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MOLOTOV

ON THE

FUTURE OF
GERMANY

Two Statements made
in Paris by the Minister
for Foreign Affairs of
the U.S.S.R.

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MOLOTOV on the FUTURE OF GERMANY

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V. M. MOLOTOV'S STATEMENT

On the American Draft Treaty for the Disarmament and Demilitarisation of Germany

The following statement was made on July 9, 1946, by V. M. Molotov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. at the meeting of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs in Paris when the American draft treaty on the disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany was discussed :

THE Soviet Government has studied with due attention the draft treaty of the four Powers for the disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany submitted by Mr. Byrnes. The Soviet Government reaffirms that the disarmament and long-term demilitarisation of Germany are absolutely essential.

The Soviet Government feels that Germany should be kept disarmed and demilitarised not for 25 years, as suggested in the draft, but for at least 40 years. Experience has shown that the short period of time during which restrictions on Germany's armaments were enforced after the First World War proved to be absolutely insufficient to prevent Germany's renaissance as an aggressive force endangering the peoples of Europe and the world. Only 20 years had passed since the end of the First World War when Germany unleashed a second world war. It is obvious that the peace-loving nations are interested in keeping her disarmed as long as possible.

The suggested draft treaty is motivated by the interests of world peace and security. The preamble refers to the desire to make it possible for the peoples of Europe and the whole world to devote themselves wholly to peaceful pursuits. Study of the draft, however, shows the complete inadequacy of the proposed measures to safeguard security and to prevent aggression by Germany in the future. The said document is confined to the enumeration of certain military and war economy measures, but even those measures are set out in a less comprehensive form than was done in the decisions of the Berlin Conference of the leaders of the three Powers, which, in addition, indicated other no less essential conditions for safeguarding security and lasting peace.

For this reason the Soviet Government has come to the conclusion that if the treaty of the four Powers is confined only to what Mr. Byrnes' draft says regarding Germany's disarmament it cannot be a reliable guarantee of security in Europe and the world as a

whole. On the contrary, the inadequacy of the measures it sets forth might result in Germany's resurgence as an aggressor Power.

The question arises, what form should the treaty of the four Powers assume, so as to prevent a renewal of German aggression and thus really serve to safeguard durable peace and the security of the nations. To reply to this question one must turn to the joint decisions of the Allied Powers, adopted in the course of the war with Germany.

Everybody knows that the joint decisions adopted by the Governments of the U.S.A., the Soviet Union and Great Britain at the Crimea Conference and subsequently elaborated at the Berlin Conference*, and to which France, too, set her hand, outlined the main objectives in the matter of safeguarding Europe and the world against the danger of a new German aggression. There is no reason for us to renounce these decisions. They must form the basis for our further steps in the maintenance of peace.

First of all, it should be said that these decisions refer to the necessity to effect "the complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production."—(*Berlin Conference.*)

Thus, our countries took their decision on the complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany long before the appearance of the draft treaty under discussion. At that time, it was also found necessary to carry out the industrial disarmament of Germany; indeed, the Allies have always regarded the elimination of Germany's war and economic potential and the establishment of proper Allied control over German industries as their primary objective in safeguarding the security of the nations in the future.

The proposed draft, however, formulates these objectives in a restricted and utterly inadequate form. If one examines the present position, the situation will prove to be entirely unsatisfactory. The Soviet Government has already proposed that an investigation be undertaken in all the zones in Germany to see how the disarmament of German forces and disbandment of all other military and para-military organisations and establishments have been carried out in actual fact. To this day, this has not been

*See pages 14 and 17 for Decisions of the Crimea and Berlin Conferences relating to Germany.

done. But we continue to press for such an investigation in order to avoid all sorts of misunderstandings in this sphere.

As regards the elimination of German war and military-economic potential, the position is entirely unsatisfactory. There is as yet nothing to investigate, because up to now no plan for the elimination of Germany's war potential has been adopted and, apart from certain measures taken independently of a general plan, nothing has been accomplished in this respect.

The Soviet Government, therefore, considers that there should be no further delay in drawing up such a plan, and in establishing procedure for eliminating those branches of German industries which, producing enormous quantities of armaments for the German Army, formed a military-economic base for aggressive Germany. Only a disarmament programme that includes the disbandment of the German armed forces and all military and para-military organisations, as well as the elimination of those German industries which supplied Germany's armaments—only such a disarmament and demilitarisation programme for Germany will correspond to the interests of lasting peace and the security of nations.

The four Power treaty which is intended to safeguard peace and security must, above all, provide for the accomplishment of these tasks. The suggested draft, however, does not provide a satisfactory answer to these questions.

At the same time we must bear in mind the fact that the safeguarding of security and the prevention of fresh aggression by Germany does not depend only on military and military-economic measures. Of no less importance are the measures envisaged by the decisions of the Crimea and Berlin Conferences which deal with political objectives in respect of Germany, the achievement of which has always been considered by the Allied Powers as a necessary pre-condition for safeguarding future peace and the security of the nations.

The decisions of the Crimea Conference referred to the necessity "to wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organisations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people." All this is set out in greater detail in the decisions of the Berlin Conference, which stress the necessity "to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis."

The suggested draft evades the question of liquidating the remnants of German Fascism and of reconstructing German political life on democratic lines, an omission to which one cannot agree.

Only yesterday we all admitted that our primary objective was not only "to wipe out the Nazi Party" but also to remove the effects of the domination of Hitlerism in all spheres of public life in Germany. We regard the accomplishment of these tasks as a necessary condition for the reconstruction of the German State on democratic lines, in order that Germany may cease to exist as an aggressive force and become a democratic and peace-loving State which will then be able to co-operate peacefully in international affairs.

We all realised that this reconstruction would not be easy, that it would take some time, and would require us to give active support to those democratic forces among the German people which would undertake the task. It should be admitted that substantial democratic forces have sprung up in Germany, and that these are already working with a certain amount of success for her democratic renaissance. But, after all, this democratic reconstruction has only just begun; only a beginning has been made; the forces of Fascism in Germany are far from eradicated. It is well known that agrarian reform, involving the elimination of the big landowners who formed a reliable base for Hitlerism, has been carried out only in the Soviet zone, and has not even begun in the Western zones.

Monopolistic associations of German industrialists, all those cartels, trusts, syndicates and the rest, on which German Fascism relied in preparing for aggression and in waging the war, still exercise their influence, particularly in the Western zones. Consequently, if we want to have reliable guarantees of security for the future, we have no reason to pay less attention to the problem of eliminating the last trace of Nazism, and transforming Germany into a democratic country.

In view of this, how is one to interpret the fact that the draft does not say a single word about these important objectives of maintaining peace and the security of the nations? It must be clear to us that all advocates of lasting peace are interested in a complete implementation of the decisions of the Crimea and Berlin Conferences. We must remember our joint decisions, which say that "German militarism and Nazism will be extirpated and the Allies will take in agreement together, now and in the future, the

other measures necessary to assure that Germany will never again threaten her neighbours and the peace of the world."—(*Berlin Conference*.)

The suggested treaty does not conform to these objectives. It evades and disregards these extremely important pre-requisites for ensuring lasting peace and the security of the nations. Thus, in the light of security requirements, the suggested draft treaty does not achieve its purpose, not to mention the fact that it conflicts with the earlier joint decisions of the Allies.

Despite the complete inadequacy of the measures proposed to prevent a new aggression by Germany, the draft envisages the possibility of terminating the Allied occupation of German territory, ignoring the aims which guided the Allies when they decided on Germany's occupation.

The presence of Allied and Soviet forces in Germany has three aims: first, to secure and complete the military and economic disarmament of Germany; secondly, to secure the democratisation of the regime in Germany; and thirdly, to assure reparation deliveries. We hold that presence of occupation forces in Germany and the maintenance of zones of occupation are absolutely essential as long as these objectives have not been achieved.

It has already been indicated how unsatisfactory the draft is as a means of securing the complete military and economic disarmament of Germany; and also that it completely disregards the problem of securing the democratisation of the regime in Germany. It remains for me to add that Mr. Byrnes' draft totally ignores the necessity to secure reparation deliveries, an omission to which the Soviet Government is quite unable to agree.

It is necessary to dwell upon the question of reparations from Germany. This question particularly affects the interests of those nations which were invaded by German armies and experienced exceptionally great suffering as a result of German occupation. Naturally, the Soviet Union cannot forget about reparations, as has been done in the suggested draft.

With respect to the total amount of reparations from Germany for the U.S.S.R., the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States already at the Crimea Conference felt it possible to take the amount of 10,000 million dollars as a starting point.

At the Berlin Conference the Soviet Government again insisted on fixing reparations from Germany in favour of the Soviet Union to the amount of 10,000 million dollars. At that time it was decided,

on the suggestion of the United States, that the Soviet Union should draw reparations mainly from its occupation zone of Germany and partly from the Western zones, which fact was inscribed in the decisions of the Berlin Conference.

Naturally, these reparations must include not only equipment, but also commodities out of Germany's current production. But, as we know, the fulfilment of reparation deliveries is meeting ever new obstacles. Notwithstanding the obligations assumed by the United States of America and Great Britain, and subsequently undertaken also by France, the Berlin decisions about reparation deliveries are not being carried out in the Western zones of occupation of Germany.

Ever new pretexts are found to postpone and frustrate the implementation of those decisions. The American General Clay recently issued an unlawful statement announcing a refusal to carry out reparation deliveries to the Soviet Union and other countries, even under the first and utterly inadequate decisions which were already agreed upon by the four Governments in the Allied Control Council.

The Soviet Government can by no means accept such an attitude towards the joint decisions of our Governments on the subject of reparations. All the more are we unable to accept the proposal contained in Mr. Byrnes' draft which admits the termination of the Allied occupation of German territory irrespective of the fulfilment of reparation deliveries.

The Soviet Government insists that reparations from Germany to the amount of 10,000 million dollars be exacted without fail, because this amount is but a small portion of the enormous damage suffered by the Soviet Union as a result of German occupation. It is possible that the United States of America and England, which did not experience the sufferings of occupation, somewhat underrate the value of reparations to the U.S.S.R. But the peoples of the Soviet Union who suffered German occupation cannot accept such an attitude towards their legitimate claims.

All that I have said makes clear the attitude of the Soviet Union towards the draft submitted by Mr. Byrnes on Germany's disarmament and demilitarisation. It is clear to us that the draft treaty in the form in which it is submitted to us does not correspond to the interests of ensuring peace and the security of the nations. The draft is in need of radical revision. The observations that I have made indicate the lines along which, in our opinion, revision is necessary.

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY AND THE PEACE TREATY WITH HER

Statement by V. M. Molotov

On July 10, 1946, at the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris, during discussion of the German problem, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov, made the following statement on the fate of Germany and on the Peace Treaty with her :

THE time has come when we should discuss the fate of Germany and a peace treaty with that country. The Soviet Government has always held that the spirit of revenge is a poor counsellor in such affairs. It would be equally incorrect to identify Hitler Germany with the German people, although the German people cannot divest themselves of responsibility for Germany's aggression, and for its most grave consequences.

The Soviet people experienced the unparalleled suffering of enemy occupation, as a result of the invasion of the Soviet Union by the German armies. Our losses are great and inestimable. Other peoples of Europe, and not of Europe alone, will long feel the heavy losses and hardships caused by the war which Germany imposed.

It is natural, therefore, that the problem of Germany's fate should be agitating the minds not only of the German people, but also of other peoples who are trying to safeguard themselves for the future, and to prevent a renewal of German aggression. One should also bear in mind the fact that, thanks to her industrial might, Germany is an important link in the whole system of world economy. Nor can one forget that more than once this industrial might has served as the foundation for aggressive Germany's armed might.

Such are the premises from which we must draw our conclusions. I proceed from the fact that, in the interests of world economy and tranquillity in Europe, it would be incorrect to adopt a policy of annihilating Germany as a State, or to agrarianise her, wiping out her main industrial centres.

Such a policy would undermine the economy of Europe, dislocate world economy and cause a chronic political crisis in Germany, which would spell a threat to peace and tranquillity. I think that,

even if we were to adopt such a policy, the course of history would impel us subsequently to renounce it as abortive and groundless.

I think, therefore, that our purpose is not to destroy Germany, but to transform Germany into a democratic and peace-loving State which, next to its agriculture, will have its own industry and foreign trade, but which will be deprived of the economic and military potentiality to rise again as an aggressive force.

While still engaged in the war the Allies declared that they had no intention of destroying the German people. Even at the time when Hitler with overweening presumption openly proclaimed that he wanted to destroy Russia, Stalin, head of the Soviet Government, ridiculing these boastful stupidities, said: "It is no more possible to destroy Germany than to destroy Russia. But the Hitler State can and must be destroyed."

Germany has long held an important position in world economy. While continuing to exist as a single State, Germany will remain an important factor in world trade—which corresponds to other people's interests as well. On the other hand, a policy of annihilating Germany as a State, or agrarianising her and wiping out her principal industrial centres, would cause her to nurture dangerous sentiments of revenge. Such a policy would play into the hands of German reactionaries and deprive Europe of tranquillity and stable peace.

One should look not backward, but ahead, and concern oneself about what is to be done so that Germany may become a democratic and peace-loving State with a prosperous agriculture, industry and foreign trade, while lacking the opportunity to revive as an aggressive force. The victory over Germany has given us powerful means of achieving this purpose. It is our duty to utilise them to the full.

It has of late become fashionable to talk about dismembering Germany into several "autonomous" States, about federalising her, and about separating the Ruhr from her. All such proposals originate in the same wish to destroy and agrarianise Germany, for it is obvious that without the Ruhr Germany cannot exist as an independent and viable State. But as I have already said, if the interests of peace and tranquillity are dear to us, the destruction of Germany should not be our objective.

Naturally, if as a result of a plebiscite throughout Germany the German people express their wish to transform Germany into a federal State, or if as a result of a plebiscite in various former German States the desire is manifested to break away from Germany,

it goes without saying that we cannot object. In not a few instances the Allied authorities in the Western zones of occupation of Germany have encouraged the idea of a federal structure for Germany. But the attitude of the Allied authorities is one thing, while the German people's real desire or the desire of the population of some part of Germany, is another.

We Soviet people hold that it is incorrect to impose some particular solution of this question on the German people. Such an imposition would not, in any case, do any good, if only because it would be precarious. If, on the one hand, we should not stand in the way of the German people's rightful aspirations, once their State has revived on democratic lines, it is equally our duty to prevent Germany's rise as an aggressive force. It would be a crime to forget this sacred duty of ours to the peoples of the world.

If the world is to be safeguarded against eventual German aggression, Germany must be completely disarmed, both militarily and economically, and the Ruhr placed under inter-Allied control exercised by our four countries, with the object of preventing the revival of war industries in Germany.

The proposal for the complete military and economic disarmament of Germany is not something new. The decisions of the Berlin Conference deal with it in detail. And it is natural that the Ruhr, as the main base of Germany's war industries, should be kept under the vigilant control of the principal Allied Powers.

The aim—Germany's complete military and economic disarmament—must also be furthered by a plan for reparations. The fact that until now no such plan has been drawn up, in spite of the repeated demands of the Soviet Government that the relevant decision of the Berlin Conference should be carried out, and the fact that the Ruhr has not been placed under inter-Allied control, on which the Soviet Government insisted a year ago, is a dangerous thing, as far as the maintenance of future peace and the security of nations is concerned.

We take the view that it is impossible to put off the accomplishment of these tasks without running the risk of frustrating the decision to carry out the complete military and economic disarmament of Germany.

Such is the view of the Soviet Government regarding the war industry and war potential of Germany.

These considerations cannot hamper the development in Germany of industries serving the needs of peace. In order that such development may benefit other peoples who need German coal, metal and manufactured products, Germany should be granted the right to export and import and, if this right to foreign trade is to be effectual, we should not hinder Germany from increasing her output of steel, coal and manufactured products of a peaceful nature, naturally within certain bounds, and on the understanding that inter-Allied control is inevitably established over German industry, and over the Ruhr industries in particular.

As we know, the Control Council in Germany recently fixed the level which would be reached by German industries in the near future. Germany is far from having reached this level as yet. Nevertheless, it should already be admitted that her peaceful industries must be given the opportunity to develop on a wider scale, provided only that this industrial development is really used to satisfy the peaceful needs of the German people and the requirements of trade with other countries.

All this calls for the establishment of proper inter-Allied control over German industry and over the Ruhr industries in particular. Responsibility for the latter cannot rest upon one Allied country alone.

The adoption of an appropriate programme for the development of Germany's peaceful industries, which will provide for the development of her foreign trade as well as for the establishment of inter-Allied control over the whole of German industry, would serve to implement those decisions of the Berlin Conference which provide for treating Germany as an economic whole.

It remains for me to dwell on the question of the peace treaty with Germany. Of course we stand in principle for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, but before concluding this treaty there should be set up a single German Government sufficiently democratic to be able to extirpate all remnants of Fascism in Germany, and sufficiently responsible to be able to fulfil all its obligations towards the Allies, including more particularly those in respect of reparation deliveries to the Allies.

It goes without saying that we raise no objection to the setting up of a German central administration as a transitional step towards the establishment of a future German Government.

From what I have said it follows that, before talking about a peace treaty with Germany, it is necessary to solve the question of setting up an all-German Government. To this day, however, no German central administration of any kind whatsoever has been created, although the Soviet Government raised this question at the Berlin Conference a year ago.

But while, at that time, consideration of this question was postponed, it is now becoming particularly urgent as the first step towards the establishment of a future German Government.

Even when a German Government has been set up it will take a number of years to decide what this new German Government represents, and whether it is trustworthy.

A future German Government must be a democratic Government which will be able to extirpate the remnants of Fascism in Germany, and at the same time be able to fulfil Germany's obligations towards the Allies. Amongst other things, and above all, it will be bound to carry out reparation deliveries to the Allies.

Only when we are satisfied that the new German Government is able to cope with these tasks, and is really honestly fulfilling them in practice—only then will it be possible to speak seriously of concluding a peace treaty with Germany. Unless this condition is fulfilled Germany cannot claim a peace treaty, and the Allied Powers will not be able to say they have fulfilled their duties towards the nations who are demanding that durable peace and security be assured.

Such is the view of the Soviet Union on the fundamental problems of Germany and on the question of the peace treaty with Germany.

APPENDIX

FROM THE STATEMENT

made by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., the President of the U.S.A. and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, on the RESULTS of the CRIMEA CONFERENCE issued by TASS Agency, February 12, 1945

II.—OCCUPATION AND CONTROL OF GERMANY

WE have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany is accomplished.

Under the agreed plan the forces of the three Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Co-ordinated administration and control has been provided for under the plan through a Central Control Commission consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the three Powers with headquarters in Berlin.

It has been agreed that France should be invited by the three Powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation, and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four Governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to a just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organisations and institutions; remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public offices and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world.

It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans and a place for them in the comity of nations.

III.—REPARATION BY GERMANY

WE have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war, and recognised it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for the damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A Commission for the Compensation of Damage will be established. The Commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries. The Commission will work in Moscow.

V.—DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

WE have drawn up and subscribed to a Declaration on Liberated Europe. This Declaration provides for concerning the policies of the three Powers and for joint action by them in meeting the political and economic problems of Liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles. The text of the Declaration is as follows :—

The Premier of the U.S.S.R., the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of Liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in Liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany, and the people of the former Axis satellite States of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice.

This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated State or former Axis satellite State in Europe where, in their judgment, conditions require :—

- (a) to establish conditions of internal peace ;
- (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed people ;
- (c) to form interim Governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people ; and
- (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authority or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated State or any former Axis satellite State in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this Declaration.

By this Declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom, and the general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this Declaration the three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

IX—UNITY FOR PEACE AS FOR WAR

OUR meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all peoples of the world.

Only with continuing and growing co-operation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realised—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, “afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.”

Victory in this war and the establishment of the proposed International Organisation will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

SECTIONS OF THE REPORT ON THE TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE OF BERLIN DEALING WITH GERMANY

(July 17—August 2, 1945)

III.—GERMANY

THE Allied armies are in occupation of the whole of Germany, and the German people have begun to atone for the terrible crimes committed under the leadership of those whom, in the hour of their success, they openly approved and blindly obeyed.

Agreement has been reached at this Conference on the political and economic principles of a co-ordinated Allied policy towards defeated Germany during the period of Allied control.

The purpose of this agreement is to carry out the Crimea declaration on Germany. German militarism and Nazism will be extirpated and the Allies will take in agreement together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbours or the peace of the world.

It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people. It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis. If their own efforts are steadily directed to this end, it will be possible for them in due course to take their place among the free and peaceful peoples of the world.

The text of the agreement is as follows :—

The Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period

A. Political Principles

1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany, as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council.
2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.
3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are :—
 - (i) The complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends :—
 - (a) All German land, naval and air forces, the S.S., S.A., S.D., and Gestapo, with all their organisations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organisations and all other military and quasi-military organisations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganisation of German militarism and Nazism ;
 - (b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialised facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented.
 - (ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

(iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organisations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.

(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful co-operation in international life by Germany.

4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discrimination on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.

5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organisations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

6. All members of the Nazi party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.

7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.

8. The judicial system will be reorganised in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion.

9. The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed towards the decentralisation of the political structure and the development of local responsibility.

To this end :

- (i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation ;

- (ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;
- (iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government;
- (iv) for the time being no central German government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

B. Economic Principles

11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war, as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships, shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peace-time needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 15.

Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed.

12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralised for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.

13. In organising the German economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.

14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to:

- (a) mining and industrial production and allocation;
- (b) agriculture, forestry and fishing;
- (c) wages, prices and rationing;
- (d) import and export programmes for Germany as a whole;
- (e) currency and banking, central taxation and customs;
- (f) reparation and removal of industrial war potential;
- (g) transportation and communications.

In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions.

15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary:

- (a) to carry out programmes of industrial disarmament and demilitarisation, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports.
- (b) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)
- (c) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports.
- (d) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein.
- (e) to control all German public or private scientific bodies, research and experimental institutions, laboratories, etc., connected with economic activities.

16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any breakdown in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited.

17. Measures shall be promptly taken :

- (a) to effect essential repair of transport ;
- (b) to enlarge coal production ;
- (c) to maximise agricultural output ;
- (d) to effect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities.

18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned external assets not already under the control of the United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.

19. Payment of Reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic plan of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports.

The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraph 4 (a) and 4. (b) of the Reparations Agreement.

IV.—REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY

IN accordance with the Crimea decision that Germany be compelled to compensate to the greatest possible extent for the loss and suffering that she has caused to the United Nations and for which the German people cannot escape responsibility, the following agreement on reparations was reached :

1. Reparation claims of the U.S.S.R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U.S.S.R. and from appropriate German external assets.

2. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.

3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German external assets.

4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U.S.S.R. from its own zone of occupation, the U.S.S.R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones :

(a) 15 per cent. of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries, as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.

(b) 10 per cent. of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously.

5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest.

6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 (a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U.S.S.R. in agreed instalments within five years of the date hereof.

The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control

Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed.

7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect of such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6.

8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of occupation in Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below.

9. The Governments of the United Kingdom and United States of America renounced their claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria.

10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany.

V.—DISPOSAL OF THE GERMAN NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE

The Conference agreed in principle upon arrangements for the use and disposal of the surrendered German fleet and merchant ships. It was decided that the Three Governments would appoint experts to work out together detailed plans to give effect to the agreed principles. A further joint statement will be published simultaneously by the Three Governments in due course.

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