

**TO HELP PARTY ACTIVES AND
PROPAGANDISTS**

**LET'S BE ALERT AND
VIGILANT**

***A COLLECTION OF ARTICLES
AND MATERIALS***

***Authors: D. Manuilsky, A. Vyshinsky, S. Uranov,
Al. Hamadan, O. Windt, L. M. Zakovsky***

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1937**

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"It is necessary to remember and never forget that the capitalist encirclement is the main fact determining the international position of the Soviet Union.

Remember and never forget that as long as there is a capitalist encirclement, there will be wreckers, saboteurs, spies, and terrorists sent into the rear of the Soviet Union by the intelligence agencies of foreign countries. Remember this and fight against those comrades who underestimate the significance of the fact of capitalist encirclement, who underestimate the power and significance of sabotage.

Explain to our party comrades that no economic successes, no matter how great, can annul the fact of capitalist encirclement and the results that follow from this fact.

"Take the necessary measures to ensure that our comrades, party and non-party Bolsheviks, have the opportunity to become familiar with the goals and objectives, the practices and techniques of sabotage and espionage work of foreign intelligence agencies."

J. STALIN.

D. MANUILSKY, ON THE CAPITALIST ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE USSR

I

At the last Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Comrade Stalin warned our Party against a careless attitude toward the capitalist encirclement of our country. He especially insistently urged us all to remember that socialism has so far triumphed on only one-sixth of the globe, while the remaining five-sixths are dominated by a capitalist system, ruled by a bourgeoisie that wants either to destroy socialism and restore capitalism in the USSR, or at least to delay the development of a socialist system in our country.

The struggle between the capitalist world and the socialist world has never ceased and will never cease as long as both systems exist. History teaches us that no class ever leaves voluntarily. No socio-political order ever yields its place to another without the defenders of the old order waging the most bitter struggle against the emerging new order. This is especially true of socialism, which fundamentally changes all economic and socio-political relations between people. The exploiting classes fight socialism not only through propaganda, mobilising their scientists, their press, and their churches for this purpose; they resort to violence, stifling the labour movement, destroying its organisations, and resorting to bribery and terror, hoping in this way to deter the masses of their countries from fighting for socialism.

At the same time, the capitalist states are feverishly arming themselves on land, at sea, and in the air, not only to fight each other for the realisation of their imperialist ambitions, but also for a war to overthrow the hated socialist system in the USSR and

enslave the peoples of the Soviet Union. But while some of these states—those that won the world war of 1914-1918, in which the bourgeois-parliamentary system still remains, and which fear their restless fascist neighbors—are showing a certain readiness for peaceful cooperation with the Soviet Union, other states—of the fascist type—are gripped by an aggressive zeal that, however, does not always correspond to their capabilities for carrying out aggression. And if fascist states today do not wage open war against the countries of socialism, it is not because they have resigned themselves to the victory of socialism on one-sixth of the earth, but because they are not yet ready for such a war, because the wild aggressiveness of fascist states causes alarm in neighbouring capitalist countries, and most importantly because the defence capability of the USSR has grown and because they are afraid of their own peoples.

In the past, the capitalist world already tried to probe our country with bayonets. Can we forget the armed intervention of capitalist states during the Civil War—an intervention that did not bring victory to its initiators, but rather prolonged the civil war, increased the suffering of our masses, and hindered the more rapid expansion of our socialist construction? Can we forget how these states supplied arms to counterrevolutionary generals—Denikin, Kolchak, Wrangel—how they sent expeditionary forces to our country, how they occupied parts of Soviet territory? Can we forget how Japanese interventionists reigned supreme in the Far East, how German occupiers reigned supreme in Ukraine, how foreign troops advanced from both the north and the south, from the

Volga to Siberia? And if this intervention failed, it failed because the soldiers sent by the capitalist states did not want to fight against the workers and peasants of our country; the peoples of these states were exhausted by the war and were against the intervention, while the workers and peasants of our country displayed miracles of heroism in the fight against the foreign invaders.

Can we also forget the war orchestrated by bourgeois governments, which spurred the Polish gentry to attack the Soviet Union in 1920? This war, too, failed to bring success to our enemies, but it intensified the economic devastation caused by the imperialist and civil wars and intervention, prolonged the period of War Communism, and created a number of additional difficulties in the transition to the restoration period of our socialist construction.

The end of the intervention and the Soviet-Polish War changed the USSR's international position, but did this mean that the capitalist world had left the Soviet Union alone? Bourgeois governments were forced to temporarily abandon their plans to destroy the USSR through direct military aggression, but they continued their struggle by other means. Capitalist states recognised the USSR one after another, but this did not prevent them from weaving a complex web of diplomatic intrigue over the years, aimed at isolating the Soviet Union and creating ever more new external and internal difficulties for it. Diplomatic intrigues were accompanied by clandestine plots. Open warfare gave way to covert warfare.

The capitalist states moved armed gangs into Soviet territory, raided local executive committees, killed party and Soviet workers, blew up railway

tracks, cut telegraph and telephone wires, set fire to military depots, ravaged state farms, destroyed people's property, and robbed the population. Set in motion by British colonels, the Basmachi in Central Asia, the Petliurists in Ukraine, fed by the Polish defences, the Hunguz from Manchuria sent by the Japanese headquarters, and the white Karelians from Finland continued to operate in conditions of "peace" as if our country were at war with the capitalist states that sent these gangs. Can we forget this bloody chain of crimes committed by the capitalist environment of the Soviet country?

Can our country forget another form of the capitalist world's hidden war against us—sabotage? The vile agents of foreign capital flooded mines, caused accidents, disabled power plants, damaged expensive foreign equipment, staged explosions with fatalities, and drew up either deliberately unrealistic, exaggerated, or deliberately understated plans—all while workers, gripped by the fervour of socialist construction, performed miracles, breaking world production records. Isn't it clear that our successes on the front of socialist construction would have been even greater if not for this subversive activity by capitalist states, which recruited their agents among the brutalised scions of nobles, merchants, kulaks, and priests, defeated by the revolution?

We had no right to forget the capitalist environment, especially since the fascist movement had been growing in capitalist countries in recent years. While the first wave of fascism in Europe followed the end of the world imperialist war and led to the victory of fascism in Italy, the second wave was associated with the rise of German fascists to power in

1933. Following the German fascists, Heimwehr-type fascists came to power in Austria, a fascist movement took to the streets in France on February 6, 1934, Henlein's movement grew in Czechoslovakia, Degrelle's movement in Belgium, and Mosley's in England. The Iron Guard began to rage in Romania, and fascists began to stir in the Scandinavian countries.

What did the rise of fascism—that most ferocious enemy of both the world workers' movement and the Soviet Union—mean? It meant that the contradictions between the capitalist and socialist worlds were becoming increasingly acute, that the most rabid obscurantists—advocates of war against the USSR—were gaining the upper hand among the ruling classes, that the initiative in aggression against the Soviet Union was passing into the hands of the fascist states, and that the danger of a capitalist attack on the USSR was increasing. This meant that, faced with a growing fascist movement, we had little reason to be complacent; we had every reason to exercise wary vigilance against the capitalist encirclement.

How did it happen that just recently we began to forget about the capitalist environment?

The reason for this lies in the fact that, under the influence of the great successes of our socialist construction, we began to downplay the strength of the capitalist environment and underestimated its ability to do us harm and damage us.

Socialist industry grew rapidly, the country was clad in iron and granite, collective farms grew stronger, "life became better, life became more joyful," the boundaries between industrial worker and collective farmer were erased, the peoples of the

USSR were transformed into a single family of builders of a socialist society, the socialist consciousness of the masses grew, and the country's defence capability strengthened. Self-confidence grew along with the enormous growth of Soviet people's love for their homeland. Love for the fatherland of all workers grew among the exploited and oppressed throughout the world. But this also gave rise to a feeling among Soviet people that all difficulties had already been overcome, that all the reefs and shoals had been navigated, that all dangers were behind them, that all the threats of capitalist encirclement were a piece of cake.

We must also bear in mind that all of our greatest successes coincided with the development of a global economic crisis that shook the capitalist world to its foundations. While our socialist country was rapidly advancing, the capitalist countries were retreating. From 1929 until 1932, the lowest point of the economic crisis, capitalism's fortunes worsened. But even after the capitalist world had passed its nadir, the grave socio-political consequences of the crisis had only just begun to unfold. This gave rise to the sentiment that capitalism had already fallen on its back, that it was already a dead dog, and that peeling away the capitalist shell of social relations was no longer such a difficult task.

In the tactics of communist parties in capitalist countries, these sentiments led to an underestimation of the fascist danger, revealed in the fact that some German communists, when the fascists were already advancing to power, declared that the development of fascism had already been limited, that fascism had already been defeated. This underestimation of the

strength and potential of capitalism was just as harmful as the overestimation of these potentials, which found its expression in the thoroughly false, capitulatory theory of "organised capitalism." But this underestimation of capitalism's inexhaustible potential led not only to a weakening of vigilance against fascism but also to an underestimation of the military danger. Why should capitalism engage in wars when it is on its last legs? Why should capitalist states fight when their affairs are so entangled? The capitalist system is rotting at the roots, and the workers of the capitalist countries will seize it with their bare hands.

But this is incorrect. Incorrect, firstly, because although capitalism is a historically doomed regime, and although the general line of its development does indeed lead capitalism to worsening conditions and inevitable demise, nonetheless, temporary improvements in capitalism's situation have occurred, are occurring, and will continue. It is enough to cite the current significant improvement in the economic situation in capitalist countries. In some of them, production has not only reached the pre-crisis level, that of 1929, but has even surpassed it. This does not exclude, but, on the contrary, presupposes, the escalation of a new economic crisis, but today this economic recovery is an indisputable fact.

This is untrue, secondly, because the more entangled capitalism's situation becomes, the more the capitalist states will seek a way out of their entanglement through war. And since the situation is most entangled in fascist states, it is precisely these states that exhibit the greatest inclination toward military adventurism. After all, Tsarism sought to delay its demise with the Russo-Japanese War. After

all, Japan is seeking a way out of its internal contradictions through the war against China. After all, Italian fascism sought salvation from its internal difficulties through the war against Abyssinia. After all, German fascism seeks to ignite the flame of war over the world in order to avoid its own complete bankruptcy.

The successes of our peace policy also had a calming effect on the Soviet people. The peace policy of the Soviet state is the most consistent peace policy, for it is pursued by a country of socialism—that is, a system in which the exploitation of one class by another, the oppression of one nation by another, has been abolished, where there can be no room for territorial conquests or imperialist claims. The peace policy of the Soviet country was successful because it was supported, to varying degrees, even by some capitalist states. Some—the large states—supported this policy because they were not interested in a new division of the world; others—the small states—because they did not want to lose their independence in a new war; still others because they feared the revolutionary upheavals that would follow a war.

But the success of the Soviet peace policy was ensured above all by its meeting the aspirations of the peoples of all countries. Our peace policy is fundamentally different from that of those bourgeois democratic leaders and parties who, while not desiring new wars, stand on the foundations of capitalism. Therefore, the peace policy of the Soviet Union finds the broadest support among the masses of the capitalist countries—masses who rightly see the USSR as the most reliable bulwark of peace among the nations.

Only by relying on this support of the masses throughout the world, on the deep love of the peoples of the USSR for the Soviet country, on the ever-growing power of our socialist system, on our glorious Red Army, could the Soviet government prevent the capitalist states, and first and foremost the fascist aggressors, from unleashing a new monstrous war.

But over the past few years, the cause of peace seemed to hang by a thread. More than once, the Japanese military and the German fascists provoked conflicts that could have led to war, if not for the Soviet government's steadfast devotion to the cause of peace and its fortitude, and, most importantly, the military might built by the Soviet Union to defend the working people's homeland. From this, our people concluded: if we were able to slap the knuckles and curb the fascist aggressors once, then why shouldn't we be able to do so a second and third time? If, thanks to the wisdom of the Soviet government, we were able to preserve peace today, then we could do so tomorrow. The acute awareness of the danger of war waned slightly, and people seemed to cease noticing that the cause of war and peace depended not only on us, but also on the governments to which we addressed our peace proposals. And these governments showed no will for peace. Don't the delirious, hysterical speeches of Hitler and Goebbels at the Nuremberg Congress demonstrate the kind of counterparties the Soviet Union must deal with in matters of war and peace? Didn't the Soviet government propose a non-aggression pact with Japan, but the Japanese government rejected it? Didn't the Soviet government propose general disarmament at the League of Nations, but the

capitalist states rejected this initiative of the Soviet Union?

Take Spain, for example. The whole world knows that the Spanish government did everything humanly possible to prevent the German and Italian invaders from attacking the Spanish people. And yet, the fascist governments of Germany and Italy invaded Spain without any external pretext, without any declaration of war.

But they say that the heroic struggle of the Spanish people against fascism had a sobering effect on the fascist governments, that Guadalajara somewhat tempered the militant ardour of the German and Italian interventionists, that these interventionists, confronted with the armed Spanish people, began to realise both their own insufficient preparation for a serious war and the inherent weakness of the fascist regime. They say that the military failures of the interventionists are creating discontent in the rear of their own countries. They say that mass discontent is growing not only in Germany and Italy, that great unrest is gripping the masses in Poland, that the influence of the Pilsudski faction is rapidly waning, that Poland is beginning to experience a fever. They say that there is also unrest in Japan, where officers are assassinating ministers, where military units are staging putsches, where even representatives of conservative parties, reflecting the deep discontent in the country, are constantly attacking the government. And from this they conclude that with such unstable rears, fascist governments can neither start a war nor fight.

This is not true: the instability of the fascist governments' rear is not yet such that they cannot

start a war. **Wars are started with such rears**, wars are waged with such rears, but with such rears they never **win. With such rears, nations end** wars, ending their own governments in the process.

They say, further, that in recent months the fascist movement in all capitalist countries has been declining, that the victory of the Spanish people will deal a heavy blow to the prestige of fascism and will contribute to a more powerful growth of the anti-fascist movement.

This is correct. But it would be wrong to conclude from this that the military danger is diminished. For the exploiting classes, war is a means to strengthen reaction and give new impetus to the development of the fascist movement.

II

The entire current international situation is characterised by intensified preparations for a new war. This is evidenced by the growth of armaments in capitalist countries, and above all, by the growth of armaments in fascist states. This is evidenced by the technical rearmament of capitalist armies, the militarisation of the civilian population in fascist states, the policy of economic autarky, and the intensified espionage work of fascist intelligence services. This is also evidenced by the recently uncovered espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities of Trotskyists.

Political collaboration between Trotskyists and fascists had existed for several years. This bloc was unofficial. It could be discerned by a keen political eye when comparing the fundamental political positions

regarding the USSR, questions of war and peace, the unity of the labour movement, the united workers' front, the anti-fascist movement, and the popular front movement. The recent trial of Pyatakov and others demonstrated that this political collaboration between Trotskyism and fascism concealed something more: a direct, unmediated agreement between Trotsky and fascist leaders to use Trotskyist counterrevolutionary cadres to carry out destructive work against the Soviet Union. The trial demonstrated that **Trotskyism had become a spy and sabotage agency for fascism.**

History knows many examples of dizzying apostasy and vile betrayals. Mussolini, before becoming a fascist leader, stood on the left flank of the Italian Socialist Party. Pilsudski was the leader of the PPS, and the French fascist Hervé was a "fervent" anti-militarist and, at the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International in 1907, demanded that workers' parties respond to the declaration of war with revolution. And yet, Trotskyist betrayal stands out from this series for its monstrosity.

Only in the era of the decay of monopoly capitalism, the extreme brutality of the bourgeoisie against the workers' movement, against the country building socialism, and the frenzied rampage of fascist reaction, could such a betrayal have matured. Trotskyism's already well-known "Clemenceau thesis" showed the direction in which Trotskyism was developing. The program of restoring capitalism linked Trotskyism with fascism. And since Trotskyism could not count on domestic support, it sought support from abroad. Hence the alliance of Trotsky and the Trotskyists with the Japanese military and German fascism. But an alliance with fascist states could be

purchased with territorial concessions. Hence Trotsky's directive to his agents to dismember the Soviet Union. Trotsky and his accomplices saw that they could not shake Soviet power, which was unconditionally supported by the masses of the USSR. Hence the bet on war. Hence the course toward the defeat of the Soviet Union and the victory of the fascist states. Hence the terror, sabotage, espionage, and subversion on behalf of an "ally" who demands not promises and words, but dirty and vile deeds. Consumed by a bestial hatred of socialism, Trotskyism descended into the cesspool of counterrevolutionary banditry.

Russian White Guards in exile have already embarked on this path: they now supply personnel for all the intelligence agencies of the capitalist world. There is no dirty deed so filthy that these corrupt White Guard scoundrels, who have lost their humanity, have not taken up: they serve as Japanese spies in Shanghai, they torture communists in the Romanian Sigurana, they fabricate false "Comintern" documents in Germany, they spy on workers in England, they organise terrorist attacks, including the assassination of the President of the Republic in France, they steal secret defence documents in America. They are everywhere where the smell of human blood swirls.

Trotskyism followed the same well-trodden path. The Trotskyist-Zinovievists bear the blood of our party's favourite, the outstanding tribune of the working class, S. M. Kirov, the blood of Red Army soldiers killed on foreign intelligence missions, and the blood of workers who fell victim to sabotage bombs. Its record includes passing secret information about the chemical industry and the capacity of the Siberian railway to fascist intelligence services. Trotskyism

systematised duplicity, deception, hypocrisy, and pharisaism. And it's quite understandable that it could only find the resources for this treacherous work among the counterrevolutionary dregs of the liquidated exploitative classes.

But what are the reserves of Trotskyism in capitalist countries?

In capitalist countries, these reserves are also small in terms of numbers. They are isolated groups, small groups, and small cliques with no roots in the masses. They have never seen the masses before, for those who might be receptive to the Trotskyists' counterrevolutionary agitation against the USSR and the Communist Party have already been hand-picked by fascism. But these groups are oversupplied with "leaders" and "trends." They attract adventurous elements dreaming of a quick political career, who are uncomfortable in workers' organisations with a certain amount of party discipline. Anyone expelled from the communist movement for dirty tricks, for unseemly behaviour, for connections with the police, for provocation, gravitates toward Trotskyism. Political swindlers and Gestapo agents alternate here with individuals without ideological lineage or tribe, but possessing a fascist grip.

But the crux of the matter isn't these groups, but who stands behind them. In our country of proletarian dictatorship, Trotskyism has no support. It's a different matter in capitalist countries: Trotskyism is backed by the most reactionary, chauvinistic, and imperialist elements of finance capital. Trotskyism marches at the beck and call of these elements in capitalist countries. Trotsky is promoted by the entire fascist press. The notorious fascist Hearst newspaper

company in America offers Trotsky columns in its newspapers. Trotsky's vile, slanderous books are vigorously distributed by the most reactionary publishing houses. Trotsky feeds on the strength of Hitler, who needs Trotsky to fight Bolshevism.

A Trotskyist like Souvarine in France reflects the light of the fascist Doriot and Colonel de la Rocque. And behind Souvarine, Doriot, and Trotsky, as well as behind de la Rocque and Hitler, stands finance capital. That's why Trotskyism poses a greater danger to the workers' movement in capitalist countries than in our country, where capitalism has been destroyed.

The danger of Trotskyism for workers' organisations in capitalist countries is further aggravated by the fact that here Trotskyism plays with leftist phrases that can mislead some radically minded elements.

It's well known that in the struggle against the USSR and its enormous successes in socialist construction, Trotskyism fails to capture the workers of capitalist countries. This is Trotskyism's weakest point, where its fascist tendencies are most clearly visible. But by fraudulently criticising the united and popular front movement "from the left," Trotskyism can more easily recruit supporters. This calls for extensive outreach to the provocative activities of Trotskyists, who are assisting fascism in its attempts to crush the workers' movement.

Take France. There, the working class achieved significant success in improving its material situation with a powerful strike movement last summer. Even as the economic crisis continued in France, it wrested from the bourgeoisie a 30% wage increase, a forty-hour workweek, two weeks of paid vacations,

collective bargaining agreements, and the institution of elected representatives at enterprises, not to mention smaller gains. The enraged French bourgeoisie hasn't calmed down since. It's attempting to at least partially recapture these working-class gains by resorting to outright provocation. It seeks to provoke individual groups of workers into renewed uprisings, occupying enterprises, in order to crush the workers piecemeal and, under the pretext of "anarchy," force them back to their previous working conditions through lockouts.

Who is helping the French bourgeoisie carry out these villainous plans? The Trotskyists. They, along with the employers' paid agents, are trying to push workers into scattered, unorganised protests, allowing the factory owners to violate the agreement they signed.

Or another example, with the so-called French Social Party, which is a second edition of the armed fascist detachments disbanded by the French government. Now the working masses are vehemently demanding the arrest of Doriot and de la Roque and the dissolution of their fascist party, which has adapted to the conditions of "legality." The French bourgeoisie is determined to defend fascist organisations and achieve the dissolution of the Communist Party. The entire French reaction is straining its resources to provoke bloody clashes with the Communists. They need these clashes to disrupt the unity of the popular front, isolate the Communist Party, and incite wavering sections of the petty bourgeoisie and peasantry against it. And here the Trotskyists are acting as a "united front" with the fascists. It is they, under the directives of Doriot and

de la Roque, who, together with fascist provocateurs, are inciting workers to armed clashes. They, together with the fascists and the French police, provoked the recent events in the Paris suburb of Clichy, where many workers were killed and wounded.

Who is now opposing the Franco-Soviet Pact? Hitler, Doriot, and with them the darkest forces of French reaction. The reactionary forces counterpose the Franco-Soviet Pact, which helps consolidate peace, with an agreement between French reaction and Hitler, which serves the cause of war.

And here the Trotskyists are on the side of reaction, against the forces of peace.

Trotskyists are playing the same role as fascist collaborators and agents in Spain. It is well known that the most important condition for the Spanish people's victory over the forces of the rebel generals and the German and Italian interventionists is the preservation of the unity of the Popular Front. Franco's agents are working tirelessly to discredit the Spanish Popular Front in the eyes of the masses, to undermine it from within, to demoralise and politically disarm the struggling Spanish people. One day they are inciting anarchists against the Communist Party, the next they are cautiously testing the waters to see if the Basque nationalists can be separated from the Popular Front, then they are fomenting conflicts within the Socialist Party, spreading rumours, lying, and endlessly slandering. And here too, Trotskyists are involved, trying to help Franco undermine the unity of the Popular Front with their shameless attacks on the Popular Front and their provocative actions.

All parties and organisations of the Popular Front are fighting for a unified people's army, for the

elimination of individual party detachments that hinder the unity of military operations. But General Franco seeks disorganised guerrilla warfare in the Republican army, a lack of discipline, chaos, and disorder. The Trotskyists, hand in hand with fifth columnists, are furthering General Franco's vile plans with their subversive work in the army and in the rear.

To justify their war against the Spanish people, the German and Italian interventionists shout that a "communist revolution" is taking place in Spain, that the International Brigades fighting on the side of the Spanish people are preparing the "enslavement" of Spain to the Comintern. Hitler's Trotskyist agents in Spain are conducting the same propaganda. The fascist newspapers of Burgos and Salamanca sympathetically reprint Trotskyist articles, which in style and content are indistinguishable from those of General Franco.

In China, where, despite the resistance of the most reactionary leaders of the Kuomintang, a nationwide front of struggle against the Japanese invaders is being formed with the greatest difficulty, the Trotskyists act as the fiercest enemies of the nationwide Chinese front, helping the Japanese military, interested in dismembering the national forces of China, to commit further seizures and commit atrocities on Chinese territory.

The fight against Trotskyism demands even greater vigilance from workers' organisations in capitalist countries, since Trotskyism fulfils specific tasks for fascism that fascism itself is incapable of fulfilling. Trotskyism is capturing the sentiments of left-leaning Social Democratic workers, attempting to channel them into counterrevolutionary, anti-Soviet

channels. Trotskyists have recently been striving intensely to infiltrate anarchist groups, the "left" factions of Social Democratic parties, and to establish a certain base of support for themselves within them. In France, this is a group of semi-anarchists. Marceau Pivert, in Spain—the anarchist elements in the National Confederation of Labour, in England—the Independent Labour Party, in Belgium—the Young Socialist Guard, in America—what remains of the American Socialist Party, etc. It must be noted that in all those groups and organisations where Trotskyism manages to penetrate, there inevitably begins the disintegration of these organisations into "factions," into warring "currents," the degeneration of these organisations into sects cut off from the masses, a striking example of which can serve as the so-called English Independent Labour Party and especially the Socialist Party of America, which has reduced its membership in the last few months from 16 thousand to 7 thousand members.

It's quite obvious that this sabotaging role of Trotskyism isn't escaping the workers' attention. They are beginning to understand that the fight against Trotskyism is not just the responsibility of communists, but of all workers' organisations interested in protecting themselves from the subversive activities of Trotskyist agents of fascism.

The working masses cannot help but see that while they selflessly fight against fascism, the worst enemy of humanity, Trotsky and his henchmen are fighting in alliance with fascism against the USSR, against socialism, against the workers' movement. The workers see that while the masses in all countries oppose war and advocate peace, Trotsky and the

Trotskyists act as warmongers in close alliance with the most aggressive fascist states. The working masses strive to unite their forces and establish a united front to fight the common class enemy; the Trotskyists, in the interests of the bourgeoisie, fight against the formation of a united front, striving in every way to disperse and weaken the proletariat and bring about its defeat.

And hence the growing hatred of the workers against Trotskyism, hence the growing understanding of the indisputable fact that it is impossible to successfully fight against fascism without waging a stubborn struggle against its Trotskyist agents, that the struggle against Trotskyism is an integral part of the workers' struggle against fascism and war, for the unification of all anti-fascist forces.

Bolshevik No. 9, 1937

**A. VYSHINSKY, METHODS OF SUBVERSIVE
AND SABOTAGE WORK OF TROTSKYIST-
FASCIST INTELLIGENCE AGENTS**

Comrade Stalin, in his historic report to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party (Bolsheviks), "On the Shortcomings of Party Work and Measures for the Elimination of Trotskyist and Other Double-Dealers," gave a brilliant analysis of these shortcomings and indicated practical measures for their elimination.

In his report, Comrade Stalin focused on the issue of capitalist encirclement and the issue of contemporary Trotskyism, which had turned into "a rabid and unprincipled gang of wreckers, saboteurs, spies and murderers, acting on assignments from the intelligence agencies of foreign states."

Comrade Stalin mercilessly exposed the errors of those of our comrades who misunderstand these issues. Such comrades are accustomed to chattering about the capitalist encirclement, but they fail to grasp its true nature, its essence. They fail to understand the connection between the capitalist encirclement and such phenomena as espionage, sabotage, wrecking, and terrorism, and they are unable to draw the appropriate conclusions from them.

These comrades have forgotten, said Comrade Stalin, about the law of relations between bourgeois states, by virtue of which each of these states systematically sends its intelligence agents, spies and saboteurs into the rear of neighbouring states.

The most suitable agents for fascism in the implementation of these criminal plans at the present time are the Trotskyists, who represent an unprincipled gang of wreckers, saboteurs, spies and murderers from foreign intelligence services.

Until very recently, not all comrades clearly understood the true essence of modern Trotskyism and its role in the struggle of capitalist interventionists against the USSR.

The Trotskyists turned out to be the most suitable agents for the fascists in carrying out such immeasurably vile crimes against socialism and the Soviet country as espionage, sabotage, subversion, terror, and treason, which in recent years have become their usual and favourite methods of struggle against the socialist state of workers and peasants.

The organisation on the territory of the USSR of real gangs of criminals and adventurers like Arnold, Turok, Ratajczak and other cutthroats, the preparation of terrorist acts against the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Soviet state, the outright robbery of state funds for the more successful implementation of their criminal plans, sabotage, subversion, espionage for Japanese and German intelligence services and the development under the direction of these intelligence services of an entire system of the most vile crimes—this is what characterises today's Trotskyists and modern Trotskyism.

"Modern Trotskyism is not a political movement in the working class, but an unprincipled and unprincipled gang of wreckers, saboteurs, intelligence agents, spies, murderers, a gang of sworn enemies of the working class, acting on behalf of the intelligence agencies of foreign states."

This is how Comrade Stalin characterised modern Trotskyism in his report on March 3, 1937, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), emphasising its true essence and the evolution that Trotskyism had undergone in recent years.

Recent trials—the case of the so-called united Trotskyist-Zinovievist centre, the Kemerovo affair

(Western Siberia), and the case of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist centre—have clearly revealed the criminal nature of the Trotskyist-fascist bandits. One need only recall such facts as the systematic murder of workers by means of mine explosions and gassing, the systematic train derailments with fatalities, the murder of honest people who interfered with their criminal plans (for example, the murder of engineer Boyarshinov), bank robberies, and the like, to leave no doubt as to the profound moral decline of these gentlemen, who have become veritable executioners of the workers and peasants of our country.

It is no coincidence, of course, that such people as Arnold, this international vagabond who had visited almost every country in the world and left traces of his dirty, fraudulent deeds everywhere, or such a scoundrel as Ratajczak, found themselves in the ranks of the Trotskyists.

During the trial of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist centre, it was revealed that the enemy of the people, L. Trotsky, had already been preparing robberies of Soviet trade missions abroad as early as 1929.

Isn't it clear that all these people, regardless of their rank or position in the espionage, sabotage, and terrorist underground, have long since become "highwaymen," as Comrade Stalin described them in his report to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(B). Completely morally and politically corrupt, having lost all sense of humanity, they wreak havoc on the Soviet state and the cause of socialism in every way they can, shunning no means.

And these affinities are extremely diverse. Here, in the arsenal of our enemies, there are all sorts of "methods" of struggle, ranging from such old weapons

as counterrevolutionary slander, sabotage, and wrecking, to subversion, espionage, terrorism, and treason.

All these counter-revolutionary crimes of the enemies of the people were intertwined in the Trotskyist-fascist underground with direct criminal offenses: theft, robbery, arson, forgery and murder.

Having lost all shame and conscience, having no support among the masses, doomed to complete isolation, covered in shame and public contempt, these mercenaries of foreign intelligence services do not disdain any methods or means of struggle.

That is why, among the "methods" of struggle of these fascist scoundrels, one of the most prominent places is occupied by a means tested in the hands of the enemies of the socialist state and Soviet power - sabotage.

Trotskyist bandits are ingenious in disguising their criminal, sabotage-inducing activities. They are often successful, especially in areas where an "atmosphere of ceremonial demonstrations and noisy self-praise" reigns. In such an atmosphere, Comrade Stalin said at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), "people begin to overlook such unpleasant facts as the capitalist encirclement, new forms of sabotage, the dangers associated with our successes, and so on."

Sabotage as a method of fighting against socialism and Soviet power has its own history. It's worth recalling now.

The Shakhty saboteurs, like the saboteurs from the Industrial Party, were members of organisations created by former émigré capitalists with the active support of foreign intelligence services.

The Shakhty people themselves described themselves as "chief officers of capital," that they had inherited from capitalism a burning hatred of the Soviet system and a desire for capitalist restoration. Our enemies were convinced of the fragility of Soviet power, of the inevitability of a return to capitalism, even if only through the bayonets of foreign interventionists.

"The Bolsheviks have come, the Bolsheviks will go." This "idea" also defined the criminal methods of the Shakhty and " industrial party " saboteurs.

First, there is "passive sabotage": the saboteurs hide valuable seams of coal deposits, try to prevent the devaluation of the subsoil by developing it, try to exploit the worst seams, saving the best seams for the old, "real owners," who are about to return to their nests devastated by the Great Socialist Revolution.

This "passive sabotage" was combined with espionage and intelligence work designed to prepare for intervention and undermine the USSR's defence capability. This continued for two or three years. But hopes for a swift fall of Soviet power faded increasingly, and "passive sabotage" gave way to covert sabotage, directly aimed at the national economy and Soviet power.

This period of saboteur activity is characterised by such crimes as the deliberate destruction of machinery, turbines, winches, flooding of mines, etc. These crimes, of course, were unable to halt the development of the Soviet national economy, but they were able to undermine the stability and strength of the Soviet state.

However, the saboteurs did not calm down, and indeed could not, since sabotage was one of the forms

of the bourgeois counterrevolution's struggle against the proletarian state, against socialist construction. It was precisely this circumstance that determined the entire significance of the Shakhty affair, revealing the role of the Shakhty people as one of the detachments of the bourgeois counterrevolution, best suited at that time to fight for the interests of this bourgeois counterrevolution.

It's no coincidence that the true instigators and organisers of the Shakhty sabotage were certain circles of the international bourgeoisie. It's no coincidence that the Donbass sabotage organisation found itself in extremely close proximity to capitalist organisations of certain foreign states and certain foreign intelligence services. The Shakhty saboteurs' conspiracy exposed major shortcomings and errors in our economic work and in the system of economic management itself: the dulling of Bolshevik vigilance and revolutionary instincts toward class enemies, the inadequacy of efforts to involve the working masses in production management, the isolation of the governing bodies of a number of our trade union and party organisations from the masses, and the obvious weakness of party leadership in economic development.

* * *

The Shakhty affair signalled the need for a fundamental restructuring of the entire work of our economic organisations and the working methods of our party bodies.

Our Party, under the leadership of its Central Committee, fearlessly and courageously exposed the shortcomings, errors, and distortions in the work of

economic bodies, and in particular, in the economic management system, and identified the means and methods for eliminating these shortcomings. Our Party quickly managed to eliminate the consequences of the Shakhty sabotage and heal the wounds inflicted by the saboteurs. All the necessary lessons were learned from the Shakhty affair, including the most important lesson, which Comrade Stalin once described:

“The lesson that follows from the Shakhty affair is to accelerate the pace of education, the creation of a new technical intelligentsia from people of the working class, devoted to the cause of socialism and capable of technically managing our socialist industry”¹.

Our technological backwardness at that time was one of the weakest points in the construction of socialism. “We overcame this technical weakness by issuing the slogan of mastering technology and, over the past period, by training tens and hundreds of thousands of technically skilled Bolshevik cadres,” Comrade Stalin said at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in March 1937.

But this success did not come immediately. The enemy continued its struggle even after the defeat of the Shakhty saboteurs; sabotage remained a poisoned weapon in the enemy’s hands, a means of resisting the cause of socialism. This was clearly demonstrated by the trial of the “Industrial Party” (1930), which continued the criminal activities of the “Shakhty saboteurs.”

¹ Comrade Stalin's report at a meeting of the Leningrad Party organization on July 13, 1928. Pravda, July 15, 1928.

The Industrial Party (Prompartiya) consisted of the top of the old engineering and technical intelligentsia, of leading specialists and professors who occupied a privileged position under the capitalist system and who, for a certain part, were participants in capitalist enterprises.

The Shakhty failure taught these gentlemen a lesson. They realised that sabotaging socialist construction in the manner in which the Shakhty people had attempted to undermine our economy was very difficult, and most importantly, extremely risky. The Shakhty people's crimes—destroying state property, flooding mines, creating rubble, concealing valuable coal seams from development, and so on—were often conspicuous and ultimately unsuccessful precisely because of the excessively clumsy and crude sabotage they carried out. This is why the saboteurs from the "Industrial Party" shifted the focus of their sabotage to planning institutions, attempting to achieve their criminal goals by subverting the drafting of national economic plans, disrupting socialist industrialisation, and delaying and slowing down the progress of socialist construction.

The sabotage of this period can be characterised as sabotage primarily in the area of planning, "planned sabotage." The Shakhtyites damaged property, directly and indirectly destroying material assets belonging to the Soviet state. The "Industrial Party" members drew up sabotage plans, wasting capital invested in the national economy, using every possible criminal means to prepare, as they put it at the time, a "general crisis" of our national economy, something our enemies both within the USSR and abroad constantly dreamed of. The saboteurs from the

“Industrial Party” sought to destroy our fuel supply, reduce metal and oil production, reduce electricity production, and disrupt electrification, creating various “sore points” that, in some cases, placed our industry in extremely difficult situations.

The saboteurs tried their best to delay the development of the defence industry, slowing the pace of work, reducing production capacity, lowering plans, and failing to fulfil even these reduced plans. They resorted to outright fraud, for example, producing the same bricks under different brands, supplying inferior bricks to more critical construction sites and, conversely, better bricks to less critical ones.

In the transport sector, the “industrial party” scrapped perfectly good, perfectly serviceable locomotives, rigorously delayed the construction of new locomotives and carriages, and deliberately degraded the quality of fuel. While preparing for the intervention, the saboteurs delayed the supply of necessary materials and spare parts to the railways most crucial to defence. They completely neglected the availability of materials and spare parts for repairs, openly banking on the disruption of the railway system.

But despite all the differences in the methods and means of fighting Soviet power used by the Shakhty people and the “promparty” members, both of them, as Comrade Stalin emphasised in his report to the last Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), were “openly alien to us.”

Today’s modern fascist-Trotskyist saboteurs are a different matter. These modern Trotskyist saboteurs deceived the Soviet government and the Party

politically, engaged in double-dealing and betrayed their country, all while hiding behind their Party membership cards. "...Trotskyist saboteurs, as people with Party membership cards and access to all parts of our institutions and organisations, proved a real catch for the intelligence agencies of foreign countries," Comrade Stalin pointed out.

This is the enormous difference between the saboteurs of that period and those of today. It makes today's saboteurs even more dangerous than the Shakhty and "Industrial Party" men were. This demands even greater vigilance and the ability to promptly and fully uncover and expose all the criminal methods, practices, and techniques of the Trotskyist-fascist bandits.

The Shakhtyites and the "Industrial Party" also tried their best to disguise their crimes, but this disguise was comparatively less skilful than the disguise now practiced by fascist-Trotskyist agents. Neither the Shakhtyites nor the "Industrial Party" descended to the Herculean heights of cynicism, treachery, hypocrisy, and duplicity that the Trotskyists did.

This circumstance cannot help but complicate our work of exposure. The difficulty is further compounded by the far more skilful methods of conspiracy employed by the Trotskyists, on the one hand, and by the political blindness, short-sightedness, complacency, and political carelessness of our comrades.

Comrade Stalin spoke at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks):

“Now the weakness of our people is not technical backwardness, but political carelessness, blind trust in people who accidentally received a party card, the lack of verification of people not by their political declarations, but by the results of their work.”

That is why the main task now is to eliminate political carelessness, increase vigilance, and master Bolshevism.

One of the means of eliminating political carelessness is a correct and clear understanding of the tasks and goals of Trotskyist and other criminal organisations, groups and groups, and of the methods, means and techniques by which Trotskyist bandits try to carry out their criminal plans.

Therefore, Comrade Stalin pointed out the need to “explain to our party comrades that no economic successes, no matter how great they may be, can annul the fact of capitalist encirclement and the results that follow from this fact.

“Take the necessary measures to ensure that our comrades, party and non-party Bolsheviks, have the opportunity to become familiar with the goals and objectives, the practices and techniques of sabotage and espionage work of foreign intelligence agencies.”

This last instruction is of exceptional importance in the matter of the correct and successful organisation of the fight against the intrigues of the enemies of the people—wreckers and saboteurs—no matter what flag they disguise themselves under—Trotskyist or Bukharinist.

In this matter, the study of the “practice and technique” of sabotage and espionage work of our enemies plays a huge role.

It's worth recalling that in his article "How to Organise Competition?" Lenin pointed out the need to develop "a thousand forms and methods of practical accounting and control over the rich, the crooks, and the parasites," that it was precisely in this mastery of the experience of struggle that the key to our success lay, and that now "it's all a matter of **practice** ."

In the fight against the "idiotic disease of carelessness," familiarity with the criminal methods and techniques employed by our enemy is particularly important. The enemy himself, above all, understands this perfectly well. Therefore, his plans to conceal his crimes include creating an atmosphere, a "stupefying atmosphere of arrogance and complacency" (Stalin), which kills and dampens every spark of criticism and self-criticism, analysis, or even fresh thought. In such an atmosphere, as in a dense haze, it is impossible to discern what is happening around or to navigate the situation. The enemy skilfully exploits this to expand his criminal activity, evading punishment, growing increasingly brazen, becoming ever more daring and dangerous in his criminal encroachments. In the fight against such an enemy, decisiveness alone is not enough: great skill and uncovering of the enemy and his criminal machinations are required. This is one of the most important tasks in the fight against the Trotskyist-fascist bandits. To this end, Comrade Stalin pointed out, we are obliged to "become familiar with the goals and objectives, with the practices and techniques of sabotage and espionage work of foreign intelligence agencies" and their Trotskyist, right-wing and all other agents.

* * *

The methods, practices, and techniques of criminal sabotage, subversion, and espionage are extremely diverse. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to provide an exhaustive list of all the methods and types of these crimes. However, it is possible to characterise the most common methods of sabotage and subversion and to identify some "basic principles" and general "methodological" rules of this criminal activity.

Analysing the facts, one can conclude that, in carrying out their criminal plans, Trotskyist saboteurs and wreckers are guided by the following rules: "deliver sensitive blows in the most sensitive places," as the enemy of the people Pyatakov formulated in his cynical testimony; carefully prepare and disguise these blows in every possible way, exploiting various organisational and technical malfunctions in the work of individual enterprises and institutions for their criminal purposes; resort to ostentatious zeal as a disguise, occasionally providing positive facts about their work; achieve the most complete sabotage results with a minimum risk of failure and exposure. Of course, this does not exhaust the arsenal of sabotage methods. To this, one more rule must be added—maximum secrecy in the organisation and implementation of their criminal plans. To this end, saboteurs and wreckers establish connections between individual members of their criminal organisation and between individual groups using the so-called "chain": each member of the organisation maintains contact with only one other member of the organisation. There are a number of members of the underground organisation who do not engage in any ordinary criminal activity—the so-called "strictly covert"

members of the organisation, like the Trotskyist terrorist Goltsman, exposed at the trial of the United Trotskyist-Zinoviev Centre. This category also includes the so-called "reserve" members of the organisation, who remain in reserve until a certain, arbitrary moment.

It's important to note that, while widely employing duplicity and disguise, saboteurs and subversives typically display a frenzied energy, doing everything they can to establish themselves as loyal to Soviet power. They speak energetically and frequently at meetings, often feigning "exposure" of "enemies of the people," while simultaneously unstintingly engaging in slander, falsification, and outright forgery in order to compromise honest individuals truly devoted to the Party and the cause of socialism. Sometimes they sacrifice some of their own accomplices for this purpose, creating the appearance of a fight against "saboteurs," "Trotskyists," and the like. They foster an atmosphere of "arrogance and complacency," "ceremonial demonstrations and noisy self-praise," as Comrade Stalin put it at the Plenum. By dulling political vigilance, fostering political complacency, deceiving, falsifying the true state of affairs, demobilising, and otherwise demagnetising people, entangling them in their insidious nets, the enemy skilfully exploits such factors as the decline or weakening of labour discipline, violations of internal regulations, sloppiness, and laxness in certain areas of production. They encourage a careless attitude toward such factors, in every way supporting the vestiges of capitalism in people's minds, all manner of old habits and habits that hinder the development of new forms of production and social activity. In such an

environment, wreckers and saboteurs find it easiest to carry out their insidious plans and conduct their subversive work.

Back in 1933, in the report "The results of the first Five-year Plan" at the joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Committee of the CPSU(b), Comrade Stalin pointed out the fact that the enemies of the Soviet government, full of fierce hatred for new forms of economy, life, culture, unable to go directly against the Soviet government, "they mess up as much as they can, acting quietly."

This is fully applicable to modern Trotskyist wreckers and saboteurs from Japanese-German intelligence.

The facts of recent years indicate a fairly widespread system of sabotage and subversion through the destruction of tools and machines, the setting of fires, the mass destruction of property of socialist enterprises, especially in transport, and the creation of accidents resulting in human casualties and the destruction of rolling stock.

The trials of the so-called united Trotskyist-Zinovievist centre and the anti-Soviet Trotskyist centre in Moscow and a number of trials in the periphery (the Kemerovo trial, the trial of the group of saboteurs on the Amur railway, etc.) have shown that all these crimes are strictly organised in nature, that they constitute an entire system of criminal activity aimed at disorganising the Soviet economy, weakening the defence capability of the USSR, and preparing the most favourable conditions for an attack on our homeland.

The success of these crimes is greatly facilitated by the political carelessness and indolence of a number of

our people, their inability to promptly expose this criminal activity, these criminal machinations of the enemy.

Comrade Stalin pointed out that political carelessness, in turn, is explained by the fairly widespread dissemination of various rotten and dangerous theories that lull people into a trap, and allow the class enemy to recover for the fight against Soviet power.

One such rotten theory, particularly dangerous on the eve of war or during the war itself, is the theory that the systematic fulfillment of economic plans supposedly negates sabotage and its consequences. Comrade Stalin exposed this theory, along with other rotten theories, emphasising "the colossal harm that saboteurs would inflict on our state in the event of war if they were allowed to remain within the depths of our national economy under the shadow of the rotten theory of the 'systematic fulfillment of economic plans.'" Incidentally, saboteurs and diversifiers in rail transport made particular use of this theory, attempting to cover up their sabotage with references to the advances in transport, particularly the achievement of high speeds and the increased overall pace of railway operations.

Doing everything in their power to disrupt the work of railway transport, to disorganise its activities by organising railway accidents that cause enormous damage to the Soviet state and take tens and hundreds of human lives to the grave, these gentlemen hypocritically and blasphemously shout at every crossroads about their overfulfilment of "economic plans," soothing the "departmental pride"

of our workers and thereby weakening their fight against sabotage.

Trotskyist-fascist agents of Japanese-German intelligence services naturally concentrated their attention on the destruction of socialist industry and rail transport; in transport, the coordination of all production sectors is one of the most important conditions for the proper functioning of the entire transport mechanism, and there, consequently, the disruption of the proper operation of any one part of this mechanism inevitably entails extreme difficulties, and in individual cases and in individual sectors—the complete disruption of the entire operation.

This was taken into full account by Japanese-German saboteurs, subversives, spies and terrorists, who chose a number of sections of our railway transport for their crimes, especially those main lines that are of the most important national and defence significance.

* * *

When discussing the sabotage and criminal activities of enemies of the people in railway transport, it's important to mention locomotive operations first and foremost. Railroad depots are a favourite location for saboteurs and wreckers to conduct criminal activities. These enemies primarily strive to disrupt efforts to improve the technical condition and operation of the locomotive fleet.

At the trial of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist centre, the defendant Livshits was forced to admit that the deployment of sabotage and subversive activities in transportation was one of the main tasks of the

Trotskyist organisation, which acted under the direct orders of L. Trotsky and Japanese-German intelligence. The defendant Knyazev also testified to this, admitting his connection with Japanese intelligence through Mr. X, who directly tasked Knyazev, Turok, and Livshits with subversive activities in the locomotive industry by sabotaging locomotives, causing derailments, and so on.

Enemies of the people Livshits and Pyatakov, together with Serebryakov, are developing a plan for sabotage and subversion activities on Transport, the main objective was to disrupt the implementation of Order No. 183 of the People's Commissar of Railways, Comrade L. M. Kaganovich. As is well known, Order No. 183 specifically addressed the organisation of locomotive and depot facilities. The efforts of Trotskyist-fascist wreckers and saboteurs in transport were directed toward the destruction of this facility and the disruption of depot operations—the main, leading link in the entire rail transport system.

By what means did these gentlemen achieve their criminal goals? This can be judged by the following testimony given by Knyazev at the court hearing on January 27, 1937. In response to a direct question from a Supreme Court judge about how the sabotage of the locomotive fleet was carried out, Knyazev replied: "Powerful FD locomotives were introduced into the Kurgan depot. Taking advantage of the fact that they were poorly known at the depot, the administration deliberately degraded the quality of maintenance supervision, forcing engineers to frequently leave with incomplete repairs. Almost all the water-testing instruments were destroyed. As a result of this neglect, in January 1936, on the Roza-

Vargashi stretch, a firebox exploded. As far as I remember, the assistant engineer and the stoker were killed, and the engineer was thrown 30 meters away. The locomotive was completely disabled.”

It’s important to emphasise a unique feature of the sabotage method used by Trotskyist bandits: deteriorating the quality of routine repairs. Subversive repairs are a very convenient means of preparing sabotage, since, with several members of a criminal Trotskyist organisation at a given depot, defects in such repairs are easily concealed, making it easier and more feasible to cause the actual sabotage (crash, accident, etc.) not through intent or deliberate actions by the perpetrator, but through “objective causes.” This is why this method of sabotage and preparation for sabotage is more widespread than any other.

In the case of a Trotskyist group uncovered in railway transport, it was established that in just one depot, 18 locomotives were produced with defects and flaws in the course of two months in 1936. This depot systematically released locomotives from the washroom with improper axle alignment—a defect that was clearly a potential accident hazard. As a result of such sabotage, a number of locomotives were rendered unusable, and they could only be used for local work. As a result, the locomotives were routinely returned for further repairs, in some cases four to six times.

Not satisfied with the direct damage to steam locomotives with the help of such “repairs”, the Trotskyist saboteurs in some cases tried to act in other ways. They rolled obviously faulty wheel sets under the locomotive. In one case, during the run-in, the axle neck fell off, the crash was inevitable and was

prevented only thanks to the exceptional vigilance of the driver.

The saboteurs rolled a wheelset with an unacceptable rib thickness of 1 under the locomotive, which, with insufficient vigilance, would also inevitably lead to a crash. And in this case, they were again prevented by the vigilance of the engineer who received the locomotive. A number of cases have been recorded when steam locomotives were released from this depot with the axle running in the axle box, with an abnormal run-up of the stage 2 and an incorrect spring suspension mechanism. In some cases, it came to the point that, in order to cause a crash or at least an accident, burst axle boxes were deliberately placed on steam locomotives. In one case, the catastrophe was prevented by the Komsomol brigade, which noticed and uncovered this diabolical fraud in time. I must immediately say that elementary vigilance and an honest attitude towards one's duties and one's duty help to easily and quickly expose the insidious intentions of criminals.

In some cases, saboteurs, members of Trotskyist spy organisations, exploit their work at the depot and in other areas of the railway system to systematically carry out minor acts of sabotage, which, however, often lead to major and serious consequences. In one

² The gear shifter is one of the most important components of the steam distribution mechanism. Abnormal gear shift is a deviation from the established clearance dimensions between the most important parts of the gear shifter mechanism, leading to a disruption in steam distribution.

¹ Flange is a projection of the tire that prevents the rolling stock from derailing.

case, a depot coppersmith, who turned out to be a member of a Trotskyist spy and sabotage organisation, melted down axle boxes on trains with deliberately contaminated babbitt mixed with sand and iron filings. Such minor acts of sabotage in transport and production are often committed by Trotskyists who have infiltrated the sector. Undoubtedly, such acts of sabotage can only occur due to a lack of vigilance and poor performance by people who have nothing in common with saboteurs, but are infected with the "idiotic disease of carelessness."

The most drastic method of anti-Soviet subversive activity by Japanese and German saboteurs on our railway transport is the orchestration of accidents and derailments. Livshits, Knyazev, and Turok, convicted in the case of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist centre, testified to this with cynical frankness in court. Knyazev, for example, testified that Mr. X, a representative of Japanese intelligence, told Knyazev during a meeting that "the Japanese are not satisfied with their subversive activities, and that it is necessary to switch to sabotage, especially with military trains traveling to the Far East, in order to demoralise the Red Army." And Knyazev added: "In essence, these principles, developed by Mr. X..., were later confirmed by Livshits." Another defendant in this case, the defendant Turok, confessed that he had a special task—to create an organisation from Trotskyists on the Perm and South Ural railways that could carry out destructive work, primarily by causing train derailments.

In a number of cases, the scoundrels succeeded in carrying out their criminal plans. For example, they managed to cause a train derailment at Shumikha

station, which was very skilfully disguised at the time by Knyazev, who, as head of the South Ural Railway, led the Trotskyist group there and was one of the main organisers of the derailment.

The success of such disguise is explained not only and not so much by the objective difficulties in exposing the methods and techniques of criminal activity employed by saboteurs and wreckers, but by the inexperience and lack of insight of the investigating authorities themselves. The case of the derailment at Kozyrevo station on the South Ural Railway is particularly illustrative in this regard. This derailment represents a typical case of sabotage. A proper analysis of the facts, which were in the hands of the investigative authorities and the prosecutor's office from the very beginning of the investigation, would have undoubtedly established the presence of sabotage in this case. A thorough examination of the facts and a qualified investigation from the very beginning could have established the presence of not just official misconduct, but sabotage. However, this was not done.

What are these facts? As the investigation revealed, the main culprit of the crash, the station attendant at Kozyrevo-Fakeyev, deliberately committed a number of actions that can only be explained by malicious intent. For example, while accepting train #801 at the station, Fakeyev, for completely unclear reasons, delayed the departure of train #721 from the station and dispatched it only just as train #801 arrived, even though both trains were supposed to pass the same switch.

The investigation established that , when meeting train No. 801 entering the station, Fakeyev gave

unclear signals, confusing the engineer. During the investigation, Fakeyev himself admitted that he had deliberately violated the station's technical operating regulations and technical regulations, and offered an extremely bizarre explanation to justify these actions. It turns out he considered these regulations "outdated" and wanted, you see, to "test in practice" just how outdated they truly were. Finally, during a search of Fakeyev's home, several documents belonging to someone else were discovered. This circumstance alone obliged the investigation to focus on establishing Fakeyev's criminal connections, resolving the fundamental question of his political persona, and his direct counterrevolutionary intentions. This, however, was not done. Fakeyev was, admittedly, severely punished, but the derailment at Kozyrevo station was not fully resolved at the time. From this fact, it is necessary, of course, to draw extremely serious conclusions both for the investigative bodies and the Prosecutor's Office.

But, on the other hand, a legitimate question arises: how could it be that the station attendant commits a series of gross violations of technical operating regulations in full view of others? This can only be attributed to laziness, a lack of vigilance, poor work discipline in this section of railway transport, and the low level of political and social development of individual transport workers.

In water transport, the criminal activity of Japanese-German Trotskyist agents manifests itself in various forms of destructive work on individual steamships. In one case, Trotskyist saboteurs planted a piece of gas pipe in the main engine apparatus; in another, they placed a chisel under a manifold valve;

in a third, they planted a table knife under a pump valve in an attempt to disable an air pump. There are also instances where faulty valves are installed, causing the ship's steering wheel to malfunction, causing the ship to lose direction, and so on.

In water transport, at least in some basins (for example, in the Caspian basin), various rotten theories are in circulation, which are cleverly used by saboteurs and wreckers.

Thus, in connection with the investigation into the sinking of the steamship *Sovetskaya Armenia* in the Caspian Sea, it was established that among the Caspian Shipping Company's management, a "theory" of working the fleet "to the point of exhaustion" prevailed. One of the Caspian Shipping Company's executives explicitly stated that the primary concern in a steamship is its "heart," i.e., the engine, while the hull is secondary. Hence the inattention to the condition of the steamship's hull. Is it a coincidence that the People's Commissariat of Water Transport usually lacks funds for dry-docking of steamships—that is, for promptly docking the steamship, replacing obsolete and dilapidated layers of hull planking, etc.?

The case of the sinking of the steamship *Sovetskaya Armenia* established that the registry had prohibited the ship from sailing due to the poor condition of the hull. Nevertheless, the management of the Caspian Shipping Company allowed the ship to leave port, risking lives, valuable cargo, and the ship itself. The company's management committed this completely unacceptable, anti-state, and criminal act under the guise of alleged state interests and the need to fulfil the shipping plan. Clearly, this incident involved malicious intent or criminal negligence, and

those who committed it must be severely punished by the courts.

The most characteristic difference between modern Trotskyist sabotage methods and those of the Shakhty and Industrial Party trials is the particular brutality and ferocity of their sabotage tactics, the deliberate intent of Trotskyist saboteurs not only to damage property, hinder economic progress, and undermine the economic strength of our enterprises and individual branches of industry, but also a direct intent to cause human deaths, and in the greatest possible number. This was revealed with utmost clarity during the trial of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist centre. Pyatakov, Drobnis, Livshits, and Knyazev all spoke of this, recounting with exceptional cynicism how they relied on the extermination of people in peacetime and especially in wartime. One cannot recall without a shudder the testimony of Knyazev about the instructions given by the Japanese agent Mr. X, under whose leadership the Trotskyists organised the arson of military warehouses, military train stations, and prepared to poison the cars intended for transporting troops with highly infectious bacteria, which this same X promised to deliver to the Trotskyists at the right time.

When a Trotskyist sabotage group was uncovered, it was discovered that the Trotskyists, who had infiltrated several elevators and grain warehouses, were distributing a self-igniting substance disguised as phosphorus-gelatine rodent bait, which caused fires in the grain warehouses. Fortunately, these fires were promptly put out by fire departments and honest warehouse workers. But the fact remains. Enemies of the people, having infiltrated state farms and machine

and tractor stations, are attempting to cause mischief and harm, disabling individual tractors and combines, disrupting fuel deliveries, delaying and disrupting sowing and harvesting deadlines in every possible way, and so on. Through all manner of minor and major "malfunctions," they are harming our national economy, causing considerable damage, amounting to millions and tens of millions of rubles.

The methods of sabotage, sabotage, and criminal activity of Japanese-German Trotskyist agents in industry, particularly in the coal industry, are exceptionally diverse. Here, these gentlemen specialised in the deliberately criminal organisation of fires in coal faces, the artificial and deliberate gasification of mines, and the use of a mining system that inevitably leads to underground fires, causing significant coal losses and disrupting coal production. The Trotskyists strive to operate in this area in the most disguised manner possible, covering up their criminal activities with supposedly rationalisation measures. Acting cautiously and discreetly, they generally avoid drastic and crude sabotage. Once, Pyatakov testified, while at a construction site and seeing sabotage being carried out so crudely that it was obvious even to the most superficial observer, he immediately took the necessary measures. "I was quite concerned about this and pointed out to Zharikov (one of my accomplices—**A. V.**) that this was unacceptable. I suggested that he outwardly slow down the construction and be more cautious. To this end, Zharikov and I then adopted more camouflaged methods of sabotage. We agreed that he would 'show energy,' speed up the construction, begin construction

of some facilities, but in such a way that there would still be no copper.”

Comrade Stalin emphasised at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) that “a true saboteur must demonstrate success in his work from time to time, for this is the only way to survive as a saboteur, to gain trust, and to continue his sabotage.” This is precisely how Pyatakov and his accomplices operated.

For example, having set themselves the task of destroying the copper industry and, in particular, Sreduralmedstroy, which was to be built as a combined enterprise, the Trotskyists “disintegrated” it for sabotage purposes. “The chemical component,” Pyatakov said during interrogation, “was transferred to Glavkhimprom, where Rataichak froze it.” As a result, only the copper component of the production was built (and that was sabotage), while construction of the chemical component was not even begun. Shestov admitted that, following Pyatakov’s instructions, he, too, had set himself the task of “creating the appearance of a widespread expansion of new construction and production efficiency in a very short period of time, with a large capital investment, but with the aim of subsequently producing the opposite effect.”

While not disdaining the little things, harming the cause of our socialist construction wherever possible and in any way possible, these criminals, however, concentrate their main efforts on the most important objects, on the most important, leading sectors of our industry, using a variety of methods of sabotage and subversive work in accordance with the diversity of the conditions in which they are forced to operate.

We can't take comfort in the fact that there are few saboteurs, while there are millions of honest builders of socialism. We can't take comfort in the fact that sabotage can't undermine the might of our economy, the strength of our country.

"In order to cause mischief and harm," Comrade Stalin said at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), "a large number of people is not at all required."

One of the means of solving the great task outlined by Comrade Stalin—the task of eradicating Trotskyist and other double-dealers—is the systematic and consistent exposure of all the methods and techniques of Trotskyist-fascist wreckers and saboteurs, all their treacherous, vile practices and techniques for committing the most heinous crimes. This, in turn, is possible through mastering Bolshevism, strengthening Bolshevik self-criticism, and constant and genuine Bolshevik ties with the masses.

Bolshevik No. 10, 1937

**S. URANOV, ON SOME INSIGNIFICANT
TECHNIQUES OF RECRUITMENT WORK OF
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES**

Espionage, sabotage, and subversion are tried and tested weapons in the arsenal of bourgeois states.

These means are used not only to combat potential adversaries but also so-called friendly states.

Our enemies don't stop there when sending their spies to us, seeking to plant their people in key positions. They also make every effort to draw inferior and unstable elements among the citizens of the Soviet Union into their spy networks; they strive to entangle them in their spy web, pushing them onto the path of treason, using blackmail, bribery, deception, and threats, forcing them to serve the cause of the enemies of the Soviet Union. It is essential to remember that a spy, a saboteur, or a wrecker is dangerous because, disguised as an insider, he infiltrates our ranks, exploiting our carelessness and gullibility, in order to carry out the orders of his masters, stab us in the back, destroy masses of Soviet people, cause misfortunes and disasters, and facilitate the enemy's victory.

To hinder the enemy's work, prevent them from disclosing our state secrets, and damage our defence capability and socialist construction, we must draw the necessary conclusions from the lessons we've learned. We must declare war on the gullibility and carelessness that serve as openings for enemy penetration. We must expose the cunning and devious methods by which foreign intelligence services lure into their networks sometimes good people who have no desire to become traitors to their homeland, but who become spies only because of a lack of vigilance and an inability to discern the enemy and his vile designs, hidden beneath a mask of benevolence and pretence.

Foreign intelligence agencies use various methods to deploy their trained spies to foreign territory. These

personnel undergo thorough training at home and are then sent to the target country to conduct espionage work.

During the World War, we know of a case in which the British agent "DN-27," a graduate of the Devonshire intelligence school, infiltrated Germany before the war, volunteered for the German army, and was soon promoted to lieutenant. Fluent in German, English, and French, he was transferred to the headquarters of Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, commander of the Bavarian Corps near Lille. "DN -27" corresponded with British intelligence throughout the war. Even in 1918, when German intelligence managed to obtain lists of Allied intelligence agents, this officer, who already commanded a German regiment, was not discovered. He revealed himself in Spa, where he was sent as a German delegate to negotiate an armistice and where he openly joined the British delegation.

Sending spies into other countries with the goal of firmly infiltrating the respective state is a practice practiced by all foreign intelligence services. At the same time, citizens of neighbouring countries are being investigated to identify anyone who might be involved in espionage under one pretext or another, by one method or another. It is known that almost all persons granted permission to leave Germany are required to report first to the Foreign Policy Department of the National Socialist Party, where the vast majority receive intelligence assignments and instructions on how to research the people they will encounter abroad.

A similar system exists in Japan. **Intelligence studies of foreign citizens are conducted from a**

single perspective—how to most successfully recruit them for espionage work. As before the war, German intelligence developed a special card index, broken down by city of residence, industry, and individual characteristics of individuals targeted for recruitment into a spy network.

These lists of “candidates” for spies, very often unwitting victims of espionage blackmail, are compiled according to various criteria; first of all, of course, politically unstable, wavering elements are taken into account, then people with all sorts of weaknesses and vices, inclinations to drink, perversions, those noticed in a dishonest attitude towards state funds, committing embezzlement, etc.

With such a list of more or less compromised individuals, foreign intelligence agencies take advantage of these individuals’ travel abroad to recruit them for espionage work. Special recruiting agents are sent to recruit individuals living in their own countries. Spies sent to the Soviet Union undergo rigorous training. They are given language training, forced to read the local Soviet press depending on the location of their destination, taught radio, and forced to listen to Soviet radio broadcasts daily during their training. Polish intelligence, for example, maintains special “minimum recommended lists” of literature for all spies being trained for work in the USSR, which the spy must read and be able to interpret in the spirit of

¹ Before the war, German intelligence had a database of 47,000 citizens of Russia, England, and France. These individuals served as a reserve for espionage. Depending on their personal qualities, various methods of blackmail, bribery, threats, and provocation were used to recruit them .

Soviet criticism. These lists include books such as "The Pillar Raised," "Chapayev," "Bruski," and "How the Steel Was Tempered." Recently, Polish intelligence officers have also been forced to study the new Soviet Constitution, the history of the party, and materials on the Stakhanovite movement. They are also required to be able to use Soviet terminology.

The spy recruiters, trained in this way, disguised themselves as foreign tourists or transit passengers and were sent to the USSR or simply illegally transferred to the Soviet Union, with the task of recruiting people for their espionage work.

Every spy sent to us from capitalist countries strives to quickly acclimatise to Soviet conditions, pass as a Soviet citizen, and find a job. This is especially facilitated by our complete lack of unemployment. The spy strives to infiltrate the factory, join a Soviet institution, make contacts there, and see who and how he can draw into his network. To this end, the spy provides himself with a forged or stolen passport, sometimes even a party card, and all sorts of certificates and references. To legitimise himself, the spy stops at nothing. He begins, for example, by seeking out trusting women or well-known Stakhanovite girls from the families of long-time workers, so that by intermarrying with them, he can immediately enter the strong and established circle at the factory as "husband of so-and-so," "son-in-law or relative of so-and-so." To carry out espionage tasks, all means are good: "activity" in public life, "Stakhanovite work", sycophancy, obsequiousness, flattery, and, finally, repeated "marriages" and "divorces" in order to find a more suitable match.

Thus, taking advantage of a weakened or completely absent vigilance, the enemy infiltrates our ranks and becomes "one of our own." Having established himself in a company or institution, the spy gradually begins recruiting people from our country, seeking to turn them into traitors to the homeland and force them to work for foreign intelligence.

As recent trials have shown, Trotskyists, Zinovievists, and right-wing renegades—enemies of the people—quickly responded to the call of their masters in the fascist camp and, not out of fear but out of conscience, sought to work for Japanese-German fascism. The trial of the Trotskyist-Japanese-German agents demonstrated that these filthy traitors—Trotskyists, saboteurs, spies, and subversives—sought masters among the fascist intelligence services with the same energy as the latter sought Trotskyists as their agents.

It's more difficult to recruit people who have nothing in common with Trotskyist traitors for espionage. Fascist intelligence agents keep a close eye on such previously honest people and, using all sorts of dirty tricks, try to draw them into their espionage work, entangling them financially and morally, using blackmail and intimidation.

If a spy does not find willing people among the offended, politically unstable, weak-willed, chatterboxes and vicious people, he selects victims for himself and artificially develops in them what he needs—grievances, dissatisfaction, vices, and sometimes deliberately compromises them in the eyes of others.

For example, there are known cases where an anti-Soviet leaflet is sent to a person targeted by a foreign

intelligence service, and the recipient's reaction is then carefully observed. If the recipient fails to report the counterrevolutionary leaflet to anyone, fails to notify the Party or Soviet authorities, or even destroys the leaflet, a spy recruiter will approach them shortly afterward, attempting to persuade them to work for the foreign intelligence service. When the individual becomes indignant at receiving such an offer and threatens to inform the authorities, the spy coolly counters by pointing out the fact of having received and concealed the anti-Soviet leaflet, pointing out that this fact can easily be proven by the postman who delivered the letter, and so on. Having failed to obtain consent to work the first time, the spy is unsettled. After some time, he returns to the same individual, this time intimidating them by pointing out that the individual had not turned him in to the authorities the first time. The spy demands only minimal, barely classified information that he claims he desperately needs, offers money, and promises to stop pestering them once he receives it. And then everything goes as planned: the "obedient" one finds themselves in a quagmire for the first time, a quagmire from which they will never escape, already tainted, and become a puppet in the hands of a clever spy.

To establish a closer and more intimate relationship with a target, spies employ various methods. Often, when a business executive travels on a business trip or to a resort, they are "recognised" in the train by a recruiter delighted by the unexpected encounter, who, it turns out, "has mutual acquaintances," and so on. During the long journey, the recruiter probes their target from every angle, pinpointing their weaknesses and beginning to weave

their web. Often, for the same purpose, they use a meeting at a resort, where time is plentiful, opportunities for leisure activities are available, and where it's easy to connect, especially with interesting and helpful people who, at first glance, seem unmistakable.

There are several known cases of spy recruiters setting up naive men with their wives. These wives "sensitively" showed a heightened interest in their husbands' work, prying into their professional secrets. Having obtained enough material to politically compromise their husband, such a wife would lay her cards on the table, offering to transfer them directly to a well-paid service within "their" intelligence agency. Not everyone had the courage to escape such a predicament honestly. And this is precisely what the spies exploited, turning their unconscious and careless victims into traitors and betrayers of their homeland.

In reality, every honest Soviet citizen has every opportunity to ward off the dirty advances of espionage, free themselves from the web that entangles them, and benefit their homeland by exposing persistent spies. To do this, they must simply understand that any mistake or misdeed, even a serious crime, if acknowledged, not concealed, and brought to the attention of Soviet authorities, constitutes a lesser offense than secretly colluding with an enemy of the homeland and carrying out espionage missions. It must always be kept in mind that a person who has taken the path of collusion with foreign intelligence services is never again able to control themselves: gradually, beginning with innocent assignments, they are forced first to become a spy, and then are required to meekly carry out sabotage

and terrorist acts. One only has to offer a spy a finger, and he will completely possess the victim, turning a previously honest person into a traitor and murderer.

This, for example, was the case with the young engineer Stroilov, convicted in the last trial of Trotskyist spies. This man had been raised, trained, and developed into a specialist by the Soviet government. Having fallen into the hands of spies, he gradually turned into a traitor to the motherland, a wrecker, and a saboteur. First, during his assignment in Germany, German spies gave Stroilov a book by Trotsky to read, then began feeding him other counterrevolutionary literature, and finally, they began blackmailing him, threatening to turn him over to the Soviet authorities, also using the argument that Stroilov's very association with individuals like the German spy Berg was already sufficiently compromising. Instead of honestly exposing these machinations of German spies and thereby saving himself from their persecution, Stroilov chose to remain silent about his misdeeds and, in exchange for a promise not to be turned over to the Soviet authorities, gave German intelligence a receipt promising to provide them with the information they needed. Thus, he fell completely, completely, into the clutches of the Gestapo. When Stroilov returned to his homeland, he was no longer left alone and was forced to engage in sabotage and subversion. Thus, the Gestapo built a bridge between the spy Stroilov and the Trotskyist agents in Kuzbass. Meanwhile, it is clear to everyone that Stroilov could not only have avoided his despicable fate as a traitor, spy, and saboteur, but could also, by promptly uncovering the vile intrigues of

Gestapo agents, have benefited his homeland and remained a loyal son.

While on Soviet territory, spies must act with the utmost caution to avoid failure and exposure by our Soviet and Party public and the NKVD, in their fascist homeland, they behave cynically and aggressively toward Soviet citizens who arrive there. Even when passing through Poland or Germany, they place fellow travellers with Soviet citizens on trains who are eager to probe them and, under any pretext, lure them into their net.

A number of cases taken from life show how vigilant our engineers, business executives and other people traveling abroad on business must be in order to avoid falling into the cleverly laid nets of foreign espionage.

A certain Soviet worker, "L," having arrived abroad, decided to study a foreign language. He placed an ad in the newspaper seeking a teacher. Among the numerous letters he received, one touchingly described the author's dire financial situation: a certain teacher, the breadwinner of a family of three, asks that a final decision regarding other teachers not be made until personal negotiations have established that this teacher, based on her knowledge of the language and her teaching methods, deserves preference over all others. "L" was a bachelor, known among his comrades as a good party member, a social activist, and a modest person in everyday life. His work, although technical, was highly responsible, as the nature of his work involved his privy to many important state secrets. "L" agreed and asked the "needy" teacher to come to him for negotiations. At the appointed time, a young, beautiful

woman of 26 years appeared. She called herself Mary. From the very first conversation, she charmed "L" with her modest appearance and touched him with the story of her dire financial situation.

The lessons that had begun at "L"s apartment proceeded normally for several months. During this time, "L" became friends with his teacher, and they began taking walks together in the countryside, going to the cinema, and so on. Their relationship grew increasingly amicable. During their entire time together, Mary never asked any questions that might arouse suspicion. She knew little about politics, although she did say that, unbeknownst to her mother, a fanatically religious woman, she had read books about the Soviet Union and, undoubtedly, if she had had more free time, she would have shared the views of the Bolsheviki. One evening, during a regular lesson, Mary felt ill. She asked for a doctor—her distant relative, "N." By the time the doctor arrived, Mary had worsened, and they had to place her on the sofa. The doctor who arrived diagnosed severe fatigue and weakened heart function. The doctor gave her some powders, said she would soon calm down and fall asleep, suggested that L not disturb Mary, let her lie quietly, and left. Hours passed, Mary didn't wake up, and when two o'clock in the morning approached, L decided that even if she did wake up, it was too late to let her out of the apartment. Exhausted, L soon fell asleep himself. Waking up in the morning, L, to his surprise, found Mary missing from the sofa, and she was also gone from the apartment. He was even more surprised when he couldn't find the keys to either the front or back door of his apartment. The keys were gone, and no matter how much L searched, he

couldn't find them. He had to call a locksmith to break the lock. Instead of going to his comrades and telling them what had happened, "L" began to worry that no one would think anything was wrong, that he would tell them that anything had happened between him and Mary, that no one would believe the story about the missing keys, and that as a result of everything that had happened, people would start talking about him, twisting the facts, and potentially starting conversations that would only lead to trouble. "Keep quiet," "L" decided, "because no one knows anything except me." The thing was, "L" had no idea that the counterintelligence service, of which Mary was an agent, had built its entire plan precisely on the psychological fact that "L" would be afraid to tell anyone about Mary's overnight stay at his apartment, the disappearance of the keys, and the broken doors.

After some time had passed and "L" had begun to forget what had happened, one evening a stranger showed up at his apartment and, introducing himself as a local counterintelligence agent, said he had instructions from the chief of counterintelligence to meet him and discuss what had happened between him and Mary. According to the agent, Mary had filed a report with counterintelligence that her student—an employee of a certain Soviet institution abroad, with whom she had studied for many months and who had behaved respectably—had offered her tea and cake during her last lesson. While eating, she felt dizzy. "L" called a doctor, who gave her some powders. After the powders, she felt a little better and fell asleep. That night, she suddenly woke up feeling heavy and in intense physical pain. When she came to, she saw "L" on her sofa, who allegedly attempted to rape her,

accompanying his attempts with sadistic torture and biting her in no fewer than 15 places. After a brief struggle, she managed to break free and run into another room. However, "L" caught up with her there, and the struggle between them resumed. In a desperate moment, Mary grabbed a cup of salt from the table and threw it in "L"'s eyes. Fearing that "L," in his frantic state, would pursue her, Mary ran out and locked the front and back doors of the apartment. Mary enclosed with her statement a set of keys and a statement from Dr. "N," who had been called to "L"'s apartment and who confirmed that "L" had urged him not to take Mary home and to leave her at his apartment. In the statement, the doctor stated that the following day, Mary came to him in great distress and that 15 bites and bruises were found on her skin.

Listening to the agent, "L" was already in a trance, unable to collect his thoughts. He began to clearly understand one thing: he was on the brink of an abyss, completely at the mercy of this stranger. He was consumed by thoughts of self-saving, not realising that the only way was to go and tell his close friends everything; the other solution meant immediate death. The counterintelligence plan had been carefully devised. The recruitment of "L" was planned in such a way as to present counterintelligence to him psychologically not as his strangler, the mastermind behind this whole affair, but as a saviour who had come to his aid in a difficult moment, and therefore such good people from counterintelligence could be rendered a few "small" favours.

The agent indicated that counterintelligence was not interested in compromising him or causing a scandal, as this was not an ordinary individual, but a

senior official of a country with which his government maintained normal diplomatic relations. However, since the complaint had been filed, counterintelligence was obligated to conduct an investigation and refer the matter to the prosecutor. They had already summoned Mary for questioning, and on their own initiative, they offered her the option of not causing a scandal and instead making a settlement. Mary resisted for a long time, but under pressure from counterintelligence, she agreed, but only on the condition that she receive 5,000 gold rubles within five days. "L" initially refused, then agreed to a smaller sum, but the agent stated that he was not authorised to conduct such negotiations. Over the following days, "L" met with the agent, demonstrating that he had no money and could not obtain it. On the third day, a foreigner, identifying himself as the assistant to the head of counterintelligence, came to meet with "L." He made it clear to "L" that he was willing to help him get money from the bank, but in exchange for this service, he hoped to receive some compensation from "L." Counterintelligence doesn't ask for much; it's interested in peace and order in the country, and it receives many denunciations. It's often difficult to distinguish truth from lies, and so counterintelligence only asks for its findings and opinions on individuals of interest.

"L" expected much worse. This demand seemed innocent to him. He even began to convince himself that he was doing a very good thing—he would save the Soviet people from possible slander by the enemies of the Soviet Union. One more step, and "L" would have embarked on the disastrous path of betraying the homeland.

However, the enemy was not to triumph. "L"'s outward behaviour had not gone unnoticed by his co-workers. Rumours of the broken-down doors had reached them, and they noticed that "L" was avoiding his friends, disappearing into thin air in the evenings, and lying when answering questions. It was also noted that "L" was actively selling certain items and attempting to borrow money. They decided to have a friendly talk with him, and at the last moment, "L" found the courage to tell them everything.

We have deliberately dwelt on this example in detail to show how a lack of vigilance, seemingly in such a simple matter as the selection of a foreign language teacher, lulling oneself into thinking that the enemy is not as insidious as he is portrayed, cowardice and a lack of awareness of one's duty to the homeland led that previously honest, unblemished citizen, which "L" used to be, into the clutches of the most evil gates of our homeland, which, as a rule, always begins with requests for the provision of small services, in order to subsequently force one to commit murders, arson and espionage.

There are also a number of other known cases in which the enemy, taking advantage of the promiscuity of some Soviet citizens on assignment abroad, set them up with women, then forced them to satisfy the offended "insulted husband." Under the guise of compensation for hushed up matters and preventing a scandal, he tempted these gullible and promiscuous individuals into espionage and treason. One Soviet citizen, previously supposedly blameless, suffered such a disaster while on assignment in Japan. He began frequenting restaurants and other places of entertainment, and there he became close to one of

the patrons, a seemingly "aristocratic" and rather beautiful woman. During one of his meetings with this woman in a secluded corner of a fashionable restaurant, a Japanese man in military uniform suddenly appeared, introduced himself as the woman's "husband," and attacked the Soviet citizen, demanding satisfaction for the insult to his family's honor. The matter would have ended in scandal if another man hadn't appeared immediately, a rather amiable-looking Japanese man in civilian clothes, who began to persuade the Japanese military officer not to stir up trouble and settle the matter peacefully. The Soviet citizen, feeling desperate, seized upon the "mediator" as a lifeline. The matter ended peacefully, but at what cost? The Soviet citizen signed a document pledging to provide the mediator with "information" about certain matters in the USSR that were of interest to the "mediator," who turned out to be a Japanese intelligence agent. But having signed the document, he found himself in the "mediator's" clutches. Fearing exposure by the "mediator," he became increasingly entangled, carrying out ever more espionage assignments. He became a Japanese spy and an enemy of his homeland.

There is a well-known case where a certain Soviet employee, "N," while on a business trip abroad, came under attack by foreign counterintelligence under the following circumstances. One day, "N," carrying a briefcase, went to a café. Since there were no business papers in the briefcase, "I," after drinking several cups of coffee, left the briefcase on the table, and went to talk on the phone. When he returned to his table, he found his briefcase still in place and, after sitting there for a while, headed for the exit. At the

café exit, he was stopped by a young man, a foreigner, who addressed "N" with the following question: "Are you so-and-so?" "N" answered in the affirmative. Then the foreigner asked "N" to step aside and informed him: "You, Mr. "N," are a Soviet spy violating the laws of this state. The police do not yet know this, but you are entirely in my hands. I can capture you if you do me a certain 'favour.'" When "N," indignant, began to deny the slander, the foreigner asked him to calm down, as "N" would be unable to evade the accusation, given that he was carrying a spy document in his briefcase, aimed against the country in question. "N," knowing that there couldn't possibly be anything incriminating in his briefcase, immediately opened it and, to his horror, discovered, tucked among his other papers, a classified document in a foreign language, apparently tucked in during his telephone conversation. When "N" became indignant and accused the stranger of planting the document, the stranger replied, "Calm down, Mr. N. I don't know how you'll get out of this situation. My intention was to rescue you, and if you refuse, I will immediately, this very minute, hand you over to the local police." In short, instead of immediately ceasing such conversations and, being an honest, unblemished man, immediately contacting the police himself, "N" began to seek compromise with the stranger and ultimately, in order to "avoid a scandal," agreed to conduct an inquiry about a person living in the Soviet Union. But the spy who had lured "N" into his web didn't stop there. He refused to let "N" out of his grasp, even after receiving written confirmation of his agreement to carry out the task. Seeing no other way to rid himself of the spy pursuing him, "N" made the

fatal mistake of giving the latter a receipt pledging to carry out the task, a receipt that proved fatal to "N" for the rest of his life. Taking advantage of this receipt and threatening to publish it, agents of the fascist intelligence caught up with him wherever he was, and, moving from assignments of an at first glance innocent nature, they "loaded" "N" with real espionage work, forced him to betray his homeland and become a despicable hired spy in the hands of the fascist intelligence.

There are also other known cases of spies luring people visiting abroad into their networks, exploiting their moral instability. For example, one employee posted abroad became acquainted with several officials at foreign consulates through official relationships. One of them, posing as a wealthy man, frequently invited citizen "T" to various spectacles—horses races, theatres, entertainment venues, chantants, cabarets, and similar entertainment establishments. Moreover, the foreigner always looked for an opportunity to pay for all the entertainment he enjoyed with "T." Thus, "T" began systematically spending time with his new generous acquaintance, visiting various dives, and becoming immersed in the high life. But one fine day, the "benefactor" informed "T" that he had gone bankrupt, that he was being demanded to pay his bills immediately, and therefore he was asking for reimbursement for all expenses incurred by "T" during their shared carousing. When "T" heard the sum demanded of him, he was dumbfounded, because he had never spent such money with a foreigner. But the foreigner insisted on immediate reimbursement of the expenses incurred. Naturally, "T" had nowhere to get a large sum of

money, and so his drinking buddy suggested a solution that could "save" them both: namely, that "T" provide modest information to a very respectable person who could derive commercial benefit from this information. When "T" refused, his "friend" began to threaten him, saying that he would immediately inform "T"'s superiors about "T"'s immorality, about all their joint adventures, by the way, and about the secret information that "T" had allegedly already divulged to him. "Wouldn't it be better to give you this harmless information," declared spy "T," "than to risk your good name, and perhaps even your life, as well as the complete destruction of your family, since your wife will not forgive you for your immoral adventures. Wouldn't it be better to forget everything that happened at the cost of telling my friend some information, the disclosure of which would not cause any harm to anyone? Unable to find the courage to admit to his comrades his unacceptable behavior, his liaison with a hostile environment, and thereby protect himself from further downfall, "T" signed a document agreeing to provide the requested information, receiving in return from his acquaintance a meaningless receipt pledging not to demand any money from him or blackmail him. "T" ended up attempting to steal a secret document at the request of his new masters and was caught in the attempt.

There's a well-known case where German intelligence attempted the following clumsy recruitment tactic against a Soviet citizen posted abroad. The man was looking for an apartment. He inspected several properties and finally settled on a room rented out by an elderly woman. During his conversation with the landlady, a young woman was

present and introduced herself as an acquaintance of the landlady. After discussing the terms of the rental, the man agreed to return in two days for final negotiations. So, arriving at the appointed time at the apartment he'd chosen, he was met by the same landlady, who told him she had to wait a bit, as she needed to consult with her relatives, who lived in the neighbouring building, about finalising the lease. The tenant waited in the living room, smoking. A few minutes later, the landlady arrived, along with a police inspector and a police sergeant. The inspector reported that he had received a complaint from the woman, alleging that two gold rings had been stolen from the owner during the first visit and inspection of the apartment. Since no one had been present at the apartment either before or after the inspector's visit, suspicion fell on the Soviet citizen. The inspector invited him to the police station to file a report. Despite the inspector's strong protests, he was forced to go to the police, where he was subjected to a humiliating interrogation and even attempted to search his apartment. When the inspector became convinced of the accused's serious intention to resist the search, he suddenly adopted a polite tone and said, "The citizen may not be guilty of this, but the evidence is clear, and he is obliged to have the citizen searched or file a report and refer the case to the prosecutor's office. He will have to be detained pending the hearing." But since he, the inspector, understands what a scandalous matter this is for the esteemed gentleman, he is prepared to hush up the whole matter for a small sum to "cover the trouble" and let the "thief" go his way. Unfortunately, the comrade was eager to extricate himself from the

awkward situation he found himself in and, without considering the consequences, took out his wallet and placed 20 marks on the inspector's desk. Just then, the door opened and a decently but modestly dressed young man, clearly an officer in appearance but in civilian clothes, entered. The newcomer stated that, while in the next room, he had heard the detainee offer a bribe to the police inspector. As the senior officer, he should draw up a report on this. After questioning the inspector about the reason for the Soviet citizen's detention, the officer declared that the bribe was direct evidence of the detainee's guilt and demanded that a report be drawn up immediately, stating that the detainee had attempted to free himself with a bribe. The officer ordered the detainee to be sent to prison immediately. After the report was written and the detainee refused to sign it, the officer, dismissing the inspector and being left alone with the detainee, declared that he was a counterintelligence officer overseeing police activities. He fully understood the scandalous nature of the incident and was willing to assist the Soviet citizen in distress. However, he could not do so without receiving some kind of favor from the detainee. In this case, his proposal was that the Soviet citizen reciprocate his favour by inquiring about a certain person—another Soviet citizen living in his home country. Our simpleton, unsuspecting, wrote down the name and address given to him in his notebook, then, at the officer's request, wrote the same name in Russian in his own handwriting in the officer's notebook. Then, believing he had gotten off easy, he, under the protection of the counterintelligence officer, left the police station and went home.

On the way, our acquaintance pondered what had happened, pondering whether he should tell his comrades about it. However, fearing ridicule, he told no one about his adventure and tried to forget it. However, 15 days later, he received a phone call at his apartment informing him that a counterintelligence officer wished to see him for discussions regarding a matter he knew about. Only after these phone calls did the simpleton realise what was going on. He decided to immediately report the incident to his superior, thereby saving himself from the death that awaited him if this vile comedy orchestrated by counterintelligence continued. When the intelligence agent pressed him and threatened to expose him, our friend quickly brushed him off, declaring that he had already reported everything to his superior and that counterintelligence should take into account the protests against the vile espionage tactics it was perpetrating against honest Soviet citizens. Counterintelligence remained hesitant for a long time, unwilling to let go of their intended victim, and tried new methods of intimidation. But nothing came of this affair, thanks to the straightforward and honest stance of the Soviet citizen.

The examples given only partially reveal the dirty and vile tactics used by foreign, especially fascist, intelligence agencies to lure innocent people into their spy networks. Truthfulness, honesty before the Soviet state, a sense of duty to one's homeland, vigilance, conscientious fulfillment of assigned duties, and self-control must protect every Soviet citizen from these vile attempts by their enemies.

While employing the most sordid methods in their espionage work, fascist intelligence agencies

understand that the methods they employ can be used by other bourgeois intelligence agencies as well, and can be used against them to the same extent. To instil a certain resistance in their subjects, the fascists release one film after another aimed at introducing the methods and techniques of foreign intelligence agencies. Such films as "Mata Hari" (the famous German spy in Paris), "Port Arthur," "Natasha," and "Traitor" are widely promoted. The latter depicts the work of foreign spies on German soil. It particularly emphasises how a German pilot, entangled in spy networks, found the strength, undaunted by fabricated and incriminating documents, to tell his superior everything, for which he was ultimately awarded a commendation. On the other hand, the fascists idealise their spies in every possible way. A whole series of completely false literature about their exploits has been created.

All this is aimed at luring young people into the "romance" of espionage. The core cadres of these fascist "romantics" are being trained to work against foreign powers. Their hope is to slip through the cracks of laxity, carelessness, and slack vigilance in order to carry out their vile deeds of murder, sabotage, and espionage.

To carry out its functions, espionage has at its disposal a powerful apparatus, exploiting all legal and illegal means of infiltrating neighbouring states. The experience of the First World War, the post-war period, and the current pre-war period, despite the veil of secrecy that always cloaks espionage work, provides numerous examples of the widespread scope of espionage activity. Espionage extends its tentacles into government institutions, major defence

enterprises, and transportation systems, with the goal of penetrating state secrets, discovering defence secrets, uncovering technical improvements, planting its people in key positions, and organising sabotage, subversion, and treason. Espionage is a continuous, covert war waged by an army of spies and never ceasing for a moment. This is evidenced by the numerous closed-door trials that have recently taken place in America, England, France, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Spain.

INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE *

Ominous Front

One day, early in the spring of 1913, four staff officers stood at the front door of a Vienna hallway, listening and waiting with tragic intensity. They were waiting for a revolver shot, and when it rang out, the senior among them, a colonel, opened the door, and they all, one after another, entered the room. The man who had fired the shot lay in a chair by the window. Judging by his uniform, he was an officer of the General Staff. A government-issue revolver lay at his feet. The officer was dead. By committing suicide, he had delayed the declaration of war on Russia for a year, a move of crucial importance to the Austro-Hungarian command.

The suicide was secretly discussed in official circles in Central Europe for an entire season. The officer who committed suicide was Colonel Redl, assigned to the secret service of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He headed counterintelligence and betrayed his homeland. The Russian military attaché, Colonel Zubov, had six hours to leave Austria-Hungary. Staff officers did everything they could to make Redl understand the situation he had placed his homeland in with his betrayal. One of them, a renowned

* From the editors of Pravda: We are publishing an abridged translation from English of the book "Intelligence and Counterintelligence" by the American writer R. Rowan. The editors hope that this will, to some extent, help their readers—Bolsheviks, both party and non-party—to become familiar with "the goals and objectives, the practices and techniques of sabotage and espionage work of foreign intelligence agencies" (I. Stalin).

marksman, was designated to eliminate the colonel if his courage failed him.

For at least four years, Redl systematically divulged a number of military secrets to Russia. He sold a new mobilisation plan and the plans for defensive fortifications of fortresses such as Przemyśl and Krakow. He even assiduously betrayed to the tsarist secret police the Austro-Hungarian agents he personally sent to Russia. But since Redl had carried out his own death sentence, numerous excuses were soon found for him. The government used all its influence to hush up the episode.

Those less informed believed that Redl died to save his homeland from defeat, and this, regardless of his betrayal, was the absolute truth, since Austria-Hungary was completely unprepared; it was necessary to spend millions to change plans known to Russia. Redl's supporters claimed that no one expected war and that he had sold Russia only things that would have lost all significance by the time the war began. By August 1914, Redl's friends had almost succeeded in creating a reputation for him as an incorruptible man.

The Russian army surrounded Przemyśl, but captured the fortress only after a lengthy siege. As we can see, the Austrian General Staff did everything they could within a year to protect the empire from Redl's betrayal.

If the Russian military attaché had failed to bribe the Austrian officer, the task of obtaining the necessary information would have been entrusted to intelligence agents. They would have needed great dexterity and persistence to discover everything Redl could sell.

In peacetime, espionage replaces military action, but it is more economical. In war, the spy is the most deadly weapon, the only ancient weapon that has not lost its significance.

We've become accustomed to such a rapid pace of improvements in modern warfare that innovations that ensure victory in one battle are considered insufficient and obsolete in the next. Yet, despite all the changes in military art, the intelligence officer remained unimproved. Although the institution now called the Army Intelligence Department collects military information from a variety of sources, it primarily relies on the courage and resourcefulness of scouts and secret agents. As important as good organisation behind enemy lines is, the primary role falls to the intelligence officer himself. Information obtained by a skilled secret agent can be valued by his home government at ten thousand times its weight in gold.

According to French data, one skilled female spy destroyed sixteen transports and merchant ships during the World War II. This result, far more destructive than any battleship, suggests that spies are not only a powerful weapon, unchanged throughout history, but also a relatively inexpensive one. Building and equipping a battleship and maintaining it for several years until it becomes obsolete costs at least one hundred million dollars, while the best patriotic secret agents are incomparably cheaper. Most spies, regardless of the danger of their work, receive comparatively small compensation. Every government has numerous agents.

In peacetime, intelligence officers and secret agents behave in exactly the same way as in wartime,

but with greater confidence and without embarrassment in moving from place to place.

During this time, the intelligence officer doesn't risk his life, as enemies become neighbors and the population's suspicions are significantly reduced. The intelligence officer's disguise and subterfuge are much more difficult to uncover. In all likelihood, while carrying out these missions, the intelligence officer receives several completely legitimate, business-like assignments. Compared to the tension and danger inevitable in wartime, such work is a true joy for any professional secret agent.

During times of war, the world is fenced off by inevitable barriers. Travel is controlled, mail is subject to military censorship, and the work of an intelligence officer is countered by counterintelligence: organised surveillance of intelligence officers, the vigilance of the civilian population, all of which can hinder the work of even the most experienced intelligence officer.

It's interesting to note that intelligence work doesn't cease with the cessation of hostilities. States watch each other with all the fervour of hardened enemies. Secret service personnel are sometimes reduced, but never demobilised. No peace treaty sends them home. The Treaty of Versailles was still being drafted, the bonds that would later bind Germany were still being negotiated, and yet the already triumphant Allies began to watch each other closely, as if this were the only way to secure their position as victor.

Espionage is, at its core, an illegal act of invading a foreign country. Yet, states dedicated to maintaining peace and order continually condone espionage. There is no truce on this sinister front. This means that while

most of us live and work, striving for our well-being and observing the well-known rules of individual integrity, an incessant struggle and intrigue rage underground, recognised by all as natural yet simultaneously illegal.

In the four months leading up to March 1, 1928, seventeen people were convicted of espionage in Great Britain, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, even today, whenever a former intelligence officer or any reserve officer trusted by the intelligence department of the service to which he once belonged travels abroad, he is immediately given a series of instructions. Upon departure, he receives a list of questions about the army or navy (depending on his specialty) of the foreign countries he is visiting; the answers to these questions are supposed to provide the intelligence department with the additional information it needs. The intelligence department may later claim that it has never heard of anything like this, that the instructions were handed down unofficially, yet this has become routine practice in all first-class and second-class powers. A traveling reserve officer is not always obliged to act secretly. What he does cannot always be characterised as reprehensible actions; his work can mainly be seen as a supplement to the observations of military and naval attachés, who are called "accredited spies."

Not long ago, a European power was offered a vital naval invention. For the right to exclusive use, the inventor demanded a hefty sum of one million pounds sterling. The statesman, who had to add this million to the budget and then find the money, opposed any payment for the invention. He cynically declared, "Let some other power buy it. We can wait a little. Our

agents will soon steal it, and then we can use it for next to nothing.” This sober realist currently heads one of the largest banks in the world. His attitude toward the prospects of state intelligence in peacetime (this was before 1914) is worthy of note.

Modern warfare requires an organised intelligence service and, consequently, another service—counterintelligence. Every state capable of waging war must have intelligence: to counter the clandestine undertakings of its neighbors, it must also have well-trained and experienced agents capable of neutralising the intelligence of other powers. An intelligence agent who violates the rights of other states risks his life during wartime and, in peacetime, expulsion, imprisonment, and expulsion, because he has no protection. Governments cannot engage in illegal enterprises. They strictly persecute foreign spies. Therefore, they punish their agents by abandoning them when they fall into difficult circumstances.

On the other hand, it’s clear that an army or naval staff, in both peacetime and wartime, must know everything there is to know about all potential adversaries. Experts argue that poor intelligence causes war; in any case, it contributed to the outbreak of the last war. It’s well known that the belligerent mood in the Austro-Hungarian and German general staffs was fuelled by information received in the winter and early spring of 1914 from traitors and spies in the Russian War Ministry. According to reports, the Tsarist army was completely disorganised. Why then wasn’t there a rush to deliver an ultimatum to Serbia, mercilessly and without mercy?

This was all a tragic mistake. Russia managed to mobilise the armies of Rennenkampf and Samsonov

with such speed that it surprised its allies. And from then on, the German command began to believe that its intelligence service had been gravely mistaken in its assessment of the potential strength of the Belgians.

According to intelligence reports, Great Britain was hopelessly bogged down in resolving the difficult problems posed by the labour movement and the Irish rebellion. But once again, the information obtained by the world's best-prepared and most comprehensive intelligence service proved unfounded.

In undertaking a detailed account of the activities and military significance of intelligence officers, it should be established from the outset that the risk faced by intelligence officers does not seem excessive compared to the mortal danger faced by active troops in modern warfare. Military law requires the execution of those accused of espionage, regardless of ethical considerations. It is assumed that the threat of capital punishment will make it difficult to recruit suitable personnel for intelligence missions. But in reality, this threat has deterred very few individuals gifted with intelligence qualities. These are usually adventure seekers. Officers of this type are typically extremely talented in military affairs; as a result, commanders, unwilling to risk valuable subordinates for any undertaking that goes beyond the unit's mission and is highly dangerous, refused to allow them to enter enemy territory.

To answer the question of who is more at risk—a soldier or a scout—it's worth examining some statistics from 1914–1918, although there are no records anywhere that would allow a precise determination of the number of scouts. Many intelligence officers were

allowed to recruit agents and report on them in general, accounting only for the sums spent on them. As has been repeatedly reported, Frederick the Great claimed that he had one cook and a hundred scouts at his disposal in the war zone. Frederick needed only one cook, as he was frugal in his eating habits and often ill, but, surrounded by strong and persistent opponents, he needed a significantly larger number of scouts and undoubtedly had them. The head of Prussian intelligence, Stieber, assured von Roon and Moltke that at the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War, he sent 36,000 scouts to the flanks and rear of the armies of MacMahon and Bazaine. Avoiding the extremes of these assertions, Major Steinhauer estimated that there were approximately 8,000 scouts in northern France and Belgium at the time "Big Bertha" fired its first shell at Liège.

During the occupation of territories, civilians were often executed as spies simply for glaring at the invading enemy. Sometimes their entire crime consisted of instinctive resistance to the humiliation inflicted on civilians. However, numerous residents of Belgium and the occupied departments of France were convicted of espionage and sentenced to long prison terms.

The intelligence service's achievements are primarily the work of a few exceptionally skilled intelligence officers. All others provide random, fragmentary information, though even this information can sometimes be of great value. Furthermore, such intelligence officers distract enemy counterintelligence and act as a smokescreen, concealing the work of a few exceptional intelligence geniuses.

In the final months of the Great War, counterintelligence gained the upper hand and effectively went on the offensive. Brigadier General G. I. Cockerill, former head of the Special Intelligence Section of the British War Office, proudly listed the victories of his employees. Counterintelligence detained intelligence officers, intercepted naval and military communications, uncovered plots and plots to set fire to and destroy military factories, delayed reports of ships leaving British ports, and, in addition, significantly facilitated the blockade. Counterintelligence reported all instances of smuggling, prevented the transfer of £70 million to the enemy, and completely disrupted all enemy communications with overseas countries.

If General Cockerill and his energetic staff saved Britain millions of dollars, then there is every reason to believe that a modern intelligence service will continue to justify its purpose.

All Secret Service archives are kept in the deepest secrecy; precious materials are disregarded and doomed to perish during the succession of senior officers. Books about the Secret Service are boastful memoirs ("only the bravest of the brave are allowed to serve with us in this dangerous post!"), dubious revelations, or semi-fictional and melodramatic accounts of mysterious, exciting events and the exploits of some Secret Service agent.

World War and Intelligence

The activities of an officer assigned to the intelligence department of an army or navy, in both wartime and peacetime, are exclusively offensive in nature. Their goal is a detailed study of the fleets and armies of other states, as intelligence is inevitably linked to their development.

Intelligence officers who, in peacetime, gather information about a country's armed forces will never forget Germany's example. Before the war, the Germans collected comprehensive information about every country in the world. Under the direction of naval and military attachés, they collected all the data on ports, major cities, the hills from which artillery would bombard them, bridges and railway lines, roads and valleys, ditches and canals, all amenities and obstacles, and, of course, fortifications, naval bases, dry docks, and arsenals. Having acquired this data, it was necessary to monitor its further development. If, for example, a new, rapid-fire cannon was invented in a given country, all foreign data on improvements to these weapons had to be reviewed. Such improvements could render an arsenal obsolete.

The army headquarters of other countries admired the German intelligence system and perceived it as a threat to their homeland.

Most states allocated limited funds for intelligence before the World War. After the World War, all major powers continued to prepare plans for naval and land attacks against each other and to gather information through espionage.

The chief of intelligence is obliged to have all information about the enemy ready before it is needed, and no authority can prevent him from presenting it to his superior. To compile this

information, the chief reads reports from numerous spies and secret agents, compares these reports, analyses them with common sense and experience, and attempts to uncover the truth, discarding errors and lies that may be present in each report.

Nowadays, the best intelligence agencies refuse to buy information—this demonstrates the desire of intelligence agencies to obtain more accurate data. The British, French, Italians, and Americans have learned from bitter experience that to be sure of the accuracy of information, they must obtain it themselves. It is said that in Switzerland during the World War, there existed a kind of exchange or market where professional spies sold information about the countries they served. Any intelligence officer could buy anything they wanted from them.

A major source of information comes from the testimony of prisoners and civilians. However, all of this requires careful verification. All belongings of prisoners of war and the dead must be carefully examined. The slightest detail can help reveal the enemy's intentions. A simple postcard found on a dead artilleryman warned of a major German offensive on Chemin des Dames in the last week of March 1918, although this warning was not timely enough for the French to mount a decisive response. Two prisoners of war captured at Diksmude in October 1914 reported that the German General Staff had formed replacement regiments, numbered 201 to 270, and organised them into six new corps on the Western Front, which were intended to be deployed against the weak Allied left flank.

Reconnaissance helps mislead enemy observers. At Loos, the Germans used an empty train to deceive

enemy observers into thinking reinforcements were arriving. However, such a ploy cannot be repeated frequently. Enemy artillery will destroy such trains.

The chief of intelligence must constantly monitor enemy artillery, know the number of guns, their locations, calibres, and be aware of ammunition supplies. The constant introduction of new types of weapons during the World War (the marvellous Stokes mortar, hand grenades, flamethrowers, poison gas) forced intelligence officers to be constantly on guard, determining whether incoming information should be attributed to the intelligence officer's imagination or the enemy's inventive genius. Before the Battle of Cambrai, German intelligence received several reports from its agents in France about tanks being built, but technical advisers at headquarters decided that such clumsy mechanical constructions were of no use in combat. It is said that one of these conservatives shot himself upon learning of the tanks' effectiveness. Later in the war, the British were greatly embarrassed to learn from their intelligence that the Germans had delivered to the front over three hundred new 6-inch howitzers, manufactured in England and sent to Russia for the "Kerensky Offensive." These howitzers were captured by Austro-German troops when the Russian Eleventh Army left the front in the autumn of 1917 and practically ceased to exist.

Intelligence must have capable and dedicated agents. It was Sunday, March 24, 1918, when a German ultra-long-range cannon, the largest of all the "Big Berthas," began shelling Paris. The bombardment of the city, which had not yet been declared under siege, followed a raid by bombers and Zeppelins. In the initial panic, the city's population did not

comprehend the miracle performed by the Big Bertha and assumed that the Germans, who had by then destroyed the British front from Barisis to Gouzeaucourt, had made another stunning advance through the centre of the front and were approaching Paris. In reality, the cannon was located near Crépy-en-Laonnais, on the edge of the Forest of Saint-Gobain, 112 kilometres from Paris. Airplanes flew in swarms over the area, but since the Germans camouflaged it well and frequently moved their monster from place to place, it was only by nightfall that the gun's location was determined. The entire area was bombed by aircraft and strafed by French batteries. But intelligence couldn't rely on chance; it was necessary to turn to the local population. A large number of people volunteered for the task. Four were chosen by lot and flown overnight to the rear of the German front between Da Fer and Anizy-le-Château. A week later, three volunteers were safely returned by plane. They brought information, including film footage of the gun. Only one of them did not return.

Calibre, rifling, gunpowder, shell weight, charge, elevation angle—all data of interest to artillerymen was submitted by volunteers to the intelligence department in Chantilly. This information was then sent to French artillery experts. French, British, and American firms could recreate this monster. But why? The German cannon had seriously shaken the morale of the French civilian population, and that was the only effect the Germans achieved with "Big Bertha." This cannon astonished the French for a single day. Intelligence, having obtained all the data on this weapon, once again proved its energy and activity.

When talking about the world war, two examples of the absence or failure of military intelligence are always mentioned.

First, the powerful Anglo-French Mediterranean Fleet, under the command of British Admiral Dom Robeck, bombarded the Dardanelles fortifications. The superdreadnought Queen Elizabeth fired at the peninsula, launching 15-inch shells at the forts, at the ships transporting troops in the Sea of Marmara, and at the land lines of communication. The impact of these shells was so devastating that all the German energy could not support the courage of the ships. Perhaps one more salvo, and the precious strait would have been opened. This would have ensured free passage to the Black Sea and passage through the ice-free seas to Russia, the unimpeded supply of ammunition, equipment, and medical supplies, and the removal of much-needed grain from the breadbasket of Europe. This would have also prevented the Gallipoli massacre and saved the lives of several thousand people on both sides in Mesopotamia and Palestine, and at least a million on the Russian and Romanian fronts, where, due to a lack of weapons, the fighting after 1915 was a simple massacre. But the Allies had failed to take the situation into account. The Turkish government, as the Allies later learned from American Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, confident of the capture of Constantinople by de Robeck's squadron, fled in panic to Asia Minor, loading official archives onto trains destined for Anatolia. And at that moment, the Allies ceased their bombardment. The lack of reconnaissance that would have promptly warned of a probable success meant that the Allied naval forces squandered all their advantages.

Another example: 1917 was a year of frenzied defeatist propaganda in France. The morale of the country's war-weary troops was extremely low. The fighting capacity of the army, which a year earlier had held Verdun under hurricane-force enemy fire, was seriously undermined. Several units mutinied, unwilling to enter the dangerous sector. They turned back along the same road they had come, and the units they were supposed to replace could not be sent back to the front. Thus, for an entire day, a critical sector of the front was held by a handful of artillerymen and sappers. However, German intelligence had no scouts in this sector who would have known everything that was happening and informed the German command in a timely manner. A decisive attack that day would have been the easiest achievement of the war on the Western Front, but no attack took place. The French were urgently amassing troops to close the gap, while the Germans in Kilaystra were blind and unaware of the French weakness.

General Cox of the British Expeditionary Force's Intelligence Section was a remarkably astute and well-informed man. In February and early March 1918, he not only accurately predicted the sector in Picardy where Ludendorff intended to launch an offensive, but also specified the date of this offensive (March 20 or 21). He and his staff calculated almost exactly the size of the forces Ludendorff and von Hutier would send against Hauff's 17 divisions along a front over 40 miles long. They reported that of the 60 German divisions attacking on this front, 23 would advance directly on Saint-Quentin, where Hauff had only four divisions. However, despite such a clear warning, no reinforcements were sent. At dawn on March 21,

attacking German troops emerged from the fog, and reinforcements arrived only on the 24th, and then only insignificantly: they consisted of only three divisions. Compared to this gross blunder, a few intelligence misdeeds lose all significance.

Mobilisation in France during the first three weeks of the war was very poorly organised. Some German commanders believed this circumstance could have been exploited to avoid violating Belgian neutrality. They believed that in the latter case, Great Britain would not have immediately entered the war, and the German fleet could have been used as an offensive weapon against France and Russia.

The defence of Liège was the first obstacle not foreseen by German headquarters. Naturally, intelligence was blamed for pointing to a closed door instead of an open window.

At one point during the war, British intelligence officers were instructed to spare no expense or effort in obtaining the drawings and specifications for the new Fokker aircraft, which had just entered service with the German Air Force. A disgruntled German non-commissioned officer, who had previously maintained contact with a British agent in Belgium, was persuaded to fly his Fokker and land behind British lines. The non-commissioned officer happily accepted a ten-pound deposit and received an additional fifty pounds upon the safe delivery of the aircraft. Undoubtedly, the most powerful motivator the British agent offered to persuade the non-commissioned officer was the assurance that the war would end safely for the agent personally.

Many deserters tried to ensure a good reception for themselves by providing more or less interesting information about the plans of their commanders.

In 1917, several Alsatians deserted and went over to the French, warning them of an impending attack they expected they would not have to take part in. Intelligence officers began to investigate these men, as three years of fighting had not at all indicated the Alsatians' integrity. The French wondered if the German command was trying to mislead the French about an impending attack. But this time, intelligence was too slow. The predicted attack began precisely on time, and the French soldiers, who likely trusted the Alsatians' intelligence, were brutally defeated, instead of repelling the attack if such a warning had been used properly for preparation.

Several years before the World War, the Berlin Victoria Insurance Company had a "special branch" in Paris, with all employees and agents being Prussian reserve officers. Every six months, all employees rotated and returned to Berlin, but before returning, each one was required to take a tour of the republic's eastern departments. All insurance specialists were trained for military intelligence. When the war began, they were already prepared.

Perhaps now is the time to blame intelligence and say that the German generals rushed forward because they knew the road too well. Several years ago, a colonel lectured at the French Academy of the General Staff. The lectures attracted the attention of specialists, as the lecturer skilfully ridiculed the Germans for their tactics in 1870. Later, this lecturer—Ferdinand Foch—proved himself a master of

manoeuvre, so we can condemn the Prussian methods of warfare with great confidence.

But the most absurd and senseless thing in the German army is the conflicts between the military and naval intelligence services.

Each received substantial sums (at least twelve million marks), yet each envied the other's place in the secret budget. The nature of the friction that existed before August 1914 is unknown, but when the crisis arrived, both intelligence departments were in a state of "civil war," competing with each other and treating each other with greater hostility than they did the other. All information from military intelligence agents was considered contradictory and worthless. This was the contention of naval intelligence officers, but if naval intelligence fell into the hands of military intelligence officers, they vilified it with even greater vehemence. Agents and other employees, as well as Allied intelligence, exploited this conflict to their advantage: the former plundered the treasury, while the latter obtained the information they needed. In contrast, during the war, the Allied intelligence services cooperated harmoniously, a phenomenon not always evident in the relations between the civil and military authorities of these powers.

Many volunteers joined the professional secret service, indicating that the newcomers were well received. The organisation of excellent artillery reconnaissance was a significant contribution by the French to the common cause. The goal of this organisation was to obtain all information related to enemy artillery, even employing civilians, both men and women, who, thanks to their long stay near the front, had learned to identify German batteries by

their sound. Shortly before the conclusion of peace, each of the major Allied powers began organising a special artillery reconnaissance service modelled on the French Army.

In Germany, it was a common complaint that there would never again be another intelligence officer like Wilhelm Stieber. This meant that the successors of the great master of intelligence, despite all their talents, were merely accidental imitators. During the war, in an isolated office in London, one could encounter (but only with his consent) a good-natured little man, a sailor, rear admiral, and head of the secret service, whose methods were hidden even from Bismarck's bloodhound. Sir Reginald Hall was known in the Royal Navy as an expert on artillery and as a specialist in explosives; this officer, with exceptional resourcefulness (which was demonstrated, in particular, in the masterful rescue of a ship in 1911), possessed enormous personal charm. He had an excellent command of foreign languages and studied world politics. In October 1914, he was appointed Chief of Naval Intelligence. A brilliant conspirator and ardent patriot, without a trace of personal ambition, Hall inspired his subordinates to numerous strange and dangerous undertakings. His achievements led many impartial observers to recognise the British Secret Service as the most effective of all departments operating anywhere during the Great War. Hall always strove to find the most effective means to win the war. American naval officers who worked with him spoke with deep respect of the mutual cooperation and camaraderie within British naval intelligence.

British Naval Intelligence achieved its greatest achievements thanks to the underwater penetration of

a man who deserves more than cursory recognition. Shipbuilder E. C. Miller was a highly capable diver: a year after his appointment in 1914 as a diving instructor at the Naval Academy, he was tasked with descending to a German U-boat that had recently been sunk by gunfire off the coast of Kent. A buoy marked the suspected location of the sunken submarine. Miller was tasked with obtaining all possible information about the submarine's design and layout, as well as its on-board installations, about which the Admiralty could not obtain sufficient information from its agents in German naval bases. Risking the entanglement of its air lines, Miller crawled through a hole made by a shell in the submarine's hull and thoroughly examined its interior. Miller was not only a walrus doing his duty; he was also a highly enterprising diver. He made his way to the officers' quarters in the stern and in the safe found a very valuable metal box containing plans for new minefields, two books of German naval codes and a secret code for communication with the Imperial Navy.

Thus began the mysterious work of the Naval Intelligence Department in London, in which the famous "Room 40" played a vital role. Miller's initial success was a surprise, but then his extraordinary dexterity, courage, and ability to withstand pressure at great depths were utilised to the fullest extent possible. A special organisation was created to deliver him, air pumps, and other equipment to any location on the British coast where a German U-boat had sunk. U-boats would crash and disappear forever, as far as anyone could tell, except Miller. He would race to the spot where the victorious ship had left a buoy and, weather permitting, descend to the bottom. He often

had to use explosive shells to penetrate, but he always managed to get inside the submarine, despite the danger, and would then emerge with a new metal box containing new codes and enemy plans.

Over time, he became as familiar with the internal workings and mechanisms of German submarines as any German engineer. By November 1918, more than 60 submarines had sunk to the seabed, and with a very few exceptions, Miller examined all of them. German naval commanders constantly changed the locations of minefields, secret codes, and special orders, but British intelligence quickly learned of all these changes.

In some cases, up to 2,000 intercepted messages arrived at the Admiralty within 24 hours. All German codes and ciphers were quickly deciphered, although at first each of these documents was a complete mystery. The British claim that they knew about the advance of German forces, their numbers, and their direction of movement the day before the Battle of Dogger Bank, and also knew about preparations for the Battle of Jutland thanks to intercepted and decrypted radio orders. However, one highly competent expert believes that British naval intelligence was caught off guard by the Battle of Jutland, as neither the intercepted messages nor the reports from agents in Cuxhaven were promptly acted upon. This may be true, but hundreds of other messages decrypted in "Room 40"—messages about submarines cruising, about Zeppelins preparing for a raid, then coded naval orders, instructions from the Foreign Ministry to ambassadors in neutral countries—were undoubtedly used to further the Allies' interests. From "Room 40" came the disastrous Zimmermann

telegram to the German ambassador to Mexico, von Eckhardt, the story of which is recounted in one of Ambassador Walter Hayes Page's famous letters.

President Wilson remained neutral; he understood that the country was on the brink of war, but he was unwilling to take a path that contradicted all his ideals. Zimmermann wanted to stir up trouble in the New World to avoid American interference in European affairs. His telegram to von Eckhardt contained a proposal for an alliance with Mexico against the United States and an alliance with Japan; the bait for Mexico was to be the seizure and annexation of territory in the southwestern United States. This proposal was entirely fanciful, yet it served as the decisive impetus that compelled the American government to enter the war.

The role played by Sir Reginald Hall remained unknown to the general public. Zimmermann's telegram was intercepted by British naval intelligence agents and decrypted by Hall's subordinates. But to facilitate further surveillance, the Chief of Naval Intelligence misled the enraged German officials. He suggested that several London journalists, whose articles might have reached Germany via Holland, Denmark, or Switzerland, blame him for the Naval Section's failure to intercept this important message en route to von Eckhardt, while American secret agents in Mexico easily stole the document.

Development of a modern intelligence system

Military espionage was a particularly risky branch of intelligence. Intelligence was an honorable

occupation before warfare assumed such a massive scale that it required the mobilisation of entire nations. Even marshals disguised themselves and went on reconnaissance missions (for example, Marshal Ney). The great French Marshal Catinat boasted of once disguising himself in the dirty rags of a coal miner to infiltrate Arras, which his army was besieging. And the English King Alfred was no less "great" because, in disguise, he secretly visited the Danish camp to assess the danger threatening his West Saxon kingdom.

During the Age of Chivalry, intelligence was considered a disgraceful occupation, and for a time, army commanders refused to employ it. During this time, vires were hanged for common theft, while professional spies enjoyed certain privileges. Robinson, a military intelligence officer caught in London in 1757, served only six months in the Tower before being released. Soon after, a certain Dr. Hansey, tried in June 1758, was unexpectedly sentenced to hang. At his trial, he asked whether it was right to treat an intelligence officer like a common rogue. (Colin, "The War of the Saxon Marshal")

We have no information about whether Hansey was executed, but the possibility of it caused great unrest among secret agents. The death penalty was a terrifying innovation, and it frightened off many of the agents working for Louis XV in England. Around the same time, Frederick the Great put an end to intelligence as a frivolous endeavor. Frederick possessed an innate talent for military leadership, and this was most clearly demonstrated in his use of spies. He is considered the father of organised military intelligence, while necessity itself was the mother of intelligence.

At first, Frederick dreamed of Voltaire's laurels. His pamphlets were distributed throughout Europe. Known to all as the "land-stealer," Frederick added bad manners and cynicism to his list of "crimes." In influential boudoirs, the question of how to curb the upstart was discussed. Frederick soon realised that Russia and France were allying with Austria, and that Saxony and Sweden would follow suit.

Instead of devoting himself to philosophy and pamphlets, Frederick had to become a great military leader of his time, otherwise this alliance would have crushed him. He had to take into account the circumstances of his small, poor kingdom and thoroughly understand the military strength of his opponents. He had already defeated Austria once, but to defeat these countries as well, he had to be aware of all their intentions. Therefore, Frederick organised his secret service in such a way as to base his plans on extensive and factual information. His secret service was the most significant military innovation of the time, and his methods of secret warfare remained effective a century and a half later, unchanged in all other areas of military affairs. Frederick maintained hundreds of scouts and personally checked and compared their reports. He divided his agents into four categories: 1) ordinary spies, recruited from among the poor, satisfied with the opportunity to earn insignificant sums or render a service to a military man; 2) doubles, unreliable renegades, and vulgar informants, useful primarily for spreading false information among the enemy; 3) high-ranking officials, courtiers and nobles, staff officers, and conspirators who constantly demanded large sums or privileges; and 4) individuals forced to become spies

against their will. The energetic Prussian king not only classified agents but also developed rules for the recruitment and use of secret agents of all categories.

Frederick failed to take into account the patriotic intelligence officer. He was a realist, a cynic, and an absolute monarch. The rulers of his time rarely encountered genuine patriotism. The French Revolution had not yet ignited Europe with nationalist enthusiasm. Threats and bribery, promises of advancement and benefits—these were the tools Frederick used.

Politicians such as Grotius and Machiavelli wrote in defence of the use of spies. But in our own time, Sir Robert Baden-Powell has discredited himself with his book "My Adventures as a Spy." Napoleon, who had a carefully organised and expensive secret police service, often repeated, "A spy is a born traitor." He relied primarily on bribery and threats.

Thus, there were no innovations in the systematisation of intelligence until another Prussian appeared—Stieber, the great master of intelligence under Bismarck. In 1870, military intelligence experienced a major upsurge, with agents swarming everywhere and behaving in a way they had never done before. Stieber's first experiments date back to the period before 1866, when he organised intelligence in Austria, the results of which were unparalleled in history. His model was not Friedrich, but Moses. When this great prophet sent 12 of his kindred to survey the fear, he did not limit them to a purely topographical task. After the usual consultation with Jehovah, he was ready to give precise instructions for an aggressive secret service. When Moltke attacked MacMahon and crossed the Rhine, the

northern part of France he invaded was swarming with Prussian scouts. Stieber had 36,000 agents in the area from Strasbourg to the Seine.

The biblical leader commanded his kinsmen to ascend a mountain, survey the land and its people, and determine whether they were many or few, strong or weak, what kind of land they had, what kind of cities they had, and whether they lived in tents or houses. He further advised them to find out how fertile the land was and what kind of forests there were. And the battalions sent by Stieber into Napoleon III's territory, beginning in 1868, collected precisely such information. Every step of the march to Paris was mapped and verified to scale, as if a military offensive were an exact science, like astronomy or mathematics. French counterintelligence was extremely weak and could do nothing against 36,000 residents or tourists engaged in wholesale treason. The activity of so many spies must have been noticeable. They saw everything and, like a vacuum cleaner, sucked up everything Stieber needed.

The unrivalled speed with which the Prussian armies advanced toward Paris in the 1870 campaign is largely attributed to Stieber's preparation in the invasion zones. The thought of this success dominated all European secret services and intelligence projects for the next forty years. Those that did not intend to emulate Stieber still had to plan to meet such a threat. All this led to the creation of special schools—the only innovation in military secret service training in the decades between Stieber's triumphs and the outbreak of the World War. However attractive such an institution may seem, an intelligence school is only a secondary academy of the General Staff, where

intelligence aptitude can be cultivated through technical training that will direct the future intelligence officer's activities in a field of immediate importance. Before the war, German intelligence schools enjoyed some renown in Europe. The teachers were undoubtedly very good and quite demanding, but there were still cases when German agents who graduated from this school before the World War were imprisoned in the fortress for the mistakes they had made.

During the war, the Allies developed a series of disciplinary measures for misconduct within the secret service. Stieber's intelligence apparatus immediately lost its balance when confronted with a vigilant enemy. When Brussels had just been occupied, German officers arriving by train, without the slightest hesitation, gave their cabbies the addresses of quarters designated for officers in the Belgian capital. It seemed like a perfectly organised joyride. At the same time, it was Stieber's trick of secret readiness, but it was almost the last in these sinister and threatening advances.

The misfortune of the German service was that its leaders were unable to quickly navigate the new conditions in which it found itself after the Franco-Prussian War.

The German service was divided into army intelligence, naval intelligence, and an individual corps. The first operated under the direction of the General Staff, which, rumour has it, also desired to direct the second. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs oversaw the third organisation, directing it under the direct supervision of the Emperor. Intelligence schools were primarily affiliated with the first two departments

of the secret service, and the classes were staffed and administered no more secretly than many other departments of the military department. The heads of the secret service themselves taught at these schools and discussed various sophisticated operations in detail. Military engineers from the General Staff gave lectures on fortification, trigonometry, topography, and craftsmanship.

A scout must be able to accurately determine heights, angles, distances, and terrain. In short, he must become an observer, relying solely on his vision and intuition. It is known that one secret agent, operating in Great Britain until the summer of 1914, measured distances by pacing, randomly observing angles, and then triangulating them. He calculated, to the nearest yard and foot, the size of a large and important bridge in the north. Without arousing any suspicion among the locals, he even determined how many men could be stationed near this structure; he studied the bridge's foundations, the geological formation of its piers, and determined the amount of dynamite he believed would be required for "major repairs" in the event of war between Germany and Britain.

During the World War, training in German intelligence schools was apparently hastily, carelessly, and un-German. Before the war, training was conducted in such a way that within six to eight months, the schools produced agents whose education, in the opinion of informed and impartial individuals, was not inferior to that provided by many technological institutes. However, one must take into account the truth that intensive study of technology is contrary to the nature of a talented intelligence officer.

Natural masters of the Stieber-Schulmeister technique will never want to attend school. Perhaps this explains the activity of German agents in peacetime and their complete failure in the conditions of the World War. It should also be noted that the leaders of the German service, despite their trust in their schools, before the war constantly dealt with a number of shady characters engaged in studying fortresses and selling the information they obtained to the highest bidder.

Leaving aside Friedrich's time-honoured classification of military intelligence officers, it should be noted that a modern intelligence officer, regardless of their importance and character, is known to their superiors only by the nature of their work. An intelligence officer can be a resident, sitting in one place and biding their time, or traveling around the country in search of insight into its secrets. The latter's work can be extremely useful in peacetime and can sometimes yield highly effective results during war. Traveling around the country, a resident intelligence officer is less suspicious and provides more accurate information, as they report only what they have seen with their own eyes. Amateurs, professionals, patriots, renegades, mercenaries—all can be vigilant, truthful, and prudent in their choice of communications: each can avoid imprudent actions, and no superior will demand more of them. A resident is much harder to detect, and the enemy usually finds him by tracking scouts carrying bags or report collectors, sometimes called "mailboxes." Sometimes the resident himself gives himself away with some fantastic attempt to send reports directly.

Individual agents of the German service were united into a single organisation, and after war was

declared, each agent discovered by enemy counterintelligence attracted a number of others. Counterintelligence discovered the inadequacy of most of the innovations introduced by Stieber and his clique into Frederick the Great's system. The modern secret service declared that legions, cohorts, and even small groups of intelligence agents operating together posed a greater danger than the same number of agents led separately and working separately. Military experts, who like to emphasise that training and discipline transform a crowd into a disciplined army, naturally could not accept the idea that the same conditions favourable to a soldier are unfavourable for an intelligence officer. At the beginning of the World War, intelligence department leaders working under Stieber's system were forced, through their own experience, to reject accepted systems and rules in the very first weeks of the war.

A month after the declaration of war, London counterintelligence met a certain Karl Gustav Ernst, a hairdresser who was legally a British subject, having been born in England. This man had lived in the same house on Caledonian Road for 16 years and, in all likelihood, received mail throughout this time as a "post-box" for the German intelligence service in Britain. As it later became known, his salary was only one pound sterling per month, but if this seems insignificant, the risk was also small, and the effort even less. Letters with instructions for agents arrived to him in batches from the German intelligence centre in Charlottenburg. All the envelopes were stamped with British stamps, and Ernst had only to drop them in the nearest post-box. He forwarded all the replies that reached him to his German masters. Thus, his

activities were so casual and mundane that he could not reveal himself in any way. Except for names and addresses (the latter changed very rarely), he knew little or nothing about the centrifugal force that he maintained.

The Germans believe, and the British don't dispute, that the failure of Ernst, this typical "letterbox," was the work of a single British agent who had penetrated the secrets of the German intelligence centre. This unassuming, unknown barber corresponded with twenty-two correspondents, all Germans, carefully dispersed throughout various naval and military centres in Britain. One of them left on August 4, 1914, and thus, by chance or premonition, avoided failure. Ernst himself had no reason to raise the alarm and no means of escape. He was arrested on August 5, razor in hand; the 21 agents who remained to monitor England's preparations for war were taken into custody that same day.

Ernst was sentenced to seven years of hard labour. The others, as German citizens, were merely interned until the end of the war. This counterintelligence achievement surpassed all known cases of intelligence failure up to that time. The German intelligence service was blinded by a single blow: a pall thicker than any London fog enveloped Britain immediately after the declaration of war. Prussian General von Kluge spoke of his surprise when the vanguard of his First Army unexpectedly encountered British regular troops. British counterintelligence had concealed the expeditionary force from its closest adversary. And if the British standing army had been as large as von Kluge's, he would have been so astonished that the shock would have been felt from Mons to Tannenberg.

After the initial failures, German intelligence leaders lost faith in the infallibility of their organisation and began to despise and often blame themselves. It was said that important intelligence missions were too often given to uncultured and stupid individuals. Ernst, a barber and a foreigner by birth, had failed miserably in England from the very beginning.

The German secret service's failures weren't due to a lack of blue blood: their failures can be attributed to an outdated strategy. A Helium like Stieber would have taken the changes into account and avoided lagging behind. However, to be fair to Steinhauer and his colleagues who led German intelligence in 1914, it should be noted that the main failures occurred not in the European contingent. Great Britain, North America, and the East were tough nuts, resisting all pressure, and Stieber left no instructions on how to penetrate an enemy with no land borders.

As soon as the Charlottenburg centre realised the significance of the failure in Britain, they immediately set to work—Ernst and twenty-one other agents needed to be replaced. The centre sought advice from various major agents in Holland, Sweden, and Denmark. German intelligence demanded decisive action, but the events of the following months sent a new batch of agents to prison and the Tower of London to be shot. In the autumn of 1914, approximately a quarter of a million Belgian refugees arrived in England on destroyers, steamships, tugs, and oarboats. This mass movement concealed the infiltration of a significant number of spies, as the British authorities could not subject all arrivals to rigorous questioning. One agent from this batch was so insolent that he reprimanded the British coastguard

for letting him through too quickly and reminded them that during wartime, all foreigners should be viewed with suspicion.

The German agents who infiltrated England with the Belgians failed to live up to the hopes placed in them by intelligence officials. They failed to reactivate Ernst and the interned correspondents.

The first of these was the hapless patriot Karl Hans Lodi. Lodi was a senior lieutenant in the waning days of the German navy and knew England well, having previously served as a guide for the Hamburg-America-Lion Society. He had lived in America for some time and, speaking with an American accent, posed as an American. Most of those arrested were ignorant of the peculiarities of English speech and paid the price. Lodi suffered most for his zeal and excessive efforts to cover his tracks. After his failure became known in Germany, secret service officials mentioned him only to condemn him, claiming that he had made a series of blunders and aroused suspicion and vigilance toward traveling agents, leading to the discovery and death of other agents.

In the first half of September 1914, Lodi appeared in Edinburgh with a passport in the name of an American, Charles E. Ingliss. The real Ingliss had recently been to Berlin, applying for a visa. He had to wait for some time because the Foreign Office inexplicably "lost" his document, which led to Lodi's arrest in Scotland. Ingliss, with the usual apologies, was given a different passport at the request of the American embassy. Meanwhile, Lodi sent a telegram to Stockholm, quietly moved from his hotel to a private apartment, and, renting a bicycle, began exploring the area. He asked too many questions,

evinced a suspicious interest in the harbour at Rosyth, and displayed a maritime knowledge that was completely out of keeping with the average tourist. Lodi was taken under suspicion after his very first telegram. He addressed it to Adolf Buchard in Stockholm and rashly attempted to portray himself as someone hostile to Germany. But censorship isn't so gullible. If someone writes too deliberately, it, in turn, rewards them with special attention. Agents monitoring Lodi began testing his clumsy ruse through the mail; his letters were held for chemical treatment. Clearly, in Lodi's position, no subject of a neutral power, nor even an American, would waste money on a telegram expressing their joy to another subject of a neutral power over Germany's failures.

Lodi used no code, ruse, or any other form of secret communication. He arrived in London, stayed in a small hotel, and studied anti-aircraft defences, then returned to Edinburgh, and from there went to Liverpool to inspect the ocean-going steamships converted into auxiliary cruisers. Lodi sent Buchard five letters, of which only one reached Sweden. In this letter, Lodi confirmed the absurd rumours of a Russian army landing in Scotland and being transported from there to France for operations on the Aisne. From Liverpool, he travelled to Holyhead, Dublin, and Killaria, and from there to the naval base at Quinetown. But his last letter to Buchard was sufficient evidence, and at the request of Scotland Yard, he was detained by the Irish police. Four weeks later, on October 30, Lodi appeared before a military court in London.

Among his belongings, in addition to a false passport, they found a notebook with notes on naval

matters and addresses in Berlin, Hamburg, and Stockholm. Copies of four letters sent to Bukhard were also in this notebook. He didn't defend himself and carried himself as a man doing his duty without shame or fear of the consequences.

After Lodi's death, a stream of agents was sent to Britain, primarily from the intelligence schools in Antwerp and Wesel. Long before 1914, the German intelligence service had collected all the information on the potential military strength of France and Russia. Therefore, intelligence in these countries could be limited to routine monitoring of troop movements, the strength and morale of regiments and divisions, and the production and loading of ammunition. But in Britain, a large volunteer army was being trained, workers remained restless, unrest raged in Ireland, and the British navy, unstoppable in battle, was tightening its blockade, which would become a lasso around Germany's neck, regardless of victories on the continent. Resident agents were able to carry out the tasks assigned to them in France and Russia. A large number of such agents remained in these countries, many of whom remained undetected and, from time to time, provided significant services to their centres. England not only removed all the agents planted before the declaration of war and who maintained contact with Germany through the barber Ernst, but also held in its hands most of the secrets that tormented Steinhauer and his colleagues.

Over the course of fifteen days (May-June 1915), seven agents were discovered and arrested. None of these agents was a mere amateur in an extremely dangerous field; none was without prior training. Each of these seven agents had received some training,

although their teachers were men with only theoretical knowledge, as Germany had not waged any wars during their lifetimes. These teachers could only explain the difference between espionage in peacetime, in the absence of counterintelligence, and intelligence in an era when nations are engaged in mortal struggle and have a young but vigilant counterintelligence service that is improving day by day. This difference was quite palpable. Of the seven agents captured during these two weeks, not one managed to obtain any valuable information. Not one of them arrived in England with favourable recommendations, extensive experience in the secret service, or an innate ability to overcome all manner of obstacles.

The scout and his activities

Smart and capable intelligence agents rarely fail, and the best of them don't even arouse suspicion. This defines the art of espionage, which essentially boils down to three things: 1) discovering the location of the most valuable documents, 2) obtaining them undetected and quickly relaying what you've obtained to your superiors, and 3) keeping the enemy unaware that your plans are known.

If the second or third of these conditions is violated, then everything collapses—the agent fails both at home and abroad.

Locating valuable documents is less difficult than it seems, especially in war, when the most mundane things can be significant to enemy headquarters. Moreover, many agents receive precise instructions on

what information to obtain, where to obtain it, and so on. After this, the actual work of obtaining the information is a great feat. Any secret agent can accomplish this. Relaying the information once it has been obtained is far more difficult and dangerous. An amateur spy, excited by his apparent success in obtaining secret information, imagines his mission is almost complete. A cautious professional knows that the greatest danger lies ahead. Under conditions of modern censorship and counterintelligence, an agent, despite a number of ingenious inventions and chemical innovations, becomes extremely vulnerable the moment he attempts to communicate his observations or discoveries.

So much attention was devoted to the problem of transmitting messages during the war that the third requirement—concealing the enemy's knowledge of their secrets—was only remembered much later. Intelligence officers sometimes kept this in mind, sometimes neglected it—depending on the circumstances. It must be remembered that an intelligence officer who neglects nothing will surpass and outlive the rest.

After the peace, a French secret agent declared that he had repeatedly visited Major von Bülow's German intelligence centre in the suburbs of the Swiss capital. It was a veritable fortress, a centre that controlled most of the intelligence agents operating behind the French armies' lines on the centre and right flank. To convince his former adversaries of the veracity of his claims, the agent boldly described the main intelligence room: a hatch under the carpet and floorboards with bells that sounded an alarm when stepped on, chairs, and even keys deliberately left in

the locks and connected to high-voltage wires. Regardless of how he first penetrated this secret refuge (through bribery or sheer courage), his caution and intelligence allowed him to repeat these visits. The agent achieved this only because all his intelligence activities left traces.

It is also known that one German agent served for many months at a French military court as an interpreter during the trials of those accused of espionage. This man, with a cool, theatrical composure, witnessed the convictions of his colleagues, but never showed any emotion toward them. His job as an agent was to report to his superior on how the French detected and tried spies, which was of great importance to the superiors who trained and dispatched new agents.

Intelligence agents like this translator are rare and especially dangerous types who rise to great power. On the staff of the Crown Prince of Bavaria was a highly regarded young major, whose tireless diligence aroused universal admiration. This respected assistant to Prince Ruprecht was, in fact, English. He had connections with the British intelligence service, which had sent him to Germany before the war, like Trang, Brandon, and countless other adventurers. Fortuitous circumstances elevated him to a high position, and thanks to his dexterity and intelligence, he held this post until the Armistice; after which, he finally changed his uniform and participated in peace negotiations. His value as an agent during his service as a major on the Bavarian staff can only be estimated. It's possible that his entire job primarily consisted of organising ongoing secret communications, a task that became increasingly

difficult as the prince's trust in him grew. Envious comrades and subordinates could spy on him more closely than detectives.¹ It is still assumed that he did something out of the ordinary because the War Office in London refused to report his actions.

Appointments or promotions, as in this case or that of the translator, are naturally rare. Counterintelligence officers now exist to curb this evil. But protecting oneself against an agent permanently resident in the country and gifted with persistence and intelligence is unthinkable. Such a secret agent was Karl Siebert. He lived his entire life in Russia and, for over forty years, by order of the Minister of the Interior, held the post of secret postal censor in Kyiv. On this basis, he was permitted to open mail addressed to the Chief of the Imperial Staff, General Alekseyev, and to examine letters sent by Brusilova, the wife of the army commander, to the wife of General Trotsky, commander of the Kyiv District. He even read official correspondence from the Minister of War and Count Georgy Bobrinsky, the Russian governor of the occupied Austrian territory in Galicia. Siebert was caught only by chance.

Siebert's extensive experience made him a valuable asset to any intelligence chief. However, agents without official positions surpassed him in their ability to penetrate military affairs. It has now become known that one agent worked on the railway and, during the first two months of the war, communicated a Russian field code to the German headquarters in East Prussia. Knowing this code, the German command could immediately translate all radio

¹ Detective police agent in England and the USA.

messages exchanged by the Russians during the invasion of East Prussia. It is highly likely that the agent who delivered the code received only a few hundred rubles for his work, but von Hindenburg's fame became a bulwark for the German people and sustained their spirit for many years. However, the Russians suffered a crushing defeat: six corps were destroyed, tens of thousands of men were captured or perished in the lakes.

A list of great intelligence officers would be incomplete without the name of Colonel Lawrence. A recognised genius and a man of great learning, Lawrence demonstrated during the Asia Minor campaign that he could, as a scout, penetrate the Turkish-German front at any moment. He disguised himself so masterfully that in Damascus he was mistaken for a Turkish deserter and beaten unconscious as a "disciplinary measure." He always had accurate information about enemy forces, and his reconnaissance was invaluable to General Allenby during the Palestine campaign. Lawrence described his work in intelligence and other fields so vividly and sensibly that we would refer the reader to his own famous book.

As for amateur spies, a Belgian serving in the Liège steel mills during the occupation deserves recognition as a champion of the world war. Thanks to the courage and diligence of this patriot, the Allies received information on all German troop trains passing through Liège until August 22; after that date, he no longer had anyone to send the messages he had previously sent with refugees bound for England. For many days, he hid in a drainage pipe, under an embankment, observing the trains and counting the

carriages as they passed overhead. He was even able to note artillery and other special units of the occupation forces with cues. Had he received special training for the secret service, he could not have acted with greater understanding, and all the information he received was promptly delivered to the British.

The fact that a significant portion of military intelligence was entrusted to civilians during the World War is explained by the military's over-cautiousness or neglect of work behind enemy lines. Civilians living in the zone of armed conflict (at Armentières, for example, some families lived less than 750 meters from the trenches) were unwillingly recruited for secret military service. Intelligence is a profession as difficult as acting or playwriting—a field in which almost everyone feels called to greatness. At the same time, counterintelligence, i.e., exposing enemy intelligence agents, is the passion of millions. However, there are those who sell information for profit. Immediately after war is declared, these people (usually citizens of neutral countries) and all manner of renegades, former criminals, and swindlers rush to the highest bidder. If not for the military court and execution, vast packs of these jackals would scurry across the entire theatre of military operations. And strangely, the fate awaiting them in the event of failure doesn't stop these corrupt observers. After one of this gang fails, is tried and executed, they disappear or switch sides. That's why, during the war, both sides announced the execution of scouts.

The work of intelligence or counterintelligence, its significance and risk, creates a kind of special caste among professional secret agents. They are not always mysterious, as in novels. They have to do much more

boring, mundane work than those who view their activities with a romantic eye might imagine. They may be patriotic, enjoy a reputation for honesty in their personal lives, but their lives will be relatively dull, calm, and prosaic. They may even be alien to the so-called spirit of adventure, and the best thing for them is a lack of inclination to dramatise their profession. But they are adventurers, and their profession requires a curious combination of qualities, unlike those required by a soldier or explorer, a mercenary, a speculator, a smuggler, or any other lawbreaker. Every professional intelligence officer must be a gifted linguist, able to speak the languages he requires fluently, with the correct accent or without any accent, depending on the nature of the role he has assumed.

In addition to the knowledge of languages and technical familiarity with military matters that a school can provide, a secret agent must possess such innate qualities as courage, endurance, calm, imagination, etc. There are several basic rules of conduct that every professional intelligence officer should know, and he must believe in the fairness and necessity of these rules.

Some intelligence officers were immediately frightened and quickly confessed. Quite a few cowardly insisted that they were "only studying the decline in enemy morale." Patriotic intelligence officers allowed themselves to display their ardent patriotism upon hearing news of their army's victory, or, even worse, attempted to express joy over a defeat that actually saddened them and wounded their pride. However, they obviously deliberately ignored the facts and reported rumours without clarifying, as an intelligence

officer should, that they were just rumours. German intelligence officers were constantly engaged in propaganda and sabotage; both are military actions, but they should be carried out by special agents whose failure would not endanger other intelligence officers or disrupt the intelligence system, which after a failure can only be rebuilt with great difficulty.

Since Stieber's time, there has been a doctrine of the individual merit and social worth of those engaged in intelligence, government conspiracies, and similar secret, yet still official, activities. It was believed that members of high society should also engage in intelligence, and the German intelligence leadership emphasised that espionage was a more "honorable occupation" than the regular performance of one's daily duties in the army. In reality, despite Stieber's insistence on the primacy of the secret service and the participation of gentlemen and lords in it, as well as the existence of expensive intelligence schools, the majority of agents knew little or nothing about intelligence. Agents were selected and trained to provide specific services to their superiors and employers, without any guidance on how to save their lives or improve their skills. It is generally accepted that a hired agent always becomes a liability after a while. Considering that this idea was so strongly emphasised, while the training of agents was still neglected, there is no reason to be surprised that the Allies discovered so many mercenaries and professionals who were not even amateurs in terms of their knowledge of their business.

Eva, a governess who had found a position in a prominent London house, was suspected of espionage and interrogated. She immediately lost heart and

confessed to her intentions, but claimed that until now she hadn't had the opportunity to obtain any valuable information. In fact, she had had excellent opportunities before arousing suspicion, but she simply didn't understand the game she was playing. This girl naively admitted this as well. She explained that she had been sent to England by her lover and wanted to become a spy to please him. In addition to his tender gratitude, she was to receive two hundred marks a month.

German intelligence agents wasted their time on drug addicts, pathetic and disgusting creatures who craved narcotics and were willing to promise anything for them. German chemists could send them as much of the stuff as they wanted, and small packets of narcotics were attached to the bottoms of freight trains traveling from Switzerland to France. But the agents who distributed these drugs among the scum of Paris were acting childishly if they assumed that a drug addict might possess accurate military information or could understand it if they accidentally came into contact with it. Criminals, of course, could be forced to commit murder or theft for drugs, but trustworthy individuals in possession of important military secrets never treated their duties with indifference during the war. And so they were well protected from criminal elements.

An intelligence officer's commandments must contain many strange demands, including the requirement not to display one's distinctive national traits. French agents were warned to avoid excessive politeness. One of them introduced himself in Munich as an agent for some Berlin concern, and a waitress at a restaurant betrayed him to the police. She said he

thanked her for everything she served him; his frequent "thank you" convinced her he wasn't who he claimed to be. At the beginning of the World War, when Germany's military position seemed favourable, some German agents found it difficult to conceal their delight. An insolent or rude, self-satisfied, self-important, or talkative agent would be hanged far more quickly than a well-mannered, prudent, and reserved intelligence officer.

We would be very pleased to tell you about spies with stage talent, wearing makeup and a false moustache. But the fact is that modern spies rarely disguise themselves if they can avoid it. A false name in a passport or an American suit on a German sailor—that is modern disguise. Professional informants of the lowest order can pose as gentlemen, a person of low birth can pretend to be a duke traveling incognito—that is disguise. A very difficult, daring, and by no means uncommon method of disguise is to present oneself as an officer in the enemy army or navy. All heads of the secret services know that the panic that grips the civilian population of all countries at the beginning of a war, various rumours, spy mania—all this serves to conceal the initial steps of enemy agents. General excitement and appeals to counterintelligence agencies By about everyone A true spy uses random suspicions and false alarms as the best means of disguise. He will run with the crowd and demand the arrest of every obvious foreigner, or, conversely, he will disavow the rowdy patriots, calmly take his position (which he will later use for reconnaissance), and mislead even the most vigilant people with his peaceful, normal lifestyle.

An American secret agent assigned to spy on Plutarch Elias Calles, the governor of Sonora and a renowned Germanophile, during the World War II disguised himself as a Mexican. He covered his entire skin in iodine, and when this proved too painful, he added mud.

The dexterity of this agent is evident from the fact that he was even allowed to use the train of the dictator of Sonora on some important occasions.

An experienced agent knows how to act so as not to arouse suspicion; he will best hide his face under a mask of rudeness or stupidity: an athlete becomes a lout, a smart officer and an educated gentleman can always hide behind a mask of dirt, bad manners and dissolute life.

All this applies mainly to the post-war situation and to that part of the world where the victorious allies suddenly became filled with greater distrust of each other than of their just defeated opponents.

Knowledge of languages, innate talent, good training, personal superiority—all this will not help an agent if he does not choose a suitable disguise and a role that he can play flawlessly and naturally.

Müller and Altshuller, the most resourceful of the Austrian agents working in Russia, were received in good society. They were useful agents. There were rumours that the wife of the Russian Minister of War was planning to visit the beautiful new estate of Altshuller, who had returned to his native Vienna not only with military intelligence but also with profits from speculating on army supplies. But war broke out, and the borders were closed. Müller worked for about two years behind Russian army lines and was so careless that he gave himself away. An agent of the

Tsarist secret police detained him. But Müller was a remarkable individual and knew well with whom he was dealing. He began to reveal the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian secret service with regard to Russia.

He revealed startling facts and even betrayed three Russian agents in Austrian service. Then, after he had told everything he deemed necessary, and with little time remaining before his trial, Müller fled. It was assumed that someone had helped him do so.

The Serb Krivosh rose to prominence thanks to his linguistic talents. Although poor, he was happy to receive money from Russians and those interested in Russian military affairs. Krivosh held no high rank, but was willing to accept one. For a time, he served as a translator on General Brusilov's staff, and as such, he attracted the attention of Prince Orlov, the head of the Tsar's private chancery. Orlov needed a translator, and Krivosh made such an impression that he seemed more suitable for the job than hundreds of patriotic Russians. Orlov obtained an officer's badge for him and assigned him to the headquarters of the VIII Corps. Here, Krivosh received the same colossal opportunities for his secret work as Karl Schulmeister had enjoyed.

The revolution revealed that Krivosh's name was among the many suspects on the secret police's lists. Thus, we see that this unknown man had so ingratiated himself with the authorities that even the secret police were afraid to touch him. Counterintelligence agents failed to apprehend him; their power ended, and Krivosh's activities ceased.

In Palestine and Asia Minor, the British had to contend with several talented intelligence agents who were as elusive as the Austro-German agents

operating behind the lines of the Tsarist army. Military intelligence officer Allenby reports two outstanding agents: Preisser and Franks. Preisser, like Colonel Dourance, masterfully posed as an Arab. His Turkish allies believed him to be a Bedouin. As is now known, he infiltrated British headquarters in Cairo at least three times, traveling freely between Constantinople and Cairo, gathering information from lesser agents, native residents, and local intelligence officers paid by Germany or Turkey. Preisser was never caught; he didn't even suffer the same setbacks as Lawrence, and Turkish sergeants didn't beat him unconscious, mistaking him for an Arab deserter.

Frenke, promoted to captain and then major by his admiring opponents, whom he had caused much trouble, was even more daring than Preisser. He easily posed as a British or colonial officer, and possessed such extensive and versatile knowledge that he never pretended to be the same person twice. He possessed excellent appearance, good manners, and technical knowledge in almost every area of military affairs; he had a wide selection of enemy uniforms at his disposal. Once, dressed as an artillery supply officer, he "inspected" an artillery regiment. Another time, he received a complete plan of a proposed obstacle; he caused great trouble for all officers who even remotely resembled him. They were detained while carrying out the most urgent tasks and forced to waste time until their identities were fully established.

Communication is the most dangerous part of a spy's job.

The most dangerous aspect of an intelligence officer's work is transmitting information to its destination. Nine out of ten intelligence agents discovered by counterintelligence agents failed due to the unreliability of their communications. During the World War I, a German agent used the River Scarn, which flows near Arras, to travel from British to German positions. He slit fish, inserted messages into the slits, and entrusted the fish, loaded with military information, to the river for delivery. The agent was never caught, and only one of his messages was intercepted. British soldiers were ordered to collect and sort all the garbage floating down the river past their positions, and this proved another cunning scheme unfounded.

The use of homing pigeons was so common that all troops at the front were ordered to shoot at pigeons flying toward the enemy. It is reliably established that one pigeon was brightly painted to resemble a parrot, as an agent believed a parrot would attract less attention in Flanders than a pigeon. With favourable winds, German agents in France tried using hot air balloons to deliver their messages. German snipers shot down these toys, which fell on German territory; French and British snipers were also ordered to watch for toy balloons and shoot them down as they flew over French or British territory.

Letters are delivered quickly and reliably during peacetime. But during wartime, they fall into the hands of censors, who notice every mark, deliberate text, underlining, and other features that even

remotely suggest the presence of a code. The use of sympathetic ink, it would seem, could have fooled the censors. But the spy Anton K pferle, who followed Lodi to the Tower, was discovered because the letter he sent to Holland was developed.

K pferle was unsuitable for intelligence. Many German agents died during the World War II due to poor pronunciation. K pferle's pronunciation aroused suspicion even before he landed in Liverpool. He was given the opportunity to visit Dublin and then travel to London, where, immediately after sending the letter that ruined him, Scotland Yard detectives cut short the agent's short career; his patriotism couldn't cover his complete incompetence in intelligence.

Chemists on both sides of the conflict invented new and remarkable inks whenever the secret of an old one became known to the enemy, and each such invention was secretly sent to agents. Therefore, ink was often prepared in the form of medicines, soaps, toothpaste, and ointments. But an even better way to send a small amount of ink was to ask an unsuspecting traveller to pass on some article of clothing to a friend abroad. This friend—an agent or his assistant—would then soak the article of clothing (a coat, vest, shirt, trousers, or a pair of socks) in the new ink. A process as simple as boiling a shirt or socks could supply the agent with enough ink to cover the margins of newspapers or the surface of other paper that might escape the censor's scrutiny.

A very important intelligence report, sent to England by a Belgian agent at the very beginning of the war, was written on a large sheet of paper, greasy as if greased, with a large hole burned in the centre. Written on this paper, in lemon-formaldehyde ink, was

a detailed estimate of the number of German troops marching through Belgium toward France. The writing ran through the grease to the edge of the burn hole and continued on the other side to the very edge of the sheet. Wrapped in this paper was a pair of boots, which a refugee was carrying along with other hastily packed belongings.

Some claimed that the unexploded shells failed to explode precisely because they contained instructions rather than explosives. It was assumed that the agents knew where and when the shell they were targeting would be fired. An agent would have to be nearby, dig up the shell, and examine its contents.

Many agents were given a bulky item, a cage containing homing pigeons. The agent was required to hide both the cage and the pigeons from prying eyes.

The English agent Richardson, who lived in Roubaix, was receiving a German staff officer when a pigeon timidly poked its head out of its basket. The German pretended not to notice, but soon left and returned with a soldier. Certain the pigeon had been spotted, Richardson placed a chicken in the basket, and the bird so astonished the Germans that they left, unaware that Richardson had hidden the pigeon elsewhere.

The capture of a carrier pigeon carries a greater risk than the arrest of an enemy agent. If the Germans had captured Richardson's pigeon, they would undoubtedly have used it to send false information. Intelligence agents were always aware of this, and in many cases, when capture seemed a matter of minutes, they released their pigeons before attempting to save themselves. In 1916, a pilot was carrying a scout whom he was to drop off in a remote

part of Belgium. Since the agent was assigned for at least two weeks, he was given three pigeons, which he was to leave with the resident agent and send at regular intervals with preliminary reports. Despite his experience, the pilot crashed while approaching the landing site, killing the agent and seriously wounding himself. Thanks to the elasticity of the basket, the pigeons remained unharmed, but the pilot had a broken leg, was entangled in the wreckage of his plane, and couldn't reach it. He knew he would be found within a few hours, and if a German patrol found him, the pigeons would be delivered to the nearest headquarters and then sent to the Allies with whatever information the enemy command desired. Confident that no troops would pass near the crash site before morning, he began calling for help. His judgment proved correct: an elderly Belgian market vendor was the first to hear his cries, understood the meaning of his gestures, and opened the basket of pigeons before offering him any other assistance.

The use of aircraft to deliver reconnaissance personnel behind enemy lines is the greatest innovation in the history of intelligence.

This method was first used in the Balkan War of 1912-1913. The first experiments are associated with the name of an enterprising young American, who introduced it to the French General Staff in late 1914. Lieutenant Bert Hall began his career as a pilot in the Turkish army in 1912. He flew a French monoplane, conducting aerial reconnaissance for the sum of one hundred dollars in gold a day. The Turkish army held on to defensive positions. When Adrianople was besieged after the defeats at Kirk Kilis and Lule Burgas, the Turks began to take an interest in Asia

Minor. Hall worked well, but when the pay stopped, his work ended too. He flew his plane with a French mechanic to Bulgaria and was invited by the Bulgarians to conduct reconnaissance for them for the same sum; And since he had thoroughly studied the fortified positions before Constantinople during his service with the Turks, he was offered the opportunity to attempt a reconnaissance landing behind the front at Çatalca. Hall pointed out the widely recognised difference between aerial reconnaissance, for which he had been invited, and intelligence conducted by agents. But he agreed, for an appropriate reward, to attempt to land a Bulgarian agent within the Turkish front.

However, when the Bulgarians began to delay payments, Hall considered the war over. He had exhausted the funds allocated by both warring parties for aerial reconnaissance. He was already packing his bags when... he was arrested as a Turkish spy. This typical Balkan method of settling accounts with a creditor placed the American in a critical situation: as a mercenary, he could not appeal to American diplomatic representatives for assistance. He was court-martialled and sentenced to death. His French mechanic, arrested as a minor accomplice, managed to escape and, returning with a few brave souls, smashed the Bulgarian guardhouse and rescued Hall. In August 1914, the American aviator repaid his debt to the French, joining the French army on the second day of the war. Three months later, he was transferred to the Air Service. He joined Lafayette's squadron, of which only Hall and one other pilot remained alive by the end of the war. Before the formation of this squadron, Lieutenant Hall carried French

reconnaissance aircraft behind German lines. Such flights had to be carried out at night—the darker the night, the better. They would land in an unfamiliar and unprepared location; then there would be a return flight, and two weeks later he would fly back for the reconnaissance aircraft, and the entire dangerous procedure would be repeated. Hall was a pioneer in this field, and thanks to his composure and skill, he safely returned all the reconnaissance aircraft.

After such a dangerous beginning, airborne agent delivery became a routine part of the aviation operations of all the warring powers, with numerous improvements being devised to protect the pilot and his passenger. For example, landings were made near the home of a resident agent, who would illuminate a bright light in a chimney, visible only from directly above. This signal also aided the pilot in his flight to retrieve the agent. In some cases, the resident agent was unavailable on the appointed night or was detained on suspicion of espionage, in which case the pilot would make the flight for nothing. Sometimes, he would have to fly in vain for several consecutive nights until the agent appeared.

The Allies enjoyed a significant advantage in this area of secret service. Belgium and occupied France offered them thousands of landing sites unknown to the Germans, and hundreds of patriots were always ready to assist them. With pay as low as seven hundred francs per round trip, the British and French relied on former Belgian residents, who could be dropped off near homes or in the immediate vicinity, where they knew every inch of the terrain. To maintain such advantages in the west, the Germans had to pay French traitors who knew the terrain but

could be known and detained as spies. When the Germans realised the odds were stacked against them, they installed microphones that picked up aircraft engine noise in those remote areas of occupied territory where German pilots had no business flying at night. The Allies countered this by halving the number of necessary landings and lowering scouts by parachute. Thus, reconnaissance took on a fantastic appearance, and scouts descended directly from the sky onto the enemy, who would have to remove all soldiers from the trenches in order to observe the fields and gardens of the partisans, who were ready to receive and hide the scout.

War demands courage. Sure, there were men and women brave enough to conduct reconnaissance, but flying over enemy anti-aircraft batteries, landing in the dark, or, worse, jumping out of a parachute—not everyone wanted that. However, the advantages of an airborne scout are clear to everyone. Let's assume the pilot has made a successful landing, and the scout changes from his uniform to civilian clothes and heads to a city where his stay will yield valuable material. He doesn't need to write anything down, as he'll return within two weeks and report everything he's seen. Naturally, the scout will keep an eye on passing troops, and since every soldier's uniform bears regimental or divisional insignia, the scout, by memorising these insignia, gathers valuable information about the military units in the area.

If this scout encounters a large artillery detachment, he must find out how many guns are there and what condition they are in. By examining several guns here and there, he can judge whether they are new or have already seen combat. He will

also determine their calibres. However, showing too much interest in the guns could prove fatal for the scout. It should not be obvious to an outsider that the scout is counting the guns. He can, while paying attention to the guns, stroll around the detachment, counting his steps: so many in length, so many in width. Then, by multiplying these numbers, he will calculate the approximate area occupied by guns of each type, determining the area of the detachment. Then, by dividing the total area by the area occupied by each gun, the scout will arrive at an approximate number of guns.

It is possible that the intelligence officer will have to accept a written report from the resident agent, which he has will difficult remember . In this case, he takes the report with him only when he sets off to meet the plane arriving for him.

A scout should avoid crossing a border post where he could be questioned and searched, and he should avoid making written reports, no matter how hidden they may be. This will greatly increase his safety.

By using aircraft, Secret Service agents avoid the dangers that await them at the border. Currently, preference will always be given to an agent who memorises and delivers their reports orally.

The harsh postal censorship of the World War II era also had a positive side, which was exploited by the Secret Service.

Communications had to be simplified to the extreme to avoid censors. Once this condition was met, a multitude of inventions followed. Complex codes and ingenious ciphers, so convoluted that lieutenants trying to decipher them went crazy, were consigned to the archives along with muskets, muzzle-

loaders, and other obsolete items. A secret agent could reduce their written report to a series of fragmented words, symbols, and numbers. This report could confuse an enemy who accidentally fell into its hands. However, the document's outward strangeness could hasten the agent's downfall.

Edgar Allan Poe wrote with stunning clarity about the complex problem of deciphering messages that remained secret to anyone without the key used by the sender. The methods Poe described haven't changed much in a hundred years. Another American, Colonel Fabian, devoted his knowledge and leisure to solving all manner of problems related to codes and ciphers. After studying thousands of pages of printed text, he perfected a letter repetition table that facilitates the work of a cipher clerk.

This ease of deciphering codes plays an important role, as it limits their use in war. Codes and ciphers always serve as isolators for transmitted thoughts. Army orders, regardless of the method of transmission, must be encrypted, which is a simple rearrangement of words or letters. They can be easily deciphered by anyone with the key. Encryption is intended to deceive the enemy for no more than a few hours. Ciphers merely conceal a secret, while codes can conceal a thought so deeply that it will never be revealed if the codebook is lost. Codes use words and sentences with arbitrary meanings, and their true meaning is impossible to understand unless the meaning of each individual word or phrase is known. During the war, one British general, as an experiment, sent important orders by radio in clear-text. As he expected, the Germans, reading his brief and energetic sentences, were convinced it was a new,

extremely complex code, and they did not use the intercepted orders. This was the result of the constant use of codes and ciphers in the field: what seemed very simple was mistaken for the most complex code.

But where, tell me, can one find a code an intelligence officer can use that won't be noticed by censors? If an intelligence officer writes in invisible ink between the lines of a letter, or on sheet music, an advertisement, or a newspaper, he's following the age-old custom of trying to write his information in code. The appearance of a few letters or numbers will expose the message as a dangerous document, and it will be destroyed. One agent was captured in England because the authorities obtained such a trivial piece of evidence as three numbers in the margins of a newspaper. One might assume that if his numbers had been written in code, he could have saved his life or remained undetected for a longer period. But intelligence officers have a certain superstitious aversion to codes and ciphers. How many agents have perished because of absurd or complex intricacies! It's no wonder that these contrivances have been replaced by an exaggerated naturalness as a new protective colouring. Two Dutchmen, Jaissen and Roos, acted as naval intelligence agents, posing as agents for a tobacco company and sending telegrams from every seaport they visited, ordering thousands of cigars of the most expensive brands. In these telegrams, the word "crown" stood for battleship. If 4,000 "crowns" were ordered, it meant that four battleships were moored in the port from which the "order" was sent. Naturally, this sudden demand for tobacco products was noted by telegraph censors. When these "Dutch merchants" (in reality, unemployed sailors) were

interrogated, they claimed to be representatives of a Dutch firm so insignificant that such large orders for expensive cigars could only have been conceived by the feeble-mindedness of its owner. After being confronted with incriminating evidence, they confessed and were sentenced to death.

Ciphers were already known to the ancient Greeks and Romans, both of whom already used pigeons for postal service and, according to one ancient historian, even attempted to train swallows to carry military messages. A cunning Greek, the tyrant of Miletus, wanted to revolt against Darius. Aware of the Persians' vigilance, he ordered a slave to shave his head, wrote his message on it, and, when the hair grew back, sent it to the Ionian Aristagoras, who could read the message simply by shaving the slave's head again. A modern secret agent, searching for new ways and means of transmitting secrets, must again resort to cunning. Smoke from chimneys in the Vosges Mountains was considered an effective means of transmission. The smoke was visible from a great distance and, moreover, could be controlled: released at certain intervals, etc. In short, smoke was a highly flexible code. Invisible, almost microscopic scratches on coins also served as a code. An unsuspecting traveller might be approached by a hotel employee asking to give a few coins to a "poor relative" living in the city they were traveling to. The traveller would take the coins, unaware that each one contained between two and ten words inscribed on it, which could be read by slowly rotating the coin under a magnifying glass.

The so-called "dictionary" cipher successfully conceals messages from the uninitiated, but no agent

in enemy territory can use it for a letter or telegram, as such a message would be immediately intercepted by the censor. This code is an excellent means of correspondence between secret service agents in peacetime. To use it, only one book is required, preferably a dictionary. To someone unfamiliar with the dictionary and the accepted notation, a message sent in this code will appear as a jumble of letters and numbers with a frantic punctuation. Small dictionaries printed in two columns are most convenient for this purpose.

A more tedious code, but quite reliable and a source of frustration for postal censors, is a stencil, which isolates a few words from the text, forming a separate message and scattered among a verbose and vague letter. A stencil is a simple sheet of paper with holes cut in it through which the desired words are visible. These holes, forming a specific pattern, and their distances from each other and from the margins are stored in the agent's memory, who must write messages taking into account the dimensions of the stencil holes. Each agent must have six or seven stencil variants in order to assign to them all the possible combinations of words necessary for his secret message. A single letter may contain two or three messages between the lines, describing family matters. To read these messages, two different stencils are necessary. The recipient of the letter, if he can safely carry the necessary stencils, has the necessary stencils ready. Mentioning a particular day of the week in the first sentence of the letter tells him which combination of stencils he should use; he then places the stencil on the designated page and reads the agent's report. In cases where neither the letter

writer nor the recipient has an incriminating document, they must memorise the stencil design very precisely.

An agent in possession of an absolutely secure code or cipher must consider the dangerous problem of address when sending a message (whether by mail or telegraph). Censors, in collaboration with counterintelligence services, acquire very precise information about enemy intelligence centres in cities in neutral countries and remember all addresses associated with suspicious letters or telegrams. During the World War II, German agents, according to instructions, wrote to non-existent Belgian prisoners, a very clever ruse. However, some German agents posing as commissioners made the grave mistake of claiming to be representatives of Dutch and Swiss firms already named by agents who had failed before them and whose fate was unknown to them. Some individuals asked British soldiers returning to France after leave to post a letter. The English readily complied with this request, unaware that the letter they carried to France had not undergone any censorship. But letters weren't always the primary means of communication; messages were found on eggs supposedly destined for market and on curling irons. In the latter case, the inscriptions were etched with acid and then covered with a thin artificial layer of rust.

British agents in London intercepted and examined the sheet music because it was addressed to a suspicious individual in Zurich. It contained two songs, "Ladder of Love" and "On the Road to Dublin," and the sender's address was "Jack Cummings, Palace Theatre." No one by that name existed; however, the

fact that counterintelligence was dealing with an enemy agent became clear when the developer discovered reports of observations made in England hidden between the lines of the sheet music. It was later established that "Cummings"'s real name was Courtenay Rnsbach. This man, the son of an Austrian who had taken British citizenship, was a talented vaudevillian, comedy writer, magician, and stunt cyclist. At the time of the declaration of war, he was engaged in German music halls and interned in Ruhleben. There, he was persuaded to become an intelligence agent and allowed to leave Germany and travel—"to improve his health." But because he sent his reports to an address on a list of suspicious addresses, these travels led to his life imprisonment.

Seeing how dangerous postal censorship was for secret correspondence, German intelligence centres began sending orders to their agents in France via musical code; the lyrics remained unchanged, but the notes were different each time. A song called "Forget-me-not of Alsace" was sent out as a periodical, and despite dozens of copies of the song being sent out by a foreign music publisher, for a long time no one suspected it was an intelligence bulletin. But a suspicious individual lived in a certain French port, whose mail was carefully monitored. Every week, he received a copy of "Forget-me-not of Alsace" along with other sheet music. These notes were examined and photographed. It turned out that the lyrics remained the same, but the music was different in each copy. The notes were handed over to a decoder, and he solved the mystery.

Sometimes postcards were used. They were glued together under great pressure, with an address on one

side, a picture on the other, and a sheet of the thinnest paper with a report or map in between. One German agent living in the south of France wrote his reports with special ink on a piece of the finest mica, then skilfully attached this transparent layer to the lenses of his pince-nez . Writing on small pieces of thin paper was common practice. Many intelligence officers carried these documents in their pipes, under the tobacco; this way, in case of danger, the agent could always light his pipe and destroy the evidence. But when a new method emerged—mica on pince-nez—many agents abandoned their pipes.

Secret agents bravely risk their lives, acting on inspiration; their opponents—counterintelligence agents—are also seized by inspiration, and sometimes patiently work for months without presenting any cases to a military court.

During the Great War, a suspicious man lived in Paris, who for many weeks did nothing incriminating. But eventually, one thing was discovered that provided the necessary clue. This man lived in a modest hotel, and during repeated searches of his room, it was noticed that he possessed several handkerchiefs, which he never gave to the laundress. These precious handkerchiefs were impregnated with a new chemical compound, previously unknown to the Allies. It took about two months to discover a certain amount of this compound in a handkerchief taken by a French agent and replaced with another, identical one. Not surprisingly, this man managed to deceive the secret service's observant eyes. Thanks to the extraordinary patience of counterintelligence agents and chemists, the new ink was finally discovered, and afterward, the

agent with the handkerchiefs, along with many others, were caught red-handed.

The large German radio station in Cowen periodically seemed to be in the grip of some kind of fever, broadcasting a meaningless stream of words spoken at an alarming rate. This was supposedly done to interfere with Allied radio communications. Like all other German broadcasts, this jumble was also recorded by a phonograph. One day, an officer played the recording, trying to detect a semblance of a code in the transmission. While he was listening, the phonograph slowed down, and that's when he finally made a discovery. The transmission speed was masking a specific code used to send instructions to German agents in South and Central America; this ingenious device was only discovered by the accidental slowing of the phonograph.

Let's recall the famous story of a British soldier-artist who, while sketching a windmill in Flanders, noticed that it was turning against the wind. No less famous is the story of a mother and daughter spy who lived for many years in an important strategic location near Amiens. Both women were German by birth and German agents settled in France in 1901. They undoubtedly saw much that was undetectable to German intelligence officers 75 miles away. They devised a method of signalling German pilots: hanging laundry on a line in the yard to dry. But the women quickly aroused suspicion. A French counterintelligence agent observing them could not accept that two people could soil so much laundry. He also noticed that they often hung clothes out in bad weather, and that almost all of them were brightly coloured. Women in France, which lost 900,000 lives, typically wore

mourning or dark-coloured dresses to avoid offending the victims. Suspicion gave way to certainty: German planes flew low, and pilots showed great interest in the constantly washed red, green, and orange dresses. Soon, two female agents, who had been expecting war since 1901, found themselves waiting for it in prison cells.

During the final months of the World War II, various secret services encountered a new signalling method: infrared and ultraviolet rays. Infrared rays—long light waves that produce no visible light—can be transmitted by a special signal lamp and remain undetected by anyone except an observer equipped with field binoculars with a special screen. Under the most favourable atmospheric conditions, in bright sunlight, these signals could be transmitted over a distance of eight miles. Now we see the advances intelligence is making in communications and the magical devices it holds for future conflicts.

In their work, intelligence officers strive to utilise all the advances of modern technology. We cannot predict the communications methods that intelligence officers will use in the future, but we believe that their scientific ingenuity would seem like science fiction to us today.

Counterintelligence is the Organised Surveillance of Intelligence Agents.

As we have already seen, military intelligence was somewhat amateurish and something of a sport for officers until Frederick the Great discovered that it was better to recruit and train peasants for this work than

to risk the lives of generals and marshals disguised as peasants. The soldier king was the first to give intelligence the character of a strictly planned system. Forty years later, two inventive Frenchmen—Réal and Desmarais, senior lieutenants of Fouché, Napoleon's talented but unstable Minister of Police—accidentally created the modern system of spying on intelligence officers.

Counterintelligence is contrasted with intelligence, and the intelligence officer and counterintelligence officer represent the attacker and the defender. A simple classification compares intelligence to criminal activity, and counterintelligence to organised defence against crime. But such a division of roles not only misrepresents the work of many intelligence officers, whose exploits we discussed above, but also limits the counterintelligence officer's activities to basic tasks. In the secret service, as in war itself, an active attack is often the best defence. A counterintelligence officer uses every weapon and every trick employed by intelligence officers. Counterintelligence is the most skilful form of intelligence: it involves surveillance of the intelligence officers themselves, and the counterintelligence officer must also refrain from any talk and operate discreetly.

A sensational espionage case that made headlines throughout Europe in 1910 was actually a demonstration of counterintelligence techniques. Bertram Stewart was a professional intelligence officer and a capable officer in the regular British Army. He was asked to obtain information about German fortifications and the military situation on the islands and mainland from Emden to Cuxhaven—the only part of the German coastline that worried headquarters in

Whitehall. Stewart was ordered to remain in Friesland, make inquiries on the Dutch side, and investigate everything he could without entering Germany. He was also allowed to generously pay any informants who provided him with valuable information. Stewart was ambitious, energetic, and, as a professional intelligence officer, not content with second-hand information obtained at a great distance from his target. He exceeded his authority, crossed the border, and met someone who seemed trustworthy and possessed valuable information. They travelled to Bremen, where the man turned out to be a German counterintelligence agent. In Bremen, Stuart was arrested and sentenced to six years in prison. The German press interpreted this episode as a threatening act of British aggression. Thanks to this trial, the Reichstag was able to approve significantly larger amounts of funding for armaments that same year. On the occasion of the English king's visit to Berlin, the German Emperor pardoned Stuart.

In other circumstances, especially during the last war, counterintelligence officers had to enter enemy territory. Sometimes they pursued an intelligence officer who had slipped across the border unexpectedly. In other cases, they undertook this dangerous mission in search of evidence that could lead them to other enemy agents whose activities they had partially uncovered. When a counterintelligence officer leaves their native soil to carry out such a mission, they risk being detained as intelligence officers.

Thus, during the World War, intelligence and counterintelligence agents of the Western belligerent powers carried out truly fantastic activities in Bern,

Zurich, Geneva, and almost all other parts of Switzerland. Despite the fact that the Swiss army and police were largely on the German side at the beginning of the war, the Swiss rarely detained French, British, or American agents, despite being aware of their activities. However, German agents, such as Kohr, von Sommers, Koeniger, Meyer, and many others, were detained and sentenced to prison. This occurred because Allied agents were able to obtain and present to the Swiss authorities documentary evidence that German intelligence agents were also encroaching on Switzerland's security. The Germans, however, were unable to convince the Swiss that British, French, Italian, or American agents were not actually engaged in counterintelligence, but rather in attempts to undermine the neutrality of the small Alpine state.

A counterintelligence officer rarely enjoys advantages over an intelligence officer, and to top it all off, he must be prepared to withstand the wrath of a trapped agent. Discovered and cornered, the agent understands his life is at stake, and if he can, he resorts to betrayal, murder, deception, and so on. Neither a knife in the back nor a bribe—no crime will increase his punishment, but it can lead to salvation.

Anyone entering the counterintelligence service must possess a number of qualities: modesty, courage, patience, a keen mind, resourcefulness, ingenuity, imagination, intuition, tireless work ethic, honesty, and the ability to learn languages. Every counterintelligence officer must also be vigilant toward their fellow officers. This is necessary because intelligence officers who infiltrate enemy secret services always aim for counterintelligence.

Let's look at how an Englishman named Evert infiltrated German counterintelligence. During the war, British, French, and other counterintelligence agents visited intelligence schools in Charlottenburg, Wesel, Antwerp, Bern, and Freiburg, applying there as citizens of neutral countries willing to sell their services to Germany. But it was very rare for anyone other than Germans to get a job with German counterintelligence. Evert was simply lucky. He knew Germany and spoke German fluently. Having managed to infiltrate German military intelligence, he carried out counterintelligence missions along the Dutch border and in the Rhine region. areas.

German intelligence leaders received information about a daring British agent who was obtaining carefully concealed information right under their noses in the vicinity of Essen—Ewert. But since he had a reputation as an energetic counterintelligence agent, he was ordered to track down the Englishman. It seems ridiculous now, but for him it was a great danger at the time. Evert managed to overcome all obstacles and survived. This would remain unknown to this day if he hadn't personally revealed his work after the peace was concluded.

Stieber also dabbled in counterintelligence as a sideline. From time to time, his agents would attack some lone, unfortunate enemy agent. But Stieber deserves credit for proving that counterintelligence operations must be ruthless and cautious. He argued that during wartime, an intelligence officer should have the right to kill an enemy agent, just as a soldier can fire on an enemy soldier who refuses to surrender.

An enemy agent, he argued, must be shot, just like the enemy on the battlefield. But if he is not killed,

but wounded and captured, he must be tried and executed. Let him be shot for "attacking a transport of wounded," "shooting" at a supply train, or at a general and his adjutants. In short, the reason for the execution had to be such that the executed person would not evoke sympathy or be hailed as a hero. Stieber put his conviction into practice: the most ruthless of the secret services would win the war.

But the true art (or science) of counterintelligence was created in France. Napoleon's secret police agents, Réal and Desmarais, made counterintelligence ruthless enough, but at the same time, it was strictly defensive in nature and was undoubtedly necessary in a country infested with a multitude of foreign agents. Bonaparte's rule had always been military. The foundations of his empire rested on the smouldering ruins of previous regimes. Revolutionaries watched him and hated him as a monarch who oppressed his homeland, while royalists, émigrés, exiled aristocrats, and all manner of charlatans plotted against him and spied on him as a military usurper.

As we have already seen, a broadly organised, bold and intelligent intelligence service requires the creation of a real counterintelligence service.

Achievements of counterintelligence during the World War

During the World War, intelligence activities became an international problem that interested all belligerent and almost all neutral states, forcing them to take all possible measures to organise effective counterintelligence.

In 1916, as in Napoleon's time, intelligence gave birth to counterintelligence. Soon, sensational intelligence achievements became rare. Counterintelligence exploited all its organisational advantages, recruiting capable individuals and employing offensive tactics. In Russia, it had to deal with prominent traitors, bribed by the enemy and cleverly entrenched, and although counterintelligence failed to identify them all, many were brought to justice. Austria-Hungary had to monitor the numerous nationalities within its borders.

In France, the British and American expeditionary forces had to improvise a counterintelligence system in a foreign, but not hostile, population. All military undertakings had to be protected in a foreign country, often presenting the same difficulties as enemy territory. In the Balkans and Palestine, the heads of the British and French secret services found themselves in a similar situation. It's no wonder that in the vast European theatre of war, counterintelligence developed into a formidable force, far surpassing the achievements of agents and military police in all previous wars.

Of all the counterintelligence organisations brought to life by the World War, that created by the Belgians was the most sophisticated and unprecedented in history. This organisation was created informally, impromptu, and yet proved entirely viable throughout the entire period of Belgium's occupation. The German army, superbly trained and organised, unafraid of a frontal assault, after a victorious march from Liège to Antwerp lasting just over nine weeks, established itself in place, imposing unbearable hardships on a nation of seven million. Young Belgians of military age fled

Belgium to join the remnants of King Albert's army, positioned on the extreme left flank of the Allied front. Hiding in this seemingly conquered country were numerous English and French soldiers, wounded and abandoned when their units were driven back to France. These wounded refused to surrender, and so, with the help and advice of Colonel Gibbs, Miss Cavel, Dr. Bull, and the Prince and Princess de Croy organised their passage across the border. This work contravened the conqueror's military laws. Fearing the German secret service, the Belgians organised counterintelligence, which in many cases received timely information about impending raids and pursuits, saving lives on more than one occasion.

The German intelligence service in Belgium had been operating for several years under the direction of Couer and Thiesen; it had agents no less patriotic than the Belgians. However, the position of a conqueror differs from that of the vanquished in that the latter is on its own territory and has thousands of people at its disposal, eager to take revenge on the enemy. The Belgian conspirators demonstrated extreme dexterity in outwitting the German system, renowned for its perfection. Several groups, working in the same direction, formed around the Committee for Aid to Fugitives. Initially, all the Belgians crossed through the forests to the extreme left flank of the Allies, but after October 1914, this route was closed, the front line extended to the sea, and a route to neutral Holland had to be found via Brussels. The men in these groups were extremely energetic and resourceful. In the course of four months, some transported three thousand people abroad, while others, during the

same period of time, transported eight hundred people along a longer and more dangerous route.

At the trial of Armand Jeanne in Mons in March 1922, the perfection of Belgian counterintelligence was revealed for the first time. Jeanne, an informer, rather thoughtlessly boasted of having betrayed Edith Cavel and of having been involved in the conviction of 126 Belgians, Frenchmen, and Englishmen by a German military court. After the conclusion of peace, he disappeared from the house he occupied in Liège and was discovered several months later in Mons, where he was working in the office of a lawyer sentenced by the Germans to 15 years of hard labour. It was reported that Jeanne had denounced his benefactor. Archives found in Cambrai after the German retreat incriminated Jeanne; German intelligence archives from the intelligence centre in Brussels, on Rue Berlaymont, also confirmed his treasonous activities. At the trial, Jeanne, unaware of the mountain of evidence that was fatal to him, began to defend himself, demanding witnesses and renouncing all the charges brought against him; with his loud and cynical behaviour, he turned everyone present at the trial against himself.

Then a gentleman spoke, and the defendant was completely destroyed. It was Judge Lacroix of Brussels. He horrified Jeanne with his statements and descriptions of events that had taken place during the World War. "How do you know all this?" the defendant asked. Lacroix always replied, "But I was on your side." Along with lawyer Filienne, who was handling Jeanne's case, Lacroix had headed Belgian counterintelligence during the war, and he now revealed this so that everyone would understand his

position at the trial. Lacroix and Filienne knew many of the enemy's secrets and could now, with documentary evidence, incriminate Jeanne. According to one of the correspondents present at the trial, after Lacroix's speech, "the defence attorney took no active part in the trial." Jeanne was convicted and publicly executed.

The arrest of the London barber Ernst and his correspondents, as we saw above, dealt German intelligence in Great Britain a blow from which Germany was unable to recover. The German counterintelligence service, in turn, succeeded in depriving the French headquarters of its agents in many strategic locations. The Germans waited from early autumn 1915 until January 1916. They tracked down more than sixty French intelligence agents operating along communication lines and near railway junctions. On the eve of the major offensive on Verdun, all of these agents were captured by the Germans.

This devastating blow placed French intelligence in a dangerous position, since the Allied command needed to know what reserves the German command was sending to the theatre of operations and whether a simultaneous attack was being prepared on any other sector of the front.

The elimination of more than sixty spies was a major achievement for German counterintelligence. Throughout the World War, this achievement remained unmatched. In truth, the collapse of French intelligence was orchestrated not by German agents, but by Belgian renegades like Jeanne. Acting on Stieber's teachings, German intelligence chiefs in Brussels and Antwerp emptied prisons in search of counterintelligence agents for combat zones and

occupied territories: Belgium, the northern departments of France, Luxembourg, Alsace, and Lorraine.

In the Balkans, on the Salonika front, where there was more espionage and intrigue than fighting, the French and English used a gang of pirates for counterintelligence, who posed no less a threat than Jeanne. A young English officer was placed at the head of this crew of about two hundred men; he alone had to lead them, and he enjoyed almost unlimited powers. Fearless, muscular men, hung with pistols, knives, and enormous daggers, went to war as a whole community, with wives, children, and the elderly; they roamed at night, killing enemy soldiers and intercepting numerous messages.

There is no doubt that France had more enemy spies than any other country.

The British soon established close cooperation between the French gendarmes, the civilian police, secret service agents, and expeditionary force officers. This system was subsequently adopted by all the Allies. If the British in France suspected anyone of military crimes, they almost always reported it to the French authorities. The French secret service guarded the Swiss, Italian, and Spanish borders, Mediterranean ports, Paris, and other points where military equipment was manufactured. The British protected their naval bases in the English Channel, the combat zone from Belgium to the outskirts of Amiens (the junction with the French army), and a significant inland territory, including rest camps for troops, hospitals, communication lines, and supply bases. Here, they assumed responsibility for security, but

wisely utilised the French gendarmerie for surveillance of the civilian population.

The American army in France organised its own counterintelligence service to monitor bases, training areas, communication lines that were longer than those in Britain, and combat zones. America fought in the World War II for nineteen months, and not a single German agent carried out any serious mission on the American front during that time.

The primary task of counterintelligence was to protect headquarters, commanders, and their secrets. Paris demanded the utmost vigilance from those entrusted with guarding the numerous military missions and institutions temporarily or permanently located in the city. Each of these institutions underwent a thorough cleaning daily. Scraps and scraps of paper, even blotting paper, were carefully collected and destroyed. It was reported that when Delcassé, dismissed in 1905 due to the Kaiser's threat to declare war, was Foreign Minister, he worked to the point of exhaustion and entrusted the cleaning of his office to a servant, who hid discarded papers in them and then sold them to foreign agents. London was less accessible to spies than Paris during the Great War, yet the heads of the British secret service occasionally received reports from their agents while riding the streets in taxis. This precaution had a threefold significance: it spared the agent from visiting headquarters, where he could be seen entering or leaving, it completely guaranteed against eavesdropping, and it did not attract public attention to the person of the chief and the agent, as might happen during a meeting in a restaurant or hotel.

In all countries, it's customary for secret service leaders and superiors to remain unknown to many of their subordinates, both in wartime and peacetime. If the names of superiors are known abroad, they can be tracked down and photographed. This can significantly reduce the value of a secret service leader. Counterintelligence must protect its own superiors from any unwanted attention, protect their homes and lives, and at the same time (although this is already the domain of intelligence), it must learn the names, obtain photographs, and obtain precise information about outstanding intelligence officers and secret service leaders in other countries. The French achieved great results by monitoring such prominent German agents as Thiesen and Steinaguer. During the war, French intelligence officers even infiltrated German intelligence schools and intelligence headquarters in Bern, Antwerp, and Berlin. They then had extraordinary luck capturing enemy agents who, to complete their intelligence exploits, only needed to safely cross the border. The Swiss border was a trap where these clandestine incursions most often ended. Over four years, more than three hundred people were arrested at this border, either while attempting to leave France or shortly after arriving from Switzerland. Not all of those detained were spies, but each one was a suspect. While internment of so many people required significant expense, it was still insignificant compared to the damage some of them could cause.

A woman detained en route to Berne was in possession of blueprints for a new cannon from the Le Creusot factories. These blueprints were written in invisible ink on her petticoat, but the skirt was heavily starched, which would have attracted attention in

1917. After careful examination, the secret writing was eventually discovered. A "neutral" tourist was also confiscated of a schematic sketch of the main anti-aircraft fortifications in Paris. The sketch was written on the thinnest paper, tightly rolled into a tube, and inserted into the centre of a blue pencil (there were several pencils), but since most of the graphite had to be removed, this pencil weighed less than the others. Counterintelligence agents checked the weight of the pencils, and the spy was caught. In this case, like the exposure of the German agent Holtzman, counterintelligence had outdone itself. Holtzman remained undetected in France for some time. He received orders to meet another agent, who appeared to be in a similarly secure position, and to travel with him to Switzerland to receive further instructions. French counterintelligence agents learned of the proposed meeting, and one of them, posing as Holtzman, managed to obtain instructions outlining detailed plans to blow up hydroelectric installations in southeastern France. Holtzman and his comrade were captured while attempting to slip across the border disguised as French deserters. They even managed to seize the explosives intended for the explosions. After this incident, the Swiss government ordered the German conspirators to leave Switzerland immediately and never return.

Counterintelligence in Russia uncovered enemy agents, while traitors threw spokes in their wheels in every way possible. One of these traitors was such an important figure as the Minister of War. Even those unfamiliar with the Russian temperament and the imperial political structure can imagine the effort required to bring Sukhomlinov to the gallows. Indeed,

it was so difficult that the death sentence imposed by the court was never carried out. Even Sukhomlinov's transition from power to prison and the entire trial were a brilliant achievement of counterintelligence, but it is regrettable that it did not happen sooner.

At his trial, Sukhomlinov offered a bizarre defence. He claimed that his wife was young and extravagant, so he was forced to accept generous bribes offered to him by German emissaries.

It is known that before becoming Minister of War, Sukhomlinov was a highly capable officer. His appointment as Minister of War was met with approval by Russian military circles. While serving as commander of the Kyiv Military District, Sukhomlinov met the wife of a teacher and decided to marry her. To formally obtain a divorce, her ex-husband was granted leave and allowed to travel abroad.

Mrs. Sukhomlinova became the careerist's adored wife. Sukhomlinov was happy with her and paid no attention to public opinion. He deferred to her in everything, and she frequently travelled abroad. The head of the border guard in Verzhbolovo, on the main railway line to Germany, was Colonel Sergei Myasoedov. This gendarme officer, an agent in the pay of German intelligence, was more than happy to earn the approval of his superior by doing a favour for his wife.

Myasoedov allowed spies to cross the border and provided services to distinguished travellers. Sukhomlinov's young wife purchased various items abroad, and the colonel assisted her in smuggling.

Soon, the general was summoned to the capital to serve as Minister of War; his wife rose to the highest rank, allowing her to live an excessively lavish life.

Colonel Myasoedov was soon dismissed from his post due to a scandal stemming from his smuggling activities. Officially, he was "assigned to the Minister of War." As a bosom friend, he followed Sukhomlinov to St. Petersburg and was appointed the general's trusted aide. Myasoedov was openly accused of espionage; for this, he challenged the Octobrist leader Guchkov to a duel.

Guchkov, a renowned pistol marksman, accepted the challenge but fired into the air during the duel. Myasoedov fired at Guchkov but missed. When questioned by his friends, Guchkov replied, "I didn't want to save that scoundrel from the gallows." After this, Myasoedov resigned, but after war was declared, he reappeared, seeking a staff appointment, which was denied. Colonel Myasoedov then again found himself at the disposal of the Minister of War, who needed him for his shady machinations. Sukhomlinov's dastardly deeds manifested in the falsification of official reports on ammunition supplies and ammunition. In one report, he informed the commander-in-chief, who was about to launch an offensive in Volyn, that there were sufficient shells for field guns in the rear of the front. Acting on this message, the artillery launched an offensive, with brilliant success, as the Russian soldiers at the time were well-trained, fearless, resilient, and patient. But soon the supply of shells ran out, and with no shells left in the rear, the victorious offensive came to a halt.

Sukhomlinov, Myasoedov, and their sordid gang were suspected by many from the very beginning; however, the final evidence was uncovered by a young Russian officer. This officer, known by the pseudonym K., was captured by the Germans and faced the

prospect of years of waiting for peace as a prisoner of war. He had never been involved in counterintelligence work, but decided to exploit the trust of the German secret service. In this regard, it should be remembered that the Germans, while paying the Russian Minister of War and other influential figures, had a very low opinion of Russian patriotism. The Chief of the German General Staff on the Eastern Front, General von Hoffmann, naively complained that the German government was not giving him sufficient credit to buy Russian campaign plans. Therefore, when K. declared himself an opponent of autocracy, ready to return to Russia as a German agent, his sudden willingness to sell out his homeland apparently surprised no one. He was taken to the intelligence centre in Charlottenburg and given very detailed instructions. This was followed by a staged "escape." He made his way to Copenhagen and then to Stockholm, from where German agents were transported to the Baltic provinces. He eventually reached Riga and was able to reveal the story of his escape.

In Berlin, they dreamed of assassinating Prince Nicholas. One renegade (Rudzinsky) was offered \$50,000 for the job. He was too well known to the Okhrana, and secret police agents kept a close eye on him whenever he appeared near headquarters. They finally forced Rudzinsky to tell the whole truth about his assignment. His confession caused a sensation in Russia, but by this time, K. had arrived with detailed information about the German espionage system in Russia, obtained during his briefing in Charlottenburg. He had been sent to collaborate with Myasoedov's agents and had sufficient evidence to incriminate a

dozen people. However, he was not told anything about the agents of German origin from the gang of Altshuller, Krivosh, and Müller. These agents were ready to betray the Russian traitor Myasoedov, revealing his secret machinations to another Russian. The information provided by K. added to the indictment against the disreputable colonel and indirectly led to the arrest of his friend, the Minister of War. Sukhomlinov's guilt had been proven, and his defence was as pitiful as he himself.

Myasoedov was arrested, convicted, and hanged. At trial, it was proven that he supplied the enemy with army orders, codes, and even forged Russian telegraphic orders in favor of the Germans. During one operation in East Prussia in 1915, his treacherous intervention led to the destruction of the entire left flank of the Russian forces participating in the operation.

Officer K. received a military award for his counterintelligence activities, but his name was not released to the public. There were fears that Sukhomlinov and Myasoedov's numerous supporters might seek revenge against him.

The enterprising officer instinctively acted in accordance with the two cardinal rules of counterintelligence: 1) allow a minor agent, unaware that he has been discovered, to lead to a more dangerous agent; 2) the discovered messenger agent must be used to discover other agents whose reports he is transmitting, or to transmit false information to the enemy.

Censorship as a means of counterintelligence

Postal and telegraph censorship during wartime are generally believed to prevent the leakage of important information in letters sent by people unaware of the significance of the news they convey. It is also believed that censors thwart the plots of traitors and enemy agents attempting to pass on information they have obtained. But during the Great War, postal censorship played an even more important role: in a completely unexpected way, it complemented counterintelligence activities, uncovered agents, and helped uncover their methods. By studying letters sent to neutral countries, it collected a wealth of information that proved invaluable to military and naval intelligence.

It's known that during his campaign in Asia, rumours of discontent among his allies and mercenaries reached Alexander the Great, and the Tsar checked them in a very simple way. He announced that he was writing a letter home and advised his commanders to do the same. When the couriers set out, he stopped them and read all the letters entrusted to them. Napoleon devoted some time each day to reading private letters; Richelieu was the first Frenchman to systematically violate the sanctity of private correspondence. Generally, we know of very few kings or commanders who neglected this means of obtaining information.

In London during the Restoration, the renowned inventor Sir Samuel Morland astonished his admirers by constructing a device that opened letters and then quickly and accurately copied them. The postal service in England at that time was a private enterprise,

leased by the Countess of Chesterfield: her agent and manager, Sir Philip Froude, appointed the dexterous James Hicks as London postmaster. Morland's device was displayed openly at the post office, and Charles II once spent three hours "with delight and great satisfaction" watching the copying of letters, the contents of which, in all likelihood, interested him less than the machine itself. Copying a handwritten letter in less than two minutes without the aid of photography would seem an astonishing achievement to us too. Sadly, the device was destroyed in a fire.

When war broke out in Europe in 1914, only two belligerent powers—Russia and Germany—had a ready-made cadre of censors. French military and naval censorship was established at the very beginning of the war without any particular difficulty. But the British, who had the largest correspondence in Europe, admit that they were threatened with complete chaos in the first weeks of August, when they "set about organising this department of the secret service." Ships arriving in English ports delivered huge quantities of letters to the new censorship office. The pile of these letters grew with terrifying speed. People were hastily appointed to sort through this flood of letters, and among them, according to the Germans, were three German agents; the main danger these agents faced was overwork.

Several days before the outbreak of hostilities, a prudent official held back all mail he deemed of any interest. When this mass of written information was finally sorted and examined, numerous German and Austrian mobilisation orders were found among them. These orders were sent to Germans and Austrians abroad. The orders were passed on to the intelligence

department. Based on these documents, the intelligence department compiled a detailed summary of the enemy units advancing against France and Russia; all this information was urgently sent to these countries and served as the first warning of the forces deployed against them. Not once during the entire war were the censors able to gather so much valuable information in such a short period as in these two weeks.

Censors must search through a mass of nonsense for a single potentially dangerous line. During the World War II, hundreds of letters, packages, and newspapers were examined weekly in London. The same thing happened in Paris. Most of this material turned out to be completely innocent; when the specialists conducting these examinations ultimately found no traces of invisible ink or signs of coded or encrypted messages, the mail was resealed and sent on its way. If any letters aroused suspicion, they were briefly held, as this could serve as a warning to the culprit. But they were copied or photographed and preserved as evidence for counterintelligence. Any letters and packages that seemed suspicious, but did not provide any positive evidence that their sender was an intelligence agent, were held indefinitely.

The vigilance of the postal censor, working in liaison with counterintelligence, led to the discovery of a major German intelligence officer named Müller. One day in 1915, the London censor received a newspaper addressed to Amsterdam. A secret message was discovered in the margins of the newspaper. The message stated that "S" was heading north and would be writing "from 201." The postmark read "Deptford."

One Scotland Yard inspector set to work as if "C" were a bank robber or a murderer who needed to be caught. He approached Deptford police and asked them which streets in the city had houses with the number 201. "Only one," they replied. "Deptford High Street."

In this house, English detectives found a certain Peter Haan, a baker (an English citizen), who swore he had never made any strange notes in the margins of newspapers, never sent newspapers to Holland, and didn't even know who "C" was. However, during a search, they found a rounded-tip quill pen and invisible ink. Haan was arrested.

The baker stubbornly refused to talk, but his neighbors volunteered to answer for him and recalled a man who often visited him. They described him as a tall, well-mannered man, apparently Russian. Detectives consulted a list of London boarding houses, and their search led to Bloomsbury, where a terrified landlady recognised the description as that of her Russian lodger, named Müller, and said he had recently gone to Newcastle on private business. Indeed, "C" had ended up in the north.

Armed with all the necessary descriptions, detectives monitoring the Northumberland port identified Müller on the train. He was arrested and returned to London under guard. He was truly a dangerous spy. His system for transmitting the information he received was a remarkable innovation in itself. It could remain undetected for a very long time. He placed advertisements in English provincial newspapers and then forwarded these newspapers to his Dutch correspondent.

The code Müller used was eventually cracked by specialists from the infamous "Room 40." Even after Müller's execution, intelligence officers continued to send false information to the Germans using his method. Moreover, British intelligence had long been receiving cash transfers from the Germans as a reward for this information. This incident allowed counterintelligence to accurately determine the amounts the Germans paid their agents and the dates of receipt. After the Müller affair, the British secret service was able to alert censors to the need to mark the receipt of such sums sent at regular intervals to a recipient in a neutral country.

There is no doubt that the most sophisticated postal censorship organisation was the famous "black cabinet" of Tsarist Russia. It received primarily the correspondence of high-ranking officials; specialised officials opened and read this correspondence, copied or photographed it, and stored it secretly. Given the relatively limited number of senders deemed important enough to warrant such attention, officials comfortably ensconced in the post office studied handwriting samples until they learned to recognise them at first glance. Some censors knew up to 20 languages. The Russians called the work of the "black cabinet" perлуstration¹.

Count Ignatiev, during his time as governor of Kyiv, invariably sent letters through trusted confidants, as if he were involved in secret

¹ Opening and reading letters without the knowledge of the addressee.

conspiracies. A leading statesman like Count Witte suffered greatly early in his career because he was accused of his opinions on various public issues, openly expressed in his private correspondence. Public affairs—that was the subject matter applied to all letters that passed through the “black cabinet.” We can imagine censors at work, searching for clear indications of treason or vague signs of dissatisfaction with the existing regime. After days and weeks of poring over tedious and intimate personal files, gossip, and perfectly well-intentioned chatter about trivialities, finally a word would come across, casually uttered by some count, grand duke, or general. Even members of the imperial family were not exempt from this postal surveillance.

The “Black Cabinet” had branches in Moscow, Kiev, and Odessa. The Moscow branch was called the “secret expedition” and consisted of a director and eight officials; the Kiev branch had a similar staff and was, in all likelihood, the most active of all, since its tireless officials were also Austro-German agents. If not for the discovery of espionage in the Russian postal censorship, we would know much less about its secret activities. When enemy agents were discovered in the Kiev branch of the “Black Cabinet,” they were arrested and brought to trial, as if the cracks in the old edifice were so great that nothing was worth hiding from the public.

The main defendant, Karl Sievert, had worked in censorship for nearly fifty years. He worked with equal conscientiousness for two or more masters and displayed a remarkable indifference to all political camps. His three main assistants—Eduard Hardak,

Max Schulz, and Konrad Gusander—were, like him, of German origin, but had long been living in Kyiv.

The Black Cabinet went so far in its work as to look through the mail of the local secret police.

In 1911, Nicholas I visited Kyiv (during this visit, Stolypin was assassinated in the theatre). General Kurlov was entrusted with the protection of the royal retinue, and he ordered the “black cabinet” not to touch letters from members of the royal retinue. Zivert disobeyed this order.

During Sievert’s trial, it was revealed that he had photographed letters the Dowager Empress wrote to admirals and commanders-in-chief. Even members of Rasnutino’s gang couldn’t protect their correspondence from Sievert and his henchmen.

At the trial, it was proven that Sievert had been sending Russian military secrets to Vienna even before the war. Sievert testified that a special electric kettle used to steam-open ordinary envelopes was manufactured by a German company. He also explained that many letters were copied by hand; if a word or signature was illegible, it was photographed and pasted into the appropriate place in the text. All the photographic equipment was also obtained from Germany.

It was always clear to everyone that some government agency opened important letters, and since most of them were sealed with wax, it was believed that this required considerable dexterity. Experts and lecturers on military intelligence in both Europe and America commonly recommended using a heated blade to remove seals from envelopes; after the letter was read, the seal would be replaced. But Sievert, who had to open dozens of letters with

numerous seals, found that a heated blade or wire were unworthy of his perustration "genius." Very often, the heated metal damaged the envelope. Therefore, he invented a small device consisting of a thin, round rod, the diameter of a knitting needle, split halfway along its length. The rod was inserted into the sealed envelope at the very corner and pushed through to the opposite corner. The letter would fall into the crack. The wand was then quickly spun in the hand, and the letter was wound around the wand. It was then carefully pulled out, without stretching the envelope or damaging the seal or seals. The read and copied letter was then wound around the wand again, carefully inserted into the envelope, and unwound. The wand was then pulled back out, and the envelope was smoothed down by hand at the edge. The letter was then sent to its destination in the same well-sealed envelope in which it had arrived at the "black office."

Secret police

In modern Europe, the secret police participates in counterintelligence; one could say that the police service provides practical training for secret service personnel, promoting a number of capable agents and commanders for military counterintelligence work. Secret police, in one form or another, were used by all ancient dynasties; they reached their greatest power and sophistication in 16th-century India. Emperor Akbar organised a secret intelligence service around 1556, which effectively controlled the state.

Akbar considered spies the best means of governing a densely populated empire with extremely complex social and religious relationships. One Indian political philosopher remarked that spies "moderate the zeal" of officials. Reports on travellers apparently occupied a special place in Akbar's secret service system. The Englishman John Hawkins, traveling through the East as Queen Elizabeth's envoy, was received very unfriendly in Surat by Moqarrub Khan. Hawkins stubbornly continued on to Agra. But Akbar's spies preceded him with their reports. When the English admiral entered the city, he was greeted with honor, and in a private audience, the emperor mentioned all the troubles that had occurred in Surat before the admiral had time to complain to him. In addition to expressions of regret, the visitor was given the impression that order had already been restored in Surat. Thus, the spies helped the all-seeing and all-knowing ruler to keep the people in fear.

The entire secret service in India was entrusted primarily to scavengers. By law, they were sent out twice a day to clean all homes, and while clearing away trash and refuse, they eavesdropped on all possible conversations. Everything they overheard was passed on to their superiors, whose reports went directly to the emperor. The material was unselected, and the dirtiest gossip, the most trivial squabbles between neighbors or rivals, all minor scandals became known in the palace.

Nowhere else in Europe did such a secret police organisation exist, save for the powerful medieval church. The renowned German intelligence expert von Decker once said that a secret that a clergyman or woman cannot reveal will never be revealed. And the

parish priest was a clergyman with enormous influence over his parishioners; thus, the church had excellent opportunities to penetrate local secrets, and local reports constituted valuable intelligence material for archbishops like Wolsey or Richelieu.

Opponents of the Church have always claimed that confession was a means of secret service. Leaving aside these controversies, it should be noted that until the last century, the Church produced many brilliant secret agents, spies, and heads of secret services. Fouché, Talleyrand, and Desmarais were former priests who knew how to organise and utilise a secret police force. Cardinal Richelieu had at his disposal the cunning Father Joseph du Tremblay, who, with the help of bold and unscrupulous agents, uncovered the Cinq-Mars conspiracy, spied on Austria and its allies, and the Austrian queen in France, and went further than the conspirator Marie de Rohan, the Duchess of Lagnée and Chevreuse.

In France, traditions that trace back to Fouché and his agents are still alive. All methods of the French secret police revolve around compiling so-called "dossiers"—files. These "dossiers" are complete summaries of information on all residents of the republic who might be of interest to the authorities. This includes information on all prominent figures and their relatives, on those on the path to fame, their family relationships, and, finally, on all individuals even remotely connected to what is known as the criminal underworld.

The "dossier" system found many imitators. But Stieber's students in Berlin applied it to citizens of other countries for intelligence and secret service purposes in the event of war. German agents sent

abroad before 1914 were instructed to report all private information they could obtain about prominent foreigners and their family members. The result was an encyclopaedia of contemporary scandalous news, containing thousands of names of people famous in their home countries who could, if necessary, be pressured by threatening to reveal their sins, misdeeds, or even family secrets.

This was simply a wholesale preparation for official blackmail. It was hardly believed that all these people, no matter how intimidated, could be forced to provide information to the enemy. But they could be persuaded to provide indirect assistance or conceal the activities of German agents during the inevitable conflict.

Propaganda as a tool of the secret service

The World War perfected a new form of attack; alongside conventional reconnaissance methods, propaganda, influencing the morale of the army and the civilian population, developed to a tremendous extent.

As a means of attack, we encounter propaganda even in ancient times. The warlike Greeks wielded this weapon with great skill. During the World War, systematic propaganda won great battles and disarmed fleets; it demoralised nations and transformed a dozen hesitant neutral countries into energetic belligerents. Entire companies and battalions of men devoted all their time and all their abilities to scientifically conducted propaganda; these people had to possess a wide variety of qualities, ranging from

great resourcefulness and an ability to spread news to an outstanding gift for persuasion.

Propaganda, like bombs, fell on battle zones and unfortified cities, awakening millions of minds. Artillery required shells; propaganda required paper and ink. Propaganda was delivered through drawings, plays, and songs for those who preferred to listen rather than think. In the five years from 1915 to 1920, propaganda surpassed all fictions ever presented to voters or the rebellious masses.

Soon after the outbreak of war in Europe, the warring countries began convincing themselves and others that responsibility for the war should be placed on the enemy. Each side denied the blame and disputed the evidence presented by the other. People gifted with logical thinking were mobilised for propaganda purposes. People are usually willing to believe what they want to believe, and war propaganda must always strive to appeal to their emotions. In modern conditions, when the entire nation is involved in war, whatever is said and written about the enemy does not seem too improbable.

Propaganda is also a target of counterintelligence. It was primarily controlled and suppressed by censorship. However, in Great Britain, France, Italy, and America, strict control over the publication of various news items constantly aroused public indignation and anxiety. Here, censorship has probably done more harm than good. Enemy propaganda exploited this circumstance, since half-informed people are always eager to know everything, and this is a boon for the propagandist. It's a different matter when people are unaccustomed to reading and understanding. They confuse the propagandist with

their complete unfamiliarity with the foundations of their plan.

This explains the fact that during the World War, Austro-German propaganda did not have much success among Russian troops and the civilian population.

On the Italian front, in early October 1917, Austro-German intelligence was gathering accurate information about serious civil unrest in northern Italy. Riots were occurring in Turin, troops were firing on the people, and people were killed while dispersing the crowd. Through agents, it was possible to learn the names of the dead and other information known to all residents of Turin and its environs. Propagandists got to work. In Austria, special issues of newspapers well known in northern Italy were printed, containing shocking accounts of the unrest and bloodshed. Lists of the dead and injured were published, along with editorial explanations that were unfettered by wartime censorship and sparing of the authorities. At the end of October, units from Piedmont arrived in the northern part of Gorizia, and bundles of newspapers were airdropped to these divisions, dated so that they seemed to have been published in Italy. The Piedmontese read these newspapers—the effect was stunning. They decided to return home to Turin and restore order there. The impregnable trenches were immediately emptied. This occurred on October 24, and on October 25, the Battle of Caporetto took place. The Isonzo front was broken, despite the fact that the Italian forces outnumbered the Austrians seven to four. During the retreat, the Italians lost approximately half a million men killed and captured; having reached Piave, the Italians halted the advance,

and the Austrians were stopped by the timely arrival of six French and five British divisions.

In the final months of the war, from July to November 1918, the cautious and incessant propaganda of the Allies gradually exerted its corrosive influence; peace became inevitable. Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary withdrew from Germany, leaving it alone.

Like any other means, propaganda can cause serious harm to the cause it is intended to serve.

At the beginning of the war, the French, trying to delay the war, delayed mobilisation, which led to great disorder and the enemy's numerical superiority on the left flank. However, French cavalry patrols crossed the Lorraine border, which was exploited by German propaganda to convince the German people that Germany was a nation on the defensive.

America entered the war, and the Germans might have been alarmed if not for official assurances that the Americans were simply motivated by greed, possessing a completely inexperienced, untrained, and outnumbered army. After the creation of a large American army and its arrival on the European continent, Allied propagandists operating in neutral countries ensured that the Germans received false information about the size of enemy forces. Having learned from agent reports about the poor condition of French railways, the German headquarters asserted that France might allow the landing of large American forces, but would never be able to provide the means to transport them to the front.

The Americans quickly built their own railroad, brought in their own rolling stock, and deployed millions of soldiers to the front. Thus, the populations

of Germany and Austria suffered yet another crushing disappointment.

The Allies were astonished that sixty million people could be fooled and given such false information. The Germans believed that England's population was dying of starvation, and that London had been reduced to rubble by Zeppelins.

The head of British Naval Intelligence, Sir Reginald Hall, quickly devised a multitude of means to influence enemy public opinion. But in one case, Hall started a rumour that ricocheted back to England. In December 1914, Hall spread a rumour in Germany that the British fleet was massing forces to cover a British landing in northern Holland, between the Liesk and Weser. This rumour reached directly to German General Staff and was accepted at face value. The Germans believed it so seriously that they sent replacement divisions to the threatened area. This measure alarmed The Hague. News of the replacement divisions' movement spread across the North Sea and alarmed the British. Agents of the British Army Intelligence Corps reported the unexplained presence of German forces on the coast. The British command, for its part, was forced to be on alert. It was only after several days of great nervous tension on both sides that Hall learned that the result of the hoax had exceeded his expectations, and put an end to the anxiety of the military staff in Whitehall.

The task of propaganda should never be entrusted to intelligence agents. Talented intelligence officers who tried to engage in propaganda at the same time invariably regretted it, and some, the more reckless, paid for this attempt with their lives. Bolo Pasha, who was engaged in soap manufacturing and speculating

throughout Southern Europe, was a talented conspirator. But in 1914, having received large sums from American banks, he came to France and began acquiring newspapers with which he intended to propagate defeatist ideas; according to Germany's plan, such propaganda was supposed to demoralise the French troops at the front. Bolo was able to obtain only insignificant, pitiful leaflets that had no influence in the country. When he began to seek the purchase of a major newspaper and finally received "Le magazine" senator Humbert, then his game was over. A man who suddenly found vast resources and bought newspapers at a time when public opinion was crucial immediately drew suspicion. The voice of defeatism heard in Bolo's small press was soon drowned out by Bolo's own voice defending himself in court. He was shot.

In 1915, German agents were sent to America not for intelligence purposes, but for propaganda. They were tasked with spreading rumours against their compatriots living in Germany and abroad. They spread fictitious facts that degraded German dignity. What was the purpose of this strange campaign? The Germans assumed that once the American public realised the rumours were untrue, they would attribute them to Allied machinations.

But ultimately, this plan failed and was undoubtedly exploited by Allied propaganda. About two-thirds of the stories about German atrocities were fictitious. But one-third, such as the destruction of Louvain and the execution of Miss Kavel and Captain Fryatt, were true.

Pravda, June 9, 10, 11, 12, 1937

AL. HAMADAN. JAPANESE ESPIONAGE

Espionage and intelligence occupy a unique place in all areas of Japanese policy. "Military intelligence, political and economic espionage precede and prepare the ground for Japanese conquests on the Asian mainland," writes the Shanghai magazine *China Weekly Review*.

Espionage within Japan reaches colossal proportions. The tentacles of the political police penetrate and attach themselves to every segment of the country's population. All areas of life—work, everyday life, culture—are subject to police control. A system of surveillance and denunciation dominates the country. In schools, children are taught to report anything suspicious to the police, even if it concerns their parents. Children are indoctrinated into espionage and denunciation, painted with images of a "dying" and then "saved" empire.

Japan's ruling classes cultivate a particular hatred among the population toward foreigners. Every move and word of a foreigner living in Japan is immediately reported to the police.

Things reached the point where, as the English professor O'Conroy recounts in his book, the following official notice was posted at a Tokyo police station: "Kara-beru Forbes" ("kara-beru" means "watch carefully, follow every movement and observe," and Forbes is a former American ambassador to Japan). Conroy cites an excerpt from the Tokyo police department's notice in his book, which states that the Tokyo police authorities "will gladly receive secret messages from citizens." Commenting on the notice, Conroy writes that this "signifies the establishment of

a nationwide system of espionage, denunciation, and police surveillance.”

Japanese espionage and intelligence operations are no less developed outside the empire. The central targets of foreign espionage and intelligence are China, the United States, England, and the Soviet Union. Japanese spies and intelligence agents operate in these countries under a wide variety of guises: diplomats and barbers, priests and military attachés, businessmen and photographers. A vast army of Japanese spies and intelligence agents operates in almost every country in the world, even in countries as far removed from Japan as those seemingly of no immediate military or political interest, such as Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, Greece, and the Baltic states.

Leadership of espionage and intelligence abroad is concentrated in the General Staff of the Army. The 2nd Department of the General Staff directs, regulates, and organises all espionage and intelligence activities. The functions of this body are not limited to military intelligence: it also engages in political and economic espionage, organising political sabotage in various countries, and training personnel for the most “sensitive” areas of its activities.

The General Staff has at its disposal an extensive military intelligence apparatus. Under the overall direction of the General Staff, intelligence work is carried out by the headquarters of military units:

¹ T. O'Conroy, "The Japanese Menace." The book was translated into Russian. Published by Sotsekgiz in 1934.

¹ Command of naval intelligence is concentrated in the Naval General Staff. Naval intelligence is completely independent in its operations from the intelligence department of the army General Staff.

primarily the headquarters of the Kwantung Army (the Japanese occupation army in Manchuria) and the Korean Army, as well as the headquarters of the Japanese garrison in Northern China, military attachés, military missions, and so on.

In addition, the Japanese General Staff has a vast network of subsidiary intelligence agencies: all manner of "civilian," "patriotic," and similar organisations, recruited to carry out espionage and sabotage missions abroad. Such organisations, usually cloaked in highly chauvinistic and "patriotic" slogans, are, in essence, nothing more than covert intelligence agencies: they carry out "particularly sensitive" missions in cases where intelligence officers in officer uniforms, for one reason or another, prefer to remain in the shadows.

The foreign espionage and sabotage network created by these "true Japanese patriot" organisations on behalf of the General Staff numbers several thousand agents. The General Staff heavily funds its training of spies, intelligence agents, saboteurs, and terrorists. Special courses and schools have been established to train espionage personnel.

Among the numerous auxiliary intelligence agencies closely tied to the Japanese military, the most prominent was the fascist terrorist organisation "Black Dragon" (Kokuryukai in Japanese). Kokuryukai emerged in 1901 as an uncompromisingly nationalist, ultra-patriotic organisation advocating the seizure of Manchuria and the Russian Far East. These "patriotic" missions of the "Black Dragon" were closely intertwined with active espionage and sabotage operations on behalf of the 2nd Department of the General Staff.

The Black Dragon played a major role during the Russo-Japanese War, organising, on assignment from the General Staff, espionage, reconnaissance, and sabotage in the rear of the Tsarist army.

The Japanese government spent colossal sums on espionage and sabotage in Tsarist Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. In his book "Gold in the Russo-Japanese War," published in Berlin in 1905, Karl Helfferich recounts that in 1904 alone, the Japanese government allocated 120 million gold yen to cover the costs of intelligence in Tsarist Russia, organising a spy network, and carrying out sabotage.

Several sources shed light on the activities of Japanese intelligence during the war with Tsarist Russia. The notorious Socialist Revolutionary provocateur Azef was a long-time agent of the "Black Dragon." The notorious provocateur priest Gapon spied for Japan, receiving "rewards" from the Japanese military attaché in Stockholm, Sweden. Pilsudski also received subsidies from this attaché in exchange for the espionage services he provided to Japanese intelligence.

The extensive reach of Japanese intelligence in Tsarist Russia is demonstrated by the fact that the Japanese command was aware of all the most important decisions of the Russian high command during the 1905 war. For example, Tokyo was already aware by June 1 of the Russian command's secret decision to launch an operation near Wafangou (Manchuria), made on May 31. Negotiations regarding this crucial military action were conducted between Kuropatkin, the Minister of War, the Tsar's viceroy, and the Tsar via encrypted telegrams. Japanese spies, through their agents, discovered the keys to these

secret codes. It was only natural that the Japanese command prepared for the Russian offensive. But Japanese intelligence was active not only within Tsarist Russia: Japanese agents conducted extensive work to disrupt the Tsarist government's military contracts abroad. An order for 500,000 shrapnel shells, placed with Austrian military factories, was fulfilled due to the activities of Japanese agents in such a way that no gunpowder was added to the shells' spacer tubes. Naturally, not a single shell could explode.

Many current Japanese political and military leaders have also been trained in the "Black Dragon" school of Japanese deception. Former Japanese Prime Minister Koki Hirota began his political career in 1904-1905 as a low-ranking Black Dragon agent in Korea and Manchuria. In his memoirs, published in 1935 in the Japanese magazine *Gendai*, Hirota not only detailed his activities as an intelligence agent but also called on Japanese youth to follow his example.

Shortly before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Hirota, who was studying at a university in Tokyo, was summoned late one night to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The head of the ministry's intelligence department, Yamaza, told Hirota that war between Russia and Japan was inevitable. "You will have to go to Russia to conduct intelligence work there," Yamaza declared to Hirota. "You will go together. One of you will go via Vladivostok to Siberia, and the other via Korea to Manchuria. It is extremely convenient to send you students: you will go ostensibly to use your vacation in Russia to study the language (Russian) in practice."

"After this conversation," writes Hirota, "we received from Yamaza the necessary sums of money,

instructions, and admonitions about the need to exercise caution. My friend departed via Vladivostok for Siberia, and I, via Korea, for Manchuria. I visited Dairen, the port of Yingkou, Port Arthur, Nanjiang, Mukden, and other points, thoroughly surveyed the fortified positions of the Russian troops, military units, etc., and returned to Tokyo..."

Arita, former Foreign Minister in the Hirota cabinet, was trained in exactly the same way. Many Japanese diplomats, including Mushakoji (current Ambassador to Germany) and Ota (former Ambassador to Moscow), are closely connected to Black Dragon leader Mitsuru Toyama.

Although the Black Dragon's influence in modern Japan has significantly diminished, Mitsuru Tōyama remains one of the most authoritative figures in reactionary, military-fascist terrorist organisations. The Japanese press refers to Mitsuru Tōyama as a "dictator behind the scenes." The right-wing French journal *Le Docume* (April 1936) described Tōyama's activities as follows:

"It's time to talk about Toyama. His life is a series of unheard-of adventures..."

He extorts enormous sums, using them for his own organisation. He stirs up unrest in China and British India. In Japan, he overthrows prime ministers and ministers and appoints his supporters. He is responsible for countless murders. His hand is felt in the military uprising in Tokyo on February 26, 1936, which was a response to the moderates' success during the parliamentary elections. He has prominent students: former Prime Minister Inukai, who was assassinated on his orders; Baron Hiranuma (now Chairman of the Privy Council), whose star is now

rising; the current Prime Minister Hirota (forced to resign in February 1937 – **AI. X.**); General Doihara and hundreds of others.

Japanese intelligence operates according to strictly defined methods and systems. Typically, Japanese intelligence engages in extensive recruitment of agents.

When recruiting spies for China, the Japanese primarily recruit those with knowledge of the Chinese language, the country, and its customs. Preference is given to those born in China and having lived there for a long time. Among the Chinese, recruitment is primarily focused on those who studied or were born in Japan. In the first case, the emphasis is on a deep knowledge of the country, a soft accent in spoken language, and some assimilation, sometimes allowing the agent to pass themselves off as a Chinese born or lived in Japan. In the second case, extensive indoctrination is required during the Chinese's stay in Japan, etc. Furthermore, intelligence agencies are quite willing to recruit Japanese Buddhist priests. These agents, as a rule, have a good command of Chinese and are familiar with Chinese history and culture, which significantly facilitates their espionage work.

The principle of recruiting agents for work in European and American countries is noteworthy. As a rule, Japanese spy agencies, for example in England, consist of Americans, Germans, and French. Of course, particular preference is given to the British. The main task of Japanese spy centres is to create a broad network of agents among the local population. For espionage and sabotage activities in the USSR,

Japanese intelligence readily recruits Trotskyists and other enemies of the people, along with White Guards.

Japanese spies and intelligence agents have a wide variety of methods at their disposal: blackmail, bribery, terror, poisoning, robbery, murder, explosions, arson, organising train derailments, etc.

Japanese espionage in the British Empire and the United States of America

As we have already noted, Japanese intelligence agencies focus primarily on espionage and subversive activities in the United States, China, the British Empire, and the Soviet Union. Japanese intelligence employs foreigners of diverse nationalities and professions: British (for example, Trebitsch-Lincoln, a former member of the British Parliament known by the nickname "Monk Zhao Kun"), Indians (for example, Pratap, known by the Japanese as an "opposition figure" in India), Chinese, Americans, Germans, Poles, Russian White Guards, and so on.

The activities of Japanese intelligence agents, in particular the Black Dragon, in India and other English colonies have reached such a large scale that, as the China Weekly Review states, "the British government now considers it more useful to remain silent about the activities of the Black Dragon in India and other eastern possessions of England, resorting to other means of struggle."

But Japanese spies weren't operating only in India: in Australia, Singapore, New Zealand, and, finally, in England itself, the tentacles of Japanese intelligence had latched onto the most important government

institutions. The main targets of Japanese intelligence in the British Empire were the navy and the military industry. The Tokyo Naval General Staff regularly received reports not only on the progress of various British military construction programs but also detailed overviews of the state of various branches of the military and shipbuilding industries.

The Japanese Navy Ministry systematically receives exact copies of secret documents from the British Admiralty.

"Such information," writes the China Weekly Review, "costs enormous sums and considerable energy. But the fact is that such information is always at the disposal of Japanese intelligence, which has a vast network of agents. The Intelligence Service (British intelligence) is taking special countermeasures. Undoubtedly, the Intelligence Service possesses no less important data on Japanese plans."

...The duel between British and Japanese intelligence has become increasingly heated. The Japanese claim to have better organised intelligence than the British, borrowing the most valuable elements from the British and German intelligence systems... In any case, in Asia, Japanese intelligence is outperforming its British rival. The Japanese are aided here by their racial background. No matter how hard an Englishman tries, he finds it difficult to transform himself into a Chinese. The Japanese, on the other hand, often closely resemble the Chinese. The Japanese and Chinese belong to the same race—this is a great advantage for Japanese intelligence. Knowledge of language plays an equally important

role. Learning Chinese is difficult even for the Japanese and almost impossible for the British.

"...Japanese intelligence has firmly established itself in Hong Kong, England. It is constantly monitoring the Malay Peninsula, Singapore, and Indonesia..."

The magazine cites a fascinating excerpt from a speech by Japanese Vice-Admiral Imamura, who arrived on an official visit to Australia (an English dominion). At a secret meeting of Japanese residents in Sydney, Imamura declared: "We ask you, our compatriots, to devote all your energy to our country; maintain the closest contact with your consul, who will always be grateful for any information you manage to obtain and deliver to him."

Comments on this very clear call for espionage are unnecessary."

* * *

Japanese espionage in the United States is even more active than in the British Empire. Official and unofficial Japanese spies, "observers," "researchers," and the like are stationed in all the country's most important locations. At one time, the foreign press noted a not uninteresting fact: on a New York street, a large building was occupied by an office with a small sign reading: "Japanese War Ministry. Research Bureau in New York." The Japanese Navy Ministry maintains an identical bureau in San Francisco (California, USA). While these bureaus formally "study" the American economy, they are in fact spy centres. In other words, Japanese espionage and

intelligence have entirely legal grounds in the United States for their activities.

In 1936, a number of major Japanese spy organisations were uncovered in the United States. The American Navy, shipbuilding industry, and naval bases were the targets of all these organisations' espionage. American Harry Thomson, a former naval officer recruited by Japanese officials in the United States, collected information on the status of individual warships. He stole ship logs, signal codes, plans, and secret ciphers. He passed all these documents on to Japanese naval officer Miyazaki, stationed at the Japanese embassy in the United States. After Thomson's arrest by American authorities, Miyazaki secretly fled the United States. Shortly after Thomson's exposure, another American, also a former naval officer, John Farnsworth, was arrested.

American press reports reveal that Farnsworth was a spy of a more "major scale" than Thomson. He was directly connected to the Japanese naval attaché in the United States and his assistants. Farnsworth served in the Japanese secret service for several years. Farnsworth's indictment states that he and Japanese officials "knowingly, unlawfully, and for money conspired with each other and others to transmit to the Japanese government documents relating to the national defence of the United States, with the intent to injure the United States for the benefit of Japan."

It is significant that in the indictment against Farnsworth, the American authorities named in full the names of all Japanese diplomats associated with Farnsworth, who was accused of espionage.

According to American media reports, Farnsworth, using his connections in US naval circles, gained access to classified documents. He managed to steal top-secret instructions on naval combat tactics from the American fleet and passed them on to Japanese "diplomats." In the same way, he obtained classified data on the artillery power of US naval ships, the strength and status of naval aviation, and a host of other crucial military information.

Farnsworth was a spy with decades of experience, an incomparable memory, and extensive military and technical knowledge. According to foreign media reports, he could simply glance at a particular machine design or blueprint to accurately reproduce it. These qualities were highly valued by Japanese intelligence, which made extensive use of this agent. With Farnsworth's help, Japanese intelligence was constantly kept abreast of all US military secrets. This circumstance forced US naval authorities to immediately revise naval combat tactics and change all secret codes, ciphers, and so on after Farnsworth's arrest.

In February 1937, the American newspaper The New York Herald Tribune reported the discovery of a Japanese spy centre in Havana, Cuba, led by a Japanese man named Osawa. During interrogation, Osawa was forced to admit that the group of Japanese intelligence officers he led was engaged in "obtaining secret naval plans of the United States of America." Plans for the naval harbours of New York and Norfolk, Virginia, along with secret American codes and a detailed plan of the American naval base in Cuba—Guantanamo Bay—were discovered in Osawa's apartment. Osawa's testimony revealed that official

Japanese diplomatic representatives in the United States were also engaged in espionage with him. Ordinary Japanese spies in Osawa's group posed as Japanese peasant émigrés.

Japanese intelligence agents adopt a wide variety of guises to maintain their operations in the United States. U.S. Congress members Diamond and Sirovich recently issued statements demanding that the U.S. government take action against the activities of Japanese fishermen. It turns out that these "fishermen" devote all their time to photographing the American Pacific and Alaskan coastlines, compiling maps, sketches, and so on. "Japan," Diamond declared, "knows as much about the Alaskan coastline and the Aleutian Islands as we do, and possibly much more."

Japanese intelligence is paying particular attention to Panama. In this case, Japan is less interested in Panama than in the famous Panama Canal. This canal allows the United States, in the event of a Japanese-American war, to quickly transfer its fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. The Japanese are meticulously and painstakingly creating a vast network of scouts, saboteurs, and spies in the Panama Canal Zone in order to immediately disable the canal in the event of war. Such an operation, if successful, would deal a severe blow to the United States. The consequences of such an operation could be disastrous for the American fleet's Pacific squadron, which would be cut off from the US Atlantic squadron for a long time.

The Panama-American newspaper published an article alarmingly noting the growing threat to the Panama Canal from Japanese spies and saboteurs.

Fort Randolph—an important strategic point on the Panama Canal—is teeming with Japanese spies posing as tailors, barbers, photographers, and so on. “This Japanese occupation army,” the newspaper writes, “seemingly armed with razors and needles, is numerous and mobile. It is capable of destroying the canal within an hour any night, despite the precautions of our admirals and generals.”

In recent years, many “stories” and “novels” have been written in Japan about the Panama Canal. The destruction of this canal is portrayed as a heroic feat. The authors of some of these “novels” openly depict how Japanese spies and saboteurs blow up the canal at the beginning of the Japanese-American War, when the US Atlantic squadron was heading towards it, rushing to the aid of the Pacific squadron.

China in Japanese intelligence networks

The Japanese General Staff’s thousands-strong intelligence agency and its extensive auxiliary network of spies and saboteurs are scattered throughout China. Japanese agents are often employed in China by the government. In this regard, it’s worth citing an excerpt from a Japanese newspaper that attests to the connections of Black Dragon leader Mitsuru Toyama with Chinese government circles.

“Mitsuru Toyama,” wrote the newspaper Niroku on November 12, 1936, “concerned about the state of Japanese-Chinese relations, decided to visit Nanjing (the capital of China). Toyama has had special ties with the leaders of the Nanjing government for a long time. Among the current leadership of the Nanjing

government, there are still many people who enjoy Mr. Toyama's patronage. Foreign Minister Arita (who resigned in February 1937 along with the entire Hirota cabinet— **Al. H.**) and others express gratitude to Mr. Toyama and place great hopes on his work in China."

One of the long-time Japanese intelligence agents, the notorious Ataman Semyonov, oversees all White Guard espionage and sabotage activities in Manchuria. In Inner Mongolia (Chahar and Suiyuan provinces), the spy network operating on behalf of the Japanese General Staff is headed by Yasuguro Sadzaki (nicknames: "White-Bearded Hermit," "King of Mongolia"). This "hermit" is closely associated with espionage and sabotage in Inner Mongolia, the provinces of Gansu, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Tibet, and neighbouring countries.

Recently, a well-known Japanese intelligence officer, "Dr." Morishima, was sent to Inner Mongolia, apparently to strengthen the activities of espionage agents. This "doctor" now heads the Japanese military mission in Kalgan (the capital of Chahar Province).

Japanese intelligence agents are stationed in every city in China without exception. Officially, they are engaged in the entirely "innocent" activities of photographers, barbers, monks, shopkeepers, brothel keepers, and opium den owners. In reality, they meticulously study their regions, gather information, compile detailed military-geographical maps, photograph key strategic areas, and establish an intelligence network among the local population. Japanese intelligence agents often act as representatives of "cultural" societies, trading firms, and the like. In late 1936, in Zhengzhou, a major centre of Henan Province, a Japanese spy organisation

was uncovered that was plotting the breakaway of that province from China. The spies disguised their activities by organising a "cultural association." As it turned out later, this "cultural association" collected information about the Chinese army, organised a "movement for the autonomy of Henan," prepared the explosions of bridges, the destruction of railways, and, finally, had a secret radio station, with the help of which it transmitted all spy information to the headquarters of the Kwantung army.

Where threats and bribery fail, Japanese intelligence agents resort to more potent means. Japanese agents managed to capture the renowned Inner Mongolian prince De Wang. However, further recruitment of agents encountered stubborn resistance from a group of Mongolian princes who refused to voluntarily submit to the Japanese yoke. This group consisted of Princes So, Erek Sechen, and Shalabu Dorzhi. In October 1936, as preparations for the Japanese offensive on Suiyuan Province began, Erek Sechen "suddenly died," followed by Shalabu Dorzhi. Shortly before this, Prince So mysteriously died. The Suiyuan newspaper Baotouzhibao reports that this group of princes was sharply anti-Japanese. The newspaper adds that the princes were poisoned.

Secret Report of a Japanese Intelligence Agent

Before us is a crucial document—the secret report of Major General Matsumuro, presented to a conference of Japanese military agents in China convened by the Kwantung Army Headquarters. Representatives of the Tokyo General Staff

participated in the conference, which took place in October 1936 in Changchun (the capital of Manchukuo). To properly appreciate the significance of this report, it is necessary to understand the character of its author. General Matsumuro was an experienced Japanese intelligence officer who devoted much of his life to "special work" in the Far East. Having spent many years serving in the 2nd Department of the General Staff, he naturally became "a great expert on China and Mongolia," as The Japan Times described him. In 1936, after a lengthy "familiarisation tour" of Mongolia and China, Matsumuro was appointed head of the "special service" (the main Japanese intelligence agency in China) at the Kwantung Army Headquarters. He replaced the notorious General Doihara in this position. This latter circumstance testifies to the significant role Matsumuro plays in the implementation of Japanese foreign policy.

General Matsumuro's report is entirely devoted to developing methods for the further enslavement of China.

"It is perfectly obvious," writes this intelligence officer, "that the territories we seize for the purpose of obtaining raw materials must be closely linked to our empire. This is why Manchuria was occupied following the Mukden incident of 1931 (according to the Japanese version, the explosion of the South Manchurian Railway near Mukden in September

¹ The American magazine China Weekly Review, published in Shanghai, published in its issue of February 13, 1937, a significant, most important part of the "Major General Matsumuro Memorandum." This document, as the magazine points out, was widely distributed in China in the form of a separate brochure.

1931.—Al. **Kh.**). If our Manchu-Mongolian policy means anything at all, it is aimed at seizing a second territory (Mongolia) following the first (Manchuria), the exceptional strategic importance of which compels us to act continuously in this direction.

...Recently, training of special agents has begun, but they are reluctant to travel to Mongolia due to the difficult living conditions...

By sending our vanguard—reconnaissance troops deep into Northern China—we ensure that various pro-Yanow elements operate in different locations. In this way, we gradually gain control over all military authorities in Northern China. To test local officials, we engaged in smuggling and bribery...”

The Japanese intelligence officer’s frankness is noteworthy. Without disguise (publishing the report was certainly not part of Matsumuro’s plans), he describes the methods the Japanese are using to prepare new aggressive actions.

From this part of Matsumuro’s report, the next objective of the Japanese imperialists becomes clear: the seizure of Inner Mongolia and Northern China. At the beginning of his report, Matsumuro strongly emphasises the importance of these Chinese territories as major sources of raw materials and markets. “The population,” he points out, “which will form the basis of our future markets (if we count the provinces of Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shaanxi, and Henan), reaches 100 million people, i.e., three times more than Manchuria. Besides Togo Northern China is the main supplier of raw materials for all of China: coal, iron, cotton, oil and wheat.”

Matsumuro devotes considerable attention to the favourable environment that allowed Japanese spies

and intelligence agents to operate with impunity in Northern China. And to his credit, his observations are accurate.

“Our subjects,” he emphasises, “engaged in certain activities (espionage.—**Al. Kh.**) in Northern China, rarely have to be the objects of persecution. Chinese officials rarely protest even about the illegal activities of our agents. Japanese consulates almost never receive such complaints from the Chinese authorities. The activities of our agents played a very important role. They revealed the pliability and inability of Chinese officials to resist. This circumstance, however, causes discontent among the masses. Since Manchuria came under our control, we have ceased active activities on its territory. But in Northern China, where our agents act much more boldly and more lawlessly than it was in Manchuria before the Mukden incident, the situation is different. The influx of these agents (spies. —**Al. Kh.**) from Manchuria to Northern China will bring the desired effect.”

Matsumuro—as the second part of his secret report reveals—understood perfectly well that a direct military takeover of Northern China and Inner Mongolia (excluding those territories already controlled by the Japanese) would create significant difficulties for Japanese imperialism. Unbridled Japanese aggression and the Chinese authorities’ policy of concessions and non-resistance sparked a powerful movement within the country for a united national anti-Japanese front.

An experienced intelligence officer cannot ignore this formidable factor, which could thwart all Japanese plans of conquest. This is why Matsumuro proposes a new subversive plan—preliminary preparations by

spies and pro-Japanese elements for the seizure of Northern China. Japanese intelligence is already employing new methods of aggression—saturating the entire apparatus of power in this part of China with Japanese proxies.

Matsumuro says without a trace of embarrassment: "If Japan needs a pretext for a new invasion of China, it's very easy to find. This makes particularly comical the extraordinary caution of the Chinese authorities, who are trying to avoid any offense to Japan." But he himself rejects this favoured Japanese method of conquest. In a special chapter of his report, Matsumuro lays out in great detail the content of the "new course" of Japanese aggressive policy in China.

"Our objectives in China," we read in this chapter, "must be based on the principle of nominal Chinese control. The foundation of this principle is the refusal to occupy new Chinese territories with armed forces, as this can only cause further complications for us. The most reliable path is to place influential Chinese at the head of numerous autonomous and independent states. In the first stage, this will secure for us the north and northwest of China... The north and northwest of China, which form an external barrier to Manchukuo, can serve as a buffer zone of great military significance.

The creation of such zones means, first, making territorial demands on China one after another. This must be carried out until China's desire to regain lost territories is completely suppressed. Finally, once northern and northwestern China are under our control, we can advance into eastern and southern China. This will finally subjugate China and gradually

destroy its national government. Then, it will be possible to establish separate independent states under Japanese control throughout China. These plans have a good chance of success in China. Victory without war—that is how one can formulate the essence of these plans.”

In concluding this chapter, Matsumuro comes to the following practical conclusions.

“We must,” he notes, “now use new methods in our activities and achieve the following goals:

1. Control over various local rulers and assist them in suppressing anti-Japanese elements.

2. Strictly monitor and hinder the desire to unify the country, implement plans for national self-defence, create a united anti-Japanese front, and also hinder the formation of a united front between individual groups led by Generals Feng Yu-xiang, Yang Xi-shang, Zhang Xue-liang, and the Chinese Red Army.”

General Matsumuro’s program, as is evident from the excerpts we’ve cited, differs from other Japanese documents of this kind in a number of new ways. Japanese imperialists, as we’ve already noted, cannot ignore the significant changes that have occurred in China’s political situation over the past two years. This new situation compels the Japanese to adapt, seeking new forms of aggression that would facilitate their plans to enslave the Chinese people. And this new form of aggression is proposed by General Matsumuro: **flooding China with spies, saboteurs, and terrorists, in order to undermine the Chinese people’s will to resist.**

General Doihara—the “Far Eastern Lawrence”

Among the most famous modern international spies and intelligence officers, Japanese General Kenji Doihara undoubtedly occupies a prominent place. He was one of Mitsuru Tōyama’s students. In a short period of time, he made a remarkable career. Even as a junior officer, Doihara specialised in intelligence work in China. Tōyama’s patronage opened up broad prospects for him. Doihara’s first major “case” was organising an uprising by the troops of Chinese General Shi Yusan in the Beiping-Tianjin region (northern China). The uprising was suppressed, but Doihara had already proven himself a capable intelligence officer and organiser.

In 1931, Doihara headed the largest Japanese intelligence centre in Manchuria—the Harbin Military Mission. In September 1931, Japan began its armed occupation of Manchuria. Doihara appeared in Tianjin, “abducted” the inglorious descendant of the last Chinese dynasty, Henry Pu Yi, brought him to Manchuria, and declared him “Emperor of Manchukuo.” Sometime later, Doihara was appointed head of the Japanese military mission in Mukden. Feverish work began to form a “Manchukuo government,” which included all the corrupt Chinese officials Doihara had recruited. He realised that such a “government” would need to include at least one popular figure in Manchuria. Doihara chose General Ma Zhangshan, who was still resisting the Japanese occupation forces. After extensive indoctrination, General Ma received an offer, as the Far Eastern press reported in detail, to serve as Minister of War in the new “government.” General Ma also received 1 million

yen. General Ma accepted the money, but did not join the “government” and continued fighting against Japanese troops.

Doihara was severely compromised by this failed attempt to bribe General Ma, a scandal for Japanese intelligence. The Japanese General Staff was forced to temporarily remove Doihara from Manchuria, promoting him to the rank of major general and commanding a brigade stationed in Japan.

Soon, Doihara reappeared in Manchuria, this time as the head of the Kwantung Army’s “special service” department. In his new position, he demonstrated his abilities to the fullest: all Japanese intelligence in China, Manchuria, Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang was now under his command. Doihara frequently made extended “journeys” across China, inspecting the work of intelligence agents on the ground and organising new military and political sabotage operations. The foreign press described him as a behind-the-scenes organiser of the uprising of individual Chinese generals against the Nanjing government. Following one of his trips to Beiping and Tianjin, the Hebei-Chahar Political Council, led by pro-Japanese elements, was established in northern China.

Between inspection tours, General Doihara organised sabotage squads of Russian White Guards and transferred them to Soviet territory with missions to blow up railway bridges and junction stations, derail trains, set fires, kill, and loot. But he also acted more subtly: he ordered the White bandits to settle in Soviet territory and await the outbreak of war to undermine the rear. Trotskyist spies and saboteurs—agents of the Japanese General Staff—carried out exactly the same mission in the USSR.

In late 1935 and early 1936, Doihara made an extended trip to southern China. The ink on his report to the Tokyo General Staff was barely dry when the militarists of southern China launched a generals' war against Nanjing. By provoking this war, the Japanese intended to divert attention from northern China, thereby facilitating its capture by Japanese forces. Now promoted to lieutenant general, Doihara commands the 14th Japanese Division.

Doihara is the most prominent and experienced Japanese intelligence officer. The foreign press calls him the "Far Eastern Lawrence." However, Doihara is undoubtedly an even greater intelligence officer: he is a persistent and consistent instigator of a "great war" on the Asian mainland. He is an experienced organiser of political intrigue, provocations, and espionage in the complex environment of the Far East, particularly China. Over the course of five to six years, Doihara achieved an incredible career (from colonel to lieutenant general) in the imperialist army. To illustrate the dizzying nature of his career, consider the following example, typical of the Japanese army: the notorious military-fascist terrorist Aizawa, who assassinated Japanese General Nagata (chief of the military department of the Japanese Ministry of War) in 1935, served in the army for 25 years before achieving the rank of lieutenant colonel.

Some Facts About Japanese Espionage in the USSR

Doihara and his associates in espionage and sabotage work created a large, well-established intelligence apparatus in Manchuria, a vast network of

spies and saboteurs. The notorious White bandit Ataman Semyonov, the Tsarist General Kislitsyn, and others, under the guidance of intelligence "specialists"—General Ando, Major Onouci, and Captain Suzuki—trained brutal White Guards in sabotage and espionage at a special school in Harbin. Detachments of White bandits were then transferred by the Japanese to Soviet territory.

In late 1936, the Japanese transferred a gang of White Guard spies and saboteurs to the USSR, whose activities were suppressed by the NKVD. In November 1936, this gang was tried in Khabarovsk. The Japanese White Guard spies received their just deserts, as was expected of the rabid enemies of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

Japanese intelligence resorted to a wide variety of methods to recruit new agents for espionage within the USSR. In his deeply instructive article in Pravda, S. Uranov provides one example characterising the methods of Japanese intelligence.¹

"There are also a number of other known cases," writes Comrade Uranov, "in which the enemy, taking advantage of the promiscuity of some Soviet citizens on foreign assignments, set them up with women, then forced them to satisfy the 'insulted husband' who had appeared, and, under the guise of compensation for the matter being hushed up and not allowed to escalate to a scandal, persuaded these gullible and promiscuous people to espionage and treason. Such a disaster befell one Soviet citizen, previously

¹ S. Uranov, "On Some Insidious Recruiting Techniques of Foreign Intelligence Services." Pravda, May 4, 1907.

supposedly blameless, while he was on assignment in Japan. He began frequenting restaurants and other places of entertainment, and there he became close to one of the patrons, an apparently 'aristocratic', rather beautiful woman. During one of his meetings with this woman in a secluded corner of a fashionable restaurant, a Japanese man in military uniform suddenly appeared, introduced himself as the woman's 'husband', and pounced on the Soviet citizen, demanding satisfaction for the insult to the honor of his family. The matter would have ended in scandal if another man hadn't appeared immediately, a rather amiable-looking Japanese man in civilian clothes, who began to persuade the Japanese military man to avoid causing a scene and settle the matter peacefully. The Soviet citizen, feeling desperate, seized upon the "mediator" as a lifeline. The matter ended peacefully, but at what cost? The Soviet citizen had signed a document pledging to provide the "mediator" with "information" about certain matters in the USSR that were of interest to the "mediator," who turned out to be a Japanese intelligence agent. But having signed the document, he found himself in the "mediator's" clutches. Fearing exposure by the "mediator," he became increasingly entangled, carrying out ever more espionage assignments. He had become a Japanese spy and an enemy of his homeland.

The example cited by Comrade Uranov is quite remarkable. It not only exposes the insidious tactics of Japanese intelligence but also shows the politically unstable elements the enemy is banking on. Idiotic illnesses—carelessness, gullibility, lack of vigilance, vices, a penchant for alcohol, perversion, and dishonest handling of public funds—these are the

cracks through which the enemy seeks to penetrate our territory, undermine our defences, ferret out state secrets, and stab us in the back.

In the city of Svobodny, a visiting session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR recently heard the case of members of a Trotskyist espionage, terrorist, and sabotage organisation operating on the railways of the Far East under the direction of Japanese intelligence. The defendants confessed to their heinous crimes. This gang of Japanese-Trotskyist spies and saboteurs was led by a resident of Japanese intelligence, the veteran spy Averbakh, who had established himself on the Amur Railway. This vile gang, in addition to Trotskyists, included Mensheviks, Kolchakites, Socialist Revolutionaries, and rightists. They were all Japanese spies. Saboteur Averbakh testified during interrogation: "The Japanese demanded that we resort to mass sabotage, sabotaging machines and equipment, setting fire to factories, and would especially intensify the sabotage when tensions arose in relations between Japan and the USSR."

These seasoned spies carried out Japanese intelligence assignments with precision. They orchestrated the derailments of passenger, troop, and freight trains on the Amur and Far Eastern Railways, destroyed locomotive facilities, supplied the Japanese with information on the number of troop trains traveling to Khabarovsk, and so on. Pravda, in its editorial of May 22, 1937, reports the villainous tactics the Japanese spies resorted to cover up their bloody crimes: "When Comrade Fedorkin, the party organiser at the Kuibyshevka station depot, uncovered traces of their criminal activities and attempted to expose them,

the Trotskyists poisoned him with a toxin obtained from the Japanese intelligence resident, the seasoned spy Lezhedko...”

Forty-four Japanese-Trotskyist spies caught red-handed, fierce enemies of the peoples of the USSR, received the punishment they deserved: all were executed by firing squad by verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. **“For every drop of spilled workers’ blood, the enemies of the USSR will pay with poods of the blood of spies and saboteurs!”** —these words of Pravda echo the anger of tens of millions of workers of the Soviet Union, the terrible wrath of a great and powerful nation.

Trotskyist Agents of the Japanese General Staff

The trial of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist centre, traitors to the socialist state, and sworn enemies of the peoples of the USSR, demonstrated to the entire world that Trotskyism is an international espionage and sabotage agency of the fascist general staffs. The testimony of the defendants in the case of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist centre, among other things, painted a monstrous picture of their vile espionage and intelligence work, carried out in preparation for Japan’s “great war.” In preparing for war, the Japanese imperialists, as the trial showed, relied on Trotskyist spies, terrorists, and traitors who undermined the USSR’s defences from within. The vile “Trotskyist Judases, who sold out their homeland for 30 pieces of silver, and even those were counterfeit pieces”¹, did everything they could to ensure that the

USSR would be defeated in the event of a war with imperialist Japan.

It's no coincidence that the Japanese General Staff, when recruiting spies and saboteurs for subversive work in the USSR, chose Trotskyists. Who else but these Trotskyist scoundrels, who betrayed and sold out their homeland, could become the servile lackeys of the Japanese generals? Only they, consumed by a fierce hatred of Soviet power, could coldly and calculatingly condemn the peoples and wealth of the socialist state to the torment and plunder of Japanese and German imperialists.

In his report to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on March 3, 1937, Comrade Stalin gave an extremely profound characterisation of contemporary Trotskyism.

“Modern Trotskyism,” said Comrade Stalin, “is not a political current in the working class, but an unprincipled and unprincipled gang of wreckers, saboteurs, intelligence agents, spies, murderers, a gang of sworn enemies of the working class, acting under the employ of the intelligence agencies of foreign states.”²

The Japanese General Staff deployed its Trotskyist spy network to the most vital sectors of the Soviet Union's national economy—railway transport and heavy industry. Japanese intelligence (just like

¹ A. Vyshinsky. Speech at the Trial of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Centre, p. 48. Partizdat. 1937.

² I. Stalin, “On the Shortcomings of Party Work and Measures for the Elimination of Trotskyist and Other Double-Dealers”; p. 17. Partizdat. 1937 (my interpretation.— **Al. Kh.**).

German intelligence) attached exceptional importance to the destruction of Soviet rail transport. They assumed that severing rail links between the Far East and the central regions of the USSR would sharply weaken the OKDVA's combat supplies and thereby significantly reduce the Red Army's resistance to a Japanese attack on Soviet territory. Japanese intelligence also assigned other tasks to its Trotskyist spy network. Long before the war began, the Japanese General Staff instructed Trotskyists to organise the destruction of troop trains sent to the Soviet Far East, always with fatalities. This was done primarily to artificially demoralise the Red Army soldiers and the country's population. Even more heinous crimes were being prepared by Trotskyist bandits on orders from the Tokyo General Staff before the start of the war. Japanese saboteurs were plotting **a bacteriological war** in the deep Soviet rear, in order to cause highly contagious, destructive epidemics among the ranks of the Red Army and among the civilian population of the country.

"Knyazev testified," notes the state prosecutor and prosecutor of the USSR, Comrade Vyshinsky, in his speech at the trial, "that, in agreement with this very Mr. X... (a representative of Japanese intelligence.— **Al. X.**), he gave and carried out orders in the event of war to organise the arson of military warehouses, food stations, and troop sanitary treatment centres. Knyazev confirmed that **Japanese intelligence particularly sharply raised the issue of organising sabotage acts through the use of bacteriological means during the war with the aim of infecting trains carrying troop echelons,**

as well as food and sanitary treatment centres for troops, with highly infectious bacteria.”¹

This is far from a complete list of the atrocities plotted against the peoples of the Soviet Union by the Japanese imperialists and their Trotskyist mercenaries. The Japanese General Staff resorted to its old, tried-and-true methods of espionage and sabotage. It made no distinction between ordinary spies and Trotskyists. And what difference could there be? Perhaps only that the Trotskyist bandits went even further in their subversive work than the Japanese and White Guard professional assassins, spies, and saboteurs. And while an ordinary spy could “let down” his masters, the Trotskyists acted with dog-like devotion. “The connection (of the Trotskyists— **Al. Kh.**) with the Japanese,” as the Japanese spy Knyazev testified at his trial, “will not be an individual act, but rather stems from the methods of struggle of the organisation with which I am associated.” The interests of Trotskyism were so closely intertwined with those of foreign intelligence services and aggressive, anti-Soviet forces. Espionage, sabotage, assassinations, servile subservience to the imperialists—this is the vile, despicable nature of Trotskyism in all its nakedness.

The trial of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist centre, incidentally, revealed the methods used by Japanese intelligence to penetrate Soviet territory and conduct its “peaceful” operations. In 1930, a group of Japanese railway specialists was invited to the USSR for

¹ A. **Vyshinsky**. Speech at the trial of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist centre, p. 62. Partizdat. 1937 (my discharging.— **Al. Kh.**).

technical consultations. This group of "specialists," who settled on the Kazan Railway, turned out to be an intelligence group of the Japanese General Staff. The head of the Kazan Railway at the time was Knyazev, whom the Tokyo "specialists" recruited as a Japanese intelligence agent. Another Trotskyist degenerate, the spy Turok, was recruited in a similar manner.

Soon, having received sanction from the Trotskyist centre, the Trotskyist spies Livshits and Turok set about implementing the notorious "Japanisation" of the railways. They faithfully carried out the orders of the Japanese intelligence representative, "Mr. X...": they organised the derailments of troop trains and destroyed the USSR's locomotive and railcar fleet. Knyazev alone, this Trotskyist spy fanatic, directly organised 13-15 derailments. He testified as much during interrogation. As a result of these derailments, 63 people were killed and 154 injured in 1935 and 1936.

During one of the crashes at Shumikha station, 29 Red Army soldiers were killed and 29 were seriously injured. Vile Trotskyist saboteurs, carrying out orders from their Japanese masters, sought to stab the Red Army in the back and demoralise its soldiers. At the same time, Knyazev and Livshits stole highly classified government documents and passed them on to Japanese intelligence. Livshits cynically claimed that he acted in the interests of "maintaining contact with the Japanese."

The Japanese paid for this "connection." Turok and Knyazev received 35,000 rubles for their bloody sabotage. They weren't the only ones to benefit. The notorious "Mr. X," a Japanese intelligence representative, told Knyazev: "... a **Trotskyist**

organisation is currently working in the Soviet Union, with the help of Japan. We... mutually assist each other, therefore, what we are about to ask of you is nothing more than a response to the assistance we provide to the Trotskyist organisation" (my deflection.—Al. X.).

Trotskyist agents of the Japanese General Staff used every means to better fulfil their masters' orders. The spy Livshits testified in court how he maliciously sabotaged coal supplies to industrial centres by damaging and deliberately delaying empty railroad cars. He bitterly admitted that an attempt to disrupt the spring sowing campaign by sabotaging oil loading on the North Caucasus Railway failed thanks to the vigilance of the authorised representative of the Council of Labour and Defence.

And when the Trotskyist bandits failed, the Japanese "encouraged" them in a rather peculiar way. They (both the Japanese and the Trotskyists) resorted to mutual blackmail and threats. Thus, Japanese intelligence threatened Knyazev with exposure of his Trotskyist subversive activities. Conversely, the Trotskyist bandit Turok, himself a Japanese spy and saboteur, blackmailed Knyazev, threatening to expose his affiliation with Japanese intelligence. This entire gang tried to pin their heinous crimes on innocent people: the apprentice switch-woman Chudinova, the foreman Nikolaev, and the engineer Fedorov. While orchestrating the derailments, they took every measure to divert suspicion from themselves. Knyazev himself drew up the reports on the crashes and, of course, drew them up in such a way that he and his gang would get away with it.

The Trotskyists, who had set themselves the goal of restoring capitalism in the USSR and intended to enslave Soviet workers and collective farmers to landowners and factory owners, sold off our country wholesale and retail. They handed over the flourishing Soviet Ukraine to German generals, and Primorye and the Amur region to the Japanese military. Trotsky, the leader of this entire spy ring, conducted corresponding negotiations with the German and Japanese governments, as nearly all the defendants confirmed in their testimony. The chief bandit, Trotsky, gave Soviet territories to the Japanese and German generals in exchange for their help in overthrowing Soviet power and turning the USSR into a colony of the imperialist powers.

It is widely known that the Japanese imperialists have plans for "world conquests." They dream of conquering China and dominating the entire Pacific basin. But the implementation of these plans is hindered by the presence of a powerful and peaceful power—the Soviet Union. And the Trotskyists come to the aid of the Japanese. They tell them: take Primorye and the Amur region, seize and enslave China. Moreover, by fomenting the Japanese-American war, they offered the Japanese what they feel they lack—oil. They intended to give Sakhalin oil to the Japanese and "promised further oil supplies during the Japanese-American war. The Trotskyist degenerates, the henchmen of fascism, intended to give the imperialists everything that had been won and won by the hard struggle and hard work of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

As the trial of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist centre revealed, General Doihara and Ando (chief of the

Japanese military mission in Harbin) had agents who did not require training in espionage, sabotage, and wrecking. Trotskyist traitors—saboteurs, spies, murderers, and subversives—stood before the judgment of the Soviet people. This vile gang of Trotskyist degenerates acted on orders from the bloody Japanese-German spies Himmler, Doihara, and others, doing everything possible to prepare for the anti-Soviet war and the defeat of the USSR in that war. These vile traitors cleared the way for the Japanese barons and German fascist generals to enslave the peoples of the Soviet Union into colonial rule.

The trial of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist centre in Moscow exposed to the entire world the true instigators of the new bloodbath and their vile Trotskyist accomplices. This trial documented who stood behind the Trotskyist spies and saboteurs. Both the German and Japanese governments tried their best to evade the irrefutable evidence. And yet, despite the strictest censorship, the leading press organs of these countries, consumed by anti-Soviet rage, blurted out what their governments had initially tried so hard to disavow.

The Japan Times, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' organ, wrote frankly in its editorial on January 28, 1937:

"The fact that both countries, Germany and Japan, naturally seek to obtain any information about the USSR that might have military value must be accepted as a fact. If they did not do so, they would be fools and would be failing in their duty to their state and country. The possibility of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union at some point in the future cannot be

ruled out with certainty, although it is to be hoped that it will not occur. Therefore, states facing such a prospect are obliged to prepare by every possible means to ensure victory in the event of a conflict. This is a recognised and legitimate course of action for governments in all countries."

From this position, the newspaper drew the conclusion that since the matter stands in this way, "neither Japan nor Germany will gain anything particularly good from being offended by the testimony given before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR."

This admission from a leading Japanese newspaper cannot be underestimated. The warmongers, pressed to the wall by inexorable facts, confirmed their authenticity. They admitted that the Trotskyist bandits were acting on orders from the fascist general staffs in Berlin and Tokyo.

The last session of the Japanese Diet provided further evidence that a despicable gang of Trotskyist degenerates was in the employ of the Japanese General Staff. The renowned Tokyo bourgeois newspaper Miyako reported in its February 20, 1937, issue on a secret meeting of the Budget Committee of the Japanese Lower House. According to this information, Ashida, a Seiyukai member of parliament, asked the Minister of War, General Sugiyama, "**Is the army aware of the carrying capacity of the Siberian Railway?**" Sugiyama answered affirmatively, refusing to disclose the railway's carrying capacity alone. Ashida then asked the Minister of War how he had learned of the Siberian Railway's carrying capacity.

“ In Russia ,” General Sugiyama replied, “ there are elements that are in opposition to the current government, and it is through them that we know.”

The issue of the Miyako newspaper that published this report was confiscated by Japanese authorities. This only confirms the accuracy of the Miyako report. A member of the Japanese government, one of its de facto leaders, officially admitted in parliament that vile Trotskyist counterrevolutionaries were in the service of the Japanese General Staff.

The whole world is well aware of the bloody sabotage orders that the Japanese intelligence officer “Mr. X...” gave to his Trotskyist agents: to blow up factories, mines, to cause the crashes of military trains, to infect trains with bacteria, etc., etc. And the Trotskyist gang carried out these diabolical orders of the Japanese General Staff with precision.

General Sugiyama made a very valuable admission. Whatever measures the Japanese authorities take now, this admission will become known to all working people struggling against the threat of a new war.

The vile, subversive attack of the Japanese-German aggressors and the Trotskyist gang of murderers and spies crashed against the solidarity of the Soviet Union’s masses, devoted to the cause of socialism. The higher and stronger the edifice of socialism, the more furious the rage of our country’s enemies. That is why, in his historic report to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on March 3, 1937, Comrade Stalin warned all Party and non-Party

Bolsheviks against complacency and the rotten theory that "there are many Bolsheviks and few saboteurs."

"It is, of course, true that Trotskyist saboteurs are supported by a few individuals, while the Bolsheviks are supported by tens of millions of people. But this does not mean that saboteurs cannot cause serious harm to our cause. To cause mischief and harm, a large number of people is not at all required. To build the Dnieper , tens of thousands of workers must be deployed. But to blow it up, a few dozen people are required, no more. To win a battle during a war, several corps of Red Army soldiers may be required. But to ruin this victory at the front, a few spies somewhere in army headquarters or even divisional headquarters, capable of stealing an operational plan and passing it on to the enemy, are enough. To build a large railway bridge, thousands of people are required. But to blow it up, only a few people are enough. Dozens and dozens of such examples could be cited."¹

And Comrade Stalin also noted:

"Remember and never forget that as long as there is a capitalist encirclement, there will be wreckers, saboteurs, spies, terrorists sent into the rear of the Soviet Union by the intelligence agencies of foreign countries; remember this and fight against those comrades who underestimate the significance of the fact of capitalist encirclement, who underestimate the power and significance of sabotage"².

¹ Stalin, "On the Shortcomings of Party Work and Measures for the Elimination of Trotskyist and Other Double-Dealers," p. 34. Partizdat. 1937.

² Ibid., p. 26.

These words of Comrade Stalin must become an unbreakable law of vigilance for all party and non-party Bolsheviks of the Soviet Union.

Bolshevik No. 11, 1937

² Ibid., p. 26.

OTTO WINDT. GERMAN SECRET MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Nazi Germany's frantic preparations for war were accompanied by an unprecedented increase in the activities of German secret military intelligence. The failures of German spies in recent years demonstrate that the primary efforts of German intelligence are focused on monitoring the military strength of the USSR, France, Czechoslovakia, and England. At the same time, intelligence work is underway in the Baltic states, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Austria, and Switzerland. Since late 1936, increased attention has been paid to monitoring the British navy and the British aviation industry. The Balkan countries and Italy are also not beyond the purview of German secret intelligence.

This is far from the extent of German military intelligence's activities. The alliance with Japan and German fascism's raising of the colonial question undoubtedly led to the establishment of secret German military agents in the Far East, the United States, and the colonies of the major imperialist powers.

A powerful apparatus with extensive material resources is in place to cover all of the above-mentioned countries with a military espionage network. This apparatus is a fairly extensive organisation, actively working to fulfil its assigned tasks. It is headed by the III (Intelligence) Department of the German General Staff. The primary task of the III Department of the General Staff is to establish military espionage deep in the rear of the countries being investigated, with the goal of obtaining

information about their armed forces, military equipment and industry, internal situations and military-geographical conditions (roads, crossings, engineering structures, local resources), as well as for the purpose of launching surprise attacks on their rear (sabotage). To accomplish these tasks, the central organ of German intelligence deploys its own spy (agent) network of three types: a) a peacetime agent network, b) a wartime network, and c) a network of agents for committing acts of sabotage at the beginning of a war and during it. To test this sabotage network, "rehearsals" are carried out in peacetime in the form of individual sabotage acts.

Along with the deployment of this deep (strategic) espionage network, the task of the central organ of German intelligence is also to create a network of border intelligence commandant's offices (existing under various names) and direct their work. The work of the border intelligence commandant's offices boils down to organising a secret network of agents in the border zone of the countries being investigated. Each commandant's office receives a zone of operation in which it is obliged to create a network of three types: a) a peacetime agent network, b) a wartime agent network, c) a pre-mobilisation agent network. period. In addition, border intelligence commandant's offices are required to create a so-called reserve agent network on their territory (in case of war being waged on German territory itself).

Thus, the German military deception is organised on a grand scale. It strives to extend its tentacles into every pore of the countries it spies and, by entangling them in an invisible web, not only to uncover their secrets but also, at the opportune moment, to deliver

a series of sudden, sensitive blows to their vital centres. Both German military intelligence systems (central and regional) work in close coordination with each other.

As an example, four such intelligence commandant's offices have been established on Germany's eastern border: in Königsberg, Stettin, Berlin, and Breslau. The commandant's office in Königsberg occupies a particularly prominent position; it conducts reconnaissance against the USSR, Lithuania, and Poland. The others work against Poland; the commandant's office in Breslau also partially operates against Czechoslovakia. The intelligence commandant's offices in Dresden and Munich primarily operate against Czechoslovakia; the latter also conducts operations against Austria and the Balkan countries. A number of border intelligence commandant's offices on Germany's western border operate against France and Switzerland.

All border intelligence commandant's offices are strictly accountable to the Intelligence Department of the General Staff. However, these commandant's offices enjoy considerable autonomy, and in practice, their activities often extend deep into the rear of the countries they are reconnoitring, right up to the central military bodies of the armies they are reconnoitring. This significantly relieves the centre (the Intelligence Department of the General Staff) of the burden and allows the latter to focus its full attention on penetrating the key elements of the military and military-economic apparatus of the countries they are reconnoitring.

As indicated above, the entire deep (strategic) agent network of German intelligence is divided into

three types: 1) a peacetime agent network, i.e. a network that operates in peacetime, obtaining documents and information on the army and military industry of the countries being investigated; 2) a wartime agent network, which is recruited from individuals recruited in the country being investigated and intended to work only in wartime; 3) a network of saboteur agents.

The so-called pre-mobilisation network is created by border intelligence commandant's offices and recruited from among individuals residing in the border zone. When recruiting agents for this network, emphasis is placed on individuals such as customs officials, border gendarmerie officers, or border railway station employees. The purpose of this network is to provide timely information on the preparations, signs, and beginning of the mobilisation of reconnaissance armies.

It has been established that German intelligence strives to ensure that spies do not know each other. Therefore, each of these agent networks is created independently, without any organisational contact. However, German intelligence anticipates that some of the agents operating in peacetime (the peacetime network) will also be able to operate in wartime.

To provide a general description of German intelligence's operational methods, it is necessary to examine in more detail the demands it placed on wartime agents. German intelligence's guidelines on this matter can be summarised as follows.

Agents for a wartime network must be recruited and trained in peacetime. Such a network must cover the enemy's most important points. These points (cities, railway junctions) are selected by the

intelligence centre (the intelligence department of the General Staff) based on their importance both in troop concentration areas and deep in the rear of the countries being investigated. For example, when organising a wartime network in France, German intelligence primarily sought to cover cities such as Paris, Verdun, Toul, Epinal, Nancy, Brest, Cherbourg, and Marseille.

Thus, wartime network agents must be located at key railway junctions and garrison centres to be able to promptly record and report on all troop movements.

It is believed that wartime agents can only be nationals of the enemy country residing in locations subject to reconnaissance during wartime. Therefore, German intelligence recruits its entire wartime network primarily from citizens of the target country.

German intelligence considers its wartime network's core cadre to be those agents residing in major centres of the country being scouted and behind troop concentration areas. It seeks agents who can sustain (and not "fail") their work for extended periods and, with freedom of movement throughout the country, can carry out missions directly behind enemy lines.

German intelligence devotes considerable attention to the training of recruited agents for its wartime network. Each agent is treated with a strictly individualised approach. During peacetime, the agent's capabilities are determined, and the possibilities for their use during wartime are established. Agent training is based on the specific task they will be required to perform during wartime. For example, if a recruit's social status and abilities allow them to serve as an informant during wartime, they are immediately

assigned an observation area where they practice their future work, including compiling reports using various encryption methods.

In all of German intelligence's preparations for wartime missions, the centre of gravity lies in organising a system of communications with wartime agents. This issue is considered both the most important and, at the same time, the most difficult. The success of wartime intelligence depends entirely on the channels through which the information and materials gathered by agents can be delivered to the intelligence agencies of the German army. Therefore, German intelligence repeatedly returned to this issue, drawing on its experience of intelligence operations during the Great War. It concluded that, even now, in peacetime, it was necessary for each individual agent to develop a method for transmitting reports that would be feasible in wartime, based on neutral countries or across the front. In the opinion of German intelligence, these communication methods do not guarantee the reliability and timeliness of communications. Therefore, the primary emphasis is placed on introducing radio communications (shortwave radios) into the wartime intelligence network. It is known that German intelligence possesses several types of shortwave radios for use in clandestine situations, with varying ranges. Already, certain trusted wartime agents are being equipped with radios and transmitting and receiving using a special code. Such radios were discovered during the arrests of some German intelligence agents in Poland and Austria.

When organising their wartime network, German intelligence focused primarily on the possibility of

acquiring “documentary agents”—spies who would serve in various administrative bodies of the country, in the headquarters of the active army, and at key military factories. They also showed particular interest in railway personnel, especially those at junction stations. German intelligence believed that one agent at a junction station was equivalent to several surveillance agents.

Thus, the German espionage network in wartime will consist of a special wartime network, created and trained in peacetime, plus a part of the peacetime network switched to wartime work.

Added to this is the so-called active network, or network of spy-saboteurs, selected and trained to commit acts of sabotage (bombing important military installations, setting fire to industrial plants, sabotaging airfields, assassinating prominent military and government officials, etc.). The saboteurs are planted and trained during peacetime. This entire network of saboteurs is maintained on a particularly clandestine basis and is more carefully and deeply concealed than the network of information agents.

To more fully understand the methods of German intelligence, it is necessary to examine the classification of German intelligence agents. We encounter the following agent names.

Resident agents in peacetime or wartime (i.e., individuals tasked with reconnaissance of military units, military establishments, or military-industrial facilities in a region or major centre in an enemy country). They infiltrate the target country under some form of business guise (for example, as businessmen, specialists, freelancers, artists, clergy, etc.). Resident agents in peacetime and wartime are recruited from

among German nationals and, to some extent, from nationals of the target countries.

Observer agents. By all indications, this breed of spy will be most widely used in wartime. Their job is to observe a designated target or area for reconnaissance, report overheard secrets, leaked state secrets, etc.

Informers, sources. These are individuals recruited by German intelligence, traitors to their country, who use their official position to obtain information for the enemy or steal classified documents.

Agent recruiters are individuals who, due to their social position and personal connections in society, are capable of recruiting new agents for German intelligence.

Agents-spotters. They do not directly recruit, but provide information ("tips") to German intelligence on individuals who, for one reason or another, might agree to work for Nazi Germany. Their duty is to report to the German intelligence centre on all such elements: those politically hostile to the existing government, those dissatisfied, those with secret vices, hidden misdeeds or crimes, and those fearing exposure and compromise; gamblers, debauchees, and drunkards entangled in corrupt connections, those involved in shady dealings, those with moral instability, religious fanatics, those who love to live high, those greedy for money and easy gain, those with a penchant for women, gullible chatterboxes, embezzlers, and, finally, those willing to voluntarily sell out their homeland or offer themselves to Nazi intelligence.

As the lessons of the exposed Trotskyist-Zinovievist Japanese-German organisation of spies and

saboteurs showed, the double-dealing Trotskyists, Zinovievists, and rightists turned out to be a godsend for German intelligence.

Liaison agents, i.e. persons who perform only specific functions of communication with individual agents or between residents and intelligence agencies.

Route agents are used to reconnoitre specific roads and areas of the target country to determine the deployment of armed forces, establish fortified areas, reconnoitre airfields, and so on. This category of agent operates through external surveillance and discreet questioning of local residents, disguised as a common occupation in the area. These spies make extensive use of criminal gossip and a lax attitude toward maintaining state secrets.

This article does not address the question of how German intelligence obtains the necessary complement of agents in these categories to carry out the tasks assigned to it by the German Army General Staff. This extensive topic will be examined in a subsequent special article. Recruitment is a fundamental issue that all levels of German intelligence address on a daily basis. The identification and recruitment of new agents is a continuous process, utilising all available resources in the countries under investigation.

Bribery, blackmail, deception of all kinds, threats, and exploiting the weaknesses and blunders of individuals—these are the primary recruiting methods of German intelligence. The Gestapo (the German secret police), which had a large network of fascist provocateurs in many countries, provides significant assistance to German intelligence in this regard.

* * *

The trials of the counterrevolutionary Trotskyist-fascist spy gang of Zinoviev-Kamenev and Pyatakov-Radek revealed the channels through which foreign intelligence services penetrated the USSR. The broadest possible public in the Soviet Union must be informed about the organisation and methods of secret intelligence in order to recognise spies under any disguise.

Pravda, April 8, 1937

SPEECH BY COMRADE L. M. ZAKOVSKY AT THE LENINGRAD REGIONAL PARTY CONFERENCE

At the February Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, Comrade Stalin cited many striking examples of the work of foreign intelligence services, their tactics, and their relationships.

How does modern intelligence work in capitalist armies? How does it send its spies into our Soviet territory? Intelligence is conducted by the 2nd departments of the General Staffs. These departments have permanent schools where spies and intelligence officers undergo a specific training course. They become familiar with the language, customs, traditions, and geography of the country in which they will be operating. They master devious intelligence methods, from the use of poison to all manner of provocations. After completing the school, the intelligence officers are sent to other countries, including ours, disguised as engineering specialists, political emigrants, and so on.

In 1936, we arrested a Japanese spy. He had graduated from Japanese intelligence school about 10 years earlier. He was initially stationed in Harbin, conducting intelligence work in the Far East. Then he was sent to the USSR as a clerk at the Japanese consulate. In our country, he played the role of a social, fun-loving young man. He attended dance classes, enjoyed sports, and mixed with our youth. After a while, the Japanese spy began spreading the word that he was breaking with Japan, as it was a samurai country with expansionist tendencies, and

that he was convinced of the correctness of the Soviet Union's policies. The spy left the consulate, came to Leningrad, and joined the Radlov Theatre, studying to be an actor. This spy demonstrated some talent and developed a wide circle of acquaintances. And so it went until 1932.

It should be noted that Japanese intelligence categorically forbade him from engaging in any intelligence work for two to three years. He was advised to lead an average life and make friends. The Japanese spy travelled with the theatre to garrisons where he could have engaged in espionage, but, as already mentioned, on orders from his General Staff, he did not do so. He was intended for more serious purposes—sabotage and assassination. On instructions from the General Staff, he converted to Soviet citizenship and attempted to infiltrate the NKVD. But the spy was caught and exposed.

Many comrades talk about the role of women in intelligence, about female residents.

Let me give you an example. A Soviet pilot commander was traveling to Sochi on vacation. On the train, he met a certain citizen G., who turned out to be the wife of an employee of one of the Soviet trade missions abroad. They struck up an acquaintance, spent their vacation together, and developed a close and intimate relationship. After vacation, she went abroad, and he went to Moscow. The correspondence between them continued. After some time, G.'s husband became involved in this correspondence. Friendly letters flowed in both directions. After some time, the husband arrived in the Soviet Union. He was a spy and intelligence officer for one of the general staffs. He had joined the Communist Party abroad

and, as a communist, was hired by the trade mission. He accepted our citizenship and moved to the Soviet Union, where he quickly established a connection with the pilot commander. After some time, his wife also arrived in Moscow. She often saw the pilot commander. They have a close relationship; she looks into his field bag and starts talking about aviation.

One day, G.'s husband meets with the pilot commander and tells him:

"I know that my wife receives all the information about the squadron from you. I know that this information was transmitted via diplomatic pouch to the general staff of a foreign army. You are entirely in my hands, a willing or unwilling spy, and please be kind enough to give me the information I need and listen to me. It's also no secret to me that you live with my wife, who, by the way, is not my wife at all."

The pilot commander revealed the military secrets he knew. Moreover, he began carrying out specific assignments for foreign intelligence, specifically intending to assassinate one of the Red Army's leaders.

Spies, saboteurs, and enemies of our country operate in the most unexpected forms. I'll give you an example. For a long time, a foreign concession operated in the Soviet Union, manufacturing rather innocent items commonly used in everyday life. Now, under a loyal commercial guise, a spy organisation has emerged. The head of this concession, a foreign national, decided to find a commercial director—a Soviet citizen. He searched diligently, going through dozens of people until he found the right person—a non-party citizen named R., a former officer in the tsarist army. He invited R. to his office, having learned

that the man had extensive family connections and acquaintances. One of R.'s close acquaintances works in a major construction project in Moscow. R. has a relative—the head of the orders department of a large Leningrad plant. He has another relative who works in the supply department of another large plant. R. had acquaintances working in military factories.

The former officer immediately formed a close relationship with the concessionaire. At the concessionaire's suggestion, he became an active spy. Over the course of a year or two of working at the concession, R. collected a considerable amount of important classified information.

The supply manager of a large plant was also involved in this same spy organisation. Here's how this spy obtained secret documents. During the investigation, he recounted the following episode:

"During one of my regular reports to the plant's commercial director, I noticed a production plan for guns on his desk. As I was leaving, I grabbed the document, which I then passed on to the spy organisation."

A secret document was lying on the desk, the boss was drooling over it, and a spy took advantage of it. And then, probably, the boss beat his chest and talked about vigilance.

Comrade Stalin said at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) that many of us have forgotten that Trotskyism has long ceased to be a political movement, that it is an agent of the bourgeoisie, an agent of international capital. It must be said that in the Trotskyists, foreign intelligence has acquired a network of spies, saboteurs, and assassins. For foreign

intelligence, this is a real find. These vicious enemies, as is well known, are double-dealing and lying. They have lost all moral integrity.

Some comrades think that in order to demonstrate vigilance, one must do something special, something exceptional. I will tell you how, in practice, ordinary people in our country sometimes demonstrate vigilance. A terrorist organisation was uncovered in Leningrad. Our workers, even Soviet citizens, helped expose it. It happened like this: a foreign ship arrived at the Leningrad port. The captain's mate on this ship turned out to be Russian. This mate was conducting anti-Soviet agitation among the longshoremen at our port. The longshoremen wrote about this. And here is another fact related to this same story. A postcard from a foreign port was received in an apartment in Leningrad. The addressee was not home. A neighbour, out of curiosity, read the postcard. It seemed suspicious to him. The Soviet citizen forwarded this suspicious postcard to the appropriate authorities. It was later discovered that the postcard was written by the same captain's mate of the foreign ship. He wrote it to a White Guard soldier who had taken refuge in our country. On the next visit of the assistant captain of a foreign steamship to Leningrad, it was discovered that, on instructions from a White Guard organisation, he had created a terrorist organisation in Leningrad with the help of his acquaintances.

So, you see, the enormous benefit of the vigilance of individual worker comrades who fervently love their homeland, who hate their enemies, and who are ready to fight them with all their might. There are many such ordinary people. They display a legitimate

wariness of every fact, perhaps at first glance insignificant.

It must be taken into account that, even when liquidating counterrevolutionary spy organisations and Trotskyists, it is not always possible to completely destroy them. We know of cases where, even after the liquidation of one organisation or another, their roots remained. And when individual comrades claim to have already eliminated sabotage, this is self-deception. It is a disease that can lead to quite serious consequences. Our Party and economic organisations must mobilise their best people, their best and most proven cadres, to daily eradicate the poison brought into our country by the intelligence agents of the capitalist powers, Japanese-German-Trotskyist and right-wing spies and saboteurs. We must immunise ourselves from this poison. We must declare an implacable war on what are called malfunctions. We must always seek out the root causes of these malfunctions. This is the surest way to find the saboteur and paralyse his work.

We must destroy the enemy completely. And we will destroy him! (Prolonged applause).

Pravda, June 11, 1937

DEFENDERS OF TROTSKYIST-JAPANESE- GERMAN SPIES AND SABOTEURS

Our Far Eastern newspaper, "Tikhookeanskaya Zvezda," recently reported that the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, in the city of Svobodny, heard the case of members of a Trotskyist spy-terrorist and saboteur organisation operating on the railways of the Far East under the direction and on the instructions of Japanese intelligence agencies. Forty-four members of this organisation were sentenced to the death penalty—execution by firing squad. The sentence was carried out.

Japanese-German spies, Trotskyist saboteurs, and terrorists found protection in the pages of the British Labour newspaper The Daily Herald, which claims to be a "democratic socialist" newspaper. The Daily Herald declares: "Democratic socialists cannot pass over this in silence." But instead of indignantly condemning the criminal and bloody, dirty activities of Japanese-German spies and exposing Trotskyist provocateurs, the newspaper defends the convicted criminals and vilifies the Soviet Union.

However, there's nothing unexpected in this position from a newspaper that has made deceiving English workers its profession. During the trial of the Trotskyist centre, the Daily Herald, contrary to the justified indignation of the entire international proletariat and all honest workers, defended the restorers of capitalism, criminals, spies, bandits, and terrorists. Having failed to defend the leaders of the Trotskyist spy ring, the Daily Herald now acts as an uninvited advocate for Trotsky's henchmen, Pyatakov,

and Livshits—agents of German and Japanese intelligence.

The workers of the Soviet Union, the workers of England and the whole world must know who the main organ of the Labour Party takes under its protection.

A trial in Svobodny exposed a Trotskyist spy and sabotage organisation that was a branch of Japanese intelligence. The defendants confessed to their crimes. The organisation of Trotskyist spies and saboteurs worked on assignments for a Japanese intelligence resident, the seasoned spy Averbakh. Japanese intelligence generously provided their agent with funds—he received up to 60,000 rubles from his employers. Averbakh held the position of head of the locomotive service planning department on the Amur Railway.

Under his command, all manner of counterrevolutionary rabble gathered in the spy organisation. In addition to Trotskyists, rightists, Mensheviks, and Socialist Revolutionaries, this organisation included active Kolchak supporters, such as Kashcheyev, deputy head of the Amur Railway locomotive service; Doroshenko, a participant in Kolchak's punitive expeditions and an employee of the administrative movement; and Aleksandrov, a native of Estonia, a Japanese-German spy—former deputy head of the Amur Railway.

All members of this counter-revolutionary Trotskyist-White Guard gang were simultaneously members of a Japanese spy organisation.

This is the kind of human scum that sold itself to Japanese intelligence agents, that traded wholesale and retail in the lives and blood of workers and Red

Army soldiers, that the English Labour newspaper takes under its protection.

These spies and saboteurs carried out their bloody work on a large scale, in accordance with the plans of the Japanese warmongers. Averbakh stated during interrogation: "The Japanese demanded that we resort to mass sabotage, sabotaging machines and equipment, setting fire to factories, and especially intensifying the sabotage when tensions between Japan and the USSR reached a certain point."

The Japanese demanded, and Trotskyist and White Guard agents carried out their orders, receiving payment for it. They derailed passenger, troop, and freight trains on the Amur and Far Eastern Railways, set fire to factories, sabotaged locomotive operations, and deliberately created traffic jams. They supplied Japanese intelligence with information on the number of troop trains traveling to Khabarovsk and the state of railway junctions. They passed station maps, plans of Khabarovsk depots, and other information to Japanese intelligence. In short, they did everything the Japanese military, preparing a new world war, demanded of them.

To artificially create discontent among the workers, they arranged for Stakhanovites, shock workers, and honest workers to receive less pay than slackers, absentees, and defective workers. When Comrade Fedorkin, the party organiser of the Kuibyshevka station depot, uncovered traces of their criminal activities and attempted to expose them, the Trotskyists poisoned him with a toxin obtained from the Japanese intelligence agent, seasoned spy Lezhedko, head of the Kuibyshev branch of the Amur Railway.

Having set itself the task of breaking the record of renowned English bourgeois hypocrisy and sanctimony, the Daily Herald pretends to be horrified by the news of a spy and sabotage organisation operating on the railways of the Far East. But journalist Yuri Benes, who attended the Moscow trial of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist centre, writes in the Czechoslovak newspaper A-zet, regarding the execution of 44 Far Eastern bandits, that it was already clear during the Moscow trial that each of the Trotskyist defendants had created their own group to organise espionage, sabotage, and terrorist acts. "These were not only Trotskyists, but also Japanese agents," Benes writes.

The leaders of the Trotskyist-Japanese-German spy and sabotage organisation formed their gangs locally. Crimes were committed not only on the railways of the Far East. The investigation uncovered bloody crimes committed on the Ordzhonikidzevskaya Railway by the assistants and accomplices of the executed Trotskyist-German spy Livshits.

A gang was operating here, whose goal, as the accused Burstein admitted, **was to cause crashes "with the greatest number of human casualties."**

The trial of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist centre did not stop the bandits. They continued to carry out the orders of Trotsky, Pyatakov, and Livshits. In January 1937 alone, 17 derailments and accidents occurred on the Ordzhonikidzevskaya Railway. The derailment at Kiyán station stands out for its heinousness.

The gang's leaders participated in organising this derailment: the head of the North Caucasus Railway, Mayevsky; the career Trotskyist head of the Mineralovodsk branch of the traffic service, Burshtein;

dispatcher Dombrovsky; and others. The derailment was planned with villainous cold-bloodedness. The railway signalling system was sabotaged in advance, three freight trains scheduled to run on the night of January 26-27, 1937, were cancelled, and it was arranged so that express train No. 31 would collide with tanker train No. 731. The scoundrels monitored the movements of these trains. They stopped train No. 731 three times to give the express train time to collide with the tanker. They selected a location beyond the Kiyon station, on a slope and a curve. And the derailment occurred precisely according to plan. **Forty-nine killed, ninety-five wounded** - these are the bloody trophies of the Trotskyist-German murderers.

Trusting in the protection of saboteurs, let the Daily Herald chalk up the lives of the honest workers who suffered—the lives of women, the elderly, and children—to the credit of its “democracy”! Let the editors of the Daily Herald, having grossly mocked these murdered and wounded, shed crocodile tears over the scoundrels who were shot or are to be shot by the court for these vile murders. But let them not seek sympathy from the honest workers and toilers of England!

The English workers will brand with shame the hypocrisy and perfidy of the Daily Herald leaders, who systematically defend the restorers of capitalism, the enemies and traitors of the working class, the instigators of world war.

The lives of working people are the highest value in the Soviet Union. Our entire great country listened with great sympathy to Comrade Stalin’s words at the Central Committee Plenum on the need for merciless

reprisals against the enemies of the working class and traitors to our homeland.

Any defender of spies and saboteurs is an enemy of the Soviet Union, an enemy of genuine democracy, an enemy of the workers of the entire world, an ally and accomplice of the fascist warmongers. Let the despicable hypocrites of the Daily Herald know this:

There is no and will be no mercy for spies, saboteurs, and terrorists who raise their hands against the lives of the workers of the Soviet Union!

We will continue to exterminate spies and saboteurs!

We will not give the enemies of the USSR any peace!

For every drop of spilled workers' blood, the enemies of the USSR will pay with pounds of the blood of spies and saboteurs!

"Pravda", May 22, 1937

THE CRISIS OF FOREIGN BOURGEOIS INTELLIGENCE

Today we publish a notice from the USSR Prosecutor's Office about the trial of eight spies caught red-handed. Mercenaries of a foreign state, the most vile traitors to their homeland, they had a mission from their masters: to use every available means to undermine the might of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army—the beloved brainchild of the peoples of the USSR—and to undermine the defence capability of the world's first socialist state of workers and peasants. Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Eideman, Feldman, Primakov, and Putna—these are the thrice-despicable, hated names of the members of this now-defeated spy ring of fascist intelligence agents.

Capitalist states send thousands and tens of thousands of spies and intelligence agents to each other. Using striking historical examples, Comrade Stalin, in his report to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on March 3, 1937, demonstrated and proved that the deployment of spies and saboteurs is an essential attribute of any bourgeois state:

"It's proven as hard as two plus two is four that bourgeois states send spies, saboteurs, subversives, and sometimes even assassins into each other's rear areas, tasking them with infiltrating the institutions and businesses of these states, creating their own networks there, and, 'if necessary,' blowing up their rear areas in order to weaken them and undermine their power. That's how things stand today. That's how things stood in the past... That's the law of relations between bourgeois states."

There is every reason, from the point of view of Marxism, to assume, Comrade Stalin said in the same report, that "bourgeois states must send twice and three times more wreckers, spies, saboteurs and murderers to the rear of the Soviet Union than to the rear of any bourgeois state."

The eight spies who will appear today before the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR were a highly important contingent of a foreign state, particularly active in planting spies in the USSR. The fascist masters placed great hopes on this core, and therefore the wild howl raised by the bourgeois, especially the fascist, press over the arrest of this spy gang is understandable. Inspired by Goebbels's ministry, notorious for its anti-Soviet lies, the German press has been incessantly screaming in recent days about "the removal and arrest of high-ranking military officers in the USSR," which supposedly signifies practically a "crisis of Soviet power."

The ridiculous attempts to portray the exposure of the eight spies as evidence of the "weakness of Soviet power" completely betray the masters of the fascist press. **The exposure of this gang and its trial is a sign of the strength, power, and invincibility of the Soviet system.**

The fascist lawyers are putting themselves in a ridiculous position. They send their own spies to us, and when the Soviet authorities expose them, catch them red-handed, these gentlemen scream about the inhumanity allegedly shown to spies. Only the most naive simpletons could take these cries of the reactionary press at face value. In reality, as all sensible people understand perfectly well, these **cries the essence is nothing other than, like a lament**

for the lost spies on whom so much hope was placed. The defeat of the last military-espionage core of one foreign states—a big blow but to the warmongers and their plans undermining power The Red Army and the enslavement of the peoples of the USSR.

This defeat testifies not to a “crisis” of Soviet power, but to a crisis in the intelligence services of capitalist countries.

The spies have been caught red-handed. Their plans, and those of their fascist masters, have been exposed by the dictatorship of the working class. They are revealed as pygmies—poisonous, full of malice and hatred toward the workers and peasants—and yet insignificant even in their fury before the great power of victorious socialism. All the tricks, all the sophisticated disguises, all the centuries-old experience of bourgeois intelligence are already being proven, and will ultimately be proven, to be defeated by the increased vigilance of Soviet intelligence, by the vigilance of the organs of the dictatorship of the working class created by the great party of Lenin and Stalin.

The eight spies who were captured, those who sold out to the enemy and betrayed their homeland, will be tried in the name of the entire Soviet people by the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR. The court will include the Chairman of the Military Collegium, Comrade Ulrikh, and our marshals and army commanders Blucher, Budyonny, Alksnis, Dybenko, Kashirin, Belov, Shaposhnikov, and Goryachev—the cream of our glorious Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, the cream of the cadres trained

by the party of Lenin and Stalin to defend our great homeland.

The court will fully expose all the vile methods, techniques, and tactics used by the military-espionage group to destroy our great Red Army, to shed rivers of worker and peasant blood to defeat the USSR and restore the power of the landowners and capitalists. These vile dreams will never come true! In the name of the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the name of all the peoples of our country, the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court will repay the fascist spy scum with full justice for their vile deeds!

Great and sacred is the hatred of all the workers of our homeland for the enemies of the people—spies, saboteurs, wreckers, and all those who seek to defile the flourishing Soviet land with the stinking boot of German-Japanese fascism. The Soviet people will judge the spy gang in full accordance with Article 133 of the great Stalin Constitution, which stipulates that **“treason against the homeland: breaking the oath, going over to the enemy, damaging the military might of the state, and espionage—are punishable to the fullest extent of the law as the most serious crime.”**

To the spies of the capitalist There is no peace and there will be no mercy for us. These spies will not escape the increasingly vigilant eye of the working-class dictatorship. The viper of fascist espionage has many heads. But we will cut off its heads, we will discover, neutralise, and sever all its tentacles and stings. For these tentacles and stings are being sought by millions of Soviet patriots.

The vigilance of Soviet intelligence, the vigilance of the NKVD, led by Comrade Yezhov, whose words

match his actions, put an end to the vile activities of the eight fascist spies. This defeat of the military espionage group, on which the fascists had pinned so much hope, is a clear indicator of the crisis, the decline of bourgeois intelligence. This defeat demonstrates that any new attempt to infiltrate spies and saboteurs into the USSR will be promptly stopped. **Soviet intelligence is growing stronger, expanding, and becoming more powerful. Let all spies, saboteurs, and murderers tremble! Soviet intelligence will show what it is capable of!**

Pravda, June 11, 1937

FOR ESPIONAGE AND TREASON— EXECUTION!

The Supreme Court has delivered the well-deserved sentence to eight spies caught red-handed. The Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR found all defendants—M. N. Tukhachevsky, I.E. Yakir, I. P. Uborevich, A. P. Kork, R.P. Eideman, B. I. Feldman, V. M. Primakov, and V. K. Putna—guilty of violating their military duty (oath), treason against the Workers' and Peasants' Army, and treason against the homeland. It ruled that all defendants be stripped of their military ranks, defendant Tukhachevsky of his rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union, and that all be sentenced to the highest measure of criminal punishment— **death by firing squad**.

The sharp sword of socialist justice fell upon the heads of the vile military-espionage gang. Together with the vile wretch Gamarnik, who committed suicide to escape exposure and trial, these eight spies committed the most heinous crimes imaginable. Like Judas, they sold out to the enemy for fascist silver coins. This gang, as the court established, committed the full range of crimes that Article 133 of the Stalin Constitution requires to be punished as the most heinous crimes. The spies now convicted...

"While serving the military intelligence of a foreign state pursuing an unfriendly policy towards the USSR, they systematically supplied the military circles of that state with espionage information, committed sabotage acts with the aim of undermining the power of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, prepared for the defeat of the Red Army in the event of a military attack on the USSR, and had as their goal the

dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the restoration of the power of landowners and capitalists in the USSR.”

The vile plans of the fascist gang will not come to fruition! A great and holy anger gripped millions of workers when they learned of the vile activities of the military spy ring. Yesterday, news of the exposure of eight military spies and their trial spread like wildfire through our factories, mines, and Red Army units. Throughout the great Soviet land—at meetings and rallies of workers, Red Army soldiers, intellectuals, and collective farmers—unanimous demands for the execution of the spies and unanimous approval of the verdict of the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR are heard.

For example, workers at the Moscow Ordzhonikidze plant wrote in their resolution:

“We demand the harshest punishment from Soviet justice—to shoot the most vile of the vile! There is no place for monsters and murderers on Soviet soil!”

Mighty waves of popular anger will wash away from the face of the earth every traitor, every turncoat, every spy, anyone who wants to undermine the power of the Red Army, anyone who encroaches on the great achievements of the socialist revolution, on our wealth, acquired by the labour of the peoples and belonging to the peoples of the Soviet Union.

The workers of the Paris Commune factory declare in their resolution:

“There is no mercy, nor can there be, for the enemies of the people, the traitors, and the spies who sold our homeland to the bloody dogs of fascism. For the sake of our country’s happiness, for the continued prosperity of our homeland, for the happiness of all

working humanity, we demand that the Soviet court execute this gang of spies. Wipe these traitors to the homeland from the face of the earth!”

The keen eye of the working-class dictatorship discovered this last military-espionage core of one foreign state; the firm hand of the working-class dictatorship destroyed, smashed this core, and wiped it off the face of the earth. This demonstrated the growing power of the Soviet system and the strength and vigilance of Soviet intelligence. This demonstrated the crisis of foreign bourgeois intelligence, with all its centuries-old experience of provocation, espionage, and sabotage.

All the tricks of the fascist intelligence agents have not helped, and will not help, our Soviet country! **By defeating the last military-espionage core, we have not only strengthened the power of the Red Army. We have revealed the maps and plans of one foreign state, and any attempt by it to attack the USSR will mean the beginning of the end of the Goebbels-style rule!**

The rulers of a foreign state placed great hopes on a now-destroyed military spy ring that trafficked in the blood of tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers and the blood of millions of workers and peasants. A frenzied rage consumes the imperialists, especially the German ones, when they see our socialist homeland growing and strengthening, brimming with the promise of future abundance, blossoming with the talents of millions of workers and peasants, and conquering cultural heights unattainable by capitalism.

All the efforts of the fascist leaders of certain foreign countries are aimed at defeating the Red Army, dismembering the USSR, destroying the

magnificent achievements of the peoples of the Soviet Union, and turning our people into slaves of the fascist barbarians. This is what was being prepared, these are the goals served by the core military espionage core of one foreign state—eight fascist spies, yesterday sentenced to death by firing squad by the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

This sentence is the voice of the Soviet people. Demands for the execution of spies are echoed with universal acclaim in Red Army units and schools, in mines and divided roads, on collective and state farms. And as if expressing the common sentiment of the working people of the USSR, the workers of the Gorbunov plant declared at their rally:

“We’ve dealt a major blow to the warmongers. This is a good lesson for the fascists. If they try to poke their pig snouts into our Soviet garden, we’ll give them such a response they won’t be able to pick up their pieces.”

“We will not allow the dirty fascist boot to set foot on our sacred soil!”—such is the unanimous response of all the working people of your homeland to the machinations of bourgeois military intelligence, their spies, and their fascist masters. Let all spies, saboteurs, and murderers tremble! Let them firmly remember: we will raze to the ground and destroy every nest of war-mongering spies, we will tear every thread of the spy web, no matter how thinly it is woven, we will mercilessly wipe from the face of the earth all enemies of the peoples of the USSR!

No force can break a people led by the party of Lenin and Stalin. Under the leadership of our glorious party, the peoples of the USSR overthrew tsarism and the rule of the landowners and capitalists. Under the

leadership of the party of Lenin and Stalin, the peoples of the USSR victoriously ended the civil war and routed the armies of German, Japanese, and other interventionists who attempted to seize Soviet land. Under the leadership of the party of Lenin and Stalin, the exploitative classes were eliminated in our country, and first-class socialist industry and the largest socialist agriculture in the world were created.

The Soviet system straightened the backs of millions of people, breathing into them a new, socialist, happy life. And the German imperialists want to conquer and enslave such a people. Despicable! Their vile dreams and plans will never come true. The Soviet people and their glorious Workers' and Peasants' Red Army are invincible!

The twilight of bourgeois intelligence has arrived. The working people of the Soviet Union are increasing their vigilance tenfold, and the strength of our Soviet intelligence lies in the fact that it is backed and supported by the entire people. In the name of millions of people, eight military spies have been eliminated. A dog's death for dogs!

The strength of the Soviet people is immeasurable. Their will to victory is unwavering. Their love for the party of Lenin and Stalin, for the Soviet government, and for Stalin's Central Committee is boundless. No fascist jackals or spies will be able to halt our victorious march to communism! **The Great Proletarian Revolution Under the banner of the Lenin-Stalin party, it won definitively and irrevocably on one-sixth of the globe. Under this banner, it will win throughout the world!**

Pravda, June 12, 1937

THE POWER OF THE SOVIET STATE IS INDIVISIBLE!

Like a mighty cliff, the Soviet Union rises above the raging sea of capitalist encirclement. Every year, every month, every day brings the world new, ever more vivid evidence of the growing strength of our homeland, its wealth, its might, its defence capability. One measure of our might is the defeat and destruction of the fascist spies Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, and others—the military espionage core of a foreign state pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the USSR.

Warmongers placed great hopes on this military spy ring. With the help of their mercenaries, the General Staff of a foreign state hoped to achieve the defeat of the Red Army, the defeat of the Soviet Union. Messrs. Goebbels and his ilk built their plans of conquest on the subversive work of their spies. These plans have been uncovered, and they have failed miserably!

The distraught fascist intelligence officers and their masters raised a wild howl over the defeat of the military-espionage gang of Tukhachevsky, Yakir, and others. Lamentations over the loss of valuable spies are accompanied in the German and Japanese press by cries of "the weakness of the USSR," "uprisings in Moscow," "disorder in the Red Army," and similar nonsense. **Apparently, they forget that Moscow is not Tokyo, where any small group of militarists can slaughter ministers in broad daylight.** Such discipline in the army, such support for the government by the entire population as we have in the

USSR—no country in the world has ever known or can ever know!

The outcry of the reactionary press cannot conceal the obvious fact of the exposure and failure of the fascist plans for a military invasion of the USSR. Every sane person understands that the defeat and uprooting of fascist spies in the USSR, flushing them out of all their holes, further increases the strength of our homeland, the might of the Red Army! **If anyone has been weakened by the defeat of the military spy gang, it is, of course, not the USSR, but the fascist masters of the executed spies. The cards of their General Staff have been laid bare, their trump cards have been defeated, their strategic plans have become clear, the direction of their aggression and war plans have become known.**

The German press, which has launched a frenzied anti-Soviet campaign, has reason to be furious. **The growing weakness of the fascist aggressors is countered by our growing strength!**

The five-year reign of the Nazis in Germany has brought a disgraceful end. The capitalists themselves can no longer hide from the world the ever-increasing famine in Germany. Industry has been almost entirely converted to the production of weapons of war. Cultivated land has been greatly reduced—the land is being devoured by airfields and massive concentration camps for workers. The currency—the mark—has fallen almost in half. Prices are rising, which has a disastrous impact on the already starved budgets of millions of working families. The country's poverty is starkly evident through all the masks, through the Nazis' desperate attempts to embellish the situation. The discontent of the broad masses of the German

people with their rulers is becoming ever more pronounced, ever more acute.

The fascists' main bet was on a war of conquest against the USSR, on the defeat and dismemberment of the Soviet Union, and on preparing this defeat with the help of their spies. That card is now lost! Bad things will come to those who dare to test the strength of the Red Army, the strength of the Soviet people, led by the party of Lenin and Stalin. The peoples of the USSR defeated all their enemies even during the Civil War, when the Soviet government inherited an impoverished, economically weak country. What can we say about the coming battles, which we will meet as a mighty industrial power, fully armed with the world-historic victories of socialism we have achieved!

The Soviet Union is mighty because of its first-class socialist industry, created by Stalin's five-year plans. The Soviet Union is mighty because of its largest socialist agriculture in the world, which is flourishing year after year. The Soviet Union is mighty because of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, created by the party of Lenin and Stalin and loyal to the end to the Soviet government, the party, and its Central Committee.

The Soviet country and Soviet power are mighty, stronger than all the world's nations, for they possess inexhaustible sources of strength unavailable to the bourgeois state. This source is the love and trust of the entire Soviet people for their beloved party of Lenin and Stalin, which, through unparalleled difficulties and in the struggle against hosts of enemies, led and brought the Soviet land and its people to a happy, socialist life the likes of which history had never seen.

From this source of popular love, Soviet patriotism, and labour enthusiasm, our Party and its Stalinist Central Committee draw ever new strength for the victories of socialism. It's not for nothing that our folk song sings: "When the country commands a hero, anyone can become one." This is true in all areas of socialist construction, and it's true in every area of defending our borders.

Our army and people are one, something that does not and cannot exist in any bourgeois state. The Red Army is the vanguard of our defence. The sons of the people, who protect their socialist labor, are surrounded by the ardent love of the people and the daily care of the Party, the government, and the entire country. The Party and the Soviet government created the Red Army and trained its excellent cadres in the spirit of devotion to the cause of Lenin and Stalin. The Party and government, with the ardent support of the entire country, equipped the Red Army with powerful defensive equipment. The full intensity of the hatred of our country's enemies for the Red Army is understandable, the enemy's desire above all to undermine the Red Army's strength, to plant their spies and saboteurs within it in order to disorganise our army, prepare for its defeat, and the shedding of the blood of tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers.

Every spy discovered in the Red Army is a great loss for the enemy; every spy discovered saves hundreds and thousands of Red Army lives. It's not for nothing that Comrade Voroshilov's order states: "By cleansing our army of rotten filth, we thereby make it even stronger and more invulnerable. An army is strengthened by cleansing itself of filth."

Our Red Army is invulnerable and invincible! The entire might of the country, its socialist industry, its transport, its collective and state farms, will come to the aid of the Red Army when the enemy dares to attack us. The entire people will rise to defend the sacred Soviet homeland. The words of the Red Army oath:

“I pledge, at the first call of the workers’ and peasants’ government, to come to the defence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from all dangers and attacks from all enemies, and in the struggle for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for the cause of socialism and the brotherhood of peoples, to spare neither my strength nor my life.”

—every citizen of the Soviet Union applies these words to themselves. **Such a people, such a country, such an army are invincible !**

We crushed Tukhachevsky’s military-espionage gang and his accomplices like the most insignificant worms. **With the full might of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, we will crush the fascist masters of this spy gang as well, should they dare attack us. Such is the inviolable word of the Party of Lenin and Stalin, such is the will of the Soviet people, whose word never diverges from their deeds!**

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