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94

ETHICS & marxism



Lewis S. Feuer

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Ethics And Marxism

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Ethics and Marxism

The thesis of historical materialism, with respect to ethics, is that philosophical questions vanish when the status of ethical statements and theories is clarified from the standpoint of sociological science. We shall try to demonstrate this thesis by examining the theories of the best-known contemporary ethical philosophers. We shall find that the ethical theories of bourgeois philosophers are examples of ideology in the sense which Engles gave to this term. "Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, indeed, but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all." (1.) We shall then go on to show how historical materialism provides the foundation for a purely scientific politics. (2.)

By way of definition, we may characterize ethical statements as those which use words like "ought," "good," "bad," "duty". If a person says, "one ought not to bear arms," then he is using ethical language. An "ethical theory" is one which tries to "analyze" what ethical terms mean. Such analyses, as we shall

see, turn out to be ideological exercises of the "false consciousness".

From the psychological standpoint, ethical terms may be described as the terms of the "super-ego language." The super-ego is made up of social values which are derived through the conditioning influences of parents, nursemaids, teachers. (3) Moral restrictions are external in origin, but they are subsequently "introjected" (in other words, "interiorized") within the child. (4)

The source of these restrictions is, in later years, repressed; the child is now swayed by the admonitions of an autonomous conscience, by "the man within the breast, the abstract and ideal spectator of our sentiments and conduct," as Adam Smith puts it. (5) The super-ego, which takes over the parental function, holds aloft certain ideals, and criticizes our activities. (6)

The function of ethical terms as the vehicles of social manipulation now becomes clear. The person who uses such terms is trying to have you identify him with your super-ego. He addresses you with a vocabulary which touches off tensions and anxieties, a vocabulary which stirs the unconscious in ways with which you cannot cope. Disobedience to ethical statement carries with it a sense of moral guilt, the outcome of a conflict between conscience and desire. (7)

It is important to bear in mind the social psychology of ethical terms because we are thus enabled to understand the ideological character of ethical theories. Because such theories are elaborated within a "false con-

sciousness," because they are propounded with an ignorance as to the underlying motives, we must look for those philosophic devices by means of which the ethical theory becomes the agency of resistance to sociological analysis.

ENGLISH INTUITIONIST SCHOOL

To begin with, let us examine the ethical theory of the English intuitionist school in the form which has been given to it by the so-called realistic philosopher, G. E. Moore. This type of doctrine has perhaps somewhat more than an academic importance. One scholar R. G., Collingwood, has gone so far as to say: "If the realists had wanted to train up a generation of Englishmen and Englishwomen expressly as the potential dupes of every adventurer in morals and politics...no better way of doing it could have been discovered." (8)

Moore has argued that "good" is indefinable that it is a unique property, an irreducible essence which is not to be found in the word of material things. Moore maintains that anybody who tries to define "good" in some scientific way is necessarily guilty of what he calls the "naturalistic fallacy." Moore's proof of his thesis is "analytic"; it is supposed to follow solely from a discussion of what we mean by "good". On further scrutiny, however, the proof turns out to be an exposition of correct mores as articulated in linguistic usage according to a Cambridge don. Encrusted within linguistic usage, we find the devices which the psychologist would call the "resistances" to sociological analysis.

Moore argues that we cannot say that "pleasure is good", because we don't have the same feelings about "pleasure" as we do about "good". To say "pleasure is good", he observes, is obviously different from saying "pleasure is pleasure". Now it is quite obvious that Moore is not looking for definition of "good". Rather he is asking whether there is any emotive symbol which will have the same affective value for himself as the word "good". He then fails to find an emotive equivalent. This was quite to be expected, for the approved mores of middle-class Englishmen have been molded in some measure by the Puritan opposition between "pleasure" and "good." (9) For such a person, no set of words can constitute a "definition" of "good" because no other words have been the vehicle for the same childhood experiences. The word "good" is associated with all the emotions which the child felt when it acted in such a way as to keep the love of some parental authority. The word elicits unconscious responses and anxieties which no scientific terms can call forth.

We can thus explain along lines of social psychology why the English intuitionists find that "good" is indefinable. Our explanation shows at the same time that there is no ground for saying that we are enabled by a "moral intuition" to apprehend some non-natural quality of goodness. Moore, as an intuitionist philosopher, wishes however to resist the materialistic analysis of ethical terms. He wishes to guarantee that the super-ego is an unanalyzable entity, and to project its mandates

into a metaphysical realm to which only the ethical intuition has access. (10) For the materialistic analysis undermines the ground of traditional ethical consciousness, and against such a threat, the intuitionist must summon all the forces of repression. The "naturalistic fallacy" is thus invented as a device for rulling out of order any scientific study of ethical language. And since the memories of early moral education lie repressed, there is any kind of plausibility to the view that we have an immediate source of ethical insight. (11) The scientist, however, seeks to penetrate beneath the conscious ideological level; he then finds not a unique quality of goodness, but rather the complex of anxieties which lend to ethical terms their peculiar flavor. That ethical terms are apparently unanalyzable is simply an indication that their analysis requires a burrowing into the unconscious background. The edicts of the super-ego then present themselves no longer as the intuitive declarations of conscience. (12)

Moore replies to the materialistic analyst that moral obligation cannot be regarded as a psychological idea. The notion of "better moral taste" he regards as something which lies outside the province of the sociologist. "It seems to me quite clear," says Moore, "that when we say our morality is higher than another, ... we are not merely asserting that it has a certain relation to our feelings, but are asserting, if I may say so, that the person who has it has a better moral taste than the person who has not." (13) Moore rejects the sociological analysis because it leads to the view, in his opinion, that two men who belong to different societies cannot ever differ on moral

questions. And this view he simply finds unacceptable without further argument. The criterion of proof evidently resolves itself into nothing more than an appeal to the conventional beliefs of upper class Englishmen with a gentleman's training. An ethical theory is held to be demonstrated when it conforms to the canons of good form and imperialist honour with which the youth in the schools of the upper classes are inculcated. (14) Moore invokes such canons likewise when he gives brief consideration to specific political and social questions. The moral rules of the status quo are endorsed when he writes that "it seems doubtful whether ethics can establish the utility of any rules other than those generally practised." It is noteworthy, moreover, how the ethics of Moore's Common Sense coincides with the requirements of dominant interests in British economy. "The desire of property," he states, is "so universal and so strong that it would be impossible to remove." Therefore, he argues, the "common legal rules for the protection of property" are justified by the ethics of Common Sense. (15) The ethical intuition thus transforms the requirements of capitalist economy into universal moral laws.

What is the basic contrast then between Moore's Philosophical method and the method of historical materialism? Moore proposes that it is the office of philosophy to accept the propositions of common sense and then to analyze their meanings. (16) The Marxian scientist, on the other hand, refuses to give any primacy to the statements of "common sense." Historical

materialism affirms that language itself is a historical, evolving product; existent linguistic usage has been molded by the agencies of class conditioning, and it would be a gross error to mistake the class prejudices embedded in linguistic habits for immutable metaphysical deliverances. Marx likewise held that the limitations of bourgeois economists expressed themselves in a commitment to the prevalent 'economic slang.' (17) The bourgeois economist who is contented with the categories which business men have found useful will not get very far in his scientific analysis. For the economic language which has been molded to assist bourgeois relations of production is not necessarily the appropriate instrument for the analysis of those economic relations of which it is the expression; the bourgeois linguistic forms may serve too well to conceal the essential relations of economic development. "Vulgar economy" is a theory which conforms to bourgeois "common sense." It is similarly a blunder to accept the statements of common sense ethics as the touchstone of analysis. (18) Rather, historical materialism leads us to expect that the ethical language of common sense is not exempt from the laws of historical change. Common sense ethics, like its economic counterpart, may serve only too well to conceal the social relations from which the efficacy of ethical terms derives. Indeed, so intent is Moore on barring the application of sociological analysis to ethical usage that he is driven finally to the assertion that it is a mistake to regard ethics as concerned essentially with human conduct. (19) Things may be good, he says, even if there

were no human beings alive. The "moral intuition," by projecting its judgments into a metaphysical sphere, eludes the social scientists; it has translated its pronouncements, however, into meaningless statements. The dialectic "of common sense" thus culminates in nonsense.

The realistic movement in English philosophy which began as a hopeful protest against idealistic metaphysics failed, as we have seen in the foregoing instance, to achieve a thoroughgoing scientific approach. It was not immune to the temper of mind dominant in English academic centres. The doctrines of absolute idealism, which were prevalent at the end of the nineteenth century were largely a rationalization of a tradition akin to "Tory democracy." (20) The English idealists criticized laissez-faire liberalism which gave only a negative freedom to the poor; at the same time, however, they confined all proposals of social reform within the framework of the existent social organism. English idealism sought a paternalistic, traditionalistic state. Those who were rebellious against this frame of mind often found themselves drawn by its attractions. McTaggart, under whose influence Moore and Russell were for a while Hegelians, went through just such an evolution. He came to Cambridge as a young radical, with eager hopes for serious political work. But he soon changed. Some said it was because he had read Hegel, and had come to see that material things were unreal. More deepseated causes, however, had brought about a receptivity to the conservative philosophy. "The glamour of ancient institutions like those of Cambridge, rooted in a distant

past ... seemed to make ready-made schemes for the reformation of society, on lines of shallow, if well-intentioned, theories, look preposterous, like a garden city of jerry-built cottages." 21 He subsequently became a Tory and an opponent of trade unionism.

The preoccupation of the English idealists was to show that no materialistic analysis could be provided for ethical notions. (22) Realistic philosophers like G. E. Moore criticized the more extreme theses of idealism, but shortly took over a metaphysical standpoint which was likewise hostile to materialism. Cambridge philosophy under the aegis of Moore became a singular product of the leisure-class mentality. It took delight in proclaiming that the "knowledge" it sought was unimportant and useless. (23) Philosophic arguments became a type of sport; the primary object was to exhibit prowess. (24) Although the Cambridge thinkers regarded themselves as "critical" empiricists, it was quite evident that they had departed far from the ways of classical English empiricism. Men like Locke conceived of their work as contributing to a definite social function. Locke drew on the resources of sociological and psychological analysis to take the props from under the ideology of "innate ideas" and the "divine right" theory of kings. It was with just cause that men spoke of him as the philosopher of the Glorious Revolution of 1688; he had provided the bases for a social order which he hoped would safeguard toleration and men's rights. The Cambridge School of the twentieth century had no desire, however, to tamper with the established society. They could therefore

accept its "common sense" without qualms; their analyses revolved around existent linguistic usage, but never sought to alter it. No central hypothesis of reconstruction guided their work; they elaborated many verbal distinctions which were employed, however, to do nothing. "Moral Philosophy" became exclusively a game between pedagogues and undergraduates.

LOGICAL EMPIRICISTS

Logical empiricists profess to be loyal followers of scientific method and mathematical logic. Their resistance to the materialistic analysis of their ethical views will therefore be clothed in "logical" armor. Their devices, however, exemplify the "resistance-phenomenon" just as competently as Moore's metaphysical doctrine of the "naturalistic fallacy." Logical empiricists often hold that ethical disagreements resolve themselves finally into disagreements concerning "ultimate values." Now what are "ultimate values"? To define them, the empiricist employs his logical skill to construct an axiomatic system for those ethical statements which express the views to which he adheres. A statement is an "ultimate-value statement," from this standpoint, if it is a postulate in some such formalized system of ethical statements. For instance, some persons affirm their ultimate values to be "racial purity" and "dominance of the master race.;" they aver thereby that their political behaviour conforms to specific ethical statements which follow from their ultimate-value postulates. (25)

Those who adhere to this theory find it an ideological tool of great usefulness. If a person wishes

to make a consistent defense for his actions but does not care to have his underlying motives set forth, he finds it very convenient to invoke certain basic "values" as the ground of his behavior. A value is "ultimate" only when you are reluctant to answer questions concerning why you hold it. The axiomatic method thus contributes to the fulfillment of functions of resistance and repression in a unique way. For it is always possible to construct some axiomatic system of ultimate values which will "justify" your behavior no matter what it be. And consistency within your own framework is supposed to make you immune from criticism which does not accept your "ultimate" values. (26)

Now it is, of course, possible to construct formal systems of ethical statements. The significance which is attached to them may however be unwarranted. An ethical-postulate set, for instance, may contain the statement that the "dominance of the master race" is an ultimate-value. This is regarded, in effect, as equivalent to the assertion that there is some basic drive toward such dominance in the person's psychological organization. Such reasoning is characteristic of what we may call "ideological inference", in which the conclusion is a grounded, not on overt evidence but rather on under-lying class biases. The particular inference in question assumes that to every "ultimate-value" postulate there corresponds in a one-to-one manner some ineradicable and unconditioned drive. It is obviously absurd, however, to maintain that organisms have some basic drive toward "racial

dominance," for such "ultimate values" are the product of complex processes of social conditioning. What is the proper estimate then of the formalist's system of ethical axioms? In effect, he has taken a group of verbal responses, confined solely to the conscious level, and has systematized them with his logical techniques. The resultant product is an axiomatic set for the utterances of the "false consciousness". The "empiricist" takes his value-utterances at the face value, and thus provides himself with a deductive formulation of his prejudices. Those who resist the economic and psychological analysis of their "ultimate values", are prone to take refuge in the logical impeccability of their axiomatic systems. Where a set of ultimate-value postulates is thus employed, we have what is commonly called a "rationalization." Historical materialist analysis is then regarded askance because it brings into light the disparity between verbal pretensions and underlying motives.

Logical empiricists have often described ethical statements as commands. This description is scarcely adequate, because there are commands which are not ethical statements. The orders of a high-wayman is not regarded with those emotions which we attach to a moral authority. Commands, on the contrary, which are called ethical statements, tend to evoke obedience without the use of threats as to the consequences of disobedience. Guilt-anxieties from an unconscious source prod the person to conform to ethical injunctions. A purely philological analysis of ethical statements is un-

satisfactory because it leaves out of the picture essential social factors. (27)

Logical positivism is the ideology of middle-class men living under conditions quite unlike those of the placid Victorian era, which provided the setting for the English idealists. The predominant emphasis of its most provocative period might be characterized as "ethical nihilism." It was the desire of a large segment of the academic class in Germany and Austria to preserve a kind of neutrality throughout the severe class struggles which followed the First World War. Events had upset all the old certainties; the pre-war values of status had been jolted, and experiences with inflation had called into question the basic bourgeois yardstick. During this period the "ethical nihilism" Wittgenstein found a receptive audience, (28)

The questions of ethics and politics were held to be transcendental; one's choices on such matters were arbitrary, and the academic scientist had nothing to say about such problems. Behind the positivist critique of metaphysics, there was an emotive element, a desire to be free from responsibility to any social group. (29)

The academic class endeavored to preserve its social status by insisting on the irrelevance of its "science" to social issues.

The equivocal thesis that ethical statements are nonsense had thus more of an ideological content than is generally supposed. Under conditions of economic depression, some sections of the middle class incline to

such a view because they wish to reject the so-called propaganda of both the working class and finance capitalists. One can then tacitly adhere to the status quo because all persuasive sentences are nonsense. (30) The citizens of Thucydides' day "who were of neither party" were likewise perturbed by the linguistic phenomena of a revolutionary era. "The meaning of words," said Thucydides, "had no longer the same relation to things, but was changed by them (the political partisans) as they thought proper. (31) Likewise, the contemporary movement of linguistic criticism does not proceed from the motives of "pure" scholarship, but rather from the enhanced role of language to those of a middle-class perspective. (32)

The method of logical empiricism is confined to analyzing what might be called the manifest content of ethical statements. The empiricist does not try to penetrate beneath the level of the "false consciousness." He takes the ideological statements in the form in which they are uttered on the conscious level, and shows they are meaningless. (33) For ideological statements do not assert anything which could possibly be confirmed by experimental methods. The Marxian analyst however wishes to go much further. The Marxian takes the ideological statements, and by sociological methods makes explicit their latent significance. Ideological statements are thus transformed into assertions, for instance, of class preferences and repressions, assertions which are meaningful in a scientific sense. The psychologist who ascertains the meaning of a symptom by bringing into the

foreground those unconscious desires of which it is the expression, the sociologist who traces the class consequences of a behaviour-pattern, contribute to Marxian analysis. (34)

The preoccupation of logical positivists with the analysis of language served a curious ideological function. (35) Their concern with statements was solely with regard to conformity to the rules of a language system. The basic meaning of ideologies, which sociological analysis reveals beneath the nonsensical statements, was something which found no place in their scheme of things. Furthermore, though all ideologies are framed in a meaningless form, they differ vastly in their social functioning. The underlying content of the Declaration of Independence places it on a different footing from, let us say a Nazi ideology. The empiricist account throws them in the same boat. The kind of analysis which was socially required by contemporary problems was evaded in deference to the motives of academic escapism. It was in this sense that empiricism provided an ideology of sterile verbalism. (36)

"THEORY OF VALUE"

In recent years, traditional ethical theory has been to some degree replaced by a subject called "theory of value." Ralph Barton Perry, its principal representative, defines value as any "object of interest. According to this view, conflicts ensue when men disagree as to their respective values. (37) The value-theorist, however, is describing conflicts as they appear in

refracted form to the "false consciousness." Men clash because their interests meet on some common ground. Rival ideologies or value-systems may obscure a common object of interest. Two groups may, for instance, both seek imperialist spoils. There is then no basic disagreement in interest. Conflict arises under such circumstances because, relative to the given economic organization, there are not enough spoils to go round.

Men do not quarrel when their values are different provided that the productive resources and economic system permit their ample satisfaction. If one man likes motion pictures and another likes books instead, there will be no conflict between them unless a scarcity in productive resources arises. Thus, the ground of conflict is neither the identity nor difference in values. Rather, its locus is the struggle for the productive means which are essential to the satisfaction of man's wants. When socio-economic conditions generate conflict, ethics enter the picture, for men then have a motive for trying to coerce others into changing their values or for "justifying" their own (38)

The method employed by value-theory is taxonomic; it classifies men's "values" according to the form in which they are embodied in the existent structure of social relations. Perry writes, for instance; A fruitful theory of value will accept those stable and well-marked unities in which the values of life are already grouped, The great foci of interest are science, conscience, art, industry, state and church. Perhaps there is no absolute reason why this should be

so, but there is no denying the fact that it is so. "Perry's criterion of value thus lends itself as an instruments for the maintainance of the status quo, the "stable and well-marked unities. "Conservatives have always said that those who criticize social institutions are insensitive to the "values" which are therein preserved. (39) The conservative thinker would find perry's definition of value suitable enough for his purposes. Men may conditioned to accept at least verbally the "values" of exploitative institutions; the oppressed classes are then said to have their submissive interests. The historical materialist will scarcely, however, accept such statements as evidence that men really value their exploited status, their "station and its duties". Perry's criterion of other words, does not enable us to distinguish between "value" which are acknowledged only within the "false consciousness" from values which express men's free, uncontaminated desires.

To determine when the men's allegiance to certain "values" is induced solely by traditional fears, to ascertain whether their respect for these values is the product of class intimidation rather than a response to their own needs, recourse must be had to a study of social backgrounds of value-judgments. We must inquire as to why men say they like the things that they do. Value-theorists, naturally, exhibit all the symptoms of the resistance-phenomenon when such historical materialist analysis is suggested. They assert that such analysis is guilty of an egregious blunder, to which they have given the special name "genetic fallacy." According to this doctrine, the study of the social backgrounds

of value-judgments has no bearing on their validity; "the value of anything is independent of its history." (40) Hence, it is said, when Marxists show how certain esthetic preferences arise, for instance, from conditioning in accordance with leisure-class canons, nothing has been demonstrated concerning the "validity of the value-judgment. Let us show briefly the misconceptions which underline the doctrine of the "genetic fallacy."

If a person asserts, "such and such are my values," what method shall we employ to varify or disprove his statement. Although the speaker may be thoroughly honest, it may be that this statements are simply introspective reports of his "false consciousness." Are they indeed his values? Or was he perhaps told by persons whom he feared that these should be his values so that he finally began to assert them as his own, despite the fact that he flatly rejected them fully within his unconscious? The "my" in the expression "my values" is, indeed, ambiguous. "My values" may mean the values of my super-ego, the inculcated ideological traditions; "my values" may signify, on the contrary, preferences which are contaminated by no element of suppression. When a person states "such and such are my values," he generally takes the my in some which cannottes that they are his own "free" choices. The method of historical materialism provides an operational criterion for ascertaining whether they are, indeed, his "own" values. Moreover, when a person comes to realize that he subscribes to "values" for no other reason than the hold of traditional anxieties,

then he no longer claims these values as his own. The validity of value-statements is thus dependent in two ways on historical analysis. The study of the genesis of values is first an essential component in any experimental effort to confirm judgements about one's values, and secondly, the very process of that study operates to alter the person's judgement of what his preferences are. Men, for instance, are taught by fascist rulers that the state is a supreme value; historical materialist analysis weakens the hold which such ideology has upon their emotions. An inquiry into the social origins of ideology, by leading to a full awareness of underlying motives, dissolves the "false consciousness." Marx once said that the human essence is an ensemble of social relations. This is forgotten by the theorists of the "genetic fallacy". Precisely a study of social backgrounds is required to determine whether a man's value judgments are ideological or not. For the "my" in the assertions about "my value" is not an unanalyzable essence; it encloses a whole net-work of social relations.

Although value-theory exhibits ideological inadequacies, it is clear, however, that as compared to traditional ethical theory, it is a progressive step toward a scientific approach to social problems. (41) In American theory, the terminology of values has tended to supplant that of moral duties. The duty language obtains in in those societies where class hierarchy is the social tradition; the exploited classes are there by traditioned to regard the "necessities" of their lot as virtues. The development of the American industrial order

against the background of a mobile society altered men's ethical perspective. Expanded production was dependent upon the encouragement of a diversity of wants. It was now regarded as helpful to the prosperity of an "economy of scarcity".

A terminology was required which would attach approval to the varied activities of a rising standard of living; at the same time, the import of traditional moral pursuits was to be acknowledged. As Perry says, "theory of value in the modern sense is in effect a sort of democratic revolution against a hereditary aristocracy. Hitherto, "the special value sciences have included only such values as have assumed an institutional form, and have therefore acquired a certain prestige or authority. "The theory of value" begins with a promiscuous acknowledgment of the rights of every value, however lowly and disreputable. (42)

Nevertheless, it does not seem that adherence to the terminology of an autonomous value—science helps solve problems which could not otherwise be handled satisfactorily. Indeed, all that value theory has to say which is meaningful could be said just as well within the body of sociological science. And to do so would assist in keeping ideological factors from contaminating our scientific thought about social problems.

It has generally been taken for granted that the ethical mode of speech is a characteristic of the language of all societies. Most scholars are agreed that the specific content of ethical statements varies with different societies; the mode of speech itself is, however, regarded

as a universal social law. The outcome of our analysis, on the contrary is that the ethical mode of speech depends on the existence of special social conditions. The elimination of these conditions would be accompanied by the obsolescence of ethical statements. The terms of the super-ego language would have lost its traditional social role. (43). This proposition is of importance because those authors who have stressed most the "emotive meaning" of ethical statements fall back at this point on their own class "values". Thurman Arnold, for instance, calls ethical statements "folklore," but, he opines, they are a folklore which is socially necessary. (44) A philosopher with a Cambridge background adds that there is no reason to scorn such statements because it is only by such means that our personalities grow (45). Let us explain what is meant by the obsolescence of the ethical mode of speech by reference to a simplified sociological model.

When a ruling class comes to power, its hegemony rests on sheer force. At their inception, the class relations are overt and visible. As time goes on, a movement begins which may be described in white-heads phrase as proceeding "from force to persuasion". The governing class, through its control of educational institutions and opinion-manufacturing industries, instills the dominant attitudes in people. Class relations become embedded in folklore, in "persuasive sentences", and are grounded in moral obligation. The use of ethical statements makes it possible to reduce considerably the budget for military repression; ethical training thus provides a device of great utility to those most concerned

with the administrative economy of the social order (46). The mechanism of the super-ego is strengthened by all the agencies of social control, for in this way, the governing class can get people to do things which they don't like to do. Ethical language helps to tie up people's emotions in such ways as to secure their commitment to modes of unenjoyable behavior.

Let us suppose, however, that a society is evolved which approximates to classless relations. To that extent the conditions which called for the use of "persuasive sentences," namely, conditions of coercion, would have vanished. And to that extent, ethical statements would become obsolete; their usage would no longer fulfill any social function. Persuasive statements have a place in speech when people grow up emotionally dependent on the suggestion of some authority. Where social conditions are such that people may develop into complete emotional independence, the foundation for the influence of ethical statements disappears, and the latter become archaic expressions. (47) Men then deal with social and economic problems with complete clarity concerning their desires, and without the intrusion of the "ethical question", that is, whether their proposed action has the approval of their super-ego, i. e., their nursemaid, parent, or teacher, in their roles as the vehicles of traditional social relations and attitudes (48)

Against the foregoing theory, various objections might be raised. Some persons hold, for instance, that it is a universal law that all social institutions try

to keep the allegiance of people by developing their super-egos along channel of institutional loyalty. Every society is thus held to have recourse to ethical imperatives, which it inculcates through the educational process. (49) We find, however, that some societies of the past have required less of such mechanisms than others. Indeed, to the extent to which a society, is progressive, that is, make possible a rising standard of living, to that extent a society avails itself less of devices for the manufacture of "loyalty." Philosophers of the progressive middle class like John Locke were thus critical of the ethical metaphysics which was used on behalf of political reaction. Institutions which are founded on exploitation try to perpetuate themselves by the use of ethical ideology. Institutions which are delivering the goods to the people can afford to be judged solely by their fruits. As social institutions lose their repressive character, the ethical mode of speech loses its social ground.

Moral philosophy, as a subject-matter, had its inception in the class struggles of the classical Greek era. (50) Ethical doctrines as to the nature of right and justice were then elaborated in the form of rational argument. When class struggles grow intense among men who share a common culture, they give rise to ethical theories which are used as ideological weapons. Each class tries to show that its stand point inherits its thematole of the traditional cultural ideals. With the ebb of class antagonisms, ethical theories as distinct from ethical statements likewise tend to vanish.

Some question might be raised concerning the process by means of which the mandates of the governing class are translated into segments of the child's conscience. The state acquires its status within the cultural super-ego as the result of a sequence of what might be called "delegations of authority." The parental authority early tells the child to respect the authority of policemen, ministers, and teachers. The child perceives, furthermore, that its parent regards himself as subordinate, in certain respects, to other authorities. A "delegation of authority" ensues when the child attaches to the teacher respect and fear which are derivative from the parental source. The teacher in turn enjoins the pupil to respect dominant institutions and their symbols. The initial parental authority is usually reinforced when the child is taught, for instance, to honor the parents. There is thus an interactive reinforcement between the parental and delegated super-egos. The situation is altered, however, during a period of social crisis. Such a period is characterized by what may be called a "conflict between rival super-egos." The child at school may be taught that the "values" of the parent are mistaken. The delegated authority is thus used to undermine the original parental authority. Acute psychological tensions within individuals are thus concomitant with the clash of social institutions. The governing class uses its powers to induce institutions such as the family and school to ingrain within the child those habits of subservience which help keep the established order intact (52)

Many people believe that ethical training is a neces-

sary consequence of the educational process, that the process of upbringing cannot dispense with the cultivation of a super-ego mentality. How, it is asked, can children otherwise be taught essential habits of cleanliness and cooperation? It is easy, however, to mistake for a universal law of educational psychology what is rather an historically conditioned cultural trait.

Work such as that which Susan Isaacs carried out in her experimental school suggests that educational technique can be rendered compatible with the development of psychological freedom. "We never used general categories," she writes, "such as 'naughty,' 'good,' or 'horrid.' In other words, we wanted to help the children to realize and adjust to other people's wishes as everyday facts rather than as mysterious absolutes." There was no training in obedience for obedience's sake. "The area of definite command and prohibition was thus kept as small as possible. Moreover, even within these limits, appeal was made wherever possible to the children's intelligence, and to the objective grounds for the desired behaviour. Our aim was to lessen progressively the need for mere implicit obedience, just because it was to us an instrument of education, not an absolute value". "In general, we tried to use our parental powers in such a way as to reduce the child's need for them" (53)

Within the framework of a society founded on exploitative economic relations, the use of educational methods such as those of Susan Isaacs cannot become widespread. The development of a socialist economy tends, however, to liberate those movements which are

retarded under capitalism. Within an exploitative conomey, moreover, institutions like the family are contaminated by the prevalent "ethical" attitudes. A parent who is bullied during the day in a factory will react in a compensatory way by bullying his children at home. The family thus retains the techniques of discipline and coercion which are the groundwork for the ethical mode of speech. (54)

BEARING OF MARXIAN ANALYSIS ON CONTEMPORARY THOUGHTS

What bearings does the Marxian analysis of ethical ideology have for those well-known movements in contemporary thought, such as pragmatism, which seek to apply scientific method to ethics? Only brief indications can be ventured in this context. Dewey's theory that "a scientific ethics" is possible is, from our standpoint, another example of an ethical theory which exhibits the usual traits of resistance to analysis. The American middle class admires "science" but it also has a strong attachment to traditional ethical symbols. Dewey is thus always trying to redefine the old vocabulary in scientific terms. This "compromisists" approach, however, simply expresses a reluctance to have the traditional symbols scrapped. (55) The terms of the super-ego language are too much a part of the status quo, and the suggestion that they are outmoded leaves the middle class with an emotional vacuum. "Scientific ethics" is thus experimental up to the point where the "values" of the middle class are concerned.

Dewey's pragmatic development of the idealist phi-

losophy was undertaken largely to develop an ideology which would be expressive of the American progressives of the muck-raking era. (56) Ethical slogans about the interest of the whole and the application of intelligence to politics were well-suited to the middle-class reform movements. When these same ethical formulae were applied by Dewey to the problems of class struggle and international relations fifty years later, they involved a profound misreading of events.

Dewey's "scientific ethics" is, in effect, an ideology disguised in scientific language. It is the more difficult to get at his ideological core because it is embedded within the interstices of ethical propositions which are conventionally acceptable. Dewey and his followers make abundant use of dictalike "ends are never better than the means used to attain them." (57) In accordance with such maxims, they have painted a dire picture of the Soviet Union. Political means like proletarian dictatorship were held to involve consequences like lack of initiative and loyalty among the people. Such formulae are confuted when confronted with sociological fact. Social relations which are founded historically through dictatorial means are not themselves irrevocably committed to a dictatorial superstructure. After the Cromwellian Revolution, for instance, had established with some firmness the economic relations which the rising bourgeoisie sought, there was a relaxation of the dictatorial pressures against the landed aristocracy.

The Marxian conception of the means-end relation is dialectical in a way in which Dewey's for all his criticism of "fixed ends," is not. According to Dewey,

the character of the end bears the indelible imprint of the means employed. According to the Marxian conception, this is a "static" misconception of the historical process. For the state of affairs realized through certain means, may in its own development make the continuance of those means historically superfluous. The scaffolding which is used to construct a great building does not remain with it as an historical necessity. The Deweyan theory of the means-end relation is an ideological projection which has no cogency from the standpoint of sociological science.

Dewey believes moreover that we generally have a choice of possible means to attain a given end. He forgets, however, that the means available are historically conditioned, that history need not present progressive movements with a generous collection of alternatives. Dewey reasons as a metaphysician with an aim to show that men have a social free will; he objects to the use of any "dogma of inevitability". The Marxians, however, do not regard the questions as one of metaphysics. They take the ground rather that an applied social science is possible. The Marxian analysis leads to predictions concerning the decline of capitalism which are then used as a guide for political action. Nobody would attach much weight to a metaphysician who criticized the air corps for guiding its operations in accordance with the best available meteorological forecasting. Such however, is precisely what Dewey does with regard to the social sciences. The petty-bourgeois Utopia of multiple possibilities takes the place of sociological analysis. (58)

As against any reliance upon class struggle, Dewey urges that the "method of cooperative intelligence" be used as the instrument for social action. (59) Dewey uses the word "method", however, in a non-scientific, ideological sense. He believes, in idealist fashion, that the "method" used in inquiry shapes the structure of facts whose pattern is otherwise indeterminate. Dewey believes, in other words, that social laws are imposed on social data by the scientist's methods of research. He thus argues that the Marxian method brings class struggles into existence. To hold, however, that method shapes the structure of "indeterminate" data is to assert a statement which makes no scientific sense. Moreover, class struggles certainly did not begin with Marx who, as a social scientist, was concerned with establishing their crucial role in social change. The idealistic overtones which Dewey attaches to "method" provide him with a covert device for maintaining that agitation is made by agitators. The pragmatic metaphysics obscures the fact, to use Tawney's word, that it is much rather the agitators who are produced by the agitation. (60)

Dewey's "method" of cooperative intelligence, in effect, covertly assumes that the contemporary social scene is one in which there are no developed class struggles. We have here what might be called the "academic fallacy," the assumption, in other words, that political issues are like the problems with which an academic group deals, soluble when all the scholars get together. To assert that we live in such a society is to project one's petty-bourgeois wishes upon realities. The

prestige-value of scientific symbols such as "method" and "intelligence" camouflage what is essentially a process of ideological reasoning.

Dewey, of course, would disapprove of the foregoing employment of the method of historical materialism. Indeed, his reactions toward the method are a clear example of the "resistance-phenomenon." Dewey uses the method against others; (61) he objects to its application to himself. Russell attempted something in the latter direction when he found the "love of truth obscured in America by commercialism of which pragmatism is the philosophical expression." Dewey thinks it sufficient to reply that this "is much as if I were to link his philosophy to the interest of the English landed aristocracy instead of with his dominant interest in mathematics." Russell's analysis, he avers, is akin to that "order of interpretation" which would regard the tendency of French thought to dualism as "an expression of an alleged Gallic disposition to keep a mistress in addition to a wife." (62)

Dewey's resistance to historical materialism leads him to overlook that Russell has himself acknowledged the influence of the values of the English aristocracy on his thinking. (63) Russell's own predilection toward a Platonic theory concerning the nature of mathematics, the Utopian quality of Russell's social theory, his ambivalent attitude toward the role of the working class and his aversion to industrial civilization are attitudes not unrelated to the tradition of Tory democracy. The essential traits of Russell's philosophical perspective are explicable along historical materialist lines. Nor

would it be amiss to recognize that the peculiar customs of the French bourgeois family may be related to the propensity toward dualism. Engles studied the class factors which underlie the French bourgeois mores in a well-known work. (64) Dualistic thinking, furthermore, which regards the methods of science as inapplicable to human questions, derives from a desire to preserve that same class configuration. The instrumental fruitfulness of historical materialism eludes the awareness of the confirmed "instrumentalist."

We have thus seen that Dewey, as a philosopher, has mirrored the social contradictions of the American middle class. His thinking is a combination of scientific analysis with ideological projection. It starts with a progressive modification of Hegel, with a concern for the practical bearings of idealism, but it ends with formulae about cooperative intelligence and means-ends relations which serve only to befuddle political thinking. And when the method of historical materialism is applied to clarify the pragmatic philosophy, Dewey responds with resistances. The larger historical movements fall without his purview.

In the light of the foregoing, a lengthy discussion of hedonistic ethics is unnecessary. The hedonist thesis that "pleasure is the good" shows by its very formulation that it is not free from ideological components. The hedonist philosophers have used such statements for self-persuasive purposes. Many a "hedonist" is preoccupied with the problem of convincing his Calvinist conscience that pleasure is "good". To a world of men who are taught to distrust their

impulses, Rabelais's admonition, "Fay ce que tu voudras" is itself a command of ethical severity.

The controversies between hedonist and anti-hedonist often resolve themselves into recitations of their respective feelings with regard to the word "Pleasure". F. H. Bradley, for instance, regards the theory that pleasure is man's end as the "music-hall theory of life" (65). Another writer, however, finds that hedonism is consistent with his own value-judgments, and then proceeds to formulate his acceptance in metaphysical terms. (66) Both types of argument are elaborations of the "false consciousness." The great work of the utilitarian thinkers, however, such as John Stuart Mill is basically of a scientific character. (67) What is required is that this scientific core be separated from the ideological integument in which it is enclosed.

Let us now review the implications of historical materialism with regard to the ethical mode of thought.

The obsolescence of ethical ideology is a corollary of historical materialism as applied to the superstructure of a socialist society. Ethical laws come into being as attempts to solve social antagonisms, not by removing their basic causes, but through moral coercion. An appeal to ethical doctrine is a confession that the given standpoint does not enable social antagonisms found to be resolved. Such a moral law, for instance, as the command to honor one's parents reflects institutional contradictions within the family under certain historical conditions. The Biblical injunctions thus seems to have come to the fore during the crisis undergone in the Hebrews' transition from a patriarchal economy to a

sedentary agricultural and urban economy. (68) The family enlists the support of ethical ideology only when it becomes a field of tensions, which reflect economic contradictions. When the latter are eliminated, then social problems of the family are on the way to being resolved; the ethical devices are needless. (69)

A socialist way of life grows without ethical ideology. In a developed socialist order, men are not haunted by the anxieties of insecurity which ramify their activities in a capitalist world. They are not driven by the aggressive impulses which predominate in a competitive economy, nor are they tormented by the frustrations which characterize a class society. The capitalist world breeds ambivalent emotions in men's social relation. The social nature of its technology makes men co-operative; its class relations make, at the same time for what Hobbes called "this war of every man against every man". Men's lives in a socialist world are lives in a common enterprise. Their work is free from inner strife. "Ethics" is required to make men cooperate only when their mutual attitude is one of latent hostility. A socialist economy provides the groundwork for socialist society of men of good will. (70)

Morality in a socialist society becomes a branch of sociology and psychology; it contains no statements with distinctively ethical terms, and is not cast in the form of imperatives. When men's thinking is no longer deflected by super-ego mechanisms, they are ready to answer the question: what modes of behavior under the given technological conditions are best calculated to promote their happiness? A socialist order removes the founda-

tion, moreover, for systems of class morality. Societies based on exploitative relations are characterized by such systems. (71) The Militarist virtues of Sparta, for instance, were the defence reactions of a ruling class which lived in perpetual fear of an uprising by the enslaved Helots. With the abolition of classes, however, the class mentalities of fear and resentment become psychological type of the past.

The socialist society does not peremptorily reject mores solely because they arose under the capitalist system, for such origin is not incompatible with their utility in a socialist order. The bourgeoisie itself was long a progressive class, and its achievements are absorbed within the socialist society. Historical materialism does, however, lead to the revaluation of men's customs in terms of their correspondence to present needs. (72)

Confronted with the problems of the constructions of a socialist economy, Lenin tried to define a conception of morality which would answer to the social conditions of a transition period. "Morality" he said, "is that which serves to destroy the old exploiting society and to unite all the toilers round the proletariat, which is creating a new communist society." (73) Morality is thus identified with those modes of behavior by which people can most readily organize an economy in which they will have available the means of happiness. Its content coincides with the practice of the social scientist who is endeavoring to work out the foundations of a socialist society.

The Social scientist does not, like the metaphysician, declare any mode of behavior to be "mandatory" under

all social conditions. His proposals are as flexible as the diversities in historical conditions themselves; his solutions vary with the state of the technological and social relations. Absolute ethical maxims have no place in the scientist's approach to social problems.

Historical materialism prepares men for such a scientific approach to social questions; its method is analogous to that by which the psychiatrist eradicates unconscious determinants to irrational action. To bring the origin of an institution into full consciousness is to take the most important step toward dissolving the irrational attachment by which it controls one's behavior. The myths and folklore which are promulgated by vested interests shape, in large measure, the ways of men's thinking. The bourgeois "stereotypes" lose their hold on men's minds when their character is clarified. The development of class consciousness brings with it the full understanding of and therefore freedom from ideological influences. (74)

Historical materialism provides men with a scientific idiom in which to articulate their discontent with the capitalist order. The language in which men express their aspirations reflects their degree of intellectual development. The theological mode of expression, for instance, may afford a significant vehicle for social criticism; nevertheless, its use indicates that outmoded ways have not lost their grasp. The emotive relations which are thus perpetuated lend themselves too easily to an ideology of "political quietism." The influence of Methodism, for instance, on the English working class, was an important factor in staving off a revolutionary

crisis in eighteenth-century England. (75) With the acquirement of scientific maturity, the working class finds the traditional form inadequate; it no longer feels constrained to use the approved emotive language. (76)

The Marxian objective is to develop the capacities of people so that they may achieve a self-reliant understanding of political problems. The historical materialism helps men to acquire the full equipment of scientific maturity. He seeks in idiom devoid of political metaphysics, an idiom in which "profound" questions of state are seen as problems about the homely realities of everyday life. Historical materialism thus helps to make men free.

THE END.

References

1. The correspondence of Marx and Engels (New York: International Publishers, 1935),
2. Political philosophers regard it as axiomatic that social policies are founded on ethical doctrines. According to their view, a political theory tells of things as they ought to be, and cannot therefore be a branch of science, for science studies only what is the case. E. F. Carritt thus regards political philosophy as that branch of ethics in which you reflect on such propositions as "I ought to obey this law." Cf. *Morals and Politics* (Oxford University Press, 1935), Political theorists have consequently been long puzzled by the standpoint of historical materialism; they have found it difficult to give credence to a view which aims to eliminate ethical ideology from political reasoning. Marx, indeed, held that ethical philosophy was a type of thinking which was peculiar to exploitative societies; he believed that it would vanish with the total disappearance of class antagonisms. Cf. *The Communist Manifesto* (International Publishers, New York: 1932), p.29. He was, moreover, averse to the use of phrases about "duty" and "right," and he held that the "goddesses of Justice, Freedom, Equality" were best described as "modern mythology," of *Correspondence*, p. 162, p.347. Marx's critics hold, on the other hand, that the ethical mode of thought is a universal trait of all societies,

that it is only the specific content of ethical ideas which varies with different historical conditions. They argue that scientific socialism tries to conceal its ethical premises, that it must perforce contain non-scientific components.

A terminological caution : in this essay, we are concerned with ethics in the sense of ethical ideology ; we shall not use "ethics" vaguely to mean any mode of social behaviour.

3' Cf. Muzafer Sherif, *The Psychology of Social Norms* (New York 1936), p.179.

4. Op cit., p. 182. The author likewise speaks of established social values as "standardized fixations which the individual incorporates in himself" Cf.p. 125.

5. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Part III, chapter 3.

6. F. H. Bradley thus describes in the terminology of idealistic philosophy what the psychologist would call the compulsive character of moral laws. Cf. *Ethical studies* (Oxford, 1927), second edition, p. 110.

7. Cf. Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (New York, 1933), p. 88-96. "The cultural super-ego has elaborated its ideals and erected its standards. Those of its demands which deal with the relations of human beings to one another are comprised under the name of ethics." *Civilization and its Discontents* (New York, 1930), p. 130. Karen Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* (New York, 1939), p. 208. The observations of child psychologists have given ample confirmation to the genetic theory of moral obligation.

Jean Piaget thus states : "Every command coming from a respected person is the starting point of an obligatory" rule." "Right is to obey the will of the adult." Cf. *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (London, 1932), p. 193 ; also, Susan Isaacs, *Social Development in Young Children* (London, 1938), p. 269-71 and 371 f.

8. *An Autobiography* (Oxford, 1939), p. 48. Also, H. W. Arndt, "The Social Outlook of British Philosophers," *Science & Society*, Vol. iv (1940), p. 443 f.

9. "I can imagine a state of things in which all desires were satisfied, and yet can judge of it that it would not be so good as another in which some were left unsatisfied," G. E. Moore, *philosophical studies* (New York, 1922), p. 339.

10. This motivation is not restricted to philosophers but is quite common among sociologists. Talcott Parsons thus writes : "The source of specific moral obligations cannot be derived from the empirical properties of 'human nature' as revealed by scientific psychology," "The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory," *The International Journal of Ethics*, XIV (1935), p. 289. Parsons adopts "a metaphysical position of a voluntaristic character" (p. 285). This is an example of the persistence of theological procedure among accredited sociologists.

11. Cf. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book 1, chapter 2, paragraph 23.

12. Cf. Ralph Barton Perry, "Value as Simply Value," *The Journal of Philosophy*, xxvii (1931), p. 523, W. K. Frankena. "The Naturalistic Fallacy." *Mind* ; xlviii (1939), p. 472-7.

13. *Op. cit.*, p. 335 f.

14. The inter-relationships between the ethical code of the public schools and the socio-economic interests of aristocratic and middle class England are set forth with full detail in Edward C. Mack, *Public schools and British Opinion since 1860* (Columbia University Press, 1941). See also Harold J. Laski's observations in the *Danger of Being a Gentleman* (New York 1940).

15. George Edward Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge University Press), p. 161 and 157.

16. "A Chinese philosopher who recently visited Cambridge remarked mock-regretfully that he had hoped to learn from Moore the nature of the world and had instead learnt a great deal about the correct use of the English language," R. B. Braithwaite, "Philosophy," in *University Studies*, Cambridge, 1933, ed. by Harold Wright (London, 1933), p. 30.

17. *Capital* ii, p. 21, iii p. 951.

18. George H. Sabine, in discussing Moore's ethical realism, remarks: "His valuations become rationalizations partly because protect themselves from criticism by the specious claim that the evidence is well known and need only be consulted," "Social Studies and Objectivity," *University of California Publications*, xvi (1941), p. 135 f.

19. Cf. *Principia Ethica*, p. 40; 83-85.

20. Cf. George H. Sabine, "The Social Origin of Absolute Idealism," *The Journal of Philosophy* XII (1915), P 169ff Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, Ed. by J. H. Muirhead (London, 1935), 46-48.

21. G. Lowes Dickinson, J. McT. E. McTaggart (*Cambridge*, 1931), p. 112.

22. Cf. A. E. Taylor cotemporary British philosophy (second series), (New York, 1926), ed. by J. H. Muirhead, P 273f.

23. Cf. *Principia Ethica*, ; P. 63 ; also C. D. Broad, Preface to Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy (*Combridge* 1933) ; Thorstein veblen *The, Theory of the Leisure class*, chapter 10.

24. We followed an argument in the spirit of adventure, and not with object of making for port. In our view, nothing was final but the rules of sound navigation ; and everyone seemed ready to be argued out of his fundamental convictions of the term before," John Laird, *Contemporary British Philosophy*. (First series)'ed by J. H. Muirhead (London 1924) P. 215

25. Cf. Alfred J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and logic* (1936, New York), P 160ff; Alf Ross, "Imperatives and Logic," Rudolf Carnap, *Philosophy and Logical Syntax* (London 1935.) P. 24.

26. Pareto's views on ethics are allied to those of the logical empiricists. "As for Marx's ethics, it was no better than the 'bourgeois' ethics, but it was different," *The Mind and Society*, edited by Arthur Livingston (New York, 1935), iii, p. 1412.

27. Most commands are, of course, a mixture of ethical and non-ethical components. The injunction to be honest in one's business dealings, for example, receives compliance partially with a view to such desired

economic consequences as "good credit" but also with a view to satisfying one's "conscience." It is the latter component which provides the domain of ethical terms.

28. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (New York 1922.) P. 183.

29. Moritz Schlick noted the emotive use of "metaphysical" by positivists; he remarked, moreover, upon those behavioral traits which indicated a preoccupation of revolt against something not yet overcome. The empiricist thesis that ethical statements are devoid of meaning might be regarded as the logical expression of a conflict between different cultural ideals which is resolved by a complete rejection of all their claims. Cf. *Gesammelte Aufsätze* (Vienna, 1938) P. 391 and 394; also Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York 1941), P. 284 Karl Mannheim's notes that modern positivism "has always retained its affinity with the bourgeois-liberal out-look". *Ideology and Utopia* (New York 1936.) P. 147. Mannheim's own theories are the sociological analogue of the logical empiricist philosophy. Cf. also Pierre Viot, *Is Germany Finished?* (New York 1932), P. 80ff.

30. Eduard Heimann states that those German economists who welcomed the semantics doctrine found it an easy stepping-stone to the Nazi creed of anti-intellectualism. Cf. *Social Research*, vii (1940) P. 360 During an era of stable capitalism, the middle class professes to found its political action on ethical ideas. The semantical critique those of ideas is an aspect of the crisis in middleclass mentality, the dislocation which prepares the soil for the spread of fascist ideology.

31. Thucydides (transl. by Benj. Jowett), (Oxford; 1900), Book III. Section 82

32. "This whole business of criticizing language," says Neurath, "was in the air and has increased in the last decades." "Universal Jargon and Terminology," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, xii. (1940-41), P 132, 143 Neurath alludes to Chase's work; in which the semantical rejection of Marxian economic concepts like "capitalism" is made the vehicle for a defense of a piecemeal reformism. Empiricists like Neurath regard "capitalism" as a word which should be in the "Index Verborum Prohibitorum" because they think it has no clear referent. The Marxian scientist makes further discriminations like "merchant capitalism" and "finance capitalism" in order to keep his terminology flexible enough to meet the requirements of changing historical situations. The petty-bourgeois theorist shows his incapacity for confronting social change by simply revolting against theoretic categories entirely.

33. Schlick did try to apply a psychological method to ethical theories in his *Problems of Ethics*, transl. by D. R. Rynin (New York; 1939). His treatment, however, exhibits typical inadequacies. He discusses vaguely how ethical valuations correspond to what "society" finds useful, P. 90-96 but does not consider how his term "society" covers up conflicts of class interest. Also, though the book is a psychological one there is no concern whatever with the unconscious components in ethical ideology.

34. It should be noted that the assertion of an

ideological proposition is equivalent, from a purely formal standpoint, with the transformed latent statement. In other words, if a racial ideology is asserted, then finance capitalism seeks a dictatorship, and vice versa.

35. Logical empiricism has a tendency also to make formal logic serve as an ideology. A fetishism of rigor is pursued, a "faith in formal logic." The "logician" takes on the austere role of "criticism" which can be directed particularly against psychologists and social scientists. This fetishism of formal rigor is something quite different from the flexible, dialectic development of scientific method. According to the latter standpoint, the degree of rigor to be required is relative to the historical stage of development of the given science. It is thus a mistake to impose upon a science criteria of rigor which are purely abstract and unhistorical; such a use of formal stipulations enables the "logician" to reject theories which the practising social scientist finds most useful. One finds "logicians" raising the demand that historical materialism provide them with the exact time-specifications of predicted trends on the model of a highly idealized physical theory. Such "criticisms" overlook that historical materialism as compared with rival sociological hypotheses has been providing an approach of immeasurably greater productivity. Pure logic serves as a kind of facade moreover for the inner conflicts within the academic mind. The "critical method," as thus employed, is a device for guaranteeing that, whatever the question, the philosopher will end up without taking sides.

36. Marx emphasized that the dissolution of ideo-

logical nonsense was not to be achieved without sociological analysis. "Always, for these Germans, it is simply a matter of resolving the nonsense of earlier writers into some other freak.....; while really it is only a question of explaining this theoretical talk from the actual existing conditions. The real, practical dissolution of these phrases, the removal of these notions from the consciousness of men, will, as we have already said, be effected by altered circumstances, not by theoretical deductions." The German Ideology. (International Publishers : New York, 1939), P31f

37. Cf also Donald C. Williams, "Ethics as Pure Postulate," *Philosophical Review*, XLII (1933), p. 402.

38. An ideology, from this perspective, is a set of ethical statements by means of which a group tries to convince itself as well as others that the measures which it is taking to achieve its aims are justified. This involves an appeal to "ultimate values" of which the group is the sole representative. It should be emphasized that the ideology is at least in part designed to justify the ideology group's present acts before the bar of its inherited conscience. The super-ego, as the vehicle of tradition, must be so reconstructed as to give sanction to the new policies. Ethical statements, in other words, often serve a self-persuasive function.

39. Ralph Barton Perry, *General Theory of Value* (New York 1926). p. 694, 260; Lord Hugh Cecil, *Conservatism* (London 1927). p. 56.

40. Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (New York, 1931), p. 369.

41. Cf. Ralph Barton Perry, *Shall not Perish From the Earth* (New York, 1940), p. 21-23.

42. Ralph Barton Perry, *The General Theory of Value* (New York 1926), p. 10. He notes further the economic basis of the value-standpoint when he remarks how "valuable objects have been multiplied and diversified by the development of industry and commerce," *ibid*, p. 13.

43. Freud himself suggests that the content of the cultural super-ego varies with historical conditions. But he seems to regard the existence of some super-ego mechanism as an eternal social necessity. "The fear of the super-ego should normally never cease, since it is indispensable in social relations in the form of moral anxiety, and it is only in the rarest instances that an individual succeeds in becoming independent of the community." Cf. *New Introductory Lectures*, p. 138. The whole issue hinges on the meaning of "independent of the community." The social relations of a community may be of two kinds, cooperative or coercive. The fear of the super-ego is the essential foundation also for coercive social relationships. A man may, however, cooperate with his fellowman without being actuated by super-ego fears. Social interdependence is compatible with psychological freedom. Despite his tendency to eternalize the super-ego, Freud does recognize that in solving the problems of civilization "an actual change in men's attitude to property would be of more help in this direction than any ethical commands." Cf. *Civilization and its Discontents*. p 140.

44. Cf. Thurman W. Arnold, *The Folklore of Capitalism* (New Haven, 1937), p. 343-5.

45. Charles Leslie Stevenson in "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," *Mind* XLVI (1937), p. 29.

46. Perhaps the clearest contemporary example of such a use of ethics is found in Japanese Society. Classes in ethics are held in all the large factories, where rules of humility and hard work, coupled with reverence for employers and Emperor, are impressed upon the working girls. This instruction is said to be designed to counteract Marxist influences which have proved incapable of extirpation. For an earlier example, Cf. Masaharu Anesaki, *History of Japanese Religion* (London, 1935), p. 285.

47. "Cooperation, on the other hand, seems to be essentially the social relation which tends to eliminate infantile phenomena. And this is enough to show that cooperation leads eventually to results that are qualitatively the opposite of constraint," Piaget, *op. cit.*, p.350.

48. The value theory of the late D. W. Prall arrived at a similar conclusion with respect to the "fatuousness of duty ethics." Prall believed, however, that an autonomous discipline, the theory of value, enables one to derive such theorems as "conformity to rule cannot as such be value." The critique of duty-ethics is thus itself cast in the terminology of a more enlightened ethics. The traditional categories are still operative within such a frame work. Cf. David W. Prall, *The present Status of the Theory of Value*, University of California Publications in Philosophy. 1. (1923), p. 101 f.

49. Frankwood E. Williams, a distinguished psychiatrist, found that the Soviet methods of education proceeded along a different pattern. Cf. *Russia, Youth and the present-Day World, Further studies in Mental Hygiene* (New York, 1934) 24 p. Those who believe that the super-ego and the Oedipus complex are universal patterns of human psychology are led to conclude that a communist economy must founder if it dares tamper with them. See W. R. D. Fairbairn, "The Sociological Significance of Communism, Considered in the Light of Psychoanalysis," *The British Journal of Medical Psychology*, XV (1935) p. 229. For the reply of Soviet scientists, see Ella Winter, *Red Virtue* (New York, 1933), p. 179.

50. Cf. L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Fifth Edition (New York: Henry Holt & Co.), p. 544.

51. For the class basis of the ethical school among the Jews, see Louis Finkelstein, *The Pharisees: The Sociological Back-grounds of Their Faith*, Second Edition, 2 Vols. (Philadelphia, 1940). James Henry Breasted assigns the beginning of ethical conceptions to the incipient class struggles in ancient Egypt. The Nile Valley, he states, is the "earliest social arena, where we may observe man victoriously emerging from an age-long struggle with nature, and entering this new arena of social forces, to begin the baffling struggles of mankind within himself." *The Dawn of Conscience* (New York, 1934), p. 11. Cf. also p. 355 f.

52. Flugel has called attention to the "considerable degree of correspondence between the family system as

found in any country and some of the political features...," *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Family*, Second Edition (London, 1926), p. 128 f. A rigid system of family rule is correlated with political conservatism; the relaxation of parental authority is concomitant with the loosening of Governmental authority. This generalization helps us to understand the psychology of the Nazi ideology. Flugel remarks that "there exists a tendency to resurrect some of the parental attributes and give them a political application by bestowing them upon the State...." "The adult individual is thus let to transfer into the State that attitude of dependence which he originally adopted in relation to his parents, failing to this extent to attain that full degree of self-reliance and independence...," *ibid.*, p. 236. The Nazi regime has sought to reinforce habits of obedience and to stamp out independent thought by lending its aid to the authoritarian patriarchal family. The Nazi philosophy, moreover, emphasizes the process by which the individual attains his own full "freedom" by identifying himself with the will of the state. This insistence on the individual's "identifying" himself with the state is the philosophic analogue of the process by means of which a person attains some stability through "identifying" his own desires with the commands of his super-ego. The series of Hegelian stages which the individual's will traverses on its path to final identification with the all-inclusive State Absolute is the ideological expression of the route which men's minds take under the conditioning influences of authoritarian rule. Cf. Alfred Meusel, "National Socialism and the Family,"

"The Sociological Review, XXVIII (1936). Beccaria, the great Italian theorist of the eighteenth century, described with clarity the antagonism between the free republic and strong family spirit. "Such contradictions between the laws of a family and the fundamental laws of a state are fundamental source of other contradictions between public and private morality, giving rise consequently to a perpetual conflict in every individual mind. For whilst private morality inspires fear and subjection, public morality teaches courage and freedom. "From Crimes and punishments, Translated by J. A. Farrer (London, 1880), p. 237 f.

53. Susan Isaacs, "The Experimental Construction of an Environment Optimal for Mental Growth," in a Handbook of Child Psychology, edited by Carl Murchison (Worcester, Mass, 1931), p. 139-143.

54. Here again, such institutional Phases enter their absolutescent stage with the beginnings of socialist reconstruction,

55. The expression "compromisist" approach is used in Marxian analysis to denote that frame of mind which seeks to reconcile scientific method with the requirements of class interests. It seeks to impose a kind of consistency on motivations which remain inherently incompatible. The economic basis of "compromisism" has its analogue in the compromisist aspect of neurotic behavior. "Psychoanalysis early recognized that every neurotic symptom owes its existence to some compromise," The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, Modern Library Edition (New York, 1938), p. 967.

56. In a letter to William James in 1891, he speaks of of the inspiration derived from Franklin Ford, a financial newspaperman, whose efforts at muck-raking came up against obstacles of financial control of the press; these he traced to the social structure which prevents free inquiry. Dewey's idealist problem "the unity of intelligence and the external world," then came to mean the securing of the conditions for intelligence's objective expression. Dewey told James how Ford became concerned "with inquiry as a business, the selling of truth for money," in which the whole would have a representative as well as the various classes." The bourgeois progressive emphasis on the interest of the "whole" as above that of classes is herein evident. In an interesting passage, Dewey envisages a dictatorship of bourgeois intellectuals, who having seized the telegraphs and printing presses "shall, through free inquiry in a centralized way, demand the authority of all other so-called authorities." Cf. Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James (Boston, 1935), II, p. 518 f.

57. Dewey has redefined the theory of valuation as concerned with propositions about the relation of means and ends; "Value-propositions of the distinctive sort exist whenever things are appraised as to their suitability and serviceability as means," "Theory of Valuation," International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, II no. 4 (1939), p. 51. f. This definition of the scope of the valuation-theory conforms to Dewey's central objective, the criticism of the Marxian theory of political action.

58. Dewey further disregards the sociological fact

that class motives color the estimate of appropriate means. A policy of appeasement may be espoused by men dominated by narrow class interests; efforts to secure their cooperative intelligence may themselves be a device of appeasement.

59. Liberalism and Social Action (1935), p. 79-81.

60. R. H. Tawney, Land and Labour in China (London, 1932), p. 69.

61. Cf. Dewey's analysis of the Platonic theory of knowledge as the intellectual expression of the Greek leisure class in *The Quest for Certainty* (New York, 1929).

62. *The Philosophy of John Dewey* edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp (Northwestern University, 1939), p. 527.

63. Cf. *Selected papers of Bertrand Russell*, Modern Library Edition, p. XV.

64. *The Origin of the Family. Private Property and the State* (New York, 1942), p. 63.

65. Bradley, op. cit., p. 90.

66. Felix Cohen, *Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals* (New York, 1933), p. 188 and 220.

67. It is interesting to note that Marx's evaluation of Bentham's utilitarianism did not coincide with Engels' early judgment. Marx regarded Bentham as a "genius in the way of bourgeois Stupidity," *Capital*, I (New York, Modern Library edition), p. 668. Engels, however, spoke of Bentham as the "great Practical Philosopher" who is "almost exclusively the Property of the Proletariat," *The condition of the working class in England*

in 1844 (London, 1936), p. 240. For Marx's judgment of Mill, see op. cit. p. 669.

68. Cf. Adolphe Lods, *Israel*, translated by S. H. Hooke (London, 1932), p. 148, 191, 397; *The Prophets and the Rise of Judaism*. (London, 1937), P. 63-66.

69. Likewise, "In a society in which the motive for stealing has been done away with..... how the teacher of morals would be laughed at who tried solemnly to proclaim the eternal truth. Thou shall not steal" Cf. Friedrich Engels, Herr Eugen Duhring's *Revolution in Science* (New York, International Publishers) p. 109.

70. Engels thus states: "A really human morality becomes possible only at a stage of society which has not only overcome class contradictions, but has even forgotten them in practical life," loc. cit. Cf. V. J. McGill's noteworthy essay. "Scheler's Theory of sympathy and Love" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. Vol. II (1942). p. 289 f.

71. Adam Smith thus observed: "In every civilized society in every where the distinction of rank has once been completely established, there have been always two different schemes or systems of morality current in the same time; of which the one may be called the strict or austere; the other the liberal, or, if you will, the loose system. The former is generally admired and revered by the common people; the latter is commonly more esteemed and adopted by what are called people of fashion....." *The wealth of Nations* (New York, 1937), p. 746.

72. Ella Winter, *Red Virtue*, p. 131.

73. Selected Works, IX (New York : International Publishers, 1937) p. 475-477.

74. Marx was aware that the efforts required for men to achieve full clarity concerning their interests would be considerable. "You have got to go through fifteen, twenty, fifty years of civil war and national wars not merely in order to change yourselves and become qualified for political power." To his opponents, he said "Just as the democrats turned the word 'people' into a sacred being, so you have done with the word proletariat" correspondence, p. 92.

75. Lecky and Halevy both suggested this view. Cf. E. R. Taylor, Methodism and Politics (Cambridge, England, 1935), p. 13 and and 62.

76. The recognition of Exploitative relations within the religious categories is itself, however, an achievement of historical importance"..... a very true economic content may be concealed behind the formal economic incorrectness" Cf. Engels' preface to Karl Marx. The Poverty of Philosophy (New York), p. 11.