liberation war with a democratic people's revolution under the leadership of the working class striving in its development to a higher socialist form . . ."

"The process of the development of the people's democratic revolution interblended with the socialist forms which today have become predominant." (Kardelj's report to Communist Information Bureau, August, 1947, reprinted in Indian Communist, January, 1948).

What did this mean? It meant that the Titoites were using all their influence to persuade Indian revolutionaries to embark on a leftist course of action that would inevitably break the unity of the anti-imperialist Indian peoples, divorce the vanguard from the masses of the people, isolate the leading section of the working class and open it up to oppression and persecution by reaction.

The policy the Titoites advanced was in direct contradiction to the correct path forward for the Indian revolutionary movement, as set out in the historic Draft Programme of the Communist Party of India published in April, 1951, and the statement of policy which followed it.

The Titoites also tried to gain an influence in the Communist Party of Ceylon. Here they contacted the Trotskyite groupings of Ceylon and supplied them with anti-Soviet slanders, but the Ceylon Communists exposed their role and the Titoite propagandists were utterly routed. They made especial efforts to contact African Marxists and the African national movement through the medium of African students studying in the West; and the same with the students of Viet Nam. They offered special radio receiving sets for reception of Yugoslav news agency reports to colonial movements. They made desperate but utterly vain attempts to win Chinese support for their anti-Soviet, bourgeois nationalist line and to contact Chinese students abroad. Until they were exposed, they tried to use their position in the international democratic organisations, the International Union of Students, World Federation of Trade Unions, World Federation

of Democratic Youth, etc., to contact and indoctrinate the colonial people.

For Western imperialism, therefore, the Titoites were a weapon of special importance for the disruption of the anti-imperialist struggle. So the imperialists dreamed of new "national Communist" groupings in the colonies and dependant countries:

"The Communist danger in South-East Asia will be the main issue before the Conference of Commonwealth Ministers when they meet at Colombo . . .

"... Communism has so far found some difficulty in coming to terms with the new nationalism which today is perhaps the most potent force in South-East Asia.

"There is indeed, some evidence for the belief that quite a new Communist animal may eventually emerge from this part of the world. For some time, for instance, there has been a strong Trotskyist movement in Ceylon. In Burma the Communists have split into two groups. . . .

"National communism existed in South-East Asia even before Tito successfully defied Moscow. It is too early to say what effect this is likely to have, but at the very least Tito's survival can only be an encouragement to the dissident groups." (Observer, 25.12.49.)

The State Department exerted, and still exerts, every effort to extend the network of Tito Yugoslav Legations throughout the world of dependent states, of which the Yugoslav Legation in Delhi is to be the principal centre. The New Delhi correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* reported early in 1950 that the U.S. Government was going to encourage the establishment of Titoite missions throughout Asia. The Belgian journal *Libre Belgique* (14.1.50) wrote:

"In its future actions, vis-à-vis the Asiatic states, Washington is counting on two factors—nationalism and national communism of the Tito type. American experts have become convinced that the latter formula would be perfectly compatible with the aid that the U.S.A. intends to give to these countries. An American action of this type has already begun in Burma where American agents are actually supporting anti-Stalinist Communist groupings and are trying to organise a common bloc of these groups with the Government Parties. . . . If this action is crowned with some success, the United States would even go as far as envisaging the creation of a centre whose essential task would be to check the action of the pro-Soviet elements."

By early 1951 the Americans were pressing hard for the establish-

FROM TROTSKY TO TITO

ment of a Yugoslav legation in Indonesia.

What could be clearer? To combat Communism in Asia and throughout the colonial and dependent world, imperialism needs an instrument which will look (a) nationalist and (b) revolutionary, but whose real purpose will be anti-Communist and anti-Soviet. They need an imperialist line dressed up in anti-imperialist phrases. The answer is Tito and the Titoites.

The activity of the Titoites is not confined to the People's Democracies and the colonial and dependent countries. There is hardly a country under imperialist rule where, in some form or other, the Titoites are not working alongside the domestic reactionaries—sometimes as secret agents inside the Communist Parties, sometimes more openly in socialist or nationalist organisations, sometimes in Trotskyite grouplets, but always against the unity and against the interests of the working class and the working people.

In Western Germany they tried for a period to work underground, inside the Communist Party. But when they were exposed, they turned to the formation of a phoney "Communist Party" on chauvinist lines with all the aid and encouragement of the Western occupation forces. The so-called "Independent German Communist Party" was founded at Dusseldorf on July 23, 1950, under the leadership of a Titoite, Schappe, recently expelled from the Communist Party. The Manchester Guardian correspondent in Western Germany wrote (24.7.50):

"The Titoist split in Germany is, according to Herr Schappe, due to three main reasons. He and his followers refuse to accept the Oder-Neisse line. . . . They further refuse to accept the political directives of a foreign country—Soviet Russia. . . .

"Herr Schappe said that his party would take the title of the 'Independent Workers' Party'. It would be prepared to make common cause with the Social-Democrats, but would advocate far more radical social reform. . . .

"Titoism is a model for this new party.... The party has plenty of links with the Socialist Unity Party in the Soviet Zone, but would naturally maintain them 'on a strictly underground basis'."

Herr Schappe, reporting the Conference, which was held secretly, to a New York Herald Tribune correspondent, said that his party "condemned Russia's prisoner-of-war policy".

What did the imperialists need in Western Germany? They wanted something to complement amongst the workers the activities of the right-wing social democratic leaders whose influence was waning, something that would talk left but would have a nationalist line directed against the Potsdam agreement and the Soviet Union, something that could be the basis for espionage activity inside the Socialist Unity Party of the Eastern Zone. Here was a "new sort of communism" that could bring tears of joy to imperialist eyes:

". . The long-term possibilities of a really strong independent communism fighting a Moscow-controlled movement in Western Europe stirs all sorts of happy political visions in the minds of Western allied officials." (New York Herald Tribune, Bonn correspondent, 4.8.50.)

In France the Titoites tried at first to find a foothold inside the Communist Party, but were quickly exposed. They carried out special activity, but with no success, amongst the Yugoslav émigré population in France. With social democracy badly compromised, they were trying in 1951 to form an "independent", "third-force" Party. Founded by the well-known Trotskyist Jean Rous and Yves Dechezelles, ex-assistant secretary of the Socialist Party, it called itself the "Independent Socialist Left" and claimed to stand for a "democratic socialism which will replace both social democracy and Stalinite communism". It collaborates with the "Co-ordination Centre for Socialist and Democratic Action" of which Louis Dalmas, ardent Titoite propagandist and tourist in Tito Yugoslavia, is a leading member.

In Italy, too, the Titoites tried at first to penetrate the Communist Party. Then they turned their attention to the Nenni Socialist Party, once more without success. They were particularly vociferous in calling for provocative forms of political demonstration that would have furnished the de Gasperi Government with a much-needed pretext for repressive action. The Yugoslav Embassy in Italy turns out a vast quantity of propaganda. Bribes are freely used in trying to attract delegations. Two members of the Italian Communist Party were expelled for maintaining contacts with the Titoites. On the publication of the news the local police (carabinieri) chief called to congratulate them and offer them his full support. This made them see very rapidly the real role of the Titoites.

Titoites have been active amongst the Spanish Republican exiles, trying to split and confuse the republican movement. They were one of the sources of "information" on the Spanish Republicans in France that led to the recent mass arrests by the French Government. Even Franco has now seen the use of Tito. The Falange organ, Arriba, wrote in 1951 "Tito is not a real Communist", while the Franco organ, Heraldo de Aragon, explained: "It is expedient for the Western world that Tito should continue to be called a Marxist".

The work of the Titoites in Britain will be dealt with in a later chapter.

How can the efforts of the Titoites to penetrate, spy on and disrupt the left-wing movement from within, be summarised? What methods are common to the Titoite groups in all countries?

The Titoites tried, in the first place, to penetrate into the Communist Parties, to establish secret groups within them and to develop a distorted "Marxist" theory, calculated to put these parties at the mercy of capitalism. But after the Information Bureau Resolution of June, 1948, and still more clearly after the revelations of the Rajk and Kostov trials, the role of the Titoites was exposed, and though their efforts to maintain secret groups within the Communist Parties were, of course, continued, the Titoites were, in general, thrown out of the Communist organisation, while those sincere Communists who had fallen under their influence before their exposure came to see how they had been misled.

So today the Titoites, having failed to carry out their aim of organising a split in the world Communist movement, are endeavouring to carry on their work inside social democratic and nationalist organisations, and also by the formation of little splinter-grouplets—"independent" "socialist" bodies, reminiscent of the countless Trotskyite splinter-grouplets of the thirties—"Bolshevik-Leninist", "Leninist-Internationalist", "national-communist", etc., etc.—all of which with the aid of the police of their various countries try to disrupt working-class and popular unity.

What is the ideology of these Titoite groups? There is no ideology, there are no principles in the Titoite groups. From country to country, from place to place, from time to time their slogans change, not with a changing situation nor with a changing relation of class forces, but according to what is expedient to help capitalism inside the progressive movement. Whatever is against the interests of the working class, whatever is anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, against unity of the working class, against peace, is served up in pretentious ultra-revolutionary pseudo-Marxist language as the slogan of the hour. The only thing common to the Titoites, as to the Trotskyites before them, is their utter lack of principle.

In the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe a certain bourgeois nationalism survives in the minds of even progressive elements; so in these countries bourgeois nationalism becomes an essential part of the Titoite "programme". In these countries, in the 1947-49 period, the main progressive tasks were to carry forward the march to socialism, fight for the leading position of the working class, cement the alliance

of the working class with the working peasantry, isolate and restrict the kulaks, prepare the working people for intensifying class battles, strengthen the leading role of the Communist and Workers' Parties. So the Titoites, overtly and covertly, taught the *opposite*. They developed what they called "new advances in Leninism", they taught the *opposite* of Lenin—rejected the leading role of the working class, rejected the need to differentiate amongst the peasantry, taught the need to hide the Communist Party and to dissolve it into the People's Front, taught that the class struggle would die away. When the struggle for socialism was on the order of the day, the Titoites preached nationalism. When socialism could only be built with the aid and friendship of the U.S.S.R., the Titoites preached enmity to the Soviet Union.

But in the colonial countries they changed their slogans. In these countries the revolutionary struggle had at this stage as its main tasks the fight against imperialism and against feudalism. Further periods of struggle and further stages of struggle were necessary before the fight for socialism would be on the order of the day; so here the Titoites preached socialism, the "intertwining of the national liberation struggle with the struggle for socialism". Where a national liberation is the main immediate task, the Titoites preach "socialism". But where the next task is the advance to socialism the Titoites preach "nationalism". Here they try to hold back the revolutionary advance, there they try to break the revolutionary movement by advancing provocative leftist slogans, destined to split the movement and cut off and destroy the vanguard. Everywhere they aid imperialism.

Thus, like their Trotskyite predecessors, and along with the old Trotskyites, with whom in most cases ranks have been fused, they have no principles, but only one standpoint—enmity to the working class and socialism. The "Marxism" which they preach can only be described as "police-Marxism", "M.I.5 Marxism". It consists in expressing the aims of imperialism in a pseudo-Marxist jargon.

Have they a platform, an aim? Yes. It is the aim of their masters—the restoration of capitalism, subordination to American imperialism. war against the lands of socialism and People's Democracy.

But this is the platform of the inner ring of Titoites, and they dare not make it known to their supporters. Thus it was with the Trotskyite conspirators in the Soviet Union. They did not dare to make known their platform even to their own leading supporters:

"Naturally the Trotskyites could not but hide such a platform from the people, from the working class. And they hid it not only from the working class, but also from the Trotskyites as a

Court asked him: "You say that you pursued a Trotskyist policy. What was the standpoint of this group?" Rajk replied:

"I could outline the essence in a few words: by saying that it was a refutation and disruption of everything which is in the in-

whole, and not only from the Trotskyite rank and file, but even from the leading group of the Trotskyites, consisting of a small handful of thirty or forty people. When Radek and Pyatakov asked Trotsky's permission to call a small conference of Trotskyites, thirty or forty people, to inform them of the character of this platform, Trotsky forbade them, saying that it was inexpedient to talk of the real nature of the platform even to a small group of Trotskyites, as such an 'operation' might cause a split." (Stalin, Report at Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.(B.), March 3, 1937.)

"I could outline the essence in a few words: by saying that it was a refutation and disruption of everything which is in the interests of the revolutionary working-class movement, on a political basis that completely lacked all principle." (Rajk's evidence, Verbatim Report of Rajk Trial, p. 39.)

ROLE AND TACTICS OF THE TITOITES TODAY (II)

In the same way the real platform of Tito, Kardelj, Rankovic, Djilas, has been concealed from all but the innermost ring of their immediate associates, agents of imperialism.

Thus the Titoites today pursue within the world progressive movement the same three roles as the Trotskyites between the wars, of whom they are the successors:

And to keep the support of their wider associates, to try and attract sincere workers who have not yet seen through their manœuvres, to try and confuse and divide the workers and their allies, the Titoites, like the Trotskyites, put forward, without principle, any concatenation of phrases they consider useful for the moment. All the old Trotskyite catch-phrases are repeated—"Stalin has departed from Leninism", "the Soviet Union is a bureaucracy", "the Communist Parties are the instrument of Soviet foreign policy". There is nothing in Djilas, Pijade, Kardelj, Rankovic and Tito that they could not have culled from the works of Trotsky as translated into German under Hitler and disseminated with the aid of the Gestapo. But the Titoites trade on the fact that large sections of the labour and progressive movement did not know or have forgotten the role of the Trotskyites.

(1) As an instrument of the war plans of imperialism.

Stalin, in the speech quoted above, showed that Trotskyism in the thirties had ceased to be a trend in the working class:

(2) As an arsenal of anti-Communist, anti-Soviet, anti-progressive slanders dressed up in "left-wing" language.

"... Trotskyism has ceased to be a political trend in the working class... it has changed from the political trend in the working class which it was seven or eight years ago into a frantic and unprincipled gang of wreckers, diversionists, spies and murderers, acting on the instructions of the intelligence services of foreign states." (Stalin, ibid.)

(3) As a weapon of imperialism for the penetration of the Communist and progressive organisations and movements, for spying on them, for confusing them and disrupting them *from inside*.

It is such an "unprincipled gang" that the Titoites are today. Their platform, known only by an inner ring, is the restoration or maintenance of capitalism, world domination of U.S. imperialism, war against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. Their immediate slogans are a hotch-potch of pseudo-left phraseology aimed at confusion, division, disruption, and directed against whatever is in the interests of the working class and the working people.

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Rajk made it clear. In the course of his trial the President of the

INSIDE TITO YUGOSLAVIA

THE COMMUNIST INFORMATION BUREAU, in its Resolution on Yugoslavia of June, 1948, warned the Yugoslav people where the false policy of the Tito group would inevitably lead their country:

"The Yugoslav leaders evidently do not understand or, probably, pretend they do not understand, that such a nationalist line can only lead to Yugoslavia's degeneration into an ordinary bourgeois republic, to the loss of its independence and to its transformation into a colony of the imperialist countries."

Has that stern warning been proved correct? A study of the conditions inside Tito Yugoslavia since the Information Bureau's Resolution, shows to what hard extremes of misery the rule of the Titiotes has brought the people of Yugoslavia.

The Working Class

It was inevitable that those who were secretly working for the betrayal of the Yugoslav national liberation movement, for the betrayal of the aims and struggles of the Yugoslav Communist Party, should hate the Yugoslav working class. The Titoites squeezed out the industrial workers from leading positions in Party and state, denied the leading role of the working class, belittled the actions of the workers in the partisan movement.

The lot of the workers in Tito Yugoslavia has been a very hard one. Their living conditions have grown steadily worse in the last three years. The cost of living has soared, wages have remained unchanged. Working hours have been steadily lengthened, speed-up systems and various forms of forced labour introduced; safety measures in dangerous industries are neglected and accident rates are rising. At the Ikarus factory, in Belgrade, for instance, working hours at the end of 1949 were in the neighbourhood of twelve hours per day, beyond which the workers were compelled to offer a number of unpaid "voluntary" labour hours. In a number of enterprises a system was introduced by which the workers had to pay "compensation" to the enterprise if they did not reach the norms established by the management.

The position of the Yugoslav miners is typical of the general position

of the working class. In 1949 some 450,000 were employed in the mines of Bosnia, Slovenia and Croatia and accident rates were conspicuously high. Lead and mercury poisoning is frequent in the Trepca mines in Serbia. There have been repeated accidents through the collapsing of mines at Bor. In Mostar miners are working knee-deep in water. Even *Borba*, the official Titoite daily, admitted (8.7.51) that in the Rastoka coal mines near Despotovac "the condition is sad".

"We, the miners," writes a worker from the Trepca lead mines, "live in torn-down barracks, ditches and stables."

The reaction of the workers to their miserable conditions has been expressed in a steadily growing mass absenteeism that has reached such proportions that even the official Titoite press has been forced to admit it. Workers leave their factories. The poorer peasants, despite their own miserable conditions in the countryside, refuse to enter industry, and when forcibly mobilised to do so flee away from the towns.

In 1949 absenteeism on the majority of Yugoslav building sites reached an average of over 60 per cent, in the mines 40-45 per cent. The Titoite trade union organ *Rad* reported towards the end of 1949 that during the first half of July, 1949, 4,306 new workers arrived for work at the Bor copper mines, whilst 5,070 left Bor during the same period. *Borba* admitted in July, 1949, that no less than 10,500 workers left the Trepca mines out of 11,000 who had been directed there.

In a speech at Split, in March 1950, Tito admitted that 400,000 workers out of 2,200,000 were absentees. Writing in *Borba* in July, 1950, the Yugoslav Minister of Labour reported that the majority of peasants "mobilised" for work in the mines had returned to the countryside. "We have not yet succeeded", he reported, "in getting the majority of them to become permanent workers."

By mid-1951, 400,000 of some 630,000 peasants mobilised for compulsory labour had absconded.

The "voluntary labour brigades" have been transformed into their opposite, into squads for forced labour. In 1948, in ninety-six Yugoslav mines, over one million hours were extorted unpaid from the workers. In 1949, 465,000 were enrolled, compulsorily, into the "voluntary work brigades" in Croatia.

To combat mass absenteeism, the Titoite government has been trying to use hunger as a weapon of compulsion. In 1949 the government tried to compel the workers to sign long-term labour contracts. They were met in general with widespread and stubborn refusal. So there was started a system-of withdrawing ration cards and ration privileges from those who refused to accept long-term contracts, thus putting

them at the mercy of the profiteers of the free market for food, clothing, and all the necessities of life, which means virtual starvation.

The official trade union organisation (Zemeljski Sindikalni Savez—Z.S.S.), instead of protecting the workers and defending the living standards, has been transformed into a weapon of the régime for enforcing the hard conditions on the workers. All the militant and fighting elements have been purged from official positions and many arrested as "Cominformists". All the important officials, from Djuro Salaj downwards, are "reliable" Titoites. The Z.S.S. agreed that workers who would not sign long-term labour contracts should be punished, expelled from the unions, and forfeit their food and clothing cards, often along with their entire families.

The anti-Titoite paper of Yugoslav political exiles in Czechoslovakia published the following letter from a factory worker in Rijeka (Fiume):

"Here, at the works, a new method was introduced; henceforth, it was decided, food and supply cards, would be distributed at the works office by the management instead of at the Municipal Office of Public Supply. In case of an 'unjustified' absence of a worker, his coupons for the day, including those of his family, are removed by the management. Textile and shoe coupons are distributed by the factory management only to those workers who have worked three to six months without absence from the works.

"... The meeting at which these fresh Titoite terror methods were announced to the workers of the factory was called by the Works Committee of the union. After the announcement the attitude of the workers was very hostile. Although those protesting were threatened with arrest, many remonstrated against these methods of slavery and declared that they would stop paying trade union dues because the union represented the fascist interests of the régime and not the interests of the workers." (Nova Borba, No. 24, 1950.) The Belgrade-published Republika reported on January 30, 1951:

"Under the influence of diverse factors, particularly mental depression, which seems to be spreading like a contagious disease, and concern about the future, many intellectuals and manual workers, who until recently performed their duties conscientiously, now work only out of fear of punishment, at best they do their work mechanically."

Even the legal Titoite press is forced to admit the growing opposition of the working class to the Tito regime. The Position of the Peasants

We saw in the first chapter that one of the main criticisms of the policy of the Titoites put forward by the first Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau was their attitude to the peasantry. The Titoites, claiming that they were leading Yugoslavia on the road to socialism, made no differentiation in their attitude to the peasantry, no efforts to restrict the kulaks, the rich peasants, no efforts to give special aid to the poor and middle peasants. They denied the existence of the class struggle in the countryside. They developed a special theory of "Yugoslav exceptionalism".

After the publication of the Information Bureau Resolution the Titoites made strenuous efforts to justify their position. The Serbian Titoite leader Neshkovic claimed at a Belgrade Conference on February 8, 1949, that the kulaks in Yugoslavia would play a progressive part in "building socialism":

"There is no need to add to the fiction about a class struggle in our countryside. Our kulaks are not the same as those in the U.S.S.R. They helped us in the war. They should therefore be regarded as part of the working peasantry. We must draw the kulaks into the committees of the people's power, into the People's Front, into the co-operatives and so on."

Bebler, Assistant Foreign Minister, and one of the immediate entourage of Tito, Kardelj and Rankovic, developed the same thesis (29.4.49):

"We have no kulaks such as there were in the U.S.S.R. Our rich peasants took part en masse in the people's liberation war. What is more, our kulaks, taking into account the existence of the U.S.S.R., learned a great deal about the fate of the kulaks in the U.S.S.R. Bearing this in mind they showed themselves to be more sensible and capitulated . . . Do we have to destroy the kulaks in order to satisfy fossilised dogmatic survivals? Would it be a mistake if we succeeded in getting the kulaks to pass over to socialism without a class struggle?"

Tito himself went further. He denied the very existence of kulaks, or of classes in the countryside. (Speech as Skoplje, beginning of August, 1949):

"We cannot say where the border between the middle peasant and the kulak begins or ends . . . One cannot judge an individual to be a kulak according to the number of hectares of land in his economy."

This is the theory of classes in the countryside which the Titoites

daily claim to be "true Leninism"—a theory of ending capitalism with the aid of the capitalists, denying the existence of classes, denying the stages in revolutionary advance to socialism and the different class alliances necessary at the different stages.

Lenin showed, again and again, that to build up socialism it was necessary first to restrict the kulaks as a class, to aid the poor and middle peasants, and to prepare the way for the eventual elimination of the kulaks as a class. He showed that a failure to do this would lead to a restoration of capitalism, to the exploitation of the poorer peasants, to the betrayal of the revolutionary struggle.

The last two years of development in the Yugoslav countryside have shown that the Titoite theory of the denial of class struggle in the countryside has led, in practice, as it was inevitably bound to do, to the growth of the kulak class, to the domination of the countryside by the kulaks, to the wholesale impoverishment of the mass of the working peasantry, to the wholesale exploitation of the poorer peasants by the rich.

The Titoite taxation policy spells ruin for the poor and middle peasants. Poor peasants who received land in the belated and restricted land reform were left without government aid in cheap credits, seed, agricultural equipment, draught animals, and therefore, with a taxation burden that they could not bear, quickly fell under kulak domination. The quotas fixed by the state for compulsory sale of agricultural produce at cheap prices to the authorities fell heavily on the poor and favoured the wealthy peasants. Obligatory quotas fixed in October 1949 compelled small peasants with 5-7 acres of land to hand over 450 kilograms of wheat, regardless of the quality of the land or the size of the peasant's family. Peasants with 7-11 acres had to hand over 850 kilograms, peasants with 45 acres or over a maximum of 1,700 kilograms. The result of these and other similar measures has been wholesale ruin for the masses of working peasantry. For non-fulfilment of compulsory contributions in kind, penalties are very heavy. Those not complying in time or in full are fined as much as 50,000 dinars, with an alternative of three months forced labour (clearing the forests, building roads, work in the mines under police surveillance).

In its issue of September 9, 1950, the paper *Vjesnik*, organ of the Titoites in Croatia, highly praised the authorities in one region for raising the compulsory grain quota for poor peasants by 20 per cent, leaving the peasants only 63 kilograms of grain per person per year for themselves. It called on other districts to follow suit. An early decree exempting the poorest peasants from taxation has been annulled, and according to the Montenegrin paper *Pobeda*, which describes the work of the "people's" administration in the Podgorica

area, the peasants in this area pay equal taxes irrespective of differences in income and property.

The result has been that poor and middle peasants, unable to meet the compulsory quotas, and endeavouring to escape the heavy penalties, borrow from the kulaks, to whom they become indebted, and under whose exploitation they increasingly fall.

Meanwhile the kulaks flourish. In 1948 a regulation was issued by which the peasants, irrespective of their category, could sell grain from their surplus products (quotas paid) to the state and receive in exchange, in lieu of money, coupons which could be exchanged for cheap industrial commodities-clothes, tools, furniture, etc.-all of extreme scarcity in Tito's Yugoslavia. This enabled the kulaks to use their surpluses not only to trade in grain but to speculate in coupons. Kulaks who accumulated large quantities of coupons or of the industrial goods which are exchanged for them began to trade them in the villages. So in the village market kulaks began to be seen not only selling draught animals, grain, milk, fats, but furniture, shoes, boots, spades, scythes, tools and even American gramophones—at inflated prices. Meanwhile the poor peasantry, the workers, lower civil servants and intellectual workers were often unable to purchase a toothbrush. To obtain these industrial goods from the kulak traders the poorer peasantry have to make over portions of their land or pay by their labour on the kulak farms.

The former Assistant Finance Minister of Serbia, Todor Todorovic, who took refuge from the Titoites in Bulgaria, revealed that Secret Order No. 17 of March 18, 1949, of the Serbian Ministry of Finance instructed the provincial authorities to revise (of course downwards) kulak taxation. In the Pancevo district taxes on kulak produce were reduced from 200 million dinars to 110 millions; in Negotin district from 112 million to 65.

Meanwhile the theory of the Titoites on the role of the kulaks in "building the new Yugoslavia" is being put into practice by wholesale admission of rich peasants into key positions in local administration organs in the countryside and in the "Popular Front" Committees.

Phoney Collectives

Nothing illustrates better the duplicity of Titoism, the hiding of reactionary right-wing policy under left-wing forms and phrases, than the phoney collective farms of Tito Yugoslavia. What is boosted as a striking illustration of advance to socialism turns out on closer examination to be a cunning form of maintaining kulak domination in the Yugoslav countryside.

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Formally the Titoites began to establish their "agricultural co-operatives" in 1946. By January 1950 they claimed 6,615 producers' co-operatives with some 4 million acres. The form of organisation is that the members "pay in" their land, draught animals and agricultural animals and draw out according to what they have paid in. Nor is this form of organisation considered as a first step to further development towards socialist agriculture at a later stage. Rather is it taken as the final form of collective farming. The kulak poor-peasant relationships are thus permanently conserved and even reinforced in these phoney collectives, in which the kulaks not only exercise economic domination but hold all the leading positions. This is why there is often willingness or even eagerness amongst the kulaks to enter the "co-operatives" and wholesale resistance from the poor and middle peasants.

Take the example of that rich agricultural area the Vojvodina. Here there are some 251,000 farm-holdings, of which 14,672 are kulak farms. In 1946 the "rural co-operatives" in the Vojvodina contained 34 kulak farms; in 1947, 217; in 1949, 7,122 or 50 per cent of the kulak holdings.

The incomes of the poorer members of the "co-operatives" reveal the exploitation which they outwardly conceal. In the Babic co-operative in the village of Dragotin near Prijedor the peasants receive 15 dinars per work-day unit; in the Naprijed co-operative (also Prijedor district) about 11 dinars. The average daily earnings of the poor peasants in the "co-operatives" are 15-20 dinars. Up to 30 per cent of the income goes as "rent" for the land contributed. In addition there are large payments made to the various office-holders, who are in general kulaks. Of 28 office-holders in the "co-operative" of Vrbanje in Croatia, 16 are kulaks. The rank-and-file "co-operative" members share out about 15 per cent of the total income of the co-operative in payment for their work. But even on these payments there are often long delays.

The Chairman of a Titoite "co-operative" in one Bosnian village drew out in cash and kind more than all the other 15 members put together, and sat at leisure while poor peasants did his work and cultivated his land. Some of the kulaks divide their land, putting part into the "co-operatives" as a profitable investment and using the profits to pay poor peasants to cultivate the rest. It was announced at the Slovenia Party Conference in 1950 that during that year the membership of the "co-operatives" in Slovenia had increased by 4 per cent whilst the land "pooled" had increased by 17 per cent. This shows the character of the peasants who are joining.

The capitalist press all over the world raged and stormed in the twenties and thirties against the development of collective socialist agriculture in the Soviet Union. No words have been strong enough in this same press to storm at and slander the development towards genuine socialist collective agriculture in the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe. But in Yugoslavia there has happened what, at first sight, might seem a miracle. Here is a "new kind of Communism" that captivates the capitalists, a "new type of collective" that warms their hearts. The *Economist* writes (18.2.50):

"In Yugoslavia collectivisation is more rapid than elsewhere, but persecution of kulaks is less severe. Kulaks are not, as in the other 'popular democracies', excluded in principle from the collective farms. . . Communist doctrinaires regard attempts at the collectivisation of agriculture without first liquidating the kulaks much as a dentist would regard the filling of a tooth without drilling away the decay. Tito's reason for this policy is, however, simple. His policy has already won him enough hatred; if he is to maintain his régime . . . he must at least abstain from antagonising the whole upper layer of the peasantry."

The phoney collectives of Tito Yugoslavia which the kulaks eagerly join, the poor peasants abhor and the *Economist* praises, are as much like the collectives in the People's Democracies as the Federation of British Industries is like a trade union of industrial workers. The collective farms of the People's Democracies bring together the small and middle peasants, raise their living standards, and reinforce their struggle against the village rich, the kulaks. In Tito's Yugoslavia the phoney co-operatives bring together the kulaks for the more ruthless exploitation of the working peasantry.

The kulak domination of the countryside, both inside and outside the phoney collectives, leads to increasing resistance of the working peasantry to the Tito régime, a resistance that is growing so wide-spread that even the official Titoite organs have to reckon with it and even Tito's most ardent capitalist supporters abroad have to comment on it. It is reflected in the refusal of masses of peasants to sow their crops. Even Tito had to admit in a speech in mid-March of 1950 at Drvar that the peasants were unwilling to comply with the compulsory taxes in kind. He was forced to recognise that:

"... the local authorities have been incorrectly imposing taxes on the peasants. Many have had their barns thoroughly cleared... Peasants are refusing to sow bread grain."

It is reflected in the refusal of the working peasants to join the

phoney collectives or in their sabotaging them when forced to do so. As Tito admitted at Drvar:

"When forced to join the co-operatives the peasants sell their implements and livestock or slaughter the cattle and thus commit a crime."

But his remedy was-threats, and a new law on "co-operatives" which provides for the death sentence for those "conducting undermining activity in the co-operatives" or "damaging co-operative property", and long terms of imprisonment for those illegally leaving the co-operatives.

The resistance of the peasants is reflected in refusal to pay taxes in cash or kind, resistance which is increasingly reaching the level of what are reported in the Titoite press as peasant "riots".

All the evidence of the developments in the Yugoslav countryside in the last three years goes to show that kulak domination is extending, that the Tito clique is basing itself on the kulaks in the countryside, and supports the justice of the resolution of the Communist Information Bureau of November, 1949, which stated that:

"The compulsory pseudo-co-operatives in the countryside are in the hands of kulaks and their agencies and represent an instrument for the exploitation of broad masses of the working peasants."

Yugoslavia's Economic Plight

The peasants resisted. And one of the main expressions of their resistance was the refusal to till the land. Why should they cultivate the land to have their produce seized by the Titoite tax collectors?

Already in 1949 the area of arable land was below that of the previous year and in 1950 it fell lower still. Even the official press had to admit it. The Sunday Times Belgrade correspondent quoting from Borba reported on May 14, 1950, that:

"... with less than a week left for making good our leeway, the spring-sowing campaign on the private sector of agriculture-still about 80 per cent of the arable land—is lagging dangerously behind.

"In Serbia, the newspaper said, only between 60 and 70 per cent of the land still tilled by 'free' peasants had been sown, in Bosnia-Hercegovina about 51 per cent, and in Croatia 45 per cent. In Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro the figures are all under 40 per cent."

As the year progressed the extent of the collapse of Yugoslav agriculture became ever clearer. A food-producing country was threatened with famine. Speaking in Llubljana, the capital of Slovenia, Kraiger, the Chairman of the Economic Council of Slovenia, declared in October, 1950:

"This year the maize crop in the Republic is 35 per cent below that of last year. . . . The sugar yield will be far less. There will not be enough sugar to supply the population. Fodder has not been stocked and peasants are slaughtering their cattle. . . . In the third quarter the delivery programme was carried out badly. Worse still was the situation with meat supplies to the population. . . ."

Observers of the internal developments in Yugoslavia had long forecast this disaster. They knew that the resistance of the mass of the peasantry, their refusal to cultivate the land, would lead to a catastrophic harvest. But as the results became known, the Titoites tried to find a pretext for the disaster by explaining it away by the drought. Drought there indeed was, but it does not account for more than a small proportion of the Yugoslav food shortage. The basic causes were non-cultivation of land by the peasants, the general kulak domination of the countryside and oppression of the working peasantry, together with the mass exports of foodstuffs to the Western capitalist countries. The Times correspondent at Trieste reported on October 10, 1950:

"This year's harvest in Yugoslavia is said to amount to less than half the 1949 harvest, and to have been poorer than that of 1944, a year of heavy fighting in most parts of the country . . . peasants have been openly refusing to deliver their produce to the Government . . . The slaughter of cattle temporarily improved meat supplies in the towns, but last week's reports indicate that the meat ration has again become minute."

The correspondent admits that if the drought was one of the causes of this disaster it was "not the only one" and adds:

"According to official admissions, no more than three-fifths to four-fifths of the acreage tilled in Yugoslavia before the war was cultivated this year. The reason is in part the peasants lack of inducement to do more work than strictly necessary, because the prices paid for their crops are low and no consumer goods are available. Contributory causes are the lack of agricultural machinery, and even of ordinary tools. . . . Production also fell on state-owned collective farms. . . "

The Swiss National-Zeitung wrote at the end of October (26.10.50): "Not since the end of the war has the situation been so bad and never has the Titoite régime encountered such difficulties as was the case at the end of the autumn, on the threshold of a winter that threatens the Yugoslav people with hunger and hardship, and the Yugoslav régime with disorder and anxiety. . . . Prices are soaring and poverty is growing month by month."

Rakosi, the Vice-Premier of the Hungarian People's Republic, exposed the Titoite "excuse" that the cause of the famine was solely the drought:

"The Tito gang puts responsibility for the economic crisis and chaos on this year's drought: we in Hungary also experienced a drought this year. Certainly no milder than that in Yugoslavia. As is also known, the vital agricultural regions of Yugoslavia are located along the Hungarian border; the drought was absolutely the same in Mako and Velika-Kikind, in Szeged and Subotica, Baia and Sombor, Pecs and Osijek. And yet the drought in our country did not cause such misfortunes as in Yugoslavia because our peasants, helped by the People's Democratic State, enthusiastically, promptly and in good time, completed all agricultural work, which, to a considerable degree, offset the effects of the drought." (Rakosi, Speech to Plenum of the Hungarian United Working People's Party, October 27, 1950.)

The drought hit Yugoslavia's other neighbours, Bulgaria and Rumania; but the states of People's Democracy, with a working peasantry supporting the government and state, and a government and state supporting the working peasantry, were able to withstand it and offset its consequences.

Nor is the situation any better in Yugoslav industry than in the countryside. The Five-Year Plan, even according to official sources, has failed dismally. In 1948 the plan targets were not reached (officially) in the electrical, metallurgical, coal, food, textile, glass, chemical and other industries. In 1949 the situation was worse. The report of the Tito Government to U.N.O.'s Economic Committee for Europe (E.C.E.) admitted that in the first half of 1949 Yugoslav industrial output fell by 20 per cent. In 1950 a whole series of industries failed to complete even 50 per cent of the year's targets, and Kardelj and other Yugoslav leaders were speaking of the need for at least a further year's extension to begin to reach towards the five-year targets. In all the countries in Eastern Europe with long-term plans, in Yugoslavia alone was failure reported.

The inevitable result of the disastrous situation in agriculture and industry was the rapid fall in living standards. Whilst rationing remained in force the rations were more and more unfulfilled and the

working people forced to turn to the free market with its profiteers' prices. Rations, in theory, in 1950, were supposed to cover some 35 per cent of the requirements of the people. In fact they hardly covered 15 per cent of their essential needs. The meat, sugar, fat and oil coupons were often not worth more than the paper on which they were printed. The New York Herald Tribune, in general an enthusiast for the Titoites, recognised (16.9.50) that the entire population depended on the free market. And what was the situation in the free market? It was a situation of incredible shortages of the most elementary consumption goods and of fantastically inflated prices. Study for a moment the reports of eye-witnesses published in journals that on matters political are ardent supporters of the Tito régime.

The correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* wrote from Zagreb (11.5.50):

"The shortage of goods is just as grave in Zagreb as everywhere else in Yugoslavia. Even the most common every-day necessities such as needles, cotton, soap, etc., are unobtainable. The lucky foreigner who receives a parcel from home could make his or her Yugoslav friend very happy indeed by giving a tooth-brush or a card of snapfasteners as a present. The shop-windows look miserable! A few metres of light material, a few bottles of inferior Eau de Cologne, a range of coarse brushes, cane baskets. . . "

In the same month the *Neue Zuricher Zeitung* correspondent reported (14.5.50):

"In the Explanade Café in Zagreb one is served with some sort of a liquid in a chipped cup which resembles coffee by its colour only. People in the streets show signs that they must be living under difficult circumstances. The shortage of goods—in cloth, soap, needles, cotton, razor-blades, and in every possible kind of every-day necessities—is just as great in Zagreb as everywhere else in Yugoslavia."

G. E. R. Gedye, an enthusiast for Tito's anti-Soviet activity, wrote in *Tribune*, a journal which ardently boosts the Tito régime (9.6.50):

". . . fantastic prices are paid for such simple things as razorblades and pocket-combs. I myself saw a Yugoslav sell a used comb, which was worth new perhaps 3s. 6d., for 350 dinars." [viz., £1 15s., at 200 dinars to the £ sterling, before the devaluation of the £. After devaluation, still more in terms of sterling.]

In July, 1950, the *New York Herald Tribune* correspondent Gaston Coblentz reported in detail on the living conditions of the Yugoslav people:

FROM TROTSKY TO TITO

"With practically the entire Belgrade population depending on the free market to eke out sufficient nourishment, it was seen today that prices of some basic items have gotten so far out of hand that it takes about 20 per cent of an average city dweller's monthly income to buy two pounds of butter.

"The situation can be gauged by measuring a few other items against the average city wage of 4,000 dinars a month.

"Two pounds of sugar, 500 dinars. Last year about 200.

"Two pounds of coffee, 1,700 to 2,000 dinars. Last year 1,000 to 1,200.

"Two pounds of lard, 550 dinars. Last year 250.

"A litre of cooking oil (sunflower seed), 650 to 700 dinars. Last year 200 to 300.

"A pair of chickens, 450 to 700 dinars. Last year, 200 to 300.

"Two pounds of tomatoes, 150 dinars. Last year 30 to 40.

"Two pounds of pork, 500 dinars. Last year 300 to 400.

"The conditions are causing a great deal of scarcely veiled grumbling. They are attributed by qualified Western economic observers mainly to the following causes:

- "(1) Premier Marshal Tito's Government is failing to supply the peasant population with any but the shoddy rationed consumer goods. This is driving peasants to demand higher and higher prices for their free-sale produce in order to be able to buy consumer items at exorbitant prices on the free market in the capital.
- "(2) Large-scale exporting of food by the régime. . . .
- "(3) Heavy monetary taxation of sizeable sections of the peasant population."

(New York Herald Tribune, continental edition, 10.7.50.)

It is only necessary to comment on this report that the surplus goods for sale in the free market at "exorbitant prices" came only from the kulak section of the peasantry, whilst the "heavy monetary taxation" falls overwhelmingly on the working peasantry, the poor and middle peasants.

The same correspondent visited the town of Subotica near the Hungarian border and in a strongly pro-Tito anti-Hungarian article reported that:

"The shops around a small and pretty park in the middle of the city are an index of the economic situation. The meaning of the following prices in the *Narodni Magasin* (People's Store) may be graphed by measuring them against an average city-dweller's wage of 4,000 dinars a month:

"A plain tablespoon, 520 dinars. [Remember that there were 200 dinars to the £1 before devaluation of sterling, now less—J. K.] Poorest quality men's shirts, 721-1,000 dinars [no others available] . . . 'woollen' blankets that customers poke their fingers through, 2,878 dinars. Poor quality men's sweaters 1,895 dinars. . . ."

Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, M.P., who is very approving of Tito's "liberal Leninism", as he calls it, who sees Tito, whom he has done so much to promote, as a useful anti-Soviet instrument, nevertheless had to admit, reporting on his journey through Yugoslavia in September, 1950, that there is:

". . . a devastating shortage of consumer goods. The difficulty of finding anything for money to buy has led to large-scale absenteeism in industry and an ever-increasing tendency on the part of the peasants, already disgruntled by government interference, to produce only as much food as they need for themselves." (Sunday Times, 17.9.50.)

Ian Mackay, reporting from Belgrade to the News Chronicle, stated early in September, 1950, that:

"... the ration [of butter and sugar] has not been honoured for several weeks. Prices in the free market are soaring astronomically. Compared with last year, butter is up from 40s. to 60s. lb.; sugar from 20s. to 50s.; potatoes from 1s. 6d. to 10s.; lard from 20s. to 50s.; coffee from 70s. to 200s.; and eggs from 1s. 8d. to 3s. each." [They were about 3d. each when I was in Belgrade in 1946—J. K.] (News Chronicle, 18.9.50.)

Denis Martin, reporting his trip through Yugoslavia at the end of 1950, in the *Daily Herald*, which has surpassed itself these last two years in friendliness for Tito, wrote in these terms about the situation in Belgrade:

"I found myself in a milling mass of human scarecrows, people whom the desperate shortage of suits, dresses, coats, stockings, shoes and hats has robbed of all style and fashion. Sparse meals remind them hourly of what the winter will bring. The basic rations have not been honoured in full for many weeks. . . .

"The Yugoslavs are forced more and more into the so-called 'free markets', where soaring prices and a primitive barter system mirror the impossibility of any sort of normal life. Here for the desperate housewife, potatoes fetch 3s. 8d. a pound; bread 3s. 10d. a pound; and meat 14s. a pound. Sugar, butter and cooking fats are well out of reach at between 25s. and 30s. a pound, while tea and coffee have risen to the incredible levels of £10 and £5 per

pound respectively. . . . The most elementary needs of daily life are lacking. To buy a pair of weather-worthy shoes the workers must save a month's pay. No one can find good soap. A tube of toothpaste will change hands at 30s. Anxious-faced women spend days in the search for needles, thread, darning wool and buttons. . . .

"Public morale is not good and public health gives cause for anxiety. 'These people', said an overworked and weary doctor, 'are ravaged by tuberculosis.' Shortages of soap and hot water are inducing a record incidence of scabies and give encouragement to the sicknesses of social distress." (Daily Herald, 28.11.50.)

The U.S. News and World Report, an extreme right-wing journal of the United States, which has given much favourable publicity to the Titoites and constantly presses for U.S. support for the Tito régime, describes how Tito is selling the Yugoslav people into bondage, "mortgaging" the country's wealth, to the U.S. capitalists:

"Not much question Tito is in a jam, and desperately needs outside help. Starvation in some parts of Yugoslavia is possible unless food comes from abroad. . . . Tito is already mortgaging Yugoslavia's future exports to pay for past imports. . . Quality of even heavy goods is often inferior. Half-finished buildings testify to bad planning. Labour turnover is very high. At the big Trepca lead mines, for instances [also mortgaged to the U.S.A. —J. K.], of 11,000 workers taken on, 10,500 quit within a few months." (U.S. News and World Report, 24.11.50.)

These are the "glories" of the "new kind of Communism" proclaimed by Zilliacus. This is the fruit of the Titoite policy of breaking the friendship and mutual co-operation with the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. This is the fruit of that "benevolent generous aid" of the U.S.A. and the other Western imperialist states. With wages frozen, rations unfulfilled, fantastic rise of prices of all essentials, incredible shortage of the most elementary consumption goods, ill-health spreading, the unhappy Yugoslav people have very rapidly been brought to the depths of misery by the Titoites from the high hopes at the end of the war.

An unending stream of similar reports could be quoted, reports culled from the pro-Titoite press of the West, as well as reports smuggled out from Tito Yugoslavia from the people themselves. They confirm one another. Meanwhile a few "guests" of the West, some bought, some misled, are wined and dined and fêted at the best hotels by Titoite officials, personally conducted to a few well-prepared "model" institutions, and come back as Titoite propagandists—just as

the "guests" of Hitlerite Germany used to return swearing that Hitler wanted peace, that the German people were prosperous, and that concentration camps and Jew-baiting were a "myth of the Comintern".

The condition of the Yugoslav masses corresponds more every day, under the régime of the Titoites, to that of a typical semi-colony of Western imperialism.

The Oppression of the Yugoslav People

And, like the people of any colonial or semi-colonial country the Yugoslav working population faces not only economic but political oppression. The arrests of leading Communists and national liberation leaders began, even before the publication of the Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau, with the arbitrary arrest of Hebrang and Zhujovic, members of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, in April, 1948.

As soon as the Resolution had been published and the criticism of some of the world's greatest and most experienced Communist Parties could no longer be withheld from the members of the Yugoslav Party, the Titoites began a full-scale drive of arrest and persecution. All who stood up for continued friendship with the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies or who in any way openly criticised the betrayal of the Titoites were expelled from the Party, arrested, imprisoned or thrown into concentration camps.

In Novisad, for instance, about eighty Communists were expelled from the Party in the first few days after the publication of the Resolution. Of seventeen members of the Party Committee at Kladovo, only two supported Tito (one was the local secret police chief). Of the twenty-five leading propagandists of the Regional Committee of Bosnia-Hercegovina, only one supported Tito. Thirty-nine out of forty members of the City Party Committee at Sarajevo supported the criticisms of the Communist Information Bureau. The reply was mass expulsion and arrest. The Fifth Congress of the Party, which was held in July, 1948, was preceded and followed by a wave of arrests and even assassinations. Members of the leading Party Committees were expelled at Sarajevo, Rijeka, Zajecar, Negotin, Bijelo-Polje, Crkvenica, Pola, Pristina, and from towns and villages all over the country. More than twenty Ministers were arrested from the Federal and State Governments.

In 1949 and 1950 the attack on the people grew ever more open. Whilst war criminals and former collaborators were released from the prisons, their places were filled by leading Communists and Partisans. But as the old prisons were not sufficient there was large-scale exten-

sion of prison installations and establishment of old-style fascist concentration camps. Communists often went back to the same prisons that they had known under the dictatorship between the wars.

Amongst the arrested were some of the foremost leaders of the National Liberation Army. General Arso Jovanovic was assassinated. He had been one of the main organisers of the first Partisan detachments in 1941, and from July, 1941, for the rest of the war Chief of Staff of the Liberation Forces. Always disliked by the British and American military liaison leaders for his firm adherence to the interests of the Yugoslav people, he had been replaced by Koca Popovic (a former surrealist and persona grata with the Western missions and Embassies) when the war ended. Appointed head of the Yugoslav Military Academy in July, 1948, he supported the criticisms of the Titoites made by the Information Bureau, and was assassinated in August.

General Slavko Rodic, youngest Partisan general, was murdered in jail. Amongst those arrested in the highest army circles were General Branko Petricevic, General Krdjic, the National Hero Colonel Sava Stanojevic, Colonel Vlado Dapcevic and Major-General Moma Djuric, who organised the insurrection in the Macva and commanded Tito's Guards Battalion. Five members of the editorial staff of the Army paper Narodna Armija were "purged". Major-General Pero Popivoda of the Yugoslav air force had to take refuge abroad to escape arrest. His brother, a major in the army, a Partisan from the first days of struggle in 1941, was deprived of his rank, arrested and put to torture on the news of his brother Pero's action. General Popivoda's mother, who had given six members of her family to the Partisan forces, was exiled from Belgrade. And these are only a handful of examples from thousands of officers and soldiers, with brilliant records in the liberation struggle, who met with a similar fate.

The same oppression—arrest, torture and often murder—was turned against all sections of the working population. The highest state crime was to be a "Cominformist", that is to stand for friendship with the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies, for loyalty to socialist principles. Amongst those who suffered most were the youth and students. Thousands of students were expelled from the universities and hundreds arrested. It was in Belgrade University with its great traditions of struggle against fascism and dictatorship, a centre of strong Marxist influence even in the old days of the dictatorship, that the first and strongest resistance to the Titoites arose. And it was the students of Belgrade University who suffered the heaviest blows.

Many of Yugoslavia's leading left-wing intellectuals were arrested,

including several of the best-known professors of Belgrade University and the poet Radovan Zogovic, one of the most prominent of the Partisan poets.

The oppression turned against the foreign population. A whole number of Soviet citizens who had lived long years in Yugoslavia were arrested on trumped-up charges. Two thousand Macedonian and Bulgarian citizens who wanted to leave the country for Bulgaria were refused permission. Foreign journalists who reported the opposition to the Titoites were expelled from the country, whilst the doors were opened wide to all the representatives of the worst red-hating and red-baiting press of Britain and America.

The Belgrade correspondent of *The Times* summed up his observations in these words:

"Persons may be arrested without reason given and kept in prison for months without trial on a simple order from the Minister of the Interior. . . .

"To root out Cominformist opposition within the Communist Party and to enforce the collection from the peasants of produce quotas the Government has made numerous arrests. . . . Most observers estimate the number of persons now in prison at anything from 100,000 to 200,000. Certainly, in spite of a grave shortage of labour and materials for building, prison accommodation has been steadily expanded. It is impossible to say how many of the prisoners have actually been tried."

It was estimated that by mid-1951 there were 200,000 patriots in Titoite jails, including 15,000 officers and several thousand N.C.O.s. Some 9,500 trade union functionaries were arrested in 1950 alone.

Inside the jails and concentration camps there is a Hitlerian régime of starvation, floggings, and all the refinements of the Gestapo.

To carry through these repressive measures against the working people the Titoite clique has had to convert the key organs of state power into organs of repression directed against the mass of people who want Yugoslavia to move forward to socialism. In this the development of a "reliable", i.e. anti-socialist, anti-working-class, army and secret police has been amongst Tito's first aims.

Right from the formation of the first Partisan detachments in 1941 the Titoite group, operating secretly inside the Yugoslav Communist Party and inside the liberation forces, conspired to place their own men in the key positions in the armed forces. Some of Tito's main associates like Peko Dapcevic, Koca Popovic, Ivan Gosnjak were pushed into leading positions. A number of officers from the old Royal Yugoslav Army, renowned for its reactionary Great Serb (Serb

chauvinist) outlook, were admitted into the Partisan forces, confirmed in their original ranks, and quickly promoted to the most vital positions. Officers who came over from the various quisling forces—Ustashi (Croat terrorists), Domobranci (army of the "independent", i.e. Axis puppet Croatian state), Slovene "White Guards", and followers of Mihailovic—were treated likewise. Such men were Colonel Krishanic who commanded a Pavelic unit, but was taken prisoner by the Partisans and promoted by Tito to the rank of major-general, or Suleiman Filipovic who was a lieutenant-colonel in the puppet Croatian army and is now a highly placed army instructor.

Today the Yugoslav Army, with Tito himself as its Supreme Commander, with his chief associates in key positions—Ivan Gosnjak, Kocha Popovic (son of a Belgrade millionaire), Peko Dapcevic, Otmar Kreacic, etc.—and with former Cetniks, Ustashi and reactionary officers of the old régime Royal Army in positions of command, is an open weapon of reaction. Lieutenant-General Ulepic of the old Royal Army commands the Air Force; Josip Cerni from the Royal Yugoslav Navy is a vice-admiral in Tito's fleet; Major-General Jovanovic, formerly of the Royal Yugoslav Army, Cetnik and Great Serb chauvinist, commands Tito's artillery; Apostolski of the old Royal Army is a Lieutenant-General, chief of the Sarajevo military district. A key position is occupied by Colonel Radoslav Djuric, one of the main associates of Mihailovic in Serbia and renowned for his ill-treatment of the Serb population.

No sooner had the Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau been published at the end of June, 1948, than a furious purge started in the Yugoslav Army, which has continued to this day. The mass of the soldiers came from the people and wanted friendship with the Soviet Union. Many had fought heroically to defeat the Axis and build what they hoped would be a new Yugoslavia of the people. They could not be trusted. And so while in every People's Democracy in Eastern Europe a new people's army is being forged, new cadres of officers are being drawn from the people, workers and small peasants become generals and air marshals, in Tito Yugoslavia the leading ranks of the army are filled with Tito's own chief associates and with the officers of the old régime.

That is why the right-wing press of America speaks of Tito's Army, alongside the forces of Franco and the Nazis, as an integral part of the Western imperialist bloc. That is why that reactionary of reactionaries, former Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, could proclaim in January, 1951, on taking the oath as Governor of South Carolina:

"Since last September we have been discussing with France and

Britain what limitations should be placed on military forces recruited in Western Germany. That time should have been spent encouraging Western Germany to raise an army . . . we should send Spain more than an ambassador. We should send military supplies as rapidly as possible. . . We should seek the friendship of Tito and furnish military supplies to Yugoslavia. Tito has trained soldiers. . . . " (*U.S. News and World Report*, 26.1.51.)

That is why President Truman rushed in during the last weeks of 1950 to despatch the \$12 million worth of food to Tito's Army. The Nazis, Franco's forces and Tito's Army were considered "reliable allies".

Equally, and perhaps even more vital for the Titoites was the problem of converting the secret police, the civil and military security forces, into a "reliable" anti-popular weapon.

The evidence given at the Rajk, Kostov and Koci Xoxe trials showed that from 1941 onwards the Titoites had filled the leading positions in the security forces with foreign agents, members of the police and secret police of the old régime, reliable members of the clique headed by Rankovic. It was from such sources that, from the beginning, the leading cadres of O.Z.N.A. (the so-called Department for the Defence of the People) were picked. It was such "reliable" enemies of the working class who engineered the removal and murder in one way or another of leading Communists like Ivan (Lolo) Ribar, leader of the Young Communist League, General Milutinovic and General Petar Drapsin in the course of the war.

In 1948 the purge of the security forces by the Titoites was taken a step further, even before the publication of the Information Bureau Resolution. O.Z.N.A. had been replaced by the U.D.B. (State Security Board) comprising police, frontier guards and all types of secret police.

Veselin Popovic, a former colonel of the U.D.B. who escaped from the Titoites, disgusted by the role that he was ordered to fulfil, reports that in April, 1948, a meeting was called of U.D.B. representatives from all over Yugoslavia, presided over by Rankovic, to discuss action against the genuine Communists, increased activity abroad, and the establishment of a special agency for "removing Cominformists". Following this meeting a new purge was carried out inside the U.D.B. since many previously considered "reliable" could no longer be counted on to carry out the openly anti-Soviet, anti-progressive programme of sabotage in the People's Democracies and of physical liquidation of the genuine left now openly outlined by Rankovic and Tito.

The U.D.B., suitably purged of all progressive elements, has come to dominate all sections of the Yugoslav state machine in a way reminiscent of the role of the Gestapo. U.D.B. officials dominate the "Party" organisations, the local councils, the mass and so-called "popular" organisations.

Rankovic himself serves as General Secretary in the "Union of Veterans of the People's Liberation Struggle", and leading positions are held by the Police Ministers of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia. U.D.B. officials hold leading positions in the cultural and educational organisations. U.D.B. officials have been put into many of the key posts in the national economy.

Lieutenant-General Micunovic, a former deputy of Rankovic, has been made Director-General of Metallurgy; Lieutenant-General Maks, former chief of the espionage department of U.D.B., has become Minister of Marine Transport; Colonel Jovan Bojovic, who once organised in Bulgaria and formerly held the post of chief of the personnel department of U.D.B., has been put in charge of civil airlines.

The Titoites, therefore, have turned the state machinery of the Yugoslavia that emerged from the Second World War into the very opposite of that for which people made their sacrifices and gave their lives in the national liberation struggle. The state that should have operated in the interests of the working people against the old ruling class and external reaction, has been transformed into an apparatus operating against the working people of Yugoslavia in the interests of foreign reaction and of the restoration of capitalism at home.

While some external forms of popular democracy were conserved to confuse progressive people at home and abroad, the *content* of the state of Tito's Yugoslavia became one of open repression of the workers, working peasantry and progressive intelligentsia. The Army and security organisations that the people helped to forge for use against the Axis murderers and domestic quislings were transformed by treachery from within into organs for attack on the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies abroad and the working masses led by the genuine Communists at home.

Power was taken into the hands of the Titoites by a secret putsch organised from within the Communist Party and the state. For a time the rulers of Yugoslavia were compelled publicly to carry out the political and economic policy demanded by the people. As Rankovic explained to Rajk:

"It should be clearly understood that neither Tito nor other members of the Yugoslav Government wanted, after Liberation, to establish a democratic system in Yugoslavia and to build socialism. And if they were compelled, nevertheless, to undertake . . . revolutionary measures . . . this was not because they wanted seriously to carry out this programme of socialism; they were forced to do this only under the pressure of the masses of the Yugoslav working people." (Verbatim Report of Rajk Trial.)

And with power in their hands the Titoite clique proceeded to transform the Yugoslav state into a repressive state of a fascist type, conserving wherever possible the earlier external forms of organisation in order the better to conceal their *real* aims and in order to confuse the people.

But the Titoites, with their plan of restoring capitalism, could not simply transform Yugoslavia into a bourgeois democracy. The Yugoslav people had strong revolutionary fraditions, deep experiences of the national liberation struggle. If allowed even a limited democracy, they would have used this to throw out the traitors, to remove the Titoites. In trying to turn history backwards, to lead their people from incipient People's Democracy back to capitalism, the Titoites inevitably needed a strong repressive state apparatus of a dictatorial fascist type. Before Tito, his predecessor Trotsky had already seen this. It was such a régime that Trotsky dreamed of imposing on the Soviet peoples if he could seize power by a secret counter-revolutionary putsch. Radek, speaking of Trotsky's letter of December, 1935, the existence of which was confirmed by Pyatakov and Serebriakov, explained in his evidence at the trial of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre:

"In the sphere of politics, a new note in this letter was the way it posed the question of power. In this letter Trotsky said: there can be no talk of any democracy. The working class have lived through eighteen years of revolution, and it has vast appetites; and this working class will have to be sent back partly to privately owned factories and partly to state-owned factories which will have to compete with foreign capital under most difficult conditions. That means that the living standards of the working class will be drastically lowered. In the countryside the struggle of the poor and middle peasants against the kulaks will be renewed. And then, in order to hold power, we shall need a strong Government, irrespective of what forms are employed to veil it." [My italics—J. K.] (Trial of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre, Verbatim Report, p. 114.)

It is the plan which Trotsky failed to accomplish, that Tito, his

successor, is endeavouring to carry out in Yugoslavia today. Tito has carried out a *coup d'état* of a Bonapartist type, of the type that Stalin was describing when he wrote in 1927:

"Bonapartism is an attempt to impose the will of the minority on the majority by force. Bonapartism is the forcible seizure of power in the party or in the country by the minority against the majority." (Stalin, Collected Works, Russian edition, Vol. X, p. 164.)

Power was seized by a secret coup d'état by the secret Titoite group inside the Party. But the Titoites, in order to maintain power, and to "impose the will of the minority on the majority", are working to restore capitalism in Yugoslavia. Though this is not a single act that takes place overnight, and though the Titoites are trying every conceivable trick to disguise their restoration of capitalism, every day the developing class basis of Titoism is emerging more clearly.

In the countryside, as we have seen, they base themselves on the rich peasants, the kulaks, who are exploiting the mass of the working peasantry and reducing them to a state of penury. Today 72,000 kulak farms possess two and a half times the land held by 629,000 small farms.

The nationalised sector of Yugoslav industry does not operate in the interests of the working people. Nationalisation, as we know from British experience, does not in itself mean socialism, even if the government in office cares to describe it as such. Whether state control of industry is socialised or not depends, in the last analysis, on the character of the state that is controlling industry, and the Yugoslav state has been transformed by the Titoites into a reactionary machine, operated by a bureaucracy, a caste, and working to subordinate the country to foreign, mainly U.S. imperialism, and to restore capitalism. The nationalised industries in Yugoslavia have become essentially a means for exploiting the people in the interests of Western capitalism. Just as Tito's phoney collective farms cover up kulak exploitation of the working peasantry, so the Titoite nationalised industries cover up caste rule and the exploitation of foreign imperialism.

The most recent demagogic measure of the Titoites, the so-called decentralisation measures, cover up, in fact, a partial return to private capitalist ownership in industry. Tito himself declared in mid-December, 1950, that a number of industrial concerns would be "denationalised" and handed back to their former private owners. Very significant is the disbandment of a whole series of state agricultural machine stations and the handing over of the machines to the phoney collectives, that is to the kulaks. The process of placing the

management of certain industrial enterprises in the hands of what the Titoites call "labour collectives", while final control remains in the hands of the Titoite state, was most nearly paralleled in Mussolini's "labour (fascist) corporations".

The much vaunted "decentralisation", or abolition of Ministries and central state organs which formerly acted as forms of state regulation of the national economy (five economic Ministries and the Central Planning Commission), simply covers, in a typically demagogic way, the handing over of control of Yugoslav economy to foreign imperialism. This is what is proclaimed by the Titoite "theoreticians" as the "withering away of the state".

The class basis of the Tito state consists of the kulaks in the country-side and the reviving capitalist class in the towns. Trade has now returned almost entirely into the hands of private traders. The state monopoly of foreign trade has been abolished and facilities granted to separate organisations, enterprises and individuals to trade with foreign firms. Over 100 export-import firms and nine export agencies are now functioning.

Western imperialism openly boasts how, as a result of "persuasion" the Titoites have returned to capitalism. The American business organ, U.S. News and World Report, carried an article in its issue of August 3, 1951, headed "Tito finds Communism doesn't pay—Nation facing bankruptcy, turns to West". It boasted of the connection between Western aid and the renunciation of socialism.

"... a switch away from rigid planning and control is being installed now that Tito is looking more and more to the West for the help he needs. A measure of free economy is to be restored, replacing the Communist method of doing business. As one small example, the men who have been responsible for distributing manufactured goods to the stores have been on straight salaries. Now they are going to be put on sales commissions . . . Bankers are coming in as accountants to get some order into industrial bookkeeping. . . . Trained specialists in business and production are to be put above the party bosses. . . . Central distribution of raw materials is to be limited. Companies will be allowed to retain 70 per cent of net profits for reinvestment, with the idea of encouraging improvements and free competition. Changes in the wage system to pattern it after the U.S. rather than Russia, are under study. . . . Critics say it is high time, because the country is just about broke".

This business organ of U.S. monopoly, which regularly inveighs against the development of "socialism" in Labour Britain, finds the

"free economy", "profits", "free competition" and "U.S. wage pattern" of Tito Yugoslavia very satisfying.

In London, the *Economist* (1.9.51)) echoed the enthusiasm of its U.S. colleague. It wrote of "a spectacular statement from Belgrade heralding new internal reforms" that were to come into effect not later than January 1, 1952—reforms "which would touch the heart of the Yugoslav economy much more nearly than any of the previous steps towards administrative decentralisation and the reduction of political privilege". The proposals, announced the *Economist*, had been published under the arresting title "Preparations for the Institution of a New System of Economic Planning and Finance".

What were these reforms that, according to the *Economist*, deserve the respectful attention of the West? In the first place, "the federal government . . . proposes to relinquish detailed economic planning to the separate republics, and they in turn will delegate to the local authorities and the individual 'economic enterprises'". Secondly, "the enterprises themselves are to be allowed to retain their net profits". Thirdly, "the workers are to share in this freeing of profits through bonus payments, and conversely, if the enterprise does not make enough to cover the basic wage bill, the workers will have to go short". Fourthly, (and how "new", how "revolutionary", what a new "development of Marxism"!) "prices are to be determined by the market, that is, by supply and demand".

These latest proposals fill the *Economist* with joy. They "can only be welcomed by the West" it declares delightedly. The *Daily Mail* correspondent, Alexander Clifford, is even more ecstatic at the prospect of Tito's new economic reform. "If it comes off", he writes (31.8.51), "Yugoslavia looks like ending up a good deal less socialised than Britain". He reviews with satisfaction Tito's promised economic measures: "price of goods . . . determined by the market—that is, by supply and demand"—"wages and salaries . . . fixed on the basis of the income or profits of the enterprise"—economic enterprises that "decide independently what to produce and in what quantities".

And he concludes—and how correctly—"there isn't much classical Marxism in all of that".

The business journals of the U.S.A. and Britain welcome Tito's "new kind of Communism"—"liberal Communism" the *Daily Mail* correspondent calls it. For what it has become is—a rather old sort of capitalism.

The whole country is being brought under the rule of foreign and mainly American imperialism.

Under the rule of the Titoites Yugoslavia has returned to capitalism, but not to capitalist democracy. Yugoslavia today is a semi-colonial

country ruled over by a reactionary caste operating a police state of a fascist type in the interests of foreign imperialism abroad and the kulaks and reviving capitalists at home.

A report on Tito's Yugoslavia given in December, 1950, by an Austrian Carinthian, Andrej Haderlap, is of special interest, since Haderlap was one of the officials of the Freedom Front (organisation of the Slovene minority) in Carinthia, who, after the publication of the Information Bureau Resolution in mid-1948, supported Tito, and was expelled from the Austrian Communist Party. He therefore became persona grata with the Titoites. After visiting Slovenia, where he knew the language and was able to move about as he pleased, he wrote in April, 1950:

"In 1949, I visited Yugoslavia three times, and, in the course of those visits, I was able to see the justice of the Communist Information Bureau criticism that Yugoslavia was following a wrong road. I was able to see that the position in regard to the Soviet Union of the Yugoslav leadership had completely changed, that in Yugoslavia only a part of the population, those who hold leading positions, live comfortably and luxuriously, whilst the working people go hungry.

"It is an incontrovertible fact that in Yugoslavia old-established Communists are imprisoned. The prisons are full of them, and in their places are members of the Tito clique or even former supporters of Mihailovic, the White Guard or collaborators with the Nazis and Gestapo. . . .

"I am of the opinion, now, that a Yugoslav clique has got hold of the leading positions, a clique which has nothing in common with Communist ideology or the working class. . . .

"The political line of the Democratic Front has also changed. Its Central Committee in Slovenia has only one aim: struggle against the Communist Party of Austria, against the People's Democracies and, above all, against the Soviet Union. The betrayal of the Tito clique has definitely shown that those who separate themselves from the progressive camp, inevitably, sooner or later, go over to the side of imperialism and fascism."

Resistance of the Yugoslav People

The Titoite gang has led the Yugoslav people to disaster. Once again they face famine. Once again a rich country pours out its wealth into the hands of foreign capitalists and of a tiny minority at home, whilst the mass of the people go hungry. Once again those who labour are those who suffer and are poor. Once again police and army arrest

those who struggle for better conditions and condemn them, often without trial, to the sufferings of jail and concentration camp. Once again a reactionary government is trying to maintain itself in power by inciting national hatred, trying to rule by division. Once again a reactionary clique in power is endeavouring to turn the people against their real friends and allies abroad and to deliver them to the mercy of their real enemies and exploiters. All that the Yugoslav peoples knew and suffered between the wars and even worse—they know and suffer today.

But with ever-greater organisation and in ever-greater strength, the people are moving into resistance against the Titoites.

At first the people were confused and disarmed by the treachery of the Tito group. Opposition was of an unorganised character and found expression in individual acts of resistance, mainly by the workers. Individual workers did not turn up to the unpaid ("voluntary") labour brigades. They did not fulfil norms and targets set by the factory managements. They were punished by deprivation of ration cards, reduction of wages, curtailment of holidays; loss of free medical attention, sacking and imprisonment.

This phase of individual resistance turned into more collective forms of opposition. Absenteeism developed, as we have seen, on a mass scale, particularly in mining and other important industries. The Titoite rulers replied by trying to force the workers to sign long-term labour contracts. But it has been estimated that not more than 30 per cent, of the workers have signed such contracts, and never more than half the workers at any large enterprise. Besides, once signed the contracts were often broken.

Punished with forced labour, the workers turned to more advanced forms of action—strikes, sabotage. In 1949, of 11,000 workers sent to the Trepca mines in Serbia, 10,500 left again. Faced with heavy punishment and arrest, the workers turned to sabotage. A funicular was blown up and a tunnel on the nearby railway was mined to prevent the despatch of the metal ore to the imperialists. A strike for the return of ration cards assumed big proportions, and when the U.D.B. put 3,000 prisoners into the mines in their efforts to break the strike, the miners replied by destroying one of the principal dynamos. In the first half of 1950, and this is admitted even by the Titoite "trade union" paper Rad, 22 per cent of the workers sent to work in Serbia left the mines and enterprises to which they had been despatched, 30 per cent in Croatia, and 28 per cent in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

In the second phase of developing resistance to the Titoites, the

poor and middle peasants, the working peasantry, began to join with the workers. The area of land cultivated fell enormously in 1949, and still further in 1950. The character of the peasant resistance began to develop from passive to more and more active and militant forms.

Organised refusal to pay taxes in kind began to arise in the villages, developing into armed conflict with the authorities. The *New York Herald Tribune* correspondent touring the Yugoslav countryside reported (1.8.50) acute discontent amongst the working peasants:

"Marshal Tito is having serious trouble with the peasant population in this part [Croatia and Bosnia] of Yugoslavia. Twelve peasants were condemned to death within the last month in a village near here after a riot against local Communist [read Titoite—J. K.] authorities. Mutinous demonstrations have occurred in three other nearby districts.

". In the village of Glina alone, peasants say that 150 men were jailed in May and that they are still being held. The towns that are involved are in Croatia and in an adjacent sector of Bosnia; from thirty to sixty miles south of Zagreb, Yugoslavia's second largest city. . .

"... The atmosphere in the countryside is still one of extreme bitterness. There is outspoken exasperation with local Communist Committees, and with the Communists' economic policies."

It is interesting that the New York Herald Tribune correspondent had to admit that the resistance came not from the kulaks, but, in every case, from the poor peasantry:

"Many of the peasants are clearly living in depressing poverty. None of those with whom this reporter talked has more than two acres of land." (*ibid.*, 1.8.50.)

In August, 1950, peasant "riots" and anti-Titoite demonstrations began to spread widely in Serbia. On August 26, 118 poor peasants were arrested in Serbia on a single day for handing in their grain quotas too late or not at all, and 68 were sentenced to hard labour. A few days later 342 working peasants were arrested and sentenced. Resistance of the working peasants to the phoney collectives has reached higher levels. In August, too, Serb peasants set fire to the granary and mill of the Borina "collective" and to the granary of the Blagoje Neskovic "collective". In July, 1950, 103 Macedonian peasants were sentenced for "unjustifiably" leaving their "collectives".

Passive refusal to cultivate the land is developing into more active militant refusal to pay taxes, into sabotage and even armed resistance.

The Manchester Guardian diplomatic correspondent, writing on "Yugoslavia in Transition" on June 14, 1951, commented on the growth of peasant opposition to the Tito régime:

"Several observers, both Western and Yugoslav, expressed the view that pro-Cominformism was still fairly strong among the lower ranks of the Party officials in the countryside. . . . It was believed that the local Communist officials feared that the peasants would take the opportunity to cut their throats if Yugoslavia took part in a war at the side of the Western powers."

The New York Herald Tribune correspondent, Gaston Coblentz, touring Yugoslav Macedonia at the end of August and beginning of September 1951 reported:

"A tour of parts of Yugoslav Macedonia provides a striking spectacle of unthrashed wheat still lying on many fields as the result of the peasants' slowdown in grain deliveries to the Government... hundreds of neglected wheat piles covered intermittent fields as far as the eye could see. . . . Thrashing processes are a month behind normal schedule in some districts. As has become common throughout Yugoslavia in the last few weeks, peasants in the plateau said farm machinery had broken down." (New York Herald Tribune, from Salonica, dateline 3.9.59.)

By 1950, the purely *economic* and semi-spontaneous opposition of the people to the Titoites began to turn into *political* opposition. This was reflected in the high vote against the régime in many areas, despite the terror, during the March "elections" to the Federal Parliament. It was reflected in increasing arrests of well-known Communist and Partisan leaders. In the first half of September, 1950, three members of the Croatian Government, who were also members of the Central Committee of the Croatian Communist Party, were arrested—Dusan Brkic, Croatian Deputy Prime Minister; Rade Zigic, member of the Economic Council and Opasic, Minister of Forestry:

". . . they were charged . . . with spreading the following subversive information among the lower ranks of the Yugoslav Party: that Tito and his associates were 'squandering' the nation's wealth and were 'robbing the people'; that 'any rural tradesman would direct the economy better' than the Marshal; and that 'we have constantly been moving backward for three years [since the split with Moscow].' "(New York Herald Tribune, from correspondent in Belgrade, 13.9.50.)

The Belgrade correspondent of *The Times* reported on May 22, 1951, that Lazar Plavsich, President of the Yugoslav Metalworkers'

Union, had been expelled from his union and arrested on charges of "conspiracy on behalf of the Cominform". At the end of June, 1951, the New York Herald Tribune reported the arrests of a whole number of highly placed Communist officials for "pro-Cominform activities". Among those reported arrested were: Vojislav Srzentic, Assistant Minister of Finance; his brother Nikola, a major in the U.D.B. (secret police); his wife, who had occupied a high post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Maxim Goranovic, Assistant Minister of Agriculture, and his wife Marija, who had been the director of a large commercial establishment in Belgrade.

Both Srzentic and Goranovic were of old Communist and progressive families; the former a Partisan, whose brother was killed by the police in a student anti-fascist demonstration in the pre-war period; the latter a leading Partisan officer. Srzentic, who had been earlier the Assistant Minister of Foreign Trade, went over to the Ministry of Finance when his predecessor, Dr. Obren Blagojevic, was himself arrested for opposition to the Tito régime.

It is clear that opposition to the Tito clique has steadily grown in the circles of the older Communist generation. History is exposing the role of the Titoites even to those who were at first deceived.

Today, whilst the broad masses of the people, faced with ever-lowering living standards and with ever more open attacks and slanders by the Titoites against the Soviet Union and People's Democracies, are shedding what illusions remain to them about the leaders of the state, there is developing within this broad but not yet fully organised movement of anti-Tito opposition a smaller but compact illegal Communist Party—a real Communist Party, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and loyal to the principles of proletarian internationalism.

The old Yugoslav Communist Party, headed by Tito and his associates, has been transformed into its opposite. Of the 12,000 illegal members of the Yugoslav Communist Party before the outbreak of the Second World War, 8,000 lost their lives during the war. Many were deliberately sent to their deaths by the Titoites. Of the 4,000 that remain, many are in jail. The old "Party" has been transformed into an appendage of Tito's police state.

The new Party, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, is arising, despite the terror directed against it. Illegal Party groups are distributing illegal anti-Titoite journals and leaflets. Anti-Titoite slogans are painted on the roads and walls. A new leadership is developing which will stand at the head of the broad mass people's opposition to the Tito régime of betrayal.

The Yugoslav people will not be content to let their country return to the semi-colonial status it occupied between the wars. They will not be led into war against their best friends and closest allies, the Soviet and other Slav peoples and the neighbouring People's Democratic states. They will not patiently and passively watch the restoration of capitalist dictatorship.

With the long traditions of heroic struggle for independence, against imperialism, against domestic and foreign reaction they will develop the struggle against Tito's clique, remove it from power, punish the traitors, and set forward again along the path of People's Democracy and Socialism.

Chapter Seven

THE GREAT CONTRAST

In all the mass of verbiage and slander turned out by the Titoite press, translated into every living language, and reproduced joyfully and in bulk by the capitalist press throughout the world, there is one principal slander, one great lie, that takes precedence over all others. Tito and his chief propagandists, Djilas, Dedijer and company, have learned their tactics from Hitler and Goebbels. Take a big lie and repeat it ad nauseam.

This big lie is that the Soviet Union is trying to colonise the countries of Eastern Europe to stop their industrial development, to keep their economies backward. It is that "heroic little Yugoslavia", led by Tito, resisted colonisation by "red imperialism" and now enjoys the economic aid of the generous West, whilst the People's Democracies which have remained under "Soviet domination", are unable to advance economically.

Take three typical Titoite pronouncements chosen at random from hundreds:

"It is of course absurd to talk of economic and political co-operation as between equals, if one starts from the standpoint that the economy of smaller or less developed countries should be but an appendage to the economy of large and developed countries, and a source of super-profit to them, instead of from the standpoint of raising the economic strength and prosperity of every country."

This is Tito's Foreign Minister Kardelj, attacking not British or American imperialism, but the Soviet Union, at the Fourth General Assembly of U.N.O. in October, 1949.

"... Through their pressure the Soviet leaders have prevented the construction of heavy industry in Bulgaria, thus holding the country at the level of an agrarian land, as a source of material for Soviet industry... the U.S.S.R. harboured similar designs against Yugoslavia, but we would not agree with such undemocratic intentions."

The above is Tito's miniature Goebbels, Dedijer, Chief of the Yugoslav Information Department, at the time of the Kostov trial.

"The fundamental contradiction in the world is the unequal

relations between Socialist countries—the ordering about, the political and economic subordination of small countries by the U.S.S.R."

That is Tito's daily organ Borba early in June, 1950, approvingly reproduced by the New York Herald Tribune.

In this chapter we shall examine this main line of Titoite slander, seeing first what has been the fate of Tito's Yugoslavia "heroically set free from red imperialism", and what the fate of the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe who have remained under "Soviet domination".

Let facts and figures talk!

Soviet Aid and Western Generosity

When the Red Army and the Yugoslav National Liberation Forces drove the last Axis forces from Yugoslav soil in the first part of 1945, the country, after four years of Axis occupation and devastation, was in dire economic straits. In the winter of 1944-45 there was famine and starvation on the Dalmatian coast. The communications were wrecked and ravaged, bridges blown up, roads mined. When the Western military and civilian authorities were asked for food for the famine areas, rigorous conditions were imposed, and while bargaining continued, and whilst foodships lay waiting in ports in Eastern Italy, men, women and children starved. This was the first post-war example of "generous" Western aid. The food rotted, people died, yet it was not far across the Adriatic sea.

It was from the Soviet Union, itself devastated by the war, the Soviet Union whose army and people had borne the brunt of the war, that the first aid was despatched to the Yugoslav people. It was the Soviet Union that first rushed in supplies of food to the Yugoslav starvation areas, that sent fuel to restore transport and raw materials and equipment to rehabilitate industry.

It was the Soviet Union that first developed trade on a large scale with Yugoslavia at the end of the Second World War, delivering precisely the material that was most needed to revive industry. On the basis of the trade agreements of April, 1945, June, 1946, and July, 1947, the U.S.S.R. supplied Yugoslavia between 1945-48 with goods to the value of 541.6 million roubles, besides goods on credit to the value of 795 million roubles. Ferrous metals, rubber, raw materials, machinery, locomotives, 5,700 railway waggons poured into Yugoslavia, on credit, to help rehabilitation.

Moreover, before Tito had dragged Yugoslavia into the Western orbit and cut his relations of mutual aid and friendship with the

U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies, the Soviet Government had undertaken to supply Yugoslavia with an iron and steel works of an annual capacity of 400,000 tons of pig-iron, 500,000 tons of steel, 300,000 tons of rolled steel and 600,000 tons of coke, as well as equipment for an oil refinery with an annual capacity of 300,000 tons, equipment for the oil and mining industries and for non-ferrous metallurgy, and sulphuric acid plants.

Indeed the whole basis of Soviet aid and trade with Yugoslavia after Liberation was precisely for the speediest industrial recovery and rapid further industrialisation of Yugoslavia.

During the first three years after the Second World War, the Titoites concealed their treachery from their people. So they had to voice in public their people's gratitude to the people and the government of the Soviet Union.

A Yugoslav Department of Information official news release of mid-1946, entitled "Post-War Foreign Trade of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia", stated:

"The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, since the early days after the liberation of the country, paid special attention to the re-establishment and development of commercial relations with the U.S.S.R. A commercial agreement was signed in Moscow as early as April 13, 1945.

"It would be difficult to imagine what would have happened to our economy, during the past year, without the unselfish assistance of the U.S.S.R., consisting of fuel, raw materials, semi-finished products and spare parts most urgently needed by our industry and mines.

"The U.S.S.R. punctually fulfilled their obligations resulting from the agreement showing at the same time a complete understanding of our difficulties. The U.S.S.R. today holds the first place in the statistics for our foreign trade for 1945 and the first two quarters of 1946..."

Nikola Petrovic, a leading Titoite, then the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Trade (equally at that time concealing his real aims and therefore forced to reflect the feelings of the mass of the people) wrote in *Trideset Dana* of August-September, 1946:

"The U.S.S.R. represented in the past and still represents today the one firm point in world economy. She is not subject to cyclical crises and shocks; she has vast wealth and economic strength, and unswerving economic possibilities and perspective.

"And above all, the Soviet Union, in her economic and commercial relations with other countries, is not governed by selfish aims and has no intention of exploiting the riches of other lands and peoples.

"Does it not follow from this that it is to the vital interests of small people, who want to protect themselves from the dangerous appetites of foreign imperialists, to seek co-operation and support and protection, equally in the political and economic and commercial fields from the Soviet Union?"

By 1947 it was perfectly clear to all that friendship with the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies, that Soviet aid and trade, and the aid and trade of the People's Democracies, would lay the basis for Yugoslav rehabilitation and *industrialisation*, the basis for an independent and prosperous Yugoslavia.

The U.N.O. Report Economic Development in Selected Countries stated:

"From Czechoslovakia, \$150,000,000 worth of capital equipment is expected over the five years of the agreement (Czechoslovak-Yugoslav economic agreement); this would make a substantial contribution to the (Yugoslav) Five-Year Plan targets.

"Of special importance for the implementation of the Five-Year Plan is the conclusion of a trade agreement with the Soviet Union, officially reported on July 30, 1947. According to the terms of this agreement, Yugoslavia will receive metallurgical plants and equipment, both ferrous and non-ferrous, and plants for oil and chemical industries and for coalmining. Yugoslavia's deliveries of goods will not take place until 1950. . . ."

The same contrast between the Soviet aim of helping Yugoslavia to rehabilitate its industry and the Western aim of using so-called "aid" to reduce Yugoslavia to colonial status was fought behind the scenes of U.N.R.R.A., the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

U.N.R.R.A. was established as an organ of international aid and rehabilitation to the states that had been victims of the Axis aggression. Its written aim was to allow these countries to stand on their own feet again, which meant in the first place, when the early famine relief stage was over, the rehabilitation of industry. But this was not the aim of the capitalist representatives who held the majority of positions in U.N.R.R.A., and above all it was not the aim of the United States Government, which, throughout the whole U.N.R.R.A. period, dominated the U.N.R.R.A. machinery from its Washington office.

This was, however, the aim of the Soviet representatives in U.N.R.R.A. who fought consistently for the carrying out of international agreements, for the transformation of U.N.R.R.A. into an

organisation true to its own constitution which would provide the goods necessary for the victims of Axis aggression to stand economically on their own feet again. This was the aim of the Soviet representatives in the U.N.R.R.A. Yugoslav Mission, including the head of that mission who was a Soviet citizen.

The Soviet representatives in U.N.R.R.A. and the Soviet officials in the U.N.R.R.A. Yugoslav Mission (backed by honest Mission members from many Western countries) fought continuously, day in and day out, for the despatch by U.N.R.R.A. to Yugoslavia of those materials needed for the rehabilitation of industry—materials to clear the harbours, to build roads, to reconstruct the mines, to set transport going again, to build factories. But very different was the Washington objective!

Washington, that is American imperialism, saw U.N.R.R.A. essentially as an organisation with two main purposes. The first was as an organisation to build up countries, not according to the degree of devastation they had suffered, but according to the degree of their subordination to U.S. policy. This meant that every effort was made to favour Greece and Italy at the expense of the East European countries. And though Yugoslavia fared better than the other East European countries, for reasons that are now clear, Yugoslavia was not yet in the 1945-46 period considered as a safe satellite of the Greek type, for Tito and his clique had not yet succeeded in removing from office all genuine Yugoslav Communists. Yugoslav needs, therefore, were constantly sidetracked in favour of that most favoured nation-monarcho-fascist Greece. Secondly, Washington, i.e. American imperialism, saw in U.N.R.R.A. an instrument for the disposal of, for the dumping in vast quantities of their surplus and now unwanted second-rate and often second-hand military goods.

How many telegrams reached U.N.R.R.A., Belgrade, from U.N.R.R.A., Washington, and U.N.R.R.A., London, along these lines! "Have so many hundred thousand tons soya flour. Necessary dispose of. Explain Yugoslav authorities soya in bread tasty. Reply soonest specifying needs." Or: "Have so many hundred thousand U.S. K-rations. Believe useful Yugoslav peasantry. Can you take so many hundred thousand?" But the Yugoslav people needed not soya flour or K-rations or other surplus and often damaged U.S. goods, but material to rehabilitate their industry. It was for this that, constantly and consistently, the Soviet representatives in U.N.R.R.A. and the Soviet members of the U.N.R.R.A. Yugoslav mission strove.

Such industrial goods as were finally obtained through U.N.R.R.A. channels in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia included, were wrung out of

Washington and London by the ceaseless efforts of the Soviet representatives and officials in U.N.R.R.A., backed up by conscientious U.N.R.R.A. officials of all countries including Britain and U.S.A., who, despite very varying political outlook, wanted U.N.R.R.A. to be true to its own Constitution, to fulfil the mission for which it was originally intended.

The U.S. Government had other aims. It wanted colonial satellites industrially dependent on U.S. economy. At the end of the Second World War it refused to return to Yugoslavia the Yugoslav Danube vessels which the Nazis had seized and brought up-stream to that part of Austria which was occupied by the West. It refused to release the Yugoslav gold held in America. It organised through the big oil companies periodic boycotts of the oil that Yugoslavia was trying to import through U.N.R.R.A. The Western capitalists were not yet sure of the victory of their Titoite puppets, so the Yugoslav people could pay in starvation. The New York Herald Tribune correspondent in Belgrade quoted on November 13, 1946, a Yugoslav foreign office official as saying in relation to the Yugoslav ships withheld by the U.S. authorities in Austria:

"We cannot evaluate the lives lost because of a lack of railroads at the beginning of last year, and ships were the only means of bringing food to the stricken areas of our country. And they were not available."

This was Western "generosity" in action. Yugoslavia was denied its own ships stolen by the Nazis and now lying useless under U.S. occupation. Even Tito himself, who could not yet, in those days, allow his betrayal openly to appear, had to reflect the feelings of the Yugoslav people towards the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. In his address to the Communist Youth Congress on June 1, 1946, he declared:

"Of course we have received some help from abroad, namely from U.N.R.R.A., but the principal and most substantial aid came from our great ally, the Soviet Union."

So the first part of the answer, the Chapter One of the reply to the Titoite slander of "Soviet imperialism" is the presentation of the facts in the early post-war period of 1945-46, when it is seen, in all clarity, that Western "generosity" was a hollow mockery, that played cynically with the lives of Yugoslav men and women and children, whilst it was from the U.S.S.R., despite its incredible war losses, that came the first aid to the Yugoslav people, and the consistent effort, in every way, to rehabilitate Yugoslav industry and to help to set it firmly on the road of post-war industrialisation.

Tito Yugoslavia Goes West

In the immediate years that followed on the end of the Second World War, it was the Soviet Union that first came to the aid of the Yugoslav state, and, despite its own great needs of reconstruction, made sacrifices to aid the reconstruction of Yugoslav economy. Moreover the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe gave enormous help to Yugoslav reconstruction by establishing mutual aid agreements with Yugoslavia.

But long before the June, 1948, Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau, Yugoslavia, under the Tito régime, began to break the mutually established trade agreements, and to turn westwards.*

Tito Yugoslavia failed to deliver the goods agreed upon with her East European neighbours. In 1947, whilst trade agreements between Yugoslavia and the People's Democracies provided for an equal exchange of goods, Yugoslav deliveries fell short by 18 per cent. Yugoslav deliveries to Czechoslovakia, the most important trading partner to Yugoslavia in Eastern Europe, fell short by 28 per cent. Even Tito and Kardelj had to admit this in their letter of April 13, 1948, to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

"We do not deny, in connection with this, that on our part there were *oversights* in commercial affairs." ["Oversights" in the English translation published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs is "negligence" in the Belgrade edition.]

In this same letter Tito and Kardelj made no counter-charges against the Soviet Union or the People's Democracies. There were no such "oversights" on their part. But on the part of the Titoites the "oversights" became more and more glaring, and these "oversights" were a direct blow at the planned economies of the People's Democracies. The Titoites, whilst accepting the regular deliveries of key materials like Polish coal and Czechoslovak machinery, more and more withheld deliveries of essential raw materials in exchange and either went into default or tried to replace essential goods that they were pledged to deliver with unessential luxuries.

The Soviet Union and the People's Democracies were helping Yugoslavia in this period by mutual trade and by credits to build up her industry. With their aid the structure of Yugoslav trade was developing out of its old semi-colonial status. This was admitted by

^{*}For details see articles by Victor Perlo on "Yugoslav Foreign Trade" and on "Who is Pushing Yugoslavia Backwards" in Soviet Russia Today (published in New York), issues of January and February, 1950, on which this section is essentially based.

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Yugoslav trade officials themselves. The Yugoslav communiqué on foreign trade in 1948 reported:

"In 1948, Yugoslavia considerably altered the structure of her exports and imports. The structure of pre-war Yugoslavia's foreign trade had a typically agrarian raw material character in the exports, whilst final products constituted by far the greatest percentage of the imports. Thus, during the last two years of pre-war Yugoslavia, 45 per cent of the total imports were textiles. In 1948, the changes in the structure of our foreign trade became particularly obvious. In that year 67.2 per cent of the whole imports were raw materials and other goods needed in current production. Means of investment amounted to 25.6 per cent, final consumer merchandise to 7.2 per cent of the total imports."

But in 1948 Yugoslav imports were coming essentially from the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies, which accounted for something like 60 per cent of all Yugoslav trade. It was the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies that were helping Yugoslavia to shed her old semi-colonial economic status from which she had suffered so much between the wars.

The U.S.S.R. sent more goods per head to Yugoslavia than to any of the People's Democracies in the years 1945-48. Imports of Yugoslavia from the People's Democracies as a group were higher than those of any of the individual People's Democracies, amounting in 1948 to \$6.20 per capita, compared to \$6 in Hungary, \$4.10 in Poland and Bulgaria and \$2 in Rumania. Therefore no other country in the whole of Europe received as much help from the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies towards developing industry as Yugoslavia.

It was precisely in this situation, and in this period, long before the Communist Information Bureau Resolution, that Tito deliberately turned his back on the People's Democracies, openly betrayed the mutual trade agreements, and began to lead Yugoslavia right back into the Western imperialist economic orbit.

In 1947, 1948 and 1949 the Yugoslav default on agreed mutual exchange of goods with the People's Democracies became more and more open. The Czechoslovak declaration of June 11, 1949, made this abundantly clear:

"The most important problem in the commercial relations between the two countries is the fact that, owing to Yugoslavia's intransigence, it has been impossible up to the present to arrange for Yugoslavia's counter-deliveries for the next three years in return for investment plant, etc., supplied to Yugoslavia. According to the existing agreements these counter-deliveries for the next three years ought to have been fixed by the end of June 1949. This breach of agreement on the part of Yugoslavia is all the more detrimental to Czechoslovakia as all the contracts for the supply of this investment material have already been given to the Czechoslovak industries where work is proceeding upon them on an intensive scale."

It was only a whole year after the agreed deadline (and after the publication of the Information Bureau Resolution) that the Czechoslovak Government, after further fruitless efforts to get Yugoslavia to adhere to her agreed commitments, finally ordered its factories to cease producing the investment goods ordered by Yugoslavia.

In the relations of Tito Yugoslavia to Poland the identical story was repeated. In its note of July 6, 1949, the Polish Government had to report that of the copper deliveries to Poland to which Yugoslavia was pledged, none had been delivered; only 35 per cent of the agreed quantity of lead concentrates was delivered by Yugoslavia; an order for timber, actually loaded for delivery to Poland, had been halted. Instead, in exchange for Polish coal and other essential goods, Yugoslavia had tried to palm off large quantities of wine, grapes, dried figs and tobacco.

Thus whilst the People's Democracies, true to their pledges, were delivering to Yugoslavia the minerals for her to develop industrialisation, the industrialisation plans of the People's Democracies were being sabotaged by the non-delivery of agreed supplies by the Titoites.

Nor was this the whole story. Closer examination of Yugoslav trade relations shows that these "oversights" were completely deliberate. The Titoites were exporting Westwards the very goods on which they were defaulting Eastwards.

British statistics of foreign trade reveal a fourfold increase in the rate of imports from Yugoslavia beginning in 1948. During the twelve-months period ending in August, 1949, Tito Yugoslavia sent to Britain goods to the value of \$39 million (at pre-devaluation exchange rates) and received in return goods to the value of \$14 million. Thus the Titoites, who could not find their way to meet their pledges to neighbours, based on mutual and equal exchange, could send to Britain three times what they received. During the first eight months of 1949 Britain received from Tito Yugoslavia timber to the value of \$25 million. Tito, who could not find any timber to meet his pledges to Poland and to pay for his imports of Polish coal, etc., was able to send to Britain almost as much timber as the total value of Yugoslav exports to Poland in 1948. Moreover, the acceleration of Yugoslav timber deliveries to Britain began already in mid-1948.

With Yugoslav copper exports the same process was repeated. In

1947 Tito Yugoslavia sent some 20 million pounds of copper to the U.S.A. In 1948 there was a sharp drop of copper exports to the U.S.A., not in order to meet pledges to the People's Democracies, but in order to make out that the copper was not available to meet these pledges. In actual fact, the copper was simply stored up for subsequent delivery to the U.S.A. During the first two months of 1949, 10,500,000 pounds of Yugoslav copper were delivered to the U.S.A., i.e. more than twice as much as was delivered in the whole of 1948. On January 16, 1949, the New York Times, reporting on these deliveries, explained that they consisted of the 1948 production of the Serbian copper mines of Bor. During 1948, whilst Tito Yugoslavia was withholding pledged deliveries of copper to the People's Democracies, countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia were forced to buy for dollars 10,975,000 pounds of copper from the U.S.A., i.e. nearly exactly the quantity that the Titoites withheld in that year for subsequent delivery to America.

Very much more could be written about the two-faced trade policy of the Titoites. What is the conclusion?

It is clear enough. The second part of the reply to the Titoite slander of "Soviet imperialism" is that the economic break with the People's Democracies was undertaken by the Titoites themselves, starting long before the Resolution of June, 1948, of the Communist Information Bureau. Tito and his confederates, with their planned "oversights", broke the mutual economic relations with Eastern Europe that were so advantageous to the Yugoslav people and to Yugoslav industrialisation, and equally deliberately led their unfortunate country into the orbit of Western imperialism.

Back to Semi-Colonial Status

And what has been the result? What has been the effect on Yugo-slavia and on the Yugoslav people of bringing the country into the orbit of Western imperialism?

The first result has been that Yugoslav trade, now based on the capitalist countries of the West, and above all on American monopoly capitalism, has returned to its old character of between the wars, i.e. the export of raw materials in exchange for made-up industrial goods. Yugoslavia has returned to the typical trade relationship of a semi-colonial country with its imperialist masters.

What do the Western imperialists want economically from Yugo-slavia? They want to buy cheap raw materials—timber, foodstuffs, and above all non-ferrous metals, many of which are of key importance in their war preparations. They want Yugoslavia to remain industrially

weak as a permanent market for their surplus goods. And in so far as they do want her industry to develop, they want it for their own purposes and not for the interests of the Yugoslav people—for their own interests and under their control. They see in Yugoslavia, finally, a profitable source for their capital investments, as it was once before, between the wars, to the great detriment of the Yugoslav people.

Look at the transformation of Yugoslav trade since Tito's open surrender to the West. In 1948, Yugoslavia exported to the U.S.A. raw materials (mainly strategic) to the value of \$5 million; in 1949 to the value of \$16 million; in 1950 to the value of more than \$30 million. During the first nine months of 1949 more than 80 per cent of U.S. imports from Yugoslavia were composed of copper, lead, antimony, chrome and other strategic raw materials, whilst, in the same period, only 12 per cent of Yugoslav imports from the U.S.A. were machinery and transport. Yugoslavia received in this period less than one-quarter of the machinery from the U.S.A. that it received from the U.S.S.R. in the first nine months of the previous year for the timber industry alone.

Nearly all Yugoslav copper now goes to the U.S.A. To Britain go timber, lead, zinc, chrome and foodstuffs from amidst a half-starved people. In 1949 already 80 per cent of Yugoslav hemp was sold at extremely low prices to Britain and the U.S.A.

Increasing quantities of Yugoslav raw materials are exported by the Titoites to the former Axis countries. To Austria goes meat, whilst in Yugoslavia the meat queues grow longer and the meat prices go up. To Italy go bauxite, lead, magnesite, chrome and other non-ferrous metals. The Titoites sell sugar to Italy at 6.5 dinars per kilo for which they are charging their own people up to 500 dinars. They are selling maize to Western Germany at 4 dinars per kilo for which Yugoslav workers are paying over 40 dinars. Copper, antimony, magnesite and bauxite are sent to swell the war preparations in Western Germany. Whilst the Yugoslav people were suffering from hunger, whilst food rations went unhonoured and black market profiteers grew rich, the West German paper Der Kurier wrote (4.8.50) that "100,000 tons of wheat, 300,000 tons of maize, and 60,000 tons of barley" were to be exported from Yugoslavia to West Germany.

And what are the Yugoslav people receiving in return? The United States sends food to food-exporting Yugoslavia, at prices many times higher than Yugoslavia's own food exports—it supplies lard, processed flour, dried milk, chemical specialities, bad films, and radio equipment for broadcasting slanders against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. And when industrial equipment and machines are sent,

they are directed specifically to those extracting industries which provide raw materials for the U.S.A. and West European capitalism—machinery to exhaust Yugoslav timber supplies and to drain the country of its non-ferrous metals; nothing is left behind for Yugoslav industry, so that the Yugoslav market remains wide open for Western products.

Thus the new trade relations of Yugoslavia with the West today are the old trade relations of Yugoslavia with the West between the wars. The Yugoslav people live in poverty in a rich country; surrounded by raw materials, their own industry is starved of them. Shoddy surpluses are dumped on them at high prices. And their wealth is drained away into the pockets of the Western capitalists.

The Western capitalist countries, proclaim the Titoites, have generously provided Yugoslavia with loans and credits. It is interesting to examine the character of this "generous assistance". The Export-Import Bank granted Yugoslavia credits of \$20 million followed by a further \$20 million in April 1950 and \$15 million in September 1950. The International Bank of Reconstruction gave a \$2,700,000 loan in October 1949 and has since been negotiating further loans. Two loans (\$3 million in October 1949 and \$9 million in December 1949) have been provided by the International Monetary Fund. The British Government gave credits of £8 million in December 1949 and a further £3 million in November 1950. The U.S. Congress authorised \$38 million in December 1950 for "famine relief" and a further \$29 million in April 1951 "to obtain critically needed raw materials for her armed forces" (The Times, 17.4.51.)

The Economist on June 23, 1951, reckoned that in the previous eighteen months Tito Yugoslavia had received, in all, loans and credits amounting to £22 million from Britain and £53 million from the U.S.A., plus a further £10 million mostly for food for the Army. On Júly 5, Herbert Morrison, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, announced that the U.S.A., Britain and France were considering a further joint programme of "aid" to Tito, of which the British contribution might amount to the order of £10 million in the current financial year. But not one dollar or one £ sterling of this "generous" aid was without its price—and a heavy price at that.

The New York Herald Tribune (15.11.50), commenting on the second British credit to Yugoslavia, wrote:

"Great Britain was said to be considering also a Yugoslav bid for additional longer-term aid with which the Belgrade Government hopes to develop some of its natural resources. These resources include various non-ferrous metal deposits and large timber tracts.

Their output would be made available to Western nations which could find use for them in their rearmament programmes." [My italics—J. K.]

The loans mean, therefore, according to the old colonial pattern, development of Yugoslav resources not for Yugoslav industry or for the Yugoslav people, but for Western imperialist profit and Western imperialist war.

Equally frank about its U.S. "partner", the British *Times* wrote on the same day (15.11.50):

"The United States Government is known to have considered what further assistance can be given [to Yugoslavia], but is faced with the difficulty that Congress would hardly agree to a grant of credits without attaching some measure of control over the manner in which the moneys loaned were to be spent."

Still franker was the New York Herald Tribune correspondent, writing from Yugoslavia on November 29, 1950. Declaring that Tito's "Communist Party" and the Yugoslav people were "two mutually hostile groups" which could only be held together by U.S. "aid", he admitted that if this aid were to be provided "Tito to some extent will become a prisoner of Washington as his dependence on the United States increases". "Prisoner of Washington" is an apt description of the present plight of the Yugoslav people, with Tito as a paid jailer of his own people.

The American and American-dominated banks and funds do not even trouble to disguise the strings and conditions attached to their "generous" credits and "altruistic" loans. When the Export-Import Bank made its first loan of \$20 million to Yugoslavia, its representative publicly explained that 75 per cent was earmarked for the restoration of non-ferrous metal mines and of plants where the ores were to be smelted. This was being done, he said, so that Yugoslavia might increase her exports of bauxite, mercury, copper, lead and other strategic raw materials needed by the U.S.A.

In December 1949, Kardelj announced that Yugoslavia was trying to negotiate further loans from the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (whose funds are 87 per cent provided by the U.S.A.). The Bank sent to Yugoslavia an exploratory mission headed by the U.S. businessman Hoar, who declared that if the loan were granted, the Bank would reserve the right to control its spending in Yugoslavia. The Bank, he explained would concentrate its attention on the development of agriculture, transport and ore extraction, so

that Yugoslavia could keep its role of exporting agricultural and industrial raw materials, above all strategic ones.

The officials of this Bank have always been particularly brazen. In November 1949 the Bank's Chief Economist, Antonin Basch, wrote a long article in the U.S. magazine International Conciliation in which he explained:

"The Bank is obviously directly interested in the general economy of the borrower... It therefore requires that the borrower, when requested, give full information with respect to significant economic and financial developments. This creates much closer and more permanent relations between the bank and its borrowers than has been usual between the creditor and the debtor in the international field."

The New York Herald Tribune (3.1.50) described in these terms the Bank's "standard requirements" from borrowers:

- "(1) That the borrower keep the bank informed on the goods bought with loan funds, on the progress of its project, on its general operations and financial conditions and recognises the Bank's right, if need be, to inspect, audit and make copies of its books and records.
- "(2) That the Bank have the right to inspect goods bought with its loan funds, and also inspect the use of the goods in its loan project,
- "(3) That the borrower agree, with certain specified exceptions, to give the Bank liens or security from its assets of equal priority and on a proportional scale to any maker of subsequent loans.

"(4) That the Bank has the right to sell bonds given to it under

the loan agreement as a security for its loan."

It should be noted here that even the British Government found these "standard requirements" too much to stomach, and that, on January 2, 1950, the British Colonial Development Corporation explained that it was withdrawing its application for a \$5 million loan from the International Bank because the conditions were too "onerous".

But, with all his empty demagogy about "independence" these "standard requirements" were not too "onerous" for Tito. The New York Herald Tribune in its article quoted above explained that the two first "standard requirements" would lead the Bank "towards control or a veto power over the borrower's activities". It is to this control or veto power exercised by Wall Street that the Titoites have submitted the Yugoslav people and their country.

Thus Tito, dragging Yugoslavia into the orbit of Western imperialism. has reduced Yugoslav trade to its old semi-colonial status and put Yugoslav economy at the mercy of the great Western monopoly capitalists. Commenting on the Italo-Yugoslav trade agreement of August 1949, arranged under the "benevolent" aegis of the U.S.A., the New York Times Rome correspondent wrote:

"It would again open up to Italy one of her traditional European markets and enable her to sell manufactured goods in return for raw materials of which she stands in need."

Yugoslavia, therefore, is to be a junior colony of the U.S.A. standing in semi-colonial economic relationship even with those countries whose economies have already been subordinated to American imperialism.

Nor is that all.

We have already seen the character of Titoite nationalisation. Today the Titoites are using the power of their caste in the Titoite state to sell out whole sectors of the so-called "nationalised" economy to Western imperialism. A régime of "concessions" has been instituted by which a number of key economic sectors are subordinated to Western monopolies. In exchange for credits U.S. monopolists have received the right to exploit Yugoslav bauxite mines, sections of the aluminium industry, copper and molybdenum mines. On January 19, 1950, the Tribune des Nations wrote that representatives of the American Bethlehem Steel were touring Yugoslavia. Concessions are reported to have been made to the Anaconda Copper Mining Company. At the end of 1949, representatives of the U.S. Mackenzie Engineering Company were reported to be "visiting" Yugoslavia. The Paris Monde reported that the Tito Government "fully agrees that a special American Commission should control the distribution of products sent to Yugoslavia by the Americans". The part that the Nazi "tourists", "experts" and trust representatives were playing in the late thirties had been taken over fully by the envoys of Wall Street.

For their right to be colonised by U.S. imperialism, which is the real definition of Tito's conception of "independence", the Yugoslav people have to pay-in hard cash. Tito has agreed to pay off all the old "debts" of the Yugoslav monarchy to the U.S.A. amounting to some \$385 million. He has undertaken to compensate foreign owners of "nationalised" industries to the tune of \$17 million to the U.S.A., \$18 million to Great Britain and \$1,600,000 to France. Commenting on Tito's promises to compensate the former French exploiters of the Yugoslav people, the Observer Paris correspondent wrote (5.11.50):

"It is the first time that the Yugoslavs have agreed to settle these obligations, which go back to the Serbian, Montenegrin and Austrian debts from before the First World War."

Tito has assumed, therefore, the task of paying imperialism for its exploitation of the Yugoslav peoples even before Yugoslavia existed as a state.

The Yugoslav people have to pay for their enslavement, too, by the total renunciation of a planned economy and the harnessing of the weak Yugoslav economy to the anarchy of Western capitalism. All statements to the contrary are nothing but Titoite demagogy. Mose Pijade, Vice-President of the Presidium of Tito's Parliament, boasted at a Foreign Press Association dinner in London on March 15, 1951:

"As we in Yugoslavia hold all the key positions of industry ourselves, there is no danger whatsoever in its furtherance of its economic relations with other [Western capitalist—J. K.] countries."

But this is nonsense! Not only because it is not the Yugoslav people but the Titoite caste acting for Western imperialism that controls Yugoslav industry today, but because this industry and the whole Yugoslav economy have become dependent upon the economies of the great imperialist states, above all the U.S.A., and under such conditions planned economy would be impossible, even if the Titoites desired it.

And, in actual fact, even the whitewashed official Yugoslav figures reveal the complete collapse of Yugoslav planning, logical consequence of Tito's betrayal.

The United Nations Report of 1947, comparing Yugoslav Government import estimates with the requirements of the Yugoslav Plan, estimated that there was a gap of \$383 million, and stated that:

"Yugoslavia will need external credit or else the Government import programme will have to be cut drastically. . . . Any drastic cut in the import programme is, therefore, likely to have repercussions on the targets of the Five-Year Plan." (Economic Developments in Selected Countries, United Nations, Lake Success, 1947.)

The 1948 survey at U.N.O.'s Economic Commission for Europe (E.C.E.), published in Geneva in 1948, reported that the Yugoslav investment plan for 1947 was only 87 per cent fulfilled and that no details were given of the individual industries.

In April, 1949, Cyrus L. Sulzberger, of the New York Times, wrote of Yugoslav economic development:

"The nation's planners have had to forestall food shortages and

accommodate themselves to inflation and deterioration of plant and equipment. The Five-Year Plan has been modified . . . without new mining equipment, ore production is near its peak. Transport is strained and timber reserves are being drained by the need to find new export products."

By October, 1949, the U.S. News and World Report, always a faithful mirror of the outlook of U.S. big business, was boasting (21.10.49):

"Ambitious plans for Yugoslav industrialisation will have to be shelved. Also Tito probably will have to make political or military concessions.

"Important fact now is that Tito must have dollars and must play ball."

And play ball he did with such effect that, a year later, the Yugo-slav Hungarian-language paper Magyar Szo, organ of the Titoite People's Front of the Vojvodina, had to admit that:

"According to the Plan, we should have exported maize to be able to buy machines and installations indispensable to the realisation of our Five-Year Plan. Instead, we have to import goods which we have never had to buy abroad before, so as to satisfy our most basic needs and to conserve our livestock."

By the end of 1950 the Yugoslav Five-Year Plan, which had been launched with such boastfulness by the Titoites, which had been drastically reduced in 1948, drastically reduced a second time in 1949, postponed a year in the early part of 1950, had almost ceased to be mentioned in the Yugoslav press. It had become a fiasco. The Five-Year Plan had miserably failed and no further long-term plan was even hinted at. Within the orbit of Western imperialism planned economy is an empty fiction!

By September 1951, the Governments of the U.S.A., Britain and France were circularising eighteen other "Western" governments calling for a moratorium on Yugoslavia's foreign debts reckoned as about £60 million (see *The Times*, 1.9.51). Talk of "planning" by the Titoite leaders decreased in direct proportion to the increase in their debts to imperialism.

About the same date, no other person than Boris Kidric, head of the Yugoslav "Planning" Commission, proclaimed against the dangers of planning:

"Economic liberals will find comfort in a description of the Yugo-slav Reds' new move in a series of articles by Boris Kidric. Too much planning is bad, Mr. Kidric said. He put it as follows: 'The

economic organisations have not paid much attention to the laws of supply and demand. . . No matter how much we tried to strangle these laws they always revenged themselves upon us by the appearance of illegal speculation, the disappearance of goods and other economic derangements. . . . Accordingly the Tito régime will allow 'a certain, or even a considerably large liberty to the operation of these laws'." (New York Herald Tribune correspondent from Belgrade, 4.9.51.)

Planning is dead, long live the free market! Tito's "theoreticians" have "developed" Marxism way back to the earliest period of bourgeois economics.

Each "generous" Western loan has meant still greater impoverishment, still greater debt. Each new debt has tied Tito Yugoslavia still more firmly to Western capitalist economy.

The fruits of dragging Yugoslavia into the orbit of Western imperialism have been to reduce her to colonial status. There is no such thing as imperialist "aid" without imperialist strings.

Tito has endeavoured to disguise his quisling role by trying to achieve "Marshall status" without, officially, entering into the Marshall bloc. As the New York Herald Tribune correspondent explained already in June, 1949:

"One thing that is not being considered is Yugoslav participation in the Marshall Plan. That would be politically embarrassing to Marshal Tito. . . . [My italics—J. K.] In any case, help to Yugoslavia by small loans will be much simpler all around."

The American Government and American Intelligence, for whom Tito's special utility is his façade of left demagogy, were, at least for a period, quite willing to help him carry out this shallow maneuvre:

"What Tito is anxious to avoid—if he can—is asking for help which would necessitate a debate in Congress, for such help would inevitably be interpreted as 'indirect Marshall aid'—accompanied by political strings. The view prevalent among Americans in Belgrade, however, is that Tito will be spared that indignity, and that ways and means will be found to see him through." (Alexander Werth, "Tito Turns West", in New Statesman and Nation, 17.6.50.)

Yet, from the very outset, this manœuvre has been peculiarly transparent, deceiving no one, least of all the imperialists themselves. Reception of Western "aid" carries the same strings whether it is labelled Marshall or whether it is not, and formal membership of the Atlantic Pact is not necessary in order to carry out a foreign policy

of capitulation to imperialism. The *Spectator* put it clearly enough (30.12.49):

"Yugoslav spokesmen have insisted with such emphasis that the trade and compensation agreements signed with the United Kingdom on Monday would have no influence on the home or foreign policy of Yugoslavia that they have almost convinced themselves that this is true. But how could it be true? The internal economic arrangements of Yugoslavia, as well as that country's foreign relations, are so bound up with Marshal Tito's quarrel with the Cominform, and with the steadily improving relations with the West which have followed it, that denials of a connection are hollow . . . [Yugoslavia] occupies such a crucial position between East and West that her economic policies cannot be isolated from the balance of powers, and it is useless to pretend that they can."

As usual still clearer and franker is the uninhibited voice of American big business. Read, for instance, the United States *Business Week* (12.4.50):

"For the United States in particular and the West in general this encouragement of Tito has proved to be one of the cheapest ways yet of containing Russian Communism.

"To date the West's aid to Tito has come to \$51.7 million. This is far less than the billion dollars or so that the United States has spent in Greece for the same purpose. . . .

"Yugoslavia has had to settle for a Western credit policy based on these two principles:

- "(1) Priority assistance for industries having the best potential for volume exports readily marketable in the West: minimum of aid for basic industries . . . just enough to meet security needs and to facilitate exports.
- "(2) Extension of credit in instalments. This would act as an incentive to the Yugoslavs to put their last efforts into foreignaided projects. The better their efforts, the better their chances of getting favourable consideration on further dollar requests."

What does this mean? It means that with each instalment of "aid" the strings are pulled tighter, each small credit means more abject surrender. It means that of all the quislings, Tito is the cheapest Judas of them all.

It means that Tito, the Tito clique, the whole Tito régime is a puppet of American imperialism. The country and the people have been put by the Titoites into the clutches of the great American

Trusts. "The American Congress", wrote Mr. Gaston Coblentz, Belgrade correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune, on November 29, 1950, "has the fate of Marshal Tito in its hands."

It means that Tito, who claims to have rescued Yugoslavia from "red imperialism", has in fact broken off her friendly and mutually beneficial relationships with the countries of Socialism and People's Democracy, and placed her, hands tied, into the orbit of imperialist exploitation.

The third part of the answer to the Titoite slander of "red imperialism" is that the Titoites, rejecting the friendship and generous aid and trade of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies, have transformed Yugoslavia into a colony of Western imperialism. Yugoslavia has been led back to her colonial status of between the wars, but with more avaricious imperialist masters than ever before.

In the words of the November, 1949, Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau:

". . . the Yugoslav Government is completely dependent on foreign imperialist circles and has become an instrument of their aggressive policy . . . the Tito-Rankovic clique has created wide possibilities for the penetration of foreign capital into the economy of the country, and has placed the economy under the control of capitalist monopolies."

The Other Road

But there is still a fourth part to the reply to the Titoite slanders of "red imperialism". The Titoites proclaim that "heroic little Yugoslavia" resisting "red imperialism" has "maintained her independence" by turning to the West. But facts and figures speak a different language. They reveal that a group of traitors have sold their country to Western monopoly capitalism, and that Yugoslavia, dragged by the Titoites into the Western orbit, has returned to its semi-colonial status of between the wars, but knowing even a greater exploitation than before.

The Titoites proclaim that the "satellite Cominform states of Eastern Europe" have allowed themselves to become the "victims of Soviet imperialism". Yugoslavia, "heroically led by Tito, has escaped from the red net", while the other countries of Eastern Europe "groan under the Soviet yoke". "The Soviet Union", proclaim the Titoites, "tried to stop the industrialisation of Yugoslavia and of the satellite states." Let us now turn the light of facts and figures on to the countries of People's Democracy, which have remained in peace, friendship and close economic relations with the U.S.S.R. and with

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each other. We know what the Titoites claim, let us now seek the truth.

The People's Democracies of Eastern Europe—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania—existed in the two decades between the wars as semi-colonies of the Western capitalist states. They were deprived of heavy industry. They exported mainly foodstuffs and industrial raw materials. Their economies were unbalanced, lop-sided, developed according to the needs of Western capitalism and not to the needs of their own people. Foreign capital dominated their economies. The masses of their people—workers, peasants, professional people, those who did the useful work—lived in the most dire poverty in countries of great potential wealth, but whose resources were either untapped and undeveloped or developed in the interests of the rich of the Western capitalist world. Theirs, in those years between the wars, was the same hard fate as that of the peoples of Yugoslavia.

Western capitalism owned and controlled the material resources of these countries. In Poland, foreign capital (principally British, French and German), invested in the different branches of industry, made up from 50 to 85 per cent of the total invested capital according to the industry. More than half the industrial shares in Bulgaria were, before Liberation in 1944, held by foreign capitalists. British, French, German and American capital dominated the main industries of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania. In Albania the whole financial and credit system was controlled by a few Italian, British and American monopolies. An enormous tribute was extracted every year from these lands. Between 1922-44 in Bulgaria, for instance, 1,000 billion leva, or 20 per cent of the total national income during that period, went to capitalists abroad.

The P.E.P. Report, Economic Development in South-East Europe, paints the following picture. The foreign loans were used:

"to accumulate private balances abroad and to pay for ... essential imports ... most foreign loans carried excessive interest charges ... the service of the external debt in 1931-32 claimed ... 48 per cent of [the total exports] of Hungary, 29 per cent of Yugoslav exports [service of public debt only], 28 per cent of Rumanian, 24 per cent of Polish. ... It should be added that these figures of interest charges represent percentages related to total exports, whereas the servicing of foreign loans called in fact for 'strong currencies' obtainable only from a limited range of exports. The actual strain on the balance of payments was therefore considerably heavier."

Bulgaria, which has important reserves of iron and non-ferrous metals, had no national metallurgical industry, but a one-sided economy developed around the export of vegetable oils. In Rumania the oil industry, foreign controlled, was highly developed, but there was no engineering, no production of agricultural equipment. Hungary produced locomotives and railway waggons for export, but no machine-tools. Poland, with all its resources of coal and metal, had no engineering industry corresponding to the needs of the people. Czechoslovak industry was unbalanced, one-sided, specialising in textiles, ceramics and other light production while heavy industry was grossly lacking.

With economies of a semi-colonial type, the present People's Democracies of Eastern Europe and also Yugoslavia, between the wars, exported foodstuffs, raw materials, a few products of light and luxury industries, but depended on Western capitalism for heavy industrial production and for a large part of all manufactured goods. Amidst all their wealth, the people lived in the deepest poverty.

Dr. Doreen Warriner, in her recent study Revolution in Eastern Europe (Turnstile Press, 1950), described the prevailing position in these words:

"Foreign capital did not relieve the shortages, because it was invested only in the raw materials needed by the West, such as Rumanian oil and Yugoslav minerals; it skimmed the cream and took both produce and profits out of the country, without putting the money back into projects for long-term development . . . the ruling class was a paralytic network of interests resisting change, topped off by a monarchy or military dictatorship."

This description is valid for the position between the wars both of Yugoslavia and the countries that have now become the People's Democracies. Then what is the difference?

Just simply this. Yugoslavia, the heroic struggles of its peoples betrayed, has been dragged back by the Titoites to its old position, whilst the People's Democracies, in friendship and co-operation with the U.S.S.R. and with each other, have advanced in such a way and at such a speed that the evil days of between the wars are being forgotten.

The devastation of Poland in the course of the Second World War was very terrible. Yet the industrial production of the new Poland,

which in 1946 was still only 77 per cent of pre-war, was by 1949, end of the Three-Year Plan, 75 per cent above pre-war. This was due above all to the aid and trade of the Soviet Union.

In Hungary, despite the ravages of the war, industrial production reached at the end of 1949, with the completion of the Three-Year Plan (in two years and five months), 53.4 per cent above pre-war. Heavy industrial production was 74 per cent above pre-war. This was due above all to the aid and trade of the Soviet Union.

Bulgarian industrial production, which passed pre-war production already in the course of 1947, was over 90 per cent above pre-war by the end of 1949. This was due above all to the aid and trade of the Soviet Union.

The first Rumanian plan, the One-Year Plan, carried out in the course of 1949, saw an increase of 40 per cent in that one year alone. Czechoslovak industrial production had passed the pre-war level already before the end of 1947. By the end of 1949, first year of the Albanian Two-Year Plan, industrial production reached 400 per cent of that of 1938.

All this enormous industrial advance, with its colossal tempo and constant acceleration, took place in countries that had suffered so terribly from war destruction, and developed, primarily, as a result of the aid and trade of the U.S.S.R.

In 1950 the development of industry in the six People's Democracies of Eastern Europe went ahead still faster with continued Soviet aid and increased trade with the Soviet Union and with each other. Polish industrial output increased 30.8 per cent over 1949; Czechoslovak industrial output by 15.3 per cent in the same period; Hungarian by 35.1 per cent; Rumanian by 37.3 per cent; Bulgarian by 23.3 per cent and Albanian by 34 per cent.

By the end of 1950, year of economic misery for the Yugoslav people, of indefinite shelving of the Yugoslav Plan, Albanian industrial output, thanks to Soviet aid, reached over four times pre-war; Bulgarian almost treble; Polish more than double; Czechoslovak per capita production almost double. Rumanian industrial output increased, in that one year of 1950, more than in the last quarter of a century of capitalist rule. Hungarian industry reached almost double pre-war output and developed more than in twenty years of capitalist domination.

The period of 1949-50 was the period when it became clear that the Tito betrayal had turned Yugoslav planning into full fiasco. But in the People's Democracies it was the triumphant period of change-over from short-term to long-term planning. Czechoslovakia and

Bulgaria embarked on their Five-Year Plans in 1949. Poland started her Six-Year Plan and Hungary her Five-Year Plan in 1950. And, at the beginning of 1951, Rumania and Albania began the first years of their Five-Year Plans.

Whilst Yugoslavia was falling under colonial domination, new and undreamed-of perspectives opened before the eyes of the People's Democratic peoples. Now they could plan mutually. Their main trading relations (with the U.S.S.R. and with one another) were themselves subject to planning, were of a type qualitatively new. Their economic relationships were based on equality; the strength of one planned economy enhanced and reinforced the strength of the other. Each could count ahead on expanding economies, unbroken by crises, with growing volumes of mutually exchanged complementary goods.

The Polish Six-Year Plan (1950-55) forecast an industrial production, which, by the end of 1955, would be $2\frac{1}{2}$ times that of 1949 and over 4 times pre-war. Polish industry was to produce many heavy industrial machines for the first time-tractors, steam turbines, highpressure crucibles, complex machine-tools. The Czechoslovak Five-Year Plan (1949-53) foreshadowed a 75 per cent increase in industrial production. With the development of the coal, metallurgical, engineering and power industries, the unbalanced one-sided character of Czechoslovak industry was to be ended. But even this bold perspective was quickly outrun by history. In February, 1951, the long-term perspectives were radically revised-upwards. The successes in the first two years of the Czechoslovak Five-Year Plan made it possible to envisage the completion of the original plan in $3\frac{1}{2}$ years and to put forward an altogether more far-reaching vista for the full Five-Year Plan. It was decided that industrial output as a whole would increase 98 per cent over 1948 in the course of the Plan instead of the original 75 per cent, i.e. doubled in five years. Heavy industrial output was to reach by 1953, 2.3 times that of 1948. Dolansky, Chairman of the State Planning Administration, declared in February, 1951:

"We are able to fulfil the original Five-Year Plan in 3.5 years. The guarantee of this is the tremendous labour enthusiasm of the broad masses of the people, the development of socialist emulation, the application of the advanced experience of the Soviet Union in industry and other branches of national economy, and the existence of great internal opportunities for this within Czechoslovakia. An important factor which helps to extend the tasks of our Five-Year Plan is the deepening and extension of economic co-operation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, which leads the camp

of peace and socialism, and also the co-operation between Czechoslovakia and the People's Democracies."

The Bulgarian Five-Year Plan (1949-53) will ensure a gigantic step forward in industrial development. In 1953, the volume of industrial production (excluding artisan production) will reach about four times that of pre-war. Rumania, in the course of the Five-Year Plan (1951-55), will not only surpass the highest pre-war production of oil, but develop vast new industries in the field of power and engineering.

The Hungarian Five-Year Plan (1950-54) was planned to bring about an 86 per cent increase in industrial production over that of 1949 and an increase of heavy industrial production of 204 per cent during the same period. In five years the production of means of production was planned to increase 17 times. Hungarian industry, aided by the Soviet Union, will produce for the first time diesel engines, complex machine-tools and technically developed mining equipment. But, once again, history has run ahead of even the boldest of perspectives. The first year of the Five-Year Plan exceeded all prevision and in the first months of 1951 the Plan was radically revised—upwards. Matyas Rakosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Working People's Party, explained the new and revised perspective when he addressed his Party's Second Congress on February 25, 1951;

"What does the new, increased Five-Year Plan mean? First of all, that the new plan invests far more in heavy industry and within it, in the iron, steel, coal and electrical-energy production. In numerical terms, we wish to invest 37-38 milliards [of forints] into heavy industry, more than double the original plan. In 1949, we planned that our factory industry would increase by 86.4 per cent. According to the new plan, factory industry production will increase by approximately threefold, nearly 200 per cent, and within this, heavy industry by four times. Light industry, instead of the 72.9 per cent of the original plan, will increase by 150 per cent. Last year, the production of heavy industry was only 2.2. per cent higher than that of light industry, but by the end of the Five-Year Plan the proportion of heavy industry in production will be 70 per cent, that of light industry 30 per cent."

Never has any anti-Soviet slander been more false than the Titoite-Wall Street cry that the Soviet Union tries to prevent the industrialisation of the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe! A study of the facts shows that exactly the reverse is true. The Titoite tactic, like that of Goebbels, is to turn truth on its head!

For it is precisely the friendly economic aid and trade of the Soviet

Union that has enabled the People's Democracies, treading the opposite road to that of Tito Yugoslavia, to make so triumphant and rapid an industrial advance, despite all the devastation of the war, and all the boycott efforts of Western imperialism. The economic policy of the U.S.S.R. is exactly the opposite of that of imperialism. The Soviet Union, which was the principal factor in the liberation of the People's Democracies from Axis domination, and which, the war ended, protected them from Western imperialist military intervention, permitted them, through its unselfish socialist aid and trade, to rehabilitate their stricken economies and to advance rapidly on the road of socialist industrialisation.

Such an industrialisation remained impossible under Western imperialist domination. Non-Communist economists who honestly examine the post-war developments in Eastern Europe are bound to admit this:

"What Eastern Europe primarily needed was the industrial revolution, and without the shift in the European balance of power resulting from Soviet victory it would never have come. Western Europe, so far as it was interested in Eastern Europe at all, was interested in keeping it backward as a source of cheap food and cheap labour. . . . Had the Western powers been able to influence the course of events [after the Second World War], they would have put back into power the same kind of Governments which existed before, and whose failure led to fascism." (Dr. Doreen Warriner, Lecturer at the London School of Slavonic Studies, in Revolution in Eastern Europe, 1950.)

But it was only in Yugoslavia that, with the aid of the Titoite betrayal, the "Western powers were able to influence the course of events" and to keep "it backward as a source of cheap food and cheap labour". Thanks to the U.S.S.R., the Western capitalist states have not been able to get their greedy hands on the six People's Democracies. These countries had loyal Communists, good patriots, at the heads of their governments—Dimitrov, Kolarov, Chervenkov, Bierut, Gheorghiu-Dei, Gottwald, Rakosi, Gero and Enver Hoxha, and not Tito, Kardelj, Rankovic, Djilas and Mose Pijade. And the Western imperialists, who protest so vigorously at the trial and condemnation of this or that Titoite traitor in the People's Democracies, are, in fact, behind the façade of their so very righteous indignation, protesting at their own failure to reduce these People's Democracies to the same semi-colonial status as Tito Yugoslavia, i.e., to their semi-colonial status of before the war.

Socialist aid and trade has no "Marshall strings". It is based on

mutual respect for national integrity and sovereignty, on equality, on mutual strengthening. This has been and remains the basis of Soviet aid and trade with the People's Democracies. It is the Soviet Union that has supplied the heavy machinery, modern equipment, raw materials, that have permitted the so rapid industrialisation of the People's Democracies and the so rapid rise in the living standards of their peoples. It is the U.S.S.R. that has sent them Soviet technicians, not to spy on them in the old Western tradition, not to take over their economies like the Nazi and American "experts", but to help them to train their own advanced technicians in the most modern techniques perfected in the Socialist Soviet Union.

It is Soviet aid and trade, based on socialist principles, that have enabled the People's Democracies to develop their bold long-term plans, and to open up before their peoples such grandiose perspectives.

Soviet long-term credits have been used by the People's Democracies to obtain from the Soviet Union metallurgical, chemical, machine-building materials. The U.S.S.R. has sent them whole largescale modern industrial installations—machine-tool factories, power plants, hydro-electric stations. With the help of Soviet equipment, the People's Democracies are now able, themselves, to produce heavy and complex industrial goods previously imported, to manufacture many machines for the first time in their history, including the machines that will lay the basis for the development of socialist agriculture. These countries are no longer dependent on imperialism. They have shed, and for ever, their semi-colonial status. It is Soviet aid and trade and friendship that has permitted them to develop independent of Western imperialism, and has allowed them to know, for the first time, the real meaning of independence, for which their peoples fought so long and so bitterly, made such sacrifice and shed so much of their blood.

With Soviet aid and trade the Polish people are now constructing the Nowa Huta iron and steel works, which will double the capacity of that country's iron and steel industry:

"Industrial production [in Poland in 1955] is destined to soar 85 per cent above 1949, or more than four times the output per head of population in the pre-war years. The new blast furnaces received from the Soviet Union are to make possible steel production twice as high as pre-war. . . ." (Marguerite Higgins, in New York Herald Tribune, writing from Warsaw, 12.1.50.)

The Soviet Union has supplied Poland with the plans and materials for a giant cement works which will be amongst the largest and most modern in Europe—and this is only one of the dozens of such installa-

tions delivered by the U.S.S.R. to Poland. All the machinery was already on the site and assembly had begun by the beginning of 1951. The Wierzbica cement works, unlike capitalist-built plants, will provide not only for the maximum mechanisation, but for the best hygienic conditions for the workers. Work will be done in clean air and dust-absorbers are no longer necessary. It will start production in 1952. Blocks of the most modern flats, schools, shops, cinemas, clinics and crèches, cultural centres, workers' clubs, swimming pools and sports grounds are already under construction for the employees. On January 26, 1948, the Polish-Soviet long-term trade and credit agreement was signed. Since then trade turnover between Poland and the U.S.S.R. has constantly grown. If it is taken as 100 in 1947, it increased to 153 in 1948 and 212 in 1950, and will go on increasing. Poland has received and will receive manganese and chromium ore, liquid fuel, fertilisers and raw materials for their production, ballbearings, asbestos, tractors, agricultural machinery, and whole completely equipped industrial installations of the type of the Nowa Huta iron and steel plant. Patents have been supplied free by the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union has helped and is helping in planning the buildings and in the assembly of these huge projects and has trained Polish engineers and specialist workers.

The Bulgarian people, with Soviet aid and trade, are constructing industries never before dreamed of in Bulgaria—a nitrogen fertiliser plant, iron and steel works, automobile repair shops. Even hostile Western observers have had to admit this:

"With the exception of Rumania, Bulgaria has adapted its policy most closely to that of the Soviet Union . . [Soviet exports to Bulgaria] consist primarily of materials and goods of key importance for Bulgaria's industrialisation and for modernisation of its agriculture." (Vernon Bartlett, East of the Iron Curtain.)

Thanks to Soviet cotton deliveries, Bulgaria was able to revive and extend her textile industry. Soviet supplies of metals, building materials, machines and fittings, permitted the development of a Bulgarian heavy industry. Without Soviet petrol and its derivatives, vehicles, road and rail transport, Bulgarian industry would not have been able to take on its new tempo of extension. Without Soviet tractors and other agricultural machinery, spare parts, fertilisers and the material to make such equipment and materials inside Bulgaria, Bulgaria could not have made its triumphant advance along the road of socialist agriculture. Without the aid of Soviet experts, Bulgaria could never have tapped its mineral resources, not for export abroad, in the old imperialist manner, but for the achievement of her own

industrialisation. In the course of 1951, with Soviet aid, the giant "Stalin" nitrogen fertiliser plant, the Maritsa III and "Republic" thermo-electric power stations, an ultramarine dye plant, two steel furnaces, the Nikopol-Belen irrigation scheme, oil extraction works and many others, will all have begun operation.

A decree of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party was published early in 1951 for the development of rural economy, water supply and electrification of Dobrudja. The Dobrudja, under capitalism, was a symbol of peasant poverty. In the last fifty to sixty years of capitalist rule the forest areas were halved, the rivers dried up. Hot winds swept the tree-less land in summer and, in the winter months, blew off the snow from the soil, exposing it to the frost. A few wells, 200 to 250 feet deep, were the only source of water, but even these were used for profit by kulaks and landowners. Now electrification and irrigation have begun and by 1954 nature in the Dobrudja will have been transformed. By 1956, all the villages will have water supply, drainage systems and electricity, roads and railways. With Michurin methods the former semi-desert will begin to bloom.

To Rumania the U.S.S.R. is sending metals, coke, cotton, machinery, automobiles, agricultural equipment of an advanced type. Using Soviet technique, the amount of coal mined in Rumania in 1950 was 38 per cent above that of 1938. In four years (1947-50), with Soviet aid, the network of natural gas pipes increased four times. Now, through Soviet aid and trade, Rumania, once deprived of an engineering industry, turns out its own tractors, steam engines, threshers, textile machinery, equipment for the oil industry. It has started to produce its own automobiles, locomotives, freight cars, oil tanks, coastal vessels and barges. In the course of the Five-Year Plan, thanks to Soviet aid, Rumania will produce 21,000 tractors in her own factories.

The Albanian people, with Soviet credits, aid and trade, are transforming their country out of all recognition. From the U.S.S.R. they have received machinery and high voltage cables for hydro-electric stations; equipment and piping for the oil industry; tractors and combines; transport; machinery for a textile plant in Tirana, for two large wood-working plants, for an oil-refinery with an annual capacity of 150,000 tons. The construction of the new textile plants was, in the main, completed by the beginning of 1951, and these textile mills will have an annual capacity of 20 million metres of cotton fabrics. The Selita hydro-electric station, built with Soviet equipment, was also nearing completion by the beginning of 1951.

Matyas Rakosi, speaking in February, 1951, at the Second Congress

of the Hungarian Working People's Party, explained the role of the U.S.S.R. in Hungarian industrialisation:

"The Soviet Union helps us in the building of our most modern factories, gives us its best machines, most up-to-date manufacturing processes and, what is no less important, puts its best scientists and ace workers at our disposal. The best engineers and technicians of the Soviet Union, led by Academician Bardin, the world-famous foundry expert, have visited us, people whose advice and guidance means a service to us which cannot be overestimated.

"Comrade Bikov was here and passed on his experience in the field of fast cutting. Comrade Zuravlyov taught our foundrymen the method of quick smelting. Comrade Petrov, the chief foundryman of the Stalin Automobile Factory, passed on his experience in the fields of casting and foundrywork. Comrade Dubyaga helped us to transfer to the multi-machine system in the textile industry. Comrade Annanyeva taught our spinning workers how to decrease scrap to the minimum in the spinning mills. Comrade Shavlyugin taught our bricklayers the fast bricklaying method. Comrades Maximenko, Koba and Zuyev developed a whole team of Stakhanovites among our building workers. Comrade Panin taught the Hungarian engine drivers to increase the average speed of our railways. Filimonov, Padgarov and Logvinyenko gave help to our miners in acquiring methods of handling mining machinery, and so on. I will not continue this enumeration."

Between the role of the Soviet engineers and skilled workers and that of the U.S. "experts" who litter Yugoslavia is the difference between fraternal friendly advisers and F.B.I. stooges, between those who come to help and those who come to spy, between those who want to aid the development of Hungarian socialism and those who come to speed up the colonisation of Yugoslavia by Western imperialism.

And, whilst Western imperialism sucks Tito Yugoslavia dry of raw materials and dumps on her, with Tito's connivance, made-up industrial goods (mainly secondary)—the traditional economic relationship of colony and coloniser—the U.S.S.R., in a new socialist trading relationship, imports from the People's Democracies not only raw materials but, more and more, industrial goods manufactured in People's Democratic factories, often built with Soviet equipment and supplied with Soviet raw materials.

The Soviet Union, for instance, imports from Czechoslovakia 72 per cent *manufactured* goods. Even critical Western observers are forced to admit this new relationship:

"It seems important to explode another favourite myth of our

anti-Communist propagandists—that Czechoslovakia is being 'mercilessly exploited' by the Soviet Union. It is not. The clear purpose of Soviet policy is to make Czechoslovakia, economically, an outstanding success . . of course, Czech hats, shoes and textiles go to the Soviet Union, and the Czechs I have talked to are only too delighted that they do. ('What else would our light industries do?') In return, Czechoslovakia receives from the Soviet Union not only raw materials and large quantities of food, but as one Czech leader remarked to me, increasing amounts of elaborate heavy machinery. . . . The favourite story that the Russians merely use Czechoslovakia for 'turning their raw materials into shoes and textiles', and that all these are sent back to Russia, is just another piece of bunkum." (Alexander Werth, New Statesman and Nation, 24,12,49.)

Bunkum, yes! But pernicious bunkum put out by the Tories, right-wing Labour leaders, Wall Street journalists and, above all, by the Titoites, to hide, on the one hand, the generous and genuine socialist character of Soviet aid and trade, and, on the other, to conceal the exploiting imperialist character of American economic relationships with its colonies, semi-colonies and satellites, including not only Tito Yugoslavia but also Britain herself.

Socialist trade relationships are not confined to the relations of the Soviet Union with the People's Democracies. They are at the basis of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, formed in January, 1949, of which the members, at the beginning of 1951 were the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and the German Democratic Republic. The workings of this Council are the reverse of the workings of the Marshall bloc. The Council strengthens each of its members by mutual aid. The degree of specialisation does not warp the economies of its members. The strength of each adds to the strength of all. The Marshall bloc, which now, unofficially, includes Tito Yugoslavia, weakens the weaker members to the advantage of the stronger, above all to the advantage of the U.S.A. The co-ordination and mutual aid of planned socialist economies means that the sum of the individual countries that make up the Council of Mutual Assistance is greater than the simple addition of each of them; the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. With the Marshall bloc, greater production in the U.S.A. means greater curtailment of production in its satellites: the whole is less than the sum of the parts. A new tractor plant in the U.S.A. means death to the tractor industry in one of the Western satellites; a new tractor plant in the U.S.S.R. means new advance to socialist development throughout the countries of the Council. The difference is the simple but complete difference between capitalism and socialism at work!

The tremendous tempo of economic advance, of industrialisation, in the People's Democracies, has brought about a corresponding rise in the living standards of their peoples. Whilst the peoples of Tito Yugoslavia have seen each of the last few years bring higher prices, reduced real wages, greater hunger and greater hardship, those of the People's Democracies have known constantly rising wages, falling prices, increased consumption and developing social services.

In Poland, in 1950 output of pork was 44 per cent above that of 1949, of cotton textiles 7 per cent, woollen fabrics 13 per cent, leather footwear 13 per cent. In Hungary, output of sugar in 1950 was 15 per cent above the previous year, cotton textiles 8 per cent, footwear 50 per cent. In Rumania, in the same period, sugar output increased by 24 per cent, bakery products by 42 per cent. In Bulgaria, 1950 was marked by a 27 per cent increase in the manufacture of cotton textiles, 37.3 per cent of woollen fabrics and 127.6 per cent of footwear. In Czechoslovakia, in the first half of 1950, there was a 15 per cent increase in output of cotton goods, 17 per cent more butter, 12 per cent more synthetic fats. Consumption of meat increased 45 per cent and of fat 100 per cent.

In all these countries there has been a consistent fall of prices contrasting in all sharpness with the steep price rise and increasing shortages of Tito Yugoslavia. In Czechoslovakia, since the establishment of special "commercial shops" with controlled prices, prices of foodstuffs have dropped 10-50 per cent, textiles 39-61 per cent, shoes 58 per cent. In Rumania, commercial shop prices for underwear and textiles fell 20 per cent in the course of 1950. In Albania, the prices of meat and butter were reduced by 50 per cent and sugar 28 per cent at the beginning of 1950. In Poland a further series of price reductions were announced at the end of 1950, including a drop of 10 per cent in the price of sausages, pork, fats and laundry soap and 5-20 per cent in footwear.

In all these countries there has been a consistent rise of real wages, a consistent development of social services of every description, a consistent increase in the number of men and women employed in industry.

The Lesson

It would take a long book to chart the vast economic, cultural and political advances made in the People's Democracies in the post-war

years in their rapid and accelerating progress along the road to socialism.

In every way and in every field their road and their achievements contrast with the retreat and sufferings of the Yugoslav peoples under conditions of the Titoite dictatorship and the Titoite betrayal.

On the one side, in the People's Democracies, rapid economic advance; on the other, in Tito Yugoslavia, economic enslavement, colonisation. In the People's Democracies rapidly advancing socialist agriculture; in Tito Yugoslavia kulak domination even under the facade of phoney "collectives". In the People's Democracies, more and more participation by the working class and working people in every field of state administration from the Ministers to the smallest village people's council; in Tito Yugoslavia growing oppression of the people by the Titoite clique. In the People's Democracies rapid advance to socialism; in Tito Yugoslavia return to capitalism, in a more and more openly fascist form. In the People's Democracies colossal advance of the peace movement, minimum war budget, maximum budget expenditure on social services; in Tito Yugoslavia rising war budget and attacks on even those social services introduced in the immediate post-war years. In the People's Democracies, planning, security, confidence in the future; in Tito Yugoslavia planning abandoned, misery and hunger, insecurity, the future grim. In the People's Democracies, cultural advance in giant strides, national in form and socialist in content; in Tito Yugoslavia, cultural decay and Hollywood films. In the People's Democracies-independencepolitical and economic; in Tito Yugoslavia colonisation, a return, on a lower level, to the semi-colonial status of between the wars.

And the key and the crux of this great contrast is that the People's Democracies have leaned on the aid, the trade, the friendship of that first socialist country, leader of the camp of peace—the Soviet Union, whilst Yugoslavia has been dragged by the Titoites, traitors to the national liberation struggles, to the sacrifices and aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples, into the camp of war, into the orbit of Anglo-American imperialism.

The moral was eloquently drawn in the words of Georgi Dimitrov when he declared:

"Sincere friendship with the Soviet Union is as important for the national independence and prosperity of the Bulgarian people as are sunlight and air for every living being."

There is no third way! Turning away from the path of friendship with the Soviet Union, the Titoites have led their people along a

bitter road of enslavement, hunger and war. Lacking the "sunlight and air" of Soviet friendship, they are choked and stifled by imperialism.

We have dealt at length in this chapter with only one, but the essential, Titoite propaganda slander—the greatest of the "great lies" put out by the Goebbels of Tito Yugoslavia. This is the lie that "Soviet imperialism", "red imperialism" has sought to stop the economic advance of its "East European satellites", and that "under Tito's heroic leadership, Yugoslavia resisted the threat of Soviet imperialism and took the road of independence and socialist construction leaning on the generous aid of the West".

What have we seen? We have seen that every word, every section of this main Titoite slander is not only utterly false, but that every phase of the argument is the exact reversal of the truth.

We have seen, firstly, that it was the Soviet Union that first gave aid to Yugoslavia at the end of the Second World War, despite its own vast losses, that it was Soviet citizens in U.N.R.R.A. and Soviet representatives who fought for the rehabilitation of Yugoslav industry, that Soviet aid and trade, and the aid and trade of the People's Democracies, laid the basis and offered the opportunity for the genuine advance of Yugoslavia to socialism.

We have seen, secondly, that it was Tito Yugoslavia that, long before the 1948 Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau, broke its contracts with the People's Democracies who were honouring theirs, and turned westwards, to the Western capitalist states.

We have seen, thirdly, that by dragging Yugoslavia into the orbit of Western imperialism, and above all that of the U.S.A., the Titoites have surrendered the economic and political independence of Yugoslavia, ended all socialist planning, made their country into a semicolony of the U.S.A., returned it, on a lower level, to its semi-colonial status of between the wars, so that once again, surrounded by wealth, the Yugoslav people groan under dire poverty.

We have seen, fourthly and lastly, that the People's Democracies, led by real internationalists, patriots and Communists of the Dimitrov stamp, enjoying the friendship of the U.S.S.R., receiving the genuine and generous socialist aid and trade of the Soviet Union, have known an economic advance, a tempo of industrialisation, hitherto unknown, which even the boldest of their own bold people had hardly dared to dream of. We have seen that these people and these states, in friendly co-operation, one with another and all with the Soviet Union, are building socialism, transforming nature and human nature, and at a colossal speed are building their future of prosperity, culture and peace.

Chapter Eight

SOME CONCLUSIONS

Tito in the Service of Western Reaction

THERE IS ONE more line of propaganda that is particularly dear to the Titoite propagandists. It is the proclamation, which is echoed in every type of capitalist newspaper, that "Tito is a new kind of Communist and Titoism a new kind of communism".

To this propaganda there is a very simple answer. All that is necessary is to examine for a moment who are the men, who are the Parties, whose are the newspapers and journals, that today are lauding the Titoites.

Already by the end of 1949 Britain's leading Tories were paying homage to their stooges. Lord Vansittart on October 18, 1949, spoke of Tito as the origin of a "crack throughout the Communist Empire" and added:

"It should be the business of our diplomacy to widen that crack by every possible means." (Manchester Guardian, 19.10.49.)

Mr. Churchill himself, speaking in the House of Commons on November 15, 1949, rejoiced that Tito Yugoslavia (instead of Czechoslovakia) had been elected (under U.S. pressure) on to the Security Council of the United Nations. On December 12, 1949, the *Daily Telegraph* published an article by Mr. Eden declaring that:

"Tito's example and influence can decisively change the course of events in Central and Eastern Europe."

It is, indeed a very "new" sort of communism that enlists the support of Messrs. Churchill, Eden and Vansittart.

On the American side, as usual, the same sentiments were echoed with even greater frankness. The *New York Herald Tribune* wrote (2.9.49):

"Meanwhile [the U.S.] Department of Commerce records showed yesterday that permits to ship goods to Yugoslavia have climbed sharply during the last ten months as Marshal Tito's resistance to Russia increased."

The Washington Star proclaimed (8.10.49):

"In terms of the cold war between East and West, Yugoslavia today is one of the most important countries in the world."

The London *Times*, explaining how Tito had to conceal his surrender to the West, wrote that (14.7.49):

"Instead of making concessions in return for loans, Yugoslavia makes them in advance."

All the organs of the most openly reactionary of Wall Street satellites rallied to the support of the Marshal. The West German business organ published in Stuttgart declared (29.10.49):

"The Belgrade Marshal is on the way to becoming the favourite of the Western states engaged in the cold war. They fell over each other in their efforts to give him further political and economic help, and perhaps even to prepare for the despatch of arms. The American diplomats who recently met in London and Paris thoroughly discussed the possibilities of how Tito's opposition to Moscow could help American policy towards the Soviet Union."

In Italy, the Titoites failed dismally to win support from the Nenni Socialists, but enjoyed the outspoken backing of the neo-fascists of the M.S.I. (Italian Social Movement, upholders of Mussolini). A motion put forward by Signore Alfredo Cucco, the M.S.I. neo-fascist leader, declared on January 15, 1950:

"The Italian Social Movement expresses its dissatisfaction with the weaknesses, lack of understanding and restraint in the Government's foreign policy at a time when a country bordering us in the East . . . is in vital need of our mutual understanding."

Becoming franker and franker in their praise for Tito's "new kind of communism", the Western imperialists began more and more openly to reveal their real motives. On November 2, 1950, an *Economist* article on "American aid to Tito" explained:

"For four years the Americans have been told by the Government and their representatives in Congress that the United States is unalterably opposed to Communism and to dictatorship. Yet with surprising facility, without a word of debate, the American Government has for almost one year been lending ever-increasing aid and moral support to the Communist dictatorship in Yugoslavia. Now the National Security Council has gone so far as to commit itself to the idea of military aid in the event of aggression, while the new American Ambassador, Mr. George Allen, has hinted that 'aggression' might include internal revolt fostered by a 'certain foreign power'. . . . The main problem for the State Department and for the Western world in general is to contain the Soviet Union. . .

"The policy has already paid its dividends. Political convulsions

produced by the Belgrade-Moscow struggle in Bulgaria and other satellites; the loss of prestige suffered by the Russians at the last General Assembly of the United Nations; the splitting of 'front' organisations and the defections in Western Communist Parties over the 'Titoist' issue; the removal of Trieste as a danger spot from the international agenda; the end of the Greek civil war; the solution of the Carinthian problem in Austria—these are the rewards of the policy forwarded by the State Department. . . Moreover the interest accruing from this policy has far exceeded the principal expended. In fact, it has been the cheapest and most rewarding of all Western investments so far." [My italics—J. K.]

Read between the lines of the curiously semi-Aesopian language of British diplomacy, and what have you? A frank acknowledgement that Titoism and the Titoites are recognised by Western reaction as an important anti-Soviet and anti-Communist weapon, dividers of the people's front for peace, betrayers of the Greek people and the Slav peoples of Trieste and Carinthia; a frank recognition that of all quislings Tito is the most cheaply bought!

Along the same lines the press of American big business put its cards on the table:

"It is pointed out that advantages accruing from Marshal Tito's survival have included the distancing of Russia from the Adriatic Sea; a weakening of Communist guerilla bands in Greece, an important factor in their collapse; some protection for the Western position in Austria in the event of war. . . ." (New York Herald Tribune, 12.6.50.)

"In Belgrade, Marshal Tito's capital, a new Tito is on display. Old Tito, pre-1948 model, appears to have disappeared. . . . It is this new Tito who says he might send troops to Asia in support of the United Nations, says he's willing to return Greek children to Greece, release a Catholic archbishop from jail, trim Communist privileges in Yugoslavia, and accept loans and gifts from the United States." (U.S. News and World Report, 24.11.50.)

"Look at a map. Yugoslavia today is, as a country hostile to Russia, the biggest bargain in foreign relations the United States has ever had." (Look, 10.4.51.)

To be a "Tito" has become a synonym in the press of Western capitalism with a "friend of Western imperialism". The capitalists turn hopefully from country to country looking for Titos—usually in vain.

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"It would be delectable, indeed, if a split after the style of that

with Yugoslavia's Tito should occur between the Politbureau crowd and Mao." (Philadelphia Inquirer, quoted by United States Information Service in London, 21.12.49.)

"Since the Chinese Communists came to power the hope has been openly expressed in the West, particularly in the United States, that Mao Tse-tung would become the Tito of Asia. The bait has been offered almost openly. If Mao will act the Tito, the West will not refuse economic aid." (World Today, organ of Chatham House, June, 1950.)

They hope in vain, but they make themselves clear. To be a Tito means to surrender to imperialism and to become an enemy of the U.S.S.R., the Communists, Socialists, working class, and of all those who stand for progress and for peace.

All these quotations, and ten thousand more, make it abundantly clear what is the true nature of what some of the capitalist and rightwing Labour propagandists call a "new kind of Communism". Imperialism needs Tito dressed up as a Communist:

"Titoism remains a force, however, only so long as Marshal Tito can claim to be a Communist." (The Times, 13.9.49.)

But Imperialism openly recognises that beneath the Communist façade they have a cheap, obedient tool, ready to carry out their war policy directed against the Soviet Union, People's Democracies, and the working people everywhere. "There are two kinds of communism", they proclaim. But is it not rather strange that there is only "one sort of communism" that captivates the capitalists, that Churchill lauds, Truman supports, the right-wing Labour leaders admire, that the red-baiters acknowledge as their friend, the Greek monarchists and Italian fascists and German monopolists recognise as their ally?

No! It is not so strange. Because there is only one sort of communism, one sort of Marxism-Leninism, one genuine sort of socialism, and because Tito's "communism" has as much in common with real communism as Hitler's "national socialism" had with a true socialist outlook.

Tito and the Right-Wing Labour Leaders

Tito's "communism" is as communist as Hitler's "socialism" was socialist. But the particular value of the Titoites to imperialism, like the Trotskyites before them and along with them, is that they carry the utterly imperialist outlook and actions concealed under a thin veneer of ultra-rrrrevolutionary pseudo-Marxist phrases. That is their utility and that is the use that has been made of them by imperialism in Britain, too.

When the war was over every effort was made by the Yugoslav Embassy in Britain to attract the maximum number of British Socialists and Communists, and particularly the youth, to Tito Yugoslavia. Deceived by the propaganda of the Titoites, Socialists and Communists accepted the invitations in large numbers. When the publication of the Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau in June 1948 revealed the anti-socialist character of Titoite policy, the Titoites, through channels of the Yugoslav Embassy, and amply supplied with finances from sources it is now not hard to guess at, made a dead set at the British Communist Party, deluging its members with propaganda of every type, invitations to receptions, free holidays, and unlimited wining and dining. Their aim, quite openly expressed, was to split the Communist Party

Here they met with abysmal failure and succeeded in clipping off from the Party at most a dozen or so wobbling elements throughout the whole country, by the loss of whom the Communist Party was undoubtedly strengthened. With this fiasco, the British Titoites directed their attention to the Labour Party, to the trade union and co-operative movements, joining forces with the small clique of Trotskyites (once self-styled "Revolutionary Communists"), most of whom entered the Labour Party in the course of 1948.

In this "operation", and with the fullest aid of the capitalist press. they tried to present themselves as a new brand of "left" Socialist. Here their manœuvre was clear. Inside the broad British labour movement, the right-wing social-democratic leaders still exercised a very great influence, and, in 1948-49, could still succeed in holding back the larger section of British workers from united struggle with the Communists and militant Labour workers against capitalism. The theories of the right-wing social democrats were still politically disarming a large section of the working people. But they were losing ground. More and more attacks were being made against the living standards of the working people, against democracy. The war propaganda of the Attlees and Bevins was becoming more and more blatant, and their surrender to U.S. imperialism more and more apparent. More and more trade unionists, co-operators, Labour Party members were throwing off the long-established influence of social democracy, moving into struggle for wages, democracy, independence and peace, moving into united action with the Communists and militant workers. This made it necessary for imperialism—and for the right-wing Labour leaders—to look for an instrument with which to divert and confuse the growing militancy and the growing unity. This was the role assigned to the Titoites.

In the 1949 period the Titoites in Britain turned their attention, in the first place, to the youth and to the students. The reason for this is not hard to find, for it is precisely amongst the youth and students that the influence of the right-wing social democrats has been, and remains, the weakest. The youth, by nature fighters, prompt to rebel against persecution and bad conditions, ardently desirous for peace, have continuously found themselves opposed in their struggles, not only by Tories, but by the right-wing Labour leaders. Time and again the Labour Party leadership has stepped in to disband or to "discipline" the Labour League of Youth, to stop them from united struggle with the other sections of the youth, including their comrades in the Young Communist League. As for the students, no one could claim that Transport House had a high intellectual appeal, or that the student youth would find inspiration in Attlee or Morrison. Hence it was in the fields of the youth and the universities that imperialism, first and most urgently, found need of the Titoites.

When young members of the Labour League of Youth protested that the Labour Party was rejecting socialism, they were side-tracked on to the Tito issue. "You want socialism", they were told, "then go to Yugoslavia, there you will find a new sort of socialism". Whilst youth from the Labour League were disciplined for united action with the Young Communist League on issues of peace or wages, whilst the Transport House press inveighed against the evils of communism, they were given every encouragement to visit and make contact with "that new kind of communism" of the Tito brand. In the universities the old Trotskyite arsenal of anti-Soviet slanders dressed up as Marxism was heavily drawn on to confuse the students who were moving left. Youth and students were deluged with Yugoslav Embassy propaganda, gratis and unasked for. Carefully conducted tours were organised to Tito Yugoslavia, where the youth were shepherded with the aid of carefully chosen interpreters from one well-prepared showpiece to another. A number of experienced Trotskyites, skilled in diversionary phrases and tactics, were drafted into the ranks of the Labour League of Youth.

Another field where Titoite activity in Britain took on a special concentration was amongst the colonial peoples living in Britain and especially amongst the colonial student organisations—African, West Indian, Indian, Ceylonese, etc. In the colonies, too, for obvious reasons, there was no economic basis for a mass influence of social democracy. The colonial people and the colonial youth were, everywhere, on the march against imperialism. Imperialism, as we have already seen in an earlier chapter, saw in Titoism a specially important weapon to

confuse, disrupt and spy on the colonial people, and British imperialism saw that a "useful" (in the M.I.5 sense) job could be done by the Titoites in the colonial student organisations, using them as a bridge to gain an influence in the colonial and semi-colonial countries themselves. Here Titoite propaganda took on a special demagogy. It tried to cash in on the revolutionary sentiments of the colonial youth, to turn their national revolutionary aspirations against the Soviet Union, to confuse their study of Marxism, to lead them to skip stages in the revolutionary struggle, to put forward Tito Yugoslavia as a "model".

By 1950, the successes scored in these activities were extremely slight. A few initial successes were quickly repelled when the progressive youth and students saw the need to expose the true character of Titoism, and when, each month, history itself made clearer and clearer the road of disaster, hunger, and subjection to imperialism, along which the Titoites were leading the Yugoslav people. But in 1950, disillusion with social democracy began to accelerate not only amongst youth and students, but in the broad adult labour movement—in the trade unions, co-operatives and Labour Party Branches.

In the course of 1950, therefore, and still more in 1951, the right-wing Labour leaders, themselves, began to make direct personal contact with the Titoites, to take the pro-Tito campaign out of the hands of the phoney "left", into their own hands. The direct link-up was more and more openly established between the Titoites and Transport House. The *Daily Herald* and all the official Labour Party propaganda publications began more and more openly to boost Tito.

Labour Ministers and Labour Party leaders visited Yugoslavia and publicly paid homage to Titoism. Noel Baker, Morgan Phillips, Sam Watson, the right-wing miners' leader from Durham, and Mr. Ernest Davies, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, took the road to Belgrade. All that was most openly and consistently anti-communist in the labour movement began to laud to the skies Tito's "new kind of communism". In return, the Titoites began to praise the Labour Party leaders and their right-wing policy in their official press. Indeed, they went further and began to make open contact with the Tory leaders and to find sweet words for them.

The Belgrade Review of International Affairs, which has an English edition, and which is aimed at functioning as an international Tito-Trotskyite "ideological" centre, loudly praised Gaitskell's Budget:

"The Labourite Minister Mr. Gaitskell succeeded in balancing the new Budget by proposing decisive but popular [sic!—J. K.] measures which prevented the Conservative opposition from publicly

taking a stand against the Budget as a whole. The Labour followers are pleased [sic!—J. K.] that taxes have been increased for the rich. . . " (Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, April 25, 1951.)

Djilas, Titoite Minister without Portfolio, paid a hush-hush visit to Britain in February, 1951, had conferences with Labour Ministers, a number of secret talks, and gave a lecture to the élite of reaction assembled by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, on how to distort Marxism. Needless to say, the Djilas brand of "Marxism" was warmly received by the most reactionary press of the country.

On February 28, 1951, *Borba* printed an interview with Marshal Tito with a Reuter correspondent. The Marshal had been converted to social democracy. "I consider the British Labour Party", he explained:

"... a workers' party which in practice is led by elements of socialist science, especially in solving the economic problems in its own country."

In mid-March, 1951, the Titoite "theoretician", Mose Pijade, led a Titoite delegation to Britain and delivered himself of the following at the official dinner organised by the Foreign Press Association (15.3.51):

"...Our yesterday's meeting with the representatives of the two Houses of Parliament happened to coincide with a fierce [sic!—J. K.] tussle between the Government and the opposition, yet we were able to observe that as far as feelings of friendship for Yugoslavia went, there was no difference between the conflicting parties."

Indeed how could there be a difference of attitude between Tories and right-wing Labour leaders who so "fiercely" contest who is to prepare imperialist war and defend capitalism in Britain, towards their joint and obedient stooges? The Tories are delighted with the open rapprochement of Tito and Transport House. Already in September, 1950, the *Economist*, commenting on the right-wing Labour delegation to the Titoites, applauded the fact that it could find in Yugoslavia:

"a Communist Party which has irretrievably burned its boats with the Soviet Union" and which "can overcome any inhibitions it may have against the representatives of these Western democrats who are so continually reviled by the Communist Information Bureau. . . " (Economist, 16.9.50.)

And The Times, describing the visit of Pijade and his men, lauded

the new "liberalism" of the Titoites (17.3.51). "Pendennis" in the Sunday Observer's weekly "Table Talk" remarks how "Yugoslavia continues to move, quietly, towards the Western system" (26.6.51). Indeed the Titoites are forced more and more into the open by history, and are even beginning to admit their conversion to capitalism. Boris Kidric, member of the Political Bureau of the Titoite Party, exhorted the Yugoslav economists at a meeting of the Society of Economists in mid-April, 1951, to study much more the development of capitalist countries. He described as "all very ridiculous" the theory that there is unemployment in the U.S.A. "The Society of Economists", he declared, "ought to pay great attention to the development of capitalist economy."

The Manchester Guardian's diplomatic correspondent, writing on his visit to Yugoslavia ("Yugoslavia in Transition—The West and the Future", 14.6.51), remarked how Titoite officials told him that they "recognised that there were many good aspects of the capitalist system".

Thus history itself has shown, as it always does, that there is no difference in practice between the doctrines of the Trotskyite-Titoites covered with a veneer of revolutionary phrases and those of the rightwing social democrats, and that both act as instruments for the defence of dying capitalism. Despite all demagogy, Titoites, Tories and rightwing Labour leaders all serve the same end.

This does not mean that Titoism is already exposed for what it is amongst all sections of the British labour and progressive movement. This does not mean that there is not urgent need of increased explanation of the true role of the Titoites. For as the mass movement for peace, democracy, independence and living standards, swings into motion, as the unity of the labour and progressive movement against capitalism is forged in action, as the Marxist explanations of the causes of the growing misery of the people, of the menace of war, and Marxist indications of the way out of crisis, of the way forward for the British people towards independence, peace and socialism, fall on ever more fertile ground, imperialism looks for weapons to divert this movement, to split it and confuse it, and more and more as the masses of the people turn away from the right-wing social democrats, reaction will turn to Titoism and all brands of pseudo-left demagogy as its main weapon of disruption.

Moreover the Titoites have become a co-ordinating centre, in Britain, as in other countries, for the secret infiltration of spies, provocateurs, stooges of all kinds into the working-class movement. Indeed as the struggle develops, there will be need for ever-increased

vigilance, and for ever clearer exposure of the role of the Titoites as instruments of reaction.

The visit to Britain of two further leading Titoites in June-July, 1951, only adds point to this fact. In June, following Djilas and Pijade, Rankovic himself, chief of the Titoite repressive forces, came to Britain on a mission of which both British and Yugoslav officials kept equally silent. In July came General Popovic, Chief of Staff, fresh from Washington where he was "understood to have made a favourable impression". (New York Herald Tribune, 9.7.51.)

Some Lessons

The task of explaining to the masses of the people the role of treachery played by the Titoites is not an affair for specialists. For those who are fighting for peace and socialism, in this country as in all others, will find that they have to face, not only open Tories and reactionaries, not only right-wing Labour leaders who try to disguise the class struggle, to secure class collaboration, and to put forward perspectives of winning socialism without struggle within the framework of capitalism. They will also find themselves, inevitably, up against leftist demagogues who conceal a right-wing policy in leftwing phrases (and we have had plenty of these in our country), and against agents of capitalism who try to penetrate into the militant labour movement, and to sap it, disrupt it, spy on it, from inside.

From the examination that we have made of the role of the Titoites, what lessons can we learn?

Socialist Theory

The first lesson is the importance of socialist theory to the working class and working people in their struggles to establish a Socialist Britain. It was on the background of a low level of socialist theory, of the understanding of Marxism, that the Titoites were able to betray the liberation struggles of the Yugoslav peoples, and to get power into the hands of their own clique.

Wherever Titoites through their secret work have been able to gain leading positions in the working-class movement of this or that country, it has been by trading on weaknesses of political understanding—bourgeois nationalism, abstract doctrinaire approaches, lack of political education and discussion.

In this country where the right-wing Labour leaders preach that the working class has no need of its own theory, its own philosophy, and where the Attlees and Morrisons purvey throughout the labour movement the theories of the capitalist class, Titoism and Trotskyism are

of especial danger, unless there is a consistent effort made by the Communist Party and militant sections of the Labour workers to fight for a political understanding based on Marxism-Leninism.

Action alone will not bring socialism. How many Labour workers have toiled and sacrificed all their lives to build up the labour movement, to find themselves betrayed in the end by right-wing Labour leaders? Action and struggle will only lead to socialism when the working class and working people know where they are going, have a sure course set before them, a compass that can guide them, which can only be the theory of Marxism-Leninism applied concretely to their own country, their own historic conditions. Without this the working people can again and again, despite their efforts and sacrifices, be misled and betrayed and see their movement, built up with such pains, disrupted.

All the theories of the right-wing Labour leaders attempt, in one form or another, to show the need for class collaboration, the need for the working class to collaborate with the capitalist class of both their own and other countries. They teach that the state is a neutral apparatus, above classes, which loyally serves whichever Party is elected to office.

But the whole of history repeatedly brings to the fore the lesson that class collaboration leads to disaster, that friendship with, say, the American capitalists leads to colonisation by American imperialism, that the transition to socialism is only possible in continued struggle against the capitalist class at home and internationally.

Friendship with the Soviet Union

It is not by accident that the Tories, right-wing Labour leaders and the Titoites all point their shafts in *one* direction, that their venom and their hatred, their lies and their slanders, are all directed, in the first place, against the Soviet Union.

It is because the Soviet Union has given an example to the working class and the working people of the whole world. It has shown them that the working people can take power under the leadership of the working class, that the people can build socialism without the capitalists. It is because the very existence of the Soviet Union and its enormous achievements in all spheres of life, inspire the working people in all capitalist and in colonial countries, to follow the example of the Soviet people, to end the rule of the capitalists and landowners, and build their own new free and prosperous lives in a country which belongs to them.

It is because it is the Soviet Union that leads the world struggle for

peace, which has become today the greatest dread of the monopolists. The imperialists see war as the only "solution" of their problems, and they hate most those who the most strongly and the most consistently fight for peace.

The imperialists hate the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its leader Stalin, because it is the most experienced and clear-sighted of all working-class parties in the world—the greatest enemy of dying capitalism.

When the tricks and cumning of the Titoites were misleading the working class of all countries, when they had succeeded in concealing their real aims and intentions, it was the C.P.S.U.(B.), with its great experience, that first gave warning of the betrayal of Tito and his confederates, that first unmasked their departure from Marxist theory, that first exposed the Titoite conspiracies. Those of us, like myself, who in the early stage were deceived by the manœuvres of the Titoites, can well understand the gratitude that we owe, and that, indeed, the peoples of all countries owe, to the wisdom of the warnings given by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Indeed we only have to think what might have happened if the Communist Information Bureau, on Soviet initiative, had not warned and had not unmasked the plots of the Tito gang, to understand the debt of all progressive people to the Soviet Communists.

And therefore a second task that emerges from an examination of the role of Titoism is the appreciation of the need ceaselessly to fight in the labour and progressive movement to make known and understood by the people the vanguard role of the U.S.S.R. in the world fight for peace and socialism and ceaselessly to fight for friendship and trade with the Soviet people.

Unity

Combating social democracy and combating Tito-Trotskyism is not simply a question of explanation and education. These are essential. But, at the same time, it is in the course of struggle that the people learn the most quickly, and it is in the course of the struggle against capitalism, for peace, independence, living standards, democracy—for socialism, that the explanations and education fall on really fertile soil. When the struggle is weak, when politics is divorced from action, then the Titoites can thrive.

And, therefore, we learn from our examination of the role of the Titoites the need for unity, for an ever-growing unity of the working people and of the working class, which will help the people, in the course of their struggle, to throw out the betrayers of their movement,

which will divide the demagogues from those who genuinely are prepared to struggle, which will strengthen the bonds between the most militant class-conscious and far-sighted workers with the masses of the working people.

Vigilance

The British bourgeoisie is the most experienced capitalist class in the whole world. No group of capitalists in any country has learned better how to combine ruthless repression with cunning bribery and corruption. No ruling class has acquired the same skill at manœuvring, retreating where necessary, disguising its real aims.

Over a long period British imperialism has used a small portion of the super-profits that it has drawn from the colonial people, to draw over to class collaboration (often without their being conscious of it) a section of the working class. Now that British imperialism has entered into deep crisis, that it can no longer give the sops and concessions of yore, it is still aided and abetted by a group of rightwing Labour leaders, who try by every means to conceal the facts of exploitation, and the truth of the dictatorship exercised, under a Labour Government, by the monopoly capitalists, through the capitalist state.

The right-wing social democrats teach that the state is neutral, above classes, that the generals, and police chiefs, colonial officials, ambassadors, spies, M.I.5 agents and Foreign Office leaders, under a Labour Government serve the interests of the labour movement. They try by every method to *disarm* the working class and the working people, to make them relax their vigilance.

But the British ruling class and its state apparatus are experienced in all forms of exercising class rule. As we have seen, it was the British capitalists who first, alongside their open, overt instruments of class rule, their parties, army, police and law courts, set up the network of police spies and provocateurs to spy on and disrupt the working-class movement from within. In every colonial country within the Empire the British capitalists have set up their network of police agents and provocateurs in the labour and national liberation movements. It was Britain who first on a large scale developed the machinery of espionage against the U.S.S.R. And though they have tried to disguise and conceal it, the British capitalist class has maintained its apparatus for secret espionage and disruption inside the labour movement.

They have their whole apparatus, and on a very large scale, for tapping the telephones of progressive people, for opening and record-

ing their personal correspondence, for reporting on trade union and political meetings. And they have their apparatus which is constantly trying to infiltrate into the organisations of the labour and progressive movement, and in the first place, into the Communist Party, agents of different varieties, to spy on it and disrupt it from within.

The issue of vigilance, therefore, too long and too much neglected by the British workers, disarmed by social democracy, is a question of urgent importance for the whole labour movement. It does not mean that every worker or youth or student who has been misled by Titoite propaganda is a police spy. Far from it. But it does mean that the workers and their people have to be on their guard against individuals sent by the police or Intelligence, including Trotskyites and Titoites amongst the first, trying to make their way into the organisations of the working people and to capture leading positions.

Solidarity with the Yugoslav People

Throughout their history the peoples of Yugoslavia carried out with untold heroism the struggle against foreign rule and domination. It was indeed a tragedy that their struggles and sacrifices in the Partisan war against the Axis should have ended in so deep a betrayal.

But the Yugoslav peoples have known other defeats and they have known other traitors. Not all the repressions and ruthlessness of Rankovic will succeed in holding them in servitude. And stage by stage as they grow conscious of the character of the betrayal their resistance will grow stronger, better organised, until the rule of the Titoite clique is shattered and the Yugoslav people can return to the road of People's Democracy and socialism.

But we cannot stand by, watching their difficult struggle, in a mood of passivity. Every step taken to make the British people conscious of the real role of the Titoites and the real character of Titoism helps the Yugoslav people in ending their domination by the Titoites and their imperialist masters.

In the interests of the international solidarity of the working people, of peace and of socialism—the combating of Titoism, instrument of imperialist rule, is an urgent and honourable task.

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