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**DIALECTICAL  
MATERIALISM**

***“The Red Proletarian” by the  
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*To the birthday of the Leader of the world proletariat  
V.I. Lenin*

*“I, - a molten plant,  
Someone’s Glory and Honour,  
Someone’s Death...”*

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- 1) the mathematical formulas given by Engels as examples  
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- 2) all of Lenin’s notes from “philosophical notebooks”  
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# FROM COMPILERS

This collection, which cites and systematizes extracts from the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, gives a wide opportunity to get acquainted with the classical works of dialectical materialism. The range of issues and the location of the material presented here mainly correspond to the program of socio-economic universities.

The compilers of the collection tried in every possible way to overcome the fragmentation and fragmentation of the material usual for this type of book by preserving the internal connection of the presentation, as well as by bringing individual works in full. One can master materialist dialectics only in the practice of revolutionary struggle and tireless work on the whole wealth of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

Here are fully Marx's theses on Ludwig Feuerbach, individual chapters of Engels' Anti-Dühring, a number of chapters from the Dialectics of Nature, a fragment On the Question of Dialectics, Hegel's Logic Plan, Karl Marx, letter from Comrade Stalin to the editorial board of the Proletarian Revolution magazine and a number of other works.

A large place is occupied in the collection of extracts from the philosophical notebooks of Lenin, published in IX and XII "Lenin collections." Here they are systematized in accordance with the structure of the collection, which makes their use easier. The article by Comrade Adoratsky, placed as an appendix to the chapter "Leninist Stage", gives a holistic view of the philosophical works of V. I. Lenin.

The drafters considered it necessary to highlight in a special chapter the work of the classics on theoretical natural sciences. It gives answers to all the basic questions about the relationship of Marxism-Leninism to natural science.

The chapter "Leninist stage..." contains a number of important passages from the works of Lenin and Stalin that characterize the new that was introduced by Lenin and Stalin into the treasury of dialectical materialism, and in particular in the field of criticism of revisionism (the collection contains excerpts from the works of modern revisionists in philosophy) and social fascism.

At the end of the book is placed an index to facilitate the use of material in the collection.

The collection was compiled by a team of students of the IKP philosophy as a part of

vols. *Vinogradova, Kalinin, Nikitin, Puschutz, Rudov* and *Shapovalov* under the leadership of Comrade *Shevkin*.

The drafters are grateful to Comrade Pichugin, who gave a number of very valuable instructions in the process of compiling the collection.

# CHAPTER ONE. MARXISM- LENINISM—THE WORLD OUTLOOK OF THE PROLETARIAT

## I. The Historical Conditions for the Emergence of Marxism

The newest socialism in its content is primarily the result of observations, on the one hand, of the antagonism that prevails in modern society between the haves and have-nots, classes, capitalists and wage workers, and on the other, of the anarchy that exists in production. But in its theoretical form, it seems at first glance only a further development, as if a more consistent implementation of the principles established by the great philosophers of the XVIII century. Like any new theory, socialism was supposed to join the order of ideas created by its immediate predecessors, although its roots lay very deep in economic facts.

The great men who enlightened the French heads for the approaching revolution were themselves extreme revolutionaries. They did not recognize any external authorities. Religion, views on nature, society, the state — everything was subjected to their merciless criticism, everything was called before the court of reason and condemned to disappear if it could not prove its rationality. Reason was the only measure under which everything was brought. This was the time when, according to Hegel, “the world was put on the head” [Here is what Hegel says about the French Revolution: “The idea, the concept of law at *once* it won recognition, and the dilapidated supports of lawlessness could not show her any resistance. The idea of law is the foundation of the constitution, and now everything should be based on it. Since the sun shines in the sky and the planets revolve around it, it has never been for a person to stand on his head, that is, to rebuild reality according to ideas. Anaxagoras was the first to say that reason rules the world; but only now for the first time has man come to the recognition that thought should dominate in the realm of spiritual reality. *It was*

*a magnificent sunrise. All thinking people joyfully welcomed the advent of a new era. The solemn mood prevailed over this time, and the whole world was imbued with the enthusiasm of the spiritus* if his reconciliation with the deity was first made” ( *Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 535, 1840*).], that is, when the human head and the theoretical propositions it invented made a claim to serve as the sole basis for all human actions and social relations, and when after that the reality contradicting these propositions was actually overthrown from top to bottom. All old social and state forms, all traditional concepts were considered unreasonable and discarded like old trash. It was decided that so far the world has been guided by prejudice alone, and its entire past is worthy only of regret and contempt. Now the sun has risen for the first time, the kingdom of reason has come, and from then on superstition and injustice, privileges and oppression will give way to eternal truth, eternal justice, natural equality and inalienable human rights.

We now know that this kingdom of reason was nothing more than the idealized kingdom of the bourgeoisie; that eternal justice was realized in the form of bourgeois justice; that natural equality was limited to the equality of citizens before the law, and the bourgeois property right was declared the most significant of human rights. The rational state and the “social contract” of Rousseau turned out to be and could only be found in practice as a bourgeois democratic republic. The thinkers of the eighteenth century, like all their predecessors, could not go beyond the limits that the then era set for them.

But next to the struggle between the feudal nobility and the bourgeoisie, acting as a representative of the rest of society, there was a common antagonism — exploiters and exploited, wealthy parasites and working poor. It was he who gave the opportunity to the representatives of the bourgeoisie to be the defenders of not a single class, but of all suffering humanity. Moreover, from the very beginning the bourgeoisie already carried within itself its future adversary: capitalists could not exist without wage workers, and the very conditions under which the medieval guild master developed into a modern capitalist forced the guild apprentice and the labourer who did not belong to the shop to become a proletarian . And although the demands that the third estate defended in *their struggle against the nobility*, in general terms, really corresponded to the interests of various layers of the working population of that time, nevertheless, with each major uprising of the townspeople, an independent

movement of the layer that was the more or less developed predecessor of the modern proletariat flashed. Such was the movement of the Christians and Thomas Münzer during the Reformation and peasant wars in Germany, the Levellers during the English Revolution, Babeuf during the French. Along with the revolutionary attempts of an undeveloped class, corresponding theories arose: utopian images of the ideal social system in the 16th and 17th centuries, and in the 18th century, already directly communist theories (Morelli and Mably). The demand for equality was no longer limited to the field of political rights, but extended to the social status of individuals; the need was proved to destroy not only class privileges, but also the classes themselves. Ascetically harsh, Spartan communism, condemning all pleasure, was the first manifestation of a new teaching. Then came three great utopians: Saint-Simon, whose bourgeois aspirations coexisted partly with protecting the interests of the proletariat, Fourier, and finally Owen, who in the country of the most developed capitalist production and, under the influence of antagonism generated by this method of production, developed a series of projects to eliminate class differences in the form of a system directly adjacent to French materialism.

These three great utopians concurred in the fact that they never advocated the interests of the proletariat, which had historically developed at that time. Like the philosophers of the 18th century, they wanted to liberate all of humanity from the very beginning, and not just this social class. Like these philosophers, they wanted to establish a kingdom of reason and eternal justice, but their kingdom, like heaven from earth, is different from the kingdom of reason of the French Enlightenment. The bourgeois order, based on the principles of the eighteenth-century philosophers, is just as unreasonable and unjust and should be rejected with the same contempt as feudalism and all previous social forms. Until now, the true laws of reason and justice have not been known to mankind, and only for this reason it was not guided by them. For his happiness was missing that brilliant man, who has now appeared to tell the world all the truth. That he appeared just now, that truth is revealed only now, is not at all a necessary result of the general course of historical development, which inevitably led to it, but simply by chance. A brilliant man could have been born with the same convenience five hundred years ago, and thereby save mankind from five centuries of delusion, struggle and suffering.

The world outlook of the Utopians for a long time dominated the socialist views of the 19th century. and partly still dominates today. It

was held by all English and, until recently, all French socialists, as well as former German communists, not excluding Weitling. Socialism, in their view, is an expression of absolute truth, reason and justice, and you only need to open it so that it conquers the whole world with its own power; and since absolute truth does not depend on the time, space and historical development of mankind, this is already a matter of pure chance, when and where it will be discovered. Moreover, the absolute truth, reason and justice are different for each founder of the school and are determined by the subjective mood of his mind, the conditions of his life, the amount of his knowledge and way of thinking. Therefore, in the collision of these various varieties of absolute truth, reconciliation is possible only by smoothing their mutual contradictions. Nothing could be developed from this, except for a special kind of eclectic, average socialism, which really still prevails in the minds of most of the socialist workers in England and France. This eclectic socialism is a motley mixture of the most universally recognized criticisms, economic conditions and ideal ideas of the various founders of sects; this mixture is obtained the easier, the sooner its components lose in the stream of spores, like pebbles in a stream, their sharp corners and edges. In order to become a science, socialism had, first of all, to become on real ground. ( Nothing could be developed from this, except for a special kind of eclectic, average socialism, which really still prevails in the minds of most of the socialist workers in England and France. This eclectic socialism is a motley mixture of the most universally recognized criticisms, economic conditions and ideal ideas of the various founders of sects; this mixture is obtained the easier, the sooner its components lose in the stream of spores, like pebbles in a stream, their sharp corners and edges. In order to become a science, socialism had, first of all, to become on real ground. ( Nothing could be developed from this, except for a special kind of eclectic, average socialism, which really still prevails in the minds of most of the socialist workers in England and France. This eclectic socialism is a motley mixture of the most universally recognized criticisms, economic conditions and ideal ideas of the various founders of sects; this mixture is obtained the easier, the sooner its components lose in the stream of spores, like pebbles in a stream, their sharp corners and edges. In order to become a science, socialism had, first of all, to become on real ground. ( This eclectic socialism is a motley mixture of the most universally recognized criticisms, economic conditions and ideal ideas of the various founders of sects; this

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We saw how the philosophers of the 18th century who prepared the revolution. appealed to the mind as the only judge over everything that exists. They demanded the founding of a rational state, a rational society and the ruthless elimination of everything that is in conflict with the eternal mind. We have also seen that this eternal mind turned out to be in reality only an idealized reason of the third estate, ready to turn into a modern bourgeoisie. If the social system and the new state created by the French Revolution, and seemed reasonable in comparison with the old institutions—they were in any case very far from absolute rationality. The kingdom of reason has collapsed. Russo's social contract has found application in the reign of terror, from which the bourgeoisie, having verified in its political ability, sought salvation, first in the corruption of the directory, and then under the wing of Napoleonic despotism. The promised eternal peace has turned into endless war of conquest.

No more fortunate enough was the rational social order. The contrast between wealth and poverty, instead of resolving into general prosperity, on the contrary, intensified as a result of the elimination of the guild and other privileges that served to a certain extent as its cover, as well as the disappearance of church charity, which somewhat alleviated the scourge of poverty. [The "freedom of property" now effected from feudal shackles was, for the petty bourgeois and the peasant, the freedom to sell petty property crushed by the powerful competition of big capital and large land ownership to precisely these magnates and thus became for these petty bourgeois and peasants freedom from property.] The rapid development of industry on a capitalist basis soon elevated poverty and suffering of the working masses to a necessary condition for the existence of

society. [Christogan became, in the words of Carlyle, the only connecting element of this society.] The number of crimes increased every year. If the vices of the feudal lords, formerly exposed, were now fading for a while, then the vices of the bourgeoisie, formerly timidly hiding in the dark, blossomed in their place. Trade was increasingly imbued with fraud. The revolutionary motto “brotherhood” was realized in the wickedness and in the enmity of competition. Bribery replaced brutal violence, and, instead of the sword, money became the main lever of social life. The “right of the first night” was inherited from the feudal lords to the manufacturers. Prostitution has grown to unprecedented proportions, and even the marriage itself has turned into a legally recognized form of debauchery, into its official cover, supplemented by numerous illegal connections. In a word, the political and public institutions that arose after the “victory of reason” turned out to be the most evil, most sobering caricature of the brilliant promises of the philosophers of the 18th century. There was only a lack of people capable of ascertaining general disappointment, and these people appeared at the beginning of the new century. In 1802, the Geneva Letters of Saint-Simon came out; in 1808 the first work of Fourier appeared, although the basis of his theory dates back to 1799; On January 1, 1800, Robert Owen took control of New Lanark. the political and public institutions that arose after the “victory of reason” turned out to be the most evil, most sobering caricature of the brilliant promises of philosophers of the 18th century. There was only a lack of people capable of ascertaining general disappointment, and these people appeared at the beginning of the new century. In 1802, the Geneva Letters of Saint-Simon came out; in 1808 the first work of Fourier appeared, although the basis of his theory dates back to 1799; On January 1, 1800, Robert Owen took control of New Lanark.

But at that time capitalist production, and with it the antithesis between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, was still very

undeveloped. Big industry was unknown in France and had just emerged in England. But meanwhile, only large-scale industry develops the struggle not only between the classes it created, but also between the productive forces and forms of exchange generated by it, and only these conflicts created by large-scale industry lead to the fatal necessity of a revolution in the mode of production and the elimination of its capitalist character. Moreover, the same large-scale industry in the gigantic development of productive forces also provides a means for resolving the contradictions it has created. If in 1800 the struggle itself, stemming from the modern public order, had just begun, it was all the same in the availability of funds to eliminate it. Although during the terror the poor masses of Paris seized power for a moment and were thus able to direct the bourgeois revolution against the bourgeoisie itself, but their momentary victory served as the best proof of the impossibility of a lasting domination of the working class under the then conditions. The proletariat, which had not yet stood out from the total mass of poor people, at that time was only the embryo of the future class and was not capable of independent political action. He was only an oppressed, suffering mass, capable in his helplessness of waiting for deliverance only from some external, higher power. but their momentary victory served as the best proof of the impossibility of a lasting domination of the working class under the then conditions. The proletariat, which had not yet stood out from the total mass of poor people, at that time was only the embryo of the future class and was not capable of independent political action. He was only an oppressed, suffering mass, capable in his helplessness of waiting for deliverance only from some external, higher power. but their momentary victory served as the best proof of the impossibility of a lasting domination of the working class under the then conditions. The proletariat, which had not yet stood out from the total mass of poor people, at that time was only the embryo of the future class and was not capable of independent political action. He was only an oppressed, suffering mass, capable in his helplessness of waiting for deliverance only from some external, higher power.

This historical situation was reflected in the teachings of the founders of socialism. The immature capitalist production, the obscurity of the mutual position of the classes corresponded to immature theories. I had to invent, and not discover, a solution to social problems, still shrouded in a fog of undeveloped economic relations. Only the shortcomings of the social system were obvious,

but finding the means to eliminate them seemed to be the task of a thinking mind. It was necessary to invent a new, most perfect system of human relations and instil it in the existing society through propaganda, and, if possible, through the example of exemplary institutions according to the new system. These new social systems were doomed to remain utopias in advance, and the more carefully their details were developed, the further they were carried away into the realm of pure fantasy.

The utopian side of socialist theories has now completely receded into the field of history, and we will not dwell on it even a minute longer by letting the literary shopkeepers á la Dühring smugly shake up these ridiculous fantasies and admire the sobriety of our way of thinking in comparison with such “folly”. We are much more willing to try to find, under a fantastic cover, the embryos of brilliant ideas, scattered everywhere in the theories of the great Utopians, but invisible to blind philistines.

[Saint-Simon can be called the son of the Great French Revolution, at the beginning of which he did not reach the age of thirty. The revolution was the victory of the third estate, that is, the majority of the nation engaged in production and trade, over the until then privileged estates — the nobility and the clergy. But the victory of the third estate was actually the victory of a small part of this estate; it boiled down to the conquest of political power by the socially privileged part of it, the bourgeoisie possessing. Moreover, this bourgeoisie quickly developed during the revolution, on the one hand, with the help of speculation confiscated and then *sold* land holdings of the nobility and the church, on the other—by swindling the nation with military suppliers. It was the dominance of these speculators in the era of the directory France and the revolution to the brink of destruction and at the same time gave Napoleon an excuse for his coup. Thus, in the head of Saint-Simon, the antithesis between the third estate and the privileged estates took the form of the antithesis between the “workers” and the “idle.” The latter were not only the old privileged, but all those who did not take part in production and trade lived on their own rents. And the “workers” were not only hired workers, but also manufacturers, merchants, and bankers. That the idle ones lost their ability for spiritual leadership and political domination was beyond any doubt and was finally proved by the revolution. That the dispossessed did not possess this ability, this, according to Saint-Simon, was evidenced by the experience of the era of terror. Who was supposed to lead and dominate? According to Saint-Simon, — science

and industry, united by a new religious connection, are necessary for the mystical and strictly hierarchical “new Christianity”, which was supposed to restore the unity of religious views, destroyed since the time of the reformation. But science—these were scientists, and industry—primarily active bourgeois, manufacturers, merchants, bankers. True, these bourgeois were supposed to be something like state officials, proxies of the whole society, but in relation to the workers they retained administrative functions, as well as a privileged economic position. As for the bankers, then they were called upon to regulate all social production by regulating credit. Such a view was in full agreement with the era when in France large-scale industry, and with it the antithesis between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, was just beginning to develop. But what Saint-Simon particularly emphasizes is the following: everywhere and always he is primarily interested in the fate of the “largest and poorest class” (“la classe la plus nombreuse et la plus pauvre”).]

Already in the “Geneva Letters” of Saint-Simon we find the provision that “all people must work”; in the same work, he argues that the reign of terror in France was the reign of the poor.

“Look,” he appeals to these masses, “what happened in France when your brothers reigned there: they created hunger!” It took ingenious insight in order to understand in 1802 that the French revolution was a class struggle, and not only between the nobility and the bourgeoisie, but also between the nobility, the bourgeoisie and the *poor*. In 1816, Saint-Simon states that politics is the science of production, and predicts its complete absorption by the economy in advance. If the concept of the origin of political institutions from economic fundamentals is only visible in the bud, then the idea is clearly expressed that political power over people should turn into the management of things, into the management of production processes, that is, come to the “abolition of the state,” about which have been making so much noise lately.

With the same superiority over his contemporaries, Saint-Simon declares in 1814, immediately upon the entry of the Allies into Paris, and then in 1815 (during the war, a hundred days) that the alliance of France with England and these two countries with Germany represents the only guarantee peaceful development and prosperity of Europe. It took more courage and historical farsightedness to preach an alliance with the victors at Waterloo in 1815 than to wage a verbal war with German professors.

If Saint-Simon's brilliant broad views allowed him to catch the embryos of almost all the later socialist ideas that were not related to the field of pure economy, then Fourier, for his part, gives us deeply exciting criticism of the existing social system, expressed in this with purely French wit. He catches on the word of the inspired prophets of the pre-revolutionary bourgeoisie and its bribed flatterers of modern times. He mercilessly reveals all the material and moral poverty of the bourgeois world and compares it with the brilliant promises of the advent of the kingdom of reason, a civilization that brings happiness to all, and the endless improvement of the human race; he shows how miserable reality corresponds to the pompous speeches of contemporary bourgeois ideologists, and pours all his sarcasm into this final fiasco of the phrase. Thanks to the liveliness of his nature, Fourier is not only a critic, but also a satirist, and even one of the greatest satirists of all time. With strong and well-aimed strokes, he draws speculative frauds and a petty-mercantile spirit that has mastered the French trade of the post-revolutionary period. Even more successful is his satirical depiction of the relations of the sexes in bourgeois society and the position of women in it. He was the first to own the idea that the degree of freedom achieved by a given society should be measured by the greater or lesser freedom of a woman in this society. Even more successful is his satirical depiction of the relations of the sexes in bourgeois society and the position of women in it. He was the first to own the idea that the degree of freedom achieved by a given society should be measured by the greater or lesser freedom of a woman in this society. Even more successful is his satirical depiction of the relations of the sexes in bourgeois society and the position of women in it. He was the first to own the idea that the degree of freedom achieved by a given society should be measured by the greater or lesser freedom of a woman in this society.

But Fourier rises above all in his view of the history of human societies. He divides his entire previous course into four stages of development: a wild state, barbarism, patriarchy and civilization. By the latter, he means the existing bourgeois system, which began in the sixteenth century, and shows how "this civilization makes every vice that remained in its simple form under barbarism complex, complex, ambiguous, duplicitous and hypocritical." He points to the "bewitched circle" of invincible and ever-renewing contradictions in which civilization moves, always achieving results opposite to those to which it sincerely or mockingly seeks. For example, according to him, "in civilization, *poverty is generated by excess itself*". Obviously,

Fourier also masterfully possessed dialectics, like his contemporary Hegel. From the same dialectical point of view, he argues, contrary to the prevailing theory of man's infinite ability to improve, that not only every historical phase has its own period of growth and decline, but that all of humanity is ultimately doomed to disappear. This idea of Fourier took in historical science the same place as Kant's idea of the ultimate destruction of the globe took in natural science.

While a hurricane of revolution swept over France, a less noisy but no less powerful coup was taking place in England. Steam and machines turned the manufactory into a modern large-scale industry and thereby revolutionized all the foundations of bourgeois society. The slow, sleepy course of the manufactory turned into a real "period of turbulent aspirations" of industry. The division of society into large capitalists and deprived of any property of the proletarians was carried out with ever-increasing speed, destroying intermediate states. The stable middle class of the old time has now turned into an unstable, unstable mass of artisans and small traders, leading an unsecured lifestyle and making up the most fluid part of the population. The new mode of production was still at the first stages of its upward development; he was still normal correct, the only possible way of production under the given conditions, and yet he managed to give rise to egregious social disasters. A mass of the homeless population has accumulated in the hideous corners of the big cities; traditional ties, patriarchal family life, even the family itself were destroyed; the extreme lengthening of the working day was exhausted by overwork, mainly children and women; the corruption of morals among the working population, suddenly thrown into completely new living conditions, from a village to a city, from agriculture to industry, has reached astonishing proportions. And so, the reform of public relations that engendered such disasters was undertaken by Robert Owen, a 29-year-old manufacturer who combined a rare ability to lead people with a sublime and almost childlike simplicity of character. He learned the materialistic doctrine of the 18th century.

Most of his colleagues, according to their position, saw in the industrial revolution only disorder and chaos, suitable for fishing in troubled waters and for quick enrichment. Owen was looking for favourable conditions in her to implement his beloved idea, bringing order to chaos. He already tried, and not without success, to apply it in Manchester, as the director of a factory that occupied 500 workers. From 1800 to 1829, he ran a large paper mill in New Lanark,

in Scotland, and as a companion in the enterprise, he acted here with greater freedom and with such success that his name soon became known throughout Europe. The population of New Lanark, which gradually increased to 2,500 people and consisted of extremely mixed and for the most part highly corrupted elements, he turned into an exemplary colony in which drunkenness, police, prisons, courts, charity and the need for it have become unknown things. He achieved his goal solely by placing workers in conditions more consistent with human dignity, and in particular, taking care of the good upbringing of the younger generation. In New Lanark, kindergartens invented by Owen were first introduced. They accepted children from the age of two, and occupied them so well that their parents could hardly take their playing pets home. Working day was reduced in New Lanark to 10 starting from the age of two, they occupied them so well that their parents could hardly take their playing pets home. Working day was reduced in New Lanark to 10 starting from the age of two, they occupied them so well that their parents could hardly take their playing pets home. Working day was reduced in New Lanark to  $10\frac{1}{2}$  hours, while competing with them to factories operation lasted 13 and 14 hours. And when the cotton crisis forced a four-month stoppage of work, workers continued to receive full pay. And with all this, the factory doubled its value and constantly brought its owners excellent income.

But all this did not satisfy Owen. The situation in which he placed his workers in his eyes was far from consistent with human dignity. "These people are my slaves," he said; the relatively favourable living conditions of the workers of New Lanark were far from sufficient for the comprehensive development of their mind and character, not to mention the free application of forces and abilities. "Meanwhile, the working part of these 2,500 people has created such an amount of real income that would have required 600,000 people to produce half a century ago. I asked myself: where does the difference between the number of products consumed by these 2,500 workers and the amount that would be required for the previous 600 thousand?" The answer was clear. This difference was obtained by the owners of the factory in the form of 300 thousand pounds. Art. (6 million marks) of annual income, over 5% on the fixed capital of the enterprise. This answer, even more so than with New Lanark, was applicable to all other factories in England. "Without a new source of wealth created by machines, it would not be possible to wage war to overthrow Napoleon and maintain the aristocratic

principles of social structure. And this new power was the work of workers.” [From a note: “The Revolution in Mind and Practice”, addressed to all the “red Republicans, Communists and Socialists” of Europe and the French interim government of 1848, but also filed with “Queen Victoria and her responsible to advisers.”]. Therefore, her fruits must belong to them. The powerful new forces of production, which until now have served only to enrich the units and enslave the masses,

In such a business environment, based, so to speak, on commercial bookkeeping, Owen’s communism arose and retained its practical character to the end. So in 1823, Owen drafted agricultural colonies to eliminate Irish disasters and attached to it a detailed calculation of the necessary fixed capital, annual costs and estimated income. In his final plan for the future system, Owen pays special attention to the technical side of the matter, carefully develops all the details, attaches plans, drawings and drawings, and all this with such knowledge of the matter, that if you accept his method of social reform, you can say very little against the details, even from the point of view of a specialist.

The transition to communism was a turning point in Owen’s life. While his work was simple philanthropy, it brought him wealth, universal approval, honour and glory. He was then the most popular person in Europe. His speeches were favourably attended not only by his comrades in public position, but even by the sovereigns and ministers themselves. But as soon as he came up with his communist theories, the flip side of the coin appeared. Three great obstacles, in his opinion, blocked the path to social reform: private property, religion and the modern form of marriage. Starting the struggle against these obstacles, he knew that he was to become an outcast among official society and lose his social position; but these considerations did not diminish the energy of his attack. It was exactly what he foresaw: he was expelled from official society; ignored by the press, impoverished by the unsuccessful communist experiences in America, swallowing up his entire fortune, he turned directly to the working class and worked in his midst for another thirty years. The entire social movement, all the real successes achieved by the working class of England, are connected with the name of Owen. So in 1819, thanks to his five-year efforts, the first law was passed restricting the work of women and children in factories. Under his chairmanship, the first congress convened, at which the trade unions throughout England united into one large, universal trade union. He organized, as

transitional steps towards a completely communist social system, for the first time cooperative partnerships (consumer and productive), useful for those alone, that they proved the full possibility of doing without merchants and manufacturers. In addition, he organized working bazaars, on which products were exchanged using paper money, the unit of which was hours of labour. These bazaars inevitably should have failed, but they completely anticipated the later Proudhon exchange bank, from which they differed only in that they did not build their inventor into a universal remedy for all evils, but were offered only as a first step towards a more radical reconstruction of the whole society...

Utopians, as we have seen, were Utopians because they could not be anything else in an era when capitalist production was still so poorly developed. They were forced to construct the elements of the new society from their own head, for these elements had not yet clearly emerged clearly in the depths of the oldest society; sketching out the plan of the new building, they were forced to limit themselves to appealing to the mind, since they still could not appeal to modern history. If now, almost 80 years after their performance, Mr. Dühring appears on the scene with a claim to derive the “governing” system of the new social system, not from the available historically developed material as its necessary result, but from his sovereign head, from his fraught with final truths mind, then he, who everywhere feels epigones, Itself is only the epigone of the Utopians, the newest Utopian. He calls the Utopians “social alchemists.” So be it! Alchemy was necessary at one time. But since then, large-scale industry has developed the contradictions lurking in the capitalist mode of production into such egregious antagonisms that the approaching collapse of this mode of production can be groped, so to speak. New productive forces can be preserved and further developed only with the introduction of a new mode of production corresponding to their current stage of development. The constant struggle between the two classes created by the existing mode of production, generating more and more aggravation of class relations, swept all civilized countries and flared up every day, so, finally, an understanding of this historical process and the conditions that became necessary thanks to it to social transformation, as well as the main characteristic properties of the latter, has already been reached. If Mr. Dühring now fabricates the “utopia” of the new social system not from the available economic material, but simply extracts it from his highest skull, then it is far from enough to say that he is engaged in “social alchemy”. No, he

does worse than someone who, after discovering the laws of modern chemistry, would have thought to resurrect old alchemy and would like to use atomic weight, molecular formulas, atom valence, crystallography and spectral analysis to discover Dühring and now fabricates the “utopia” of the new social system not from the available economic material, but simply extracts it from his highest skull, it is far from enough to say that he is engaged in “social alchemy”. No, he does worse than someone who, after discovering the laws of modern chemistry, would have thought to resurrect old alchemy and would like to use atomic weight, molecular formulas, atom valence, crystallography and spectral analysis to discover Dühring and now fabricates the “utopia” of the new social system not from the available economic material, but simply extracts it from his highest skull, it is far from enough to say that he is engaged in “social alchemy”. No, he does worse than someone who, after discovering the laws of modern chemistry, would have thought to resurrect old alchemy and would like to use atomic weight, molecular formulas, atom valence, crystallography and spectral analysis to discover *philosopher’s stone* . (*Engels , Anti-Dühring, p. 183-189, 190-191, 1932*)

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But meanwhile, as the natural-scientific worldview could develop only as the studies delivered the corresponding positive knowledge, historical events had already taken place much earlier, which determined a decisive turn in the understanding of history. In 1831, the first working uprising took place in Lyon; From 1838 to 1842, the first national labour movement, the English Chartist movement, reached its zenith. The class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat began to take first place in the history of the more developed countries of Europe, as large-scale industry developed, on the one hand, and the newly acquired political domination of the bourgeoisie. The facts more and more clearly showed the whole falsehood of the teachings of bourgeois economy about the same interests of capital and labour, about universal harmony and the general well-being of the people, which would seem to be the result of free competition. It was impossible to ignore these facts, as well as French and English socialism, which was their theoretical, though extremely imperfect expression. But the old, idealistic, not yet rejected view of history did not know any class struggle based on material interests, as it generally did not recognize these interests. Production,

like all economic relations, appeared in it, among other things, as a secondary element of the “history of culture”. But the old, idealistic, not yet rejected view of history did not know any class struggle based on material interests, as it generally did not recognize these interests. Production, like all economic relations, appeared in it, among other things, as a secondary element of the “history of culture”. But the old, idealistic, not yet rejected view of history did not know any class struggle based on material interests, as it generally did not recognize these interests. Production, like all economic relations, appeared in it, among other things, as a secondary element of the “history of culture”.

New facts forced to subject the whole previous history to a new study, and then it turned out that *all of it*, with the exception of the primitive state, was the history of the struggle of classes, that these struggling social classes are at any given moment the result of relations of production and means of intercourse, in short, *economic* relationship of his time. The economic structure of society in each given era is that real soil, the properties of which ultimately explain the entire superstructure, formed by a combination of legal and political institutions, as well as religious, philosophical and other views of each given historical period. Hegel freed the understanding of history from metaphysics: he made it dialectical—but his own view of it was essentially idealistic. Idealism was now driven out of its last refuge, from the realm of history, now the understanding of history has become materialistic, now a way has been found to explain human self-awareness by the conditions of human existence instead of the previous explanation of these conditions by human self-consciousness.

Therefore, socialism is now not an accidental discovery of one or another ingenious mind, but an inevitable consequence of the struggle of two historically emerging classes—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. His task is no longer to invent the most perfect social system, but to investigate the historical and economic process, the necessary consequence of which were the said classes with their mutual struggle, and to find a means in the economic situation created by this process to resolve this fight. But former socialism was just as incompatible with this materialistic outlook on history as it was incompatible with dialectics and modern science from the views of the French materialists on nature. Although former socialism criticized the existing capitalist mode of production and its consequences, but he could not explain it, and therefore was not able to cope with it - he could only declare him worthless. The stronger he rebelled against the

inevitable exploitation of the working class in this method of production, the less he was able to clearly explain what this exploitation consists of and how it arises. It was made thanks to the discovery *surplus value*. It has been proved that the appropriation of unpaid labour is the main form of the capitalist mode of production and its characteristic exploitation of workers; that even if the capitalist buys labour at the full value that it, as a commodity, has on the market, it nevertheless extracts from it a value greater than that which he paid for it, and that this surplus value is the source of that the amount of value due to which an ever-growing mass of capital is accumulated in the hands of the possessing classes. Thus, the origin of the capitalist mode of production was clarified, as was the production of capital itself.

We owe these two great discoveries—the materialistic understanding of history and the exposure of the secrets of capitalist production through the concept of surplus value—to *Marx*. Thanks to them, socialism has now become a science that needs only to be developed in all its details and in the interconnection of its individual parts. (*Engels, Anti-Dühring, pp. 18-19, 1932*)

## **II. Marxism as a generalization of the experience of the class struggle of the proletariat**

### **Marx and Engels put science in place of dreams**

Marx and Engels were the first to show that the working class with its demands is the necessary product of the modern economic order, which together with the bourgeoisie inevitably creates and organizes the proletariat; they showed that it was not the benevolent attempts of certain noble personalities, but the class struggle of the organized proletariat that would save mankind from the calamities that were oppressing it. Marx and Engels in their scientific works first explained that socialism is not an invention of dreamers, but the ultimate goal and necessary result of the development of productive

forces in modern society. All written history has until now been the history of the class struggle, a change in the domination and victories of some social classes over others. And this will continue as long until the foundations of class struggle and class domination—private property and promiscuous social production—disappear. The interests of the proletariat require the destruction of these foundations, and therefore a conscious class struggle of organized workers should be directed against them. And every class struggle is a political struggle.

These views of Marx and Engels were now adopted by all the proletariat fighting for their liberation, but when two friends took part in the socialist literature and social movements of their time in the 1940s, such views were perfect news. Then there were many talented and mediocre, honest and dishonourable people who, carried away by the struggle for political freedom, the struggle against the autocracy of kings, police and priests, did not see the opposite interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. These people did not even allow the idea that the workers act as an independent social force. On the other hand, there were many dreamers, sometimes genius, who thought that it was only necessary to convince the rulers and the ruling classes of the injustice of the modern public order, and then it would be easy to establish peace and general well-being on earth. They dreamed of socialism without a fight. Finally, almost all of the then socialists and, in general, friends of the working class saw in the proletariat only *an ulcer*, they watched in horror how this ulcer also grew with the growth of industry. Therefore, they all thought about how to stop the development of industry and the proletariat, to stop the “wheel of history.” In contrast to the general fear of the development of the proletariat, Marx and Engels placed all their hopes on the continuous growth of the proletariat. The more proletarians, the greater their strength as a revolutionary class, the closer and more possible socialism. In a few words, the merits of Marx and Engels to the working class can be expressed as follows: they taught the working class self-knowledge and self-awareness, and put science in its place of dreams. (*Lenin, F. Engels (1895), Op., Vol. I, pp. 43 -434, 3rd ed., 1926* ).

## **Spontaneity and consciousness**

We said that the workers *could not have a* social democratic consciousness. It could be brought only from without. The history of all countries shows that the working class is only able to develop only union-consciousness, that is, the conviction that it is necessary to unite in alliances, to fight with the owners, to get the government to issue these or those laws necessary for workers, etc. p. [Trade unionism does not at all preclude any “politics,” as is sometimes thought. The trade unions have always waged well-known (but not social-democratic) political agitation and struggle. We will talk about the difference between trade unionism and social democratic politics in the next chapter.] The doctrine of socialism grew out of those philosophical, historical, economic theories that were developed by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by the intelligentsia. The founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, They themselves belonged, in their social position, to the bourgeois intelligentsia. In the same way, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of social democracy arose completely independently of the spontaneous growth of the labour movement, arose as a natural and inevitable result of the development of thought among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia. By the time we are talking about, that is, by the half of the 90s, this teaching was not only a well-established program of the Emancipation of Labour group, but also won the majority of revolutionary youth in Russia. ( arose as a natural and inevitable result of the development of thought among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia. By the time we are talking about, that is, by the half of the 90s, this teaching was not only a well-established program of the Emancipation of Labour group, but also won the majority of revolutionary youth in Russia. (arose as a natural and inevitable result of the development of thought among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia. By the time we are talking about, that is, by the half of the 90s, this teaching was not only a well-established program of the Emancipation of Labour group, but also won the majority of revolutionary youth in Russia. (*Lenin, what to do? (1902), Op., Vol. IV , p. 384-385, ed. 3rd )*

Class political consciousness can be brought to the worker *only from the outside* , that is, from the outside of the economic struggle, from outside the sphere of workers’ relations with the masters. The area from which this knowledge can only be drawn is the area of relations of *all* classes and strata to the state and government, the field of relations between *all* classes. Therefore, to the question: what to do to bring workers political knowledge? one cannot give only that

answer, which in most cases are satisfied with practices, not to mention practices that are prone to economism, namely the answer: “go to the workers.” In order to bring political knowledge to the *workers*, the Social Democrats must *go to all classes of the population*, they must send out *in all directions* detachments of his army. (*Lenin, What to do? (1902), Op., Vol. IV, p. 422, ed. 3rd.* )

## **World historical role of the proletariat**

International Social Democracy is currently undergoing a wobble of thought. Until now, the teachings of Marx and Engels were considered the solid foundation of revolutionary theory - now voices are heard everywhere about the insufficiency of these teachings and their obsolescence. Anyone who declares himself a Social Democrat and intends to come forward with a Social Democratic body must accurately determine his attitude to a question that concerns far from the German Social Democrats alone.

We stand entirely on the basis of Marx’s theory: for the first time, it turned socialism from utopia into science, established the solid foundations of this science and outlined the path that it should take, developing this science further and developing it in all its particulars. She revealed the essence of modern capitalist economy, explaining how hiring a worker, buying labour, covers the enslavement of millions of poor people to a handful of capitalists, landowners, factories, mines, etc. She showed how the whole development of modern capitalism tends to displace small-scale production by large, creates conditions that make possible and necessary the socialist structure of society. She taught to see rooted customs, political intrigues, sophisticated laws, intricate teachings — the *class struggle*, the struggle between all kinds of propertied classes with the mass of the poor, with the *proletariat*, which stands at the head of all the poor. She clarified the real task of the revolutionary socialist party: not writing plans for rebuilding society, not preaching to the capitalists and their henchmen about improving the situation of workers, not plotting conspiracies, *but organizing the class struggle of the proletariat and leading this struggle, the ultimate goal of which is the conquest of political power by the proletariat and the organization of the socialist society* .

And we ask now: what did those loud “renewers” of it who made such a noise in our time, grouping around the German socialist

Bernstein, contribute to this theory? *Exactly nothing*: they did not move a step ahead of the science that Marx and Engels had bequeathed to us to develop; they did not teach the proletariat any new methods of struggle; they only backed away, adopting fragments of backward theories and preaching to the proletariat not the theory of struggle, but the theory of pliability — pliability in relation to the worst enemies of the proletariat, to governments and bourgeois parties that are not tired of finding new means to persecute socialists. One of the founders and leaders of Russian Social Democracy, Plekhanov, was quite right when he mercilessly criticized Bernstein's latest "criticism", the representatives of the German workers (at the congress in Hanover) have now rejected their views.

We know that a bunch of accusations will fall upon us for these words: they will shout that we want to turn the socialist party into an order of "faithful" persecuting "heretics" for deviating from "dogma", for any independent opinion, etc. We know all these fashionable biting phrases. Only there is not a drop of truth in them and not a drop of meaning. There can be no strong socialist party if there is no revolutionary theory that unites all socialists, from which they draw all their beliefs, which they apply to their methods of struggle and methods of activity; to defend such a theory, which in your extreme understanding you consider true, from unreasonable attacks and from attempts to worsen it, does not at all mean to be an enemy of *all* critics. We do not at all look at the theory of Marx as something complete and untouchable; we are convinced, on the contrary, that it laid only the cornerstones of the science that the socialists *should* move further in all directions if they do not want to lag behind life. We think that Russian socialists especially need the *independent* development of the theory of Marx, for this theory gives only general *guidelines* that apply *in particular* to England differently than to France, to France differently than to Germany, to Germany differently than to Russia . Therefore, we will be happy to devote a place in our newspaper to articles on theoretical issues and invite all comrades to an open discussion of controversial points. (*Lenin, Our Program (1899), Op., Vol. II, pp. 491-492, ed. 3rd*)

## **It is necessary to master the knowledge of world science**

The old school was a school of study, it forced people to learn a lot of unnecessary, superfluous, dead knowledge that clogged their heads and turned the younger generation into officials fit into the general ranking. But you would make a huge mistake if you tried to draw the conclusion that you can become a communist without having learned what has been accumulated by human knowledge. It would be a mistake to think that it is enough to assimilate the communist slogans, the conclusions of communist science, without assimilating the amount of knowledge that results in communism itself. An example of how communism emerged from the sum of human knowledge is Marxism.

You read and heard about how communist theory, communist science, mainly created by Marx, how this doctrine of Marxism ceased to be the work of one though brilliant socialist of the 19th century, how this doctrine became the doctrine of millions and tens of millions of proletarians around the world, applying this teaching is in its struggle against capitalism. And if you put forward the following question: why could the teachings of Marx master millions and tens of millions of hearts of the most revolutionary class — you can get one answer: this was because Marx relied on a solid foundation of human knowledge gained under capitalism, having studied the laws of development of human society Marx understood the inevitability of the development of capitalism leading to communism, and most importantly he proved it only on the basis of the most accurate, most detailed, the most in-depth study of this capitalist society, with the full assimilation of all that the old science gave. All that was created by human society, he reworked critically, without leaving a single point unattended. He reworked, criticized, tested on the labour movement all that was created by human thought, and made those conclusions that people, limited by bourgeois boundaries or bound by bourgeois prejudices, could not draw. ( which limited by bourgeois framework or connected by bourgeois prejudice people could not do. ( which limited by bourgeois framework or connected by bourgeois prejudice people could not do. (*Lenin, Speech at the III All-Russian Congress of the RKSM (1920), Soch., Vol. XXV p. 386-387, ed. 3rd )*

## **The Communist International is on the point of view of dialectical materialism**

Relying on the historical experience of the revolutionary labour movement of all continents and all peoples, the Communist International, in its theoretical and practical work, fully and unconditionally stands on the point of view of *revolutionary Marxism*, which was further developed in *Leninism*, which is nothing but the Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions.

Defending and propagandizing the *dialectical materialism of Marx-Engels*. Applying it as a revolutionary method of cognizing reality in order to revolutionize this reality, the Communist International is actively fighting all kinds of bourgeois worldviews and all kinds of theoretical and practical opportunism. Standing on the basis of the consistent class struggle of the proletariat, subordinating the temporary, partial, group, national interests of the proletariat to its long, common international interests, the Communist International mercilessly exposes the doctrine of the “class world” adopted by reformists from the bourgeoisie in all its forms. Expressing the historical need for an international organization of revolutionary proletarians, grave diggers of the capitalist system, the Communist International is the only international force, *the organizer of the international revolution of the proletariat*. ( *The Comintern Program*, pp. 11–12. Introduction. )

## **III.Sources and Components of Marxism**

### **The Three Sources and Three Components of Marxism**

The teachings of Marx evoke the greatest enmity and hatred of the whole bourgeois (both treasury and liberal) science, which sees in Marxism something like a “harmful sect.” No other relationship can be expected, for there can be no “impartial” social science in a society built on the class struggle. One way or another, but *all* official and

liberal science *defends* wage slavery, and Marxism has declared a merciless war on this slavery. Expecting an impartial science in a society of wage slavery is as stupid a naivety as expecting an impartiality by factory owners on the question of whether workers should increase their wages and reduce capital gains.

But this is not enough. The history of philosophy and the history of social science show with full clarity that in Marxism there is nothing like “sectarianism” in the sense of some closed, ossified teaching that arose *away* from the main road of the development of world civilization. On the contrary, the whole genius of Marx lies precisely in the fact that he gave answers to the questions that the advanced thought of mankind has already posed. His teaching arose as a direct and immediate *continuation of the* teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism.

The teachings of Marx are omnipotent because they are true. It is complete and harmonious, giving people a whole outlook, irreconcilable with any superstition, with any reaction, with no defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the legal successor of the best that created humanity in the XIX century. in the face of German philosophy, English political economy, French socialism.

We will briefly dwell on these three sources and, at the same time, on the component parts of Marxism.

## I

The philosophy of Marxism is *materialism*. Throughout the recent history of Europe, and especially at the end of the XVIII century, in France, where a decisive battle was fought against all kinds of medieval trash, against serfdom in institutions and ideas, materialism turned out to be the only consistent philosophy, true to all the teachings of the natural sciences, hostile to superstitions, hypocrisy, etc. The enemies of democracy therefore tried to “refute” with all their might, to undermine, slander materialism and defended various forms of philosophical idealism, which always comes down, one way or another, to the protection or support of religion.

Marx and Engels most decisively defended philosophical materialism and repeatedly explained the deep fallacy of any deviations from this foundation. Most clearly and in detail are their views in Engels’ writings: Ludwig Feuerbach and Dühring’s Refutation, which, like the Communist Manifesto, are the reference book of every conscious worker.

But Marx did not dwell on materialism of the eighteenth century, but moved philosophy forward. He enriched it with acquisitions of German classical philosophy, especially the Hegelian system, which in turn led to Feuerbach's materialism. The main thing from these acquisitions is *dialectics*, that is, the doctrine of development in its most complete, deepest and free from one-sided form, the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge, which gives us a reflection of the ever-evolving matter. The latest discoveries of natural science—radium, electrons, the transformation of elements—have remarkably confirmed Marx's dialectical materialism, contrary to the teachings of bourgeois philosophers with their "new" returns to the old and rotten idealism.

Deepening and developing philosophical materialism, Marx brought it to the end, extended his knowledge of nature to the knowledge of *human society*. The greatest achievement of scientific thought was the *historical materialism* of Marx. The chaos and arbitrariness that prevailed so far in views on history and politics have been replaced by a strikingly coherent and harmonious scientific theory, showing how it develops from one way of social life due to the growth of productive forces, another, higher, from serfdom, for example, capitalism is growing.

Just as cognition of a person reflects independently the existing nature, i.e., developing matter, so *public cognition of a person* (i.e., different views and teachings philosophical, religious, political, etc.) reflects the *economic structure of society*. Political institutions are a superstructure over the economic foundation. We see, for example, how the various political forms of modern European states serve to strengthen the rule of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat.

The philosophy of Marx is complete philosophical materialism, which has given mankind great tools of knowledge, and in particular to the working class.

## II

Recognizing that the economic system is the basis on which the political superstructure rises, Marx devoted most of his attention to the study of this economic system. The main work of Marx, "Capital," is devoted to the study of the economic system of modern, that is, capitalist, society.

Classical political economy before Marx took shape in England, the most developed capitalist country. Adam Smith and David

Ricardo, exploring the economic system, laid the foundation for the *labour theory of value*. Marx continued their work. He strictly substantiated and consistently developed this theory. He showed that the value of any product is determined by the amount of socially necessary working time spent on the production of goods.

Where bourgeois economists saw the relation of things (exchange of goods for goods), there Marx revealed the *relationship between people*. The exchange of goods expresses the relationship between individual producers through the market. Money means that this connection is becoming ever closer, inextricably combining the entire economic life of individual producers into a single whole. *Capital* means the further development of this connection: human labour becomes a commodity. The wage worker sells his labour to the owner of the land, factories, tools. The worker uses one part of the working day to cover the costs of maintaining his and his family (wages), and the other part of the day the worker works for nothing, creating *surplus value* for the capitalist, the source of profit, the source of wealth of the capitalist class.

The doctrine of surplus value is the cornerstone of Marx's economic theory.

The capital created by the labour of the worker crushes the worker, ruining the small masters and creating an army of the unemployed. In industry, the victory of large-scale production is immediately visible, but in agriculture, we see the same phenomenon: the superiority of large-scale capitalist agriculture is increasing, the use of machinery is growing, peasant farming is falling into the loop of money capital, falling and ruining under the yoke of backward technology. In agriculture, there are other forms of decline in small-scale production, but its very decline is an indisputable fact.

Beating small-scale production, capital leads to an increase in labour productivity and to the creation of a monopoly position of the unions of the largest capitalists. Production itself is becoming more and more social—hundreds of thousands and millions of workers are becoming a systematic economic organism—and the product of general labour is appropriated by a handful of capitalists. The anarchy of production, crises, the frantic pursuit of the market, the insecurity of existence for the mass of the population are growing.

By increasing the dependence of the workers on capital, the capitalist system creates the great power of united labour.

From the first beginnings of commodity economy, from simple exchange, Marx traced the development of capitalism to its highest forms, to large-scale production.

And the experience of all capitalist countries, both old and new, clearly shows with each passing year to an increasing number of workers the correctness of this doctrine of Marx.

Capitalism has won all over the world, but this victory is only the threshold of the victory of labour over capital.

### III

When serfdom was overthrown and “free” capitalist society came into existence, it was immediately revealed that this freedom meant a new system of oppression and exploitation of the working people. Various socialist teachings immediately began to arise as a reflection of this oppression and protest against it. But the original socialism was *utopian* socialism. He criticized capitalist society, condemned, cursed him, dreamed of destroying it, fantasized about a better system, convinced the rich in the immorality of exploitation.

But utopian socialism could not indicate a real way out. He could neither explain the essence of wage slavery under capitalism, nor discover the laws of its development, nor find that *social force* that could become the creator of a new society.

Meanwhile, the turbulent revolutions that accompanied the fall of feudalism, serfdom, everywhere in Europe and especially in France, more and more clearly revealed, as the basis of all development and its driving force, the *struggle of the classes*.

Not a single victory of political freedom over the feudal class was won without desperate resistance. Not a single capitalist country has developed on a more or less free, democratic basis, without a struggle not for life but for death, between different classes of capitalist society.

The genius of Marx lies in the fact that he was able to draw from here earlier than anyone and consistently draw the conclusion taught by world history. This conclusion is the doctrine of the *class struggle*.

People have always been and always will be stupid victims of fraud and self-deception in politics, until they learn to seek the *interests of* particular classes for any moral, religious, political, social phrases, statements, promises. Proponents of reform and improvement will always be fooled by the defenders of the old, until

they understand that every old institution, no matter how wild and rotten it may seem, is held by the forces of one or another ruling class. And to break the resistance of these classes, there is *only one* remedy: to find in the society around us, to enlighten and organize for the struggle against such forces which can—and for their social position *should*—create a force capable of sweeping away the old and build new.

Only the philosophical materialism of Marx indicated to the proletariat a way out of spiritual slavery, in which until now all the oppressed classes had lived. Only the economic theory of Marx clarified the actual position of the proletariat in the general system of capitalism.

All over the world, from America to Japan and from Sweden to South Africa, independent organizations of the proletariat are multiplying. He is enlightened and educated, waging his class struggle, gets rid of the prejudices of bourgeois society, rallies closer and learns to measure the measure of his successes, temper his strength and grows uncontrollably. (*Lenin, Three sources and three components (1913), Soch., Vol. XVI, p. 349 - 353, 3rd ed.*)

## **The Place and Significance of the Various Components of Marxism**

### **Doctrine of Marx**

*Marxism* is the system of views and teachings of Marx. Marx was the continuer and brilliant finisher of the three main ideological movements of the 19th century, belonging to the three most advanced countries of mankind: classical German philosophy, classical English political economy and French socialism in connection with the French revolutionary teachings in general. Even admitted by Marx's opponents, the remarkable consistency and integrity of his views, which together give modern materialism and modern scientific socialism, as the theory and program of the labour movement of all civilized countries of the world, compels us to preface the main content of Marxism, namely: the economic doctrine of Marx, a brief outline of his worldview generally.

## Philosophical materialism

Starting from 1844-1845, when the views of Marx were formed, he was a materialist, in particular a supporter of L. Feuerbach, seeing, and subsequently, his weaknesses exclusively in the insufficient sequence and comprehensiveness of his materialism. Marx saw the world-historical, “component of an era” significance of Feuerbach precisely in a decisive break with Hegel’s idealism and in the proclamation of materialism, which was still “in the 18th century, especially in France it was a struggle not only against existing political institutions, but also against religion and theology, but also... against all metaphysics” (in the sense of “drunken speculation” as opposed to “sober philosophy”) (“The Holy Family” in the “Literary Heritage”).

“For Hegel,” wrote Marx, “the process of thinking, which he turns even under the name of an idea into an independent subject, is a demiurge (creator, creator) of the real... But on the contrary, the ideal is nothing but a material, transplanted into the human head and transformed in it.” (“Capital”, I, preface to the 2nd ed.).

In full accordance with this materialistic philosophy of Marx and expounding it, Fr. Engels wrote in *Anti-Dühring* (see):—Marx got acquainted with this work in the manuscript—... “The unity of the world consists not in its being, but in its materiality, which is proved... by the long and difficult development of philosophy and natural science... Motion is a form of being of matter. Nowhere and never has there been and cannot be matter without movement, movement without matter... If we ask a question... what is thinking and cognition, where do they come from, we will see that they are products of the human brain and that man himself—a product of nature, developed in a well-known natural setting and with it. It goes without saying, by virtue of this, that the products of the human brain, which in the last analysis are also products of nature, do not contradict the rest of the connection of nature, but correspond to it. “Hegel was an idealist, that is, for him, the thoughts of our head were not reflections (Abbilder, reflections.)”

In his essay “Ludwig Feuerbach”, in which Fr. Engels sets forth his and Marx’s views on Feuerbach’s philosophy and which Engels sent to the press, after having re-read the old manuscript of him and

Marx 1844- 1845, on the question of Hegel, Feuerbach, and the materialistic understanding of history, Engels writes:

“The great fundamental question of any, and especially the latest philosophy is the question of the relation of thinking to being, spirit to nature... what comes before: spirit to nature or nature to spirit... Philosophers divided into two large camps, in accordance with how they answered this question. Those who claimed that spirit existed before nature, and who, therefore, somehow recognized the creation of the world,... constituted an idealistic camp. Those who considered nature to be the main principle joined the various schools of materialism.”

Any other use of the concepts of (philosophical) idealism and materialism leads only to confusion. Marx resolutely rejected not only idealism, always connected in one way or another with religion, but also the point of view of Hume and Kant, which is widespread especially today, agnosticism, criticism, positivism in various forms, considering such a philosophy a “reactionary” concession to idealism and, at best, “shyly passing through the back door of materialism driven out in front of the public...”

In particular, one should note the view of Marx on the relation of freedom to necessity: “Blind is a necessity until it is conscious. Freedom is the consciousness of necessity” (Engels in “Anti-Dühring”) = recognition of the objective laws of nature and the dialectical transformation of necessity into freedom (along with the transformation of an unknown, but knowable “thing in itself” into a “thing for us”, “the essence of things” in “Phenomena”). The main drawback of the “old” material, including Feuerbach (and especially the “vulgar”, Buchner-Voigt-Moleshott) materialism, Marx and Engels considered: 1) that this materialism was “predominantly mechanical, not taking into account the latest development of chemistry and biology... 2) that the old materialism was unhistorical, non-dialectical (metaphysical in the sense of anti-dialectics), did not conduct a consistent and comprehensive point of view of development; 3) then..

## **Dialectics**

Hegelian dialectics, as the most comprehensive, rich in content and in-depth doctrine of development, was considered by Marx and

Engels to be the greatest acquisition of classical German philosophy. They considered any other formulation of the principle of development and evolution to be one-sided, poor in content, mutilating and mutilating the actual course of development (often with leaps, disasters, revolutions) in nature and in society.

“Marx and I were almost the only people who set ourselves the task of saving” (from the defeat of idealism and Hegelianism in particular) “conscious dialectics and translate it into a materialistic understanding of nature.” “Nature is a confirmation of dialectics, and just the latest natural science shows that this confirmation is unusually rich” (written before the discovery of radium, electrons, transformation of elements, etc.), “Accumulating a mass of material daily and proving that things are in nature ultimately dialectically, not metaphysically.”

“The great main idea,” writes Engels, “is that the world does not consist of finished, finished objects, but is a combination of processes in which objects that seem to be unchanged, as well as their mental images and concepts made by the head, are in continuous change, then arise, they are destroyed—this great basic thought from the time of Hegel has entered into the general consciousness to such an extent that hardly anyone will challenge it in its general form. But it’s one thing to acknowledge it in words, another thing is to apply it in each individual case and in each given area of research.” “For dialectical philosophy, there is nothing once, forever established, unconditional, holy. She sees the seal of imminent fall on everything and everything, and nothing can resist her, except for the continuous process of emergence and destruction, infinite ascension from the lowest to the highest. She herself is just a simple reflection of this process in the thinking brain.”

Thus, according to Marx, dialectics is “a science of the general laws of motion of both the external world and human thinking.”

This revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was adopted and developed by Marx. Dialectical materialism “does not need any philosophy above other sciences.” From the previous philosophy remains “the doctrine of thinking and its laws—formal logic and dialectics.” And the dialectic, in the understanding of Marx, according to Hegel, also includes what is now called the theory of knowledge, epistemology, which should consider its subject equally historically, studying and generalizing the origin and development of knowledge, the transition from *not* knowledge to knowledge.

## **Materialistic understanding of history**

The consciousness of inconsistency, incompleteness, and one-sidedness of the old materialism led Marx to the conviction of the need to “reconcile the science of society with a materialistic foundation and rebuild it accordingly to this foundation. “If materialism generally explains consciousness from being, and not vice versa, then when applied to the social life of mankind, materialism demanded an explanation of *social* consciousness from *public* of being. “Technology,” says Marx, “... reveals the active relationship of man to nature, the direct process of the production of his life, and at the same time his social conditions of life and the spiritual ideas that flow from them.” Marx gave an integral formulation of the basic principles of materialism, which is extended to human society and its history, in the preface to the essay “To a criticism of political economy” in the following words:

“In the social production of their lives, people enter into certain, necessary, independent of their will relations, production relations that correspond to a certain stage of development of their material productive forces.

The totality of these production relations makes up the economic structure of society, the real basis on which the legal and political superstructure rises and to which certain forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of material life determines the social, political, and spiritual processes of life in general. Not the consciousness of people determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society conflict with existing production relations, or—which is only a legal expression of this—with property relations within which they have developed so far. From the forms of development of productive forces, these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the era of social revolution. With a change in the economic basis, a coup d’etat more or less quickly takes place in the entire huge superstructure. When considering such coups, it is always necessary to distinguish a material coup, with natural science accuracy, in the economic conditions of production from legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophical, in short: from ideological forms in which people are aware of this conflict and struggle with it.

Just as an individual cannot be judged on the basis of what he thinks of himself, it is impossible to judge a similar era of a revolution in her mind. On the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between social productive forces and production relations..." "In general terms, Asian, antique, feudal and modern, bourgeois, methods of production can be described as progressive eras of the economic social formation." (Compare Marx's short wording in a letter to Engels dated July 7, 1866: "Our theory of the definition of the organization of labour by means of production.")

The discovery of a materialistic understanding of history, or rather, the sequential continuation, the spread of materialism in the field of social phenomena, eliminated two main shortcomings of previous historical theories. First, they at best considered only the ideological motives of the historical activity of people, not exploring what causes these motives, not capturing the objective laws in the development of the system of social relations, not seeing the roots of these relations in the degree of development of material production; secondly, the previous theories did not cover just the actions of the *masses of the* population, while historical materialism for the first time made it possible to study the social conditions of the masses and changes in these conditions with natural-historical accuracy. Pre-Marxian "sociology" and historiography in *at best*, they gave an accumulation of raw facts, fragmentarily collected, and an image of individual sides of the historical process. Marxism pointed the way to a comprehensive, comprehensive study of the process of the emergence, development and decline of socio-economic formations, considering the *totality of* all conflicting trends, reducing them to precisely defined conditions of life and production of various *classes of* society, eliminating subjectivity and arbitrariness in the choice of individual "dominant" ideas or in interpreting them, revealing the *roots* without exception, all ideas and all the various trends in the state of material productive forces. People create their own history, but what determines the motives of people, and precisely the masses of people, what causes the clashes of conflicting ideas and aspirations, what is the totality of all these clashes of the entire mass of human societies, what are the objective conditions for the production of material life, which create the basis for all historical activity of people, what the law of the development of these conditions,—Marx drew attention to all this and showed the way to

the scientific study of history, as a single, logical in all its enormous versatility and contradictory nature.

## **Class struggle**

That the aspirations of some members of this society run counter to the aspirations of others, that social life is full of contradictions, that history shows us the struggle between peoples and societies, as well as within them, and also the change of periods of revolution and reaction, peace and war, stagnation and rapid progress or decline—these facts are well known. Marxism has given a guiding thread that allows us to discover a pattern in this seeming maze and chaos, namely: the theory of class struggle. Only the study of the set of aspirations of all members of a given society or group of societies can lead to the scientific determination of the result of these aspirations. And the source of conflicting aspirations is the difference in the position and living conditions of those *classes* into which each society breaks up.

“The history of all hitherto existing societies,” says Marx in the “Communist Manifesto” (with the exception of the history of the primitive community, “Engels adds),” was the history of the class struggle. The free and slave, patrician and plebeian, landowner and serf, master and apprentice, in short—oppressing and oppressed, were in eternal antagonism to each other, waged a continuous, sometimes hidden, now obvious struggle, always ending in a revolutionary reconstruction of the entire public building or the general death of those fighting classes... The modern bourgeois society emerging from the bowels of a lost feudal society has not destroyed class contradictions. It only put new classes, new conditions of oppression and new forms of struggle in place of the old. Our era, the era of the bourgeoisie, however, differs in that it simplified class contradictions:

Since the time of the French Revolution, European history has revealed with particular visibility in a number of countries this real lining of events, the struggle of the classes. And already the era of restoration in France put forward a number of historians (Thierry, Guizot, Migneux, Thiers), who, summarizing what was happening, could not fail to recognize the struggle of the classes as the key to understanding all of French history. And the newest era, the era of the complete victory of the bourgeoisie, representative institutions, broad (if not universal) suffrage, cheap, reaching the masses, daily press,

etc., the era of the powerful and ever-wider alliances of workers and unions of entrepreneurs, etc., showed even more clearly (although in a very sometimes unilateral, “peaceful”, “constitutional” form) the struggle of the classes as an engine of events. The next passage from Marx’s “Communist Manifesto” will show us.

“Of all the classes that are now opposed to the bourgeoisie, only the proletariat is a truly revolutionary class. All other classes are declining and destroyed with the development of large-scale industry; the proletariat is its own product. The middle estates: the small industrialist, petty trader, artisan and peasant—all of them are fighting the bourgeoisie in order to save their existence from death, as the middle estates. They, therefore, are not revolutionary, but conservative. Even more, they are reactionary: they seek to turn back the wheel of history. If they are revolutionary, to the extent that they are going to join the ranks of the proletariat, because they defend not their present, but their future interests: since they abandon their own point of view in order to take the point of view of the proletariat.”

In a number of historical works (*see literature*), Marx gave brilliant and deep examples of materialist historiography, an analysis of the position of *each* individual class, and sometimes of different groups or layers within the class, showing first hand why and how “every class struggle is a political struggle.” The passage we have given illustrates what a complex network of social relations and *transitional* stages from one class to another, from past to future, Marx analyses to take into account the entire resultant historical development.

The most profound, comprehensive and detailed confirmation and application of Marx’s theory is his economic doctrine.

## **The Economic Doctrine of Marx**

“The ultimate goal of my work,” says Marx in the preface to “Capital,” is to discover the economic law of the movement of modern society, “that is, capitalist bourgeois society. A study of the production relations of a given, historically defined society in their origin, development and decline—such is the content of Marx’s economic doctrine. In capitalist society, the production of *goods* dominates, and the analysis of Marx therefore begins with the analysis of goods.

## *Cost*

A commodity is, firstly, a thing satisfying a human need; secondly, a thing exchanged for another thing. The usefulness of a thing makes its *use value*. Exchange value (or simply value) is primarily a ratio, a proportion, when exchanging a known number of use values of one type for a known number of use values of another type. Daily experience shows us that millions and billions of such exchanges constantly equate all and all, the most diverse and incomparable with each other, use values one to another. What is common between these various things that are constantly equated with each other in a certain system of social relations? What is common between them is that they are *products of labour*. When exchanging products, people equate the most diverse types of labour. The production of goods is a system of social relations in which individual producers create a variety of products (the social division of labour), and all these products are equated with each other in exchange. Consequently, the general that is in all goods is not concrete labour of a certain branch of production, not labour of one kind, but *abstract* human labour, human labour in general. The entire labour force of a given society, represented in the sum of the costs of all goods, is one and the same human labour force: billions of facts of exchange prove this.

And, therefore, each individual product is only a certain fraction of the *socially necessary* working time. The value of the value is determined by the amount of socially necessary labour or labour time, socially necessary for the production of a given product, this use value.

“Equating their various products in an exchange with one another, people equate their various types of labour with one another. They don’t realize it, but they do it.”

Value is the relationship between two persons—as one old economist said; he should only add: a relationship covered by a material shell. Only from the point of view of the system of social production relations of one particular historical formation of society, moreover, relations manifested in the mass, repeated billions of times the phenomenon of exchange, it is possible to understand what value is.

“As values, goods are only a certain amount of frozen working time.”

After analysing in detail the dual nature of labour embodied in goods, Marx goes on to analyze the *forms of value* and *money*. The main task of Marx is in this case the study of the *origin of the monetary form of value*, the study of the *historical process* deployment of an exchange, starting with its individual, random acts (“simple, separate or random form of value”: a given quantity of one commodity is exchanged for a given quantity of another commodity) up to a universal form of value, when a series of different commodities are exchanged for the same specific commodity, and before the monetary value, when this particular commodity, the universal equivalent, is gold. Being the highest product of the development of exchange and commodity production, money obscures, covers the social character of private work, the social connection between individual producers united by the market.

Marx undergoes an extremely detailed analysis of the various functions of money, and here (as in the first chapters of *Capital*) it is particularly important to note that the abstract and sometimes seemingly purely deductive form of presentation actually reproduces gigantic factual material on the history of the development of exchange and commodity production.

“Money implies a certain height of commodity exchange. Different forms of money—a simple commodity equivalent or a medium of exchange or a means of payment, a treasure and world money — indicate, depending on the various sizes of application of this or that function, the comparative predominance of one of them, at very different stages of the social production process.” (*Capital*, I.)

## ***Surplus Value***

At a certain stage in the development of commodity production, money turns into capital. The formula for commodity circulation was —T (product) —D (money)—T (product), i.e., the sale of one product to buy another. The general formula of capital is, on the contrary, D — T — D, i.e., purchase for sale (with profit). Marx calls surplus value this increase in the initial value of money put into circulation. The fact of this “growth” of money in capitalist circulation is well known. It is this “growth” that turns money into *capital* as a

special, historically defined, social relation of production. Surplus value cannot arise from commodity circulation, for it knows only the exchange of equivalents, cannot arise from a markup to the price, because the mutual losses and winnings of buyers and sellers would be balanced, and we are talking about a mass, average, social phenomenon, and not individual. In order to get surplus value, “the owner of the money must find in the market such a product, the use value of which would possess the original property of being a source of value”, such a product, the consumption process of which would be at the same time a process of creating value. And such a product exists. This is the manpower. Its consumption is labour, and labour creates value. The owner of the money buys labour at its cost, determined by like the value of any other product, the socially necessary labour time necessary for its production (i.e., the cost of maintaining the worker and his family). Having bought labour, the owner of the money has the right to consume it, that is, make it work all day, say, 12 hours. Meanwhile, a worker within 6 hours (“necessary” working time) creates a product that pays for its content, and within the next 6 hours (“surplus” working time) creates a “surplus” product or surplus value not paid by the capitalist. Therefore, in capital, from the point of view of the production process, it is necessary to distinguish two parts: the constant capital spent on the means of production (machinery, tools, raw material, etc.)—its value (immediately or in parts) without changes to the finished product—and variable capital, spent on labour. The value of this capital does not remain unchanged, but increases in the process of labour, creating surplus value. Therefore, to express the degree of exploitation of labour by capital, one must compare surplus value not with all capital, but only with variable capital. The rate of surplus value, as Marx calls this ratio, will be, for example, in our example  $6/6$ , i.e. 100%.

The historical prerequisite for the emergence of capital is, firstly, the accumulation of a certain amount of money in the hands of individuals with a relatively high level of development of commodity production in general and, secondly, the availability of a “free” in the double sense of the worker, free from any constraints or restrictions on the sale of labour and free from land and generally from the means of production, the ownerless worker, the “proletariat”, who have nothing to exist but to sell labour.

The increase in surplus value is possible by two basic methods: by lengthening the working day (“absolute surplus value”) and by

reducing the necessary working day (“relative surplus value”). Analysing the first trick, Marx deploys a grandiose picture of the struggle of the working class for shortening the working day and government interference for lengthening the working day (XIV-XVII centuries) and for reducing it (factory legislation of the XIX century). After the emergence of Capital, the history of the labour movement of all civilized countries of the world gave thousands and thousands of new facts illustrating this picture.

Analysing the production of relative surplus value, Marx explores three main historical stages of increasing labour productivity by capitalism: 1) simple cooperation; 2) division of labour and manufactory; 3) machinery and large industry. How deeply the main, typical features of the development of capitalism are revealed here by Marx, it is evident, among other things, from the fact that studies of the Russian so-called “artisanal” industry provide a wealth of material for illustrating the first two of the three stages mentioned. And the revolutionary action of the large machine industry, described by Marx in 1867, was discovered during the half century that has elapsed since then in a number of “new” countries (Russia, Japan, etc.).

Further. Marx’s analysis of the *accumulation of capital*, that is, the conversion of part of surplus value into capital, its use not for the personal needs or whims of the capitalist, but for new production is extremely important and new. Marx showed the error of all the previous classical political economy (starting with Adam Smith), which believed that all surplus value converted into capital goes to variable capital. In fact, it breaks up into *means of production* plus variable capital. Of great importance in the process of development of capitalism and its transformation into socialism is the more rapid increase in the share of constant capital (in the total amount of capital) compared to the share of variable capital.

The accumulation of capital, accelerating the crowding out of workers by the machine, creating wealth on one pole and poverty on the other, also creates the so-called “reserve labour army”, the “relative excess” of workers or the “capitalist overpopulation”, which takes extremely diverse forms and allows capital to expand extremely rapidly production. This possibility, in connection with credit and the accumulation of capital in the means of production, gives, among other things, the key to understanding *crises* overproduction, periodically occurring in the capitalist countries, first on average every 10 years, then at longer and less defined intervals. The so-called initial accumulation should be distinguished from capital accumulation on

the basis of capitalism: forcible separation of a worker from the means of production, expulsion of peasants from the land, theft of communal lands, a system of colonies and state debts, protective duties, etc. “Initial accumulation” creates at one pole “Free” proletariat, on the other owner of money, the capitalist.

Marx describes the “*historical trend of capitalist accumulation*” in the following famous words:

“The expropriation of the direct producers is carried out with the most merciless vandalism and under the pressure of the meanest, dirtiest, smallest and most rabid passions. Private property obtained by the labour of the owner “(peasant and artisan),” based, so to speak, on the merging of a separate independent worker with his tools and means of labour, is supplanted by capitalist private property, which rests on the exploitation of alien, but formally free labour ... Now the expropriation is no longer subject to the worker himself leading an independent economy, but a capitalist exploiting many workers. This expropriation is accomplished by playing the immanent laws of capitalist production itself, by centralizing capital. One capitalist beats many capitalists. Hand in hand with this centralization or expropriation of many capitalists, few develop a cooperative form of the labour process on an ever larger and larger scale, develop a conscious technical application of science, systematic exploitation of the land, the transformation of labour means into such means of labour that allow only collective use, the economization of all means of production by using them as means of production of combined social labour, weaving all peoples into a network of the world market, and at the same time the international character of the capitalist regime. Together with the ever-decreasing number of capital tycoons who usurp and monopolize all the benefits of this transformation process, the mass of poverty, oppression, slavery, degeneration, exploitation, but at the same time the indignation of the working class, which is being trained, is united and organized by the mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes the shackles of the mode of production that has grown under and under it. The centralization of the means of production and the socialization of labour reach such a point when they become incompatible with their capitalist shell. She explodes. The hour of capitalist private property is beating. The expropriators are being expropriated.” (Capital, I.) when they become incompatible with their capitalist shell. She explodes. The hour of capitalist private property is beating. The expropriators are being expropriated. “ (Capital, I.) when

they become incompatible with their capitalist shell. She explodes. The hour of capitalist private property is beating. The expropriators are being expropriated.” (Capital, I.)

Further extremely important and new is the analysis of the reproduction of social capital, taken as a whole, given by Marx in Volume II of Capital. And here Marx takes not an individual, but a mass phenomenon, not a fractional part of the economy of society, but all this economy as a whole. Correcting the aforementioned mistake of the classics, Marx divides all social production into two large departments: I) the production of means of production and II) the production of consumer goods, and considers in detail, using the numerical examples he takes, the circulation of all social capital as a whole, as in the case of production in the previous size and accumulation. In the third volume of Capital, the issue of the formation of an average rate of profit on the basis of the law of value is resolved. The great step forward of economic science, in the person of Marx, is that the analysis is conducted from the point of view of mass economic phenomena, the entire aggregate of the social economy, and not from the point of view of individual incidents or the external surface of competition, which often limits the vulgar political economy or the modern “marginal utility theory”. First, Marx analyses the origin of surplus value and then proceeds to its disintegration into profit, interest and land rent. Profit is the ratio of surplus value to all capital invested in the enterprise. Capital of “high organic structure” (that is, with the prevalence of constant capital over variable in size above the average social) gives a rate of return below average. Capital of “low organic structure” is above average. Competition between capitals, their free transition from one industry to another will reduce in both cases the rate of profit to the average. The sum of the costs of all goods of a given company coincides with the sum of the prices of goods, but in individual enterprises and certain branches of production, goods, under the influence of competition, are sold not at their cost, but at *production prices* (or production prices), which are equal to the capital spent plus average profit.

Thus, the well-known and indisputable fact of the deviation of prices from values and equality of profit is fully explained by Marx on the basis of the law of value, because the sum of the values of all goods coincides with the sum of prices. But the reduction of value (of public) to prices (of individual) does not occur in a simple, not direct, but in a very complicated way: it is quite natural that in a society of disparate producers connected only by the market, regularity cannot

manifest itself except in an average, social, mass regularity, with the mutual cancellation of individual deviations in one direction or another.

Increased labour productivity means faster growth of constant capital compared to variable. And since surplus value is a function of variable capital alone, it is clear that the rate of profit (the ratio of surplus value to all capital, and not to its variable part only) tends to fall. Marx analyses in detail this tendency and a number of circumstances covering it or opposing it. Without dwelling on the transfer of extremely interesting sections of Volume III devoted to usurious, trading, and money capital, we will move on to the most important: to the theory of *land rent*. The price of production of agricultural products, due to the limited land area occupied by individual owners in capitalist countries, is determined by production costs not on average but on worse soil, not on average, but under worse conditions for delivering the product to the market. The difference between this price and the price of production on better soils (or under better conditions) gives a difference or *differential rent*. By analysing it in detail, showing its origin with a difference in the fertility of individual plots of land, with a difference in the amount of capital invested in land, Marx completely revealed (see also Theories of Surplus Value, where Rodbertus's critic deserves special attention) Ricardo's mistake, as if differential rent It turns out only with a consistent transition from the best lands to the worst. On the contrary, there are reverse transitions, there is the transformation of one category of lands into others (due to the progress of agricultural technology, the growth of cities, etc.), and the notorious "law of diminishing soil fertility" is a grave mistake, putting the nature of the shortcomings, limitations and contradictions of capitalism. Then, the equality of profits in all sectors of industry and the national economy in general implies complete freedom of competition, freedom of capital overflow from one industry to another. Meanwhile, private ownership of land creates a monopoly, an obstacle to this free flow. By virtue of this monopoly, agricultural products, characterized by a lower capital structure and, therefore, an individually higher rate of return, do not go into a completely free process of equalizing the rate of profit; the land owner, as a monopolist, gets the opportunity to keep the price above average, and this monopoly price gives rise to *absolute rent*. Differential rent cannot be destroyed under the existence of capitalism, but absolute rent *can*—for example, with the nationalization of land, with its transfer to state ownership. Such a

transition would mean undermining the monopoly of private owners, would mean a more consistent, more complete implementation of freedom of competition in agriculture. And therefore, the radical bourgeois, Marx notes, repeatedly made in history this progressive bourgeois demand for the nationalization of the land, which, however, frightens off the majority of the bourgeoisie, for it too closely “offends” another, especially important and “sensitive” monopoly: the monopoly of the means of production in general. (Marx himself remarkably popularly, succinctly and clearly stated his theory of average return on capital and absolute land rent in a letter to Engels dated August 2, 1862. See “Correspondence”, Vol. III, pp. 77-81. Compare also the letter from August 9, 1862, *ibid.*, Pp. 86-87. )—In the history of land rents, it is also important to point out the analysis of Marx, showing the transformation of developmental rents (when a peasant creates a surplus product on the land of the landowner) into rents in kind or in kind (the peasant produces a surplus product on his land, giving it to the landowner by virtue of “non-economic coercion”), then into a rent of money (the same rent in kind, turned into money, a “rent” of old Russia, due to the development of commodity production) and finally into a capitalist rent, when in place of the peasant is An agricultural entrepreneur is engaged in farming with the help of hired labour. In connection with this analysis of the “genesis of capitalist land rent”, a number of subtle (and especially important for backward countries like Russia) Marx’s thoughts on showing the transformation of developmental rent (when the peasant creates a surplus product on the land of the landowner) into rents in kind or in kind (the peasant produces a surplus product on his land, giving it to the landlord by virtue of “extra-economic coercion”), then into cash rent (the same rent in kind turned into money, a “quitrent” of old Russia, due to the development of commodity production) and finally into capitalist rents, when an agricultural entrepreneur takes the place of the peasant and carries out processing with the help of hired workers wow labour. In connection with this analysis of the “genesis of capitalist land rent”, a number of subtle (and especially important for backward countries like Russia) Marx’s thoughts on showing the transformation of developmental rent (when the peasant creates a surplus product on the land of the landowner) into rents in kind or in kind (the peasant produces a surplus product on his land, giving it to the landlord by virtue of “extra-economic coercion”), then into cash rent (the same rent in kind turned into money, a “quitrent” of old Russia, due to the development of

commodity production) and finally into capitalist rents, when an agricultural entrepreneur takes the place of the peasant and carries out processing with the help of hired workers' own labour. In connection with this analysis of the "genesis of capitalist land rent", a number of subtle (and especially important for backward countries like Russia) Marx's thoughts on then into a cash rent (the same kind of rent, converted into money, a "rent" of old Russia due to the development of commodity production), and finally into a capitalist rent, when an agricultural entrepreneur takes the place of the peasant and processes it using hired labour. In connection with this analysis of the "genesis of capitalist land rent", a number of subtle (and especially important for backward countries like Russia) Marx's thoughts on then into a cash rent (the same kind of rent, converted into money, a "rent" of old Russia due to the development of commodity production), and finally into a capitalist rent, when an agricultural entrepreneur takes the place of the peasant and carries out processing with the help of hired labour. In connection with this analysis of the "genesis of capitalist land rent", a number of subtle (and especially important for backward countries like Russia) Marx's thoughts on *the evolution of capitalism in agriculture*.

"The conversion of in-kind rent into money not only inevitably accompanies, but even is preceded by the formation of a class of poor pavers who are hired for money. In the period when this class arose, when it only appears sporadically, the more affluent peasants, obliged to rent, naturally develop the custom of exploiting rural wage workers at their own expense — just like in feudal times, prosperous serf peasants themselves kept serfs. Thus, these peasants are gradually developing the opportunity to accumulate well-known property and turn themselves into future capitalists. Among the old landowners, conducting independent farming, therefore, there is a hotbed of capitalist tenants,<sup>2</sup>, p. 332)... "The expropriation and expulsion from the countryside of a part of the rural population not only" liberates "workers for their industrial capital, their livelihoods, their tools, but also creates an internal market" (Capital, vol. I<sup>2</sup>, p. 778).

The impoverishment and ruin of the rural population, in turn, plays the role of creating a reserve labour army for capital. In any capitalist country, "a part of the rural population is therefore constantly in a transitional state to becoming an urban or manufactory (that is, non-agricultural) population. This source of relative excess population flows constantly... The rural worker is reduced to the

lowest level of wages, and he always stands with one foot in the swamp of pauperism” (Capital, vol. I , p. 668).

The private ownership of the peasant on the land he cultivates is the basis of small-scale production and the condition for its prosperity and the acquisition of its classical form. But this small-scale production is compatible only with the narrow primitive framework of production and society. Under capitalism, “the exploitation of peasants differs from the exploitation of the industrial proletariat only in form. The exploiter is the same—capital. Individual capitalists exploit individual peasants through hypotheses and usury; the capitalist class exploits the class of peasants through state taxes.” (“The Class Struggle in France “). ”The farmer’s parcel (small plot of land) represents only an excuse that allows the capitalist to extract profit, interest and rent from the land, leaving the landowner himself to help out his own wages, as he pleases.”

Usually, the peasant even gives capitalist society, that is, the capitalist class, part of his wages, dropping “to the level of an Irish tenant under the guise of a private owner” (“Class struggle in France”).

What is “one of the reasons that the price of bread is lower in countries with predominantly small peasant land ownership than in countries with a capitalist mode of production?” (Capital, vol. III <sup>2</sup> , p. 340).

The fact that the peasant gives society (i.e., the capitalist class) for nothing part of the surplus product.

“Therefore, such a low price (of bread and other agricultural products) is a consequence of the poverty of producers, and in no case is the result of the productivity of their labour” (Capital, vol. III , p. 340).

Small-scale land ownership, the normal form of small-scale production, is degraded, destroyed, and perishes under capitalism.

“Small land ownership, in essence, excludes: the development of social productive forces of labour, social forms of labour, social concentration of capital, cattle breeding on a large scale, and the increasing use of science. Usury and the tax system inevitably lead to impoverishment everywhere. The use of capital for the purchase of land subtracts this capital from use for land culture. The endless fragmentation of the means of production and the separation of the producers themselves. “ (Cooperatives, that is, partnerships of small peasants, playing an extremely progressive bourgeois role, only weaken this tendency, but do not destroy it; we must also not forget

that these cooperatives give a lot to wealthy peasants and very little, almost nothing, to the mass of the poor, and then the partnerships themselves become exploiters of wage labour. ) “Giant theft of human power. More and more deterioration of the conditions of production and the rise in price of the means of production is the law of parcel (small) property.”

Capitalism, both in agriculture and in industry, transforms the production process only at the cost of “martyr ology of producers”.

“The scattering of rural workers in large spaces breaks down their strength of resistance, while the concentration of urban workers increases this strength. In modern, capitalist, agriculture, as in modern industry, an increase in the productive power of labour and its great mobility are bought at the cost of destruction and exhaustion of the labour force itself. Moreover, any progress in capitalist agriculture is not only progress in the art of robbing the worker, but also in the art of robbing the soil... Capitalist production, therefore, develops the technique and combination of the social process of production only in such a way that it undermines at the same time the sources of all wealth: the land and the worker.” (Capital, vol. I, end of chapter 13).

## **Socialism**

From the previous one it is clear that the inevitability of the transformation of capitalist society into a socialist Marx derives entirely and exclusively from the economic law of the movement of modern society. The socialization of labour, in thousands of forms, progressing more and more rapidly and manifesting itself during the half century that has passed since the death of Marx, is especially evident in the growth of large-scale production, cartels, syndicates and trusts of the capitalists, as well as in the gigantic increase in the size and power of financial capital, - this is the main material basis of the inevitable onset of socialism. The intellectual and moral engine, the physical executor of this transformation is the proletariat brought up by capitalism itself. His struggle with the bourgeoisie, manifesting itself in various and increasingly rich forms, inevitably becomes a political struggle, aimed at the conquest of political power by the proletariat (“dictatorship of the proletariat”). The socialization of production cannot but lead to the transfer of the means of production into the ownership of society, to the “expropriation of

expropriators.” A tremendous increase in labour productivity, a shorter working day, the replacement of remnants, ruins of small, primitive, fragmented production by collective improved labour—these are the direct consequences of such a transition. Capitalism is finally breaking the connection between agriculture and industry, but at the same time, with its higher development, it is preparing new elements of this connection, combining industry with agriculture on the basis of a conscious application of science and a combination of collective labour, a new settlement of humanity (with the destruction of rural abandonment, isolation from the world wildness and unnatural clusters of gigantic masses in big cities). The new form of the family, the new conditions in the position of women and in the upbringing of the younger generations are prepared by the highest forms of modern capitalism: female and child labour, the decomposition of the patriarchal family by capitalism inevitably take on the most terrible, distressing and disgusting forms in modern society. Nevertheless, “large-scale industry, assigning a decisive role in the socially organized production process, outside the home, to women, adolescents and children of both sexes, creates the economic basis for the higher form of the family and the relationship between the sexes. Of course, it is equally absurd to consider the Christian-Germanic form of the family as absolute, as well as the form of the ancient Roman or ancient Greek or Eastern, which, incidentally, in connection with one another form a single historical series of development. Obviously, the compilation of combined workers from people of both sexes and of different ages, being in their spontaneous, crude, capitalist form, when the worker exists for the production process, and not the production process for the worker, is a plagued source of death and slavery, under the appropriate conditions it is inevitable it must turn, on the contrary, into a source of humane development.” (“Capital”, vol. I, end of chapter 13).

The factory system shows us “the embryos of educating the era of the future, when for all children over a certain age productive work will be combined with teaching and gymnastics not only as a means to increase social production, but also as the only means for the production of comprehensively developed people” (ibid. )

Marx’s socialism and questions about nationality and the state put on the same historical basis, not in the sense of just explaining the past, but also in the sense of fearless foresight of the future and bold practical activities aimed at its implementation. Nations are an inevitable product and an inevitable form of the bourgeois era of

social development. And the working class could not grow stronger, mature, form, not “settling within the nation”, not being “national” (“although not in the sense that the bourgeoisie understands this”). But the development of capitalism more and more breaks down national partitions, destroys national isolation, puts class antagonisms in place of national antagonisms. In the developed capitalist countries, the complete truth is therefore that “the workers do not have a fatherland” and that the “combination of efforts” of the workers,

The state, this organized violence, inevitably arose at a certain stage in the development of society, when society split into irreconcilable classes, when it could not exist without the “power” that supposedly stands above society and is to some extent isolated from it. Arising inside class contradictions, the state becomes “the state of the strongest, economically dominant class, which, with its help, becomes the politically dominant class and in this way acquires new means for subjugating and exploiting the oppressed class. Thus, the ancient state was primarily a state of slave owners for the subordination of slaves, the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for the subordination of serfs, and the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of hired workers by the capitalists.”

Even the freest and most progressive form of the bourgeois state, the democratic republic, does not eliminate this fact in any way, but only changes its form (government connection with the stock exchange, bribery—direct and indirect—of officials and the press, etc.). Socialism, leading to the destruction of classes, thereby leading to the destruction of the state.

“The first act,” writes Engels in *Anti-Dühring*, “with which the state really acts as a representative of the whole society—the expropriation of the means of production in favour of the whole society,” will be at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of state power in public relations will become unnecessary in one area after another and will cease by itself. Managing people will be replaced by managing things and regulating the production process. The state will not be “abolished”, it will “die”. ”A society that organizes production on the basis of free and equal associations of manufacturers will put the state machine where it will then be: in the museum of antiquities, next to the spindle and bronze axe.” (Engels in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*.)

Finally, on the question of the relation of socialism of Marx to the small peasantry, which will remain in the era of the expropriation

of expropriators, it is necessary to point out the statement of Engels, expressing the thought of Marx:

“When we seize state power, we will not think about forcibly expropriating the small peasants (anyway, with remuneration or not), as we will be forced to do with large landowners. Our task in relation to the small peasants will consist primarily in transferring their private production and private property into a comradeship, but not by force, but through the example and offer of public assistance for this purpose. And then of course we will have enough funds to prove to the peasant all the advantages of such a transition, the advantages that should now be explained to him.” (Engels, *On the Agrarian Question in the West*, ed. Alekseeva, p. 17, Russian translation with errors. Original in “*Neue Zeit*”).

## **The Tactics of the Class Struggle of the Proletariat**

Having found out as early as 1844 - 1845. [Lenin here refers to the works of K. Marx and F. Engels “The Holy Family”, “German Ideology” and “Theses on Feuerbach” by Marx.—*Ed.*] One of the main shortcomings of the old materialism, consisting in the fact that he did not know how to understand the conditions and evaluate the significance of revolutionary practical activity, Marx throughout his life, along with theoretical works, paid steady attention to the tactics of the class struggle of the proletariat. Enormous material is given in this respect by *all the* works of Marx and ... his correspondence with Engels in particular. This material has not yet been collected, not brought together, not studied and not developed. Therefore, we should limit ourselves here to only the most general and brief remarks, emphasizing that without *this* Marx rightly considered it half of the side of materialism, half-sided, dead. Marx defined the main task of the tactics of the proletariat in strict accordance with all the premises of his materialist-dialectical worldview. Only an objective account of the totality of the relationships of all classes of a given society without exception, and, consequently, consideration of the objective stage of development of this society and consideration of the relationship between it and other societies, can serve as the basis for the correct tactics of the advanced class. Moreover, all classes and all countries are considered not in a static but in a dynamic form, that is, not in a

stationary state, but in motion (the laws of which follow from the economic conditions for the existence of each class). The movement, in turn, is considered not only from the point of view of the past,

At each stage of development, at every moment, the tactics of the proletariat must take into account this objectively inevitable dialectic of human history, on the one hand, using for the development of consciousness, strength and fighting ability of the advanced class of the era of political stagnation or turtle, the so-called “peaceful” development, and with on the other hand, conducting all the work of this use in the direction of the “ultimate goal” of the movement of a given class and creating in it the ability to practically solve great problems on great days, “concentrating in itself for 20 years”. Two arguments of Marx are especially important in this matter: one from the “Poverty of Philosophy” regarding the economic struggle and economic organizations of the proletariat, the other from the “Communist Manifesto” regarding its political tasks. The first reads:

“Large-scale industry accumulates in one place a mass of people unknown to each other. Competition splits their interests. But the protection of wages, this common interest in relation to their owner, unites them with one common idea of resistance, coalition... Coalitions, at the beginning isolated, form groups, and the protection by workers of their unions against constantly united capital becomes more necessary for them, than wage protection... In this struggle—a real civil war—all the elements for the coming battle unite and develop. Having reached this point, the coalition assumes a political character.”

Here we have before us the program and tactics of the economic struggle and the professional movement for several decades, for the entire long era of training the forces of the proletariat “for the coming battle.” One must compare with this the numerous indications of Marx and Engels on the example of the English labour movement, how industrial “prosperity” provokes attempts to “buy workers” (I, p. 136, “Correspondence with Engels”), to distract them from the struggle, as this prosperity in general “demoralizes the workers.” (II, p. 218), as the English proletariat “bourgeois”—the “most bourgeois of all nations” (English) “apparently wants to lead the matter to having a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois side by side with the bourgeoisie the proletariat” (II, p. 290); how does “revolutionary energy” disappear from him (III, p. 124); how will one have to wait for a more or less long time “for the deliverance of the British workers from their apparent bourgeois corruption” (III, p. 127); how the

English labour movement lacks “the fervour of the Chartists” (1866; III, p. 305); how the British leaders of the workers are created as a middle ground “between the radical bourgeois and the worker” (about Goliok, IV, p. 209); how, by virtue of the monopoly of England and until this monopoly bursts, “there is nothing to be done with the British workers” (IV, p. 433). The tactics of the economic struggle in connection with the general course (*and outcome*) of the labour movement are considered here from a remarkably broad, comprehensive, dialectical, truly revolutionary point of view.

The “Communist Manifesto” on the tactics of political struggle put forward the main point of Marxism: “The Communists are fighting for the immediate goals and interests of the working class, but at the same time they are upholding the future of the movement.”

In the name of this, Marx in 1848 supported the party of the “agrarian revolution” in Poland, “the very party that caused the Cracow uprising of 1846.” In Germany, 1848-1849 Marx supported extreme revolutionary democracy and never subsequently took back what he said then about tactics. He regarded the German bourgeoisie as an element that “from the very beginning was inclined to betray the people” (only an alliance with the peasantry could give the bourgeoisie the complete fulfilment of its tasks) “and a compromise with the crowned representatives of the old society”. Here is Marx’s final analysis of the class position of the German bourgeoisie in the era of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, an analysis which, among other things, is an example of materialism that considers society in movement and, moreover, not only from the side of the movement that is turned *back*... “without faith in themselves, without faith in the people; grumbling before the tops, trembling before the bottoms; ... frightened by a world storm; nowhere with energy, everywhere with plagiarism; ... without initiative; ... a cursed old man condemned to lead the first impulses of youth of a young and healthy people in his senile interests ... “(New Rhine Newspaper, 1818, see Literary Inheritance, vol. III, p. . 212). About 20 years later, in a letter to Engels (vol. III, p. 224), Marx declared the cause of the failure of the 1848 revolution to be that the bourgeoisie preferred peace over slavery to the prospect of the struggle for freedom. When the era of revolutions of 1848 - 1849 ended, Marx rebelled against any game of revolution (Schapper-Willich and the struggle against them), demanding the ability to work in an era of a new band preparing supposedly “peacefully” new revolutions. In what spirit did Marx demand the conduct of this work,

“The whole business in Germany will depend on the ability to support the proletarian revolution with some second edition of the peasant war” (Correspondence with Engels, Vol. II, p. 108).

While the democratic (bourgeois) revolution in Germany was not over, Marx turned his full attention to the tactics of the socialist proletariat to the development of the democratic energy of the peasantry. He considered Lassalle to commit “objectively betraying the labour movement for the benefit of Prussia” (vol. III, p. 210), among other things, precisely because Lassalle peacefully disposed of the landlords and Prussian nationalism.

“It’s vile,” Engels wrote in 1865, exchanging thoughts with Marx about their forthcoming general appearance in the press, “in an agricultural country, on behalf of the industrial workers, attack only the bourgeois, forgetting about the patriarchal” stick exploitation “of rural workers by the feudal nobility” ( III, p. 217).

Between 1864 and 1870, when the era of the completion of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of Germany was approaching the end, the era of the struggle of the exploiting classes of Prussia and Austria for one way or another to complete this revolution *from above*, Marx not only condemned Lassalle, flirting with Bismarck, but also corrected Liebknecht, who fell into “Austrophilism” and in defence of particularism; Marx demanded revolutionary tactics, equally mercilessly fighting both Bismarck and the Austrophiles, tactics that would not fit in with the “winner”—the Prussian cadet, but immediately resume the revolutionary struggle against him *and on the ground*, created by Prussian military victories (Correspondence with Engels, vol. III, p. 134, 136, 147, 179, 204, 210, 215, 418, 437, 440 - 441). In the famous address of the International of September 9, 1870, Marx warned the French proletariat against an untimely uprising, but when it nevertheless came (1871), Marx enthusiastically welcomed the revolutionary initiative of the masses, “storming the sky” (Marx’s Letter to Kugelmann). The defeat of revolutionary action in this situation, as in many others, was, from the point of view of Marx’s dialectical materialism, a lesser evil in the general course *and outcome* proletarian struggle, rather than giving up one’s position, surrender without a fight: such a surrender would demoralize the proletariat and undercut its ability to fight. Fully appreciating the use of legal means of struggle in the era of political stagnation and the dominance of bourgeois legality, Marx in 1877-1878, after an exceptional law was issued against the socialists, sharply condemned the “revolutionary phrase” of Most, but no less, if not more sharply, collapsed

opportunism, which then took possession of the official Social Democratic Party for a time, which did not immediately show steadfastness, firmness, revolutionism, and a readiness to proceed to an illegal struggle in response to an exceptional law ("Letters of Marx to Engels", vol. IV, pp. 397, 404, 418, 422, 424. Compare also the letters to Sorge). ( *Lenin, K. Marx (1914), Op., Vol. XVIII, pp. 8 - 31, ed. 3rd* )

## **The main thing in Marxism-Leninism**

The main thing in the teachings of Marx is the class struggle. So they say and write very often. But this is not true. And from this infidelity, an opportunistic distortion of Marxism and its forgery in the spirit of acceptability for the bourgeoisie are very often obtained. For the doctrine of the class struggle, *not by* Marx but by the bourgeoisie *before* Marx, was created for the bourgeoisie, generally speaking, is *acceptable*. He who recognizes *only the* struggle of the classes is not yet a Marxist, he may still not go beyond the framework of bourgeois thinking and bourgeois politics. To limit Marxism to the doctrine of the struggle of classes means to curtail Marxism, distort it, and reduce it to what is acceptable to the bourgeoisie. A Marxist is only one who *extends the* recognition of the class struggle to recognition *dictatorships of the proletariat*. This is the deepest difference between a Marxist and a dozen small (and indeed large) bourgeois. On this basis, one must experience a *real* understanding and recognition of Marxism. ( *Lenin, State and Revolution (1917), Op., Vol. XXI, p. 392, ed. 3rd.* )

The main thing in the teachings of Marx is the clarification of the world-historical role of the proletariat as the creator of a socialist society. ( *Lenin, The historical fate of the teachings of Karl Marx (1913), Soch., Vol. XVI, p. 331, ed. 3rd.* )

Looking materialistically at the world and humanity, they (Marx and Engels.—*Ed.* ) saw that, as the basis of all natural phenomena are material causes, so the development of human society is determined by the development of material productive forces. Relations depend on the development of productive forces ,into which people become to each other in the production of items necessary to meet human

needs. And in these respects—an explanation of all the phenomena of social life, human aspirations, ideas and laws. The development of productive forces creates social relations based on private property, but now we see how the same development of productive forces takes property from the majority and concentrates it in the hands of an insignificant minority. It destroys property, the basis of modern social order, it itself strives for the same goal that the socialists have set for themselves. Socialists only need to understand what kind of social power, by its position in modern society, is interested in the implementation of socialism, and to communicate to this force a consciousness of its interests and historical tasks. Such a force is the proletariat. (*Lenin, Friedrich Engels (1895), Op., Vol. I, p. 435, ed. 3rd, 1926*)

The brochure “On the Foundations of Leninism” says:

“Others think that the main thing in Leninism is the peasant question, that the starting point of Leninism is the question of the peasantry, its role, its specific gravity. This is completely untrue. The main question in Leninism, its starting point is not the peasant question, but the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the conditions for its conquest, and the conditions for its strengthening. The peasant question, as the question of the ally of the proletariat in its struggle for power, is a derivative question.”

Is this the right situation?

I think that’s right. This position follows entirely from the definition of Leninism. Indeed, if Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution, and the dictatorship of the proletariat is the main content of the proletarian revolution, then it is clear that the main thing in Leninism is the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the development of this question, the justification and concretization of this question.

Nevertheless, Comrade Zinoviev, apparently, does not agree with this provision. In his article “In Memory of Lenin,” he says:

“The question of the role of the peasantry, as I said, is the *main question* [My italics. — *J. St.* ] of Bolshevism, Leninism “(see” Truth “No. 35 of February 13, 1924).

This position of Comrade Zinoviev, as you see, derives entirely from the incorrect definition of Leninism given by Comrade Zinoviev. Therefore, it is just as wrong as its definition of Leninism.

Is Lenin’s thesis that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the “root content of the revolution” correct (see Vol. XXIII, p. 337)? Of course, correct. Is the thesis that Leninism the theory and tactics of the

proletarian revolution correct? I think that is correct. But what follows from this? And from this it follows that the main question of Leninism, its starting point, its foundation is the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Is it not true that the question of imperialism, the question of the spasmodic development of imperialism, the question of the victory of socialism in one country, the question of the state of the proletariat, the question of the Soviet form of this state, the question of the role of the party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the question of the paths of building socialism—that all these questions were developed precisely by Lenin? Is it not true that these very questions constitute the basis, the foundation of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat? Is it not true that without the elaboration of these basic questions the elaboration of the peasant question from the point of view of the dictatorship of the proletariat would be inconceivable?

There is no word that Lenin was an expert on the peasant question. There is no word that the peasant question, as the question of an ally of the proletariat, is of the utmost importance to the proletariat and is an integral part of the basic question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But is it not clear that if Leninism had not faced the fundamental question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, there would have been no derivative question of the ally of the proletariat, the question of the peasantry? Is it not clear that if Leninism had not faced the practical question of the conquest of power by the proletariat, there would have been no question of an alliance with the peasantry?

Lenin would not be the greatest proletarian ideologist, as he undoubtedly is, he would be a simple “peasant philosopher”, as he is often portrayed by foreign literary inhabitants, if he would develop the peasant question not on the basis of the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but in addition to this base out of this base.

One out of two:

*either the* peasant question is the main one in Leninism, and then Leninism is not suitable, it is not obligatory for countries that are capitalistically developed, for countries that are not peasant countries;

*or* dictatorship of the proletariat is the main thing in Leninism, and then Leninism is the international teaching of the proletarians of all countries, suitable and compulsory for all countries without exception, including capitalistically developed ones.

Here you have to choose. ( *Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 192 - 194, Partizdat, 1932, ed. 9th.*  )

## **IV. Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action**

### **Partisan theory**

Strict partisanship is a companion and the result of a highly developed class struggle. And, conversely, in the interests of an open and broad class struggle, the development of a strict partisanship is necessary. Therefore, the party of the conscious proletariat, social democracy, is always quite rightly fighting against non-partisanship and is steadily working to create a fundamentally sustained, firmly united socialist workers party. This work is successful among the masses as the development of capitalism splits the whole people deeper and deeper into classes, sharpening the contradictions between them.

It is quite understandable that the real revolution in Russia has generated and is giving rise to so many non-partisan organizations. This revolution is democratic, that is, bourgeois in its socio-economic content. This revolution overthrows the autocratic-feudal system, freeing the bourgeois system from under it, thus realizing the demands of all classes of bourgeois society, being in this sense a nation-wide revolution. This does not mean, of course, that our revolution should not be class; of course not. But it is directed against classes and castes that are obsolete and obsolete from the point of view of a bourgeois society, alien to this society, and hindering its development. And since the whole economic life of the country has already become in all its basic features bourgeois, since the vast majority of the population already lives in fact in bourgeois conditions

of existence, then the counter-revolutionary elements, of course, are scarce to the extent of scanty, are truly “handful” in comparison with the “people”. The class character of the bourgeois revolution therefore manifests itself inevitably in the “nationwide”, non-class, at first glance, character of the struggle of all classes of bourgeois society against autocracy and serfdom.

The era of the bourgeois revolution differs in Russia, as in other countries, in the comparatively underdeveloped class contradictions of capitalist society. True, capitalism in Russia is now developed much higher than in Germany in 1848, not to mention France in 1789, but there is no doubt that the purely capitalist contradictions are still obscured by the contradictions of “culture” in our very and Asians, Europeanism and Tatarism, capitalism and serfdom, that is, those requirements are put to the forefront, the fulfilment of which will develop capitalism, cleanse it of the toxins of feudalism, improve the living and struggle conditions for both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

In fact, if you look closely at those requirements, orders, doléances, which are now countless in Russia at every factory, in every office, in every regiment, in every city command, in every diocese, in every educational institution, etc. etc., then we will easily see that the vast majority of them are purely “cultural”, so to speak, requirements. I want to say that these are not specifically class requirements, but requirements that are elementary legal, requirements that do not destroy capitalism, but, on the contrary, introduce it into the framework of Europeanism, save capitalism from barbarism, savagery, bribes and other “Russian” vestiges of serfdom. In essence, proletarian demands are limited in most cases to such transformations as are quite feasible within the framework of capitalism.

Of course, the special position of the proletariat in capitalist society leads to the fact that the desire of the workers for socialism, their alliance with the socialist party breaks through with elemental force at the earliest stages of the movement. But the actual socialist demands are still ahead, and the next in line for the day are the democratic demands of the workers in politics, the economic demands within the limits of capitalism in the economy. Even the proletariat makes a revolution, so to speak, within the framework of the minimum program, and not the maximum program. There is nothing to say about the peasantry, this gigantic, overwhelming mass of the population. Its “maximum program”, its ultimate goals, do not go beyond the bounds of capitalism, which would have expanded even

wider and more magnificent during the transition of the whole earth to the whole peasantry and to all the people.

The outlined character of the ongoing revolution gives rise to non-partisan organizations quite naturally. The imprint of external non-partisanship, the appearance of non-partisanship is inevitably acquired in this case by the whole movement as a whole — but only visibility, of course. The need for a “human”, cultural life, for unification, for the protection of one’s dignity, one’s human and citizen rights embraces everything and everyone, unites all classes, overtakes gigantic party affiliation, shakes people who are still far, far unable to rise to party affiliation. The urgency of the nearest elementary-necessary rights and reforms pushes back, so to speak, thoughts and considerations about something further. The fascination with the ongoing struggle, the necessary and legitimate passion, without which the success of the struggle is impossible, makes us idealize these immediate, elementary goals, draws them in a pink light, sometimes even dresses them in a fantastic costume; simple democracy, a dozen bourgeois democracy, is mistaken for socialism and credited “under the authority” of socialism. Everything and everything seems to be “non-partisan”; everything and everything seems to be twisting in one “liberation” (in fact: liberating the whole bourgeois society) movement; everything and everyone acquires a light, light touch of “socialism”, especially thanks to the advanced role of the socialist proletariat in the democratic struggle.

The idea of non-partisanship cannot but gain certain temporary victories under such conditions. Non-partisanship cannot but become a fashionable slogan — for fashion is helplessly trailing behind life, and the non-partisan organization seems to be the most “ordinary” phenomenon of the political surface; non-partisan democracy, non-partisan strike, non-partisan revolutionism.

The question now is: how should supporters and representatives of different classes relate to this fact of non-partisanship and to this idea of non-partisanship? — should not in a subjective sense, but in an objective, that is, not in the sense of how to relate to it, but in the sense of what attitude to this fact inevitably develops depending on the interests and points of view of various classes.

## II.

As we have already shown, non-partisanship is a product—or, if you like, expression—of the bourgeois nature of our revolution. The

bourgeoisie cannot but gravitate toward non-partisanship, for the absence of parties among the bourgeois society fighting for freedom means the absence of a new struggle against this very bourgeois society. Whoever leads the “non-partisan” struggle for freedom either does not recognize the bourgeois nature of freedom, or sanctifies this bourgeois system, or postpones the struggle against it, “improving” it to the Greek calends. And vice versa, who consciously or unconsciously stands on the side of the bourgeois order, he cannot but feel an attraction to the idea of non-partisanship.

In a society based on division of classes, the struggle between hostile classes inevitably becomes, at a certain stage of its development, a political struggle. The most integral, complete and formalized expression of the political struggle of the classes is the struggle of parties. Non-partisanship is indifference to the struggle of parties. But this indifference does not equal neutrality, abstinence from struggle, for there can be no neutral ones in the class struggle, one cannot “refrain” in capitalist society from participating in the exchange of products or labour. And the exchange inevitably gives rise to the economic struggle, and after it the political struggle. Indifference to the struggle is by no means, therefore, in fact a suspension from the struggle, abstention from it or neutrality. Indifference is the silent support of one who is strong, one who dominates. Those who were indifferent in Russia to autocracy before its fall during the October Revolution silently supported the autocracy. Whoever is indifferent in modern Europe to the rule of the bourgeoisie is silently supporting the bourgeoisie. Anyone who is indifferent to the idea of the bourgeois character of the struggle for freedom, tacitly supports the rule of the bourgeoisie in this struggle, the rule of the bourgeoisie in the emerging free Russia. Political indifference is political satiety. ”Indifferent”, “indifferent” refers to a piece of bread a well-fed man; the hungry will always be “party” on the question of a piece of bread. ”Indifference and indifference” to a piece of bread does not mean that a person does not need bread, but that a person is always provided with bread, that he never needs bread, that he is firmly attached to the “party” of well-fed.

Non-partisanship is a bourgeois idea. Partisanship is a socialist idea. This provision, by and large, applies to all bourgeois society. Of course, one must be able to apply this general truth to individual particular questions and particular cases. But to forget this truth at a time when the whole bourgeois society as a whole is rebelling against

serfdom and autocracy, means in fact completely abandoning the socialist criticism of bourgeois society.

The Russian revolution, despite the fact that it is still at the beginning of its development, already provides a lot of material to confirm the stated general considerations. Strict partisanship has always been upheld and is upheld only by social democracy, the party of the conscious proletariat. Our liberals, representatives of the views of the bourgeoisie, hate socialist partisanship and don't want to hear about the class struggle: recall at least recent speeches by S. Rodichev, repeating for the hundredth time what the foreign "Liberation" said and chewed on and the countless vassal organs Russian liberalism. Finally, the ideology of the intermediate class, the petty bourgeoisie, found itself a vivid expression in the views of Russian "radicals" of various shades, starting from "Our Life", r.-d. ("Radical democrats") and ending with "socialist revolutionaries." These last captured their mixture of socialism and democracy most clearly in the agrarian question and in the slogan "socialization" (land without the socialization of capital). It is also known that tolerant of bourgeois radicalism, they are intolerant of the idea of social democratic party affiliation. (*Lenin, The Socialist Party and Non-Party Revolutionism (1905), vol. VIII, p. 412-416, ed. 3rd*)

## **The Difference between Materialism and Objectivism**

We cannot but leave without objection one remark by Mr. Struve against Mr. Mikhailovsky. "In his view," the author says, "there are no insurmountable historical trends, which, as such, should serve, on the one hand, as a starting point, and on the other, as mandatory boundaries for the worthwhile activities of individuals and social groups."

This is the language of the objectivist, not the Marxist (materialist). There is a difference between these concepts (systems of views), which we should dwell on, since an incomplete understanding of this difference belongs to the main drawback of Mr. Struve's book, manifesting itself in most of his arguments.

The objectivist speaks of the necessity of this historical process; the materialist states with accuracy the given socio-economic formation and the antagonistic relations generated by it. The

objectivist, proving the necessity of this series of facts, always runs the risk of straying at the point of view of the apologist of these facts; the materialist reveals class contradictions and thereby determines his point of view. The objectivist speaks of “irresistible historical trends”; the materialist speaks of the class that “manages” this economic order, creating such and such forms of opposition from other classes. Thus, the materialist, on the one hand, is more consistent than the objectivist and more deeply, more fully pursues his objectivity. It is not limited to indicating the need for a process, but finds out *which class* defines this need. In this case, for example, a materialist would not be satisfied with stating “insurmountable historical trends”, but would point to the existence of well-known classes that determine the content of these orders and exclude the possibility of going beyond the speeches of the producers themselves. On the other hand, materialism includes, so to speak, partisanship, obliging, in any assessment of an event, to directly and openly take the point of view of a particular social group. ( *Lenin, The economic content of populism and its criticism in Prince Struve (1894), Soch., Vol. I , p. 287 - 288, 3rd ed., 1926* )

## **Theory and Practice in Marxism**

The socialist intelligentsia can only count on fruitful work when it is done with illusions and begins to seek support in the real, rather than desirable, development of Russia, in real and not possible social and economic relations. At the same time, her *theoretical* work will be directed towards a *concrete study of all forms of economic antagonism in Russia, a study of their connection and consistent development* ; it must reveal *this antagonism wherever it is covered by political history, the peculiarities of the legal order established by theoretical prejudices* . She must *give a complete picture of our reality as a definite system of production relations, to show the need for exploitation and expropriation of workers under this system, to show the way out of these orders that economic development points to.*

This theory, based on a detailed and detailed study of Russian history and reality, should give an answer to the requests of the proletariat—and if it satisfies scientific requirements, then any awakening of the protesting thought of the proletariat will inevitably lead this idea into the mainstream of social democracy. The further the

development of this theory moves forward, the faster Social Democracy will grow, since the most ingenious savings of the modern order are not able to prevent the awakening of the thought of the proletariat, they are not able to, because these orders are necessary and inevitably entail all the most powerful expropriation producers, the growing growth of the proletariat and its reserve army — and this, along with the progress of social wealth, with the enormous growth of productive forces and the socialization of labour by capitalism.

By this emphasis on the necessity, importance and enormity of the theoretical work of the Social Democrats, I do not want to say that this work should be put first in the front of the *practical*[On the contrary, the practical work of propaganda and agitation always comes first, for the reason, firstly, that theoretical work gives only answers to the questions that the second poses. And, secondly, the Social Democrats too often, due to circumstances beyond their control, are forced to confine themselves to one theoretical work, so as not to value every moment when practical work is possible.], All the less so that the second is postponed until the end of the first. Only fans of the “subjective method in sociology” or followers of utopian socialism could conclude this way. Of course, if the task of the socialists is to seek “other (besides the actual) development paths” of the country, then it is natural that practical work becomes possible only if when ingenious philosophers will open and show these “other ways”; and, conversely, these paths are open and shown - the theoretical work ends and the work of those who must direct the “fatherland” along the “newly discovered” “other path” begins. The situation is completely different when the task of the socialists comes down to being the ideological leaders of the proletariat in its real struggle against the real enemies standing on *the actual* path of this socio-economic development. Under this condition, theoretical and practical work merge together into one work, which the veteran of the German Social Democracy Liebknecht so aptly described:

Studieren, propagandieren, organisieren [To study, to promote, to organize.—*Ed.* ].

It is impossible to be an ideological leader without the above theoretical work, just as it cannot be without directing this work at the request of a case, without propagating the results of this theory among workers and helping to organize them.

This formulation of the problem guarantees social democracy from the shortcomings that socialist groups suffer so often from dogmatism and sectarianism.

There can be no dogmatism where the supreme and only criterion of the doctrine is its conformity with the actual process of socio-economic development; there cannot be sectoralism when the task is reduced to promoting the organization of the proletariat, when, therefore, the role of the “intelligentsia” is reduced to making unnecessary special, intelligent leaders. (*Lenin, What are “Friends of the People” and How Do They Fight Against Social Democrats? (1894), Soch., Vol. I, p. 196 - 198, 3rd ed., 1926*)

## **Philosophy Associated with Politics**

You do not see, Mr. Potresov, a living, real connection between the philosophical debate and the Marxist current? Let me, yesterday’s politician, respectfully point out the following circumstances and considerations to you: 1) The debate about what philosophical materialism is, why it is erroneous, what dangerous and reactionary deviations from it are always connected with a “living real connection” with a “Marxist” socio-political current—otherwise this last would not be Marxist, not socio-political and not a current ... 2) Given the richness and versatility of the ideological content of Marxism, there is nothing surprising in the fact that in Russia, as in other countries, personal historical periods put forward especially one or the other side of Marxism. In Germany, until 1848, the philosophical formation of Marxism was especially advanced, in 1848 — the political ideas of Marxism, in the 50s and 60s—the economic doctrine of Marx. In Russia, before the revolution, the application of the economic doctrine of Marx to our reality was especially advanced, during the revolution—Marxist politics, after the revolution — Marxist philosophy. This does not mean that it is ever permissible to ignore one of the sides of Marxism; it means only that it depends not on subjective desires, but on the totality of historical conditions *the predominance of interest* in one or another side. 3) The time of social and political reaction, the time of “digesting” the rich lessons of the revolution is no coincidence that the time when the main theoretical, including philosophical, questions for every *living thing*. Directions are pushed to one of the first places. 4) In the advanced currents of Russian thought there is no such great philosophical tradition as the French have associated with the encyclopaedists of the 18th century, the Germans with the era of classical philosophy from Kant to Hegel

and Feuerbach. Therefore, philosophical “disassembly” was necessary for the advanced class of Russia, and there is nothing strange in the fact that this belated “disassembly” occurred after this advanced class fully matured during the recent great events for its independent historical role. 5) This philosophical “disassembly” was prepared long ago in other countries of the world insofar as, for example, new physics posed a number of new questions with which dialectical materialism had to “cope”. In this regard, “ours” (as Potresov put it) the philosophical debate is not only known, that is, Russian, value. Europe provided material for the “refreshment” of philosophical thought, while Russia lagged behind during the forced lull of 1908-1910. especially “eagerly” threw herself at this material. (*Lenin, Our Abolitionists (1911), Op., Vol. XV, p. 88 - 89, ed. 3rd*)

## **Combine practice with theory**

... There is no doubt that without a *combination* the practical work of the Komsomol asset with its theoretical preparation (“the study of Leninism”) is impossible any meaningful communist work in the Komsomol. Leninism is a generalization of the experience of the revolutionary movement of the workers of all countries. This experience is the guiding light that illuminates the path for practitioners in their daily work and gives them direction. Practitioners cannot have either confidence in their work, or consciousness of the correctness of this work, if they have not mastered this experience at least to a minimum degree. Groping, working in the dark — such is the lot of practical workers if they do not study Leninism, if they do not seek to master Leninism, if they do not want to combine their practical work with the necessary theoretical training. Therefore, the study of Leninism, Leninist education is a prerequisite for the transformation of the current Komsomol asset into a real Leninist asset, capable of educating millions of Komsomol youth in the spirit of the dictatorship of the proletariat and communism. (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, p. 190, ed. 9th, Partizdat, 1932*)

## **Eliminate the Backlog of Theory from Practice**

... If we have reason to be proud of the *practical* successes of socialist construction, then the same cannot be said about the successes of our *theoretical* work in the field of economics in general, and in the field of agriculture in particular. Moreover: it must be admitted that theoretical thought does not keep pace with our practical successes, that we have a certain gap between practical successes and the development of theoretical thought. Meanwhile, it is necessary that theoretical work not only keep pace with the practical, but also be ahead of it, arming our practitioners in their struggle for the victory of socialism.

I will not speak here about the meaning of the theory. You know it well enough. It is known that a theory, if it is a real theory, gives practitioners the power of orientation, clarity of perspective, confidence in work, faith in the victory of our cause. All this has, and cannot but have, enormous significance in the cause of our socialist construction. The trouble is that we are starting to limp in this area, in the field of theoretical development of issues in our economy. How else to explain the fact that we, in our socio-political life, still have various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theories on the issues of our economy? How to explain that these theories and theorists have not yet met with due rebuff? How can we explain that a number of basic principles of Marxist-Leninist political economy, being the surest antidote against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theories, it begins to be forgotten, is not popularized in our press, and for some reason does not come to the fore? Is it difficult to understand that without an irreconcilable struggle against bourgeois theories on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, it is impossible to achieve complete victory over class enemies?

New practice gives rise to a new approach to the problems of the economy in transition. The question now is raised in a new way about NEP, about classes, about the pace of construction, about the link, about party policy. In order not to lag behind practice, we must now begin to develop all these problems from the point of view of the new situation. Without this, it is impossible to overcome bourgeois theories that clog the heads of our practitioners. Without this, it is impossible to uproot these theories, which have gained the strength of prejudice. For only in the struggle against bourgeois prejudices in

theory can one strengthen the position of Marxism-Leninism. ( *Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 442–443, ed. 9th, Partizdat, 1932* )

## **Theory gives clarity of perspective**

In the future, the development of our economy, the intensification of the struggle between the elements of socialism and capitalism in it, especially the temporary stabilization of capitalism, only aggravated and strengthened the significance of the question of the possibility of socialist construction in our country.

What is the importance of this issue in terms of party practice?

The fact that he addresses the issue of the prospects for our construction, the objectives and goals of this construction. You can't really build without knowing what you are building for. You cannot move a single step without knowing the direction of movement. The question of perspective is the most important question of our party, which is used to having a clear and definite goal. Whether we are building in the name of socialism, counting on the victory of socialist construction, or we are building it blindly, in order "to pave the way for bourgeois democracy" in anticipation of a socialist revolution around the world, this is now one of the main questions. You cannot work and build truly without a clear answer to this no less clear question. Hundreds and thousands of party workers, professionals and co-operators, business executives and cultural workers, military workers and Komsomol members are contacting us, they ask us, they ask our party: what is the point of doing business, in the name of what is building? And woe to those leaders who are unable or unwilling to give a clear and definite answer to this question, who will begin to wag their tail and begin to send people from Pontius to Pilate, stoking the socialist prospects of our construction in intellectual scepticism.

The great significance of Leninism, by the way, lies in the fact that he does not recognize construction at random, blindly, that he does not think of construction without a prospect, that he gives a clear and definite answer to the question of the prospect of our work, stating that we have all the data for building a socialist economy in our country, that we can and should build a complete socialist society. ( *Stalin, Questions of Leninism, p. 174, ed. 9th.* )

## **The creative nature of Marxism-Leninism**

The greatness of Lenin, as the successor of Marx and Engels, lies precisely in the fact that he was never a slave to letters in Marxism. In his studies, he followed the instructions of Marx, who repeatedly said that Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action. Lenin knew this and, strictly distinguishing between the letter and the essence of Marxism, he never considered Marxism a dogma, but tried to apply Marxism, as the main method, in the new situation of capitalist development. It is precisely Lenin's greatness that he openly and honestly, without hesitation, raised the question of the need for a new formula, the possibility of the victory of the proletarian revolution in individual countries, not being afraid that the opportunists of all countries would cling to the old formula, trying to cover up with their names Marx and Engels are their opportunist cause.

On the other hand, it would be strange to demand from Marx and Engels, no matter how brilliant thinkers they are, that they provide exactly 50-60 years before developed monopoly capitalism all the possibilities of the class struggle of the proletariat that appeared during the period of monopolistic, imperialist capitalism.

And this is not the first time that Lenin, following the method of Marx, continues the work of Marx and Engels, without clinging to the letter of Marxism. I have in mind another similar case, namely the case with the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is known that on this issue Marx expressed the idea that the dictatorship of the proletariat, like breaking up the old state apparatus and creating a new apparatus, a new proletarian state, is a necessary stage in the development of socialism in the countries of the continent, making an exception for England and America, where, according to the statement Marx, militarism and bureaucracy are poorly developed or not developed at all, and where, therefore, another way is possible, a "peaceful" way of transition to socialism. That was completely correct in the 70s...

I think that in the 70s, when militarism in England and America was not as developed as it subsequently developed, this situation was absolutely correct. That this provision was correct, you could be convinced from the well-known chapter of Comrade Lenin's pamphlet "On the tax in kind", where Lenin considers the development of socialism in England of the 70s not excluded by agreement between

the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the country where the proletariat constitutes the majority where the bourgeoisie is accustomed to compromise, where militarism was weak, the bureaucracy was weak. But this position, being correct in the 70s of the last century, became already wrong after the 19th century, during the period of imperialism, when England became no less bureaucratic and no less, if not more, militaristic than any other country on the continent. In this regard, t.

That is precisely the greatness of Lenin that he did not surrender himself to the letter, that he knew how to grasp the essence of Marxism and, proceeding from it, develop further the positions of Marx and Engels. ( *Stalin, On the Opposition, pp. 338-340, 1928* )

## **Our theory is a guide to action**

One must be able to distinguish between the letter and the essence of Marxism, between individual provisions and the method of Marxism. Lenin managed to discover the truth about the victory of socialism in one country because he considered Marxism not a dogma, but a guide to action, he was not a slave to the letter, and was able to grasp the main, the main in Marxism. Here is what Lenin says on this subject in his pamphlet, *The Children's Disease of "Leftism" in Communism*:

"Our theory is not a dogma, *but a guide to action*," said Marx and Engels, "and the greatest mistake, the greatest crime of such" patented "Marxists as K. Kautsky, Otto Bauer, etc., is that they do not understand, failed to apply at the most important moments of the revolution of the proletariat "[ *Lenin* , vol. XVII, p. 159.].

This is the path, the path of Marx, Engels and Lenin, on which we stand and on which we must continue to stand if we want to remain revolutionaries to the end. Leninism defended itself as Marxism of the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution because it stood and continues to stand in this way. To deviate from this path means to fall into the swamp of opportunism. To slide off this path means to lash behind Social Democracy in the tail, which happened in this case with Comrade Zinoviev. (*Stalin, On the Opposition, p. 380-381, 1928*)

## **Without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement**

... Loud phrases against the ossification of thought, etc., cover up carelessness and helplessness in the development of theoretical thought. The example of the Russian Social Democrats illustrates especially clearly the pan-European phenomenon (long noted by the German Marxists as well) that the notorious freedom of criticism does not mean replacing one theory with another, but freedom from any holistic and well-thought-out theory means eclecticism and unprincipledness. Anyone who is somewhat familiar with the actual state of our movement cannot fail to see that the wide spread of Marxism was accompanied by a certain decrease in the theoretical level. For the sake of its practical significance and practical successes, a lot of people adjoined the movement, very few and even not theoretically prepared at all. Therefore, one can judge what lack of tact manifests in the “Work Case”, when he puts forward with a victorious air the statement of Marx: “every step of the real movement is more important than a dozen programs.” To repeat these words in the era of theoretical confusion, it’s the same as shouting “you do not drag to drag!” at the sight of a funeral procession. Yes, and these words of Marx are taken from his letter about the Gotha program, in which he *sharply condemns* eclecticism that has been admitted in the formulation of principles: if you already had to unite, Marx wrote to the party leaders, then conclude agreements to satisfy the practical goals of the movement, but do not allow bargaining by principles, do not make theoretical “concessions”. This is what Marx thought was, and we have people who, in his name, are trying to weaken the significance of the theory!

Without a revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement. One cannot insist on this thought enough at a time when the fascination with the narrowest forms of practical activity embraces the fashionable preaching of opportunism. And for Russian Social-Democracy, the significance of the theory is reinforced by three other circumstances that are often forgotten, namely: firstly, the fact that our party is still taking shape, is still developing its physiognomy and has not yet finished counting with other areas of revolutionary thought, threatening to combine movement with the right path. On the contrary, it was the very last time that was marked (as Axelrod had long predicted to economists) by the revitalization of non-social-

democratic revolutionary trends. Under such conditions, a “seemingly unimportant” mistake can cause the most sad consequences, and only short-sighted people can find factional disputes and a strict difference in shades untimely or unnecessary. The future of Russian social democracy for many, many years may depend on the consolidation of one or another “shade”.

Secondly, the social democratic movement is international in its very essence. This does not only mean that we must fight national chauvinism. It also means that the movement that begins in a young country can be successful only if it implements the experience of other countries. And for such a translation, simply acquainting yourself with this experience or simply rewriting the latest resolutions is not enough. For this, it is necessary to be able to critically relate to this experience and independently test it. Whoever imagines how the modern labour movement has grown and branched out gigantically, he will understand what reserve of theoretical forces and political (as well as revolutionary) experience is needed to carry out this task.

Thirdly, the national tasks of Russian Social-Democracy are those that have not existed before any socialist party in the world. We will have to talk below about the political and organizational responsibilities that this task confronts us with the task of liberating the whole people from the yoke of autocracy. Now, we only want to point out that *only a party led by advanced theory can fulfil the role of front-line fighter*. And in order to at least somehow concretely imagine what this means, let the reader remember about such predecessors of Russian social democracy as Herzen, Belinsky, Chernyshevsky and the brilliant galaxy of revolutionaries of the 70s; let him think about the universal significance that Russian literature is now acquiring; let ... yes that's enough!

Let us cite Engels' remarks on the significance of theory in the Social Democratic movement in 1874. Engels *does not* recognize two forms of the great struggle of social democracy (political and economic), as is customary for us to do this, *but three, along with them and the theoretical struggle*. His parting word for the practically and politically strengthened German labour movement is so instructive from the point of view of contemporary issues and disputes that the reader does not complain about us, we hope for a long extract from the preface to the brochure *Der deutsche Bauernkrieg*, which has long become the greatest bibliographic rarity:

“German workers have two significant advantages over workers in the rest of Europe. The first is that they belong to the most

theoretical people of Europe and that they retained the theoretical meaning that was almost completely lost by the so-called “educated” classes in Germany. Without German philosophy preceding it, especially Hegel’s philosophy, German scientific socialism would never have been created—the only scientific socialism that has ever existed. Without the theoretical meaning of the workers, this scientific socialism would never have gone so far into their flesh and blood, as we now see. And how vast this advantage is, it shows, on the one hand, the indifference to any theory, which is one of the main reasons why the English labour movement is moving so slowly forward,

“The second advantage is that the Germans took part in the labour movement almost later than all. Like German theoretical socialism, it will never forget that it stands on the shoulders of Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen — three thinkers who, despite all the fantastic and utopian teachings of their teachings, belong to the greatest minds of all time and who brilliantly anticipated countless such truths, the correctness of which we are now proving scientifically, — so the German practical labour movement must never forget that it developed on the shoulders of the English and French movement, that it was able to simply draw Using their expensive experience, now to avoid their mistakes, which then in most cases could not be avoided.

“It is necessary to give justice to the German workers that they, with a rare diminution, took advantage of the benefits of their position. For the first time since the labour movement has existed, the struggle has been waged systematically in all three of its directions, coordinated and interconnected: in the theoretical, political and practical-economic (resistance to the capitalists). This, so to speak, concentric attack is the strength and invincibility of the German movement.

“On the one hand, as a result of their advantageous position, on the other hand, due to the insular characteristics of the English movement and the violent suppression of the French, the German workers are now at the head of the proletarian struggle. How long events will allow them to occupy this honourable post, this cannot be predicted. But, as long as they occupy it, they will fulfil, it is hoped, as appropriate, the duties assigned to them. This requires a double effort in all areas of struggle and agitation. In particular, the duty of leaders will be to educate themselves more and more on all theoretical issues, to more and more free themselves from the influence of traditional phrases belonging to the old worldview, and always bear in mind that

socialism, since it became a science requires to be treated like a science, that is, to be studied. The increasingly clearer consciousness acquired in this way must be spread among the working masses with ever greater zeal, and the party organization and the organization of trade unions rallied more and more...

“... If the German workers also go forward, then they—not just marching at the head of the movement—it is not at all in the interests of the movement that the workers of one nation march at the head of it — but they will take pride of place in the line of wrestlers; and they will be fully equipped if unexpectedly difficult trials or great events require higher courage, higher determination and energy from them.”

Engels' words were prophetic. A few years later, German workers suffered unexpectedly difficult trials in the form of an exceptional law on socialists. And the German workers, indeed, met them fully armed and managed to triumphantly emerge from them.

The trials of the Russian proletariat are still immeasurably more difficult, a struggle with a monster is ahead, in comparison with which the exceptional law in a constitutional country seems like a real pygmy. History has now set before us the immediate task, which is the *most revolutionary* of all the *nearest* the tasks of the proletariat of any other country. The realization of this task, the destruction of the most powerful stronghold, not only of the European, but also (we can say now) and the Asian reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat. We have the right to expect that we will achieve this honorary title, already deserved by our predecessors, revolutionaries of the 70s, if we can inspire our thousand-fold wider and deeper movement with the same wholehearted determination and energy. (*Lenin, What to do? (1902), Op., Vol. IV, pp. 379 - 382, 3rd ed.*)

## **Our Party is Guided by Advanced Theory**

Others think that Leninism is the primacy of practice before theory in the sense that the main thing in it is the implementation of Marxist propositions into action, the “fulfilment” of these propositions, as far as theory is concerned, Leninism is, as it were, carefree. It is known that Plekhanov repeatedly made fun of Lenin’s “carelessness” about theory and especially philosophy. It is also known that many current Leninist practitioners do not really pardon theory, especially in view of the abyss of practical work that they are forced to carry out according to the situation. I must say that this more than strange opinion about Lenin and Leninism is completely wrong and does not correspond to reality in any way, that the desire of practitioners to shrug off theory is contrary to the whole spirit of Leninism and is fraught with great danger to the cause.

Theory is the experience of the labour movement of all countries, taken in its general form. Of course, a theory becomes pointless if it is not associated with revolutionary practice, just as practice becomes blind if it does not illuminate its own path with revolutionary theory. But a theory can turn into the greatest force of the labour movement if it is inextricably linked with revolutionary practice, for it, and only it, can give the movement confidence, orientation power and understanding of the internal connection of surrounding events, for it, and only it, can help practice to understand not only how and where classes are moving in the present, but also how and where they should move in the near future. No one other than Lenin spoke and repeated dozens of times the well-known position that:

*“ Without a revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement ” [ Lenin , vol. IV, p. 380.].*

More than anyone else, Lenin understood the importance of theory, especially for a party like ours, in view of the role of the leading fighter of the international proletariat, which fell to its lot, and in view of the complexity of the internal and international situation that surrounds it. Predicting this special role of our party as early as 1902, he considered it necessary to recall even then that:

*“ Only a party led by advanced theory can fulfil the role of a front-line fighter ” [ Ibid .].*

It is hardly necessary to prove that now that Lenin’s prediction about the role of our party has already been put into practice, this position of Lenin is acquiring special strength and special significance. ( *Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 16-17, ed. 9th, Partizdat, 1932* )

## V. Leninism—Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions

What is Leninism?

Some say that Leninism is the application of Marxism to the peculiar conditions of the Russian situation. There is some truth in this definition, but it far from exhausts the whole truth. Lenin really applied Marxism to Russian reality and applied it expertly. But if Leninism was only the application of Marxism to the peculiar situation in Russia, then Leninism would be a purely national and only national, purely Russian and only Russian phenomenon. Meanwhile, we know that Leninism is an international phenomenon, rooted in all international development, and not just Russian. That is why I believe that this definition suffers from one-sidedness.

Others say that Leninism is a revival of the revolutionary elements of Marxism of the 1940s. Unlike Marxism in the following years, when it seemed to be moderate, non-revolutionary. If we ignore this stupid and vulgar division of the teachings of Marx into two parts, the revolutionary and the moderate, we must admit that even in this completely insufficient and unsatisfactory definition there is some truth. It consists, this share of truth, that Lenin really revived the revolutionary content of Marxism, which was stained by the opportunists of the Second International. But this is only a fraction of the truth. The whole truth about Leninism is that Leninism not only revived Marxism, but it took a further step forward, developing Marxism further under the new conditions of capitalism and the class struggle of the proletariat.

What, after all, is Leninism?

Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution. More precisely: Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular. Marx and Engels laboured during the pre-revolutionary period (we mean the proletarian revolution), when there was still no developed imperialism, during the preparation of the proletarians for the revolution, at a time when the proletarian revolution was not yet a direct practical inevitability. Lenin, a disciple of Marx and Engels, laboured during the period of developed imperialism, during the unfolding proletarian

revolution, when the proletarian revolution had already triumphed in one country, defeated bourgeois democracy and opened the era of proletarian democracy, the era of soviets.

That is why Leninism is a further development of Marxism.

They usually note the exclusively militant and exclusively revolutionary character of Leninism. This is absolutely correct. But this peculiarity of Leninism is explained by two reasons: firstly, by the fact that Leninism emerged from the proletarian revolution, the imprint of which it cannot but bear on itself; secondly, by the fact that he grew up and got stronger in the battles with opportunism of the Second International, the struggle against which was and is a necessary precondition for a successful struggle against capitalism. It should not be forgotten that between Marx and Engels, on the one hand, and between Lenin, on the other, lies a whole strip of undivided domination of opportunism of the Second International, a merciless struggle against which could not but constitute one of the most important tasks of Leninism. ( *Stalin, Questions of Leninism*, pp. 5-6, ed. 9th, Partizdat, 1932)

*Is it possible in our conditions for the Komsomol asset to combine practical work with a thorough study of Marxism and Leninism, and what should the Komsomol organizations and individual Komsomol members do in this direction?*

First, a small remark about Marxism and Leninism. With this formulation of the question, one might think that Marxism is one thing, and Leninism is another, that one can be Leninist without being a Marxist. But such a view cannot be considered correct. Leninism is not a Leninist doctrine *minus* Marxism. Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. In other words, Leninism includes everything that was given by Marx, plus the new that Lenin brought to the treasury of Marxism and which necessarily follows from everything that was given by Marx (the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the peasant question, the national question, the party, the question of the social roots of reformism, the question of the main deviations in communism, etc.). Therefore, it would be better to formulate the question so that it is about Marxism or Leninism (which is basically the same thing), and not about Marxism and Leninism. ( *Stalin, Questions of Leninism*, pp. 189-190, ed. 9th, Partizdat, 1932 )

## VI. Revisionism and its Class Roots

### The Historical Destiny of the Teachings of K. Marx

The main thing in the teachings of Marx is the clarification of the world-historical role of the proletariat as the creator of a socialist society. Did the doctrine around the world confirm this doctrine after it was presented by Marx?

For the first time, Marx put forward it in 1844. The “Communist Manifesto” of Marx and Engels, published in 1847, gives an integral, systematic, still the best, exposition of this doctrine. World history since that time is clearly divided into three main periods: 1) from the revolution of 1848 to the Paris Commune (1871), 2) from the Paris Commune to the Russian Revolution (1905), 3) from the Russian Revolution.

Let us take a look at the fate of the teachings of Marx in each of these periods.

#### I

At the beginning of the first period, the teachings of Marx did not dominate. It is only one of the extremely numerous fractions or movements of socialism. The dominant forms of socialism are those that are mainly related to our Narodism: a lack of understanding of the materialistic basis of the historical movement, inability to single out the role and significance of each class of capitalist society, covering up the bourgeois essence of democratic transformations with different, supposedly socialist phrases about “people”, “justice”, “law “ etc.

The revolution of 1848 inflicts a mortal blow to all these noisy, colourful, boisterous forms of *pre-Marxian* socialism. The revolution in all countries shows *in action* the different classes of society. The execution of workers by the republican bourgeoisie in the June days of 1848 in Paris finally determines the socialist nature of *one* proletariat. The liberal bourgeoisie is a hundred times more afraid of the independence of this class than any reaction. Cowardly liberalism creeps in front of her. The peasantry is satisfied with the abolition of the remnants of feudalism and goes over to the side of

order, only occasionally vacillating between *workers' democracy and bourgeois liberalism*. All teachings on *non-class socialism* and on *non-class class politics* turn out to be nonsense.

The Paris Commune (1871) ends this development of bourgeois transformations; only the heroism of the proletariat owes its consolidation to the republic, that is, that form of state structure in which class relations appear in the most blatant form.

In all other European countries, more complicated and less complete development leads to the same established bourgeois society. By the end of the first period (1848-1871), the period of storms and revolutions, *pre-Marxist socialism* was *dying*. Independent *proletarian* parties are born: the First International (1864-1872) and German Social Democracy.

## II

The second period (1872-1904) differs from the first in a "peaceful" character, in the absence of revolutions. The West has done away with bourgeois revolutions. The east has not yet reached them.

The West is entering a period of "peaceful" preparation for an era of future transformations. Everywhere, proletarian socialist parties are taking shape that are learning to use bourgeois parliamentarism, create their own daily press, their educational institutions, their trade unions, their cooperatives. The doctrine of Marx wins a complete victory and *goes in breadth*. Slowly, but steadily, the process of picking up and gathering the forces of the proletariat, preparing it for future battles, is moving forward.

The dialectic of history is such that the theoretical victory of Marxism forces its enemies to *disguise themselves as Marxists*. Rotten liberalism is trying to revive itself in the form of socialist *opportunism*. They interpret the period of preparation of forces for great battles in the sense of abandoning these battles. They explain the improvement of the position of slaves for the struggle against wage slavery in the sense of the sale by slaves for a penny of their freedom rights. They cowardly preach the "social world" (that is, the world with slavery), renunciation of the class struggle, etc. Among the socialist parliamentarians, various officials of the labour movement and the "sympathetic" intelligentsia, they have many supporters.

## III

The opportunists did not have enough time to brag about the “social world” and the need for storms under “democracy”, when a new source of the greatest world storms in Asia was discovered. The Russian revolution was followed by Turkish, Persian, Chinese. We now live precisely in the era of these storms and their “reverse reflection” in Europe. Whatever the fate of the great Chinese republic, on which various “civilized” hyenas now sharpen their teeth, but no forces in the world will restore the old serfdom in Asia, they will wipe out the heroic democratism of the masses in Asian and semi-Asian countries.

Some people, inattentive to the conditions of preparation and development of the mass struggle, were driven to despair and to anarchism by the long delay of a decisive struggle against capitalism in Europe. We see now how myopic and cowardly anarchist despair.

Not despair, but vivacity should be gleaned from the fact of involving eight hundred million Asia in the struggle for the same European ideals.

The Asian revolutions showed us the same spinelessness and vileness of liberalism, the same exceptional significance of the independence of the democratic masses, the same distinct demarcation of the proletariat from the bourgeoisie. Who, after the experience of both Europe and Asia, speaks of *non-* class politics and *non-* class socialism, you should just put him in a cage and show him next to some Australian kangaroo.

Europe began to move after Asia — but not in an Asian way. The “peaceful” period of 1872-1904 departed irrevocably into eternity. The high cost and the oppression of the trusts cause an unprecedented aggravation of the economic struggle, which pushed even the most corrupted by liberalism British workers. A political crisis is ripening before our very eyes, even in the most “stony-stone” bourgeois-junker country, Germany. The frenzied armaments and the policy of imperialism make of modern Europe such a “social world” that looks most like a barrel of gunpowder. But the decomposition of *all* bourgeois parties and the maturation of the proletariat is steadily moving forward.

After the advent of Marxism, each of the three great eras of world history brought him new confirmations and new triumphs. But an even greater triumph will bring Marxism, as the doctrine of the proletariat, the coming historical era. (*Lenin, The historical fate of the teachings of K. Marx (1913), Soch., Vol. XVI, pp. 331 - 333, 3rd ed.* )

## **Disagreements in the European Labour Movement**

The main tactical disagreements in the modern labour movement of Europe and America come down to a struggle with two major areas that deviate from Marxism, which in fact has become the dominant theory in this movement. These two areas are revisionism (opportunism, reformism) and anarchism (anarcho-syndicalism, anarcho-socialism). Both of these deviations from the prevailing Marxist theory and Marxist tactics in the labour movement have been observed in various forms and with different shades in all civilized countries over the course of more than half a century of the history of the mass labour movement.

From this fact alone it is clear that one cannot explain these deviations either by chance or by the mistakes of individuals or groups, or even by the influence of national characteristics or traditions, etc. There must be root causes lying in the economic system and in the character of development of all capitalist countries and constantly generating these retreats. A small book published last year by the Dutch Marxist Anton Pannekoek: "Tactical differences in the labour movement" (Anton Pannekoek: "Die taktischen Differenzen in der Arbeiterbewegung." Hamburg, Erdmann Dubber, 1909) is an interesting attempt to research these causes. In the following presentation, we will introduce the reader to the conclusions of Pannekoek, which cannot be recognized as completely correct.

One of the most profound reasons that periodically disagrees about tactics is the very fact of the growth of the labour movement. If you do not measure this movement by the standards of some fantastic ideal, but consider it as a practical movement of ordinary people, it will become clear that the attraction of new and new "recruits", the retraction of new layers of the working mass, will inevitably be accompanied by vacillations in the field of theory and tactics, repetition of old mistakes, a temporary return to outdated views and outdated methods, etc. For the "training" of recruits, the labour movement of each country spends periodically larger or smaller reserves of energy, attention, time.

Further. The speed of development of capitalism is not the same in different countries and in different areas of the national

economy. Marxism is easiest, fastest, fullest and more firmly assimilated by the working class and its ideologists in the conditions of the greatest development of large-scale industry. Economic relations lagging behind or lagging behind in their development constantly lead to the emergence of such proponents of the labour movement who assimilate only certain aspects of Marxism, only certain parts of a new world outlook or individual slogans, demands, not being able to decisively break with all traditions of the bourgeois world outlook in general and bourgeois Democratic worldview in particular.

Then, the dialectical nature of social development, proceeding in contradictions and through contradictions, is a constant source of disagreement. Capitalism is progressive, for it destroys the old modes of production and develops productive forces, and at the same time, at a certain stage of development, it inhibits the growth of productive forces. It develops, organizes, disciplines workers, and it crushes, oppresses, leads to degeneration, poverty, etc. Capitalism creates its own grave digger, creates elements of the new system and, at the same time, without a “leap”, these separate elements do not change anything in the general state of things, do not affect the dominance of capital. Marxism is able to embrace these contradictions of living life, the living history of capitalism and the labour movement as a theory of dialectical materialism. But it goes without saying that the masses learn from life,

Bourgeois ideologists, liberals and democrats, not understanding Marxism, not understanding the modern labour movement, are constantly jumping from one helpless extreme to another. They either explain the whole thing by the fact that evil people “set” the class against the class, then they console themselves with the fact that the workers’ party is a “peaceful reform party.” The direct product of this bourgeois worldview and its influence should be considered both anarcho-syndicalism and reformism, seizing on *one* side of the labour movement, raising one-sidedness in theory, declaring mutually exclusive such trends or such features of this movement that make up a specific feature of a particular period, other conditions for the working class. And real life, real history *includes* these various tendencies in themselves, just as life and development in nature include both slow evolution and fast leaps, breaks of gradualness.

Revisionists consider as phrases all discussions about “leaps” and about the fundamental opposition of the labour movement to the whole old society. They take reforms for the partial implementation of

socialism. The anarcho-sindicalist rejects “petty work,” especially the use of a parliamentary tribune. In fact, this last tactic comes down to waiting for the “great days” with the inability to gather forces that create great events. Both of them hinder the most important, most pressing matter: rallying workers into large, strong, well-functioning, able to function well under *all* conditions, organizations imbued with the spirit of the class struggle, clearly aware of their goals, brought up in a truly Marxist worldview.

Here we allow ourselves a small digression and note in parentheses, in order to avoid possible misunderstandings, that Pannekoek illustrates his analysis *exclusively with* examples from Western European history, especially Germany and France, *completely without* Russia in mind. If sometimes it seems that he is hinting at Russia, then it depends only on the fact that the main trends that give rise to certain deviations from Marxist tactics also appear in our country, despite the enormous cultural, domestic, and historical-economic differences between Russia and the West.

Finally, an extremely important reason causing disagreement among the participants in the labour movement is changes in the tactics of the ruling classes in general, and the bourgeoisie in particular. If the tactics of the bourgeoisie were always uniform, or at least always uniform, the working class would quickly learn to respond to them with the same uniform or uniform tactics. In fact, the bourgeoisie in all countries inevitably develops two systems of government, two methods of fighting for their interests and defending their domination, moreover, these two methods alternate or intertwine in different combinations. This is, firstly, the method of violence, the method of renouncing all concessions to the labour movement, the method of supporting all old and obsolete institutions, the method of implacable denial of reforms. This is the essence of conservative politics, which more and more ceases to be the policy of the landowning classes in Western Europe, more and more becomes one of the varieties of general bourgeois politics. The second method is the method of “liberalism”, steps towards the development of political rights, towards reforms, concessions, etc.

The bourgeoisie moves from one method to another not by malicious calculation of individuals and not by chance, but because of the fundamental contradictory nature of its own position. A normal capitalist society cannot develop successfully without a strengthened representative system, without the well-known political rights of the population, which cannot but be distinguished by a relatively high

demand in a “cultural” sense. This demanding part of the well-known minimum of culture is generated by the conditions of the capitalist mode of production itself with its high technology, complexity, flexibility, mobility, rapid development of global competition, etc. Fluctuations in the tactics of the bourgeoisie, transitions from a system of violence to a system, allegedly, are inherent in concessions. as a result, the stories of all European countries over the past half century, moreover, different countries mainly develop the application of a particular method during certain periods. For example, England in the 60s, 70s of the XIX century. was a classic country of “liberal” bourgeois politics, Germany of the 70s and 80s adhered to the method of violence, etc.

When this method reigned in Germany, the one-sided echo of this one of the systems of bourgeois management was the growth of anarcho-syndicalism, or, as it was then, anarchism in the labour movement (“young” in the early 90’s, Johann Most in the early 80’s) . When in 1890 there came a turn to “concessions”, this turn, as always, turned out to be even more dangerous for the labour movement, giving rise to an equally one-sided echo of bourgeois “reformism”: opportunism in the labour movement.

“The positive real goal of the liberal policy of the bourgeoisie,” says Pannekoek, “is to mislead the workers, to split among them, to turn their policies into a powerless appendage of the powerless, always powerless and ephemeral, supposedly reformatory.”

Often, for some time, the bourgeoisie achieves its goal through a “liberal” policy, which, according to Pannekoek’s fair remark, is a “more cunning” policy. Some of the workers, some of their representatives sometimes allow themselves to be deceived by seeming concessions. The revisionists proclaim the doctrine of the class struggle to be “out of date” or begin to pursue a policy that actually renounces it. The zigzags of bourgeois tactics cause an intensification of revisionism in the labour movement and often bring differences within it to a direct split.

All the causes of this kind cause disagreement regarding tactics within the labour movement, within the proletarian milieu. But there is no and cannot be a Chinese wall between the proletariat and the layers of the petty bourgeoisie, including the peasantry, in contact with it. It is clear that the transitions of individuals, groups and strata from the petty bourgeoisie to the proletariat cannot but generate, for their part, fluctuations in the tactics of this latter.

The experience of the labour movement of various countries helps to clarify the essence of Marxist tactics on specific practical issues, helps younger countries to more clearly distinguish the true class significance of deviations from Marxism and to more successfully deal with these deviations. (*Lenin, Disagreements in the European Labour Movement (1910), Soch., Vol. XV, p. 5-9, ed. 3rd.*)

## **Marxism and Revisionism**

A well-known adage says that if geometric axioms offended the interests of people, then they would probably be refuted. Natural-historical theories, which offended the old prejudices of theology, have provoked and are still causing the fiercest struggle. It is not surprising that the teaching of Marx, which directly serves to educate and organize the advanced class of modern society, indicates the tasks of this class and proves the inevitable - due to economic development - the replacement of the modern system with new orders, it is not surprising that this teaching should take every step of the battle to life path.

There is nothing to talk about bourgeois science and philosophy, taught by official professors in order to stupidly grow up young people from the propertied classes and to “drag” them to external and internal enemies. This science does not want to hear about Marxism, declaring it refuted and destroyed; and young scientists, making their careers on the refutation of socialism, and dilapidated old men, keeping the covenant of all kinds of dilapidated “systems”, attack Marx with equal zeal. The growth of Marxism, the spread and strengthening of its ideas in the working class, inevitably causes the increase and aggravation of these bourgeois attacks against Marxism, which after each “destruction” by its official science becomes stronger, more hardened and more vital.

But even among the doctrines connected with the struggle of the working class, prevalent mainly among the proletariat, Marxism far and not immediately strengthened its position. For the first half century of its existence (from the 1940s), Marxism fought against theories that were fundamentally hostile to it. In the first half of the 40s, Marx and Engels settled accounts with the radical Young Hegelians, who held the point of view of philosophical idealism. At the end of the 40s, a struggle in the field of economic doctrines was

advocated—against Proudhonism. The fifties ended this struggle: a criticism of the parties and teachings that showed themselves in the stormy 1848. In the 60s, the struggle was transferred from the field of general theory to a region closer to the immediate working-class movement: the expulsion of Bakunism from the International. In the early 70s in Germany, the Proudhonist Mühlberger was briefly promoted; at the end of the 70s—positivist Dühring. But the influence of both on the proletariat is already completely insignificant. Marxism already conquers unconditionally all other ideologies of the labour movement.

By the 90s of the last century, this victory was basically completed. Even in Romance countries, where the traditions of Proudhonism were held the longest, the workers' parties actually built their programs and tactics on a Marxist basis. The resumed international organization of the labour movement—in the form of periodic international congresses—at once and almost without struggle became, in everything essential, on the soil of Marxism. But when Marxism supplanted all completely solid teachings that were hostile to it, the tendencies expressed in these teachings began to look for other ways for themselves. The forms and causes of the struggle changed, but the struggle continued. And the second half century of the existence of Marxism began (the 90s of the last century) with the struggle of a current hostile to Marxism within Marxism.

Former Orthodox Marxist Bernstein gave the name to this movement, speaking with the greatest noise and with the most integral expression of amendments to Marx, the revision of Marx, revisionism. Even in Russia, where non-Marxist socialism is natural—due to the country's economic backwardness and the prevalence of the peasant population, crushed by the remnants of serfdom—it lasted only longer, even in Russia it is clearly developing before our eyes into revisionism. And on the agrarian question (the program of municipalisation of the whole earth) and on general questions of the program and tactics, our Social-Narodniks are increasingly replacing the “dying” Marx with the “amendments” to Marx, the falling away remnants of the old, in its own way whole and completely hostile Marxism system.

Pre-Marxist socialism is broken. He continues the struggle no longer on his own independent soil, but on the general soil of Marxism, like revisionism. Let us see what the ideological content of revisionism is.

In the field of philosophy, revisionism came in the wake of bourgeois professorial “science.” The professors walked back “to Kant,”—and revisionism dragged on for the Neo-Kantians, the professors repeated the priestly vulgarities uttered against philosophical materialism a thousand times—and the revisionists mumbled condescendingly (word for word on the latest handbook) that materialism had long been “refuted”; professors harassed Hegel as a “dead dog”, and, preaching idealism themselves, only a thousand times smaller and more vulgar than Hegel’s, shrugged contemptuously about dialectics—and the revisionists climbed behind them into the swamp of philosophical vulgarization of science, replacing the “cunning “(And revolutionary) dialectics of “simple” (and calm) “evolution”; professors fulfilled their official salary,

What real class significance these “amendments” to Marx had, it is not necessary to talk about this—the matter is clear by itself. We only note that the only Marxist in international social democracy who criticized the incredible vulgarities that the revisionists have spoken here from the point of view of consistent dialectical materialism was Plekhanov. This is all the more necessary to strongly emphasize that in our time deeply erroneous attempts are made to smuggle old and reactionary philosophical trash under the flag of criticism of Plekhanov’s tactical opportunism.

Turning to political economy, it should be noted, first of all, that in this area the “amendments” of the revisionists were much more versatile and thorough; they tried to act on the public with “new data on economic development.” They said that the concentration and crowding out of large-scale small-scale production did not occur in the field of agriculture at all, and in the field of trade and industry it was extremely slow. They said that crises have now become less frequent, weaker, probably, cartels and trusts will enable capital to completely eliminate crises. It was said that the “theory of collapse” to which capitalism is heading is untenable in view of the tendency to dull and soften class contradictions. They said at last that Marx’s theory of value doesn’t interfere with the correction of Böhm-Bawerk.

The struggle with the revisionists on these issues gave the same fruitful revival of the theoretical thought of international socialism as the polemic of Engels with Dühring twenty years before. The Revisionists’ arguments dealt with facts and figures in their hands. It has been proven that revisionists systematically tint modern small-scale production. The fact of the technical and commercial superiority of large-scale *production* over small-scale *production* not only in

industry but also in agriculture is proved by irrefutable data. But in agriculture, commodity production is much less developed, and modern statisticians and economists are usually not very good at distinguishing those special branches (sometimes even operations) of agriculture that express the progressive involvement of agriculture in *exchange* world economy. On the ruins of subsistence farming, small-scale production is supported by endless deterioration of nutrition, chronic hunger strike, prolonged working hours, deterioration in the quality of cattle and their care, in a word, by the same means used by artisanal production against capitalist manufactory. Every step forward of science and technology undermines inevitably and inexorably the foundations of small-scale production in capitalist society, and the task of socialist economy—to investigate this process in all its often complex and confused forms—to prove to the small producer the impossibility of staying under capitalism, the hopelessness of peasant farming under capitalism, the need for the peasant to switch to the point of view of the proletariat.

With the theory of crises and the theory of collapse, revisionism was even worse. Only the shortest time and only the most short-sighted people could think of remaking the foundations of the teachings of Marx under the influence of several years of industrial growth and prosperity. That crises did not die out, it showed the revisionists very quickly the reality: the crisis came after prosperity. The forms, sequence, and picture of individual crises have changed, but crises have remained an inevitable component of the capitalist system. Cartels and trusts, uniting production, at the same time strengthened before everyone's eyes the anarchy of production, the insecurity of the proletariat and the oppression of capital, thus exacerbating class contradictions to an unprecedented degree. That capitalism is crashing—and in the sense of individual political and economic crises, and in the sense of the complete collapse of the entire capitalist system, this was shown with particular clarity and on an especially wide scale by the very latest giant trusts. The recent financial crisis in America, the terrible exacerbation of unemployment in all of Europe, not to mention the near industrial crisis, which is indicated by many signs — all this has led to the fact that the recent “theories” of revisionists are forgotten by all, it seems, by many and of them. We should not just forget the lessons that this intellectual instability gave the working class.—All this has led to the fact that the recent “theories” of revisionists are forgotten by all, it seems, by many and of them themselves. We should not just forget the lessons that this

intellectual instability gave the working class.—All this has led to the fact that the recent “theories” of revisionists are forgotten by all, it seems, by many and of them themselves. We should not just forget the lessons that this intellectual instability gave the working class.

On the theory of value, it is only necessary to say that, in addition to hints and gasps, very vague, according to Böhm-Bawerk, the revisionists did not give anything decisively here and therefore left no traces in the development of scientific thought.

In the field of politics, revisionism really tried to reconsider the basis of Marxism, namely: the doctrine of the class struggle. Political freedom, democracy, universal suffrage destroy the ground for the class struggle, they told us, and make the old position of the Communist Manifesto wrong: the workers have no fatherland. In democracy, since the “will of the majority” reigns, one cannot, they say, look at the state as an organ of class domination, nor refuse alliances with the progressive, social-reformist bourgeoisie against reactionaries.

It is indisputable that these objections of the revisionists came down to a fairly stable system of views, namely, the long-known liberal bourgeois views. Liberals have always said that bourgeois parliamentarism destroys classes and class divisions, since all citizens have the right to vote, the right to participate in state affairs without distinction. The whole history of Europe in the second half of the XIX century. The whole history of the Russian revolution at the beginning of the XX century. shows first-hand how ridiculous such views are. Economic differences do not weaken, but intensify and exacerbate with the freedom of “democratic” capitalism. Parliamentarism does not eliminate, but exposes, the essence of the most democratic bourgeois republics, as an organ of class oppression. Helping to enlighten and organize the immeasurably wider masses of the population than those that previously participated actively in political events, parliamentarism does not prepare for the elimination of crises and political revolutions, but the greatest exacerbation of the civil war during these revolutions. The Paris events in the spring of 1871 and the Russians in the winter of 1905 showed more clearly than how inevitably such an aggravation ensues. The French bourgeoisie did not hesitate for a second to enter into a deal with the national enemy, with the alien army that had ruined its fatherland, to suppress the proletarian movement. Anyone who does not understand the inevitable internal dialectic of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy, which leads to an even harsher settlement of the dispute

by mass violence than in previous times, will never be able to conduct fundamentally sustained propaganda and agitation based on this parliamentarism, which really prepares the working masses for victorious participation in such “disputes.” Experience of unions, agreements, blocs with social reformist liberalism in the West, with liberal reformism (cadets) in the Russian revolution showed convincingly that these agreements only dull the consciousness of the masses, not strengthening, but weakening the real value of their struggle, linking those struggling with the elements that are least able to fight, the most fragile and treacherous. French milieranism—the largest experience in applying revisionist political tactics on a wide, truly national scale — gave such a practical appraisal of revisionism that the proletariat of the whole world will never forget. the least able to fight, the most precarious and treacherous. French milieranism—the largest experience in applying revisionist political tactics on a wide, truly national scale—gave such a practical appraisal of revisionism that the proletariat of the whole world will never forget. the least able to fight, the most precarious and treacherous. French milieranism—the largest experience in applying revisionist political tactics on a wide, truly national scale—gave such a practical appraisal of revisionism that the proletariat of the whole world will never forget.

A natural complement to the economic and political trends of revisionism was its relation to the ultimate goal of the socialist movement. “The ultimate goal is nothing, movement is everything,” Bernstein’s catchword expresses the essence of revisionism better than many lengthy arguments. From time to time, to determine one’s own behaviour, to adapt to the events of the day, to the turns of political little things, to forget the fundamental interests of the proletariat and the main features of the entire capitalist system, all capitalist evolution, to sacrifice these fundamental interests for the real or perceived benefits of the minute—this is revisionist policy. And from the very essence of this policy it follows with obviousness that it can take infinitely diverse forms and that every “new” question is somehow

The inevitability of revisionism is determined by its class roots in modern society. Revisionism is an international phenomenon. For any knowledgeable and thinking socialist, there can be no doubt that the attitude of Orthodox and Bernsteinists in Germany, hedists and jaressists (now especially Brussists) in France, the Social Democratic Federation and the independent workers’ party in England, Brucker and Vandervelde in Belgium, integralists and reformists in Italy,

Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in Russia are uniformly everywhere in spite of the enormous diversity of national conditions and historical moments in the present SRI of all these countries. "Separation" within modern international socialism is, in fact, already now *one* by *one* lines in different countries of the world, documenting this a huge step forward in comparison with what it was 30 to 40 years ago, when heterogeneous tendencies within different countries within united international socialism fought. And that "revisionism on the left," which has now been described in Roman countries as "revolutionary syndicalism," also adapts to Marxism, "correcting" it: Labriola in Italy, Lagardel in France all the time appeal from Marx, misunderstood, to Marx, correctly understood.

Here we cannot dwell on the analysis of the ideological content of *this* revisionism, which has not yet developed as much as opportunist revisionism, has not internationalized, and has not withstood a single major practical struggle with the socialist party of at least one country. We therefore restrict ourselves to that "revisionism on the right," which was outlined above.

What is its inevitability in a capitalist society? Why is it deeper than the differences in national characteristics and degrees of development of capitalism? Because in any capitalist country, broad layers of the petty bourgeoisie, petty masters always stand next to the proletariat. Capitalism was born and is constantly born out of small-scale production. A whole series of "middle strata" will inevitably be re-created by capitalism (an appendage of a factory, work at home, small workshops scattered throughout the country due to the requirements of a large, such as bicycle and automobile industry, etc.). These new small producers are inevitably again thrown into the ranks of the proletariat. It is quite natural that the petty-bourgeois worldview erupts again and again in the ranks of the broad labour parties. Completely natural that this should be and will always be right up to the ups and downs of the proletarian revolution, for it would be a profound mistake to think that a "complete" proletariat of the majority of the population is necessary for the feasibility of such a revolution. What we now often experience only ideologically: disputes with theoretical amendments to Marx—what now breaks out in practice only on certain particular issues of the labour movement, such as tactical disagreements with the revisionists and schisms on this basis—we will certainly have to go through this to the working class on an incomparably larger scale, when the proletarian revolution aggravates all controversial issues, concentrates all disagreements on

points that are of the most direct importance for determining the behaviour of the masses, it will force you fight to distinguish enemies from friends.

The ideological struggle of revolutionary Marxism with revisionism at the end of the 19th century there is only the threshold of the great revolutionary battles of the proletariat, which goes forward to the complete victory of their cause, in spite of all the vacillations and weaknesses of philistinism. (*Lenin, Marxism and Revisionism (1908), Soch., Vol. XII , p. 183-189, 3rd ed.*)

## **Lenin on Kautsky and Kautskyism**

Kautskyism does not represent any independent movement, having no roots either among the masses or in the privileged layer that has passed to the bourgeoisie. But the danger of Kautskyism is that, using the ideology of the past, it intensifies to reconcile the proletariat with the “bourgeois working party”, to uphold its unity with it, and thereby increase its authority. (*Lenin, Imperialism and the split of socialism (1916), Soch., Vol. XIX , p. 312, 3rd ed.*)

Open opportunism, which repels the working mass at once, is not so terrible and harmful, as this theory of the golden mean, which justifies opportunist practice with Marxist words, proves that the revolutionary actions are delayed by a number of sophisms, etc. , proved to be a first-rate hypocrite and virtuoso in the matter of prostitution of Marxism. (*Lenin, The Crash of the Second International (1915), Op., Vol. XVIII , p. 279, ed. 3rd.* )

Kautsky, the greatest authority of the Second International, is a highly typical and striking example of how the verbal recognition of Marxism actually led to its transformation into “Struvism” or “Brentanism.” We see this with the example of Plekhanov. Out of Marxism, their revolutionary living soul is emasculated by explicit sophisms, *all* are recognized in Marxism *except* revolutionary means of struggle, preaching and preparing them, educating the masses precisely in this direction. Kautsky “reconciles” without conviction the basic idea of social chauvinism, recognition of the defence of the fatherland in this war, with a diplomatic, ostentatious concession to the left in the form of credit abstention, verbal recognition of his opposition, etc. Kautsky, who wrote an entire book in 1909 about approaching the era of revolutions and the connection of war with

revolution, Kautsky, who signed the Basel manifesto on the revolutionary use of the coming war in 1912, now justifies and embellishes social chauvinism in every way and, like Plekhanov, joins bourgeoisie to ridicule all thoughts of revolution, all steps to the direct revolutionary struggle.

The working class cannot fulfil its world-revolutionary role without waging a merciless war against this renegade, spinelessness, servitude to opportunism and the unprecedented theoretical vulgarization of Marxism. Kautskyism is not an accident, but a social product of the contradictions of the Second International, the combination of fidelity to Marxism in words and submission to opportunism in practice.

In different countries, this basic falsehood of “Kautskyism” is manifested in various forms. In Holland, Roland-Holst, rejecting the idea of protecting the fatherland, defends unity with the party of opportunists. In Russia, Trotsky, also rejecting this idea, equally defends unity with the opportunist and chauvinist group of Our Dawn. In Romania, Rakovsky, declaring war on opportunism, as the culprit of the collapse of the International, is at the same time ready to recognize the legitimacy of the idea of protecting the fatherland. All these are manifestations of the evil that the Dutch Marxists (Horter, Pannekoek) called “passive radicalism” and which boils down to replacing revolutionary Marxism with eclecticism in theory and to servility or powerlessness against opportunism in practice. (*Lenin, Socialism and War (1915), Op., Vol. XVIII , p. 203, 3rd ed.*)

How can one explain this monstrous perversion of Marxism by Kautsky, a raider in Marxism? If we talk about the philosophical foundations of this phenomenon, then it comes down to replacing the dialectic with eclecticism and sophistry. Kautsky is a great master of such a substitution. Speaking practically-politically, it will come down to servility to the opportunists, that is, in the end, to the bourgeoisie. From the beginning of the war, progressing faster and faster, Kautsky came to virtuosity in this art of being a Marxist in words, a lackey of the bourgeoisie in practice. (*Lenin, the Proletarian Revolution and the renegade Kautsky (1918), Soch., Vol. XXIII , p. 339.* )

## **K. Marx on Kautsky**

... When this handsome man first came to me—I'm talking about the eccentric Kautsky—the first question that broke out of me was:—do you look like your mother. No, not at all, he answered. To myself, I congratulated his mother. He is mediocre with petty views, an overwise man (only 26 years old), a know-it-all, to a certain extent diligent, he is engaged in statistics a lot, but he is of little use in this, he belongs to the tribe of philistines by nature, however, he is a kind person, I'm possible I try to fuse it to a friend Engels. ( *Marx's letter to Jenny Long, April 11, 1881, journal "Bolshevik" 1931, No. 5, p. 76 - 78.* )

## **VII. The general crisis of capitalism and the transformation of social democracy into social fascism**

### **Revolutionary Crisis and Counter-Revolutionary Social Democracy**

During the international revolution, the leading cadres of the Social Democratic parties and reformist trade unions, and on the other hand, militant capitalist organizations, acquired the special significance of the largest counterrevolutionary force, which actively fought the revolution and actively supported the partial stabilization of capital.

The military crisis of 1914-1918 accompanied by the shameful *collapse of the Social Democratic II International*. In complete contradiction with the thesis of the "Communist Manifesto" of Marx and Engels that under capitalism the proletarians do not have a fatherland, in complete contradiction with the anti-war resolutions of the Stuttgart and Basel congresses, the leaders of the national Social Democratic parties, with a few exceptions, voted for military loans and spoke out decisively for the defence of imperialist "fatherland" (that is, state organizations of the imperialist bourgeoisie) and instead

of fighting the imperialist war, they became its loyal soldiers, about pagandans and singers (social patriotism, growing into social imperialism). In the following period, social democracy supported predatory treaties (Brest, Versailles); she acted as an active force on the side of the generals during the bloody suppression of proletarian revolts (Noske); she waged an armed struggle with the first proletarian republic (Soviet Russia); she betrayed the betrayed proletariat (Hungary); she entered the imperialist League of Nations (Tom, Paul Boncourt, Vandervelde); she directly sided with the imperialist slaveholders against the colonial slaves (British Labour Party); she actively supported the most reactionary executioners of the working class (Bulgaria, Poland); she took the initiative of the imperialist “military laws” (France); she betrayed the great general strike of the English proletariat; she helped strangle the miners’ strike; she helped and helps strangle China and India (MacDonald government); she is the propagandist of the imperialist League of Nations, the herald of capital and the organizing force in the struggle against the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR (Kautsky, Hilferding).

Pursuing this counterrevolutionary policy systematically, Social Democracy operates with its two wings: the *right* wing of Social Democracy, openly counterrevolutionary, is necessary for negotiations and direct communication with the bourgeoisie, the *left*—for a particularly subtle deception of workers. The “left” social democracy, playing with a pacifist, and sometimes even revolutionary phrase, actually opposes the workers, especially at the most critical moments (the British “independent” and “left” leaders of the General Council during the general strike of 1926, Otto Bauer and K during the Vienna uprising, etc.), and is therefore the most dangerous faction of the Social Democratic parties. Serving the interests of the bourgeoisie among the working class and standing entirely on the basis of class cooperation and coalition with the bourgeoisie, social democracy in certain periods is forced to switch to the position of the opposition party and even pretend to defend the class interests of the proletariat in its economic struggle only in order to win this trust of a part of the working class, the shame is to betray its long-term interests, especially during the decisive class battles.

The main role of social democracy now consists in undermining the necessary military unity of the proletariat in its struggle against imperialism. By splitting and decomposing the united front of the proletarian struggle against capital, social democracy is the main pillar of imperialism in the working class. The International Social

Democracy of all shades, the Second International and its professional branch office—the Amsterdam Association of Trade Unions—have thus become the reserve of bourgeois society, its most faithful stronghold. (*Program and charter of the Comintern, pp. 36–40, Partizdat, 1932*)

## **The crisis of capitalism and fascism**

Along with Social Democracy, by means of which the bourgeoisie suppresses the workers or lulls their class vigilance, there is *fascism*.

The era of imperialism, the aggravation of the class struggle and the growth, especially after the world imperialist war, of the elements of the civil war led to the bankruptcy of parliamentarism. Hence the “new” methods and forms of governance (for example, the system of small offices, the creation of backstage oligarchic groups, the fall and falsification of the role of “popular representation”, the shortening and destruction of “democratic freedoms”, etc.). This process of the onset of the bourgeois-imperialist reaction under the special historical conditions takes the form of fascism. Such conditions are: the instability of capitalist relations; the presence of significant declassified social elements, the impoverishment of the broad layers of the urban petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, the discontent of the rural petty bourgeoisie, and finally the constant threat of mass protests by the proletariat. In order to ensure greater stability of power, its firmness and constancy, the bourgeoisie is increasingly forced to switch from a parliamentary system to a fascist method independent of inter-party relations and combinations. This method is a method of direct dictatorship, ideologically covered by a “national idea” and the representation of “professions” (and essentially various groups of the ruling classes), a method of exploiting the discontent of the petty-bourgeois, intellectual and other masses through a kind of social demagoguery (anti-Semitism, partial attacks against usurious capital, indignation of the parliamentary “talking”) and corruption in the form of creating a cohesive and paid hierarchy of fascist squads, party apparatus and officials; at the same time, fascism seeks to penetrate into the working environment, recruiting the most backward layers of workers, using their discontent, the passivity of social democracy, etc. The main task of fascism is the rout of the revolutionary workers’

vanguard, that is, the communist layers of the proletariat and their cadre. The combination of social demagoguery, corruption and active white terror, along with extreme imperialist aggressiveness in the sphere of foreign policy, are characteristic features of fascism.

Using anti-capitalist phraseology during periods especially critical for the bourgeoisie, fascism, having consolidated itself at the helm of state power, is increasingly revealing itself as a terrorist dictatorship of big capital, losing its anti-capitalist trinkets along the way.

Adapting to a change in the political situation, the bourgeoisie uses both the methods of fascism and the methods of coalition with Social Democracy, and social democracy itself at times most critical for capitalism often plays a fascist role. In the course of development, she discovers fascist tendencies, which does not prevent her from facing a bourgeois government as an opposition party under a different political situation. The method of fascism and the method of coalition with Social Democracy, being methods unusual for “normal” capitalism and being signs of a general capitalist crisis, are used by the bourgeoisie to slow down the progressive course of the revolution. (*The program and charter of the Comintern, pp. 40–43, Partizdat, 1932*)

## **Fascism is Based on Social Democracy**

Further aggravation as a result of the economic crisis of all the main contradictions of capitalism, which is manifested primarily in its weakest links, growing discontent among the broadest masses of people, the growth of communism, the growing prestige of the country of proletarian dictatorship, lead, on the one hand, to the more open use of the apparatus of violence by the bourgeois dictatorships, on the other hand, to the growth of a revolutionary upsurge and the growth in a number of countries of the prerequisites of a revolutionary crisis.

Organically growing out of the so-called bourgeois democracy as a disguised form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, fascism as a naked form of the bourgeois dictatorship aggravates all the methods of suppressing and enslaving the working people that are inherent in the capitalist system and are inseparable from the whole system of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

The bourgeoisie erects and shapes the fascist regime, interwoven with the remnants of bourgeois democracy, on the path of routing the class organizations of the proletariat, prohibiting the Communist Parties, creating special military terrorist organizations, regardless of the abolition or preservation of parliamentary forms.

In an effort to weaken the revolutionary influence of the country of the proletarian dictatorship on the millions of oppressed and enslaved all over the world and to hinder the revolutionary movement of workers, peasants and colonial peoples, the fascists resort to social demagoguery, which hides the counterrevolutionary goals of the bourgeois dictatorship. Playing on the needs and calamities of the working masses, fomenting national hostility, the imperialist spirit of revenge in the defeated countries, anti-Semitism, speculating in Germany on the Jung plan, covering up their services to capital with deceitful anti-capitalist phraseology, fascists paid by financial capital (Hitler) use the discontent of the masses for strengthening the bourgeois dictatorship and the ruthless suppression of the working class.

The growth of fascism in recent years has become possible only on the basis of support for international social democracy during the entire post-war period of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, regardless of its forms. Contrasting the "democratic" form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie with fascism, lulling the vigilance of the masses in the struggle against the growing political reaction and fascism, covering up the counter-revolutionary nature of bourgeois democracy as a form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, social democracy is itself an active factor and conductor of the fascism of the capitalist state.

The successful struggle against fascism requires the communist parties to mobilize the masses on the basis of a united front from below against all forms of bourgeois dictatorship, against all its reactionary measures, clearing the path to an open fascist dictatorship. It requires a quick and decisive correction of errors, mainly reduced to the liberal opposition of fascism to bourgeois democracy and parliamentary forms of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie to its openly fascist forms, which was a reflection of social democratic influences in the communist ranks. (*Theses, resolutions, and resolutions of the XI plenum of the ECCI, pp. 9-10, Ogiz, The Moscow Worker, 1931* )

## **Social Democracy as the Main Social Support of the Bourgeoisie**

1. The global economic crisis has revealed with all clarity the role of international social democracy as the *main social support* dictatorships of the bourgeoisie. At all the basic stages of the development of the class struggle since the time of the world imperialist war and the emergence of the proletarian dictatorship, social democracy was on the side of capitalism, against the working class. She sent millions of proletarians to the imperialist massacre under the banner of “defending the fatherland.” She helped “her” bourgeoisie to carry out military intervention in the USSR in 1918 - 1920. She saved capitalism from the proletarian revolution immediately after the war (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Finland). She actively helped the bourgeoisie strengthen the capitalist economy. It harnessed the working masses to the yoke of capitalist rationalization. She is making every effort now, at the time of the gravest crisis, to save the capitalist system of exploitation and slavery from impending doom.

2. The entire development of social democracy since the war and the emergence of Soviet power in the USSR is a continuous process of evolution towards fascism.

In the line of *capital attack on the working class*, this is direct and indirect support for the policy of lowering wages, curtailing the entire social security system, supporting a new wave of the most merciless rationalization, organizing sabotage and disruption of strikes, improving arbitration as a tool for strike-breaking and enslaving the working class.

In the area of *economic and financial* robbery of the masses, this includes comprehensive support for the policies of banks, trusts and cartels, a policy of high cost of all consumer goods, tightening the tax press, and active support for protectionism.

In the line of *colonial* robbery, this is a direct suppression of the national revolutionary movement in colonial and semi-colonial countries; these are tens of thousands of prisoners and mass executions in India, the destruction of villages from airplanes, in China - direct support for the butchery government of Chiang Kai-shek and the open war waged by foreign military vessels in the Yangtze with the Red Army in southern China, mass executions in Indo China.

On the line of *imperialist robbery*, this is active direct *complicity* in the Versailles system, in the behind-the-scenes intrigues of purely secret diplomacy, support under the “pacifist” flag for a bacchanal of arms and preparation for war, support for imperialist military alliances.

In *England*, the “labour party”, going to power, promised to mitigate unemployment and improve the situation of the unemployed, to fight against a decline in the living standards of workers, peace with India, and a firm disarmament policy. *In practice* Fulfilling the will of the imperialist bourgeoisie, the “working” government implements capitalist rationalization, reduces wages by arbitration, lengthens the working day (bill on the coal industry), cuts down the social insurance budget, suppresses the revolutionary liberation movement in India, Egypt and Arabistan, and surpasses Baldwin’s government in the construction and rearmament of the navy, is preparing together with French imperialism a united front of military intervention against the USSR (the role of the worker governments in the maritime agreement of France and Italy).

In *Germany* Social Democracy, during its recent sojourn in power, with the hands of the Müller government launched the first attack on social insurance, launched the first construction of new battleships, shot workers at the May Day demonstrations in Berlin in 1929, banned the Red Front Union, persecuted the workers’ press, strangled workers strikes. Chased out by the bourgeoisie from the government after it carried out Jung’s plan, the anti-labour law on the “defence of the republic”, after she had cleared the path of a series of reactionary measures to the government of the fascist dictatorship (Bruening), social democracy, being in the government (Prussia) and outside the government, Votes for all anti-labour laws of the Bruening government, organizes strikebreaking and initiates police terror against strikers and the unemployed,

3. The entire counter-revolutionary, anti-labour policy of international Social-Democracy finds its completion in the preparation of a *blockade and military intervention* against the world’s first proletarian state. The turn to the military intervention of the world bourgeoisie, which had lost hope for the capitalist degeneration of the USSR, for the victory of the right-wing elements in the CPSU (B.), A general offensive against the capitalist elements in the USSR and the development of a revolutionary upsurge in capital countries strengthened the interventionist and wrecking orientation of all parties of the Second International (formerly of the whole of German Social-

Democracy, which is the core of the Second International), aware that the victory of socialism in the USSR will finally undermine their influence among the working masses of the capitalist other countries.

The process of the “union bureau” of the Russian Mensheviks (Social Democrats), which revealed the vile, double-dealing role of Social Democracy, showed that the Second International, setting itself the goal of restoring capitalism in the USSR through military intervention, organizing wrecking in all areas through its counter-revolutionary agents in the USSR The national economy, trying to disrupt the supply of workers and peasants, trying to consciously reduce the real wages of workers, *turned into a militant detachment of world imperialism preparing for war against the USSR* .

4. Under the pressure of growing discontent and the beginning of the mass withdrawal of workers, Social Democracy, which has found its powerlessness in the face of crisis and unemployment, is forced to resort to “left” demagogic manoeuvres to deceive the masses, hypocritically speaking *in words* for shortening the working day and five-day working week, for the expansion of social insurance, for disarmament, for the fight against fascism. *In fact*, social democracy by these manoeuvres *helps capital* to advance on the living standards of the working class, strengthen its dictatorship, accelerate the fascism of the bourgeois state, suppress the resistance of the masses to fascism, delay the spontaneous attraction of the broadest working masses to a united front, and cover up preparations for war against the USSR.

All these and similar facts clearly reveal the counter-revolutionary role of international social democracy as the main social support of the bourgeoisie in its struggle against the proletariat. Therefore, the exposure of social democracy, the exposure of the Second International, the liberation of the working masses from the influence of social democracy is the next task of the communist parties, without the resolution of which the successful struggle of the proletariat for their liberation from the chains of capitalism is impossible. (*Abstracts, resolutions, and resolutions of the XI Plenum of the ECCI, pp. 14–16, Ogiz, The Moscow Worker.* )

## **VIII. Lenin’s Struggle for the Purity of Marxist Theory**

## **Leninism as a Direct Continuation and Development of Marxism**

... Between Marx-Engels, on the one hand, and Lenin, on the other, lies the whole period of domination of opportunism of the Second International. In the interest of accuracy, I must add that we are not talking here about the formal domination of opportunism, but only about its actual domination. Formally, at the head of the Second International there were “faithful” Marxists, “orthodoxies”—Kautsky and others. In fact, however, the main work of the Second International was carried out along the lines of opportunism. The opportunists adapted to the bourgeoisie by virtue of their adaptive, petty-bourgeois nature, while the “orthodox”, in turn, adapted to the opportunists in the interests of “maintaining unity” with the opportunists, in the interests of “peace in the party.” The result was the dominance of opportunism, for the chain between the politics of the bourgeoisie and the politics of the “Orthodox” turned out to be closed.

It was a period of comparatively peaceful development of capitalism, a period, so to speak, before the war, when the catastrophic contradictions of imperialism did not yet have time to reveal itself with full evidence, when the economic strikes of workers and trade unions developed more or less “normally”, when the electoral struggle and parliamentary factions gave “dizzying “Successes when legal forms of struggle were extolled to the skies and legality thought to” kill “capitalism, — in a word, when the parties of the Second International were overgrown with fat and did not want to think seriously It is useful about revolution, about the dictatorship of the proletariat, about the revolutionary education of the masses.

Instead of a complete revolutionary theory, there are conflicting theoretical positions and fragments of theory, torn off from the lively revolutionary struggle of the masses and turned into dilapidated dogmas. For the sake of course, they remembered the theory of Marx, but in order to emasculate from it a living revolutionary soul.

Instead of revolutionary politics—flabby philistinism and sober politicking, parliamentary diplomacy and parliamentary combinations. For the view, of course, “revolutionary” decisions and slogans were adopted, but in order to put them under the cloth.

Instead of educating and training the party in the right revolutionary tactics on their own mistakes, they carefully circumvent

painful issues, obscure and gloss over them. For the view, of course, I was not averse to talking about sore issues, but in order to end the matter with some kind of “rubber” resolution.

That was the physiognomy of the Second International, its method of work, its arsenal.

Meanwhile, a new period of imperialist wars and revolutionary struggles of the proletariat was approaching. The old methods of struggle turned out to be obviously insufficient and powerless before the omnipotence of financial capital.

It was necessary to reconsider the entire work of the Second International, its entire method of work, expelling philistinism, narrow-mindedness, politicking, renegade, social chauvinism, social pacifism. It was necessary to check the entire arsenal of the Second International, to throw out everything rusted and shabby, to forge new types of weapons. Without such preliminary work, there was nothing to go to war with capitalism. Without this, the proletariat risked finding itself in the face of new revolutionary struggles not sufficiently armed or even simply unarmed.

This honour of the general inspection and the general cleaning of the Augean stables of the Second International fell to Leninism.

This is the situation in which the method of Leninism was born and forged.

What are the requirements of this method?

Firstly, to *test the* theoretical dogmas of the Second International in the fire of the revolutionary struggle of the masses, in the fire of living practice, that is, to restore the broken unity between theory and practice, to close the gap between them, because only in this way can a truly proletarian party armed with revolutionary theory.

Secondly, to *check the* policies of the parties of the Second International not by their slogans and resolutions (which cannot be trusted), but by their deeds, by their actions, because only in this way can the proletarian masses be won and earned the trust.

Thirdly, the *restructuring of* all party work in a new revolutionary way in the spirit of educating and preparing the masses for the revolutionary struggle, because only in this way can the masses be prepared for the proletarian revolution.

Fourthly, to the *self-criticism of the* proletarian parties, to training and educating them on their own mistakes, because only in this way can the real cadres and real leaders of the party be educated.

Such are the basis and essence of the method of Leninism.

How was this method applied in practice?

The opportunists of the Second International have a number of theoretical dogmas from which they always dance, like from a stove. Take a few of them:

Dogma One: on the conditions for the seizure of power by the proletariat. The opportunists claim that the proletariat cannot and should not take power if it is not itself a majority in the country. There is no evidence, for there is no way to justify this ridiculous position either theoretically or practically. Suppose Lenin answers the gentlemen of the Second International. Well, if there is such a historical situation (war, agrarian crisis, etc.) in which the proletariat, which constitutes a minority of the population, has the opportunity to rally the vast majority of the working masses around itself—why not take power? Why not use the favourable international and domestic situation for the proletariat in order to break through the front of capital and accelerate the common denouement? Didn't Marx say back in the 50s of the last century, that the case of the proletarian revolution in Germany could have been "perfectly" if it had been possible to support the proletarian revolution, "so to speak, with the second edition of the peasant war"? Is it not known to everyone and everyone that the proletarians in Germany were then relatively smaller than, for example, in Russia in 1917? Has not the practice of the Russian proletarian revolution shown that this beloved dogma of the heroes of the Second International is devoid of any vital significance for the proletariat? Is it not clear that the practice of the revolutionary struggle of the masses beats and beats this dilapidated dogma? ? Has not the practice of the Russian proletarian revolution shown that this beloved dogma of the heroes of the Second International is devoid of any vital significance for the proletariat? Is it not clear that the practice of the revolutionary struggle of the masses beats and beats this dilapidated dogma? ? Has not the practice of the Russian proletarian revolution shown that this beloved dogma of the heroes of the Second International is devoid of any vital significance for the proletariat? Is it not clear that the practice of the revolutionary struggle of the masses beats and beats this dilapidated dogma?

The second dogma: the proletariat cannot hold onto power if it does not have enough ready-made cultural and administrative cadres capable of establishing government of the country—first it is necessary to develop these cadres under capitalism, and then take power. Suppose, Lenin answers, but why can't you turn things around so that you first take power, create favourable conditions for the development of the proletariat, and then move forward with leaps and

bounds to raise the cultural level of the working masses, to develop numerous cadres of workers' leaders and administrators? Didn't Russian practice show that under the proletarian power the cadres of workers' leaders grow a hundred times faster and more thoroughly than under the rule of capital? Isn't it clear?

Dogma Three: the method of a general political strike is unacceptable for the proletariat, because it is theoretically untenable (see Engels criticism), practically dangerous (it can upset the normal course of the country's economic life, can empty the box office of trade unions), cannot replace parliamentary forms of struggle, which are the main form class struggle of the proletariat. Well, the Leninists answer. But, firstly, Engels did not criticize any general strike, but only a certain kind of general strike, the general *economic* strike of the anarchists, which was put forward by the anarchists *instead of the political* struggle of the proletariat—and here the method of general *political* strikes? Secondly, who and where has proved that the parliamentary form of struggle is the main form of struggle of the proletariat? Does not the history of the revolutionary movement show that the parliamentary struggle is only a school and a support for organizing the extra-parliamentary struggle of the proletariat, that the main issues of the labour movement under capitalism are resolved by force, by the direct struggle of the proletarian masses, their general strike, their revolt? Thirdly, where did the question of replacing the parliamentary struggle come from with the method of a general political strike? Where and when did supporters of the general political strike try to replace parliamentary forms of struggle with forms of struggle out of parliament? Fourth, didn't the revolution in Russia show that a general political strike is the greatest school of the proletarian revolution and an indispensable means of mobilizing and organizing the broadest masses of the proletariat on the eve of the assault on the strongholds of capitalism — what does this have to do with philistine complaints about the frustration of the ordinary course of economic life and about the box office of trade unions? Is it not clear that the practice of revolutionary struggle breaks down this dogma of the opportunists as well?

Etc.

That is why Lenin said that “revolutionary theory is not a dogma”, that “it is finally formed only in close connection with the practice of a truly massive and truly revolutionary movement” (“Children's Disease”), because theory must serve practice, because

“theory must answer to questions put forward by practice (“ Friends of the People “), for it must be verified by the data of practice.

As for the political slogans and political decisions of the parties of the Second International, it’s enough to recall the story with the slogan “war to war” to understand all the falsity and all the rottenness of the political practice of these parties, covering up their anti-revolutionary cause with magnificent revolutionary slogans and resolutions. Everyone remembers the magnificent demonstration of the Second International at the Basel Congress with the threat to the imperialists of all the horrors of the uprising if the imperialists decide to start a war, and with the formidable slogan “war to war.” But who does not remember that after some time, just before the start of the war, the Basel resolution was put on the cloth, and the workers were given a new slogan — to exterminate each other for the glory of the capitalist fatherland? Is it not clear that revolutionary slogans and resolutions are worthless, if they are not backed up by deed? One has only to compare the Leninist policy of turning the imperialist war into a civil war with the treacherous policies of the Second International during the war in order to understand the vulgarity of the politicians of opportunism, the greatness of the method of Leninism. I cannot help but cite here one passage from Lenin’s book “The Proletarian Revolution and Renegade Kautsky,” where he brutally scourges the opportunist attempt of the leader of the Second International, K. Kautsky, to judge parties not by their deeds, but by their paper slogans and documents: “Kautsky conducts typically philistine, philistine politics, imagining... as if *putting up a slogan* changes things. The whole history of bourgeois democracy exposes this illusion: to deceive the people, bourgeois democrats have always put forward and always put forward any kind of “slogans”. The point is to *verify* their sincerity, to compare *actions* with words , not to be content with an idealistic or charlatan *phrase* , but to seek out *class reality*.” [ *Lenin* , vol. XXIII, p. 377.].

Not to mention the fear of the parties of the Second International of self-criticism, their manner of hiding their mistakes, obscuring sensitive issues, covering up their shortcomings with a fake parade of prosperity, stifling lively thought and hindering the revolutionary education of the party on its own mistakes, a manner ridiculed and nailed to a shameful pillar Lenin. ( *Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 11-15, ed. 9th.* )

# **Against Trotskyist smuggling in questions of the history and theory of Bolshevism**

## **On some questions of the history of Bolshevism**

Letter to the editors of the journal "Proletarian Revolution."

*DEAR COMRADES!*

I resolutely protest against the publication in the journal Proletarian Revolution (No. 6 of 1930) of the anti-party and half-Trotsky article by Slutsky, "Bolsheviks on German Social Democracy during its pre-war crisis," as a discussion article.

Slutsky argues that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) underestimated the dangers of *centrism* in German and generally pre-war social democracy, that is, he underestimated the dangers of sheer opportunism, the danger of conciliation with opportunism. In other words, according to Slutsky, it turns out that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) did not wage an irreconcilable struggle against opportunism, because underestimating centrism is, in essence, a refusal to launch a comprehensive struggle against opportunism. It turns out, therefore, that Lenin in the period before the war was not yet a real Bolshevik, that only during the imperialist war, or even at the end of this war, Lenin became a real Bolshevik. This is how Slutsky narrates in his article. And instead of stigmatizing this newly-born "historian" as a slanderer and a forger, you get involved in a discussion with him and give him a platform. I can't help but protest against placing in your journal Slutsky's article as a discussion article, *about* Lenin's *Bolshevism*, the question of whether Lenin *waged* a fundamental, implacable struggle against centrism as a well-known form of opportunism, or *did not*, was Lenin a real Bolshevik or *not*.

In your statement "from the editors" sent to the Central Committee on October 20, you acknowledge that the editors made a mistake by placing Slutsky's article as a discussion article. This is certainly good, despite the fact that the editorial statement appears with a great delay. But you make a new mistake in your statement by

declaring that “the editors consider it politically extremely urgent and necessary to further develop on the pages of the” Proletarian Revolution “the whole range of problems associated with the relationship of the Bolsheviks with the pre-war II International.” This means that you intend to again draw people into the discussion on issues that are axioms of Bolshevism. This means that you are again thinking of turning the question of Lenin’s Bolshevism from an axiom into a problem that needs to be “further developed”. Why, on what basis? Everyone knows that Leninism was born, grew and gained strength in the merciless struggle against opportunism of all stripes, including centrism in the West (Kautsky), and centrism among us (Trotsky and others). Even the direct enemies of Bolshevism cannot deny this. This is an axiom. And you are pulling us back, trying to turn the axiom into a problem subject to “further development”. Why? On what basis? Maybe out of unfamiliarity with the history of Bolshevism? Perhaps for the sake of rotten liberalism, so that the Slutsky and other students of Trotsky could not say that they were being pinched? - A rather strange liberalism, carried out at the expense of the vital interests of Bolshevism ... subject to “further development”. Why? On what basis? Maybe out of unfamiliarity with the history of Bolshevism? Perhaps for the sake of rotten liberalism, so that the Slutsky and other students of Trotsky could not say that they were being pinched? - A rather strange liberalism, carried out at the expense of the vital interests of Bolshevism ... subject to “further development”. Why? On what basis? Maybe out of unfamiliarity with the history of Bolshevism? Perhaps for the sake of rotten liberalism, so that the Slutsky and other students of Trotsky could not say that they were being pinched?—A rather strange liberalism, carried out at the expense of the vital interests of Bolshevism...

What actually considers the editorial staff worthy of discussion in the article by Slutsky?

1) Slutsky claims that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) did not pursue a line of discontinuity, of a split with the opportunists of the German Social Democracy, with the opportunists of the Second International of the pre-war period. You want to discuss against this Trotskyist thesis of Slutsky. But what’s debatable here? Is it not clear that Slutsky simply slanders Lenin, the Bolsheviks? Defamation must be branded, and not turned into a subject of discussion.

Every Bolshevik knows, if he really is a Bolshevik, that Lenin long before the war, from about 1903-1904, when a group of Bolsheviks took shape in Russia and when the left in the German

Social-Democracy first made themselves felt, led the line to the gap, a split with the opportunists both here in the Russian Social Democratic Party and there, in the Second International, in particular in German Social Democracy. Every Bolshevik knows that this is why the Bolsheviks already then (1903-1905) earned the honourable fame of “schismatics” and “disorganizers” among the opportunists of the Second International. But what could Lenin have done, what could the Bolsheviks have done, if the Left Social Democrats in the Second International and, above all, in German Social Democracy represented a weak and feeble group, organizationally unformed, ideologically uninformed, a group afraid to even pronounce the word “gap”, “split”? One cannot demand that Lenin, that the Bolsheviks arrange from Russia for a left split in the Western parties. This is not to say that organizational and ideological weakness was a characteristic feature of the left social democrats not only in the pre-war period. She, this negative trait, as you know, was preserved for the left and in the period after the war. Everyone knows the assessment of the German left social democrats in Lenin’s famous article “On the pamphlet of Junius” [Junius—Rosa Luxemburg, leader of the left social democrats in German social democracy.], Written in October 1916, that is, after more than two years after the outbreak of war, where Lenin, criticizing a number of serious political mistakes by the left social democrats in Germany, speaks of “ for the Bolsheviks to arrange from Russia for a left split in the Western parties. This is not to say that organizational and ideological weakness was a characteristic feature of the Left Social Democrats not only in the pre-war period. She, this negative trait, as you know, was preserved for the left and in the period after the war. Everyone knows the assessment of the German left social democrats in Lenin’s famous article “On the pamphlet of Junius” [Junius—Luxemburg, leader of the left social democrats in German social democracy.], Written in October 1916, that is, after more than two years after the outbreak of war, where Lenin, criticizing a number of serious political mistakes by the left social democrats in Germany, speaks of “ for the Bolsheviks to arrange from Russia for a left split in the Western parties. This is not to say that organizational and ideological weakness was a characteristic feature of the left social democrats not only in the pre-war period. She, this negative trait, as you know, was preserved for the left and in the period after the war. Everyone knows the assessment of the German left social democrats in Lenin’s famous article “On the pamphlet of Junius” [Junius—Rosa Luxemburg, leader of the left social democrats

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Of all the groups of the Second International, the Russian Bolsheviks were then the only group capable of undertaking something serious in their organizational experience and ideological sense in the sense of a direct break, a split with their opportunists in their Russian social democracy. Now, if the Slutsky did not even try to prove, but simply assume, that Lenin and the Russian Bolsheviks did not use all their power to organize a split with the opportunists (Plekhanov, Martov, Dan) and expel the centrists (Trotsky and other supporters of the August bloc),—then one could argue about Bolshevism of Lenin, about Bolshevism of the Bolsheviks. But the fact of the matter is that the Slutsky dare not even stammer in favour of such a wild assumption. They don’t dare, because they know that the well-known facts of a decisive policy of a break with opportunists

of all stripes, pursued by the Russian Bolsheviks (1904 - 1912), cry out against this assumption. They don't dare, because they know that the next day they will be nailed to a pillory.

But the question is: could the Russian Bolsheviks split with their opportunists and centrists-conciliators long before the imperialist war (1904 -1912), without at the same time leading a line to break, a line to split with opportunists and centrists of the Second International? Who can doubt that the Russian Bolsheviks considered their policy towards the opportunists and centrists a model of politics for the left in the West? Who can doubt that the Russian Bolsheviks in every possible way pushed the left social democrats in the West, in particular, the left in German social democracy, to break up, to split with their opportunists and centrists? It is not the fault of Lenin and the Russian Bolsheviks, if the left social democrats in the West were not ripe to follow in the footsteps of the Russian Bolsheviks.

2) Slutsky reproaches Lenin and the Bolsheviks for not supporting the left in German Social Democracy decisively and irrevocably, that they supported them only with serious reservations, that factional considerations prevented them from supporting the left to the end. You want to discuss against this quack and through and through false reproach. But what is actually debatable? Is it not clear that Slutsky is manoeuvring and trying to cover up false gaps in the position of the left in Germany with a false rebuke against Lenin and the Bolsheviks? Is it not clear that the Bolsheviks could not support the left in Germany, now and then hesitating between Bolshevism and Menshevism, *without* serious reservations, *without* serious criticism of their mistakes, *without changing* the working class and its revolution? Fraudulent manoeuvres need to be branded, and not turned into a subject of discussion.

Yes, the Bolsheviks supported the Left Social Democrats in Germany only with well-known serious reservations, criticizing their half-Menshevik mistakes. But for this they should be welcomed, not blamed.

Are there any people who doubt this?

Let us turn to the most famous facts from history.

a) In 1903, serious disagreements emerged between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in Russia on the issue of party membership. By their wording on party membership, the Bolsheviks wanted to create an organizational bridle against the influx of non-proletarian elements into the party. The danger of such an influx was then more than real, in view of the bourgeois-democratic nature of the

Russian revolution. The Russian Mensheviks defended the opposite position, opening wide the doors of the party to non-proletarian elements. In view of the importance of the issues of the Russian revolution for the world revolutionary movement, the West European Social Democrats decided to intervene. Leftist social democrats in Germany, Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg, then leaders of the left, also intervened. And what? Both of them spoke out against the Bolsheviks. At the same time, the Bolsheviks were accused of ultra-centralism and Blanquist tendencies. Subsequently, these vulgar and philistine epithets were seized by the Mensheviks and spread all over the world.

b) In 1905, disagreements developed between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in Russia about the nature of the Russian revolution. The Bolsheviks defended the idea of an alliance of the working class with the peasantry under the hegemony of the proletariat. The Bolsheviks argued that the cause must be led to the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry in order to move from the bourgeois-democratic revolution immediately to the socialist revolution with the support of the rural poor. The Mensheviks in Russia rejected the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, they preferred the policy of union of the working class with the peasantry, a policy of agreement with the liberal bourgeoisie, and declared the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry a reactionary Blanquist scheme that contradicted the development of the bourgeois revolution. How did the Left in German Social Democracy, Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg react to these disputes? They composed the utopian and semi-Menshevik scheme of permanent revolution (an ugly depiction of the Marxist scheme of revolution), penetrated through the Menshevik denial of the policy of the union of the working class and the peasantry, and contrasted it with the Bolshevik scheme of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. Subsequently, this semi-Menshevik scheme of permanent revolution was picked up by Trotsky (partly Martov) and turned into an instrument of struggle against Leninism. penetrated through and through by the Menshevik denial of the policy of the union of the working class and the peasantry, and opposed it to the Bolshevik scheme of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. Subsequently, this semi-Menshevik scheme of permanent revolution was picked up by Trotsky (partly Martov) and turned into an instrument of struggle against Leninism. penetrated

through and through by the Menshevik denial of the policy of the union of the working class and the peasantry, and opposed it to the Bolshevik scheme of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. Subsequently, this semi-Menshevik scheme of permanent revolution was picked up by Trotsky (partly Martov) and turned into an instrument of struggle against Leninism.

c) In the period before the war, the parties of the Second International appeared on the stage as one of the most pressing issues, the national-colonial question, the question of oppressed nations and colonies, the question of liberating the oppressed nations and colonies, the question of ways to fight imperialism, the question of ways the overthrow of imperialism. In the interests of the unfolding of the proletarian revolution and the environment of imperialism, the Bolsheviks proposed a policy of supporting the liberation movement of the oppressed nations and colonies on the basis of the self-determination of nations and developed a united front between the proletarian revolution of the advanced countries and the revolutionary liberation movement of the peoples of the colonies and oppressed countries. The opportunists of all countries, the social-chauvinists and social-imperialists of all countries were not slow in rebelling against the Bolsheviks in this connection. The Bolsheviks were poisoned like mad dogs. What position did the Left Social Democrats in the West take then? They developed the semi-Menshevik theory of imperialism, rejected the principle of self-determination of nations in its Marxist understanding (up to the secession and formation of independent states), took away the thesis about the serious revolutionary significance of the liberation movement of the colonies and oppressed countries, and took away the thesis about the possibility of a united front between the proletarian revolution and the national liberation movement and opposed all this semi-Menshevik mess, which is a complete underestimation of the national-colonial issue - the Marxist Khem Bolsheviks. It is known that Trotsky then seized this semi-Menshevik mess and used it as an instrument of the struggle against Leninism. rejected the principle of self-determination of nations in its Marxist understanding (up to the secession and formation of independent states), took away the thesis about the serious revolutionary significance of the liberation movement of the colonies and oppressed countries, took away the thesis about the possibility of a united front between the proletarian revolution and the national liberation movement, and opposed the whole semi-Menshevik movement porridge, which is a continuous

underestimation of the national-colonial issue—the Marxist scheme of the Bolsheviks. It is known that Trotsky then seized this semi-Menshevik mess and used it as an instrument of the struggle against Leninism. rejected the principle of self-determination of nations in its Marxist understanding (up to the secession and formation of independent states), took away the thesis about the serious revolutionary significance of the liberation movement of the colonies and oppressed countries, took away the thesis about the possibility of a united front between the proletarian revolution and the national liberation movement, and opposed the whole semi-Menshevik movement porridge, which is a continuous underestimation of the national-colonial issue—the Marxist scheme of the Bolsheviks. It is known that Trotsky then seized this semi-Menshevik mess and used it as an instrument of the struggle against Leninism. They took the thesis about the possibility of a united front between the proletarian revolution and the national liberation movement and opposed all this semi-Menshevik mess, which is a complete underestimation of the national-colonial issue, to the Marxist scheme of the Bolsheviks. It is known that Trotsky then seized this semi-Menshevik mess and used it as an instrument of the struggle against Leninism. They took the thesis about the possibility of a united front between the proletarian revolution and the national liberation movement and opposed all this semi-Menshevik mess, which is a complete underestimation of the national-colonial issue, to the Marxist scheme of the Bolsheviks. It is known that Trotsky then seized this semi-Menshevik mess and used it as an instrument of the struggle against Leninism.

These are the well-known mistakes of the Left Social Democrats in Germany.

I'm not talking about other mistakes of the German left, criticized in the relevant articles of Lenin.

I am not talking about the mistakes they made in evaluating the policy of the Bolsheviks during the October Revolution.

What are these errors of the German left, taken from the history of the pre-war period, talking about, but about the fact that the left social democrats, despite their leftism, have not yet freed themselves from the Menshevik baggage?

Of course, the left in Germany had not only serious mistakes. They also have large and serious revolutionary affairs. I have in mind a whole series of their merits and revolutionary speeches on the issues of domestic politics and, in particular, the electoral struggle, on the issues of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary

struggle, on the general strike, on the war, on the 1905 revolution in Russia, etc. therefore, the Bolsheviks reckoned with them, as with the left, and supported them, pushed them forward. But this does not and cannot destroy the fact that the Left Social Democrats in Germany, at the same time, had a number of serious political and theoretical errors behind them, that they still had not freed themselves from the Menshevik burden and therefore needed serious criticism from the Bolsheviks. .

Now judge for yourselves: could Lenin and the Bolsheviks support the Left Social Democrats in the West *without serious reservations, without serious criticism* of their mistakes, without changing the interests of the working class, without changing the interests of the revolution, without changing communism?

Is it not clear that Slutsky, reproaching Lenin and the Bolsheviks for what he should have welcomed them if he were a Bolshevik, exposes himself to the end as a half-Menshevik, as a masked Trotskyist?

Slutsky makes the assumption that Lenin and the Bolsheviks, in their assessment of the left in the West, proceeded from their factional considerations, that, therefore, the Russian Bolsheviks sacrificed the great cause of the international revolution to the interests of their faction. It is hardly necessary to prove that there can be nothing more vulgar and infamous than such an assumption. There can be nothing vulgar, since even the rabid vulgarities from the Mensheviks are beginning to understand that the Russian revolution is not a private affair of the Russians, that, on the contrary, it is the work of the working class of the whole world, the work of the world proletarian revolution. Nothing could be more infamous, since even professional slanderers from the Second International are beginning to understand that the consistent and completely revolutionary internationalism of the Bolsheviks is a model of proletarian internationalism for the workers of all countries.

Yes, the Russian Bolsheviks highlighted the fundamental issues of the Russian revolution, such as questions about the party, about the attitude of Marxists to the bourgeois-democratic revolution, about the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, about the hegemony of the proletariat, about the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary struggle, about the general strike, about overgrowing the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist one, about the dictatorship of the proletariat, about imperialism, about the self-determination of nations, about the liberation movement of the oppressed nations and colonies,

about the policy of supporting this movement, etc. About nor raised these questions as a touchstone on which they tested the revolutionary perseverance of the Left Social Democrats in the West. Did they have the right to do so? Yes, they did. Not only had, but were required to do so. They were obliged to do so since all these questions were, at the same time, the fundamental questions of the world revolution, the tasks of which the Bolsheviks subordinated their policies and tactics. They were obliged to do so, since only on such questions could one verify the truly revolutionary nature of various groups of the Second International. The question is, what is the “factionalism” of the Russian Bolsheviks, and where does the “factional” considerations?

As far back as 1902, Lenin wrote in his pamphlet “What to do?” That “*history has set for us the immediate task, which is the most revolutionary of all the immediate tasks of the proletariat of any country*”, that “*the implementation of this task, the destruction of a mighty stronghold of not only European, but also Asian reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat* . “ Since the publication of the What to Do? Brochure 30 years have passed. No one dares to deny that the events of this period brilliantly confirmed the words of Lenin. But does it not follow from this that the Russian revolution was (and remains) the key point of the world revolution, that the fundamental questions of the Russian revolution were at the same time (and are now) the fundamental questions of the world revolution?

Is it not clear that only on such fundamental questions could the true revolutionism of the Left Social Democrats in the West be verified?

Is it not clear that people who regard these issues as “factional” questions expose themselves to the end as vulgar and degenerate?

3) Slutsky claims that not enough official documents have yet been found testifying to the decisive and irreconcilable struggle of Lenin (Bolsheviks) against centrism. He operates with this bureaucratic thesis as an irresistible argument in favour of the position that Lenin (the Bolsheviks), therefore, underestimated the dangers of centrism in the Second International. You undertake to discuss against this nonsense, against this fraudulent crocheting. But what is actually debatable? Is it not so clear that by talking about documents Slutsky is trying to cover up the squalor and falsity of his so-called attitude?

Slutsky considers the existing party documents insufficient. Why, on what basis? Are all the well-known documents of the Second

International, as well as of the internal party struggle in Russian Social-Democracy, not enough to clearly demonstrate the revolutionary intransigence of Lenin and the Bolsheviks in their struggle against opportunists and centrists? Are Slutsky familiar with these documents? What other documents does he need?

Suppose that in addition to already known documents, a bunch of other documents will be found in the form of, say, Bolshevik resolutions, once again interpreting the need to destroy centrism. Does this mean that the presence of only paper documents is enough to demonstrate the real revolutionism and the real intransigence of the Bolsheviks in relation to centrism? Who, besides hopeless bureaucrats, can rely on paper documents alone? Who, besides archival rats, does not understand that parties and leaders should be checked according to their *affairs*, first of all, and not only according to their declarations? History knows many socialists who readily signed any revolutionary resolutions to unsubscribe from annoying critics. But this does not mean that they *carried out* these resolutions. History further knows many socialists who, with foam at the mouth, demanded that the workers' parties of *other* countries take the most revolutionary action. But this does not mean that they *did not pass* in their own party or in their own country to *their* opportunists, to *their* bourgeoisie. Is that why Lenin taught us to check revolutionary parties, movements, leaders, not by their declarations and resolutions, but by their *deeds*?

Is it not clear that if Slutsky really wanted to check the intransigence of Lenin and the Bolsheviks in their relationship to centrism, he should have made the *basis of* his article not separate documents and two or three personal letters, but a check of the Bolsheviks on their *affairs*, on their *history*, by their *actions*? Didn't we, the Russian Social-Democracy, have opportunists, centrists? Did not the Bolsheviks wage a decisive and implacable struggle against all these trends? Weren't these movements ideologically and organizationally connected with opportunists and centrists in the West? Have not the Bolsheviks defeated the opportunists and centrists in a way that not a single left group in the world has crushed them? How can one say after all this that Lenin and the Bolsheviks underestimated the dangers of centrism? Why did Slutsky neglect these facts, which are crucial for characterizing the Bolsheviks? Why didn't he use the most reliable method of checking Lenin and the Bolsheviks for their deeds, for their actions? Why did he prefer a less reliable method of digging through randomly selected papers?

Because an appeal to a more reliable method of checking the Bolsheviks for their affairs would instantly overturn the whole Slutsky installation upside down.

Because checking the Bolsheviks for their deeds would show that the Bolsheviks are the *only* revolutionary organization in the world that defeated the opportunists and centrists to the end and expelled them from the party.

Because an appeal to the actual affairs and the true history of the Bolsheviks would show that the Slutsky teachers—the Trotskyists—were the *main and main* group that instilled centrism in Russia and created a special organization for this, as the centre of centrism, in the form of the August bloc.

Because checking the Bolsheviks for their affairs would finally expose Slutsky as a falsifier of the history of our party, trying to cover up the centrism of Trotskyism in the pre-war period with the slanderous accusations of Lenin and the Bolsheviks in underestimating the dangers of centrism.

This is how things are, comrade editors, with Slutsky and his article.

You see that the editors made a mistake by allowing a discussion with a falsifier of the history of our party.

What could push the editors on this wrong path? I think that her rotten liberalism pushed this way, which now has some distribution among one part of the Bolsheviks. Some Bolsheviks think that Trotskyism is a fraction of communism, though it is a mistake, it does a lot of stupid things, sometimes even anti-Soviet, but still a fraction of communism. Hence some liberalism regarding the Trotskyists and Trotskyist-minded people. It is hardly necessary to prove that such a view of Trotskyism is deeply erroneous and harmful. In fact, Trotskyism has long ceased to be a fraction of communism. In fact, Trotskyism is the advanced detachment of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, waging a struggle against communism, against Soviet power, and against the building of socialism in the USSR.

Who gave the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie spiritual weapons against Bolshevism in the form of a thesis about the impossibility of building socialism in our country, in the form of a thesis about the inevitability of the degeneration of the Bolsheviks, etc.? This weapon gave her Trotskyism. It cannot be considered an accident that all anti-Soviet groups in the USSR, in their attempts to justify the inevitability of the struggle against the Soviet power, referred to the well-known thesis of Trotskyism about the

impossibility of building socialism in our country, the inevitability of the degeneration of Soviet power, and the likelihood of a return to capitalism.

Who gave the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie in the USSR tactical weapons in the form of attempts to openly speak out against the Soviet regime? This weapon was given to her by the Trotskyists, who were trying to organize anti-Soviet demonstrations in Moscow and Leningrad on November 7, 1927. It is a fact that the anti-Soviet actions of the Trotskyists lifted the spirit of the bourgeoisie and unleashed the wrecking work of bourgeois experts.

Who gave the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie organizational weapons in the form of attempts to organize underground anti-Soviet organizations? This weapon was given to her by the Trotskyists, who organized their own anti-Bolshevik illegal group. It is a fact that the underground anti-Soviet work of the Trotskyists facilitated the organizational design of anti-Soviet groups in the USSR.

Trotskyism is the advanced detachment of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

That is why liberalism with regard to Trotskyism, even if it is shattered and disguised, is a gagging, bordering on crime, betrayal of the working class.

That is why the attempts of some “writers” and “historians” to smuggle into our literature the disguised Trotskyist trash must be resolutely rebuffed by the Bolsheviks.

That is why a literary discussion with Trotskyist smugglers cannot be allowed.

It seems to me that “historians” and “writers” from the category of Trotskyist smugglers are trying to carry out their smuggling work on two lines so far.

*First*, they try to prove that Lenin underestimated the dangers of centrism in the period before the war, while allowing the inexperienced reader to guess that Lenin was not then a true revolutionary, that he only became such after the war, after “Rearm” with the help of Trotsky. A typical representative of such smugglers can be considered Slutsky. We saw above that Slutsky and the company are not worth it to mess with them for a long time.

*Secondly*, they try to prove that Lenin did not understand the need for the bourgeois-democratic revolution to turn into a socialist revolution, and it is left to the inexperienced reader to guess that Lenin, then, was not yet a real Bolshevik, that he understood the need for such a development only after war, after he “rearm” with the help

of Trotsky. Volosevich, the author of the History Course of the CPSU (B.), Can be considered a typical representative of such smugglers. True, Lenin wrote back in 1905 that “*we will immediately begin to move from a democratic revolution, and just to the best of our strength, the forces of a conscious and organized proletariat, we will begin to switch to a socialist revolution*”, that “*we stand for a continuous revolution*”, what “*we will not stop halfway.*” True, a lot of facts and documents of a similar order could be found in the works of Lenin. But what does Volosevich care about facts from the life and work of Lenin? Voloseviches write in order to embellish themselves with the Bolshevik color, to smuggle their anti-Leninist contraband, to lie against the Bolsheviks and to falsify the history of the Bolshevik party.

You see that the Voloseviches are worth the Slutsky.

These are the “paths and crossroads” of Trotskyist smugglers.

You understand that it’s not up to the editorial office to facilitate the smuggling of such “historians” by providing them with a discussion platform.

The editorial task, in my opinion, is to raise the questions of the history of Bolshevism to the proper level, to put the matter of studying the history of our party on the scientific, Bolshevik tracks and to draw attention to the Trotskyist and any other falsifiers of the history of our party, systematically tearing off masks from them.

This is all the more necessary because even some of our historians—I speak of historians without quotes, *of the Bolshevik* historians of our party — are not free from mistakes pouring water into the Slutsky and Volosevich mill. Unfortunately, Comrade Yaroslavsky does not make an exception here, whose books on the history of the CPSU (B.), Despite their merits, contain a number of errors of a fundamental and historical nature. (*The Bolshevik magazine No. 19-20 for 1931, p. 10-18.*)

# **IX. The significance of Comrade Stalin in the further development of Marxist-Leninist theory**

## **Comrade Stalin - leader of the Communist International**

### **To the leader of the class struggle**

*DEAR TO J. V. STALIN!*

On your fiftieth birthday, the Presidency of the ECCI sends you warm Bolshevick greetings!

The Presidency of the ECCI is committed to stopping the attention of the entire Communist International on the exceptional importance of your leading participation in the world communist movement.

In your person, the presidency of the ECCI welcomes the most experienced representative of the old Bolshevick guard, the leader of the Leninist party and the leader of the Communist International. At all critical and crucial moments of the revolution, you stood firmly at the Leninist military post. The Communist International particularly appreciates that after the death of Lenin you were the most faithful and firm bearer of Leninist teachings and the glorious traditions of Bolshevism. In the most difficult and crucial days, you helped the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Comintern to correctly and successfully use the dialectical method of Lenin's class strategy and tactics.

On the threshold of a new revolutionary upsurge, your leadership is invaluable in defining the tasks of the international proletariat, in the matter of further socialist offensive in the USSR and in preparing the offensive of the proletariat of the West and the oppressed peoples of the colonies to the decisive positions of imperialism.

With your active participation, the Comintern dealt a crushing blow to both the "left" and right opportunists, who retreated to the difficulties of the struggle. The Presidency of the ECCI notes your historic merits in exposing the Trotskyist legend about the

impossibility of the victory of socialism in the USSR and their slander about the national limitations of the CPSU (B.). The international proletariat was convinced by facts of the victorious construction of socialism in the USSR, which became the greatest lever of the world proletarian revolution. Your intransigence in the struggle against the capitulationism of openly right-wing opportunists was a necessary prerequisite for these successes. The labour enthusiasm and revolutionary initiative of the working masses, which ensured the tremendous achievements of the proletarian dictatorship, have found a fiery inspirer in your face.

The Presidium of the ECCI also notes that with your direct and leading participation, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern forged the invincible weapon of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat - the program of world communism.

By sending you the best wishes, we express our firm conviction that the coming victory of the world proletariat will be inextricably linked with your experienced Leninist leadership. (*Collection "Stalin", p. 5 - 7, 1929*)

## **The Role of Comrade Stalin in the Struggle for the Implementation of the Party's General Line**

### **Giving All His Strength, Energy and Knowledge to the Cause of the Working Class—Stalin**

*DEAR FRIEND AND BATTLE COMRADE!*

The Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Leninist Party warmly welcome you, the best Leninist, the oldest member of the Central Committee and his Politburo.

Fifty years of your life, thirty-plus years of your active Bolshevik activity, are inextricably linked with the whole heroic struggle of our party and with the victories of Leninism.

From the very first days of your work as a professional revolutionary, who built the first cells of the Bolshevik organization

under Lenin's leadership, you have proved yourself to be the faithful, best student of Lenin. Of the direct students and associates of Lenin, you turned out to be the most persistent and consistent Leninist to the end. During your entire activity, you have never retreated from Lenin both in your theoretical and principled positions, and in all your practical work.

The harsh years of the underground, the brutal persecution of tsarism, prisons and exiles tempered your steel will and revolutionary perseverance.

In the difficult years of defeat and in the years of growth, you always remained firm and unshakable, always together with Lenin, under his leadership you carried out a consistent Bolshevik line, with all decisiveness, opposed opportunism, intellectual phrasing, despondency, hesitation and open renegade.

In the victorious days of the great October Revolution, you, in contrast to other disciples of Lenin, turned out to be the first, closest and most faithful assistant to him as the most prominent organizer of the October victory.

In the difficult days of Brest, when the fate of the revolution was being decided, you and Lenin firmly defended the Bolshevik strategy against those opportunists who split the party, undermining Bolshevik unity under the flag of petty-bourgeois leftism.

During the Civil War, the party sent you to organize victories on the most decisive fronts. And your name is associated with the most glorious victories of our Red Army.

Death pulled out of our ranks our greatest leader and teacher, Comrade Lenin, precisely in the most difficult years of the restoration of the national economy. The party was having hard days. Trotskyism, hostile to Leninism, attacked the party, making attempts to seize the party leadership and turn it off the Leninist path. Already in the first battle with the enemies of Leninism after the death of Lenin, the Central Committee rallied around you as the most faithful and restrained successor of Lenin's struggle for the Leninist unity of the party.

The party won a brilliant victory over Trotskyism and the new Zinoviev-Kamenev opposition, which falsely covered itself with the flag of Leninism, but in reality was the direct agent of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism.

Just as in 1923 you boldly revealed the anti-Party, Menshevik essence of Trotskyism, so in 1928 you exposed the anti-Party, anti-proletarian, kulak essence of the right deviation.

It is precisely because of this that the Central Committee of the Party was able to rally the vast masses around itself, managed to successfully defeat the Right deviation and draw the Leninist line in practice, in practice.

Through the greatest difficulties of the reconstruction and reconstruction period, the Bolshevik Party led the country onto the path of the grand scale of socialist construction. The rapid development of the country's industrialization and the socialist reorganization of agriculture is a clear confirmation of Lenin's theory about the possibility of building socialism in our country, the theory that you defended in the struggle against petty-bourgeois Trotskyism.

The greatest successes of socialist construction achieved by the party are inextricably linked with your name, with your stubborn, implacable struggle for the party's general line.

Your name is inextricably linked with the unprecedented pace of industrialization of the country and the decisive transfer of the village to the rails of a collective and large socialist economy, a bold attack on the fist, the development of socialist competition and self-criticism. You, like no other, combined a deep theoretical knowledge of Leninism with the ability to boldly put it into practice at various stages of the revolutionary struggle.

This helped the party with the least expenditure of time and energy to successfully cope with the most difficult historical tasks; it helped the party maintain the real Leninist unity of its ranks.

As a genuine Leninist, you fought for party unity not at the cost of concessions to opportunism, but in a bold, implacable struggle against all manifestations of opportunism.

That is why the miserable attempts of all the enemies of the party to oppose the Central Committee failed.

The enemies of Leninism have already had occasion to make sure that the Central Committee and Stalin are an indissoluble Leninist whole.

Today will rally even closer the million-strong party around the Central Committee, rallying the multimillion-dollar masses of the proletariat and working people around the Leninist general line of the party for which you fought, are fighting, and to which you are giving all your strength, energy and knowledge.

The millions of proletarians can be sure that the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, which has in its ranks such a leader as Stalin, will lead the country to the complete construction of

socialism and the victory of the proletarian revolution throughout the world.

Long live the Leninist Bolshevik Party!

Long live the iron soldier of the revolution—Comrade Stalin! (*Collection “Stalin”, pp. 8-12, 1929*)

## **Concretisation and Development of Marxist-Leninist Theory in the Works of Comrade Stalin**

Two years ago (December 27, 1929), at the conference of Marxist agrarians, Comrade Stalin delivered a speech. This speech was a turning point of world-historical significance in the politics of our party in the countryside. Comrade Stalin in this speech, put forward the slogan of the transition from a policy of limiting and crowding out the kulaks to a policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class on the basis of continuous collectivization. Comrade Stalin’s speech opened before the party and the country a new historical stage in the struggle and development, it marked the rise of our socialist revolution to a new, higher level.

The continuous collectivization that began and the liquidation of the kulaks as a class on its basis, marking the second step of the October Revolution in the countryside, opened a new page in the struggle for the final victory of socialism, for the final decision in favour of socialism of the question “who is whom?” and in agriculture, for completing the foundation of the socialist economy of our country. The slogan of eliminating the kulaks as a class on the basis of continuous collectivization meant the beginning of a long struggle for the consolidation and development of the socialist economy in the countryside, for the further unprecedentedly rapid growth of industry and agriculture on a socialist basis.

In a new way the question arose about NEP, about classes, about collective farms, about the economy in transition. The country entered a period of socialism, a period of rapid erosion of the antithesis between city and country. There was a basis for the party’s slogan —“facing the village” to be supplemented by the slogan of collective farmers—“facing the city.”

This whole turn, this rise of the socialist revolution to a new, higher level, was prepared by the entire previous development of our

country on the basis of the consistent Leninist policy of our party under the leadership of the Lenin Central Committee. This whole turn, this upsurge of the revolution was possible only as a result of the Leninist intransigence of the party to all attempts to “revise” the foundations of Bolshevism, both on the right and on the “left.”

In the battles against counter-revolutionary Trotskyism and right-wing opportunism, the party led by Comrade Stalin defended the Leninist teaching on the nature of our revolution as a socialist revolution and the Leninist teaching on the possibility of building socialism by the internal forces of our country. The party defended the Leninist cooperative plan from all the attacks on it by the Trotskyists and right-wing opportunists, mobilizing the multimillion-dollar workers and peasants to build socialism in our country, to implement the Leninist cooperative plan.

The party emerged victorious in all these battles because it held high the banner of Lenin, the banner of Leninism, the banner of revolutionary Marxist-Leninist theory. The party not only guarded, but also continued to develop Leninist teachings, in the fire of the class struggle forging the experience of applying Leninism to new concrete conditions. And the first, worldwide merit in this development of Leninist teaching, its concretization in relation to the new conditions of the struggle for socialism belongs to the Leninist Central Committee, belongs to Comrade Stalin.

Continuing after Lenin the task of educating the party in the spirit of decisive intransigence to the slightest distortions of the revolutionary theory of Marxism-Leninism, in the spirit of safeguarding the purity of party theory, in the spirit of the strictest class vigilance on all sectors of the ideological front, Comrade Stalin gave a classical model of developing the foundations of Leninism and constantly served the party a personal example of Bolshevik vigilance.

It is enough to bring Comrade Stalin’s last letter to the editorial board of the journal Proletarian Revolution in order to realize the full force and significance of revolutionary theory in the daily political class struggle of the proletariat and its party, the iron need for vigilant class vigilance on all sections of the ideological front, on all sections of socialist construction.

This letter from Comrade Stalin is inextricably linked with all the brightest theoretical forecast that Comrade Stalin gave a new stage in our development two years ago at a conference of Marxist agrarians.

As is known, Comrade Stalin then drew the attention of the party to the question of the social nature of collective farms. He criticized

attempts to dethrone collective farms as enterprises of a socialist type, for these attempts are essentially no different from the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist smuggling of the Slutsky, Volosevich, and others. Moreover, these attempts stem from the denial of the socialist nature of our revolution, from the denial of the possibility of building socialism the internal forces of our country, i.e., from the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist theory.

The blind and they cannot help but see the whole political urgency, relevance and significance of this letter of Comrade Stalin for the current stage of socialist construction.

In his speech at the conference of Marxist agrarians, Comrade Stalin, later on, “uncovered” the theory of “equilibrium”, the theory of “gravity”, and the theory of “stability” of small-peasant farming. Where, essentially, do all these bourgeois and petty-bourgeois “theories” and “theorists” lead, if not to denying the socialist nature of our revolution, denying the leading role of the proletariat in our revolution and in all socialist construction? And is it not clear that all these “theories” are nothing more than an attempt to smuggle the right-opportunist and counter-revolutionary Trotskyist smuggling into modern new conditions?

That is why Comrade Stalin, with particular strength back then, two years ago, emphasizing our lag on the agrarian theoretical front, and set before the Marxist agrarians the task of eliminating this lag, the task of increasing class vigilance.

Is it not obvious how the experience of this year fully confirmed the timeliness of Comrade Stalin’s instructions given in his speech? For everyone it should now be clear why Comrade Stalin, in his speech, proclaiming a turn to the new, current stage of socialist construction, based his theoretical forecast on a detailed and annihilating criticism of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theories.

But not only in this is the historical significance of Comrade Stalin’s speech. *This speech is a new contribution to the development of Leninist doctrine in relation to the period of the expanded offensive of socialism on the whole front, in relation to the period of completing the foundation of the socialist economy of the USSR.* And now, when the proletariat of the Soviet Union, under the leadership of the party and its Central Committee, has achieved victory of world historical significance, the instructions that Comrade Stalin put forward in his speech at the very beginning of the turn, at the very beginning of the current stage, two years ago, continue to be guiding in all our work.

The organizational and economic strengthening of collective farms has now become the central task of the party in the countryside. The need to combat the underestimation of this task, the “leftist” idealization of collective farms was already envisaged by Comrade Stalin. ”It would be a mistake to think that members of collective farms have already turned into socialists. No, there’s still a lot of work to be done to remake the collective farmer, straighten his individualistic psychology and make him a real worker in socialist society.”

The organizational and economic strengthening of collective farms in the language of a socialist economy means the beginning of a rapid, unthinkable in the conditions of capitalism and small economy, process of expanded reproduction in agriculture, the process of converting a collective farmer into a socialist worker. And since collective farms are basically the same type as the socialist production of the public sector, the questions of expanded socialist reproduction in the entire national economy are raised in a new way.

Comrade Stalin developed this perspective extraordinarily vividly at a conference of Marxist agrarians, and then, in his six historical conditions, gave her a brilliant concretization. *The six conditions of Comrade Stalin are a direct path to the realization of those new grandiose opportunities for expanded socialist reproduction that open up as a result of the victories of continuous collectivization and the elimination of the kulaks as a class, as a result of completing the foundation of the socialist economy of our country .* And in the matter of organizational and economic strengthening of the collective farms, our task now is to develop, on the basis of the six conditions of Comrade Stalin, all those new questions of the organization of collective farm production, which will make it possible to maximize the newly opened opportunities for expanded reproduction not only in rural but also in all national economy.

Comrade Stalin’s speech, as well as his six conditions, concretize the ways in which the eradication of the antithesis between city and village will go further at an accelerated pace. And the task of the whole party, in particular of the upcoming party conferences, is now to ensure the Bolshevik implementation of the problems posed by Comrade Stalin along this path, to launch a struggle for the fulfilment of the national economic plan for 1932, for the completion of the five-year plan in four years.

To do this, we must further strengthen class vigilance in our ranks, intensify the fire on opportunism and rotten liberalism,

strengthen the Marxist-Leninist education of our party members and, under the leadership of the Central Committee, wage an implacable struggle for the purity of the revolutionary banner of Leninist theory. (*The Truth of December 27, 1931*)

## **Comrade Stalin—The Theorist of Bolshevism, The Organiser and Leader of the Victorious Offensive of Socialism on the Whole Front**

*DEAR J.V. STALIN!*

The Moscow III regional and II city conference on behalf of the four hundred thousandth detachment of Bolsheviks, the proletariat and working people of the entire region welcomes you, the leader of the Leninist party and the Comintern, the theorist of Marxism-Leninism, the successor to the great cause of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

Holding high the banner of communism, the party of Lenin grew and strengthened in class battles with the bourgeoisie, in an implacable struggle against enemies within the labour movement, in a struggle on two fronts within the party at all stages of its development.

Our party defended the iron unity of its ranks, defeating counter-revolutionary Trotskyism and right-wing opportunism, thereby ensuring the worldwide historical successes of socialism, inspiring the working people of the whole world to an even more decisive struggle for communism.

We have achieved these successes under your leadership. You led the party and the working class from one victory to another, rallying the ranks of the Bolsheviks around the Leninist Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, of which you have consistently been a member for twenty years.

Our party, faithful to the precepts of Lenin, is building a socialist society. Old tsarist Russia from a backward, unicultural, agrarian country turned into a country of socialist industry, into a country of the largest agriculture. Bolshevism raises giant still untouched strata, innumerable opportunities and wealth of the country.

Heavy industry is expanding and rebuilding. The Soviet Union created a large machine industry, freeing us from foreign dependence

in the technical and economic sense. Dozens of giants of the socialist industry have come and go.

The village, eliminating its age-old backwardness and lack of culture, is taking giant steps forward along the path of socialist reconstruction. The last exploiting class—the kulaks—is being eliminated; the antithesis between the city and the village is being erased.

The material and living conditions of the working people are improving rapidly. On the basis of the decision of the Central Committee, tremendous work is being done to reconstruct the urban economy in the Soviet Union. The Bolsheviks of the city of Moscow, guided by your instructions and with your daily help, fight for the implementation of these decisions, for turning Moscow into the model capital of the proletarian state.

Your leadership of the class battles of the proletariat, your theoretical works are an example of the application of the Marxist-Leninist method of combining theory with socialist practice, an example of concrete leadership.

Under your leadership, the party defeated the bourgeois theory of Trotskyism about the impossibility of the victory of socialism in one country, and dealt a crushing blow to the kulak theories of the right.

Eliminating the kulaks as a class on the basis of continuous collectivization—this slogan, put forward by you and successfully carried out by the party, has world-historical significance and is a gigantic contribution to the treasury of Marxism-Leninism.

Your six historical conditions have become a practical program and a banner of the struggle of millions of working people of our country for a great plan.

The second five-year plan is a gigantic program for building a socialist society in our country, the greatest historical era of mankind. In your second five-year plan, under your leadership, the party and the working class will successfully complete the building of a socialist society.

The faithful stronghold of the Leninist Central Committee - the Moscow organization assures you, Comrade Stalin, that it will continue to be the implacable enemy of right and “left” opportunism, conciliationism and rotten liberalism, an active fighter for socialism, for the world proletarian revolution.

*Long live the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.)!*

*Long live the leader and theorist of Bolshevism, Comrade Stalin!*

*Long live the victory of Leninism throughout the world!*

( *The Truth of January 25, 1932* )

## **X. The Need for an Irreconcilable Fight Against Anti-Marxist Movements**

### **Ideologies Hostile to Communism in the Working Class**

In its struggle with capitalism for the dictatorship of the proletariat, revolutionary communism encounters numerous trends among the working class—movements that express a greater or lesser degree of ideological subordination of the proletariat to the imperialist bourgeoisie or reflect ideological pressure on it from the petty bourgeoisie and philistinism, which at times rebel against the shameful regime of financial capital but not capable of a sustained and scientifically thought-out strategy and tactics of the struggle and to conduct this struggle through severe discipline based on inherent proletariat.

The enormous social power of the imperialist state—with all its auxiliary devices: school, press, theatre, church—primarily affects the existence of *confessional and reformist* movements among the working class, which represent the main obstacle to the socialist revolution of the proletariat.

*Confessional*, religiously coloured trends among the working class are expressed in confessional *trade unions*, often directly associated with the relevant political organizations of the bourgeoisie and adjacent to one or another church organization of the ruling class (Catholic trade unions, Christian youth unions, Jewish Zionist organizations, etc.). All these movements, being the most striking product of the ideological captivity of some layers of the proletariat, are in most cases romantically feudal. Sanctifying religion with holy water for all the vileness of the capitalist regime and terrorizing their flock with the ghosts of afterlife, the leaders of these organizations are the most *reactionary* detachments of the class enemy in the camp of the proletariat.

The commercially cynical and secular imperialist form of subordination of the proletariat to the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie is the modern "*socialist*" *reformism*. Writing off his basic commandments from the tablets of imperialist politics, he now has as his model the consciously anti-socialist and openly counter-revolutionary "American Federation of Labour." The "ideological" dictatorship of the American lackey trade union bureaucracy, which in turn expresses the "ideological" dictatorship of the American dollar, has become through the English reformism and its royal socialists from the "working" party the most important part of the theory and practice of all international social democracy and the leader of the Amsterdam International, moreover the leaders of German and Austrian Social Democracy tint these theories with Marxist phraseology, covering it with their complete betrayal of Marxism. "Socialist" reformism, *against the proletarian revolution*.

In the field of *foreign policy*, the Social Democratic parties, under the banner of "defending the fatherland", actively contributed to the imperialist war. The expansion of the imperialist state and "colonial policy" find every possible support in them; orientation toward the counter-revolutionary "Holy Alliance" of imperialist powers ("League of Nations"), the preaching of "ultra-imperialism", mobilization of the masses under false-pacifist slogans, and at the same time, active support for imperialism in its attacks on the USSR and its impending war against the USSR - these are the main features of the foreign policy of reformism.

In the field of *domestic policy* Social democracy has set as its task direct assistance and direct assistance to the capitalist regime. Full support for capitalist rationalization and stabilization of capitalism, ensuring the class world, "peace in industry"; the policy of growing workers' organizations in the organization of entrepreneurs and the robber imperialist state; the practice of the so-called "economic democracy", which in fact is the practice of complete subordination to trust capital; worship of the imperialist state and especially of its false democratic signs; active construction of the organs of this state: its police, army, gendarmerie, its class court; the defence of this state from any encroachment by the revolutionary communist proletariat and the butcherous role of social democracy in times of revolutionary crises—such is the line of the domestic policy of reformism. While simulating the professional struggle, reformism also sets the main task in this area to conduct this struggle, which would guarantee the capitalist class against all kinds of shocks and, in

any case, ensure the complete inviolability of the foundations of capitalist property.

In the field of *theory* social democracy has completely changed Marxism, passing through the revisionist stage to complete liberal bourgeois reformism and frank social imperialism; she replaced Marx's doctrine of the contradictions of capitalism with bourgeois doctrine of its harmonious development; she handed over the doctrine of crises and the impoverishment of the proletariat to the archive; she turned the formidable and fiery theory of class struggle into the vulgar preaching of the class world; she exchanged the doctrine of aggravation of class contradictions with a philistine fable about the "democratization" of capital; in place of the theory of wars unavoidable under capitalism, it put the bourgeois deception of pacifism and the false preaching of "ultra-imperialism"; she exchanged the theory of the revolutionary collapse of capitalism for a fake coin of "healthy" capitalism, peacefully turning into socialism; she replaced revolution with evolution; the destruction of the bourgeois state—its active construction; the doctrine of proletarian dictatorship—the theory of a coalition with the bourgeoisie; the doctrine of international proletarian solidarity—the doctrine of the defence of imperialist fatherland; the dialectical materialism of Marx—idealistic philosophy and flirting with the religious dregs of the bourgeoisie.

Within this Social-Democratic reformism, a number of trends stand out that are especially characteristic from the point of view of the bourgeois degeneration of Social-Democracy.

"*Constructive socialism*" (McDonald and Co.), in its very name bearing the idea of combating the revolution of the proletariat and a positive attitude towards the capitalist system, continues the liberal-philanthropic anti-revolutionary and bourgeois traditions of Fabianism (spouses Webba, B. Shaw, Lord Oliviere, etc.). Fundamentally denying the dictatorship of the proletariat and the violent means of the struggle against the bourgeoisie, he supports the violent struggle against the proletariat and the colonial peoples. Being an apologist for the capitalist state, preaching, under the guise of socialism, state capitalism, declaring—together with the most vulgar ideologists of imperialism of both hemispheres—the theory of class struggle as a "pre-scientific" theory, "constructive socialism" preaches in words a moderate nationalization program with a ransom, a tax on land rent, inheritance tax and excess profits as a means of destroying capitalism. Being a decisive opponent of the dictatorship of the

proletariat in the USSR, “constructive socialism” in full alliance with the bourgeoisie is an active enemy of the communist movement of the proletariat and colonial revolutions.

A special type of “constructive socialism” is “*koopera-tizm*” or “*co-operative socialism*” (Charles Gide, Totomyants and Co. ), which is also strongly rejects the class struggle and promotes co-operative organization of consumers as a means to peacefully overcome capitalism, in fact greatly promoting its strengthening. “Co-operatism”, which has a broad propaganda apparatus in the face of mass consumer cooperation organizations for daily systematic influence on the masses, is waging a fierce struggle against the revolutionary labour movement, hampering the achievement of its goals, and is now one of the most active factors in the camp of reformist counter-revolution.

The so-called “*guild socialism*”(Penty, Orazh, Hobson, etc.) is an eclectic attempt to combine “revolutionary” syndicalism with bourgeois-liberal Fabianism, anarchist decentralization (“national industrial guilds”) with state-capitalist centralization, and shop-floor limited craftsmanship of the Middle Ages with modern capitalism. Based on the verbal demand for the abolition of the “wage system” as an “immoral” institution, which should be abolished by workers’ control over industry, guild socialism completely bypasses the most important issue, the issue of power. Striving to unite workers, intellectuals and technicians into a federation of national industrial “guilds” and turn these guilds by peaceful means (“control from within”) into industrial management bodies within the framework of a bourgeois state, Guild socialism actually protects this state, obscures its class, imperialist, anti-proletarian character and gives it the place of an “extra-class” representative of the interests of “consumers” as a counterweight to the “producers” organized in the guild. By preaching “functional democracy”, that is, representing the classes of capitalist society, portrayed as professions with their special social production functions, guild socialism paves the way for the “corporate state” of fascism. Denying parliamentarism and at the same time denying “direct action”, most guild socialists doom the working class to complete inaction and passive submission to the bourgeoisie. He thus represents a peculiar trade unionist utopian opportunism and, as such, cannot but play an anti-revolutionary role.

A special form of social democratic reformism is finally *Austro-Marxism*. Being an integral part of the “left” wing of social democracy, Austro-Marxism is the most subtle form of deception of

the working masses. By prostituting Marxist terminology and at the same time decisively breaking with the foundations of revolutionary Marxism (Kantianism, Machism, etc. of the “Austro-Marxists” in the field of philosophy), coquetting with religion, copying off the theory of “functional democracy” from the English reformists, standing on the point of view “ the construction of the republic, “that is, the construction of a bourgeois state, Austro-Marxism recommends” class cooperation “during periods of the so-called” equilibrium of class forces, “that is, just when a revolutionary crisis is brewing. This theory means justifying a coalition with the bourgeoisie to overthrow the proletarian revolution in the guise of defending “democracy” from the attack of reaction. Objectively and in practice violence, tolerated by Austro-Marxism in cases of attack of reaction, turns into violence of reaction against the revolution of the proletariat. The “functional role” of Austro-Marxism is to deceive the workers who are already moving towards communism, and therefore Austro-Marxism is a particularly dangerous enemy of the proletariat, more dangerous than outspoken proponents of robber social-imperialism.

If all these trends, being the constituent parts of “socialist” reformism, are the agents of the imperialist bourgeoisie among the working class, then, on the other hand, communism is confronted with a number of petty-bourgeois trends that reflect and express the stagger of unstable social strata (urban petty bourgeoisie, decaying urban philistinism , lumpen proletariat, declassified intellectual bohemia, impoverished artisans, some sections of the peasantry, etc., etc.). These trends, characterized by extreme political instability, often cover left-wing phraseology with right-wing politics or fall into adventurism, replacing the objective account of forces with loud political gestures, often passing from incredible revolutionary swagger to deepest pessimism and true surrender to the enemy. These currents under certain conditions,

*Anarchism*, the most prominent representatives of which (Kropotkin, Jean Grav etc.) traitorously crossed during the war of 1914-1918. on the side of the imperialist bourgeoisie, denies the need for broad centralized and disciplined organizations of the proletariat and thereby leaves him powerless in the face of powerful capital organizations. Preaching individual terror, he distracts the proletariat from the methods of mass organization and mass struggle. Denying the dictatorship of the proletariat in the name of abstract “freedom”, anarchism deprives the proletariat of the most important and sharpest weapon against the bourgeoisie, its armies, all its repressive

organs. Far from any mass movement in the most important centers of the proletarian struggle, anarchism is increasingly turning into a sect, with all its tactics and all its speeches,

“*Revolutionary*” *syndicalism*, many of whose ideologists moved during the most critical war period to the camp of “anti-parliamentary” counter-revolutionaries of the fascist type or turned into peaceful reformists of a social democratic type, like anarchism, their denial of the political struggle (in particular revolutionary parliamentarism) and the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat, with their preaching of the guild decentralism in the labour movement in general, in the professional movement in particular, by its denial of the party of the proletariat, by its negation is necessary Mosti uprising and its reassessment of the general strike (“crossed arms tactics”) prevents revolutionizing the workers masses wherever it has any influence. His attacks on the USSR, related to the denial of proletarian dictatorship, generally put him on the same level with Social Democracy in this regard.

All these trends and trends converge with *Social Democracy*, this main enemy of the proletarian revolution, the main political issue - the *question of the dictatorship of the proletariat*. Therefore, they all more or less definitely stand in the same front with the Social Democracy against the USSR. On the other hand, social democracy, which has completely and completely changed Marxism, is increasingly based on the ideology of the Fabians, constructive and guild socialists. These trends are turning into the officially liberal-reformist ideology of the bourgeois “socialism” of the Second International.

*In colonial countries* and among oppressed peoples and races in general, communism in the labour movement is confronted with the influence of peculiar currents, which at a certain stage of development played a certain positive role, but which become a reactionary force at a new stage of development.

*Sunniensism* in China was the ideology of petty-bourgeois, populist “socialism.” In the doctrine of the “three principles” (nationalism, democracy, socialism) the concept of the people covered and hid the concept of classes, socialism was not a specific and special mode of production carried out by a special class carrier - the proletariat, but an uncertain social welfare; the struggle against imperialism was not linked to the prospects for the development of the class struggle within the country. Therefore, Sunniensism, having played a huge positive role in the first stage of the Chinese revolution,

as a result of further class differentiation in the country and the further course of the Chinese revolution, has turned from the ideological form of its development into the shackles of this development. The epigones of Sunnienism, in every possible way inflating precisely those ideological traits of it that have become objectively reactionary, thereby turning it into the official ideology of the Kuomintang, which became an open counter-revolutionary force. The ideological growth of the masses of the Chinese proletariat and the working peasantry must, therefore, be accompanied by a decisive struggle against Kuomintang deception and overcoming the remnants of the ideology of Sunnienism.

Such trends as *Gandhism* in India, thoroughly imbued with religious ideas, idealizing the most backward and economically reactionary forms of life, seeing a way out not in proletarian socialism, but in a return to these backward forms, preaching passivity and denial of the class struggle, turn into a process of development of the revolution in open reactionary force. Gandhism is increasingly becoming an ideology directed against the revolution of the masses. It must be the subject of decisive struggle on the part of communism.

*Harvism*, which was formerly the ideology of Negro small proprietors and workers in America, and which still has a certain influence on the Negro masses, has become exactly the same obstacle to the revolutionisation of these masses. Initially advocating the complete social equality of blacks, he turned into a kind of Negro "Zionism", which instead of fighting against American imperialism put forward the slogan: "Back to Africa!" This dangerous ideology, devoid of any truly democratic features, flirting with the aristocratic attributes of the non-existent "Negro kingdom", must meet with fierce resistance, since it does not contribute, but, on the contrary, impedes the mass liberation struggle of blacks against American imperialism.

All these trends are opposed by *proletarian communism*. Being the great ideology of the international revolutionary working class, it differs from all these movements and, above all, from Social Democracy in that, in full agreement with the teachings of Marx and Engels, it wages a theoretical and *practical revolutionary struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, while applying all forms of the proletarian mass action*. (*The program and charter of the Comintern, p. 127-145.*)

## **The Party is Strengthened by Cleansing Itself of Opportunist Elements**

The source of factionalism in the party is its opportunist elements. The proletariat is not a closed class. Immigrants from peasants, philistines, intelligentsia, proletarianised by the development of capitalism, constantly flow to him. At the same time, there is a process of decomposition of the tops of the proletariat, mainly from professionals and parliamentarians, fed by the bourgeoisie at the expense of colonial super-profits. "This layer of bourgeois workers," said Lenin, "or a "labour aristocracy", quite petty bourgeois in their way of life, in terms of earnings, in their entire world outlook, is the main pillar of the Second International, and today the main *social* (not military) *pillar the bourgeoisie*. For these are the real *agents of the bourgeoisie in the labour movement*, the working clerks of the capitalist class, the real vehicles of reformism and chauvinism."

All these petty-bourgeois groups penetrate one way or another into the party, introducing a spirit of hesitation and opportunism, a spirit of corruption and uncertainty. They are mainly the source of factionalism and decay, the source of disorganization and explosion of the party from the inside. To fight imperialism, having such "allies" in the rear, this means getting into the position of people being fired from two sides—both from the front and from the rear. Therefore, the ruthless struggle against such elements, their expulsion from the party is a prerequisite for a successful struggle against imperialism.

The theory of "overcoming" opportunist elements through an ideological struggle within the party, the theory of "getting rid" of these elements within the framework of one party is a rotten and dangerous theory that threatens to doom the party to paralysis and chronic malaise, threatens to give the party to eat opportunism, threatens to leave the proletariat without a revolutionary party threatening to deprive the proletariat of its main weapon in the struggle against imperialism. Our party could not take the road, it could not take power and organize the dictatorship of the proletariat, it could not get out of the civil war as a victor if it had Martov and Danov, Potresovs and Axelrodov in its ranks. If our party managed to create within itself the internal unity and unprecedented cohesion of its ranks, then this is, first of all, because it managed to clear itself from the filth of opportunism in time, she managed to expel the liquidators and the Mensheviks from the party. The path of

development and strengthening of the proletarian parties goes through their purification from opportunists and reformists, social-imperialists and social-chauvinists, social-patriots and social-pacifists. The party is strengthened by cleansing itself of opportunist elements. (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 72-73, ed. 9th, Partizdat, 1932* )

## **To destroy the influence of revisionism on the socialist proletariat**

Individuals “die” so-called natural death, but *ideological and political* currents so to die *can not* . Just as the bourgeoisie does not die until it is overthrown, so the current, nourished and supported by the bourgeoisie, expressing the interests of a group of intellectuals and the aristocracy of the working class that entered into an alliance with the bourgeoisie, will not die if it is not “killed”, that is, not overthrown, not to deprive *all* influence on the socialist proletariat. This trend is strong precisely because of its ties with the bourgeoisie, it has become thanks to the objective conditions of the “peaceful” era of 1871-1914. a kind of commander, a parasitic *layer* in the labour movement.

Here it is imperative not only to “censure”, but to sound the alarm, ruthlessly expose, overthrow, “remove from office” this parasitic layer, destroy its “unity” with the labour movement, for such “unity” means in fact the unity of the proletariat with the national bourgeoisie and *the split of the international proletariat*, the unity of lackeys and the split of revolutionaries. ( *Lenin, Honest Voice of the French Socialist, (1915), Soch., Vol. XVIII , p. 287 - 288, 3rd ed. )*

## **CHAPTER TWO. MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM**

## I. Materialism and idealism

The great fundamental question of any, especially the newest philosophy is the question of the relation of thinking to being. Already from that very distant time, when people, still having no idea about the structure of their bodies and not knowing how to explain dreams [Even now, savages and barbarians of the lower level have the widespread perception that the people who dream of him are souls who leave the body for a while; at the same time, the person who is seen in a dream is held responsible for those of his acts that dreamed of a dreamer. This was noted, for example, by Imturn in 1884 among the Guinean Indians.], They came to the idea that their thinking and sensations are not the activities of their bodies, but special from the body of the soul, which dwells in this body and leaves it at death - already from this time they had to think about the relationship of this soul to the outside world. If at death she separates from the body and continues to live, then there is no reason to invent a special death for her. So the idea of its immortality arose, at that stage of development that did not contain anything comforting in itself, which seemed to be a fatal, absolutely irresistible necessity and very often, for example, among the Greeks, was considered a positive misfortune. The boring idea of personal immortality in general did not grow out of the need for religious consolation, but from that simple circumstance that, once they recognized the existence of the soul, people, due to universal limitations, could not explain to themselves where it was after death. In a similar way, thanks to the personification of the forces of nature, the first gods appeared who, with the further development of religion, more and more became gods not from this world, so far, due to the process of distraction, *Monotheism* is literally monotheism. Monotheistic religion recognizes only one god, like Buddhism, Islam, Christianity.—*Ed* .].

The highest question of all philosophy, the question of the relation of thinking to being, spirit to nature, is rooted, therefore, no less than any religion, in the limited and ignorant representations of the savage. But it could be delivered with all sharpness, it could acquire all its significance only after European humanity woke up from the long winter hibernation of the Christian Middle Ages. Already in medieval scholasticism [*Scholasticism* - in the Middle Ages—the philosophy of the Catholic Church in the service of theology.—*Ed*.] The important question of how thinking relates to

being, the question of what is primary: spirit or nature, this question, to the evil of the church, took a sharper view of the question of whether the world was created by God or he exists from century.

Philosophers divided into two large camps according to how they answered this question. Those who claimed that the spirit existed before nature, and which, therefore, ultimately recognized the creation of the world in one form or another, and among philosophers, for example, Hegel, the creation of the world takes an even more confused and ridiculous appearance than that of the faithful Christians - made up an idealistic camp. Those who considered nature to be primary belong to various schools of materialism.

Idealism and materialism, taken in their original sense, do not mean anything else, and only in this sense are they used here. Below we will see what confusion arises when they are given any other meaning. ( *Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, pp. 18-19, ed. 1932* ).

## **Lenin on two main directions in philosophy**

Throughout the previous exposition, on each of the questions of epistemology raised by us, on each philosophical question posed by the new physics, we traced the struggle of *materialism and idealism*. Behind a bunch of new terminological tricks, behind the litter of the hellieristic scholasticism, always, without exception, we found *two* main lines, two main directions in solving philosophical issues. Whether to take the primary nature, matter, physical, external world—and consider consciousness, spirit, sensation (experience, according to the terminology *widely used* in our time), mental, etc. as secondary, is the fundamental question that *actually* continues to be shared philosophers into *two large camps*. The source of thousands upon thousands of errors and confusion in this sphere is that of the appearance of terms, definitions, scholastic quirks, verbal tricks *are browsing* the two main trends (Bogdanov, for instance, refuses to acknowledge his idealism, because instead of the “metaphysical” you see, the concepts: “nature” and “spirit” he took the “experienced”: physical and mental. The word changed!).

The genius of Marx and Engels consisted in the fact that for a very long period, *nearly half a century*, they developed materialism, further advanced one fundamental trend in philosophy, not stamped on

the repetition had already been solved epistemological issues but consistently - showed *how* necessary carry out *the samematerialism* in the field of social sciences, mercilessly sweeping away, like rubbish, nonsense, pompous pretentious balcony, countless attempts to “open” a “new” line in philosophy, invent a “new” direction, etc. The verbal nature of such attempts, the scholastic game of new philosophical “isms”, the clogging of the essence of the issue with elaborate tricks, the inability to understand and clearly imagine the struggle between the two fundamental epistemological trends—that is what Marx and Engels pursued, poisoned throughout their activity.

˘ We said: almost half a century. In fact, back in 1843, when Marx was just becoming Marx, i.e., the founder of socialism as a science, the founder of *modern materialism*, immeasurably richer in content and incomparably more consistent than all previous forms of materialism,—even at that time, Marx with amazing clarity outlined the root lines in philosophy. C. Grün cites Marx’s letter to Feuerbach on October 30, 1843, where Marx invites Feuerbach to write an article in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* against Schelling. This Schelling is an empty bouncer, writes Marx, with his claims to embrace and surpass all previous philosophical trends. “To the French romantics and mystics, Schelling says: I am a combination of philosophy and theology; To French materialists: I am a union of flesh and ideas; French skeptics: I am a destroyer of dogma...” [*Karl Grün*. “Ludwig Feuerbach in seinem Briefwechsel und Nachlass, sowie in seiner philosophischen Charakterentwicklung”, I Bd., Lpz. 1874, S. 361 (*Karl Grün*, Ludwig Feuerbach in his correspondence...”, vol. I, p. 361, Lpts., 1874—*Ed.*).]. That the “skeptics”, whether they are called Humeans or Kantians (or Machists, in the 20th century), shout against “dogma” and materialism and idealism, Marx already saw then and, not allowing himself to be distracted by one of the thousand scanty philosophical systems, he managed to through Feuerbach, directly embark on the materialistic road against idealism. Thirty years later, in the afterword to the second edition of the first volume of *Capital*, Marx likewise clearly and distinctly contrasts *his materialism with* Hegel’s, that is, the most consistent, the most developed *idealism*, contemptuously removing Kont’s “positivism” and declaring the pitiful epigones of modern philosophers who believe that they destroyed Hegel, in fact, they returned to the repetition of the pre-Hegelian mistakes of Kant and Hume. In a letter to Kugelman dated June 27, 1870, Marx also contemptuously treats “Buchner, Lange, Dühring, Fechner,

etc.” because they failed to understand Hegel’s dialectics and disdain him [For the positivist Beesley, Marx says in a letter dated December 13, 1870: “as a follower of Comte, he cannot help but throw out all kinds of twists” (crotches). Compare this with Engels’ 1891 assessment of positivists á la Huxley.]. Finally, take Marx’s individual philosophical remarks in *Capital* and other writings—you will see an *unchanging* basic motive: insisting on *materialism* and contemptuous ridicule at all obscurations, all confusion, all deviations from *idealism*. In these two fundamental contradictions *all the* philosophical remarks of Marx revolve—from the point of view of professorial philosophy, this “narrowness” and “one-sidedness” also consists in their lack. In fact, this reluctance to reckon with the bastard projects of the reconciliation of materialism and idealism is the greatest merit of Marx, who went *forward* along a sharply defined philosophical path.

In the spirit of Marx and in close collaboration with him, Engels, in all his philosophical works, briefly and clearly contrasts the materialistic and idealistic line on *all* issues, not taking seriously either in 1878, or in 1888, or in 1891. endless attempts to “surpass” the “one-sidedness” of materialism and idealism, to proclaim a *new* line, whatever the “positivism”, “realism” or other professorial charlatanism. All the fight against Dühring, Engels spent *the entire* under the slogan of the consistent implementation of materialism, blaming the materialist Dühring for verbally clogging the essence of the matter, for the phrase, for the methods of reasoning, which express a concession to idealism, the transition to the position of idealism. Either consistent materialism to the end, or the lie and confusion of philosophical idealism—that is the formulation of the question that is given in *each paragraph* of *Anti-Dühring* and which only people with brains already spoiled by reactionary professorial philosophy could not notice. And until 1894, when the last preface to the *Anti-Dühring*, revised by the author and last supplemented, was written, Engels, while continuing to follow both the new philosophy and the new natural sciences, continued with the same determination to insist on his clear and firm position, sweeping away new systems and systems.

That Engels followed the new philosophy is evident from Ludwig Feuerbach. The 1888 preface even speaks of such a phenomenon as the revival of classical German philosophy in England and Scandinavia, while the prevailing neo-Kantianism and Humism in Engels have no other words (both in the foreword and in the text of

the book) except the most extreme contempt. It is quite obvious that Engels, observing the repetition of the old, pre-Hegelian, mistakes of Kantianism and Humeism with *fashionable* German and English philosophy, was ready to wait for good even *from the turn* (in England and Scandinavia) to *Hegel*, hoping that the great idealist and dialectic would help to behold petty idealistic and metaphysical errors.

Without going into consideration of the enormous amount of shades of neo-Kantianism in Germany and of Humeism in England, Engels rejects *from the threshold* their basic deviation from materialism. Engels announces the *whole direction* of both schools as “a *scientific step backwards*.” And how does he assess the undoubtedly “positivist”, from the point of view of current terminology, undoubtedly “realistic” tendency of these New Kantians and Humeans, of which, for example, he could not have known Huxley? That “positivism” and that “realism”, which seduced and seduces an infinite number of confusion, Engels declared *at best a philistine device to secretly smuggle materialism*, publicly spreading it and renouncing it! It’s enough to at least think about *such an* appraisal of Thomas Huxley, a very great scientist and an incomparably more realistic realist and positive positivist than Mach, Avenarius and <sup>about</sup> to understand how contemptuously Engels would have greeted the present infatuation of a group of Marxists “recent positivism” or “latest realism,” and so on. n. ( *Lenin, Materialism and empirio-criticism, Soch., vol. XIII , p. 274 - 277, 3rd ed.*  ).

## II. Forms of idealism

### Subjective idealism

The work of Bishop George Berkeley, published in 1710 under the title “A Treatise on the Foundations of Human Knowledge” [ *George Berkeley. Treatise concerning the Principles of human Knowledge, vol. I of Works, edited by AC Fraser, Oxford 1871. There is a Russian translation ( Berkeley George, A Treatise on the Foundations of Human Knowledge, vol. I. Collected Works, published by Fraser, Oxford, 1871—Ed.).*] Begins the following reasoning: “For anyone who observes *objects* of human cognition, it is obvious that

they are either ideas (ideas) really perceived by the senses, or those that we receive by observing the emotions and actions of the mind, or, finally, ideas formed with the help of memory and imagination ... Through vision I make up ideas about light and about colours, about their various degrees and types. Through touch, I perceive hard and soft, warm and cold, movement and resistance... Smell gives me smells; taste—a sense of taste; hearing—sounds... Since various ideas are observed together with each other, they are denoted by the same name and considered any thing. For example, a certain color, taste, smell, shape, texture is observed connected to go together—they recognize this as a separate thing and denote the word *apple*; other collections of ideas comprise stone, wood, books, and similar sensual things...” (§1).

This is the content of the first paragraph of Berkeley’s work. We need to remember that he puts “hard, soft, warm, cold, colours, tastes, smells” at the base of his philosophy, etc. For Berkeley, things are “collections of ideas”, and with this last word he means just the above, say, qualities or sensations, not abstract thoughts.

Berkeley goes on to say that besides these “ideas or objects of cognition”, there exists something that perceives them—“mind, spirit, soul or *I*” (§ 2). It goes without saying, the philosopher concludes, that “ideas” cannot exist outside the mind that perceives them. To verify this, just think about the meaning of the word: to exist. “When I say that the table on which I write exists, it means that I see and feel it; and if I left my room, I would say that the table exists, meaning that if I was in my room, I could perceive it... “So Berkeley says in § 3 of his work and here but he begins a polemic with people whom he calls materialists (§§ 18, 19, etc.). It’s completely incomprehensible to me, he says, how can one talk about the absolute existence of things without their relation to what anyone perceives them? To exist is to be perceived (their, i.e. things *esse* is *percipi* [— “to exist for them (for things) is to be represented.”—*Ed.*] § 3,—Berkeley’s dictum, quoted in textbooks on the history of philosophy). “In a strange way, the prevailing opinion among people is that at home, mountains, rivers, in a word, sensual things have an existence, natural or real, different from what the mind perceives” (§ 4). This opinion is “a clear contradiction,” says Berkeley, “for what are these above-mentioned objects, if not the things that we perceive through the senses? But what do we perceive if not our own ideas or sensations? and isn’t it really ridiculous that any ideas or feelings, or combinations of them, can exist without being perceived?” (§ 4).

Berkeley now replaces Collections of ideas with an expression equivalent to him: *combinations of sensations* accusing the materialists of the “absurd” desire to go even further, to search for some source for this complex ... that is, for this combination of sensations. In § 5, materialists are accused of fussing with abstraction, for, according to Berkeley, to separate sensation from an object is an empty abstraction. “In fact,” he says at the end of § 5, omitted in the second edition, “the object and the sensation are one and the same thing and therefore cannot be abstracted from one another.” “You will say,” writes Berkeley, “that ideas can be copies or resemblances of things that exist outside the mind in non-thinking substance. I reply that an idea can be nothing but an idea; a color or a figure cannot be anything but a different color, a different figure... I ask if we can perceive these supposed originals or external things, with which our ideas are supposedly pictures or representations, or cannot? If so, then they are the essence of the idea, and we have not moved a single step forward; and if you say no, then I will turn to anyone and ask him if it makes sense to say that the color looks like something invisible; “hard or soft, it’s like something that cannot be felt, etc.” (§ 8).

The “arguments” of Bazarov against Plekhanov on the question of whether things can exist outside of us besides their effect on us, on the hair, as the reader sees, do not differ from Berkeley’s arguments against materialists not named by him. Berkeley considers the idea of the existence of “matter or bodily substance” (§ 9) to be such a “contradiction”, such an “absurdity” that there is nothing to actually waste time refuting it. “But,” he says, “in view of the fact that the tenet on the existence of matter apparently has deep roots in the minds of philosophers and entails so many harmful conclusions, I prefer to seem eloquent and tedious, if only not to omit nothing to completely expose and eradicate this prejudice “(§ 9).

We will now see what harmful conclusions Berkeley speaks of. Let us first finish with his theoretical arguments against the materialists. Denying the “absolute” existence of objects, that is, the existence of things outside of human knowledge, Berkeley expresses directly the views of his enemies in such a way that they do not recognize the “thing in itself.” In § 24, Berkeley writes in italics that this refuted opinion recognizes “*the absolute existence of sensory objects in themselves (objects in themselves) or outside the mind*”(p. 167-168 cit. Ed.). Two main lines of philosophical views are outlined here with the directness, clarity and distinctness that distinguishes philosophical classics from the composers of “new” systems in our

time. Materialism is the recognition of “objects in oneself” or outside the mind; ideas and sensations—copies or reflections of these objects. The opposite doctrine (idealism): objects do not exist “outside the mind”; objects are “combinations of sensations.”

This was written in 1710, that is, 14 years before the birth of Immanuel Kant, and our Machists, on the basis of supposedly “latest” philosophy, made the discovery that the recognition of “things in themselves” is the result of infection or distortion of materialism by Kantianism! The “new” discoveries of the Machists are the result of their striking ignorance in the history of the main philosophical trends.

Their next “new” thought is that the concepts of “matter” or “substance” are the remnants of old uncritical views. Mach and Avenarius, you see, moved philosophical thought forward, deepened analysis and eliminated these “absolutes”, “unchanging essences”, etc. Take Berkeley to check such statements from the source, and you will see that they come down to a pretentious invention. Berkeley quite definitely says that matter is “nonentity” (non-existent entity, § 68), that matter is *nothing* (§ 80). “You can,” Berkeley sneers at the materialists, “if you already feel like it, use the word” matter “in the sense in which other people use the word” nothing “(pp. 196 - 197 cit. Ed.). At first, says Berkeley, they believed that colors, smells, etc., “really exist”, then they abandoned this view and recognized that they exist only depending on our feelings. But this elimination of old erroneous concepts has not been brought to an end: the remainder is the concept of “substance” (§ 73)—the same “prejudice” (p. 195), finally exposed by Bishop Berkeley in 1710! In 1908, we are such jokers who seriously believe Avenarius, Petzoldt, Mach and Co. that only the “latest positivism” and the “latest natural science” have been finalized to eliminate these “metaphysical” concepts.

The same pranksters (including Bogdanov) assure readers that it was the new philosophy that clarified the fallacy of the “doubling of the world” in the teachings of the ever refuted materialists, who talk about some kind of “reflection” by the human mind of things that exist outside of his mind. About this “doubling” by the above-mentioned authors, an abyss of felt words is written. Out of forgetfulness or ignorance, they did not add that these new discoveries were already discovered in 1710.

“Our knowledge of them (ideas or things),” writes Berkeley, “was extremely obscured, confused, and directed toward the most dangerous misconceptions by the assumption of twofold existence of sensory objects, namely: one existence is *intelligible* or existence in

the mind, the other is *real* outside the mind “(i.e. outside the mind). And Berkeley makes fun of this “absurd” opinion, allowing the possibility of thinking the unthinkable! The source of “absurdity” is, of course, the distinction between “things” and “ideas” (§ 87), “the assumption of external objects”. The same source gives rise, as Berkeley discovered in 1710 and rediscovered Bogdanov in 1908, faith in fetishes and idols. ”The existence of matter,” says Berkeley, “or things not perceived, was not only the main pillar of atheists and fatalists, but idolatry in all its various forms rests on the same principle” (§ 94).

Here we came to those “harmful” conclusions from the “absurd” doctrine of the existence of the outside world, which made Bishop Berkeley not only theoretically refute this doctrine, but also passionately pursue his supporters as enemies. ”On the basis of the doctrine of matter or of bodily substance,” he says, “all the godless constructions of atheism and the denial of religion were erected... There is no need to talk about how great atheists have always been material substance. All their monstrous systems are so obvious, so dependent on it, that once this cornerstone is removed, the whole building will inevitably fall apart. We therefore have nothing to pay special attention to the absurd teachings of individual pathetic sects of atheists “(§92, p. 203, 204 cit. Ed.).

“Matter, once it will be expelled from nature, carries with it so many sceptical and godless constructions, such an incredible amount of controversy and confusing questions” (“the principle of saving thought”, discovered by Mach in the 1870s! “Philosophy as thinking about the world according to the principle the least waste of energy “-Avenarius in 1876!),” which were an eyesore for theologians and philosophers; matter inflicted so much fruitless labour on the human race that even if the arguments that we put forward against it were not considered sufficiently evidence-based (as for me, I consider them quite obvious), I’m sure that all friends of truth, of the world and religions have reason to wish these arguments to be considered sufficient”(§ 96).

Frankly reasoned, Bishop Berkeley reasoned rustically! Nowadays, the same thoughts about the “economical” removal of “matter” from philosophy are clothed in a much more cunning and confusing “new” terminology form, so that these thoughts are considered by naive people as “new” philosophy!

But Berkeley not only frank about the trends of his philosophy, but also tried to cover up her idealistic nudity, portray it free from

absurdities and acceptable to “common sense”. Our philosophy, he said, instinctively defending himself from the accusation of what would now be called subjective idealism and solipsism, is our philosophy of “we are not losing any things in nature” (§ 34). Nature remains, there remains the difference of real things from chimeras—only “both of them exist in the same consciousness.” “I do not dispute the existence of any thing that we can learn through feeling or thinking. That the things that I see with my own eyes, touch them with my own hands, exist, really exist, I have no doubt about that. The only thing we deny is that *philosophers* (Berkeley italics) are called matter or bodily substance. Denying it does no harm to the rest of the human race, which, I dare say, will never notice its absence... The atheist really needs this phantom of an empty name to justify his godlessness...” (36).

This idea is even more clearly expressed in § 37, where Berkeley answers the accusation that his philosophy destroys bodily substances: “if the word *substance* is understood in the everyday (vulgar) sense, that is, as a combination of sensory qualities, length, strength, weight etc., then I cannot be blamed for their destruction. But if the word substance is understood in a philosophical sense—as the basis of accidents or qualities (existing) outside of consciousness—then I really admit that I destroy it, if we can talk about the destruction of something that never existed, did not exist even in the imagination.” (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, p. 18-23*).

## **Machism and its criticism by Lenin**

The main premises of the theory of knowledge of Mach and Avenarius openly, simply and clearly stated by them in their first philosophical works. We will turn to these works, postponing until further discussion of the analysis of amendments and erasures, subsequently given by these writers.

“The task of science,” Mach wrote in 1872, “can consist only in the following: 1. To study the laws of the connection between representations (psychology).—2. Discover the laws of the connection between sensations (physics).—3. Clarify the laws of the relationship between sensations and perceptions (psychophysics)” [*E. Mach, Die Geschichte und die Wurzel des Satzes von der Erhaltung der Arbeit*,

Vortrag gehalten in der K. Böhm. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften am 15 November 1871, Prag, 1872, S. 57-58 ( *E. Max* , History and root of the law of conservation of work, Report read in the Royal Bohemian Scientific Society on November 15, 1871, Prague 1872, pp. 57- 58.—*Ed.*).]. This is quite clear.

The subject of physics is the connection between sensations, and not between things or bodies, the image of which is our sensations. And in 1883, in his “Mechanics” Mach repeats the same thought: “Sensations are not” symbols of things. “Rather, a “thing” is a mental symbol for a complex of sensations with relative stability. Not things (bodies), but colours, sounds, pressures, spaces, times (what we usually call sensations) are the real *elements of the world*”[ *E. Mach* , Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung: historisch-kritisch dargestellt, 3 Auflage, Leipzig 1897, S. 473 ( *E. Max* , Mechanics, Historical and Critical Essay on its Development, ed. 3, Leipzig 1897, p. 473.—*Ed.*).].

We will talk about this phrase “elements”, which was the fruit of a twelve-year “reflection”. Now we need to note that Mach here expressly admits that things or bodies are complexes of sensations, and that he quite clearly contrasts his philosophical point of view with the opposite theory, according to which sensations are “symbols” of things (it would be more accurate to say: images or representations of things ) This last theory is *philosophical materialism*.. For example, the materialist Friedrich Engels—the notorious collaborator of Marx and the founder of Marxism— constantly and without exception speaks in his writings about things and their mental images or images (Gedanken-Abbilder), and it is clear by itself that these mental images do not arise other than from sensations. It would seem that this basic view of the “philosophy of Marxism” should be known to everyone who speaks of it, and especially to anyone who appears in the press *on behalf of* this philosophy. But in view of the extraordinary confusion introduced by our Machists, we have to repeat the well-known. Unveiling the first paragraph of the “Anti-Duhring” and read: “... things and their mental mapping...” [ *Fr. Engels*, Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft, 5 Auflage, Stuttgart 1904, S. 6 ( *F. Engels*, Anti-Dühring, Guise, p. 6, 1928—*Ed.*).]. Or the first paragraph of the philosophical department: “Where does these principles come from thinking?” (we are talking about the basic principles of all knowledge). “From yourself? No ... Thinking can never draw and derive forms of being from itself, but only from the outside world ... Principles are not the starting point of research “(as

Dühring, who wants to be a materialist, but does not know how to conduct materialism consistently), “And its final result; these principles do not apply to nature and to human history, but abstract from them; not nature, not humanity, is consistent with principles, but, on the contrary, principles are true only insofar as they correspond to nature and history. This is the only materialist view of the subject, and Dühring’s opposite view is the idealistic view, turning the actual relationship upside down, *ibid.* , p. 21). And this “solely materialistic view” Engels holds, we repeat, everywhere and without exception, mercilessly pursuing Dühring for the most deviation from materialism to idealism. Anyone who reads *Anti-Dühring* and Ludwig Feuerbach with a drop of attention will come across dozens of examples when Engels talks about things and their images in the human head, in our consciousness, thinking, etc. Engels does not say that sensations or representations are the “symbols” of things, for consistent materialism should put here “images”, paintings or displaying the “symbol” in place, as we will show in detail in our place. But now we are talking not about a particular formulation of materialism at all, but about the opposition of materialism to idealism, about the difference between the two main *lines* in philosophy. From things to go to sensation and thought? Or from thought and sensation to things? The first, i.e. materialistic, line is held by Engels. The second, i.e. idealistic, line is held by Mach. No evasions, no sophisms (of which there are many more) will not eliminate the clear and undeniable fact that E. Mach’s teaching about things as complexes of sensations is subjective idealism, is simply chewing Berkeley. If bodies are “complexes of sensations,” as Mach says, or “combinations of sensations,” as Berkeley said, then it inevitably follows that the whole world is only my idea. On the basis of such a premise, it is impossible to come to the existence of other people except himself: this is pure solipsism. Oddly renounce Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and but in reality without glaring logical absurdities they cannot get rid of solipsism. To clarify even more clearly this basic element of the philosophy of Machism, we give some additional quotes from the works of Mach. Here is a sample from the “Analysis of Sensations” (Russian translation of Kotlyar, published by Skrymunt, M. 1907):

“Before us is a body with a point S. When we touch the point, we bring it into contact with our body, we get an injection. We can see the tip without feeling a prick. But when we feel the injection, we will find the tip. Thus, the visible tip is a *permanent core*, and the injection is something random, which, depending on the

circumstances, may not be associated with the core. With the increase in similar phenomena, they finally get used to considering *all the* properties of bodies as “actions” emanating from the constants of such nuclei and produced on our *Self* through the medium of our body —“actions”, which we call “*sensations*”... “(p. twenty).

In other words: people “get used” to stand on the point of view of materialism, to consider sensations as the result of the action of bodies, things, nature on our senses. This harmful “habit” for philosophical idealists (acquired by all humanity and all natural sciences!) Is extremely disliked by Mach, and he begins to destroy it:

“... But with this, these nuclei lose all their sensual content, becoming bare abstract symbols”...

Old buzz, the most honourable professor! This is a literal repetition of Berkeley, who said that matter is a bare abstract symbol. But Ernst Mach actually walks naked, for if he does not recognize that the “sensual content” is objective reality, independent of us, then he remains with one “naked abstract” *I*, certainly large and italic written *I* = “Crazy piano, imagining that it alone exists in the world.” If the “world of senses” of our sensations is not the outside world, then nothing exists, except for this naked *I*, engaged in empty “philosophical” twists. Stupid and barren occupation!

“... Then it is true that the world consists only of our sensations. But then we *only* know our sensations, and the assumption of those nuclei, as well as the interaction between them, the fruit of which are only sensations, is completely idle and superfluous. This view can only be good for *half* realism or *half* criticism.”

We wrote out the entire 6th paragraph of Mach’s “anti-metaphysical remarks.” This is pure plagiarism at Berkeley. Not a single thought, not a single glimpse of thought, except that “we feel only our sensations.” From this—only one conclusion, namely—that “the world consists only of *my* sensations.” The word “ours”, set by Mach instead of the word “mine,” was delivered illegally by him. With this word Mach reveals the very “half-heartedness” in which he blames others. For if the “assumption” of the outside world is “idle”, the assumption that the needle exists independently of me and that interaction occurs between my body and the tip of the needle, if all this assumption is truly idle and unnecessary, “then it is idle and unnecessary, above all, “Assuming” the existence of other people. Only *I* exist, and all other people, like the whole outside world, fall into the category of idle “nuclei”. One cannot speak of “*our*” sensations from this point of view, and since Mach speaks of

them, this only means his egregious half-heartedness. It only proves that his philosophy is idle and empty words that the author himself does not believe in.

Here is a particularly graphic example of Mach's half-heartedness and confusion. In § 6 XI of the same "Analysis of Sensations" we read: "If, while I was feeling something, I myself or someone else could observe my brain using all kinds of physical and chemical means, then to determine what processes occurring in the body are associated with a certain kind of sensation..." (p. 197).

Very well! So, our sensations are associated with certain processes occurring in the body in general and in our brain in particular? Yes, Mach quite definitely makes this "assumption"—it would be wise not to do it, from the point of view of natural science. But excuse me—after all, this is the very "assumption" of those very "nuclei and the interaction between them", which our philosopher declared unnecessary and idle! Bodies, we are told, are complexes of sensations; to go further than this, Mach assures us, to consider sensation as the product of the action of bodies on our senses is metaphysics, idle, excessive assumption, etc., according to Berkeley. But the brain is the body. So, the brain is also no more than a complex of sensations. It turns out that with the help of a complex of sensations I (and I also nothing but a complex of sensations) I feel complexes of sensations. The beauty of what philosophy! First, declare the sensations "real elements of the world" and build on this "original" Berkeleyism, and then secretly push through the opposite views that sensations are associated with certain processes in the body. Are these "processes" related to the metabolism between the "organism" and the outside world? Could this metabolism occur if sensations of a given organism did not give it an objectively correct idea of this external world?

Mach does not pose such uncomfortable questions for himself, comparing mechanically scraps of Berkeleyism with the views of natural science, spontaneously standing on the point of view of the materialist theory of knowledge... "Sometimes they also ask a question," Mach writes in the same paragraph, "does not" feel "matter (inorganic)... "So, about what *organic* matter feels, there is no question? So sensation is not something primary, but is one of the properties of matter? Mach jumps over all the absurdities of Berklianism! ... "This question," he says, "is quite natural, if we start from the usual, widespread physical ideas, according to which matter represents that *immediate* and undoubtedly given *realon* which

everything, both organic and inorganic, is built ... “Let us remember well this truly valuable Mach’s recognition that ordinary and widespread *physical* ideas consider matter to be immediate reality, and only one kind of this reality (organic matter) has a clearly expressed property to feel ... “After all, in this case,” Mach continues, “in a building made of matter, the sensation must appear somehow suddenly, or it must exist in the very foundation of this building, so to speak. From *our* point of view, this issue is fundamentally false. For us, matter is not the first given. Such primary data are rather *elements* (which in a certain sense are called sensations)”...

So, the primary data are sensations, although they are “associated” only with certain processes in organic matter! And, speaking of such absurdity, Mach, as it were, blames materialism (the “usual, widespread physical idea”) for the unresolved issue of where the sensation “arises” from. This is an example of the “denials” of materialism by the fideists and their henchmen. Does any other philosophical point of view “solve” the question for the solution of which insufficient data has yet been collected? Doesn’t Mach himself say in the same paragraph: “as long as this task (to solve,” how far the sensations extend in the organic world “) is not resolved in any special case, it is impossible to solve this question”?

The difference between materialism and “Machism” comes down, therefore, on this issue to the following. Materialism, in full agreement with natural science, takes for this primary matter, considering consciousness, thinking, sensation secondary, for in a clearly expressed form, sensation is associated only with higher forms of matter (organic matter), and “in the foundation of the building of matter” one can only assume the existence of ability similar to sensation. Such is the assumption, for example, of the famous German naturalist Ernst Haeckel, the English biologist Lloyd Morgan, and others, not to mention the didro guess we cited above. Machism stands on the opposite, idealistic point of view and immediately leads to nonsense, because, firstly, the primary sensation is taken contrary to that it is connected only with certain processes in a certain way of organized matter; and, secondly, the basic premise that bodies are complexes of sensations is violated by the assumption of the existence of other living beings and generally other “complexes”, besides this great *I am*.

The word “element”, which many naive people take (as we shall see) for some novelty and some discovery, actually only confuses the question with an unspoken term, creates a false appearance of some

kind of resolution or step forward. This appearance is false, because in reality it remains to investigate and investigate how matter, supposedly not sensing at all, is connected with matter made of the same atoms (or electrons) composed and at the same time possessing a clearly expressed ability of sensation. Materialism clearly poses an unresolved issue and pushes to its resolution, pushes to further experimental research. Machism, that is, a kind of confused idealism, clogs up the question and takes it aside from the right path by means of an empty verbal twist: “element”. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII , p. 32 - 37, ed. 3rd* ).

## **Sensation is the Direct connection of Consciousness with the Outside World**

For any naturalist who is not confused by professorial philosophy, as well as for any materialist, sensation is really a direct connection of consciousness with the outside world, it is the transformation of the energy of external irritation into a fact of consciousness. Each person has watched this transformation millions of times and is indeed observing it at every step. The sophism of idealistic philosophy is that sensation is not accepted as a connection of consciousness with the outside world, but as a partition, a wall separating consciousness from the outside world - not as an image of an external phenomenon corresponding to the sensation, but as “the only thing”. Avenarius gave only a slightly altered form to this old sophism, worn out by Bishop Berkeley. Since we do not yet know all the conditions of the connection we constantly observe with a certain way organized matter,

In order to put an end to the characterization of the basic idealistic premises of empirio-criticism, we briefly indicate the English and French representatives of this philosophical movement. About the Englishman Karl Pearson, Mach bluntly says that he “agrees with his epistemological (erkenntniskritischen) views in all essential points” (“Mechanics”, p. IX cited ed.). C. Pearson, in turn, agrees with Mach [ *Karl Pearson , The Grammar of Science 2-nd ed., Lond. 1900, p. 326. ( C. Pearson , Grammar of Science, p. 326, 2nd ed., London 1900—Ed..)*]. For Pearson, “real things” are “sense impressions”. All recognition of things beyond the sensory perceptions Pearson declares metaphysics. With materialism (not

knowing neither Feuerbach nor Marx-Engels) Pearson fights in the most decisive manner—the arguments do not differ from those discussed above. But Pearson is alien to such an extent any desire to fake materialism (a specialty of the Russian Machians), Pearson is so inconsiderate that, without inventing “new” nicknames for his philosophy, he simply declares his views as well as Mach , “*Idealistic*” (p. 327 cit. Ed.)! Pearson directly leads his pedigree from Berkeley and Hume. Pearson’s philosophy, as we will see below, is much more complete and thoughtful than Mach’s philosophy...

## **“Discovery of the Elements of the World”**

Under this title, he writes of Mach Assistant Professor, University of Zurich, Friedrich Adler, perhaps the only German writer who also supplement Marx Machism [ *Friedrich the W. Adler* , Die Entdeckung der Weltelemente (Zu E. Machs, 70. Geburtstag), Der Kampf, 1908, Nr. 5 (Februar). ( *Adler Fr.* , Discovery of the Elements of the World. On the occasion of Mach’s seventieth birthday, “Struggle” No. 5 for 1908 (February).—*Ed.*) Translated to The International Socialist Review No. 10 for 1908 (April) (International Socialist Review “No. 10 of 1908 (April).—*Ed.*). One article of this Adler has been translated into Russian in the collection Historical Materialism.]. And we must give justice to this naive privat-docent that he, with his innocence, renders a disservice to Machism. The question is posed at least clearly and sharply: did Mach really “discover the elements of the world”? Then, of course, only completely backward and ignorant people can still remain materialists. Or is this discovery a return of Mach to old philosophical errors?

We saw that Mach in 1872 and Avenarius in 1876 stand on a purely idealistic point of view; for them, the world is our sensation. Mach’s Mechanics was published in 1883, and in the preface to the first edition Mach refers precisely to Avenarius’ Prolegomes, welcoming the “extremely close” (sehr verwandte) to his philosophy of thought. Here is the reasoning in this “Mechanics” about elements: “All natural science can only depict (nachbilden und vorbilden) complexes of those *elements* , which we usually called *sensations*. It is about the connection of these elements. The

connection between A (heat) and B (fire) belongs to *physics*, the connection between A and N (nerves) belongs to *physiology*. Neither connection exists *separately*. both exist together. Only for a while can we be distracted from one or the other. Even, apparently, purely mechanical processes are thus always physiological “(p. 498 cit. German edition). The same thing in “Analysis of sensations”: “... Where next to the expressions: “element”, “complex of elements” or instead of them are used the notation: “sensation”, “complex of sensations”, you should always keep in mind that the elements are *sensations only* in this *connection*” (namely: the connections of A, B, C with K, L, M, that is, the connections of “complexes, which are usually called bodies”, with “the complex that we called our body”), “In this *respect*, in this *functional dependence*. In another functional dependence, they are at the same time physical objects” (Russian translation, p. 23 and 17). *Color* is a *physical object* if, for example, we pay attention to its dependence on the light source illuminating it (other colors, heat, space, etc.). But if we pay attention to its *dependence* on the *retina* (elements K, L, M ...), we have before us a *psychological object*, a *sensation*” (ibid., P. 24).

So, the discovery of the elements of the world is that

- 1) everything that exists is declared sensation;
- 2) sensations are called elements;
- 3) the elements are divided into physical and mental; the latter is something that depends on the nerves of a person and generally on the human body: the first is independent;
- 4) the connection of physical and the connection of psychic elements is declared non-existent separately from one another; they exist only together;
- 5) only temporarily can one be distracted from one or another connection;
- 6) the “new” theory is declared devoid of “one-sidedness” [Mach in “Analysis of sensations”: “Elements are *usually called sensations*. In view of the fact that this *name* implies a definite *one-sided theory*, we prefer to speak briefly about the elements” (27-28)].

There is really no one-sidedness here, but there is the most incoherent confusion of opposing philosophical points of view. Since you proceed *only* from sensations, you do not correct the “one-sidedness” of your idealism with the word “element”, but only confuse the matter, hide cowardly from your own theory. In words, you eliminate the antithesis between the physical and the psychic [“The antithesis between the *Self and the world, sensation or*

*appearance and thing then disappears*, and the whole thing comes down only to the *combination of elements*” (“Analysis of Sensations”, p. 21).], Between materialism (which takes for the primary nature, matter) and idealism (which takes for the primary spirit, consciousness, sensation)—in reality you immediately restore this opposite, restore it secretly, retreating from your main premise. For, if the elements are sensations, then you are not entitled to accept for a second the existence of “elements” *regardless* from my nerves, from my mind. And since you admit such physical objects that are independent of my nerves and of my sensations that give rise to sensation only by acting on my retina, you shamefully leave your “one-sided” idealism and go over to the point of view of “one-sided” materialism! If color is a sensation only depending on the retina (as natural science forces you to admit), then, therefore, the rays of light falling on the retina produce a sensation of color. So, outside of us, independently of us and from our consciousness, there is a movement of matter, say, waves of ether of a certain length and a certain speed, which, acting on the retina, produce a sensation of one color or another in a person. So it is natural science that looks. It explains the various sensations of one color or another with different wavelengths of light, existing outside the human retina, outside of man and independently of him. This is materialism: matter, acting on our senses, produces sensation. Sensation depends on the brain, nerves, retina, etc., i.e., on a certain way of organized matter. The existence of matter is independent of sensation. Matter is primary. Sensation, thought, consciousness is the highest product of a specially organized matter. Such are the views of materialism in general and of Marx-Engels in particular. Mach and Avenarius consciousness is the highest product of a specially organized matter. Such are the views of materialism in general and of Marx-Engels in particular. Mach and Avenarius consciousness is the highest product of a specially organized matter. Such are the views of materialism in general and of Marx-Engels in particular. Mach and Avenarius *secretly* smuggling materialism through the word “element”, which *supposedly* saves their theory from the “one-sidedness” of subjective idealism, *supposedly* allows the psychic to be dependent on the retina, nerves, etc., to allow the physical to be independent of the human body. In fact, of course, the trick with the word “element” is the most miserable sophism, for the materialist, reading Mach and Avenarius, will immediately raise the question: what are the “elements”? It would be childish, in fact, to think that by inventing a new word, one can get

rid of the main philosophical trends. Or the “element” is a *sensation* , as all empirio- *critics* say, and Mach, and Avenarius, and Petzoldt [*Joseph Petzoldt*, Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung, Bd. I, Leipz. 1900, S. 113. “Elements are sensations in the usual sense of simple, further indecomposable perceptions” (Wahrnehmungen). (*I. Petzoldt*, Introduction to the Philosophy of Pure Experience, vol. I, Leipzig 1900, p. 113.—*Ed* .).], Etc.,—then your philosophy, gentlemen, is *idealism* , trying in vain to cover up its nakedness solipsism an outfit of more “objective” terminology. Either the “element” is not a sensation, and then *exactly no thought* is connected with your “new” word , then it is simply important with a dummy. (*Lenin*, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, *Op.*, Vol. XIII , p. 41-42, 43-45, ed. 3rd ).

## **Sensation is a Subjective Image of the Objective World**

There is nothing else but a rephrasing of subjective idealism in the studied teachings of Mach and Avenarius. Their claims that they had risen above materialism and idealism, eliminated the opposite of the point of view that goes from a thing to consciousness, and the point of view opposite this is an empty claim of renewed Fichteanism. Fichte also imagines that he “inextricably” connected “I” and “environment”, consciousness and the thing, as if he “solved” the issue by reference to the fact that a person cannot jump out of himself. In other words, Berkeley’s argument is repeated: I only feel my sensations, I have no right to assume “objects by themselves” outside my sensation. Different ways of expressing Berkeley in 1710, Fichte in 1801, Avenarius in 1892 - 1894. do not change the essence of the matter, that is, the basic philosophical line of subjective idealism. The world is my sensation; not—I “Relies” (created, produced) by our selves; a thing is inextricably linked with consciousness; the inextricable coordination of our *selves* and the environment is empirio-critical principle coordination; it’s all the same situation, the same old trash with a slightly tinted or repainted sign.

The reference to “naive realism”, supposedly defended by such a philosophy, is *sophism* of the cheapest property. The “naive realism” of any healthy person who has not visited the madhouse or the science

of idealist philosophers is that things, the environment, the world exist *independently* of our sensations, of our consciousness, of our *I* and of man in general. The very *experience* (not in the Machist, but in the human sense of the word) that created an unshakable conviction in us that other people exist *independently* of us, and not simple complexes of my sensations of high, low, yellow, solid, etc., this very *experience* creates our belief that things, the world, the environment exist independently of us. Our sensations, our consciousness is only an *image of the* external world, and it is clear by itself that the display cannot exist without the displayed, but the displayed exists independently of the display. The “naive” conviction of humanity is *consciously* laid by materialism at the basis of its theory of knowledge. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, p. 56, ed. 3rd*).

## **Subjective idealism leads to solipsism**

We have seen that the starting point and basic premise of the philosophy of empirio-criticism is subjective idealism. The world is our sensation, this basic premise, obscured, but not changed at all by the word “element”, theories of the “independent series”, “coordination” and “introjection”. The absurdity of this philosophy lies in the fact that it leads to solipsism, to the recognition of the individual philosophizing individual as existing. But our Russian Machians assure the reader that Mach’s “accusation” of “idealism and even solipsism” is “extreme subjectivity”. So says Bogdanov in the preface to the “Analysis of Sensations” (p. XI) and the whole Machist company repeats this in many ways.

Having examined what disguises solipsism are Mach and Avenarius, we must now add one thing: the “extreme subjectivism” claims lies entirely on the side of Bogdanov and <sup>about</sup>, for in philosophical literature writers of the most diverse trends long ago discovered fundamental sin of Machism beneath all its disguises. We confine ourselves to a simple *set of* opinions that sufficiently show the “subjectivity” of our Machians’ *ignorance*. At the same time, we note that almost all philosophers-experts sympathize with different types of idealism: in their eyes, idealism is not at all reproached, as for us Marxists, but they state the *real* Mach’s philosophical trend, contrasting one system of idealism with another, also idealistic,

system that seems more consistent to them. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII , p. 76 - 77, ed. 3rd*).

## **Bogdanov's Philosophy — Subjective Idealism**

"I personally," Bogdanov writes to himself, "so far I know in literature only one empirio-monist—a certain A. Bogdanov; but then I know him very well and I can guarantee that his views completely satisfy the sacramental formula of the primacy of "nature" over "spirit". Namely, he considers everything that exists as a continuous chain of development, the lower links of which are lost in the "chaos of the elements", and the highest, known to us, links represent the *experience of people* (Bogdanov's italics)—"mental" and—even higher—physical experience, and this experience and the knowledge that arises from it corresponds to what is commonly called the "spirit." ("Emp.", III, XII).

As a "sacramental" formula, Bogdanov makes fun of Engels's position known to us, which, however, he diplomatically circumvents! We do not disagree with Engels, nothing like that...

But take a closer look at this summary by Bogdanov himself of his notorious "empiriomonism" and "substitution". The physical world is called *human experience*. and it is declared that physical experience is "higher" in the chain of development than mental. Why, this is blatant nonsense! And nonsense is just that which is characteristic of all and every idealistic philosophy. This is directly comic, if Bogdanov also brings a similar "system" to materialism: my nature is primary, my spirit is secondary. If the definition of Engels is applied in this way, then Hegel is also a materialist, because he also has psychic experience (under the name of an absolute idea) before, then follows the "physical world", nature and, finally, the knowledge of a person who cognizes an absolute idea through nature. In this sense, no idealist will deny the primacy of nature, for in reality it is not primacy, in fact, nature does not *directly* given, for the starting point of epistemology. In fact, a long transition *through the abstractions of the "psychic"* leads to nature . It doesn't matter how to call these abstractions: whether it is an absolute idea, universal *I*, world will, etc., etc. This distinguishes between *varieties of idealism*, and there are innumerable varieties of such varieties. The essence of

idealism is that the primary point is the psychic; nature is derived from it, *and then* from human nature the ordinary human consciousness. This original “psychic” always therefore turns out to be a *dead abstraction*, covering up liquefied theology. For example, everyone knows what a human *idea* is. but an idea without man and before man, an idea in abstraction, an absolute idea is the theological invention of the idealist Hegel. Everyone knows what a human sensation is, but a sensation without a person, before a person, is nonsense, a dead abstraction, an idealistic twist. It is such an idealistic twist that Bogdanov does when he creates the following stairs:

- 1) The chaos of the “elements” (we know that no other human concept than *sensations* is hidden behind this word “element”).
- 2) The mental experience of people.
- 3) The physical experience of people.
- 4) “The knowledge arising from it.”

There are no sensations (human) without a person. So, the first step is a dead idealistic abstraction. In fact, we are faced here with not familiar and ordinary *human* sensations, but some kind of fictional, *nobody’s* sensations, sensations *in general*, divine sensations, as Hegel’s ordinary human idea became divine, once it was torn from the person and from the human brain.

Down with the first step.

Down with the second one too, because not a single person knows the *mental to the* physical (and the second stage is *before* Bogdanov’s third), does not know natural science. The physical world existed before the psychic could appear, as the highest product of higher forms of organic matter. The second step of Bogdanov is also a dead abstraction, there is a thought without a brain, there is a human mind divorced from man.

Now, if you throw away both first steps at all, then, and only then, can we get a picture of the world that truly corresponds to natural science and materialism. Namely: 1) the physical world exists *independently* of human consciousness and existed long *before* a person, *before* any “human experience”; 2) the psychic, consciousness, etc., is the highest product of matter (i.e., physical), is the function of that particularly complex piece of matter, which is called the human brain.

“The region of substitution,” writes Bogdanov, “coincides with the region of physical phenomena; nothing is required to substitute for psychic phenomena, for these are immediate complexes “(XXXIX).

This is idealism, for the psychic, that is, consciousness, representation, sensation, etc., is taken for the *immediate*, and the physical is derived from it, substituted for it. The world is the *non-Self* created by our *Self*, “Fichte said. The world is an absolute idea, said Hegel. Peace is a will, said Schopenhauer. The world is a concept and a representation, “says the immanent of Remke. Being is consciousness, says the immanent Schuppe. The physical is the substitution of the mental, “says Bogdanov. One must be blind so as not to see the same idealistic essence in different verbal outfits.

“Let us pose such a question,” writes Bogdanov in I issue. “Empiriomonism”, pp. 128-129,—what is a “living being”, for example, “man”? And he answers: “Man” is, first of all, a certain complex of “direct experiences”. Note: “*first of all*”! “*Then*, in the further development of experience, the “man” turns out to be for himself and for others a physical body in a series of other physical bodies.

After all, this is a continuous “complex” of nonsense, suitable only for deducing the immortality of the soul or the idea of God, etc. A person is, first of all, a complex of direct experiences and a physical body *in further development*! This means that there are “immediate experiences” *without* a physical body, *up to* a physical body. What a pity that this magnificent philosophy has not yet reached our theological seminaries; there they would be able to appreciate all its advantages.

“... We recognized that the” physical nature “itself is a *derivative* (Bogdanov’s italics) of complexes of a direct nature (which include” psychic “coordination), that it is a reflection of such complexes in others, analogous to them, only of the most complex type (in the socially organized experience of living beings) “(p. 146).

A philosophy that teaches that physical nature itself is a derivative is the purest philosophy of clericalism. And such a character of her does not change at all from the fact that Bogdanov himself intensely renounces all religion. Dühring was also an atheist; he even proposed to ban religion in his “socialist” system. Nevertheless, Engels was quite right when he showed that Dühring’s “system” does not make ends meet without religion. The same is with Bogdanov, with the significant difference that the given place is not an accidental inconsistency, but the essence of his “empiriomonism” and all of his “substitution”. If nature is a derivative, then it is clear by itself that it can only be derived from something that is bigger, richer, wider, more powerful than nature,

from something that exists, because in order to “produce” nature , one must exist independently of nature. So there is something *outside of* nature and, moreover, *producing* nature. In Russian, it is called a god. Ideal philosophers have always tried to change this last name, to make it more abstract, foggy and at the same time (for credibility) closer to the “psychic”, as the “direct complex”, as directly given, which does not require proof. Absolute idea, universal spirit, world will , “*universal substitution*” Mental under physical, is the same idea, only in different formulations. Every person knows—and natural science explores—the idea, spirit, will, psychic, as a function of a normally working human brain; tearing this function away from organized matter in a certain way, turning this function into a universal, universal abstraction, “substituting” this abstraction for the whole physical nature is the nonsense of philosophical idealism, this is a mockery of natural science.

Materialism says that the “socially organized experience of living beings” is a derivative of physical nature, the result of its long development, development of a state of physical nature when neither sociality, organization, experience, nor living things could exist. Idealism says that physical nature is a derivative of this experience of living beings, and, saying this, idealism equates (if not submits) nature to God. For God is undoubtedly a derivative of the socially organized experience of living beings. No matter how you twirl Bogdanov’s philosophy, it contains absolutely nothing but reactionary confusion.

It seems to Bogdanov that to speak of the social organization of experience is “cognitive socialism” (III book, p. XXXIV). These are crazy trifles. The Jesuits, so to speak about socialism, are ardent supporters of “cognitive socialism,” for the starting point of their epistemology is a deity, as “a socially organized experience.” And undoubtedly, Catholicism is a socially organized experience; it only reflects not objective truth (which Bogdanov denies and which science reflects), but the exploitation of popular darkness by certain social classes.

What Jesuits! We find Bogdanov’s “cognitive socialism” entirely from the immanentists beloved by Mach. Leclair sees nature as a consciousness of the “human race” (Der Realismus etc., S. 55), and not a separate individual at all. Bourgeois philosophers will present you with such Fichtean cognitive socialism as much as you like. Schuppe also emphasizes the *das generische, das gattungsmässige Moment des Bewusstseins* (cp. S. 379 - 380 in V. fw

Ph., XVII vol.), That is, the general, generic moment in cognition. To think that philosophical idealism disappears from replacing the individual's consciousness with the consciousness of humanity, or the experience of one person by socially organized experience, is like thinking that capitalism disappears from replacing one capitalist with a joint-stock company.

Our Russian Machists, Yushkevich and Valentinov, repeated for the materialist Rakhmetov that Bogdanov was an idealist (while cursing Rakhmetov in a hooligan way). But they failed to think about where this idealism came from. It turns out that Bogdanov is an individual phenomenon, an accident, a separate incident. It is not true. It may seem to Bogdanov personally that he invented the "original" system, but it is enough to compare it with Mach's students mentioned above to see the falsity of such an opinion. The difference between Bogdanov and Cornelius is much smaller than the difference between Cornelius and Carus. The difference between Bogdanov and Kapus is less (from the philosophical system, not the consciousness of the reactionary conclusions of course) than between Karus and Tsigen, etc. Bogdanov is only one of the manifestations of that "socially organized experience", which indicates the growth of Machism in idealism. Bogdanov (we are talking, of course, *exclusively* about Bogdanov as a philosopher) God could not have been born if there were no "elements" in the teachings of his teacher Mach... Berklianism. And I can't imagine a more "terrible revenge" against Bogdanov, as if his "Empiriomonism" had been translated into German, say, the language and given for review to Leclair and Schubert-Soldern, Cornelius and Kleinpeter, Karus and Pilon (a French employee and pupil Renouvier). These notorious comrades-in-arms and partly direct followers of Mach would say more with their kisses at the address of "substitution" than with their reasoning.

However, Bogdanov's philosophy could hardly be considered as a complete and motionless system. For nine years, from 1899 to 1908, Bogdanov went through four stages of his philosophical wandering. At first he was a "natural-historical" (that is, half-unconscious and spontaneously faithful to the spirit of natural science) materialist. "The basic elements of a historical view of nature" bear obvious traces of this stage. The second step is Ostwald's "energy", fashionable at the end of the 1890s, that is, confused agnosticism, stumbling in some places into idealism. From Ostwald (on the cover of Ostwald's Lectures on Natural Philosophy: "Dedicated to E. Mach"), Bogdanov went over to Mach, that is, he adopted the basic

premises of subjective idealism, inconsistent and confused, like Mach's whole philosophy. Fourth stage: attempts to remove some of the contradictions of Machism, to create a semblance of objective idealism. The Theory of General Substitution shows that Bogdanov described the arc almost exactly 180 °, starting from his starting point. Is this stage of Bogdanov's philosophy farther from dialectical materialism, or closer than the previous stages? If he stands in one place, then, of course, further. If he continues to move forward along the same curved line that he had been moving for nine years, then closer: he needs now *only* one serious step to turn back to materialism, namely, to universally throw out its universal substitution. For this universal substitution also collects together, in one Chinese braid, all the sins of half idealism, all the weaknesses of consistent subjective idealism, like (si licet parva componere magnis! - if you can compare the small with the great) - as Hegel's "absolute idea" brought together all the contradictions of Kantian idealism, all the weaknesses of Fichteanism. Feuerbach *could only* one serious step to turn back to materialism: namely, to universally throw out, absolutely remove away the absolute idea, this Hegelian "substitution of the psychic" for the physical nature. Feuerbach cut off the Chinese braid of philosophical idealism, that is, took nature as a basis without any "substitution."

We will wait and see how long the Chinese braid of Machist idealism will grow. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Op., Vol. XIII, p. 185-190, ed. 3rd.*)

## **Empiriomonism recognizes the identity of thinking and being**

Bogdanov, objecting to Plekhanov, wrote in 1906: "... I cannot recognize myself as a Machist in philosophy. In the general philosophical conception, I took only one thing from Mach - the idea of the neutrality of the elements of experience in relation to the "physical" and "mental", about the dependence of these characteristics only on the *connection of* experience "(Empiriomonism, Prince III, p. XLI, St. Petersburg. 1906). It's the same as if a religious person said: I can't recognize myself as a supporter of religion, because I took "only one" from these supporters: faith in God." "Only one", taken by Bogdanov from Mach, is the *main mistake* Machism, the basic

incorrectness of this whole philosophy. Bogdanov's departures from empirio-criticism, to which Bogdanov himself attaches great importance, are in fact completely secondary and do not go beyond the detailed, particular, individual differences between the various empirio-critics approved by Mach and endorsed by Mach (more on this below). Therefore, when Bogdanov was angry that he was being confused with the Machists, he only discovered that he did not understand the *fundamental* differences between materialism and what is common to Bogdanov and all other Machians. It is not that important how Bogdanov developed or how he corrected, or how Machism worsened. The important thing is that he left the materialistic point of view and thereby condemned himself inevitably to confusion and idealistic wanderings.

In 1899, as we saw, Bogdanov stood on the correct point of view when he wrote: "The image of the person standing before me, directly given to me by sight, is a sensation" ["Basic Elements of a Historical View of Nature," p. 216. Cf. the above quotes.]. Bogdanov did not bother to give critics of this old view. He took a word, blindly believed Mach and began to repeat after him that the "elements" of experience were neutral in relation to the physical and mental. "As revealed by the latest positive philosophy, elements of mental experience," wrote Bogdanov in the book. I "Empiriomonism" (p. 90, 2nd ed.), Are identical with elements of all experience in general, as they are identical with elements of physical experience. "Or in 1906 (Prince III, p. XX): "and as for" idealism, "is it possible to speak about it only on the basis of this is where the real source of all the philosophical misadventures of Bogdanov is the source that he shares with all Machians. One can and should speak of idealism when sensations recognize as "elements of physical experience" (that is, the physical, external world, matter) as identical, because this is nothing more than Berklianism. There is no trace here either of the latest, or positive philosophy, or an indisputable fact; there is simply an old, old idealistic sophism. And if you ask Bogdanov how he can prove this "indisputable fact" that it is physical with sensations, you will not hear a single argument, except for the eternal refrain of idealists: I only feel my sensations;"Evidence of self-identity" (die Aussage des Selbstbewusstseins—by Avenarius in the Prolegomenes, p. 56 of the second German edition, § 93); or: "in our experience" (speaking, that "we are sensing substances") "sensation is given to us more reliably than substantiality" (ibid., p. 55, § 91), etc., etc., etc. For "an undoubted fact" Bogdanov accepted (believing Mach) a reactionary

philosophical twist, for in fact not a single fact has been and cannot be given that would refute the view of sensation as an image of the external world, a view shared by Bogdanov in 1899 and shared by natural science according to this time. Physicist Mach, in his philosophical wanderings, went completely away from “modern natural science,” - we will have to talk a lot more later about this important circumstance, unnoticed by Bogdanov. ( for in fact not a single fact has been and cannot be given which would refute the view of sensation as an image of the external world—a view shared by Bogdanov in 1899 and shared by natural science by now. Physicist Mach, in his philosophical wanderings, went completely away from “modern natural science,”—we will have to talk a lot more later about this important circumstance that was not noticed by Bogdanov. (for in fact not a single fact has been and cannot be given which would refute the view of sensation as an image of the external world—a view shared by Bogdanov in 1899 and shared by natural science by now. Physicist Mach, in his philosophical wanderings, went completely away from “modern natural science,”—we will have to talk a lot more later about this important circumstance that was not noticed by Bogdanov. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII , pp. 47-48, ed. 3rd* )

## **marxist Approach to the Assessment of Empirio-Criticism**

From four points of view, a Marxist should approach the assessment of empirio-criticism.

First and foremost, it is necessary to compare the theoretical foundations of this philosophy and dialectical materialism. Such a comparison, to which the first three chapters were devoted, shows *on the whole line of* epistemological questions the *continuous reactionary* nature of empirio-criticism, which covers with old twists, words and tricks the old mistakes of *idealism and agnosticism* . Only with absolute ignorance regarding what philosophical materialism is in general and what the dialectical method of Marx and Engels is, can one speak of the “connection” of empirio-criticism with Marxism.

Secondly, it is necessary to determine the place of empirio-criticism, as one very small school of specialist philosophers, among the other philosophical schools of our time. Starting with Kant, both Mach and Avenarius went from him not to materialism, but in the

opposite direction, to Hume and to Berkeley. Imagining that he “purifies experience” in general, Avenarius in fact cleared only agnosticism from Kantianism. The whole school of Mach and Avenarius is moving towards idealism more and more definitely, in close unity with one of the most reactionary idealistic schools, the so-called immanentists.

Thirdly, it is necessary to take into account the undoubted connection of Machism with one school in one branch of modern science. On the side of materialism, the vast majority of natural scientists invariably stand both in general and in this special branch, namely: in physics. A minority of new physicists, under the influence of breaking old theories by the great discoveries of recent years, under the influence of the crisis of new physics, which especially showed the relativity of our knowledge, slipped, due to ignorance of dialectics, through relativism to idealism. The fashionable physical idealism of our days is the same reactionary and the same short-term hobby as the fashionable physiological idealism of the recent past.

Fourth, behind the epistemological scholasticism of empirio-criticism, one cannot help but see the struggle of parties in philosophy, a struggle that ultimately expresses the tendencies and ideology of the hostile classes of modern society. The latest philosophy is just as partisan as it was two thousand years ago. The struggling parties, in fact, covered by the heraldic-quack new nicknames or the meager non-partisanship, are materialism and idealism. The latter is only a refined, refined form of fideism, which is fully armed, has huge organizations and continues to steadily influence the masses, turning the slightest wobble of philosophical thought to its advantage. The objective, class role of empirio-criticism is wholly reduced to the servitude of fideists in their struggle against materialism in general and against historical materialism in particular. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII , pp. 29-292, ed. 3rd* )

## **Kant’s Dualistic Philosophy**

The main feature of Kant's philosophy is the reconciliation of materialism with idealism, a compromise between the one and the other, a combination of heterogeneous, opposite philosophical trends in one system. When Kant admits that something outside of us, some thing in himself, corresponds to our ideas, then Kant is a materialist. When he declares this thing in himself unknowable, transcendental, otherworldly, Kant acts as an idealist. Recognizing the only source of our knowledge of experience, sensations, Kant directs his philosophy along the line of sensualism, and through sensualism, under certain conditions, and materialism. Recognizing the a priori of space, time, causality, etc., Kant directs his philosophy towards idealism. For this half-heartedness, Kant mercilessly waged a struggle with him and consistent materialists and consistent idealists (as well as "pure" agnostics, Humeans). The materialists blamed Kant for his idealism, refuted the idealistic features of his system, proved the knowability, all-roundness of a thing in itself, the absence of a fundamental difference between it and phenomenon, the need to derive causality, etc., not from the a priori laws of thought, but from objective reality. Agnostics and idealists blamed Kant for his assumption of a thing in himself as a concession to materialism, "realism" or "naive realism", and the agnostics rejected, except the thing in himself, a priori, and idealists demanded a consistent deduction from pure thought not only of a priori forms contemplation, and of the whole world in general (stretching the thinking of man to the abstract. The materialists blamed Kant for his idealism, refuted the idealistic features of his system, proved the knowability, all-roundness of a thing in itself, the absence of a fundamental difference between it and phenomenon, the need to derive causality, etc., not from the a priori laws of thought, but from objective reality. Agnostics and idealists blamed Kant for his assumption of a thing in himself as a concession to materialism, "realism" or "naive realism", and the agnostics rejected, except the thing in himself, a priori, and idealists demanded a consistent deduction from pure thought not only of a priori forms contemplation, and of the whole world in general (stretching the thinking of man to the abstract. The materialists blamed Kant for his idealism, refuted the idealistic features of his system, proved the knowability, all-roundness of a thing in itself, the absence of a fundamental difference between it and phenomenon, the need to derive causality, etc., not from the a priori laws of thought, but from objective reality. Agnostics and idealists blamed Kant for his assumption of a thing in himself as a concession to materialism,

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When I read the assurances of our Machists that they are much more consistent and decisive than some obsolete materialists criticize Kant, it always seems to me that Purishkevich came into our company and shouts: I have criticized the Cadets much more consistently and decisively than you, gentlemen Marxists ! There are no words, Mr. Purishkevich, people consistent in politics can and will always criticize the Cadets from diametrically opposite points of view, but

one should not forget that you criticized the Cadets for being *too* democrats, and we for them that they are *not* democrats *enough*. The Machists criticize Kant for being too materialistic, and we criticize him for being insufficiently materialistic. The Machians criticize Kant on the right, and we on the left.

In the history of classical German philosophy, the Yumist Schulze and the subjective idealist Fichte serve as examples of the first kind of criticism. As we have seen, they are trying to etch the “realistic” elements of Kantianism. Just as Kant himself was criticized by Schulze and Fichte, so are German neo-Kantians of the second half of the 19th century. criticized Humean empirio-critics and subjective idealistic immanentists. The same line of Hume and Berkeley appeared in a slightly updated verbal garb. Mach and Avenarius rebuked Kant, not because he was not real enough, not materialistic enough about the thing in himself, but because he *allowed* her existence;—not because he refuses to deduce the causality and necessity of nature from objective reality, but because he generally admits any causality and necessity (except perhaps purely “logical”). The immanentists kept pace with empirio-critics, criticizing Kant also from the Humean and Berkeley point of view. For example, Leclair in 1879, in the very composition in which he praised Mach as a remarkable philosopher, reproached Kant for “inconsistency and suppleness (Connivenz) towards realism”, expressed in the concept of “*things in themselves*”, this “nominal remainder ( Residuum) from vulgar realism (“ Der Real. Der mod. Nat. Etc.”, S. 9) [“Realism of modern natural science, etc.”]. — *Red.*]. Leclair calls materialism vulgar realism—“so that it is stronger”. “In our opinion,” Leclair wrote, “all those components of Kant theory that gravitate towards realismus vulgaris, as an inconsistency and a zwitterhaft product from the point of view of idealism, should be eliminated” (41). The “inconsistencies and contradictions” in Kant’s teachings stem from “the mixing (Verquickung) of idealistic criticism with the unsurpassed remnants of realistic dogma” (170). Realistic dogma calls Leclair materialism.

Another immanent, Johann Remke, reproached Kant for *realistically* isolating himself from Berkeley (Johannes Rehmke: *Die Welt als Wahrnehmung und Begriff*, S. 9, Brl. 1880) [ *I. Remke* , *The World as a Representation and concept*, p. 9, Berlin, 1880—*Ed.*].

“Kant’s philosophical activity was essentially polemical in nature: through the thing in himself he directed his philosophy against

German rationalism” (that is, against the old fideism of the 18th century), “and through pure contemplation against English empiricism” (25). “I would compare the Kantian thing in itself with the moving trap set above the pit: the thing will look innocently and safely, and if you step on it, and suddenly fall into the abyss of *peace in yourself*” (27). That is why Kant’s associates of Mach and Avenarius, the immanent, do not like Kant: for he is approaching in some ways to the “abyss” of materialism!

And here is a sample of criticism of Kant on the left. Feuerbach reproaches Kant not for “realism,” but for “idealism,” calling his system “idealism based on empiricism” (Werke, II, 296).

Here is a particularly important discussion of Feuerbach about Kant. “Kant says: if we consider the objects of our senses as simple phenomena,—as they should be considered—then we recognize that the basis of the phenomena is a thing in itself, although we don’t know how it is structured by itself, but we know only its phenomena, that is, the way in which our feelings are affected (afflicted) is an unknown something. Consequently, our mind thereby accepts the being of phenomena, also recognizes the being of things in itself; and to the extent that we can say that to imagine such entities that underlie phenomena, that is, which are only mental entities, is not only permissible, but also necessary... “Having chosen such a place from Kant, where the thing in itself is considered simply as a mental thing, mental essence, and not reality, Feuerbach directs all his criticism to this. “... Consequently,—he says,—objects of feelings, objects of experience are for the mind only appearances, not truth...”. “Thought entities, you see, are not real objects for the mind! Kantian philosophy is a contradiction between subject and object, essence and existence, thinking and being. Here the essence goes to the mind, existence to the senses. Existence without essence “(that is, the existence of phenomena without objective reality)” is a simple phenomenon—these are sensual things; an entity without existence is a mental entity, essence and existence, thinking and being. Here the essence goes to the mind, existence to the senses. Existence without essence” (that is, the existence of phenomena without objective reality)” is a simple phenomenon—these are sensual things; an entity without existence is a mental entity, essence and existence, thinking and being. Here the essence goes to the mind, existence to the senses. Existence without essence” (that is, the existence of phenomena without objective reality)” is a simple phenomenon — these are sensual things; an entity without existence is a mental entity,

nouns; they can and should be thought, but they lack existence—at least for us—lack of objectivity; they are things in themselves, true things, but they are not real things... What a contradiction: to separate truth from reality, reality from truth! “(Werke, II, S. 302-303). Feuerbach reproaches Kant not for allowing things in himself, but for not allowing them to be reality, that is, objective reality, for believing them to be a simple thought, “mental entities,” not “entities possessing existence”, that is, real, really existing. Feuerbach reproaches Kant for deviating from materialism.

“Kantian philosophy is a contradiction,” Feuerbach wrote on March 26, 1858 to Bolin, “it leads with the inevitable necessity to Fichte’s idealism or to sensualism”; the first conclusion “belongs to the past”, the second— “to the present and the future” (Grün, I. S., II, 49). We have already seen that Feuerbach defends objective sensualism, i.e., materialism. The new turn from Kant to agnosticism and idealism, to Hume and Berkeley, is undoubtedly *reactionary* even from Feuerbach’s point of view. And his ardent follower, Albrecht Rau, who, along with Feuerbach’s merits, adopted his flaws, surpassed by Marx and Engels, criticized Kant entirely in the spirit of his teacher: “Kant’s philosophy is amphibole (ambiguity), it is both materialism and idealism, and in this dual nature is the key to its essence. As a materialist or empiricist, Kant cannot shy away from recognizing being outside of us (Wesenheit). But as an idealist, he could not get rid of the prejudice that the soul is something completely different from sensual things. There are real things and a human spirit that comprehends these things. How does this spirit approach things completely different from it? Kant’s evasion is as follows: the spirit has known a priori knowledge, thanks to which things should appear to him as they appear to him. Therefore, the fact that we understand things the way we understand them is our creation. For the spirit that lives in us is nothing but the spirit of God, and just as God created the world out of nothing, so the human spirit creates something from things that these things themselves do not consist of. In this way, Kant guarantees their real things as “things in themselves.” Kant needs a soul, for immortality is a moral postulate for him.” “A thing in itself, gentlemen,” says Rau at the Neo-Kantians in general and the confusion of A. Lange, who falsified the “History of Materialism,” in particular, is what separates Kant’s idealism from Berkeley’s idealism: it forms a bridge from idealism to materialism. - Such is my criticism of Kantian philosophy, and let him refute this criticism, who can “(87- 88).” For a materialist, distinguishing a priori knowledge

from” a thing in itself “is completely superfluous: he never breaks constant connections in nature, does not consider matter and spirit to be fundamentally different things, but only sides of the same thing, and therefore does not need in no special kunshtyuki to bring the spirit closer to things “(88-89) [*Albrecht Rau* , Ludwig’s Philosophie Feuerbach, Die Naturforschung und die philosophische Kritik der Gegenwart, Leipzig 1882, S. 87-89. ( *A. Pay* ., Feuerbach philosophy study nature and philosophical criticism present, Leipzig, 1882, page 87-89.—*Ed.*)].

Further, Engels, as we have seen, reproaches Kant for being an agnostic, and not for retreating from consistent agnosticism. ( *Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII* , p. 162-166, 3rd ed. )

## **Turning “Things in Ourselves” into “Things for Us”**

“Modern philosophical spiritualism,” says L. Feuerbach, “calling himself idealism, makes materialism the following reproaching, in his opinion, reproach: materialism is dogmatism, that is, it proceeds from the sensible (sinnlichen) world, as from indisputable ( ausgemacht), objective truth, considers it to be the world in itself (an sich), that is, existing without us, whereas in reality the world is only a product of the spirit “(Sammtliche Werke, B. X, S. 185.1866) [ Collected Works, vol. X, p. 185.—*Ed.*].

Does that seem clear? The world in itself is a world that exists *without us*. This is Feuerbach’s materialism, as the materialism of the 17th century, disputed by Bishop Berkeley, consisted in the recognition of “objects in themselves” that exist outside of our consciousness. Feuerbach’s “An sich” (in itself or “in itself”) is directly opposite to Kant’s An sich: recall the above quote from Feuerbach, who accuses Kant that for him the “thing in itself” is an “abstraction without reality”. For Feuerbach, the “thing in itself” is an “abstraction with reality”, that is, the world existing outside of us, quite cognizable, not fundamentally different from “appearance”.

Feuerbach very wittily and vividly explains how absurd it is to accept some kind of “transcendence” from the world of phenomena to the world in oneself, some kind of intolerable abyss created by priests

and adopted by professors of philosophy. Here is one such explanation:

“Of course, works of fantasy are also works of nature, for the power of fantasy, like all other human powers, is, in the last analysis (zuletzt), based on its origin, the power of nature, but nevertheless man is a creature different from the sun, the moon and stars, from stones, animals and plants, —in a word, from all those creatures (Wesen), which he designates with the general term: nature,—and, therefore, the representations (Bilder) of man about the sun, moon and stars and about all other creatures of nature (Naturwesen), although these ideas are works of nature, but *other* works that differ from their objects in nature “(Werke, B. VII, S. 516, Stuttg. 1903) [Works, vol. VII, p. 516. Stuttgart, 1903. - *Ed.*].

The objects of our ideas are different from our ideas, the thing in itself is different from the thing for us, for the latter is only a part or one side of the first, as man himself is only one particle of nature reflected in his ideas.

“... My taste nerve is the same product of nature as salt, but it doesn't follow that the taste of salt itself, as such, is an objective property of it—that what salt is (ist) only as an object of sensation it was also in itself (an und für sich), so that the sensation of salt on the tongue was a property of salt, as we think without sensation (des ohne Empfindung gedachten Salzes)...” (516). A few pages earlier: “Bitterness, like taste, is the subjective expression of the objective property of salt” (514).

Sensation is the result of the impact of an objectively existing thing within us on our senses, this is Feuerbach's theory. Sensation is the subjective image of the objective world, the world an und für sich.

“... So man is a creature of nature (Naturwesen), like the sun, star, plant, animal, stone, but nevertheless he is different from nature and, therefore, nature in the head and in the heart of man is different from nature outside the human head and outside the human heart “(516).

“... Man is the only thing in which, as the idealists themselves admit, the requirement of” the identity of the subject and the object “is fulfilled; for a man is that object whose equality and unity with my being is beyond any doubt ... But is not one person for another, even for the closest, an object of fantasy, an object of representation? Does everyone not understand the other person in their own sense, in their own way (in und nach seinem Sinne)? ...” (517). And even if between man and man, between thinking and thinking, there is such a

difference that cannot be ignored, how much more should there be a difference between the non-thinking, non-human, non-identical with us being in itself (Wesen an sich) and the same being as we think, imagine and understand him?" ( *ibid.* , p. 518).

Every mysterious, tricky, ingenious difference between a phenomenon and a thing in itself is pure philosophical nonsense. In fact, every person has seen the simple and obvious transformation of "a thing in itself" into a phenomenon, "a thing for us," millions of times. This transformation is knowledge. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. X III , pp. 96 - 98, ed. 3rd.*)

## **Natural Science Rejects the Kantian "Thing in Itself"**

The form of development of natural science, as it thinks, is a *hypothesis* . A new fact is discovered, making the previous way of explaining facts related to the same group unsuitable. From this moment, a need arises for new methods of explanation, based first only on a limited number of facts and observations. Further experimental material leads to the purification of these hypotheses, eliminates some of them, corrects others, until, finally, the law is established in its purest form. If we wanted to wait until the material for the law was cleaned up, then we would have to postpone theoretical research until that moment, and for this alone we would never get the law.

The number and change of hypotheses crowding out each other, in the absence of logical and dialectical training among natural scientists, makes them easily aware that we are unable to cognize *essence* things (Galler and Goethe). This is not unique to natural science alone, since all human knowledge develops along a very complicated curve, and theories supplant each other also in the historical sciences, including philosophy - on the basis of which, however, no one will conclude that, for example, formal logic - this is nonsense. The final form of this view is the "thing in itself". This statement that we are unable to know a thing in ourselves (Heg., *Enz.*, § 44), firstly, moves from science to the realm of fantasy, and secondly, it does not add anything to our scientific knowledge, for if we are not capable to do things, they don't exist for us, and, thirdly, it's a bare, never-used phrase. Abstractly speaking, it sounds quite

intelligible. But let them try to apply it. What to think of a zoologist who would say: the dog has, *it seems to* have four legs, but we don't know if it actually has four million legs, or no legs at all? About mathematics, which first defines a triangle as a figure with three sides, and then declares that it does not know if it has 25 sides?  $2 \times 2 =$  seems 4? But naturalists are wary of using the phrase about things in themselves in natural science, allowing it only when they look into the field of philosophy. This is the best proof of how lightly they treat her, and what insignificant value it has in itself. If they took her seriously, then a *quoi bon* to study anything at all? From a historical point of view, this problem can have a certain meaning: we can only know under the conditions given by our era and as *much as these conditions allow*. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 6-7, Partizdat, 1932*)

## Hegel's objective idealism

Just as in France of the 18th century, in Germany of the 19th century. the philosophical revolution served as an introduction to political collapse. But how dissimilar these philosophical revolutions are! The French are waging an open war with all official science, with the church, often also with the state; their works are printed on the other side of the border in Holland or in England, and they themselves often move to the Bastille [The *Bastille* is a state prison for political prisoners in Paris, in pre-revolutionary France. In the days of the French Revolution, it was taken by storm by the rebellious people (July 14, 1789), and then destroyed.—*Red.*]. On the contrary, the Germans are professors, state appointed mentors of youth; their works—approved by the leadership of the leadership, and the Hegelian system, the crown of all philosophical development,—to a certain extent even elevated to the rank of royal-Prussian state philosophy. And behind these professors, in their pedantically dark words, in their clumsy, boring periods, was the revolution hiding ?! But weren't the people who were then considered representatives of the revolution—the liberals—the most ardent opponents of this philosophy, which filled human heads with fog. However, that which neither the government nor the liberals noticed was already seen in 1833 by at least one person; it was called, however, Heinrich Heine [Engels means the articles of the famous German poet Heine “On Germany”, where he, setting out for the

French public the history of the culture of the German people (in three parts: 1) before Luther; 2) from Luther to Kant; 3) from Kant to Hegel), gave a description of German philosophy and the role that it once performed. *MEd.*].

Take an example. None of the philosophical propositions was the subject of such appreciation on the part of short-sighted governments and such anger on the part of no less short-sighted liberals as Hegel's famous position: "Everything real is rational; all reasonable is really." "After all, it was obviously an excuse for everything that existed, philosophical coverage of despotism, the police state, administrative arbitrariness, censorship. So thought Frederick William III; so his subjects thought. But Hegel does not have everything that exists, without further deceitfulness also true. Attribute [*Attribute* is a property of an object, not separable from the object itself, inextricably linked with it. For example, dialectical materialism considers movement one of the main attributes of matter without movement.—*Red.*] of reality belongs to him only to what is necessary at the same time. "In its development, reality is a necessity." This or that governmental measure,—Hegel himself takes as an example a "well-known tax"—is therefore not recognized by him at all, therefore, without far-sightedness for something real. But in the final analysis, the necessary also turns out to be reasonable, and when applied to the then Prussian state, the Hegelian position was reduced, therefore, only to the following: this state is as reasonable, as consistent with reason as it is necessary. And if it seems to us unsuitable, but meanwhile continues to exist, despite its worthlessness, then the unsuitability of the government is explained and justified by the corresponding unsuitability of the subjects. The then Prussians had the kind of government they deserved.

So, reality does not at all represent an attribute inherent in a given social or political order under all circumstances and at all times. On the contrary. The Roman Republic was valid, but the Roman Empire, which replaced it, was also valid. The French monarchy became so invalid in 1789, that is, to such an extent deprived of all necessity, to such an extent unreasonable that it should have been destroyed by the great revolution, of which Hegel always speaks with the greatest enthusiasm. Thus, here the monarchy turned out to be invalid and the revolution real. And in exactly the same way, as it develops, everything that was previously valid becomes invalid, loses its necessity, its right to exist, its rationality. The place of a dying reality is occupied by a new one, viable reality, takes peacefully, if the old is

judicious enough to die without resistance,—forcibly, if it resists this necessity. Hegel’s dialectic turns, therefore, the Hegelian thesis under consideration into its direct opposite: everything real in the field of human history turns out to be unreasonable over time, it is therefore unreasonable by virtue of its definition; burdened with unreasonableness in advance; and everything that is in the human heads of the rational will necessarily become valid, no matter how much it contradicts the existing apparent reality. According to all the rules of the Hegelian method of thinking, the thesis proclaiming the rationality of everything real turns into another thesis: everything that exists is worthy of death, to die without resistance, forcibly if it resists this necessity. Hegel’s dialectic turns, therefore, the Hegelian thesis under consideration into its direct opposite: everything real in the field of human history turns out to be unreasonable over time, it is therefore unreasonable by virtue of its definition; burdened with unreasonableness in advance; and everything that is in the human heads of the rational will necessarily become valid, no matter how much it contradicts the existing apparent reality. According to all the rules of the Hegelian method of thinking, the thesis proclaiming the rationality of everything real turns into another thesis: everything that exists is worthy of death. to die without resistance, forcibly if it resists this necessity. Hegel’s dialectic turns, therefore, the Hegelian thesis under consideration into its direct opposite: everything real in the field of human history turns out to be unreasonable over time, it is therefore unreasonable by virtue of its definition; burdened with unreasonableness in advance; and everything that is in the human heads of the rational will necessarily become valid, no matter how much it contradicts the existing apparent reality. According to all the rules of the Hegelian method of thinking, the thesis proclaiming the rationality of everything real turns into another thesis: everything that exists is worthy of death. the Hegelian thesis under consideration is in its direct opposite: everything that is real in the field of human history turns out to be unreasonable over time, it is therefore unreasonable by virtue of its definition; burdened with unreasonableness in advance; and everything that is in the human heads of the rational will necessarily become valid, no matter how much it contradicts the existing apparent reality. According to all the rules of the Hegelian method of thinking, the thesis proclaiming the rationality of everything real turns into another thesis: everything that exists is worthy of death. the Hegelian thesis under consideration is in its direct opposite: everything that is real in the field of human history turns out

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But it was precisely in this that the true meaning and revolutionary nature of Hegelian philosophy consisted (of which we shall confine ourselves here as the final phase of the philosophical movement from the time of Kant), that it once and for all put an end to all thoughts about the final nature of the results of human thinking and action. The truth that philosophy should have known was no longer presented to Hegel in the form of a collection of ready-made dogmatic provisions that could only be memorized once they were open; the truth now lay in the process of cognition, in the long historical development of science, rising from the lower levels of knowledge to higher, but never reaching a point from which, having found the so-called absolute truth, it could no longer go further and where it could not remain would have nothing more how idly to contemplate with enthusiasm this acquired absolute truth [Engels has here in mind the metaphysical understanding of absolute truth as complete, exhaustive, unchanging knowledge for all time.—*Red.*]. And so—not only in philosophical, but also in any other knowledge, but also in the field of practical action. History can stop just as little as knowledge; she will never receive final completion in some perfect, perfect state of society; a perfect society, a perfect “state”, these are things that can exist only in fantasy. All social orders, successive one after another, are only passing stages of the endless development of human society from the lowest to the highest. Each step is necessary, and thus has its justification at that time and under the circumstances to which it owes its origin. But it becomes shaky and loses its justification in the face of new higher conditions, gradually developing in its own bowels. It

must give way to a higher stage, which in turn also falls into decay and perishes. Dialectical philosophy destroys all ideas about the ultimate, absolute truth and the absolute relations of people corresponding to it in the very same way as the bourgeoisie, through large-scale industry, competition and the world market, practically destroys all stable, consecrated institutions for centuries. For dialectical philosophy there is nothing once and for all final, absolute, holy. On everything and in everything she finds the seal of imminent disappearance, and nothing can resist her, except for the continuous process of formation and destruction, the endless ascent from the lowest to the highest. She herself is only a reflection of this process in the thinking brain. She, without a doubt, has a conservative side: each given step in the development of knowledge of social relations is justified by it due to the circumstances of a given time, but no more. Her conservatism is relative, her revolutionary character is unconditional—this is the only unconditional, for which she leaves a place.

We do not need to consider here how this worldview corresponds to the current state of the natural sciences, which the earth itself predicts possible, and its habitability is undoubted, the end and thereby say that human history will have not only an ascending, but also a descending branch. But we are, in any case, still pretty far from the turning point beyond which the movement of social history will begin from top to bottom, and we cannot demand Hegelian philosophy to deal with the issue that has not yet been put on the forefront of modern science.

However, it is necessary to note the following here: the above views are stated by us much more sharply than they are stated by Hegel. This is the conclusion to which his method inevitably leads; but this conclusion was never made by himself with such clarity. And that is understandable. Hegel was forced to build a system, and the philosophical system, according to the old established custom, had to end with an absolute truth of one kind or another. And the same Hegel, who in his “Logic” pointed out that eternal truth in reality is nothing but the logical process itself, that is, it means the historical process—the very same Hegel sees himself forced to put an end to this process, since he had to finish his system on something. In Logic he can make this end a beginning again, because there is a final point, an absolute idea [Under this concept, Hegel hides the concept of God.*Red.*],—absolute only insofar as he could absolutely not say anything about it, “finds itself”, that is, it turns into nature, and then in

spirit, that is, in thinking and in history,—again returns to herself. But at the end of all philosophy there was only one way left for such a return to the beginning. It was necessary to imagine the end of history this way: humanity comes to the knowledge of this particular absolute idea and announces that this knowledge has been achieved by Hegelian philosophy. But this meant proclaiming as absolute truth all the dogmatic content of Hegel's system and thereby contradicting his dialectical method, destroying everything dogmatic. This meant strangling the revolutionary side under the weight of the excessively overgrown conservative side. And not only in the field of philosophical knowledge, but also in relation to historical practice. Humanity, which in the person of Hegel has come to the knowledge of an absolute idea, should have come forward so far in the practical field that it has already become possible for him to carry out an absolute idea into reality. The absolute idea was not to, therefore, present too broad political demands to their contemporaries. That is why we at the end of the Philosophy of Law learn that the absolute idea must be realized in that monarchy limited by estate, which Frederick William III so stubbornly and so vainly promised his subjects, that is, it would be limited and moderate, indirect domination of the propertied classes, adapted to the then petty-bourgeois relations of Germany. And besides, the necessity of the nobility is also proved to us there by speculative means. in the practical field, it had to be so far advanced that it was already possible for him to put an absolute idea into reality. The absolute idea was not to, therefore, present too broad political demands to their contemporaries. That is why we at the end of the Philosophy of Law learn that the absolute idea must be realized in that monarchy limited by estate, which Frederick William III so stubbornly and so vainly promised his subjects, that is, it would be limited and moderate, indirect domination of the propertied classes, adapted to the then petty-bourgeois relations of Germany. And besides, the necessity of the nobility is also proved to us there by speculative means. in the practical field, it had to be so far advanced that it was already possible for him to put an absolute idea into reality. The absolute idea was not to, therefore, present too broad political demands to their contemporaries. That is why we at the end of the Philosophy of Law learn that the absolute idea must be realized in that monarchy limited by estate, which Frederick William III so stubbornly and so vainly promised his subjects, that is, it would be limited and moderate, indirect domination of the propertied classes, adapted to the then petty-bourgeois relations of Germany. And

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So, already the internal needs of the system alone sufficiently explain why the highly revolutionary method of thinking led to a very peaceful political conclusion. However, we owe the specific form of this conclusion to the fact that Hegel was German and, like his contemporary Goethe, a decent philistine. Hegel, like Goethe, was in his area a real Zeus-Olympian, but neither one nor the other could completely get rid of the spirit of German philistinism.

All this did not prevent, however, Hegelian philosophy from embracing an incomparably wider area than any previous system, and

from developing in this area the still striking wealth of thoughts. *Phenomenology of the Spirit* [Title of one of Hegel's first major works. - *Red.*] (which could be called a parallel of embryology and palaeontology of the spirit, the development of individual consciousness at its various levels, considered as an abridged reproduction of the steps historically passed by the human consciousness), logic, philosophy of nature, philosophy of spirit, developed in its separate historical divisions: philosophy history, law, religion, the history of philosophy, aesthetics, etc.,—in each of these various historical areas, Hegel tries to find and indicate the thread of development passing through it. And since he possessed not only creative genius, but also comprehensive scholarship, his appearance everywhere constituted an era. It goes without saying that the needs of the “system” quite often made him resort to those violent theoretical constructions, about which so far his insignificant opponents cry so terribly. But these constructions serve only as the framework for his work, the forests of the building he is building. Who, not stopping unnecessarily near them, penetrates deeper into the grand building, he finds countless treasures there, which to date have retained their full value. For all philosophers, it is precisely the “system” that is transient, and precisely because the systems arise from the enduring need of the human spirit: the need to overcome all contradictions. But if all the contradictions were once and for all resolved, we would come to the so-called absolute truth - world history would be over and at the same time should continue, although it would have nothing left to do: a new, insoluble contradiction. Once we understood, and by this we are more than anyone Hegel is obliged precisely—that to demand from philosophy a resolution of all contradictions means to require that one philosopher do such a thing that only all mankind is able to carry out in its progressive development—once we understand this, philosophy, in the old sense of the word, is coming to an end. We leave alone the “absolute truth” that is unattainable in this way and for each person individually, and then we rush in pursuit of the relative truths that are attainable for us along the path of the positive sciences and the unification of their results with the help of dialectical thinking. Philosophy ends with Hegel, on the one hand, because his system is a magnificent result of all its previous (philosophy) development, and on the other, because he himself, although unconsciously, shows us the way,

It is not difficult to understand how great the action of the Hegelian system was in the philosophically coloured atmosphere of

Germany. This was a solemn procession that lasted for decades and did not end with the death of Hegel. On the contrary, it was precisely in the period from 1830 to 1840 that the supreme supremacy of the “Hegelianism” reached its peak, infecting more or less even its opponents: it was during this period of time that Hegel’s views, consciously or unconsciously, penetrated into various sciences in abundance and impregnated even popular literature and daily press, from which the average “educated person” draws his thoughts. But this victory across the line was only the prologue of internecine war.

Taken as a whole, Hegel’s teachings left, as we saw, a lot of free space for the practical views of various parties. Two things were of practical importance in Germany at that time: religion and politics. A man who treasured predominantly *the Hegel system* could be quite conservative in each of these areas. The one who considered the dialectical *method* to be the main one, could in politics and religion belong to the most extreme opposition. Hegel himself, despite the explosions of revolutionary anger that were not uncommon in his writings, generally tended to be mostly conservative: it was not without reason that his system cost him much more “hard work of thought” than his method. (*Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, pp. 7-14, ed. 1932*)

## **The Contradiction Between Method and System in Hegel’s Philosophy**

Next to the French philosophy of the XVIII century, and after it the latest philosophy developed, which found its completion in Hegel. Her greatest merit was a return to dialectics as the highest form of thinking. The ancient Greek philosophers were all born dialectics, and Aristotle—the most comprehensive head between them—already explored all the most essential forms of dialectical thinking. Although in the new philosophy dialectics had brilliant representatives (Descartes and Spinoza), but it, especially under the influence of English philosophy, was more and more inclined towards the so-called metaphysical way of thinking, which almost exclusively mastered the French of the 18th century, at least in their special philosophical works. However, outside this area, they were able to leave us high samples of dialectics: we recall only the “Nephew of Rameau” Diderot and the work of Rousseau “On the origin of inequality

between people”... The latest German philosophy found its completion in the Hegelian system, the greatest merit of which is that it first presented the whole natural, historical and spiritual world in the form process, that is, investigated it in a continuous movement, change, transformation and development and tried to reveal the mutual internal relationship of this movement and development. To people who hold this point of view, the history of mankind has ceased to seem like an absurd confusion of senseless violence, which are equally condemned in front of the judicial chair of the now ripened philosophical mind and which are best forgotten as soon as possible. The history of people was a process of development of humanity itself, and the task of scientific thought came down to It makes no difference to us whether the Hegelian system solved all the tasks it posed for itself: its great merit consisted in its formulation of these tasks. Resolving them cannot be the work of any single mind. Although Hegel, along with Saint-Simon, was the most comprehensive mind of his time, he still had to reckon with the inevitable limitations of his own knowledge, as well as with the limitations—in terms of depth and vastness—of the knowledge and views of his era. This was joined by a third circumstance. Hegel was an idealist, that is, his thoughts did not seem to him more or less abstract reflections of things and phenomena existing in reality, but, on the contrary, objects and their development seemed to him only the embodiment of the “Idea” that existed somewhere before the creation of the world. So everything was put on his head, and the real connection of world phenomena is turned inside out. And although Hegel made a lot of true and ingenious instructions regarding the interconnection of certain individual phenomena, the reasons we mentioned all the same led to the fact that even in the particulars of his system much seemed erroneous, artificial, strained, a word—perverted. The Hegelian system as a system was a colossal nonsense, but it was also the last of its kind. Moreover, she suffered from an incurable internal contradiction: on the one hand, it was based on the conviction that human history is a development process, the course of which, by its very nature, cannot be completed by the discovery of the so-called absolute truth; but, on the other hand, his system claims to be a statement of this very truth. Comprehensive once and for all, the completed system of cognition of nature and history contradicts the basic laws of dialectical thinking, which, however, does not exclude, but, on the contrary, suggests that a systematic knowledge of the entire external world can

make tremendous successes with each generation. (*Engels, Anti-Dühring, pp. 13-14, 16-17, 1932*)

## **Marx on the Hegelian Phenomenology**

The secret of this Bauer courage is *Hegelian phenomenology*. Since Hegel puts *self-consciousness* in it in the place of *man*, the most *diverse* human reality is presented only as a *definite* form, as a *certainty of self-consciousness*. But the bare definiteness of self-consciousness is a “*pure category*”, a naked “*thought*”, which I can therefore eliminate in “*pure*” thinking and overcome through pure thinking. In Hegel’s phenomenology, *material, sensory, objective* the foundations of various images alienated by self-consciousness. Therefore, all the destructive work resulted in *conservative philosophy*, since such a point of view assumes that the *objective, sensually real* world is defeated, as soon as it turns into a “*thinking thing*”, into a simple *definiteness of self-consciousness*. It is easy to triumph over the real adversary thus transformed into an *etheric being* “*in the ether of pure thinking*.” Therefore, phenomenology quite consistently ends up putting “*absolute knowledge*” in the place of all human reality – *knowledge* because this is the only form of existence of self-consciousness, and also because self-consciousness is regarded as the only form of human existence, it is *absolute knowledge* because only self-consciousness knows *itself* and is not constrained by any other objective world. Hegel makes a *person a person of self-awareness*, instead of making self—identity a *self-consciousness of a person*—a real person, that is, living in reality, the objective world and due to it. He puts the world *on his head* and, for this reason, destroys all limits *in his head*, which, however, does not bother them to exist for *evil sensuality*, for *real* person. In addition, he necessarily considers the framework as everything that reveals the *limitations of universal self-consciousness*—all sensuality, reality, individuality of people and their world. All phenomenology has as its goal to prove that *self-consciousness is the only and universal reality*. (*Marx and Engels, “The Holy Family,” Op., Vol. III, pp. 224–225.*)

## **Agnosticism**

But the question of the relation of thinking to being has another side: how do our thoughts about the world around us relate to this world itself? Is our thinking able to know the real world? Are we able in our ideas and concepts about the real world to give a correct reflection of reality? In philosophical language, this question is called the question of the identity of thinking and being. The vast majority of philosophers answer in the affirmative. For example, Hegel's affirmative answer to this question is implied by himself: in the real world we know precisely its rational content, precisely what makes the world a gradual implementation of an absolute idea that existed for some time independently of the world and before it. It goes without saying that thinking can know that content, which in advance is the content of thought. It is also no less clear that, arguing in this way, we only prove the position that we tacitly recognize as indisputable in our premise. But this did not prevent Hegel from his proof of the identity of thinking and being to draw the further conclusion that since his thinking recognizes his philosophy as correct, it means that it is the only correct philosophy, and that, by virtue of the identity of thinking and being, humanity must immediately transfer this philosophy from theory to practice and re-arrange the whole world on Hegelian principles. This illusion is peculiar to him together with almost all other philosophers. But this did not prevent Hegel from his proof of the identity of thinking and being to draw the further conclusion that since his thinking recognizes his philosophy as correct, it means that it is the only correct philosophy, and that, by virtue of the identity of thinking and being, humanity must immediately transfer this philosophy from theory to practice and re-arrange the whole world on Hegelian principles. This illusion is peculiar to him together with almost all other philosophers.

Along with these, there are a number of other philosophers who dispute the possibility of knowing the world, at least its exhaustive

knowledge. To them among the philosophers of modern times belong Hume and Kant, who played a very significant role in philosophical development. The decisive refutation of this view has already been said by Hegel to what extent this could be done from an idealistic point of view [Engels calls the philosophy of Hume and Kant agnosticism (from *a* - not, *gnosis*- knowledge). The agnostic says: I do not know if there is an objective reality reflected by our sensations. "It is possible that we are able to correctly perceive the properties of a thing, but we cannot comprehend the thing itself in any way, either sensual or mental. This "thing in itself" is on the other side of our knowledge," say the agnostics. Engels says about this: "Hegel answered this a very long time ago: if you know all the properties of a thing, then you know the thing itself; then there remains only the naked fact that the named thing exists outside of us, and as soon as your feelings confirmed this fact, you comprehended this thing all without a trace—you comprehended the famous Kantian thing in yourself" (*Engels*, Preface to the English edition "The Development of Socialism").—*Red.*] Feuerbach's additional materialistic objections are more witty than thoughtful. The most decisive refutation of these, like all other philosophical twists, lies in practice, namely in experiment and in industry. If we can prove the correctness of our understanding of this natural phenomenon by the fact that we ourselves produce it, call it out of its conditions, and make it serve our purposes, then the Kantian elusive "thing in itself" comes to an end. The chemicals formed in the bodies of animals and plants remained like "things in themselves" until organic chemistry began to prepare them one after another; thereby the "thing-in-itself" turned into a thing for us, such as alizarin, the colouring matter of madder, which we now get not from the roots of madder grown in the field, but much cheaper and easier from coal tar. Copernicus's Solar System [Copernicus, in his work "Rotation of Celestial Bodies" (1543), first put forward a scientific hypothesis (assumption) about the rotation of planets around the sun.—*Ed.*] For three hundred years remained a hypothesis, highly probable, but still a hypothesis. When Leverrier, on the basis of the data of this system, not only proved that there should be another planet, unknown until then, but also determined, by means of calculation, the place it occupied in the heavenly space, and when after that Halle really found this planet [It's about Neptune.—*Red.*], the Copernican system has been proven. And if the neo-Kantians in Germany try to resurrect the views of Kant, and the agnostics in England—the views of Hume (who never died out there), despite the

fact that both theory and practice have long been refuted by both, then in a scientific sense this is a backward movement, but in practice gives these bashful people the opportunity to let through the back door the very materialism that is being expelled in front of the public [The main feature of Kant's philosophy is the reconciliation of materialism with idealism, the compromise between the two, the combination in one system of different native, opposite philosophical trends. When Kant admits that something outside of us, some thing in himself, corresponds to our ideas, then Kant is a materialist. When he declares this thing in himself unknowable, transcendental (i.e. turning out to be inaccessible to the understanding of the human mind.—*Ed.*), Otherworldly—Kant acts as an idealist. Recognizing the only source of our knowledge of experience, sensations, Kant directs his philosophy along the line of sensualism, and through sensualism, under certain conditions, and materialism. Recognizing a priori (i.e. independence from experience.—*Ed.*) Space, time, causality, etc., Kant directs his philosophy towards idealism. For this half-heartedness, Kant mercilessly waged a struggle with him and consistent materialists and consistent idealists (as well as “pure” agnostics, Humeans)” (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Sobr. op., vol. XIII, p. 162*). This dual philosophy was also resurrected by the Neo-Kantians (Kogen, Natorp, etc.). Neo-Kantianism is actually the philosophy of modern social fascism (Max Adler and others).—*Ed.*].

However, throughout this long period, from Descartes to Hegel and from Hobbes to Feuerbach, philosophers were pushed forward not only by the power of pure thinking, as they imagined. On the contrary. In fact, they were pushed forward by the great, more and more rapid and rapid development of natural science and industry. For materialists, this was clearly evident. But the systems of idealists were increasingly filled with materialistic content, pantheistically seeking [*Pantheism* is a world outlook that identifies God with nature. One of the prominent representatives of pantheism was Spinoza.—*Red.*] reconcile the opposite of spirit and matter. In the Hegelian system, it finally came to the point that it, both in terms of method and content, was only idealistic materialism set on its head. (*Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, pp. 19-22, ed. 1932*)

## **The Possibility of Cognition is Practically Proved**

Indeed, what is agnosticism, if not bashfully disguised materialism? [In the English text, Engels adds that he uses the “expressive Lancashire term”—Shamefaced.] The agnostic’s view of nature through and through is materialistic. The whole world, all nature is governed by laws and absolutely excludes all external influences. But, the agnostic continues cautiously, we are not able to prove the existence or non-existence of any higher being outside the world we know. This reservation was valuable at the time when Laplace asked Napoleon why the name of the creator of the world was never mentioned in the “Mecanique celeste” (“Celestial Mechanics”) of this great astronomer, gave a proud answer: “Je n’avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse “(I did not need this hypothesis). At present, our idea of the universe in its development leaves no room for either the creator or the Almighty. The recognition of some higher being, excluded from the whole existing world, would in itself be a contradiction and, in addition, it seems to me that it would be an undeserved insult to the feelings of religious people.

Our agnostic also agrees that all our knowledge rests on the data we receive through our senses. But, “he adds,” how do we know if our feelings give us the correct reflection of things perceived through them? “ And he continues to teach us: when he talks about things or their properties, he really does not think about these things themselves and their properties, about which he cannot know anything reliable, but only means the impressions that they made on our feelings. This, of course, is a way of reasoning that is not easy to refute with arguments alone. But before people argued, they acted.” In the beginning was the case.” And people in fact have already resolved this difficulty long before human reasoning revealed it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. At the moment when we turn these things into our own use, depending on the properties that we perceive in them, at this very moment we are subjected to an unmistakable test of the correctness or incorrectness of our sensory perceptions. If these perceptions were wrong, then our judgment on the suitability of this thing should be wrong, and our attempt to use this thing should be unsuccessful. If we achieve our goal, if we find that the thing corresponds to our idea of it, that it is suitable for what we used it, then this serves as positive evidence that, within these limits, our

perceptions of the thing and its properties correspond to the existing outside of us reality. If, on the contrary, we are convinced Since we made a mistake, for the most part it does not take a long time to find out the cause of the error. We find that the perception underlying our experience is either incomplete and superficial, or is confused with the results of other perceptions in a way that is not justified by the state of things. As long as we develop our feelings correctly, use them correctly and act within the limits established by correctly received and used perceptions, until then we will always be convinced that the results of our actions are proof of the coincidence of our perceptions with the material nature of perceived things. There is not a single fact, as far as we know to date, when we would be forced to come to a conclusion, that our scientifically controlled sensory perceptions create in our brain such representations of the external world that, by their nature, deviate from reality; or that there is an inherent mismatch between the outside world and our sensory perceptions of this world.

But here a neo-Kantian agnostic comes and says: yes, it is possible that we are able to correctly perceive the properties of a thing, but we cannot comprehend the thing itself by any sensory or mental process. This “thing in itself” is on the other side of our knowledge. - To this, Hegel already answered a very long time ago: if you know all the properties of a thing, then you know the very thing; then there remains only the naked fact that the named thing exists outside of us; and as soon as your feelings were confirmed by this fact, you comprehended this thing all without a trace—You comprehended the famous Kantian unknowable thing in yourself. At present, we can only add to this that in the era of Kant, our knowledge of material things was still so fragmentary that for each of them we could still allow the existence of a particularly mysterious thing in ourselves. But since that time, these incomprehensible things, one after another, thanks to the gigantic progress of science, have already been comprehended, analysed and, even more, reproduced. And what can we *to do*, of course, we cannot call it unknowable. For chemistry in the first half of the 19th century, organic matter was such a mysterious thing. Now we manage to get them one by one by synthesis from chemical elements and without the help of organic processes. The latest chemistry claims: as soon as the chemical composition of a body is known, it can be composed of elements. True, we are still very far from an accurate knowledge of the composition of higher organic substances, the so-called protein bodies; however, there is no reason to doubt that we, even after

centuries, will achieve this knowledge and with its help we will produce artificial protein. If we achieve this, at the same time we will reproduce organic life, for life from the lowest to its highest forms is nothing more than the normal form of existence of protein bodies.

But our agnostic, having once made his formal reservations, speaks and acts quite like an inveterate materialist, which in essence he is. He may say: since *we* it is known that matter and its motion, or, as they say now, energy, can neither be created nor destroyed, but we have no evidence that both were not created at some time unknown to us. But as soon as you try to somehow use this recognition against him in any given case, he will instantly silence you. If he abstractly admits the possibility of spiritualism, then in reality he does not want to know about this possibility. He will tell you: as far as we know and can know, there is no creator or almighty of the universe; since it depends on us, matter and energy can neither be created nor destroyed: for us, thinking is only a form of energy, a function of the brain; all *we* we know, it boils down to the fact that the material world is governed by immutable laws, etc., etc. Thus, since he is a man of *science*, because he *knows* something, insofar as he is a materialist; Outside of his science, in areas that are alien to him, he translates his ignorance into Greek and calls it agnosticism. (*Engels, The Development of Socialism from Utopia to Science, pp. 10-15, 1932*)

## Yuma agnosticism

In his essay Ludwig Feuerbach, he (F. Engels.—*Ed.*) Divides philosophers into “two large camps”: materialists and idealists. Engels, who takes into account the much more developed, diverse and rich in theories of both directions than Fraser, sees Engels as the main difference between them, is that for materialists nature is primary, and spirit is secondary, and vice versa for idealists. Between those and the other Engels places supporters of Hume and Kant as denying the possibility of knowing the world or at least knowing it completely, calling them *agnostics*. In his “L. Feuerbach “Engels applies this last term only to Hume supporters (thereby whom Fraser calls himself and who they call themselves” positivists “), but in the article” On Historical Materialism “Engels explicitly speaks of the point of view of” *neo-Kantian agnostic*”, considering neo-Kantianism as a kind of agnosticism [*Fr. Engels, Ueber historischen*

Materialismus, “Neue Zeit”, XI Jg., Bd. I (1892-1893), No. I, S. 18 (*Fr. Engels*, On Historical Materialism, “New Time”, XIth ed., Vol. I, 1892 - 1893, No. 1, p. 18. - *Ed.* ). The translation from English was made by Engels himself. The Russian translation in the collection “Historical Materialism” (p. 167, St. Petersburg, 1908) is not accurate (see *F. Engels*, The Development of Socialism from Utopia to Science, The Marxist Library, pp. 12–36, no. 11, ed. 2nd, Guise, 1928 —*Ed.* ).].

We cannot dwell on this remarkably correct and deep reasoning of Engels (a discourse shamelessly ignored by the Machists). Details will be discussed later. For now, we confine ourselves to pointing to this Marxist terminology and to this coincidence of extremes: the view of a consistent materialist and consistent idealist on the main philosophical trends. To illustrate these areas (with which we will constantly have to deal in the following presentation), we briefly mention the views of the greatest philosophers of the 18th century who took a different path than Berkeley.

Here is Hume’s reasoning in *The Study of Human Cognition* in Chapter 12 of *Sceptical Philosophy*: “It can be considered obvious that people tend to trust their feelings by natural instinct or predisposition, and that without any reasoning or even before resorting to reasoning, we always assume the external world (external universe), which is not dependent on our perception, which would exist if we and all other sensory creatures disappeared or were destroyed. Even animals are guided by this opinion and maintain this belief in external objects in all their thoughts, plans and actions ... But this universal and initial opinion of all people is soon destroyed by the lightest philosophy that teaches us that our mind can never be available anything except for the image or perception, and that feelings are only channels (inlets) through which these images are transmitted, not being able to establish any direct relationship (intercourse) between the mind and the object. The table that we see seems smaller if we move further away from it, but the real table, existing independently of us, does not change; therefore, nothing other than the image of the table appeared to our mind. These are the obvious directions of the mind; and not a single person who reasoned has ever doubted that the objects (existences) we are talking about: “this table”, “this tree”, are nothing more than perceptions of our mind ... What argument can to prove that the perceptions in our mind should be caused by external objects that are completely different from these perceptions, although similar to them (if possible), and do not stem either from the energy of the mind

itself, or from the action of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other reason, even more unknown to us? .. How can this issue be resolved? Of course, through experience, like all other questions of this kind. But at this point, experience is silent and cannot but be silent. The mind never has any things in front of itself except perceptions, and it is in no way able to produce any experience regarding the relationship between perceptions and objects. Therefore, the assumption of such a relationship is devoid of any logical basis. To resort to the truthfulness of the supreme being to prove the truthfulness of our feelings means to circumvent the question in a completely unexpected way ... Once we raise the question of the outside world, we will lose all arguments, *David H u t e*, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Essays and Treatises, vol. II, p. 150-153, Lond. 1882 (*Hume David*, Study of human knowledge. Experiments and reasoning, vol. II, p. 150-153, London, 1882.—*Ed.*).

And Hume says the same thing in A Treatise on Human Nature, Part IV, Division II: “On Scepticism in Relation to Feelings.” “Our perceptions are our only objects” (p. 281 of the French translation of Renouvier and Pillon, 1878). Hume calls scepticism the refusal to explain sensations by the influence of things, the spirit, etc., the refusal to reduce perceptions to the outside world, on the one hand, to a deity or unknown spirit, on the other. And the author of the preface to Hume’s French translation, F. Pillon, a philosopher of a Mach-related direction (as we will see below), rightly says that for Hume the subject and object are reduced to “groups of different perceptions”, to “elements of consciousness, impressions, ideas etc., “that we should only talk about the” grouping and combination of these elements “[Psychologie de Hume. Traité de la nature humaine etc. Trad. par Ch. Renouvier et F. Pillon, Paris 1878. Introduction, p. X (Psychological works of Hume. A treatise on human nature. Translation by C. Renouvier and F. Pillon. Paris 1878. Introduction, p. X. -*Ed.*)]. Likewise, the English humist Huxley, the founder of the accurate and faithful expression “agnosticism”, emphasizes in his book on Hume that the latter, taking “sensations” as “initial, indecomposable states of consciousness”, is not entirely consistent on the question of whether objects influence per person or by the creative power of the mind, the origin of sensations should be explained. “He (Hume) admits realism and idealism as equally probable hypotheses” [*Th. Huxley*, “Hume,” p. 74, London 1879 ( *T. Huck c Does Hume*, page 74, London, 1879 -. *Ed.*)]. Hume does not go beyond

sensations. "The colors are red and blue, the smell of a rose, these are simple perceptions... The red rose gives us a complex perception (complex impression), which can be decomposed into simple perceptions of red, the smell of a rose, etc." (p. 64 - 65, *ibid.*). Hume admits both a "materialistic position" and an "idealistic" one (p. 82): a "collection of perceptions" can be generated by Fichtev's "I", it can be "an image or at least a symbol" of something real (real something). That is the interpretation of Hume Huxley. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII , p. 26-28, ed. 3<sup>rd</sup>.*)

## **Agnostic Denies the Possibility of Knowledge of Matter**

In the article "On Historical Materialism" [Preface to the English translation "The Development of Socialism from Utopia to Science", translated by Engels himself into German in "Neue Zeit", XI, 1 (1892-1893, No. 1), S. 15 and cl. The Russian translation, if I am not mistaken, is the only one in the collection: "Historical materialism", p. 162 et seq. The quote is quoted by Bazarov in Essays "on" the philosophy of Marxism, p. 64.] Engels says the following about English agnostics (philosophers of the Hume line):

"... Our agnostic agrees that all our knowledge is based on the messages (Mitteilungen) that we receive through our senses" ... (NZ, S. 18) .

So, we note for our Machists that the agnostic (humist) also comes from *sensations* and does not recognize any other source of knowledge. An agnostic is a pure "*positivist*", for information of the supporters of the "latest positivism"!

"... But," he adds (agnostic), "how do we know that our senses give us the right images (Abbilder) of the things they perceive?" And then he tells us that when he talks about things or their properties, he really doesn't mean these very things or their properties, about which he can't know anything reliable, but only the impressions that they made on him feelings"... (NZ, S. 18).

What two lines of philosophical trends does Engels contrast here? One line is that feelings give us true images of things, that we know *these very things*, that the outside world affects our senses. This is materialism with which the agnostic disagrees. What is the *essence* of his line? That he *does not go beyond* sensations, that he *stops on*

*this side of the phenomena* , refusing to see anything “authentic” beyond the limits of sensations. About *these very things*(that is, about things in themselves, about “objects in themselves,” as the materialists argued with Berkeley), we cannot know anything reliable—that’s a completely definite statement by an agnostic. This means that the materialist in the dispute that Engels speaks of asserts the existence and knowability of things in himself. An agnostic *does not allow the very thought* of things in himself, stating that we cannot know anything reliable about them. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII , p. 87-88, ed. 3rd.*)

### **III. The Reactionary Nature of Idealism and the Need to Combat It**

#### **Idealism - the Defence and Justification of Religion**

Idealism in philosophy is a more or less clever defence of clericalism, a teaching that puts faith above science, or alongside science, or in general gives place to faith. Agnosticism (from the Greek word “a”—and *not* “gnosis”—*knowledge* ) is an oscillation between materialism and idealism, that is, in practice, an oscillation between materialistic science and clericalism.

Among the agnostics belong supporters of Kant (Kantians), Huma (positivists, realists, etc.) and modern “Machists”. (*Lenin, On the twentieth anniversary of the death of Joseph Dietzgen, Op., Vol. XVI , p. 379, ed. 3rd.*)

\* \* \*

The refined epistemological tweaks of some Avenarius remain a professorial invention, an attempt to establish a small “own” philosophical sect, but *in reality* , in the general atmosphere of the struggle of ideas and directions of modern society, an *objective* the role of these epistemological tricks is one and only one: to clear the way to idealism and fideism, to serve them faithfully. It is no accident, indeed, that both the English spiritualists like Ward, and the French

neo-critists, praising Mach for the struggle against materialism, and the German immanentists, are grabbing at a small school of empirio-critics. I. Dietzgen's formula "Certified lackeys of fideism" doesn't bother, but hits Mach, Avenarius and their entire school [Here is another example of how widespread currents of reactionary bourgeois philosophy actually use Machism. Perhaps the "last fashion" of the most modern American philosophy is "pragmatism" (from the Greek *pragma*—deed, action, philosophy of action). Philosophical journals speak about pragmatism almost more than anything. Pragmatism makes fun of metaphysics and materialism and idealism, *it relies specifically on Ostwald, Mach, Pearson, Poincaré, Duhem*, on the fact that science is not an "absolute copy of reality", and... safely draws from all this god for practical purposes, only for practice without any metaphysics, without any way out the bounds of experience (cf. *William James*, Pragmatism. A new name for some old ways of thinking, NY 1907, p. 57 and 106 in particular) ( *in James*, Pragmatism. The new name for the old ways of thought, New York 1907, p. 57 and 106.—*Ed.*) The differences between Machism and pragmatism are just as insignificant and ten-degree from the point of view of materialism, as the differences between empirio-criticism and empiriomonism. Compare at least the Bogdanov and pragmatist definition of truth: "Truth for the pragmatist is a generic concept for any kind of certain working values in experience (ibid, p. 68).].

The misfortune of the Russian Machists, who decided to "reconcile" Machism with Marxism, lies in the fact that they trusted the reactionary professors of philosophy once and, having trusted, rolled downhill. The methods of composing various attempts to develop and supplement Marx were very simple. They will read Ostwald, believe Ostwald, retell Ostwald, call it Marxism. They will read Mach, believe Mach, retell Mach, call it Marxism. They will read Poincare, believe Poincare, retell Poincare, call it Marxism! *None* of these professors, capable of giving the most valuable work in special fields of chemistry, history, physics, *can be trusted in a single word*, since it comes to philosophy. Why? For the same reason that *not one* a professor of political economy, capable of producing the most valuable work in the field of factual, special studies, cannot be trusted *in a single word*, since it comes to the general theory of political economy. For this last one is the same *party science* in modern society, like *epistemology*. By and large, professors-economists are nothing more than scientific clerks of the capitalist class, and professors of philosophy are scientific clerks of theologians.

The task of Marxists here and there to be able to assimilate and process the gains that are made by these “clerks” (for example, you will not take a single step in the study of new economic phenomena without using the works of these clerks), and *be able to* cut off their reactionary tendency, to be able lead *your* line and fight the *whole line of* forces and classes hostile to us. Our Machians, *slavishly* following reactionary professorial philosophy, did not *succeed* in this. “Maybe we are mistaken, but we are looking,” wrote Lunacharsky on behalf of the authors of the Essays.—Not *you are* looking, but *they are looking for you*, that’s the trouble! You do not approach yours, that is, Marxist (for you want to be Marxists), point of view to every turn of the bourgeois-philosophical fashion, but this fashion suits you, it imposes its new fakes on you in the taste of idealism, today à la Ostwald , tomorrow à la Mach, the day after tomorrow à la Poincare. Those silly “theoretical” tricks (with “energy”, with “elements”, “introjection”, etc.) that you naively believe remain within a narrow, tiny school, and the ideological and *social tendency*. These tricks are immediately captured by Wards, neo-critists, immanentists, Lopatins, pragmatists, and they serve their service. The fascination with empirio-criticism and “physical” idealism passes just as quickly as the fascination with neo-Kantianism and “physiological” idealism, and fideism from each such hobby takes its prey, modifying its tricks in favour of philosophical idealism in thousands of ways.

Attitude to religion and attitude to natural science perfectly illustrates this *actual* class use of bourgeois reaction of empirio-criticism.

Take the first question. Do you think this is an accident if, in a collective work *against the* philosophy of Marxism, Lunacharsky agreed to “deify the higher human potentialities”, to “religious atheism” [Essays, p. 157, 159. In the “3-page Newspaper” the same author he speaks of “scientific socialism in its religious significance” (No. 3, p. 5), and in Education, 1908, No. 1, p. 164, he directly writes: “A new religion has long been ripening in me ...” ] etc.? If you think so, it is solely due to the fact that the Russian Machists incorrectly informed the public about the *entire* Machist movement in Europe and the relationship of this movement to religion. Not only is there nothing in this respect similar to that of Marx, Engels and Dietzgen, even Feuerbach, but there is *just the opposite* starting with Petzoldt’s statements: empirio-criticism “does not contradict either theism or atheism” (“Einf. id Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung” (“Introduction to the philosophy of pure experience.”—*Ed.*], I, 351) or Mach—

“religious opinions private affair” (French translation, p. 434) and ending with *direct fideism*, direct Black Hundreds and Cornelius, who praises Mach and whom he praises Mach, and Carus, and all immanentists. The neutrality of the *philosopher* in this matter is *already* a servility to fideism, and Mach and Avenarius cannot rise beyond neutrality due to the starting points of their epistemology.

Since you deny the objective reality given to us in sensation, you have already lost all weapons against fideism, for you have already slipped into agnosticism or subjectivity, and this is only necessary for him. If the sensual world is an objective reality, any other “reality” or quasi-reality (remember that Bazarov believed the “realism” of the immanentists who proclaim God to be a “real concept”) the door is closed. If the world is moving matter, it can and should be studied endlessly in the infinitely complex and detailed manifestations and ramifications of *this* movement, *this* movement matter, but outside of it, outside of the “physical”, external world, familiar to everyone and everyone, nothing can be. And hostility to materialism, clouds of slander against materialists - all this in a civilized and democratic Europe is the order of the day. All this continues to this day. All this is *hidden* from the public by the Russian Machians, who *not once* not attempted even simply to compare the attacks made on materialism by Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and <sup>for</sup> statements *in favour* of materialism by Feuerbach, Marx, Engels, J. Dietzgen.

But “harboring” the relationship of Mach and Avenarius to fideism will not help anything. The facts speak for themselves. No efforts in the world will tear these reactionary professors from the shameful pillar to which the kisses of Ward, the neocritists, Schuppe, Schubert-Soldern, Leclair, pragmatists, etc. have nailed. And the influence of the persons named now as philosophers and professors, the prevalence of their ideas in the “educated”, that is, bourgeois, public, special literature created by them is ten times wider and richer than the special school of Mach and Avenarius. The school serves whoever needs it. The school is used as it should.

The shameful things that Lunacharsky sank to are not an exception, but the product of empirio-criticism, both Russian and German. It is impossible to defend them with the “good intentions” of the author, the “special meaning” of his words: if it was direct and ordinary, that is, directly fideistic, we would not even talk to the author, for there would probably not be a single Marxist for whom such statements *not* be equated *entirely* Anatoly Lunacharsky as Peter Struve. If this is not (and this *is* not yet), it is solely because we see a

“special” meaning and *fight*, while there is still the basis for a friendly war. That is the shame of Lunacharsky’s claims that he *could* associate them with their “good” intentions. The fact of the evil of his “theory” is that it allows *such* means or *such* conclusions in the implementation of good intentions. The trouble is that “good” intentions remain, *at best*, the subjective affair of Karp, Peter, Sidor, and the *public significance* of such statements is unconditional and undeniable, and can not be weakened by any reservations and explanations.

One must be blind so as not to see an ideological relationship between the “deification of higher human potentialities” by Lunacharsky and the “universal substitution” of the psychic for the whole physical nature of Bogdanov. This is one and the same idea, expressed in one case mainly from the aesthetic point of view, and in the other—epistemological. “Substitution”, *silently* and on the other hand approaching the matter, is *already deifying the* “higher human potentialities”, tearing the “psychic” away from the person and substituting the immensely expanded, abstract, divine dead “psychic in general” under the *whole physical nature*. And what about Yushkevich’s “Logos” introduced “into the irrational stream of the given”?

Claw is bogged down—there is a chasm to the whole bird. But our Machians were all bogged down in idealism, that is, weakened, refined fideism, bogged down from the very moment they took the “sensation” not as an image of the external world, but as a special “element”. No one’s sensation, no one’s psyche, no one’s spirit, no one’s will — it is inevitable to slip into this, if one does not recognize the materialistic theory of *reflection* by the human consciousness of the objectively real external world. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, pp. 279—282, 3rd ed.* )

## **Against God-Seeking and God-Building**

(November 14, 1913)

Dear A. M.! What are you doing this?—just awful, right!

Yesterday I read in Rech your answer to the “howl” for Dostoevsky and was ready to rejoice, but today comes a liquor

(ideatorial) newspaper and a *paragraph of your article is printed there* , which was not in Rech.

This paragraph is as follows:

“But” the search for God “is necessary *for a while* ” (only for a while?) “To postpone is a futile exercise: there is nothing to look for, where it is not supposed. Without sowing, you will not reap. God you do not, you are *still* “(yet!)” Did not create it. *They* do not seek the gods—*they are created* ; life is not invented, but created.”

It turns out that you are against “God-seeking” only “for a while”!! It turns out that you are against God-seeking *only* for the sake of replacing it with God-building!!

Well, isn't it terrible for you to *get* such a thing?

The search for God differs from God-building or God-creation or God-making, etc., no more than the yellow line differs from the blue line. Speaking of God-seeking is not to speak out against *all* devils and gods, against any ideological disfavour (every dear god is deceitful—be it the cleanest, ideal, not sought after, but the deity being built, anyway), but to prefer the blue line to yellow it's a hundred times worse than not talking at all.

In the freest countries, in those countries where the call for “democracy, for the people, for the public and science” is *completely* inappropriate, in such countries (America, Switzerland, etc.) people and workers are numbed especially hard by the idea of a clean, spiritual, built god. Precisely because any religious idea, any idea of any god, any flirtation even with a god is an inexpressible abomination, especially tolerated (and often even benevolently) met by the *democratic* bourgeoisie—that is why it is the most dangerous abomination, the most infamous “infection”. A million sins, dirty tricks, violence and *physical* infections are much more easily revealed by the crowd and therefore much less dangerous than *subtle*, spiritual, dressed up in the most elegant “ideological” costumes, the idea of God. The Catholic pop who molests girls (which I accidentally read about in a German newspaper) is *much less* dangerous for “democracy” than pop without a cassock, pop without a crude religion, pop ideological and democratic, preaching the creation and creation of a god. For the first priest is *easy* to expose, condemn and expel - and the second *one cannot be* expelled so simply, expose it a thousand times more difficult, to “condemn” him not a single “fragile and pitifully shaky” philistine will agree.

And you, knowing “the fragility and pitiable precariousness (Russian, why Russian? Is Italian better ??) the *philistine* soul, confuse

this soul with poison, the sweetest and most covered with candies and all kinds of coloured papers !!

Really, this is terrible.

“Self-spitting is enough, replacing our self-criticism.”

But is god-building not the *worst* kind of self-spitting?? Every person engaged in the construction of *a god* or even just allowing such construction, *spit upon themselves* the worst way, instead of engaging in “acts” *just* self-contemplation, self-admiration, and “contemplates”—What kind of person most dirty, stupid, slavish features or dash his “I” deified by god-building.

From the point of view of not personal, but public, *all* god-building is precisely the *love of self-contemplation* of stupid bourgeoisie, fragile philistine, dreamy “self-spitting” of philistines and petty bourgeois, “desperate and tired” (as you deigned to say very correctly about the *soul*—just not “Russian” it would be necessary to say a *philistine*, for Jewish, Italian, English—*all one hell* everywhere lousy philistine equally disgusting, but “democratic philistinism”, occupied by the ideological trupolozhstvom purely disgusting).

I’m perplexed when I read your article and *wonder* where you got this *slip of pen*. What is it? The remnants of the “Confession”, which *you yourself* did not approve?? Echoes of her ??

Or otherwise—for example, an unsuccessful attempt to *bend* to the point of view of a *general democratic* instead of the point of view of the *proletariat*? Maybe for a conversation with “democracy in general” you wanted (sorry for the expression) to lisp, as licking with children? maybe “for a popular exposition” the *townsfolk* wanted to admit for a minute *him or them*, the townsfolk, prejudice??

But this is a *wrong* trick in every sense and in every respect!

I wrote above that in *democratic* countries, *quite* out of place it would be the proletarian writer’s appeal “to democracy, the people, the public and science.” Well, and here in Russia?? Such an appeal is *not entirely* appropriate, for it also somehow flatter the philistine prejudices. The call is some kind of general to the nebula—we even Izgoyev from the “Russian Thought” *with both hands* will sign it. Why take such slogans that *you* separate perfectly from the rogue, *but the reader will* not be able to separate?? Why would the reader throw a democratic flair instead of *clearly* distinguishing the *philistines*(fragile, pitifully shaky, tired, desperate, self-contemplating, God-beholding, God-constructing, God-indulging, self-spitting, *stupidly-anarchistic*—a wonderful word!! and other and other)—and *proletarians* (who can be cheerful not in words, who can

distinguish between “science and science”. “*Bourgeoisie* from their own, bourgeois democracy from the proletarian)?

Why are you doing it?

It’s a shame devilishly. (“*Lenin Collection*” I, *Letter to Gorky*, pp. 145-147, 1925 )

## **The idea of God is the idea of slavery**

*December 1913.* On the question of God, the divine and everything connected with this, you get a contradiction—the same, in my opinion, that I pointed out in our conversations during our last meeting on Capri: you broke (or as if broke up) with the “Vperyod”, not noticing the ideological foundations of the “leading”.

So it is now. You are “annoyed”, you “cannot understand how the word slipped for a while” [The word “for a while” refers to the quotation from Gorky’s article cited and analysed by Lenin in a letter to Gorky dated November 14, 1913—*Ed.*]—so you write—and at the same time you are defending the idea of God and God-building.

“God is a complex of those ideas developed by the tribe, nation, humanity, which wake up and organize social feelings, with the goal of connecting the individual with society, curbing zoological individualism.”

This theory is clearly related to the theory or theories of Bogdanov and Lunacharsky.

And she is clearly false and clearly reactionary. Like the Christian socialists (the worst kind of “socialism” and the worst distortion of it), you use a technique that (despite your best intentions) repeats the hocus-pocus of the clergy: what is *historically and worldly* in it (evil spirits, prejudices) is removed from the idea of God, the consecration of darkness and oppression, on the one hand, serfdom and monarchy, on the other), and instead of historical and everyday reality, a kindly philistine phrase is put into the idea of God (God = “ideas, awakening and organizing social feelings”).

You want to say “good and good”, point to “Truth-Justice” and the like. But this good desire of yours remains your personal property, the subjective “innocent wish.” Once you wrote it, it went to *mass*, and its *significance* is determined not by your good wishes, but by the *ratio of social forces*, the objective ratio of classes. By virtue of this ratio, it *comes out* (contrary to your will and regardless of your

consciousness), it turns out that you tinted, sugared the idea of clerics, Purishkevichs, N (Ikolai) II and Struve, for *in fact the* idea of God to *them*. Helps keep people in slavery. Embellished the idea of God, you embellished the chains with which they fetter the dark workers and men. Here—they will say the priests and Co—what a good and deep idea this is (the idea of God), as even “*yours*” admit, gg. Democrats leaders—and we (priests and Co. ) serve this idea.

It is not true that God is a complex of ideas that awaken and organize social feelings. This is Bogdanov’s *idealism* , obscuring the material origin of ideas. God is (historically and worldly) primarily a set of ideas generated by the stupid oppression of man and external nature and class oppression—ideas that *reinforce* this oppression, *lull the* class struggle. There was a time in history when, despite such an origin and such real significance of the idea of God, the struggle of democracy and the proletariat proceeded in the form of the struggle of *one religious* idea against another.

But this time has long passed.

Now in Europe and in Russia, *every* , even the most refined, most well-intentioned defence or justification of the idea of God is a justification of reaction.

Your whole definition is thoroughly reactionary and bourgeois. God = a complex of ideas, which [“wake up and organize social feelings, with the goal of connecting the individual with society, curbing zoological individualism”].

Why is this reactionary? Because it tints the priestly-feudal idea of “curbing” zoology.

In reality, “zoological individualism” was not curbed by the idea of God; it was curbed by both the primitive herd and the primitive commune.

The idea of God *always* lulled and dulled “social feelings”, replacing the living with carrion, *always* being the idea of slavery (the worst, hopeless slavery). Never has the idea of God “connected the individual with society,” but has always *linked the* oppressed *classes with* faith in the *divinity of the* oppressors.

Your definition is bourgeois (and not scientifically, unhistorically), for it operates on sweeping, general, “Robinson” concepts in general—and not on certain *classes of a* certain historical era.

It is one thing - the idea of God from the savage Zyryanin etc. (poludikarya too), and the other—. From Struve and in both cases, this idea is supported by class domination (and this idea supports

it). The “popular” concept of God and the God of God is “popular” stupidity, clogging, darkness, exactly the same as the “popular idea” of the tsar, of the goblin, of pulling wives by the hair. How can you call the “popular idea” of God “democratic”, I absolutely do not understand.

That philosophical idealism “always has in mind only the interests of the individual” is not true. Do Descartes, compared with Gassendi, had more in mind the interests of the individual? Or Fichte and Hegel versus Feuerbach?

That “God-building is a process of further development and accumulation of social principles in the individual and in society”, this is simply awful!! If there was freedom in Russia, you would be raised by the whole bourgeoisie for such things, for this sociology and theology of a purely bourgeois type and character.

Well, so far enough - and then the letter dragged on. Once again I firmly shake my hand and wish you good health. (*Lenin Collection I, Letter to Maxim Gorky, pp. 149 - 151, 1925*)

## **Class and epistemological roots of idealism**

Primitive idealism: the general (concept, idea) is a *separate being*. It seems wild, monstrous (or rather: childish) ridiculous. But is it not in the same way ( *quite* in the same way) modern idealism, Kant, Hegel, the idea of God? Tables, chairs and table and chair *ideas* ; the world and the idea of peace (god); thing and “numen”, unknowable “thing in itself”; the connection of the earth and the sun, nature in general - and the law, logo, god. The bifurcation of human knowledge and the *possibility* of idealism (= religion) *are* already *given in the first elementary* abstraction “house” in general and individual houses.

The approach of the mind (person) to a single thing, taking a cast (= concept) from it is *not a* simple, direct, mirror-dead act, but a complex, forked, zigzag, *including the* possibility of the departure of fantasy from life; not only that: the possibility of *transforming* (and, moreover, an invisible, unconscious transformation by man) abstract concept, idea into *fantasy* (in letzter Instanz = god). For in the simplest generalization, in the most elementary general idea (the “table” in general) *there is a* certain piece of *fantasy* . Vice versa: It is absurd to deny the role of fantasy in the most rigorous science: cf. Pisarev about

the dream as useful as a jerk to work, and empty dreaminess. “*Lenin’s collection*” XII , c tr. 337-339, 1930)

\* \* \*

Philosophical idealism is *only* nonsense from the point of view of materialism, crude, simple, metaphysical. On the contrary, from the point of view of *dialectical* materialism, philosophical idealism is a *one-sided* exaggerated, überschwengliches (Dietzgen) development (inflating, swelling) of one of the lines, sides, faces of cognition in the absolute, *divorced* from matter, from nature, deified. (“*Lenin Collection*” XII , p. 326, 1930)

## **The class roots of religion**

Idealism is clericalism. Right. But philosophical idealism is ( “*more truly*” and “*moreover*” ) the *road* to clericalism *through one of the shades of the* infinitely complex *knowledge of a* (dialectical) person. Cognition of man is not (resp, does not follow) a straight line, but a curved line infinitely approaching a series of circles, a spiral. Any fragment, fragment, piece of this curved line can be turned (one-sidedly turned) into an independent, whole, straight line, which (if you can’t see the forests behind the trees) then leads into the swamp, into the clergy (where it is *reinforced by the* class interest of the ruling classes). Straightforwardness and one-sidedness, woodenness and ossification, subjectivity and subjective blindness voilà epistemological roots of idealism. But the clergy (=NB philosophical idealism) of course have *epistemological* roots, this it is not baseless, it is a *hollow*, indisputably, but a hollow aphorism flower growing on a living tree of a living, fruitful, true, powerful, omnipotent, objective, absolute human knowledge. (“*Lenin Collection*” XII, “*On the Question of Dialectics*”, p. 326, 1930 )

We must fight religion. This is the ABC of *all* materialism and, therefore, Marxism. But Marxism is not materialism, dwelling on the alphabet. Marxism goes further. He says: we must *be able to* fight religion, but for this we must *materialistically* explain the source of

faith and religion among the masses. The struggle against religion cannot be limited to abstract ideological preaching, it cannot be reduced to such a sermon, this struggle must be brought into connection with the specific practice of the class movement aimed at eliminating the social roots of religion. Why is religion held in the backward layers of the urban proletariat, in the broad layers of the semi-proletariat, and also among the mass of the peasantry? By the ignorance of the people, the bourgeois progressive, radical or bourgeois materialist answers. Therefore, down with religion, long live atheism, the dissemination of atheistic views is our main task. The Marxist says: untruth. Such a view is superficial, bourgeois limited culturalism. Such a view is not deep enough, not materialistically, but idealistically explains the roots of religion, *social*. The social oppression of the working masses, their apparent helplessness in front of the blind forces of capitalism, which inflicts daily and hourly a thousand times more terrible sufferings, the most savage torment on ordinary working people, than all sorts of outstanding events like wars, earthquakes, etc.—this is the deepest modern root of religion. "Fear created the gods." Fear of the blind power of capital, which is blind, because it cannot be foreseen by the masses of the people, which at every step of the life of the proletariat and the small proprietor threatens to bring him and brings "sudden", "unexpected", "random" ruin, death, transformation into a beggar, in pauper, in a prostitute, starvation—that's the *root* of modern religion, which, above all, and most of all, must be borne in mind by a materialist, if he does not want to remain a materialist of the preparatory class. No enlightening book will erase religion from the masses that are clogged by capitalist hard labour, depending on the blind destructive forces of capitalism, until these masses themselves learn in a united, organized, systematic, conscious way to fight against this *root of* religion, against the *rule of capital* in all forms... (*Lenin, On the Relation of the Working Party on Religion, Collected Works, Vol.. the XIV , p. 70-71, 3rd ed.*)

## IV. Materialism before Marx

### 1. French Materialism of the XVIII century, and Its Historical Significance

The 18th century French enlightenment, and in particular French materialism, is not only a struggle against existing political institutions, religion and theology, but also an *open, clearly expressed* struggle against the *metaphysics of the 17th century* and against *all metaphysics in general*—against the metaphysics of *Descartes, Malbranche, Spinoza and Leibniz*. Philosophy was opposed to metaphysics, just as *Feuerbach*, when he first resolutely opposed *Hegel*, contrasted the *sober philosophy of drunken speculation*. Struck by French enlightenment, and especially by *French materialism*. The *metaphysics of the 17th century* celebrated its *victorious, full-content restoration* in the face of *German philosophy*, namely in the *speculative German philosophy of the 19th century*. After *Hegel* ingeniously combined it with all previous metaphysics and German idealism, creating a metaphysical universal kingdom, attacks on theology again, as in the XVIII century, went along with attacks on *speculative metaphysics and all metaphysics in general*. *Materialism*, now replenished with what was obtained by *speculation* itself, and coinciding with *humanism*, will end metaphysics forever. Similar to *Feuerbach in theory*, French and English socialism and communism are in *practice materialism*, coinciding with *humanism*.

“Expressing itself *precisely and prosaically*,” there are *two areas of French materialism*: one originates from *Descartes*, the other from *Locke*. The latter type of materialism is, for the *most part*, a *French educational element* and leads directly to *socialism*. The first, *mechanical materialism*, merges with French *natural science*. In the course of development, both directions intersect. We need not enter into a detailed examination of French materialism, which originates directly from *Descartes*; just as there is no need to stop

at Newton's French school and on the development of French natural sciences in general.

We only note the following:

In his *physics*, *Descartes* ascribes matter to independent creative power and considers *mechanical* movement as a manifestation of the life of matter. He completely separates his *physics* from his *metaphysics*. Within the boundaries of his physics, matter is the only *substance*, the only foundation of being and knowledge.

*Mechanical* French materialism sided with *Descartes' physics*, as opposed to its metaphysics. His students were in the profession of *anti-metaphysics*, i.e., *physics*.

This school begins with *Leroy* as a physician; in *Kabinis*, it has reached its climax; *Lamettri*, a doctor, is its centre. Even during his life, *Descartes Leroy* applied his teacher's gaze to the human soul on the structure of the *animal body* (like *La Mettrie* in the 17th century) and declared the soul a *body mode*, and ideas a *mechanical movement*.

*Leroy* was even sure that *Descartes* had hidden his true view of this question. *Descartes* protested against this. At the end of the 18th century, *Cabanis* completed the development of Cartesian materialism in his work *Rapport du physique et du moral de l'homme*.

*Cartesian* materialism still exists today in France. He achieved significant successes in *mechanical science*, which is least possible, "expressing himself *precisely and prosaically*," to reproach in *romance*.

*The metaphysics of the 17th century*, of which *Descartes* was the main representative in France, had to *fight materialism* from the day it was born. Materialism opposed *Descartes* in the person of *Gassendi*, who revived *Epicurean* materialism. French and English materialism has always maintained an internal connection with *Democritus and Epicurus*. Cartesian metaphysics met another opponent in the person of the *English* materialist *Hobbes*. *Gassendi* and *Hobbes* defeated their adversary a long time after her death, at a time when she officially dominated all French schools.

*Voltaire* noted that the French indifference of the eighteenth century to the dispute between the Jesuits and the Jansenists should be attributed not so much to the influence of philosophy as to the financial speculations of *Lowe*. Indeed, the fall of the metaphysics of the seventeenth century to the extent that can be explained by the materialist theory of the eighteenth century, since this theoretical movement itself finds its explanation in the practice of the then French

life. This life was aimed at immediate reality, at worldly enjoyment and worldly interests, at the *earthly world*. Her anti-theological, anti-metaphysical, materialistic practice should have been consistent with anti-theological, anti-metaphysical, materialistic theories. Metaphysics is *practically* lost all credit. We need to outline here only the *theoretical* course of this evolution.

The metaphysics of the 17th century still contained a *positive*, earthly content (recall Descartes, Leibniz, etc.). She made discoveries in mathematics, physics, and other exact sciences that seemed connected with her. But already at the beginning of the XVIII century, this imaginary connection was destroyed. Positive sciences separated from metaphysics and dissociated themselves from their own field. All the wealth of metaphysics is now limited only to the world of ideas and divine objects, and this is just at the time when real entities and earthly things began to concentrate on themselves all the interest. Metaphysics has become flat. In the same year when the last great French metaphysicians of the 17th century, Malbranche and Arnault passed away, *Helvetius and Condillac* were born.

The man who *theoretically* undermined all *confidence* in the metaphysics of the seventeenth century and in all metaphysics in general was *Pierre Beil*. His weapon was *skepticism*, which itself was forged from the magical formulas of metaphysics. He himself proceeded primarily from Cartesian metaphysics. Just as *Feuerbach's* struggle against speculative theology pushed into the struggle against *speculative philosophy* precisely because he saw the last pillar of theology in speculation and was forced to force the theologians back from imaginary science to a *gross repulsive faith*, in the same way, religious doubt led Beil to doubt metaphysics, which served as the basis for faith. He therefore criticized the entire historical development of metaphysics. He became her historian in order to write the story of her death. For the most part, he refuted *Spinoza and Leibniz*.

*Pierre Beil* not only destroyed metaphysics with scepticism, thereby clearing the way for the assimilation of materialism and the philosophy of common sense in France, he heralded the emergence of an atheistic society, which soon really began to exist, by proving that a *society* consisting of *atheists* was possible that an atheist *can* be a respectable person, that a person is not humiliated by atheism, but by prejudice and idolatry.

In the words of one French writer, *Pierre Beil* was “the last metaphysician in the sense of the 17th century and the first philosopher in the sense of the 18th century.”

In addition to the negative refutation of theology and metaphysics of the 17th century, a *positive anti-metaphysical* system was also needed. There was a need for a book that would bring the then life practice into the system and give it a theoretical justification. *Locke*’s work on the Origin of the Human Mind came in very handy from that side of the strait. It was greeted with enthusiasm as a long and passionately anticipated guest.

The question is: was *Locke* a student of *Spinoza*? A “sinful” story can answer this:

Materialism is the *natural born* son of *Great Britain*. Even the British scholastic *Duns Scott* asked himself: “*is matter capable of thinking?*”

To make such a miracle possible, he appealed to God’s omnipotence, that is, he forced *theology itself* to preach *materialism*. In addition, he was a *nominalist*. Nominalism was one of the main elements of *English* materialism and in general is the *first expression* of materialism.

But the true ancestor of *English materialism* and generally the *experimental sciences of modern times* was *Bacon*. Natural science is in his eyes a true science, and *physics*, based on the evidence of external feelings, is an essential part of natural science. *Anaxagoras* with his homeomerics and *Democritus* with his atoms are often cited by him as authorities. According to him, *feelings* are infallible and constitute the *source* of all knowledge. Science is an *experimental science* and consists in applying the *rational method* to sensory data. Induction, analysis, comparison, observation, experiments are the main conditions of the rational method. The first and most important of the innate properties of *matter* it is a *movement*—not only as a *mechanical* and *mathematical* motion, but more as an *aspiration*, as the life *spirit* as *voltage*, or, as *Jacob Boehme*, *torture* (Qual) matter. The primary forms of matter are living, individualizing, intrinsic to it, creating specific differences, *significant forces*.

In *Bacon*, as the first creator of materialism, the embryos of the comprehensive development of this teaching are still hidden in a naive form. Matter smiles with its poetic sensual splendour to the whole person. But *Bacon*’s teachings set out in aphoristic form are still full of theological inconsistency.

In its further development, materialism becomes *one-sided*. Hobbes is a *taxonomist of Bacon* materialism. Sensuality loses its bright colours and turns into an abstract sensuality of the *geometric*. *Physical* movement is sacrificed to *mechanical*, or *mathematical*, motion, geometry is proclaimed the main science. Materialism becomes *hostile to man*. In order to overcome the *man-hating, ethereal* spirit in his own field, materialism must itself mortify its flesh and become *an ascetic*. He acts as a *rational being* but, on the other hand, he develops all conclusions of reason with merciless consistency.

If sensuality is the source of all knowledge, as Hobbes argues, proceeding from Bacon, then contemplation, thought, representation, etc. are none other than the phantoms of the bodily world, more or less devoid of its forms accessible to external senses. Science can only name these phantoms. *The same name can be applied to many phantoms. Name names may even exist. But it would be a contradiction, on the one hand, to see in the sensory world the source of all ideas, on the other hand, to assert that a word is something more than a word, that in addition to existing in a representation, there are always only separate beings, there are still common entities. An incorporeal substance is the same contradiction as an incorporeal body. The body, being, substance—all this is one and the same real idea. It is impossible to separate thought from that matter which thinks. She is the subject of all changes. The word infinite is meaningless if it does not mean our ability to endlessly increase any given value. Since only the material is accessible to perception and knowledge, one can not know anything about the existence of God. Only my own existence is certain for me. Every human passion is a mechanical movement that ends or begins. The objects of our aspirations are good. Man is subject to the same laws as nature. Strength and freedom are identical.*

Hobbes systematized Bacon, but did not provide a detailed justification for the main principle - the origin of knowledge and ideas from the sensory world. This principle of Bacon and Hobbes was developed by Locke in his "*Experience on the Origin of the Human Mind.*"

Hobbes destroyed the *theistic* prejudices of Bacon's materialism; Collins, Dodval, Coward, Gartley and Priestley destroyed the last theological framework of Locke's sensualism. Theism - at least for the materialist—is no more than a convenient and mild form of getting rid of religion.

We have already mentioned how the appearance of Locke's work met the needs of French enlightenment. Locke substantiated the philosophy of bon sens of common sense, that is, he said indirectly that there can be no philosophy other than reason based on the testimonies of healthy human feelings.

Locke's *immediate* student and *French* interpreter, Condillac, immediately directed Locke's sensualism against *metaphysics of the seventeenth century*. He proved that the French rightly rejected this metaphysics as a simple and unfortunate result of imagination and theological prejudice. He published a work in which he refuted the systems of *Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Malbranche*.

In his essay *Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines*, he developed Locke's point of view, proving that not only the soul, but also feelings, not only the art of creating ideas, but also the art of sensory perception are a matter of *experience and habit*. Of *education and external circumstances* depends therefore all human development. Only *electric* philosophy subsequently supplanted Condillac from French schools.

The difference between *French and English* materialism corresponds to the difference between these nations. The French endowed English materialism with wit, flesh, blood and eloquence. They gave him still lacking temperament and grace. They *civilized* him.

In *Helvetius*, who also came from Locke, materialism takes on a true French character. It directly applies to public life (Helvetius, "De l'homme"). Sensual impressions, selfishness, pleasure and correctly understood personal interest form the basis of morality. The natural equality of human spiritual abilities, the unity of the successes of the mind with the successes of the industry, the natural kindness of man, the omnipotence of education are the main points of his system.

*Lamettri's* works represent the experience of combining Cartesian materialism with English. La Mettrie uses Descartes' physics in all its details. His "L'homme-machine" is modeled on the animal - the Descartes machine. In Holbach's *Système de la nature*, the part devoted to physics also represents a combination of French and English materialism, while the theory of morality essentially relies on Helvetius morality. Robinet ("De la nature"), the French materialist who most of all remained in touch with metaphysics and therefore received Hegel's praise, refers most definitely to *Leibniz*.

We do not need to talk about Volna, Dupuis, Diderot and others, like about the Physiocrats, after we, on the one hand, found out the

double origin of French materialism from the physics of Descartes and English materialism, and on the other hand, pointed to the opposite of French materialism *the metaphysics of the 17th century*; the metaphysics of Descartes, Spinoza, Malbranche and Leibniz. The Germans first drew attention to this opposite only after they themselves entered the struggle against *speculative metaphysics* .

Just as *Cartesian* materialism leads to *natural science in the close sense of the word*, so another direction of French materialism leads directly to *socialism and communism*.

It does not take much wit to see the connection between the teachings of materialism about the innate inclination toward good, about the equality of people's mental abilities, about the omnipotence of experience, habits, upbringing, about the influence of external circumstances on a person, about the high importance of industry, about the moral right to enjoyment, etc.—and communism and socialism. If a person draws all his knowledge, sensations, etc. from the sensory world and experience received from this world, then it is necessary to arrange the world around him so that a person cognizes the true humanity in him, so that he gets used to educate himself human properties. If a correctly understood interest is the principle of all morality, then we must strive to ensure that the private interest of an individual coincides with universal interests.

If a person's character is created by circumstances, then it is necessary to make the circumstances humane. If a person, by his nature, is a social being, then he can only develop his true nature in society, and the strength of his nature must be judged not by individual individuals, but by the whole society.

You can find these and similar clauses almost literally even among the oldest French materialists. This is not the place to enter their assessment. Evidence of the socialist tendency of materialism is the "defence of vices" of Mandeville, one of Locke's earliest English students. He proves that in *modern* society, vices are *necessary and useful* . This in no way can be recognized as a defence of modern society.

*Fourier* directly proceeds from the teachings of the French materialists. *Babuvists* were rude, uncivilized materialists, but developed communism originates *directly from French materialism* . Materialism in the exact form that *Helvetius* gave it is returning to its homeland, to *England* . *Helvetius* morality served as the basis for *Bentham's* moral system , built on a *correctly understood personal interest*, and *Owen* , based on *Bentham's* theory , laid the

foundation for English communism. French *cabe*, exiled to England, is influenced by the communist ideas there and, upon returning to France, becomes the most popular, albeit the most superficial, representative of communism. The more scientific French Communists, Desami, Gay, and others, develop, like Owen, the doctrine of *materialism* as a doctrine of *real humanism* and as the *logical basis of communism*. (*k. Marx and F. Engels, Holy Family, vol. III, p. 153-161.*)

## **The Limitations of Materialism of the XVIII Century**

The materialism of the past (XVIII) century was predominantly mechanical, because of all the natural sciences by that time only mechanics had reached a certain degree of completeness, and it was only the mechanics of solids (earthly and heavenly)—in short, the mechanics of gravity. Chemistry had a childish appearance, it still adhered to the theory of phlogiston [According to this theory, the essence of combustion was that a special fiery substance called phlogiston was supposedly separated from a burning body. At the end of the 18th century, scientists found a different explanation for the combustion process. The French chemist Lavoisier, using the instructions of the English chemist Priestley, put forward the theory that during burning some mysterious phlogiston does not stand out from the burning body, but rather, a special element, oxygen combines with the burning body. By this discovery, Engels says, *F. Engels, Preface to Volume II of Capital, 1885—Ed.*]. Biology was still in diapers; the plant and animal organism was studied only in draft; it was explained by purely mechanical reasons. In the eyes of the materialists of the eighteenth century, man was a machine, like animals in the eyes of Descartes. The exceptional application of the measure of mechanics to chemical and organic processes, in the field of which mechanical laws, although they continue to operate, but recede into the background before other, higher laws, is the first peculiar, but inevitable then limitation of classical French materialism.

The second peculiar limitation of this materialism lies in its inability to understand the world as a process, as a substance that is in continuous development. This corresponded to the then state of natural science and the metaphysical, i.e., anti-dialectical, method of

philosophical thinking associated with it. Nature is in perpetual motion: they knew it then. But according to the then view, this movement rotated exactly the same forever in a circle and thus remained in fact in the same place: it always led to the same unchanging consequences. Such a view was then inevitable. Kant's theory of the emergence of the solar system [The theory that explains the origin of the sun and planets from rotating red-hot nebulae. - *Red.*] then just appeared and seemed so far only a simple curiosity. The history of the development of the earth, geology, was still completely unknown. The idea of the origin of present living beings through continuous development, leading from simple to complex, could not then have a scientific basis. Therefore, the absence of a historical view of nature became inevitable. And this drawback is all the less possible to blame the philosophers of the XVIII century that even Hegel is not alien to him. In Hegel, nature, as a simple "discovery" of an idea, is incapable of development in time; it can only unfold its diversity in space, and thus condemned to the eternal repetition of the same processes, it simultaneously exposes all the stages of development it contains, one next to the other. And this nonsense of development in space, but outside of time, - which is the main condition for any development - Hegel imposed on nature when geology, embryology, physiology of plants and animals, and organic chemistry had already been sufficiently developed, and when, on the basis of these new sciences, ingenious forerunners arose later developmental theory (e.g. Goethe and Lamarck). But so the system commanded, and for the sake of the system, the method had to change itself.

In the field of history—the same lack of a historical view of things. Here the eyes clouded the struggle with the remnants of the Middle Ages. They looked at the Middle Ages as a simple break in the course of history caused by universal barbarism over a thousand years. No one paid attention to the great steps taken during the Middle Ages: the expansion of the cultural region of Europe, the great viable nations that formed there in close mutual proximity, and finally, the huge technical successes of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. As a result of this, a correct view of the great historical connection became impossible, and history, at best, was no more than a collection of illustrations and examples ready for the services of a philosopher. (*F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, pp. 24–25.*)

## Feuerbach Materialism

Taken as a whole, Hegel's teachings left, as we saw, a lot of free space for the practical views of various parties. Two things were of practical importance in Germany at that time: religion and politics. A man who treasured predominantly *the Hegel system* could be quite conservative in each of these areas. Those who mainly regarded the dialectical *method*, could in politics and religion belong to the most extreme opposition. Hegel himself, despite the explosions of revolutionary anger that were not uncommon in his writings, generally tended to be mostly conservative: it was not without reason that his system cost him much more "hard work of thought" than his method. But at the end of the 30s, the split in his school became more and more noticeable. In the fight against Orthodox priests and feudal reactionaries, the so-called young Hegelians are the left wing [In contrast to the right Hegelians, who upheld conservative views, supported the autocracy, the privileged position of the nobility and the dominant religion (Protestant faith), young, or left-wing, Hegelian Bauer, sought in time to draw atheistic and revolutionary conclusions from Hegel's philosophy.—*Red.*]—little by little they rejected that philosophical and neglectful attitude to the burning issues of the day, for which the government tolerated their teachings and even patronized it. And when in 1840 the orthodox hypocrisy and feudal-autocratic reaction came to the throne in the person of Friedrich-William IV, it was necessary to openly side with one or another party. The struggle was still waged by philosophical weapons, but not for the sake of abstract philosophical goals. It was already about the destruction of the inherited religion and the existing state. Whereas in *Deutsche Jahrbücher* the practical ultimate goals were predominantly in philosophical attire, in the *Rheinische Zeitung* of 1842 the preaching of the Young Hegelians was already directly the philosophy of the rising radical bourgeoisie; the philosophical cloak served her only to avert censorship [*Deutsche Jahrbücher* (German Yearbooks)—a journal published by the left-wing Hegelians A. Ruge and T. Echtermeyer in 1838–1843. in Leipzig. *Reinische Zeitung* (Rhine Newspaper) 1842-1843.- The organ of the Rhine liberal bourgeois. Among the main employees of the newspaper was K. Marx. From October to the end of 1842, Marx was its editor in chief. Under the leadership of Marx, the newspaper took on a sharply radical character. The newspaper was discontinued by the Prussian

government in late March 1843 - Under the leadership of Marx, the newspaper took on a sharply radical character. The newspaper was discontinued by the Prussian government in late March 1843 - Under the leadership of Marx, the newspaper took on a sharply radical character. The newspaper was discontinued by the Prussian government in late March 1843—*Ed.*].

But politics was then a very thorny area, so the main struggle was conducted against religion. However, at that time, especially in 1840, the struggle against religion was indirectly a political struggle. The first impetus was given by Strauss's book "Das Leben Jesu" ("The Life of Jesus"), published in 1835. Later, the theory of the emergence of gospel myths presented in this book was later opposed by Bruno Bauer, who claimed that a number of gospel stories were composed by the authors of the gospels themselves. The dispute between Strauss and Bauer was waged under the guise of a philosophical struggle between "self-awareness" and "substance" [Strauss in his book portrayed Jesus as an outstanding historical figure, and not as a god. Strauss considered the gospel stories myths (fairy tales), prevailing in Christian communities; Strauss, therefore, held the opinion that the gospel stories arose as if unconsciously. B. Bauer, criticizing Strauss, reproached him for not taking the proper place for consciousness. According to Bauer, the gospel myths "in the historical process of their formation passed through the consciousness of people who intentionally composed them for one or another religious purpose" (*G. Plekhanov*). The "self-awareness" that the young Hegelians brought to the forefront reflected the very consciousness of the revolutionary-minded bourgeois intelligentsia of Germany in the pre-revolutionary era.—*Ed.*].

The question of how the gospel stories about miracles arose—whether they were formed through unconscious mythological creation in the bowels of the community or were fabricated by the evangelists themselves—has grown to the question of what is the main active force in world history: "substance" or "self-consciousness". Finally, Stirner, the prophet of modern anarchism, appeared—Bakunin borrowed a lot from him—and outdid the autocratic "self-consciousness" with his autocratic "only" [Engels means the book of Max Stirner (pseudonym Caspar Schmidt) published in 1845 ("The Only and his Property"). Its criticism was given by Marx and Engels in their manuscript "German Ideology" (see Works, vol. IV).—*Ed.*].

We will not consider in more detail this side of the process of decomposition of the Hegelian school. For us it is more important to

pay attention to this: the practical needs of the struggle against a positive religion have led many of the most determined young Hegelians to Anglo-French materialism [In the 17th century. in England and in the XVIII century. in France, in connection with the development of a bourgeois mode of production in these countries, natural science and materialistic philosophy developed. (Representatives of English materialism: Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and others.) In France, materialistic philosophers of the XVIII century. (Didro, Helvetius, Holbach, and others.)—Representatives of the revolutionary bourgeoisie—waged a merciless struggle “against serfdom in institutions and ideas,” using the lessons of the English revolution and being in philosophy students and successors of English materialism—*Red.*]. And this put them in conflict with their school system.

Meanwhile, as nature alone is valid for a materialist, in the Hegelian system nature is the “discovery” of an absolute idea, as if its belittling; and in any case, thinking and its product, the idea, appear in this system as something primary, and nature as derivative, existing only because the idea has come down to this. The Young Hegelians were confused in different ways in this contradiction.

Then the essay of Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, appeared. With one blow it dispelled this contradiction, proclaiming the triumph of materialism again and without reservation. Nature exists independently of any philosophy. It is the foundation on which we, humans, the works of nature have grown. There is nothing outside of nature and man, and the higher beings created by our religious fantasy are just fantastic reflections of our own essence. The spell was lifted: the “system” was blown up and thrown aside, the contradiction was resolved by a simple discovery of the fact that it exists only in the imagination. He who has not survived the liberating influence of this book cannot even imagine it. We were all delighted, and we all became temporarily followers of Feuerbach. With what enthusiasm Marx welcomed the new view and how much it influenced him, despite all his critical reservations, can be read in *The Holy Family* [Full title of the book of Marx and Engels: “*The Holy Family*”, or criticism of critical criticism. Against Bruno Bauer with associates. “*The Holy Family* is the comic nickname of the Bauer brothers’ philosophers and their followers. These gentlemen preached criticism that stands above all reality, above parties and politics, denies all practical activity and only “critically” contemplates the world around and the events taking place in it. Lord Bauers judged the proletariat

from above as an uncritical mass. Marx and Engels resolutely rebelled against this absurd and harmful direction. In the name of the real human person—the worker, trampled upon by the ruling classes and the state, they require not contemplation, but a struggle for a better society. They see a force capable of waging such a struggle and interested in it, of course, in the proletariat (Lenin, *Soch.*, Vol. I, article “Friedrich Engels”).—*Ed.* ].

Even the mistakes of the book (Feuerbach) then strengthened its influence. The fiction, sometimes even pompous syllable provided a wide range of readers, and in any case acted refreshingly after an abstract and heavy Hegelianism. The same can be said of the exorbitant deification of love. He could be excused, although not justified, as a reaction against the autocracy of “pure thinking,” which had become completely unbearable. One should not forget, however, that it was precisely these two weaknesses of Feuerbach that seized upon “true socialism”, which had spread like an infection since 1844 among the “educated” people of Germany and which scientific research replaced with a fiction phrase, and to the place of liberation of the proletariat by economic transformation of production set the liberation of mankind through “love”—in a word, hit the most disgusting fiction and loving chatter. A typical representative of this trend was Mr. Karl Grün [For a description of German “true” socialism, see the “Communist Manifesto.”].

We will not forget yet this: the Hegelian school has decayed, but the criticism has not yet mastered the Hegelian philosophy, Strauss and Bauer, taking each of its sides, directed it as a polemical weapon against the other, Feuerbach crashed the system and simply dropped it. But declaring this philosophy erroneous does not mean coping with it. And it was impossible through simple ignorance to eliminate such a great work as Hegelian philosophy, which had such a huge impact on the spiritual development of the nation. She had to be “buried” [I pass on the word to *bury* the German word *aufhaben*, which Hegel had the sense of eliminating and at the same time preserving this concept: *aufgehoben aber zugleich aufbewahrt.*—*G. P.*] in its own sense, that is, criticism was supposed to destroy its form, preserving its content, we will see below how this task was solved.

In the meantime, however, the revolution of 1848 just as accurately cast aside all philosophy, just as Feuerbach cast aside his Hegel. Thanks to this, Feuerbach himself receded into the background. (*F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 13-11*).

## Idealism in Feuerbach's Views on Social Life

The course of the development of Feuerbach is the course of the development of the Hegelian,—though he was never a completely faithful Hegelian,—to materialism. At a certain stage of this development, he came to a complete break with the idealistic system of his predecessor. With irrepressible force, finally, he conquered the realization that the Hegelian eternal being of the “absolute idea” and “logical categories” [Hegel in his “logic” analyses basic concepts, such as: being, becoming, quality, quantity, essence, phenomenon, opportunity, chance, necessity, reality, etc. These abstract basic concepts are called “logical categories.” According to Hegel, these categories have an independent “eternal existence, independent of man (objective idealism). In reality, concepts and conclusions are only reflections of processes in the human brain, occurring in the material world. “Moments of cognition (= “ideas”) by man of nature is what the categories of logic are.” “The practice of man, repeating billions of times, is fixed in the human mind by the figures of logic. These figures have the strength of a prejudice, the axiomatic character is precisely (and only) by virtue of this billionth repetition” (“L. Collection”, IX, pp. 230 and 267). “Logical categories” is precisely that ideal that Marx speaks of in the preface to the first edition of Volume I of Capital. “The ideal is nothing but the material, transplanted into the human head and transformed in it.”—These figures have the strength of a prejudice, the axiomatic character is precisely (and only) by virtue of this billionth repetition (“L. Collection”, IX, pp. 230 and 267). “Logical categories” is precisely that ideal that Marx speaks of in the preface to the first edition of Volume I of Capital. “The ideal is nothing but the material, transplanted into the human head and transformed in it.”—These figures have the strength of a prejudice, the axiomatic character is precisely (and only) by virtue of this billionth repetition (“L. Collection”, IX, pp. 230 and 267). “Logical categories” is precisely that ideal that Marx speaks of in the preface to the first edition of Volume I of Capital. “The ideal is nothing but the material, transplanted into the human head and transformed in it.”—*Red.*], whose existence, according to Hegel, preceded the existence of the world, is nothing more than a fantastic remnant of faith in a creator who is outside the world; that the material, sensually perceived world

to which we ourselves belong is the only real world and that our consciousness and thinking, no matter how supersensible it may seem, is generated by the material, bodily organ—the brain. Not matter is generated by spirit, but spirit itself is the highest product of matter. This, of course, is pure materialism. But, having reached this point, Feuerbach stops. He cannot overcome the usual philosophical prejudice, the prejudice is not against the creature itself, but against the word “materialism”. He says: “For me, materialism is the foundation of the building of human nature and knowledge; but for me it’s not like for a physiologist, for a natural scientist in the strict sense, for example, for Moleshott, and what he cannot but be for them according to their point of view and their specialty, that is, for me it is not the building itself. Going back, I am entirely with the materialists; going forward, I am not with them.”

Feuerbach confuses materialism here as a general worldview, based on a certain understanding of the relationship of matter and spirit, with the particular form in which this worldview was expressed at a certain historical level, namely in the 18th century. Moreover, he ascribes to materialism the generally vulgar, vulgar appearance that materialism of the eighteenth century has now taken in the heads of doctors and naturalists and in which it was presented by the peddlers Buchner, Vogt, and Moleshott in the 1950s. But materialism, like idealism, has gone through a series of stages of development. He has to take a new form with each new great discovery that constitutes an era in natural science. And since history began to be considered from a materialistic point of view, a new path for development has also been paved here...

Two things must be kept in mind here. Firstly, during Feuerbach’s life, natural science was in the process of strong fermentation, which received a relative, introducing somewhat greater clarity, completion only in the last fifteen years. An unprecedented multitude of new scientific data was collected, but only very recently it became possible to establish a connection, and, therefore, order in this chaotic crowd of discoveries. True, the three most important discoveries—the opening of the cell, the doctrine of the conversion of energy, the development theory named after Darwin—still found Feuerbach alive. But could the philosopher who was in solitude in the countryside follow the science sufficiently to be able to fully appreciate such discoveries, which the natural scientists themselves partially disputed, partly, they did not know how to use it properly. The only miserable German order is to blame here, thanks to

which the professorial departments were exclusively replaced by sophisticated eclectic crumbs, while Feuerbach, who was infinitely higher than all these crumbs, was greedy and sour in the rural outback. It is not Feuerbach, therefore, to blame for the fact that the newest historical view of nature, which has now made possible, eliminating all the one-sidedness of French materialism, has remained inaccessible to him.

Secondly, Feuerbach was absolutely right when he said that exclusively natural science materialism “constitutes the basis of the building of human knowledge, but not knowledge itself”. We are surrounded not only by nature, but also by a human society, which, like nature, has its own history of development and its own science. The task was to reconcile the science of society, i.e., the whole totality of the so-called historical and philosophical sciences, with the materialistic basis and reconstruct it. But Feuerbach was not destined to do so. In this regard, in spite of the “basis”, he has not yet freed himself from the old idealistic bonds, which he himself admitted, saying: “going back, I am wholly with the materialists; going forward—I am not with them.” But it was here, in the public sphere, that Feuerbach himself “didn’t go beyond his point of view of 1840 or 1844,” and again, mainly due to his seclusion, thanks to which he, in his inclinations, needed society more than all other philosophers, was forced to produce his thoughts in complete solitude, and not in friendly or hostile clashes with other people of his calibre. Below we will examine in more detail to what extent he remained an idealist in this field. (*F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, pp. 26-27*).

\* \* \*

Feuerbach’s actual idealism emerges immediately as we approach his ethics and philosophy of religion. Feuerbach does not want to abolish religion at all; he wants to perfect it. Philosophy itself must be absorbed in religion. “The periods of mankind differ from one another only by changes in religion. This historical movement only becomes powerful when it takes hold of the human heart. The heart is not a form of religion; so it cannot be said that religion must also be in the heart; it is the essence of religion” (quoted from Starke, p. 168). According to Feuerbach’s teachings, religion is a feeling-based cordial relationship between people, a relationship that has so far tried to find its true content in a fantastic reflection of reality—through the

medium of a god or several gods, of these fantastic reflections of human properties—and now he directly and directly finds him in the love between “I” and “you.” In the end, Feuerbach’s sexual love is one of the highest, if not the highest, form of professing his new religion.

Feeling-based relationships between people, especially between people of different sexes, have existed since humanity has existed. As for sexual love, over the past eight centuries it has acquired such a significance and has won such a place that it has become the axis around which all poetry necessarily revolves. The existing positive religions are limited to giving the highest sanctification to the state regulation of sexual love, i.e., marriage law. If they had completely disappeared, the slightest change would not have occurred in the practice of love and friendship. In France, in the period from 1793 to 1799, the Christian religion really disappeared to such an extent that Napoleon himself, not without difficulty and not without resistance, managed to introduce it again [meaning the restoration of the Catholic Church in France by Napoleon, which was destroyed by the Jacobin convention. Napoleon (while still a consul) July 15, 1801 signed a concordat (agreement) with the pope.—*Ed* .]. However, during this time no one felt that it needed to be replaced with something like Feuerbach’s new religion.

Feuerbach’s idealism consists in the fact that he has sexual love, friendship, compassion, selflessness and everything based on mutual inclination, he does not dare to leave the relations of people in the form that they have on their own, in addition to connecting them with some special religious system, which, in his opinion, belongs to the past. He argues that these relations will get their full meaning only when they are consecrated with the word “religion.” For him, the main thing is not that such purely human relations exist, but that they should be looked upon as a new, true religion. He agrees to recognize them as complete only if the seal of religion is attached to them. The noun *religion* comes from the verb *religare* and originally meant *connection*. Thus, any mutual connection between two people is a religion. Such etymological tricks represent the last loophole of idealistic philosophy. The words are assigned not the meaning that they received through the historical development of their actual use, but that which they should have by virtue of their etymological genealogy. So that the word “religion”, which is expensive for the old idealistic habit, does not disappear, sexual love and sexual relations

are elevated to the rank of religion. (*F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, pp. 30-31.*)

## **Feuerbach's Place in the History of Philosophy**

“In relation to Saint-Simon and Fourier, Proudhon represents approximately the same as Feuerbach in relation to Hegel. Feuerbach is very pale compared to Hegel. Nevertheless, appearing after Hegel, he carried out a coup, shading off some points that Hegel left in a mystical half-light, which were unpleasant for the Christian consciousness and very important for the success of critics. (*Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, p. 18, ed. 1928*)

## **Vulgar Materialism**

People who took on the role of peddlers of cheap materialism in Germany in the 1950s did not go beyond the teachings of their teachers. All the new successes of the natural sciences served them only as new arguments against the existence of the creator of the universe. They did not even think about developing further the theory. Idealism, the wisdom of which had already been completely exhausted by that time and which was mortally wounded by the revolution of 1848, was thus satisfied that materialism had fallen even lower at that time. Feuerbach was absolutely right in rejecting all responsibility for this materialism. But he did not have the right to confuse the doctrine of peddlers with materialism in general. (*F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, pp. 25-26.*)

\* \* \*

*Buchner.* The origin of the direction. (Crash.) The resolution of idealistic philosophy into materialistic. Control over science removed. The sudden flourishing of flat materialistic popular literature, the materialism of which was to replace the lack of scientific. Its heyday was just in the era of the deepest humiliation of bourgeois Germany and the fall of official German science. 1850-

1860. Vogt, Moleshott, Buchner. Mutual insurance. (Swearing at the address of philosophy.) A new revival thanks to the entry into fashion of Darwinism, which these gentlemen immediately rented.

It would be possible to leave them alone, leaving them to pursue their own, nevertheless not bad, though modest affair of spreading philosophy, atheism, etc. among the Germans, but 1) scolding at the address of philosophy (leading places) [Buchner knows philosophy only how a dogmatist, since he himself is a dogmatist, the flattest epigon of German enlightenment, to whom the intellectual movement of the great French materialism (Hegel about them) remained alien, just as Nikolai was a stranger to Voltaire. Lessingovskoe: “Dead Dog—Spinoza”. Enz. Vorr. 19.], which, in spite of everything, is the glory of Germany, and 2) the claim to extend this theory of nature to society and reform socialism—all this makes us pay attention to them. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 3.*)

## **Criticism of Mechanical and Vulgar Materialism by Marx and Engels**

Marx and Engels always condemned *bad* (and mainly anti-dialectical) materialism, but they condemned it from the point of view of higher, more developed, dialectical *materialism*, and not from the point of view of Humeism or Berkeley. Marx, Engels and Dietzgen talked about the bad materialists, reckoning with them and wanting to correct their mistakes, but they would not even talk about the Yumists and Berklians, Mach and Avenarius, confining themselves to one more contemptuous remark about their *entire* direction. Therefore, the endless antics of our Machians, and their faces over Holbach and Co., Buchner and Co. etc., mean wholly and exclusively throwing sand into the eyes of the public, covering up the retreat of all Machism from the very foundations of materialism in general, fear of directly and clearly reckoning with Engels.

And it's clearer than Engels said about the French materialism of the XVIII century. and about Büchner, Focht and Moleshott at the end of Chapter II of his Ludwig Feuerbach, it would be difficult to express oneself. Engels *can not be* misunderstood unless *one* wishes to pervert it. Marx and I are materialists, says Engels in this chapter, clarifying the *main* difference between all schools of materialism from the *entire camp of* idealists, from all Kantians and Humeans in general. And

Engels reproaches Feuerbach for some cowardice, frivolity, expressed in the fact that in some places he renounced materialism in general because of the mistakes of one or another school of materialists. Feuerbach “had no right (durfte nicht),—says Engels,—mixing the doctrine of hawkers (Buchner and Co.) with materialism in general” (S. 21). Only the heads, spoiled by reading and accepting on faith the teachings of the German reactionary professors, could *not understand* the nature of *such* reproaches by Engels at Feuerbach.

Engels says, more clearly, that Buchner and Co. “did not go beyond the teachings of their teachers,” that is, the materialists of the eighteenth century, and did not take a *single step forward*. For this and *only for that* Engels took Büchner and Co., not for their materialism, as the ignoramuses think, but because they *did not move forward* materialism, “*did not think even to further develop the theory of*” materialism. *Only* for that Engels took Büchner and Co. And right there *on the points* Engels lists *three* fundamental “limitations” (Beschränktheit) of the French materialists of the XVIII century, which got rid of Marx and Engels, but failed to get rid of Buchner and Co. The first limitation: the view of the old materialists was “mechanical” *in the sense* that they “applied exclusively the scale of mechanics to processes of a chemical and organic nature” (S. 19). We will see in the next chapter how a misunderstanding of these words by Engels led some people to go crazy into idealism through new physics. Engels does not reject *mechanical* materialism for this, as physicists accuse him of the “newest” idealistic (Machist identity) trend. The second limitation: the metaphysical views of the old materialists in the sense of the “*anti-dialecticism of their philosophy*”. This limitation is wholly shared with Buchner and Co. our Machists, who, as we have seen, have understood absolutely nothing about Engels’s application of dialectics to epistemology (absolute and relative truth, for example). The third limitation: the preservation of idealism “above” in the field of social science, a lack of understanding of historical materialism.

After listing and explaining these three “limitations” (S. 19-21) with exhaustive clarity, Engels *immediately* adds: “Buchner and Co. did not go *beyond these limits*” (Über diese Schranken) .

*Exclusively* for these three things and *exclusively* within these limits, does Engels refute both the materialism of the XVIII century. and the teachings of Buchner and Co.! On all other, more elementary, questions of materialism (perverted by the Machists) *there is no difference* between Marx and Engels, on the one

hand, with all these old materialists, on the other, *there cannot be*. Confusion into this perfectly clear question have only the Russian Machians, as for the Western teachers and their adherents obviously fundamental divergence line of Mach and Co. with the line of materialists in general. Our Machists needed to confuse the issue in order to present their break with Marxism and the transition to the camp of bourgeois philosophy in the form of “small corrections” to Marxism!

Take Dühring. It is hard to imagine anything more contemptuous than Engels’ reviews of him. But look *how Lehler criticized the same Dühring simultaneously with Engels*, praising Mach’s “revolutionary philosophy”. For Leclair, Dühring is the “*extreme left*” of materialism, “declaring without cover as a sensation, like any manifestation of consciousness and reason, by isolation, function, the highest flower, cumulative effect, etc. of the animal organism” (*Der Realismus*, etc., 1879, S. 23-24).

Did Engels criticize Dühring for this? No. In this, he *completely agreed* with Dühring, as well as with any other materialist. He criticized Dühring from a diametrically opposite point of view, for the inconsistency of materialism, for idealistic quirks, leaving a loophole for fideism.

“Nature itself works in a being with a representation, as well as from outside it, in order to naturally produce coherent views and create the necessary knowledge about the course of things.” Lehler cites these words of Dühring and furiously attacks materialism of this point of view, the “gross metaphysics” of this materialism, “self-deception”, etc., etc. (S. 160 and 161-163).

Did Engels criticize Dühring for this? No. He ridiculed all pomp, but in recognition of the objective laws of nature, reflected by consciousness, *Engels completely converged with Dühring*, as well as with any other materialist.

“Thinking is the highest form of the rest of reality” ... “The basic premise of philosophy is the independence and distinctness of the materially real world from the group of phenomena of consciousness that arise in this world and know it.” Lehler cites these words of Dühring along with a number of Dühring’s attacks on Kant, etc., accusing Dühring of “metaphysics” for this (S. 218-222), of recognizing the “metaphysical dogma”, etc.

Was Engels Dühring criticized for this? No. In the fact that the world exists independently of consciousness, and that any deviation from this truth of the Kantians, Humeans, Berkeleyans, etc., is false,

Engels completely agreed with Dühring, as well as with any other materialist. If Engels could see *on which side* Lehkler would criticize Dühring arm in arm with Mach, he would have called these two philosophical reactionaries a *hundred times* more contemptuous terms than Dühring! For Leclair, Dühring was the epitome of evil realism and materialism (cf. also *Beitrag zu einer monistischen Erkenntnistheorie*, 1882, S. 45 [Essays on the Monistic Theory of Knowledge, 1882, p. 45,—*Ed.*]).—W. Schuppe, a teacher and associate of Maxa, accused Dühring in 1878 of “delusional realism” (Traumrealismus) [Dr. *Wilhelm Schuppe*, *Erkenntnistheoretische Logik*, Bonn, 1878, S. 56. (*Schuppe V.*, *Epistemological Logic*, p. 56, Bonn, 1878.—*Ed.*)] In revenge for the word “delusional idealism”, promoted by Dühring against all idealists. For Engels, *it was just the opposite*: Dühring was *not sufficiently* seasoned, clear and consistent materialist.

And Marx, with Engels and I. Dietzgen, entered the philosophical field when materialism reigned in the advanced intelligentsia in general, in working circles in particular. It is quite natural, therefore, that Marx and Engels turned their full attention not to the repetition of the old, but to the serious theoretical *development of* materialism, its application to history, that is, to *building the building of* materialistic philosophy to the *top*. Naturally, they *limited themselves* to correcting Feuerbach’s mistakes in the field of epistemology, ridiculing the vulgarities of the materialist Dühring, criticizing Buchner’s mistakes (see I. Dietzgen), emphasizing what these writers, most common and popular in the work environment, *especially* lacking, namely: dialectics. The alphabetical truths of materialism, which dozens of screamers shouted in dozens of publications, Marx, Engels and I. Dietzgen did not worry, directing all their attention to the fact that these alphabetical truths were not vulgarized, not simplified too much, did not lead to stagnation of thoughts (“materialism below, idealism above”), to forgetfulness *valuable* fruit idealistic systems *gegelevskoj* dialectic—this pearly grain, which cocks Buchner Dühring and Co. (along with Leclair, Mach, Avenarius, etc.), could not be isolated from dung heap absolute idealism.

If you imagine any concrete ideas about these historical conditions of the philosophical works of Engels and I. Dietzgen, it will become completely clear why they *were fenced off* from the vulgarization of the elementary truths of materialism rather than *protecting* these very truths. Marx and Engels also fenced themselves off from the vulgarization of the basic requirements of

political democracy, rather than defended these requirements themselves.

Only students of philosophical reactionaries could “not notice” this circumstance and present the readers with a case in such a way as if Marx and Engels did not understand what it means to be a materialist. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, p. 196-199, ed. 3<sup>rd</sup>.*)

## **The Abstractly Contemplative Nature of Pre-Marxian Materialism**

### **Abstracts about Feuerbach**

1

The main drawback of all the preceding materialism, including Feuerbach's, is that the object, reality, sensuality is taken only in the form of an *object* or in the form of *contemplation*, and not as *human sensory activity, practice*, not subjectively. Therefore, it so happened that the *real* side, in contrast to materialism, was developed by idealism, but only abstractly, since idealism, of course, does not know real, sensory activity as such. Feuerbach wants to deal with sensory objects, really different from objects in thought, but he does not perceive human activity itself as *objective* activity. Therefore, in the “Essence of Christianity” he considers as truly human only theoretical activity, while practice is comprehended and affirmed only in its dirty Jewish form of manifestation. Therefore, he does not understand the significance of “revolutionary”, practically critical activity.

2

The question of whether objective truth is characteristic of human thinking is not at all a question of theory, but a *practical* question. In practice, a person must prove the truth, that is, reality and power, the compassion of his thinking. The debate about the reality or invalidity of thinking isolated from practice is a purely *scholastic question*.

3

The materialistic doctrine that people are the products of circumstances and upbringing, that therefore, changed people are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, this doctrine

forgets that circumstances are changed by people and that the educator himself needs to be educated. It inevitably therefore comes to the conclusion that it divides society into two parts, one of which rises above society (for example, from Robert Owen).

The coincidence of changing circumstances and human activity can be comprehended and rationally understood only as *revolutionary practice*.

4

Feuerbach proceeds from the fact of religious self-estrangement, from a doubling of the world into a religious, imaginary and real. And he is busy reducing the religious world to its secular basis; he does not notice that after completing this work, the main thing remains to be done. But the fact that the secular basis separates itself from itself and affirms itself an independent kingdom in the clouds can only be explained by the self-determination and self-contradiction of this secular basis. Therefore, the latter, firstly, must itself be understood in itself, in its contradiction, and then practically revolutionized by eliminating the contradiction. Therefore, after, for example, the earthly family is revealed as the secret of the holy family, the former must be subjected to theoretical criticism and practically revolutionary.

5

Unhappy with *abstract thinking*, Feuerbach puts forward sensual *contemplation*; but he does not consider sensuality as a practical human-sensory activity.

6

Feuerbach reduces the religious essence to the human essence. But human nature is not an abstraction inherent in an individual. In its reality, it is a combination of social relations.

Feuerbach, without criticizing this real entity, is therefore forced to:

1) abstract from the course of history and affirm a religious feeling in itself and assume an abstract—*isolated*—individual;

2) therefore, his human essence can be understood only as a “race”, as an internal, dumb community, connecting many individuals with *natural* ties.

7

Therefore, Feuerbach does not see that the “religious feeling” itself is a *social product* and that the abstract individual, subjected to analysis, actually belongs to a certain social form.

8

Social life is essentially a *practical* life . All mysteries that lure theory into mysticism find their rational resolution in human practice and in understanding this practice.

9

The most that *contemplative* materialism can achieve, that is, materialism that does not comprehend sensuality as practical activity, is the contemplation of individual individuals in “civil society” [Here, “bürgerliche Gesellschaft” is “civil society”. Not a bourgeois society, but like Hegel’s in the sense of the totality of social (economic, personal, cultural, etc.) relations—in contrast to the political organism—the state.—*Ed.*].

10

The point of view of old materialism is a “*civilian*” society; the point of view of new materialism is *human* society or socialized humanity.

11

Philosophers have only *explained the world* in various ways , but the point is to *change* it. (*F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, pp. 62-65.*)

## V. Dialectical Materialism of Marx, Engels, Lenin

### **The Overcoming of the Old Philosophical Teachings by Marx and Engels and the Creation of Dialectical Materialism**

Strauss, Bauer, Stirner, Feuerbach were the offspring of Hegelian philosophy, since they had not yet left the philosophical ground. After his *Life of Jesus and Dogmatics*, Strauss devoted himself to the philosophical and church-historical fiction à la Renan. Bauer did something significant only in the area of the history of the emergence of Christianity. Stirner remained a simple curiosity even after Bakunin combined it with Proudhon and christened this mixture “anarchism”. Feuerbach alone was an outstanding philosopher. But he not only did not manage to step beyond the bounds of philosophy, posing as a certain science of sciences, reigning over all separate sciences, connecting them together; this philosophy remained in his eyes an inviolable shrine; but even as a philosopher he stopped halfway, he was a materialist from below, an idealist from above. He did not defeat Hegel with a weapon of criticism, but simply threw it aside as something unfit for consumption; at the same time, he himself was not able to oppose the encyclopaedic wealth of the Hegelian system with anything positive except for the pompous religion of love and skinny, powerless morality.

But a different direction emerged from the decomposition of the Hegelian school, the only one that really paid off. This trend is mainly connected with the name of Marx [I will allow myself one personal explanation. Recently, I have repeatedly pointed out my participation in the development of this theory. Therefore, I have to say a few words here that exhaust this issue. I cannot deny that, both before and during my forty-year collaboration with Marx, I independently contributed both to the substantiation and mainly to the development of the theory in question. But a huge part of the main guiding thoughts, especially in the field of history and economics, and even more, their final harsh formulation is Marx's. What I contributed,

Marx could easily replenish without me, with the possible exception of two or three special areas. And that what Marx did, I could never have done. Marx stood higher, saw further, surveyed more and more likely than all of us. Marx was a genius; we are, at best, talents. Without it, our theory would now far not be what it is. Therefore, she is rightly called by his name.]

A break with Hegelian philosophy also occurred here by returning to the materialistic point of view. This means that people in this direction have decided to understand the real world—nature and history—as it is given to anyone who approaches it without pre-prepared idealistic inventions; they decided without any regret to abandon any idealistic fabrication that does not correspond to the facts understood in their own, and not in some kind of fantastic connection. And materialism does not mean anything more. The only difference was that here for the first time they took seriously the materialistic worldview, that it was consistently carried out—at least mainly—in all decisively fields of knowledge.

Hegel was not simply pushed aside. On the contrary, the above-mentioned revolutionary side of his philosophy, his dialectical method were taken as a starting point. But this method in its Hegelian form was unsuitable. Hegel's dialectic is the self-development of a concept. The absolute concept not only exists,—no one knows where,—from the century, but also constitutes the true, life-giving soul of all that exists. It develops to itself, going through all the steps that are contained in it and which are discussed in detail in the Logic. Then it “reveals itself”, turning into nature, where it makes a new development, not conscious of itself, taking the form of natural necessity, and in man, finally, he again comes to self-consciousness. And in history, this self-awareness is again knocked out of a gross state, until, finally, the absolute concept does not again come fully to itself in Hegelian philosophy. The dialectical development that is found in nature and in history, that is, the causal connection of that progressive movement, which, through all deviations to the side and through all short reverse steps, makes its way from the lowest to the highest, this development in Hegel is simply a snapshot of the self-movement of the concept, forever what is happening is unknown where and, in any case, completely independent of any thinking human brain. It was necessary to eliminate this ideological perversion. Returning to the materialist point of view, we again saw pictures in human concepts of pictures from real things, instead of seeing pictures in real things of pictures

from an absolute concept that is at a certain stage of development. Dialectics was reduced to science of the general laws of motion in the external world and in human thought: two sets of laws that are essentially identical but different in expression, since the human head can apply them consciously, while in nature, and for the most part while still in human history, they are paving their way unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an infinite number of seeming accidents. Thus, the dialectic of concepts itself became only a conscious reflection of the dialectical movement of the external world. Along with this, the Hegelian dialectic was placed on the head, or rather, on the feet, as it stood on the head before. And it's wonderful that we were not the only ones to discover this materialistic dialectic, which for many years was our best tool and our sharpest weapon: the German worker Joseph Dietzgen reopened it independently of us and even independently of Hegel [See "Das Wesen der Kopfarbeit, von einem Handarbeiter", Hamburg, Meissner ("The Essence of the Head Work of Man"—I. Dietzgen, Selected Works, vol. I, published by the Marx-Engels Institute, 1931—*Ed.* .)].

Thus, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again perceived and at the same time freed from those idealistic mistakes that made it difficult for Hegel to carry it out consistently. (*F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, pp. 39–41.*)

## **The Abolition of Philosophy in the Old Sense of the Word**

The comprehension of the complete fallacy of idealism that prevailed in Germany until then should inevitably lead to materialism, but, of course, not to the simple metaphysical, exclusively mechanical materialism of the eighteenth century. In contrast to the naive revolutionary, simple denial of the whole past history, modern materialism sees in history the process of development of mankind, and its task is to discover the laws of motion of this process. In contrast to the dominant among the French of the XVIII century, and Hegel's notion of nature as always equal to itself as a whole, invariably moving in the same limited spheres with eternal world bodies, as Newton taught about them, and with invariable organic species, as Linnaeus taught about them, modern materialism connects in one system all the latest successes in science, thanks to which it

became clear that nature also has a history in time, that celestial bodies, like all types of organisms that inhabit them, arise and disappear under favourable conditions, and that, as we generally allow them, they take on infinitely large sizes. In both cases, materialism is essentially dialectical and makes any philosophy that claims to be higher than other sciences redundant. When the requirement to find out one's place in the general system of things and knowledge is applied to each individual science, any special science about this common connection becomes unnecessary. Of all the previous philosophies, only the science of thinking and its laws retains independent significance—formal logic and dialectics, yet the rest is included in the positive sciences of nature and history. (That nature also has a history in time, that celestial bodies, like all kinds of organisms that inhabit them, arise and disappear under favourable conditions, and that these spheres, as we generally allow them, take infinitely large sizes. In both cases, materialism is essentially dialectical and makes any philosophy that claims to be higher than other sciences redundant. When the requirement to find out one's place in the general system of things and knowledge is applied to each individual science, any special science about this common connection becomes unnecessary. Of all the previous philosophies, only the science of thinking and its laws retains independent significance—formal logic and dialectics, yet the rest is included in the positive sciences of nature and history. (*Engels, Anti-Dühring, p. 17, 1932*)

## **The Creation of Materialistic Dialectics by Marx and Engels**

In such an essay as the one that lies before us, there can be no talk of non-methodological criticism of individual chapters from political economy, or of an unsystematic examination of one or another economic controversy. On the contrary, this essay from the very beginning is based on a systematic exposition of the whole complex of economic sciences, on the coherent development of the laws of bourgeois production and exchange. And since economists are nothing more than interpreters and apologists for these laws, this development is at the same time a criticism of all economic literature.

Since the death of Hegel, there has hardly been an attempt to develop any kind of science in its own internal connection. The

official Hegelian school learned from the dialectic of the teacher only the manipulation of the simplest techniques, which it applied to everything that came across, and moreover, often with an awkwardness that reached ridiculous things. Hegel's entire legacy was reduced for her to a simple template, with the help of which any topic was processed, and to the register of words and phrases, which had as their sole task to fill in, when required, a lack of thoughts and positive knowledge. This was the type of Hegelian people about whom one Bonn professor said that they did not understand anything, but could write about everything. Of course, the value of their work corresponded to their level of understanding. However, these gentlemen, despite their arrogance, deep down they felt their weakness so much that they did not undertake any tasks; The old scientific China has maintained its position due to its superiority in relation to positive knowledge. And only when Feuerbach, with his criticism, dealt a crushing blow to the speculative idea, did Hegelianism gradually come to naught, and it might seem that the old metaphysics with its motionless categories was being revived in science.

It was quite natural. After the regime of Hegelian dyadoms, which was the realm of empty phrases, the era naturally began, in which the positive content of science again prevailed over its formal side. But Germany attacked at the same time extraordinary energy in the natural sciences, which corresponded to its mighty bourgeois development since 1848, and as these sciences, in which the speculative direction never played a special role, became fashionable, the old worked its way again metaphysical method of thinking, up to Wolf's extremely flat rationalism. Hegel was forgotten, a new science of materialism developed, which theoretically is almost no different from materialism of the eighteenth century, having in front of the latter in most cases only the advantage of using richer natural science, namely, chemical and physiological, material. We find this limited philistine way of thinking of the pre-Kantian period reproduced right down to its most ugly forms by Buchner and Vogt, and even Moleshott, who swears by Feuerbach, every minute funnily gets entangled in the most ordinary categories. The clumsy nag of the ordinary bourgeois mind perplexedly stops before the moat, separating the essence from the phenomenon, the cause from the effect; but he who is going to hunt on the rugged soil of speculative thinking should not go on a nag. We find this limited philistine way of thinking of the pre-Kantian period reproduced right down to its most ugly forms by Buchner and Vogt,

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Here, however, it was necessary to solve another question, which is not related to political economy as such. What method of scientific research should be chosen? On the one hand, there was a Hegelian dialectic in all its abstract "speculative" form, which Hegel left it; on the other hand, there was the usual, now again fashionable, predominantly rationalist-metaphysical method, which the bourgeois economists followed in their thick, systemless books. This last one was subjected to such murderous criticism from Kant and especially from Hegel that only mental laziness and the absence of another *simple* method made possible its further practical existence. On the other hand, the Hegelian method in its *concrete* form was absolutely unsuitable. He was mostly idealistic, but here it was a question of the development of a world outlook, which was supposed to be more materialistic than all the previous ones. While the former proceeded from pure thinking, it was necessary to proceed from stubborn facts. The method, which, by Hegel's own admission "from nothing through nothing to nothing," was absolutely inappropriate in this form. Nevertheless, from all the available logical material, this was the only one that could at least serve as a starting point.

No serious objections were made to this method, it was not refuted: none of the opponents of the great dialectic could break gaps in his proud building. He was forgotten because the Hegelian school did not know how to apply it. First of all, therefore, the Hegelian method had to be systematically criticized.

The advantage of Hegel's way of thinking over the way of thinking of all other philosophers is rooted in that enormous historical flair that underpinned the first. Despite the abstractness and idealism

of the form, his train of thought always developed parallel to the course of history, and the latter was to serve only as a test for the former.

If the real relationship between thinking and reality was presented in a wrong way and put on his head, then in this way positive content penetrated all areas of philosophy, especially since Hegel, unlike his students, did not make virtues from ignorance, but was one of the most educated people of all time. He was the first to try to prove an internal connection in the development of the historical process. And no matter how bizarre some thoughts of his philosophy of history may seem to us now, the basic concept of this work with its grandeur can still be surprising today, especially if we compare Hegel with his predecessors or with those who after him allowed themselves general thoughts about history. In his phenomenology, in aesthetics, in history, in philosophy—everywhere, this magnificent understanding passes through the red thread,

This epoch-making understanding of history was an immediate theoretical prerequisite for a new materialistic understanding of history, and thanks to this, a fulcrum was given for the logical method. If this forgotten dialectic, already on the basis of “pure thinking”, could lead to such results, if, moreover, it seemed to effortlessly deal with all the old logic and metaphysics, then in any case it could not be just sophistry and literary criticism. But criticism of this method was not an easy task, to which all official philosophy has retreated and is now retreating.

Marx was and remains the only one who could take on the task of isolating from Hegelian logic the core that contains Hegel’s real discoveries in this field, and working out the dialectical method, freed from its idealistic shell, in that simple form in which it only and is the right form of development of thoughts. We consider the development of the method that underlies Marx’s critique of political economy to be a result that has hardly less significance than the basic materialistic view. (*Engels, From a review of Prince Marx, Toward a Critique of Political Economy, pp. 9-12, Partizdat, 1932*)

## **Three Great Discoveries in the Field of Natural Sciences and Materialistic Dialectics**

But about this very time [Around the 50s of the XIX century. — *Composition.*] empirical science has reached such an upsurge and has achieved such brilliant results that not only has it become possible to completely overcome the mechanical one-sidedness of the eighteenth century, but natural science itself, thanks to the proof of the existence in the very nature of dependencies and connections between different fields of research (mechanics, physics, chemistry, biology etc.) has transformed from empirical science to theoretical, becoming due to the generalization of the results obtained a system of materialistic knowledge of nature. The mechanics of gases... a newly created organic chemistry that learned to obtain so-called organic compounds from inorganic substances and eliminated the last remnant of the mystery of these organic compounds, dating back to 1818, scientific embryology, geology and palaeontology, comparative anatomy of plants and animals - all these branches of knowledge delivered new material in immense quantities. But three great discoveries were decisive here.

The first of these was evidence of energy conversion resulting from the discovery of the mechanical equivalent of heat (Robert Meyer, Joule, and Kolding). Now it has been proved that all the innumerable natural causes that still led some strange and mysterious existence in the form of the so-called forces - mechanical force, heat, radiation (light and radiant heat), electricity, magnetism, chemical force of the compound and decompositions—are special species, forms of existence of one and the same energy, i.e., movement. Not only can we show the transformations of energy taking place constantly in nature from one form to another, but we can even reproduce them in the laboratory and in the industry so that a certain amount of energy in one form always corresponds to a certain amount of energy in one form or another. In this way, we can express a unit of heat in kilograms, etc., and units of any quantities of electrical or chemical energy can be expressed in units of heat, and vice versa; we can measure the amount of energy received and consumed by some living organism in exactly the same way and express it in any unit, for example, in units of heat. The unity of all forms of movement in nature is now no longer just a philosophical statement, but a natural science fact.

The second, although in time and earlier, discovery is the discovery by Schwann and Schleiden of an organic cell as that unit, from the multiplication and differentiation of which all organisms arise and grow, with the exception of lower ones. Only with this

discovery did the study of organic, living products of nature become firmly on its feet—both comparative anatomy and physiology, and embryology. The shroud of mystery that enveloped the process of emergence and growth and the structure of organisms was broken. An incomprehensible miracle so far has appeared in the form of a process that takes place according to the law that is essentially identical for all multicellular organisms.

But for all that, there was one more significant gap. If all multicellular organisms—both plants and animals with the inclusion of humans—grew each of one cell according to the law of cell division, then what explains the infinite diversity of these organisms? The third great discovery answered this question: the development theory, first systematized and substantiated by Darwin. Whatever transformations are expected in the future in particular, but in general it already now solves the problem under consideration in a more than satisfactory manner. The basic features indicate a series of development of organisms from a few simple forms to increasingly diverse and complex, as we observe them in our time, ending with man; this was not only an explanation of the existing representatives of organic life, but the foundation has also been laid for the prehistory of the human spirit, for studying various stages of its development, starting from a simple structureless, but experiencing irritation protoplasm of lower organisms, and ending with a thinking human brain. Without this prehistory, the existence of a thinking human brain remains a miracle.

Thanks to these three great discoveries, the basic processes of nature are explained, reduced to natural causes. Here it remains to achieve only one thing: to explain the emergence of life from inorganic nature. At the modern level of knowledge, this simply means the ability to make protein bodies from inorganic substances. Chemistry is getting closer and closer to solving this problem, although it is still far from this. But if we recall that only in 1828 did Weler receive the first organic body—urea—from inorganic substances, if we pay attention to the countless number of so-called organic compounds obtained now artificially without the help of any organic substances, then we will not dare, of course, to assert that protein is an impenetrable barrier to chemistry. At present, she is able to produce all kinds of organic matter, the composition of which she knows for sure; as soon as the composition of the protein bodies is exactly known, chemistry will be able to start producing living protein. But to demand chemistry to give in a blink of an eye what

nature itself under extremely favourable circumstances managed to do only on separate planets after millions of years—this means demanding miracles from it.

Thus, the materialistic worldview in our time is undoubtedly more justified than in the last century. Then, to a certain extent, in an exhaustive way, only the motion of celestial bodies and the motion of terrestrial solid bodies, which was influenced by gravity, were explained; almost the entire field of chemistry and all organic nature remained mysterious and mysterious. Now all nature lies before us as a certain system of connections and processes, explained and understood at least in the main features. A materialistic worldview simply means an understanding of nature as it is, without any extraneous additions—and therefore this materialistic worldview was originally taken by Greek philosophers for granted. But between the ancient Greeks and us lies more than two thousand years of essentially idealistic worldview, and in such a case, returning even for granted is more difficult than it seems at first glance, for it is not a matter of simply rejecting the entire theoretical content of these two thousand years, but of criticizing it, of extracting from the transient idealistic form the valuable results obtained in the framework of this false, but inevitable for its era according to historical conditions form. And how difficult it is, we are proved by those numerous naturalists who, within the framework of their private science, are merciless materialists, and outside it not only idealists, but even pious orthodox Christians. About the extortion from the transient idealistic form of valuable results obtained within the framework of this form, which is false, but inevitable for its era according to historical conditions. And how difficult it is, we are proved by those numerous naturalists who, within the framework of their private science, are merciless materialists, and outside it not only idealists, but even pious orthodox Christians. (*Engels, Dialectics of nature, pages from the draft manuscript "Ludwig Feuerbach", pp. 215-217, Partizdat, 1932*)

## **Materialistic Understanding of History**

Although Hegel himself was a fan of the autocratic Prussian state, in the service of which he was a professor at the University of Berlin, Hegel's teaching was revolutionary. Hegel's faith in the human mind and its rights and the fundamental tenet of Hegelian

philosophy that there is a constant process of change and development in the world led those students of the Berlin philosopher who did not want to put up with reality to the idea that the struggle against reality, the struggle against existing untruth and reigning evil is rooted in the world law of eternal development. If everything develops, if some institutions are replaced by others, why will the autocracy of the Prussian king or the Russian tsar, the enrichment of an insignificant minority at the expense of the vast majority, the domination of the bourgeoisie over the people, continue forever? Hegel's philosophy spoke of the development of spirit and ideas, *idealistic*. From the development of the spirit, she deduced the development of nature, man and human, social relations. Marx and Engels, holding back Hegel's thought about the eternal process of development [Marx and Engels have repeatedly pointed out that in their mental development they owe much to the great German philosophers and, in particular, Hegel. "Without German philosophy," Engels says, "there would be no scientific socialism".], They rejected the prejudiced idealistic view; turning to life, they saw that it was not the development of the spirit that explains the development of nature, but rather that the spirit should be explained from nature, matter ... In contrast to Hegel and other Hegelians, Marx and Engels were materialists. Looking materialistically at the world and humanity, they saw that, as the basis of all natural phenomena are material causes, so the development of human society is determined by the development of material productive forces. The relations that people become to each other in the production of objects necessary to satisfy human needs depend on the development of productive forces. And in these respects - an explanation of all the phenomena of social life, human aspirations, ideas and laws. The development of productive forces creates social relations based on private property, but now we see how the same development of productive forces takes property from the majority and concentrates it in the hands of an insignificant minority. It destroys property, the basis of modern social order, it itself strives for the same goal that the socialists have set for themselves. Socialists only need to understand what social power, by its position in modern society, is interested in the implementation of socialism, and communicate to this force a consciousness of its interests and historical task. Such a force is the proletariat. (*Lenin, Friedrich Engels, Op., Vol. I, pp. 434-436, ed. 3rd*)

# Fundamentals of Dialectical Materialism

## Matter is an Objective Reality

The Machists scornfully shrug their shoulders at the “outdated” views of the “dogmatists”—materialists who hold on to the notion of *matter*, which is allegedly refuted by “the latest science” and “the latest positivism”. We will speak about new theories of physics concerning the structure of matter. But it is completely inadmissible to mix, as the Machians do, the doctrine of a particular structure of matter with the epistemological category—to mix the question of the new properties of new types of matter (for example electrons) with the old question of the theory of knowledge, the question of the sources of our knowledge, the existence of objective truth and so on. Mach “discovered the elements of the world”: red, green, hard, soft, loud, long, etc., they tell us. We ask: is it given to a person when he sees red, feels solid, etc., objective reality or not? This old, old philosophical question is confused by Mach. If not given, then you will inevitably slide with Mach into subjectivism and agnosticism into the arms of the immanentists you deserve, that is, the philosophical Menshikovs. If given *matter*. Matter is a philosophical category for designating objective reality, which is given to a person in his sensations, which is copied, photographed, displayed by our sensations, existing independently of them. Therefore, to say that such a concept can “become obsolete” is *babble*, there is a senseless repetition of the arguments of fashionable *reactionary* philosophy. Could the struggle of idealism and materialism become obsolete in the two thousand years of the development of philosophy? Trends or lines of Plato and Democritus in philosophy? The struggle of religion and science? Denial of objective truth and recognition of it? The struggle of supporters of supersensible knowledge with opponents of it?

The question of accepting or rejecting the concept of matter is the question of trusting a person in the testimony of his sensory organs, the question of the source of our knowledge, the question that has been posed and discussed from the very beginning of philosophy, a question that can be oversized by professors clowns but which cannot

become obsolete, just as the question of whether vision and touch, hearing, and sense of smell is a source of human cognition. To consider our sensations as images of the external world—to recognize objective truth—to stand on the point of view of the materialist theory of knowledge—this is one and the same. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, p. 105-106, ed. 3rd.*)

The denial of matter by them [Empirio-critics.—*Ed.*] Is a long-known solution to cognitive-theoretical issues in the sense of negating the external objective source of our sensations, objective reality corresponding to our sensations. And vice versa—the recognition of the philosophical truth that the idealists and agnostics deny is expressed in definitions: matter is that, acting on our senses, it produces sensations; matter is an objective reality given to us in sensation, etc. (*Lenin, Materialism and empirio-criticism, Soch., vol. XIII, p. 119, ed. 3rd.*)

## **Matter is Known by the Study of its Individual Forms.**

This is an old story. First they compose abstractions, distracting them from sensory things, and then they want to know them sensually, they want to see time and smell space. The empiricist is so far drawn into his empirical experience that he still imagines himself in the realm of feelings, experience, even when he is dealing with abstractions. We know what an hour is, a meter, but we do not know what time and space are! Precisely time is nothing other than just one hour, and space is nothing other than just one cubic meter! <Matter and motion also remain unprovable...> Of course, both forms of the existence of matter without this matter represent nothing, only an empty representation, an abstraction that exists only in our head. But we are incapable of knowing what matter and motion are! Of course incapable for matter as such and motion as such no one has yet seen or experienced in any other way; people deal only with various really existing matters and forms of motion. A substance, matter is nothing other than the totality of substances from which this concept is abstracted; movement as such is nothing but the totality of all sensually perceived forms of movement; words, like matter and motion, it's just *abbreviations* in which we embrace, according to their general properties, various sensually perceived things. Therefore,

matter and motion *can be* known only by studying individual forms of matter and motion; since we know the latter, insofar as we know matter and motion *as such*. Therefore, when the Negeli says that we do not know what time, space, movement, cause and effect is, he only asserts that we use our heads to compose abstractions first, distracting them from the real world, and then not into able to know these abstractions we have composed, for they are mental, not sensory things, while all knowledge is a sensory *dimension*. This is exactly the same difficulty encountered by Hegel that we are able to eat cherries, plums, but not able to eat the *fruit*, because no one has eaten the fruit as such. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 85, Partizdat, 1932*)

## Matter and Motion

Matter, says Mr. Dühring, is the bearer of all that is real; therefore, there can be no mechanical force without matter. Further, mechanical force is a state of matter. In the initial state, when nothing happened, matter and its state, mechanical force, were one. Therefore, subsequently, when something began to happen, the state should have become different from matter. This means that we should be content with such mystical phrases and assurances that to ourselves an equal state was neither static nor dynamic, neither in equilibrium, nor in movement. We still do not know where the mechanical force was in that state, and how we, without a push from the outside, that is, without God, must move from absolute stillness to movement.

Before Herr Dühring, materialists spoke of matter and motion. Herr Dühring reduces motion to mechanical force as if it were its basic form, and thus deprives itself of the opportunity to understand the real connection between matter and motion, which, however, was unclear to all previous materialists. Meanwhile, the matter is quite simple. *Motion is a form of existence of matter*. There has never been and cannot be matter without motion anywhere. Movement in world space, the mechanical movement of small masses on separate world bodies, molecular vibrations in the form of heat or in the form of electric or magnetic current, chemical decomposition and compound, organic life—these are the forms of movement, in which one or several infections are each a single atom of matter in the world at any given moment. All peace, all equilibrium have only relative

significance, make sense only in relation to one form or another of movement. Some body, for example, may be on the ground in mechanical equilibrium, mechanically in a state of rest; this does not in the least alter the fact that it participates in the motion of the earth and in the motion of the entire solar system; and likewise, it does not change the fact that the smallest physical particles of it are in vibrations caused by its temperature, and the atoms perform a chemical process. Matter without motion is as unthinkable as motion without matter. Therefore, motion is as irreplaceable and indestructible as matter itself—this fact the former philosophy (Descartes) expressed in words that the amount of movement in the world remains always the same. Consequently, movement cannot be created, but only transmitted. If the movement passes from one body to another, then in it—since it is transmitted and active—you can see the reason for the movement, since the latter is transmitted and passively. This is an active movement we call Therefore, motion is as irreplaceable and indestructible as matter itself—this fact the former philosophy (Descartes) expressed in words that the amount of movement in the world remains always the same. Consequently, movement cannot be created, but only transmitted. If the movement passes from one body to another, then in it - since it is transmitted and active - you can see the reason for the movement, since the latter is transmitted and passively. This is an active movement we call Therefore, motion is as irreplaceable and indestructible as matter itself - this fact the former philosophy (Descartes) expressed in words that the amount of movement in the world remains always the same. Consequently, movement cannot be created, but only transmitted. If the movement passes from one body to another, then in it - since it is transmitted and active—you can see the reason for the movement, since the latter is transmitted and passively. This is an active movement we call since the latter is transmitted and passive. This is an active movement we call since the latter is transmitted and passive. This is an active movement we call *by force*, and passive by the *manifestation of force*. It is clear, therefore, that the force is as great as its manifestation, for in fact both of them manifest *the same* movement.

Thus, the state of matter devoid of movement is one of the most empty and absurd representations, a simple “feverish delirium”. To come to it, you need to imagine the relative mechanical equilibrium in which the body on our earth can be, absolute peace, and then transfer it to the totality of the entire universe. This operation is facilitated if

all kinds of motion are reduced to sheer mechanical force. The restriction of movement by bare mechanical force has the further advantage that one can imagine the force at rest, bound, that is, temporarily inactive. Namely, if the transfer of any movement is, as it often happens, a little more complicated process, which includes various intermediate links, then you can delay the actual transmission until any moment, omitting the last link in the chain. For example, this happens when we load a gun and hold on for a moment from triggering a trigger to discharge, transmitting the movement released by burning gunpowder. Consequently, one can imagine that during a still, equal state of self, matter was charged with force, and apparently this is what Mr. Dühring (if at all means something) understands by his unity of matter and mechanical force. This idea is meaningless, because it transfers to the universe, as an absolute, a state that is essentially relative and in which at a certain moment it can always be only to itself of an equal state, matter was charged with force, and apparently this is what Mr. Dühring (if at all means something) understands by his unity of matter and mechanical force. This idea is meaningless, because it transfers to the universe, as an absolute, a state that is essentially relative and in which at a certain moment it can always be only to itself of an equal state, matter was charged with force, and apparently this is what Mr. Dühring (if at all means something) understands by his unity of matter and mechanical force. This idea is meaningless, because it transfers to the universe, as an absolute, a state that is essentially relative and in which at a certain moment it can always be only *part of* matter. But if we digress from this, then there are still other kinds of difficulties: firstly, how to explain that the world turned out to be charged, because in our time rifles do not charge by themselves, and secondly, whose finger then pulled the trigger? No matter how we turn and twist here, but under the guidance of Herr Dühring we always come back to the finger of God. (*Engels, Anti-Dühring, pp. 52-54, 1932*)

## **Motion is a Way of Existence of Matter**

The main difference between a materialist and a supporter of idealistic philosophy is that the sensation, perception, representation and general consciousness of a person is taken as an image of objective reality. The world is the movement of this objective reality,

reflected by our consciousness. The movement of ideas, perceptions, etc., corresponds to the movement of matter outside of me. The concept of matter does not express anything other than the objective reality given to us in sensation. Therefore, tearing movement away from matter is tantamount to tearing thinking from objective reality, tearing my sensations from the outside world, that is, going over to the side of idealism. The trick that is usually done with the negation of matter, with the assumption of motion without matter, is that it is silent about the relation of matter to thought...

Matter has disappeared, they tell us, wanting to draw epistemological conclusions from here. But the thought remains?—we ask. If not, if the thought disappeared with the disappearance of matter, and the ideas and sensations disappeared with the disappearance of the brain and nervous system, then it means that everything has disappeared, your reasoning has disappeared as one of the examples of any “thoughts” (or thoughtlessness)! If, yes, if, with the disappearance of matter, a thought (thought, perception, etc.) is assumed to have not disappeared, then you secretly moved to the point of view of philosophical idealism. This is precisely what always happens with people who, from “economy”, want to think of motion without matter, for it is *tacit*, simply by the fact that they continue their argument, they recognize the existence of thought *after* disappearance of matter. And this means that a very simple or very complex philosophical idealism is taken as the basis: very simple, if the matter comes down openly to solipsism (*I* exist, the whole world is only *mine* sensation); very complex, if instead of a thought, presentation, sensation of a living person, a dead abstraction is taken: nobody’s thought, nobody’s idea, nobody’s sensation, thought in general (absolute idea, universal will, etc.), sensation as an indefinite “element”, “mental”, substituted for the whole physical nature, etc., etc., Between varieties of philosophical idealism, thousands of shades are possible, and you can always create a thousand and one shades, and to the author such a thousand first systems (for example, empiriomonism), distinguishing it from the rest can stay important. From the point of view of materialism, these differences are completely insignificant. The starting point is significant. The essential thing is that an attempt to *think* motion without matter drags *thought* torn from matter, and this is philosophical idealism. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, p. 219-220, 3rd ed.*)

## Time and Space

Now we move on to *natural philosophy*. Here, Mr. Dühring, again, has every reason to be dissatisfied with his predecessors. Natural philosophy “fell so low that it degenerated into some kind of unbridled, resting on ignorance, false poetry” and “became the lot of the prostitutional philosophy of a certain Schelling and others like him, delving into the secrets of the absolute and fooling the audience.” Fatigue saved us from these “uglinesses,” but so far it has cleared the ground for only “unscrupulousness,” “and as for the general public, here, as you know, the departure of a large charlatan often makes it possible to repeat it to a less significant, but more deft successor under with a new sign all the pieces of the first. “Naturalists themselves feel “little desire for excursions into the realm of world-wide ideas” and therefore give in the theoretical field only “incoherent, early generalizations.”

In order to appreciate the following revelations about the development of the world in time and its limitations in space, we must again turn to some places from the “world schematics”.

Being here, again in agreement with Hegel (Encyclopaedia, § 93), is attributed to infinity—what Hegel calls *evil infinity*—which is then investigated. “The clearest form of infinity that can be thought of *without contradiction* is the unlimited multiplication of numbers in a number series. Just as we can add one more unit to each number without ever having exhausted the possibility of further calculation, like this a new state is added to every state of being, and infinity is the unlimited generation of these states. This is *precisely conceivable* infinity therefore has only one basic form with one single direction. Indeed, although our thinking may indicate the opposite direction for adding states, the idea of going backward infinity is only the result of a too hasty idea. Indeed, since in reality it would have to be passed in the *opposite* direction, then for each of its states it would have an infinite number series. But in this case, we would get an unacceptable contradiction of the counted infinite number series, so it makes no sense to admit another second direction of infinity.”

The first conclusion that is drawn from this understanding of infinity is that the linking of causes and effects in the world had to have its origin: “an infinite number of causes that seem to adjoin each other are unthinkable by the mere fact that it suggests countless counted.” So, the existence of the *final cause* is proved.

The second consequence is “the law of a certain amount: the accumulation of identical copies of some real series of independent entities is conceivable only as the formation of a certain number.” Not only the available number of celestial bodies at each moment of time, but also the total number of all the smallest independent particles of matter existing in the world should be determined. This necessity is the true reason why it is impossible to think of anything composite without atoms. Any real separation always has finite definiteness and must have it, for otherwise a contradiction of counted countlessness will turn out. Therefore, not only should there be a definite—though not known to us—number of all revolutions of the earth around the sun, but all periodic processes of nature must have a beginning, and all differences, *equal status to oneself*. This state can, without falling into contradiction, be thought of as having existed for centuries, but this idea would not be possible if time itself consisted of real parts, and would not rather be divided arbitrarily by our minds by means of an ideal positioning of possibilities. In a different form, the question of the real and different content of time is presented; it is the actual filling of time with differing facts, and the forms of existence of this area relate—precisely because of their difference—to what is available to the account. Imagine a state that does not undergo changes and which in its equality to itself does not represent differences in succession—in this case, the particular concept of time turns into a more general idea of being. What accumulation of empty duration should mean - this is completely impossible to imagine.—So argues Mr. Dühring, who enjoys the importance of these discoveries. At first he expresses the hope that they, at least, will not be looked upon as unimportant truth; but then we read: “Remember those” *extremely simple techniques* with which we attached the concept of infinity and its criticism to *an unknown value*... we recall such *simple*, thanks to modern refinement and deepening, elements of the universal concept of space and time.”

*We have attached!* Modern deepening and refinement! Who are we, and when is this modernity played out? Who deepens and clarifies?

“Thesis. The world in time has a beginning, and in space it is enclosed in borders.

Evidence. Suppose that the world has no beginning in time, then we must imagine that before each given moment, an entire eternity has elapsed and, therefore, an endless series of subsequent states of things in the world. The infinity of the series consists in the fact that by

sequential synthesis it can never be finished. Consequently, the endless flowing world series is impossible, and the beginning of the world is a necessary condition for its existence. This is the first.

In the second case, we also start with the opposite statement. Then we must represent the world as an infinite given whole of things that simultaneously exist. But a quantity of such a quantity, the limits of which are not defined in a visual representation, can be represented only through the synthesis of parts, and the integrity of such a quantity—only through a complete synthesis or complete addition of units. Therefore, in order to think of a world that fills space as a whole, it is necessary to present a sequential synthesis of parts of the infinite world as complete, i.e., it is necessary to imagine infinite time elapsed in calculating all coexisting things, which is impossible. So, an endless collection of real things cannot be considered as a given whole, and, moreover, as a given *at the same time*. Consequently, the world, in its extent in space, is not *infinite*, but is enclosed within the limits, which was to be proved.”

These provisions are copied verbatim from one well-known book published for the first time in 1781 and entitled: “A Critique of Pure Reason”, by Emanuel Kant, where everyone can read them in 1 part, 2 chapters, 2 books, 2 chapters of § 2: “The first antinomy of pure reason.” Therefore, Mr. Dühring owns only advertising, only the *name*: “The Law of a Specific Quantity” glued to Kant’s thought, and the discovery that there was once a time when there was no time at all, although the world already existed. As for everything else, that is, which still has some sense in the discussion of Herr Dühring, the “we” are Emanuel Kant, and the present is only ninety-five years old. Indeed, “extremely simple”! Wonderful, “meaning not known before”!

But Kant does not at all think that the above statements are exhausted by his proof. On the contrary: on the opposite page, he asserts and proves the opposite, that the world has no beginning in time and no end in space, and he sees the antinomy, the insoluble contradiction, namely that one statement is as provable as the second. People of a smaller calibre might think a little over the fact that a “certain Kant” found an insoluble difficulty here. But this is not our brave manufacturer of “completely peculiar conclusions and views”: he tirelessly writes off what he may find useful in the Kantian antinomy, and casts the rest aside.

The question itself is resolved very simply. Eternity in time, infinity in space, in the very meaning of words, simply means that

there is no end *to any side*, neither forward nor backward nor upward nor downward nor to the right nor to the left. This infinity is of a completely different order than the infinity of an infinite series, for the latter always begins directly with unity, with the first term. The inapplicability of this notion of series to our subject is revealed as soon as we try to apply it to space. An infinite row applied to space means a line drawn from a certain point in a certain direction to infinity. But does this even remotely express the infinity of space? Not at all: on the contrary, we need as many as six drawn from this point in three opposite directions of lines to cover the dimensions of space, which in this case we would have six. Kant understood this so well that he only roundabout way, indirectly, applied his number series to the question of the spatiality of the world. Herr Dühring compels us to take six dimensions in space, which, however, does not prevent him from immediately expressing the greatest indignation at the mathematical mysticism of Gauss, who did not want to be content with the usual three dimensions of space.

As applied to time, an endless line or a series of units in both directions has some figurative meaning. But if we imagine time as being reckoned from *one* or proceeding from some certain *point* line, then we already claim in advance that time has a beginning: we assume exactly what we want to prove. We have given the infinity of time a one-sided, half-hearted character; but one-sided, half-infinity is also an internal contradiction, the direct opposite of “infinity conceivable without contradiction.” We can deal with this contradiction only by assuming that the unit from which we begin to count the row, the point from which we measure the line further, represent any unit in the row, any point on the line, so it does not matter where the line or series we will put the starting point.

But what about the contradiction of the “counted infinite number series”? We will be able to investigate it closer when Herr Dühring shows us his focus earlier and *counts it*. When he finishes the task of counting from—  $\infty$  (minus infinity) to zero, then let him come to us. After all, it is clear that no matter where he starts to count, he always leaves behind an endless series, and, therefore, the task that he must solve. Let him turn his own infinite row  $1 + 2 + 3 + 4 \dots$  and try to count from the infinite end to one; after all, this is obviously an attempt by a person who does not understand the essence of the matter at all. Little of. When Herr Dühring claims that the endless series of elapsed time has been counted, then he asserts that time has a beginning, because otherwise he could not have started to “count” at

all. Therefore, he again assumes what he must prove. Thus, the idea of a counted infinite series, in other words, the world-wide Dühring law of a certain amount, *absurd* contradiction.

After all, it is clear: infinity, which has an end, but has no beginning, is no more and no less infinite than infinity, which has a beginning, but has no end. The smallest bit of dialectical thinking should have prompted Herr Dühring that the beginning and the end are inextricably linked, like the North Pole and the South Pole, and that if they discard the end, then the beginning becomes the end - the *only one* the end that the row has, and vice versa. This mistake would not have been possible without the mathematical habit of operating on endless rows. Since in mathematics we must proceed from the definite, the finite, in order to arrive at the indefinite, the infinite, then all mathematical series—positive and negative—must begin with unity, otherwise you cannot make calculations with them. But the ideal need of mathematics is far from being a compulsory law for the real world.

However, Herr Dühring will never be able to imagine real infinity without contradictions. Infinity *is a* contradiction, and it is full of contradictions. The contradiction is that infinity should be composed of limbs alone, and yet it is. The assumption of the limitations of the material world leads to the same contradictions as the assumption of its infinity, and each attempt to eliminate these contradictions leads, as we have already seen, to new and worse contradictions. Precisely *because* that infinity is a contradiction, it represents an infinite process that unfolds endlessly in time and space. Removing the contradiction would be the end of infinity. Hegel already understood this quite correctly, who, therefore, treated with well-deserved contempt the gentlemen who like to be wise over this contradiction.

Let's go further. So, time had a beginning. What was before this beginning? A world that is in its own equal, unchanging state. And since in this state no changes follow each other, the particular concept of time turns into a more general idea of *being*. First of all, we don't care at all what concepts are turning into the head of Herr Dühring. It's not about the *concept of time*, but about *real time*, from which Herr Dühring does not get off so cheaply. Secondly, no matter how much the concept of time turns into a more general idea of being, this does not move us one step further, because the basic forms of all being are space and time, and being outside of time is as nonsense as being outside of space. The Hegelian "being that passed without time"

and the New Shelling “unrepresentable being” are rational notions compared to this being without time. That is why Herr Dühring is very cautious in the matter; in fact—this is time, but one that essentially cannot be called time at all; Indeed, time does not at all consist of real parts in itself, and only our reason arbitrarily divides it; the realm of an accessible account belongs only to the actual filling of time with different facts, and what should mean the accumulation of empty duration, this is completely impossible to imagine. What should this accumulation mean is completely indifferent to us, we only ask whether the world in the state assumed here is experiencing, is it continuing in time? We know very well that nothing will come of measuring such a similar, devoid of content duration, as well as of a similar, aimless measurement in space, and Hegel, precisely because of the senselessness of such an occupation, calls this infinity *bad*. According to Herr Dühring, time exists only because of change, and not change exists in time and through it. Due to the fact that time is excellent, regardless of change, it can be measured due to change, because for measurement it is always necessary to have something different from the thing being measured. And the time during which there are no changes available to cognition, far from being not *at all time*, it rather represents *pure*, not affected by any extraneous impurities and, therefore, the true time, time *as such*. Indeed, when we want to imagine the concept of time in all its purity, free of all alien, extraneous impurities, we are forced to leave aside as irrelevant all the various events occurring in time next to each other and after each other, and imagine in this way a time in which nothing happens. In doing so, we do not at all dissolve the concept of time in the general idea of being, but we get just a pure concept of time.

But all these contradictions and inconsistencies are a child’s game compared to the confusion that Herr Dühring falls into with his own equal initial state. If the world was ever in a state in which there were no changes in it, then how could it move from this state to a state of change? That which was absolutely unchanged—and besides, had been in this state for centuries—could not, of itself, leave this state and go into a state of movement and change. Therefore, from somewhere outside, from outside the world, the first push should have come, which set it in motion. But the “first push”, as you know, is just another name for God. Herr Dühring, who assured us of his world schematics that he had finally done away with God and the other world, he himself introduces them again in a “refined and in-depth” form into natural philosophy. (*Engels, Anti-Dühring, pp. 31-37, 1932*)

## Matter Moves in Space and in Time

Recognizing the existence of objective reality, i.e., moving matter, regardless of our consciousness, materialism must inevitably also recognize the objective reality of time and space, in contrast, first of all, from Kantianism, which stands on the side of idealism in this matter, considers time and space not by objective reality, but by forms of human contemplation. The fundamental discrepancy in this issue of the two main philosophical lines is quite distinctly recognized by writers of various directions, by any kind of consistent thinkers.

Let's start with the materialists.

"Space and time," Feuerbach says, "are *not simple forms of phenomena, but root conditions (Wesensbedingungen)... of being*" (Werke, II, 332). Recognizing the objective reality of the sensual world that we know through sensations, Feuerbach naturally rejects both the phenomenalist (as Mach would say to himself) or the agnostic (as Engels puts it) understanding of space and time: as things or bodies are not simple phenomena, not complexes of sensations and the objective realities acting on our feelings, both space and time, are not simple forms of phenomena, but objectively real forms of being. There is nothing in the world except moving matter, and moving matter cannot move otherwise than in space and time. Human representations of space and time are relative, but absolute truth is formed from these relative representations, these relative representations, developing, follow the line of absolute truth, approach it.

Engels, exposing the inconsistent and confused materialist Dühring, catches him precisely on the fact that he is talking about a change in the *concept of time* (the question is undeniable for any large modern philosophers of the *most diverse* philosophical directions), *dodging* a clear answer to the question: are space real or ideal? time? Are our relative notions of space and time of *approximation* to objectively real forms of being? Or is it just the products of a developing, organizing, harmonizing, etc. human thought? This and only this is the main epistemological question, which divides the truly fundamental philosophical trends. "We don't care," writes Engels, "what concepts change in Mr. Dühring's head. This is not about the *concept of time*, but about *real time*, from which Mr. Dühring is so cheap "(that is, with phrases about the

variability of concepts)” in no case get rid of “(Anti-Dühring, 5th German edition. , p. 41).

It would seem so clear that even the Messrs. Yushkevich could understand the essence of the issue? Engels contrasts Dühring with the universally recognized and self-evident for any materialist statement about *reality*, that is, the objective reality of time, saying that one *cannot get rid* of direct recognition or denial of this provision by reasoning about changing *concepts* time and space. It is not that Engels rejected the necessity and scientific significance of research on change, the development of our concepts, time and space, but that we consistently solve the epistemological question, that is, the question of the source and significance of every human being. knowledge in general. Any sensible philosophical idealist—and Engels, speaking of idealists, had in mind the brilliantly consistent idealists of classical philosophy—easily recognizes the development of our concepts of time and space, without ceasing to be an idealist, considering, for example, that the developing concepts of time and space they are approaching the absolute idea of both, and so on. One cannot consistently hold a point of view in philosophy that is hostile to all fideism and all idealism, if one does not recognize it decisively and definitely, *reflect* objective-real time and space, and here they are approaching, as in general, to objective truth.

“The basic forms of all being,” teaches Engels Dühring, “are space and time; being outside of time is the same great nonsense as being outside space” (Ibid.).

Why did Engels need in the first half of this phrase an almost literal repetition of Feuerbach, and in the second a reminder of the struggle against the greatest nonsense of theism that Feuerbach so successfully carried out? Then, that Dühring, as can be seen from the very same chapter of Engels, could not make ends meet in his philosophy, not resting either on the “ultimate cause” of the world, or on the “first impulse” (another expression for the concept: God, Engels says ) Dühring probably no less sincerely wanted to be a materialist and an atheist than our Machists want to be Marxists, but he *did not know how* to consistently pursue that philosophical point of view that would really take all the ground from under the feet of idealistic and theistic nonsense. Not recognizing—or at least not recognizing clearly and distinctly (for Dühring staggered and confused on this issue)—the objective reality of time and space, Dühring does not accidentally, but inevitably rolls along an inclined plane up to the “final causes” and “the first shocks”, because he deprived himself of

an objective criterion, which hinders to go beyond time and space. If time and space are *only* concepts, then the humanity that created them has the right to go beyond them, and bourgeois professors have the right to receive a salary from reactionary governments for upholding the legitimacy of this exit, for direct or indirect defence of the medieval “nonsense.”

Engels showed Dühring that the denial of the objective reality of time and space is theoretically a philosophical confusion, practically capitulation or helplessness before fideism...

“Many individual views of Engels,” writes, for example, V. Bazarov in *Essays*, p. 67, “for example, his idea of” pure “space and time, are now outdated.”

Of course! The views of the materialist Engels are outdated, and the views of the idealist Pearson and the confused idealist Mach are the very latest! The most curious thing here is that Bazarov does not even doubt that the views on space and time, namely: the recognition or denial of their objective reality, can be attributed to the number of “*individual views*” as opposed to the “*starting point of the world outlook*”, Which is mentioned in the next sentence of this writer. Here’s a good example of the “eclectic beggarly soup” that Engels used to say when it came to German philosophy of the 80s of the last century. For to contrast the “starting point” of the materialistic worldview of Marx and Engels with a “separate view” of them on the objective reality of time and space is the same egregious nonsense as if you would oppose the “starting point” of Marx’s economic theory to the “separate view” of it on surplus value. To tear off Engels’s teachings about the objective reality of time and space from his teachings on turning “things in ourselves” into “things for us”, from his recognition of objective and absolute truth, namely: the objective reality given to us in sensation, from his recognition of objective law causality the need for nature - this means turning a holistic philosophy into an okroshka. Bazarov, like all Machians, strayed from the fact that he mixed the variability of human concepts of time and space, their exclusively relative nature, with the immutability of the fact that man and nature exist only in time and space, while creatures outside of time and space created clergy and supported by the imagination of the ignorant and clogged mass of humanity, are sick imagination, twisted philosophical idealism, an unfit product of an unfit social order. The doctrine of the science of the structure of matter, of the chemical composition of food, of the atom and electron can become outdated and aging every day, but the truth that a person cannot feed

on thoughts and give birth to children with platonic love alone cannot become outdated. A philosophy which denies the objective reality of time and space, is just as absurd, internally rotten and false as the denial of these last truths. The tricks of the idealists and agnostics are just as generally hypocritical as the preaching of Platonic love by the Pharisees! (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, pp. 143-145, 151-152, ed. 3rd*)

## **Motion is the Essence of Time and Space**

“To understand is to express in the form of concepts.” Motion is the essence of time and space. Two basic concepts express this essence: (infinite) continuity and “punctuality” (= denial of continuity, *discontinuity*). Motion is the unity of continuity (time and space) and discontinuity (time and space). Movement is a contradiction, there is a unity of contradictions ...

... “When we generally talk about movement, we say: the body is in one place and then it goes to another Wed objections place. While it is moving, it is no longer in the firstChernov place, but it is also not in the second; if it is in one ofEngels. both places, then it is at rest.

To say that it is between both means to say nothing, because in that case it is again in one place; therefore, the same difficulty is evident.

To move means to be in this place, and at the same time not to be in it; it is the continuity of space andNB time, and it is precisely this that makes movementRight possible “(p. 322).

Motion is the body being in the moment, in this place, in the other, the next moment in another place - this is the objection that Chernov repeats (see his philosophical studies.) *Followed for all* ”metaphysical” opponents of Hegel.

This objection is *incorrect* : (1) it describes the *result of the movement*, not *the movement itself* ; (2) it does

not show, does not contain the *possibility of movement*; (3) it depicts movement as a sum, a connection of the states of *rest*, i.e., the (dialectic) contradiction is not eliminated by them, but only covered, pushed back, obscured, curtailed. ( "*Lenin Collection*" XII , pp. 191 - 193. )

# CHAPTER THREE. LAWS AND CATEGORIES OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS

## I. Dialectics and Metaphysics

When we mentally consider nature, or human history, or our own spiritual activity, then we first have a picture of the endless interweaving of connections and interactions, in which nothing remains motionless and unchanged, but everything seems to be moving, changing, arising and disappearing. Thus, we see the first big picture, in which the particular more or less effaced, we no longer pay attention to the course of the movement, on the transitions and the clutch than *that*, what moves, moves, engages. This initial, naive, but essentially correct view of the world was inherent in ancient Greek philosophy and was first clearly expressed by Heraclitus: everything exists and at the same time does not exist, since everything *flows*, everything is constantly changing, everything is in a constant process of occurrence and disappearance. Despite the fact that this view correctly captures the general character of the whole picture of phenomena, it is still insufficient to explain the particulars that make up it, and so far we do not know them, the general picture is also unclear to us. In order to study these particulars, we must remove them from their natural or historical connection and, considering each separately, examine its properties, its particular causes, actions, etc. This is primarily the task of natural science and history, etc. e. those branches of science that, for obvious reasons, occupied the Greeks of classical times only in a secondary place, because the Greeks needed to accumulate the material necessary for this before. Only after the natural science and historical material was accumulated in sufficient quantities could critical research, comparison and division into classes, orders and types arise. Therefore, the methods of an accurate study of nature developed for the first time only among the Greeks of the Alexandrian period, and then in the Middle Ages they were further developed by Arabs. True natural science begins only in the second half of the 15th century, and from that time on, it continuously makes ever more rapid successes. The decomposition of nature into its

separate parts, the division of various phenomena and objects in nature into specific classes, the anatomical study of the diverse and internal structure of organic bodies—all this was the basis of those gigantic successes that marked the development of natural science in the last four centuries *of this*—not in motion, but in a motionless state, not as essentially changing, but as eternally unchanging, not living, but dead. Transferred by Bacon and Locke from natural science to philosophy, this worldview has created a characteristic limitation of recent centuries: a metaphysical way of thinking.

For metaphysics, things and their mental images, that is, concepts, are separate, unchanging, frozen, once and for all given objects to be studied one after the other and one independently of the other. The metaphysician thinks with complete, direct opposites; his speech consists of: “yes — yes, no — no; and what’s more, from the evil one. “ For him, a thing exists or does not exist; for him, an object cannot be himself and at the same time something else; positive and negative are absolutely mutually exclusive; cause and effect are also completely opposite to each other. This way of thinking therefore seems to us at first glance quite true that it is inherent in the so-called common sense. But common human sense, a very respectable companion in everyday life, between the four walls, is experiencing the most amazing adventures, as soon as he dares to embark on a long journey of research. Likewise, the metaphysical worldview, quite true and necessary in the well-known more or less broad areas, sooner or later reaches those limits beyond which it becomes one-sided, limited, abstract and entangled in insoluble contradictions, because behind objects it does not see them as mutual connection, for their being does not see their emergence and disappearance, for their peace does not see their movement, for the trees does not see the forest. For example, in everyday life, we can say with certainty whether a given animal exists or not, but with a more accurate study we are convinced that this is sometimes a highly confused question, the difficulties of which are well known to lawyers who tried in vain to open a rational boundary, for which killing a child in the womb can be considered a murder. It is also impossible to accurately determine the moment of death, since physiology shows that death is not a sudden, instantaneous act, but a very slowly occurring process. Every organic being in every given moment is the same as it was in the previous one, and at the same time it is not. At every moment, it processes the substance received by him from the outside and releases another substance from itself; some cells of his body die out, others are born,

so that, after a certain period of time, the substance of this organism is completely updated, replaced by a different composition of atoms; that is why every organic being is always the same and, however, not the same. Similarly, with a more accurate study, we find *the* opposite, mutually penetrate each other. We see further that cause and effect are concepts that matter only when applied to a single phenomenon, but that if we consider the same phenomenon in its general global connection, then these two concepts are combined and pass into the concept of universal interaction, in which cause and the consequence is constantly changing places, and what is now or here is the consequence will become the cause there or then, and vice versa.

All these phenomena and research methods do not fit into the framework of metaphysical thinking. For the dialectic, which takes things and their mental reflections mainly in their mutual connection, in their cohesion, in their movement, in their appearance and disappearance, such phenomena as the above, on the contrary, confirm only her own method. Nature is the touchstone of dialectics, and modern natural science, which presented extremely rich material that is increasing every day, for this test, has proved that in nature, in the end, everything happens dialectically, and not metaphysically; that it does not move in an eternally homogeneous, constantly repeating circle, but is experiencing a true story. Here, first of all, one should point to Darwin, who dealt a severe blow to the metaphysical view of nature, proving that the whole modern organic world, plants and animals, and therefore also man, are the products of a development process that has lasted millions of years. But since it is still possible to reckon on the fingers of natural scientists who have learned to think dialectically, this contradiction of the obtained scientific results with the above metaphysical way of thinking completely explains the boundless confusion that now prevails in theoretical natural science and equally leads to despair both teachers and students, both writers and their readers.

So, an accurate idea of the universe, of its development and of human development, as well as of the reflection of this development in people's heads, can be acquired only through dialectics, only by constantly taking into account the general interaction between emergence and disappearance, between progressive changes and changes regressive. (*Engels, Anti-Dühring, pp. 14-16, 1932*)

## The Historical Conditions of the Rule of Metaphysics

The great basic idea that the world does not consist of finished, finished *things*, but is a set of *processes*, in which things that seem to be unchanging, as well as their mental pictures in our head, concepts, are in continuous change, appearing and disappearing, and that progressive development, with all the seeming randomness and in spite of all temporary ebbs, ultimately makes its way,—this great basic idea from the time of Hegel has entered into the general consciousness to such an extent that hardly anyone will dispute it in its general form. But to recognize it in words and conduct it in practice in each individual case and in each given area of research, these are two different things. If in our research we constantly adhere to this point of view, then in our eyes the demand for final decisions and for eternal truths loses all meaning once and for all; we never forget that all the knowledge we acquire is necessarily limited and determined by the circumstances in which we acquire it. We are not embarrassed by the opposition between truth and error, between good and evil, between identity and difference, between necessity and chance. The old, still very widespread metaphysical thinking could not cope with this opposite. But we understand the relative significance of this opposition: that which is now recognized as truth has now a hidden erroneous side, which will come out with time; and in exactly the same way that which is now recognized as a delusion has a true side, thanks to which it was previously considered to be true. We know, finally, that necessity is made up entirely of pure coincidences, and these imaginary coincidences are a form,

The old method of research and thinking, which Hegel called “metaphysical”, which dealt mainly with things, as with something completely ready and finished, and the remnants of which are still deeply seated in their heads, had at one time a great historical justification. We had to research things before we could start researching processes. It was necessary first to find out what this thing is, and then to study the changes that are taking place in it. So it was in the natural sciences. From natural science, which considered all objects - both dead and living—in the form of finished and once and for all finished, the old metaphysics grew up, which considered them unchanged. When this study of individual things moved so far that it was possible to take a new decisive step forward, that is, to begin a

systematic study of changes, which happen to these things in nature, then in the philosophical field the mortal hour of the old metaphysics has struck. And in fact, until the end of the last century, natural science was predominantly *collecting* science, the science of finished things; in our (XIX) century, it became essentially an *ordering* science, the science of processes, the origin and development of these things, and the connection that unites these processes of nature into one great whole. Physiology, which explores the processes in the plant and animal body; embryology, studying the development of an individual organism from an embryonic state to maturity; geology studying the gradual formation of the earth's crust—all these sciences are the children of our (XIX) century. (*F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, pp. 41–43.*)

## **II. Hegel's Idealistic Dialectic and Its Overcoming by Marx and Engels**

### **The Attitude of Marx and Engels to Hegel's Idealistic Dialectic**

Hegelian dialectics, as the most comprehensive, rich in content and in-depth doctrine of development, was considered by Marx and Engels to be the greatest acquisition of classical German philosophy. They considered any other formulation of the principle of the development of evolution to be one-sided, poor in content, mutilating and mutilating the actual course of development (often with leaps, disasters, revolutions) in nature and in society.

“Marx and I were almost the only people who set ourselves the task of saving” (from the defeat of idealism and Hegelianism in particular) “conscious dialectics and translate it into a materialistic understanding of nature.” “Nature is a confirmation of dialectics, and just the latest natural science shows that this confirmation is unusually rich” (written before the discovery of radium, electrons, transformation of elements, etc.), “Accumulating a mass of material daily and proving that things are in nature ultimately dialectically, not metaphysically.”

“The great main idea,” writes Engels, “is that the world does not consist of finished, finished objects, but is a combination of processes in which objects that seem to be unchanged, as well as their mental

images and concepts made by the head, are in continuous change, then arise, they are destroyed—this great basic thought from the time of Hegel has entered into the general consciousness to such an extent that hardly anyone will challenge it in its general form. But it's one thing to acknowledge it in words, another thing is to apply it in each individual case and in each given area of research." "For dialectical philosophy, there is nothing once, forever established, unconditional, holy. She sees the seal of imminent fall on everything and everything, and nothing can resist her, except for the continuous process of emergence and destruction, infinite ascension from the lowest to the highest. She herself is just a simple reflection of this process in the thinking brain."

Thus, according to Marx, dialectics is "a science of the general laws of motion of both the external world and human thinking."

This revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was adopted and developed by Marx. Dialectical materialism "does not need any philosophy above other sciences."

From the previous philosophy remains "the doctrine of thinking and its laws—formal logic and dialectics."

And the dialectic, in the understanding of Marx, according to Hegel, also includes what is now called the theory of knowledge, epistemology, which should consider its subject equally historically, studying and generalizing the origin and development of knowledge, the transition from ignorance to knowledge.

In our time, the idea of development, evolution, has entered almost entirely into public consciousness, but in other ways, not through Hegel's philosophy. However, this idea in the wording given by Marx and Engels, relying on Hegel, is much more comprehensive, much richer in content than the current idea of evolution. Development, as if repeating steps already passed, but repeating them differently, on a higher base ("negation of negation"), development, so to speak, in a spiral, and not in a straight line; spasmodic, catastrophic, revolutionary development; "Breaks in gradualness"; turning quantity into quality; internal impulses to development given by a contradiction, a clash of different forces and tendencies acting on a given body either within a given phenomenon or within a given society; interdependence and the closest, inextricable connection of *all* sides of each phenomenon (moreover, history reveals more and more new sides), a connection that gives a single, regular world process of movement—these are some of the features of dialectics as a more substantial (than usual) doctrine of

development. (Compare Marx's letter to Engels dated January 8, 1868 with a mockery of Stein's "wooden trichotomies," which are ridiculously confused with materialist dialectics.) (*Lenin, Karl Marx (1914), Op., Vol. XVIII, p. 10-12.*)

## **The Laws of Dialectics are Extracted from the History of Nature and Human Society**

(To develop the general character of dialectics as a science of connections, as opposed to metaphysics.)

Thus, the laws of dialectics were abstracted from the history of nature and human society. But they are nothing but the most general laws of both of these phases of historical development, as well as thinking itself. In essence, they come down to the following three laws:

The law of the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa.

The law of mutual penetration of opposites.

The law of negation of negation.

All these three laws were developed by Hegel in his idealistic manner as simple laws of *thought*: the first—in the first part of "Logic"—in the doctrine of being; the second occupies the entire second and most significant part of his "Logic", the doctrine of essence, finally, the third appears as the basic law in the construction of the entire system. The mistake is that these laws are not derived from nature and history, but are imposed by the latter as laws of thought. This implies the whole tortured and often terrible construction: the world—whether it wants it or not—must be consistent with the logical system, which itself is only a product of a certain stage of development of human thinking. If we turn this attitude over, then everything takes on a very simple form, and the dialectical laws that seem extremely mysterious in idealistic philosophy immediately become simple and clear.

However, anyone who is even a little familiar with Hegel knows that Hegel gives astounding examples hundreds of times from natural science and history in support of dialectical laws.

We are not going to write a guide to dialectics here, but only want to show that the dialectical laws are real laws of the development

of nature and, therefore, are valid for theoretical science. (*F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 125, 1932*)

## How to Study Hegel

Of course, it is impossible to do without Hegel (when studying Marxism), and moreover, it takes time to digest it. A brief logic in the Encyclopaedia is a great start. But you take the sixth volume of the collected works, and not a separate edition of Rosencrantz (1845), since the first contains much more explanatory additions, although for the dumb-headed Genning they often remained incomprehensible.

In the introduction, you find §26, etc., above all a criticism of Wolf's treatment of Leibniz (Metaphysics in *historical* sense). Then—Anglo-French empiricism, § 37, etc., then—Kant's §40 and the following, finally, Jacobi's mysticism, § 61. In section I ("Genesis") you do not stop too long on "Genesis" and "Nothing". The last paragraphs, "Quality", then "Quantity" and "Measure", are much better. But the main part is the doctrine of "essence" (die Lehre vom Wesen). Disclosure of abstract contradictions in all their failure, and, as soon as you are going to grasp firmly on one side (contradictions), it quietly turns into the other. You can figure this out constantly with concrete examples. For example, you, as a groom, will find a vivid example of the inseparability of identity (Identität) and difference (Unterschied) in yourself and in your bride. It is completely impossible to establish whether sexual love is joy in what is identity in difference or difference in identity? Discard the distinction (in this case of the sexes) or the identity (the humanity of both), and what remains of yours? I recall how at first it was precisely this inseparability of identity and difference that tormented me, although we cannot even take a step to avoid stumbling upon it.

But you should not read Hegel the way P. Bart read it, precisely in order to open in it the paralogisms and overexposures that served him as levers for constructions. This is the work of the student. It is much more important to find the right and the ingenious under the irregular shape and in the artificial connection. Transitions from one category to another or from one contradiction to the next are almost always arbitrary. Often this happens with the help of acuity, for example, both positive and negative die (literally—go to the bottom, to the base—zu Grunde gehen), so Hegel can go to the category of foundation (des Grundes). Thinking about it a lot means simply

wasting time. Since each category in Hegel's represents a step in the history of philosophy (as he mostly gives it) (wie er auch meist solche angiebt), you'll do well, if you look at lectures on the history of philosophy (one of the most brilliant works). For relaxation, I can recommend you aesthetics. If you work a little in this way, you will be amazed.

Hegel's perversion of dialectics is based on the fact that he should be "the self-development of thought" in him, and therefore the dialectics of things are only its reflection. But in fact, the dialectic in our head is only a reflection of the actual development that takes place in the world of nature and human society and is subject to dialectic forms.

At least compare Marx's development from commodity to capital with Hegel's development from being to nonexistence, and you will have a wonderful parallel for concrete development, as it comes from facts, on the one hand, and on the other hand, an abstract construction in which highly ingenious thoughts and in places very important transitions, such as qualities in quantity and vice versa, are processed into the apparent self-development of an idea from one to another. Like this, you can compose a dozen more of these. (*K. Marx and F. Engels, Letters, pp. 392- 394, Sotsekgiz, 1931, Engels to Konrad Schmidt, November 1, 1891*)

I cannot but mention your remark about Hegel, whom you are refusing a deeper mathematical, natural science education. Hegel knew mathematics so much that none of his students were able to publish his mathematical manuscripts, which remained after him in large numbers. The only person who, as far as I know, knows enough mathematics and philosophy to do this is Marx. I readily agree with you that nonsense is found in the details of natural philosophy, but his *real* natural philosophy lies in the second part of the Logic, in the doctrine of "essence", which, in fact, is the core of the whole doctrine. Modern natural science theory on the interaction of forces of nature (*Grove, Correlation of forces, which appeared, it seems to me, for the first time in 1838*) is only an expression in other words or, rather, a positive proof of the correctness of Hegel's thoughts regarding the cause, action, interaction, strength, etc. I, of course, now no longer Hegelian, but still feel great respect and sympathy (Pietät und Anhänglichkeit) for the great old man (an dem alten kolossalen Kerl). (*K. Marx and F. Engels, Letters, p. 164-165, Sotsekgiz, 1931 Engels—F. A. Lange, March 29, 1866*)

I have decent success. For example, I destroyed the whole doctrine of profit, as it has been so far. In the processing method, I did a great job of flipping through Hegel's "Logic", which accidentally fell into my hands. The Freiligrat, who had found somewhere several of Hegel's volumes belonging to Bakunin, sent them to me as a gift. If someday the time comes again for such work, I would very much like to make it accessible to the general human mind in the amount of 2–3 printed sheets that is reasonable in the method that Hegel discovered and at the same time darkened. (*K. Marx and F. Engels, Letters, p. 105, Sotsekiz, 1931 Marx-Engels, January 14, 1858*)

## **Marx's Method is the Opposite of Hegel's**

Mr. Dühring's strangely embarrassed tone in his criticism is now clear to me. This is an enormous impudent subject, writhing himself a revolutionary in political economy. He accomplished two feats. Firstly, he published *The Critical Foundations of National Economy* (about 500 pages),—in theory, based on Carey's views, — and then the new *Natural Dialectics* (directed against Hegel's). My book put an end to him in both respects. Out of hatred for Rocher et al. He began to write about my book. The lies in his writings are partly intentional, partly the result of thoughtlessness. He knows very well that my method of research is *not the same* as that of Hegel, for I am a materialist, and Hegel is an idealist. Hegelian dialectics is the main form of all dialectics, but only *after* cleansing her of her mystical form, and this is precisely what distinguishes *my* method from her. (*K. Marx and F. Engels, Letters, pp. 229-230, Sotsekiz, 1931 Marx-Kugelmann, March 6, 1868*)

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The method used in *Capital* was poorly understood, as is already proved by various conflicting characteristics of it.

So, for example, the Parisian *Revue Positiviste* reproaches me, on the one hand, for considering political economy metaphysically, and on the other hand, "guess what?" That I confine myself to critical dismemberment of the given, and not compose recipes (Kontov?) For the laboratory of the future. Regarding the reproach in metaphysics

prof. Sieber remarks: "As far as theory is concerned in the proper sense of the word, the Marx method is the deductive method of the entire English school, the advantages and disadvantages of which are shared by all the best economist-theorists." Mr. M. Blok—Le Théoricien du socialisme en Allemagne. Extrait du "Journal des Economistes, juillet et août 1872"—reveals that my method is—analytical, and says among other things: "With this work, Mr. Marx proved that he is one of the most outstanding analytical minds." German reviewers shout, of course, about the Hegelian sophistry. The St. Petersburg Herald of Europe, in an article devoted exclusively to the Capital method (May 1872 issue, pp. 427–436), finds that the method of my research is strictly realistic, and the method of presentation, unfortunately, is German-dialectical. The author writes: "In appearance, judging by the external form of presentation, Marx is a great idealist philosopher and, moreover, in the" German " , that is, bad, meaning of this word. In fact, he is infinitely more realistic than all his predecessors in the field of economic criticism... In no case can he be considered an idealist. "I cannot answer the author better than a few excerpts from his own criticism;

Having quoted a passage from my introduction to *Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie*, Berlin 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I set forth the materialistic foundations of my method, the author continues:

"For Marx, only one thing is important: to find the law of phenomena, the study of which he is engaged in. And at the same time, it is not only the law that governs them that is important for him, as long as they have a certain form and while they are in the relationship that is observed at this time. For him, moreover, the law of their mutability, their development, that is, the transition from one form to another, of one order of relationship to another, is still important. Once he discovered this law, he considers in more detail the consequences in which the law manifests itself in public life ... In accordance with this, Marx cares only about one thing: to prove the necessity of certain orders of social relations with accurate scientific research and to state the facts that serve him as the most accurate points and prop. It's quite enough for him if he, having proved the necessity of the modern order, He also proved the need for a different order, to which a transition must certainly be made—it doesn't matter whether they think about it or not, whether they are aware of it or not. Marx considers the social movement as a natural-historical process governed by laws, not only not depending on the will,

consciousness and intentions of a person, but also themselves determining their will, consciousness and intentions... If a conscious element in the history of culture plays such a subordinate role, it is clear that criticism, which has culture as its subject, can least of all have any form or some result of consciousness as its basis, that is, not an idea, but an external phenomenon alone can serve it one point. Criticism will consist in comparing, juxtaposing and juxtaposing a fact not with an idea, but with another fact. All that matters to her is so that both facts are investigated as accurately as possible and truly represent different degrees of development, and, moreover, it is important that the order, sequence and connection in which these degrees of development are manifested no less accurately ... A different reader may come to this thought and such a question ... because the general laws of economic life are the same, anyway, do they apply to modern or past life? But this is precisely what Marx does not recognize. Such general laws do not exist for him. In his opinion, on the contrary, each historical period has its own laws ... but as soon as life has survived a given period of development, has left this stage and entered another, it begins to be governed by other laws. In a word, economic life represents in this case a phenomenon completely analogous to what we observe in other categories of biological phenomena... A careful analysis of the internal structure and properties of the active state of the phenomenon of this (economic) life has repeatedly convinced many researchers, already from the forties, of the impossibility of the view of old economists on the nature of the economic law, according to which the latter is homogeneous with the laws of physics and chemistry... A deeper analysis of the phenomena showed that social organisms differ from each other no less deeply than the organisms of botanical and zoological... The same thing is, as a result of differences in the structure of these organisms, the heterogeneity of their bodies, the differences of conditions, among which the authorities have to operate, and so on. e., can therefore at different degrees of development to obey completely different laws. Marx refuses, for example, to acknowledge that the law of population growth is the same always and everywhere, for all times and for all places. He argues, on the contrary, that each degree of development has its own law of reproduction... What happens in economic life depends on the degree of productivity of economic forces... With differences in productivity, its consequences will be different, and with them the laws they managers. Setting himself, therefore, the goal—to

investigate and explain the capitalist order of the economy—Marx only strictly formulated a goal that an exact study of economic life can have... His scientific goal is to clarify those particular laws that govern the emergence, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement with another, higher one. And the price really has the book of Marx.”

The author, outlining so successfully what he calls my actual method, and treating so favourably my personal methods of applying this method, thereby outlined the dialectical method.

Of course, the method of presentation cannot formally differ from the method of research. The study should become familiar with the material in detail, analyze the various forms of its development, and trace their internal connection. Only after this work is completed can the actual movement be properly stated. Since this succeeded and the life of the material received its ideal reflection, at first glance it might seem that we are faced with an a priori design.

My dialectical method is not only fundamentally different from Hegel's, but represents its direct opposite. For Hegel, the process of thought, which he even turns into an independent subject under the name of idea, is a demiurge (creator) of reality, representing only its external manifestation. For me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing but the material translated and processed in the human head.

I criticized the Hegelian side of Hegelian dialectics almost 30 years ago, while it was still in fashion. But just at the time when I was developing the first volume of *Capital*, the loud, pretentious and limited epigones that set the tone in modern educated Germany were especially pleased to play Hegel, as the valiant Moses Mendelssohn once spoke to Spinoza during Lessing's time. namely, as a “dead dog.” Therefore, I openly declared myself a student of this great thinker, and in the chapter on the theory of value I even flirted somewhat with Hegelianism, using here and there the terminology characteristic of him. The mystification that dialectics in Hegel's hands did not prevent the fact that it was Hegel who first gave an exhaustive and conscious picture of its general forms of movement. Hegel's dialectic is on his head.

In its mystified form, dialectics became fashionable in Germany, since, apparently, it made it possible to throw a veil over the existing state of affairs. In its rational form, dialectics inspire the bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire-ideologists only with malice and horror, because in a positive understanding of the existing, it includes at the same time an understanding of its denial, its necessary death, it considers each

realized form in motion, therefore also with its the transient side, since it does not bow to anything and is by its very essence critical and revolutionary. (*K. Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. XXI - XXIII, Partizdat, 1932 Afterword to the 2nd ed.*)

## **Lenin on the Attitude to the Idealistic Dialectic of Hegel**

The natural scientist must be a modern materialist, a conscious supporter of the materialism that is represented by Marx, that is, he must be a dialectical materialist. To achieve this goal, the staff of the journal *Under the Banner of Marxism* should organize a systematic study of Hegel's dialectics from a materialistic point of view, that is, the dialectic that Marx practically applied both in his *Capital* and in his historical and political works and applied with such a success that now every day the awakening of new classes to life and to the struggle in the East (Japan, India, China), that is, those hundreds of millions of humanity that make up the majority of the world's population and which, due to their historical activity and their historical sleep have so far caused stagnation and decay in many advanced European countries.

Of course, the work of such a study, such an interpretation and such propaganda of the Hegelian dialectic is extremely difficult, and, undoubtedly, the first experiments in this regard will be associated with errors. But only he who does nothing is not mistaken. Based on how Marx used Hegel's materially understood dialectics, we can and should develop this dialectic from all sides, print excerpts from Hegel's main works in the journal, interpret them materialistically, commenting on examples of the use of dialectics by Marx, as well as those examples of dialectics in the field relations of economic and political relations, of which the recent history, especially the modern imperialist war and revolution, provide unusually much. The group of editors and employees of the journal "*Under the Banner of Marxism*" should, in my opinion, a kind of "society of materialistic friends of Hegelian dialectics." Modern naturalists will find (if they are able to search and if we learn to help them) in Hegel's materialistically interpreted dialectic a number of answers to those philosophical questions that are posed by the revolution in natural science and which intellectual admirers of bourgeois fashion "get confused" with reaction.

Without such a task to be set and systematically carried out, materialism cannot be militant materialism. He will remain, using a generous expression, not so much fighting as fighting. Without this, large-scale naturalists as often as until now will be helpless in their philosophical conclusions and generalizations. For natural science is progressing so fast, going through a period of such a revolutionary breakdown in all areas that it is impossible to do without philosophical conclusions in any case. (*Lenin, On the significance of militant materialism (1922), Soch., Vol. XXVII , p. 187-188, 3rd ed.*)

\* \* \*

Hegel's logic cannot be applied in its present form; can not be taken as given. From it it is necessary to choose logical (epistemological) shades, having cleared the mysticism of ideas: this is still a lot of work. (*"Lenin Collection" XII , p. 205.*)

### **III. Forms of Motion of Matter, Their Interaction and Transitions from One to Another**

Motion, considered in the most general sense of the word, that is, understood as a way of the existence of matter, as an attribute inherent in matter <quality>, embraces all the changes and processes taking place in the universe, starting from simple movement and ending with thinking. It goes without saying that the study of the nature of motion should have come from the lower, simplest forms of it and explained them before it could give anything to explain the higher and more complex forms of it. And indeed, we see that in the historical development of natural science the theory of simple displacement, the mechanics of celestial bodies and earthly masses was first created; followed by the theory of molecular motion, physics, and immediately after the latter, almost along with it, and sometimes even before it, the science of the motion of atoms, chemistry. Only after these various branches of cognition of the forms of motion prevailing in the field of inorganic nature reached a high degree of development could we begin to explain the phenomena of motion that represent the process of life, and its successes paralleled the progress of science in

the fields of mechanics, physics and chemistry. Thus, while mechanics has long been able to reduce all the actions of bone levers set in motion by muscle contraction to the laws prevailing in an inanimate nature, the physicochemical substantiation of other life phenomena is still in its infancy. Therefore, intending to begin here to study the nature of motion, we are forced to leave aside its organic forms. In accordance with the level of scientific knowledge, we will be forced to limit ourselves to forms of movement in an inorganic nature. dominant in the field of inorganic nature, reached a high degree of development, it was possible to begin to explain the phenomena of motion that represent the process of life, and its successes paralleled the progress of science in the fields of mechanics, physics and chemistry. Thus, while mechanics has long been able to reduce all the actions of bone levers set in motion by muscle contraction to the laws prevailing in an inanimate nature, the physicochemical substantiation of other life phenomena is still in its infancy. Therefore, intending to begin here to study the nature of motion, we are forced to leave aside its organic forms. In accordance with the level of scientific knowledge, we will be forced to limit ourselves to forms of movement in an inorganic nature. dominant in the field of inorganic nature, reached a high degree of development, it was possible to begin to explain the phenomena of motion that represent the process of life, and its successes paralleled the progress of science in the fields of mechanics, physics and chemistry. Thus, while mechanics has long been able to reduce all the actions of bone levers set in motion by muscle contraction to the laws prevailing in an inanimate nature, the physicochemical substantiation of other life phenomena is still in its infancy. Therefore, intending to begin here to study the nature of motion, we are forced to leave aside its organic forms. In accordance with the level of scientific knowledge, we will be forced to limit ourselves to forms of movement in an inorganic nature. one could begin to explain the phenomena of motion that represent the process of life, and its successes paralleled the progress of science in the fields of mechanics, physics, and chemistry. Thus, while mechanics has long been able to reduce all the actions of bone levers set in motion by muscle contraction to the laws prevailing in an inanimate nature, the physicochemical substantiation of other life phenomena is still in its infancy. Therefore, intending to begin here to study the nature of motion, we are forced to leave aside its organic forms. In accordance with the level of scientific knowledge, we will be forced to limit ourselves to forms of movement in an inorganic

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Any movement is associated with some kind of movement - the movement of celestial bodies, terrestrial masses, molecules, atoms or particles of ether. The higher the form of movement, the smaller the movement. It does not at all exhaust the nature of the corresponding movement, but it is inseparable from it. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate it before everything else. (*F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 130, 1932*)

*Interaction*—this is the first thing that we observe when we begin to consider moving matter as a whole from the point of view of modern natural science. We are seeing a number of forms of movement: mechanical motion, light, heat, electricity, magnetism, chemical composition and decomposition, transitions of states of aggregation of organic life, which are all—if we exclude *until* organic life - into each other, determine mutually each other, they are here—the cause, there—the action, and the total amount of movements, with all changes in form, remains the same (Spinozovsky: the *substance* is

causa sui, expresses perfectly the interaction). Mechanical movement turns into heat, electricity, magnetism, light, etc., and vice versa. So in natural science confirms what Hegel says (where?), That interaction is the true *causa finalis* of things. We cannot go beyond the knowledge of this interaction, for there is nothing knowable behind it. Since we have known the forms of motion of matter (for which, however, we still have a lot to do due to the short duration of the existence of natural science), then we have known matter itself, and this is the end of knowledge. (Grove's entire misunderstanding about causality is based on the fact that he does not involve the category of interaction into consideration. This category itself appears in him, but there is no abstract thought about it, and this leads to confusion—pp. 10-14). Only on the basis of this universal interaction, we come to a real causal relationship. To understand individual phenomena, we must tear them out of a universal connection and consider them in an isolated way, and *in this case*, the changing movements appear before us - one as a cause, the other as an action... (*F. Engels, Dialectic of Nature, pp. 15-16, 1932*)

## About Mechanical Science

**Note 2 to page 46: Various forms of movement and the sciences that consider them.**

Since this article appeared (Yorwärts, February 9, 1877), Kekule (Die Wissensch. Ziele u. Leistungen der Chemie) gave a completely similar definition of mechanics, physics and chemistry: "If you take this idea as the basis about the essence of matter, then chemistry can be defined as the *science of atoms*, and physics as the *science of molecules* ; in this case, the idea is to single out the part of modern physics that deals with *mass*, in a special discipline, leaving for her the name of mechanics." Thus, mechanics is the basis of physics and chemistry, since both, with a well-known assessment and quantitative consideration of their molecules or atoms, should consider them as masses. This concept differs, as we see, from that given in the text and in the previous note, only in its somewhat less certainty. But if one English journal ("Nature") gave Kekula the above thought in such a way that mechanics is the statics and dynamics of the masses, physics is the statics and dynamics of the molecules, chemistry is the statics

and dynamics of the atoms, then in my opinion, such an unconditional reduction even chemical processes to purely mechanical constricts the field of chemistry inappropriately. And yet it has become so fashionable that, for example, *the broad sense of the word to mechanical forces*”(Perigenesis).

Calling physics the mechanics of molecules, chemistry—the physics of atoms and, further, biology - the chemistry of proteins, I want to express by this the transition of one of these sciences to another and, therefore, the connection, continuity, as well as the difference, the gap between both areas. To go beyond this, to call chemistry a kind of mechanics, in my opinion, is irrational. Mechanics—in the broader or narrower sense of the word— knows only quantities, it operates with speeds and masses and, in the best case, volume. Where quality stands in her way, as, for example, in hydrostatics and aerostatics, she cannot come to satisfactory results without going into consideration of molecular states and molecular motion; she herself is only a simple auxiliary science, a premise of physics. But in physics, and even more in chemistry, not only is there a constant qualitative change as a result of a quantitative change, not only is there a transition of quantity into quality, but one also has to consider a lot of quality changes, which are not completely proven that they are due to “quantitative changes”. We can readily agree that modern science is moving in this direction, but this does not prove at all that this direction is the only correct one, that, following this path, *we’ll completely exhaust* physics and chemistry. Every movement involves a mechanical movement and the movement of large or the smallest parts of matter; to know these mechanical movements is the *first* the task of science, however, only the first. This mechanical movement itself does not at all exhaust the movement at all. Movement is not at all a simple movement, a simple change of place; in the supra-mechanical areas, it is also a change in quality. <Thinking is also movement>. The discovery that heat is a molecular motion constituted an era in science. But if I have nothing else to say about heat, except that it is a known movement of molecules, then it is better for me to shut up. Chemistry is on the verge of explaining a number of chemical and physical properties of elements from the ratio of atomic volumes to atomic weights. But not a single chemist will dare to assert that all the properties of any element are expressed in an exhaustive way by its position on the Lothar-Meyer curve, that this one determines, for example, specific properties of carbon, making it the main carrier of organic life, or the

need for phosphorus in the brain. Meanwhile, the mechanical concept boils down to just that; she explains all kinds of changes from changes in the place, all qualitative differences from quantitative ones and does not notice that the relationship between quality and quantity is mutual, that quality also goes into quantity, like quantity into quality, that there is interaction. If we must reduce all differences and changes in quality to quantitative differences and changes, to mechanical displacements, then we necessarily come to the position that all matter consists of she explains all kinds of changes from changes in the place, all qualitative differences from quantitative ones and does not notice that the relationship between quality and quantity is mutual, that quality also goes into quantity, like quantity into quality, that there is interaction. If we must reduce all differences and changes in quality to quantitative differences and changes, to mechanical displacements, then we necessarily come to the position that all matter consists of she explains all kinds of changes from changes in the place, all qualitative differences from quantitative ones and does not notice that the relationship between quality and quantity is mutual, that quality also goes into quantity as quantity into quality, that there is interaction. If we must reduce all differences and changes in quality to quantitative differences and changes, to mechanical displacements, then we necessarily come to the position that all matter consists of *of the* smallest particles and that all the qualitative differences in the chemical elements of matter are caused by quantitative differences in the number and spatial grouping of these smallest particles when they are combined into atoms. But this is still a long way off.

Only the unfamiliarity of modern natural scientists with a philosophy other than the most ordinary vulgar philosophy that is currently flourishing in German universities allows them to use such expressions as “mechanical” in this way, and they don’t realize and don’t even know which necessary conclusions follow from this. The theory of the absolute qualitative identity of matter has its adherents; empirically, it also cannot be refuted, just as it cannot be proved. But if you ask people who want to explain everything in a “mechanical way”, do they recognize the inevitability of this conclusion and recognize the identity of matter, what different answers are obtained!

The most ridiculous thing is that the equation of “materialistic” and “mechanical” has *Hegel* as his ancestor, who wanted to humiliate materialism with the epithet “mechanical”. But the fact is that materialism criticized by Hegel—the French materialism of the

eighteenth century—was really exclusively *mechanical* and for the simple reason that physics, chemistry and biology were then still in their infancy, far from being the basis of a common worldview. In the same way, Haeckel borrows from Hegel the translation of *causae efficientes* through mechanically acting causes and *causae finales* through purposefully acting causes; but Hegel understands the word “mechanical”—blindly, unconsciously acting, and not mechanically acting in the sense of Haeckel. But for Hegel himself, all this opposition is something outdated, so obsolete that it *does not mention* about him in neither of his expositions of the problem of causality in the *Logic*, mentioning him only in the *History of Philosophy*, where it is covered in a historical perspective (therefore, Haeckel’s complete misunderstanding due to the superficial attitude!) and completely by chance when analysing the question of teleology (“*Logic*”, II, 3), as about the form in which the *old metaphysics* considered the opposite between mechanism and teleology. In general, he sees it as a long-overlooked point of view. Thus, Haeckel, in his enthusiastic desire to find confirmation of his “mechanical” concept, simply wrote off Hegel incorrectly, thereby achieving the remarkable result that if natural selection creates any definite change in this or that animal or plant, then this happens thanks to *causa efficiens*; if this very change is caused by *artificial* selection, this is due to *causa finalis* and, therefore, the breeder is in the role of *causa finalis*. It is clear that the dialectic of Hegel’s caliber could not be confused in the limited contrast between *causa efficiens* and *causa finalis*. From the modern point of view, it is not difficult to put an end to all the confusion and chatter about this opposite, indicating that, as we *know* from experience and theory, matter and its mode of existence, motion, are irreplaceable and, therefore, are their ultimate causes. If we take some particular reason, isolated in time and place in the interaction of the world movement or isolated by our thought, then we will not add any new definition to it, but we will introduce only a complicating and confusing moment, calling it *valid* cause. A reason that does not work is not a cause at all. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 79-82.*)

## **The Inconsistency of Mechanical Materialism Leads to Idealism**

*N.B.* Matter as such is a pure creation of thought and abstraction. Summing up the things that we consider to be bodily existing under the concept of matter, we digress from all the qualitative differences in them. Therefore, matter as such, in contrast to certain existing matters, is not something sensually existing. Natural science, striving to find a single matter as such, striving to reduce qualitative differences to purely quantitative differences in the composition of the smallest particles, acts as it would if, instead of cherries, pears, apples, it sought fruit as such; instead of cats, dogs, sheep, etc., they were looking for a mammal as such, gas as such, metal as such, stone as such, chemical compound as such, movement as such. Darwin's theory requires a similar first mammal, *the germ of all future and modern mammals*, it actually stood below all modern mammals and was completely rude, and therefore more transient than all of them. As Hegel already proved (*Encyclopaedia I*, 199), this view, this "one-sided mathematical point of view", according to which matter is quantifiable only and qualitatively the same, is "exactly the point of view" of 18th-century French materialism. It is even a return to Pythagoras, who already considered number, quantitative certainty as the essence of things. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature*, p. 82.)

## **Attributes of Matter are not Destroyed**

Matter moves in an eternal cycle, completing its trajectory at such intervals of time for which our earthly year cannot serve as a sufficient unit; in a cycle in which the time of the highest development, the time of organic life and even more the life of conscious beings is as poorly measured as space in life and in self-consciousness; in a cycle in which each separate form of the existence of matter - indifferent, the sun or nebula, separate animal or animal species, chemical compound or decomposition—is equally transient and in which nothing lasts forever but the ever-changing, ever-moving matter and the laws of its motion and change. But, no matter how often and no matter how ruthlessly this cycle takes place in time and space; no matter how many countless suns and lands arise and die, no matter how long you have to wait until the conditions necessary for organic life appear in some solar system, on any planet; no matter how many countless creatures should die and arise before animals with a

thinking brain develop out of their environment, finding conditions suitable for their life for a short period of time, and then be also exterminated without mercy, we are sure that matter is in all in its transformations it remains forever the same that not one of its attributes can perish and that therefore, with the same iron necessity with which it once exterminated its highest color on earth—a thinking spirit, it will have to give birth to it again n whether in another place and another time. ( essential for organic life; no matter how many countless creatures should die and arise before animals with a thinking brain develop out of their environment, finding conditions suitable for their life for a short period of time, and then be also exterminated without mercy, we are sure that matter is in all in its transformations it remains forever the same that not one of its attributes can perish and that therefore, with the same iron necessity with which it once exterminated its highest color on earth—a thinking spirit, it will have to give birth to it again n whether in another place and another time. ( essential for organic life; no matter how many countless creatures should die and arise before animals with a thinking brain develop out of their environment, finding conditions suitable for their life for a short period of time, and then be also exterminated without mercy, we are sure that matter is in all in its transformations it remains forever the same that not one of its attributes can perish and that therefore, with the same iron necessity with which it once exterminated its highest color on earth—a thinking spirit, it will have to give birth to it again n whether in another place and another time. (in order to be also exterminated without mercy, we are nevertheless sure that matter in all its transformations remains forever the same, that none of its attributes can perish, and that therefore with the same iron necessity with which it once will destroy its highest color on earth - the thinking spirit, it will have to give birth to it again somewhere else and at another time. ( in order to be also exterminated without mercy, we are nevertheless sure that matter in all its transformations remains forever the same, that none of its attributes can perish, and that therefore with the same iron necessity with which it once will destroy its highest color on earth - the thinking spirit, it will have to give birth to it again somewhere else and at another time. ( *F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 99, 1932*)

## Equilibrium is relative

*Movement and balance.* Equilibrium is inseparable from movement. In the motion of celestial bodies, *motion is in equilibrium and equilibrium in motion*, relatively (..? ..). Every specially relative movement, that is, here every separate movement of individual <smaller bodies> on some moving celestial body, is a desire to establish relative peace, balance. <Without relative peace there is no development>. The possibility of relative rest of bodies, the possibility of temporary equilibrium is an essential condition for the differentiation of matter, and hence life. In the sun there is no equilibrium of individual substances at all, but only of the whole mass, or only a very insignificant equilibrium due to significant differences in density, on the surface—perpetual motion, lack of peace, dissociation. On the moon, apparently, complete equilibrium reigns, without any relative movement—death (the moon—negativity). On earth, movement differentiated in a change of movement and equilibrium: a separate movement tends to equilibrium, and the aggregate movement again destroys a separate equilibrium. The rock came to rest, but the weathering process, the work of the sea surf, the action of rivers, glaciers continuously destroy the balance. Evaporation and rain, wind, heat, electrical and magnetic phenomena present the same picture. Finally, in a living organism, we observe a continuous movement of all the smallest particles of it, as well as larger organs, resulting in, during the normal period of life, a constant balance of the whole organism and, however, always in motion; here we see a living unity of movement and balance. All equilibrium is only The rock came to rest, but the weathering process, the work of the sea surf, the action of rivers, glaciers continuously destroy the balance. Evaporation and rain, wind, heat, electrical and magnetic phenomena present the same picture. Finally, in a living organism, we observe a continuous

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## **Movement and Development in Nature and Society**

<And now we again returned to the concepts of the great founders of Greek philosophy that all nature, from its smallest particles to its greatest bodies, starting from a grain of sand and ending with the sun, starting from a protist and ending with a man, is in eternal emergence and destruction, in continuous flow, in relentless movement and change, with the only significant difference that what the Greeks had a brilliant guess at is the result of a strictly scientific, experimental study and therefore has a much more definite and clear form. True, the empirical evidence of this cycle is not free of gaps, but the latter are insignificant in comparison with what has already been firmly established; moreover, they are more and more filled every day. And can there be such a detailed proof without spaces, if you recall.

Of the glowing rotating masses of gas, the laws of motion of which, perhaps, will be known to us only after several centuries of observing the stars themselves, have developed thanks to cooling and compression, countless suns and solar systems of our own, limited by the last stellar rings of the Milky Way, the world island. This development, obviously, did not go everywhere at the same speed. Astronomy is increasingly forced to recognize the existence of

dark, not just planetary bodies in our star system, that is, to recognize the existence of extinct stars (Medler); on the other hand (according to Secchi), part of the foggy spots refers to our star system as still unprepared suns, which does not exclude the possibility that other nebulae, as Medler claims, are distant independent world islands.

Laplace showed in a detailed and still unsurpassed way, how the solar system develops from a separate foggy mass; later science only confirmed the course of his thoughts.

On the separate bodies formed in this way—the suns, planets, satellites—initially that form of motion of matter that we call heat dominates. There can be no question of the chemical compounds of the elements even at the temperature that the sun has in our time; further observations of the sun will show how much heat can turn into electricity or magnetism; even now it can be considered almost established that the mechanical movements occurring in the sun have as their exclusive source the struggle of heat with gravity.

Individual bodies cool faster as they are smaller. First satellites, asteroids, meteors are cooled; our moon has long gone out. Planets cool more slowly, the central luminary is slower.

Along with progressive cooling, the interaction of physical forms of motion begins to come to the fore more and more, until, finally, the point is reached from which the chemical affinity begins to show itself, when previously chemically indifferent elements are differentiated chemically other, they acquire chemical properties and enter into compounds with each other. These compounds continuously change along with the cooling of the temperature, which affects in a different way not only each individual element, but also each individual connection of the elements; also change together with the transition of gaseous matter depending on this, first into a liquid, and then into a solid state and together with the new conditions created due to this.

The era when the planet acquires a solid crust and water accumulations [“Water accumulations” is underlined by an outsider.] On its surface coincides with the era when its own heat begins to play less and less importance compared to the heat received by it from the central body. Its atmosphere is becoming the arena of meteorological phenomena in the modern sense of the word, its surface is the arena of geological changes, in which deposits created by atmospheric precipitation gain an ever greater advantage over slowly weakening actions outside the red-hot liquid inner core.

Finally, if the temperature has cooled to the point that—at least on a significant area of the surface—it no longer crosses the border at which protein can exist, then living protoplasm is formed under favourable chemical conditions. At present, we do not yet know what these favourable preconditions are, which is not surprising, since the chemical formula of the protein has not yet been established, and we do not even know how many chemically different protein bodies exist, and since only about ten years or so it became known that a completely structureless protein exhibits all the essential functions of life “assimilation”: digestion, excretion, movement, contraction (irritability), reaction to irritation, reproduction [In the fields: Zirkelschluss.].

Maybe millennia passed before the conditions necessary for the next step forward were created, and from this shapeless protein <about which Oken prophetically...> did not occur due to the formation of the nucleus and membrane of the first cell. But along with this first cell, the basis for the shaping of the entire organic world was also given. According to the fossil record, the innumerable species of cell-free and cellular protists, which the only Eozoon Canadense tells us about, and some of which differentiated gradually into the first plants and others into the first animals, first formed, as we should allow, according to the fossil record. And from the first animals developed—mainly through further differentiation—countless classes, orders, families, genera and species of animals and, finally, that breed of animals,

And man arose through differentiation, and not only in an individual sense, that is, so that from one single cell, through differentiation, the most complex of organisms existing in nature develops, but also in a historical sense. When, after millennia-old attempts, finally, a differentiation of the arm from the leg was established and a straight gait was established, the man was isolated from the monkey, and the foundation was laid for the development of articulate speech and for the powerful development of the brain, thanks to which an impassable gap between the man and the monkey has formed since then. The development of the specific functions of the hand means the appearance of a tool, and the tool means specifically human activity, transforming the inverse effect of a person on nature, production. And animals have tools in the narrow sense of the word, but only in the form of members of their body, how it can be argued about ants, bees, beavers; and animals produce, but their productive impact on the environment is zero. Only a man managed to

leave his stamp on nature: he not only moved the plant and animal worlds, but also changed the appearance and climate of his whereabouts and even changed plants and animals to the point that the results of his activities can disappear only with the death of the entire globe.

And he achieved this primarily and mainly thanks to *his hand*. Even the steam engine, which is still its most powerful tool in the transformation of nature, in the last analysis, being a tool, is based on the hand. But in parallel with the development of the hand, the head also developed, consciousness first arose of individual practical, useful actions, and subsequently, on the basis of this, among peoples who were in more favourable conditions, an understanding of the laws of nature determining these beneficial actions. And along with a rapidly growing knowledge of the laws of nature, means of influence on nature also grew; with one hand people would not have created a steam engine if, along with the hand and partly thanks to it, the brain had not developed accordingly.

Together with man, we enter the field of history. And animals have a history, namely, the history of their origin and gradual development to their present state, but this story is made apart from them, for them, and since they themselves take part in this, this happens without the <consciousness of the ultimate goal> of their knowledge and desire. People, the more they move away from animals in the close sense of the word, the more they consciously begin to make their own history, the less the influence of unforeseen factors, uncontrolled forces on this story becomes, and the more the result of the historical action of a goal set in advance corresponds. But if we approach with this scale human history, even the history of the most developed peoples of our time, we will find that there still exists a colossal disharmony between the goals set and the results achieved, that unforeseen influences still dominate, that uncontrolled forces are much more powerful than those that are systematically set in motion by forces. And this cannot be otherwise as long as the most important historical activity of man, that activity due to which mankind has emerged from the animal state, which forms the material basis of all other types of human activity, while production aimed at satisfying the vital needs of mankind <even in in the most industrialized countries ...>, i.e., in our time, social production is left to a blind game of unforeseen influences of uncontrolled forces, and so far, therefore, it has set itself Any goal is carried out only as an exception, much more often the opposite results are realized. In the most advanced,

industrialized countries, we have humbled the forces of nature, putting them at the service of humanity; thanks to this, we have immensely increased production, so now the child produces more than before a hundred adults. But what are the results of this increase in production? The growing surplus labour, the growing poverty of the masses and every ten years a huge collapse. Darwin did not understand how he wrote a bitter satire on people and especially on his countrymen when he proved that free competition, the struggle for existence—glorified by economists as the greatest historical achievement—is a normal state thanks to this, production has increased immensely, so now the child produces more than a hundred adults before. But what are the results of this increase in production? The growing surplus labour, the growing poverty of the masses and every ten years a huge collapse. Darwin did not understand how he wrote a bitter satire on people, and especially on his fellow countrymen, when he proved that free competition, the struggle for existence—glorified by economists as the greatest historical achievement—is a normal state thanks to this, production has increased immensely, so now the child produces more than a hundred adults before. But what are the results of this increase in production? The growing surplus labour, the growing poverty of the masses and every ten years a huge collapse. Darwin did not understand how he wrote a bitter satire on people, and especially on his fellow countrymen, when he proved that free competition, the struggle for existence—glorified by economists as the greatest historical achievement—is a normal state *fauna*. Only a conscious organization of social production, in which systematic production and consumption takes place, can raise people above other animals in a social sense, just as production was raised in general in a specific sense. Thanks to social development, such an organization is becoming more and more possible every day. A new historical epoch will be dated from it, in which people, and with them all branches of their activity, and in particular natural science, will make such successes that everything perfect before that will seem only a weak shadow.

But everything that arises is worthy of destruction. Millions of years will pass, hundreds of thousands of generations will be born and go to the grave, but the time is inexorably approaching when the exhausting solar heat cannot already melt the ice approaching from the poles, when humanity, more and more crowding at the equator, stops finding the heat necessary for life, when the last trace of organic life

will gradually disappear, and the earth—a frozen, dead ball, like the moon—will circle in deep darkness in ever shorter orbits around the deceased sun, to which it finally will fall. Other planets will experience the same fate, others earlier, others later than the earth; instead of a harmoniously dissected, light, warm, solar system, a cold, dead ball will remain, continuing to go on its own lonely path in world space.

But when such a solar system completes its life cycle and undergoes the fate of everything finite, when it becomes a victim of death, what will happen next? Will the corpse of the sun continue to roll in the form of a corpse in infinite space, and will really all the infinitely diverse, previously differentiated forces of nature turn forever into a single form of movement, into attraction? “Or,” as Secchi asks (p. 810), “are there forces in nature that can bring the dead system back to its original state of a red-hot nebula, can awaken it for a new life? “We don’t know this.”

Of course, we do not know this in the sense in which we know that  $2 \times 2 = 4$  or that the attraction of matter acts inversely with the square of the distance. In theoretical natural science, which tries to unite its views on nature into one harmonic whole, without which even the most carefree empiricist in theory does not take a step forward in our time, we often have to operate with not quite known quantities, and logic, the sequence of thought, should always fill such inevitable knowledge gaps. (*F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 93-97, ed. 1932*)

## **Historical View of Society**

The most reliable in the question of social science and necessary in order to really acquire the skill to approach this issue correctly and not to get lost in the mass of small things or the enormous variety of conflicting opinions is the most important thing in order to approach this issue from the scientific point of view, it’s not forget the basic historical connection, look at every question from the point of view of how a well-known phenomenon in history arose, what are the main stages in its development, this phenomenon took place, and from the point of view of it it is developed to look at, than given It has become today.

In order to correctly approach this question, as well as any question, for example, the question of the emergence of capitalism, exploitation between people, socialism, how socialism appeared, what conditions gave rise to it, one can reliably, with confidence approach only by casting a historical look at the whole development of it as a whole. On this issue, we must first pay attention to the fact that the state did not always exist. There was a time when there was no state. It appears there and when and when the division of society into classes appears, when the exploiters and the exploited appear.

And this division of society into classes in history should always stand before us clearly, as a basic fact. The development of all human societies for thousands of years in all countries without exemption shows us a general pattern, correctness, consistency of this development in such a way that at the beginning we have a society without classes, an initial patriarchal, primitive society in which there were no aristocrats; then - a society based on slavery, a slaveholding society. All modern civilized Europe went through this - slavery was completely dominant two thousand years ago. The vast majority of the peoples of the rest of the world passed through this. The least developed peoples still have traces of slavery now, and the institutions of slavery, for example, in Africa, you will find now. Slaveholders and slaves - the first major division into classes. The first group owned not only all means of production—land, tools, no matter how primitive they were then, but it also owned people. This group was called slaveholders, and those who laboured and delivered labour to others were called slaves.

This form was followed in history by another form—serfdom. Slavery in the vast majority of countries in its development has turned into serfdom. The main division of society—feudal landlords and serfs. The form of relationships between people has changed. Slave owners considered slaves to be their property, the law strengthened this view and considered slaves as a thing entirely in the possession of the slave owner. Mass oppression and dependence remained in relation to the serf peasant, but the feudal landowner was not considered the owner of the peasant as things, but had only the right to his labour and to compelling him to serve a certain duty. In practice, as you all know, serfdom, especially in Russia, where it lasted for the longest time and took the most rude forms, was no different from slavery.

Further, in serfdom, with the development of trade, the emergence of the world market, with the development of money

circulation, a new class arose - the class of capitalists. From the goods, from the exchange of goods, from the emergence of the power of money, the power of capital arose. During the eighteenth century, or rather, from the end of the eighteenth century, and during the nineteenth century there were revolutions throughout the world. Serfdom was ousted from all countries of Western Europe. Most recently, it happened in Russia. In Russia, in 1861, a coup also took place, the consequence of which was the change of one form of society to another—the replacement of serfdom by capitalism, in which division into classes remained, various traces and remnants of serfdom remained, but basically the division into classes received a different form. (*Lenin, On the State (1919), Op., Vol. XXIV, p. 364, 365, 366-367.*)

## **Capital Movement**

The notion of capital as self-increasing value embraces not only the notion of class relations, of the specific nature of society, arising from the fact that labour exists as wage labour. Capital is, in addition, movement, the process of the circuit, going through various stages and itself, in turn, embodying three different forms of the process of the circuit. Therefore, capital can only be understood as movement, and not as a thing that is at rest. Those who believe that value acquires an independent existence only in abstraction forget that the movement of industrial capital is this abstraction in actu. Value passes here through various forms, makes various movements in which it is stored and at the same time increases, increases. Since we are dealing here primarily with a form of movement, then we do not take into account those revolutions that capital value can undergo in the process of its circulation; however, it is clear that, in spite of all the revolutions in value, capitalist production exists and maintains existence only as long as capital value undergoes an increase, that is, while it, as value having reached an independent existence, completes the process of its circulation; therefore, until the revolutions to which value is exposed are overcome in one way or another and neutralized. Capital movements are represented by the actions of an individual industrial capitalist in the sense that he acts as a buyer of goods and labour, a seller of goods, a productive capitalist and, therefore, serves the circuit with his activities. If a revolution takes place in the value of social

capital, then it may happen that the individual capital of a given capitalist cannot cope with the coup and die, as he is unable to conform to the conditions of this change in value. The sharper and more frequent the revolutions in value become, the greater the automatic movement of capital value, acting with the force of the spontaneous process of nature, that has reached independent existence, triumphs over the foresight and calculations of a single capitalist, the more the course of normal production submits to abnormal speculation, the greater the risk of existence single capitals. Thus, these periodic revolutions in value confirm that they would seem to refute, namely, that value, as capital, acquires an independent existence, which it preserves and strengthens through its movement. (*Marx, Capital, Vol. II* , pp. 60-61, *Partizdat, 1932*)

## IV. The Law of Unity of Opposites

### **Contradiction is a Source of Self-Movement**

“The first and most important theorem on the logical basic properties of being relates to the *elimination of contradictions*. A contradictory one is a category that is possible only in a combination of thoughts, but not in reality. There are no contradictions in things, or, in other words, a contradiction accepted as reality is the very peak of nonsense... The antagonism of forces opposing each other in the opposite direction is even the basic form of all actions in nature and in its manifestations. But this struggle of the directions of the forces of elements and individuals does not even remotely coincide with the idea of an absurd contradiction... Here we can be content with dispersing the fog that usually rises from the imaginary mysteries of logic, with the help of a clear image of the real absurdity of a real contradiction and showed the futility incense, which in places was ignited by the clumsy idol of the dialectic of contradictions, slipped instead of the antagonistic world schematics. “—That’s about all that is said in the “Course of Philosophy” about dialectics. In “Critical History,” the dialectic of contradictions, and Hegel with it, is already completely different.”The contradictory, according to Hegelian logic, or rather, the doctrine of the Logos, does not exist simply in thinking,

which, by its very nature, can be imagined only subjective and conscious; it is objective and, so to speak, bodily in the very things and processes, so that nonsense does not remain an impossible mental combination, but becomes a factual force. The reality of the absurd is the first member of the faith symbol of the Hegelian unity of logic and illogic... The more contradictory, the more true or, in other words, the more absurd, the more reliable: it's not even a new discovery.

The content of both places we cited can be reduced to the position that the contradiction is nonsense and that therefore it cannot be found in the real world. For people who have sound, generally speaking, reason, this position may seem as self-evident as the position that the line cannot be curved, but the curve straight. But differential calculus, in spite of all the protests of common human reason, equates the straight line under a certain curve under certain conditions and, thanks to this, achieves the successes that a common human mind would never have achieved, indignant at the senselessness of identifying a straight and curved. And judging by the large role played by the so-called dialectic of contradictions in philosophy, starting from the most ancient Greeks to our times, then even a more powerful opponent than Herr Dühring

While we consider things in a state of peace and lifelessness, each by itself, next to each other and after each other, we, of course, do not run into any contradictions in them. Here we find well-known properties that are partly common, partly different or even contradict each other, but in this latter case they are distributed between different things, so that they do not contain any contradiction. While we are spinning in this area, we can get around the ordinary metaphysical way of thinking. But it turns out quite different when we begin to consider things in their movement, in their change, in their life, in their mutual influence on each other. Here we immediately encounter contradictions. The movement itself is a contradiction; even simple mechanical movement can only happen in such a way that the body at one and the same moment in time is in one place and at the same time in another place, is in the same place and not in it. And the constant assumption and at the same time the resolution of this contradiction is precisely the movement.

Here, therefore, we have such a contradiction that "in things and phenomena themselves is present objectively and can be, so to speak, bodily felt." And what does Mr. Dühring say about this? He argues that in general there is still no "bridge in the rational mechanics between strictly static and dynamic." Now, finally, the reader may

notice what is hidden behind this beloved phrase of Mr. Dühring; no more than the following: a metaphysically minded mind absolutely cannot go from the idea of rest to the idea of movement, since the aforementioned contradiction blocks it here. For him, the movement is completely incomprehensible, for it is a contradiction. And asserting the incomprehensibility of the movement, he is forced to admit that there is an objective contradiction in the very things and phenomena, which, moreover, are actual force.

If already a simple mechanical motion in space contains a contradiction, then it appears even more in the higher forms of motion of matter, and especially in organic life and its development. We have seen above that life primarily consists in the fact that a given being at each given moment appears to be the same and something else. Consequently, life is likewise the existence of things and phenomena themselves, the contradiction that is always created and resolved, and as soon as this contradiction ceases, life also ends, death sets in. In the same way, we saw that in the field of thinking we cannot do without contradictions, and that, for example, the contradiction between the internally unlimited human ability of cognition and its actual realization in individual individuals, extremely limited from the outside and knowing only to a limited extent,

We have already mentioned that one of the main foundations of higher mathematics is the contradiction, which, under certain conditions, leads to a straight line with a curve. It also leads to another contradiction, which consists in the fact that the lines that intersect before our eyes, however, should be considered as parallel as 5-6 cm from the point of intersection, that is, those that cannot intersect even with their infinite continuation. And, nevertheless, through these and even stronger contradictions, higher mathematics reaches not only correct, but completely inaccessible to lower mathematics results.

But lower mathematics is teeming with contradictions. Such a contradiction is, for example, that a root from  $A$  can be a degree  $A$ , but

nevertheless. A  $A^{1/2} = \sqrt{A}$  contradiction also represents that a negative quantity can be a square of a quantity, because each negative quantity multiplied by itself gives a positive square. Therefore, the square root of minus one is not just a contradiction, but even a directly absurd contradiction, real nonsense. And yet it  $\sqrt{-1}$  is in many cases a necessary result of correct mathematical operations; moreover,

what would happen to mathematics, both lower and higher, if it were forbidden to operate with  $\sqrt{-1}$  ?

Mathematics itself, dealing with variables, enters the dialectical field, and it is characteristic that it was the dialectical philosopher Descartes who made this progress in it. As the mathematics of variables relates to the mathematics of constant quantities, so dialectical thinking generally refers to metaphysical. This, however, does not prevent the fact that the vast majority of mathematicians recognize dialectics only in the field of mathematics and that many of them, using dialectically obtained methods, operate on the old, limited, metaphysical mode.

It is completely impossible to analyze in more detail the antagonism of Mr. Dühring's "forces" and his "antagonistic world schematics", since he does not provide any material for this except simple *phrases*. (*Engels, Anti-Dühring, pp. 84-86, Partizdat, 1932*)

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Movement and "*self-movement*" (this is NB! Spontaneous (independent) spontaneous, *internally necessary* movement), "change", "movement and vitality", "principle of all self-movement", "impulse" to "movement" and to "activity"—the opposite of "*dead being*"—who will believe that this is the essence of "Hegelianism", abstract and abstrusen (heavy, ridiculous?) Hegelianism ?? This essence had to be discovered, understood, saved, husked, cleaned, which Marx and Engels did.

The idea of universal movement and change (1813 Logic) was guessed before its application to life and society. It was proclaimed to society earlier (1847) than proved in application to man (1859). (*The Lenin Collection IX, pp. 127-129.*)

## **The Law of Unity of Opposites is the Essence of Dialectics**

The bifurcation of the one and the knowledge of its conflicting parts (see the quote from Philo about Heraclitus at the beginning of the third part ("On the knowledge") of Lassalean Heraclitus) is the *essence* (one of the "essences", one of the basic, if not basic,

features or traits) of dialectics . This is precisely what Hegel poses the question (Aristotle in his “Metaphysics” constantly  *fights*  around this and  *struggles*  with Heraclitus resp. With Heraclitian ideas).

The correctness of this aspect of the content of dialectics must be verified by the history of science. Insufficient attention is usually paid to this side of dialectics (for example, for Plekhanov): the identity of opposites is taken as the sum of  *examples*  (“for example, grain”; “for example, primitive communism.” The same is with Engels. But this is “for popularity”...), and not as the  *law of knowledge*  (and the law of the objective world).

- “In mathematics + and -. Differential and integral.
- »Mechanics action and reaction.
- »Physics positive and negative electricity.
- »Chemistry, compound and dissociation of atoms.
- »Social science class struggle.

The identity of opposites (their “unity”, perhaps more truly? Although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly significant here. In a certain sense, both are true) is the recognition (discovery) of contradictory,  *mutually exclusive* , opposite trends in  *all*  phenomena and processes of nature (and spirit and society  *including* ). The condition for knowing all the processes of the world in their “ *self-movement* ”, in their spontaneous development, in their living life, is knowing them as the unity of opposites. (“ *Lenin Collection* ” XII , p. 323).

## **Two development concepts**

Development is the “struggle” of opposites. The two main (or two possible? Or two observed in history?) Concepts of development (evolution) are: development as a decrease and increase, as a repetition,  *and*  development as a unity of opposites (dividing one into mutually exclusive opposites and the relationship between them).

With the first concept of movement,  *the movement itself* , its  *motive*  power, its source, its motive (or this source is transferred  *outside*  - God, subject, etc.) remains in the shadow . In the second concept, the main focus is precisely on knowing the  *source of the “self”*  movement.

The first concept is dead, poor, dry. The second is vital.  *Only the second*  gives the key to the “self-movement” of all things; only it

gives the key to “leaps”, to “a break in gradualness”, to “turning into the opposite”, to destroying the old and the emergence of the new.

The unity (coincidence, identity, equal effect) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transient, relational. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, as is absolutely development, movement.

*NB:* the difference between subjectivity (scepticism and sophistry etc.) from dialectics, by the way, is that in (objective) dialectics is relative (relational) and the difference between relational and absolute. For objective dialectics *in the* relational is absolute. For subjectivity and sophistry, the relational is only relational and excludes the absolute. (*The Lenin Collection XII*, p. 324.)

## **The Unity of Opposites**

*Light and darkness* are, of course, the sharpest and most decisive contrasts in nature, and from the 4th gospel to the *lumières* of the eighteenth century, they have always served as a rhetorical phrase for religion and philosophy. Fick, p. 9: “the position already proved long ago strictly in physics... that the form of motion, called radiant heat, is identical in everything essential with that form of motion that we call *light*”, Clerk Maxwell, p. 14: “These rays (radiant heat) possess all the physical properties of light rays; they are reflected, etc. ... some of the thermal rays are identical with the rays of light, while other types of thermal rays do not make any impression on our eyes. “ So there are *darklight* rays, and the famous opposite of light and darkness disappears as an absolute opposite from natural science. Let us note, by the way, that the deepest darkness and the brightest, sharpest light evoke in our eyes the same sensation of *blinding*, and in this respect they are identical *to us*. The fact is this: depending on the length of the oscillations, the sun’s rays have various effects; rays with the longest wavelengths transfer heat, with medium—light, with the smallest—chemical action (Secchi, p. 632 et seq.), the maxima of these three actions closely coincide, and the *internal* the minima of the outer group of rays cover each other in their action in the light group. What is light and what is not light depends on the structure of the eyes; nocturnal animals can see even part of not heat, but chemical radiation, since their eyes are adapted to shorter wavelengths than our eyes. All the difficulty disappears if, instead of the three types of rays, only one type of them is accepted (and scientifically we know

only *one* type—everything else is only a hasty conclusion), they render, depending on the wavelength, a different, but compatible within narrow boundaries action. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 37- 38, Vol 6 th, 1932.*)

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*Life and death.* Already now they do not consider that physiology, which does not consider death as an essential moment of life (note: Hegel, *Enz. I, p. 152, 153*), which does not understand that the negation of life is essentially embedded in life itself so that life it is always thought in relation to its inevitable result, which is constantly in the bud in it - death. The dialectical understanding of life is precisely what this comes down to. But whoever understood this, for that, all talk about the immortality of the soul has lost its meaning forever. Death is either the decomposition of an organic body that leaves nothing behind itself but the chemical constituents that make up its substance, or it leaves behind a life principle, a soul that survives all living organisms, and not just humans. Thus, here a simple clarification to oneself, using dialectics, is enough the nature of life and death to end ancient superstition. To live is to die. (*Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, pp. 9-10, ed. 6th, 1932*)

\* \* \*

*Dialectics* is the doctrine of how *opposites* can be and how (how) they become *identical*—under what conditions they are identical, turning into each other—why a person’s mind should not take these opposites for the dead, frozen, and for the living, conditional, mobile, turning one into another. Reading Hegel... (*Lenin Collection IX , p. 69, 1st ed.*)

## **Positive and negative sides of the contradiction**

The proletariat and wealth are opposites. As such, they form one whole. Both of them are forms of existence of private property. The point is only in the specific position that each of these two elements of

the contradiction occupies as a whole. It is not enough to declare them two sides of the whole.

Private property as private property, as wealth, is forced to maintain its own existence, and therefore the existence of its opposite—the proletariat. This is the *positive* side of the contradiction, private property satisfied in itself.

On the contrary, the proletariat, as the proletariat, is compelled to reject itself, and thereby the opposite that makes it the proletariat—private property. This is the *negative* side of the contradiction, its anxiety within itself, abolished and abolishing itself private property.

The class of the haves and the class of the proletariat equally represent human self-estrangement. But the first class feels satisfied and affirmed in this self-alienation, sees in the alienation evidence of *its power* and in it possesses the *appearance* of human existence. The second class feels itself destroyed in this alienation, sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of inhuman existence. This class, in order to use Hegel's expression, is *outrage* in *indignation* against this rejection, indignation, which is necessarily caused by the contradiction between the human *nature of the class* and its life position, which is a frank, decisive and comprehensive denial of this very nature.

Within the limits of the contradiction, the private owner is a *conservative* side, the proletariat is *destructive*. From the first comes an action aimed at preserving the contradiction, from the second—an action aimed at its destruction.

Private property in its economic movement itself, however, pushes itself to its own destruction, but only by means of an independent development, unconscious, against its will and the nature of the cause of the matter of conditioned development, by creating the proletariat *as* the proletariat,—this conscious of its spiritual and physical poverty of poverty, this conscious of its rejection and thereby itself abolishing rejection. The proletariat enforces a sentence which private property itself imposes by giving birth to the proletariat, just as it enforces a sentence which itself renders hired labour by the production of another's wealth and own poverty. Having won a victory, the proletariat in no way becomes the absolute side of society, for it triumphs only by abolishing itself and its opposite. With the victory of the proletariat, both the proletariat itself and the opposite, which determines it, private property disappear.

If socialist writers attribute this world-historical role to the proletariat, then this does not in any way stem from the fact that, as

criticism assures us, they consider the proletarians to be *gods* . Rather, the opposite. Since the distraction from everything human, even from the *appearance of man*, has found for itself in the formed proletariat an almost perfect expression; since in the life conditions of the proletariat all the life conditions of modern society have reached the peak of inhumanity; since in the proletariat a man lost himself, but at the same time not only gained the theoretical consciousness of this loss, but he was also directly compelled to indignation against this inhumanity by the command of an unadorned, inexorable, absolutely imperious *need*, this practical expression of *necessity*, that is why the proletariat can and must liberate itself. But he cannot free himself without abolishing his own living conditions. He cannot abolish his own living conditions without abolishing *all the* inhuman living conditions of modern society, concentrated in his own situation. It is not in vain that he goes through a harsh, tempering school of *labour* . The point is not what the individual proletariat or even the whole proletariat *sees* its goal at the moment . The point is *what the* proletariat is and what it is, in accordance with this *being of its* own, historically will be forced to do. His purpose and his historical action are most clearly and indisputably predicted by his own life position, as well as by the whole organization of modern bourgeois society. There is no need to spread that a significant part of the English and French proletariat is now *aware of* its historical task and is constantly working on the further development and final clarification of its identity. (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Holy Family*, Vol. III , p. 54-56.)

## **Hegelianism of Proudhon**

Let us now see what modifications Mr. Proudhon subjected to the Hegelian dialectic, applying it to political economy.

In his opinion, Mr. Proudhon, every economic category has two sides: the good and the bad. He considers categories as a petty bourgeois considers great historical figures: *Napoleon* is a great man; he did a lot of good, but he also brought a lot of evil.

Taken together, the *good side and the bad side, benefit and inconvenience*, according to Proudhon, constitute a *contradiction* inherent in each economic category.

Thus, it is necessary to solve the following problem: to maintain the good side and eliminate the bad side.

*Slavery* is the same economic category as any other. Therefore, it also has two sides. Let us leave the bad side of slavery and consider the good. It goes without saying that this is only about real slavery, about the slavery of blacks in Suriname, in Brazil, in the southern states of North America.

Like machines, credit, etc., this slavery is the cornerstone of bourgeois industry. Without slavery, there would be no clap; without cotton, modern industry is unthinkable. Slavery gave importance to the colonies, the colonies created world trade, world trade is a necessary condition for large-scale industry. Consequently, slavery is a highly important economic category.

Without slavery, North America, this country of greatest progress, would have turned into a patriarchal country. Erase North America from the map of the globe—and you will produce anarchy, the complete decline of modern trade and civilization. Destroy slavery, and you will erase America from the map.

Since slavery is an economic category, it has always been one of the institutions of various nations. The newest nations were only able to mask slavery in their own country, and in the New World they introduced it openly.

What will Mr. Proudhon do to save slavery? He will propose a *task*: to maintain the good side of this economic category and eliminate the bad side.

Hegel has no tasks. He knows only dialectics. G. Proudhon borrowed only language from Hegel's dialectic. His own dialectical method consists only in the dogmatic distinction between good and evil.

We take for the time of Mr. Proudhon himself as a category. We examine its evil side and its good side, its advantages and its disadvantages.

If, compared with Hegel, he has the advantage of being able to set goals - which he is willing to solve for the benefit of mankind - then he also has the disadvantage of complete inability to dialectically produce any new category. The coexistence of two mutually conflicting parties, their struggle and their merging into one new category, is the essence of the dialectical movement.

If you are limited only to setting yourself the task of eliminating the bad side, then you are putting an end to the whole dialectical movement. You are no longer dealing with a category that posits itself

and is opposed to itself by virtue of its contradictory nature; you are dealing only with Mr. Proudhon, who is beating, tormenting, and losing his strength between the two sides of the category.

Having thus fallen into a dead end, from which it is difficult to break out by legal means, Mr. Proudhon makes a desperate effort and, with one leap, is transferred to the field of a new category. Then a *series in the mind* reveals itself to his admiring eyes .

He grasps the first category that comes across and arbitrarily ascribes to it the property of eliminating the inconvenience of the category to be purified. So, taxes heal, according to Mr. Proudhon, the inconvenience of a monopoly; the trade balance eliminates the inconvenience of taxes; land ownership eliminates the inconvenience of credit.

Going through all the economic categories one after another and making one category *an antidote* to the other, Mr. Proudhon composes with this mixture of contradictions and antidotes from contradictions two volumes of contradictions, which he rightly calls the “System of Economic Contradictions” ...

Economists use a very strange trick in their reasoning. For them, there are only two kinds of institutions; some are natural, others are artificial. Feudal institutions are artificial, bourgeois institutions are natural.

In this case, economists are similar to theologians who also have two kinds of religions. Every foreign religion is, in their opinion, the work of people, while their own religion is the emanation of God. Saying that the existing relationship, i.e. relations of bourgeois production are natural, economists want to say that in these relations the production of wealth and the development of productive forces are carried out in accordance with the laws of nature. Therefore, the named relations themselves turn out to be natural laws, independent of the influence of time. Society must always be influenced by these eternal laws. Thus, before there was a story, but now it is no longer there. History was because there were feudal institutions and because in these feudal institutions we find relations of production that are completely unlike bourgeois ones,

Feudalism also has its proletarians: serfs, embodying all the embryos of the bourgeoisie. Feudal production, in turn, included two irreconcilable elements, which are also called the *good and bad side*, feudalism, while not noticing that, in the end, the bad side always prevails over the good. It is the evil side, which determines the struggle, that creates the historical movement. If economists,

fascinated by knightly virtues, the harmony between rights and duties, the patriarchal life of cities, the prosperity of home industry in villages, the development of production organized in a corporation, guilds and workshops, in a word, if they were fascinated by everything that is a good side of feudalism, set itself the task of eliminating the flip side of the coin—slavery, privileges, anarchy—what could their efforts lead to? All elements that determined the struggle would have been destroyed, the development of the bourgeoisie would have been interrupted in the bud. Economists would set themselves the ridiculous task of eliminating history.

When the bourgeoisie prevailed, there was no longer any talk of either the good or the bad side of feudalism. The bourgeoisie came into possession of the productive forces developed by it under the rule of feudalism. But at the same time, all the old economic forms were developed, all civil relations corresponding to them, as well as the political order, which served as the official expression of the old society.

Thus, in order to correctly judge feudal production, it is necessary to consider it as a mode of production based on antagonism. It is necessary to show how wealth was created in this environment based on antagonism, how the productive forces developed along with the development of the class struggle, as one of these classes, which represented the bad uncomfortable side of society, gradually grew until it was ripe, finally, the material conditions of his release. But in doing so, do you not recognize that the methods of production, as well as those relations under which the development of productive forces takes place, do not at all constitute eternal laws, but correspond to the well-known development of people and their productive forces; don't you also recognize that any change in the field of productive forces belonging to people necessarily leads to a change in production relations? Since it is necessary first of all to preserve the acquired productive forces, these fruits of civilization, it is necessary to break down the traditional forms in which they were produced. Following this moment, the former revolutionary class becomes conservative.

The bourgeoisie begins its historical development along with the proletariat, which, in turn, is the remnant of the proletariat of feudal times. During its historical development, the bourgeoisie necessarily develops its antagonistic character, which is initially very unclear and exists only in a latent state. As the bourgeoisie develops, a new proletariat, the modern proletariat, develops in its bowels; a struggle

ensues between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which before both sides sensed, noticed, appreciated, understood, recognized and loudly proclaimed it, manifests itself only in partial and transient conflicts and in destructive actions. On the other hand, if all members of the modern bourgeoisie have the same interest, since they form a special class that contradicts another class, then in their own mutual relations their interests are hostile and opposite. This contradiction of interests stems from the economic conditions of their bourgeois life.

Thus, with each passing day it becomes more and more obvious that the nature of those production relations within which the movement of the bourgeoisie takes place is characterized by duality, and not at all by uniformity and simplicity, that with the same relations in which wealth is produced, is also produced and poverty; that under the same relations in which the development of productive forces takes place, the force of oppression also develops; that these relations create *bourgeois wealth*, that is, the wealth of the bourgeois class, only under the condition of the constant destruction of the wealth of individual members of this class and the formation of an ever-growing proletariat. (*K. Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, Op., Vol. V, p. 363-367, 373-375, Guise, 1929.*)

## **The Contradictions of the Capitalist Mode of Production**

... Just like manufactory and crafts that improved under its influence, once clashed with the feudal ties of the workshops, large-scale industry, at a higher stage of its development, comes into conflict with the narrow limits that its capitalist mode of production limits. The new productive forces outgrew the bourgeois forms of their exploitation. This contradiction between the productive forces and the mode of production was not invented by people—like the contradiction between original sin and divine justice—but exists in reality, objectively, outside of us, regardless of the will and behaviour of even those people whose activities it was created. Modern socialism is nothing but a mental reflection of this factual contradiction, its ideal reflection in the minds, above all of the class.

What is this contradiction?

Before the advent of capitalism, that is, in the Middle Ages, there was everywhere small-scale production based on the private property

of producers in relation to the means of production; in the countryside, agriculture was dominated by small, free or serfs, peasants; in cities, craft. Tools—land, agricultural tools, workshops and tools of artisans—were the tools of individuals, designed only for single use, and, therefore, by necessity remained small, imperfect, limited. But that's why they belonged to the manufacturers themselves. The historical role of capitalism and its bearer—the bourgeoisie—consisted precisely in the concentration of these scattered crayons of the means of production, in giving them a wider scale, in turning them into modern powerful levers of production. How did she play this role Beginning in the 15th century, at three different historical stages of production: simple cooperation, manufactory, and large-scale industry, is depicted in detail in the fourth section of Marx's *Capital*. But it is also shown there that, turning the limited means of production into enormous modern productive forces, the bourgeoisie could not but turn them from private to *public*, driven only by the efforts of *many people*. Instead of a self-spinning wheel, a manual loom, a blacksmith hammer, spinning machines, a mechanical loom, and a steam hammer appeared; instead of small workshops, huge factories requiring the combined work of hundreds and thousands of workers. Like the means of production, production itself has evolved from a series of disparate efforts of units into a series of social actions, and products from the work of an individual into the works of the whole society. Yarn, fabrics, metal goods, now coming out of factories and factories, are the product of the labour of many workers who alternately applied their efforts to them before giving them their final form. No one individually can say about them: "I did it, this is *my* product".

But in a society whose production is based on the naturally divided division of labour that has gradually developed without any plan, products inevitably take the form of *goods*, the exchange of which, buying and selling, gives individual producers the opportunity to satisfy their diverse needs. So it was in the Middle Ages. A peasant, for example, sold agricultural products to a craftsman and bought handicrafts from him. A new method of production has penetrated into this society of disconnected commodity producers. Among the naturally grown, *without any plan for the* existing division of labour between members of the whole society, there was a division of labour in factories, organized *according to a deliberate plan*; next to *individual* production appeared *social* production.

The products of both were sold in the same markets and, therefore, at prices at least approximately equal. But the organization, created according to a deliberate plan, was more powerful than the naturally grown division of labour; products of social factory labour were cheaper than products of small, disconnected producers. Individual production suffered one defeat after another, social production finally revolutionized the whole old mode of production. Its revolutionary nature, however, was so little recognized that it was introduced precisely to strengthen and promote commodity production. It arose in direct connection with the well-known, already existing, engines of commodity production: commercial capital, crafts and wage labour. Speaking only in the form of a new form of commodity production,

In medieval production of goods, the question of who should belong to the products of labour could not even arise. They were made by each individual producer from his own material, often made by himself, with his own tools and with his own hands or the hands of the family. There was no need for such a manufacturer to appropriate his products; they belonged to him by the very essence of the matter. Consequently, ownership of the products was based on *personal work*. Even where outside help took place in production, in most cases it played only a minor role and was rewarded not only with wages; the guild apprentice and apprentice worked not so much for pay or maintenance as for their own education and preparation for the title of independent master. But now the concentration of the means of production in large workshops and manufactories began, their transformation in practice into social means of production. And with these social means and products they continued to act as if they were still the means of production and the products of the labour of individuals. If until now the manufacturer, who was at the same time the owner of the instruments of labour, has appropriated his own product, in which the labour of others participated only as an exception, *him*, but exclusively by *another's labour*. Thus, the products of social labour began to be appropriated not by those who worked with the help of its tools and who were a real producer of its products, but by *capitalists*. The means of production and production itself have essentially become public; but they were subordinate to the form of appropriation, based on a private unit production, characteristic of the time when everyone owned his own product and brought it to the market himself. The new form of production obeyed the old form of appropriation, despite the fact that it completely

destroyed its foundations [It goes without saying that although the *form of appropriation* remained the same, but the *character* it has changed as a result of the above process as radically as the nature of production itself. The big difference is whether I am appropriating a product of my own or a product of another's labour. We note in passing that wage labour, which hides in itself the embryo of all capitalist production, has existed since ancient times. In a single random form, we meet him for centuries alongside slavery. But a hidden embryo could not develop into a capitalist mode of production before the historical conditions necessary for it ripened.].

This contradiction, which informed the new mode of production of its capitalist character, contained the *embryos of all modern contradictions*. And the more dominance of the new mode of production became in all the most significant sectors of labour, in all countries most economically influential, the more he pushed aside the insignificant remnants of individual production, *the more sharply the incompatibility of social production with capitalist appropriation should have come forward*.

The first capitalists found, as we saw, a form of wage labour already ready. But wage labour existed only in the form of an exception, a side occupation, a transitional position for the worker. The farmer, hired from time to time for day work, had his own patch of land, the products of which he could live in case of extreme. The shop charters made sure that today's apprentice tomorrow became a master. But everything has changed, only the means of production have acquired a social character and concentrated in the hands of the capitalists. The means of production and the products of individual producers became more and more depreciated, and their owners had no choice but to hire capitalists. Wage labour, which previously existed in the form of an exception and subsidiary fishing, became the general rule, the basis of all production; from a by-product he turned into the only occupation of the workers. The temporary wage worker has turned into a lifelong one. The mass of wage workers has increased tremendously due to the simultaneous destruction of the feudal order, the dismissal of the retinue of feudal lords, the expulsion of peasants from their estates, etc. There has been a complete gap between the means of production concentrated in the hands of the capitalists and the producers deprived of everything except labour. *The contradiction between social production and capitalist appropriation manifested itself in the antagonism between*

*the proletariat and the bourgeoisie* . (Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, pp. 192-195, *Partizdat*, 1932)

The development of production (and, consequently, the domestic market) mainly at the expense of the means of production seems paradoxical and is, of course, a contradiction. This is a real “production for production”, expansion of production without a corresponding expansion of consumption. But this contradiction is not a doctrine, but a real life; it is precisely such a contradiction that corresponds to the very nature of capitalism and the remaining contradictions of this system of social economy. It is this expansion of production without a corresponding expansion of consumption that corresponds to the historical mission of capitalism and its social structure [In the first edition: “its specific social structure”.—*Red.*]: the first is the development of the productive forces of society; the second excludes the disposal of these technical gains by the mass of the population. There is an undoubted contradiction between the limitless desire to expand production inherent in capitalism and the limited consumption of the masses (limited due to their proletarian state). It is precisely this contradiction that Marx ascertains in those provisions that the Narodniks readily cite in support of supposedly their views on the reduction of the domestic market, the non-progressiveness of capitalism, etc., etc. These are some of these provisions: “A contradiction in the capitalist mode of production: workers, how Buyers of goods are important for the market. But capitalist society has a tendency to limit them to the minimum price, as sellers of their goods—labour “ (Das Kapital, II, 303).

... “The conditions of realization... are limited by the proportionality of the various branches of production and the consumer power of society... The more the productive force develops, the more it comes into conflict with the narrow basis on which the relations of consumption rest” (ibid., III, 1 225-226). “The limits within which the preservation and increase in the cost of capital based on the expropriation and impoverishment of the mass of producers can only be made, these limits constantly contradict those production methods that capital is forced to adopt to achieve its goal and which strive for unlimited expansion of production, to the unconditional development of social productive forces that set production as a self-sufficient goal... Therefore, if the capitalist mode of production is a historical means for the development of the material productive force, for the creation of a world market corresponding to this force, then it is at the same time a constant contradiction between this historical

task and the social relations of production characteristic of it" (III, 1, 232. Russ. lane, p. 194). "The last cause of all real crises is always the poverty and limited consumption of the masses, which counteracts the desire of capitalist production to develop productive forces in such a way as if the boundary of their development was only the absolute consumption capacity of society" [This is the place quoted by the famous (Herostratic famous) Ed. Bernstein in his Prerequisites for Socialism (Die Voraussetzungen etc., Stuttg. 1899, S. 67). Of course our opportunist, turning from Marxism to the old bourgeois economy, hastened to declare that this was a contradiction in the theory of crises of Marx, that such a view of Marx "is not very different from the Rodbertusian theory of crises." In fact, "contradiction" exists only between Bernstein's claims, on the one hand, and his senseless eclecticism and his unwillingness to reflect on Marx's theory, on the other. To what extent Bernstein did not understand the theory of implementation, this can be seen from his truly curious argument, as if a huge increase in the mass of the surplus product on the one hand, and his senseless eclecticism and unwillingness to ponder Marx's theory, on the other. To what extent Bernstein did not understand the theory of implementation, this can be seen from his truly curious argument, as if a huge increase in the mass of the surplus product on the one hand, and his senseless eclecticism and unwillingness to ponder Marx's theory, on the other. To what extent Bernstein did not understand the theory of implementation, this can be seen from his truly curious argument, as if a huge increase in the mass of the surplus product *it must necessarily* mean an increase in the number of the propertied (or an increase in the well-being of the workers), for the capitalists themselves, if you please see, and their "servants" (Sic! Seite 51-52) cannot "consume" the entire surplus product!! ( *Note. To 2nd ed.*)] (III, 2, 21. Russ. Trans., 395). In all these provisions, the indicated contradiction between the limitless desire to expand production and limited consumption, and nothing more is stated [The opinion of Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky, who believes that Marx, putting forward these provisions, contradicts his own analysis of implementation, is erroneous ("The World divine", 1898, No. 6, p. 123, in the article: "Capitalism and the Market"). Marx has no contradiction, for in the analysis of realization the connection between productive and personal consumption is indicated.]. There is nothing more meaningless than deducing "Capital" from these places, as if Marx did not allow the possibility of realizing the super cost in capitalist society, as if he explained crises by insufficient

consumption, etc. An analysis of Marx's implementation showed that "ultimately the circulation between constant capital and variable capital is limited by personal consumption", but the same analysis showed the true nature of this "limitedness", showed that commodities play a smaller role in the formation of the domestic market in comparison with the means of production. And then, there is nothing more ridiculous how to deduce from the contradictions of capitalism its impossibility, non-progression, etc. - this means to escape to the sky-high heights of romantic dreams from an unpleasant, but unquestionable reality. The contradiction between the desire for unlimited expansion of production and limited consumption is not the only contradiction of capitalism, which cannot exist and develop without contradictions at all. The contradictions of capitalism testify to its historical and transitory character, they find out the conditions and reasons for its decomposition and transformation into a higher form, but they by no means exclude the possibility of capitalism or its progressiveness in comparison with previous systems of social economy [Cf. "To the characteristic of economic romanticism. Sismondi and our domestic sismondists "(vol. II, Op.—Ed)]. (Lenin, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, Op. Vol. III, chap. I, § VI, p. 3 -33.)

## Product Contradiction

Until now, a product has been viewed from two points of view—as use value and as exchange value—each time one-sidedly. But as a commodity, it is directly the *unity of* use value and exchange value; however, it is a commodity only in relation to other commodities. *The actual* relationship of goods to each other is *their exchange process*. This is a social process in which individuals independent from each other enter, but they enter it only as commodity owners; their mutual existence for each other is the existence of their goods, and thus, in reality, they are only conscious carriers of the exchange process.

The product is use value: wheat, canvas, diamond, machine, etc.; but as a commodity, however, it is *not a* use value. If it were use value for its owner, that is, directly a means to satisfy its own needs, then it would not be a commodity. For the owner, on the contrary, he is *not a use value*, it is for him that he is only a material carrier of

exchange value, or a simple *medium of exchange* ; as an active carrier of exchange value, use value becomes a medium of exchange. For its owner, a commodity is use value only as exchange value. Therefore, it still has *to be done* use value primarily for others. Since a product is not a use value for its own owner, it is a use value for owners of other goods. If this is not the case, then the work of its owner was useless labour, and its result is not a commodity. On the other hand, a product *for its owner* should become a use value, because the livelihood of this owner exists outside this product, in the use values of other people's goods. To *become a* use value, a product must meet a specific need, in relation to which it is a means of satisfaction. Consequently, the use values of goods *become* consumption values when they comprehensively change places, when they change from the hands in which they are a medium of exchange into the hands in which they are a commodity. Only through such a comprehensive *alienation of* goods does the labour enclosed in them become useful labour. *In the process* of these relations of goods to each other as use values, they do not receive any new economic definiteness of form. On the contrary, the definiteness of the form that characterized them as goods also disappears. For example, bread, when passing from the hands of a baker to the hands of a consumer, does not change its being like bread. On the contrary, only the consumer treats him as a use value, as a certain means of food, while in the hands of a baker he was a carrier of economic relations, a sensually supersensible thing. Consequently, the only change in the form to which the goods are subjected, becoming use-values, is the destruction of their formal being, in which they were not use-values for their owner and were use-values for their non-owner. To become consumer values, goods must be fully alienated, enter into the exchange process, but their being for exchange is their being as exchange values. Therefore, in order to be realized as use values, they must be realized as exchange values.

If a single product, from the point of view of use value, was initially presented as an independent thing, then, on the contrary, as exchange value, it was considered from the very beginning in relation to all other goods. However, this attitude was only theoretical, mental. It becomes real only in the process of exchange. On the other hand, a commodity is nevertheless an exchange value, since it contains a certain amount of working time, because, therefore, it represents *materialized working time* . But directly, it represents only materialized individual working time with a special content, and

not *universal* working time. Consequently, the product is not a direct exchange value, he should still *to become* such. First of all, it can be a reification of universal working time, since it represents working time in a certain useful application, that is, in some kind of use value. This was a material condition under which it was only possible to take working time, enclosed in goods, as universal, social. Consequently, if a commodity can become a use value only through its realization as exchange value, then, on the other hand, it can be realized as exchange value only if it finds its use value in the process of alienation. A commodity as use value can only be alienated to the one for whom it is use value, that is, a subject of special need. On the other hand, it is alienated only for other goods, or, if we put ourselves in the place of the owner of this other product, we will see that this owner can alienate his product in the same way, that is, realize it only when it brings it into contact with the special need for which it serves. Consequently, with the complete alienation of goods as *use values* goods relate to each other according to their material difference, as special things that satisfy their specific properties with special needs. But as such simple use-values, they are indifferent to each other and, moreover, do not stand in any relation to each other. As use values, goods can only be exchanged because of their relationship to special needs. But they are exchanged only as equivalents, but they are equivalents only as equal amounts of materialized working time, so that any attention to the natural properties of their use values, and therefore to their connection with special needs, disappears. The exchange value of the goods is, on the contrary, found in the fact that, as an equivalent, it replaces, at will, a certain amount of any other goods, regardless of whether it represents the use value for the owner of another product or not. But for the owner of this other product, he is only insofar as the goods, because it is a use value for him, and for his own owner, he is only insofar as the exchange value, since he is a commodity for another. Therefore, this ratio should be: the ratio of goods as quantities essentially equal, only quantitatively different; their equality as a materialization of universal working time; but at the same time, it should be the ratio of goods as qualitatively different things, or special use values that serve to satisfy certain needs, in a word, the ratio at which they differ as actual use values. But this equalization and non-equalization are mutually excluded. In this way,

The process of exchange of goods should be both the deployment and resolution of these contradictions, which cannot, however, appear

in it in such a simple form. We only saw how the goods themselves relate to each other as use values, i.e., how do the goods *within* exchange processes act as use values. On the contrary, exchange value, as we have so far considered, existed only in our abstraction, or, if you like, in the abstraction of an individual commodity owner, in whom the goods, as use value, are in stock and as exchange value are on conscience. However, the goods themselves in the sphere of the exchange process should be for each other not only consumer, but also exchange values, and this being should be manifested in the form of their mutual relationship. The difficulty that we first encountered was that a commodity, in order to be realized as exchange value, as materialized labour, must first be alienated, realized as use value; meanwhile, this alienation of it as a use value implies, on the contrary, its being as exchange value. Suppose, however, that this difficulty is resolved. Suppose that a product has thrown off its special use value and, through its alienation, has fulfilled the material condition in order to be a socially useful work, and not a special work of an individual for himself. Then the commodity should become in the process of exchange of exchange value, the universal equivalent, the reification of universal working time for other goods and, therefore, instead of the limited value of the individual use value, it should acquire the direct ability to express itself in all consumer values as in its equivalents. But each commodity is just such a commodity, which, through the alienation of its special use-value, should appear as a direct materialization of universal working time. However, on the other hand, in the exchange process, only special goods or individual works embodied in special use values are confronted. Universal working time itself is an abstraction, which as such does not exist for goods. (*Marx, Toward a Critique of Political Economy, Ch. I, Commodity, pp. 63-67. Partizdat, 1932*).

## **The dual position of the peasantry under capitalism**

The “remnants of the old serfdom” are still terribly large in our village. This is a well-known fact. Work and bondage, class and civil incompetence of the peasant, his subordination to the privileged landowner armed with a rod, domestic humiliation, making the peasant a real barbarian—all this is not an exception, but the rule in

the Russian village, and all this is, in the last analysis, a direct experience of serfdom. In those cases and relations where this order still reigns, and since it still reigns, the enemy is the *whole peasantry as a whole*. Against serfdom, against feudal landlords and the state serving them, the peasantry continues to remain a *class*, precisely by the class of not capitalist, but serf society, that is, by the class-class [It is known that in slave and feudal society the difference in classes was fixed and in the social division of the population was accompanied by the establishment of a special legal place in the state for each class. Therefore, the classes of slave and feudal (as well as serfdom) society were also special classes. On the contrary, in a capitalist, bourgeois society, all citizens are legally equal, class divisions are destroyed (at least in principle), and therefore classes ceased to be estates. The division of societies into classes of general and feudal and bourgeois societies, but in the first two there were classes—estates, and in the latter—classes are unconscious. (Note by V.I. Lenin.)]. And *since* This class antagonism of the “peasantry” and privileged landowners, characteristic of serfdom, still persists in our village, *so long as the workers’ party* must undoubtedly be on the side of the “peasantry”, must support its struggle and *push it to fight* against all the remnants of serfdom.

We quote the word peasantry in order to indicate the presence of contradictions that are not subject to any doubt: in modern society, the peasantry, of course, is no longer a single class. But whoever is embarrassed by this contradiction, he forgets that this is not a contradiction of presentation, not a doctrine, but a contradiction of Russian life itself. This is not a composition, but a living dialectical contradiction. *Because* in our village serf society superseded “modern” (bourgeois) society, *so far* the peasantry ceases to be a class, breaking into the rural proletariat and the rural bourgeoisie (large, medium, small and very small). *Since* serfdom is still maintained, *insofar as* the “peasantry” continues to be a class, that is, we repeat, a class of not bourgeois, but serf society. This “insofar as” exists in reality in the form of an *extremely complex* interweaving of serfdom and bourgeois relations in the modern Russian village. (*Lenin, Agrarian Program of Russian Social Democracy, Soch., Vol. V, p. 92, 95, 1902*)

The revolution now reveals an increasingly ambivalent position and the dual role of the peasantry. On the one hand, the enormous remnants of corvée farming and all kinds of remnants of serfdom, with the unprecedented impoverishment and ruin of the peasant poor, fully

explain the deep sources of the revolutionary peasant movement, the deep roots of the revolutionary nature of the peasantry as a mass. On the other hand, during the revolution, and in the character of various political parties, and in many ideological and political trends, the internal-contradictory class structure of this mass, its petty-bourgeoisness, and the antagonism of economic and proletarian tendencies within it are revealed. The wobble of the impoverished landlord between the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and the revolutionary proletariat is as inevitable as that phenomenon is inevitable in any capitalist society, that an insignificant minority of small producers profits, “turns into people”, turns into a bourgeois, and the vast majority either goes bankrupt and becomes wage workers or paupers, or lives forever on the border of the proletarian state. (*Lenin, The Development of Capitalism in Russia, Soch., Vol. III , pp. 11-12, ed. 3rd*)

## **The Contradictions of Imperialism**

The era of imperialism is the era of dying capitalism. World War 1914-1918 and the general crisis of capitalism unleashed by it, being the direct result of the sharp contradiction between the growth of the productive forces of the world economy and its state partitions, they showed and proved that the material prerequisites of socialism have ripened within capitalist society, that the capitalist shell of society has become unbearable fetters for the further development of mankind, which History puts the order of the day in the task of revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist yoke.

Imperialism subjugates the vast masses of the proletarians of all countries, beginning with the centres of capitalist power and ending with the most remote corners of the colonial world, the dictatorship of financial-capitalist plutocracy. Imperialism with elemental force reveals and deepens all the contradictions of capitalist society, takes class oppression to the extreme, exacerbates the struggle between capitalist states to extreme tension, causes the inevitability of imperialist wars of a global scale that shake the entire system of dominant relations, and with iron necessity leads to a *world revolution of the proletariat* .

Linking the whole world with the chains of financial capital, blood, iron and hunger, forcing the proletarians of all countries,

peoples and to grow under his yoke, gigantically aggravating exploitation, oppressing and enslaving the proletariat and putting forward the immediate task of gaining power, imperialism creates the need for the rallying of workers a single international army of proletarians of all countries, regardless of state borders, national, cultural, linguistic or racial differences, gender or profession. Thus, imperialism, developing and completing the process of creating the material prerequisites of socialism, at the same time rallying the army of its own grave diggers, putting the proletariat in front of the need to organize into a *militant international community of workers*. “*The Program and Charter of the Communist International,*” pp. 5-7, *Partizdat, 1932*)

## **Transitional Resolution**

Our country represents two groups of contradictions. One group of contradictions is the internal contradictions that exist between the proletariat and the peasantry. Another group of contradictions is external contradictions that exist between our country as a country of socialism and all other countries, as countries of capitalism.

We consider both of these groups of contradictions separately. That there are some contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry, of course, this cannot be denied. It is enough to recall everything that happened in our country and is happening in connection with the price policy for agricultural products, in connection with the limits, in connection with the campaign to lower prices for products, etc., in order to understand the whole reality of these contradictions. Two main classes stand before us: the class of proletarians and the class of private owners, i.e., the peasantry. Hence the inevitability of contradictions between them. The whole question is whether we, with our own forces, can overcome these contradictions that exist between the proletariat and the peasantry. When they say: is it possible to build socialism on their own? - this is what they want to say: are contradictions overcome?

Leninism answers this question in the affirmative: yes, we can build socialism, and we will build it together with the peasantry, under the leadership of the working class.

Where are the reasons, motives for such an answer?

The motives for such an answer are that, in addition to the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry, there are also common interests on the fundamental issues of development that cover and, in any case, can cover these contradictions and which are the basis, the basis of the union of workers and peasants.

What are these common interests?

The fact is that there are two ways of developing agriculture: the capitalist path and the socialist path. The capitalist path means development through the impoverishment of the majority of the peasantry in the name of enrichment of the upper layers of the urban and rural bourgeoisie. The socialist path, on the contrary, means development through a steady increase in the well-being of the majority of the peasantry. Both the proletariat and, in particular, the peasantry, are interested in the development taking the second path, along the socialist path. For this path is the only salvation of the peasantry from impoverishment and half-starved existence. Needless to say, the dictatorship of the proletariat, which has in its hands the main strands of the economy, will take all measures to defeat the second path, the socialist path. It goes without saying, on the other hand,

Hence the community of interests of the proletariat and the peasantry, covering the contradictions between them.

That is why Leninism says that we can and must build a complete socialist society together with the peasantry, on the basis of an alliance of workers and peasants.

That is why Leninism says, relying on the common interests of the proletarians and peasants, that we can and must overcome by our own forces the contradictions that exist between the proletariat and the peasantry.

That is how Leninism looks at this matter. (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 120-121, ed. 9th.*)

## **The Dual Nature of NEP**

NEP is capitalism, the opposition says. NEP is a retreat for the most part, says Comrade Zinoviev. All this, of course, is not true. In fact, NEP is a party policy that allows the struggle of socialist and capitalist elements and is designed for the victory of socialist elements

over capitalist elements. In fact, NEP has just begun a retreat, but it is designed to regroup forces and lead an offensive during the retreat. In fact, we have been advancing for several years, and we are advancing with success, developing our industry, developing Soviet trade, and crowding out private capital.

But what is the meaning of the thesis - NEP is capitalism, NEP is a retreat for the most part? What does this thesis come from?

It proceeds from the incorrect assumption that we are now having a simple restoration of capitalism, a simple "return" of capitalism. Only by this assumption can the opposition's doubts about the socialist nature of our industry be explained. Only this assumption can explain the panic of the opposition in front of the fist. Only this assumption can explain the haste with which the opposition seized on the wrong figures about the differentiation of the peasantry. Only this assumption can explain the special forgetfulness of the opposition about the fact that the middle peasant is our central figure in agriculture. Only this assumption can explain the underestimation of the proportion of the middle peasant and doubts about the cooperative plan of Lenin. Only with this assumption can one "justify" the disbelief of the new opposition in the new path of village development.

In fact, what is happening now is not the unilateral process of restoring capitalism, but the bilateral process of developing capitalism and the development of socialism, the contradictory process of the struggle of the elements of the socialist and the elements of the capitalist, the process of overcoming the elements of the capitalist elements by the socialist. This is equally undeniable both for a city where state industry is the basis of socialism, and for a village where the main key to socialist development is mass cooperation, interconnected with socialist industry. (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 233-234, ed. 9th.*)

## **Transitional Revolution Conditions**

But besides external conditions, there are also internal conditions that dictate the rapid pace of development of our industry, as the leading principle of our entire national economy. I mean the excessive backwardness of our agriculture, its technology, its culture. I mean the presence in our country of the overwhelming majority of small

producers with their fragmented and completely backward production, in comparison with which our large socialist industry looks like an island among the sea, an island whose base is expanding every day, but which still represents the island among the sea. Usually they say that industry is the leading principle of the entire national economy, including agriculture, that industry is the key with which it is possible to rebuild backward and fragmented agriculture on the basis of collectivism. This is absolutely true. And we should not retreat from this for a single minute. But we must remember that if the industry is a leading start, then agriculture represents the basis for the development of the industry both as a market absorbing the products of the industry, and as a supplier of raw materials and food, and as a source of export reserves necessary to introduce equipment for needs National economy. Is it possible to move industry forward, leaving agriculture in conditions of completely backward technology, not providing an agricultural base for the industry, not reconstructing agriculture and not driving it to industry? No you can not. Hence the task is to provide agriculture with the maximum tools and means of production necessary to accelerate and move forward the task of its reconstruction on a new technical basis. But in order To achieve this goal, we need a fast pace of development of our industry. Of course, the reconstruction of fragmented and dispersed agriculture is incomparably more difficult than the reconstruction of a united and centralized socialist industry. But this task is before us, and we must solve it. And it is impossible to resolve it except on the basis of a fast pace of industrial development. It is impossible without end, that is, to continue too long a period of time, to base Soviet power and socialist construction on two and we must resolve it. And it is impossible to resolve it except on the basis of a fast pace of industrial development. It is impossible without end, that is, to continue too long a period of time, to base Soviet power and socialist construction on two and we must resolve it. And it is impossible to resolve it except on the basis of a fast pace of industrial development. It is impossible without end, that is, to continue too long a period of time, to base Soviet power and socialist construction on two *different* foundations, on the basis of the largest and most united socialist industry and on the basis of the most fragmented and backward small commodity peasant economy. It is necessary to gradually, but systematically and persistently transfer agriculture to a new technical base, to the base of large-scale production, pulling it towards socialist industry. Either we will solve this problem—and then the final victory is guaranteed, or

we will move away from it, we will not solve this problem—and then a return to capitalism can become an inevitable phenomenon. ( *Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 361 - 362, ed. 9th.* )

We came to power in a country whose technology is terribly backward. Along with the few large industrial units, more or less based on new technology, we have hundreds and thousands of factories and plants, the technology of which does not withstand any criticism from the point of view of modern achievements. Meanwhile, we have around us a whole series of capitalist countries that possess much more developed and modern industrial technology than our country. Look at the capitalist countries, and you will see that there technology not only goes, but runs straight ahead, surpassing the old forms of industrial technology. And so it turns out that, on the one hand, we have in our country the most advanced power in the whole world, Soviet power, on the other hand, we have an overly backward industrial technique, which represents the basis of socialism and Soviet power. Do you think that it is possible to achieve the final victory of socialism in the presence of this contradiction? What needs to be done to eliminate this contradiction? To do this, it is necessary to achieve in order to catch up and overtake the advanced technology of the developed capitalist countries. We have caught up with and surpassed the advanced capitalist countries in the sense of establishing a new political system, the Soviet system. It's good. But this is not enough. In order to achieve the final victory of socialism, it is still necessary to catch up and overtake these countries also in the technical and economic sense. Either we will achieve this, or they will kill us. This is true not only in terms of building socialism. This is also true from the point of view of upholding the independence of our country in a capitalist environment. It's impossible to defend the independence of our country, not having a sufficient industrial base for defence. It is impossible to create such an industrial base without the highest technology in industry. That's what we need and that's what the fast pace of industry development dictates to us. (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 358–359, ed. 9th.*)

## **Dialectic of Transition**

The reporting period was a turning point for both the capitalist countries and the USSR. For the USSR, it meant a transition from a

recovery period to a reconstruction period and a gigantic expansion of socialist construction; in capitalist countries, a turning point occurred in the direction of economic decline.

The Congress notes with satisfaction that the correct Leninist policy of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks) led to the further strengthening of the international power of the USSR, gigantic successes in the socialist industrialization of the country, the strengthening of fraternal cooperation among the peoples of the Union on the basis of Leninist national policies, the implementation and overfulfilment of the program of the first two years of the five-year period, a decisive turn towards the socialism of the middle masses, which allowed the party to move from the slogan of limiting and crowding out the kulaks to the slogan of *eliminating the kulaks as a class but on the basis of continuous collectivization...*

The rapid pace of the country's socialist industrialization, carried out by the Central Committee on the basis of the directives of the Fifteenth Congress, makes profound changes in the correlation of classes within the country. These changes are characterized, first of all, along with the rapid growth in the number of the working class and the *strengthening of its leading role* in relation to the poor and middle peasantry. *The economic bond between the working class and the main masses of the peasantry acquired primarily a production character*. The policy of the party and its Central Committee ensured the successful transition of backward and dispersed small-scale peasant farms to the rails of large socialist agriculture, the development of *continuous collectivization and the transition to the practical implementation of the slogan of eliminating the kulaks as a class*. During the reporting period, the role of private capital fell sharply and its further displacement takes place. The planning and regulatory role of the Soviet state in the entire national economy of the country is being decisively strengthened, encompassing more and more not only industry, but also agriculture. The task set by Lenin of transforming "NEP Russia" into "Socialist Russia" is being carried out.

The growth of socialist construction, the intensified offensive against the capitalist elements inevitably caused the *aggravation of the class struggle in the country* from the side of the kulak-capitalist elements and attempts of desperate resistance from them. Relying on the growing activity of the farm labourers and the poor, strengthening the alliance with the middle peasant, the party broke the counter-

revolutionary sabotage and resistance of the kulaks, successfully carried out grain procurement and accumulated a significant reserve grain fund. *The decisive turn of the middle peasant masses towards socialism* as a result of the party's correct policy found itself most vividly in the powerful collective farm movement, which at the end of 1929 swept millions of peasant farms, creating a *new balance of class forces in the country* turning the middle peasant who joins the collective farm into the pillar of the Soviet regime, creating the conditions for replacing the kulak bread production with the production of state farms and collective farms and allowing the party to move from the slogan of limiting and crowding out the kulaks to the slogan of eliminating the kulaks as a class based on continuous collectivization.

The congress emphasizes the great historical significance of this slogan, which means the assault on the working class at the *last bastion of capitalist exploitation in the country*. (*From the resolution of the XVI Congress of the CPSU (B.)*, Pp. 3, 8-9, *Ogiz "The Moscow Worker"*, 1931)

## **Substitution of Equilibrium Theory by the Mechanists of Materialist Dialectics**

It is known, for example, that in the science of organisms, *in biology*, they talk about *adaptation*. By adaptation we mean a state of affairs in which that which adapts to another can exist with this other for a long time. If, for example, they say that some kind of animal is "adapted" to the environment, this means that it can survive in this environment: it is attached to it, its properties are such that they help it to stay and live. The mole is "adapted" to the situation that exists underground, the fish is "adapted" to that situation which is in water; but throw a mole in the water or bury the fish in the ground—they will die immediately.

We observe a similar phenomenon, however, in the so-called "dead" nature: the earth, for example, does not fall in the sun, but runs around it, which is called "without hurt." The whole solar system has such a relationship with the world around it that it can exist for a long time, etc. Here, they usually talk not about fitness, but about *equilibrium* between bodies, about equilibrium between the systems of these bodies, etc.

Finally, we observe a similar phenomenon in society. Society, whether it's bad, good, lives in nature: it is more or less "adapted" to it, somehow it is in balance with it. And the different parts of society nevertheless, since society lives, are so adapted to each other that their simultaneous existence is possible: how many years capitalism has existed with capitalists and workers!

From all these examples it can be seen that in essence it is one and the same thing, namely, *equilibrium*. But if this is so, then what does the contradiction and struggle have to do with it? Just the opposite: the struggle is *an imbalance!* Why was the garden fenced? However, the whole point is that the *equilibrium that we observe in nature and society is not an absolute, not a fixed equilibrium, but a moving equilibrium*. What does it mean? This means that the equilibrium is established and immediately violated, re-established on a *new basis* and again violated, etc.

Otherwise, you could say that. In the world there are variously acting, opposed forces. Only in exceptional cases do they counterbalance each other at some point. Then we have a state of "rest", that is, their actual "struggle" remains hidden. But one has only to change one of the forces, as soon as the "internal contradictions" are revealed, the imbalance occurs, and if a new equilibrium is established at the moment, it will be established on a *new basis*, that is, with a *different* combination of forces, etc. What this implies? *And from this it follows that "struggle", "contradictions," that is, antagonisms of differently directed forces, determine the movement.*

On the other hand, here we see the *form* of this process: this is, firstly, a state of equilibrium; secondly, the violation of this balance; thirdly, the restoration of equilibrium on a *new basis*. And then history repeats itself again: the new equilibrium becomes the starting point for its new disturbance, then another equilibrium follows again, and so on to infinity. On the whole, we have a process of movement, the basis of which is the development of internal contradictions.

*Hegel* noticed this nature of the movement and expressed it in the following form: he called the initial state of equilibrium the thesis, imbalance the antithesis, that is, the opposite, the restoration of equilibrium on a new basis - synthesis (a unifying position in which the contradictions are reconciled). This is the nature of the movement of everything that fits into the three-term formula ("triad"), he called the *dialectic*...

Anything—whether it be a stone, or a living object, or human society, or something else—we can consider as a whole, consisting of parts, elements connected with each other, in other words, we can consider this whole as a *system*. Each such thing (system) does not exist in an empty hole; it is surrounded by other elements of nature, which in relation to it are called the *environment*. For a tree in a forest, the environment will be all other trees, streams, ground, ferns, grass, shrubs, etc. with all their properties. For humans, the environment is primarily human society, *among* whom (hence the word “environment”) he lives; for human society, the environment is external nature, etc. There is a constant connection between the environment and the system; “Environment” acts on the “system”, “system”, in turn, acts on the “environment”. First of all, we must set ourselves one basic question: what are these relations between the environment and the system; how they can be determined, what are their forms; What is their significance for this system?

Here we can immediately distinguish three main types of these relationships.

1. *Stable balance*. Stable equilibrium occurs when the interaction between the environment and the system is expressed in an unchanged state of things or in such a violation of the former position, which is restored to its former form. For example, suppose some kind of animal lives in the steppe. The environment itself does not change. To feed this type of animal, the amount of food does not increase or decrease; the number of predatory animals remains the same; all diseases carried by microbes (all this is a “medium!”), remain in the same proportions. What will happen then? In general, the number of our animals remains the same: some of them will die or die from predators, others will be born, but this species in *such* environmental conditions will remain the same as it was. Here we have a case of stagnation. Why? Because here the *relationship* between the system (this type of animal) and the environment remains unchanged. This is a case of stable equilibrium. Stable balance is not always complete stillness. The movement can be, but here disequilibrium should his recovery on *the previous* same basis. In this case, the contradiction between the *environment* and the system is constantly reproduced *in the same quantitative ratio*.

We will have the same case with a stagnant society (we will discuss this in more detail below). If the *relationship* between society and nature remains the same, that is, if society draws out as much energy as it spends from nature, then the contradiction between

society and nature is also reproduced in its previous form, society is marking time, and we have a case of sustainable equilibrium.

2. *Mobile equilibrium with a positive sign (system development)*. In reality, however, there is no stable equilibrium. This is only an imaginary, only conceivable or, as they say, an “ideal” case. In fact, the relationship between the environment and the system is never reproduced in the same proportion. In other words: the imbalance does not really lead to the restoration of the balance on exactly the same basis as before, but a new balance is created on a *new* basis. Suppose, for example (we take an example with our cute animals, which we talked about above) that the number of predators that ate them, for some reason, decreased, and the amount of food increased. Then, undoubtedly, the number of these animals will increase. Our “system” will grow; a new equilibrium is established on a higher basis. Here, *development* is evident. In other words: the contradiction between the environment and the system quantitatively became different.

If we take human society instead of animals and assume that the relationship between it and nature changes so that society, through production, draws more energy from nature than it spends (the soil has become more fertile, or new tools have appeared, or both), then this society will *grow*, not stagnate. A new equilibrium will be truly new every time. The contradiction between society and nature will be reproduced each time on a new “higher” basis, and moreover, when the system grows, develops. Here we have a case of mobile equilibrium, so to speak, with a positive sign.

3. *Mobile equilibrium with a negative sign (destruction of the system)*. However, there may be a completely opposite case, namely, when a new equilibrium is established on a “lower” basis. Suppose, for example, that the amount of food has decreased for the species of our animals, or that the number of predators is increasing for some reason. Then this species will “die out”. The equilibrium between the medium and the system will be established each time due to the death of part of this system. The contradiction will be reproduced on a different basis with a negative sign. Or the case of society. Suppose that the relationship between nature and society is changing in such a way that society is forced to spend more and less (soil is depleted, equipment deteriorates, etc.). Then a new equilibrium will be established each time on a reduced basis, due to the death of part of society. There will be a movement with a negative sign:

All three conceivable cases come down to these three cases. The basis of the movement, as we have seen, is really a contradiction between the environment and the system, which is constantly reproduced.

But the question has another side. So far, we have only talked about the contradictions between the environment and the system, about *external* contradictions. But there are *internal* contradictions, inside the system itself. Each system consists of composite particles (elements), interconnected one way or another. Human society is made up of people, forest is made up of trees and bushes, a bunch of stones are made of these stones, a herd of animals is made up of individual animals, etc. And there are a number of contradictions, incoherences, and inadequacies. And there is no absolute balance. If, strictly speaking, there is no absolute balance between the environment and the system, then there is no such balance between the elements (parts) of the system itself.

This is best seen by the example of the most complex system, by the example of human society. Do we not encounter an infinite number of contradictions here? The struggle of classes is the most vivid expression of “social contradictions,” and we know that “the struggle of classes drives history.” Contradictions between classes, contradictions between groups, contradictions between ideals, contradictions between how people work and how they distribute the products of labour, incoherence in production (the capitalist “anarchy of production”) are an endless chain of contradictions. All these are contradictions within the system, arising from its contradictory *structure* (“structural contradictions”). Nevertheless, these contradictions in themselves do not yet destroy society. They *can* destroy it (for example, when both fighting classes die in a civil war), but they may not destroy it for the time being.

In the latter case, there must be a moving equilibrium between the elements of society. What it consists of—this will be the subject of further exposition. Now it’s important for us to understand one thing. One cannot foolishly view society as a whole series of bourgeois scholars who do not see contradictions within society do. On the contrary, the scientific examination of society suggests that we consider it from the point of view of the contradictions that are inherent in it. *Historical “development” is a contradictory development.*

Here we must turn our attention to another fact that we will have to talk about more than once in this book. We have seen that there are

two kinds of contradictions: between the environment and the system and between the elements of the system itself. Is there any connection between these two phenomena?

One has only to think a little over this question in order to answer in the affirmative: yes, such a connection exists.

For it is absolutely clear that the internal structure of the system (internal equilibrium) should change depending on the relationship that exists between the system and the *environment*. The relationship between the system and the environment is critical. For the whole position of the system, the basic forms of its movement (decline, development, stagnation) are determined precisely by this relation.

Indeed. We pose the question this way: we saw above that the nature of the equilibrium between society and nature determines the basic line of movement of society. Under such conditions, can the internal structure develop for a long time in the opposite direction? Of course not. Suppose we are given a developing society. Under such conditions, can the internal structure of society deteriorate *all the time*? Of course not. *If it worsens in its structure during development*, i.e., its internal coherence begins to grow, this means that a *new contradiction* has come out: the contradiction between external and internal equilibrium. What then? Then, if society continues to develop, it must be reorganized: that is, its internal structure must adapt to the nature of external equilibrium. *Consequently, the internal (structural) equilibrium is a quantity dependent on the external equilibrium (there is a "function" of this external equilibrium)* [Underlined by the brigade. — *Ed.*]. (Bukharin, *Theory of Historical Materialism*, pp. 74-81, Guise, 1929, ed. 7th.)

## **Marx's Criticism of the Mechanistic Theory of Equilibrium**

There is nothing easier than to understand the source of the uneven supply and demand and the resulting deviations of market prices from market values. The real difficulty lies in determining what should be understood by the expression: supply and demand are covered.

Supply and demand are covered if they are in such a way that the mass of goods of a particular industry can be sold at its market value, not higher or lower. Here is the first thing we are told about this.

And secondly, if the goods are sold at their market value, then supply and demand are covered.

If supply and demand cover each other, then they cease to act, and that is why goods are sold at their market value. If two forces of equal magnitude act in opposite directions, then they mutually annihilate, do not act outside at all, and the phenomena arising under this condition should be explained in some other way, and not by the action of these two forces. Once supply and demand are mutually annihilated, they cease to explain anything, do not affect the market value anymore and leave us completely unaware as to why the market value is expressed precisely in this amount of money, and not in any other. The actual internal laws of capitalist production are obviously cannot be explained from the interaction of supply and demand (regardless of even a deeper analysis of these social driving forces, which does not apply here), since these laws are implemented in pure form only when demand and supply cease to operate, i.e. cover each other. Demand and supply never really cover each other or, if they do, it is only by chance, therefore, from a scientific point of view, this case should be equal to zero, should be considered as non-existent. However, in political economy it is assumed that they cover each other. Why? This is done in order to consider the phenomena in their regular form, corresponding to their concept, that is, to consider them regardless of what they seem due to fluctuations in supply and demand. On the other hand, in order to find the real tendency of their movement, so to speak, to fix it. Deviations from equality are opposite in nature and, since they constantly follow each other, they are mutually balanced due to the opposite of their direction, due to their contradiction. So, if supply and demand are not covered mutually in one single case, then deviations from equality follow each other in this way—because a deviation in one direction causes, as a result, a deviation in the opposite direction—which, considering the outcome of the movement for more or a shorter period, we find a complete balance between supply and demand; however, this result is obtained only as the average of completed oscillations, only as a constant movement of their contradiction. This way market prices, deviating from market values, equalize and give an average that coincides with market value, and deviations from this latter are mutually destroyed as plus and minus. And this average is not only of theoretical value, it is

of practical importance for capital, the costs of which are designed for fluctuations and equations over a more or less certain period of time. (*Marx, Capital, vol. III* , pp. 126-127, *Partizdat, 1932*)

## **Criticism by Comrade Stalin of the Theory of Equilibrium**

You, of course, know that among the Communists the so-called theory of “equilibrium” of the sectors of our national economy is still in use. This theory, of course, has nothing to do with Marxism. However, she, this very theory, is propagated by a number of our comrades from the right-wing camp. According to this theory, it is assumed that we primarily have a socialist sector—this is a kind of box—and we also have a non-socialist sector, if you want, a capitalist sector—this is another box. Both of these boxes lie on different rails and peacefully roll forward, not hitting each other. By geometry, it is known that parallel lines do not converge. However, the authors of this remarkable theory think that someday these parallels will converge, and when they converge, we will get socialism. Moreover, this theory overlooks,

It is easy to understand that this theory has nothing to do with Leninism. It is easy to understand that this theory objectively aims to defend the position of the individual peasant economy, equip the kulak elements with “new” theoretical weapons in their struggle against collective farms and discredit the positions of collective farms. However, she, this theory, is still circulating in our press. And it cannot be said that she would meet with a serious rebuff, let alone a crushing rebuff from our theorists. How else to explain this inconsistency, if not the backwardness of our theoretical thought?

Meanwhile, one had only to extract the theory of reproduction from the treasury of Marxism and contrast it with the theory of equilibrium of sectors so that this last theory does not leave a trace. In fact, the Marxist theory of reproduction teaches that modern society cannot develop without accumulating from year to year, and it is impossible to accumulate without expanded reproduction from year to year. This is clear and understandable. Our large centralized socialist industry is developing according to the Marxist theory of expanded reproduction, for it grows annually in its volume, has its own accumulations and moves forward by leaps and bounds. But our large-

scale industry does not exhaust the national economy. On the contrary, small peasant farming still dominates in our national economy. Is it possible to say that our small-peasant economy is developing on the principle of expanded reproduction? No, this cannot be said. Our small-peasant economy not only does not carry out expanded reproduction annually, but, on the contrary, it does not always have the ability to carry out even simple reproduction. Is it possible to move our socialized industry at an accelerated pace, having such an agricultural base as a small-peasant economy, incapable of expanded reproduction and, moreover, representing a predominant force in our national economy? No you can not. Is it possible for a more or less long period of time to base Soviet power and socialist construction on two Our small-peasant economy not only does not carry out expanded reproduction annually, but, on the contrary, it does not always have the ability to carry out even simple reproduction. Is it possible to move our socialized industry at an accelerated pace, having such an agricultural base as a small-peasant economy, incapable of expanded reproduction and, moreover, representing a predominant force in our national economy? No you can not. Is it possible for a more or less long period of time to base Soviet power and socialist construction on two Our small-peasant economy not only does not carry out expanded reproduction annually, but, on the contrary, it does not always have the ability to carry out even simple reproduction. Is it possible to move our socialized industry at an accelerated pace, having such an agricultural base as a small-peasant economy, incapable of expanded reproduction and, moreover, representing a predominant force in our national economy? No you can not. Is it possible for a more or less long period of time to base Soviet power and socialist construction on two how is a small-peasant economy incapable of expanded reproduction and, moreover, representing a predominant force in our national economy? No you can not. Is it possible for a more or less long period of time to base Soviet power and socialist construction on two how is a small-peasant economy incapable of expanded reproduction and, moreover, representing a predominant force in our national economy? No you can not. Is it possible for a more or less long period of time to base Soviet power and socialist construction on two *on different* foundations—on the basis of the largest and most united socialist industry and on the basis of the most fragmented and backward small commodity peasant economy? No you can not. This should ever end in the complete collapse of the entire national economy. Where is the way out? The solution is to enlarge

agriculture, make it capable of accumulation, of expanded reproduction, and thus transform the agricultural base of the national economy. But how to enlarge it? There are two ways to do this. There is a *capitalist* path, consisting in the enlargement of agriculture through the imposition of capitalism in it, the path leading to the impoverishment of the peasantry and to the development of capitalist enterprises in agriculture. We reject this path as a path incompatible with the Soviet economy. There is another path, the *socialist* path, consisting in planting collective farms and state farms in agriculture, the path leading to the unification of small-peasant farms into large collective farms armed with technology and science, and to the crowding out of capitalist elements from agriculture. We stand for this second path.

Therefore, the question is this: either one way, or another, or *back*—to capitalism, or *forward*—to socialism. There is no third way and cannot be. The theory of “equilibrium” is an attempt to outline the third path. And precisely because it is designed for a third (non-existent) path, it is utopian, anti-Marxist.

So, it was only necessary to contrast the theory of reproduction of Marx with the theory of “equilibrium” of sectors, so that there was not a trace of this last theory. (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 443–445, ed. 9th.*)

What is the theoretical basis of this blindness and this confusion of Comrade Bukharin’s group?

I think that the theoretical basis of this blindness and confusion is Comrade Bukharin’s incorrect, non-Marxist approach to the question of the class struggle in our country. I have in mind Comrade Bukharin’s non-Marxist theory of the growth of the kulaks in socialism, a misunderstanding of the mechanics of the class struggle in the context of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Here they quoted several times a well-known place from Comrade Bukharin’s book, *The Way to Socialism*, about the growing of the kulaks into socialism. But it was quoted here with some omissions. Let me quote it completely. This is necessary, comrades, in order to demonstrate the whole depth of Comrade Bukharin’s departure from the Marxist theory of the class struggle. Listen to:

“The main network of our cooperative peasant organizations will consist of cooperative cells, not of the kulak type, but of the” labour “type, cells that grow into the system of our state bodies and thus become *links in a single chain of socialist economy*. On the other hand, *kulak cooperative nests will grow in the same way through*

banks, etc., *in the same way* ; but they will be to a *certain extent a foreign body, like, for example, concession enterprises*” [ Bukharin, *The Way to Socialism and the Workers ‘and Peasants’ Union*, p. 49. Italics mine.—*J. St.* ].

Quoting this passage from Comrade Bukharin’s pamphlet, some comrades for some reason missed the last sentence about the concessionaires. Comrade Rosit, apparently wanting to help Comrade Bukharin, took advantage of this and shouted here from the spot that they were distorting Bukharin. Meanwhile, the salt of the whole quotation consists precisely in the last phrase about the concessionaires. For if concessionaires are put on a par with fists, and fists grow into socialism, then what comes of this? From this, only one thing is obtained, namely, that the concessionaires also grow into socialism, that not only the kulaks, but also the concessionaires grow into socialism. (*General laughter.*)

This is what follows from this, Comrade Rosit.

*Rosit.* Comrade Bukharin says—“an alien body.”

*Stalin.* Bukharin said, Comrade Rosit, not “by an alien body,” but “to a certain extent by an alien body.” Consequently, the kulaks and concessionaires are “to a certain extent” an alien body in the socialist system. But this is precisely what Comrade Bukharin’s mistake consists in, that the kulaks and concessionaires, being “to a certain extent” an alien body, nevertheless grow into socialism. This is the kind of nonsense that Comrade Bukharin’s theory brings. The capitalists of the city and the countryside, the kulaks and concessionaires who are growing into socialism—this is how stupid Comrade Bukharin has agreed. No, comrade, we do not need such “socialism.” Let Comrade Bukharin take it for himself.

Until now, we Marxist-Leninists have thought that between the capitalists of the city and the countryside, on the one hand, and between the working class, on the other, there is an *irreconcilable* opposite of interests. This is precisely what the Marxist theory of the class struggle is based on. And now, according to Bukharin’s theory *of the peaceful growth of capitalists in socialism*, all this is turned upside down, the irreconcilable antithesis of the class interests of the exploiters and the exploited is disappearing, the exploiters are growing into socialism. (*Stalin, Leninism, page 395-397 9th ed.*)

## Revision of the Menshevik Idealism of the Marxist-Leninist Understanding of the Law of Unity of opposites

Metaphysics, which proceeded from the finite, that is, abstract, one-sided definitions of reason, was *dogmatism*, because it took one of the two necessary definitions or statements for the necessary true, the other for the necessary false. "Dogmatism always allows only one of two opposite definitions: for example, that the world is either finite or infinite, but one or the other is necessary. True, speculative thought does not have only one-sided definition and is not limited to it; it is wholeness and combines those definitions that dogmatism recognizes as complete and true in their separateness. "Reason, i.e., dialectical thinking, reconciles those opposite definitions that the mind recognizes as incompatible and incompatible..."

Not every difference leads to the opposite; but every opposition contains a moment of difference. Differences are external and internal or *significant*. We have already talked about external differences. Internal or definite differences mean those that are revealed from the nature of the identity itself. Unity unfolds the differences hidden within it. Without these differences, concrete unity does not exist. "Opposition is the *unity of* identity and difference." A difference in the same relation is the *opposite*. Due to the fact that certain things are identical in essence, they are opposed to each other and form, so to speak, extreme poles. Opposites relate to each other, on the other hand, in their unity or identity. The statement of formal logic that there is no intermediate third between two opposites, that of the two opposite predicates, only one is characteristic of each thing, is incorrect. "Usually they think that the positive and negative are completely different." But in reality they make up the same concept of difference. Positive and negative mutually determine each other and exist in relation to each other. Therefore, they are connected with each other. Dialectics aims to reveal the inner connection of all things and "to know the necessity of things, so that each is in contrast with *my* other thing. For example, one should not think that inorganic nature is something other than organic; she is her *necessary other* (italics mine.— A. D. ). Both are in the necessary connection, and each of them exists only because it excludes the other and, through this, correlates with it."

The bourgeoisie and the proletariat are the opposite social classes. But one should not think that they are “indifferent” to each other; on the contrary, each sees in his antagonist *his own other*, that is, *his necessary opposite*. They cannot exist without each other, and, therefore, are mutually connected. Each is reflected in the other and exists only because the other exists. Each class sees in another *its* opposite, its other, as Hegel puts it. Each pole is equally positive and negative. Positive therefore is at the same time negative, and negative is positive. The positive side of each pole is because it is *necessary* definition of the whole. But it is the negative side, since it is the opposite of the other pole, its antagonist.

*The opposite* goes further into a *contradiction*, which is a new step in the process of knowledge and development of the world. Things change gradually so that opposing definitions take on the nature of a *contradiction*. “The beginning of the *excluded third*,” says Hegel, “the beginning, which belongs to abstract reason, should be replaced by another: “everything contains a contradiction.” In fact, neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor in the natural world, nor in the spiritual world is there anything to which these abstract definitions of reason are applied ( *or other*). Everything that is has a specific nature and, therefore, contains a difference and an opposite. The finiteness of things consists precisely in the fact that their immediate being does not correspond to what they are in themselves. So, for example, in an inorganic nature, acid is a basis in itself, that is, it exists only because it is in connection with its opposite. And as a result, acid does not remain calm in its opposite, but seeks to put itself in what it is in itself. *In general, the world is driven by a contradiction*, and it is ridiculous to say that a contradiction is unthinkable. But it is true that things do not stop at a contradiction and that it is destroyed by necessity.”

The opposite contains a contradiction, as an opportunity, in a hidden form. Contradiction is the *active* discovery of the opposite, and only here latent antagonism takes the form of “conflict”. The contradiction is resolved by the struggle of opposites, in which the disorganizing and organizing moments act simultaneously. A new form is born and develops precisely because of a contradiction, by denying the old...

The developed *distinction* is the *opposite*; the developed opposition is a *contradiction*. Opposing things are identical, for the concept of opposition is applicable—and can be applicable—only to a homogeneous concept. Light and dark are identical, as types of

light. Contradiction means distinguishing oneself from oneself. Each of the two sides of the opposite necessarily presupposes the other and requires its *being*, as Kuno Fisher puts it. But at the same time, each side, being the negation of the second, requires the *non-existence of the other*. Therefore, each side both posits and negates the other side, treats it both positively and negatively, therefore it is itself both positive and negative, i.e. *it requires its own being and non-being* , or, in other words, it constitutes the *whole opposite, that is, it is opposite to itself. This contradiction of self consists of the essence of the contradiction*, as Kuno Fisher correctly formulates. The nature of the contradiction further explains the nature of the *resolution of the contradiction*. Each of the independent opposites “removes itself and turns itself into another and thereby is destroyed at the base.” Everything finite is contradictory in itself, transient and must return to its foundation, that is, to some higher form. “The thinking mind,” says Hegel, “exacerbates, so to speak, the blunted distinction of the various, the simple diversity of representation, into *essential* distinction, in *contrast*. Only in this way are the diverse, aggravated in contradiction, opposed energetically and vitally and acquires in it that negativity which is the inherent self-movement and vitality of the pulse” (“Logic”). Sentimental *ambiguity* about things only cares that they do not contradict themselves. Formal logic transferred the contradiction from life, from reality to reason. But from this the contradiction does not cease to exist nevertheless in true reality. However, those who feed tenderness forget that contradictions in history, for example, are resolved by a fierce struggle. Then all the necessary stages of development—from simple identity through differences and opposites to the exclusive contradiction—are passed, then the era of “resolution of contradictions” begins. (*A. Deborin, Philosophy and Marxism, pp. 228, 231, 232, 233, Guise, 1930*)

## V. The Law of the Transition of Quantity into Quality and vice versa

A number is the purest quantitative definition known to us. But it is full of qualitative differences. Hegel, quantity and unit, multiplication, division, exponentiation, root extraction. Thanks to this, qualitative differences are already obtained—to which Hegel does not indicate—primary numbers and products, simple roots and

degrees are obtained. 16 is not just the sum of 16 units, it is also square 4 and biquad 2. Moreover, the primary numbers tell the numbers obtained by multiplying them by other numbers, certain new qualities: only even numbers are divided by two, the same applies to 4 and 8. To divide by three, we have a rule on the sum of numbers. The same is in case 9 and 6, where it merges also with the property of an even number. For 7—a special law. This is the basis for tricks with numbers that do not seem to be incomprehensible to those who do not know arithmetic. Therefore, what Hegel (III, p. 237) says about the meaninglessness of arithmetic is not true. Wed however: “Measure.”

Mathematics, speaking of the infinitely large and infinitesimal, introduces a quantitative difference, even taking the form of an unavoidable qualitative opposite. Quantities that are so vastly different from each other that any rational relationship, any comparison between them, becomes quantitatively incommensurable. The usual incommensurability of a circle and a straight line is also a dialectical qualitative difference, but here it is precisely the *quantitative* difference of *homogeneous* quantities that elevates the *qualitative* difference to incommensurability.

*Number.* A single number gets a known quality already in the numerical system, since this 9 is not just summed nine times 1, but the basis for 90, 99, 900000, etc. All numerical laws depend on the system underlying it and are determined by it. In a binary and ternary system,  $2 \times 2$  is not = 4, but = 100 or = 11. In each system with an odd base number, the difference between even and odd numbers disappears. For example, in the quaternary system,  $5 = 10$ ,  $10 = 20$ ,  $15 = 30$ . In the same system, the number  $3n$ , like the products ( $6 = 11$ ,  $9 = 14$ ) by 3 or 9. Thus, the root number does not determine only the quality of himself, but of all other numbers.

In the case of degrees, things go even further: each number can be regarded as the degree of every other number—there are as many logarithm systems as there are integer and fractional numbers (*F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 47-48, 1932*)

## **Examples from the Field of Physics and Chemistry**

1. The law of the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa. We can express this law for our purposes in such a way that

qualitative changes can occur in nature—by a method precisely defined for each individual case—only by a quantitative addition, or a quantitative reduction of matter or motion (the so-called energy).

All qualitative differences in nature are based either on a different chemical composition, or on different quantities or forms of motion (energy), or—which almost always happens—on both. Thus, it is impossible to change the quality of any body without adding or subtracting matter or movement, that is, without a quantitative change in this body. In this form, the mysterious Hegelian position not only acquires a rational look, but it seems quite clear.

There is no need to indicate that various allotropic and aggregative states of bodies, depending on different groupings of molecules, are based on a greater or lesser amount of motion imparted to the body.

But what about the change in the form of movement or the so-called energy? After all, when we turn heat into mechanical motion, or vice versa, then here the quality changes, but the quantity remains the same? This is true, but regarding the change in the form of movement, one can say what Heine says about vice: everyone can be virtuous to himself, two subjects are always necessary for vice. Changing the form of motion is always a process that occurs between at least two bodies, one of which loses a certain amount of motion of such and such quality (for example, heat), and the other acquires the corresponding amount of motion of such and such other quality (mechanical movement, electricity chemical decomposition). Consequently, quantity and quality are mutually consistent here. So far, it has not yet been possible to turn the movement inside a separate isolated body from one form to another. Here we are talking only about inorganic bodies; the same law applies to organic bodies, but it occurs under much more complicated circumstances, and quantitative measurement here is still often impossible.

If we take any inorganic body and mentally divide it into smaller particles, then at first we will not notice any qualitative change. But this process can only go to a certain limit: if we manage, as in the case of evaporation, to liberate individual molecules, then although in most cases we can continue to further divide these latter, but at the same time a complete change in quality occurs. The molecule breaks up into its individual atoms, which have completely different properties than it does. For molecules that consist of various chemical elements, the atoms of these elements take the place of a compound molecule, and

for elementary molecules free atoms appear that exhibit actions that are completely different in quality: free oxygen atoms in statu nascendi...

But the molecule is already qualitatively different from the mass to which it belongs. It can perform regardless of the last movement, while this mass seems to be at rest; the molecule may, for example, undergo thermal vibrations; due to a change in position or connection with neighbouring molecules, it can transfer the body to another, allotropic or aggregative state, etc.

Thus, we see that a purely quantitative fission operation has a boundary in which it passes into a qualitative difference: the mass consists of some molecules, but it is essentially different from the molecule, as the latter, in turn, is different from the atom. This separation is the basis for the separation of mechanics, as a science of celestial and terrestrial masses, from physics, as the mechanics of molecules, and from chemistry, as the physics of atoms.

In mechanics, we do not encounter any qualities, and in the best case, states such as “rest” equilibrium, motion, potential energy, which are all based on a measurable transfer of motion and can be expressed quantitatively. Therefore, since there is a qualitative change, it is due to the corresponding quantitative change.

In physics, bodies are regarded as chemically unchanged or indifferent; we are dealing here with changes in their molecular states and with a change in the form of motion, in which in all cases the molecules come into play—at least on one of both sides. Here, each change is a transition of quantity into quality—a consequence of a quantitative change in the body’s inherent or imparted momentum of some form. ”So, for example, the temperature of water does not at first matter in relation to its drip-liquid state; but when the temperature of liquid water increases or decreases, there comes a moment when this cohesion state changes, and in one case the water turns into steam, and in the other into ice “(*Hegel, Enzyklopädie, Gesamtausgabe, Band VI, S. 217*). So, a certain minimum of current is needed so that the platinum wire begins to give light; so, each metal has its own heat of fusion; so, each liquid has its own specific, at a given pressure, freezing and boiling point, since we are able to achieve the appropriate temperature with our means; so, finally, each gas has a critical point at which it can be converted into a liquid state by appropriate pressure and cooling. In a word, the so-called constants of physics are for the most part nothing more than the names of nodal points, where a quantitative <change> of an increase or decrease in motion causes a

qualitative change in the state of the corresponding body,—where, therefore, the quantity goes into quality.

But the law of nature discovered by Hegel celebrates its greatest triumphs in the field of chemistry. Chemistry can be called the science of the qualitative changes in bodies that occur under the influence of changes in the quantitative composition. Hegel himself already knew this (*Hegel*, Gesamtausgabe, B. III, S. 433). Take oxygen; if three atoms are joined into a molecule, and not two, as usual, then we have in front of us ozone - a body that is definitely different in smell and action from ordinary oxygen. And what about the various proportions in which oxygen combines with nitrogen or sulphur and of which each gives a body that is qualitatively different from all other bodies! How is laughing gas (nitrous oxide  $N_2O$ ) different from nitric anhydride (nitrous dioxide  $N_2O_5$ )! The first is gas, the second, at ordinary temperature, is a solid crystalline body! Meanwhile, the whole difference between them in composition is that in the second body there are five times more oxygen than in the first, and between the two other nitrogen oxides ( $NO$ ,  $N_2O_3$ ,  $N_2O_7$ ), which all differ qualitatively from both of them and from each other.

This is even more strikingly found in homologous series of carbon compounds, especially in the case of simple carbohydrates. Of normal paraffins, the simplest is  $CH_4$  methane. Here 4 units of affinity of a carbon atom are saturated with 4 hydrogen atoms. The second paraffin - stage  $C_2H_6$ —has two carbon atoms bonded to each other, and 6 free bond units are saturated with 6 hydrogen atoms. Further we have  $C_3H_8$ ,  $C_4H_{10}$ , —in a word, according to the algebraic formula,  $C_nH_{2n+2}$ , so that thanks to the addition of the group  $CH_2$  each time we get a body that is qualitatively different from the previous body. The lower three members of the series are gases, the highest known to us, hexadecane,  $C_{16}H_{34}$ , this is a solid with a boiling point of  $270^\circ C$ . The same can be said about the series of primary alcohols derived from (theoretically) paraffins with the formula  $C_nH_{2n+2}O$  and monobasic fatty acids (formula  $C_nH_{2n}O_2$ ). What qualitative difference brings with it the quantitative addition of  $C_3H_6$  can be found on the basis of experience: it is enough to take in some form suitable for drinking, without the admixture of other alcohol, wine alcohol  $C_2H_6O$ , and another time take the same wine alcohol, but with a small admixture of amyl alcohol  $C_5H_{12}O$ , which is the main component of the vile fusel oil. The next morning, our head will feel, to the detriment of itself, the difference between both cases, so we can even say that the

hopping and the subsequent hangover from fusel oil (the main component of which, as you know, amyl alcohol) is also converted to quality quantity: on the one hand, wine alcohol, and on the other hand,  $C_3H_6$  added to it.

In these ranks, the Hegelian law appears before us in another form. Its lower members allow only one mutual arrangement of atoms. But if the number of atoms uniting in a molecule reaches a certain value specific for each series, then the grouping of atoms into molecules can occur in several ways: two or more isomers can appear that enclose the same number of C, H, O atoms in the molecule, but are qualitatively different from each other. We are able to even calculate how many similar isomers are possible for each member of the series. So, in the paraffin series for  $C_4H_{10}$  there are two isomers, for  $C_5H_{12}$  three; for higher terms, the number of possible isomers increases very rapidly <as it can also be calculated>. Thus, again, the number of atoms in the molecule determines the possibility, as well as—as shown by experience—the real existence of such qualitatively different isomers.

Little of by analogy with the bodies we know in each of these series, we can draw conclusions about the physical properties of members of this series that are still unknown to us and predict with some degree of certainty—at least for the bodies that follow the known members—these properties, for example, the boiling point and etc.

Finally, Hegel's law is valid not only for complex bodies, but also for the chemical elements themselves. We now know, "that the chemical properties of elements are a periodic function of atomic weights" (*Roscoe Schorlemmer, Ausführliches Lehrbuch der Chemie, II Band, S. 823*), which, therefore, their quality is due to the amount of their atomic weight. This was brilliantly confirmed. Mendeleev showed that in the rows of related elements located at atomic weights, there are various gaps indicating that new elements must still be discovered here. He described in advance the general chemical properties of one of these unknown elements—called ekaaluminium, because in the corresponding row he immediately follows aluminium—and predicted approximately its specific and atomic weight and its atomic volume. A few years later, Lecoc de Bois Bodran really discovered this element, and it turned out that Mendeleev's predictions were justified with slight deviations: ekaaluminium embodied in gallium (*ibid., P. 828*). Mendeleev

This very law is confirmed at every step in biology and in the history of human society, but we prefer to confine ourselves to examples from the field of exact sciences, because here the quantity can be indicated and precisely measured.

It is very likely that those gentlemen who still praised the law of the transition of quantity into quality as mysticism and incomprehensible transcendentalism will now find it necessary to state that this is a self-evident, banal and flat truth, that they have been using it for a long time and that, thus, they are not informed here of anything new. But the establishment for the first time of the universal law of the development of nature, society and thought in the form of a universally significant beginning will forever remain a feat of world historical significance. And if these gentlemen for many years allowed the quantity to turn into quality, not knowing what they were doing, then they will have to seek consolation together with Moliere's Mr. Jourdan, who also spoke prose all his life, without knowing about it [The manuscript follows this page with excerpts from Hegel's Logic about "nothing" in "denial", further three pages with calculations of the laws of motion formulas.]. (*F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 125-129, 1932*)

## **The Universality of the Law of the Transition of Quantity into Quality**

...We must be grateful to Mr. Dühring for the fact that, as an exception, he leaves the sublime and noble style to give us at least two examples of the perverse teachings of Marx on the Logos.

"Isn't it comical, for example, to refer to Hegel's vaguely vague idea that quantity goes into quality and that therefore the amount of money that has reached certain limits becomes, thanks to this quantitative increase alone, capital?"

Of course, in such a presentation, "refined" by Mr. Dühring, this idea is rather curious. But let's see what is written in the original by Marx. On p. 313 (2nd ed. Of Capital), Marx deduces from the previous study of fixed and variable capital and surplus value that "not every arbitrary amount of money or any value can be turned into capital; but that for such a transformation, in the hands of an individual owner of money or goods, there must be a certain minimum of money or any exchange value. "He further says that if, for

example, in a particular branch of labour, the worker on average works 8 hours for himself, that is, to reproduce the value of his wages, and the next four hours—for the capitalist, for the production flowing into pocket of the last surplus value then in this case the owner, in order to live with the help of the surplus value appropriated to him, since his workers exist, should already have such a sum of costs that would be sufficient to supply the two workers with raw material, tools and wages. And since capitalist production has as its goal not only the maintenance of life, but the increase of wealth, the owner with two workers is still not a capitalist. In order to live at least twice as good as an ordinary worker, and to be able to turn half of the surplus value produced into capital, he should already be able to hire 8 workers, that is, to own an amount 4 times greater than in the first case. And only after these, and, moreover, even more detailed, considerations to illuminate and justify the fact, *the* validity of the law discovered by Hegel in his “Logic” *confirms* that purely quantitative changes in a certain paragraph turn into qualitative differences.”

And now you can enjoy the more sublime and noble style that Mr. Dühring uses, attributing to Marx the opposite of what he said in reality. Marx says: the fact that the sum of value can turn into capital only when it reaches a certain, although different, depending on the circumstances, but in each given case, a certain minimum value—this fact is *proof of the correctness of the Hegelian law*. Dühring imposes the following statement on Marx: *since*, according to Hegel’s law, quantity goes into quality, “*therefore*, a certain amount of money, having reached a certain limit, becomes... capital.” Therefore, just the opposite.

It is a mistake to quote, “in the interests of complete truth” and “in the name of obligations to the public free of shop ties”, we met when Mr. Dühring analysed Darwin’s works. The farther, the more such a trick is necessary inherent in the philosophy of reality and in any case represents a very “total trick”. This is not to say that Mr. Dühring ascribes to Marx that he is talking about any cost, whereas it is only a cost that is used for raw material, tools and wages; In this way, Mr. Dühring makes Marx speak pure nonsense. And after that he still dares to find the absurdity made by himself. As he created the fantastic Darwin in order to try his strength on him, in this case too he concocted the fantastic Marx.

We have already seen above in the global schematic that with this Hegelian nodal line of quantitative relations, according to the meaning of which a qualitative transformation suddenly occurs on the known

points of quantitative change, Mr. Dühring suffered a small misfortune, namely, that he himself recognized and applied it at that moment of weakness. In this case, we gave one of the most famous examples—an example of the variability of the state of aggregation of water, which at normal atmospheric pressure and at a temperature of 0°C changes from a liquid to a solid state, and at 100°C from a liquid to a gaseous state, so, therefore, at these two turning points, a simple quantitative change in temperature leads to a qualitative change in water.

We could cite, both from nature and from the life of human society, hundreds of similar facts to prove this law. For example, in Marx's "Capital", in the 4th division (production of relative surplus value, cooperation, division of labour and manufacture, machinery and large industry), many cases are mentioned in which a quantitative change transforms the quality of things and exactly the same qualitative transformation changes the number of them, so, using the expression hated by Mr. Dühring, "quantity goes into quality, and vice versa." Such, for example, is the fact that the cooperation of many individuals, the merging of many individual forces into one common force, creates, in the words of Marx, a "new force" that differs significantly from the sum of its individual forces.

To all this, Marx, in the place which Mr. Dühring turned inside out in the interests of truth, added the following note: "The molecular theory applied in modern chemistry, first scientifically developed by Laurent and Gerard, is based on this law." But what does this mean for Mr. Dühring? After all, he knows that "highly modern educational elements of the natural-scientific method of thinking are absent precisely where, like Mr. Marx and his rival Lassalle, half-knowledge and some philosophizing constitute meagre scientific ammunition." On the contrary, Dühring's foundation is based on "the main achievements of exact knowledge in the field of mechanics, physics, chemistry", etc., and in what form, we have already seen this. But so that third parties could form an opinion on this, we intend to consider closer the example cited in Marx's cited note.

It deals with homologous series of carbon compounds, of which many are already known and of which each has its own algebraic composition formula. If we, as is customary in chemistry, denote the carbon atom by C, the hydrogen atom by H, the oxygen atom by O, and the number of carbon atoms in each compound by  $n$ , then we can present the molecular formulas for some of these series in as follows:

$C_n H_{2n+2}$  is a series of normal paraffins.  $C_n H_{2n+2} O$  is a series of primary alcohols.  $C_n H_{2n} O_2$  is a series of monobasic fatty acids. If we take as an example the last of these series and take successively  $n = 1, n = 2, n = 3$ , etc., we obtain the following result (discarding the isomers):

$CH_2 O_2$  - formic acid. - point of bale.  $100^\circ$  melting point  $1^\circ$ .

$C_2 H_4 O_2$  - acetic acid. - ““  $118^\circ$ , ““  $17^\circ$ .

$C_3 H_6 O_2$  - propionic acid. - ““  $140^\circ$ , ““ -

$C_4 H_8 O_2$  - butyric acid. - ““  $162^\circ$ , ““ -

$C_5 H_{10} O_2$  - valerianic acid. - ““  $175^\circ$ , ““ -

etc. up to  $C_{30} H_{60} O_2$  - melissic acid, which melts only at  $80^\circ$  and does not have a boiling point at all, since it cannot escape at all without breaking.

Here we see, therefore, a whole series of qualitatively different bodies formed by a simple quantitative addition of elements, moreover, always in the same respect. In its purest form, this phenomenon appears where all the constituent elements change their amount in the same ratio, as, for example, in normal paraffins  $C_n H_{2n+2}$ : the lowest of them methane  $CH_4$  is gas; the highest known hexadecane  $C_{16} H_{34}$  is a solid, forming colourless crystals, melting at  $21^\circ$  and boiling only at  $278^\circ$ . In both series, each new term is formed by the addition of  $CH_2$ , i.e., one carbon atom and two hydrogen atoms, to the molecular formula of the previous term, and this quantitative change in the molecular formula forms a qualitatively different body each time.

But these series represent only a particularly illustrative example: almost everywhere in chemistry, for example, on various nitrogen oxides, on various phosphorus or sulphur acids, we can see how “quantity goes into quality”, and this imaginary “Hegel’s foggy representation” so to speak, it can be groped in things and phenomena, and, however, no one remains confused and foggy, except for Mr. Dühring. And if Marx was the first to pay attention to this phenomenon, and if Mr. Dühring read it without understanding anything (for otherwise he certainly would not have allowed himself his unheard-of audacity), then this is enough to, and without looking anymore into the famous Dühring “Natural Philosophy”, to find out who lacks” a high degree of modern educational elements of the natural-scientific method of thinking “- Marx or Mr. Dühring.

In conclusion, we intend to call on another witness in favour of turning quantity into quality, namely Napoleon. The latter as follows describes the battle of a poorly riding, but disciplined French cavalry

with the Mamelukes, who at that time were certainly the best in martial arts, but undisciplined riders: “Two Mamelukes were certainly superior to three Frenchmen; 100 mamelukes were equivalent to 100 French; 300 French usually defeated 300 Mamelukes, and 1,000 French always defeated 1,500 Mamelukes. “Just as Marx has a definite, albeit variable, minimum of the amount of exchange value necessary to make it possible to turn it into capital, just like Napoleon’s known minimum size of a horse detachment is necessary to allow the power of discipline to manifest itself, consisting in a closed order and systematic action, and to rise to superiority even over the larger masses of irregular cavalry, better fighting and riding better and at least equally brave. Does this say anything against Mr. Dühring? Didn’t Napoleon fall shamefully in the fight against Europe? Did he not suffer defeat after defeat? And why? Is it because he introduced Hegel’s confused and hazy representation into cavalry tactics! (that he introduced Hegel’s confused and hazy representation into cavalry tactics! (*F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, pp. 88-91, 1932*)

## **Examples from the Field of Social Production**

The form of labour in which many people systematically and jointly participate in the same labour process or in different but related labour processes is called *co-operation*.

Just as the attack force of a cavalry squadron or the resistance force of an infantry regiment is significantly different from the sum of the attack forces and resistance that individual cavalymen and infantry can develop, the mechanical sum of the forces of individual workers is different from the social force that develops when there are many hands participate simultaneously in the execution of the same inseparable operation, when, for example, it is required to lift the weight, turn the gate, remove an obstacle from the road. In all such cases, the result of combined labour either cannot be achieved at all by single efforts, or can be achieved only for a much longer time, or only on a dwarf scale. Here it’s not only about increasing individual productive power through cooperation.

But in addition to the new force that arises from the merger of many forces into one common force, in most productive work the most social contact causes competition and a peculiar increase in vital

energy (animal spirits), which increases the individual capacity of individuals. As a result of this, 12 persons within one joint working day at 144 hours will produce much more product than twelve isolated workers working 12 hours each, or one worker for twelve consecutive working days. The reason for this is that man, by its very nature, is an animal, if not political, as Aristotle thought, then in any case social.

Although many people simultaneously or jointly perform the same or homogeneous work, nevertheless, the individual labour of each individual as part of the total labour can represent the various phases of the known labour process through which the processed object, through cooperation, runs faster. So, for example, if the masons form a consecutive row in order to transfer the bricks from the base of the building under construction to its top, then each of them does the same, and yet their separate operations represent continuous steps of one general operation, special phases it, which each brick must go through during labour and due to which the brick, having passed through two dozen hands of the collective worker, is more likely to be delivered to the place than if it were carried by two hands of a single worker, who then rises to the woods, then descending from them. The subject of labour runs through the same space in a shorter time. On the other hand, combined work is also carried out if, for example, the construction of a building is started at the same time from different ends, even if the cooperating workers did the same or homogeneous work. With a combined working day of 144 hours, the subject of work is processed simultaneously from different sides, since a combined or collective worker has eyes and hands both in front and behind, and is somewhat omnipresent. At the same time, the aggregate product is moving towards its end faster than in twelve twelve-hour working days of more or less isolated workers who are forced to start the subject of labour more one-sidedly. Here spatially different parts of the product ripen simultaneously.

We emphasize that many complementary workers perform the same or homogeneous work, since this simplest form of joint work plays a major role in the most developed forms of cooperation. If the labour process is complex, then the mere fact of combining a significant mass of people working together allows you to distribute various operations between different workers, therefore, to perform them simultaneously and thus reduce the working time required for the manufacture of the total product.

In many branches of production there are critical moments, that is, known periods of time determined by the very nature of the

working process during which a certain labour result must be achieved. If it is required, for example, to shear a flock of sheep or to squeeze and remove a certain amount of bread morgen, the quantity and quality of the product obtained depends on whether this operation will be started and completed at a certain point in time. The time interval during which the labour process must be completed is predetermined here in advance, as, for example, when catching herring. An individual person cannot take more than one working day out of a day, say, at 12 o'clock, while cooperation of 100 people extends the twelve-hour day on a working day containing 1200 hours. The brevity of the working life is offset by the magnitude of the mass of labour thrown at a decisive moment into the arena of labour. The timely receipt of the result here depends on the simultaneous use of many combined working days, the size of the beneficial effect on the number of workers; the latter, however, is always less than the number of those workers who, working in isolation, would be able to produce the same work during the same time. The lack of this kind of cooperation is the reason why in the west of the United States a mass of bread disappears annually, and in those parts of the East Indies where English rule destroyed the old community, it is a mass of cotton. working in isolation would be able to produce the same work during the same time. The lack of this kind of cooperation is the reason why in the west of the United States a mass of bread disappears annually, and in those parts of the East Indies where English rule destroyed the old community, it is a mass of cotton. working in isolation would be able to produce the same work during the same time. The lack of this kind of cooperation is the reason why in the west of the United States a mass of bread disappears annually, and in those parts of the East Indies where English rule destroyed the old community, it is a mass of cotton.

Co-operation, on the one hand, allows you to expand the spatial sphere of labour, and therefore, with known processes of labour, the very location of objects of labour in space already requires it; so, for example, it is necessary for drainage works, dam construction, irrigation works, for canals, soil, railways, etc. On the other hand, cooperation allows you to relatively narrow, i.e., compared with the scale of production, production area. This limitation of the spatial sphere of labour, while expanding the scope of its impact, which saves a significant part of unproductive production costs (*faux frais*), is generated by the concentration of the mass of workers, the merging of

various labour processes and the concentration of means of production.

Compared to the equal amount of individual individual working days, the combined working day produces large masses of use values and therefore reduces the working time necessary to achieve a known beneficial effect. In each individual case, such an increase in the productive labour force can be achieved in various ways: either the mechanical labour force increases, or the sphere of its influence expands spatially, or the arena of production is spatially narrowed compared to the scale of production, or a large amount of labour is set in motion at a critical moment a short period of time, or the rivalry of individuals awakens and their animal spirit (life energy) is strained, or the homogeneous operations of many people semi see the stamp of continuity and versatility, or various operations begin to be carried out simultaneously, or the means of production are economized through their joint use, or individual labour acquires the character of average social labour. But in all these cases, the specific productive power of the combined working day is the social productive power of labour, or the productive power of social labour. It arises from the very cooperation. In a systematic collaboration with others, the worker erases individual boundaries and develops his generic potencies. (But in all these cases, the specific productive power of the combined working day is the social productive power of labour, or the productive power of social labour. It arises from the very cooperation. In a systematic collaboration with others, the worker erases individual boundaries and develops his generic potencies. ( But in all these cases, the specific productive power of the combined working day is the social productive power of labour, or the productive power of social labour. It arises from the very cooperation. In a systematic collaboration with others, the worker erases individual boundaries and develops his generic potencies. (K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I , pp. 243-246, Partizdat, 1932)

## **The Simple Addition of Peasant Implements in the Bowels of Collective Farms Gives a Sharp Increase in Labour Productivity**

In my recent press appearance (“The Year of the Great Change”), I developed well-known arguments for the superiority of large-scale farming in agriculture over small-scale farming, referring to large state farms. There is no need to prove that all these arguments relate fully and completely to collective farms as large economic units. I am talking not only about developed collective farms with a machine and tractor base, but also about primary collective farms, which represent, so to speak, the manufacturing period of collective farm construction and are based on peasant equipment. I am referring to those primary collective farms that are now being created in areas of continuous collectivization and which rely on the simple addition of peasant implements. Take, for example, collective farms in the Khopra region in the former Don region. In appearance, these collective farms seem to be no different from the point of view of technology from small-scale peasant farming (few cars, few tractors). Meanwhile, the simple addition of peasant implements in the bowels of the collective farms gave such an effect that our practices had not dreamed of. What is the effect of this? The fact that the transition to the rails of collective farms gave an expansion of the sown area by 30, 40 and 50%. How to explain this “dizzying” effect? The fact that the peasants, being powerless in the conditions of individual labour, turned into the greatest power, having folded their tools and united into collective farms. The fact that the peasants were given the opportunity to process abandoned lands and virgin lands that are difficult to cultivate under individual labour conditions. The fact that the peasants were able to take the virgin lands into their own hands. The fact that it turned out to be able to use wasteland, individual shreds, boundaries, etc. *J. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 449-450. ed. 9th.*)

## Jump

“From mechanics with its pressure and push to the connection of sensations and thoughts, one single and only rock of intermediate states extends.” This statement frees Mr. Dühring from having to say something more detailed about the origin of life; meanwhile, from a thinker who has traced the development of the world right up to his equal condition and who feels at home on other world bodies, we would have the right to expect that he knows the real word here. However, this statement itself, if not supplemented by the

already mentioned Hegelian nodal line of measure relations, is only half true. With all the gradualness, the transition from one form of movement to another is always a leap, a decisive turn. Such is the transition from the mechanics of celestial bodies to the mechanics of small masses on them; such is the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of molecules embracing movements, which we study in what is called physics in the proper sense of the word: heat, light, electricity, magnetism, in the same way, the transition from molecular physics to atomic physics—chemistry—is accomplished through a decisive leap; this applies even more to the transition from an ordinary chemical action to the chemistry of proteins, which we call life. Inside the sphere of life, leaps are becoming increasingly rare and inconspicuous. Thus, again, Hegel must correct Herr Dühring. (*F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, p. 46, 1932*)

What is the difference between a dialectical transition and a non-dialectical one? Jump. Inconsistency. A break in gradualness. The unity (identity) of being and non-being. (*The Lenin Collection XII, p. 237.*)

## **VI. Law of Negation of Negation**

“This historical essay (the genesis of the so-called initial accumulation of capital in England) represents the comparatively best place in the book of Marx, and it would be even better if he did not rely on dialectical crutches except for scientific ones. It is the Hegelian denial of denial that has to play the role of a midwife, who takes the future out of the bowels of the past, for lack of better and clearer means. The abolition of individual property, which was committed since the XVI century. in this way, represents the first negation. This is followed by the second, which is characterized as the negation of negation and, at the same time, as the restoration of “individual property”, but in the highest form, based on the common ownership of land and tools. If this new “individual property” is called Marx’s public property at the same time, then the well-known Hegelian higher unity is manifested in this, in which the contradiction is “removed”, that is, according to the well-known pun, the contradiction must be both surpassed and preserved... The expropriation of the expropriators is, according to Marx, an automatic result of historical reality in its financially external relations... Hardly any rational person will allow himself to be convinced of the need for

a common land and capital from trust in the Hegelian chatter about the denial of denial ... however, the foggy Marxist-wise Marxist the ideas will not surprise anyone who knows what result can come out of Hegelian dialectics as a scientific basis, or rather, what stupidity should come from it. For a stranger to this art, you need to emphasize that the first denial from Hegel is the concept of the Fall, borrowed from the catechism, and the second is the concept of atonement, leading to a higher unity. Of course, the logic of facts cannot be based on a strange analogy taken from the religious realm ... Mr. Marx remains immersed in the foggy world of his own, at the same time individual and public property, and leaves his followers to solve the thoughtful dialectic riddle themselves. “ So says Mr. Dühring.

So, the need for a social revolution, the creation of a system based on social ownership of land and the means of production produced by labour, Marx cannot prove otherwise than by referring to the Hegelian denial of denial, and, basing his socialist theory on this odd analogy borrowed from religion, he comes to the result that in future society both individual and social property will dominate, as the Hegelian supreme unity of the “removed” contradiction.

Let us leave aside the negation of negation and take a look at “both individual and social property.” Mr. Dühring described the latter as a “foggy world”, and in this, surprisingly, he turns out to be really right. But, unfortunately, it is not Marx who dwells in this foggy world, but again Mr. Dühring himself. Just as he previously managed, thanks to his skill in using the “insane” Hegelian method, to easily determine what the incomplete volumes of Capital should contain, so here he easily corrected Marx according to Hegel, attributing to him the highest the unity of property, about which Marx does not say a word.

Marx says: “This is the negation of negation. It restores individual ownership, but on the basis of the gains of the capitalist era, that is, on the basis of the cooperation of free workers and their common ownership of land and the means of production produced by their labour. The transformation of self-employed, fragmented private property of individuals into capitalist property, of course, is a process incomparably slower, associated with suffering and more painful than the transformation of capitalist private property, which is actually based on social production, into public property. “That’s all. Thus, the situation created by the expropriation of the expropriators is characterized here as the restoration of individual property, but *on the*

*basis of* public ownership of land and the means of production produced by labour itself. For anyone who knows how to understand what they read, this means that public ownership extends to land and other means of production, and individual ownership to products, and therefore to consumer goods. And in order to make this clear even to children of six years of age, Marx suggests on page 56 to imagine “an alliance of free people who work by means of common means of production and spend their individual labour forces as a public labour force,” that is, to introduce a socialistly organized union, and then says: “The totality of the products of labour of the union is a social product. Part of this product serves again as the means of production. *She stays public.* The other part is consumed by members of the union in the form of means of subsistence. *Therefore, it must be divided between them.*” All this, it would seem, should be clear even to Mr. Dühring, who got confused in the Hegelianism.

At the same time, individual and public property, this vague interspiritual concept, this stupidity, which is supposed to turn out in Hegelian dialectics, this foggy world, this profound dialectical mystery, which Marx left to his adherents, all this again turns out to be free creativity and imagination of Mr. Dühring. And Marx, as an imaginary Hegelian, is obligated to find, in the form of the result of the negation of the negation, the true higher unity, and since he does not like Mr. Dühring, the latter must again fall into his sublime and noble style and attribute to Marx, in the interest of complete truth, things that represent Mr. Dühring’s own product. A person who is so completely incapable of quoting correctly, if only as an exception, should, of course, fall into moral indignation over the “Chinese scholarship” of other people who, without exception, quote correctly, but this is precisely what “poorly covers up a lack of understanding of the general idea of the quoted writer in each case.” Right Mr. Dühring. Long live the “high-style narrative”!

Until now, we proceeded from the assumption that Mr. Dühring’s stubborn fake quotation occurs, at least in good faith, and rests either on his own absolute incapability of understanding, or depends on the habit of quoting from memory inherent in “setting out a high-style story”, which is usually called simply “sloppy.” But here, it seems, we have reached the point where Dühring’s quantity begins to turn into quality. For, if we take into account, firstly, that Marx’s place in itself is stated quite clearly and, moreover, is supplemented by another, absolutely non-misunderstanding, explanation in the same book; secondly, that neither in the aforementioned criticism of Capital

(in *Ergänzungsblätter*), nor in the criticism placed in the first edition of *Critical History*, g. Dühring did not discover this monster - "at the same time individual and public property", but only in its second edition, that is, already in the third reading of *Capital*; and that only in this second edition, revised in a socialist way, did Mr. Dühring find it necessary to attribute to Marx all kinds of nonsense about the future organization of society, obviously in order to, in turn, say about himself in a triumphant tone (which he does): "business community which I characterized economically and legally in my course ...", - if we take all this into consideration, then the conclusion itself is imposed that Mr. Dühring, in this case, intentionally" beneficially developed "the thoughts of Marx, that is, beneficially for Mr. Dühring himself.

What role does the negation of negation play in Marx? On page 791 and the following, he summarizes the final results of the economic and historical research carried out on the previous 50 pages of the so-called initial capital accumulation. In the pre-capitalist era, at least in England, there was small-scale production based on the private ownership of the worker on the means of production. The so-called initial accumulation of capital consisted in the expropriation of these direct producers, that is, in the decomposition of private property, based on the labour of the owner. This became possible because the aforementioned small-scale production is compatible only with the state of production and society, limited by close natural limits, and therefore, at a certain height of its development, It creates material means for its own destruction. This destruction, the transformation of individual and fragmented means of production into socially concentrated, forms the background of capital. As soon as the workers are turned into proletarians and the means of production become capital, as soon as the capitalist mode of production has taken its own feet, the further striving for the socialization of labour, the socialization of land and other means of production, and, consequently, the further expropriation of private owners, takes a new form . "Now it remains to expropriate not the leading workers of their own economy, but the capitalist, exploiting many workers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalist production itself, namely, due to the concentration of capital. One capitalist gradually beats many others. Hand in hand with this concentration or the expropriation of many capitalists by a few, a large and large-scale cooperative form of the working process, a conscious technical application of science, the expedient exploitation

of land, the conversion of implements into those that can only be applied together, and the economization of all means of production, are being developed their use as general means of production of combined social labour. Together with the ever-decreasing number of capital tycoons who kidnap and monopolize all the benefits of this transformation process, poverty, oppression, enslavement, humiliation, exploitation increase, but also the indignation of the working class, which is constantly growing and constantly learning, united and organized by the very mechanism of the capitalist process of production. The monopoly of capital becomes the bonds of the mode of production that developed with it under its influence. The concentration of the means of production and the socialization of labour have reached such an extent that they can no longer bear their capitalist shell. She is torn. The hour of capitalist private property is beating. The expropriators are being expropriated!”

Now I ask the reader: where are those dialectically curly intricacies and arabesques of thought, where is the confused and perverse idea, according to which, in the end, everything is the same, where are dialectical miracles for believers, where is dialectic mysterious nonsense and those intricacies, according to the templates of the doctrine of the logos without which Marx, according to Mr. Dühring, cannot build the course of historical development? Marx simply proves historically, and here briefly summarizes that once the small-scale production had to be created by its own development, the conditions for its destruction, i.e., the expropriation of the small owners, and now the capitalist mode of production itself created the material conditions from whom he must perish. This is a historical process, and if it is at the same time a dialectical process.

Only now, after Marx has finished his historical and economic proof, he continues: “The capitalist mode of production and appropriation, and therefore capitalist private property, is the first denial of individual private property based on own labour. The denial of capitalist production is carried out by himself with the necessity of a natural process. It is a denial of denial, “etc. (the above-mentioned place follows).

So, if Marx calls this process the negation of negation, he does not think at all about how to prove the historical necessity of the process. On the contrary, after he historically proved that this process has already been completed partly and must still be completed partly, only after that he characterizes it as a process that is being carried out according to the well-known dialectical law. That’s all. Therefore,

again, only having distorted the meaning of the teachings of Marx, Mr. Dühring can argue that in this case the negation of negation has to fulfil the obstetric role of extracting the future from the bowels of the past, or say that Marx requires that the conviction of the need for common land and capital (which Mr. Dühring's embodied contradiction itself already represents) was built on the basis of faith in the negation of negation.

The complete misunderstanding of the nature of dialectics is already evidenced by the fact that Mr. Dühring acknowledges it as an instrument of simple proof, just as with a limited understanding one can consider formal logic or elementary mathematics as such. Even formal logic is, first of all, a method for finding new results, for moving from the known to the unknown, and the same, only in a much higher sense, is dialectics, which also contains the germ of a broader worldview, since it breaks the tight horizon of formal logic. In mathematics, the same attitude exists. Elementary mathematics, mathematics of constant quantities, moves, at least in general and in general, within the boundaries of formal logic; mathematics of variables the most essential department of which is the calculus of the infinitesimal, is essentially nothing more than the application of dialectics to mathematical relations. The simple proof here completely recedes into the background in comparison with the diverse applications of the method to new areas of research.

And almost all the proofs of higher mathematics, starting with the first proofs of differential calculus, are, from the point of view of elementary mathematics, strictly speaking, incorrect. This cannot be otherwise if the data obtained in the dialectical field are to be proved by means of formal logic. Trying to prove to such an avid metaphysician, as Mr. Dühring, something through one dialectic would be the same gift of labour spent, as was the work of Leibniz and his students, who proved to the then mathematicians theorems of the calculus of infinitesimal. The differential caused the same convulsions in them, which in Dühring causes the negation of negation, in which, however, the differential also plays a role, as we shall see. In the end, these gentlemen, since they did not die in the meantime, surrendered grumblingly, not because they were convinced, but because that the solutions given by differential calculus were always true. Mr. Dühring, as he himself tells us, has reached only 40 years old, and if - what we wish him—he will live to a very old age, then perhaps he will survive the same thing.

But what, after all, is this terrible denial of denial, which so poisoned Mr. Dühring's life and is in his eyes the same terrible crime as Christians have a sin against the holy spirit? In essence, it is a very simple, daily routine that every child can understand if they tear off a mystical rag from it, into which it was wrapped in the old idealistic philosophy and in which only helpless metaphysicians like Mr. Dühring continue to keep it.

Take, for example, barley grain. Billions of such grains are ground, boiled, go to make beer, and then consumed. But if one such barley grain finds conditions normal for itself, if it gets on favourable soil, then under the influence of heat and humidity a change will occur with it - it will sprout; the grain, as such, disappears, is denied; in its place appears a plant grown from it, the negation of grain. But what is the normal life cycle of this plant? It grows, blooms, fertilizes, and, finally, produces barley grains again, and as soon as the latter ripen, the stem dies, in turn, is denied. As a result of this denial of negation, here again we have the original barley seed, but not one, but itself ten, twenty or thirty. Cereals change extremely slowly, so modern barley is almost completely similar to barley of the last century. But let's take some plastic ornamental plant, for example, dahlia or orchid; if we artificially influence a seed and a plant developing from it, then as a result of this denial of negation, we will get not only more seeds, but also a qualitatively improved seed that can produce more beautiful flowers, and each repetition of this process, each new negation negation increases this perfection. Just like with barley grain, this process also occurs in most insects, for example, butterflies. They emerge from the testicle by denying it, go through various phases of transformation to puberty, copulate and deny it again, that is, die as soon as the process of procreation is completed and the females laid many eggs. That the process is not so easy for other plants and animals, that they do not once, but many times produce seeds, eggs, or calves before they die, all this does not concern us here; we only needed to show that the negation of negation *really going on* in both kingdoms of the organic world. Further, all geology represents a series of negatives that have been denied, a series of successive destruction of old and deposits of new mountain formations. First, the primary crust arising from the cooling of the liquid mass is crushed by oceanic, meteorological and atmospheric-chemical influences, and these crushed masses are deposited in layers on the seabed. Local seabed elevations above the sea surface again expose parts of this first sediment to the effects of rain, temperature changes, depending on the

seasons, and atmospheric oxygen and carbon; Similar impacts are exerted from the bowels of the earth, breaking through deposits, molten, subsequently cooling stone masses. Over millions of centuries, thus, more and more new layers are formed, for the most part, again and again collapsing and again and again serving as material for the formation of new layers. But the result of this process is very positive: the formation of soil, composed of a variety of chemical elements in a state of mechanical fragmentation, favouring a significant and diverse vegetation.

The same is true in mathematics. Take any algebraic quantity  $a$ . If we deny it, we get  $-a$  (minus  $a$ ). If we negate this negation by multiplying  $-a$  by  $-a$ , then we get  $+a^2$ , that is, the initial positive value, but at the highest level, precisely in the second degree. And in this case it does not matter that we can get the same  $a^2$  by multiplying the positive  $a$  by itself. For the denied negation  $a$  so firmly abides in  $a^2$  that the latter under any circumstances has two square roots, namely  $+a$  and  $-a$ . And this inability to get rid of the negation of negation, from the negative root contained in the square, gets a very tactile value already in the quadratic equations. Even more sharply, the negation of negation appears in higher analysis, in those "summations of infinitesimal quantities", which Mr. Dühring himself announces as the highest mathematical operations and which in ordinary language are called differential and integral calculus. How are these types of calculus produced? For example, in the well-known problem, we have two variables  $x$  and  $y$ , one of which cannot be changed without the other changing in the relation determined by the conditions of the problem. I differentiate  $x$  and  $y$ , that is, I accept them so infinitely small that they disappear compared to an arbitrarily small real value, that nothing remains of  $x$  and  $y$  but their mutual relationship, devoid of, so to speak, any material basis, a quantitative

relationship remains, devoid of any quantity. Consequently,  $\frac{dy}{dx}$  i.e.,

the ratio of both differentials  $x$  and  $y$  is equal  $\frac{0}{0}$ , but this  $\frac{0}{0}$  expresses

itself  $\frac{y}{x}$ . I mention only in passing that this ratio of the two disappeared quantities, this fixed moment of their disappearance, is a contradiction; but it should disturb us as little as it generally disturbed mathematics for almost 200 years. So, what am I doing,

differentiating, if it is not that I deny  $x$  and  $y$ , but not in the sense that I don't care about them, as metaphysics denies, but deny according to the circumstances of the case? Namely, instead of  $x$  and  $y$ , I have in these formulas or equations their negation  $dx$  and  $dy$ . Then I carry out further actions with these formulas, handle  $dx$  and  $dy$  as with real values, although subject to some exceptional laws, and in a certain point I *deny the negation*, that is, integrate the differential formula, instead of  $dx$  and  $dy$ , I again get the real values of  $x$  and  $y$ , and thereby not just return to the original moment, but I'm solving a problem on which ordinary geometry and algebra, perhaps, would have broken their teeth in vain.

The situation is not different with history. All cultural peoples begin with communal ownership of land. For all nations that have crossed a certain stage of their primeval state, communal property begins, with the development of agriculture, to constrain production. It is canceled, denied, and after more or less long intermediate stages it turns into private property. But at the highest stage in the development of agriculture, achieved through the dominance of private ownership of land, the latter, in turn, imposes fetters on production, and this is currently observed both in small and large land tenure. Hence the need arises to deny private land ownership, turning it into public property. But this requirement does not mean the restoration of primitive communal property,

Or another example. Ancient philosophy represented primitive, natural materialism. As such, she was not able to figure out the relation of thought to matter. But the need to clarify this issue led to the doctrine of the soul separated from the body, then to the assertion of the immortality of this soul, and finally, to monotheism. Old materialism was thus rejected by idealism. But with the further development of philosophy, idealism also turned out to be untenable and is denied by modern materialism. The latter—the negation of negation - does not constitute a simple resurrection of the old materialism, but to the solid foundations of the latter still connects the entire ideological content of the two-thousand-year development of philosophy and natural science, as well as this two-thousand-year history itself. In general, he is no longer a philosophy, but simply a worldview, which seeks evidence and manifests itself not in the special science of sciences, but in the real sciences themselves. Philosophy is thus “removed”, that is, “buried,” “simultaneously destroyed and preserved.” Destroyed formally,

retained by its actual content. Thus, where Mr. Dühring sees only a “pun,” it turns out, with closer observation, the real content.

Finally, even Rousseau’s doctrine of equality, a pale distorted photograph of which is Dühring’s doctrine, even it could not be built without the Hegelian denial of negation play an obstetric role (and this is more than 20 years before Hegel’s birth). And Rousseau’s doctrine, far from being ashamed of this, in its first presentation, we can say, brilliantly reveals the seal of its dialectical origin. In a natural and wild state, people were equal, and since Rousseau already looked at the appearance of speech as a distortion of the natural state, he had every right to attribute equality to those hypothetical animal people whom Haeckel called alali in recent times—speechless. But these equal human animals had one advantage over other animals: the ability to improve, further development, and this ability has become the cause of inequality. So, Rousseau sees progress in the emergence of inequality. But this progress was antagonistic, at the same time it was also a regression. “All further successes were only apparent progress. *in the direction of improving the individual*, in fact, this progress went in the direction of the *decline of the human race*. Metalworking and agriculture were the two arts whose discovery brought about this enormous revolution “(that is, the transformation of primeval forests into cultivated land, but also the dominance of poverty and slavery created by the establishment of property).” From the point of view of the poet, gold and silver, and from the point of view of the philosopher - iron and bread civilized people, but also destroyed the human *race*”. Each new progressive step of civilization is at the same time the progress of inequality. All the institutions that society creates for itself, which arose along with civilization, are turning into something opposite to their original purpose. “It is indisputable—and this is the basic law of all state law—that nations have created sovereigns to protect their freedom, and not to destroy it.” Nevertheless, says Rousseau, these rulers necessarily became oppressors of peoples, and their oppression intensifies until the moment when inequality, which has reached an extreme degree, turns back into its opposite, becoming the cause of equality: before a despot, everyone is equal, it is each equal to zero. “Here is the highest degree of inequality, *that end point, which closes the circle and comes in contact with the starting point from which we proceeded*: here all private people again become equal members, but only because they are nothing, and subjects have no other law than the will of the master.” But the despot is the lord, while

he has power on his side, and therefore, “if he is expelled, he cannot complain about violence... Violence supported him, violence overthrows him, everything goes in its right and natural way.” And thus, inequality again turns into equality, but not into the old natural equality of primitive people, deprived of language, but into higher equality—a social contract. Oppressors are oppressed. This is the negation of negation.

Thus, here we already have Rousseau’s argument, like two drops of water similar to that of Marx in *Capital*, but in detail we see a number of the same dialectical turns that Marx uses: processes that are antagonistic in their nature, contain a contradiction, the transformation of a certain extreme into its opposite and, finally, as the basis of everything—the negation of negation. If, therefore, Rousseau could not speak “Hegelian jargon” in 1754, then, in any case, he, 23 years before the birth of Hegel, was deeply infected with Hegelian poison, the dialectic of contradiction, the doctrine of the Logos, theology, etc. D. And if Mr. Dühring, vulgarizing the theory of Rousseau, then philosophizes about equality with the help of his two mythical personalities, then still he is on an inclined plane, with which hopelessly slides into the arms of denial of denial. A system in which the equality of two persons flourishes and which at the same time is presented as an ideal system is called on page 271 of the *Course of Philosophy* the “primitive system.” But this primitive system on page 279 is necessarily replaced by a “robbery system”—such is the first denial. Finally, now, thanks to the philosophy of reality, we have come to the point where we are destroying the robbery system and introducing in its place the city commune opened by Mr. Dühring, which rests on equality. Thus, we come to the negation of negation, to equality at the highest level. An amusing, beneficially broadening one’s horizons: Mr. Dühring himself mercifully commits a mortal sin—the denial of denial. in which the equality of two persons flourishes and which at the same time is presented as an ideal system, is called on page 271 of the “*Course of Philosophy*” the “primitive system.” But this primitive system on page 279 is necessarily replaced by a “robbery system”—such is the first denial. Finally, now, thanks to the philosophy of reality, we have reached the point where we are destroying the robbery system and introducing in its place the city commune opened by Mr. Dühring, which rests on equality. Thus, we come to the negation of negation, to equality at the highest level. An amusing, beneficially broadening one’s horizons: Mr. Dühring himself mercifully commits a mortal sin—the denial of denial. in which the

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So what is negation of negation? A very general and precisely because of this very broadly valid and important law of the development of nature, history and thinking; the law, which, as we have seen, manifests itself in the animal and vegetable kingdom, in geology, in mathematics, in history, in philosophy, and which, without knowing it, is forced to submit to Mr. Dühring, despite all his force and importance. It goes without saying that I’m still not saying anything *special* the development process, which, for example, goes through a barley seed, from germination to dying of a fruitful plant, if I say that this is a denial of denial! For since the same negation of negation is, for example, integral calculus, then, limiting myself to this general statement, I could say such nonsense that the process of life of a barley ear is an integral calculus or, if you want, socialism. This absurdity is constantly attributed to metaphysics by dialectics. If I say about all these processes that they represent the negation of the

negation, then I only embrace them with this one law of development and it is because of this that I disregard the features of each individual special process. After all, dialectics is no more than a science of the universal laws of movement and development of nature, human society and thought.

However, they may object to us: the negation given here is not a real negation; I deny the barley grain, and if I grind it, the insect—if I crush it, a positive value  $a$ —if I cross it out, etc. Or I deny the situation - a rose is a rose, saying: a rose is not a rose; and what will come of the fact that I again deny this denial, saying: a rose is still a rose? Such, indeed, are the main arguments of metaphysicians against dialectics, quite worthy of the limitations of their way of thinking. In dialectics, denying does not mean just saying “no,” or declaring a thing non-existent, or destroying it arbitrarily. Spinoza already said: *omnis determinatio est negation*—every restriction, or definition, is at the same time a negation. And, further, the method of negation is determined here, firstly, by the general, and secondly, by the special nature of this process. I must not only deny, but also then “remove” this denial. Therefore, I must produce the first negation in such a way that the second negation is or is possible. But how to achieve this? This is depending on the special nature of each individual case. If I ground barley grain or crushed an insect, then although I committed the first act of denial, I also made the second impossible. For each category of objects, there is, therefore, a special, peculiar to him, method of negation so that development is derived from it; in the same way for each category of representations and concepts. In the calculus of infinitesimal negation occurs differently than in obtaining a positive degree from negative roots. You have to learn this, as well as everything else. Knowing only that the barley spike and the calculus of infinitesimals are embraced by the concept of “negation of negation,” I can neither successfully grow barley nor differentiate and integrate, in the same way as knowing only the laws of dependence of sounds on the size of strings does not give me the opportunity to play the violin. It is clear, however, that with such a denial of negation, which consists in a child’s occupation, alternately set *and* then delete it, or assert alternately about the rose that it is a rose and that it is not a rose—that with such an occupation nothing will be found out except the stupidity of the one who undertakes such a boring procedure. Meanwhile, metaphysicians want to assure us that since we want to negate the negation, it must be done in this way.

So, again, it is none other than Mr. Dühring who is mystifying us, claiming that the negation of negation is a strange analogy with the fall and atonement, invented by Hegel and borrowed from the sphere of religion. People reasoned dialectically long before they knew what dialectics were, just as they spoke prose long before the word prose appeared. The law of negation of negation, which is carried out unconsciously in nature and history, as well as until it is known, and in our thinking, is only for the first time sharply formulated by Hegel. And if Mr. Dühring, as it turns out, himself secretly uses dialectics, but he just doesn't like this name, then let him find the best. If he intends to expel the essence of the matter from thinking,  $-a \times -a$  does not give  $+a^2$ , and also to pass a law by virtue of which differentiation and integration would be prohibited under penalty of punishment. (*F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, pp. 91-101, ed. 1932*)

## **How Mikhailovsky Distorts the Attitude of Marxists Towards Dialectics**

"... The essence of the historical course of things," continues Mr. Mikhailovsky, "is elusive in general, and is not captured by the doctrine of economic materialism, although it seems to be based on two foundations: on the discovery of the universal significance of forms of production and exchange and on "indisputability the dialectical process."

So, materialists rely on the "indisputability" of the dialectical process! that is, they base their sociological theories on Hegel's triads. We have before us the stereotyped accusation of Marxism in Hegelian dialectics, which, it seemed, had already been worn out enough by the bourgeois critics of Marx. Unable to protest anything essentially against the doctrine, these gentlemen clung to the way of expressing Marx, attacked the origin of the theory, thinking thereby to undermine its essence. And Mr. Mikhailovsky does not stand on ceremony to resort to such receptions. The reason for it was one chapter in the composition of Engels against Dühring. Objecting to Dühring, who was attacking the dialectics of Marx, Engels says that Marx never thought to "prove" anything to the Hegelian triads, that Marx only studied and investigated the real process, that he recognized as the only criterion of the theory its loyalty with

reality. If, they say, it sometimes turned out that the development of a social phenomenon fell under the Hegelian scheme: position—negation—negation of negation, then there is nothing surprising here, because in nature it is not uncommon. And Engels begins to cite examples from the field of natural history (the development of grain) and the public—like, first, primitive communism, then private property and then capitalist socialization of labour; or primitive materialism first, then idealism, and finally scientific materialism, etc. For everyone, it is obvious that the centre of gravity of Engels’s argument lies in the fact that the task of the materialists is to correctly and accurately depict the real historical process, that insisting on dialectics, the selection of examples proving the fidelity of the triad is nothing but the remnants of the Hegelianism from which scientific socialism grew, the remnants of its mode of expression. In fact, since it is categorically stated that it is absurd to “prove” something by the triads, that no one even thought about it—what significance can examples of “dialectical” processes have? Is it not clear that this is an indication of the origin of the doctrine, and nothing more. Mr. Mikhailovsky himself feels this, saying that the origin of the theory cannot be blamed on her. But in order to see something more than the origin of the theory in Engels’ arguments, one would obviously have to prove that at least one historical “question” was resolved by materialists not on the basis of relevant facts, but through triads. Did Mr. Mikhailovsky try to prove it? Not at all. On the contrary he himself was forced to admit that “Marx has filled the empty dialectic scheme to such an extent with actual content” that “it can be removed from this content like a lid from a cup without changing anything” (about the exception Mr. Mikhailovsky makes here about the future , we will say even lower). If so, then why is Mr. Mikhailovsky bothering with such zeal with this lid that does not change anything? Why does it mean that materialists “rely” on the irrepressibility of the dialectical process? What does he say, fighting with this cap, that he is fighting against one of the “foundations” of scientific socialism, while this is a direct lie? we will say even lower). If so, then why is Mr. Mikhailovsky bothering with such zeal with this lid that does not change anything? Why does it mean that materialists “rely” on the irrepressibility of the dialectical process? What does he say, fighting with this cap, that he is fighting against one of the “foundations” of scientific socialism, while this is a direct lie? we will say even lower). If so, then why is Mr. Mikhailovsky bothering with such zeal with this lid that does not

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It goes without saying that I will not follow up with Mr. Mikhailovsky’s analysis of triad examples, because, I repeat, this has nothing to do with scientific materialism or Russian Marxism. But the question is interesting: what, after all, were Mr. Mikhailovsky’s grounds for distorting the attitude of Marxists towards dialectics? There were two reasons: firstly, Mr. Mikhailovsky heard a ringing, but does not know where he came from; secondly, Mr. Mikhailovsky committed (or rather, appropriated from Dühring) another overexposure.

Ad 1) [—to the 1st point.—*Red.*] Reading Marxist literature, Mr. Mikhailovsky constantly came across the “dialectical method” in social science, the “dialectical thinking” again in the field of social issues, “of which we are just talking,” etc. In the simplicity of the soul (it’s good, if only in simplicity) he accepted that this method consists in resolving all sociological issues according to the laws of the Hegelian triad. He would have taken the matter at least a little more closely; he could not help convincing himself of the absurdity of this idea. The dialectical method—as opposed to the metaphysical—was called by Marx and Engels the scientific method in sociology, which consists in the fact that society is seen as a living organism in constant development (and not as something mechanically linked and therefore allowing any arbitrary combinations of individual public elements) for the study of which an objective analysis of the production relations forming this social formation is necessary, the study of the laws of its functioning and development. We will try to illustrate the relation of the dialectical method to the metaphysical one (which, of course, the subjective method in sociology also fits into a concept), using the example of Mr. Mikhailovsky’s own arguments. Now, we only note that anyone who reads the definition and description of the dialectical method by Engels Lee (in a polemic against Dühring, in Russian: “The Development of Socialism from Utopia to Science”), or by Marx (various notes in “Capital”, “Afterword “To the 2nd edition,” The Poverty of Philosophy “) - he will see that there is no question of Hegel’s triads, but the whole thing boils down to to consider social evolution as a natural-historical process of development of socio-economic formations. To prove it, in extenso [—completely—*Red.*], a description of the dialectical method made in *Vestnik Evropy* 1872,

No. 5 (note: “The point of view of political and economic criticism of K. Marx”), which Marx quotes in the “Afterword” to the 2nd edition of *Capital*. Marx says there that the method he used in *Capital* was poorly understood. “German reviewers shouted, of course, about the Hegelian sophistry.” And so, in order to clarify his method, Marx gives a description of it in the indicated note. “For Marx, one thing is important,” it says, “namely, to find the law of the phenomena that he studies, and the law of change, development of these phenomena, their transition from one form to another, from one order of social relations to another, is especially important for him. Therefore, Marx cares about one thing: to show with an accurate scientific investigation the need for these orders of social relations, stating with all possible completeness the facts that serve as his starting and support points. For this purpose, it is absolutely sufficient if, while proving the necessity of the present system, he also proves the need for another system, which inevitably must grow from the previous one, it doesn’t matter whether people believe in it or not, whether they are aware of it or not. Marx considers the social movement as a natural-historical process, obeying laws that not only do not depend on the will, consciousness and intentions of people, but, on the contrary, determine their will, consciousness and intentions. (For information for Messrs. Subjectivists who distinguish social evolution from natural-historical precisely because a person sets conscious “goals”, he is guided by certain ideals.) If the conscious element plays such a subordinate role in the history of culture, then it goes without saying that criticism, which has this very culture as its subject, can least of all rely on some form or any result of consciousness. In other words, the starting point for it may not be an idea, but only an external, objective phenomenon. Criticism should be to compare and contrast this fact not with an idea, but with another fact; it’s important for her only that both facts be precisely investigated if possible and that they represent, in relation to the other, different developmental moments, and it is especially necessary that the whole series of known states, their sequence and connection be investigated with the same accuracy between different stages of development. Marx denies the very idea that the laws of economic life are the same for the past and for the present. On the contrary, each historical period has its own laws. Economic life is a phenomenon similar to the history of development in other areas of biology. Former economists did not understand the nature of economic laws when they compared them with the laws of physics and chemistry. A deeper analysis shows that

social organisms are as deeply different from each other, as are organisms of animals and plants. Setting his task from this point of view to explore the capitalist economic organization, Marx thereby strictly formulates the goal that any exact study of economic life should pursue. The scientific significance of such a study is to elucidate those special (historical) laws that govern the occurrence.

Here is a description of the dialectical method, which Marx fished out from the abyss of magazine and newspaper notes on Capital and translated it into German because this characteristic of the method, as he himself says, is completely accurate. The question is, is there even a word mentioned about triads, trichotomies, the unquestioned dialectic (method) of the process, etc. nonsense, against which Mr. Mikhailovsky fights so knightly? And Marx following this description directly says that his method is “directly opposite” to Hegel’s. According to Hegel, the development of an idea, according to the dialectical laws of the triad, determines the development of reality. Only in this case, of course, can one speak of the significance of triads, of the unquestionability of the dialectical process. In my opinion - on the contrary - says Marx: “The ideal is only a reflection of the material.” And the whole thing boils down in this way to a “positive understanding of the present and its necessary development”: for triads there is no other place than the role of the lid and husk (“I flirted with the Hegelian language,” says Marx in the same afterword), which some people are interested in philistines. How, now asked, should we judge a person who wanted to criticize one of the “foundations” of scientific materialism, that is, dialectics, and began to talk about everything you want, even about frogs and Napoleon, but not about that, what does this dialectic consist of, not about whether the development of society really is a natural-historical process? Is the materialistic concept of socio-economic formations correct? how special social organisms? Are the methods of an objective analysis of these formations true? do social ideas really not determine social development, but are they determined by them? etc. Is it possible to allow only misunderstanding in this case?

Ad 2) After such a “criticism” of the dialectic, Mr. Mikhailovsky hands Marx these methods of proof “through” the Hegelian triad and, of course, fights victoriously against them.

“Regarding the future,” he says, “the immanent laws of society are set exclusively dialectically.” (This is the exception mentioned above.)

Marx's argument about the inevitability of the expropriation of expropriators by virtue of the laws of the development of capitalism is "exclusively of a dialectical character." Marx's "ideal" about the commonality of land and capital "in the sense of inevitability and certainly rests exclusively at the end of the Hegelian three-membered chain".

This argument was "wholly taken" from Dühring, who conducted it in his "Kritische Geschichte der Nationaloekonomie und des Sozialismus" (3-te Aufl., 1879, S. 486–487). Moreover, Mr. Mikhailovsky did not mention Dühring in a word. Perhaps, by the way, he independently thought of this twisting of Marx? ..

The reader sees that all of this beautiful rebuke to Engels Dühring is wholly related to Mr. Mikhailovsky, who asserts in the same way that Marx's future rests solely at the end of the Hegelian chain and that the conviction of its inevitability can be based only on faith. (It seems worthwhile to note on this subject that Engels's whole explanation is placed in the same chapter where he discusses grain, the teachings of Rousseau and other examples of the dialectical process. It would seem that one comparison of these examples with such clear and categorical statements by Engels (and Marx, to whom the manuscript of this work was previously read), that there can be no question of "proving" something by triads, or of slipping "conditional members" of these triads into the image of the actual process, is perfect of enough

The whole difference between Dühring and Mr. Mikhailovsky comes down to the following two small points: first, Dühring, despite the fact that he cannot talk about Marx without foam at the mouth, nevertheless found it necessary to mention in the next paragraph of his "History" that Marx categorically rejects the Hegelian accusation in The Afterword. Mr. Mikhailovsky, however, did not say anything about this (above) absolutely definite and clear exposition of what Marx understood by the dialectical method.

Secondly. The second originality of Mr. Mikhailovsky is that he focused all his attention on the use of the tenses of verbs. Why, speaking of the future, does Marx use the present?—our philosopher asks with a victorious look. You can handle this in every grammar, Hon. Critic: they will tell you that the present is used instead of the future, when this future seems inevitable and undeniable. But why is it, why is it certain?—worries Mr. Mikhailovsky, wanting to depict such a strong excitement that it could justify even overexposure. And on this score, Marx gave a very definite answer. It can be considered

insufficient or incorrect, but then it is necessary to show “what exactly” and “why exactly” it is incorrect, and not talk nonsense about Hegelianism. (*V.I. Lenin, What are “Friends of the People” and How They Fight Against the Social Democrats (1894), Soch., Vol. I, pp. 82-87, 92 ed., 1926*)

## **Russian Social Democrats are Fighting Among Themselves, too, According to Hegel**

Casting a general view on the development of our party crisis, we can easily see that the main composition of both struggling parties was always, with few exceptions, the same. It was a struggle of the revolutionary and opportunist wing of our party. But this struggle went through a variety of stages, and anyone who wants to understand the accumulated huge literature should have an accurate acquaintance with the features of each of these stages, in the mass of fragmentary instructions torn from the connection of quotations, individual accusations, etc., etc....

Each of these stages is characterized by a significantly different conjuncture of the struggle and the direct aim of the attack; each stage is, so to speak, a separate battle in one general military campaign. You cannot understand anything in our struggle unless you study the specific situation of each battle. Having studied this, we will clearly see that development does follow the dialectical path, through contradictions: the minority becomes the majority, the majority the minority; each side goes from defence to attack and from attack to defence; the starting point of the ideological struggle (§1) is “denied”, giving way to an ever-filling squabble [The difficult question of distinguishing squabbles and a fundamental discrepancy is now resolved on its own: everything related to co-optation is squabble, everything related to the analysis of the struggle at the congress, to the debates about §1 and the turn towards opportunism and anarchism, there is a fundamental discrepancy.], but then the “denial of denial” begins, and, “getting along” somehow, with half-and-half sin, with the blessed wife, in various centres, we return to the starting point of a purely ideological struggle, but already this “thesis” is enriched with all the results of the “antithesis” and turned into a higher synthesis, when an isolated, random error in § 1 grew into a quasi-system of

opportunist views on the organizational question, when the connection of this phenomenon with the main division of our couples, on the revolutionary and opportunist wing speaks to all more and more clearly. In a word, not only oats grow according to Hegel, but the Russian Social Democrats are also fighting among themselves according to Hegel. (“Getting along” somehow, with a sin in half, with a God-given wife, in various centres, we return to the starting point of a purely ideological struggle, but already this “thesis” is enriched with all the results of the “antithesis” and turned into a higher synthesis, when isolated, random the mistake in § 1 grew into a quasi-system of opportunist views on the organizational question, when the connection of this phenomenon with the main division of our party into a revolutionary and opportunist wing appears more and more clearly to everyone. In a word, not only oats grow according to Hegel, but the Russian Social Democrats are also fighting among themselves according to Hegel. (“Getting along” somehow, with a sin in half, with a God-given wife, in various centres, we return to the starting point of a purely ideological struggle, but already this “thesis” is enriched with all the results of the “antithesis” and turned into a higher synthesis, when isolated, random the mistake in § 1 grew into a quasi-system of opportunist views on the organizational question, when the connection of this phenomenon with the main division of our party into a revolutionary and opportunist wing appears more and more clearly to everyone. In a word, not only oats grow according to Hegel, but the Russian Social Democrats are also fighting among themselves according to Hegel. (when an isolated, accidental mistake according to § 1 grew into a quasi-system of opportunist views on the organizational question, when the connection of this phenomenon with the main division of our party into a revolutionary and opportunist wing appears to all more and more clearly. In a word, not only oats grow according to Hegel, but the Russian Social Democrats are also fighting among themselves according to Hegel. ( when an isolated, accidental mistake according to § 1 grew into a quasi-system of opportunist views on the organizational question, when the connection of this phenomenon with the main division of our party into a revolutionary and opportunist wing appears to all more and more clearly. In a word, not only oats grow according to Hegel, but the Russian Social Democrats are also fighting among themselves according to Hegel. (V.I. Lenin, *A Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, Soch., Vol. VI , pp. 324-325-326, ed. 3rd)

## **Denial as a Moment of Development**

Not naked denial, not vicious denial, *not sceptical* denial, hesitation, doubt is characteristic and essential in dialectics—which, undoubtedly, contains an element of negation and, moreover, as its most important element, no, but negation as a moment of connection, as a moment of development, with the retention of the positive, that is, without any hesitation, without any eclecticism. (*Lenin Collection IX*, p. 285, 1st ed.)

## **VII. Categories of Materialist Dialectics**

### **General Characteristics of the Categories of Materialist Dialectics**

Before man is a *network* of natural phenomena. An instinctive man, a savage, does not distinguish himself from nature. The conscious person identifies categories as the essence of the steps of separation, that is, cognition of the world, nodal points in the network that help to cognize and master it. (*The Lenin Collection IX*, p. 41, ed. 1st.)

Moments of cognition (= “ideas”) by man of nature is what categories of logic are. (*The Lenin Collection IX*, p. 231, 1st ed.)

Objectivism: the categories of thinking are not a human allowance, but an expression of the laws of both nature and man - cf. further opposition ( "*Lenin Collection*" IX, p. 37, ed. 1st )

### **Historical and Logical**

Hegel correctly begins the philosophy of law with ownership as the simplest legal relationship of the subject. But no possession exists prior to the family or to a relationship of domination and submission, which are much more specific relationships. Therefore, it would be more correct to say that there are families, clans that still only *own*, but do not have *property*. The simplest category thus appears as the

relation of primary family and clan communities to property. In an earlier society, it is a simpler relation of the developed organism, but a specific substrate, the relation of which is possession, is constantly assumed. One can imagine owning a single savage. But then ownership is not a legal relationship. It is not true that ownership has historically developed into a family. On the contrary, it always implies this "more specific legal category". But, meanwhile, there remains a grain of truth, namely, that the simplest categories are an expression of the conditions under which undeveloped concreteness can be realized, until a more multilateral relationship or a more multilateral relationship is established, the ideal category of which is the ideal expression

Money can exist and existed historically before capital, earlier than banks, earlier hired labour, etc. On this side, we can say that the simplest category can express the dominant relations of an undeveloped whole [relations] that already existed historically before the whole developed in that direction, which finds expression in a more specific category. To the extent that the laws of abstract thinking, ascending from the simplest to the most complex, correspond to the actual historical process.

On the other hand, we can say that there are highly developed and yet historically immature social forms where there are higher economic forms, for example, cooperation, a developed division of labour, etc., but money is completely unknown, for example, Peru.

Similarly, in Slavic communities, money and the exchange that determines them either do not appear at all, or play an insignificant role within individual communities, but are found on the borders of the latter, in relations with other communities; it is generally a mistake to accept an exchange between members of the same community as an initially constituting element. On the contrary, at first it appears in the relations of different communities to each other to a much greater extent than in the relations of members within the same community. Further, although money began to play a role very early and in various respects, however, in antiquity they act as the dominant element only among unilaterally defined nations, among trading nations, and even in the most developed antiquities, among Greeks and Romans, the full development of money, which is the premise of modern bourgeois society, observed only during the decomposition period. Thus, this completely simple category is revealed historically in its full strength only in the most developed social relations. It in no way penetrates (?) Into all economic relations; for example, in the

Roman Empire, during the period of its greatest development, the basis was made by natural taxes and duties. The money economy was quite developed there, in fact, only in the army, it never embraced the whole process of labour as a whole.

So, although the simplest category can historically exist before the concrete, in its complete internal and external development it can belong only to more complex (?) Social forms, while a more specific category can be completely developed in less developed social formations.

Labour seems like a completely simple category. Ancient is also the idea of him in this universality - as of labour in general. However, "labour", economically considered in this simple form, is as modern a category as the relationships that give rise to this simplest abstraction. The monetary system, for example, defines wealth as completely objectively as a thing [?] [It is absolutely impossible to make out two words here. They look like "außer sich," "beside themselves."] In money. In relation to this point of view, great progress was made when the manufactory or commercial system transferred the source of wealth from the subject to subjective activity, to commercial and manufactory labour. However, this activity itself is still understood in a limited form, namely as generating money. In relation to this system, the physiocratic system [represents further progress]; it exposes a certain form of labour—agriculture, as creating wealth — and the object itself is no longer seen in the money shell, but as a product in general, as a general result of labour. This product, however, in accordance with a limited specific activity, is always a product with certain natural properties. Agriculture produces, land produces par excellence. Enormous progress on the part of Adam Smith was to reject any certainty of the activity that generates wealth, putting in this place labour as such, not manufactory, not commercial, not agricultural labour, but both. Together with the abstract universal concept of wealth-creating activity, we also have a universal concept of a product in general, defined as wealth, or again about labour in general, but already as past, materialized labour. How difficult and great this transition was, it can be seen from the fact that Adam Smith himself at times returns to the physiocratic system. It may seem that in this way only an abstract expression has been found for the simplest and most ancient relationship in which a person, under any social forms, acts as a producer. This is true, on the one hand, but false, on the other. under any social forms, acts as a producer. This is true, on

the one hand, but false, on the other. under any social forms, acts as a producer. This is true, on the one hand, but false, on the other.

Indifference to a certain type of labour presupposes a highly developed set of actual types of labour, of which not one is dominant anymore. Thus, the most comprehensive abstractions in general arise only in conditions of rich concrete development, where the same is common to many or all elements. Then it can no longer be presented to thinking only in its own special form. On the other hand, this abstraction of labour in general is only the spiritual result of a specific set of labour processes. Indifference to any particular type of labour corresponds to a social form in which individuals easily move from one type of labour to another and in which any particular labour is random and therefore indifferent to them. Here is labour, not only in the category, but in reality, became a means of creating wealth in general and lost its specific connection with a particular individual. This state has reached the greatest development in the most modern of the forms of being of bourgeois society in the United States. Here, therefore, the abstract category of "labour", "labour in general", labour sans phrase, this starting point of modern economic science, becomes for the first time practically true. Consequently, the simplest abstraction, which modern economy places at the forefront and which expresses the most ancient relation, which is valid for all social forms, is, however, practically true in this abstraction only as a category of the most modern society. But they can say that what is a historical product in the United States is indifference to any particular type of labour, among Russians, for example, there is an innate quality. But, firstly, there is a huge difference: whether barbarians tend to be suitable for everything, or do civilized people themselves apply their forces to all areas. And then among the Russians, this indifference to any particular type of work is almost consistent with the traditional habit of a certain job, from which only external influences separate them. This example of work convincingly proves that even the most abstract categories, despite the fact that precisely because of their abstractness, they are valid for all eras, in the very definiteness of this abstraction are no less a product of historical conditions and have full significance only for these conditions and inside them. or civilized people themselves apply their forces to all areas. And then among the Russians, this indifference to any particular type of work is almost consistent with the traditional habit of a certain job, from which only external influences separate them. This example of work convincingly proves that even the most abstract categories,

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Bourgeois society is the most developed and multilateral historical organization of production. The categories expressing his relations, understanding of his structure, at the same time allow penetrating into the structure and production relations of all obsolete social forms, from the fragments and elements of which it is built, continuing to partly drag along their remains, which it has not yet managed to overcome, partly developing to the full extent that which previously existed only in the form of a hint. Human anatomy is the key to monkey anatomy. Hints of higher in lower species of animals, on the contrary, can be understood only if this higher is already known. The economy of bourgeois society will thus give us the key to the ancient economy, etc. But not at all in the sense that economists understand, who erase all historical differences and in all social forms see bourgeois forms. Dues, tithing, etc., can be understood by us if we know the land rent, but we cannot identify them with the latter.

Since, further, bourgeois society itself is only a contradictory form of development, the relations of the preceding formations are often found in it only in a degenerated or even disguised form, such as, for example, communal property. Therefore, if it is correct that the categories of bourgeois economies embody the truth for other social forms, then this should be understood only *grano salis*. They can be contained in it in a developed, distorted, caricature, at least in a substantially altered form. The so-called historical development generally rests on the fact that the subsequent form considers the previous one as a step towards itself and always understands it one-sidedly, because it is only very rarely and under quite certain conditions that it is capable of self-criticism; here, of course, we are not talking about such historical periods, which themselves are

represented as decay times. The Christian religion was only then able to objectively understand the old mythology, when its self-criticism was to a certain extent ready, so to speak, *dynamei*. So bourgeois economy only then came to understand feudal, ancient and eastern societies when the self-criticism of bourgeois society began. Since bourgeois economy did not identify itself, falling into mythology, completely (?) With the past, its criticism of the former, namely the feudal [society], which it directly had to struggle with, was like the criticism that Christianity applied to paganism or Protestantism attitude to Catholicism. when her self-criticism was to a certain extent ready, so to speak, *dynamei*. So bourgeois economy only then came to understand feudal, ancient and eastern societies when the self-criticism of bourgeois society began. Since bourgeois economy did not identify itself, falling into mythology, completely (?) With the past, its criticism of the former, namely the feudal [society], which it directly had to struggle with, was like the criticism that Christianity applied to paganism or Protestantism attitude to Catholicism. when her self-criticism was to a certain extent ready, so to speak, *dynamei*. So bourgeois economy only then came to understand feudal, ancient and eastern societies when the self-criticism of bourgeois society began. Since bourgeois economy did not identify itself, falling into mythology, completely (?) With the past, its criticism of the former, namely the feudal [society], which it directly had to struggle with, was like the criticism that Christianity applied to paganism or Protestantism attitude to Catholicism.

As in any historical, social science, in relation to economic categories, one must constantly bear in mind that both in reality and in the head the subject is given,—in our case, modern bourgeois society—and that therefore the categories express forms of being, the conditions of existence, often only individual sides of this specific society, this subject, and that is why [political economy] *in the scientific sense*, by no means begins only where of it *as such* is at stake. This consideration must be kept in mind, because it immediately gives decisive guidance on the dismemberment of the subject.

For example, nothing seems more natural than starting with land rent, with land ownership, since it is connected with land, this source of all production and all existence, and agriculture, this original form of production in all, to some extent, firmly established societies. However, there is nothing more erroneous. Each form of society has a certain branch of production that prevails over others and

whose relations therefore determine the place and influence of everyone else.

This is a general lighting in which all other colours are drowned and which modifies them in their features. This is a special ether, which determines the specific gravity of every creature that is in it.

Take, for example, shepherd's peoples (peoples engaged exclusively in hunting and fishing lie outside the point where real development begins). They sporadically meet a certain form of agriculture, and this determines land ownership. It is collective and retains this form to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the fact, to a greater or lesser extent, these peoples adhere to their traditions, for example, land ownership among the Slavs. Among peoples with settled agriculture—this settledness was already great progress—where agriculture prevails, as in ancient and feudal society, industry itself, its organization, and its corresponding forms of ownership are more or less the same as land ownership; [society] or completely dependent on agriculture [In the original, “from it” (“ihr”). ], like the ancient Romans, or imitates the relations developing in it, as in the Middle Ages, in the organization of cities. Capital itself—since it is not yet purely monetary capital—in the Middle Ages, in the form of traditional tools of craft (?), Etc., has this landowning character.

In bourgeois society, on the contrary, agriculture more and more becomes only one of the branches of industry and falls completely under the rule of capital. Similarly, land rent. In all forms, where land ownership predominates, natural relations still prevail. In those where capital dominates, social, historically created elements prevail. Land rent cannot be understood without capital, but capital can very well be understood without land rent. Capital is the dominant economic power of bourgeois society. It should be the starting and ending point, and its concept should be developed earlier than the concept of land ownership. After they are considered separately, their relationship should be sorted out.

Thus, it would be completely inappropriate and erroneous to take economic categories in the order in which they historically played a decisive role. On the contrary, their sequence is determined by the attitude in which they stand to each other in modern bourgeois society, and this attitude is directly opposite to that which seems natural or contributes to the sequence of historical development. This is not about the place occupied historically by economic relations in the alternation of various social forms. Even less is the question of their sequence “in idea” (*Proudhon*), which is only a perverse

representation of the historical process. It is a question of their dismemberment within the framework of modern bourgeois society.

The purity (abstract certainty) with which the trading peoples—the Phoenicians, Carthaginians—appear in the ancient world is given by the very predominance of agricultural peoples. Capital, like trade or money capital, appears in such an abstraction precisely where capital has not yet become the dominant element of society. Lombards and Jews held the same position in relation to the agricultural society of the Middle Ages.

A further example of how the same categories can occupy a different place at different levels of social development is the following: one of the last forms of bourgeois society, joint-stock companies, also appears at the beginning of the latter, in the form of large privileged trading companies endowed with monopolies .

The very concept of national wealth slips among the economists of the 17th century only in the form—this view is partially preserved by economists of the 18th century—that wealth is created only for the state, but that the power of the latter depends on this wealth. It was that unconsciously hypocritical form in which the wealth and production of the latter were announced as the goal of modern states and the latter were considered only as a means for the production of wealth.

The dismemberment of the subject, obviously, should be as follows: first [should be developed] general abstract definitions, which is precisely why they more or less apply to all social forms, however, in the above clarified sense. Secondly, the categories that form the internal structure of bourgeois society and on which the main classes rest. Capital, wage labour, land ownership. Their relationship to each other. City and village. Three large public classes. Exchange between them. Appeal. Credit (private). Thirdly, the final expression of bourgeois society in the form of a state. Considered in relation to oneself. "Unproductive" classes. Taxes. State debt. Public credit. Population. Colonies. Emigration. Fourth, international production conditions. International division of labour. International exchange. Export and import. Bill rate. Fifth, the global market and crises. (*K. Marx, Toward a Critique of Political Economy, pp. 33–40, Partizdat, 1932* )

## Law, Essence and Phenomenon

The concept of *law* is *one* of the steps in a person's knowledge of *unity* and *communication*, the interdependence and integrity of the world process. The "breaking off" and "twisting" of words and concepts, to which Hegel indulges here, is a struggle against the absolutisation of the concept of *law*, with its simplification, with its fetishization. NB for modern physics!!!

NB The law is strong (remaining) in the phenomenon

(The law is identical in appearance)

Law = calm reflection NB

NB Law is a significant phenomenon

(Ergo, the *law* and the *essence of the* concept are homogeneous (single-order) or, rather, single-degree, expressing a deepening of a person's knowledge of phenomena, the world etc.

NB (Law is a reflection of the essential in the movement of the universe)

(Phenomenon, wholeness, totality ((s [ako] n = part))

(The phenomenon is *richer than the law*). (*The Lenin Collection IX*, pp. 145, 147, 149.)

## Exile Laws from Science and Drag Laws of Religion

A powerful current to social science from natural science was, as is known, not only in the Petty era, but also in the era of Marx. This current is no less, if not more powerful, and remained for the 20th century. How is it possible, in an essay claiming to be scientific and setting itself the task of studying the "philosophical motives of economic thinking", to raise the question of this "current" and of the materialism of Petty and Marx, without finding out absolutely nothing about the philosophical premises and conclusions of natural science ??

But this is precisely the whole Struve's manner: to raise, or rather, to hurt a thousand and one questions, to "talk" about everything, to present everything balanced and considered, but in reality to give nothing but okrosha quotes and quick remarks.

It is a blatant lie that the idea of natural law in political economy crashed, that it was "indecent to talk about it." Just the opposite. It was

the “current from natural science to social science” that reinforced, reinforces and makes this idea inevitable. It was precisely “materialist historicism” that finally substantiated this idea, clearing it of the metaphysical (in the Marxist sense of the term, that is, anti-dialectical) absurdities and shortcomings. To say that the “natural law” of the classics is “ethically discredited”, like bourgeois apologetics, means speaking intolerable nonsense, it means distorting both the classics and “materialist historicism” in the most reckless way. For the classics groped and groped for a whole series of “natural laws” of capitalism, not understanding its transitory nature, not seeing the class struggle within it.

Mr. Struve, in particular, would like to submit the concept of value to the archive. “Value,” he writes, “as something different from price, independent of it, defining it, is a phantom” (96). “Categories of objective value are only, so to speak, a metaphysical doubling of the price category” (97).

In order to destroy socialism, Mr. Struve chose the most... radical and easiest, but also the most lightweight method to deny science in general. The lordly scepticism of a supersaturated and frightened bourgeois reaches here to *nec plus ultra* [To the last degree.—*Ed.*]. Just as one lawyer with Dostoyevsky, defending himself from the charge of murder with the purpose of robbery, agrees that there was no robbery and there was no murder, so Mr. Struve “refutes” Marx’s theory of value with the simple *assurance* that value is a phantom.

“At present” (the theory of objective value) “one does not even have to refute it; it is enough to describe it as we did here and in our Introduction to show that it does not and cannot have a place in scientific constructions “(97).

Well, how not to call this very “radical” method the most lightweight? For thousands of years, mankind has noticed the legality in the phenomenon of exchange, is trying to understand and more accurately express it, is checking its explanations with millions and billions of daily observations of economic life, and suddenly a fashionable representative of a fashionable activity—collecting quotes (I almost said: collecting postage stamps)—“cancels all this”: “value is a phantom.”

No wonder it has long been said that if the truths of mathematics offended the interests of people (the interests of classes in their struggle, or rather), then these truths would be disputed hotly. To challenge the insurmountable truths of economics requires very, very

little baggage. Let's insert, for example, a word that the phantom is value, *as something independent of price*—and it's all about the hat!

It doesn't matter that this insert is absurd. Price is a manifestation of the law of value. Value is the law of prices, i.e., a generalized expression of the phenomenon of price. Here we can speak of "independence" only for mockery of science, which in all areas of knowledge shows us the manifestation of the basic laws in the apparent chaos of phenomena.

Take, for example, the law of species change and the formation of higher species from lower ones. It would be very cheap to declare as a phantom generalizations of natural science, laws already found (recognized by all, despite the darkness of seeming violations and deviations in the motley of individual incidents), the search for corrections and additions to them. In the field of the natural sciences, a person who would say that the laws of the phenomena of the natural world is a phantom would be put in a madhouse or simply ridiculed. In the field of economic sciences, a man who flaunts so boldly ... in a naked state ... will be readily appointed professor, for he is, indeed, quite suitable for the stupidity of bourgeois sons.

"Price is a fact. Let's put it this way: price is the concept of a real exchange relationship between exchanged goods, there is a realized exchange relation.

"Value is the norm. Let us put it this way: value is the concept of an ideal, or due, correlation between goods in the process of exchange "(88).

Is it not true, as characteristic for Mr. Struve, this carelessly, advertised, frivolously thrown remark "let's say this"? Deliberately heavyweight, flirting with sophisticated terms and neoplasms, Mr. Struve suddenly turns into a feuille tone... It would be difficult to declare a phantom value without switching to a feuille tone.

If price is a "realized exchange relationship", then it is permissible to ask, between whom does this relationship exist? Obviously, between exchanging farms. If this "exchange ratio" is no accident there is an exception, for a short time and is repeated with unfailing regularity, everywhere and every day, it is obvious that the "exchange ratio" links *in one economic system of* collection of farms; it is obvious that between these farms there is a strengthened division of labour.

Here you and crumbling *already* like a house of cards, all the intricacies of Mr. Struve about "mezhdusozyaystvennyh" relations *separable* if by social relations. Mr. Struve drove out the

concept of commodity production at the door to secretly pass it back out the window. Mr. Struve's notorious "empiricism" consists in expelling from science unpleasant generalizations for the bourgeoisie, which nevertheless have to be recognized, so to speak, unofficially.

If price is an exchange ratio, then it is inevitable to understand the difference between a single, exchange ratio and constant, between random and mass, between instant and covering long periods of time. Since this is so - and this is undoubtedly the case - we inevitably rise from the random and the individual to the stable and the mass, from price to value. Mr. Struve's attempt to declare the value "due", to bring it closer to the ethics or teachings of the canonists, etc., falls like a house of cards.

Calling "empiricism" the recognition of value behind the phantom and "metaphysics", the desire (going "from Aristotle" to Marx—p. 91—we must also add: through all the classical political economy!), The desire to find the *law of formation* and change in prices, Mr. Struve repeats the technique of the latest philosophical reactionaries, who consider materialism of natural science in general to be "metaphysics," and declare a step toward religion as "empiricism". The expulsion of *laws* from science is, in fact, only the *pushing of the laws of religion*. Mr. Struve imagines in vain that his "little tricks" can deceive anyone about this simple and undeniable fact. (*Lenin, Another Destruction of Socialism (1914), Op., Vol. XVII , p. 269-270, 272-274.*)

## **The Historicity of Laws**

*The eternal laws of nature* turning more and more into historical laws. That water from 0 to 100 ° C is liquid, this is the eternal law of nature, but in order for it to be valid, there must be: 1) water, 2) this temperature and 3) normal pressure. There is no water at all on the moon, only its elements are on the sun, and our law does not apply to these celestial bodies. The laws of meteorology are also eternal, but only for the earth or for a body with a size, density, tilt and temperature of the earth and under the assumption that it has an atmosphere with the same proportion of oxygen and nitrogen and with the same masses of vaporized and deposited water vapour. There is no

atmosphere on the moon; the sun has an atmosphere of red-hot metal vapours, therefore there is no meteorology on the moon, but on the sun it is completely different than ours. All of our official physics, chemistry and biology is exclusively *geocentric* and designed for the earth. We do not know at all the forms of electric and magnetic stresses in the sun, on motionless stars and nebulae, and even on planets with a different density. The laws of chemical bonds of elements cease in the sun due to high temperature or have a temporary effect at the border of the solar atmosphere, and these compounds decompose again when approaching the sun. But the chemistry of the sun is in formation, and it is inevitably different than the chemistry of the earth; she does not refute the latter, but is outside her. On nebulae, perhaps, those of the 65 elements that may themselves be complex do not exist. So, if we want to talk about the universal laws of nature, applicable to *all* bodies, starting with a foggy spot and ending with a man, then we have only the severity and, perhaps, the most general formulation of the theory of energy conversion—vulgar mechanical theory of heat. But this theory itself turns, if applied successively to all phenomena, into a historical image of what is happening in some world system, from its inception to death, changes, that is, it turns into a story, at which each stage is dominated by other laws, t e. other forms of manifestation of one and the same universal movement, and thus only one thing has absolutely universal significance—*movement*. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 48-49, 3rd ed., 1932*)

## **Bourgeois Theorists Perpetuate the Laws of Capitalism**

I read with great interest your book on the Work Question. And at the first reading of Darwin, too, I was struck by the striking resemblance of his depiction of plant and animal life to Malthus's theory. Only the conclusion I made was not what you did. Namely: I believe that for modern bourgeois development, the greatest disgrace is the fact that in this respect it has not yet emerged from the economic forms of the animal kingdom. For us, the so-called "economic laws" are not eternal laws of nature, but historical laws that arise and disappear, and the code of modern political economy, since economists made it objectively correctly, is for us only a summary of laws and conditions under which modern bourgeois society only and

can exist. In a word, this is an abstract expression, a summary of the conditions of production and communication of bourgeois society (Produktions und Verkehrsbedingungen). For us, none of these laws, because it expresses *purely bourgeois conditions* not older than bourgeois society. Those laws that are more or less valid for the whole history, up to the present time, express only those conditions that are common to any society that rests on class domination and on class exploitation. The first is the so-called Ricardo law, which had no force either for the serfdom or for the slave system of the ancient world. The latter include what is right in the theory of Malthus. Pop Malthus stole his theory directly from his predecessors, as, indeed, all his other thoughts. Actually, there is nothing belonging to him except a purely arbitrary application by him of his two progressions. The theory itself has long been reduced by English economists to its reasonable size. The population puts pressure not on the means of subsistence, but on the means, *Beschäftigung* ). Humanity could multiply faster than it can be compatible with modern bourgeois society. For us, this is yet another new ground for declaring this bourgeois society an obstacle to development, an obstacle that must be removed. (*Marx and Engels, Letters, Engels—F. A. Lange March 29, 1866, p. 162-163. Partizdat, 1932*)

## Essence and Visibility

The true nature of the definitions of “essence” is given by Hegel himself: *Enz. I, § 111, Zusatz*: “In essence, everything is *relative*” (for example, positive and negative, which make sense only in their relationship, and not each in itself). (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 8, 1932*)

Is it not that thought that is objective and appearances, for in it is *one of the sides of the objective world*? Not only the essence, but also the appearance is objective. There is a difference between the subjective and the objective, but it also has its limits. that is, the non-essential, apparent, surface often disappears, is not so “tightly” held, not so “firmly sits” as “essence”. For example: river movement—foam above and deep currents below. But *foam* is an expression of essence!

You include in the visibility all the wealth of the world, and you deny the objectivity of visibility!!

appearance = negative nature of the entity

Appearance is (1) nothing, non-existent, which exists—(2) being as a moment.

appearance (apparent) is a *reflection of the essence* in itself (it) itself.

It seems that there is an essence in *one of* its definitions, in one of its sides, in one of its moments. *The essence* seems to be so. Impact is a phenomenon of essence in itself.

So, here, too, Hegel accuses Kant of *subjectivity*. This is NB. Hegel for the “objective significance” (sit venia verbo) of the “direct given” [the term “*given*” is common with Hegel in general, and here see page [13]]. Smaller philosophers argue about whether to take the essence *or the* directly given as the basis (Kant, Hume, all Machians). Hegel instead of *or* puts *and*, explaining the specific content of this “and”. (“*Lenin Collection*” IX, p. 51, 107, 109, 111, 113, 115, ed. 1st).

## **War is a Continuation of Politics by Other Means**

The resolution of our party, adopted at the Berne Conference in March 1915 and bearing the title “On the slogan of defending the fatherland,” begins with the words: “The *real essence of modern war lies*” in that and that.

It’s about a *modern* war. It cannot be said more clearly in Russian. The words “real essence” show that it is necessary to distinguish the apparent from the real, the appearance from the essence, the phrase from the case. The phrases about the defence of the fatherland in this war are baldly betraying the imperialist war of 1914-1916—a war over the division of colonies, over the robbery of foreign lands, etc., for a national war. In order not to leave the slightest opportunity to distort our views, the resolution adds a special paragraph on “*truly* national wars”, which “took place *especially* (note: it does not mean exclusively!) In the era of 1789-1871”...

What is the “defence of the fatherland” generally speaking? Is there any scientific concept from the field of economics or politics,

etc.? No. This is simply the most common, commonly used, sometimes simply philistine expression, meaning the *justification of war*. Nothing more, absolutely nothing! What can be “traitorous” here is that the inhabitants can justify *any* war by saying “we are defending the fatherland,” while Marxism, which does not belittle ourselves to the philistines, requires a historical analysis of each individual war to make out whether *this* war can be considered progressive, serving the interests of democracy or the proletariat, *in this sense* legal, fair, etc.

How to find the “real essence” of war, how to define it? War is a continuation of politics. We need to study the politics before the war, the politics that lead to the war. If the policy was imperialist, that is, protecting the interests of financial capital, robbing and oppressing colonies and foreign countries, then the war resulting from this policy is imperialist war. If the policy was national liberation, that is, it expressed a mass movement against national oppression, then the war resulting from such a policy is a national liberation war.

The average person does not understand that war is “a *continuation of politics*”, and therefore it is limited to the fact that “the enemy attacks”, “the enemy has invaded my country”, not knowing *why* the war is fought, *what* classes, for *what* political purpose. P. Kievsky completely falls to the level of such a layman when he says that the Germans were about to occupy Belgium, that means, from the point of view of self-determination, “the Belgian social patriots are right,” or: part of France was occupied by the Germans, which means “Gad can be satisfied”, Because “it comes to the territory inhabited by the given nation” (and not foreign).

For the layman it is important *where* the troops stand, who is winning. It is important for a Marxist *why this* war is being waged, during which one or other troops may be victors. (*Lenin, On the caricature of Marxism, Op., Vol. XIX, p. 197, 198, ed. 3rd.*)

## **Scientific Research Reveals a Significant Relationship**

In fact, in the product market, the owner of the money is not directly opposed by labour, but by the worker. The product sold by the latter is its labour power. The latter no longer belongs to the worker at the moment when his labour really begins, and, therefore, can no

longer be sold to him. Labour is a substance and an immanent measure of value, but it itself has no value.

In the expression “cost of labour” the concept of value is not only completely annulled, but also turned into its opposite. This is the same imaginary (not true) expression, as, for example, the value of land. But such imaginary expressions arise from the relations of production themselves. This is a category for the forms of manifestation of some truly significant relationships. That things in their manifestation can often be presented in a distorted form, it is recognized, as if, in all sciences, with the exception of political economy.

Classical political economy, without any criticism, borrowed the category of “price of labour” from everyday life, in order to then pose the question: what determines this price? She quickly became convinced that the change in the relationship between supply and demand could not explain anything in the price of labour, nor in the price of any other good, except for its change, i.e., fluctuations in market prices below or above a certain value. If supply and demand cover each other, then, *ceteris paribus*, price fluctuations cease. But then supply and demand cease to explain anything. Obviously, the price of labour with equal supply and demand should be determined independently of the relationship between supply and demand; in this way, they came to the “natural” price of labour as an object, which, in fact, is subject to research. Or they considered fluctuations in the market price for a more or less long period, for example, for one year, and found that its deviations in one direction or another are mutually balanced at a certain average constant value. Obviously, this average should be determined by something else, and not mutually neutralizing deviations from it. This price of labour, prevailing over random market prices and regulating these latter, the so-called “necessary price” (physiocrats) or “natural price” (A. Smith) of labour can represent, like other goods, only value expressed in money. this average should be determined by something else, and not mutually neutralizing deviations from it. This price of labour, prevailing over random market prices and regulating these latter, the so-called “necessary price” (physiocrats) or “natural price” (A. Smith) of labour can represent, like other goods, only value expressed in money. this average should be determined by something else, and not mutually neutralizing deviations from it. This price of labour, prevailing over random market prices and regulating these latter, the so-called

“necessary price” (physiocrats) or “natural price” (A. Smith) of labour can represent, like other goods, only value expressed in money.

In this way, political economy hoped to break through random labour prices and get to its value. Like other goods, this value was then determined by production costs. But what are the costs of production of the worker, that is, the costs spent on producing or reproducing the worker himself? This question for political economy unconsciously replaced the original question, since in the study of the costs of production of labour as such, it revolved in a vicious circle and did not move. Consequently, what she calls the value of labour is in fact the value of labour, which really exists in the personality of the worker and is as different from its function, labour, as the machine is different from its operations. Preoccupied with the difference between the market prices of labour and its so-called value, the ratio of this value to the rate of profit, to the commodity values produced by labour, etc., economists have never noticed that the course of analysis not only leads them from market prices of labour to imaginary “value”, but also makes this very cost of labour, in turn, reduce to the cost of labour. Without being aware of these results of his own analysis, uncritically applying the categories of “cost of labour”, “natural price of labour”, etc. as the last adequate expression of the value relationship, classical political economy has become entangled, as we will see later, in insoluble contradictions, while at the same time providing a solid operational basis for vulgar economy vulgarities that fundamentally recognize only one appearance of phenomena ... By the ratio of this value to the rate of profit, to the commodity values produced by labour, etc., economists have never noticed that the course of analysis not only leads them from the market prices of labour to its imaginary “value”, but also forces this very cost of labour in turn, reduce to the cost of labour. Without being aware of these results of his own analysis, uncritically applying the categories of “cost of labour”, “natural price of labour”, etc. as the last adequate expression of the value relationship, classical political economy has become entangled, as we will see later, in insoluble contradictions, while at the same time providing a solid operational basis for vulgar economy vulgarities that fundamentally recognize only one appearance of phenomena... By the ratio of this value to the rate of profit, to the commodity values produced by labour, etc., economists have never noticed that the course of analysis not only leads them from the market prices of labour to its imaginary “value”, but also forces this very cost of labour in turn, reduce to the cost of

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... the form of wages erases all traces of the division of the working day into necessary and surplus, paid and unpaid labour. All labour seems to be paid labour. During corvée labour, the labour of the serf on himself and his forced labour on the landlord differ among themselves in the most tactful way, in space and time. In slave labour, even that part of the working day during which the slave only reimburses the cost of his own means of subsistence, during which he actually works only for himself, seems to be labour for the master. All his work seems to be unpaid labour. On the contrary, in the wage labour system, even surplus or unpaid labour seems paid. There, the ownership relationship hides the slave's work on himself.

Therefore, it is clear how enormous the transformation of the value and price of labour into the form of wages, that is, into the form of the value and price of labour itself, is of great importance. On this external form of manifestation, which hides the true attitude and creates the appearance of a relationship directly opposite, all legal representations of both the worker and the capitalist, all the mystifications of the capitalist mode of production, all the illusions of freedom generated by him, all the apologetic evasions of vulgar economy rest.

If world history took a long time to reveal the secret of wages, then, on the contrary, there is nothing easier than to understand the necessity (*raison d'être*, reasons for existence) of this external form of manifestation.

The exchange between capital and labour is initially perceived in exactly the same way as the purchase and sale of any other good. The buyer gives a known amount of money, the seller—a thing other than money. The legal consciousness sees here at best only material difference, which is expressed in legally equivalent formulas: “Do ut des”, “do ut facias”, “facio ut des” and “facio ut facias” (that is, “I give you gave”, “I give you to do”, “I do for you to give”, “I do for you to do”—the four basic forms of Roman law of obligations.—K.).

Further: since exchange value and use value in themselves are incommensurable, the expressions “labour cost”, “labour price” seem no more irrational than, for example, the expressions “cotton cost”, “cotton price”. This is joined by the fact that the worker is paid after he has delivered his labour. In its function of a means of payment, money *post factum* (subsequently) realizes the value or price of the delivered product, therefore, in this case, the value or price of the delivered labour. Finally, the “use value” that the worker delivers to the capitalist is not really labour power, but its function, a certain

useful labour, the work of a tailor, shoemaker, spinner, etc. What is the same labour, considered from a different perspective, there is a universal value-creating element.

If we come to the point of view of a worker who, for his twelve-hour labour, receives the value produced by six-hour labour, say, 3 shillings, then for him twelve-hour labour is really only a means to buy 3 shillings. The cost of his labour power can change along with the cost of his usual means of subsistence: increase from 3 shillings. to 4 or fall from 3 shillings. up to 2, or, at a constant cost of labour, its price due to fluctuations in supply and demand can rise to 4 shillings. or fall to 2 shillings., - in all these cases, the worker equally gives 12 hours of labour. Therefore, any change in the amount of the equivalent received by him must be presented to him by a change in the value or price of his 12 working hours. This very circumstance led A. Smith, who considers the working day as a constant value, to the opposite error: to the assertion that the cost of labour is constant, despite the fact that the cost of means of subsistence changes and therefore the same working day can be expressed to the worker in more or less money. It says:

“The price (expressed in labour) received by the worker must always remain the same, no matter how much the quantity of goods that he receives for it changes. At this price, in one case you can buy more of them, in another less; but in this case their value changes, and not the cost of labour buying them.”

Take, on the other hand, the capitalist. First of all, he wants to get as much work as possible for as little money as possible. Therefore, in practice, he is only interested in the difference between the price of labour and the value that its functioning creates. But he tries to buy all the goods as cheaply as possible and always sees the source of his profit in simple swindle, in buying lower and selling higher than value. Consequently, he is far from understanding the fact that if such a thing as the cost of labour really existed and he really paid this value, then there could be no capital, his money could not turn into capital.

Moreover, the actual movement of wages reveals phenomena that seem to prove that it is not the cost of labour that is paid, but the cost of its function, that is, labour itself. We can reduce these phenomena to two large classes: 1. Change in wages along with changes in the length of the working day. With the same right, it would be possible to draw a conclusion that it is not the cost of the car that is paid, but the cost of its operations, because it is also more expensive to hire a car

for a week than for one day. 2. Individual differences in wages of different workers performing the same function. But we find the same individual differences in the system of slave labour, where there is no longer any room for illusions, where labour itself is sold completely openly without any embellishment...

However, about forms of manifestation such as “the value and price of labour” or “wages”, in contrast to the significant relationship that manifests in them—in contrast to the cost and price of labour—the same can be said that about all forms of manifestation in general and about their basis hidden behind them. The former are directly reproduced by themselves, as walking forms of thinking, the latter can only be revealed by scientific research. Classical political economy comes very close to the true state of things, but does not consciously formulate it. She cannot do this without losing her bourgeois skin. (*Marx, Capital, vol. I, pp. 418-420, 421-423, Partizdat, 1932*)

## **Form and Content**

All organic nature is one solid proof of the identity or continuity of form and content. Morphological and physiological phenomena, form and function determine one another mutually. Differentiation of the form (cell) determines the differentiation of the substance in the muscle, skin, bones, epithelium, etc., and differentiation of the substance, in turn, determines the differentiation of the form. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 20-21, 1932*)

## **Forms of Party Work Organically Linked to Historical Conditions**

1. The party of revolutionary Marxism fundamentally denies the search for the absolutely correct, suitable for all stages of the revolutionary process, the form of party organization, as well as the methods of its work. On the contrary, the form of organization and working methods is entirely determined by the features of this particular historical situation and the tasks that directly follow from this situation.

2. From this point of view, it is clear that any organizational form and corresponding working methods can, with a change in the objective conditions for the development of the revolution, turn from forms of development of the party organization into the shackles of this development; and vice versa, an organizational form that has become unfit for use may again become necessary and only appropriate when reviving the corresponding objective conditions.

3. The contradiction between the needs of the new emerging situation, on the one hand, and the established form of organization and the methods of its work, on the other, are outlined generally before the need for a change in course will finally affect. This last one should change only when, in general, the main and main task is completed that put forward the previous type of organization and the corresponding method of work.

4. It is impossible to mechanically transfer the forms and methods of work of a party organization practiced at one or another historical moment to other organizations, for example, councils, or bodies of an administrative, economic nature. Such a transfer would rest on the complete oblivion of the difference between the organization of the vanguard of the working class (party) and other organizations, the difference between classes, between different groups within the working people, between the different tasks that these organizations set themselves, and, etc. (*Verbatim report of the X Congress of the RCP (B.), Resolution on Party Building, p. 128.*)

## **Only with All the Means of Struggle, You can Certainly Win**

History in general, the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more diverse, versatile, livelier, “trickier” than the best parties, the most conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes imagine. This is understandable, because the best vanguards express consciousness, will, passion, fantasy of tens of thousands, and carry out a revolution, at the moments of special uplift and tension of all human abilities, consciousness, will, passion, fantasy of tens of millions, spurred on by the most intense class struggle. Two very important practical conclusions follow from this:

the first, that the revolutionary class, in order to carry out its task, must be able to master *all*, without the slightest exemption, by forms or parties to social activity (finishing after the conquest of political power, sometimes with great risk and great danger, that he did not complete before this conquest); second, that the revolutionary class must be ready for the quickest and most unexpected change of one form from another.

Everyone will agree that it will be unreasonable or even criminal to conduct the army that is not preparing to take possession of all types of weapons, all the means and methods of struggle that the enemy has or can have. But this applies even more to politics than to military affairs. In politics, even less can be known in advance what means of struggle will prove applicable and beneficial to us under certain future conditions. Not possessing all the means of struggle, we can suffer a huge—sometimes even decisive—defeat, if changes in the position of other classes independent of our will put forward in the line of the day a form of activity in which we are especially weak. Possessing all the means of struggle, we win for sure, since we represent the interests of a truly advanced, truly revolutionary class, even if circumstances do not allow us to launch the weapon, the most dangerous weapon for the enemy, the weapon most quickly delivering mortal blows. Inexperienced revolutionaries often think that the legal means of struggle are opportunistic, because the bourgeoisie in this field, especially often (especially in “peaceful”, not revolutionary times), deceived and fooled the workers;—illegal means of struggle are revolutionary. But this is not true. It is true that the opportunists and traitors of the working class are parties and leaders who are not able or unwilling (don’t say: I can’t, say: I don’t want to) (wer, will, kann) use illegal means of struggle in conditions such as during the imperialist war of 1914-1918, when the bourgeoisie of the freest democracies, with unprecedented arrogance and ferocity, deceived the workers, forbidding to tell the truth about the predatory nature of the struggle. But revolutionaries who are not able to combine illegal forms of struggle with *all* legal, are very bad revolutionaries...

The old forms burst, for it turned out that the new content in them—anti-proletarian, reactionary content—had reached unreasonable development. Now, from the point of view of the development of international communism, we have such a solid, so strong, so powerful content of work (for the Soviet power, for the dictatorship of the proletariat) that it can and *should* manifest itself in any form, both new and old, maybe it must degenerate, conquer, subjugate to itself all

forms, not only new but also old, not in order to reconcile with the old, but in order to be able to do everything and all sorts, new and old, to make the instrument a complete and final, decisive and the irrevocable victory of communism.

The Communists must make every effort to direct the labour movement and social development in general in the most direct and quickest way to the worldwide victory of the Soviet regime and the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is an undeniable truth. But if you take a small step further - it would seem a step in the same direction - and the truth will turn into a mistake. It is worth saying, as the German and English left-wing communists say, that we recognize only one, only the direct path, that we do not allow manoeuvring, compromise, compromises, and this will already be a mistake that is capable of bringing, in part has already brought and is bringing serious harm to communism. Right doctrine rested on the recognition of old forms alone and went bankrupt until the end, not noticing the new content. Left doctrine rests on the unconditional denial of certain old forms, not seeing that the new content is making its way through all and all forms, that our duty as communists, to master all forms, learn to maximize one form with another, replace one with another, adapt our tactics to any such shift caused not by our class or not ours efforts. (*Lenin, "Left-wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder, pp. 61-62, 67, Partizdat, 1932*)

## **Proletarian culture does not abolish national culture, but gives it content**

I spoke further about raising the national culture in the Soviet republics of the East. But what is national culture? How to combine it with proletarian culture? Did not Lenin even say before the war that we have two cultures—the bourgeois and the socialist, that the slogan of national culture is the reactionary slogan of the bourgeoisie, which is trying to poison the consciousness of the working people with the poison of nationalism? How to combine the construction of a national culture, the development of schools and courses in the native language and the development of cadres from local people with the construction of socialism, the construction of proletarian culture? Is there an impassable contradiction here? Of course not! We are building a proletarian culture. This is absolutely true. But it is also true that the

proletarian culture, socialist in content, takes various forms and ways of expression among different peoples, drawn into socialist construction, depending on the difference in language, life, etc. Proletarian in content, national in form—such is the universal culture that socialism is moving towards. Proletarian culture does not abolish national culture, but gives it content. And vice versa, national culture does not abolish proletarian culture, but gives it a form. The slogan of national culture was a bourgeois slogan, while the bourgeoisie was in power, and the consolidation of nations took place under the auspices of the bourgeois order. The slogan of national culture became the proletarian slogan when the proletariat became in power, and the consolidation of nations began to flow under the auspices of Soviet power. Whoever does not understand this fundamental difference between two different situations will never understand either Leninism or the essence of the national question from the point of view of Leninism. (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, p. 137, ed. 9th.* )

## **Form and Content of the State**

Forms of the state were extremely diverse. In the days of slavery in the countries of the most advanced, cultured and civilized then, for example, in ancient Greece and Rome, which completely rested on slavery, we already have various forms of the state. Then a distinction already arises between the monarchy and the republic, between the aristocracy and democracy. The monarchy—as the power of one, the republic—as the absence of any non-elective power; aristocracy—as the power of a relatively small minority, democracy—as the power of the people (democracy is literally translated from Greek and means: the power of the people). All these differences arose in the era of slavery. Despite these differences, the state at the time of the slave-holding era was a slave-owning state, all the same whether it was a monarchy or an aristocratic or democratic republic.

In any course in the history of ancient times, after listening to a lecture on this subject, you will hear about the struggle that was between the monarchist and republican states, but the main thing was that slaves were not considered human beings; not only were not considered citizens, but also people. Roman law regarded them as a thing. The law on murder, not to mention other laws protecting the human person, did not apply to slaves. He defended only slaveholders

as the only ones who were recognized as full citizens. But whether a monarchy was established, it was a slave-owning monarchy, or a republic—it was a slave-owning republic. In them, slaveholders enjoyed all rights, and slaves were a thing of the law, and it was possible not only violence of any kind against them, but also the murder of a slave was not considered a crime. Slaveholding republics differed in their internal organization: there were aristocratic and democratic republics. In the aristocratic republic, a small number of privileged people took part in the elections, in a democratic republic, everyone participated, but again all slave owners, all but slaves. This basic circumstance must be borne in mind, because it sheds most light on the question of the state and clearly shows the essence of the state.

The state is a machine for oppressing one class by another, a machine to keep other subordinate classes in obedience to one class. The shape of this machine is different. In a slave state, we have a monarchy, an aristocratic republic, or even a democratic republic. In reality, the forms of government were extremely diverse, but the essence of the matter remained the same: the slaves had no rights and remained an oppressed class, they did not recognize people. We see the same thing in a serfdom...

The form of state domination can be different: capital manifests its power in one way where there is one form, and in another in another, but essentially the power remains in the hands of capital: is there a censorship right or something else, is there a democratic republic, and even than it is more democratic, the more rude, cynical is the rule of capitalism. (*Lenin, On the State, Op., Vol. XXIV, p. 369-370, 375.*)

## **The Peculiarity of the Revolution of 1905**

The peculiarity of the Russian revolution lies precisely in the fact that it was *bourgeois-democratic* in its social content, but was *proletarian* in its means of struggle. It was bourgeois-democratic, since the goal to which it directly sought and which it could directly achieve on its own was a democratic republic, an 8-hour working day, confiscation of colossal large noble land tenure—all measures that are almost fully carried out the bourgeois revolution in France in 1792 and 1793.

At the same time, the Russian revolution was proletarian, not only in the sense that the proletariat was the leading force, the vanguard of the movement, but also in the sense that the specifically proletarian means of struggle, namely the strike, represented the main means of rocking the masses and the most characteristic phenomenon in the wave-like growth crucial events.

The Russian revolution is in the history of the world *first*, but it will undoubtedly not be the last - of the great revolution, in which the mass political strike played an unusually large role. It can even be argued that the events of the Russian revolution and the change in its political forms cannot be understood if we do not study the *statistics of strikes on the basis of* these events and this change of forms. (*Lenin, Report on the Revolution of 1905, Soch., Vol. XIX, p. 345-346, ed. 3rd.*)

## **Soviet Power—A New Type of State**

3) *Soviet power as a state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.* The victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat means the suppression of the bourgeoisie, the destruction of the bourgeois state machine, the replacement of bourgeois democracy with proletarian democracy. It is clear. But what are the organizations through which this colossal work can be done? That the old forms of organization of the proletariat, which grew up on the basis of bourgeois parliamentarism, are insufficient for such work—there can hardly be any doubt about this. What are the new forms of organization of the proletariat that can play the role of the gravedigger of the bourgeois state machine that can not only break this machine and not only replace bourgeois democracy with proletarian democracy, but also become the basis of proletarian state power?

This new form of organization of the proletariat is the councils.

What is the strength of advice compared to old forms of organization?

The fact is that the soviets are the most *comprehensive* mass organizations of the proletariat, for they, and only they, cover all workers without exception.

The fact that the soviets are the *only* mass organizations that embrace all the oppressed and exploited, workers and peasants, soldiers and sailors, and where the political leadership of the struggle

of the masses from the vanguard of the masses, from the proletariat, can be carried out in view of this most easily and most fully.

The fact that the Soviets are the *most powerful organs of the* revolutionary struggle of the masses, political actions of the masses, insurrection of the masses, organs capable of breaking the omnipotence of financial capital and its political appendages.

The fact is that the Soviets are the *direct* organizations of the masses themselves, that is, the *most democratic* and, therefore, the most authoritative organizations of the masses, making it as easy as possible for them to participate in the organization of the new state and to manage it and to maximally unleash the revolutionary energy, initiative, and creative abilities of the masses in struggle for the destruction of the old way, in the struggle for a new, proletarian way.

Soviet power is the unification and execution of local councils into one general state organization, into the state organization of the proletariat, as the vanguard of the oppressed and exploited masses and as the ruling class—the union of the Soviets in the republic.

The essence of Soviet power lies in the fact that the most massive and most revolutionary organizations of precisely the classes that were oppressed by the capitalists and landowners are now “the *permanent and only* foundation of all state power, the entire state apparatus”, which are “precisely those masses that are even in the most democratic bourgeois republics, “being equal under the law,” in fact, by thousands of tricks and tricks were excluded from participation in political life and from the use of democratic rights and freedoms, ... now to the *constant* and unfailing, moreover, *decisive* participation in the democratic administration of the state” (see. m. XXIV of, p. 13).

That is why the Soviet government is a *new form of* state organization, fundamentally different from the old, bourgeois-democratic *and* parliamentary form, a *new type of* state, adapted not to the tasks of exploitation and oppression of the working masses, but to the tasks of their complete liberation from all oppression and exploitation, to the tasks dictatorships of the proletariat. (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 33-35, ed. 9th.*)

## **The Interaction of Form and Content**

In the social production of their life, people enter into certain, necessary, independent of their will relations, production relations that

correspond to a certain stage of development of their material productive forces. The totality of these production relations forms the economic structure of society, the real basis on which the legal and political superstructure rises and to which certain forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of material life determines the process of social, political, and spiritual life in general. Not the consciousness of people determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society conflict with existing production relations, or—which is only the legal expression of this—with property relations within which they have so far developed. From the forms of development of productive forces, these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the era of social revolution. With a change in the economic basis, a coup takes place more or less quickly in the whole huge superstructure. When considering such coups, a distinction should always be made between a material coup in the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with natural scientific accuracy, and legal, political, religious, artistic and philosophical, in a word, ideological forms in which people are aware of this conflict and in which they are fighting. How an individual is not judged by what he thinks of himself, in the same way, one cannot judge such a revolutionary era by its consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness should be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between social productive forces and production relations. Not a single social formation dies before all the productive forces develop, for which it gives ample room, and new, higher production relations never appear before the material conditions of their existence ripen in the bosom of the oldest society. Therefore, mankind always sets itself only those tasks that it can solve, since upon closer examination it always turns out that the task itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution already exist or, at least, are in the process of becoming. In general terms, the Asian, antique, feudal and modern bourgeois methods of production can be described as progressive eras of the economic formation of society. Bourgeois production relations constitute the last antagonistic form of the social process of production, antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but antagonism, which grows out of the conditions of social life of individuals; but the productive forces developing in the bowels of bourgeois society at the same time create the material conditions necessary for the resolution of this

antagonism. This social formation therefore completes the prehistory (Vorgeschichte) of human society. (Bourgeois production relations constitute the last antagonistic form of the social process of production, antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but antagonism, which grows out of the conditions of social life of individuals; but the productive forces developing in the bowels of bourgeois society at the same time create the material conditions necessary for the resolution of this antagonism. This social formation therefore completes the prehistory (Vorgeschichte) of human society. (Bourgeois production relations constitute the last antagonistic form of the social process of production, antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but antagonism, which grows out of the conditions of social life of individuals; but the productive forces developing in the bowels of bourgeois society at the same time create the material conditions necessary for the resolution of this antagonism. This social formation therefore completes the prehistory (Vorgeschichte) of human society. (necessary to resolve this antagonism. This social formation therefore completes the prehistory (Vorgeschichte) of human society. (necessary to resolve this antagonism. This social formation therefore completes the prehistory (Vorgeschichte) of human society. (Marx, *Toward a Critique of Political Economy*, pp. 45–46, Partizdat, 1932)

## Causality

Cause and effect, ergo, only moments of worldwide interdependence, communication (universal), interconnection of events, only links in the chain of development of matter.

NB. The comprehensiveness and comprehensive nature of world communication is only one-sided, fragmentary and incompletely expressed causality.

Causality, which is usually understood by us, is only a small particle of global communication, but (materialistic addition) a particle of not subjective, but objectively real communication. (*The Lenin Collection IX*, pp. 161, 163, 1st ed.)

## Human Activities and the Law of Causality

For anyone who denies causality, every law of nature is a hypothesis, including the chemical analysis of stars, that is, the prismatic spectrum. What a flat mind among those who wish to limit themselves to this! (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 7, 3rd ed., 1932*)

*Causality.* The first thing that catches our eye when considering moving matter is the interconnection of individual movements, individual bodies with each other, their *conditionality* with each other. But we find not only that another movement follows a certain movement, we also find that we are able to reproduce a certain movement, creating the conditions under which it occurs in nature; we even find that we are able to cause movements that are not at all found in nature (industry)—at least, they are not found in this form—and that we can give this movement direction and dimensions determined in advance. *Thanks to this*, thanks to *human activity*, an idea of *causality is created*, the idea that one movement is the *cause of* another. True, one correct alternation of known natural phenomena can give rise to the idea of causality - heat and light received from the sun - but there is no real evidence, and in this sense, Hume was right with his scepticism when he said that a correctly repeated post hoc never cannot justify propter hoc. But human activity provides *evidence* causality. If, taking an incendiary mirror, we concentrate the sun's rays in focus and cause them to have such an effect as an ordinary fire gives, then we prove by this that heat is generated from the sun. If we put gunpowder, a capsule and a bullet into a gun and then shoot, counting on the effect known in advance from experience, then we should be able to trace in all its details the entire process of ignition, combustion, explosion from sudden conversion into gases, gas pressure on a bullet . And in this case, the septic has no right to assert that from the past experience it does not follow at all, as if the same thing will happen next time. Indeed, sometimes it happens that the same thing *does not* happen again, that the capsule or gunpowder refuses to serve, that the barrel of the gun ruptures, etc. But it *proves* this causality, but does not refute it, because with each such deviation from the rule, you can, by conducting an appropriate study, find the reason for this: chemical decomposition of the capsule, dampness, etc. of gunpowder, damage to the barrel, etc., so here, in fact, a *double* causality check

is performed. Until now, naturalists and philosophers have completely neglected the study of the influence of human activity on his thinking; they know, on the one hand, only nature, and, on the other, only thought. But the most essential and first basis of human thinking is precisely the *change in nature by man*, and not one nature, as such, and the human mind developed in proportion to how he learned to change nature. Therefore, a naturalistic understanding of history—how it occurs, for example, to one degree or another by Draper and other naturalists who hold the view that only nature acts on man and that natural conditions determine his historical development everywhere—is one-sided and forgets that man also acts on nature, changes it, creates new conditions of existence for himself. From the “nature” of Germany, as it was in the era of the resettlement of the Germans in it, damn little is left. The surface of the earth, climate, vegetation, fauna, even man himself have changed endlessly since then, and all this thanks to human activity, meanwhile, the changes <occurred> during this time in the nature of Germany without human assistance, are negligible. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, 14-15, 1932*)

## **On Causality and the Need for Nature**

The question of causality is especially important for determining the philosophical line of this or that newest “ism,” and we must therefore dwell on this issue in more detail.

Let’s start with the presentation of the materialist theory of knowledge on this point. The views of L. Feuerbach are stated by him especially clearly in the aforementioned objection of R. Gaim.

“Nature and the human mind,” says the author (Geim), “completely diverge from him (Feuerbach), and a whole abyss breaks out between them, inextricable from either side. Gaim bases this rebuke on §48 of my *Essence of Religion*, which states that “nature can be understood only through nature itself, that its necessity is not human or logical, metaphysical or mathematical, that nature alone is such a creature to which no human measure can be applied, although we compare its phenomena with similar human phenomena, apply human expressions and concepts to it to make it understandable to us, for example: order, purpose, law, are forced to apply to expressions in fact our language.” What does it mean? Do I mean by this: there is no

order in nature, so, for example, summer can follow autumn, winter spring, spring autumn? There is no purpose, so, for example, between the lungs and the air, between the light and the eye, between the sound and the ear there is no coherence? There is no order, so, for example, does the earth move in an ellipse, or in a circle, revolve around the sun every year or at a quarter of an hour? What nonsense! What did I want to say in this passage? Nothing more than to distinguish between that which belongs to nature and that which belongs to man, this passage does not say that words and ideas about the order, purpose, law do not correspond to anything real in nature, only the identity of thought is denied in it and being, it is denied that order, etc., exist in nature just as in the head or in a person's sense. Order, purpose, law are no more than words, *your* language to understand them; these words are not without meaning, not without objective content (nicht Sinn = dh gegenstandlose Worte); but nevertheless it is necessary to distinguish the original from the translation. Order, purpose, law express in the human sense something arbitrary.

“Theism *directly* concludes from the randomness of the order, expediency and regularity of nature to their arbitrary origin, to the being of a being different from nature and introducing order, expediency and regularity into nature, in itself (an sich) chaotic (dissolute), alien to all definiteness. The mind of theists... is a mind that is in conflict with nature, completely lacking in understanding the essence of nature. The mind of theists divides nature into two beings, one material, the other formal or spiritual” (“Werke, VII Band, 1803, S. 518-520).

So, Feuerbach recognizes an objective regularity in nature, an objective causality, reflected only approximately correctly by human ideas about order, law and so on. Feuerbach's recognition of the objective laws of nature is inextricably linked with the recognition of the objective reality of the external world, objects, bodies, things reflected by our consciousness. Feuerbach's views are consistently materialistic. And all sorts of other views, or rather, a different philosophical line on the question of causality, the denial of the objective laws of causality, the need for nature, Feuerbach rightly refers to the direction of fideism. For it is clear, in fact, that the subjectivist line in the question of causality, the derivation of the order and necessity of nature, is not from the external objective world, but from consciousness, from reason, from logic, etc. *part of the* mind, instead of being considered a piece of nature. The subjectivist line in the question of causality is philosophical idealism (the varieties of

which include the theories of causality and Hume and Kant), i.e., more or less weakened, liquefied fideism. The recognition of the objective laws of nature and the approximately true reflection of these laws in the head of man is materialism.

As for Engels, he did not have, if I am not mistaken, to specifically contrast his materialistic point of view with other directions on the question of causality. This was not necessary for him, since on the more fundamental question of the objective reality of the external world, he completely dissociated himself from all agnostics. But anyone who has carefully read his philosophical works, it should be clear to him that Engels did not allow even a shadow of doubt about the existence of objective law, causality, and the necessity of nature. We restrict ourselves to a few examples. In the first paragraph of *Anti-Dühring*, Engels says: "In order to cognize certain aspects" (or in particular the general picture of world phenomena), "We are compelled to tear them out of their natural (natürlich) or historical connection and to investigate each individually according to its properties, for its special reasons and consequences" (5-6). That this natural connection, the connection of natural phenomena exists objectively, it is obvious. Engels emphasizes a particularly dialectical view of cause and effect: "Cause and effect are the notions that matter, as such, only when applied to this particular case; but as soon as we consider this particular case in its general connection with the whole world, these ideas converge and intertwine in the idea of universal interaction, in which the causes and effects are constantly changing places; what is the cause here or now becomes a consequence there or then and vice versa" (8). Hence, the human concept of cause and effect always somewhat simplifies the objective connection of natural phenomena, only approximately reflecting it, artificially isolating one or another side of one single world process. If we find that the laws of thinking correspond to the laws of nature, then this becomes completely understandable, says Engels, if we take into account that thinking and consciousness are "products of the human brain and man is the product of nature." It is clear that "the products of the human brain, being themselves ultimately products of nature, do not contradict the rest of the natural connection (Naturzusammenhang), but correspond to it" (22). There is no doubt that there is a natural, objective connection between the phenomena of the world. Engels constantly speaks of the "laws of nature," of the "necessity of nature" (Naturnothwendigkeiten),

In Ludwig Feuerbach, we equally read that “the general laws of the movement of the external world and human thinking are essentially identical, and in terms of expression they are only different to the extent that the human head can use them consciously, while in nature it is still for the most part in human history—they make their way unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, among an endless series of seeming accidents” (38). And Engels accuses the old natural philosophy of replacing “still unknown to her real connections” (natural phenomena) with “ideal, fantastic” (42). The recognition of objective law, causality, and necessity in nature is quite clear in Engels, along with emphasizing the relative nature of our, that is, human, approximate reflections of this law in certain concepts.

Take Mach. In a special chapter on “causality and explanation” (“Wärmelehre”, 2 Auflage, 1900, S. 432–439) [Full title of this book: *Mach, E.*, Die Prinzipien der Wärmelehre, 2 Aufl., 1900 (*Max, E.*, Principles of the doctrine of heat, pp. 432–439, 2nd ed., 1900—*Ed.*)] We read: “Yumova’s criticism (concepts of causality) remains in force” (433). Kant and Hume differently solve the problem of causality (Mach does not take into account other philosophers!); Hume’s decision “we adjoin” (435).

“Apart from the *logical* (Mach italics), there is no other need, for example, physical,” (437). This is precisely the view with which Feuerbach so decisively fought. It does not occur to Makhu to deny his kinship with Hume. Only the Russian Machians could get to the point of asserting the “connectivity” of Humean agnosticism with the materialism of Marx and Engels. In Mach’s *Mechanics* we read: “There is neither cause nor effect in nature” (S. 474, 3 Auflage, 1897). “I have repeatedly stated that all forms of the law of causality stem from subjective aspirations (Trieben); for nature there is no need to conform to them” (495).

It should be noted here that our Russian Machists with astonishing naivety substitute the question of the materialistic or idealistic direction of all discussions about the law of causality with the question of one or another formulation of this law. They believed German empirio-critical professors that if we say “functional correlation”, this will constitute the discovery of the “latest positivism”, save from “fetishism” expressions, such as “necessity”, “law”, etc. Of course, these are pure trifles, and Wundt had every right to laugh at this *change of word* (S. 383 and 388, cited in *Phil. Studien*), which does not change the essence of the matter. Mach himself speaks of “all forms” of the law of causality and in “Cognition

and Delusion” (2nd ed., S. 278) makes a self-evident reservation that the concept of function can express more precisely “the dependence of elements” only when the opportunity is reached to express the results of the study in *measurable* quantities, and this is only partially achieved even in such sciences as chemistry. It must be, from the point of view of our Machists who are gullible to professors’ discoveries, Feuerbach (not to mention Engels) did not know that the concepts of order, regularity, etc., can be expressed under certain conditions by a mathematically defined functional relation!

A really important theoretical and cognitive question that separates philosophical directions does not lie in the degree to which our descriptions of causal relationships have reached accuracy and whether these descriptions can be expressed in an exact mathematical formula, but whether the objective regularity is the source of our knowledge of these relationships nature, or the properties of our mind, its inherent ability to know known a priori truths, etc. This is what irrevocably separates the materialists of Feuerbach, Marx and Engels from the agnostics (Humeans) Avenariu sa and maha.

In some places of his writings, Mach, whom it would be a sin to blame for consistency, often “forgets” his agreement with Hume and his subjectivist theory of causality, reasoning “simply” as a natural scientist, that is, from a spontaneously materialistic point of view. For example, in “Mechanics” we read: “Nature teaches us to find uniformity in its phenomena” (p. 182 French translation). If we *find* uniformity in natural phenomena, then does this uniformity exist objectively, outside our mind? No. On the same question of the uniformity of nature, Mach speaks such things: “The force pushing us to replenish in our thoughts the facts that are only half observed is the power of association. It is strengthened by repetition. It seems to us then to be a force independent of our will and of individual facts, directing and thoughts, *and* (Mach italics) facts holding them in line with each other, as the *law* of both. That we consider ourselves capable of making predictions with the help of such a law, this only proves (!) The sufficient uniformity of our environment, but it does not prove the *necessity of the* success of predictions” (“Wärmelehre”, S. 383).

It turns out that one can and should look for some kind of necessity *besides the* uniformity of the environment, that is, nature! Where to look, this is the secret of idealistic philosophy, which is afraid to recognize the cognitive ability of man as a simple reflection of nature. In his last work, “Cognition and Delusion,” Mach

even defines the law of nature as “limiting expectations” (2nd ed., S. 450 et seq.)! Solipsism takes its toll.

Let’s look at the position of other writers of the same philosophical direction. The Englishman Karl Pearson expresses himself with his characteristic certainty: “The laws of science are much more products of the human mind than the facts of the outside world” (“The Grammar of Science”, 2nd ed., P. 36). “And poets and materialists who speak of nature as a sovereign over man too often forget that the order and complexity of the phenomena that cause their admiration are at least as much a product of man’s cognitive abilities as his own memories and thoughts” (185). “The widespread nature of the law of nature owes its existence to the ingenuity of the human mind” (ib.) “*Man is the creator of the law of nature*”, Reads § 4 of the second chapter. There is much more meaning in the statement that nature gives laws to nature than in the reverse statement that nature gives laws to man,” though, “the venerable professor admits bitterly,” this last (materialistic) view, “unfortunately, is too widespread in our time” (p. 87). In chapter IV, devoted to the question of causality, §11 formulates Pearson’s thesis: “*Necessity belongs to the world of concepts, and not to the world of perceptions*”. For Pearson, it should be noted that perceptions or sensory impressions “are” the existing reality outside of us. “In the uniformity with which the well-known series of perceptions are repeated, there is no inner need for that routine of perceptions; but a prerequisite for the existence of thinking beings is the presence of a routine of perceptions. The need, therefore, lies in the nature of the thinking being, and not in the perceptions themselves; it is a product of cognitive ability” (p. 139).

Our Machist, with whom Mach himself repeatedly expresses full solidarity, has safely come to pure Kantian idealism in this way: man gives laws to nature, not nature to man! It is not a matter of repeating the doctrine of a priori after Kant—this does not determine the idealistic line in philosophy, but the special formulation of this line—but that mind, thinking, consciousness are primary here, nature is secondary. Not a mind is a piece of nature, one of its highest products, a reflection of its processes, but nature is a piece of mind, which itself stretches in this way from the ordinary, simple familiar human mind to the “excessive”, as I. Dietzgen said, mysterious, divine mind. The Kantian-Machist formula: “man gives laws to nature,” is the formula of fideism. If our Machians make big eyes when reading from Engels that the main distinguishing feature of materialism is the adoption of nature as primary, and not spirit, then this only shows to what extent

they are unable to distinguish between really important philosophical directions from the professorial game of scholarship and the sophisticated catchwords. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII , p. 126 - 128, 130-132, ed. 3rd* )

## **Randomness and Necessity**

*Accident and necessity.* The other opposite, which captures metaphysics, is the opposite between chance and necessity. Is there anything more conflicting than both of these logical categories? How is it possible that both of them are identical, that random is necessary, and necessary is just as random? The usual common sense, and with it the majority of natural scientists, considers necessity and chance as categories that are absolutely mutually exclusive. Some thing, some relationship, some process is either random or necessary, but it cannot be both [*In the manuscript here, a new paragraph began initially with a red line: <The case is unlikely to change if we take the point of view of that determinism that has moved to this view of nature from French materialism and which eliminates chance by denying it. According to this interpretation> In a slightly modified form, this proposal is again repeated below.*]. Thus, both exist side by side in nature: the latter consists of all kinds of objects and processes, of which some are random, others are necessary, and only one thing is important - do not mix them together. So, for example, they take the main species characteristics as necessary, considering the remaining differences among individuals of the same species random; and this applies to crystals, as well as to plants and animals. At the same time [Further to the words: “What we don’t know”, attributed by Engels on the back of the sheet.], In turn, the lower group is considered as random compared to the higher: for example, how many different genus species are considered random felis, or agnus, or how many genera and orders are there in any class, or how many individuals exist in each of these species, or how many different species of animals are in a certain area, or what is the general fauna, flora. And then the necessary is declared the only worthy of scientific interest, and the random—indifferent to science. This means the following: what can be summed up under the laws, which therefore *they know*, it’s interesting, but that which cannot be brought under the laws, which, therefore, do not know, is indifferent, so it can be neglected. But with this point of view, all

science ceases, because its task is to investigate what we *don't* know. This means the following: what can be brought under universal laws is considered necessary, and what cannot be brought is considered random. It is easy to see that this is such a kind of science that gives off as natural what it can explain, reducing the incomprehensible to it to supernatural reasons. Moreover, the essence of the matter is completely indifferent whether I call the cause of the incomprehensible phenomena case or God. Both of these names are only an expression of my ignorance and therefore do not relate to the conduct of science. Science ceases to exist where the necessary connection loses its strength.

The opposite position is taken by determinism, which has passed into natural science from French materialism and hopes to end the chance that it generally denies it. According to this view, only simple, immediate necessity dominates in nature. That there are five peas in this pod, not four or six, that this dog's tail is five inches long and not longer or shorter than one line, that this clover flower was fertilized by a bee this year, and that one wasn't, and this a certain bee, and at this particular time, that this certain, wind-blown dandelion seed sprouted, and the other didn't, that last night I was bitten by a flea at 4 a.m., not at 3 or 5, and, moreover, on my right shoulder, and not in the left caviar,—all these facts, caused by the constant linking of causes and effects, are unshakable... and a gas balloon, from which the solar system arose, was so arranged that these events could happen only this way and not otherwise. With the necessity of this kind, we still do not go beyond the boundaries of the theological view of nature. For science, it makes no difference whether we call it, together with Augustine and Calvin, the eternal decision of God, or, together with the Turks, Kismet, or we call it necessity. In none of these cases can we talk about the study of the causal chain, in none of these cases we are not moving. The so-called necessity remains a simple phrase, and thanks to this, chance remains what it was. Until we can show what the number of peas in the pod depends on, it remains random; but because they will tell us that this fact is already foreseen in the primary structure of the solar system, we do not move one step further. Not only that, the science that would undertake to trace this case with a separate pod in its causal cohesion would no longer be a science, but simply a game, for this very pod also has countless other individual—seeming to us random—properties: color shade, density and the husk hardness, the size of the peas, not to mention the individual features available only to the microscope. Thus, with this

pod alone, we would have to trace more causal connections than all the nerds in the world are able to solve. not to mention the individual features available only to the microscope. Thus, with this pod alone, we would have to trace more causal connections than all the nerds in the world are able to solve. not to mention the individual features available only to the microscope. Thus, with this pod alone, we would have to trace more causal connections than all the nerds in the world are able to solve.

Thus, randomness is not explained here out of necessity; rather, on the contrary, necessity is reduced to something purely random. If the fact that a certain pod contains six peas, and not five or seven, is a phenomenon of the same order as the law of motion of the solar system or the law of energy conversion, then it means that it is not accident that rises to the level of necessity, but necessity is degraded to the level of randomness. Not only that, it can be arbitrarily claimed that the diversity of organic and inorganic species and individuals located in a certain area side by side rests on an unbreakable need, but for individual species and individuals it remains what it was, i.e., random. For an individual animal, it's accidental where it was born, what environment it finds around itself, which enemies and exactly how many enemies threaten him. For the mother plant, by chance where the wind will take its seed, for the daughter plant - where this seed will find the soil, where it will grow from, and the assurance that here too everything rests on an indestructible necessity is a very miserable consolation. The chaotic combination of objects of nature in any particular area or even on the whole earth remains, with all its eternal, primary determination of it, as it was, random.

In contrast to both of *these* views, Hegel comes forward with previously unprecedented claims that the random has a foundation, for it is random, but likewise has no foundation, because it is random; that randomness is necessary, that necessity itself defines itself as randomness, and that, on the other hand, this randomness is rather an absolute necessity (Logik, Book II, Department: Reality). Natural science preferred to ignore these propositions as a paradoxical play on words, as contradicting nonsense itself, theoretically basking in the hollowness of Wolf's metaphysics, according to which something is *either* accidental *or* it is necessary, but in no case neither one nor the other at the same time, or in an equally empty mechanical determinism, which verbally denies randomness in general, in order to recognize it in practice in each individual case.

While natural science continued to think so, what *did* it do in the person of Darwin?

Darwin, in his compilation of an era, proceeds from an extremely broad, factual basis resting on chance. It is the inconspicuous random differences of individuals within individual species, the differences that can intensify before the nature of the species changes, the closest even reasons for which can be indicated only in the rarest cases, it is they that make him doubt the previous basis of any regularity in biology, doubt the concept of species, in his former metaphysical immutability and constancy. But without the concept of species, all science lost its meaning. All of its branches needed a concept of species: what would human anatomy, anthropology, geology, palaeontology, botany, etc. be without a concept of species? All the results of these sciences were not only controversial, but were simply destroyed. Randomness destroys necessity, as it was understood until now. The old idea of necessity refuses to serve. (Accidental material accumulated during this time eliminated and destroyed the old idea of necessity [This phrase, put in brackets and in the original, stands in the margins without a clear indication of where the text refers to.]) To keep it means to impose an arbitrary logical construction contradicting itself and reality, as a law, means to deny any internal need for living nature, and generally to declare the chaotic kingdom of chance the only law of living nature. Really the law and the prophets have lost all their authority!—Biologists of all schools shouted quite consistently... (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 107 - 110, 1932*)

## **Accident is an Addition and a Form of Manifestation of Necessity**

... People make their own history, but still not consciously, not guiding it with a common will, according to a single common plan. This was not even within the framework of a specific, delimited given society (not to mention all of humanity). Their aspirations intersect, and in all such societies, therefore, dominates *need*, the complement and form of manifestation of which is *chance*. The need, breaking through all chance here, is again exclusively economic. Here we come to the question of the so-called great people. The fact that this particular great person appears in this country at a certain time, of course, is a pure coincidence. If we cross out this person, then there is

a demand for replacing him with someone and such a deputy is located - good or bad, but over time is. That Napoleon was just this Corsican, that he was the military dictator who became necessary for the French republic, exhausted by the war—it was an accident. But if Napoleon was not there, then another would have played his role. This is undoubtedly because whenever such a person was required, he was: Caesar, Augustus, Cromwell, etc. *should* have been open.

The situation is exactly the same with all accidents or with everything seeming accidental in history. The further we move away from the economic area that we are exploring, the more it approaches a purely abstract ideological one, the more we will find that in its development it reveals more randomness, the more zigzag its curve is. If we draw the middle axis of the curve, we will find that the longer the study period, the larger the study area, the closer this axis is to the axis of economic development, the more parallel it goes. (*Marx and Engels, Letters, pp. 407-408, Engels—G. Starkenberg, January 25, 1894, Partizdat, 1932*)

## **Dialectical Understanding of Interaction**

According to the materialistic understanding of history in the historical process, the decisive moment in the *final analysis* is the production and reproduction of real life. Neither I nor Marx claimed more. If someone distorts this position in the sense that it is as if the economic moment is the *only* defining moment, then this statement turns into an unspoken, abstract, meaningless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the course of the historical struggle is influenced and in many cases it determines mainly the *form* its various moments of the superstructure: the political forms of the class struggle and its results—constitutions established by the victorious class after a victory, etc. legal forms, and even the reflection of all these real battles in the brains of participants, political, legal, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into a system of dogmas. Here there is an interaction of all these points, in which in the end the economic movement, as necessary, makes its way through an endless crowd of accidents (that is, things and events whose internal interconnection is so distant or so difficult to determine that we can forget about her, assume that she does not exist). Otherwise,

applying the theory to any historical period would be easier than solving the simplest equation of the first degree.

We make our own history, but, firstly, we do it under very specific conditions and conditions. Among them, economic ones are ultimately decisive. But political conditions, etc., even traditions that live in people's heads, play a certain role, although not decisive. The Prussian state arose and developed due to historical and, ultimately, economic reasons. But it is hardly possible, without becoming a pedant, to say that among the many small states of Northern Germany it was Brandenburg that was intended for the role of a great power, which embodied economic differences, differences in language, and since the reformation, religious differences between north and south, moreover this was predetermined precisely by economic necessity, and other aspects also did not influence (mainly the fact that Brandenburg, thanks to the possession of Prussia, was drawn into Polish affairs and through this into international political relations, which were also decisive in the formation of the power of the Austrian house). It is hardly possible for anyone, without having become ridiculous, to explain economically the existence of every small German state in the past and at present or explain the economic origin of the Upper German vowel changes, which divides Germany (with respect to the dialect) into two halves, which is further strengthened geographically by a mountain chain from the Sudetenland to Taunus.

Secondly, the story is made in such a way that the end result is obtained from collisions of many separate wills, each of these wills becoming what it is, again thanks to a host of special life circumstances. Thus, there is an infinite number of crossing forces, an endless group of parallelograms of forces, and one common result comes out of this crossing - a historical event. This historical result can be considered as a product of one force acting as a whole, *unconsciously* and involuntarily. After all, what one wants is met by an obstacle from the side of every other, and in the end, something appears that no one wanted. Thus, history, as it has been going on so far, proceeds like a natural-historical process and is essentially subordinated to the same laws of motion. But from the fact that the wills of individual people, who each want what they are attracted to by the structure of their bodies and external, ultimately economic circumstances (or their own personal, or in general society), that these wills do not achieve what they want, but merge into something common, into one common result—one should not conclude from this that these wills are equal to zero. On the contrary,

each will contribute its share to the overall result, and to the extent included in it.

Further, I ask you to study this theory from original sources, and not from second-hand sources - it is much easier. Marx wrote almost nothing in which this theory does not play a role. An especially magnificent example of its application is the “*8 Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*”, just as many directions in the “*Capital*”. Then I can, of course, point out my writings: “*A Coup in Science by Mr. Dühring*” and “*Ludwig Feuerbach and the Completion of Classical German Philosophy*”, in which I gave the most detailed, as far as I know, of all the existing expositions of historical materialism.

Marx and I were partly to blame for the fact that the young [Marxists] sometimes attached more importance to the economic side than it should. We had, objecting to our opponents, to emphasize the main principle, which they denied, and there was not always enough time, place and reason to give credit to the other moments involved in the interaction. But as soon as it came to portraying a historical period, that is, to practical application, the matter changed, and there could no longer be any mistake. Unfortunately, it is often believed that the new theory was completely understood and can be applied immediately as soon as the basic principles are mastered, and this is far from always correct. In this I can reproach many of the latest “Marxists”, and thanks to this, sometimes there was an amazing confusion. (*Marx and Engels, Letters, pp. 374-377, Engels-Joseph Bloch, September 21, 1890, Partizdat, 1932*)

## **Accident in Public Life**

The history of the development of society in one paragraph differs significantly from the history of the development of nature. Namely: in nature (since we leave aside the reverse effect of man on it) only blind unconscious forces act on one another, and general laws are manifested in the interaction of these forces. There is nowhere a conscious, desired goal: neither in the innumerable seeming accidents visible on the surface, nor in the final results showing that among all these accidents the phenomena occur in accordance with general laws. On the contrary, in the history of society, there are people gifted with consciousness, acting deliberately or out of passion, setting themselves specific goals. Nothing is done here without

conscious intention, without the desired goal. But no matter how important this difference is for historical research,—especially of individual eras and events, —it does not in the least alter the fact that the course of history is determined by internal general laws. In fact, on the surface of phenomena and in this area, in spite of the conscious and desired goals of all individual people, randomness reigns, by and large, apparently. The desired thing is accomplished only in rare cases; for the most part, the goals that people set for themselves come into mutual clashes and contradictions or turn out to be unattainable part by its very essence, part by lack of funds. The clashes of countless individual aspirations and individual actions in the field of history lead to a state completely similar to that which prevails in an unconscious nature. Actions have a known desired purpose; but the results actually arising from these actions are not at all desirable. And if they, apparently, correspond to the desired goal, then, in the end, they carry with them far from what was desired. Thus, it seems that in general, chance equally dominates in the historical field. But where a game of randomness takes place on the surface, this very randomness always appears to be subject to internal, hidden laws. The thing is to discover these laws. (*Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, pp. 44-45, 1932*)

## **The General Course of Development and Chance**

Creating world history would, of course, be very convenient if the struggle was undertaken only under the condition of infallibly favourable chances. On the other hand, the story would have a very mystical character if the “coincidences” did not play any role. These accidents, of course, are themselves part of the general course of development, balanced by other accidents. But acceleration and deceleration to a large extent depend on these “accidents”, among which is also included such a “case” as the character of the people who are at the beginning of the movement. (*Marx and Engels, Letters, pp. 290-291, Marx-Kugelmann, April 17, 1871, Partizdat, 1932*)

\* \* \*

We know, finally, that necessity is composed entirely of pure coincidences, and these imaginary accidents represent the form behind

which necessity is hidden, etc. (*Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 42, 1932*)

## **Mechanisms Denying the Objective Nature of Chance**

*If under the intersecting action of two or more causal chains (rows) we know only one, then the phenomenon that results from this crossing appears to us to be random, although in fact it is quite natural. I know one chain (one row) of reasons—those that appear in my journey through the streets; I don't know another purpose (another series) of reasons that move my friend. Therefore, I do not foresee the crossing of two causal series. Therefore, this crossing (meeting) seems to me to be a "random" phenomenon. Thus, strictly speaking, there are no random, i.e., *unreasonable*, phenomena. Phenomena may seem to us to be "random," since we don't know their reasons enough...*

If, as a matter of fact, everything happens naturally, and random, in the sense of causeless, does not happen *at all*, then it is clear that there is no historical accident. Every historical event, no matter how accidental it may seem, is in fact completely and entirely determined: usually here, too, historical accident means the phenomenon that happened due to the intersection of several causal series, of which only one is known.

Sometimes, however, by historical chance they mean something else. When, for example, they say that the imperialist war *necessarily* arose from the development of world capitalism, but that, say, the assassination of the Austrian Archduke was an *accidental* occurrence, here we are talking about something else. What exactly? It is easy to see what is the matter here. When one speaks of the necessity (causal necessity, *inevitability*) of an imperialist war, then this inevitability is seen in the enormous importance of the available causes in the development of society — the causes that cause war. Moreover, the war itself, in turn, is also an event of tremendous importance, i.e., such an event that has a *decisive* influence on the future fate of society. Thus, here the word "historical accident" is understood as a circumstance that does not play an important role in the chain of social events: if it had not existed, the picture of further development would have changed so little that no one would have noticed it. In this example: the war would have been

without the murder of the Archduke, for it was not at all the “essence of the matter”, but in the intensified competition of the imperialist powers, which became sharper every day with the development of capitalist society.

Is it possible to say that such a “random” phenomenon does not play *any* role in public life, that it *does* not affect the fate of society, that it, in other words, is equal to zero? If we want to give an accurate answer, we must answer in the negative. For *every* event, no matter how “insignificant” it is, actually affects all subsequent development.

The question is how major changes in this development it is making. Since we are talking about random phenomena in the above sense, to the extent that this influence is practically unimportant, imperceptible, and infinitely small. It can be extremely small, but it is never zero. This immediately becomes noticeable if we take the *combined*, joint action of such “accidents.” We give an example. Suppose we are talking about pricing. The market price is formed from the collision of a mass of estimates from buyers and sellers. If we take *one* case, *one* assessment, the collision of one buyer with one seller, then this phenomenon can be called “random”. The merchant Sidorov beat the old woman Petrova. This is in terms of *market price, i.e., a social* phenomenon resulting from *many* collisions between different estimates, is an accident. “Does it really matter what happened in Sidorov’s particular case? The final result, the social phenomenon, what is *typical* character. “So often they say, and they say quite rightly. For a separate case plays an imperceptible role. He is not important. But try you to group, to connect a large number of such “cases”. And immediately you will see that “chance” begins to disappear. The role and significance of many cases, their combined effect immediately affects further development. For isolated cases are not zeros at all. Zero, no matter how much you multiply, will still not be greater than zero. You won’t do anything out of the dummy, no matter what manipulations we make with this dummy.

Thus, we see that, strictly speaking, there are no accidental phenomena in the historical development of society: that Kautsky did not sleep on such and such a night when he dreamed of the horrors of the Bolshevik revolution; and the fact that the Austrian Archduke was killed shortly before the war; and the fact that England pursued a colonial policy; and the fact that a world war arose,—in a word, all events, starting with the most meagre and inconspicuous and ending with the stunning events of our time, - all these events *are not equally random*, equally causally determined, that is, equally causally

necessary.” (N. Bukharin, *Theory of Historical Materialism*, pp. 41-44, Guise, 1929)

## Freedom and Necessity

You can not talk about law and morality without touching the issue of so-called free will, the sanity of a person, the relationship between necessity and freedom. The philosophy of reality also provides an answer to this question, and not even one, but two.

“In place of all the false theories of freedom, it is necessary to put the empirical property of that attitude, according to which rational understanding, on the one hand, and instinctual impulses, on the other, are, *as it were*, combined into one medium power. The main facts of this kind of dynamics must be borrowed from observation and applied, in qualitative and quantitative terms, to the anticipation of an event that has not yet occurred, *since it succeeds*. Thanks to this, not only all the stupid fantasies of inner freedom that have been fed by whole millennia are radically destroyed, but they themselves are also replaced by something positive, which is suitable for the practical organization of life. “According to this, freedom consists in the fact that a rational understanding pulls a person to the right, irrational motives—to the left, and with this parallelogram of forces, the actual movement occurs in the diagonal direction. Therefore, freedom is the resultant between understanding and instinct, between reason and unreasonableness, and its degree in each individual person can be established according to experience using the “personality equation”, using an astronomical expression. But after a few pages we read: “We base moral responsibility on the concept of freedom, which, however, means for us only susceptibility to conscious motives, in accordance with the natural and acquired reason. All such motives act, despite the perception of a possible contradiction in actions, with an inevitable, natural pattern; but when we bring moral leverage into action, we rely on precisely this fatal compulsion.”

This second definition of freedom, which sharply contradicts the first, is nothing but the extreme vulgarization of the Hegelian point of view. Hegel first correctly understood the relationship between freedom and necessity. For him, freedom is an understanding of necessity. “Necessity is *blind* only *insofar as it is not understood*”. Freedom does not lie in imaginary independence from

the laws of nature, but in the knowledge of these laws and in the possibility, therefore, to systematically use them for certain purposes. This is true both of the laws of external nature, and of those that regulate the physical and spiritual life of man himself—of the two classes of laws that we can separate from each other only in the idea, but not in reality. Therefore, free will means nothing more than the ability to make decisions with knowledge of the matter. Therefore, the *freer* the judgment of a person in relation to a known problem, the greater the *need* the content of this judgment will be determined; but, on the contrary, the insecurity arising from ignorance, which supposedly chooses arbitrarily between many different and opposing decisions, thereby proves its lack of freedom, its subordination to the object of reality, which it should just subordinate to itself. Consequently, freedom consists in domination over oneself and over external nature, based on the knowledge of natural necessity; therefore, it is a necessary product of historical development. The first people to stand out from the animal kingdom were as unfree in everything essential as the animals themselves; but every step forward on the path of culture was a step towards freedom. On the threshold of human history is the discovery of the transformation of mechanical motion into heat: the production of fire by friction; at the end of this development is the discovery of the conversion of heat into mechanical motion: a steam engine. And despite the colossal liberation revolution being carried out by the steam engine in public life—which is not yet half complete—there is no doubt that the production of fire by friction surpasses it in its significance that liberates humanity. After all, for the first time it gave man dominion over a certain force of nature and, thanks to this, finally cut him off from the animal kingdom. The steam engine will never cause such a powerful shift in the development of mankind, although it seems to us to be the representative of all those productive forces associated with it, with the help of which it is only possible to create a new society, where there will be no class differences, no worries about individual livelihoods, and where for the first time we can talk about real human freedom, about existence in harmony with the known laws of nature. But how young the whole history of mankind is, how ridiculous it would be to wish to assign some absolute meaning to our present views, it can be seen from the simple fact that the whole history that has passed can be regarded as the history of a period of time from the practical discovery of the transformation of mechanical

motion into heat to the discovery of transformation heat into mechanical motion.

Herr Dühring, of course, takes a different view of history. In general, as a story of delusions, ignorance and rudeness, violence and enslavement—it is an object contrary to the philosophy of reality. (*Engels, Anti-Dühring, pp. 80-81, 1932*)

## Freedom is a Known Necessity

On pages 140 - 141 of the Essays, A. Lunacharsky cites Engels' arguments in *Anti-Dühring* on this issue and completely joins Engels' "striking in terms of distinctness and accuracy" on the corresponding "wondrous page" [Lunacharsky says: "...wondrous page of "religious economy". I'll say so, risking the smile of a "non-religious" reader. "Whatever your good intentions, comrade Lunacharsky, your flirting with religion does not cause a smile, but a disgust.] Of this work.

There are really a lot of marvellous here. And all the more "marvellous" that neither A. Lunacharsky, nor a bunch of other Machians who want to be Marxists, "did not notice" the epistemological significance of Engels's reasoning about freedom and necessity. Read, read and rewrite rewrote, but why didn't understand.

Engels says: "Hegel was the first to correctly present the correlation of freedom and necessity. For him, freedom is the knowledge of necessity. "Blind is a necessity only because it is not understood." Freedom does not lie in imaginary independence from the laws of nature, but in the knowledge of these laws and in the ability based on this knowledge to systematically force the laws of nature to act for specific purposes. This applies both to laws of an external nature, and to the laws governing the bodily and spiritual being of man himself — the two classes of laws that we can separate at most from each other in our view are by no means in reality. Free will, therefore, means nothing more than the ability to make decisions with knowledge of the matter. Thus, the *freer* a person's judgment in relation to a particular issue, the content of this judgment will be determined all the more *necessary* ... Freedom consists in the domination of ourselves and external nature based on the knowledge of nature (Naturnothwendigkeiten)... "(p. 112-113 5 German ed.)

Let us examine on which epistemological premises all this reasoning is based.

First, Engels recognizes from the very beginning of his reasoning the laws of nature, the laws of external nature, the necessity of nature—that is, everything that Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and Co. <sup>Fr.</sup> declare as “metaphysics”. If Lunacharsky wanted to think carefully about Engels’ “wondrous” reasoning, then he could not help but see the main difference between the materialistic theory of knowledge and agnosticism and idealism, denying the laws of nature or declaring it only “logical,” etc., etc.

Secondly, Engels does not engage in the extortion of “definitions” of freedom and necessity, those scholastic definitions that are most occupied by reactionary professors (like Avenarius) and their students (like Bogdanov). Engels takes knowledge and the will of man - on the one hand, the necessity of nature—on the other, and instead of any definition, any definition, he simply says that the need for nature is primary, and the will and consciousness of man is secondary. The latter must, inevitably and necessarily, must adapt to the former; Engels considers this to such an extent self-evident that he does not lose superfluous words to explain his view. Only Russian Machists could *complain about Engels’* general definition of materialism (nature is primary, consciousness is secondary: remember Bogdanov’s “bewilderment” about this!) and at the same time find “marvelous” and “strikingly accurate” *one of Engels’ s particular applications of this general and basic definition!*

Thirdly, Engels does not doubt the existence of “blind necessity.” He acknowledges the existence of a need *not known to man*. This is clearer than clear from the passage quoted. And yet, from the point of view of the Machists, how can a person *know* about the existence of that which he *does not know* ? Know the existence of an unknown need? Is it not “mysticism”, not “metaphysics”, not recognition of “fetishes” and “idols”, not “Kantian unknowable thing in itself”? If the Machists thought about it, they could not have missed the *complete identity* Engels’ reasoning about the cognizability of the objective nature of things and the transformation of the “thing in itself” into a “thing for us,” on the one hand, and his reasoning about blind, unknown necessity, on the other. The development of consciousness in each individual human individual and the development of collective knowledge of all mankind at every step shows us the transformation of an unknown “thing in itself” into a known “thing for us”, the transformation of a blind, unknown knowledge, “necessity in ourselves”, into a known “necessity for us”. There is absolutely no gnoseological difference between this and

that transformation, for the main point of view here and there is one, namely: materialistic, recognition of the objective reality of the external world and the laws of the external nature, moreover, this world and these laws are completely recognizable to man, but they can never be known to them *to the end* . We do not know the necessity of nature for weather phenomena and insofar as we are inevitably weather slaves. But, *not knowing this necessity, we know* that it exists. Where does this knowledge come from? From where the knowledge comes from, that things exist outside of our consciousness and independently of it, namely: from the development of our knowledge, which shows each person millions of times that ignorance is replaced by knowledge when an object acts on our senses, and vice versa: knowledge turns into ignorance when the possibility of such an action is eliminated.

Fourth, in the above discussion, Engels explicitly applies the “saltovital” method in philosophy, that is, takes a *leap* from theory to practice. None of those scholars (and stupid) professors of philosophy that our Machists follow are ever able to jump like that, shameful for the representative of “pure science”. They have one thing to do with the theory of knowledge, in which it is necessary to concoct “definitions” verbally somehow, and practice is a completely different thing. At Engels, all living human practice breaks into the theory of knowledge itself, giving an *objective* criterion of truth: as long as we do not know the law of nature, he, existing and acting in addition to, outside of our knowledge, makes us slaves of “blind necessity”. Since we learned this law, acting (as Marx repeated thousands of times) *independently* from our will and from our consciousness, we are the masters of nature. The dominance over nature, manifesting itself in the practice of mankind, is the result of an objectively correct reflection in the human head of the phenomena and processes of nature, there is evidence that this reflection (within the limits of what practice shows us) is objective, absolute, eternal truth.

What do we get in the end? Every step in Engels’s discussion, almost literally every phrase, every statement is built entirely and exclusively on the epistemology of dialectical materialism, on premises that hit the whole Machist nonsense about bodies, as complexes of sensations, about “elements”, about “the coincidence of the sensory representation with the outside us with the existing reality “, etc., etc. Not a bit embarrassed by this, the Machists abandon materialism, repeat (à la Berman) the worn-out vulgarities about dialectics and immediately accept one with open arms *one* from the

applications of dialectical materialism! They drew their philosophy from an eclectic beggarly soup and they continue to treat the reader to the same. They take a piece of agnosticism and a little idealism from Mach, combining this with a piece of Marx's dialectical materialism, and babble that this okroshka is a *development of* Marxism. They think that if Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and all their other authorities do not have the slightest idea about resolving the issue (about freedom and necessity) by Hegel and Marx, then this is a pure coincidence: well, simply, they did not read such and such a page in such a little book, and it's not at all the point that these "authorities" were and remain round ignoramuses about the *actual* progress of philosophy in the 19th century, were and remain philosophical obscurantists.

Here is the reasoning of one such obscurantist, the most ordinary professor of philosophy at the University of Vienna, Ernst Mach:

"The correctness of the position of "*determinism*" or "*indeterminism*" cannot be proved. Only a complete or proven impossible science could solve this issue. We are talking about such premises that we introduce (man heranbringt) into the consideration of things, depending on whether we attribute to the previous successes or failures of research more or less significant subjective weight (subjectives Gewicht). But during the study, every thinker is necessarily a theoretical determinist" (Cognition and Delusion, pp. 282-283, 2nd German ed.).

Is it not obscurantism when a pure theory is carefully fenced off from practice? When determinism is limited to the field of "research", and in the field of morality, social activity, in all other areas except "research", is the question given to a "subjective" assessment? "In my office," says the learned pedant, "I am a determinist, and there is no question of a philosopher taking care of an integral, embracing both theory and practice, world outlook based on determinism. Mach says vulgarity because theoretically the question of the relationship between freedom and necessity is completely unclear to him. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, p. 154-157, ed. 3rd.*)

## **The Role of Personality in History**

It is not without interest that Mr. Mikhailovsky's subsequent discussion of historical necessity is necessary, since it reveals to us at least partially the real ideological baggage of "our famous sociologist" (the title that Mr. Mikhailovsky uses along with V. V. among the liberal representatives of our "cultural society") He speaks of a "conflict between the idea of historical necessity and the meaning of personal activity": public figures are mistaken in believing themselves to be figures, while they are "deeds", "puppets twitching from the mysterious underground by the immanent laws of historical necessity"—this conclusion should be said, from this idea, which is therefore called "barren" and "blurry." Perhaps not every reader understands where he got all this nonsense - puppets, etc. - Mr. Mikhailovsky. The fact, that this is one of the favourite skates of the subjective philosopher—the idea of a conflict between determinism and morality, between historical necessity and the meaning of the individual. He wrote a pile of paper about this and uttered an abyss of sentimental philistine nonsense to resolve this conflict in favour of morality and the role of the individual. In fact, there is no conflict here; it was concocted by Mr. Mikhailovsky, who feared (and not without reason) that determinism would rob the soil of his beloved philistine morality. The idea of determinism, establishing the need for human actions, rejecting the absurd rumour about free will, does not in the least destroy either the mind, or the conscience of a person, or the assessment of his actions. Quite the contrary, it is only with a deterministic view that a rigorous and correct assessment is possible, and not dumping anything on free will. Likewise, the idea of historical necessity does not undermine the role of the individual in history: the whole story is made up of the actions of personalities, which are undoubtedly personalities. The real question that arises in assessing the social activities of an individual is under what conditions are these activities successful? What are the guarantees that this activity will not remain a single act, drowning in a sea of acts of opposite? This is also the question that the Social Democrats and the rest of the Russian socialists decide differently: how should activities aimed at the implementation of the socialist system draw the masses in order to bear serious fruit? Obviously, the resolution of this issue directly and directly depends on the ideas about the grouping of social forces in Russia, about the struggle of classes, from which Russian reality is composed—and again, Mr. Mikhailovsky only went around and around the question, not even making an attempt to put it exactly and try to give one or another solution. The social-democratic solution to

the question is based, as is well known, on the view that the Russian economic order is represented by bourgeois society, from which there can be only one way out, which necessarily follows from the very essence of the bourgeois system, namely the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. Obviously, serious criticism should be directed either against the view that our orders are bourgeois, or against the idea of the essence of these orders and the laws of their development, but Mr. Mikhailovsky does not even think about raising serious issues. He prefers to get off with meaningless phrases about that necessity is too general a bracket, etc. Why, any idea will be too general a bracket, Mr. Mikhailovsky, if you, like a sun-dried roach, first throw all the contents out of it, and then start messing around with the remaining husk! This area of husk, covering really serious, burning issues of our time, is the favourite area of Mr. Mikhailovsky, and he, for example, emphasizes with particular pride that “economic materialism ignores or incorrectly illuminates the question of heroes and the crowd.” Would you please see—the question of what kind of classes and on what basis the modern Russian reality is composed is probably too general for Mr. Mikhailovsky, and he circumvents it. But the question of what kind of relations exist between the heroes and the crowd does not matter whether it is a crowd of workers, peasants, manufacturers, landowners—such a question he is extremely interested in. Maybe these are “interesting” questions, but reproaching the materialists for directing all efforts to solving such issues that are directly related to the liberation of the working class means to be a lover of philistine science, and nothing more. (*Lenin, What are “Friends of the People” and How They Fight Against Social Democrats, Soch., Vol. I, pp. 78–80, ed. 3rd*)

## **From the Kingdom of Necessity to the Kingdom of Freedom**

With the transfer of the means of production into public ownership, commodity production is eliminated, and at the same time, the dominance of products over producers. The anarchy of social production is replaced by its organization according to a pre-planned plan. The individual struggle for existence ceases. Thus, a person finally in a certain sense stands out from the animal kingdom and from

animal conditions of existence passes into truly human conditions. The living conditions that surround people and still have dominated them fall under the power and control of people who for the first time become real and conscious masters of nature as they become masters of their own social relations. The laws of their own social actions, opposed to people so far as alien, the laws of nature that dominate them are quite consciously applied by them and, therefore, submit to their dominance. The social system, which until now is to people as if bestowed by nature and history from above, will then be their own, free business. The objective, external forces that dominated history will come under human control. And only then will people begin to consciously create their own history, only then will the social causes that they set in motion have the desired and increasing degree of desired action. And this will be the leap of humanity from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. ( free business. The objective, external forces that dominated history will come under human control. And only then will people begin to consciously create their own history, only then will the social causes that they set in motion have the desired and increasing degree of desired action. And this will be the leap of humanity from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. (*Engels, The Development of Socialism from Utopia to Science, p. 63, 1932*)

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The realm of freedom begins in reality only where work, dictated by need and external expediency, ceases, therefore, by the nature of things, it lies on the other side of material production itself. Like a savage, in order to satisfy his needs, in order to preserve and reproduce his life, he must fight with nature, so must a civilized one, and he must do this in all social forms and with all possible methods of production. With his development, this kingdom of natural necessity expands, because his needs expand; but at the same time, productive forces are expanding, which serve to satisfy them. Freedom in this area can only consist in the fact that a socialized person, associated producers rationally regulate their metabolism with nature, place it under their general control, instead of, on the contrary, dominating them like a blind force; in that they commit it with the least expenditure of force and under conditions most worthy and adequate to their human nature. Nevertheless, it still remains a kingdom of necessity. On the other side of it begins the development

of human power, which is an end in itself, the true kingdom of freedom, which, however, can flourish only on this kingdom of necessity, as on its basis. Shortening the working day is the main condition. (Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, pp. 591-592, 1932)

## **Fatalistic Understanding by Mechanists of Necessity**

The concept of randomness is the opposite of the concept of *necessity* (causal necessity).

“What is inevitably arises from certain causes is necessary.” When they say that such a phenomenon was historically necessary, it means that it inevitably had to happen, *regardless of whether it is good or bad*. When one speaks of causal necessity, there is not the slightest hint of an *assessment of the event*, of its desirability or undesirability; here it is only about its *inevitability*. It is not necessary—as is sometimes done—to confuse two very different concepts: necessity in the sense of desirability and causal necessity. These are two *completely* different things. And when they talk about historical necessity, they mean not what is desirable in terms of, say, social progress, but what *inevitably follows from the course of social development*. In this sense, both the rapid development of productive forces at the end of the 19th century and the fall of the Roman Empire or the disappearance of the so-called Cretan culture were historically necessary. Necessary is causal. No more, no less.

Now we come to one, rather difficult question, all about the same necessity.

Suppose we have before our eyes a human society that has doubled in 20 years. Then we have the right to conclude (conclude) that production in this society has expanded. *If* it had not expanded, then society could not have doubled. If it *increased*, then production also increased. This example does not in itself need further clarification. But what is he like? Here we find in a special way the *reason for* social development—the reason which appears to be a *necessary condition* for this development. No, it is there—no development. *If* there is development, *then* this condition must also be present.

This example may lead to some thoughts. At the beginning of the book, we mercilessly expelled teleology. And now we seem to introduce it ourselves: “chase nature through the door, it will fly into the window”. In fact, how is the question here? *For the* development of society, in *order* for society to double, it is necessary that production grows. The development and growth of society is the goal, “telos”. Production development is a *means* to achieve this goal. The pattern of development is a teleological pattern. It is as if we committed a sin against science in this way and fell into the priestly arms.

However, in reality, there is something else, and teleology does not smell at all. In fact, we proceed from the assumption that society has grown (in this case, we even proceed from the fact that society has grown). But it could not increase. And if it *had not* increased, but, say, halved, then we could have made exactly the same conclusion in the same way: since society has decreased by half, and, moreover, decreased from malnutrition, *it means* that production has decreased. No man, however, would ever dream of seeing a “goal” in the destruction of society. No one can say in this case: the goal is to reduce society from malnutrition; the means to this end is to reduce production. This means that there is absolutely no teleology. There is only a special search technique *conditions* (causes) for the *result* (for the consequences).

*A necessary condition for* further development is often called *historical necessity*. In this sense, the French revolution was a historical necessity, without which capitalism could not have developed; or the so-called “liberation of the peasants” in 1861, without which Russian capitalism could not have developed further. In this sense, socialism is a historical necessity, since *without* it the further development of society is impossible. If society develops, socialism will *inevitably* be. (*Bukharin, Theory of Historical Materialism, pp. 45-46, 1929*)

## **The Possibility of Two Lines of Development of the Revolution**

On this economic basis of the Russian revolution, two main lines of its development and outcome are objectively possible.

Or the old landlord economy, connected with serfdom by thousands of threads, is preserved, turning slowly into a purely capitalist, “cadet” economy. The basis for the final transition from mining to capitalism is the internal transformation of feudal landlord economy. The entire agrarian system of the state becomes capitalist, retaining feudal features for a long time. Or the old landlord economy breaks the revolution, destroying all the remnants of serfdom and large-scale land ownership above all. The basis of the final transition from mining to capitalism is the free development of small-scale peasant farming, which received a tremendous impetus due to the expropriation of landowner land in favour of the peasantry. The entire agrarian system becomes capitalist, for the decomposition of the peasantry is the faster the more completely destroyed the traces of serfdom. In other words: either—preservation of the main mass of landlord tenure and the main foundations of the old “superstructure”; hence the predominant role of the liberal-monarchist bourgeois and landowner, the rapid transition to their side of the prosperous peasantry, the decline of the peasant mass, not only expropriated in enormous proportions, but also enslaved by one or another Cadet ransom, slaughtered and stifled by the domination of the reaction; the executors of such a bourgeois revolution will be politicians of a type close to the Octobrists. Or—the destruction of landlord tenure and all the main foundations of the corresponding old “superstructure”; the predominant role of the proletariat and peasant masses in neutralizing the unstable or counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie; the most rapid and free development of the productive forces on a capitalist basis, with the best possible in general in the context of commodity production, the situation of the working and peasant masses;—Hence the creation of the most favourable conditions for the further implementation by the working class of its real and fundamental task of socialist reconstruction. Of course, infinitely diverse combinations of elements of one type or another of capitalist evolution are possible, and only hopeless pedants could solve the peculiar and complex issues that arise with just quotes from one or another review of Marx about another historical era. (V.I. Lenin, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, Soch., Vol. III, pp. 12-13, ed. 3rd)

## Turning Opportunity into Reality

But the question is: did the party manage to correctly use the opportunities provided by the Soviet system; didn't she keep these opportunities under wraps, thus preventing the working class from unleashing all its revolutionary power to the end, was it able to squeeze out of these possibilities all that could be squeezed out in order to deploy socialist construction on the whole front?

The Soviet system provides tremendous *opportunities* for the complete victory of socialism. But *opportunity is not yet reality*. To turn an opportunity into reality, a number of conditions are necessary, including the party line and the correct implementation of this line play an important role.

A few examples.

Right opportunists argue that NEP provides us with the victory of socialism, therefore, we don't have to worry about the pace of industrialization, the development of state farms and collective farms, etc., since the onset of victory is all the same ensured, so to speak, gravity flow. This, of course, is wrong and stupid. To say so is to deny the role of the party in building socialism, to deny the responsibility of the party for this building. Lenin did not say at all that NEP provides us with the victory of socialism. Lenin only said that "economically and politically, NEP fully provides us with the *opportunity to build the foundation of a socialist economy.*" But opportunity is not yet *reality*. In order to turn an opportunity into reality, it is necessary, first of all, to discard the theory of gravity, it is necessary to rebuild (reconstruct) the national economy and launch a decisive attack on the capitalist elements of the city and village.

The right-wing opportunists further argue that there is no foundation in our system for a split between the working class and the peasantry—therefore, you don't have to worry about establishing the right policy for the social groups of the village, since the fist will still grow into socialism, and the union of workers and peasants gravity will be provided in order, so to speak. It is also untrue and stupid. Only people who do not understand that the party's policy, and even that of the party that is in power, can say this, is the main point determining the fate of the cause of the union of workers and peasants. Lenin did not at all consider the danger of a split between the working class and the peasantry to be excluded. Lenin said that "in our social system are *not inherently necessary* for such a split," but

“if serious class disagreements *arise* between these classes, then a split will be *inevitable*.” In this regard, Lenin believed that:

“The main task of our Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, as well as of our party as a whole, is to closely monitor the circumstances from which the schism may arise and to *warn* them, because in the final analysis the fate of our republic will depend on whether the peasant the masses with the working class, while remaining faithful to the alliance with it, or it will allow the “Nepman”, that is, the new bourgeoisie, to separate themselves from the workers, to split themselves with them.”

Consequently, a split between the working class and the peasantry is not excluded, but it is not necessary at all, since our system has the *opportunity* to prevent this split and strengthen the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. And what is required in order to turn this opportunity into reality? In order to turn the possibility of *preventing* a split into reality, it is necessary, first of all, to bury the theory of gravity, to uproot the roots of capitalism by organizing collective farms and state farms, and to move from a policy of limiting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks to a policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class.

It follows, therefore, that it is necessary to strictly distinguish between the *opportunities* available in our system and the *use of* these opportunities, the transformation of these opportunities into *reality*.

It turns out that there are quite admissible cases when there are opportunities for victory, and the party does not see these opportunities or does not know how to use them correctly, in view of which defeat may turn out instead of victory.

And now the same question: did the party manage to correctly use the *opportunities* and *advantages* provided to us by the Soviet system; Did she do everything in order to *turn these opportunities into reality* and thus ensure maximum success for our construction?

In other words: did the party and its Central Committee correctly lead the construction of socialism over the past period?

What is required for proper party leadership in our modern conditions?

For the party’s proper leadership, it is necessary, among other things, that the party’s line is correct, that the masses understand the correctness of the party line and actively support it, that the party does not limit itself to developing a general line, but leads its implementation day by day, and that the party leads decisive struggle against deviations from the general line and conciliationism, with

them, so that in the fight against deviations the party forged the unity of its ranks and iron discipline. (*J. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 548-550, ed. 9th.*)

## **Eliminating the Restoration of Capitalism**

Do we, in our Soviet country, have conditions that make *it possible to restore* (restore) capitalism? Yes there are. It may seem strange, but it is a fact, comrades. We overthrew capitalism, established the dictatorship of the proletariat, and we are developing at an accelerated pace our socialist industry, connecting the peasant economy with it. But we have not yet taken the roots of capitalism. Where are they, these very roots, nesting? They nest in commodity production, in small-scale production of the city and especially the village. The strength of capitalism consists, as Lenin says, “in the power of *small-scale production*, because small-scale production has remained in the world, unfortunately, very, very much, and small-scale production *gives birth to* capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a massive scale” (see Vol. XXV, p. 173). It is clear that since small-scale production is massive and even predominant in our country, and since it gives rise to capitalism and the bourgeoisie, especially under the conditions of NEP, constantly and on a massive scale, we have conditions that make *it possible to restore* capitalism.

Do we, in our Soviet country, have the means and forces necessary to destroy, eliminate the *possibility of the* restoration of capitalism? Yes there are. This is precisely the basis for the correctness of Lenin’s thesis about the *possibility of* building in the USSR a complete socialist society. For this, it is necessary to strengthen the proletarian dictatorship, strengthen the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, develop our commanding heights from the angle of industrialization of the country, the fast pace of industrial development, electrify the country, transfer the entire national economy to a new technical base, mass cooperation of the peasantry and increase the productivity of its economy, gradual the unification of individual peasant farms into social enterprises, the development of state farms, the limitation and overcoming of the capitalist elements of the city and Eunis, etc., etc.

Here is what Lenin says on this subject:

“As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a stronger economic base for capitalism in Russia than for communism. This must be remembered. Everyone who carefully watched the life of the village, in comparison with life in the city, knows that we did not uproot the roots of capitalism and did not undermine the foundation, foundation of the internal enemy. The latter rests on small-scale farming, and in order to undermine it, there is one way - to transfer the country’s economy, including agriculture, to a new technical base, to the technical base of modern large-scale production. Such a base is only electricity. Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country. Otherwise, the country remains small-peasant, and it is necessary that we clearly recognize this. We are weaker than capitalism, not only on a global scale, but also domestically. Everyone knows that. We have recognized this and we will bring the matter to the point that the economic base from small-peasant is transferred to large-scale. Only when the country is electrified, when the technical base of modern large-scale industry is brought under industry, agriculture and transport — only then will we win completely “(vol. XXVI, p. 46 - 47).

It turns out, firstly, that while we live in a small-peasant country, until we have uprooted the roots of capitalism, there is a stronger economic base for capitalism than for communism. It happens that a tree was cut down, but the roots were not uprooted: there was not enough strength. From this follows the *possibility of restoring capitalism* in our country.

It turns out, secondly, that besides the possibility of restoring capitalism, we still have the *possibility of the victory of socialism*, for we *can* destroy the *possibility of restoring capitalism*, we can uproot the roots of capitalism and achieve a final victory over capitalism *if* we carry out intensive work on electrifying the country, *if* for industry, agriculture and transport will summarize the technical base of modern large-scale industry. From this the *possibility of the victory of socialism* in our country follows .

Finally, it turns out that it is impossible to build socialism only in industry, leaving agriculture to the mercy of spontaneous development, on the basis that the village itself will go out of town. The presence of socialist industry in the city is the main factor in the socialist transformation of the countryside. But this does not mean that this factor is quite sufficient. In order for the socialist city to lead the peasant village to the end, for this it is necessary, as Lenin

says, “to transfer the country’s economy , *including agriculture* , to a new technical base, to the technical base of modern large-scale production.”

Does this quote from Lenin contradict his other quote that “NEP fully provides us with the *opportunity* to build the foundation of a socialist economy”? No, it does not contradict. On the contrary, they coincide with each other. Lenin does not say at all that NEP gives us ready-made socialism. Lenin only says that NEP provides us with the *opportunity* to build the foundation of a socialist economy. Between the *possibility of* building socialism and *its actual construction* there is a big difference. You must not confuse opportunity with reality. Precisely in order to turn this opportunity into reality, it is precisely for this that Lenin proposes, in his big quote, to electrify the country and bring the technical base of modern large-scale industry to industry, agriculture and transport, as a condition for the final victory of socialism. But to realize this condition of building socialism in one or two years is not possible. It is impossible in one or two years to industrialize a country, build a powerful industry, co-operate with millions of peasants, bring a new technical base for agriculture, unite individual peasant farms into large collectives, develop state farms, limit and overcome the capitalist elements of the city and village. This requires years and years of intensive construction work of the proletarian dictatorship. And while this has not been done—and you won’t do it right away—we are still a small-peasant country where small-scale production gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly and on a massive scale, and where the danger of the restoration of capitalism remains in force. (*J. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 349-351, ed. 9th.*)

## **What is the Possibility of the Victory of Socialism in One Country?**

It is possible to resolve contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry of the internal forces of our country, the possibility of the proletariat seizing power and using that power to build a complete socialist society in our country, with the sympathy and support of the proletarians of other countries, but without the preliminary victory of the proletarian revolution in other countries . (*J. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, p. 222, ed. 9th.*)

## **The Special Nature of Our Difficulties Contains the Possibility of Overcoming Them.**

It is about the special nature of our difficulties. The point is that our difficulties are not difficulties of *decline* or difficulties of *stagnation*, but difficulties of *growth*, difficulties of *recovery*, difficulties of *moving forward*. This means that our difficulties are fundamentally different from the difficulties of the capitalist countries. When people in the USA talk about difficulties, they mean the difficulties of decline, because America is now in crisis, that is, the decline of the economy. When people talk about difficulties in England, they mean the difficulties of *stagnation*, for England has been experiencing *stagnation* for several years now, that is, the suspension of progress. When we talk about our difficulties, we do not mean decline or stagnation in development, but *the growth of our forces*, *the rise of our forces*, *the advancement of our economy forward*. How many points to *move forward* by such a date, how many percent to produce *more* products, how many million hectares to sow *more*, how many months *earlier* to build a plant, factory, railway—these are the questions we have in mind when they talk about difficulties. Consequently, our difficulties, in contrast to the difficulties of, say, America or England, are difficulties of *growth*, difficulties of *moving forward*.

What does it mean? This means that our difficulties are those difficulties which *themselves contain the possibility of overcoming them*. This means that the distinguishing feature of our difficulties is that they *themselves give us the basis for overcoming them*.

What follows from all this?

From this it follows, first of all, that our difficulties are not difficulties of small and random “problems”, but difficulties of the class struggle.

This implies, secondly, that our class enemies are hiding behind our difficulties, that these difficulties are complicated by the desperate resistance of the obsolete classes of our country, the support of these classes from the outside, the presence of bureaucratic elements in our own institutions, the presence of uncertainty and inertia in some sections of our party.

Thirdly, it follows from this that, in order to overcome difficulties, it is necessary, first of all, to repel the attacks of the capitalist elements, suppress their resistance and, thus, clear the way for quick progress.

It finally follows from this that the very nature of our difficulties, which are difficulties of *growth*, gives us the *opportunities* necessary to suppress class enemies.

But in order to use these *opportunities* and turn them into *reality*, to suppress the resistance of class enemies and overcome difficulties, there is only one way to do this: organize an *attack* on the capitalist elements on the *whole front* and isolate the opportunist elements in our own ranks that impede the offensive, rushing about panic from side to side and introducing into the party insecurity of victory. (*J. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 527-528, ed. 9th.*)

# CHAPTER FOUR. THE IDENTITY OF DIALECTICS, LOGIC AND THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN MARXIST- LENINIST PHILOSOPHY

## I. Marxist-Leninist Theory of Reflection

### The Unity of Thinking and Being

The absolute fact is dominated over all our theoretical thinking by the fact that our subjective thinking and the objective world are subject to the same laws and that therefore they cannot contradict each other in their final results, but must be consistent with each other. This fact is an unconscious and unconditional prerequisite for our theoretical thinking. <Only modern dialectical philosophy, and specifically Hegel's philosophy, examined this premise more closely and set forth the law of the ideality of thinking and being.> Materialism of the eighteenth century, being essentially metaphysical in nature, studied this premise only from the point of view of its content. He limited himself to proving that the content of all thinking and knowledge should come from sensory experience, and restored the old position: nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu. Only modern idealistic—but at the same time dialectical—philosophy, especially Hegel, investigated this premise from the point of view of *forms*. Despite the countless arbitrary <and fantastic> constructions of this philosophy, despite the idealistic, set on its head form of its final result—the unity of thought and being, it cannot be denied that it has proved on many examples taken from the most diverse branches of knowledge, the analogy between processes thinking and processes in the field of nature and history, and vice versa: the rule of the same laws for all these processes. On the other hand, modern natural

science has so far expanded the thesis of the experimental origin of the entire content of thinking that nothing remains of its old metaphysical limitation and formulation. Natural science, recognizing the heredity of the acquired properties, expands the subject of experience, making it not an individual, but a genus: there is no need at all for a separate individual to have a known experience; his private experience can be <in many cases> to some extent replaced by the results of the experiments of a number of his ancestors. If, for example, among us, the mathematical axioms seem to every eight-year-old child for granted, not requiring experimental proof, then this is only the result of accumulated heredity. It is difficult for Bushman or the Australian Negro to interpret them by evidence. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 75-76, Partizdat, 1932*)

## **Being Determines Consciousness**

So, he is talking about *principles*, formal *principles*, derived from *thinking*, and not from the outside world, which should be applied to nature and to humanity and along which nature and man should be guided. But where does these foundations come from? From yourself? No, for Herr Dühring himself declares that a purely ideal domain is limited to logical schemes and mathematical formations (the latter, as we shall see, is also false). Logic schemes can relate only to *forms of thinking*; here it is only about forms of *being*, the external world, and these forms of thinking in no case can create and bring out of himself, but only from the outside world. But in this case, the whole attitude should be reversed: the principles are not the starting point, but the end result of the study; they are not attracted for application to nature and human history, but are derived from them; it is not nature and the kingdom of man that are guided by principles, but principles are correct only insofar as they are consistent with nature and history. This is the only materialistic understanding of the matter, and the opposite, belonging to Herr Dühring, is idealistic: it puts the matter completely on its head and constructs the real world from thoughts, from some existing, dominated schemes or categories exactly like “a certain Hegel.” (*Engels, Anti-Dühring, pp. 23-24, 1932*)

... man also has a “consciousness.” But it is not there beforehand, as a “pure” consciousness. On the “spirit” the curse of “burdening”

with its matter gravitates in advance, which appears here in the form of moving layers of air, in the form of sounds, in short, in the form of a tongue. Language is as old as consciousness, language, it is practical, existing for other people, and, therefore, existing for myself, real consciousness, and language, like consciousness, arises from the need for relations with other people. My attitude to my environment is my consciousness. Where there is any relation, it exists for me; an animal does not *belong* to anything; *for an animal its relation to others does not exist as a relation*. Thus, consciousness is originally a historical product and remains so until people exist at all. Consciousness is, of course, first of all, the consciousness of the closest sensory setting and the consciousness of a limited connection with other persons and things that are outside the individual who begins to become aware of himself; it is at the same time a consciousness of nature, which initially confronts people as a completely alien, omnipotent and unapproachable force, to which people relate in an absolutely animal like way, and which dominates them like cattle; therefore, it is a purely animal consciousness of nature (natural, natural religion), and, on the other hand, it is the consciousness of the need to enter into relations with surrounding individuals, the beginning of the consciousness that the individual generally lives in society. This beginning is just as animalistic, like social life at this stage, it is a purely herd consciousness; a person differs from a ram only in that his consciousness replaces his instinct or that his instinct is conscious in nature. [By the hand of Marx: Here it is immediately evident (that) this natural religion or this particular attitude to nature is determined by the social form, and vice versa. (Here) the identity of nature and man is revealed, (which) determines the conscious attitude of people to nature, their conscious relationship to each other and their conscious relationship to each other, their conscious relationship to nature.] ((that) this natural religion or this certain attitude towards nature is determined by the social form, and vice versa. (Here) the identity of nature and man is revealed, (which) determines the conscious attitude of people to nature, their conscious relationship to each other and their conscious relationship to each other, their conscious relationship to nature.] ((that) this natural religion or this certain attitude towards nature is determined by the social form, and vice versa. (Here) the identity of nature and man is revealed, (which) determines the conscious attitude of people to nature, their conscious relationship to each other and their conscious relationship to each other, their conscious relationship to

nature.] (*Marx and Engels, About L. Feuerbach, "Archive of K. Marx and F. Engels", Prince. 1, p. 220-221, Guise, 1930*)

## **The Content of Human Knowledge**

The production of ideas, ideas, consciousness is first of all directly woven into material activity and into material relations of people—into the language of real life. The ideas, thinking, spiritual relationships of people here are still a direct result of their material practice. The same can be said about spiritual production, as it is expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of some people. People (and it is people, how they are conditioned by the mode of production of their material life, their material relations and the further development of the latter in social and political dismemberment), how they are caused by a certain development of their productive forces and the corresponding methods of relations to their distant formations, are producers of their representations, ideas, etc., etc. about real acting people. Consciousness... can never be anything other than a conscious being ... and the being of people is the real process of their life. If in the whole ideology people and their relationships seem to be on their heads, like in some obscurantist camera, then this also follows from the historical process of their life, just as the inverse image of objects on the retina follows from the directly physical process of their life.

In complete contrast to German philosophy, descending from heaven to earth, we are going to rise here from earth to heaven, that is, we will not proceed from what people say, imagine, imagine, and not imaginable, imagined, imagined people, then to come to bodily people; we will proceed from really active people, trying to deduce from their real life process also the development of ideological reflexes and reflections of this life process. And vague formations in the brain of people are also necessary sublimates of their material, empirically ascertainable and related to material conditions, life process. Thus, morality, religion, metaphysics and other types of ideology and the corresponding forms of consciousness lose their appearance of independence. They don't have a story at all, they have no development: only people who develop their material production and their material relations change their thinking and the products of their thinking in this activity. It is not consciousness that determines

life, but life that determines consciousness. In the first way of considering, they proceed from consciousness, as from a living individual, - in the second, corresponding to real life, they proceed from the real, living individuals themselves and consider consciousness only as their consciousness.

This method of consideration is not without prerequisites. It proceeds from real premises without leaving them for a single moment. Its prerequisites are people taken not in some fantastic isolation and establishment, but in their real, empirically visual process of development, under certain conditions. Once this effective process of life is revealed, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts, as we see even among the still abstract [limited] empiricists, or the imaginary activity of imaginary subjects, like idealists.

Thus, where speculation ceases, that is, at the threshold of real life, real positive science begins, the image of practical activity, the practical process of human development. Phrases about consciousness disappear, their place should be taken by real knowledge. When they begin to depict reality, independent philosophy loses its *raison d'être*. In its place, at best, it may be a summation of the most general results, abstracted from a consideration of the historical development of people. But these abstractions in themselves, isolated from real history, have no value. They can serve only to facilitate the ordering of historical material and outline the sequence of its individual layers. But, unlike philosophy, they by no means give any recipe or scheme, according to which one can arrange historical eras. Difficulty, on the contrary, begins only where it is taken for consideration and ordering of the material, it does not matter, of any past era or present time, when it is taken for the image of reality. The elimination of these difficulties is due to the prerequisites, which in no case can be indicated here, but follow only from the study of the real life process and the actions of individuals of each individual era. But follow only from the study of the real life process and the actions of individuals of each individual era. (*Marx and Engels, About L. Feuerbach, "Archive of K. Marx and F. Engels", Prince. 1, pp. 215-217, Guise, 1930*).

## **Public Consciousness Reflects Social Being**

Whatever the “exact” meaning of the words “social being” and “public consciousness” Bogdanov may come up with, it remains undeniable that the position we cited *is incorrect*. Social being and social consciousness are not identical, in exactly the same way as being in general and consciousness in general are not identical. From the fact that people entering into communication enter into it like conscious beings, it does *not follow* in any way that social consciousness should be identical to social being. Entering into communication, people in all any kind of complex social formations - and especially in the capitalist social formation—are *not aware* of what kind of social relations are formed, according to what laws they develop, etc. For example, a peasant, selling bread, enters into “communication” with world bread producers on the world market, but he does not recognize this, does not recognize that what social relations are made up of exchange. Public consciousness *reflects* social being—that is what Marx’s doctrine consists of. A reflection may be a true approximate copy of the reflected, but it is absurd to speak of identity here. Consciousness generally *reflects* being—this is the general position of *all* materialism. Not to see its direct and *inextricable* connection with the position of historical materialism: public consciousness *reflects* social being—it is impossible.

Bogdanov reconciles his theory with the conclusions of Marx, sacrificing these conclusions to an elementary sequence. Each individual producer in the world economy is aware that he is making such and such a change in the production technique, each owner is aware that he is exchanging such and such products for others, but these manufacturers and these owners do not realize that they are changing this *social being*. The sum of all these changes—in all their ramifications—could not have covered 70 Marxes in the capitalist world economy. The most that the *laws* of these changes are open is shown in the main and mostly *objective* the logic of these changes and their historical development is objective not in the sense that the society of conscious beings, people, could exist and develop independently of the existence of conscious beings (it’s only these trifles *that* Bogdanov *emphasizes* with his “theory”), but in the sense that social being, *regardless* of the *public consciousness* of people. From the fact that you live and host, give birth to children and produce products, exchange them, the objectively necessary chain of events, a chain of development, independent of your *social* consciousness, never fully encompassed by him. The highest task of

humanity—to reach this objective logic of economic evolution (the evolution of social life) in its general and fundamental features, so that perhaps more clearly, clearly, critically adapt *to it* one's social consciousness and the consciousness of the advanced classes of all capitalist countries.

Bogdanov admits all this. So? This means that his theory of the “identity of social being and public consciousness” is *actually* thrown overboard by him, remaining an empty scholastic pendant—as empty, dead and worthless as the “theory of universal substitution” or the doctrine of “elements”, “introjection” and all other Machist nonsense. But “the dead grabs the living”, the dead scholastic weight gain *against the will and regardless of* Bogdanov's *consciousness* turns his philosophy into a *service tool of the Schubert-Zoldernov* and other reactionaries, who are spreading *this* in thousands of ways from hundreds of professorial departments dead for the living, against the living, in order to strangle the living. Bogdanov personally is the sworn enemy of all reaction and bourgeois reaction in particular. Bogdanov's “substitution” and the theory of “the identity of social being and social consciousness” *serve* this reaction. This is a sad fact, but a fact.

Materialism generally recognizes objectively real being (matter), independent of consciousness, of sensation, of experience, etc. of humanity. Historical materialism recognizes social being independent of the public consciousness of mankind. Consciousness here and there is only a reflection of being, at best, approximately true (adequate, ideally-accurate) reflection of it. In this philosophy of Marxism, poured out of one piece of steel, it is impossible to take out a single basic premise, not a single essential part, without departing from objective truth, without falling into the arms of bourgeois-reactionary lies. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, p. 264, 266-267, 3rd ed.*).

## **Man, Acting on Nature, Changes His Own Nature**

Labour is, first and foremost, a process that takes place between man and nature, a process in which man determines, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and nature through his own activities. He confronts the substance of nature as a force of nature. In

order to appropriate the substance of nature in a known form suitable for his own life, he sets in motion the natural forces belonging to his body, arms and legs, head and fingers. Acting through this movement on the external nature and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops latent in the last ability and subordinates the game of these forces to his own power. We will not consider here the first animal-like instinctive forms of labour in comparison with the state of society, when a worker appears on the commodity market as a seller of his own labour power, the depths of primitive times include the state when human labour has not yet freed itself from its primitive, instinctive form. We assume labour in a form constituting the exclusive property of man. A spider performs operations resembling that of a weaver, and a bee by the construction of its wax cells shames some architects. But even the worst architect from the best bee from the very beginning differs in that before building the wax cell, he already built it in his head. At the end of the labour process, a result is obtained that already before the start of this process was ideally present, i.e., in the mind of the employee. He not only changes the form of what is given by nature: in what is given by nature, he realizes at the same time his conscious goal, which as a law determines the method and nature of his actions and to which he must subordinate his will. And this submission is not an isolated act. Leaving aside the tension of those organs by which labour is carried out, an appropriate will, expressed in attention, is necessary throughout labour, and moreover, it is necessary all the more, the less labour captivates the worker with his content and method of execution, therefore, the less the worker enjoys work as a game physical and intellectual forces. ( and moreover, it is necessary all the more, the less labour captivates the worker with his content and method of execution, therefore, the less the worker enjoys labour as a game of physical and intellectual forces. ( and moreover, it is necessary all the more, the less labour captivates the worker with his content and method of execution, therefore, the less the worker enjoys labour as a game of physical and intellectual forces. (*Marx, Capital, Vol. I, pp. 119-120, ed. 1932*)

## **The Starting Point of the Historical Description**

We know only one single science, the science of history. History can be viewed from two sides and divided into the history of nature and the history of people. But you cannot separate both of these sides: as long as people exist, the history of nature and the history of people condition each other...

The premises from which we will proceed are not arbitrary statements, not dogmas, but real premises, from which one can be distracted only in the imagination. These include real individuals, their activities and the material conditions of their life, both foreseen by them and created by their own activities. Thus, these premises can be stated in a purely empirical way.

The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living individuals, people. The first historical act of these individuals, by which they are separated from animals, is not that they think, but that they begin to *produce means for their existence*.

Thus, the first fact that needs to be ascertained is the bodily organization of these individuals and their connection with the rest of nature. Here we cannot, of course, deal with either the physical properties of the people themselves, or the natural environment surrounding them, geological, oro-hydrographic, climatic and other relations. [These relations determine not only the initial, natural organization of people—especially racial differences—but also all their further development or underdevelopment up to our time.] Any historical description should come from these natural foundations and their modification in the course of history, thanks to the activities of people.

People can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, religion, in general, by anything. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals, they only begin to *produce the means necessary for their life*—a step due to their bodily organization. People, producing the means necessary for their life, indirectly produce their material life.

The way people produce the means necessary for their life depends in the closest way on the properties of the means of subsistence that they themselves imagine and reproduce.

So, we have the following fact: certain individuals who produce in a certain way enter into certain social and political relations. Empirical observation must, in each individual case, reveal empirically, without any mystification and speculation, the connection of social and political dismemberment with production. Social dismemberment and the state arise constantly from the life process of

certain individuals, but individuals are not as they may be in their own or someone else's view, but as they are *in essence*, i.e., how they act, materially produce, and, therefore, are active under certain material conditions and conditions independent of their will. The representations made up by these individuals are the essence of the idea either about their relationship to nature, or about their relationship to each other, or about their own properties... It is clear that in all these cases, these representations are real or illusory conscious expressions of their real relationships and activities, their production, their relationships, their social and political practices. The opposite assumption is possible only if one assumes, in addition to the spirit of real, materially conditioned individuals, some other spirit. If the conscious expression of the real relationships of these individuals is illusory, if in their ideas they put their reality on their heads, then this, in turn, is a consequence of their limited material mode of activity and the resulting limited social relations. (*Marx and Engels, About L. Feuerbach, "Archives of Marx and Engels," Prince. 1, pp. 214-215, ed. 1930*)

## **The Contemplative Nature of Feuerbach's Materialism**

... For a *practical* materialist, i.e., for a *communist*, the point is to revolutionize the existing world, to practically turn against things, how it catches them, and change them. If Feuerbach sometimes encounters such views, they nevertheless always remain at the stage of some scattered guesses, having such a negligible influence on his general worldview that here they can only be regarded as capable of developing primordia. Feuerbach's understanding of the sensory world is limited, on the one hand, by a naked sensation [attributed by Marx's hand: considers "a person in general" instead of a "real, historical person". This "man" is realiter "German"]. In the first case, when considering the sensory world, he inevitably comes across things, *the appearance of sensory reality*, established through a more accurate study of sensory facts, and in the fact that in the final analysis he cannot approach sensuality without "eyes," that is, without the "glasses" of the *philosopher*.]. To eliminate this, he is forced to seek salvation in a dual view, distinguishing between the ordinary view, which sees only what is "under the nose", and the highest,

philosophical view, discerning the “true essence” of things. He does not notice that the sensual world that surrounds him is not at all a given, always equal to himself thing, but a product of industry and social condition, a product in the sense that it is the result of the activity of a whole series in every historical era generations, of which each stands on the shoulders of a generation preceding it, developing its industry and its way of relations and modifying, depending on changing needs, its social structure. Even the objects of the simplest “sensual certainty” were given to him only thanks to social development, thanks to industry and trade. It is known that a cherry tree, like all almost fruit trees, appeared in our belt only a few centuries ago due to trade, and thus it became accessible to Feuerbach’s “sensible authenticity” only thanks to this action of a certain society at a certain time. However, with this view of things, which takes them the way they are in reality, any profound philosophical problem—as will be seen even more clearly in the future—is simply reduced to a certain empirical fact. So, for example, the important question of man’s relationship to nature [by Marx’s hand: or even, as Bruno says (p. 110), about the opposite: “nature and history”, as if these are two “things” that are separate from each other, as if man there is historical nature and has no natural of natural history], from which all “immensely high creations” flowed about “substance” and “world consciousness”, is eliminated by itself, if we understand that the notorious “unity of man with nature” was always in industry and appeared in every era, depending from a greater or lesser development of industry, in a different form [by Marx’s hand: just like the “struggle” of man with nature to the development of his productive forces on an appropriate basis]. Industry and trade, production and the exchange of means necessary for life, on the other hand, determine and, in turn, determine in their forms the distribution, dismemberment of various social classes; thanks to this, it turns out that Feuerbach sees, for example, only factories and machines in Manchester, while a hundred years ago you could see only spinning wheels and looms there, or you can find only pastures and swamps in Roman Campania, while in the time of August you could see solid vineyards and villas of Roman capitalists. Feuerbach speaks in particular about the view of natural science; he mentions secrets that are accessible only to the eye of a chemist and physicist, but what would natural science be without industry and trade? Thus, even this “pure” natural science receives its goal, as well as its material, only thanks to trade and industry, thanks to the sensory activity of

people. This activity, this ongoing sensual work and creativity, this production is so much the basis of the entire sensual world, as it now exists, that if it stopped for at least one year, then Feuerbach would not only find enormous changes in the physical world, but very soon would not find the whole human world, his own ability to view and even his own existence. Of course, this preserves the priority of the external nature and, of course, all this has nothing to do with the primary people generated by the generatio aequivoca. But this distinction makes sense only insofar as a person is recognized for something different from nature. However, this nature, preceding human history, in which Feuerbach lives, is not at all that nature, which—with the exception of some Australian coral islands of the newest origin—does not exist anywhere else in our time and therefore does not exist for Feuerbach... but very soon I would not have found the whole human world, my own ability to view and even my own existence. Of course, this preserves the priority of the external nature and, of course, all this has nothing to do with the primary people generated by the generatio aequivoca. True, Feuerbach has a huge advantage over “pure materialists” that he understands that man is a “sensual object”, but [by Marx’s hand: in addition, he considers it only as a “sensual object” and not as “sensual activity”], since at the same time he does not leave the sphere of abstract theory and considers people not in their given social connection, not in their life environment, which makes them what they are, he never gets to really existing, active people, but remains with the abstraction agility “and is limited only to that which recognizes the” real, individual, bodily person “in sensation, that is, it does not know any other” human relations of “person to person”, except love and friendship [by Marx’s hand: and, moreover, in an idealized way. It does not give any criticism of the current relationship in life] *the activities of its constituent individuals*, and therefore forced, when, for example, instead of healthy people, notices a crowd of scrofulous, torn by work and consumptive poor people, are saved in “higher intuition”, in ideal “levelling out”, that is, forced to fall into idealism again as times where the communist materialist sees the need and at the same time a condition for the transformation of industry and social dismemberment. (*Marx and Engels, About L. Feuerbach, “Archive of K. Marx and F. Engels,” book 1, p. 217-218, ed. 1930*)

## The Concrete Historical Unity of the Subject and Object in Public Practice

In production, people act not only on nature, but also on each other. They cannot produce without connecting in a known manner for joint activities and for the mutual exchange of their activities. In order to produce, people enter into certain relations and relations, and only through these social relations and relations does their relationship to nature exist, does production take place.

Depending on the nature of the means of production, of course, the social relations in which producers enter into each other are changing, the conditions under which they exchange their activities and participate in aggregate production are changing. With the invention of a new weapon of war, firearms, the whole internal organization of the army had to change, the relations on the basis of which individual persons rallied into the army and could act as an army, as well as the mutual relations of different armies, had to change.

Consequently, social relations in which people engage in production, *social relations of production change, transform with the change and development of material means of production, productive forces. The relations of production, in their totality, form what are called social relations, society, form a society at a certain stage of historical development*—a society with a peculiar distinctive character. Ancient society, feudal society, bourgeois society are such aggregates of relations of production—aggregates, each of which at the same time marks a special stage of development in the history of mankind.

*Capital* also represents the social relation of production, namely, the *bourgeois relation of production*, the relation of production in bourgeois society. Have the constituent parts of capital — means of subsistence, tools, raw materials—been produced and accumulated outside these social conditions, outside certain social relations? Is it not in the given social conditions, not under the same definite social relations that they are used for new production? And is it not this particular social character that turns *into capital* products that serve for new production?

Capital consists not only of livelihoods, tools and raw materials, —not only of material products; it consists at the same time of *exchange values*. All the products of which it consists

are *goods* . Capital is, therefore, not only the sum of material products, but also the sum of goods, exchange values, and *social values* . (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Wage, Labour and Capital*, Vol. V , p. 429-430, Guise, 1929)

## **Cognition is the Process of Reflecting the Objective World in Human Consciousness**

The dialectical development that is found in nature and in history, that is, the causal connection of that progressive movement, which, through all deviations to the side and through all short reverse steps, makes its way from the lowest to the highest, this development in Hegel is simply a snapshot of the self-movement of a concept that is always happening no one knows where and, in any case, is completely independent of any thinking human brain. It was necessary to eliminate this ideological perversion. Returning to the materialistic point of view, we again saw pictures in human concepts of pictures from real things, instead of seeing pictures in real things of pictures from an absolute concept that is at a certain stage of development. Dialectics was reduced to the science of the general laws of motion in the external world and in human thought: two series of laws, which are essentially identical, but different in expression, since the human head can use them consciously, while in nature, and for the most part still in human history, they make their way unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an infinite number seeming accidents. Thus, the dialectic of concepts itself became only a conscious reflection of the dialectical movement of the external world. (Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, pp. 40–41. Partizdat, 1932)

Whether we say that matter is a constant possibility of sensations (according to J. St. Mill), or that matter is more or less stable complexes of “elements”—sensations (according to E. Mach), we remained *within the limits of agnosticism or humism*; both points of view or, rather, both of these formulations *are covered by the statement of agnosticism by Engels*: the agnostic does not go beyond sensations, declaring that *he cannot* to know anything reliable about their source or about their original, etc. And if Mach attaches great importance to his discrepancy with Mill on the indicated issue, it

is precisely because Mach fits the characteristic given by ordinary professors Engels: Flohknacker, you infringed a flea, gentlemen, making corrections and changing the nomenclature instead of leaving the main half point of view!

How does the materialist Engels refute,—at the beginning of the article, Engels openly and decisively contrasts his materialism with agnosticism?—the stated arguments?

“... There are no words,” he says, “this is a point of view that is difficult, apparently, to be refuted by argument alone. But before people began to argue, they acted.” In the beginning was the case.” And human activity resolved this difficulty long before human philosophies invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating (proof for pudding or testing, checking pudding is that it is eaten). At that moment, when, according to the properties of a thing that we perceive, we use it for ourselves, we are at this very moment subjected to an unmistakable test the truth or falsity of our sensory perceptions. If these perceptions were false, then our judgment about the possibility of using this thing will need to be false, and any attempt to such use will inevitably lead to failure.

So, the materialist theory, the theory of the reflection of objects by thought, is stated here with complete clarity: things exist outside of us. Our perceptions and ideas are their images. Testing these images, separating the true from the false is given by practice. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII , p. 88-89, ed. 3rd.*)

## **Our Senses are Images of the Outside World**

Engels bluntly and clearly says that he objects to both Hume and Kant together. Meanwhile, Hume has no talk of any “unknowable things in himself”. What do these two philosophers have in common? The fact that they *fundamentally isolate* “appearances” from what is, sensation from perceived, thing for us “from things in themselves”, and Hume does not want to know anything about “things in himself”, the very thought of it is philosophically unacceptable, considers “metaphysics” (as the Humeans and Kantians say); Kant, however, admits the existence of a “thing in itself,” but declares it to be “unknowable,” fundamentally different from a phenomenon

belonging to a fundamentally different region, to a region of the “other world” ... inaccessible to knowledge, but revealed to faith.

What is the essence of Engels’ objection? Yesterday we did not know that alizarin exists in coal tar. Today we learned this. The question is, did alizarin exist in coal tar yesterday?

Of course yes. Any doubt about this would be a mockery of modern natural science.

And if so, then three important epistemological conclusions follow:

1) There are things, regardless of our consciousness, regardless of our sensation, outside of us, for it is undoubtedly that alizarin existed in coal tar yesterday, and it is also certain that we did not know anything about this existence yesterday, we did not receive any sensations from this .

2) There is absolutely no fundamental difference between a phenomenon and a thing in itself and cannot be. The difference is simply between what is known and what is not yet known, and philosophical speculations about the special facets between the one and the other, that the thing in itself is “on the other side” of phenomena (Kant), or that it’s possible it must be fenced off by some kind of philosophical barrier from the question of the unknown in this or that part, but the world existing outside of us (Hume)—all this is empty nonsense, Schrulle, twisted, fiction.

3) In the theory of knowledge, as in all other fields of science, we must think dialectically, t. E. Not assume ready regard our knowledge, and to understand the way of *ignorance is knowledge*, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more accurate.

Once you have taken the point of view of the development of human knowledge out of ignorance, you will see that millions of examples, as simple as the discovery of alizarin in coal tar, millions of observations not only from the history of science and technology, but from the everyday life of everyone, show a person how “Things in oneself” into “things for us,” the emergence of “phenomena” when our senses experience a push from the outside from certain objects—the disappearance of “phenomena” when this or that obstacle eliminates the possibility of exposure existing object to our senses. The only and inevitable conclusion from this, which all people make in living human practice and who consciously puts materialism at the base of their epistemology, is that there are objects, things, bodies outside of us and independently of us, that our sensations are

images of the outside world. Mach's inverse theory (bodies are complexes of sensations) is pathetic idealistic nonsense. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, pp. 83-84, ed. 3rd*)

## **Path of Knowledge**

Cognition of man is not (resp. Does not follow) a straight line, but a curved line infinitely approaching a series of circles, a spiral. Any fragment, fragment, piece of this curved line can be turned (one-sidedly turned) into an independent, whole, straight line, which (if you can't see the forests behind the trees) then leads into the swamp, into the clergy (where it is *reinforced by the class interest of the ruling classes*). (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, p. 304, ed. 3rd.*)

\* \* \*

Cognition is the eternal, infinite approximation of thinking to the object. *The reflection of nature in human thought must be understood not "deadly", not "abstractly", not without movement, not without contradictions, but in the eternal process of movement, the occurrence of contradictions and their resolution.* (*The Lenin Collection IX, p. 227, 1st ed.*)

## **Cognition is Movement**

The conviction that the totality of the processes of nature is in a systematic connection encourages science to find this systematic connection everywhere, both in particular and in general. But the corresponding, exhaustive, scientific image of this connection, the compilation of an accurate mental image of the system of the world in which we live, is impossible for us, and for all future generations. If at any moment in the development of mankind a similar final, final system of world connections—physical, spiritual, and historical—were drawn up, then the growth of human knowledge would end and further historical development would cease from the moment the

society was established in according to this system, which is absurd, is simply nonsense. Thus, people face a contradiction: on the one hand, they seek to know the world system in an exhaustive way in its aggregate connection, and on the other, by virtue of the laws of their own nature and the nature of the world system, they will never be able to completely solve this problem. But this contradiction not only lies in the nature of both factors—the world and man—it is also the main lever of all intellectual progress and is constantly, daily resolved in the infinite progressive development of mankind, just as other mathematical problems are solved with the help of infinite series or continued fractions. In fact, every mental image of the world's system is limited by the objectively historical moment, subjectively by the physical and spiritual organization of its author. (*Engels, Anti-Dühring*, p. 25, *Partizdat*, 1932)

## **The Contradictory Process of Cognition**

We cannot imagine, express, measure, depict movements without interrupting the continuous, without simplifying, being rude, not dividing, not having mortified the living. The depiction of the movement of thought is always coarsening, mortification, and not only thought, but also sensation, and not only movement, but also *any* concept.

And this is the *essence* of dialectics. *This essence* is expressed by the formula: unity, the identity of opposites. (*“Lenin Collection” XII*, p. 193, *1st ed.*)

... The human concept of cause and effect always somewhat simplifies the objective connection of natural phenomena, only approximately reflecting it, artificially isolating one or another side of one single world process. If we find that the laws of thinking correspond to the laws of nature, then this becomes quite understandable, Engels says, if we take into account that thinking and consciousness are “products of the human brain and man is the product of nature.” (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op.*, Vol. XIII, p. 128, *ed. 3rd.*)

An idea (read, knowledge of a person) is a coincidence (agreement) of a concept and objectivity (“general”). This is the first.

Secondly, an idea is an *attitude* for itself of the existing (= supposedly independent) subjectivity (= person) to the *distinct* (from this idea) objectivity.

Subjectivity is the *desire* to destroy this separation (ideas from the object).

Cognition is the *process* of immersion in inorganic nature (of the mind) for the sake of subjecting the subject to its power and generalization (cognition of the general in its phenomena)... The coincidence of thought with the object is a *process*. Thought (= man) should not imagine the truth in the form of dead peace, in the form of a simple picture (image), pale (dull), without aspiration, without movement, just like a genius, like a number, like an abstract thought.

The idea has a very strong contradiction in itself, peace (for a person's thinking) consists in the firmness and confidence with which he always creates (this is a contradiction of thought with an object) and overcomes it forever... ( *Leninsky Collection IX* , p. 225 , 1st ed.)

## **Plekhanov's Identification of the Theory of Cognition of Marxism with the Epistemology of Feuerbach**

Even *criticizing* Feuerbach in his theses, Marx often develops and complements his own thoughts. Here is an example from the field of "epistemology". According to Feuerbach, a person, before *thinking* about an object, *experiences* its action *on himself*, *contemplates it*, *feels it*. Marx has in mind this idea of Feuerbach, saying: "The main drawback of materialism—up to and including Feuerbach—consisted in the fact that it considers reality, the objective world, perceived by an external sense, only in the form of an *object* or in the form of *contemplation*", and not in the form of specific human activity, not in the form of practice, not subjectively." This shortcoming of materialism explains, further Marx says, the fact that Feuerbach, in his *Essence of Christianity*, considers only theoretical activity as truly human activity. In other words, it can be expressed as follows. Feuerbach indicates that our "I" cognizes the *object*, only *being exposed to it*. Marx, however, objects: our "I" cognizes the object, *acting on it from its side*. The thought of Marx is quite correct; even *Faust* said: "*in the beginning it was.*" Of course, one can argue in defence of Feuerbach that, after all, in the process

of *our influence* on objects we know their properties only insofar as they, for their part, affect us. In both cases, *thinking* is preceded by *sensation*, in both cases we first *feel* their properties, and then we *think* about them. But Marx did not deny this. For him, the point was not the undeniable fact that sensation precedes reflection, but that a person is prompted to think mainly by the sensations that he experiences in the process of his influence on the outside world. And since this effect on the outside world is prescribed to him by his struggle for his existence, the theory of knowledge is closely connected with Marx with his materialistic view of the cultural history of mankind. It is not for nothing that the very thinker who directed the thesis that interests us here against Feuerbach wrote in the first volume of his *Capital*: "By acting on nature outside of it, man changes his own nature." This position reveals all its deep meaning only in the light of the Marxian theory of knowledge. And we will see how strongly this theory of his is confirmed by the history of cultural development and even, by the way, the science of language. But nevertheless, we must admit that the epistemology of Marx in a very straight line comes from the epistemology of Feuerbach, or, if you want, that it, in fact, is the epistemology of Feuerbach, but only deepened by the genius correction made to it by Marx. (*Plekhanov, Fundamental Questions of Marxism, pp. 15-16, 1931*)

## **Leninist Criticism of the Theory of Hieroglyphs Plekhanov**

In addition to what was said above about idealists, as comrades-in-arms and successors of empirio-criticism, it would be appropriate to note the nature of Machist criticism of some philosophical points raised in our literature. For example, our Machians, wishing to be Marxists, pounced with particular joy on Plekhanov's "hieroglyphs," that is, on a theory according to which the sensations and representations of man are not copies of real things and processes of nature, not their image, but conventional signs, symbols, hieroglyphs, etc. Bazarov ridicules this hieroglyphic materialism, and it must be noted that *he would be right* if he rejected hieroglyphic materialism in favour of *materialism* non-hieroglyphic. But here again Bazarov uses a trick technique, smuggling his renunciation of materialism under the flag of criticism of "hieroglyphism". Engels speaks neither of

symbols, nor of hieroglyphs, but of copies, pictures, images, mirror images of things. Instead of showing the fallacy of Plekhanov's deviation from the formulation of materialism by Engels, Bazarov obscures the reader's truth of Engels from Plekhanov's mistake.

To clarify Plekhanov's mistake and Bazarov's confusion, let's take one major representative of the "theory of symbols" (Helmholtz doesn't change things from replacing a word with a hieroglyph) and see how the materialists and idealists criticized Helmholtz together with the Machists.

Helmholtz, the largest value in natural science, was inconsistent in philosophy, like the vast majority of natural scientists. He was inclined towards Kantianism, but even this point of view did not consistently withstand in his epistemology. Here, for example, from his "Physiological Optics" reasoning on the topic of correspondence of concepts with objects: "... I designated sensations as *symbols* of external phenomena and I rejected after them any analogy with the things that they represent" (p. 579 French. transl., p. 442 German original). This is agnosticism, but further on the same page we read: "Our concepts and ideas are the essence of *action*" that produce on our nervous system and on our consciousness the objects that we see or that we imagine. This is materialism. Only Helmholtz unclearly imagines the relation of absolute and relative truth, as can be seen from his further arguments. For example, Helmholtz says somewhat lower: "I think, therefore, that it makes no sense to talk about the truth of our ideas in a different way than in the sense of *practical* truth. The ideas that we make up about things *cannot be* nothing but symbols, natural designations for objects, which designations we learn to use to regulate our movements and our actions. When we learn to decipher these symbols in the right way, we find ourselves able, with their help, to direct our actions in such a way as to obtain the desired result" ... This is not true: Helmholtz is heading here towards subjectivism, to the denial of objective reality and objective truth. And he comes to glaring falsehood when he concludes the paragraph with the words: "The idea and the object represented by it are two things that obviously belong to two completely different worlds" ...Only Kantians break the idea and reality, consciousness and nature. However, we read a little further: "As for, first of all, the qualities of external objects, then a little thought is enough to see, *the effect of* external objects either on our senses or on other objects of nature" (pp. 580- 581 French transl.; pp. 443-445 German original; I translate from the French translation). Here again Helmholtz moves to

the materialistic point of view. Helmholtz was an inconsistent Kantian, now recognizing the a priori laws of thought, sometimes leaning towards the “transcendental reality” of time and space (that is, to a materialistic view of them), then deriving human sensations from external objects acting on our senses, then declaring sensations only with symbols, that is, with some arbitrary designations divorced from the “completely different” world of designated things (cf. Victor Heyfelder, *Ueber den Begriff der Erfahrung bei Helmholtz*, Brl. 1897) [V. Geifelder, On the concept of experience with Helmholtz, Berlin 1897.—Ed.].

Here is how Helmholtz expresses his views in a 1878 speech on “facts in perception” (“a major phenomenon in a realistic camp,” as Leclair called this speech): “Our sensations are precisely the actions that are caused in our organs by external causes, and even that the circumstance of how such an action is detected depends, of course, very significantly on the nature of the apparatus on which the action is exerted. Since the quality of our sensation gives us news about the properties of the external influence that this sensation is caused by, sensation can be considered as a *sign* (Zeichen) of it, but not a *picture*. For the image requires a certain resemblance to the depicted object ... But the sign does not require any resemblance to what it is a sign of” (Vorträge und Reden, 1884, S. 226 [Reports and speeches, vol. II, p. 226, 1884. - Ed.] of the second volume). If sensations are not images of things, but only signs or symbols that do not have “any resemblance” to them, then the original materialistic premise of Helmholtz is undermined, the existence of external objects is questioned, for signs or symbols are quite possible with respect to imaginary objects, and any knows examples of *such* signs or symbols. Helmholtz, following Kant, attempts to draw a semblance of a fundamental distinction between “appearance” and “thing in itself”. Helmholtz has an insurmountable prejudice against direct, clear, open materialism. But he says a little further: “I do not see how it would be possible to refute the system of the most extreme subjective idealism, which would wish to consider life as a dream. You can declare it unbelievable, unsatisfactory, as much as possible - I would join in this regard the strongest expressions of denial - but it can be consistently held ... *Realistic hypothesis*, on the contrary, trusts the utterance (or: testimony, Aussage) of ordinary self-observation, according to which changes in perception following a certain action have no psychic connection with the previous impulse of will. This hypothesis considers, as existing, regardless of our ideas,

all that is confirmed by daily perceptions, the material world outside of us. Undoubtedly, the realistic hypothesis is the simplest that we can compose, tested and confirmed on extremely wide fields of application, precisely defined in its individual parts and therefore highly suitable and fruitful, as the basis for action "(242-243). Helmholtz's agnosticism also resembles "bashful materialism," with Kantian attacks in contrast to Huxley's Berkeley attacks.

The follower of Feuerbach, Albrecht Pau, therefore strongly criticizes the Helmholtz symbol theory as an inconsistent departure from "realism." Helmholtz's main view, says Rau, is a realistic premise, according to which "we can use the senses to understand the objective properties of things" [*Albrecht Rau*, *Empfinden und Denken*, S. 304, Giessen 1896. (A. Pay, *Impressions and Thoughts*, p. 304. Giessen 1896. - *Ed.* )]. The theory of symbols does not put up with such a (wholly materialistic, as we saw) view, for it introduces a certain distrust of sensuality, distrust of the testimonies of our senses. It is indisputable that the image can never completely equal the model, but the image is one thing, the symbol is the other thing, the *symbol*. An image necessarily and inevitably assumes the objective reality of what is being "displayed". "Conditional sign", symbol, hieroglyph are the concepts that introduce a completely unnecessary element of agnosticism. And therefore A. Rau is absolutely right in saying that Helmholtz pays tribute to Kantianism by the theory of symbols. "If Helmholtz," Pay says, "remained true to his realistic view, if he consistently held to the principle that the properties of bodies express both the relations of the bodies between themselves and their relations to us, then he obviously would not need all this symbol theory; he could then, speaking briefly and clearly, say: "The sensations that are caused in us by things are the essence of the image of the essence of these things" (*ibid.* , p. 320).

This is how the materialist criticizes Helmholtz. He rejects the hieroglyphic or symbolic materialism or semi-materialism of Helmholtz in the name of Feuerbach's consistent materialism. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII , p. 190-193.*)

## **The Defence of Plekhanov's Mistakes by Representatives of Mechanism and Menshevik Idealism**

Lenin was absolutely right in his objection to the theory of symbols or hieroglyphs. *The reader knows that Plekhanov, generally speaking, does not stand on the hieroglyphic point of view and that he recognized his terminology as incorrect, because Plekhanov's whole business was reduced only to the terminology, and not to the substance of the issue.* The theory of symbols, of course, leads to idealism. (*Deborin, Lenin as a Thinker, p. 52, Guise, 1929, 3rd ed.*)

*"... Our ideas about the forms and relationships of things are nothing more than hieroglyphs; but these hieroglyphs accurately indicate these forms and relationships, and this is enough so that we can study the actions on us of things in ourselves and, in turn, influence them."*

So wrote Plekhanov; it was *he who spoke of the correspondence of subjective phenomena to objective, consciousness to being; is it I repeat.*

*Plekhanov continued to stand on this point of view even after Lenin opposed him; he wrote: "... I am very sorry that even the opponent of idealism, Vladimir Ilyich, found it necessary to walk in his book" Materialism, etc. "against my characters. "Plekhanov refused only his old terminology.*

He wrote ("Materialismus militans"): *"Although a thing in itself has a colour only when they look at it, but if the rose has this condition in red, and the cornflower is blue, then it is clear that the reasons for this difference must be sought in the differences in the properties possessed by those things in themselves—one of which we call a rose and the other a cornflower—regardless of the subject looking at them."*

Whether Plekhanov is at variance with materialism, let the reader judge.

*In my books, I clearly develop Plekhanov's point of view and show what is meant by correspondence. I see a red banner. "Red" is my sensation (subjective phenomenon), which corresponds to a certain objective process in me caused by the ether vibrations acting on me. The banner has the property, quite objective, in no way subjective, to cause a certain kind of movement in the ether medium.*

*But only in the interaction of etheric vibrations with specially organized matter and a sensing object, that is, with the subject, does "red" appear, which is not objective.* This is a provision that I literally chew in my books, Comrade Stolyarov literally swallowed everything without a trace, presenting to readers only one thing: that Comrade Sarabyanov recognized the existence of subjective non-

spatial phenomena and ... no more. A good way to polemicize, nothing to say! But one can also argue very fruitfully on this issue without disfiguring the enemy, and I will help Comrade Stolyarov understand what the real difficulty of the problem is.

*That the presentation of an object is red, cool, sweet, etc. is not at all a copy of an object, it is indisputable for me personally.*

*There is no doubt that the sound “la” or “do” is not such and such a wave, but only a subjective reaction to this wave, sensation, hieroglyph, according to Plekhanov’s old unsuccessful terminology .*

But we are also talking about weight, volume, “age”, etc. of objects. That volume is not a sensation is also beyond dispute. What is the relation of our idea of the weight or volume of an object to objective weight or volume? Is there a copy of the first from the second or a correspondence?

*Comrade Stolyarov thinks that I will not venture to say out loud about my divergence with Lenin or Engels. He is mistaken. Not every comma even for Lenin has a law for me. And in this case, I resolutely stood up and stand on the point of view of Plekhanov [Underlined by the compiler.—Ed .]. ( Sarabyanov, journal, “p. 3. M.,” No. 6, 1926, pp. 64–65. Emphasized by the Compilers ).*

## **The Concept of “Experience”**

All ideas are borrowed from experience, reflections—true or distorted—of reality.

Two kinds of experience—external, material and internal—the laws of thinking and forms of thinking. And the forms of thinking are partly inherited due to development (self-evident, for example, mathematical axioms for Europeans, but certainly not for Bushmen and Australian blacks).

If our premises are true and if we correctly apply the laws of thought to them, then the result must correspond to reality, just as the calculation in analytical geometry must correspond to the geometric construction, although both are completely different methods. But, unfortunately, this almost never happens, or it is achieved only in completely simple actions.

The external world, in turn, is either nature or society.

Already a true reflection of *nature* is extremely difficult; it is the product of a long history of experience. The forces of nature seem to

primitive man as something miraculous, mysterious, overwhelming. At a certain stage through which all cultural peoples pass, he likens them to himself by means of personification. It is this desire for personification that has created gods everywhere, and the consensus gentium [the consent of the peoples], to which the proof of the existence of God refers, proves only the universality of this desire for personification as a necessary transitional stage, and therefore religion. Only a true knowledge of the forces of nature gradually crowds out gods or gods from everywhere (Secchi and his solar system). Currently, this process has moved so far that theoretically it can be considered complete.

In the field of social phenomena, reflection is even more difficult. Society is determined by economic relations, production and exchange, together with historical preconditions. (*Engels, Anti-Dühring, p. 269, 1932*)

\* \* \*

Let us now take a look at the use of the word: experience in empirio-critical philosophy. The first paragraph of the “Critique of Pure Experience” sets out the following “assumption”: “any part of our environment is so attuned to human individuals that if it appears, then they declare their experience: “*I know this and that by experience*”; “*Such and such is experience*”; or “*stemmed from experience*”, “*depends on experience*” (p. I Russian translation). So, experience is defined all through the same concepts: *I* and the environment, and the “doctrine” of their “inextricable” connection is hidden for the time being under the cover. Further, the “Synthetic concept of pure experience”: “namely experience, as such a statement, *to which, in all its composition, only parts of the environment serve as a prerequisite*”(1-2). If we accept that the environment exists independently of the “statements” and “statements” of a person, then the opportunity opens up for interpreting experience materialistically! ”Analytical concept of pure experience”: “just like such a statement, *to which nothing is mixed up, which, in turn, would not be experience, and which, therefore, is nothing more than experience*” (2). Experience is experience. And there are people who take this quasi-scientific nonsense for true thought!

It should be added that Avenarius in the second volume of “Critics of pure experience” considers “experience” as a “special case” of the *mental* that he shares experience with sachhafte Werte

(material values) and gedankenhafte Werte (mental values), that “experience in the broad sense” includes these latter, that “complete experience” is identified with principle coordination (“Bemerkungen”). In a word: “whatever you want, you ask.” “Experience” covers both the materialistic and idealistic line in philosophy, sanctifying their confusion. If our Machists trustingly accept “pure experience” at face value, then in philosophical literature representatives of different directions equally indicate abuses of this concept by Avenarius. “What is pure experience,” writes A. Riel, “Avenarius remains uncertain, and his statement: “pure experience is such an experience that is not mixed up with anything that, in turn, would not be experience”, “clearly spinning in a circle” (Systematische Philosophie, Lpz. 1907. S. 102). The pure experience of Avenarius, Wundt writes, either means any fantasy, or utterances with the character of “thingness” (Phil. Studien, XIII Band, S. 92-93). Avenarius *stretches* the concept of experience (S. 382). ”From the precise definition of terms: experience and pure experience,” writes Kovelart, “the meaning of this whole philosophy depends. Avenarius does not give such an exact definition” “Rev. neo-scholastique”, 1907, fevr., p. 61). ”The ambiguity of the term: experience provides good services to Avenarius in dragging idealism under the guise of fighting it,” says Norman Smith (“Mind”, vol. XV, p. 29).

“I declare solemnly: the inner meaning, the soul of my philosophy is that man has nothing at all but experience; man comes to everything that he comes to, only through experience “... Isn’t it true what an ardent philosopher of pure experience it is? The author of these words is the subjective idealist I. G. Fichte (“Sonn. Ber. Etc.”, S. 12). From the history of philosophy it is known that the interpretation of the concept of experience separated the classical materialists and idealists. Currently, professorial philosophy of all kinds of shades puts its reactionariness on the outfits of recitation about “experience”. All immanentists refer to experience. Mach praises in the preface to the 2nd edition of his “Knowledge and Delusion” a book by Professor W. Jerusalem in which we read: “Acceptance of the divine primacy is not contrary to any experience” (“Der krit. Id. Etc.”, S. 222) .

You can only feel sorry for the people who believed Avenarius and <sup>on</sup>, as if by the word “experience” can surpass the “obsolete” distinction between materialism and idealism. If Valentinov and Yushkevich accuse Bogdanov, who slightly backtracked on pure Machism, of misusing the word experience, then these gentlemen find here only their ignorance. Bogdanov is “innocent” on this point:

he *only* slavishly adopted the confusion of Mach and Avenarius. When he says: “consciousness and direct psychic experience are identical concepts” (“Empiriomonism”, II, 53), matter is “not experience”, but “unknown, which causes all that is known” (“Empiriomonism”, III, VIII),—then he interprets experience *idealistically*. And he, of course, is not the first and not the last to build idealistic systems on the word experience. When he objects to reactionary philosophers, saying that attempts to go beyond experience only lead to empty abstractions and contradictory images, all the elements of which were nevertheless taken from experience (“I, 48), he contrasts the empty abstractions of human consciousness with that that exists outside of man and independently of his consciousness, that is, he interprets experience materialistically.

In the same way, Mach, with the initial point of view of idealism (bodies are complexes of sensations or “elements”), often gets lost on the materialistic interpretation of the word experience. “It’s not philosophical (nicht aus uns herausphilosophiren),” he says in “Mechanics” (3rd German ed., 1897, S. 14), “but from experience”. Experience here is opposed to philosophizing from oneself, that is, it is interpreted as something objective, given from outside to man, it is interpreted materialistically. Another example. “What we observe in nature is imprinted in our ideas, at least *incomprehensible* and *not analysed* by us, and these ideas then in their most general and stable (stärksten) features imitate (nachahmen) the processes of nature. We have in this experience such a reserve (Schatz), which we always have at hand ... “(*ibid.*, S. 27). Here nature is taken for the primary, sensations and experience—for the derivative. If Mach had consistently held such a point of view in the basic questions of epistemology, then he would have saved mankind from many stupid idealistic “complexes”. Third example: “The close connection of thought with experience is created by modern natural science. Experience begets thought. It is developed further and again compared with experience”, etc. (Erkenntnis und Irrthum, S. 200). Mach’s special “philosophy” is thrown overboard, and the author spontaneously switches to the usual point of view of natural scientists who look at experience materialistically.

Bottom line: the word “experience,” on which the Machians build their systems long ago served as a shield for idealist systems, and now serves Avenarius and <sup>on</sup> to the eclectic transition from idealistic positions to materialism and back. The various “definitions” of this concept express only those two main lines in philosophy that Engels

so vividly revealed. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, p. 121-123, ed. 3rd.*)

## **Plekhanov's Mistake Regarding the Concept of "Experience"**

On pages X-XI of his preface to "L. Feuerbach" (ed. 1905) Plekhanov says:

"One German writer remarks that for empirio-criticism, *experience* is only a subject of research, and not a means of cognition at all. If this is so, then the opposition of empirio-criticism to materialism is meaningless, and discussions on this topic that empirio-criticism is called upon to replace materialism turn out to be empty and idle."

This is one continuous confusion.

Fr. Karstienne, one of the most "orthodox" followers of Avenarius, says in his article on empirio-criticism (Wundt's answer) that "for the Critique of Pure Experience," experience is not a means of cognition, but only a subject of study "[*Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie* ", Jahrg. 22, 1898, S. 45. ("Three Months of Scientific Philosophy," ed. 22, 1898, p. 45.—*Ed.* )]. It turns out, according to Plekhanov, that the opposition of the views of Fr. Karstienne materialism loses its meaning!

Fr. Karstienne almost literally retells Avenarius, who in his "Remarks" strongly contrasts his understanding of experience as that which is given to us that we find (*das Vorgefundene*)—a view of experience as a "means of cognition" in the "sense of dominants, in essence completely metaphysical, theories of knowledge" (Ic, S. 401). Following Avenarius and Petzoldt, the same thing is said in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Pure Experience (vol. I, S. 170). It turns out, according to Plekhanov, that contrasting the views of Karstienne, Avenarius and Petzoldt with materialism is meaningless! Either Plekhanov has not "finished reading" Karstienne and Co. or he took his reference to "a German writer" from the fifth hand.

What does this statement of the most prominent empirio-critics not understood by Plekhanov mean? Karstienne wants to say that Avenarius, in his Critique of Pure Experience, takes the *subject of study* as experience, that is, all sorts of "human

statements". Avenarius does not investigate here, says Carstanién (S. 50 cit. Art.), Whether these statements are real or they relate, for example, to *ghosts* ; he only groups, systematizes, formally classifies all kinds of human statements *and idealistic and materialistic* (S. 53), without entering into the essence of the issue. Karstienne is absolutely right in calling *this* the point of view of "predominantly scepticism" (S. 213). Karstanyen, among other things, defends his dear teacher in this article from the shameful (from the point of view of a German professor) accusation of materialism thrown by Wundt.

What materialists we are, have mercy! - this is the meaning of Karstanyen's objections—if we are talking about "experience", then it's not at all in the usual, common sense that leads or could lead to materialism, but in the sense of our study of all that people "express" as experience. Karstanyen and Avenarius consider the view of experience, as a means of cognition, materialistic (this may be the most common, but still incorrect, as we saw on the example of Fichte). Avenarius fenced off from that "prevailing" "metaphysics", which stubbornly considers the brain an organ of thought, ignoring theories of introjection and coordination.

By the data we find or (*das Vorgefundene*) Avenarius means precisely the inextricable connection between the *self* and the environment, which leads to a confused idealistic interpretation of "experience".

So, under the word "experience", undoubtedly, the materialistic and idealistic line in philosophy can also be hidden, as well as the Humean and Kantian lines, but not the definition of experience as an object of research [It seemed to Plekhanov that Karstanyen said: "The object of cognition is independent from knowledge", and not "the subject of research"? Then it would be really materialism. But neither Karstanyen, nor anyone at all, familiar with empirio-criticism, said or could not say such a thing.], Nor his definition as a means of cognition, still does not solve anything in this regard. Specially, the remarks of Karstanyen against Wundt have absolutely nothing to do with the question of opposing empirio-criticism to materialism.

As a curiosity, we note that Bogdanov and Valentinov, answering Plekhanov on this point, found not the best knowledge. Bogdanov stated: "it is not entirely clear" (III, p. XI), "it is the business of empirio-critics to understand this wording and accept or not accept the condition." Advantageous position: I'm not a Machist and I don't have to understand the sense in which Avenarius or Karstanyen is talking about the experience! Bogdanov wants to use Machism (and

the Machist confusion with “experience”), but does not want to be responsible for it.

The “pure” empirio-critic Valentinov wrote out the Plekhanov note and publicly danced the cancan, making fun of the fact that Plekhanov did not name the writer and did not explain what the matter was (pp. 108–109 cit.). At the same time, this empirio-critical philosopher *did* not answer *a word* in essence, admitting that he “re-read three times, if not more,” Plekhanov’s note (and, obviously, did not understand anything). Well, and the Machians! (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, pp. 124-125, ed. 3rd.*)

## **The Value of Sensory and Mental Moments in Cognition**

*Cognition.* Ants have different eyes than ours, they see chemical (?) Rays (Nature, June 8, 1882, Lebbcock), but in the knowledge of these rays invisible to us, we went much further than ants, and the fact that we can prove that ants *see* things that are invisible to us, and that the proof of this is based on the perceptions of *our* eyes, shows that the special arrangement of the human eye is not an absolute boundary for human cognition.

Not only other feelings join our eye, but also the activity of our thinking. Regarding the latter, it is necessary to say the same as with respect to the eye. To find out what our thinking can achieve, there is no need at all, a hundred years after Kant, to determine the boundaries of thinking from criticism of the mind, from the study of the instrument of knowledge; Helmholtz does the wrong thing when he sees in the insufficiency of our vision (which is necessary: an eye that would see *everything* rays, that’s why I wouldn’t see anything) and in the structure of our eye, which sets certain limits for our vision, and even within these limits does not give full accuracy of vision, is evidence that the eye gives us false or inaccurate information about the properties of what we see. What thinking can achieve, we see rather from what it has already achieved and still achieves daily. And this is quite sufficient both in terms of quantity and in terms of quality. On the contrary, the study of *forms of* thinking, rational definitions is a very grateful and necessary task, and only Hegel systematically performed it after Aristotle.

Of course, we will never know *how* chemical beams appear to ants. Whom this upsets, there is nothing to help. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 100, Partizdat, 1932*)

## **Representation and Thinking**

“Stands before consciousness without mutual contact” (subject)—this is the essence of anti-dialectics. Here, it was only as if Hegel had stuck out the donkey ears of idealism—attributing time and space (in connection with the idea) to something *lower* against *thinking*. However, in a *certain* sense, the idea, of course, is lower. The bottom line is that thinking must *encompass* all the “representation” in its movement, and *for this*, thinking must be dialectical. Is representation *closer* to reality than thinking? Yes and no. Representation cannot capture movements in *general*, for example, does not capture movements with a speed of 300,000 *km* in 1 second, and *thinking* grasps and must grab. Thinking taken from the concept also reflects reality; time is a form of being of objective reality. Here, in the concept of time (and not in relation to representation to thinking), Hegel’s idealism. (*The Lenin Collection IX, pp. 287–289, 1st ed.*)

## **Neglect of Theory Leads to Spiritualism.**

Contempt for dialectics does not go unpunished. No matter how much one neglects any theoretical thinking, it is still impossible to relate any two natural facts to one another or to comprehend the connection existing between them. In this case, only one thing is important: whether they think correctly or not, and neglect of the theory is, of course, the most reliable way to think in a naturalistic way and, therefore, is wrong. But wrong thinking, brought to the end, leads inevitably, according to the long-known dialectic law, to a contradiction with its starting point. And thus, empirical contempt for dialectics is punished by the fact that some of the most sober empiricists fall prey to the wildest of all superstitions—modern spiritualism. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 67, ed. 1922*)

## Practice Proves Necessity

A single empirical observation can never prove sufficient in a necessary way. Post hoc, but not propter hoc. (Enz., I, p. 84). This is so true that from the constant rising of the sun in the morning it does not at all follow that it will rise tomorrow, and indeed we now know that there will come a moment when the sun *does not rise* one fine morning. But the proof of the need lies in human activity, in experiment, in work: if I can *do* some post hoc, then it becomes the same with propter hoc. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature*, p. 122, 1932)

## Partisan Theory

... The thoughts of the ruling class are in every era dominant thoughts, that is, the class, which is the dominant *material* force of society, is at the same time its dominant *spiritual* force. The class, which can manage the means of material production, has at the same time thanks to this means of spiritual production, so that thanks to this, it dominates in general at the same time the thoughts of those who do not have means for spiritual production. Dominant thoughts represent nothing more than an ideal expression of dominant material relations, represent dominant material relations expressed in the form of thoughts, that is, relations that make one particular class dominant, that is, represent thoughts of its domination. (*Marx and Engels, About L. Feuerbach, "Archives of Marx and Engels," Prince. 1, p. 230, 1930*)

The teachings of Marx evoke the greatest enmity and hatred of the whole bourgeois (both treasury and liberal) science, which sees in Marxism something like a "harmful sect." No other relationship can be expected, for there can be no "impartial" social science in a society built on the class struggle. One way or another, but *all* official and liberal science *defends* wage slavery, and *Marxism has declared a merciless war on this slavery*. Expecting an impartial science in a society of wage slavery is as stupid a naivety as expecting an impartiality by factory owners on the question of whether workers should increase their wages and reduce capital gains. (*Lenin, Three*

*sources and three components of Marxism, Op., Vol. XVI, p. 349, ed. 3rd)*

## **Bourgeois Philosophy Expresses the Class Interests of the Capitalists.**

Dietzgen, the father, who should not be confused with his as pretentious as the unfortunate writer-son, expressed correctly, accurately and clearly the main point of view of Marxism on the philosophical trends prevailing in bourgeois countries and among their scholars and publicists, saying that professors of philosophy in modern society are, in most cases, in reality nothing more than “certified lackeys of the clergy”.

Our Russian intellectuals, who like to consider themselves advanced, as well as their brothers in all other countries, really do not like to transfer the issue to the plane of the assessment given by Dietzgen. But they do not like this because the truth pierces their eyes. It is enough to think a little about the state, then general economic, then everyday and all sorts of other dependence of modern educated people on the ruling bourgeoisie to understand the absolute correctness of the sharp characterization of Dietzgen. It is enough to recall the vast majority of fashionable philosophical trends that so often arise in European countries, starting from at least those that were associated with the discovery of radium, and ending with those that now strive to cling to Einstein in order to imagine the connection between class interests and class position the bourgeoisie her support of all forms of religion and the ideological content of fashionable philosophical trends. It can be seen from the above that a magazine that wants to be an organ of militant materialism must be a militant organ, first of all, in the sense of steadily exposing and prosecuting all modern “certified lackeys of priesthood,” it does not matter whether they act as representatives of official science or in as free shooters who call themselves “democratic left or ideologically socialist” publicists. (*Lenin, On the Importance of Militant Materialism, Op., Vol. XXVII, p. 183, ed. 3rd*)

The storm caused by E. Haeckel’s “World Riddles” in all civilized countries, remarkably vividly revealed the *partisanship* of philosophy in modern society, on the one hand, and the real social

significance of the struggle of materialism with idealism and agnosticism on the other. *Hundreds of thousands of* copies of the book immediately translated into all languages, published in specially cheap editions, showed first-hand that this book “went to the people”, that there are masses readers, who immediately attracted E. Haeckel to his side. The popular book became an instrument of the class struggle. Professors of philosophy and theology of all countries of the world began to smash and destroy Haeckel in thousands of ways. The famous English physicist Lodge set out to defend God from Haeckel. The Russian physicist, Mr. Hvolson, went to Germany to publish there a vile black-hundred-fold pamphlet against Haeckel and assure the esteemed gentlemen of the philistines that not all natural sciences now stand on the point of view of “naive realism” [O.D. Chwolson, Hegel, Haeckel, Kossuth und das zwölfte Gebot. 1906. Cf. S. 80 ( O. D. Hvolson, Hegel, Haeckel, Kossuth and the Twelfth Commandment. 1906, p. 80.—Ed.)]. There are no numbers of those theologians who have taken up arms against Haeckel. There is no such fierce abuse that would not be showered by his professed professors of philosophy [Broshyurk *Heinrich Schmidt* “The struggle for the “*World Riddles*” (Bonn, 1900) gives a good picture of the campaign of professors of philosophy and theology against Haeckel. But this brochure has already become very outdated now.]. It is fun to watch how these mummies, dried up on a dead scholasticism — perhaps for the first time in their lives — have their eyes lit up and their cheeks rosy from the slaps that Ernst Haeckel gave them. Priests of pure science and the most abstract, it would seem, theory directly groan from rage, and in all this roar of philosophical bison (idealist Paulsen, immanent Remke, Kantian Adikes and others, their names are you, gentlemen, Vesey) one main motive is clearly heard: against the “*metaphysics*” of natural science, against “dogmatism”, against the “exaggeration of the value and significance of natural science” against the “natural historical *materialism*”. He is a materialist, he is his, he is a materialist, he is deceiving the public, not calling himself directly a materialist—that is what especially brings the venerable gentlemen of professors to frenzy. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, p. 284-285, 3rd ed.*)

## **The Limitations of Classical Political Economy**

Since 1848, capitalist production has developed rapidly in Germany and is now experiencing the fever of its speculative heyday. But in relation to our professional scientists, fate remains unforgiving. At a time when they could show impartiality in their pursuits of political economy, modern economic relations were absent in German reality. When these relations were created, this happened under conditions that already exclude the possibility of an impartial study of the subject within the framework of the bourgeois horizons. Since political economy is bourgeois, that is, since it considers the capitalist system not as a historically transient stage of development, but, on the contrary, as an absolute, final form of social production, it can only remain scientific until.

Take England. Its classical political economy refers to the period of the undeveloped class struggle. The last great representative of the English classical economy, Ricardo, consciously takes as the starting point of his research the antithesis of class interests, wages and profits, profits and land rents, naively considering this antithesis as the natural law of social life. At the same time, bourgeois science in the field of political economy has reached its last, inextricable limit. During the life of Ricardo and in contrast to him, criticism of bourgeois economy in the person of Sismondi came out [See my work: *Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie*, I. Auflage. Berlin 1859, p. 39. [See *K. Marx*, *Toward a Critique of Political Economy*. B-Marxist, p. 90, Guise, M. 1929]]. (*K. Marx*, *Capital*, vol. I, *Afterword to the second edition*, p. XVIII, 1932)

## **Bankruptcy of Bourgeois Political Economy**

The subsequent period, 1820-1830, is characterized in England by the scientific revival in the field of political economy. It was a period of vulgarization and the spread of Ricardian theory and at the same time its struggle with the old school. There were brilliant tournaments. What economists did at that time is little known on the European continent, since the controversy is mostly scattered in

journal articles, casual brochures and pamphlets. The circumstances of that time explain the impartial nature of this controversy, although in exceptional cases Ricardo's theory was already used as an instrument of attack on bourgeois economy. On the one hand, large-scale industry itself barely left the diaper during the period under review, as is already evident from the fact that only the crisis of 1825 began the periodic circuits of its modern life. On the other hand, the class struggle between capital and labour was relegated to the background: in the political field, it was overshadowed by the struggle between feudal lords and governments rallied around the Holy Union and between the masses led by the bourgeoisie; in the economic field, it was overshadowed by the feud between industrial capital and aristocratic land ownership, which in France was hidden behind the contradiction of interests of small and large land ownership, and in England it broke openly from the time of the grain laws. The English economic literature of this era resembles the period of the storm and the onslaught in France after the death of Dr. Quesnay—however, it recalls only in the sense in which Indian summer resembles spring. In 1830, a crisis ensued, with which everything was decided at once. In the political field it was obscured by the struggle between the feudal lords and the governments rallied around the Holy Union, and between the masses led by the bourgeoisie; in the economic field, it was overshadowed by the feud between industrial capital and aristocratic land ownership, which in France was hidden behind the contradiction of interests of small and large land ownership, and in England it broke openly from the time of the grain laws.

The bourgeoisie in France and England conquered political power. From this moment on, the class struggle, practical and theoretical, takes on ever more pronounced and threatening forms. At the same time, the death hour struck for scientific bourgeois economy. From now on, the question for the bourgeois economist is no longer whether this or that theorem is right or wrong, but whether it is useful for capital or harmful, convenient or inconvenient, consistent with police considerations or not. Selfless research gives way to the battles of hired writers, impartial scientific research is replaced by biased, obsequious apologetics (excuse). However, the pretentious tractants published by the Anti-Cornlawleague (League Against the Law of the Bread) with factory owners Cobden and Bright at the head, nevertheless, with their polemic against the landowning aristocracy, they were of a certain interest, if not scientific, then at

least historical. But since the time of Sir Robert Peel, this last sting has also been pulled out of vulgar economy by free-trade legislation.

Continental Revolution of 1848-1849 reflected in England. People who claimed scientific importance and were not satisfied with the role of simple sophists and sycophants of the ruling classes tried to reconcile the political economy of the capitalists with the claims of the proletariat, which could no longer be ignored. Hence the flat syncretism (the reconciliation of opposing views), of which John Stuart Mill is the best representative. This is the bankruptcy of the "bourgeois" political economy, as the great Russian scientist and critic N. Chernyshevsky already skilfully found out in his *Essays on Political Economy* by Mill.

Thus, in Germany, the capitalist mode of production matured only after its antagonistic (built on opposites) character was revealed in the noisy conflicts of the historical struggle that boiled in England and France, and the German proletariat already possessed a much more theoretically developed class consciousness than the German bourgeoisie. So, hardly had the conditions come under which the bourgeois science of political economy seemed possible, as it had already become impossible again.

Under such circumstances, her leaders were divided into two camps. Some wise practices, people of profit, rallied around the banner of Bastia - the most vulgar, and therefore the most successful representative of the vulgar-economic apologetics. Others, professorsly proud of the dignity of their science, followed John Stuart Mill in his attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. The Germans in the period of the decline of bourgeois political economy, as in its classical period, remained simple students, admirers and imitators of foreign countries, small distributors of the products of large foreign firms.

Thus, the features of the historical development of German society exclude the possibility of the original development of a "bourgeois" political economy, but not the possibility of criticizing it. Since such criticism generally represents a well-known class, it can represent only one class: one whose historical vocation is to revolutionize the capitalist mode of production and finally destroy the classes, that is, only the proletariat can represent. (*Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Afterword to the second edition, pp. XVIII-XX, 1932*)

## II. Marxist-Leninist Doctrine of Objective Truth

### Objective Truth

Bogdanov declares: “For me, Marxism contains a denial of the unconditional objectivity of any truth was, the denial of all eternal truths” (“*Empirio*”, Vol. III of, with. IV of the V.) What does it mean *absolute* objectivity? “Truth for all eternity” is “objective truth in the absolute sense of the word,” says Bogdanov there, agreeing to recognize only “objective truth only within a certain era.”

Two questions are clearly mixed here: 1) is there objective truth, that is, can there be content in human notions that does not depend on the subject, does not depend on either man or humanity? 2) If so, can human notions expressing objective truth express it immediately, entirely, absolutely, absolutely, or only approximately, relatively? This second question is the question of the relation between absolute and relative truth.

Bogdanov answers the second question clearly, directly and definitely, denying the smallest assumption of absolute truth and accusing Engels of *eclecticism* for such an assumption. This discovery of the eclecticism of Engels by A. Bogdanov will be discussed separately later. Now let us dwell on the first question, which Bogdanov, without saying this directly, also resolves negatively, for one can deny the relative element in certain human notions without denying objective truth, but one cannot deny absolute truth without denying the existence of objective truth.

“... The criterion of objective truth,” Bogdanov writes a little further, p. IX, - in the Beltian sense does not exist, truth is an ideological form - the organizing form of human experience”...

There is nothing to do with the “Beltian sense,” for it is a question of one of the main philosophical questions, not Beltov at all, nor a *criterion of* truth, which we must speak about separately, without confusing this question with the question of *whether* objective truth *exists*? Bogdanov’s negative answer to this last question is clear: if truth is *only an* ideological form, then there can be no truth independent of the subject, of humanity, for Bogdanov and I do not know any other ideology. And Bogdanov’s negative answer from the

second half of his phrase is even clearer: if truth is a form of human experience, then there can be no truth independent of humanity, there can be no objective truth.

The denial of objective truth by Bogdanov is agnosticism and subjectivity. The absurdity of this denial is obvious even from the above example of one natural-historical truth. Natural science does not allow to doubt that his assertion of the existence of the earth before humanity is the truth. This is quite compatible with the materialist theory of knowledge: the existence of an independent of the reflecting reflected (independence of the consciousness of the outside world) is the basic premise of materialism. The assertion of natural science that the earth existed before humanity is an objective truth. This position of natural science is irreconcilable with the philosophy of the Machians and with their teachings on truth: if truth is an organizing form of human experience, then the statement that the earth exists *outside of* it cannot be true. all human experience.

But this is not enough. If truth is only an organizing form of human experience, then, then, the doctrine of, say, Catholicism is also true. For there is not the slightest doubt that Catholicism is the “organizing form of human experience.” Bogdanov himself felt this blatant falsity of his theory, and it is extremely interesting to see how he tried to get out of the swamp into which he fell.

“The basis of objectivity,” we read in the 1st book of “Empiriomonism,” should lie in the realm of *collective* experience. We call objective data of experience that have the same vital value for us and for other people, that data on which we not only build our activities without contradiction, but on which, in our opinion, other people should be based so as not to come to the contradiction. The objective nature of the physical world is that it does not exist for me personally, but for everyone “(wrong! It exists *independently of*” everyone “)” and for everyone it has a certain meaning, in my opinion, the same as for me. The objectivity of the physical series is its *general validity*”(P. 25, italics by Bogdanov). “The objectivity of the physical bodies that we encounter in our experience is ultimately established on the basis of mutual verification and coordination of the statements of various people. In general, the physical world is a socially coordinated, socially harmonized, in a word, *socially organized experience*”(p. 36, Bogdanov’s italics).

We will not repeat that this is fundamentally wrong, idealistic definition, that the physical world exists independently of humanity

and from human experience, that the physical world existed when there could be no “sociality”, no “organization” of human experience, etc. We now dwell on exposing the Machist philosophy on the other hand: objectivity is defined in such a way that the doctrine of religion, undoubtedly possessing “universal validity”, is suitable for this definition. We will listen further to Bogdanov: “Once again I recall to their reader that “objective” experience is not at all that of “social” experience... Social experience is far from being socially organized and always contains various contradictions, so some parts of it are not consistent with others; goblins and brownies can exist in the sphere of social experience of a given people or a given group of people, for example, the peasantry; but because of this, it is still not necessary to include them in a socially organized or objective experience, because they do not harmonize with the rest of the collective experience and do not fit into its organizing forms, for example, into a chain of causality” (45).

Of course, we are very pleased that Bogdanov himself “does not include” social experience regarding goobies, brownies, etc., in objective experience. But this well-intentioned, in the spirit of denying fideism, correction does not at all correct the fundamental error of the entire Bogdanov’s position. The Bogdanov’s definition of objectivity and the physical world certainly falls, for the “universally valid” doctrine of religion is more than the doctrine of science: most of humanity is still held to this first doctrine. Catholicism is “socially organized, harmonized, agreed upon” by its centuries-old development; in the “chain of causality” he “fits” In the most undeniable way, because religions did not arise without cause, they are not kept by the mass of people under modern conditions by chance, professors of philosophy are quite “regular “to them. If this undoubtedly universally valid and undoubtedly highly organized socio-religious experience “does not harmonize” with the “experience” of science, then it means that there is a fundamental, fundamental difference between the two, which Bogdanov erased when he rejected objective truth. And no matter how Bogdanov “gets better”, saying that fideism or clericalism does not harmonize with science, it nevertheless remains an undeniable fact that Bogdanov’s denial of objective truth “harmonizes” entirely with fideism. Modern fideism does not at all reject science; he rejects only the “excessive claims” of science, namely, the claim to objective truth. If there is objective truth (as materialists think), if natural science, reflecting the external world in the “experience” of man, is only capable of giving

us objective truth, then any fideism is unconditionally rejected. If there is no objective truth, truth (including scientific) is only an organizing form of human experience, then the main premise of clericalism is recognized as this, the door is opened for it, and the place for “organizing forms” of religious experience is cleared.

The question is whether this denial of objective truth belongs personally to Bogdanov, who does not want to recognize himself as a Machist, or does it follow from the foundations of the teachings of Mach and Avenarius? This question can only be answered in the latter sense. If only sensation exists (Avenarius, 1876), if bodies are complexes of sensations (Mach in the Analysis of Sensations), then it is clear that we have philosophical subjectivity, which inevitably leads to the denial of objective truth. And if sensations are called “elements”, which in one connection give the physical, in the other—the psychic, then this, as we have seen, only confuses and does not reject the main starting point of empirio-criticism. Avenarius and Mach recognize sensations as the source of our knowledge. They become, therefore, on the point of view of empiricism (all knowledge from experience) or sensualism (all knowledge from sensations). But this point of view leads to a difference in fundamental philosophical trends, idealism and materialism, and does not eliminate their differences, no matter how “new” verbal outfit (“elements”) you clothe it with. Both the solipsist, i.e., the subjective idealist, and the materialist can recognize sensations as the source of our knowledge. Both Berkeley and Diderot left Locke. The first premise of the theory of knowledge, of course, is that the only source of our knowledge is sensation. Recognizing this first premise, Mach confuses the second important premise: about the objective reality given to a person in his sensations or being a source of human sensations. Based on sensations, one can follow the line of subjectivism leading to solipsism (“bodies are complexes or combinations of sensations”), and one can follow the line of objectivism leading to materialism (sensations are images of bodies, the external world). For the first point of view - agnosticism or a little further: subjective idealism - there can be no objective truth. For the second point of view, i.e., materialism, the recognition of objective truth is essential. This old philosophical question about two tendencies, or rather: about two possible conclusions from the premises of empiricism and sensualism, was not solved by Mach, not eliminated, not surpassed by him, but *confused* by means of linguistic fornication with the word “element”,

etc. The denial of objective truth by Bogdanov is the inevitable result of all Machism, and not deviation from it.

Engels in his “L. Feuerbach “calls Hume and Kant philosophers,” disputing the possibility of knowing the world, or at least its comprehensive knowledge. “Engels, therefore, highlights that which is common to Hume and Kant, and not that which separates them. At the same time, Engels points out that “the decisive factor for refuting this (Humean and Kantian) view has already been said by Hegel” (p. 14 of the fourth German edition). On this occasion, it seems to me not uninteresting to note that Hegel, declaring *materialism*” a consistent system of empiricism,” he wrote: “For empiricism, the external (das Aeusserliche) in general is true, and if then empiricism admits something supersensible, then it denies the knowability of it (soll doch eine Erkenntnis desselben (dh des Uebersinnlichen) nicht Statt finden könn ) and considers it necessary to adhere exclusively to that which belongs to perception (das der Wahrnehmung Angehörige). This basic premise, however, gave in its successive development (Durchführung) what was later called *materialism* . For this materialism, matter, as such, is truly objective “(das wahrhaft Objective) [Hegel, Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, Werke, VI Band (1840), S. 83, cf. S. 122. (Hegel, Essay on the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, Op., Vol. VI, p. 83, cf. p. 122.—Ed.)].

All knowledge is from experience, from sensations, from perceptions. This is true. But the question is: “does it belong to perception”, that is, is *objective reality* a source of perception ? If so, then you are a materialist. If not, then you are inconsistent and will inevitably come to subjectivity, agnosticism—it doesn’t matter whether you deny the knowability of a thing in yourself, the objectivity of time, space, causality (according to Kant) or not allow thoughts of a thing in yourself (according to Hume) the inconsistency of your empiricism, your philosophy of experience will then consist in the fact that you deny the objective content in the experience, the objective truth in experimental knowledge.

Supporters of the line of Kant and Hume (including the last Mach and Avenarius, since they are not pure Berkeley) call us materialists “metaphysicians” for recognizing the objective reality given to us in experience, recognizing an objective, independent of man, source our sensations. We, materialists, after Engels, call the Kantians and Humeans *agnostics* for denying objective reality as the source of our sensations. Agnostic is the Greek word: *which* means in Greek *not*;

gnosis is knowledge. Agnostic says: *I do not know* whether there is an objective reality reflected, reflected by our sensations, I declare it impossible to know this (see Engels' words above, which stated the position of an agnostic). Hence the negation of objective truth by an agnostic and tolerance, philistine, philistine, cowardly tolerance for the doctrine of goblin, house, Catholic saints and the like. Mach and Avenarius, pretentiously putting forward a "new" terminology, an allegedly "new" point of view, actually repeat, confused and confused, the answer of the agnostic: on the one hand, bodies are complexes of sensations (pure subjectivity, pure Berkeley); on the other hand, if we cross sensations into elements, we can think of their existence independently of our senses!

The Machists love to recite on the topic that they are philosophers who fully trust the testimonies of our senses, that they consider the world really to be what it seems to us, full of sounds, colours, etc., while for materialists, they say, the world is dead, it has no sounds and colours, it differs in itself from what it seems to be, etc. In such a recitation, for example, I. Petzoldt exercises both in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Pure Experience and in The Problem peace from a positivist point of view (1906). Mr. Petr Chernov chats after Petzoldt, admiring the "new" idea. In fact, the Machists are subjectivists and agnostics, because they are *not enough* trust the testimonies of our senses, inconsistently pursue sensualism. They do not recognize the objective, independent of man reality, as the source of our sensations. They do not see in the sensations a true shot from this objective reality, coming into direct conflict with natural science and opening the door for fideism. On the contrary, for a materialist, the world is richer, more vibrant, more diverse than it seems, for each step in the development of science opens up new aspects in it. For a materialist, our sensations are images of the only and last objective reality, the latter not in the sense that it has already been fully known, but in the fact that there can be no other than it. This point of view irrevocably closes the door not only for all fideism, but also for that professorial scholasticism, which, not seeing objective reality, as the source of our sensations, "Derives" through tortured verbal constructions the concept of the objective, as universally valid, socially organized, etc., etc., not being able to, and often not wanting to separate objective truth from the doctrine of goblin and house. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, pp. 99-105, ed. 3rd*)

## Absolute and Relative Truth

Is human thinking sovereign? Before answering this question in the affirmative or negative, we must first examine what human thinking is. Is it about the thinking of any particular individual? No. Human thinking exists only as the individual thinking of many billions of past, present and future people.

If now I unite in my view the thinking of all these people (including future generations here) and say that it is *sovereign*, that it is able to know the existing world, because humanity has a sufficiently long existence and since knowledge and boundaries will not be set by organs and objects knowledge—then I will say only something pretty banal and also pretty barren. After all, the most valuable result of this thought would be an extreme distrust of our current knowledge, because, in all likelihood, we are only at the very beginning of the history of mankind—and the generations that will have to correct *us* will, one must think, be much more numerous than generations, whose knowledge - often underestimating it—we are now correcting.

Herr Dühring himself considers it inevitable that consciousness—and therefore thinking and cognition—can only be found in a number of separate creatures. We can recognize the thinking of each such individual sovereign only insofar as we do not know any power that would be able to force to impose any thought in him in a healthy awake state. As for the sovereign nature of the knowledge of each individual, we all know that this is out of the question and that, judging by past experience, all this knowledge, without exception, contains much more elements that need to be corrected than those that do not need to be him or right.

In other words: the sovereignty of thinking is carried out in a number of extremely insecure-minded people; cognition claiming to be the unconditional truth—in a number of relative delusions; both this sovereignty and this knowledge can only be fully realized in the process of the endless existence of mankind.

Here again, as above, we have the same contradiction between the essence of human thinking, which we inevitably think is absolute, and its implementation in only limited-thinking individuals, a contradiction that finds its solution only in endless progress, in endless progress—at least practically for us—a successive change of human generations. In this sense, human thinking is as sovereign as it is

sovereign, its cognitive ability is as unlimited as it is limited. It is sovereign and unlimited in its inclinations, in its purpose, in its capabilities, in its historical ultimate goal; but it is not sovereign and limited in its individual implementation, according to reality given at one time or another.

The same can be said of eternal truths. If mankind went so far as to operate only with eternal truths, only with judgments that have sovereign significance and claims to unconditional truth, it would mean that it has reached the point where the infinity of the intellectual world is really and potentially exhausted and where therefore, the famous miracle of counted countlessness occurred.

But after all, there are such unchanging truths that any doubt in them seems to us tantamount to madness? Truths are like twice two four, the sum of the angles of the triangle is two straight lines, that Paris is in France, that a person who does not eat food will starve to death, etc. Does this mean that there are *eternal* truths, final truths in the last resort?

Of course they exist. In the old fashion, we can divide the entire field of cognition into three large departments. The first includes all sciences dealing with inanimate nature and accessible to more or less mathematical processing: mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, physics, chemistry. If someone is pleased to resort to magnificent words to denote very simple things, then we can say that *some of the* results of these sciences are eternal truths, final truths in the last resort; that's why these sciences are called *exact*. But far from all of their results are indicated in nature. Once so perfect mathematics, introducing variables in itself and extending the property of variability to the field of infinitely large and infinitesimal, committed the fall; she tasted the apple of knowledge, which opened before her a field of gigantic successes, but also delusions. The eternal state of absolute correctness, the irrefutable truth of all mathematical things, has sunk into eternity; the era of disagreement has opened, and we have come to the point where most people differentiate and integrate not because they understand what they are doing, but guided by pure faith, because the result so far has always been true. In astronomy and mechanics the situation is even worse; as for physics and chemistry, here we are surrounded on all sides by hypotheses, exactly in the centre of a bee swarm. But it should be so. In physics, we are dealing with the movement of molecules, in chemistry with the formation of molecules from atoms, and if the interference of light waves is not a fairy tale, then we absolutely have no hope of ever seeing these interesting

things with our own eyes. Final truths of last resort become surprisingly rare over time.

The situation is even worse in geology, which is mainly concerned with processes in which not only we, but not a single person were present. Therefore, obtaining the final truths in the last resort is very difficult, and the results are extremely scarce.

The second class of sciences includes sciences that study living organisms. An incredible variety of relationships and causal relationships reigns in this area, and not only each resolved issue raises a lot of new questions, but in general each issue can be resolved in most cases only in parts, by means of numerous, sometimes stretching for centuries of research. Moreover, the need to systematize the observed connections forces here every time again to surround the final truths in the last instance with a dense forest of hypotheses. What a long journey it took from Galen to Malpigi to correctly establish such a simple thing as blood circulation in mammals, how little we know about the origin of blood balls, and how much we still lack to establish, for example, rational relationship between the manifestation of the disease and its causes! Quite often, discoveries are added to this, such as the opening of a cell, forcing us to subject all the final truths in the field of biology to a complete revision and throw whole piles of them overboard. Therefore, one who wants to establish genuine, lasting truths here will have to be content with trivialities, such as: all people must die, all female mammals have mammary glands, etc.; he will not even have the right to say that digestion in higher animals is accomplished with the help of the stomach and intestinal canal, and not with the help of the head, for digestion requires centralized nervous activity in the head. forcing us to complete a complete revision of all final truths in the last instance in the field of biology and to throw whole piles of them overboard. Therefore, one who wants to establish genuine, lasting truths here will have to be content with trivialities, such as: all people must die, all female mammals have mammary glands, etc.; he will not even have the right to say that digestion in higher animals is accomplished with the help of the stomach and intestinal canal, and not with the help of the head, for digestion requires centralized nervous activity in the head. forcing us to complete a complete revision of all final truths in the last instance in the field of biology and to throw whole piles of them overboard. Therefore, one who wants to establish genuine, lasting truths here will have to be content with trivialities, such as: all people must die, all female mammals

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But the prospects of eternal truths in the third, historical group of sciences, studying, in their historical continuity and modern condition, the conditions of people's existence, social relations, legal and state forms with their ideal superstructure in the form of philosophy, religion, art, etc., are even more bleak. In organic nature, we are nevertheless dealing with a number of processes that, within the framework of our direct observation, are repeated quite correctly within very wide limits. Species of organisms have remained the same from the time of Aristotle. On the contrary, in the history of mankind - as soon as we leave the primitive state, the so-called Stone Age, the repetition of phenomena is not the rule, but the exception; and if such repetitions occur where, then it never happens under exactly the same circumstances. Is that for example, the fact of common ownership of land and the form of its decomposition, observed among all cultural peoples. Therefore, in the field of human history, our science is in an even more backward state than in biology. Not only that: if, as an exception, sometimes it is possible to understand the connection between the social and political forms of existence of an era, then this always happens when these forms have already half-survived, when they decompose. Consequently, knowledge in this area is essentially relative, for it is limited to the study of the connection and consequences of the known, existing only at a given time and these peoples and by their nature transient social and political forms. Therefore, one who begins to chase after the final truths in the last resort, for genuine, never-changing truths.

But it is remarkable that it is in this area that we most often come across imaginary eternal truths, final truths of the last resort, etc. That two, two, four, that birds have beaks, or the like, will be called eternal

truths only by those who gather from the presence of generally eternal truths to conclude that in the field of human history there are eternal truths, eternal morality, eternal justice, etc., claiming the same role and significance as mathematical theories and their applications. And we can be sure that in the first case this same friend of mankind will declare that all the previous manufacturers of eternal truths were to a greater or lesser extent donkeys and charlatans, that everyone was mistaken, everyone was wrong, but their errors, their mistakes are logical and prove, that truth and truth are *with him* that he, the now revealed prophet, has a ready, final truth in the last resort, eternal morality, eternal justice. All this has already been repeated so often that one can only wonder how so frivolous people can still be to believe this when it comes not only to others, but about themselves. And yet, in front of us, apparently, is another such prophet who, as expected, comes to high moral indignation when there are people who deny the possibility that an individual person could have the ultimate truth in the last resort. Such denial—even simple doubt—s a sign of weakness, reveals a wild confusion, insignificance, corroding scepticism; it is worse than naked nihilism, wild chaos, etc., etc., in the style of similar courtesies. Our prophet, like everyone like him,

We could also mention the sciences that study the laws of human thinking, i.e., logic and dialectics. But here, with eternal truths, things are no better. Mr. Dühring declares the dialectic proper pure nonsense, and the numerous books that have been written and will still be written on logic prove in abundance that the final truths here and there are not scattered in such abundance as others think.

However, we have nothing to be completely horrified by the fact that the modern stage of knowledge is as little final to us as all the previous ones. It already covers a huge mass of facts and requires a very great specialization from anyone who wants to get comfortable with any area of it. But one who applies the scale of genuine, unchanging, final truth in the last resort to knowledge that, by the nature of things, or will have to remain relative for many generations, only gradually reaching completion, or which, like cosmogony, geology, human history, will forever remain incomplete and incomplete, in view of the insufficiency of historical material,—he proves this only his own ignorance and misunderstanding, even if they do not serve as a true lining, as in this case, claim to own infallibility. Truth and error, like all logical categories moving in polar opposites, have absolute value only in an extremely limited area. We

already talked about this above, and Mr. Dühring might have known this at the slightest acquaintance with the first beginnings of dialectics, which treat just the insufficiency of all polar opposites. It is enough to begin to apply the opposite of truth and error outside the narrow field mentioned above, as it becomes relative and, therefore, unsuitable for strict scientific use; if, nevertheless, we try to consider it absolutely true outside this area, then we suffer a complete collapse: both poles of the opposite turn into each other, the truth becomes a delusion, the error becomes a truth. Take, for example, the famous Boyle's law, according to which the volume of gases at a constant temperature is inversely proportional to pressure. Reno found that this law is not applicable in known cases. If he were a philosopher of reality, he would have to say: Boyle's law is changeable, therefore, he is not at all true truth, therefore, he is a delusion. But in this case he would have made a far greater mistake than that contained in Boyle's law; his grain of truth would be lost in a heap of error; he would have turned his initially correct result into a delusion, in comparison with which Boyle's law, with its inherent particle of error, would be the truth. But Reno, as a real man of science, did not allow himself such childishness; he continued to work on and found that Boyle's law is generally true only approximately, and that in particular it loses its effect on gases that turn into a droplet-liquid state under pressure, and loses exactly when the pressure approaches the point where liquefaction occurs. Thus, it turned out that Boyle's law is correct only within certain boundaries. But is it absolutely, is it finally true within these boundaries? No physicist will dare to assert this. He will say that Boyle's law is valid within the known boundaries of pressure and temperature and for known gases. And he will not deny the possibility that within the framework of these narrow borders a new restriction will have to be made or the wording of the law will have to be altered altogether [Since I wrote these lines, my words have apparently already been confirmed. According to the latest research, produced by Mendeleev and Bogussky with the help of more accurate apparatuses, it was found that all constant gases exhibit a changing relationship between pressure and volume; for hydrogen at all pressures applied so far, the expansion coefficient turned out to be positive (the volume decreased more slowly than the pressure increased); atmospheric air and other gases studied were found to have a zero pressure point, so that with a lower pressure this coefficient was positive, with a larger one it was negative. Consequently, Boyle's law, which still retains its significance, will require its completion in the form of a number of

particular laws. (Now—in 1885—we also know that there are no “real” gases at all. All of them are brought into a droplet-liquid state.)). So therefore the situation with final truths in the last resort, for example, in physics. Therefore, truly scientific works usually avoid such dogmatic and moral expressions as “delusion” and “truth”, which are always found in works like “philosophy of reality”, where empty, worthless chatter wants to impersonate the sovereign result of sovereign thinking. (*Engels, Anti-Dühring, pp. 60-65, Partizdat, 1932*).

## What is True Knowledge

Negeli at first declares that we are not able to recognize real qualitative differences, and after that he immediately says that such “absolute differences” do not occur in nature! (Page 12.)

Firstly, each qualitative infinity represents numerous quantitative gradations, for example, shades of colours, hardness and softness, durability, etc., and although they are qualitatively different, they are accessible to measurement and cognition.

Secondly, there are not just qualities; there are only things that *have* qualities, and, moreover, infinitely many qualities. Two different things always have well-known common qualities (at least the property of corporeality); other qualities differ in degree; finally, other qualities may be completely absent from one of the things. If we begin to consider such two extremely different things - for example, some meteorite and some person - then we will achieve little, in the best case, that both are inherent in heaviness and other bodily properties. But between both of these things, you can insert an endless series of other natural things and natural processes that allow us to fill a series from a meteorite to a person and indicate each its place in the connection of nature and thus *to know* her. The Negeli himself agrees with this.

Thirdly, our various feelings could give us absolutely different qualitatively impressions. In this case, the properties that we would recognize through vision, hearing, smell, taste and touch would be completely different. But here, differences disappear as research progresses. It has long been recognized that the sense of smell and taste are related, interconnected feelings, perceiving interconnected, if not identical, properties; vision and hearing perceive wave

oscillations. Touch and sight complement each other so much that we can often predict its tactile properties based on the appearance of a thing. Finally, always the same “I” perceives in itself all these different sensory impressions, collecting them into a kind of unity; in the same way, these different impressions are delivered by the same thing, *its general* properties and, thus, giving the opportunity to know her. Therefore, the task of explaining these various properties that are accessible only to different senses, establishing a connection between them is the task of science, which until now had no reason to complain that we do not have one common feeling instead of five special senses or that we are unable to see either hear smells and tastes.

Wherever we look, we never meet in nature such “qualitatively or completely different areas” that we are told that they are incomprehensible. All the confusion comes from the confusion of quality and quantity. Negeli, standing on the prevailing mechanical point of view, considers all qualitative differences to be explained only when they can be reduced to quantitative differences (we will talk about this elsewhere); for him, quality and quantity are completely different categories. Metaphysics.

“We can know *only the finite*, etc.” This is absolutely true only insofar as only finite objects fall into the sphere of our knowledge. But this provision needs to be supplemented: “In essence, we can *know only the infinite*”. Indeed, all real, exhaustive knowledge consists only in the fact that in our thoughts we extract the unit from its oneness and translate it into a singularity, and from this latter into universality, lies in the fact that we find the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transient. But the form of universality is a form in itself of closure, and therefore infinity; it is the union of many finite things into the infinite. We know that chlorine and hydrogen under the action of light combine under certain conditions of temperature and pressure in a hydrochloric gas, giving an explosion; since we know this, we also know that this *happens*, under the above conditions, *everywhere* and *always*, and it makes no difference to us whether this happens once or is repeated millions of times on how many planets. The form of universality in nature is the *law*, and no one speaks so much *about the eternity of the laws of nature* as naturalists. Therefore, if the Negeli says that we make the finite incomprehensible, if we do not limit ourselves to studying only this finite, but mix the eternal with it, then it denies either the knowability of the laws of nature or their eternity. Every true knowledge of nature

is knowledge of the eternal, infinite, and therefore it is essentially absolute.

But this absolute knowledge has its own serious catch. Like the infinity of knowable matter, which is composed of only limbs, the infinity of absolute cognitive thinking is composed of an infinite number of finite human heads, which, with this endless work of cognition, make practical and theoretical mistakes, come from unsuccessful, one-sided, incorrect premises, go wrong, crooked, unreliable ways and often do not even recognize the truth, although they rest against her forehead (Priestley).

Therefore, the knowledge of the infinite is surrounded by two kinds of difficulties and is inherently an endless asymptotic process. And this is enough for us to have the right to say: infinity is as knowable as it is unknowable, and that's all we need.

In a comical way, the Negeli states the same thing: we are only able to know the finite, but we can know *all the finite*, falling within the scope of our sensory perception. The finite, falling into the sphere, etc., gives the infinite in total, for the Negeli *makes up his idea of the infinite precisely on the basis of this sum*. Without this finite, etc., he would have no idea of the infinite. (Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, pp. 251-252, 1932)

Marxism recognizes the relativity of knowledge in the sense of historical conventionality of the limits of their approximation to absolute truth.

Bogdanov's discovery was made by him in 1906 in the preface to the 3rd book of Empiriomonism. "Engels in Anti-Dühring," writes Bogdanov, "speaks *almost* in the sense in which I now characterized the relativity of truth" (p. V), that is, in the sense of denying all eternal truths," denying the unconditional objectivity of any truth". "Engels is wrong in his indecision, in that, through all his irony, he recognizes some, albeit miserable," eternal truths "(p. VIII). "Only inconsistency makes eclectic reservations here, as in Engels..." (p. IX). Let us cite one example of the refutation of Engels' eclecticism by Bogdanov. "Napoleon died on May 5, 1821," Engels says in Anti-Dühring ("chapter on eternal truths"), explaining to Dühring what to confine to, what Plattheiten, "planes" to be content with, who in historical sciences claims to discover eternal truths. And so Bogdanov protests to Engels as follows: "What is this" truth "? And what is "eternal" in it? The statement of a single correlation, which, perhaps, already has no real meaning for our generation, cannot serve as a starting point for any activity, leads nowhere "(p. IX). And on page

VIII: “Can *Plattheiten* be called *Wahrheiten*?” Are “planes” truths? Truth is a living organizing form of experience, it *leads* us somewhere in our work, gives us a fulcrum in the struggle of life. “

From these two quotations it is quite clearly seen that instead of a refutation of Engels. Bogdanov gives a *recitation*. If you can't argue that the provision “Napoleon died on May 5, 1821” erroneously or inaccurately, then you recognize it as true. If you do not claim that it could be refuted in the future, then you recognize this truth as eternal. To call such phrases an objection that truth is a “living organizing form of experience” means to pass off a simple *set of words* for philosophy. Did the earth have the story that geology sets out, or was the earth made in seven days? Is it really permissible to dodge phrases about “living” (what does this mean?) Truth that leads “somewhere”, etc., from this question? Does knowledge of the history of the earth and the history of mankind “have no real meaning”? After all, this is just pompous nonsense with which Bogdanov covers his *retreat*. For this is a retreat, when he undertook to prove that Engels' admission of eternal truths is eclecticism, and at the same time he only escapes the question with the noise and ringing of words, leaving not refuted that Napoleon really died on May 5, 1821 and what to consider this *truth* rebuttable in the future is ridiculous.

The example taken by Engels is very elementary, and anyone can easily come up with dozens of such examples of *truths* who are eternal, absolute, which only madmen can doubt (as Engels says, citing another similar example: “Paris is in France”). Why is Engels talking about “planes” here? Because he refutes and ridicules the dogmatic, metaphysical materialist Dühring, who did not know how to apply dialectics to the question of the relationship between absolute and relative truth. To be a materialist means to recognize the objective truth revealed to us by the senses. Recognizing the objective, that is, independent of man and humanity, truth means one way or another to recognize absolute truth. This “one way or another” separates the materialist metaphysician Dühring from the materialist dialectic Engels. Dühring right, left, on the most complicated questions of science in general and historical science in particular, he threw words: the last, final, eternal truth. Engels ridiculed him: of course,—he answered, —there are eternal truths, but it is not wise to use big words (*gewaltige Worte*) regarding simple things. In order to move materialism forward, we must abandon the vulgar game with the word: eternal truth, we must be able to dialectically pose and solve the question of the relationship between absolute and relative truth. That

is why there was a struggle thirty years ago between Dühring and Engels. But Bogdanov, who contrived “not one must be able to dialectically pose and solve the question of the relationship between absolute and relative truth. That is why there was a struggle thirty years ago between Dühring and Engels. But Bogdanov, who contrived “not one must be able to dialectically pose and solve the question of the relationship between absolute and relative truth. That is why there was a struggle thirty years ago between Dühring and Engels. But Bogdanov, who contrived “not to note” the explanation of the question of absolute and relative truth given by Engels *in the same chapter*,—Bogdanov, who managed to accuse Engels of “eclecticism” for admitting a situation that is elementary for *all* materialism,—Bogdanov only once again showed his absolute ignorance of materialism, no dialectic.

“We come to the question,” Engels writes at the beginning of the indicated chapter (chap. I, chap. IX) of *Anti-Dühring*, “can the products of human knowledge in general, and if so, which, have sovereign value and unconditional right (Anspruch) to the truth” (S. 79 of the fifth German edition). And Engels resolves this issue as follows:

“The sovereignty of thinking is carried out in a number of people who think extremely unsurely; cognition that has an unconditional right to truth—in a number of relative (relational) errors; neither one nor the other “(neither absolutely true knowledge, nor sovereign thinking) can be realized completely otherwise than with the infinite duration of human life.”

“We have here again the contradiction that we have already met above, the contradiction between the nature of human thinking, which seems absolute to us by necessity, and its implementation in individuals who think only in a limited way. This contradiction can only be resolved in such a series of successive human generations that for us, at least in practice, is endless. In this sense, human thinking is as sovereign as it is sovereign, and its cognitive capacity is as unlimited as it is limited. Sovereignly and unlimited in nature (or device, Anlage), vocation, opportunity, historical ultimate goal; unsuccessful and limited in its individual implementation, according to the reality given at one time or another “(81) [Cf. V. Chernov, name cit., p. 64 et seq. The Machist Mr. Chernov is fully in the position of Bogdanov, who does not want to recognize himself as a Machist. The difference is that Bogdanov is trying to cover up his discrepancy with Engels, to present it as an accident, etc., and

Chernov feels that this is a struggle with both materialism and dialectics.].

“In the same way,” Engels continues, “the situation is with eternal truths.”

This reasoning is extremely important on the issue of *relativism*, the principle of relativity of our knowledge, which is emphasized by all Machists. The Machists *all* insist that they are relativists—but the Russian Machists, repeating the words after the Germans, are afraid or unable to clearly and directly raise the question of the relation of relativism to dialectics. For Bogdanov (as well as for all Machians) the recognition of the relativity of our knowledge *excludes the* tiniest assumption of absolute truth. For Engels, absolute truth is composed of relative truths. Bogdanov is a relativist. Engels is a dialectician. Here is another equally important reasoning of Engels from the same chapter of *Anti-Dühring*.

“Truth and error, like all logical categories moving in polar opposites, have absolute value only within an extremely limited area; we have already seen this, and Mr. Dühring would have known this if he had been somewhat familiar with the beginnings of dialectics, with its first premises, treating precisely the insufficiency of all polar opposites. As soon as we begin to apply the opposition of truth and error outside the boundaries of the aforementioned narrow domain, this opposition will become relative (relational) and, therefore, unsuitable for an exact scientific method of expression. And if we try to use this opposition outside the specified area, as absolute, then we will completely fail: both poles of the opposition will each turn into their opposite, that is, the truth will become a delusion, error is true “(86). An example follows—Boyle’s law (the volume of gases is inversely proportional to pressure). The “grain of truth” contained in this law is only within certain limits of absolute truth. The law turns out to be “only approximately.”

So, human thinking by its nature is capable of giving and gives us absolute truth, which consists of the sum of relative truths. Each step in the development of science adds new grains to this sum of absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each scientific position are relative, being either moved apart or narrowed by a further growth of knowledge. “Absolute truth,” says I. Dietzgen in “Excursions,” “we can see, hear, smell, touch, undoubtedly also *know*, *but it does not enter wholly* (geht nicht auf) *into knowledge*” (S. 195). “It goes without saying that the picture does not exhaust the subject, that the artist remains behind his model... How can the picture “coincide”

with the model? Approximately yes "(197)." "We can only relatively (relationally) know nature and parts of it; for every part, although it is only a relative part of nature, still has the nature of the absolute, the nature of the natural whole in itself (des Naturganzen an sich), not exhausted by knowledge... How do we know that behind the phenomena of nature, behind relative truths is there a universal, unlimited, absolute nature that does not fully reveal itself to man? Where does this knowledge come from? It is born to us. It is given with consciousness (198). This last one is one of Dietzgen's inaccuracies that made Marx note in one letter to Kugelmann the confusion in Dietzgen's views. Only by clinging to such wrong places can one talk about Dietzgen's special philosophy, which is different from dialectical materialism. But Dietzgen himself is recovering *on the same page* : "If I say that knowledge of infinite, absolute truth is born to us, that it is one and only knowledge a priori, then experience confirms this inborn knowledge" (198).

From all these statements of Engels and Dietzgen it is clearly seen that for dialectical materialism there is no inevitable boundary between relative and absolute truth. Bogdanov did not understand this at all, since he could write: "It (the worldview of old materialism) wants to be unconditionally *objective knowledge of the essence of things* (Bogdanov's italics) and is incompatible with the historical conventions of any ideology" (Book III of Empiriomonism, p. IV). From the point of view of modern materialism, i.e., Marxism, the *limits of approximation* of our knowledge to objective, absolute truth are historically arbitrary, but *unconditionally* the existence of this truth is certainly that we are approaching it. The contours of the picture are historically conventional, but it is unconditional that this picture depicts an objectively existing model. Historically, it is conditional when and under what conditions we moved in our knowledge of the essence of things before the discovery of alizarin in coal tar or the discovery of electrons in an atom, but it is clear that each such discovery is a step forward of "unconditionally objective knowledge." In a word, all ideology is historically conditional, but it is unconditional that any scientific ideology (in contrast, for example, from religious) corresponds to objective truth, absolute nature. You will say: this distinction between relative and absolute truth is vague. I'll answer you: it's just so "indefinite" to prevent the transformation of science into dogma in the worst sense of the word, into something dead, frozen, ossified, but at the same time it is just so "definite" that it dissociates itself in the most decisive and

irrevocable way from fideism and agnosticism, from philosophical idealism and from the sophistry of the followers of Hume and Kant. There is a line here that you did not notice, and, without noticing it, rolled into the swamp of reactionary philosophy. This is the line between dialectical materialism and relativism.

We are relativists, proclaim Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt. We are relativists, Mr. Chernov and several Russian Machists who want to be Marxists echo them. Yes, Mr. Chernov and the Machist comrades, this is your mistake. For to put relativism in the basis of the theory of knowledge means inevitably condemning oneself either to absolute scepticism, agnosticism and sophistry, or to subjectivity. Relativism, as the basis of the theory of knowledge, is not only an acknowledgment of the relativity of our knowledge, but also a denial of any objective measure, independent of humanity, of a model or model to which our relative cognition approaches. From the point of view of naked relativism, any sophistry can be justified, it can be considered “conditional” whether Napoleon died on May 5, 1821 or not,

Dialectics, as Hegel explained, *includes* a moment of relativism, denial, scepticism, but it does not come *down* to relativism. The materialist dialectics of Marx and Engels certainly include relativism, but it does not come down to it, i.e., it recognizes the relativity of all our knowledge not in the sense of denying objective truth, but in the sense of historical convention of the limits of approximation of our knowledge to this truth.

Bogdanov writes in italics: “*Consistent Marxism does not allow such dogma and such static*” as eternal truths (Empiriomonism, III book, p. IX). This is confusion. If the world is an ever-moving and developing matter (as Marxists think), which reflects a developing human consciousness, then what does “static” have to do with it? It is not at all about the unchanging essence of things and not about an unchanging consciousness, but about the *correspondence* between the consciousness reflecting nature and the nature reflected by consciousness. On this—and only on this—issue, the term “dogma” has a special characteristic philosophical aftertaste: it is a favourite word of idealists and agnostics *against* materialists, as we have already seen in the example of the rather “old” materialist Feuerbach. Old, old rubbish—this is what all the objections to materialism are made from the point of view of the notorious “latest positivism.” (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, p. 107-112, ed. 3rd.*)

## **Revision of the Marxist-Leninist Doctrine of Objective Truth by Mechanists and Menshevik Idealists**

*Why do I call all truth subjective? Yes, because truth is not objective being, that truth is our idea of the world, things, processes [Italics compiled.—Ed.].*

Because without a subject there is no representation, no sensation, no theory of class struggle.

*Because our idea of an apple is not an objective apple, but only a “reflection” of it in our heads [Italics compiled.—Ed.].*

In my works, I almost did not stop there, because I did not consider it necessary to repeat old, old elementary truths, and it was just shameful—not for a fool we consider our reader!—to convince that all truth is subjective.

But there was a sort of “critic” who needs to chew on the Az-Buk-Vedi.

*I say that the world knows not one truth, but many of them, that the monarchy is reasonable, but the struggle against the monarchy is also reasonable [Italics compiled.—Ed.].*

Comrade Stolyarov replies: “It is not true, Comrade Sarabyanov! In the objective historical sense, both the monarchy and the struggle against it cannot be *at the same time*. The struggle against the monarchy becomes “reasonable” just at the moment when the monarchy itself becomes “unreasonable”. It is not true that there are two truths—bourgeois and proletarian, between which you can choose according to completely subjective arbitrariness (do not hang up dogs, dear critic!—*Vl. S.*). There is a class point of view that expresses the objective need for historical development, and the point of view of other classes, which does not follow this objective historical need.

And then Comrade Stolyarov summarizes: the Sarabyan dialectic is Hottentot, that is, if I stole your wife from you, it’s good, but if you stole from me, it’s bad. He, apparently, does not even suspect that the Hottentot morality is the morality of any class, in different only “modes”, including the proletariat. Hottentot morality is supposedly disgusting to the tradesman, moralist and hypocrite, but we do not do moralism and definitely say that when we are shot by generals it is bad, and when we shoot generals it is good.

When the bourgeoisie subordinates the proletariat—badly, and when we subordinate the bourgeoisie—fine.

Comrade Stolyarov considers himself a revolutionary Marxist and, like muscular young ladies, faints with “Hottentot morality,” which is a reflection of the multiplicity of truth.

Comrade Stolyarov thinks that the world knows only one truth at a time, the truth of one class.

This is nonsense and blatant metaphysics, dear comrade. (*Sarabyanov, The Under the Banner of Marxism journal, No. 6 for 1926, p. 66, 73.*)

## **Menshevik Idealism Divides the Path of Knowledge From its Content**

Just as our ideas and concepts are not absolute reflections of objective reality, so the success of human practice, human activity is only an approximation to objective truth. Such a correct and deeply Marxist understanding of the issue indicates the absence of dogmatism and doctrinaire in Lenin’s worldview. “Following the path of Marxian theory, we will approach the objective truth more and more, never exhausting it.” That is why Marx’s theory is an objective truth. What our practice confirms both in the field of purely theoretical and in the field of social activity is the only objective truth. There is no other way to objective truth. But Lenin speaks precisely of the *path*, of the *method*, perfectly understanding that any given truth is not absolute, but relative truth. And therefore, the *path* is important, the right direction, which leads to the truth. But we never possess the absolute truth itself. We are only approaching it in our knowledge and in our activity. (*Deborin, Lenin as a thinker, pp. 26-27, 3rd ed., Guise, 1929*)

## **The Truth is Concrete, There is No Abstract Truth**

But the great Hegelian dialectics, which Marxism adopted upon putting it on its feet, should never be confused with the vulgar method of justifying the zigzags of political figures who are shifting from the

revolutionary to the opportunist wing of the party, with a vulgar manner of mixing together separate statements, individual moments of development of different stages of a single process. True dialectics do not justify personal mistakes, but studies the inevitable turns, proving their inevitability on the basis of a detailed study of development in all its specificity. The main point of dialectics: there is no abstract truth, truth is always concrete... And one should not confuse this great Hegelian dialectic with that vulgar worldly wisdom expressed by the Italian proverb: mettere la coda dove non va il capo (stick your tail where your head does not climb) ) (*Lenin, A Step Forward, Two Steps Back (1904), Op., Vol. VI , p. 326, ed. 3rd* )

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Undoubtedly, the task here, as always, is to be able to apply the general and basic principles of communism to the *originality* of relations between classes and parties, to the *originality* in objective development of communism, which is characteristic of each individual country and which must be able to study find, guess...

The thing now is that the Communists of each country fully consciously take into account both the fundamental principles of the struggle against opportunism and “left” doctrine, as well as *specific features* which this struggle accepts and must inevitably accept in each individual country, in accordance with the original features of its economy, politics, culture, its national composition (Ireland, etc.), its colonies, its religious divisions, etc., etc. The dissatisfaction with the Second International and for its opportunism and its inability to create a truly centralized, truly leading centre capable of directing the international tactics of the revolutionary proletariat in its struggle for world wide is felt, widespread and growing. soviet republic. It is necessary to give a clear account that such a leadership center can in no way be built on standardization, on mechanical alignment, on the identification of tactical rules of struggle. As long as there are national and state differences between peoples and countries, *the basic* principles of communism (Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat), which would *correctly modify* these principles *in particular*, correctly adapt, apply them to national and national-state differences. To investigate, study, find, guess, grasp the national-specific, national-specific in the *specific* approaches of each country to the solution of a *single* international task, to victory over opportunism and left doctrine within the labour movement, to overthrow the

bourgeoisie, to establish the Soviet Republic and proletarian dictatorship—that is the main task of the historical moment experienced by all advanced (and not only advanced) countries. (*Lenin, “Left-wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder (1920), Soch., T. XXV, p. 227, 228-229, ed. 3rd)*

## **How Opportunists Distort the Truth**

The question of fatherland, we will answer to the opportunists, cannot be posed ignoring the concrete historical nature of this war. This war is imperialist, that is, a war of the era of the most developed capitalism, the era of the *end of* capitalism. The working class must first “settle down within the nations,” says the “*Communist Manifesto*,” while indicating the *boundaries and conditions* for our recognition of nationality and the fatherland as necessary forms of the bourgeois system, and therefore of the bourgeois fatherland. The opportunists distort this truth by transferring what is true of the era of capitalism to the era of the end of capitalism. And about this era, about the tasks of the proletariat in the struggle for the destruction of not feudalism, but capitalism, clearly and definitely says “*Communist manifesto* ”:” workers do not have a fatherland. “ It is clear why the opportunists are afraid to recognize this truth of socialism, they are afraid even in most cases to openly reckon with it. The socialist movement cannot win in the old framework of the fatherland. It creates new, higher forms of human community, when the legitimate needs and progressive aspirations of the working masses of any nationality will be first satisfied in international unity, provided that the present national partitions are destroyed. Conscious workers will respond to the attempts of the modern bourgeoisie to divide and separate the workers through hypocritical references to “defence of the fatherland” with new, new, repeated and repeated attempts to establish the unity of workers of different nations in the struggle to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie of all nations. (*Lenin, The Situation and Tasks of the Socialist International (1914), Soch., Vol. XVIII, p. 69- 70.*)

## **The Desire to Seek Answers in the Simple Logical Development of a Common Truth is the Vulgarization of Marxism**

On this economic basis, the revolution in Russia is inevitably a bourgeois revolution, of course. This position of Marxism is completely irresistible. He must never be forgotten. It must always be applied to all economic and political issues of the Russian revolution. But it must be able to apply. A concrete analysis of the position and interests of the various classes should serve to determine the exact meaning of this truth in its application to a particular issue. The reverse way of reasoning, which is often encountered among the Social Democrats of the right wing with Plekhanov at their head—that is, the desire to seek answers to specific questions in the simple logical development of a common truth about the basic character of our revolution—is a vulgarization of Marxism and a complete mockery of dialectical materialism. About people who derive, for example, the leading role of the “bourgeoisie” in the revolution or the need for socialists to support liberals from the general truth about the nature of this revolution, Marx would probably repeat the quote he once quoted from Heine: “I sowed dragons, and the harvest was reaped gave me a flea.” (*Lenin, The Development of Capitalism in Russia (1907), Op., Vol. III , p. 12.*)

## **The Peculiarity of the Marxist Method of Studying Social Development**

Why does Marx speak of a “modern” society, when all economists before him talked about society in general? In what sense does he use the word “modern”, on what grounds does this modern society especially stand out? And further, what does this mean: the economic law of the movement of society? We are used to hearing from economists - and this, by the way, is one of the favourite ideas of publicists and economists of the environment to which “R. B-in”,—that only the production of values is subject to economic laws alone, while distribution, they say, depends on politics, on what will be the impact on society by the authorities, the intelligentsia, etc. In what is it

sense, Marx speaks of the economic law of the movement of society and still nearby calls this law *Naturgesetz*—the law of nature? How to understand this?

All these perplexities arise naturally and necessary, and of course only complete ignorance can circumvent them, speaking of “Capital”. To understand these issues, we first cite one more place from the same preface to “Capital”, just a few lines below.

“My point is,” says Marx, “that I look at the development of an economic social formation as a natural-historical process.”

It is enough to simply compare at least the above two passages from the foreword to see that this is where the main idea of “Capital” lies, as we have heard, is carried out strictly with a rare logical force. First of all, we note two circumstances about all this: Marx speaks of only one “socio-economic formation”, of the capitalist one, that is, he says that he studied the law of development of only this formation and no other. This is the first. And secondly, we note the methods of working out Marx’s conclusions: these methods consisted, as we have heard from Mr. Mikhailovsky, of “a painstaking study of the relevant facts.”

Now let’s move on to the analysis of this basic idea of Capital, which our subjective philosopher so cleverly tried to get around. What, in fact, is the concept of economic social formation? And how can the development of such a formation be and should be considered a natural historical process? - these are the questions now facing us. I have already pointed out that from the point of view of old economists and sociologists (not for Russia), the concept of a socio-economic formation is completely superfluous: they talk about society in general, argue with Spencers about what society is in general, what is the purpose and essence of society in general, and so on. (*Lenin, What are “Friends of the People” and How They Fight Against Social Democrats (1894), Soch., Vol. I, pp. 57-58, 3rd ed.*)

## **The Difference Between Dialectics and Sophistry**

... Dialectics denies absolute truths, figuring out the change of opposites and the meanings of crises in history. The eclectic does not

want “too absolute” statements to stick his philistine, his philistine desire with “*transitional steps*” to replace the revolution.

The fact that the transitional stage between the state, the organ of domination of the capitalist class, and the state, the organ of domination of the proletariat, is precisely the *revolution*, which consists in *overthrowing the bourgeoisie* and in *breaking*, in breaking up *its* state machine, Kautsky and Vandervelde are silent about this. The Kautsky and Vandervelde obscure the fact that the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie must be replaced by the dictatorship of *one* class, the proletariat, that the “transitional steps” of the *revolution will be* followed by the “transitional steps” of the gradual withering away of the proletarian state. This is their political renegade.

This is, theoretically, philosophically, the substitution of eclecticism and sophistry for the dialectic. The dialectic is concrete and revolutionary, it distinguishes the “transition” from the dictatorship of one class to the dictatorship of another class from the “transition” of a democratic proletarian state to a non-state (“withering away of the state”). The eclecticism and sophistry of Kautsky and Vandervelde, for the sake of the bourgeoisie, smear everything concrete and exact in the class struggle, substituting the general concept of “transition”, where you can hide (and where *nine-tenths of the official Social Democrats of our era hide*) the renunciation of the revolution! (*Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, Soch., Vol. XXIII, p. 410, ed. 3rd.*)

## **Practice is the Basis and Criterion of the Truth of Knowledge**

The main drawback of all the preceding materialism—including Feuerbach’s one—is that the object, reality, sensuality is taken only in the form of an *object* or in the form of *contemplation*, and not as *human sensory activity, practice*, not subjectively. Therefore, it so happened that the *real* side, in contrast to materialism, was developed by idealism, but only abstractly, since idealism, of course, does not know real, sensory activity as such. Feuerbach wants to deal with objects that are really different from objects in thought, but he does not comprehend human activity itself as *objective* activity. Therefore, in the “Essence of Christianity” he considers as truly human, only

theoretical, activity, while practice is comprehended and affirmed only in its dirty Jewish form of manifestation. Therefore, he does not understand the significance of “revolutionary”, practically critical activity. (*Marx, Theses on Feuerbach. Appendix to the book “L. Feuerbach and the End of German Classical Philosophy” by Engels, p. 62, 1932*)

Until now, naturalists and philosophers have completely neglected the study of the influence of human activity on his thinking; they know, on the one hand, only nature, and on the other, only thought. But the most essential and the first basis of human thinking is just the *change in nature by man*, and not just one nature as such, and the mind of man developed in proportion to how he learned to change nature. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 14-15, 1932*)

## **The Emergence and Development of Pure Mathematics is Associated with the Development of Social Production and Sciences**

With respect to all pure mathematics, Herr Dühring thinks that he can—as well as the basic forms of being—take it a priori, i.e. directly from his head, without resorting to experience from the outside world. In pure mathematics, he assures, reason is engaged in “its own free creations and fantasies”; the concepts of number and figure constitute “an object sufficient for her and created by herself,” and thus she has “significance independent of personal experience and the real content of the world.”

That pure mathematics has significance independent of *special* experience of each individual, this, of course, is true and applies to all well-established facts of all sciences, and indeed to all facts. The magnetic poles, the composition of water from hydrogen and oxygen, the fact that Hegel is dead, and Herr Dühring is alive, are significant regardless of my experience or the experience of other individuals, even irrespective of the experience of Herr Dühring when he sleeps as a righteous man. But it does not at all follow from this that reason in pure mathematics deals only with its “own creations and fantasies.” The concepts of numbers and figures are borrowed precisely from the real world. The ten fingers on which people learned

to count, that is, to perform the first arithmetic operation, represent anything, but not a free creation of reason. An account requires not only account objects, but also already the ability when considering these objects is distracted from all their properties, except for their number, and this ability is the product of a long historical empirical development. The concept of a figure, like the concept of a number, is borrowed exclusively from the outside world, and did not arise at all from the head from pure thinking. Before people could come to the concept of a figure, there had to be things that had a form and the forms of which were compared. Pure mathematics has as its subject spatial forms and quantitative relations of the real world, that is, a very real content. The fact that this content appears in an extremely abstract form can only slightly obscure its origin from the outside world. In order to study these forms and relationships in their pure form, they should be completely torn off from their content, eliminate it as something indifferent to the cause. This gives points without extension, lines without thickness and width,  $a$  and  $b$ ,  $x$  and  $y$ , constants and variables, only at the very end we come to the real “free creations and fantasies” of the mind, namely imaginary values. In the same way, the derivation of mathematical quantities as if from each other proves not their a priori origin, but only their rational connection. Before they came to the idea of deducing the *shape of the cylinder* from the rotation of the rectangle around one of its sides, it was necessary to study a lot of real rectangles and cylinders, albeit in a very imperfect form. Like other sciences, mathematics arose from *needs* person: from the measurement of the earth and the capacity of vessels, from the calculation of time and mechanics. But, as in all areas of thinking, laws abstracted from the real world at a certain stage of development are torn off from the real world, contrasted with it as something independent, like laws that appeared from outside, according to which the world should be directed. So it was with society and the state; thus, and not otherwise, subsequently *pure mathematics is applied* to the world, although it is borrowed from this world and represents only part of its composite forms, and, *in fact*, only because of this is generally applicable to it...

Mathematical axioms are expressions of extremely meagre mental content, which mathematics must borrow from logic. They can be reduced to the following two axioms:

1. The whole is more of a piece. This position is a pure tautology, since the quantitative representation of the “part” is already assigned

in a certain way to the representation of the “whole”, just so that the concept of “part” simply means that the quantitative “whole” consists of several quantitative “parts”. “Because the indicated axiom expresses this explicitly, we do not move one step further. One can even *prove* this tautology in a known way, one can say: the whole is that which consists of several parts; the part is that of several instances of which the whole is, therefore, the part is less than the whole. It is clear that due to the emptiness of repetition, the emptiness of content is only sharper manifested here.

2. If two quantities are equal to the third, then they are equal to each other. This position, as shown by Hegel, is an inference, the correctness of which is guaranteed by logic; it, therefore, is proved, although outside the field of pure mathematics. Other axioms of equality and inequality are simply the logical development of this conclusion.

You will not seduce anyone with these skinny propositions in mathematics or anywhere else. To move on, we need to attract real relationships, relationships and spatial forms taken from real bodies. All ideas about lines, surfaces, angles, polygons, cubes, balls, etc. are borrowed from reality, and a certain dose of ideological naivety is needed to believe mathematicians that the first line arose from the movement of a point in space, the first surface from motion lines, the first body - from the movement of the surface, etc. Language already protests against this. The mathematical figure of three dimensions is called the body, *corpus solidum*, which in Latin means even a tangible body, that is, it is called a product that is not the product of “free fantasy” of reason, but taken from crude reality. (*Engels, Anti-Dühring, pp. 25–27, 1932*)

## **The Unity of Theory and Practice**

An idea is “truth” (p. 385, § 213). An idea, that is, *truth*, as a truth is a process. From a subjective process — for truth is a *process*—idea, a person goes to objective goes through three stages in truth *through* “practice” (and its *development* : 1) life; 2) the technique). process of cognition, which includes the *practice* of man and *technology* (see above), - 3) the

level of the absolute idea (i.e., complete truth).

Life gives birth to the brain. Nature reflects in the human brain. By checking and applying the correctness of these reflections in his practice and in technology, a person comes to objective truth. (*The Lenin Collection IX*, p. 237.)

\* \* \*

The unity of the theoretical idea (cognition) and *practice*—this is NB—and this unity is *precisely in the theory of knowledge*, because in total we get the “absolute idea” (and the idea = “objective truth” [volume V, [143]]). (*Lenin Collection IX*, p. 271, 1st ed.)

The activity of a person who has compiled an objective NB picture of the world, *changes* external reality, destroys its certainty (= changes one or another of it hand, quality), and thus takes away her features of appearance, appearance and insignificance, makes her self-in- self and self-for-self existing (= objective truth). (“*Leninsky collection*» IX, p. 269, ed. 1- f.) NB

Practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also immediate reality. (“*Lenin Collection*” IX, p. 261, ed., 1st.)

\* \* \*

When Hegel tries—sometimes even: scrutinizes and puffs up—to summarize the purposeful activity of man under the category of logic, saying that this activity is a “conclusion” that a subject (person) plays the role of such a “member” in the logical “figure” of a conclusion, etc., this is not only a stretch, not just a game. There is a very deep content, purely materialistic. It’s necessary to turn over: a person’s practical activity billions of times should have led the human consciousness to repeat different NB

Categories of logic and human practice.

logical figures *so that* these figures *can* get the value of *axioms*. This is *Nota bene*. (*The Lenin Collection IX*, p. 219, 1st ed.) NB

## **K. Marx on the Significance of Revolutionary Practical-Critical Activity**

2 .

The question of whether objective truth is characteristic of human thinking is not at all a question of theory, but a *practical question* . In practice, a person must prove the truth, that is, reality and power, the compassion of his thinking. The debate about the reality or invalidity of thinking isolated from practice is a purely *scholastic question* .

3.

The materialistic doctrine that people are the products of circumstances and upbringing, that therefore, changed people are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, this doctrine forgets that circumstances are changed by people and that the educator himself needs to be educated. It inevitably therefore comes to the conclusion that it divides society into two parts, one of which rises above society (for example, from Robert Owen).

The coincidence of changing circumstances and human activity can be comprehended and rationally understood only as *revolutionary practice* .

8 .

Social life is essentially a *practical* life , all the mysteries that lure the theory into mysticism find their rational resolution in human practice and in understanding this practice.

11 .

Philosophers have only *explained* the world in various ways, but the point is to *change* it. (*Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, Appendix to the book "L. Feuerbach" by Engels, pp. 62–64, 1932* )

### **Practice is the Unity of Contradictions**

Remarkably: Hegel approaches the "idea", as the coincidence of a concept with an object, the idea, as a *truth through* practical, expedient human activity. A close approach to what a person proves by his *practice* the objective correctness of his ideas, concepts,

knowledge, science. (*The Lenin Collection IX*, p. 219, 1st ed.) From a subjective concept and a subjective goal to objective truth.

Theoretical knowledge should give the object in its necessity, in its comprehensive relations, in its contradictory movement in—and for-itself. But the human concept “finally” captures this objective truth of knowledge, catches, captures it only when the concept becomes “for itself being” in the sense of practice. That is, the practice of man and humanity is a test, a criterion for the objectivity of knowledge. Is this Hegel’s thought? We must return to this. (*The Lenin Collection IX*, p. 257, 1st ed.)

## **Hegelon the Practice and Objectivity of Knowledge.**

“Conclusion of action” ... For Hegel, *action*, practice is a *logical “conclusion”*, a figure of logic. And it is true! Of course, not in the sense that the figure of logic by its own existence has human practice (= absolute idealism), but vice versa, the practice of man, repeating itself billions of times, is fixed in the human mind by the figures of logic. These figures have the strength of prejudice, the axiomatic character is precisely (and only) by virtue of this billionth repetition.

1st premise: *good goal* (subjective goal) versus *reality* (“external reality”)

2nd premise: external *means* (instrument), (objective) 3rd premise, or conclusion: conclusion of subject and object, verification of subjective ideas, criterion of objective truth. (*The Lenin Collection IX*, p. 267, 1st ed.) NB

the idea of including *life* in logic is understandable—and ingenious—from the point of view of the *process of reflection* in the consciousness (first individual) of a person of the objective world and verification of this consciousness (reflection) by practice—see: (*“Lenin Collection” IX*, p. 239, ed. 1- e.) NB

\* \* \*

The meaning of the *general* is contradictory, it is dead, it is NB unclean, incomplete, etc., etc., but it is only a *step* towards the

knowledge of the *concrete*, for we never fully know the concrete. *The endless* sum of general concepts, laws, etc. gives the *concrete* in its entirety.

The movement of cognition *to an object* can always go only dialectically: to move away, or rather to get in - to retreat, to better jump (to know?). Lines converging and diverging: circles touching each other. Nodal point = practice of man and human history ...

These key points are a unity of contradictions when being and non-being, as disappearing moments, coincide at the moment, at given moments of movement (= *technology, history, etc.*). ("Lenin Collection" XII, p. 229, ed. 2nd. )

## **Lenin's Criticism of the Machist Detachment of the Theory of Knowledge from Practice**

We saw that Marx in 1845, Engels in 1888 and 1891. introduce the criterion of practice into the basis of the theory of knowledge of materialism. Beyond practice, the question of whether "objective" (that is, objective) "truth" corresponds to human thinking is scholasticism, "says Marx in the 2nd thesis on Feuerbach." The best refutation of Kantian and Humean agnosticism, as well as other philosophical twists (Schrullen), is practice," Engels repeats. "The success of our actions proves the agreement (conformity, Übereinstimmung) of our perceptions with the objective (objective) nature of perceived things," Engels argues to the agnostics.

Compare Mach's reasoning about practice criteria with this. "In everyday thinking and ordinary speech, the usually *seeming, illusory reality* is contrasted . Holding the pencil in front of us in the air, we see it in a straight position; dropping it in an inclined position into the water, we see it bent. In the latter case, they say: "the pencil *seems bent, but in reality* it is straight." But on what grounds do we call *one* fact reality, and the *other* reduce it to the meaning of illusion? ...When we make the natural mistake that in extraordinary cases we still wait for the onset of ordinary phenomena, our expectations, of

course, are deceived. But the facts are not to blame. To speak in such cases of *illusion* it makes sense from a practical point of view, but not at all scientific. To the same extent, the frequently discussed question of whether the world really exists, or whether it is only our illusion, is nothing more than a dream, from the scientific point of view. But even the most inconsistent dream is a fact, no worse than any other” (“Analysis of Sensations”, pp. 18-19).

It is true that the fact is not only inconsistent dream, but inconsistent philosophy. It is impossible to doubt this after acquaintance with the philosophy of Ernst Mach. As the latest sophist, he mixes the scientific, historical and psychological study of human errors, all kinds of “incongruous dreams” of mankind such as faith in goblin, house, etc., with an epistemological distinction between the true and the “incongruous.” This is the same as if the economist said that Senior’s theory, according to which the “last hour” of the worker’s labour, and Marx’s theory gives all capitalists profit, is the same fact, and from the scientific point of view, the question of what theory expresses objective truth and which one - the prejudices of the bourgeoisie and the venality of its professors. Tanner I. Dietzgen saw in the scientific, i.e. materialistic, the theory of knowledge is “a universal weapon against religious faith” (“Kleinere philosophischen Schriften”, S. 55), and for the ordinary professor Ernst Mach “from the scientific point of view it makes no sense” to distinguish between a materialistic theory of cognition and a subjective-idealistic one! Science is non-partisan in the struggle of materialism with idealism and religion, this is not a favourite idea of Mach alone, but of all modern bourgeois professors, these, in the right expression of the same I. Dietzgen, are “certified footmen who make a fool of the people with tortured idealism” (S. 53, *ibid.*)

This is just such a tormented professorial idealism, when the criterion of practice that separates the illusion from reality for everyone is taken out by E. Mach beyond the limits of science, beyond the limits of the theory of knowledge. Human practice proves the correctness of the materialistic theory of knowledge, said Marx and Engels, declaring “scholasticism” and “philosophical twists” attempts to solve the main epistemological question besides practice. For Mach, practice is one thing, and the theory of knowledge is quite another; they can be placed side by side without first conditioning the second. “Cognition,” says Mach in his last essay, “Cognition and Delusion” (p. 115 of the second German edition), “is ... a biologically beneficial (förderndes) mental experience.” “Only success can

separate knowledge from error” (116). “The concept is a physical working hypothesis” (143), *approaching* Marxism. But Mach here is also approaching Marxism as Bismarck was approaching the labour movement, or Bishop Eulogius towards democracy. Mach’s similar positions *stand next* to his idealistic theory of knowledge, and do not determine the choice of a particular line in epistemology. Cognition can be biologically useful, useful in human practice, in preserving life, in preserving a species, only if it reflects objective truth that is independent of man. For the materialist, the “success” of human practice proves the conformity of our ideas with the objective nature of the things that we perceive. For a solipsist, “success” is all that *I need in practice*, which can be considered separately from the theory of knowledge. If you include the criterion of practice in the basis of the theory of knowledge, then we inevitably get materialism, “says the Marxist. Let the practice be materialistic, and the theory is an individual article, says Mach.

“In practice,” he writes in “Analysis of Sensations,” “by performing some kind of action, we can do as little without a representation of the *Self* as we cannot do without a representation of the body, holding out our hand for some thing. Physiologically, we remain egoists and materialists with the same constancy with which we constantly see the rising of the sun. But theoretically, we should not adhere to this view at all “(245-6).

Egoism here is neither to the village, nor to the city, for this is a category not at all epistemological. There is nothing to do with the apparent movement of the sun around the earth, because in the practice that serves us as a criterion in the theory of knowledge, we must also include the practice of astronomical observations, discoveries, etc. There remains a valuable recognition of Mach that in their practice people are guided entirely and exclusively by materialistic theory knowledge, the attempt to circumvent it “theoretically” expresses only the heleristic-scholastic and tortured-idealistic aspirations of Mach.

To what extent these efforts are not new to highlight practice as something not to be considered in epistemology to clear the place for agnosticism and idealism, the following example from the history of German classical philosophy shows. On the road from Kant to Fichte stands G.E. Schulze (the so-called Schulze-Enezidem in the history of philosophy). He openly defends the skeptical line in philosophy, calling himself a follower of Hume (and from the ancients - Pirron and Sextus). He resolutely rejects every thing in himself and the

possibility of objective knowledge, resolutely demands that we do not go beyond “experience”, beyond sensations, and also anticipates an objection from another camp: “As a skeptic, when he is involved in life’s affairs, he admits it for certainty the reality of objective objects behaves in accordance with this and admits a criterion of truth, *The G. E. Schulze*, Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von dem Prof. Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementarphilosophie, 1792, S. 253. (*Schulze, G. E.*, Aenesidemus or about bases presenting Reinhold Professor of elemental philosophy Jena, pp 253, 1792. —*Ed.* ). “Such arguments,” Schulze replies indignantly, “are only suitable for the mob (Pöbel, S. 254), for my scepticism does not affect life practice, remaining within the limits of philosophy” (255).

Likewise, the subjective idealist Fichte hopes within the philosophy of idealism to find a place for that “realism that is inevitable (sich aufdringt) for all of us and even for the most determined idealist, when it comes to action, realism accepting that objects exist completely independently of us, outside of us” (Werke, I, 455).

Not far from Schulze and Fichte, Mach’s newest positivism! As a curiosity, we note that for Bazarov, on this issue, again, there is no one in the world except Plekhanov: there is no beast stronger than a cat. Bazarov laughs at Plekhanov’s “saltovital philosophy” (Essays, p. 69), who wrote a really awkward phrase that “faith” in the existence of the outside world “is the inevitable salto vitale” (life leap) of “philosophy” (Note to L. Feuerbach, p. 111). The expression “faith”, although quoted, repeated after Hume, reveals a confusion of terms in Plekhanov—no words. But where does Plekhanov?? Why didn’t Bazarov take another materialist, well, at least Feuerbach? Just because he doesn’t know him? But ignorance is not an argument. And Feuerbach, like Marx and Engels, makes it inadmissible, in terms of Schultz, Fichte and Mach, “Jump” to practice in the basic issues of the theory of knowledge. Criticizing idealism, Feuerbach expounds its essence in such a relief quotation from Fichte, which splendidly beats all Machism. “You believe,” Fichte wrote, “that things are real, that they exist outside of you only because you see, hear, and touch them. But vision, touch, hearing are only sensations ... You do not feel objects, but only your sensations “(Feuerbach, Werke, X Band, S. 185). And Feuerbach objects: “Man is not abstract You feel not objects, but only your sensations “(Feuerbach, Werke, X Band, S. 185). And Feuerbach objects: “Man is not abstract You feel not objects, but only your sensations “(Feuerbach, Werke, X Band, S.

185). And Feuerbach objects: “Man is not abstract *I*, or either a man or a woman, and the question of whether the world has a sensation, can be equated to the question: is there another person my sensation or our relationship in practice proves the opposite? This is precisely the fundamental error of idealism that it poses and resolves the question of objectivity and subjectivity, of the reality or invalidity of the world only from a theoretical point of view” (189, *ibid.*). Feuerbach takes into account the totality of human practice as the basis of the theory of knowledge. “Of course,” he says, “and idealists recognize in practice the reality of both our *Self* and stranger *You*. For idealists, “this is a point of view suitable only for life, and not for speculation. But speculation, which contradicts life, making the point of view of truth the point of view of death, of a soul separated from the body, is such speculation is a dead, false speculation” (192). Before we *feel*, we breathe; we cannot exist without air, without food and drink. “

“So, then, we are talking about food and drink when analysing the question of the ideality or reality of the world? - exclaims the indignant idealist.—What a baseness! What a violation of a good custom to scold materialism in the scientific sense from the Department of Philosophy and from the Department of Theology, in order to practice materialism in the most crude sense behind a table d’hote” (195). And Feuerbach exclaims that equating subjective sensation with the objective world “means equating emission with procreation” (198).

The remark is not very polite, but it does not fall into the eyebrow, but into the eyes of those philosophers who teach that the sensory representation is the reality outside of us.

The point of view of life, practice should be the first and main point of view of the theory of knowledge. And it inevitably leads to materialism, discarding from the threshold the endless fabrications of professorial scholasticism. Of course, one should not forget that the criterion of practice can never, in essence, confirm or refute *completely* any human notion. This criterion is also so “indefinite” as not to allow human knowledge to turn into an “absolute”, and at the same time so defined as to lead a merciless struggle against all varieties of idealism and agnosticism. If what our practice confirms is the only, last, objective truth, then the recognition of the only way to this truth of the path of science, which stands on a materialistic point of view, follows from this. For example, Bogdanov agrees to recognize the Marxian theory of monetary circulation as objective truth only “for our time”, calling it “dogmatism” ascribing

this theory to “supra-historical and objective truth” (Empiriomonism, book III, p. VII). This is confusion again, *the eternal* truth is that Napoleon died on May 5, 1821. But since the criterion of practice—that is, the developmental course of *all* capitalist countries over the past decades—proves only the objective truth of the *entire* socioeconomic theory of Marx in general, and not of this or that part, formulation, etc., it is clear to speak here of the “dogmatism” of the Marxists is to make an inexcusable concession to bourgeois economy. The only conclusion from the opinion shared by Marxists that Marx’s theory is objective truth is the following: following *the path of Marx’s theory*, we will come closer and closer to objective truth (never exhausting it); walking *in every other way*, we cannot come to anything but confusion and lies. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, p. 112 - 117, ed. 3rd.*)

## **The Class Roots of the Separation of Theory from Practice**

The division of labour becomes truly a division of labour only when the separation of material and spiritual labour sets in. From now on, consciousness *canto* really imagine that it is something other than the consciousness of existing practice. From the moment that consciousness begins to really represent something, without representing anything real, from that moment it is able to free itself from the world and proceed to the formation of a “pure theory”, theology, philosophy, morality, etc. But even if this theory, theology, philosophy, morality, etc., conflicts with existing relations, this is possible only because existing social relations have come into conflict with existing production forces; however, for a certain people this can also happen due to the fact that a contradiction is not revealed within its national framework, but between its national consciousness and the practice of other peoples, i.e. between the national and universal consciousness of a people (as, for example, now in Germany). If for some people this contradiction is represented as a contradiction within the national consciousness, then the struggle should, apparently, be limited to this national rubbish ... since this people is rubbish in itself.

However, it does not matter at all what consciousness alone can do; from all this nonsense for us we get only the result that these three moments—productive power, social status and consciousness—can,

and should, come into conflict with each other, because together with the division of labour, it becomes possible and even that actually happens, that spiritual and material activity, enjoyment and labour, production and consumption fall to the lot of various individuals; the absence of contradictions between them is possible only on condition that the division of labour is again destroyed. However, it goes without saying that “ghosts”, “connection”, “higher being”, “concept”, “doubt” are simply an idealistic, spiritual expression, a representation of, apparently, a disconnected individual, a notion of very empirical bonds and shackles, within which the mode of production of life and the related form of intercourse move. (*Marx and Engels, About L. Feuerbach, “Archive of Marx and Engels, Vol. I, pp. 221-222, 1924*)

## **Separation of Material and Spiritual Labour**

The largest division of material and spiritual labour is the separation of the city from the village. The opposition between town and country begins with the transition from barbarism to civilization, from tribal life to state life, from locality to nation, and stretches through the entire history of civilization to our time (Anti-orn-Law-League). Together with the city, the need arises for the administration, police, taxes, etc., in short, community life (Gemeindewesens), and therefore politics in general. Here, for the first time, the division of the population into two large classes, based directly on the division of labour and on the instruments of production, affected. In the city we have before us the fact of the concentration of the population, instruments of production, capital, pleasures, needs, while in the village we observe a diametrically opposite fact of isolation and isolation. The opposition between town and country can exist only within the framework of private property. It is a gross expression of the fact that an individual submits to the division of labour and certain, forcibly imposed on him activities, subordination that turns one person into a limited city animal, the other into a limited village animal, and every day anew contradicting the interests of both. Work here again is the main thing, is and daily anew generating a contradiction of interests of both. Work here again is the main thing, is and daily anew generating a contradiction of interests of both. Work here again is the main thing, is *power* over individuals, and as long as this last exists, private property must also exist. The elimination of the

contradiction between city and country is one of the first conditions of collectivity (Gemeinschaft), a condition which, in turn, depends on a mass of material prerequisites and which, as everyone sees immediately, cannot be realized by will alone (these conditions must still be developed). (*Marx and Engels, About L. Feuerbach, "Archive of Marx and Engels, Vol. I , p. 234, 1924)*

## **How to Learn Communism**

Naturally, at first glance, the idea that learning to communism comes to mind means learning the amount of knowledge that is set forth in communist textbooks, brochures, and works. But such a definition of the study of communism would be too rude and insufficient. If only the study of communism consisted in the assimilation of what is stated in communist writings, books and brochures, then it would be too easy for us to get communist raiders or bouncers, and this would very often bring us harm and damage, since these people, Having learned and read what has been stated in the communist books and brochures, they would have been unable to combine all this knowledge and would not have been able to act as communism really requires.

One of the greatest evils and calamities that has remained for us from the old capitalist society is the complete break of the book with the practice of life, for we had books where everything was painted in the best possible way, and these books, in most cases, were the most disgusting the hypocritical lies that deceived us in a communist society. Therefore, a simple book assimilation of what the books say about communism would be extremely wrong. Now in our speeches and articles there is no simple repetition of what was said earlier about communism, since our speeches and articles are connected with everyday and comprehensive work. Without work, without struggle, the book knowledge of communism from communist brochures and works costs absolutely nothing, since it would continue the old gap between theory and practice, that old gap, which constituted the most disgusting feature of the old bourgeois society. (*Lenin, Speech at the Third Congress of the Komsomol (1920), Soch., Vol. XXV , p. 385-386, ed. 3rd )*

## **The Combination of Knowledge and Practice is Necessary**

Cognition ... finds before itself a true being as a reality, independent of subjective opinions. (This is pure materialism!) The will of man, his practice, itself impedes the achievement of its goal ... by separating itself from cognition and not recognizing external reality as a true being (for objective truth). *A combination of knowledge and practice is necessary.* (*The Lenin Collection IX*, p. 265, 1st ed.)

## **The Value of Scientific Abstractions in Cognition**

Hegel is quite right *in essence* against Kant. Thinking, going from concrete to abstract, does not depart—if it is *correct* (NB) (and Kant, like all philosophers, speaks of correct thinking) —*from the truth*, but approaches it. The abstraction of *matter*, the *law of nature*, the abstraction of *value*, etc., in a word, *all* scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, or rather, *more fully*. From living contemplation to abstract thinking *and from it to practice*—this is the dialectical way of knowing the *truth* cognition of objective reality. Kant belittles knowledge in order to clear the place of faith: Hegel exalts knowledge, assuring that knowledge is knowledge of God. The materialist exalts the knowledge of matter, nature, sending God away and the philosophical bastard protecting him into a garbage pit. (*“Lenin Collection” IX*, p. 183-185, ed. 1st.)

## **The Power of Scientific Abstraction**

Every beginning is difficult—this truth is true for every science. And in this case, the greatest difficulties are the understanding of the first chapter, —especially of its department, which includes an analysis of the goods. As for the closest analysis of the substance of value and value, I made it as popular as possible. The form of value, which gets its finished form in cash, is very empty and simple. Nevertheless, the human mind tried in vain to comprehend it

for more than 2000 years, while the analysis of much more substantial and complex forms was successful, at least approximately. Why is that? Because a developed body is easier to learn than a cell in the body. Moreover, when analysing economic forms, one cannot use either a microscope or chemical reagents. Both should be replaced by the power of abstraction. But the commodity form of the product of labour or the form of value of the commodity is the form of the economic cell of bourgeois society. For the uninitiated, its analysis will seem like just a series of intricacies and small things. And these are really trifles, but trifles of the kind with which it deals, for example, microscopic anatomy. (*Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Preface to the First Edition, p. XIII-XIY, 1932*)

## **The Use of Scientific Abstractions**

When it comes to production, it is always about production at a certain stage of social development—the production of social individuals. It may therefore seem that, in order to talk about production in general, we must either follow the historical process of development in its various phases, or from the very beginning declare that we are dealing with a certain historical era, for example, modern bourgeois production, which, in fact, is our real theme. However, all eras of production are characterized by some common features, some general definitions. Production in general is an abstraction, but an abstraction that makes sense, since it really puts forward the general, fixes it, and thereby relieves us of repetition. However, this is common and similar, highlighted by comparison. It is itself many times divided and contains various definitions. Some belong to all eras, others are common to only some. Some definitions are common to both the most modern and the most ancient era. Without them, it is absolutely impossible to think of production for yourself, however, although the most developed languages have laws and definitions that are common with the least developed languages, it is precisely their difference from this universal and common that forms their development. Definitions that are valid in general for production should be singled out precisely so that due to the unity, which is already due to the fact that both the subject - humanity—and the object—nature are the same, significant differences are not forgotten. Forgetting these differences, for example, is all the wisdom of modern economists, who prove the eternity and harmony of

existing social relations, for example, conclude that no production is possible without tools, even if this tool was only a hand, that no production is possible without previous accumulated labour, even if this work was just a knack, which the savage's hand gained and accumulated through repeated exercises. Capital, by the way, is also an instrument of production—it is also past, objectified labour. Hence the conclusion that capital is a universal, eternal, natural relation. But this can be asserted only by discarding the specific one, which only turns the “tool of production”, “accumulated labour”, into capital. Therefore, for example, with Carey, the entire history of industrial relations is presented as a series of falsifications,

If there is no production at all, then there is also no general production. Production is always a *special* branch of production: for example, agriculture, cattle breeding, manufactory, etc., or it is a combination of them. However, political economy is not technology. The relation of universal definitions of production at a given social stage to individual forms of production should be developed elsewhere (subsequently).

Finally, production is not only a special production. There is not always a definite social organism, a public subject, acting within a more or less rich set of such branches of production. The relation of the scientific exposition to the real movement again does not apply here. [We must therefore distinguish] production in general, special branches of production, production as a whole. (*Marx, Toward a Critique of Political Economy, pp. 16–18, 1932*)

## **Abstraction of Universal Human Labour**

In order to measure the exchange value of goods by the labour time that is enclosed in them, it is necessary to reduce the various types of labour to indifferent, monotonous, simple labour, in short - to labour, which is qualitatively the same and therefore represents only quantitative differences.

This information is an abstraction; however, this is an abstraction that takes place on a daily basis in the social production process. The conversion of all goods into working time is no more, but at the same time, no less real abstraction than the conversion of all organic bodies into air. Labour, measured in such a way by time, does not really act

as the labour of various individuals, but, on the contrary, various working individuals act as simple organs of this labour. In other words, since labour is represented in exchange values, it can be expressed as *universal human* labour. This abstraction of universal human labour *exists* in average labour, labour that every average individual in a given society is able to perform; it is a certain productive expenditure of human muscles, nerves, brain, etc. It is a *simple* labour that every average individual can learn and which he must perform in one form or another. The nature of this average labour is different in different countries and in different eras of culture, but in a given society it is definite. Simple labour makes up the largest part of the total mass of labour in bourgeois society, as can be seen from any statistics. Does A produce 6 hours of canvas and 6 hours of iron, and B devotes the same 6 hours to produce canvas and iron, or does A produce iron within 12 hours and B within 12 hours of canvas from the first glance it is clear that it is a question only of the various applications of *one* and *the same* working hours. But what about complex labour, which rises above the average level, like labour of greater tension, greater specific gravity? Labour of this kind boils down to multiplied simple labour; it is a simple work raised to a power; for example, one day of difficult labour is equal to three days of simple labour. There is still no place to consider the laws governing this information. However, that such a reduction takes place is obvious, because the product of the most complex labour, like exchange value, is equivalent in a certain respect to the product of simple, average labour, and therefore equal to a certain amount of this simple labour. (*Marx, Toward a Critique of Political Economy, pp. 52-53, 1932*)

## **Research Method and Presentation Method**

When we consider this country in economic terms, we start with its population, its division into classes, population distribution between the city, village and marine industries, between various industries, with the export and import of annual production and consumption, commodity prices, etc. It would seem most right to start with the real and the concrete, with the actual premises, therefore, for example, in political economy with a population that forms the basis

and subject of the entire social process of *zvodstva*. But upon closer inspection, this turns out to be erroneous. A population is an abstraction if, for example, I leave aside the classes of which it consists. These classes are again an empty phrase if I do not know the elements on which they rest, for example, wage labour, capital, etc. These latter involve exchange, the division of labour, prices, etc. Capital, for example, is nothing without wage labour, without the cost of money, price, etc. If I, therefore, would start with the population, then I would give a chaotic the concept of the whole, and only through more partial definitions, I would analytically approach more and more simple concepts: from the concrete given in the presentation, to more and more skinny abstractions, until I reached the simplest definitions. And then I would have to set off on my way back until I would approach the population again, but not as a chaotic idea of the whole, but as a rich totality, with numerous definitions and relationships. The first path is the one along which political economy has historically followed when it emerged. 17th century economists, for example, always start with a living whole, from the population, nation, state, several states, etc., but they always end up by analysing some defining abstract general relations, such as the division of labour, money, value, etc. Once these individual moments were more or less abstracted and fixed, economic systems arose that stem from the simplest, like labour, division of labour, need, exchange value, to the state, international exchange and the world market. The latter method is obviously scientifically correct. Specific because it is concrete because it is a combination of numerous definitions, being the unity of the diverse. In thinking, it therefore appears as a process of connection, as a result, and not as a starting point, although it is a starting point in reality and, therefore, also the starting point of contemplation and presentation. If we go the first way, then the complete picture will evaporate to the degree of abstract definition; in the second, abstract definitions lead to the reproduction of the concrete by thinking. Hegel therefore fell into the illusion that the real should be understood as the result of ascending to internal unity (*des sich in sich zusammenfassenden*), deepening and developing thinking from itself, while the method of ascending from the abstract to the concrete is only a way by which thinking assimilates the concrete, reproduces it spiritually as concrete. However, this is by no means a process of the emergence of the most concrete. The simplest economic category, for example, exchange value, implies a population—a population producing under certain conditions,

On the contrary, as a category, exchange value has antediluvian existence. Therefore, for consciousness—and philosophical consciousness is different in that for it logical thinking is a real person, and a logically conscious world is a real world—the movement of categories seems really to be an act of production, which, unfortunately, receives a push from the outside; it is an act the result of which is the world, and so far as it is right, here we again fall into tautology, because a concrete totality, as a mental totality, mental concreteness, is really a product of thinking, understanding; however, this is by no means the product of a concept that generates and reflects on itself outside of contemplation and representation, but the processing of contemplation and representation into concepts. The whole, as it is in the head, as a conceivable whole, there is a product of the thinking head, which conquers the world for itself in the only way possible for it, a way different from the artistic, religious, practical, spiritual development of the world. The real subject remains all the time outside the head, existing as something independent, and just as long as the head refers to it only speculatively, only theoretically. Therefore, even with the theoretical method of [political economy], the subject, that is, society, must constantly wander in our view as a prerequisite. (Therefore, even with the theoretical method of [political economy], the subject, that is, society, must constantly wander in our view as a prerequisite. (Therefore, even with the theoretical method of [political economy], the subject, that is, society, must constantly wander in our view as a prerequisite. (*Marx, Toward a Critique of Political Economy*, pp. 32–33, 1932)

### III. Historical and Logical

A break with Hegelian philosophy also occurred here by returning to the materialistic point of view. This means that people in this direction have decided to understand the real world—nature and history—as it is given to anyone who approaches it without pre-prepared idealistic inventions; they decided without any regret to abandon any idealistic fabrication that does not correspond to the facts understood in their own, and not in some kind of fantastic connection. And materialism does not mean anything more. The only difference was that here for the first time they took seriously the

materialistic worldview, that it was consistently carried out - at least mainly - in all decisively fields of knowledge.

Hegel was not simply pushed aside. On the contrary, the above-mentioned revolutionary side of his philosophy, his dialectical method were taken as a starting point. But this method in its Hegelian form was unsuitable. Hegel's dialectic is the self-development of a concept. The absolute concept not only exists, —no one knows where, —from the century, but also constitutes the true, life-giving soul of all that exists. It develops to itself, passing through all those steps that are contained in itself and which are examined in detail in Logic. Then it "reveals itself", turning into nature, where it makes a new development, not conscious of itself, taking the form of natural necessity, and in man, finally, he again comes to self-consciousness. And in history, this self-awareness is again knocked out of a gross state, until, finally, the absolute concept does not again come fully to itself in Hegelian philosophy. The dialectical development that is found in nature and in history, that is, the causal connection of that progressive movement, which, through all deviations to the side and through all short reverse steps, makes its way from the lowest to the highest, this development in Hegel is simply a snapshot of the self-movement of the concept, forever what is happening is unknown where and, in any case, completely independent of any thinking human brain. It was necessary to eliminate this ideological perversion. Returning to the materialistic point of view, we again saw pictures in human concepts of pictures from real things, instead of seeing pictures in real things of pictures from an absolute concept that is at a certain stage of development. Dialectics was reduced to science of the general laws of motion in the external world and in human thought: two sets of laws that are essentially identical but different in expression, since the human head can apply them consciously, while in nature, and for the most part while still in human history, they are paving their way unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an infinite number of seeming accidents. Thus, the dialectic of concepts itself became only a conscious reflection of the dialectical movement of the external world. Along with this, the Hegelian dialectic was placed on the head, or rather, on the feet, as it stood on the head before. And it's remarkable that we were not the only ones to discover this materialistic dialectic, which for many years was our best tool and our sharpest weapon; German worker Joseph Dietzgen reopened it

independently of us and even independently of Hegel. (*Engels, L. Feuerbach, pp. 40–41.*)

Criticism of political economy, even after choosing a method, could be constructed in two ways: historically or logically. Since in history, as in its literary reflections, development generally goes from simpler to more complex relationships, the literary-historical development of political economy provided a natural guiding thread that criticism could follow, so that economic categories in by and large they would follow in the same order as in logical development. This form at first glance has the advantage of greater clarity, since the *real* development; in fact, such a construction would at best only contribute to the greater popularity of the presentation. Historical development is often irregular and zigzag, and it would have to be traced in all its vicissitudes, thanks to which not only would have to be given too often place and low-value material, but would have to and often interrupt the train of thought. Moreover, one cannot write the history of political economy without the history of bourgeois society, and the latter would extend the work indefinitely, since there is no more or less processed material in this area. The logical method of research was therefore the only suitable one. The latter, however, is the same historical method, only freed from its historical form and from historical incidents that violate the harmony of presentation. The logical train of thought should begin with this research method, we proceed from the first and simplest relationship, which has been given to us historically or in fact, therefore from the first economic relationship that we find. We dismember this relation.

The fact that this is an *attitude* speaks for the fact that it has two sides that *relate to each other*. We subject each of these parties to an isolated consideration and in this way we learn the form of their relationship, their interaction. In this case, contradictions arise that require resolution. But since we are considering here not an abstract thought process that occurs only in our head, but a real process that took place at a certain historical moment or even continues to take place at the present time, these contradictions will develop in practice and will probably find their resolution. We will trace the way of this resolution and find that it caused the establishment of a new relationship, the two opposite sides of which we will have to develop, etc.

Political economy begins with *goods*, from the moment when products—by individuals or primitive communities—are exchanged

for each other. An exchange *product* is a *commodity*. But it is a product only because it (the thing, the product) embodies the *relationship* of two persons or communities, the relationship between the producer and the consumer, which here no longer merge in one person. Here we immediately have before us an example of a peculiar phenomenon that runs through the entire political economy and created a terrible confusion in the heads of bourgeois economists; in political economy, we are not talking about things, but about relations between individuals, in the last resort, between classes, but these relations *always associated with things and manifest as things*. This connection, the weak consciousness of which, of course, already flickered in some cases of one or another economist, was first revealed by Marx in its significance for the whole political economy, thanks to which he could simplify the most difficult questions so clearly and make it so clear that they can now be understood even bourgeois economists.

If we consider the product in its various relations, and it is the product in its completely developed form, and not at the beginning of its difficult path of development, in the initial exchange of goods between the two primitive communities, then we will be presented with both angles of view: use value and exchange value, and here we are already entering the field of economic debate.

If anyone wants to be convinced by a vivid example that the German dialectic method at its present stage of development is at least as superior to the old, flat-blown metaphysical one as far as modern railways surpass the means of communication of the Middle Ages, let him read with Adam Smith or some other official economist with the name of the appropriate place, and he will see how these gentlemen struggled over use and exchange value and how difficult it is for them to distinguish between them and understand the specific features concern each. He can only then compare with this a clear, simple development of these problems at Marx.

After the use and exchange value are analysed, the product is examined as a direct unity of both, therefore the product in the form in which it enters *the exchange process*. What contradictions arise here, the reader will find on pages 20, 21. We only note that these contradictions are not only of abstract theoretical interest, but also reflect the difficulties that arise from the nature of the direct exchange relationship, from simple exchange trade, reflect those impossibilities, which inevitably rests on this primitive form of exchange. The resolution of these impossibilities lies in the fact that the property of

representing the exchange value of all other goods is transferred to a special product—*money*. Money or simple circulation is then considered in the second chapter, namely: 1) money as a *measure of value*, and right there it finds its more precise definition of the *value* measured in money, *price*, 2) as a *medium of circulation*, 3) as the unity of both definitions, as *real money*, as a representative of all material bourgeois wealth. This ends the first issue, leaving for the second issue the question of the transfer of money to capital.

From this it can be seen that if one is guided by this method, then logical development is not at all obliged to stay in the field of pure abstraction. On the contrary, it requires historical illustration, constant contact with reality. These illustrations are given here in huge numbers, on the one hand, in the form of indications of the actual historical course of things at different levels of social development, and on the other hand, in the form of indications of economic literature, with the aim of following from the very beginning the process of developing clear definitions of economic relations. Criticism of individual, more or less one-sided or inconsistent views is already given during the development of the logical concept and can only be briefly summarized in the historical part.

In the third article, we will move on to the economic content of the book itself. (*Engels, On the book of Marx, "On the Critique of Political Economy," pp. 12–14, 1932*)

But the historical views of Marx inflict a mortal blow on philosophy in the field of history, just as the dialectical view of nature makes any natural philosophy unnecessary and impossible. Now the task is not to *come up with* a connection that exists between phenomena, but to *discover it in the phenomena themselves*. For philosophy, driven out of nature and from history, there remains, as it remains, only an area of pure thought: the doctrine of the laws of the process of thinking, logic and dialectics. (*Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 78, Sotsekiz, 1931*)

## **Materialistic Logic Coincides with the Theory of Knowledge**

So, not only a description of the *forms of thinking* and not only a *natural-historical description of the phenomena of thinking* (how does this differ from

the description of *forms* ??), but also a correspondence with the truth, i.e. ?? quintessence, or, more simply, the results and results of the history of thought ?? Hegel's idealistic ambiguity and lack of understanding here. *Mysticism* .

In this understanding, logic coincides with the *theory of knowledge* . This is generally a very important issue. *Not* psychology, *not* the phenomenology of the spirit, *but* logic = the question of truth.

( *The Lenin Collection IX* , p. 191, 1st ed. )

Logic is a doctrine not about external forms of thinking, but about the laws of development of "all material, natural and spiritual things," that is, the development of the entire concrete content of the world and its cognition, that is, the total, sum, conclusion of the *history of cognition* of the world. ( *Lenin Collection " IX* , p. 41. )

"Nature, this direct wholeness, is being developed into a logical idea and into a spirit." Logic is the doctrine of knowledge. There is a theory of knowledge. Cognition is a reflection of nature by man. But this is not a simple, not direct, not integral reflection, but a process of a number of " *only* deified abstractions, formulations, the formation of concepts, laws etc., which concepts, laws etc. (thinking, science = logical idea "logical idea") and conditionally *cover* , approximately " , universal regularity of an ever-moving and developing regularity, nature. There are *really* , objectively *three* members: 1) universality nature; 2) human cognition = *brain* of man (as the highest. ( *The product of the same nature* ) and 3) the form of reflection *Lenin* of nature in the knowledge of man, this form is concepts, *Collection I* laws, categories etc. A person cannot embrace = reflect = X , p. 203. ) display the nature of *all* , in its entirety, its "immediate

integrity”, he can only *ever* come close to this, creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a scientific picture of the world, etc., etc.

## How to study dialectics

Thus, in *any* sentence it is possible (and should), as in a “cell” (“cell”), to reveal the rudiments of *all* elements of dialectics, thus showing that dialectics is generally characteristic of all cognition of a person. And natural science shows us (and again this must be shown with *any* simple example) the objective nature in its same qualities, the transformation of the individual into the general, random into necessary, transitions, overflows, the interconnection of opposites. Dialectics is *the* theory of knowledge (of Hegel and) of Marxism: this is what “side” of the matter (this is not the “side” of the matter, but the *essence of the matter*) did not pay attention to Plekhanov, not to mention other Marxists. (*Lenin, On the Question of Dialectics, Op., Vol. XIII, p. 303, ed. 3rd*)

\* \* \*

[If M (ar) x did not leave “Logic” (with a capital letter), then he left the *logic of* “Capital”, and this should be used strictly on this issue. In Capital, logic, dialectics, and the theory of the knowledge of materialism are applied to one science (do not need 3 words: this is the same thing), which took everything valuable from Hegel and pushed this valuable forward.] (*Lenin Collection XII, p. . 291 - 292, ed. 1st.*)

	Whole field of knowledge
History of Philosophy. Hence:	Briefly, the history of knowledge in general
Greek philosophy outlined everything	these are the areas of knowledge that should form the theory of
» Individual sciences	
» Mental development of the child	
» » Animals	
» NB <i>language</i> :	

these moments

+ psychology                      knowledge      and  
+ physiology of the dialectics

senses

( *The Lenin Collection XII*, p. 315. )

## **The Historical Nature of Dialectical Logic**

Empirical science has accumulated such an immense mass of positive material that the need to systematize it in each individual field of study and arrange it from the point of view of internal connection has become unavoidable. In the same way, it became inevitable to bring separate areas of cognition into a proper connection. But, having tackled this, natural science falls into the theoretical field, and here the methods of empiricism are powerless, only theoretical thinking can help here. But theoretical thinking is a natural property only in the form of ability. It must be developed, improved, and for such a development there is still no other means than studying the history of philosophy.

The theoretical thinking of each era, and therefore of our era, is a historical product that takes very different forms at different times and therefore receives very different contents. Consequently, the science of thinking, like any other science, is historical science, the science of the historical development of human thinking. And this is important for the practical application of thinking to empirical fields, because, firstly, the theory of the laws of thinking is not at all some kind of forever established “eternal truth”, as philistine thought connects with the word “logic”. Formal logic itself was, from Aristotle to the present day, the scene of fierce debate. As for dialectics, so far it has been studied in a more or less accurate way by only two thinkers—Aristotle and Hegel. (*Engels, Anti-Dühring*, pp. 239-240, 1932)

## **The Contrast Between Dialectics and the Theory of Knowledge Among the Menshevik Idealists**

*The significance of dialectics as a methodology, opposed to the theory of knowledge, was fully recognized by the founders of Marxism and its largest representatives . Revisionism began its “career” with a criticism of the dialectical method and with a demand for a return to Kant. Our revolutionary era requires us to carefully study reality and master the dialectic, which is a method of scientific knowledge and revolutionary action, at the same time. Dialectics already in the person of Hegel overcame Kant’s epistemological metaphysics. However, it still continues to gravitate over minds - not only bourgeois, but partly “proletarian”. The theory of knowledge fulfilled a certain historical task. It was called upon to “curb” human thought, which considered it possible to know things that do not exist. The theory of knowledge fought against the old metaphysics, which had ready-made, accepted for faith objects like God, soul, etc., as its subject . (Deborin, *Philosophy and Marxism*, pp. 234-235, 1930. Italics compiled.)*

### **Dialectics, Logic and Theory of Knowledge among Menshevik Idealists**

... Philosophy is not a science of sciences, and not a “consistent system of their most general results,” but a synthesis that penetrates the sciences and actively relates to them.

However, if the task of philosophy is not just a summary of the results of our knowledge, then perhaps its task is to justify our knowledge, to clarify the *conditions* for its possibility and its *boundaries* . Thus, we get a Kantian “critical” statement of the problem of philosophy. Philosophy here is basically based on the theory of knowledge, epistemology. Thus, the problem arises: what is the relationship between the theory of knowledge and philosophy in Marxism? And what is the relation of the theory of knowledge, *that of knowing*, to the method, to *how to know*?

We already know that in Engels the concept of the theory of thinking does not mean the theory of the boundaries of thinking, but

means the theory of dialectics and formal logic, i.e., methodology. For Engels, philosophy is the self-knowledge of thinking, but not of abstract thinking in general, but of concrete thinking, cognizing concrete reality and reflecting in its forms the most general forms of its development. A prerequisite for almost all bourgeois epistemology, in particular Kantian, is the idea of certain absolute boundaries of our thinking, which are the task of this science to establish. But in order to know the boundaries of knowledge, one must know. While there is no cognition, there is no problem about its borders. However, Hegel also pointed out that the border is recognized only when it is already crossed. The “critical” idea that our knowledge distorts cognizable objects, Recycling the world of phenomena in its own way, is itself dogmatic and unprovable. Only practical activity shows what is subjective and what is objective in our knowledge. Hence, not the theory of knowledge subordinates methodology, knowledge, but methodology, dialectics, includes the theory of knowledge as its moment. (Karev, *For Materialist Dialectics*, pp. 49-50, Guise, 1930, ed. 2nd.)

## Doctrine of the Concept

Logical concepts are subjective, as long as they remain “abstract,” in their abstract form, but at the same time they express things-in-themselves. Nature is *both* concrete *and* abstract, *and* phenomena *and* essence, *and* instant *and* relation. Human concepts are subjective in their abstractness, isolation, but objective in general, in the process, in the end, in the trend, in the source. ( *The Lenin Collection IX*, p . 249. )

<p>NB To question about true meaning Logic Hegel</p>	<p>The a(abstract) operations them representation, conviction, of the laws objective</p>	<p>formation concepts with Marx applied Hegel's dialectic in her developed form to political saving connection</p>	<p>To should return to parse step by step any walking</p>
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the world. It is ridiculous to single out causality from this connection. It is impossible to deny the objectivity of concepts, the objectivity of the general in the individual and in the particular. Hegel is much deeper, therefore, than Kant and others, tracing the reflection in the motion of the concepts of motion of the objective world. As a simple form of value, a separate act of exchanging one, a given, product for another, already includes in its unexpanded form *all the main contradictions of capitalism*, it's the simplest *generalization*, the first and simplest formation of *concepts*(judgments, conclusions etc.) means the knowledge of man more and more deep *objective* connection of the world. Here we must look for the true meaning, meaning and role of Hegelian Logic. This is NB. (*Lenin Collection " IX , p. 197.)*

logic and  
theories  
knowledge  
e  
Kantian  
etc.

In any case, natural science is now at such a stage of development that it cannot slip away from dialectical generalization if it is not forgotten that the results in which the experience data are generalized are the essence of the concept; the art of operating

concepts is not innate and does not consist in ordinary common sense, but it requires real thinking, which, in turn, has as long a history as experienced natural science. (*Engels, Anti-Dühring, p. 9, 1932*)

## **Marxism Requires an Objective Application of Dialectics**

witty and smart! Hegel analyses the concepts that usually seem dead, and show that *there is* movement in NB them . Finite? So *moving* towards the end! Something? - thoughts means *not* that different. Being in general? - means such about uncertainty that being = non-being. Comprehensive, dialectics. At universal flexibility of concepts, flexibility reaching the reading identity of opposites—that is the essence. This flexibility Hegel. applied subjectively = eclecticism and sophistry. The flexibility applied *objectively*, that is, reflecting the comprehensiveness of the material process and its unity, is dialectics, it is the correct reflection of the eternal development of the world. (*The Lenin Collection IX , p. 71. )*

## **Concepts Must be Flexible**

If I'm not mistaken, Hegel has a lot of mysticism and empty pedantry in and “purely logical” these conclusions, but the main idea is processing? It is the brilliant: a worldwide, same. This *should* coincide, comprehensive, *lively* connection of like induction and everything with everything and deduction in Capital. reflection of this connection—Hegel materialistically put on his head—in the concepts of man, which should also be hewn, broken off, flexible, mobile, relational, interconnected, united in opposites in order to embrace the world. The continuation

of the work of Hegel and Marx should consist in *the dialectical* treatment of the history of human thought, science and technology. (*The Lenin Collection IX*, p. 139.)

\* \* \*

... human concepts are not motionless, but always move, pass into each other, pour one into another, without which they do not reflect living life. The analysis of concepts, the study of them, the “art of operating with them” (Engels) always requires the study of the *movement* of concepts, their connection, their mutual transitions. (*The Lenin Collection XII*, pp. 181 - 183.)

River and *drops* in this river. The position of *each* drop, its relation to others; her connection with others; direction of its movement; speed; line of movement—straight, curve, round, etc.—up, down. The amount of movement. Concepts like *taking into account* the individual sides of the movement, individual drops (= “things”), individual “jets” etc. Here is an approximate picture of the world according to Hegel’s Logic—of course, minus God and the absolute. (*The Lenin Collection IX*, p. 139, 1st ed.)

Hegel often has the word “*moment*” in the sense of the moment of *connection*, the moment of cohesion.

## **Need to Study the History of Thinking**

Apparently, the main thing here for Hegel is to *outline the transitions*. From a known point of view, under certain conditions, the universal is separate, the separate is universal. Not only (1) the *connection*, and the connection is inextricable, of all concepts and judgments, but (2) the *transitions from* one to another, and not only

the transitions, but also (3) the *identity of the opposites*—that’s what matters for Hegel. But this only “shines through” the *fog of exposition* of the archa “abstrus”. The history of thought from the point of view of the development and application of general concepts and categories of Logic is what you need! (*The Lenin Collection IX* , pp. 193-195.)

## **Hegel only guessed the Dialectics of the Material World in the Dialectics of Concepts**

*the totality of all* aspects of the phenomenon, reality and their (mutually) *relationship*—this is what truth is made of. Relations (= transitions = contradictions) of concepts = the main content of logic, *and* these concepts (and their relations, transitions, contradictions) are shown as reflections of the objective world. The dialectic of *things* creates the dialectic of *ideas* , and not vice versa.

Hegel ingeniously guessed the dialectic of things (phenomena, world, nature) in the dialectic of concepts #

This aphorism should be more popularly expressed, without the word dialectic: something like this: Hegel ingeniously *guessed* in the change, the interdependence of *all* concepts, in the *identity of their opposites* , in the *transitions* of one concept to another, in an eternal change, the movement of concepts is just such an attitude of things, nature.

=. . . . .	= NB
interdependence of concepts	Each concept is in a
“ <i>All</i> ”	certain <i>respect</i> , in a certain
without exception	connection
transitions of concepts from one	with <i>everyone</i> else.

to another  
“All” without exception.

the relativity of the opposition between concepts...  
the identity of opposites between concepts (“*Lenin  
Collection*” IX , p. 229.)

what is  
dialectics

## **Induction and Deduction**

Unity, peculiarity, universality—these are the three categories within which the whole “doctrine of the concept” moves. Moreover, the transition from the individual to the special, and from the special to the universal, is accomplished not in one but in many ways, and Hegel quite often illustrates it with the example of the transition: individual, species, genus. And then Haeckel came with his induction and advanced against Hegel, seeing in this some kind of great feat, the idea that we must move from the individual to the special and then from the special to the universal, from the individual to the species, and then from species to genus, allowing then to do *deductive* conclusions, which should already lead further! These people are so bent on the opposite between induction and deduction that they reduce all logical forms of inference to these two, without noticing at all that they 1) apply completely different forms of inference under this name, 2) do not use all the wealth of forms of inference, since they cannot be squeezed into the framework of these two forms, and 3) they thereby make these forms themselves—induction and deduction—into pure nonsense. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 102, 1932* )

## **Analysis of the History of Thought and the History of the Body**

The development, for example, of some concept or relationship (positive and negative, cause and effect, substance and accidents) in the history of thinking refers to its development in the head of a separate dialectic, as the development of any organism in palaeontology—to its development in embryology (or rather, in history and in a separate germ). What it is, was first discovered by

Hegel for concepts. In historical development, chance plays a role, which in dialectical thinking, as in the development of the embryo, is expressed in necessity. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 112, 1932*)

## **Induction must Coincide with Deduction**

*Induction and analysis.* A wonderful example of how thorough the claims of induction to be the only or at least the main form of scientific discovery are given by thermodynamics. The steam engine is an amazing proof that mechanical motion can be obtained from heat. 100,000 steam engines proved this no more convincingly than one machine, but they more and more forced physicists to take up the explanation for this. Sadi Carnot was the first to take this seriously, but not by induction. He studied the steam engine, analysed it, found that in it the main process does not appear in *pure* form, and obscured by all kinds of side processes, eliminated these side circumstances unnecessary for the main process and created the ideal steam engine (or gas engine), which cannot be built in the same way as, for example, it is possible to draw an almost geometric line or surface, but which has, in its own way, the same services as these mathematical abstractions: it represents the process in question in a pure, independent, undisguised form. And he came nose to the mechanical equivalent of heat (see. The value of its functions *with* ), he could not open up and see just because he believed in the *caloric*. This is, by the way, evidence of the harm of false theories. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 39, 1932*)

## **Development Theory Proves Unsuitable for Induction Divorced from Deduction**

By induction, it was found a hundred years ago that crawfish and spiders are insects, and all lower animals are worms. Using the same induction, it is now found that this is absurdity and that there are  $x$  classes. What is the advantage of the so-called inductive inference, which may turn out to be as false as the so-called deductive inference? After all, its basis is classification.

Induction fails to prove that someday a mammalian animal without mammary glands will not be found. Previously, nipples were considered a sign of a mammal, but the platypus has no nipples at all. All this bacchanalia with induction was created by the British, starting from Wavell, etc., who came up simply mathematically and thus composed the opposite of the induction of deduction. The old and new logic do not know anything about this. All forms of inference, starting with a single, are experimental and based on experience. Inductive inference begins even with A - E - B (universal).

It is characteristic of the power of thought of our natural scientists that Haeckel fanatically defends induction just at the very moment when the *results of* induction - classification - are everywhere questioned (Limulus - spider; Ascidia - vertebral or chordatum; Dipnoi, contrary to the initial definition of amphibians, turn out to be fish) and when new facts open daily that upset *all the* previous inductive classification. What a magnificent confirmation of Hegel's words that inductive inference is essentially problematic! Not only that: thanks to the successes of the development theory, even the entire classification of organisms is taken away from induction and reduced to "deduction", to the doctrine of origin—some kind is literally *deduced*, is derived from another by way of origin, and it is impossible to prove the theory of development using simple induction, since it is completely anti-inductive. Thanks to induction, concepts are sorted: species, genus, class; thanks to the theory of development, they have become fluid, and therefore *relative*; and relative concepts are not amenable to induction.

Induction and deduction. Haeckel, Schöpfungsgeschichte, S. 76-77. Inference is polarized by induction and deduction! ( *Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 103-104, ed. 1932* )

## **Dialectical Thought is Peculiar Only to Man**

*Reason and reason.* This is Hegelian distinction, according to which only dialectical thinking is reasonable, has a certain meaning. We share with animals all types of rational activity: *induction*, *deduction*, therefore, also *abstraction* (the generic concept of four-legged and two-legged), *analysis of unknown objects* ([?] Breaking a nut is the beginning of analysis), *synthesis* (in the case

of animal tricks) and, in as a compound of both, *experiment*(in case of new obstacles and in unfamiliar positions). By type, all these methods—that is, all means of scientific research known to ordinary logic—are completely identical in humans and in higher animals. Only by degree (development of the corresponding method) are they different. The main features of the method are the same in humans and animals and lead to the same results, since both operate or are satisfied only with these elementary methods. —On the contrary, dialectical thought - precisely because it involves the study of the nature of the concepts themselves - is peculiar only to man, and to the latter only at a relatively high stage of development (Buddhists and Greeks), and reaches its full development only much later, in modern philosophy; Despite this, the Greeks had enormous results, in many respects anticipating the work of scientific research. *Analysis* is the predominant form of research; nothing is worth without its opposite—*synthesis*.)

*To all inductivists.* No induction in the world would help us understand the *process of* induction. Only *analysis* could do this. Of this process. Induction and deduction are interconnected in the same necessary way as synthesis and analysis. Instead of extolling one of them to heaven at the expense of the other, it is better to try to use each in its place, and this can only be achieved if we keep in mind their relationship with each other, their mutual complement each other. According to inductivists, induction is an infallible method. This is so untrue that its supposedly reliable results are daily refuted by new discoveries. Light bodies, calorific values, were the fruits of induction. Where are they now? Induction taught us that all vertebrate animals have a central nervous system differentiated into the brain and spinal cord and that the spinal cord is enclosed in cartilaginous or bony vertebrae—even the name of these animals is borrowed from; *without* vertebrae. Induction has established that fish are those vertebrates that have been breathing exclusively gills all their lives. And then animals are found that almost everyone recognizes as fish, but which possess, along with gills, well-developed lungs, and it turns out that each fish has a potential lung in its air bubble. Only through a bold application of the doctrine of development, Haeckel helped natural scientists, inductivists, who felt very well in these contradictions, get out of them. If induction were really so infallible, then where would these endless upheavals come from in the classifications of representatives of the organic

world? They are the most authentic product of induction, and yet they destroy each other. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 33-34, 1932*)

## **Subordination of the Forms of Thinking Movement**

Dialectical logic, in contrast to the old, purely formal logic, is not content to list and compare without connection the forms of the movement of thinking, i.e., various forms of judgment and inference. On the contrary, it deduces these forms from one another, establishes a relationship of subordination, rather than coordination between them, it develops higher forms from lower ones. Hegel, true to his division of all logic, groups judgments into:

1. The judgments of the present being, the simplest form of judgment, where a certain property is expressed, in the affirmative or negative, is some common property (positive proposition: the rose is red; negative: the rose is not blue; infinite proposition: the rose is not a camel).

2. Judgments of reflection, where some relation is expressed about the subject (single judgment: this person is mortal; particular: some, many people are mortal; universal: all people are mortal or a person is mortal).

3. Judgments of necessity, where its substantial certainty is expressed about the subject (categorical proposition: a rose is a plant; hypothetical proposition: when the sun rises, the day becomes; separation: lepidosiren is either fish or amphibian).

4. Judgments of the concept in which the subject is expressed as far as he corresponds to his universal nature, or, as Hegel puts it, to his own concept; (assertive judgment: this house is bad; problematic: if this house is made in such a way, then it is good; apodictic: a house made in such and such a way is good).

1) Single judgment, 2) special, 3) universal (*Engels, Dialectics of nature, pp. 100 - 101, 1932*)

## **Consistency of the Laws of Thought and the Laws of Nature**

No matter how dry all this has and how arbitrary this classification of judgments may seem at first glance, but the inner truth and necessity of this grouping will become clear to anyone who follows Hegel's brilliant arguments about this in *Big Logic* (Werke, V, p. 63-115). But how much this group is justified not only by the laws of thinking, but also by the laws of nature, can be shown in a very famous example taken from another field.

Prehistoric people already knew in practice that friction gives rise to warmth when they discovered—maybe already a hundred thousand years ago—a way to get fire by friction, and much earlier they warmed the cold parts of the body by rubbing them. But from here to the discovery that friction is generally a source of heat, it has passed, who knows how many millennia. But, one way or another, the time has come when the human brain has developed so much that it could make a judgment: *friction is a source of warmth*—a judgment of being and, moreover, a positive judgment.

New millennia passed, until in 1842 Mayer, Joule and Kolding studied this special process in its relations to other similar processes open during this time, i.e., studied it in its relations to its closest general conditions and were able to formulate this kind of Judgment: Any mechanical movement can turn by friction into heat. So, here is how much time and how much empirical knowledge it took to advance in the cognition of a question from the above positive judgment and existing being to this universal judgment of reflection. But from now on, things went faster. Three years later, Mayer was able to raise—at least essentially—the judgment of reflection to the height at which it is now.

Any form of movement is capable and compelled, under the conditions defined for each case, to turn directly or indirectly into any other form of movement: the judgment of a concept, and moreover, apodictic, is the highest form of judgment in general.

So, what Hegel is the development of a logical form of judgment as such, appears here before us as the development of our theoretical evidence based on the *empirical* basis about the nature of motion in general. This shows that the laws of thinking and the laws of nature are necessarily consistent with each other, if they are only correctly known.

We can consider the first proposition as a proposition of singularity: it records the single fact that friction generates heat. The second proposition can be regarded as the proposition of a feature: a particular form of motion, mechanical, exhibits the property to pass

under special circumstances (due to friction) into another special form of motion, in warmth. The third proposition is the proposition of universality: any form of movement turns out to be capable and should be transformed into any other form of movement. In this form, the law has reached its last expression. Thanks to new discoveries, we can find new evidence of it, give it a new, richer content. But to the law itself, as it is expressed here, we can add nothing more. In its universality, in which form and content are equally universal, it is incapable of further expansion:

Unfortunately, the case is lame in the case of a form of protein movement, alias life, until we can make a protein. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 101-102, 1932*)

## IV. Formal Logic and Dialectics

The complete misunderstanding of the nature of dialectics is already evidenced by the fact that Mr. Dühring acknowledges it as an instrument of simple proof, just as, with a limited understanding, formal logic or elementary mathematics can be considered as such. Even formal logic is, first of all, a method for finding new results, for moving from the known to the unknown, and the same, only in a much higher sense, is dialectics, which also contains the germ of a broader worldview, since it breaks the tight horizon of formal logic. In mathematics, the same attitude exists. Elementary mathematics, mathematics of constant quantities, moves, at least in general and in general, within the boundaries of formal logic; mathematics of variables the most essential department of which is the calculus of the infinitesimal, is essentially nothing more than the application of dialectics to mathematical relations. The simple proof here completely recedes into the background in comparison with the diverse applications of the method to new areas of research. And almost all the proofs of higher mathematics, starting with the first proofs of differential calculus, are, from the point of view of elementary mathematics, strictly speaking, incorrect. This cannot be otherwise if the data obtained in the dialectical field are to be proved by means of formal logic. Trying to prove to such an avid metaphysician, as Mr. Dühring, something through one dialectic would be the same gift of labour spent, as was the work of Leibniz and his students, who then proved to mathematicians theorems of the

calculus of infinitesimal. The differential caused the same convulsions in them, which in Dühring causes the negation of negation, in which, however, the differential also plays a role, as we shall see. In the end, these gentlemen, since they did not die in the meantime, surrendered grumblingly, not because they were convinced, but because the solutions given by differential calculus were always correct. Mr. Dühring, as he himself tells us, has reached only 40 years old, and if - what we wish him - he will live to a very old age, then perhaps he will survive the same thing. (that the solutions given by differential calculus were always true. Mr. Dühring, as he himself tells us, has reached only 40 years old, and if - what we wish him - he will live to a very old age, then perhaps he will survive the same thing. ( that the solutions given by differential calculus were always true. Mr. Dühring, as he himself tells us, has reached only 40 years old, and if— what we wish him—he will live to a very old age, then perhaps he will survive the same thing. (*Engels, Anti-Dühring, pp. 95-96, 1932*)

## **The Law of Abstract Identity**

*The law of the same* in the old *metaphysical* sense is the basic law of the old worldview:  $a = a$ . Every thing is equal to itself. Everything was constant—the solar system, stars, organisms. Natural science has refuted this law in each case, step by step; but theoretically it still continues to exist, and the adherents of the old still contrast it with the new. A thing cannot be simultaneously itself and something else. And, however, natural science has recently proved in detail (see above [p. 8- 9]) the fact that a true, concrete identity contains a difference, a change. —Like all metaphysical categories, abstract identity is only suitable for *home* uses where insignificant relationships or short periods of time are considered; the boundaries within which it is suitable are different in almost every case and are determined by the nature of the object to which it is applied—in the planetary system, where for ordinary astronomical calculations it is possible to take an ellipsis as the main shape without a sensitive error, these boundaries are much wider than in the case of an insect that does its transformation within a few weeks (give other examples, for example, a change in species that has taken place over many millennia). But for synthetic natural science, abstract identity is completely insufficient even in any separate field, and although in general the idea of such

identity is almost now rejected, but theoretically it still rules over the minds, and most naturalists still imagine that identity and difference are irreconcilable opposites, not one-sided poles that matter only in their interaction, in including difference in identity. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 21, 1932*)

## **Inapplicability of Abstract Identity**

The organic nature also applicable abstract identity of  $a = a$ , and negative *and* equal and unequal *and* simultaneously. A plant, animal, every cell in every moment of its life is identical with itself and at the same time different from themselves, due to the absorption and release of substances, due to respiration, formation and dying of cells, due to the circulation process,—in short, due to the sum of continuous molecular changes that make up life, and the result of which is clearly in the different phases of life - embryonic life, youth, puberty, the process of reproduction, old age, death. *We leave aside the development of species.* The more physiology develops, the more important these continuous, infinitesimal changes become for it, the more important it also becomes for it to consider the differences *within* identities, and the old, abstract, formal point of view of identities, according to which an organic being is regarded as something simply identical with itself, permanent, is out of date. Despite this, the way of thinking based on it continues to exist along with its categories. But already in inorganic nature, identity, as such, does not really exist. Each body is constantly exposed to mechanical, physical influences that produce continuous changes in it, modify its identity. Abstract identity and its antithesis, difference, are relevant only in mathematics - abstract science that deals with mental constructions, even though they are reflections of reality—but here it is constantly removed. Hegel, *Enz. I, p. 235.* The fact that the identity also contains a difference is expressed in every *sentence* where the predicate is inevitably different from the subject. *Lily is a plant; the rose is red*; here either in the subject or in the predicate there is (difference) something that is not covered by the predicate or subject. Hegel, *Enz. I, p. 231.* It goes without saying that *identity with itself* already has a predetermined complement, *unlike everything else*.

Constant change, that is, the removal of abstract identity with oneself, also exists in the so-called inorganic nature. Geology is the story of this. On the surface, mechanical changes (erosion, frost), chemical (weathering), inside the earth mechanical (pressure), heat (volcanic), chemical (water, acid, binders) on a large scale - soil elevations, earthquakes, etc. Modern slate is radically different from the silt from which it was formed, chalk - from unconnected microscopic shells that made it up; even more limestone, which, according to some scientists, is of completely organic origin, sandstone is from unbound sea sand, which, in turn, arose from crushed granite, etc., not to mention coal. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 8–9, 1932*)

## **The Opposite of Formal Logic and Dialectical Logic**

Comrade Bukharin speaks of “logical” foundations. All his reasoning shows that he - perhaps unconsciously—stands here on the point of view of formal or scholastic logic, and not of dialectical or Marxist logic. To clarify this, I will begin with the simplest example taken by Comrade Bukharin himself. At the discussion on December 30, he said:

“Comrades, perhaps, many of you have disputes that are taking place here that make an impression of something like this: two people come and ask each other what a glass is that stands on a chair. One says: “This is a glass cylinder, and may anyone anathematize who says it is not.” The second one says: “A glass, this is a tool for drinking, and let those who say that this is not so be anathematized” (p. 46).

With this example, Bukharin wanted, as the reader sees, to popularly explain to me the harm of one-sidedness. I accept this explanation with gratitude and, in order to prove my gratitude with the deed, I respond with a popular explanation of what eclecticism is in contrast to dialectics.

There is no doubt a glass and a glass cylinder, and a tool for drinking. But the glass has not only these two properties, or qualities, or sides, but an infinite number of other properties, qualities, sides, relationships and “mediations” with the rest of the world. A glass is a heavy object that can be a throwing tool. A glass can serve as a paperweight, as a room for a caught butterfly, a glass can be of value

as an object with artistic carvings or patterns, regardless of whether it is suitable for drinking, whether it is made of glass, whether its shape is cylindrical or not really, and so on and so forth.

Further. If I need a glass now as a tool for drinking, then it's completely not important for me to know whether its shape is completely cylindrical and whether it is really made of glass, but it's important that there is no crack in the bottom, so that you cannot hurt your lips using this a glass, etc. If I need a glass not for drinking, but for such a use that every glass cylinder is suitable for, then a glass with a crack in the bottom or even without a bottom at all is suitable for me, etc.

The formal logic, which is limited in schools (and should be limited—as amended—for the lower grades of the school), takes formal definitions, guided by what is most common or most often striking, and limited to this. If at the same time two or more different definitions are taken and combined together completely by accident (both a glass cylinder and a drinking tool), then we get an eclectic definition that indicates different sides of the subject - and that's it.

Dialectical logic requires us to move on. To really know the subject, it is necessary to embrace, study all its sides, all connections and “mediations”. We will never achieve this fully, but the requirement of comprehensiveness will warn us against mistakes and from necrosis. This is the first. Secondly, dialectical logic requires to take an object in its development, “self-movement” (as Hegel sometimes says), change. In relation to the glass, this is not immediately clear, but the glass does not remain unchanged, but in particular, the purpose of the glass, its use, its *connection* him with the world around him. Thirdly, all human practice should enter into a complete “definition” of an object both as a criterion of truth and as a practical determinant of the connection of an object with what a person needs. Fourth, dialectical logic teaches that “there is no abstract truth, truth is always concrete”, as Hegel used to say, the late Plekhanov (in brackets appropriate, it seems to me to notice for young party members that *one cannot* become conscious, a *true* communist without studying - just *studying*- everything written by Plekhanov on philosophy, because it is the best in all the international literature of Marxism) [By the way, one cannot but wish, firstly, that the publication of Plekhanov's works now published would highlight all articles on philosophy in a special volume or special volumes with a detailed index and so on. For this should enter into a series of obligatory textbooks of communism. Secondly, the workers' state, in

my opinion, should require professors of philosophy to know the presentation of Marxist philosophy by the Plekhanov's and be able to transmit this knowledge to students. But all this is already a deviation from "propaganda" to "administration".].

Of course, I did not exhaust the concept of dialectical logic. But for now, this is enough. (*Lenin, Once Again on Trade Unions (1921), Op., Vol. XXVI, pp. 133 - 135, 3rd ed.*)

## **Plekhanov Gives Formal Logic an Independent Meaning**

"Everything flows, everything changes," says the ancient Ephesian thinker. The combinations we call objects are in a state of constant, more or less rapid, *change*. Since these combinations remain *these combinations*, we must judge them by the formula: "yes - yes and no - no." And since they *change and cease to exist*, as such, we must appeal to the *logic of contradiction*; we must say - at the risk of bringing displeasure to the Messrs. Bernshteinov, N. G. and other metaphysical fraternity: "yes and no, both exist and do not exist."

*Just as peace is a special case of movement, so thinking according to the rules of formal logic (according to the "basic laws" of thought) is a special case of dialectical thinking. (Plekhanov, Preface to the book of F. Engels "L. Feuerbach", p. 22, 1931)*

When we are faced with the question of the transition of one type of motion to another, say, mechanical motion in heat, we also have to reason according to the basic rule of *Iberweg*. This kind of motion is *either heat, or mechanical motion, or so on*. This is clear. But if this is so, then the basic laws of formal logic within certain limits *apply also to motion*. And from here it follows once again that dialectics does not abolish formal logic, but only deprives it of the laws of *absolute value* ascribed to them by metaphysicians. (*Plekhanov, Preface to Engels' book L. Feuerbach, p. 24, 1931*)

## **Dialectics and Eclecticism**

Consistent with this desire to theoretically deepen the question, Comrade Bukharin, starting from the discussion on December 30, if not earlier, brings the dispute precisely to this area.

“I consider it absolutely necessary,” said Comrade Bukharin on December 30, —this is the theoretical essence of what is called the “buffer” faction or its ideology here—and it seems to me absolutely certain that this political and this economic moment cannot be discarded ... “(p. 47) .

The theoretical essence of the mistake that Comrade Bukharin makes here is that he replaces the dialectical relationship between politics and economics (which Marxism teaches us) with eclecticism. “Both that and another”, “on the one hand, on the other hand”—this is the theoretical position of Bukharin. This is eclecticism. Dialectics requires comprehensive consideration of the relationships in their specific development, and not pulling out a piece of one, a piece of another. By the example of politics and economics, I have already shown this...

In the same Petrograd speech of Bukharin on page 7 we read:

“Comrade Trotsky’s mistake is that he does not adequately protect the moment of the school of communism.”

At the discussion on December 30, Bukharin argues as follows:

“Comrade Zinoviev said that the trade unions were a school of communism, and Trotsky said that this was the administrative-technical apparatus of production management. I do not see any logical grounds that would prove that neither the first nor the second is true; both of these positions are true and the combination of these two positions “(p. 48).

The same idea in the 6th thesis of Bukharin and his “group” or “faction”: ... “on the one hand, they (trade unions) are the” school of communism “... on the other hand, they are, and moreover, to an increasing degree—an integral part of the economic apparatus and the apparatus of state power in general...” (Pravda, January 16).

This is where Comrade Bukharin’s main theoretical error lies, substituting eclecticism for Marxism’s dialectic (especially widespread among authors of various “fashionable” and reactionary philosophical systems)...

“On the one hand, a school, on the other, an apparatus,” Bukharin says and writes in his theses. Trotsky’s mistake is that he “does not adequately protect the moment of school ...” with Zinoviev—a lack of “moment” of the apparatus.

Why is Bukharin's reasoning a dead and empty eclecticism? Because Bukharin doesn't even have the shadow of an attempt, from his point of view, to independently analyze the whole history of this dispute (Marxism, *that is*, dialectical logic, requires this unconditionally), as well as the whole approach to the question, the whole formulation—or, if you want, the whole direction of the statement is a question at a given time, under given specific circumstances. Not a shadow of Bukharin's attempt to do this! He approaches without the slightest concrete study with bare abstractions and takes a piece from Zinoviev, a piece from Trotsky. This is eclecticism.

To make this even clearer, I'll take an example. I know absolutely nothing about the rebels and revolutionaries of South China (except for 2-3 articles by Sun Yat-sen, and several books and newspaper articles that I read many years ago). Since there are uprisings, there are probably disputes between Chinese No. 1, who says that the uprising is the product of the class struggle that has intensified and seized the whole nation, and Chinese No. 2, which says that the uprising is art. I can write theses like Bukharin's theses without knowing anything else: "on the one hand ... on the other hand". One insufficiently took into account the "moment" of art, the other—the "moment of exacerbation", etc. This will be a dead and empty eclecticism, because there is no *concrete* study of *this* debate, this issue, this approach to it, etc.

Trade unions, on the one hand, are schools; on the other, the apparatus; with the third, the organization of workers; fourth, the organization of almost exclusively industrial workers; fifth, organization of production, etc., etc. Bukharin has no justification, no independent analysis, and no shadow to prove why it is necessary to take the first two "sides" of a question or subject, and not the third, fourth, fifth etc. Therefore, the theses of the Bukharin group are entirely an eclectic dummy. Bukharin fundamentally incorrectly, eclectically, raises the whole question of the relationship between "school" and "apparatus".

In order to pose this question correctly, it is necessary to move from empty abstractions to a concrete one, that is, a given dispute. Take this debate as you like: whether it was as it appeared at the V All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions, or as it was set up and *directed* by Trotsky himself with his platform brochure on December 25—you will see that Trotsky's *whole* approach, the whole direction, is wrong. He did not understand that it is necessary and

possible to the trade unions, as a school, and when you put the theme of “Soviet trade-unionism”, and when talking about production propaganda at all, and if you raise the question, like Trotsky, of “merging”, of the participation of trade unions in the management of production. And in this last question, as it is posed in the entire brochure platform of Trotsky, the incorrectness consists in not understanding that the trade unions are a *school of administrative and technical management of production*. Not “on the one hand is a school, on the other is something else”, *but on all sides* - in this dispute, with this question raised by Trotsky, the *trade unions are a school*, a school of association, a school of solidarity, a school for defending their interests, a school of management, a school of management. Instead of understanding and correcting this fundamental mistake of Comrade Trotsky, Comrade Bukharin gave a ridiculous correction: “on the one hand, on the other hand.” (*Lenin, Once Again on Trade Unions (1921), Soch., Volume XXVI, pp. 131-132, 133, 135 -136, ed. 3rd*)

## IV. Formal Logic and Dialectics

The complete misunderstanding of the nature of dialectics is already evidenced by the fact that Mr. Dühring acknowledges it as an instrument of simple proof, just as, with a limited understanding, formal logic or elementary mathematics can be considered as such. Even formal logic is, first of all, a method for finding new results, for moving from the known to the unknown, and the same, only in a much higher sense, is dialectics, which also contains the germ of a broader worldview, since it breaks the tight horizon of formal logic. In mathematics, the same attitude exists. Elementary mathematics, mathematics of constant quantities, moves, at least in general and in general, within the boundaries of formal logic; mathematics of variables the most essential department of which is the calculus of the infinitesimal, is essentially nothing more than the application of dialectics to mathematical relations. The simple proof here completely recedes into the background in comparison with the diverse applications of the method to new areas of research. And almost all the proofs of higher mathematics, starting with the first proofs of differential calculus, are, from the point of view of elementary mathematics, strictly speaking, incorrect. This cannot be

otherwise if the data obtained in the dialectical field are to be proved by means of formal logic. Trying to prove to such an avid metaphysician, as Mr. Dühring, something through one dialectic would be the same gift of labour spent, as was the work of Leibniz and his students, who then proved to mathematicians theorems of the calculus of infinitesimal. The differential caused the same convulsions in them, which in Dühring causes the negation of negation, in which, however, the differential also plays a role, as we shall see. In the end, these gentlemen, since they did not die in the meantime, surrendered grumblingly, not because they were convinced, but because the solutions given by differential calculus were always correct. Mr. Dühring, as he himself tells us, has reached only 40 years old, and if—what we wish him—he will live to a very old age, then perhaps he will survive the same thing. (that the solutions given by differential calculus were always true. Mr. Dühring, as he himself tells us, has reached only 40 years old, and if—what we wish him - he will live to a very old age, then perhaps he will survive the same thing. (that the solutions given by differential calculus were always true. Mr. Dühring, as he himself tells us, has reached only 40 years old, and if—what we wish him—he will live to a very old age, then perhaps he will survive the same thing. (*Engels, Anti-Dühring, pp. 95-96, 1932*)

## **The Law of Abstract Identity**

*The law of the same* in the old *metaphysical* sense is the basic law of the old worldview:  $a = a$ . Every thing is equal to itself. Everything was constant—the solar system, stars, organisms. Natural science has refuted this law in each case, step by step; but theoretically it still continues to exist, and the adherents of the old still contrast it with the new. A thing cannot be simultaneously itself and something else. And, however, natural science has recently proved in detail (see above [p. 8-9]) the fact that a true, concrete identity contains a difference, a change.—Like all metaphysical categories, abstract identity is only suitable for *home* uses where insignificant relationships or short periods of time are considered; the boundaries within which it is suitable are different in almost every case and are determined by the nature of the object to which it is applied—in the planetary system, where for ordinary astronomical calculations it is possible to take an ellipsis as the main shape without a sensitive error, these boundaries

are much wider than in the case of an insect that does its transformation within a few weeks (give other examples, for example, a change in species that has taken place over many millennia). But for synthetic natural science, abstract identity is completely insufficient even in any separate field, and although in general the idea of such identity is almost now rejected, but theoretically it still rules over the minds, and most naturalists still imagine that identity and difference are irreconcilable opposites, not one-sided poles that matter only in their interaction, in including difference in identity. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 21, 1932*)

## **Inapplicability of Abstract Identity**

The organic nature also applicable abstract identity of  $a = a$ , and negative *and* equal and unequal *and* simultaneously. A plant, animal, every cell in every moment of its life is identical with itself and at the same time different from themselves, due to the absorption and release of substances, due to respiration, formation and dying of cells, due to the circulation process,—in short, due to the sum of continuous molecular changes that make up life, and the result of which is clearly in the different phases of life—embryonic life, youth, puberty, the process of reproduction, old age, death. *We leave aside the development of species.* The more physiology develops, the more important these continuous, infinitesimal changes become for it, the more important it also becomes for it to consider the differences *within* identities, and the old, abstract, formal point of view of identities, according to which an organic being is regarded as something simply identical with itself, permanent, is out of date. Despite this, the way of thinking based on it continues to exist along with its categories. But already in inorganic nature, identity, as such, does not really exist. Each body is constantly exposed to mechanical, physical influences that produce continuous changes in it, modify its identity. Abstract identity and its antithesis, difference, are relevant only in mathematics - abstract science that deals with mental constructions, even though they are reflections of reality - but here it is constantly removed. Hegel, *Enz. I, p. 235.* The fact that the identity also contains a difference is expressed in *every sentence* where the predicate is inevitably different from the subject. *Lily is a plant; the rose is red*; here either in the subject or in the predicate there is

(difference) something that is not covered by the predicate or subject. Hegel, *Enz. I*, p. 231. It goes without saying that *identity with itself* already has a predetermined complement, *unlike everything else*.

Constant change, that is, the removal of abstract identity with oneself, also exists in the so-called inorganic nature. Geology is the story of this. On the surface, mechanical changes (erosion, frost), chemical (weathering), inside the earth mechanical (pressure), heat (volcanic), chemical (water, acid, binders) on a large scale - soil elevations, earthquakes, etc. Modern slate is radically different from the silt from which it was formed, chalk - from unconnected microscopic shells that made it up; even more limestone, which, according to some scientists, is of completely organic origin, sandstone is from unbound sea sand, which, in turn, arose from crushed granite, etc., not to mention coal. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature*, pp. 8–9, 1932)

## **The Opposite of Formal Logic and Dialectical Logic**

Comrade Bukharin speaks of “logical” foundations. All his reasoning shows that he—perhaps unconsciously—stands here on the point of view of formal or scholastic logic, and not of dialectical or Marxist logic. To clarify this, I will begin with the simplest example taken by Comrade Bukharin himself. At the discussion on December 30, he said:

“Comrades, perhaps, many of you have disputes that are taking place here that make an impression of something like this: two people come and ask each other what a glass is that stands on a chair. One says: “This is a glass cylinder, and may anyone anathematize who says it is not.” The second one says: “A glass, this is a tool for drinking, and let those who say that this is not so be anathematized” (p. 46).

With this example, Bukharin wanted, as the reader sees, to popularly explain to me the harm of one-sidedness. I accept this explanation with gratitude and, in order to prove my gratitude with the deed, I respond with a popular explanation of what eclecticism is in contrast to dialectics.

There is no doubt a glass and a glass cylinder, and a tool for drinking. But the glass has not only these two properties, or qualities, or sides, but an infinite number of other properties, qualities, sides,

relationships and “mediations” with the rest of the world. A glass is a heavy object that can be a throwing tool. A glass can serve as a paperweight, as a room for a caught butterfly, a glass can be of value as an object with artistic carvings or patterns, regardless of whether it is suitable for drinking, whether it is made of glass, whether its shape is cylindrical or not really, and so on and so forth.

Further. If I need a glass now as a tool for drinking, then it’s completely not important for me to know whether its shape is completely cylindrical and whether it is really made of glass, but it’s important that there is no crack in the bottom, so that you cannot hurt your lips using this a glass, etc. If I need a glass not for drinking, but for such a use that every glass cylinder is suitable for, then a glass with a crack in the bottom or even without a bottom at all is suitable for me, etc.

The formal logic, which is limited in schools (and should be limited—as amended—for the lower grades of the school), takes formal definitions, guided by what is most common or most often striking, and limited to this. If at the same time two or more different definitions are taken and combined together completely by accident (both a glass cylinder and a drinking tool), then we get an eclectic definition that indicates different sides of the subject - and that’s it.

Dialectical logic requires us to move on. To really know the subject, it is necessary to embrace, study all its sides, all connections and “mediations”. We will never achieve this fully, but the requirement of comprehensiveness will warn us against mistakes and from necrosis. This is the first. Secondly, dialectical logic requires to take an object in its development, “self-movement” (as Hegel sometimes says), change. In relation to the glass, this is not immediately clear, but the glass does not remain unchanged, but in particular, the purpose of the glass, its use, its *connection* him with the world around him. Thirdly, all human practice should enter into a complete “definition” of an object both as a criterion of truth and as a practical determinant of the connection of an object with what a person needs. Fourth, dialectical logic teaches that “there is no abstract truth, truth is always concrete”, as Hegel used to say, the late Plekhanov (in brackets appropriate, it seems to me to notice for young party members that *one cannot* become conscious, a *true* communist without studying—just *studying*—everything written by Plekhanov on philosophy, because it is the best in all the international literature of Marxism) [By the way, one cannot but wish, firstly, that the publication of Plekhanov’s works now published would highlight all

articles on philosophy in a special volume or special volumes with a detailed index and so on. For this should enter into a series of obligatory textbooks of communism. Secondly, the workers' state, in my opinion, should require professors of philosophy to know the presentation of Marxist philosophy by the Plekhanovs and be able to transmit this knowledge to students. But all this is already a deviation from "propaganda" to "administration".].

Of course, I did not exhaust the concept of dialectical logic. But for now, this is enough. *Lenin, Once Again on Trade Unions (1921), Op., Vol. XXVI, pp. 133 - 135, 3rd ed.)*

## **Plekhanov Gives Formal Logic an Independent Meaning**

"Everything flows, everything changes," says the ancient Ephesian thinker. The combinations we call objects are in a state of constant, more or less rapid, *change*. Since these combinations remain *these combinations*, we must judge them by the formula: "yes - yes and no - no." And since they *change and cease to exist*, as such, we must appeal to the *logic of contradiction*; we must say - at the risk of bringing displeasure to the Messrs. Bernshteinov, N. G. and other metaphysical fraternity: "yes and no, both exist and do not exist."

*Just as peace is a special case of movement, so thinking according to the rules of formal logic (according to the "basic laws" of thought) is a special case of dialectical thinking. (Plekhanov, Preface to the book of F. Engels "L. Feuerbach", p. 22, 1931)*

When we are faced with the question of the transition of one type of motion to another, say, mechanical motion in heat, we also have to reason according to the basic rule of *Iberweg*. This kind of motion is *either heat, or mechanical motion, or so on*. This is clear. But if this is so, then the basic laws of formal logic within certain limits *apply also to motion*. And from here it follows once again that dialectics does not abolish formal logic, but only deprives it of the laws of *absolute value* ascribed to them by metaphysicians. ( *Plekhanov, Preface to Engels' book L. Feuerbach, p. 24, 1931* )

## Dialectics and Eclecticism

Consistent with this desire to theoretically deepen the question, Comrade Bukharin, starting from the discussion on December 30, if not earlier, brings the dispute precisely to this area.

“I consider it absolutely necessary,” said Comrade Bukharin on December 30,—this is the theoretical essence of what is called the “buffer” faction or its ideology here—and it seems to me absolutely certain that this political and this economic moment cannot be discarded... “(p. 47).

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In order to pose this question correctly, it is necessary to move from empty abstractions to a concrete one, that is, a given dispute. Take this debate as you like: whether it was as it appeared at the V All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions, or as it was set up and *directed* by Trotsky himself with his platform brochure on

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## **CHAPTER FIVE. DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AND SCIENCE**

### **I. The Emergence and Development of Modern Science**

# The Subject of Natural Science and the Basics of the Classification of Natural Sciences

*ENGELS TO MARX*

*May 30, 1873*

This morning in bed the following dialectical construction about natural science occurred to me.

The subject of natural science is moving matter, bodies. Bodies cannot be separated from movement. The forms and types of bodies can be known only in motion. Nothing can be said about bodies without movement, without any relation to other bodies. Only in motion does the body discover that it is. Natural science, therefore, cognizes bodies, considering them in their relation to each other, in motion. The knowledge of various forms of motion is the knowledge of bodies. Thus, the study of these various forms of movement is the main subject of natural science. [*Very good. This is also my opinion. —K. Sh.*] [In direct brackets are comments by Karl Schorlemmer, a specialist chemist, a friend of Marx and Engels.]

1. The simplest form of movement is a change of *place* (in time, to please the old Hegel), a *mechanical* movement.

a. The movement of a *single* individual body, in fact, does not exist, but, speaking relatively, *fall* can be considered such a movement. Movement to one central point common to many bodies. But as soon as an individual body should move not to the centre, but in any *other* direction, then although this movement fits the law of *incidence*, these laws change. [*That's right! — K. Sh.*]

b. The laws of the trajectory lead to the mutual motion of many bodies (planetary and the like, motion, astronomy, equilibrium)—temporarily or apparent in the movement itself. *The real* result of this kind of movement, in the end, is always the *contact* (contact) of moving bodies - they fall on each other.

c. Contact mechanics—contacting bodies. Ordinary mechanics—a lever, an inclined plane, etc. *But this alone does not exhaust all the consequences of contact.* It directly appears in two forms: friction and impact. Both have the property of generating, under a certain voltage and under certain conditions, not only mechanical consequences, but also completely *new ones: heat, light, electricity, magnetism.*

2. *Actually physics*, the science that studies these forms of motion, examining each of them individually, comes to the conclusion that these forms under certain conditions *pass one into another*, and finally finds that all of them with a certain degree of tension, varying with various moving bodies, cause actions that go beyond the boundaries of physics, namely—cause changes in the internal structure of the body—*chemical* actions.

3. *Chemistry*. To study the previous forms of movement, it would be more or less indifferent whether it is performed on animate or inanimate bodies. In inanimate bodies, phenomena even appear in their greatest *purity*. Chemistry, on the contrary, can know the chemical nature of the most important bodies only on those substances that arise from the process of life. The main task of chemistry is becoming more and more the artificial creation of these substances. It forms a transition to the science of the body, but the dialectical transition can only be established when chemistry either has already made a real transition or is close to it. [ *This is the whole point!* - K. Sh. ]

4. The body.—Here I do not enter into any dialectic yet. [ *I do not go too.*— K. Sh. ] (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Letters, Partizdat*, pp. 293-295, 1932)

## Dialectics of Natural History

*Dialectics of natural science*: the subject is a moving substance. The various forms and types of the substance itself can again be known through motion; only in motion are the properties of bodies revealed; about a body that does not move, there is nothing to say. Consequently, the properties of moving bodies follow from the forms of motion.

1. The first, simplest form of movement is a mechanical, simple change of place.

a) The motion of an individual body does not exist, there is only relative motion.—The fall.

b) Movement of separated bodies: trajectory, astronomy,—visible equilibrium,—end— always *contact*.

c) The movements of the contacting bodies in relation to each other—pressure. Statics. Hydrostatics and gases. The lever and other forms of the mechanics proper, which all in their simplest form of

contact are reduced to differing from each other only in the degree of friction and impact. But friction and shock, in reality, representing contact, have other consequences that are never indicated by natural science: under certain circumstances, they produce sound, heat, light, electricity, magnetism.

2. These various forces (with the exception of sound)—the physics of celestial bodies—a) pass into each other and replace each other, and b) at a known quantitative stage of the development of forces, different for different bodies—chemically complex or simple—*chemical* changes occur. And we find ourselves in chemistry [*In the fields*: Chemistry of celestial bodies. Crystallography is part of chemistry].

3. Physics should or could leave without consideration a living organic body, chemistry, only when studying organic compounds, finds the real key to the true nature of the most important bodies, on the other hand, it makes up bodies that are found only in organic nature. Here chemistry leads to organic life, and it has moved far enough forward to convince us that *it alone will* explain to us the dialectical transition to the body.

4. But the *real* transition only in *history*—the solar system, the earth—is the *real* premise of organic life.

Divisibility. A mammal is indivisible, a reptile can still grow a leg. Ethereal waves are divisible and measurable to infinitely small - each body is divisible practically within known boundaries, for example, in chemistry.

*Coupling*—already negative for gases—the transformation of attraction into *repulsion*, the latter only in gases and ether (?) is real. *Aggregate* states are nodal points where a quantitative change passes into a qualitative one.

Secchi and dad.

Newtonian attraction and centrifugal force are an example of metaphysical thinking, the problem is not solved, but only *posed*, and this is presented as a solution.—The same applies to the reduction of heat according to Clausius.

Laplace's theory assumes only moving matter—rotation is necessary for all bodies moving in *world space*. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature*, pp. 4-5, 1932)

## **Classification of Sciences**

*The classification of sciences*, each of which analyses a particular form of movement or a series of related forms of movement that are related to each other, is also a classification, a hierarchy, in accordance with their inherent order, of these forms of movement themselves, and this is precisely its significance.

At the end of the last century, after the French materialists, whose materialism was predominantly mechanical, there was a need to *encyclopaedically summarize* the entire natural sciences of the old Newton-Linnaeus school, and two geniuses—*Saint-Simon* (did not finish) and *Hegel*, took up this business. Now that a new outlook on nature has formed in its basic features, the same need is felt, and attempts are being made in this direction. But since now the universal connection of development is proved in nature, the purely external arrangement of the material is just as insufficient as the Hegelian dialectical transitions. Transitions must occur by themselves, must be natural. Just as one form of movement develops from another, so the reflection of these forms, different sciences, must necessarily flow from one another. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 18-19, 1932*)

## **Metaphysical Period and Successes in the Development of Natural Science at the End of the 18th and Beginning of the 19th Centuries**

Modern natural science, which alone has achieved comprehensive, systematic, scientific development, as opposed to the ingenious natural-philosophical conjectures of the ancients and the very important, but sporadic and largely unsuccessful discoveries of the Arabs,—modern natural science, like all modern history, dates from that significant era which we Germans call the national misfortune that happened to us then [The “national misfortune” is *underlined by an unknown person*] by the Reformation, the French by the Renaissance, and the Italians by the Quinchevento, and the content of which is not limited to any of these names. This is an era beginning in the second half of the 15th century. The royal power, relying on the townspeople, broke the power of the feudal nobility and

founded large, essentially national monarchies, in which modern European nations and modern bourgeois society developed; and while the bourgeoisie and the nobility still fought fiercely among themselves, the German peasant war prophetically pointed to the coming class battles, because not only the rebellious peasants appeared in the arena—there was nothing new in it—but the beginnings of the modern proletariat with a red banner in their hands and demanding common property on their lips. In the manuscripts saved during the death of Byzantium, in ancient statues dug from the ruins of Rome, a new world appeared before the amazed West—Greek antiquity; before the <classical... [..?..] plastic> light images, the ghosts of the Middle Ages disappeared; in Italy, an unprecedented flowering of art, which was just a reflection of classical antiquity, and which in the future never rose to such a height. In Italy, France, Germany, a new, first modern literature arose; England and Spain soon survived then their classical literary era. The frames of the old Orbis terrarum were broken; only now, in fact, the land was discovered and the foundations laid for later world trade and for the transfer of craft to manufacture, which, in turn, was the starting point of modern large-scale industry. The spiritual dictatorship of the church was broken;

It was the greatest progressive revolution experienced by mankind, an era that needed the titans and which gave birth to the titans by the power of thought, passion and character, by versatility and learning. The people who founded the modern domination of the bourgeoisie were anything, but not bourgeois-limited. On the contrary, they were more or less inspired by the adventurous nature of their time. Then there was almost no major person who would not have made long journeys, would not speak four or five languages, would not shine in several areas of creativity <perfectly, and it was not only in theoretical, but also in practical life...>; Leonardo da Vinci was not only a great artist, but also a great mathematician, mechanic and engineer, who owed important discoveries to the most diverse branches of physics; Albrecht Durer was an artist, engraver, sculptor, architect and, in addition, invented a fortification system that contains many ideas developed much later by Montalamber and the latest German doctrine of fortresses. Machiavelli was a statesman, historian, poet and, in addition, the first worthy of mention, a military writer of the new era. Luther cleaned out not only the Augean stables of the church, but also the stables of the German language, created modern German prose and composed the text and melody of the chorale,

saturated with a sense of victory, which became the Marseillaise of the 16th century. People of that time have not yet become slaves to the division of labour, the limiting, crippling action of which we so often see on their successors. But what is especially characteristic of them is that they almost all live by all the interests of their time, take part in the practical struggle, take the side of one or another party and fight, some with the word and pen, some with the sword, and some with both. Hence the fullness and strength of character that makes them whole people. Cabinet scientists were then exceptions; these are either people of the second and third rank, or prudent philistines who do not want to burn their fingers <like Erasmus>.

And then natural science developed in the midst of a general revolution, being itself completely revolutionary: after all, it still had to win the right of “free [research]> to exist. Together with the great Italians, from whom the latest philosophy dates, she gave her martyrs for bonfires and dungeons of the Inquisition. And it is characteristic that Protestants warned Catholics in the persecution of free science. Calvin burned Servetus, who was close to the opening of blood circulation, and at the same time forced him to fry alive for two hours; the Inquisition was satisfied, at least, by simply burning Giordano Bruno.

The revolutionary act by which natural science declared its independence and, as it were, repeated the Lutheran burning of the papal bull, was the publication of an immortal creation in which Copernicus threw—although modestly and, so to speak, only on the death bed—a glove to church authority in natural affairs. From here dates the liberation of natural science from theology, although the elucidation of individual reciprocal claims has dragged on to our time, not yet ending in many heads now. From there, the development of sciences took giant strides, which won, if I may say so, in proportion to the square of the distance (in time) from its starting point. It was precisely necessary to prove to the world that from now on for the higher product of organic matter, for the human spirit, as well as for inorganic matter.

The main task that faced natural science in the first period of its development that began now was to cope with the available material. In all areas had to start from the very beginning. Antiquity had Euclid and the solar system of Ptolemy, the Arabs—decimal calculus, the beginnings of algebra, the modern number system and alchemy; Christian Middle Ages left nothing. In this state of affairs, it is natural that the elementary branch of natural science—the

mechanics of earthly and celestial bodies—took first place and, along with it, in the service of it, the discovery and improvement of mathematical methods. Great things were done here. At the end of the period under review, marked by the names <Leibniz and> of Newton and Linnaeus, these branches of knowledge received a certain conclusion. The most important mathematical methods were established in general terms: analytic geometry—mainly by Descartes, logarithms—by Napier, differential and integral calculus—by Leibniz, and perhaps Newton. The same can be said about the mechanics of solids, the main laws of which were clarified once and for all. Finally, in astronomy of the solar system, Kepler discovered the laws of planetary motion, and Newton explained them by the general laws of motion of matter. The remaining branches of science were still far from such preliminary completion. The mechanics of liquid and gaseous bodies managed to be processed somewhat only by the end of the specified period [the main laws of which were clarified once and for all. Finally, in astronomy of the solar system, Kepler discovered the laws of planetary motion, and Newton explained them by the general laws of motion of matter. The remaining branches of science were still far from such preliminary completion. The mechanics of liquid and gaseous bodies managed to be processed somewhat only by the end of the specified period [the main laws of which were clarified once and for all. Finally, in astronomy of the solar system, Kepler discovered the laws of planetary motion, and Newton explained them by the general laws of motion of matter. The remaining branches of science were still far from such preliminary completion. The mechanics of liquid and gaseous bodies managed to be processed somewhat only by the end of the specified period [*In the margins with a pencil it is noted*: Toricelli regarding the regulation of alpine mountain streams.]. Physics in the proper sense of the word was still in its very initial stages, with the exception of optics, the successes of which were caused by the practical needs of astronomy. Chemistry was emancipated from alchemy only thanks to the theory of phlogiston. Geology has not yet emerged from the embryonic stage of mineralogy, and therefore palaeontology could not yet exist [*On the margins in pencil*: There is still no talk of comparing the anatomical (..?..) climatic distribution, the geography of fauna and flora.]. Finally, in the field of biology, they mainly dealt with the accumulation and first selection of colossal material, both botanical and zoological, as well as anatomical and actually physiological. There was no question of the equalization of life forms, the study of their geographical

distribution, their climatological, etc. conditions. Here, only botany and zoology have reached some end thanks to Linnaeus.

But what especially characterizes the period under consideration is the formation of a well-known whole worldview, the centre of which is the doctrine of *the absolute immutability of nature*. According to Newton's view, planets invariably move around their... According to this view, nature, no matter how it arises, once it is already present, always remains unchanged as long as it exists. The planets and their satellites, once set in motion by the mysterious "first impulse", continue to circle the ellipses they have designated for ever and ever, or, in any case, to the end of all things. Stars rest forever motionless in their places, holding each other thanks to "universal gravitation". The earth remains the same, unchanged from a century or from the day of its creation (depending on the point of view). The present "five parts of the world" always existed, always had the same mountains and valleys, the same climate, the same flora and fauna, if not to speak about the changes made by a person's hand. The species of plants and animals were established once and for all upon their appearance, the equal always generated the equal, and Linnaeus made a great concession when he said that new species could have arisen due to crossbreeding. In contrast to the history of mankind, developing in time, the history of nature was attributed only to occurrence in space. For nature, every change, every development, was denied. At first revolutionary natural science suddenly faced a thoroughly conservative nature, in which everything was and remains now the same as it was from time immemorial and in which everything should remain until the end of the world or forever and ever as it was from the very beginning. that due to crossbreeding, new species could arise. In contrast to the history of mankind, developing in time, the history of nature was attributed only to occurrence in space. For nature, every change, every development, was denied. At first revolutionary natural science suddenly faced a thoroughly conservative nature, in which everything was and remains now the

same as it was from time immemorial and in which everything should remain until the end of the world or forever and ever as it was from the very beginning.

Although natural science of the first half of the 18th century rose high above Greek antiquity in terms of the volume of its knowledge and even in terms of material selection, it was far inferior to it in the sense of the perfect overcoming of this material, in the sense of a universal worldview. For Greek philosophers, the world was essentially something arising from chaos, something evolving, something becoming. For the natural scientist of the period under consideration, he was something ossified, unchanging, and for the majority something created immediately. Science still sat deep in theology. Everywhere she sought and found, as a last reason, a push from without, inexplicable from nature itself. If attraction—solemnly called Newton's universal gravitation—is regarded as an essential property of matter, then where is the source of incomprehensible tangential force, giving rise to planetary orbits? How did innumerable species of animals and plants come about? How, in particular, did a man arise, regarding whom it was firmly accepted that he did not exist forever? To all such questions, science has too often responded with a reference to the creator of all things. Copernicus at the beginning of the period we are considering gives the resignation of theology; Newton concludes this period with the postulate of a divine first push. The highest universal idea of natural science of the period under consideration is the idea of the expediency of natural processes, flat Wolf's theology, according to which cats were created to devour mice, mice to be devoured by cats, and all nature to prove the wisdom of the creator. It must be considered a huge dignity and honour of the then philosophy,

I refer to this period also the materialists of the 18th century, because they did not have at their disposal any other natural science material than that described above. The work of Kant that made up the era was unknown to them, and Laplace appeared long after them. We will not forget that although the progress of science completely undermined this outdated worldview, the whole first half of the 19th century is still under its influence and is essentially taught even now in all schools [How unshakable people could believe in this worldview as early as 1861, the scientific work of which brought a lot of valuable material to overcome it, show the following classic words "All... in sich" (Mädler, Pop. Astr. Berlin 1861, 6 Aufl., S. 316.) (*Marked in pencil on the margins*: The completeness of the old

worldview gave rise to the consideration of all natural science as a whole. French encyclopaedists, one after another, stood still on this point of view, still purely mechanically, then at the same time Saint-Simon and German natural philosophy - it was completed by Hegel.)). The first breach in this petrified worldview was pierced not by a natural scientist, but by a philosopher. In 1755, Kant's "General Natural History and Theory of Sky" appeared. The question of the first push was eliminated here; the earth and the entire solar system appeared as something that *became* in the course of time. If the vast majority of natural scientists did not feel the fear that Newton expressed with his warning: physics, beware of metaphysics! —then they would have to extract from this one of Kant's brilliant discoveries such consequences that would save them endless wanderings along the crank paths and the enormous amount of time and labour spent in the false direction. In the discovery of Kant lay the germ of all further progress. If the earth was something that had become, then something that had become something should also be its current geological, climatic, geographical state, its plants and animals, and it should have a history not only in space but also in time. If they began to work immediately and decisively in this direction, then natural science would have gone far beyond that place, where it is located. But what good could come of philosophy? Kant's writing did not have a direct impact until, many years later, Laplace and Herschel developed and substantiated its content, thus preparing the triumph of the "nebular hypothesis". Further discoveries finally cemented her victory; the most important of them were the establishment of the proper motion of fixed stars, the proof of the existence of a resistive medium in world space, the chemical identity of world matter established by spectral analysis, and the existence of such glowing foggy masses as Kant had suggested. thus preparing the triumph of the "nebular hypothesis." Further discoveries finally cemented her victory; the most important of these were the establishment of the proper motion of fixed stars, the proof of the existence of a resistive medium in world space, the chemical identity of world matter established by spectral analysis, and the existence of such glowing foggy masses as Kant had suggested. thus preparing the triumph of the "nebular hypothesis." Further discoveries finally cemented her victory; the most important of them were the establishment of the proper motion of fixed stars, the proof of the existence of a resistive medium in world space, the chemical identity of world matter

established by spectral analysis, and the existence of such glowing foggy masses as Kant had suggested.

But one may doubt whether it would naturalists occurred to replace the contradiction between the teachings of the changing earth and immutable organisms existing on it, if nascent understanding that nature is not *there*, and *it becomes* and *perishes*, there was no help on the other hand. Geology arose, which revealed not only the presence of geological layers formed after each other and located one above the other, but also the shells and skeletons of extinct animals, trunks, leaves and fruits of non-existing plants that survived in these layers. I had to admit that not only earth taken as a whole, but also its present surface and plants and animals living on it have a history in time. The recognition of this happened initially not without difficulty. Cuvier's theory of earthly revolutions was revolutionary in words and reactionary in practice. In place of the act of divine creation, she put a number of such creative acts and made of miracle an essential "component" of the lever of nature. Only Lyell introduced common sense into geology, replacing sudden ones. Caused by the whim of the creator of the revolution, the gradual actions of the slow transformation of the earth [The disadvantage of the Lyell concept—at least in its original form—was that it considered the forces acting on the earth constant, both in quality and quantity. For her, there is no cooling of the earth; the earth regains its pre-Kantian eternal (..?..) character, although this eternity this time includes a more or less cyclical movement, does not develop in a certain direction, it simply changes in a random, incoherent way.]. For her, there is no cooling of the earth; the earth regains its pre-Kantian eternal (..?..) character, although this eternity this time includes a more or less cyclical movement, does not develop in a certain direction, it simply changes in a random, incoherent way.]. For her, there is no cooling of the earth; the earth regains its pre-Kantian eternal (..?..) character, although this eternity this time includes a more or less cyclical movement, does not develop in a certain direction, it simply changes in a random, incoherent way.].

Lyell's theory was even more difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis of the constancy of organic species than all theories that preceded it. The thought of the gradual transformation of the earth's surface and all living conditions on it led directly to the doctrine of the gradual transformation of organisms and their adaptation to a changing environment, led to the study of the variability of species. However, tradition is a force not only in the Catholic Church,

but also in natural science. For many years, Lyell himself did not notice this contradiction, and his students even less. This can be explained only by the division of labour, which was established at that time in natural science, due to which everyone is limited to his special field of knowledge and few are only able to survey it as a whole.

Meanwhile, in physics there was a huge shift forward, the results of which were almost simultaneously summarized by three different people in the year 1842, so significant for this branch of natural science. Meyer in Heilbronn and Joule in Manchester proved the conversion of heat into mechanical force and mechanical force into heat. The establishment of a mechanical equivalent of heat eliminated all doubts about this. At the same time, Grove—by no means a professional natural scientist, but an English lawyer—proved, by simple processing of accumulated physical material, that all the so-called physical forces—mechanical force, heat, light, electricity, magnetism and even the so-called chemical force—pass under certain conditions, into each other without any loss of strength, and thus proved, in hindsight, using physical methods, Descartes' theorem that the amount of movement in the world is unchanged. Owing to this, various physical forces—these, so to speak, unchanging “types” of physics—have turned into differently differentiated forms of the motion of matter that are transformed according to certain laws into one another. <And if electricity turns into heat, light, magnetism, chemical force, mechanical motion, is this a greater miracle than the origin of man from a monkey? [mechanical movement, is this a greater miracle than the origin of man from a monkey? [mechanical movement, is this a greater miracle than the origin of man from a monkey? [*It is marked with a pencil in the margins*: forces find their unity in the motion of matter, the randomness of the presence of such and such a number of forces is eliminated. Unity was introduced into the physical worldview and agreement with the general results of the study in the (..?..) perpetual cycle...]> In science, we managed to get rid of the randomness of the presence of such and such a number of physical forces, because their mutual relationship was proved and transitions into each other. Like astronomy, physics came to the inevitable result that the final conclusion is the eternal cycle of moving matter [*In the fields with the wrong hand (probably Arons), pencil marked: Helmholtz?*].

The surprisingly rapid development of chemistry after Lavoisier and especially after Dalton destroyed, on the other hand, the old idea of nature. Thanks to the inorganic production of compounds

previously produced only in living organisms, it was proved that the laws of chemistry have the same effect for organic bodies as for inorganic ones, and a significant part of the impassable gap that remained after Kant between the inorganic and organic nature was filled.

Finally, in the field of “physiological” biological research, systematic scientific trips, expeditions, more exact <botanical and geological> studies of European colonies in all parts of the world by the experts living there, begun in the middle of the last century, started in the middle of the last century, then the successes of palaeontology, anatomy, physiology in general, especially since the systematic use of the microscope and the opening of the cell—all this has accumulated so much material that it became possible—and at the same time necessary—to use a comparative method. On the one hand, due to comparative physical geography, the living conditions of various flora and fauna were established, and on the other, various organisms were compared with respect to their homologous organs, and not only in adulthood, but also at all stages of their development [*On the sidelines: Embryology* (Erhaltung der Kraft 1847.)]. The deeper this study penetrated, the more accurately it was done, the more that frozen system of “invariable species, sexes, classes, kingdoms> unchanged organic nature.” Not only did the borders hopelessly disappear between separate species of plants and animals, but animals appeared, like amphiox and lepidosiren, which accurately mocked all classifications that existed before [*In the fields: Ceratodus.*], and finally, organisms were found that couldn’t even be said whether they relate to the animal world or to the plant [*In the fields: dito Archeopterix etc.*]. The gaps in the fossil record have more and more filled, forcing even the most stubborn scientists to recognize the amazing parallelism that exists between the history of the development of the organic world as a whole and the history of the development of individual organisms, thus giving the ariadne a thread from the labyrinth in which it seemed to be completely confused botany and zoology. It is characteristic that almost simultaneously with Kant’s attack on the doctrine of the eternity of the solar system, C. Wolf launched the first attack on the theory of the constancy of species in 1759, proclaiming the doctrine of their development. But what was only brilliant anticipation in him took more concrete forms at Oken, Lamarck, Bera and was triumphantly carried out exactly one hundred years later, in 1859, by Darwin. Almost simultaneously, it was ascertained that protoplasm and the cell, previously recognized as

the last formed elements of all organisms, live independently as lower organic forms. Thanks to this, the gap between the organic and inorganic nature was minimized, and at the same time, one of the most serious obstacles to the study of the origin of organisms through development was eliminated. Thus, the modern worldview was ready in its main features: everything solid was decomposed, everything unchanged disappeared, everything recognized as eternal began to be considered transient, all nature appeared to be in an eternal stream and cycle. (Thanks to this, the gap between the organic and inorganic nature was minimized, and at the same time, one of the most serious obstacles to the study of the origin of organisms through development was eliminated. Thus, the modern worldview was ready in its main features: everything solid was decomposed, everything unchanged disappeared, everything recognized as eternal began to be considered transient, all nature appeared to be in an eternal stream and cycle. (Thanks to this, the gap between the organic and inorganic nature was minimized, and at the same time, one of the most serious obstacles to the study of the origin of organisms through development was eliminated. Thus, the modern worldview was ready in its main features: everything solid was decomposed, everything unchanged disappeared, everything recognized as eternal began to be considered transient, all nature appeared to be in an eternal stream and cycle. (Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, pp. 86-93, 1932)

## **Penetration of the Idea of Development into Natural Science**

*From the realm of history.* Modern science, the only one that can be discussed (as a science), in contrast to the ingenious guesses of the Greeks and sporadic, random studies of Arabs, begins with that grandiose era when the bourgeoisie broke the power of feudalism, when in the background the struggle between the townspeople and the rebellious peasantry appeared to the feudal nobility, and behind it the revolutionary pioneers of the modern proletariat, with a red banner in their hand and with communism on their lips, begin with the era that created the monarchies of Europe, destroy and spiritual dictatorship of the Papacy, revived Greek antiquity and with it the highest development of art in modern times, which broke the boundaries of

the old world (orbis) and for the first time, in fact, opened land <it is revolutionary, as well as all the era>.

It was the greatest revolution that the earth has survived so far. And natural science, which developed in the atmosphere of this revolution, was completely revolutionary, went hand in hand with the awakening new philosophy of the great Italians, sending their martyrs to bonfires and dungeons. Characteristically, Protestants competed with the Catholics in persecuting them. The first burned Servetus, the second burned Giordano Bruno. It was a time that needed giants and gave birth to giants, giants of learning, spirit and character - it was a time that the French rightly called the Renaissance, while Protestant Europe was one-sided and limited - the Reformation.

And then natural science also proclaimed its independence then, though not from the very beginning, just as Luther was not the first Protestant. What in the religious field was Luther's burning of the papal bull, in natural science was the great creation of Copernicus, in which, although timidly, after 36 years of hesitation and, so to speak, on his deathbed, he challenged church superstition. Since that time, the study of nature has essentially been freed from religion, although the final clarification of all the details has dragged on to the present, still not completed in many heads. But since then, the development of natural science has taken giant steps, increasing, so to speak, in proportion to the square of the distance in time from its starting point, just wanting to show the world that in relation to the movement of the highest color of organic matter, the human spirit,

The first period of the new natural sciences ends—in the field of the inorganic world—by Newton. This is the period of mastering this material; in the field of mathematics and astronomy, statics and dynamics, he gave great achievements, especially thanks to the work of Kepler and Galileo, from which Newton drew a number of consequences. But in the field of organic phenomena, they have not yet gone beyond the limits of the first rudiments of knowledge. There has not yet been a study of historically successive and successive life forms, just as there has been no study of their corresponding and changing living conditions—there was no palaeontology and geology. At that time, nature did not seem to be something historically developing, having its own history in time. They were only interested in spatial extent; different forms were grouped not one after the other, but one beside the other, natural history was considered something unchanging, everlasting, like the elliptical orbits of the planets. For a more or less thorough study of the forms of organic life, both basic

sciences lacked—chemistry and the science of the main organic structural form, the cell. Naturally revolutionary in its beginning science was faced with a thoroughly conservative nature, in which now everything was the same as at the beginning of the world, and in which everything would remain the same as it was at the beginning of the world.

Characteristically, this conservative view of nature in both inorganic and organic [...] [The phrase breaks off unfinished].

Astronomy Physics Geology Plant Physiology Therapeutics

Mechanics Chemistry Palaeontology Animal Physiology  
Diagnostics

Mathematics Mineralogy Anatomy

The first breach is Kant and Laplace. The second is geology and palaeontology (Lyell, slow development). The third is organic chemistry, which makes organic bodies and shows the applicability of chemical laws to other bodies. The fourth—1842, mechanical heat, Grove. Fifth—Darwin, Lamarck, cell, etc. (The struggle of Cuvier and Agassis.) <To emphasize the contradictions of the old worldview: the first impetus, countless acts of creation of organic creatures, teleology>. Sixth is a comparative element in anatomy. Climatology. (Isotherms.) Scientific expeditions and travels from the middle of the 18th century. The geography of animals and plants, generally physical geography (Humboldt), bringing the material into communication. Morphology (embryology, K.-E. F.-Ber) [All this remark has been crossed out to this point. Wed below is the beginning of the “Old Introduction”].

The old teleology went to hell, but now the firm conviction firmly reigns that matter in its eternal cycle moves according to the laws and at a certain stage must—in one place, then in another—produce a thinking spirit with an necessity in an organic being.

Let the normal existence of animals be given under the conditions in which they live and to which they adapt; the conditions for the existence of man, as soon as he is isolated from the animal in the narrow sense of the word, turn out to be non-existent; they have to be worked out only for future historical development. Man is the only animal that can get out of a purely animal state; his normal state corresponds to his consciousness, *he must create it himself*. (Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, pp. 22-24, 1932)

Energy saving. The quantitative constancy of the movement was already expressed by Descartes and in almost the same terms as now [...] (Clausius [...] Meyer). But the transformation of the *form*

of movement was discovered only in 1842, and this, and not the law of quantitative constancy, is just new. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 48.*)

## **The Ratio of Mechanical Motion and Heat**

The practical discovery of the transformation of mechanical motion into heat is so old that the beginning of human history can be considered from it. No matter how great the discoveries that preceded this, - in the form of the invention of tools and the taming of animals - but, only having learned how to make fire using friction, people first subjugated the inorganic power of nature. What an impression made on the thought of mankind by this gigantic discovery is still shown by modern folk superstitions. Long after the introduction of bronze and iron, the discovery of a stone knife, this first weapon, was celebrated; all religious sacrifices were performed with a stone knife. According to Jewish tradition, Joshua ordered circumcision of men born in the desert with stone knives; Celts and Germans used only stone knives in their human sacrifices. But all this has long been forgotten, which cannot be said about the fire obtained by friction. Long after people became acquainted with other ways of receiving fire, all sacred fire should have been obtained from most peoples by friction. Even today, according to popular beliefs of most European countries, miraculous fire (for example, we have fire for spells against animal chastity) can be lit only by friction. Thus, even in our time, the grateful memory of man's first victory over nature continues to semi-consciously live in popular superstition, in the remnants of pagan-mythological memories of the most educated peoples on earth. obtained by friction. Long after people became acquainted with other ways of receiving fire, all sacred fire should have been obtained from most peoples by friction. Even today, according to popular beliefs of most European countries, miraculous fire (for example, we have fire for spells against animal chastity) can be lit only by friction. Thus, even in our time, the grateful memory of man's first victory over nature continues to semi-consciously live in popular superstition, in the remnants of pagan and mythological memories of the most educated peoples on earth. obtained by friction. Long after people became acquainted with other ways of

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However, the process that takes place during the production of fire by friction is still one-sided. Here, mechanical movement turns into heat. To complete this process, it is necessary to reverse the conversion of this heat into mechanical motion, because only in this case the dialectics of the process is satisfied and the process closes - at least at first - in a circle. But history has its own pace of movement, and no matter how dialectical its course may be, but dialectics often have to wait a long time for history. Probably tens of thousands of years have passed since the opening of fire production by friction before Heron of Alexandria (about 120) invented a machine that was driven into rotational motion by steam leaving it. And almost two thousand years passed again until the first steam engine was built,

The steam engine was the first truly international discovery, and this fact, in turn, testifies to the great historical progress. The Frenchman Papin invented the steam engine, but in Germany. The German Leibniz, scattering brilliant ideas around himself, as always, without worrying about whether they would ascribe merit to him or others, Leibniz, as we now know from Papin's correspondence (published by Gerland), told him the main idea of this machine—the use of a cylinder and piston. Shortly afterwards, the British Saveri and Newcomen came up with similar cars; finally, their fellow countryman Watt, introducing a separate condenser, gave the steam

engine in principle its modern look. The cycle of discoveries in this area has ended: we managed to achieve the conversion of heat into mechanical motion. All further was only an improvement in the details.

So, practice in its own way solved the question of the relationship between mechanical motion and heat. She first turned the first into the second, and then the second into the first. But what was the role of the theory? Pretty sad. Although it was precisely in the 17th and 18th centuries that countless travel descriptions were teeming with tales of wild peoples who knew no other way of generating heat than friction, but physicists were almost completely uninterested in it; with the same indifference they throughout the eighteenth century and the first decades of the nineteenth century to the steam engine. In most cases, they were limited to simply recording facts.

Finally, in the twenties, Sadi Carnot became interested in this issue and developed it in a very skilful way, so that his calculations, which Clapeyron gave a geometric shape, retained their significance to this day and were used in the works of Clausius and Clerk-Maskwell. He got almost to the point; it was not the lack of factual material that prevented him from finally solving the problem, but a biased *false theory*, and, moreover, a false theory that was not imposed on physicists by some evil philosophy, but they invented by themselves using their own naturalistic method of thinking, so superior to the metaphysical-philosophizing method.

In the seventeenth century, heat was considered—at least in England—a property of bodies, “a *movement of a special kind*, the nature of which has never been explained in a satisfactory manner.” That is what T. Thomson calls it two years before the discovery of the mechanical theory of heat (Outline of the Sciences of Heat and Electricity, 2nd edition, London 1840). But in the eighteenth century, the view that heat, like light, electricity, magnetism, is a special substance, more and more gained dominance, and all these peculiar substances differ from ordinary matter in that they do not have weight, that they are weightless. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 161-162, 1932*)

## **The Emergence and Development of Science is Due to Production**

It is necessary to study the *consistent development* of individual branches of science.—First, *astronomy*—already because of the seasons it is absolutely necessary for shepherd and agricultural peoples. Astronomy can only develop with the help of *mathematics*. Consequently, I had to deal with the latter. Further, at a certain stage in the development of agriculture and in famous countries (raising water for irrigation in Egypt), and especially with the emergence of cities, large buildings and the development of crafts, *mechanics* also developed. Soon it becomes necessary also for *shipping and military affairs*. And she needs the help of mathematics and therefore contributes to its development. Thus, from the very beginning, the emergence and development of sciences is determined by production.

Throughout antiquity, scientific teaching proper has been limited to these three sciences, and only in the post-classical period (Alexandrians, Archimedes, etc.) as an accurate and systematic study. Until then, it was possible in physics and chemistry, which had not yet been separated from each other (element theory, lack of understanding of the chemical element), in botany, zoology, human and animal anatomy, to be limited only to the collection of facts and, if possible, their systematization. Physiology, just moving away from the most tactile things, such as digestion and excretion, came down to just guessing; it could not have been otherwise, until they even knew the blood circulation.—At the end of this period, chemistry appears in the original form of alchemy.

If, after a dark night of the Middle Ages, they suddenly reborn with the unexpected power of science, beginning to develop at a wonderful speed, then this miracle we again owe to production. Firstly, since the Crusades, the industry has developed tremendously and has produced a lot of new mechanical (weaving, watchmaking, mill), chemical (dyeing, metallurgy, alcohol) and physical facts (glasses), which have provided not only great material for observation, but also completely different than before, means for experimentation, and allowed the construction of *new* tools. We can say that a systematic experimental science proper became possible only from that time on. Secondly, the whole of Western and Central Europe, including Poland, is now developing in mutual connection, although Italy, thanks to its ancient civilization, continues to be at the head. Thirdly, geographical discoveries made in pursuit of the profits, that is, ultimately, under the influence of the interests of production, delivered endless, previously inaccessible material in the fields of

meteorology, zoology, botany and physiology (human). Fourth, a *printing press* appeared [They still boasted of what production owes to science, but science owes infinitely more to production.].

Now—if we ignore mathematics, astronomy, and mechanics that already existed independently, physics is completely isolated from chemistry (Torricelli, Galileo, —the first, in connection with industrial hydraulic structures, studies the movement of fluids,—Clerk Maxwell); Boyle makes science out of chemistry. Harvey, thanks to the discovery of blood circulation, makes science out of physiology (human as well as animals); zoology and botany still remain fact-gathering sciences until palaeontology (Cuvier) is born, and soon afterwards the discovery of the cell and the development of organic chemistry. Only because of this did morphology and physiology become possible as true sciences. At the end of the last century, the foundations of geology were laid, in modern times - the so-called (unsuccessful) anthropology, which is a transition from the morphology and physiology of man and his races to *stories*. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 39-40, 1932*)

## **The development of theoretical science and materialistic dialectics**

It may, however, happen that the progress of theoretical natural science will make most of my work or all of it completely superfluous, for the revolution, to which theoretical natural science is prompted by the simple need to systematize the mass of accumulating purely empirical discoveries, will make even the most stubborn empiricist recognize the dialectical nature of natural phenomena. Old, frozen contradictions, sharp, impassable borders are disappearing more and more. From the time that it was possible to turn the last “real gases” into a liquid state, from the time it was proved that the body can be brought into a state in which it is impossible to distinguish a droplet form from a gaseous form, the aggregates have lost the last remainder of their former absolute character. The law of the kinetic theory of gases, by virtue of which the velocity squares in perfect gases, with which individual gas molecules move at the same temperature, are inversely proportional to the weight of the molecules, this law also introduced heat into a number of those forms of motion that are subject to our measurement. If ten years ago, the newly

discovered great basic law of motion was understood as a simple law of conservation of energy, as a simple expression of the indestructibility and indestructibility of motion, therefore, simply from its (law) quantitative side, now this narrow negative definition is more and more supplanted positive—namely, the doctrine of *energy conversion*, and in this definition, the qualitative content of the process is clearly expressed and the last memory of the extra-world creator disappears. Now it is no longer necessary to prove as something new that the momentum (the so-called energy) does not change when it is converted from kinetic energy (the so-called mechanical force) into electricity, heat, potential energy, etc., and vice versa; this once and for all now serves as the basis for a deeper study of the process of transformation itself, that great basic process, in the knowledge of which all knowledge of nature lies. Since biology is studied in the light of the theory of evolution, the ossified classification boundaries disappear one after another in the field of organic nature; mismatched intermediates increase every day, a more accurate study transfers organisms from one class to another, and the distinguishing features, which have become almost a symbol of faith, lose their unconditional value; we now know the laying eggs of mammals and, if this is confirmed, then the four-legged birds. If, many years ago, Virkhov was forced, due to the discovery of the cell, to replace the indivisibility of the individual with a federation of cellular states, which, of course, is very progressive, but does not correspond to the scientific and dialectical point of view, then now the concept of an animal (and therefore, human) individual even more complicated due to the discovery of white blood balls, amoebae moving in the body of higher animals. But it is precisely these seemingly irreconcilable and insoluble polar opposites, these forcibly fixed boundaries of classification have given modern theoretical natural science a limited metaphysical character. The recognition that these opposites and differences have only relative significance in nature, and that, on the other hand, the immobility and absoluteness attributed to nature are introduced into it only by our reflection, is this recognition that is the main point of the dialectical understanding of nature. The correctness of dialectical understanding is increasingly confirmed by the accumulating facts of natural science, and this understanding is easier to perceive if we compare the knowledge of the law of dialectical thinking with the dialectical nature of these facts. In any case, natural science is now at such a stage of development that it cannot slip away from dialectical generalization if

it is not forgotten that the results in which the data of experience are generalized, the essence of the concept; the art of operating concepts is not innate and does not consist in ordinary common sense, but it requires real thinking, which, in turn, has as long a history as experienced natural science. It is precisely because natural science will assimilate to itself the results achieved by the development of philosophy over two and a half thousand years, it, on the one hand, will be freed from any separate, standing and above natural philosophy, and on the other, also from its own, inherited from English empiricism, a superficial method of thinking. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 213-214, 1932*)

## **The Significance of the Three Great Discoveries for the Penetration of Dialectics into Natural Science**

...Until the end of the last century, natural science was predominantly a *collecting* science, a science of finished objects, in our century (XIX) it became a science ordering, a science of natural *phenomena*, a science of the origin and development of objects and a connection that unites phenomena into one great whole. Physiology, which explores the phenomena that occur in the plant and animal body; embryology, observing the development of an individual organism from an embryonic state to maturity; geology studying the gradual formation of the earth's crust—all these sciences are the children of the present (XIX) century.

Cognition of the interconnection of processes occurring in nature develops in gigantic steps, especially thanks to three great discoveries. Firstly, thanks to the discovery of cells, these units, from the reproduction and differentiation of which plant and animal organisms develop. This discovery not only convinced us that the development and growth of all higher organisms obey one general law, but, showing the ability of cells to change, it also indicated the path leading to *species-related* changes in organisms, changes that result in organisms developing *not only as separate individuals*.

Secondly, thanks to the discovery of the conversion of energy, which showed that all the so-called forces acting primarily in inorganic nature: mechanical force and its complement, the so-called potential energy, heat, radiance (light and radiant heat), electricity,

magnetism, chemical energy,—represent various forms of manifestations of the global movement,—forms that pass one into another in known quantitative relations, so that when a certain amount of one disappears, in its place is certain The quantity is different, and all movement in nature is reduced to a continuous process of transforming one form into another.

Finally, thirdly, thanks to the first coherent evidence presented by Darwin that the organisms around us, not excluding humans, were the result of a long development process from a few, initially unicellular, embryos, and these embryos, in turn, were formed from chemically protoplasm or protein.

Thanks to these three great discoveries and other successes of natural science, we can now find not only the connection that exists between natural phenomena in its individual areas, but, speaking generally, also the one that unites these separate areas. Thus, the data obtained by empirical science, allow us to compile a fairly systematic image of nature as one coherent whole. Similar images were compiled before by the so-called natural philosophy (philosophy of nature), which replaced the still unknown then real connection of phenomena with an ideal, fantastic connection and replaced the missing *facts with fiction* by filling in the actual gaps only in the imagination. At the same time, she expressed many brilliant thoughts and predicted many later discoveries, but not a little nonsense was also spoken. It could not be otherwise then. Now, when it is enough for us to look at the results of the study of nature *dialectically*, that is, from the point of view of their own mutual connection, to form a “*system of nature*” satisfactory for our time, and when the dialectical nature of this connection forcibly penetrates even the metaphysical heads of natural scientists—Now natural philosophy is buried forever. Any attempt to dig it out would not only be unnecessary, but would mean a *step back*. (*Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, pp. 65-66, Sotsekiz, 1931*)

### **ENGELS TO MARX**

**Manchester, July 14, 1858**

Send me the promised “Philosophy of Nature” by Hegel. I’m doing a little physiology now, and I’ll add to it the lessons of comparative anatomy. In these sciences, there are highly speculative things that have recently been discovered. I would very much like to know if the old man [Hegel] did not foresee anything like that. One thing is certain: if he had to write a philosophy of nature *now*, then the

facts themselves would fly to him from all sides. Generally speaking, almost no one knows about the successes of the natural sciences over the past 30 years. Particularly important for physiology were, firstly, the tremendous successes made by organic chemistry, and secondly, the microscope, which has been used correctly for the past 20 years. This latter led to results even more important than chemistry. The main reason why a revolution in physiology occurred and due to which comparative physiology became possible was the discovery of the cell, the discovery that Schleiden made in the plant and Schwann in the animal organism (around 1836). Everything is a cell. A cell is a Hegelian being in itself. It is precisely in its development that it goes through the Hegelian process, until, finally, an “idea” develops from it, that is, a complete organism.

Another result that old Hegel would be very pleased with is the correlation of forces in physics, or the law that, under certain conditions, mechanical motion, i.e., mechanical force (for example, through friction), turns into heat, heat into light, light—into chemical affinity, chemical affinity (for example, in a volt pole) —into electricity, this last—into magnetism. These transitions can also occur differently: forward and backward. Currently, one Englishman, whose name I don’t remember, has proved that these forces pass into each other in precisely defined quantitative proportions, so that a certain amount of one force, such as electricity, corresponds to a certain amount of any other—for example, magnetism, light, heat chemical affinity (positive or negative—connecting or degrading) and movement. The meaningless theory of latent heat is thus eliminated. Is this not an excellent material example of how reflective concepts (*Reflexionsbestimmungen*) pass into one another. Be that as it may, when studying comparative physiology, you begin to despise with all your heart the idealistic exaltation of man over all the other beast. At every step with your nose you come across a complete coincidence of the human structure with the structure of the rest of the mammals, in general terms, all vertebrates and even somewhat less sharply coincide in insects, crustaceans, worms, etc. The Hegelian story with a qualitative leap in a quantitative series here is also very suitable. In the end, reaching the most primitive ciliates, you come to the primitive type—a simple self-living cell. This cell, again, is not necessarily sharply different from lower plants (fungi consisting of one cell) and from embryos of higher stages of development, up to the human egg and seminal bodies, and in appearance it is exactly the same as independent cells in living the body (blood cells, epithelial cells, cells

secreted by the glands, kidneys, etc.). (*Marx and Engels, Letters, pp. 108-110, Partizdat, 1932*)

## Criticism by Engels Darwin

*The struggle for existence.* First of all, it is necessary to strictly limit it to the struggle that occurs from the *overpopulation* of plants and animals *in the world*—the struggle that really takes place at a certain stage of the development of the plant kingdom and at the lower stage of the development of the animal kingdom. But it is necessary to strictly distinguish from those cases where species change, the old ones die out, and their place is occupied by new, more developed, *without* the presence of such overpopulation: for example, when plants and animals are relocated to new places where new climatic, soil, etc. conditions cause a change. If here adaptive individuals survive and form a new species due to constantly changing adaptation, while other, more stable individuals die and eventually die out, and imperfect intermediate elements die out with them, then this can happen—and actually happens—*without any Malthusianism*, and if the latter takes part here, then it does not change anything in the process, at best only accelerates it. The same can be said about the gradual change in the geographical, climatic, etc. conditions of a given locality (drying up of Central Asia, for example); it doesn't matter whether the animal or plant population presses on each other or not; caused by a change in geographical, etc. conditions, the process of development of organisms occurs by itself —The same applies to sexual selection, where Malthusianism plays absolutely no role.

Therefore, Haeckel's "adaptation and heredity" can, in addition to any selection and Malthusianism, cause the whole process of development.

Darwin's mistake lies precisely in the fact that in his "Natural selection, or *the experience of the fittest*," he mixes two completely different things:

- 1) Selection due to the pressure of overpopulation, where, first of all, the strongest are experienced, but where these survivors can also be the weakest in a certain respect individuals.

- 2) Selection due to the greater ability to adapt to changed circumstances, where the survivors are better adapted to these *circumstances*, but where this adaptation can be both progress

and regression (for example, adaptation to parasitic life is *always a regression*).

The essence of the matter is that every progress in organic development is at the same time a regression, because it captures *one-sided* development and excludes the possibility of development in many other directions.

But this is the *basic law* [*In a bundle of Engels' papers, here follows only one randomly caught sheet with the following remark: "In my opinion, determining the value of a thing only by the time spent on it is absurd. So says Philippe Pauli. May 17, 1882 [". (Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 123, 1932)*

## **The Importance of Darwin's Work for Marxism**

**MARX — LASSALLE**  
**January 16, 1861**

Darwin's work is very valuable and suits me as the natural science pillar of the historical class struggle. Of course, one must put up with the rude English manner of presentation. Despite all the shortcomings, not only the mortal blow of "teleology" in the natural sciences was dealt here, but its reasonable significance was also empirically clarified. (*Marx and Engels, Letters, p. 118, Partizdat, 1932*)

## **Philosophy and Natural Sciences**

Naturalists imagine that they are freed from philosophy when they ignore or abuse it. But since they cannot move one step without thinking, logical definitions are necessary for thinking, and they inadvertently borrow these definitions either from the current theoretical heritage of the so-called educated people, over which the remnants of long-past philosophical systems dominate, or from the crumbs of compulsory university courses in philosophy (which leads not only to fragmented views, but also to a mishmash of the views of people belonging to the most diverse and for the most part the most

nasty schools), or from uncritically and unsystematic reading of all kinds of philosophical works,—in the end, they still find themselves held captive by philosophy, but, unfortunately, for the most part—very bad; and here are the people especially diligently scolding philosophy, they become slaves to the most nasty vulgarized remnants of the most nasty philosophical systems. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 21-22, 1932*)

\* \* \*

No matter how the scientists resisted, they are controlled by philosophers. The only question is whether they want to be controlled by some nasty fashion philosopher, or whether they want to be guided by a variety of theoretical thinking based on familiarity with the history of thinking and its conquests. Physics, watch out for metaphysics! This is perfectly true, but in a different sense. Natural science, content with the scum of the old metaphysics, after philosophy still dragged on its imaginary existence. Only when natural science and history absorb the dialectic, only then all the philosophical trash—with the exception of the pure doctrine of thinking—will become superfluous, dissolve in positive science. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 107, 1932*)

\* \* \*

All nature available to us forms a certain system, a kind of aggregate connection of bodies, and here we mean by the word body all material realities, starting from a star and ending with an atom and even a particle of ether, since we recognize the reality of the latter. From the fact that these bodies are in mutual connection, it logically follows that they act on each other, and this interaction is precisely movement. Already here it is discovered that matter is inconceivable without motion <that together with a given mass of matter motion is also given>. And if, further, we notice that matter confronts us as something given, as something indissoluble and indestructible, then it follows that the movement is also indomitable and indestructible. This conclusion became inevitable, as soon as they began to consider the universe as a system, as a connection and a combination of bodies. And since philosophy came to this long before this idea was consolidated in natural science, it is understandable why philosophy made a conclusion two hundred years before natural

science about the incompatibility and indestructibility of motion. Even the form in which she made it is still above the modern natural science formulation of it. Descartes's theorem that the sum of the motion available in the universe always remains unchanged suffers only from a formal flaw, since in it an expression that makes sense when applied to the finite is applied to an infinite quantity. On the contrary, in natural science there are now two expressions of this law: Helmholtz's conservation formula in which she made it, is still above the modern science of his formulation. Descartes's theorem that the sum of the motion available in the universe always remains unchanged suffers only from a formal flaw, since in it an expression that makes sense when applied to the finite is applied to an infinite quantity. On the contrary, in natural science there are now two expressions of this law: Helmholtz's conservation formula *forces* and a new, more accurate formula for *energy* conservation, and, as we will see later, each of these formulas sharply contradicts the other and each in addition expresses only one side of the relationship that interests us. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 130-131, 1932*)

\* \* \*

Philosophy avenges itself retroactively to the natural sciences for the fact that the latter has left it. Naturalists could already be convinced by the example of the natural science successes of philosophy that in all this philosophy there is something that surpasses them even in their own field (Leibniz is the founder of mathematics of the infinite, compared with which Newton's inductive donkey is a plagiarist and pest; Kant is cosmogonic theory of the origin of the world *before* Laplace; Oken—the first, put forward the theory of development in Germany, Hegel... that their synthesis and rational grouping of the natural sciences do more business than all the materialistischeskie doodles, taken together). (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 4, 1932*)

## **II. The Development and Crisis of Natural Science in the Era of Imperialism**

### **Lenin on the Causes of the Crisis in Natural Science and Ways to Overcome it**

The famous French physicist, Henri Poincaré, speaks in his book of the “Values of Science” that there are “signs of a serious crisis” of physics, and devotes a special chapter to this crisis (ch. VIII, cf. p. 171). This crisis is not limited to the fact that “the great revolutionary—radium” undermines the principle of conservation of energy. “Dangers also apply to all other principles” (180). For example, the Lavoisier principle or the principle of conservation of mass is undermined by the electronic theory of matter. According to this theory, atoms form the smallest particles charged with positive or negative electricity, called electrons and “immersed in a medium, which we call the ether.” The experiments of physicists provide material for calculating the speed of motion of electrons and their mass (or the ratio of their mass to their electric charge). The speed of movement is comparable to the speed of light (300,000 kilometres per second), for example, reaching up to a third of this speed. Under such conditions, it is necessary to take into account the double mass of the electron, respectively, the need to overcome the inertia, firstly, of the electron itself, and, secondly, of the ether. The first mass will be the real or mechanical mass of the electron, the second - “electrodynamic mass, representing the inertia of the ether.” And so, the first mass is equal to zero. The whole mass of electrons, or at least negative electrons, is by its origin completely and exclusively electrodynamic. The mass disappears. The basics of mechanics are undermined. It undermines Newton’s principle, the equality of action and reaction, etc. Under such conditions, it is necessary to take into account the double mass of the electron, respectively, the need to overcome the inertia, firstly, of the electron itself, and, secondly, of the ether. The first mass will be the real or mechanical mass of the electron, the second—“electrodynamic mass, representing the inertia of the ether.” And so, the first mass is equal to zero. The whole mass of electrons, or at least negative electrons, is by its origin completely and exclusively electrodynamic. The mass disappears. The basics of

mechanics are undermined. It undermines Newton's principle, the equality of action and reaction, etc. Under such conditions, it is necessary to take into account the double mass of the electron, respectively, the need to overcome the inertia, firstly, of the electron itself, and, secondly, of the ether. The first mass will be the real or mechanical mass of the electron, the second—"electrodynamic mass, representing the inertia of the ether." And so, the first mass is equal to zero. The whole mass of electrons, or at least negative electrons, is by its origin completely and exclusively electrodynamic. The mass disappears. The basics of mechanics are undermined. It undermines Newton's principle, the equality of action and reaction, etc. representing the inertia of the ether. "And so, the first mass is equal to zero. The whole mass of electrons, or at least negative electrons, is by its origin completely and exclusively electrodynamic. The mass disappears. The basics of mechanics are undermined. It undermines Newton's principle, the equality of action and reaction, etc. representing the inertia of the ether. "And so, the first mass is equal to zero. The whole mass of electrons, or at least negative electrons, is by its origin completely and exclusively electrodynamic. The mass disappears. The basics of mechanics are undermined. It undermines Newton's principle, the equality of action and reaction, etc.

Before us, says Poincare, is the "ruins" of the old principles of physics, the "general rout of principles." True,—he makes a reservation,—all the indicated exceptions from the principles apply to infinitesimal quantities, —it is possible that we don't know yet others, infinitesimal, which counteract the undermining of old laws,—and radium is also very rare, but in any case "*period of doubt*" on the face. The author's epistemological conclusions from this "period of doubt" we have already seen: "not nature gives (or imposes) the concepts of space and time to us, but we give them to nature"; "Everything that is not thought is pure nothing." These are idealistic conclusions. Breaking down the most basic principles proves (such is the course of Poincare's thought) that these principles are not some copies, pictures from nature, not images of something external to the human consciousness, but products of this consciousness. Poincare does not consistently develop these conclusions, is not interested in any essentially philosophical side of the issue. The French writer on philosophical questions Abel Rey stops at it in detail in his book: "The Theory of Physics among Modern Physicists" (Abel Rey: "La théorie de la physique chez les

physiciens contemporains”, Paris, F. Alcan, 1907). Truth, the author himself is positivist, that is, confused and half Machian, but in this case it is even a little convenient, because he cannot be suspected of wanting to “slander” the idol of our Machists. Ray cannot be trusted when it comes to the precise philosophical definition of concepts and especially materialism, for Ray is also a professor and, as such, is full of endless contempt for the materialists (and differs in endless ignorance about the epistemology of materialism).

The attention of philosophers in general, the author says, as well as those who, for reasons of one or another order, want to criticize science in general, is now attracted especially to physics. “When discussing the limits and value of physical knowledge, they essentially criticize the validity of positive science, the possibility of cognizing an object” (p. I-II). They are in a hurry to draw sceptical conclusions from the “crisis of modern physics” (p. 14). What is the essence of this crisis? During the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, physicists agreed among themselves on everything essential. “They believed in a purely mechanical explanation of nature; accepted that physics is only more complex mechanics, namely molecular mechanics. Diverged only on the issue of methods of reducing physics to mechanics, about the details of a mechanism.” “At present, the spectacle presented to us by the physical and chemical sciences seems completely opposite. Extreme disagreements replaced the former unanimity, and disagreements, not in details, but in basic and guiding ideas. If it were an exaggeration to say that each scientist has his own special tendencies, it is nevertheless necessary to state that, like art, science, especially physics, has numerous schools, the conclusions of which often diverge and sometimes are directly hostile to one another...

From here one can see what is the significance and the breadth of what is called the crisis of modern physics.

Until the middle of the 19th century, traditional physics accepted that a simple extension of physics was enough to get a metaphysics of matter. This physics attached ontological significance to its theories. And these theories were entirely mechanical. The traditional mechanism “(Ray uses this word in the special sense of the belief system that reduces physics to mechanics)” thus represented, beyond the results of experience, beyond the results of experience, a *real* knowledge of the material world. It was not a hypothetical expression of experience, it was a dogma” (16)...

Here we must interrupt the venerable “positivist.” It is clear that he is drawing us the materialistic philosophy of traditional physics, not wanting to name a feature (i.e., materialism) by name. To Yumist, materialism must seem like metaphysics, dogma, going beyond experience, etc. Without knowing materialism, Yumist Rey has absolutely no idea about dialectics, about the difference between dialectical materialism and metaphysical materialism in the Engels sense of the word. Therefore, for example, the ratio of absolute and relative truth is absolutely unclear to Ray.

“... Critical remarks against the traditional mechanism, which were made in the second half of the 19th century, undermined this premise of the ontological reality of the mechanism. This criticism affirmed the philosophical view of physics, which has already become almost traditional in the philosophy of the late XIX century. Science, in this view, is nothing more than a symbolic formula, marking techniques (designations, repérage, creating marks, marks, symbols), and since these marking techniques are different in different schools, a conclusion was soon drawn that only that previously created (faconné) by a person for designation (for symbolization). Science became a work of art for amateurs, a work of art for utilitarians: points of view that naturally began to be interpreted everywhere as a denial of the possibility of science. The science, as a purely artificial means of influencing nature, as a simple utilitarian technique, it does not have the right to be called a science if it does not distort the meaning of words. To say that science can be nothing but such an artificial means of influence is to deny science in the real meaning of the word.

The collapse of the traditional mechanism, or rather, the criticism to which it was subjected, led to the following situation: science also crashed. From the impossibility to stay on simply and exclusively the traditional mechanism concluded to the impossibility of science” (17). And the author poses the question: “Is the modern crisis of physics a temporary and external incident in the development of science, or does science suddenly turn back and finally leave the path it followed?..”

“... If the physical and chemical sciences, which in history were essentially champions of emancipation, crash in such a crisis that leaves them with exclusively the value of technically useful recipes, but takes away all their importance from the point of view of cognition of nature, then from here a complete revolution in logic and in the history of ideas must result. Physics loses all educational value; the spirit of positive science represented by it becomes false

and dangerous. “Science can only give practical recipes, not actual knowledge.” The knowledge of the real must be sought by other means... We must go a different way, we must return the subjective intuition, the mystical sense of reality, in a word, mysterious, what was considered to be taken away from them by science” (19).

As a positivist, the author considers this view to be incorrect and the crisis of physics temporary. How Rey purifies Mach, Poincaré and so on from these findings, we will see below. Now we confine ourselves to stating the fact of the “crisis” and its significance. From the last words of Ray we cited, it is clear which reactionary elements took advantage of this crisis and exacerbated it. In the preface to his work, Rey says directly that “the general spirit of modern physics” seeks “to lean on the fideist and anti-intellectual movement of the last years of the 19th century” (II). Fideists (from the Latin word *fides*, faith) are called in France those who put faith over reason. Anti-intellectualism is a doctrine denying the rights or claims of the mind. Consequently, in philosophical terms, the essence of the “crisis of modern physics” is that the old physics saw in their theories a “real knowledge of the material world,” that is, a reflection of objective reality. A new trend in physics sees in theory only symbols, signs, marks for practice, i.e., denies the existence of objective reality, independent of our consciousness and reflected by it. If Ray adhered to the correct philosophical terminology, he would have to say: the materialist theory of cognition, spontaneously accepted by the old physics, was replaced by idealistic and agnostic, which fideism used, contrary to the desire of idealists and agnostics.

But Rey does not imagine this shift, which constitutes a crisis, as if all new physicists are opposed to all old physicists. No. He shows that according to their epistemological tendencies, modern physicists are divided into three schools: energy or conceptual (*conceptuelle*—from the word *concept*, pure concept), mechanistic or new-mechanistic, which continues to be held by the vast majority of physicists, and the critical school in between. The first includes Mach and Duhem; to the third Henri Poincaré; to the second Kirchhoff, Helmholtz, Thomson (Lord Kelvin), Maxwell from the old, Larmor, Lorenz from the latest physicists. What is the essence of the *two* main lines (for the third is non-independent, but intermediate), it can be seen from the following words of Ray:

“The traditional mechanism has built a system of the material world.” In the doctrine of the structure of matter, he proceeded from “elements of qualitatively homogeneous and identical”, and the

elements should be considered “unchanged, impenetrable”, etc. Physics “built a *real* building from *real* materials and *real* cement. The physicist possessed *material elements*, *causes* and the *way of* their action, *real* the laws of their operation “(33-38).” The changes in this view of physics consist mainly in discarding the ontological value of theories and extremely emphasizing the phenomenological significance of physics.” The conceptualist view deals with “pure abstractions,” “looking for a theory of purely abstract, eliminating, as far as possible, the hypothesis of matter.” “The concept of energy is becoming the substructure of a new physics. Therefore, conceptualist physics can for the most part be called *energetic* physics “, although this name does not fit, for example, with such a representative of conceptualist physics as Mach (p. 46).

This mix of energy with Machism by Ray, of course, is not entirely correct, as well as the assurance that the new-mechanistic school (p. 48) comes to a phenomenological view of physics, with all its depth of discrepancy with conceptualists. Ray’s “new” terminology does not clarify matters and obscures it, but we could not avoid it to give the reader an idea of the “positivist” view of the crisis of physics. On the merits, the opposition of the “new” school to the old view completely coincides, as the reader could see, with the above criticism of Helmholtz Kleinpeter. Transmitting the views of various physicists, Ray reflects in his exposition all the uncertainty and precariousness of their philosophical views. *Essence*. The crisis of modern physics consists in breaking old laws and basic principles, in discarding objective reality outside of consciousness, i.e., in replacing materialism with idealism and agnosticism. “Matter has disappeared”—this is how one can express the main and typical difficulty in relation to many particular issues that created this crisis. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, p. 20-211, ed. 3rd.*)

## **Natural Facts Confirm Dialectical Materialism**

Materialism and idealism are distinguished by one or another solution to the question of the *source of* our knowledge, the relation of knowledge (and the “psychic” in general) to the *physical* world, and

the question of the structure of matter, of atoms and electrons is a question that concerns only this “physical world”. When physicists say: “matter disappears,” they want to say by this that until now, natural science has led all its studies of the physical world to the last three concepts—matter, electricity, ether; now *only* the last two, because matter can be reduced to electricity, the atom can be explained as the likeness of an infinitesimal solar system, inside which negative electrons move with a certain (and immensely immense, as we saw) speed. Instead of dozens of elements, it is possible, therefore, to reduce the physical world to two or three (since the positive and negative electrons make up “two substances substantially different,” as the physicist Pella says,—Rey, I. p., Pp. 294-295). Natural leads consequently to a “unity *ma me Rhee*” (ibid) [Avg. *Oliver Lodge*. “Sur les électrons.” Paris 1906, p. 159.) *Oliver Lodge*. On Electrons, Paris 1906, p. 159. *Ed.*] “The electrical theory of matter”, the recognition of electricity as “fundamental substance” is “a close theoretical achievement of what philosophers have always strived for, that is, the unity of matter”. Compare also Augusto Righi. Über die Struktur der Materie, Lpz. 1908 (*Riga*, A “Structure of Matter.” Lpts. 1908.—*Ed.*); *J. Thomson*. The Corpuscular Theory of Matter, Lond. 1907 (*Thomson, J.* “The Corpuscular Theory of Matter.” L. 1907. *Ed.*); *P. Langevin*. La physique des électrons in Revue générale des sciences, 1905, p. 257-276 (*Langevin, P.* “Electron Physics,” Universal Scientific Review, 1905, pp. 257–276.—*Ed.*.)—This is the actual content of that phrase about the disappearance of matter, the replacement of matter by electricity, etc., which confuses so many. “Matter disappears”—this means the limit to which we have known matter until now disappears, our knowledge goes deeper; such properties of matter that previously seemed absolute, unchanging, initial (impermeability, inertia, mass, etc.) and which are now found to be relative, inherent only to certain states of matter, disappear. For the *only* “property” of matter, with the recognition of which philosophical materialism is associated, is the property of *being an objective reality*, of existing outside our consciousness.

The mistake of Machism in general and of Machist new physics is that this basis of philosophical materialism and the difference between metaphysical materialism and dialectical materialism are ignored. The recognition of any unchanging elements, the “unchanging essence of things”, etc., is not materialism, but *metaphysical*, that is, anti-dialectical materialism. Therefore, I.

Dietzgen emphasized that the “object of science is infinite”, that the immeasurable, unknowable to the end, *inexhaustible* is not only infinite, but also the “smallest atom”, because “nature in all its parts is without beginning and without end” (“Kl. ph. Schr.”, S. 229-230). Therefore, Engels cited his example with the discovery of alizarin in coal tar and criticized the *mechanical* materialism. To pose the question from the only correct, that is, dialectically materialistic point of view, one must ask: Do electrons, ether, *and so on* exist outside of human consciousness, as objective reality or not? Naturalists will also have to answer this question without hesitation and constantly answer *yes*, as they without hesitation recognize the existence of nature before man and before organic matter. And this solves the question in favour of materialism, for the concept of matter, as we have already said, does not mean epistemologically *anything other* than: objective reality, existing independently of human consciousness and displayed by it. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op. Vol. XIII, pp. 213-214, ed. 3rd*)

## **Reasons for “Physical” Idealism**

The connection of modern “physical” idealism with the crisis of modern physics is universally recognized, as we have already indicated above. “The arguments of sceptical criticism against modern physics,” writes A. Rey, referring not so much to sceptics as direct proponents of fideism, like Brunetier, “come down, in essence, to the famous argument of all sceptics: to disagreement of opinions” (among physicists) But these differences “prove nothing against the objectivity of physics.” “In the history of physics, as in any history, large periods can be distinguished, which are characterized by a different form, a different general form of theories. As soon as one of those discoveries arrives that respond to all parts of physics, establishing some cardinal fact, unknown until then or not fully appreciated, the whole form of physics changes; a new period begins. So it was after the discoveries of Newton, after the discoveries of Joule-Meyer and Carnot-Clausius. The same happens, apparently, after the discovery of radioactivity... The historian, who will subsequently observe events from some necessary far away, can easily see the constancy of evolution where contemporaries see only conflicts, contradictions, a

split into different schools. Apparently, the crisis experienced by physics in these last years belongs to the same category (contrary to the conclusions made on the basis of this crisis by philosophical criticism). This is a typical crisis of growth (*crise de croissance*) caused by great new discoveries. It is indisputable that a crisis leads to a transformation of physics—without this there would be no evolution and progress—but it will not change the scientific spirit” (I. p., pp. 370-372). The same happens, apparently, after the discovery of radioactivity... The historian, who will subsequently observe events from some necessary far away, can easily see the constancy of evolution where contemporaries see only conflicts, contradictions, a split into different schools. Apparently, the crisis experienced by physics in these last years belongs to the same category (contrary to the conclusions made on the basis of this crisis by philosophical criticism). This is a typical crisis of growth (*crise de croissance*) caused by great new discoveries. It is indisputable that a crisis leads to a transformation of physics—without this there would be no evolution and progress—but it will not change the scientific spirit” (I. p., pp. 370-372). The same happens, apparently, after the discovery of radioactivity... The historian, who will subsequently observe events from some necessary far away, can easily see the constancy of evolution where contemporaries see only conflicts, contradictions, a split into different schools. Apparently, the crisis experienced by physics in these last years belongs to the same category (contrary to the conclusions made on the basis of this crisis by philosophical criticism). This is a typical crisis of growth (*crise de croissance*) caused by great new discoveries. It is indisputable that a crisis leads to a transformation of physics - without this there would be no evolution and progress—but it will not change the scientific spirit” (I. p., Pp. 370-372). Easily see the constancy of evolution where contemporaries see only conflicts, contradictions, a split into various schools. Apparently, the crisis experienced by physics in these last years belongs to the same category (contrary to the conclusions made on the basis of this crisis by philosophical criticism). This is a typical crisis of growth (*crise de croissance*) caused by great new discoveries. It is indisputable that a crisis leads to a transformation of physics - without this there would be no evolution and progress - but it will not change the scientific spirit “(I. p., Pp. 370-372). easily see the constancy of evolution where contemporaries see only conflicts, contradictions, a split into various schools. Apparently, the crisis experienced by physics in these last years belongs to the same

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Mediator Ray is trying to bring together all the schools of modern physics against fideism! This is a well-intentioned falsehood, but still false, for the deviation of the Mach–Poincaré–Pearson school towards idealism (or sophisticated fideism) is undeniable. And the objectivity of physics, which is connected with the foundations of the “scientific spirit”, in contrast to the fideist spirit, and which Rei so ardently defends, is nothing but a “bashful” formulation of materialism. The materialistic basic spirit of physics, as well as of all modern natural science, will conquer all and all kinds of crises, but only with the indispensable replacement of materialism by metaphysical dialectical materialism.

That the crisis of modern physics consists in retreating it from a direct, decisive and irrevocable recognition of the objective value of its theories, is that the conciliator Rey very often tries to obscure, but the facts are stronger than all conciliatory attempts. “Mathematicians,” writes Ray, “getting used to dealing with a science in which an object - at least, apparently - is created by the mind of a scientist or in which, in any case, concrete phenomena do not interfere with research, have made themselves too abstract about physics: trying to bring it closer to mathematics, they transferred the general theory of mathematics to physics... All experimenters point to the invasion of the spirit of mathematics in the methods of physical judgments and in the understanding of physics. Is it not this influence—which does not lose its strength from what is sometimes hidden—often explains uncertainty.

That is excellently said. The “reeling of thought” in the question of the objectivity of physics is the essence of the fashionable “physical” idealism.

“... The abstract fictions of mathematics created a kind of screen between physical reality and the way mathematicians understand the science of this reality. They vaguely feel the objectivity of physics... they want to be, first of all, objective, when they take up physics, they try to rely on reality and maintain this support, but old habits take their toll. And, down to the energy industry, which wanted to build a world more solidly and with fewer hypotheses than the old mechanical

physics,—sought to copy (décalquer) a sensual gift, rather than recreate it,—we are still dealing with theories of mathematicians... Mathematicians they did everything to save the objectivity of physics, because without objectivity—they understand this very well—there can be no question of physics... But the complexity of their theories, their workarounds leave them feeling awkward. It is too done, too elegant, composed (édifié); the experimenter does not find here the elemental trust that inspires him with constant contact with physical reality... That's what they say, in essence, all physicists, who are primarily physicists—and their name is legion—or who are only physicists, this is what the whole neo-mechanistic school says... The crisis of physics consists in the conquest of physics by the spirit of mathematics. The progress of physics, on the one hand, and the progress of mathematics, on the other, led to a close convergence of the two sciences... Theoretical physics became mathematical physics... Then the period of formal physics, i.e., mathematical physics, began to become purely mathematical, mathematical physics not as a branch of physics, but as a branch of mathematics. In this new phase of mathematics, accustomed to the conceptual (purely logical) elements that make up the only material of his work, and feeling constrained by the gross, material elements that he found insufficiently malleable, he could not help but strive to abstract as much as possible from them, to imagine them completely immaterial purely logical, or even completely ignore them. Elements, as real, objective data, i.e., as *physical* elements have disappeared completely. There are only formal relations represented by differential equations... If a mathematician is not fooled by this constructive work of his mind... then he will be able to find a connection between theoretical physics and experience, but at first glance it seems that for an unprepared person the construction of a theory... A concept, a pure concept, is replaced by real elements... This is explained historically, by virtue of the mathematical form adopted by theoretical physics,... malaise, the crisis of physics and its apparent distance from objective facts” (228- 32).

This is the first reason for the “physical” idealism. Reactionary creeps are generated by the very progress of science. The great success of natural science, the approach to such homogeneous and simple elements of matter, the laws of motion of which allow mathematical processing, generates oblivion of matter by mathematicians. “Matera disappears”, only equations remain. At the new stage of development and, supposedly, in a new way, the old Kantian idea is obtained: the mind prescribes laws to nature. German

Kogen, admiring, as we have seen, the idealistic spirit of new physics, comes to the point of preaching the introduction of higher mathematics in schools—for the sake of introducing the spirit of idealism supplanted by our materialistic era into the gymnasium (*Geschichte des Materialismus* von A. Lange, 5. Auflage, 1896, Bd. II, S. XLIX [Lange, A. “The History of Materialism.” 5th ed. 1896, vol. II, pp. XLIX.—*Ed.*]). Of course, this is the reactionary’s absurd dream and, in fact, there is not and cannot be anything but a passing enthusiasm for idealism in a small fraction of specialists. But it is highly characteristic of how a drowning man grabs a straw, by what sophisticated means the representatives of the educated bourgeoisie are trying to artificially save or find a place for fideism, which is generated in the lower classes of the masses by ignorance, clogging and ridiculous savagery of capitalist contradictions.

Another reason that gave rise to “physical” idealism is the principle of *relativism*, the relativity of our knowledge, a principle that is imposed on physicists with particular force during the period of steep breaking up of old theories and which, *in ignorance of dialectics*, inevitably leads to idealism.

This question of the relationship between relativism and dialectics is perhaps the most important in explaining the theoretical misadventures of Machism. For example, Ray, like all European positivists, has no idea about Marxist dialectics. He uses the word dialectics exclusively in the sense of idealistic philosophical speculation. Therefore, he, feeling that the new physics has gone astray on relativism, flounders helplessly, trying to distinguish between moderate and immoderate relativism. Of course, “immoderate relativism logically, if not in practice, borders on real scepticism” (215), but Poincare, you see, does not have this “immoderate” relativism. Just think, you can weigh a little more pharmacy—a little less relativism, and thereby fix the cause of Machism! (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, pp. 249-252, ed. 3rd*)

## **Lenin’s Criticism of the Idealism and Reactionary Nature of Bourgeois Naturalists**

The use of new physics by philosophical idealism or idealistic conclusions from it is not caused by the fact that new types of matter and force, matter and motion are discovered, but by the fact that an attempt is made to think of motion without matter. This Machinists, in essence, does not understand this attempt. To reckon with Engels's statement that "movement is *unthinkable* without matter, "they did not wish. I. Dietzgen back in 1869, in his *Essence of the Head Work*, expressed the same idea as Engels, though it was true not without his usual confused attempts to "reconcile" materialism with idealism. Let us leave aside these attempts, largely explained by the fact that Dietzgen is polemicizing with Buchner materialism, which is alien to dialectics, and look at Dietzgen's own statements on the issue of interest to us. "Idealists want," says Dietzgen, "a common without anything special, a spirit without matter, power without matter, science without experience, or without material absolute without relative" (*Das Wesen der menschlichen Kopfarbeit*, 1903, S. 108 ["The essence of the head the work of man", 1903, p. 108.—*Ed.*]). So, Dietzgen connects the desire to tear motion away from matter, the force from matter with idealism, and places next to the desire to tear thought from the brain. "Liebig," continues Dietzgen, "who loves to deviate from his inductive science towards philosophical speculation, says in the sense of idealism: forces cannot be seen" (109). "The spiritualist or idealist *believes* in a spiritual, that is, a ghostly, inexplicable being of power" (110). "The opposition between power and matter is as old as the opposition between idealism and materialism" (111). "Of course, there is no force without substance, there is no substance without force. A substance without force and force without substance is nonsense. If idealistic naturalists believe in the non-material existence of forces, then at this point they are not natural scientists, but ... spiritualists "(114).

We see from here that forty years ago, scientists also met, ready to admit the conceivability of motion without matter, and that Dietzgen declared them "at this point" as spirit men. What is the connection of philosophical idealism with the separation of matter from motion, with the elimination of matter from force? Is it not "more economical" to really think of motion without matter?

Imagine a consistent idealist who, let us assume, believes that the whole world is my sensation or my idea, etc. (if we take a "no-one" sensation or idea, only the kind of philosophical idealism will change, but not its essence will change). The idealist will not even think about denying that the world is a movement, namely: the movement of my

thoughts, ideas, sensations. The idealist rejects the question of what *is* moving and considers it absurd: there is a change in my feelings, ideas disappear and appear, and nothing more. There is nothing outside me. "Moving" —and the basta. More "economical" thinking cannot be imagined. And no evidence, syllogisms, definitions can not refute the solipsist, if he consistently holds his gaze.

The main difference between a materialist and a supporter of idealistic philosophy is that the sensation, perception, representation and general consciousness of a person is taken as an image of objective reality. The world is the movement of this objective reality, reflected by our consciousness. The movement of ideas, perceptions, etc., corresponds to the movement of matter outside of me. The concept of matter does not express anything other than the objective reality given to us in sensation. Therefore, tearing movement away from matter is tantamount to tearing thinking from objective reality, tearing my sensations from the outside world, that is, going over to the side of idealism. The trick that is usually done with the negation of matter, with the assumption of motion without matter, is that it is silent about the relation of matter to thought...

Matter has disappeared, they tell us, wanting to draw epistemological conclusions from here. But the thought remains? — we ask. If not, if the thought disappeared with the disappearance of matter, and the ideas and sensations disappeared with the disappearance of the brain and nervous system - then everything has disappeared, your reasoning has disappeared, as one of the examples of any "thoughts" (or thoughtlessness) ! If, yes, if thought (matter, perception, etc.) is supposed to not disappear when matter disappears, then you secretly moved to the point of view of philosophical idealism. This is precisely what always happens with people who, from "economy", want to think of motion without matter, for it is *tacit*, simply by the fact that they continue their argument, they recognize the existence of thought *after* disappearance of matter. And this means that a very simple or very complex philosophical idealism is taken as the basis: very simple, if the matter comes down openly to solipsism (I exist, the whole world is only *mine* sensation); very complex, if instead of a thought, presentation, sensation of a living person, a dead abstraction is taken: nobody's thought, nobody's idea, nobody's sensation, thought in general (absolute idea, universal will, etc.), sensation as an indefinite "element", "mental", Substituted for the whole physical nature, etc., etc.. Between the varieties of philosophical idealism, thousands of shades are possible and you can

always create a thousand and one shades and to the author such a thousand first systems (eg, empirio-monism),... From the point of view of materialism, these differences are completely insignificant. The starting point is significant. The essential thing is that an attempt to *think* motion without matter drags *thought* torn from matter, and this is philosophical idealism.

Therefore, for example, the English Machian Karl Pearson, the most clear, consistent, hostile verbal evasions Machist directly begins Chapter VII of his book devoted to “matter” to the section, which is the characteristic title: “*Some things are moving—but only in the concept of* (<All things move—but only in conception”). ”In relation to the field of perceptions, the idle question is (“ it is idle to ask), what is moving and why is it moving” (p. 243,” The Grammar of Science”).

Therefore, Bogdanov’s philosophical misadventures began actually before his acquaintance with Mach, and began when he believed the great chemist and the petty philosopher Ostwald that it is possible to think of motion without matter. It will be all the more appropriate to dwell on this long-past episode of Bogdanov’s philosophical development because Ostwald’s “energies” cannot be circumvented, speaking about the connection of philosophical idealism with certain trends in new physics.

“We already said,” Bogdanov wrote in 1899, “that the nineteenth century could not be completely resolved with the question of the unchanging essence of things. This essence plays a prominent role even in the worldview of the most advanced thinkers of the century under the name of “matter”... (“Main electronic history. Glance”, p. 38).

We said that this is confusion. The recognition of the objective reality of the external world, the recognition of the existence outside our consciousness of ever-moving and ever-changing matter, is mixed here with the recognition of the unchanging essence of things. We must not allow Bogdanov not to include Marx and Engels in 1899 among the “leading thinkers”. But he clearly did not understand dialectical materialism.

“... In the processes of nature, usually two sides are still distinguished: *matter* and its *motion*. This is not to say that the concept of “matter” was very clear. To the question, “what is matter?”—It is not easy to give a satisfactory answer. They define it as the “cause of sensations” or as “the constant possibility of sensations”; but it is obvious that matter here is mixed with motion...” (38).

Obviously, Bogdanov is reasoning incorrectly. Not only does he confuse the materialistic recognition of the objective source of sensations (the reason for sensations is unclearly formulated in words) with the agnostic Mille definition of matter as a constant *possibility of* sensations. The main mistake here is that the author, having come close to the question of the existence or non-existence of an objective source of sensation, throws this question halfway and jumps to another question about the existence or non-existence of matter without movement. The idealist can consider the world a *movement* our feelings (at least “organized socially” and “harmonized” to the highest degree); the materialist—by the movement of an objective source, an objective model of our sensations. A metaphysical, that is, anti-dialectical, materialist can accept the existence of matter (at least temporarily, before the “first push”, etc.) without movement. The dialectical materialist not only considers movement an inextricable property of matter, but also rejects a simplified view of movement, etc.

“... More precisely, perhaps it would be such a definition:” matter is that which moves “; but it is as empty as if we said: matter is the subject of the sentence, the predicate of which is “moving”. However, the point is, perhaps, that people in the age of statics are accustomed to seeing something solid, some kind of “object” in the role of the subject, and they agreed to endure such an uncomfortable thing for static thinking as “movement” only in as a predicate, one of the attributes of “matter” “(38-39).

This is already something like the Akimov accusation of the Iskra-ists that they do not have the word proletariat in the nominative case in the program! Whether to say: the world is moving matter or: the world is a material movement, this does not change the matter.

“... After all, energy must have a carrier!”—say the proponents of matter. —“And why? Ostwald asks reasonably.” Is nature obliged to consist of subject and predicate?” (p. 39).

Ostwald’s answer, which Bogdanov liked so much in 1899, is a simple sophism. Are our judgments, one might answer Ostwald, obliged to consist of electrons and ether? In fact, the mental elimination of matter as “subject” from “nature” means the tacit assumption of *thought* as “subject” (that is, as something primary, original, independent of matter) in *philosophy*. It is not the subject that is eliminated, but the objective source of sensation, and *sensation* becomes “subject”, that is, philosophy becomes Berkeley, no matter how later the word: sensation is

overloaded. Ostwald tried to avoid this inevitable philosophical alternative (materialism or idealism) through the indefinite use of the word “energy”, but it is his attempt that once again shows the futility of such tricks. If energy is movement, then you only moved the difficulty from the subject to the predicate, only redid the question: is matter moving? to the question: is material energy? Is there a transformation of energy outside of my mind, regardless of man and humanity, or is it just ideas, symbols, conventional signs, etc.? On this issue the “energy” philosophy broke its neck, this attempt to “cover up” old epistemological errors with “new” terminology.

Here are examples of how the energy engineer Ostwald got confused. In the preface to his Lectures on Natural Philosophy [*Wilhelm Ostwald*. “Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie”. 2. Aufl., Leipz. 1902, S. VIII.] He declares that he considers “a huge gain if the old difficulty: how to combine the concepts of matter and spirit—will be simply and naturally eliminated by bringing both of these concepts under the concept of energy.” This is not a gain, but a loss, for the question of whether to conduct epistemological research (Ostwald does not clearly realize that he poses the epistemological, not the chemical question!) In a materialistic or idealistic direction, is not solved, but is confused by the arbitrary use of the word “energy”. Of course, if you “bring” matter and spirit to this concept, then *verbal* the annihilation of the opposite is undoubted, but the absurdity of the doctrine of wood goblin and brownies will not disappear from what we call it “energy.” On page 394 of Ostwald’s Lectures, we read: “That all external phenomena can be depicted as processes between energies, this circumstance is most easily explained by the fact that it is the processes of our consciousness that are themselves energetic and transmit their own property (aufprägen) to all external experiments”. This is pure idealism: not our thought reflects the transformation of energy in the outside world, but the outside world reflects the “property” of our consciousness! The American philosopher Hibben very aptly says, pointing to this and other similar passages in Ostwald lectures that Ostwald “appears here in the dress Kantian”: explainable phenomena of the external world is deduced from the properties of our mind [*J. Gr. Hibben*. “The Theory of Energetics and its Philosophical Bearings.” *The Monist*, vol. XIII, 1903. April p. 329-330. (*Hibben, J.* “Energy Theory and Its Place in Philosophy.” “*Monist*,” vol. XIII, 1903, April.—*Ed.*.)]! “Obviously,” says Hibben, “that if we define the initial concept of energy in such a way that it also includes psychic phenomena, then this will not be that simple concept of

energy that is recognized in the scientific community or even by the power engineers themselves.” The transformation of energy is considered by natural science as an objective process, independent of human consciousness and the experience of mankind, i.e., it is considered materialistically. And in Ostwald himself, in a mass of cases, even probably in the vast majority of cases, energy means a *material* movement.

Therefore, such an original phenomenon happened that Ostwald’s student, Bogdanov, who became Mach’s student, began to blame Ostwald not for not consistently maintaining a materialistic view of energy, but for allowing (sometimes even laying the foundation) on a materialistic view for energy. Materialists criticize Ostwald for falling into idealism, for trying to reconcile materialism with idealism. Bogdanov criticizes Ostwald from an *idealistic* point of view: “... Ostwald’s energy “, hostile to atomism, but otherwise very related to the old materialism,” wrote Bogdanov in 1906, “attracted my hottest sympathies. Soon, however, I noticed an important contradiction of his “natural philosophy”: emphasizing many times the *purely methodological* the meaning of the concept: “energy” - he himself in most cases does not withstand it.” Energy” from a pure symbol of the relationship between the facts of experience, he now and then turns into the *substance* of experience, into the “matter of the world” ... (“Emp.”, Prince III, pp. XVI - XVII).

Energy is a pure symbol! After this, Bogdanov can argue arbitrarily with the “empiriosymbolist” Yushkevich, with the “pure Machians”, empirio-critics, etc. — from the point of view of materialists, this will be a dispute between a person who believes in the yellow line and a person who believes in the green line. For it is not the differences between Bogdanov and other Machians that are important, but what they have in common: an *idealistic* interpretation of “experience” and “energy”, a denial of objective reality, in adaptation to which is human experience, in the picture of which the only scientific “methodology” consists and scientific “energy”.

“The material of the world for her (Ostwald’s energetics) is indifferent; old materialism and panpsychism are completely compatible with it “(XVII)...—that is, philosophical idealism? And Bogdanov went *from* confused energy *not* along the materialistic, *but on the idealistic* path ... “When” energy “is presented as a substance, this is nothing more than old materialism minus absolute atoms—materialism corrected in the sense of *continuity of the existing*” (ibid.). Yes, from the “old” materialism, that is, the metaphysical

materialism of the naturalists, Bogdanov did not go to *dialectical* materialism, which in 1906 he did not understand as well as in 1899, but to idealism and fideism, for against the “methodological” concept of energy, against its interpretation as a “pure symbol of the relationship between the facts of experience”, not one educated the representative of modern fideism, not a single immanent, not a single “neo-criticist”, etc. will not object. Take P. Karus, whose physiognomy we met enough above, and you will see that this Machist criticizes Ostwald in a *completely* Bogdanian way: “Materialism and energy,” writes Carus, “certainly belong to the same category” (The Monist, vol. XVII, 1907, No. 4, p. 536). “Materialism enlightens us very little when it tells us that everything is matter, that bodies are matter, and that thought is only a function of matter, and energy is prof. Ostwald is no better, since he tells us that matter is energy, and that the soul is only an energy factor” (533).

Ostwald’s energy is a good example of how quickly the “new” terminology becomes fashionable and how quickly it turns out that a slightly modified way of expression does not eliminate the basic philosophical issues and main philosophical trends. In terms of “energy” one can also express materialism and idealism (more or less consistently, of course), as well as in terms of “experience”, etc. Energy physics is the source of new idealistic attempts to think of motion without matter - on the occasion of decomposition considered to be indecomposable particles of matter and the discovery of hitherto unseen forms of material motion. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol. XIII . p. 218-224, ed. 3rd.* )

## **Partisanship of Science**

Another German idealist, far more reactionary than Cohen’s shade, Eduard von Hartmann, devoted an entire book to the “Worldview of Modern Physics” (Die Weltanschauung der modernen Physik, Lpz. 1902). We are not interested, of course, in the author’s special reasoning about the kind of idealism that he advocates. It is important for us only to indicate that this idealist also ascertains the same phenomena that were ascertained by Ray, and Ward, and Cohen. “Modern physics grew up on realistic grounds,” says E. Hartman, “and only the New Kantian and agnostic course of our era led to the fact that the final results of physics began to be interpreted

in an idealistic sense” (218). Three epistemological systems, according to E. Hartmann, underlie modern physics: hylokinetics (from the Greek words *hyle* = matter and *kinesis* = motion, i.e. recognition of physical phenomena by the movement of matter), energy and dynamism (i.e., recognition of force without matter). It is clear that the idealist Hartmann defends “dynamism”, deduces from this that the laws of nature are world thought, in a word, “substitutes” the psychic for physical nature. But he is forced to admit that most physicists have on their side that this system is “most often used” (190), that its serious drawback is “materialism and atheism threatening pure hylokinetics” (189). The author considers the energy quite rightly, as an intermediate system, and calls it agnosticism (136). Of course, she is “an ally of pure dynamism, for it eliminates matter” (S. VI, p. 192), but her agnosticism does not like Hartmann, like some “Anglomania”,

It is extremely instructive to see how this party-irreconcilable idealist (non-partisan people in philosophy are just as hopeless dumbasses as in politics) explains to physicists that this actually means following a particular epistemological line. ”The smallest part of those physicists who are doing this fashion,” Hartmann writes of an idealistic interpretation of the latest results of physics, “fully recognize the full significance and all the consequences of such an interpretation. They did not notice that physics, with its special laws, only insofar as it retained independent significance, since physicists, in spite of their idealism, held to *realistic* the basic premises, namely: the existence of things in themselves, their real variability in time, real causality ... Only under these realistic premises (the transcendental meaning of causality, time, space with three dimensions), that is, only under the condition that nature , the laws of which physicists speak, coincides with the realm of things in themselves ... we can talk about the laws of nature in contrast to psychological laws. Only if the laws of nature act in a field independent of our thinking can they serve as an explanation for the fact that the logically necessary conclusions from our images turn out to be images of the naturally-historical-necessary results of the unknown that these images reflect or symbolize in our consciousness “(218- 19).

Hartmann correctly feels that the idealism of the new physics is precisely *fashion*, and not a serious philosophical turn away from natural-historical materialism, and therefore he correctly explains to physicists that in order to turn “fashion” into a consistent, integral,

philosophical idealism, the doctrine of objective the reality of time, space, causality and the laws of nature.

It is impossible to consider only atoms, electrons, ether as a simple symbol, a simple “working hypothesis”—it is necessary to declare time, space, the laws of nature, and the whole external world as a “working hypothesis”. Either materialism, or the universal substitution of the psychic for the whole physical nature; to mix these two crafts is the darkness of hunters, but Bogdanov and I are not among them. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, pp. 233–235, 3rd ed.*)

## **The Development of Physics Confirms the Correctness of the Marxist Separation of the Two Directions in Philosophy**

Across the entire composition of A. Ray, the recognition that the *fideism* (p. 11, 17, 220, 362 and others) and “*philosophical idealism*” (200), scepticism seized upon the new theory of physics of “conceptualists” (Machists) regarding the rights of reason and the rights of science (210, 220), subjectivity (311), etc. And therefore, A. Rey takes the *centre* of his work quite correctly the analysis of “the views of physicists regarding the objective value of physics” (3).

What are the results of this analysis?

We take the basic concept, the concept of experience. Ray assures us that Mach’s subjective interpretation (we will take it for simplicity and brevity as a representative of the school that Ray calls conceptualist) is one misunderstanding. True, one of the “main new features of the philosophy of the end of the 19th century” is that “empiricism, more subtle, increasingly rich in shades, leads to fideism, to the recognition of the supremacy of faith—empiricism, which was once a great weapon in the struggle of scepticism against statements of metaphysics. Did this not happen because, essentially, by imperceptible nuances, they gradually distorted the real meaning of the word “experience”? In fact, experience, if we take it in its conditions of existence, in the experimental science that defines it and polishes it, experience leads us to necessity and to truth” (398). There is no doubt that all Machism, in the broad sense of the word, there is nothing more than a perversion by imperceptible nuances of the real meaning of the word “experience”! But how does Rey correct this

perversion, accusing only the fideists of perversion, and not Mach himself? Listen: “Experience, by the usual definition, is cognition of an object. In physical science, this definition is more appropriate than anywhere else ... Experience is that over which our mind is not in control, that our desires cannot change, our will, that which is given, which we do not create. Experience is an object in front of (en face du) subject “(314). than anywhere else ... Experience is that over which our mind is not in control, that our desires cannot change, our will, that which is given, that we do not create. Experience is an object in front of (en face du) subject “(314). than anywhere else ... Experience is that over which our mind is not in control, that our desires cannot change, our will, that which is given, that which we do not create. Experience is an object in front of (en face du) subject” (314).

Here is an example of the defence of Machism Reem! How brilliantly perspicacious was Engels, who described the newest type of supporters of philosophical agnosticism and phenomenism with the nickname: “bashful materialists.” A positivist and ardent phenomenalist, Ray is an excellent specimen of this type. If experience is “cognition of an object”, if “experience is an object before a subject”, if experience is that “something external (quelque chose du dehors) exists and exists necessary” (se pose et en se posant s’impose, p 324),—this, obviously, comes down to materialism! Ray’s phenomenism, its most earnest emphasis, that there is nothing but sensations that the objective is universally significant, etc., etc., is all a fig leaf, an empty verbal cover for materialism, since we are told:

“Objectively, that which is given to us from without is imposed (imposé) by experience; that which we do not produce, that which is produced independently of us, and that to some extent produces us “(320). Ray defends “conceptualism” by destroying conceptualism! The refutation of idealistic conclusions from Machism is achieved only by the fact that Machism is interpreted in the sense of bashful materialism. Recognizing the very difference between the two directions in modern physics, Ray works with the sweat of his face to erase all the differences in favour of the materialistic direction. For example, with respect to the school of neo-mechanism, Rey says that she does not allow “the slightest doubt or the slightest uncertainty” regarding the objectivity of physics (237): “here (that is, on the basis of the teachings of this school) you are far from all those workarounds that you were forced to go through in terms of other theories of physics,

It is these “workarounds” of Machism that Ray covers up, fleur throws at them in all his exposition. The main feature of materialism is precisely that it *proceeds* from the objectivity of science, from the recognition of objective reality reflected by science, while idealism *needs* “workarounds” to “derive” objectivity one way or another from the spirit, consciousness, from the “psychic”. “A neo-mechanistic (that is, dominant) school in physics,” writes Rey, “*believes in the reality of physical theory in the same sense that humanity believes in the reality of the outside world*” (p. 234, §22: thesis). For this school, “theory wants to be a picture (le decalque) from an object” (235).

Fair. And this basic feature of the “neo-mechanistic” school is nothing but the basis of *materialistic* epistemology. No Ray’s denial of the materialists, no assurances of him that the neo-mechanists, in essence, phenomenologists, etc., can weaken this fundamental fact. The essence of the distinction between neo-mechanists (materialists more or less bashful) and Machians lies in the fact that the latter *depart* from such a theory of knowledge and, departing from it, inevitably *stumble* into fideism.

Take Ray’s attitude to Mach’s teachings on the causality and necessity of nature. Only at first glance, Rey assures, does Mach “approach scepticism” (76) and “subjectivism” (76); this “ambiguity” (equivocal, p. 115) is dispelled, if we take Mach’s teaching as a whole. And Ray takes it as a whole, gives a series of quotes from both the Doctrine of Warmth and the Analysis of Feelings, specifically dwells on the chapter on causality in the first of the above-mentioned works, but ... *but beware of citing a decisive place, Mach’s statement, that there is no physical need, but only logical!* One can only say to this that this is not an interpretation, but a tinting of Mach, that this is an erasure of the differences between the “neo-mechanism” and Machism. Ray’s conclusion: “Mach continues the analysis and accepts the conclusions of Hume, Mill, and all the phenomenologists, according to whom causality has nothing *substantial* in itself, and is only a habit of thinking. Mach accepts the basic thesis of phenomenology, in relation to which the doctrine of causality is a simple consequence, namely: that there is nothing but sensations. But Mach adds in a purely objectivist direction: science, exploring sensations, finds in them constant and common elements that, abstracted from sensations, have the same reality as they are, for they are drawn from sensations through sensory observation. And these constant and general

elements, such as: energy and its transformations, constitute the basis for the systematization of physics” (117).

It turns out that Mach accepts Hume’s subjective theory of causality and interprets it in an objectivist sense! Ray dodges, defending Mach with references to his inconsistency and leading to the fact that in a “real” interpretation of experience this experience leads to “necessity.” And experience is that which is given from without, and if the necessity of nature, its laws are also given from outside to man, from objective-real nature, then, of course, any difference between Machism and materialism disappears. Rey defends Machism from “neo-mechanism” by surrendering to the latter along the entire line, upholding the word phenomenism, and not the essence of this trend.

Poincare, for example, in the spirit of Mach, derives the laws of nature—to the extent that space has three dimensions—from “convenience.” But this does not mean at all: “arbitrary”, in a hurry to “fix” *Rei*. No, “convenient” here expresses “*adaptation to the object*” (Italics Rey, p. 196). Needless to say, the magnificent distinction between the two schools and the “refutation” of materialism ... “If the Poincare theory is separated by a logically inextricable abyss from the ontological interpretation of the mechanistic school” (that is, from the recognition of this school that the theory is a snapshot from the object) ... “ while Poincare’s theory is capable of supporting philosophical idealism, then, at least on the basis of science, it agrees very well with the general development of the ideas of classical physics, with the tendency to regard physics as objective knowledge, as objective as it is about torture, that is, as sensations from which experience emanates “(200).

On the one hand, one cannot help but confess; on the other hand, I must admit. On the one hand, an impenetrable gulf separates Poincare from the neo-mechanism, although Poincare is *in the middle* between Mach’s “conceptualism” and neo-mechanism, and Mach is as if not at all separated by such a chasm from neo-mechanism. On the other hand, Poincaré is quite consistent with classical physics, entirely, according to Ray himself, who stands on the point of view of the “mechanism”. On the one hand, Poincare’s theory can serve as a pillar of philosophical idealism, on the other hand, it is compatible with the objective interpretation of the word experience. On the one hand, these evil fideists perverted the meaning of the word experience by imperceptible deviations, departing from the correct view that “experience is an object”; on the other hand, the objectivity of

experience only means that experience is sensation—with which both Berkeley and Fichte completely agree!

Ray got confused because he set himself the insoluble task: to “reconcile” the opposite of the materialistic and idealistic schools in the new physics. He is trying to weaken the materialism of the neo-mechanistic school by bringing phenomenalism to the point of view of physicists who consider their theory to be a photograph from the object [The “Mediator” A. Rey not only threw Fleur into posing the question as philosophical materialism, but also bypassed the most pronounced materialistic statements of French physicists. He did not mention, for example, Alfred Cornu (A. Cornu), who died in 1902. This physicist met the Ostwald “destruction (or overcoming of the Ueberwindung) of scientific materialism” with a scornful remark about the pretentious feuilletton interpretation of the issue (see *Revue générale des sciences* 1895, p. 1030-1). (“Universal Scientific Review” 1895, p. 1030-1. —*Ed.* ). At the International Congress of Physicists in Paris in 1900, A. Cornu said: “... The more we learn about the phenomena of nature, the more the bold Cartesian view of the mechanism of the world develops and more precisely: in the physical world there is nothing but matter and motion. The problem of the unity of physical forces ... again comes to the fore after the great discoveries that marked the end of the 19th century. The main attention of our modern leaders of science—Faraday, Maxwell, Hertz (if we only talk about the deceased already famous physicists) —is aimed at more accurately determining the nature and guessing the property of *weightless matter*(*matière Subtile*), the bearer of world energy ... A return to Cartesian ideas is obvious ... (Rapports présentés au Congrès International de Physique, P. 1900, t. 4-me, p. 7). (“Papers Read at the International Congress on Physics.” Paris 1900, v. IV, p. 7.—*Ed.* ) Lucien Poincaré in his book on “Modern Physics” rightly notes that this Cartesian idea was accepted and developed by encyclopaedists XVIII century (Lucien Poincaré “La physique moderne”, P. 1906, p. 14), but neither this physicist nor A. Cornu know how the dialectical materialists Marx and Engels cleared this basic premise of materialism from the one-sidedness of *mechanical* materialism.]. And he is trying to weaken the idealism of the conceptualist school, cutting off the most resolute statements of its supporters and interpreting the rest in the sense of bashful materialism. To what extent is fictitious at the same time, the tortured denial of Ray from materialism, shows, for example, his assessment of the theoretical value of the differential equations of Maxwell and

Hertz. For the Machians, the fact that these physicists limit their theory to a system of equations is a refutation of materialism: equations - and that's it, no matter, no objective reality, just symbols. Boltzmann refutes this view, realizing that he refutes the phenomenological physics. Ray refutes it, thinking of defending phenomenalism! "You can't refuse," he says, "from reckoning Maxwell and Hertz to "mechanists "on the grounds that they limited themselves to equations, similar differential equations in Lagrange dynamics. This does not mean that, according to Maxwell and Hertz, we will not be able to build a mechanical theory of electricity on real elements. On the contrary, the possibility of this is proved by the fact that electrical phenomena are presented by a theory whose form is identical with the general form of classical mechanics "(253) ... Uncertainty in the current solution to the problem" will decrease as it more accurately emerges *the nature of* those quantitative units, that is, the elements that enter into the equations. "The unexplored nature of various forms of material movement is not a reason for Rey to deny the materiality of the movement. "Homogeneity of matter" (262), - not as a postulate, but as a result of the experience and development of science, "homogeneity of the object of physics" —that is the condition for the applicability of measurements and mathematical calculations.

Here is Reem's assessment of the criterion of practice in the theory of knowledge: "In contrast to the premises of scepticism, we have the right to say that practical value stems from its theoretical value" (368) ... That these premises of scepticism were completely unequivocally accepted by Mach, Poincare and all of them at school, Ray prefers to remain silent ... "Both of these values are two inextricable and strictly parallel sides of its objective value. To say that a given law of nature has practical value, ... boils down to essentially saying that this law of nature has an objective value ... Impact on an object involves a change in the object, the reaction of the object in accordance with our expectations or predictions, on the basis of which we have taken this action. Therefore, these expectations or these foresights contain elements *controlled by the* object and our action ... In these various theories there is, therefore, a part of the objective" (368). This is a completely materialistic and only materialistic theory of knowledge, for other points of view and Machism in particular deny the objective, that is, independent of man and humanity, the value of the criterion of practice.

Result: Rey approached the question is not on the same side as the Ward, Cohen and Co., but the results and it turned out the same,

— the recognition of the materialist and idealist trends, as a basis for separation of the two main schools of modern physics. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-criticism, vol. XIII , 240-245, ed. 3rd.*)

## **Machism is a Kind of Idealism**

We have seen that the question of epistemological conclusions from modern physics has been raised and is discussed from a wide variety of points of view in English, German, and French literature. There can be no doubt that we are faced with a certain international ideological trend, independent of any one philosophical system, but arising from some general reasons that lie outside of philosophy. The above review of the data undoubtedly shows that Machism is “connected” with the new physics, and at the same time it *fundamentally* shows a *wrong* idea about this connection, spread by our Machists. In both philosophy and physics, Machists slavishly weave after *fashion*, not being able, from their own, Marxist point of view, to give a general overview of known trends and evaluate their place.

The double falsehood pervades all the rantings on the theme that Mach’s philosophy is “the philosophy of natural science of the 20th century”, “the latest philosophy of the natural sciences”, “the latest natural science positivism”, etc. (Bogdanov in the introduction to the “Analysis of sensations”, with IV, XII; Wed same Yushkevich, Valentinov and Co.). Firstly, Machism is ideologically connected with only *one* school in *one* branch of modern natural science. Secondly, and *this is the main thing*, *what* is connected with this school in Machism is *not what distinguishes it from all other directions and systems of idealistic philosophy, but that it is common to it with all philosophical idealism in general*. It is enough to cast a glance at the entire ideological trend under consideration *as a whole* so that the shadow of doubt about the correctness of this situation could not remain. Take the physicists of this school: the German Mach, the Frenchman Henri Poincare, the Belgian P. Duhem, the Englishman K. Pearson. There is a lot in common between them, they have one basis and one direction, as each of them quite rightly admits, but neither the doctrine of empirio-criticism in general, nor Mach’s doctrine at least about “elements of the world” in particular are included in this general. The three last physicists do not even know either

teaching. There is “only” one thing in common between them: philosophical idealism, to which they all, without exception, *tend* more or less consciously, more or less decisively. Take philosophers who rely on *this school* they are trying to gnoseologically substantiate and develop it, and here again you will see German immanentists, Mach’s students, French neo-critics and idealists, English spiritualists, Russian Lopatin, plus the only empirio-*monist* A. Bogdanov. There is only one thing in common between all of them, namely, that they are more or less consciously, more or less decisively, whether with a steep and hasty bias towards fideism or with personal aversion to it (A. Bogdanov), they pursue philosophical idealism.

The main idea of the school of new physics under consideration is the denial of the objective reality given to us in sensation and reflected by our theories, or doubt the existence of such a reality. Here this school departs from the prevailing, *admittedly*, among physicists of *materialism* (inaccurately called realism, neo-mechanism, gylokinetics and not consciously developed by physicists themselves), - departs as a school of “physical” idealism.

To explain this last term, which sounds very strange, it is necessary to recall one episode from the history of modern philosophy and modern natural science. In 1866, L. Feuerbach attacked Johann Müller, the famous founder of modern physiology, and ranked him as “physiological idealists” (Werke, X, S. 197). The idealism of this physiologist was that, exploring the significance of the mechanism of our sensory organs in relation to sensations, indicating, for example, that a sensation of light is obtained by various kinds of exposure to the eye, he was inclined to deduce from this the denial that our sensations are images objective reality. This tendency of one school of natural scientists towards “physiological idealism”, that is, towards an idealistic interpretation of the known results of physiology, L. Feuerbach grasped extremely accurately. The “connection” of physiology with philosophical idealism, mainly of the Kantian sense, was then exploited for a long time by reactionary philosophy. F. A. Lange trumped physiology in favour of Kantian idealism and a refutation of materialism, and of the immanentists (whom A. Bogdanov so wrongly attributed to the middle line between Mach and Kant) I. Remke specifically turned up against the alleged confirmation of the physiology of Kantianism [*Johannes Rehmke*, Philosophie und Kantianismus, Eisonach 1882, S. 15 et seq. ( *Remke, I.*, “Philosophy and Kantianism.” Eisenach, 1882, p. 15. - *Ed .*)]. That a number of

major physiologists *bent* at the time of idealism and Kantianism is as indisputable as the indisputable fact that a number of prominent physicists *oppression* in our time to philosophical idealism. "Physical" idealism, that is, the idealism of the well-known school of physicists at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, "refutes" materialism just as little, just as little proves the connection between idealism (or empirio-criticism) and natural science, how little the corresponding attempts of F. A. Lange and the "physiological" idealists. The bias towards reactionary philosophy, which was revealed in both cases by one school of natural scientists in one branch of natural science, has a temporary zigzag, a passing painful period in the history of science, a growth illness caused most of all by a *sharp breakdown* of old established concepts. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, p. 247-249, 3rd ed.*)

## **Description of the Philosophical Struggle over the Conclusions from the New Physics**

To show specifically the philosophical struggle that has flared up in modern literature over certain conclusions from new physics, we will give the floor to the direct participants in the "battle" and start with the British. The physicist Arthur W. Ricker defends one direction - from the point of view of a natural scientist; philosopher James Ward is different - from the point of view of epistemology.

At the congress of British naturalists in Glasgow in 1901, the president of the physical section A.W. Ricker chose the topic of his speech as a question about the value of physical theory, about the doubts that the existence of atoms and ether in particular was subjected to. The speaker referred to the physicists Poincaré and Meeting, who raised this issue (English-minded Symbolists or Machists), to the philosopher Ward, to the famous book of E. Haeckel and tried to give an account of his views [The British Association at Glasgow, 1901. Presidential Address by Prof. Arthur W. Rucker in *The Scientific American Supplement*, 1901, No. 1345 and 1346. (Congress of the British Association in Glasgow. 1901. Chairperson, Prof. A. W. Ricker, *American Science Supplement*, 1901, No. 1345 and 1346.—*Ed.*)].

“The debatable question is,” said Ricker, “should those hypotheses that underlie the most common scientific theories be considered as an accurate description of the structure of the world that surrounds us, or just as convenient fictions.” (In terms of our controversy with Bogdanov, Yushkevich and Co.: Is it a copy from objective reality, from moving matter, or just “methodology”, “pure symbol”, “forms of organization of experience?”). Ricker agrees that there may be practically no difference between the two theories: the direction of the river can perhaps be determined by one who only considers the blue bar on a map or diagram, as well as one who knows that this bar really represents the river. The theory, from the point of view of convenient fiction, will be “a relief of memory”, “bringing order” into our observations, matching them with some artificial system, “regulating our knowledge”, summarizing it into equations, etc. One can limit oneself to, for example that heat is a form of motion or energy, “thus replacing the living picture of moving atoms with a pale (colourless) statement of thermal energy, the real nature of which we are not trying to determine. “Fully recognizing the possibility of major scientific successes along this path, Ricker “dares to assert that such a system of tactics cannot be regarded as the last word of science in the struggle for truth.” The question remains in force: “can we conclude from the phenomena discovered by matter to the structure of matter itself?” “Do we have reason to believe that the outline of the theory that science has already given is to some extent a copy, and not a simple diagram of the truth”?

Parsing the question of the structure of matter, Ricker takes air as an example, says that air consists of gases and that science decomposes “every elementary gas into a mixture of atoms and ether.” Here, “he continues,” they shout to us: “Stop!” Molecules and atoms cannot be seen; they may be suitable as “simple concepts”, but they cannot be regarded as realities. Ricker eliminates this objection by referring to one of the countless masses of cases in the development of science: the rings of Saturn appear to be a continuous mass through the telescope. Mathematicians proved by calculation that this was not possible, and spectral analysis confirmed the conclusions drawn from the calculations. Another objection: such properties are attributed to atoms and ether that our senses do not show us in ordinary matter. Ricker also eliminates it, citing such examples, like diffusion of gases and liquids, etc. A number of facts, observations, and experiments prove that matter consists of individual particles or grains. The question of whether these particles and atoms

are different from the “initial medium”, the “basic medium” surrounding them (the ether), or whether they are parts of this medium that are in a special state, remains open so far without affecting the theory of the existence of atoms. There is no reason to deny a priori, against the indications of experience, the existence of “quasi-material substances” other than ordinary matter (atoms and ether). Errors in particulars are inevitable here, but the entire body of scientific data leaves no room for doubt in the existence of atoms and molecules. The “main environment” surrounding them (the ether), or they are parts of this environment that are in a special state, remains open so far without affecting the theory of the existence of atoms. There is no reason to deny a priori, against the indications of experience, the existence of “quasi-material substances” other than ordinary matter (atoms and ether). Errors in particulars are inevitable here, but the entire body of scientific data leaves no room for doubt in the existence of atoms and molecules. The “main environment” surrounding them (the ether), or they are parts of this environment that are in a special state, remains open so far without affecting the theory of the existence of atoms. There is no reason to deny a priori, against the indications of experience, the existence of “quasi-material substances” other than ordinary matter (atoms and ether). Errors in particulars are inevitable here, but the entire body of scientific data leaves no room for doubt in the existence of atoms and molecules.

Ricker then points to new data on the structure of atoms from corpuscles (Taurus, electrons) charged with negative electricity, and notes the similarity of the results of various experiments and calculations regarding the size of the molecules: the “first approximation” gives a diameter of about 100 nanometres (millionths of a millimetre). Passing Ricker’s private remarks and his criticism of neovitalism, we cite his conclusions:

“Those who belittle the ideas that have guided the progress of scientific theory so far too often accept that there is no choice but two opposing statements: either that atom and ether are simple fictions of scientific imagination, or that the mechanical theory of atoms and ether is now it is not completed, but if it could be completed, it gives us a complete and perfectly accurate idea of realities. In my opinion, there is a middle way.” A person in a dark room can very clearly distinguish objects, but if he does not stumble on furniture and does not go in the mirror, like in a door, then he means that he sees something correctly. Therefore, we do not need to either give up claims to penetrate deeper than the surface of nature, or pretend that

we have already torn all veils of mystery from the world around us. "I can agree that we have not yet made ourselves a completely complete picture of either the nature of atoms or the nature of the ether in which they exist; but I tried to show that, despite the approximate (tentative, literally: groping) nature of some of our theories, despite many particular difficulties, the theory of atoms... is fundamentally true; that atoms are not only auxiliary concepts (aids) for mathematicians (puzzled mathematicians), but physical realities."

So Ricker ended his speech. The reader sees that he did not engage in epistemology, but on the merits of the matter, on behalf of the masses of scientists, of course, he defended the spontaneously materialistic point of view. The essence of his position: the theory of physics is a snapshot (more and more accurate) from objective reality. The world is moving matter, which we know more and more deeply. The inaccuracies of Ricker's philosophy stem from the optional defence of the "mechanical" (why not electromagnetic?) Theory of ether movements and from a misunderstanding of the relationship between relative and absolute truth. This physicist lacks *only* knowledge of *dialectical* materialism (except, of course, for those very important everyday considerations that make English professors call themselves "agnostics").

Let us now see how the spiritualist James Ward criticized this philosophy. "... Naturalism is not a science," he wrote, "and the mechanical theory of nature, which serves as the basis for it, is also not a science ... But although naturalism and natural science, the mechanical theory of the world and mechanics, as science, are logically different things, but at first look they are very similar to each other and historically closely related. There is no danger that natural science and philosophy are mixed up in an idealistic or spiritualistic direction, for such a philosophy necessarily includes criticism of the epistemological premises that science makes unconsciously"... [James Ward, "Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. I, 1906, p. 303. (Ward J., Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. I, 1906, p. 303.—Ed.)] True! Natural science *unconsciously* accepts that his teaching reflects objective reality, and *only* such a philosophy is reconciled with natural science! "... The situation is different with naturalism, which is as innocent in the theory of knowledge as science itself. In fact, naturalism, like materialism, is simply physics, interpreted as metaphysics... Naturalism is less dogmatic than materialism, no doubt, because it makes agnostic reservations about the nature of the latter

reality; but he insists emphatically on the primacy of the material side of this unknowable... “(303).

The materialist interprets physics as metaphysics. A familiar argument! Metaphysics is the recognition of objective reality outside of man: spiritualists converge with Kantians and Humeans in such defiance of materialism. It is understandable: without eliminating the *objective* reality of each and every known thing, body, object, you cannot clear the way for “real concepts” in the spirit of Remke! ..

“... When the question, essentially philosophical, arises, how best to systematize experience as a whole” (plagiarism by Bogdanov, Mr. Ward!), “Then the naturalist ... states that we must start from the physical side. Only these facts are accurate, definite and strictly related; every thought that worried a person’s heart ... can, we are told, be reduced to a completely accurate redistribution of matter and motion “(303-304).” That statements of such philosophical significance and such breadth are legal conclusions from physical science” (that is, natural sciences), “this is not decided directly by modern physicists. But many of them consider undermining the importance of science of those who seek to reveal the secret metaphysics, to expose the physical realism on which the mechanical theory of the world rests ...” (304). So de looked at my philosophy and Ricker.”... In fact, my criticism “(of this “metaphysics”, which is hateful to all Machians)” is based entirely on the conclusions of the school of physicists, if I may call it that, growing in number and expanding its influence, a school that rejects this almost medieval realism ... This realism for so long I have not met with objections that rebellion against him is equated with the proclamation of scientific anarchy. Meanwhile, it would be truly extravagant to suspect people like Kirchhoff and Poincaré—I will name only two big names out of many—that they want to “undermine the importance of science” ... “To separate them from the old school, which we have the right to called physical realists, we can call the new school physical symbolists. This term is not entirely successful, but it at least emphasizes one significant difference between the two schools, which is of particular interest to us at this time. The contentious issue is very simple. Both schools proceed, of course, from the same perceptual experience; both use abstract systems of concepts, differing in particulars, but identical in essence; both resort to the same methods of testing theories. But one believes that she is getting closer and closer to the last reality and is leaving behind more and more appearances. The other believes that she substitutes (is substituting)

generalized descriptive schemes, suitable for intellectual operations, under complex concrete facts ... On neither side is the value of physics as a systematic knowledge both resort to the same methods of testing theories. But one believes that she is getting closer and closer to the last reality and is leaving behind more and more appearances. The other believes that she substitutes (is substituting) generalized descriptive schemes, suitable for intellectual operations, under complex concrete facts ... On neither side is the value of physics as a systematic knowledge both resort to the same methods of testing theories. But one believes that she is getting closer and closer to the last reality and is leaving behind more and more appearances. The other believes that she substitutes (is substituting) generalized descriptive schemes, suitable for intellectual operations, under complex concrete facts ... On neither side is the value of physics as a systematic knowledge *about* (italics Ward) things; the possibility of further development of physics and its practical applications is the same in both cases. But the philosophical (speculative) difference between the two schools is enormous, and in this respect the question of which of them is right is gaining importance"... (304- 05).

The question posed by a frank and consistent spiritualist is remarkably true and clear. Indeed, the difference between the two schools in modern physics is *only* philosophical, only epistemological. Indeed, the main difference is *only* that one recognizes the "last" (it was necessary to say: objective) reality, reflected by our theory, and the other denies this, considering the theory only a systematization of experience, a system of empiriosymbols, etc., etc. New physics, finding new ones types of matter and new forms of its motion, posed old philosophical questions on the occasion of the breakdown of old physical concepts. And if people of "average" philosophical trends ("positivists", Humeans, Machists) are not able to clearly raise a controversial issue, then the open idealist Ward dropped all the covers. "... Ricker devoted his presidential address to the defence of physical realism against a symbolic interpretation, which was recently defended by professors Poincare, Poynting and me" (p. 305 - 306; in other places in his book, Ward adds Duhem, Pearson and Mach to this list, see II vol., p. 161, 63, 57, 75, 83, etc.

"... Ricker constantly speaks of "mental images" and at the same time constantly states that the atom and ether are more than mental images. Such a method of reasoning actually comes down to the following: in such a case, I cannot compose another image, and

therefore reality should be similar to it ... Professor Ricker recognizes the abstract possibility of a different mental image ... He admits even “approximate” ( tentative) nature of some of our theories and many “particular difficulties”. In the end, he defends only the working hypothesis (a working hypothesis), and moreover, one that has largely lost its prestige over the past half century. But if the atomic and other theories of the structure of matter are only working hypotheses, and, moreover, hypotheses strictly limited by physical phenomena, then there is no justification for the theory that states that the mechanism is the basis of everything and that it reduces the facts of life and spirit to epiphenomenons, that is, makes them, so to speak, one degree more phenomenal, one degree less real than matter and motion. Such is the mechanical theory of the world, and if Professor Ricker does not directly support it, then we have nothing to argue with him “ (p. 314-315).

This, of course, is utter nonsense, as if materialism affirmed the “lesser” reality of consciousness, or necessarily “mechanical”, and not electromagnetic, not some other immeasurably more complex picture of the world as *moving matter*. But truly magical, much better than our Machists (i.e., confused idealists) —a direct and open idealist Ward *catches* weaknesses of “spontaneous” natural-historical materialism, for example, inability to explain the relationship of relative and absolute truth. Ward somersaults and announces that since the truth is relative, approximate, it only “finds” the essence of the matter—it means that it cannot reflect reality! It is extremely true, but the spiritualist posed the question of atoms, etc., as a “working hypothesis”. More than the declarations of the concepts of natural science as “working hypotheses”, modern, cultural fideism (Ward directly derives it from his spiritualism) *does not think and demand*. We will give you science, gg. naturalists, give us epistemology, philosophy—such is the condition for coexistence between theologians and professors in the “advanced” capitalist countries. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, pp. 224-229, ed. 3rd*)

## **Machism Associated with the Reactionary Minority of Physicists**

... We must take into account the undoubted connection of Machism with one school in one branch of modern science. On the side of materialism, the vast majority of natural scientists invariably stand both in general and in this special branch, namely: in physics. A minority of new physicists, under the influence of breaking old theories by the great discoveries of recent years, under the influence of the crisis of new physics, which especially showed the relativity of our knowledge, slipped, due to ignorance of dialectics, through relativism to idealism. The fashionable physical idealism of our days is the same reactionary and the same short-term hobby as the fashionable physiological idealism of the recent past. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII , p. 291, ed. 3rd.*)

## **Modern Physics Spontaneously goes to Dialectical Materialism**

In a word, today's "physical" idealism, just like yesterday's "physiological" idealism, means only that one school of natural scientists in one branch of natural science slipped into reactionary philosophy, failing to directly and immediately rise from metaphysical materialism to dialectical materialism [Famous chemist William Ramsay says: "I was often asked: Is electricity not vibration? how can one explain the wireless telegraph by the movement of small particles or bodies (corpuscles)? - The answer to this is as follows: electricity is a *thing* , it *is*(Ramsay's italics) these little bodies, but when these bodies fly away from some object, a wave similar to a light wave propagates through the ether, and this wave is used for a wireless telegraph "(William Ramsay," *Essays, Biographical and Chemical. "Lond. 1908, p. 126.*) (*Ramsay V., Biographical and Chemical Essays, London 1908, p. 126.—Ed.*) Speaking about the conversion of radium into helium, Ramsay remarks: "At least one so-called element can no longer be regarded as the last matter; he himself turns into a simpler form of matter!" (p. 160). "It is almost certain that negative electricity is a special form of matter; and positive electricity is matter, devoid of negative electricity, that is, there is matter minus this electric matter" (176). "What is electricity? Before they thought that there are two kinds of electricity: positive and negative. In those days it was impossible to answer the question posed. But the latest research makes it possible that what they used to call negative

electricity is actually a (really) substance. In fact, the relative weight of its particles is measured; this particle is approximately one seven hundredth of the mass of a hydrogen atom... The atoms of electricity are called electrons” (196). If our Machians, writing books and articles on philosophical topics, knew how to think, then they would understand that the expression “matter disappears”, “matter is reduced to electricity”, etc. is only an epistemologically helpless expression of the truth that can be discovered new forms of matter, new forms of material motion, to reduce the old forms to these new ones, etc.]. This step is made and done by modern physics, but it does not go directly to the only true method and philosophy of natural science directly, but in zigzags, not consciously, but spontaneously, not clearly seeing its “ultimate goal”, but approaching it gropingly, staggering, sometimes even backwards. Modern physics lies in childbirth. She gives birth to dialectical materialism. The birth is painful. Besides a living and viable creature, they inevitably produce some dead food, some garbage to be sent to the sewage disposal room. These rejects include all physical idealism, all empirio-critical philosophy, together with empirio-symbolism, empirio-monism, etc., etc. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII , p. 255-256, ed. 3rd*)

### **III. The Importance of Dialectical Materialism for Natural Science**

#### **The Need for Materialistic Dialectics for Natural Science**

The revolution of 1848 left almost everything in place in Germany, with the exception of philosophy, where a complete revolution took place. The nation, embraced by the spirit of practicalism, which, on the one hand, gave an impetus to large-scale industry and speculation, and on the other, caused a powerful upsurge in natural science in Germany, surrendering itself under the guidance of wandering preachers of materialism Focht, Büchner, etc., resolutely turned its back on the lost in the sands of Berlin old Hegelianism of classical German philosophy. The Berlin Old Hegelians deserve it. But a nation that wants to stand at the height of science cannot do

without theoretical thinking. Together with Hegelianism, they threw overboard and dialectics just at the very moment when the dialectical nature of the processes of nature began to impose irresistibly thoughts, i.e., then, when only dialectics could help natural science get out of difficulties; thanks to this, the scientists again turned out to be helpless victims of the old metaphysics. Since then, the public has been successful among the public, on the one hand, flat reflections of Schopenhauer, later even Hartmann, adapted to the spiritual level of the philistine, and, on the other, vulgar, in the style of wandering preachers, the materialism of different Fochts and Buchners. The universities competed among themselves the most diverse varieties of eclecticism, which had in common only that they consisted of only the scum of the old philosophical systems and were all equally metaphysical. The remnants of classical philosophy survived only in the form of neo-Kantianism, the last word of which was an eternally unknowable thing in itself, i.e. that part of Kant's doctrine, which least deserved to be preserved. The end result was now the prevailing confusion and incoherence of theoretical thinking.

One cannot now pick up almost a single theoretical book on natural science, in order not to be convinced that the natural scientists themselves understand how they suffer from this confusion and incoherence, from which fashionable, if one may say, philosophy gives them no way out. And there is really no other way out, there is no way to achieve clarity without returning in one form or another from metaphysical to dialectical thinking.

This refund may occur in a variety of ways. It can break through spontaneously, thanks simply to the power of the natural science discoveries themselves, which no longer fit in the old metaphysical Procrustean bed. But this is a difficult and painful process, in which you have to overcome a huge mass of unnecessary friction. This process for the most part is already taking place, especially in biology. But it can be significantly reduced if theorizing naturalists want to become more thoroughly acquainted with dialectical philosophy in its historically given forms. Among these forms, two may become especially fruitful for modern science.

First, it is Greek philosophy. Here, dialectical thinking appears even in primitive simplicity, not violated by those cute obstacles that metaphysics of the 17th and 18th centuries—Bacon and Locke in England, Leibniz in Germany—and with which she blocked her path from understanding the individual to understanding the whole, to penetration into the universal connection of being. Since the Greeks

had not yet reached dismemberment, an analysis of nature, they considered it as a whole, by and large. The universal connection of phenomena in the world is not proved in detail: <the Greek view is instinctively based on it> for the Greeks it is the result of direct contemplation. This is the drawback of Greek philosophy, due to which it was subsequently to give way to other types of worldview. But in this lies its superiority over all its later metaphysical rivals. If metaphysics is right in relation to the Greeks in detail, then the Greeks are right in relation to metaphysics in general. This is one of the reasons why we will be forced in philosophy, as in many other areas, to constantly return to the exploits of that small nation, whose universal talent and activity provided him with a place in the history of the development of mankind that no one can claim other people. Another reason is that in the diverse forms of Greek philosophy there are in embryo, in appearance, almost all the later types of worldview. Therefore, theoretical science, if it wants to get acquainted with the history of the emergence and development of its modern general theories, should return to the Greeks. Understanding this is more and more spreading. Those scientists who, using the scum of Greek philosophy—for example, atomic science—as eternal truths themselves, look bacon-like down on the Greeks on the grounds that the latter did not have empirical science <in the modern sense>, are becoming less and less. It would only be desirable for this understanding to deepen and lead to a real familiarization with Greek philosophy.

The second form of dialectics, especially close to German naturalists, is classical German philosophy from Kant to Hegel. Here the ice was already breaking, for, even in addition to the neo-Kantianism already mentioned, it is becoming fashionable again to return to *Kant*. Since it was discovered that Kant is the creator of two ingenious hypotheses that modern theoretical science cannot do without - namely, the theory of the emergence of the solar system and the theory of the slowing down of the earth's rotation due to the tides, which Laplace attributed to before—Kant has again been held in high esteem naturalists. But to study the dialectics of Kant would be unnecessarily tiring and ungrateful work, since in *Hegel's* works there is an extensive encyclopaedia of dialectics, although developed from a completely false starting point.

After, on the one hand, the reaction against “natural philosophy” - largely justified by this false starting point and the miserable shallowing of the Berlin Hegelianism - exhausted itself, degenerating

into a simple abuse at the end, after, on the other hand, natural science in its theoretical the search did not find any satisfaction with the walking eclectic metaphysics - perhaps it will become possible to speak to natural scientists once more about Hegel, without causing Mr. Dühring to cause the dancing of St. Witt, in which he is so inimitably funny.

First of all, it should be established that the point here is not at all about protecting the Hegelian starting point, but that the spirit, thought, idea is primary, and the real world is only a reflection of the idea. Feuerbach has already refused this. We all agree that in any scientific field—whether it is indifferent, in natural science or in history—it is necessary to proceed from these *facts*, that is, that in natural science we must proceed from various objective forms of matter's movement < *we*, socialist materialists, go much further natural scientists ...> and that, therefore, in theoretical natural science it is impossible to construct connections and bring them into facts, but it is necessary to extract them from the latter and, having found, prove them, as much as possible, by experience.

In exactly the same way, it cannot be a question of preserving the dogmatic content of the Hegelian system as it was preached by the Berlin Hegelians of the older and younger lines. Along with the idealistic starting point, the system built on it also falls, therefore, in particular, the Hegelian philosophy of nature. But we must remember that the struggle against Hegel by natural scientists, since they generally understood it correctly, was directed only against both of these points: against an idealistic starting point and against an arbitrary, contrary to the facts of system construction.

With the exception of all this, Hegelian dialectics still remains. It is Marx's merit that he first brought back to light, as opposed to the "grumbling, pretentious and mediocre epigonism now setting the tone in Germany", the forgotten dialectical method, pointed out its connection with Hegelian dialectics, as well as its difference from the latter and at the same time, he showed in *Capital* the application of this method to the facts of a certain empirical science, political economy. And he did it with such success that even in Germany the newest economic school rises above the vulgar free trade only because it, under the pretext of criticizing Marx, writes off from him (quite often incorrect).

In Hegel, in dialectics, the same perversion of all real relations is observed, as in all other parts of his system. But, as Marx observes, "the mystification that Hegel's dialectic exposes does not in the least

prevent him from portraying for the first time in a comprehensive and conscious way its universal forms of movement. She stands on his head. "We need to turn it over to find a rational core in a mystical shell!"

But even in natural science itself we often encounter theories in which real relationships are put on the head, in which reflection is taken as objective reality, and which therefore need such a reversal. Such theories quite often dominate for a long time. A similar case presents us with the doctrine of heat, which for almost two centuries has been considered as a special mysterious matter, and not as a form of motion of ordinary matter: only the mechanical theory of heat produced the necessary inversion here. Nevertheless, physics, in which the theory of calorific reigned, discovered a number of very important laws of heat. In particular, the Fourier and Sadi Carnot

[Function Carnot *with*, literally upside down,  $\frac{1}{c} = d$  absolute temperature. If you do not flip in this way, there is nothing to do with it.] Laid the path here for a correct theory, which could only flip over the laws discovered by its predecessor and translate them into your own language. Similarly, in chemistry, the phlogiston theory, with its centuries-old experimental work, obtained exactly the material with which Lavoisier managed to discover the real antipode of the fantastic phlogiston in the oxygen received by Priestley, which enabled him to reject all this phlogistic theory. But this did not mean at all that the experimental results of phlogistics were rejected. On the contrary, they survived, their wording was only turned over, translated from the phlogiston language to the modern chemical language.

Hegelian dialectics refers to rational dialectics as the theory of caloric to the mechanical theory of heat, as the theory of phlogiston to the theory of Lavoisier. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 71–74, 1932*)

\* \* \*

Chemistry, the abstract divisibility of the physical, evil infinity—atomism. Physics is a cell (the process of organic development of both individuals and species through differentiation is a striking example of rational dialectics) and, finally, the identity of the forces of nature and their mutual transformation into each other, destroying any immutability of categories. Despite this, the bulk of natural scientists still cannot abandon the old metaphysical categories and are helpless

when they have to rationally explain and systematize these modern facts, which show, so to speak, the presence of dialectics in nature. And here, perforce, you have *to think*: atom and molecule, etc., cannot be observed with a microscope, but only with thought. Compare chemists (with the exception of Schorlemmer, who knows Hegel) and Virchow's "Cellular Pathology," where general phrases should ultimately cover up the author's helplessness. Liberated from mysticism, dialectics becomes an absolute necessity for natural science, who left the area where constant categories were sufficient, this kind of lower mathematics of logic. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 4, 1932*)

## **Natural Facts Supplant Formal Logic**

Hard and fast lines are incompatible with development theory. Even the boundary line between vertebrates and invertebrates is already more unchanged. In the same way, the boundaries between fish and amphibians, between birds and reptiles, are increasingly disappearing every day. Only a few intermediate members are missing between Compsognathus and Archaeopteryx, and toothy bird beaks are found in both hemispheres. —Either—or” is becoming more and more inadequate. In lower animals it is impossible to strictly establish the concept of the individual. Not only in the sense of whether this creature is an individual or a colony, but also on the question of where in the history of development one individual ceases and another begins (“feeders”). —For that stage of development of natural science, where all the differences merge in the intermediate steps, all opposites pass into each other through intermediate members, the old metaphysical method of thinking is no longer enough. Dialectics, which in the same way do not know hard and fast lines and do not know the unconditional, suitable everywhere “either—or”, which translates into each other unchanging metaphysical differences and can correctly see along with “either—or” also “like that, and another”, reconciling the contradictions among themselves, this dialectic is the only suitable method of thinking at the highest stage of development. Of course, for everyday life, for scientific petty trade, the metaphysical category retains its significance. (which translates into each other invariable metaphysical differences and is able to correctly see, along with “either—or” also “both this and the other”,

reconciling the contradictions among themselves, this dialectic is the only suitable method of thinking at the highest stage of development. Of course, for everyday life, for scientific petty trade, the metaphysical category retains its significance. (which translates into each other invariable metaphysical differences and is able to correctly see, along with “either—or” also “both this and the other”, reconciling the contradictions among themselves, this dialectic is the only suitable method of thinking at the highest stage of development. Of course, for everyday life, for scientific petty trade, the metaphysical category retains its significance. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 35, 1932*)

## **The Study of the History of Thinking is Necessary for Natural Scientists**

Anyone who deals with theoretical issues, the results of modern science are imposed with the same coercion with which modern natural scientists—whether they want it or not—are forced to come to general theoretical conclusions. And here there is a well-known compensation. If theorists are half-knowledge in the field of natural science, then the same half-knowledge are modern natural scientists in the field of theory, in the field of what has been called until now philosophy.

Empirical science has accumulated such an immense mass of positive material that the need to systematize it in each individual field of study and arrange it from the point of view of internal connection has become unavoidable. *In the same way, it became inevitable to bring separate areas of cognition into a proper connection.* <But this is a task that cannot be solved in a simple empirical way. This problem is solved by theoretical thinking> *But, having taken up this, natural science falls into the theoretical field, and here the methods of empiricism are powerless, only theoretical thinking can help here.* But theoretical thinking is a natural property only in the form of ability. It must be developed, improved, and for such a development there is still no other means than studying the history of philosophy.

The theoretical thinking of each era, and therefore of our era, is a historical product that takes very different forms at different times and therefore receives very different contents. Consequently, the science of thinking, like any other science, is historical science, the science of

the historical development of human thinking. And this is important for the practical application of thinking to empirical fields, because, firstly, the theory of the laws of thinking is not at all some kind of forever established “eternal truth”, as philistine thought connects with the word “logic”. Formal logic itself was, from Aristotle to the present day, the scene of fierce debate. As for dialectics, so far it has been studied in a more or less accurate way by only two thinkers, Aristotle and Hegel. But it is precisely dialectics that is the most correct form of thinking for modern science, for it alone represents an analogue, and, therefore, a method of explanation for the processes of development taking place in nature, for the universal connections of nature, for transitions from one area of research to another. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 69–70, 1932*)

## **Without a Philosophical Justification, Natural Science cannot Withstand the Struggle Against Bourgeois Ideology**

In addition to an alliance with consistent materialists who do not belong to the Communist Party, it is no less, if not more important, for the work that militant materialism must do, an alliance with representatives of modern science who are inclined toward materialism and are not afraid to uphold and preach it against the dominant in the so-called “educated society” of fashionable philosophical vacillations towards idealism and scepticism.

The article by A. Timiryazev on Einstein’s theory of relativity, published in the first and second issue of the journal *Under the Banner of Marxism*, gives hope that the journal will succeed in realizing this second alliance. It is necessary to pay more attention to it. It must be remembered that it is precisely from the abrupt withdrawal that modern natural science is experiencing that reactionary philosophical schools and schools, directions and directions will be born all the time. Therefore, following the questions posed by the latest revolution in the field of natural science and involving natural scientists in this work in the philosophical journal is a task without which militant materialism cannot in any case be militant or materialism. If Timiryazev in the first issue of the magazine had to stipulate what kind of theory is Einstein, who himself, according to Timiryazev.

And in order not to be unconscious of such a phenomenon, we must understand that without a solid philosophical justification, no natural sciences, no materialism can withstand the struggle against the onslaught of bourgeois ideas and the restoration of the bourgeois worldview. In order to withstand this struggle and conduct it to the end with complete success, the natural scientist must be a modern materialist, a conscious supporter of the materialism that is represented by Marx, that is, he must be a dialectical materialist. To achieve this goal, the staff of the journal *Under the Banner of Marxism* should organize a systematic study of Hegel's dialectics from a materialistic point of view, that is, the dialectic that Marx practically applied both in his *Capital* and in his historical and political works and applied with such a success.

Of course, the work of such a study, such an interpretation and such propaganda of Hegelian dialectics is extremely difficult and, of course, the first experiments in this regard will be associated with errors. But only he who does nothing is not mistaken. Based on how Marx used Hegel's materially understood dialectics, we can and should develop this dialectic from all sides, print excerpts from Hegel's main works in the journal, interpret them materialistically, commenting on examples of the use of dialectics by Marx, as well as those examples of dialectics in the field relations of economic and political relations, of which the recent history, especially the modern imperialist war and revolution, provide unusually much. The group of editors and employees of the journal "*Under the Banner of Marxism*" should, in my opinion, a kind of "society of materialistic friends of Hegelian dialectics." Modern naturalists will find (if they are able to search and if we learn to help them) in Hegel's materialistically interpreted dialectic a number of answers to those philosophical questions that are posed by the revolution in natural science and which intellectual admirers of bourgeois fashion "get confused" with reaction.

Without such a task to be set and systematically carried out, materialism cannot be militant materialism. He will remain, using a generous expression, not so much fighting as fighting. Without this, large-scale naturalists as often as until now will be helpless in their philosophical conclusions and generalizations. For natural science is progressing so fast, going through a period of such a revolutionary breakdown in all areas that it is impossible to do without philosophical conclusions in any case. (*Lenin, On the Importance of Militant Materialism, vol. XXVII, p. 186-187, 3rd ed.*)

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Very true and important—this is what Engels repeated more popularly when he wrote that natural scientists should know that the results of natural science are concepts, and the skilful handling of concepts is not natural, but is the result of a 2000-year development of natural science and philosophy.

Naturalists have a narrow concept of transformation and no understanding of dialectics. (*“Lenin Collection” XII, p. 201.*)

## **Misunderstanding of Materialistic Dialectics Leads Naturalists to Idealism**

All the old truths of physics, even those considered indisputable and unshakable, turn out to be relative truths, which *means* that there can be no objective truth that does not depend on humanity. This is the reason not only of all Machism, but of all “physical” idealism in general. That from the sum of relative truths an absolute truth is formed in their development—that relative truths are relatively true reflections of an object independent of humanity—that these reflections become more and more true—that in every scientific truth, in spite of its relativity, there is an element of absolute truth—all these provisions, taken for granted by anyone who thought of Engels’ *Anti-Dühring*, are a book with seven seals for the “modern” theory of knowledge.

Such works as “The Theory of Physics” by P. Duhem [*R. Duhem, La theorie phisique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906.*] or “Concepts and modern physics theory” Stallo [*J. Bed and . Stallo, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics, Lond. 1882, There are French and German translations.*], Which Mach especially recommends, show extremely clearly that these “physical” idealists attach the most importance to the proof of the relativity of our knowledge, fluctuating, in essence, between idealism and dialectical materialism. Both authors, belonging to different eras and approaching the issue from different points of view (Duhem, a physicist by profession, who worked in this field for 20 years; Stallo, a former orthodox Hegelian who is ashamed of his philosophy of nature philosophy in the Old Hegelian style, published in 1848), are fighting

more energetic with an atomistic-mechanical understanding of nature. They prove the limitations of such an understanding, the impossibility of recognizing it as the limit of our knowledge, the ossification of many concepts among writers, holding on to this understanding. And such a flaw *old* materialism is undeniable; a lack of understanding of the relativity of all scientific theories, an ignorance of dialectics, an exaggeration of the mechanical point of view — Engels reproached the former materialists for this. But Engels managed (unlike Stallo) to discard Hegelian idealism *and to understand the* brilliantly true seed of Hegelian dialectics. Engels abandoned the old, metaphysical materialism in favour of *dialectical* materialism, and not in favour of relativism, sliding into subjectivity. “A mechanical theory,” says, for example, Stallo, “together with all the metaphysical theories hypostasizes particular, ideal, and maybe purely conditional groups of attributes or individual attributes and treats them as different types of objective reality” (p. 150). This is true if you do not renounce the recognition of objective reality and fight against metaphysics as an anti-dialectic. Stallo does not give a clear account of this. He did not understand materialistic dialectics and therefore often rolls through relativism to subjectivism and idealism. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, pp. 253-254, 3rd ed.*)

## **Dialectics in Mathematics**

*Unit.* Nothing seems simpler than a quantitative unit, and nothing is more diverse than the last, as soon as we begin to study it in connection with the corresponding set, from the point of view of various ways of its origin from the latter. A unit is, firstly, the main number of the entire system of positive and negative numbers, due to the successive addition of which to itself all other numbers arise. A unit is an expression of all positive, negative, and fractional powers of

a unit:  $1^2, \sqrt{1}, 1^{-2}$  all equal to one. The unit is the value of all fractions for which the numerator and denominator are equal. It is the expression of any number raised to the power of zero, and therefore it is the only number whose logarithm is the same in all systems, namely = 0. Thus, the unit is the boundary dividing all possible systems of logarithms into two parts: if the base is larger units, then the

logarithms of all numbers greater than one are positive; all numbers less than one are negative; if the base is less than one, then the opposite happens. Thus, if each number contains unity in itself, since it consists of only units attached to each other, then the unit, in turn, contains all other numbers. Not only potentially, since we can build any number from one units, but it's real, since the unit is a certain power of any other number. But the same mathematicians who, in a relaxed way, introduce, where they need it, into their calculations  $x^0 = 1$  or a fraction whose numerator and denominator are equal and which, therefore, also represents unity, are mathematicians who, therefore, mathematically apply the set contained in the unity, wrinkle their nose and make grimaces when they are told in a general way that unity and the set are inseparable, penetrating each other concepts and that the set is also contained in unity, as is unity in the set. How true this is easy to notice, as soon as we leave the area of pure numbers. Even when measuring lengths, areas and volumes, it turns out that we can take any unit of the corresponding kind as a unit, the same applies to measuring time, weight <heat>, movement, etc. For measuring cells, millimetres and milligrams are too large for measuring a solar distance or the speed of light a kilometre is extremely small. In the same way, a kilogram is extremely small for measuring the masses of planets, and even more so the sun. Here one can see first-hand what diversity and multitude is contained in such a simple at first glance concept of unity. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 117, 1932*)

## **Contradiction in mathematics**

Transition to dialectics. Two philosophical directions: metaphysical with unchanged categories, dialectical (Aristotle and especially Hegel) —with fluid; evidence that these constant opposites of foundation and effect, cause and effect, identity and difference, being and essence do not stand up to criticism, that analysis shows the presence of one pole already in nuce [In the bud—*Red.*] in another, that at a certain point one pole passes into another and that all logic develops only from opposites moving forward. Hegel himself is mystical, for the category is something pre-existing with him, and the dialectic of the real world is its simple reflection. In reality, the opposite happens: the dialectic of the head is only a reflection of the

forms of movement of the real world, both nature and history. Naturalists of the last century, even before 1830, managed quite easily with the help of the old metaphysics, for actual science did not go beyond the framework of mechanics, terrestrial and cosmic. However, confusion in the minds has already been made by higher mathematics, which considers the eternal truths of lower mathematics as a surpassed point of view, often asserts things that are opposite to them, and sets forth theorems that seem, from the point of view of lower mathematics, simple nonsense. Here the invariable categories disappeared, mathematics entered such a ground where even such simple concepts as “abstract quantity”, “evil infinity” took a completely dialectical form and made mathematics, against its will and without its knowledge, become dialectical. There is nothing more comical than the miserable tricks, subterfuges and fictions that mathematics resort to in order to resolve this contradiction, to reconcile the lower and higher mathematics; make it clear to them that what is their indisputable result does not constitute pure nonsense, and in order to rationally explain the starting point, method and end results of mathematics of the infinite. (“Evil infinity”, took a completely dialectical form and made mathematics, against its will and without its knowledge, become dialectical. There is nothing more comical than the miserable tricks, subterfuges and fictions that mathematics resort to in order to resolve this contradiction, to reconcile the lower and higher mathematics; make it clear to them that what is their indisputable result does not constitute pure nonsense, and in order to rationally explain the starting point, method and end results of mathematics of the infinite. (“Evil infinity”, took a completely dialectical form and made mathematics, against its will and without its knowledge, become dialectical. There is nothing more comical than the miserable tricks, subterfuges and fictions that mathematics resort to in order to resolve this contradiction, to reconcile the lower and higher mathematics; make it clear to them that what is their indisputable result does not constitute pure nonsense, and in order to rationally explain the starting point, method and end results of mathematics of the infinite. ( what is their indisputable result does not constitute pure nonsense, and in order to generally rationally explain the starting point, method and end results of the mathematics of the infinite. ( what is their indisputable result does not constitute pure nonsense, and in order to generally rationally explain the starting point, method and end results of the mathematics of the infinite. ( what is their indisputable result does not constitute pure nonsense, and in order to generally rationally explain the starting point, method and end results of the mathematics of the infinite. (Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, pp. 3–4, 1932)

## Dialectic of Quantity

Because *zero* there is a denial of any definite quantity; it is not completely devoid of content. On the contrary, zero has a very definite content. Being the boundary between all positive and negative quantities, being the only truly neutral number that cannot be neither + nor -, it represents not only a very specific number, but in itself is more important than all other numbers limited to it. Indeed, zero is richer in content than any other number. Added to any number on the right, he will triple it in our number system. To do this, one could take any other sign instead of zero, but only on condition that this sign, taken by itself, meant zero = 0. Thus, it depends on the nature of the zero that it finds such an application and that only it one can find such an application. Zero destroys every other number, by which it is multiplied; as a divisor of a number he makes it infinite, as a divisor he makes it infinitely small; he is a singular in infinite relation to any

other number.  $\frac{0}{0}$  can express any number between  $-\infty$  and  $+\infty$  and in each case represents a real value. The real value of an equation is revealed only when all its terms are transferred to one side and the equation is equal to zero, as it is already found in quadratic equations and is used almost always in higher algebra. You can  $f(x, y) = 0$  equate some function  $z$  and then differentiate this  $z$ , although it = 0, like an ordinary dependent variable and get its partial derivative.

Nothing of any quantity has yet to be quantified, and only because of this can one operate on zero. Those very mathematicians who calmly operate with zero, as indicated above, that is, as a well-defined quantitative representation, and put it in quantitative relations with other quantitative representations, raise a terrible cry when they find in Hegel such a general position: nothing some something is a *certain* nothing.

We now turn to analytic geometry. Here, zero is a certain point, starting from which one direction along a known straight line is considered positive, and the opposite—negative. Thus, here the zero point is not only as important as any point with a certain positive or negative value, but also much more important than all of them: this is the point on which they all depend, to which they all relate, to which

they are all determined. In many cases, it can even be taken in a completely arbitrary way <in other cases, where the nature of the given task puts restrictions, nevertheless there remains a choice, at least between two possibilities>. But once it is taken, it remains the focus of the whole operation, often even determines the direction of the line on which other points, the end points of the abscissa, are applied. If, for example, - passing to the equation of the circle, - we will take any point on the periphery as the zero point, then the abscissa line should go through the centre of the circle. All this finds application also in mechanics, where when calculating the movements, the adopted zero point is the reference point of the whole operation. The “randomly taken” zero point of the thermometer is the well-defined lower boundary of the temperature region, divided by an arbitrary number of degrees and, due to this, serves as a measure of temperatures both within itself and higher or lower temperatures. Thus, here it is a very significant point. And even the absolute zero of the thermometer does not represent a pure abstract negation at all, but a very definite state of matter, namely the boundary at which the last trace of the independent movement of molecules disappears and matter acts only in the form of mass. Thus, wherever we encounter zero, it everywhere is something very definite, and its practical application in geometry, mechanics, etc., shows that it is more important as a boundary than all real quantities limited by it. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 115-117, 1932*)

## **Asymptotes**

*Asymptotes.* Geometry begins with the discovery that a straight line and a curve represent absolute opposites, that a straight line cannot be perfectly expressed in a curve, a curve in a straight line, that they are incommensurable with each other. And yet, a circle can only be calculated if its periphery is expressed in the form of straight lines. In the case of curves with asymptotes, the straight line completely dissolves in the curve and the straight line in the straight line; in the same way, the concept of parallelism also disappears: the lines are not parallel, they are continuously approaching each other, and yet they never intersect. The branch of the curve becomes more direct, never becoming completely straight. Similarly, in analytic geometry, a straight line is considered as a first-order curve with

infinitely small curvature. No matter how big the  $-x$  logarithmic curve becomes,  $y$  will never become  $= 0$ . (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 31, 1932*)

## Attraction and Repulsion

*The Newtonian parallelogram of forces in the solar system is undoubtedly true for the moment when the rings separate, because the rotational motion contradicts itself here, being, on the one hand, in the form of attraction, and on the other—in the form of tangential force. But as soon as this separation took place, the movement is again a proof of the dialectical process, a proof that this separation must occur.* (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 33, 1932*)

## Unity and Diversity

Zero degrees. Their importance in the logarithmic number:  $\frac{0}{10^0}, \frac{1}{10^1}, \frac{2}{10^2}, \frac{3 \log}{10^3}$ .

All variables pass somewhere through the value of unity, therefore also the constant of some variable degree  $a^x = 1$ , when  $x = 0$ .  $a^0 = 1$  simply means that the unit must be taken in connection with other members of a number of degrees  $a$ . Only in this case does

$\left( \sum x^0 = \frac{\omega}{x} \right)$

it make sense and can give useful results, otherwise not. It follows that the unit, no matter how it seems identical to itself, contains an infinite variety, for it can be a zero degree of any other number; and that this variety is by no means imaginary, is found in all cases when a unit is considered as a certain unit, as one of the variable results of a process (as an instantaneous value or the form of a variable) in connection with this process. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 31, 1932*)

## Straight and Crooked

*Straight and crooked.* In differential terms, they are ultimately equated with each other. In a differential triangle whose hypotenuse is the arc differential (in the tangent method), this hypotenuse can be considered “as a small straight line, which is both an element of an arc and an element of a tangent,” regardless of whether the curve is considered to consist of infinitely many straight lines or [citation given in French.] “how strict curve, because since the curvature at each point *M* is infinitely small, the latter ratio curve of an item tangent is, *obviously, equal to the ratio nstva*”. So, although here the ratio is continuously *approaching* the relation of equality, but it is approaching by the nature of the curve *asymptotically*, since the contact is limited to a *point* having no length, but in the end it is accepted that the equality of the curve and the straight line is achieved. Bossut, Calcul diff. et. int Paris, An VI, I, p. 149. In the case of polar curves, the differential imaginary abscissa is even considered parallel to the real abscissa, and on this basis they produce an action, although both intersect at the pole; hence they even conclude that two triangles are similar, of which one has an angle just at the intersection of both lines, on the parallelism of which all similarities are based! ..

When the mathematics of straight and curved is exhausted in this way, a new, almost unlimited field is opened, i.e., mathematics that *treats a curve as a straight line* (differential triangle) and mathematics that *treats a straight line as a curve* (first-order curve with infinitesimal curvature) . Oh, metaphysics! [This paragraph is written later in the margin.] ( *Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 31–32, 1932* )

## Interpenetration of Arithmetic Operations

*From the field of mathematics.* Nothing seems to rest on such an unshakable basis as the difference between the four arithmetic operations, which are elements of all mathematics. And, however, multiplication is a reduced addition, division is a reduced subtraction of a certain number of identical numbers, and in the known case, if the divisor is a fraction, division is replaced by multiplication by the

inverse fraction. Algebra goes even further than this. Each subtraction (**ab**) can be considered as addition (**-b + a**), each

division  $\frac{a}{b}$  as multiplication  $a \cdot \frac{1}{b}$ . With actions with degrees go even further. All invariable differences of calculation methods disappear; everything can be depicted in the opposite way. Degree - as

root  $(x^2 = \sqrt{x^4})$ , root - as degree  $(\sqrt{x} = x^{1/2})$ . The unit divided by degree or root is in the form of a denominator

degree  $(\frac{1}{\sqrt{x}} = x^{-1/2}; \frac{1}{x^3} = x^{-3})$ .

The multiplication or division of the degrees of any quantity turns into the addition or subtraction of their indicators. Each number can be considered and represented as the degree of any other number (logarithms). And this transformation from one form to another, the opposite, is not an idle game at all—this is one of the most powerful levers of mathematical knowledge, without which no complicated calculation can be made at present. It is enough to delete negative and fractional degrees from mathematics to make sure that you cannot go far without them.

( $- \cdot - = +, \frac{-}{-} = +, \sqrt{-1}$  etc. develop earlier).

The turning point in mathematics was a Cartesian *variable*. Thanks to this, *movement* and *dialectics* entered into mathematics, and thanks to this, *differential and integral calculus became necessary immediately*, the rudiments of which were soon laid down and which were generally completed, but not discovered, by Newton and Leibniz [This paragraph was written later in the margin.]. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 30-31, 1932*)

*Identity and distinction.* Their dialectic relation exists already in differential calculus, where it is infinitely small, but at the same time it is effective and produces everything. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 30, 1932*)

## Negative and Positive Values

$\sqrt{-1}$ . Negative quantities of algebra are real only insofar as they relate to positive quantities, are real only in their relations to the latter; taken outside this relationship, by themselves, they are imaginary. In trigonometry and analytical geometry, together with the branches of higher mathematics built on them, they express a certain direction of motion, the opposite of the positive direction. But you can equally well count the sines and tangents in both the first and fourth squares, and so you can turn plus to minus. Similarly, in analytical geometry, abscissas can be counted in a circle, either starting from the periphery, or starting from the centre and in general for all curves in the direction usually denoted by minus, and in this case we get the correct rational equation of the curve. Here + exists only as an addition—, and vice versa. But algebra in its abstractions considers them as real, independent quantities, without regard to any *larger*, positive value. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 111, 1932*)

## **The Mathematical Image of Processes**

Only differential calculus gives natural science the ability to mathematically depict *processes*, and not just *states*, motion. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 113, 1932*)

## **Decomposition of a Binomial into an Infinite Series**

*Mathematics.* It seems absurd to human common sense to decompose a certain definite quantity, for example, binom into an infinite series, that is, into something indefinite; but would we go far without endless series or without a binomial theorem? (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 48, 1932*)

## **Trigonometry Development**

*Trigonometry.* After synthetic geometry has considered the properties of a triangle in itself and completely exhausted them, a

wider horizon opens, that is, a very simple, completely dialectical method. A triangle is no longer considered in itself and for itself, but in connection with some other figure, a circle. Each right-angled triangle can be considered as belonging to a certain circle: if the hypotenuse =  $r$ , then the legs are  $\sin$  and  $\cos$ ; if one leg =  $r$ , then the other leg =  $tg$ , and the hypotenuse =  $sec$ .

Thanks to this, the sides and the angle acquire completely different definite relationships that could not be opened and used without this assignment of the triangle to the circle, and a completely new, far superior to the old, theory of the triangle is developing, which is applicable everywhere, because any triangle can be divided into two right-angled triangles. This development of trigonometry from synthetic geometry is a good example of how dialectics views things in their connection, rather than in isolation. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 121, 1932*)

## **An Example of the Law of Fall Confirms the Variability of Relationships in Nature**

An example of the need for dialectical thinking and not changing categories and relationships in nature: the law of falling, which becomes invalid even after a duration of falling of several minutes, because in this case it is impossible to accept without a sensitive error that the radius of the earth =  $\infty$ , and the gravity of the earth increase instead of staying equal to himself, as the law of the fall of Galileo suggests. Nevertheless, the law continues to be taught without reservations. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 25, 1932*)

## **The Relationship of Categories is Justified by a Change in the Forms of Matter**

If Hegel considers force and manifestation, cause and action as identical, then this is proved by a change in the forms of matter, where their equivalence is proved mathematically. The world has already

been recognized in advance: strength is measured by its manifestation, reason—by action. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 111-112, 1932*)

## **The Continuity of Attraction and Repulsion**

*It is generally accepted that heaviness is the most common sign of materiality, that is, attraction, and not repulsion, is a necessary property of matter. But attraction and repulsion are just as inseparable as positive and negative, and therefore, based on the principles of dialectics, it can be predicted that the true theory of matter should give repulsion the same important place as attraction, that the theory of matter based only on attraction false, insufficient, half. And, indeed, there are enough phenomena indicating this. It is impossible to refuse ether already because of light. Is ether material? If he did have, then it must be material, it must fit the concept of matter. But he is completely devoid of gravity. Comet tails are considered material. They exhibit strong repulsion. Heat in the gas gives rise to repulsion, etc.*

If two bodies act on each other, and as a result of this, one of them or both moves, then this movement can only consist in their mutual approximation or distance from each other. They either attract each other or repel. Or, in terms of mechanics, the forces acting between them—of a central nature, act in the direction of the line connecting their centres. For us, it is now self-evident truth that this happens always and without exception in the universe, no matter how complex other movements may seem to us. We would consider it absurd to admit that two bodies acting on each other, the interaction of which is not hindered by any obstacle or the influence of third bodies, reveal this interaction differently than along the shortest and most direct path, i.e., in the direction of the straight line, connecting their centres [Kant says that due to the existence of three dimensions of space, this attraction or repulsion is inversely proportional to the square of the distance.]. But, as you know, Helmholtz (*Erhaltung der Kraft, Berlin 1847, Abschn. I u. II*) also gave mathematical proof that the central action and the invariance of the momentum are mutually dependent and that the assumption of off-centre action leads to results in which the motion can be either created or destroyed. Thus, the main form of all movement is approximation and removal, contraction and

expansion—in short, the old polar opposite as is known, Helmholtz (Erhaltung der Kraft, Berlin 1847, Abschn. I u. II) also gave mathematical proof that the central action and the invariance of the quantity of motion are mutually dependent and that the assumption of off-centre actions leads to results in which the movement can be or created, or destroyed. Thus, the main form of all movement is approximation and removal, contraction and expansion—in short, the old polar opposite As is known, Helmholtz (Erhaltung der Kraft, Berlin 1847, Abschn. I u. II) also gave mathematical proof that the central action and the invariance of the quantity of motion are mutually dependent and that the assumption of off-centre actions leads to results in which the movement can be or created, or destroyed. Thus, the main form of all movement is approximation and removal, contraction and expansion—in short, the old polar opposite *Attraction and repulsion*.

We emphasize here: attraction and repulsion are not considered by us here as so-called “*forces*”, but as *simple forms of motion*. After all, Kant already considered matter as a unity of attraction and repulsion. In due time we will see how important the concept of “power” is.

Every movement consists in the interaction of attraction and repulsion. But it is possible only if each individual attraction is compensated by a corresponding repulsion in another place, because otherwise one side would gain an advantage over the other over time, and then the movement would end in the end. Thus, all attraction and all repulsions in the universe must be mutually balanced. Owing to this, the law on the indestructibility and inviolability of motion reduces to the proposition that each attractive movement in the universe must be supplemented by an equivalent repulsive movement, and vice versa, or, as it was expressed long before the law on the conservation of force was respected in natural science. The energy of the old philosophy is that the sum of all attractions is equal to the sum of all repulsions.

But here, apparently, there are still two possibilities for stopping any movement with time, namely: either repulsion and attraction toward the end will ever really balance out, or all repulsion will finally concentrate in one part of matter, and all attraction in another parts of it. But from a dialectical point of view, these alternatives are no longer a priori real. Since dialectics, based on the results of our experimental study of nature, has proved that all polar opposites are generally determined by the interaction of both opposite poles, that the

separation and contrast of these poles exists only within the framework of their connection and association, and that, on the contrary, their union exists only in their separation, and their connection is only in their opposition, then there can be no talk of either the final balancing of repulsion and attraction, or of the final distribution and concentration of one form of motion in one half of matter, and the other of its form in the other half of it, i.e. there can be no question of mutual penetration, nor about the absolute separation from each other of both poles. To assert this would mean the same thing - resorting to an example—to require, in the first case, that the north and south poles of a magnet neutralize each other and through each other, and in the second case, that the magnet is cut in the middle, between both poles, gave in one part the northern half without the south pole, and in the other part the southern half without the north pole. But although the inadmissibility of such assumptions follows already from the dialectical nature of the polar opposite, nevertheless, thanks to the metaphysical way of thinking prevailing among natural scientists, at least the second hypothesis still plays a known role in physical theories. This will be discussed in its place. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 113, 131 - 132, 1930*)

## **The Interpenetration of Attraction and Repulsion**

*Gravity and gravity.* The whole doctrine of gravitation comes down to the assertion that attraction is the essence of matter. This is necessarily false. Where there is attraction, it must be generated by repulsion. Therefore, Hegel already correctly noted that the essence of matter is attraction and repulsion. And in fact, we are increasingly forced to admit that the scattering of matter has a boundary where gravity becomes repulsive, and that, on the contrary, the condensation of pushing matter has a boundary where it becomes gravity. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 114, 1932*)

\* \* \*

A good example of the dialectic of nature; according to modern theory, the *repulsion of the same-named* magnetic poles is explained

by the *attraction of the same-named* electric currents. (Guthrie, p. 264.) (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 114, 1932*)

## **Natural Science Advances Confirm Dialectical Materialism**

The correctness of dialectical understanding is increasingly confirmed by the accumulating facts of natural science, and this understanding is easier to perceive if we compare the knowledge of the law of dialectical thinking with the dialectical nature of these facts. In any case, natural science is now at such a stage of development that it cannot slip away from dialectical generalization if it is not forgotten that the results in which the experience data are generalized are the essence of the concept; the art of operating concepts is not innate and does not consist in ordinary common sense, but it requires real thinking, which in turn has as long a history as experienced natural science. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 214, 1932*)

## **The Restriction of the Laws of Classical Mechanics**

But dialectical materialism insists on the approximate, relative nature of any scientific position on the structure of matter and its properties, on the absence of absolute facets in nature, on the transformation of moving matter from one state to another, apparently, from our point of view, irreconcilable with it, etc. e. No matter how strange it is from the point of view of “common sense”, the transformation of weightless ether into weighty matter and vice versa, however “strange” the absence of any other mass of the electron except the electromagnetic one, no matter how unusual the mechanical restriction laws of motion by only one area of natural phenomena and their subordination to the deeper laws of electromagnetic phenomena, etc.,—all this is only superfluous *confirmation* dialectical materialism. New physics went crazy in idealism, mainly because physicists did not know dialectics. They fought with metaphysical (in Engels, and not in the positivist, that is, Humean, sense of the word)

materialism, with its one-sided “mechanicality”—and at the same time they splashed out the child along with water. Denying the immutability of the previously known elements and properties of matter, they slipped into the negation of matter, i.e., the objective reality of the physical world. Denying the absolute nature of the most important and fundamental laws, they slipped into the denial of any objective law in nature, the declaration of the law of nature as a simple convention, “limiting expectations”, “logical necessity”, etc. Insisting on the approximate, relative nature of our knowledge, they slipped into the negation of an object independent of cognition, approximately, truly, relatively-correctly reflected by this knowledge. And so on and so forth without end. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, vol. XIII , pp. 214 - 215, ed. 3rd* )

## **Separation of Motion from Matter Leads to Spiritualism**

The spiritualist is true to himself, tearing motion away from matter. The movement of bodies in nature turns into the movement of what is not a body with constant mass, into the movement of what is an unknown charge of unknown electricity in an unknown ether—this dialectic of *material* the transformations carried out in the laboratory and at the factory, serves in the eyes of idealists (as in the eyes of the general public, as in the eyes of the Machists) a confirmation not of materialistic dialectics, but an argument against materialism: ... “A mechanical theory, as a professed explanation of the world, receives a fatal blow from the progress of mechanical physics itself” (143)... The world is moving matter, we will answer, and the laws of motion of this matter are reflected by mechanics in relation to slow movements, the electromagnetic theory—in relation to movements are fast... “An extended, solid, indestructible atom has always been the backbone of a materialistic view of the world. But unfortunately for these views, the extended atom did not satisfy the demands (was not equal to the demands) that the growing knowledge presented to it “... (144) The destruction of the atom, its inexhaustibility, the variability of all forms of matter and its motion has always been a pillar of dialectical materialism. All facets in nature are conditional, relative, mobile, express the approximation of our mind to the knowledge of matter, but this does not prove at all that nature, matter itself, be a symbol, a

conditional sign, that is, a product of our mind. An electron refers to an atom, as a point in this book refers to a building volume of 30 fathoms long, 15—wide and 7½—heights (Lodge), it moves with speed up to 270,000 kilometres per second, its mass changes with its speed, it makes 500 trillion revolutions per second - all this is much wiser than old mechanics, but all this is the movement of matter in space and in time. The human mind has discovered many outlandish things in nature and will open even more, thereby increasing its power over it, but this does not mean... (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, pp. 230-231, ed. 3rd*)

## **Engels Modern Science and Anti-Dühring**

A year ago, an article by Joseph Dine-Denes was published in the journal *Die Neue Zeit*: “Marxism and the Newest Revolution in Natural Science” (1907, No. 52). The disadvantage of this article is the neglect of the epistemological conclusions that are drawn from the “new” physics and which are of particular interest to us at present. But it is precisely this shortcoming that makes the point of view and conclusions of the mentioned author especially interesting for us. Joseph Dine-Denes stands, like writing these lines, on the point of view of that same “ordinary Marxist” about whom our Machists speak with such magnificent contempt.”For example, Mr. Yushkevich writes, as a materialist dialectic,” he usually calls himself an average, ordinary Marxist “(p. 1 of his book). This same ordinary Marxist in the person of I. Dine-Denes compared the latest discoveries in natural science, and especially in physics (X-rays, Becquerel’s rays, *directly* with the “Anti-Dühring” Engels. What conclusion did this comparison lead to?”In the most diverse fields of natural science,” writes I. Dine-Denes, “new knowledge has been acquired, and they all come down to the point that Engels wanted to highlight, namely, that in nature” there are no irreconcilable opposites, no forcibly fixed demarcation lines and differences “and that if opposites and differences are found in nature, then their stillness, absoluteness are brought into nature exclusively by us.” They discovered, for example, that light and electricity are only manifestations of the same force of nature. Every day it becomes more likely that chemical affinity is reduced to electrical processes. The indestructible and indecomposable elements

of chemistry, the number of which continues to increase precisely as a mockery of the unity of the world, are destructible and degradable. We managed to turn the element of radium into the element of helium. "Just as all the forces of nature are reduced to one force, so all the substances of nature are reduced to *one substance* (italics I. Dine-Denes). Having cited the opinion of one of the writers who consider the atom to be only a condensation of ether, the author exclaims: "How brilliantly confirms Engels saying: motion is a form of being of matter." All natural phenomena are movement, and the difference between them is only in the fact that we humans perceive this movement in various forms... This is exactly the situation as Engels said. In the same way as history, nature is subject to the dialectical law of motion." (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, vol. XIII, pp. 205 - 206, ed. 3rd.*)

## **IV. The Development of Science and Technology in the USSR**

### **Class Struggle in the Field of Science and Technology**

The question of the attitude towards the old, bourgeois industrial-technical intelligentsia is also raised differently.

About two years ago, the situation was with us in such a way that the most qualified part of the old technical intelligentsia was infected with the disease of wrecking. Moreover, sabotage was then a kind of fashion. Some harmed, others covered the pests, others washed their hands and remained neutral, the fourth hesitated between the Soviet government and the wreckers. Of course, most of the old technical intelligentsia continued to work more or less loyally. But this is not about the majority, but about the most qualified part of the technical intelligentsia.

What created the wrecking movement, what did it cultivate? The aggravation of the class struggle within the USSR, the offensive policy of the Soviet government regarding the capitalist elements of the city and the village, the resistance of these latter to the policy of

the Soviet government, the complexity of the international situation, the difficulties of collective and state farm construction. If the activity of the warhead of the pests was reinforced by the interventionist ventures of the imperialists of the capitalist countries and grain difficulties within the country, then the hesitation of another part of the old technical intelligentsia towards active wreckers was intensified by the fashionable conversations of the Trotskyist-Menshevik talkers about the fact that “nothing will come of the collective farms and state farms”. “The Soviet government is still reborn and should soon fall.” It is clear that in this state of affairs, the Soviet government could practice only one single policy in relation to the old technical intelligentsia—the policy of *defeating* active pests, *stratifying* the neutral and *attracting* the loyal.

So it was a year or two ago.

Can we say that we now have the exact same atmosphere? No, this cannot be said. On the contrary, we have now a completely different situation. To begin with, we defeated and successfully overcome the capitalist elements of the city and village. Of course, this cannot please the old intelligentsia. It is very likely that they still express their condolences to their broken friends. But it does not happen that sympathizers and, especially, neutral and vacillating ones voluntarily agree to share the fate of their active friends, after the latter have suffered a cruel and irreparable defeat. Further, we overcame the grain difficulties, and not only overcame, but exported as much bread as we did not export during the Soviet era. Consequently, this “argument” of the hesitant also disappears. Further, now even the blind see that on the front of collective and state farm construction we have definitely won, having achieved the greatest successes. Therefore, the most important thing in the “arsenal” of the old intelligentsia has gone into the abyss. As for the interventionist hopes of the bourgeois intelligentsia, we must admit that they turned out to be - at least for now - a house built on sand. In fact, for six years they promised an intervention and have never tried to intervene. It’s time to admit that our visionary bourgeois intelligentsia was simply led by the nose. I’m not talking about the fact that the very behaviour of active pests at a famous trial in Moscow was supposed to debunk and really debunked the idea of wrecking, the most important thing in the “arsenal” of the old intelligentsia has gone into the abyss. As for the interventionist hopes of the bourgeois intelligentsia, we must admit that they turned out to be - at least for now - a house built on sand. In fact, for six years they

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It is clear that these new circumstances could not remain without influence on our old technical intelligentsia. The new situation was to create and indeed created new moods among the old technical intelligentsia. This, in fact, explains the fact that we have certain signs of turning a certain part of this intelligentsia, which had previously sympathized with pests, towards the Soviet regime. The fact that not only this layer of the old intelligentsia, but even certain yesterday's wreckers, a significant part of yesterday's wreckers begins to work in a number of factories and factories along with the working class, this fact undoubtedly suggests that the turn among the old technical intelligentsia has already begun. This does not mean, of course, that we have no more pests. No, it doesn't. Pests are and will be, as long as we have classes, as long as there is a capitalist environment. But this means that since a significant part of the old technical intelligentsia, who had somehow sympathized with the pests earlier, turned now towards the Soviet regime, there are only a few active pests, they are isolated, and they will have to go deep underground for the time being.

But it follows from this that our policy regarding the old technical intelligentsia must change accordingly. If during the height

of wrecking, our attitude towards the old technical intelligentsia was expressed mainly in the policy of rout, now, during the period when this intelligentsia turned towards the Soviet regime, our attitude towards it should be expressed mainly in the policy of attracting and caring for it. It would be wrong and not dialectical to continue the old policy under the new changed conditions. It would be foolish and unreasonable to consider now almost every specialist and engineer of the old school as an undetected criminal and pest. "Special eating" has always been considered and remains with us a harmful and shameful phenomenon.

*So, to change the attitude to the engineering and technical forces of the old school, to show them more attention and care, more boldly attract them to work—this is the task. (Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 596-598, ed. 9th.)*

The situation has also changed in relation to the commanding staff of industry in general, and in relation to engineering personnel in particular.

Previously, the situation was with us so that the main source of our entire industry was the Ukrainian coal and metallurgical base. Ukraine supplied metal to all of our industrial areas, both the South and Moscow and Leningrad. She supplied coal to our main enterprises in the USSR. I exclude the Urals here, since the proportion of the Urals in comparison with the Donbass was insignificant. In accordance with this, we had three main centres for the development of the command structure of industry: the South, the Moscow region, and the Leningrad region. It is clear that in this state of affairs, we could somehow manage with the minimum of engineering and technical forces that our country could have at that time.

So it was in the recent past.

But now we have a completely different environment. Now it's clear, I think, that while maintaining the current pace of development and the gigantic scale of production, we are no longer able to turn around on the Ukrainian coal-metallurgical base alone. You know that we are already short of Ukrainian coal and metal, despite the increase in their production. You know that we are forced, therefore, to create a new coal and metallurgical base in the East—the Urals—Kuzbass. You know that we are creating this base not without success. But this is not enough. We need to create, further, metallurgy in Siberia itself to meet its growing needs. And we are already creating it. In addition, we need to create a new base of non-ferrous

metallurgy in Kazakhstan, in Turkestan. Finally, we need to develop the broadest railway construction.

But it follows from this that we can no longer do with the minimum of engineering, technical and command forces of industry that we did before. It follows that the old centres of formation of engineering forces are no longer enough, that it is necessary to create a whole network of new centres—in the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia. We now need to provide ourselves three times, five times more with the engineering, technical and command forces of industry, if we really think about implementing the program of socialist industrialization of the USSR.

But we do not need *all sorts of* command and engineering forces. We need *such* command and engineering forces that are able to understand the policies of the working class of our country, are able to assimilate this policy, and are ready to implement it conscientiously. What does it mean? This means that our country has entered such a phase of development when the *working class must create for itself its own production and technical intelligentsia* capable of defending its interests in production as the interests of the ruling class.

Not a single ruling class could do without its own intelligentsia. There is no reason to doubt that the working class of the USSR also cannot do without its own production and technical intelligentsia.

The Soviet government took this circumstance into account and opened the doors of higher educational institutions in all sectors of the national economy for working people. You know that tens of thousands of workers and peasants youth are now studying in higher educational institutions. If earlier, under capitalism, higher education institutions were the monopoly of the Barchuk, now, under the Soviet system, the working-peasant youth is the dominant force there. There is no doubt that we will soon receive from our educational institutions thousands of new technicians and engineers, new commanders of our industry.

But this is only one side of the matter. The other side of the matter is that the production and technical intelligentsia of the working class will be formed not only from people who have completed higher education - it will also be recruited from the practical workers of our enterprises, from skilled workers, from the cultural forces of the working class in the factory, in the factory, in mine. The initiators of the competition, the leaders of the shock

brigades, the practical inspirers of the labour upsurge, the organizers of work at various construction sites—this is the new layer of the working class, which, together with our high school comrades, should constitute the core of the intelligentsia of the working class, the core of the command structure of our industry. The task is not to wipe these initiative comrades, boldly put them to command posts.

Among these comrades there are many non-partisans. But this can not serve as an obstacle to more courageously put forward them to leadership positions. On the contrary, it was them, these non-partisan comrades, who should be given special attention, should be promoted to command posts so that they could see in practice that the party knew how to value capable and talented workers. Some comrades think that only party comrades can be promoted to leadership positions in factories, factories. On this basis, they often wipe out capable and proactive non-partisan comrades, putting forward party members, although less capable and not proactive, to the first place. Needless to say, there is nothing more stupid and reactionary than such, so to speak, “politics”. It’s hardly necessary to prove that such a “policy” can only discredit the party and alienate non-party workers from the party. Our policy is not at all to turn the party into a closed caste. Our policy is that there should be an atmosphere of “mutual trust”, an atmosphere of “mutual verification” between party and non-party workers (*Lenin*). Our party is strong in the working class, by the way, because it pursues such a policy.

*So, to achieve that the working class of the USSR had its own production and technical intelligentsia—such is the task. (Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 594-596, ed. 9th.)*

\* \* \*

Thus, the first condition for fulfilling the plan— “objective” opportunities—we have.

Do we have a second condition - the ability to use these opportunities?

In other words, do we have the right management of factories, plants, mines? Is everything okay here?

Unfortunately, not everything is going well here. And we, as Bolsheviks, must say this directly and openly.

What does it mean to manage production? We do not always look in a Bolshevik way on the question of enterprise management. We often think that to lead is to sign papers. This is sad, but it is a

fact. Sometimes you involuntarily remember Shchedrin's pompadour. Remember how the pompadour taught the young pompadour: don't puzzle over science, don't go into the matter, let others do it, it's not your business, it's up to you to manage, to sign papers. I must admit, to our shame, that among us, the Bolsheviks, there are many who lead by signing papers. But, in order to delve into the matter, master the technology, become the master of the business - on this score—no, no.

How could it happen that we, the Bolsheviks, who made the three revolutions, who emerged victorious from the brutal civil war, solved the major task of creating industry, turned the peasantry on the path of socialism—how could it happen that in the matter of managing production we pass in front of a piece of paper?

The reason here is that signing paper is easier than managing production. And so many business executives took this line of least resistance. There is also our fault, the fault of the centre. About ten years ago, the slogan was given: "Since the Communists still don't understand the production technique, since they still need to learn how to manage the economy, let the old technicians and engineers, specialists, conduct production, and you, the Communists, don't interfere in the technique of business, but, without interfering, learn the technology, study the science of production management tirelessly, so that later you can become, together with our dedicated specialists, real production managers, real business owners. " That was the slogan. And what happened in practice? The second part of this formula was discarded, because it's harder to learn than signing papers, and the first part of the formula was vulgarized, interpreting non-interference as a refusal to study production techniques. It turned out nonsense, harmful and dangerous nonsense, from which the sooner we free ourselves, the better.

Life itself has more than once signalled to us about the troubles in this matter. The Shakhty affair was the first signal. The Shakhty affair showed that party organizations and trade unions lacked revolutionary vigilance. It showed that our business executives were technically ugly behind, that some old engineers and technicians, working uncontrollably, more easily slide down the path of wrecking, especially since enemies from abroad are constantly harassing them with "offers". The second signal is the process of "industrial party". Of course, wrecking is based on the class struggle. Of course, the class enemy fiercely resists the socialist offensive. But this alone is not enough to explain such a magnificent flowering of wrecking.

How could it have happened that wrecking took such a wide scale? Who is to blame for this? We are to blame. If we had set the business of managing the economy differently, if we had much earlier begun to study the technique of the business, to master the technique, if we had more often and intelligently intervened in managing the farm, the pests would not have been able to do so much harm. (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 58 -583, ed. 9th.*)

## **The Importance of Science and Technology for Socialist Construction**

Everyone who carefully watched the life of the village, in comparison with the life of the city, knows that we did not uproot the roots of capitalism and did not undermine the foundation, foundation of the internal enemy. The latter rests on small-scale farming, and in order to undermine it, there is one way - to transfer the country's economy, including agriculture, to a new technical base, to the technical base of modern large-scale production. Such a base is only electricity.

Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country. Otherwise, the country remains small-peasant, and it is necessary that we clearly recognize this. We are weaker than capitalism, not only on a global scale, but also domestically. Everyone knows that. We have recognized this, and we will bring the matter to the point that the economic base from small-peasant is transferred to large-scale. Only when the country is electrified, when the technical base of modern large-scale industry is brought under industry, agriculture and transport, only then we will win completely.

We have already developed a preliminary plan for the electrification of the country, two hundred of our best scientific and technical forces worked on this plan. A plan has been developed that for a long period of years, not less than ten years, gives us the calculation of material and financial. This plan indicates how many millions of barrels of cement and how many millions of bricks we need to conduct electrification. To accomplish the tasks of electrification financially, the calculation was made for 1 - 1.2 billion rubles in gold. You know that we cannot cover all this figure with our gold fund. We also have a small food fund. Therefore, we must cover these calculations with concessions according to the plan of which I

spoke. You will see the calculation of how the restoration of our industry and our transport is planned on this basis.

Not so long ago I had to be at a peasant holiday in a remote area of the Moscow province, in Volokolamsk Uyezd, where the peasants had electric lighting. A rally was organized on the street, and one of the peasants came out and began to speak, in which he welcomed this new event in the life of the peasants. He said that we peasants were dark, and now we have a light, “an unnatural light that will illuminate our peasant darkness.” I personally was not surprised at these words. Of course, for a non-partisan peasant mass, electric light is “unnatural” light, but it is unnatural for us that for hundreds, thousands of years peasants and workers could live in such darkness, in poverty, in oppression by the landowners and capitalists. You won’t jump out of this darkness soon. But we need to achieve at the moment that every power plant, what we built was really turning into a pillar of enlightenment so that it would deal, so to speak, with the electrical education of the masses. We have a developed electrification plan, but the implementation of this plan is designed for years. At all costs, we must implement this plan and shorten its implementation time. It should be the same thing that happened with one of our first economic plans, with the plan for the restoration of transport—Order No. 1042, which was designed for 5 years, but has now been reduced to 3½ years, since it is being fulfilled beyond the norm. At all costs, we must implement this plan and shorten its implementation time. It should be the same thing that happened with one of our first economic plans, with the plan for the restoration of transport - Order No. 1042, which was designed for 5 years, but has now been reduced to 3½ years, since it is being fulfilled beyond the norm. At all costs, we must implement this plan and shorten its implementation time. It should be the same thing that happened with one of our first economic plans, with the plan for the restoration of transport—Order No. 1042, which was designed for 5 years, but has now been reduced to 3½ years, since it is being fulfilled beyond the norm.

But you need to know and remember that it is impossible to conduct electrification when we have illiterates. Not only will our commission try to eradicate illiteracy. She has done a lot in comparison with what was, but little in comparison with what is needed. Besides literacy, cultural, conscious, educated workers are needed; it is necessary that the majority of peasants definitely imagine the tasks that confront us. This party program should be the main book, which should go to all schools. You will receive in it, next to

the general electrification plan, special plans written for each region of Russia. Each comrade who travels to places will have a certain development of electrification in his area, the transition from darkness to normal existence...

The best workers, business executives, specialists completed their task to develop a plan for the electrification of Russia and the restoration of its economy. Now we need to ensure that the workers and peasants know how great and difficult this task is, how to begin it and how to tackle it.

It is necessary to ensure that every factory, every power station turns into a centre of enlightenment, and if Russia is covered by a dense network of power stations and powerful technical equipment, then our communist economic construction will become a model for the coming socialist Europe and Asia. (*Lenin, VIII Congress of Soviets (1920), Op., Vol. XXVI, p. 46-48, ed. 3rd.*)

## **To Build Communism, it is Necessary to Draw Up the Basis of Modern Technology in Industry and Agriculture**

... We know that a communist society cannot be built unless industry and agriculture are revived, and it is not necessary to revive them in the old way. It is necessary to revive them on a modern, state-of-the-art science basis. You know that this foundation is electricity, that only when there will be electrification of the whole country, of all branches of industry and agriculture, when you master this task, only then can you build for yourself a communist society that the old generation cannot build. You are faced with the task of economic revival of the whole country, the reorganization, restoration of both agriculture and industry on a modern technical basis, which rests on modern science, technology, and electricity. You understand very well that illiterate people will not fit electrification, and there is little simple literacy here. It is not enough to understand what electricity is: one needs to know how to technically apply it to industry, and to agriculture, and to individual industries and agriculture. We must learn this ourselves, we must teach this to the whole rising working generation. This is the task facing every conscious communist, every young man who considers himself a communist and clearly realizes that he, having entered the communist youth union, has taken on the

task of helping the party build communism and helping the entire young generation create a communist society. He must understand that only on the basis of modern education can he create it, and if he does not have this education, communism will remain only a wish. (*Lenin, Speech at the III All-Russian Congress of the RKSM (1920), Soch., Vol. XXV, p. 389, ed. 3rd*)

## **The Tasks of Introducing Mechanization**

The XVII Party Conference draws the attention of all party organizations and industry itself to the need for accelerated mechanization of labour-intensive and difficult work both in production and in construction, especially in such industries as coal mining, metallurgy, mining, logging, peat mining, transportation and loading and unloading.

The widespread introduction of mechanization becomes absolutely necessary both for the successful implementation of the production and construction plan, requiring the movement of huge cargo flows, and for the replacement of manual labour in hard work and in hazardous industries.

The Conference considers it necessary that already in the plan of 1932 an enhanced supply of the listed industries with mechanisms and means of railway and road transport be provided.

The basis for all further development of industry should be a rapid increase in labour productivity, which becomes quite feasible thanks to the introduction of new machines and equipment. This year, a particularly urgent need to mobilize all internal industry resources and all hidden opportunities, based on the enormous tasks of technical reconstruction (including the task of the correct geographical location of the industry and the technical combination of related industries), requires exceptional attention to quality indicators—as economic (cost price), labour productivity, etc.), as well as technical, constituting their material basis (proper use of machine capacities and units, the corresponding utilization rates of the furnaces, the proper speed of technological processes, etc.).

Rationalization and standardization of production, the most severe savings in the consumption of materials, especially scarce, saving metal and fuel per unit of product, the widespread introduction

of electro-autogenous welding, the full development of new technological processes, merciless fight against losses, ensuring product quality, especially in metallurgy, starting from the quality of the ore to the finished products, all these are necessary prerequisites for improving quality indicators and growing intra-industrial accumulation. These tasks dictate the further development of the process of mastering technology on the basis of ever closer cooperation of research institutions with industry and, in particular, on the basis of a *decisive strengthening of factory laboratories* and their organization in large new buildings. The work of research institutes should in no way be limited to the walls of laboratories, but it must be brought to the stage of setting up work in factories. The attention of scientific research institutions should be especially keen on the tasks put forward by the plan of 1932. The attention of a technical asset and business executives should be sharply focused on the tasks of technical management. Only under such conditions will it be possible to triumphantly solve the tasks put forward by the plan of 1932 (*From the resolution of the XVII Conference of the CPSU (B.) On the Report of Comrade Ordzhonikidze.*)

## **On the Training of Technical Personnel**

The Bolshevik pace of technical re-equipment of the national economy requires a huge increase in skilled labour and the rapid growth of technical personnel in industry. These unprecedented rates and the need for the development of new technological processes by wide layers of workers and engineering workers, including the huge masses of new workers, make it necessary, in addition to the planned training of personnel in the entire system of in-house training, the *wide development of production and technical propaganda*. Noting the underestimation of the importance of this matter by economic authorities and trade unions, the conference considers it necessary to provide an adequate material basis for the implementation in 1932 of a broad plan of work on industrial and technical propaganda, in particular on the translation and publication of manuals and technical guides for all industries.

The training of personnel, quantitatively and qualitatively corresponding to the enormous development of socialist industry, is an

indispensable condition for the successful implementation of the 1932 plan. This applies to both lower, middle, and higher technical personnel, personnel of research workers and retraining of foremen, and it is especially important to pay attention for retraining of personnel on technical standardization. It is necessary to achieve advanced training for these personnel, ensuring a qualitative side in the entire system of stationary education. The highest engineering staff should be at the height of modern world technology, with full knowledge of the specific conditions of our economy. Theoretical training in high schools should be accompanied by practical experience in enterprises,

The conference pays special attention to the need to develop a broad scientific and technical community, from a working asset in enterprises (drummers, inventors, rationalizers) to scientific and technical societies. Only with the deployment of this public, in connection with the growth of socialist competition, the wide exchange of experience, etc., can the process of mass growth of the technical personnel of socialist industry be accelerated. The preparation of the technically cultured broad masses of the working class and the training of specialist engineers who are truly capable of responsible leadership in the work on the basis of the latest technology is the task. (*From the resolution of the XVII Conference of the CPSU (B) on the report of Comrade Ordzhonikidze.*)

## **The Main Economic Task of the Second Five-Year Plan**

Successes in the implementation of the first five-year plan laid the foundation for the further even more powerful growth of socialism in the USSR.

The XVII Conference of the CPSU (B) considers that the country's vast natural wealth, the Bolshevik pace of socialist construction, the growing activity of the broad masses of workers and collective farmers and the correct line of the party fully ensure such a deployment of the productive forces of the socialist economy in the second five-year period, on the basis of which the capitalist elements will be finally eliminated. in USSR. The conference considers that the main political task of the second five-year plan is the final elimination of capitalist elements and classes in general, the complete destruction

of the causes of class distinctions and exploitation, and the overcoming of the vestiges of capitalism in the economy and consciousness of people, the transformation of the entire working population of the country into conscious and active builders of a classless socialist society.

On the basis of the elimination of the parasitic class elements and the general growth of the national income, wholly at the disposal of the working people, a much faster rise in the well-being of the workers and peasant masses should be achieved, and at the same time a decisive improvement in the entire housing and communal services in the USSR. The conference considers that the provision of the population with basic consumer goods, including food items, should increase by at least two to three times by the end of the second five-year period against the end of the first five-year period.

1. The implementation of these tasks is possible only on the basis of a detailed *technical reconstruction of the entire national economy* - industry, transport, agriculture.

By the beginning of the first five-year plan, the USSR had basically completed the recovery period and in recent years had embarked on the path of reconstruction in a number of basic sectors of the national economy, in particular in metallurgy, mechanical engineering, and the coal industry, not to mention the reconstruction carried out earlier in the oil industry. A special place is occupied by the widespread reconstruction of agriculture, which is rapidly rebuilding on a new technical basis.

The successes achieved in the first five-year period in this area are, however, only the beginning of the technical reconstruction of the national economy. Meanwhile, with the present insufficient, and also obsolete and worn-out equipment of industry and transport, not to mention agriculture, without technical reconstruction in all sectors of the economy, without bringing under them the latest machinery, it is impossible to ensure the Bolshevik pace of socialist construction, which requires the implementation of the main tasks of the second five-year plan.

Therefore, the XVII Conference of the CPSU (B) Believes that *the main and decisive economic task of the second five-year plan is to complete the reconstruction of the entire national economy and create the latest technical base for all sectors of the national economy. (From the resolution of the XVII Conference of the CPSU (B.) On the reports of Comrades Molotov and Kuibyshev.)*

## **Master the Technique**

We must become specialists ourselves, master of the business, we must turn our faces to technical knowledge—that is where life pushed us. But neither the first signal, nor even the second signal provided the necessary turn. It's time, it's time to turn to the technology. It is time to discard the old slogan, which has outlived the slogan of non-interference in technology, and become experts themselves, experts in the business, become the full masters of the business.

They often ask why we do not have one-man management? He is not and will not be until we master the technique. Until among us, among the Bolsheviks, there will be a sufficient number of people who are well acquainted with issues of technology, economics and finance, we will not have real unity of command. Write as many resolutions as you like, swear by whatever you like, but if you don't master the technology, economics, finances of the plant, factory, mine—there will be no sense, there will be no one-man management.

The task, therefore, is to master the technology ourselves, to become the masters of the business ourselves. Only this is the guarantee that our plans will be fully implemented, and one-man management will be carried out.

This business, of course, is not easy, but quite surmountable. Science, technical experience, knowledge—all this business is acquired. Today they are not, and tomorrow they will be. The main thing here is to have a passionate Bolshevik desire to master technology, to master the science of production. With longing, you can achieve everything, you can overcome everything...

I can't say that nothing has been done with us over the years in managing the economy. Done, and even a lot. We doubled industrial output compared to pre-war. We have created the world's largest agricultural production. But we could have done even more if we had tried during this time to really master production, its equipment, its financial and economic side.

A maximum of ten years, we must run the distance by which we are behind the advanced countries of capitalism. For this we have all the “objective” possibilities. The only thing missing is the ability to truly use these opportunities. And it depends on us. *Only* from us! It’s time for us to learn how to use these opportunities. It’s time to put an end to the rotten installation of non-interference in production. It’s time to learn another, new, relevant to the current period installation: to intervene in everything. If you are the director of a plant, intervene in all matters, delve into everything, do not miss anything, study and study again. The Bolsheviks must master the technique. It is time for the Bolsheviks to become experts themselves. Equipment during the reconstruction period is everything. And a business executive who does not want to learn technology, who does not want to master technology, is a joke, not a business executive.

They say that it’s hard to master the technique. Wrong! There are no such fortresses that the Bolsheviks could not take. We have solved a number of difficult tasks. We have overthrown capitalism. We took power. We have built the largest socialist industry. We turned the middle peasant on the path of socialism. The most important in terms of construction, we have already done. We have little left: to study technology, to master science. And when we do this, we will go at a pace that we don’t even dare to dream about now. And we will do it if we really want it! (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 583, 585, ed. 9th.*)

## **The Need to Fight on Two Fronts in Science and Technology**

1. The USSR entered the period of socialism, the stage is completing the foundation of the socialist economy, the stage of “restructuring all organs of the proletarian dictatorship, party, trade union, Soviet and cooperative organizations under the slogan of mobilizing the masses for the Bolshevik pace of socialist reconstruction” (Resolution of the 16th Party Congress). This restructuring should also extend to research work in engineering, science and medicine.

2. The socialist reconstruction of the entire economy of the USSR requires, in contrast to the capitalist system of the economy, the conscious and planned management of the construction of all science,

in particular science. By assimilating and applying all the real achievements of science in capitalist society, we must reorganize the forms of organization of science and reprocess its very content on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology. An irreconcilable struggle is necessary against all manifestations in science in general, in natural science in particular, the ideology of classes that are hostile to the proletariat and with attempts to restore this ideology.

This perestroika presupposes further working out the composition of scientific workers, strengthening the communist core among them, changing the forms of work in the direction of direct connection with the broadest masses of working people, and focusing attention on problems that are most important for socialist construction.

3. The right line of the party, the unprecedented growth of our economy, and in connection with it the growth of science, have led to a number of successes in putting science at the service of socialist construction. A significant part of specialists in the field of technical and natural sciences is actively involved in construction; among scientists, the necessity of turning science to socialist construction is becoming more and more recognized; interest of a wide mass of natural scientists in dialectical materialism has significantly increased, although the workers and communist cadres of natural scientists have grown, although not enough, natural Marxist literature has been growing, scientific Marxist societies are growing, the influence and participation of communists in natural science congresses has increased.

4. The noted successes, however, do not cover significant breakthroughs on the front of natural science. These include, first of all, the lag of theory from practice. The position ascertained by Comrade Stalin at the conference of agrarian-Marxists on economics, "the insurrection of theory behind the practical successes of socialist construction," entirely refers to the natural-science front. The growth of socialist construction along the lines of industry and agriculture, the formulation of a number of new problems in these areas, as well as in Soviet health care, in the defence of the country, etc., are ahead of the growth of theoretical work in the field of natural science. The quantitative and qualitative growth of science workers in general, and especially their working, communist stratum, is completely insufficient.

There was no work on the reconstruction of science based on the methodology of dialectical materialism; the problem of partisanship in science was not posed; at the same time, the struggle against hostile

organizational and ideological trends in the field of scientific research was completely insufficient and was not conducted from an orthodox-Marxist standpoint.

5. The struggle for the reconstruction of science, advanced by the tasks of socialist construction, is complicated at this stage by increased resistance to socialist construction of class forces hostile to the proletariat. This resistance is expressed on the natural science front both in open struggle through wrecking (Shpitalsky in chemistry, etc.), and in ideological movements hostile to the proletariat in the person of Machism (Frenkel in physics), vitalism (A. Gurvich, Berg, Sobolev, Lyubishchev in biology), reactionary political conclusions from natural science (Savich—the doctrine of higher nervous activity, Koltsov—in eugenics, etc.).

In the struggle for the reconstruction of science on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist methodology, it is important to expose all kinds of pseudo-Marxist trends such as Kornilovism, Bechterevisism in psychology, Serebrovsky in biology and a number of areas in other fields of science that are a form of adaptation to Marxism-Leninism under the dictatorship of the proletariat creatures displaying the pressure of the class enemy on the ideology of the proletariat.

6. The growth of hostile sentiments manifests itself in world science in the expulsion of the materialistic worldview from the natural sciences, in more and more propaganda through the scientific literature of religious and mystical ideas, in the rotation of a considerable number of natural scientists in the direction of spiritualism, occultism, parapsychics (Schneider, Drish), in a decisive struggle against the revolutionary significance of Darwinism, which in America took medieval forms of the “monkey process”, attempts to create higher institutions of science based on the Bible (Bryan University), in propaganda from special departments in the philosophy of natural science hostile to materialism, philosophical teachings (in Berlin—Reichenbach, in Vienna—M. Schlick, in Munich—G. Dingler, in Prague—Frank, etc.).

Generated by the gigantic advances in technology, the enormous accumulation of new factual material, the revolutionary breakdown of natural science theories in the conditions of the decomposition of capitalist society, with only a handful of naturalist communists in capitalist countries, is used by idealistic and philosophical schools that hold their views in the formulations of various natural science theories (Machist an idealistic interpretation of the theory of relativity by Einstein by Eddington, Weil et al .; Machist tract the study of wave

mechanics by Heisenberg, Schrödinger, the idealistic school in Krell's pathology, the idealistic schools in psychology—Stern, Adler).

The growth of the socialist construction of the USSR and its strengthening as a factor in the world proletarian revolution lead at the same time to further stratification among the scholars of Western Europe and America in the sense of most of them leaving for the camp of classes hostile to the proletariat (Einstein). Attitude towards wrecking in the USSR and attempts at intervention). Social democracy acts as social fascism not only in politics but also in ideology and contributes to the fascization of science (the writings of Kautsky, F. Adler, etc.).

7. Under the conditions of an ever-growing class struggle within and outside the USSR, the struggle for the purity of the party line in the field of theory is becoming especially important. The greatest danger in this regard is the mechanistic deviation from the philosophy of dialectical materialism, which is objectively an expression of the influence of ideologies hostile to the proletariat.

Mechanists (Timiryazev, Varyash, Sarabyanov, Obukh and others) emasculate the entire revolutionary content of Marxism and replace it with the philosophy of bourgeois naturalists, restoring the methodology of vulgar mechanism. In solving a number of theoretical problems of natural science, mechanists intertwine with reactionary-idealistic concepts (the problem of life, the problem of adaptation, the problem of behavior, etc.).

On the other hand, the mechanistic views and the whole system of the mechanistic worldview are at this stage the theoretical and methodological basis of the right deviation.

8. The tasks of leadership on the natural science front in the USSR are in the struggle for the Bolshevization of science, for the general line of the party. The fight must be fought relentlessly, exposing all the modern “certified lackeys of priesthood”, it does not matter whether they act as representatives of official science or as free shooters who call themselves “democratic left or ideological-socialist publicists” (*Lenin*).

9. Summing up the work done by the section (now an association) of the natural sciences of the Communist Academy, a number of achievements and successes should be noted. These include primarily:

- a) the quantitative growth of the association itself;
- b) strengthening the influence on significant strata of natural scientists by organizing a number of Marxist societies (the society of

physicists, mathematicians, doctors, biologists, neuropsychiatrists, geologists);

c) participation of the association in a number of natural science congresses (congress on behaviour, physiologists, zoologists, mathematicians, physicists), where representatives of the Communist Academy, leading the materialist wing, influenced the work of the congress;

d) the propaganda and literary activities of the association (organization of lectures, reports, the creation of the theoretical journal "Natural History and Marxism", the publication of individual monographic works, the organization of courses for teachers, etc.);

e) the struggle, although insufficient in scope and not orthodox-Marxist in nature, with the mechanists, as well as with the open speeches of idealists.

10. Noting the indicated achievements, it should be said that the natural-science leadership (Schmidt, Levin, Levitic, Hesse, Agol) did not implement the party's general line at the front of science, did not take into account the shifts associated with the entry of the USSR into the era of socialism, and did not understand the tasks that dictated by the accelerating pace of socialist construction, the aggravation of the class struggle.

The natural-science leadership directly closed with the group of Deborin, Karev, Stan, and others, either actively supporting it in the struggle against partisanship in philosophy and natural science (Levin, Leviticus, Agol, Hessen), or they are conciliatory, essentially defending it (Schmidt).

Defending the wrong line of the group of Deborin, Karev, Stan and holding responsibility for this line as a whole, the natural science leadership itself perverted the understanding of the problem of partisanship in science, took the anti-Marxist path, allowing theory to be separated from practice.

11. Comrades from the natural science leadership, recognizing in words the need to develop and apply materialistic dialectics in natural science, in a number of their works identify the latest works of bourgeois naturalists with Marxism, thereby capitulating to bourgeois science. Lenin, analysing the process of deep revolutionary breakdown in all areas of natural science, emphasized that the task of the Marxist naturalists is to process the gains made by bourgeois scholars, to reduce their reactionary tendency, to reduce their line and fight the entire line of those hostile to us forces and classes. " The comrades from the natural science leadership neglected these

instructions of Lenin. So Comrade Hesse uncritically states in his pamphlet on the theory of relativity, that “in the field of physics, the views of the theory of relativity on space and time basically coincide with the view of dialectical materialism on the relationship of space, time and matter.” Of course, a critical attitude to the theory of relativity should not be accompanied by a sweeping denial of its physical side, as mechanists do (Timiryazev); the views developed by Timiryazev on this issue have nothing to do with Marxism. Leviticus identifies modern genetics with dialectical materialism in biology. The comrades enumerated did not cut off reactionary philosophical tendencies in these theories and identified them with Marxism.

12. At the same time, comrades from the natural science leadership underestimated the significance of the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin for the natural sciences. At the same time, not only was the theoretical legacy of Marx, Engels and Lenin not developed (in the journal *Natural Science and Marxism* there was not a single article devoted to Engels’ *Dialectics of Nature* or Lenin’s works dealing with the problems of natural science), but there were attempts to directly revise Marxism-Leninism in the interpretation of a number of natural science problems. With the approval and support of comrades Leviticus, Levine and Agol in the journal. “Natural science and Marxism” was written (Serebrovsky) that in the field of evolutionary theory Engels “only sought to be on par with the science of that time.”

13. In relation to Lenin, underestimation was expressed by the indicated group of comrades from the natural science leadership of the Communist Academy in the misunderstanding that in natural science Leninism is “Marxism of the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution”, that Lenin gave an analysis of the situation that was created in the field of natural science in the era imperialism and the proletarian revolution and defined the task and tactics of the proletariat on this front. In contrast to what was said in resolution II of the conference of Marxist-Leninist institutions, according to Comrade Schmidt’s report, it is written: “In natural science, after Engels, Marxism was hardly developed, and only Lenin has relatively few genius pages, however.” There is a complete misunderstanding and belittling of the role of Lenin.

14. The errors of the mechanistic order, which in many cases develop into idealistic ones, include, first of all, the metaphysical interpretation of the problem of chance in Hesse and Agol; mechanistic and metaphysical interpretation of the problems of

the body and evolution, external and internal in connection with the problems of genetics in Agol, Leviticus and Levine; mechanistic and metaphysical interpretation of causality, physiological and evolutionary correlations in Serebrovsky with the support of Agol, Levit, Levin. Levin's underestimation of the danger of Helmholtz's mechanistic views (vol. XIII, note, foreign publication of op. Lenin), the same Dühring (vol. XIII), the same Weismann (TSB), etc. belong to the same category of errors.

Mechanistic is the reduction of social to biological in Comrade Serebrovsky. With the support of Levit, Agol and Levin, Comrade Serebrovsky replaces the struggle for the party's general line with the problem of improving the gene pool (five-year plan in 2½ years), which makes an objectively politically reactionary mistake.

Comrade Hesse makes a blatantly idealistic order by asserting that "matter is a synthesis of space and time," and uncritically assimilating some of the Machists' positions on movement. Agol also makes idealistic mistakes in the interpretation of expediency and causality (article in the journal. "Natural History and Marxism" No. 1-5 of 1930).

15. The natural science leadership has waged a completely inadequate struggle against idealism. Natural science is completely not used in the work of all bodies of the association, including the societies of the Communist Academy, for anti-religious struggle. "The most important thing - most often this is what our supposedly Marxist, but really communist ugly Marxists forget—to be able to interest the completely undeveloped masses with a conscious attitude to religious issues and a conscious criticism of religion" (*Lenin*).

The struggle against deviations from Marxist-Leninist philosophy among naturalists and, above all, with the main danger in this regard—mechanism—was completely insufficient. The mechanics not only freely deployed their propaganda activities within the walls of sectional institutions, but until recently had their organizational arrangements under the flag of the so-called section of Timiryazev's work, having become isolated in a group with a group platform and work plan. Of particular note is the deployment by mechanists of the work in society "Leninism in medicine" (Obukh group); against her, the natural science association of the Communist Academy was not able to launch a struggle in a timely manner.

16. The noted incorrect attitudes and mistakes of the comrades from the natural science leadership affected the literary products that came out under the responsibility of these comrades. The journal

Natural Science and Marxism did not publish a single article on socialist construction and the defence of the party's general line, and was essentially a group organ of naturalists who supported philosophical leadership.

In the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, led by the responsible editor, chairman of the Association of Natural Sciences of the Communist Academy, Comrade Schmidt, the natural sciences department should be qualified as basically non-Marxist.

In a number of important ideological articles ("Waves" written by the Machist Frank, "Harvey", "Substance", "Vitalism", "Anthropotechnics", "Axiom", "Suggestion" "Weismann", "Probability", "Attraction", "Berg", "Baer" (and others) gives an anti-Marxist interpretation of the subject and anti-Marxist orientation of the broad cadre of readers. In addition, the editors of the natural sciences department of the TSB made political mistakes in organizing and selecting editorial and authorial staff, not attracting to this work the existing and growing Marxist, communist cadres of natural scientists, using for this work the reactionary circles of natural scientists, working together with them in the spirit of liberalism, in the spirit of tolerance for their non-Marxist views.

Comrade Levitte's article in the fifth issue of the journal Under the Banner of Marxism, devoted to the 16th Party Congress, is Menshevik in character.

17. A number of errors were made by the management of the association and in the area of organizational and practical work. In particular, it did not organize the naturalist communist community, which is most evident when the association is separated from the IKP F and E. The practice of gravity reigned in the deployment of a network of research institutions, and the ideological and political leadership of the work was not adequately provided, for which indicates a large contamination of the composition of scientists by socially alien elements and the fact that the scientific institutes of the association are still not much different from similar ones that are not part of the Communist academy institutions.

18. Until now, the activities of scientific societies in the association of natural sciences have been of an academic and apolitical nature. Societies did not manage to organize the masses around the problems posed by socialist construction, did not wage an active struggle for the propaganda of Marxism and the struggle against deviations from it among natural scientists, relying entirely on gravity in their work. The positive role of these societies in the sense of

creating new Marxist cadres is also insignificant. The influence of these societies did not go beyond the boundaries of the Comacademy and did not play any leading role in the activities of similar societies outside the Comacademy, including in the provinces.

The conquest and restructuring of natural science on a Marxist basis, its participation in socialist construction require a rapid growth rate of the natural workers and communist cadres. Natural science leadership, the problem of personnel has not been developed and posed. Moreover, the positions of the natural science leadership led to the disorientation of the few existing Marxist cadres.

19. The whole system of anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist errors of natural science leadership is a form of manifestation on the natural science front of Menshevik idealism, which has emerged on the general front of the struggle against Marxism-Leninism (Rubinism in political economics, reverberation in literary criticism, the anti-Marxist deviation of Deborin's group. ) The anti-Marxist errors of the natural science leadership were combined with the fact that instead of facilitating the deployment of Bolshevik self-criticism among natural scientists, it counteracted it and thereby deepened its mistakes and locked itself in a group divorced from the masses, leading a common group line with the so-called philosophical leadership (platform 10, etc.).

This must be emphasized, especially since the natural-science front is one of the sections of the theoretical front that are the most backward and least provided with Marxist cadres. All this leads to the fact that the situation on the natural science front is currently more difficult than on the philosophical one.

20. The responsibility for the situation on the natural science front lies not only with the associations of natural sciences, but also with the presidium of the Communist Academy, which did not pay enough attention to the general political attitude and did not exercise sufficient control over work on the front of the natural sciences. The Presidium of the Communist Academy underestimated the importance of natural science in socialist construction and in the party's theoretical struggle. In the general system of institutions of the Communist Academy, the association of natural sciences was not placed in the appropriate conditions for the deployment of work.

A. For the actual implementation of the turn, the association of natural sciences must reorganize all its work on the following principles:

1. Bolshevik partisanship, everyday irreconcilable struggle for the party's general line.

2. Direct participation in socialist construction, party methodological influence on all research work in the USSR.

3. "Waging a war" with all directions in the natural sciences hostile to dialectical materialism, with all varieties of idealism, with all perversions of Marxism-Leninism, with mechanistic danger as the main one, showing at the same time a special vigilance to the Menshevik idealism of the group of Deborin, Karev, Stan and those who walked with natural scientists—Levine, Leviticus, Agol, etc.

4. Ensuring the development of the legacy of Marx, Engels, and especially Lenin on the issues of the methodology of natural science, reconstruction of the natural and mathematical sciences on the basis of materialist dialectics, propaganda and the spread of the influence of Marxist-Leninist thought in the field of natural science both in the USSR and internationally (creating a special bulletin etc.).

5. The maximum concentration of Marxist-Leninist cadres of natural scientists, the decisive nomination and planned accelerated training of new working communist cadres.

6. Strict planning and discipline, self-criticism, socialist competition and shock work, team work, verification of performance. (*From a resolution of the Presidium of the Comacademy on the report of Schmidt and A. Maximov on the situation on the front of natural sciences.*)

## **About Oversimplification and Oversimplification**

One must not forget Lenin's indication that "... that without a solid philosophical foundation no natural sciences, no materialism can withstand the struggle against the onslaught of bourgeois ideas and the restoration of the bourgeois worldview. In order to withstand this struggle and conduct it to the end with complete success, the natural scientist must be a modern materialist, a conscious supporter of the materialism that is represented by Marx, that is, he must be a dialectical materialist" (*Lenin, vol. XXVII, p. 187*).

Our scientists must carefully, systematically study dialectical materialism, they must take under fire all propaganda of clericalism, idealism in all their forms and manifestations. No matter how hard the

proponents of mechanism try to remove the task of the struggle for dialectics, this task—the struggle for dialectical materialism against the bourgeois worldview—is *and will be on our order of the day*.

However, this struggle cannot be waged in the manner of declarations, spells, verbal hype. First of all, a scientific worker is required to seriously master his specialty, to know his scientific field, to work hard in it—only under this condition a real struggle against the bourgeois worldview and the victory of the dialectical method are possible. Without this condition, the declaration of partisanship in science is *worthless*. What is the use of the declaration “for partisanship in mathematics” if people throwing out this slogan do not know mathematics. You can swear allegiance to dialectical materialism dozens of times and demand its implementation in mathematics, but all these oaths and statements are *an empty phrase* if they are not supported by knowledge of the subject itself, its method, its problems, understanding of how and in what way *specifically in this discipline* a bourgeois worldview is manifested.

It is also time among non-partisan specialists to put forward a more qualified propaganda of Marxism-Leninism and materialist dialectics.

We cannot show non-partisan how to conduct a domain process on the basis of Marxism-Leninism or how to paint pictures or build houses on the basis of materialist dialectics. And the one who undertakes this is the *charlatan*. But to give them the best works of the founders of Marxism, to deliver practical lectures on the issues of dialectics, to show how Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin in their works carried out the dialectical method—this is not only we can, *but we must certainly* do. And those scientists who sincerely come to us, learning from Marx and Lenin, they will take care and think about how to apply the dialectical method in their field on the basis of their knowledge, factual material, a real understanding of the problems of their science.

And finally, about scientific societies. Around the Comacademy a decent network of societies formed: physiologists-Marxists, doctors-Marxists, mathematicians, etc.

All these societies are almost entirely communist. They locked themselves in their shells and fenced off from the wide societies of Soviet specialists. Is it not time to remove these partitions here, the Communists to enter into the broad societies of Soviet specialists, hand in hand with them, and arguing, when necessary, to work on

resolving scientific problems, not in words, but in practice? (*Stetsky, Pravda, June 4, 1932*)

# **CHAPTER SIX. THE LENINIST STAGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS AND THE STRUGGLE ON TWO FRONTS IN THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY**

## **I. Leninism and Its Historical Roots**

### **The Historical Roots of Leninism**

To expound the foundations of Leninism—this does not mean expounding the foundations of Lenin’s worldview. Lenin’s worldview and the foundations of Leninism are not the same in volume. Lenin is a Marxist, and the foundation of his worldview is, of course, Marxism. But it does not at all follow from this that the exposition of Leninism should begin with an exposition of the foundations of Marxism. To expound Leninism means to expound that particular and new in the writings of Lenin that Lenin introduced into the general treasury of Marxism and which is naturally connected with his name. Only in this sense will I speak in my lectures on the foundations of Leninism.

So what is Leninism?

Some say that Leninism is the application of Marxism to the peculiar conditions of the Russian situation. There is some truth in this definition, but it far from exhausts the whole truth. Lenin really applied Marxism to Russian reality and applied it expertly. But if Leninism was only the application of Marxism to the peculiar situation in Russia, then Leninism would be a purely national and only national, purely Russian and only Russian phenomenon. Meanwhile, we know that Leninism is an international phenomenon, rooted in all international development, and not just Russian. That is why I believe that this definition suffers from one-sidedness.

Others say that Leninism is a revival of the revolutionary elements of Marxism of the 1940s. Unlike Marxism in the following years, when it seemed to be moderate, non-revolutionary. If we ignore this stupid and vulgar division of the teachings of Marx into two parts, the revolutionary and the moderate, we must admit that even in this completely insufficient and unsatisfactory definition there is some truth. It consists, this share of truth, that Lenin really revived the revolutionary content of Marxism, which was stained by the opportunists of the Second International. But this is only a fraction of the truth. The whole truth about Leninism is that Leninism not only revived Marxism, but it took a further step forward, developing Marxism further under the new conditions of capitalism and the class struggle of the proletariat.

What, after all, is Leninism?

Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution. More precisely: Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular. Marx and Engels laboured during the pre-revolutionary period (we mean the proletarian revolution), when there was still no developed imperialism, during the preparation of the proletarians for the revolution, at a time when the proletarian revolution was not yet a direct practical inevitability. Lenin, a disciple of Marx and Engels, laboured during the period of developed imperialism, during the unfolding proletarian revolution, when the proletarian revolution had already triumphed in one country, defeated bourgeois democracy and opened the era of proletarian democracy, the era of soviets.

That is why Leninism is a further development of Marxism.

They note, as a rule, the exclusively militant and exclusively revolutionary character of Leninism. This is absolutely correct. But

this peculiarity of Leninism is explained by two reasons: firstly, by the fact that Leninism emerged from the proletarian revolution, the imprint of which it cannot but bear on itself; secondly, by the fact that he grew and became stronger in the battles with opportunism of the Second International, the struggle against which was and is a necessary precondition for a successful struggle against capitalism. It should not be forgotten that between Marx and Engels, on the one hand, and between Lenin, on the other, lies a whole strip of undivided domination of opportunism of the Second International, a merciless struggle against which could not but constitute one of the most important tasks of Leninism. (*Stalin, On the Foundations of Leninism, "Questions of Leninism," pp. 5-6, ed. 9th.*)

## **Leninism - Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions**

Leninism grew and took shape under the conditions of imperialism, when the contradictions of capitalism reached an extreme point, when the proletarian revolution became a matter of direct practice, when the old period of preparing the working class for the revolution rested and grew into a new period of direct assault on capitalism.

Lenin called imperialism “dying capitalism.” Why? Because imperialism brings the contradictions of capitalism to the last line, to the extremes beyond which the revolution begins. The most important of these contradictions should be considered three contradictions.

*The first contradiction* is the contradiction between labour and capital. Imperialism is the omnipotence of monopolistic trusts and syndicates, banks and the financial oligarchy in industrial countries. In the fight against this omnipotence, the usual methods of the working class—trade unions and cooperatives, parliamentary parties, and parliamentary struggles—proved completely inadequate. Either surrender to capital, vegetate in the old way and go down, or take on new weapons—this is how imperialism poses the question to the millions of proletariat masses. Imperialism brings the working class to revolution.

*Second contradiction*— This is a contradiction between various financial groups and imperialist powers in their struggle for sources of raw materials, for foreign territories. Imperialism is the export of

capital to the sources of raw materials, a frantic struggle for the monopoly possession of these sources, a struggle for the redivision of the already divided world, a struggle waged with particular frenzy by the new financial groups and powers seeking “places in the sun” against the old groups and powers, tenaciously holding on to the captured. This frantic struggle between various groups of capitalists is remarkable in that it includes imperialist wars, wars for the seizure of foreign territories as an inevitable element. This circumstance, in turn, is remarkable in the sense that it leads to a mutual weakening of the imperialists, to a weakening of the position of capitalism in general,

*Third contradiction*— this is a contradiction between a handful of dominant “civilized” nations and between hundreds of millions of colonial and dependent peoples of the world. Imperialism is the most arrogant exploitation and the most inhuman oppression of hundreds of millions of people in vast colonies and dependent countries. Squeezing superprofits is the purpose of this exploitation and this oppression. But, exploiting these countries, imperialism is forced to build railways, factories and plants, industrial and commercial centers there. The emergence of a class of proletarians, the emergence of local intelligentsia, the awakening of national identity, the strengthening of the liberation movement — these are the inevitable results of this “policy”. The intensification of the revolutionary movement in all colonies and dependent countries without exception testifies to this with obviousness. This circumstance is important for the proletariat in that respect

Such, in general, are the main contradictions of imperialism, which turned the old “flourishing” capitalism into dying capitalism.

The significance of the imperialist war, which started 10 years ago, consists, among other things, in that it gathered all these contradictions into one knot and threw them onto the scales, accelerating and facilitating the revolutionary battles of the proletariat. In other words, imperialism has led not only to the fact that revolution has become a practical inevitability, but also to the creation of favourable conditions for a direct assault on the strongholds of capitalism.

Such is the international situation that gave rise to Leninism.

All this is good, they will tell us, but where does Russia, which after all was not and could not be a classical country of imperialism? And then Lenin, who worked primarily in Russia and for Russia? Why did Russia serve as the hotbed of Leninism, the birthplace of the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution?

Because Russia was the key point of all these contradictions of imperialism.

Because Russia was pregnant with the revolution more than any other country, and only she was therefore able to resolve these contradictions in a revolutionary way.

To begin with, tsarist Russia was a hotbed of all kinds of oppression — capitalist, colonial, and military—taken in its most inhuman and barbaric form. Who doesn't know that in Russia the omnipotence of capital merged with the despotism of tsarism, the aggressiveness of Russian nationalism—with the butchery of tsarism against non-Russian peoples, the exploitation of entire regions—Turkey, Persia, China—with the capture of these areas by tsarism, with the war for capture? Lenin was right in saying that tsarism is “military feudal imperialism.” Tsarism was the focus of the most negative aspects of imperialism, squared.

Further. Tsarist Russia was the greatest reserve of Western imperialism, not only in the sense that it gave free access to foreign capital, holding in its hands such decisive branches of the national economy of Russia as fuel and metallurgy, but also in the sense that it could put in favour of the Western imperialists millions of soldiers. Remember the 12 millionth Russian army that shed blood on the imperialist fronts to secure the frantic profits of the Anglo-French capitalists.

Further. Tsarism was not only a watchdog of imperialism in eastern Europe, but it was also an agent of Western imperialism to extort hundreds of millions of percent from the population for loans issued to it in Paris and London, in Berlin and Brussels.

Finally, tsarism was the surest ally of Western imperialism in dividing Turkey, Persia, China, etc. Who does not know that the imperialist war was waged by tsarism in alliance with the imperialists of the Entente, that Russia was an essential element of this war?

That is why the interests of tsarism and Western imperialism were intertwined and ultimately merged into a single ball of imperialist interests. Could Western imperialism reconcile with the loss of such a powerful support in the East and such a rich reservoir of forces and means as the old, tsarist, bourgeois Russia, without having tested all its forces in order to wage a mortal struggle against the revolution in Russia, with a view to upholding and preserving tsarism? Of course I could not!

But it follows from this that whoever wanted to strike at tsarism inevitably threatened imperialism, who rebelled against tsarism, he

had to rebel against imperialism too, for he who overthrew tsarism should also overthrow imperialism, if he really thought not only to defeat tsarism, but also to finish it off without a trace. Thus, the revolution against tsarism was drawing closer and was to grow into a revolution against imperialism, into a proletarian revolution.

Meanwhile, the greatest national revolution was rising in Russia, led by the most proletarian revolutionary in the world, who had at his disposal such a serious ally as the revolutionary peasantry of Russia. Is it necessary to prove that such a revolution could not stop halfway, that if successful, it had to go further, raising the banner of rebellion against imperialism? That is why Russia was to become the key point of the contradictions of imperialism, not only in the sense that these contradictions were most easily revealed in Russia because of their particularly ugly and especially intolerant character, and not only because Russia was the most important pillar of Western imperialism, connecting financial capital West with the colonies of the East, but also because only in Russia there was real power.

But it follows from this that the revolution in Russia could not but become proletarian, that it could not but take on the international character in the very first days of its development, that it could not, therefore, not shake the very foundations of world imperialism.

Could the Russian Communists in this state of affairs limit themselves in their work to the narrow national framework of the Russian revolution? Of course not! On the contrary, the whole situation, both internal (deep revolutionary crisis) and external (war), pushed them to go beyond this framework in their work, transfer the struggle to the international arena, uncover the ulcers of imperialism, prove the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism, break up social chauvinism and social pacifism, finally, to overthrow capitalism in their country and forge for the proletariat new weapons of struggle, the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution, in order to make it easier for the proletarians of all countries to overthrow capitalism. The Russian Communists could not act otherwise, because only on this path could one count on certain changes in the international situation, That is why Russia has become a hotbed of Leninism, and the leader of the Russian Communists, Lenin, its creator.

The same thing happened to Russia and Lenin here as it did to Germany and Marx-Engels in the forties of the last century. Germany was fraught then, just like Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, with a bourgeois revolution. Marx wrote then in the "Communist Manifesto" that:

“The Communists turn their main attention to Germany because it is on the eve of the bourgeois revolution, because it will make this revolution under more progressive conditions of European civilization in general, with a much more developed proletariat than in England in the seventeenth and in the eighteenth century France. The German bourgeois revolution, therefore, can only be a direct prologue to the proletarian revolution. “

In other words, the centre of the revolutionary movement moved to Germany. There can hardly be any doubt that this particular circumstance, noted by Marx in the citation quoted, was the probable reason that Germany was the birthplace of scientific socialism, and the leaders of the German proletariat, Marx and Engels, its creators.

The same must be said, but even more so, about Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. Russia at that time was on the eve of the bourgeois revolution, it had to carry out this revolution under more progressive conditions in Europe and with a more developed proletariat than Germany (not to mention England and France), all data indicating that this revolution should be to serve as the prologue and prologue of the proletarian revolution. It cannot be considered a coincidence that in 1902, when the Russian revolution was just beginning, Lenin wrote in his pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* prophetic words that:

“History has now set before us (that is, the Russian Marxists. — *J. St.*) the immediate task, which is the most revolutionary of all the immediate tasks of the proletariat of any country. The fulfilment of this task, the destruction of the most powerful stronghold of not only the European, but also the Asian reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat” (see Vol. IV, p. 138).

In other words, the centre of the revolutionary movement was supposed to move to Russia.

It is known that the course of the revolution in Russia justified this prediction of Lenin in abundance.

Is it then surprising that a country that has undergone such a revolution and having such a proletariat has served as the birthplace of the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution?

Is it any wonder that the leader of this proletariat, Lenin, became at the same time the creator of this theory and tactics and the leader of the international proletariat? (*Stalin, On the Foundations of Leninism, “Questions of Leninism,” pp. 6–11, ed. 9th.* )

## The international significance of Leninism

In the pamphlet “On the Foundations of Leninism” a well-known definition of Leninism is given, which seems to have received citizenship rights. It reads:

“Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution. More precisely: Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular. “

Is this definition correct?

I think that’s right. It is correct, firstly, because it correctly points to the historical roots of Leninism, characterizing it as Marxism of the *era of imperialism*, as opposed to some critics of Lenin who incorrectly think that Leninism arose after the imperialist war. It is correct, secondly, because it correctly notes the international character of Leninism, as opposed to social democracy, which considers Leninism applicable only in the national-Russian situation. It is correct, thirdly, because it correctly notes the organic connection of Leninism with the teachings of Marx, characterizing it as *Marxism of the era of imperialism*, as opposed to some critics of Leninism, who consider it not a further development of Marxism, but only the restoration of Marxism and its application to Russian reality.

All this, as if, does not need special comments.

Nevertheless, in our party there are, it turns out, comrades who consider it necessary to define Leninism somewhat differently. Here, for example, Comrade Zinoviev thinks that:

“Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialist wars and world revolution, *which began immediately in a country where the peasantry prevails*” [Italics by Comrade Zinoviev.— *J. St.* ] (see the article by Comrade Zinoviev “Bolshevism or Trotskyism”, “Pravda” No. 273 of 30 / XI 1924)

What can the words underlined by Comrade Zinoviev mean? What does it mean to introduce into the definition of Leninism the backwardness of Russia, its peasant character?

This means transforming Leninism from international proletarian teachings into a product of Russian identity.

This means playing into the hands of Bauer and Kautsky, who deny the suitability of Leninism for other countries that are capitalistically more developed.

There is no word that the peasant question is of crucial importance for Russia, that our country is a peasant. But what significance can this fact have for characterizing the foundations of Leninism? Is Leninism worked out only on the basis of Russia and for Russia, and not on the basis of imperialism and not for the imperialist countries in general? Does such works of Lenin as “Imperialism”, “State and Revolution”, “Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky”, “Childish Illness of “Leftism”, etc., have significance only for Russia, and not for all imperialist countries in general? Is not Leninism a generalization of the experience of the revolutionary movement of *all* countries? Is the foundations of the theory and tactics of Leninism not suitable, not obligatory for the proletarian parties of *all* countries? Was Lenin wrong when he said that “Bolshevism is suitable as a model of tactics *for everyone*” [Italics mine.— *I. St.*] (see vol. XXIII, p. 386)? Was Lenin wrong when speaking of “*international significance*” [My italics.— *J. St.*] of Soviet power and the foundations of Bolshevism [My italics.— *J. St.*] of Soviet power and the foundations of Bolshevism theory and tactics” (see vol. XXV, p. 171-172)? Are not the following words of Lenin correct, for example:

“In Russia, the dictatorship of the proletariat must inevitably differ in some features compared to the advanced countries due to the very great backwardness and petty bourgeoisie of our country. But the main forces — and the basic forms of social economy — are the same in Russia as in any capitalist country, so *these features, in any case, cannot concern the most important thing*” [My italics mine.— *j. St.*] (see vol. XXIV, p. 508).

But if all this is true, does it not follow from this that the definition of Leninism given by Comrade Zinoviev cannot be recognized as correct?

How to combine this nationally-limited definition of Leninism with internationalism? (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 191-192, ed. 9th.* )

## **Leninism—the Receiver of Marxism**

On the one hand, Bolshevism arose in 1903 on the most solid foundation of the theory of Marxism. And the correctness of this—and only this—revolutionary theory was proved not only by the worldwide experience of the entire 19th century, but also in particular by the experience of the wanderings and vacillations, mistakes and

disappointments of revolutionary thought in Russia. For about half a century, from about the 40s to the 90s of the last century, progressive thought in Russia, under the yoke of an unprecedentedly wild and reactionary tsarism, eagerly searched for the correct revolutionary theory, following with surprising zeal and thoroughness every and every “last” the word “Europe and America in this area. Marxism, as the only correct revolutionary theory, Russia truly *suffered* a half-century history of unheard—of torments and sacrifices, unprecedented revolutionary heroism, incredible energy and selflessness of searches, training, testing in practice, disappointments, testing, comparing the experience of Europe. Thanks to the emigrant regime forced by tsarism, revolutionary Russia possessed in the second half of the 19th century. such a wealth of international relations, such excellent awareness of the universal forms and theories of the revolutionary movement as no other country in the world.

On the other hand, Bolshevism, which arose on this granite theoretical basis, carried out a fifteen-year (1903-1917) practical history, which, by the wealth of experience, has no equal in the world. For not a single country in these 15 years has even experienced so much in the sense of revolutionary experience, speed and variety of changes in various forms of movement, legal and illegal, peaceful and stormy, underground and open, circle and mass, parliamentary and terrorist. Not a single country has concentrated on such a short period of time such a wealth of forms, shades, methods of struggle of *all* classes of modern society, besides the struggle, which, due to the backwardness of the country and the severity of the oppression of tsarism, matured especially quickly, especially eagerly and successfully assimilated the corresponding “last word” of American and European political experience.

## **The Main Stages in the History of Bolshevism**

Years of preparation for the revolution (1903-1905). Everywhere one feels the approach of a great storm. In all classes, fermentation and preparation. Abroad, the emigrant press theoretically raises *all the* basic questions of the revolution. Representatives of the three main classes, the three main political movements, the liberal-bourgeois, petty-bourgeois-democratic (covered by the signs “social-

democratic” and “social-revolutionary” directions) and proletarian-revolutionary fierce struggles of program and tactical views anticipate—and prepare—the coming open fighting classes. *All* the issues that led to the armed struggle of the masses in 1905–1907 and in 1917–1920 can (and should) be traced, in germinal form, according to the then press. And between the three main directions, of course, there are any number of intermediate, transitional, half-hearted formations. Rather: in the struggle of the press, parties, factions, groups, those ideological and political directions that are truly class are crystallized; classes forge themselves the proper ideological and political weapons for future battles.

Years of revolution (1905-1907). All classes are open. All programmatic and tactical views are verified by the action of the masses. The unprecedented breadth and severity of the strike struggle in the world. The development of an economic strike into a political and political strike into an uprising. The practical verification of the relations between the leading proletariat and the guided, vacillating, shaky, peasantry. Birth, in the spontaneous development of the struggle, the Soviet form of organization. The then debate about the importance of advice anticipates the great struggle of 1917-1920. The change of parliamentary forms of struggle and non-parliamentary, tactics of boycotting parliamentarism with the tactics of participation in parliamentarism, legal forms of struggle and illegal, as well as their relationships and ties — all this is characterized by an amazing richness of content. Each month of this period was equal to in the sense of teaching the basics of political science — both the masses and leaders, and classes and parties—the year of “peaceful” “constitutional” development. Without the “dress rehearsal” of 1905, the victory of the October Revolution of 1917 would have been impossible.

Years of reaction (1907-1910). Tsarism has triumphed. All revolutionary and opposition parties are defeated. Decline, demoralization, schisms, confusion, renegadeness, pornography in the place of politics [The printed text further adds: “Strengthening the craving for philosophical idealism; mysticism, as the vestment of counter-revolutionary moods.” — *Ed* .]. But at the same time, it is the great defeat that gives the revolutionary parties and the revolutionary class a real and useful lesson, a lesson in historical dialectics, a lesson in understanding, skill and art in waging a political struggle. Friends are made in misery. Broken armies study well.

Victorious tsarism is forced to rapidly destroy the remnants of pre-bourgeois, patriarchal life in Russia. Its bourgeois development steps forward remarkably quickly. Extra-class, superclass illusions, illusions about the possibility of avoiding capitalism are scattered in the dust. The class struggle appears in a completely new way and all the more distinctly.

Revolutionary parties must finish their studies. They learned to advance. Now we have to understand that this science must be supplemented by science, how to retreat more correctly. One has to understand, and the revolutionary class learns from its own bitter experience, that one cannot win without learning the correct offensive and the right retreat. Of all the defeated opposition and revolutionary parties, the Bolsheviks retreated in the greatest order, with the least damage to their "army", with the greatest preservation of its core, with the smallest (in depth and incurability) splits, with the least demoralization, with the greatest ability to resume work most widely, right and energetic. And the Bolsheviks achieved this only because they mercilessly exposed and drove out the revolutionaries phrases that did not want to understand that we must retreat, that we must be able to retreat,

Years of rise (1910-1914). At first, the climb was incredibly slow, then, after the Lena events of 1912, it was somewhat faster. Overcoming unprecedented difficulties, the Bolsheviks pushed aside the Mensheviks, whose role, as bourgeois agents in the labour movement, was perfectly understood by the whole bourgeoisie after 1905 and which the whole bourgeoisie therefore supported in thousands of ways. But the Bolsheviks would never have been able to achieve this if they had not carried out the correct tactics of combining illegal work with the obligatory use of "legal opportunities." In the most reactionary Duma, the Bolsheviks conquered the entire working curia.

The first world imperialist war (1914-1917). Legal parliamentarism, under conditions of extreme reactionariness of the "parliament", serves the most useful service of the party of the revolutionary proletariat, to the Bolsheviks. Bolshevik deputies go to Siberia. In the emigrant press, all shades of the views of social imperialism, social chauvinism, social patriotism, inconsistent and consistent internationalism, pacifism and the revolutionary denial of pacifist illusions find their full expression in us. The learned fools and old women of the Second International, who scornfully and arrogantly wrinkled their nose at the abundance of "fractions" in Russian

socialism and the fierce struggle between them, failed when the war took away the vaunted “legality” in *all* advanced countries, to organize even approximately such a free (illegal) exchange of views and such free (illegal) development of the correct views that the Russian revolutionaries organized in Switzerland and in a number of other countries. That is why direct social patriots and “Kautskyites” of all countries turned out to be the worst traitors to the proletariat. And if Bolshevism managed to win in 1917 - 1920, one of the main reasons for this victory is that Bolshevism since the end of 1914 has mercilessly exposed the vileness, abomination and meanness of social chauvinism and “Kautskyism” (which corresponds to longuetism in France, the views of the leaders of the independent workers’ party and the Fabians in England, Turati in Italy, etc.), but the masses later, from their own experience, became more and more convinced of the correctness of the views of the Bolsheviks.

The second revolution in Russia (from February to October 1917). The incredible old age and obsolescence of tsarism created (with the help of the blows and the burdens of a painful war) an incredible force of destruction directed against it. In a few days, Russia turned into a democratic bourgeois republic, freer—in a war environment—than any country in the world. The government began to be created by the leaders of opposition and revolutionary parties—as in the most “strictly parliamentary” republics, and the title of leader of the opposition party in parliament, albeit very reactionary, *facilitated* the subsequent role of such a leader in the revolution.

The Mensheviks and the “Socialist-Revolutionaries” in a few weeks perfectly mastered all the tricks and manners, arguments and sophisms of the European heroes of the Second International, the ministerialists and other opportunistic trash. Everything that we read now about the Scheidemanns and Noska, Kautsky and Hilferding, about Renner and Austerlitz, Otto Bauer and Fritz Adler, about Turati and Longet, about the Fabians and leaders of the independent workers’ party in England, all this seems to us (and in fact is) boring repetition, rehash of a familiar and old motive. We have already seen all this with the Mensheviks. History played a joke and forced the opportunists of a backward country to anticipate the opportunists of a number of advanced countries.

If all the heroes of the Second International suffered bankruptcy, were disgraced on the question of the importance and role of the Soviets and the Soviet authorities, if the leaders of three very

important parties that have now left the Second International are disgraced and confused on this issue (namely, the German independent Social Democratic Party, longuetistkoy French and the British independent labour party), if they were all slaves of petty-bourgeois prejudices democracy (quite in the spirit of the petty bourgeois of 1848 who called themselves “Social-Democrats”), we *have* the example of menshevikov seen *it all*. History played such a joke that advice was born in Russia in 1905 that they were falsified in February - October 1917 by the Mensheviks, who went bankrupt due to their inability to understand their role and significance, and that now *the* idea of Soviet power was born *all over the world*, spreading with unprecedented speed among the proletariat of all countries, and the old heroes of the Second International *everywhere* go bankrupt due to their inability to understand the role and significance of the soviets, like our Mensheviks. Experience has shown that in some very significant issues of the proletarian revolution, *all* countries inevitably have to do what Russia has done.

The Bolsheviks started their victorious struggle against the parliamentary (in fact) bourgeois republic and against the Mensheviks very carefully and prepared not at all simply - contrary to the views that are often found now in Europe and America. We *did not* call for the overthrow of the government at the beginning of this period, but clarified the impossibility of overthrowing it *without* preliminary changes in the composition and mood of the tips. We did not proclaim a boycott of the bourgeois parliament, the founders, but spoke from the April (1917) conference of our party, we spoke officially on behalf of the party, that a bourgeois republic with a constituent party is better than a similar republic without a constituent party, and a “worker-peasant”, Soviet, republic is better any bourgeois-democratic parliamentary republic. Without such careful, thorough, prudent and lengthy preparation, we could neither win the victory in October 1917 nor hold this victory. (*Lenin, The Children's Disease of “Leftism” in Communism, Op. Vol. XXV, pp. 175-179, 3rd ed.* )

**In the struggle against which enemies  
within the labour movement Bolshevism  
grew, strengthened and tempered**

Firstly, and mainly in the struggle against opportunism, which in 1914 finally developed into social chauvinism, finally sided with the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. This was, of course, the main enemy of Bolshevism within the labour movement. This enemy remains the main one on an international scale. Bolshevism paid and is paying most attention to this enemy. This aspect of the activity of the Bolsheviks is now quite well known abroad.

We have to say differently about another enemy of Bolshevism within the labour movement. They still know too little abroad that Bolshevism has grown, developed and tempered in the long-term struggle against *petty-bourgeois revolutionism* which smacks of anarchism or borrows something from it, which departs in whatever essential way from the conditions and needs of the sustained proletarian mass struggle. Theoretically, it was completely established for Marxists—and it has been completely confirmed by the experience of all European revolutions and revolutionary movements—that a small proprietor, a small proprietor (a social type who has a very wide mass representation in many European countries), constantly under oppression under capitalism and very often incredibly sharp and the rapid deterioration of life and ruin, easily goes to extreme revolutionism, but is unable to show restraint, organization, discipline, perseverance. The petty bourgeois who was “furious” from the horrors of capitalism is a social phenomenon that is characteristic, like anarchism, of all capitalist countries. The instability of such revolutionism, its barrenness, the ability to quickly turn into humility, apathy, fantasy, even into a “mad” passion for one or another bourgeois “fashionable” trend—all this is well known. But the theoretical, abstract, recognition of these truths does not at all save the revolutionary parties from the old mistakes that always appear on an unexpected occasion, in a slightly new form, in unprecedented vestments or surroundings, in an original—more or less original—setting.

Anarchism was often a kind of punishment for the opportunist sins of the labour movement. Both ugliness mutually reinforced each other. And if in Russia, despite the smaller bourgeois composition of its population compared to European countries, anarchism enjoyed during the period of both revolutions (1905 and 1917) and during the preparation for them a relatively insignificant influence, this undoubtedly should be partially credited to Bolshevism who always led the most merciless and implacable struggle against opportunism. I say: “in part”, for an even more important role in weakening

anarchism in Russia was played by the fact that it had the opportunity in the past (70s of the XIX century) to develop unusually magnificent and to reveal to the end its infidelity, its unsuitability as a guiding theory for the revolutionary class.

Bolshevism, when it emerged in 1903, adopted the tradition of ruthless struggle against petty-bourgeois, semi-anarchist (or capable of flirting with anarchism) revolutionism, which tradition always existed in revolutionary Social Democracy and was especially strengthened in our country in 1900-1903, when the foundations of mass parties of the revolutionary proletariat in Russia. Bolshevism embraced and continued the struggle with the party, which most of all expressed the tendencies of petty-bourgeois revolutionism, namely with the party of “socialists-revolutionaries”, on three main points. Firstly, this party, which denied Marxism, stubbornly did not want (or rather, it would probably say: could not) understand the need for strictly objective consideration of class forces and their relationship to any political action. Secondly, this party saw its particular “revolutionism” or “leftism” in its recognition of individual terror and assassination attempts, which we Marxists resolutely rejected. Of course, we rejected individual terror only for reasons of expediency, and people who would be able to “condemn” in principle “the terror of the Great French Revolution, or terror in general from the victorious revolutionary party besieged by the bourgeoisie of the whole world, such people as Plekhanov in 1900-1903. when Plekhanov was a Marxist and revolutionary, he mocked and spat on him. Thirdly, the “socialist revolutionaries” saw “leftism” in giggling at the relatively small opportunist sins of German Social Democracy along with imitation of the extreme opportunists of the same party on the question, for example, agrarian or the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

History, in passing, has now given on a large, world-wide historical scale the confirmation of the opinion that we have always upheld, namely that *revolutionary* German social democracy (note that even Plekhanov in 1900-1903 demanded Bernstein’s exclusion from the party, and The Bolsheviks, always continuing this tradition, in 1913 exposed all the baseness, meanness and betrayal of Legin) that revolutionary German Social-Democracy is *closest* was to such a party, which the revolutionary proletariat needed so that it could win. Now, in 1920, after all the shameful crashes and crises of the war era and the first years after the war, it is clear that of all the Western parties, it was the German revolutionary Social Democracy that gave

the best leaders, and also recovered, recovered, and strengthened again before the others. This can be seen both on the Spartacist party and on the left proletarian wing of the “independent Social Democratic Party of Germany”, which is waging a steady struggle against opportunism and the lack of character of the Kautsky, Hilferdings, Ledeburov, Crispinov. If we now take a general look at a completely finished historical period, namely: from the Paris Commune to the first Socialist Soviet Republic, then a completely definite and indisputable outline outlines the general attitude of Marxism to anarchism. Marxism turned out to be right, in the end, and if the anarchists rightly pointed to the opportunism of the views of the state prevailing among most socialist parties, then, firstly, this opportunism was associated with a distortion and even direct concealment of Marx’s views on the state (in his book *The State and the revolution* “I noted that Bebel, 36 children, from 1875 to 1911, kept in secret the letter of Engels, which was particularly vivid, sharp, direct, clearly exposing the opportunism of the current social-democratic views on the state); secondly, the correction of these opportunist views, the recognition of Soviet power and its superiority over bourgeois parliamentary democracy, all this came most quickly and broadly from the bowels of the most Marxist currents among European and American socialist parties. and if the anarchists rightly pointed to the opportunism of the views on the state that prevail among the majority of socialist parties, then, firstly, this opportunism was associated with the distortion and even direct concealment of Marx’s views on the state (in my book “*State and Revolution*” I noted that Bebel 36 children, from 1875 to 1911, kept Engels’ letter under cover, especially in a bold, sharp, direct, clearly exposing the opportunism of current social-democratic views on the state); secondly, the correction of these opportunist views, the recognition of Soviet power and its superiority over bourgeois parliamentary democracy, all this came most quickly and broadly from the bowels of the most Marxist currents among European and American socialist parties. and if the anarchists rightly pointed to the opportunism of the views on the state that prevail among the majority of socialist parties, then, firstly, this opportunism was associated with the distortion and even direct concealment of Marx’s views on the state (in my book “*State and Revolution*” I noted that Bebel 36 children, from 1875 to 1911, kept Engels’ letter under cover, especially in a bold, sharp, direct, clearly exposing the opportunism of current social-democratic views on the state); secondly, the correction of these opportunist views, the

recognition of Soviet power and its superiority over bourgeois parliamentary democracy, all this came most quickly and broadly from the bowels of the most Marxist currents among European and American socialist parties.

In two cases, the struggle of Bolshevism with the “left” deviations of its own party took on a particularly large scale: in 1908, due to the question of participation in the most reactionary “parliament” and in the legal workers societies furnished by the most reactionary laws, and in 1918 (Brest Peace) due to the question of the admissibility of one or another “compromise”.

In 1908, the “left” Bolsheviks were expelled from our party for their stubborn reluctance to understand the need to participate in the most reactionary “parliament”. The “Lefts,” among whom there were many excellent revolutionaries who later were (and continue to be) members of the Communist Party, relied especially on successful experience with a boycott in 1905. When the Tsar announced the convening of an advisory “parliament” in August 1905, the Bolsheviks declared a boycott of it - against all opposition parties and against the Mensheviks—and the October Revolution of 1905 really dared it. Then the boycott turned out to be right, not because non-participation in reactionary parliaments was generally correct, but because the objective situation was correctly taken into account, which led to the rapid transformation of mass strikes into a political one, then into a revolutionary strike and then into an uprising. Moreover, the struggle was then over whether to leave in the hands of the king the convocation of the first representative institution or try to wrest this convocation from the hands of the old government. Since there was and could not be confidence in the existence of a similar objective position, as well as in the same direction and pace of its development, the boycott ceased to be correct.

The Bolshevik boycott of the “parliament” in 1905 enriched the revolutionary proletariat with extremely valuable political experience, showing that with a combination of legal and illegal, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forms of struggle, it is sometimes useful and even necessary to be able to abandon parliamentary ones. But the blind imitative, uncritical transfer of this experience to *other* conditions, to *another*. The decor is the greatest mistake. The mistake, albeit a small one, easily fixable, was already a boycott of the Duma by the Bolsheviks in 1906. The most serious and difficult fix was the boycott of 1907, 1908 and the following years, when, on the

one hand, it was impossible to wait for a very rapid rise of the revolutionary wave and its transition to rebellion and when, on the other hand, the need to combine legal and illegal work flowed from the entire historical situation of the renewed bourgeois monarchy. Now, when you look back at a completely finished historical period, the connection of which with subsequent periods has already been fully revealed, it becomes especially clear that the Bolsheviks *could not* to maintain (not to mention: strengthen, develop, strengthen) the solid core of the revolutionary party of the proletariat in 1908 - 1914, if they did not defend in the most severe struggle the *obligation* to join illegal forms of struggle with legal forms, with *mandatory* participation in a reactionary parliament and in a number of other institutions furnished with reactionary laws (insurance funds, etc.).

In 1918, it did not come to a split. The “left” communists then formed only a special group or “faction” within our party and, moreover, not for long. In the same 1918, the most prominent representatives of “left communism”, for example, vol. Radek and Bukharin openly admitted their mistake. It seemed to them that the Brest Peace was an unacceptable compromise with the imperialists for the party of the revolutionary proletariat. It was really a compromise with the imperialists, but just such and in such an environment that was *obligatory* .

At present, when I hear attacks on our tactics when signing the Brest Peace by, for example, “Socialist Revolutionaries,” or when I hear Comrade Lansbury’s remarks in his conversation with me: “Our English trade union leaders say, that compromises are acceptable for them, if they were acceptable for Bolshevism”, I usually answer primarily with a simple and” popular “comparison:

Imagine that your car was stopped by armed bandits. You give them money, a passport, a revolver, a car. You get rid of a pleasant neighbourhood with bandits. There is no doubt a compromise. ”Do ut des” (“I give” you money, weapons, a car, “so that you give” me the opportunity to go away, pozdorovu). But it’s hard to find a person who has not gone mad, who would declare such a compromise “fundamentally unacceptable” or declare a person who made such a compromise an accomplice to the bandits (although the bandits, sitting on a car, could use it and weapons for new robberies, but in the case that was with me personally, indeed they did, but then they were caught and shot). Our compromise with the bandits of German imperialism was similar to such a compromise.

But when the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia, the Scheidemanns (and largely Kautskyites) in Germany, Otto Bauer and Friedrich Adler (not to mention the years. Renner and Co.) in Austria, Renaudels and Longuet with Co. France, the Fabians, "Independents" and "Trudoviks" ("labourists") in England concluded in 1914-1918 and 1918-1920. *compromises* with the bandits of their own, and sometimes the "union" bourgeoisie, *against the* revolutionary proletariat of their country, then all these gentlemen acted as *accomplices of banditry* .

The conclusion is clear: to deny compromises is "fundamental", to deny any admissibility of compromises in general, whatever it may be, is childishness that is difficult even to take seriously. A politician who wants to be useful to the revolutionary proletariat must be able to single out *concrete* cases of precisely such compromises that are unacceptable, in which opportunism and *betrayal* are expressed , and direct all the power of criticism, the whole edge of merciless exposure and irreconcilable war against *these specific* compromises, not allowing the experienced "divisive" socialists and parliamentary Jesuits to dodge and evade responsibility by reasoning about "compromises in general." Gentlemen, the English "leaders" of the trade unions, as well as of the Fabian society and the "independent" labour party, dodge the responsibility *for their betrayal*, for *the* compromise they have committed , which really means the worst opportunism, treason and betrayal.

There are compromises and compromises. One must be able to analyze the situation and specific conditions of each compromise or each kind of compromise. We must learn to distinguish the person who gave the bandits money and weapons in order to reduce the evil brought by the bandits and to facilitate the capture and execution of the bandits, from the person who gives the bandits money and weapons to participate in the sharing of the bandit booty. In politics, this is far from always as easy as in a childishly simple example. But whoever would like to invent a recipe for the workers that would give ready-made solutions for all occasions or who would promise that there would be no difficulties and no confusing provisions in the politics of the revolutionary proletariat would be just a quack.

In order not to leave room for rumours, I'll try to outline, at least very briefly, a few basic provisions for the analysis of specific compromises.

The party, which made a compromise with the German imperialists, which consisted of signing the Brest Peace, had worked

out its internationalism in practice since the end of 1914. It was not afraid to proclaim the defeat of the tsarist monarchy and to stigmatize “defence of the fatherland” in the war between two imperialist predators. The MPs of this party went to Siberia, instead of the path leading to ministerial portfolios in the bourgeois government. The revolution that overthrew tsarism and created a democratic republic gave a new and greatest test to this party: it did not agree to any agreements with “its” imperialists, but prepared to overthrow them and overthrow them. Having taken political power, this party left no stone unturned either from landlord or capitalist property. By publishing and terminating the secret treaties of the imperialists, this party proposed peace and obeyed the violence of the Brest predators to *all* nations only after the Anglo-French imperialists tore the world, and the Bolsheviks did everything humanly possible to accelerate the revolution in Germany and in other countries. The complete correctness of such a compromise concluded by such a party, in such an environment, every day becomes clearer and more obvious to everyone.

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia (like all the leaders of the Second International around the world in 1914 - 1920) began with treason, justifying directly or indirectly “the defence of the fatherland”, that is, the defence of *their* predatory bourgeoisie. They continued their betrayal by joining a coalition with the bourgeoisie of *their* country and fighting together with *their* bourgeoisie against the revolutionary proletariat of their country. Their bloc, first with Kerensky and the Cadets, then with Kolchak and Denikin in Russia, as well as the bloc of their foreign associates with the bourgeoisie of *their* countries, was a transition to the side of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. *Their* compromise with the bandits of imperialism, from beginning to end, was that they made themselves *accomplices* imperialist banditry. (*Lenin, The Children’s Disease of “Leftism” in Communism, Op., Vol. XXV, pp. 179-186, 3rd ed.* )

## **II. The role of Lenin in the development of the theory of social development**

### **Marxism grew out of the revolutionary experience and revolutionary thought of all countries**

The world's greatest liberation movement of the oppressed class, the most revolutionary in the history of the class, is impossible without revolutionary theory. It cannot be torn out; it *grows* out of the totality of revolutionary experience and revolutionary thought of all countries of the world. And such a theory *grew* from the second half of the 19th century. It is called Marxism. You can not be a socialist, can not be a revolutionary Social-Democrat, without participating as much in the development and application of this theory, nowadays in a merciless fight against mutilation of her Plekhanov, Kautsky and so on. (*Lenin, Honest voice of the French socialist (1915), Op., Vol. XVIII, p. 286-287.*)

### **Marxism is enriched by the new experience of the class struggle of the proletariat**

According to Zinoviev, it follows, therefore, that Marxism should not be enriched with new experience, that any improvement in certain provisions and formulas of certain classics of Marxism is revisionism. What is Marxism? Marxism is a science. Can Marxism as a science be preserved and developed if it is not enriched by the new experience of the class struggle of the proletariat, if it does not digest this experience *from the point of view of Marxism, from the point of view of the Marxist method*? Clearly it cannot.

Is it not clear after this that Marxism requires improving and enriching the old formulas on the basis of taking into account new experience *while maintaining the point of view of Marxism*, while maintaining its method, and Zinoviev does the opposite, preserving

the letter and replacing the letter of certain provisions of Marxism with the point of view of Marxism, its method .

What can be common between real Marxism and between the substitution of the main line of Marxism with the letter of individual formulas and quotations from individual provisions of Marxism?

Is there any doubt that this is not Marxism, but a caricature of Marxism?

Marx and Engels had in mind precisely such “Marxists” as Comrade Zinoviev, when they said: “Our teaching is not a dogma, but a guide to action.”

The trouble with Comrade Zinoviev is that he does not understand the meaning and meaning of these words of Marx and Engels. ( *Stalin, On the Opposition, p. 510.* )

## **The task of science is to give a true slogan of struggle**

Marx believed that the whole price of his theory was that “in its very essence, it is a critical theory [Note that Marx here speaks of materialistic criticism, which he only considers scientific, that is, criticism comparing political, legal, social, everyday and other facts with the economy, with the system of production relations, with the interests of those classes that inevitably take shape on the basis of all antagonistic social relations. That Russian public relations are antagonistic, hardly anyone could doubt it. But no one has yet tried to take them as a basis for *such* criticism.] And revolutionary. “And this last quality is really inherent in *Marxism* completely and unconditionally, because this theory directly sets as its task to *open* all forms of antagonism and exploitation in modern society, to trace their evolution, to prove their transitory character, the inevitability of turning them into another form and *thus serve the proletariat so that it ends all exploitation as soon as possible and as easily as possible.* The irresistible attractive force that attracts socialists from all countries to this theory lies in the fact that it combines rigorous and higher science (being the last word of social science) with revolutionism and combines not by chance, not only because the founder of the doctrine personally combined qualities of a scientist and revolutionary, but combines in the theory itself internally and inextricably. In fact, the task of theory, the goal of science, is directly

set here to promote the class of the oppressed in its really ongoing economic struggle.

*“We are not telling the world: stop fighting—your whole struggle is nothing. We only give him the true slogan of struggle.”*

Consequently, the direct task of science, according to Marx, is to give a true slogan of struggle, that is, to be able to objectively present this struggle as a product of a certain system of production relations, to be able to *understand the* need for this struggle, its content, course and development condition. A “slogan of struggle” cannot be given without studying in detail every single form of this struggle, not following every step of it, as it moves from one form to another, in order to be able to determine the situation at any given moment, not losing sight of the general nature of the struggle, its common goal - the complete and final destruction of all exploitation and all oppression. (*Lenin, What are “Friends of the People” (1894), Op., Vol. I, pp. 225 - 226, ed. 1926*)

## **Concretization and development of the teachings of Marx by Lenin**

I think that Lenin did not “add” any “new principles” to Marxism, just as Lenin did not abolish any of the “old” principles of Marxism. Lenin was and remains the most faithful and consistent student of Marx and Engels, fully and completely relying on the principles of Marxism. But Lenin was not only a performer of the teachings of Marx-Engels. He was at the same time a successor to the teachings of Marx and Engels. What does it mean? This means that he developed further the teachings of Marx and Engels in relation to the new conditions of development, in relation to the new phase of capitalism, in relation to imperialism. This means that, developing further the teachings of Marx in the new conditions of the class struggle, Lenin introduced into the general treasury of Marxism something new in comparison with what was given by Marx and Engels, in comparison with what could be given in the period of pre-imperialist capitalism, moreover, this new one, introduced by Lenin into the treasury of Marxism, is based entirely on the principles given by Marx and Engels. In this sense, we are talking about Leninism as Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. Here

are a few questions in the field of which Lenin gave something new, developing further the teachings of Marx.

First, the question of monopoly capitalism, of imperialism, as a new phase of capitalism. Marx and Engels gave an analysis of the foundations of capitalism in *Capital*. But Marx and Engels lived during the domination of pre-monopoly capitalism, during the smooth evolution of capitalism and its “peaceful” spread to the whole globe. This old phase ended by the end of the XIX and the beginning of the XX century, when Marx and Engels were no longer alive. It is clear that Marx and Engels could only speculate about the new conditions for the development of capitalism that came about in connection with the new phase of capitalism, which replaced the old phase, in connection with the imperialist, monopolistic phase of development, when the smooth evolution of capitalism was replaced by an abrupt catastrophic development of capitalism, when the uneven development and the contradictions of capitalism came out with particular force, when the struggle for markets and the export of capital in conditions of extreme uneven development made periodic imperialist wars inevitably subject to periodic re-divisions of the world and spheres of influence. Lenin’s merit and, therefore, a new one for Lenin consists in the fact that, based on the main provisions of *Capital*, he gave a justified Marxist analysis of imperialism as the last phase of capitalism, revealing its ulcers and the conditions for its inevitable death. On the basis of this analysis, Lenin’s well-known position that under the conditions of imperialism the victory of socialism is possible in separate capitalist countries is possible. when the struggle for markets for the sale and export of capital in conditions of extreme uneven development made periodic imperialist wars inevitable for periodic re-divisions of the world and spheres of influence. Lenin’s merit and, therefore, a new one for Lenin consists in the fact that, based on the main provisions of *Capital*, he gave a justified Marxist

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Secondly, the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The main idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the political domination of the proletariat and as a method of overthrowing the power of capital through violence, was given by Marx and Engels. Lenin's new lies in this area: a) he discovered Soviet power as the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, using the experience of the Paris Commune and the Russian Revolution for this; b) he opened the brackets in the formula of the dictatorship of the proletariat from the angle of the problem of the allies of the proletariat, defining the dictatorship of the proletariat as a special form of the class alliance of the proletariat, which is the leader, with the exploited masses of non-proletarian classes (peasantry, etc.) that are governed; c) he emphasized with particular force the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the highest type of democracy in a class society, a form *proletarian* democracy, expressing the interests of the majority (exploited), as opposed to *capitalist* democracy, expressing the interests of the minority (exploiters).

Thirdly, the question of the forms and methods of successfully building socialism during the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, during the transitional period from capitalism to socialism in a country surrounded by capitalist states. Marx and Engels regarded the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a more or less long period, full of revolutionary struggles and civil wars, during which the proletariat, while in power, takes the economic, political, cultural and organizational measures necessary to replace the old capitalist society create a new socialist society, a society without classes, a society without a state. Lenin stood entirely on the basis of these basic

principles of Marx and Engels. Lenin's new in this area is that a) he justified the possibility of building a complete socialist society in the country of the dictatorship of the proletariat surrounded by imperialist states, provided that this country is not strangled by military intervention of the surrounding capitalist states; b) he outlined the concrete paths of economic policy ("the new economic policy"), with which the proletariat, holding economic commanding heights (industry, land, transport, banks, etc.), connects the socialized industry with agriculture ("the link between industry and peasant farming") and thus leads the entire national economy to socialism; c) he outlined concrete ways of gradually bringing and involving the main masses of the peasantry in the mainstream of socialist construction through cooperation

Fourth, the question of the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution, in any popular revolution, both in the revolution against tsarism and in the revolution against capitalism. Marx and Engels gave a basic outline of the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat. The new thing for Lenin here is that he developed and expanded these sketches into a harmonious system of hegemony of the proletariat, into a harmonious system of leadership of the proletariat by the working masses of the city and village, not only in the overthrow of tsarism and capitalism, but also in the matter of socialist construction under the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is known that the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat received, thanks to Lenin and his party, a masterful application in Russia. This, incidentally, explains the fact that the revolution in Russia brought the proletariat to power. It used to be that way, that the workers fought during the revolution on the barricades, they shed blood, they overthrew the old, and power fell into the hands of the bourgeois who oppressed and exploited the workers later. That was the case in England and in France. That was the case in Germany. Here in Russia, things have taken a different turn. Our workers represented not only the striking power of the revolution. Being the shock force of the revolution, the Russian proletariat tried at the same time to be a hegemon, the political leader of all the exploited masses of the city and village, rallying them around itself, tearing them away from the bourgeoisie, and isolating politically the bourgeoisie. Being the hegemon of the exploited masses, the Russian proletariat fought all the time to seize power in their own hands and use it in their own interests against the bourgeoisie, against capitalism. This actually explains that every powerful speech of the revolution in Russia both in October 1905 and

in February 1917 brought to the stage the councils of workers' deputies as the seeds of a new apparatus of power designed to suppress the bourgeoisie, in contrast to the bourgeois parliament, as the old apparatus of power designed to suppress proletariat. The bourgeoisie twice tried to restore the bourgeois parliament and put an end to the Soviets: in August 1917, during the Pre-Parliament, before the Bolsheviks seized power, and in January 1918 during the Constituent Assembly, after the proletariat took power, everyone once defeated. Why? Because the bourgeoisie was already politically isolated, the millions of working people considered the proletariat the only leader of the revolution, and the soviets were already tested and tested by the masses as their own working power, exchanging it for the bourgeois parliament would be suicide for the proletariat. It is not surprising, therefore, that bourgeois parliamentarism did not take root in our country. That is why the revolution in Russia brought the proletariat to power. Such are the results of the implementation of the Leninist system of hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution.

Fifth, the question is national-colonial. Marx and Engels, analysing events in Ireland, in India, in China, in the countries of Central Europe, in Poland, in Hungary, at one time gave basic, starting ideas on the national-colonial issue. Lenin in his works was based on these ideas. Lenin's new in this area is that a) he brought together these ideas into a harmonious system of views on national-colonial revolutions in the era of imperialism; b) connected the national-colonial question with the question of the overthrow of imperialism; c) declared the national-colonial question an integral part of the general question of the international proletarian revolution.

Finally, the question of the party of the proletariat. Marx and Engels gave basic sketches about the party as the vanguard of the proletariat, without which (without the party) the proletariat could not achieve its liberation either in the sense of taking power, or in the sense of rebuilding capitalist society. Lenin's new in this area is that he further developed these sketches as applied to the new conditions of the struggle of the proletariat during the period of imperialism, showing that a) the party is the highest form of class organization of the proletariat in comparison with other forms of organization of the proletariat (trade unions, cooperation, state organization), the work of which it is called upon to generalize and direct; b) the dictatorship of the proletariat can be realized only through the party, as its guiding force; c) the dictatorship of the proletariat can be complete only if it is led by one party, a Communist Party that does not and should not

share leadership with other parties; d) without iron discipline in the party, the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be carried out to suppress the exploiters and restructure the class society into a socialist society.

This is basically the new that Lenin gave in his writings, specifying and developing further the teachings of Marx with reference to the new conditions of the struggle of the proletariat during the period of imperialism.

Therefore, they say in our country that Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions.

From this it can be seen that Leninism cannot be separated from Marxism, much less opposed to Marxism.

The delegation's question said further: "Would it be correct to say that Lenin believed in a "creative revolution", while Marx was more inclined to expect a culmination of economic forces?" I think it would be completely wrong to say that. I think that every popular revolution, if it is truly a people's revolution, is a creative revolution, for it breaks the old way and creates, creates a new one. Of course, there can be nothing creative in such, so to speak, "revolutions", which sometimes happen, say, in Albania in the form of toy "rebellions" of some tribes against others. But such toy "revolts" were never considered Marxists revolution. Obviously, this is not a question of such "uprisings", but of a mass popular revolution that raises the oppressed classes against the oppressor classes. But such a revolution cannot but be creative. Marx and Lenin stood precisely for such a revolution - and only for this. Moreover, it is clear that such a revolution cannot occur under any conditions, that it can be played out only under certain favourable conditions of an economic and political order. (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 263-267, ed. 9th. )*

### **III. Lenin's doctrine of the party and partisanship of philosophy**

**The party is the advanced detachment  
and political leader of the working class.**

The party must be, first of all, the *foremost* detachment of the working class. The party must incorporate all the best elements of the working class, their experience, their revolutionism, their wholehearted devotion to the cause of the proletariat. But in order to be a truly advanced detachment, the party must be armed with revolutionary theory, knowledge of the laws of movement, knowledge of the laws of revolution. Without this, it cannot manage the struggle of the proletariat, lead the proletariat. A party cannot be a real party if it is limited to registering what the masses of the working class are experiencing and thinking, if it is dragging its tail behind the spontaneous movement, if it cannot overcome the inertia and political indifference of the spontaneous movement, if it cannot rise above momentary interests proletariat, if it does not know how to raise the masses to the level of class interests of the proletariat. The party must stand in front of the working class, it must see beyond the working class, it must lead the proletariat, and not drag itself behind the spontaneity. The parties of the Second International, which preach “tail”, are the agents of bourgeois politics, which dooms the proletariat to the role of an instrument in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Only a party that has come to the point of view of the advanced detachment of the proletariat and is capable of raising the masses to the level of the class interests of the proletariat is only such a party capable of combining the working class with the path of trade unionism and turning it into an independent political force. The party is the political leader of the working class. They are the conductors of bourgeois politics, condemning the proletariat to the role of a tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Only a party that has come to the point of view of the advanced detachment of the proletariat and is capable of raising the masses to the level of the class interests of the proletariat is only such a party capable of combining the working class with the path of trade unionism and turning it into an independent political force. The party is the political leader of the working class. They are the conductors of bourgeois politics, condemning the proletariat to the role of tools in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Only a party that has come to the point of view of the advanced detachment of the proletariat and is capable of raising the masses to the level of the class interests of the proletariat is only such a party capable of combining the working class with the path of trade unionism and turning it into an independent political force. The party is the political leader of the working class.

I spoke above about the difficulties of the struggle of the working class, about the complexity of the situation in the struggle, about

strategy and tactics, about reserves and manoeuvring, about advance and retreat. These conditions are no less difficult, if not more so, than the conditions of war. Who can understand these conditions, who can give the right orientation to the millions of proletarians? No army in a war can do without an experienced headquarters if it does not want to doom itself to defeat. Is it not clear that the proletariat all the more cannot do without such a headquarters if it does not want to surrender itself to its sworn enemies? But where is this headquarters? This headquarters can only be the revolutionary party of the proletariat. The working class without a revolutionary party is an army without a headquarters. The party is the combat headquarters of the proletariat.

But the party cannot be only an *advanced* detachment. She must be with that squad *class*, part of the class, closely connected with it by all the roots of its existence. The distinction between the advanced detachment and the rest of the working class, between the party and non-party, cannot disappear until the classes disappear, the proletariat is replenished by people from other classes, and the working class as a whole is deprived of the opportunity to rise to the level of the advanced detachment. But the party would cease to be a party if this difference turned into a gap, if it became self-contained and detached from the non-party masses. The party cannot lead the class if it is not connected with the non-partisan masses, if there is no bond between the party and non-partisan masses, if these masses do not accept its leadership, if the party does not use moral and political credit among the masses. Recently, two hundred thousand new members from the workers were admitted to our party. What is remarkable here is that these people did not so much come to the party as they were sent there by the rest of the non-party masses, which took an active part in the admission of new members and without whose approval new members were not accepted at all. This fact suggests that the broad masses of non-partisan workers consider our party *their* party, a *close and dear* party, in the expansion and strengthening of which they are vitally interested and whose leadership they voluntarily entrust their fate. It is hardly necessary to prove that without these elusive moral threads connecting the party with the non-party masses, the party could not become the decisive force of its class. The party is an inextricable part of the working class.

“We,” says Lenin, “are a party of the class, and therefore *almost the entire class*(and in wartime, in the era of the civil war, and the whole class) should act under the leadership of our party, should

adjoin our party as tightly as possible, but it would be Manilovism and “tail” to think that almost the entire class or the whole class is able, under capitalism, to rise to the consciousness and activity of its advanced detachment, its socialist party. No other intelligent socialist doubted that under capitalism even a professional organization (more primitive, more accessible to the consciousness of the undeveloped strata) was not able to cover almost the entire or the entire working class. Just deceiving yourself, turning a blind eye to the vastness of our tasks, narrowing down these tasks would mean forgetting about the difference between the advanced detachment and all the masses gravitating towards it, *to raise* more and more extensive layers to this advanced level.” (Stalin, *On the Foundations of Leninism*, “Questions of Leninism,” pp. 65–66, ed. 9th. )

## **Party - an organized detachment of the working class**

The party is not only an *advanced* detachment of the working class. If she wants to really lead the class struggle, she must be *organized* at the same time. Detachment of its class. The tasks of the party under capitalism are extremely large and varied. The party must lead the struggle of the proletariat under extremely difficult conditions of internal and external development, it must lead the proletariat on the offensive when the situation demands an offensive, it must bring the proletariat out of the attack of a strong adversary, when the situation requires retreat, it must bring into the millions of unorganized non-party workers the spirit of discipline and orderliness in the struggle, the spirit of organization and endurance. But a party can fulfil these tasks only if it itself is the personification of discipline and organization, if it itself is *organized* detachment of the proletariat. Without these conditions, there can be no question of the actual leadership of the party by the millions of proletariat masses. The party is an organized detachment of the working class. (Stalin, *Questions of Leninism*, pp. 66-67.)

## **Party as the highest form of class organization of the proletariat**

The party is an organized detachment of the working class. But the party is not the only organization of the working class. The proletariat still has a number of other organizations without which it cannot wage a proper fight against capital: trade unions, cooperatives, factory organizations, parliamentary factions, non-partisan women's associations, press, cultural and educational organizations, youth unions, revolutionary militants organizations (during open revolutionary actions), councils of deputies as a state form of organization (if the proletariat is in power), etc. The vast majority of these organizations are free, and only some of them adjacent to the right of the party and of its branches. Under certain conditions, all these organizations are absolutely necessary for the working class, for without them it is impossible to strengthen the class position of the proletariat in the various spheres of struggle, for without them it is impossible to temper the proletariat as a force called upon to replace the bourgeois order with socialist ones. But how to implement a single leadership with such an abundance of organizations? Where is the guarantee that having multiple organizations will not lead to inconsistencies in leadership? They may say that each of these organizations is working in its own separate sphere and that therefore they cannot interfere with each other. This, of course, is true. But it is also true that all these organizations should work in one direction, because they serve But how to implement a single leadership with such an abundance of organizations? Where is the guarantee that having multiple organizations will not lead to inconsistencies in leadership? They may say that each of these organizations is working in its own separate sphere and that therefore they cannot interfere with each other. This, of course, is true. But it is also true that all these organizations should work in one direction, because they serve *one* class, the class of the proletarians. The question is: who determines that line, then the

general direction in which all these organizations should conduct their work? Where is the central organization that is not only capable, in the presence of the necessary experience, of developing this common line, but still has the opportunity, in view of the sufficient authority for this, to induce all these organizations to implement this line in order to achieve unity in leadership and exclude the possibility of interruptions?

Such an organization is the party of the proletariat.

The party has all the data for this, because, firstly, the party is an assembly point for the best elements of the class that have direct connections with the non-partisan organizations of the proletariat and very often direct them; because, secondly, the party, as an assembly point for the best people of the working class, is the best school for developing leaders of the working class who are able to lead all forms of organization of their class; because, thirdly, the party, as the best school of the leaders of the working class, is, by its experience and authority, the only organization capable of centralizing the leadership of the struggle of the proletariat and thus turning all and any non-partisan organizations of the working class into service bodies and drive belts connecting it with class. The party is the highest form of class organization of the proletariat.

This does not mean, of course, that non-party organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, etc., must be formally subordinate to party leadership. It is only a matter of ensuring that party members who are members of these organizations as undoubtedly influential people take all measures to convince non-party organizations to draw closer to the party of the proletariat in their work and voluntarily accept its political leadership.

That is why Lenin says that “the party is the *highest* form of the class association of the proletarians”, the political leadership of which should be extended to all other forms of organization of the proletariat.

That is why the opportunist theory of “independence” and “neutrality” of non-partisan organizations, which produces *independent* parliamentarians and press workers *cut off* from the party, *narrow-minded* professionals and *substitute* co-operatives, is completely incompatible with the theory and practice of Leninism. (Stalin, *On the Foundations of Leninism*, “Questions of Leninism,” pp. 68–70, ed. 9th. )

## **The role of the party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat**

Marxism teaches—and this teaching was not only formally confirmed by the entire Communist International in the decision of the Second (1920) Congress of the Comintern on the role of the political party of the proletariat, but it was also practically verified by all the experience of our revolution that only a political party of the working class, i.e., the communist party, able to unite, educate, organize such an avant-garde of the proletariat and the entire working mass, which is able to withstand the inevitable petty-bourgeois fluctuations of this mass, traditions and inevitable relapses about sectionalist narrowness or professional prejudices among the proletariat and to lead all the parties of the proletarian movement, and hence all the toiling masses. Without this, the dictatorship of the proletariat is inconceivable. (*Resolutions on the syndicalist and anarchist deviation in our party, X Congress of the RCP (B.), P. 139.*)

## **Central Committee of the CPSU (B.)— Political and Theoretical Headquarters of the Party**

Sole decisions always or almost always are one-sided decisions. In every collegium, in every collective there are people whose opinion must be taken into account. In every collegium, in every collective there are people who are able to express incorrect opinions. Based on the experience of three revolutions, we know that out of approximately 100 individual decisions that have not been verified, are not collectively corrected, 90 are one-sided. There are about 70 members in our governing body, in the Central Committee of our party, which directs all our Soviet and Party organizations. Among these 70 members of the Central Committee are our best industrialists, our best co-operators, our best suppliers, our best military, our best propagandists, our best agitators, our best experts on state farms, our best experts on collective farms, our best experts on individual peasant farming, our best experts on the nationalities of the Soviet Union and national politics. The wisdom of our party is concentrated in this aeropaus. Everyone has the opportunity to correct someone's sole

opinion, proposal. Everyone has the opportunity to contribute their experience. If this had not happened, if decisions had been made individually, we would have had serious mistakes in our work. Since everyone has the opportunity to correct the mistakes of individuals and since we reckon with these corrections, our decisions are more or less correct. ( If this had not happened, if decisions had been made individually, we would have had serious mistakes in our work. Since everyone has the opportunity to correct the mistakes of individuals and since we reckon with these corrections, our decisions are more or less correct. ( If this had not happened, if decisions had been made individually, we would have had serious mistakes in our work. Since everyone has the opportunity to correct the mistakes of individuals and since we reckon with these corrections, our decisions are more or less correct. (Stalin, *Conversation with German writer Emil Ludwig, Bolshevik magazine No. 8, 1932 p. 34.*)

## **Partisanship of philosophy**

Marx and Engels from the beginning to the end were party in philosophy, were able to discover deviations from materialism and concessions to idealism and fideism in all and every “new” directions. Therefore, *exclusively* from the point of view of the persistence of materialism, they evaluated Huxley. Therefore, they rebuked Feuerbach for the fact that he did not carry out materialism to the end - for the fact that he renounced materialism due to the mistakes of individual materialists—for the fact that he fought with religion in order to renew or compose a new religion,—for that in sociology he did not know how to get rid of the idealistic phrase and become a materialist.

And this greatest and most valuable tradition of his teachers was fully appreciated and adopted by I. Dietzgen, whatever his private mistakes in expounding on dialectical materialism. I. Dietzgen sinned a lot with his awkward deviations from materialism, but he never tried to fundamentally separate himself from him, to throw out the “new” banner, he always declared firmly and categorically at the decisive moment: I am a materialist, our philosophy is materialistic. ”Of all the parties,” our Joseph Ditsgen rightly said, “the most vile is the middle party ... As in politics, parties are more and more grouped into two camps only ... so science is divided into two main classes

(Generalklassen); there are metaphysicians, here are physicists or materialists [And here is an awkward, inaccurate expression: instead of “metaphysics” it was necessary to say “idealists”. Dietzgen himself contrasts dialectics in other places of metaphysicians.]. Intermediate elements and conciliatory charlatans with all kinds of nicknames, spiritualists, sensualists, realists, etc., etc., fall on their way, now and then in another direction. We demand decisiveness, we want clarity. Idealists [Note that I. Dietzgen has already recovered and explained *more precisely*, what is the party of the enemies of materialism.] the reactionary obscurantists (Retraitebläser) call themselves, and all those who strive to free the human mind from metaphysical gibberish should be called materialists ... If we compare both parties with a solid and fluid one, then in the middle lies something mushy “ [Cm. article: “Social Democratic Philosophy”, written in 1876, “Kleinere philosophischen Schriften”, 1903, S. 135.].

Truth! ”Realists”, etc., including “positivists”, Machists, etc., are all a miserable mess, a despicable *middle party* in philosophy, confusing the materialistic and idealistic direction on each separate issue. Attempts to jump out of these two fundamental trends in philosophy contain nothing but “conciliatory quackery.”

That the “scientific clergy” of idealistic philosophy is a simple eve of direct clericalism, there was no shadow of doubt for I. Dietzgen. ”The scientific clergy,” he wrote, “seeks to seriously support the religious clergy” (I. p. 51). “In particular, the field of the theory of knowledge, a misunderstanding of the human spirit is such a lousy hole (Lausgrube) in which it lays its eggs” and that and other clergy”... (51). “Certified lackeys with speeches about “ideal goods”; stultifying the people with the help of the tortured (geschraubter) idealism” (53)—that’s what professors of philosophy are for I. Dietzgen. “Just as the goddess has the antipode, the devil, so the priestly professor (Kathederpfaffen) has a materialist.” The theory of the knowledge of materialism is a “universal weapon against the religious faith” (55), and not only against “the well-known, real.”

Compared to the “half-heartedness” of free-thinking professors, Dietzgen was ready to prefer “religious honesty” (60)—“there is a system” there, there are whole people who do not break theories and practices. ”Philosophy is not science, but a means of protection from social democracy” (107)—for years. professors. ”Those who call themselves philosophers, professors and privatdozents, all drown, despite their free thinking, more or less in prejudice, in mysticism... all make up a reactionary mass in relation to Social Democracy”

(108 ) ”To follow the right path without letting any religious and philosophical absurdities (Welsch) lead you astray, you need to study the wrong path of the wrong paths (der Holzweg der Holzwege)—philosophy” (103).

And now look, from the point of view of parties in philosophy, on Mach and Avenarius with their school. Oh, these gentlemen *boast of their non-partisanship* , and if they have an antipode, then only one and *only ... materialist* . Through *all the* writings of *all* Machians, the stupid claim of “rising above” materialism and idealism, surpassing this “obsolete” opposition runs through the red thread, but *in reality* this whole fraternity stumbles on idealism *every minute*, waging a continuous and steady struggle against materialism. The refined epistemological tweaks of some Avenarius remain a professorial fabrication, an attempt to establish a small “own” philosophical sect, and *in fact* , in the general atmosphere of the struggle of ideas and directions of modern society, the *objective* the role of these epistemological tricks is one and only one: to clear the way to idealism and fideism, to serve them faithfully. It is no accident, indeed, that both the English spiritualists like Ward, and the French neocritists, praising Mach for the struggle against materialism, and the German immanentists, are grabbing at a small school of empirio-critics. The formula of I. Dietzgen: “certified lackeys of fideism” does not hit the eyebrows, but hits Mach, Avenarius and their entire school [Here is another example of how widespread currents of reactionary bourgeois philosophy actually use Machism. Perhaps the “last fashion” of the most modern American philosophy is “pragmatism” (from the Greek pragma—deed, action, philosophy of action). Philosophical journals speak about pragmatism almost more than anything. Pragmatism makes fun of metaphysics and materialism and idealism, *relies specifically on Ostwald, Mach, Pearson, Poincaré, Duhem*, on the fact that science is not an “absolute copy of reality”, and ... safely draws from all this God for practical purposes, only for practice without any metaphysics, without any way out beyond experience (Avg. *William James* , Pragmatism. a new name for some old ways of thinking, NY 1907, p. 57 and 106, especially ( *James B .* , Pragmatism. The new name for the old ways of thought, pp. 57 and 106, 1907. - *Ed.*) The differences between mechanism and pragmatism are just as insignificant and ten-degree from the point of view of materialism, as the differences between empirio-criticism and empiriomonism. Compare at least the Bogdanov’s and pragmatic definition of truth: “truth is for the pragmatist, there is a generic

concept for any kind of certain working values in experience” (ibid., p. 68).].

The misfortune of the Russian Machists, who decided to “reconcile” Machism with Marxism, lies in the fact that they trusted the reactionary professors of philosophy and, trusting, rolled downhill. The methods of composing various attempts to develop and supplement Marx were very simple. They will read Ostwald, believe Ostwald, retell Ostwald, call it Marxism. They will read Mach, believe Mach, retell Mach, call it Marxism. They will read Poincare, believe Poincare, retell Poincare, call it Marxism! *None* of these professors, capable of giving the most valuable work in special fields of chemistry, history, physics, *can be trusted in a single word*, since it comes to philosophy. Why? For the same reason that *not one* a professor of political economy, capable of producing the most valuable work in the field of factual, special studies, cannot be trusted *in a single word*, since it comes to the general theory of political economy. For this last one is the same *party science* in modern society, like *epistemology*. By and large, professors-economists are nothing more than scientific clerks of the capitalist class, and professors of philosophy are scientific clerks of theologians. The task of Marxists here and there to be able to assimilate and process the gains that are made by these “clerks” (for example, you will not take a step in the study of new economic phenomena without using the works of these clerks), and *be able to* cut off their reactionary tendency, be able to lead *your* line and fight the *whole line of forces* and classes hostile to us. Our Machians, *slavishly* following reactionary professorial philosophy, did not *succeed* in this. “Maybe we are mistaken, but we are looking,” wrote Lunacharsky on behalf of the authors of the Essays.—Not *you* are looking, but *they are looking for you*, that’s the trouble! You do not approach yours, that is, Marxist (because you want to be Marxists), the point of view of every turn of the bourgeois-philosophical fashion, but this fashion suits you, it imposes its new fakes on you in the taste of idealism, today à la Ostwald, tomorrow à la Mach, the day after tomorrow à la Poincare. Those silly “theoretical” tricks (with “energy”, with “elements”, “introjection”, etc.) that you naively believe remain within a narrow, tiny school, and the ideological and *social tendency* of these tricks is immediately captured by Wards, neocriticists, immanentists, Lopatins, pragmatists and *serves their service*. The fascination with empirio-criticism and “physical” idealism passes just as quickly as the fascination with neo-

Kantianism and “physiological” idealism, and fideism from each such hobby takes its prey, modifying its tricks in favour of philosophical idealism in thousands of ways.

Attitude to religion and attitude to natural science perfectly illustrates this *actual* class use of bourgeois reaction of empirio-criticism. ( *Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, pp. 277–280, 3rd ed. )*

## **IV. Development and concretization of materialist dialectics by Lenin**

### **The Lenin method is a further development of the Marx method**

What was given in Lenin’s method basically already existed in Marx’s teaching, which, according to Marx, is “essentially critical and revolutionary”. It is this critical and revolutionary spirit that penetrates from beginning to end the method of Lenin. But it would be wrong to think that the Lenin method is a simple restoration of what was given by Marx. In fact, Lenin’s method is not only a restoration, but also a concretization and further development of the critical and revolutionary method of Marx, his materialist dialectics. ( *Stalin, Questions of Leninism, p. 16, ed. 9th. )*

\* \* \*

Perhaps the most striking expression of the high importance that Lenin attached to the theory should be considered the fact that none other than Lenin undertook the most serious task of generalizing in materialist philosophy the most important thing that was given by science over the period from Engels to Lenin, and comprehensive criticism of the anti-materialist movements among Marxists. Engels said that “materialism has to take on a new look with every new great discovery.” It is known that this task was fulfilled for its time by none other than Lenin in his remarkable book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. It is known that Plekhanov, who loved to make fun of Lenin’s “carelessness” about philosophy, did not even dare to

seriously begin to carry out such a task. (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, p. 17, ed. 9th.*)

## Lenin on the essence of dialectics

The bifurcation of the one and the knowledge of its conflicting parts (see the quote from Philo about Heraclitus at the beginning of the third part (“On the knowledge”) of Lassalean Heraclitus) is the *essence* (one of the “essences”, one of the basic, if not basic, features or traits) of dialectics. This is precisely what Hegel poses the question (Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* constantly  *fights* around this and *struggles* with Heraclitus resp. [At the same time, at the same time. - *Ed.* ] With Heraclitian ideas).

The correctness of this aspect of the content of dialectics must be verified by the history of science. Insufficient attention is usually paid to this side of dialectics (for example, for Plekhanov): the identity of opposites is taken as the sum of *examples* (“for example, grain”, “for example, primitive communism.” The same is with Engels. But this is “for popularity” ... ), and not as the *law of knowledge* (and the *law of the objective world*).

In mathematics + and -. Differential and integral.

In mechanics - action and reaction.

In physics, positive and negative electricity.

In chemistry, the compound and dissociation of atoms.

In social science - the class struggle.

The identity of opposites (their “unity”, perhaps more truly? Although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly significant here. In a certain sense, both are true) is the recognition (discovery) of contradictory, *mutually exclusive*, opposite trends in *all* phenomena and processes of nature (and spirit and society *including* ). The condition for knowing all the processes of the world in their “ *self-movement* ”, in their spontaneous development, in their living life, is knowing them as a unity of opposites. Development is the “struggle” of opposites. Two basic (or two possible? Or two observed in history?) Concepts of development (evolution) are: development as reduction and increase, as repetition, *and* development as a unity of opposites (bifurcation of the one into mutually exclusive opposites and the relationship between them).

With the first concept of movement, *the movement itself*, its *motive* power, its source, its motive (or this source is transferred *outside* - God, the subject, etc. [and so on. - *Ed.*]) Remain in the shadow. In the second concept, the main focus is precisely on knowing the *source of the "self"* movement.

The first concept is dead, poor, dry. The second is vital. *Only the second* gives the key to the "self-movement" of all things; only it gives the key to "leaps", to "a break in gradualness", to "turning into the opposite", to destroying the old and the emergence of the new.

The unity (coincidence, identity, equal effect) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transient, relational. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, as is absolutely development, movement.

NB: the difference between subjectivity (scepticism and sophistry etc.) from dialectics, by the way, is that in (objective) dialectics is relative (relational) and the difference between relational and absolute. For the objective dialectic and *in the relational* there is the absolute. For subjectivity and sophistry, the relational is only relational and excludes the absolute.

In Marx, in *Capital*, the first thing that is analysed is the simplest, ordinary, basic, most massive, most ordinary, billions of times found, the *attitude of bourgeois* (commodity) society: the exchange of goods. Analysis reveals in this simplest phenomenon (in this "cell" of bourgeois society) *all the* contradictions (resp. The embryos of *all* contradictions) of modern society. Further presentation shows us the development (*and growth and movement*) of these contradictions and this society, in  $\Sigma$  [The Greek letter "sigma" is used in mathematics to denote the sum. *Ed.*] Of its individual parts, from its beginning to its end.

Such should also be the method of presentation (resp. Study) of dialectics in general (for the dialectics of bourgeois society, Marx has only a special case of dialectics). To start with the simplest, most ordinary, massive, etc., with *any offer*: the leaves of the tree are green; Ivan is a man; A bug is a dog, etc. Already here (as Hegel brilliantly noted) there is a *dialectic*; *the individual* is the *general*, (Compare Aristoteles, *Metaphisik* [*Aristotle, Metaphysics.—Ed.*], lane Schwegler. Bd. II, S. 40, 3 Buch., 4 *Capital* [T. II, p. 40, 3rd book, chap. 4. - *Ed.*] 8 - 9 "denn natürlich kann man nicht der Meinung sein, dass es ein Haus—the house in general—gebe ausser den sichtbaren Häusern"... [because, obviously, it is impossible to think that some house exists outside (apart from ) visible houses.—

*Ed.*]. This means that the opposites (the separate is the opposite of the general) are identical: the separate does not exist except in the connection that leads to the general. The common exists only in the separate, through the separate. Any individual is (somehow) common. Every common thing is (a particle or side or essence) of the individual. Anything common only approximately covers all individual objects. Every individual is incompletely included in the general, etc., etc. Every individual is connected with another *kind of* separate (things, phenomena, processes) by the thousands of transitions, etc. *Already here* there are elements, rudiments, concepts of *necessity*, objective connection of nature etc. The accidental and necessary, the phenomenon and the essence are already here, for saying: Ivan is a man, a bug is a dog, *it* is a leaf of a tree, etc., we *discard* a number of signs, as *random*, we separate the essential from the being and contrast one another.

Thus, in *any* sentence it is possible (and should), as in a “cell” (“cell”) to reveal the rudiments of *all* elements of dialectics, thus showing that dialectics is generally characteristic of all cognition of a person. And natural science shows us (and again this must be shown with *any* simple example) the objective nature in its same qualities, the transformation of the individual into the general, random into necessary, transitions, overflows, the interconnection of opposites. Dialectics is *the* theory of knowledge (of Hegel and) of Marxism: this is what “side” of the matter (this is not the “side” of the matter, but the *essence of the* matter) did not pay attention to Plekhanov, not to mention other Marxists.

\* \* \*

Cognition in the form of a series of circles represents both Hegel (see Logic) and the modern “epistemologist” of natural science, eclecticism, the enemy of Hegelism (which he did not understand) Paul Volkmann (see his Erkenntnistheoretische Grundzüge der Naturwissenschaft) [*Volkman P.*, Theory of cognition of natural sciences.—*Ed.*].

“Circles” in philosophy: (is a chronology obligatory for *persons* ? No!)

Antique: from Democritus to Plato and the dialectic of Heraclitus.

Rebirth: Descartes versus [*v.*—*Ed.* .] Gassendi (Spinoza?).

New: Holbach-Hegel (via Berkeley, Hume, Kant).

Hegel-Feuerbach-Marx.

Dialectics as a *living*, multilateral (with an ever-increasing number of sides) cognition from the abyss of the shades of any approach, approximation to reality (with a philosophical system growing into a whole from each shade) - this is an immeasurably rich content compared to “metaphysical” materialism, the main *trouble* of which there is an inability to apply dialectics to the Bildtheorie [theory of reflection. - *Ed.*], To the process and development of cognition.

Philosophical idealism is *only* nonsense from the point of view of materialism, crude, simple, metaphysical. On the contrary, from the point of view of *dialectical* materialism, philosophical idealism is *one-sided*, exaggerated, *überschwengliches* [excessive, unlimited. - *Ed.*] (Dietzgen) the development (inflating, swelling) of one of the lines, sides, faces of cognition in the absolute, *divorced* from matter, from nature, deified. Idealism is clericalism. Right. But idealism

NB: philosophical is (“*more truly*” and “*besides*”) this the *road* to clericalism *through one of the shades of* aphorism *the infinitely complex cognition of* (dialectical) man.

Cognition of man is not (resp. Does not follow) a straight line, but a curved line infinitely approaching a series of circles, a spiral. Any fragment, fragment, piece of this curved line can be turned (one-sidedly turned) into an independent, whole, straight line, which (if you can't see the forests behind the trees) then leads into the swamp, into the clergy (where it is *reinforced by the* class interest of the ruling classes). Straightforwardness and one-sidedness, woodenness and ossification, subjectivity and subjective blindness voila [here.—*Ed.*] The epistemological roots of idealism. But the clergy (=philosophical idealism), of course, have *epistemological* roots, it is not baseless, it is a *hollow*, indisputably, but a hollow flower growing on a living tree of a living, fruitful, true, powerful, omnipotent, objective, absolute, human knowledge. (*Lenin, On the Question of Dialectics, Op., Vol. XIII, pp. 301 - 304.*)

In short, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This will capture the core of dialectics, but this requires explanation and development. (*The Lenin Collection IX, p. 259.*)

In particular, dialectics is the study of the opposite of a thing in itself, essence, substrate, substance—from a phenomenon, “for others-being.” Here we also see a transition, overflowing one into another:

the essence is. The phenomenon is significant. A person's thought deepens infinitely from a phenomenon to an essence, from an essence of the first, so to speak, order to an essence of the second order, etc. *without end*.

In the proper sense, dialectics is the study of contradictions *in the very essence of objects*: not only phenomena are transient, mobile, fluid, separated only by conditional faces, but also the *essence of things* as well. (*The Lenin Collection, XII p. 183.* )

## Elements of materialistic dialectics

1) The definition of the concept of itself [ *the thing itself* in its Dialectic relations and in its development should be considered]; Elements

2) inconsistency in the thing itself, conflicting forces and tendencies in every phenomenon;

3) the combination of analysis and synthesis. These are the elements of dialectics, apparently.

Perhaps, in more detail, these elements can be represented as follows:

1) *objectivity of consideration* (not examples, not derogations, but a thing in itself). X

2) the whole totality of the diverse *relationships of this thing* to others.

3) the *development of this thing* (respective phenomena), its own movement, its own life.

4) internally conflicting *tendencies ( and sides)* in this thing.

5) a thing (phenomenon etc.) as the sum *and unity of opposites* .

6) the *struggle of the* respective deployment of these opposites, the inconsistency of aspirations etc.

7) the combination of analysis and synthesis - the disassembly of individual parts and the totality, the summation of these parts together.

X 8) the relations of each thing (phenomena etc.) are not only diverse, but universal, universal. Each thing (phenomenon, process etc.) is associated with *each* .

9) not only the unity of opposites, but the *transitions of each* definition, quality, trait, side, property to *each* other [in its opposite?].

- 10) an endless process of disclosing *new sides*, relationships etc.
  - 11) the endless process of deepening a person's knowledge of a thing, phenomena, processes, etc. from phenomena to essence and from less deep to deeper essence.
  - 12) from coexistence to causality and from one form of communication and interdependence to another, deeper, more general.
  - 13) repetition at the highest stage of the known features, properties, etc. inferior and
  - 14) supposedly returning to the old (negation of negation).
  - 15) content struggle with form and vice versa. Dropping forms, remaking content.
  - 16) The transition of quantity into quality and vice versa. ( 15 and 16 are *examples of the 9th*)
- + (continued. See the previous page) ( *Lenin Collection IX* , pp. 257–259, 1st ed. )

With the “principle of development” in the XX century. (and at the end of the 19th century) “everyone agrees.” - Yes, but this superficial, ill-conceived, random, philistine “consent” is *the kind of consent* that strangles and vulgarizes the truth. - If everything develops, it means everything moves from one to another, because development is certainly not a simple, *universal* and perpetual *growth, increase* (respectively *decrease*), etc. - If so, then first, we need to understand evolution *more precisely*, how the emergence and destruction of everything, mutual transitions. - And secondly, if *everything* develops, does this apply to the most general *concepts and categories*? thinking? If not, then thinking is not connected with being. If so, then there is a dialectic of concepts and a dialectic of cognition that has objective significance. +

I principle of+ In addition, the universal development ... principle of development must be II principle of combined, connected, combinedNB unity ... with the universal principle of

To the question of *dialectics* and its objective meaning.

the *unity of the world*, nature,  
movement, matter, etc. (*Lenin  
Collection “ XII , pp. 185 - 187. )*

“Integrity, the totality of the moments of reality,  
which in its *deployment* is a necessity.”

The unfolding of the totality of the moments of  
reality NB = the essence of dialectical  
knowledge. (*The Lenin Collection IX, p. 159. )*

## **Heil’s Dialogue [ect] Ki (Logic)**

(CONTENT OF SMALL LOGIC (ЭНЦ [ICLOPED] AI)

[“The Hegelian dialectic plan” was written down by Lenin in a  
notebook of arch. No. 18693, following the recording of the abstract  
of Noel’s book (p. 278). - *Ed .]*

I. The doctrine of being. A) Quality. a) Being; b) Cash being; c) For-  
myself-

being.

B) To [o] l [and] h [eats] in. a) pure to [o] l [and] h [eats] in; b) great  
rank (Quantum); c) degree.

C) Measure.

II. The doctrine of the essence. A) The essence, k [a] k the basis of  
existence.

a) identity - difference - basis.

b) existence.

c) thing.

B) The phenomenon. a) the world of the phenomenon; b) content and  
form;

c) attitude.

C) Validity.

a) relation of substance

b) “causality

c) interaction.

III. The doctrine of the concept.

A) The subjective concept. a) the concept; b) judgment; c) conclusion.

B) The object. a) the mechanism; b) chemism; c) teleology.

C) The idea. a) life; b) knowledge; c) an absolute idea.

the concept (cognition) in being (in direct abstraction [act] phenomena) reveals the essence (the law of Seyn reason, identity), difference [etc.] - such is the [ol] ko k [a] by really *general course of all [human] cognition the moment in (of all science) in general. the course and eating πάντα περι of [knowledge] and [political] economy [ and [everything flows] history].* Dialog [ect] k [ege] For there is, so far, a generalization of the history of thought. *history of individual sciences* . In logic, the history of thought *should* , in general, coincide with the laws of thought.

It is striking that sometimes [G] egel goes from abstraction [act] to concrete [Seyn - abstraction [act] - Daseyn - concret [act] - Fürsich eyn), - sometimes vice versa (subjective) concept) - object - truth (abs [idea]). Is this not the inconsistency of the idealist (what M [ar] x called Ideen mystik [ Hegel's *Ed* .])? Or are there deeper reasons? (eg [imer], *being = nothing* - the idea of becoming, development). First *glimpses* impressed [eniya], then released *something* - and then develop the concept of *quality* (definition of a thing or phenomenon) and to [a] l [and] h [eating] va. Then, study and reflection direct the thought to cognition of identity [differences] - differences - fundamentals - essences v [ersu] s [v. - *Ed* .] Appearances, - reason [innovation] etc. All these moments (steps, steps, processes) of cognition are directed from the subject to the object, being tested by practice and coming to this truth through this test (= abs [lute] idea).

Quality and sensation (Empfindung) are one and the same g [ovo] rit [uye] rb [a] x. The very first and best known to us is sensation, and *in it quality is inevitable ...*

[If M [ar] x did not leave "*Logic*" (with a capital letter), then he left the *logic of "Capital"*, and this should be used strictly on this issue. In Capital, logic, dialectics, and the theory of the knowledge of materialism are applied to one

science [3 words are not necessary: this is one and the same], taking everything valuable from Hegel and moving this value forward.]

commodity - money - capital

↗pr [production] abs [foreign exchange] M [ehr] w [ert] [surplus value. - Ed .].

↘pr [production] rel. [Relative] M [ehr] w [ert] [surplus value. - Ed .]

The history of capitalism and analysis of *concepts* summarizing it.

The beginning is the simplest, ordinary, massive, direct “being”: a separate [commodity] product (“seyn” in the [political] economy). An analysis of it, to [a] to the relationship of social. The analysis is *twofold*, the deduct [iven] and the induct [iven] - logical [es] and historical [es] (form [value] of value).

fact-checking resp [active] practice is here at *every* step of the analysis  
cf. to the question of the essence of v [ersu] s  
phenomenon

- price and [cost] st

- supply and demand]

v [ersu] s *Werlh*

(= kryst [allisirte] Arb [eit]) [crystallized labour. - Ed .]

- h [wage] pl [ata] and price

work force.

( *The Lenin Collection XII* , pp. 290 - 292. )

## **The doctrine of Leninism on the main link**

“It is not enough to be a revolutionary and a supporter of socialism or a communist in general,” I wrote in April 1918 in “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government.”—“We must be able to find at every moment that particular chain link that we must grasp by all means in order to hold the entire chain and prepare for the transition to the next link, the order of the links, their shape, their

linkage, their difference from each other in the historical chain events are not so simple and not so stupid as in an ordinary chain made by a blacksmith. “

At the moment, in that area of activity in question, such a link is the revival of domestic *trade* with its proper state regulation (direction). Trade is the “link” in the historical chain of events, in the transitional forms of our socialist construction of 1921-1922, “ *which we must grasp with all our might* ” for us, the proletarian state power, for us, the leading Communist Party. If we *now* ”grasp” this link quite tightly, we will surely take possession of the *whole* chain in the near future. Otherwise, we will not be able to master the whole chain, and we cannot create the foundation of socialist socio-economic relations. (*Lenin, On the significance of gold now even after the complete victory of socialism (1921), Soch., Vol. XXVII , p. 82. )*

One of the greatest advantages of the political strategy of our party is that it knows how to choose at every given moment the *main link of the movement*, clinging to which it then pulls the whole chain to one common goal in order to achieve a solution to the problem. Can it be said that the party has already chosen the main link of the collective farm movement in the system of collective farm construction? Yes, it is possible and necessary.

What is it, is this the main link?

Maybe in a *partnership for joint* land cultivation? No, not that. Partnerships for joint land cultivation, where the means of production are not yet socialized, represent the already passed stage of the collective farm movement.

Maybe in an *agricultural commune* ? No, not in the commune. The communes are still an isolated phenomenon in the collective farm movement. For agricultural communes, as the *predominant form* , where not only all production, but also distribution is socialized, conditions have not yet matured.

The main link of the collective farm movement, its *prevailing* form at the moment, which we must now grasp at, is the *agricultural artel*.

In the *agricultural artel*, the basic means of production are socialized, mainly for grain farming: labour, land use, machinery and other equipment, livestock, farm buildings. It *does not socialize* : personal land (small gardens, kindergartens), residential buildings, a known part of dairy cattle, small cattle, poultry, etc. The artel is the *main link in the collective farm movement* because it is the most appropriate form of resolving the grain problem. The grain problem is

the *main link in the system of all agriculture* because without its resolution it is impossible to solve either the problem of animal husbandry (small and large), or the problem of technical and special crops that provide the main raw materials for industry. That is why the agricultural *artel* is at the moment the main link in the system of collective farm movement. ( *Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 467-468, ed. 9th.* )

... Finding at any given moment that particular link in the chain of processes, seizing upon which it will be possible to hold the whole chain and prepare the conditions for achieving strategic success.

The point is to single out from a number of tasks facing the party that particular next task, the resolution of which is the central point and the implementation of which ensures the successful resolution of the remaining next tasks.

The significance of this provision could be demonstrated by two examples, one of which could be taken from the distant past (the period of the formation of the party), and the other from the closest present to us (the period of NEP).

In the period of the formation of the party, when countless circles and organizations were not yet connected, when cunning and circle circles corroded the party from top to bottom, when ideological confusion was a characteristic feature of the party's internal life, during this period the main link and main task in the chain of links and in the chain of tasks facing the party then was the creation of an all-Russian illegal newspaper. Why? Because it was only through an all-Russian illegal newspaper that it was possible under those conditions to create a ripened core of the party, capable of uniting countless circles and organizations, preparing the conditions for ideological and tactical unity and thus laying the foundation for the formation of a real party.

During the period of transition from war to economic construction, when industry vegetated in the clutches of devastation, and agriculture suffered from a lack of urban products, when the link between state industry and peasant farming turned into the main condition for successful socialist construction, during this period the main link in the chain of processes the main task in a number of other tasks was the development of trade. Why? Because under the conditions of NEP, the link between industry and peasant farming is impossible other than through trade, because production without marketing under the conditions of NEP is a death for industry, because industry can only be expanded through expansion of sales through the

development of trade, because, only having strengthened in the field of trade, only having mastered trade, only having mastered this link, one can hope to close the industry with the peasant market and successfully solve other immediate tasks in order to create the conditions for building the foundation of a socialist economy. (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 60–61, ed. 9th.*)

Why did the Bolsheviks seize precisely on the advice, as the main organizational lever that could facilitate the isolation of the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, able to advance the cause of the proletarian revolution and called upon to lead the millions of working people to the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat?

What are tips?

“The Soviets,” said Lenin back in September 1917, “are the essence of the new state apparatus, giving, firstly, the armed force of the workers and peasants, and this force is not divorced from the people, like the force of the old standing army, but in close contact with it connected; militarily, this force is incomparably more powerful than the former; in a revolutionary sense, it is indispensable to nothing else. Secondly, this apparatus makes contact with the masses, with the majority of the people, so close, inextricable, easily verifiable and renewable that there is nothing of the kind in the former state apparatus. Thirdly, this apparatus, by virtue of the electivity and change of its composition by the will of the people, without bureaucratic formalities, is much more democratic than the previous apparatuses. Fourth, it gives you a strong connection with a wide variety of professions, making it easier for the most diverse reforms of the most profound nature without red tape. Fifthly, it gives the form of organization of the avant-garde, i.e., the most conscious, most energetic, advanced *of the oppressed* classes, workers and peasants, thus being the apparatus by which the vanguard of the oppressed classes can raise, educate, educate and lead the *whole gigantic mass* of these classes, which until now has stood completely outside of political life, outside of history. Sixth, it provides an opportunity to combine the benefits of parliamentarism with the benefits of direct and direct democracy, that is, to combine in the person of elected representatives of the people both the legislative function *and the implementation of laws*. Compared to bourgeois parliamentarism, this is such a step forward in the development of democracy, which has a world-historical significance ... If the folk art of the revolutionary classes did not create councils, then the proletarian revolution would be hopeless in Russia, for with the old apparatus the proletariat would

undoubtedly he could not have kept power, but it was impossible to create a new apparatus at once “(see Vol. XXI, pp. 258–259).

That is why the Bolsheviks seized on the Soviets as the main organizational link that could facilitate the organization of the October Revolution and the creation of a new powerful apparatus of proletarian statehood. ( *Stalin, Questions of Leninism*, pp. 93–94, ed. 9th. )

## V. Lenin’s struggle for the purity of Marxist philosophy

### Lenin’s struggle with philosophical revisionism

In the field of philosophy, revisionism came in the wake of bourgeois professorial “science.” The professors walked “back to Kant,”—and revisionism dragged on for the Neo-Kantians, the professors repeated the priestly vulgarities uttered against philosophical materialism a thousand times—the revisionists mumbled condescendingly (word for word on the latest handbook) [Leadership.—*Red.*] that materialism has long been

“refuted”; professors harassed Hegel as a “dead dog”, and, preaching idealism themselves, only a thousand times smaller and more vulgar than Hegel’s, shrugged contemptuously about dialectics - and the revisionists climbed behind them into the swamp of philosophical vulgarization of science, replacing the “cunning” (And revolutionary) dialectics of “simple” (and calm) “evolution”; professors worked out their official salaries, fitting their idealistic and “critical” systems to the prevailing medieval “philosophy” (that is, theology), and the revisionists moved towards them, trying to make religion a “private affair” not in relation to the modern state, and in relation to the party of the advanced class.

What real class significance these “amendments” to Marx had, it is not necessary to talk about this—the matter is clear by itself. We only note that the only Marxist in international social democracy who criticized the incredible vulgarities that the revisionists have spoken here from the point of view of consistent dialectical materialism was Plekhanov. This is all the more necessary to strongly emphasize that in our time deeply erroneous attempts are made to smuggle old and reactionary philosophical trash under the flag of criticism of Plekhanov’s tactical opportunism [See the book “Essays on the Philosophy of Marxism” by Bogdanov, Bazarov and others. There is no place to disassemble this book, and for now I must confine myself to statements that in the near future I will show in a number of articles or in a special brochure that *everything* what is said in the text about neo-Kantian revisionists refers essentially to these “new” neo-Yunist and neo-Kercian revisionists.]. (*Lenin, Marxism and revisionism (1908), Soch., Vol. XII, p. 184 - 185.*)

A whole series of writers wishing to be Marxists have taken this year a real campaign against the philosophy of Marxism. In less than six months, four books were published, devoted mainly and almost entirely to attacks on dialectical materialism. These include, first of all, “Essays on (? It was necessary to say: against) the philosophy of Marxism”, St. Petersburg. 1908, a collection of articles by Bazarov, Bogdanov Lunacharsky, Berman, Gelfond, Yushkevich, Suvorov; then books: Yushkevich - “Materialism and critical realism”, Berman—“Dialectics in the light of the modern theory of knowledge”, Valentinova—“Philosophical constructions of Marxism”.

All these persons cannot but know that Marx and Engels called their philosophical views dozens of dialectical materialism dozens of times. And all these people, united - despite the sharp differences in political views—hostile to dialectical materialism, at the same time,

claim to be Marxists in philosophy! Engels's dialectic is "mysticism," says Berman, Engels's views are "outdated,"—in passing, as something taken for granted, throws Bazarov—materialism turns out to be refuted by our brave warriors who proudly refer to the "modern theory of knowledge", to the "latest philosophy" (or "the latest positivism"), on the "philosophy of modern natural science" or even "the philosophy of natural science of the 20th century". Based on all these supposedly latest teachings, our fighters of dialectical materialism fearlessly agree to direct fideism [Fideism is a doctrine that puts faith in the place of knowledge or generally assigns a certain meaning to faith.] (for Lunacharsky everything is clearer, but not for him alone!), but they immediately lose all courage, all respect for one's own convictions when it comes to directly defining one's relationship with Marx and Engels. In fact, it is a complete renunciation of dialectical materialism, i.e., of Marxism. In words—endless evasions, attempts to circumvent the essence of the issue, cover up its retreat, put in place materialism in general any one of the materialists, a decisive refusal to directly analyze the countless materialistic statements of Marx and Engels. This is a real "rebellion on your knees," as one Marxist rightly says. This is a typical philosophical revisionism, for only revisionists have gained notorious fame for their retreat from the basic views of Marxism and their fear or inability to openly, directly, decisively and clearly "settle" with abandoned views. When the orthodox happened to oppose the outdated views of Marx (for example, Mehring against some historical provisions), it was always done with such certainty and thoroughness that no one ever found anything ambiguous in such literary speeches. However, in "Essays" on "the philosophy of Marxism" there is one phrase that resembles the truth. This is Lunacharsky's phrase: "maybe we" (that is, obviously, all the employees of the Essays) "are mistaken, but we are looking for" (p. 161). That the first half of this phrase contains absolute, and the second - relative truth, I will try to show with all thoroughness in the book before the reader. Now I only note that if our philosophers spoke not on behalf of Marxism, but on behalf of several "seeking" Marxists, they would show more respect for themselves and for Marxism.

As for me, I am also a "seeker" in philosophy. Namely: in these notes, I set myself the task of finding out what crazy people are presenting under the guise of Marxism as something incredibly confusing, confusing and reactionary. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, ed. 3rd, pp. 11-12.*)

Turned over these days, Sukhanov's notes on the revolution. Particularly striking is the pedantry of all our petty-bourgeois democrats, as well as all the heroes of the Second International. Not to mention the fact that they are unusually cowardly, that even the best of them feed themselves with reservations when it comes to the smallest deviation from the German model, not to mention this property of all petty-bourgeois democrats, which was sufficiently manifested by them throughout the revolution, is striking their slavish imitation of the past.

They all call themselves Marxists, but they understand Marxism to an impossibly pedantic degree. They completely did not understand the decisive one in Marxism: namely, his revolutionary dialectics. Even Marx's direct indications that maximum flexibility is required at times of revolution are absolutely not understood by them, and they are not even noticed, for example, Marx's instructions in his correspondence relating to, remember, by 1856, when he expressed hope for a peasant war in Germany, which could create a revolutionary environment, with a labour movement, they even go around this direct order and go around and around it, like a cat near a hot porridge.

In all their behaviour, they find themselves as cowardly reformists, afraid to abandon the bourgeoisie, and even more so to break with it, and at the same time cover their cowardice with the most reckless phrasing and boasting. But even purely theoretically, they are all struck by the complete inability to understand the following consideration of Marxism: they have so far seen a certain path of development of capitalism and bourgeois democracy in Western Europe. And so, they cannot imagine that this path cannot be considered a model *mutatis mutandis* [Corresponding changes.—*Ed.*] Only with some amendments (completely insignificant from the point of view of world history).

*The first* is the revolution associated with the first world imperialist war. In such a revolution, new features should have manifested themselves, or modified depending on the war, because never in the world of such a war, in such an environment, has ever happened. Until now, we see that the bourgeoisie of the richest countries cannot establish "normal" bourgeois relations after this war, and our reformists, petty bourgeois, writhing themselves as revolutionaries, considered and still consider normal bourgeois relations to be the limit (it's not to go beyond it), and they understand this "norm" is extremely stereotyped and narrow.

*Secondly*, they are completely alien to any idea that, given the general pattern of development in all of world history, they are not at all excluded, but, on the contrary, separate development bands are proposed that represent the uniqueness of either the form or the order of this development. It doesn't even occur to them, for example, that Russia, standing on the border of civilized countries and countries, for the first time this war was finally drawn into civilization, countries of the whole East, non-European countries, that therefore Russia could and should have shown some peculiarities lying of course, along the general line of world development, but distinguishing its revolution from all previous Western European countries and introducing some partial innovations in the transition to eastern countries. (*Lenin, On our revolution (1923), Op., Vol. XXVII, ed. 3rd, pp. 39 -399.* )

As for materialism, it is precisely as a world outlook that I think I disagree with you on the merits. It is not about the "materialistic understanding of history" (our "empirio-" ["Our" empirio—, that is, empirio-critics and empiriomonists (A. A. Bogdanov, V. A. Bazarov, A. V. Lunacharsky). For the course of disagreements with them, see the following (209) letter, p. 527 of this volume.]), And for philosophical materialism. For the Anglo-Saxons and Germans to "materialism" owe their philistinism, and the Romans anarchism—I strongly dispute this. Materialism, like philosophy, is *everywhere in their pen*. *Neue Zeit*, the most seasoned and knowledgeable body, indifferent to philosophy, has never been an ardent supporter of philosophical materialism, and lately it has printed empirio-critics without a single reservation. So *that* materialism, which was taught by Marx and Engels, it was possible to deduce the dead philistinism, this is wrong, wrong! All petty bourgeois movements in social democracy are fighting the most with philosophical materialism, are drawn to Kant, to neo-Kantianism, to critical philosophy. No, the philosophy that Engels substantiated in *Anti-Dühring* does not allow philistinism to enter the threshold."Plekhanov harms this philosophy, linking the struggle *here* with the factional struggle, but after all, no Russian Social Democrat should confuse the present Plekhanov with the old Plekhanov." (*Lenin, Letter to Gorky of February 13, 1908, Op., Vol. XXVIII, p. 524.*)

A useful lesson could (and should have been) what happened to such highly-trained Marxists and socialist leaders of the Second International as Kautsky, Otto Bauer and others. They fully recognized the need for flexible tactics, they studied and others taught Marxian dialectics (and much of what they have done in this regard

will remain forever a valuable acquisition of socialist literature), but they made such a mistake in the *application* of this dialectic or turned out to be in practice *not* sodialecticists turned out to be people so far unable to take into account the rapid change of form and the rapid filling of old forms with new content, that their fate is a little more enviable than the fate of Gainndman, Gad and Plekhanov. The main reason for their bankruptcy was that they “peered” at one particular form of growth of the labour movement and socialism, forgot about its one-sidedness, were afraid to see that sharp break-up, which due to objective conditions became inevitable, and continued to repeat simple, learned, at first glance indisputable truths: three more than two. But politics is more like algebra than arithmetic, and even more like higher mathematics than lower. In fact, all the old forms of the socialist movement were filled with new content, therefore a new sign appeared in front of the numbers: “minus”, and our sages stubbornly continued (and continue) to assure themselves and others that “minus three” is greater than “minus two”. (*Lenin, Children’s disease of “leftism” in communism (1920), Soch., Vol. XXV, p. 237.* )

## **Lenin’s struggle with the subjectivity of the Narodniks and the objectivism of Struve**

Having finished sociology, the author proceeds to more “concrete economic issues” (73). At the same time, he considers it “natural and legal” to begin with “general provisions and historical references,” with “indisputable, universal experience of established premises,” as he says in the preface.

It is impossible not to notice that this technique sins with the same abstractness that was noted from the very beginning as the main drawback of the book being analysed. In the chapters to which we now proceed (the third, fourth, and fifth), this shortcoming led to two kinds of undesirable consequences. On the one hand, he weakened those certain theoretical positions that the author put up against the Narodniks. G. Struve reasoning *at all*, outlines the transition from subsistence to commodity economy, indicates that the thing happened in the world for the most part this way and that way, and at the same time it goes to Russia with separate, quick directions, extending to it the general process of “historical development of economic life.” It is

indisputable that such a distribution is completely legal and that the author's "historical references" are absolutely necessary for criticizing Narodism, which misrepresents the history of not only Russia. But it would be more specific to state these provisions, more precisely to contrast them with the arguments of the Narodniks, who deny the correctness of the spread of the general process to Russia; one should compare such and such an understanding of Russian reality by the Narodniks *with another* understanding of *the same* reality of the Marxists. On the other hand, the abstract nature of the author's reasoning leads to a lack of understanding of his propositions, to the fact that, correctly pointing out the existence of such and such a process, he does not make out which classes were formed at the same time, which masses were carriers of the process, obscuring others subordinate to them, strata of the population; in a word, the author's objectivism does not reach materialism here - in the aforementioned meaning of these terms [Such a correlation of objectivism and materialism is indicated, among other things, by Marx in the preface to his work: *Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonapartes*. Marx says that Proudhon (*Coup d'État*) (*Coup d'etat.—Ed.*) Wrote about the same historical event and speaks of his point of view as opposed to his as follows:

"Proudhon, for his part, seeks to present the coup [December 2] as a result of previous historical development. But the historical construction of the coup turns at his fingertips into the historical apology of the hero of this coup. He thus falls into the error of our so-called *objective* historians. On the contrary, I show how the *class struggle* in France created the conditions and circumstances that made it possible for a dozen and ridiculous persons to play the role of a hero." ((Vorwort) Foreword—*Ed.*) ( *Lenin, The Economic Content of Narodism (1894), Soch., Vol. I, ed. 1929, pp. 295-296.*)

As the reader sees, I only have to agree on the provisions of Mr. Struve, give them a different wording, "the same word, let's say otherwise." The question is: is there a need for this? Should I dwell with such detail on these additions and conclusions? Do they take for granted?

It seems to me—it's worth, for two reasons. Firstly, the narrow objectivity of the author is extremely dangerous, as it comes to forgetting the boundaries between the old, professed arguments in the literature about the ways and destinies of the fatherland, and the exact characterization of the real process driven by such and such classes. This narrow objectivity, this incontinence of Marxism is the

main drawback of Mr. Struve's book, and it is necessary to dwell on it in particular in order to show that it follows not from Marxism, but from its insufficient implementation; not from the fact that the author saw other criteria of his theory, except for reality, so that he made other practical conclusions from the doctrine (they are impossible, I repeat, unthinkable, without mutilating all its most important points), but because that the author limited himself to one of the most general aspects of the theory and did not carry it out in complete sequence. Secondly, one cannot disagree with the idea expressed by the author in the preface that before criticizing Narodism on particular issues, it was necessary to "reveal the very foundations of disagreement" (VII) through "principled polemics". But precisely so that this goal of the author does not remain unattained, and it is necessary to give a more concrete meaning to almost all of his positions, it is necessary to reduce his too general indications of specific questions of Russian history and reality. On all these issues, the Russian Marxists still have a lot of work to "review the facts" from a materialistic point of view - to reveal class contradictions in the activities of "society" and "state", behind the theories of "intelligentsia", finally, the work of establishing a connection between all the separate, infinitely diverse forms of appropriation of surplus product in Russian "national" industries and that advanced, most developed capitalist form of appropriation, which contains the "pledges of the future" and currently highlights the idea and historical task of the "manufacturer". Therefore, no matter how bold an attempt seems to indicate the solution of these issues, no matter how many changes, corrections a further detailed study would bring, it is nevertheless worth the effort to outline specific issues in order to provoke a more general and wide discussion of them. which contains the "pledges of the future" and currently highlights the idea and historical task of the "producer". Therefore, no matter how bold an attempt seems to indicate the solution of these issues, no matter how many changes, corrections a further detailed study would bring, it is nevertheless worth the effort to outline specific issues in order to provoke a more general and wide discussion of them.

The culmination point of Mr. Struve's narrow objectivity, which gives rise to incorrect questions, is his discussion of Liszt, his "wonderful teaching" about the "confederation of national productive forces", the importance of developing factory industry for agriculture, and the superiority of manufacturing of an agricultural state over an agricultural state, etc. The author finds that this "teaching" extremely "convincingly speaks of the historical inevitability and legitimacy of capitalism in the broad sense of the word a "(123), on the" cultural and historical power of triumphant commodity production "(124).

The professorial character of the reasoning of the author, as if rising above any certain countries, certain historical periods, certain classes, is especially evident here. No matter how you look at this argument, whether from a purely theoretical or practical point of view, such an assessment would be equally correct. Let's start with the first one. Is it not strange to think that one can "convince" anyone of the "historical inevitability and legitimacy of capitalism" for a known country by abstract, dogmatic provisions on the significance of factory industry? Is it not a mistake to raise a question on this basis so dear to liberal professors from Russian Wealth? Is it not necessary for a Marxist to reduce the whole thing to finding out what is and why it is that way, and not otherwise? (*Lenin, The Economic Content of Narodism (1894), Op., Vol. I, ed. 1929, pp. 303-305.*)

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Pointing out that the Narodnik doctrine of a special method in sociology is best described by Mirtov and Mikhailovsky, Mr. Struve characterizes this doctrine as "subjective idealism" and, in confirmation of this, cites a number of places worth dwelling on from the writings of these persons.

Both authors emphasize the position that the story was made by "lone fighting personalities." "Personalities create history" (Mirtov). Mr. Mikhailovsky is even clearer: "A living person with all his speculations and feelings becomes a figure of history at his own fear. She, and not some mystical power, sets goals in history and moves events towards them through a series of obstacles posed to her by the elemental forces of nature and historical conditions "(8). This position—that history is made by individuals—is theoretically completely meaningless. The whole story consists of the actions of individuals, and the task of social science is to explain these actions, so that the indication of "the right to intervene in the course of events"

(words of Mr. Mikhailovsky quoted from Struve, p. 8) is reduced to an empty tautology. This is especially clearly seen on the last tirade near the city of Mikhailovsky. A living person, he argues, moves events through a series of obstacles posed by the elemental forces of historical conditions. And what are these “historical conditions”? According to the logic of the author, again in the actions of other “living personalities.” Is it not true what a deep philosophy of history: a living person moves events through a system of obstacles posed by other living personalities! And why are these actions of some individuals called spontaneous, while others say that they “move events” to goals set in advance? It is clear that to look for at least some theoretical content here would be an almost hopeless enterprise. The thing is that the historical conditions that provided material for “subject” for our subjectivists were (as they are now) antagonistic relations, gave rise to the expropriation of the manufacturer. Not being able to understand these antagonistic relationships, not being able to find in. *They are also* such social elements that “lonely personalities” could join, subjectivists limited themselves to writing theories that comforted “lonely” personalities by what “living personalities” did history. The famous “subjective method in sociology” expresses nothing but good desire and poor understanding...

...the theory that reduces the social process to the actions of “living individuals” who “set goals” and “move events” is the result of a misunderstanding. No one, of course, ever thought of attributing to an “social group an independent existence independent of its constituent personalities” (31), but the fact is that “a personality, as a concrete individual, is a derivative of all living and modern her personalities, that is, a social group “(31). Let us explain the author’s thought. Mr. Mikhailovsky argues that history is made “by a living person with all his thoughts and feelings.” That’s right. But what determines these “thoughts and feelings”? Is it possible to seriously defend the view that they appear by chance, and do not necessarily stem from the given social environment, which serves as material, the object of the spiritual life of the individual and which is reflected in its “thoughts and feelings” from the positive or negative side, in the representation of the interests of one or another social class? And further: by what signs do we judge *about real* “thoughts and feelings” of *real* personalities? It is clear that there can be only one such sign: the *actions* of these personalities, and since we are only talking about social “thoughts and feelings,” we should add more: *social actions*

of individuals, that is, *social facts* .”Separating a social group from the individual,” says Mr. Struve, “we mean by the first all those diverse interactions between individuals that arise on the basis of social life and are objectified in customs and law, in mores and morals, in religious ideas” (32). In other words: a materialist sociologist who makes the subject of his study certain social relations of people, thereby already studying real *personalities* from the actions of which this relationship is composed. A subjectivist sociologist, starting his argument allegedly with “living personalities”, actually begins by putting such “thoughts and feelings” into these personalities that he considers rational (because, isolating his “personalities” from a specific social situation he thereby deprived himself of the opportunity to study the *valid* their thoughts and feelings), that is, “begins with utopia,” as Mr. Mikhailovsky had to admit. And since, further, this sociologist’s own ideas about the rational themselves reflect (unconsciously for himself) this social environment, his final conclusions from the reasoning that seem to him to be the “purest” product of “modern science and modern moral ideas” are actually express only the point of view and interests ... philistinism. (*Lenin, The Economic Content of Narodism (1894), Op., Vol. I, ed. 1929, p. 273, 279-280.* )

I have already pointed out that from the point of view of old economists and sociologists (not for Russia), the concept of a socio-economic formation is completely superfluous: they talk about society in general, argue with Spencers about what society is in general, what is the purpose and essence of society in general, and so on. etc. In such reasoning, these subjective sociologists rely on arguments such as those that the goal of society is the benefit of all its members, that therefore justice requires such and such an organization and that are inconsistent with this ideal (“Sociology must start with some utopia”—these words of one of the authors of the subjective method, Mr. Mikhailovsky, perfectly characterize the essence of their methods) organization orders are abnormal and must be eliminated.

“The essential task of sociology,” argues, for example, Mr. Mikhailovsky, “is to elucidate the social conditions under which a particular need of human nature is satisfied.” You see, this sociologist is only interested in a society that satisfies human nature, and not at all some social formations there, which, moreover, can be based on such an inconsistent “human nature” phenomenon as the enslavement of the majority by the minority. You see also that, from the point of view of this sociologist, there can be no question of looking at the

development of society as a natural-historical process. (“Having recognized something as desirable or undesirable, the sociologist must find the conditions for the realization of this desirable or the elimination of the undesirable”—“the implementation of such and such ideals,” argues the same Mr. Mikhailovsky.) Moreover, there can be no talk even of development, but only of various deviations from the “desirable,” of “defects” that occurred in history as a result of... because people were not smart, they did not know how to understand well of what human nature requires, were not able to find the conditions for the implementation of such reasonable orders. It is clear that the basic idea of Marx on the natural historical process of the development of socio-economic formations undermines this childish morality, which claims to be the name of sociology. How did Marx work out this basic idea? He did this by isolating the economic field from different areas of social life, by isolating from all social relations —“industrial relations”, as the main, initial, defining all other relations. (there can be no talk even about development, but only about different deviations from the “desirable,” about the “defects” that occurred in history as a result of ... because people were not smart, they did not know how to understand well what human nature requires, did not know how to find the conditions for the implementation of such reasonable orders. It is clear that the basic idea of Marx on the natural historical process of the development of socio-economic formations undermines this childish morality, which claims to be the name of sociology. How did Marx work out this basic idea? He did this by isolating the economic field from different areas of social life, by isolating from all social relations - “industrial relations”, as the main, initial, defining all other relations. (there can be no talk even about development, but only about different deviations from the “desirable,” about the “defects” that occurred in history as a result of... because people were not smart, they did not know how to understand well what human nature requires, did not know how to find the conditions for the implementation of such reasonable orders. It is clear that the basic idea of Marx on the natural-historical process of the development of socio-economic formations undermines this childish morality, which claims to be called sociology. How did Marx work out this basic idea? He did this by isolating the economic field from different areas of social life, by isolating from all social relations—“industrial relations”, as the main, initial, defining all other relations. (but only about different evasions from the “desirable,” about the “defects” that occurred in history as a result of... because

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Marx work out this basic idea? He did this by isolating the economic field from different areas of social life, by isolating from all social relations—“industrial relations”, as the main, initial, defining all other relations. ( that the basic idea of Marx on the natural historical process of the development of socio-economic formations undermines this childish morality, which claims to be the name of sociology. How did Marx work out this basic idea? He did this by isolating the economic field from different areas of social life, by isolating from all social relations—“industrial relations”, as the main, initial, defining all other relations. ( by isolating from all social relations—“industrial relations”, as the main, initial, defining all other relations. ( by isolating from all social relations—“industrial relations”, as the main, initial, defining all other relations. (*Lenin, What are “Friends of the People” and How They Fight Against Social Democrats (1894), Soch., Vol. I , pp. 58-59.*)

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Another “important side” of materialism, Mr. Struve continues, “is that economic materialism subordinates the idea to fact, consciousness and obligation to being” (40). “Subjugates”—this means, of course, in this case: assigns a subordinate place in the explanation of social phenomena. Subjectivists-Narodniks do just the opposite: they proceed from “ideals” in their reasoning, not at all thinking that these ideals could only be a well-known reflection of reality, that they must therefore be verified by facts and reduced to facts.—To the populist, however, this last position will be incomprehensible without explanation. How it is? He thinks, ideals should condemn facts, indicate how to change them, verify facts, and not be verified by facts. This last seems to the populist, accustomed to hovering in sky-high spheres, reconciliation with the fact. We will explain.

The presence of “managing at someone else’s expense”, the availability of exploitation will always generate ideals opposite to this system both in the exploited and in individual representatives of the “intelligentsia”.

These ideals are extremely valuable to a Marxist; he is only on their basis and polemicizes with Narodism, he polemicizes solely on the question of building these ideals and realizing them.

It’s enough for the populist to state the fact that generates such ideals, then give indications of the legality of the ideal from the point of view

of “modern science and modern moral ideas” [and he does not understand that these “modern ideas” mean only concessions of Western European “public opinion” to the new emerging force ] and appeal further to “society” and “state”: provide, protect, organize!

The Marxist proceeds from the same ideal, but does not compare it with “modern science and modern moral ideas [Engels in his book *Herrn E. Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft*] remarked perfectly that this is an old psychological method: to compare one’s concept with a fact, which he reflects, but with a different concept, with a cast from another fact.] “*and with existing class contradictions*, and formulates it therefore not as a requirement of “science”, but as a requirement of such and such class, generated by such and such social relations (which subject to objective investigation food) and achievable only so-and-so due to such and such properties of these relations. If not reduced *in this way* ideals to facts, these ideals will remain innocent wishes, without any chance of acceptance by the masses and, therefore, of their implementation. (*Lenin, The Economic Content of Narodism (1894), Soch., Vol. 7, ed. 1929, pp. 288-289.*)

## **Lenin’s criticism of Plekhanov’s retreat from dialectical materialism**

### *a) The formulation of the theory of hieroglyphs by Plekhanov*

Our sensations are a kind of hieroglyphs that bring to our attention what is actually happening. Hieroglyphs are not like the events that they convey. But they can *quite correctly* convey both the events themselves, and so—and this is most important—and the relations that exist between them. (*Plekhanov, Note to the 1st edition of “L. Feuerbach” in the original edition, Op., Vol. VIII p. 408.*)

\* \* \*

“Here it is! Plekhanov brilliantly refutes Beltov, i.e., himself. This is very maliciously said. But wait, m. Rira bien, qui rira le dernier. Remember, under what circumstances my thought criticized by you was expressed and what its *true “look”* was.

I expressed it in a dispute with Konrad Schmidt, who attributed to materialism the doctrine of the *identity of being and thinking* and

said, addressing me that if I “seriously” acknowledge the effect on me of things in myself, I must also admit that space and time exist objectively, and not just as forms of contemplation characteristic of the subject. To this I replied: “That space and time are the forms of consciousness and that therefore their first distinctive property is *subjectivity*, this was already known to Thomas Hobbes and no materialist will now deny this. The whole question is whether certain forms or relations of *things* do not correspond to these forms of consciousness... Materialists, of course, cannot answer this question otherwise than in the affirmative. This does not mean, of course, that they recognize the bad (or rather absurd) identity that the Kantians impose on them with helpful naivety, including Mr. Schmidt. No, the forms and relationships of things in themselves cannot be what they *seem to us*, that is, what they are to us, being “translated” in our head. Our ideas about the forms and relationships of things are nothing more than *hieroglyphs*; but these hieroglyphs accurately indicate these forms and relationships, and this is enough so that we can study the actions on us of things in ourselves and, in turn, influence them.”

What are these lines about? About the same thing that I spoke with you, Mr. Bogdanov, above. The fact that another thing is *an object in itself*, and another thing is an object in the representation of the subject. Now the question is: do I have any logical right to replace the word “form” here with the word “type”, which, in your words, serves as its synonym? Let’s try, see what happens with us. ”That space and time are types of consciousness and that therefore their first distinctive property is *subjectivity*, this was already known to Thomas Hobbes and not a single materialist will deny this “... Wait, how is this? What are these subjective “types” of consciousness? I have the word “view” used in the sense of that visual representation that exists about an object in the mind of the subject. We are talking about the “sensual contemplation” of the subject, and therefore, in the lines that we are now examining, the expression “types of consciousness” should mean—if only the word “view” is really a synonym for the word “form”, it is nothing but a visual representation consciousness about consciousness. “ ( *Plekhanov, Soch., Vol. XVII , ed. 1924, p. 34-35.* )

Helmholtz’s agnosticism also resembles “bashful materialism,” with Kantian attacks in contrast to Huxley’s Berkeley attacks.

The follower of Feuerbach, Albrecht Rau, therefore strongly criticizes the Helmholtz symbol theory as an inconsistent departure

from “realism.” Helmholtz’s main view, says Rau, is a realistic premise according to which “we can use our senses to understand the objective properties of things” [*Albrecht Rau*, *Empfinden und Denken*, Giessen 1896, S. 304. (*Rau A.*, *Impressions and Thoughts*, Giessen 1896, p. 304.—*Ed.*)]. The theory of symbols does not put up with such a (wholly materialistic, as we saw) view, for it introduces a certain distrust of sensuality, distrust of the testimonies of our senses. It is indisputable that the image can never completely equal the model, but the image is one thing, the symbol is the other thing, the *symbol*. The image is necessary and inevitably assumes the objective reality of what is “displayed”. “Conditional sign”, symbol, hieroglyph are the concepts that introduce a completely unnecessary element of agnosticism. And therefore A. Rau is absolutely right in saying that Helmholtz pays tribute to Kantianism by the theory of symbols. “If Helmholtz,” says Rau, “remained faithful to his realistic view, if he consistently held to the principle that the properties of bodies express both the relations of bodies between themselves and their relations to us, then he obviously would not need all this symbol theory; he could then, speaking briefly and clearly, say: “the sensations that are caused in us by things are the essence of the image of the essence of these things.” (*Ibid.*, p. 320. )

This is how the materialist criticizes Helmholtz. He rejects the hieroglyphic or symbolic materialism or semi-materialism of Helmholtz in the name of Feuerbach’s consistent materialism.

The idealist Leclair (a representative of Mach’s kind of “immanent school” of mind and heart) also accuses Helmholtz of inconsistency, of the hesitation between materialism and spiritualism (*Der Realismus etc.*, S. 154). But the symbol theory for Leclair is not materialistic enough, but too materialistic. “Helmholtz believes,” writes Leclair, “that the perceptions of our consciousness provide sufficient support points for knowing the sequence in time and the identity or unevenness of transcendental causes. According to Helmholtz, this is enough to suggest a regular order in the field of transcendental (p. 33), i.e., in the field of objectively real. And Leclair thunders against this “dogmatic” prejudice of Helmholtz. “ “The Berkeley god,” he exclaims, “as a hypothetical reason for the *logical* the order of ideas in our minds is at least as capable of satisfying our need for a causal explanation as the world of external things” (34). “The consistent implementation of the theory of symbols... is impossible without a generous admixture of vulgar realism” (p. 35), that is, materialism.

So the Helmholtz spread the “critical idealist” for materialism in 1879. Twenty years later, Kleinpeter, a student praised by Mach, refuted the “outdated” Helmholtz as follows, using Mach’s “latest” philosophy, in his article “On fundamental views on physics by Ernst Mach and Heinrich Hertz “[“Archiv für Philosophie”, II, Systematische Philosophie. Bend V, 1899, S. 163-164 persons. (“Archive of Philosophy”, II, Systematic Philosophy, vol. V, 1899, p. 163-164.—*Ed.*)]. Let us leave aside Hertz (who in essence was as inconsistent as Helmholtz) and look at Kleinpeter’s comparison of Mach and Helmholtz. Having quoted a number of quotes from both writers, emphasizing with particular emphasis Mach’s famous statements that bodies are mental symbols for a complex of sensations, etc., Kleinpeter says:

“If we follow the train of thought of Helmholtz, then we will meet the following new packages:

- 1) There are objects of the outside world.
- 2) Changing these items is unthinkable without the influence of any (accepted for real) reason.
- 3) “The reason, according to the original meaning of this word, is that it remains unchanged, like remaining or existing behind alternating phenomena, namely: substance and the law of its action, force” (quoted by Kleinpeter from Helmholtz).
- 4) It is possible to deduce logically strictly and unambiguously all phenomena from their causes.
- 5) Achieving this goal is tantamount to possessing objective truth, the conquest (Erlangung) of which is recognized as conceivable in this way “(163).

Outraged by these premises, their inconsistency, the creation of insoluble problems, Kleinpeter notes that Helmholtz does not stand up strictly to such views, sometimes using “turns of speech reminiscent of Mach’s somewhat purely logical understanding of such words” as matter, force, reason, etc.

“It is not difficult to find the source of our dissatisfaction with Helmholtz if we recall Mach’s so beautiful and clear words. An erroneous understanding of words: mass, power, etc. - this is what Helmholtz’s whole argument sins with. After all, these are only concepts, products of our imagination, and not at all realities that exist outside of thinking. We are completely unable to cognize any realities. From the observations of our feelings, we are not at all able, due to their imperfection, to make only one definite conclusion. We can never argue that, for example, when observing a famous rock

(durch Ablesen einer Scala) we get one definite number - infinitely many numbers are always possible, within known boundaries, which are equally well consistent with the facts of observation. But to know something real that lies outside of us - this we can no longer. Assume even that it would be possible and that we knew realities; then we would not have the right to apply the laws of logic to them, for they are *our* laws are applicable only to *our* concepts, to *our* (italics everywhere Kleinpeter) products of thought. There is no logical connection between the facts, but only a simple sequence; apodictic judgments are unthinkable here. It is therefore incorrect to say that one fact is the cause of another, and with this assertion all Helmholtz deduction, built on this concept, falls. Finally, it is impossible to achieve objective, that is, existing independently of any subject, truth, it is impossible not only because of the properties of our feelings, but also because we, being people (wir als Menschen), can never make any idea about that exists completely independently of us "(164).

As the reader sees, our student Mach, repeating the favourite words of his teacher and not recognizing himself as a Machist Bogdanov, rejects the whole philosophy of Helmholtz, rejects from an idealistic point of view. The theory of symbols is not even particularly distinguished by the idealist, who considers it unimportant and may be an accidental deviation from materialism. And Helmholtz, Kleinpeter takes as a representative of "traditional views in physics", "for which views and now most of the physicists hold on" (160).

As a result, we get that Plekhanov made a clear mistake in expounding materialism, while Bazarov completely confused the matter by dumping materialism and idealism in heaps, contrasting "theory of symbols" or "hieroglyphic materialism" with idealistic nonsense, as if "a sensual representation is the existing reality outside of us ". From the Kantian Helmholtz, as well as from Kant himself, the materialists went to the left, the Machists to the right. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Op., Vol. XIII, p. 193 - 195.* )

Two aphorisms:

To the question of  
 1. Plekhanov criticizes Kantianism (and criticism of modern agnosticism in general) more from a vulgarly Kantianism, materialistic than from a dialectically Machism, etc. materialistic point of view, *since* he only a *limine rejects* their reasoning, and does not *correct* (as Hegel corrected Kant) these arguments, deepening, generalizing, expanding them showing the *connection* and *transitions*

of any and all concepts.

2. *Marxists* criticized (at the beginning of the 20th century) Kantians and Humeans more Feuerbach (and Buchner) than Hegelian. ( "*Lenin Collection*" IX , pp. 197 - 198 ).

Develop:

Plekhanov wrote about philosophy (dialectics), probably up to 1000 pages (Belto + against Bogdanov + against Kantians + basic questions, etc., etc.). Of these, *about* big logic, *about* her, *her* thoughts

(i.e., *actually* dialectics as a philosophical science) nothing !! [By the way, one cannot but wish, firstly, that the publication of Plekhanov's works now published would highlight all philosophical articles in a special volume or special volumes with a detailed index, etc. For this should be included in a series of obligatory textbooks of communism. Secondly, the workers' state, in my opinion, should require professors of philosophy to know the presentation of Marxist philosophy by Plekhanov and be able to convey this meaning to students. But all this is already a deviation from propaganda to "administration."] ( *Lenin Collection*, XII , pp. 223–225. )

## **Lenin on the merits and errors of Plekhanov in philosophy**

To really know the subject, it is necessary to embrace, study all its sides, all connections and "mediations". We will never achieve this fully, but the requirement of comprehensiveness will warn us against mistakes and from necrosis. This is the first. Secondly, dialectical logic requires to take an object in its development, "self-movement" (as Hegel sometimes said), change. In relation to the glass, this is not immediately clear, but the glass does not remain unchanged, but in particular, the purpose of the glass, its use, its *connection* him with the

world around him. Thirdly, all human practice should enter into a complete “definition” of an object both as a criterion of truth and as a practical determinant of the connection of an object with what a person needs. Fourth, dialectical logic teaches that “there is no abstract truth, truth is always concrete,” as the late Plekhanov liked to say after Hegel. (In parentheses, it seems appropriate to me to notice for the young party members that *one cannot* become a conscious, *real* communist without studying—namely *studying*—everything written by Plekhanov in philosophy, for this is the best in all the international literature of Marxism).

Of course, I did not exhaust the concept of dialectical logic. But for now, this is enough. (*Lenin, vol. XXVI, Once Again on Trade Unions (1920), 3rd ed., Pp. 134-135.*)

## **Lenin’s criticism of tactical opportunism by Plekhanov**

Such is our view on the authority of the opinions of both Kautsky and Plekhanov. The theoretical work of the latter—mainly criticism of the Narodniks and opportunists—remains a solid acquisition of the Social-Democrats throughout Russia, and no “factionalism” will dazzle a person who possesses at least some “physical strength of mind”, until oblivion or denying the importance of these acquisitions. But as the political leader of the Russian Social-Democrats in the bourgeois Russian revolution, as a tactician, Plekhanov was below all criticism. He displayed such opportunism in this area that he damaged the Russian Social-Democrats a hundred times more workers than Bernstein’s opportunism—German. And with this cadet-shaped policy of Plekhanov, who returned to the bosom of his exiles in 1899-1900, from s.d. party years Prokopovich and so on, we must wage a most ruthless war.

That this tactical opportunism of Plekhanov is a complete denial of the foundations of the Marxist method proves the best acquaintance *with the course of Kautsky’s argument* in the article proposed to the reader. (*Lenin, Preface to the Russian translation of K. Kautsky’s pamphlet (1906), Op., Vol. X, p. 231.*)

\* \* \*

What is the misconception of the Cadets about the sovereign Duma? Plekhanov is silent about this. This silence, firstly, proves that Plekhanov is using the election campaign (putting up an election platform is already a step of the election campaign) not to develop the consciousness of the people, but to obscure it. And, secondly, this silence undermines all meaning of Plekhanov's conclusion: "and the Cadets and Social-Democrats need a sovereign Duma. "It's just nonsense covered up with verbal twists: to say that two different parties need the same thing, which they understand differently! So, it's not the same: the first comer will catch Plekhanov in a logical blunder. Perhaps you can call the autocratic monarchy and the democratic republic the letter "a" and say, that different parties are free to substitute various arithmetic quantities under this general algebraic formula. This will be pure Plekhanov logic, or rather Plekhanov sophistry. (*Lenin, New Senate Explanation (1906), Op., Vol. X , p. 174.* )

\* \* \*

Let us take the second question that we have outlined: is our liberal bourgeoisie, that is, the Cadets, really fighting against the Black-Hundred danger and how is it fighting? Plekhanov can neither raise this question nor resolve it through careful analysis of the policy of the Cadets in revolutionary Russia. Plekhanov, violating the ABC of Marxism, deduces from the "general concept" of the bourgeois revolution a concrete attitude of the Russian Social-Democrats to the Cadets, instead of deriving from the study of the real features of the Russian bourgeois revolution a general concept of the relationship between the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the peasantry in modern Russia. (*Lenin, Preface to the Russian translation of the brochure by V. Liebknecht (1906), Op., Vol. X , p. 217.* )

The connection of the boycott with the special historical conditions of a certain period of the Russian revolution should be examined on one more side. What was the political content of the boycottist Social-Democratic campaign in the fall of 1905 and in the spring of 1906? The content of this campaign did not consist, of course, of repeating the word boycott or of calling not to participate in elections. This content was not limited to calls for a direct onslaught that ignored the bypass and zigzag paths proposed by the autocracy. In addition, and not even close to the indicated topic, but rather at the centre of the entire boycottist campaign was the *struggle against*

*constitutional illusions*. This struggle was truly the living soul of the boycott. Remember the speeches of the boycottists and all their agitation, take a look at the most important resolutions of the boycottists, and you will be convinced of the correctness of this situation.

The Mensheviks were never given the opportunity to understand this side of the boycott. It always seemed to them that the struggle against constitutional illusions in an era of incipient constitutionalism was absurdity, nonsense, “anarchism.” And in speeches at the Stockholm Congress, especially—I remember—in Plekhanov’s speeches, this point of view of the Mensheviks is expressed clearly, not to mention the Menshevik literature.

At first glance, the position of the Mensheviks on this issue may indeed seem as unquestioned as the position of a man smugly teaching his neighbours that horses eat oats. In the era of nascent constitutionalism, proclaim the struggle against constitutional illusions! Isn’t that anarchism?

Isn’t that soft-boiled boots?

The debriefing of the question, made with the help of a plausible reference to simple common sense in such considerations, is based on the fact that they bypass the special period of the Russian revolution, *forget about the boycott of the Bulygin Duma*, and replace the concrete steps of the path that our revolution has taken with a general designation of everything, past and future, our revolution in general, as a revolution that generates constitutionalism. This is an example of violation of the method of dialectical materialism by people who, like Plekhanov, spoke with the greatest pathos about this method. (*Lenin, Against Boycott (1907), Op., Vol. XII, p. 25.*)

Engels wrote to Marx in 1870 that W. Liebknecht mistakenly makes himself the *only* guiding principle from anti-Bismarckism. Plekhanov was delighted to find this quote: we have the same thing with anti-tsarism! But try to replace sophistry (i.e., grasping the external similarity of cases outside the context of events) with dialectics (i.e., studying the entire concrete situation of the event and its development). The unification of Germany was necessary, and Marx, both before 1848 and after it, always recognized this. In 1859, Engels directly called the German people to war for the sake of unification. When the revolutionary unification failed, Bismarck did this counter-revolutionary, in a cadet style. Anti-Bismarckism as the *Only One* the principle has become absurd, for the completion of the necessary unification has become a fact. But in Russia? Did our

brave Plekhanov have the courage to proclaim in advance that for the development of Russia it is necessary to conquer Galicia, Constantinople, Armenia, Persia, etc.? Does he have the courage to say it now? Did he think that Germany had to move from the fragmentation of Germans (oppressed by France and Russia in the first two thirds of the 19th century) to their unification, and in Russia the Great Russians not so much united as they crushed a number of other nations? Without thinking about it, Plekhanov simply covers up his chauvinism, perverting the meaning of the quote from Engels in 1870, as Südekum perverts the quote from Engels in 1891, when Engels wrote about the need for the Germans to fight not for life, but for death against the allied forces of France and Russia. (*Lenin, Russian Südekums (1915), Op., Vol. XVIII , pp. 91-92. )*

## **Philosophical works of Lenin**

### **I**

In the IX Lenin Collection, published in January 1929, in which three of Lenin's notebooks containing Hegel's Science of Logic abstract were printed, the publication of the so-called "philosophical notebooks" of Lenin was begun. This XII collection contains all other materials of this kind, from among those that are in the archive of the Lenin Institute. Thus, this collection completes the publication of Lenin's philosophical notes. All the notebooks kept at the Institute with notes, extracts, and Lenin's abstracts on questions of philosophy are now available to the study of everyone who is interested in questions of the theory of Marxism.

The value of these materials in this respect is enormous. In terms of rich content, "philosophical notebooks" cost many volumes. They give extracts from the works of such representatives of philosophy as Heraclitus, Aristotle, Leibniz, Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx. In total, the books read by Lenin about which all these notes were written embrace at least 8 thousand pages. But the special interest and value of notebooks in Lenin's thoughts, which he wrote down while reading all these books. In separate notes, sometimes brief, sometimes more detailed, Lenin developed his point of view, posed questions, outlined the tasks of further research, and indicated the ways for the further development of thought and the topic of further scientific work.

The composition of this collection includes the following handwritten abstracts of Lenin. The earliest compendium dates back to 1895, an abstract of the book of the Marx and Engels “The Holy Family”. A detailed, carefully compiled compendium of this famous book of 1846, the period when Marx was already on the soil of dialectical materialism, shows an example of how Lenin carefully studied the works of Marx and Engels. In an obituary article entitled “Friedrich Engels” (Autumn 1896), Lenin mentions the “Holy Family” and says that the foundations of revolutionary materialist socialism have already been laid there” (Soch., Vol. I, p. 437).

Then, following the chronological order, there are extracts from Paulsen’s book “Introduction to Philosophy” and notes about it, made around 1904. Further comments on the article by A. M. Deborin “Dialectical materialism” relating to 1909; it is possible that a detailed summary of Feuerbach’s lectures on the essence of religion dates back to that time.

The remaining notebooks are the result of work on philosophy during the war years—from the fall of 1914 until 1916 inclusive. By the richness of their content, by the genius of the thoughts collected in these notebooks, they are of exceptional value to the theory of Marxism. In these notebooks, a special, new theme is being developed—the question of dialectics. Extracts and notes on Feuerbach’s book about Leibniz (p. 127), Hegel’s Philosophy of History, an especially valuable comprehensive compendium of the first two volumes of Hegel’s History of Philosophy, which, according to Engels, is one of the most brilliant works and is devoted to this topic. giving a lot of material to the question of the history of dialectics (p. 171). The notes on the metaphysics of Aristotle (p. 329) and the book of Lassalle about Heraclitus (p. 296) are equally important. This also includes a number of smaller notes,

Lenin carefully collected material on the issue of interest to him and always skilfully cleared the ideas of idealist philosophers from idealistic husks, brilliantly used them materialistically to elucidate and study individual aspects, features, and the essence of *materialistic* dialectics.

It would be a great mistake to think that Lenin became especially interested in questions of philosophy only at that time or from 1908, and until that time he was supposedly “indifferent” to questions of theory in general, in particular philosophy. This, of course, is completely untrue.

True, in letters to Bogdanov in 1906, Lenin called himself an “ordinary Marxist” in matters of philosophy. These letters, unfortunately still not found, in which Lenin criticized Bogdanov’s philosophy, he even intended to publish under the heading “Notes of an ordinary Marxist on philosophy”.

But if someone were inclined to interpret this name in the sense that Lenin then had some kind of “ordinary”, “average”, “dozen” understanding of philosophical issues, then this would be a gross mistake. The fact is that Lenin, as is known, was distinguished by exceptional scientific conscientiousness. Having become a Marxist, he paid all his attention to a detailed study of the economic system of Russia and Russian capitalism, to the study of the classes of Russian society, and next to this, to the development of the program, organization and policy of a revolutionary Marxist workers party. In these areas, Lenin studied with exhaustive completeness all the questions related here. All literature worthy of attention in these areas was studied by Lenin. With such fullness Lenin in 1906 He did not specifically study philosophical literature, and therefore considered it necessary to call himself an “ordinary” Marxist in this area. But the brilliant characteristic of dialectical materialism that Lenin had already given in 1894 in his early works, and the brilliant mastery with which he mastered the method of Marxism, best indicate that he had already been read, studied and studied in his youth. learned all the basic works of Marx and Engels.

In the ensuing bourgeois revolution of 1905, Lenin proved himself to be a better materialist-dialectic than other Marxists who managed to read by then a larger amount of special philosophical literature, such as Plekhanov.

This, of course, in no way should have meant that Lenin had nothing to worry about and trouble himself with the further study of philosophical literature. Quite the contrary: the fact that Lenin took possession of the essence of materialist dialectics like no other Marxist did, it was this circumstance that made Lenin’s further study of philosophy issues especially fruitful. Two years later, in 1908, he wrote a philosophical work, which he himself did not consider it necessary to call the work of an ordinary Marxist and which marked a significant step forward in the development of the philosophy of dialectical materialism.

In all areas of Marxist theory, Lenin was able to move theoretical thought far ahead. He managed to do this in the field of

philosophy. Therefore, Lenin's notes on philosophy are of such great value.

Unfortunately, at the disposal of the Lenin Institute there is by no means everything that was generally written by Lenin on questions of philosophy. There are no letters to Lengnik (1899) devoted to criticism of Kantianism. Three notebooks "Notes of an ordinary Marxist on philosophy" (1906) with a criticism of Bogdanov's philosophy are missing. There are no materials related to work on the book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (1908). Finally, there is no abstract at all in the early days when Lenin began to study the main works of Marxism—*Capital*, *Anti-Dühring* and other works of a philosophical nature. Taking into account, on the one hand, the difficulty in obtaining such books in those days (an instance of *Anti-Dühring* was, for example, a great rarity in Russia in the late 80s and early 90s), on the other hand, taking into account the usual nature reading Lenin taking notes and extracts from books that he read, it is safe to assume that such notebooks and extracts existed, but they are lost forever. The only exception is the surviving compendium of the "Holy Family" ("*Die heilige Familie, oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik gegen Bruno Bauer und Consorten von Friedrich Engels und Karl Marx*"), written, as already said, by all probability, in the summer of 1895, when Lenin was abroad, where he apparently managed to get this rare book, then still unpublished. Lenin read it from the 1846 edition, *oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik gegen Bruno Bauer und Consorten von Friedrich Engels und Karl Marx* ("), written, as already said, by all likelihood, in the summer of 1895, when Lenin was abroad, where he apparently managed to get this rare book, then still unpublished. Lenin read it from the 1846 edition. *oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik gegen Bruno Bauer und Consorten von Friedrich Engels und Karl Marx*"), written, as already said, by all likelihood, in the summer of 1895, when Lenin was abroad, where he apparently managed to get this rare book, then still unpublished. Lenin read it from the 1846 edition.

According to the documentary data that are at our disposal, Lenin's studies of philosophy are divided between three periods. The first is the eve of the bourgeois revolution in Russia, this includes the beginning of the literary activity of Lenin, the time of exile and the first emigration.

The second period is the period of the bourgeois revolution and the temporary victory of the counter-revolution. Lenin's great

philosophical work, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, dates to this period.

Finally, the third period, embracing about three years (1914 - 1916), described by Lenin himself as the period on the eve of the socialist revolution, was the last period during which Lenin managed to work a lot on philosophical issues (especially at the beginning of the imperialist war).

Since 1917, especially since the end of this year, the time has come when Lenin could not devote much time to specially theoretical, scientific work. The latest records of philosophical notebooks date back to 1915 - 1916. But this in no way meant that Lenin did not return to questions of philosophy even later, in the Soviet period. Despite his extreme busyness, the need to devote all his attention and all his energies to practical questions, Lenin continued to be interested in questions of philosophy. This is also evident from his reading. For example, on November 30, 1920, Lenin ordered the books of A. Labriol "Historical Materialism" and "On Philosophy". On June 24, 1921, he asked for a Hegel's Russian translation of *Logic and Phenomenology of the Spirit* (see Notes of the Lenin Institute, vol. III, pp. 94-95).<sup>9</sup> / <sup>10</sup> Notes on the book of Bukharin's "Economics of Transition" refers to a method subject. Despite the brevity of these remarks, they give infinitely much, reveal the weaknesses and shortcomings of Bogdanov's eclecticism and idealism and the mistakes made by Bukharin from the inability to master materialistic dialectics. Analysis and evaluation of all of these notes and their theoretical significance require special special work.

Finally, it is necessary to mention here the remarkable letter of Lenin to the journal *Under the Banner of Marxism*, which we will discuss in more detail below. All this shows that Lenin's attention to philosophy did not weaken until the end of his life. Lenin began to deal with questions of philosophy very early.

## II

Documentary evidence of Lenin's early studies on philosophical questions is two large works related to 1894: "What are" Friends of the People "and How They Fight the Social Democrats" and "The Economic Content of Narodism and its Critique in the Book of Mr. Struve."

Already in these early works, Lenin was already a mature materialist-dialectician.

The essence of the method of Marx by Lenin was independently thought out, and he mastered this method to perfection, independently applying it to questions of the Russian economy, Russian history, to questions of the class struggle and politics. Anyone who reads these works will be convinced that in 1894 Lenin completely mastered dialectical materialism. Lenin was well aware of the significance of *materialism* for Marxism, and he clearly understood even then the features of *dialectic* Marx's method. In "What are" Friends of the People", he notes the genius of the very idea of materialism in social science (Soch., Ed. 3rd, vol. I, p. 60). He emphasizes that the materialism of Marx is dialectical (vol. I, p. 84, 100, 105, 121, etc.). The early works of Lenin are imbued with revolutionary dialectics. According to Lenin's theory, the theory of Marxism combines "rigorous and higher science" with revolutionism - not by chance, but "internally and inextricably" (vol. I, p. 225), not because these were the individual characteristics of Marx, combining the quality of a scientist and revolutionary, but because, as Lenin later put it, in 1923, revolutionary dialectics is "*decisive in Marxism*". Describing dialectical materialism, Lenin notes that, in contrast to the metaphysical method, which looks at social relations "as a simple mechanical aggregate of various institutions, a simple mechanical linkage of various phenomena," dialectical materialism sets as its task to understand and portray the social system in its whole "*as a living organism in its functioning and development*" (Vol. I, p. 105). Lenin saw the main idea of Marx's "Capital" in the position that Marx put forward in his introduction to the first edition of the first volume: to look "at the development of the economic social formation as a natural-historical process". In this concise formulation, which is extremely rich in thoughts, the objective regularity of the process is noted, which is not determined by the consciousness of people, but, on the contrary, determines this consciousness itself, and Marx's understanding of the peculiar regularity of each particular "economic social formation" that needs to be studied in its particularity and development. The requirement of the dialectical method *to highlight the most essential* and pay special attention to its study, not losing sight of the entire totality of the whole (vol. I, p. 124). Subsequently, Lenin, constantly returning to this thought, speaks of "the main link", grabbing hold of which you can master the entire chain. Such a link, in order to gain an understanding of the social process, is the study of

the structure of economic relations. A particular advantage of Lenin's presentation of the historical theory of Marx, which must be noted, is the emphasis on the meaning of the concept of "*economic social formation*."

Lenin entirely accepts the "theory of reflection," as it was formulated by Marx: "the ideal is only a reflection of the material."

And Lenin masterfully applies it. In accordance with the materialistic nature of the theory, Lenin points to its task: "to accurately depict the actual historical process" and nothing more. The criterion of the theory is "its fidelity with reality" (vol. I, p. 110), but this criterion is not in abstract schemes. In the early works of Lenin, the crucial importance of *contradictions* was also noted: their presence testifies to the special strength and vitality of the phenomenon (vol. I, p. 171), and Lenin, studying "Russian history and reality," everywhere reveals the class contradictions and the class struggle that are present. It provides brilliant materialistic coverage of the economic history of Russia (Vol. I, pp. 73–74, etc.), reveals the features of Russian capitalism (for example, the entire III part of "Friends of the People" and a number of other works, not to mention the "Development of Capitalism" ), gives an unusually vivid and strong image of the economy of the Russian village (vol. I, pp. 142 - 144), etc., and he invariably puts all this exposition into connection with the practical tasks of the working class, systematically and systematically studies, reveals, explains the objective dialectics of capitalist society... formation and all the features of its specific manifestations in the development of *Russian* capitalism and the class struggle growing up on this soil and the leading role in this struggle of the Russian proletariat. And this is done so that the proletariat "as soon as possible and as easily as possible ends all exploitation" (vol. I, p. 225). Invariable fidelity to these basic principles of scientific work, their consistent implementation is a characteristic feature of the method of Marx, as well as of Lenin, starting with his earliest (known to us) works. None of the other Marxists in this was so consistent and so faithful to the Marxist method as Lenin was. And it is especially characteristic, as has been noted more than once in our literature, that Lenin's ability to take into account and *study the specific features of this phenomenon, not limited to arguments*. In the various disputes that Lenin had to lead, it should be noted (leaving aside the class basis of the essence of disagreement, and considering only the difference in method) that the opponents of Lenin were not able to understand the essence of the specific features of the subject under

consideration. Examples of this could be cited endlessly. We point out at least disputes about the program in the early 900s (Soch., Vol. V), disputes with the Mensheviks (Two Tactics, vol. VIII), disputes on the national question in 1913 - 1916. (Vol. XVII, XIX), etc.

“An unconditional requirement of Marxist theory in analysing any social issue is to set it in a *certain* historical framework, and then, if we are talking about one country (for example, a national program for a given country), taking into account specific features that distinguish this country from others within the same historical era” this is how Lenin wrote in 1914 in a dispute with R. Luxemburg on the national question (Soch., vol. XVII, pp. 431-432).

There is no place to dwell in all details on the whole wealth of the theoretical content of Lenin’s first works and the perfection of their method. The little that is indicated here by us gives a concept of their enormous value. It would be a very interesting task to follow how a whole series of thoughts, found in the bud or in a concise formulation in these early works, subsequently found further development and widespread use, were confirmed in the further course of the struggle of the working class and the development of the revolution in 1905 and 1917 years

Such was the first period of Lenin’s studies of general theory, the philosophy of Marxism. Having completely mastered the foundations of dialectical materialism, having studied and thought through to the end, to full clarity, all the conclusions from the main works of Marx and Engels, understanding in general all aspects of Marxism, Lenin began to devote all his forces to theoretical and practical leadership of the struggle of the working class. And here it was not individual desires and tastes, but objective conditions that advanced one or the other side of Marxism, forcing it to deal mainly with it. As Lenin himself later noted, during the period under review, “the application of the economic doctrine of Marx to our reality has advanced” (“Our Abolitionists,” Soch., Vol. XV, p. 88). But even during this period, Lenin devoted a certain part of his time to the study of questions of philosophy. He knew of course all the works of Plekhanov were well read, Spinoza read, individual works of the French materialists of the 18th century, Hume and representatives of German classical philosophy—Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Feuerbach [We provide here an extract from the inventory compiled by the Moscow guard. In the spring of 1900, at the end of the link, boxes of books sent by Lenin from Siberia to his mother, M. A. Ulyanova, were detained at the Moscow station, opened, books were rewritten, and then packed

again and delivered to the address. Of the total number of books (243 titles), almost exclusively in economics, there were the following books on philosophy: 1) compiled by a Moscow guard. In the spring of 1900, at the end of the link, boxes of books sent by Lenin from Siberia to his mother M. A. Ulyanova were detained at the Moscow station, opened, books were rewritten, and then packed again and delivered to the address. Of the total number of books (243 titles), almost exclusively in economics, there were the following books on philosophy: 1) compiled by a Moscow guard. In the spring of 1900, at the end of the link, boxes of books sent by Lenin from Siberia to his mother M. A. Ulyanova were detained at the Moscow station, opened, books were rewritten, and then packed again and delivered to the address. Of the total number of books (243 titles), almost exclusively in economics, there were the following books on philosophy: 1) *Spinoza*, Die Ethik, 1 t.; 2) *Spinoza*, Der theologisch-politischer Traktat; 3) *Spinoza*, Vervollkommung des Verstandes, 1 t.; 4) De l'esprit (Helvetia), 2 t.; 5) De l'homme (his own), 2 tons; 6) Essais philosophiques, concernant l'entendement humain, 3 tons; 7) *Kant*, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1 t.; 8) *Fichte*, Die Tatsachen des Bewusstseins, 2 vol. 9) *Fichte*, Grundzüge zu System der Philosophie 2 vol.; 10) *Fichte*, Die Bestimmung des Menschen; 11) *Schelling*, Samtliche Werke one volume (which is unknown); 12) *Hegel*, Werke, 1 vol. (Without further designation—most likely that it was a volume containing the so-called “Small Logic”); 13) *Hegel*, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, 1 vol.; 14) *Feuerbach*, Geschichte der neueren Philosophie 1t.; (from Bacon to Spinoza); 15) *Feuerbach*, Philosophische Kritiken; 16) *Plechanoff*, Beiträge, zur Geschichte des Materialismus; 17) *Lange*, The History of Materialism. In addition, there were two more books by Gumilovich: Philosophisches Staatsrecht and Grundriss der Sociologie (archive of the Lenin Institute, arch. No. 25977).]. Lenin did not write a special philosophical work during this period, but in a number of his works he devoted much attention to the question of the method: in polemic works against populism, against revisionism of the “legal Marxists” (works 1894—1899), against economists (“What to do?”, 1902), against the Mensheviks (“Step Forward, Two Steps Back”, 1904).

### III

The period of the upsurge of the revolution of 1905 was, of course, a time little suitable for specially philosophical studies. But at

this time, Lenin's theoretical thought worked continuously and hard. The time of revolution was a time of learning from life, learning in practice, a time of testing the theoretical weapons of Marxism. Lenin in 1905 returned many times to the study of a number of works by Marx.

Following the decline of the revolutionary wave, an atmosphere was created in which the need for a struggle on the basis of philosophy came to the fore for the theoretical Marxist, leader of the revolutionary Marxist workers' party. The fascination with idealism and religion, which spread among the bourgeoisie after the revolution of 1905, was far from an accidental phenomenon. This hobby also captured some unstable elements from among Marxist writers, even party ones. Religion has developed long ago, and its old forms, crudely naive, ceased to satisfy, repelled from religion. Religious ideology, adapted to feudal-feudal relations, more and more ceased to influence. In order to keep the masses in obedience after the experience of an experienced revolution, physical coercion alone was not enough. It took a "spiritual", "moral" whip, what religion is, and it took the development of more sophisticated forms, adapted to the needs created by new relationships. The struggle against religion and against idealism, which is a sophisticated defence of faith in God, became especially necessary and acquired special significance as a struggle against bourgeois influences on the proletariat and the masses of working people. Plekhanov also fought against Machism and clericalism, but he waged it in such a way that this did not satisfy Lenin. First, Plekhanov did not sufficiently explain these issues of disagreement with the Machists, questions of the theory of knowledge. In a letter to Gorky in March 1908, Lenin said that Plekhanov was essentially right against Bogdanov and other Machians, "only he doesn't know how or doesn't want to, or he is too lazy to say that created by new relationships. The struggle against religion and against idealism, which is a sophisticated defence of faith in God, became especially necessary and acquired special significance as a struggle against bourgeois influences on the proletariat and the masses of working people. Plekhanov also fought against Machism and clericalism, but he waged it in such a way that this did not satisfy Lenin. First, Plekhanov did not sufficiently explain these issues of disagreement with the Machists, questions of the theory of knowledge. In a letter to Gorky in March 1908, Lenin said that Plekhanov was essentially right against Bogdanov and other Machians, "only he doesn't know how or doesn't want to, or he is too

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In the same letter to Gorky mentioned above, Lenin reported that he would certainly write a critical analysis of Machian philosophy “in his own way”. Lenin did this in his book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and did it in a truly Marxist manner. After Engels’ *Anti-Dühring*, this book is the largest philosophical work of Marxism. The appearance of this main work of the second period was an outstanding event in the field of the theory of Marxism. Besides the fact that this book dealt a crushing blow to the Machists, it gave an enormous amount of new to the theory of Marxism.

In this book, for the first time in Marxist literature, the foundations of the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism

were explained with such fullness. For each question: about matter and experience, about sensation and cognition, about the objectivity of space and time, about causality, about absolute and relative truth, two lines in philosophy were shown with complete clarity.

Engels did this in a polemic with Dühring in the 70s of the 19th century, while Lenin had to do this in a new situation, more than 30 years later, in a polemic with other opponents - the Machists. During these decades, a whole revolution took place in the natural sciences and it was necessary to master completely new material. Lenin had to consider and resolve a number of new issues. A completely new task in Marxist literature was a detailed analysis and explanation of the crisis of modern science. Representatives of natural science, as a rule not possessing philosophical knowledge, did not know how to think dialectically. Scientific research spontaneously leads them to materialism, but their class position and their inability to master the dialectical method leads to confusion, forcing them to slide into relativism and idealism. The conclusion reached by Lenin at the end of Chapter V of that “modern physics gives rise to dialectical materialism” retains its significance more than 20 years after it was expressed. Thanks to his brilliant ability to master materialistic dialectics, Lenin was also able to say his new word in the field of natural science methodology and not to say it at all, but by giving precise indications of the mistakes and deviations of the “spontaneous materialists of the naturalists” from dialectical materialism. Lenin criticized their theory dialectically, correcting errors and emphasizing the correct. Such criticism should be recognized as exemplary. Thanks to his brilliant ability to master materialistic dialectics, Lenin was able to say his new word in the field of natural science methodology and not to say it at all, but by giving precise indications of the mistakes and deviations of the “spontaneous materialists of the naturalists” from dialectical materialism. Lenin criticized their theory dialectically, correcting errors and emphasizing the correct. Such criticism should be recognized as exemplary. Thanks to his brilliant ability to master materialistic dialectics, Lenin was able to say his new word in the field of natural science methodology and not to say it at all, but by giving precise indications of the mistakes and deviations of the “spontaneous materialists of the naturalists” from dialectical materialism. Lenin criticized their theory dialectically, correcting errors and emphasizing the correct. Such criticism should be recognized as exemplary.

It should be noted that, despite the strict scientific nature of the content of the book, its entire presentation is quite understandable. All questions were not at all simplified. The clarity of presentation is explained by the clarity of thought and the certainty of what Lenin was going to say on questions of philosophical debate. When he wrote this philosophical book, he did not forget for a minute that this work was also written in order to help the proletariat “to put an end to all exploitation as soon as possible.”

During this period, Lenin was far ahead of all Marxists who, after Marx and Engels, were engaged in the development of questions of philosophy. The first of all the most prominent theoreticians of Marxism (we are not talking about Engels), Lenin took up the problems of theoretical physics, independently resolved them and outlined the ways in which Marxism should secure its influence in this area too. Therefore, with good reason, it can be argued that the appearance of the book “Materialism and Empirio-Criticism” marked a new stage in the development of the theory of Marxism.

The main theme during this period was the struggle for materialism. But, unfortunately, no unpublished material has been preserved from this period. Neither the manuscript of the book “Materialism and Empirio-Criticism”, nor any notes and materials we have. None of the surviving notebooks of Lenin have direct indications that any of them belongs to this period. The closest to the content may be the summary of Feuerbach’s lectures on the essence of religion. It may refer to a somewhat later period (by 1909?). All other entries except these belong to the third period, where the theme of dialectics aroused the predominant interest.

#### IV.

In the third of the periods indicated by us, despite the relative brevity of the time when Lenin could do entirely scientific work, he did a tremendous theoretical work. It is enough to point out that over the course of 2 to 3 years he worked on such large and complex issues as the question of imperialism and the state. That which now seems to us self-evident, after we all studied Lenin’s books “Imperialism as the latest stage of capitalism” and “State and revolution”, which has now entered the consciousness of the broad circles of the working class studying the ideas of these books in Marxist circles and schools of political literacy, then, in 1913 - 1916, represented a whole maze of complex and confusing issues, and this confusion was created not only

by the works of bourgeois theorists, but it was in the works of the Marxist theorists of the Second International—Kautsky, Hilferding, Plekhanov and several others. Lenin was able to resolve and unravel these complex issues due to the fact that he stood firmly on the soil of dialectical materialism, brilliantly knew how to master the dialectic method and was inextricably linked with the class whose interests he lived with the proletariat. Studying world capitalism and struggling with bourgeois influences on the proletariat in the person of the newest opportunists—social imperialists, Kautskyites, etc.—Lenin approached questions in exactly the same way as he did in the 1890s when he studied Russian capitalism and He fought with bourgeois influence on the proletariat in the person of Russian populists and Russian revisionists of the 90s and early 900s. It would be a very instructive task to compare in all details the method of Lenin’s early works with the method of his works 1915-1916. If such work had been done, the height of the theoretical level of the early works of Lenin and the invariably revolutionary character of his method 20 and more years later would have clearly been revealed. Lenin did not recede from the revolutionary dialectics of Marxism. There would be no difference in the use of dialectics. But something new in Lenin’s attitude to the issues of dialectics appeared during this period. He dealt with this issue on purpose, collecting all the data related to the history of dialectical thinking, all the characteristics marking various moments of dialectics, and distinctive features, various shades that characterize the very essence of dialectical thinking, the essence of materialistic dialectics.

The reason for this is understandable. We saw that already in the early works of Lenin the crucial importance of dialectics was noted. In an article on the correspondence of Marx and Engels (in 1913), Lenin says that the most significant, newest, “brilliant step forward in the history of revolutionary thought” was that Marx and Engels applied materialistic dialectics to all areas of knowledge - to the processing of political economy, to philosophy, to natural science, to politics and tactics of the working class.

Materialist dialectics—decisive in Marxism,—“the living soul of Marxism”, its “fundamental theoretical foundation.” It was natural to specifically study this, such an important weapon, especially at a time when, thanks to the upcoming socialist revolution, the practical significance of this weapon became especially important. In theoretical battles on issues of current politics, it was especially necessary to deal with the desire of opponents to *pervert the* dialectic,

to *replace it with sophistry*, and such allies increasingly began to become former allies, from proletariat supporters turning into enemies of its movement, who went over to the side of the bourgeoisie, as a number of prominent theoreticians of the Second International did, especially with the outbreak of the imperialist war. In the revolutionary era, the dialectical nature of the movement, the unity of opposites, the movement in contradictions, especially sharply comes out, it becomes especially clear, as Engels noted. The accelerated pace of movement, diversity and, so to speak, the concentration of events broaden one's horizons and provide a wealth of material for theoretical thought. Awakening to the conscious life of new and new masses inevitably introduces an unprecedented revival in the development of theoretical thought and, in particular, philosophy.

In the era of bourgeois revolutions in Europe, Hegel, the ideologist of the bourgeoisie (then still generally revolutionary), was the largest representative of dialectics, "gave an exhaustive and conscious picture of the general forms of movement" (Marx). The first leaders and theorists of the new revolutionary class—the proletariat, Marx and Engels took this theoretical conquest, "saved the dialectic from the defeat of idealism" and, using it materialistically, fruitfully used it in scientific research. The brilliant leader and theoretician of the proletariat, Lenin, on the eve of the socialist revolution took further steps in this direction, deepened the theoretical study of this revolutionary method, tested and tested in a number of revolutions and in the last, shortly before that, the largest, Russian revolution of 1905. And it is no coincidence ,

Of all European countries, it was in Russia at the end of the 19th —beginning of the 20th centuries that it the most revolutionary situation has developed. The revolutionary soil of Russia was a prerequisite that the theoretical consciousness of the Russian Marxist revolutionaries was *higher* than anywhere else in other capitalist countries. Proof of this is Plekhanov's struggle against Kantianism, starting in the 1890s, Lenin's struggle against Machism in 1908 for materialism and revolutionary materialist dialectics, and then and later, against sophistry and distortion of this most important theoretical weapon of the proletariat by the former allies in the struggle for revolutionary Marxism—Bernstein, and then Plekhanov, Kautsky and others.

Of the notebooks related to the subject of dialectics, of course, three notebooks with Hegel's *Science of Logic* abstract (IX Lenin's Collection) should be put in the foreground. The abstracts of the

Hegelian “History of Philosophy” that are printed in the present collection are directly adjacent to this, in which Lenin carefully collected everything related to dialectics. The remarks concerning the Lassalle Heraclitus and Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* contain in this respect likewise unusually much valuable. After taking notes on Heraclitus, Lenin, in a large passage on dialectics, gives, as opposed to a misunderstanding of Hegel’s dialectics by Lassalle, his understanding of dialectics. In this passage and in a number of other remarks (“elements of dialectics” at the end of the synopsis of “The Science of Logic,” the notes in our collection on pages 290–292), Lenin’s main thoughts on dialectics are collected and put together

The synopsis of Feuerbach’s book on Leibniz also belongs to the same cycle. Whereas when Lenin gave Feuerbach’s lectures “On the Essence of Religion”, he mainly drew attention to the opposition of materialism to idealism, here, in the abstract of the book on Leibniz, the prevailing interest in the question of dialectics is already visible. The predominance of the same interest is striking in the notebook with extracts from Clausewitz’s book “On War”. Reading it, Lenin was interested in two topics and collected all the places related here with exhaustiveness. One of these topics was: “on the application of dialectics to the question of war,” another topic: “the question of the relationship between politics and war.”

The remaining notes of smaller volume are adjacent to these main works containing the main material. This includes some materials on the question of the history of science and technology, which is closely related to the materialist study of dialectics. Lenin began to collect such material, but managed to do only a little, stopping at the very beginning of the work. This also includes the bibliography of works on Hegel collected by Lenin.

If Lenin was going to write a work on dialectics, he collected the richest material for this task, and in certain parts (especially on the subject of “Hegel on Dialectics”), he was directly exhaustive. Lenin, like Marx, did not have time to write a special work on dialectics. But in all the articles after 1914, Lenin began to devote a place to clarifying the essence of dialectics, to generalizing remarks. Lenin is directly engaged in the propaganda of dialectics. For example, in the article “The Collapse of the Second International,” he shows the difference between dialectics and sophistry. In the articles “Results of the discussion on self-determination”, “On the brochure of Junius”, “Letters on tactics”, various points, especially dialectic thinking, are noted. Finally, in 1920-1921. in the article “Once again about trade

unions, about the current moment and about errors of vols. Trotsky and Bukharin “Lenin gives a widely known popular explanation of the essence of dialectical logic in contrast to eclecticism. All these remarks are based on the work on the study of dialectics, which Lenin did in particular at the beginning of the imperialist war.

It is striking that Lenin’s understanding of dialectics is particularly clear and deep. Developing this understanding completely independently, Lenin agrees with the characteristic of dialectics that Engels gives, which, like Marx, studied Hegel perfectly and did independent work to turn Hegel’s idealistic dialectic into a materialist one. This work was also done by Lenin, and every Marxist theorist should do after it. According to Lenin, the very essence of dialectics most successfully expresses the formula “unity of opposites.” According to Lenin’s expression, this formula successfully captures the “core of dialectics.” The bifurcation of the one, the contradictory nature of its parts is an internal source of all activity, an internal impulse of development. The objective world in continuous motion which is infinitely complex and diverse, at the same time is one (this unity of the world, as Engels says, consists in its materiality). All facets in this objective material world are relative and conditional, everything in it changes and turns into another. And our consciousness, which generally reflects correctly this objective world, reflects the absolute truth of its objective existence, is at the same time relative. It approaches the exact reflection of the movement of the objective world, never having fully exhausted it, because this movement, development, change never stops, does not stop. reflecting in general correctly this objective world, reflecting the absolute truth of its objective existence, at the same time is relative. It approaches the exact reflection of the movement of the objective world, never fully exhausting it, because this movement, development, change never stops, does not stop. reflecting in general correctly this objective world, reflecting the absolute truth of its objective existence, at the same time is relative. It approaches the exact reflection of the movement of the objective world, never fully exhausting it, because this movement, development, change never stops, does not stop.

As the main shortcoming of metaphysical materialism, Lenin points to his inability to apply dialectics to the process of development of knowledge. “The approach of the mind (person),” writes Lenin when reading Aristotle’s “Metaphysics”, “to a single thing, taking a cast, or (what’s the same) concept from it is *not a simple, direct, mirror-dead act, but a complex, forked, zigzag-like, which includes*

the possibility of the departure of fantasy from life, moreover, the possibility of *transforming* (and, moreover, an inconspicuous, unconscious person transformation) of an abstract concept, idea *into fantasy* (ultimately = God). For in the simplest generalization, in the most elementary general “idea” (“table” in general) *there is* a famous piece of fantasy “(see p. 389 of this collection). The materialist dialectics applied objectively to our cognition, i.e., mindful of the fact that our consciousness is determined independently by the ongoing process, is the best guarantee against such transformations, the best weapon against clericalism, ossification of thought, against the substitution of living work of the mind for dead abstraction, leading to mental stagnation.

For Lenin’s understanding, his program of study and presentation of dialectics is very characteristic. And in this regard, Lenin’s tremendous merit is that he saves the dialectic from simplification, from vulgarization, from turning it into sophistry, as occurs with the renegades of the Second International of Kautsky, Vandervelde, Otto Bauer and others, and restores it in that form as Marx has it.

Lenin points out that in the simplest phenomenon, in any sentence, it is necessary to reveal the rudiments of *all* elements of dialectics. This autopsy of the special dialectics of each individual area to be investigated is the dialectical method. In this way, dialectics must be stated and studied.

Lenin equates dialectics and the theory of knowledge and points out that Plekhanov did not pay due attention to this, but this is the *essence of the matter*.

In the third period we are considering, Lenin systematically draws attention to the shortcomings of the Plekhanov dialectic and criticizes them. The replacement of dialectics by Plekhanov with sophistry was noted by Lenin in 1904. This is done systematically in articles of the war period. Considering Plekhanov’s mistakes that separated him from dialectical materialism and brought him closer to vulgar materialism, Lenin notes that Plekhanov’s criticism of the Kantians and Humeans was insufficient because Plekhanov simply rejected their reasoning and did not correct it, for example, as Hegel did, criticizing Kant .

We have already indicated above that Lenin’s criticism of the Machists, given in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, is just free from this shortcoming. Such criticism, correcting, generalizing, showing the connection and transitions of all concepts, was generally characteristic of Lenin. We find especially brilliant examples of such

criticism in the works of Lenin, starting from the period under consideration. It is enough to point out such works as “The State and the Revolution”, “The Childish Illness of” Leftism “in Communism,” and others. Lenin, everywhere showing the material roots of certain phenomena in the field of theory, invariably reveals the enemy’s methodological errors and shows how they should be correct.

Attaching such great importance to the study of dialectics, Lenin, as already mentioned, outlined a program of work in order to put this study systematically. In the synopsis of “The Science of Logic,” Lenin repeatedly expresses the idea that the continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx consists of “a dialectical treatment of the history of human thought, science and technology” (IX “Lenin Collection”, p. 138). This, so to speak, is a general attitude, which says that the materialistic history of philosophy, the history of the development of human thought cannot be separated from the history of the material process of production. But then there are more detailed instructions that give a whole program of study. Among the notes when reading the Lassalebian Heraclitus, Lenin lists: “the history of philosophy, the history of individual sciences, the history of the mental development of a child, the history of the mental development of animals, history of language + psychology + physiology of the senses. Therefore, in short, the history of knowledge in general. These are the areas of knowledge that should form the theory of knowledge and dialectics “(see p. 315 of this collection). Here is a whole program of work on the study of dialectics.

In his famous letter to the journal “Under the Banner of Marxism” in 1922, Lenin left a testament, as it were, how to work in the future in the study of dialectics.

First of all, Lenin points out the necessity of the struggle for materialism against the “philosophical reaction” and “philosophical prejudices” of the so-called “educated society”, that is, against idealism, against clericalism. Lenin invites “to relentlessly expose and persecute all modern” certified lackeys of the priesthood “, representatives of reactionary bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology, to conduct atheistic propaganda.” Lenin points out the need for an alliance with all consistent materialists and “with representatives of modern natural sciences who are inclined towards materialism and are not afraid to uphold and preach it against fashionable philosophical vacillations prevailing in the so-called” educated society “towards idealism and scepticism.”

Lenin recalls that from the abrupt withdrawal that modern natural science is experiencing, “reactionary philosophical schools and schools, directions and directions” will be born all the time. And in order to cope with all the complex and difficult issues that arise in this connection, not to let oneself go astray, it is necessary, as Lenin says, “to be a conscious supporter of the materialism that is represented by Marx, i.e... be a dialectical materialist. “And Lenin, referring to the staff of the journal “Under the Banner of Marxism”, further says what to do, how to work in order to master the materialistic dialectics.

“In order to achieve this goal, the employees of the journal” Under the Banner of Marxism “must organize a systematic study of Hegel’s dialectics from a materialistic point of view, that is, the dialectics that Marx practically applied both in his” Capital “and in his historical and political works and applied with such success that now every day the awakening of new classes to life and to the struggle in the East (Japan, India, China)—that is, those hundreds of millions of humanity that make up the majority of the world’s population and which are historically passivity and historical torpor have hitherto conditioned the stagnation and decay of many advanced European countries—every day of the awakening to life of new peoples and new classes, more and more confirms Marxism.

Of course, the work of such a study, such an interpretation and such propaganda of the Hegelian dialectic is extremely difficult, and, undoubtedly, the first experiments in this regard will be associated with errors. But only he who does nothing is not mistaken. Based on how Marx used Hegel’s materialistically understood dialectics, we can and should develop this dialectic from all sides, print excerpts from Hegel’s main works in the journal, interpret them materialistically, commenting on examples of the use of dialectics by Marx, as well as those examples of dialectics in the field relations of economic and political relations, of which the latest history has exemplified, especially the modern imperialist war and revolution, give unusually much. The group of editors and employees of the journal “Under the Banner of Marxism” should, in my opinion, a kind of “society of materialistic friends of Hegelian dialectics.” Modern naturalists will find (if they are able to search and if we learn to help them) in Hegel’s materialistically interpreted dialectic a number of answers to those philosophical questions that are posed by the revolution in natural science and which intellectual admirers of bourgeois fashion “get confused” with reaction.

Without such a task to be set and systematically carried out, materialism cannot be militant materialism. He will remain, using a generous expression, not so much fighting as fighting. Without this, large-scale naturalists will just as often as still be helpless in their philosophical conclusions and generalizations. For natural science is progressing so fast, going through a period of such a deep revolutionary breakdown in all areas that in any case natural science cannot do without philosophical conclusions “(Soch., Vol. XX, part 2, pp. 497-498).

To what Lenin says here about the need to study the samples of dialectics by Marx, it should be added that it is equally important to study the materialist dialectics that are found in all of Lenin’s works. This is especially important because his works, speeches, and speeches give materialistic coverage and explanation of the phenomena and events of recent history: the first world imperialist war and the proletarian revolution. Lenin’s philosophical notebooks contain endlessly valuable instructions on how to study materialist dialectics. (V. Adoratsky , Preface to the XII “*Lenin Collection* ”.)

## VI. The struggle on two fronts in philosophy

### **The struggle on two fronts is the law of the development of our party**

But if we stand behind the slogan of the struggle on two fronts, does this not mean that we thereby proclaim the need for *centrism* in our party? What does the struggle on two fronts mean? Is this not centrism? You know that the Trotskyists in this way depict the matter: there are “leftists,” they say, “we” are Trotskyists, “real Leninists”; there are “right” ones, these are all the others; finally, there are “centrists,” who oscillate between the “left” and the right. Can such a view of our party be considered correct? Clearly not. Only people who have mixed all concepts and who have long since broken with Marxism can say this. Only people who cannot see and understand the *fundamental difference* between the party of the Social Democratic pre-war period, which was the party of the *bloc*, can say

this, proletarian and petty-bourgeois interests, and between the Communist Party, which is a *monolithic* party of the revolutionary proletariat. Centrism is not a spatial concept: the right are sitting in one place, the “left” in the other, and the centrists in the middle. Centrism is a political concept. His ideology is the ideology of adaptation, the ideology of subordinating proletarian interests to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie *as part of one common party*. This ideology is alien and nasty to Leninism. Centrism is a natural phenomenon for the Second International of the pre-war period. There were right-wingers (majority), left-wingers (without quotation marks) and centrists, whose whole policy was to tint opportunism of the right with left phrases and subordinate the left to the right. What was then the policy of the left, whose core was the Bolsheviks? In the decisive struggle against the centrists, in the struggle for a split with the right (especially after the outbreak of the imperialist war) and in the organization of a new revolutionary International from truly leftist, truly proletarian elements.

Why then could such a disposition of forces arise within the Second International and such a policy of the Bolsheviks in it? Because the Second International was then the party of the *bloc of* proletarian and petty-bourgeois interests for the sake of petty-bourgeois social-pacifists, social-chauvinists. Because the Bolsheviks could not help but concentrate fire on the centrists who tried to subordinate the proletarian elements to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. Because the Bolsheviks were then obliged to preach the idea of a split, because without this the proletarians could not have organized their own revolutionary Marxist party.

Can it be argued that our party has the same disposition of forces and that it should practice the same policy that the Bolsheviks practiced in the parties of the Second International of the pre-war period? Clearly not. It is impossible, since this would mean not understanding the *fundamental difference* between the party of the *bloc of* proletarian and petty-bourgeois elements and between the *monolithic* party of the revolutionary proletariat. There (the Social Democracy) there was one class sub-base of the party. Here (among the Communists) a completely different basis of the party. There (for Social Democracy), centrism was a natural phenomenon, since the party of a bloc of diverse interests cannot do without the centrists, and the Bolsheviks were obliged to follow the line of division. Here (among the Communists), centrism is pointless and incompatible with Leninist partisanship, since the Communist Party is a *monolithic* party

of the proletariat, and not a party of a bloc of heterogeneous class elements. And since the dominant force of our party is the left-most trend of the world labour movement (Leninists), the split policy in our party does not and cannot have any justification from the point of view of Leninism. (*Voice*: “Is there a split in the party with us or not?”) The point is not about the possibility of a split, but that the split policy in our monolithic Leninist party cannot be justified from the point of view of Leninism. He who does not understand this fundamental difference, is at odds with Leninism, he is breaking with Leninism.

That is why I think that only people who have lost their minds and have lost the last vestiges of Marxism can seriously argue that the policy of our party, the policy of struggle on two fronts, is a policy of centrism.

Lenin always waged a struggle on two fronts in our party, both against the “left” and against clearly Menshevik deviations. Browse through Lenin’s pamphlet, “The Childish Disease of” Leftism in Communism, “review the history of our party, and you will realize that our party has grown and strengthened in the struggle against both deviations—both the right and the “left.” The struggle against the otzovists and the “left” communists, on the one hand, the struggle against an openly opportunist deviation before the October Revolution, during and after the October Revolution, on the other hand, are the phases our party went through in its development. Everyone knows the words of Lenin that we must fight both opportunism and the “left” doctrines.

Does this mean that Lenin was a centrist, that he pursued a policy of centrism? Clearly, that does not mean.

What, then, are our right and “left” deviators? As for the right deviation, this, of course, is not that of opportunism of the Social Democrats of the pre-war period. The bias towards opportunism is not yet opportunism. We know how Lenin at one time explained the concept of bias. A deviation to the right is something that has not yet resulted in opportunism and that can be corrected. Therefore, one cannot identify the deviation to the right with complete opportunism. As for the “left” deviation, it represents something directly opposite to what the extreme left represented in the Second International of the pre-war period, that is, the Bolsheviks. They are not only not left without quotes, they are essentially the same right deviators, with the difference, however, that they unconsciously cover up their real nature with “left” phrases. *The only left* (without quotes)

in our party. ( *Voice* : “And the legalization of biases?”) If an open struggle with biases is legalization, it must be admitted that Lenin “legalized” them a long time ago.

They, these deviators, both right and left, are recruited from the most diverse elements of the non-proletarian strata, elements reflecting the pressure of the petty-bourgeois elements on the party and the decomposition of individual parts of the party. Part of immigrants from other parties; people with Trotskyist tendencies in the party; fragments of former fractions in the party; bureaucratic (and bureaucratic) party members in the state, economic, cooperative, and trade union apparatus, joining in with clearly bourgeois elements of these apparatuses; prosperous party members in our village organizations, growing together with the kulaks, etc., etc.—such is the nutrient medium of deviations from the Leninist line. It is clear that nothing truly leftist and Leninist can be perceived by these elements. They can only feed openly opportunistic bias or the so-called “left” bias,

That is why the struggle on two fronts is the only right party policy. ( *Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 378–381, ed. 9th.* )

“The first question is the question of the struggle within our party, of the struggle that did not start yesterday and which does not stop. If we take the history of our party since its inception in the form of a group of Bolsheviks in 1903 and trace its subsequent stages up to our time, we can say without exaggeration that the history of our party is the history of the struggle of contradictions within this party, the history of overcoming these contradictions and the gradual strengthening of our party on the basis of overcoming these contradictions. You might think that the Russian people are too pugnacious, they love to discuss, they create disagreements, and therefore they develop the party through overcoming intra-party contradictions. That is not true, comrades. It’s not about pugnacity. The point here is the presence of fundamental disagreements arising during the development of the party, during the struggle of the proletariat. The point here is that contradictions can only be overcome by fighting for one or another principle, for one or another goal of the struggle, for one or another method of struggle leading to the goal. It is possible and necessary to make all kinds of agreements with dissenters inside the party on issues of current politics, on issues of a purely practical nature. But if these issues are connected with fundamental disagreements, then no agreement, no “middle” line can save the matter. There is no and cannot be a

“middle” line in matters of principle. Either one or other principles should be the basis of the work of the party. The “middle” line on issues of principle is the “line” of clogging heads, the “line” of obscuring differences, the “line” of the ideological degeneration of the party, the “line” of the ideological death of the party. for those or other methods of struggle leading to the goal. It is possible and necessary to make all kinds of agreements with dissenters inside the party on issues of current politics, on issues of a purely practical nature. But if these issues are connected with fundamental disagreements, then no agreement, no “middle” line can save the matter. There is no and cannot be a “middle” line in matters of principle. Either one or other principles should be the basis of the work of the party. The “middle” line on issues of principle is the “line” of clogging heads, the “line” of obscuring differences, the “line” of the ideological degeneration of the party, the “line” of the ideological death of the party. for those or other methods of struggle leading to the goal. It is possible and necessary to make all kinds of agreements with dissenters inside the party on issues of current politics, on issues of a purely practical nature. But if these issues are connected with fundamental disagreements, then no agreement, no “middle” line can save the matter. There is no and cannot be a “middle” line in matters of principle. Either one or other principles should be the basis of the work of the party. The “middle” line on issues of principle is the “line” of clogging heads, the “line” of obscuring differences, the “line” of the ideological degeneration of the party, the “line” of the ideological death of the party. But if these issues are connected with fundamental disagreements, then no agreement, no “middle” line can save the matter. There is no and cannot be a “middle” line in matters of principle. Either one or other principles should be the basis of the work of the party. The “middle” line on issues of principle is the “line” of clogging heads, the “line” of obscuring differences, the “line” of the ideological degeneration of the party, the “line” of the ideological death of the party. But if these issues are connected with fundamental disagreements, then no agreement, no “middle” line can save the matter. There is no and cannot be a “middle” line in matters of principle. Either one or other principles should be the basis of the work of the party. The “middle” line on issues of principle is the “line” of clogging heads, the “line” of obscuring differences, the “line” of the ideological degeneration of the party, the “line” of the ideological death of the party. But if these issues are connected with fundamental disagreements, then no agreement, no “middle” line can save the matter. There is no and cannot be a “middle” line in matters of principle. Either one or other principles should be the basis of the work of the party. The “middle” line on issues of principle is the “line” of clogging heads, the “line” of obscuring differences, the “line” of the ideological degeneration of the party, the “line” of the ideological death of the party.

How do the Social Democratic parties in the West live and develop? Do they have contradictions within the party, fundamental disagreements? Of course have. Do they reveal these contradictions and try to overcome them honestly and openly in front of the party masses? No. Of course not. The practice of social democracy consists in hiding, hiding these contradictions and differences. The practice of social democracy is to turn their conferences and congresses into an empty masquerade of ceremonial prosperity, carefully hiding and glossing over internal differences. But nothing can come of this except for clogging the heads and impoverishing the party ideologically. This is one of the reasons for the fall of West European social democracy, once revolutionary, and now reformist.

But we cannot live and develop like that, comrades. The policy of the “middle” principle line is not our policy. The policy of the “middle” principle line is the policy of fading and degenerating parties. Such a policy cannot but lead to the transformation of the party into an empty bureaucratic apparatus, idling and torn off from the working masses. This path is not our path.

The whole past of our party is a confirmation of the fact that the history of our party is the history of overcoming internal party contradictions and the steady strengthening of the ranks of our party on the basis of this overcoming.

Let us take the first period, the period of Iskra or the period of the II Congress of our party, when disagreements within our party between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks first appeared and when the top of our party finally split into two parts: the Bolshevik part (Lenin) and the Menshevik part (Plekhanov, Axelrod, Martov, Zasluchich, Potresov). Lenin was then in the singular. If you only knew how many screams and cries there were about the “irreplaceable” who had departed from Lenin. However, the practice of struggle and the history of the party showed that this discrepancy had a fundamental basis, that this discrepancy was a necessary stage for the emergence and development of a truly revolutionary and really Bolshevik party. The practice of struggle then showed that, firstly, the matter is not in quantity, but in quality, and, secondly, it is not in formal unity, but in so that unity has a fundamental basis. History has shown that Lenin was right, and the “irreplaceable” were wrong. History has shown that without overcoming these contradictions between Lenin and the “indispensable” we would not have a real revolutionary party. Let us take the next period, the period on the eve of the revolution of 1905, when the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks were still facing each

other within the same party, like two camps with two completely different platforms, when the Bolsheviks stood on the threshold of a formal split in our party and when they were to defend our line revolutions were forced to convene their own special congress (III congress). What then prevailed the Bolshevik part of the party, how did it win the sympathies of the majority of the party? The fact that she did not gloss over the fundamental disagreements and fought for overcoming these disagreements by isolating the Mensheviks.

I could refer further to the third stage of the development of our party, the period after the defeat of the revolution of 1905, the period 1907, when one part of the Bolsheviks, the so-called "otzovists" led by Bogdanov, departed from Bolshevism. This was a critical period in the life of our party. This was the period when a number of Bolsheviks from the old guard left Lenin and his party. The Mensheviks then shouted about the death of the Bolsheviks. However, Bolshevism did not die, and the practice of struggle for a year and a half showed that Lenin and his party were right in the struggle to overcome the contradictions within the ranks of Bolshevism. These contradictions were not overcome by glossing over, but by opening them and by fighting for the good and benefit of our party.

I could refer further to the fourth period in the history of our party, to the period 1911-1912, when the Bolsheviks restored the party that had been ruined by the tsarist reaction and expelled the liquidators. And here, as in previous periods, the Bolsheviks went to the restoration and strengthening of the party not by glossing over the fundamental differences with the liquidators, but through opening and overcoming them.

I could then point to the fifth stage in the development of our party, the period before the October Revolution of 1917, when one part of Bolshevism, headed by the well-known leaders of the Bolshevik party, hesitated and did not want to go on an uprising, considering it an adventure. It is known that this contradiction was also overcome by the Bolsheviks not by glossing over differences, but by open struggle for the October Revolution. The practice of struggle has shown that without overcoming these differences, we could put the October Revolution in a critical position.

I could finally point out the further periods of development of our internal party struggle, the period of the Brest Peace, the period of 1921 (trade union discussion) and other periods that you are aware of and which I will not discuss here. It is known that in all these periods,

as in the past, our party grew and strengthened through overcoming internal contradictions.

So what comes of this?

It follows that the CPSU grew and grew stronger through overcoming internal party contradictions.

It turns out that overcoming internal party differences through struggle is the law of the development of our party.

They may say that this is a law for the CPSU, and not for other proletarian parties. This is not true. This law is the law of development for all parties of any size, anyway, whether it is a proletarian party of the USSR or parties in the West. If it is possible in one way or another to disagree in the small party of a small country, covering them with the authority of one or several persons, then in a large party with its various regions, development through overcoming contradictions is an inevitable element of the growth and strengthening of the party. This was the case in the past. So it goes in the present. Here I would like to refer to the authority of Engels, who, together with Marx, led the proletarian parties in the West for decades. The case is about the 80s of the last century, when an exclusive law against socialists reigned in Germany. Marx and Engels sat in exile in London, and the foreign illegal organ of the German Social Democracy, the Social Democrat, actually directed the work of the German Social Democracy. Bernstein was then a revolutionary Marxist (he had not yet managed to migrate to the reformists), Engels was in lively correspondence with him on the most topical issues of the policy of German Social Democracy. Here is what he wrote to Bernstein (1882):

“Apparently, every labour party of a large country can develop only in the internal struggle, in full accordance with the laws of dialectical development. The German party became what it is in the struggle of the Eisenachs and Lassalleans, where friction itself played a major role. Unity became possible only when the rabble, intentionally fed by Lassalle as a tool, wore out, and here it happened on our part with too much haste. In France, people who sacrificed the Bakuninist theories, but continue to use the Bakuninist methods of struggle and at the same time want to sacrifice the class character of the movement for their social goals, must also wear out before unity becomes possible again. Desiring to preach unity under such conditions would be sheer stupidity. Moral sermons cannot prevent childhood diseases, which under modern conditions need to be ill

“(see” Archives of Marx and Engels “, book 1, pp. 324–325) [This citation was not given in full in a newspaper text.—J. St.].

For, says Engels in another place (1885): “Contradictions can never be obscured for long, they are resolved by struggle” (see *ibid.*, P. 371).

That is the first thing to explain the existence of contradictions within our party and the development of our party through overcoming these contradictions through struggle. (*Stalin, Once Again on the Social Democratic Bias, Compilation on the Opposition, pp. 439–443, ed. 1928* )

## **The social base of deviations from the general line of the party. Right deviation is the main danger at this stage**

One would think that the work of leading socialist construction, the work of enforcing the party’s general line, took place in our party calmly and smoothly without struggle and willpower. But this is not true, comrades. In fact, this work went on in the struggle against intra-party difficulties, in the struggle against all kinds of deviations from Leninism both in the field of general politics and in the field of the national question. Our party does not live and work in an airless space. She lives and strives in the midst of life, being influenced by the environment. And our environment consists, as you know, of various classes and social groups. We have launched a comprehensive attack on the capitalist elements, we have advanced our socialist industry far ahead, we have launched the construction of state farms and collective farms. But such phenomena cannot be in vain for the exploiting classes. These phenomena are usually accompanied by the ruin of the obsolete classes, the ruin of the kulaks in the countryside, and the narrowing of the field of activity of the petty-bourgeois strata of the city. It is clear that all this cannot but aggravate the struggle of the classes, the resistance of the obsolete classes to the policy of Soviet power. It would be ridiculous to think that the resistance of these classes will not find this or that reflection in the ranks of our party. And it, indeed, is reflected in the party. A reflection of the resistance of the obsolete classes are all and all sorts of deviations from the Leninist line, which are available in the ranks of our party. that all this cannot but aggravate the struggle of the classes, the

resistance of the obsolete classes to the policy of Soviet power. It would be ridiculous to think that the resistance of these classes will not find this or that reflection in the ranks of our party. And it, indeed, is reflected in the party. A reflection of the resistance of the obsolete classes are all and all sorts of deviations from the Leninist line, which are available in the ranks of our party. that all this cannot but aggravate the struggle of the classes, the resistance of the obsolete classes to the policy of Soviet power. It would be ridiculous to think that the resistance of these classes will not find this or that reflection in the ranks of our party. And it, indeed, is reflected in the party. A reflection of the resistance of the obsolete classes are all and all sorts of deviations from the Leninist line, which are available in the ranks of our party.

Is it possible to wage a successful struggle against class enemies without simultaneously fighting the deviations in our party, without overcoming these deviations? No you can not. It is impossible, since it is impossible to launch a real struggle against class enemies, having them reflected in the rear in the party, leaving behind people who do not believe in our cause and are trying in every possible way to slow down our movement forward.

Hence the implacable struggle against deviations from the Leninist line as the party's next task.

Why is right deviation now the main danger in the party? Because it reflects the kulak danger, and the kulak danger at the moment, at the time of the widespread offensive and rooting out of the roots of capitalism, is the main danger in the country...

Actually, capitulation as a *content*, "leftist" phrases and "revolutionary" adventurous manners, as a *form* that covers and advertises capitulation content— such is the essence of Trotskyism.

This duality of Trotskyism reflects the ambivalence of the ruined urban petty bourgeoisie, the impatient "regime" of the dictatorship of the proletariat and trying either to jump "immediately" into socialism in order to get rid of ruin (hence the *adventurism* and *hysteria* in politics), or, if this is impossible, to make any concessions capitalism (hence the *capitulation* in politics).

This duality of Trotskyism explains the fact that Trotskyism usually crowns its "rabid" attacks against right-wing deviators with a *bloc* with them, as with capitulators without a mask.

And what are the "left" bends that took place in the party in the field of the collective farm movement? They represent some, though unconscious, attempt to revive the traditions of Trotskyism in practice,

to revive the Trotskyist attitude towards the middle peasantry. They are the result of the mistake in politics that Lenin calls “re-administration.” This means that some of our comrades, fascinated by the successes of the collective farm movement, began to approach the problem of collective farm construction not as builders, but as administrators, for the most part, having made a number of gross errors in view of this.

In our party there are people who think that it was not necessary to pull out the “left” bends. They believe that it was not necessary to offend our workers and counteract their enthusiasm, even if this passion led to mistakes. This is nonsense, comrades. Only people who want to go with the flow can say this. These are the very people who can never learn the Leninist line—go against the tide, when the situation requires it, when the interests of the party demand it. These are tails, not Leninists. That is why the parties managed to turn the whole detachments of our comrades on the right road, the party therefore managed to correct the mistakes and achieve success because it resolutely went against the tide in the name of implementing the general line. This is Leninism in practice, Leninism in leadership.

That is why I think that, without overcoming the “left” bends, we would not be able to achieve the successes in the collective farm movement that we have now.

This is the case with the struggle against the remnants of Trotskyism and their belching in practice.

The situation is somewhat different with the question of right opportunism, at the head of which stood or stand TT. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsk.

One cannot say about right deviators that they do not recognize the possibility of building socialism in the USSR. No, they recognize her, and this is their difference from the Trotskyists. But the trouble of the right deviators is that, formally recognizing the possibility of building socialism in one country, they do not want to recognize the ways and means of struggle without which it is impossible to build socialism. They do not want to recognize that the comprehensive development of industry is the key to transforming the entire national economy on the basis of socialism. They do not want to recognize the implacable class struggle against the capitalist elements and the extensive offensive of socialism on capitalism. They do not understand that all these ways and means are that system of measures without which it is impossible to maintain the dictatorship of the

proletariat and build socialism in our country. They think, that socialism can be built secretly, by gravity, without the class struggle, without attacking the capitalist elements. They think that the capitalist elements either themselves will die imperceptibly, or they will grow into socialism. And since there are no such miracles in history, it turns out that *right-wing deviators are actually slipping into the viewpoint of denying the possibility of building socialism in our country* .

One cannot also speak of right-wing deviators that they deny the possibility of involving the main masses of the peasantry in the cause of building socialism in the countryside. No, they recognize her, and this is their difference from the Trotskyists. But, recognizing it formally, they at the same time deny those ways and means, without which it is impossible to involve the peasantry in the cause of building socialism. They do not want to recognize that state farms and collective farms are the main means and the “pillar road” of involving the bulk of the peasantry in the cause of building socialism. They do not want to admit that without implementing a policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class, it is impossible to achieve a transformation of the village on the basis of socialism. They think that the village can be put on the rails of socialism secretly, by gravity, without a class struggle, by means of supply and marketing cooperation alone, for they are sure that the fist itself will grow into socialism. They think that the main thing now is not in the high pace of development of industry and not on collective farms and state farms, but in “unleashing” the market element, “liberating” the market and “taking off the bonds” from individual farms up to the capitalist elements of the village. But since the fist cannot grow into socialism, and the “emancipation” of the market means arming the kulaks and disarming the working class, it turns out that *right-wing deviators actually slide into the point of view of denying the possibility of involving the main masses of the peasantry in the cause of building socialism*.

This, in fact, explains the fact that right-wing deviators usually crown their cockfights with the Trotskyists with backstage negotiations with the Trotskyists about a *bloc* with them.

The main evil of right-wing opportunism is that it *breaks* with the Leninist understanding of the class struggle and slides into the point of view of *petty-bourgeois liberalism*.

There can be no doubt that the victory of the right deviation in our party would mean the complete disarmament of the working class, the arming of the capitalist elements in the countryside and the growth of chances for the restoration of capitalism in the USSR.

Right deviators do not stand on the point of view of the formation of another party, and this is one more difference from the Trotskyists. The leaders of the Right deviators openly admitted their mistakes and surrendered to the party. But it would be foolish to think on this basis that right-wing deviation is already buried. The power of right opportunism is not measured by this circumstance. The power of right opportunism lies in the power of the petty-bourgeois element, in the force of pressure on the party from the side of capitalist elements in general, from the side of the kulaks in particular. And precisely because the right deviation reflects the resistance of the basic elements of the obsolete classes, that is why the right deviation is the main danger of our time in the party.

That is why the party considered it necessary to lead a decisive and implacable struggle against the Right deviation.

There can be no doubt that without a decisive struggle against the right deviation, without isolating its leading elements, we could not have achieved the mobilization of the forces of the party and the working class, the mobilization of the forces of the poor and the middle peasant masses on the cause of the widespread offensive of socialism, on the organization of state farms and collective farms, to the restoration of our heavy industry, to the elimination of the kulaks as a class.

This is the case with the “left” and right deviations in the party.

The task is to continue the irreconcilable struggle *on two fronts*, both against the “left”, representing *petty-bourgeois radicalism*, and against the right, representing *petty-bourgeois liberalism*.

The task is to continue the *irreconcilable* struggle against those *conciliatory* elements in the party that do not understand or pretend that they do not understand the need for a decisive struggle on two fronts. (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 556-557, 559-562, ed. 9th.* )

## **Mechanistic revision of dialectical materialism**

*The denial of Marxist philosophy by the mechanists*

Partly due to the habit of a philistine language, partly under the influence of our class enemies, we usually mean philosophy as

nothing more than the most general, whole and harmonious view of the world, as something very wise, high, beautiful, etc. Of course, we state that there is a so-called “bourgeois philosophy”, but that this philosophy is false, false, “not scientific,” but the most real, scientific, authentic philosophy, this is Marxism, this is the “philosophy of the proletariat” . And we create “philosophical” circles, “philosophical” magazines, departments of philosophy, etc.

In fact, *one cannot talk about any scientific, revolutionary, communist, etc. philosophy, for there is no such philosophy and cannot be, just as there can be no communist, scientific, etc. religion* , because philosophy is not there is simply some general concept for a unified, integral, harmonious worldview, and a specific and very definite concept of a bourgeois view of the world, of human society and of cognition. *Every philosophy, like any religion, is to one degree or another hostile to the proletariat and communism...*

Philosophy is a half-faith in a half-personal god (“absolute idea”, “higher mind”, “world will”, etc.) and this is a half-science about the semi-material world (these are the main types of new philosophy, “metaphysical materialism” of the eighteenth century and “dialectical idealism “of the 19th century).

If the expression “religion of socialism” cannot be otherwise understood as “wooden iron”, then mixing science and philosophy or calling Marxism a philosophy means roughly the same thing as not distinguishing iron from iron ore or calling gold gold mines.

Marxism is a science. That’s all. Is this really not enough?

*And philosophy must be overcome and eliminated in the same way that we have overcome and eliminate religion .*

.....

K. Marx in the XI thesis of Feuerbach wrote:

“The philosophers only *explained* the world one way or another, but the point is to *change* it.”

That is: *Marx and Engels are not philosophers* . Yes, they could not be such, as the founders of science in the true sense of the word...

V. I. Lenin, like Plekhanov, uses the obsolete terminology: “*philosophy of Marxism*”, “*philosophical conclusions of natural science*”, etc., however, such terminology in Lenin, as in Plekhanov, is only a series of descriptions - no more, so like everything that Lenin wrote is nothing but, firstly, the merciless and crushing struggle not only against religion, but also against philosophy in all its forms and forms, and, secondly, this is the most fruitful development of that very

science, the full foundation of which for the first time in history was laid by Marx and Engels...

Nevertheless, contrary to the clear essence of the matter, contrary to the clear instructions of the founders of Marxism, there are Communists who are trying at all costs to resurrect philosophy, disinfect it and support Marxism with it. But *philosophy, not only as a system, but even as a term, as a “synonym” or “symbol” is defiled and scandalized no less than “social democracy”, and therefore deserves to be discarded as infected linen.* (Minin, Magazine “Under the Banner of Marxism” No. 11–12 for 1922, p. 185–187, 195. *Italics by compilers.* )

Historical materialism *continues* the work, which in one part is carried out by philosophical materialism, or, using a clearer and more direct expression, is done by modern *natural science*; for Marxists, there is no area of some kind of “philosophizing”, separate and separate from science: materialistic philosophy for Marxists is the last and most general conclusions of modern science. (Stepanov, *Historical materialism and modern science*, pp. 56-57, Guise, 1924 )

## **The denial of the philosophical understanding of matter by mechanists**

... Now we can not agree with Engels, who wrote that “matter as such is a *pure creation of thought and abstraction* .” In the same way, I directly admitted that we can no longer follow Engels, who has great doubts about the desire of natural science to find single matter as such and reduce qualitative differences to only quantitative differences in the composition of the smallest particles. “

In contrast to this, I wrote that at present “natural science does not seek to find a *single matter* as such: it already *finds* it... Matter as such *sensually exists for us as negative electrons and positive nuclei* .” ( Stepanov, *Dialectical Materialism and the Deborin School*, pp. 39–40, Guise, 1928. *Italics compiled.* )

## **Engels and Lenin on the philosophical concept of matter**

Materialism and idealism are distinguished by one or another solution to the question of the *source of* our knowledge, the relation of knowledge (and the “psychic” in general) to the *physical* world, and the question of the structure of matter, of atoms and electrons is a question that concerns only this “physical world”. When physicists say: “Matter disappears,” they want to say by this that until now, natural science has led all its studies of the physical world to the last three concepts—matter, electricity, ether; now *only* the last two, because matter can be reduced to electricity, the atom can be explained as the likeness of an infinitesimal solar system, inside which negative electrons move with a certain (and immensely immense, as we saw) speed. Instead of dozens of elements, it is possible, therefore, to reduce the physical world to two or three (since the positive and negative electrons make up “two substances that are significantly different,” as the physicist Pella says,—Rey, I. p., Pp. 294-295). Natural science leads, therefore, to the “*unity of matter*”(Ibid.)—this is the actual content of that phrase about the disappearance of matter, about the replacement of matter by electricity, etc., which confuses so many. “Matter disappears”—this means the limit to which we have known matter until now disappears, our knowledge goes deeper; such properties of matter that previously seemed absolute, unchanging, original (impermeability, inertia, mass, etc.) and which are now found to be relative, inherent only to certain states of matter, disappear. For the *only* “property” of matter, with the recognition of which philosophical materialism is associated, is the property of *being an objective reality*, of existing outside our consciousness. (*Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1908), Op., Vol. XIII, p. 213, ed. 3rd*)

All the philosophers we have cited, who directly, who with a snap, replace the main philosophical line of materialism (from being to thinking, from matter to feeling) with the reverse line of idealism. The denial of matter by them is a long-known decision of cognitive-theoretical issues in the sense of negating the external, objective source of our sensations, objective reality corresponding to our sensations. And, on the contrary, the recognition of the philosophical line that idealists and agnostics deny is expressed in definitions: matter is that, acting on our senses, it produces sensation; matter is an objective reality given to us in sensation, etc. (*Lenin, Materialism and empirio-criticism, Op., vol. XIII, p. 119.*)

We know what an hour is, a meter, but we do not know what time and space are! For sure, time is something other than the sum of

hours, and space is something other than the sum of cubic meters! Of course, both forms of the existence of matter without this matter represent nothing, only an empty representation, an abstraction that exists only in our head. But we are not able to know what matter and motion are. Of course, they are not capable, because no one has yet seen or experienced matter as such and movement as such in any other way: people deal only with various really existing matter and forms of movement. Matter, matter is nothing but the totality of all sensually perceived forms of motion; words like “matter” and “motion” are simply *abbreviations* in which we summarize, according to their general properties, various sensually perceived things. Therefore, matter and motion *can be* known only by studying individual forms of matter and motion; since we know the latter, insofar as we know matter and motion *as such*. Therefore, when the Negeli says that we do not know what time, space, movement, cause and effect is, he only asserts that we use our heads to compose abstractions first, distracting them from the real world, and then not able to know these abstractions we have composed, for they are mental, not sensory things, while all knowledge is a sensory *dimension*. This is exactly the same difficulty encountered by Hegel that we are able to eat cherries, plums, but not able to eat the *fruit*, because no one has eaten the fruit as such. (*Engels, Anti-Dühring, p. 253.*)

## **Mechanistic interpretation of movement**

Marx, as is known, freed dialectics from the mystical shell, exposing the position that dialectics as a mental category is a reflection of dialectics in the process of real, *material* formation, for the “ideal” is only material translated in the human brain into a specific language. However, so far—and moreover, to an increasing extent—attempts have been made to *tear off the* thought process from the material process—attempts to turn dialectics into an exclusively thought construct, into some method that does not correspond to any reality. Typical in this respect is “Austro-Marxism” with Max Adler at the head. How to deal with this distortion of Marxism, a manifestly *anti-materialistic* distortion? It is quite obvious that it is necessary to uncover the material root of dialectics, that is, *in the forms of moving matter to find what “matches” Hegel’s dialectic*

*formula* . The constant clash of forces, the breakdown, the growth of systems, the formation of new ones and their own movement—in other words, the process of constant imbalance, its restoration on another basis; a new violation, etc., is what *really* corresponds to the Hegelian triune formula. What is “new” in this interpretation? This is essentially the same. But here the *material* process and the movement of the *material* form are indicated. In other words, here is the dialectic of *material* formation, ideally expressed by the Hegelian triad.

The reproach in the mechanics of such a formulation is completely wrong. It is wrong because modern mechanics *cannot be opposed to* dialectics. If mechanics is non-dialectical, that is, the whole movement is also non-dialectical, then what remains of dialectics? On the contrary. *Movement* is, so to speak, the material soul of the dialectical method and its objective basis. (Bukharin, *Theory of Historical Materialism*, pp. 36 -362, Guise, 1929)

... It is not about how to somehow “partially” adopt physical and chemical methods of explaining the phenomena of life, and that these methods *already gave such brilliant results* , to recognize the “only scientific” explanation for taking life, *that* to generally put the methods of explaining life to a scientific height. The dispute between us has long been resolved by *practice, the whole practice of scientific biology...*

... We have every reason to recognize the consistent application of physicochemical methods, using the expression of Marx and Lenin, as the “only scientific” method of explaining life. Any attempt to supplement them will lead to helpless eclecticism. All the previous development of scientific biology does not give any reason for cowardly betrayal of methods for reducing the body’s life to physicochemical processes. (Stepanov, *Dialectical Materialism and the Déborine School*, p. 14, 18, Guise, 1928—*Underlined comp.* )

In biology, until now, only two main trends have fought and still struggle: the *idealist* , called vitalism and rejecting the reducibility of life phenomena to physicochemical processes, and the *materialist* , affirming this reducibility and still brilliantly demonstrating this reducibility by practice, experiment. It does not hinder to note that this is the *only materialistic* trend in biology has long been called *mechanistic* . (Stepanov, *Dialectical Materialism and the Debory School*, p. 52, Guise, 1928)

## Engels movement interpretation

Calling physics the mechanics of molecules, chemistry—the physics of atoms, and then biology - *the* chemistry of proteins ... I want to express by this the transition of one of these sciences to another and, therefore, the connection, continuity, as well as the difference, the gap between both areas. To go beyond this, to call chemistry a kind of mechanics, in my opinion, is irrational. Mechanics—in the broader or narrower sense of the word—knows only quantities, it operates with speeds and masses and, in the best case, volumes. Where in the way she stands quality—such as in hydrostatics and aerostatics,—it cannot come to satisfactory results without going into consideration of molecular states and molecular motion; she herself is only a simple auxiliary science, a premise of physics. But in physics, and even more in chemistry, not only is there a constant qualitative change as a result of a quantitative change, not only is there a transition of quantity into quality, but one also has to consider many quality changes, for which it is not at all proven that they are due to changes. We can readily agree that modern science is moving in this direction, but this does not prove at all that this direction is the only correct one, that, going this way, we will *exhaust* to the end physics and chemistry. Every movement involves a mechanical movement and the movement of large or the smallest parts of matter; to know these mechanical movements is the *first* the task of science, however, only the first. This mechanical movement itself does not at all exhaust the movement at all. Movement is not at all a simple movement, a simple change of place; in the supra-mechanical areas, it is also a change in quality. <Thinking is also movement>. The discovery that heat is a molecular motion constituted an era in science. But if I have nothing else to say about heat, except that it is a known movement of molecules, then it is better for me to shut up. Chemistry is on the verge of explaining a number of chemical and physical properties of elements from the ratio of atomic volumes to atomic weights. But not a single chemist will dare to assert that all the properties of any element are expressed in an exhaustive way by its position on the Lothar-Meyer curve, that this one determines, for example, specific properties of carbon, making it the main carrier of organic life, or the need for phosphorus in the brain. Meanwhile, the mechanical concept boils down to just that; she explains all kinds of changes from changes in the place, all qualitative differences from

quantitative ones and does not notice that the relationship between quality and quantity is mutual, that quality also goes into quantity, like quantity into quality, that there is interaction. If we must reduce all differences and changes in quality to quantitative differences and changes, to mechanical displacements, then we necessarily come to the position that all matter consists of she explains all kinds of changes from changes in the place, all qualitative differences from quantitative ones and does not notice that the relationship between quality and quantity is mutual, that quality also goes into quantity, like quantity into quality, that there is interaction. If we must reduce all differences and changes in quality to quantitative differences and changes, to mechanical displacements, then we necessarily come to the position that all matter consists of she explains all kinds of changes from changes in the place, all qualitative differences from quantitative ones and does not notice that the relationship between quality and quantity is mutual, that quality also goes into quantity, like quantity into quality, that there is interaction. If we must reduce all differences and changes in quality to quantitative differences and changes, to mechanical displacements, then we necessarily come to the position that all matter consists of *of the* smallest particles and that all the qualitative differences in the chemical elements of matter are caused by quantitative differences in the number and spatial grouping of these smallest particles when they are combined into atoms. But this is still a long way off.

Only the unfamiliarity of modern natural scientists with a philosophy other than the most ordinary vulgar philosophy that is currently flourishing in German universities allows them to operate with expressions such as “mechanical” in this way, and they do not realize and do not even know which necessary conclusions follow from this. The theory of absolute qualitative identity of matter has its adherents; empirically, it cannot be refuted in the same way as it cannot be proved. But if you ask people who want to explain everything in a “mechanical way”, whether they recognize the inevitability of this conclusion and recognize the identity of matter, what different answers are obtained!

The most comical thing is that the equation of “materialistic” and “mechanical” has *Hegel*, his ancestor, who wanted to humiliate materialism with the epithet “mechanical”. But the fact is that the materialism criticized by Hegel—the French materialism of the eighteenth century—was really exclusively *mechanical*, and for the simple reason that physics, chemistry and biology were still in their

infancy, far from being the basis of a common worldview. (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, pp. 80-81.*)

## **Mechanistic information theory**

*Modern science* in its general character is a *consistent continuer of the scientific views of the eighteenth century*. Strictly critical observation and experience (experiment) are in her eyes the only means of knowing the world. *To understand* a group of phenomena means for it to interpret it as a continuously ongoing process in which one stage or step (considered as a *cause* ) inevitably gives rise to another (which is a *consequence* ). Thus, to explain any group of phenomena means to reveal the *causal relationship* between them. At the same time, *we must dismember, break up complex phenomena and descend from them to simpler ones, reduce them to these simpler phenomena*. So, for example, science stopped in complete perplexity before the process of life, before the processes *taking place in living matter*, until it began *to reduce them to simpler phenomena occurring in dead, mineral matter and constituting the subject of study of physics and chemistry*. (*Stepanov, Historical materialism and modern natural science, pp. 24–25, Guise, 1924-Underlined by the brigade.*)

\* \* \*

Science is confidently going in the direction in order to open up the transformation of some forms of energy into others under mental processes and to reduce them to such simple phenomena as reflexes, the mechanism and forms of which are complicated by the development and complication of the neuro-brain system. Despite all its complications, reflexes also in the same sense remain the main element of mental life, including up to its most complex manifestations, as a cell is the main element of all tissues that make up the human body.

The mechanistic understanding of nature, revealing that the *field of psychic life does not give exceptions to the law of conservation of energy* , comes to its completion and, at the same time, to the greatest triumph ...

Each step in the development of the world and its elements, its dead and living forms, is a necessary consequence of the previous step

and with strict causal necessity, which does not know exceptions, exceptions and gaps, determines the next step. Modern science is steadily moving in the direction to interpret all this unfolding of the world as the *development of relatively simple physical and chemical processes* . (Stepanov, *Historical Materialism and Modern Natural Science*, pp. 67–68, Guise, 1924—*Emphasized by the drafters.*)

\* \* \*

*Our task is to turn random phenomena by opening their causality into necessary phenomena* . In natural science, our task is to reveal the physicochemical nature of all processes and thereby tear mystery from them.

Why do we stop halfway, as it were, without reaching successively the mechanics of all the processes?

Only because the mechanics of the old time, explaining everything by impact, pressure, friction, adhesion of invariable bodies that do not change in the order of “self-movement”, failed and was forced to state the presence of mechanics as well as the internal system.

Mechanics took the right path, speaking not only about mutual collisions, pressures, etc. of particles, but also about the processes of friction, attraction, repulsion in each of the latter, but this area was developed by chemistry. Sciences all the time turn into one another, merge, differentiate.

Chemistry is already absorbed in physics, in which we personally see the triumph of mechanics that has risen to physics. To explain the world physically means to explain it from the point of view of mechanics, which has outgrown itself and is forced to become physics.

They can, of course, say that we thereby reject the mechanics that exist as an independent science.

No, we do not reject it, but we consider what is now called mechanics, mechanics in the narrow sense of the word, mechanics of gravity, friction, adhesion, etc. bodies, from the self-movement of which it is distracted, considering it to be existing.

To reduce a thing or process to physical processes means to explain this thing in all its manifestations by the *movement of the last self-moving particles* of which it consists. (Sarabyanov, *In Defence of the Philosophy of Marxism*, pp. 153-154, Guise, 192-Underlined by the compilers, except for the last sentence.)

## **Criticism of the theory of “information” by Engels**

*Simple and compound* . Categories, which also lose their meaning already in organic nature, are not applicable here. Neither the mechanical addition of bones, blood, cartilage, muscles, tissues, etc., nor the chemical composition of the elements constitutes an animal (Hegel. *Enz.*, I, p. 256). An organism is *neither simple nor compound*, no matter how complex it is. ( *Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 10, ed. 3rd, 1930* )

\* \* \*

*Mechanical movement* . For natural scientists, movement is always understood as = mechanical movement, movement. This was inherited from the pre-chemical XVIII century and greatly complicates a clear understanding of things. Motion, as applied to matter, is a *change in general*. From this misunderstanding, there arises a fierce desire to reduce everything to mechanical motion—Grove is already “very much inclined to think that the other properties of matter are forms of motion and will ultimately be reduced to them” (p. 16), thereby blurring the specific character of other forms of motion . This does not deny at all that each of the higher forms of motion is always necessarily associated with real mechanical (external or molecular) motion, just as higher forms of motion simultaneously produce other types of motion, chemical action is impossible without changing temperature and electricity, organic life impossible without mechanical, molecular, chemical, thermal, electrical, etc. changes. But the presence of these secondary forms does not exhaust the essence of the main form in each case. We undoubtedly We will “reduce” sometime experimental way of thinking to molecular and chemical movements in the brain; but is this the essence of thinking? (*Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 18, ed. 3rd, 1930* )

## **Mechanists replace materialist dialectics with the theory of equilibrium**

Marx and Engels liberated dialectics from its mystical husks in *action*, i.e. materialistically *using the* dialectic method in the study of various areas of nature and society. We are now talking about a theoretical and systematic presentation of this method and its theoretical and systematic justification. This is given by the *theory of equilibrium*.

The theory of equilibrium also has one more important argument for itself: it frees the world outlook from the *teleological* taste, which is inevitably connected with the Hegelian formulation, which rests on the *self-development of the* “spirit”. Instead of evolution (development), and *only* evolution, it also allows you to see *cases of destruction of* material forms. Thus, it is also a *more general and purified from idealistic elements* formulation of the laws of moving material systems. ( *Bukharin, TIM, p. 362, Guise, 1929. For more on the “theory of equilibrium” see “Theme Three.”—Compilers.* )

## **Lenin and Stalin on Bukharin’s distortions in questions of philosophy**

They say that Comrade Bukharin is a theorist of our party. He, of course, is a theorist, and a considerable theorist. But the fact is that with his theory, not everything is going well. This is evident even from the fact that he piled up a whole bunch of mistakes on the issues of party politics, which I have just described. It cannot be that these errors, errors on the line of the Comintern, errors on questions of the class struggle, on the aggravation of the class struggle, on the peasantry, on NEP, on new forms of the bond—it cannot be that all these errors appear by chance. No, these errors are not accidental. They, these errors of Comrade Bukharin, emerged from his incorrect installation, from his theoretical flaws. Yes, Comrade Bukharin is a theorist, but he is not a completely Marxist theorist, a theoretician who has yet to finish his studies in order to become a completely Marxist theorist.

They refer to Comrade Lenin’s famous letter about Bukharin as a theorist. Let’s read this letter.

“Of the young members of the Central Committee,” says Lenin, “I want to say a few words about Bukharin and Pyatakov. These, in my opinion, are the most outstanding forces (of the youngest forces), and with regard to them, the following should be borne in mind: Bukharin is not only the party’s most valuable and largest theoretician, he is also legally considered the favourite of the whole party, but *his theoretical views are very big doubt can be attributed to a completely Marxist, because there is something scholastic in him (he never studied and, I think, never understood completely dialectics)*”. (*Transcript of the July Plenum of 1926, issue IV, p. 66. Italics mine.—J. Stalin.*)

So, a theorist without dialectics. Scholastic theorist. Theorist, whose “theoretical views with very great doubt can be attributed to a completely Marxist.” Such is the characteristic of Comrade Bukharin’s theoretical physiognomy given by Lenin.

You yourself understand, comrades, that such a theorist must still finish his studies. And if Comrade Bukharin understood that he was not a complete theoretician, that he needed to finish his studies, that he was a theoretician who had not yet fully mastered dialectics, and that dialectics is the soul of Marxism, if he understood this, then he would be more modest, and the party would only benefit from this. (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 415-416, ed. 9th.*)

## **Lenin’s remarks on N. Bukharin’s book “The Economy in Transition”**

It is unnecessary to spread that the guiding thread for the author was the Marx method, a method whose cognitive value has only now become at its full gigantic height.

[7] *Theoretical* political economy is the science of social economy based on thephew! production of *goods*, that is,

only “cognitive value” ?? and not an objective world reflecting? ”Bashful” ... agnosticism!  
Two infidelities:  
1) the definition of a step back against Engels;  
2) commodity production is *also* an ”organized” economy!

the science of *unorganized* social economy ... Marx ... in his doctrine of commodity fetishism gave a brilliant sociological introduction to theoretical economy ... in fact, as soon as we take an organized social economy, all the main “problems” of political economy disappear ... [33 - 34] ... The penetration of bank capital into industry led to the consolidation of enterprises (the creation of “fusions”, combined trusts, etc.). Consequently, in these cases, the organizing processes go from the sphere of circulation to the sphere of production: this is because the process of circulation is an integral part of the general “process as a whole”, the process of reproduction, which has a “forced regularity” for all its parts and phases <sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> T. A. Bogdanov prefers to see only “cards” in the entire organizational process during the war, that is, only the normalization process that arose on the basis of a regression of productive forces. In fact, the normalization process is immeasurably deeper in meaning. The regression of productive forces does not at all preclude the progress of organized forms of

((NB  
 × Marx spoke *more simply* (without tricks with “terms” and “systems” and sociology) and spoke *more truly about socialization*. The author provides valuable *new facts*, but worsens, verballhorn Marx’s theory “Sociological scholasticism.”

# archinetically. Antagonism and contradictions are not at all the same thing. The first will disappear, the second will remain under socialism.  
 phew!  
 guard!

× Dialectical process. Exactly! And not the scholastic à la Bogdanov. The author puts him *next* (and in 2nd place) with Begriffsscholastik Bogdanova. But you can’t put it near: either - or. “Impossibility” is provable only in practice. The author does not *dialectically* put the theory into practice.

capitalism . This happened in “normal time”, namely during crises, when a temporary regression of productive forces was accompanied by accelerated centralization of production and the emergence of capitalist organizations. This - mutatis mutandis - Engels made a mistake when he spoke about syndicates and trusts. This error does not need to be repeated now.

[43 - 44] Capitalism is an antagonistic, contradictory # system. But class antagonism, splitting society into two main classes, is consistently carried out everywhere. Consequently, the structure of capitalism is monistic antagonism or antagonistic monism . We took society as a system of elements in natura ...

[56 - 57] The giant shock of the entire capitalist system, which we assess as its collapse, is considered by a number of quasi-Marxist scholars and unlearned sycophants as an argument against socialism. This view is logically based on a complete misunderstanding of the dialectical ×, in the contradictions of the developing process.

NB right!

this is an approximation to dialectics.

“My” Bogdanovskaya Begriffsscholastik there is a main enemy “my”.

not that word

??

it was necessary to say: between the *socialist* tendency of the proletariat and the commodity- *capitalist* tendency

[58] Once the disintegration of capitalist production relations is really given, and once the impossibility of restoring them theoretically is proved, the question arises of solving the dilemma: “death of culture” or socialism ... .. the era of the breakdown of production-technical-social strata preserves the unity in general the proletariat, *which embodies, first and foremost, the material basis of the future society* . This decisive and fundamental element in the course of the revolution only partially breaks up. On the other hand, he is unusually united, re-educated, organized. Empirical evidence of this is provided by the Russian revolution with its relatively weak proletariat, which nonetheless turned out to be a truly inexhaustible reservoir of organizational energy.

Under these conditions, the “mathematical probability” of socialism turns into “practical certainty.”

[59] ... Only when the proletariat is transformed from the class exploited into the dominant class can the labour process be restored, that is, social reproduction.

of the peasantry. Substitute the organizing word here there is a theoretical infidelity, Step back from Karl Marx to Louis Blanc.

Within this framework and on this basis, the tasks facing the proletariat, in general, formally, i.e., regardless of the social content of the process, are the same as for the bourgeoisie with expanded negative reproduction: the economization of all resources, their systematic use,

maximum possible centralization. The exhaustion resulting from the war and the disruption of the continuity of the production process during the collapse *requires*, from the point of view of socio-organizational technology, just a transition to socialist production relations. One has only to raise the general question of how a system of at least relative equilibrium is possible, or rather, how it is possible to create *conditions for moving towards such an equilibrium* in order to understand the categorical compulsory nature of a centralized and formally socialized economy.

[83] ... the dictatorship of the proletariat is inevitably accompanied by a *latent or*

more or less open struggle between the organizing tendency of the proletariat and the commodity-anarchist tendency of the peasantry.

[130] The consideration of the social, and, moreover, irrational, blind, system from the point of view of equilibrium, of course, has nothing in common with harmonia praestabilitata [predefined harmony. - Ed.], Because it proceeds from the *fact of the* existence of this system and from the same *fact of* its development ...

It is very good. But isn't it more accurate to talk about the "need for certain proportionality" than about the "*point of view of equilibrium*"? More precisely, more truly, for objectively the first, and the second opens the door to philosophical vacillations in the direction *from* materialism to idealism.

That's it!

[130-131] ... The task is to analyze the restructuring of the *social* system. Here: a) a collective, collective, *conscious* economic entity is growing - a proletarian state with all its subordinate bodies; b) since the anarchist-commodity system is maintained, the irrational, blind "rock" of the market is preserved, that is, again, the social element, more and more falling under the regulatory influence of the

decay elements are limited ...

Phew!

× why not easier:

"Limits them"?

Oh academism! Oh, false classicism! Oh, Tretyakov.

# Wrong words. The mistake of "Bogdanov" terminology comes

crystallized social-conscious centre; c) finally, since there are elements of the breakdown of social connectives (for example, the formation of closed subsistence cells), they, on the one hand, are “limited” in their actions by the economic environment (their very internal reorganization is a function of social shifts); on the other hand, they are increasingly involved in the construction process, constantly being subjected to the systematic impact of the state economic organization of the proletariat (labour service, all kinds of natural service, etc.). Thus, even when certain elements fall out of the social production process, they are in a constant sphere of influence and are considered# from the point of view of the *social* system of production, at the moments of their maximum isolation they are theoretically interesting # as an object of social attraction, as a potential component of the new social system.

out: subjectivism, solipsism. It is not a matter of who is “considering”, who is “interested”, but of what is independent of human consciousness.

“The method takes on a different tone.” Bukharin learned a *bad* tone. There is no “tone” and not “logic”, but *material* .

?

(2 is not “she”, not “point of view”

wrong. Before

*bourgeoisie*

“Forced” through the courts, tax collectors, etc. (cf. Marx about *France* , not only about Russia). Now the *proletariat* is forcing *straighter* . The author forgot the “social-class” relationship.

not only “on  
surface “  
and not only “appearances”.

Ho  
wever, despite the fact that the  
significance of the objectively  
social method is retained, this  
latter takes on a *different  
logical tone* . When analyzing  
the social structure of the  
commodity-capitalist type, all  
the laws are of the nature  
of *spontaneous* laws, of “blind”  
power, because the whole  
social-production process is  
irrational. When analyzing the  
structure of the transition  
period, the situation is  
different, because here  
the *rationalization of the social  
and economic process* takes  
place in an increasing  
proportion .

*The material and  
production point of view, in  
general, also remains  
mandatory. However  
(2, it undergoes significant  
changes*

From this phrase  
great  
clearly visible  
what for the author  
spoiled  
Bogdanov’s eclecticism, the  
dialectical “point of view” is  
only one of many equal “points  
of view”. Wrong!

very well!

and *limitations*. *Firstly*, the production process itself is not a priori given value ...

[132 - 133] *Secondly*, an extremely significant reduction may occur, and in some places the *termination* of the production process. Since society does not die out, this is compensated for in other ways: a) by a more economical distribution of the *remnants of* the previous production (purely capitalist) cycles — here the consumption process is detached from the production process and becomes incommensurable with the latter;

b) *forced* extraction of agricultural products from the village (here the difference from the “normal” situation is that this extraction is only partially funded directly by economic methods; therefore, only one half of the “national economy” enters the reproduction cycle); c) unproductive methods of obtaining products (military production, transfer from hand to hand of basic warehouses, etc.).

*Thirdly*, since the production process is divorced from the consumption process, so far - even where the free market persists - consumer motives appear on the surface of

right!

not *pure* *fiction*, and unclear form. Violation “Dialectical materialism” consists in *logical* (not tangible) *leap* through *several* specific stages.

The author forgot that  
(1) most> imperial states have grown from national;  
(2) that “national” states are also being formed in the colonies.

that’s it!

the phenomena.

*The* *dialectical-historical* approach is not only not subject to restriction, but, on the contrary, is pushed to the fore. The existing forms of new relations, their interweaving with old, sometimes in unusually bizarre combinations - all this makes the sui generis complex [a kind of industrial relations of the transitional period]. - *Ed* .]. Further, it is completely clear that the dialectical-historical point of view, which puts forward the principle of constant variability of forms, the principle of cognition of the process, must inevitably be emphasized in the analysis of an era where shifts of social strata occur with unprecedented speed. The relativity of the "categories" of political economy becomes clear to the full extent.

[139 - 140] In the era of the transition from capitalism to communism, the revolutionary class, the creator of the new society, is the proletariat. His state power, his dictatorship, the Soviet state, is a factor in the destruction of old economic ties and the creation of new ones." Political power, in the proper sense of the word, is an organized force of one class, with the goal of subordinating

another class” [ *K. Marx and F. Engels* , Communist Manifesto.]. Since this political power, as “concentrated violence” against the bourgeoisie, is itself an *economic* force, it is a force that breaks down capitalist production relations, transfers the material and material skeleton of production at the disposal of the proletariat and gradually inserts it non-proletarian human elements of production in the system of new social production relations . On the other hand, it’s “concentrated violence”

partly turns *inward* , being a factor in *self-organization and forced self-discipline* \_\_\_\_\_ of workers ...

[154 - 155] The largest factor in the decomposition of the capitalist system is the breakdown of communication between the imperialist states and their many colonies. The so-called “national state” already in the pre-war period was a pure fiction. In fact, there really were subjects of colonial policy, imperialist states representing complex systems with a strong core and subordinate periphery, and objects of this colonial policy with different shades and degrees of submission ... State commissure, ultimately based

on armed force was crucial. Consequently, as the state power of capital decomposes, the decomposition of imperialist systems, the fall of the colonies, the fragmentation of the “great powers” must inevitably begin the allocation of independent “national states” ...

... colonial uprisings and national revolutions are included as an integral part of the great world revolutionary process, which moves the entire axis of the world economy. For objectively, there are factors of the general collapse of capitalist production relations, the collapse that facilitates the victory of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the working class.

It is unnecessary to spread that the guiding only “cognitive thread for the author was the Marx method, value” ?? and not an a method whose cognitive value has only objective world now become at its full gigantic height. reflecting? ”Bashful” ... agnosticism!

Two infidelities:

1) the definition of a step

[7] *Theoretical* political economy is the back against Engels; science of social economy based on the 2) commodity production production of *goods*, that is, the science *of is also an* ”organized” *unorganized* social economy ... Marx ... in economy! his doctrine of commodity fetishism gave ap

brilliant sociological introduction to the theoretical economy ... in fact, as soon as we take an organized social economy, all the main “problems” of political economy! disappear ...

[33 - 34] ... The penetration of bank capital into industry led to the consolidation of enterprises (the creation of “fusions”, combined trusts, etc.). Consequently, in these cases, the organizing processes go from the sphere of circulation to the sphere of production: this is because the process of “terms” and “systems” and circulation is an integral part of the general sociology and “process as a whole”, the process of reproduction, which has “regularity” for all its parts and provides valuable new phases<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> T. A. Bogdanov prefers to see only “cards” in the entire organizational process during the war, that is, only the normalization process that arose on the basis of a regression of productive forces. In fact, the normalization process is immeasurably deeper in meaning. The regression of productive forces does not at all preclude the progress of organized forms of capitalism. This happened in “normal archinetically. Antagonism time”, namely during crises, when a temporary regression of productive forces at all the same thing. The was accompanied by accelerated first will disappear, the centralization of production and the second will remain under emergence of capitalist organizations. This socialism.

- mutatis mutandis - Engels made a mistake when he spoke about syndicates and trusts. This error does not need to be repeated now.

× Dialectical process. Exactly! And not the scholastic à la

[43 - 44] Capitalism is an antagonistic, contradictory # system. But class puts him next (and in 2nd antagonism, splitting society into two main place) with

classes, is consistently carried out Begriffsscholastik everywhere. Consequently, the structure of Bogdanova. But you can't capitalism is monistic antagonism or put it near: either - or. antagonistic monism. "Impossibility" is provable We took society as a system of only in practice. The author does elements in nature... not *dialectically* put the theory into practice.

[56 - 57] The giant shock of the entire capitalist system, which we assess as its collapse, is considered by a number of quasi-Marxist scholars and unlearned sycophants as an argument against socialism. This view is logically based on a complete misunderstanding of the *dialectical*  $\times$ , in the contradictions of the developing process.

NB right!

this is an approximation to dialectics.

[58] Once the disintegration of capitalist production relations is really given, and once the impossibility of restoring them theoretically is proved, the question arises of solving the dilemma: "death of culture" or socialism ... .. the era of the breakdown "My" Bogdanovskaya of production-technical-social strata Begriffsscholastik preserves the unity in general there is a main enemy proletariat, *which embodies, first and "my". foremost, the material basis of the future society*. This decisive and fundamental element in the course of the revolution only partially breaks up. On the other hand, he is unusually united, re-educated, organized. Empirical evidence of this is provided by the Russian revolution with its not that word relatively weak proletariat, which nonetheless turned out to be a truly inexhaustible reservoir of organizational energy.

Under these conditions, the “mathematical probability” of socialism turns into “practical certainty.”

[59] ... Only when the proletariat is transformed from the class exploited into the dominant class can the labour process be restored, that is, social reproduction.

Within this framework and on this basis, the tasks facing the proletariat, in general, formally, i.e., regardless of the social content of the process, are the same as for the bourgeoisie with expanded negative reproduction: the economization of all resources, their systematic use, it was necessary to say: between maximum possible centralization. The exhaustion resulting from the war and the disruption of the continuity of the production process during the collapse *requires*, from the point of view of socio-organizational technology, just a transition to socialist production relations. One has only to raise the question of how a system of at least relative equilibrium is possible, or rather, how it is possible to create *conditions for moving towards such an equilibrium* in order to understand the categorical compulsory nature of a centralized and formally socialized economy.

[83] ... the dictatorship of the proletariat is inevitably accompanied by a *latent or more or less open struggle between the organizing tendency of the proletariat and the commodity-anarchist tendency of the peasantry.*

[130] The consideration of the social, and, moreover, irrational, blind, system from the more accurate to talk

point of view of equilibrium, of course, has about the “need for certain nothing in common with harmonia proportionality” than praestabilitata [predefined harmony. - Ed.], about the “*point of view* Because it proceeds from the *fact of of* equilibrium”? More *the* existence of this system and from the precisely, more truly, for same *fact of* its development ... objectively the first, and the second opens the door to philosophical vacillations in the direction *from* materialism to idealism.

[130-131] ... The task is to analyze the restructuring of the *social* system. Here: a) a collective, collective, *conscious* economic entity is growing - a proletarian state with all its subordinate bodies; b) since the That’s it! anarchist-commodity system is maintained, the irrational, blind “rock” of the market is preserved, that is, again, the social element, decay elements are limited more and more falling under the regulatory ... influence of the crystallized social-Phew! conscious centre; c) finally, since there are × why not easier: elements of the breakdown of social “Limits them”? connectives (for example, the formation of Oh academism! Oh, false closed subsistence cells), they, on the one classicism! Oh, Tretyakov. hand, are “limited” in their actions by the economic environment (their very internal reorganization is a function of social shifts); on the other hand, they are increasingly involved in the construction process, constantly being subjected to the systematic impact of the state economic# Wrong words. The organization of the proletariat (labour mistake of “Bogdanov” service, all kinds of natural service, terminology comes out: etc.). Thus, even when certain elements fall subjectivism, solipsism. It out of the social production process, they is not a matter of who is are in a constant sphere of influence and “considering”, who is are considered# from the point of view of “interested”, but of what is

the *social* system of production, at the independent of human moments of their maximum isolation they consciousness. are theoretically interesting # as an object “The method takes on a of social attraction, as a potential different tone.” Bukharin component of the new social system. learned a *bad* tone. There is no “tone” and not “logic”, but *material* .

?

(2 is not “she”, not “point of view”

However,

despite the fact that the significance of the objectively social method is retained, this latter takes on a *different logical tone*. When analysing the social structure of the commodity-capitalist type, all the laws are of the nature of *spontaneous* laws, of “blind” power, because the whole social-production process is irrational. When analysing the structure of the transition period, the situation is different, because here the *rationalization of the social and economic process* takes place in an increasing proportion .

wrong. Before *bourgeoisie* “Forced” through the courts, tax collectors, etc. (cf. Marx about *France* , not only about *Russia*). Now the *proletariat*

*The material and production point of view, in general*, also remains mandatory. However (2, it undergoes significant changes and *limitations* . *Firstly* , the production process itself is not a priori given value ...

is forcing straighter . The author forgot the “social-class” relationship.

[132 - 133] *Secondly* , an extremely not only “on

significant reduction may occur, and in surface “some places the *termination of* and not only *the production process*. Since society does “appearances”. not die out, this is compensated for in other ways: a) by a more economical distribution of the *remnants of the* previous production (purely capitalist) cycles — here the consumption process is detached from the production process and becomes incommensurable with the latter;

b) *forced extraction* of agricultural products from the village (here the difference from the “normal” situation is that this extraction great is only partially funded directly by clearly visible economic methods; therefore, only one half what for the author of the “national economy” enters the spoiled reproduction cycle); c) unproductive Bogdanov’s eclecticism, methods of obtaining products (military the dialectical “point of production, transfer from hand to hand of view” is only one of many basic warehouses, etc.). equal “points of *Thirdly*, since the production process is view”. Wrong! divorced from the consumption process, so far - even where the free market persists - consumer motives appear on the surface of the phenomena.

*The dialectical-historical* approach is not only not subject to restriction, but, on the contrary, is pushed to the fore. The existing forms of new relations, their interweaving with old, sometimes in unusually bizarre combinations - all this makes the sui generis complex [a kind of industrial relations of the transitional period]. - *Ed* .]. Further, it is completely clear that the dialectical-historical point of view, which puts forward the principle of constant variability of forms, the principle of cognition of the process, must inevitably be emphasized in the analysis of an era where shifts of social

strata occur with unprecedented speed. The relativity of the “categories” of political economy becomes clear to the full extent.

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submission ... State commissure, ultimately based on armed force was crucial. Consequently, as the state power of capital decomposes, the decomposition of imperialist systems, the fall of the colonies, the fragmentation of the “great powers” must inevitably begin the allocation of independent “national states” ...

... colonial uprisings and national revolutions are included as an integral part of the great world revolutionary process, which moves the entire axis of the world economy. For objectively, there are factors of the general collapse of capitalist production relations, the collapse that facilitates the victory of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the working class.

$\Sigma\Sigma$  [summa summarum, grand total. - *Ed.*] = Fly in the ointment.  
Note 2 on page 33 [See above, p. 13, - *Ed.*] - naively, almost childishly naive, Bukharin “took” terms ““ in the sense “in which they are used by comrade. A. Bogdanov “- - - and didn’t think that both Bogdanov’s terms and meaning are” well-founded “(let the academician author forgive me this ridiculous, helter word) by his *philosophy*, philosophy of idealism and eclecticism. Therefore, too often, too often, the author falls into the scholasticism of the terms (agnostic, Hume-Kantian in philosophical principles) contrary to dialectical materialism (that is, Marxism), into idealism (“logic”, “point of view”, etc., *out of* consciousness their derivatives from *matter*, from objective reality), etc. Hence, a number of just *theoretical*(what was the claim to the “*general theory*”?) of infidelity, learned rubbish, academic nonsense. The book would be absolutely excellent if the author threw out the subtitle for the second edition, threw out pages 20-30 of scholasticism and unconsciously idealistic (in a philosophical sense) and eclectic exercises in

terminology, replaced them with 20-30 pages of *facts* (from the rich economic cited by him literature). Then the swollen, unhealthy beginning of the book would have *recovered*, lost weight, strengthened with bones, reduced anti-Marxist fat and thus would have been more “funded” (ha ha)! excellent end to the book.

When the author personally rises to his head—it comes out very cute and fun and non-pedantic. And when he, blindly imitating Bogdanov’s “terms” (in fact, not “*terms*” *at all*, but philosophical errors), *first* in his book, for the sake of importance, for the sake of academism, he often gets up on his head, and *then* roll over and get on his feet - It turned out just pedantically, inappropriately.

So-so-that-in-the-second, from-from-no-and-on, etc., etc.

On pages 131 and 132, Marxism clearly “sticks out” in contrast to “Bogdanovism”. ( *Lenin, Remarks on the book of N. N. Bukharin, The Economy in Transition*, p. 5 - 6, 13 - 14, 18 - 19, 20, 25, 42 - 45, 49-50, 58, 60, etc.)

## **The denial by the mechanists of the Leninist stage in the development of Marxist philosophy**

Here I have to dwell on one thing so that there is no misunderstanding. What can we mean by Marxism? By it we can mean two things: either we have before us a methodology - a system of methods for studying social phenomena, or it is a certain sum of ideas; - say, we include here the theory of historical materialism, the doctrine of the development of capitalist relations, etc., and *in addition* include a number of *specific* provisions, that is, we take Marxism not only as a method or theoretically formulated methodology, but we take a number of specific *applications* of this method, the whole amount of ideas that came about as a result of this application. From the last point of view it is quite clear that Leninist Marxism is a much wider field than Marxism of Marx. It’s clear why. Because to the sum of ideas that was then added as a result of the analysis of completely new phenomena, a completely new historical strip, a new sum of specific provisions. In this *conditional* sense, Leninism is a conclusion beyond Marxism. But if by Marxism we mean not the sum of ideas that Marx had, but that tool, the methodology that is inherent in Marxism, then it goes without saying

that Leninism is not something that modifies or revises the methodology of Marxist doctrine. On the contrary, in this sense, Leninism is a complete *return*.to that Marxism, which was formulated by Marx and Engels themselves. (*Bukharin, Sat. "Attack", p. 255, Guise, 2nd ed. )*

... The largest and greatest that Comrade Lenin introduced into the theoretical and practical treasury of Marxism can be formulated as follows: Marx had mainly the *algebra of capitalist development and revolutionary practice*, and Lenin had this algebra and the algebra of *new phenomena* (destructive and positive order), and their arithmetic, i.e., the decoding of the algebraic formula under a more specific and even more practical point of view. (*Bukharin, Sat. "Attack", p. 258, Guise, 2nd ed. )*

\* \* \*

Over the past few years, Comrade Deborin and his school have been waging an offensive against orthodox Marxism.

As befits revisionism, this offensive is waged in the name of the classics of Marxism. But history repeats itself not only in this, but also in the following extremely revealing fact: the Deborynites are forced to contrast some classics of dialectical materialism with others.

Just as the revisionists of the Second International opposed Engels to Marx in their time, as Bogdanov and other empirio-critics opposed Engels to Plekhanov, so now the Deboryans are doing the same procedure with Plekhanov and Lenin. Needless to say, on the merits of the question, on all the basic problems of Marxist philosophy between Lenin and Plekhanov, as well as their teachers, there are absolutely no disagreements.

Needless to say, the theory of knowledge is resolved by all of them in the same way as all the central problems of materialist dialectics are equally resolved.

If Lenin essentially disagreed with Plekhanov, he would not have recommended the philosophical works of the latter as the best in Marxist literature. (*Sarabyanov, In Defence of the Philosophy of Marxism, Preface, p. V, Guise, 1929*)

## Mechanism - the philosophical basis of the right bias

Comrade Bukharin's fourth mistake concerns the question of NEP. Comrade Bukharin's mistake here is that he does not see the two-sided nature of NEP, he sees only one side of NEP. When we introduced the NEP in 1921, we then directed its spearhead against military communism, against such a regime and orders that exclude *any kind of* freedom of trade. We believed and believe that NEP means a *certain* freedom of trade. Comrade Bukharin remembered this side of the matter. And this is very good. But Comrade Bukharin is mistaken in believing that this side of the matter is exhausting NEP. Comrade Bukharin forgets that NEP has another side. The fact is that NEP does not at all mean *complete* freedom of trade, *free* play of prices in the market. NEP have freedom of trade in *famous* limits, in *known* ranks, *while ensuring the regulatory role of the state and its role in the market*. This is precisely the second side of NEP. Moreover, this side of NEP is no less, if not more, important than its first side. We do not have a free game of prices on the market, as is usually the case in capitalist countries. We determine the price of bread mainly. We determine the prices of manufactured goods. We are trying to pursue a policy of reducing production costs and lowering prices for manufactured goods, striving to maintain price stability for agricultural products. Is it not clear that such special and specific orders on the market do not exist at all in capitalist countries.

It follows from this that, as long as there is NEP, both sides must be preserved: both the first side directed against the regime of military communism and aimed at ensuring a *certain* freedom of trade, and the second side directed against *full* freedom of trade and aimed at ensuring regulatory the role of the state in the market. Destroy one of these sides, and you will not have NEP. (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 404–405, ed. 9th.*)

Let us pass to the second prejudice in political economy, to the second theory of the bourgeois type. I have in mind the theory of “self-flowing” in the cause of socialist construction, a theory that has nothing to do with Marxism, but is fervently preached by our comrades from the right camp. The authors of this theory state approximately the following. We had capitalism, industry developed on a capitalist basis, and the village followed the capitalist city spontaneously, by gravity, transforming itself in the image and

likeness of a capitalist city. If so, what happened was under capitalism, why the same thing could not happen under Soviet economy, why cannot a village, a small-peasant economy, go the course of gravity behind a socialist city, spontaneously transforming itself in the image and likeness of a socialist city? The authors of this theory argue on this basis that the village can follow the socialist city in a self-flowing manner. Hence the question: should we get excited about the formation of state farms and collective farms, should we break spears if the village can go after the socialist city anyway?

Here is one more theory, which objectively aims to give new weapons into the hands of the capitalist elements of the village in their struggle against collective farms. The anti-Marxist essence of this theory is beyond any doubt.

Is it not strange that our theorists still have not bothered to uncover this strange theory, which is clogging the heads of our collective farmers?

There is no doubt that the leading role of a socialist city in relation to a small-peasant village is great and invaluable. It is on this that the transformative role of industry with respect to agriculture is built. But is this factor enough for the small-peasant village itself to go out of town in the cause of socialist construction? No, not enough. Under capitalism, the village went spontaneously outside the city, because the capitalist economy of the city and the small commodity economy of the peasant are basically of the *same type* economy. Of course, the small peasant commodity economy is not yet a capitalist economy. But it is basically the same type as the capitalist economy, as it relies on private ownership of the means of production. Lenin is right a thousand times when he speaks in his notes about Comrade Bukharin's book on the "Economy of the Transition" about the "commodity-*capitalist* tendency of the peasantry" as opposed to the *socialist* tendency of the proletariat [Italic Lenin. - I. St.]. This explains precisely that "small-scale production *gives rise to* capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly, annually, hourly, spontaneously and on a massive scale" (*Lenin*) Is it possible, therefore, to say that small-scale peasant farming is basically the same as socialist production in the city? Obviously, this cannot be said without breaking with Marxism. Otherwise, Lenin would not say that, "while we live in a small peasant country, there is a more solid economic base for capitalism in Russia than for communism." Consequently, the theory of gravity in the cause of socialist construction is a theory of rotten, anti-Leninist. Therefore, in

order for the small-peasant village to follow the socialist city, it is necessary, among other things, to *plant* large socialist farms in the form of state farms and collective farms, as the bases of socialism that could *lead the* main masses of the peasantry led by the socialist city. The point is clear. The theory of “gravity” in socialist construction is an anti-Marxist theory. A socialist city should *lead* a small-peasant village, *planting* collective farms and state farms in the village and transforming the village into a new, socialist way. (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 445–447, ed. 9th.* )

... The “theory” of spontaneity is the theory of opportunism, the theory of worship of the spontaneity of the labour movement, the theory of the actual denial of the leading role of the vanguard of the working class, the party of the working class.

The theory of admiration for spontaneity is strongly opposed to the revolutionary nature of the labour movement, it is against the movement being directed along the line of struggle against the foundations of capitalism - it is for the movement to go exclusively along the line of “feasible”, “acceptable” requirements for capitalism, it is entirely for “line of least resistance. “ The theory of spontaneity is the ideology of trade unionism.

The theory of admiration for spontaneity is strongly opposed to giving the spontaneous movement a conscious, planned character, it is against the party going ahead of the working class, the party raising the masses to the level of consciousness, the party leading the movement — it is for the conscious the elements of the movement did not prevent the movement from going its own way; it was for the party to only listen to the spontaneous movement and drag in the tail behind it. The theory of spontaneity is a theory of downplaying the role of the conscious element in movement, the ideology of “tailism”, the logical basis of *all* opportunism.

In practice, this theory, which appeared on the stage before the first revolution in Russia, led to the fact that its followers, the so-called “economists”, denied the need for an independent working party in Russia, opposed the revolutionary struggle of the working class to overthrow tsarism, and preached trade unionism politics in the movement and generally gave the labour movement under the hegemony of the liberal bourgeoisie.

The struggle of the old Iskra and the brilliant criticism of the theory of “tailism” given in Lenin’s pamphlet “What to do?” Not only defeated the so-called “economism”, but also created the theoretical

foundations of the truly revolutionary movement of the Russian working class.

Without this struggle, there was nothing to think about creating an independent working party in Russia and about its leading role in the revolution.

But the theory of worship of spontaneity is not only a Russian phenomenon. It has the widest distribution, albeit in a slightly different form, in all parties of the Second International without exception. I mean the so-called theory of “productive forces” vulgarized by the leaders of the Second International, which justifies everything and reconciles everyone, which states the facts and explains them after they are already tired of everyone, and, stating, settles down on this. Marx said that materialist theory cannot be limited to explaining the world, that it must still change it. But Kautsky and so on No matter what, they prefer to stay with the first part of the formula of Marx. Here is one of many examples of the application of this “theory”. It is said that before the imperialist war, the parties of the Second International threatened to declare “war on war” if the imperialists started the war. It is said that just before the start of the war, these parties laid the slogan “war to war” and put into practice the opposite slogan of “war for the imperialist fatherland”. It is said that the result of this change of slogans was millions of casualties from workers. But it would be a mistake to think that there are those responsible, that someone has betrayed the working class or betrayed it. Not at all! Everything happened as it should have happened. Firstly, because the International is an “instrument of peace,” not war. Secondly, because with the “level of productive forces” that existed at that time, nothing else could be done. “Productive forces” are to blame. This “to us” exactly explains the “theory of productive forces” of Mr. Kautsky. And whoever does not believe in this “theory” is not a Marxist. The role of the parties? Do they matter in motion? But what can the party do with such a decisive factor as the “level of productive forces”? ..

A whole bunch of such examples of falsification of Marxism could be cited.

It is hardly necessary to prove that this falsified “Marxism”, designed to cover up the nudity of opportunism, is only a European modification of the very theory of “tailism” with which Lenin fought even before the first Russian revolution. (*Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 17-19, ed. 9th.*)

## **The Opposite of the Methodological Foundations of Bolshevism and Menshevism**

There are two groups of Marxists. Both of them work under the flag of Marxism, consider themselves “truly” Marxist. And yet they are far from identical. Moreover: there is an abyss between them, because the methods of their work are diametrically opposed.

The first group is usually limited to the external recognition of Marxism, its solemn proclamation. Not knowing how or not wanting to understand the essence of Marxism, not knowing how or not wanting to put it into practice, it transforms the living and revolutionary positions of Marxism into dead formulas that do not say anything. She bases her activity not on experience, not on the basis of practical work, but on quotations from Marx. She draws instructions and directives not from an analysis of living reality, but from analogies of historical parallels. The discrepancy between words and deeds is the main disease of this group. Hence the disappointment and eternal discontent with fate, which all the time brings it, leaves “with a nose.” The name of this group is Menshevism (in Russia), opportunism (in Europe). Comrade Tyszko (Yogyges) at the London Congress rather aptly described this group, saying that it is not worth it, but *lies* on the point of view of Marxism.

The second group, on the contrary, transfers the centre of gravity of the issue from the external recognition of Marxism to its implementation, to its implementation. The marking of the ways and means of implementing Marxism appropriate to the situation, the change of these ways and means when the situation is changing - that is what this group draws its attention to mainly. This group draws directives and directions not from historical analogies and parallels, but from the study of environmental conditions. In her activity, she does not rely on quotes and sayings, but on practical experience, testing every step of her experience, learning from her mistakes and teaching others how to build a new life. This, in fact, explains that in the activities of this group the word does not diverge from deeds, and the teachings of Marx fully retain their living revolutionary force. The words of Marx are quite suitable for this group, by virtue of which Marxists cannot stop to explain the world, but must go further in order to change it. The name of this group is Bolshevism, communism.

The organizer and leader of this group is V.I. Lenin. ( *Stalin, On Lenin, pp. 3 - 4.* )

## **An idealistic understanding of philosophy by Menshevik idealists**

The liberation or separation of logical categories from a specific objective content makes it possible to turn logic into an independent science. Logic is the science of thinking.

... Logic is the basis of all sciences, making their foundation and foundation. It has as its object not any specific sensory and empirical objects, but those general logical categories that underlie all sciences. (*Deborin, Sat. Philosophy and Marxism, pp. 270 and 272, Guise, 1930* )

## **Restoration and canonization of Hegel among the Menshevik idealists**

The dialectic system of our time can only arise as an *open essence of all our knowledge*, i.e., encyclopaedic knowledge is a prerequisite for its creation...

What, in all honesty, should we say about our strengths? True, we do not start from scratch. We have a brilliant system of Hegelian dialectics and scattered “hints” of the theory of materialist dialectics among our classics. The Hegelian system of dialectics is idealistic—it must be translated into materialistic language. But such a translation can at best be a materialistic commentary or exposition of the dialectic of Hegelian times. One must begin with this—this is the beginning only. The Hegelian system of dialectics is the system of its time. It must be translated into the language of modern materialism. (*Gonikman, Journal of the Problems of Marxism, No. 2, 1932, pp. 22-23.* )

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Hegel in the *dialectic of concepts* guessed the *dialectic of things*. Contrary to his idealism, Hegel himself was already groping

for the materialistic roots of dialectics, for he was looking for it not in reason but in “idea”, that is, in objective reality.

Hegel synthesized into one whole the theory of knowledge, dialectics and logic.

Hegel correctly resolved, at least theoretically, the question of the relationship between theory and practice, which enabled Marx to introduce the criterion of practice into the theory of knowledge.

At Hegel we find the beginnings of historical materialism, since he finds the role of tools (and technology in general) in the production process.

Hegel discovered in Logic the basic laws of dialectics and presented them, although in an idealistic way, but in a systematic form. The order of arrangement of the categories should be generally recognized as correct and consistent with the actual course of development of human cognition. ( *Deborin, Preface to the “Lenin Collection” IX , p. 19. )*

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Since ideas constitute only a “reflection” of the real world in our heads, since, therefore, the objective existence is not inherent in the idea, all of Hegel’s teachings on the concept and idea, as it is developed especially in the last part of “Logic,” must be radically processed into accordance with the *materialistic* understanding of the world. It does not follow from this, however, that the views expressed by Hegel in this part of the Logic themselves do not deserve the most serious attention ...

As for the doctrine of *being* and *essence* , it seems to us that these two departments do not need a radical revision in the sense of eliminating certain particular parts.

We can talk only about their materialistic interpretation and about certain additions (it is necessary to include time and space in the doctrine of being), about some regrouping of categories and their greater concretization...

Together with Hegel, we must begin logic with the categories of *being* as *directly* existing definitions of a real principle, that is, with material substance. At this first stage, matter, of course, appears only as an indefinite substrate, which, as it moves forward, is enriched with more and more specific definitions.

One often encounters the opinion that Hegel did the wrong thing, taking *quality* as the first step in being. He would have to start with

quantity or even measure. We think these arguments are erroneous. First of all, there is no doubt that the structure of Hegelian logic, since it relates to the mutual relationship of being and essence, in general should be recognized as fully consistent with the actual course of the process of cognition. (*Deborin, Introductory article to volume I of Hegel, p. LXVIII - LXIX .* )

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Hegel's main idea in his criticism of criticism and any theory of knowledge boils down to the fact that *criticism of thought*, that is, an investigation of its abilities, should go hand in hand with the *activity of thought*. Hegel solves the problem of knowledge in the light of the world-historical practice of mankind. The dualism of the subject and the object, knowledge and the object is overcome not by *contemplating* , so to speak, these opposites, but as a result of the *struggle of the subject* with the object, their mutual comparison and comparison in the process of the historical life of mankind. "You can't learn to swim without going into the water." *The history of human knowledge* gives us the key to understanding and correctly resolving the very *problem of knowledge*. Various forms of thought and cognition correspond to various historical steps in the course of the development of life in all its manifestations—in the process of the historical formation of mankind. Hegel first understood the need to apply the *historical method* to the very process of knowledge. Both forms of knowledge are the product of *historical development* , and they themselves rest on those lower forms from which it came about through overcoming them. Hegel showed that the *consciousness of mankind has its own history* and that the history of this consciousness of mankind coincides with the history of all other forms of life with which it makes one integral truth. (*Deborin, Philosophy and Marxism, p. 238, Guise, 1930*)

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For Hegel, in fact, it is highly characteristic that he assigns such an honourable place to *practice* , seeing in it the necessary link in the process of *cognition* . Moreover, in the category system, practice immediately *follows* a theoretical idea and *before* objective truth, which should mean that practice is a *criterion for cognition* and a *transition* to objective truth. "The reconciliation between the subject

and the object,” says Hegel, “consists in the fact that the will returns to the assumption of knowledge, that is, it recognizes the unity of the theoretical idea with the practical one.” Thus, the problem of the unity of *subject* and *object* also receives the correct permission on the basis of the *unity of theory and practice*. (Deborin, *Preface to the Lenin Collection IX*, pp. 16-17.)

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Lenin considered basically the Hegelian construction, expressed in the movement of our knowledge (as well as the historical process of the development of human knowledge and with it all science in general) from direct being (quality, quantity, measure) to the essence, concept and absolute idea, which Lenin understands as complete *truth*.

Further developing his thoughts on the Hegelian structure of “Logic,” that is, the dialectics of scientific knowledge, Lenin writes the following: “First impressions *flicker*, then *something* stands out, then concepts of *quality* (definition of a thing or phenomenon) and *quantity* develop. Then study and reflection direct the thought to cognition of identity—difference—basis—the essence of the versus phenomenon, causality etc. All these moments (steps, steps, processes) of knowledge are directed from the subject to the object, being tested by practice and coming to the truth through this test (= the absolute idea). “Consequently, from this reasoning of Lenin, his agreement with Hegel on the question of the general course of development of human knowledge and, consequently, also on the structure of logic, follows.” (Deborin, *Preface to the Lenin Collection IX*, pp. 6–7.)

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If Marx and Engels, taking from Hegel the foundations of his method, discarded his system, then we can say that they turned out to be better and more consistent Hegelians than Hegel himself. The theory of knowledge, as it will be clarified in another connection, is absorbed by *methodology*. Criticism of the abilities of the mind dissolves into their *history*, for their true significance is contained in their *development* and in the fact that they are the *result of this development*. *The subject and object are historical categories, and not metaphysical entities* - this is the starting point of Marx, who in this

respect directly adjoins Hegel the *dialectic*. For a correct understanding of Marxism, this position is of fundamental importance. (*Deborin, Sat "Philosophy and Marxism", pp. 245-246, Guise, 1930*)

## **Lenin on the relation of Marxism to Hegel's idealistic dialectic**

... Arguments on the topic that Marxism is associated with Hegelianism [I, of course, am not talking about the historical origin of Marxism, but about its modern content.], With faith in triads, in abstract dogmas and schemes that do not need to be verified by facts, in binding for each country to go through the phase of capitalism, etc., turn out to be empty chatter.

Marxism sees its criterion in the *formulation* and theoretical *explanation of the* struggle of social classes and economic interests *that is going on before our eyes.* (*Lenin, The Economic Content of Narodism (1894), Op., Vol. I, p. 282.*)

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Hegel's logic cannot *be applied* in its present form: it cannot be *taken* as given. From it, it is *necessary to choose* logical (epistemological) shades, having cleared the *mysticism of ideas*; this is still a lot of work. (*"Lenin Collection XII, p. 205.*)

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Marx says that his method is "directly opposite" to Hegel's. According to Hegel, the development of an idea, according to the dialectical laws of the triad, determines the development of reality. Only in this case, of course, can one speak of the significance of triads, of the unquestionability of the dialectical process. In my opinion, it's the other way around, "says Marx:" The ideal is only a reflection of the material. "And the whole thing is thus reduced to a "positive understanding of the present and its necessary development": for the triads there is no other place than the role of the lid and husk ("I flirted with the Hegelian language," says Marx in the same Afterword), which some people are interested in

philistines. (*Lenin, What are “Friends of the People” (1894), Op., Vol. I , p. 86.*)

In general, I try to read Hegel materialistically: Hegel is materialism put on its head (according to Engels)—that is, for the most part I throw out God, the absolute, the pure idea, etc. (*The Lenin Collection IX , p. 59.* )

## **Denial by the Menshevik idealists of the Leninist stage in the development of philosophy**

Lenin in philosophy, of course, is Plekhanov’s “disciple,” about which he himself has repeatedly stated. But the fact that he studied with Plekhanov did not prevent Lenin from independently approaching a number of issues and correcting Plekhanov in some significant points. Both of these thinkers in a certain sense complement each other. First of all, Plekhanov is a theorist, Lenin, above all, is a practitioner, politician, leader. (*Deborin, Lenin as a thinker, p. 26, Guise, 1929, 3rd ed. )*

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Lenin was the greatest *practical materialist*, that is, the philosopher of the practical struggle for changing reality, while relying on the *theory of materialism*, on that philosophy that comes from a materialistic understanding of human nature and history ...

Lenin *foresaw the future* better than others . In order for the foresight to *be realized*, it was necessary to *act* in the direction in which life developed, in which the process of life was going. This was what Lenin did. *He was mainly a practical philosopher* [Italics compiled.]. ( *Deborin, Lenin as a thinker, p. 7, Guise, 1929, ed. 3rd. )*

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Lenin is a brilliant student and follower of Marx. There is no doubt that the *whole strength of Lenin was*, in addition to his personal genius, *in the correct application of Marxism in practice, in putting it into practice* [Italics compiled.] ...

Marx is a great, brilliant theorist, a colossal mind that sees hundreds of years ahead. Bourgeoisie *such* thinkers never put forward

and never had. She had, of course, many large, ingenious minds; they built comprehensive philosophical systems; they did a lot for science in general. But on their systems lay the seal of “academism.” These thinkers and scientists got to the most distant celestial bodies, to the depths of the atom. But for sociohistorical science they did relatively little. Here they were rude empiricists, for the story is against them. They were supposed to stop and limit the course of historical development. All the spiritual power of proletarian revolutionary thinkers focused on the mastery of human society, on its restructuring, on the knowledge of its driving forces. Marx raised social sciences to an unattainable height, to the height of exact science. *Marxism turned politics into a science. Lenin was a brilliant politician of that school* [Italics compiled.]. The theoretical basis of scientific policy was for him Marxism. Therefore, one must not contrast Leninism—Marxist politics and tactics—with Marxism as the philosophical, historical, and economic theory on which Lenin’s politics and tactics were built, but see in it the application and further development of Marxism. ( *Deborin, Lenin as a thinker, p. 12, 1929, 3rd ed.*)

Vladimir Ilyich began close to the study of Hegel in 1914, apparently intending to write a special work on materialist dialectics. He managed to work through Hegel’s main works, Aristotle’s “Metaphysics”, Lassalle’s two-volume work on Heraclitus the Dark, a number of works by old and newest authors on Hegel’s philosophy and, in connection with this, various works on questions of theory and the history of *natural science*. In his philosophical notebooks we find a list of books scheduled for further study in connection with the study of Hegel. But Lenin, unfortunately, failed to process all this material and systematically present the results of his research, since the relative political “lull” that gave Lenin the opportunity to take serious scientific work during this period of respite soon ceased, and he was forced to abandon your academic pursuits.

*There is no doubt that if he managed to complete the work he had begun to the end, he would give a serious impetus to the further development of dialectical materialism, raising it to a higher level* [Italics compiled.]. ( *Deborin, Preface to the IX Lenin Collection, p. 3.*)

The coincidence of Lenin’s assessments as a theoretician among the Menshevik idealists and Trotskyists Lenin reflects the working class not only in its proletarian present, but also in its still fresh peasant past. This most indisputable of the leaders of the proletariat has not only a peasant appearance, but also a strong peasant

background. In front of Smolny stands a monument to another great man of the world proletariat: Marx on a stone, in a black frock coat. Of course, this is a trifle, but Lenin, even mentally, can not be dressed in a black frock coat. In some portraits, Marx is depicted with a wide open starchy shirt-front, on which hangs something like a monocle. That Marx was not inclined to coquetry is too clear for those who have an idea of the spirit of Marx. But Marx was born and raised on a different national and cultural basis, breathed a different atmosphere, as the tops of the German working class do not have their roots in a peasant village,

Marx's very style is rich and beautiful, the combination of strength and flexibility, anger and irony, severity and sophistication carries the literary and aesthetic accumulations of all previous social and political German literature, starting from the reformation and earlier. The literary and oratory style of Lenin is terribly simple, utilitarian, ascetic, as well as his entire way. But in this mighty asceticism there is not even a shadow of moralism. This is not a principle, not a far-fetched system, and certainly not a picture—it is simply an outward expression of the internal concentration of forces for action. This is a masterly peasant business—only on a grand scale. Marx is all in the “Communist Manifesto”, in the preface to his “Critique”, in “Capital”. If he had not even been the founder of the First International, he would forever remain what he is now. On the contrary, Lenin is all in revolutionary action. His scientific work is only preparation for action. If he had not published a single book in the past, he would have gone down in history forever as he is now: the leader of the proletarian revolution, the founder of the Third International. (*Trotsky, On Lenin, pp. 147–148, Guise, 2nd ed.*)

The fact that the working class raised such two figures as Marx and Lenin on two ridges of its stream is a tremendous advantage of the revolution. Marx is the prophet with the tablets, and Lenin is the greatest fulfilment of the covenants, teaching not proletarian aristocracy like Marx, but classes, nations in experience, acting in the most difficult circumstances, manoeuvring and defeating. (*Trotsky, On Lenin, p. 160, Guise, 2nd ed.*)

... After Marx, Marxist thought developed primarily in the sphere of economics, in the historical and sociological field, and not in the field of applying dialectical materialism to natural science. There were, of course, reasons for this. But here it is important for me to note that Marx is completely innocent in this outcome—on the contrary, in Marxism, in the method of dialectical materialism, all the

possibilities of the necessary theoretical generalizations based on natural science are already laid. Do we need a system of a complete dialectical-materialistic view of nature, will it be a solid building, or only construction forests? This is a different question. It is only important to note that for the construction of such a system of views (subject to the development of specific data of the exact sciences), all the necessary elements in Marxism are.

On the basis of both the economic and sociological analysis of the existing, the Marxian theory of capitalist society is built, including the theory of the capitalist state, the theory of the death of bourgeois society and the theory of proletarian dictatorship. Finally, the application of the Marxist method to the direct practice of the labour movement will give what can be called the theoretical premises of Marxist tactics. This element should by no means be excluded from the sphere of the theory of Marxism and Leninism, because it is here that we approach the last link of the entire theoretical system, the link where the theory is directly connected with practice ...

Let's run again through the above list of the basic elements of Marxism and see what Lenin could and did give in the field of theory after Marx ...

I. As regards the general philosophical method, Lenin took it entirely from Marx, defended it from the attacks of opponents, and brilliantly applied (together with the method of historical materialism) the concrete philosophical work Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, etc. Since Lenin wrote about the method of dialectical materialism, he wrote as a supporter of this method, he wrote in defence of the understanding of the method of Marx and Engels, which he considered correct and "with the true."

II. As far as historical materialism is concerned, here too, Lenin completely mastered the method of Marx, brilliantly applied it in all theoretical and concrete research works without exception, and also brilliantly applied it in the analysis of the social situation for tactical purposes. But he himself wrote very little on the methodology of historical materialism, and this was hardly an accident. He believed that the method of historical materialism, just as Marx had set it out and how he, Lenin, understood it, was quite enough for concrete research and for guiding the concrete struggle of the proletariat.

III. As regards the theory of class struggle, here the situation is already somewhat different. He does not have a single special work that would constitute a systematic supplement and development of the theory of the class struggle of Marx, an addition based on the

experience of a new era. But the lack of special work on this topic, which is not entirely clear from the privat-docent point of view, did not prevent Lenin from scattering many such generalizations and theoretical remarks in his numerous works that are still waiting for their codifiers. (I mean, of course, codifiers, who understand the essence of the matter and connect individual thoughts into a system with their own mind, and not with gum Arabic. Unfortunately, it is the last “creativity” that prevails in our country so far.) Someone, Comrade Bukharin, seems to be right noticed that Lenin must be able to read, that his depth of thought is invisible at first glance due to the extraordinary simplicity of presentation. This is absolutely true. Behind this simplicity lies an extremely ramified, complex, dialectically moving system of thoughts that is put forward on paper only at the end of its conclusions. I will return below to the method of presentation of Lenin, which is completely different from the Marx method. Here I settled on this, that’s why. The new that Lenin introduced into the theory of class struggle is a condensation of theory over the practice of the class struggle of the proletariat, which Lenin directed. These clumps of theory must not only be combined into a system on the basis of the recorded generalizations, but they must be supplemented by studying the theoretical premises of Leninist tactics, premises that were not directly stated by Lenin himself normally. And this is not less than half of all the work. Only after the implementation of this work will it be possible to say in which direction Lenin developed and supplemented the theory of the class struggle of Marx, and in particular, than supplemented the typical description of the most important classes of capitalist society.

IV. As for the theory of capitalist society and capitalist economy, that is, the main one in Marx economy and in a concrete sociological analysis of what is existing, here Lenin’s theoretical works are sharply divided into two parts: the works that relate to the analysis of capitalist relations, and the works that lay the foundation for a theoretical analysis of the new post-capitalist economy. This also applies entirely to sociological issues, to the theory of the new proletarian state, to the sociological analysis of Soviet society, that is, a society without a class of large landowners and with a layer of the new bourgeoisie under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Indeed. If we consider all the basic works of Lenin in the first period, then they are the presentation, development and defence of the basic constructive ideas of the Marxist theory of capitalist economy, firstly, and their application to the study of capitalist relations in

Russia, secondly. Here, Lenin did not duplicate Marxian studies; he relied entirely on these studies, considering them mostly complete. Such are all of his economic works related to the criticism of critics of Marx, works devoted to the analysis of agrarian relations in Russia, etc.

On the contrary, starting from approximately 1913 - 1914, Lenin switched to work, which can be briefly called the preparation of the theoretical basis of the transitional era and the new society. Such are his works on the national question. Such is further his remarkable work on imperialism, such is the work on the state, finally, all his articles and speeches related to the problems of the Soviet economy and the Soviet state. If somewhere between Marx and Lenin as theorists lies somewhere a dividing line, then it runs approximately here. (*Preobrazhensky, Militant Materialism Magazine, book 2, p. 38–39, 40, 43, 44–46.*)

## **Lesser idealism and Trotskyism**

... Why did Lenin fight, in this case, with the idea of a “permanent (continuous) revolution”?

Because Lenin proposed “exhausting” the revolutionary abilities of the peasantry and using its revolutionary energy to the bottom for the complete elimination of tsarism, for the transition to proletarian revolution, while the supporters of the “permanent revolution” did not understand the serious role of the peasantry in the Russian revolution, underestimated the power of revolutionary energy peasants, underestimated the strength and ability of the Russian proletariat to lead the peasantry, and thus hindered the task of freeing the peasantry from the influence of the bourgeoisie, de to rally the peasantry around the proletariat.

Because Lenin proposed to *crown the* cause of the revolution with the transfer of power to the proletariat, while the supporters of the “permanent revolution” thought to *start the* business directly from the power of the proletariat, not realizing that by doing so they turn a blind eye to such a “trifle” as survivals of serfdom, and not they take into account such a serious force as the Russian peasantry, not realizing that such a policy can only slow down the matter of conquering the peasantry on the side of the proletariat.

Lenin, therefore, fought with the supporters of the “permanent revolution” not because of the question of continuity, for Lenin himself stood on the point of view of the continuous revolution, but because they underestimated the role of the peasantry, which is the greatest reserve of the proletariat, because of a misunderstanding of the idea of hegemony the proletariat.

The idea of “permanent revolution” is not a new idea. It was first put forward by Marx in the late 1940s in his famous “Appeal” to the “Union of Communists” (1850). The idea of a continuous revolution is taken from this document by our “permanents”. It should be noted that our “permanents”, taking it from Marx, slightly altered it and, altering, “spoiled” it, making it unsuitable for practical use. It took Lenin’s experienced hand to rectify this mistake, take the idea of Marx’s continuous revolution in its pure form, and make it one of the cornerstones of his theory of revolution.

This is what Marx says in his “Appeal” about the continuous revolution, after he lists a number of revolutionary democratic demands that he calls for the communists to conquer:

“While the democratic petty bourgeois want, with the greatest possible number of the above requirements, to end the revolution as quickly as possible, our interests and our tasks are to make the revolution continuous until all more or less propertied classes are removed from domination until the proletariat conquers state power, until the associations of proletarians not only in one country, but in all the dominant countries of the world develop so much that competition between the proletarians of these countries prevails multiply, and until at least the decisive productive forces are concentrated in the hands of the proletarians. “

In other words:

a) Marx did not at all propose *starting* the revolution in Germany of the 50s directly from the proletarian power, *contrary to the plans* of our Russian “permanents”;

b) Marx only proposed to *crown the* cause of the revolution with proletarian state power, pushing one faction of the bourgeoisie one after another step by step from power, so that, having achieved the power of the proletariat, it would then ignite the revolution in all countries, *in full accordance* with everything that he taught Lenin and what he enforced during our revolution, following his theory of the proletarian revolution in an atmosphere of imperialism.

It turns out that our Russian “permanents” not only underestimated the role of the peasantry in the Russian revolution and

the significance of the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat, but also altered the Marxist idea of a “permanent” revolution, making it unsuitable for practice.

That is why Lenin ridiculed the theory of our “permanents”, calling it “original” and “beautiful” and accusing them of reluctance to “think about the reasons why life went by this beautiful theory for ten years” (Lenin’s article was written in 1915., 10 years after the appearance in Russia of the theory of “permanents,”—see Vol. XVIII, p. 317).

That is why Lenin considered this theory to be semi-Menshevik, saying that it “takes from the Bolsheviks a call for a decisive revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the conquest of political power by it, and from the Mensheviks”—“denial of the role of the peasantry” (see Lenin’s article “On the two lines of the revolution”, *ibid*). ( *Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 25–26, ed. 9th.*)

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The opportunists of all countries argue that the proletarian revolution can begin—if at all it should start somewhere according to their theory—only in industrialized countries, that the more industrialized these countries are, the greater are the chances of the victory of socialism, and the possibility of a victory of socialism in one country, and even capitalistically underdeveloped, is excluded from them as something completely unbelievable. Even during the war, Lenin, relying on the law of uneven development of imperialist states, contrasted the opportunists with his theory of the proletarian revolution about the victory of socialism in one country, even if this country is capitalistically less developed.

It is known that the October Revolution completely confirmed the correctness of Lenin’s theory of the proletarian revolution.

What is the situation with Comrade Trotsky’s “permanent revolution” from the point of view of the Leninist theory of the proletarian revolution?

Let us take Comrade Trotsky’s pamphlet “Our Revolution” (1906). Comrade Trotsky writes:

“Without the direct state support of the European proletariat, the working class of Russia cannot stay in power and turn its temporary domination into a long-lasting socialist dictatorship. You cannot doubt it for a minute “(see” Our Revolution, “p. 278).

What is this quote talking about? Yes, that the victory of socialism in one country, in this case in Russia, is impossible “*without* direct state support of the European proletariat”, that is, until the European proletariat conquers power.

What is common between this “theory” and Lenin’s position on the possibility of the victory of socialism “in one single, capitalist country”?

Clearly, there is nothing in common.

But suppose that this brochure of Comrade Trotsky, published in 1906, when it was difficult to determine the nature of our revolution, contains involuntary errors and does not fully correspond to the views of Comrade Trotsky in a later period. Consider another brochure of Comrade Trotsky, his “Peace Program”, which appeared before the October Revolution of 1917 and was reprinted now (in 1924) in the book “1917”. In this pamphlet, Comrade Trotsky criticizes the Leninist theory of the proletarian revolution about the victory of socialism in one country and contrasts it with the slogan of the United States of Europe. He claims that the victory of socialism in one country is impossible, that the victory of socialism is possible only as the victory of several major European countries (England, Russia, Germany), uniting into the United States of Europe, or it is completely impossible. He says bluntly that “a victorious revolution in Russia or England is inconceivable without a revolution in Germany, and vice versa.” (See “1917,” vol. III of Trotsky’s works, part 1, p. 89.)

“The only concrete historical consideration,” says Comrade Trotsky, “was formulated against the slogan of the United States in the Swiss Social Democrat (the then central organ of the Bolsheviks.— *J. St.*) in the following phrase: “The unevenness of economic and political development is the unconditional law of capitalism.” Hence, the Social Democrat concluded that socialism could triumph in one country, and therefore there was no need to condition the dictatorship of the proletariat in each individual state with the creation of the United States of Europe. That the capitalist development of different countries is uneven is an absolutely indisputable consideration. But this very unevenness is very uneven. The capitalist level of England, Austria, Germany or France is not the same. But compared with Africa and Asia, all these countries represent the capitalist “Europe”, ripe for a social revolution. That no country should “wait” for others in its struggle is an elementary thought that is useful and necessary to repeat, so that the idea of parallel international action is not replaced by the idea of expectant international inaction. Without waiting for

others, we begin and continue the struggle on a national basis in full confidence that our initiative will give impetus to the struggle in other countries; and if this did not happen, then it is hopeless to think,—both the experience of history and theoretical considerations testify—that, for example, revolutionary Russia could resist the face of conservative Europe, or socialist Germany could remain isolated in the capitalist world. “ (See Vol. III of Trotsky’s Works, part 1, pp. 89–90.) and if this did not happen, then it is hopeless to think,—both the experience of history and theoretical considerations testify—that, for example, revolutionary Russia could resist the face of conservative Europe, or socialist Germany could remain isolated in the capitalist world. “ (See Vol. III of Trotsky’s Works, part 1, pp. 89–90.) and if this did not happen, then it is hopeless to think,—both the experience of history and theoretical considerations testify—that, for example, revolutionary Russia could resist the face of conservative Europe, or socialist Germany could remain isolated in the capitalist world. “ (See Vol. III of Trotsky’s Works, part 1, pp. 89–90.)

As you see, we have before us the same theory of the simultaneous victory of socialism in the main countries of Europe, as a rule, excluding the Leninist theory of revolution about the victory of socialism in one country.

No words, that for the *complete* victory of socialism, for the *full* guarantees against the restoration of the old order require the joint efforts of the proletarians of several countries. There is no word that without the support of our revolution from the proletariat of Europe, the proletariat of Russia could not resist the general pressure, just as without the support of the revolutionary movement in the West from the side of the revolution in Russia, this movement could not develop at the rate at which it began to develop after the proletarian dictatorship in Russia. No words, we need support. But what is the support of our revolution from the side of the Western European proletariat? The sympathy of the European workers for our revolution, their readiness to upset the imperialists’ plan for intervention — is there all this support, serious help? Of course, yes. Without such support, without such help, not only on the part of European workers, but from the side of the colonial and dependent countries the proletarian dictatorship in Russia would have been tight. Has this sympathy and help so far, combined with the power of our Red Army and the willingness of the workers and peasants of Russia to defend the socialist fatherland, been enough—was all this enough to repel the imperialist attacks and conquer the necessary conditions for serious

construction work ? Yes, enough. Is this growing sympathy or decreasing? Certainly growing. Thus, do we have favourable conditions not only to advance the work of organizing a socialist economy, but also, in turn, to support both the West European workers and the oppressed peoples of the East? Yes there is. The seven-year history of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia eloquently speaks of this. Is it possible to deny that a mighty labour rise has already begun with us? No, it is undeniable.

What significance can Comrade Trotsky's statement that revolutionary Russia could not resist in the face of conservative Europe after all this?

It can have only one meaning: firstly, Comrade Trotsky does not feel the inner power of our revolution; secondly, Comrade Trotsky does not understand the invaluable significance of the moral support which the workers of the West and the peasants of the East provide to our revolution; thirdly, Comrade Trotsky does not capture the inner weakness that imperialism is now corroding.

Carried away by criticism of the Leninist theory of the proletarian revolution, Comrade Trotsky accidentally smashed himself utterly in his pamphlet *The Peace Program*, published in 1917 and reprinted in 1924.

But perhaps this brochure of Comrade Trotsky is outdated, for some reason having ceased to correspond to his current views? Let us take the later works of Comrade Trotsky, written after the victory of the proletarian revolution *in one country*, in Russia. Take, for example, Comrade Trotsky's "Afterword" for the new edition of the book "Peace Program" written in 1922. Here is what he writes in this "Afterword":

"The assertion repeated several times in the Peace Program that the proletarian revolution cannot triumphantly end within the national framework will perhaps seem to some readers to be refuted by the nearly five-year experience of our Soviet Republic. But such a conclusion would be unfounded. The fact that the workers' state held itself against the whole world in one country, and, moreover, a backward one, testifies to the colossal power of the proletariat, which in other, more advanced, more civilized countries will be able to perform truly miracles. But having defended ourselves in the political and military sense as a state, we did not come to the creation of a socialist society and did not even come up ... As long as the bourgeoisie is in power in other European states, we are forced, in the fight against economic isolation, seek agreements with the capitalist

world; at the same time, we can confidently say that these agreements, at best, can help us heal one or another economic wound, take one or another step forward, but that a genuine rise in the socialist economy in Russia will become possible *only after victory* [Italics mine.— *J. St.* ] of the proletariat in the most important countries of Europe.” (See Vol. III of Trotsky’s Works, part 1, pp. 92–93.)

This is what Comrade Trotsky says, clearly sinning against reality and stubbornly trying to save the “permanent revolution” from its final collapse.

It turns out that, no matter how you turn it over, and to the creation of a socialist society, not only “did not come”, but even “did not fit.” It turned out that some had hope for “agreements with the capitalist world”, but it also turned out that nothing came out of these agreements, because no matter how you go about it, you won’t get a “genuine upsurge of the socialist economy until the proletariat defeats “the most important countries in Europe.”

Well, since there is still no victory in the West, there remains a “choice” for the revolution in Russia: either decay in the bud or degenerate into a bourgeois state.

It is not for nothing that Comrade Trotsky has been talking for two years now about the “degeneration” of our party.

No wonder Comrade Trotsky last year prophesied the “doom” of our country.

How to reconcile this strange “theory” with Lenin’s theory of the “victory of socialism in one country”?

How to reconcile this strange “perspective” with Lenin’s perspective that the new economic policy will give us the opportunity to “build the foundation of a socialist economy”? ( *Stalin, Questions of Leninism*, pp. 84 - 87, ed. 9th. )

## **Results of the Discussion on the Philosophical Sector of the Theoretical Front**

*(From the resolution of the general assembly of the cell of the  
Institute of Philosophy and Natural Sciences)*

1. The modern period of socialist construction is the best test of the combat effectiveness of all sectors of our theoretical front. In the

period of aggravated class struggle and hard work on the socialist reorganization of the country, all fundamental political and theoretical questions are posed in full swing: in the course of the struggle, the party reveals everything that is not only in economics and politics, but also in all theoretical areas, an expression of resistance to the victorious offensive of socialism. He mercilessly exposes everything rotten, opportunistic, all Bolshevik, anti-Leninist in theory, everything that is in one form or another an expression of bourgeois or petty-bourgeois influence on the ideology of the proletariat, no matter how carefully it is veiled and hidden.

2. The recovery period in the development of our country was accompanied by a certain growth of capitalist elements, which inevitably generated and revived various forms of manifestation of the Menshevik theories of the Second International in a number of theoretical areas, disguised in every possible way as revising the theory of Marxism-Leninism.

These essentially Menshevik, revisionist theories and “theories”, for a number of reasons and circumstances, are firmly rooted in certain theoretical fields. The counter-revolutionary ideology of Trotskyism, the Menshevik ideology of Rubinism, which is essentially the economic theory of the Second International, which, despite the direct instructions of the Central Committee of the Party, is still not sufficiently criticized and exposed, the Bogdanov-mechanical theory of Bukharin and others in political economy, the Menshevik-Struvist concept perseveres, Voronshchina, etc. in literary criticism, the criticism of which has not yet been raised to the appropriate theoretical height, the block of mechanistic revisionist dialectics with an openly Menshevik, positivist-Kantian revision of Marxism (Sarabyanov, Varyash, Timiryazev)

3. The successful struggle for the party’s general line with all sorts of anti-Bolshevik deviations and trends, the exposure of the anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist essence of Trotskyism and right-wing opportunism took place on the basis of the development of the direct implementation of Leninist teachings. Leninism as Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions represents a new stage of development decisively in all areas of Marxist theory. Over the past period, we have had the penetration of Marxist-Leninist theory into the vast masses of the proletariat and working people, as well as significant growth and training of truly Bolshevik theoretical personnel.

All these circumstances lead to an intensified struggle in the most important sectors of the ideological front. The main meaning and significance of this struggle is the extensive offensive of Marxist-Leninist theory in all areas of ideology and the final overcoming of all anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist theories, all manifestations of quasi-Marxism of the era of the Second International in theory.

4. The party organization of the ICP of Philosophy and Natural Science correctly understood Comrade Stalin's instructions at a conference of Marxist agrarians about the need to quickly eliminate the unacceptable lag of theory from the practical successes of socialist construction and the extreme need arising from these instructions to raise these questions in breadth and depth as applied to the situation on the philosophical front. In the process of philosophical discussion, the main lines of disagreement were correctly identified: the need and nature of the turn on the philosophical front, the partisanship of philosophy, natural science and the whole theory in general, Leninism in philosophy as a new stage in the development of dialectical materialism, the need for a detailed struggle on two fronts in philosophy and science,

5. The discussion showed the correctness of the basic principles of the bureau in criticizing the positions of the so-called philosophical leadership.

6. Taking into account the experience and lessons of the discussion, the whole depth of political and philosophical disagreements with the Deborino group, the meaning and significance of which were particularly clearly defined in Comrade Stalin's instructions given to him in an interview with the bureau of the party committee of the IKP of Philosophy and Natural Sciences, the meeting considers that the qualification of views the so-called philosophical leadership given in a resolution of the Bureau of October 14, p. g. ("Bolshevik" No. 19 - 20) as a formalistic bias, is academic, not clear enough and needs to be clarified and strengthened, because the formalistic distortion of materialist dialectics is essentially an idealistic revision of Marxism.

The whole set of theoretical and political views of the Deborino group is in fact an essentially *Menshevik idealism*, based on a non-Marxist, non-Leninist methodology, expressing a form of manifestation of petty-bourgeois ideology and pressure on the proletariat of the hostile class forces surrounding it. This is an extremely subtle form of the idealistic revision of Marxism, extremely carefully veiled, covered by materialistic Marxist phraseology, often

dressed up in Marxist-Leninist clothes, often speaking in very harsh form not only against frank, priestly counter-revolutionary idealism like Losev, but even against idealistic Hegelians like Lukach.

Struggling against Leninism in philosophy and against turning on the philosophical front, the group of Deborin, Karev, Stan, and others took the path of direct and open struggle with dialectical materialism, *the path of anti-Marxism* .

7. The IKP meeting of philosophy and natural sciences also considers it necessary to change the following formulations, which give an assessment of the line of work at the last stage of the so-called philosophical leadership, in a resolution of the cell bureau on October 14:

1) “that work over the past period in a number of areas was carried out, in general, in the direction indicated by Lenin,” and 2) “at the last stage of development, the line of philosophical leadership was basically correct,” as being untrue, as well as the one given above characterization of the essence of the views of the deborin group ...

The Menshevik traditions of Comrade Deborin, the strong influence of a number of erroneous moments of Plekhanov’s political and philosophical views criticized by Lenin, from which Comrade Deborin has not completely freed himself until now, as well as the party incontinence of the cadres surrounding him (Karev, Stan, etc.), —All this created material from the Deborino group that was easily exposed to the influence of the petty-bourgeois environment, and could not but have a sharp impact on its theoretical work.

The Deborino group not only failed to implement the basic instructions of Lenin in his article “On the Importance of Militant Materialism”, but, on the contrary, perverted them to a large extent, conducting their theoretical work not in the spirit of consistent dialectical materialism, but in the spirit of an essentially idealistic revision of it .

In the struggle against the mechanists, the Deborin group played a certain positive role. It must be borne in mind, however, that this group criticized mechanists not from orthodox Marxist positions. Basically and essentially Hegelian, idealistic-dialectical installations of the Deborin group on the most important issues of methodology made it possible to criticize and expose to a certain extent the complete misunderstanding by the mechanists of the essence of philosophy in general and dialectics in particular, their thorough metaphysical methodology, their crude, vulgar materialism and positivism, and thereby fulfil known positive role. At one time,

Lenin aptly noted: “Hegel beats all materialism *except* dialectic” [Lenin Collection, XII, p. 235.].

However, criticism of the Deborin group did not provide a consistent, until the end of the exposure of the mechanistic methodology. On the contrary, the idealistic essence and eclecticism of the writings of this group actually led its representatives to actually agree on a number of issues with the mechanists (for example, the agreement of Comrade Deborin and Luppol with Sarabyanov on the question of the supposedly terminological nature of Plekhanov’s mistakes, about hieroglyphs, about the relationship between Lenin and Plekhanov as Marxist philosophers, Luppol’s agreement with Sarabyanov on the Locke theory of primary and secondary qualities, etc.).

8. The anti-Marxist essence of the views of the Deborin group found expression:

a) in isolation of theory from practice, philosophy from politics, etc., which actually revived “one of the harmful traits and dogmas of the Second International” ( *Stalin* );

b) a complete rejection of the application, as well as a perversion of the Leninist principle of partisan philosophy, which most clearly expresses the class nature of our philosophy, because the best in the working class is its vanguard — the Communist Party. The group of Deborin, Karev, Stan ignored this Leninist principle, because it necessarily includes the requirement to protect the party’s general line and to fight against any deviations from it;

c) in underestimating, at last, Lenin as a theoretician in general, and especially as a Marxist philosopher, in ignoring, not recognizing Leninism in philosophy as a new stage in the development of dialectical materialism, in repeating and deepening a number of Plekhanov’s mistakes in the field of philosophy and historical materialism. The underestimation of the philosophical and generally theoretical significance of Lenin’s work undoubtedly stands in connection with the attitudes in the research work carried out by the Institute of Marx and Engels.

9. The same essence also found expression not only in a misunderstanding on the part of the Deborin group of Leninism in philosophy, but also in an organically related misunderstanding of the most important problems of Leninism in general, in the biggest mistakes made on these issues. These include: the Kautsky type of error in the interpretation of imperialism, a completely abstract statement of the problems of the dictatorship of the proletariat,

democracy and dictatorship (*Deborin*, Lenin as a thinker), legal opportunist views on cultural and cultural revolution (Luppol, Karev, Bobrovnikov), abstract, Bogdanov's juxtaposition of individualism and collectivism, the formulation of a number of problems of communist society in the spirit of the old, Bogdanov-Bazarov "philosophy of collectivism", with a large admixture of Feuerbachianism, "collectivization senses "and t. d. (*Deborin*, The construction of socialism and our tasks on the theoretical front, "Under the Banner of Marxism" No. 5 for 1930), the Menshevik-Sukhanov interpretation of the problem of productive forces and production relations ("productive forces *are* an active principle, production relations are a passive consequence."—*Gonikman*, "Under the Banner of Marxism" No. 2–3 for 1930), Kautskyite errors in moral issues (*Deborin*),—finally, Trotsky's, but essentially Menshevik's, social-democratic positions of Karev on the issue of transitional classes, the impossibility of building socialism in our country, the half-Trotskyist mistakes of comrade Stan, one of the "ideological" inspirers of the right-"leftist" bloc, and the general extreme abstractness of the questions of classes and class struggle in those cases when the representatives of the Deborin group touched them to one degree or another.

10. The inability to truly overcome Hegel's idealism, the perception, without a materialist restructuring, of the most important moments of his philosophy were expressed in the form of a whole system of idealistic views on philosophical issues proper, starting with a general interpretation and definition of matter and ending with the question of the structure of logic. The study of Hegelian dialectics, the need for which in a very sharp form was emphasized by Lenin, since in the works of the Deborin group it did not rely on the materialist dialectics of Marx, Engels, Lenin, the practice of socialist construction, etc., turned into its opposite. Instead of developing and developing dialectical materialism, such a "study" of Hegel led to an idealistic perversion of materialist dialectics.

11. This perversion found expression in errors related to incorrect definitions of matter falling into idealism. For example: the definition of matter as an infinite set of mediations, relationships, connections (*Deborin*), from which the real carrier of these relations fell out; a completely idealistic understanding of matter as a synthesis of space and time (*Hesse*); the Machist position that "an object receives living reality, reality only in the process of interaction with the subject"

( *Hesse* ); idealistic rationalism in all the most important questions of philosophy (*Tymyansky*, Introduction to dialectical materialism), etc.

The wrong definitions of matter are organically linked: a completely incorrect understanding of the materialistic dialectic itself, which is supposedly a “universal methodology that introduces an internal connection into a specific content” (*Deborin*); mistakes in understanding the theory of dialectics as supposedly only “a general theory that treats the category” abstractly “, distracting from how they are applied in certain particular cases, giving a general logical analysis of them” (*Deborin*); the requirement of the need for a “closed system of categories of dialectics” (*Gonikman*. “Lenin’s thought has another content: it speaks of a closed system of dialectics. Dialectics must begin with being, but it must end with being”, etc.) . etc.

12. The “methodologization” in the works of the Deborin group was expressed essentially in an idealistic break of the method and worldview, dialectics and materialism, dialectics and the theory of knowledge, dialectics and historical materialism.

In his article “On the Question of Dialectics”, Lenin wrote: “Dialectics is the theory of cognition of (Hegel and) Marxism: this is what” side of the matter (this is not the “side” of the matter, but the *essence of the matter*) Plekhanov did not pay attention to, not to mention about other Marxists. “Meanwhile, Deborin fancily combines, on the one hand, the opposition of the theory of knowledge to dialectics (*Deborin* , Marx and Hegel), on the other hand, the view that “the theory of knowledge is absorbed by methodology (*ibid.*). The question of absorbing the theory of knowledge by methodology has only one meaning—scholastic-idealistic theorizing over a “pure” methodology, over a “dialectic” divorced from materialism.

The main feature of all these errors is that this group in its theoretical works failed to correctly resolve the question of the relationship between theory and practice, perverted the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the law of the unity of opposites, was unable to materialistically rework Hegel’s doctrine of the unity of the general, the special and the unitary, failed to cope with these crucial problems of materialist dialectics. As a result of this, its representatives got a gap between empirical and rational moments in cognition, between sensation and thinking, between historical and logical, between form and content. The categories of dialectics turned out to be only abstract, “general” divorced from the concrete, special, and singular, categories of thinking, in which supposedly there is no atom of empiri, purely logical categories,

13. Closely connected with the situation on the philosophical front is the situation on the natural science front. A number of leading comrades in the field of natural science fully supported the position of the Deborin group (Agol, Levin, Leviticus, Hesse), or treated it conciliatorily, essentially defending it (O. Yu. Schmidt). In addition, the indicated group of natural scientists took a wrong—essentially anti-Marxist—position on political issues (apoliticalism, a distortion of Comrade Stalin's instructions on the correlation of theory and practice, separation of theory from practice, opposition to self-criticism, ignoring Lenin's role in natural science, revision of Engels' methodological guidelines in natural science, in particular in biology, a misunderstanding of the meaning and significance of Engels' works for modern natural science, identification of the achievements of theoretical biology with Marxism, substitution of materialistic dialectics as a methodology of natural science by genetics, transition to the positions of autogenesis, Machist statements in the field of physics and mathematics, essentially anti-Marxist content of the BSE natural sciences department conducted by representatives of the Deborin group). The struggle with mechanists was completely inadequate, purely formal, in essence there is a junction with mechanists in separate settings (the ratio of Marxism and natural science, the problem of internal and external, etc.). Mechanistic concepts in the field of medicine (Obukh group) remained completely out of sight. essentially anti-Marxist content conducted by representatives of the Deborin group of the BSE natural science department). The struggle with mechanists was completely inadequate, purely formal, in essence there is a junction with mechanists in separate settings (the ratio of Marxism and natural science, the problem of internal and external, etc.). Mechanistic concepts in the field of medicine (Obukh group) remained completely out of sight. essentially anti-Marxist content conducted by representatives of the Deborin group of the BSE natural science department). The struggle with mechanists was completely inadequate, purely formal, in essence there is a junction with mechanists in separate settings (the ratio of Marxism and natural science, the problem of internal and external, etc.). Mechanistic concepts in the field of medicine (Obukh group) remained completely out of sight.

14. In connection with all of the above, the task arises of revising, revising everything written in philosophy by the representatives of Comrade Deborin's group and severely criticizing everything anti-

Marxist, anti-Lenin in their writings. At the same time, this review should not only not weaken the struggle against the mechanistic revision of dialectical materialism, but, on the contrary, should lead to the intensification of the struggle against it, to the final exposure of the mechanists.

The denial by the mechanists of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the struggle against materialist dialectics under the flag of the struggle against the Hegelianism of the Deborin group, the tailistic attitude to the “latest conclusions of modern science”, supposedly replacing the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, the theory of “information”, leading to the discrediting of social sciences, Menshevism theory of leaps, the defence of the “hieroglyphic” theory of knowledge and the Locke theory of primary and secondary qualities, the Kantian-agnostic distortion of Lenin’s doctrine of *ektivnoy*, relative and absolute truth, the protection of the Menshevik-Kantian theory of non-class morality, and so on and so forth,—.... All this suggests that in the face of unscrupulous block mechanists we openly revisionist, anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist philosophical trend.

15. Of particular importance is the decisive and consistent struggle on two fronts in the field of philosophy. *The main danger in modern conditions remains the mechanistic revision of dialectical materialism* (Comrades Bukharin, Perov, Varjash, Sarabyanov, Timiryazev, Axelrod and others), the Bogdanov-mechanistic revision of historical materialism (Bukharin and others), because it is basically a theoretical basis openly opportunist right deviation, the agents of the kulaks in the party, for it has deep social roots in the country in the conditions of the reconstructive period and the extensive offensive of socialism on the whole front.

At the same time, the greatest vigilance is needed, special attention is paid to those who have *embarked* on the path of anti-Marxism—the *idealistic revision of materialist dialectics, to the Menshevik idealism of the Deborin group* (Deborin, Karev, Stan, Podvolotsky, Leviticus, Agol, etc.), because this danger is exposed to a very small degree, still completely insufficiently subjected to theoretical and political criticism, because it, in turn, nourishes the main danger.

It is necessary to wage a decisive struggle against all kinds of *conciliationism* both against the mechanists (for example, Vasilyev and others), and towards the idealistic revision of Marxism by the deborin group (for example, Stolyarov and others).

After exposing the essence of the views of the Deborino group as a Menshevik idealism, the open defence of their views or openly conciliatory attitude towards them is extremely difficult. Therefore, special attention is required in relation to the formal recognition of these basic principles and a decisive struggle against unwillingness to carry them out in all both theoretical and practical work, for such a formal recognition will be one of the worst forms of conciliationism. Along with this, the assembly of the ICP cell of philosophy and natural sciences considers it necessary to point out the danger of a simplistic understanding of Menshevik idealism. Such ideas try to reduce the whole essence of Menshevik idealism exclusively and exclusively to the Menshevik past of Deborin, and essentially limit themselves to this in their critical work, they do not understand the social roots that the idealistic revision of Marxism-Leninism has under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Objectively, such representations are directed against the task set above to overturn everything written by Deborin and his colleagues in philosophy.

16. The party meeting of the IKP of Philosophy and Natural Sciences considers it necessary to note the attempt to put together a bloc between the mechanists and representatives of the idealistic revision of Marxism, which took place, for example, during a discussion on philosophical issues in Baku between the half-mechanist Comrade Vasiliev and an active deborer, an accomplice in “leftist” affairs Stan and Karev on the IKP — Comrade Garber.

17. The workers of the theoretical front face the crucial importance and complexity of the task of raising to a new height all theoretical work in philosophy on the basis of the actual study and development of Lenin’s richest legacy in the field of materialist dialectics, on the basis of a critical overcoming, on the one hand, of crude, vulgar, mechanistic materialism with his creeping empiricism, misunderstanding and vulgarization of the basic laws of dialectics, with his positivism, with his theory of “information”, the theory of equilibrium, etc., and on the other hand, abstract scholastic theorizing, separation of theory from practice, turning philosophy into an end in itself, scholastic manipulation of “thought entities”, an exclusively and purely logical analysis of the categories of dialectics, etc.

We are confronted with the task of actually developing a theory of materialist dialectics, the special relevance of which is put forward by the whole course and successes of socialist construction.

In connection with the large demands placed by the practice of socialist construction, the party’s stubborn struggle to complete the

foundation of the socialist economy in front of all sectors of the theoretical front, it is necessary to quickly bridge the gap that exists between these tasks and the work of the Communist Academy.

The meeting poses before the Communist Academy, the Institute of Philosophy, and also to the board of the Department of Internal Affairs the question of the need to completely revise the agenda of the philosophical conference and ensure its convening in the second half of 1931, as well as the need to completely revise the prepared material of the Philosophical Encyclopaedia in order to ensure access to the light of a truly Marxist-Leninist philosophical encyclopaedia, as well as the philosophical department of TSB. ( *The Truth of January 26, 1931* )

## **VII. The tasks of theoretical work in the field of philosophy**

### **The meaning of militant materialism**

On the general tasks of the journal Under the Banner of Marxism, comrade Trotsky in No. 1-2 has already said all that is substantial and said perfectly. I would like to dwell on some issues that more closely determine the content and program of the work that was proclaimed by the editors of the journal in the opening statement to No. 1-2.

This statement says that not all united around the journal Under the Banner of Marxism are Communists, but all consistent materialists. I think that this alliance of communists with non-communists is absolutely necessary and correctly defines the tasks of the journal. One of the biggest and most dangerous mistakes of the Communists (as well as the revolutionaries in general, who have successfully completed the beginning of the great revolution) is the idea that the revolution can be made only by the revolutionaries. On the contrary, for the success of any serious revolutionary work, it is necessary to understand and be able to realize that revolutionaries can play a role only as the vanguard of a truly viable and advanced class. The avant-garde only then performs the tasks of the avant-garde, when it knows how not to tear itself away from the masses it leads, but to really lead the whole mass forward.

This also applies to the work of defending materialism and Marxism, which the journal *Under the Banner of Marxism* undertook. Fortunately, the main directions of advanced social thought in Russia have a solid materialist tradition. Not to mention G. V. Plekhanov, it's enough to call Chernyshevsky, from whom modern Narodniks (people's socialists, social-revolutionary, etc.) often retreated in pursuit of fashionable reactionary philosophical teachings, succumbing to tinsel allegedly "the last word »European science and not being able to make out under this tinsel this or that kind of servitude to the bourgeoisie, its prejudices and bourgeois reactionarism.

In any case, in Russia we still have — and will undoubtedly have for quite some time — materialists from the non-communist camp, and it is our unconditional duty to attract all the supporters of consistent and militant materialism in the struggle against philosophical reaction and the philosophical prejudices of the so-called "educated society." "Dietzgen, the father, who should not be confused with his as pretentious as the unfortunate writer-son, expressed correctly, accurately and clearly the main point of view of Marxism on the philosophical trends prevailing in bourgeois countries and among their scholars and publicists, saying that professors of philosophy in modern society are, in most cases, in reality nothing more than "certified lackeys of the clergy".

Our Russian intellectuals, who like to consider themselves advanced, as well as their brotherhood in all other countries, really do not like to transfer the issue to the plane of the assessment given by Dietzgen. But they do not like this because the truth pierces their eyes. It is enough to think a little about the state, then general economic, then everyday and all sorts of other dependence of modern educated people on the ruling bourgeoisie to understand the absolute correctness of the sharp characterization of Dietzgen. It is enough to recall the vast majority of fashionable philosophical trends that so often arise in European countries, starting from at least those that were associated with the discovery of radium, and ending with those that now strive to cling to Einstein, to imagine the connection between class interests and class the position of the bourgeoisie,

It can be seen from the above that a magazine that wants to be an organ of militant materialism must be a militant organ, first of all, in the sense of relentlessly exposing and prosecuting all modern "certified lackeys of priesthood," it does not matter whether they act

as representatives of official science or in as free shooters who call themselves “democratic left or ideological-socialist” publicists.

Such a journal should be, secondly, an organ of militant atheism. We have departments or, at least, state institutions that are in charge of this work. But this work is being conducted extremely sluggishly, extremely unsatisfactorily, apparently experiencing the oppression of the general conditions of our truly Russian (albeit Soviet) bureaucracy. Therefore, it is extremely important that, in addition to the work of the relevant state institutions, to correct it and revive it, a journal dedicated to the task of becoming a body of militant materialism, conduct indefatigable atheistic propaganda and struggle. We must carefully monitor all relevant literature in all languages, translating or, at least, abstracting everything of any value in this area.

Engels had long advised the leaders of the modern proletariat to translate atheistic literature of the late 18th century for mass distribution among the people. To our shame, we still have not done this (one of the many evidence that gaining power in the revolutionary era is much easier than being able to use this power correctly). Sometimes they justify our lethargy, inaction and ineptitude with all sorts of “disdainful” considerations: for example, they say, old atheistic literature of the 18th century, outdated, unscientific, naive, etc. There is nothing worse than similar, supposedly scholars, sophisms, covering either pedantry or a complete misunderstanding of Marxism. Of course, both the unscientific and the naive can be found in the atheistic works of the revolutionaries of the 18th century. But no one bothers the publishers of these works to shorten them and provide them with short epilogues indicating the progress of scientific criticism of religions made by mankind since the end of the 18th century, indicating the latest relevant works, etc. It would be the greatest mistake and worst mistake that can to make a Marxist, to think that the multimillion-dollar folk (especially peasant and craft) masses, condemned by the whole modern society to darkness, ignorance and prejudice, can get out of this darkness only in a straight line of pure Marxists enlightenment. These masses need to give a wide variety of material on atheistic propaganda, to acquaint them with facts from the most diverse areas of life, to approach them this way and that in order to interest them, to awaken them from a religious dream, to shake them from various sides. Lively, lively, talented, witty and openly attacking the prevailing clericalism, the journalism of the old atheists of the 18th century. it will turn out to be

a thousand times more suitable for awakening people from religious sleep than boring, dry, not illustrated by almost any skilfully selected facts, retelling of Marxism, which prevail in our literature and which (there is nothing to hide) often distort Marxism . All any large-scale works of Marx and Engels have been translated here. We fear that the old atheism and old materialism will remain incomplete with the corrections that Marx and Engels made, there is absolutely no reason. The most important thing — most often this is what our supposedly Marxist

On the other hand, look at representatives of modern scientific criticism of religions. Almost always, these representatives of the educated bourgeoisie “supplement” their own refutation of religious prejudice with such arguments that immediately expose them as ideological slaves of the bourgeoisie, as “certified lackeys of priesthood.”

Two examples. Prof. R. Yu. Visher published in 1918 a booklet: “The Emergence of Christianity” (published by Faros, Moscow). Retelling the main results of modern science, the author not only does not fight the prejudices and deceit that make up the church’s weapon as a political organization, not only circumvents these issues, but expresses a directly ridiculous and reactionary claim to rise above both “extremes”: idealistic and materialistic . This is the servitude of the ruling bourgeoisie, which around the world uses hundreds of millions of rubles from the profits it squeezed out of the working people to support religion.

The famous German scientist, Arthur Drews, refuting religious prejudices and tales in his book *The Myth of Christ*, proving that there was no Christ, at the end of the book advocates a religion that is only refreshed, cleaned up, clever, able to withstand “every day more and more a more intensifying naturalistic stream” (p. 238 of the 4th German edition of 1910). This is a direct, conscious reactionary, openly helping the exploiters to replace old and rotten religious prejudices with new, even more nasty and vile prejudices.

This does not mean that it was not necessary to translate Drews. This means that the Communists and all consistent materialists must, to a certain extent, realize their alliance with the progressive part of the bourgeoisie, to relentlessly expose it when it falls into reactionism. This means that shying away from an alliance with representatives of the bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century, that is, from that era when it was revolutionary, would mean changing Marxism and materialism, for “alliance” with the Drews in one form

or another, to one degree or another, obligatory for us in the struggle against the dominant religious obscurantists.

The magazine *Under the Banner of Marxism*, which wants to be an organ of militant materialism, must devote much attention to atheistic propaganda, a review of relevant literature, and the correction of the enormous shortcomings of our state work in this area. It is especially important to use those books and brochures that contain many concrete facts and comparisons showing the connection of class interests and class organizations of the modern bourgeoisie with organizations of religious institutions and religious propaganda.

All materials related to the United States of North America are extremely important, in which the official, state, state connection of religion and capital is less manifested. But on the other hand, it becomes clearer to us that the so-called “modern democracy” (before which the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and partly anarchists, etc.) break their foreheads is nothing more than the freedom to preach what it is profitable for the bourgeoisie to preach, but it is advantageous for it to preach the most reactionary ideas, religion, obscurantism, the protection of exploiters, etc.

We would like to hope that a magazine that wants to be an organ of militant materialism will give our reading public reviews of atheistic literature with a description of which readership and in what respect certain works might be suitable, and with an indication of what appeared in our country (only decent translations should be considered as appeared, and there are not so many of them) and what should be published.

In addition to an alliance with consistent materialists who do not belong to the Communist Party, it is no less, if not more important, for the work that militant materialism must do, an alliance with representatives of modern science who are inclined toward materialism and are not afraid to uphold and preach it against the dominant in the so-called “educated society” of fashionable philosophical vacillations towards idealism and scepticism.

The article by A. Timiryazev on Einstein’s theory of relativity, published in the first and second issue of the journal *Under the Banner of Marxism*, gives hope that the journal will succeed in realizing this second alliance. It is necessary to pay more attention to it. It must be remembered that it is precisely from the abrupt withdrawal that modern natural science is experiencing that reactionary philosophical schools and schools, directions and directions will be born all the time. Therefore, following the questions posed by the latest revolution

in the field of natural science and involving natural scientists in this work in the philosophical journal is a task without which militant materialism cannot in any case be militant or materialism. If Timiryazev in the first issue of the magazine had to stipulate what kind of theory is Einstein, who himself, according to Timiryazev.

And in order not to be unconscious of such a phenomenon, we must understand that without a solid philosophical justification, no natural sciences, no materialism can withstand the struggle against the onslaught of bourgeois ideas and the restoration of the bourgeois worldview. In order to withstand this struggle and carry it out to the end with complete success, the natural scientist must be a modern materialist, a conscious supporter of the materialism that is represented by Marx, that is, he must be a dialectical materialist. To achieve this goal, the staff of the journal *Under the Banner of Marxism* should organize a systematic study of Hegel's dialectics from a materialistic point of view, that is, the dialectic that Marx practically applied both in his *Capital* and in his historical and political works and applied with such a success

Of course, the work of such a study, such an interpretation and such propaganda of Hegelian dialectics is extremely difficult and, of course, the first experiments in this regard will be associated with errors. But only he who does nothing is not mistaken. Based on how Marx used Hegel's materially understood dialectics, we can and should develop this dialectic from all sides, print excerpts from Hegel's main works in the journal, interpret them materialistically, commenting on examples of the use of dialectics by Marx, as well as those examples of dialectics in the field relations of economic and political relations, of which the recent history, especially the modern imperialist war and revolution, provide unusually much. The group of editors and employees of the journal "*Under the Banner of Marxism*" should, in my opinion, a kind of "society of materialistic friends of Hegelian dialectics." Modern naturalists will find (if they are able to search and if we learn to help them) in Hegel's materialistically interpreted dialectic a number of answers to those philosophical questions that are posed by the revolution in natural science and which intellectual admirers of bourgeois fashion "get confused" with reaction.

Without such a task to be set and systematically carried out, materialism cannot be militant materialism. He will remain, using a generous expression, not so much fighting as fighting. Without this, large-scale naturalists as often as until now will be helpless in their

philosophical conclusions and generalizations. For natural science is progressing so fast, going through a period of such a deep revolutionary breakdown in all areas that it is impossible to do without philosophical conclusions in any case.

In conclusion, I will give an example that is not related to the field of philosophy, but in any case related to the field of social issues, which the journal *Under the Banner of Marxism* also wants to pay attention to.

This is one example of how modern supposedly science actually serves as a vehicle for the grossest and most infamous reactionary views.

Recently I was sent the *Economist* magazine No. 1 (1922), published by the XI department of the Russian Technical Society. The young communist who sent me this journal (probably, who did not have time to get acquainted with the contents of the journal) inadvertently responded extremely sympathetically to the journal. In fact, the journal is, I don't know how consciously, an organ of modern serf-owners, hiding, of course, in the mantle of science, democracy, etc.

A certain P.A. Sorokin places in this journal extensive allegedly "sociological" studies "On the Impact of War". The scientific article is replete with scientific references to the "sociological" works of the author and his many foreign teachers and associates. Here is his scholarship:

On page 83 I read:

"For 10,000 marriages in Petrograd, now there are 92.2 divorces—a fantastic figure, of which 100 out of 100 divorced marriages lasted less than one year, 11%—less than one month, 22%—less than two months, 41%—less than 3-6 months and only 26%—over 6 months. These figures say that modern legal marriage is a form that hides essentially extramarital sexual relations and enables "strawberry" lovers to "legitimately" satisfy their appetites" (*Economist* No. 1, p. 83).

There is no doubt that this gentleman and the Russian technical society that publishes the journal and places similar arguments in it, consider themselves to be supporters of democracy and consider it to be the greatest insult when they are called what they really are, that is, serfs, reactionaries, "certified lackeys of the popovschina."

The smallest acquaintance with the laws of bourgeois countries on marriage, divorce and illegitimate children, as well as with the

actual situation in this regard, will show anyone interested in the matter that modern bourgeois democracy, even in all the most democratic bourgeois republics, manifests itself in this respect precisely serfdom in relation to a woman and in relation to illegitimate children.

This does not interfere, of course, with the Mensheviks, S.-R. and parts of the anarchists and all relevant parties in the West to continue shouting about democracy and its violation by the Bolsheviks. In fact, it is the Bolshevik revolution that is the only consistently democratic revolution in relation to issues such as marriage, divorce, and the situation of illegitimate children. And this is a question that directly affects the interests of more than half of the population in any country. Only the Bolshevik revolution for the first time, despite the huge number of bourgeois revolutions preceding it and calling themselves democratic, waged a decisive struggle in this respect against both reactionism and serfdom, and against the ordinary hypocrisy of the ruling and propertied classes.

If Mr. Sorokin's 92 divorces for 10,000 marriages seems to be a fantastic figure, then it remains to be assumed that either the author lived and was brought up in some monastery so barred from life that hardly anyone would believe in the existence of such a monastery, or that this author distorted truth for the sake of reaction and the bourgeoisie. Anyone who is familiar at all with social conditions in bourgeois countries knows that the actual number of actual divorces (of course, not authorized by church and law) is immeasurably greater everywhere. Russia in this respect differs from other countries only in that its laws do not sanctify the hypocrisy and disempowerment of a woman and her child, but openly and on behalf of state power declare a systematic war against all hypocrisy and all lawlessness.

The Marxist magazine will have to wage war against similar modern "educated" serfs. Probably a considerable part of them even receives state money from us and is in the public service to educate young people, although for this purpose they are no more suitable than notorious molesters would be suitable for the role of overseers in educational institutions for young children.

The working class in Russia has managed to gain power, but has not yet learned how to use it, because, otherwise, it would have politely delivered such teachers and members of learned societies to bourgeois "democracies". There is a real place for such serfs.

Learning, there would be a desire to learn. (*Lenin, On the significance of militant materialism (1922), Soch., Vol. XXVII , p. 180 — 190, 3rd ed.*)

## **Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) of January 25, 1931**

1. Despite the well-known achievements that were in the work “Under the Banner of Marxism”, especially in the struggle against mechanism, which is an attempt to revise Marxism in a peculiar way, the magazine failed to implement Lenin’s basic instructions given in the article “On the Significance of Militant Materialism”, became a fighting organ of Marxism-Leninism. The work of the journal was divorced both from the tasks of building socialism in the USSR and from the tasks of the international revolutionary movement. None of the problems of the transition period, theoretically developed and practically solved by the party, were raised by the journal.

2. The journal “Under the Banner of Marxism” proceeded from a completely erroneous attitude resulting from a misunderstanding of the Leninist stage as a new stage in the development of the philosophy of Marxism, which was due to the position of the group TT. Deborin, Karev, Stan and others, who actually turned the magazine, especially recently, into its group organ.

3. Separating philosophy from politics, not pursuing a partisan philosophy and natural science in all its work, the head of the magazine Under the Banner of Marxism revived one of the most harmful traditions and dogmas of the Second International - the gap between theory and practice, slipping into a number of important issues on the positions of the lesser idealism.

4. The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) decides:

a) The magazine “Under the Banner of Marxism” should be a fighting organ of Marxism-Leninism, wage a decisive struggle for the party’s general line, against any deviations from it, pursuing the Leninist principle of partisan philosophy in all its work. In the field of philosophy, the journal must wage a steady struggle on two fronts: with the mechanistic revision of Marxism as the main danger of the modern period, and with the idealistic distortion of Marxism by the group of comrades. Deborin, Karev, Stan and others. The most important task “Under the banner of Marxism” should be the actual

implementation of the program outlined for him by Lenin, the development of the Leninist stage in the development of dialectical materialism, the merciless criticism of all anti-Marxist and, therefore, anti-Leninist attitudes in philosophy, social and natural sciences, no matter how disguised they are. The magazine should develop the theory of materialist dialectics, questions of historical materialism in close connection with the practice of socialist construction in the world revolution. The magazine "Under the Banner of Marxism" must unite militant materialist-dialectics to systematically grow Bolshevik-seasoned philosophical cadres to fulfil these tasks... (*Pravda*, January 26, 1931)