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A. Y. Vyshinsky

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J. V. STALIN
REPLIES TO "PRAVDA" CORRESPONDENT'S
QUESTIONS ON RESULTS OF SECURITY COUNCIL
DISCUSSION OF "BERLIN QUESTION"

The following questions were put to J. V. Stalin by a "Pravda" correspondent on October 28, 1948.

Question: How do you appraise the results of the discussion by the Security Council of the question on the situation in Berlin and the behaviour of the Anglo-American and French representatives in this matter?

Reply: I regard them as a manifestation of the aggressiveness of the policy of the Anglo-American and French ruling circles.

Question: Is it true that in August of this year agreement had already once been reached between the four Powers on the Berlin question?

Reply: Yes, it is true. As is known, on August 30 this year agreement was reached in Moscow between the representatives of the U.S.S.R., the United States of America, Britain and France on the simultaneous carrying out of measures for the removal of transport restrictions, on the one hand, and the introduction in Berlin of the German mark of the Soviet zone as the sole currency, on the other hand.

This agreement does not infringe upon anyone's prestige; it takes account of the interests of the parties to it and guarantees the possibility of further co-operation. But the Governments of the United States of America and Britain disavowed their representatives in Moscow and declared that this agreement was null and void, i.e., they violated it, deciding to place the question before the Security Council where the Anglo-Americans have an assured majority.

Question: Is it true that recently in Paris, when the question was being discussed in the Security Council, in unofficial talks agreement was again reached on the question of the situation in Berlin already before it was voted on in the Security Council?

Reply: Yes, it is true. The representative of Argentina, Dr. Bramuglia, the Chairman at the Security Council, who conducted unofficial talks with Mr. Vyshinsky on behalf of other interested Powers, did indeed have in hand an agreed draft for the solution of the question of the situation in Berlin. But the representatives of the U.S.A. and Britain again declared this agreement non-existent.

Question: What is the fact of the matter? Can it not be explained?

Reply: The point is that the inspirers of the aggressive policy of the United States of America and Britain do not consider themselves interested in agreement and co-operation with the U.S.S.R. They want not agreement and co-operation but talk about agreement and co-operation, in order to disrupt agreement, to throw the blame on the U.S.S.R., and, by so doing, "prove" the impossibility of co-operation with the U.S.S.R.

The instigators of war, who are striving to unleash a new war, fear more than anything else agreement and co-operation with the U.S.S.R., since a policy of agreement with the U.S.S.R. undermines the positions of the warmongers and deprives the aggressive policy of these gentlemen of its objective. Precisely for this reason they disrupt agreements already reached, disavow their representatives who have reached such agreements with the U.S.S.R., transfer the question, in violation of the U.N. Charter, to the Security Council where they possess a guaranteed majority and where they can "prove" anything they like.

All this is done in order to demonstrate the impossibility of co-operating with the U.S.S.R., to demonstrate the necessity of a new war and thus prepare the conditions for unleashing a war. The policy of the present leaders of the United States and Britain is a policy of aggression and unleashing a new war.

Question: How do you appraise the actions of the six States in the Security Council—China, Canada, Belgium, the Argentine, Colombia and Syria?

Reply: Obviously all these gentlemen support a policy of aggression, a policy of unleashing a new war.

Question: How can this all end?

Reply: It can end only with the disgraceful collapse of the instigators of a new war. Churchill, the chief instigator of a new war, has already succeeded in depriving himself of the confidence of his nation and the democratic forces of the whole world. The same fate awaits all other instigators of war.

The horrors of the recent war are too alive in the minds of the people and the social forces in favour of peace are too great for Churchill's pupils in aggression to be able to overpower and deflect them towards a new war.

BAN ATOMIC BOMB AND REDUCE ARMAMENTS

A. Y. VYSHINSKY'S SPEECH

of October 12, 1948

in Paris



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The speech delivered by A. Y. Vyshinsky in the first committee of the General Assembly on October 12, in Paris.

I

ATTEMPT TO THWART THE SOVIET PROPOSALS

OUR debate on the second point of the agenda regarding the proposals presented by the Government of the Soviet Union to prohibit the atomic weapon, reduce armaments and the armed forces of the five great Powers by one-third within one year and to institute international control over execution of these decisions, is nearing an end. In this case again we see two camps of States, with one camp consistently defending peace and the security of the nations and seeking decisions that would constitute a first step towards a real reduction of armaments and armed forces, a first step toward eliminating the threat of a new war, toward consolidating peace. The other group of States continues the policy, which it has been pursuing to this day and which is characterized by the desire at any cost to postpone, to thwart the implementation of measures for prohibiting the atomic weapon and for reducing the armed forces, at least by the five great Powers, as is proposed by the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that the stand of the second group of Powers radically contradicts the principles, spirit, tasks and aims of the United Nations Organisation, that it radically contradicts the decisions which were already adopted by the United Nations two years ago and against which nobody, I repeat—nobody, dares come out openly, which fact, however, does not prevent backstage activity aimed at thwarting the above-mentioned historic decisions of the General Assembly.

The Soviet delegation has repeatedly emphasised how disastrous is such a stand, which is fraught with a real threat to peace and the security of the nations. Nevertheless the opposition of that camp to the proposals directed against the armaments race and toward the consolidation of peace continues.

To this effect they search for and invent every sort of motive and argument that would help them to conceal their desire to secure rejection of the Soviet Union's proposals. The Soviet delegation has already analysed such motives and has demonstrated, or at least has striven to demonstrate, their utter inconsistency. Indeed, does not the artificiality of the great majority of the arguments presented against the Soviet Union's proposals, leap to the eye, arguments which strikingly coincide once again with what has been said for nearly 25 years and is said every time the Soviet Union and States friendly to it

raise their voices in defence of peace? A fresh attempt is being made to shake the proposals which are aimed at stopping the war fever, at prohibiting the atomic weapon, at reducing the armed forces of the five great Powers by one-third, which measure would no doubt be of great importance in regard to the further development of international relations along the line of friendly co-operation of the various States, and would undoubtedly be of tremendous importance in regard to relieving the pressure exerted by the reactionary forces, which are striving to direct developments along a course that has nothing in common with the tasks of the consolidation of peace and security.

As frequently happens in similar cases, the campaign against the Soviet proposals is headed at this session by the representatives of the United States of America, Great Britain and France. They, as could be seen from the speeches we have just heard, have been completely unrestrained in their attacks on the Soviet Union, and their speakers transgress all bounds of decency. The tune was set by the British delegation, whose representatives—Mr. Bevin in the General Assembly and Mr. McNeil and Sir Hartley Shawcross in the Political Committee—stooped to any means in order to besmirch—I say it straight out—to besmirch, and to slander the Soviet delegation's stand, and thereby to try and undermine confidence in the Soviet Union's proposals. They were followed by the representatives of the French, Canadian, Greek, Chilean and Salvador delegations and some others—these are precisely those States which belong to the other camp I have referred to—to the camp of the opponents of the Soviet proposals, the opponents of peace and of all measures advanced with a view to strengthening peace and the security of the nations and to easing the tension in international relations, with a view to eliminating the danger which is looming before us, owing to the course pursued by the United States of America and Great Britain and supported by France and China. Their speeches were crowned by Mr. Austin, who spared no effort to add more poisonous insinuations and sheer slander in his speech, which was aimed not only against the proposals, which figure now here in the shape of the draft resolution of the Soviet delegation, but was pointed against the Soviet Union generally.

I shall begin with the Canadian representative who declared that every thinking being—as he said—on our troubled planet should remember that the present tension has been created by the Soviet Union, which, it is alleged, continues to pour oil upon the flames. The Canadian representative went so far as to claim that responsibility for this tension rested with Soviet foreign policy, the more so, as he asserted here, in that the Soviet Union sought with every means at its disposal to provoke strife in other States. Well, we could expect nothing else from the Canadian representative after the celebrated “contributions”,

so to say, which the Canadian Government made to the unbridled campaign of hostility and hatred against the Soviet Union, when it even resorted to the employment of various provocateurs and traitors, for whom there can be no place in decent human society. But in this matter, in this chorus of slanderers and insinulators acting against the Soviet Union, the Canadian representative was not alone: he was seconded by the representatives of Salvador, Greece and France. They all endeavoured to sow suspicion, to undermine the trust in regard to the Soviet proposals and the motives by which we were guided when introducing our proposals. They distorted the true meaning and substance of our proposals, whose character and significance were perfectly clear. Things went so far that the British representative, as we heard the Attorney-General of Great Britain Sir Hartley Shawcross saying, attempted to present the Soviet proposals, the Soviet draft resolution on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and on the reduction of armaments and the armed forces by the five great Powers, as nothing more nor less than an act of aggression. He was obediently echoed by the French representative M. Parodi, whose argument in this case likewise was altogether without foundation.

Unabashed, Sir Hartley Shawcross declared here that, when the Soviet delegation offered the olive branch of peace, it did so in a manner so aggressive, as if it expected that others would not feel like accepting it. As you see, even when such a peaceful step is taken as offering an olive branch, this also is described as a screen for aggressive intentions. Now is this not a caricature sketched by Britain's Attorney-General to suit the bad political taste of his admirers?

Yet Sir Hartley Shawcross went still further. He was tempted by some German proverb which he deemed it appropriate to recall in connection with our proposals, namely in connection with the efforts which we, the minority comprising the champions of peace and the security of the nations, have been exerting here in order to curb the danger of a new war, in order to take at least one real step toward consolidating peace. And it is precisely at such a moment and in regard to a proposal of that kind that the Attorney-General of Great Britain deemed it appropriate to recall a German proverb which says: “Either you must be my brother or I shall smash your skull”.

Such a criminal propensity is quite natural—we are dealing with a speech by a prosecutor. But is it really appropriate to interpret things in this way, is it scrupulous to interpret the Soviet proposal as though we are compelling people either to be peaceful or else—we threaten to “smash their skulls?” This, of course, was only a wisecrack, in connection with which it would be appropriate to recall the Russian proverb which says that “For the sake of a wisecrack he will not spare his own father”.

Sir Hartley Shawcross attempted to make an examination of the Soviet proposals and the adoption of resolutions on them conditional on the results arrived at by the sub-committee entrusted with drafting resolutions on the Atomic Commission's reports. Accordingly, he declared that the British delegation would not assume any definite stand in regard to the proposals on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the reduction of armaments and the armed forces by the great Powers by one-third within one year, until he had a report from the above sub-committee.

It is perfectly clear that such an attitude testifies to unwillingness to deal in a business-like manner and in earnest with the Soviet Union's proposals. Such an attitude represents nothing less than a subterfuge, a desire to avoid solution of this task, the more so since the above attitude is completely illogical.

What is the sub-committee which we have elected to deal with the first item on the agenda of the first committee doing now? It is engaged in drafting resolutions in regard to the Atomic Commission's three reports. And whether or not it will accept some draft resolution in regard to the Atomic Commission's reports will have no bearing on the cardinal problem of the prohibition of the application of atomic energy for war purposes.

One may adopt any resolution regarding the Atomic Commission's reports, yet the problem of the prohibition of the atomic weapon cannot and will not be touched by such a resolution, for this Commission has not been set up to draft a convention on prohibition of the application of atomic energy for war purposes, for it has not been set up to map out the General Assembly's policy in regard to prohibition of the application of atomic energy for war purposes. We may adopt no resolution at all on the Atomic Commission's reports. But would this eliminate the possibility or necessity, the expediency and wisdom of adopting a resolution to prohibit the atomic weapon? Is there any connection here? The connection is purely superficial, far-fetched, artificial, and I would not even call it formally logical, for there is no formal logic here. And we are offered, after we have spent so much time on discussing the Soviet proposal and a number of other proposals that were submitted here in abundance by other delegations—we are told that we should decide nothing until the sub-committee reports to us its decision regarding the Atomic Commission's reports, as though this was the substance of the matter, and as though this was relevant to the substance of the proposals presented to the General Assembly for consideration by the Soviet delegation, acting on behalf of the Soviet Government.

That is why I say that such an attitude is unacceptable. This is an attempt to sidetrack this issue until at least such a time as my respected friend on the right, Sir Hartley Shawcross, may

deem convenient. The British delegation is striving to forestall the development of events, to prepare the ground for making the best use of the difficulties in regard to drafting the convention on control, so as to be able to deal a blow to the proposal to prohibit the atomic weapon. This is the only way I understand that part of Sir Hartley Shawcross' speech in which he, perfectly unembarrassed, declared that the Soviet proposals were formulated—as he said, and at first I could scarcely believe my ears—in a provocative tone.

Now let us look into this matter. What proofs of this allegedly provocative tone of the Soviet resolution has Sir Hartley Shawcross offered? He found two proofs. Firstly, the paragraph in the preamble of the proposals presented by the Soviet delegation on September 25, which says that nothing has been done in practice up to this time to carry out the Assembly's decisions of January 24 and December 14, 1946.

So this, it transpires, gives the keynote to our resolution! But did we not establish that the work of the Atomic Commission had reached an impasse? All right, we differ as to the causes of this fact and as to who is responsible for it. You hold that we are responsible, we hold that you are responsible. But what we want to know is what is the position. What is the outcome of 30 months of the work of the Atomic Commission? Objectively and calmly, we state there is no political result. Then we are told that this is provocation.

The British Attorney-General, who became angry, discovered a provocative tone in the last paragraph of the Soviet proposals, in which paragraph these proposals are substantiated by the desire to consolidate peace and to eliminate the threat of a new war which is being fomented by expansionists and other reactionary elements. Such is the second proof for accusing us of a provocative tone. Will you, Sir Hartley Shawcross, deny that there are reactionary elements in this world who are fomenting war? Do you deny the existence of groups that are fomenting war? What reason then had the General Assembly last year to adopt a resolution condemning war propaganda? On what was that resolution based? Or maybe it was a mistake? We believe that it was not a mistake.

To-day, just as we did before, we shall cite facts showing that there are not only individuals, but whole groups and definite circles, which are reactionary, which are carried away by the idea of world domination, which are trying to establish such a world domination, to launch a new war, which are inciting to a new war. Where is the provocation? What kind of provocation do you find here? Our resolution did nothing but establish an undeniable fact. If you were to compare our resolution with the resolution submitted by the British delegation, for instance, you would see that each single paragraph in this constitutes a charge against the minority of the Commission. Each single

paragraph and each single sentence is an accusation. And after that we are told that the tone in which the British draft resolution was composed is a loyal tone, whereas the tone of the Soviet draft resolution, which contains not one single outburst, is a provocative tone. This really means talking two different languages.

The first and second paragraphs of the Soviet draft resolution, as I indicated, objectively present the facts, against which spite, hatred, slander and abuse are impotent. After all, all these refined phrases, with which Sir Hartley Shawcross so profusely spiced his speech, after losing his spiritual equilibrium, were evidently designed to provoke us, to discredit, if not our proposals, then at least the delegation which presented these proposals. And it is for this reason that we again and again hear these hackneyed phrases of a hostile anti-Soviet nature about the "Iron Curtain" and other anti-Soviet nonsense of the same sort.

II

MANOEUVRES OF THE FALSIFIERS

The task of our opponents, as always, judging from their speeches, is to attempt to prove that the Soviet Union is altogether against any international co-operation and agreements with other Powers, that the Soviet Union in general regards this co-operation as some sort of tactical method, that in reality the Soviet Union is in a state of war with the entire world, masking this with words about peace. That is the conception which has been elaborated here very primitively by the British and American gentlemen and, in particular, by Mr. Austin. To prove this they found it necessary to attempt to distort a series of facts concerning the fundamental principles of Soviet foreign policy. I must admit that I feel somewhat uncomfortable when I am drawn into a theoretical discussion about Marxism-Leninism in the Political Committee. I understand that fundamentally speaking the Political Committee was not set up for that purpose. But if there is a demand for this discussion, if such a discussion is forced on us, we accept it.

If, for example, the laurels of Mr. Bevin, who launched into theoretical research of Leninism, do not give peace to Mr. McNeil, or do not give Mr. Austin peace either, then I am ready to go half way to meet their desires in this question.

Well then, let us talk it over, let us see what comes of it.

Now Mr. McNeil, in defending, as he said, his chief, launched into a discussion about a quotation from the works of V. I. Lenin regarding the difficult ascent of an unexplored mountain. Sometimes, said Lenin—it is necessary to advance not by the

direct route, but in zigzags and to attempt various directions. I hope a Scotsman, as Mr. McNeil frequently likes to call himself, is well aware of what it means to ascend a mountain, and what is more, one that is unexplored. And has Mr. McNeill in making such an ascent never resorted to these so-called zigzags, but preferred to go straight ahead even at the risk of breaking his head?

What does Leninism teach us? It teaches us the great truth that one cannot but take account of the situation, that one must be able to adapt oneself to the situation, that one must be able to manoeuvre, be able not only to attack, but also to retreat. The history of real wars shows us that the art of retreating is the supreme military art. This art was possessed to perfection by Kutuzov, and he defeated Napoleon. This art is possessed to perfection by Stalin, and he defeated Hitler. This art is possessed by the Bolsheviks and they have emerged victorious on more than one occasion in the struggle against their enemies.

But more curious than all else is that this quotation to which Mr. McNeil has referred has exactly the opposite meaning to that which Mr. McNeil put into it. This quotation is directed against those who did not understand the need to be flexible in one's tactics. Our opponents are also attempting here in practice to manoeuvre in their own way, to apply their tactics. For example, they do not like the Soviet resolution. In their opinion it is simply unreal, meaningless, provocative. But not a single one of the opponents of our resolution dares openly to propose the rejection of this resolution. And the Syrian representative, the esteemed Mr. el Khoury, has even said that if we were directly, openly, to reject such a resolution we would evoke disillusionment throughout the world. Hence the searches for a more flexible and cautious solution of the task.

To-day the Belgian representative said: we must justify why we consider it necessary to turn down the Soviet proposals. We must, said the Belgian delegate further developing his ideas, while turning down the proposals regarding prohibition of the atomic bomb, say that we are not at all against prohibition of the atomic bomb, otherwise we will find ourselves in an embarrassing position.

The passage quoted by Mr. McNeil could only prove one thing, namely that Mr. McNeil, as he himself has admitted, is at odds with logic. What is true is true. If, however, we go deeper into the realm of views as expressed by responsible leaders of the various countries regarding international co-operation, would it not be better to examine what was said by representatives of the British Government or of the British ruling party on this question. Will not Mr. McNeil, and by the way, Sir Hartley Shawcross too, call to mind the speech made by Mr. Bevin in the House of Commons on May 4, 1948, when Mr. Bevin said that he always considered that if he did not have to do with

Communist ideology, a settlement of the various questions with the U.S.S.R. would be possible.

We adhere to another point of view. We can have different ideologies, we can have different social systems and we can co-operate, if we respect one another, despite the difference in ideologies, despite the difference in social systems. And hence our striving for co-operation. We—the minority—want this co-operation, we are striving to achieve it. On what basis? Not on the basis of a *diktat*. We want co-operation on the basis of mutual respect and confidence, which comes of such respect, co-operation of equal with equal. It is not a matter of different ideologies, nor of different social systems. Wars in capitalist society are wars between countries with identical economic systems. Generalissimo Stalin in a talk with Mr. Stassen pointed out that "the economic systems in Germany and the United States are alike, nevertheless war broke out between them. The economic systems of the United States and the U.S.S.R. are different, but they did not fight one another but co-operated during the war." J. V. Stalin said that "if two different systems could co-operate during the war, then why can they not co-operate in peace time?" . . . and further: "We should respect the systems approved of by the people. Only on this condition is co-operation possible."

Mr. Bevin, however, adheres to diametrically opposite views. Chamberlain attempted to come to an agreement with Hitler. He tried to do this by secret negotiations behind the back of the Soviet Union, at a time when negotiations were in progress in Moscow with the Anglo-French delegation. At that time the negotiations were conducted with Hitler in secret from us. Hitler was egged on towards the East, towards the U.S.S.R., he was instigated to begin a new war. This is historical fact. The State Department of the U.S.A. made a clumsy attempt to falsify history by issuing its booklet entitled "German-Soviet Relations in 1939-1941". The State Department attempted in this way to blacken the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Information Bureau under the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. replied to this with a historical note entitled "Falsifiers of History", where it showed the facts and the real role of Chamberlain and Daladier, masters of Europe's destiny at that time, the role of the United States of America which stood behind their backs, which fertilised the German Fascist soil with billions of American dollars, American gold, and gave food and drink to the beast of Hitlerite aggression.

We are told that, if there were no Communist ideology in the U.S.S.R., agreement could be arrived at with us. This is incorrect, firstly because the capitalist world has known of wars, and these wars were not prevented by the identity of the ideologies or by the proximity of the ideologies of the warring countries. Take the Franco-Prussian war—was it not a war between two

States of approximately identical political, social and class structure? And the First World War—was it not the same? Was not the Second World War the same?

Did the Second World War begin between Communist and non-Communist systems? No. It began within the bounds of the capitalist system. But its edge was subsequently turned mainly against the Socialist State. And therein lay the gigantic error, the irreparable historical error of the Fascists, who attempted to test the strength of the Soviet land and ended with their catastrophic defeat.

Of course, we were not alone in this struggle and we give their due to those services which the Soviet-Anglo-American fighting coalition rendered to history. And this once again goes to prove that differences in systems cannot be of decisive significance where there are common interests expressed in the strivings of the people for peace and security, for democracy, to clip the wings of the aggressor, to put an end to crazy plans of world domination and of the destruction of the independence of other democratic States.

How can Mr. Bevin say that if there were no Communist ideology in the U.S.S.R., everything would be in order? How can Mr. Bevin in saying this attempt to assert that the Soviet Union is against co-operation? There is a book written by the theoretician of the Labour Party, Professor Laski. His book is entitled "Faith, Reason and Civilisation". Do we not read the following in this book: "Though we fight in partnership with Russia, there is never long absent from the minds of our rulers, both here and in the United States, a certain scepticism about our capacity to find a basis upon which we and the Russians can reach a permanent understanding. Our rulers, truth to tell, are more at their ease with men like Franco or Salazar than they have been, so far, with men like Lenin or Stalin."

Nothing can be added to this. Commentaries, as they say, are superfluous. You have said, your Party has said, who is closer to you. You prefer such people as Franco and Salazar. What can be added to this? Mr. McNeil said that in many respects it is impossible to foresee the position of the Government of the U.S.S.R.

In what connection is this said? In connection with our proposals to reduce armaments. But maybe Mr. McNeil had no time, as he said, to arm himself with documents, for which he has on one occasion already had to apologize. But all the same he should at least have asked his experts as to whether such an assertion corresponds to reality. They would have had to tell him that it does not correspond to reality. Here are the proofs. Let us turn to the question of the reduction of armaments. The Soviet Union, even while it was a member of the League of Nations, invariably raised the question of disarmament or of arms reduction. Are you aware of this, gentlemen, British

delegates? If you are, then how do you permit yourselves to speak of the inconstancy of Soviet policy? No, our policy is constant. We are opposed to an intensification of armaments. We are against an armaments race. We are against preparation of new wars, we are in favour of doing away with these wars, although we know that the law of capitalist society is such that war is a kind of law of the social development of capitalism. In passing, I will remark that this is not the only vice, not the only misfortune, inflicted on mankind by capitalism, which at one time was a progressive phenomenon, taking the place of feudalism. But subsequently, in the process of its historical development, it became transformed into the negation of progress, it has outlived its day, and its place is being taken by Socialism. Wars are not the only companions of capitalism. Capitalism is accompanied by economic crises, unemployment, prostitution, crime. All this is the ABC of Marxism-Leninism, which has pointed out the way to overcome the vices of the capitalist system. But to argue about Marxism-Leninism, one should at least know this ABC. Let them rather do this without my help.

Today, Mr. Austin has stated that he would willingly set about studying Marxism-Leninism. I welcome this, Mr. Austin. I am only very sorry that you spoke today before you set about studying Marxism-Leninism (Laughter). I would have preferred to have listened to you not before but after you had set about this study (Laughter). But the main thing is that you will then be in a less ridiculous position than you are today, after you have become the victim of your unscrupulous text-mongers, the victim of your unscrupulous text compilers, quotation specialists who have palmed off on you several quotations which, by the way, begin not where they should begin, and end not where they ought to end. That of course places a person in a ridiculous position.

But let us return to Mr. McNeil. Mr. McNeil said that it is impossible in many respects to foresee the position of the Government of the U.S.S.R. That is untrue. For thirty years already we have been hammering day in and day out, year in and year out, at the point that armaments should be reduced, that superfluous armaments should be abolished. But we are told of our inconstancy. No, Mr. McNeil, this is very great constancy, and I would like you to possess some part at least of this constancy. It is worth while, by the way, recalling that in 1932 at the Geneva Conference, the then United States representative introduced a draft in which provision was made for reduction of so-called conventional armaments by approximately one-third. The draft was at that time generally rejected. You may even suspect that we, so to speak, filched the proposal from Hoover. No, at that time we also introduced a proposal to reduce armaments by 50 per cent.

Mr. McNeil's other statement—regarding the problem of

atomic energy—is also without foundation. For two years, beginning with the resolution of 1946, the Soviet Union has been fighting for the prohibition of atomic energy for war purposes. We are confronted by a thousand stipulations. We are searching for a solution of the task. We introduce our proposals, make necessary concessions in the interest of achieving a possible agreement, but we are told: "Why did you not introduce your proposals previously, why did you not come with these proposals previously?" When we do not come with our proposals we are asked: "Why did you not come?" When we come, we are told: "Why have you come?" Such is your logic.

We say that first the atomic weapon must be prohibited, and then control must be established, because it is senseless to control that which does not exist. We are answered: "No, that is unacceptable. They must be done simultaneously." We say: Very well, we are agreed that a convention regarding prohibition of the atomic weapon and a convention regarding control should be introduced and put into operation simultaneously. We then receive the answer: "No, first we must conclude a convention regarding control, and then one about prohibiting the atomic weapon." What can that mean other than an attempt at all costs to seek out ever new excuses for preventing the conclusion of both one and the other convention.

When the destiny of mankind is in question it is impermissible to be obstinate, mechanically rejecting proposals which do not concern fundamental questions of principle. We see no grounds for insisting at all costs on our proposals when no principles are involved and when a concession can be made without affecting aspects of principle. But when we make concessions we are asked why we did not make them earlier. Moreover, people permit themselves to voice all sorts of suspicions regarding some schemes by which, it is alleged, the Soviet delegation is guided; people permit themselves to hint that it is difficult to deal with us, because, it is alleged, of some sort of manoeuvres on our part.

It is not difficult to see who is manoeuvring and who is guided by secret plans. It is a fact that the Soviet delegation, in the interest of reaching agreement, found it possible not to insist on its original formula and presented a formula stating that a convention on prohibition of the atomic weapon and a convention on international control over implementation of this decision should be signed and should enter into force simultaneously. This formula provides every possibility for finding the way to agreement. But those who decided to evade concluding both one and the other convention are, of course, evading adoption of the new Soviet formula. They speak of some sort of trap which we have laid on this road, seeking a new pretext for rejecting the Soviet proposals.

I shall now pass over to the remarks made by the several delegates and first and foremost by the British delegates, Mr. McNeil and Sir Hartley Shawcross, dealing with the substance of the proposals submitted by the Soviet delegation.

The British delegate, and following him several other delegates, stated here that the Soviet proposals are unreal. Mr. McNeil stated that the Soviet proposals do not constitute a method which holds out any hope for real disarmament. By the way, Sir Hartley Shawcross and some other delegates, the Belgian delegate in particular, whenever they deal with the Soviet proposals systematically speak of disarmament. But we are not proposing any disarmament, we are not proposing any method for a general reduction of armaments. Why then substitute one question for another?

The Soviet draft and the speeches of our delegation stated quite clearly that the point at issue is the reduction of armaments and armed forces by one-third by the five great Powers. We pointed out that the five great Powers possess the overwhelming share of armaments and armed forces, that they bear the main responsibility for the state of armed forces and armaments. Therefore, inasmuch as the decisions of the General Assembly on the preparation of measures for a general reduction and regulation of armaments have not been realised, it would be important that this task should be solved at least by the five great Powers; this would be a first step in the reduction of armaments and armed forces. The five great Powers more than anyone else should think of measures which could help to cool down the foreign political atmosphere, which is growing ever hotter, in order to change that international climate of which one of the delegates spoke here. That is why it would be absolutely incorrect, it would be a distortion of the Soviet proposals, to argue as to whether disarmament is possible and real or not, when the issue in question is not disarmament but merely a reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the five great Powers by one-third.

To our proposal that the great Powers reduce all their armed forces—land, air and naval—we are told that this is impossible since the U.S.S.R. has tremendous armies and, should the U.S.S.R. reduce them by one-third, this would not be of great importance. We are told that this is not the case with the other great Powers.

However, we in turn can also say: you have a tremendous navy and if you reduced it by one-third this also would be felt but little, because even after reduction your navy would remain considerably larger than the navies of a number of other States taken together. Moreover, you consider that you are the monopolists of the atom bomb. This also means something in the general balance of armaments. True, you do not rely too much on yourselves in this respect. But in any case the proposal to

reduce the armed forces of the five great Powers by one-third—I repeat, of the five great Powers and not of all 58 member States of the United Nations Organisation—cannot be made dependent on how this will affect the armed forces of one or another State. Reduction is reduction. And, inasmuch as it is proposed to make this reduction in equal measure for the five great Powers, the correlation of forces will remain the same, but the very fact of reduction of the armed forces will set a limit to the armaments race, will serve as one of the most important factors for consolidation of mutual trust in international relations.

But when we speak of reducing the armaments of the five great Powers, Luxemburg rises and says—I cannot reduce. But, gentlemen of Luxemburg, no one is asking you to do so and in vain do you display anxiety, because what is in question now is the armed forces and armaments of the five great Powers and not a general reduction of armaments.

The Soviet delegation is confident that, should the great Powers desire, they can solve this question without great difficulties, but they lack this desire and I shall endeavour to show further why they lack this desire. Of course, reduction of armaments and armed forces and prohibition of the atomic weapon are connected with a whole number of measures of a technical nature. One should not deny that some difficulties are possible here and that consequently it will be necessary earnestly to work to eliminate the difficulties, to pave the way and ensure full possibility for implementing a decision adopted in good faith. But we must categorically reject any hints about possible tricks on the part of the Soviet Union, about the danger of some traps which, it is alleged, we are preparing on this road, about some deception.

Of course, people whose entire psychology is conditioned to traps, deception and tricks on the part of their partners cannot get rid of their suspicions in this case, too. But no one is putting the question about merely taking one's word for it.

It goes without saying that, in deciding such an important and cardinal question as prohibition of the atomic weapon or reduction of armaments and the armed forces it is necessary to provide in advance for all measures to be taken with regard to control over implementation of the decisions adopted. I cannot but remind you once more about the position of the Soviet Union on this question and about the statement made by Generalissimo Stalin in this respect, who pointed out that we stand for strict international control.

The most diverse motives are advanced against our proposals to reduce the armaments and armed forces of the five great Powers. The delegate of China spoke here and he frankly stated that the Soviet proposals are unsuitable for them because at present a substantial part of China's territory is occupied by

Communist troops and that the present Chinese Government needs soldiers, so to speak, for internal consumption, that is, for suppressing the liberation movement of the Chinese people. The Chinese delegate said that the issue for China is not the reduction of armaments but, on the contrary, increase of armaments. These considerations seemed convincing to the Syrian delegate, who supported the statement of China's representative about the need for a further increase of the armaments and armed forces of China.

However, one need not exert great efforts to prove the utter inconsistency of the objections of China's delegate. The United Nations Organisation cannot be interested in the internal affairs of China. These questions connected with the internal situation in China, with the civil war now being waged in China, cannot serve as a subject of discussion in the United Nations Organisation, inasmuch as, I repeat, this is an internal affair of China.

That is why it is strange to hear an objection here against a reduction of armaments dictated not by foreign political considerations, which alone can be of interest to the United Nations Organisation. Of course, if armies are utilised as police forces and are being established not for defending a country's frontiers but to send them against its own people, in such a case it is difficult to expect a sympathetic attitude to a proposal for reducing armaments and armed forces by one-third, as the proposals of the Soviet Union do. But think what we have here. Proposals are made to reduce the armaments and armed forces of the five great Powers by one-third, which should be a first step in reducing armaments and serve as an important element in strengthening the peace and security of the nations. But instead of responding sympathetically to this proposal in the interests of all peace-loving peoples, some begin to prove that this proposal is unreal because, they say, armed forces are needed to suppress the national liberation movement.

But there were other motives, too, presented against the Soviet proposals. Here too the British delegation was in the front ranks; its representative, Mr. McNeil, advanced two main arguments, as he said, against our proposals. The first argument: it is known, Mr. McNeil said, what funds Great Britain spends for armaments and armed forces, what number of people are in active service in Great Britain. The second argument: it is not known what funds are spent in the U.S.S.R. for maintenance of the Soviet armed forces. The numerical strength of the Soviet armed forces is not known. Therefore the conditions are unequal. As for Great Britain and the United States, everyone knows how much money is being spent for the army and how many soldiers there are in these countries and how they are equipped. As for the Soviet Union on the other hand, allegedly nothing is known about the money being spent for the army, how many soldiers there are in the ranks of the Soviet armed

forces or how the Soviet army is equipped. Under such conditions, it is said, to adopt the proposals of the Soviet Union is unthinkable.

Mr. McNeil stated outright that, under such conditions, those who have large armed forces will gain immediate advantage from such a method of reduction, but in doing so he let it be understood that in this matter we should still not dispense with the presentation of incorrect information which, moreover, it would be impossible to check, that is, he directly hinted at some sort of deception. True, Mr. McNeil immediately remarked that, notwithstanding the disadvantages which in such a case the great Powers would have to face, Great Britain would be ready to agree to this if an appropriate system of inspection, verification and control were adopted.

But the third point of the Soviet proposals precisely contains a demand for establishment of international control. What then is lacking?

Evidently, seeing that he cannot hold his ground, Mr. McNeil is preparing in advance his route of retreat, trying to discredit the very possibility of coming to terms with the Soviet Union regarding a system of control. That is, at first we are told: "No use talking to you because you do not recognise control." When we say: "But look, we have written here about control," we are told: "Yes, you recognise control, but your system of control is no good for anything, you must accept our system of control." If you are counting on this then you are very naive people.

But how are we to understand this way of putting the question? Does not the way the question is put testify to an unwillingness to reach any agreement? Does it not provide grounds for thinking that, even if the Soviet delegation were to agree to the proposed Anglo-American system of control, they would try to find some other argument or pretext in order to avoid reaching agreement, in order to refuse concluding a convention on prohibition of the atomic weapon and taking a decision on reduction of armaments and armed forces? After all, can the Government of the United States or the Government of Great Britain reckon that they will succeed in simply dictating their terms to the Soviet Union? If they are counting on this they are showing great naiveté. The Soviet Union does not belong to those States and the Soviet people does not belong to those peoples to whom terms and demands can be dictated. One should not forget that. We are ready to come to terms on an agreed decision of a most difficult question, but we are ready to do so on equal terms proceeding from the understanding of mutual interests and of mutual respect for one another.

But when we are told: accept this system of control under which all enterprises for production of atomic energy and even enterprises of allied branches of industry are to be transferred to the ownership of some American super-trust called the "inter-

national control body", when demands are made that we should permit some people freely to roam our land and engage in various "investigations", to make all sorts of aerial surveys and engage, in general, in occupations of which we had the opportunity to gain an idea from a dialogue in the American Congress—of which we were told here by the Polish delegate, Mr. Katz-Suchy—to all this we must say outright that the American and British gentlemen are addressing the wrong party.

Nothing good can come of this, my good gentlemen. That is why we resolutely reject the way the question is put, which bears the nature of a *diktat*; we cannot agree to this formulation of the question, all the more so because the system of control drafted by the majority of the Commission is unsatisfactory. This, as we have already said, is not a system of international control, but a means for subjecting the industry and national economy of other sovereign States to American control. It is impossible to agree to this, we are not agreeing to this and will not agree.

We were told here by the British representative that the Soviet proposals constitute an unjust system of quantitative disarmament and that experience of work in the Chiefs of Staff Committee offers no grounds for optimism.

But this statement cannot be regarded otherwise than as a direct refusal to adopt the proposal on prohibition of the atomic weapon and on reduction of armaments, in which, however—and this must not be forgotten—millions upon millions of people throughout the world are interested. Mr. McNeil's colleague, Sir Hartley Shawcross, in my opinion, was compelled to soften the unfavourable impression created by Mr. McNeil's statement on his refusal, and this evidently explains the fact that Sir Hartley Shawcross had to cover up the negative attitude of Great Britain to the Soviet proposals by meaningless platitudes about the striving of the British Government for co-operation, about readiness "to try once more" whether some positive result could not be attained. I would not wish to cast suspicions on this statement, but nevertheless I must say that statements alone, platitudes alone, are insufficient, all the more so when words and high-sounding statements are opposed by facts, which always prove stronger than any words. And facts testify that our proposals are not to the liking of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain and some other countries, which are at present in the grip of war fever.

In this connection one cannot overlook an article published recently in an Indian newspaper, the "National Herald", which gave data on the accumulation of wealth in the United States during the First and Second World Wars. This article rightly points out that, as a result of the end of the Second World War in 1945, American industry lost its most profitable customer, lost the war, that in view of this a rather serious situation arose,

particularly for the biggest private war enterprises. The article points out that between 1940 and 1943 General Motors alone received war orders to a sum equivalent, when converted into Indian currency, to 4,000 million rupees. "Here is the reason why General Motors prefers war to peace," the author of this Indian newspaper writes. "That is why," the author concludes, "a frenzied campaign for fanning war is now being waged in Britain and the United States of America." And the author, justly, too, to my mind, adds: "The masses of people need peace, but this means bankruptcy for the corporations working for war. I have grounds for maintaining," the author of the article states, "that the present campaign of fanning war is cultivated and subsidised by corporations interested in war profits."

I venture to think that our proposals are encountering resistance—not because they are unreal, not because they are senseless—as the Canadian delegate incautiously said when speaking about the formula "within the framework of the Security Council"—of which I will speak specifically later—but because our proposals are upsetting the plans of the militarists, all the plans of the war instigators.

In countries where a frenzied armaments race is under way, where huge sums are spent for manufacture of all sorts of new models of improved weapons, where huge outlays are made for war research and all kinds of war experiments which promise billions of dollars of profits to capitalist monopolies—in these countries influential circles are viciously opposing any proposal directed against war and against war measures. Fierce opposition is offered in these countries also to such proposals as are now submitted by the Soviet Union in the interests of lightening the heavy economic burden which falls on to the shoulders of millions upon millions of working people. Naturally, no sympathy for the Soviet proposals could be expected from circles where war profits are regarded as a virtue as much as war itself is. There are circles in the countries I mentioned which are engaged in affairs entirely different from the consolidation of peace and the security of the nations. According to press reports, the Government of the United States is now engaged in drafting three bills which are to be introduced in the American Congress in January, 1949. These three drafts are: firstly, a draft of new laws on the system of "Lend-lease" under which the United States will supply France, Great Britain and Benelux with the necessary armaments for 25 tank divisions; secondly, a bill on the establishment of semi-permanent American bases in France, Great Britain, Holland, Italy and Western Germany, and on the setting up, jointly with Canada, of a network of air bases in Norway, Greenland and Alaska. And all this is being done under the pretext of repulsing possible attacks in the Arctic areas.

What in such a case can be expected from delegations of countries which represent Governments engaged now in drafting, say, these three and other similar bills? These bills proceed from tasks and aspirations diametrically opposed to the tasks and aspirations which inspired the authors of our proposals on prohibition of the atomic weapon, on reduction of armed forces and armaments.

The opponents of the Soviet proposal cite most diverse motives in justification of their negative stand. The French delegate, M. Parodi, cited, for example, as a motive the argument that to disarm or not to arm is not a simple matter; it is a dangerous risk. It turns out that to disarm is a dangerous risk. He stated that France took such a risk in the period between the two wars and paid dearly for it. He added that at this time—the year in question was 1939—the Soviet Union itself went too far in a desire to gain time. So this, it turns out, is what is now prompting the French Government to speak against the Soviet proposals. It is in keeping with the Russian proverb: "He who has burnt his lips on hot milk blows on water."

But France's representative gave an entirely incorrect interpretation of historical facts; he completely distorted the historical perspective. The crux of the matter, of course, is not in the risk which France allegedly assumed in 1938-1939 but in the policy pursued at that time by the Governments of Chamberlain and Daladier. It is known that this policy was aimed at deflecting the menace of Hitlerite aggression from themselves in the expectation that the Munich and similar agreements had opened the gates for Hitler to the East, in the direction of the Soviet Union. This policy was a policy of provocative incitement of Hitlerite Germany against the Soviet Union, a policy camouflaged in order to deceive people, not only by pharisaical phrases about readiness to co-operate with the U.S.S.R., but also by some simple diplomatic manoeuvres designed to conceal from public opinion the true nature of the policy then pursued. This is what M. Parodi forgot when he said that reduction of armaments was a dangerous risk.

Those who oppose taking a decision on the prohibition of atomic energy and on the reduction of armaments by the great Powers by one-third say, as I have already mentioned before, that these decisions are not real. But this is an old song without even a new tune, but with an old tune. I recalled the conference of 1932 and the proposals of the American Government when the very same arguments were produced, when it was also said that those proposals were unreal.

But when some talk about the proposals being unreal, I ask: why was it possible 20 years ago to prohibit the use of asphyxiating poison gases in war, why was it possible to sign in Geneva on June 17, 1925, a protocol on prohibition of the use of poison and other asphyxiating gases in war, on prohibition of bacterio-

logical warfare, why is it impossible in 1948 to sign here in Paris an agreement on prohibition of atomic energy for war purposes?

Twenty-three years ago 33 States were able to sign an act prohibiting gas and bacteriological wars, and now it turns out that the General Assembly is unable to adopt on behalf of 58 States an act which would be even more significant, even more imposing, even more essential, even more in keeping with the demands of millions of the masses of ordinary people, whose conscience rebels against the use of the atomic weapon designed for mass extermination of people, for destruction of cities. Why?

III

FOR STRICT CONTROL, FOR TRUTHFUL INFORMATION

The question of control still remains. The British delegates are talking quite a lot about control, without which, they allege, it is impossible to adopt a decision regarding the prohibition of the atomic weapon and a one-third reduction of armaments by the great Powers.

And the same thing is being repeated as has already been said, for example, in relation to the utilisation of atomic energy. Now, making reference to the difficulties of drawing up a plan regarding a reduction of armaments by the great Powers, they propose that the Commission on Conventional Armaments should operate by stages, that is to say, it should first ask for information about armaments, and only after receiving the corresponding information, should it begin to draw up possible measures that would prove beneficial for the given cases.

But, if we adopt this path, the path of stages, it means dragging out a solution of the task still further and avoiding a solution of it.

Our proposal is a different one. We propose that a decision be adopted and on the basis of this decision to set about drawing up the practical and technical order of measures that would ensure its operation and control over its correct operation. Such is our path. Now, let those of us who are sitting here decide to reduce armaments by one-third and give instructions for corresponding technical measures to be drawn up.

We are told: "No, that is impossible. We must gather information".

You need information as to the strength of the armed forces in existence, you need information as to where they are quartered? Good. You need information as to what funds we are expending on the armed forces? We can answer that right now. We can say: As regards the budget, there is nothing mysterious in it.

We can satisfy Mr. McNeil's curiosity, and that of everybody else and cite figures and give the necessary explanations.

As regards the Soviet Union, we can say before all, that the composition of the post-war budget of the Soviet Union reflects, of course, in a general way, the post-war reconversion of the war economy. What does that mean in figures? It means the following: In 1940, the Soviet Union's expenditure on the armed forces constituted 32.5 per cent of all budget expenditure. In 1944, when the war was at its height, expenditure on the armed forces of the Soviet Union constituted 52 per cent of the total budget expenditure. In 1946, the first post-war year, this expenditure constituted 23.09 per cent; in 1947—18.4 per cent; in 1948—17 per cent.

Consequently the characteristic of the post-war period in the U.S.S.R. is the reduction of expenditure on war needs and the ever growing increase of expenditure on the needs of the development of the national economy.

You wish to cast doubt on that? Very well. Then bear one thing in mind. Are you aware of what damage was inflicted on the Soviet Union by the war forced on us by the Hitlerite bandits? Are you aware of what the damage and the ruin that were inflicted on the Soviet Union by this war means in reality and as expressed in values, as expressed materially? Are you aware that the Soviet Union has to eliminate these after-effects of the war? For it needs houses, since millions of people do not possess them; for it needs factories, since tens of thousands of factories were destroyed; for it needs railways, since hundreds of thousands of kilometres of railway track were destroyed; for it needs hospitals, since tens of thousands of hospitals were put to flames, plundered and destroyed; for it needs tractors, since thousands of tractors were carried off or destroyed; for it needs to rehabilitate the soil, since sown areas were also destroyed and the seeds perished; we need horses and cattle, since millions of horses were destroyed.

All this has to be restored. Otherwise the country cannot live, breathe, work, perfect itself and advance. And even the worst enemies of the Soviet Union cannot deny that we are alive, that we are breathing, that we are working, that we are advancing, that we are rebuilding our country, that we are growing. All this requires funds, and that is why, when the land of Socialism sets itself the task expressed in the Stalin Five-Year Plan of rehabilitation and development of the national economy, the task of ensuring the advance of agricultural production, industry and the means of consumption, and on this basis of raising the pre-war level of national income during the five-year period by 1½ times, of creating an abundance of food-stuffs and consumer goods in the country, of ensuring the full flourishing of the material well-being of the peoples of the Soviet Union, of abolishing the rationing of supplies to the population, something

that has almost been solved now as a result of the three years' work of giving effect to our Five-Year Plan of rehabilitation—this requires funds, gigantic funds, but there is no other source for providing these funds, than that source from which the military expenditure also has to be provided.

That is to say we have, as it were, two vessels which are filled from a common reservoir of a definite volume. If you pour more liquid into one vessel, then less liquid will remain for the other one. The two vessels are war expenditure and other expenditure, and we say that the mass of expenditure is absorbed by the task of fulfilling the plan of restoration of the national economy.

Thus the overwhelming part of the budget expenditure in the recent period, in the post-war period, is expended on peaceful, economic, cultural measures, while expenditure on war needs is declining and has now fallen to 17 per cent.

And how, allow me to ask, do matters stand in the United States of America? The message addressed by the President of the United States of America, Mr. Truman, to Congress regarding the budget for the 1948-49 fiscal year stated that 79 per cent of expenditure in the 1949 Budget year directly reflected the cost of the war, the results of this war and efforts to avert future war. Only 21 per cent. of expenditure was destined for financing the Government's programme in such spheres as social welfare, housing construction, education, scientific research, agriculture, natural resources, transport, finance, commerce, industry, labour, general administration. This was said by the President of the United States of America, Mr. Truman, in his message to Congress.

And what is the situation in Great Britain? According to existing data, Great Britain's war expenditure in 1948 exceeds expenditure on any other item of the budget. In Great Britain approximately one dollar out of every four dollars of income will be expended in 1948 on the army, navy and air force.

So then, in the United States war expenditure constitutes 79 per cent of all expenditure of the current fiscal year. In Great Britain, war expenditure constitutes 25 per cent. of all budget expenditure for 1948. In the U.S.S.R., military expenditure constitutes 17 per cent. of all expenditures for 1948. Facts are facts. As I have already said, they speak louder than all words.

Now about the armed forces. On June 27 the "New York Times" published data characterising the complement of armed forces of the United States of America. According to these data, in the 1948-49 fiscal year the complement of American armed forces was 25 per cent. higher than in 1947-48. As regards the complement of land forces, it showed an increase even of 44 per cent. That is how matters stand regarding the military budgets and armed forces in the three countries—the United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.

But we are told—put your cards on the table. Give us exact

data regarding the strength of the armed forces at your disposal. All right. We can answer that with one thing: if a positive decision is taken here at the General Assembly on the Soviet Union's proposals to prohibit atomic energy for war purposes and for the five great Powers to cut down their armaments and armed forces by one-third, then the Soviet Union, simultaneously with other States, will present information both about its armed forces and about its armaments.

And it should be borne in mind that the concept of "armed forces" should include all types of armaments, including the atomic weapon and all other means of mass destruction of mankind.

But we are told that in some committee or other we were already requested to provide information regarding armaments and armed forces and that we failed to give such information. The representative of Syria has already said in this regard that such information was requested from many States, from all States it seems, but that nobody supplied this information. We, however, are blamed for this. But we are under no obligation at all to supply information on any occasion, in any committee, as to what armed forces we possess, and what quantity of armaments we have. No, we shall give information, or—as you say—we shall put our cards on the table, when this is called for by actual necessity and is bound up with practical measures which are to follow a decision on the principles regarding the reduction of armaments and armed forces. That is why in reply to all these demagogic howls that nothing allegedly is known either about our expenditure on military needs, or our armed forces, etc., we say: adopt a decision to prohibit the atomic weapon, take a decision that the great Powers reduce their armaments and armed forces by one-third during the course of one year, and we shall furnish you with all the necessary data regarding our armed forces and our armaments, we shall, as you say, put our cards on the table.

IV

ILL-STARRED CRITICS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS

I must now pass to Mr. Austin, although allow me first to say a few words about the speech of the Canadian representative. The Canadian representative went off the mark to such an extent as to declare nonsensical that part of the Soviet resolution which deals with the recommendation to set up within the framework of the Security Council an international control agency for supervising and controlling the fulfilment of measures for a reduction of armaments and armed forces and prohibition of the atomic weapon. However, he left out of account

the fact that this part of our resolution reproduced that which was stated in point 6 of the resolution of the General Assembly dated December 14, 1946, and nothing more.

The United States representative, Mr. Austin, is also dissatisfied with our proposal to set up an international control agency within the framework of the Security Council. But he also, apparently, has left out of account the fact that the Soviet delegation, in introducing such a proposal, proceeded from the decision of the General Assembly dated December 14, 1946, which stated plainly that an international control system should be set up within the framework of the Security Council. If the Canadian representative has stated here so loosely that the Soviet resolution, which demanded the establishment of an international control agency within the framework of the Security Council, was "nonsensical", then all I can ask him is: How did the Canadian delegation come to vote last year for this "nonsensical" resolution? Or, perhaps, this resolution has become "nonsensical" only because it is supported by the Soviet delegation? Apparently that is so. But all the same one must not demonstrate so openly one's hostility to everything that emanates from the Soviet delegation.

Equally ridiculous are other critical remarks of the Canadian representative. That gentleman declared, for example, that the Soviet proposals made no provision for international inspection. But, excuse me, where is the source of this noise, where is the source of this thunder and lightning against the Soviet proposal, when in the letter of the representative of the U.S.S.R. dated December 5, 1947, in point 1 and point 2 of the replies to questions, it is stated outright that measures shall be taken to institute control and inspection, that inspection should be of a periodic character, and that, in addition, it shall be possible to carry through any act of inspection on the decision of the Atomic Energy Commission, when the Commission deems it necessary. Has the Canadian representative read all this? If he has, then how does he come to repeat such, I must say, absolutely nonsensical heresy. And this is called criticism! And it is done in such a loose manner that young people speak here and permit themselves to attack the Soviet resolution and call it nonsensical, unreal and devoid of this and that. Such "criticism" cannot be taken into account.

In objecting to the proposals introduced by the Soviet delegation, it is pointed out that it is necessary first of all to achieve mutual trust. This, of course, is a very important circumstance, since without mutual confidence it is difficult to ensure co-operation, it is difficult to achieve success in the task that faces us. But we are not simply told of the importance of mutual trust; it is said that inasmuch as the representatives of the U.S.S.R. and of States friendly to it do not agree with the system of control proposed by the majority, they thereby undermine con-

fidence in themselves. Thus it would seem that the main condition for trust, about which so much has been said here, is simply agreement with the proposals of the majority. It would seem, consequently, that the minority can earn trust only if it agrees unconditionally with the proposals of the majority. But in that case, is not the minority equally entitled to present a similar demand to the majority? Is not the minority in that case entitled to expect that the majority would also recognise and agree with the reasonable demands of the minority, without which the majority, too, cannot merit any trust?

Fundamentally speaking, the arguments of these delegations regarding confidence, to which we have already referred, amount to the simple demand that we submit to the will of the majority and accept unconditionally that which is proposed by the majority. But such a method is unacceptable in international affairs. There can be no co-operation among countries if certain groups of States, which, having come to an agreement among themselves on the basis of joint actions against other States, which do not at the given time possess a majority, demand from the minority unconditional acceptance of their proposals. I repeat that such a method is unacceptable, it contradicts all the principles of international co-operation, it is a gross violation of all the principles of international law, it contradicts the fundamental demand of respect for the State sovereignty of independent countries and peoples.

But if we turn to the essence of the problem, what, in reality, can stand in the way of trust in international relations? Are there really any facts that could serve as a basis for attacks on the U.S.S.R., which, it is alleged, is undermining confidence in international affairs? Is it the Soviet Union who is building war bases on the territories of other countries? Is the Soviet Union encircling the United States of America, or Great Britain, or any other country with a fan-shaped network of its naval and air bases, as is being done by the United States Government in relation to the U.S.S.R.—a fact which is now no secret and is known to the entire world? Or maybe anxiety is being prompted by the fact that Soviet troops are not to be found anywhere else in the world except in the Soviet Union or in places where they are located in accordance with international treaties, concluded, by the way, with the participation of the other great Powers? Or maybe confidence in the Soviet Union is being undermined by such acts of the Soviet Government's foreign policy as its decision to evacuate its troops from Korea while American troops continue to stay in South Korea, and the American Government displays no desire whatsoever to withdraw its troops from South Korea simultaneously with the evacuation of Soviet troops from North Korea, and thus avoids giving a direct answer to the questions raised by the Soviet Government

in its Note of September 18, 1948. Such are the facts. These facts speak for themselves.

We are told by the representatives of certain States that they have carried through demobilisation in their countries of such and such age-groups, but that nothing is known as to how matters stand in this respect in the Soviet Union, and that, bearing in mind the mystery which, they allege, surrounds this question in the U.S.S.R., it is impossible to demand, it is impossible to speak of, any confidence whatsoever. Such statements, however, are more than strange. Either the representatives of certain States who say these things are really unaware of what is happening on the globe, and in that case they themselves must bear responsibility for being uninformed, or they know the facts but pretend not to know them so as to be able to advance the arguments to which they resort in their opposition to the proposals of the Soviet Union.

Really, is it not known that in June 1945, a law was adopted in the U.S.S.R. regarding the demobilisation of the first of 13 senior age-groups of the personnel of the field armies, and that this demobilisation was completed in the latter half of 1945? Are they unaware that in February 1947, an edict was issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. regarding the demobilisation of the next age-groups? Are they unaware that in 1948 an edict was issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet regarding the demobilisation of all contingents called up for service in the armed forces during the war period? How then, after all this, can certain persons dare to say that the question of the demobilisation of men called up for service in the ranks of the Soviet Army during the war is shrouded in some veil of secrecy, and that nothing is known about what is being done in this sphere?

Is it not clear that all these arguments are devoid of all foundation, that all these suspicions are too thin altogether, that all this has been invented and is merely designed to find some sort of excuse for avoiding the adoption of the Soviet proposals? All these are fairy tales and inventions which, it goes without saying, will not carry you very far.

There is some other thing that is preventing the establishment of confidence in international relations. This is the trend of foreign policy of such countries as the United States and Great Britain, which is really preventing international co-operation, for it pursues aims which have nothing in common with this task.

What is really needed for trust to prevail in international relations?

The reply to this question was given 26 years ago by Lenin in an interview granted to a correspondent of the British newspapers the "Observer" and the "Manchester Guardian". Lenin said: "Our experience has given us the unswerving conviction

that only the greatest attention to the interests of the various nations will remove grounds for conflicts, will remove mutual distrust, will remove apprehension of some intrigues, will create the confidence, particularly on the part of the workers and peasants who speak in various languages, without which peaceful relations among nations or any successful development whatever, of all that is precious in modern civilisation are absolutely impossible".

That, gentlemen, is the path by which confidence is created and won. This is the path to be followed in order really to secure confidence and to make it the basis in international relations.

V

THEORETICAL EXERCISES OF AN AMERICAN SENATOR

Now I must deal with the speech of Senator Austin, and before all else with certain of his theoretical exercises regarding Marxism-Leninism. Mr. Austin, you see, is dissatisfied with the fact that the Marxist-Leninist teachings distinguish between just wars and unjust wars. But this is so, this is really so; Marxism-Leninism teaches that there are just wars and there are unjust wars.

War, said Mr. Austin, is the recognised weapon of the communist system.

No! This is an absolutely false assertion devoid of all meaning.

The Soviet State began its life after finishing with a war, throughout three decades of its existence the Soviet State has waged a consistent and energetic struggle against wars, for peace, for democracy, for the security of the nations. Thus, the assertion made by the American Senator is absolutely without any foundation whatsoever.

Mr. Austin has quoted those passages in "The Short Course of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)" where it states that war is the inevitable fellow-traveller of capitalism, where it states that there are just wars which are waged in order to liberate nations from capitalist slavery, and unjust wars. Mr. Austin further referred to the book by Academician Voznessensky, "The War Economy of the U.S.S.R. During the Patriotic War", and cited a passage from this book which said: "Lenin and Stalin on more than one occasion warned the Socialist Motherland about the inevitability of historic battles between imperialism and Socialism, and prepared the peoples of the U.S.S.R. for these battles. Lenin and Stalin explained that wars that are waged by a working class that has defeated its own bourgeoisie, in the interest of its

Socialist Motherland, in the interest of strengthening and developing Socialism, are legitimate and holy wars".

Mr. Austin finally also cited a passage from Academician Voznessensky's book which said: "To render the outbreak of new imperialist aggression against the Socialist country and the outbreak of a third world war impossible for any lengthy period, the military and economic disarmament of aggressive imperialist countries is necessary, the welding together of the camp of the anti-imperialist and democratic countries is necessary. It should not be forgotten that capitalist economy in foreign countries itself gives rise to aggressive wars and their leaders".

Mr. Austin, in giving all these quotations, wanted to prove that the Soviet Union was thus trying to destroy the capitalist States and that consequently war was not only regarded as an inevitable phenomenon, but was extolled by the leaders of the Soviet Union.

But actually in launching into arguments about just and unjust wars according to Marxism, Mr. Austin when giving his quotation prudently omitted the passage saying "so long as capitalist encirclement remains, the danger exists of an attack by imperialist States on the land of Socialism".

Yet the entire history of the Soviet State serves as clear confirmation of the incontrovertibility of this thesis. The crusade of the 14 Powers in 1918-19 against the Soviet Union is a historical fact. The Second World War and Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union is a historical fact. It is not the Soviet Union that attacks and prepares plans for attacking neighbouring countries, but capitalist encirclement that threatens to attack the Socialist State. This is also stated in the book of Academician Voznessensky. Mr. Austin preferred not to deal with the corresponding passages in this book. He also preferred to keep silent about the fact that Generalissimo Stalin stated in the very first days of the Patriotic War—this holy war of liberation waged by the Soviet people against German imperialism—that "the Germans are now waging a war of aggression, an unjust war aimed at the seizure of foreign territory and the subjugation of foreign peoples. That is why all honest people must rise up against the German invaders as against enemies. As distinct from Hitlerite Germany, the Soviet Union and its allies are waging a war of liberation, a just war aimed at liberating the enslaved peoples of Europe and the U.S.S.R. from Hitlerite tyranny. That is why all honest people must support the armies of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the other allies, as armies of liberation".

I would ask the American Senator whether he considers that the war of the democratic States, headed by the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition against Hitlerite Germany was a just war? Or, does he, perhaps, consider that the predatory war of

Hitlerite Germany against the democratic countries was a just war? As for us, to this question we answer: the war which was waged by the democratic countries against Hitlerite Germany and militarist Japan was a just war. The war which was waged by these latter aggressive countries, against democratic countries, was an unjust war. But this is so clear that one need not have stopped to deal with this question. Marxism-Leninism distinguishes just and unjust wars. This apparently is not understood by Mr. Austin, or he pretends not to understand this.

Mr. Austin also does not like passages which say that we are not pacifists. No, we are not pacifists, nor are we vegetarians. Had we been pacifists we would long ago have been swallowed up by Hitler's hordes. We answer blows with blows, and try to answer each blow with a triple blow. We are not pacifists, because we do not deny a just war, which is essential for defence against an aggressor, and we say it. This is not understood by, or at any rate, does not please, the American Senator. But this is well understood by every worker and peasant, by every working person in any country.

Making reference to our telegram of a protocol character addressed to Ribbentrop, Mr. Austin tried to repeat the experiment of the State Department which issued a booklet dealing with Nazi-Soviet relations during 1941. But it has already been proved that this so-called booklet constitutes a gross falsification of history. If reference is made to the period that preceded the Second World War, then one should recall the role that was played by the United States of America in preparing Hitlerite aggression against the Soviet Union, in preparing the drive Eastwards.

One could limit oneself to recalling that one of the most important prerequisites of Hitler's aggression was the restoration of Germany's heavy industry and war potential, which became possible as a result of the direct and extensive support for Hitlerite Germany given by the ruling circles of the United States of America during the period following the First World War and before the beginning of the Second. It was precisely the United States of America that helped Hitlerite Germany to establish in a brief period military and economic bases, and thus armed Hitlerite aggression.

In this matter a prominent role was played by the Schroeder Bank, in which the German steel trust organised by Thyssen and other industrial magnates of the Ruhr, held a leading position; a prominent role was played by the well-known firm of lawyers Sullivan and Cromwell, headed by John Foster Dulles, one of the prominent figures in American foreign policy. All these are facts from which you cannot get away.

Mr. Austin, in his desire to undermine confidence in the Soviet Union, struck a blow at the Communist Parties, and first and foremost against the Soviet Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

He cited one passage (by the way he did not state whence he drew his quotation, but I know where it came from), which he took from Lenin's splendid work "Left-Wing Communism". But Mr. Austin presented it in a distorted form. Mr. Austin made use of a crib prepared for him by illiterate officials from the State Department, who, it goes without saying, did not and could not understand the essence of the question. Moreover they tore this quotation from its context, and that is why nothing but embarrassment for Mr. Austin could result.

The passage quoted by Mr. Austin was taken from Lenin's splendid work "Left-Wing Communism". In this passage it is pointed out that it is necessary to counter the machinations of the enemies of the working class with tactics which do not disdain all kinds of artifices, ruses, etc. But at that point Lenin states the following:

"There can be no doubt that those gentlemen, the 'leaders' of opportunism will resort to every trick of bourgeois diplomacy, to the aid of bourgeois governments, priests, police and law courts, to prevent Communists joining the trade unions, to force them out by every means, to make their work in the trade unions as unpleasant as possible, to insult, bait and persecute them". (Lenin. Selected Works, English ed., Vol. 2, p. 597.)

It is precisely this persecution, oppression, attacks on advanced members of the working class that Leninism teaches us to counter with courage and steadfastness, and not only with these qualities, but also with all sorts of ruses, artifices, illegal methods, so as to establish a link with the masses, to be among the masses, to fight together with the masses, and to lead the masses. Mr. Austin distorted this quotation by substituting certain words for others, and attempted to use it to show the morals of the tactics and policy of the progressive working class parties.

A vain effort! The matter at issue here is the struggle of the working class. We are dealing with the employment by the bourgeoisie of all sorts of illegal ways and means of exerting pressure, of hounding and persecuting front-rank members of the working class and trade union movement. Leninism teaches us to counter this persecution and baiting of the best people of the working class with courage and readiness to undertake any sacrifices in order, along with the masses, to fight for their interests.

Thus, we are dealing with a struggle. But Mr. Austin should know the French proverb *à la guerre comme à la guerre*. If the bourgeoisie sets going all possible means of pressure, badgering, persecution against the working class, is it not natural that the working class should also resort to means of self-protection and defence?

Now, if reference is made in this respect to Marxism-Leninism,

one should remember the following passage from the above-mentioned splendid work of Lenin:

"If you want to help 'the masses' and to win the sympathy, confidence and support of 'the masses', you must not fear difficulties, you must not fear the pin-pricks, chicanery, insults and persecution of the 'leaders' (who, being opportunists and social-chauvinists, are in most cases directly or indirectly connected with the bourgeoisie and police) but must imperatively **work wherever 'the masses' are to be found.** You must be capable, to make every sacrifice, of overcoming the greatest obstacles in order to carry on agitation and propaganda systematically, persistently and patiently, precisely in those institutions, societies and unions—even the most reactionary—in which proletarian and semi-proletarian masses are to be found". (Lenin. Selected Works, English ed., Vol. 2, p. 596.)

That is what is taught by Marxism-Leninism—that great teaching, that indispensable banner of the working class, of the whole of toiling mankind.

Mr. Austin attempted to blacken the Soviet Union, to undermine confidence in Soviet policy, which it is alleged, does not disdain and even justifies Machiavellian methods and means of action. But let him look rather to himself and his friends. . . . Have Mr. Austin and his friends forgotten that quite recently the British Intelligence Service issued a forgery known as "Protocol M" in order to discredit the progressive people in Germany, and at the same time the policy of the Soviet Union in Germany?

Everybody very likely remembers that last January the British Foreign Office distributed through the press a mysterious document entitled "Protocol M". The content of this protocol was formulated in its title—"The Plans of the German Communists to Call Strikes in the Ruhr and Disorganise Transport in Western Germany". When Mr. Bevin was asked about that affair in the House of Commons he put up Mr. McNeil to answer for him, and Mr. McNeil then declared that the British Government believed in the authenticity of that document.

On receiving this forgery, the American and British occupation authorities in Germany utilised it to carry through gross police violence, to ban the Communist Party press, to launch a series of police raids and to ransack the premises of democratic organisations of Germany, to ban the People's Congress and, finally, to intensify pressure on the trade unions. But on April 10, 1948, the "New York Times", referring to quite reliable sources, announced that "Protocol M" was a forgery.

The leaders of the British Foreign Office at first refused to comment on this report which was so unpleasant to them, and a question was put to Mr. Bevin in the House of Commons as to whether he could say anything about the authenticity of the

document. It was then, on April 19, that Mr. Hector McNeil spoke, admitting that the authenticity of the document was in doubt. When the Labour Member of Parliament, Mr. Emrys Hughes, asked Mr. McNeil why Mr. Bevin could not come to the House of Commons and openly admit his error, Mr. McNeil made no answer, but in reply to further questions of Members of Parliament, repeated that a careful and thorough investigation had refuted the results of the original, ordinary investigation.

Therefore, it seems to me that the newspaper "Manchester Guardian", in characterising this story, was right when it wrote: "The Foreign Office comes rather badly out of the episode of 'Protocol M'. It accepted as genuine a document which even to uninstructed observers like ourselves appeared to be doubtful on internal evidence alone . . . Mr. Bevin should now direct his searching attention to the calibre of some branches of our Intelligence in Germany. Gullibility is the worst possible vice of an Intelligence Service. Those who swallowed 'Protocol M' might well be relieved to seek their fortunes in writing thrillers for the commercial market".

But it seems to me that this advice could with some changes be given also to those who are too credulous of sensational discoveries of that kind.

Why did I recall this story? I did so in order to show that all sorts of forgeries are easily resorted to by reactionaries of every brand, enemies of democracy and progress, in pursuit of their political aims, without hesitating to resort to outright crimes and to the employment of most immoral and filthy methods of struggle.

That is why, instead of talking about various "military strategems" to which leaders of the working-class movement and progressive people in general in capitalist countries who are subjected to all kinds of persecution and oppression, are compelled to resort to in self-defence, there should have been recalled the devilish system of forgeries, provocation, tyranny and lawlessness employed by the ruling circles of the capitalist countries in the struggle against their opponents.

That is the position as regards Mr. Austin's efforts to utilise Marxist-Leninist literature for his attacks on the Soviet Union and Soviet foreign policy.

Finally, Mr. Austin, full of indignation, struck a blow against the decision of the Communist Party of France, to the effect that the French people would not fight the Soviet Union. It is not my task here to speak as a defender of the Communist Party of France. It stands in no need of that. But I cannot fail to react to the following circumstance: What, essentially speaking, is the cause of Mr. Austin's indignation? The declaration of the Political Bureau, which I have read, stated that war is being prepared against the Soviet Union, a war of the imperialists, and

it stated: "We shall take no part in such a war, we shall not fight against the Soviet people". This reduces Mr. Austin to a state of irritation, almost of fury. Apparently he would prefer opposite appeals—for war against the Soviet Union. By his indignation Mr Austin gives himself away and those whom he represents here.

We can sum up our discussion. What does it show? We have examined all the pros and cons in this matter. What, then, can prevent the adoption of the proposals presented by the Soviet Government, the adoption of which, as well as their subsequent operation, does not in our view present any insuperable obstacles?

At least, all that is said by the opponents of this proposal does not withstand serious, business-like criticism. They demand that, first, international confidence should be secured, and that afterwards our measures should be put into operation.

But it has already been pointed out that such a stand is an absolutely arbitrary one, for the very adoption of the proposals introduced by the Soviet Union regarding prohibition of the atomic weapon and a reduction by the great Powers of armed forces and armaments by one-third—one such decision alone will lay, and cannot fail to lay a firm foundation for international confidence.

There is talk that it is impossible to implement the Soviet proposals without a control system. But the Soviet proposals have in view the institution of an international control agency which is to be an important link in the system of measures connected with the prohibition of the atomic weapon and a one-third reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the five great Powers.

We are told that nothing will be accomplished here by a mere declaration. That is true. A mere prohibition, a mere decision to prohibit the atomic weapon, a mere declaration, cannot rid mankind of the threat of the atomic weapon. But a decision of the General Assembly prohibiting the atomic weapon will be a powerful stimulus to the consolidation of peace. Such a decision will sound the joyful tidings of peace and will go down in the history of mankind as a supreme act of humanity, civilisation and co-operation among nations.

That is why the Soviet delegation energetically supports and will continue to support its proposals.

We know that not a single hand will be raised against our proposals, not a single hand of those to whom the interests of the millions of peoples who are longing for peace and loathe war, are dear.

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