

**PLENUM OF THE CPSU CENTRAL
COMMITTEE
JULY 1953
A STENOGRAPHIC REPORT
JULY 2—7, 1953**

Source:

Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Acad. A. N. Yakovleva; comp.. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — page 219—356 — (Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

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Archive: RGANI, F. 2, op. 1, 45, ll. 2—25, 26—30, 31—39, 40—43. Typographic copy

E—Book prepared by

The Socialist Truth in Cyprus—London Bureaux

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Direct Democracy (Communist Party)

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Source: <http://istmat.info/node/26522>

Language: Russian

The English translation from Russian: Google Translate

E—Book: June 2020

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No 12

PLENUM OF the CPSU Central Committee. JULY 1953

TRANSCRIPT

No

P420¹ 2—7, 1953

Proletarians of all countries, unite!

STRICTLY SECRET

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*To be refunded
to the Presidency of the CPSU Central Committee*

¹ *When the verbatim report of the plenum was sent out, it was not possible to establish.*

FIRST MEETING. *July 2*

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. On behalf of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, I declare the Plenum open.

The agenda recommends:

1. On criminal anti—party and anti—state actions of Beria. (Mr. Malenkov G.M.)

2. On convening the next Session of the Supreme Council of the USSR.

(Speaker V. Voroshilov K. E)

3. Organizational issues.

(Speaker T. Khrushchev N.S.)

Will there be any comments on the Plenum agenda?

Voice. No.

Khrushchev. No one else puts forward any other questions?

Voice. No.

Khrushchev. Vote or consider accepted?

Voice. To be accepted.

Khrushchev. The word for the report has Comrade Malenkov. **Malenkov².** Comrades! It was about 4 months after Stalin's death³.

You remember, comrades, how our enemies around the world were inspired by the death of our great leader and teacher. They were betting on squabbling in our ranks. The whole world hostile to us

² G. Malenkov's report is reproduced on the text of the verbatim report of the plenum, which is checked with versions of the report, which are postponed in the archival case with the author's copies of the transcript. The first version of the report contains a litter: "The original. July 2, 53," the second is "Original with amendments. Malenkov G.M.D. Sukhanov. 28/IX-53."

³ Stalin died, as reported in the official news of his death, on March 5, 1953 at 9:50 p.m.

was making calculations for the struggle within the leadership of our Central Committee. Enemies counted on the confusion of the party ranks, the lack of unity and the split in the leadership of the party.

Hence the main task that faced the party and our Central Committee in connection with the death of Stalin.

The title of the document. Sost.

The task was to prevent confusion in the ranks of our party, in the working class, in the country in connection with the death of Stalin. We had to unite our ranks, act vigorously and decisively, ensure unity and lead the country together along the path defined by the genius of mankind Lenin and his great successor Stalin.

Our Lenin—Stalinist Central Committee successfully solved this problem. The Central Committee acted vigorously and addressed our country and the world as a united, united, monolithic collective worthy of the brilliant founder of our party — Lenin and his great successor — Stalin.

We knocked over the calculations of the enemies, did not allow any hesitation, no panic, no semblance of panic. The Central Committee confidently led the country forward along the Leninist—Stalinist path. Enemies had to recognize our strength and cohesion and abandon the calculations for the weakening of the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin.

Over the past 3—4 months, the party and the government have done a lot of positive work both in the field of foreign policy and in the internal life of the country^A, a lot of work has been done to unite the party and the people around the tasks of building communism and strengthening the economic and defence power of our Motherland, on the bold and proactive deployment of the struggle to preserve and consolidate peace.

^A *The words were removed: "After the death of Stalin by the Central Committee of the party." Here and further, the report of Mr. Malenkov in page-by-page footnotes provides a text deleted from the first version of the report in the process of preparing a verbatim report for printing and mailing to the party organization. Sost.*

But, comrades, the Presidency of the Central Committee is obliged to report to the Plenum of the Central Committee that soon after Stalin's death, we, members of the Presidency, began to convince that Beria was dishonest and, as it became more and more, for criminal purposes began to use our desire for unity, for friendly work in the leadership team.

First of all, Beria became deft and skilful in using his position as Minister of the Interior and developed an active activity in that criminal direction to put the Interior Ministry over the party and the government.

The Presidency of the Central Committee has many facts in this regard.

A few days ago, T. Strokach, the head of the Interior Ministry of the Lviv region, reported to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union⁴ Following.

"In April this year, **Minister of the Interior of Ukraine**^B Meshik gave me, as the head of the regional department of the Interior Ministry for the Lviv region, to collect and convey to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR information about the national composition of senior cadres of party bodies, ranging from party organizations of collective farms, enterprises and to the party's regional committee inclusive. At the same time, Meshik offered to report on the shortcomings of the work of the party bodies in collective farms, enterprises, educational institutions, among intellectuals and among young people.

⁴ T. Strokach's statement was sent to N. Khrushchev on June 28, 1953.

On June 30, Khrushchev sent out this statement to the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as well as N. Shvernik, P. Ponomarenko and A. Kirichenko.

^B Here and further in the report of Mr. Malenkov boldly highlighted the words inscribed in the first version of the report in the preparation of the verbatim report. Sost.

Considering such instructions incorrect, as the authorities of the Interior Ministry should not and do not have the right to check the work of the party bodies, I called the VH personally Meshik and checked whether he really gave such an instruction. Meshik confirmed that this was his instruction and demanded that the execution be expedited. Thinking that Meshik had given such an instruction by mistake or inexperience, I tried to convince him that it was unacceptable to collect such information about the work of party bodies through the Interior Ministry. Meshik came down on me with expletives and said with great irritation: "You can't charge our Chekist secret assignments, you will go to the district and report them to the secretary, but know that this is a task. You can't pull it off, you can't work hard to do it today." I did not believe Meshik that this task comes from Beria, as I believe that Beria as a member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at any time can get such data in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine or in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

Guided by my party's duty, I reported to the secretary of the party's regional committee, T. Serdyuk, about the statement I received from Meshik.

On the same day in the evening I received a phone call from Beria and said literally the following: "What are you doing there, you do not understand anything, why you went to the party and told Serdyuk about the task you received? Instead of helping, you substitute a bandwagon for Meshik. We will expel you from the organs, arrest you and burn in the camps, we will wipe you down in powder, we will turn you into camp dust. And then, in a state of great irritation, Beria repeated several times: "Did you understand it or not, I understand? So keep that in mind." On my attempts to explain therefore the question T. Beria did not listen to me and hung up.

On June 12, this year, the Ministry of Internal Affairs removed me from my position as the head of the Interior Ministry and recalled me to Moscow. At my request to leave me to work in Ukraine I was categorically refused.

That, Meshik, knowing about the conversation T. Beria had been talking to me, twice reminded me: “Well, did you get from T. Beria? You’ll be smarter from now on.” Next, Meshik in a mocking form told me literally the following: “And that Melnikov — the secretary of the Central Committee — a bad Chekist. He gave you as a spy of the Central Committee immediately, calls me and says directly that Strokach reported to the secretary of the regional committee Serdyuk that I, Meshik, collect information about party bodies. Is it possible to conspire your agents.”

It is characteristic to note that the deputy interior minister of the USSR, T. Milstein, has the same conversations. For example, in March of this year, Ivasutin, a former deputy interior minister of the USSR, said that now everything will be new, the party bodies will not interfere as it used to be in the work of the Chekist bodies. The heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the regions should and will be independent from the secretary of the party’s regional committee.

Lieutenant General Kobulov A. 3. (brother of Deputy Minister T. Kobulov B. 3.) also said to me: “You did not take into account the fact that T. Beria came to the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and that now the bodies of the Interior Ministry will not be so dependent on the party bodies, as it was before. You have no idea what rights T. Beria enjoys. He decisively breaks all the old orders not only in our country, but also in democratic countries.” As it has now become known, Beria gave exactly the same tasks for other republics — Lithuanian, Estonian, Belarusian, etc. You remember, comrades, that as recently as December 1952, the CPSU Central Committee gave a directive to party organizations against the IGB bodies⁵. This directive, developed under Comrade Stalin, stated:

⁵ It refers to the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party “On the Situation in the MGB” of December 4, 1952, sent out by the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, extreme committees and regional committees of the party.

“To consider the most important and urgent task of the party, the governing party bodies, party organizations to monitor the work of the bodies of the Ministry of State Security. It is necessary to decisively end the lack of control in the activities of the Ministry of State Security and put their work in the centre and on the ground under the systematic and constant control of the party, its governing party bodies, party organizations.”

Is it not clear that Beria criminally violated the directive and went against the Central Committee.

I must tell Plenum of the Central Committee and about such criminal actions of Beria, such as the use of protection of members of the Presidency of the Central Committee to monitor them.

We now know that every movement of members of the Presidency of Beria was immediately known through security.

It is also known that telephone conversations with members of the Central Committee’s Presidency were eavesdropped and reported by Beria. We have documentary evidence on this matter.

There is nothing to prove that such actions of Beria are hostile to the party. It is clear that Beria criminally planned to put the Interior Ministry over the party, planned to put the Central Committee and the Government under the control of the Interior Ministry.

Comrades! It is clear that in light of the^a what **we’ve learned**^b O Beria, we **started**^c in a new way, with different eyes to look at his activities^d.

It is known that he has started to develop a lot of activity in recent times. Now bemused with Beria’s plans and objectives, and it is therefore our responsibility to be critical of his activities and proposals.

^a *Just*

^b *I’ve already said.*

^c *Should*

^d *especially in the last period, after the death of Stalin.*

Here are the facts that Plenum of the Central Committee should know about.

Last week, on the eve of the day we decided to consider the Beria case in the Presidency of the Central Committee⁶, he came to me with a proposal to take steps through the Interior Ministry to normalize relations with Yugoslavia⁷. I told him that this issue should be discussed in the Central Committee. What's the offer? Beria's **materials now** seized have the following document:

⁶ ⁶ L. Beria was arrested on June 26, 1953 during a meeting of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in the Kremlin. The arrest was carried out by G. Shchukov and a group of officers. There is no protocol of the meeting and the decision of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

⁷ Relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia began to deteriorate in June 1948. 1948, on the initiative of the MAC (b), a meeting of the Information Bureau of Communist and Workers' Parties adopted a resolution "On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia." It noted that "the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is pursuing the wrong line in the main issues of foreign and domestic policy, representing a departure from Marxism-Leninism". The Yugoslav Communist Party was also accused of having an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union and the MAC (b) of politics, nationalism and rapprochement with capitalist countries. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia did not take part in the meeting. In July 1948, at the 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine, a decision was taken on the attitude to the resolution of the Information Bureau, which stated that criticism by the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) and the resolution of the Information Bureau are unfair, that the Central Committee of the Communist Party did not depart from the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, but on the contrary, correctly applies this teaching in the specific conditions of Yugoslavia. Since then, relations between the COMMUNIST and MAC (b) have deteriorated, and then interstate relations with Yugoslavia have been interrupted, which began to be restored only in 1954.

“I take this opportunity to convey to you, Comrade Rankovic, a big greeting from Comrade Beria, who remembers you well. Comrade Beria instructed me to inform you personally in strictly confidentially that he and his friends⁸ are behind the need for fundamental revision and improvement of relations between the two countries.

In this regard, Comrade Beria asked you to personally inform Comrade Tito about this, and if you and Comrade Tito share this view, it would be appropriate to organize a confidential meeting especially for the authorized persons. The meeting could be held in Moscow, but if you consider it unacceptable for some reason, it is also in Belgrade.

Comrade Beria expressed confidence that no one would know about this conversation except you and Comrade Tito.”

Beria did not have time to implement this measure because we have turned events against him personally in a different direction.

Or another fact. The Government discussed the German issue⁹. It was a serious disadvantage in the situation of the GDR. We have all come to the conclusion that as a result of the wrong policy in the GDR made many mistakes, there is a great deal of discontent among the German population, which is especially pronounced in the fact that the population from East Germany began to flee to West Germany. Over the last period, in about 2 years, about 500,000 people have fled to West Germany¹⁰.

⁸ *The archive contains the handwritten text of this note, apparently written by the hand of L. Beria. Instead of the words “Beria and his friends...” The note reads” Malenkov, Beria and their friends.....*

⁹ *We are talking about a meeting of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on May 27 1953, which discussed the political and economic situation created in the GDR. Cm. Document 18 of Title I.*

¹⁰ *From January 1951 to April 1953, 447,000 people fled from the GDR to West Germany.*

We explained to our German friends, and they quite agreed that it is impossible in modern international conditions to pursue a course on the forced construction of socialism **in the GDR**.

Why have we come to this conclusion and believe that the course towards the forced construction of socialism in the GDR should not be pursued at present?

Analysis of the internal political and economic situation in the GDR, the facts of the mass exodus of the population of East Germany to the West (about 500,000 have already escaped!) clearly show that we have a danger of internal catastrophe. We had to look to the truth soberly and recognize that without the presence of Soviet troops, the existing regime in the GDR is fragile. The political and economic situation in the GDR is currently extremely precarious.

We felt that the most urgent task was for our German friends to quickly and decisively implement measures to improve the political and economic situation in the GDR. Events in the GDR¹¹ have shown that these measures are correct. We're even late with their implementation than the enemy, as you know, took advantage.

¹¹ *On June 16, 1953, a mass strike of construction workers began in East Berlin, which turned into a spontaneous demonstration. The following day, strikes and demonstrations included, in addition to Berlin, 14 other major cities in the southern and western parts of the GDR (Rostock, Leipzig, Magdeburg, etc.). In addition to economic demands, political demands were put forward: the immediate resignation of the government, the holding of unified German elections, the release of political prisoners. In Berlin, demonstrators seized Government House and several other sites. During June 16-20, more than 430,000 people took part in the strikes, and more than 330,000 people took part in the demonstrations. On 17 June, Soviet troops entered Berlin, where martial law was imposed, and several other cities, along with the police units of the GDR, took part in the dispersal of the demonstrators. In some cases, shots were fired to kill. About thirty people were killed and about four hundred people were wounded.*

Therefore, we believed and believe together with German friends that it is necessary to correct the course on the forced construction of socialism.

It must be said that Beria, when discussing the German question, proposed not to correct the course on the forced construction of socialism, but to abandon any course on socialism in the GDR and keep the course on bourgeois Germany. In the light of everything we have learned now about Beria, we must re—evaluate this view. It is clear that this fact characterizes him as a bourgeois rebirth.

Then, comrades, the fact related to the issue of mass amnesty¹². We believed and believe that this amnesty measure is absolutely correct. But, having now revealed the true face of Beria, we come to the conclusion that he approached this event from his point of view, he had his plans in this regard. The facts showed that he carried out this measure with harmful haste and captured contingents that should not have been released, for example, it was not necessary to release the thieves—recidivists. **(Voices.)** After the events with Beria, we have corrected this further, but Beria's behaviour around amnesty issues is undoubtedly suspicious. We must learn a lesson in this regard.

Further, comrades, it is known that Beria was in charge of a special committee, **busy with atomic affairs**¹³. We are obliged to

¹² *Cm. Article I.*

¹³ *The work on the creation of atomic weapons in the USSR was entrusted to L. Beria even before the formation of the Special Committee under the SCO in 1945. He was instructed to “monitor the development of uranium work” in accordance with the ruling of the SKO on the laboratory of I. Kurchatov on December 3, 1944.*

In October 1949, Beria was thanked by the ruling of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (B) and the Soviet Council of Ministers “for organizing the production of atomic energy and the successful completion of the atomic weapons test”. He was awarded the Order of Lenin, awarded the Honorary Certificate and awarded him the title of the winner of the Stalin Prize of the first degree.

report to Plenum that here he became isolated and acted, ignoring the Central Committee and the government in the most important issues of the work of the special committee. Thus, without the knowledge of the Central Committee and the government decided to organize the explosion of a hydrogen bomb¹⁴. Needless to say the meaning of this fact. When the senior officials of the special committee (they are here — T. Vannikov, Savenyagin) gave him a draft decision for the introduction of the government, he, Beria, crossed out the document and single-handedly made a decision, hiding it from the Central Committee and the government.

We are obliged to report to the Plenum of the Central Committee that even during Stalin's lifetime it was sometimes possible to observe how he, **Beria**, skilfully and deftly sowed the seeds of distrust against many leading comrades. (Go! oh s a. Correct!)

In this regard, unfortunately, we must admit that in the history of our country there have been more than once attempts on the part of enemies who have snuck into the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to sharpen the leadership of the party, erecting slanders on honest, selflessly devoted parties of people, prominent figures of the party, composing slanderous "materials".

I have to^A say, and such is our unanimous opinion that in Stalin's speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee after the 19th party congress¹⁵ under the influence of slanderous slanders on the

¹⁴ *The first hydrogen bomb test took place on August 12, 1953. It is not known what specific resolution the USSR Council of Ministers refers to in the text.*

^A *It should be straight*

¹⁵ *The 19th Congress of the Communist Party (b) was held from October 5 to October 14, 1952. The congress considered the directives on the five-year plan for the development of the USSR for 1951-1955, changes in the Charter of the MAC (b). The Congress changed the name of the party - MAC (b) to the CPSU, made changes in the structure of its central bodies. The Politburo of the Central Committee was transformed into the Presidency of the Central Committee, the Orgburo was eliminated, the functions of which passed to the Secretariat.*

part of enemy elements from the Ministry of Internal Affairs was given the wrong, erroneous characterization of Comrade V.M. Molotov, whom the party and the country knows for decades as a loyal and loyal fighter for communism, as a prominent figure of the party and the Soviet state. (Stormy applause.)

We also consider the comments made at the same Plenum to T. Mikoyan **to be dishonest in front of the party.**

After Stalin's death, Beria was cleared and deployed, with permission to say, "activity" **aimed at disunited the management team, to suppress the principles of teamwork in the work^B**, acting so that the governing comrades work with regard to each other. We have many facts on this matter.

Needless to say, where a monolithic, cohesive leadership team is needed, there is no place for adventurers trying to sow discord, to make discord in the environment of members of the leadership team (*Voices*).

At the event on October 16, 1952. The central committee's plenary was elected as the largest in the party's history, the Presidency of the Central Committee in the number of 25 members (V.Andrianov, A.Aristov, L.Beria, N.Bulganin, K.Voroshilov, S.Ignatieff, L.Kaganovich, D.Korotchenko, V.Kuznetsov, O.Kuusinen, G.Malenkov, V.Malenkov, V.Malenkov, M.Pervukhin, P.Ponomarenko, M.Saburov, I.Stalin, M.Suslov, N.Krushkov, D.Chesnokov, N.Shvernik, M.Shkiryatov) and 11 candidates for membership (L.Brezhnev, A.Vyshinsky, A.Sverev, N.Ignatov, I.Kabanov, A.Kosigin, N.Patoliev, N.Patoli I.Tevosyan, P.Yudin) of the Central Committee's Presidency. At the initiative of I.Stalin, it was allocated not provided by the Charter or any other documents of the Bureau of the Central Committee's Presidency, which except for Stalin included L.Beria, N.Bulganin, K.Voroshilov, L.Kaganovich, G.Malenkov, M.Saburov and N.Krushchev.

J.Stalin's speech with sharp criticism of V. Molotov and A.Mikoyan at the plenum of the Central Committee was not stenographed and therefore there is no plenary in the protocol.

^B to organize the disunity of the management team, suppressing the principles of collective work.

I don't dwell on Beria's moral character. Although it will have to be said. Plenum should know that in the person of Beria we have a criminally decomposed man. I stress it is criminally decomposed.

They may ask why the Presidency of the Central Committee did not take measures against Beria, pandered to him, conceded, accepted his wrong proposals, made such a mistake as sending out some of his notes on a par with the decisions of the Central Committee, such as a note on Ukraine, about Lithuania¹⁶?

Here's what I have to say about that.

It took 3, about 4 months after Stalin's death. I had to unravel and see Beria in all its glory. Everyone should have seen him as an intruder, a disrupter of the unity of our Central Committee. It was necessary to unite in order to unanimously, I emphasize — quite unanimously, to solve the question of Beria.

When we in the Presidency of the Central Committee all became convinced, with whom we are dealing, we called a meeting of the Presidency of the Central Committee and in the presence of Beria charged him. He wasn't fair. He could not deny the facts, but he became cowardly, mean—spirited to hide the ends, saying that he would be corrected.

The Presidency of the Central Committee unanimously recognized the need to act quickly and decisively, given that we are dealing with an adventurer in the hands of which great opportunities in order to once and for all put an end to the ulcer and rot that poison the healthy atmosphere of a cohesive and monolithic Lenin—Stalin collective. (Stormy applause.)

The Presidency decided to remove Beria from his posts and expel him from the party.

The Presidency came to the conclusion that it is impossible to stop with such an adventurer halfway, and decided to arrest Beria as an enemy of the party and the people. (Voices. (Stormy applause.)

¹⁶ *Cm. Documents Number 15 and No. 16 of Title I.*

Exposing and expelling^A such a rebirth, as Beria turned out to be, our Central Committee will be even more cohesive and monolithic.

Taking these **Steep**^B The Presidency of the Central Committee was guided by the belief that in this case these measures are the only correct ones, the Presidency of the Central Committee was guided by the belief that Lenin would do so, Stalin would do so. (Stormy applause.)

We are confident that our actions will be unanimously approved by the Plenum of the Central Committee. (Stormy applause.) As for the individual mistakes and wrongs we made during the period when we exposed Beria after the death of Comrade Stalin for 3—4 months, we will correct these mistakes and wrongness.

I would say — well, it took only 3 months (Exclamations. Right!) to see the true face of the adventurer, and despite his position and significant opportunities, quite unanimously cut off this, this sick growth on a healthy body. (Applause).

Comrades! Is it right if we reduce the whole thing to Beria's personality?

Of course not!

We have to^A comprehend how all this could have happened, and to do the proper^B conclusions, learn lessons for the party. What are these conclusions and lessons?

1. The first conclusion and lesson relates to the task of strengthening the leadership of our party, increasing party leadership in all parts of our public work.

It is no coincidence that the enemies of the party, having snuggled up to the leadership positions and deftly disguised in their enemy work, first of all strikes and begin to sharpen our governing party bodies, weaken their leadership.

^A *Without*

^B *Large*

^A *Should*

^B *Correct*

And are we doing well, comrades, in respecting the norms developed by the great Lenin, Bolshevik principles of leadership? No, not all of them. Moreover, we have accumulated over many years of significant abnormalities. I will refer, for example, to the fact that we have not been going to Plenum of the Central Committee for years, in our last years the Politburo has ceased to function normally as the highest party body in the period between the plenums of the Central Committee. I'm not saying that the 19th party congress was gathered later^C 13 years after the 18th Congress¹⁷. What kind of collective leadership, what criticism and self—criticism can be talked about, how it is possible to ensure the leadership of the party and correctly^D to exercise party leadership in such abnormalities in the organization of the central committee and its governing bodies?

We have to fix it decisively. It is necessary to immediately establish the regular work of the Plenum of the Central Committee, the Presidency of the Central Committee, the Secretariat of the Central Committee and to ensure in the work of these bodies methods of collective leadership, in fact to instill in the work of these bodies methods of criticism and self—criticism.

It is necessary to check the work of any leader, to check whether any of us ensures proper partisanship, Lenin—Stalinist principle. Is it not a fact that in the case of Beria during the decade and a half of his stay in the top leadership of the party, we all, and those who are older, starting with Stalin, and those who are younger, had to show more vigilance and not allow this adventurer to burst so much that there was a direct threat to the unity of our party.

^C *In between in*

¹⁷ *The 18th Congress of the Communist Party (b) was held on March 10-21, 1939. The congress considered the directives on the third five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1938-1942. and changes to the MAC Charter (b).*

^D *Hard*

It is necessary to decisively put an end to the lack of control in the work of anyone. Any member of the Central Committee, no matter what position he holds, must be under the appropriate party control. The activities of any of the leaders should take place under the leadership of the Party Central Committee.

It is necessary to understand that only the Central Committee is able and must provide discipline in the work of party and state figures. Who undermines the authority of the Central Committee, tramples the Bolshevik principles and traditions of our party, he is our worst enemy, and such people should be mercilessly expelled from the party. No post, no past merit should serve as an obstacle to cleansing the party from the snubs of the starveling grandees trying to get out of control of the party.

2. Another conclusion and lesson concerns the gross violation of party norms in relations between the party and the Interior Ministry. Is it not a fact that for many years the Ministry of the Interior gained too much influence and put out of control of the party. In fact, for a number of years the party's effective control over the interior ministry's organs has been lost.

All this gave the opportunity to various adventurers, enemies of the party, who made their way to the Interior Ministry, to try to use the Interior Ministry apparatus in order to become over the party, to subdue the state apparatus, to become over the government.

The urgent task of the party is to make impossible attempts by the enemies of the party to use the Interior Ministry apparatus. And to do this, the Ministry of the Interior must actually subordinate to the Central Committee of the CPSU, the government of the USSR.

The challenge is to ensure that the edge of our Internal Affairs department is truly turned against our class enemies, against our external enemies and their agents, spies, saboteurs, pests.

It is necessary to decisively put an end to the uncontrollability of the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior and to put their work in the centre and on the ground under the systematic and constant control of the party, its governing bodies, party organizations.

The most important duty of the governing bodies is to exercise strict control over the work of the ministry of the Interior.

3. It must be said that we are committed to increasing revolutionary vigilance in our ranks. We often take into words, but we really forget that because our party is the only party in the country and because it is the ruling party^A, enemies, deftly disguised, tried and will try to penetrate the ranks of the party. It should not be forgotten that the class struggle continues, that the capitalist environment is trying and will repeatedly try to use every opportunity, to use people infected with the remnants of capitalism, including nationalist remnants, to weaken the Communist Party and the Soviet state. We should not forget that the agents of our class enemies are able to deftly camouflage and adapt sometimes for many years. That's why we need to evaluate^B workers not only in terms of their business qualities, but also necessarily in terms of their political honesty, their loyalty to the party and the Soviet people, the ability to merge their will with the will and desires of the party, the ability to obey the will of the party team.

It should be bluntly acknowledged that we in the party still have a divisive approach to workers that makes it difficult to expose people who are essentially alien to the party, who are not dear to the party.

4. The next conclusion and lesson from the case before us is that we need to significantly and comprehensively strengthen the party's educational work. We are far from at the height of the party's theoretical, ideological, propaganda work, and there is still too much bureaucracy and formalism in it. The task of propaganda educational work is not that the Communists learn the famous formulations, quotations, dates, but that they with all their heart, mind and heart assimilate the essence of the great revolutionary teachings of Marx—Engels—Lenin—Stalin, to assimilate its colossal transformative power.

The main task of all our propaganda work is to educate the consciousness of the historical invincibility of our great cause, based

^A *there is only one ruling party in our country and that's because*

^B *Consider*

on the knowledge of objective laws of the development of society and on such a powerful factor as the revolutionary energy, organization and cohesion of the Communist Party, the leading and transformative force of the Soviet society and the world revolutionary movement.

The main task of our propaganda is to educate the communists in the spirit of selfless devotion to the party, devotion to the cause of the working class, the Soviet people, the cause of communism, to educate the communists as active, conscious fighters for the cause of the party.

5. Finally, we must conclude that the highest principle of our leadership — collectiveness, cohesion and monolithicity — must be strictly respected. Now more than ever we need to understand that only the collective mind of the party, the collective wisdom and political experience of the Central Committee can ensure the right leadership of the party and the country in the current complex international environment, ensure the successful construction of communism.

The invincible strength of our party is in the cohesion and collectiveness of the leadership, in the unshakable unity of its ranks. No one is allowed to undermine or violate this unity.

Comrades! The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, created 50 years ago by the great Lenin, will throw away all attempts to shake the unity of the party and diminish the role of the party as the leading force of the Soviet society building communism.

Our mighty party, led by the genius of humanity Lenin, under the leadership of his faithful disciple and associate Stalin forged and hardened numerous cadres of capable, dedicated to the great communism workers.

Our Central Committee represents the best people of the party with precious experience in all areas of the construction of communism.

Our Central Committee has forged for decades Lenin and Stalin, hardened in battles with enemies leadership core, cohesive and monolithic. (Stormy applause.)

No enemies of the party will be able to bring discord to the leadership of our Communist Party! No renegade will be able to break the will of our heroic party to build communism. Throwing out from its path bourgeois rebirths and adventurers like Beria, our party in close unity with the people will confidently and firmly continue to solve their great world—historical problems. (Stormy long applause.)

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. Comrades, there is a proposal to take a break of 20 minutes so that the comrades think, and then begin to discuss the report of Comrade Malenkov. To comrades who want to speak, please sign up. There will be no other offers?

A 20—minute break is announced.

Presiding officer. Bulganin. Let's keep going, comrades. Comrade Khrushchev has the word.

Khrushchev. Comrade Malenkov in detail^A reported to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the party about how the members of the Presidency organized their work after the death of Comrade Stalin, how they cherished the preservation of unity in the leadership of the party, so as not to give cause for division and the slightest hesitation. We have sought to maintain full unity in our ranks so that this unity, through the Presidency of the Central Committee, is transferred to the entire Central Committee, to the entire party, in order to ensure the continued cohesion and monolithicity of our great party. This desire for unity was cleverly used by the adventurer Beria.

We've known Beria for years. I have known him for twenty years from the plenums of the Central Committee, communicated with him directly on work. I want to express my opinion, my views

^A *Here and further, the verbatim report will emphasize the text that has been edited in its preparation for printing and mailing in the party organization. Sost.*

on this person. Even before the time when we began to come to a certain opinion about Beria's behaviour, before we embarked on the path of decisive action, even during the life of Comrade Stalin, we saw that Beria is a great schemer. He's a treacherous man, a deft careerist. He got very strong with his dirty paws into the soul of Comrade Stalin, he was able to impose his opinion on Comrade Stalin. He found ways to cause doubt when considering a question, found ways to show in a bad light one or another comrade. Beria managed to work for a certain time to restore Comrade Stalin against one or another worker. Impudence and arrogance are the main qualities of Beria.

During Comrade Stalin's illness, when doctors said he was in a hopeless state, there was an exchange of views about Beria between individual members of the Central Committee Presidency. It is clear that all members of the Presidency could not exchange views on this issue at that time. In the days of Comrade Stalin's illness, two members of the Bureau of the Presidency of the Central Committee were on duty. I and I had to be on duty together. In one of the duties, about a day before the death of Comrade Stalin, I told Comrade Bulganin: "Nikolai Alexandrovitch, Comrade Stalin is hopelessly ill, how will the leadership after his death? I am concerned that after Stalin's death Beria will rush to the post of Interior Minister by all means. Why does he need this post? He needs this post in order to capture such positions in the state, to be able to establish espionage for members of the Politburo, to eavesdrop, to eavesdrop, to create affairs, to intrigue, and this will lead to very bad consequences for the party."

Bulganin. There was such a conversation.

Khrushchev. We can't, I say, let it happen before, otherwise the death will be our cause. I can say: although you talked among themselves, and still Beria became the Minister of the Interior. You, they say, thought and said, but neither you nor So Bulganin did not speak on this issue when forming the Government.

I'll tell you, comrades, why it happened. It should be borne in mind that Beria during the life of Comrade Stalin achieved disunity

among the members of the Bureau of the Presidency of the Central Committee.

Voroshilov. Correct.

Khrushchev. At the time when the body of Comrade Stalin had not cooled down in front of us, it was impossible to raise this issue. Comrades could say: took advantage of the death of Comrade Stalin and immediately makes a split and confusion in the leadership of the party. Beria could deftly use this circumstance, and you would be fools, and even in what! Could it be?

Voice. That's right, it could have been.

Khrushchev. Beria was very harassed as Minister of the Interior. You, comrades, each know what the weight of this "person" was in the party. Pretty big. It would seem that such a person should be given the most acute area of work. Is the Ministry of the Interior currently the sharpest site? According to my conclusions, I may meet some comments, but it seems to me that the Interior Ministry is not such a site now. That's my personal opinion. Why do I think that? Let's look back, take the period of the last 10 years. What conspiracies within our country were opened by the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of State Security? There were a lot of fake, blowing cases, and no conspiracies.

Voroshilov. That's right, no.

Khrushchev. Let's look at the cases of 1937 and after 1937, among them there were also many fake cases.

A voice from the Presidency. More than half the lime, right.

Khrushchev. If you raise the cases of the Interior Ministry and the IGB as group and individual and see them, we will meet there a lot of blow—up cases. Take the case of "pest doctors." This is a disgraceful case for us. The Mingrel case in Georgia is also a linden. You can name other similar fake cases.

We have spies, saboteurs, terrorists, imperialist intelligence agents inside our country, but we did not have any significant group conspiracies against the Soviet system and they could not be, because we have the monolithicity of the ranks of the party, the cohesion of our people around our party.

Voices from the seats. Correct.

Khrushchev. Comrades, when the war with Fascist Germany began, Hitler expected that he would pass on tanks on the steppes of Ukraine, all over our country and quickly conquer it, take over Moscow and all fall before his army. The whole world knows how the war began and how it ended. What do the results of the war say? They show the strength of our party, the cohesion of the Soviet people around the party, the boundless trust of the people of our party and its leadership.

Beria knew it well. The question is, why did he aspire to the post of Minister of the Interior? He needed this post in order to take into his own hands this, I would say, difficult controlled body and use it for its nefarious purposes. We control any minister, any employee by checking the implementation of economic plans. Party organizations also speak out, reveal flaws. And in the Interior Ministry everything is shrouded in mystery. An interior ministry worker says: "I'm going to a safe house." And no one knows what he does there, who he accepts. You can only rely on the honesty of the employee. That's his goal. Notice this detail. After the publication of reports about the shameful case of "doctors—pests", about the same shameful Georgian case I received a letter from colonel—general Kryukov, who was sentenced to 25 years, to the Central Committee. The same letter was received by Marshal Shchukov. I sent this letter to the members of the Presidency of the Central Committee, including Beria. There are other convicted generals. Beria did not undertake to analyze these cases, and that it is a linden — it is undeniable.

Voroshilov. Linden.

Khrushchev. I think that Beria did not take up these cases because he wanted to "work" with the convicted generals and then release them. After all, he was not just liberating. He insinuated that it was Beria who gave them freedom. Not the party, not the government, but Beria.

General Kuzmichev was released from prison a few months ago. Maybe he was released correctly. But was it necessary, having released him from prison, immediately put on him a general's uniform and appointed the head of the Government's security? It was hardly necessary to do it, and Beria appointed Kuzmichev to this

important post. Why? Because Kuzmichev became a shadow of Beria, he needed such a man.

Beria tried to use the Interior Ministry for criminal purposes. He wanted to establish his dictatorship through the Interior Ministry, to put the Interior Ministry over the party. It's impossible. I am a member of the Presidency, some shadow is cast on me, someone calls my first deputy." He raised the issue so that it is impossible to call the employees of the Interior Ministry neither in the Central Committee, nor in the city committee. In fact, this meant to release the Interior Ministry from any party control, so that Beria and his assistants could commit arbitrariness.

Voice. Correct.

Khrushchev. That's what Beria wanted. And I would say, comrades, that he has achieved a lot in this. Take notes on Ukraine, Latvia and Belarus. Now you all know that these materials, all the facts for these notes are collected not through the committees, not through the central committees of the Communist Parties of the republics, but through the employees of the Interior Ministry, although such materials, though more accurate and more correct, are available in the party bodies. There are other facts showing that Beria tried to become a party, to subdue the party of the Interior Ministry. This must be recognized in order to exclude in the future any possibility of even a hint of such anti—party actions.

Comrades, I am deeply convinced that Beria is not a communist, that he was not a communist. Beria is a careerist and provocateur. This conclusion I draw not only from the facts of today. Comrades, remember the Plenum of the Central Committee in 1937. Then it was stated from this rostrum that Beria worked in counterintelligence in Baku. Kaminsky said that. At the same time it was said that Beria worked in counterintelligence on the instructions of the party, although there is no evidence of this. Beria did not present them. A lot of time has passed.

Bagirov. The underground work was then led by Anastas Ivanovic, without him no one could go anywhere or be sent by a party organization, especially in Musavat intelligence, because under

the counter—revolutionary Musavat regime¹⁸ in Baku and all of Azerbaijan, underground and party cadres and all party work was led by T. Mikoyan.

Khrushchev. Comrades, we already have a decent age of Soviet power and we have longed for many of them under Soviet rule, even if anyone says that he had a task, why is the evidence not presented to the Central Committee? And who can vouch that he did not work on another task, against us, having a cover that he worked allegedly on the instructions of the party?

Comrades, I have repeatedly heard Beria's reasoning about the party and the construction of socialism. His last statements were made when we discussed the situation in the GDR and the Hungarian People's Republic. Then there was the question that one person did not combine the leadership of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. During the discussion, Mr. Rakoshi asked: "I ask to give advice on what issues should be decided in the Council of Ministers, and which in the Central Committee, what kind of distinction should be. If the leadership of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers are not combined in one person, it is necessary to divide the issues that should be considered more clearly in the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers." Then Beria disparagingly said: "What is the Central Committee? Let the Council of State decide, and let the Central Committee deal with personnel and propaganda."

I was surprised by this statement. It means that Beria excludes the leadership of the party, limits its role to work with personnel (and then, apparently, at first) and propaganda. Is this a Marxist—

¹⁸ *Musavat was an Azerbaijani bourgeois party that emerged in Baku in 1911 after the collapse of the Transcaucasian Republic, which initiated the proclamation of the Azerbaijani bourgeois republic, in which the entire period of its existence (1918-1920) was the ruling. Relied on interventionists (Turkish, then English). In April 1920, with the help of red army units, the Musavatist government was overthrown.*

Leninist view of the party? Is that how Lenin and Stalin taught us to treat the party? Beria's views on the party are no different from Hitler's.

Why did he say that? This was based on his consciousness that the role of the party should be overshadowed. Beria thought to strengthen and then completely destroy the party. Of course, destroy not physically, but he could do a lot of damage. In this, comrades, there was a great danger to the party. Beria is not a member of the party, but a careerist, and maybe a spy, this is still a must be dug up.

A voice from the audience. Both.

Khrushchev. Beria and I often went together, so we could hear a lot from him. He sometimes resented what was being done in the Interior Ministry or in the IGB. But it was in words, and in reality he was creating lawlessness. He recently entered the Presidency of the Central Committee with a proposal for special meetings. We haven't discussed this issue yet, we haven't had time. We decided to put Beria in jail before, and then discuss it. Beria made a proposal for the rights of a special meeting at the Interior Ministry. What is a special meeting? This means that Beria arrests, Beria interrogates and Beria judges.

The question is, do we have such a stream of counter—revolutionary uprisings that the judiciary does not have the opportunity to consider these cases? Is it really necessary to have a special meeting to deal with the case without consequence? Beria did not propose to abolish the special meeting, but to preserve it. Why does he need it? Then, in order to have a special meeting in his hands, he had the opportunity to condemn any person. He himself said, "I can force anyone to sign a confession that he has a direct connection with the English king or queen." And he did. Having an investigator who interrogates Beria, who seeks the necessary testimony, he could convict through a special meeting of any person. Is this a conceivable matter? What did he offer us? He writes that it is necessary to "order" this case, and suggested that the special meeting should have the right to imprison for 10 years. This means that he will be sentenced to 10 years, and in 10 years he can return

and sentence him again for the same term. Here's a real terror. In this way he could turn any person into camp dust.

When I received this offer, I called my comrades Mikoyan, Bulganin, Molotov, Kaganovich and asked if they had read what Beria was proposing. Is it necessary to do it and for what purposes? It is clear that there may be some case with which it is not necessary to go out into the light. It could be. But isn't v us the opportunity to specifically discuss and make the right decision? We have military tribunals where we can solve such cases. Such rights and authority should not be allowed to be held by the Minister of the Interior. After all, these rights could be enjoyed by adventurers like Beria, terrorizing the party and the government.

Recently, Beria has also proposed that all persons who have been convicted or acquitted by the investigation or the court should be released only after the prosecutor has reported to the Interior Ministry. What does that mean? This means that Beria was trying to eliminate the rule of law. What can be the legality if the prosecutor commands the Interior Ministry? How can a judge or a prosecutor work and enjoy the trust when he has to report to the Interior Ministry, at a time when the court has already proved that the person is innocent. Who needs such "legitimacy"?

Beria grasped for this because he wanted to hold the soul not only of those who are in prison, but also of those who are under investigation, who have already come out of prison, so that they tremble while Beria is in power. This was done for terror. This terror was directed against the party, against the government, against our people.

Voice. Correct.

Khrushchev. That's what this scoundrel needed. Beria, Yagoda, Yezhov, Abakumov are all berries of the same field.

The sword of our socialist state must be sharp, honed. We still have many enemies. We have a capitalist environment, we have a strong enemy and his agents inside the country. Therefore, it would be deeply wrong to mix the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior with dirt, it would be wrong to think that they are no longer needed. If we go down this path, we can pay for it. But this sword

must be held sharp against enemies and not allowed to be directed against its people.

Kaganovich. And that it was in the hands of the party.

Khrushchev. And to do this, you need the Interior Ministry to put in its place. More intelligence and counterintelligence agencies need to be strengthened. Good, honest Bolsheviks put on this case. And we'll fix this case. The Interior Ministry should and will be controlled by the party, controlled by the government.

Malenkov. We spend 17.5 billion rubles on the Ministry of Internal Affairs, not counting the fact that we spend on construction and economy.

Khrushchev. Georgi Maksimilyanovich gave here a perfectly correct line.

Comrades, I am a man, as they say, of the “old” regime. (S m e x). I first saw the gendarme when I was probably 24 years old. There were no gendarmes in the mines. We had a Cossack policeman who was walking and drinking. There was no one in the parish except one of them. Now we have in every district the head of the Interior Ministry, he has a large apparatus, the commissioners. The head of the Interior Ministry receives the highest rate, more than the secretary of the district committee of the party.

Twice as much as the secretary of the district committee.

Khrushchev. But if he has such a network, you need to show that he is doing something. If we look at the archive of the Interior Ministry now, I am convinced that there are questionnaires for a significant number of citizens and many cases are being developed. (*Laughter.*)

Voice. Correct.

Khrushchev. Of course, if the money is paid, then something must be done. And if there are no crimes, and the boss asks and says, “You are such, as such, do not work well, show your work.” Then some workers start to fabricate things, go to meanness. After all, there was a case in Moscow last year, when a man was sentenced to 25 years, and then it turned out that this agent made up the case himself, and condemned in vain.

It is necessary to impose, comrades, order in the bodies of the Interior Ministry, leave there as many people as necessary, and those who would understand the policy of the party, strictly conducted it and worked under the leadership of party organizations.

Voice. Correct.

Khrushchev. Comrades, you can tell you what you went to, I haven't exposed Beria before. Me and Beria personally had different periods of relationship. Attitude changed especially after the death of Comrade Stalin. If I don't call him for a day, he's already calling and asking, "Why aren't you calling?" "There was no time," you reply, "there were things." "You call more often," he says. I, comrades, began to think, why such love ignited to me, what is the matter? Nothing seems to have changed, I stayed the same as I was. Sometimes he calls and tells me about Malenkov, about Molotov. He could throw poison against everyone and at the same time somehow point out, emphasize that you are, they say, better than them. I then told my comrades Malenkov and Molotov about it.

Malenkov. He thought we were all simpletons.

Khrushchev. I say to Comrade Malenkov, listen, you must be against me, and he's talking to me against you. He's a schemer, he thinks he's a fool, he thinks he's just a great scout and he understands everything. But we're not as simple as he thought. He did a lot of damage for his provocative purposes.

Unfortunately, we could not make important decisions on agriculture both in the last period of Comrade Stalin's life and after his death. Why? Because in the setting of a question Beria sowed doubts or often in the discussion sought to remove the issue from the discussion. We all respect Comrade Stalin. But the years take their toll. Recently, Comrade Stalin did not read papers, did not accept people, because his health was weak. And this circumstance cleverly used the tail of Beria, very cleverly. He, as a provocateur, told Comrade Stalin that, they say, the question is not worked out, and he was filmed. And you know that on any issue, no matter how well he works, you can always find evidence for further improvement. Voices from the seats. Correct.

Khrushchev. All the time these issues were “unfinished” and were not solved. This was the case during the life of Comrade Stalin, and he continued to do so after his death. I want to give my thoughts on why he did this. He’s a provocateur. He thought the worse the better. You know that Comrade Malenkov was tasked with overseeing agriculture, Beria, demonstrating outwardly his friendship with Comrade Malenkov, in fact slowed down the issues that were introduced on agriculture to undermine the collective farms.

A voice from the Presidency. Potatoes are not enough.

Khrushchev. Potatoes are not enough. This was done in order to lay the blame on others, and then, having reached the authorities, to declare amnesty, to say: here Beria saves. It’s cheap demagoguery.

A voice from the Presidency. Absolutely right.

Khrushchev. He was a provocateur, a big provocateur. Comrades, recently the Secretariat of the KK listened to a number of regional committees — Novgorod, Pskovsky, Smolensky — and made decisions. But, comrades, no matter how smart the resolution is, whatever decisions we make, but if we pay four pennies per kilogram of potatoes, no resolution will help agriculture.

Voice. Correct.

Mikoyan. Economic laws must be taken into account.

Khrushchev. We have to count everything, comrades. We currently have 3.5 million fewer cows than we had before the war. And if there are fewer cows, there is less meat, less oil, less skin. Some said that it would be necessary to abolish cows in sole use, and collective farmers to supply through the collective farm. There will be a time when the collective farmer himself will go for it. If we don’t believe in this, then we’re not communists. Will there always be a farmer—collective to hold on to the tail of her own cow? But it’s foolish to offer it now. You can’t do that. It is necessary to create conditions, it is necessary to raise collective farms, to raise the commodity of collective farms, productivity of livestock production.

They say there is no attention of the party bodies to this issue. No attention will help if this cow should give a certain amount of milk and from the same cow Comrade Zverev takes tax. When you count everything that the collective farmer gives for a cow, it turns

out that he has only manure. Therefore, the collective farmer decides to get rid of this cow. This is a very sensitive issue and needs to be properly addressed. This issue is now being studied, and we are confident that the situation will be rectified.

Let's take the potato and vegetable production issues. We have reduced the prices of potatoes and cabbage, and potatoes and cabbage in stores are not. Cabbage has become more expensive or in the same price as bananas. Have our collective farmers forgotten how to grow potatoes and cabbage?

Adventurer Beria persistently plucked all offers on agriculture. For example, the issue of increasing potato production was discussed for three months and we could not make a decision for three months. As soon as we put it on the table, Beria proposes to refine. That's what this provocateur did. He was slowing down many issues. I think he thought that if there were complications somewhere based on the discontent of the population, it would be better for him. What a scoundrel!

Comrades, I fully agree with what Comrade Malenkov said about the decisions that were made on Western Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and Latvia. We need to revoke Beria's notes. We need to look at these decisions, and maybe we will have to make adjustments to them.

It is clear that Beria sought to undermine the friendship of peoples, he tried to warm up and activate bourgeois—nationalist elements. In recent days, the Central Committee received letters, which reported on the contortions in this matter. I received a letter from a woman, an employee of the party's district committee from the Stanislav region. She addresses me: "You said that now there are no two Ukrainians — Western and Eastern, and there is one Soviet Ukraine. I have been working in the Stanislav region for 13 years, and now I, a Ukrainian woman, am being expelled from Ukraine." And this is done by our decision. That's what happens, comrades. Such letters are also written from Lithuania. One communist reports that recently nationalist elements have brazenly and began to speak out against Russian workers. It came to the point that in stores sellers who know Russian do not let go of goods, if they are addressed in

Russian language. What do these facts say? That Beria's proposals were aimed at quarrelling Russians with other nationalities in order to incite hostility between the peoples of our country.

Voices from the seats. Correct!

Khrushchev. Beria stands under the guise of Stalin's national policy, and essentially divides the nations. Now all Beria's speeches must be viewed in a different light. Take his speech when he talked about Russian people. It's vile! Not by definitions Beria is a great Russian people, not his will the great Russian people rose and created greatness for themselves. He had to pat the Russian people on the head. He was already considering himself a successor to Stalin. Stalin made a toast to the great Russian people, and Beria spoke in words about the greatness of the Russian people, but in fact he had long had enemy intentions. He took a big wave, but fell off and crashed, the spirit let out.

Most vividly Beria showed himself as a provocateur and agent of the imperialists when discussing the German question, when he raised the question of abandoning the construction of socialism in the GDR and making concessions to the West. This meant giving 18 million Germans under the domination of the American imperialists. He said, "We need to create a neutral democratic Germany."

Can a neutral democratic bourgeois Germany be neutral? Is it possible? Beria said, "We will make a deal." And what is this contract worth? We know the value of contracts. The treaty has its effect if it is backed up by guns. If the contract is not backed up by force, then it is worthless, we will be laughed at, will be considered naive. And Beria is not naive, not stupid, not a fool. He's smart, cunning and treacherous. He behaved not as a communist, but as a provocateur, damn it, maybe he received assignments from residents of foreign intelligence.

Comrades, the audacity of this man was simply impossible to tolerate. Recently we listened to the Germans. When we discussed this issue, Beria yelled at Comrade Ulbricht and other German comrades in a way that was embarrassing to listen to. Ministers are present here, they know what insults be received from Beria and at

the same time they were forced to smile (revival in the hall), thinking that it was a friendly pill. Now I think you're different from this.

Beria believed that the Interior Ministry was in his hands and even if they wanted to arrest him, who would arrest him? They will turn to Kobulov to arrest Beria, he and Kobulov can arrest before anyone. He was convinced of that. But when we saw that we were dealing with a provocateur, we had no disagreement or disunity, which he hoped for. We exchanged opinions with each other, asking, "Listen, do you like this man? At first, some looked at me in surprise and probably thought, "Why is he asking this question, for what purpose?" (*Laughter.*) Then we went, "What you look like, because it's a provocateur, you look and see for yourself that it's a scoundrel." After that, the answer followed: "Yes, this is the correct question, principled." When we talked to each other, it turned out that we all had the same opinion. After that, we organized a meeting of the Council of Ministers, and the members of the Central Committee's Presidency, who are not part of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, invited to this meeting, and then opened the meeting of the Presidency of the Central Committee and there all laid out, directly in the forehead Beria said: you are a provocateur, not a communist and was not a communist, we will not tolerate. And so you would look at this hero, as he immediately softened, and maybe even more. (*Laughter.*)

In making this decision, we were deeply convinced that the Central Committee would understand us correctly and approve our decision. (Continued applause.)

The unanimous decision of the Central Committee's Presidency on Beria had to be achieved. It should be said directly that they do not whisper afterwards. Some people said: how is it that Malenkov often walks with Beria, they probably talk about me together. And others were probably told that Khrushchev also goes with him. (S m e x.) And rightly so. They walked, and I walked. Vyacheslav Molotov once even said: "You go and discuss something all the time." I said, "Nothing good, he says all sorts of vile things, it's disgusting to even listen."

I believe that for the time being this walk has benefited us and was necessary. On Thursday, Malenkov, me and Beria were driving in the same car, although we knew that he was a schemer, that he intrigued me against Malenkov and against others, and mainly against Malenkov. He says goodbye, shakes his hand, I also answer him with a “hot” handshake: well, I think, a scoundrel, the last handshake, tomorrow at 2 o’clock we will set you on fire. (*Laughter.*) We’re not going to shake your hand, we’re going to blow your tail.

Comrades, that’s the only thing that such a treacherous man should have done. If we’d told him a little bit earlier that he was a scoundrel, I’m sure he’d have killed us. He can do it. I told some of my comrades about it. And when I was told that I was exaggerating, he said, Look, don’t be a weirdo, you’ll be buried, he’ll say a speech, and he’ll say, There’s a party and government leader here, and then he’ll say,, rest there. He’s capable of it. He is able to add poison, he is capable of all nefariousness. We were dealing not with a member of the party, with whom it is necessary to fight party methods, but with a conspirator, a provocateur, and therefore it was impossible to reveal himself. We thought that if he found out that the meeting would discuss the issue of him, it could turn out that we will come to this meeting, and he will raise his thugs and damn him knows what he will do, because we are dealing with an adventurer and a provocateur. That’s why we had to think about all these issues. The situation was such that it was impossible to act otherwise. After all, it came to the point that if the head of the Interior Ministry will report to the Central Committee about the misdeeds in the Interior Ministry, he was considered an “agent” of the Central Committee.

Now you can see what this “friendship” was and how it ended. I think that the members of the party will understand us correctly. Now we have to put the work well, so that there was nothing like it in the future. First, it is necessary to put honest people in the Interior Ministry, and secondly, to strengthen the control of party organizations over the work of the Interior Ministry.

It should be noted that in solving the question of Beria we were all unanimous — Comrade Malenkov, Comrade Molotov, Comrade

Bulganin, Comrade Kaganovich and all other comrades. I believe that this operation, so to speak, will not weaken, but strengthen the leadership of the Central Committee. (Applause).

Voice. Correct.

Khrushchev. There should be no fear in this regard. And if we do not solve the issues of agriculture, when the country lacks meat, milk and even not enough potatoes and cabbage, then is it a force? It's a disgrace, comrades. After all, our friends can tell us: listen, dear comrades, you teach us how to build socialism, and you do not know how to grow potatoes, you can not provide your people, you do not have cabbage in the capital. And why? Because they couldn't decide if the provocateur was tearing up.

Therefore, I believe that the decision on Beria strengthens our leadership, strengthens our party. They may ask, how will other countries evaluate this decision? they'll find out. I am convinced that everywhere will appreciate it correctly. And in bourgeois circles they will think: if they did not stop and arrested Beria (and the glory of his power was), then there is a character. (Applause.)

Therefore, comrades, we are convinced of the correctness of this decision.

Comrade Malenkov correctly spoke about Comrade Stalin's speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee after the 19th congress of the party at the address of his comrades Molotov and Mikoyan. We know very well that there was nothing in his life that he talked about on this issue. This was said as a result of the slander and a certain age and physical condition of Comrade Stalin.

Comrades, I'm finishing my speech. We firmly believe that no one will be able to turn us off the right path that our party is following, along the path indicated by Lenin and Stalin. (Applause.)

Now, after purifying this scum and seizing the enemy of Beria, we will move even more confidently and accelerated forward to new victories. (*Applause.*)

Having expelled Beria, we, our comrades, have become even stronger. I want to give you such a detail. When Comrade Malenkov told Comrade Voroshilov about the case before the meeting, Comrade Voroshilov, who is the oldest member of the party, rushed

to hug His comrade Malenkov. At the same time, Comrade Voroshilov warned Comrade Malenkov: "Hush, he will overhear." Then Kliment Efremovic was told that if he overheard, he would not have time to decipher. We've already deciphered it. This is the environment he created inside the Presidency! There were times when someone would say, "Right, Lavrentiy Pavlovic," and he slowly spat. Is it possible to have such an environment in the party? It's not going to happen now. There will be collective leadership, present, party leadership. It is necessary that the situation of collective leadership was not only in the Central Committee, but also on the ground before the primary party organizations inclusive. It is necessary that the plenums of the Central Committee are held regularly. Meetings of party committees, sessions of Labour MPs, and it is necessary to organize them without parade and hype, without ceremonial inconsequential chatter. All this needs to be rebuilt. We have a lot of power. And the better and deeper we develop intra—party democracy, criticism, the better we organize and engage the masses in active discussion of our policy and all our economic and political work, the stronger we will be. The people are behind our party, going confidently behind the party.

Comrades, I am confident that the purification of this vile traitor, the provocateur will further strengthen our Leninist—Stalinist leadership. (*Continued applause.*)

Presiding officer. Bulganin. The word has Comrade Molotov.

Hammers. Comrades, we are discussing this issue, the Beria issue, which should be taken into account in recent months, and Beria's special position as the head of the Interior Ministry, who was also a member of the governing body.

The peculiarity of the situation, as the comrades said here, is that after Stalin's death we had to demonstrate the unity of the Central Committee. This was necessary, both domestically and internationally.

The peculiarity of Beria's situation also deserves serious attention.

His calculations failed.

I think it is necessary first of all to share with my comrades at the Plenum of the Central Committee some personal observations over the past three and a half months. These observations, as well as the observations of other members of the KK Presidency, first made you wary, and then made necessary certain strong conclusions, of which you are now aware.

Here is the first fact pertaining to these observations.

You, the members of the Plenum of the Central Committee, remember who here in March made a proposal for the President of the Council of Ministers.

Even before the Meeting of the Supreme Council, I called him on the phone and tried to dissuade him from this intention. that it would be more correct that at the session of the Supreme Council the proposal of our party on the head of the Soviet Government came directly from the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union.

The second fact, which cannot be ignored.

The party has long established a rule that operated under both Lenin and Stalin: the Chairman of the Council of Ministers presides over the Politburo, and the protocols are maintained by the Secretary of the Central Committee. There was no reason to change this order in March.

In this regard, I turned to you. Khrushchev: why is there no signature of the Central Committee Secretary under the protocols of the Presidency? Why are they nameless? He agreed that it was not normal to restore the previous order. I'm calling you. Malenkov, and he agrees. I call Beria, and here I come across an objection. To my proposal to restore normal order — he answers: if this is the case, it is necessary to solve other important issues. Beria was silent, what "other important issues" he meant. However, it became clear that he was waiting for something and did not want to talk about his plans for the balance of power in the central core of the Central Committee.

On 26 June, the entire Presidency of the Central Committee dealt with Beria's criminal conduct and for two and a half hours demanded an explanation from him on many issues. Then we asked him to explain what he meant when he said that before restoring the signature of the Secretary of the Central Committee under the protocols of the Presidency, it would be necessary to consider some "other important issues". But even then he did not say anything sensible about it, mentioning only that it seemed that it was necessary to persuade how the Agenda of the Presidency should be drafted. Apparently, he did not want to reveal his plans and simply lied, continuing to hide his thoughts and "plans".

The third fact that you can't get past.

Since March v, we have been in an abnormal position in the discussion of some important issues. Voroshilov, Saburov, Pervukhin, who are not part of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Khrushchev, however, was invited to the relevant meetings of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, but his situation was in this case not quite certain.

The fourth fact that finally alerted us to Beria.

For most of us, the true political physiognomy of Beria was decided when we began discussing the German question in May.

A number of recent facts have made it abundantly clear that the German Democratic Republic has developed a precarious political and economic situation, that there is serious discontent among the general population of the GDR. This, by the way, was reflected in the fact that between January 1951 and April 1953, 450,000 people moved from the GDR to West Germany. This situation could be beneficial only to the government of Adenauer, the West German bourgeoisie, foreign imperialist circles.

In the case, it was striking that the German Democratic Republic had taken an overly fast course for industrialization and that large-scale new construction was not appropriate. All this was carried out at a time when East Germany, in addition to having to bear significant occupation costs and pay reparations, not to mention the need for extensive reconstruction work after the end of the war. Meanwhile, it should not be forgotten that East Germany is in a

particularly difficult situation, when, using the position of the occupying powers in Berlin, the authorities of the United States, England and France, as well as the West German authorities have the opportunity to take many such steps, which disorganize the political and economic situation in the GDR.

In these circumstances, we felt it was our duty to take urgent action to help our German friends correct the apparently leftist course that the GDR had taken, especially since the summer of 1952. When discussing the German issue in the Presidency of the Council of Ministers it was revealed, however, that Beria stands on completely alien positions of our party. He then said that there was nothing to build socialism in East Germany, which is enough for West and East Germany to unite as a bourgeois peace—loving state.

These Beria speeches could not pass our attention, that under the current situation, that is, in the current imperialist era, to proceed from the perspective that bourgeois Germany can become a peace—loving or neutral state against the USSR, is not only an illusion, but also means an actual transition to positions alien to communism. Soon, however, it turned out that this is not the case.

In Beria's draft resolution of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers on this issue, it was proposed to recognize "the course of socialism for the construction of socialism as erroneous in the current circumstances. In this regard, it was proposed to "abandon the course of socialism in the GDR.

In the draft resolution I proposed in both cases to amend: instead of saying the error of the "course for the construction of socialism" to say about the error of "the course for the accelerated construction of socialism." Everyone agreed with that. This was recorded in the resolution of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers on 27 May, contrary to Beria's original proposal.

It is clear from what was said that Beria's speeches at previous meetings of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers on the German issue were not accidental, that it would be enough for the Soviet Union if Germany were reunited as a single state — on bourgeois basis, as if modern bourgeois Germany could not but be bound by close ties with other imperialist states, and as if in the

present conditions there could be a bourgeois Germany, which would not be at the same time aggressive, imperialist Germany. that in the person of Beria have a man who has nothing to do with our party, that this is the man of the bourgeois camp, that this is the enemy of the Soviet Union.

In fact, he demanded the surrender of the so—called “Western” bourgeois states. For us, it must be clear that the existence of the German Democratic Republic, which is strengthening the people’s democratic system and is gradually embarking on a course towards the construction of socialism, is a serious blow not only to German imperialism, but also to the entire imperialist system in Europe.

You can see that in Beria’s political form, it was clear that he was hiding in every way before.

Voice. Correct.

Hammers. It wasn’t easy to expose Beria. As a result of all this, he was exposed and imprisoned. I believe that this decision of the Presidency of the Central Committee should be approved. (Stormy applause.)

Voice. Correct.

Hammers. For a number of years, we, the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, have been close to Beria, often dealing with him. But it was only now that we became aware of how alien he was to us and how dirty, immoral he was. Now it is clear that he caused a lot of damage to our party and the Soviet state, that he is a big criminal and a dangerous adventurer.

There can be no doubt that he was making his way, or, better to say, sneaking, to capture the highest office in the state. But he turned out to be too short—sighted and grossly miscalculated.

By his political short—sightedness, he relied too much on some of his henchmen in the Interior Ministry.

Why would he want to do that? Did he need it if he, like us, was on course to defeat communism? And he went against the CK line, against the governing core.

I’m going to have to stop your attention once again on Beria’s attempt to connect with Rankovic and Tito, as you’ve already mentioned. Malenkov.

It is known that our Central Committee recently made a decision aimed at changing official relations with the government of Yugoslavia¹⁹. In this regard, well-known steps were taken and it was decided to exchange ambassadors with Yugoslavia.

Malenkov. We, of course, wanted normalization of relations.

Hammers. The Presidency of the Central Committee concluded that it was impossible to continue the recent line in relations with Yugoslavia²⁰: ambassadors, official telegrams, business meetings, etc.

I wanted to use this moment in a very different way.

According to his plan, the relevant representative of the Interior Ministry in Yugoslavia was to hand over to Rankovic in Belgrade, which on behalf of Beria outlined views alien to our party, alien to Soviet power. According to Beria's project, the representative of the Interior Ministry at the meeting with Rankovic had to declare: "I take the opportunity to pass to you, t. Rankovic, big hello from you. Beria." It was further said that Beria and his friends "are in favour of the need for fundamental revision and improvement of relations between the two countries", which "is therefore in connection with this. Beria asked you (i.e. Rankovic) to personally inform you about it. Tito, and if you're. Tito shares this view, it would be appropriate to organize a confidential meeting especially for the commissioners" and so on. Rankovic" and "t. Tito." Beria was unable to send this

¹⁹ *No information was found about the meeting or decision of the Presidency of the Cpsu Central Committee on the issue of relations with Yugoslavia. Apparently, we are talking about the proposal of the Soviet side to the Yugoslav government to exchange ambassadors: from 1,949 - charge d'affaires.*

²⁰ *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - a military alliance (bloc) formed on the initiative of the United States in 1949, the bloc included the United States, Great Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Iceland, in 1952 they joined Greece and Turkey.*

letter to Yugoslavia, with a draft letter in his pocket he was arrested as a traitor.

But isn't it clear what this attempt by Beria to collude with Rankovic and Tito, who act like enemies of the Soviet Union, mean?

Voice. Correct.

Hammers. Beria climbed into our combat headquarters and sat there for a long time.

Death. He, like our enemies abroad, expected that at that moment the party would be weakened, that in our environment there would be confusion, and that it would be possible for him to use it for his own purposes.

Voice. Correct.

Hammers. Of course, in the apparatus of the Interior Ministry could find some or other scoundrels, especially from among the people picked up earlier by Beria himself. But the Interior Ministry has enough strong communists, as well as in other major organizations. Therefore, Beria's altruistic calculations on the Interior Ministry apparatus could not be justified, although it does not follow that attempts to carry out these calculations could not cause great damage to the Soviet State.

What internal forces in the country could Beria count on?

Couldn't Beria and the people associated with it expect to get support for their hidden plans from workers, or collective farmers, or intellectuals? Of course, he and his anti—Soviet plans did not and could not find a real foothold inside the country, in the working class, among workers.

His anti—Soviet plans were related to the calculations to support the imperialist camp.

He could count mainly on the sympathy and support of some foreign bourgeois circles, on the support of, say, Churchills, Dalles or Tito—Rankovic. He could not count on anyone but the sworn enemies of the Soviet Union in his plans to seize power.

We didn't do much to biography him. Now we have to do it more seriously.

How did it happen that such a hardened enemy as Beria could get into our party and its governing body?

To this question, if we do not go into the deep reasons of such facts, we can give a simple answer: it is the result of insufficient vigilance of our Central Committee, including you. Stalin. Beria found some human weaknesses in Stalin, and who does not? He cleverly exploited them, and he managed it for a number of years.

I personally have to work in Moscow. Recalling the past, I see that since Beria came to Moscow in 1938, the general atmosphere and working environment in the Central Committee began to deteriorate markedly. He has poisoned the atmosphere with his intrigues before, but especially since coming to work in Moscow. Beria also played a nefarious role in the fact that the work of the Central Committee of the party was weakened to the point that the plenums of the KK ceased to gather for several years.

But the answer above to the question of how it could happen that Beria made her way to the leadership of our party cannot be satisfied.

In this regard, it is necessary to dwell on one important fundamental issue: the question of the existence of only one party in our country. We do not always fully understand the meaning of this essential political circumstance.

There are no more antagonistic classes in the USSR, Since there are no capitalists, landlords, fists, etc., there are only two classes in the USSR: workers and peasants, who are in friendly relations between themselves.

However, the question of the existence of one party in the USSR is not only connected with such a paramount fact as the absence of antagonistic classes in our country. As you know, even when there was still a fist, the experience of fighting for the existence of the Soviet state in the capitalist environment showed that under the circumstances it is impossible to allow the existence of other parties. There can be no doubt that foreign capital would throw any millions and billions of rubles, only to be able to lean in the USSR on some political organization, opposing itself the Communist Party, standing in power. This kind of special organization would be used by them to undermine the union of workers and peasants, for the purpose of all sorts of excavations under socialist construction, for the purpose of

intrigue and decomposition of the Soviet state, although it is already openly served by the North Atlantic imperialist bloc. Why not in our country someone like Beria to fake a communist and use all the tricks to get into the trust of certain people and get into the main headquarters of our party? Such an agent of the bourgeoisie, of course, would be ready to shower gold and support at the right moment not only with money, but also by other means.

We now see that the provocateur Beria had to be disguised for a long time, for many years to wear the guise of a communist.

At the same time, Beria used different disguises.

Thus, he did not stop before any loud words, saying, where he saw fit, about his devotion to the party. V. Stalin in these organizations, which, as we know, belongs to the wonderful pages in the history of our party. Like singing with enemy targets to our party Sharia and some others.

Beria has used other techniques for his careering purposes.

Khrushchev. Ramzin received the Order of Lenin.

Hammers. There are also such former pests who gave us good aircraft designs and subsequently so resolutely abandoned their anti—Soviet past that they became major figures in our industry as advanced engineers and designers.²¹

Beria, of course, knew that in order to reach senior government positions, you have to have a party ticket and certain merits in public work. To achieve high positions and influence the work of the central bodies, it is necessary to have the trust of the party.

Sometimes we clearly underestimated some of his nonpartisan tricks.

²¹ *We are talking about prisoners-specialists in the field of aircraft construction, who worked in special design and technical bureaus at the UGPU-NKVD of the USSR. Among them were A.Tupolev, V. Petlyakov, V. Myasishchev, etc.*

In particular, this can be shown in one example, when Beria managed to drag through the highest party bodies a clearly wrong decision about his friend Sharia, who is an outsider for our party.

In 1948, the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia had to consider the issue of the pamphlet of Sharia, who was then one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia. There is no need to talk in detail about the contents of this brochure. V.M.) wrote an ideologically harmful work in verse, imbued with deep pessimism and religious—mystical sentiments.” Instead of removing this outsider from the party, The Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia, as if to in mind condemned the publication of the “ideologically harmful book in verse” Sharia, decided to remove him from his job as secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia on propaganda and at the same time sent him to teaching at a higher educational institution in Tbilisi, which actually meant “absolution” to this crook. The case was not limited to this. Meanwhile, it is impossible not to admit that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) had no grounds to approve the said decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia on Sharia.

For Beria, however, he was not just a friend, but an ideologically close person.

Let me move on to other questions.

It is impossible to ignore the fact that we have taken some hasty decisions under the pressure of Beria, Patolichev and his replacement by another comrade, although there was no reason for this. Clinging to some shortcomings in the party’s work in Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Beria sought to correct the relevant shortcomings in such a way that it would be a blow not to certain nationalist sentiments, At the same time, he sought to undermine the authority of a number of responsible party workers.

Malenkov. Correct.

Hammers. Yes, comrades, in the order of self—criticism, we must recognize the existence of these serious shortcomings.

What was Beria counting on when he recently began to impose with such impudence some of his proposals against the party line against the main party cadres?

He could not ignore the strength of the political situation in the country. He could not help but see that our country is in its prime, that it is growing economically, that its successes in technology and science are growing every day, that we are creating numerous and well—trained qualified personnel for a further steady rise in socialist construction.

But, comrades, let's not forget that we have many shortcomings in the work, that there are also such omissions and miscalformities in the national economy, which for a long time did not pay proper attention.

In recent years, some regulations have been adopted, sometimes in a hurry, which we must urgently check and correct. However, it soon became clear that the construction of this canal, together with all the accompanying irrigation and other works, will cost 30 billion rubles. that would insist on the urgency of building this canal. Naturally, we have come to the conclusion — to cancel the decision made earlier on this construction. The same unpreparedness was affected by the rulings on some other construction projects, which were supposed to allocate many billion rubles, but the urgency of construction of which is by no means proven.

On the other hand, from the speeches of T. Malenkov and Khrushchev you can see how urgent, for example, are such issues of agriculture as livestock and vegetable production, which have not received any attention in recent years.

The provocateur Beria is also known for the urgency of dealing with these issues. It is for this reason that, as you can see, he not only did not help in correcting and improving these sectors of economic work, but it was just the opposite.

Voices from the seats. Correct!

Hammers. We must also focus on the international environment.

In fact, after the Second World War, the international situation has changed, which has unprecedentedly raised the

international weight of the USSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, MNR. Two world markets were formed, as it is said remarkably correctly in Stalin's "Economic Problems", for their existence, and the governments of imperialist states do not sit idly by.

We are witnessing more and more adventures against the Soviet Union and the countries of popular democracy. Recently, everything has been done to delay the conclusion of the truce in Korea, although the measures taken in the line of strengthening peace—loving steps by the USSR, China and North Korea, make it extremely difficult to carry out such aggressive imperialist plans.

Taking into account all these circumstances, it will become clear why in the current conditions our class enemies abroad seek to intensify their anti—Soviet work. They have now moved on to open acts of sabotage, terror and sabotage against countries belonging to the camp of socialism and democracy.

In the last three months, Beria's behaviour has been characteristic of him becoming arrogant and in a hurry in his attacks against our party and the Soviet government. But it was also said that he was in a hurry.

Class enemy made another attempt to weaken the leadership of our party, the fighting headquarters of our country. (Stormy applause)

Today, as before, we stand firmly on our own feet.

From all this we should draw simple but serious Bolshevik conclusions: we need to raise the banner of partisanship, principle and vigilance in all work, and then we can confidently look forward to our country will be provided with further and even greater successes in the construction of communism. (Applause)

Presiding officer. Bulganin. There is a proposal, comrades, to stop the work of the Plenum today, to announce a break until tomorrow. There will be no objections? No.

Tomorrow is a meeting at 12 p.m.

SECOND MEETING. Morning, July 3

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. I declare the plenary meeting open. We continue to discuss the report of Comrade Malenkov.

Comrade Bulganin has the word. Prepare comrade Serdyuk.

Bulganin. Comrades! Comrade Malenkov reported everything in detail, correctly and, I would say, well. Comrades Khrushchev and Molotov correctly continued the coverage of the issue. However, the question in its significance is that I also want to say my opinion.

There have been more serious events in our party. We know how the party broke the ridges to adventurers, conspirators on the scale of the larger, acting group, not alone. From the history of our party, we also know that by suppressing and eliminating adventurers and conspirators, the party was hardened, strengthened, and its authority in the people grew.

Everything we have heard here about Beria, and what we know now about him, says, comrades, that we are dealing with the enemy of the party, with the enemy of the Soviet state and the people.

Even during the life of Comrade Stalin Beria behaved very suspiciously. In front of us, we saw it, he behaved rudely, cheekily, brazenly neglecting the team, neglecting his comrades, intriguing in front of Comrade Stalin. Each of us has seen many times on the part of Beria cases of the most vile, most vile intrigues in front of Comrade Stalin about the comrades around him. This was Beria's character and, apparently, was done by him in the interests of the long—range sight.

After the death of Comrade Stalin, Beria not only continued this line to disunity of the collective, to intrigue, to discredit, but, as you can see, behaved even more brazenly and openly engaged in direct anti—party, anti—state activities.

It became clear that it was impossible to leave the case like this.

If we had left the case like this, we would inevitably have come to a gamble.

Despite the fact that we tolerated Beria in our midst, and moreover, treated him with apparent respect, in reality it was quite different. The comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev and Molotov correctly spoke here about the real mood of the members of the Central Committee's Presidency towards Beria.

Comrade Nikita Khrushchev before the death of Comrade Stalin did tell me about Beria, and I want to say more about it here. "As you can see," said Comrade Khrushchev, "we stand on the eve of our leader's death, but I foresee and I am afraid that Beria will make things very difficult for us. I foresee that when Stalin dies, he will rush to the Interior Ministry. Why do you think he needs the Interior Ministry? Then, in order to take matters into their own hands, to subdue the party and the state."

As you can see, we had such sentiments even then. That's what happened. Members of the Presidency were under the supervision of the Interior Ministry and Beria. Members of the Presidency were monitored.

It was about eavesdropping. Comrades, we have at our disposal recordings of eavesdropping of comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin, Voroshilov. We were watched. I will give one small fact, but it is typical for clarification of the situation. Two or three days before Beria was arrested on June 26, we drove to the apartment at half past midnight— Comrade Malenkov, Comrade Khrushchev, me and Beria—he droves. We live—Georgi Maximilyanovich, Nikita Sergeevich and I—in the same house. Nikita and I live against each other on the same floor, and George lives on the floor below. Georgi Maksimilyanovich went to the fourth floor, and Nikita and I went up to the fifth floor. We went out to the playground, we stand and say that the house is hot, it is better to go to the country.

Khrushchev says, "I'll go home, I'll take a look." I said, "I'm going straight to the cottage." I went into the elevator, went down and went to the cottage. The next day Nikita Sergeevich calls me and says: "Listen, I want to ask you for a check. You didn't tell anyone we went to the cottage? You didn't have a conversation with

anyone? How does Beria know we're going to the country? He called me and said, "You went to the cottage with Bulganin."

The next day at Comrade Malenkov's, in his office, Beria said of us: "They are cunning. We went up to the apartment, and then went to the cottage." I said, "It was very hot at home, so we went to the cottage." "Come on," he says, "you didn't go into the apartment, you went down in the elevator, not going to the apartment, and went to the cottage, and Khrushchev, he really came and followed you." We decided to make it a joke. Nikita Sergeevich says: "How do you know, what are you agents?"

Khrushchev. Spies.

Bulganin. Yes, that's right, he said spies. Beria did not answer.

I will say one more fact that I referred to Beria at the Meeting of the Presidency, which the fellow Bureaus know about. It was about the German question. On this major issue, Beria was rebuffed at the meeting of the Presidency. From the speeches of Comrade Malenkov and Comrade Molotov, you heard that the question was about which way we should go — on the path of strengthening the German Democratic Republic, that is, along the path of socialism, or on the path of the elimination of the German Democratic Republic and the creation of bourgeois Germany. Beria was on the last point of view. Members of the Presidency spoke out against Beria.

The next day there was a meeting of the so-called special committee, of which Beria was chairman and I am a member of the Presidency. The conversation was of such a nature. I gave him examples of neutralization in Germany at the time and said that it would not work. Pointed out as an example that in history there were such facts as the Treaty of Versailles, under which Germany was disarmed, and then what happened? Germany armed itself and attacked the Soviet Union. Beria rudely and brazenly stated the following: "This cannot continue. If this goes well, we will have to remove some ministers from the Presidency."

I say that in our Presidency ministers Molotov, Bulganin, Beria and Mikoyan— who are we talking about? He says, "The current leadership will have to change." It was, of course, a direct

threat. If, they say, you continue this line, you do not vote for my proposals, we will simply expel you.

If we add to this the conversation with Strouch, about which Georgi Maksimilyanovich Malenkov spoke here: “Let’s burn out, arrest, burn in camps, bleed into camp powder,” then there is no need to talk more about who we were dealing with. These facts speak for themselves.

Moreover, comrades, there is every reason to believe, and we are convinced of this, that we are dealing with a large, hard—working international adventurer, an international agent and a spy. Here he read his letter, which remained unscaled, a letter to “comrades” Rankovic and Tito. Next, comrades, I’ll give you some more facts. Just before our arrest, we learned that Beria was collecting military material, in particular materials about our Navy. They developed a questionnaire, and this questionnaire collected data on what our U.S. and British navies can counter, what our coastal defence is, what our artillery is, what its qualities are, and some other data. They were also asked questions and requested data about our air defence, about our anti—aircraft artillery, its effectiveness. Then at the same time a questionnaire about our aircraft, their features, ceiling, weapons, etc. was drawn up and sent to the Air Force.

The case revealed that the data was supposedly to address some of the special issues related to the jet. But, one wonders why this data is required without the knowledge of the Central Committee of the party, bypassing the Minister of Defence? All this data, of course, Beria was not given, it was reported to me, and I reported to the Central Committee. It maybe that this data was needed to give someone advice and guidance.

Now, comrades, look at the internal issues, which Georgi Maksimilyanovich Malenkov reported here and which were also discussed by Nikita Khrushchev and Vyacheslav Molotov. Whatever the question, the background is extremely dangerous for the state. Take the issue of amnesty: the release of thieves and repeat offenders is a blow to public order in the country. Is that correct?

Voices from the audience. Correct.

Bulganin. Let's take the issues of Latvia, Lithuania, Western Ukraine. It is now clear to us that this was certainly an attempt to strike at the Leninist—Stalinist national policy and the moral and political unity of the Soviet people.

Voices from the audience. Correct.

Bulganin. Speaking about the national issue, it is impossible to pass by the Georgian question. You've read the material. This henchmen assumed the monopoly right of the sole solution of all Georgian issues to Georgia. I will express the general opinion of the Presidency of the Central Committee: he has confused this case so that it is necessary to seriously understand what is being done in Georgia now.

Voices from the audience. Correct.

Bulganin. We hope that the party organization of Georgia will be unanimous with the whole party in exposing and expelling from the party ranks of this vile pro—avost and adventurer.

Comrades, if we add to this what Nikita Khrushchev said about our agriculture, then here, of course, the hand of Beria is visible. Agriculture has been brought to a situation that was in the interests of Beria and others like it.

All these facts show that Beria acted on the principle: the worse, the better.

Comrades, I had to hear about Beria's supposedly positive role in his cases on the release of doctors, on the liquidation of the Georgian case, on the liquidation of the case of Shahurin and Novikov, the case of Marshal Yakovlev. We have to debunk it here, too. He has no positive role in these matters. On the contrary, all this was done in order to create a semblance of popularity.

Voices from the audience. Correct.

Bulganin. What was the reality? I will tell you that even during the life of Comrade Stalin, we, members of the Presidency of the Central Committee, among ourselves said that the case of doctors is a linden. Right, comrades?

Voices from the Presidency. Correct.

Bulganin. We talked about the fact that the Georgian case is a linden, a bloated business. The case of Shahurin and Novikov is a

shameful matter for us. Talked? Talked. The case of Marshal Yakovlev is a shameful matter for us. Talked? Talked.

Beria knew about these conversations. I ask, what did he have to do after the death of Comrade Stalin when he took over as Interior Minister? Of course, he had to end these cases. And these cases are over not because he personally played some positive role, but because his situation forced him. He knew the opinion of the Central Committee, the opinion of the members of the Central Committee's Presidency on these issues.

Now it turns out such a touch: Beria from all released took a subscription (this was told to me by doctor Ryzhikov), how they should behave in the future.

Comrades, Beria exposing, especially the conclusion of this revelation and the very arrest of Beria were difficult and risky. And here we must pay tribute to comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev and Molotov (stormy applause), who well organized this case and brought it to the end.

Khrushchev. There is one amendment: you don't rule yourself out. (*Applause.*)

Bulganin. I am very grateful to you, Nikita, for this line and declare to you and all other comrades that I did only what every honest member of the party should do. (*Applause.*)

Comrades, after the death of Comrade Stalin, the Presidency of the Central Committee had to carry out very difficult work, to solve complex issues of domestic and foreign policy.

Beria's exposure and arrest demonstrate the firmness, the Leninist—Stalinist principledness of our Central Committee and its Presidency, and their intransigence towards their enemies. Beria's case shows that our current Central Committee and its Presidency, brought up and hardened by Comrade Stalin, is a loyal bulwark, a reliable leader of the party and our Soviet people. (*Stormy applause.*)

Now, comrades, I want to raise some practical measures against the Ministry of the Interior. We must admit, comrades, it is clear that we had poor control and checked the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its bodies. When I say we do, I mean not only the Presidency of the Central Committee, but everyone sitting here.

Voice. Correct.

Bulganin. Our regional committees of the party, the Central Committee of the Republics, the extreme, despite the fact that we have repeatedly recorded in the decisions of the Central Committee on the need to decisively end the uncontrollability in the activities of the Interior Ministry, still really deeply the work of these bodies was not controlled and not controlled until now. We have to end this. It's undeniable. Today, at this Plenum, it became especially clear. But I think comrades, that's a little if we just say so. I think it should be said more specifically. These bodies need to be controlled on specific practical issues. The Bureau of the Regional Committee, the Extreme Committee, the Central Committee of the Republic, the Presidency of the Central Committee should know who is being arrested, how they interrogate, who is in prison, what are the rules there.

Khrushchev. And the main thing is to strengthen party work among the employees of the Interior Ministry.

Bulganin. Yes, strengthen and help them stay on good party members. They say that they are not allowed to control under the guise of the fact that all the activities of the Interior Ministry are imposed incredible secrecy. But we have party organizations, extreme instructors, **obcoms** and other senior officials of the party bodies have access to the most secret laboratories, research institutes, where only secret work is done. Why can't they go to prison and check the contents of those arrested?

Voroshilov. Check who is arrested and why arrested.

Bulganin. Yes, and how interrogations are conducted. Why can't the instructor go and check it all out? Why does the instructor of the regional committee go to any laboratory of the most secret order, and can not go here?

And the other question is about the personnel. I believe that the footage we also did not finish the matter, recorded many times, but did not do what needed to be done. We often talked about the need to replace many people in the Interior Ministry, change, put new ones. But how did it work? People from the periphery, the same people

from the Interior Ministry were taken for the centre. We have to get new people in there.

Voice. Correct.

Bulganin. From our party and state apparatus.

Voice. That's right, new people need to be.

Bulganin. It was often heard that newly appointed employees were Chekists with experience, and these Chekists with experience and spoiled the case.

After all, what happened? What is the Interior Ministry? This is the Cheka, the Extraordinary Commission. You remember, in any case, most remember and know the Czech Republic against counter—revolution, sabotage and speculation. They were created during the most difficult years of Soviet power, during the civil war. So the Interior Ministry remains now, nothing has changed except the name. And the rights are the same, the methods of work are the same, and we have lived for 35 years. How can this be tolerated any further? We have to end this.

There are some questions that I think need to be re—examined. For example, should prisons be left to the Interior Ministry? Do not hand them over to the justice authorities, and the Interior Ministry to make the body of intelligence.

Another question. It is necessary to implement the repeated instructions of Comrade Stalin to make the Ministry of the Interior a civil ministry, not a military one.

Voice. Correct.

Bulganin. We have an army, there are generals, officers and soldiers. Why do we have the Interior Ministry paramilitary? We all know that Comrade Stalin has repeatedly swore and scolded Beria:

“This, says, is your thing, your work.” We need to disperse the Interior Ministry. For employees of the Interior Ministry, the easier they are, the better, and their work will become more effective.

I, comrades, end. I will say in conclusion that a great deal has been done. A serious and dangerous gamble for the party and the state has been warned. All this shows that our party is a strong and strong party. Comrade Stalin left us a party strong and united. It is still today. This is also the case with the real Plenum of the

Central Committee. All that is happening at the Plenum speaks for the fact that the real Plenum will be unanimous in its decision and will approve the actions of the Presidency of the Central Committee. (Continued applause.)

The decisions of the Plenary will further strengthen the ranks of our party, further unite these ranks around its Lenin—Stalin Central Committee, in order to carry the banner of Lenin—Stalin with honour and dignity forward to communism. (Applause.)

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. The word has Comrade Serdyuk. Prepare to comrade Bakradze.

Serdyuk. Comrades, the history of our Communist Party, as this was very vividly reported to the Plenary of the Central Committee of the Party Comrade Malenkov, Comrade Khrushchev, Comrade Molotov, now before me spoke Comrade Bulganin, showed how the enemies of our Soviet people, the Soviet state, the parties tried to strike first of all the leadership of our party, sow discord, divide, strike the most intimate of our Soviet people — workers, collective farmers, intellectuals — this is our Communist Party, which leads our Soviet people to a bright future. And here at this plenum of the Central Committee of the Party we discuss the issue when one of the notorious enemies (I say bluntly that it is the enemy of the party, the Soviet state) tried to strike our Communist Party, the leadership of the Lenin—Stalinist Central Committee of the Party.

But, as Comrade Malenkov and in his speeches Comrade Khrushchev, Comrade Molotov, Comrade Bulganin showed that the party exposed, destroyed the enemies of the party and the people, and after each destruction of enemies strengthened, rallied and led the people along Lenin—Stalin's path to communism.

I believe that the Presidency of the Central Committee of the party did absolutely right by removing from the posts of Beria, who snuck into the leadership of this adventurer, a spy, a declared enemy of our Soviet state, excluding from the party and arresting him—this decision of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the party found unanimous approval from all those present at this Plenum, we

approved it, listening to the report of Comrade Malenkov and the speech of the members of the Presidency of the Presidency of the Party.

I believe, like everyone here, that this decision will find the unanimous support and approval of all the communists of our great Lenin—Stalin party. (Applause.)

Our comrades, our leadership, the Leninist—Stalinist Central Committee of our party, will support the Communists, will support our Soviet people, who shed so much blood and sweat to build a new, bright, communist society in our country. From the detailed report of Comrade Malenkov, from the speeches of the members of the Presidency of Tt. Khrushchev, Molotov and Bulganin we see how mean the enemy who has made his way into our ranks has reached. He, comrades, wanted to behead our Soviet state. He, as here and Comrade Malenkov, and all the speakers spoke, wanted, becoming the Minister of the Interior, to subjugate the party. If you think about it, comrades, he's up to something terrible. He failed, and this is the strength of the Lenin—Stalinist education of the leadership of our party.

Do you see what this scoundrel tried to do among the leadership? To sow distrust, but brought up by Lenin—Stalin leaders of our party decided correctly the question, and his decision will find, I repeat, unanimous support of the entire Soviet state, the entire Soviet people.

Beria, as can now be seen very clearly from the report of Comrade Malenkov and other speeches, having snuck into the leadership, has forced his plans. I, comrades, Beria knew as one of the leaders and did not know him closely and I believed that he works for the benefit of our party, for the benefit of our state.

Voroshilov. That's what everyone thought.

Serdyuk. But now in light of the events you can see how he skillfully conducted it, at least on examples after he became Minister of the Interior, in the field of personnel. Comrades, in a month and a half or two, he replaced all the heads of the regional departments of the Interior Ministry in Ukraine without the knowledge of the Central Committee. While in Lviv, Kirichenko told me that Strokach was

being recalled to Moscow. You look — in two months moved all the chiefs. What's going on? I understood when I reported Comrade Malenkov on the Plenum and from the speeches of his comrades. I didn't know those things. I, put by the party at the head of the party organization, was guided by the decisions of the Central Committee and pursued the party's policy to strengthen the party, to strengthen the unity of the party and the Soviet people. And here are the facts that they say.

Comrade Strokach comes to the regional committee of the party and says: "Comrade Serdyuk, it is not clear to me, maybe I broke away." And he was the last minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, and the IGB had all the intelligence, all the arrests, all the prisons... It was all in the IGB. Comrade Strokach says, "Maybe I'm behind, but Mesik demands that I take a picture of the two most backward collective farms and give it to him." You understand, comrades, that, of course, to photograph not "leuko" but simply to give a description of these collective farms. I ask why the most backward, we have huge shortcomings in agriculture, but we have the same good collective farms, on the example of which you can show the life of peasants. What was it for?

Where was I supposed to go? In the Central Committee. Comrade Melnikov was secretary of the Central Committee of Ukraine, a candidate for the Presidency. I told him that for me something is unclear what Meshik wants.

The second question. My comrades Seereta and Strokach come to me with information and reported that Melnikov was interested in the political situation in the western regions. The comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev and Molotov correctly said that for Beria the worse the situation, the better. What is the political situation in the western areas? Meshik so portrayed that there is no Soviet power in the western regions. During the day it is still supported by the Interior Ministry, and at night it is completely dominated by the Ounovs.

I then told Comrade Strokach — he is here — and the work of our party, the Communists worked since 1939,

then Hitler's occupiers were expelled, the Soviet people defeated the enemies, people uplifted, began to breathe more freely.

I go to collective farms at night, I am present, when the chairman of the collective farm gives outfits to foremen and linkmen. The Soviet government can feel why the scoundrels say that there is no Soviet power?

I indignantly reported to the b————ing secretary of the Central Committee of Ukraine Melnikov that this is being done, he was also indignant. You can't tell you everything on the phone. If I may, I'll tell you why you won't. I felt it for myself. Not because I'm offended. I am a member of the great Communist Party, I can not be offended, it was not about one person, it was about the freedom of the Soviet people.

That's how far the provocateur has come. I and T. Strokach went to Melnikov when he was in Lviv, told him how so, the party works, so much attention to the Western regions pays to the KK, the Soviet government, how many heroic exploits of our Soviet people — and suddenly say that there is no Soviet power. Comrade Melnikov was indignant. What was I supposed to do? Maybe go on. It is my fault that I did not report to my comrades Malenkov and Khrushchev. But that's not the point.

Here's the last case. Comrade Strokach comes to me and says, "Comrade Serdyuk, I can't go any further. Meshik gave the task to give him information, how much in the party apparatus, in the district committees, town committees, district committees works Russians, Ukrainians, of them local. I don't know what to do." I know Comrade Strokach as an honest communist, as a loyal of our party, to the Soviet people. I jokingly say to him, "Well, come on. I know the Central Committee's decision to liquidate the agency." We burned the cases of agents that were before 1938. I know the decision of the Central Committee of the party on the attention and supervision of the party committees for the bodies of the Interior Ministry that it is necessary to intervene. I say to Strokach: in the committee at the head of the head. there was such information, but if you went to it, it would not give it without the permission of the Secretariat. Maybe you've got agents, agents will, but it's a terrible

thing. I decided to call Comrade Melnikov, I think that the case is not going there, and then I think to myself: I will call Comrade Melnikov, Melnikov will probably call Mesik, and Strokach will fall into the opal. And then I think again: after all, I will call not somewhere, but in the Central Committee, and if some Meshik will attack Strouch, the Central Committee will protect him. I call Melnikov, I am indignant, I say, how is it so, since when should the regional committee report to the IGB? I in the party take an active part in the work, I know the decisions of the Central Committee, I know what line the Central Committee of the party is, and I do not allow the idea that the regional committee will report to the IGB. Of course, I, as Ukrainians say, “didn’t know” that Beria was there. Melnikov says to me: yes, it’s a disgrace, I’ll find out and call. We sit with Strokach and wait for the call. After the Central Committee’s decision, I personally went to prison and interrogated. We have now taken one enemy of the people, the organizer of the murder of the writer Yaroslav Golan, I also interrogated this killer, it was necessary to know who he relies on.

The call of Comrade Melnikov, he says: “You, Comrade Serdyuk, look about the information, maybe we should give, this is Beria’s mission. But why Meshik does not apply to the Central Committee?”

I said to you. Comrade Strokach is here and he will confirm that I did not give information, and Beria still received this information through the Interior Ministry. Comrade Strokach, is it right that I didn’t give you any information?

Take the decision of the Central Committee, Beria’s note. As the secretary of the regional committee, I see the shortcomings, I see that there are a lot of shortcomings in the practical work. But now, after Comrade Malenkov reported, after the members of the Presidency spoke, I came to the conclusion that everything is in this note, but what is not?

There is no one who killed party Soviet workers, Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, whom the Central Committee of the Party sent to the western regions, so that the experience of our Communist Party in the construction of socialism is faster to

pass. How many honest peasants were killed only for the fact that they honestly worked in the collective farm. We stand on the eve of the historic event — the three—hundredth anniversary of the reunification of two great nations — Russian and Ukrainian. Russians and Ukrainians have been fighting their enemies for centuries, and Beria wanted to make a point of contention.

Khrushchev. Why apologize?

Serdyuk. More than 20,000 people were killed in the Lviv region alone. That's not in the note. Beria was unprofitable to show it.

Comrades, when I listened to the report of Comrade Malenkov, I realized that it was not about Serdyuk. After the Plenary of the Central Committee, when I had a conversation with Mesik, I will say at Plenum that the words were Ukrainian, and the essence is not Ukrainian, not Soviet, but anti—Soviet.

Khrushchev. I was told that one of the intellectuals, who was sitting on the Plenum and listening to Meshik's speech, said, that's how great he scratches in the Ukrainian—Bengali language. (Laughter.)

Serdyuk. A couple more examples. The call is ringing for the High Office, and they say that now Minister Meshik will speak to you. He was in the region for 10 days and did not go to the party committee to talk about the work of the interior ministry. And so he was merciful and went to the party committee, just went. And he left. This minister wants to fight the enemies of our party, but apart from the party.

Or another example. And I really put a question to the Central Committee of Ukraine about the fact that the former prison to transfer to the school for the training of mechanized personnel. Meshik was indignant as to why I reported to the Central Committee and not to him, and told me that, they say, how long he works in the organs, it is the first time that we have never applied to Tsyka. I indignantly replied that as long as I work in the party bodies, I always appealed to the Central Committee, and not to Tsyka, but to the Central Committee, and hung up. I was very indignant and tell My friend Shevchenko that he wants to arrest me.

The secretaries witnessed this. When there was the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine to discuss the ruling of the Communist Party of Ukraine's Central Committee of 26. V. invited to this plenum of the Central Committee and Mesik. Meshik's behaviour on the Plenum was outrageous.. At 11 o'clock a meeting is scheduled, comes at 1 o'clock. He's gone, he's gone, he's gone, and so on. I spoke to Struev, and we resented his behaviour. You, I say, serve the party, why do you treat me like that, I didn't say to Mesik, but to Struev, and exchanged opinions with him. If you tell him, he'll arrest him. (Laughter.)

Frankly, before Meshik's speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, I thought that he was just a non—partisan person, did not know what the party was, that it was, sorry, a soldafon. I reasoned so that he does not understand what the party is, what is the Central Committee, I thought so. And then, when he spoke at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Comrade Struev and I exchanged views on this issue, I said then that he spoke in such a way that he wanted to intimidate everyone, to sit over the Central Committee in Ukraine. I also expressed this to Mr. Mzhavanadze, a member of the bureau of the Lviv Regional Committee. I go to Comrade Kirichenko, he also had the secretary of the Central Committee of Ukraine, I was indignant and comrade Kirichenko say: Alexander Illarionovich, if this will continue to behave Meshik in Ukraine, especially in Western Ukraine, I will not tolerate. He's going to arrest me. So, Comrade Kirichenko?

Kirichenko. Correct.

Serdyuk. He gets up and says, "Are you crazy?" And I say — Comrade Kirichenko, he will arrest and you will give the protocol of inquiry, and there will be a signature Serdyuk. He's telling me again, you're crazy. (*Laughter*).

I say comrade Kirichenko, you are two secretaries here, if he arrests me, please take action. Please help me. I am an honest communist, I have been in the party for many years, I am not guilty of anything before the party. I fought with the Soviet people against

our enemies, saving our Homeland. Can I be honest? (*Addresses the Presidency.*)

From the Presidency. Can.

Serdyuk. Arriving home (turns to the Presidency)—Nikita Sergeevich, you know me, I told my wife; you know what can happen, they can arrest me, but I am not guilty of anything before the party. (Revival in the hall.) I just said that before the party is not to blame and ask to address then to Nikita Sergeevich, he knows me. And that they could have arrested me, the secretary, and they could have made me the most ardent bender.

Voroshilov. And they can do.

Serdyuk. They won't do it now. Our party is strong, and the leadership of our party unanimously cut off the dirty paws of these enemies of the people, now it will not happen to anyone.

Comrades, what is the power of the decision of the Presidency of the Central Committee? The members of the Presidency, brought up by Lenin—Stalin, consulted and made the right decision. As a grassroots worker, as a secretary, as a communist, I believe that the party will take this as the greatest victory of our leadership, the entire Soviet people will support, and we will direct the way, which was indicated to us by the great Lenin and Stalin, under the leadership of the Leninist—Stalin Central Committee, we will go forward and build communism in our country. (Applause.)

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. Comrade Bakradze has the word. Prepare for Comrade Kaganovich.

Bakradze. Comrades, facts and materials, communicated to the present Plenum comrade Malenkov and then supplemented by Comrade Khrushchev, Comrade Molotov and Comrade Bulganin, undeniably prove that in the person of the Beria of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has exposed the largest adventurer of international scale, a notorious squabbler and intriguer, irrepressible careerist and, of course, no serious spy.

For all of us, the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a holy saint, and to some

extent you feel annoyed that for so long in this governing body lurked such a notorious bandit from the great road, as Beria turned out to be.^{1/2} This is a huge invaluable tribute to the party of our Stalinist collective leadership, the Presidency of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

A tremendous effort has been done to further unite and strengthen the collective leadership of our glorious Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Not only this Plenum, but the whole party, the entire Soviet people unanimously with a sense of great satisfaction will approve the decision, which will be taken by this Plenum in relation to the scoundrel Beria.

In light of the facts published here at the Plenum revealing Beria's nefarious treasonous work, I would like to recall the history of his coming to power in the Communist Party of Georgia in 1931 and then to the leadership of the Caucasian party organizations.

Now it is quite clear that Beria even then came to this leadership not quite honest ways. In the future, he literally did everything just to magnify his personality, and for this he did not disdain literally anything. Along with the Central Committee of Georgia and the Sovnarcom of its understudies, personally loyal people to him, literally sat on the head of the Central Committee and Sovnarcom, and when they were finally exposed, Beria took them under protection and offered to call and make Sharia and Rapava only verbal suggestion, that Beria had always acted only on personal careerist considerations, by the way, it was evident from his heinous behaviour in the so—called provocative case of the Mingrel nationalists. Beria knew best from the beginning that it was a provocation, he knew who and how he created provocative materials on honest people, he raised provocateurs Mgeladze and Rukhadze, knew that honest workers were being tortured, but until the last moment, While it did not become profitable for him, he did not say anything about it.

I must say that I fully agree with Comrade Bulganin's statement that the scoundrel Beria has confused and harmed the affairs of Georgia and that it is necessary to specifically understand these cases. It was impossible to do literally anything on his own,

even sometimes the dead were not allowed to bury where we wanted, spoiled and now it is necessary to quickly correct.

I fully agree with Comrade Khrushchev's statement that the case of the Mingrel nationalist group was concocted for provocative purposes. and as a result, scoundrels such as Sharia, who was released long before the decision of the Presidency of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were released on April 10 this year, and Sharia was released from prison in mid—March. for which they should have been punished to some extent. In fact, all have been rehabilitated indiscriminately, and now individuals who have escaped punishment for the above—mentioned misdeeds, go to us as rehabilitated in all sins and demand large positions, not lower than the Vice—President of the Council of Ministers or not below the Minister.

A voice from the spot. A lot of people were appointed.

Bakradze. It is right that in general the case was provocative, but in some personalities, in my opinion, more needs to be sorted out.

I would like to dwell on another question. That in light of today's facts about Beria, all the fuss that Beria started with The Georgian Lessivist emigration, looks very, very suspicious.

As for the bodies of the Interior Ministry and the party leadership of them, then, dear comrades, let you know that in Georgia the bodies of the Interior Ministry have been commanding all for a long time. who not only did not count with anyone, but engaged in the beating of Bolshevik cadres, and after the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of April 10, this year, on Georgian affairs, Beria sent us his people — the Minister of the Interior of Georgia Dekanozov and the head of the department of party, Komsomol and trade union personnel of the Central Committee of The Communist Party of Georgia Mamulova. And after the decision of the Presidency Beria summoned Mirtshulaw and me and in the presence of Dekanozov and Mamulov offered to discuss all the issues only in the presence of Dekanozov and Mamulov. that Beria had us put his supervisors. In fact, that's what

happened. They systematically, in addition to us, informed Beria about the affairs in Georgia as they wanted.

Prior to Dekanozov's appointment as Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia, the police chief systematically presented to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Gruzireports on some criminal crimes, From the day dekanozov's appointment, these reports have stopped, and there has been no other information.

I was instructed to report to the Communist Party of Georgia Central Committee on the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia on the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia on the issue of the so—called Mingrel nationalist group. "Read?" "How are you going to report on Plenum?" "No," he says, "read everything first to the end, from point to point." I explained the ruling on the so—called Mingrel nationalist group, instructed how to explain the ruling and how to conduct the Plenum. "I was sitting in the Council of Ministers, and Beria said, "What have you done? How did you hold the Plenum?" (With m e x in the hall.)

I was completely perplexed, it is true that I worked as Minister of Food Industry of Georgia for five years and something in this industry with the help of the government did. We wanted to discuss the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on Georgian issues to finish at the Plenum of the Central Committee and at the plenary of the regional committees and not to enter into further wilds, as the issue was clear and it was necessary to organize practical work on the implementation of the plans of 1953, where there was a big backlog. That Beria wanted us to do our part and all the other work to fail. (Laughter in the hall.) It's not clear to me that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government are formula is, they are in charge of us, we are in charge of all matters of principle, and we have a duty to keep them alive. I have nothing to do with international politics, because we have a foreign policy engaged in the CPSU and Comrade Molotov. (Laughter in the hall). I told Beria that I was working as I understood and as I could, and after that he never called me again.

When I read in the press a report about the appointment of Kobulov as deputy interior minister of the USSR, my heart was bled.

Beria's chief of staff has done a lot of damage in Georgia. I fully agree with this statement of Comrade Bulganin, failing to work, Beria supported. They could not be touched.

We have a serious lag in Georgia in the field of economic work, and especially in agriculture. In some of our districts, 80% of collective farmers do not have any livestock at all.

After this Plenary, after the report of Comrade Malenkov and after the speech of comrades Khrushchev, Molotov and Bulganin, who revealed to us an eerie picture of the enemy work of the now exposed major pest and, apparently, the old spy Beria (the fact that Beria used to be a Musavatist intelligence and that the issue was raised in 1937 at the Plenum, I heard here today for the first time), our entire party will have even greater confidence in our collective leadership.

As for the Communist Party of Georgia, created in the distant past by our great leader Comrade Stalin, it is certainly healthy and tightly united around the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In general, the entire Communist Party of Georgia was, is and always will be one of the faithful detachments and a reliable support of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (Applause.)

As for the attitude of the Georgian people to all these things, I can, comrades, to assure the real Plenum that the Georgian people, seventeen decades ago, escaping from the threat of physical and national annihilation by the Turks and Persians, forever linked their fate with the great Russian people, and no scoundrels like Beria will be able to upset the most sincere friendship of the Georgian people with the great Russian people, their devotion to the unbreakable friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union, its unbreakable friendship with the peoples of the Soviet Union, its firm confidence in the Soviet Union. (Applause.)

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. Comrade Kaganovich has the word. Prepare to Comrade Bagirov.

Kaganovich. Comrades, Comrade Malenkov vividly, clearly and correctly reported, and Comrades Khrushchev, Molotov and Bulganin supplemented and illuminated the Plenum the political essence and all the circumstances of the case of the anti—Party, anti—state criminal Beria. The importance of this whole thing, its place in our political life, and the lessons that we must learn from this cause cannot be underestimated. This is not a political bias from the party line, but a dangerous counter—revolutionary, adventurous conspiracy against the party and the government. From the facts reported by comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov and Bulganin it is not difficult to see on all methods, essentially the actions themselves, on the goals that Beria led the case to a fascist coup.

We know that in our socialist state, with our close relationship between party and government with the people and with the complete separation of adventurer Beria and his ilk from the people, any attempt at a “palace” coup is doomed to imminent collapse. However, Beria could do a lot of damage to the party and the state both inside and outside, and to the leadership of the Beria party.

It must be said that if the Presidency of the Central Committee of the party was late for a very short time, calculated, maybe days, we today would have a very different position.

It is possible and necessary to learn from this case, to reveal our shortcomings and mistakes from this case, but above all we need to note and establish the main and basic things at this Plenum. And the main thing is that when the facts showed us that we were dealing with a counter—revolutionary, fascist conspirator, the Presidency of the Central Committee of the party acted decisively, quickly, and most importantly, cleverly. My hand didn’t flinch. The enemy was expelled from the party and arrested. In this way, the Presidency of the Central Committee justified the confidence of its Central Committee. (Applause.)

Voice. Correct.

Kaganovich. Comrade Bulganin here correctly noted the particularly outstanding role of the initiators of Malenkov's comrades, Khrushchev, Molotov, and as Comrade Khrushchev added, and Comrade Bulganin, and other members of the Presidency of the Central Committee.

When this case came to light here, I was in the Urals, arrived the day before the decision.

Malenkov. But when we informed Comrade Kaganovich, he made the same decision as all of us. (Applause.)

Kaganovich. Because we are all people of the same school, the schools of Lenin and Stalin, and all of us in our activities strive in peace, military, and at any other difficult time to be worthy students of their teachers. (Applause.)

And this time our party and the peoples of the Soviet Union, led by it, have seen once again, as it has been more than once in the history of our party in the fight against the enemies of the people, with the enemies of the party, that the peoples of the Soviet Union and the party can trust completely and entirely the leadership of their Lenin—Stalin Central Committee and its Presidency, faithful to the disciples of the great teachers and leaders of the working class Lenin and Stalin. (Applause.)

Of course, comrades, we can legitimately ask the question — it is good that you acted decisively and did away with Beria's adventurous plans and with him personally, and where have you been before, why did you allow such a man's leadership to the heart of your heart? This question naturally arises both in those present, and for each of us who want to honestly give themselves an answer to this question, to understand and truthfully answer it. Party members will also have this issue.

I must say that, analysing the state of affairs, as it turned out, we should in the behaviour and activities of this provocateur, as Comrade Malenkov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, the big provocateur, Beria , "to allocate" two periods, correctly called here. The first period — before Stalin's death, the second period — after Stalin's death.

Of course, today we look with different eyes, analyze all its activities in a different way, weigh the facts in a different way. However, it must be said that in the first period hardly any of us had, so to speak, the mood or assessment of Beria such, though close to the assessment that we give him today, when his deceiver activity was revealed. He acted from the background like a real provocateur like Fouché, but on a smaller scale, he acted underhand.

We've all seen that he's a schemer, that he's intrigued by one against the other, pits one against the other, sets Stalin against us and other comrades, but many of us thought that perhaps these are specific traits of his personal squabbling, intriguing nature.

Khrushchev. And mean.

Kaganovich. And vile, of course. But mostly a figure who works with us in the party.

Voroshilov. Correct.

Kaganovich. It must be said that we were dominated by another: he deftly rubbed into the trust of Comrade Stalin.

After you die. Stalin this vile man, who during Stalin's life showed himself as the first disciple, faithful and devoted, began to discredit Stalin. No one was afraid, he came to the fore from the background, he began to act with an open visor, he began to behave cheekily and brazenly.

This brazen, brazen and provocateur, as we have already begun to consider it, and later, as it is now established, an adventurer and counter—revolutionary, who did not know the power of the Bolshevik party, did not know the power and roots of each of us, thinking that he with impunity can take each of us by the throat, he imagined himself the “strongest” and “great” man who can, who everything is allowed, to whom everything is allowed. Each of us felt it, saw it, experienced it, each of us accumulated a sense of indignation, which then took the character of an organized and firm decision known to you.

The reason why we had not colluded and exposed it before was, first, that it was necessary to make sure firmly that it was not just a snatched man, but an adventurer and anti—state counter—revolutionary conspirator: secondly, we considered the issue

politically, and here correctly Comrade Malenkov, Comrade Khrushchev, Comrade Molotov, Comrade Bulganin laid out the essence of the case. We were in no hurry, we had no right to hurry as serious politicians. Each of us could jump out, reveal untimely maps, in advance, unpreparedly, and he, of course, could do a lot of vile political counter—revolutionary affairs.

It must be taken into account that he had the opportunity. Of course, comrades, if he addressed the people, the people would fail him, would expel him, but he had serious means in his hands — he was the Minister of the Interior. No wonder he rushed to this post, and he was eager. When I once asked, “It’s strange that you’re planning yourself for the Interior Ministry.” “It’s better,” he said. In general, he was not talking to most of us, only in meetings.

When we accumulated these facts and when we received a firm belief that we were dealing not only with the schemer, but that we were dealing with a counter—revolutionary conspirator, with an adventurer, with a provocateur, we began to act, and the Presidency was unanimous in this matter. I noted the role of the most active comrades, but we all made a quick and decisive decision. I think that everyone who soberly evaluates the facts, recognizes that 3—4 months after the death of you. Stalin is a short period of time for the disclosure and elimination of an enemy like Beria.

It must be said that under Stalin, having his general political leadership, we lived calmer, although Comrade Stalin, as correctly said, recently could not work so actively and participate in the work of the Politburo. There were two periods — before the war and after the war, when Comrade Stalin was already gathering us less often, when there was no such collective live exchange as it was before. Of course, this reflected and created a favourable environment for intrigue and vile clandestine activities of Beria. He’s a nimble man. In open meetings, it was still more difficult for him, and we did not show proper vigilance to his clandestine activities. Each of us knew that Stalin unites and has nothing to fear.

After Stalin died, after we suffered a grave grief, it is natural that we, all members of the Presidency, old and new, we were very tense and careful about the leadership of the collective that formed after

Stalin. We tried not to complicate the work. We worked so as to make less elements of the dispute. There were, of course, business disputes, but still we made decisions, in general, unanimously. We not only outwardly demonstrated unity, no, comrades. Each of us internally tried to really achieve this unity, not to complicate the work of the top management team. We have seen the inconsistencies associated with Beria, but still each of us thought — maybe the first period of shab, setting up, and the case of leadership will go more normally.

However, this insolent, and now it is clear that it is a provocateur and a political adventurer, took this our holy care, He took it in a very different way. Malenkov and Khrushchev both insist on why it is not written: “Approve the note of Beria”, he demanded to attach to the protocol and send to all to whom the protocols of the Presidency are sent.

Malenkov. It had to be dealt with immediately.

Kaganovich. That’s right. You can usually argue with any of us, it was impossible to argue with him like that. He was a temperamental, sharp man. With him, any of us engaged in a heated argument, but everyone knew that it was a highly partisan, ideological, principled Bolshevik, and any dispute that happened between us, ended with the fact that in two or three hours we moved on to the next case, as if there was no dispute. Forgive me our late friend Sergo for the comparison, but I do it to emphasize the meanness of Beria. So I think we were politically correct as Marxists, as Leninists.

Voice. Correct.

Kaganovich. We survived to the end, and then with one blow ended with this scoundrel forever. (Applause.)

The Presidency of the Central Committee summarized all his actions and came to the conclusion that we are dealing with the enemy of the party and the people. We opened this case in a timely manner. I don’t think the Presidency has to apologize. We have flaws and mistakes, we will reveal them in the order of criticism and self—criticism, but we speak with a clear conscience before the members of the Central Committee. In this short period of time we managed to

accumulate facts, managed to summarize the facts and at the right moment to solve the way our great teachers Lenin and Stalin would decide this case.

The party and the people will undoubtedly approve this decision of the Presidency, which will hopefully be approved by the resolution of the Plenary of the Central Committee of our party. (*Applause.*)

But, comrades, of course, exclude and arrest a little. We need, and for that we are discussing this issue, to learn from it and to mobilize the party for a new uplift on this basis, to raise the political and ideological—theoretical level through the fight against enemies, as it has always been in our party, and to properly explain this matter to the party and the people. We hope that the party and the people, as our comrades said here, will approve this event.

Who and what did we deal with? What is the socio—political face of all this?

The first and absolutely correct answer is that we are dealing with an adventurer, a crook, a provocateur and, of course, an international spy who has snuck into the leadership of the party and the state and has set his goal of trying to use his position to seize power. But that's the subjective side of the matter.

What is the objective basis, the objective background, whom does he reflect, what line did he put at the base of his activities? The ordinary adventurer sets a goal of personal gain, but when we are dealing with a political adventurer, we must look deeper that this adventurer has tightened up some views, unscrupulous, hopeless, but still his “principles”.

In contrast to the ideological principles of the Bolshevik party, which subordinates his work, his position, his position to the principles of ideological service to the work of the working class, the cause of communism, the adventurer, careerist Beria, on the contrary, subordinated his behaviour, his “line”, his “principles” to his adventurous plans — the seizure of power. In the name of what and whom? Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov and Bulganin about the line of bourgeois rebirth.

This line on bourgeois rebirth is aimed at undermining the socialist country, undermining its power and preparing its full subordination to foreign capital, at the rebirth of our state into a bourgeois state. That is why Beria hindered our work in agriculture and other industries, he carried out preparatory work to replace the line of communism, the line of Bolshevism, the line of Lenin—Stalin line of bourgeois rebirth. Of course, this is only an attempt by an adventurer, funny to think that it would have succeeded him. But he's messed up a lot of things, and if we hadn't exposed him, he'd have done it very seriously. This case cannot be underestimated. We faced a serious threat that was eliminated by the Central Committee of our party.

Until his decisive actions, he sought aggravation and complications of the situation in the country. Let's take the national question. Everyone knows that the basis of the power of our multi—ethnic state is the friendship of peoples. This friendship is the result of the victory of Lenin—Stalinist theory and practice of our party in the national issue. It played an important and decisive role in both peacetime and war. Our party has won this friendship of peoples in the fight against biases — great—power and local nationalism. So always Lenin, Stalin and all of us formulated this question. How did Beria approach him? He replaced the struggle for the purity of the national policy of our party, the struggle on two fronts replaced the setting of one nation with another, serving it under the saucer of flattery. As a matter of fact, his praise actually pitted one nation against another.

Comrade Stalin after the Great Patriotic War at the banquet, when we summed up the heroism of all the peoples of the Soviet Union who participated in the war, rightly, rightly so — and every communist, no matter what nation he belongs to, will say that it is fair — paid tribute to the people who most sacrificed their lives, to the people who were the front line in this unequal first time, the heavy war with German fascism. He paid tribute and made a wonderful toast to the great Russian people. Beria, in passing, flatteringly mentioned the Russian people and, without deploying the essence of the matter, filled his speech with flattering

praises of national republics, inciting national pride instead of ideological coverage of the national policy of our party, which, relying on the best people of all nations, ensured great victories in the fight against nationalists of all stripes.

At the heart of our policy is the internationalism of Marx—Engels—Lenin—Stalin. The national issue reflects the struggle of the classes. Beria didn't have anything like that. He had flattery, flattery and flattery, praise, praise and praise. This was already his speculation on the national issue.

As a result of the implementation of our policy on the national issue, on the basis of the victory of a single socialist system in the national economy, we have created new, socialist nations. These socialist nations need to unite more and more for their heyday, not to oppose them. Beria led to the separation of nations.

His line, which he pursued as Minister of the Interior, was aimed at pitting one nation against another within the Union republics. Even if, for example, to take the case of doctors, which some elements incorrectly associated with the Jewry in general, even the case of the release of doctors, which the party did correctly.

Voice. Correct.

Kaganovich. This was presented in such a way that some caused a reaction of opposition and over—poisoning.

Voice. Correct.

Kaganovich. On. Take all the decisions, as he presented them, for example, on Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus and other republics. Of course, there are drawbacks, no words. I think that we at the Plenum of the Central Committee assess these decisions on the republics correctly, basically a number of shortcomings are noted correctly.

Voice. Correct.

Kaganovich. But how did he bring it, how? There was a indiscriminate accusation. First, the indiscriminate justification of the Ounovs. It was during the war anti—Soviet army, which had to be destroyed, and he portrayed the Ounovs as innocent lambs.

If to nominate local cadres it is necessary to replace the current, it is necessary to do prepared, organized, prepare new personnel, give good work to the current workers.

That's how he acted with his project "on amnesty." Now it is clear that he did it in order to release them, to get them a receipt of allegiance and to use them afterwards for their vile deeds.

Voice. Correct.

Kaganovich. The Central Committee has destroyed the adventurer Beria and will certainly correct everything that is needed on the national issue, will ensure better preparation of these events and, of course, I have no doubt that we will ensure the flourishing of the socialist nations, we will ensure further strengthening of the national policy of our state and further implementation of the policy taught to us by Lenin and Stalin and which the party pursued. We will not allow the fight between nations, which was the lot and is the lot of bourgeois states, which was the lot of oppressed peoples under tsarism and eliminated in our country, so that this fight in our country to some extent flourished or even existed. We will strengthen the friendship of nations. This, comrades, is the key to our successful progress.

Let's take the question of Beria's attitude to the working class. I have to say that he was generally very dismissive of trade unions. All his comrades remember him saying about trade unions, that they are worth nothing, that they are slackers. And we know the importance the party attaches and attaches to this great union of the working class.

The great Leninist definition that trade unions are a school of communism remains valid to this day. It is no coincidence that Beria kept trying to wipe away the work. For example, he objected to being invited to the meetings of the Central Committee's Presidency. Beria persistently pushed housing construction for workers to the background, even when there was a great opportunity in connection with the liquidation and conservation of a number of large buildings.

Voice. Correct.

Kaganovich. And to show: here, say, "my" new course. This was presented as an audit of Stalin. Each of us is convinced that Stalin himself would correct the mistakes, as always, when he found them, especially when opportunities and health allowed him. We have already made a number of decisions. However,

Beria has been offered this under special sauce, with its special goals.

Voice. Correct.

Kaganovich. For Beria this question was not. Nothing, he says, will be tolerated, there is nothing to hurry with it. Not to mention the fact that this man did not know the workers, was not in the factories, did not speak to the workers, he was dismissive of all these issues.

Meanwhile, the issue of housing is now the most pressing issue across the country. There are wonderful plants, can give new reserves of capacity, and workers can not be recruited, because some of the available has no housing, and some live still in the semi—terrestrials. At Uralvagonzavod, at the Bereznikov chemical plant, for example, which were built 20 years ago, and they have many old barracks that were built 20 years ago. New factories are building houses, and there barracks are falling apart, and now the factories built in the 1st five—year period, with housing in a worse position than new ones. There is no more pressing issue than housing. Of course, the food is also spicy: there is little meat, sausages are scarce, but housing is especially acute. This applies to steel mills, construction materials factories, water and rail transport and other industries.

Voice. Correct.

Kaganovich. He led the provocative work of inhibiting our communist construction, he led the case to the bourgeois rebirth of our system. I will not talk here about agriculture, here have already spoken in detail comrades. After all, it is a fact that even before the death of Comrade Stalin, and after the death of Comrade Stalin, he slowed down the decision—making on agriculture, especially on livestock.

It must be said that he knew little about agriculture. The vineyard knew, and as for livestock, potatoes and vegetable farming, grain farming, he knew little, but with great aplomb spoke on agriculture.

There was a question about potatoes. Comrade Stalin in the “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR” teaches us that economic adventurers (as if it is written for him) do not know and do

not recognize the objective laws of the economy, they believe that they can write laws themselves. He is proved by Comrade Khrushchev, Comrade Malenkov, comrades Mikoyan, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and others that it is necessary to raise the harvesting prices for potatoes, it is impossible to keep the harvest price for potatoes 4 pennies per kilogram. And he, pressing on himself toga “orthodox”, slowed down this issue to finally leave the country without potatoes. For the adventurer is worthless: no and no, for him there is only a method of pressure. However, this is not the main method of our economy. The main method of our economy is an economic understanding of the essence of the matter — economic interest.

Now, I think things are going to get better. We have a lot of shortcomings in agriculture, but the collective farm system is a healthy system, it has huge reserves, huge opportunities.

For example, in the Urals agriculture is in a difficult situation, the region there is industrial, for example, in the Sverdlovsk region 11% of the population engaged in agriculture. Of course, the healthiest population of collective farms leaves, there are women, old people, children, no one to work. It is necessary to equip high mechanization and to balance the labour force, so that agriculture is not undermined, that the Urals do not import all agricultural products to the Urals, that the Urals feed themselves primarily with vegetables. Now that we have done away with the provocateur Beria, which has slowed down our movement, the party and the government will certainly fix the affairs of agriculture and others.

The main thing is that our party and its Central Committee have shown their strength and great vitality.

We know from history that always any hostile act of speaking against the state, against socialism, was primarily directed against the party. Why? Because the party stands like a rock, it is the backbone of the state, it is the leader of the working class; the party is a fortress of the working class, and without ruining the party, no one can do anything. That is why the oppositionists and the period of the previous, even before the Trotskyists, and the so—

called “Working Opposition” and others—Trotskyists, Zinoviev, right—, Bukharin and so on — all of them attacked the party. Time is not the same, of course, the period is not the same, but it is always necessary to remember it.

Comrade Stalin in 1937, dwelling on the shortcomings of party work and lessons of sabotage, said that trotskyists, right—who were 7—8 years ago political current, ceased to be a political current. They degenerated into bandits, the more it can be applied to Beria—this geek from geeks, who has absolutely no one behind him, but attacked the party undercover, counting on his forces in the interior ministry.

However, in his calculations it was his main tool. It is no coincidence that he did not want to go to the Central Committee, but put himself in the Interior Ministry. It would seem, why not in the Central Committee, but in the Czech Republic? Because it is a tool sharp and convenient for the device of various provocations and, as Beria hoped, to seize power, and at first to oppose the party.

His calculations were based on the fact that this apparatus of the Interior Ministry — a tool partially spoiled, as said comrade Malenkov, Comrade Khrushchev, comrade Molotov and others. It is partly spoiled by the fact that for a number of years it was spoiled not only by bad people — Yagoda, Jezhov, Abakumov — but was spoiled by the method. Gradually created a tradition, created a custom, created mores of uncontrollability of the Interior Ministry and separation from the party.

All the facts that were presented are not just disparate facts, no, it is a system of opposition of the Interior Ministry of the party. It seemed that the thin, on the contrary, is good, the Central Committee wants to help, and he, Beria, calls Comrade Khrushchev with malice: “On what basis the head of the department calls Kobulov — my deputy?” “No, I’m not going to let that happen,” Beria says.

I remember in 1924, when I was secretary of the Central Committee and head of the Orgrasprospr—house of the Central Committee, At the meeting of the Orgburo considered the issue of the nomenclature of workers, which had to be approved in the Central Committee. Comrade Molotov must remember this. Then

Comrade Stalin spoke and said: “No, Felix, we are talking about the system of party control, about the system of party leadership. It is necessary that the party appoints senior people. It is difficult for you as a drug addict, and you should be grateful to the KK for it.”

And then Beria, who does not stand Dzerzhinsky’s feet (if he was even an honest man), blatantly and cheekily flouted the rights of the KK. Because he didn’t want the Central Committee to know his people, for the Central Committee to control him. He wanted to control the party himself. The facts, which were told here, when the Interior Ministry was given special tasks to collect compromising materials on the secretaries of the regional committees and on the committees themselves, means nothing but an act that puts the party under the control of the Interior Ministry, it means that the Interior Ministry monitors the Communists, the secretaries of district committees, the secretaries of the regional committees.

If all the secretaries of the regional committees were in such a position as Comrade Serdyuk, what would they be as party—political leaders? That would be a disaster for our party. Such people under the supervision of the “Beria police” could not be the leader of the masses, could not be the leader of the socialist competition, such people can not be organizers of criticism and self—criticism, such people can not lead. He wanted to paralyze our cadres, turn them into rags, in order to dominate himself and to make it easier to carry out the fascist coup he conceived in the name of the party. It is impossible to speak to the people with the name of the Interior Ministry. He needed to speak on behalf of the party, and for that he had to break some people, turn some people into their agents and act. This line is enemy, it is a line of intelligence of foreign states, which are the masters of this vile traitor.

The idea was very big — to tear the Interior Ministry away from the Government and send it against the party and the government. He acted supposedly democratically and presented us within formation, but in fact he did not give us anything serious.

I have already said that he acted not only in local organizations, but also in the Presidency. It didn’t work out, it didn’t come up like that. But local party workers also brought it to the attention of the

Central Committee. He failed, this renegade, to create a wall between the Central Committee and local party organizations. Party people put the issue before the Central Committee. Our party managed to expose the enemy, the wolf in sheep's clothing. All his actions, and all the actions he took within the party, are the actions of the enemy who wanted to suppress our party. It is ridiculous, a party with such rich experience, having such a Central Committee, such leaders, a party that made under the leadership of Lenin—Stalin the path of great victories over enemies within the party, inside the country and over the enemies of our homeland, over imperialist sharks, such a party this pygmy, klop, of course, could never be suppressed. However, he was plotting it and people could have been killed.

He launched an attack on the party with an attack on Stalin. The day after Stalin's death, when Stalin was still lying in the Column Hall, he actually started to prepare a coup, began to overthrow the dead Stalin, he began to muddle, dirty, then told that Stalin said something about you, about another something, then said that Stalin and against him, Beria, went. He told us, a group of people: "Stalin did not know that if he tried to arrest me, the Chekists would stage an uprising." Did you say that?

Voices from the Presidency. Said.

Kaganovich. He was the one who spoke on the podium of the mausoleum. When he said that, we immediately felt that we were dealing with a scoundrel, a counter—revolutionary who was preparing something. He insulted, portrayed Stalin with the most unpleasant, offensive words. And all this came under the guise that we need to live in a new way now. I must say that he has achieved something. Stalin gradually began to leave the pages of the press.

Voices from the audience. Correct.

Kaganovich. We know very well that nothing human is alien to all human beings. That's what Marx was talking about. This is no stranger to Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin. We know well that every great man has flaws, and comrade Stalin had them. And we, his disciples, do not intend to deify and portray him without flaws. Moreover, we have always assumed and believed that our science,

the great science of Marxism—Leninism, not dogma, we are not the scribes, we understand creative Marxism.

We know, as it is written in the party's history, that Marxist—Leninist science cannot be seen as a collection of dogmas, as catechists and Marxists themselves as letter—eaters. Marxist—Leninist science cannot but be enriched with new experiences, new knowledge, and some of its positions cannot but change over time.

The haste, the sizzling whistling that Beria raised, showed that it was a careerist, an adventurer who wanted to discredit Stalin, undermine the foundation on which we sit and clear the way for ourselves. He wanted to undermine the foundation of the teachings of Marx—Engels—Lenin—Stalin, although he not only underestimated the theory, but simply did not know it, in his speeches — published and not published — you will find very little about Marxism—Leninism. Theoretically, he was a little savvy; the book that Comrade Molotov was talking about here was not written by him, he earned his capital on it.

Beria was hostile to claims that Stalin was the great successor to Lenin, Marx—Engels. Today, having eliminated this traitor Beria, we must fully restore Stalin's legitimate rights and call the Great Communist Doctrine—the teachings of Marx—Engels—Lenin—Stalin. (*Applause.*)

Beria didn't just want the amendments we're talking about. Amendments can be made, but to what, to the basics of Marxism—Leninism, and he wanted to eliminate Marxism—Leninism, he needs it to clear his way to bourgeois rebirth, to a fascist coup.

Of course, we soberly take into account the situation, do not get carried away, we know that we have shortcomings. Although the conditions are different, the situation is different, but it is useful to recall Comrade Stalin's report and the resolution adopted on his report at the Plenum of the Central Committee in 1937, on the issue of shortcomings and lessons of harm. In this report and in this resolution, Comrade Stalin raises a number of questions, analyses rotten theories that as if we have a class struggle completely outlived, raises a number of acute questions, speaks about shortcomings in our work. Comrade Stalin demands that we have an

honest criticism and self—criticism, that we do not have a parade, he criticizes and demands the urgency of the situation in which, in the name of not arguing, concede to each other in principle.

Of course, we must improve our party work. We have to take it to a higher level. Of course, we, in the Presidency of the Central Committee, have shortcomings, and I think that we will eliminate them now. It's a different environment now. Now we have a really partisan, friendly situation, there is no such thing as a scoundrel sitting here. We will work as it should Lenin—Stalinists, amicably criticizing each other, not afraid to become an enemy to each other.

That's how you need to work in party organizations at the bottom. We need criticism, but criticism is not hostile, but criticism of shortcomings that we need to address in order to improve our performance. We must raise our ideological and political work among workers and communists and strengthen the party bodies.

The party is above all for us. The scoundrel Beria has repeatedly said: the KK should deal only with propaganda and part of the personnel — to this he reduced the role of the CENTRAL. Organizing and politics are closely related, that's why we must keep the power of the Central Committee, protect it, strengthen it and that the Central Committee would really not be what this scoundrel wanted, but that it remained, as it has always been, a strong, central body of our party, which governs the whole life of our country. We, our comrades, understand, of course, that the internal and international situation has changed, not that that was before. We have many victories and successes, however, we should not and will not be carried away by success, we will be self—critical and vigilant.

The capitalist environment remained, it became smaller, the camp of democracy and socialism included a number of countries. However, the imperialist enemies that exist have exacerbated their hostile attitude towards us, and we must be alert.

The enemy is still strong, and we must respond with even greater force and vigilance to its strength. Still, and even with even greater frenzy, enemies will send spies, saboteurs, and most

importantly, will look for some points of support inside the country for their enemy work.

It is impossible, being fascinated by our achievements in strengthening our Soviet society, to deny that the known remnants of bourgeois elements in the mind and unfinished hidden living and survivable hostile elements exist and are fertile ground for imperialist intelligence.

Now there is no opportunity to speak openly hostile to the political movement in our country, especially since we have one powerful party and can not have two parties. But with the current activity and aggressiveness of imperialism and its intelligence remnants of bourgeois, including careerist, adventurous, elements in connection with foreign intelligence can not only be simple spies and pests, but also to prepare and organize counter—revolutionary conspiracies and adventures.

Beria has certainly been associated with international imperialist intelligence as a major agent and spy. The facts cited here, his letter and brotherhood with Rankovic and Tito, after Tito came from England and visited America, is no coincidence his proposal to abandon the construction of socialism in the GDR and focus on the de facto elimination of the GDR.

At the same time, it is necessary to conduct a great patient educational work with those who need to be rehabilitated and treated from rotten embryos, but at the same time to single out skillfully adventurers and people with bourgeois sentiments, to which vigilance and vigilance are needed. The Central Committee and the whole party will strengthen our ties with the masses, strengthen the care of the needs of the masses and further strengthen our Soviet state.

Comrades, as the holy saints, we must preserve the unity of the party and principled policy. Comrade Stalin said at the evening of the graduates of the Kremlin cadets: “Principled policy is the only correct policy.” This is the formula by which Lenin took a new position in attack. We are and will continue to pursue this policy. This principled policy has helped the Presidency to resolve the issue of exposing and isolating Beria.

If the Presidency of the Central Committee had strayed into small cases and petty disputes, it would not have found as much determination as it had shown. Only because the Presidency summarized the facts and looked at these facts from a political point of view, it saved the people, saved our party from upheaval, from the possibility of serious complications. We didn't allow it because we have a strong Central Committee. That's why I think that without bragging, for all the shortcomings that exist in the Central Committee and party organizations, we can say — the glory of our Bolshevik tradition of collectiveness and party wisdom! Kudos to our Central Committee, which was able to draw the conclusions that it had drawn quickly and decisively!

Comrades! Under the leadership of our party on one sixth of the earth built a socialist society, where there is no exploitation of man by man, no crises and unemployment, no antagonistic classes, and there are friendly classes of society, a society where there is no division into lower and higher races, on dominant and oppressed nations. The great fraternal family of socialist nations is building a new culture, national in form and socialist in content, builds communism.

To the great goal of communism peoples go under the banner of Marx—Engels—Lenin—Stalin. The party went by itself and led the working class, the working peasantry, the working intelligentsia throughout its history not in the darkness, not in the groping, but consciously, confidently, illuminating their way to communism with the most advanced and most revolutionary theory.

Our party successfully built, led, inspired the people to labour and military feats on the fronts of peaceful communist construction and on the battlefields of World War II, because it successfully fought the enemies of the party and rallied the peoples around its Central Committee, around its Soviet government.

And today the party, its Central Committee once again show their ideological and political power and power, their loyalty to the theory, principles and methods of Marxism—Leninism. We come out of this event even more united, even more united. We were cleansed of filth, we were cleansed of trash, we were cleansed of a

large provocateur, who spoiled the atmosphere, harmed and prevented us from working.

From this new test our party comes out even more united, and our KK is even more united.

Under the banner of Marx—Engels—Lenin—Stalin, under the leadership of his strong, wise Central Committee of the party, our party will lead the people to the new victories of communism not only in our country, but all over the world. (*Applause.*)

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. There's a suggestion, comrades, to take a break. There will be no objections?

Voice. No.

"Krushchev." A 15—minute break is announced.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. Let's keep going, comrades. There was a proposal to establish the regulations, as a lot of signed up and it is necessary to give an opportunity for more comrades to speak at the Plenum. There is a proposal to set a time limit for the speech of 20 minutes.

Voice. Correct.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. No other offers? No objections? Then please to the protruding comrades to adhere to the established regulations.

The word has Comrade Bagirov. Prepare for Comrade Malyshev.

Bagirov. Comrades, working away from Moscow, recently after the party and the country lost Comrade Stalin, I must tell the Plenum of the Central Committee, felt at heart some weight that something is wrong.

What happened, what's going on? Were all the measures that were carried out on Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, the decision on doctors' cases in the form in which it was sent to the field were needed? I have to say bluntly, it was hard for me, and to

share with comrades who do not receive the documents of the Central Committee, you can not, you do not have the right. And yesterday, when I first learned of Nikita Khrushchev's decision about what had happened, as if the heavy weight had taken off, I felt some relief. It's a relief, I think, felt not only me, but other comrades. It is difficult, comrades, to overestimate the significance of the decision of the Presidency of the Central Committee to expose Beria.

Report by Comrade Malenkov and speeches here at Plenum, tt. Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin and other members of the Presidency with exhaustive completeness and persuasiveness revealed the face and true methods of the enemy work of this international provocateur, a large—scale adventurer, Beria.

Beria, this chameleon, the worst enemy of our party, of our people, was so cunning and dexterous that I personally, knowing him for thirty—odd years, before the Central Committee's Presidency exposed him, I could not bite him, to reveal his real enemy gut. I can't explain it otherwise as my excessive credulity and dulling of the party, camorrist vigilance in my own double—breaker and scoundrel. This will be a serious lesson for me.

In support of what was said here in the report of Comrade Malenkov and other members of the Presidency about the adventurer Beria, his careerist aspirations, who know no limits, his attempts to always put himself forward, to put himself above the leadership of the party and the government — I will give a couple of examples from the facts of recent times.

Before that, I would like to say two words about what Nikita Sergeevich said here in his speech — about the work of this adventurer in the Musavat police. I must say that after the temporary defeat of Soviet power in Azerbaijan, I went to Russia and returned to Azerbaijan in 1920 together with our Red Army. But I know very well that under the counter—revolutionary Musavatist regime all the underground work, all the personnel, everything that was done in Baku by the party organization, all the instructions of Lenin and Stalin, transmitted through Astrakhan, through Kirov to Baku— all this was carried out under the direct leadership of Anastas Mikoyan. Anastas Ivanovic never said that.

As for The Archives of Baku, there are no traces on this matter, indicating that it was sent by a party organization.

Therefore, apparently, this man is not only in recent years working for enemies. Apparently, he was abandoned in our party by an agent of international imperialism for a long time.

Now with regard to his attempts, aspirations always jump forward, show everywhere and everywhere himself. Every time I visited Moscow, the members of the Presidency knew, because we had to visit Comrade Stalin together. I saw, watched how other members of the Presidency, then members of the Politburo, Comrade Stalin behaved modestly and how this cheeky behaved.

Two years ago, in 1950, the party and the government decided to expand the production of bread, mainly wheat, in the Caucasus republics. Now, in connection with the revision of a number of decisions that were not and do not have for individual republics, regions and areas of actual importance, the Council of Ministers decided to revise this issue and made a decision. Suddenly, out of the blue, a call to Baku was made by Beria, who said that he was preparing proposals for a review of this decision. It was only recently, the decision of the Council of Ministers was taken a month ago. And on the day he called, a decision was already received. Clearly, it's not his merit. I say this to the way he deftly, being a member of the Presidency and a member of the Central Committee of the party, knowing what is being done in the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, tried to pass out for his own, nominating his own self. Beria calls me and says, you know, I'm preparing a question about orders. I tell him, "How do you cook this?" He has recovered and says: we want to establish new orders. I think the question of orders is not an easy question. This is not an organizational issue. It is part of the Central Committee of the party and the government, it is a matter of policy, how can he prepare this issue.

Pegov. Moreover, this is not the case of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Bagirov. And even more so, it doesn't happen that even on the smallest issues related to our practical work, so that they don't first

call from the apparatus of the Central Committee of the party or from the apparatus of the Council of Ministers. As a rule, they always say:

I am calling on behalf of the Central Committee of the party or on behalf of the Council of Ministers. He has only one me.

Malenkov. What orders?

Bagirov. Orders of Culture, Allied and Republican Orders of Culture.

Bulganin. For what category of people?

Bagirov. For art workers, theatre workers.

Malenkov. For example, what orders?

Bagirov. You ask him, he told me , the Order. (Laughter in the hall.)

Malenkov. Orders can be someone's name.

Yusupov. I received a call on his behalf from his assistant, the Ordyns, that Beria was proposing to establish two groups of orders: the first group, the Allied Orders, the second group, the Republican Group; then establish the orders of the great people of national republics. For example, he has Nizami, Uzbeks have Alisher Navoi, etc. (*Laughter.*)

So far, we've been brought up in a different way. I said I should think about it.

Bagirov. Our opinion was that it is better to talk on this issue in the Central Committee

Voice. Did you call Comrade Malenkov on this issue?

Bagirov. I didn't call.

Voice. Not good.

Bulganin. The Central Committee didn't know about it.

Malenkov. The Central Committee did not know, and it turns out that without the knowledge of the Central Committee, he talked to the republics. We only found out for the first time now.

Bagirov. The correct comment here was a remark that I did not report to the Central Committee. There's nothing to justify. That's absolutely right. But the fact remains.

I'll tell you more. Apparently, Beria, what he spent on Lithuania, on Ukraine, tried to extend not only to those areas and areas that have not such a long period of establishment of Soviet

power. He did not address us, the Central Committee or the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan on this issue. On his instructions, the Minister of State Security of the Republic Emelyanov called to provide information about the national composition of the Interior Ministry' employees. Emelyanov's comrades were also asked for ideas on who could be replaced from among the local nationality. Emelyanova, as well as a dozen other comrades, was raised by the Azerbaijani party organization. Emelyanov replied to the person who called him on Beria's instructions, that since the minister requires information on the national composition of the Interior Ministry, I can report, but in regards to whom I can be replaced, I ask to contact the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the Republic.

Here my comrades can tell why I didn't call the Central Committee. It must be said that we have dozens of calls every day. Until yesterday Nikita Sergeevich called me, did not say what happened, I did not know, and when he informed me about the arrest of Beria, it did not surprise me.

Malenkov. Why do you keep yourself here at the Plenum? No one's charging you, it's about exposing Beria.

Khrushchev. You explain it that way because everyone knows and I know. When you were met and asked— did Beria call? “You say no. You know him more than anyone else, so people know him more than anyone else.

Voice. Correct.

Bagirov. In terms of calls. I left here after the death of Comrade Stalin on March 16. During this time he called me twice, which I said above.

Voice with T. Comrade Bagirov, when you start to make excuses, you do it not in full voice. You will say that the Central Committee has forgotten in recent years...

Bagirov. I am?

A voice from the spot. We went to the chief.

Bagirov. I am?

A voice from the spot. And they went to Beria's all the time.

Bagirov. I do not know whether there is a reason for my comrades to make such a demand to me, maybe it is, but I, for

example, the Central Committee did not forget for a moment and on all issues, when I had to allow them, always called one of the secretaries of the Central Committee.

I couldn't count Beria as the head of Azerbaijan, even though he tried to do it. It's different. Maybe Comrade Ignatov will speak and say in more detail, but I can't take it upon myself and say that I bypassed the Central Committee. I will tell you more: whenever I came to Moscow, I visited the Central Committee and its departments.

Voice. It's another story.

Bagirov. I want to tell you how it is. This is the case of the Plenum Of the Central Committee, how it will react.

Suslov. Instructors of the Central Committee were afraid to go to Azerbaijan.

Bagirov. Azerbaijan?

Suslov. Yes, to Azerbaijan, they were afraid that you have a boss.

Bagirov. I don't know who they were afraid of or why you were still silent about the bosses.

Malenkov. Comrade Bagirov, you're making excuses. You were close to Beria, but that's not the issue being discussed.

Voice. Correct.

Malenkov. And Plenum is therefore perplexed. You make excuses, you defend yourself. That's not the point.

Bagirov. Comrades, the revelation by the Presidency of the Central Committee of the party of this hardened, cunning and deft enemy, decisive actions of the Presidency are the best proof of the correctness of the line and vision of the party leadership. This is a guarantee, a sure guarantee that any attempt, on whose part it may be, to shake the unity of the ranks of our party will be mercilessly crushed.

The fact of the harmful work of Beria once again shows that we, including me, especially after the death of Comrade Stalin, need to raise our vigilance even higher than ever before, to raise our vigilance in the ranks of our party, in the ranks of all Soviet people. Now we need to expand and strengthen our party's ties with the

general masses of working people, to unite the Soviet people around the party and the government even closer.

The question of the friendship of peoples. This was rightly said here in the speeches of the members of the Presidency, it is the basis on which our power is based, on which our power, our power is based. Further strengthening this friendship and uniting all the peoples of the Soviet Union around the great Russian people is our sacred task, our sacred duty.

The events carried out by the Presidency in relation to this scoundrel, the international adventurer Beria, and the decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee will be unanimously confirmed and warmly approved by our party.

Comrades, our party is the party of action, the struggle party, the party of creation, the party created by the great Lenin. To stay at the helm of this party, on the great streams of the revolutionary movement, whose goal is to build communism, it is necessary to be the way a faithful soldier, a faithful son, a faithful disciple, a faithful member of our party should be. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the emergence and disappearance of such adventurers as Beria, not only can not influence the pace of our movement forward, on the contrary, each case of such revelation further strengthens the ranks of our party, further increases the combat capability of our party, further unites the party around the Central Committee, further unites our people around the party and government.

I, comrades, have been, are and remain faithful to the great covenants of Lenin—Stalin, a loyal soldier of my party, at any moment ready to perform any tasks of the party and the government.

I don't make excuses, I just want to say it hurts me some replica mates listen to. Maybe there are many mistakes in my work, but the only thing I always do is one thing: to serve the party, to serve the cause of the party, to serve the people, to serve the country, to serve socialism, to serve communism, that's all I can say.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. The word has Comrade Malyshev. Prepare for Comrade Snehkas (*Lithuania*).

Malyshev. Comrades, what we heard yesterday from Comrade Malenkov, from Comrade Khrushchev, from Comrade Molotov, today from Comrade Bulganin, from Comrade Kaganovich, shows us what enemy in the person of Beria made his way to the leadership of the party and the government. Their statements opened our eyes to many actions, to Beria's behaviour, which we have seen many for a long time. As a minister, for example, I worked under the guidance of several comrades, both for Comrade Molotov, comrade Kaganovich, and for Beria. I must say that every time you go to report on a question to your comrades, you go with a different feeling. With one feeling you go to Comrade Molotov, about whom we know that he is a strict leader, demanding, but always, when you go to him, you know that there will never be hasty decisions, adventurous decisions, never you, if you have not made a major and serious mistake, will not be under attack because of some mood. Here comrade Kaganovich is a short—tempered man sometimes, but we know that he is also a waste. He will flare up, but quickly and will move away and make the right decision. Beria is another matter. We ministers knew you were going into the cabinet as a minister and whoever you were coming back, you don't know, maybe a minister, or maybe you'll go to jail. The method was: "knock on the head," you go out and swing. In short, Beria's leadership style is dictatorial, rude, non—partisan.

Speaking of partisanship. I worked under Beria during the war, ran tank business and after the war a year or a year and a half on Transmash and made sure that he never had partisanship. He somehow set up or pushed not directly, but indirectly, that the party organization should only provide services, on his part were only orders, commands to the secretaries of the regional committees of the party. Many secretaries can say that there was only a snooker—you do something else.

Voice. Correct.

Malyshev. There was no such situation that he taught us partisanship, that the regional party organization would ask for help to organize party work and so on. He considered the secretaries of the regional committees of the party dispatchers. For what case Beria will take, on such a case the secretary of the regional committee should be a dispatcher. Of course, we were oppressed. We thought that there was something wrong, but we forgave, thought, a great thing does a man, hot, probably, so it is necessary. In fact now it is evident that it is no coincidence that it was a non—partisan style of work. Beria didn't make any mistakes. I must say that, of course, we and his authority were considered, we often considered him infallible, and sometimes just afraid, despite his position as a member of the Central Committee, afraid of him, what there sin to hide.

Many of us have seen Beria literally every day, especially after the death of Comrade Stalin, more and more brazen and swollen. He ruthlessly pressed his high position on people. Beria commanded, dictatorial, insulted, intimidated people, including ministers and members of the Central Committee. At every turn he stressed his power and showed that what he does, all this is done on behalf of the party, on behalf of the government, and if there is no formal decision today, he will still make a decision. And we had the impression that Beria wanted, he would hold. Obviously, not only I had such an opinion, but many. Now the facts have become known that he deceived the Central Committee, that behind the back of the Central Committee and the government, using its position as chairman of the Special Committee, single—handedly conducted and signed the most important state decisions, decisions of great state importance. Comrade Malenkov has already said that he signed a very important decision on experiments with a hydrogen bomb. We started digging through the archives and found that he had signed a number of major decisions without the knowledge of the Central Committee and the government, for example, in terms of work for 1953 on a very important design bureau working on the construction of atomic bombs. He hid and single—handedly signed a number of other solutions, which will cost many, many hundreds of millions of

rubles, decisions on special issues. He hid them from the government, single—handedly signed, using his position as chairman of the Special Committee.

I still want to say one thing. Especially after the death of Comrade Stalin, and during the life of Comrade Stalin, somehow it was difficult for us to go sometimes to meetings of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, especially when Beria presided. It hurt us, I will say bluntly, it was often hurtful and painful to see Beria rudely interrupting, not only us ministers — we have already come to terms with this case — but the leaders of our party and government. It was just a shame, for example, for Comrade Voroshilov. We have been used to it since the Age of Komsomol that Kliment Voroshilov is Voroshilov. Am I right?

Voice. Correct.

Malyshev. One word — Voroshilov — said a lot for us, and Beria at the meetings rudely cuts off Voroshilov, tress. Clement Efremovic recently led culture, voluntary defence societies. I remember How Clement Efremovic reported on the charter of the united voluntary society. Beria rudely cut off, insulted him.

Beria and Comrade Shvernik played. We've already talked about it here. He was dismissive of Shvernik, he was rude. Andrey Andreev mocked Andreyev. Andrey Andreevich was sick, we all saw that a man could not work, and on the part of Beria ridiculed the disease, statements with a grin: "He is there, in the apartment, sick."

Such disdain for the respected comrades we all respected was jarring. We are not used to such an attitude towards old leadership comrades.

Voroshilov. And the young ones?

Malyshev. I don't think I'm young. We're used to him banging on the head. It must be said, and afraid of him, the authority of great y him was. We thought that it was forgivable for the big man to admit rudeness, we tolerated his antics for the sake of our party, state affairs. Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan. That's a fact. We were very sorry for that. We have known all of Molotov's comrades since the age of Komsomol. These are tried and tested comrades, and suddenly

for some reason it turned out that they are not needed in the leadership of the party. It was incomprehensible. Now everything is clear. Beria cleared the way to power. First Voroshilov under the guise of old age was rubbed, then Molotov, imposing some far-fetched mistakes, allegedly he almost with the Americans and the British kisses at every intersection. It is clear that Comrade Stalin did not say this from his own words, Beria presented these materials to him. Beria wiped out one after another tried and tested party comrades, broke down the collective work of the governing body of our party, so that it was easier for him to get to power. Our souls were sick, and our brains could not be very much. They couldn't figure it out right away. Beria sought a dictatorial position, leadership in the party and the country, directly climbed into the prime ministers, no matter what.

Such a person in the leadership of our party, in the leadership of our state was a mortal danger to our party and the state. We, members of the Central Committee, see that the Presidency of the Central Committee of our party was at the height of the situation, showed Leninist—Stalin's foresight and timely unravelled this adventurer, provocateur and enemy and took a courageous, it is courageous and wise, deeply partisan decision, neutralizing Beria and preventing the party and the country from great troubles. We fully approve the decision taken by the Central Committee of the party. (Stormy applause.)

We believe more than ever to our Presidency of the Central Committee, the Leninist—Stalinist Presidency of the Central Committee, under whose leadership we will work. (Applause.)

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. The word is given to Comrade Snechkas. Prepare for Comrade Shatalin.

Snechkas. Comrades! Lithuania gained sad notoriety in connection with Beria's provocative note in the ninth year of Soviet rule after liberation from Hitler's invaders. Now it is clear to us why It was necessary for Beria to inflate the importance and role of the bourgeois—nationalist underground in Lithuania. This was done in

order to exploit our shortcomings in the work, excessively inflating these shortcomings, to show themselves to be the saviour of the Soviet power in Lithuania.

Everyone, reading this provocative note, thought about the order there in Lithuania: so many years of Soviet power, and the earth is burning underfoot.

What was it like for us, the communists of Lithuania?

After all, it was said there that if the measures in Lithuania are not taken immediately, the case of the Soviet authorities in Lithuania will be in jeopardy.

At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania, I could not cite anything convincing in support of this provocative thesis, and no member of the Plenary even remembered this provocative hysteria.

Beria also incredibly inflated the reactionary influence of the Catholic Church, saying that 90 percent of Lithuania's population are devout Catholics. Meanwhile, the Catholic Church could wish for such a percentage in the best bourgeois times for it.

There are no words, the struggle of the Lithuanian people against Lithuanian bourgeois nationalists and their social support — fist was harsh and difficult. We should not forget that Lithuanian bourgeois nationalists to fight the Soviet power armed the Germans, and then actively supported them American imperialists. We have lost more than 13,000 poor people, labourers and partly party—Soviet assets in this struggle. But this struggle against the class enemy under the leadership of the Central Committee was largely brought to an end. I must say that this year we have only 7 soviet people killed. But where are the arguments that the case of Soviet power in Lithuania is under threat? Bourgeois nationalists themselves admit that they lost the fight. By the way, the note mentioned that the underground is led by a former captain of the Lithuanian bourgeois army Jemaytis, elected underground to the "presidents of Lithuania." That this captain of the bourgeois Lithuanian army Jematis was not caught then — it is, of course, our fault. But now they caught Yemaitis, and without Beria's help his Lithuanian Chekists caught him.

Bulganin. And he attributed it to himself.

Snechkas. What turned out to be this “President of Lithuania” Jematis? He orders to bring Zemaitis to Moscow for personal interrogation.

Malenkov. Did he interrogate him?

Snechkas. Yes, he was interrogated on Thursday last week. Martavicius said that after the interrogation of Zemaitis Beria made a proposal to create an underground nationalist organization with the help of Zemaitis. You see, first Beria inflated the role of Zemaitis, and now makes an offer to the same Martavicius to create with the help of Zemaitis an imaginary nationalist organization.

Wasn’t another provocation Beria was preparing to write another note about the imaginary mighty nationalist underground. By the way, how Beria tried to help the cause of the elimination of the nationalist underground in Lithuania. After a meeting of the Presidency two or three days later, I came to Beria for a face—to—face conversation. It was the only conversation. (Laughter.)

Pervukhin. Did he call you?

Snechkas. No, I called myself and said that I would like to talk to him about some measures to combat bourgeois nationalism. I told him I wanted to talk. Comrade Gedvilas, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian USSR, was also present at this private conversation.

Malenkov. He hid from the Central Committee that you were with him.

Snechkas. And now you can find out everything.

Khrushchev. Beria sought to summon secretaries of the Central Committee and the committees to the Interior Ministry.

Snechkas. By the way, I did not use such “good”.

Khrushchev. That’s not what he’s called for.

Snechkas. I put forward a question in this personal conversation about the need to clog all the transmissions of enemy stations, which are conducted in The Lithuanian language, and in Lithuanian transmissions at least six broadcasts a day, and radio transmitters in Lithuania can receive them. You see, bad

scoring exists, and that eliminates he wants. So what kind of help is it in the elimination of the bourgeois—nationalist underground? And on the radio, the American imperialists broadcast all sorts of installations to the still bourgeois nationalist snouter in Lithuania.

Now a few words about how Beria's note was made. I knew something a little earlier, but last night Deputy Interior Minister Martavicius told me (I may have broken order, but I said, tell me everything you know about Beria). (*Laughter.*)

So that's how this note was made. It was not Sharia, which was mentioned, it was mainly another magician in general form — Sazykin. This Sazykin was in Lithuania twice, but he did not go to the Central Committee, and the Central Committee did not even know that he was in Lithuania, was incognito. For a lot of weight there was a rumour that he was an atomizer at the same time. (*Laughter.*)

Comrades from the Lithuanian Interior Ministry initially objected to many provisions in Beria's note, but were then forced to sign the document after obscene rudeness. Comrade Martavicius, deputy interior minister of the Lithuanian SSR, writes: "The report note written by us (i.e. Kondakov, Martavicius—an old Lithuanian communist with clandestine experience, Gailavicius—a communist also with underground experience." A.S.), was a very self—critical report note, but Beria was not satisfied. He accused us of concealing the real situation in Lithuania (although the leadership of the Lithuanian Interior Ministry did not allow this even in thought). Beria scolded us with the most low—grade scolding, threatened and forced to remake in his spirit, that is, to inflate the state of the current nationalist underground and governing centres of the Catholic clergy, to show them massive, slenderly organized and centralized, out of our sight. As for the nationalist underground, we do not have such a situation in the republic, but we had to describe it underground as Beria wanted. My objections to Beria against this biased assessment of the situation he attacked me with swearing with threats." That's how that note was made.

Oh, by the way, about the proverbial figure. The report notes give a large figure — 270,000 all repressed, but it was not fair. Here

at least take what is there, in the note, indicated since 1944, and meanwhile includes and repressed before the war of 1941. It's one thing, and then there seems to be several times the same person passing through. This figure includes Germans repatriated to Germany. And this figure we have now started to walk in the republic, on the Plenum it was notified.

Why was Beria going to inflate the situation in Lithuania? Apparently, the Americans. I have to remember, comrades, Eisenhower's speech last fall, when he talked about the fact that the Americans are determined to free their blood brothers — the Baltic residents. Remember, there was an editorial in Pravda. Apparently, it was necessary to inflate the existence of the bourgeois—nationalist underground, to inflate the shortcomings, to give new trump cards in the hands of American imperialists.

Of course, both this note and what has become a property abroad have done us great damage.

What's the situation now?

It was correctly said here by Comrade Khrushchev and Comrade Molotov that bourgeois—nationalist elements in Lithuania began to unravel, they began to unravel after the harmful rush to replace the Russians with Lithuanians in the Interior Ministry. And here Beria aimed to show himself as the only conductor of national policy, diminishing the authority of the Central Committee.

In fact, Beria acted in order to sow discord between Lithuanians and Russians, to incite all sorts of nationalist passions.

What is the nature of these rumours in Lithuania? The Russians will be expelled from Lithuania, and the exiled fists will return to Lithuania, and the Lithuanian communists will be expelled for the Russians. We will kill these Lithuanian communists like rabbits. At the same time, rumours are spreading that collective farms will be dissolved. This is how bourgeois—nationalist elements are unleashed.

I must say, comrades, that we did not allow a mass replacement of Russian comrades, and none of those working in the party apparatus were released.

The day before the flight to Moscow, Tov. Moskvinov (formerly secretary of the Vilnius Regional Committee) told me and the inspector of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Sheblykin, who is in Lithuania, that one retired officer, a participant of the Patriotic War, a disabled man, spoke at the Shlginik district committee, and said: this is Beria's guilty state.

The colonel guessed what he had learned here at the Plenum.

What I could say before the flight, then we knew nothing about Beria.

Of course, It is impossible to think that Beria with his provocative antics could restore more or less broad layers of Lithuania against the Soviet power.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. It's time to go.

Snechkas. I'd ask for five to seven more minutes.

Voice. Give.

Snechkas. We sowed well. The farmers went out to work together, proceeded amicably to the haymaking. There is not a single fact of individual cleaning, meanwhile last year in some young collective farms the facts of individual cleaning were noted. There are none this year. So, our collective farms are not bloated, not like Beria wanted to imagine. We have good collective farms and even good ones, but we have our own shortcomings in collective farms and general shortcomings, which Comrade Khrushchev spoke about here. We are very carefully preparing proposals to the Presidency on measures to raise agriculture in Lithuania. We have up to 90 percent of the peasants living on farms. This issue has been raised for the last two years, the Central Committee was actively and personally supported by Comrade Malenkov, and Beria in the Council of Ministers failed this issue.

Of course, we have flaws in the national policy of the party, and here they were talked about by Comrade Kaganovich — both on national staff, and on the nomination, especially in the party apparatus. Only 0.5 percent of the Communists have been nominated by Lithuanian communists over the past year. There are very few

Lithuanians in the apparatus of some rural district committees. But on the issue of national cadre, Beria did not give an exact picture in the note.

We asked for personnel from the Central Committee, we asked for it, and now we are trying to keep those comrades that we need. There are indeed our shortcomings.

In any case, Beria can not be attributed to the initiative in the nomination of national personnel.

But it must be said here that at the same time there are shortcomings in party work, as Comrade Molotov correctly said. Of course, we are to blame for the fact that the secretaries of the Central Committee did not put these questions, but do not want to bypass the party apparatus, and meanwhile there did not always listen to the opinion of the Lithuanian communists. Unfortunately, there were such facts. And this could not have a positive effect on our party—organizational work on the cultivation of communists of Lithuanian nationality.

Another manoeuvre of Beria's provocation. Abroad there are many Lithuanians, only about 800,000 people, meanwhile the population in Lithuania is 2700,000 people. You see, what kind of family ties with those living abroad, especially in America. And indeed, a difficult situation was created in the field of nomination of new people. Last year at the meeting of the Secretariat we were asked that we cannot nominate Lithuanian communists to the IGB bodies, because grandmothers and aunts and all kinship here played a decisive role, and not the man we could recommend as a devoted party man, despite the shady sides of his relatives. There is Beria, who, using this provision, acts as an amnesty, you see, they say, I approach it differently.

Beria's provocative note perverted the true position of the Leninist—Stalinist national policy in Lithuania.

We have considerable changes in the mood of the intelligentsia. We still have some debates about our national affairs, about our history, but that have to do with our practical work. We also have a lot of success in the development of the history and culture of the Lithuanian people, where nationalist remnants are the most resilient.

I'll go for one example. Recently we held a conference of the Academy of Sciences of the Baltic countries with the participation of historians of Moscow. This could tell Comrade Pankratova, who participated in this conference.

We will continue to learn to fight fundamentally against all nationalist remnants. Comrade Malenkov drew our attention to these remnants in his report. They are, of course, resilient. We must be vigilant in any part of our work, as Comrade Molotov has said. Recently, instructions from abroad were intercepted, in which Lithuanian nationalist organizations were tasked with infiltrating our organizations, to find out whether there were no people of The Titov direction among Lithuanian communists.

We must be vigilant, we must put an end to the remnants of bourgeois—nationalist snou than. But in this fight, of course, we have to hit the target. In this regard, we were correctly criticized at the Presidium of the Central Committee that party and Soviet bodies in Lithuania still allow administration. That's the guilt we're pleading guilty to. But we do not recognize, and no one now accuses us of fighting against people who made it difficult to carry out land reform, which made it difficult to collectivize.

We in Lithuania have many shortcomings in the implementation of Lenin—Stalin's national policy, and in the insufficient management of collective farms. Under the leadership and the central committee of the party, with the help of its Presidency, monolithic, unified and cohesive, we will correct these shortcomings. I can state with full responsibility that the Communists of Lithuania will meet unanimously the upcoming decision of the Plenum, which will stigmatize the enemy of the party and the people of Beria. (Applause.)

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. Comrade Shatalin asked to give him his word later. The word is given to Comrade Kruglov, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

Kruglov. Comrades! The decision taken by the Presidency of the Central Committee of our party to arrest the enemy of our state,

the bourgeois rebirth and adventurer Beria, is the only right decision. In the report of Comrade Malenkov and in the speeches of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, T. Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich shows the whole sneaky role and the enemy face of this enemy of our state. The removal of this enemy and the rogue will strengthen our party, strengthen its unity and cohesion around the Leninist—Stalinist leadership of the party and will be perceived by all party members and honest people with a sense of special satisfaction.

A cunning, cunning and dangerous enemy made his way to the heart of our party, to the leadership of our country. The dissimulation of this enemy, the exposure of his hostile person and the suppression of his counter—revolutionary activities are a great credit to our Central Committee of the party and its Leninist—Stalinist Presidency.

The party won a major, big victory in the struggle for communism, timely exposing this adventurer and the enemy. Our party and our state defused a dangerous filth that could do a lot of damage. Especially the correctness of this decision is clear to those who had at least a little communication in the service with this hench. Beria's behaviour often made me think, especially in the last three months. The adoption of non—appeal decisions, the complete disregard of all other opinions except him, brazen and boorish judgment on all issues were in great contradiction with the party's teachings about the methods of leadership, about attitude to people, about collectivism. There are many comrades present here, in whose life this tail has done a lot of harm and much has carried away health. Humility, arrogance, unbearable rudeness, humiliation, destruction of all human dignity — that's the lot of people whom fate brought to talk to this parasite Beria. We witnessed at the meetings of the Council of Ministers, when this Beria allowed itself a boorish attitude to the people the party knows, whom the entire Soviet people know, who have huge, immeasurable successes and merits in the victory of our revolution. I witnessed that Beria ignored and abused Comrade Voroshilov at one meeting of the Presidency. I remember

how Clement Efremovic answered him very cleverly, everyone liked this answer very much, “I even dream of you.” I then thought how cleverly Clement Efremovic responded to this brazen.

Tymoshenko. Were you happy and smiling then?

Malenkov. The Central Committee knows Kruglov, he grew up with the Central Committee apparatus. He had to endure a lot.

Kruglov. There is no doubt that if he had not been stopped by prison, he would have gone far in the fight against our party and, as it has become abundantly clear, could have tried to use the Interior Ministry apparatus. But this tail would have miscalculated this time. In the vast majority, with the exception of a small handful of especially close people to Beria, the interior ministry’s staff is devoted to our party, its Leninist—Stalinist Central Committee, and no Beria will be able to use it for its nefarious purposes. (Applause.) However, now it is necessary to critically understand all behaviour of Beria during the last 3 months in the Interior Ministry, I am talking about 3 months, because a number of employees who now work in the Interior Ministry, as Kruglov, Serov, Maslennikov, the last 10 years had nothing to do with the current Interior Ministry (still IGB) had no relation to the current Interior Ministry (still IGB). After all, the present Ministry of the Interior is the former IGB, and the IGB solved the issues of intelligence, counterintelligence, arrests of people, etc. The Old Ministry of the Interior, in which we worked until the death of Comrade Stalin, had nothing to do with the IGB and did not know what was going on there. And when for 3 months on the next month you understand the behaviour in the new Interior Ministry of this Beria, then much speaks in a different, true sense, and becomes clear its anti—party and hostile face. It becomes clear that he wanted and took into account in his nefarious plans to use the system of the Interior Ministry. To this end, under the sign of special conspiracy, all the issues of intelligence and counterintelligence were solved by him and Kobulov. We, who are listed as deputies—Kruglov, Serov and Maslennikov — learned about many issues only from the minutes of the meetings of the Presidency of the Central Committee. For example, we learned the decision on Belarus only from the protocols

of the Central Committee's decisions. The decision on the Korean issue was unknown to us. It was also unknown to us in the German Democratic Republic. There are still in the protocols of the decision on the Interior Ministry, the so—called special folder, but we do not know what these questions are, for us they are unknown. We were not aware of the cases in the investigative unit in the most important cases, because they were solved by Kobulov and Beria. We did not know what operational activities were carried out against some comrades, and only now we became aware of it. We were entrusted mainly with the issues of police work, fire protection issues, economic issues — in short, everything that concerns the former Interior Ministry. As for the former IGB, it was forbidden.

Why did we put up with this case? We are responsible for that. We failed to uncover this enemy during this period. We were helped by the Presidency of the Central Committee. Therefore, like all those here, I express my great gratitude and satisfaction at the firmness and correctness of the decision of the Central Committee of the party on the question of Beria.

Our task now is to help to fully, to the end expose this crook, three times a traitor, a crook, a provocateur, brazenly and smugly standing among our leadership, and our leadership is the pride of the people and the pride of our party. This schemer, slanderer, provocateur by vocation, immoral scoundrel to the bone combined the greatest meanness and the greatest audacity.

The investigation will reveal all the hostile activities of Beria, but even now some of his measures, in our opinion, are harmful and anti—state. Especially on intelligence issues. We now know that in April and May of this year Beria simultaneously summoned to Moscow about half of the employees of the residents of the Interior Ministry.

Hammers. Where did they come from?

Kruglov. Vyacheslav Mihajlovic, from abroad, from capitalist countries.

Malenkov. Several hundred such workers were called in.

Kruglov. Currently, there are about 200 people who live in Moscow for two to three months, about which the issue is not solved.

During this time, the work of the resident of the Interior Ministry has weakened. Many valuable agents have been lost. Residents of Soviet intelligence in capitalist countries were bare and were left without leadership for a long time.

Voice. It was deliberately done.

Kruglov. That's right. In Moscow, the Commissioner of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR for Germany and his deputies sat for three months, and at the time of the preparation of the mutiny in Germany, Beria decided to reduce the office of the authorized Interior Ministry in the GDR seven times. We decided to abolish the instructor apparatus in Germany, leaving only Soviet functions.

It seems doubtful and indiscriminately omulating Beria all that is in the ward intelligence. He has repeatedly stated that there is no intelligence, that there is no agency, no valuable information, there are no personnel and everything should start on a bare ground. At the same time, as it became known, Beria and Kobulov were focused on the abandonment of a number of intelligence activities, and many materials on foreign intelligence were not reported to the Central Committee of the party.

A number of facts with the appointment of senior officials of the Interior Ministry suggest that Beria was intended to have people loyal to himself in the districts, without taking into account the political allegiance of their party. A number of appointments by people such as Reichman, Etingong²², Sudoplatov, Meshik, Milstein, and others who absolutely do not enjoy the political trust of the collective and were expelled from the Interior Ministry before his arrival, as it has now become clear, should be considered as a desire to have to the end devoted to him people.

Beria has drastically reduced and cleaned up the intelligence agency. In a short period of time, a large number of people were dismissed, taken to the bodies of party mobilization.

²² *That's right: Eitingon.*

Particular attention is drawn to the recent creation of Beria, bypassing the structure of the Ministry's new department approved by the Central Committee, which is personally subordinate to it and does not know what it is doing. Even the personnel in this department were selected in addition to the Office of Personnel of the Ministry.

Recently, the newly appointed resident in Finland, Kotov, said that during his time at the reception at Beria the latter invited him to visit the former Minister of the Interior of Finland renegade Leino, who was allegedly improperly pushed away by the Finnish Communists. Beria made it clear to His friend Kotov that Leino should meet. This instruction of Beria looks extremely suspicious, as it is impossible to consider normal the meeting of our Soviet workers abroad with persons who are renegades and traitors of the labour movement.

Comrades! In the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or rather, the former IGB, a difficult situation has developed lately. Over the past three years, there has been ongoing breakdown and reorganization. This greatly shook the device. But the Communists working in the system of the Ministry of the Interior, to which their party sent, are well aware that, under the guidance of their own Communist Party, its Central Committee, taking all the lessons into account, they will take all measures to strengthen the organs in order to turn them against our class enemies, will increase their revolutionary vigilance in their work and will make every effort to justify the great trust that the Motherland gives us, which the Leninist—Stalin Central Committee of the Party gives us. (Applause.)

Presiding comrade Khrushchev. Comrades, there is an offer now to take a lunch break before 8 o'clock in the evening. No objections?

Vote. Not.

Presiding comrade Khrushchev. A break is announced until 8 pm.

THIRD SESSION Evening, July 3

Presiding comrade Khrushchev. We continue the work of the Plenum. The word is comrade Patolichev²³. Prepare for Comrade Kirichenko (Ukraine).

Presiding comrade Khrushchev. The word is comrade Kirichenko²⁴. Prepare for Comrade Mikoyan.

Presiding comrade Khrushchev. The word is Comrade Mikoyan. Prepare for Comrade Shatalin.

Mikoyan. Comrades, in the speeches of comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, the whole state of affairs with Beria's criminal adventure was clearly described and documented, a proper political assessment was given, and the organizational and political conclusions that the party must draw from this sad but instructive events in our party.

I completely agree with what is said by the comrades. I would only like to introduce additional considerations and a number of facts confirming that what was said is absolutely correct.

Since that day, when Comrade Stalin fell ill, and the doctors told us he won't recover, the main concern for each of us was to maintain the iron unity of the party's leading collective, for the unity of the party was already ensured during the lifetime of Stalin.

When the leadership of the state and the party was formed, all of Stalin's students, who worked for many years under his leadership and who could provide assistance in their work, found a plot of their work and their share of responsibility for the cause. And everyone understood that the Stalinist leadership could only be replaced by the

²³ *The text of N. Patolychev's speech can be published. Article 11 of Title II (p. 157-159 of this edition).*

²⁴ *See the text of A.Kirichenko's speech. paper No. 11 sections (p. 159-165 of this edition).*

leadership of the collective, that only the collective as a whole could replace Comrade Stalin, and not an individual. At the beginning, the work proceeded amicably and there were great successes of our party and the Government in foreign and domestic policy. However, signals soon began to appear that in our midst Beria was taking measures to squeeze everyone and dictate himself, and to this end spoiled the work of the leadership. We knew Beria's intriguing character before, but in such an unbridled form we saw it only after the death of Comrade Stalin, when he went too far, leading his criminal game, and finally played out.

Many comrades may ask how these members of the Central Committee, knowing Beria for many years, were unable to recognize a stranger and harmful person in their midst for so long. Meanwhile, this business is not so simple, it is not so easy to achieve this. Firstly, not all facts were known to all of us in due time. Secondly, the facts took place at different times and, taken separately, did not matter what they acquire when they are connected together. We must not forget that there was a great and clever work to disguise these facts, to gloss over their meaning and to interpret them in a completely different sense. There were many facts of the positive work of Beria, in the shadow of which negative facts were covered.

It must be honestly and truthfully said that the Presidium of the Central Committee, first of all, vol. Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov and Bulganin, showed insight and accomplished a real feat — immediately ending in one sitting with this adventurer. The party will always be grateful to them for their feat.

I first met Beria in 1920 in Baku after the establishment of Soviet power, when he was picked up by the Baku party committee to be sent to Georgia as a courier to deliver a secret letter. Before that I did not know him. After that, I did not meet with him in Baku, since four months later I myself was transferred to the Nizhny Novgorod sponge.

After Beria moved to work in Moscow, I had about the same relations with him as many other comrades from the Politburo of the Central Committee. Relations are uneven, sometimes good, in the

last two months bad, when he failed to demonstrate several correct suggestions made by me to demonstrate his relationship.

What Beria worked in the counterintelligence of the Azerbaijani bourgeois government, I learned only when this question was raised at the Central Committee Plenum in 1937.

In 1919, while underground, the Baku organization of the Bolsheviks, to maintain an illegal connection with Astrakhan, where Kirov worked then, used two Azerbaijanis who were known as socialists and enjoyed the confidence of the bourgeois government, but in fact had already joined the communists, Musevi²⁵ and Ashum Aliyev. Their task, as well as the communists attached to them, was to obtain the complete information necessary to prevent the failure of the illegal organization of the Bolsheviks and to facilitate illegal transfers to Astrakhan and vice versa, as well as to provide illegal transportation of aviation gasoline to Astrakhan by boat, delivery of money to Baku and literature.

I used to admit the possibility that, perhaps, Beria, as an ordinary worker among others, was sent. But now, having sorted out the facts in my memory, I strongly doubt it. And was it by chance that, having received such a blow at the Central Committee Plenum as the accusation that he worked in the bourgeois counterintelligence, but was not sent by the party, did not consider it necessary to find confirmation from at least one of the Baku workers who were then alive, in order to remove such a stain.

However, he was scrupulous about his own personality in such matters. In another case, he would never have missed the opportunity to refute any rebuke against him. Since he did not do this, it means that he was not sent by the organization. Therefore, Comrade Khrushchev is absolutely right when he said: "Was or was not sent by the party organization, this does not increase confidence when it is revealed in our eyes." Indeed, the question arises: was his work in

²⁵ *That's right: M. Mussevi.*

counterintelligence a screen for fulfilling instructions not from the Communists, but from other owners?

Malenkov. No one confirmed that he was sent by a party organization?

Mikoyan. Not a single person, and he did not seek. He never spoke to me on this subject. Sergo Ordzhonikidze asked me at that time, Comrade Stalin also asked me about this, I said the same thing. But Beria never attempted either to comrade Stalin, or Sergo, or to the Plenum of the Central Committee to submit confirmation from any side that he had been sent to the counterintelligence by the party. Meanwhile, such a document was necessary.

Now that the whole case has been opened, such a statement of the question by Comrade Khrushchev is completely legal.

Malenkov. Who could send?

Mikoyan. We sent two or three dozen comrades. I directed the top of the leading workers, the rest — other comrades. Could send Sarkis, then Victor Naneishvili. For several months I was absent from Baku, came to Moscow with a report to the Central Committee, and returned to Baku with the troops.

Even before Beria arrived in Moscow, and especially when he was in Moscow, he managed to deftly, by hook or by crook, into the confidence in Comrade Stalin. Even during the life of Comrade Stalin, especially in recent years, when Comrade Stalin could no longer do business normally, as before, when he began to meet people less, read less information, at that time Beria deftly settled himself as the main informant of Comrade Stalin.

I must say that recently, Comrade Stalin did not trust Beria. Beria was forced to admit at the last meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee that Comrade Stalin did not trust him, that the Mingrelian case was created in order to arrest Beria on this basis, that Stalin did not manage to bring to the end what he wanted.

During the war, Comrade Stalin divided the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security. It seems to me that this was also done out of some distrust of him, otherwise there was no sense in dividing the ministry. This had to be done to deprive him of the rights of the Minister. Then they appointed him to the Council of Ministers and

the GFCS. This was also one of the signs of distrust. But despite all this, Comrade Stalin showed him great confidence.

Beria's information was usually intriguing and served special purposes. He managed through Comrade Stalin to make a lot of difficult decisions, while others did not always succeed, and it was known that if Beria was against this or that decision, it would be failed with this or that sauce. By this he created his authority. He pretended to be a friend of one or the other, speaking one thing in the face and the other behind his back, disconnecting comrades of one or the other, and confused the cards for his own purposes — we all saw this, but did not attach the significance that everything acquired after of how comrade Stalin died.

The late Sergo, a few days before his death, in a conversation with me, said: "I don't understand why Stalin does not trust me. I am absolutely faithful to him, I do not want to fight him, I want to support him, but he does not trust me. The intrigues of Beria play a big role here, which gives Stalin the wrong information, and Stalin believes him. " Then Beria worked in Tbilisi.

Some may tell us why you didn't find this bastard in time. I explain this to myself as follows: the trust that he enjoyed with Comrade Stalin, his high position in the party leadership created too great difficulties for him to recognize everything without Stalin, bearing in mind the disunity between members of the Presidium, which excluded the possibility of an exchange of views , as is customary among the Bolsheviks, to give a complete assessment of a particular fact. Sometimes you analyze some facts and think: maybe I am mistaken, because the opinion of other comrades is unknown. The main obstacle to the disclosure of his true face was that he wanted by all means to maintain the unity of the leadership team. It was difficult to recognize everything as quickly as it is now desirable. draw conclusions to the end. It is psychologically very difficult to make such a cool decision in one sitting, almost unprecedented in the history of our Central Committee.

Knowing the negative aspects of Beria and condemning him, it was difficult for me to immediately get used to the idea of arresting a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. However,

during the discussion, his adventurous appearance became full and the danger of a conspiratorial threat became apparent.

This led to the complete isolation of Beria and the adoption by the Presidium of a unanimous decision on his arrest.

In addition to intrigue and treacherous setting one against the other, Beria's main weapon was his double—dealing.

What was the expression of Beria's double—dealing?

Once I asked him: why do you need the NKVD? And he answered: it is necessary to restore the rule of law, such a situation in the country cannot be tolerated. We have many arrested people, they need to be released and people should not be sent to camps in vain. The NKVD must be reduced, we do not have security, but supervision of us. It is necessary to change this, send the guards to Kolyma and leave one or two people to protect members of the Government. These are the statements he made. And then, when it came to work, he began to do the opposite, spun the car even more. When he spoke on Red Square over the tomb of Comrade Stalin, after his speech I told him: in your speech there is a place about guaranteeing to every citizen the individual rights granted to him by the Constitution. In the speech of another leader, this would be only a political declaration, and in the speech of the Minister of the Interior, this is a program of action, you must implement it. He answered me: I will fulfill it. And then he made a proposal, allowing without trial and investigation to arrest people for ten years through a special meeting under his chairmanship. This kind of double—dealing has gradually begun to unfold.

Comrade Molotov is absolutely right in his assessment of his pamphlet "To the question of the history of Bolshevik organizations of the Caucasus."

That he was a big scoundrel and forger, it is also evident from the following: recently, a few days before this event, after the meeting of the Presidency on the Kremlin, several people were walking. Beria started a conversation in which he said that this pamphlet has falsification, a number of facts and articles without evidence attributed to Stalin: he believed that Stalin would like it.

Beria made this pamphlet a springboard for jumping on the tower of the all—party leadership, which he unfortunately succeeded. His brochure began to be worked out in all circles. He received a halo of a theoretical worker and a faithful Stalin. Hence the further — all this helped him to rub into the trust of Stalin. You see, Beria did well, picked up the material, studied, worked on himself, wrote a good book, said Comrade Stalin. Beria understood that it was impossible to come to the leadership of the party without having universally recognized revolutionary merits before the party or some theoretical works, to get into the leadership of the party. He also falsified in his biography the period of work in the Caucasus, which I was convinced, having read today for the first time on the advice of a fellow Soviet Encyclopedia²⁶.

Another fact of his sussing. In the first days after the death of Comrade Stalin, he opposed the cult of personality. We understood that there were inflections in this matter and during the life of Comrade Stalin. Comrade Stalin was a great critic of us. What the cult around me is created, Comrade Stalin said, is created by the SS. We couldn't fix it then, and it went like that. We need to approach the role of personality in a Marxist way. But, as it turned out, Beria wanted to undermine the cult of personality of Comrade Stalin and create a cult of self. (Laughter.)

This soon manifested itself when his report was attached to the Central Committee's decision on the western regions of Ukraine. The central committee's decision was not signed by the members of the Presidency, but the attached report, which gives all the installations, has the signature of Minister Beria.

In order to support the cult of his own personality, he closely followed and sought to ensure that the departmental interests of the ministry, which he was in the know, even when they are wrong, to defend to the end. All ministers know that it was almost impossible

²⁶ *This is an article about L. Beria in the second edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. M. 1950-1958*

to give the ministry under its control any task, if the Ministry itself objected.

There was, for example, such a case. The agreement on goods deliveries between Czechoslovakia and the USSR for 1953 was discussed, in which a number of types of supplies were proposed to accept what the Czechs thought possible to deliver, reducing the quantities stipulated by a long—term agreement.

Thus, under the long—term agreement between Czechoslovakia and the USSR, signed three years ago, it was recorded to supply in 1953 for the oil production of 800 pieces of diesels of 500 hp each, with a capacity of 400 thousand hp. In the draft agreement for 1953, only 400 pieces were recorded, i.e. How many Czechs were offered, which corresponded to the refined needs of the oil industry.

Beria was furious.

In this fact, the departmental interest was affected, and therefore Beria prevented us from making a decision in time.

Agreements with all countries of popular democracy and a number of important decisions on trade with capitalist countries have been adopted unanimously by the Presidency over the past two to three months, which has seriously enhanced our foreign trade and strengthened economic cooperation with the countries of popular democracy.

Beria decided to show his strength in another case, on the issue of trade with India.

The Presidency of the Council of Ministers discussed the issue of India. Hindus play between us and the Americans. They asked us to give the Soviet Union about 300,000. tons of grain in exchange for Indian goods. The Presidency of the Central Committee decided not to deny the Hindus in order to reduce the influence of the Americans, to dislodge the ground from those enemies of the Soviet people, which are in India, and instructed Molotov and me to draw up such a project. We have prepared, found grain from export resources by withdrawing the sale to other capitalist countries to sell this grain to Hindus, considering it politically more profitable.

Beria suggested not accepting the project and postponing it until the country's bread—free balance and export grain fund were checked.

Two days ago, the Presidency considered that the draft on India, which had been introduced by Molotov and me, was accepted as correct.

On. Beria, finally, apparently decided that inside the country he had taken care of everything, and recently took up the affairs of the countries of popular democracy. You read the message that his sneer boasted that he would take over the country of popular democracy.

We have three bodies through which cooperation between us and the countries of popular democracy is carried out. This is the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance. Comrade Stalin for the first time after the formation of these bodies took an active part in their work, and the last two years ceased to be interested in them. These bodies stopped gathering, worked poorly.

This dexterous Beria, having decided to take over the hands of the Interior Ministry our levers of relations with the countries of popular democracy, made proposals prepared by his apparatus, which gives deftly drafted criticism of the state of affairs in the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance, sharply criticizes the economic and military policy of the countries of popular democracy and proposes to create a new body of the highest representatives of the states to lead this case.

Comrade Malenkov called me to understand this document critically.

He had not yet waited until his proposal had been discussed in the Presidency.

Beria sacrificed both big and small policy issues for his dark designs, trying to upset the ranks of our leadership and disrupt its work.

Here are some more examples. By the spring of last year, we already had a sharp word, a crisis of meat supply, an acute shortage of meat and animal oil. I reported to Comrade Stalin that we do not have enough meat and oil. He asks, why is it not enough? I answer that livestock is bad, we harvest little, and demand is

growing fast. He wasn't happy. And then he decided that this question should be interested.

Please pay attention to the following fact. For the first half of this year we sold as much meat as for the whole of 1940 from centralized resources. However, we really sell meat only in Moscow, Leningrad, with sin in half in the Donbass and the Urals, in other places with interruptions.

Kaganovich. In the Urals, not with sin in half, but by a quarter. There's not much meat.

Mikoyan. And since 1948, the price of meat has been reduced as follows: if 1948 count for 100, now 42, that is more than twice.

As prices for all goods decrease, part of the money released is switched by consumers to more valuable products — meat and oil, so the demand for them grows faster than for other goods. Moreover, in recent years, a decrease in the yen for meat and butter has occurred to a greater extent than for most other products. Over 5 years, prices have more than halved. It is clear that we have a rapid increase in population demand for meat, without a corresponding increase in meat resources.

In November, the Minister of Agriculture Benediktov reported on the situation with livestock farming at the Presidium of the Central Committee.

Benediktov formally reported: a large cattle mortality rate, a small increase in the number of livestock, low productivity, a lack of feed, a lack of premises, and the unwillingness of collective farmers to take care of cattle. It turned out that the collective farmers were almost enemies of their own business.

Comrade Stalin, who was able, on the basis of several facts with brilliant insight, to draw great conclusions, to see what others, studying the topics of materials, could not see, said: if collective farmers take poor care of livestock, then they are not interested in social animal husbandry. Therefore, it is necessary to create the economic interest of collective farmers in the development of public animal husbandry.

At the same time, the Commission of the Presidium of the Central Committee on Livestock was formed, headed by Comrade Khrushchev. I was a member of this Commission.

The commission of two months worked diligently. She introduced a project in which, among other measures, there was the issue of raising procurement prices.

Of course, we understood that in principle it was impossible to raise procurement prices, but in this case, regarding the meat and milk, it was impossible not to raise the question of raising the yen, because the current prices are erroneous and impede the rapid development of animal husbandry. The prices are as follows: the price of beef meat in live weight of average fatness is 25 kopecks per kilogram.

Malenkov. Was it under comrade Stalin?

Mikoyan. Yes.

For comparison, take the price of kerosene. Kerosene cost 10 kopecks per litre in 1930, after a repeated decline now costs 1 ruble 5 kopecks. Previously, to buy 1 litre of kerosene, the peasant sold half a kilogram of live cattle, and now four kilograms of cattle. Livestock prices have not changed for more than 20 years, although the general level of all prices has risen significantly, despite lower prices in recent years.

When we, the Bolsheviks, undertake for real, we are able to achieve tremendous success, this can be seen in the rise in the production of cotton, beets, and tea. I am convinced that flax production will also rise rapidly. Why can't we solve such a problem as raising livestock? We can, and with complete success. Khrushchev and I were of the same opinion that price policy is a hot issue. Two options were offered for choice — what Comrade Stalin wants to accept, this will be so. The first option is the average price of cattle is 90 kopecks per kilogram, the second option is 70 kopecks. Comrade Stalin said that he offers the third option — 60 or 50 kopecks. Under Comrade Stalin, they did not manage to finish the consideration of this question. It would seem that four months after his death, if there was a finished project, a decision could be made, but so far no decision has been made. Several times I raised a

question on the Presidium. Comrade Khrushchev proposed restoring the work of the livestock commission.

Khrushchev. When the third option was prepared, a proposal was made — to increase the tax on collective farms and collective farmers by 40 billion rubles, and all income is estimated at 42 billion. Mikoyan. The current tax of 15 billion to bring up to 40 billion. This was already impossible. Then we ourselves were in no hurry with this project. Then Beria was indignant. He said that if we accept Comrade Stalin's proposal for a tax, this means leading to an uprising of the peasants. These were his words, and as soon as Stalin died, he began to interfere with the solution of the issue of animal husbandry.

Back in 1950, we had enough vegetables and potatoes. But for two years we have an acute shortage. Recently, prices for potatoes, vegetables and fruits²⁷ have been halved, and the population is complaining: who needs such a reduction in prices when it is impossible to buy these products at stores at such prices, but on collective farm markets prices have not decreased, or even increased. Along with the weak mechanization of the production of potatoes and vegetables, the main reason here lies in the economic field.

Of course, the price of 3—4 kopecks per kilogram of potatoes cannot interest the collective farms in the development of this business. What did we do? Every year, institutions in Moscow and other cities sent employees who were paid 1,000 rubles a month to plant or dig potatoes, and the collective farmers looked and laughed. Instead of interest of collective farmers in the cultivation of potatoes, we replace them on the field with highly paid employees and skilled workers.

²⁷ *On March 31, 1953, a resolution was adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union lowering retail prices for a range of food and industrial goods.*

It is necessary that the collective farmers are engaged in the cultivation of potatoes, and employees and workers are engaged in their own business.

And to raise procurement prices for potatoes, only about 400 million rubles a year is required. About 3 billion rubles are required to raise prices for meat, milk and vegetables — funds that we could easily find due to the reduction.

Therefore, Khrushchev was quite right when he said that Beria was trying to disrupt these measures to improve agriculture in order to undermine the authority of the leadership.

The new Minister of Agriculture and Harvest, T. Kozlov, had a miserable position: no matter what project he entered, Beria always attacked him.

Finally, Comrade Stalin in his work “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR” said that it is impossible to ignore objective economic laws, but in our field of meat, milk and potatoes these laws are trampled.

A political adventurer, Beria turned out to be an adventurer in economic politics. In order to disrupt the leadership and break up the members of the Presidency, he deftly sought to reject the necessary proposals. For example, the supply plan in the second half of the year failed under the flag of reserve protection. It was only after his arrest that the plan was approved and sent to the field on the 30th.

It was such a disruptor, especially in recent times, that it was impossible to work quietly. That is why the decision taken not only does not weaken us, but opens the possibility to work creatively on the further rise and strengthening of our country.

Malenkov. The devil is not so black as he is painted.

Mikoyan. And how pathetic he looked at the Presidency!

Over the past 3 months, our government has done a great job of increasing market funds, improving the supply of people and trade. At the request of Comrade Malenkov, what more needs to be done to help the market, I proposed, in view of the opportunity we now have, to buy a certain number of high—quality imported wool fabrics for tailoring suits and coats, because the domestic industry can not give fabrics beyond the program, as well as to purchase 30—40

thousand tons of herring, because the fishing industry does not provide the needs of the population.

And this case Beria began to slow down, thus preventing further improvement in the supply of our population.

Khrushchev. It may seem that we were really sitting and shaking in front of him. There were a lot of times when we gave good teeth and made decisions. And then it seems that we sat and looked at him.

Mikoyan. I mean, he's ripped off where everyone knows it's bad for the state, so if we've thrown him out of our environment, it only strengthens our party and makes it a good job.

The harm of Beria was that he, when the Government and the Central Committee made good decisions that could be of great benefit to the country, tried to spoil so that instead of a positive result to get a negative.

This can be seen in the central committee's decisions to correct distortions and inflections in national politics in the Baltic republics and Western Ukraine.

With the skilful implementation of these decisions should rise even higher among the Baltic peoples the authority of the Russian people, which by their policy ensures the equality of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

This provocateur tried to use these decisions to his advantage to direct the mood of the peoples of the young Soviet republics against the Russians.

The task of our comrades in the Baltics and Western Ukraine is to ensure the steady implementation of Lenin—Stalinist national policy in order to further strengthen the friendship of their peoples with the great Russian people and all the peoples of Soyuz.

It is clear from this from this that we have become stronger. Now there is no such interference in the further work of our Central Committee.

It is necessary to draw conclusions and lessons from this case not only to the Central Committee, but also to local party organizations and the whole party.

Since this is not the only case, but there have been other cases, it is necessary to study the conditions that give rise to the possibility of such phenomena, and put the Interior Ministry in its place, as It is simple and clear said Comrade Khrushchev.

That's not enough. It is necessary to put the Bolshevik principle at the forefront of all work and the work of the Central Committee and local organizations. Intra—party democracy, the collective leadership of both the Central Committee and local party organizations, the revitalization of the Soviet bodies, from the Councils of Ministers to the local councils.

The issue of intra—party democracy should rise to the fullest.

We do not yet have direct data, whether he was a spy, whether he received instructions from foreign masters, but the main thing is it?

The Central Committee and the party, cleansed of this scum, will strengthen in the field of principle, strengthen in the field of organizational, become even more monolithic and will achieve new successes in both domestic and foreign policy, faithfully fulfilling the covenants of Lenin and Stalin on the construction of communism in our country, strengthening international ties with brotherly countries and parties.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. The word has Comrade Shatalin. Prepare for Comrade Mikhailov (Moscow).

The Shatalin. Comrades, the essence of the issue in Comrade Malenkov's report and in the statements of the members of the Presidency is presented with the utmost clarity and in detail proven. I must say that the operation to suppress Beria's enemy activities and his arrest caused a sense of joyful satisfaction. And as I watched the secretaries of the regional committees, they were no less pleased with this circumstance, this happy circumstance.

Voice. Correct.

The Shatalin. Why did it happen and why did we respond to it so much? Why did we react so bolshevikly?

The fact is that Beria's non—partisanship, the desire to oppose itself to the Central Committee, could be observed even from afar (I mean comrades who did not come close to him at work).

What was the expression of this, what were the symptoms?

Few of the secretaries of the regional committees, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republics did not feel the arrogance, arrogance, arrogance and impudence of this scoundrel.

Voice. That's right.

The Shatalin. We in the Central Committee also felt a clear abnormality in relations with the Ministry of the Interior, especially in the work with personnel. Beria has recently become so brazen that it has become apparently bypassed at least the central committee apparatus. In many cases, he appointed and displaced people without a Central Committee decision. I — I ask to understand me correctly — tried to grumble, expressing discontent...

Khrushchev. It was.

The Shatalin. But Nikita Sergeevich told me that in these conditions the manifestation of discontent in this form is no more or less than waving hands with leaving them in the air. (Laughter.) He was talking about such a swing that you could really punch the table. I confess that at that time I didn't quite understand the whole story. (Laughter.)

And this powerful blow is inflicted on a very agile and dangerous adventurer. The endurance, and when it was needed, the determination of the members of the Presidency of our Central Committee did their noble cause. He thought to take cunning, dexterity, and found people both cunning and smarter.

It is now abundantly clear that Beria went to all for criminal careerist purposes. The comrades of Malenkov, Molotov, Khrushchev, Bulganin and others here spoke about the Jesuit methods of the villain Beria. I want to emphasize once again that he, deftly hiding behind Leninist—Stalinist provisions on both national and other issues, ultimately harmed us very decently; he presented every case, every question, solely in terms of the exaltation of his

own person, the sewage of his personality' vision. State, party interests, of course, did not bother him.

In fact, As it turned out, they were arrested incorrectly.

In light of the materials we now have on Beria.

For criminal careerist purposes, Beria has achieved the inclusion in the protocol of the Presidency of his notes on the western regions of Ukraine, Lithuania with falsified and falsified figures and alleged facts.

In a few words I want to dwell on the issue, which characterizes the clear non—partisanship, hostile activities of Beria in terms of his attitude to party organizations. Take the Georgian Party Organization.

Beria did everything to tear the Georgian party organization away from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He self—imposed and single—handedly gave instructions to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, placed there pleasers.

Take Beria's behaviour lately. He was clearly trying to find a well—known support among the secretaries of the regional committees of the party. Not such a snub!

Here Vyacheslav Mihajlovic said that after all that happened, we washed our hands with satisfaction from the dirt, from the evil spirits, which during this time stuck to our core. But he was apparently referring to the political side of the issue.

Hammers. Both.

The Shatalin. I believe it is necessary to introduce the members of the Plenary to the facts that characterize Beria's moral character.

The Presidency of the Central Committee instructed me in the Beria office (in the Council of Ministers) to find documents related to the activities of the former First General Office. Doing this task, looking through the contents of safes and other places where documents can be stored, we came across unusual things for office offices and items. Along with the documents, we found in large quantities all sorts of attributes, as to name them, the attributes, or what, the women's toilet. Here are excerpts from the description that I want to read. I remind you that it was found in the office. The

description includes: ladies' tracksuits, ladies' blouses, stockings of ladies' foreign firms — 11 pairs, women's silk combinations — 11 pairs, ladies' silk tights — 7 pairs, cuts to ladies' dresses — 5 cuts, silk ladies' scarves, handkerchiefs of foreign firms, etc. — a whole list of 29 orders of the room. We also found a large number of items of a male libertine. These things speak for themselves, and, as they say, the comments are superfluous.

Nevertheless, in order to make this side more convincing, I will read the testimony of a Sarkisov, who worked in the protection of Beria for 18 years. He was the last chief of his security.

This is what Sarkisov showed: "I know of Beria's many connections with all sorts of random women. I know that through a citizen S. (let me not mention the last name) Beria knew a friend of S., whose name I do not remember. She worked at the Model House. Later I heard from Abakumov that this friend S. was the wife of a military attaché. Later, while in Beria's office, I heard Beria on the phone calling Abakumov and asking why this woman had not been put down yet.

In addition, I know that Beria cohabited with a student of the Institute of Foreign Languages Maya. She subsequently became pregnant with Beria and had an abortion. Beria also cohabited with an 18—20—year—old girl, Lilay. Beria had a child with whom she now lives in the former cottage of Obbrunikov.

While in Tbilisi, Beria met and cohabited with a citizen M. After cohabitation with Beria, M. gave birth to a child, whom, on Beria's instructions, I, together with the commissioner Vitonov, was taken and taken to an orphanage in Moscow.

I also know that Beria cohabited with a certain Sophia. At Beria's suggestion, she had an abortion through the head of the Soviet Interior Ministry's sanitary unit, Voloshin. I repeat that Beria had a lot of such connections.

At Beria's direction, I kept a special list of the women he cohabited with. (Laughter in the hall.)

Subsequently, at his suggestion, I destroyed this list. However, I kept one list. This list is on my apartment in the pocket of the

bearer. (The list, which Sarkisov speaks of, is found, it contains 39 names of women. — S.)

A year or a half ago, I knew for sure that as a result of Beria's relationship with prostitutes, he had syphilis. He was treated by the doctor of the clinic of the Interior Ministry Y.B., I do not remember his name.

Here, comrades, the true face of this, so to speak, a contender for the leadership of the Soviet people. And this dirty moss dared to compete with the giant, with our party, with our Central Committee. Please don't understand me in the sense that I underestimate the possibilities of this very dexterity. I want to say that the party, the Central Committee coped with the shavks more than ever.

Having cleared from the filth, having driven out of its ranks a provocateur and an adventurer, now having no interference, which he managed to create, under the leadership of our Leninist—Stalinist Presidency of the Central Committee, we will be even more successful in building a communist society. (Applause.)

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. Comrades, there's a suggestion to take a break. There will be no objections? No. A 15—minute break is announced.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. Let's continue the work of our Plenum. The word has Comrade Mikhailov²⁸. To prepare for Comrade Mirtshulava, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. The word has Comrade Mirtshulava. Prepare to comrade Zavenyagin.

Mirtshulava. Comrades, Comrade Malenkov detailed the Plenum of the Central Committee about Beria's hostile actions.

²⁸ See the text of N.Mikhailov's speech. Article 11 of Title II (p. 177-181 of this edition).

There is no doubt that we are dealing with a notorious provocateur who intended to break Leninist—Stalinist unity and cohesion in the leadership of our Bolshevik party.

The deceiver and provocateur of the Beria Party by the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was caught and exposed on the crimes committed by him. The decision adopted by the Presidency of the Central Committee to remove Beria from his posts, expel him from the ranks of the party and arrest him is the only correct measure, because criminals and scoundrels like Beria have no right to breathe our clean Soviet air.

Comrades, I want to address some issues concerning the work of the Georgian party organization, because, as the audience knows here, Beria exercised harmful leadership over the Georgian party organization.

Discussing in party organizations the ruling of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of April 10, 1953 on violations of Soviet laws in Georgia, we revealed a lot of blatant facts of flouting of Soviet laws, beating honest, loyal party cadres, rough administration in party work and planting foreign to our party manners on the part of former secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia Charkviani and Mgeladze.

In an atmosphere of mutual patronage and favor, dulling of revolutionary vigilance, clamping criticism, and especially critics from below, Charkviani and Mgeladze, reborn as political inhabitants, planted a vicious style of reassessing imaginary successes, self—promotion and ceremonial hype.

After listening yesterday to the report of Comrade Malenkov and the speeches of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of comrades Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin and others, I came to believe that in all this a big role to the detriment of the interests of the party played this scoundrel Beria. Sensing the support of Beria, Charkviani and Mgeladze ignored the Central Committee of our party, they did not count with the apparatus of the Central Committee and did not even go to the Central Committee of our

party. They addressed Beria directly and resolved all the issues directly in connection with Beria.

I, comrades, had the good fortune to work for a year and a half in the Central Committee of our party. He passed a large school of Bolshevik upbringing. Even then, the Central Committee received a lot of exposing statements, letters and complaints from the communists of the Georgian Party Organization. The Communists reported to the Central Committee about the serious perversions of the party's policies and the lawlessness in charge of Charkviani and Mgeladze.

Recently, it has been established that everything that was written in the Central Committee by the Communists turned out to be correct.

From the detailed report of Comrade Malenkov, we learned that the adventurer Beria perverted the Leninist—Stalinist national policy. It turns out that in Abkhazia, when he worked there as secretary of the Mgeladze party' regional committee, feeling support for Beria, he did not allow Russian comrades to work in the party and Soviet bodies, gave instructions to the Russian police not to prescribe, changed the Russian names of settlements. Sukhumi is home to a sufficient number of Russian intellectuals, but no one was considered with it.

I knew about it the Central Committee of the Party of Georgia, and I am convinced that Beria knew about it, and therefore he always defended these scoundrels and crooks.

Comrades! When we began to discuss in party organizations the decision of the Presidency of the Central Committee of our party from 10.IV 1953, the Communists began to expose and identify people who fraudulently smeared in the ranks of our party. Previously, they were in a foreign party, and then found themselves in the governing bodies — in the party and Soviet. I'll list them. Shaduri, the son of a former major Menshevik, was the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, and was a morally unstable element. An inspection was carried out and the charges were confirmed, but Charkviani, through Beria, saved him. We expelled Shaduri from our party for deception.

For a long time, the former federalist Egnatashvili, who in the past actively fought against the Bolsheviks, worked as secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Georgian Republic. On the recommendation of Beria and other enemies of the party, he managed to join the Bolshevik party and found himself in leadership work, where he acted anti—party. At present, Egnatashvili has been expelled from the party.

The former Menshevik commissioner in various regions of Georgia, Elisavetoshvili, worked as Minister of Social Security. About this, as it is now established, Beria knew when he was secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. Elisavetoshvili had to be removed from the post of minister, and his partisanship is considered in the party organization.

I must, comrades, say that, to our shame (meaning the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia), a member of the Central Committee of our party, is Zakhary Nikolaevich Ketskhoveri, a former member of the National Democratic Party. He is hiding behind the name of Lado Ketskhoveri — a revolutionary, an associate of the great Stalin.

Ketskhoveri 3. N. hid from our party his stay in the National Democratic Party from 1917—1921, and his arrest in 1923 for the second time on charges of anti—Soviet work.

We carefully checked these documents, and these facts were confirmed. Ketskhoveri's brother, Nikolai Ketskhoveri, actively fought against the Soviet regime in the past, was arrested, but gave the word to the GPU authorities that he would stop working against the Soviet regime and would be loyal to all the events of the Soviet regime. After this receipt, he was released from custody by the organs of the OGPU. Ketskhoveri Z.N. in his explanations he writes that he joined the party on the advice of Beria. As if Beria asked him in 1938 why he did not join the Bolshevik party. He replied that he was not prepared to join the party. Beria then said: "Nothing, I recommend you join the party." Reference to Beria was then profitable Ketskhoveri. Because Beria was the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. When admitted to the ranks of our party, Ketskhoveri hid his membership in an alien party, as a

result of which he was admitted to the party in violation of the charter of the Communist Party. Ketskhoveli himself confirms that he was nominated by the Prime Minister of Georgia on the recommendation of Beria. I have collected all this material and will submit it to the Central Committee for consideration. I don't know how Beria learned about this, he called me and said: what's going on, what kind of discussion you are doing there, you'll work out all the people. I ask who he means. He names the names of the chief of the road Kiknadze and Ketskhoveli. I said that the Communists are making serious charges, they are pressing and we cannot hide the truth from the Communists. (Laughter.) Then Beria declares: "This is not true, I know them. Send me the material. They are people such that we all know them, and you just got to work. " I could not argue with Beria. I answered him: "We will check this material again."

I say this because Beria has clogged the governing bodies of Georgia, party and Soviet, with foreign elements. By this, he wanted to gain cheap credibility.

I gave the surname Kiknadze. He works with us as the head of the road. This is a former Menshevik. And Beria tells me that Kiknadze is a good business executive. I said that he is a good business executive, but he has no party affiliation. "Yes," says Beria, "he will never be a party man, but the business executive is good. Look, you don't need to discuss it, otherwise your road is long, everything will fail. " I said then that we will still see. I repeat that I could not argue with Beria.

What happened in Georgia? It was that the son of a notorious Menshevik worked as secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, the former national democrat in the Council of Ministers, and the former Menshevik as the head of the road. We are with comrade Bakradze decided that when we were in Moscow, we would talk with Beria and raise the question with the Central Committee of the party, because it was impossible to work with the former Mensheviks. The party made it possible for the former Mensheviks to join the ranks of the Communist Party, but there is a certain order — this is an honest admission of their

mistakes and will continue to work tirelessly for the good of the Soviet Motherland. The people I mentioned did not comply with these conditions; they placed their personal interests above public and state interests.

A voice from the audience. The Central Committee will consider.

Mirzhulava. The material is known, you yourself signed it. You cannot deny that under Soviet rule, you were twice arrested as an enemy of Soviet power.

I have been working in the Central Committee of Georgia for only two and a half months, we have done something, but so far we have not been able to resolve all the issues.

The next question is about Beria's calls. I can't say that he didn't call me, there was such a case. We have serious perversions in the line of party work, in the line of state work, in the line of spending public funds. People did not reckon with Soviet laws, believed that they (I mean the former secretaries of the Central Committee, Charkviani and Mgeladze) were not subject to control, and committed lawlessness, arrested people to the right and left. Ordinary communists criticized them correctly. The Communists appealed to the Central Committee of the Party, wrote that the Charter of collective farm life was grossly violated in Georgia, that on many collective farms the collective farmers received almost nothing, they took everything away, and they asked them to intervene in this matter. These letters were sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. Taking advantage of his position, Mgeladze gave the wrong information to the Central Committee, deceived the Central Committee, and arrested and imprisoned people who complained about and sentenced them to prisons. We examined many statements sent from the Central Committee, dealt with them for a long time, and then made a decision. A number of executives were punished, and wrongly arrested were released and rehabilitated. An explanatory note about all this was described in detail and sent to the Central Committee to comrade Khrushchev.

The former secretary of the Abkhaz regional committee of the party Getia, who did not recognize Soviet laws and violated the

decisions of the party and government in his personal interests, was also excluded. He turned to Beria with a complaint, as if he had been expelled incorrectly. Beria called me and says: for what Getia expelled? I say: because he is a non—partisan person, a criminal, an anti—state element. He asks: where is the material? I say: we have the material, we checked and discussed it at the Central Committee bureau.

Why do not we have? I say that on this issue I reported in detail to the Central Committee of our party and reported to Comrade Khrushchev. Then he tells me: send me this material. It was not necessary to send, because Comrade Khrushchev, it turns out, sent it to all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee.

Comrade Bagirov spoke here at the Plenum about the establishment of republican orders. On behalf of Beria, the head of the secretariat called me, I forgot my last name, he said that ...

Malenkov. Did the head of the secretariat talk to you?

Mirzhulava. Yes, the head of the secretariat was talking to me, so he recommended himself.

From the Presidium. Ordynsev.

Mirzhulava. Yes, Ordynsev called. He said that Beria wants to submit to the government a project on the establishment of orders of culture in the Union republics, and in Georgia he proposes to establish the Order of Shota Rustaveli and asks my opinion. Maybe you have another challenger? (Laughter, animation in the hall.)

I said that there can be no other. Such a call was, apparently, in other republics.

Vyacheslav Mikhailovich in his speech mentioned Sharia that he had been wrongly restored. Yes, comrades, we restored Sharia; he was not expelled in 1948 when he was accused of mysticism, but was expelled due to the fact that he was arrested as a Mingrelian nationalist. Since he was rehabilitated for political charges, he was reinstated in the party, among others. It was not clear to us when he ended up in the apparatus of the Council of Ministers, but we could not say anything. We saw that he works for Beria.

Comrades! I will not say about the other Georgian party organization about other Transcaucasian party organizations, about

this comrade Bagirov did not say, but Beria had influence on the Georgian party organization. I must say that he received this influence by a deceitful At one time, the Americans created an atomic bomb, detonated it. After a while, with the help of our scientists, our industry, under the leadership of our government, we eliminated this monopoly of the U.S. atomic bomb. The Americans saw that the benefits were lost, and on Truman's orders began work on the hydrogen bomb. Our people and our country are not bald, we have also taken up this cause, and as far as we can tell, we think that we are not behind the Americans. A hydrogen bomb is ten times stronger than a conventional atomic bomb, and its explosion will mean the elimination of the upcoming second monopoly of the Americans, that is, will be the most important event in world politics. And Beria, a scoundrel, allowed himself to solve such a question in addition to the Central Committee.

I worked with Beria for quite a while and had the opportunity to observe this man. From the very beginning, the main quality of Beria was to be seen : it was contempt for people. He despised the entire Soviet people, despised the party, despised the leaders of the party. And in this contempt turned out to be a blind man. He considered the members of the Presidency of the Central Committee for simpletons, which he could at any moment take a fist and isolate. And turned out to be a simpleton, a blind sheep. Our Central Committee showed foresight and this scoundrel, the adventurer in time isolated. There was a lot of talk about Beria's negative qualities, I will not repeat it: about his arrogance, uncereimoniousness, offensive rudeness towards employees. Beria's non—state approach to many issues was often struck. If the question is related to his personal authority, to his personal reputation, he showed interest in him. If the question had nothing to do with him personally, he failed it. There are many examples.

After the war, Comrade Mikoyan raised the issue of the restoration of “Severonickl” — the largest enterprise on the Kola Peninsula, which gives nickel to our country. It was built and operated by the Interior Ministry. The Germans were expelled, it would seem that the Interior Ministry had to restore it, as it had

powerful construction organizations. That. Stalin, apparently, did not instruct this Beria, and the latter strongly denied Comrade Mikoyan in this matter.

I remember that Comrade Kosygin raised the question many times — give us Comrade. Orlova to represent the post of People's Commissar of the paper industry. Comrade Orlov was at that time the head of the headquarters in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a very large engineer and specialist in the field of the paper industry. But in the paper industry, things did not go. And, of course, it was possible to release the chief of the central board for appointment to the post of people's commissar. Beria replies: "In no way, we ourselves need people." When Beria was then commissioned to the paper industry, Comrade Orlov was immediately relieved of his work at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and appointed People's Commissar for the pulp and paper industry.

In relation to people, Beria had nothing party, nothing sacred. Everyone who had to deal with him could always run into rudeness and insult, he never spoke respectfully of anyone. More than once the famous Gogolevsky Sobakevich came to mind, who did not have a single decent person in the whole city, there was one decent person—the prosecutor, and even that pig.

A very negative quality of Beria was the suppression of initiative among subordinate workers. If you come up with any initiative proposal, they will immediately tear you off, put you in place. Beria's favourite expression was: here is the inventor! In order for any of our proposals to receive support, it was necessary to raise the question in such a way that it was introduced on behalf of Beria. The suppression of the initiative, naturally, seriously affected the interests of the state.

It seems to me that in assessing Beria as an employee there is an exaggeration of his certain positive qualities. Everyone knows that he is an unceremonious, pushy person, he did not reckon with anyone and could advance the matter. This quality he had. But from the point of view of understanding the issue, seriously understanding the essence of the matter, I would say that Beria was blunt. Without flattery, I can say to the members of the Presidium of the Central

Committee: any member of the Presidium of the Central Committee can understand any issue much faster and deeper than Beria. When we tried to cover a question more deeply, he usually said — do not give lectures, you are not inventors, you are organizers. How can I organize work without understanding the essence of the matter? Beria was known as the organizer, but in reality he was a desperate bureaucrat. He fenced himself off from people, sometimes, for weeks, months, did not accept workers directly subordinate to him. Questions were considered and resolved in a clerical order. Beria had very large secretariats, documents walked from one referent to another. The reviewers composed resolutions for him, which were often absurd in nature, and the resolution of issues dragged on for weeks and months. For example, prepared at the direction of Comrade Stalin, our proposals on the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes have not yet been considered for many months: questions of the use of atomic energy in aviation and in the navy have not been considered. The most important cases did not receive movement due to bureaucratic practice in the work of Beria. The correspondence between the Beria secretariats and the First General Directorate has become enormous. All the main employees of the central office were engaged in writing notes and draft resolutions, redoing them, piling up a heap of paper, and often there was absolutely no time left for operational work on the management of research institutions and enterprises. And this is called the organizer?! A very dangerous and harmful person.

Beria had great arrogance, he believed that he knew everything, that he would notice everything on time, put the question on time, and decide on time. In fact, due to this arrogance, the questions raised in time were not resolved. Here we are with comrade Vannikov was asked two years ago about the use of atomic energy in the Navy. It has not been resolved so far, and we are losing precious time.

After the death of comrade Stalin, Beria became especially noticeably demagogic to play the game of economy. Money really needs to be saved, it is needed for the development of industry, the rise of culture, and agriculture. But in the field of atomic energy use

there are issues in which we could not afford excessive savings. We need to seriously develop our nuclear power. The Americans are building new large factories for the production of explosive nuclear substances. Spend a lot of money on this business. When we raised the question of new construction, Beria told us: "To hell, you spend a lot of money, fit into the five—year plan." When the five—year plan was drawn up, we could more or less fully determine the scope of work only for the next three years, there was no data for the next period, the construction projects that were started were mostly completed in the first three years, transitional work remained in the fourth year, and in the 4th and in the 5 years of the five—year plan it was necessary to begin new construction projects. According to the outlines of the five—year plan, in the fourth year the volume of work was halved compared to the third year, and half compared to the fourth in the fifth. We could not put up with this; the state cannot put up with it. Beria repeated to us: "To hell, fit into the approved numbers."

Malenkov. This business will have to be controlled, because money was spent there without proper control.

Zavenyagin. Control is needed unconditionally.

Kaganovich. They did not build cities, but resorts.

Zavenyagin. The fact that the resorts were built, I can't say, and the cities were built good.

The question is, where were we, who worked with Beria, what did we see, what did we do? I'm honestly here, comrades, I must say that Beria did not captivate me when I had to work with him. I was struck by his anti—Party qualities, rudeness, arrogance, disrespect for people. A person who does not respect other people himself is not worthy of the respect and trust of the party.

At times I thought with great anxiety that Comrade Stalin would die, there would be a new party leadership, Beria would make his way to the leadership. What a danger it will be! Apparently, many comrades understood this.

What did you have to do? It used to be snapped. One example, perhaps, comrade Malenkov remembers. A telegram was received from Czechoslovakia, in which it was reported that the uranium

mining program, which was planned by the head office, would require large funds. Obviously incorrect astronomical figures were given. After reading the telegram, Beria began to resent, curse. I became unbearable, and I replied — it's enough to fool people, we are fulfilling the decision of the government, which we are tasked with coordinating the production program with the Czechs. The inflated stupid numbers that are called are wrong, we will correct them. Swearing again: "Here is a hero." I answer: not a hero and not a fool, there is nothing to fool people. "Get out." I had to go out. Then Beria softened and tried to soften the conflict.

There have been attempts on our part to convince Beria. For example, during the reorganization of the Ministry of Geology, a question arose regarding uranium exploration. I must say that our state is well provided with uranium raw materials. We think it is better off than all our possible opponents. However, a significant proportion of this raw material is mined abroad. It is important to conduct a forced reconnaissance of the domestic raw material base. We believed that in the First General Directorate this would be better provided. Beria decided: "No, you don't have to do uranium exploration, let Comrade Tevosyan do this." Comrade Tevosyan himself believed that uranium intelligence should not be transferred Ministry of metallurgy. Naturally — he has non—ferrous metallurgy, ferrous metallurgy. Why would he even charge uranium exploration? I tried to convince Beria, I told him that, since we were entrusted with the whole business of using atomic energy, we would be better engaged in uranium exploration, as we are directly interested in them and are responsible for creating a domestic raw material base. Beria rudely rejected my insistence, stated that he would find other leaders in the First Glavk, and added a number of offensive remarks to this. Of course, it is impossible to think that an individual worker could fight Beria; he would slide into the wrong positions. We could only count on the party leadership to figure this person out and give him the right rating. And our Central Committee passed this historical exam.

I would like to touch on several issues that are not relevant to the work of the 1st Glavka. Here is the question regarding Zap. Ukraine

and Lithuania. When the members of the Central Committee received the minutes of the Presidium of the Central Committee, they reflected on the proposals of Beria and the decisions of the Central Committee. And I had the thought that it was wrong to leave only national cadres in Western Ukraine and Lithuania, and remove all Russian workers, that this would only lead to a split in our multinational state. This is clear to everyone now.

In the notes of Beria, it was stated that the ill—being in Western Ukraine and Lithuania was due to distortions in the national question. It seemed to us that this was not the only matter. Everyone remembers what a huge gangster movement was in Ukraine in the 20s. Not by correcting national policies, the issue was then resolved and the gangster movement was ended. Western Ukraine was a part of Austria, under Franz Joseph, Lithuania, Latvia were under the rule of Russian landowners and generals. However, there was no rebel movement. There are some other reasons for the trouble in Western Ukraine, in Lithuania — economic issues, administrative, which were bypassed in the proposals of Beria, not raised, not opened.

Regarding the German Democratic Republic. Ordinary party members, ordinary workers were unclear how to go for the unification of West Germany with East Germany. This meant putting 18 million of the population and the German Democratic Republic in the clutches of the bourgeois rulers. This is quite obvious. It was impossible to solve the question of Germany in this way. In addition, there are also special considerations that cannot be ignored. A lot of uranium is mined in the GDR, maybe no less than the Americans have at their disposal. Beria was aware of this fact, and he had to tell the Central Committee about it in order to take these considerations into account.

Comrades, with the removal of Beria from the Presidium of the Central Committee and the leadership of our party, the Central Committee of the Party, the Presidium, without fear of intriguers, without fear of introducing discord into the ranks of the Central Committee, into the party's leadership, will be able to calmly discuss all questions of government, calmly discuss all the shortcomings that were in our work, and confidently eliminate them.

There is no doubt that the Central Committee of our party, the Presidium of the Central Committee, freed from this scoundrel, will lead our party and state forward to new successes.

Presiding comrade Khrushchev. There is a proposal tomorrow, July 4, not to hold an afternoon meeting of the Plenary, and now create a Commission to develop proposals and resolutions of the Plenary.

Will there be no objections?

Voice. Not.

Khrushchev. There is a proposal to create a Commission of 13 people.

Any other suggestions?

Voice. Not.

Khrushchev. I'll name the comrades recommended to the composition of the Commission on the development of the resolution "On the criminal anti—Party and anti—state actions of Beria":

T. Malenkov G.M.

T. Molotov V.M.

T. Khrushchev N.S.

Comrade Bulganin H.A.

Comrade Kaganovich L.M.

Comrade A. Kirichenko

T. Mikhailov H.A.

T. Patolichev N.S.

T. Bakradze V.M.

Comrade Yusupov U. Yu.

t. Pospelov P.N.

t. Suslov M.A.

T. Shepilov D.T.

Presiding comrade Khrushchev. Any other suggestions?

Voices from the seats. To accept.

Presiding comrade Khrushchev. Consider accepted.

Request to the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, to the chairmen of

the Councils of Ministers, the secretaries of the regional party committees, to the chairmen of the regional executive committees, to the agricultural workers who are present at the Plenum of the Central Committee, to stay here for a few minutes to agree on the use of daytime tomorrow.

At this meeting of the Plenum, I consider it completed. We will meet tomorrow at 8 o'clock in the evening.

FOURTH SESSION. July 4

Presiding comrade Khrushchev. We continue, comrades, the work of the Plenum. The word is comrade Andrianov. Prepare for Comrade Voroshilov.

Andrianov. Comrades! The decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee on the enemy of the people of Beria is the only correct and timely decision. The members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, thoroughly and with all necessary fullness revealed the face of this conspirator and treacherous enemy.

As it has now become very clear, this is not about a simple careerist, upstart. This is a dangerous enemy — a traitor who made his way into the leading nucleus — the brain of our party, who had in his dirty hands an armed and, in some part, apparatus devoted to him. This is a man of Bonapartist spirit, ready to go to power through mountains of corpses and rivers of blood.

That is why the constructive activity of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the government was so difficult. It is in this that we can see so penetrating and courageous measures adopted by the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, which made it possible to neutralize this beast without the slightest shock. His main aspiration was manifested in the seizure of power in order to elevate himself to dictators like Tito—Rankovich, and the ideological foundations of our party—Marxism—to change to Americanism. Therefore, it is no coincidence that his desire for rapprochement with Tito—Rankovich.

That is why, comrades, we are all deeply convinced that the Plenum of the Central Committee and our entire Party will unanimously approve this wise and at the same time courageous decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of our Party.

We local workers did not know much before the Plenum of the Central Committee, and it was difficult to at least to some extent

suppose this person's treachery. Touching on business, many had to listen to all sorts of audacity from him, not excluding the mat, which he equipped with almost every comment. Often we attributed this to his specific nature, taking into account his position, and yes, besides, they were afraid, because he could achieve his goal. After Stalin's death, he bit the rod and, in front of nothing and without stopping, sought his goal. First of all, in the Ministry of The Interior Ministry and on the ground, in regions and republics made a mass replacement of Chekist cadres, and in the selection of personnel was guided by the only principle of personal loyalty. The opinions of the party bodies, as it turned out at the Plenum, were not taken into account and recklessly trampled. I want to dwell on this issue, about the personnel, and on the example of the Leningrad region. In the Leningrad region, about a year before, instead of the withdrawn bankrupt head of the Office was approved by the Central Committee of the party comrade, who had just started to enter the case. A new leadership came to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR — replaced the head and in the Leningrad regional office, despite the objections of the party's regional committee, ostensibly under the guise of illness, although he was a healthy man and did not want to admit to being sick. I applied to the Ministry of the Interior to find out the reasons for the withdrawal and ask to leave the working head of the department at work. Apart from rudeness and audacity, nothing could be heard. I did not agree with this behaviour of the Ministry and appealed to the Central Committee of the party, especially since I knew that a number of dubious people were nominated to the Ministry for leadership positions, such as the former head of the Leningrad department Gorlinsky, withdrawn by the decision of the Central Committee and dismissed from the bodies, I will say about it below. He was approved by the head of the Economic Directorate of the Interior Ministry of the Union. Another "activist" nominated for a responsible post in the Ministry. Rodionov, who was engaged in provocations in the Ministry and on the ground, one of the active participants in the concocted provocative case about Comrade Shahurin, etc., dismissed before that from the bodies by the decision of the Central

Committee were nominated to the Ministry by such people as Kobulov and others. It seemed dangerous to me such concentration of forces in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, unacceptable practice of recruitment. I expressed my thoughts to the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Shatalin. I have stated directly about the inadmissibility of dangerous concentration of questionable people in the Ministry and the wrong removal of the head of the Office in the Leningrad region. The new head of the Leningrad department has arrived. The Minister was appointed and took up his duties. Apparently, he knew about my attitude to the movement or for other reasons, but he did not come to me, did not consider it necessary to inform the party. Moreover, he forbade his office to go to the party bodies.

I had to call Comrade Kruglov to the Ministry of Internal Affairs about a month ago and ask him to pay attention to the misconduct of the head of the Office, so that he would change his attitude to the party's regional committee. I do not think it is necessary here to talk about the dirty tricks of this man, who bypassed the Central Committee picked up all sorts of materials on the party bodies for information of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

On the issue of amnesty. I think that provocateurs from the Interior Ministry have made a dirty imprint on this useful case. The notorious thugs were released, even without any basic training on the part of the police. As soon as these faces appeared in the city, they earned daggers. There was an alarming situation among the population. And there were certainly fair complaints to the local authorities, to the Government and to the Central Committee. The Secretary of the Central Committee of the party Comrade Khrushchev drew our attention to the need to restore public order in the city of Leningrad and the region. We heard about the situation with ensuring public order at the bureau of the regional committee, outlined a number of measures to restore order quickly, criticized the police for poor work.

The intervention of the regional committee in this case was painfully perceived. When these shortcomings began to be corrected,

the Interior Ministry allowed distortions and unjustified, indiscriminate arrests of people. Instead of hitting the bullies were under attack many honest people. There are a number of other examples of arbitrariness on the part of some employees of the Ministry of the Interior.

It begs the question, why have such cases taken place in the Ministry of Internal Affairs for a number of years, what is the matter here?

I think, comrades, of course, it was bad that such dirty, if we can say, people like Yagoda, Yezhov, Abakumov, Beria made their way to the leadership in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They kept not enemies at bay, but honest people and even governing bodies, all sorts of elementary norms of relations between the party and the Interior Ministry were violated. Disproportionately large, worth 18 billion rubles, the apparatus of the Interior Ministry has turned into such a brainchild, which ceased to be considered even with the one who created this body. They held a lot in their hands in the country, but poorly fought against enemies, as quite rightly here at the Plenum, it was noted.

It would be unforgivable to underestimate and detract from the role of Soviet intelligence. It is therefore not about weakening, but strengthening intelligence, everything to do in order to put it in its place. Comrade Stalin paid timely attention to the edge of Soviet intelligence to turn now against external enemies. This Stalinist position of Beria for its own selfish purposes was completely ignored and discarded. It contradicted the decisions of the Central Committee introduced economic and secret—political offices and departments in the centre and on the ground, when the situation is not currently required of it, and especially since such a structure contradicted the decision of the Central Committee of the party. Other internal departments and departments were inflated, and intelligence and counterintelligence work was secondary, abandoned. Regional devices inflated, made colossal, planted thousands of people.

If we add to this and take into account that the agency was planted in a number of cases without need and benefit for the cause in almost every institution and enterprise, it is difficult to

imagine a fruitful, thoughtful work for the actual intelligence and counterintelligence work of the Chekists. If in some places we had to take a closer look, what kind of agency was planted, then, comrades, had to be at a loss, who and with whom they worked.

Some time ago, during the life of Comrade Stalin, we accidentally discovered that one of the terrorists — participants in the murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov — was brought from the camps to Leningrad to work, as we were told from the Interior Ministry Office, among the anti—Soviet intelligentsia.

The second case: an agent of the Interior Ministry's Office was uncovered, who persuaded one citizen to a terrorist act — the murder of one of the leaders who came to Leningrad. This man, who was tipped by the agent, honestly came and told us about it. When we began to find out what kind of person who is leaning on such provocations, we were told from the department that the agent of management allegedly conducted such conversations to verify the intentions of the person with whom he spoke. Of course, the provocation is obvious. Therefore, I wrote a note to Comrade Stalin on the subject and other equally important matters. The review of my note was entrusted to Beria, who did not speak out about these blatant ugliness that was outlined in the note. Moreover, the former head of Gorlinsky's department, whom I mentioned above, was filmed by the Central Committee with the active help of Comrade Malenkov and dismissed from the bodies, but when Beria came to the Interior Ministry, so this Gorlinsky turned out to be the head of the Economic Department of the Ministry of the Union, and Rodionov was also nominated for a leadership job in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Union. What could be expected from such personnel?

I think comrades are also wrong when we sometimes overestimate the work of organs. In fact, on any issue we are quicker to resolve and often indiscriminately when the issue of the Interior Ministry is introduced, rather than other more competent bodies. This can be judged by the notes we are aware of, as well as by a number of local facts. Moreover, some "actors" from the bodies were specialists in Marxist theory, on the national issue, while

in some acquaintance it turned out that with Marxism such figures in quotes had little to do, and their offices were filled not with literature, but by means of debauchery. Such truth is certainly bittersweet to hear, but the facts require that they be drawn from due conclusions.

On the national issue, the exposed provocateur caused great harm. He tried to oppose, to anger other nationalities against the Russian people. He inspired and activated bourgeois nationalists. This is definitely a great pest act.

Further, it seems to me, that it is not quite the right practice when appointing senior officials, including party workers, we usually resort to vetting these workers through the Interior Ministry, while all possibilities, and no less, are in the hands of the party bodies themselves. It is necessary to put everything in its place and oblige the Interior Ministry to carry out work in full accordance with the decision of the Central Committee on active intelligence against our external enemies.

In the Department of the Interior Ministry of the Leningrad region, we have an expensive, thousand—thousand—dollar apparatus, but not a single American or English scout this device has not disclosed, although the Leningrad region, as it is known, borders with other states and the sea, and land.

It is urgently necessary, as Comrade Malenkov correctly said in his speech, to strengthen the leadership of the party in all levels and to end forever with the violation of the norms of relations between the party and the Interior Ministry, to raise the ideological education of the Chekist cadres, to raise the responsibility of the party bodies for the implementation of day—to—day and concrete leadership of the bodies, constantly seeking to increase revolutionary vigilance.

Comrades, I think there is no need to exaggerate the identity of this villain. The party mass and the people do not know him, he was nowhere to be found, did not know the life of party organizations. The guide was known as a man of brash and rude, and now learned as a provocateur and traitor.

The Leningrad Party Organization, deeply committed to the Central Committee of our party, as well as our entire party, will

unanimously approve the decisions of the Central Committee and stigmatized this insidious villain and will unite even more closely around the Lenin—Stalinist Central Committee, our great Communist Party. (Applause.)

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. The word has Comrade Voroshilov, to prepare Ketzhobeli.

Voroshilov. Comrades, the decision of the Presidency of the Central Committee of our party to exclude from its ranks and arrest Beria, as well as the present discussion of this issue at the Plenum of the Central Committee are a matter of great state and political importance, aimed at preserving the unity of the governing body of our party, and hence the unity of the party and the people, aimed at ensuring Stalin's leadership of the party and the state and the further success of our entire cause.

The report of Comrade Malenkov, the speeches of the members of the Presidency and the Central Committee quite fully revealed the entire criminal abomination of the traitor Beria, whether exhaustive and vivid characterization of this criminal adventurer. However, the reasonable question arises, why this subject for so long was able to freely get involved in the leadership of the party and the state, without being previously exposed, enjoyed such great authority, held such high party and public posts? The question is quite legitimate.

First of all, my comrades, answering this question, I must stress that I fully subscribe to the detailed report of Comrade Malenkov, and from myself — it is necessary to keep in mind that Beria is a type of insidious, cunning enemy, the type of complete adventurer, schemer, who was able to deftly enter the trust of the leader, who was able to hide his vile plans for a long time and wait for himself a convenient moment. He saw the daily life of the great Stalin. Together with all of us, he knew that Stalin, as a result of hard work in recent years, often began to cook, apparently, this circumstance to a certain extent served as the basis of the vile tactics of Beria. He expected in the hope that sooner or later Stalin would not become. As the facts have now shown, this adventurer

after Stalin's death hoped for the rapid implementation of his criminal plans against the party and the state. That's why he was in such a hurry after Stalin's death, and maybe he was in a hurry. We are not yet clear, we do not still know, maybe he was rushed, pushed to accelerate his criminal adventure. But all this vile and criminal romp of a traitor is solved, well understood and stopped in time.

Beria during the life of the great Stalin was cheeky, rude, arrogant, arrogant, sought everywhere and everywhere to show his "superiority" to others, was not considered with the human dignity of those around and especially subordinate to him people, whether ministers or scientists, or his work comrades — he harassed all. Comrade Zverev looks at me and thinks: Voroshilov speaks the truth. How much he has said to comrade Zverev over the years all sorts of abominations and rudeness and inflicted undeserved insults on him. There is not a single comrade here, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the members of the government, to which Beria would not spery at different times the most audacious, impudent and causing on his part insults and insults. At all this, he knew the people he needed to care for them, to treat them in a panibratically. That's always why there were people who were with him for the day, for two were on good terms.

For all these qualities, Beria was afraid of Stalin, fawning before him, fawning in his own way, skilfully; whispered all sorts of nastiness, misled him. And only in the mood of Comrade Stalin, when we met in a business and non—business environment, we all felt which of us today "whispered". (Laughter in the hall.) I remember how in my time, it is known to his comrades Molotov, Kaganovich, and especially Tbilisi—Georgians, in particular, and those who are present here, what a nefarious role played in the life of the wonderful communist Sergo Ordzhonikidze Beria. He did everything to slander, to stain this truly crystal clear man and Bolshevik before Stalin. Sergo Orjonikidze told not only me, but also other comrades terrible things about this man, even then seeing him as the real enemy. He said that it was both a brazen and an enemy who would show himself.

Voices from the audience. Correct.

Voroshilov. He pitted the people he worked with on each other, creating an atmosphere of nervousness. Beria has been pursuing such a line of disunity throughout her years of work. He was especially cleared at the time of his illness and after the death of Comrade Stalin. Stalin was still alive, in a serious, unconscious state, and Beria had already begun to act. He's all over and always first, he's offering everything, he's anticipating everything, he knows everything, he's in charge. So it was, comrades? (Addresses the members of the Presidency.)

Voices from the Presidency. Well, that's right.

Voroshilov. We were up to our last breath near Stalin, and Beria immediately demonstrated his "activity" — they say, keep in mind, I'm here. He was given the candidacy of Georgi Maksimilianovich Malenkov for the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. We all recognized Comrade Malenkov as a natural and legitimate candidate. Beria could not offer himself, and it was impossible to wait for any of us to name him. (Laughter in the hall. applause.) So he decided to go roundabout, in a special way to the chairman's seat in the Council of Ministers. He chose the path of the enemy, but in this roundabout he chose the most roundabout roads. First, he started with an amnesty. We have all seen that there is a lot of what can be called "the evil" in this act, but nevertheless the Amnesty Decree was to some extent an act of useful. I must say that lately I have become acquainted with our jurisprudence and its v results. There is a lot of talk about crooks and recidivist criminals lately. A lot of people talk and especially write in anonymous and signed letters about murders, violence, etc. in connection with the alleged amnesty.

The second act is the clean—up of the Augean stables of the Interior Ministry. Everyone knows that Beria during his stay in Moscow was either directly the head of the IGB, or over the course of his time in Moscow. And those abominations and crimes.

Voice. Correct.

Voroshilov. Mr. Beria relied on this department, or rather, on some "their" people relied on this subject. All of a sudden they started talking: Minister Beria discovered, Beria proposed, Beria

opened, Beria cleared the Interior Ministry, etc., and at that time he openly dispersed his people to the appropriate places for his plans.

Voice. Correct.

Voroshilov. He put his hand at it, putting in the right way to win. It seems to me, comrades, that, despite the fact that this man was cunning and seemed to be stupid, and the real mind of this scoundrel, fortunately, was not. and he was the Interior Ministry, this very important state body, did not know, did not know him and recently, because there, along with the bastards who really did the dirty thing against the party and the government, most of the employees of the Interior Ministry honestly worked, these are the people we can honestly rely on.

Voice. Correct.

Voroshilov. It is no coincidence that after Beria's arrest, none of these people wrote a letter saying, "What have you done to our great leader, how will we do without our Beria? ...» (Laughter.) Nothing like this has happened.

Voice. Correct.

Voroshilov. He expected that he would first advertise himself, extol, and then gradually get to the intended goal. What abominations was he capable of? Yes to all, and the most monstrous including. Thanks to the comrades who are sitting here for exposing him. I found out, really, the last one. (Laughter.) But I never trusted him, he felt it and didn't really "read" me.

Malenkov. Correct.

Voice. Correct.

Voroshilov. We took it out in time. It is impossible to believe, comrades, that this subject is only an adventurer.

Voice. Correct.

Voroshilov. In such a difficult international environment, ambient, with, so to speak, a kind of international camouflage (laughter), we would find ourselves in a very difficult situation. So now we have to admit that this gentleman was removed in time. This is the greatest merit of our comrades from the Presidency of the Central Committee of the party, and now of the entire Central Committee, who unanimously and with a genuine understanding

of the seriousness of the matter have dealt with this issue. (*Stormy applause.*)

After the death of the great Stalin, the tasks faced by our party, its Central Committee, the state, the Soviet people as a whole, demanded, dictated to us the preservation of unity in our ranks, monolithicity and fortress. Each of us is shored up as the apple of the eye of the party, its steadfastness—unity and loyalty to the covenants of Lenin—Stalin.

The unity of the leadership of the Party and the Government we have put, colluding and not colluding, its sacred and obligatory task. We understood that unity is everything, unity of feelings, thoughts and actions, the path that the great Lenin and Stalin have shown us, the path that we must at all costs keep free for our movement forward is our sacred and immutable task. And this vile enemy Beria believed that we. This explains that he spent three months and imposed something on us, even what we wouldn't want. Here I have to say that we had to give this subject the will for a time, let it be clear further. And we saw, as I said, where it led.

Our task, comrades, now is not only to stigmatize the crimes of Beria, who has done much harm to our cause, but also to direct our efforts towards the implementation of all those preceding the great Stalin before us in his time. We are facing some challenges today that are particularly ups and off. Comrade Malenkov also spoke about it, and other comrades said that we should cleanse ourselves of this filth, and this is bad (Russian people have a lot of good sayings, and one of them is to some extent suitable here — there is no evil without good) — it is a big evil, but the good will be no less. What do you mean? We will now be more careful, careful, more vigilant and all sorts of scoundrels will soon be recognized and brought to clean water.

That's one challenge. But the main challenge that we must now, while maintaining the unity of our ranks, the strength of our party and the purity of our party, is to ensure that our economy and politics, both domestic and international, conform to the place and position that our socialist state occupies in the world.

Agriculture is, as it has been said here, in a somewhat dry state. — we need to make them real Soviet farms, profitable, revealing in all respects, now they are very bad, low—income.

Voice. Correct.

Voroshilov. We need all our agriculture as a whole, both public and state, to really raise to the proper height.

Voice. Correct.

Voroshilov. This is a big, difficult, but urgent and quite solvable task. I will not talk about other issues: our industry as a whole and other issues of economy and culture are more or less in proper condition, but agriculture needs vigilance and in itself, I would say, great attention on the part of our party, the state.

Having cleared the traitor Beria and his ilk, if they are anywhere else and will meet, we become only stronger, more united, even more confident in the rightness of our great cause — the case of Lenin—Stalin. No enemy will lead us from the glorious path that is shown to us and humanity by Lenin and Stalin. Our wise party led and will lead the Soviet people with confidence to the shining heights of communism that we fought for, and we are convinced that we will emerge victorious in this struggle. (Continued applause.)

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. The word has Comrade Kezhobeli²⁹. Prepare for Comrade Arutinov (Armenia).

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. The word has Comrade Harutinov. Prepare for Andrey Andreyevich.

Arutinov. The ruling of the Presidency of the Central Committee on exposing the adventurer Beria and arresting him I believe the correct Lenin—Stalinist approach to assessing the actions of Beria, this careerist and adventurer, who resorted to any means to seize power.

²⁹ See the text of the speech. Article 11 of Title II (p. 198-201 of this edition).

I haven't met Beria for the last 7—8 years, but when I was in Georgia, I worked during the period when Beria was secretary of the Central Committee and secretary of the party's regional committee. The traits that have been revealed recently v Beria, as we have learned in detail from Comrade Malenkov's report and the statements of the members of the Presidency, have been revealed to him before. This is careerism, unbridled desire for power, he all subordinated it — and his attitude to people, his attitude to the party staff, the attitude to the leaders of the party and the government, and the behaviour that Comrade Voroshilov spoke about the provocation by Beria against Sergo Ordzhonikidze in the last years of his life.

Beria treated the cadre solely in terms of using them not for the interests of the party, but in order to move above to the leadership. He used to be a sneer at his leadership comrades — ministers or other employees who have access to leadership and can put a word on him — to be almost sneering, he established a sneering relationship until he used it, and then he began to ridicule inaccessible forms, succinctly, in two or three words, in order to insult the face of any leader.

The question is: how did all the previously known negative traits have taken such monstrous forms and no one has noticed it, has not taken action in a timely manner? In my opinion, one circumstance gives an explanation for this issue — that the Central Committee quite correctly proclaimed the slogan of unity and cohesion of both the ranks of the party, and above all the governing body of the party and the government as the main task facing the party after the death of Comrade Stalin.

Our party organizations have accepted the central committee's call with exceptional approval. It is this absolutely correct call and correct questioning can fill the great loss that the party suffered with the death of Comrade Stalin. It seems to me that Beria wanted to use the atmosphere of unanimity and cohesion in his career interests, convinced that in this situation so easily will not go to break or condemn his adventurous actions, used this situation and began to put his feet on the table, as we saw after reading the facts.

On the other hand, the atmosphere of unanimity of the members of the KK Presidency helped to expose it. Everyone knows that he was afraid of Stalin, he was afraid of him for a long time, even since he worked in Georgia. After Stalin's death, he almost ceased to reckon with the leaders of the party and the government. I have not seen him in recent years, but according to those documents, which I read in the annexes to the protocol of the Presidency, I became convinced that this man does not count with anyone, above all puts his personal I, tried to put pressure on the party to take a certain position of successor to our leader Comrade Stalin.

Knowing his career traits, when I read these documents, I was taken by fear for threats to the unity of the leadership of the party. I was also afraid in Red Square when Beria was the second. Then I thought that if he was in the top three, he would definitely reach for full power. He has no partisanship, no principles in his actions, just as he has never had such loyalty to Stalin, which he tried to portray by the publication of a book on the history of the Caucasian party organizations. Comrade Molotov correctly said here that this book was not made by him, it is not his work on the history of the Caucasian party organizations.

He hasn't read a book. How could he raise the party archives, raise these documents? Many people who work in Georgia know that a certain Beria and renegade, the famous in Georgia Menshevik Pavel Sakvarlidze, participated in the compilation of this book. I don't know why Georgian comrades don't talk about it. That's who wrote this book. (Revival in the hall.) The whole point is that the party archives were raised earlier than our central party institutions could raise. Here's the story of this book. The book was published for the purpose of a career. He achieved recognition that Beria is one of the Stalinists in the Caucasus organizations, who first saw the exceptional role of Comrade Stalin in the struggle for the creation of our party.

I would like to say more in relation to some personnel. It is known that Beria, being a non—party man, being unprincipled, was a real ataman. He approached the frames in terms of their personal devotion to him. He did not admit, did not respect a single bit of

partisanship in a man. He could ruin anyone, any devoted man in the party. It is known how many good party cadres were interrupted by him in Georgia in 1937 only because many of them did not recognize him. It seems to me that in many places such shots, which are not parties, but personally were devoted to him. We know why he did it now. Therefore, in terms of taking lessons from this great event and in terms of helping the party all do the necessary work, we need to carefully examine the footage placed on Beria's part in some areas.

The Shatalin. And you can tell me.

Arutinov. Here we are talking about the Interior Ministry, we are talking about some Caucasian workers.

Voice. Correct.

Arutinov. I, not considering myself an outsider for the Georgian Republic, draw conclusions from the speeches of Georgian comrades at this Plenum of the Central Committee.

Voice. Correct.

Arutinov. I, comrades, don't take long. I remembered that period, and which I was aware of the case, and what anti—party traits be noticed then in Beria. I must say that now the Presidency of the Central Committee can be firmly confident that the entire party will support this decision of the Central Committee of the party, including the party organizations of the Caucasus and the workers of the Caucasus republics unanimously approve and will unite their ranks even closer around the Leninist—Stalinist Central Committee and our Soviet government. (Applause.)

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. The word has a friend Andrey Andreyev. Prepare for Comrade Tevosyan.

Andreev. Comrades, I think it is very right that our Presidency has not limited itself to a mere message, but has decided to hold a detailed discussion on the Beria case at Plenum in order to reveal the real face of this enemy, its purpose, its tactics and to learn from it all the necessary lessons.

Beria is an unusual type of enemy. our party used to struggle, and he pursued unusual tactics compared to the former exposed enemies.

It is true that he was (yesterday Comrade Savenyagin, speaking, talked about it), he was a bureaucrat, rude, cynical, bad to people, but it would be too simple an explanation of the face of this enemy. It seems to me that from the clear messages made by Comrade Malenkov in the report, the speeches of the members of the Presidency and members of the Central Committee at the Plenum show that Beria exposed an old provocateur, whom he was undoubtedly long before his transfer to Moscow. Now it became obvious that his pamphlet, which had been so extolled for some time, was only an approach to the beginning of his extensive enemy work.

I don't agree with Comrade Savenyagin that Beria is not a distant man. No, comrades, we must not downplay his abilities and the harm done to him. He was a smart, very agile enemy, otherwise he would have been exposed long ago, and he lasted a long time. And finally, it is clear that it was a hard, in ingles, very insidious and dangerous political enemy of international scale, an agent of the imperialists. I don't think he was so confident, he wasn't a loner.

Voice. Right.

Andreev. If in our country he could not have a more or less large number of his supporters, he certainly relied on some kind of force, and this force fed him, pushed, dictated. He was certainly an international agent of the imperialists. Experience tells us that all the enemies of the party and the Soviet government that have been exposed so far have been in one way or another connected with foreign intelligence or general headquarters, from where they were given directives. Beria could not be an exception. It is possible that they relied on him as a dictator of the fascist type. And I think that from this bastard it is necessary to draw all the veins so that there is a clear picture of his relations with abroad, to whom and how he served, then a lot will be revealed to us. We do not yet know everything about him, the investigation should reveal all aspects of his enemy work. But even now, what the comrade members of the

Presidium said, it is clear that he had carefully developed, of course, not just him, but a plan dictated by his masters to eliminate the Soviet system in our country.

What was Beria's plan? Unlike what the enemies of our people carried out before, his plan was somewhat different. To go through the split of our party, as its predecessors tried to do. — This is a bad thing, because our party is an unshakable monolith. To follow the path of terror and incapacitation of individual leaders is also a verified case in the sense that after this the party rallies even more. By this, I do not want to say that the enemies abandoned terror, they will carry out terror, and in this regard one must be vigilant.

The plan of Beria in this sense was different from the plan of the traitors of the Soviet people, former enemies. As is now clear, this plan consisted of: First, to get into anything in the trust of Comrade Stalin. He considered it the main condition for his enemy activity. And here he was rubbing into the trust of Comrade Stalin in all sorts of ways. Did he do it? Absolutely, I did. This is the first huge damage that has been done. Here comrades have already said that Comrade Stalin had such a weakness of excessive credulity.

The second and obviously the main task he had in his plan was to break the Bolshevik core of our leadership. You know that all our enemies, to weaken the leadership of the party, to disorganize the party — this foundation of everything— have long sought to shake something, to break the Bolshevik core, but they failed. And this task Beria, obviously, and set as the main task — to break the Bolshevik core, to undermine the trust of individual leaders in Comrade Stalin, to sow discord within the leaders of the party and the government.

Has he achieved anything in this regard? Something, of course, temporarily he sought.

Here Comrade Voroshilov spoke in relation to Comrade Ordzhonikidze. Sergo was an honest, noble Bolshevik, and there is no doubt that he was a victim of Beria's intrigues...

Voice. Correct.

Andreev. Beria destroyed Comrade Stalin and Ordzhonikidze, and the noble heart of T. Sergo could not stand it: so Beria brought

out one of the best leaders of the party and friends of Comrade Stalin.

On. All of us, the old Cekists, and the new ones, know what a warm friendship there was between Comrade Stalin and Molotov. We all considered this friendship to be natural, we rejoiced in it. But Beria appeared in Moscow — and everything changed radically, Stalin's relations with Molotov soured. That. Molotov began to be subjected to undeserved attacks by Comrade Stalin. It was Beria with his intrigues achieved the undermining of the close friendship of Stalin, and so Molotov.

Take other facts regarding Malenkov. Beria knew that Comrade Stalin fully trusted Comrade Malenkov, considered him his friend. And Beria had to hit Comrade Malenkov. As a real provocateur, pretending to be a friend and Malenkov, in fact, he cleverly concocted the case of Shahurin and Novikov. This case was certainly done by Beria.

Voice. Correct.

Andreev. It is known that in the difficult years of the restoration of transport and during the war, Kaganovich did a lot for the successful operation of transport. And as soon as Beria achieved as a member of the Defence Committee of the Chiefs of Transportation, Comrade Kaganovich was after a while released from the management of transport, and instead was planted Khrulev, who did not understand anything in matters of railway transport.

Let's take a question like that. Everyone knows who Voroshilov is, what his share in our party is, and everyone knows about the long—term and close friendship of Comrade Stalin with Voroshilov. With the advent of Beria the situation completely changes, friendship is broken, Comrade Voroshilov actually for some time finds himself out of leadership work. It was Beria's work.

Voroshilov. Worked, worked.

Andreev. The same can be said about other members of the Politburo, for example, against Khrushchev, against Mikoyan, who were also subjected to heavy attacks. It is clear from all this, comrades, that he was trying in every way to ensure that all members of the Politburo were marked with something, that they were stained,

and he, you see, is clean. And in fact, look, you can't show anything to him— it's clean. (Laughter in the hall.) It was a subtle calculation. He sought to disarm Stalin, deprive him of his friends and remain alone as a loyal and impeccable friend of Stalin. I believe that this should be seen as a new way of working for our enemies. Previously, our enemies, all sorts of traitors peeked out the donkey ears of their political views, he—nothing could be noticed.

So, to disable individual leaders, to disrupt the leadership, to break the established friendship and unity in the core of our party, to undermine Comrade Stalin's trust in the individual members of the Politburo, it means to undermine their trust in the country — this, in fact, was his main task. He managed to do something for a while, but he could not achieve his goal, because the core of the KK remained solid and unshakable.

This is witnessed by the 19th Congress of the party, which we see perfectly at the present Plenum, when our governing core of the Bolsheviks is strong and unanimous as ever. (Applause.)

Beria's next move, as all the materials show, was to disrupt the work of the Council of Ministers. Many of the ministers who are here know that with Beria's appearance in the Council of Ministers, and especially when he has begun to preside, the situation is changing dramatically. A thorough discussion of the issues was the exception, and the rule became a conveyor belt. There are 40—50 questions to be taken into account by the presiding Beria of pre-prepared proposals and the submission of questions to the commission. I must say that sometimes I would like to express my thoughts. Where to go? It's breaking. The question is submitted to the commission.

Now it is clear that the case was not just about the bureaucracy of Beria or his special operational methods, but that it was a special method of sabotage. Only those questions, which were personally reported by individual members of the Politburo to Comrade Stalin, were quickly passed. The rest of the issues were settled for months and were not solved.

It was a special tactic of the enemy to disrupt the work of our government bodies.

From the report of Malenkov and the speeches of members of the Presidency and members of the Central Committee it is clear that he acted as a true provocateur.

What else did the enemy seek to strike at the Soviet system and the party? This sow enmity between the peoples of the USSR. This Beria was hesitant to do during the life of Comrade Stalin, and if he did, he was very careful. It was only when Comrade Stalin was gone that he led this vile affair subtly and deftly through his provocative notes on Western Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic republics. But, as you can see, he, like many other things, failed to do it.

After the death of Comrade Stalin, it is clear that he began to force his rise to power, and he must have been rushed, as Comrade Voroshilov correctly said, and he was even more brazen. What he was hesitant to do during the life of Comrade Stalin, he began to spend after his death, began to discredit the name of Comrade Stalin, to cast a shadow on the greatest man after Lenin. In fact, the appearance of materials signed by Beria in the protocols of the Presidency in the case of doctors, Georgia, etc., where the name of Comrade Stalin casts a shadow— because it is his business.

Voices from the audience. Correct.

Andreev. He did it consciously to bury Comrade Stalin's name and to make it easier to come to power.

Voices from the audience. Correct.

Andreev. I have no doubt that under his pressure soon after the death of Comrade Stalin suddenly disappears in the press the mention of Comrade Stalin.

Voices from the audience. Correct.

Andreev. It's a disgrace to print workers. Previously, too diligent, and where it is necessary and not necessary, inserted the name of Stalin, and then suddenly disappeared the name of Stalin. What's it? I believe it was his hand, his influence, he was able to confuse and intimidate some print workers.

From somewhere the question of the cult of personality appeared. Why did this question come up? After all, it was solved long ago in Marxist literature, it is solved in life, millions of people know what is important a brilliant personality, standing at the head of the movement, know what importance Lenin and Stalin have, and then from somewhere there was a question about the cult of personality. It's Beria's antics.

Comrade Voroshilov from the Presidency. Correct.

Andreev. He wanted to bury the name of Comrade Stalin, and not only the name of Comrade Stalin, but it was also directed against the successor of Comrade Stalin Comrade Malenkov.

Voices from the audience. Correct.

Malenkov. We are all successors, Comrade Stalin does not have one successor.

Andreev. You are the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, a post held by Stalin.

Voices from the audience. Correct. (stormy applause.)

Andreev. I believe that not without his influence was made the decision, which we read in the protocols, about holding a demonstration without portraits, not to hang portraits. Why? On what basis? People should know their leaders by portraits, by speeches. It was the wrong decision.

From the Presidency of you, Kaganovich. Andrey Andreevich, this decision was overturned as wrong. (Stormy applause.)

Andreev. It was, comrades, the subtle, deft work of an insidious and dangerous enemy to clear his way, to begin to undermine the foundations of Leninism and the teachings of Comrade Stalin. But it is not given to anyone, the teachings of Lenin and Stalin are eternal and unwavering.

Voices from the audience. Correct.

Andreev. In this respect, he is very similar to Tito.

Voices from the audience. Correct.

Andreev. Of course, comrades, people will ask how it fits, everyone had an idea that Beria was doing a great job, and turned out to be such a scoundrel. But the fact is that the enemy, in order not to expose itself, is forced to conduct useful work in our country,

otherwise it would fail in three accounts, and especially in our Soviet conditions, where along with the party and the government of thousands, millions of eyes are watching the individual. And Beria, of course, did a lot of work a few times, but it was camouflage work, and that was the difficulty of exposing him. He created a halo that he, for example, during the war led a large work, etc., blackmailed in the name of Comrade Stalin. It was hard to expose him.

How will all this be accepted by the party and the people? I think it's good.

Voices from the audience. Correct.

Andreev. Because Beria has no roots in the party or in the people. I am deeply convinced of that.

Voices from the audience. Correct.

Andreev. Exposing and arresting such a venerable, dangerous enemy will be regarded by our friends at home and abroad as our biggest victory (stormy applause) and as a very serious defeat of the imperialist camp. (Applause.)

I have no doubt that everyone will say that this is a truly Leninist—Stalinist leadership, which was not lost, but acted decisively, as befits Leninists and Stalinists. (Stormy applause.)

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. Comrade Tevosyan has the word³⁰. Prepare for Comrade Baibakov.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. The word has Comrade Baibakov³¹.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. Comrades, there was a suggestion to stop discussing the report.

Voice. Correct.

³⁰ See the text of I. Tevosyan's speech. Article 11 of Title II (c. 208-212 of this edition).

³¹ See the text of the speech by N. Baibakov. Article 11 of Title II (p. 212-216 of this edition).

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. There will be no other offers?

Voice. No.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. 24 of the 46 signed—ups performed.

Voice. Stop.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. The question is clear. Voting, apparently, is not required.

Voice. No.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. No one demands the debate to continue? No. The comrades unanimously agree to end the debate.

Voice. Correct.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. The commission will report on the proposals on Monday. On Monday at 8 p.m. we will continue the work of the Plenary. There will be no other offers?

Voice. No.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. There is a proposal now to hear the 2nd question. There will be no objections?

Voice. No.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. The word for the report has Comrade Voroshilov.

Voroshilov. Khrushchev calls my statement a report, and I have only a short sentence for 3 minutes.

The Presidency of the Central Committee introduces to the Plenary of the Central Committee the question of convening the next session of the Supreme Council of the USSR. The session is to be convened in the 2nd half of July this year. The state budget of the USSR for 1953 was considered by the Council of Ministers of the USSR and submitted for approval of the session of the Supreme Council of the USSR. There is still plenty of time before the session for the work of the budget committees of both houses of the Supreme Council. The issue would thus be fully prepared by the time the session opened.

Further, by the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU, he was relieved of his duties as The Prosecutor General of the

USSR, T. Safonov. In his place, the Attorney General is planned by T. Rudenko—a former prosecutor of the Ukrainian USSR. The appointment of the General Prosecutor of the USSR is made in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR by the Supreme Council of the USSR, so it is necessary to include this issue also in the agenda of the session.

In addition, the following decrees adopted by the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR are meant to be submitted for the approval of the session: on the formation of the Ministry of Mechanical Engineering of the USSR, on the appointment of ministers of the USSR and the chairman of the State Plan of the USSR on the election of members of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

It is also necessary to make draft changes to article 126 of the USSR Constitution, arising from the decisions of the 19th party congress, on changing the name of the party and on changes in the CPSU's Charter.

That's the whole report.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. There is a suggestion to take the following decision:

ON THE CONVENING OF THE NEXT SESSION OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE USSR

1. To convene the Fifth session of the Supreme Council of the USSR in the second half of July 1953 in Moscow.

2. Introduce the following questions to the session of the Supreme Council of the USSR:

(a) Approval of the USSR State Budget for 1953 and the USSR's State Budget Report for 1951 and 1952:

b) approval of the decrees of the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR.

3. Approve by the speakers: on the State Budget for 1953 and the report on the performance of the State Budget of the USSR for 1951 and 1952 — T. Zverev A. G. and on the approval of

decrees of the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR—T. Pegov N.M.

Voice. Take.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. There will be no objections?

Voice. No.

Presiding officer. Khrushchev. Accepted.

Comrades, let me end the Plenary meeting. The next meeting is scheduled for Monday, 8 p.m.

FIFTH MEETING. 7 July

Presiding officer. Bulganin. Comrades, no objection to continuing the work of the Plenum? Have you read the draft resolution?

Voice. Read.

Presiding officer. Bulganin. Let's start the third question of the order of the day. Comrade Khrushchev has the word.

Khrushchev. Comrades, on April 28, 1953, the decision of the Plenary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to withdraw comrade Ignatieff from the Central Committee was adopted. You know this question, you hardly need to report in detail. There is a proposal now to revise this issue and restore Ignaty's rights as members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Voice. Correct.

Khrushchev. Because it was done on a known adward, and now we need to revise this case and fix it.

Presiding officer. Bulganin. Allow the proposal of the Central Committee's Presidency to vote:

about T. Ignatieff S. D.

Repeal the ruling of the Cpsu CKK Plenary of April 28, 1953 (No. 3/2) and restore Ignatieff S.D. as a member of the CPSU Central Committee.

Presiding officer. Bulganin. Vote. Who is in favour of this proposal, please raise your hands. Please let me go. Who's against it? No. Refrains? No. Accepted unanimously.

Khrushchev. A proposal is made to transfer from the candidates to the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, T. Shchukov G. K.

Voice. Correct.

Presiding officer. Bulganin. Allow the proposal of the Central Committee's Presidency to vote:

I don't know what to do. Shchukova G.K.

Translate you. G.K. Shchukova from the candidates for the CPSU Central Committee.

Presiding officer. Bulganin. Who is in favour of this proposal, please raise your hands. Please let me go. Who's against it? No. Abstaining? No. Accepted unanimously.

Khrushchev. A proposal is made to withdraw from the membership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to exclude from the ranks of the Communist Party for hostile activities against the Communist Party and the Soviet state Goglidze S. A. and Kobulov B. S.³².

Voice. Correct.

**Presiding officer. Bulganin. I vote on the proposal of the Presidency of the Central Committee:
about Goglidze S.A. and Kobulov B. 3.**

To remove Goglidze S.A. and Kobulov B. 3. from the membership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and exclude them from the ranks of the Communist Party for hostile activities against the Communist Party and the Soviet state.

Presiding officer. Bulganin. Who is in favour of this proposal, please raise your hands. Please let me go. Who's against it? No. Abstaining? No. Accepted unanimously.

³² *That's right: B. Kobulov.*

Presiding officer. Bulganin. So the third question is exhausted. Let's go back to the first question. The final word is given to Mr. Malenkov.

MALENKOV G. M. at the meeting of the Plenary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on July 7, 1953

Comrades! We all see the exceptional unanimity prevailing on the plenum of our Central Committee.

The speeches of the participants of the Plenary are imbued with a consciousness of responsibility for the fate of the party and the country and deep party principle, they testify to the unity, strength and wisdom of the leadership of our great party. This power and fortress will break all the machinations of enemies, wherever they come from. (Continued applause.)

The enemy dared to encroach on the most precious thing for each of us, the most sacred for the communist — our party, its leadership, the unity in the leadership.

That is why, with such anger and exceptional unanimity, our Central Committee decides to cut off this bastard who has snuck into the leadership of the party.

That is why we will be ruthless in our decision to continue to have enemies like Beria not to engage in the fight against our party.

(Applause.)

Each of us asks himself why the Presidency of the Central Committee did not immediately expose Beria and for some time left unpunished his individual criminal actions against the party and the government?

To that effect, I want to make some additions to what is already rightly said here at the Plenum.

Now, after Beria's arrest, things have become clearer to many. But we must not forget yesterday. And he, this day yesterday, was the following.

In the last period of Stalin's life and, consequently, immediately after his death, the situation in the Politburo as a governing group was clearly dysfunctional.

The Politburo has not functioned properly for a long time. Members of the Politburo were not involved in many important issues and worked on separate tasks. As you now know, political mistrust has been unfairly sown against some members of the Politburo.

This was the case at the time of Stalin's departure from us.

To this it should be added that Beria remained not only unmasked, but he was known as **a man close to Stalin**^A.

Isn't it clear, comrades, that it took some time for the governing team to unite and ensure unanimity in the decision of Beria.

It would be unforgivable to begin exposing Beria without the entire management team being united and unanimous in this regard.

(Voices.) In this regard, it was impossible to allow carelessness, not to run into a misunderstanding on the part of anyone, on the absence of unanimity and firm consciousness in the correctness of steep measures in the wearing of Beria.

We had to avoid any hesitation and to ensure complete unanimity in the decision in the Beria case.

The course of the case was heard first at the Presidium of the Central Committee, and now the Plenum has clearly shown that this complete unanimity has been achieved. (Stormy applause.)

^A *The words were removed: "but he enjoyed great authority of a man close to Stalin." Here and further in the closing statement of Mr. Malenkov in page-by-page footnotes the text, deleted from the first version of the final word in the process of preparing a verbatim report for printing and mailing in the party organization, and bold font highlighted inscribed words. Sost.*

You see, comrades, that we are frankly asking the Plenum questions about the state of affairs in the highest level of the party leadership.

And indeed, where, as not at the Plenum of the Central Committee, it is necessary to say with all bluntness what should be said in order to strengthen the leadership of the party, in order to ensure the best and correct organization of the most difficult cause of leadership of the party and the state.

In this regard, I want to dwell on some issues related to the leadership of the party. Moreover, a number of comrades directly touched on these issues.

Here, at the Plenum of the Central Committee, they talked about the cult of personality, and, it must be said, they spoke incorrectly. I am referring to Andreev's speech. Similar sentiments in this regard could be caught in the speech of Tevosyan. We must therefore clarify this issue.

Khrushchev. Some non—speakers have the same thoughts.

Malenkov. First of all, we have to openly admit it, and we suggest that we write it down^A **the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee** that in our propaganda in recent years there has been a retreat from the Marxist—Leninist understanding of the role of the individual in history. It is no secret that party propaganda instead of properly explaining the role of the Communist Party as a guiding force in the construction of communism in our country fell into a cult of personality. This perversion of Marxism undoubtedly contributes to the diminishing of the role of the party and its governing centre, leading to a decrease in the creative activity of the party masses and the masses of the Soviet people.

But, comrades, it's not just about propaganda. The question of the cult of personality is directly and directly related to the question of the collectiveness of leadership.

I have already said in my report that it is not justified that we did not convene during the 13 years of the party congress, that for years

^A *Our*

the Plenum of the Central Committee was not convened, that the Politburo did not function properly and was replaced by threes, fives, etc.³³ who worked on Stalin's behalf separately, on separate issues and tasks.

Haven't all of us, members of the Politburo and members of the Central Committee, if not all, then many, have not seen and understood the wrongness of such a situation? We saw and understood, but they could not fix it.

We have to say this to the Plenum of the Central Committee in order to draw the right conclusions and take measures to improve the leadership of the party and the country.

You should know, comrades, that the cult of personality of Stalin in the daily practice of leadership took painful forms and dimensions, methods of collectiveness in the work were discarded, criticism and self—criticism in our highest leadership level was absent.

We have no right to hide from you that such an ugly cult of personality has led to the non—appellation of individual decisions and in recent years has begun to cause serious damage to the cause of the leadership of the party and the country.

This should be said to decisively correct the mistakes made in this regard, to learn the necessary lessons and to ensure in practice the collectiveness of the leadership on the principle basis of the Leninist—Stalinist teaching.

Plenum should know, no one gave us the right to hide from our highest between the congresses of the party body of the party leadership, the fact that the ugly manifestation of the cult of

³³ *We are talking about the practice of considering and preparing issues that existed in the post-war years, which are within the competence of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Government of the USSR, commissions (groups) formed on behalf of Stalin, without the participation of all members of the Politburo (Presidency) of the Central Committee or the Presidency of the Soviet Union.*

personality and the destruction of methods of collectiveness in the work of the Politburo and the Central Committee, the lack of criticism and self—criticism in the Politburo and the Central Committee caused a number of errors in the leadership of the party and the country. Sad examples in this regard are not isolated.

The following fact is in our memory. After the party congress, Stalin came to the Plenum of the Central Committee in its present composition and without any reason politically discredited T. Molotov and Mikoyan.

Did the Plenum of the Central Committee, we all agree with this? No. But we were all silent. Why? Because the cult of personality has been brought to the absurd and there has come complete uncontrollability. Do we want anything like this in the future? Absolutely not. (Voices: Right.) (Stormy applause.)

In the course of the works of this Plenary you, comrades, became aware of the following fact. In connection with the task of raising livestock in February of this year, Stalin insisted on increasing taxes in the village by 40 billion rubles. After all, we all understood the blatant wrongness and danger of this event. We said that all the cash income of collective farms is a little more than this amount. However, this issue was not discussed, the collectiveness in the leadership was so belittled and suppressed that the evidence given to Stalin was rejected by him without appeal.

Let's take the decision on the Turkmen channel. Has the need for the construction of the canal been clarified in advance, has the necessary costs and economic efficiency of the construction been calculated, has the issue been discussed in the governing bodies of the party and the state? No. It was solved alone and without any economic calculations. And then it turned out that this channel with irrigation system will cost 30 billion rubles. In a completely unpopulated area of the canal will have to resettle people from the inhabited areas of Central Asia, where we still have a lot of unused land, exclusively suitable for the development of cotton. Central Asian comrades and agricultural workers can attest to this. **(Voices.)** Is it not clear that we must correct such mistakes, which were the result of a misbehaviour in the management team, the result of the

belittling of teamwork and the transition to the method of single, non—appeal decisions, the result of perversions of Marxist understanding of the role of the individual.

Or take Stalin's famous proposal on product exchange, put forward in the work "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR." It is already clear that this provision has been put forward without sufficient analysis and economic justification. It, this provision on product exchange, if not corrected, can become an obstacle to solving the most important for many years the task of full development of trade. The issue of product exchange, the timing and forms of transition to product exchange is a big and complex issue affecting the interests of millions of people, the interests of all our economic development, and it should be carefully weighed, thoroughly studied, before putting forward before the party as a policy proposal.

As you can see, comrades, we must tell you, the members of the Central Committee, that decisions on the most important international issues, issues of public work and economic construction were often taken without due consideration and without collective discussion in the governing party bodies.

The presence of such abnormalities in fact led to insufficiently grounded and wrong decisions, led to the belittling of the role of the Central Committee as a body of collective leadership of the party.

As you can see, comrades, and great men can have weaknesses. Stalin had these weaknesses. We must say this in order to correctly, in a Marxist way, to raise the question of the need to ensure the collectiveness of leadership in the party, criticism and self—criticism in all party links, including first of all in the Central Committee and in the Presidency of the Central Committee.

We must say this in order not to repeat the mistakes of the lack of collective leadership and the misunderstanding of the question of the cult of personality, for these mistakes, in the absence of Stalin, will be three times dangerous. (Voices.

We must raise this issue in a pointed way. There can't be any innuendo. If there were mistakes under Stalin, the more dangerous it

is to repeat them in the absence of such a leader as Stalin was. (*Voices.*)

Respecting, honouring and saintly following the great teachings of Marx—Engels—Lenin—Stalin means first of all eliminating what prevents its consistent conduct.

In the draft resolution proposed for consideration, we consider it necessary to remind the parties of Marx's views on the issue of the cult of personality. In a famous letter to William Blos in 1877, Marx wrote:

"I'm not angry, and Engels is just the same. We both won't give a penny for popularity. Here, for example, is proof: out of dislike for any cult of personality I during the existence of the International³⁴ I have never allowed to publicize numerous appeals in which my merits were recognized and which I was bored from different countries—I never even answered them, except occasionally for them. The first entry of Engels and mine into the secret society of the Communists occurred under the condition that everything that promotes superstitious worship before the authorities will be thrown out of the statute (Lassalle subsequently acted exactly the opposite)"

Comrades, here at the Plenum, inadvertently and clearly wrongly touched on the question of the successor of Comrade Stalin. I feel obliged to respond to this statement and say the following.

No one dares, can't, shouldn't, and doesn't want to pretend to be a successor. (*Voices. (Applause.)*)

The successor of the great Stalin is a tightly knit, monolithic team of party leaders, tested in the difficult years of the struggle for the fate of our Motherland, for the happiness of the peoples of the Soviet Union, hardened in the fight against the enemies of the party, experienced fighters for the cause of communism, able to

³⁴ *First International (International Workers' Association). The first mass organization of the proletariat. Founded by K. Marx and F. Engels in 1864 There was until 1876.*

consistently and decisively pursue the policy developed by our party, aimed at the successful construction of communism.

We have such a collective, united on the principle basis of the great teachings of Marx—Engels—Lenin—Stalin. The party knows him. He is the successor of Comrade Stalin. (Stormy applause.)

The Central Committee should know, and can be sure, that this unanimous conviction unites all of us, whom you trust in the day—to—day leadership of the party and the country.

Comrades! At the Plenum of the Central Committee, many members of the Central Committee rightly spoke about serious shortcomings in the work of certain industries and about neglect in a number of agricultural sectors.

In the draft resolution, which is submitted to the Plenum of the Central Committee, we propose to openly recognize and draw appropriate conclusions from the fact that there are indeed significant shortcomings in the activities of our party on the management of economic construction.

We have a lot of lagging industrial enterprises and even entire industries. The party's urgent task is to put an end to this anomaly and to make a serious improvement in the performance of the lagging enterprises.

In the field of agriculture there is a serious lag in the production of flax, potatoes, vegetables and oilseeds, the situation with livestock is completely unsatisfactory. Many collective farms and entire agricultural areas are in a neglected state. Crop yields and livestock productivity are low, do not correspond to the increased level of technical equipment of agriculture and opportunities laid in the collective farm.

It must be admitted that the lag in a number of agricultural sectors is primarily a consequence of the lack of interest of collective farmers in increasing the production of individual crops and in the development of livestock. (*Voices:* Right.) Therefore, in order to further lift agriculture, we must address this fundamental issue of ensuring the material interest of collective farms and collective farmers in increasing all agricultural products. (*Voices.*)

Voroshilov. That's the most important thing.

Malenkov. Additional investment will be required to ensure further recovery of agriculture. That's what we're going to have to do.

Comrades! The draft decision presented to you challenges our entire party to learn political lessons from Beria's case and draw the necessary conclusions for its future.

These conclusions are that our party should strengthen the party leadership in all parts of the party and the state apparatus, eliminate the serious abnormalities in party life and in the methods of party leadership in recent years, and ensure the precise implementation of Lenin's principles of party leadership and norms of party life. The collectiveness of the leadership is strictly enforced.

We must always remember that only the collective political experience, the collective wisdom of the Central Committee, based on the scientific basis of Marxist—Leninist theory, ensures the correctness of the leadership of the party and the country, the unshakable unity and cohesion of the ranks of the party, the successful construction of communism in our country.

The conclusions and lessons are what is needed:

- To correct the wrong situation in a number of years, when the Ministry of the Interior has actually gone out of control of the party, and to take under systematic and unrelenting control all the activities of the Interior Ministry in the centre and on the ground;

- to increase the revolutionary vigilance of communists and all workers;

- to constantly strengthen and expand the party's ties with the masses, to be sensitive to the demands of workers, to take everyday care about improving the material condition of the Soviet people, remembering that caring for the interests of the Soviet people is the most important duty of the party;

- to strengthen the unbreakable friendship of the peoples of the USSR and our multi—ethnic socialist state, to constantly educate the Soviet people in the spirit of proletarian internationalism; To use our reserves and opportunities to successfully implement and over—implement the five—year plan of development of the USSR;

— to significantly improve the whole business of party propaganda and political—educational work in the masses. Our propaganda should educate the communists and the whole nation in the spirit of confidence in the invincibility of the great cause of communism, in the spirit of selfless devotion to our party and the socialist Motherland.

Comrades! In considering all the issues of the internal life of the party and the development of the Soviet state, we should not forget for a moment about the international situation, about the existence of the capitalist environment.

The forces of communism are growing stronger by the day. Our Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the countries of popular democracy, the German Democratic Republic already represent a mighty, ever—growing bastion of peace and democracy. We all see the growth of our forces and rejoice in it.

But it is clear that our adversaries and enemies of peace also see it with the greatest concern and watch the rise of the forces of communism.

Among the imperialists, the steady rise of the forces of democracy and socialism and the general weakening of the imperialist camp forces are deeply troubling. This is the reason for the sharp intensification of reactionary imperialist forces and their feverish desire to undermine the growing power of the international camp of peace and socialism, and above all its leading force, the Soviet Union.

How can the imperialists come to terms with the fact that more and more countries and peoples are leaving under their influence.

On the basis of the growth of our forces, there will inevitably be an aggravation in the relations between the forces of communism and imperialism.

The imperialists are alarmed by the growth of our forces. They can't accept this growth.

That is why, in pursuing a coherent policy of peace, we must not allow the slightest weakness, no hesitation.

When necessary, we will negotiate with the imperialists, to the so—called meetings, but without any preconditions. We will not go

to meetings under any conditions, we will not allow unilateral concessions^A.

We firmly believe in ourselves.

Consistently, firmly and steadily pursuing the policy developed over the years by our party under the leadership of **the brilliant founder of our party Lenin and the great successor of his cause Stalin^B** we will make the imperialists respect our forces. (Voices. *(Stormy applause.)*)

We will continue our peace initiative. It brings us serious success and divides the enemy camp. But at the same time we are not going to meet all kinds of ultimatum requirements.

What does it mean to pursue a coherent policy of peace?

This means, first of all, not to allow any hesitation in relations with the enemy and to be ready to give a crushing rebuff in the adventurous attempts of the imperialists to break the world. (Stormy applause.)

Comrades! The great vivacity and confidence instills in each of us a truly Bolshevik atmosphere of cohesion and party unity based on Lenin—Stalinist principles, which reigns on the present Plenum of our Central Committee. (Stormy applause.)

There is no doubt that we will successfully solve the problems facing the party, eliminate the shortcomings in our work and further unite the entire party around the Central Committee and confidently lead the country to new victories for the benefit and happiness of our great Soviet people! (Stormy long applause.)

Presiding officer. Bulganin. Comrades, we move on to the draft resolution on criminal and anti—state actions of Beria, prepared by the commission of the Plenum of the Central Committee. The text of the resolution has been handed out.

^A *We recognize the coexistence of the forces of the peace camp and the imperialist camp only on a mutually beneficial basis, on the basis of mutual, beneficial concessions for both.*

^B *our great leaders Lenin and Stalin.*

Are there any comrades who wish to speak to speak on the project of re—delegation?

Voice. No.

Presiding officer. Bulganin. There is a proposal to vote on the draft resolution as a basis. No objections?

Voice. No.

Presiding officer. Bulganin. Vote. Who, on the other hand, to adopt the draft resolution developed by the Plenary Commission as a basis, I ask to raise my hands. Please let me go. Who's against it? No, I don't think so Are there absentees? No, I don't think so Accepted unanimously. (*Applause.*)

Presiding officer. Bulganin. Are there any amendments?

Voice. No.

Presiding officer. Bulganin. I vote the resolution as a whole. Who is in favour of adopting the ruling of the CPSU Central Committee's Plenary "On criminal anti—party and anti—state actions of Beria" in general, please raise my hands. Please let me go. Who's against it? No. Are there absentees? No ruling was unanimous. (*Applause.*)

Presiding officer. Bulganin. On this, comrades work Plenum ends. I declare the plenary session closed.

Draft Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU “On the criminal anti—Party and anti—state actions of Beria.” July 4, 1953

Source: Lavrenty Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Ed. Acad. A. N. Yakovleva; comp. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — p. 356—362 — (Russia. XX century. Documents).

Archive:

RGANI, f.2, op. 1, d.28, pp.25—37. Copies.

№13

July 4, 1953

Having heard and discussed the report of Comrade Malenkova G. M. on the criminal and anti—state actions of Beria, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union establishes:

1. Over the past almost 4 months after the death of JV Stalin, the Central Committee of the Party has done great work to rally the party and the people around the tasks of building communism and strengthening the economic and defence power of our country, and on the bold and proactive deployment of the struggle to maintain and consolidate peace, as well as to further improve the lives of workers, collective farmers, intelligentsia, all Soviet people.

It is known that in connection with the death of J.V. Stalin, the whole bourgeois world relied on the imaginary weakening of the Soviet state, on the split and confusion in the leadership of the party and state, on the weakening of the party’s connection with the people.

But these calculations of our enemies, as everyone now sees, are overturned as a result of the fact that the Central Committee has

successfully solved the problem — to ensure the greatest unity of leadership, uninterrupted and proper leadership of the whole life of the country.

The main concern of the Central Committee and its Presidium was to ensure unity in the leadership of the party and government.

2. However, in the process of leading the party and the country, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party began to increasingly identify that a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, Beria, who was entrusted with the post of first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the minister of internal affairs, was acting dishonestly, and later, treacherously using his aspiration party to maintain unity, committed a number of criminal anti—party and anti—state actions. The criminal anti—Party and anti—state activities of Beria, hidden and disguised during the life of J.V. Stalin, began to unfold step by step after the death of J.V. Stalin, when Beria became impudent and unbelted. With insidious intriguing actions, Beria tried to divide, split the Leninist—Stalinist leading core of our party in order to realize his criminal, treasonous plans.

3. Beria, as a vile provocateur and enemy of the party, tried to put the Ministry of Internal Affairs over the party and the government, to use the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the centre and in the localities against the party and its leadership, against the government of the USSR. As it is now established, Beria reinstated the employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs against the party, demanded that they consider themselves independent of the party. Thus, Beria criminally violated the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU of December 4, 1952 “On the situation in the MGB”, adopted during the life of J.V. Stalin and with his participation, which stated:

“To consider the most important and urgent task of the party, leading party bodies, party organizations to exercise control over the work of bodies of the Ministry of State Security. It is necessary to resolutely put an end to the lack of control in the activities of the bodies of the Ministry of State Security and put their work in the

centre and in the localities under the systematic and constant control of the party, its leading party bodies, and party organizations.”

Moreover, Beria secretly from the Central Committee and the government gave instructions to the local bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to control party organizations, fabricate materials on party workers and the shortcomings of party work. At the same time honest communists, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who considered these anti—party installations incorrect, Beria attacked with ferocious threats and subjected them to repression. So, for example, the head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Lviv region, comrade Strokach only because he informed the secretary of the Lviv regional committee of the party about his installation to collect information about the work of party organizations, Beria removed from work, threatened to arrest him, send him to a camp and “turn him into camp dust.” For the same anti—party motives, Beria dismissed Comrade Comrade Belorussian SSR from the work of the Minister of Internal Affairs. Baskakova and a number of other honest communists, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

4. Having achieved the post of Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Beria tried to use the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in order to terrorize the party and government. Beria used the guards of members of the Presidium of the Central Committee to spy on the leaders of the party and government. As it now became known, he had established the procedure for the mandatory reports of his agents on where the leaders of the party and government are, with whom they meet; eavesdropping and recording of their telephone conversations, etc., were organized. In this regard, the security apparatus was excessively inflated.

Roughly violating the requirements of the Party Charter on the selection of workers according to their political and business qualities, Beria nominated workers in the Ministry of the Interior on the basis of personal loyalty to him, clogging up the apparatus of the Ministry and its local organs with people who were doubtful and alien to the party, and at the same time drove them out of the

Ministry of Internal Affairs workers previously sent there by the Central Committee and local party organizations.

Beria resisted the Central Committee of the CPSU to deal with the personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, sharply opposed the call of his deputies to the Central Committee. Without the knowledge of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the party, Beria summoned the leaders of local party organizations and dictated his instructions to them.

5. As the facts show, Beria tried to undermine the principle of unity and collectivity of leadership in the party. He tried to push the leaders of the party and government among themselves, through vile, intriguing tricks, each of them individually, in order to increase his own “authority”. Only an agent of the class enemy could do so, striving to undermine the unity of the party — the main condition for the strength and power of the party.

The weakening of unity in party leadership, especially in today’s complex international situation, would pose a serious danger. Only thanks to the high ideological and moral cohesion of the party and government leaders did these adventurous, provocative attempts by Beria failed.

6. Criminally violating party and state discipline, the impudent adventurer Beria began to single—handedly solve the most important state issues, even of a special nature, without reporting them to the Central Committee and the Government.

7. As established by the facts, Beria, even during the life of JV Stalin and especially after his death, under various fictitious pretexts, in every possible way inhibited the solution of the most important urgent issues for the strengthening and development of agriculture, in particular, measures aimed at further raising livestock and developing vegetable growing . Now there is no doubt that this vile enemy of the people set as its goal the undermining of collective farms and the creation of difficulties in the country’s food supply.

8. Beria sought by various insidious methods to undermine the friendship of the peoples of the USSR — the foundation of the foundations of a multinational Soviet state. Under the false pretext of combating violations of the party’s national policy, Beria tried to

sow discord and enmity between the peoples of the USSR and distrust of the Russian people, to activate bourgeois—nationalist elements in the Union republics.

9. The criminal anti—Party and anti—state actions of Beria represented a great danger to the party and the Soviet state.

The Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU considers it fully established that Beria is not a communist, but an agent of the class enemy, that he hatched plans to seize the leadership of the party and state in order to actually destroy our Communist Party and replace Leninist—Stalinist policies with capitulationist policies that would ultimately lead to the restoration of capitalism.

10. The views and plans of Beria that are hostile, anti—communist, and surrender to the capitalist environment are clearly illustrated by such a monstrous fact as the draft of a friendly letter he prepared for “Comrade Rankovich,” this mercenary of American imperialism and the executioner of the Yugoslav people. This is also indicated by the statements and proposals of Beria when discussing the German question of abandoning the course towards building socialism in the German Democratic Republic, for turning the latter into a bourgeois republic

11. The plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union decides:

a) Fully endorse the timely, skillful and decisive measures taken by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU to eliminate the criminal anti—Party and anti—state actions of Beria as the only correct ones.

b) To approve the following, unanimously adopted decision of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on Beria:

“1. For criminal anti—party and anti—state actions aimed at putting the Ministry of Internal Affairs over the Communist Party and the Government, remove L.P. Beria from the post of Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR and from the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and arrest him with strict isolation.

2. To withdraw L. P. Beria from the membership of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and from the membership of the Central Committee of the CPSU.”

c) To expel L.P. Beria from the members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as an enemy of the party and the Soviet people.

* * *

How could it happen that the agent of the class enemy, the corrupt moral adventurer Beria, remained undisclosed for a long time, could deceive the party's trust and, finally, achieve the post of Minister of the Interior, could go over to criminal anti—party and anti—state actions?

Of course, there were such reasons as insufficient vigilance of the leading figures of our party and the government, which did not manage to figure out the cleverly disguised enemy of Beria before. It was also important that during the life of JV Stalin Beria hid his true views and intentions, and after the death of JV Stalin, Beria became insolent, decided that his time had come, and with his criminal anti—party and anti—Soviet actions he revealed his true the face of a person deeply hostile to our party, the cause of communism.

But there are other, deeper reasons.

One of the main reasons why the adventurous, anti—party and anti—Soviet attempts of Beria to put the Ministry of Internal Affairs over the party and the government turned out to be possible is that for many years incorrect, abnormal relations have developed between the party and the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of the Interior has actually gained too much influence in the system of the socialist state. In fact, over the past several years, the party's effective control and the party's collective leadership over the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior have been lost.

All this made it possible for various careerists and adventurers, enemies of the party, who made their way to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to try to use the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to terrorize, intimidate and defame honest, cadres of the party and the

Soviet state devoted to communism. Moreover, as it turns out now, careerist, hostile elements in the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have been trying for a long time to undermine and defame the party's leading cadres up to its prominent figures.

Our party must draw from the Beria case all the lessons and conclusions for its future activities.

The first one. It is necessary to strengthen party leadership at all levels of the party and the state apparatus. To eliminate the serious abnormalities that have developed in recent years in party life and the methods of party leadership, which were expressed in the fact that a party congress has not been convened for many years, plenums of the Central Committee have not been convened for years, the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretariat have worked irregularly.

The task is to ensure the exact fulfillment of the Leninist principles of party leadership and internal party democracy, and compliance with norms and requirements of the CPSU Charter on the timing of the convening of party congresses, plenums of the Central Committee, the regular work of all central and local party bodies.

The second one. It is necessary to check the work of all organizations and departments, to put an end to the uncontrolled work of any employee, no matter what position he holds, bearing in mind that party leadership of all organizations is the main condition for their successful work. And, on the contrary, withdrawal from party control inevitably leads to failures in work and to rotting of workers.

The third. It is necessary to correct the wrong situation that has arisen over the years, when the Ministry of Internal Affairs has actually left the party, which made it possible for enemies who made their way there to use the Ministry of Internal Affairs apparatus against the party.

The party exposed a number of party enemies who made their way to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Yagoda, Yezhov, Abakumov, Beria). The task now is to make impossible attempts by the party's enemies to use the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. To do this, it is necessary to put the Ministry of the Interior

at a certain place in the system of the socialist state as a ministry, in fact subordinate to the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Government of the USSR.

The task is to ensure that the tip of the organs of the Ministry of the Interior is truly turned against our class enemies, against our external enemies and their agents, spies, saboteurs, pests. Party organizations are obliged to take under the systematic and steady control all the activities of the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior in the centre and in the localities. This is not only a right, but also a direct duty of party organizations.

It is necessary to seriously strengthen the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs by party workers, to significantly strengthen party and political work among the communists, security officers, educating them in the spirit of selfless devotion to our party, the Soviet people, and the socialist Motherland.

Fourth. The revolutionary vigilance of the Communists and all working people must be strengthened in every way in the entire work of the Party and Soviet organizations. You should remember and never forget about the capitalist environment, which sends its agents into our midst, looking for rotten people who are ready to betray the interests of the motherland and fulfill the tasks of the imperialists to undermine Soviet society.

When selecting personnel, it is necessary to abandon the clerical approach to people, strictly observe the party principles of personnel selection, which require a mandatory combination of a business and political approach to employees.

Fifth. The strength and invincibility of the Communist Party lies in its inextricable connection with the people. Party organizations are obliged to constantly strengthen and expand the party's ties with the masses, to be sensitive to the demands of the working people, to show everyday concern for improving the material well-being of workers, collective farmers, intelligentsia, all Soviet people, bearing in mind that concern for the interests of the Soviet people is the highest law for our party.

Sixth. The sacred duty of our entire party is the further consolidation of the indestructible friendship of the peoples of the

USSR, the strengthening of the multinational socialist state, the education of Soviet people in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, and the decisive struggle against all manifestations of bourgeois nationalism.

Seventh. The vital interests of the party require a significant improvement in the whole cause of party propaganda and educational work with the communists. It is imperative that the Communists study Marxist—Leninist theory not dogmatically and dogmatically, so that they learn not formulations and quotes, but the essence of the all—conquering revolutionary teaching of Marx—Engels—Lenin—Stalin, transforming the world. Our propaganda must educate the Communists and the whole people in the spirit of confidence in the invincibility of the great cause of communism, the selfless devotion to our party and the socialist Motherland.

The eighth. The highest principle of our party leadership is collective leadership. Only the collective political experience, the collective wisdom of the Central Committee can ensure the correctness of party and country leadership, the unshakable unity and unity of the party ranks, and the successful construction of communism in our country.

The task is to ensure strict adherence to the principles of collective leadership in all party bodies.

* * *

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, created 50 years ago by the great Lenin, which grew into a gigantic force and hardened in battle under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin and their comrades—in—arms, will throw away and suppress all attempts to shake its unity, belittle the role of the party as the leading force of Soviet society.

No enemy of the party will be able to bring discord into the leadership of our Communist Party! No renegades and traitors will succeed in breaking the will of our heroic party in its great creative work. In close unity with the people, our party will confidently and

firmly continue to solve its world—historical tasks of building a communist society.

M.T. Pomaznev's report note to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Government of the USSR on the activities of L.P. Beria. July 6, 1953

Source: Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Akad. A. N. Yakovleva; I'm not going to do that. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999page 362—364—(Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

Archive: AP of the Russian Federation, Ph.H., op.24, d.463, ll. 223—226. Copy; Fl. 227—235. Autograph.

No. 14
July 6, 1953

Comrade MALEKU G. M.
Comrade KHRUSHCHEV N.S.

Since I was not able to get the words at the Plenum of the Central Committee, I think it is necessary to inform the following in addition to the explanation I have presented:

1. The decision of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to expel from the party, remove from all posts and arrest the fierce enemy of the Soviet people and the Communist Party, the hardened schemer, treacherous and provocateur Beria consider absolutely right and wise.

2. Beria brazenly and cheekily conducted and stressed the inequality of the members of the Presidency of the Central

Committee and the Council of Ministers. When Beria was appointed to preside over the Presidency of the Council of Ministers after the party's 19th Congress. Pervukhin and Saburov, he ignored T. Pervukhina and Saburova. As a rule, the Presidency appointed or cancelled meetings without prior advice with other presiding chair members. Often he did not even say to ask their opinion, and instructed to "cancel," "transfer," "appoint." I had to call T. Pervukhin and Saburov and say, "That Beria offers something."

He drew the same line of inequality when considering the pay, pensions and construction of cottages. In recent cases, his offers have not been accepted by you.

3. In 1949, when cleaning the renovated premises of the secretariat of the to. Molotov V.M. was discovered a strange image of a portrait of Comrade Stalin. This was reported by Beria with a request to instruct the IGB to investigate what the portrait is and where it came from. Beria was very pleased that such a portrait was found in the secretariat of Molotov. He left it in his home and returned it a few days later, instructing him to find out from the workers sitting in this room where the portrait came from and to whom it belonged. T. V. Vidyasov, a member of the secretariat called to the Office of Affairs, said that the portrait belonged to him. He received it from an immigrant artist who lived in the Paris area and applied to return to his homeland when Vidyasov worked at the Soviet Embassy in Paris and was engaged in immigrants. Beria was terribly dissatisfied that the affiliation of the portrait was not attributed to T. Molotov V. M.

4. Any flaw or failure be worn by Beria tried to ascribe to any member of the Government that, as he often put it, "smear" and "smear".

This was particularly evident in the case of the importation of bananas from Mexico, when he was collecting all sorts of materials concerning the relationship of the tov. Mikoyan A.I. to this issue.

He did the same when considering the 57 mm automatic gun, collecting materials related to the participation of the tos. Bulganina in this matter.

In the winter of 1952/53 the issue of the importation of vegetables and potatoes to Moscow was considered. The import plan was poorly executed. Beria tried his best to put this case on the tov. Khrushchev N.S. He demanded from you. Pervukhina M.G., to T. Khrushchev was necessarily at the meeting of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, so that the review of this case was entrusted to the toy. Khrushchev N.S. He achieved this, though you. Pervukhin didn't want to do that.

5. In addition to the known facts of the breakdown and the brakes of the work of the Council of Ministers, it should be pointed out that Beria had actually stopped voting on the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, although there were few very clear issues to the vote and, as a rule, previously discussed and did not require a new discussion.

6. The office of the Council of Ministers has suffered incalculable humiliation, abuse and bullying from Beria. Workers went to him to report with trepidation. Anyone could be humiliated, insulted and morally destroyed. Beria did not like the employees of the Council of Ministers' office, they were afraid of him.

Close and devoted Beria people in the apparatus were Ordynstev, Ludwigov, Sharia, Vokhmyanin. Recently, the entire office of the Beria secretariat has been isolated from the Office of Affairs and shut down. The workers who came to the Beria secretariat recently — Sharia, Saveliev, Furduev — did not even go to the Office of Affairs. The distribution of responsibilities among the staff of the Beria secretariat to the Office of Affairs is unknown.

Secretary of the special committee Mahnev was certainly a close and trusted person. Klochkov often mis mentioned Beria. Vladimirsky, Pashkov always ascended Beria. Beria was good for Vasin.

7. Beria was intolerant of party and public bodies, employees and activities. He cultivated disrespect for the apparatus of the Central Committee. Participation in public events was considered idleness. When I had to attend a party committee, a meeting or a meeting, and at that time there was a call from Beria, there was

always a scandal. He has said many times that only slackers can tolerate it.

8. The Special Committee appointed and released workers on its line without the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, i.e. the special committee replaced not only the Council of Ministers, but also the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Not without the influence of Beria there was a completely abnormal situation, when the responsible employees of the Council of Ministers were not approved in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

9. I often witnessed the transition of the Russian—Russian language to Georgian language on the phone. This could not be explained by the fact that Beria's interlocutor could not speak Russian, because much of the conversation, usually in the beginning, was in Russian language.

10. A month and a half ago, I was sent a statement from Beria by a certain Rakhmatulina about the allocation of her apartment. When we learned that she was the technical secretary of the Bolshoi Theatre, we wondered why Beria was instructing her to set aside a room. About the allocation of the room Rakhmatulina Beria called me at least 6—7 times with the strictest requirement to give a room. The allocation of the room to Rahmatulina was delayed.

M. Pomaznev.

The Resolution of the Plenary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union “On criminal anti—party and anti—State actions of Beria.” July 7, 1953

Source: Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Akad. A. N. Yakovleva; I’m not going to do that. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — page 365—373 — (Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

Archive: ARF, F.2, op.2, 198, ll. 10—14. Certified copy.

No. 15

RESOLUTION OF THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY “ON CRIMINAL ANTI—PARTY AND ANTI—STATE ACTIONS OF BERIA”¹

July 7, 1953

After hearing and discussing the report. Malenkov G. M. on criminal anti—party and anti—state actions of Beria, Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union establishes:

¹ *The text of the ruling was sent in the form of a closed letter from the Central Committee to party organizations. The verbatim report has a subtitle: “Adopted unanimously at the meeting of the Plenary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on July 7, 1953.”*

1. In connection with the death of Stalin, the whole bourgeois world relied on the weakening of the Soviet state, on the split and squabble in the leadership of our party and the state, on the weakening of the party's connection with the people. But these calculations of enemies were overturned. The Central Committee of the party in the last 4 months after the death of Stalin provided uninterrupted and correct leadership of the whole life of the country, did a great job of rallying the party and the people around the tasks of building communism, strengthening the economic and defence power of our Motherland, further improving the lives of workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, all Soviet people. Implementing the decisions of the 19th Congress of the Communist Party, the party provided a powerful rise in all sectors of the national economy.

The new peace initiative undertaken by the Soviet government led to the further strengthening of the international position of the USSR, the growth of the authority of our country, and the serious rise of the global movement for the preservation and consolidation of peace.

2. The success of the Soviet Union in the construction of communism, the steady movement forward towards the construction of socialism in the countries of the popular democracy of Europe, as well as the powerful rise of the economy and culture of the great People's Republic of China, the development of the labor movement in a number of capitalist countries and the national liberation struggle in colonial and dependent countries all mean a huge increase in the power of the democratic camp and the world liberation movement.

At the same time, the imperialist camp is further exacerbating the general crisis of capitalism and weakening the entire capitalist system, there is an undeniable deepening of economic difficulties, rising unemployment, rising high prices and impoverishment of workers. As a result of the unbridled expansion of American imperialism and the brazen dictates on his part against its younger partners and satellites, contradictions within the capitalist camp are increasingly exacerbated.

Thus, the entire course of world development demonstrates the steady growth of the forces of democracy and socialism, on the one

hand, the general weakening of the forces of the imperialist camp — on the other, which causes deep anxiety among the imperialists and leads to a sharp intensification of reactionary imperialist forces, their feverish desire to undermine the growing power of the international camp of peace and socialism, and above all its leading force, the Soviet Union.

This is reflected in the frenzied arms race of capitalist countries, in military adventures, in attempts to increase pressure on the USSR, in organizing all sorts of provocations and sabotage in the countries of the democratic camp, for which hundreds of millions of dollars are allocated. Imperialists seek for themselves in the countries of democracy and socialism support in the face of various outcasts and decomposed elements, intensify the subversive activities of their agents.

3. The Soviet country, full of unshakable power and creativity, is successfully moving forward on the path of the construction of communism. We have a powerful socialist industry, a comprehensively developed heavy industry, which is the basis of the foundations of the socialist economy. Our engineering is steadily going uphill, providing all industries, transport and agriculture with modern equipment. The development of technology and Soviet science made it possible several years ago to solve the problem of the use of nuclear energy and successfully move this case forward. Our light and food industry has reached a high level and is able to meet the growing needs of the urban and rural population through party and government policies to reduce prices. During the years of the post—war period, our agriculture, state farms and collective farms were restored to a greater extent than before the war, modern advanced equipment. Remarkable staff of specialists in all areas of the national economy have been grown.

All these successes in the recovery of the socialist economy and in cultural construction were made possible by the strong union of the working class and collective farm peasantry, the growing friendship of the peoples of the USSR, thanks to the steady consolidation of the moral and political unity of the Soviet people,

thanks to the consistent implementation of the policy developed by the Communist Party.

At the same time, as before, the party should not underestimate the difficulties and shortcomings in our economic and cultural construction.

It must not be forgotten that our country has gone through the greatest trials of the war, which has devastated much of the country and caused heavy casualties. It took a great deal of effort over the years to heal the heavy wounds and to deal with the consequences of the war.

We must admit that we have many lagging industrial enterprises and even certain industries. Many collective farms and entire agricultural areas are in a neglected state. Crop yields and livestock productivity are low, do not correspond to the increased level of technical equipment of agriculture and opportunities laid in the collective farm. As a result, we are still under—responding to the growing material needs and cultural demands of our people.

It is also impossible to ignore the fact that with the elimination of exploitative classes in our country, the remnants of capitalism in the minds of people are far from out and that there are serious shortcomings in the communist upbringing of the Soviet people. It would be oblivious to the foundations of Marxism—Leninism if we ceased to reckon with the fact that there is a capitalist environment that sends its agents into our environment, looking for people who are ready to betray the interests of the Motherland and perform the tasks of the imperialists to undermine Soviet society.

4. Our party is the organizing and inspiring force of Soviet society. As a result of the correct leadership of the party, the Soviet people won world—historical victories in the construction of communist society.

However, there are significant shortcomings in the activities of our party, both in a number of areas of economic construction and in the area of communist education of workers.

We must admit that we have serious shortcomings in compliance with the party norms developed by the great Lenin, Bolshevik principles of party leadership. Over the years, we have accumulated

significant abnormalities in this area. It is not justified that only 7 years after the end of the war and 13 years after the 18th Congress was convened the 19th Congress of the party. The plenums of the Party's Central Committee have not been collected for several years. For a long time the Politburo did not function normally. Decisions on the most important issues of public work and economic construction were often taken without due process and without collective discussion in the governing party bodies, as stipulated by the Party Charter. As a result of such abnormalities, the central committee's organization has not been staffed, as well as due criticism and self-criticism. The existence of such abnormalities in fact led sometimes to poorly grounded decisions and to the belittling of the role of the Central Committee as a body of collective leadership of the party. In this regard, it should also be recognized as abnormal that in our party propaganda in recent years there has been a retreat from the Marxist—Leninist understanding of the role of the individual in history. This was expressed in the fact that instead of properly explaining the role of the Communist Party as a true governing force in the construction of communism in our country, party propaganda often fell on the cult of personality, which leads to the belittling of the role of the party and its governing centre, to a decrease in the creative activity of the party masses and the masses of the Soviet people. This line of advocacy is at odds with Marx's well-known positions on the cult of personality. "Out of dislike for any cult of personality," Marx wrote, "I never made numerous appeals, in which my merits were acknowledged and which I was bored from different countries, to be publicized, I never even answered them, except occasionally for them. The first entry of Engels and mine into the secret society of the Communists occurred under the condition that everything that promotes superstitious worship before the authorities will be thrown out of the statute" (Marx and Engels).

5. The peculiarity of the Communist Party's position in the Soviet state system must be taken into account. Our party is the only party in the country, and it has an undivided leadership role in the socialist state. The leadership of the party is a crucial condition for the strength and inviolability of the Soviet system.

At the same time, it must be remembered that the party's monopoly has its own shadow sides when revolutionary vigilance in our ranks against a class enemy is weakened. We often forget that enemies, deftly masquerading as communists, have tried and will try to infiltrate the ranks of the party for their enemy purposes, for the sake of career and for subversive work as agents of imperialist powers and their intelligence.

6. In this regard, Plenum of the Central Committee considers it necessary to draw the party's attention to the case of Beria, exposed by the Presidency of the Central Committee as an agent of international imperialism.

As you can now see, Beria, deftly disguised, various careerist shenanigans rubbed into the trust of Stalin. Criminal anti—party and anti—state activities of Beria, deeply hidden and disguised during the life of Stalin, after his death, when the enemies of the Soviet state intensified their subversive anti—Soviet activities, began to open up step by step. Having opened up and snug, Beria recently began to reveal his true face of the enemy of the party and the Soviet people.

What were Beria's criminal actions and treachery?

After Stalin's death, the main concern of the Central Committee and its Presidency was to ensure unity in the leadership of the party and the government on the basis of Marxist—Leninist principles for the successful solution of the fundamental problems of the construction of the communist society. Insidious intrigue actions Beria tried to divide and split the Lenin—Stalinist governing core of our party, discredit the leaders of the party and the government of each individually, to raise their own “authority” and implement their criminal anti—Soviet plans.

Having achieved the post of Minister of the Interior of the USSR, Beria tried to use the apparatus of the Ministry of internal affairs in order to deploy his criminal machinations to seize power. As a vile provocateur and enemy of the party, he began by trying to put the Interior Ministry over the party and the government, to use the Interior Ministry in the centre and on the ground against the party and its leadership, against the government of the USSR. Beria used the protection of members of the Central Committee Presidency to

spy on party and government leaders. He had established mandatory reports by his agents on where party and government leaders were, with whom they met; eavesdropping and recording of their phone conversations, etc.

As it is now proven, Beria reinstated the employees of the Interior Ministry against the party, demanded that they consider themselves independent from the party. Thus, Beria criminally violated the ruling of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on December 4, 1952, "On the situation in the IGB" adopted during the life of Stalin and with his participation, which stated the need to "decisively end the uncontrollability of the bodies of the Ministry of State Security and put their work in the centre and on the ground under the systematic and permanent control of the party."

Moreover, Beria secretly from the Central Committee and the government gave assignments to local bodies of the Interior Ministry, so that they controlled party organizations, fabricated false materials on party workers, as well as on party and Soviet organizations. Beria subjected the same honest communists, employees of the Interior Ministry, who considered these anti-party attitudes to be wrong, to be repressed. For example, the head of the Interior Ministry's Office of the Lviv region. Strokacha only for the fact that he told the secretary of the Lviv regional committee of the party about the installation he received to collect, to look for negative data about the work of party organizations and party personnel, Beria in June 1953 removed from his job, threatened to arrest him, send him to the camp and "turn into camp dust."

Criminally flouting the demands of the Party's Charter on the selection of personnel on their political and business qualities, Beria nominated employees in the Ministry of the Interior on the basis of personal loyalty to him, picked up alien parties and suspicious people, at the same time expelled from the bodies of the Interior Ministry workers, previously sent there by the Central Committee and local party organizations.

As established by the facts, Beria during Stalin's life and especially after his death under various fictitious pretexts in every

way inhibited the decision of the most important urgent issues on strengthening and development of agriculture. Now there is no doubt that this vile enemy of the people aimed to undermine collective farms and create difficulties in the food supply of the country.

Beria sought various insidious methods to undermine the friendship of the peoples of the USSR — the basis of the foundations of the multinational socialist state and the main condition for all the successes of the fraternal Soviet republics. Under the false pretext of combating violations of the party's national policy, he tried to sow discord and enmity between the peoples of the USSR, to activate bourgeois—nationalist elements in the allied republics.

Beria's political face was particularly evident when discussing the German issue at the end of May this year. Beria's proposals on this issue were to abandon the course of socialism in the German Democratic Republic and to commit to the transformation of the GDR into a bourgeois state, which would mean direct surrender to the imperialist forces. However, in recent years Beria has become so clear that under the flag of struggle against shortcomings and with excesses in collective farm construction in the countries of popular democracy and in the GDR, he began to openly break through anti—kolkhoz views, up to the proposal to dissolve collective farms in these countries. In the light of the exposed crimes, Beria becomes clear that he was slipping into hostile positions against the collective farm system of the USSR.

In the most recent days, Beria's criminal plans to establish a personal connection with Tito and Rankovic in Yugoslavia were discovered through his agent.

As it turned out, Beria in 1919, during the British occupation of Baku, served in Azerbaijan in the White Guard Musavatist intelligence and hid his treacherous activities from the party.

The plenary of the Central Committee of the CPSU considers it established that Beria lost the image of the communist, becoming a bourgeois rebirth, and allotment became an agent of international imperialism, hatched plans to seize the leadership of the party and the state in order to actually destroy our Communist Party and

replace the policy developed by the party over the years, capitulation policy, which would eventually lead to the restoration of capitalism.

The plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union decrees:

(a) Fully endorse the timely and decisive measures taken by the Presidency of the CPSU Central Committee to eliminate Beria's criminal anti—party and anti—state actions as the only correct ones.

b) For treacherous actions aimed at undermining the Soviet state, to exclude L. P. Beria as an enemy of the party and the Soviet people from the members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to bring to justice.

* * *

Our party must learn political lessons from Beria's case and draw the necessary conclusions for its future activities.

First. It is necessary to strengthen the party leadership in all parts of the party and the state apparatus. To eliminate the serious abnormalities in party life and methods of party leadership that have developed in recent years. The task is to ensure the precise implementation of Lenin's principles of party leadership and norms of party life, strict compliance with the requirements of the CPSU Charter on the timing of the convening of party congresses, the plenums of the Central Committee, the regular work of all central and local party bodies.

The highest principle of party leadership in our party is the collectiveness of the leadership. Only the collective political experience, the collective wisdom of the Central Committee, based on the scientific basis of Marxist—Leninist theory, ensures the correctness of the leadership of the party and the country, the unshakable unity and cohesion of the ranks of the party, the successful construction of communism in our country. The challenge is to ensure that all party bodies are in fact strictly adhered to the principles of collective leadership.

It is necessary to regularly check the work of all organizations and agencies, to end the uncontrollability of any employee, no matter

what position he holds, remembering that the party leadership of all organizations is the main condition for their successful work. Conversely, the withdrawal from party control inevitably leads to failures in the work and to the rotting of workers.

Second. It is necessary to correct the wrong situation created over a number of years, when the Ministry of the Interior has effectively gone out of control of the party. One of the reasons why Beria's adventurous, anti—party and anti—Soviet attempts to put the Interior Ministry over the party and the government were possible is that for many years the wrong, abnormal relations between the party and the Interior Ministry were formed. The Ministry of the Interior has gained an exorbitant influence in the system of the socialist state. In fact, for a number of years, effective control of the party, the collective leadership of the party over the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has been lost. All this gave the opportunity to various careerists and adventurers, enemies of the party, who snuck into the Interior Ministry, to try to use the Interior Ministry apparatus to terrorize, intimidate and defame honest, committed to communism personnel of the party and the Soviet state. Moreover, as it turned out now, careerist, hostile elements in the Interior Ministry apparatus tried to sharpen, defame the leadership of the party up to its prominent figures.

Party organizations are obliged to take systematic and unrelenting control of all activities of the Interior Ministry in the centre and on the ground. This is not only a right, but also a direct duty of party organizations. It is necessary to seriously strengthen the bodies of the Interior Ministry by party workers, to significantly strengthen the party—political work among the Chekists, the vast majority of whom are undoubtedly honest and conscientious people, to educate them in the spirit of selfless devotion to our party, the Soviet people, the socialist Motherland.

Third. It is necessary in all the work of party and Soviet organizations to increase the revolutionary vigilance of communists and all workers. We should remember and never forget the capitalist environment that sends and will send its agents to our environment for subversion.

When recruiting personnel, it is necessary to dislodge themselves from the dividing approach, strictly observe the party principles of selection of employees on their political and business qualities.

Fourth. The strength and invincibility of the Communist Party is in its inextricable connection with the people. Party organizations are obliged to constantly strengthen and expand the party's ties with the masses, to be sensitive to the demands of workers, to take daily care about improving the material well-being of workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, all Soviet people, remembering that taking care of the interests of the Soviet people is the most important duty of our party.

Fifth. The sacred duty of our entire party is to further strengthen the unbreakable friendship of the peoples of the USSR, strengthen the multinational socialist state, educate the Soviet people in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and fight against all manifestations of bourgeois nationalism. The consequences of Beria's harmful actions in the area of national relations must be eliminated.

Sixth. The socialist system has huge advantages and opportunities for a new, even more powerful rise of our economy and culture, for further improving the material well-being of the people. We have inexhaustible natural resources, powerful first-class equipment in industry and agriculture, highly skilled workers and specialists. But it would be wrong to forget that we also have unresolved urgent economic problems, especially in the further rise of agriculture (livestock, vegetable production, etc.). We still have known growth difficulties associated with meeting the enormous challenge of maximizing the ever-increasing material and cultural needs of workers.

Party, Soviet, trade union, Komsomol organizations should mobilize and organize the creative forces of the people in order to make full use of our reserves and opportunities to solve all these problems, to successfully implement and overachieve the five-year plan of development of the USSR, the tasks set by the 19th Party Congress.

Seventh. The urgent interests of the party require a significant improvement of the whole business of party propaganda and political—educational work in the masses. It is necessary that the Communists study Marxist—Leninist theory not incostrative and dogmatically, that they understand the creative nature of Marxism—Leninism and assimilate not individual formulations and quotations, but the essence of the all—conquering, transforming the world of the revolutionary teachings of Marx—Engels—Lenin—Stalin. Our propaganda should educate the communists and the whole nation in the spirit of confidence in the invincibility of the great cause of communism, in the spirit of selfless devotion to our party and the socialist Motherland.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, created 50 years ago by the brilliant Lenin, who grew into a gigantic force and hardened in battles under the leadership of Lenin, the disciple and successor of Lenin's cause of the great Stalin and their associates, will throw away and stop all attempts to shake its unity, to diminish the role of the party as the leading force of Soviet society.

The Soviet people, under the tried and tested leadership of the Communist Party, will continue to relentlessly strengthen the power of their socialist homeland. The Soviet people will continue to fight for a lasting and lasting peace between peoples, to support the consistent policy of peace pursued by the Government of the USSR, and will continue to relentlessly strengthen friendship with the great People's Republic of China, with all countries of popular democracy. In close unity with the people, our party will confidently and firmly move forward on the path of building a communist society.

The Text of the Failed Speech of A.N. Poskrebyshv at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Not later than July 7, 1953

Source: Lavrenty Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Ed. Acad. A. N. Yakovleva; comp. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — pp. 373—376 — (Russia. XX century. Documents).

Archive:

AP RF, f. 3, on. 24, d. 463, l. 210—215. Script.

№16

TEXT OF THE FAILED SPEECH BY A. N. POSKREBYSHEV AT THE Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee¹

[Not later than July 7], 1953

The report of the Presidium of the Central Committee on the facts of Beria's anti—Party and anti—state behaviour evokes a feeling of legitimate indignation with his criminal activity and deception of the party. Beria's career aspirations, which were

¹ *In the archival case, the text of A. Poskrebyshv's failed speech is accompanied by his accompanying note to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee: "Due to my failure to address the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on the issue of Beria's anti-party and anti-state activities, I am enclosing the text of my speech." The document is not dated. Since the note was not addressed to the Presidium of the Plenum, it can be assumed that it was written no earlier than July 7, 1953, after the completion of the plenum.*

especially pronounced after Comrade Stalin's death — sticking himself out to the first place not only as one of the leaders of the party and government, but also his desire to play the first role on an international scale — led him to detach and contrast himself with the leading core of the Central Committee . He embarked on an anti—party and **anti—state path of** intrigue and politicking, trying to take first place in the leadership of the party and state.

To the characterization given by the Presidium of the Central Committee regarding Beria, I would like to add a few facts from my observations and remarks by Comrade. Stalin, confirming the correct conclusions made by the Presidium of the Central Committee.

All actions of Beria were aimed at showing that he is the most capable, most devoted and faithful person of Comrade. Stalin, and all the other members of the leading core are secondary people. Beria sought by all means to occupy during the life of Comrade. Stalin's place as First Deputy Comrade Stalin according to the Council of Ministers, believing that only he alone is the real successor to Comrade Stalin.

When did the decision to approve comrade Bulganin First Deputy Comrade Stalin according to the Council of Ministers², then Beria was very dissatisfied with this decision, characterizing Comrade Bulganin as poorly prepared and unable to cope with this work.

Another example. Comrade Stalin proposed the involvement of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Comrade Pervukhin, as a member of the steering group of the Council of Ministers. This met with Beria also an unfavourable attitude, in view of which Comrade Stalin demanded a formal decision on the appointment of Comrade Pervukhin to the leadership group³.

² *N. Bulganin was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in April 1950.*

³ *This refers to the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of August 30, 1952, according to which M. Pervukhin*

Beria also behaved inappropriately in relation to senior officials of ministries and departments. This was expressed in intolerance of other people's opinions, in excessive rudeness, vilification of employees and their discredit, although such an attitude towards them was not caused by the essence of the matter. Often I had to listen to statements from workers about Beria's indecent and rude behaviour both at meetings of the Council of Ministers and at personal reports of workers to him.

At the same time, Beria perceived criticism of his actions very painfully, believing that he was infallible and not subject to criticism. Even criticism of Comrade Stalin regarding his work was perceived by him incorrectly, and in moments of irritation after such criticism Beria said why Comrade Stalin criticizes him so much, because he is a loyal student of Comrade Stalin and no one else did to popularize Comrade Stalin.

We know perfectly well that Comrade Stalin did not need any popularization.

In addition, it should be said that Comrade Stalin was terribly outraged by the measures that Beria used during Comrade Stalin's trips to the south and to other places. Instead of organizing a trip without attracting the attention of the public, the measures taken by Beria gave opposite results. The issuance of enhanced protection along the train route and in the recreation areas of Comrade Stalin, the suspension of railway traffic during the passage of the train and the clearing of the highway during trips to the south led to the fact that the entire population in these areas knew that Comrade Stalin was traveling. Instead of conspiracy, the widest publicity was obtained. Comrade Stalin demanded the cancellation of these events and strictly warned Beria that he would take harsh penalties.

During the trips of Comrade Stalin, Beria believed that only he alone could accompany Comrade Stalin and be near him during the

was included in the Bureau of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers.

stay of Comrade Stalin in the south and elsewhere. Comrade Stalin reacted to this by categorically refusing his services. Then Beria changed his tactics and began to adapt the time of his rest to Comrade Stalin's trips.

How did Beria behave during meetings with Comrade Stalin in the south? He, with his characteristic cunning, began to talk about the shortcomings of the work of a particular executive, a member of the Politburo^a. Such frequently repeated statements created the impression among Comrade Stalin of the actual unsuitability and weakness of this worker. Especially he tried to work malign^b T. Molotov in the MFA, and the Council of Ministers and vols. Voroshilov and Kaganovich^c.

Further. One of the negative qualities of Beria was his self—praise, his desire to put himself in the first place. As one example, I recall such a case. Comrades know that the Politburo conducted the practice of alternating speeches by members of the Politburo with reports on the anniversary of the October Revolution.⁴ When Beria was commissioned to prepare report⁵, then, sending his report to Comrade Stalin to watch, Beria boastfully said that his report on the content exceeds all previous reports of members of the

^a *included in this aspect of life and household of the employee*

^b *pointed issues at work*

^c *Voroshilov.*

⁴ *The practice of alternating speeches by members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with reports at ceremonial meetings dedicated to the anniversaries of the October Revolution was introduced in 1945.*

⁵ *We are talking about the speech of L. Beria at the ceremonial meeting of the Moscow Council on November 6, 1951. The report was published in Pravda on November 7, 1951.*

Politburo. However, comrade Stalin, having read the report, noted the incorrectness of a number of provisions put forward in the section of the report on the international situation, introducing serious amendments of a fundamental order to this section.

In the same way, Beria stuck out his role in the Great Patriotic War.

Assessing the results of the battles near Moscow, he stated that the MGB and MVD troops played a decisive role in this matter, thereby putting forward himself as the head of the MGB and MVD to the role of the saviour of Moscow. No one doubts that the MGB and MVD troops, like our entire army, showed courage and heroism in the fight against the German invaders. Such bragging, needless to say, does not hold water.

In the same way, he boastfully attributed to himself a leading role in organizing the production of weapons during the war, obscuring the work of other leading figures of the State Defence Committee.

Using secrecy in the work of special committees, of which he was the chairman, and taking advantage of this, without coordination with other members of the Politburo, he reported on the work done. As a typical case, we can give an example of rewarding workers involved in nuclear energy issues without prior discussion with members of the Politburo. Among those awarded was Beria. At the second presentation of these workers, he hinted in veiled form about the desirability of rewarding him, but Comrade Stalin passed these hints, and Beria was not awarded.

It has already been said about Beria's attitude to the party, about his desire to belittle the role of the party, to turn the party into a secondary appendage of the state apparatus. Here is another example. On his initiative, such a practice was introduced when decisions of the Council of Ministers included clauses obliging party organizations to carry out certain instructions of the Council of Ministers. Such instructions, adopted in addition to the Central Committee, weaken the leading role of the party.

I consider it my duty to bring to the attention of the members of the Plenum of the Central Committee the assessment of Beria,

comrade. Stalin. Speaking of Beria, Comrade Stalin characterized him like this: Beria collapsed intelligence, and in no case should he be trusted in this section of the work. Comrade Stalin strongly scolded himself for agreeing with Beria's candidacy for Abakumov as head of the MGB. Attempts by Beria, who worked in the Council of Ministers, to take under his political supervision the work of the MGB, were unsuccessful. In general, comrade Stalin characterized Beria as follows: Beria imagines himself a great political figure, but he is not suitable for the first roles, he can only be entrusted with a plot of economic work.

The vicious methods of work of the former bodies of the MGB — arbitrariness, lawlessness, lack of control — are fertile ground for all adventurers and provocateurs. The situation is completely intolerable when a member of the Central Committee, a minister or secretary of the regional committee, being on a call to Beria, did not know whether he would return home or be sent to prison. It is necessary to resolutely put an end to these vicious methods — arbitrariness and lawlessness in the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, putting them under strict and unflagging control of the party.

I believe that the decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee, which nipped Beria's enemy adventure in the bud, are absolutely correct. Beria's criminal actions, as it was established, pursued the goals of seriously shaking the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country, causing confusion in the party, weakening the party's ties with the masses, weakening the role and importance of the Soviet Union in the socialist camp and significantly strengthening the position of capitalism in its struggle against the socialist camp.

The conclusions from this case are completely clear to us. We must rally more closely around the leading core of our party, increase vigilance, and strengthen the party's relations with the masses. Deploy criticism and self—criticism more widely. The strength of the party in the unity of its ranks. We must constantly remember the precepts of Lenin and Stalin — to preserve the unity of the party as the apple of an eye.

Information message on the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. July 10, 1953

Source: Lavrenty Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Ed. Acad. A. N. Yakovleva; comp. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — p. 376 — (Russia. XX century. Documents).

Archive: Pravda, 1953, July 10.

№17

INFORMATION MESSAGE ON THE Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU¹

July 10, 1953

The other day, a Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union took place.

Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, after hearing and discussing the report of the Presidium of the Central Committee — Comrade. Malenkova G.M. on criminal anti—party and anti—state actions of L.P. Beria aimed at undermining the Soviet state in the interests of foreign capital and expressed in treacherous attempts to put the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs over the Government and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, decided to withdraw L. P. Beria from the Central Committee of the CPSU and expel him

¹ *In the same issue of the newspaper, information was published by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the removal of L. Beria from the posts of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Minister of Internal Affairs, as well as on the transfer of the case of criminal acts of L. Beria to the Supreme Court of the USSR.*

from the ranks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as an enemy of the Communist Party and the Soviet people.

**K.E. Voroshilov's note to the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union with the annex of the Executive
Order of the Supreme Council of the USSR "On
criminal anti—state actions of L.P. Beria." July
15, 1953**

Source: Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Akad. A. N. Yakovleva; I'm not going to do that. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — page 379 — (Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

Archive: AP of the Russian Federation, F.W., on.24, 464, ll. 107—108.

No 1
No KV—90

Comrade Malenkov G.M.
Comrade Khrushchev N.S.

I am sending a decree of the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR "On criminal anti—state actions of L.P. Beria" adopted on June 26 this year, the text of which additionally includes an order to deprive L.P. Beria of all titles and awards assigned to him.
Voroshilov

Application

Decree of the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR “On CRIMINAL ANTI—STATE Actions L.P. BERIA”

In view of the fact that recently revealed criminal anti—state actions of L.P. Beria aimed at undermining the Soviet state in the interests of foreign capital, the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR, having considered the report of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on this issue, decides:

1. Remove L.P. Beria from the post of first deputy chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers and from the post of Minister of the Interior of the USSR, depriving him of all the titles and awards awarded to him.

2. The case of criminal actions of L.P. Beria to be referred to the Supreme Court of the USSR.

Chairman of the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR K. Voroshilov

N. Pegov, Secretary of the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR

Moscow, Kremlin

The Decision of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the deprivation of L.P. Beria's parliamentary powers. July 29, 1953

Source: Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Akad. A. N. Yakovleva; I'm not going to do that. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — page 380 — (Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

Archive: AP of the Russian Federation, P. 3, op. 24, 465, l. 96. Copy

No. 2

Strictly Secret

**P21/3. ON THE DEPRIVATION OF THE DEPUTY POWERS
OF THE DEPUTY OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE
USSR BERIA L.P.**

In connection with the trial as an enemy of the Communist Party and the Soviet people to deprive the deputy of the Supreme Council of the USSR Beria L.P., elected by the Tbilisi—Stalin constituency No. 598 (to the Council of the Union).¹

Secretary of the Central Committee

In the archival case there is a litter on the adoption of the decision of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on July 25, 1953.

¹ *An extract from the ruling of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was sent to N. Khrushchev, K. Voroshilov, E. Gromov and to the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.*

**A.I. Mirtshulawa's Note to the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union on the Eviction of Relatives of L.P.
Beria from the Territory of the Georgian USSR.
August 25, 1953**

Source: Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Akad. A. N. Yakovleva; I'm not going to do that. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — page 380 — (Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

Archive: AP of the Russian Federation, F.W., op.24, d.468, l. 12. Original.

No. 3

No. 2466s

Mountains. Tbilisi
Top Secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union

Comrade KRUSHKU N.S.

After exposing the criminal anti—party and anti—state actions of Beria, living in Tbilisi and other cities and regions of Georgia, his close relatives engage in unsustainable, malicious conversations, are the sources of spreading various provocative rumours. Beria's mother, Beria Marta, a deeply religious woman, attends churches and prays for her son, the enemy of the people. After the revelation, Beria became more frequent about suspicious encounters of relatives at her apartment.

Considering it impractical to continue to stay in Georgia close relatives of the enemy of the people of Beria, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia asks to instruct the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ussr Union to evict them from the territory of the Georgian USSR.¹

A list of persons to be evicted is attached.²

**Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of Georgia A. Mirtshulava**

The Ruling of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on Relatives of L.P. Beria. September 12, 1953

Source: Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Akad. A. N. Yakovleva; I'm not going to do that. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — page 381 — (Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

Archive: AP of the Russian Federation, P. 3, op. 24, 468, l. 10. Copy.

No. 4

Strictly Secret
Special folder

¹ *It is emphasized, apparently, by N. Khrushchev. On the document there is his resolution: "T. Malenkov G. M. Khrushchev. 1 /IX».*

² *The list of relatives is not published. In addition to his mother and four sisters, L. Beria, fifteen other people are on the list.*

**P32/9. NOTE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF GEORGIA
(T. Khrushchev, Malenkov)**

To instruct the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee to consider the issue and make proposals.

Secretary of the Central Committee

**The Ruling of the Presidency of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union in the case of L.P. Beria. December
10, 1953**

Source: Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Akad. A. N. Yakovleva; I'm not going to do that. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — page 382—386 — (Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

Archive: AP of the Russian Federation, 3, on. 24, 473, ll. 1—7. Copy.

No. 6

Strictly Secret

**P43/J. ISSUES OF THE GENERAL PROSECUTOR OF the
USSR
(T. Rudenko, Moskalenko, Shvernik, Kaganovich, Voroshilov,
Molotov, Khrushchev, Malenkov)**

1. The accompanying text of the message “In the Prosecutor’s Office of the USSR” in the case of Beria and his accomplices, as

amended at the meeting of the Presidency of the Central Committee, approved and published in newspapers for December 17, 1953.

2. Approve the draft of the attached decree of the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR on the formation and composition of the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR to consider the case on charges of Beri L.P. and with it Merkulov V.H., Dekanozov V.G., Kobulov B.S., Goglidze S.A., Meshik P.Y. and Vlodzimirsky L.E.

Accept the proposal of the Prosecutor General of the USSR to consider the case on charges of Beria and his accomplices in a closed court session without the participation of the parties in the order stipulated by the Act of December 1, 1934.¹

3. Approve the draft indictment submitted by the Prosecutor General of the USSR T. Rudenko in the case of Beria and with it Merkulov, Dekanozov, Kobulov, Goglidze, Meshik and Vlodzimirsky.

The indictment was sent to members and candidates for the CPSU Central Committee, as well as the first secretaries of the

¹ *On December 1, 1934, the Presidency of the CEC of the USSR adopted a resolution on the manner in which cases were prepared or committed terrorist acts. It instructed the judiciary "not to delay the execution of capital sentences because of clemency motions" and to "enforce capital sentences against the perpetrators of the above categories immediately upon sentencing".*

On the same day, the CEC and the SNC of the USSR amended the criminal procedure codes of the Union republics. The resolution provided for the investigation and consideration of cases of terrorist organizations and terrorist attacks against soviet officials: "1. Investigation in these cases to finish in a period of no more than ten days. 2. The indictment should be handed over to the accused a day before the trial. 3. Cases to listen without the participation of the parties. 4. Cassation appeal against sentences, as well as the filing of clemency applications are not allowed. 5. The death penalty should be carried out immediately upon sentencing."

regional committees, extremes and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republics.²

4. The trial of Beria and his accomplices in the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR began on December 18, 1953.

Secretary of the Central Committee

Application

IN THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE OF THE USSR

On June 26, 1953, the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR, having considered the report of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on criminal actions of L. P. Beria as an agent of foreign capital aimed at undermining the Soviet state, decided: to remove L.P. Beria from the post of first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and from the post of Minister of the Interior of the USSR and to bring Beria to justice. On August 8, 1953, the Supreme Council of the USSR approved the Decree of the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR on June 26.

At present, the Prosecutor's Office of the USSR has completed the investigation into the case of the traitor of the Motherland L.P. Beria.

The investigation found that Beria, using his position, made a treasonous group of conspirators hostile to the Soviet state, which

² *The indictment was sent to members and candidates for the CPSU Central Committee, the first secretaries of the communist party, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republics, as well as to the Prosecutor's Office of the USSR and members of the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR, together with Protocol 43 and the presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Communist Party of the Communist Party of December 10, 1953.*

was intended to use the internal affairs bodies both in the centre and on the ground, against the Communist Party and the government of the USSR in the interests of foreign capital, which sought in its treacherous designs to put the Ministry of The Interior over the party and the government to seize power and eliminate the Soviet workers' order.

Active participants of the treasonous group of conspirators were the accused associated with Beria for many years joint criminal activity in the NKVD—MVD bodies: the former Minister of State Security of the USSR, and more recently the Minister of State Control of the USSR — Merkulov V.H., the former head of one of the NKVD departments of the USSR, and more recently the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Georgian USSR — Dekanozov V.G., former deputy commissioner of the Interior of the Georgian Federation, then the Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR, and more recently, the deputy interior minister of the USSR — Kobulov B.S., former People's Commissioner of Internal Affairs of the Georgian USSR, and more recently the head of one of the departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR — Goglidze S.A., former head of one of the offices of the NKVD of the USSR, and more recently the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR — Meshik P.Y. and the former head of the investigative unit on the most important affairs of the Interior Ministry of the USSR.

Over the years, Beria and his accomplices carefully disguised and concealed their hostile treason. After the death of Stalin, when reactionary imperialist forces intensified subversive activities against the Soviet state, Beria moved to forced actions to achieve its criminal goals, primarily by using the Interior Ministry to seize power, which allowed in a short period of time to reveal the true face of the traitor of the Motherland and take decisive measures to suppress his enemy activities.

After becoming the Soviet Interior Minister in March 1953, Beria began to strenuously promote conspiratorial group members to a number of senior positions in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The conspirators persecuted and persecuted honest employees of the

Interior Ministry, who refused to comply with Beria's criminal orders.

In order to undermine the collective farm system and create food difficulties in our country, Beria sabotaged in every way, hindered the implementation of the most important activities of the Party and the Government, aimed at the rise of collective farms and state farms, to the steady improvement of the welfare of the Soviet people.

It has also been established that Beria and his accomplices have taken criminal measures to revive the remnants of bourgeois—nationalist elements in the allied republics, to sow enmity and discord between the peoples of the USSR and, above all, to undermine the friendship of the peoples of the USSR with the great Russian people.

Deprived of any social support within the USSR, Beria and his accomplices built their criminal calculations to support the conspiracy by reactionary imperialist forces from abroad.

As the investigation has now established, Beria has established ties with foreign intelligence during the civil war. In 1919, Beria, while in Baku, committed a betrayal, taking up a secret—intelligence position in the intelligence of the counter—revolutionary Musavatist government in Azerbaijan, which operated under the control of British intelligence agencies. In 1920, While in Georgia, Beria again committed a treasonous act, establishing a secret connection with the Menshevist guard in Georgia, which was a branch of British intelligence.

The investigation found that in the following years Beria maintained and expanded his secret criminal connections with foreign intelligence through the spies sent by them, which he sometimes managed to protect from exposure and deserved punishment.

Acting as a traitor of the Motherland and a spy sold to foreign intelligence, Beria throughout his criminal activity with the help of his accomplices also maintained secret ties with the counter—revolutionary Georgian Mensheviks — immigrants, agents of a number of foreign intelligence.

Carefully concealing and masking his criminal past and enemy ties with the intelligence of foreign states, Beria chose as the main method of slander, intrigue, various provocations against honest party and Soviet workers, who stood in the way of his hostile soviet state plans and prevented him from making his way to power. Having made their way with the help of these criminal methods to responsible positions in the Caucasus and Georgia, and then to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and carrying out for treasonous purposes plans to seize power, Beria and his accomplices committed a massacre of undesirable people, not stopping before acts of arbitrariness and lawlessness, vilely deceived the Party and the state.

The investigation established a number of criminal machinations of Beria, aimed at achieving careerist goals and to prevent the exposure of his enemy. Thus, the investigation found that in order to achieve his treacherous goals, Beria for a number of years with the help of his accomplices waged a criminal intrigue struggle against the outstanding figure of the Communist Party and the Soviet state — Sergo Orjonikidze, seeing him as a man who was an obstacle to his further advancement and implementation of enemy plans. As it is now established, Sergo Orjonikidze harbored political distrust of Beria. After the death of Sergo Orjonikidze, the conspirators continued to brutally retaliate against members of his family.³

The investigation also established such facts, when conspirators committed terrorist murders of persons on the part of whom feared revelations. Thus, Beria and his accomplices were killed M. S. Kedrov — a member of the Communist Party since 1902, a former member of the Presidency of the HPC and the college of the UGPU under F.E. Dzerzhinsky. The conspirators had reason to suspect

³ *This refers to the repression of the Ordzhonikidze brothers and their families. In 1937, Sergo Papulia's brother was arrested and shot by the decision of the troika. In 1938, his wife was sentenced to 10 years in prison, and then by the decision of the "troika" shot. In the same year, another brother, Ivan, and his wife were convicted. In 1941, a third brother, Constantine, was arrested.*

Kedrov that he had materials about Beria's criminal past. Other facts of terrorist murders committed by conspirators with the criminal purpose of extermination of honest, committed personnel of the Communist Party and the Soviet authorities have also been established.

According to the investigation, Beria and his accomplices committed a number of treasonous acts in an attempt to weaken the defence capability of the Soviet Union.⁴

The materials of the investigation proved that the conspiratorial group members—accused Merkulov, Dekanozov, Kobulov, Goglidze, Mesik and Wlodzimirsky, being connected with Beria years of joint criminal activity, performing any criminal tasks of Beria, helping him to hide and conceal his criminal past, committed a number of the gravest state crimes mentioned above.

Thus, it was established that the accused Beria, Merkulov, Kobulov, Goglidze, Meshik and Wlodzimirsky, changing the Motherland, acted as an agent of international imperialism, as the worst enemies of the Soviet people.

The investigation also established the facts of other crimes committed by Beria, indicating his deep moral decline, and, moreover, the facts of Beria's criminal mercenary acts and abuses of power.

After being exposed at the investigation by numerous witnesses and genuine documentary evidence, the accused pleaded guilty to a number of grave state crimes.

Beria is on trial on charges of treason in the organization of anti—Soviet conspiracy, committing terrorist acts, active struggle against the working class and the revolutionary working movement, he demonstrated in a secret—intelligence position in the intelligence

⁴ *Among other charges L. Beria was accused of organizing separate negotiations with Germany in October 1941 and harmful actions during the defence of the North Caucasus in 1942.*

agencies of the counter—revolutionary Musavatist government during the civil war, that is, in the crimes provided for by Article 58—1 “b,” 58—8, 58—13, 58—11 Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

Merkulov, Dekanozov, Kobulov, Goglidze, Meshik and Wlodzimirsky were tried on charges of treason, committing terrorist acts and participation in a counter—revolutionary treasonous conspiratorial group, that is, in crimes under Article. 58—1 B, 58—8, 58—11 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.

In accordance with the decree of the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR, the case against Beria, Merkulov, Dekanozov, Kobulov, Goglidze, Meshik and Vlodzimirsky is subject to consideration of the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR in accordance with the law of December 1, 1934.

No publication

Decree of the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR “On the formation of the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR to consider the case on charges of Beria L.P. and others”

To consider the criminal case on charges of Beria Lavrentiy Pavlovic under Article. Art. 58—1 p. “b,” 58—8, 58—13, 58—11 of the Criminal Code of the RFSR and under the decree of the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR of January 4, 1949 “On strengthening criminal responsibility for rape”; Merkulov Vsevolod Nikolaevich, Dekanozov Vladimir Georgievich, Kobulov Bogdan Saha—Rievich, Goglidze Sergey Arsenevich, Vlodzimirsky Lev Emelianovich, Mesik Pavel Yakovlevich on Art. 58—1 p. “b,”

58—8, 58—11 of the Criminal Code of the RfsR, — to form the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR in the following composition:

Chairman of the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR CONEV I.S. — Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Members of the Special Judicial Presence:

Schwernik N.M. — Chairman of the ICAC

E.L. SEIDIN — First Vice—President of the Supreme Court of the

USSR

MOSKALENKO C.S. — Army General

MIKHALY H.A. — Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee of the CPSU

GROMOV L.A. — President of the Moscow City Court

LUNEV K.F. — First Deputy Minister of the Interior of the USSR

KUCHAVA M.I. is the Chairman of the Georgian Republican Council of Professional Unions.

Chairman of the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR
K. VOROSHILOV

Secretary of the Presidency of the Supreme Council of the USSR
N. PEGOV

Moscow, the Kremlin of December 1953.

The Ruling of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee “The issue of the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR.” December 14, 1953

Source: Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Akad. A. N. Yakovleva; I'm not going to do that. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — page 386—387 (Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

Archive: AP of the Russian Federation, P. 3, op. 24, 473, l. 232. Copy.

No. 7

No P44/6

Strictly Secret

Chairman of the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR Konev I.S. and members of the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR Schwernik N.M., Seidin E.L., Moskalenko K.S., Mikhailov H.A., Gromov L.A., Lunev K.F. and Kuchav M.I. from December 15, this year, until the end of the trial in the case of Beria and be released.

Secretary of the Central Committee

Act on the Execution of the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR against L.P. Beria. December 23, 1953

Source: Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Akad. A. N. Yakovleva; I'm not going to do that. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — page 387 — (Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

Archive: There are no archival details

No. 8

This number, at 7:50 p.m., on the basis of the order of the President of the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR of December 23, 1953 for No. 003, In the presence of the Soviet Prosecutor General, Rudenko R.A. and Army General Moskalenko K.S. were executed by the Special Judicial Presence in relation to the death penalty, Beria Lavrentiy Pavlovic, who was sentenced to death by the Soviet Prosecutor General, the Special Judicial Presence.

**Colonel—General Batitsky
Soviet Attorney General Rudenko
Army General Moskalenko**

Message “In the Supreme Court of the USSR.” December 24, 1953

Source: Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Akad. A. N. Yakovleva; I’m not going to do that. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — page 387—390 — (Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

Archive: “Truth” 1953, December 24.

No. 9

December 18—23, 1953 Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR in:

Presiding officer — Chairman of the Special Judicial Presence of Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev P. S. and members of the Presence: Chairman of the All—Union Central Council of Professional Unions Shvernik N.M., First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR, E. L.L., Army General Moskalenko K.S., Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee of the Cpsu Mikhailov N. A., Chairman of the Council of Professional Unions of Georgia Kuchav M. I., Chairman of the Moscow City Court of Moscow , in accordance with the law of December 1, 1934, a criminal case on charges of Beria L.P. and others.

In accordance with the indictment, the court was presented: Beria L. P. on charges of crimes under Articles 58—1 “b,” 58—8, 58—13, 58—11 of the Criminal Code of the RFSR; Merkulov V. H., Dekanozov V.G., Kobulov B. 3., Goglidze S.A., Meshik P. Y., Vlodzimirsky L. E. on charges of crimes under Articles 58—1 “b,” 58—8, 58—11 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

The judicial investigation fully confirmed the preliminary investigation materials and the charges against all the defendants outlined in the indictment.

The court found that by changing the Motherland and acting in the interests of foreign capital, the defendant Beria had a treasonous group of conspirators hostile to the Soviet state, which included the defendants Merkulov V.H., The Demenozov V.G., Kobulov B.S., Goglidze S.A., Meshik P.Y. and Vlodzimirsky L.E. were jointly criminally involved in the joint criminal activities. , put the Ministry of The Interior over the Party and the Government to seize power, eliminate the Soviet peasant workers, restore capitalism and restore the domination of the bourgeoisie.

The court found that the beginning of the criminal treason activities of Beria L.P. and the establishment of secret ties with foreign intelligence dates back to the time of the civil war, when in 1919 Beria L. P., while in Baku, committed a betrayal, taking up a secret—agent position in the intelligence of the counter—revolutionary Musavatist government in Azerbaijan, which was under the control of the British intelligence agencies.

In 1920, Beria L.P., while in Georgia, again committed a betrayal, establishing a secret connection with the protection of the Georgian Menshevik government, which was also a branch of British intelligence.

In the years that followed, until his arrest, Beria L.P. maintained and expanded secret ties with foreign intelligence.

Over the years, Beria L.P. and his accomplices carefully concealed and disguised their hostile activities.

After the death of Stalin, betting on the general activation of reactionary imperialist forces against the Soviet state, Beria L. P. moved to forced actions to carry out their anti—Soviet treason plans, which allowed in a short time to expose Beria L.P. and his accomplices and stop their criminal activities.

Becoming in March 1953 the Minister of the Interior of the USSR, the defendant Beria L.P., preparing the seizure of power, began to strenuously promote the conspiratorial group members to senior positions in the central apparatus of the Interior Ministry, and in his local bodies. Beria L.P. and his accomplices dealt with honest employees of the Interior Ministry, who refused to comply with the criminal orders of the conspirators.

In their anti—Soviet treasonous purposes, Beria L.P. and his accomplices took a number of criminal measures in order to activate the remnants of bourgeois—nationalist elements in the soviet republics, to sow enmity and discord between the peoples of the USSR and, first of all, to undermine the friendship of the peoples of the USSR with the great Russian people.

Acting as an evil enemy of the Soviet people, the defendant Beria L.P., with the aim of creating food difficulties in our country, sabotaged, interfered with the implementation of the most important activities of the Party and the Government, aimed at the rise of collective farms and state farms and the steady improvement of the welfare of the Soviet people.

It has been established that, by concealing and masking his criminal activities, the defendant Beria L.P. and his accomplices committed terrorist massacres against people on whose part they feared being exposed. As one of the main methods of their criminal activity, the conspirators chose slander, intrigue and various provocations against honest party and Soviet workers who stood in the way of treasonous designs hostile to the Soviet state beria L.P. and his accomplices and prevented them from making their way to power.

The court found that the defendants Beria L.P., Merkulov V.H., Dekanozov V.G., Kobulov B.S., Goglidze S.A., Meshik P.Y. and Vlodzimirsky L.E., using their official position in the NKVD — IGB — Interior Ministry, committed a number of grave crimes for the purpose of extermination of honest, committed by the Communist Party.

The court also established the crimes of Beria L.P., testifying to his deep moral decay, and the facts of Beria's criminal mercenary acts and abuses of power.

The guilt of all the defendants in the charges against them was fully proved at trial by the original documents, physical evidence, handwritten records of the defendants, the testimony of numerous witnesses.

The defendants Beria L.P., Merkulov V.H., Dekanozov V.G., Kobulov V.3., Goglidze S.A., Meshik P.Y. and Vlojimirsky L. E. at

the trial confirmed the testimony given by them at the preliminary investigation, and pleaded guilty to a number of grave state crimes. The Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR found the defendant Beria L. P. guilty of treason, organizing an anti—Soviet conspiratorial group in order to seize power and restore the domination of the bourgeoisie; in the commission of terrorist acts against politicians loyal to the Communist Party and the peoples of the Soviet Union; in the active struggle against the revolutionary labour movement in Baku in 1919, when Beria held a secret intelligence position in the intelligence of the counter—revolutionary Musavatist government in Azerbaijan, tied up there with foreign intelligence, and subsequently maintained and expanded his secret criminal ties with foreign intelligence until the moment of exposure and arrest, that is, in the crimes under articles 58—1 “b,” 58—8, 58—13 58—11 of the Criminal Code of the RFSR.

The court found the defendants Merkulov V.H., Dekanozova V.G., Kobulova B.S., Goglidze S.A., Meshik P.Y. and Vlodzimirsky L.E. in treason, committing terrorist acts and participation in the anti—Soviet treason group, that is, in the crimes stipulated in articles 58—1 “b,” 58—8, 58—11 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation

The Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR ruled: to sentence Beria L.P., Merkulov V.H., Dekanozov V.G., Kobulov B.S., Goglidze S.A., Meshik P.Y., Vlodzimirsky L.E. to the death penalty — execution, with confiscation of their own property, with the confiscation of their own property, with the confiscation of their own property, with the confiscation of military titles.

The sentence is final and cannot be appealed.

The sentence was carried out.

Yesterday, December 23, the verdict of the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR was carried out against those sentenced to the highest penalty — the execution — Beria L.P., Merkulov V.H., Dekanozova V.G., Kobulov B.S., Goglidze S.A., Meshika P.Y., Vlodzimirsky L.E.

A Note by R.A. Rudenko and S.N. Kruglov to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the eviction of relatives of L.P.Beria, V.N.Merkulov and other convicts. December 31, 1953

Source: Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Akad. A. N. Yakovleva; I'm not going to do that. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — page 390—391 — (Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

Archive: AP RF, F. 3, Op. 24, D. 474, L. 101. Original.

No. 10
No2172/K

Top Secret

Comrade MALEENKOV G.M.
Comrade KRUSHKU N.S.

On December 23, 1953, the enemies of the people of Beria, Merkulov, Dekanozov, Kobulov, Goglidze, Meshik and Vlodzimirsky were convicted by the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR. Taking into account the long cohabitation and close kinship ties of the enemies of the people with their families and taking into account the social danger of persons who were in close ties with the enemies of the people, the Prosecutor's Office of the USSR and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR consider it necessary to prohibit family members and close relatives of these enemies of the people living in the cities of Moscow, Leningrad, Tbilisi and other regime cities and areas of the Soviet Union, as well as in the Caucasus and the Caucasus.

These persons will be placed under the supervision of the Interior Ministry.

A personal list of family members and relatives of the convicted enemies of the people of Beria, Merkulov, Dekanozov, Kobulov, Goglidze, Mesik and Wlodzimirsky, which are subject to territorial restrictions, is attached.¹

Please ask for your consent.

**SOVIET ATTORNEY GENERAL R. RUDENKO
S. KRUGLOV, MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR**

**A Note by V.P. Mzhavanadze and G.D.
Javakhishvili to the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the
SOVIET SS SS on the eviction of relatives of L.P.
Beria, B.S. Kobulova, S.A. Goglidze and V.G.
Dekanozov from the territory of the Georgian
USSR. April 15, 1954**

Source: Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Akad. A. N. Yakovleva; I'm not going to do that. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — page 391 — (Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

¹ *The list of relatives is not published. It includes more than thirty people, among them about half of the relatives of L. Beria, starting with his mother.*

Archive: AP of the Russian Federation, Ph.D., op. 24, 474, l. 98.
Original.

No. 11
No. 873ss
Tbilisi

Top Secret

Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, considering it impractical to continue to stay in the Georgian USSR close relatives of exposed enemies of the party and the people of Beria, Kobulova, Goglidze and Dekanozova discussed the eviction from the territory of the Georgian SSR of close relatives of the enemies of the party and the people of Beria, Kobulov, Goglidze and Dekanozov and adopted a resolution with the request of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the USSR to instruct the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR to evict from the territory of the Georgian USSR close enemies of the party and the people of Beria Kobulova, Goglidze and Dekanozova. Please ask for your instructions.

**Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Georgia V. Mzhavanadze
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Georgian USSR G.
Javakhishvili**

The Decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Commission to Establish the Residence of Relatives of L.P. Beria, V.N. Merkulov and other Convicts. April 19, 1954

Source: Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Akad. A. N. Yakovleva; I'm not going to do that. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — page 392 — (Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

Archive: AP of the Russian Federation, Ph.D., op. 24, 474, l. 99. Copy.

No. 12

Strictly Secret

P 59/VIII. ABOUT FAMILY MEMBERS AND RELATIVES OF CONDEMNED ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE (T. Khrushchev, Malenkov)

To entrust commissions in the composition of T. Shatalina, Rudenko, Serova, Kruglov and Mzhavanadze consider the note tt. Kruglov and Rudenko questions and make their suggestions.¹

SECRETARY of the Central Committee

¹ *An extract from the ruling of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was sent to N. Shatalin, R. Rudenko, I. Serov, S. Kruglov, V. Mzhavanadze.*

A Note of the Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on Relatives of those Convicted in the Case of L.P. Beria with the Application of the Draft Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. May 3, 1954

Source: Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Akad. A. N. Yakovleva; I'm not going to do that. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — page 392—393 — (Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

Archive: AP of the Russian Federation, Ph.D., op. 24, 474, l. 141—142. Original.

No. 13

Special folder

CPSU Central Committee

In accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee's Presidency, we considered the issue of family members and relatives of the condemned enemies of the people of Beria, Merkulov, Dekanozov, Kobulov, Goglidze, Meshik and Vlodzimirsky. Having thoroughly discussed this case, we have come to the conclusion that family members and close relatives of these enemies of the people should be forbidden to live in the cities of Moscow, Leningrad, Tbilisi and other regime cities and areas of the Soviet Union, as well as in the Caucasus and the Caucasus.

A draft resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and a list of family members and close relatives of convicted enemies of the people is attached.¹

Shatalin
Rudenko
Serov
Kruglov
Mjavanadze
Application

RULING OF THE CPSU CENTRAL Committee
About family members and relatives of convicted enemies of the
people

Special folder
Project

1. Agree with the proposal of the Central Committee Commission as part of the TT. Shatalina, Rudenko, Serova, Kruglov, Mzhavanadze on the prohibition to live in the cities of Moscow, Leningrad, Tbilisi and other regime cities and areas of the Soviet Union, as well as in the Caucasus and The Caucasus, the following family members and close relatives of the enemies of the people of Beria, Merkulov, Dekanozov, Kobulova, Goglidze, Meshik and Vlodzigorsky. (The list is attached.)
2. Take note of the report of the Minister of the Interior of the USSR T. Kruglov that the persons listed in the enclosed list will be taken under the supervision of the Interior Ministry at the place of their newly elected residence.²

¹ *The list of relatives is not published. It, as in the previous list, includes more than thirty people.*

² *On the note of the commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union there is a resolution of the head of the general department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Russia: "Send to the members of the Presidium of the*

The Ruling of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on Relatives of Persons Convicted in the Case of L.P. Beria. May 10, 1954

Source: Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Akad. A. N. Yakovleva; I'm not going to do that. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — page 393 — (Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

Archive: AP of the Russian Federation, Ph.D., op. 24, 474, l. 140. Copy.

No. 14

Strictly Secret

P 64/XVIII. ABOUT FAMILY MEMBERS AND RELATIVES OF CONDEMNED ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE (T. Khrushchev, Shatalin, Mikoyan, Malenkov, Pervukhin, Kaganovich, Bulganin)

Consider this issue in a month.¹

SECRETARY of the Central Committee

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The indication is that it is. Khrushchev. 4/V-54».

¹ *Information about the consideration of the CPSU Central Committee by the Presidency a month after this decision on the expulsion of relatives of persons convicted in the case of L. Beria was not found in the archive.*

I.A. Serov's Note to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on Monitoring the Behaviour of Exiled Relatives of Persons Convicted in the Case of L.P. Beria. September 19, 1955

Source: Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Akad. A. N. Yakovleva; I'm not going to do that. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — page 393—394 — (Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

Archive: AP of the Russian Federation, Ph.D., op. 24, 476, l.l. 201—202. Original.

No. 15

No. 2297s

Top Secret

After the condemnation of the enemy of the people of Beria and their accomplices, their close relatives were sent to Krasnoyarsk region, Sverdlovsk region and Kazakhstan.

The Committee of State Security has data that some of them are: Beria's nephew—KVARACCHELIA V.I., his mother—KVARACCHELIA A.P., Beria niece—KVARACHELIA—KOZLYAKOVSKA S. K., who live in Krasnoyarsk region, as well as Beria sisters—KVARATSHELIA—ANTADZE E.D. and KVARACSHELIA—KVICIDZE T.D. and their husbands—ANTADZE A.N. and KVIJID M.D., living in the Kazakh SSR, continue to and now praise Beria, to express his dissatisfaction with the decision to expel them.

Particularly vicious slanderous statements are allowed by KVARACHELIA — ANTADZE E.D. and ANTADZE A.N.

The materials of the preliminary inspection found that KVARATSheliya—ANTADZE E.D. and her husband ANTADZE A.N. are clearly anti—Soviet, allow malicious slander at the address of the leaders of the party and the Soviet state, seek ways to establish a connection with the rest of the exiled relatives of the enemy of the people of Beria in order to carry out organized hostile activities against the Soviet state.

Taking into account the hostile behaviour of KVARACHELI—ANTADZE E.D. and ANTADZE A.N., it was decided to bring them to criminal responsibility for malicious anti—Soviet agitation.

We continue to monitor the behaviour of other exiled relatives of the enemy of the Beria people and their accomplices.

**CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COMMITTEE
SECURITY AT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE
USSR
I. SEROV**

**The Ruling of the Presidency of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union on measures to Monitor the
Behaviour of the Exiled Relatives of Persons
Convicted in the Case of L.P. Beria. September
22, 1955.**

Source: Lawrence Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Under Ed. Akad. A. N. Yakovleva; I'm not going to do that. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. M.: MFD, 1999 — page 394 — (Russia. The 20th century. Documents).

Archive: AP of the Russian Federation, Ph.D., op. 24, 476, l. 200. Copy.

No. 16
P152/XXV.

Strictly Secret
Special folder

**NOTE OF THE WORLD NOSDS NO 2297s OT 19
SEPTEMBER 1953**

(T. Lunev, Saburov, Pervukhin, Kaganovich, Malenkov)

To instruct the Committee of State Security (i.e. Lunev) in the spirit of the exchange of views held at the meeting of the Presidency of the Central Committee to take the necessary measures on the issues outlined in the Committee's note of September 19, 2297s.¹

SECRETARY of the Central Committee

¹ *In 1955, L. Beria's sister E. Kvaratshelia-Antadze and her husband A. Antadze, who had been deported to the Kazakh USSR, were prosecuted.*